alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard Ortiz, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pesce, J.), rendered November 30, 1987, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree and possession of burglar’s tools, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s conviction arose out of an incident which occurred at about, noon on April 24, 1987. Two eyewitnesses observed the defendant exiting 88 Vanderbilt Avenue carrying three large plastic bags and a black pouch. The defendant walked a half-block down Vanderbilt Avenue towards Myrtle Avenue and then entered a livery cab. One eyewitness entered his own car and followed the cab. When the livery cab stopped at a red light the defendant exited it. The eyewitness approached the cab and the cab driver pointed to the defendant and stated "that’s the guy”. The police apprehended the defendant and both eyewitnesses identified him.

The defendant claims that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated when the trial court permitted one eyewitness to give hearsay testimony as to what the cab driver said. This contention, however, was not preserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Williams,*46 NY2d 1070; *People v Caldwell,*147 AD2d 581; *People v Keith,*136 AD2d 657; *People v Cummings,*109 AD2d 748) and review in the interest of justice is not warranted under the facts at bar.

*873The defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly attempted to bolster the eyewitnesses’ identifications by eliciting testimony from the defendant on cross-examination that he was arrested after the eyewitnesses had identified him. Since the defense counsel did not object to the challenged testimony on the specific ground that it constituted improper bolstering, the claimed error of law is not preserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v West,*56 NY2d 662). Under the circumstances, we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.

Similarly unpreserved for appellate review is the issue of the propriety of certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation which is raised for the first time on appeal (CPL 470.05 [2]). Kunzeman, J. P., Kooper, Sullivan and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1381 

To require the Federal Trade Commission to monitor and investigate gasoline 

prices under certain circumstances. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 14, 2007 

Mrs. BOXER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

A BILL 

To require the Federal Trade Commission to monitor and 

investigate gasoline prices under certain circumstances. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE PRICES. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—If, based on weekly data published 

5 by the Energy Information Administration of the Depart6 ment of Energy, the average price of regular grade gaso7 line in a State increases 20 percent or more for at least 

8 7 days during any 3-month period, the Federal Trade 

9 Commission shall initiate an investigation into the retail 

10 price of gasoline in that State to determine if the price 


hmoore on PRODPC68 with HMBILLS
2 

•S 1381 IS

1 of gasoline is being artificially manipulated by reducing 

2 refinery capacity or by any other form of manipulation. 

3 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the initi4 ation of the investigation described in subsection (a), the 

5 Federal Trade Commission shall report to Congress the 

6 results of the investigation. 

7 (c) PUBLIC MEETING.—Not later than 14 days after 

8 issuing the report described in subsection (b), the Federal 

9 Trade Commission shall hold a public hearing in the State 

10 in which the retail price of gasoline was investigated as 

11 described in subsection (a) for the purpose of presenting 

12 the results of the investigation. 

13 (d) ACTION ON PRICE INCREASE.—If the Federal 

14 Trade Commission determines that the increase in gaso15 line prices in a State is a result of market manipulation, 

16 the Federal Trade Commission shall, in cooperation with 

17 the Attorney General of that State, take appropriate ac18 tion. 

Æ 


hmoore on PRODPC68 with HMBILLS
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#### EMPIRE THEATRE, INC., AND ISADORE HIRST, PROSECUTORS, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT.

Argued October 7, 1947

Decided October 20, 1947.

Before Justices Donges, Colie and Eastwood.

For the prosecutors, *Harry Green.*

For the defendant, *Charles A. Malloy (Herman D.*Ringle, of counsel).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Colie, J.

This writ of *certiorari*brings up for review a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission of New Jersey that “The services of the entertainers in question constituted employment as defined by the Unemployment Compensation Law, and the refund of the contributions paid by petitioners with respect to the remuneration of the entertainers is hereby denied.” The question at issue is whether specialty act performers engaged in a burlesque theatre usually for a week, sometimes for two weeks in a year, receiving their pay from the theatre, are within the term “employment” as defined in *R. S.*43:21 — 19. The applicable part of the cited section reads:

> “(i) (1) ‘Employment’ means service, including service in interstate commerce performed for remuneration or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied.”

> “(6) Services performed by an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to be employment subject to this chapter *255unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that

> “(A) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract of service and in fact; and

> “(B) such service is either outside the usual course of the business for which such service is performed, or that such service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enteprise for which such service is performed; and

> “(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.”

In *Electrolux Corp.*v. *Board of Review,*129 *N. J. L.*157, the Court of Errors and Appeals held that all services performed by an individual for remuneration were employment within the purview of the act, unless all three tests enumerated above as A, B, C, are met. Referring to test B it is obvious that the service to be performed by the specialty artists in this case was not “outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed.” Since the service does not meet test B above quoted, it is, under the cited decision, to be considered employment subject to the act. The writ of *certiorari*is dismissed, with costs.
#### DUBOIS v. THOMAS.

No. 27833.

Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division A.

June 10, 1935.

R. H. & J. H. Thompson, of Jackson, for appellant.

Creekmore, Creekmore & Capers, of Jackson, for appellee.

J. A. Lauderdale, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Supreme Court Clerk.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

The judgment of the court below was reversed at the March, 1929, term of this court, and costs on appeal were adjudged against the appellee. 154 Miss. 286, 122 So. 495. He declined to pay the same, and execution against him therefor was returned nulla bona. The costs were then paid by the appellant. No mandate returning the case to the court below has been issued under rule of this court, No. 29, which is as follows:

> “When costs are awarded in this Court against the appellee, and there shall have been a return of nulla bona to an execution against him, and the costs shall be paid by appellant, no mandate shall issue upon the application of the appellee, until he shall pay into the Court, for the use of appellant, the costs paid by him.”

The appellant has filed three motions herein. One is for an order to the clerk of this court directing him to file a motion for the dismissal of the cause under § 667, Code of 1930; one for the dismissal thereof without the intervention of the clerk; and one for an order directing the clerk to refuse payment of the costs if tendered him by the appellee, and to decline to issue a mandate returning the cause to the court below. The grounds of these motions are that the appellee is guilty of laches in delaying to pay the costs and procure a mandate, and that the appellant has been prejudiced thereby, setting forth facts in support thereof.

Section 667, Code of 1930, applies only to pending cases, i. e., cases not yet decided, and this case has been decided, and final judgment disposing of the appeal has been rendered. No statute or rule of court grants the relief here sought, and whether the doctrine of laches applies to the appellee’s delay in *869prosecuting the case will be for the determination of the court below on the return of the cause thereto. Of. Tucker v. Wilson, 68 Miss. 693, 9 So. 898.

Motions overruled.
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<PAGE>   1



                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.01

(AMERICAN AXLE & MANUFACTURING, INC. LETTERHEAD APPEARS HERE)

                                                                    CONFIDENTIAL

December 15, 1998, as amended January 11, 2000

Mr. B.G. Mathis
1840 Holbrook Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48212

Dear Mr. Mathis:

This letter will confirm our understanding regarding the conditions applicable
to your retirement from American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. (the "Company") at
such future date as shall be established.

This understanding takes into account and is in recognition of your significant
contributions to the process of acquiring the Company's assets from General
Motors and the subsequent success of the Company.

Upon your retirement, the following shall apply:

1.   You will be treated as having 10 years of service for all benefit
     eligibility and calculation purposes and shall receive retirement benefits
     supplemented by the Company's Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan equal
     to a total amount of $150,000 per full calendar year at the time of your
     retirement.

2.   You will continue to be provided a company car while serving on the
     Company's Board of Directors.

3.   Other terms and conditions of retirement shall be in accordance with those
     generally applicable to other senior executives of the Company.

The above items have been approved by the Board of Directors of the Company and
of AAMM.

                                         Very truly yours,

                                         By: /s/ Richard E. Dauch
                                                 ----------------
                                         Title: Chairman, Chief Executive
                                                 Officer and President
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Diandre McNeill, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuffner, J.), rendered April 26, 1988, convicting him of attempted burglary in the second degree (three counts), upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s plea agreement was explicitly conditioned, among other things, upon his remaining at a drug rehabilitation facility for 30 days prior to sentencing. The defendant breached the agreement by absconding from the facility. Under these circumstances, it was entirely proper for the court to sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment in excess of that originally promised *(see, People v Erazo,*155 AD2d 477; *People v Betheny,*147 AD2d 488; *People v Asencio,*143 AD2d 917). Moreover, the sentence imposed was far less than the sentence the court had previously stated it would impose in the event the defendant failed to live up to the conditions of the agreement. Bracken, J. P., Lawrence, Eiber, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02613-DME-MEH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

$782,893.49 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

Defendant.

NOTICE OF COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE

COMES NOW the United States of America, by and through United States 

Attorney John F. Walsh and Assistant United States Attorney Martha A. Paluch, and 

states:

THAT on October 6, 2011, the United States of America filed a Verified 

Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C) for forfeiture of 

defendant $782,893.49 in United States Currency;

THAT interested parties must be provided with an opportunity to be heard in

opposition to the civil complaint for forfeiture pursuant to Supplemental Rule G for 

Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (“Supplemental Rule G”), and 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

THAT any persons claiming or asserting an interest in the above-described 

property must file their Claim pursuant to Supplemental Rule G(5) with the Clerk of the 

United States District Court, at 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado, 80294, by November 

28, 2011; 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02613-DME-MEH Document 5 filed 10/18/11 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 2
2

THAT pursuant to Supplemental Rule G(5), any Claim filed must: (1) identify the 

specific property claimed; (2) identify the claimant and state the claimant’s interest in 

that specific property; and (3) be signed by the claimant under penalty of perjury. If you 

file a Claim, you must then file an Answer to the Complaint with the Clerk of the United 

States District Court within twenty-one (21) days after filing your Claim. Copies of 

these documents must be provided to Assistant United States Attorney Martha A. 

Paluch, at 1225 17th Street, Suite 700, Denver, Colorado, 80202; and

THAT unless all interested parties file their Claims and Answers within the 

specified time, a default pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will 

be noted and forfeiture will be sought of the defendant property.

DATED this 18th day of October 2011.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN F. WALSH

United States Attorney

By: s/ Martha A. Paluch

Martha A. Paluch

Assistant United States Attorney

1225 Seventeenth Street, Ste. 700

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 454-0100

Fax: (303) 454-0402

E-mail: martha.paluch@usdoj.gov

Attorney for Plaintiff

Case No. 1:11-cv-02613-DME-MEH Document 5 filed 10/18/11 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 2
[Cite as State v. Rock , 2016-Ohio-8518.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 2016-L-122 - vs - : DAVID V. ROCK, JR., : Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 1997 CR 000363. Judgment: Appeal dismissed.

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville , OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). David V. Rock, Jr., pro se, PID: A663-040, Mansfield Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 788, 1150 North Main Street, Mansfield, OH 44901 (Defendant-Appellant).

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J. {¶1} On November 10, 2016, appellant, David V. Rock, Jr., pro se, filed a notice of appeal from an August 18, 2016 judgment entry issued by the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. In the judgment, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for the transcript of proceedings at state’s expense. {¶2} App.R. 4(A)(1) states in part:2 {¶3} “[A] party who wishes to appeal from an order that is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of that entry.” {¶4} In this case, appellant’s notice of appeal was due no later than September 19, 2016, which was not a holiday or a weekend. Since appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed until November 10, 2016, the appeal is untimely by almost two months. {¶5} App.R. 5(A) states, in relevant part: {¶6} “(1) After the expiration of the thirty day period provided by App.R. 4(A) for the filing of a notice of appeal as of righ t, an appeal may be taken by a defendant with leave of the court to which the appeal is taken in the following classes of cases: {¶7} “(a) Criminal proceedings; {¶8} “(b) Delinquency proceedings; and {¶9} “(c) Serious youthful offender proceedings. {¶10} “(2) A motion for leave to appeal shall be filed with the court of appeals and shall set forth the reasons for the failure of the appellant to perfect an appeal as of right. Concurrently with the filing of the motion, the movant shall file with the clerk of the trial court a notice of appeal in the form prescribed by App.R. 3 and shall file a copy of the notice of the appeal in the court of appeals. * * *” {¶11} In the present case, appellant has neither complied with the thirty-day rule set forth in App.R. 4(A) nor sought leave to appeal. Thus, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Appellant has a remedy under App.R. 5(A) to file an untimely appeal from a criminal judgment. {¶12} Based upon the foregoing analysis, the appeal is hereby sua sponte dismissed as being untimely.3 {¶13} Appeal dismissed.

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J., TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.,

concur.
Exhibit 35.3

SERVICER COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE

PURSUANT TO ITEM 1123 OF REGULATION AB UNDER THE

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

|   | Re: | HSBC Private Label Credit Card Master Note Trust (USA) I |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------|

Series 2007-1, Class A Notes; Series 2007-1, Class B Notes

 

I, Betty A. Earll, Vice President of HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (the “Company”), pursuant to Item 1123 of Regulation AB of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Section 3.05 of the Amended and Restated Transfer and Servicing Agreement, dated as of August 11, 2006 amending and restating in full the Transfer and Servicing Agreement dated as of June 12, 2001 (the “Agreement”), among HSBC Funding (USA) Inc. V, as Transferor, HSBC Finance Corporation, as Servicer, and Wilmington Trust Company, as Owner Trustee of the HSBC Private Label Credit Card Master Note Trust (USA) I, hereby certify that:

 

|   | 1. | A review of the activities of the Company from February 14, 2007 through December 31, 2007 and of its performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision; and |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, based on my review, the Company has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period referred to above except as set forth below: |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | NONE |
|--------|------|

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed this certificate on behalf of the Company this 3rd day of March 2008.

 

HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc.

 

 

By:  /s/ Betty A. Earll

Name:  Betty A. Earll

Title:  Vice President
EXHIBIT (21)--SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

        Name                                        State of Incorporation


Mainsource Bank                                          Indiana
Regional Bank                                            Indiana
Kentucky United Bancorp, Inc.                            Kentucky
IUB Illinois Holdings, Inc.                              Indiana
Capstone Bank, N.A.                                      Illinois
IUB Reinsurance Co., Ltd.                                Turks and Caicos
MainSource Insurance, Inc.                               Indiana
MSB Investments of Nevada, Inc.                          Nevada
RB Investments, Inc.                                     Nevada
MainSource Statutory Trust I                             Connecticut
MainSource Statutory Trust II                            Connecticut
MainSource Statutory Trust III                           Delaware
Peoples Holdings, Inc.                                   Indiana
FCBY Merger Corp.                                        Indiana
First Community Bank and Trust                           Indiana
IUB Capital Trust                                        Delaware
First Community Real Estate Management, Inc.             Indiana
RB Holdings, Inc.                                        Nevada
MSB Holdings of Nevada, Inc.                             Nevada
MSB of Nevada, LLC                                       Nevada
MSB Realty, Inc.                                         Maryland
RB of Nevada, LLC                                        Nevada
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-6028
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. PAUL VERNON MCLEAN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (0:04-cr-00322-CMC-1; 0:07-cv-70086-CMC) Submitted: May 22, 2008 Decided: May 28, 2008 Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Paul Vernon McLean, Appellant Pro Se. Stanley D. Ragsdale, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Paul Vernon McLean seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that McLean has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and di smiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED