1

 “[#43]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a

specific paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this

convention throughout this order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-02663-REB-MEH

DEMPSEY ALEXANDER KENNEDY, and

CRYSTAL PHIFER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a Tennessee corporation, and

TAMMY MOSNESS, an individual,

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Blackburn, J.

The matters before are (1) Motion for Summary Judgment from CCA

Defendants [#43],1

 filed July 31, 2012; and (2) plaintiffs’ Motion in the Alternative to

Plaintiffs’ Amended Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

[#43] for Additional Time for Specific Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(d) [#55], filed

August 22, 2012. I have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

(federal question) and 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). Having reviewed the motion

and response and the apposite arguments, authorities, and evidence presented by the

parties, it is apparent that there exist genuine issues of material fact that are not

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2

 I note also that the fact that Ms. Phifer was an at-will employee of TCF Bank, and thus had no

formal contract with her employer, does not insulate strangers to the contract from claims of intentional

interference with contract:

Just because the parties to the contract could end the employment

relationship at any time does not absolve a third party from liability where

she wrongfully induces the termination of that same relationship:

The parties to an employment-at-will contract may

terminate the employment without cause or notice;

therefore, an employee does not have a legitimate claim

of entitlement to continued employment against the

employer. However, a contract terminable at will is

entitled to protection from tortious unwarranted

interference from third parties, and until terminated, an

at-will contract is valid and subsisting, and a stranger to

the contract has no right to interfere improperly with it.

See Ramirez v. The GEO Group, Inc., 655 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1190 (D. Colo. 2009) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, at the time this lawsuit was filed, however, Mr. Kennedy had been released from prison. 

Therefore, defendants’ argument that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the

Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), is misplaced. See Norton v. The City of Marietta,

OK, 432 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[P]laintiff, who was not a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or

other correctional facility when he brought suit, did not have to exhaust his administrative remedies first.”). 

3

 As with defendants’ motion to dismiss, the individual defendant, Ms. Mosness, neither asserts

nor supports a claim of qualified immunity, and I therefore do not consider any issues related thereto.

2

appropriate for summary resolution. 2

 

Nevertheless, I briefly note that the parties appear to be under the mistaken

impression that the First Amendment claim in this lawsuit is informed by the standards

enunciated in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224

(1974). The Supreme Court has clarified that the Procunier standard is limited to

regulations concerning outgoing prisoner correspondence. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490

U.S. 401, 413-14, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1881-82, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (citing Turner v.

Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)).3

 Mail coming

into a prison is governed by the more lenient reasonableness standard announced in

Case 1:11-cv-02663-REB-MEH Document 82 Filed 11/20/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 3
3

Turner. 128 S.Ct. at 2261. See also Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147,

1153 (10th Cir. 2007). 

The motion for additional discovery requests that the court postpone ruling on the

motion for summary judgment until the discovery deadline has passed. That deadline

was November 19, 2012. (See Courtroom Minutes/Minute Order [#68], filed

September 14, 2012.) As no additional motions were filed within the deadline, I

consider this motion moot. 

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That the Motion for Summary Judgment from CCA Defendants [#43], filed

July 31, 2012, is DENIED; and

2. That plaintiffs’ Motion in the Alternative to Plaintiffs’ Amended Response

to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#43] for Additional Time for

Specific Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(d) [#55], filed August 22, 2012, is DENIED

AS MOOT.

Dated November 20, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

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