If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re GUARDIANSHIP OF DAVID P. 

VANPOPPELEN.

DENNIS J. VANPOPPELEN,

Petitioner,

and

IVY S. VANPOPPELEN,

Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

February 24, 2022

v No. 353319

Macomb Probate Court 

SHANE CHILDERS, Successor Guardian for 

DAVID P. VANPOPPELEN,

LC No. 2017-223825-GA

Appellee.
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In re CONSERVATORSHIP OF DAVID P. 

VANPOPPELEN.

VINCENT W. VANPOPPELEN,

 Petitioner,

and 

IVY S. VANPOPPELEN,

Appellant,

v No. 353320

Macomb Probate Court

SHANE CHILDERS, Successor Conservator for 

DAVID P. VANPOPPELEN,

Appellee.

LC No. 2017-223826-CA

In re CONSERVATORSHIP OF DAVID P. 

VANPOPPELEN.

VINCENT W. VANPOPPELEN,

 Petitioner,

and

IVY S. VANPOPPELEN,

Appellant,

v No. 356664

Macomb Probate Court

SHANE CHILDERS, Successor Conservator for 

DAVID P. VANPOPPELEN, WYATT R. 

VANPOPPELEN, and JUNE VANPOPPELEN,

Appellees.

LC No. 2017-223826-CA
-3-

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and MARKEY and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In case nos. 353319 and 353320, appellant, Ivy S. VanPoppelen, appeals as of right the 

orders of the probate court appointing Shane Childers as successor guardian and successor 

conservator of appellant’s father, David P. VanPoppelen. In case no. 356664, appellant claims an 

appeal of the probate court’s March 1, 2021 order denying appellant’s motion for restitution and

awarding David’s former guardian and conservator, Martin Brosnan, attorney fees and costs in the 

amount of $2,670 as a sanction for appellant filing a frivolous motion. We affirm in part and 

remand for further proceedings. 

I. FACTS 

These consolidated appeals arise from the probate court’s appointment of a guardian and 

conservator of David P. VanPoppelen. Appellant, her brother Wyatt VanPoppelen, and their 

mother June VanPoppelen (the VanPoppelen family) oppose the appointment of the guardian and 

conservator, and contend that if appointment of a guardian and conservator is necessary, appellant 

and Wyatt are entitled to be appointed to those roles. 

Appellant and Wyatt are the adult children of David and June. David and June divorced in 

2014, after which June remained in the marital home. In 2016, David began to show signs of early 

onset dementia. He moved back to the marital home with June, who became his caregiver. June 

helped David apply for disability benefits and manage his medical treatment, and David granted 

June power of attorney. 

In 2017, two of David’s brothers, Dennis and Vincent VanPoppelen, petitioned in the 

probate court for appointment as David’s guardian and conservator, respectively. In response, 

June and appellant filed petitions seeking appointment as David’s guardian, and Wyatt filed a 

petition seeking appointment as David’s conservator. Following an evidentiary hearing, the 

probate court appointed Martin J. Brosnan, a public administrator, as David’s guardian and 

conservator. Although appellant and Wyatt had statutory priority for appointment, the probate 

court found that appellant and Wyatt were not suitable as fiduciaries because they were young

(June then age 19, Wyatt then age 26), inexperienced, and susceptible to June’s influence. The 

probate court also nullified June’s power of attorney, finding that David had lacked the mental 

capacity to grant it. 

Appellant appealed to this Court challenging the probate court’s order appointing Brosnan. 

This Court vacated the probate court’s order, concluding that the probate court record was 

insufficient to support the finding that appellant’s and Wyatt’s youth and inexperience rendered 

them unsuitable for appointment as David’s guardian and conservator. This Court remanded the 

matter to the probate court for further consideration of the children’s suitability to serve as guardian 

and conservator of their father. In re VanPoppelen, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court 

of Appeals, issued December 4, 2018 (Docket Nos. 340224, 340226), p 8-9. This Court also 

concluded that the probate court did not err by finding that David had lacked the mental capacity 

to validly grant power of attorney to June. Id. at 6-7.
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On remand, the probate court issued expanded findings of fact, again concluded that 

appellant and Wyatt were unsuitable to serve as guardian and conservator, and again appointed 

Brosnan as David’s guardian and conservator. Appellant and Wyatt appealed the probate court’s 

order. This Court affirmed the order appointing Brosnan as David’s guardian and conservator, 

finding that the record supported the probate court’s expanded findings that appellant and Wyatt 

were not suitable to serve as guardian and conservator. In re VanPoppelen, unpublished per curiam 

opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 14, 2020 (Docket Nos. 347977, 347978). 

Meanwhile, in March 2019, Brosnan petitioned the probate court for authorization to 

partition real property that David and Vincent jointly owned in Pentland Township, Luce County. 

The property consisted of six contiguous parcels with a total size of 110 acres; the petition sought 

to divide the 110 acres with David and Vincent each receiving approximately 55 acres. The 

probate court granted the petition. Brosnan and Vincent executed quitclaim deeds to divide the 

property, and the deeds were filed with the Luce County Register of Deeds. 

Thereafter, Brosnan submitted to the probate court an account of David’s assets for the 

period of August 25, 2018 to August 24, 2019. The VanPoppelen family filed objections to the 

account, challenging various aspects of the report including the balance of an investment account, 

the amounts paid to paralegals and bookkeepers, and the amounts received from the sale of two 

parcels of real property in Canada that David co-owned with Vincent. By order dated March 9, 

2020, the probate court allowed the account. 

In February and March, 2020, Brosnan filed petitions to modify the guardianship and 

conservatorship, requesting to be released from the appointments on the basis that his relationship 

with appellant, Wyatt, and June had broken down. Brosnan asserted that difficulties with the 

VanPoppelen family, including the family’s objections to the accounting, prevented him from 

effectively performing his duties. The VanPoppelen family responded by challenging Brosnan’s 

performance as a fiduciary and alleging various inaccuracies in the reporting of David’s assets. 

The VanPoppelen family requested that the probate court dissolve the guardianship and 

conservatorship or appoint appellant and Wyatt to those roles. The probate court granted 

Brosnan’s petitions and permitted him to resign, and appointed attorney Shane Childers as David’s 

successor guardian and conservator. Appellant appealed the orders of the probate court appointing 

Shane Childers as David’s successor guardian and conservator (case nos. 353319 and 353320).

Brosnan filed an account of David’s assets for the period of August 25, 2019 to March 9, 

2020, and another account for the period of March 10, 2020 to July 15, 2020.1 The VanPoppelen 

family filed objections to the accountings challenging the accuracy of the amounts represented. 

The probate court entered orders allowing the accounts. 

The VanPoppelen family thereafter moved for an order of restitution to be imposed against 

Brosnan, asserting that Brosnan caused David’s investment accounts to lose value in the amount 

of $129,456.97. The VanPoppelen family argued that David’s assets should have been placed in 

investments protected from stock market volatility, and that losses to David’s account when the 

 

1 Childers asserts that the COVID-19 stay-at-home mandates prevented Brosnan from transferring 

responsibility for David’s assets to Childers until July 15, 2020. 
-5-

stock market declined sharply in March 2020 were due to Brosnan’s negligent management. 

Brosnan argued that the motion was improper and frivolous, that the VanPoppelen family lacked 

standing to bring the motion because Brosnan owed them no duty under the conservatorship, and 

that their claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the probate court 

already had resolved their objections to the accountings in its previous orders. Brosnan requested 

imposition of a sanction against the VanPoppelen family in the amount of $2,670. The probate 

court found that the VanPoppelen family lacked standing to bring the motion, and that the motion 

was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the court already had allowed Brosnan’s 

accounts. By order dated March 1, 2021, the probate court granted Brosnan’s request for sanctions 

in the amount of $2,670 on the basis that the motion was frivolous. On March 19, 2021, appellant 

claimed an appeal to this Court of the probate court’s March 1, 2021 order (case no. 356664). 

Shortly before the probate court issued the order imposing sanctions, on February 26, 2021, 

the VanPoppelen family moved for correction of the 2019 division of the 110 acres located in 

Pentland Township, after learning that the Pentland Township tax assessor’s records listed David 

as the owner of only 30 acres instead of the nearly 55 acres he should have received in the partition. 

The VanPoppelen family believed that Vincent and Brosnan wrongly executed deeds that failed to 

convey David’s rightful share of the real property. They requested that the probate court issue an 

order requiring Brosnan to correct the error at his own expense. The VanPoppelen family also 

moved to terminate the conservatorship and guardianship or, in the alternative, to appoint appellant 

and Wyatt to these roles. 

Childers confirmed to the probate court that the Pentland Township tax assessor’s records 

incorrectly listed Vincent as the owner of 80.36 acres, and David as the owner of 30 acres, and 

that the error appeared to be attributable to incomplete tax parcel identification numbers on the 

two quitclaim deeds that Brosnan and Vincent had executed to divide the 110-acre parcel. After 

learning of the VanPoppelen family’s motion for correction, Childers consulted Brosnan, who 

assured Childers that the parcels were properly partitioned in accordance with the court’s order 

and provided Affidavits of Scrivener’s Error stating that the Tax Parcel Identification numbers on 

the deeds were incomplete, but the deeds stated the correct property descriptions. Childers 

informed the probate court that he also had consulted Krystal Bertram, a senior title examiner at 

Transnation Title Agency, to investigate the legal descriptions in the quitclaim deeds and that 

Bertram found that the deeds accurately conveyed 54.87 acres to David. Childers also informed 

the probate court that he had learned that he should apply to the Township for a parcel split or 

boundary adjustment to correct the tax roll inaccuracies. 

The VanPoppelen family rejected Childers’s explanation of a scrivener’s error; they 

requested the probate court order a survey of the property and also order Vincent to tender a new 

quitclaim deed granting David his rightful share of the 110 acres. Brosnan responded that the 

VanPoppelen family’s motion should be dismissed because the family members lacked standing 

to bring a motion on David’s behalf, and that the motion was barred by res judicata and collateral 

estoppel because the land division was previously approved by the probate court. Brosnan 

requested that the VanPoppelen family again be ordered to pay sanctions in the amount of $2,670, 

on the ground that their motion was frivolous. 

At the hearing on the motion held May 24, 2021, Wyatt informed the probate court that the 

error was in the quitclaim deed, as well as in the tax assessor’s records. Childers acknowledged 
-6-

that although the deeds had the correct description they listed incorrect tax parcel identification 

numbers, causing the inaccurate tax rolls. The probate court determined that the tax roll 

discrepancy was a simple error that would be resolved when the tax assessor’s records were 

updated, and further found that the VanPoppelen family lacked standing to bring the motion and 

that the trial court had previously determined this issue. The probate court allowed the 

VanPoppelen family the option of paying for a survey to verify that the deeds actually conveyed 

to David his full share, but they declined that option. The probate court also found that the 

VanPoppelen family’s motion was frivolous and by order dated May 25, 2021, again awarded 

Brosnan attorney fees and costs of $2,670 as a sanction for the frivolous motion. The probate court 

also denied the VanPoppelen family’s request that the conservatorship and guardianship be 

dissolved, concluding that the family’s frivolous motions demonstrated that the family lacked the 

level of sophistication necessary to manage David’s finances. 

The VanPoppelen family thereafter filed an objection to Childers’s first annual accounting, 

asserting that the Pentland Township tax records now listed Vincent as a co-owner of David’s 55 

acres. The probate court overruled the family’s objections and deemed them frivolous on grounds 

of res judicata. On June 3, 2021, the probate court ordered the VanPoppelen family to pay Childers 

$175 in attorney fees, and issued an order allowing Childers’s amended first annual account. 

This Court consolidated the three appeals into the matter now before this Court. In re 

VanPoppelen, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 24, 2021 (Docket Nos. 

353319, 353320, 356664). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR 

Appellant contends that the probate court erred by appointing Childers as David’s 

successor guardian and conservator instead of appointing appellant and/or Wyatt to those roles in 

accordance with their statutory priority for appointment. We review the probate court’s 

dispositional rulings for an abuse of discretion and review the probate court’s underlying factual 

findings for clear error. In re Portus, 325 Mich App 374, 381; 926 NW2d 33 (2018). Specifically, 

we review a probate court’s appointment or removal of a fiduciary for an abuse of discretion. In 

re Conservatorship of Shirley Bittner, 312 Mich App 227, 235; 879 NW2d 269 (2015). A probate 

court abuses its discretion if its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled 

outcomes. In re Gerstler, 324 Mich App 494, 507; 922 NW2d 168 (2018). A factual finding is 

clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the probate court has 

made a mistake, even if there is evidence to support the finding. In re Conservatorship of Brody, 

321 Mich App 332, 336; 909 NW2d 849 (2017). We review de novo questions of statutory 

interpretation. In re Portus, 325 Mich App at 381. 

Under the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., the 

probate court “may appoint a guardian if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence both 

that the individual for whom a guardian is sought is an incapacitated individual and that the 

appointment is necessary as a means of providing continuing care and supervision of the 

incapacitated individual . . . .” MCL 700.5306(1). MCL 700.5313 establishes priority for the 

appointment of guardians and provides, in relevant part: 
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(2) In appointing a guardian under this section, the court shall appoint a person, if 

suitable and willing to serve, in the following order of priority:

(a) A person previously appointed, qualified, and serving in good standing 

as guardian for the legally incapacitated individual in another state.

(b) A person the individual subject to the petition chooses to serve as 

guardian.

(c) A person nominated as guardian in a durable power of attorney or other 

writing by the individual subject to the petition.

(d) A person named by the individual as a patient advocate or attorney in 

fact in a durable power of attorney.

(3) If there is no person chosen, nominated, or named under subsection (2), or if 

none of the persons listed in subsection (2) are suitable or willing to serve, the court 

may appoint as a guardian an individual who is related to the individual who is the 

subject of the petition in the following order of preference:

(a) The legally incapacitated individual’s spouse. This subdivision shall be 

considered to include a person nominated by will or other writing signed by a 

deceased spouse.

(b) An adult child of the legally incapacitated individual.

(c) A parent of the legally incapacitated individual. This subdivision shall 

be considered to include a person nominated by will or other writing signed by a 

deceased parent.

(d) A relative of the legally incapacitated individual with whom the 

individual has resided for more than 6 months before the filing of the petition.

(e) A person nominated by a person who is caring for the legally 

incapacitated individual or paying benefits to the legally incapacitated individual.

(4) If none of the persons as designated or listed in subsection (2) or (3) are suitable 

or willing to serve, the court may appoint any competent person who is suitable and 

willing to serve, including a professional guardian as provided in section 5106.

A probate court may appoint a conservator if a person is “unable to manage property and 

business affairs effectively” for reasons including “mental illness, mental deficiency, physical 

illness or disability” and the “individual has property that will be wasted or dissipated unless proper 

management is provided, or money is needed for the individual’s support, care, and welfare or for 

those entitled to the individual’s support, and that protection is necessary to obtain or provide

money.” MCL 700.5401(3). MCL 700.5409 establishes priority in the appointment of 

conservators and provides:
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(1) The court may appoint an individual, a corporation authorized to exercise 

fiduciary powers, or a professional conservator described in section 5106 to serve 

as conservator of a protected individual’s estate. The following are entitled to 

consideration for appointment in the following order of priority:

(a) A conservator, guardian of property, or similar fiduciary appointed or 

recognized by the appropriate court of another jurisdiction in which the protected 

individual resides.

(b) An individual or corporation nominated by the protected individual if he 

or she is 14 years of age or older and of sufficient mental capacity to make an 

intelligent choice, including a nomination made in a durable power of attorney.

(c) The protected individual’s spouse.

(d) An adult child of the protected individual.

(e) A parent of the protected individual or a person nominated by the will 

of a deceased parent.

(f) A relative of the protected individual with whom he or she has resided 

for more than 6 months before the petition is filed.

(g) A person nominated by the person who is caring for or paying benefits 

to the protected individual.

(h) If none of the persons listed in subdivisions (a) to (g) are suitable and 

willing to serve, any person that the court determines is suitable and willing to 

serve.

(2) A person named in subsection (1)(a), (c), (d), (e), or (f) may designate in writing 

a substitute to serve instead, and that designation transfers the priority to the 

substitute. If persons have equal priority, the court shall select the person the court 

considers best qualified to serve. Acting in the protected individual’s best interest, 

the court may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having a 

lower priority or no priority.

MCL 700.5106(1) provides the circumstances in which the court may appoint a 

professional guardian or professional conservator, and provides, in relevant part: 

(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the court may appoint or approve a 

professional guardian or professional conservator, as appropriate, as a guardian or 

conservator under this act, or as a plenary guardian or partial guardian as those 

terms are defined in section 600 of the mental health code, 1974 PA 258, MCL 

330.1600. 
-9-

(2) The court shall only appoint a professional guardian or professional conservator 

as authorized under subsection (1) if the court finds on the record all of the 

following:

(a) The appointment of the professional guardian or professional 

conservator is in the ward’s, developmentally disabled individual’s, incapacitated 

individual’s, or protected individual’s best interests.

(b) There is no other person that is competent, suitable, and willing to serve 

in that fiduciary capacity in accordance with section 5212, 5313, or 5409.

In this case, appellant contends that the probate court abused its discretion by appointing 

Childers as successor guardian and conservator, and that the probate court instead was required by

EPIC to give priority to appellant and Wyatt because there was no evidence that they were 

unsuitable for those appointments. When a guardian resigns or is removed, the probate court is 

required to appoint a successor guardian consistent with the statutory scheme for initial 

appointment. See In re Gerstler, 324 Mich App at 512-513. That is, MCL 700.5313 does not 

differentiate between an original appointment of a guardian and the appointment of a successor 

guardian. Similarly, MCL 700.5409 does not differentiate between an original appointment of a 

conservator and the appointment of a successive conservator. 

We conclude that when appointing a successor guardian and conservator for David, the 

probate court was obligated to assess anew appellant’s and Wyatt’s suitability for the roles of 

David’s guardian and conservator. See In re Gerstler, 324 Mich App at 512-513. At the May 24, 

2021 hearing,

2

the probate court explained its reasons for the appointment of Childers as 

conservator instead of appointing appellant or Wyatt, stating that the VanPoppelen family’s habit 

of filing meritless motions and objections indicated that they lacked the sophistication to manage 

David’s finances, and that appellant and June would have a conflict of interest because their 

caregiving services were compensated from David’s assets. 

The probate court’s finding that appellant and Wyatt lacked sufficient sophistication to 

manage David’s finances is not clearly erroneous. The record indicates that appellant and Wyatt 

are vigilant in their concern for the preservation of David’s assets but, together with June, fail to 

understand the law and procedures mandated by the EPIC and the court rules, resulting in needless 

litigation. For example, when early in the proceedings their attorney moved to withdraw as the 

family’s counsel, a step the VanPoppelen family apparently agreed with, June filed a lengthy and 

argumentative response asserting that the attorney did not actually represent the entire family and 

that the attorney had not performed adequately. When in 2020 the value of David’s stocks 

decreased, apparently due to the advent of the pandemic, the family filed a motion asserting 

mismanagement by Brosnan. When Brosnan moved to withdraw as guardian and conservator, a 

step that the VanPoppelen family apparently agreed with, the family responded by challenging 

Brosnan’s performance as a fiduciary and alleging various inaccuracies in the reporting of David’s 

 

2 Although this hearing was held after the probate court’s March 9, 2020 orders appointing Childers 

as successor guardian and conservator, we consider the probate court’s findings at the later hearing 

to the extent that they explain its previous decision.
-10-

assets. When the family learned of inaccuracies in the tax records regarding the division of the 

Pentland Township property, the family leapt to the conclusion that there had been 

mismanagement by the conservator, filing numerous motions with the probate court rather than 

working with the successor conservator to correct the problem. We therefore conclude that the 

probate court duly considered appellant’s and Wyatt’s priority for appointment as conservators, 

and did not clearly err by finding that they were not suitable. The probate court therefore did not 

abuse its discretion by appointing Childers as David’s successor conservator. 

However, the probate court failed to support its finding that appellant and Wyatt are

unsuitable to serve as David’s guardians. Before the probate court, David’s guardian-ad-litem and 

Childers both stated that they had no objection to appellant’s or Wyatt’s appointment as David’s 

guardian or co-guardians. They agreed that David received good care in the family home, and 

there is no evidence on the record that David has been neglected or harmed in the family’s care. 

Although this Court previously upheld the probate court’s 2017 determination that appellant and 

Wyatt were not suitable as guardians because of their youth and because they were not actively 

participating in David’s care, Childers and the guardian-ad-litem acknowledged that more recently 

appellant was actively working with June to provide David’s care. We conclude that the probate 

court abused its discretion by declining to appoint appellant and/or Wyatt as David’s guardians or 

co-guardians without making findings, supported by the record, that they are unsuitable for that 

role.

3

 

B. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

In case no. 356664, appellant contends that the probate court abused its discretion by 

imposing sanctions against the VanPoppelen family after finding their motion to correct the 

property records regarding the Pentland Township property to be frivolous. Appellant’s arguments 

involve challenges to the probate court’s May 25, 2021 order denying her motion for Correction 

of Estate Property Division, and awarding Brosnan $2,670 in costs and attorney fees as a sanction 

for bringing a frivolous motion, as well as challenges to the probate court’s June 3, 2021 order 

denying appellant’s renewed objection to the conservator’s financial report and motion for proper 

execution of the Pentland Township property deeds, and awarding Childers $175 in attorney fees 

and costs for the frivolous objections. These issues are not properly before this Court. 

In case no. 356664, appellant claimed an appeal to this Court on March 19, 2021, of the 

probate court’s March 1, 2021 order, which denied appellant’s motion for an Order of Restitution 

of Protected Person’s Monetary Loss by Conservator, and awarded Brosnan $2,670 in costs and 

 

3 We decline to reach appellant’s contentions that the probate court violated her constitutional 

rights to due process, freedom of association, and freedom of religion by interfering with family 

relationships, and whether the EPIC’s guardianship and conservatorship provisions are properly 

tailored to protect vulnerable adults without encroaching on fundamental rights of family 

association. Although appellant recites general principles regarding familial privacy, she offers 

no specific analysis of the law to the facts of this case and cites no authority supporting her 

assertion of unconstitutionality, thereby abandoning these issues on appeal. See Bank of America, 

NA v Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins Co, 316 Mich App 480, 517; 892 NW2d 467 (2016). 
-11-

attorney fees as a sanction for bringing a frivolous motion. The issues appellant raises on appeal, 

however, relate to the sanctions imposed by the probate court in orders entered May 25, 2021 and 

June 3, 2021. Although a party who files an appeal of right from a final order may raise issues 

related to preceding interlocutory orders in the case, see Bonner v Chicago Title Ins Co, 194 Mich 

App 462, 472; 487 NW2d 807 (1992), the party may not challenge orders subsequently entered in 

the lower court. Gracey v Gross Pointe Farms Clerk, 182 Mich App 193, 197; 452 NW2d 471 

(1990). Therefore, appellant’s challenges to the imposition of sanctions arising from the disputed 

division of the Pentland Township property, the subject of the probate court’s May 25, 2021 and 

June 3, 2021 orders, which were entered after the March 1, 2021 order appealed, are not properly 

before this Court, and we decline to consider them. 

C. PETITION TO DISSOLVE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP

Appellant also contends that the probate court erred by denying the VanPoppelen family’s 

petition to dissolve the guardianship and conservatorship. We disagree. The probate court 

previously determined that David was incapacitated, requiring both a guardian and a conservator. 

The VanPoppelen family did not present evidence before the probate court that David is no longer 

incapacitated, MCL 700.5306(1), nor that David is no longer “unable to manage property and 

business affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency.” MCL 

700.5401(3). Rather, the family argues that a guardian and a conservator are not necessary because 

the family can provide care and manage David’s assets without supervision by the court. As 

discussed, however, the probate court was bound by the statutory provisions of the EPIC when 

determining David’s need for a guardian and a conservator, and could not simply leave his care to 

his family without complying with the statutory framework. 

We affirm the probate court’s order appointing Childers as David’s successor conservator, 

and also affirm the probate court’s March 1, 2021 order imposing sanctions in favor of Brosnan. 

We vacate the order of the probate court appointing Childers as David’s successor guardian and 

remand to the probate court for reevaluation of appellant’s and Wyatt’s suitability to serve as 

David’s guardian or guardians. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Christopher M. Murray