COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Baker and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RONALD ERIC JAMES, A/K/A 

 TIMOTHY JOHNSON 

 OPINION 

v. Record No. 2367-94-2 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

 JULY 30, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Robert W. Duling, Judge 

 Cullen D. Seltzer, Assistant Public Defender 

 (David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on briefs), 

 for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief) 

 for appellee. 

 Ronald Eric James (appellant), also known as Timothy 

Johnson, appeals from his bench trial conviction by the Circuit 

Court of the City of Richmond (trial court) for possession of 

cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. The sole issue 

presented is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's 

motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine found on him during a 

pat-down search. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

 It is well established in Virginia that, on review of a 

trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate 

courts of this Commonwealth view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court's determination. E.g., Fore v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. 
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denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980); Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 

1, 7, 421 S.E.2d 877, 881 (1992). In light of Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. ___ (1996), it appears that in certain cases a 

deferential standard of review may no longer be appropriate. In 

Ornelas, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that henceforth, "as a 

general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and 

probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal." Id. While 

generally calling for de novo review of reasonable suspicion and 

probable cause determinations, the Supreme Court "hasten[ed]" to 

add that a trial court's finding of "historical fact" should be 

reviewed only for "clear error" and noted that a reviewing court 

should "give due weight to inferences drawn from those 

[historical] facts by resident judges and local law enforcement 

officers." Id. Additionally, recognizing "that a police officer 

may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding 

whether probable cause exists," id., the Supreme Court held that 

"[a]n appeals court should give due weight to a trial court's 

finding that [an] officer was credible and [his or her] inference 

was reasonable." Id. 

 The record discloses that on May 27, 1994, Detective James P. 

Foust (Foust) of the Richmond Police Department and a detective 

named Burke (Burke) were looking for Charles Smyrie (Smyrie) in 

order to execute a felony warrant. At approximately noon, Burke 

drove into and stopped in a parking lot. A blue "Chevy Blazer," 

driven by Smyrie, pulled up next to Burke's vehicle. Smyrie was 
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the "wanted person." Appellant was a passenger in the front seat 

of Smyrie's vehicle. 

 Burke asked Smyrie to get out of the car and began talking 

to him. Appellant addressed Burke, saying words to the effect 

of, "[W]hat's going on, why are you stopping, can I get out 

. . . ." Foust told appellant to "hold on a second," then asked 

to talk to him. Appellant began "making gestures" with his 

hands, leaning down to the right where Foust could see only one 

of his hands and asked, "[W]hat's wrong?" Foust told appellant 

to "remain quiet" and to put his hands on the dashboard. At 

first, appellant failed to respond to that request. Later, he 

placed his hands on the dashboard but left them there only for "a 

few seconds," then removed them. 

 Appellant persisted in wanting to leave the car, asking, 

"[H]ow come I can't get out?" Following that inquiry, Foust told 

appellant he could get out of the car. To assure his personal 

safety, Foust made a limited pat-down of appellant, during which 

he felt a hard object which he removed from appellant's front 

pocket. The object was a glass smoking device that contained 

cocaine residue. 

 Appellant was arrested and indicted for possession of 

cocaine. Appellant made a pretrial motion to suppress the 

evidence. 

 The trial court denied the motion to suppress, ruling that 

based upon "all the circumstances [confronting the officer] 
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presented to this Court," Foust's conduct, including the pat-down 

of appellant, was not unreasonable. The court also concluded 

that it was reasonable for Foust to remove the item from 

appellant's pocket "to determine whether it was something that 

could be used to cause harm to the officer or cause the officer 

concern for his safety." 

 The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches 

and seizures. E.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 

n.23 (1969); Warren v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 600, 602, 202 S.E.2d 

885, 887 (1974). It is not unreasonable for a police officer to 

conduct a limited pat-down search for weapons when the officer 

can point to "specific and articulable facts" "which reasonably 

lead[] him to conclude, in light of his experience, that 

'criminal activity may be afoot' and that the suspect 'may be 

armed and presently dangerous.'" Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 

Va. 204, 209, 308 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 

1104 (1984) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 

"Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer on the scene allowing for the need of split-second 

decisions and without regard to the officer's intent or 

motivation." Scott v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 725, 727, 460 

S.E.2d 610, 612 (1995) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

396-97 (1989)). An officer is entitled to view the circumstances 

confronting him in light of his training and experience, Terry, 

392 U.S. at 27, and he may consider any suspicious conduct of the 
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suspected person. Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 

354 S.E.2d 79, 86-87 (1987). 

 Here, the officers were arresting the driver of the vehicle 

on a felony warrant. Appellant, who was an occupant of the 

vehicle, was "somewhat jittery" when Foust asked him to keep his 

hands on the dash. When appellant was unresponsive to Foust's 

request to keep his hands in Foust's view, Foust did not know 

whether appellant "was under the influence of anything" or 

whether he was trying to reach to get something. Foust was 

concerned that appellant might be reaching for "a weapon or 

something like that in the car" and that appellant's hand 

movements were an attempt to divert his attention. Appellant 

appeared nervous and Foust "didn't know whether . . . [appellant] 

had a weapon on him." Because, under these circumstances, a 

reasonably prudent officer would be warranted in the belief that 

his safety or that of others was in danger, Foust was justified 

in conducting a pat-down of appellant. See Taylor v. 

Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 260, 391 S.E.2d 592 (1990). 

 To justify removal of an object from a person's clothing 

during a search for weapons, "the officer [must] reasonably 

believe [that] the object could be a weapon." Lansdown, 226 Va. 

at 213, 308 S.E.2d at 112. "[I]t makes no difference that the 

object removed . . . is not a weapon." Id. Here, the hard 

object Foust removed from appellant's pocket during the pat-down 

was about three inches long; Foust described it as being "about 
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as big as your finger." It was not unreasonable for Foust to 

believe that this object could have been a weapon. See id. (not 

unreasonable for officer to believe that rectangular box felt in 

shirt pocket could be a weapon); see also Williams, 4 Va. App. at 

67, 354 S.E.2d at 87 (not unreasonable for officer to believe 

that hard bulge felt in pocket, which was in fact a wad of rolled 

up one hundred dollar bills, was a weapon). Therefore, Foust 

acted properly in removing the object from appellant's pocket. 

 The facts reveal that appellant was not subjected to an 

unreasonable search and seizure. Accordingly, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.