16-3211 

Dong v. Sessions

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A205 607 648

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

28th day of February, two thousand eighteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

Chief Judge, 

PETER W. HALL, 

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

YAN DONG, 

Petitioner, 

v. 16-3211 

 NAC 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Louis H. Klein, Flushing, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; Briena L. 
2

Strippoli, Senior Litigation 

Counsel; John M. McAdams, Jr., Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Yan Dong, a native and citizen of the People’s 

Republic of China, seeks review of an August 26, 2016, decision 

of the BIA affirming a November 25, 2014, decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Dong’s application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”). In re Yan Dong, No. A 205 607 648 (B.I.A. Aug. 

26, 2016), aff’g No. A 205 607 648 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 

25, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the 

decisions of both the BIA and the IJ. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 

432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The standards of review are 

well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Xiu Xia Lin v. 
3

Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 

562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

I. Adverse Credibility Determination 

 The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

circumstances,” base a credibility finding on inconsistencies 

and omissions in an asylum applicant’s statements and other 

record evidence, “without regard to whether an inconsistency, 

inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s 

claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

at 166-67. “A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible 

explanation for [her] inconsistent statements to secure relief; 

[s]he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be 

compelled to credit [her] testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 

F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(emphasis in original). Substantial evidence supports the 

agency’s determination that Dong was not credible. 

 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies and 

omissions in Dong’s two written statements, her testimony, and 

letters from her parents, all of which called into question her 

claim that she was a whistleblower in China and fled to the 
4

United States and became politically active for that reason. 

Dong was inconsistent about how or if she resigned from her job. 

She testified that she immediately tried to resign after 

reporting government corruption, but her employer refused to 

permit her resignation. In contrast, one written statement 

reported that she resigned after her employer failed to pay her 

for two months. The IJ was not required to accept Dong’s 

explanation—that she thought that by leaving China, she 

effectively resigned from the company—because the written 

statement does not link her resignation with her departure from 

China. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

 Discrepancies in Dong’s statements also call into question 

her allegations that the government was monitoring and 

threatening her. Her second written statement asserted 

Chinese officials constantly called her mother in early 2010 

to ask about Dong’s whereabouts. But that statement omits 

Dong’s trips to the United States and her voluntary returns to 

China. The agency did not err in relying on this omission. See 

Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding 

that, considering context, voluntary return trips may be 
5

considered as a factor in an adverse credibility 

determination). Dong’s explanation—that she returned to China 

in part because she thought the Chinese government would no 

longer be interested in her—was not compelling because she also 

alleged that authorities had been constantly calling her mother 

just months earlier. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

 Dong’s letters from her parents further undermine her 

credibility because of the information they omit. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67. 

Although Dong’s mother refers to threatening telephone calls 

she received and discusses Dong’s political activities in the 

United States, her letter omits Dong’s earlier trips to the 

United States, and both letters omit Dong’s allegation that 

Chinese authorities handcuffed and threatened her father with 

imprisonment to prevent Dong from disclosing more government 

corruption. Despite Dong’s contention that these omissions 

are irrelevant because they concern the period before she joined 

the China Democracy Party in the United States, the agency was 

permitted to rely on them. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 

(reasoning that “an IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission 
6

in making an adverse credibility determination” and upholding 

reliance on omissions and inconsistencies stemming from 

letters). 

 Given these inconsistencies and omissions, substantial 

evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. 

II. Future Persecution Based on CDP Activities 

 To meet her burden of showing a well-founded fear of future 

persecution, Dong had to show a subjective fear of persecution 

that was objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 

357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 

421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid 

support in the record,” an asylum applicant’s fear of 

persecution is “speculative at best.”). She could either 

establish a reasonable possibility that she would be singled 

out individually for persecution or “a pattern or practice . 

. . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to 

the applicant on account of . . . political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 325, 332 (2d Cir. 

2013). Because Dong’s CDP activities occurred in the United 
7

States, she had to show that Chinese authorities were either 

already aware, or likely to become aware, of her prodemocracy 

activities. Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d 

Cir. 2008). 

 Dong did not meet that burden. She argues that she 

testified credibly that Chinese police had visited her parents 

to warn them that she would be questioned on returning to China 

if she continued her activism. She points to letters from her 

parents stating that the authorities had warned the family that 

they were aware of Dong’s CDP activities. But the agency did 

not err in extending the adverse credibility determination to 

these assertions. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d 

Cir. 2007) (reasoning that “a single false document or a single 

instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the 

petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated 

or unauthenticated evidence”). Moreover, the letters were the 

same ones that contained discrepancies about past events in 

China. 

 Nor did Dong demonstrate a reasonable possibility that 

Chinese authorities were likely to become aware of her 
8

prodemocracy activism and to persecute her on that basis. The 

fact that she posted internet articles and that her photograph 

was on the CDP’s website is not enough. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 

333-34, 336-37. Dong’s letters from the president of CDP refer 

to persecution of individuals who were predominately leaders 

of the prodemocracy movement or Democratic Party workers who 

were active in China. The only country conditions evidence in 

the record provides no further support: the 2013 State 

Department report reflected that China detained and mistreated 

political dissidents active in China, including members of the 

“banned Chinese Democracy Party,” but did not identify any 

incidents in which individuals who engaged in prodemocracy 

activism in the United States were arrested or otherwise 

mistreated upon returning to China. Because Dong failed to 

demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of persecution as 

needed for asylum, she also failed to meet the higher burdens 

of proof for withholding of removal and CAT relief. Id. at 335. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court