This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 2 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14
- 0042 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Mae Norma Przymus, Appellant. Filed September 2, 2014 Affirmed Halbrooks , Judge

Lyon County District Court File No. 42

- CR

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- 726 Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Tricia B. Zimmer, Assistant County Attorney, Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia V illalva Lijó, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Halbrooks , Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and Chutich , Judge

. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N HALBROOKS , Judge On appeal from the revocation of her probation, appell ant argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that her probation violation was intentional and2

inexcusable and that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. We affirm. FACTS Under the terms of a plea agreement, appellant Mae Norma Przymus entered an Alford plea to one count of check forgery in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(1) (2010). Przymus received a downward dispositional departure from the guidelines sentence, which was a presumptive commitment to the commissioner of corrections. The district court imposed and stayed a sentence of 25 months , placed Przymus on probation , and ordered her to serve 90 days in the Lyon County jail beginning no later than July 8,
2013

. Przymus failed to r eport to jail, and probation recommended that her sentence be executed. At her probation

- revocation hearing, Przymus admitted that she had received a dispositional departure and had been required as a condition of her probation to report to jail by July 8 , that she had failed to report as required, that this was a violation of her probation, and that she knew that “ there would probably be a warrant” for her arrest. Przymus testified that on July 7, she had called the jail and stated that she lacked transp ortation to report to the jail, which was 40 miles from her home. The state noted that in addition to failing to report, Przymus had “done zero ” on her other probation requirements, including failing to make contact with probation agents or to pay fines and restitution. After review ing Przymus’s memorandum in support of her dispositional
recommendation and hear ing Przymus’s testimony and the arguments of counsel , the district court stated on the record :3 I would make findings that the Defendant knew the specific condition that was violated; that was her requirement to report to jail. I would find that the violation is intentional or inexcusable and at this point the need for confinem ent outweighs policies favoring probat ion. The offender is in need [of] correctional treatment [that] can most effectively be provided if she is confined, and to fail

— fail to execute the Defendant’s sentence at this time would seriously depreciate the sig nificance of the violation itself. Ms. Przymus, if you’re going to be on probation, you have to have a desire and want to do the things that you must do to successfully complete probation. By your behaviors here, you have demonstrated that you do not

— you either are unwilling or unable to do so. I have no alternative but to execute sentence on this matter. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N After an offender violates probation , the district court may continue probation , impose intermediate sanctions, or revoke probation and impose the stayed sentence. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 3(2) (2012)

. A district court’ s determination that sufficient evidence exists to revoke probation is r eviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 249

- 5 0 (Minn. 1980). Under Austin , the district court must make findings 1 on three factors before revoking probation : (1) designating the specific condition of probation that was violated; (2) finding that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and (3) finding that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 250.

1 The district court may satisfy this requirement by “stating its findings and reasons on the record, which, when reduced to a transcript, is sufficient to permit review.” State v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 n.4 (M inn. 2005).4

Przymus concedes that she violated her probation by failing to report to jail. And the dist rict court made a clear finding on the record that the violation at issue was Przymus’s failure to report to jail. The first Austin factor is therefore satisfied. Przymus argues that the district court abused its discretion in revoking her probation bec ause the second and third Austin factors were not satisfied. With respect to the second Austin factor, the district court found that Przymus’s failure to report to jail was “intentional or inexcusable .” Przymus argues that because she did not have transp ortation and alerted the jail to this obstacle , the district court abused its discretion in finding that her failure to report was intentional or inexcusable. The district court rejected this argument , finding that Przymus was “ unwilling or unable ” to sa tisfy the conditions of her probation. Przymus had 12 days after her sentencing hearing to arrange transportation to the Lyon County j ail. She nevertheless failed to report, with full knowledge of the July 8 deadline. Under these circumstances, the dist rict court acted within its discretion in determining that Przymus’s violation was “intentional or inexcusable.”
The third Austin factor is whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id. When assessing whether revocation is proper under the third
Austin factor, the distric t court should consider whether (1) “confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offend er”; (2) “correctional

treatment . . . c an most effectively be provided if [the offender] is confined”; or (3) “it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.”5

Modtland , 695 N.W.2d at 607. The district court need only find the existence of one of the se sub

- factors. Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 251. Here, the district court found that “ at this point the need for confinement outweighs policies favoring probation.” The court specifically found that “ to

. . . fail to

execute [Przymus’s] sentence at this time would seriously depreciate the signi ficance of the violation itself” and that Przymus is “ in need [of] correctional treatment [that] can most effectiv ely be provided if she is confined.” Given Przymus’s criminal history and her failure to comply with the conditions of her probation, these findings are supported by the record. The record reflects that despite Przymus’s extensive criminal history, the district court gave her another chance when it sentenced her to a downward dispositional departure. Bu t Przymus failed to take advantage of the probation opportunity by disregarding the terms of her probation. Przymus not only failed to report to jail in July, she failed to make any contact with probation or to pa y restitution or fines. We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in revoking Przymus’s probation and executing her sentence. Affirmed.