### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-50309 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. TARA CARTER, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 2:10-CR-78-2

Before BENAVIDES, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Tara Carter pleaded guilty condi tionally to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more o f marijuana a nd was s entenced to 30 months in prison, f

ollowed by three y ears of supervised release. S he now appeals the denial of a pretrial motion to s uppress statements she gave at border checkpoints on D e c e mber 27 and December 2 8, 2009, and an incriminating letter found during a search of her purse on the second occasion. U n i t e d S t a te s C o u rt o f A p p e al s F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D March 11, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R

. 47. 5, the court has d eterm ined that this op inion should not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-50309 Document: 00512170687 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/11/2013No. 12-50309

We review the district co u r t’s factual findings for c lear error and the ultimate conclusion reg a r d ing constitutionality de novo. United States v. Stevens , 487 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 2007); U nited States v. Jacquinot , 258 F.3d 423, 4 2 7 ( 5 t h C ir. 2001). Our factual review is particularly deferential given that the court’s ruling followed live testi m o n y . United States v. Aguirre , 664 F.3d 606, 612 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied , 132 S. Ct. 1949 (2012). With respect to th e statement on December 27, 2009, the district court did not err by concluding that Carter knowingly and voluntarily waived h er rights pursuant t o Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U

. S. 436 (1966). The “presence or absence of coercive behavior on t h e p a r t of the government” is a crucial factor in determining whether a Miranda waiver is voluntary. United Sta t es v . C a rdenas , 410 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2005). Although Carter was initially handcuffed and detained in a ce l l p r i o r to the interrogation, “such b asic p olice procedures as restraining a s uspect with handcuffs have never been h e ld to constitute sufficient coercion to warrant suppressi o n . ” I d

. at 295. During the interview, Carter was not handcuffed, the interview t ook place in a r oom other than the cell in which she was initially detained, and none of the agents displayed weapons

or stood over her i n an intimidating way. The record s upports the district court’s conclusion that Carter’s waiver was voluntary. Carter next argues t h a t t he D ecember 28, 2009, search of a car and her
purse violated the F ourth Amendment because she did n ot consent to th e search, and any consent she gave did not extend to her purse. Although the district court found she consented, the court als o f ound–correctly–that the search was
a u t h o rized based on probable cause because a canine alerted to the car. See United States v. N

ed , 637 F.3d 5 62, 567 (5th Cir.), cert. d e n i e d , 1 32 S. Ct. 276 (2011); s e e a lso Florida v. Harris , __ U.S.

__ , No. 1 1-817, 2013 WL 598440 *7 (Feb. 1 9, 2013). Whether Carter consented to the s earch is, therefore, irrelevant. Carter do e s n o t c hallenge the district court’s probable cause finding and has thus abandoned any such argument. See United States v. Scroggins , 599 F.3d 4 3 3 , 2 Case: 12-50309 Document: 00512170687 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/11/2013No. 12-50309

447 (5th Cir. 2010)

. O n c e the a gent had probable cause, he was permitted to search any part of the car, including containers–such as Carter’s purse–where contraband might be concealed. See United States v. Castelo , 415 F.3d 407, 412 (5th C ir. 2005); U

nited S tates v . Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 825 ( 1 9 82). Contrary to Carter’s argument, the agent’s unfolding of the incriminating letter found in Carter’s p urse did not exceed the permissibl e scope, given, inter alia, the a gent’s testimony that he s melled burned marijuana a nd that a personal use amount of marijuana could have been concealed in the folded letter. Cart e r also challenges the statement she gave to Agent Gomez at secondary inspection on December 28, 2009, asserting that she was in custody and, therefore, Miranda warnings were required. Whether a suspect is in custody is a n o bjective determination that looks to (1) the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and ( 2) w h e t h er, given the circumstances, “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v . Keohane , 516 U.S. 9 9, 112 ( 1995). The ultimate inquiry is whether there was “a f ormal arrest o r restraint on freedom

o f m ov e m e nt of the degree associated w ith formal arrest.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Carter was told to exit the c a r a nd sit on a bench while the car was searched, b ut there is nothing to indicate that she was r estrained i n the sense of a n arrest; she was n ot handcuffed or placed under formal arrest when her car
was s ent to s econdary inspection, nor was she placed in a cell or interview room, and only one agent was pres e n t

. Her mere referral to secondary inspection, without more, did not constitute custody for Miranda purposes. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s determination. As for the statements Carter subsequently gave to Agent Praznik, Carter signed a Miranda waiver, and she d oes not challenge the validity of that waiver. Accordingly, s he has ab a n d oned that issue. See Scroggins , 599 F.3d at 447. Finally, although Carter’s summary of the argument asserts that her detentions
3 Case: 12-50309 Document: 00512170687 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/11/2013No. 12-50309

on December 27 and December 28 were illegal and u nduly p rolonged, she offers

no analysis or argument in the body of her br i e f

. S h e has l ikewise abandoned those contentions. See Scroggins , 599 F.3d at 447. AFFIRMED.

4 Case: 12-50309 Document: 00512170687 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/11/2013