DA 21 - 0120



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 20 2 1 MT 187N MICHAEL L. MILLER,

Petitioner and Appellant, v. MONTANA STATE FUND,

Respondent/Insurer and Appellee.
APP EAL FROM: Montana Workers ’ Co mpensation Court, WCC No. 2020 - 5145

H onorable David M. Sandler , Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant: Michael L. Miller, Self

- Represented , White Sulphur Springs, Montana For Appellee : M ark D . Meyer, Special Assistant Attorne y General , Montana State Fund, Helena, Montana Submitted on Briefs: June 30, 2021 Decided: July 27, 2021 Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk 

# sy-6ma---if 07/27/2021

Case Number: DA 21-01202

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Purs uant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c ), Montana S upreme Court Internal Ope rating Rules, this case is decided by me morandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent . Its case title, cause num ber, and disposition shall b e inc luded in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable case s published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 Michael Miller , appearing pro se, appeals the 2001 final order from the Workers ’ Compens ation Co urt denying M iller ’ s third motio n for reconsi deration relating to settlement litigation concerning a 19 83 closed hea d injury . We affirm. ¶3 On Octo ber 23, 1983, Miller suffered a closed head injury while in the course and scope of his em

ployment with Galt Ranch. Montan a St ate Fund (S t at e Fund) , G alt Ranch ’ s insurer, accepted li ability for Miller ’ s c laim . In 1988, Miller entered into a compromise settlement agreement (1988 Settlement) f or total disability benefits with State Fund . The 1988 Settlement provided Stat e Fun d would pay Miller a lump sum of $132,145.10 for the purpo se o f allowing Miller to be self - em ployed by purchasing a small ranch . The Settlement was subsequently approved by the Department of L abor and Industry . ¶4 Miller filed his first petition ag ainst St ate F und on August 3, 1998 , with the Workers ’ Compensation Co urt , seeking rescission of the 1988 Settlement due to mutual mistake . The Wo rkers ’ Com pensation Court held Miller ’ s claim was barred by a3

two - year statute of limitations pursuant to § 27 - 2 - 203, MCA. 1 Miller appealed to this Court, which affirmed the W orker s ’ Com pensation Court ’ s deci sion. See Miller v. State Comp . Ins. Fund, DA 99 - 379, 2000 MT 19N, 2000 Mont. LEXIS 19 (holding Miller ’ s petition to reopen his settlement was filed more than three years after Jun e 30, 1995) . ¶5 Miller fi led his second petition ag ainst State Fun d on March 29, 2000, again seeking rescission of the 1988 Settlement. H e additionally asserted State Fund committed a mistake of law when it failed to con sider co st - of - living adjustments, f

or c on sidering soc ial security benefits whe n Miller was not receiving them, for considering the cost to purchase an annuity , and for reducing its calculation of his future benefits . The Workers ’ Compensation Court concluded Miller ’ s claims w ere barred by res judic ata. It further concluded State F und was not operating by mistake for not considering cost - of

- li ving adjustments since claimants were not entitled to them under § 39 - 71 - 741, MCA (1983) . See generally Ti tle 39, Chapter 71 , MCA ( Workers ’ Com

pensation Act) . The Wo rkers ’ C o mpensation Court issued an order and judgment on M ay 14, 2001, h olding Miller ’ s claims to rescind the 1988 Settlement w ere barred by res judic ata. From the re cord, however, it appears the Workers ’ Compensation Court allowed Miller ’ s petition to p roceed to trial because th ere remained some

1 Section 27 - 2 - 203, MCA, states: The period prescribed for the co m mencement of

an action fo r relief on the ground of f raud or mistake is wi

thin 2 years, the cause of action in such case not t o be deemed to have ac c rued unt il the d isco very by the aggr ie ved part y of the facts consti tuting the fraud or mistake.4

outstanding iss ue ( s ) unrelated to those disposed of by the Workers ’ Compensation Court by res judicata . ¶6 In June 2001, Miller and State Fund entered into a second settlement agreeme nt (2001 Sett lement) re g arding Miller ’ s medi cal benefits. The 2001 Settlement provided that in exchange for $67,500.24 , Miller agreed to settle all benefit claims and to a complete closure of all other court procee dings against State Fund, including any right to appeal , regarding his October 23, 19 83 injury. M i ller , in si gning the 2001 Settlement, agreed he entered it of his own free will and without com pulsion . B oth Miller and State Fund asked the Workers ’ C om pensation Court to enter a jud gment in accordance with the 2001 Settlement. ¶7 On June 14, 2001, the Workers ’ C om pensation Court ente red a final order holding the parties resolved, by agreement, all benefits payable under the Workers ’ Compensation Act . O n August 11, 2 020, Mille r filed his third petiti on ag ainst State Fun d, seeking resci ssion of the 1988 Settlement and the 2001 final order . As a result, State Fun d mo ve d for summary judgment and asserted res judic ata . The Workers ’ Co mpens ation Court ente red summary judgment in favor of State Fund an d c oncluded Miller ’ s attempt to re scind the 1988 Settlement w as ag ain barred under res j udic at a and his attempt to rescind the 2001 final order lacked any legal and factual bases. Miller appeals. ¶8 M iller asserts the Workers ’ Compensation Court erred in granting summary judgment to State Fund . Spec ifically , he alleg es his attempts to rescind the 19 885

Settlement and to set aside the 2001 final order were not properly considered by the Worker s ’ C om

pensation C ourt. ¶9 We review summary judgment ruling s de novo, applying the standards set forth in M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Bird v. Cascade Co unty , 2016 MT 345, ¶ 9, 386 Mont. 69, 386 P.3d 602 (citing Moe v. Butte
- Silver Bow C ounty , 2016 MT 103, ¶ 14, 383 Mont. 297, 371 P.3d 415). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates bo th the absence of any genuine issues of materi al f act and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. M . R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Bird, ¶ 9. O nce the mo ving party has met i t s burden, the opposing party must present material and substantial evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Bird, ¶ 9 ( citing McConke y v. Flathead Elec. Coop. , 2005 MT 334, ¶ 19, 330 Mont. 48, 125 P.3d 1121). We will draw all reasonable infere nces from the offered evidence in favor o f the party opposing summary judgment; but c onclusory statements, speculative assertions, and mere denials are insufficient to de feat a motion for summary judgment. Bird, ¶ 9. W e review the Workers ’ Compensation C ourt ’ s conclusions of law for correctness . Abfalder v . Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 2003 MT 180 , ¶ 9 , 316 Mont. 415, 75 P.3d 1246 . This Court reviews findings of fact to determine if they are supported by substantial credible evidence , not whethe r the re may be contrary findings . Abfalder , ¶ 10 . We will not substitute our judgment for that of the Wo rkers ’ Co mpe nsation Court as to th e weight of evidence on questions of fact. Abfalder , ¶ 10. ¶10 Miller first asserts the Workers ’ C om pensation C ourt did no t properly consider the 1988 Settlement an d it , instead , concluded the c laim was barre d by res judicata.6

Res judicat a , or claim preclusion , is a doctrine that em bo dies a judicial policy that favors a definite end to litigation , whereby we seek to prevent parties from incessantly waging piecemeal, collateral attacks ag ainst j udgment s . B altrus ch v. Baltrus ch , 200 6 MT 51, ¶ 15, 331 Mont. 281, 130 P.3 d 1267. T he doctrine deters plaintiffs from splitting a single cause of action into more than one lawsuit, th ereby c onserving judicial resources an d en couraging rel iance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent judgments . B altrusch , ¶ 15. Res judic ata bars the relitigation of a claim that the party has already had an opportunity to litigate. B altrus ch , ¶ 15. Res j udicat a applies when the following criteria are met: (1) the parties or their p rivies are the same; (2) th e subject matter of the action is the same; (3) the issues related to the subject matter are the same; and (4) the capacities of the person are the same in reference to the subject matt er and the is sues between them. Baltrusch , ¶ 16. This Court has held that res judicata “bars relitigation of an entire c ause of action once a final judgment has been entered. ” Baltrusch , ¶ 16 (citin g Holt man v. 4
- G ’

s Plumbing and Heating, 264 Mont. 432, 436, 872 P.2 d 318 , 320 (1994) ). ¶11 In 2000 , the Workers ’ Com pensation C ourt initially held Miller ’ s claim was barred by th e statute of limitatio ns under § 27 - 2 - 203, MCA , which was af firmed by this Court. Subsequently , th e Workers ’ Compensation C o urt issue d an order co ncluding res judicata barred al l claims raised or which co uld have be en rai sed in connectio n with Miller ’ s re quest to rescind the 1988 Se ttl ement. Th e 2001 final order reaffirmed the recognition of re s judic ata pe rtaining to claims involving the 1988 Sett l ement. The Workers ’ Compensation C ourt was correct to co nclude res judicata barred Miller ’ s7

subsequent p eti tions. Miller initially asserted a claim of mistake in the 1988 Settlement . He raised the identi cal claim in his second petition

—ass erting mistake of law based on grounds that State Fund did not apply co st - of - living adjustments and wron g fully reduc ed the 1988 Settlement amount to present va lue, and mistake of fact based on grounds that State Fund di d not co nsider his concurre nt employment when calc ulating his benefits . As a res ult, the Workers ’ Com pensat ion Court conclude d the claims we re barred becaus e Miller could have litigated them in his first case against State Fund pertaining to the resc issio n of the 1988 Settlement. Miller cle arly litigate d or had the opportunity to liti gate all the issues raised in his app eal . Thus, the Worker s ’ Com pen sati on Court did not err in granting summary judgment to State Fund and concluding Miller ’ s claims re lating to the 1988 Settlement are preclude d. ¶12 Miller additionally asserts M. R. C iv. P. 60 (d) applies to his attem pt to rescind the 2001 final orde r . R

ule 60 (d) p ertains to a court ’ s power to grant relief from a judgment or order and states, “ This rule doe s not limit a court ’ s power to: (1) entert ain an indepe ndent action to relieve a party fr om a judgment, order, or proceeding; (2) grant relief to a defendant who was not personally notified of the action; or (3) set aside a judgment fo r frau d on the court. ” Th e Wo rker s ’ Compensation Court held Mi ller ’ s attemp t to resc ind the 200 1 final ord er was without merit for three reasons— (1) res judic ata is a val id defen se b ecause an independe nt action under Rule 60 (d)

“ may not be used to obtain further re view o f iss ues already d ecided in the pre vious action ” ; (2) statut e of li mitations is a valid def ense because Miller ’ s claim s of mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, and misconduct f all under8

M. R. Civ. P . 60 (b), which has a statute of li mitations , i. e. no more than a year after the entry of judgme nt or order or the date of th e proceeding ; and (3) Mille r has not set forth grounds under which the court could lawfully grant him relief from its 2001 final order. ¶13 This C o urt concludes Miller ha s n ot presented any evidence that justifies setting as ide the W o rkers ’ Compensation Court ’ s 2001 final order, other than evidence already considered , litigat ed , and decided upon. Miller could have raised his claim of mistake under Rule 60(b) had he filed it within one year following the entry of judgment of the final order in 2001. Thus, th e Workers ’ Compensation Court did not err in concluding Mill er ’ s claim to rescind the 2001 final order was untimely and lacked merit. ¶14 We have determined to deci de this case pursuant to Sectio n I, Paragraph 3(c ) o f our Internal Ope rating Rules , which provid es for me morandum opinions . In the opinion of the Court, th e case presents a question controlled by se ttl ed law or by the clear application of app licab le standards of review. ¶15 Affirmed . /S/ LAURIE McKINNON We concur: /S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JAMES JERE MIAH SHEA /S/ JIM RICE