1

The Town of Oakland, which is located on the shore of Lake

Apopka, is 255 acres in size, and, at the time this suit

commenced, had a population of just over 700 persons. 

 2The Boatmans had five adjoining lots, numbered 7 through

11, on East Henshen Avenue. Each lot measured 50 feet (along the

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 94-2825.

William BOATMAN; Mary Jane Boatman, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

TOWN OF OAKLAND, Florida, Defendant-Appellant.

Feb. 28, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida. (No. 92-254-CIV-ORL-18), Richard B. Kellam,

Judge.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, and HILL,

Senior Circuit Judge.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

The dispute in this case is not grist for the mill of a United

States district court; rather, it belongs in state court. We

therefore vacate the district court's judgment and direct the court

to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I.

A.

The warring parties are the Town of Oakland, a small community

in Orange County, Florida,1

 and two of its residents, William and

Mary Jane Boatman. The dispute involves the Boatmans' attempt,

beginning in September 1991, to build and occupy a "manufactured

home" on a lot they own in one of the Town's residential

districts.2

 After obtaining a building permit and constructing the
street) by 125 feet. A 100-year-old house and some out-buildings

occupied by the Boatmans were on lots 7 through 9. Lot 10 was

used for the manufactured home. 

 3Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color

of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (1988). 

home, they asked the Town's building inspector to perform a final

inspection so that the Town could issue them a certificate of

occupancy. The inspector refused to perform the inspection. In

his opinion, the Boatmans had constructed a "mobile home" in

violation of a provision of the Town's zoning ordinance that

prohibited the placement of mobile homes on lots in the Boatmans'

residential district. Without a favorable final inspection, the

Town refused to issue a certificate of occupancy.

Instead of petitioning the circuit court in Orange County for

an injunctive order compelling the building inspector to perform a

final inspection, the Boatmans sought refuge in the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Bypassing the

building inspector, they sought an injunction directing the Town to

issue a certificate of occupancy and an award of money damages and

attorney's fees.

Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction did not lie, because the

plaintiffs and the defendant were citizens of the same state, so

the Boatmans invoked the court's federal question jurisdiction,

bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3

 They alleged in their

complaint that the Town's refusal to issue a certificate of
 4

The Boatmans also alleged that the zoning ordinance's

prohibition against mobile homes that the building inspector

cited in refusing to inspect their home was invalid under state

law. They alleged, alternatively, that their manufactured home

was not a "mobile home" as mobile homes were defined in the

ordinance. Finally, the Boatmans alleged that the Town was

equitably estopped to deny the Boatmans a certificate of

occupancy. 

 5

At the time the Boatmans instituted this action, in March

1992, their manufactured home was still awaiting a final

inspection. By the time the case came to trial, the manufacturer

of the home had repossessed it, because without a certificate of

occupancy, the Boatmans could not finance their purchase of the

home. Because equitable relief—an order requiring the inspection

of the home and the issuance of a certificate of occupancy—would

gain them nothing, the Boatmans were left to their claim for

compensatory damages. 

occupancy was "arbitrary and capricious" and thus deprived them of

a "vested property right in their building permit" in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment.4

 In responding to the Boatmans'

complaint, the Town did not challenge the district court's subject

matter jurisdiction or the complaint's legal sufficiency. Instead,

the Town simply denied that it had infringed any of the Boatmans'

rights.

Although the relief the Boatmans sought was primarily

equitable, they requested a jury trial.5

 The Town did not object;

accordingly, the court convened one.

B.

The case was assigned to a visiting district judge for trial.

On the eve of trial, the judge grew concerned about the court's

subject matter jurisdiction. He shared his concern with counsel

just prior to the voir dire of the venire. The Town's attorney

stated that the case did not present a federal claim—that he "did

not understand why we were going to federal court with this in the
 6

The Boatmans did not allege this constitutional claim in

their complaint. There, as we indicate, supra, they alleged that

the Town's refusal to issue a certificate of occupancy was

"arbitrary and capricious" and thus deprived them of a "vested

property right in their building permit." In the parties'

pretrial stipulation, the Boatmans, in stating their

constitutional claim, said that "the Town's zoning ordinance

prohibiting mobile homes had no reasonable relationship to

health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community." 

They also said that the "zoning ordinance is vague and ambiguous

as to the definition of "mobile home.' " Finally, they said that

"the Town's arbitrary and capricious enforcement of the ordinance

deprived the plaintiffs of constitutionally protected property

rights."

After contending that the case presented these

constitutional claims, however, the Boatmans and the Town

stated the issues of law that remained to be litigated as

follows:

A. Whether the home was a "mobile home" or

"manufactured home".

B. Whether the zoning ordinance was

constitutionally valid.

C. Whether any provision of the zoning ordinance

pertaining to mobile homes was preempted by federal or

state law.

The foregoing statements as to the nature of the

Boatmans' constitutional claim(s), considered in the light

of what the Boatmans alleged in their complaint, are

confusing at best and no doubt explain why the district

court was still trying to get a handle on what the Boatmans

were contending on the day the trial began.

In their supplemental brief to us, they sought to

justify the ambiguous presentation of their constitutional

claim(s) by relying on the notice pleading permitted by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

In pleading their arbitrary and capricious due process

claim, the Boatmans were required by Rule 8(a)(2) ...

to provide only a "short and plain statement' that

first place." The Boatmans' attorney disagreed. According to her,

the provision in the zoning ordinance barring mobile homes bore no

"reasonable relationship to the protection of the public health,

safety, welfare, and morals."6 The Town's enforcement of the
would give the defendant fair notice of what the claim

was and the grounds upon which it rested.... There is

no "heightened pleading standard" in civil rights cases

alleging municipal liability under § 1983.... [Their]

complaint clearly met federal pleading requirements.

Concluding this argument, they said that the "allegations

were clearly sufficient to place [the Town] on notice of

what the Boatmans' claim was and the grounds upon which it

rested." We have described the sort of pleading in which

the Boatmans have engaged in this case as "shotgun"

pleading. See Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116

L.Ed.2d 131 (1991). 

 7

The court concluded that the verdict also disposed of the

Boatmans' pendant state claims; accordingly, it gave the Town

judgment on those claims as well. 

provision was therefore arbitrary and capricious and in violation

of the Boatmans' due process rights. The court decided to wait

until it had heard the parties' evidence before ruling on the

issue, and the trial proceeded. As it turned out, the court never

revisited the question of its subject matter jurisdiction.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the parties moved the court

for judgment as a matter of law. The court reserved ruling on

their motions and sent the case to the jury on special

interrogatories. The first interrogatory asked the jury to

determine whether "the Boatmans' home was a mobile home under the

Oakland zoning ordinance." The jury answered yes, and moved to the

second interrogatory, which asked: "In denying the Boatmans a

certificate of occupancy, was the Town of Oakland's action

arbitrary and capricious, and in violation of the zoning

ordinance?" The jury answered no, and thus did not move to the

third interrogatory, which dealt with damages. Given these

answers, the court entered judgment for the Town.7
 8

In any action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in

its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable

attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988

& Supp. V 1993). 

The Boatmans then renewed their motion for judgment. The

court granted it, concluding as a matter of law that the Boatmans'

manufactured home was not a mobile home within the meaning of the

Town's zoning ordinance. Following this ruling, the parties agreed

to let the court decide the amount of damages. After hearing

evidence on that issue, the court awarded the Boatmans compensatory

damages in the sum of $42,320 and attorney's fees of $36,786. The

court awarded the attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), even

though it had not based the Boatmans' recovery on a constitutional

violation and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8

 Following the entry of final

judgment, the Town took this appeal.

II.

 In concluding that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over this controversy, we first consider the Town's

zoning ordinance. That ordinance prohibits the use of property in

the Boatmans' residential district as the site for a mobile home.

A mobile home is described in the zoning ordinance as:

A mobile living unit equipped with built-in furnishings and

fixtures for use as a dwelling upon connection to outside

water and electrical power. It requires no foundation and is

not considered a permanent building, but is designed to be

drawn by a passenger vehicle from one parking site to another

where power connections are available.

The district court found that the Boatmans' home was not a mobile

home within this definition. As the court observed, the Boatmans'

home

was not equipped with built-in furnishings and required a
 9

The record reveals that Mrs. Boatman was a member of the

Zoning Board in 1991, at the time the present controversy began. 

She resigned in June 1992, a few months after the Boatmans

brought this suit. 

permanent foundation which had been installed by [the

Boatmans]. Second, the structure was considered as a

permanent building, and was not designed to be drawn by a

passenger vehicle from one parking site to another. After the

structure had been delivered to the site, there was

considerable carpentry work to be performed. For instance,

siding of the structure was to be installed, as well as other

substantial carpentry work. It was placed on permanent

footings.

Building Inspector Nelson erred when he told the Boatmans that

he would not perform a final inspection of the home because the

zoning ordinance prohibited mobile homes. Faced with the

inspector's interpretation of the ordinance, the Boatmans could

have sought a ruling from the Town's Zoning Board of Adjustment

that their structure was not a mobile home. Or, if the Zoning

Board disagreed, they could have requested a variance, which the

Board had the power to grant. The Boatmans knew of these options

because Mrs. Boatman was a member of the Zoning Board. 9

 The

Boatmans eschewed these options, however, and went to the Town

Council instead. They asked the Council to arrange for their home

to be inspected and, if it passed inspection, to issue a

certificate of occupancy. The Council referred the matter to its

attorney for an opinion. He concluded that Boatmans structure was

a mobile home as defined in the zoning ordinance. The Council

accepted its attorney's opinion, and informed the Boatmans that a

final inspection would not be made.

The Boatmans sought legal advice from a private attorney. The

record, of course, does not indicate what advice the Boatmans
 10In a supplemental brief to us on the question of the

remedies that would have been available to the Boatmans in state

court, the Boatmans argue that the Orange County circuit court

could not have provided them the damages relief they sought in

the district court. Their argument is disingenuous at best. We

take judicial notice that the Orange County circuit court is a

court of general jurisdiction and thus had the authority to

compensate the Boatmans with money damages. See Fla. Const. art.

V, §§ 5(b), 20(c)(3); Fla.Stat. § 26.012(2) (Supp.1994). Had

the Boatmans repaired to the circuit court in a timely manner,

however, it is likely that they would have suffered no

loss—except for a brief delay in obtaining a certificate of

occupancy, providing their structure passed inspection. 

received. We do know, however, that the Boatmans did not seek

relief in the Orange County circuit court. The Boatmans concede

that the circuit court could have ordered the building inspector to

perform a final inspection; that court, like the district court,

could have concluded that their structure did not fall within the

zoning ordinance's definition of a mobile home. And if, after a

satisfactory inspection, the Town Council nonetheless refused to

issue a certificate of occupancy, the same court could have ordered

the Council to do so.

 As this discussion clearly demonstrates—and as the district

court acknowledged—the Boatmans' claim turned solely on a question

of state law: whether their structure was a "mobile home" as

defined in the Town's zoning ordinance. Needless to say, a suit

for injunctive relief in the Orange County circuit court would not

have engendered anything close to the expense and delay that these

proceedings have generated.10

Nonetheless, the Boatmans say that their claim arises under

the Constitution of the United States. According to the Boatmans,

their claim has two constitutional underpinnings. First, as their

attorney informed the district court prior to the commencement of
 11The Department of Community Affairs is the state agency

charged, among other things, with approving or disapproving the

comprehensive growth plans of the state's local governments. 

 12Mrs. Boatman participated in the preparation of the Town's

plan. She also participated in the Town's response to the

Department's objections to the plan, including the Department's

recommendation, set out in the text, infra, concerning the need

to provide for mobile homes. 

voir dire, in banning mobile homes from the Boatmans residential

district, the Town exceeded its police power. Banning mobile

homes, they said, bore no "reasonable relationship to the

protection of the public health, safety, welfare, and morals." The

Boatmans cite no constitutional or statutory provision or judicial

precedent for this proposition, and we find none. They point only

to the rules that the Florida Department of Community Affairs uses

to determine whether a local government's comprehensive growth plan

complies with state law.11

We see nothing in the Department's rules that could support

the Boatmans' argument. It is true that the rules require local

governments to include in their comprehensive growth plans various

"goals," "objectives," and "policies" that address the need for

mobile home sites in their communities, and that the Department

urges them to provide for such sites. When, in 1990, the Town

submitted its plan to the Department for approval, the plan

indicated that the Town's zoning ordinance prohibited mobile homes

in residential districts.12 The Department objected to the lack of

provision for mobile homes sites; it recommended that the plan

include a specific, measurable objective based on relevant

data and analysis, to provide adequate sites for housing for

low and moderate income families and for mobile homes. The

Town must permit mobile homes in single-family and

multi-family residential areas or it may designate land for
 13The order could have been in the form of an injunction or

a writ of mandamus. A writ would have issued if the circuit

court concluded that the performance of a final inspection of a

new building was a ministerial act—that is, whether the Boatmans'

structure was barred by the Town's zoning ordinance was a matter

mobile home subdivisions and mobile home parks[.]

The Town, in response, advised the Department that provisions in

the plan addressed the issue. The Department accepted the Town's

response and approved its plan in 1991. In view of this

acceptance, it can hardly be contended that the zoning provision

barring the location of a mobile home on the Boatmans' lot was

beyond the Town's police power to enact.

The Boatmans contend that the second underpinning for their

constitutional claim is that the Town's refusal to direct the

building inspector to perform a final inspection was "arbitrary and

capricious" and thus deprived them of their property without due

process of law. In their supplemental brief, they describe their

claim as an " "as applied' arbitrary and capricious due process

claim." The Boatmans do not tell us, however, whether this claim

falls within the substantive or the procedural component of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

If the claim falls under the procedural component, it is

meritless because the state provided the Boatmans all the process

they were due. See, e.g., McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555-60

(11th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.

898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995). The state gave them the right to

repair to the Orange County circuit court; there, as we point out,

supra, they could have sought an order compelling the building

inspector to do his job.13
for the Zoning Board, not the inspector, to decide. In any

event, we have no doubt that, as we explain, supra, the circuit

court would have decided the state law controversy before us. 

We likewise have no doubt that the claim is not cognizable

under the substantive component of the clause. The notion that the

Constitution gives a property owner a substantive right to a

correct decision from a government official, such as the building

inspector in this case, is novel indeed. According to the

Boatmans, the right is triggered whenever an administrative

decision is clearly mandated but the government official fails to

act. In that situation, the official, in refusing to follow the

clear mandate of the law and to perform what is essentially a

ministerial act, would be deemed to have acted "arbitrarily and

capriciously." Again, the Boatmans' theory is novel. It is

frivolous, as well.

III.

In conclusion, we find no federal constitutional claim in the

case that the Boatmans presented to the district court. The court

therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it. On

receipt of our mandate, the court shall dismiss the case.

SO ORDERED.