* The Honorab le Curtis L. Collier, United States Distr ict Judge for the

Eas tern D istrict of T enne ssee, sitting b y design ation.
1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Six

th Circuit Rul e 206

ELECTRO NIC CIT

ATION: 2003 FED App . 0425P (6th C ir.) File Name: 03a04 25p.06



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________
U NITED S TAT ES OF A MERICA ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

I WAN M ANDYCZ , Defenda nt-Appel

lant. X - - - -
> , - - N No. 02-1846

Appeal from the United States District Court for the E astern D istrict of Michiga n at Flint

. No. 00-40148—Paul V. Gadola, District Judge. Submitted: September 25, 2003
Decided and Filed: December 4, 2003

Befor e: COLE and CL

AY, Circu

it Judges; C OLL

IER, District Judge. *

_________________ COUNSEL

ON BRIE F: And rew J. Hal iw III, Tracy S. Thomas, Joseph A. Sici l iano, HALI

W, SICIL IANO & MYCHAL

OWYCH, 2 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846

Farmington

Hills, Michigan, Richard P. Zipser, Sout hfie ld, Mich igan, for Appellant. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Michel l e Heyer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECI AL INVESTI GATIONS, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________ R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellee, the United States, moves to dismi ss th e inte rlocutory appe al of Defend ant-App ellant, Iwan Mandy cz, for lack of jurisdiction. Becau se the district court’s denial of Mandy cz’s motion for summary j udg ment was not a “final order” of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss Mandycz’s interlocutory appe al for lack of jurisdiction.

Inthe under

lyin g compla

in t, the Government seeks Mandy cz’s denaturalization based on his alleged service a t two Nazi-run labor camps during World War II . In the districtcourt, Mandycz moved for summary judgment on two ground s. First, he

claimed t

h at la ches bars the denaturalization action bec ause the Government unreason abl y delayed filing it s complain

t and that

th e de lay prejudice d Ma ndycz because his mental

capaci ty d iminished i

n th e interveningperiod. Second, he claimed that the denaturalizationaction should be dismissed be cause he is mentally incompetent. Mandycz con t ends that he suffers fromAlzheim er ’s disea se and ca nnot eff ectively particip ate in his own defense.

Ini ti al ly, the district co urt o rdered a competency hearing and requested briefing from both parties on the app licability of mental competency

standards to denaturalization procee dings. However, after considering the part ie s’ brief

s, the court ru

led that in

compete ncy to stand tr

ial is n ot a defense to a dena

turali zati on action. The court, therefore,No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 3

canc elled the compe

tency hearing . The distr

ict judg e als o held that laches is unavailabl e as a d efense against the Government in a denaturalization proceeding. Ac co rd in gl y, the dist rictcourt denied Mandy cz’s motion for summary judgmen t. The district court later

denied Ma

ndy cz’s req uest to certify the

competency

and laches issues in an interlocutory appeal to this Court purs uant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The inst ant uncert ified inter locut ory appeal follo wed. A ltho ugh trial was scheduled to begin on July 16, 2002, the district
c ourt granted Mandy

cz’s motion for a stay of the tria l ’ s commencement

pendingour disposition of the ins tant appe al.

The Governm

ent now moves to dismi ss the interlocutory appeal on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdic tion to consider it because the district court’s denia l of Mandycz’s motion for summa

ry ju dgmen t was not a final order. Mandycz opposes t

he G overnme

nt’s motion

to dismiss, contending that the competency and laches issues are imm ediately

appealable pursuant to the collateral orde r doctr ine set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).

This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions” o f the district c ourts. 28 U .S.C. § 1291. However, the collateral order doctrine establishes that a

“small class” of

interlocutory appeals are imme diately

appeala ble, sinc e they

amount to “fi na l decisions” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cohen , 337 U.S. at

546. That smal l class of appeala ble collateral orders “includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merit s, and that are ef fective ly u

nreviewable on a

ppeal fr om t he fin al judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Cha mbers County Com’n , 514 U.S. 35, 4 2 (1995 ) (cit ing Cohen , 337 U.S. at 546). “If the orde r at issue fails to satisfy

any one of theserequirements, it is not appealable u nde r the col lateral

order exception.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp. , 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988). 4 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846

Even if the district court’s rulingon the mental competency and laches issues was conclusive and sepa rate fr om the mer

its of th e a ct io n, Ma nd ycz ca nn ot sa ti sf y t he th ird prong of the collateral order analy sis, which requires that the order be “effe ctively

unreviewable” on appeal from a f inal judg ment of the distri ct court

. Rights tha t are ef fective ly u

nreviewable
onappeal a

re those th at “cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred.” Mitchel l v. Fors yth , 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985 ) (“A ma jo r ch aracteristic of the denial or granting of a claim appealable under Cohen’ s ‘coll a teral order’ do ctrine is that ‘unless it can be reviewed before [the procee dings terminate ], it ca n never be reviewed at all.’”) (quoting Stack v. Boyle , 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1952 ) (o pinion of Jackson, J.)). Orders implicating c laims of immunity – or claims tantamount to immunity – are the most common examples of collateral orders because immunity i s “an entitl ement

not to stand trial or face the other burdenso f litigation.” Id. at 526 (di strict co urt’s de nial of a claim o f absolute immunity is an order app ealable before final judgment). Pursuant to similar reasoning, the Supreme Court ha s also held immediately appea lable orders deny

ing a mot io n to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds, Abney

v. United Sta t es , 431 U .S. 6 51 (19 77), a nd ord ers den ying a motion to dismiss an indictmen t based on immunity

rooted in the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Helstoski v. Meanor , 442 U.S. 500 (1979).
Other ef fective ly u

nreviewableorders a

re those that resu lt ina loss of l iberty

that cannot be corrected on appea l. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that a n orde r denying a motion to re duce b ail is reviewable as a collateral order because if the appeal was not allowed, no remedy e xists down the line for the resulting loss of liberty

. Stack v. Boyl e , 34 2 U.S. 1 (1951). In addition , it i s well-established that orders of commitment for

psychiatric e

xamination are immediate ly
a ppealab le

. See, e.g., United Sta tes v. Da vis , 93 F.3d 1286 (6th Cir. 1996). In Davis , the Sixth Circuit explained:No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 5

1 Denatural ization pro ceed ings are technic ally con sidere d suits in equ ity, not crim inal actio ns. Fedor enk o v. Un it ed S tates , 449 U.S. 490, 516 (1981). However, beca use at pres ent, me ntal inco mpe tency is o nly recogniz ed a s a defen se to trial in c rimina l proc eed ings, ou r analysis is

nec essarily bas ed on th e cor pus of l aw en compas si ng me nta l i ncompetency in the co ntext o f crimina l cases. In civil case s, th e competency of

a defendant

is not irre levant , of cour se. Incompetent and infant civ il defe ndant s ar e ent it led t o the appoi ntmen t of a guardian ad lit em

. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). However, a ci vil defendant ’s ment al incompe tence doe s not trigg er an a batem ent of trial a s it doe s in th e crimi nal conte xt. The district court has never made a finding concerning M and ycz’s com peten ce, bu t it has appointed him a guardian ad litem . In his int erlocut ory appeal, however, Mandycz claims that the ment al [L]ossof libert

y occ asioned by the commitment for examination, and

the forced intrusion of a court-ordered psychiatric

examination, are com

pletely unreviewable by the time of

final judgment. Appellate review after final judgment would be available only if the defenda

n t is found guilty, and e

ven then, no effective relief

could be provided for her loss of liberty

during the period of commitment.

93 F.3 d a t 128 9 (cit ing United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Th e c om pe te nc y an d laches issues decided by the district c ourt in Ma

ndycz’s cas e failthe Cohen analysis and do not fall into the small class of orders that courts have found immediately appea lable. First, both issues are fully r

eviewable on appeal after a de cision on t he merits. Second, neither the competency nor the l ache s issue is tantamountto immunity nor enta ils an uncor

rectab le loss of liberty along

the lines of psychiat

ric commitment or the denia l of bail.

Alth ough Mandy

cz argu es that his incompet ency claim – if accepted by the court as equivalent to that of a criminal def endant’s incompetency c laim – is tantamount to immun ity , a finding that a criminal defendant is inc o mpetent me rely postpones the proceedings until such time that the defendant is compete

nt to stand

trial. 1 Unlike the protection afforded by 6 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846

incompetenc y standards and protections applicable i n c rim inal cases shou ld also app ly to den aturaliza tion pr oce eding s. absolute immunity or the Double Jeopardy Clau se, t he incompetency

of a criminal defendant

does not implicate an absoluteright not to be tried. Mitchell , 472 U.S. at 525

. Ac co rd in gl y, courts that have addre s sed this issue have consiste ntly ruled that competency

determinations – un like commitm e ntorders – are not appealable as collate ral orders because they are

fully reviewa

ble f oll owing the final judgment of the district

court. See United States v. Mattison , 904 F.2d 709, 1990 WL 75252, at *1 (6th Cir. June 6, 1990);

seealso United Sta tes v. Cara za , 483 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Vamos , 797 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 ( 2 d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987); United States

v. Be ndicks , 439 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). We there fore find that the district court’s ruling concerning

a defendant’s competency in denatur ali zation proceedings is not appealable as a c ollateral order.

Alth ough the Sixth Circuit has not considered the laches defense in the con

text o f Cohen , it routinely reviews lac hes
c laims after decisions on the merits, indicating that thes e decisions are ef

fective ly r

eviewa ble o n appeal. See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Ex ports, Inc. , 270 F.3 d 298 (6th C ir. 2001) ; City of W yandotte v. Consol. Rail Corp. , 262 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2001). Other courts have explicitly refused to consider

l aches claims on an interlocutory

basis. See , e.g. , Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway , 286 F.3d 1195 , 1200 (10 thCir. 2002). In a ddition, it i s wellsettled in this circuit that an order deny ing a mot ion to dismiss on sta

tute of limitati ons gro

unds is not i

mmediate ly appeala ble pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. United States v. Pi , 174 F.3d 745, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (ci tin g United States v. Davis , 873 F.2d 900, 908-09 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 923 (1989)); see also United States v. W eiss , 7 F.3d 10 88, 1089-91 (2d Cir. 1993). This Court explained that “[u]nlike the protection afforded by the Double JeopardyNo. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 7

Clause,” a statute o f limita tions defense “does not . . . encompa ss a ‘right not to be t ried’ which must

be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enj oyed at all.” Davis , 873 F.2d at 909 (quot ing United

States v. MacDona ld , 435 U.S. 850, 861 (1978)). Because laches is an equitable defense similar to a statute of limitations, we find the same reasoning applicable. Therefore, we hold that an ord er deny ing a mot ion to dismis s or a motion fo

r summary

judgmen t on lache s gr ounds is not immediate ly

appealable pursuant to the collat eral order doctrine.

For the fore goin g re asons, thi s Court lac ks jurisdic

tion to consider Mandy cz’s inter locutory appeal. Accordingly , the appeal is DISMI SSED.