NOT FOR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 09a0587n.06 NO. 07-6302 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT ALEXIS MOREL L,

P laintif f-App ellee,

v. ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT STAR TAXI, COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DI S TR IC T O F K

EN TU CKY Defendan t, and AMERICAN SERVICE INSURANCE COMP ANY, Defendan t-Appellant. ______________________________________/ BEF OR E: M AR TIN , SU HR HEI NRIC H, a nd WH ITE, Ci r c uitJudg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Def endant- Ap pellant Amer ican Ser vice Insuranc e Com pa ny (“ Am e ri c an” ) a

pp e a ls the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ict co ur

t g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt t o Plaintiff-Appellee Alexis Morell on her claim ag ainst America

n for a decla r a tion that De fenda

nt Star Taxi’s insurance policy

with America

n provided c overa g e for

Morell’s dama g es. We reve rse. I. Bac kgr ound A. F acts Mo re ll c la ims tha

t on May 21 , 2 00 6, sh e too k a

Star T a x i cab ho me to C a mpb e ll Co un ty Kentucky from Mount Adams in Cincinnati, Ohio. Star Taxi i s insured by Americ an. Morell alleg esM o r e ll is a K e n tu c ky

c it iz e n , D e f

e n d an t S ta

r T a xi i s anO h io c o r

p o r a ti o n , an d

D efe ndant 1 Americ an is an I llinois corpor ation. -2- that the taxi driver dropped her off in f ront of her home, but then followed he r into her a partment a

nd rape d her. She a lleg es both phy sical and e motional injuries as a re sult. Star T a xi ha s an “ Am e ri c an A uto Pol ic y ” fr om A me ri c an. I t pr ov ide s in re le va nt p art : COVERAGE A–B ODI L Y I NJ URY L I AB I L I TY COVERAGE B –PROP ERTY DAMAGE L I AB I L I TY The c ompany

will pay on behalf

of the insure d all sums, ex cept f or p u n i t i v e and exemplary

damag es, which the insured will become leg ally obligated to pay

as damag es bec ause of A. bodily injury or B. p ro p er t y

d am age to which this insuran ce applies, ca used by an ac cident and a

rising out of

the owner ship, maintenance or use of an owne d vehicle. M o r e ll b r o u g h t s u it

in s tate c o u rt a g a in s t b o th St ar T a xi an d A me r ic an . Sh e s u e d

St ar T a xi for c laims of neg lige nt hiring a nd supervision and vica

rious liability . I n her claim ag ainst America n, Morell soug ht a dec laratory judgme nt that the Amer ican Auto Policy purcha sed by

Star Taxi from Am e ri c an p ro vid e d c ov e ra g e fo r a ny dama g e s sh e mig ht r e c ov e r i n h e r t or t a c tio n a g a ins t Sta

r T a xi. Americ an re moved this case to the fede ral district c ourt in the Easter n District of Ke ntucky

on the ba sis of div e rs ity jur isd ic tio n. Am e ri c an f ile d a c ounte rc la im again st Mor e ll a nd a c ro ssc la im 1

a g a ins t Sta

r T a xi “f or de c larator

y jud g me nt p ur su ant t o 28 U.S. C. § 2201 , an d F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Procedur e 57, to deter

mi n e an ac t u al controversy betwee n [American] and Star Ta x i.” Amer ican also raise d standing as an a ffirmative defe nse. Am e ri c a nl a t e r

f i l e d a m o t i o nt o b i f

u r c a t e d i s c o v e r

y an d t r i a l o f M o r e l l ’ s c l a i m s a g a ins t Am e ri c an and the ins ur e d, Star Ta xi. Mo re ll did no t ob je c t. Mo re ll in tur

n fi le d a mot ion

to h old-3-

the per s o n al injury

portion of the cla im in abey ance . Americ an did not object. The district court g rante d both motions

. Th e re a ft e r, Mo re ll f

ile d a mot ion fo r s umm ary ju dgmen t a g a ins t A me ri c an a rguin g in

re le va nt p art that th e Am e ri c an in sura nc e po lic y

iss ue d to Star T a xi pr ov ide d c ov e ra g e be c a us e Morell’s injury

arose from the owner ship, maintenanc e or use of a motor ve hicle. Amer ican f iled

a re sponse and c ross-motion for summary judgme nt ag ainst Morell. Americ an aske d “that an or der be issued dec laring that it has neither a duty to defe nd nor indemnify Star Taxi in t he re mainder of the claims in this c ase.” Americ an asser ted that Morell lacke d standing , and argued in the alternative that Morell’s cla im was not cover ed under its poli cy . The district cour

t g rante d summary judgme nt to Morell and denied Amer ican’ s cross-motion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. I t he ld i n p e rt ine nt p art tha t the def inition of “accident” provide d by the policy

is unambiguous. The policy specific ally

defines “ac cident” to “ mean[] a sudden event ne ither expected nor intended fr om the standpoint of the insu re d wh ich re sults in bodi ly inju ry or property dam age .” Thus , th e c ourt mus t lo ok

to whe th er the ins ur e d, Star T a xi, e x p e c t e d o r i n t e n d e d t h e e v e n t t o o c c u r t h a t r e s u l t e d i n t h e p l a i n t i f f ’ s i n j u r y. C l e ar l y, Star Taxi did not expect or intend for its driver to sexually

assault a pa sseng er. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fu rt he r h e ld t hat the injury alleg ed ar ose out of the “ owner ship, maintenance , o r u s e o f an own ed ve hic le ” as r equire d by

the policy . Her e, the e vents alleg ed ar e ca usally connec ted to t he us e of the c ar. Spe c if

ic a lly , it wa s p la int if

f’ s u se of the ta xi that c a

us e d h e r t o come into contac t with its driver: she was in the taxi because it was b ei n g used as a common ca

rrier , the driver used the taxi as his means of selec ting his victim, and h e o n l y kn e w t h e l o c a t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f ’ s a p art m e n t b e c a

u s e o f h e r u s e o f t h e t a x i

. In addition, the driver was on the pre mises as a re sult of his duti es as a common car

rier to sa fely deliver the plaintiff to he r home and he had not y et driven awa y . Thus, the attack w as still part of the s er ies of eve nts surrounding the use of the taxi . . . . As discussed above , the cour t finds the injuries sustained by the plaintiff at the ha

nds of the taxi driver are sufficie ntly connec ted t o h er use of the taxi and, theref ore, A m e r i c ano w e s S t ar

T a x i c o v e r a g e u n d e r

t h e p o l i c y.-4-

The district cour

t did not address More ll’s standing. The district court ente red a confor ming judgme nt the same day , which included the require d finding s for finality under Fe d. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Me anw hil e , Am e ri can mov e d fo r, and wa s g ra nte d, a de fa

ult jud g me nt a g a ins t Sta

r T a xi. The orde r of de fault judg ment also “ORDERED A ND ADJUDGED t hat this Order shall neither aff ect nor prejudice the Plaintiff’s claims ag ainst America n for c overa g e under

the policy

of insurance at issue.” Americ an filed a

timely notice of a

ppeal f rom t h e j u dg ment g ranting Morell’s motion for summary judgme nt and deny

ing A merica

n’s cr oss-motion for summary judgme nt. II. Ana lys is This Court revie ws a district cour t’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt de novo. Gribchec k v. Runyon , 245 F.3d 547, 550 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Summ ary j udg ment is proper if “ the pleading s, the discovery and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to a ny ma te ri a l fa c t and that the mov ant is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a ma tte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56(c)

. A. St andi ng Americ an claims that Morell l acke d standing to bring a direct action aga inst Americ an that

se e ks a de c laratio n o f c ov e ra g e un de r a n a uto mob ile lia

bil ity po lic y iss ue d b y Am e ri c an to Sta

r T a xi. Am e ri c an ra ise d the iss ue in i ts s umm ary jud g me nt m oti on , b ut t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a dd re ss i t. This Court reviews the que stion of standing de novo. See Sc hultz v. United States , 529 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 1 29 S. Ct. 742 (2 00 8)

. Whe n jur isd ic tio n is pr e mis e d o n d ive rs ity of c iti zen sh ip, a

pla int if f m us t ha ve sta nd ingun de r b oth

Ar tic le I I I and state law i n o rd e r t o ma int a in-5-

a ca use of a ction. Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Minis try, Inc. v . Fine Host Corp. , 418 F.3d 16 8, 17 3 ( 2d

Cir . 2 00 5) (a

nd c a se s c ite d th e re in) ; Metro. Exp. Servs. Inc. v. City of Kansas C ity, Mo. , 23 F .3 d 136 7, 13 69 -7 0 (8t h Cir. 19 94 ) ( and

c a se s c ite d th e re in) ; se e als o M y e rs v . R ic hla nd

Cou nty , 429 F.3d 740, 749 ( 8th Cir. 2005) (stating that a fe dera l court ca nnot hear the plaintiff’s state brea ch of c on tr a c t c la im unl e ss he ha s stand ingto s ue un de r s ta te law) ; Ow e ns of G a. , I nc . v . S he lby Cou nty , 6 4 8 F

. 2 d 1 0 8 4 , 1 0 8 8

- 9 0 ( 6 th

Ci r . 1 9 8 1 ) ( a

p p ly in g s tate la

w to d e te r

mi n e w h e th e r

u n succe ssful bid de r h a d s t an d i n g t o c h a l l e n g e a c o n t r a c t aw ar d t o an o t h e r b i d d e r )

. A f e d e r a l c o u rt s i t t ing in div e rs ity a pp lie s th e su

bs tanti ve law of th e fo rum st a te , w hic h in c lud e s it s c ho ic e of law r ule s. W estfield Ins. Co. v . Tech Dry , Inc. , 336 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 2003). Here , the par ties ag ree that Kentucky law applies to the inter

pretation of Star Taxi’s automobil e insuranc e with Amer ican. “Ke ntucky

is not a ‘direct action’ jurisdiction.” State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 8 08 S.W. 2d 80 5, 80 7- 08 (K

y . 1 99 1) ; Cuppy v. Ge n. Acci den t F i r e & Life Ins

. Cor p ., 378 S.W .2d 629, 632 (Ky . 1964). This means that e x cept in ca ses of insol vency or bankruptc y , an injured pe rson has no direc t rig ht of action ag ainst an ins uranc e compa ny until after a judg ment has first been obtained aga inst the i nsured. Cuppy , 3 78 S.W. 2d a t 63 2; Fo rd

v . R atl iff , 183 S.W .3d 199, 203 & n.10 ( Ky . Ct. App. 2006)

. See also Chambers v . Ideal Pure Milk Co. , 245 S.W. 2d 58 9, 59 1 ( Ky . 1 95 2) ; Kentucky Hosp. Ass’n Trust. v. Chi. Ins. Co. , 978 S.W .2d 754, 755-56 (K y . Ct . App . 1 99 8) (s ta ting t hat “ [a]n ins ur e d mu st b e c ome le g a lly ob lig a te d to pa

y purs ua nt t o terms of the insura

nce c ontrac t”). More ll acknowledg es t hat Kentucky is not a direc t action state, bu t no ne t h e l e s s c l a i m s th a t b e c a u s e s h e h a s a r i g h t o f a c t i o n o n c e a j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t S t ar T a xi i s obtained and r emains unpaid, she ha s standing to sue Americ an dire ctly

.-6-

Whe the r o r n ot i t ma

y have ini tia lly

be e n p ro pe r t o d e c lin e j u

r i s d i c tio n o n p ru de nti a l g ro un ds , beca use Amer ican f

iled a countercla im ag ainst Morell upon remova l, we ag ree that she has standing in this case . See M

d. Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. , 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) (holding that an

a c tua l c a se or

c on tr ov e rs y

e xiste d b e tw e e n in sure r w ho br ou g ht d e c lara tor y jud g me nt a c tio n a g a ins t insured and injure d third party wh er e i njured pa rty was e ntitled under state law to bring action

a g a ins t th e ins ur e r i f h e ob ta ine d a jud g me nt a g a in st the ins ur e d p art y ); Fed. Kempe r Ins. Co. v. Rauscher , 807 F.2d 345, 354 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that when an insured party is dismi ssed from a de clar atory

judgme nt action broug ht by the insurer ag ainst the insured and the injure d third party to determine c overa g e, the injured third party has standing to remain in the suit and def end the

ac t i o n ; ap p l y i n g Md. Cas. Co. ); Ha wk e y e -S e c ur ity In s. Co. v . S

c hu lte , 302 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1962) (same; rea soning that when an insured party is dismi ssed from a decla ratory judgme nt action to deter mine cover ag e, an injured t hird party has st anding to rema in in the s uit and def end the a ction beca use “[i] t would be anomalous to hold . . . that an actual controve rsy exis ts betwee n [t he injured third party

and] the [i nsurer ,] and y et deny [t he injured third pa

rty ] t he rig h t to participate in the

c on tr ov e rs y ” ); Vt . M

ut. In s. Co. v . E

v e re tte , 875 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (E.D. V a. 1995) ( same; ap p l y i n g Md. Cas. Co., Schulte, and Rauscher to hold that case or

controve rsy

exis ted in decla

ratory jud g me nt a c tio n b ro ug ht by ins ur e r b e tw e e n li a bil ity ins ur e r a nd the inj ur e d th ir d p art

y a ft e r d e fa ult judgme nt had bee n enter ed ag ainst insureds). In other wor ds, there is a live controve rsy betwee n Americ an and Mor ell beca use Amer ican soug ht declar atory relief ag ainst Morell and Star Tax i. B. Coverage Americ an a rgues that More ll’s injuries did not arise out of the “ use” of a motor vehic le as define d under the terms of the policy and Kentucky law. The district court found that More ll’s and-7-

the driver ’s use of the taxi cause d Morell to come into contac t with the driver such t hat her injuries

wer e suff iciently connec ted to the use of the taxi

. As noted above , Kentucky law applies. W

estf ie ld , 336 F.3d at 506. The interpr etation of a n insurance contra ct i s a matter of l aw to be decided by the cour t. Id. at 5 0 7 (c i t i n g Sto ne v . Ky . F ar m Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. , 34 S.W. 3d 80 9, 81 0 (K y . Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ))

. B e c a us e the Ke ntu c ky

Sup re me Court has not decide d whether an assault and rape in a private re sidence by a taxi driver implicates

c ov e ra g e un de r t

he ta xi co mpa

ny ’s a uto mob ile ins ur anc e po lic y , we mus t pr e dic t ho w i t w ou ld r ule if prese nted with the issue. See id. Severa l decisions from that court a re instruc tive on the question of ca usation. For emost are the consolidated c ases of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rains , 715 S.W .2d 232 (Ky . 1986), and Smith v . State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 715 S.W .2d 232 (Ky . 1986), whe re the Kentucky Supreme Court ana ly

zed the phrase “ar ising out of the use of a motor v eh i cl e” in the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparatio n s Ac t , Ky . Rev. St. Ann. §§ 304.39-101-140, which pr ovides for ba sic repa

ration bene fits. I n Rains , the i nsured sued the automobi le i nsurer for ba sic repa

ration be ne fi ts f or inj ur ie s h e su sta ine d a ft e r b e inghit on the he a d wi th a ba se ba ll bat w hil e a tte mpt ingto enter his automobile. I n Sm ith , the insureds soug ht ba sic repa ration benef

its a fter being shot by

the d e r an g e d b r o t h e r o f t h e i n s u r e d

t h r o u g h t h e r e a r

w i n d o w o f

a m o t o r v e h i c l e o na

p u b l i c h i g h w a y. Id. at 233. The Ke ntucky

Supreme Court summarized that “[t] he plain lang uag e of the statutes provides for the pa y ment of basic r epar ation b enef its to t he victims of mo tor v e hic le ac c ide nts for injuries

ar is in g ou t of th e us e of a mo tor v e hic le .” Id. The Court fr amed the issues a s “(1) whether the-8-

injured per sons wer e mot or vehicle ac cident victims, and (2) whether their injuries ar ose out of the use of a motor vehicle.” Id. The Court conc luded in both case s that the injured persons we re not motor vehic le ac cident vic tim s and

that th e ir inj ur ie s d id n ot a

ri se ou t of

the us e of

a mot or ve hic le . I t r e a so ne d th a t [a] lthou g h th e in

ju r ie s to e a c h o f

th e p e r s o n s inv o lv e d

w e r e c a u s e d by int e nti on a l a c ts, the y

c on te nd that, a s to the m, t

he in ju ri es we re a c c ide nts be c a us e they wer e wholly

unexpected and unf

orese ea b l e. Conceding for the pur poses of argume nt, bu t no t de c idi ng , th a t th e inj ur e d pe rs on s we re the vic tim s o f a n a c c ide nt, they fail to establish that they wer e victims of a motor ve hicle ac cident. The acc ident claimed by

Rains was the de liberate , but unexpected, blow from a base ball bat. The a c c i d e n tc l a i m e d

b y S m i t h an d

M ar s h a l l w a s t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s h o o t i n gb y a t h i r d p art y, albeit unex pecte d and unforesee n by them. I n both case s the only connec tion between the victims and a motor vehic le was inc idental. No m o tor vehicle accide nt c on tri bu te d to the ir inj ur ie s. It fol low

s tha t the y we re no t v ic tim s o

f a m oto r v e hic le ac c ide nt. I t seems equa lly

clea r that the injuries did not arise out of the use of a

motor vehicle. The contention is made that eac h of t he inj ured persons was using a motor vehicle be cause the term “use” is de fined in K .R.S. 304.39-020( 6) as “a ny utiliz ation of t he mot or vehicle as a vehicle, including occupying, enteringinto, and alig hting fr om i t.” Ev e n if it be c on c e de d, ho we ve r, that the inj ur e d w e re us inga mot or ve hic le at t he ti me t hey wer e inj ured, it rema ins their burde n to demonstrate that the injurie s arose out of the use of

the vehicle

. T h ey interpre t the statutes involved to mean that re paration benefits ar e pay able to one who is injured while using a motor vehic le without reg ard to whe ther t h e u s e o f t h e m o t o r

v e h i c l e h a d

an y c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o nw i t h t h e i n j u r y. K. R.S. 30 4. 39 -0 30 (1 ) a

nd 04 0( 2) do no t pr ov ide fo r the pa y me nt of be ne fi ts to persons injured while using a motor vehicle. The

ypr ov idefor

pa y me nt o f be ne fit s, no t to all pe rso ns who ar e inj ur e d whi le ma k ing us e of a mo tor v e hic le , bu t on ly to those persons injured while making use of a motor ve hicle whose injuries arose out of the use of the motor ve hicle. Id. at 233-34 (some emphase s added)

. The Ra ins court re lied on the Ke n t u ck y Supreme Court’s e arlier decision in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v

. W estern Fire InsuranceCo., wher e the Court interpre ted an insuranceThe Rains Court “[saw] no reason why a diffe rent interpr etation should apply [t o the Motor 2 Reparations Act].” Rains , 715 S.W .2d at 234. The Kentucky Court of Appe als applied the r ule of Rains and Un ite d Sta te s F id. & Gu ar . 3 to an insured who w as driving her a utomobile when she wa s struck i n the ey e by an objec t propelled by a lawnmower

near the stree t. Se e Ky . Far

m Bur e au Mu t. I

ns . Co . v . H

all , 807 S.W .2d 954, 955- 56 (Ky

. Ct. App. 1991). The a ppeals c ourt held that the insure d was e ntitled to benefits beca use she was using a motor vehicle at the time of the injury , and unlike the insure ds in Ra in and Sm ith , “(w ho wer e injured by intentional a cts), her injury resulted from a pure unintentional acc ident.” Id. at 956. I n other wor ds, she was c overe d “fr om acc idental inju ry wh i ch [was] causa lly related to her operation of the motor vehicle.” Id. -9- policy providing cover ag e for “bodily injury arising out of the use of

the automobile.” Rains , 715 S

. W

. 2 d at 2 3 4 (c i t i n g U.S. Fi d. & Guar.v. W

. Fire Ins. Co. , 4 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 4 9 1 , 4 9 3 ( K

y . 1 9 7 0 ) )

. In

2 U n i t e d S t a t es F i d e l i ty , a passe ng e r i n a

mot or ve hic le wa s in

jur e d w he n a

pis tol wa s a c c ide nta lly discharg ed in the ca

r, and it wa s undisputed that the acc idental dischar g e of the pistol was not caused by the movement or operation of the ca r. The United States Fidelity c ourt he ld t hat “ the inj ur

y in the ins tant c a se wa s n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y us e -c on ne c te d to be c on sid e re d r e a so na bly to have be e n w ith in the contemplation of the parties to the automobi le i nsuranc e contr acts he re involved.” U.S. Fid. & Guar

. , 450 S.W .2d at 493. See also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Roy al Indem. Co. , 429 F.2d 1014, 1018 & n. 8 ( 6th

Cir . 1 97 0) (a

pp lyingKe ntu c ky

law; no tin g that “ [t]he te rm ‘u se ’ is the g e ne ra l c a tc h- a ll of the insuring clause , desig ned and c onstructed to include a ll proper uses of the ve hicle not fa lling within [ operation or maintenanc e]. I t is limited to the purpose for which the c overa g e is desig ned”)

. Id. at 234. 3 L ike the injured pa

rties in Sm ith and Rains , Morell is not a victim of a motor ve hicle ac cident beca use the taxi did not contribute to her injuries. Fur

ther, a lthough he r injuries occ urre d just after making use of the ta x i, those injuries did not “arise out of” her “ use” of the taxi. Rains , 715 S.W .2d

a t 2 3 4

. T h u s , b a s e d o n t h e f o r e g o i n g g u ida nc e fr om S mi th, Rains , and United States Fidelity &-10-

Gu aran ty , w e c on c lud e that if pr e se nte d wi th the iss ue pr e se nte d in thi s c a se , the Ke ntu c ky Sup re me Court w ould f

ind that Mor ell’s injuries are not c overe d under the terms of the auto policy at issue. See also Farrer v . U. S. Fi d. & Gu ar . Co. , 809 So.2d 85, 95 (F la. C t. App. 2002) (holding that sexual assault did not “ar ise out of” the use of a motor vehicle althoug h it oc curr ed there , beca use it did not arise out of the i nhere nt nature of t he vehicle and the automobi le did not itself produce the injury ). The district cour

t disti nguished the for eg oing c ases on the g rounds t hat “it was not the driver of the motor vehic le who inflicted the inju ri es compl ained of althoug h the motor vehicle was ph y sic a lly

a sso c ia te d w iththe a ssa

ult .” Th is a

na ly sis is n ot c on sis te nt w iththe Ke ntu c ky pr e c e de nt. First and f

oremost, “phy sical assoc iation with the v eh i cle” is not the appropriate test. Rather, the fo c us is t he c a us a l c on ne c tio n b e tw e e n u se of the ve hic le and the inj ur y . Ne ith e r is the dr ive r’ s r ole

a k e y f a c to r . T h u s , w e th ink

it c le ar th a t unde r Rains , Sm ith , and United States Fid. & Guar., Morell’s alleg ed injuries ar e not cove red unde r the Ame rica n auto liability

policy

. Americ an also a

rg ues that there i s n o coverag e bec ause Mor ell’s injuries fa ll outsi de the “time-a nd-plac e limitation” on her “ use” of the taxi cab. This argument finds support in the Kentucky Supreme Court’s de cision in W est Americ an Insurance Co. v. Dick erson , 865 S.W .2d 320, 321 (Ky . 1993). In Dicke rson , the i n j u re d p ar t y

slipped and fe ll on an icy parkinglot when she exit ed an a

utomobile. The i n s u re r ar gu ed that the injuries wer e not ca used by her use of the c ar beca use she ha d completed e x iting the ve hicle, did not strike the vehic le as she f ell, and her f

all was

cause d by the i ce i n the par

king lot. Id. at 321. The K entucky Supreme Court disag ree d with the insurer’ s argument that the injured par ty had re linquished all ties to the motor vehicle as a passeng er,The Motor Ve hicle Repa rations Act de fines “use ” as i n c lu d in g “ o c c u p y in g , e ntering into and 4 alighting f

rom ” the ve hicle. Ky . Rev. St. Ann. § 304-39.020(6) ( emphasis adde d). -11- “dete rmin[i ng ] t hat use of the vehicle ha s an ex t en d ed meaning to be deter mined by the statutory phrase ‘alig hting f

rom it.’” Id. at 322. The Dicke rson court he ld that 4 [i ]t is sufficient if the i njury is a natural and reasonable incident or c onsequenc e of the us e of the ve hic le wh ic h, by thi s a pp ro a c h, de te rm ine s th a t “ a lig hti ngfr om” is a question of deg ree . As a g ener al rule, there is a r ational limit t o the ac tivity that may be said to be e ncompas s ed wi t h i n the term “ alig hting f rom” whic h is the time and place at which the individual, af ter a lighting , s h o ws an intention, evidenc ed by an o v e rta c tb a s e d

u p o nt h a ti n t e n t i o n , t o u n d e rt a k e a n e w d i r e c t i o no f

a c t i v i t y. We determine, the ref

ore, that an individual ha s not f inished “alig hting” from a vehic le at lea st until both fee t are planted firmly on the g round. Id. Simi larly , even under an expanded def inition of “use,” More ll had completed he r use of the taxi “and gone on to become a mere pedestrian” by the time she wa s rape d. Se e id . at 322. She had exit ed the taxi and walked into he r home bef ore the alleg ed ra

pe took place . Under

the Dicke rson framework, she had re linquished any connec tion she had to the taxi and “unde rtake n a new direc tion of ac tivity .” Id. I n other wor ds, as in Rains , Morell’s only causa l connec tion to the vehicle is that she would not ha

ve been injured except for the fac t tha t she rode in it. Cf. Rains 715 S.W .2d at 234 (stating that “[t] he only

causa l connec tion sugg ested by Rains’ brief

is that he would not have be en injured except for

the fa ct that his vehicle w as par ked at the pl ace it was a

nd that he re turned to that pla c e to m a ke us e of

hi s veh icl e,” whic h f

a ile d to su ff

ic e a s a sh ow ingthat hi s u se of

the ve hic le

cause d the i njury

). Se e als o R.A. Stuchbery & Others Syndicate 1906 v. Re dland Ins. Co. , 6 6 Ca l. Rptr. 3d 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding t hat s exual assault of a passeng er by a shuttle driver

in the driver’ s apar

tment d i d n o t re s u l t from use of a motor vehic le bec ause use of vehic le was not theMo re ll c ite s Maryland Casualty. Co. v. Bake r , 200 S.W .2d 757, 761 (Ky . 1947). Ther e the 5 Kentucky S u p re m e Court held that one of two insurance policies at issue af forde d cover ag e for injuries sustained in an intentional assault by a taxi driver. Bake r , 200 S.W .2d at 762. Howeve r, the basis for the Court’ s decision re sted upon its cons t ru ct i on of Ky . Rev. St. Ann. § 281.460, which req u i re d a taxi company to procure insurance “binding the obligor to pay any final judg ment rend er ed aga i n s t” a taxi company for “ any act or omission connected with the ope ration of motor vehicles.” Id. a t 76 0. Th e Court he ld t hat th e statut e re quire d th e ins ur e r t o p ay the jud g me nt i n favor of the plaintiff a g ainst the taxi cab ope rator. Id

. a t 7 6 2

. H o w e v e r , t h e s t a tu t e i nt h a tc a s e , K y. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281.460, has been repe aled. The curr ent statute, Ky

. Rev. St. Ann. § 281.655, does no t re qu ir e a ta x c omp any ’s ins ur e r to “ pa y any fi na l jud g me nt. ” I ns te a d, the curr ent law mer e ly re qu ir e s th e tax i c omp any to m a int a in i ns ur anc e wi th t he same min imum li a

bil ity lim its a s is re qu ir e d o f a ll o wn e rs and op e rator s o f m oto r v e hic le s und e r t he Mo tor Ve hic le Re pa

ra tio ns Ac t. See Ky . Rev. St. Ann. § 281.655(12); Ky . Rev. St. Ann. § 304.39-010(1)

. Fur ther, the statutory lang uag e has been c hang ed fr om “any act or omission connected with the ope ration of motor vehicles” to “dama g es . . . arising out of owner ship, maintenance , use, loading or unloading of the insured vehic le.”

-12- predominating cause o r s u b s t antial fa ctor in the pa sseng er’ s injuries but merely used to drive the passeng er to the dr iver’s a partment). W estf ie ld , upon which More l l relies, is distinguishable

. There , a pane l of this Court 5 predic ted t hat t he Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that an insured c arpe t cleaningbusiness’s alleg ed neg lige nt hiring of a for mer e mploy ee w ho murdere d the insured’ s customer w a s a qualify ing “occ urre nce” under a

g ener al liability

insurance po li c y , wh ic h

d e f in e d “ occur renc e” a s an “a ccide nt.” Se e W e stf ie ld , 3 36 F .3 d at 50 3. Th e Cou rt re a so ne d th a t a lth ou g h th e ins ur e d’ s a c t of ne g lig e ntl y hir ingand

re ta ini ngthe e mpl oy e e wa s inte nti on a l, i t w a s “ no t su bs tanti a lly

c e rt a in t o r e su lt i n s ome injury ,” so it wa s ac cidental, rather tha n intentional conduct. Id. at 510. Howe ver, W estf ie ld inv olv e d a

g e ne ra l c omm e rc ia l lia

bil ity po lic y . He re , the po lic y pr ov ide s c ov e ra g e on ly

fo r b od ily injury or prope rty

damag e ca

used by the use of a

vehicle ow ned by

Star Taxi.-13-

B e c a us e we are c on fiden t that the Ke ntu c ky

Sup re me Court

wo uld c on c lud e , b a se d o n it s prec edent in Ra ins , Sm ith , Un ite d S tat es F ide lit y& Gu aran ty , and Dicke rson , that Morell’s alleg ed inj ur ie s w e re no t c a

us e d by the “ us e ” of the ta xi a s d e fi ne d in Am e ri c an’ s p oli c y , w e wi ll n ot a dd re ss its pu bli c po lic y

argume nts

. III. Conclusi on T h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e d i s t r i c t c ou rtis REVER SED , a nd the ma tte r i s REMAND ED wi th instructions to enter judg ment in favor of Americ an.