## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Tiller v. Department

of Childr en & Fam ily Service s , 2013 IL App (4th) 120504

Appellate Court Caption J ES S I C A TI L L ER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF CHI L DREN AND F AMI LY SERVI CES; and RI CHARD H. CAL I CA, Direc tor, Def

endants-A

ppellees.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-12-0504

Filed August 12, 2013

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In proce eding s arising from plaintiff’s action seekin g to reve rse and
expunge five indicated finding s of abuse and neg lect that the Depa rtment of C h i l dre n and Family Service s found wer e cre dible, three of the finding s wer e reve rsed and expunged b y t h e Direc tor’s final admin i s t ra t ive decision, and on plaintiff’s appea l from the trial court’s decision on administrative revie w upholding the two rema ining finding s,

one wa s reve rsed a

nd the other w as upheld.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l f rom the Circuit Court of McL ean County
, No. 11-MR-276; the Hon. Paul G. L awr ence , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t.Counsel on

Appea l Alan J. Novick (argued), of Blooming ton, for appe llant.

L isa Madig an, At torney Gene ral, of Chicag o (Michae l A. Scodro, Solicitor Gene ral, and M ary C. L aB rec (ar gued), Assistant Attorney Gene ral, of c ounsel), for

appellee s.

Panel PRES I DI NG J US TI CE STEI GMANN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Appleton and K

necht c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In J anuar

y 2011, plaintiff, J essica T i l l er , sought to reve rse and expunge five indicated finding s of ab u s e an d neg lect that defe ndant, the Depa rtment of Children and Family Service s (DCFS), deter

mined wer e cre dible. In September 201 1
, DCFS Direc tor Erwin McEwe n (substituted by curr ent direc tor, Richard H. Calica, by operation of law) acc epted the administrative law judge ’s (AL J ’s) recommendations and is sued a final administrative decision that reve rsed and expunged three of the indicated finding s but deter mined that the

rema ining finding s of (1) sexual penetr ation (89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (Alleg ation 19), amende d at 25 I ll. Reg

. 12781, 12797 (ef f. Oc t

. 1
, 2001)) and (2) substantial risk of phy sical i njury

/environment i njurio u s to health and welfa re by neg lect (89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (Alleg ation 10/60), adopted at 25 I ll. Reg

. 12781, 12789 (ef f. Oct. 1, 2001))

wer e supported by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Tiller later filed a complaint, reque sting administrative revie w of DCFS’ deter mination pursuant to section 3-103 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (Civil Code) (735 I L CS 5/3-103 (West 2010)). Following a May 2013 hear ing, the circ uit court aff

irmed DCFS’ de cision. ¶ 2 T il ler appea ls, arguing that (1) DCFS’ indicated finding of sexual penetr ation was a g ainst the m an i fe st weight of the evidenc e, (2) DCFS’ indicated finding of sexual penetr ation violated sever al of her constitutional rights, a nd (3) DCFS’ indicated finding of substantial risk o f phy sical injury

/environment injurious to health and welfa re by neg lect require s

reve rsal beca

use it was based on “double hear say .” Be cause we agree only with Tiller’s first
argument, we a ffirm in par t and re verse in part.

¶ 3 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 A. DCFS’ Indicated F indings of A buse and N eg lect Pursuant to the I llinois Administrative Code ¶ 5 In J anuar

y 2011, DCFS conclude d an investigation into alleg ations that Tiller and C.C.

-2-(born May 11, 1994)–a minor that Tiller had a sexual relationship wi th–had abused and

neg lected their daughter M.C. (born August 2, 2010). Specifica lly
, DCFS found credible evidenc e to support the following indicated finding s of abuse and neg lect: (1) bone fra cture s (89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (Alleg ation 9/59), amende d at 25 I ll. Reg

. 12781, 12789 (ef f. Oct. 1, 2001)); (2) substantial risk o f phy sical injury (abuse ) (89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (Alleg ation 10/60), adopted at 25 I ll. Reg

. 1 2 7 8 1
, 1 2789 (ef f. Oct. 1, 2001)); (3) substantial risk of phy sical injury /environment injurious to health and welfa re by
neg lect (89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (All eg ation 10/60), adopted at 25 I ll. Reg

. 12781, 12789 (ef

f. Oct. 1, 2001)); and (4) cuts, bruises, welts, abra sions, and oral injuries (89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (Alleg ation 11/61), amende d at 25 I ll. Reg. 12781, 12791 (ef f. Oct. 1, 2001)). In addition, DCFS also found that cre dible evidenc e supported indicating Tiller for sexual penetr ation (89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (Alleg ation 19), amende d
at 25 I ll. Reg

. 12781, 12797 (ef f. Oct. 1
, 2 0 0 1 ))
, beca

use Tiller admitted having a sexual relationship wit h C.C., who at the time of M.C.’s birth was 16 year s old. L ater that month, Tiller appe aled DF CS’ indicated finding s.

¶ 6 B. The State’s Alleg ations Under the J uvenile Court Act ¶ 7 In Marc h 2011, the State filed a first supplemental petition for adjudication of wa rdship, alleg ing that Tiller and C.C. had neg lected M.C. pursuant to section 2-3(1) (b) of the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2010)). Specifica lly
, the State alleg ed, as f

ollows: “[M.C.]
, who is under the ag e of [18] year s, is residing in a n environment injurious
to her welfa

re in that while residing with her pare nts, *** Tiller and [C .C.]
, [M.C .]

rec eived injuries that would n ot ordinarily occur except for the acts or omissions of a pare nt or custodian. Specifically
, [M.C .] was diagnosed with two healing rib fra cture s that have been deter

mined by a med i ca l expert to be cause d by phy sical abuse. This

cre ates a risk of har

m to [ M.C.] ” ¶ 8 Following an adjudicator y hear ing conducte d later that month, the trial court enter ed an order adjudicating M.C. a neg lected minor based on Tiller’s admission to the State’s neg lect alleg ation. (The court also deter mined that C.C., who did not appea r at the hearing, failed to p ro v i d e M.C. the proper car e or support as the State alleg ed in its orig inal petition for adjudication of war dship.) After an April 2011 dispositi onal hearing, the court adjudicate d M.C. a ward of the court and m aintained DCFS as her guardia n. (DCFS placed M.C

. with Tiller’s half

-sister, Gina Dutro; the court’s finding s pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act are not the subject of this appe al.)

¶ 9 C. The Evidenc e Prese nted at Tiller’ s Appea l
of DCFS’ Indicated F indings ¶ 10 In J uly 2011, an AL J considere d Tiller’s appea l of DCFS’ indicated finding s pursuant to section 7.16 of the Abused and Neg lected Child Reporting Act (Child Repor ting Act) (325 I L CS 5/7.16 (West 2010) ). (C.C. did not a ppeal DCFS’ indicated finding s.) A summary of the pertinent evidenc e prese nted at that hear i n g– d o cu mented by transcripts and the AL J ’s

-3-written re commendations and opinion issued later that month–showed the following

. ¶ 11 On November 8, 2010, DCFS rec eived information from Cry stal Dozart, Dutro’s friend,
reg arding M.C.’s injuries and Tiller’s interac tion with C.C. Specifica lly
, DCFS documented Dozart’s alleg ations, as follows: “[DCFS] rec eived a hotline repor t *** stating that [M.C .] had two black eyes in the past on two separ ate oc casions with blood beingnoted in the eye on one occa sion; had stiff/rig id torso; that there was o n go i n g domestic violence in the home; and that *** Tiller i s having a sex ual relationship with a mi nor, [C.C .], who i s 16 y ear s old and the fathe r of [M.C.] ”
Dozart later informed DC FS t h at Tiller (1) lived with C.C. and (2) had post ed to Dozart’s social networking pag e that she “wa nted to kill herse lf.” Dozart also provided DCFS pictures of M.C. that, acc ording to medical personne l, showed signific ant swelling to both of M.C.’s
eyes, blee ding in the white of M.C.’s left eye, and br uising on M.C.’s eyelids. ¶ 12 Tiller and M.C. resided with Tiller’s pare nts, her older brother, and her brother’ s friend. T i l l er estimated that C.C. “lived there occa sionally” from fall 2009 until approximat el y November 2010. Till er ad m i t t ed her sexual relationship with C.C. and acknowledg ed that she knew h e wa s a m i nor. W hile studying for a nursing exam, Tiller allowed M.C. to stay with Dozart for four day s (Nove mber 2, 2010, to November 6, 2010). When Dozart returne d M.C. to Tiller on November 6, 2010, Dozart informed Tiller that M.C. was “stiff.” Tiller immediately had M.C. evaluated by a doctor, but no abnorma lit i es wer e detec ted. M.C.’s pediatric ian later examined M.C. in the prese nce o f a DCFS investigator and opined that M.C.’s eyes wer e “sensitive and that veins are noticeable and g ive the impression that there is darkness a

round her eyes but it is actually

normal.” Tiller admitted that she place d M.C. at risk when she allowed Dozar t, a per son Tiller did not know, to carefor M.C. ¶ 13 The AL J noted that he revie wed numerous pag es of Tiller’s and Dozart’s postings to their
respe ctive socia l networkingpag es that we re pr ovided by DCFS and did not find evidenc e to corr oborate Dozart’s suicid e c laim. Instead, the AL J noted that Tiller’s postings repe atedly expressed love for M.C. and that Dozart’s postings on Tiller’s social networking pag e wer e positive toward Tiller. Dozart’s p o s t i ng s did not indicate that M.C. was experiencing any medical or

phy sical abnor

malities during the time she ca red f or M.C. ¶ 14 Dutro stated that Dozart’ s c o mm e nt reg arding Tiller’s desire to commit suicide was fa lse, and Dozart’s skill in photogr aphy enable d her to alter photogr aphs. “At one time” Dutro saw

a “re d speck” on M.C.’s right eye and bruising on bo th of M.C.’s eyelids. When Dutro confr onted Ti ller, she informed Dutro that M.C. sustained t he ey e inj uries in August 2010 when C.C. acc idently dropped a container of baby wipes on M.C. while he was chang ing her diaper

. The AL J no t ed th at T i ller’s explanation to Dutro was consistent with her later

acc ount to the DCFS investigator. ¶ 15 Dutro also testified that during the time Tiller was pregnant with M.C., C.C. lived with Tiller at the home Tiller share d with he r pare nts. D utro noted that C.C. also spent nights at other place s “fr om time to time,” which incl u d ed staying with his brothers. Dutro char acte rized C.C. ’s at t i tu de toward staying with Tiller at the hom e Til ler shared with her
pare nts as C.C.’s “saf

e zone,” beca

use C.C.’s “cr azy” mother moved to L incoln, I llinois
, and

-4-lived in a one-be droom motel room. Dutro admitted that since May 2009, she had not lived

in the home Tiller purportedly share d with C.C. Dutro added that althoug h she did not know whether C.C. spent the ni g ht at the home Tiller sha red w ith her par ents, she assumed C.C. did beca use C.C. would be prese nt “ most of the time” she visited. In response to the AL J ’s question, Dutro stated that C.C. “is basica lly homeless.” ¶ 16 Tiller’s mother, Tere sa Whit mer , te s ti f ie d th a t C.C.’s mother left C.C. in Gridley , I llinois
, when she moved to L incoln. Whit mer opined that C.C.’s mother “did not car e wher e [C .C.] was” and estimated that C.C. stayed at her home “fr om time to time” but also spent the night with his two brothers, one of whom lived in L incoln and the other in L ex i n gt o n , I l l inois. Whit mer added that C.C. would also occa sionally stay with his other friends. W h i tmer neither monitored C.C.’s movements nor knew from day to day whether C.C. would stay the night at her home. When he did stay at Whit mer’s home, C.C. would sleep either on the floor

or the couch or in Tiller’s room, which did not have a door. Whit mer confirme d that C.C. did
not rec eive mail at her h o me a nd char acte rized C.C. as “esse ntially homeless.” (Whitm er also testified briefly about phy sical alterc ations that occur red in her home betwee n Tiller and her older brothe r.) ¶ 17 Tiller confirme d that C.C. would stay overnight at her mother’s home about two to f our nights a wee k but never

for a n entire week. Tiller agree d with Whi tmer’s c hara cter ization, stating that although C.C. kept some of his c lothes at Whit mer’s home , he wa s homeless.

¶ 18 D. The A L J ’s Finding s of Fa ct ¶ 19 Ba sed on the evidenc e prese nted, the AL J made, in pertinent part, the followingfinding s of fa ct: “2. At a time when [Til ler] was [19] y ear s[ ]ol d an d an adult[,] she had sexual intercour se with [C .C.] when he was [15] year s[ ] old.
3. At the time [Til ler] had sexual intercour se with [C .C.] they wer e both residing in the same residenc e. This finding is supported by the testimony and evidenc e[,] including the finding by the J uvenile Court that [M.C .] was residing with [Til ler] and [C .C.] at the time [ M .C.] rec eived injuries that would not ordinarily occur except for the acts or omissions of a pare nt or custodian. In order for that para g raph to be true, all statements in the para g raph must be true. There fo re , t h e J uvenile Court found that [C .C.] and [Til ler] wereresidingtoge ther.

***
5. *** The evidence is not sufficie nt to deter mine which *** car etake r i s t h e m o st likely to have c aused the rib fra cture s. * * *
8. The hear say statements of *** Dozart wer e not reliable

. *** Dozart intentionally lied about [Till er].
9. Ap p el l ant admitted that she had cre ated a substantial risk of phy sical injury by allowingDozart to car e for [M.C .]”

-5-¶ 20 E. The DCF S Director’ s Acc eptanc e of the AL J ’s Recommendations

¶ 21 I n September 2011, McEwe n acc epted the AL J ’s rec ommendations and issued a fi n al administrative decision that (1 ) DC FS had not proved the indicated finding s of bone fra cture s; substantial risk of phy sical injury (abuse ); and cuts, bruises, welts, abra sions, and oral injuries by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e an d (2 ) DC FS had met its burden with
reg ard to the indicated finding s o f sexual penetr ation and substantial risk of phy sical injury /environment injurious to health and welfa re by neg lect. (Although the trial court’s Marc h 2011 adjudicator

y order found M.C. neg lected, in part, beca use she suffe red two rib fra cture s, DCFS deter

mined that beca

use “the evidenc e did not point to any one person being

more likely to have cause d the fra cture s than anyone else,” it conclude d that the indicated finding s of bone f

rac tures ag ainst Tiller had not bee n proved.)

¶ 22 F. Circuit Court Review ¶ 23 L ater that same month, Tiller fi l ed a co m p l ai n t , reque sting administrative revie w of DCFS’ decis ion pursuant to section 3-103 of t he C ivil Code. Specifica lly
, Tiller s oug ht to (1) reve rse the t wo af

o rementioned indicated finding s McEwe n found wer e supported by

cre dible ev i d en ce and (2) expunge those two indicated finding s from the State’s centr al
reg istrar of suspected child a b u sers. Following a May 2013 hearing, the circ uit court aff irmed DCFS’ fina l administrative decision. ¶ 24 This appea l followed.

¶ 25 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 26 A. Standard of Review ¶ 27 “In an appea l from an administrat i v e age n cy ’s d ec i s i o n , we review the ag ency ’s deter mination, not that of the trial court.” Lam b ert v. Downers Grove Fire Departme nt Pension Board
, 2013 I L App (2d) 110824, ¶ 23, 985 N.E.2d 654. Under the C ivil Cod e, a revie wing court considers all questions of fact and law presented by the entire rec ord. 735 I L CS 5/3-110 (West 2010). In adminis t ra t ive revie w case s, this court revie ws fac tual questions under the manifest weight standard, questions of law de novo , and mix ed questions of law an d fa ct u n d er the clea rly err oneous standard. Lambert
, 2013 I L App (2d) 110824, ¶ 23, 985 N.E.2d 654. An administrative ag ency ’s fac tual finding s are ag ainst the manifest weight of t he evide nce only when the opposite conclusion i s clea rly evident. Clarcor, Inc. v. Hame r , 2012 I LApp (1st) 111674, ¶ 26, 972 N .E.2d 692.

¶ 28 B. D CFS’ Indicated F indings ¶ 29 1. Sexual Pe netration ¶ 30 Tiller argues that DCFS’ indicated finding of sexual penetr ation was ag ainst the manife st weight of the evide nce. We a g ree

. ¶ 31 T h e C h i l d Reporting Act require s DCFS to maintain “a centr al reg ister of all case s of

s u s p ec t ed child abuse or neg lect reported and maintained by [DCFS] under this Act.” 325 I L CS 5/7.7 (West 2010). After a repor t is made, the child protec tive service unit must

-6-i n v estig ate and deter mine whether those repor ts are “indicate d,” “unfounde d
, ” o r “undete rmined.” 325 I L CS 5/7.12, 7.14 (West 2010). The Act define s “ ‘[a]n indicated
repor t ’ ” as “a repor

t made under this Act if an investiga tion deter mines that cre dible evidenc e of the alleg ed abuse or neg lect exis ts.” 325 I L CS 5/3 (West 2010) . A person who is subject to an ind icated repor t may reque st that DCFS amend the rec ord of the repor t or

remove the rec ord of the repor t from t h e S t at e Central Reg ister. 325 I L CS 5/7.16 (West 2010). ¶ 32 Section 3 of the Child Reporting Act defining “abuse d child,” provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“ ‘Abused child’ means a child whose parent or immed i at e family member, or any person responsible for

the child’s we lfare , or any individual r esiding in the same home as the c hild, or a par amour of the child’s par ent[.] ” 325 I L CS 5/ 3 (West 2010). The definition of abused chil d u n d er section 3 of the Child Reporting Act continues by specific ally segreg ating the ty pes of abuse, neg lect, or injury that has been inflicted upon the minor by the ac ts, omiss ions, or acquie scenc e of the afor ementioned c ateg ory of per sons. ¶ 33 Alleg ation No. 19, which is contained within appendix B of sect i o n 3 0 0 of Tit le 89 of the I llinois Administrative Code (Administrative Co d e)
, entitled “Sexual Penetration,” provides, in par

t, the followingdefinition: “Any contac t, howeve r slight, betwee n the sex org an or anus of one person by an object, the sex org an, mouth or anus of another person, or any intrusion, howeve r slight, of any part of the body of one person or any animal or object into the sex org an or anus of another person. This includes acts commonly known as oral sex (cu nn ilingus, fellatio), anal p en et ration, coition, coitus, and copulation.” 89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (Alleg ation 19), ame nded at 25 I ll. Reg. 12781, 12797 ( eff . Oct. 1, 2001). Appendix B of section 300 of title 89 of the Administrative Code “desc ribes the specific incidents of harm which must be alleg ed to have been cause d by the acts or omissions of the
persons identified in Section 3 of the [C hild Reporti n g Ac t ] b ef ore [DCFS] will acc ept a repor t of child abuse or neg lect.” 89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B, amende d at 25 I ll. Reg

. 12781, 12785 (ef

f. Oc t. 1, 2001). ¶ 34 Tiller contends that to sustain the indicated finding of sexual penetr atio n aga i n s t h er , DCFS was require d to show (1) actua l penetr ation as outlined in alleg ation No. 19 contained within Appendix B of section 300 of title 89 of t h e Adm inistrative Code and (2) that she satisfied one of the cate g ories of persons that cause d the sexual pe netration a s identified in section 3 of the Child Reporting Act. In this re gar d
, Tiller conce des that she eng ag ed in sexual intercour se with C.C., whom she knew to be a minor, but asser ts that DCFS failed to show that she was an offe nder as contemplated by section 3 of the Child ReportingAct. In other words, Tiller posits that DCFS failed to show that she was C.C.’s pare nt or immediate family member, a person responsible for C.C.’s welfa re, residing in the same home as C.C.,
or a pa ramour of C.C.’s parent. ¶ 35 In this c ase, DCFS adopted, in pertinent part, the AL J ’s finding of fac t that “at the time [Til ler] ha d sexual intercour se with [C .C.]
, they wer e both residing in the same residenc e.” The AL J based that finding on evidenc e prese nted conce rning C.C.’s cohabitation with Tiller

-7-and the trial court’s Marc h 2011 adjudicator y order in which the court deter mined that M.C. was in an environment injurious to her we lfare beca use “while living with pare nts[
, M.C.] suffe red two broken ribs which wer e deter mined to be non-ac cidental by a medical expert.” We, theref

ore, limit our revie w ac cording ly

. ¶ 36 Cognizant of the standard of revie w and the defe renc e this court aff ords DCFS’ fac tual finding s, we disag ree that in this case the basis ar ticulated was sufficie nt to substantiate an indicated finding of sexual penetr ation. Although the Administrative Code does not provide a definition of “residing ,” the plain and ordinary meaningof the ter

m “re side” is “to dwell
perma nently or continuously : occupy a place as one’s leg al domicile.” Merr iam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionar

y 993 (10th ed. 2000). See Dodaro v. Illinois W orkers’ Compe nsation Comm’n
, 403 I ll. App. 3d 538, 545, 950 N.E.2d 256, 262 (2010) (“[I ]n deter mining the plain and ordinary m ea n i n g o f wo rds, we may consult a dictionary if a word is undefine d in the statute.”). ¶ 37 Her e, the evidenc e prese nted shows that C.C. wa s a 16-year -old minor that, afte r being essentially abandone d by his mother, sou ght ref ug e in a varie ty of differ ent residenc es, including the home owned by Tiller’s pare nts from fall 2 0 0 9 t o November 2010. C.C.’s plight prec ipitated Whit mer’s g ener ous open invitation to allow C.C. to stay at her home when he desired, noting that she could not be cer tain whether C.C. would be at her home on any g iven date. In this reg ard, t h e t es t imony from Dutro, Tiller, and Whit mer showed that C.C. was not residing in Whit mer’s home with Tiller but, instead, was a homeless minor who would see k shelter in Whitmer’s home whe n convenie nt. ¶ 38 Wit h reg ard to DCFS ’ reliance on the trial court’s Marc h 2011 adjudicator y order , we note that despite the languag e of that order perta ining to M.C.’s living arr ang ements with her
pare nts, we disag ree that the court specific ally found C.C. and Tiller wer e “re siding toge ther” beca use, simply

put, the status of those entrusted to c are for minors–such as pare nts–is not the focus or purpose of an adjudicator y hearing. In In re J.W

. , 386 I ll. App. 3d 847, 852-53, 898 N.E.2d 803, 808 (2008) (quoting In re R.B. , 336 I ll. App. 3d 606, 614-15, 784 N.E.2d 400, 407 (2003)) , we outlined the pur pose of a n adjudicator

y hearing, a s follows:
“ ‘Section 2-3 of t h e [ J u v enil e C ourt] Act defines neglec ted children as t hose who live under cer

tain conditions, such as *** a mino r u n d er 18 y ear s of ag e “whose environment is injurious to his or her welfa re” [ ci t ati on], or *** a minor “who is not

rec eiving the proper or nece ssary suppo rt” [citation]

. These definitions do not addre ss the question of who may be responsible for such adver se conditions beca use, i n the first instance, that que stion doe s not matter. W hat m atters initially is only whether the child is neglec ted because thes e conditions exist

. After all, the Act’s mandate is to protec t children, not to assign blame to par ents.’ ” ( Emphasis added.) ¶ 39 During the J uly 2011 hear ing on T i l l er ’s ap p eal of DCFS’ indicated finding s, Tiller clar ified her admission at the Marc h 2011 adjudicator y hearing by testifying that she cre ated

a subs tantial risk of phy sical injury to M.C. based on her belief that she voluntarily transfe rre d custody of M.C. to Dozart during a four- day period without suff iciently vetting Dozart’s qualifica

tions to car e for M.C. This becam e a finding of fac t DCFS adopted. Moreove r, we note that at the time the trial court enter ed the adjudicator y order
, the evidenc e

-8-was insufficient to deter mine who inflicted the injuries M.C. sustained. Thus, consistent with

our guidance in W

eave r , we i n t erpr et the court’s adjudicator y order as setting forth that
reg ardle ss of who cause d M.C.’s injuries or when those injuries wer e inflicted–that is, while M.C. resided with her mother, Tiller; her fathe r, C.C.; or her pare nts, collectively –M.C. was no less neg lected unde r the c ircumstance s prese nted. ¶ 40 Acc ording ly
, we conclude that DCFS’ d ec i s i on to deny Tiller’s reque st to reve rse the indicated fi n d i n g of sexual penetr ation and expunge that finding from the State’s centr al
reg ister of suspected child abuser s was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. Having

so concluding
, we need not addre ss Tiller’s constitutional claims. See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Quinn
, 2012 I L App (4th) 110398, ¶ 50, 976 N.E.2d 1160 (“We should avoid constitutional questions when the c ase ma y be dec ided on other grounds.”)

.

¶ 41 2. Substantial Risk of Physical Injury/Env ironment Injurious to Health and W

elfare by Negle ct ¶ 42 Tiller also argues that DC FS ’ i n d i ca t ed fi n d i n g o f s ub s t an t i al ri sk of phy sical injur y /en v iro n men t injurious to health and welfa re by neg lect require s reve rsal beca use it was based on “ double hea

rsay .” We disagree

. ¶ 43 Alleg ation No. 10/60, which is contained within appendix B of section 300 of title 89 of th e A d mi n is tra ti v e Co d e , e nti tl e d “Substantial Risk of Phy sical Injury /Environment Injurio u s to Health and Welfa

re,”provides, in par

t, the followingdefinition:
“S ubstantial risk of phy sical injury means that the pare nt, car eg iver, immediate family member ag ed 1 6 o r o ver, other person residing in the hom e age d 16 or over, or the pare nt’s para

mour has cre ated a rea l and signific ant dang er of p hy sical injury that woul d likely cause disfigur ement, death, or impairment of phy sical health or loss or impairment of bodily functions (abuse ). *** T h i s al leg ation of harm also includes incidents of violence or intimi dation direc ted toward the child that have not y et resulted in injury or impairment but that clea rly threaten such injury or impairment (a b u s e) or placing a child in an environment that is injurious to the child’s health and welfa re [( i.e.
, domestic violence, intimi dation, and a child’s participation in a criminal act) ] (neg lect).” 89 I ll. Adm. Code 3 0 0.Appendix B (Alleg ation 10/60), adopted at 25 I ll. Reg

. 12781, 12789 (ef f. Oc t. 1, 2001). ¶ 44 In this case, DCF S ex plained the ba sis of its indi cate d findingof neg lect, as f ollows:
“As noted above, the J uvenile Court found that [Ti l l er’ s] actions had cre ated an injurious environment for [M.C .] *** [Til ler] admitted that she had cause d a substantial risk of injury

. In addition, this AL J finds that the domestic violence betwee n [Til ler] and her brother also contributed to the injurious environment. There fore
, this alleg ation must

rema in indicated.”
When the rec ord shows that a court has enter ed a judicial finding o f ch ild neg lect with
respe ct to a minor–as in this case–the indicated repor t’s acc urac y is “conc lusively presumed

on such finding ” and “ther e shall be no such rig ht to a hearing on the g round of the repor t’s inaccu ra cy

. ” 3 2 5 I L CS 5/7.16 (West 2010); see also Burris v. Departme nt of Children &

-9-Family Serv ices , 2011 I LApp (1st) 101364, ¶ 44, 951 N .E.2d 1202.

¶ 45 Her e, Tiller’s claim that DCFS’ indicated fi n d i n g o f n egl ect was based on “double hear say” is contra dicted by the rec ord, in that the in d i ca t ed finding was based on her own admission. Accor dingly , we r ejec t Tiller’s claim without further analy sis.

¶ 46 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 47 For the rea sons stated, we aff irm in part, i.e.
, we aff

irm DCFS’ indicated finding of risk of phy sical injury

/environment injurious to health and welfa re by neg lect; and we reve rse in part, i.e. , DCFS’ indicate d findingof pene tration.

¶ 48 Affir

med in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t.

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