In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 20-1690C

(Filed: March 15, 2022)

TONY JORDAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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Tony Jordan, pro se, Valrico, FL. 

Michael D. Austin, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington,

D.C., for Defendant. With him on the briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, Civil Division, Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Acting Director, and Allison KiddMiller, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Of counsel was Juliana B. Pierce, Defense 

Finance and Accounting Service, General Counsel Office.

OPINION AND ORDER

SOLOMSON, Judge. 

On November 20, 2020, Plaintiff, Tony Jordan, a retired Army reserve officer, 

proceeding pro se, filed his original complaint against Defendant, the United States. 

ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The government moved to dismiss Mr. Jordan’s complaint 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims 

(“RCFC”). ECF No. 11 (“Def. Mot.”). The Court permitted Mr. Jordan to file an 

amended complaint, ECF Nos. 13, 14 (“Am. Compl.”), which the government also 

moved to dismiss pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), ECF No. 17 (“Def. Mot. Dismiss Am. 

Compl.”). The parties filed timely response briefs. ECF Nos. 18 (“Pl. Resp.”), 19 (“Def. 

Reply”). On September 20, 2021, Mr. Jordan filed a motion for leave to respond to the 

government’s reply, ECF No. 20, which this Court granted, ECF Nos. 21, 22 (“Pl. 

Reply”).
2

The singular focus of Mr. Jordan’s several “causes of action” is a debt of

$88,578.33 which Mr. Jordan claims the Defense Finance and Accounting Authority 

(“DFAS”) unlawfully withheld from his military pay over a period of five years. 

Compl. at 2; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54–58.1 The government contends that this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to decide Mr. Jordan’s claim because he failed to file his complaint within 

the six-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501; Def. Mot. at 1; Def. Mot. Dismiss 

Am. Compl. at 2. 

For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with the government and 

holds that Mr. Jordan’s claim is untimely pursuant to the applicable statute of 

limitations, see 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the government’s 

motion to dismiss Mr. Jordan’s amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts hold the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs to a less rigorous standard than 

those of represented parties. See Roche v. U.S. Postal Serv., 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 

1987) (“Pro se petitioners are not expected to frame issues with the precision of a 

common law pleading.”); Perry v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 1, 9–10 (2020) (“Courts treat 

a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings with less scrutiny and give them a more liberal construction 

than pleadings prepared by counsel.” (citing Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 

(2003))), aff’d, 2021 WL 2935075 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021). Accordingly, the Court 

construes all of Mr. Jordan’s legal arguments in the most generous, plausible manner. 

Moss v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 611, 615 (2011). 

Pro se plaintiffs cannot, however, evade this Court’s jurisdictional requirements. 

See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, 

and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of 

announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”); Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 

F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that “leniency with respect to mere formalities 

should be extended to a pro se party,” but “a court may not similarly take a liberal view 

of [a] jurisdictional requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only”); Hale v. 

United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 180, 184 (2019) (“[E]ven pro se plaintiffs must persuade the 

court that jurisdictional requirements have been met.”); RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss 

the action.”).

Generally, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is defined by the

Tucker Act, which gives the court authority to render judgment on certain monetary

claims against the United States.” RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360

(Fed. Cir. 2009). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), provides this Court with

1 Mr. Jordan’s amended complaint numbers each paragraph, but his original complaint 

numbers only pages; this opinion address arguments presented in both complaints.
3

jurisdiction “to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded 

either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 

department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for 

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a)(1); see also Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that 

the Tucker Act permits “actions pursuant to contracts with the United States, actions to

recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant to

money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or constitutional provisions”

to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims). The Tucker Act, however, “does not 

create a substantive cause of action.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part). Moreover, “[n]ot every claim invoking the 

Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act.” 

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983). With respect to “money-mandating” 

claims, the plaintiff must identify a law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating 

compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Id. at 217 

(quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)). Illegal exaction claims allege 

that money was “improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant,” Eastport S.S. 

Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967), and do not need to identify a 

money-mandating statute. Boeing Co. v. United States, 968 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 

2020); Perry, 149 Fed. Cl. at 32. 

The Court of Federal Claims may exercise jurisdiction over a claim against the 

United States only if the plaintiff files suit within six years of when the claim accrues. 

28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has 

jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such 

claim first accrues.”). The Supreme Court has “long interpreted” this Court’s 

limitations statute as “absolute” and “jurisdictional.” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008). Consequently, the statute of limitations is not subject to 

equitable tolling. Id. at 133–39 (discussing the history of the Court of Federal Claims’ 

statute of limitations and concluding that it does not permit equitable tolling); see also 

Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[E]quitable tolling . . . is 

foreclosed by John R. Sand & Gravel, wherein the Court held that the Tucker Act’s statute 

of limitations is in the ‘more absolute’ category that cannot be waived or extended by 

equitable considerations.” (quoting John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 133–34)).

Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over [their] 

claims by a preponderance of the evidence.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 

F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). This includes establishing that the complaint was 

timely filed pursuant to the statute of limitations. Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 

F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998). To determine jurisdiction, this Court generally 

“must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1163. 

The Court is not limited to the pleadings, however, when a motion to dismiss disputes 
4

jurisdictional facts. Freeman v. United States, 875 F.3d 623, 627 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

(“When . . . a motion to dismiss ‘challenges the truth of jurisdictional facts,’ the Court of 

Federal Claims ‘may consider relevant evidence in order to resolve the factual 

dispute.’” (quoting Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014))). This 

Court “will rely on these matters [only] to the extent that they allow the court to 

determine whether it has jurisdiction over this case.” Lechliter v. United States, 70 Fed. 

Cl. 536, 543 (2006).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court begins with the facts as alleged in Mr. Jordan’s amended complaint 

and related filings.2 Mr. Jordan served in the United States Army Reserves “in various 

capacities” from early 1981 to late 2014. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. During that period, from 

October 2, 2009, through October 27, 2014, he held the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Compl. at 1. 

Between 2003 and 2008, Mr. Jordan served approximately four years and six 

months of active duty at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. During 

this active-duty tour, Mr. Jordan was the subject of an investigation regarding a

“possible lodging fraud concerning plaintiff’s travel vouchers submitted incidental to 

his continuous orders for the period May 1, 2004 through April 29, 2008.” Am. Compl. 

¶ 16. Notwithstanding this allegation, Mr. Jordan avers that the investigation 

concluded he was underpaid regarding his housing for this time period. Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 22, 31. In February 2009, DFAS established a debt of $106,051.21 against Mr. Jordan 

“for the period May 1, 2004 through April 29, 2008.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. On July 10, 

2009, “DFAS issued two debt notices” to Mr. Jordan “in the amount of $106,051.21.” 

Am. Compl. ¶ 27. On October 7, 2009, Mr. Jordan “received a Leave and Earnings 

Statement . . . revealing that a collection action was initiated in his pay records in the 

amount of $750.00 per pay period for a travel debt of $106,051.21.” Am. Compl. ¶ 36. 3 

2 For the purpose of resolving the pending motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in a plaintiff’s 

operative complaint are assumed to be true, and do not constitute factual findings by the Court. 

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 932 F.3d 

1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 

3 The government, via an attachment to its response brief, explains that DFAS determined 

Mr. Jordan’s debt followed an Army Criminal Investigation Command investigation, which 

concluded that Mr. Jordan submitted dozens of monthly travel vouchers while on active duty to 

claim “reimbursement for renting an apartment . . . supported by false receipts . . . while he 

actually lived in a residence that he owned[.]” ECF No. 19-2, Defense Office of Hearings and 

Appeals (“DOHA”) Appeal Decision of February 19, 2015 at 4. As a result of the vouchers Mr. 

Jordan submitted, the government contends, the Army paid Mr. Jordan a total of $106,051.21 in 

lodging expenses from May 2004 to April 2008, id. at 3; DFAS later audited Mr. Jordan’s travel 

vouchers and established a debt against Mr. Jordan to remedy Mr. Jordan’s overpayment, id. at 
5

To satisfy the debt, DFAS deducted money from each of Mr. Jordan’s military 

paychecks from October 2009 through October 2014, withholding a total of $88,578.33, 

at which point DFAS appears to have stopped deducting money. Am. Compl. ¶ 43 

(“From October 9, 2009 thr[ough] October 27, 2014, DFAS . . . initiat[ed] collection 

actions[.]”); Am. Compl. ¶ 57 (“From October 2, 20[0]9 thr[ough] October 27, 2014, 

DFAS failed to deliver without deduction the basic pay to Plaintiff[,] which he was 

entitled to for the performance of service during those periods.”); see also Compl. at 2 

(“On October 2, 2009, DFAS created or established a debt . . . and over the course of the 

next 5 plus years (through on or about November 27[,] 2014) unlawfully withheld 

$88,578.33 from plaintiff’s current military pay[.]”).4

The gravamen of Mr. Jordan’s claim is found in his original complaint, in which 

he alleges that DFAS established the debt “without specific legal authority” and 

“unlawfully withheld $88,578.33 from plaintiff’s military pay in violation of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 5514.” Compl. at 2. He also alleges that DFAS “is currently reporting this invalid debt 

to the three major credit reporting agencies,” which “is an ongoing violation of 15 

U.S.C. § 1692 subject to money mandated statutory penalties.” Compl. at 2. 

Accordingly, Mr. Jordan requests that the Court: (1) “Order DFAS to release Plaintiff’s 

military pay in the amount of $88,578.33”; (2) “Order DFAS to pay [a] statutory penalty 

for each occurrence of reporting to the credit bureaus”; and (3) “Issue a writ of 

Mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 to compel agency action in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

§ 5514, 37 U.S.C § 204 and provide Plaintiff judicial remedy concerning pay and 

credit[.]” Compl. at 3.

In his amended complaint, Mr. Jordan asserts four causes of action in claiming he 

is entitled to a return of the debt DFAS assessed against him. In particular, Mr. Jordan 

alleges: (1) DFAS violated both the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204, and 37 U.S.C. 

§ 1014 (“Payment date for pay and allowances”), by withholding money from Mr. 

Jordan, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54–58; (2) DFAS violated 37 U.S.C. § 1005 (“Army and Air 

4. The Court includes this information merely to contextualize the origins of the debt at issue 

and does not make any factual findings, or draw any legal conclusions, regarding the 

circumstances surrounding Mr. Jordan’s debt. Cf. Pl. Reply at 7 (alleging that “[i]t is Plaintiff’s 

sincere belief that the DOHA letter . . . has nothing to do with the issue at hand but was instead 

provided to in some [w]ay taint the Plaintiff’s image and [/] or prejudice the Court against the 

Plaintiff”).

4 It is unclear why Mr. Jordan represented November 27, 2014 as the end date of the debt 

collection in his complaint but listed October 27, 2014 as the end date in his amended complaint. 

The Court suspects a typographical error in the original complaint — particularly given that Mr. 

Jordan lists October 27, 2014 twice in his amended complaint — and proceeds with the 

understanding that the date in the amended complaint is the correct one. This conclusion is 

supported by the fact that the government, in a declaration submitted along with its motion to 

dismiss, represents that DFAS collected the debt “from October 15, 2009 through October 29, 

2014.” ECF No. 11-1, Declaration of Jeffrey Heiney, at 2–3.
6

Force: prompt payment required”) by collecting the debt, is currently in arrears to Mr. 

Jordan, and owes Mr. Jordan interest, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59–63; (3) DFAS used false 

supporting documents to create Mr. Jordan’s debt, in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 1552 

(“Correction of military records: claims incident thereto”), Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64–67; and 

(4) DFAS violated the federal claim collection standards outlined in 31 C.F.R. §§ 900–904 

by reporting Mr. Jordan’s debt to credit bureaus and a federal agency, Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 68–73. Mr. Jordan separately alleges that “DFAS violated 5 U.S.C. § 5514, by

initiating collection actions before complying with the due process requirements for the 

statute” and “by deducting more than the maximum allowed [amount] of 15%.” Am. 

Compl. ¶ 43.

In the alternative, Mr. Jordan requests that the Court transfer his case to the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia should the Court grant the 

government’s motion to dismiss. Pl. Reply at 7.

III. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER MR. JORDAN’S CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2501

Mr. Jordan’s claim is time-barred because he filed his complaint long after this 

Court’s statute of limitations had run. As noted above, this Court only has jurisdiction 

over claims that are “filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2501. 

A plaintiff’s claim is considered “filed” for the purposes of § 2501 when that 

plaintiff files a complaint with this Court. RCFC 3 (“A civil action is commenced by 

filing a complaint with the court.”). A claim accrues “against the government . . . ‘when 

all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the Government and entitle the 

claimant to institute an action.’” FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Goodrich v. United States, 434 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). The 

question of “whether the pertinent events have occurred is determined under an 

objective standard; a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the 

relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue.” Id. at 1381 (quoting Fallini v. 

United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, if a plaintiff files a claim

more than six years after the events fixing the government’s liability allegedly occurred, 

this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim and must dismiss it. To determine when Mr. 

Jordan’s claim accrued for purposes of jurisdiction, this Court examines and accepts as 

true the undisputed facts in Mr. Jordan’s complaint and amended complaint. See 

Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1163. 

This Court determines that Mr. Jordan’s claim accrued — at the latest — on 

October 9, 2009. Mr. Jordan’s suit, at its heart, and by its very terms, “seek[s] a reversal 

of the DFAS[] decision regarding an alleged debt.” Am. Compl. at 1;

5 see also Compl. 

5 The introductory paragraph of Mr. Jordan’s amended complaint is unnumbered.
7

at 3 (requesting that this Court “order DFAS to release Plaintiff’s military pay in the 

amount of $88,578.33”). Mr. Jordan represents that DFAS established that debt against 

Mr. Jordan, and began collecting it, on or before October 9, 2009. See, e.g., Compl. at 2 

(“On October 2, 2009, DFAS created or established a debt[.]”); Am. Compl. ¶ 43 (“From 

October 9, 2009, thr[ough] October 27, 2014, DFAS . . . initiat[ed] collection 

actions . . . .”); Am. Compl. ¶ 57 (“From October 2, 20[0]9 thr[ough] October 27, 2014, 

DFAS failed to deliver without deduction the basic pay to Plaintiff . . . .”). Mr. Jordan 

further concedes in his amended complaint that he was aware of the debt by October 9, 

2009. Am. Compl. ¶ 36 (“On October 7, 2009, Plaintiff received a Leave and Earnings 

Statement (“LES”) revealing that a collection action was initiated in his pay records in 

the amount of $750.00 per pay period for a travel debt of $106,051.21[.]”); Am. Compl. 

¶ 46 (referencing “substantial communication from the Plaintiff disputing the debt” 

prior to October 2, 2009). In other words, by October 9, 2009, at the latest, “all the 

events ha[d] occurred that fix[ed] the alleged liability of the government and entitle[d] 

the claimant to institute an action.” Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011).6

Because the Court concludes that Mr. Jordan’s claim accrued on or before 

October 9, 2009, Mr. Jordan was required to have filed suit on or before six years from 

that date — i.e., on or before October 9, 2015 — for his suit to fall within this Court’s 

statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Mr. Jordan filed his suit on November 20, 

2020, Compl. at 1, more than eleven years after his claim accrued, and more than five 

years after the statute of limitations had run.

7 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction 

over Mr. Jordan’s claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and must dismiss this case, 

including his amended complaint. The numerous contentions in Mr. Jordan’s amended 

6 The conclusion that Mr. Jordan had all information necessary to file suit when DFAS 

established the debt is strengthened by the fact that Mr. Jordan already has filed multiple 

lawsuits on this issue. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38–40; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 48 (“Plaintiff filed several 

[inspector general] and congressional complaints”); Jordan v. Def. Fin. & Acct. Servs. (Jordan I), 

2014 WL 4416010, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2014) (dismissing many of Mr. Jordan’s claims, filed 

pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, after finding “that the relief [Mr.] Jordan 

requests is. . . a refund of money he has paid towards his debt” and is thus “within the 

jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims”); Jordan v. Def. Fin. & Acct. Servs. (Jordan II), 744 F. 

App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming a district court dismissal of the case Mr. Jordan filed 

after Jordan I, again seeking a refund of the money Mr. Jordan paid DFAS, and noting that 28 

U.S.C. § 1491 “requires that non-tort claims against the United States for amounts in excess of 

$10,000 must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims”). 

7 Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that the statute of limitations only began to run 

as of the last alleged withdrawal from Mr. Jordan’s paycheck on October 27, 2014, see Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 43, 57, this Court would still lack jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan’s claim, as he still 

would have had to file his current suit on or before October 27, 2020. 28 U.S.C. § 2501; see also

discussion, infra, Section III.F.1 (holding that the continuing claims doctrine does not save Mr. 

Jordan’s claim).
8

complaint all stem from the debt that DFAS established against Mr. Jordan in 2009 and 

thus his amended complaint — including all of his claims, no matter how framed —

cannot avoid the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, the Court specifically addresses 

the four causes of actions as Mr. Jordan has alleged them in his amended complaint. 

A. First Cause of Action — Alleged Violations of the Military Pay Act

In Mr. Jordan’s first cause of action, he alleges that the government violated the 

Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204.

8 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54–58. Specifically, Mr. Jordan 

contends that: (1) 37 U.S.C. § 204 is a money-mandating statute, Am. Compl. ¶ 55;

(2) “[f]rom October 2, 20[0]9 thr[ough] October 27, 2014, DFAS failed to deliver without 

deduction the basic pay to Plaintiff,” Am. Compl. ¶ 57; and (3) DFAS’s “failure to 

deliver Plaintiff’s basic pay as scheduled is a legal wrong, which created an arrearage in 

Plaintiff’s pay account and records, which continues to accrue,” Am. Compl. ¶ 58. As a 

result, Mr. Jordan claims, he “is entitled to seek review of DFAS’[s] actions” and “order 

DFAS to audit and reconcile Plaintiff’s pay records and account and release accrued 

entitlements which have been withheld.” Id.

As discussed above, the Tucker Act provides this Court with jurisdiction over 

money-mandating claims. See, e.g., Roth, 378 F.3d at 1384. A money-mandating claim

seeks money from the government based on a statute that “can fairly be interpreted as 

mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” 

Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217 (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400). Mr. Jordan is correct that 

many provisions of the Military Pay Act are money-mandating, and this Court

generally possesses jurisdiction over Military Pay Act claims. See, e.g., James v. Caldera, 

159 F.3d 573, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“As far as military personnel are concerned, 37 U.S.C. 

§ 204 (1994) serves as a money-mandating statute.”); Antonellis v. United States, 723 F.3d 

1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“We have long recognized that the Military Pay Act 

‘provides for suit in [the Court of Federal Claims] when the military, in violation of the 

Constitution, a statute, or a regulation, has denied military pay.’” (quoting Dysart v. 

United States, 369 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).

Even if the Military Pay Act is money-mandating for the purposes of 

Mr. Jordan’s claim, however, this Court still lacks jurisdiction over this cause of action

due to the applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, and Mr. Jordan’s attempt to 

reframe his claim in the terms of the Military Pay Act cannot change the fact that he 

filed his claim outside of that statute of limitations. Mr. Jordan’s contention that DFAS 

8 The Military Pay Act provides that active duty uniformed servicemembers “are entitled to the 

basic pay of the pay grade to which assigned or distributed.” 37 U.S.C. § 204(a). Mr. Jordan 

also argues that 37 U.S.C. § 1014 “establishes that amounts of basic pay . . . shall be paid on the 

first day of the month beginning after the month during which the right to such compensation 

accrues,” though he does not contend that 37 U.S.C. § 1014 is money-mandating. Am. Compl. 

¶ 56.
9

must “release accrued entitlements,” Am. Compl. ¶ 58, for example, is simply another 

way of challenging the debt DFAS assessed against Mr. Jordan in 2009. The Court thus 

agrees with the government that Mr. Jordan’s first cause of action “ha[s] at [its] core the 

allegation that the United States wrongfully took monies from Mr. Jordan’s military pay 

during the period October 9, 2009 through October 27, 2014” and that “regardless of the 

label, Mr. Jordan should have filed his complaint within six years” of the claim’s 

accrual. Def. Reply at 2. 

Accordingly, even if the Military Pay Act is money-mandating in the manner 

Mr. Jordan asserts, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his first cause of action.

B. Second Cause of Action — Alleged Violation of 37 U.S.C. § 10059

In Mr. Jordan’s second cause of action, he contends that 37 U.S.C. § 1005 “is a 

money mandating statute which establishes that members of the Army and of the Air 

Force shall be paid at such times that arrears will at no time be more than two 

months[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 60. Mr. Jordan also claims that “all DOD Components are 

required to . . . pay interest payments when payments are made late,” that “DFAS is in 

arrears to Plaintiff for the entitlements which accrued from October 1, 2009 through 

October 27, 2014,” and that DFAS accordingly owes Mr. Jordan interest on the allegedly 

invalid debt it withdrew from his paychecks. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 61–63.

The Court notes that 37 U.S.C. § 1005 may be money-mandating in some 

circumstances, as Mr. Jordan contends, because the statute, on its face, requires the 

government to pay money to servicemembers within a given timeframe. 37 U.S.C. 

§ 1005 (“Members . . . shall be paid . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Def. Reply at 2 

(conceding that such “statute requires the military to pay service members” (emphasis 

added)). Nevertheless, this is yet another attempt by Mr. Jordan to reframe his central 

claim in terms of another statute; at bottom, it remains a challenge to the debt that 

accrued in 2009 and thus falls outside of the applicable statute of limitations, see 28 

U.S.C. § 2501, discussed supra. 

The fact that Mr. Jordan frames this cause of action as an ongoing violation —

alleging that interest continues to accrue on a purported arrearage, Am. Compl. ¶ 62 —

does not provide this Court with jurisdiction. Interest can only accrue upon a principal 

balance. Mr. Jordan argues that the principal balance in his case is the alleged 

“arrearage” that arose when DFAS withdrew money from his paycheck. Am. Compl. 

9 Mr. Jordan titles this cause of action “Violation of Promp[t] Payment Act.” Am. Compl. at 18. 

The Prompt Payment Act, however, is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901–3905 and provides timelines 

for the government’s payment of money owed to federal contractors. While the Prompt 

Payment Act does not cover military pay, Mr. Jordan does cite to 37 U.S.C. § 1005 (“Army, Air 

Force, and Space Force: prompt payments required”), which provides military pay deadlines, 

and the Court addresses his claim pursuant to that statute.
10

¶¶ 62–63; see also Pl. Reply at 5 (“The arrearage in this context would be akin to the 

government having a valid debt against a debtor, the debt does not simply go away but 

rather accrues interest and is thus subject to collection until either it is paid, or disposed 

of[.]”). But the alleged arrearage would only arise if the debt DFAS established were

invalid — something the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine given the statute of 

limitations. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Mr. Jordan’s claims 

regarding the principal sum of the assessed debt, the Court also lacks jurisdiction to 

consider Mr. Jordan’s claims for interest on that debt. 

C. Third Cause of Action — Correction of Military Records

In Mr. Jordan’s third cause of action, he asks the Court to correct two forms that 

he alleges DFAS wrongly relied upon in assessing the debt at issue. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64–

67. Specifically, Mr. Jordan alleges that “there are two erroneous DD Form 139s in 

Plaintiff[’]s military pay records, which were used to establish this invalid debt” and

that the placement of these “false supporting documents” in Mr. Jordan’s pay records 

“is an error.”10 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66–67. Mr. Jordan requests that the Court “direct that 

these DD Form 139[]s be voided to correct Plaintiff’s pay account and record.” Am. 

Compl. ¶ 67. As authority for this claim, Mr. Jordan cites 10 U.S.C. § 1552, which he 

contends is money-mandating. Am. Compl. ¶ 65. The Court lacks jurisdiction over this 

cause of action as well.

As is the case with Mr. Jordan’s first two causes of action, the statute of 

limitations similarly bars the Court’s consideration of the validity of the DD Form 139s. 

In that regard, the only purpose of Mr. Jordan’s challenge is to dispute the underlying

debt for which the government collected money from Mr. Jordan and that he contends 

should be refunded to him. Am. Compl. ¶ 66 (citing “two erroneous DD Form 

139s . . . which were used to establish this invalid debt”); Am. Compl. ¶ 67 (urging the 

Court to “direct that these DD Form 139[]s be voided to correct Plaintiff’s pay 

account”). As discussed above, however, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan’s 

central claim regarding the debt at issue. Because this cause of action is merely another 

attempt to challenge that debt, the statute of limitations bars consideration of this cause 

of action. 28 U.S.C. § 2501.

Moreover, the Court lacks the power to correct Mr. Jordan’s records independent 

of a valid, timely Tucker Act claim. Indeed, this Court only has the power to correct 

military records when doing so “as an incident of and collateral to” a monetary 

10 Neither Mr. Jordan nor the government specifies the purpose of DD Form 139, but the 

Department of Defense’s Forms Management Program indicates that DD Form 139 is entitled 

“Pay Adjustment Authorization.” DoD Forms Management Program, Wash. Headquarters Serv., 

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/forms/dd0001_0499 (last updated Mar. 8, 2022). The 

Court accordingly proceeds under the assumption that the DD Form 139s Mr. Jordan references 

are involved in the determination and revision of military pay.
11

judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2); see also Piotrowski v. United States, 722 F. App’x 982, 

985 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims correctly held that it could not 

provide equitable relief to correct [Plaintiff]’s military records because the requested 

relief was not tied to a money judgment.”); Sergent’s Mech. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 157 

Fed. Cl. 41, 46 (2021) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims does not have general 

authority to issue injunctive relief.”). This Court, however, lacks jurisdiction over the 

only money judgment that could possibly be related to modifying Mr. Jordan’s records

— i.e., a finding that the government improperly assessed a $88,578.33 debt against Mr. 

Jordan. See Am. Compl. ¶ 66 (alleging that the “two erroneous DD Form 139s . . . were 

used to establish this invalid debt”). Absent a money judgment, this Court lacks the 

ability to correct Mr. Jordan’s military records.

Mr. Jordan’s attempt to invoke 10 U.S.C. § 1552, which he contends is 

money-mandating, Am. Compl. ¶ 65, does not circumvent this jurisdictional barrier. 

The statute is not independently money-mandating. Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 

1295, 1315 (holding that “section 1552 is not the ‘money-mandating’ statute that gives 

rise to the cause of action that provides the basis for a Tucker Act suit in the Court of 

Federal Claims”);

11 McCord v. United States, 943 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (noting 

that 10 U.S.C. § 1552 “itself is not a ‘money-mandating’ statute” and is moneymandating only “if a claimant was improperly denied benefits but became entitled to 

them under other provisions of law”). Indeed, 10 U.S.C. § 1552 only permits this Court 

to review decisions of various corrections boards; it does not provide an independent 

jurisdictional basis upon which this Court can enter a monetary judgment. See Porter v. 

United States, 163 F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Section 1552 of title 10 gives the 

military secretaries power to correct military records using civilian boards.” (emphasis 

added)); Richey v. United States, 322 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“If an officer elects 

to pursue a remedy before the Corrections Board, after the Board renders a final 

decision, the officer may effectively obtain review of that decision in the Court of 

Federal Claims by filing suit under the Tucker Act.”); Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1315 (“The 

Corrections Board statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1552, provides for correction of military 

records . . . and for judicial review of the Board’s decision.”). Accordingly, 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552 does not independently provide this Court with jurisdiction to correct 

Mr. Jordan’s records.

In his response brief, Mr. Jordan argues that jurisdiction exists because he 

submitted an application for correction of his records to the Army Review Boards 

Agency (“ARBA”) on June 6, 2021 — but that was more than six months after he 

11 Cf. Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1315 n.4 (listing the following two exceptions to the general rule that 

10 U.S.C. § 1552 is not money-mandating, neither of which is at issue here: “if the plaintiff 

should have been retired for disability but the Correction Board illegally failed to so find,” and 

“when the correction board has granted relief and the service member seeks to enforce or 

challenge the implementation or scope of the remedial order” (citations omitted)).
12

submitted his complaint. Pl. Resp. at 3. Mr. Jordan asserts that “it is within the 

jurisdiction of this court to review the decision by the board,” and, “[g]iven that a 

decision by the board has not occurred . . . this count cannot be time-barred because 

[the] statute of limitations cannot begin to run until . . . the board renders their 

decision.” Id. at 4. Mr. Jordan further asserts that “it is within the purview of this Court 

to consider the matter” and that the Court can “rule in Plaintiff’s favor if the evidence 

warrants such.” Id.

While Mr. Jordan is correct that this Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of 

corrections boards, see, e.g., Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1315, there is no such decision before the 

Court for review. Mr. Jordan concedes as much. Pl. Resp. at 4. Mr. Jordan’s assertion

in his response brief that he submitted an application for records correction does not 

provide the Court with jurisdiction over his third cause of action.

Perhaps anticipating this, Mr. Jordan asks the Court in his response brief to “stay 

this count pending the outcome of the board’s decision.” Pl. Resp. at 4. The Court 

declines to do so. “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent 

in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of 

time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls 

for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests[.]” Landis v. N. Am. 

Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936). When deciding a motion to stay, “[t]he Court must 

consider judicial efficiency and economy, determining whether a stay will resolve 

relevant issues and simplify the case.” Braswell v. United States, 155 Fed. Cl. 148, 150 

(2021) (citing Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191, 

1196 (11th Cir. 2009)). The Court has considered the competing interests in this case 

and concludes that no stay is warranted. Mr. Jordan has been actively litigating these 

issues in various fora for years, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38–39, and had ample time to file an 

application for records correction. Moreover, the Court fails to see how granting this 

stay would “resolve relevant issues” or “simplify the case” given that no board decision 

can change this Court’s determination that the statute of limitations precludes 

Mr. Jordan’s central claim for compensation. In short, granting the requested stay 

would only delay the Court’s inevitable decision that any and all of Mr. Jordan’s claims 

relating to the debt at issue are time-barred.

Because Mr. Jordan’s third cause of action is untimely, seeks a correction of 

records that is not “incident of and collateral to” a money judgment, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a)(2), and because Mr. Jordan does not cite any other money-mandating 

statutory authority, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this cause of action.

D. Fourth Cause of Action — Alleged Violation of the Federal Claim 

Collection Standards

In Mr. Jordan’s fourth cause of action, he alleges that the government violated 

the federal claim collection standards delineated in 31 C.F.R. §§ 900–904. Am. Compl. 
13

¶ 71 (“On April 6, 2015, DFAS violated 31 [C.F.R.] [§]§ 900–904 . . . by reporting an 

invalid debt to the credit bureaus without providing Plaintiff with the required 

statutory due process, required by federal statutes and regulations.”); Am. Compl. ¶ 72

(alleging that “[i]n January 2020, Plaintiff discovered that DFAS had reported to the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Credit Alert Interactive Voice 

Response System (CAIVRS) that Plaintiff was delinquent on a federal debt” and that 

“DFAS’[s] failure to provide the required due [process] prior to reporting this invalid 

debt in this manner, is a violation of 31 [C.F.R.] [§]§ 900–904”). Mr. Jordan asserts that

the federal claims collection standards are money-mandating, Am. Compl. ¶ 69, and 

that, as a result of these alleged violations, he “is entitled to seek review of DFAS[’s] 

actions . . . and direct that DFAS promptly refund any money ultimately found not to 

have been owed to the Government,” Am. Compl. ¶ 73.12

This Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan’s fourth cause of action because the 

federal claim collection standards are not money-mandating. As discussed above, the 

Tucker Act does not provide plaintiffs a substantive cause of action. Fisher, 402 F.3d at 

1172. In money-mandating claims, plaintiffs must identify a law that “can fairly be 

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages 

sustained.” Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216. The Court has reviewed 31 C.F.R. §§ 900–904, and 

nowhere do the regulations grant Mr. Jordan “expressly or by implication[] a right to be 

paid a certain sum.” Eastport S.S. Corp., 372 F.2d at 1007. In fact, if anything, the 

provisions expressly preclude a money-mandating characterization: 

The standards in this chapter do not create any right or 

benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in 

equity by a party against the United States, its agencies, its 

officers, or any other person, nor shall the failure of an agency 

to comply with any of the provisions of parts 900–904 of this 

chapter be available to any debtor as a defense.

12 See also Compl. at 2 (“Additionally[,] DFAS is currently reporting this invalid debt to the three 

major credit reporting agencies in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692; The Fair Credit Reporting 

Act. . . . [T]he fact that . . . the [debt] is being reported to the three credit bureaus [is evidence 

that] this is an ongoing violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 subject to money mandated statutory 

penalties.”). Mr. Jordan appears to have abandoned this alleged violation of the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act (“FCRA”) in his amended complaint and subsequent filings, perhaps because the 

government (correctly) notes in its motion to dismiss that the FCRA “provides for civil remedies 

against debt collectors, [but] not the United States, in the district courts.” Def. Mot. at 6 (citing 

Dainja El v. United States, 2017 WL 4639364, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 23, 2017)). To the extent that Mr. 

Jordan has not abandoned this claim, the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction over it and grants the 

government’s motion to dismiss this claim as well. Dainja El, 2017 WL 4639364, at *2 (finding 

that 15 U.S.C. § 1692 “do[es] not provide a basis for jurisdiction in this Court”).
14

31 C.F.R. § 900.8; see also Confederated Tribes & Bands of The Yakama Nation v. United 

States, 89 Fed. Cl. 589, 615 n.39 (2009) (concluding that “31 C.F.R. § 900.8 disallows 

private causes of action enforceable against the United States for failure to comply with 

31 C.F.R. pts. 900–04”); Zandford v. S.E.C., 2012 WL 628002, at *4 (D. Del. Feb. 27, 2012)

(“[T]he regulations prohibit the Debtor from using these agency operating procedures 

as either a sword or a shield.” (quoting In re Zandford, 2006 WL 2036990 (Bankr. D. Del.

July 18, 2006))); United States v. Warfield, 2015 WL 1469545, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 

2015) (no cause of action for government’s alleged failure “to comply with the Federal 

Claims Collection Standards, 31 C.F.R. § 900, et seq.”); Care Origin, Inc. v. United States 

Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 2015 WL 6163577, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2015) (“[A]s 

Federal Defendants correctly point out, the Federal Claims Collection Act does not 

provide for a private right of action against the United States.”).

Because 31 C.F.R. §§ 900–904 is not money-mandating, the Court lacks 

jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan’s fourth cause of action. Cf. Perry, 149 Fed. Cl. at 17 

(“[Plaintiff] cannot invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate his grievances merely 

by invoking Tucker Act language, such as ‘contract,’ ‘taking,’ ‘damages,’ or ‘illegal 

exaction.’”).

E. Illegal Exaction Claims 

Illegal exaction claims are those alleging that “the [g]overnment has the citizen’s 

money in its pocket.” Eastport S.S. Corp., 372 F.2d at 1008 (quoting Clapp v. United States, 

127 Ct. Cl. 505, 512 (1954)); see also Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 

1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing illegal exaction claims as claims “made for recovery of 

monies that the government has required to be paid contrary to law”). In order “[t]o 

allege an illegal exaction within this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, a complaint 

must contain nonfrivolous factual allegations that the plaintiff is entitled to recover 

money for the government’s purported illegal action.” Gulley v. United States, 150 Fed. 

Cl. 405, 418 (2020). An illegal exaction claim need not identify a money-mandating 

statute. Boeing Co., 968 F.3d at 1384 (reviewing the illegal exaction jurisprudence of the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, this Court’s immediate appellate 

court, and concluding that the Court of Federal Claims can “assume[] jurisdiction over 

statutory illegal exaction claims with no regard for whether the statutes [a]re ‘moneymandating’”); see also Perry, 149 Fed. Cl. at 32 (holding that “there is no basis to engraft 

money-mandating requirements onto illegal exaction claims”).

Mr. Jordan repeatedly describes his causes of action as money-mandating. Am. 

Compl. ¶ 55 (first cause of action); Am. Compl. ¶ 60 (second cause of action); Am. 

Compl. ¶ 65 (third cause of action); Am. Compl. ¶ 69 (fourth cause of action); Compl. at 

2 (describing “an ongoing violation . . . subject to money mandated statutory 

penalties”). But this Court’s “jurisdictional determination is not governed by the 

plaintiff’s characterization of its claims.” Perry, 149 Fed. Cl. at 13. Accordingly, the 

Court has reviewed the many allegations in Mr. Jordan’s complaint and amended 
15

complaint through the lens of illegal exaction and concludes that some of his allegations

generously may be construed as illegal exaction claims.13 This characterization,

however, does not change the Court’s conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over 

Mr. Jordan’s amended complaint due to the statute of limitations, as explained above. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The applicable statute of limitations makes no exceptions for 

illegal exaction claims even where otherwise properly pled. Adera v. United States, 155 

Fed. Cl. 553, 558 (2021) (dismissing illegal exaction claim for, inter alia, lack of 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2501). 

For example, taking as true Mr. Jordan’s assertions and assuming only for the 

sake of deciding jurisdiction that DFAS indeed established the debt in violation of 

37 U.S.C. § 1007, see Compl. at 2, Mr. Jordan still alleges that this violation occurred 

when the debt was established in October 2009 — more than six years before he filed his 

complaint. Compl. at 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Similarly, even taking as true Mr. Jordan’s 

claim that DFAS violated 5 U.S.C. § 5514 up to and including October 27, 2014, Am. 

Compl. ¶ 43, this Court would lack jurisdiction because Mr. Joran filed his complaint 

more than six years after October 27, 2014. Compl. at 1; 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan’s central 

claim and subsidiary causes of action no matter how characterized. 

F. Various Exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 2501 

The Federal Circuit recognizes several exceptions to the six-year statute of 

limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Mr. Jordan asserts many of them in an attempt to save 

his case. None of those exceptions, however, apply here to preclude the application of 

the statute of limitations to Mr. Jordan’s claims.

13 See, e.g., Compl. at 2 (“DFAS . . . alleg[ed] that the debt was created under the authority [of] 

37 U.S.C. § 1007, but the debt and collection could not have been established under this 

statute[.]”); id. (“On October 2, 2009, DFAS created or established a debt without specific legal 

authority and over the course of the next 5 plus years (through on or about November 27[,]

2014) unlawfully withheld $88,578.33 from plaintiff’s current military pay in violation of 5 

U.S.C. § 5514”); Am. Compl. ¶ 26 (“DFAS violated Volume 7 Chapter 50 of Department of 

Defense Financial Management Regulation policy and improperly established an invalid 

debt[.]”); Am. Compl. ¶ 41 (“DFAS did not adhere to the guidance in [Department of the Army 

Pamphlet] 27-50-309 and violated Volume Chapter 37 of the [Department of Defense Financial 

Management Regulation], which . . . resulted in the creation of a debt without legal merit.”); 

Am. Compl. ¶ 43 (“From October 9, 2009 thr[ough] October 27, 2014, DFAS violated 5 U.S.C. 

§ 5514, by initiating collection actions before complying with the due process requirements for 

the statute[.]”).
16

1. The Continuing Claims Doctrine

Mr. Jordan contends that the continuing claims doctrine pushes at least part of 

his claim to within the statute of limitations. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57–58 (claiming that 

DFAS’s “withholding of the Plaintiff’s basic pay creates a continuing arrearage which 

accrues the first of each month” and “continues to accrue”); Am. Compl. ¶ 62 (claiming 

that “interest began to accrue” years ago on the money DFAS allegedly owes to 

Mr. Jordan and “each month a new interest amount accrues creating a new 

entitlement”); Pl. Reply at 1 (“Considering the fact that violations have continued 

throughout the statutory period relating to the underlying debt, there is no way that the 

Plaintiff’s complaint can be time barred.”); Pl. Reply at 5 (“[A]s long as there is an 

arrearage there is a continuing violation.”).

The continuing claims doctrine allows a plaintiff to include in its allegations 

some events that occurred outside the six-year statute of limitations if the plaintiff 

“ha[s] pled a series of distinct events — each of which gives rise to a separate cause of 

action — as a single continuing event.” Ariadne Fin. Servs. Pty. Ltd v. United States, 133 

F.3d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In such a case, “the continuing claims doctrine operates 

to save later arising claims even if the statute of limitations has lapsed for earlier 

events.” Id. For the doctrine to apply to save an otherwise untimely claim, the claim 

must be “inherently susceptible to being broken down into a series of independent and 

distinct events or wrongs, each having its own associated damages.” Wagstaff v. United 

States, 105 Fed. Cl. 99, 112 (2012) (quoting Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 550 F.3d 1135, 

1145 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The doctrine does not apply, however, to claims “based upon a 

single distinct event, which may have continued ill effects later on.” Brown Park Ests.-

Fairfield Dev. Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Ariadne Fin. 

Servs., 133 F.3d at 879 (“[T]he continuing claims doctrine does not apply to a claim 

based on a single distinct event which has ill effects that continue to accumulate over 

time.”).

Case law draws sharp boundaries around the doctrine’s application. In Hart v. 

United States, 910 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1990), for example, the Federal Circuit held that the 

doctrine did not apply to a military widow who sought monthly ongoing survivor 

benefits to which she was legally entitled because she waited more than six years to file 

her claim. Id. at 816. In that case, the government was required by statute to notify the 

plaintiff of her husband’s decision to not participate in the plan; the government’s 

failure to so notify the plaintiff “automatically enrolled” her husband in the plan and 

entitled the plaintiff to monthly ongoing financial benefits beginning the day after her 

husband died. Id. at 818. The plaintiff argued that she had “a new claim each month,” 

id., but she waited more than six years to file suit, id. at 816. As a result, the Federal 

Circuit held that the statute of limitations barred her claim, and the continuing claims 

doctrine did not save her claim for ongoing monthly benefits — despite her legal 

entitlement to them — because “all events fixing the government’s liability to his 

widow had occurred” the day after her husband died. Id. at 818.
17

Similarly, in Davis v. United States, 550 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the Federal 

Circuit held that the continuing claims doctrine did not save the claim of a discharged 

Army servicemember who sought ongoing periodic payments stemming from an 

allegedly unlawful discharge but who filed suit 20 years after the discharge occurred. 

Id. at 865. In that case, the Federal Circuit characterized the fact that the plaintiff, Mr. 

Davis, “continue[d] to argue the merits of the alleged wrongful discharge as the basis 

for the relief sought” as “an apparent admission that the discharge initiated the claim.” 

Id. at 866.

In contrast, in Wells v. United States, 420 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal 

Circuit held that the continuing claims doctrine saved the claim of a Naval retiree who 

challenged monthly deductions from his retirement pay, alleging that each deduction 

constituted a separate constitutional violation. Id. at 1344, 1346. In that case, the 

plaintiff, Mr. Wells, was a retired Navy servicemember who was convicted on 

drug-related charges a year after retiring. Id. at 1344. In addition to being sentenced to 

prison, Mr. Wells was ordered to pay a cost-of-incarceration fine, which the government 

deducted from his monthly retirement pay. Id. More than six years after the fine was 

first imposed, Mr. Wells filed suit, alleging that the monthly deductions exceeded the 

withholding limit of 15% of disposable income specified in 5 U.S.C. § 5514. Id. at 1345. 

More specifically, he alleged “that 5 U.S.C. § 5514 [wa]s violated each month” such that 

each monthly deduction constituted an independent statutory violation. Id. at 1346–47.

The Federal Circuit applied the continuing claims doctrine: “Wells’ claim can be broken 

down into a series of independent and distinct wrongs or events — deducting more 

than 15% of Wells’ retirement pay — each such wrong or event having its own 

associated damages.” Id. at 1347. The Federal Circuit did not hold that Mr. Wells was 

entitled to challenge the entire amount of the penalty; instead, the Federal Circuit held

only that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over “those claims accruing 

within six years of the date [Mr. Wells] filed suit in the trial court.” Id. at 1347–48.

The continuing claims doctrine does not save Mr. Jordan’s amended complaint. 

As discussed above, Mr. Jordan’s central claim that DFAS established an improper debt 

accrued at latest in October 2009, when DFAS had established the debt. Mr. Jordan 

received notice of the collection action and monthly withholdings from DFAS, and 

DFAS began withholding money from Mr. Jordan’s pay. Compl. at 2; Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 36, 57. At that point, all the events had occurred “that fix[ed] the alleged liability of 

the government” regarding the validity of the debt DFAS established. Holmes, 657 F.3d 

at 1317. Mr. Jordan’s claim disputing the validity of the DFAS debt more closely 

resembles the claim at issue in Davis than the claim at issue in Wells; just as Mr. Davis 

“continue[d] to argue the merits of the alleged wrongful discharge as the basis for the 

relief sought, an apparent admission that the discharge initiated the claim,” Davis, 550 

F. App’x at 866, Mr. Jordan continues to attempt to litigate the validity of the DFAS 

debt, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 57, 66. In light of the Federal Circuit’s having declined to 
18

apply the continuing claims doctrine to Mr. Davis’s claim, this Court cannot apply it to 

save Mr. Jordan’s claims here. 

Moreover, even if Mr. Jordan’s claims somehow were comparable to those at 

issue in Wells, Mr. Jordan alleges repeatedly that the last day DFAS deducted any 

money from his pay was October 27, 2014. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43, 57, 61. Thus, even if Mr. 

Jordan were correct that each pay deduction constituted a separate statutory violation, 

the statute of limitations governing a claim related to the last pay deduction would 

have run six years after October 27, 2014 — specifically, on October 27, 2020. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2501. But, as noted above, Mr. Jordan filed his complaint after that, on

November 20, 2020. See Compl. at 1.

2. The Accrual Suspension Rule

Mr. Jordan argues that the accrual suspension rule preserves his claim despite 

the statute of limitations. Pl. Resp. at 1 (“Also under the Accrual Suspension Rule 

where the government has undertaken acts of concealment of material facts, the statute 

of limitation[s] cannot begin to accrue, until those facts are made known to the 

aggrieved party.”). Specifically, Mr. Jordan claims that his amended complaint contains 

“violations” that “occurred within the six-year window” and “came to light during the 

statutory period,” id., and that the government “concealed the existence of documents 

in [Mr. Jordan’s] records that needed correcting and [Mr. Jordan] did not know of their 

existence until February 2016,” id. at 4. Mr. Jordan makes similar allegations of 

concealment in his amended complaint. Am. Compl. ¶ 40 (“In late January 2016, 

Plaintiff began receiving information pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure . . . reveal[ing] that Defendants had undertaken a coordinated cover up 

concealing material facts making inherently unknowable that certain claims or causes of 

action existed.”); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46–54 (“History of Actions to Conceal Material Facts 

of Invalid Debt”).

The accrual suspension rule delays a claim’s accrual date “until the claimant 

knew or should have known that the claim existed.” Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319; see also 

Young, 529 F.3d at 1385 (“It is a plaintiff’s knowledge of the facts of the claim that 

determines the accrual date.”). To invoke the accrual suspension rule, a plaintiff must 

show either: (1) that the government concealed its actions such that the plaintiff was 

unaware of the actions; or (2) that the injury was “‘inherently unknowable’ at the 

accrual date.” Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Welcker v. United States, 752 F.2d 1577, 

1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

The Federal Circuit has long held that this “rule is strictly and narrowly 

applied.” Welcker, 752 F.2d at 1580. For example, in Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 

1295 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Federal Circuit held that the accrual suspension rule did not 

save the claim of a discharged Army Reserve officer who brought suit in the Court of 

Federal Claims regarding his discharge more than six years after his discharge occurred 
19

but less than six years after new evidence regarding the discharge came to light. Id. at 

1300, 1319. The Federal Circuit rejected Mr. Martinez’s argument that his claim’s 

accrual should have been suspended until the date that the new evidence concerning 

his claim came to light, holding:

Mr. Martinez was not unaware of the existence of his injury 

and the acts giving rise to his claim. As of the date of 

discharge from active duty, he knew that he had been 

discharged and, as far as he was concerned, his discharge had 

been unlawfully procured. Nothing about [the new evidence] 

disclosed the existence of a claim of which he was previously 

unaware. The statement simply provided him with additional 

ammunition with which to pursue the claim.

Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).

In contrast, the Federal Circuit applied the accrual suspension rule in Holmes v. 

United States, 657 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In that case, the plaintiff-appellant,

Mr. Holmes, had reached several settlement agreements — including one in 1996 and 

another in 2001 — with the Navy regarding various employment disputes. Id. at 1306–

08. In 2006, Mr. Holmes learned when he requested copies of his personnel files that the 

Navy had violated the terms of the 1996 agreement. Id. at 1308. In 2009, Mr. Holmes

brought suit in this Court, alleging that he was unable to obtain employment because 

the Navy violated the terms of the 1996 and 2001 agreements. Id. The Court granted 

the government’s motion to dismiss, holding, among other things, that Mr. Holmes was 

on “inquiry notice” of the Navy’s alleged violations as early as 1999 for the 1996 

agreement, because at that time he had been unable to obtain employment and 

“believed this was due to the Navy’s breach.” Id. at 1318.

On appeal before the Federal Circuit, Mr. Holmes argued that the Navy’s alleged 

breach was “inherently unknowable.” Id. at 1318. The Federal Circuit noted that the 

“concealed or inherently unknowable” test contains “an intrinsic reasonableness 

component.” Id. at 1320 (“An example of [an inherently unknowable injury] would be 

when defendant delivers the wrong type of fruit tree to plaintiff and the wrong cannot 

be determined until the tree bears fruit. In this situation the statute will not begin to 

run until plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of his cause of action.”

(alteration in original) (quoting Japanese War Notes Claimants Association v. United States, 

373 F.2d 356, 359 (Ct. Cl. 1967))). The Federal Circuit held that the accrual suspension 

rule saved Mr. Holmes’s claim because his complaint alleged facts relating to, among 

other things, a statement the Navy sent to a prosecutor’s office in July 2001 that the 

Navy had begun performing the 1996 agreement. Id. at 1321. The Federal Circuit held 

that under the circumstances, it was reasonable for Mr. Holmes “to conclude that the 

Navy’s execution of the 1996 agreement, along with its partial performance thereof, 
20

could have provided the basis” for Mr. Holmes to believe that the Navy had performed 

the 1996 agreement. Id. at 1322.

The accrual suspension rule cannot save Mr. Jordan’s claim because he fails to 

allege facts demonstrating either government concealment or that his injury was 

inherently unknowable. See Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319. Regarding concealment, while 

Mr. Jordan makes conclusory allegations of an ongoing government coverup, Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 52–54,

14 his amended complaint makes plain that the government did not

conceal the existence of Mr. Jordan’s debt or the government’s collection process, Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 16–35 (describing Mr. Jordan’s participation in a years-long process of 

investigating his alleged lodging fraud and establishing the debt); Am. Compl. ¶ 36 

(noting that Mr. Jordan received written notice of the “collection action [being] initiated 

in his pay records” on October 7, 2009).

Mr. Jordan’s claims also fail the “inherently unknowable” test. Martinez, 333 F.3d 

at 1319. Mr. Jordan contends that “there is no way that Plaintiff could have known that 

a claim for the correction of records was needed” because the government “concealed 

the existence of documents” about which Mr. Jordan “did not know . . . until February 

2016.” Pl. Resp. at 4. The Federal Circuit, however, has held that “[i]t is a plaintiff’s 

knowledge of the facts of the claim that determines the accrual date.” Young, 529 F.3d at 

1385 (emphasis added). Here, Mr. Jordan has been aware of the debt, and has been 

actively disputing its validity, for years (as early as July 10, 2009). See Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 16–35; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 46 (referencing “substantial communication from the 

Plaintiff disputing the debt” prior to October 2, 2009). This is not a case, as in Holmes, 

where the substance of the plaintiff’s claim was reasonably unknowable until certain 

facts came to light. 657 F.3d at 1322. Mr. Jordan alleges instead a situation analogous to 

that of Martinez, in which new facts arise related to, and in addition to, the facts 

establishing the claim (and regarding which Mr. Jordan has long been aware). 333 F.3d 

at 1319 (“Mr. Martinez was not unaware of the existence of his injury and the acts 

giving rise to his claim. . . . The acts of alleged fabrication may have contributed to 

Mr. Martinez’s injury, but the fact of his injury was never unknown to him.” (emphasis 

added)). Just as the Federal Circuit rejected Mr. Martinez’s accrual suspension 

argument in that case, this Court rejects Mr. Jordan’s argument here.

G. Request to Transfer

Mr. Jordan’s reply brief contains a request, in the alternative, to transfer this case

to “[t]he United States District Court, District of Columbia, under the authority of 28 

14 Mr. Jordan alleges that “[b]ased on the Rule 26 [d]isclosures [from Mr. Jordan’s 2015 lawsuit 

in the Middle District of Florida,] Defendants are still concealing material facts relevant to the 

establishment and collection of the debt,” Am. Compl. ¶ 52, and that “[t]he most disturbing 

aspect of this case is that now the Department of Justice is a part of this cover up,” Am. Compl. 

¶ 54.
21

U.S.C. § 1631[.]” Pl. Reply at 7. Because Mr. Jordan’s case does not meet the standards 

for transfer, the Court denies Mr. Jordan’s request.

A court may transfer a case over which it lacks jurisdiction in particular 

circumstances:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court 

finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is 

in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other 

such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have been brought 

at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal shall 

proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to 

which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually 

filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.

28 U.S.C. § 1631 (emphasis added).

In other words, “the Court ‘shall’ transfer an action to another federal court 

when: (1) the transferring court finds it lacks jurisdiction; (2) the proposed transferee 

court is one in which the case could have been brought at the time it was filed; and 

(3) the transfer is in the interest of justice.” Space Expl. Techs. Corp. v. United States, 144 

Fed. Cl. 433, 445 (2019).

The statute does not permit this Court to transfer Mr. Jordan’s case because no

proposed transferee court, including the one Mr. Jordan suggests, would have had

jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan’s claims at the time he filed his case. As discussed above, 

the heart of all of Mr. Jordan’s claims and counts is the refund he seeks in the amount of 

$88,578.33. See, e.g., Compl. at 2. But “the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive

jurisdiction over claims for monetary damages against the United States amounting to 

more than $10,000.” Philbert v. United States, 779 F. App’x 733, 734–35 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

(emphasis added); see also Henderson v. United States, 152 Fed. Cl. 460, 469 (2021) (“[T]he 

Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims in excess of $10,000 that 

arise under the Tucker Act.”). This Court thus provides the sole venue for Mr. Jordan’s 

claims, assuming they are properly and timely pled. Indeed, other district courts have 

dismissed Mr. Jordan’s previous cases, which sought a refund of the same money he 

seeks in this case, because such claims belong in this Court.

15 Accordingly, this Court 

finds that transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 would be improper here because no 

federal district court would have jurisdiction to hear any of Mr. Jordan’s claims 

regarding the sums at issue.

15 See cases cited supra note 6.
22

Even if Mr. Jordan’s amended complaint could be construed to seek something 

other than a monetary refund — a contention this Court rejects16 — Mr. Jordan’s claim 

(and his subsidiary causes of action) would be time-barred in other courts for all of the 

reasons explained supra. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (“Except as provided by chapter 71 of 

title 41, every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless 

the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.”).

17

Finally, if Mr. Jordan were to attempt to bring his claims in district court, such 

claims likely would be barred by collateral estoppel in any event. See Jordan II, 744 F. 

App’x at 694 (“We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Counts I–III, V, and VII 

were barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine. These claims attempted to relitigate the 

unappealed prior judgment in [Jordan I].”).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will not transfer Mr. Jordan’s case to the 

district court. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

RCFC 12(b)(1). 

The clerk is directed to enter JUDGMENT accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Matthew H. Solomson 

Matthew H. Solomson

Judge

16 Again, all of Mr. Jordan’s claims have at their heart a request to refund the $88,578.33 debt. 

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58, 62, 67, 73. Mr. Jordan himself characterizes his suit this way. Pl. Resp. at 2 

(“On November 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed this action for the improper withholding of his military 

pay[.]” (emphasis added).

17 Chapter 71 of Title 41 of the United States Code references the Contract Disputes Act, Pub. L. 

No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109), which does not apply in this 

case, but, in any event, similarly contains a six-year timeliness requirement.