97-088

 No. 97-088

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

THOMAS JAY HARWOOD, ELSIE RUBY HARWOOD

and THOMAS JOSEPH ARKINSON,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

 v.

GLACIER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,

a Montana Utility Company,

 Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Glacier,

 The Honorable Marc G. Buyske, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellants:

 Patrick A. Flaherty, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana

 Randy S. Laedeke, Laedeke Law Office, Billings, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Larry D. Epstein and Thane P. Johnson; Werner, Epstein

 & Johnson; Cut Bank, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: October 30, 1997

 Decided: November 25, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

 The plaintiffs, Thomas J. Harwood, Elsie Ruby Harwood, and Thomas Joseph

Arkinson, filed a complaint in the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial 

District in

Yellowstone County, in which they alleged that the defendant, Glacier Electric

Cooperative, Inc., had been negligent and that its negligence caused the destruction 

of

their home by fire. Venue was transferred to the District Court for the Ninth 

Judicial

District in Glacier County, which ordered that the trial be conducted in Toole 

County. 

Following trial by jury, a verdict was returned in favor of Glacier Electric. The 

plaintiffs

appeal. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 There are six issues presented on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err when it failed to dismiss this case and defer to

Tribal Court jurisdiction?

 2. Did the District Court err when it denied the plaintiffs' attempts to 

introduce

evidence of and instruct the jury regarding the National Electrical Code and the 

National

Electrical Safety Code?

 3. Did the District Court err when it held that the doctrine of negligence per

se did not apply?

 4. Did the District Court err when it denied admission of several items of

evidence offered by the plaintiffs?

 5. Did the District Court engage in conduct prejudicial to the plaintiffs 

based

on comments made during plaintiffs' closing argument?

 6. Did the District Court deny the plaintiffs a fair trial?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Ruby Harwood and her stepson, Thomas Harwood, each own an interest in real

estate in Pondera County, which is also within the boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian

Reservation. In December 1989, Ruby and Tom Arkinson, a foster child, lived in the

home located on the property.

 On December 9, 1989, Ruby informed the Glacier Electric Cooperative, the

electrical supplier to the home, that the lights in her home were flickering. 

Glacier

Electric sent two linemen to the home, where they discovered that the stab knob

supporting electrical wires had detached from its anchor to the home. As a result, 

the

wires which brought power into the house had been damaged. The linemen repaired the

wires and reattached the stab knob. The next day, the home and all its contents were

destroyed by fire.

 The Harwoods filed a complaint on December 9, 1991, in the Thirteenth Judicial

District in Yellowstone County. They alleged that Glacier Electric negligently 

repaired

the wires and that its negligence caused the fire. On December 9, 1992, they filed 

an

amended complaint to add Arkinson as a plaintiff. After Glacier Electric moved to

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change venue, the District Court granted the motion and transferred the case to the 

Ninth

Judicial District Court in Glacier County. A year later, the plaintiffs filed a 

complaint

in the Blackfeet Tribal Court and moved the District Court to defer jurisdiction to 

the

Tribal Court, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), M.R.Civ.P. The District Court denied that 

motion.

 The parties agreed to bifurcate the liability and damage portions of the 

trial. The

plaintiffs were concerned about their ability to select a jury of nonmembers of the 

Glacier

Electric Cooperative and, therefore, moved the District Court to change the place of 

the

trial. On September 5, 1996, the District Court decided to try the first phase of 

the

bifurcated case in Toole County. After a three-day trial in October 1996, the jury 

found

by a special verdict that Glacier Electric had not been negligent.

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err when it failed to dismiss this case and defer to 

Tribal

Court jurisdiction?

 The decision whether to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to

Rule 41(a)(2), M.R.Civ.P., is within the discretion of the trial court, and we 

review the

district court's decision to determine if the district court abused its discretion. 

See Petritz

v. Albertsons, Inc. (1980), 187 Mont. 102, 107, 608 P.2d 1089, 1092. See also May v.

First Nat'l Pawn Brokers, Ltd. (1995), 270 Mont. 132, 134, 890 P.2d 386, 388. "[T]he

court should consider the expense and inconvenience that will result to the 

defendant,

other prejudicial consequences, and whether terms and conditions attached to the

dismissal may make the defendant reasonably whole." Petritz, 187 Mont. at 107, 608

P.2d at 1092. 

 Here, the plaintiffs brought their motion for a voluntary dismissal in October 

1995,

almost four years after they filed their original complaint and after considerable 

discovery

and multiple proceedings had occurred. The District Court considered the 

"significant

efforts and expense" incurred by Glacier Electric to prepare for trial in the years 

prior

to the plaintiffs' motion, and it also found that the plaintiffs had not been 

diligent in their

efforts to bring this case to trial. Based on these considerations, the District 

Court found

unpersuasive the plaintiffs' preference for another forum.

 The parties agree that the District Court and the Tribal Court have concurrent

jurisdiction and, therefore, that it was appropriate for the District Court to 

consider the

nature of the claim. Plaintiffs concede that, even though they are enrolled Tribal

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members and the home was on Tribal land, this action does not involve any special 

issues

of Blackfeet sovereignty or issues that require the unique expertise of the Tribal 

Court. 

The plaintiffs maintained significant control of this action from the time that they 

initiated

it, and they chose not to seek Tribal jurisdiction until almost four years after its

commencement. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion when it denied the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss and remand to the Tribal 

Court.

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err when it denied the plaintiffs' attempts to introduce

evidence of and instruct the jury regarding the National Electrical Code and the 

National

Electrical Safety Code?

 The standard of review of a district court's refusal to give jury instructions 

is

whether the district court abused its discretion. See Northwest Truck & Trailer 

Sales,

Inc. v. Dvorak (1994), 269 Mont. 150, 157, 887 P.2d 260, 264. A district court has

broad discretion regarding the instructions it gives or refuses to give to a jury. 

See Savik

v. Entech, Inc. (1996), 278 Mont. 152, 158, 923 P.2d 1091, 1095; Lacock v. 4B's

Restaurants, Inc. (1996), 277 Mont. 17, 20, 919 P.2d 373, 375.

 The plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred when it disallowed their

proposed jury instructions regarding the NEC and the NESC. Glacier Electric, on the

other hand, contends that the instructions were properly withheld from the jury 

because

the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence at trial regarding the NEC or the 

NESC. We

stated in King v. Zimmerman (1994), 266 Mont. 54, 64, 878 P.2d 895, 902, that "[a]

party [is] not prejudiced by a refusal of his proposed instructions where the 

subject matter

of the instruction is not applicable to the pleadings and facts, or not supported by 

the

evidence introduced at trial." See also Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp. (1996), 276

Mont. 342, 359-60, 916 P.2d 122, 132; Cottrell v. Burlington N. R.R. Co. (1993), 261

Mont. 296, 306, 863 P.2d 381, 387. 

 Upon review of the record, we agree with the District Court and conclude that

although the plaintiffs at certain times during the trial referred to the NEC or the 

NESC,

at no time did they offer evidence of how either standard applies to the alleged 

facts of

this case such that it would merit an instruction to the jury or be relevant to their

deliberation. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion

when it denied the proposed jury instructions.

 The plaintiffs assert that they attempted, through expert testimony, to 

introduce

evidence of the NEC and the NESC at trial, but that the District Court improperly 

denied

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those attempts. We stated in Busta, 276 Mont. at 353, 916 P.2d at 128, that a 

district

court has broad discretion to determine if evidence is admissible, and absent an 

abuse of

discretion, we will not reverse the district court's determination. Furthermore, 

"all

questions of law, including the admissibility of testimony, [and] the facts 

preliminary to

such admission . . . must be decided by the court." Section 26-1-201, MCA. 

 Here, the District Court stated that "[the plaintiffs' expert] will not be 

allowed to

testify as to the legal burdens that [the NEC and the NESC] impose upon the Co-op . .

. . That's a legal conclusion and he doesn't get to testify on that." See generally 

Crow

Tribe of Indians v. Racicot (9th Cir. 1996), 87 F.3d 1039, 1045 (stating that the 

role of

expert testimony is to interpret and analyze factual evidence, not to testify about 

the law). 

We conclude after a review of the record that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion when it excluded the testimony based on its determination that there were

insufficient factual grounds to establish the relevancy of the NEC and the NESC, and

furthermore, that the plaintiffs' expert testimony regarding the NEC and the NESC was

directed to a question of law. We affirm the District Court's evidentiary rulings

regarding the NEC and the NESC and its subsequent denial of proposed jury 

instructions

related to those sources.

 ISSUE 3

 Did the District Court err when it held that the doctrine of negligence per se 

did

not apply?

 We review a district court's conclusion of law to determine whether its

interpretation of the law is correct. See Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co.

(1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686. See also Kreger v. Francis (1995), 

271

Mont. 444, 447, 898 P.2d 672, 674; Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245

Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603-04.

 The plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the evidence. 

They

relied on testimony that the Glacier Electric linemen violated certain company 

procedures

when they repaired the damaged wires, and asserted that those violations constituted

negligence per se. Although the record supports the plaintiffs' contention that the

linemen, in fact, violated company procedures during their repairs at the Harwood 

home,

the District Court denied the motion based upon the issue of causation. Thereafter, 

the

plaintiffs proposed that the jury be instructed regarding negligence per se; 

however, the

District Court denied the instructions. The District Court stated that the 

plaintiffs failed

to satisfy the essential elements of negligence per se in Montana law and, 

therefore, were

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not entitled to an instruction on that theory of liability.

 Negligence per se requires that: (1) the defendant violated a particular 

statute; (2)

the statute was enacted to protect a specific class of persons; (3) the plaintiff is 

a member

of that class; (4) the plaintiff's injury is of the sort which the statute was 

enacted to

prevent; and (5) the statute was intended to regulate members of the defendant's 

class. 

See Patten v. Raddatz (1995), 271 Mont. 276, 283-84, 895 P.2d 633, 638; Hislop v.

Cady (1993), 261 Mont. 243, 247, 862 P.2d 388, 391. In order to impute liability to 

a

defendant as a matter of negligence per se, this Court has repeatedly stated that the

defendant must have violated a statute, as opposed to merely an administrative 

regulation,

safety code, or professional standard. See Thayer v. Hicks (1990), 243 Mont. 138, 

150,

793 P.2d 784, 792; Taylor, Thon, Thompson & Peterson v. Cannaday (1988), 230 Mont.

151, 155, 749 P.2d 63, 65-66; Cash v. Otis Elevator Co. (1984), 210 Mont. 319,

326-27, 684 P.2d 1041, 1045; Stepanek v. Kober Constr. (1981), 191 Mont. 430, 438,

625 P.2d 51, 56. The violation of a non-statutory standard may be used as evidence 

of

negligence, but it is insufficient grounds on which to find the defendant negligent 

per se. 

Thayer, 243 Mont. at 150, 793 P.2d at 792; Cannaday, 230 Mont. at 155, 749 P.2d at

66; Cash, 210 Mont. at 326-27, 684 P.2d at 1045.

 The plaintiffs failed at trial to assert that the linemen had violated any 

statute. 

Nonetheless, they contend that the Glacier Electric policies are in fact statutory, 

based

upon Glacier Electric's status as a licensed Montana corporation and its attendant

obligation to follow its own corporate bylaws and procedures. We decline to 

recognize

such a tenuous connection as sufficient grounds to elevate what are essentially just 

a

private corporation's internally created rules to the same status as a statute 

passed or a

code adopted by this State's Legislature. Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiffs 

do not

allege the threshold elements of a negligence per se claim, and that the District 

Court was

correct when it refused to direct the verdict or offer jury instructions based on 

negligence

per se.

 ISSUE 4

 Did the District Court err when it denied admission of several items of evidence

offered by the plaintiffs?

 We review a district court's evidentiary rulings to determine whether the 

district

court abused its discretion. Busta, 276 Mont. at 353, 916 P.2d at 128; Galbreath v.

Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc. (1995), 270 Mont. 19, 22, 890 P.2d 382, 384.

 First, the plaintiffs sought to introduce a video of their expert witness 

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conducting

an experiment with wires to demonstrate evidence of arcing, and then again to rebut

testimony from the Glacier Electric expert. Wire arcing generally involves a small 

flow

of electricity between two wires, which, although usually not capable of blowing a 

circuit

breaker, is able to create intense heat of up to 4000 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Plaintiffs alleged

that the fire occurred after the wires in the house had been damaged and then arced. 

Based on the plaintiffs' failure to establish an adequate foundation for the video, 

the

District Court refused to allow its use. 

 Plaintiffs contend that arcing was a legitimate issue at trial and, as such, 

that they

should have been allowed to present the video demonstration for the jury's 

understanding. 

However, Glacier Electric alleged and the plaintiffs did not deny that the 

conditions of

the arcing experiment in the video differed significantly from the conditions at the

Harwood home. 

 We have held that to provide a proper foundation for demonstrative evidence of

an experiment, the offering party must establish that the experiment was conducted in

substantially similar conditions to the conditions at the time of the original 

occurrence. 

See Richardson v. Farmers Union Oil Co. (1957), 131 Mont. 535, 548, 312 P.2d 134,

142. See also Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 194-95, 657

P.2d 594, 599; Bernhard v. Lincoln County (1968), 150 Mont. 557, 561, 437 P.2d 377,

380. Moreover, the admissibility of evidence of an experiment depends on whether it

would assist the jury to more intelligently consider the issue. See Barmeyer 202 

Mont.

at 194-95, 657 P.2d at 599. Here, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion when it found that the conditions in the experiment were not similar 

enough

to establish a foundation for the video, and when, based upon the substantial expert

testimony already presented, it found that the jury had heard sufficient testimony to

understand the concept of arcing and did not need a further demonstration.

 Second, the plaintiffs also sought to submit as an exhibit asbestos shingles 

from

the Harwood home. An investigator for the plaintiffs testified that he had 

retrieved the

shingles from inside the home's foundation after the fire. The record reveals that

although all the shingles on the home were of the same material, the shingles which 

the

plaintiffs offered as evidence had been cracked, broken apart, and pieced together 

again

by the investigator. Glacier Electric objected to admission of the shingles as an 

exhibit,

but stipulated to their use as demonstrative evidence. The District Court admitted 

them

for that purpose.

 The plaintiffs contend that the District Court should have admitted the shingles

unconditionally because they were relevant to demonstrate that the wires may have 

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been

damaged by the sharp shingles and, therefore, been made more likely to arc. The 

record

reflects that the plaintiffs could not show that the shingles which they sought to 

admit

were in fact the shingles that surrounded the area where the wires entered the home. 

Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to conclude that 

the

shingles offered were not in the same condition as those shingles which the wires may

have actually contacted. As demonstrative evidence, the shingles still permitted the

plaintiffs to provide the jury with an understanding of the shingles' texture and 

their

potential for damaging the wires, without the risk of suggesting that the shingles 

at issue

were in the identical condition. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 

did not

abuse its discretion when it limited the shingles' use as demonstrative evidence.

 ISSUE 5

 Did the District Court engage in conduct prejudicial to the plaintiffs based on

comments made during plaintiffs' closing argument?

 The standard of review of discretionary trial court rulings is abuse of 

discretion. 

See May v. First Nat'l Pawn Brokers, Ltd. (1995), 270 Mont. 132, 134, 890 P.2d 386,

388. Discretionary trial court rulings include such things as trial administration 

issues,

scope of cross-examination, post-trial motions, and similar rulings. See Steer, 

Inc. v.

Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 604.

 Here, the District Court interrupted the plaintiffs' closing argument and 

instructed

counsel in chambers to "stop testifying" as to facts not in the record. The 

District Court

stated that some of the statements and demonstrations that the plaintiffs were 

making in

their closing argument were not proven. Before the plaintiffs continued their 

closing

argument, the District Court instructed the jury as follows:

I previously instructed you on a couple of occasions, that what attorneys say

or do in the course of opening arguments or closing arguments is not

evidence. The evidence in this case is what you have heard from witnesses

who appeared in the witness box and from the exhibits which were admitted

into evidence and those which you will take into the jury room.

The plaintiffs contend that the District Court's interruption of their argument and 

its

subsequent instruction to the jury constituted interference and prejudiced the 

jury. 

 Section 25-7-301(6), MCA, states in relevant part that "[c]ounsel, in arguing 

the

case to the jury, may argue and comment upon the law of the case as given in the

instructions of the court, as well as upon the evidence in the case." Furthermore, 

it is

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well-accepted that a party may not in his or her closing argument discuss or 

introduce

facts not previously proven. See, e.g., People v. Roberts (Cal. 1992), 826 P.2d 274, 

294;

State v. Potts (Kan. 1970), 468 P.2d 78, 83. 

 Here, the District Court interrupted the closing argument when the plaintiffs'

attorney began to discuss and demonstrate how the shingles allegedly cracked and wore

the wire bare. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the District Court did 

not

err when it determined that the plaintiffs had failed to present any evidence that 

the wires

were in fact cracked or stripped bare from the shingles. Accordingly, we conclude 

that

the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it interrupted the closing 

argument

and directed the plaintiffs' attorney not to introduce or discuss evidence that was 

not

already a matter of record.

 As to the plaintiffs' assertion that the District Court inappropriately 

interrupted the

closing argument and prejudiced their case, we conclude otherwise. The court's

statement to the jury made no specific reference to the statements in the plaintiffs'

closing, nor to their theory of the case. Its initial interruption of the argument 

in front

of the jury was similarly benign: "Excuse me, Mr. Flaherty, will you approach--

let's go

into chambers. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we'll be right back." Therefore, 

we

hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by its interruption and 

admonition

during plaintiffs' closing argument.

 ISSUE 6

 Did the District Court deny the plaintiffs a fair trial?

 The plaintiffs allege a number of other errors by the District Court, the 

cumulative

result of which they assert was an unfair trial. However, they cite no relevant 

legal

authority in support of their claims. Furthermore, after a review of the record, we

conclude that their allegations that the District Court erred and acted with bias 

throughout

the trial are without merit. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not 

deny the

plaintiffs a fair trial. 

 We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

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