NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 

revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 

volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical 

error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 

Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-

1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-11865

SJC-11866

ROBERT MacLAURIN1 & another2 vs. CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.3

ROBERT MacLAURIN4 & another5 vs. CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.6

Hampden. September 10, 2015. - August 18, 2016.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 

Hines, JJ.7

Fire Prevention. Practice, Civil, Action in nature of 

certiorari. Administrative Law, Hearing.

 

1 Individually and as president of Sylvan, Inc., trustee of 

the 215 Chestnut Street Realty Nominee Trust.

2 215 Chestnut Street Realty Nominee Trust.

3 Holyoke Fire Department and Chief of Holyoke Fire

Department.

4 Individually and as president of Sylvan, Inc., trustee of 

the 11 Spring Street Realty Nominee Trust.

5 11 Spring Street Realty Nominee Trust.

6 Holyoke Fire Department and Chief of Holyoke Fire

Department.

7 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 

deliberation on this case prior to their retirements.
2

Civil actions commenced in the Hampden Division of the 

Superior Court Department on April 26, 2012, and May 14, 2012, 

respectively.

After transfer to the Western Division of the Housing Court 

Department and consolidation, the case was heard by Robert 

Fields, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Thomas D. Moore for the plaintiffs.

Kara Lamb Cunha for the defendants.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Jason R. Ferenc for Greater Holyoke Rental Housing 

Association

Joseph N. Schneiderman for Fire Chiefs Association of 

Massachusetts.

Maura Healey, Attorney General, Benjamin K. Golden, 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven P. Rourke, Special Assistant 

Attorney General, & Peter Senopoulos for the State Fire Marshal.

LENK, J. We are called upon in these consolidated cases to 

construe G. L. c. 148, § 26I, the residential sprinkler 

provision, one of a number of provisions requiring the 

installation of automatic sprinkler systems contained in G. L. 

c. 148, the fire prevention act. The residential sprinkler 

provision mandates the installation of automatic sprinklers in 

new residential buildings of four or more units, and in such 

existing buildings when they are "substantially rehabilitated so 

as to constitute the equivalent of new construction." See G. L. 

c. 148, § 26I.
3

In 2006, the plaintiff, Robert MacLaurin,8 purchased the 

second of two vacant apartment buildings in the city of Holyoke 

(city), which he intended to rehabilitate and return to 

occupancy. As existing residential buildings of four or more 

units, the buildings were subject to the residential sprinkler 

provision. MacLaurin contends that the renovations he undertook 

on the buildings do not meet the statutory standard triggering 

the requirement that sprinklers be installed. Concluding, to 

the contrary, that the two buildings had been substantially 

rehabilitated within the meaning of the residential sprinkler 

provision, the city's fire chief ordered, without a hearing, 

that automatic sprinkler systems be installed in each building.

The residential sprinkler provision differs from all of the 

other automatic sprinkler provisions in the fire prevention act9

in that it contains no statutory right of appeal. After several 

agencies had declined jurisdiction, MacLaurin filed complaints 

seeking relief in the nature of certiorari and declaratory 

 

8 For convenience, we refer to Robert MacLaurin, both in his 

personal capacity and as trustee of both the 215 Chestnut Street 

Realty Nominee Trust and the 11 Spring Street Realty Nominee 

Trust, as well as the 215 Chestnut Street Realty Nominee Trust 

and the 11 Spring Street Realty Nominee Trust themselves, as a 

single entity.

9 See, e.g., G. L. c. 148, § 26A ("high rise buildings" of 

more than seventy feet in height); G. L. c. 148, § 26G 

(commercial buildings of more than 7,500 square feet); G. L. 

c. 148, § 26G 1/2 ("[n]ightclubs, dance halls, discotheques,

[and] bars" having capacity of at least one hundred); G. L. 

c. 148, § 26H ("[l]odging or boarding houses").
4

judgment, challenging the orders as arbitrary and capricious. 

Following a remand of the consolidated matters for 

reconsideration in light of additional facts, which the fire 

chief concluded had no effect on his decision, a judge of the 

Housing Court affirmed the chief's orders, and this appeal 

followed.

The statutory standard that installation of automatic 

sprinklers is necessary only where an existing multi-unit 

residential building has been "substantially rehabilitated so as 

to constitute the equivalent of new construction" is not defined 

in the residential sprinkler provision or anywhere else in the 

fire prevention act, and the language does not appear in any 

other section of the fire prevention act. Moreover, there is no 

controlling appellate jurisprudence and no applicable Statewide 

guidance akin to that which has been developed by entities such 

as the automatic sprinkler appeals board, in considering appeals 

from the requirement to install sprinklers under other statutory 

provisions, all of which do include a statutory right of appeal.

In construing the meaning of the statutory standard that 

installation of automatic sprinklers in existing residential 

buildings is required only when a building has been 

"substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent 

of new construction," we therefore turn to fundamental 

principles of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Boston 
5

Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 719-720 

(2002). In doing so, we consider the ordinary meaning of the 

words the Legislature used, in conjunction with their 

specialized meaning in certain contexts, the course of the 

enactment of the automatic sprinkler provisions within the fire 

prevention act, as well as the goals the Legislature intended to 

achieve. We conclude that, in order to require the installation 

of sprinklers in an existing multi-unit residential building, 

the rehabilitation must be so substantial that the physical 

structure is rendered "the equivalent of new construction," 

i.e., in essence as good as new.10 Where the rehabilitation is 

suitably substantial in this regard, a corollary is that the 

cost of installation of automatic sprinklers ordinarily will 

approximate the cost of installing sprinklers in a comparable 

newly constructed building.

Although the fire chief's decision states that, after the 

modifications were complete, the buildings had been 

"substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent 

of new construction," the decision neither contains any explicit 

findings of fact nor sets forth the test used to evaluate the 

nature of the work done. Given this, coupled with the absence 

 

10 See, e.g., L. Rosenthal & D. Listokin, New or Rehab: 

Striking a New Balance Under California's Affordable Housing 

Standards, University of California at Berkeley, Program on 

Housing and Urban Policy, Working Paper No. W09-002 (Mar. 2009).
6

of controlling authority, the Housing Court judge was not in a 

position to ascertain whether the fire chief's interpretation of 

G. L. c. 148, § 26I, reasonably reflects the intent and purpose 

of the residential sprinkler provision, nor could the judge 

have ascertained whether the application of that interpretation 

is supported by the facts of record. Accordingly, no 

determination properly could be reached as to whether the 

decision was legally erroneous or so devoid of factual support 

as to be arbitrary and capricious. See State Bd. of Retirement

v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 703-704 (2006). Thus, the judgment 

affirming the fire chief's decision must be vacated and, with 

the guidance we now provide as to the meaning of "substantially 

rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new 

construction," the matter remanded to the chief of the city fire 

department for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.11

Background and prior proceedings.

12 The two vacant 

apartment buildings at issue here were built in the late 1800s, 

 

11 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the State 

Fire Marshal, the Fire Chiefs Association of Massachusetts, and 

the Greater Holyoke Rental Housing Association.

12 The facts are taken from apparently undisputed facts in 

the parties' briefs, documents in the record, and statements in 

the orders and decisions of the fire chief and the Housing 

Court. The fire chief's decision does not include express 

findings of fact, and because the matters were considered in the 

Housing Court on petitions for certiorari, the Housing Court 

judge also made no findings of fact.
7

of wood frame construction with brick facade. One, a threestory building on the corner of Essex and Chestnut Streets, has 

a total of twenty apartments on three floors and two commercial 

spaces on the ground floor; the other, a four-story building on 

the corner of Main and Spring Streets, has a total of thirteen 

apartments on four floors and two commercial spaces on the 

ground floor.13 Each has sustained fire damage in the past, 

including while empty. MacLaurin purchased both buildings, 

which had been boarded and abandoned, with the intent to 

rehabilitate them and return them to occupancy. He obtained 

building permits, hired contractors, and undertook the proposed 

work;14 each portion of the work, such as electrical and plumbing 

modifications, was approved by the relevant city inspectors as 

it was completed.

The city adopted G. L. c. 148, § 26I, a "local option" 

 

13 The residential sprinkler provision is applicable to 

buildings "occupied in whole or in part for residential 

purposes." See G. L. c. 148, § 26I.

14 MacLaurin acquired the Essex Street property in July, 

2004, and applied for a building permit to "restore and repair 

building including walls, floors and ceilings: patch and 

replace plaster as needed, and repaint; also reconstruct rear 

porches" in November, 2008. The building permit issued in May, 

2009.

MacLaurin acquired the Main Street property in June, 2006, 

and applied for a building permit in June, 2007. A building 

permit issued in September, 2007, to "restore and repair 

building including walls, floors and ceilings: patch and 

replace plaster as needed, and repair; also reconstruct rear 

porches."
8

statute, in February, 1996.15 On its face, the city's general 

application form for a building permit requires that a plan for 

an automatic sprinkler system be submitted with the application, 

and it is undisputed that sprinkler plans,16 and modifications to 

one set of plans, were attached to MacLaurin's permit 

applications.

17 During the course of the several-year period in 

which the work was being done, MacLaurin submitted to the 

building inspector several reports from licensed structural 

engineers stating that the work was not structural, that the 

buildings were not being "substantially rehabilitated" within 

the meaning of G. L. c. 148, § 26I, and thus that the 

requirement for installation of automatic sprinklers had not 

been triggered. When the work was essentially complete, 

 

15 A local option statute is applicable only where a 

municipality chooses to adopt its provisions. See, e.g., Adams

v. Boston, 461 Mass. 602, 609 (2012), and cases cited; Connors

v. Boston, 430 Mass 31, 37 (1999); 1010 Memorial Dr. Tenants

Corp. v. Fire Chief of Cambridge, 424 Mass. 661, 668 n.4 (1997). 

With the exception of high rise buildings, see G. L. c. 148, 

§ 26A, the sprinkler provisions in the fire prevention act were 

all initially adopted as local option provisions.

16 The plans were apparently "sprinkler narrative letters," 

describing a proposed system in general terms and specifying the 

types of components that would be used; they were not diagrams 

of the floor plans showing where particular components would be 

installed, nor were cost estimates provided in connection with 

the plans.

17 The parties dispute whether the submission of such plans 

was a prerequisite for the issuance of building permits, and 

whether the fire chief made statements to that effect to 

MacLaurin.
9

MacLaurin sought inspection by the city in order to determine 

what else remained to be done so that certificates of occupancy 

could issue. In February, 2012, the city's building 

commissioner, the assistant building commissioner, and a fire 

department captain made onsite inspections of each building. 

The fire chief then issued orders requiring automatic sprinkler 

systems be installed in each building.

MacLaurin sought review of the fire chief's orders before 

the State fire marshal, the State building code appeals board, 

and the automatic sprinkler appeals board; each declined to hear 

his appeals, citing a lack of jurisdiction.18 MacLaurin then 

filed complaints seeking relief in the nature of certiorari, 

G. L. c. 249, § 4, and declaratory judgment, in the Superior 

Court. The cases were transferred to the Housing Court on joint 

motions of the parties, and then were consolidated. MacLaurin 

claimed, among other things, that the fire chief's 2012 orders 

contained significant factual errors, particularly concerning 

the scope and nature of the work, such as whether substantial 

portions of walls and ceilings had been opened so as to have 

facilitated sprinkler installation. In light of documents 

 

18 Although the statute provides no route of appeal for 

owners of multi-unit residential buildings if the buildings are 

less than seventy feet tall, guidance issued by the State board 

of building regulations and standards states, without apparent 

basis, that such an owner aggrieved by a decision of a 

municipality's fire official may appeal to the State fire 

marshal.
10

attached to MacLaurin's complaint containing factual information 

that apparently had not been before the fire chief, a Housing 

Court judge remanded the matter to the city for further 

investigation and determination whether automatic sprinklers 

were required. Without conducting a hearing, the fire chief 

concluded that the additional documents had no bearing on his 

decision that automatic sprinklers were required, and, a few 

days after the orders of remand, issued essentially the same 

orders as he had previously (2013 orders).

In March, 2014, the same Housing Court judge who had 

ordered the remand conducted a hearing on the fire chief's 2013 

orders, and, in July, 2014, the judge issued a decision 

affirming the orders that automatic sprinklers must be 

installed. He stated that, "viewed through the lens" of the 

deferential standard of review applicable in a petition for 

certiorari, the fire chief's determination was not "so devoid of 

factual support as to be arbitrary and capricious." The judge 

noted that the fire chief's decisions were not constrained by 

any controlling authority, the fire department had inspected the 

properties, and the fire chief had reached a conclusion based on 

the "extent of the renovation, its costs, and its costs relative 

to the overall value of the property; all factors that upon 

facts which 'reasonable men might deem proper' to support it" 

(citation omitted). MacLaurin appealed from the Housing Court 
11

judge's affirmance of the fire chief's orders, and we 

transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. MacLaurin filed 

complaints in the nature of certiorari, G. L. c. 249, § 4, in 

the absence of a statutory right of appeal. The purpose of an 

action in the nature of certiorari is "to relieve aggrieved 

parties from the injustice arising from errors of law committed 

in proceedings affecting their justiciable rights when no other 

means of relief are open." Figgs v. Boston Housing Auth., 469 

Mass. 354, 361 (2014), quoting Swan v. Justices of the Superior 

Court, 222 Mass. 542, 544 (1916). The function of judicial 

"review in an action in the nature of certiorari is 'to correct 

substantial errors of law apparent on the record adversely 

affecting material rights.'" MacHenry v. Civil Service Comm'n, 

40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634 (1996), quoting Commissioners of 

Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of Boston, 369 Mass 84, 90 

(1975). "To obtain certiorari review of an administrative 

decision, . . . three elements must be present: (1) a judicial 

or quasi judicial proceeding, (2) from which there is no other 

reasonably adequate remedy, and (3) a substantial injury or 

injustice arising from the proceeding under review." Indeck v. 

Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 385 (2008). In the 
12

circumstances, MacLaurin's complaint meets these requirements.19

Because the fire chief's determination was discretionary, a 

reviewing court in these circumstances is limited to determining 

whether the decision is legally erroneous or so devoid of 

factual support as to be arbitrary and capricious. State Bd. of 

Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 703-704 (2006); 

Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Auditor of the Commonwealth, 

430 Mass. 783, 790-791 (2000). See Figgs v. Boston Housing 

Auth., supra at 361, quoting Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of 

Hingham, 462 Mass. 779, 792 (2012) (standard of certiorari 

review "may vary according to the nature of the action for which 

review is sought"). Unlike the ordinary situation in reviewing 

an action for relief in the nature of certiorari, however, where 

the controlling precedent against which a reviewing court 

measures whether a decision is legally erroneous or lacks 

relevant factual support is more or less evident, in this case 

 

19 Although there was no adjudicatory hearing, the chief's 

investigation and written decisions, based on physical 

inspection of the premises and written documentation gathered 

from multiple sources, including documents submitted by 

MacLaurin and city records, were quasi judicial proceedings. 

See Frawley v. Police Comm'r of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 726-

727 (2016) (quasi judicial proceeding where city police chief 

determined that retired police officer's application for gun 

license did not meet statutory standard). See also Hoffer v. 

Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 461, 457 (2012). It is 

undisputed that the absence of a statutory right of appeal left 

MacLaurin with no other route of appeal, and the injury asserted 

reaches, at least according to MacLaurin's documents, into 

hundreds of thousands of dollars.
13

there are no appellate decisions involving the statutory 

standard of "substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the 

equivalent of new construction." Nor are there interpretations 

of that standard by any authoritative Statewide body, given the 

absence of a statutory avenue of administrative review. In such 

circumstances, deference is to be accorded the fire chief's 

decision only if the reviewing court can ascertain whether the 

decision comports with apparent statutory purposes.

2. Statutory interpretation. "Our primary duty in 

interpreting a statute is 'to effectuate the intent of the 

Legislature in enacting it.'" Wheatley v. Massachusetts 

Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601 (2010), S.C., 465 

Mass. 297 (2013), quoting International Org. of Masters v. Woods 

Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 392 Mass. 811, 

813 (1984). In order to determine whether the fire chief's 

conclusion that automatic sprinklers must be installed in 

MacLaurin's buildings accurately reflects the legislative 

purpose and intent, we first must discern the meaning of 

"substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent 

of new construction" within the residential sprinkler provision. 

To do so, we begin with the plain language of the provision. 

See Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay 

Transp. Auth., 392 Mass. 407, 415 (1984), quoting Bronstein v. 

Prudential Ins. Co of Am., 390 Mass. 701, 704 (1984) 
14

("[s]tatutory language is the principal source of insight into 

legislative purpose").

"Words that are not defined in a statute[, as here,] should 

be given their usual and accepted meanings," derived "from 

sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as 

their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions." 

Seidman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477-478 (2008), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). We 

interpret the statutory language "according to the intent of the 

Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 

ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 

connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 

imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 

accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 

effectuated." Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 

Mass. 718, 719-720 (2002), quoting O'Brien v. Director of the 

Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 482, 487-488 (1984).

Because the fire chief appears to have considered the 

meaning of "substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the 

equivalent of new construction" of a residential building of 

four or more units to be essentially the same as the meaning of 

"major alterations" in the context of renovation of an existing 

commercial building, G. L. c. 148, § 26G, we also examine the 
15

ordinary meaning of "major alteration."20

To "rehabilitate" something generally means to return it 

from disuse or a poor condition to a useable condition.21 

"Alteration," on the other hand, implies a less extensive change 

to something already in existence. See, e.g., The American 

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 55 (3d ed. 1996)

("[t]he condition resulting from altering; modification"; to 

alter is "[t]o change or make different; modify"); Webster's 

Third New International Dictionary 63 (2002) ("the act or action 

 

20 Apparently the only case in the Commonwealth to have 

addressed the meaning of the statutory standard in the 

residential sprinkler provision is a Superior Court judge's 

decision in Iodice vs. Newton, Mass. Superior Ct., No. 971098D 

(Middlesex County Oct. 1, 1999) (Iodice). While recognizing 

that the "substantially rehabilitated . . ." standard is not 

identical to the "major alteration" standard of the commercial 

sprinkler provision, the judge concluded there that the 

legislative purposes underlying the commercial sprinkler 

provision and the residential sprinkler provision are similar, 

and that the factors applicable to a determination whether a 

commercial building has undergone "major alterations" under the 

standard established in Congregation Beth Sholom & Community 

Ctr., Inc. v. Building Comm'r of Framingham, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 

276, 279 (1989) (Beth Sholom), are equally applicable in 

determining whether a residential building of four or more units 

has been "substantially rehabilitated as to be the equivalent of 

new construction." See discussion of the fire chief's decision, 

part 3, infra.

21 See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 

Language 1521 (3d ed. 1996) (to rehabilitate is "[t]o restore to 

good health or useful life"; "[t]o restore to good condition, 

operation, or capacity"); Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary 1914 (2002) (rehabilitation is "the restoration of 

something damaged or deteriorated to a prior good condition); 8

Oxford English Dictionary 381 (1978) (rehabilitation is "[t]he 

action of replacing a thing in, or restoring it to, a previous 

condition or status").
16

of altering"; "the quality or state of being altered"; to alter 

is "to become different in some respect: undergo change usu. 

without resulting difference in essential nature"); 1 Oxford 

English Dictionary 255 (1978) ("[t]he action of altering or 

making some change in a thing"; to alter is "[t]o make [a thing] 

otherwise or different in some respect; to make some change in

character, shape, condition, position, quantity, value, etc. 

without changing the thing itself for another; to modify, to 

change the appearance of"). Cf. 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(b) (2010). 

"Major" is defined as "greater in . . . rank, importance, or 

interest: superior"; "notable or conspicuous in effect or 

scope"; "the greater. . . of two things, species, etc. that have 

a common designation"; "being greater than the rest." See 

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1363 (2002); 6

Oxford English Dictionary 57 (1978). See also The American 

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1084 (3d ed. 1996). 

"Substantial" is commonly understood as something "[t]hat is, 

constitutes, or involves an essential part, point, or feature; 

essential, material"; "of or relating to the main part of 

something"; "to a large degree or in the main." See 10 Oxford 

English Dictionary 54-55 (1978); Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary 2280 (2002). See also The American 

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1791 (3d ed. 1996)

These differences in common meaning underscore that the 
17

Legislature did not intend "major alteration" and "substantially 

rehabilitated" to be functionally synonymous. See Commonwealth

v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012), quoting Commonwealth

v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713 (we "presume, as we must, that the 

Legislature intended what the words of the statute say" 

[citation omitted]); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Bank 

Incorporation, 346 Mass. 29, 31 (1963) ("The distinction between 

'may' and 'shall' is not lightly to be held to have been 

overlooked in legislation"). Where "different words with 

different meaning" are used in different sections of a statute, 

see Commonwealth v. Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 301 (2007), citing 

Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 249, 252-253 (1996), "they 

cannot be construed interchangeably, but must be construed in 

relation to one another." Commonwealth v. Millican, supra.

Moreover, in electing to use the phrase "substantially 

rehabilitated," which is a term of art in certain contexts,22 the 

 

22 See Fifth Edition of the Massachusetts State Building 

Code (1990), 780 Code Mass. Regs.; User's Guide to the Fifth 

Edition, Secretary of the Commonwealth; United States Department 

of Housing and Urban Development, Nationally Applicable 

Recommended Rehabilitation Provisions (May 1997); United States 

Department of Housing and Urban Development, The Status of 

Building Regulations for Housing Rehabilitation -- A National

Symposium, at iii, 3, 16-17, 24-25 (Aug. 1995); Boca National 

Fire Prevention Code, 1990: Model Building Regulations for the 

Protection of Public Health, Safety, and Welfare, National Fire 

Prevention Association (9th Ed.) (1990). Cf. Handbook of Injury 

and Violence Prevention, 6.4.1.2.2, at 104-105; 6.4.1.3.2, at 

105-106 (2007). See also D. Madrzykowksi & R.P. Fleming, 

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Review of Sprinkler 
18

Legislature clearly incorporated a very specific degree of 

modification which is considerably more extensive than what is 

required to constitute a "major alteration." In the context of 

building construction, the phrase "substantial rehabilitation" 

has been used since at least the late 1960s to describe a 

building that has been modified so extensively that it has been 

rendered essentially "as good as new," with a concomitant 

extension of its expected useful life.23 Similar terms are used 

by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 

(HUD) in providing low-cost financing for creation of affordable 

housing;24 by State agencies, builders, and housing advocates;25

 

Systems: Research and Standards, NISTIR 6941, at 16 (rev. Dec. 

2002); The Fire Protection Research Foundation, 2013 Cost of 

Residential Sprinkler Final Report (Sept. 2013), at 4.

23 Section 235(R) of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 

17152, Pub. L. 90-448 (Aug. 1, 1968) (no longer in effect), 

defined "substantial rehabilitation" as

"the improvement of a unit in substandard condition to a 

decent, safe and sanitary level . . . . Units are in 

substandard condition when, while they may be structurally 

sound, they do not provide safe and adequate shelter, and 

in their present condition endanger the health, safety, or 

well-being of the occupants. . . . The defects are either 

so critical or so widespread that the structure should be 

extensively repaired. . . . The rehabilitation should be 

of such scope that, when completed, all the components in 

the house are operable and should not be anticipated to 

require any work or major expense over and above normal 

maintenance for the first one-fourth to one-third of the 

mortgage term."

24 See Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 457, 463 (7th Cir. 

1984); Rehabilitation Guidelines 1980, no. 3, Statutory 
19

and in State26 and Federal tax law,27 rent control law, and 

certain historic preservation and environmental laws.28 See 

Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 

 

Guideline for Building Rehabilitation (1980). See, e.g., L. 

Weiss, States and Urban Strategies. California's Urban Strategy, 

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Sept. 1980). 

See generally, W. Duncan, Substantial Rehabilitation & New 

Construction (Springer Science & Business Media, Nov. 11, 2013).

25 See D. Listokin & B. Listokin, United States Department 

of Housing and Urban Development, Barriers to the Rehabilitation 

of Affordable Housing, vol. I, at 19 (May 2001) ("Minor rehab 

refers to repairs [activities short of replacements that 

maintain the home] and improvements [activities that enhance the 

residential structure] of a minor nature, such as replacing or 

refinishing cabinets, fixtures, and finishes. Moderate rehab 

involves more extensive improvements, such as new wiring and 

heating and cooling systems, as well as new cabinets, fixtures, 

and finishes. Substantial rehab entails removal of all interior 

walls and mechanical equipment and installation of a new space 

plan"). See id. at 7 n.7 ("with substantial rehab, the entire 

[house] is often gutted").

26 See, e.g., Eilbott, P. and W. Kempey, New York City's tax 

abatement and exemption program for encouraging housing 

rehabilitation, Public Policy 26 (Fall 1978) at 571-597.

27 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 235.1206; 24 C.F.R. part 971, 

Appendix (no longer in effect); 12 U.S.C. § 1709(k) (2012). See 

generally Cheverine & Hayes, Rehabilitation Tax Credit: Does It 

Still Provide Incentives?, 10 Va. Tax. Rev. 167 (1990); Ramsey, 

Broder, Chiavieollo, Duffly, Dunnels, Larson, Sterling, & 

Vernon, The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act --

An Overview, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 177 (1993).

28 See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as 

codified in 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101, 3060103 ("substantially 

altered"); 26 C.F.R. § 1.48 ("qualified rehabilitated 

building"); Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation, The 

application of building and fire codes to existing buildings 

(1985); Tosi v. Boston Rent Control Bd., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 921 

(1982) (landlord not entitled to tax exemption for substantial 

renovation of rent controlled units because units were not as 

good as new after renovation). Cf. St. 1970, c. 842, § 1.
20

(1989) quoting National Labor Relations Bd. v. Amax Coal Co., 

453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) ("It is . . . well established that 

'[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled 

meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless 

the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 

incorporate the established meaning of these terms'"); G. L. 

c. 4, § 6, Third ("Words and phrases shall be construed 

according to the common and approved usage of the language; but 

technical words and phrases and such others as may have acquired 

a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be construed and 

understood according to such meaning"). Furthermore, by the 

addition of the phrase "so as to constitute the equivalent of 

new construction," to modify the term "substantially 

rehabilitated," the Legislature emphasized, for those unfamiliar 

with the term of art, its intent that, to meet the statutory 

standard, an existing residential building must have been 

rendered "as good as new."

That the Legislature intended "substantially rehabilitated 

so as to constitute the equivalent of new construction" to mean 

something more than a "major alteration" is also apparent in the 

structure of the automatic sprinkler provisions within the fire 

prevention act, the process of their enactment, and the history 

of the enactment of the residential sprinkler provision.

First, the residential sprinkler provision was enacted on 
21

January 2, 1990, see St. 1989, c. 642, § 1, eight months after 

the Appeals Court's decision in Congregation Beth Sholom & 

Community Center, Inc. v. Building Comm'r of Framingham, 27 

Mass. App. Ct. 276, 279 (1989) (Beth Sholom), construing the 

meaning of "major alteration" under G. L. c. 148, § 26G, with 

respect to installation of automatic sprinklers in existing 

commercial buildings.29 Thus, when the Legislature was 

considering the proper statutory language to describe the extent 

of work necessary to require automatic sprinklers in existing 

 

29 Like the residential sprinkler provision, the language in 

the commercial sprinkler provision establishing when 

modifications are sufficiently extensive so as to trigger the 

requirement for installation of automatic sprinklers is not 

defined in the provision or elsewhere in the fire prevention 

act. In concluding that "'major alterations' would include any 

work, not repairs, which is 'major' in scope or expenditure, and 

which results in changes affecting a substantial portion of the 

building," the Appeals Court turned to the several legislative 

objectives of the commercial sprinkler provision:

"The automatic sprinkler requirement . . . is a fire 

safety measure. The Legislature obviously intended . . .

to give some protection to owners of older buildings 

against the large expense of installing sprinklers. Fire 

safety concerns would predominate, however, when, because 

of certain changes to an older building, imposition of the 

sprinkler requirement would be reasonable. This could 

occur . . . when such significant work is being done to it 

that the extra cost of installing sprinklers would be 

moderate in comparison to the total cost of the work 

contemplated. It would also occur when the physical work 

being done is of such scope that the additional effort 

required to install sprinklers would be substantially less 

than it would have been if the building were intact."

Beth Sholom, supra at 279.
22

residential buildings of four or more units, it had before it 

the Appeals Court's then recently issued decision defining the 

extent of the work that had to be undertaken in order to require 

installation of automatic sprinklers in existing commercial 

buildings of more than 7,500 square feet. Yet it chose not to 

adopt the "major alteration" language. See Boehm v. Premier 

Ins. Co., 446 Mass. 689, 691 (2006), quoting Selectmen of 

Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 313 (1949) 

("[T]he Legislature is presumed 'to know the preexisting law and 

the decisions of this court'").

Second, the structure of the fire prevention act, and the 

course of enactment of the various automatic sprinkler 

provisions within the fire prevention act, indicate that each 

automatic sprinkler provision is applicable to a particular type 

of structure, being used for a specific purpose, and is intended 

to address the perceived risks of fire in uses of that type. 

The provisions expanding the types of buildings in which 

automatic sprinklers must be installed were added incrementally

over a period of years, each following a widely publicized, 

devastating fire in a building of that type. The provisions do 

not contain the same language, do not reference each other, and 

do not incorporate a common set of definitions.

Consistent generally with the national pattern of automatic 
23

sprinkler legislation,30 the mandate that automatic sprinklers be 

installed in a particular type of structure, being used for a 

particular purpose, was extended over time under the fire 

prevention act. The mandate moved from covering larger 

structures and more dangerous uses that the Legislature deemed 

to create greater risks of harm, to smaller buildings and less 

dangerous uses, where fewer lives were perceived as being at 

risk.31 At the same time, reflecting the concern that owners of 

existing buildings be afforded some protection from prohibitive 

 

30 See M. Bromann, The Design and Layout of Fire Sprinkler 

Systems 1-8 (2d ed. 2001); R.P. Fleming, National Fire Sprinkler 

Association, The Fire Sprinkler Situation in the United States, 

(2002); Shelhamer, How Fire Disaster Shaped the Evolution of the 

New York City Building Code, International Code Council, 

Building Safety Journal, vol. VIII, no. 6 (2010). See also T. 

Wieczorek & Perdu, The Debate About Residential Fire Sprinklers, 

PM Magazine, vol. 93, no. 7 (International City/County 

Management Association, Aug. 2011); The Network for Public 

Health Law, Residential Sprinkler Systems: Consideration of 

Policy and Litigation Strategies for Reducing Residential Fire 

Injuries, Residential Sprinkler Systems, Issue Brief (updated 

Dec. 2011); Fire Sprinkler History -- NFSA, NFPA & Tyco, 4 The 

Station House 1 (Feb. 2005); The History of the National Fire 

Sprinkler Association, http://www.nfsa.org/?page=NFSABIO 

[https:/perma.cc/65G4-2NMK]. Cf. Adomeit, The Station Nightclub 

Fire and Federal Jurisdictional Reach: The MultiDistrict, 

MultiParty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 25 W. New Eng. 

L. Rev. 243 (2003).

31 Legislation requiring the installation of automatic 

sprinklers first appeared, nationally, in the early 1900s, 

following a devastating fire in a clothing factory in New York 

in 1911 that resulted in more than one hundred deaths, see, 

e.g., Behrens, The Triangle Shirtwaist Company Fire of 1911: A 

Lesson in Legislative Manipulation, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 361 (1983), 

and is today governed by Federal requirements under the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 1910.159 (1981).
24

costs, the Legislature required automatic sprinklers first in 

new construction, then in existing buildings, and first in 

commercial buildings, where costs are more readily recouped, 

then in larger residential buildings.32

Under the fire prevention act, automatic sprinklers were 

first required in 1972, in new high rise buildings throughout 

the Commonwealth, for buildings built after March 1, 1974. See 

G. L. c. 148, § 26A; St. 1973, c. 395, § 1.33 In 1982, following 

a deadly fire in Fall River,34 the commercial sprinkler 

provision, applicable to new nonresidential buildings of more 

than 7,500 square feet, and existing such buildings when they 

underwent "major alterations," was adopted. See St. 1982, 

c. 545, § 1.35 In 1986, following a rooming house fire that 

 

32 In the past several years, bills to extend the automatic 

sprinkler requirement to new one- and two-family buildings have 

been introduced several times, but have not been released from 

committee. See, e.g., 2015 House Doc. No. 3475.

33 This provision was enacted following a fire in a luxury 

high rise hotel that killed nine firefighters.

34 See A Monumental Tribute: Notre Dame's WWI Statue 

Survived Fire, Herald News, Aug. 2, 2009; Fire Destroys Landmark 

Church, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1982.

35 Although initially a local option provision, in 2009 the 

commercial sprinkler provision became a Statewide mandate. See 

St. 2008, c. 508, § 1. While the revised language eliminated 

most of the waiver provisions that had been added to it, see St. 

1986, c. 284, § 1; St. 1986, c. 526; G. L. c. 148, § 26G, fourth 

par.; St. 1989, c. 416, § 2, the provision for waivers or 

reasonable alternatives in buildings having "architectural or 

historical significance" was retained. See St. 2008, c. 508, 
25

resulted in multiple deaths, sprinklers were required in new and 

existing lodging and rooming houses. See G. L. c. 148, § 26H. 

Again in 1986, after a major fire in the Prudential Center in 

Boston, sprinklers were required in existing, and not just new, 

high rise buildings across the Commonwealth, G. L. c. 148, 

§ 26A 1/2, with a ten-year phase-in period. St. 1986, c. 633, 

§ 2. In 1989, the lodging house sprinkler provision of G. L. 

c. 148, § 26H, was modified to include a five-year phase-in 

period after a municipality adopted it, St. 1989 c. 330, and, 

separately, to contain a statutory right of appeal. St. 1989, 

c. 557, § 2. One week after the then Governor signed the 

provision adding the phase-in period, a lodging house fire in 

Lynn resulted in numerous fatalities. After unsuccessful 

efforts to repeal the phase-in period,36 the residential 

sprinkler provision was enacted. Explicitly incorporating 

lodging and rooming houses, already covered by the provisions of 

G. L. c. 148, § 26H, amongst an enumerated list of residential 

buildings, it became effective on January 2, 1990, less than six 

months after the fire in Lynn. See G. L. c. 148, § 26I; 

St. 1989, c. 642, § 1.

 

§ 1.

36 See Task Force, State House News Service (Aug. 21, 1989); 

Coakely, New Law Diluted Sprinkler Regulation, Boston Globe, 

Aug. 10, 1989; Preventable Deaths in Lynn, Boston Globe, 

Editorial, Aug. 15, 1989.
26

The language of the residential sprinkler provision has 

remained virtually unchanged since its enactment. For 

municipalities choosing to adopt it, the provision requires 

sprinklers in a wide variety of buildings:37 new multi-unit 

residential apartment buildings of more than four units; new 

residential buildings such as fraternities, dormitories, hotels, 

motels, and group homes; and existing buildings of these types 

if they are substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the 

equivalent of new construction. Unlike any other provision of 

the fire prevention act, the residential sprinkler provision did 

not include a phase-in period immediately following its 

enactment, and does not afford a statutory right of appeal. 

Also unlike the other sprinkler provisions, it does not contain 

any mechanism for waivers, alternatives, or acceptable 

modifications to the sprinkler requirement.

 

37 "In a city, town or district which accepts the provisions 

of this section, any building hereafter constructed or hereafter 

substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent 

of new construction and occupied in whole or in part for 

residential purposes and containing not less than four dwelling 

units including, but not limited to, lodging houses, boarding 

houses, fraternity houses, dormitories, apartments, townhouses, 

condominiums, hotels, motels and group residences, shall be 

equipped with an approved system of automatic sprinklers in 

accordance with the provisions of the state building code. In 

the event that adequate water supply is not available, the head 

of the fire department shall permit the installation of such 

other fire suppressant systems as are prescribed by the state 

building code in lieu of automatic sprinklers. Owners of 

buildings with approved and properly maintained installations 

may be eligible for a rate reduction on fire insurance." G. L. 

c. 148, § 26I.
27

Finally, in 2004, following a widely publicized fire with 

multiple fatalities at a Rhode Island nightclub, sprinklers were 

required to be retrofitted in existing nightclubs, bars, 

discotheque and dance halls, and other places designed or used 

for "similar entertainment purposes" with a capacity of more 

than one hundred people. See G. L. c. 148, § 26G 1/2; St. 2004, 

c. 304, § 5. This legislation effectively created a retrofit 

requirement for small establishments, because larger such venues 

already were required to have sprinklers under the terms of the 

commercial sprinkler provision. Certain uses of structures 

within this category -- "a house of worship, restaurant, lecture 

hall, auditorium, state or local government building, 

educational function facility, or other similar place of 

assembly" -- were apparently perceived as being less dangerous 

and were exempted from the sprinkler requirement. G. L. c. 148, 

§ 26G 1/2, fourth par.

While phase-in provisions were adopted for other types of 

existing buildings, only the commercial sprinkler provision and 

the residential sprinkler provision contain a two-part standard 

requiring automatic sprinklers in new buildings and when a 

certain level of modification is made to an existing structure, 

reflecting their shared legislative objective of enhancing fire 

safety, while at the same time affording protection to owners of 

existing buildings. By requiring the installation only when 
28

building modifications are of a specific order of magnitude (a 

"major alteration" or "substantially rehabilitated so as to 

constitute the equivalent of new construction"), owners of such 

existing buildings are spared the significant costs of sprinkler 

installation when performing what amounts to ordinary, even if 

costly, upkeep of their buildings.

At the same time, however, the differences in statutory 

language, and the Legislature's recognition of the varying 

degrees of dangerousness amongst different types of buildings, 

indicate the legislative intent to impose distinct thresholds 

for requiring installation of sprinklers in existing qualifying 

commercial buildings38 rather than in existing qualifying 

 

38 Large existing commercial buildings may present the risks 

inherent in a "funnel effect," where many people try to reach 

few exits through narrow corridors or doorways. In addition, 

certain aspects of the construction of many commercial 

buildings, such as open ducts that are used for heating and 

cooling systems, allow fire to spread rapidly throughout the 

building. By the same token, however, the costs of sprinkler 

installation may be significantly lower in such a building than 

in an older residential building, because the large open spaces 

and construction techniques such as dropped ceilings tend to 

facilitate installation. See D. Madrzykowksi & R.P. Fleming, 

Review of Residential Sprinkler Systems: Research and 

Standards, NISTIR 6941 (rev. Dec. 2002). See also M. Bromann, 

The Design and Layout of Fire Sprinkler Systems, at 15 (2d ed. 

2001).

Similarly, studies have shown that the use of modern 

construction materials in new residential buildings has resulted 

in fires that combust and spread much more quickly than in older 

structures, because of the more volatile nature of the materials 

used. Older residential buildings, on the other hand, tend to 

be built of materials such as stone, brick, and plaster, which 
29

residential buildings. Accordingly, establishing that an 

existing residential building has undergone modifications 

significant enough to qualify as "major alterations" is not 

sufficient to show that the building has been substantially 

rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new 

construction.

We conclude that the residential sprinkler standard under 

G. L. c. 148, § 26I, is satisfied when rehabilitative work is so 

extensive that the building itself, considered as a whole, has 

been rendered "the equivalent of new construction," whether in 

terms of the materials and construction techniques used, the 

building's systems, its market value, its expected future useful 

life, or other comparable measures of equivalence to new 

construction. See United States Department of Housing and Urban 

Development, Nationally Applicable Recommended Rehabilitation 

Provisions (May 1997). This understanding of the statutory 

standard is consistent with the dual legislative purposes of 

enhancing fire safety and protecting property owners of existing 

residential buildings from the disproportionate costs of 

automatic sprinkler installation when attempting to perform 

 

are fire-retardant. Likewise, while newer residential buildings 

often have air conditioning ducts that allow fire to spread 

rapidly, older residential buildings generally do not. See 

Roman, New Fires, New Tactics, National Fire Protection 

Association Journal (Dec. 29, 2014). Thus, the need for 

sprinklers in a new residential building may be greater than in 

an older one.
30

desirable ordinary repairs and maintenance, even if extensive in 

nature, to retain a building in a habitable condition.39 See, 

e.g., 1010 Memorial Dr. Tenants Corp. v. Fire Chief of Cambridge 

& another, 424 Mass. 661, 664-665 (1997). This, in turn, 

furthers the ancillary goals of retaining and adding to existing 

housing stock, as well as avoiding an increase in abandoned 

residential buildings,40 which themselves present an increased 

risk of fire.

3. Fire chief's decisions. With this standard in mind, we 

examine the fire chief's decisions to ascertain whether they 

comport with the statutory objectives. Here, in reaching his 

determination that MacLaurin's buildings had been substantially 

 

39 See Bukowksi & Babrauskas, Developing Rational, 

Performance-based Fire Safety Requirements in Model Building 

Codes, Fire and Materials, vol. 18, at 173, 176, 180-181 (1994); 

D. Madrzykowski & R.P. Fleming, Review of Residential Sprinkler 

Systems: Research and Standards, National Fire Sprinkler 

Association, NISTIR 6941, at 5, 16 (rev. Dec. 2002). See also 

R.P. Fleming, The Fire Sprinkler Situation in the United States 

(2012).

40 In 1983, then Governor Michael Dukakis announced that 

homelessness was his highest social service priority, pointing 

to estimates that Massachusetts had somewhere between 5,000 to 

10,000 homeless residents. Among other initiatives during his 

term in office, public assistance requirements were amended so 

that homeless persons could receive benefits, the Legislature 

enacted a stringent condominium conversion law requiring four 

years' notification to tenants, and funding was obtained to 

create thousands of new and rehabilitated housing units for low 

income residents. See J. Alter, S. Doherty, N. Finke Greenbert, 

S. Agrest, V.E. Smith, G. Raine, Homelessness in America, 

Newsweek, Jan. 2, 1984, at 12-13, in Housing the Homeless, J. 

Erickson and C. Wilhelm, eds. (Rutgers, 1986), republished with 

a new introduction by J. Erickson (2012).
31

rehabilitated so as to be the equivalent of new construction, 

the chief stated that he looked to decisions of the automatic 

sprinkler appeals board (construing G. L. c. 148, § 26G), and to 

provisions in the State building code. While the decisions do 

not state so explicitly, they suggest the fire chief's 

familiarity with Beth Sholom, supra at 279, the only appellate 

decision to have construed the "major alteration" standard in 

the commercial sprinkler provision, requiring installation of 

sprinklers in existing commercial buildings of more than 7,500 

square feet whenever construction is extensive enough to be a 

"major alteration." The chief also appears to have been 

cognizant of a 1999 Superior Court judge's decision construing 

the residential sprinkler provision. See note 20, supra.

The fire chief, however, did not rely expressly on any 

identified interpretation of the statutory standard, nor did he 

set forth such an interpretation.41 If anything, the decisions 

suggest rather that the "major alteration" and "substantially 

rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new 

 

41 The February, 2012 (Main Street), and March, 2012 (Essex 

Street), orders generally relied on the same factors: reported 

observations from the inspections in February, 2012; various 

municipal records, including fire department records; and 

documents that had been submitted by MacLaurin to the building 

inspector during the course of construction. In the 2013 

orders, the fire chief noted also that he had sought guidance in 

decisions of the automatic sprinkler appeals board and the State 

building code, both with reference to the commercial sprinkler 

provision.
32

construction" standards were viewed as functionally equivalent. 

The decisions neither make clear what facts the fire chief found 

and applied, nor how he weighed their relative importance.42 

While expressing some skepticism as to the validity of 

MacLaurin's total project cost and sprinkler installation 

estimates, the decisions do not reflect any assessment of the 

relative costs of sprinkler installation compared with total 

project costs,43 a factor that is identified in both Beth Sholom, 

 

42 The fire chief stated, without discussion, that the work 

included upgrades to "all major systems" (plumbing, electrical, 

and gas); that each building, which had sustained previous fire 

damage, was of a "balloon" construction with a wooden frame that 

would allow a fire to move rapidly between floors; that the 

actual work undertaken would have facilitated the installation 

of automatic sprinklers; and that, at least as to Essex Street, 

MacLaurin had submitted automatic sprinkler plans in conjunction 

with his initial applications for building permits. The chief 

commented that he viewed the submission of these plans as an 

indication that, from its inception, MacLaurin had considered 

the project to be a substantial rehabilitation (a view MacLaurin 

disputes).

43 While the fire chief stated that he considered the cost 

of the projects, the particular work involved, and the relative 

cost of sprinklers in each building, his 2012 orders questioned 

the accuracy of MacLaurin's claimed total project costs of 

$207,062 (Essex Street) and $178,353 (later adjusted to 

$186,851) (Main Street), and of his projected costs to install 

automatic sprinklers of $124,800 (Essex Street) and $133,700 

(Main Street), suggesting that the total project costs were too 

low and the sprinkler installation estimates were too high. The 

fire chief did not provide alternative figures.

The 2013 orders adopted MacLaurin's figures without 

comment, and did not address the costs of sprinkler 

installation. Those orders contain no discussion of the costs 

of sprinklers, other than a comment that the costs of 

installation would have been "substantially less" had sprinklers 
33

supra at 279, and Iodice vs. Newton, Mass. Superior Ct., No. 

971098D (Middlesex County Oct. 1, 1999) (Iodice), as being 

relevant to the determination whether work undertaken is a 

"major alteration." Further, nothing in the decisions indicates 

consideration of the dual statutory objectives, and whether the 

modifications undertaken were so substantial that they 

constituted "the equivalent of new construction."

The difficulty of judicial review is enhanced by the 

absence of express findings of fact as to key points, certain of 

which MacLaurin disputes. For example, in addition to the 

record being unclear as to what the project costs and sprinkler 

installation cost estimates were determined to be, the record is 

at least as unclear as to specific aspects of the scope and 

nature of the actual physical work performed. Significantly, 

given its importance relative to the costs and difficulty of 

automatic sprinkler installation, the fire chief made no 

findings as to the contested issue of the extent of the walls 

and ceilings that were opened, replaced, or repaired by being 

covered with gypsum board.44

 

been installed when the permits issued. The only discussion of 

costs in the 2013 orders compares the total project costs with 

the (extremely low) assessed values of the buildings.

44 In particular, as to the Essex Street building, the fire 

chief noted that "substantial portions of both walls and 

ceilings throughout the entire building were opened up," a point 

that MacLaurin disputes as incorrect and inconsistent with 
34

In light of the foregoing, the Housing Court judge was not 

in a position to review the fire chief's decisions under G. L. 

c. 148, § 26I, and a remand for further proceedings, with the 

guidance we provide, is necessary. On remand, after taking such 

additional evidence as may be appropriate, and applying the 

standard we have identified, the fire chief should clearly 

determine and identify the particular facts on which he bases 

his conclusion whether the rehabilitative work undertaken on 

each building was so substantial as to be the equivalent of new 

construction.

4. Whether a hearing was required. MacLaurin also argues 

that the fire chief acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 

failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to allow him 

to present evidence and be heard. MacLaurin contends that such 

a hearing was necessary to establish an acceptable record for 

review on appeal, based on written findings of fact and a 

clearly articulated rationale for the decision made. He 

maintains as well that an evidentiary hearing is 

constitutionally mandated before an order may issue requiring a 

residential property owner to pay for a potentially cost 

prohibitive sprinkler system, and that the decision to require 

 

documentation for the project. Moreover, with respect to the 

Main Street building, as to which the fire chief also concluded 

that sprinkler installation would have been facilitated by 

virtue of the work done there, the record does not reflect any 

mention of walls or ceilings being similarly "opened up."
35

installation of automatic sprinklers without a hearing was a 

violation of his due process rights.

As noted, the residential sprinkler provision is the only 

section of the fire prevention act requiring the installation of 

automatic sprinklers that does not contain language affording a 

statutory right of appeal.45 In support of his contention that a 

hearing was constitutionally mandated, MacLaurin points to the 

Appeals Court's decision in Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & 

Lounge v. Selectmen of Randolph, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 302-304 

(1985) (Yerardi's), citing Milligan v. Board of Registration in 

Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 495-496 (1965) (Milligan). In the 

Yerardi's case, citing Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 Mass. 

123, 132 (1981), the court held that a restaurant owner was 

entitled to a hearing when a city board denied his application 

for a later closing hour, which had been permitted to other 

nearby restaurants, even though the licensing statute contained 

no right to a hearing after the denial of a request to expand 

closing hours.46 Without determining whether the denial of an 

 

45 Amendments to the residential sprinkler provision that 

would provide a statutory right of appeal have been introduced a 

number of times; none have come to a vote. See, e.g., 2015 

House Doc. No. 2143; 2013 House Doc. No. 982.

46 As here, other provisions of the statute applicable in 

Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & Lounge v. Selectmen of 

Randolph, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 299-300 (1985), such as an 

order to reduce licensed operating hours, did provide a right to 

a hearing.
36

extension of licensing hours was of constitutional dimension, 

the court in the Yerardi's case concluded that the aggrieved 

restaurant owner was nonetheless entitled to notice and a 

hearing under a long-standing common law "ethic that pervades 

our legal system" "where government exerts power upon an 

individual in a matter of consequence." Yerardi's, supra at 

303, citing Milligan, supra.

The situation here is, to some extent, similar, and we need 

not reach the question whether the fire chief's decision was of 

constitutional dimension to conclude that, in the circumstances 

here, a hearing would have been appropriate.47 There was no 

 

47 Consideration might well have been given to holding such 

a hearing early in the project, when adjustments could be made 

most cost-effectively, or another form of fire prevention system 

instead deemed sufficient, the types of resolutions that the 

automatic sprinkler appeals board is authorized to make. See 

discussions in Iodice, supra, and Beth Sholom, supra. We note 

that many of the factors relied upon to determine that 

sprinklers are necessary in this case (the age of the buildings, 

the type of construction, the history of a previous fire) were 

known when the building permits issued. A hearing early in the 

process might have allowed resolution of material factual 

questions, such as the extent and scope of the project 

(particularly the extent to which walls and ceilings would be 

replaced) and the cost of installation of a particular sprinkler 

system, which are of significance in determining whether

sprinklers are required.

Here, for example, an expert report indicated some 

question, with respect to the Main Street building and its 

connection to the street, as to whether water pressure from the 

street would be adequate in the building to support a sprinkler 

system. Were the water supply thereby inadequate, MacLaurin 

might be statutorily exempt from any requirement to install 

sprinklers. See G. L. c. 148, § 26I.
37

controlling decisional authority as to the applicable standard, 

key facts were in dispute, and there is no statutory avenue for 

review. The fire chief's orders clearly "exert[ed] power upon 

an individual in a matter of consequence." Yerardi's, supra at 

303, citing Milligan, supra at 495-496. While determinations 

such as these are made in the exercise of discretion, that 

discretion is not unlimited. "[B]esides the unreviewable 

elements in [such] decisions, there are other elements 

submissible to the test of elementary justice that is invoked by 

the words 'arbitrary or capricious.'" Id. at 301. In these 

particular circumstances, an appropriate opportunity for 

MacLaurin to be heard was warranted.

Conclusion. The matter is remanded to the Housing Court 

for entry of an order vacating the judgment affirming the fire 

chief's determination that automatic sprinklers are required in 

the buildings at 213-215 Chestnut Street/108-116 Essex Street 

and 268-272 Main Street/11 Spring Street, and remanding the 

matter to the Holyoke fire department. On remand, the head of 

the fire department shall consider anew, consistent with this 

opinion and after evaluation of the existing record and such 

additional information as may be submitted by either party, 

whether the properties have been substantially rehabilitated 

within the meaning of G. L. c. 148, § 26I, so as to require the 

installation of automatic sprinkler systems. Thereafter, if 
38

necessary, further proceedings consistent with this opinion will 

be had in the Housing Court.

So ordered.