2022 IL 126383 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

(Docket No. 126383) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOHN CLINE, Appellee. 

Opinion filed January 21, 2022. 

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Neville, Michael J. Burke, 

Overstreet, and Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant John Cline was convicted of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-

3(a) (West 2014)), following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. The 

appellate court reversed his conviction because the only evidence tying him to the 

burglary was a fingerprint found on a portable headphone case inside the residence 

and there was no evidence that the State’s fingerprint expert verified his results with 

another examiner. 2020 IL App (1st) 172631. For the following reasons, we reverse 
 

 

 

 

 

the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Defendant was charged with a single count of residential burglary. A bench trial 

commenced on December 14, 2016. 

¶ 4 At trial, Tom Slowinski testified that on September 1, 2015, he lived alone in a 

three-story, walk-up apartment at 4057 North Kedvale Avenue in Chicago. When 

he left home around 8:15 a.m., the front and back doors of his apartment were 

locked. He returned around 6:15 p.m. and found the front door ajar and scratched. 

Inside, Slowinski discovered that his apartment had been “ransacked” and “torn 

apart.” After police arrived, he walked them through the two-bedroom apartment 

and identified various missing objects, including a laptop, a gun safe and four 

firearms, video games, and a pair of Shure headphones. 

¶ 5 Referencing a photograph taken inside his apartment of a Shure headphone 

case, Slowinski testified that, when he left home on September 1, the headphones 

were in the metal case. When he returned, the case had been moved to the floor, 

and the headphones were gone. Slowinski testified that he did not know defendant 

and had not given him permission to enter his apartment. During cross-examination, 

he testified that he had traveled the week prior to the burglary and had given his 

apartment key to his friend, John Heroff, in case of an emergency. Slowinski did 

not know whether Heroff knew defendant. 

¶ 6 Chicago police evidence technician Hiram Gutierrez testified that on September 

2, 2015, he processed the headphone case. In photos he took, Gutierrez identified a 

“fingerprint ridge impression,” which he lifted from the headphone case with clear 

plastic contact paper. He found no other prints or other forensic evidence inside the 

apartment. He acknowledged that the impression he recovered was “not a full 

print,” if a full print was defined as “everything.” 

¶ 7 Chicago police officer Aaron Joy testified that on October 13, 2015, he took 

defendant’s fingerprints. He did so by rolling each of defendant’s fingers across a 

fingerprint scanner to ensure that the entire print was scanned from the left side all 

the way to the right side of each finger. 

- 2 -
 

 

 

¶ 8 Chicago police detective Timothy O’Brien testified that on October 13, 2015, 

he interviewed defendant after his arrest. He asked defendant if he would have 

reason to be at 4057 North Kedvale Avenue or inside an apartment at that location. 

Defendant responded that “ ‘he would not be over in that area.’ ” 

¶ 9 Chicago police officer Daniel Dennewitz testified that he had worked in the 

department’s latent prints unit for about eight years. For approximately one year, 

he had analyzed, compared, and searched latent fingerprints. He testified that he 

had trained in this area at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Justice 

Information Services Center. He had also worked as an apprentice with the Chicago 

Police Department, during which time he took classes with experts in the field and 

passed annual proficiency examinations. Dennewitz testified that he had previously 

been qualified as an expert in fingerprint examination and identification 

approximately five times and had examined “thousands” of fingerprints during his 

career. 

¶ 10 Defendant’s attorney did not object to the admission of Dennewitz’s testimony 

and declined to question him about his qualifications. The trial court found 

Dennewitz qualified to testify as a forensic expert in fingerprint identification. 

¶ 11 Dennewitz began his testimony by generally explaining about the nature of 

fingerprints and specifically about latent prints. A latent print is one that is found 

at a crime scene that is hidden and needs to be processed. He testified that he 

reviewed the fingerprint lift recovered in this case. There were four latent prints on 

the lift. He determined that one was suitable for comparison because it had enough 

detail from which he could form an opinion. 

¶ 12 Dennewitz compared the latent print to a known print of defendant’s right 

middle finger and concluded that they came from the same source. He explained 

that he had diagrammed approximately 20 points of comparison and marked 9 of 

them on both prints. Dennewitz testified that he repeated his analysis by using the 

same identification procedure and compared a known standard of defendant’s right 

middle finger with the latent print. He concluded within a reasonable degree of 

scientific certainty, based on his experience, training, and education, that the two 

prints came from the same source. 

- 3 -
 

 

 

¶ 13 Defendant’s attorney did not cross-examine Dennewitz regarding the 

methodology employed in positively matching the prints. Instead, he questioned 

him concerning the completeness of the latent print recovered from the headphone 

case. Dennewitz testified that a full fingerprint is “from one side of the fingernail 

to the next side of the fingernail. From the top of the fingernail down to the first 

joint area which would be the crease.” Dennewitz acknowledged that the latent print 

recovered at the scene in this case, in contrast to defendant’s known print, only 

showed a portion of the finger. Dennewitz testified that, had the latent print 

included those missing portions, he would assume those portions would also match 

defendant’s known print. 

¶ 14 Defendant did not present any evidence. 

¶ 15 Defendant was found guilty of residential burglary. The trial court found that 

Slowinski did not give defendant permission to be inside his apartment and, while 

defendant denied being there to police, his fingerprint was identified on the metal 

headphone case. The trial court also found the evidence showed that, although one 

side of the impression was identified on the headphone case as belonging to 

defendant, it was safe to assume that the missing portion of the latent print would 

also match defendant’s right middle finger. 

¶ 16 Defendant, represented by new counsel, subsequently moved for a new trial. He 

alleged, in pertinent part, that his trial counsel, John Paul Carroll, was ineffective 

for not vigorously cross-examining Dennewitz to undermine his conclusion that the 

fingerprint belonged to defendant. Defendant did not challenge the lack of evidence 

that Dennewitz verified his results with another fingerprint examiner. 

¶ 17 At the posttrial hearing, Carroll testified that prior to trial he reviewed the 

discovery provided by the State and developed a defense strategy. It was twofold. 

First, he sought to convince the court that Dennewitz assumed “the other part of the 

fingerprint belonged to [defendant]” and, thus, had not made a “positive 

identification.” To achieve that goal, he asked Dennewitz whether he had simply 

assumed the missing part of the print belonged to defendant. Second, Carroll 

testified that he attempted to show the State failed to prove defendant was not a 

guest of Slowinski’s friend the week prior to the burglary and that it was thus 

impossible to determine when defendant’s fingerprint appeared on the headphone 

case. 

- 4 -
 

 

 

 

 

 

¶ 18 In denying the posttrial motion, the trial court stated that no one had “presented 

any evidence that the fingerprint examiner [wa]s incompetent.” The trial court 

sentenced defendant to eight years in prison. 

¶ 19 On appeal, defendant asserted that the evidence was insufficient to find him 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of residential burglary. Defendant argued that the 

only evidence tying him to the offense consisted of a single, partial fingerprint on 

a portable object. Additionally, the State did not offer evidence that Dennewitz 

followed the accepted methodology for identifying latent fingerprints by verifying 

his results with another examiner. The appellate court agreed and reversed his 

conviction. 2020 IL App (1st) 172631, ¶¶ 28-29. 

¶ 20 Relying upon People v. Luna, 2013 IL App (1st) 072253, the appellate court 

took judicial notice of the “ ‘ACE-V’ ” method of fingerprint analysis as the widely 

accepted method of fingerprint identification. 2020 IL App (1st) 172631, ¶¶ 18-19. 

The appellate court noted the ACE-V method requires four steps: (1) analysis, 

(2) comparison, (3) evaluation, and (4) verification. Id. ¶ 18. Pertinent to 

defendant’s argument, the verification step requires that another examiner repeat 

the first three steps conducted by the initial examiner. Id. Because the State did not 

elicit testimony from Dennewitz that he followed the fourth step, the appellate court 

found that reversal was warranted. Id. ¶ 21. The court concluded the State’s 

evidence was insufficient, as it rested solely on a “flawed examination of a single, 

incomplete fingerprint.” Id. ¶ 28. 

¶ 21 Justice Walker specially concurred. Id. ¶¶ 37-40 (Walker, J., specially 

concurring). He agreed that the evidence was insufficient because the fingerprint 

analysis was not verified by another examiner. Id. ¶ 38. He also would have found 

the evidence insufficient because the State failed to establish the temporal 

proximity of the fingerprint to the burglary. Id. He noted that Slowinski did not 

testify that he had never taken the headphone case out of his apartment. Id. ¶ 40. 

Given the nature of headphones and a headphone case, Justice Walker reasoned 

that Slowinski may have carried the headphone case in public, dropped it, and had 

it returned to him as a courtesy, and that person would thereby have left a print on 

it. Id. Consequently, he believed that a reasonable person could not conclude that 

the partial fingerprint must have been made during the burglary. Id. 

- 5 -
 

 

 

¶ 22 This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. 

Oct. 1, 2019). The Innocence Project and Professor Brandon Garrett were granted 

leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendant’s position. Ill. S. Ct. R. 

345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 

¶ 23 ANALYSIS 

¶ 24 The State contends that the appellate court erred in holding that the fingerprint 

evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 

committed residential burglary. 

¶ 25 It is well settled that, when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether, “ ‘ “after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” ’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008) (quoting 

People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn 

in favor of the prosecution. People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. This court 

will not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless the evidence is so unreasonable, 

improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s 

guilt. People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70. 

¶ 26 A person commits residential burglary when he or she knowingly and without 

authority enters or remains within the dwelling of another with the intent to commit 

therein a felony or theft. See 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2014). 

¶ 27 Slowinski’s testimony was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of 

residential burglary. He testified that, when he left his apartment on the morning of 

the crime, the doors were both locked. When he returned home that evening, he 

observed signs of a forced entry and discovered that his apartment had been 

ransacked. He testified that several items were missing, including headphones that 

had been removed from a metal case. Consequently, defendant does not dispute that 

the evidence was sufficient to show that someone knowingly entered Slowinski’s 

apartment without authority and with the intent to commit theft there. 

- 6 -
 

 

 

 

 

 

¶ 28 The parties agree that the central issue in this appeal concerns the weight of the 

fingerprint evidence linking defendant to the burglary. The State argues that 

Dennewitz’s testimony established that defendant’s fingerprint was found on the 

headphone case and that the credibility of this conclusion is not contingent on 

corroboration by a second expert. 

¶ 29 Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of Dennewitz’s expert 

testimony. Instead, he contends that, while it was properly admitted, without proof 

that his conclusion was verified by another examiner, the State “failed to prove” 

Dennewitz followed the “accepted” ACE-V analytical method for fingerprint 

identification. 1 Defendant insists that, by missing this key analytical step, the 

conclusion by the State’s expert cannot be afforded any weight. In making this 

argument, defendant asks this court to take judicial notice of the ACE-V method as 

the standard analytical procedure followed by forensic fingerprint examiners. 

¶ 30 Defendant, like the appellate court below, relies upon Luna. There, the 

defendant was convicted of murder surrounding the deaths of seven people at a 

restaurant. Luna, 2013 IL App (1st) 072253, ¶ 1. On appeal, he argued, inter alia, 

that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude expert testimony 

that his palm print matched a partial latent print found on a napkin in the restaurant. 

Id. ¶ 49 The defendant asserted that the method used by the expert to match his 

known print to the latent print was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific 

community and therefore, under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 

1923), the expert testimony should have been excluded. Luna, 2013 IL App (1st) 

1

ACE-V is an acronym for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification. The process has 

been described in summary as beginning with 

“ ‘the analysis of the unknown friction ridge print (now often a digital image of a latent print). 

*** If the examiner deems that there is sufficient detail in the latent print (and the known prints), 

the comparison of the latent print to the known prints begins. 

Visual comparison consists of discerning, visually “measuring,” and comparing—within 

the comparable areas of the latent print and the known prints—the details that correspond. *** 

At the completion of the comparison, the examiner performs an evaluation of the 

agreement of the friction ridge formations in the two prints and evaluates the sufficiency of the 

detail present to establish an identification (source determination). *** Verification occurs 

when another qualified examiner repeats the observations ***.’ ” United States v. Herrera, 704 

F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Acads., 

Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 137-38 (2009), 

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/KMC9-7WG3]). 

- 7 -
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

072253, ¶ 49. The defendant alternatively argued that the trial court should have 

held a Frye hearing to determine whether friction ridge analysis is a generally 

accepted technique within the relevant scientific community. Id. 

¶ 31 The Luna court held that the trial court did not err by taking judicial notice of 

the general acceptance within the relevant scientific community of the ACE-V 

method used to match a known fingerprint to a latent fingerprint and therefore a 

Frye hearing was not required prior to admission of the expert testimony. Id. ¶¶ 66, 

81. The appellate court noted that the defendant had not cited any published opinion 

suggesting that the ACE-V methodology is not generally accepted within the 

relevant scientific community or holding that finger or palm print evidence is 

inadmissible, and that the overwhelming conclusions by the courts had been that 

such evidence is admissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 

509 U.S. 579 (1993), or Frye. Luna, 2013 IL App (1st) 072253, ¶ 69. 

¶ 32 Luna and the other cases relied upon by defendant do not inform our decision 

here. In marked contrast, the central issue in this appeal does not concern the 

admissibility of evidence but, rather, a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in 

light of the methodology employed by the State’s fingerprint expert. We note that 

Dennewitz was not asked, and did not testify, as to whether another examiner 

repeated the steps conducted by him. We further note that defendant did not attempt 

to show through cross-examination any flaws in Dennewitz’s methodology in 

reaching his conclusion that the two prints matched. Similarly, defendant did not 

challenge the lack of evidence of verification by another examiner in his posttrial 

motion. Instead, defendant is now asking this court to take judicial notice of extrarecord materials for the purpose of evaluating the evidence presented at trial. Our 

review of the sufficiency of the fingerprint evidence in this case, however, must be 

limited to evidence actually admitted at trial, and judicial notice cannot be used to 

introduce new evidentiary material not considered by the fact finder during its 

deliberations. See, e.g., People v. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1130 (2003). 

¶ 33 We recognize the importance of preventing errors based on fingerprint 

evidence, particularly in a case such as this where there is no other evidence linking 

defendant to the crime. However, defendant’s argument, like the reasoning of the 

appellate court below, wholly ignores the role of a reviewing court in considering 

the sufficiency of the evidence. It is not the function of a court of review to retry a 

- 8 -
 

 

 

 

 

 

defendant (People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209 (2004)), nor is it permissible for a 

reviewing court to take judicial notice of material that was not considered by the 

trier of fact in weighing the credibility of an expert witness’s testimony. 

¶ 34 In People v. Rhodes, 85 Ill. 2d 241 248-49 (1981) (quoting Devine v. Delano, 

272 Ill. 166, 179-80 (1916)), this court explained in the context of fingerprint 

evidence that “ ‘[c]ircumstantial evidence is the proof of certain facts and 

circumstances in a given case from which the jury may infer other connected facts 

which usually and reasonably follow according to the common experience of 

mankind.’ ” Circumstantial evidence is generally sufficient to support a conviction 

if it is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but the trier of fact 

need not search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise 

them to a level of reasonable doubt. Id. at 249. This court further explained that 

fingerprint evidence is circumstantial evidence that attempts to connect the 

defendant to the offense alleged. Id. “[T]o sustain a conviction solely on fingerprint 

evidence, fingerprints corresponding to the fingerprints of the defendant must have 

been found in the immediate vicinity of the crime under such circumstances as to 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprints were impressed at the time 

the crime was committed.” Id. 

¶ 35 The State contends, consistent with Rhodes, that the fingerprint evidence in this 

case was sufficient to establish that defendant was the burglar because it showed 

that his fingerprint was found (1) in the immediate vicinity of the crime and 

(2) under such circumstances as to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

fingerprint was impressed at the time the crime was committed. We agree. 

¶ 36 Dennewitz was found qualified by the trial court to testify as an expert in 

forensic fingerprint identification. He reviewed the fingerprint lift recovered by 

police from the headphone case and determined that one latent print was suitable 

for comparison because it had enough detail from which he could form an opinion. 

He diagrammed approximately 20 points of comparison between the latent and 

known prints and marked 9 of them on both. He compared that latent print to a 

known print of defendant’s right middle finger. He concluded that they came from 

the same source. He then repeated his analysis by using the same identification 

procedure and compared a known standard of defendant’s right middle finger with 

the latent print. Dennewitz concluded within a reasonable degree of scientific 

- 9 -
certainty, based on his experience, training, and knowledge, that the two prints 

came from the same source. Based upon this fingerprint evidence, a rational trier 

of fact could have concluded that defendant left his fingerprint on the headphone 

case at the time of the crime. 

¶ 37 Defendant makes two other arguments concerning the sufficiency of the 

evidence, which are also unpersuasive. He challenges the trial court’s reliance on 

Dennewitz’s testimony because he described the latent print used for comparison 

as “partial” and admitted to extrapolating a conclusion about the missing portion of 

the latent print by making an assumption. The State asserts that this argument 

ignores the role of the trial court in weighing the evidence and would render 

virtually all fingerprint evidence unreliable unless the individual rolled his entire 

fingertip across a surface at the crime scene. 

¶ 38 Here, Dennewitz testified that a full fingerprint stretches from one side of the 

fingernail to the other, and from the top of the fingernail down to the crease of the 

first joint. He acknowledged that the latent print recovered from the headphone 

case, in contrast to defendant’s known print, only showed a portion of the finger. 

Had the latent print included the missing portions, he would assume they would 

also match the known print of defendant. 

¶ 39 The trial court, in determining defendant’s guilt, found Dennewitz’s testimony 

credible and recognized that defendant’s print had been identified on the metal 

headphone case in the burgled apartment. The court further recognized that, while 

the evidence showed that only one side of the impression was identified on the case 

as belonging to defendant, it would naturally be assumed that the missing portion 

of the latent print would also match defendant’s right middle finger. The court also 

noted, in denying defendant’s posttrial motion, that no one had presented any 

evidence that the fingerprint examiner was incompetent. This credibility 

determination was well within the province of the trier of fact, and we do not 

substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight 

of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, 

¶ 64. 

¶ 40 Finally, we address defendant’s claim that, even if Dennewitz’s testimony was 

sufficient to link him to the headphone case, the State offered no evidence that he 

left the partial print on the headphone case during the burglary. Consistent with the 

- 10 -
 

 

 

 

 

 

special concurrence below, defendant claims that, because the latent print was 

found on such an easily moveable object and there was no evidence that his print 

was found elsewhere in the apartment or that he possessed any of the items taken, 

the evidence was insufficient to establish that the print was left at the time of the 

burglary. 

¶ 41 Slowinski testified, however, that he did not know defendant and that on the 

morning of the crime the headphones had been left in a metal case in his locked 

apartment. The headphones were gone when he returned, and the metal case had 

been moved to the floor. Defendant’s print was found on the case that had been left 

behind. Defendant told police that he had not been in the area of Slowinski’s 

apartment building. The trial court’s finding that defendant left the print during the 

burglary, rather than at some other time when he may have had a chance encounter 

with Slowinski’s headphone case that also involved him touching it, was within its 

province as the trier of fact. It was not such an unreasonable inference that the print 

was left during the burglary as to somehow warrant reversal of defendant’s 

conviction. In weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required to disregard 

inferences that flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all 

possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of 

reasonable doubt. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. 

¶ 42 In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that it 

was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable 

doubt of defendant’s guilt of residential burglary. See Wright, 2017 IL 119561, 

¶ 70. 

CONCLUSION 

¶ 43 Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and defendant’s 

conviction for residential burglary is affirmed. 

¶ 44 Appellate court judgment reversed. 

¶ 45 Circuit court judgment affirmed. 

- 11 -