alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000719961
<NAME> EL CHICO RESTUARANTS, INC
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                             266
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      979
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      1,100
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,828
<PP&E>                                          70,055
<DEPRECIATION>                                  23,846
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  51,039
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            8,524
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           475
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                      32,022
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    51,039
<SALES>                                        101,628
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               104,618
<CGS>                                           25,772
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   98,502
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (78)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 602
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,592
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,634
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,958
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .98
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .98
        

</TABLE>
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 17, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00944

- CR

Rickie RODRIGUEZ

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR4578 Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr., Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Pursuant to a plea

- bargain agreement, Rickie Rodriguez pled nolo contendere to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment and a fine of $1500.00 in accordance with the terms of his plea

- bargain agreement. On November 5,
2018 , the trial court signed a certification of defendant’s right to appeal stating that this “is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 25.2(a)(2). After Rodriguez filed a notice of appeal, the trial court clerk sent copies of the certification and notice of appeal to this court. See id. 25.2(e). The clerk’s record, which includes the trial court’s Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification, has been filed. See id. 25.2(d).

“In a plea bargain case ... a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.” Id. 25.2(a)(2). The cler k’s record, which contains a written plea bargain, establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. See id. The clerk’s record does not include a written
motion fi led and ruled upon before trial; nor does it indicate that the trial court gave its permission to appeal. See id. The trial court’s certification, therefore, appears to accurately
reflect that this is a plea

- bargain case and that Rodriguez does not have a right to appeal. We must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” Id. 25.2(d).

This appeal will be dismissed pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d),
unle ss an amended trial cour t certification showing that Rodriguez has the right to appeal ismade part of the appellate record by January 1 6, 2019

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d), 37.1;

Daniels v. State , 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

— San Anton io 2003, order).

We ORDER all appellate deadlines be suspended until further order of the court.

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
court on this 17th day of December, 2018

.

___________________________________ K eith E. H ottle
Clerk of Court
Exhibit 23




                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We consent to the incorporation by reference into the Company's previously filed
Registration Statements on Form S-8 for the Anuhco, Inc. 1992 Incentive Stock
Plan, File No. 33-51494, and the Stock Option Agreement by and between Anuhco,
Inc. and C. Ted McCarter, effective may 31, 1995, File No. 33-62553, of our
report dated February 4, 1998 on our audit of the consolidated financial
statements and financial statement schedule of TransFinancial Holdings, Inc.
(formerly Anuhco, Inc.) as of December 31, 1997 and 1996, and for the years
ended December 31, 1997, 1996, and 1995,, which report is incorporated by
reference in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.



                                   /s/ Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P.

                                   COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.




Kansas City, Missouri
March 30, 1998
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. AP -77,011

EX P ARTE EARL ST EPP , Appli cant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. F -2010-1176- E IN THE 367 DISTRICT COURT T H F ROM DENTON COUNTY

Per curiam . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Art i cl e 1 1

. 0 7 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicte d o f one count of ag grava ted assault and one count of assault family violence. He was s en t en ce d to twelve year s’ imprisonment on each c ount. He did not appea l his conviction. Applicant contends, inter alia , that his convictions violate the Double J eopar dy Clause of the US Constitution. Both counts of assault we re al leg ed to have been committed ag ainst the same victim on the same day and invol ved the same criminal act. Each victim constitutes the allowable2

unit of p ro s ecution under the Texas assault statute. See Ex parte Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing to Philips v. State , 787 S.W .2d 39, 394–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) and compar ing assault to burg lary wher ein the unlawful entry is the allowable unit of prosec ution). We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Applicant has suffe red multipl e punishments for the same off ense. A pplicant is entitled to relief. Relief is g rante d. The judgme nt in Count I I of Cause No. F- 2010-1176-E in the 367 J udicial t h District Court of Denton County is vacated and set aside. All rema ining issues ch al l en ging the judgme nt in count one ar e denie d. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Dep a r tm ent of Criminal J ustice-Corr ectional Institut ions Division and Parole Division.

Deliver ed: April 17, 2013 Do Not Publish
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 7688

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. ERNEST RAYMOND ROBERTS, a/k/a Balla Walla, a/k/a Balowala , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Aiken

. Mary G. Lewis , District Judge. ( 1:17

- cr - 00178

- MGL

- 1; 1:19

- cv - 00621

- MGL )

Submitted : February 18, 2020 Decided: February 21, 2020

Before MOTZ, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Ernest Raymond Roberts, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Ernest Raymond Roberts seeks to appeal the district co urt’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2018). A certificate of appealability will not issue ab sent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2018). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis , 137 S. Ct. 759, 773

- 74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling i s debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Limiting our review of the record to the issues raise d in Roberts’ informal brief , we conclude that Roberts has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see also Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, ou r review is limited to issues preserved in that brief.”). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-02589-REB-CBS

GRANT McWILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Blackburn, J.

The matter is before the court on the Stipulation For Dismissal With Prejudice

[#42]1 filed November 7, 2014. After reviewing the stipulation and the record, I conclude

that the stipulation should be approved and that this action should be dismissed with

prejudice.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That the Stipulation For Dismissal With Prejudice [#42] filed November 7,

2014, is APPROVED;

2. That the combined Final Pretrial Conference and Trial Preparation

Conference set November 21, 2014, are VACATED;

3. That the jury trial set to commence December 1, 2014, is VACATED; and

1 “[#42]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific

paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this convention

throughout this order.

Case 1:11-cv-02589-REB-CBS Document 43 Filed 11/12/14 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
4. That this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE with the parties to pay

their own attorney fees and costs. 

Dated November 12, 2014, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

2

Case 1:11-cv-02589-REB-CBS Document 43 Filed 11/12/14 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
#### IOWA NATIONAL MUTUAL INS CO. v. CROSBY.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Dismissed without opinion.'
<PAGE>


                                 EXHIBIT 11.1
                                       
                                  SCOOP, INC.
                      COMPUTATION OF NET LOSS PER SHARE

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                                                                 THREE MONTHS
                                                                ENDED MARCH 31,
                                                                ---------------
                                                              1997          1998
                                                              ----          ----
<S>                                                      <C>           <C>
Weighted average shares outstanding. . . . . . . . . . .   2,826,000     5,501,000
Conversion of redeemable common stock. . . . . . . . . .     927,000             0
                                                          ----------   -----------
Weighted average shares used in calculation 
  of net loss share. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3,753,000     5,501,000
                                                          ----------   -----------
                                                          ----------   -----------

Net loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ (567,700)  $(1,132,800)
                                                          ----------   -----------
                                                          ----------   -----------
Basic and diluted loss per share . . . . . . . . . . . .  $    (0.15)  $     (0.21)
                                                          ----------   -----------
                                                          ----------   -----------

                                       
</TABLE>
                                       14
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 195 (Tuesday, October 7, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 58435]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-23727]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

5 CFR Part 9901

RIN 3206-AL62

National Security Personnel System; Correction

AGENCY: Department of Defense; Office of Personnel Management.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) published in the Federal Register of September 26, 
2008 (73 FR 56344) a final rule governing the operation of the National 
Security Personnel System (NSPS), a human resources management system 
for DoD, as originally authorized by the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 and amended by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. This correction document 
clarifies the effective date of the final rule.

DATES: Effective October 7, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: At DoD, Bradley B. Bunn, (703) 696-
5303; for OPM, Charles D. Grimes III, (202) 418-3163.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In FR Doc. E8-22483, appearing on page 56344 
in the Federal Register of Friday, September 26, 2008, the DATES 
section should read, ``Effective November 25, 2008.''

Office of Personnel Management.
Charles D. Grimes III,
Deputy Associate Director, Center for Performance and Pay Systems, 
Department of Defense.

Bradley B. Bunn,
Program Executive Officer, National Security Personnel System.
 [FR Doc. E8-23727 Filed 10-6-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6325-39-P
```
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 92 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 92

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to clarify and make 
              corrections to the House ban on air travel.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 24, 2007

Mr. Issa submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
               Committee on Standards of Official Conduct

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to clarify and make 
              corrections to the House ban on air travel.

    Resolved, That clause 15(a) of rule XXIII of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives is amended to read as follows:
    ``15. (a) A Member, Delegate or Resident Commissioner may not use 
personal funds, official funds, or campaign funds for a flight on a 
nongovernmental plane that is owned or operated by a registered 
lobbyist or agent of a foreign principal or from a private entity that 
retains or employs registered lobbyists or agents of a foreign 
principal except for the following:
            ``(1) Flights on regularly scheduled air carriers.
            ``(2) Flights at the public rate on chartered aircraft 
        where seats are generally available to the public.
            ``(3) Flights on aircraft used in support of official 
        duties approved in advance by the Committee on Standards of 
        Official Conduct.''.
                                 <all>
```
Chief Judge Lynch is recused from this case and did participate in this matter. *

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

 

No. 07-2159

ALAN S. NOONAN,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

STAPLES, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

 

Before

Lynch, Chief Judge,

*

Torruella, Boudin, Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges.

 

Order of Court

Entered: February 13, 2009

In light of the panel's grant of rehearing and new opinion filed this day, the petition for en

banc rehearing is denied as moot, without prejudice to any new petition addressed to the new

decision.

By the Court:

/s/ Richard Cushing Donovan, Clerk

cc: Hon. Morris E. Lasker, Ms. Sarah Thornton, Clerk, United States District Court for the District

of Massachusetts, Ms. Wendy Sibbison, Mr. Daniel Gelb, Mr. Richard Gelb, Ms. Ariel Cudkowicz,

Ms. Pratt, Mr. Robert Messinger, Ms. Stamenia Tzouganatos, Ms. Gail Gelb, Ms. Jennifer Serafyn,

& Ms. Krista Pratt.
813 A.2d 542

#### IN THE MATTER OF PATRICK J. MOORE, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 013721989).

January 15, 2003.

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its decision in DRB 01-363, concluding that PATRICK J. MOORE of RUNNEMEDE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1989, and who has been ineligible to practice law in New Jersey since September 24, 2002, for failure to pay the annual assessments to the New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection as required by *Rule*1:28-2, should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating *RPC*1.15(c)(failure to safeguard funds in which an attorney and a third party claim an interest); *RPC*4.1(a)l(false statement of material fact to third person); *RPC*5.5(a)(practicing law while ineligible); *RPC*8.1(a)(false statement in a disciplinary matter), *RPC*8.1(b)(failure *101to cooperate with ethics authorities) and *RPC*8.4(c)(dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation);

And PATRICK J. MOORE having failed to appear on the return date of the Order to Show Cause why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

And the Court having concluded that it should impose a substantial term of suspension due to the seriousness of respondent’s misconduct, including his lack of cooperation in these proceedings and his numerous false statements about the status of escrow funds, which statements were contained in filed pleadings, in correspondence with counsel and a surety, and to the Office of Attorney Ethics;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that PATRICK J. MOORE is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and until the further Order of the Court, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of suspension and that respondent comply with *Rule*1:20-20; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
EXHIBIT 32.02

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of iGATE Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, Michael Zugay, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                              
|----------------------------------------------
|Date: November 7, 2007                        
|                                              
|/s/    MICHAEL ZUGAY                          
|Michael Zugay                                 
|Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-11322

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALLEN TUELL, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4-98-CR-191-1-E

--------------------

July 11, 2000

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Allen Tuell, Jr., appeals the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress evidence that was obtained through a search of

his car. Tuell has failed to demonstrate that the district court

erred in holding that the search was a valid inventory search

that was conducted pursuant to a valid impoundment of his car. 

See United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284, 1289 (5th Cir.

1980). Tuell’s contention that the officers stopped and arrested

him so that they could search his car is also unavailing. The

constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend
No. 99-11322

-2-

upon the actual motivations of the officer involved. See Whren

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 

Tuell argues that the district court erred in increasing his

total offense level by two levels for possession of a dangerous

weapon. This adjustment was not erroneous. Because the firearms

were found in the same location as narcotics, their connection

with the drug offense was not clearly improbable. See United

States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 271, 277 (5th Cir. 1994). Tuell has

failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying

his motion to suppress or in increasing his total offense level

by two levels. Consequently, the judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, July 13, 2021.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, July 13, 2021

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A21D0375. MUKESH PATEL v. BC 35 LLC.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

20GC01964
#### Harold CHIVERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

Dec. 10, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1955.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.