UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JASON CHRISTOPHER LUJAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 21-6088 

(D.C. No. 5:10-CR-00053-PRW-1) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.**

_________________________________ 

Defendant-Appellant Jason Christopher Lujan, a federal inmate, appeals from 

the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Lujan, No. CR-10-00053, 2021 WL 3204492 

(W.D. Okla. July 28, 2021). On appeal, Mr. Lujan challenges the district court’s 

conclusion that the waiver contained in his plea agreement is enforceable. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. ** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 3, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Background 

 In June 2010, Mr. Lujan pled guilty to a two-count superseding information 

charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm and conspiracy to 

distribute a controlled substance. 1 R. 44–54. Mr. Lujan’s plea agreement contained 

the following waiver: “[D]efendant . . . knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to 

. . . [a]ppeal, collaterally challenge, or move to modify under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 

or some other ground, his sentence as imposed by the Court . . . provided the 

sentence is within or below the advisory guideline range . . . .” 1 R. 51–52. In 

January 2011, the court sentenced Mr. Lujan within the guideline range to 324 

months’ imprisonment with each count to be served concurrently. 1 R. 122–23. 

 In August 2019, Mr. Lujan filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 

§ 3582(c)(2). 1 R. 136. Mr. Lujan argued that his sentence should be reduced based 

on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which applies retroactively and 

reduces the base offense levels assigned to drug quantities under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. 1 

R. 136. The government opposed the motion, conceding that Mr. Lujan was eligible 

for a sentence reduction but arguing that the court must enforce the appeal waiver in 

his plea agreement. 1 R. 138–52. The district court enforced the waiver and denied 

the motion. Lujan, 2021 WL 3204492, at *1. 

Discussion 

 We review de novo whether a defendant’s appeal waiver as stated in his plea 

agreement is enforceable. United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 

2011). This court uses the following three-factor test to determine an appeal waiver’s 

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enforceability: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver 

of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage 

of justice.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 

(per curiam). A miscarriage of justice results only in situations where: (1) the 

sentencing court “relied on an impermissible factor”; (2) “ineffective assistance of 

counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid”; 

(3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is otherwise 

unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quoting United States v. Elliot, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th 

Cir. 2001)). A waiver is “otherwise unlawful” where it “seriously affect[s] the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). 

 On appeal, Mr. Lujan argues that to enforce his waiver would result in a 

miscarriage of justice. Aplt. Br. at 4. Mr. Lujan claims that the waiver is “otherwise 

unlawful” because it “prevent[s] [him] from pursuing a statutory right consistent with 

the Sentencing Commission’s goals of achieving consistency and uniformity.” Aplt. 

Br. at 6. However, our precedent squarely rejects this argument, and one panel may 

not overrule another. This court has enforced a nearly identical waiver in the context 

of a § 3582(c)(2) motion based on Amendment 782. United States v. Amado, 841 

F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 2016). “[A] defendant’s waiver of the legal consequences of 

unknown future events are commonplace and enforceable. . . . To rule otherwise 

would make Defendant’s promise not to seek relief under § 3582(c)(2) purely 

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illusory.” Id. The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Lujan’s appeal waiver 

is enforceable. 

 AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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