alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1785

CAMDEN-CLARK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Joseph R. Goodwin, 

Chief District Judge. (6:10-cv-01258)

Submitted: February 28, 2012 Decided: March 7, 2012

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dino S. Colombo, Travis T. Mohler, COLOMBO & STUHR, PLLC, 

Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant. D.C. Offutt, Jr., 

OFFUTT NORD, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation 

(Camden-Clark) appeals the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment to St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company 

(St. Paul) in Camden-Clark’s action for a declaratory judgment 

of insurance coverage. 

We review de novo a district court’s order granting 

summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011). Summary judgment 

shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A district court should grant 

summary judgment unless a “reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

We have reviewed the briefs and joint appendix and 

applicable case law and find no reversible error in the district 

court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated 

by the district court. Camden-Clark Mem. Hosp. Corp. v. St. 

Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., No. 6:10-cv-01258 (S.D. W. Va. 

June 28, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 
3

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION


EXHIBIT 32.1

















CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of ZAP (the “Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:   August 15, 2011











By:  /s/ Steven Schneider


Steven Schneider


Co-Chief Executive Officer








By:  /s/ Alex Wang


Alex Wang


Co-Chief Executive Officer





By:  /s/ Benjamin Zhu


Benjamin Zhu


Chief Financial Officer














A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to ZAP and will be retained by ZAP and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 6, 2020

No. 04-19-00717-CV

ELIZABETH BENAVIDES ELITE AVIATION INC.,

Appellant

v.

CITY OF LAREDO, Laredo Jet Center, LLC, John Holler,

Appellees

From the 341st Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CVK002669-D3

Honorable Rebecca Ramirez Palomo, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellees’ brief was originally due December 9, 2019. Neither the brief nor a motion for 

extension of time was filed. On December 16, 2019, we advised appellees by letter that the brief 

was past due. Appellees were asked to file a response within ten days of the date of the letter, 

stating a reasonable explanation for failing to file the brief. Appellees did not file a response. 

We therefore ORDER appellees to file, by or before January 16, 2020, their appellees’

brief and a written response reasonably explaining their failure to timely file the brief. If 

appellees fail to file a brief and written response by the date ordered, we will order the case 

submitted without an appellees’ brief.

_________________________________

Beth Watkins, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 6th day of January, 2020.

___________________________________

Michael A. Cruz,

Clerk of Court
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AARON JOSEPH CUNNINGHAM,

Petitioner

- Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

- Appellee. No. 23

- 35262

D.C. No. 4:22

- cv

- 05165

- MKD

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Mary K. Dimke, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12, 2023 * *

Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and OWENS , Circuit Judges.

Federal pretrial detainee Aaron Joseph Cunningham appeals from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition

challenging his pretrial detention and seeking $ 100,000,000 in gold bullion . We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, s ee McNeely v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 22 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 23

- 35262

Blanas , 336 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) and we affirm.

Cunningham ’s claim that pretrial detention categorically violates

defendants’ due process rights fails. S ee United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739,

742, 75 1

- 5 5 (1987)

. Even assuming Cunningham can assert individualized

challenges to his pretrial detention in a § 2241 petition

— an issue we need not and

do not decide

—

he has not shown any constitutional violations here. 1

This disposition is without prejudice to any motion Cunningham’s counsel

may wish to file in his ongoing criminal proceedings in the district court

challenging his pretrial detention

.

We do not consider Cunningham’s remaining arguments, which he raised for

the first time on appeal . See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.

2009).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED

.

1 Even if Cunningham could establish that his pretrial detention violated his

constitutional rights, he c annot seek damages on that basis. See Nelson v.

Campbell , 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004) (“damages are not an available habeas

remedy”).
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO



18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,



AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO



SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of World Health Alternatives, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Richard E. McDonald, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                   
|-----------------------------------
|/s/ Richard E. McDonald            
|Richard E. McDonald                
|President, Chief Executive Officer,
|Chairman of the Board of Directors 



April 15, 2005
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


                CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTS



To Foothill Independent Bancorp:


We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.
2-89744 on Form S-8 filed March 1, 1984, Registration Statement No. 33-57586 on
Form S-8 filed January 29, 1993, Registration Statement No. 33-64584 on Form
S-8 filed June 17, 1993, and Registration Statement No. 33-83854 on Form
S-3 filed September 12, 1994, of our report dated January 23, 1998 on the
consolidated financial statements of Foothill Independent Bancorp as of December
31, 1997 and 1996 and for each of the three years in the period ended December
31, 1997 included at Page of its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 1997.


                                             /s/ VAVRINEK, TRINE, DAY & COMPANY
                                             -----------------------------------
                                                 VAVRINEK, TRINE, DAY & COMPANY
                                                 Certified Public Accountants

March 26, 1998
Rancho Cucamonga, California
EXHIBIT (99)--OPINION OF OLIVE LLP


Independent Auditor's Report

To the Shareholders and Board of Directors
Indiana United Bancorp
Greensburg, Indiana


We have audited the consolidated balance sheet of Indiana United Bancorp and
subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998, and the related consolidated statements of
income, shareholders' equity and cash flows for each of the two years in the
period ended December 31, 1998.  These consolidated financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company's management.  Our responsibility is to express an
opinion on these consolidated financial statements based on our audits.

The consolidated financial statements as of December 31, 1997, and for the year
then ended have been restated to reflect the pooling of interest with P.T.C.
Bancorp as described in Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements.  We did
not audit the 1997 financial statements of P.T.C. Bancorp, which statements
reflect total assets of $321,993 as of December 31, 1997, and total revenues of
$26,118 for the year then ended.  Those statements were audited by other
auditors whose report has been furnished to us, and our opinion, insofar as it
relates to the amounts included for P.T.C. Bancorp as of December 31, 1997, and
for the year then ended, is based solely on the report of the other auditors.

We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement.  An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting
the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements.  An audit also includes
assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.
We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, based on our audits and the report of other auditors, the
consolidated financial statements referred to in the first paragraph present
fairly, in all material respects, the consolidated financial position of Indiana
United Bancorp and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998, and the results of
their operations and their cash flows for each of the two years in the period
ended December 31, 1998, in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.



Olive LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
January 29, 1999
#### Milliken’s Appeal.

*Executors and administrators*— Decedents’ *estates*— Accounts—Petition *for review.*

*1.*A review of an executor’s account can be had as a matter of right in two cases only; for error on the face of the record, and for new matter that has arisen since the decree. It may be allowed ex gratia for after-discovered evidence as to facts on which the decree was founded, when it is shown that the evidence could not have been procured before the decree by the exercise of due diligence.

2. A petition for review of the first and a supplemental account, of the executors of an estate presented a year after the final confirmation of these accounts, alleging as the only reason for the review that the commissions allowed the executors were excessive, is without merit, where it appears that the petitioners for the review were of full age, were present or represented at the audit of the accounts, and therefore had their day in court.

Argued Feb. 15, 1910.

Appeal, No. 312,

Jan. T., 1909, by Alice N. Milliken et al., from order of O. C. Schuylkill Co., March T., 1907, No. 19, dismissing petition for review of executors’ accounts in estate of Allan C. Milliken, deceased.

Before Fell, C. J., Mestrezat, Elicin, Stewart and *Mosch*zisker, JJ.

Affirmed.

Petition for review of executors’ accounts. Before Wilhelm, P. J.

The facts appear in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

*Error assigned*was the dismissal of the petition.

*Guy E. Farquhar,*with him *Otto E. Farquhar,*for appellants.

*H. Gordon McCouch,*with him *Norman S. Farquhar,*for appellees.

Per Curiam,

March 21, 1910:

This appeal is from an order dismissing a petition for a review of the first and a supplemental account of the executors of the will of Allen C. Milliken. The first account was confirmed absolutely March 14, 1907, and the supplemental ac*503count September 12, 1907. The petition for a review was presented to the court September 7, 1908. The only reason alleged for a review was that the commissions allowed the executors were excessive. If there was any merit in the reason set up, a sufficient answer to the petition was that the appellants had had their day in court. They were of full age, and were present or represented at the audits of the accounts. A review can be had as a matter of right in two cases only: for error on the face of the record, and for new matter that has arisen since the decree. It may be allowed ex gratia for after-discovered evidence as to facts on which the deeree was founded, when it is shown that the evidence could not have been procured before the decree by the exercise of due diligence: Green’s App., 59 Pa. 235; Le Moyne’s App., 104 Pa. 321. In this case there was no error on the face of the record, and no allegation of new matter or of after-discovered evidence.

The order of the court is affirmed at the costs of the appellants.
#### WELLS et al. v. ANGLADE.

No. 2742.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Nov. 15, 1945.

Writ of Error Refused Jan. 7, 1946.

For former opinion, see 23 So.2d 469.

W. S. Rownd, of Hammond, for appellant.

C. Paul Phelps, of Ponchatoula, for ap-pellees.

PER CURIAM.

In an application for rehearing filed on behalf of the defendant, appellant herein, attention is called to the fact that the Court was in error in stating, in the opinion herein rendered, that it was after the motion to strike out the supplemental petition had been filed, that the case was assigned for trial without objection on her part.

Upon checking the record again we find that that is correct and that we were in error in that respect as the supplemental petition was filed after evidence had been taken. However the case was not argued and submitted until several days after the motion *742to strike out had been filed. It was fixed for argument by consent on October 17, 1944 and was argued and submitted “on exception” October 27, 1944. Whether the argument involved the merits as well as the motion to strike out and an exception of no cause of action which had also been filed, we have no means of knowing as the extract from the minutes of court is not clear on that point. We presume it was on the merits also, however, because the next entry found in the minutes shows that judgment was rendered on the merits on February 20, 1945.

The judgment as rendered had the effect of overruling the motion. After it had been signed, defendant had the right to ask that the case be reopened, or that a new trial be granted but apparently she did nothing further than to apply for a devolutive appeal to this court which she was granted.

As we endeavored to point out in the original opinion the supplemental petition did not have the effect of changing the issues in the case. That seems to be the sole complaint that is now made in the application for rehearing. We regret the error that was made in the matter of mentioning dates in the original opinion but we did not consider that as having been material to the real issues that are presented in the case. After carefully going over these matters again we still believe that all these issues were properly disposed of and decided, and the original judgment and decree will be allowed to stand.

Rehearing refused.
TheHonorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1 District of Missouri. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-2118

_____________ Minority Business Enterprise Legal * Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; * Pine Lawn Equality Association, Inc.; * King Management Corporation; * * Appeal from the United States Appellants, * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. v. * * [UNPUBLISHED] Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., * * Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: December 8, 1997 Filed: December 19, 1997

_____________ Before BOWMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs alleged tha

t in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and § 1982 defendant Wal -Mart Stores, Inc., rejected an unsolicited offer by plaintiff King Managemen t Corporation, an African-American owned business, to sell or lease property located in Pine Lawn, Missouri. The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to 1-2-

Fe d. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted
. Plaintiffs appeal. Having considered all the arguments made by plaintiffs for reversa l, we conclude that t he complaint was properly dismissed for the reasons stated in the well-reasoned memorandum and order of the District Court. S ince an extended opinion by this Court would add nothing of substance to the reasoning of the District Court, we forego further discussion of the issues. AFFIRMED. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EXHIBIT 23.1

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLICACCOUNTANTS 

 

To FoothillIndependent Bancorp: 

 

We consent to theincorporation by reference of our report dated January 24, 2003 on the consolidated financial statements of Foothill Independent Bancorp as of December 31, 2002 and 2001 and for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2002, includedat Page 34 of its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002, into Registration Statement No. 33-57586 on Form S-8 filed January 29, 1993, Registration Statement No. 33-64584 on Form S-8 filed on June 17, 1993 and RegistrationStatement No. 33-83854 on Form S-3 filed September 12, 1994 (each of which were amended by post effective amendments filed on July 27, 2000). 

 

/s/ Vavrinek, Trine, Day & Co., LLP

VAVRINEK, TRINE, DAY & CO., LLP 

Certified Public Accountants 

 

March 25, 2003 

Rancho Cucamonga, California
#### Marshall BYRD v. STATE.

8 Div. 138.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

May 21, 1935.

BRICKEN, Presiding Judge.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1488 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1488

To amend the definition of independent student for purposes of the need 
 analysis in the Higher Education Act of 1965 to include older adopted 
                               students.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 24, 2007

  Mr. Coleman (for himself and Ms. Landrieu) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, 
                     Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the definition of independent student for purposes of the need 
 analysis in the Higher Education Act of 1965 to include older adopted 
                               students.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fostering Adoption to Further 
Student Achievement Act''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO INDEPENDENT STUDENT.

    Section 480(d) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1087vv(d)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (6), by striking ``or'' after the 
        semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(8) was adopted from the foster care system when the 
        individual was 13 years of age or older.''.
                                 <all>
```
1

This minute order is issued pursuant to the express authority of the Honorable Robert E. 

Blackburn, United States District Judge for the District of Colorado.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Criminal Case No. 11-cr-00387-REB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

PABLO HERNANDEZ-DIAZ,

Defendant.

MINUTE ORDER1

A Notice of Disposition was filed on October 26, 2011. A Change of Plea hearing

is set for November 4, 2011, at 8:30 a.m. Counsel for the parties shall deliver or email a courtesy copy of all change of plea documents separately to Judge

Blackburn’s chambers AND to the Probation Department not later than 48 hours

before the change of plea hearing date. See D.C.COLO.LCrR 11.1C. If the

documents are not timely submitted, the hearing will be vacated. There will be no

exceptions to this policy. On the date of the hearing, counsel shall then bring with them

an original and one (1) copy of the plea agreement and the statement in advance. See 

D.C.COLO.LCrR 11.1F.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent necessary, the United States

Marshal for the District of Colorado shall assist the court in securing the defendant’s

appearance for this hearing.

Dated: October 26, 2011
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A of Heritage Bankshares, Inc. (the Company) for the year ending December 31, 2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John O. Guthrie, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of the Company, do each hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                    |  |  |  |                        
|------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Date: April 5, 2013 |  |  |  | /s/ John O. Guthrie    
|                    |  |  |  | John O. Guthrie,       
|                    |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer