IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Action No. 11-cr-00411-LTB

(Removal from District Court, Fremont County, Colorado,

Case No. 2011-cr-0018)

LAWRENCE M. JIRON,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF COLORADO,

JUDGE DAVID M. THORSON,

DIST. ATTORNEY THOM K. Le DOUX, and

D.A. MICHAEL L. PERRAGLIA,

Defendants.

ORDER FOR SUMMARY REMAND

Lawrence M. Jiron, Petitioner, has filed pro se a Notice of Removal stating that

he is removing to this Court criminal case number 2011-cr-0018 from the District Court

of Fremont County, Colorado. The Court must construe the Notice of Removal liberally

because Mr. Jiron is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Therefore,

the Court assumes that Mr. Jiron actually is the Defendant in the state court criminal

case he seeks to remove even though he names himself as the Petitioner in the caption

of the Notice of Removal and he lists the State of Colorado, a state court judge, and two

state prosecutors as Defendants. For the reasons stated below, the case will be

remanded summarily to the state court.

Case 1:11-cr-00411-LTB Document 2 Filed 10/20/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 4
2

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) provides that a notice of removal must include “a short

and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” Mr. Jiron alleges in the Notice of

Removal that there is no chance he will receive a fair trial, that the state court judge

refuses to take judicial notice of state statutes, and that the state court judge has

refused to issue subpoenas, which means he has no witnesses to call in his defense. 

Mr. Jiron also asserts that he is removing this criminal case to federal court pursuant to

§ 1446(a). However, § 1446 provides only the procedures for the removal of civil

actions and criminal prosecutions; § 1446 does not specify what civil actions and

criminal prosecutions may be removed.

Even construing the Notice of Removal liberally, the Court is unable to ascertain

any legitimate basis for removal of this action under the relevant statutes. Sections

1442 and 1443, 28 U.S.C., both authorize the removal of certain criminal prosecutions,

but Mr. Jiron makes no allegations relevant to § 1442, which applies to actions against

federal officers or agencies. Although § 1443 authorizes the removal to federal court of

certain civil rights cases, the Court finds that the instant action may not be removed

pursuant to § 1443.

The two requirements for removal under § 1443(1) are narrow and well-defined. 

See Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1997). “First, it must appear that

the right allegedly denied the removal petitioner arises under a federal law ‘providing for

specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.’” Johnson v. Mississippi, 421

U.S. 213, 219 (1975) (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966)). “A state

court defendant’s claim that ‘prosecution and conviction will violate rights under

constitutional or statutory provisions of general applicability or under statutes not

Case 1:11-cr-00411-LTB Document 2 Filed 10/20/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 4
3

protecting against racial discrimination’ is insufficient for removal.” Colorado v. Lopez,

919 F.2d 131, 132 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Johnson, 421 U.S. at 219). Mr. Jiron does

not allege facts that demonstrate he has been denied any rights based on his race.

“Second, it must appear . . . that the removal petitioner is ‘denied or cannot

enforce’ the specified federal rights ‘in the courts of [the] State.’” Johnson, 421 U.S. at

219 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)). The Supreme Court explained this requirement as

follows:

Under § 1443(1), the vindication of the defendant's federal

rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situations

where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation

of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those

rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the

defendant to trial in the state court.

City of Greenwood, Miss., v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828 (1966). This requirement

must be supported by specific factual allegations. See generally 14A Charles Alan

Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3728 (2d ed. 1985). Mr. Jiron does not

provide the Court with specific factual allegations regarding his inability to enforce his

constitutional rights in the state court criminal prosecution. Therefore, removal pursuant

to § 1443(1) is not appropriate.

Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2) also is not appropriate. Section

1443(2) “confers a privilege of removal only upon federal officers or agents and those

authorized to act with or for them in affirmatively executing duties under any federal law

providing for equal civil rights.” City of Greenwood, 384 U.S. at 824. Mr. Jiron does

not allege that he is either a federal officer or a person assisting a federal officer in the

performance of official duties providing for equal civil rights.

Case 1:11-cr-00411-LTB Document 2 Filed 10/20/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 4
4

Therefore, because it clearly appears on the face of the Notice of Removal that

removal of this action should not be permitted, the action will be remanded summarily to

the state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4). Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Case No. 11-cr-0018 is remanded summarily to the Fremont

County District Court. It is

 FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of this court shall mail a certified copy of this

order to the clerk of the Fremont County District Court.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 18th day of October , 2011.

BY THE COURT:

 s/Lewis T. Babcock 

LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge

United States District Court

Case 1:11-cr-00411-LTB Document 2 Filed 10/20/11 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 4