United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 11-3717

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Tiran Rodez Casteel, also known as Tiran R. Casteel

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

___________________________

No. 12-2707

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Tiran Rodez Casteel, also known as Tiran R. Casteel

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Council Bluffs

____________
 Submitted: January 16, 2013

Filed: June 21, 2013

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Separate juries convicted Tiran Rodez Casteel(Casteel) of(1) carjacking, using

or carrying a firearm in relation to a violent crime, obstructing justice, and witness

tampering in the first trial; and (2) two counts of being a felon in possession of a

firearm in the second. After the first trial, the district court sentenced Casteel to 319

1

months imprisonment for the first four convictions. At a separate sentencing after the

second trial, the district court sentenced Casteel to 63 months for each of the firearms

counts, to be served concurrently with each other and Casteel’s four other counts of

conviction. Casteel appeals, and we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On September 11, 2008, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Darlene Eitzen, a

76-year-old widow, was awake and alone in her Iowa farmhouse when two gunmen,

later determined to be Casteel and his son Devan Casteel (collectively, Casteels),

2

forced their way into Eitzen’s home and robbed her. Devan held Eitzen in a chair at

gunpoint while Casteel searched the house for valuables. 

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern 1

District of Iowa.

We affirmed Devan’s convictions in United States v. Casteel, 663 F.3d 1013,

2

1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 2011).

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Eitzen suspected the robbers were responsible for a July 27, 2008 burglary of

part of her deceased husband’s coin collection because they seemed familiar with her

house and the coin collection. Investigators later learned that in the days following

the July 2008 burglary the Casteels sold more than $10,000 worth of coins at a coin

shop in St. Joseph, Missouri. 

The Casteels’ armed robbery of Eitzen lasted about an hour. Eitzen spent most

of the hour at gunpoint. Before the Casteels left, Devan twice warned Eitzen not to

move from her chair because someone would be watching her. After the robbersleft,

Eitzen did not leave the chair for about forty-five minutes to an hour because she

“was scared that they were out there and may even shoot [her].”

Once she felt safe enough to move, Eitzen tried to call for help, but the Casteels

had cut the telephone lines. Eitzen later discovered her cell phone in a cup of water. 

Eitzen looked out the window and learned the Casteels had stolen her car. With no

other way to summon help, Eitzen walked in the rain to a neighboring farmhouse

where she called the local sheriff to report the robbery. When Deputy Jake Daly

arrived at the neighbor’s house at approximately 1:30 a.m. on September 12, 2008,

he found Eitzen frightened and crying. 

 

The robbery investigation quickly focused on the Casteels. Later in the

morning on September 12, Casteel, a convicted felon, purchased two firearms from

Special Agent Paul White, who, unrelated to the robbery investigation, was working

undercover for the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

(ATF). Devan placed the firearms in the backseat ofthe Casteels’ green 1996 Pontiac

Bonneville.

Shortly thereafter, ATF officers arrestedCasteelfor being a felon in possession

of a firearm and Devan for aiding and abetting the firearm purchase. After the

Casteels were in custody, ATF Agent Tully Kessler photographed and searched the

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Pontiac Bonneville incident to the arrests. In addition to the two firearms Casteel had

just purchased, Agent Kessler discovered coins in a bank bag and coin box. Agent

Kessler seized the firearms, but did not retrieve the coins at that time because they

were not related to the firearms investigation.

Agent Kessler asked Iowa State Trooper John Hitchcock, who was assisting

with the undercover operation, whether any robberies had been reported. Upon

learning of the Eitzen robbery, law enforcement officers secured the Bonneville and

obtained a search warrant for the car. Further investigation tied the coins to the

Eitzen robbery. 

A subsequentsearch of the house the Casteels shared with Casteel’s girlfriend,

Anna Dawn Hutt, revealed additional robbery evidence, including more coins; a map

officers described as a “back way” to Eitzen’s house through farm fields; computer

evidence of internet searches about the Eitzens and rare coins; and an all-terrain

vehicle (ATV) with burglary tools and fresh vegetation on it.

The robbery investigation also revealed Casteel had recruited others to take

part in the robbery. Nathan Wilcoxson, Hutt’s son, testified Casteel recruited him to

rob Eitzen, and Wilcoxson even took part in a “dry run” with the Casteels before the

robbery. Wilcoxson went with the Casteels to Eitzen’s farm one night, but they

aborted the robbery because it wastoo late to carry out Casteel’s plan, which required

Eitzen to be awake.

Wilcoxson testified Casteel instructed him “[a]fter the door was kicked in

[Wilcoxson] was supposed to run to [Eitzen’s] chair and hold her down while the

other person went upstairs and got the coins.” If Eitzen resisted, Wilcoxson was to

do “[a]nything in [his] power” to make her comply, including “[p]istol-whip her, hit

her.” In attempting to recruit Timothy Blank to travel with Casteel by ATV to a

house where they could rob the residents of their gold at gunpoint, Casteel warned

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Blank the robbers might have to kill their victims if the robbers used each other’s

names or the victims otherwise recognized them. 

After his arrest, Casteel sought Wilcoxson’s help in preventing Eitzen from

testifying. While awaiting trial, Casteel made phone calls and wrote letters to

Wilcoxson that Wilcoxson understood to mean Casteel wanted Wilcoxson to kill or

harm Eitzen to prevent her from testifying against Casteel or, alternatively, arrange

for someone else to “take care of business [Casteel’s] way” so Eitzen would not

“show up on the stand.” The government introduced transcripts of the calls and

copies of the letters at trial in support of Wilcoxson’s testimony. Casteel’s cellmate,

Anthony Formaro, testified Casteel spoke with him about arranging to have Eitzen

“eliminated from existence on this earth.” 

B. Procedural History

On February 19, 2009, a grand jury charged the Casteels in a nine-count third

superseding indictment. Counts 1 and 3 charged Casteel with being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 2. 

Count 1 related to Casteel’s purchase of a Winchester 12-gauge shotgun at a garage

sale; Count 3 related to Casteel’s purchase of the two firearms from Special Agent

White. Count 2 charged Devan with knowingly transferring a firearm to a felon, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d) and 924(a)(2).

Count 4 charged Casteel and Devan with carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2119 and 2. Counts 5 and 7 respectively charged Casteel and Devan with using

or carrying a firearm and brandishing that firearm in relation to the violent federal

crimes of carjacking and robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). 

Count 6 charged the Casteels with affecting commerce by robbery, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2. Count 8 charged Casteel with obstruction or attempted

obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and Count 9 charged Casteel

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with tampering with a witness by attempting to kill, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(a)(1)(A).

Before trial, the district court partially granted Casteel’s motion to sever the

firearms charges, finding the evidence related to Casteel’s prior felony conviction

would create a “high risk of prejudice” as to the remaining counts. The district court

denied Casteel’s motions to suppress evidence seized from the Bonneville and to

exclude evidence related to the earlier robbery of Eitzen’s residence.

 

On November 20, 2009, the jury convicted Casteel of all four countssubmitted

against him in the first trial. Casteel filed post-trial motions, which the district court

denied. 

Before sentencing, Casteel was twice evaluated by Dr. Dan Rogers, a clinical

psychologist who had previously found Casteel incompetent to stand trial on fraud

charges in 2004. In 2010 and 2011, Dr. Rogers concluded Casteel suffered from

paranoid schizophrenia with depression, dementia, and mental retardation. Dr.

Rogers opined Casteel was incompetent, and unlikely to have his competence

restored.

On January 3, 2011, Casteel moved for a competency hearing pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). On the government’s motion, the district court ordered a mental

evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4247. Beginning in April 2011, Dr.

Ronald Nieberding, a forensic psychologist with the United States Department of

Justice, observed Casteel on a nearly daily basis for six to eight weeks, frequently

interacting with him. Dr. Nieberding concluded Casteel suffered from “mild

symptoms of an underlying Schizoaffective Disorder,” but “appear[ed] to maintain

an accurate factual and rational understanding of his current legal case” and

“appear[ed] capable of consulting with, and assisting counsel at the” time of

evaluation.

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On September 14, 2011, the district court held a competency hearing at which

Dr. Rogers, Dr. Nieberding, and Dr. Loren Olson, a psychiatrist, testified. Dr. Rogers

and Dr. Nieberding each testified consistently with their reports. Dr. Olson did not

opine as to Casteel’s competency. Dr. Olson testified Dr. Rogers’s and Dr.

Nieberding’s diagnoses seemed supported by their testing and that the diagnostic

difference in this case between schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder was

minimal. 

After the hearing, the district court determined Casteel suffered from some

form of mental illness, but concluded Casteel was competent to proceed with

sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). In reaching that conclusion, the district court

found Dr.Nieberding’s determination of competence more credible than Dr. Rogers’s

contrary determination. The district court also denied Casteel’s request to

retroactively declare Casteel unfit to stand trial. On November 22, 2011, the district

court sentenced Casteel to 319 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release.

 

On February 29, 2012, after a two-day trial, a separate jury convicted Casteel

of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court denied

Casteel’s pro se motion for judgment of acquittal. On July 11, 2012, the district court

sentenced Casteel to 63 months on each of those countsto run concurrently with each

other and with Casteel’s 319-month sentence for his other counts of conviction.

Casteel appeals his convictions and sentences.

3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Competency

Casteel challengesthe district court’s competency rulings. “The conviction of

an incompetent person is a violation of due process.” United States v. Rickert, 685

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3

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F.3d 760, 765 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966)). 

“[A] defendant must be competent at all stages of the prosecution, including

sentencing.” Id. A defendant is competent to stand trial or face sentencing “if he ‘has

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding’ and ‘has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.’” Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402

(1960) (per curiam)). 

Section 4241(a) “directs the district court to grant a motion for a competency

hearing when ‘there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently

be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to

the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the

proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 4241(a)). “The Constitution also requires an adequate hearing if there is sufficient

doubt about the accused’s competence.” Id. “In order to make a determination of

competency, the district court should consider the behavior, demeanor, and prior

psychiatric history of the defendant.” United States v. Turner, 644 F.3d 713, 721 (8th

Cir. 2011). 

We review the district court’s “decision not to order a competency evaluation

or hold a competency hearing” for an abuse of discretion, id. at 723, and its “finding

of competency for clear error,” United States v. Kiderlen, 569 F.3d 358, 363 (8th Cir.

2009). See also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (recognizing “the trial

judge . . . will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity

decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant”). 

Importantly, “not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates

incompetence.” Vogt v. United States, 88 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 1996)

(internal marks omitted). That a defendant suffers from a mental

deficiency or demonstrates “bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior”

does not necessarily make him incompetent to stand trial. Id. (internal

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marks omitted). A defendant’s competency is not static and may change

over even a short period of time. See Lyons v. Luebbers, 403 F.3d 585,

593 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that a district court must remain alert to

changing circumstances that may indicate that a defendant who was

competent at the commencement of trial has become incompetent).

United States v. Ghane, 593 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2010).

1. Retroactive Determination

After his conviction in the first trial but before sentencing, Casteel requested

that the district court make a retroactive determination of Casteel’s competency at

trial. The district court “decline[d] to make a retroactive determination regarding

[Casteel’s] competency to have stood trial,” questioning the court’s authority under

18 U.S.C. § 4241 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2). The district court also determined

the circumstances in Casteel’s case did not warrant a retroactive competency

determination. See Speedy v. Wyrick, 702 F.2d 723, 725 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating “the

test for determining whether a trial court should sua sponte order a competency

hearing” under the rule of Pate); Harkins v. Wyrick, 552 F.2d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir.

1977) (explaining a post-conviction evaluation of a defendant’s competency “is the

proper remedy for wrongful denial of a pretrial [competency] hearing” when “a

meaningful hearing . . . is still possible”). Casteel contends “the court below errored

[sic] in failing to address whether Casteel was mentally competent during his trial.” 

We disagree.

Even if we assume the district court had the authority to grant Casteel a

retroactive competency determination more than a year after judgment, Casteel fails

to persuade us the district court committed reversible error in denying his requested

relief. In arguing a retroactive competency determination was necessary, Casteel’s

counsel states, “Counsel beliefs[sic] that the Government, and perhaps the Court, will

rely partially on Casteel’s pretrial conduct and trial demeanor to assess his

competency,” but Casteel fails to point to anything in Casteel’s pretrial conduct and

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trial demeanor that would have alerted the district court to any competency issue at

the time of trial. At oral argument, Casteel, through counsel, conceded Casteel made

no irrational or incomprehensible comments nor had any outbursts before the district

court. 

Relying exclusively on Dr. Rogers’s competency hearing testimony, Casteel

maintains “[t]he record shows he was never restored to competence” after 2004. But

Casteel acknowledges he is unable to say whether the district court, at the time of

trial, was even aware of Casteel’s 2004 incompetency determination. Casteel also

ignores the other record competency evidence, including “the 2005 competency

restoration examination that determined [Casteel’s] competency had been restored”

and Dr. Nieberding’s competence determination, which the district court found

“consistent with its own observations of [Casteel]” during and after trial. Mindful of

“the district court’s institutional advantage over the court of appeals in evaluating the

demeanor of the defendant,” Rickert, 685 F.3d at 767, we conclude the district court

did not abuse its discretion in deciding Casteel’s circumstances did not warrant a

retroactive competency determination. See Turner, 644 F.3d at 725-26 (concluding

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing

despite the defendant’s prior diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and “bizarre or

irrational” behavior at trial).

2. Firearms Trial and Sentencing

Casteel also contends the district court clearly erred in finding him competent

(1) to stand trial for the firearms charges, and (2) at the time of each sentencing. 

Casteel’s claims again fall short. Although he contends “[t]he expert testimony

presented at the September 14 competency hearing clearly showed that [Casteel]’s

th

mental health disorders have not resolved,” Casteel acknowledges “whether Tiran

Casteel lacks competency is a close call” that “may hinge on the [district court’s] own

observations.” 

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The district court cited several compelling reasons for crediting

Dr. Nieberding’s conclusion that Casteel was competent despite his mental illness,

rather than Dr. Rogers’s contrary opinion. First, the district court questioned Dr.

Rogers’s determination that Casteel’s current level of cognitive functioning was

similar to what it was in 2004, despite the 2005 evaluation indicating Casteel’s

competency had been restored. 

Second, the district court expressed concern about “the accuracy of some [of]

the facts relied upon by Dr. Rogers” in concluding Casteel did not understand the

proceedings against him. In particular, the district court questioned Dr. Rogers’s

surprise that Casteel, notwithstanding his familiarity with jails and prisons, did not

understand that his letters about silencing Eitzen would not remain private. To the

contrary, the district court reasonably found Casteel’s coded language in his letters,

“presumably to avoid detection,” supported “the exact opposite conclusion than that

reached by Dr.Rogers” and demonstratedCasteel understood the proceedings against

him because he sought to eliminate Eitzen as a key witness. 

Third, the district court credited Dr. Nieberding’s opinion because

Dr. Nieberding interacted with Casteel more frequently and for a longer period than

Dr. Rogers. Finally, as noted above, the district court determined Dr. Nieberding’s

determination of competence was more consistent with the court’s own observations

of Casteel’s behavior during and after trial. “[I]t is ‘certainly within a district court’s

province to choose one expert’s opinion over a competing qualified expert’s

opinion.’” United States v. DeCoteau, 630 F.3d 1091, 1096 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Ghane, 593 F.3d at 781). The district court did not err in finding Casteel competent

to stand trial and to proceed with sentencing. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Felon in Possession

On August 2, 2008, Dennis Caudill of Coin, Iowa, held a garage sale at which

he offered a Winchester 12-gauge shotgun for sale. The Casteels stopped at the sale,

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and Casteel picked up the shotgun, “looked it over,” and “made sure it worked.” On

August 10, 2008, the Casteels returned to Caudill’s residence unannounced, and

Casteel negotiated the purchase of the shotgun for $300 cash. After Casteel

exchanged the cash for the shotgun, Casteel handed the gun to Devan, who put the

gun in the car. Caudill also signed a receipt Casteel prepared indicating Caudill sold

the gun to Devan.

Later that month, Casteel negotiated the sale of the shotgun, along with two

other guns, to Ricky Dean Rivers. Although Devan did not participate in the

negotiations, Casteel advised RiversthatRivers needed to payDevan becauseCasteel

“wasn’t supposed to have guns.”

On September 12, 2008, Special Agent White, responding to an online

advertisement as part of an undercover operation, arranged to meet Casteel at the

America’s Best Value Inn to sell Casteel two firearms—a Ruger .40 caliber pistol and

a Colt Delta Elite 10 mm pistol. Casteel exchanged several e-mails and phone calls

with officers regarding the firearms. Casteel, who was using the alias “Don Hutt,”

arrived at the parking lot in the green Pontiac Bonneville driven by Devan.

Special Agent White showed the firearms to Casteel to inspect. Casteel first

picked up and inspected the Colt, working the slide and removing and replacing the

magazine. Casteel then examined the Ruger. While inspecting the firearms, Casteel

told Special Agent White that the Casteels had an extensive collection and had

recently purchased a large number of guns at auction. After inspecting the guns,

Casteel pulled thirty twenty-dollar bills from his pocket to cover the $600 purchase

price and gave the money to Special Agent White. Devan, who remained quiet during

the negotiations, took the two firearms and placed them in the back seat of the

Bonneville. Special Agent White’s support team then arrested the Casteels. 

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On February 29, 2012, a jury convicted Casteel of being a felon in possession

of a firearm as charged in Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment. To convict Casteel of

possessing a firearm in violation of § 922(g), the government had to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt (1) Casteel previously was “convicted of a crime punishable by a

term of imprisonment exceeding one year”; (2) Casteel “knowingly possessed a

firearm[;] and (3) the firearm” Casteel possessed moved “in or affect[ed] interstate

commerce.” See United States v. Porter, 687 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2012). Casteel

only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of firearm possession.

“We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, ‘viewing evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government’s favor,

and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.’” United States v.

Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Piwowar,

492 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2007)). We reverse “only if no reasonable jury could

have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Herbst, 666 F.3d 504,

510 (8th Cir. 2012). “‘When a sufficiency argument hinges on the interpretation of

a statute, we review the district court’s statutory interpretation de novo.’” United

States v. Reed, 668 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Gentry,

555 F.3d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 2009)).

On appeal,Casteelmaintains his “possession ofthe firearms alleged in counts 1

and 3 was simply a fleeting pre-purchase handling or inspection that does not arise

[sic] to ‘possession’ for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 92[2](g).” In Casteel’s view, “[t]he

evidence shows, even in a light most favorabl[e] to the government, that Tiran Casteel

at most momentarily handled and inspected the guns prior to their purchase by his son

Devan” and “[t]he ATF and Dennis Caudill never relinquished possession or control:

the firearms were merely on display prior to purchase.” 

“We have held that police observation of defendant’s brief possession of a

firearm is sufficient to support a conviction,” but left “open the question whether the

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duration of possession might ever be relevant to a finding of knowing possession.” 

United States v. Byers, 603 F.3d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v.

Wright, 682 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting we have not adopted a

“transitory or innocent possession” defense). Casteel’s unduly narrow view of

possession is at odds with the great weight of authority of other circuits deciding this

issue. We need not decide whether to join those circuits to resolve this appeal. 

4

Casteel did not object to the district court’s jury instruction regarding

possession or offer a separate instruction on his “fleeting” possession theory. See

United States v. Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 717 n.9 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Because defendant failed

to seek a proper instruction on his innocent possession theory, we need not, and do

not, decide at this time whether an ‘innocent reasons’ defense is available under

See United States v. Matthews, 520 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2008) (deciding 4

picking up firearms for a few seconds to inspect them “for the purpose of arranging

a sale” was “precisely what section 922 was meant to prevent”); United States v.

Gilbert, 430 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding § 922(g) “in no way invites

investigation into why the defendant possessed a firearm or how long that possession

lasted”); United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding

evidence showing the defendant actually holding firearms while inspecting them

before purchase wassufficient evidence of possession “however briefly it occurred”);

United States v. Lane, 267 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Because a defendant can

shoot a gun so quickly and easily once he holds it in his hands, we conclude that

evidence showing that a felon held a gun is by itself a factor indicating that the

defendant had the ability to exercise direct control over the firearm.”) (internal marks

and quotation omitted); United States v. Adkins, 196 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir.

1999) (discussing the “fleeting possession theory,” but finding it did not apply)

overruled on other grounds by Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009);

United States v. Parker, 566 F.2d 1304, 1306 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining the fact

“[t]hat possession is momentary isimmaterial” under 26 U.S.C. § 5861 because “[t]he

statute is written in absolute terms”); but cf. United States v. Mason, 233 F.3d 619,

624 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing an innocent possession defense to a § 922(g)(1)

charge provided “(1) the firearm was attained innocently and held with no illicit

purpose and (2) possession of the firearm was transitory”).

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§ 922(g).”). And the district court permitted Casteel to argue to the jury that

“touching, inspecting and negotiating a price” for the firearms in connection with

Casteel’s business of buying and selling used goods with Devan was not possession. 

Cf. United States v. Stover, 822 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1987) (deciding the defendant

waived any claim of error when the district court provisionally permitted the

defendant to argue innocent possession, but the defendant made no such argument).

After hearing Casteel’s argument, the jury rejected Casteel’s defense. 

Whatever the contours of any innocent or transitory possession defense to conviction

under § 922(g) that may exist, the jury was not required to accept Casteel’s theory,

especially under the circumstances of this case. The evidence adduced at trial,

viewed “‘in the light most favorable to the government,’” along with “‘all reasonable

inferences that support the verdict,’” would permit a reasonable jury to conclude

Casteel’s possession of all three firearms was neither fleeting nor innocent. Teague,

646 F.3d at 1121-22 (quoting Piwowar, 492 F.3d at 955). The jury heard testimony

that Casteel located firearms for purchase, looked them over, picked them up,

inspected them, made sure they worked, negotiated a price, and paid for the firearms

before passing themto his adult son Devan, presumably to be added to their extensive

collection. The jury reasonably found Casteel possessed the firearms as required for

conviction under § 922(g). 

C. Suppression of Evidence

After officers arrested the Casteels in the motel parking lot, Agent Kessler

photographed and searched the Bonneville incident to the arrests. In addition to the

two firearms, Agent Kessler discovered coins in a bank bag and coin box. Agent

Kessler seized the firearms, but did not retrieve the coins at that time because they

were not related to his firearms investigation. After learning of the Eitzen robbery

from Trooper Hitchcock, law enforcement officers secured the Bonneville and

obtained a search warrant for the car. 

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Casteel argues “[t]he initial search of the Bonneville automobile violated [his]

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” See Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)(“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial

process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under

the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and

well-delineated exceptions.”) (footnote omitted). Casteel argues the search was

improper under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), in which the Supreme Court

held the following:

Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest

only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger

compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the

vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these

justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be

unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another

exception to the warrant requirement applies.

Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. According to Casteel, the district court should have

suppressed the evidence of the robbery because the Casteels were handcuffed and

secured away from the Bonneville and “[t]here was no reason for the agents officers

believe [sic] evidence of the crime of arrest, possession of a firearm as a felon, would

be found within the vehicle” once agents seized the firearms. 

The district court denied Casteel’s motion to suppress, finding Agent Kessler

had probable cause to search the bank bag and coin box for paperwork evidencing the

crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm. “When reviewing the denial of a

motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and

the legal question of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated de novo.” United

States v. Salamasina, 615 F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2010). We reverse only if the denial

“‘is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of

applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear a mistake was made.’” Id.

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(quoting United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 643 (8th Cir. 2006)). The district

court did not err in finding “no constitutional defect” with respect to the search.

We agree with the government that “[t]he circumstances ofthis crime provided

‘reason to believe’ there was additional evidence of the crime to be found in [the

Bonneville], even after the firearms Casteel bought from ATF agents had been

removed from the car.” See Gant, 556 U.S. at 344. Agent Kessler testified he

searched the bank bag and coin box for ammunition and paperwork related to the

firearms investigation. As the district court observed, that paperwork could have

included printouts of Casteel’s internet communications with the ATF, a map to the

meeting location, or the receipt book Casteel filled out when he purchased the

firearms from Special Agent White—all potential evidence of the crime of arrest. 

The officers’ reasonable belief that there was additional evidence of the crime of

arrest in the car supported their search of the box and bag containing the coins. 

The officerswere also permitted to rely on our then-binding pre-Gant precedent

holding that when a police officer “‘has made a lawful custodial arrest of the

occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,

search the passenger compartment of that automobile’” even “where the arrestee has

exited the vehicle and has been handcuffed and placed in a police officer’s patrol

car,” United States v. Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting New

York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981), and applying Belton’s longstanding

“bright-line” rule). See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419,

2429 (2011) (upholding the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a pre-Gant

search of an automobile incident to the arrest of its occupants in reliance upon

pre-Gant precedent authorizing such a search); United States v. Tschacher, 687 F.3d

923, 933 (8th Cir. 2012). “[S]earches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance

on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Davis, 564

U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24. The district court properly denied Casteel’s

motion to suppress. 

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D. Sentencing

Casteel contends “the district court committed two sentencing errorsin failing

to group all indictment offenses and in awarding three criminal history points for

convictions contained in the same indictment as the offense of conviction.” In

addition to denying error, the government asserts any sentencing error was harmless

because the district “court imposed the sentences from Casteel’s second trial wholly

concurrently to those from his first trial,” leaving “no impact on the ultimate length

of [Casteel’s] sentence.”

We must disregard “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not

affect [Casteel’s] substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). When pressed at oral

argument, Casteel could not articulate any harm he has suffered as a result of the

district court’s purported sentencing errorsthat affects his substantial rights. As such,

we see no compelling reason to remand for resentencing. See United States v.

Allmon, 500 F.3d 800, 806-07 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding no prejudice to the

defendant’s substantial rights and no miscarriage of justice where a sentencing error

did not increase the defendant’s sentence beyond concurrent sentences properly

imposed for other crimes); United States v. Moyer, 182 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir.

1999) (concluding any sentencing error was harmless because the sentences for the

challenged countsran “concurrent to, and [were] shorter than” the sentencesimposed

for other counts of conviction). 

E. Other Claims

Casteel’s remaining challengesto the sufficiency of the evidence of carjacking

and the admission of evidence related to the July 27, 2008 burglary are foreclosed by

our rejection of identical claims in Devan’s direct appeal. See Casteel, 663 F.3d at

1019-22. Indeed, in conceding our opinion in Casteel “squarely resolved or rejected”

his remaining claims on the “exact same facts,” Casteel admitted at oral argument he

had no new arguments, information, or facts for the court to consider. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

We affirm.

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