Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1512-CR-2356 | May 24, 2016 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Vincent James

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Vincent James, a/k/a, Victor 

James,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 24, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

64A03-1512-CR-2356

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court

The Honorable William E. Alexa, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D02-9002-CF-30

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] Appellant-Defendant Vincent James, a/k/a, Victor James, was convicted of 

felony murder in connection to the death of Gayle Taylor and was initially 

sentenced to death. After the Indiana Supreme Court overturned James’s initial 

sentence, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of ninety years. The ninetyyear sentence was subsequently affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court.

[2] On November 30, 2015, James filed a pro-se motion requesting the trial court to 

correct his allegedly erroneous sentence. This motion was denied by the trial 

court. James appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion. For its part, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the 

“State”) argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying James’s 

motion. Because we agree with the State, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in James’s first direct appeal instructs us 

to the facts relating to the underlying matter:

On December 15, 1989, James entered an office of an insurance 

agency in Michigan City, Indiana, because he had heard that 

insurance companies keep large amounts of money on hand. 

During the course of the ensuing robbery, Gayle Taylor, who 

worked in the insurance agency office, was shot once in the head 

with James’[s] gun. At approximately 1:55 p.m., the police were 

alerted to the shooting by a telephone call from the victim. 

When police arrived, they found her on the floor in a small room 

in the rear of the insurance office, with blood spattered around 

the room. The outer office appeared intact. Witnesses identified 

James as being in the vicinity of the agency near the time of the 
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shooting. One of those witnesses worked in the office next door 

and reported hearing a single gunshot.

James v. State (“James I”), 613 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ind. 1993). Following trial, the 

jury found James guilty of felony murder and determined that James was a 

habitual offender. Id. The trial court subsequently sentenced James to death. 

Id. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court overturned James’s sentence and 

remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 21-22. The Supreme Court also 

found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s determination that 

James was a habitual offender. Id. at 26.

[4] On remand, the trial court sentenced James to a term of sixty years. James v. 

Sate (“James II”), 643 N.E.2d 321, 322 (Ind. 1994). The trial court enhanced 

James’s sixty-year sentence by an additional thirty years by virtue of his status 

as a habitual offender, for an aggregate term of ninety years. Id. The Indiana 

Supreme Court subsequently affirmed this sentence in its entirety. Id. 

[5] On November 30, 2015, James filed a pro se motion requesting the trial court to 

correct his allegedly erroneous sentence.1 Later that same day, the trial court 

denied James’s motion. This appeal follows.

 

1

 The trial court’s order denying James’s motion reveals that James filed a prior motion to 

correct what he claimed was an erroneous sentence in 2008. That motion was denied by the 

trial court on March 24, 2008. (Order)
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Discussion and Decision

[6] James contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct his 

allegedly erroneous sentence. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 provides an 

avenue by which a defendant may challenge what they believe to be an 

erroneous sentence:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake 

does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be 

corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. 

The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the 

corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must 

be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law 

specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

“The purpose of the statute ‘is to provide prompt, direct access to an 

uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal 

sentence.’” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Gaddie 

v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind. 1991)).

[7] When reviewing the trial court’s decision on a motion to correct an allegedly 

erroneous sentence, we “‘defer to the trial court’s factual finding’ and review 

such decision ‘only for abuse of discretion.’” Brattain v. State, 777 N.E.2d 774, 

776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1243 (Ind.

2000)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. (citing Myers v. 

State, 718 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). “However, we will ‘review a 
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trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.’” Id. 

(quoting Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1243).

[8] In arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request to correct his 

allegedly erroneous sentence, James claims that the trial court erred at the time 

it initially sentenced him to death by allegedly holding his habitual offender 

status in abeyance.2 However, even if we were to assume for the sake of the 

instant appeal that the trial court had committed some form of error with regard 

to the habitual finding in imposing James’s initial sentence, such error has 

already been eradicated as James’s initial sentence was reversed by the Indiana 

Supreme Court and the matter remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing. 

James I, 613 N.E.2d at 19, 21. Given the contention raised by James in the 

instant appeal, we also find it important to note that in James I, the Indiana 

Supreme Court not only reversed James’s sentence, but also explicitly upheld 

the jury’s determination that James was a habitual offender. Id. at 26. 

[9] On remand, the trial court sentenced James to a term of sixty years. The trial 

court enhanced James’s sixty-year sentence by an additional thirty years by 

virtue of James’s status as a habitual offender. This sentence, for which James 

is currently incarcerated, was affirmed in its entirety by the Indiana Supreme 

Court. See James II, 643 N.E.2d at 323-24. As this is the sentence currently in 

 

2

 We note that in levying this claim, James does not include any of the original sentencing 

documents in the record on appeal but rather relies only upon his own self-serving assertions. 
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effect, our review of the propriety of James’s sentence must be limited to this 

sentence. 

[10] James does not present any argument in the instant appeal relating to the 

propriety of the sentence imposed by the trial court on remand. James’s motion 

is based entirely on a claim relating to his initial sentence, which, again, was 

overturned by the Indiana Supreme Court in James I. Given that this sentence 

has been overturned and is no longer in effect, we conclude that any error that 

may have existed in that initial sentence is no longer of any consequence. We 

therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying James’s motion.3

 

3

 Furthermore, we observe that the record falls far short of demonstrating any error by 

the trial court with regard to James’s habitual offender status at the time the trial court imposed 

James’s original sentence. In Canaan v. State, 541 N.E.2d 894, 902 (Ind. 1989), the Indiana 

Supreme Court considered whether it violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy for the 

State to seek both the death penalty and a habitual offender enhancement. In finding no 

violation of the prohibitions against double jeopardy, the Indiana Supreme Court stated the 

following:

Double jeopardy rights protect a defendant from multiple punishments. The 

death penalty and habitual offender determination are enhancements, and do not, 

therefore, constitute cumulative punishment. Enhancement for habitual 

criminal is based on facts different from those supporting imposition of the death 

penalty. In addition, practically speaking, there is no way Canaan could be 

sentenced as an habitual offender (to a term of years) and be given the death 

penalty. Indeed, although he was found to be an habitual offender, he was not 

sentenced on that. The situation was not, as Canaan argues, that the State could 

not decide which penalty was most appropriate; rather, the State was of the 

opinion that if the death penalty were reversed on appeal or not found 

appropriate by the jury, he would receive an enhanced sentence for having 

committed this heinous crime after having been convicted several previous times 

for felonies. There is no error presented here.

Id. (emphases in original). 

The practice implicitly approved by the Indiana Supreme Court in Canaan is the practice 

followed by the State in the instant matter. According to the assertions made by James, the 

State sought the habitual offender enhancement as an alternative to the death penalty 
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[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur. 

 

enhancement. The jury found James to be a habitual offender and, in sentencing James to 

death, the trial court noted that the habitual offender finding was valid and the corresponding 

sentence enhancement would be applicable at sentencing if James’s sentence of death were ever 

overturned and the matter remanded for re-sentencing. That is precisely what happened here.