[Cite as State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 127 Ohio St.3d 202, 2010-

Ohio-5073.] 

THE STATE EX REL. BARDWELL, APPELLANT, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF 

COMMISSIONERS, APPELLEE. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 127 Ohio 

St.3d 202, 2010-Ohio-5073.] 

Mandamus — Public-records requests — Civ.R. 11 sanctions for willful and badfaith filing — Abuse-of-discretion standard of review of lower court 

judgment — Judgment affirmed.

(No. 2009-2140 — Submitted June 9, 2010 — Decided October 26, 2010.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 93058, 

2009-Ohio-5573. 

__________________ 

CUPP, J. 

{¶ 1} The issue before the court is whether the court of appeals abused 

its discretion when it imposed Civ.R. 11 sanctions against appellant, Brian 

Bardwell, for filing a pro se public-records mandamus complaint in bad faith. For 

the following reasons, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion, and we 

affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Facts 

{¶ 2} On March 26, 2009, Bardwell personally requested three types of 

public records from the Cuyahoga County prosecutor: (1) the prosecutor’s 

records-retention schedule, (2) communications between the Cuyahoga County 

Board of Commissioners and the Cleveland Plain Dealer regarding an economicdevelopment project involving county and private developers, and (3) drafts of the 

agreement relating to the project. Later that day, the prosecutor provided 

Bardwell its record-retention schedule. 
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{¶ 3} On March 27, 2009, the prosecutor’s office provided Bardwell 

with communications between the commissioners and the Cleveland Plain Dealer 

regarding the project, including a March 19, 2009 e-mail from counsel for the 

Cleveland Plain Dealer requesting that the county provide the Plain Dealer with 

drafts of the agreements relating to the project. The e-mail asks for “drafts of the 

agreement contracts that the county possesses that also have been shared with 

representatives of the organization that would enter into the contract with the 

county.” But the prosecutor informed Bardwell in writing that drafts of contracts 

relating to the project were not subject to disclosure, because they were protected 

by attorney-client privilege, adding, “[W]hen an agreement is finalized and ready 

to be submitted to the Board of County Commissioners for approval, the final 

agreement and drafts will be made available.” 

{¶ 4} That same day, Bardwell filed a complaint in the Eighth District 

Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the county to provide 

drafts of the economic-development agreement, among other records. 

{¶ 5} The court of appeals denied the writ and sua sponte ordered 

Bardwell to show cause why the court should not impose sanctions under Civ.R. 

11 or R.C. 2323.51. After the show-cause hearing, the court of appeals issued a 

decision that stated: “Bardwell’s filing of a complaint for mandamus, which was 

groundless in fact and legal argument, can only be the result of a willful action 

and constitutes bad faith. Thus, we find that Bardwell consciously violated Civ.R. 

11 and that sanctions must be imposed.” State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty. 

Bd. of Commrs., Cuyahoga App. No. 93058, 2009-Ohio-5573, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 6} Thereafter, Bardwell filed this appeal. 

Civil Rule 11 

{¶ 7} Civ.R. 11 provides: “The signature of an attorney or pro se party 

constitutes a certificate by the attorney or party that the attorney or party has read 

the document; that to the best of the attorney’s or party's knowledge, information, 
January Term, 2010 

3 

and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for 

delay. If a document is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of 

this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as 

though the document had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule, an 

attorney or pro se party, upon motion of a party or upon the court's own motion, 

may be subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party 

of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under 

this rule.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 8} “Civ.R. 11 employs a subjective bad-faith standard to invoke 

sanctions by requiring that any violation must be willful.” State ex rel. Dreamer 

v. Mason, 115 Ohio St.3d 190, 2007-Ohio-4789, 874 N.E.2d 510, at ¶ 19, citing 

Riston v. Butler, 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 2002-Ohio-2308, 777 N.E.2d 857, ¶ 9; 

Ransom v. Ransom, Warren App. No. 2006-03-031, 2007-Ohio-457, ¶ 25. This 

court has described bad faith as “ ‘a general and somewhat indefinite term. It has 

no constricted meaning. It cannot be defined with exactness. It is not simply bad 

judgment. It is not merely negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some 

moral obliquity. It implies conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a 

known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. It partakes of the nature 

of fraud. * * * It means “with actual intent to mislead or deceive another.” ’ ” 

Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (1962), 174 Ohio St. 148, 151, 21 O.O.2d 420, 

187 N.E.2d 45, overruled on other grounds in Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co.

(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397, quoting Spiegel v. Beacon 

Participations, Inc. (1937), 297 Mass. 398, 416, 8 N.E.2d 895. See also Black’s 

Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) 159 (bad faith is “[d]ishonesty of belief or 

purpose”). Under Civ.R. 11, a court can impose sanctions only when the attorney 

or pro se litigant acts willfully and in bad faith by filing a pleading that he or she 

believes lacks good grounds or is filed merely for the purpose of delay. 
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{¶ 9} We review sanctions imposed pursuant to Civ.R. 11 under an 

abuse- of-discretion standard. Dreamer, 115 Ohio St.3d 190, 2007-Ohio-4789, 

874 N.E.2d 510, ¶ 18 (“We will not reverse a court’s decision on a Civ.R. 11 

motion for sanctions absent an abuse of discretion”). As long as some competent, 

credible evidence exists to support the court of appeals’ judgment, no abuse of 

discretion occurred, and we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the court of 

appeals and reverse the judgment. See State ex rel. Grein v. Ohio State Hwy. 

Patrol Retirement Sys., 116 Ohio St.3d 344, 2007-Ohio-6667, 879 N.E.2d 195, ¶ 

1 ("Because the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying the writ 

when there was sufficient evidence to support the retirement system's decisions to 

deny benefits, we affirm"); Harris v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 116 Ohio St.3d 139, 

2007-Ohio-5587, 876 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 40 (no abuse of discretion by trial court if 

competent, credible evidence supports its order for a new trial); State ex rel. Hoag 

v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 125 Ohio St.3d 49, 2010-Ohio-1629, 925 N.E.2d 

984, ¶ 12; Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 478-479, 53 O.O. 361, 120 

N.E.2d 118 (reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of 

fact if there is conflicting evidence on an issue); and McDonald v. Berry (1992), 

84 Ohio App.3d 6, 9, 616 N.E.2d 248 (no abuse of discretion by trial court in 

assessing Civ.R. 11 sanctions "where there is evidence to support the decision"). 

Public-Records Law 

{¶ 10} “The Public Records Act reflects the state's policy that ‘open 

government serves the public interest and our democratic system.’ State ex rel. 

Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 20. The 

purpose of the act is ‘to expose government activity to public scrutiny, which is 

absolutely essential to the proper working of a democracy.’ State ex rel. WHIOTV-7 v. Lowe (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 355, 673 N.E.2d 1360. In accordance 

with this salutary purpose, ‘[w]e construe R.C. 149.43 [“availability of Public 

Records”] liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in favor of 
January Term, 2010 

5 

public records.’ State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 120 

Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, 899 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 17.” State ex rel. Morgan v. 

Strickland, 121 Ohio St.3d 600, 2009-Ohio-1901, 906 N.E.2d 1105, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 11} Imposition by a court of Civ.R. 11 sanctions upon a public-records 

requester in the absence of clear evidence that he or she acted willfully and in bad 

faith has the potential to chill public-records requests and reduce the transparency 

of government. Thus, courts must be very careful before imposing sanctions in a 

public-records case. 

Evidence Supporting Sanctions under Civ.R. 11 

{¶ 12} On appeal, Bardwell contends that the court of appeals abused its 

discretion in imposing Civ.R. 11 sanctions against him because “[t]he record 

provides absolutely no indication that [he] acted in bad faith by asserting 

violations of the Ohio Public Records Act predicated upon the Commissioners’ 

refusal to provide non-privileged draft contracts.” The commissioners assert that 

at the time Bardwell filed his mandamus complaint, many of the claims were 

groundless, and that such conduct is indicative of Bardwell’s bad faith. Despite 

the commissioners’ assertions, Bardwell’s claims may well have merit. Yet upon 

review of the record on appeal, we cannot agree with Bardwell’s claim that the 

court of appeals abused its discretion in imposing Civ.R. 11 sanctions against 

him. 

{¶ 13} In its review of this case, the appellate court observed that 

Bardwell did not introduce any exhibits at the show-cause hearing. State ex rel. 

Bardwell, 2009-Ohio-5573, ¶ 7. There is also no testimonial evidence from the 

show-cause hearing because Bardwell failed to request a court reporter to 

transcribe the hearing. Id. at fn. 1. 

{¶ 14} When an appeal is filed in this court without a transcript, we 

generally presume the regularity of that proceeding and affirm. Hoag, 125 Ohio 

St.3d 49, 2010-Ohio-1629, 925 N.E.2d 984, ¶ 12, citing Christy v. Summit Cty. 
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Bd. of Elections (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 39, 671 N.E.2d 1; State ex rel. Duncan 

v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5346, 875 

N.E.2d 578, ¶ 17. Similarly, without the benefit of the evidence that was before 

the court of appeals, this court “ ‘has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those 

assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower 

court’s proceedings, and affirm.’ ” Crane v. Perry Cty. Bd. of Elections, 107 

Ohio St.3d 287, 2005-Ohio-6509, 839 N.E.2d 14, ¶ 37, quoting Knapp v. 

Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 15 O.O.3d 218, 400 

N.E.2d 384. These general principles, in fact, compose the argument made by the 

county commissioners in their merit brief to this court. In return, Bardwell has 

not rebutted or even addressed this argument in either of his merit briefs. Thus, 

because Bardwell has failed to assure this court that it has the complete record of 

the evidence upon which the court of appeals decided this matter, we must 

presume the validity of the court of appeals’ award of sanctions. We cannot 

substitute our judgment for that of the court of appeals. 

{¶ 15} Notwithstanding the application of the foregoing presumption, we 

also conclude that the court of appeals sufficiently detailed its rationale for the 

decision to impose sanctions. The court of appeals’ opinion specified multiple 

reasons, including many that are not rebutted on appeal by Bardwell, to support 

its finding of bad faith: 

{¶ 16} “In the case sub judice, we find that Bardwell willfully violated 

Civ.R. 11 by filing a complaint for a writ of mandamus in bad faith. Our finding 

of bad faith is based upon the following: (1) Bardwell failed to comply with 

Loc.App.R. 45(B)(1)(a), which mandates that an extraordinary writ must be 

supported by a sworn affidavit that specifies the details of the claim; (2) a period 

of only one day lapsed between the making of Bardwell's request for public 

records and the filing of the complaint for a writ of mandamus; (3) Bardwell was 

promptly provided with a copy of the requested records retention schedule, thus 
January Term, 2010 

7 

rendering his request moot; (4) Bardwell was promptly provided with all public 

records that were not exempt from disclosure, thus rendering his request moot; (5) 

Bardwell was promptly provided with a detailed explanation, with supporting 

legal precedent, with regard to the exempted records; (6) Bardwell's request for 

records was not overly broad, but very specific, which did not necessitate that the 

Prosecutor provide an opportunity to revise the request; (7) all requested nonexempt records were promptly provided, thus negating any claim that the 

Prosecutor did not properly organize and maintain its records; (8) Bardwell failed 

to establish any “lost use” that resulted from a casual request for his identity; (9) 

Bardwell was provided with copies of all exempted records, within ten business 

days of the request; (10) Bardwell failed to amend his complaint for a writ of 

mandamus to take into consideration the records provided by the Prosecutor; and 

(11) Bardwell failed to file a brief in opposition to the Prosecutor's motion for 

summary judgment, which contained a properly executed sworn affidavit and 

other exhibits.” Bardwell, 2009-Ohio-5573, at ¶ 14. 

{¶ 17} Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the court of appeals 

considered the testimony and exhibits submitted by the parties at the show-cause 

hearing and concluded that sanctions should be imposed against Bardwell for 

filing a public-records mandamus complaint in bad faith and in willful violation 

of Civ.R. 11. Bardwell, 2009-Ohio-5573, at ¶ 1, 7. Accordingly, we hold that the 

court of appeals did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the judgment of the 

court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., 

concur. 

 BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 

__________________ 

 BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
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{¶ 18} In my view, the court of appeals abused its discretion in 

sanctioning Bardwell under Civ.R. 11. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

{¶ 19} Civ.R. 11 provides: “The signature of an attorney or pro se party 

constitutes a certificate by the attorney or party that the attorney or party has read 

the document; that to the best of the attorney’s or party's knowledge, information, 

and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for 

delay. If a document is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of 

this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as 

though the document had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule, an 

attorney or pro se party, upon motion of a party or upon the court's own motion, 

may be subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party 

of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under 

this rule.” 

{¶ 20} Thus, under Civ.R. 11, a court may impose sanctions only when 

the attorney or pro se litigant acts willfully and in bad faith and submits a 

pleading or other legal document believing that it lacks “good ground” to support 

it. 

{¶ 21} I acknowledge that Bardwell did not provide a transcript of the 

show-cause hearing before the court of appeals. Nor did he prepare for this court 

a statement in lieu of a transcript. See App.R. 9(C). Nevertheless, Bardwell did 

attach to his answer to the court of appeals’ show-cause order evidence in the 

form of an affidavit. That affidavit refutes the conclusion that Bardwell filed in 

bad faith a complaint that lacked “good ground to support it” in violation of 

Civ.R. 11. The affidavit is present in the record before us and was also in the 

record when the court of appeals considered the imposition of sanctions. 

{¶ 22} In his affidavit, Bardwell affirmatively states his motive for filing 

the mandamus case in the court of appeals: “to ensure that millions of taxpayer 

dollars were not wasted” relative to the Medical Mart project, an economic-
January Term, 2010 

9 

development project, and “because the County had refused to release various 

records, including drafts of development agreements and a voice mail message 

referred to in an e-mail to their outside counsel.” Bardwell further stated in his 

affidavit that he had “no interest in harassing the County, injuring the County or 

increasing the cost of litigation, and did not file the Complaint in this case to any 

of those ends.” In my view, nothing in the record before us refutes that these 

sworn statements accurately reflected Bardwell’s state of mind at the time he 

signed the mandamus complaint. As discussed below, the state of mind reflected 

by these statements is inconsistent with a finding of bad faith sufficient to support 

an order of Civ.R. 11 sanctions. 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, while it may be true, as observed by the court of 

appeals, that Bardwell did not introduce any exhibits at the show-cause hearing, 

Bardwell did provide an exhibit before the show-cause hearing that constituted 

evidentiary evidence supporting his assertion that his state of mind at the time he 

filed the mandamus action was not that of bad faith. And while it is also true, as 

observed by the majority, that Bardwell failed to request a court reporter to make 

a record at the show-cause hearing, neither did the county request that the showcause hearing be recorded.1

{¶ 24} I cannot agree on these facts that “because Bardwell has failed to 

assure this court that it has the complete record of the evidence upon which the 

court of appeals decided this matter, we must presume the validity of the court of 

appeals’ award of sanctions.” See majority opinion at ¶ 14. In the seminal case, 

this court acknowledged the duty of an appellant to provide a transcript “ ‘of such 

parts of the proceedings not already on file as he deems necessary for inclusion in 

 

1. In its opinion, the court of appeals observed: “The parties were provided with an opportunity to 

allow for the presence of an official court reporter in order to preserve the record. No party 

arranged for the presence of an official court reporter at the show cause hearing as held on 

September 22, 2009.” State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Cuyahoga App. 

No. 93058, 2009-Ohio-5573, ¶ 7, fn. 1. 
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the record,’ ”—not the “complete record” of all the evidence. (Emphasis added.) 

Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 15 O.O.3d 218, 

400 N.E.2d 384, quoting former App.R. 9(B), 54 Ohio App.2d xv. And as noted 

in a footnote, Knapp further observed, “It is also true that the appellee must bear 

some burden for providing an adequate transcript under App.R. 9(B). The 

relevant portion of that rule states that ‘[i]f the appellee deems a transcript of 

other parts of the proceedings to be necessary he shall * * * file and serve on the 

appellant a designation of additional parts to be included.’ ” Id., quoting former 

App.R. 9(B), 54 Ohio App.2d xv. 

{¶ 25} In my view, Bardwell provided prior to the show-cause hearing 

evidence that established an absence of bad faith. At the hearing, the county 

presumably argued other facts in rebuttal. Because we lack a transcript informing 

us of those other arguments or testimony—evidence that the county needs in order 

to rebut the evidence contained in Bardwell’s affidavit—the detrimental 

consequences of the lack of a transcript in this case should fall on the county. In 

short, I disagree that a “presumption of regularity” should be applied in this case, 

particularly because presuming “regularity” here is equivalent to finding that the 

court of appeals heard evidence at the show-cause hearing rebutting the evidence 

contained in the affidavit previously submitted by Bardwell. 

{¶ 26} On March 26, 2009, Bardwell personally requested three types of 

public records from the county prosecutor: (1) the prosecutor’s records-retention 

schedule, (2) communications between the Cuyahoga County Board of 

Commissioners (“county”) and the Cleveland Plain Dealer regarding the Medical 

Mart economic-development project, and (3) “drafts of contracts or development 

agreements related to Medical Mart projects.” Later that day, the prosecutor 

provided Bardwell its record-retention schedule. 

{¶ 27} On March 27, 2009, the prosecutor’s office provided Bardwell 

with communications between the county and the Plain Dealer regarding the 
January Term, 2010 

11 

project. However, the prosecutor also informed Bardwell in writing that drafts of 

the agreement were not subject to disclosure, because they were protected by 

attorney-client privilege, adding, “[W]hen an agreement is finalized and ready to 

be submitted to the Board of County Commissioners for approval, the final 

agreement and drafts will be made available.” 2 This communication constituted a 

denial of Bardwell’s public-records request until an unspecified time in the future, 

i.e., if and when the negotiations were finalized. The county effectively informed 

Bardwell of its legal position that drafts of the proposed contractual agreements 

were exempt from the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, during the period in 

which those agreements were being negotiated. 

{¶ 28} It is well established that documents protected by attorney-client 

privilege are exempt from the Public Records Act. State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio 

Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, at ¶ 

27. And during contract negotiations, the attorney-client privilege clearly applies 

to communications between negotiating entities and their own legal counsel. But 

I am unaware of any precedent that recognizes an attorney-client privilege as to 

draft contractual agreements once they are freely exchanged between the 

negotiating entities. 

{¶ 29} Attached to Bardwell’s answer to the court of appeals’ show-cause 

order was an e-mail dated March 19, 2009, from David Marburger, counsel for 

 

2. On March 27, 2009, prior to the filing of the complaint in mandamus, the county responded to 

Bardwell’s request for “[d]rafts of contracts or development agreements related to Medical Mart 

projects” as follows: “Regarding your second request, drafts of the Development Agreement are 

not records at this time, since terms of Development Agreement are still being negotiated, so there 

presently is no agreement that has been submitted to the Board of County Commissioners for their 

approval. Moreover, the rough drafts of the agreement that is being negotiated are exempt from 

disclosure because they include confidential communications between the public client and its 

attorneys including but not limited to the attorneys’ thoughts and opinions in rendering legal 

advice. * * * When an agreement is finalized and ready to be submitted to the Board of County 

Commissioners for approval, the final agreement and drafts will be made available.” 
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the Plain Dealer, to Fred Nance, counsel for the county, regarding the economicdevelopment project. It stated: 

{¶ 30} “Fred: I just left a voice mail for you – pls [sic] give the county the 

green lite [sic] to allow the Plain Dealer to inspect & receive a copy of the drafts 

of the development contracts that the county possesses that also have been shared 

with representatives of the organization that would enter into the contract with 

the county.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 31} Bardwell’s affidavit included as an exhibit the Marburger e-mail. 

In my view, Bardwell could reasonably infer from this e-mail that a licensed 

attorney representing the Plain Dealer had rejected the county’s legal assertion 

that the draft contractual agreements were protected by attorney-client privilege 

once they were released to third parties. Moreover, in his answer to the court of 

appeals’ show-cause order, Bardwell expressly stated that “[a]s negotiations have 

been ongoing for more than a year, it is most likely that the drafts have been 

exchanged back and forth between the two parties, waiving any privilege that the 

County might have claimed.” His affidavit and written argument provide 

persuasive evidence that Bardwell believed that drafts of the economic agreement 

existed at the time of his public-records request and were nonprivileged public 

records required to be disclosed, despite the county’s assertions to the contrary. 

{¶ 32} Contract negotiations are frequently fragile, and the public 

disclosure of draft proposals exchanged during negotiations may hamper the 

ability of a public entity to obtain for the public the most favorable terms. 

Perhaps for this reason, the General Assembly has already provided that a county 

using a competitive, sealed-proposal process pursuant to R.C. 307.86 may defer 

until after the award of the contract Public Records Act requests for public 

inspection and copying of “proposals and any documents or other records related 

to a subsequent negotiation for a final contract.” R.C. 307.862(C). To the best of 

my knowledge, however, it is unresolved whether documents related to the 
January Term, 2010 

13 

negotiation of other contracts are included within the short-term exemption to the 

Public Records Act provided by R.C. 307.862 or are otherwise exempt from 

disclosure prior to submission of final agreements. That legal issue can be 

resolved only through litigation, such as that initiated by Bardwell when he filed 

the mandamus action in the court of appeals. 

{¶ 33} Bardwell filed his mandamus action after having received 

information provided to him by the prosecutor’s office earlier that day, including 

Marburger’s e-mail and a letter clearly stating the county’s refusal to disclose the 

draft agreements at that time. Bardwell could reasonably conclude from the 

Marburger e-mail that the Plain Dealer was aware of or believed that there were 

nonprivileged drafts of the agreement. Pursuant to the e-mail and Bardwell’s 

affidavit, it is similarly reasonable to conclude that Bardwell believed that the 

county had drafts of the agreement that were not subject to attorney-client 

privilege and were required to be disclosed to him, but yet were being withheld. 

Thus, I would conclude that the court of appeals abused its discretion in finding 

that Bardwell lacked a good-faith belief that his complaint had a reasonable basis 

in law and fact. 

{¶ 34} Moreover, in my view, when Bardwell filed suit in the court of 

appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the county to provide copies of 

drafts of the Medical Mart agreement exchanged during the negotiations, good 

grounds to support the complaint existed as a matter of law. Accordingly, I 

believe the court of appeals wrongly concluded that Bardwell’s complaint was 

“groundless in fact and legal argument.” State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga 

County Bd. of Commrs., Cuyahoga App. No. 93058, 2009-Ohio-5573, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 35} In light of the fact that Bardwell’s mandamus complaint framed a 

legitimate legal issue, i.e., whether draft contractual agreements shared between 

parties to potential public contracts are exempt from the public-records act, I do 

not believe that the other reasons enumerated by the court of appeals and cited by 
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the majority support a finding of bad faith on the part of Bardwell at the time he 

signed the mandamus complaint. Those purported justifications either (1) recount 

pleading deficiencies in the nature of those frequently made by lay litigants, (2) 

refer to facts that occurred after the filing of the complaint, (3) fault Bardwell for 

moving quickly to file suit after the county expressly denied, in writing, his 

request for what he believed to be public records subject to disclosure, (4) suggest 

that bad faith is demonstrated when a complaint includes some claims that lack 

merit, e.g., the county’s asserted failure to provide a copy of the retention 

schedule, or (5) assume as an underlying premise that the county correctly 

withheld the requested draft agreements based on their status as privileged and 

exempt from the Public Records Act—even though the soundness of that premise 

was the very legal issue Bardwell’s complaint raised. 

{¶ 36} I would hold that the court of appeals abused its discretion by 

imposing monetary sanctions on Bardwell pursuant to Civ.R. 11. I therefore 

respectfully dissent. 

 PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

 American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc., Brian J. 

Laliberte, and Carrie L. Davis, for appellant. 

 William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 

E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

______________________