-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

December 26, 2017

v No. 335097

Washtenaw Circuit Court

LARRY JAY NOWAK, LC No. 13-001906-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and BECKERING and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Larry Jay Nowak, pleaded guilty to one count of operating a motor vehicle 

while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, MCL 257.625, and operating a vehicle with a license 

suspended (DWLS), second offense, MCL 257.904. The trial court sentenced Nowak to one to 

five years’ imprisonment for the OWI conviction and one year in county jail for the DWLS 

conviction. Nowak appeals by delayed leave granted.1 We affirm Nowak’s convictions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Nowak moved the trial court to withdraw the guilty plea to the OWI offense and to 

correct an allegedly invalid sentence. He argued that the guilty plea was not accurate and 

voluntary. He further argued that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to advise him about 

the risks and benefits of pleading guilty. He also requested a Ginther2 hearing. 

The trial court denied Nowak’s motion. The trial court found that a jury could reasonably 

infer that Nowak operated the vehicle and that Nowak admitted to operating the vehicle. The 

trial court rejected Nowak’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because Nowak’s plea was 

accurate and Nowak denied coercion. Nowak challenges both rulings on appeal. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 1 People v Nowak, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 10, 2017 (Docket 

No. 335097). 

2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
-2-

This Court reviews a ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. 

People v Blanton, 317 Mich App 107, 117; 894 NW2d 613 (2016). A trial court “abuses its 

discretion when it selects an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” 

People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 689; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). 

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed factual and constitutional 

question. People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 67; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). We review the fact 

findings for clear error and the constitutional questions de novo. People v Lockett, 295 Mich 

App 165, 186; 814 NW2d 295 (2012). If the trial court declines to hold a Ginther hearing, this 

Court’s “review is limited to mistakes apparent from the record.” Lane, 308 Mich App at 68. 

We also review the trial court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. 

People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 216-217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA 

When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he “must enter an understanding, voluntary, and 

accurate plea.” People v Brown, 492 Mich 684, 688-689; 822 NW2d 208 (2012); see also MCR 

6.302(A). A defendant does not have an “absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it has 

been accepted.” Blanton, 317 Mich App at 117 (quotation marks and citation omitted). To 

withdraw a plea, a defendant “must demonstrate a defect in the plea-taking process.” Id. at 118

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Nowak first argues that his plea was not accurate because he did not describe facts 

showing that he was operating the vehicle. For a guilty plea to be accurate, the trial court must 

ask the defendant to describe sufficient facts to support a finding of guilt. People v Fonville, 291 

Mich App 363, 377; 804 NW2d 878 (2011); see also MCR 6.302(D)(1). The trial court may also 

consider inculpatory inferences flowing from the facts described by the defendant, even if the 

defendant denies an element of the crime. Id. 

The three elements of an OWI conviction are (1) the operation of a motor vehicle (2) on 

“a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, 

including an area designated for the parking of vehicles,” (3) while intoxicated. MCL 

257.625(1); People v Hyde, 285 Mich App 428, 448; 775 NW2d 833 (2009). Our Supreme 

Court has defined operating a vehicle “in terms of the danger the [OWI] statute seeks to prevent: 

the collision of a vehicle being operated by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor 

with other persons or property.” People v Wood, 450 Mich 399, 404; 538 NW2d 351 (1995). 

Therefore, operating a vehicle extends to putting the vehicle “in a position posing a significant 

risk of causing a collision[.]” Id. at 404-405. The defendant in Wood was operating a vehicle 

because the engine was running, the transmission was in drive, the defendant was asleep at the 

wheel at a drive-through window, and the defendant’s foot on the brake pedal was the only 

reason the vehicle was not moving, thereby posing a significant risk of collision. Id. at 402, 405. 

Similarly, an intoxicated defendant was operating a truck when he tried to move it out of the 

middle of the freeway after an accident, even though the truck was not functioning, because it 

posed a risk of injury. People v Lechleitner, 291 Mich App 56, 58, 61; 804 NW2d 345 (2010). 

By contrast, an intoxicated defendant sleeping at the wheel with the car running and the lights off 
-3-

was not operating the vehicle because the car was parked next to a golf cart storage shed in the 

parking lot, showing that the defendant could have been using the vehicle as shelter. People v 

Burton, 252 Mich App 130, 132, 143-145; 651 NW2d 143 (2002). 

In this case, Nowak maintains that he was not operating the vehicle because the engine 

was not running and he was asleep. On the contrary, the trial court properly inferred that Nowak 

operated the vehicle because Nowak did not live on the road he admitted being on and did not 

start his evening there. In response to the trial court’s question of what Nowak did to be guilty of 

operating while intoxicated, Nowak answered, he “got in the seat, turned the radio on, keys in the 

ignition, cops pulled up, knocked on the window, [he] answered the questions and that was it 

. . . .” In response to defense counsel’s question whether Nowak was “operating a motor 

vehicle[,]” after defense counsel explained what it means to operate a motor vehicle, Nowak 

answered “yes.” Nowak again answered yes to the prosecution’s question whether Nowak 

“actually operated the vehicle on Wiltshire Drive[.]” Therefore, the trial court did not err by 

concluding that the plea was accurate. 

Next, Nowak argues that his plea was not voluntary. Before accepting a guilty plea, the 

trial court must verify that the plea was voluntary by asking the defendant whether anyone 

promised him anything beyond the terms of the plea agreement, whether anyone threatened him, 

and whether the choice to plead guilty was the defendant’s choice. MCR 6.302(C)(4). For a 

plea to be voluntary, the defendant “must be fully aware of the direct consequences of the plea.” 

People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 333; 817 NW2d 497 (2012) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). For example, a plea is not voluntary if the trial court does not advise the defendant of 

the maximum possible prison sentence for a habitual offender. Brown, 492 Mich at 694. 

Nowak admits that the trial court complied with MCR 6.302(C)(4) by asking Nowak 

whether the choice to plead guilty was his. Instead, Nowak maintains, the prosecution and 

defense counsel’s questions about the factual basis of the plea were coercive. The record shows 

otherwise. At the plea hearing, Nowak repeatedly stated that he wanted to plead guilty and avoid 

going to trial. The attorneys’ questions about the factual basis of the claim served that goal after 

defense counsel explained that the trial court could not accept Nowak’s guilty plea without a 

factual basis. Additionally, defense counsel emphasized that whether to plead guilty was 

Nowak’s choice, and defense counsel offered to ask the trial court for more time to discuss 

Nowak’s decision. Under these circumstances, explaining that a guilty plea requires a factual 

basis and eliciting those facts was not coercive and did not render the plea involuntary. Thus, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nowak’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

Nowak contends that his attorney was ineffective because defense counsel should have 

requested an adjournment to verify the accuracy of the plea. We disagree. 

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel,

a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2) there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings 
-4-

would have been different. A defendant must also show that the result that did 

occur was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. [Lockett, 295 Mich App at 187

(citation omitted).] 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a plea, the defendant 

must show that his plea was not voluntary or understanding. People v Armisted, 295 Mich App 

32, 48; 811 NW2d 47 (2011). In Armisted, the defendant did not argue that counsel prevented 

him from understanding the plea agreement, even if counsel mistakenly advised the defendant 

about the minimum sentence, and the defendant “testified under oath at the plea proceeding that 

he fully understood the plea and sentencing agreement.” Id. at 48-49. 

Likewise, in this case, Nowak has not identified how defense counsel prevented him from 

entering a voluntary and understanding plea. The trial court informed Nowak of the maximum

possible sentence and the rights he would give up by pleading guilty. Nowak confirmed his 

understanding. The trial court asked Nowak if the guilty plea was the result of threats or 

promises and if the choice to plead guilty was his own. Nowak denied threats, coercion, or 

external promises and affirmed that he chose to plead guilty. Defense counsel merely informed 

Nowak that the trial court could not accept a guilty plea without a factual basis and provided an 

example of what would constitute a factual basis. Nowak again confirmed that he wanted to 

plead guilty before affirming that he was operating the vehicle. Thus, Nowak has not shown that 

defense counsel’s performance was deficient or produced an unfair result. 

Finally, Nowak requests remand for an evidentiary hearing if this Court determines that 

the record is insufficient to resolve the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Nowak provides 

no detail about the missing information. “Defendant may not leave it to this Court to search for a 

factual basis to sustain or reject his position.” People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 413; 760 

NW2d 882 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, he has abandoned this 

argument on appeal. 

In any event, Nowak has not asserted facts requiring further development. Remand is 

unnecessary when the defendant has not demonstrated that the development of additional facts 

would aid his argument. People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 369; 770 NW2d 68 (2009). 

Nowak did not support his request for a Ginther hearing with facts that would defeat his 

affirmance on the record that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty and still wished 

to enter a guilty plea. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold 

an evidentiary hearing, and we decline to remand for a hearing. 

We affirm. 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens