[Cite as State v. Minor, 2014-Ohio-4660.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

JUSTIN L. MINOR : Case No. CT2014-0027 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

 Pleas, Case No. CR2014-0015 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 20, 2014 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

RON WELCH ROGER SOROKA 

27 North Fifth Street JOSHUA BEDTELYON 

Zanesville, OH 43701 503 South Front Street 

 Suite 205 

 Columbus, OH 43215 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2014-0027 2 

Farmer, J. 

{¶1} On April 24, 2014, appellant, Justin Minor, pled guilty pursuant to a 

negotiated plea to two counts of trafficking in drugs (heroin) in violation of R.C. 2925.03, 

one a felony in the fourth degree and one a felony in the fifth degree, and one count of 

possession of drugs (heroin) in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a felony in the second degree. 

Two other counts, possession of drugs and having a weapon while under disability, 

were dismissed under the plea agreement. By sentencing entry filed May 23, 2014, the 

trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months in prison on the fifth degree felony, 

seventeen months on the fourth degree felony, and eight years on the second degree 

felony, to be served concurrently. 

{¶2} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignments of error are as follows: 

I 

{¶3} "THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON THE APPELLANT BY 

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CONTRARY TO LAW." 

II 

{¶4} "THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON THE APPELLANT BY 

THE TRIAL COURT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION." 

I, II 

{¶5} Appellant claims the trial court erred and abused its discretion in 

sentencing him to the maximum and near-maximum sentences. We disagree. 

{¶6} Appellant cites R.C. 2953(G)(2) for this court's standard of review: 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2014-0027 3 

(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this 

section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or 

modification given by the sentencing court. 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence 

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the 

matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court's standard 

for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The 

appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and 

convincingly finds either of the following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under 

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 

2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, 

is relevant; 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶7} In State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, ¶ 4, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio set forth the following two-step approach in reviewing a sentence: "First, 

they must examine the sentencing court's compliance with all applicable rules and 

statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and 

convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court's decision shall 

be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." In order to find an abuse of 

discretion, we must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2014-0027 4 

unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 

Ohio St.3d 217 (1983). 

{¶8} As this court explained in State v. Robinson, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. 

CT2012-0005, 2013-Ohio-2893, ¶ 19-20: 

Where the record lacks sufficient data to justify the sentence, the 

court may well abuse its discretion by imposing that sentence without a 

suitable explanation. Where the record adequately justifies the sentence 

imposed, the court need not recite its reasons. In other words, an 

appellate court may review the record to determine whether the trial court 

failed to consider the appropriate sentencing factors. State v. 

Firouzmandi, 5th Dist No. 2006-CA41, 2006-Ohio-5823 at ¶ 52. 

Accordingly, appellate courts can find an "abuse of discretion" 

where the record establishes that a trial judge refused or failed to consider 

statutory sentencing factors. Cincinnati v. Clardy, 57 Ohio App.2d 153, 

385 N.E.2d 1342 (1st Dist.1978). An "abuse of discretion" has also been 

found where a sentence is greatly excessive under traditional concepts of 

justice or is manifestly disproportionate to the crime or the defendant. 

Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 147 (8th Cir.1973). The 

imposition by a trial judge of a sentence on a mechanical, predetermined 

or policy basis is subject to review. Woosley, supra at 143-145. Where 

the severity of the sentence shocks the judicial conscience or greatly 

exceeds penalties usually exacted for similar offenses or defendants, and 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2014-0027 5 

the record fails to justify and the trial court fails to explain the imposition of 

the sentence, the appellate court's can reverse the sentence. Woosley,

supra at 147. This by no means is an exhaustive or exclusive list of the 

circumstances under which an appellate court may find that the trial court 

abused its discretion in the imposition of sentence in a particular case. 

State v. Firouzmandi, supra. 

{¶9} Appellant pled guilty to two counts of trafficking in drugs (heroin) in 

violation of R.C. 2925.03, one a felony in the fourth degree and one a felony in the fifth 

degree, and one count of possession of drugs (heroin) in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a 

felony in the second degree. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(2), (4), and (5), felonies of 

the second, fourth, and fifth degree are punishable as follows: 

(2) For a felony of the second degree, the prison term shall be two, 

three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years. 

(4) For a felony of the fourth degree, the prison term shall be six, 

seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, 

seventeen, or eighteen months. 

(5) For a felony of the fifth degree, the prison term shall be six, 

seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months. 

{¶10} The trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months in prison on the fifth 

degree felony and seventeen months on the fourth degree felony, less than the 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2014-0027 6 

maximum, and eight years on the second degree felony, the maximum, to be served 

concurrently, for an aggregate term of eight years in prison. 

{¶11} Appellant first argues his sentence is contrary to law. In its sentencing 

entry filed May 23, 2014, the trial court specifically stated it considered the "principles 

and purposes of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code §2929.11 and its balance of 

seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code §2929.12." The trial court 

properly applied postrelease control and sentenced appellant within the permissible 

range of sentences under R.C. 2929.14(A). Accordingly, the aggregate eight year 

sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. 

{¶12} Appellant argues he should not have been sentenced to the maximum 

sentence of eight years on the second degree felony because the facts do not warrant 

such a sentence. Although appellant acknowledges he has prior convictions, he argues 

this was his first drug related offense and the subject offense was not violent. He 

argues he has shown "sincere remorse," has admitted to a drug problem, and has taken 

steps to "begin the process of rehabilitation." Appellant's Brief at 6. 

{¶13} R.C. 2929.11 governs overriding purposes of felony sentences and states 

as follows in pertinent part: 

(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided 

by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes 

of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum 

sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2014-0027 7 

imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. 

To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need 

for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from 

future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the 

victim of the offense, the public, or both. 

(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated 

to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in 

division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the 

seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and 

consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 

offenders. 

{¶14} In the May 23, 2014 sentencing entry, the trial court found the following: 

The Court further finds that the defendant has a lengthy criminal 

history with multiple crimes involving weapons and has served previous 

prison terms. Therefore, a maximum sentence is necessary to protect the 

public or to punish the offender, and the sentence is not disproportionate 

to the seriousness of his conduct and the danger the offender poses to the 

public. In addition, the Court finds the offender's history of criminal 

conduct demonstrates a maximum sentence is necessary to protect the 

public from future crime. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2014-0027 8 

{¶15} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted the presentence 

investigation report indicated he had two prior felonies in which firearms were involved. 

T. at 9-10. The trial court explained to appellant, "[y]ou have a prior conviction in 2002 

for robbery with a firearm specification; in January of 2007, robbery with a firearm 

specification. Those are dangerous - - those are dangerous things. You're a dangerous 

individual, Mr. Minor." T. at 13-14. The trial court also noted a firearm was involved in 

the case sub judice and even though the weapons charge was dismissed pursuant to 

the negotiated plea, it "[d]oesn't change the fact that there was a weapon that was part 

of this." T. at 14. Appellant had agreed to forfeit a Glock .45 handgun recovered from 

his residence. T. at 4, 9. 

{¶16} While appellant argues the trial court unreasonably focused on his child 

support arrearage, the trial court did so in response to defense counsel stating, "[h]e's a 

father of three. He has another one on the way. He's a good father." T. at 5. The trial 

court noted appellant was "nearly $16,000 behind in child support, so he hasn't really 

been taking care of his kids the way he should be, has he?" T. at 6. 

{¶17} There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court's decision was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. 

{¶18} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in 

sentencing appellant to the maximum and near-maximum sentences. 

{¶19} The sole assignment of error is denied. 

 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2014-0027 9 

{¶20} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, Ohio 

is hereby affirmed. 

By Farmer, J. 

Hoffman, P.J. and 

Delaney, J. concur. 

 

 

 

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