FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-1233

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CHRISTOPHER WADE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Thomas V. Dannheisser, Judge.

February 11, 2019

WINSOR, J.

A jury convicted Christopher Wade of sexual battery with a 

deadly weapon, and the court sentenced him to life in prison. This 

is Wade’s appeal.

I.

Wade’s twenty-eight-year-old victim was walking on a 

sidewalk early one morning. Wade approached her on a bicycle, 

spoke to her briefly, and then put a knife to her neck and raped 

her. Afterward, Wade rode off, and the victim ran home. The victim 

immediately woke up her husband and then went to the hospital, 

where medical professionals examined her and gathered DNA that 

turned out to match Wade’s. 
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After the victim testified at trial, the State presented 

testimony from two other women Wade had sexually assaulted. 

Both testified to similar encounters: They reported that Wade had 

approached them on a bicycle, threatened them with a knife, and 

forced them to have sex with him. (DNA recovered from those 

women also matched Wade.) Wade testified that he never forced 

anyone to have sex with him. He said that he frequented 

prostitutes and acknowledged that he may have had sex with all 

three women, but he insisted that if he did, it was consensual. The 

jury rejected his defense, returning a guilty verdict. 

II.

Wade first argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to conflict-free counsel. Wade’s appointed trial attorney, who

was with an Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel

(OCCCRC), discovered during trial that another OCCCRC

attorney was representing the victim in an unrelated dependency 

proceeding. Wade’s attorney insisted she was unaware of the other 

representation, that she knew nothing of the dependency case, and 

that nothing about that other representation had (or would) affect 

her representation of Wade. 

After learning that the same office represented Wade and his 

victim, the judge put Wade under oath and asked whether he 

wished “to waive any possible conflict.” Wade said he did. The 

judge then remarked that “an actual conflict has not really 

surfaced,” but nonetheless found that Wade had “freely, 

voluntarily, and knowingly waived any theoretical conflict.” 

Wade now argues that there was an actual conflict of interest, 

that he never knowingly waived it, and that his Sixth Amendment 

rights were violated as a result. We reject that argument. 

“Multiple representation alone does not violate the Sixth 

Amendment, and in the absence of an objection, a court can 

presume there is no conflict of interest.” State v. Alexis, 180 So. 3d 

929, 936 (Fla. 2015). When there is no objection (and there was 

none here) courts will not find a Sixth Amendment violation unless 

the defendant shows an actual conflict. Id. And an actual conflict, 

for these purposes, means a conflict “that adversely affect[s] 

counsel’s performance.” Id. at 937; accord Mickens v. Taylor, 535 

U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (noting that “actual conflict of interest” means 
3

“a conflict that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a 

mere theoretical division of loyalties”); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 

335, 348 (1980) (“In order to establish a violation of the Sixth 

Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must 

demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected 

his lawyer’s performance.”). 

Wade has made no showing—indeed no argument—that the 

OCCCRC’s representation of the victim (through a separate 

attorney) adversely affected his counsel’s performance. His 

attorney indicated she had no knowledge of the victim’s 

dependency case; she had not been aware there even was a 

dependency case, much less that another attorney in her office was 

handling it. Wade’s attorney vigorously cross-examined the victim 

in Wade’s defense, and she unambiguously told the court that her 

office’s involvement in the dependency case would not affect her 

representation of Wade. There is nothing in this record to suggest 

otherwise. Cf. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348-50 (noting that an actual 

conflict existed where “record showed that defense counsel failed 

to cross-examine a prosecution witness whose testimony linked 

[defendant] with the crime and failed to resist the presentation of 

arguably inadmissible evidence [because of] counsel’s desire to 

diminish the jury’s perception of a codefendant’s guilt” (citing 

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)). 

As in State v. Alexis, “there was no need for an inquiry into 

the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the waiver 

because, since there had been no finding of an actual conflict of 

interest, there was no need for a waiver.” 180 So. 3d at 938. Wade’s 

Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.

III.

Wade’s other argument is that the court abused its discretion 

by admitting testimony of two other sexual-assault victims. Under 

Florida’s Evidence Code, in prosecutions for certain sex crimes, 

“evidence of the defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, 

or acts involving a sexual offense is admissible and may be 

considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” 

§ 90.404(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2015). Here, it was certainly relevant 

that Wade had approached other women on a bicycle and forced 

sex at knifepoint—if for no other reason than to refute Wade’s 
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argument that the events leading to his charges were consensual. 

See Williams v. State, 621 So. 2d 413, 417 (Fla. 1993) (noting that 

“testimony concerning the other encounters was relevant to rebut 

[the] defense that the complainant had consensual sex with him” 

and that “[t]he similar fact evidence tended to rebut the defense by 

showing a common plan or scheme”). That leaves Wade to argue 

that the court erred in weighing the probative value against the 

prejudice. See McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1259 (Fla. 2006) 

(noting that rule 404 similar-fact evidence remains subject to rule 

403 balancing). We afford the court’s rule 403 balancing 

substantial deference and review only for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. McClain, 525 So. 2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1988). Under the 

circumstances presented, and considering the similarity of the 

collateral crimes and the charged offense, we find no abuse of 

discretion. 

AFFIRMED. 

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and MAKAR, J., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.