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The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-2927

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United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Christopher Shields, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

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Submitted: March 11, 2008

Filed: March 27, 2008 

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Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Christopher Shields entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of

possession of cocaine base (crack cocaine) with intention to distribute in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841. Appellant reserved the right to appeal a ruling by the district court1

denying a motion to suppress approximately 4.25 grams of crack cocaine that officers

found in his truck. He now raises that issue on appeal and also appeals his sentence.
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Deputy United States Marshals in Little Rock had an arrest warrant for

Appellant’s fugitive brother, Brian Shields. Brian Shields was suspected of

trafficking crack cocaine and conspiring to assassinate a United States Attorney and

a United States Magistrate Judge. The deputies also suspected Appellant, Christopher

Shields, was assisting Brian Shields in trafficking crack cocaine and evading arrest.

The deputies believed that Brian Shields was present in Little Rock and driving a tan

or champagne Chevrolet truck.

 Already armed with this information and the arrest warrant for Brian Shields,

the deputies received a tip that Brian Shields and a passenger were presently driving

a tan Chevrolet truck. The deputies located the truck and pulled it over. After

stopping the truck, one deputy approached from the front and another approached

from the rear. The deputy who approached from the front asked the driver to exit the

vehicle. Appellant exited from the driver’s seat, and the deputy recognized Appellant

as Christopher Shields, and not as Brian Shields, the person for whom they had the

arrest warrant. The deputy knew from prior information that Appellant had a

suspended driver’s license. The deputy patted down Appellant and placed him in

handcuffs.

At about the same time that Appellant exited the vehicle, the deputy who

approached from the rear arrived at the driver’s side of the truck cab. He looked into

the truck through the open door and saw rocks of crack cocaine resting, unconcealed,

on a dashboard cupholder. The deputy later testified that he could have seen the crack

through the window even if the door had been closed. It was later determined that the

rocks were about 4.25 grams of crack cocaine. Brian Shields was not a passenger in

the truck, but a woman and a child were riding with Appellant. 

Appellant argued below and argues on appeal that the deputies violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when

they handcuffed him and looked into his truck after realizing that he was not Brian
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Shields. We disagree. The deputies were attempting to execute a valid arrest warrant

for Brian Shields, which justified the stop of the truck. The valid stop placed officers

in close proximity to the truck, from which location they could see the crack in plain

view. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990); United States v. Gillon, 348

F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 2003) (approving warrantless seizure of bags of cocaine in

plain view during valid traffic stop). Appellant does not dispute that the crack cocaine

was in plain view. It was the stop itself rather than the detention that created the

opportunity for the second deputy to see the contraband. None of our precedent

regarding vehicle stops and searches prevents an officer from looking into a vehicle

through windows or open doors as a routine step at the initiation of a valid traffic stop.

Further, deputies knew Appellant did not have a valid driver’s license. This

fact, coupled with the deputy’s recognition of Appellant, might well have supported

an arrest or a detention pending the arrival of state officers. Finally, the deputies

suspected Appellant of assisting his brother and expected to find Brian Shields in the

truck. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for the deputies to detain Appellant

for security purposes while ensuring that the brother, a dangerous fugitive, was not

present in the vehicle. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Appellant’s motion to suppress.

Regarding sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence of 37 months’

imprisonment employing the then-current version of the Guidelines that contained a

100:1 crack-to-powder ratio in the drug quantity tables. See U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c) (2006). This sentence was at the bottom of a 37-46

month advisory Guidelines range. At sentencing, Appellant argued that the court

should calculate the advisory Guidelines sentence based on proposed amendments to

the Guidelines. The district court elected not to do so. Subsequently, the Sentencing

Commission adopted the proposed amendments, reducing the disparity between

Guidelines offense levels for trafficking in different forms of cocaine and making
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those amendments retroactive. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2007) (incorporating

amendments effective November 1, 2007). 

Appellant argues on appeal that we should remand his case for resentencing so

that he may enjoy the benefit of the amended Guidelines provisions. The government

consents that a remand is appropriate. Accordingly, we remand to allow the district

court to consider resentencing Appellant, using the amended Guidelines. We

emphasize, however, that we are remanding only to allow the district court to consider

a lower sentence under the amended guidelines, an ability the district court already has

as a result of the decision to make the amendment retroactive. It is still up to the

district court to decide if it wishes to exercise its discretion to resentence, and if so,

the extent of any reduction. 

We affirm Appellant’s conviction but remand for consideration of resentencing

in accordance with this opinion.

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