Filed 7/30/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RICHARD PAUL RUTGARD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B297655

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS170286)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, 

Chief Assistant City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief, Civil 

Litigation Branch, Blithe S. Bock, Assistant City Attorney, 

Michael M. Walsh, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Sullivan, Workman & Dee, Karyn A. M. Jakubowski, and 

Charles D. Cummings, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *
2

California’s Eminent Domain Law (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1230.010 et seq.)

1 —and, in particular, Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1245.245—provides that when “[p]roperty acquired by a 

public entity [through eminent domain] . . . is not used for [its 

intended] public use . . . within 10 years of adoption of the 

resolution of necessity [that authorized its taking],” the entity

must allow the property’s original owner an opportunity to buy it 

back “unless the [entity’s] governing body adopts” a new 

“resolution” “reauthorizing the existing stated public use.” 

(§ 1245.245, subds. (b), (f).) In this case, the City of Los Angeles 

adopted an initial resolution in 2007 and a reauthorization 

resolution in 2017. 

This appeal presents four cascading questions:

First, does a public entity desiring to retain condemned 

property under section 1245.245 have to “adopt” its initial and 

reauthorization resolutions within 10 years of each other? We 

hold the answer is “yes.” 

Second, and if there is such a 10-year deadline, which 

definition of “adoption” does section 1245.245 use—the date when 

the resolutions are initially adopted, are finally adopted, or 

become effective? We hold that section 1245.245 uses the date of 

“final adoption.”

Third, which law governs the inquiry into whether a 

resolution has been finally adopted—the local law governing the 

public entity at issue, or a standardized definition imposed by 

section 1245.245? We hold that local law fixes when a resolution 

is “finally adopted.”

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3

Lastly, when are resolutions finally adopted under the local 

law applicable here—namely, the city’s charter? We hold that a 

resolution is “finally adopted” once the city council has enacted 

the resolution and it has either been (1) approved by the mayor, 

or (2) vetoed by the mayor, but overridden by the city council.

Because the city in this case finally adopted its initial and 

reauthorization resolutions 19 days past the 10-year deadline,

section 1245.245 requires the city to offer to sell the property 

back to its original owner. The trial court’s writ so ordering is 

accordingly affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. Property at issue

This case concerns a two-story building with 8,300 square 

feet of commercial space (the Property). The Property is located 

on Figueroa Street in the Highland Park neighborhood of the 

City of Los Angeles (the City), and is registered as a City 

Historical Monument. In early 2007, the Property was owned by 

Richard Paul Rutgard (Rutgard). 

B. 2007 Ordinance

On May 29, 2007, the Los Angeles City Council (the City 

Council) enacted an ordinance “authorizing the condemnation” of 

the Property (the 2007 Ordinance). The 2007 Ordinance 

constituted a Resolution of Necessity declaring that the Property 

was being “acquired for public purposes”—namely, to serve as a 

“constituent service center” for City residents. The 2007 

Ordinance passed by a two-thirds majority of the City Council. 

On June 8, 2007, the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles (the 

Mayor) “approved” the 2007 Ordinance. 
4

The City calculated the effective date of the 2017 

Ordinance to be July 24, 2007. An ordinance presumptively 

becomes effective “31 days from its publication” (L.A. City 

Charter, vol. I, art. II, § 252), and an ordinance is deemed 

“published” if it is “posted . . . for at least ten days in three public 

places” (L.A. Admin. Code, § 2.13). The 2017 Ordinance was 

posted on June 14, 2007. 

C. The interregnum period

On October 16, 2007, the City filed an eminent domain 

lawsuit to condemn the Property. In November 2009, the City 

and Rutgard settled the lawsuit and the City agreed to pay $2.5 

million for the Property. 

Due to the “economic downturn in 2008,” the City never 

developed the Property into a constituent center. 

D. 2017 Ordinance

On June 23, 2017, the City Council enacted an ordinance 

“reauthoriz[ing]” the “use of the Property for a constituent service 

center” (the 2017 Ordinance). The 2017 Ordinance passed by a 

two-thirds majority of the City Council. 

On June 27, 2017, the Mayor “approved” the 2017 

Ordinance. 

The City calculated two different effective dates for the 

2017 Ordinance. The City initially calculated the effective date

to be August 7, 2017, based on a posting date of June 28, 2017, 

which would constitute publication 10 days later and would 

become effective 31 days after that. The very next day, however, 

the City re-calculated the effective date to be July 9, 2017, based 

(1) on a posting date of June 29, 2017, which would constitute 

publication 10 days later, and (2) on a finding that the ordinance 

should take “effect[] upon publication” under section 252 of the 
5

city charter (thus bypassing the presumptive, 31-day waiting 

period). 

II. Procedural Background

On July 24, 2017, Rutgard filed a verified petition for a writ 

of mandate alleging that the City had a “present legal duty” to 

“offer [him] a right of first refusal to purchase” the Property 

under section 1245.245 because its reauthorization of the 2007 

taking was untimely.2 After the City filed an answer, after 

briefing on the merits, and after a hearing, the trial court issued 

a seven-page ruling granting Rutgard’s petition.

The trial court ruled that the City had a “clear, present, 

ministerial duty to offer [Rutgard] the right of first refusal to 

purchase the Property” under section 1245.245 because the 2017 

Ordinance was not timely under that section. The court reasoned 

that the City “adopted its initial resolution of necessity on May 

29, 2007,” which was the day the City Council initially adopted 

the resolution; that the City had “failed to use the Property as a 

constituent service center”; and that all of the City’s acts to pass 

a reauthorization resolution occurred in June 2017, which was 

more than 10 years after May 29, 2007. The court rejected the 

City’s argument that section 1245.245’s 10-year clock should not 

begin to run until the date the 2007 Ordinance became effective 

(that is, on July 24, 2007) because, in the court’s view, “[the]

language [of section 1245.245] could not be clearer: The 10-year 

2 Rutgard also alleged a claim for declaratory relief, but 

voluntarily dismissed that claim after the trial court granted his 

writ petition.

Although Rutgard’s petition sought relief against the City 

and the City Council, the City responded that the City Council is 

“not a separate legal entity from the City” and the trial court 

ultimately entered judgment against the City alone.
6

clock begins running on the date of adoption, not . . . the effective 

date of the ordinance.” The court further found that section 

1245.245’s legislative history was consistent with its text: Both 

set the deadline for a new, reauthorization resolution as “within 

10 years of the adoption of the [original] resolution of necessity” 

(italics added).3

Following the entry of judgment and the issuance of a writ 

of mandate, the City filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

The City argues that the trial court erred in granting 

Rutgard’s writ of mandate. A court may issue a writ of mandate 

only if the petitioner establishes (1) “‘“a clear, present 

. . . ministerial duty on the part of the respondent”’ [citations]”; 

(2) “a correlative ‘“clear, present and beneficial right in the 

petitioner to the performance of that duty”’ [citations]”; and (3) 

“no ‘plain, speedy, and adequate’ alternative remedy exists

[citation].” (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340

(Picklesimer); People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado

(1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 490-491 (Younger); see generally §§ 1085, 

1086.) “A ministerial duty is an obligation to perform a specific 

act in a manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of facts 

exists, without regard to any personal judgment as to the 

propriety of the act.” (Picklesimer, at p. 340.) A court may issue 

a writ of mandate against a local entity such as a city (Younger, 

at p. 491 [“[t]he writ will issue against a . . . city”]), and may do so 

when a public entity fails to perform acts prescribed by our 

3 The court also rejected the City’s argument that the 10-

year clock should not begin to run until the date the Property was 

acquired by a public entity. The City does not press that 

argument in this appeal.
7

state’s Eminent Domain Law (e.g., Inglewood Redevelopment 

Agency v. Aklilu (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1114). In 

reviewing the trial court’s issuance of a writ of mandate in this 

case, we are reviewing its interpretation of the Eminent Domain 

Law and its application of that law to undisputed facts. Our 

review of each is de novo (Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, 

Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1183; Professional 

Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 

1016, 1032), and we are accordingly not bound by either the trial 

court’s ruling or its rationale (see Williams v. Superior Court

(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1361).

Under our state’s Constitution, a public entity’s eminent 

domain power authorizes the condemnation of private property 

only if “the public interest and necessity” so “require” and the 

property’s owner is “just[ly] compensat[ed]” for the taking. (Cal. 

Const., art I, § 19; see also U.S. Const., 5th Amend; §§ 1240.010, 

1240.030.) To exercise this power, the public entity must at the 

outset “adopt[] a resolution of necessity” specifying, among other 

things, “the public use for which the property is to be taken.” 

(§§ 1240.040, 1245.230.) 

To ensure that public entities do not use their eminent 

domain power to acquire a property and then hold or “bank[]” 

that property indefinitely without ever putting it to its intended 

public use, our Legislature in 2006 enacted section 1245.245. In 

pertinent part, subdivision (b) provides:

“Property acquired by a public entity . . . that is 

. . . not used for the public use stated in the [original] 

resolution of necessity within 10 years of the adoption 

of th[at] resolution . . . shall be sold in accordance 

with the terms of subdivision[] (f). . ., unless the 
8

governing body adopts a resolution . . . reauthorizing 

the existing stated public use of the property by a 

vote of at least two-thirds of all members of the 

governing body of the public entity or a greater vote 

as required by statute, charter, or ordinance.”

(§ 1245.245, subd. (b)). Subdivision (f), in turn, provides in 

pertinent part:

“If the public entity fails to adopt . . . a 

reauthorization resolution . . ., and that property was 

not used for the public use stated in [the property’s 

original] resolution of necessity . . . between the time 

of its acquisition and the time of the public entity’s 

failure to adopt a [reauthorization] resolution . . ., the 

public entity shall offer the person or persons from 

whom the property was acquired the right of first 

refusal to purchase the property . . . [a]t the present

market value.” 

(§ 1245.245, subd. (f).)

On appeal, the City argues that it complied with section 

1245.245’s mandate—and that the trial court erred in granting a 

writ premised on the City’s noncompliance—because (1) section 

1245.245 imposes no time limit whatsoever on the public entity’s 

adoption of a reauthorization resolution (because, in the City’s 

view, the statute’s 10-year deadline sets the time period during 

which the public entity must fail to put the property to public use 

and not the time period for enacting a reauthorization

resolution),

4 and (2) even if section 1245.245 requires a public 

4 Although the City raises this argument for the first time on 

appeal, it turns entirely on a question of law (namely, statutory 
9

entity to adopt a reauthorization resolution within 10 years of 

adopting the original resolution, a resolution is “adopted” on the 

date it becomes effective, and here the effective dates of the 2007 

Ordinance and 2017 Ordinance are less than 10 years apart.5 

The City’s two main arguments ultimately break down 

into—and hence present—four questions: (1) Does section 

1245.245 obligate a public entity to “adopt” a reauthorization

resolution within 10 years of adopting its original resolution?, (2) 

If so, how does section 1245.245 define when a resolution is 

“adopted”?, (3) Does section 1245.245 incorporate its own 

definition of initial adoption, final adoption or effective date, or 

does it instead look to local law to define those terms?, and (4) 

How does the local law governing the City’s adoption of 

resolutions define the relevant term?

interpretation) that we may, and in this case do, choose to 

entertain. (People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 859, fn. 3.)

5 The City raises a third argument, but it is frivolous. The 

City asserts that this case is inappropriate for a writ of mandate 

because the adoption of a resolution of necessity is a 

discretionary, quasi-legislative act and thus one that the City has 

no ministerial duty to undertake, thereby negating one of the key 

requirements for writ relief. (Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 

340; Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of 

Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 786 [“quasi-legislative decisions” 

are reviewed solely for arbitrariness].) This assertion is frivolous 

because Rutgard is not attacking the City’s discretionary decision 

whether to adopt the reauthorization resolution, but is instead 

seeking to enforce section 1245.245’s duty to make him a buyback offer, a duty that is mandated by statute once the statute’s 

10-year deadline is blown. (§ 1245.245, subds. (b) & (f).)
10

I. Does Section 1245.245’s 10-Year Deadline Apply To 

The Public Entity’s Duty To “Adopt” A Reauthorization 

Resolution?

The City argues that section 1245.245 does not impose any 

time limit on a public entity’s adoption of a reauthorization

resolution because the statute refers to “10 years” only when 

defining how long the property has not been put to its designated 

“public use” (in one clause of subdivision (b)) and not when it 

refers to the adoption of a reauthorization resolution (elsewhere 

in subdivision (b) or in subdivision (f)). The Legislature’s failure 

to re-state the “10 year” limit when specifically discussing 

reauthorization resolutions, the City reasons, means that there is 

no time limit for those resolutions. We reject this argument.

Whether section 1245.245 requires the public entity to 

adopt its reauthorization resolution within 10 years of adopting 

its original resolution presents a question of statutory 

interpretation. When interpreting a statute, “[o]ur fundamental 

task . . . is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate 

the law’s purpose.” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 

907.) As noted above, the undisputed purpose of subdivisions (b) 

and (f) of section 1245.245 is to foreclose public entities from 

indefinitely retaining property that was acquired through 

eminent domain but not put to public use, and the statute 

achieves this purpose by giving public entities three options: Put 

the property to public use within 10 years, adopt a new resolution 

reauthorizing that use, or sell the property (with a right of first 

refusal to the original owner). The only way to ensure that 

section 1245.245 achieves its purpose is to require that the new, 

reauthorization resolution be adopted within 10 years of the 

original resolution. The contrary construction urged by the 
11

City—namely, that section 1245.245 imposes no deadline for 

adopting a reauthorization resolution—would allow public 

entities to put off that task forever and, in so doing, allow them to 

indefinitely retain condemned property without ever putting it to 

public use, which is precisely the evil section 1245.245 was 

intended to prevent. As between the construction of section 

1245.245 that furthers its purpose and the one that undermines 

it, we must go with the former. (Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. 

(2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1397; Diaz v. Grill Concepts Services, Inc.

(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 859, 875.)

The City resists this conclusion with what boils down to 

three arguments. First, the City asserts its interpretation of 

section 1245.245 is supported by one of the canons of statutory 

construction—namely, that a legislature’s use of “different 

language in statutory provisions addressing the same subject” 

means that provisions with different language should have 

different meanings. (E.g., People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

237, 242.) Citing this canon, the City continues that our 

Legislature did not intend to impose a 10-year deadline for a 

reauthorization resolution because it included a 10-year deadline 

in the clause of subdivision (b) addressing the failure to use the 

property for public use but not the clause in subdivision (b) 

addressing reauthorization resolutions or in subdivision (f), and 

further distinguished the two acts of failing to use the property 

versus adopting a reauthorization resolution—by using different 

verb tenses (past versus present) when describing them. These 

assertions ignore that the canons of statutory construction are 

merely “‘guides to help courts determine likely legislative 

intent.’” (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1017.) 

Where, as here, our Legislature’s purpose is abundantly clear, 
12

canons of construction must yield to that purpose; they certainly 

cannot be used to undermine it. (Roberts v. United Healthcare 

Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132, 146 [“Where . . . [a] canon 

leads to a result at odds with the otherwise clearly expressed 

legislative intent, the canon necessarily yields to that intent.”].)

Second, the City cites to a passage from the legislative 

history of section 1245.245 indicating that the statute “would not 

impose arbitrary or inflexible restrictions on public entities’ 

future land use decisions,” and on this basis contends that section 

1245.245 should not be construed to require a public entity to 

adopt a reauthorization resolution within 10 years because such 

a fixed deadline would be arbitrary and inflexible. We reject this 

contention for several reasons. To begin, the passage the City 

cites does not refer to deadlines at all and appears instead to be 

referring to section 1245.245’s flexibility in giving public entities 

the option to choose whether to sell an acquired property or 

instead to adopt a reauthorization resolution. More to the point, 

this passage cannot justify a construction of section 1245.245—

that is, the absence of any deadline—that is wholly inconsistent 

with our Legislature’s reason for enacting the statute in the first 

place. Indeed, even the City acknowledges the need for some

deadline for a reauthorization resolution when it notes that, even 

under its view, the 10-year mark would still be the “default” 

deadline and the “natural trigger” for “taking up [a] 

reauthorization resolution,” and even goes so far as to offer up its 

prediction that the 10-year deadline would be met “in the normal 

course of events.” Thus, the City seems to suggest that section 

1245.245 should be read to impose a 10-year limit that is more of 

a guide-line than a dead-line. But there is absolutely no basis for 
13

fashioning such a “meet it if you feel like it” deadline—either 

from the text or legislative history of section 1245.245.6

Lastly, the City argues that there is no reason to construe 

section 1245.245 to impose a 10-year deadline for adopting a 

reauthorization resolution because public entities could easily 

subvert such a deadline by simply enacting a new resolution of 

necessity. The City is wrong. To the extent the City is arguing

that a public entity can blow the 10-year deadline for a 

reauthorization resolution but sidestep the consequences of doing 

so under section 1245.245 by holding onto the property and

thereafter enacting a brand new, “original” resolution of necessity

subject to no time restrictions whatsoever, we reject this 

argument. Because we read statutes “‘“with reference to the 

entire scheme of law of which [they are a part] so that the whole 

may be harmonized and retain effectiveness”’” (Horwich v.

Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276 (Horwich)), we 

necessarily read the eminent domain statutes to prevent this 

type of gamesmanship because it would authorize an end-run 

around section 1245.245’s 10-year deadline that would render its 

provisions a complete nullity. (Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 

5 Cal.4th 337, 357 [“An interpretation that renders statutory 

language a nullity is obviously to be avoided.”].) To the extent 

the City is arguing that a public entity that blows the 10-year 

deadline and sells the property has the power to thereafter 

initiate an entirely new eminent domain proceeding with a new 

6 Because section 1245.245’s 10-year fixed deadline also does 

not depend on a public entity’s reasons for the delay in 

development, the trial court properly sustained relevance 

objections to the City’s evidence as to why it did not develop the 

property between 2007 and 2017.
14

resolution of necessity to reacquire the property, this is true but 

ignores that this alternative process entails substantial 

transaction costs such as having to conduct a new valuation of 

property and to engage in negotiations with the owner. (See 

§ 1245.230, subd. (c)(4); Gov. Code, § 7267.2; see Joffe v. City of 

Huntington Park (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 492, 504.) These costs

negate the very premise of the City’s argument that this process 

would be an easy and viable substitute for a reauthorization

resolution.

II. How Does Section 1245.245 Define When Initial And 

Reauthorization Resolutions Are “Adopted”?

Because section 1245.245, subdivision (b) requires a public 

entity seeking to retain a property previously acquired by 

eminent domain but not put to public use to “adopt[]” a resolution 

reauthorizing that use “within 10 years of the adoption of [its 

original] resolution of necessity” (§ 1245.245, subd. (b), italics 

added), the next question is: How does section 1245.245 define 

when a resolution is “adopted”? Section 1245.245 provides no 

express definition. Where, as here, a public entity’s adoption of a 

resolution of necessity requires some initial action by the entity’s 

legislative body followed either by executive concurrence or a 

legislative override, “adoption” could have one of three possible 

meanings: (1) when the resolution is initially adopted by the 

entity’s legislative body (but prior to completion of the additional 

steps necessary to finally adopt the resolution), (2) when the 

resolution is finally adopted through initial adoption followed by 

executive concurrence or legislative override, or (3) when the 

resolution becomes effective, which is typically after final adoption 

followed by publication of the resolution. Choosing among these 

three adoptions turns on two questions: (1) Does section 

1245.245 look to a resolution’s “adoption” date or its “effective” 
15

date?, and (2) If section 1245.245 looks to the “adoption” date, 

does it look to the date a resolution is initially adopted or finally 

adopted?

A. Adoption date versus effective date

As between the date that a public entity adopts a resolution 

and the date that resolution becomes effective, section 1245.245 

looks to the date of adoption. The date a resolution or any other 

law is adopted and the date it becomes effective are separate 

dates (Ross v. Board of Retirement of Alameda County Employees’ 

Retirement Assn. (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 188, 193 [“the date of 

‘adoption’ or passage of an ordinance or statute is not the date the 

enactment becomes . . . effective”]; Gleason v. Santa Monica

(1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 458, 461 [same]), and section 1245.245 

specifies that the relevant date is the date of adoption. We are 

obligated to give effect to the statute’s plain text and may not 

swap one term for the other. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair 

Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 

[courts “must look first to the words of the statute[]” itself]; 

California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified 

School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 633 [courts have “‘no power to 

rewrite [a] statute’”].) Using the date a resolution is adopted 

(rather than the date it becomes effective) is also more consistent 

with the approach taken throughout the Eminent Domain Law. 

(Horwich, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 276 [statute should be read 

“‘“with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is a 

part”’”].) That is because the timing for a public entity’s eminent 

domain proceeding and for a property owner’s inverse 

condemnation action are also keyed to the date the public entity 

“adopt[s]” the resolution of necessity, not the date that resolution 

becomes effective. (§§ 1245.220 [date for eminent domain 
16

proceeding], 1245.260 [date for inverse condemnation action].) In 

all of these situations, the focus is on what the public entity has 

done or not done; the effective date, by contrast, is typically keyed 

to the subsequent, “ministerial act[]” of publication “for the 

purpose of authenticating the [public entity’s] action . . ., and 

giving notice of” that action (Pacific Palisades Asso. v. 

Huntington Beach (1925) 196 Cal. 211, 221).

The City makes two arguments in favor of its view that 

section 1245.245 looks to the effective date. First, the City cherry 

picks passages from a handful of cases and statutes, each of 

which can be read to equate a law’s adoption with its effective 

date. (E.g., Modesto City Schools v. Education Audits Appeal 

Panel (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1375 (Modesto) [“‘adopt’ 

means . . . ‘to accept formally and put into effect’”], italics added; 

Watsonville Pilots Assn. v. City of Watsonville (2010) 183 

Cal.App.4th 1059, 1072 (Watsonville) [same]; Health & Saf. Code, 

§ 18906 [“‘adopt’ means, with respect to the procedure for 

promulgation of a building standard, the final act of a state 

agency”]; Civ. Code, § 1834.9, subd. (f)(9) [deferring to alternative 

methods of animal testing if “adopted by” federal agencies and 

defining “‘[a]dopted by a federal agency’” as “a final action taken 

by an agency, published in the Federal Register, for public 

notice”].) This authority is unhelpful. Not only do these cases 

and statutes arise in wholly unrelated contexts, but they also do 

not involve a choice between the date of a law’s adoption and the 

law’s effective date (Modesto, at pp. 1374-1375 [school district did 

not “adopt” valid independent study agreements because the 

agreements it enacted did not contain the content required by 

state law]; Watsonville, at pp. 1070-1072 [city did not “adopt” 

valid airport land use commission because its city plan did not 
17

contain the content required by state law]), and the two cases the 

City cites merely parrot definitions plucked from a dictionary and 

that are thus to be approached with “‘great caution’” (Stennett v. 

Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 284, 293, fn. 4; MacKinnon v. Truck 

Ins. Exchange (2003) 31 Cal.4th 635, 649). More to the point, the 

City’s proffered authority in no sense overrides the considerations 

we have found to be determinative with respect to section 

1245.245—namely, our Legislature’s decision to use a resolution’s 

date of “adoption” (rather than the “effective date”) as a common 

point of reference throughout the Eminent Domain Law as well 

as its decision to look to “adoption” date rather than “effective 

date” (as opposed to equating the two concepts). (Cf. Modesto, at 

p. 1377 [treating legislative intent of specific statute at issue as 

dispositive].) 

Second, the City argues that there are downsides to 

defining section 1245.245’s 10-year clock by reference to the date 

a resolution is adopted rather than its effective date because 

doing so will likely leave a public entity with less than a full 10 

years to develop the condemned property. Once a resolution is 

finally adopted, a public entity may have to wait for it to become 

effective (either under its charter or under the Elections Code 

provisions applicable to non-charter cities that mandate a delay 

of 30 days to allow for possible voter referenda (Elec. Code, 

§§ 9235, 9237; see id. § 9247 [these provisions inapplicable to 

charter cities and counties])). And a public entity will need to 

start preparing a reauthorization resolution prior to the 10-year 

deadline if it hopes to finally adopt that resolution before that 

deadline. These are valid observations. But there are also 

downsides to defining section 1245.245’s 10-year clock by 

reference to the effective date of a resolution. Chief among them 
18

is the potential for a public entity to manipulate that date by 

advancing or delaying the date of publication (even within the 

discretion legally granted to the entity under its governing law). 

Indeed, the City in this very case calculated the effective date of 

the 2017 Ordinance twice to select an effective date that it 

believed would satisfy section 1245.245’s deadline. Given that 

both options have what may be viewed as drawbacks, our 

Legislature’s decision to use the adoption date of a resolution 

rather than its effective date was not an absurd choice; absent 

absurdity, we may not ignore section 1245.245’s plain text. 

(People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1071.) If anything, 

our Legislature’s decision to go with the date of “adoption” 

dovetails perfectly with the maxim that favors construing 

statutes in a manner that prevents “mischief” rather than 

encouraging it. (Freedland v. Greco (1955) 45 Cal.2d 462, 468.)

B. Initial adoption versus final adoption

As between the date that a public entity initially adopts a 

resolution and the date it finally adopts it, section 1245.245 looks 

to the date of final adoption. There is no distinction between 

these dates when a public entity’s process of enacting a resolution 

requires only the vote of the entity’s legislative body (as it does 

for cities without charters) (Gov. Code, § 36936); as to such 

entities, the date of initial adoption is also the date of final 

adoption. But when a public entity’s process of enacting a 

resolution requires the initial adoption by the entity’s legislative 

body plus the concurrence of the entity’s executive or, failing that, 

a second vote of the legislative body to override the executive’s

veto, the pertinent date under section 1245.245 is the date that 

all the necessary steps for enactment are completed—that is, the 

date of final adoption. That is because, as noted above, section 
19

1245.245 and the eminent domain statutes focus on when a 

public entity acts (or fails to act). A public entity with a multistep enactment process has not acted until all of those steps are 

completed; the initial adoption of a resolution by such an entity’s 

legislative body is most certainly a step in that process (and, 

indeed, often the biggest and most important step), but that step

is ineffectual by itself and may turn out to be wholly ineffectual if 

the entity’s executive vetoes the initially adopted resolution and 

the legislative body cannot or does not override that veto. We 

divine no rational reason why our Legislature would peg the start 

and end of its 10-year clock to a date corresponding to an 

ineffectual, intermediary point in the more complex process of 

enactment used by many public entities, and accordingly 

conclude section 1245.245 looks to the date that a public entity 

finally adopts its resolutions.

Rutgard offers one argument in favor of its view that 

section 1245.245 looks to the date a resolution is initially 

adopted. He argues that section 1245.245 focuses on when a

public entity’s “governing body” adopts a reauthorization

resolution (§ 1245.245, subd. (a), italics added); that the Eminent 

Domain Law defines a public entity’s governing body as “the 

legislative body of the local public entity” (§ 1245.210, subd. (a), 

italics added); and that the “adoption of a resolution” under 

section 1245.245 must therefore focus solely on when the 

legislative body initially adopted the resolution. This text-based 

argument overlooks that section 1245.245, subdivision (b),

expressly defers to whatever “greater vote” is “required by 

statute, charter, or ordinance.” (§ 1245.245, subd. (b), italics 

added.) Here, as discussed more fully below, the City’s charter 

requires more than just a vote of the City Council before an
20

ordinance is adopted: It requires a mayoral concurrence or, 

failing that, a three-fourths override vote of the City Council. 

III. To What Law Does Section 1245.245 Look In 

Assessing Whether A Public Entity’s Resolutions Are 

Finally Adopted?

Because section 1245.245 looks to the date of “final 

adoption,” the next question becomes: Does section 1245.245 

supply its own, standardized, one-size-fits-all definition of “final 

adoption” or does it defer to however the law governing the public 

entity at issue defines “final adoption”? We conclude that section 

1245.245 incorporates the local law definition, and reach this 

conclusion for two reasons. 

First, section 1245.245 does not purport to define 

“adoption” or, as we have construed that term, “final adoption,” 

and we are loathe to fashion a uniform definition out of whole 

cloth where our Legislature has declined to do so. (People ex rel. 

Pierson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 402, 414 

[declining to fill a gap when “the judiciary would be required to 

fill [a] void out of whole cloth”]; see also, Freeman v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 660, 667 [“it is not for this 

court to fill the statutory void”].) 

Second, section 1245.245 elsewhere looks to local 

“charter[s] or ordinance[s]” governing the process by which a 

public entity’s governing body “adopts” resolutions (§§ 1240.040,

1245.245, subd. (b)). There is good reason to apply this same 

approach of looking to local law to determine when a resolution is 

“finally adopted.” The Eminent Domain Law applies to “public 

entit[ies]” (§ 1245.220), and defines that term to apply broadly to 

the “state” itself as well as any “county, city, district, public 

authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision in 

the state” (§ 1235.190). While some of these political subdivisions 
21

are subject to the general law of the state, cities with charters 

(and, to a lesser extent, counties with charters) have “‘home rule’” 

authority to opt out of the general law and follow their own law 

as to the “‘municipal affairs’” governed by their charters. (First 

Street Plaza Partners v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th

650, 660 (First Street); State Building & Construction Trades 

Council of California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 556; 

Cal. Const., art. XI, §§ 3, 5.) These municipal affairs include the 

“structure and organiz[ation]” of a charter city’s “government” 

(Dibb v. County of San Diego (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1200, 1207), which 

necessarily entails the process for enacting ordinances, including 

resolutions of necessity. Because chartered public entities are

constitutionally empowered to “combine executive, legislative and 

judicial functions in a manner different from the structure that 

the California Constitution prescribes for state government” 

(Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 

1055, 1093, fn. 23; D’Amato v. Superior Court (2008) 167 

Cal.App.4th 861, 869), it makes sense to construe section 

1245.245 in a way that acknowledges—rather than squelches—

this freedom to experiment.

IV. When Is A Resolution Finally Adopted Under The 

Los Angeles City Charter?

Because we have concluded that section 1245.245’s 10-year 

deadline looks to the date a public entity’s initial and 

reauthorization resolutions are finally adopted and defers to the 

definition of final adoption supplied by the law governing the 

public entity at issue, the final question becomes: How does the 

City define when a resolution is finally adopted?

The City is a charter city that has invoked its 

constitutional “home rule” authority over municipal affairs. (L.A. 
22

City Charter (Charter), vol. I, art. I, § 101 [so declaring]; First 

Street, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 661 [so noting].)

The City’s charter “vests” the City Council with “[a]ll 

legislative power” to be “exercised by [enacting] ordinance[s],” but 

makes that power “subject to the power of veto by the Mayor.” 

(Charter, vol. I, art. II, § 240.) The Charter goes on to specify the 

resulting “[p]rocedure for [a]doption of [o]rdinances” in a section 

of the Charter so entitled. (Id., § 250.) The first step is for the 

City Council to “pass[]” an ordinance. (Id., § 250, subd. (a).) The 

next step is for the Mayor either (1) to “approv[e]” the ordinance, 

by signing it or by taking no action for 10 days after the 

ordinance is presented to him, or (2) to “veto” the ordinance. (Id., 

§ 250, subd. (b).) If the Mayor vetoes the ordinance, the final step 

is for the City Council to override that veto with a greater vote 

(two-thirds if a majority was required to pass the ordinance, and 

three-fourths if two-thirds or more was required). (Id., § 250, 

subd. (c).) The Charter elsewhere explains that an ordinance 

that is “finally adopted” does not become “effective” until 31 days 

after it is “publi[shed]” or posted for 10 days unless the ordinance 

qualifies for immediate effectiveness. (Id., §§ 251-253; L.A. 

Admin. Code, § 2.13.)

Under the City’s charter, an ordinance is “finally adopted” 

once it has passed the City Council and either (1) been approved

by the Mayor or (2) if not approved, passed by a second, override 

vote of the City Council. The Charter labels this entire process—

not just the first step of City Council initially passing the 

ordinance—under the heading of “Procedure for Adoption of 

Ordinances” (Charter, vol. I, art. II, § 250), and this heading is 

entitled to “considerable weight.” (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 

266, 272 [“‘“section headings”’” “‘are entitled to considerable 
23

weight’” “‘“in determining legislative intent”’” (citation omitted)].) 

What is more, an ordinance is finally adopted under the City’s 

charter before it becomes effective. Section 251 of the Charter 

explicitly distinguishes between the “final[] adopt[ion]” of an 

ordinance and when it “take[s] effect.” (Charter, vol. I, art. II, 

§ 251.) Indeed, our Supreme Court recognized as much when 

interpreting a preceding version of the City’s charter that used 

identical language. (Solomon v. Alexander (1911) 161 Cal. 23, 26 

[“‘finally adopted’ . . . does not mean taking effect of the ordinance 

by publication.”].) Nor is the distinction between an ordinance’s 

adoption and its effective date unique to the City’s charter: Even 

the general law applicable to non-charter cities (and that has no 

mayoral component) draws a similar distinction between 

adoption and effective date. (Compare Gov. Code, §§ 36936, 

36933 [procedure for passage] with id. § 36937 [procedure for 

effective date]; see generally, Fletcher v. Porter (1962) 203 

Cal.App.2d 313, 324 [general law provisions “apply to general law 

cities only and do not regulate charter cities”].)

Rutgard argues that no matter what the Charter might say 

about when an ordinance is “adopted” or “finally adopted,” the 

City officials in this case treated the 2007 Ordinance as being 

“adopted” on May 29, 2007, and were otherwise sloppy in 

referring to when that ordinance was “passed,” “approved” or 

“adopted.” In support of this argument, Rutgard points to a May 

2015 motion by one member of the City Council referring to the 

2007 Ordinance as being “approved” on May 27, 2007 (a date that 

is, itself, off by two days); a subsequently prepared draft for the 

2017 Ordinance refers to the 2007 Ordinance as being “approved” 

on that date as well. This is irrelevant. A single Council member 

does not purport to speak for the entire City (Myers v. Philip 
24

Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 845 [“single 

legislator” does not “reflect . . . the views . . of the Legislature as a 

whole”]), and even if he did, his misstatement or 

misapprehension regarding when an ordinance is “finally 

adopted” under the Charter does not somehow amend the 

Charter in this regard. Nor do his statements create any 

estoppel, as the City’s error was to its own detriment and 

Rutgard has accordingly failed to allege or substantiate any 

detrimental reliance. (Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 

462, 494; Penn-Co v. Board of Supervisors (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 

1072, 1081.) The same is true for the imprecise language 

regarding the 2007 Ordinance that is littered throughout the 

administrative record.

V. Application

Under the law as we have construed it and the undisputed 

facts, the 2017 Ordinance is not timely under section 1245.245. 

The 2007 Ordinance was finally adopted on June 8, 2007, which 

is the date that the Mayor approved the City Council-enacted 

initial resolution of necessity for the Property. The 2017 

ordinance was finally adopted on June 27, 2017, which is the date 

that the Mayor approved the City Council-enacted 

reauthorization resolution. Because the reauthorization

resolution was not “adopted” “within 10 years” of the initial 

resolution, it is untimely and the City is statutorily obligated—by 

section 1245.245, subdivisions (b) and (f)—to sell the Property 

and to give Rutgard a right of first refusal in purchasing it.
25

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Rutgard is entitled to his costs 

on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ