1

 “[#19]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a

specific paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this

convention throughout this order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-02603-REB-KMT

DAVID C. ROSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Blackburn, J.

The matter before is the motion to dismiss contained within Defendant’s

Memorandum Brief in Support of Combined Motion To Dismiss and Motion for

Summary Judgment [#19],1

 filed June 29, 2012. I previously granted that portion of

the motion seeking summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Title VII claims, but ordered the

parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issues implicated by defendant’s motion

to dismiss plaintiff’s section 1983 and state law claims for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. (See Order [#55], filed November 14, 2012.) I now grant the motion to

dismiss as well.

I. JURISDICTION

I have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal

question) and 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 11
2

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and thus may only adjudicate

claims that the Constitution or Congress have given them authority to hear and

determine. Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

115 S.Ct. 1960 (1995); Fritz, 223 F.Supp.2d at 1199 (D. Colo. 2002). A motion alleging

immunity from suit implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and therefore is

analyzed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See Neiberger v. Hawkins, 150 F.Supp.2d

1118, 1120 (D. Colo. 2001). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may consist of either a facial or a factual

attack on the complaint. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995). 

Because defendant’s motion presents a facial attack, I must accept the allegations of

the complaint as true. Id. Nevertheless, the motion “‘must be determined from the

allegations of fact in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusory allegations of

jurisdiction.’” Fritz v. Colorado, 223 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1199 (D. Colo. 2002) (quoting

Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971)). 

III. ANALYSIS

The facts of this case are set forth in detail in my previous Order at 3-8 ([#55],

filed November 14, 2012), and need not be repeated here. Defendant has moved to

dismiss plaintiff’s constitutional and state law claims as barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. Determination whether CDOT is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity depends on whether it is properly considered an “arm of the state.” See Ruiz

v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1908

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 11
2

 There is authority for the proposition that the former State Highway Department was entitled to

the benefit of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mitchell v. Board of Commissioners of

Morgan County, 152 P.2d 601, 602 (Colo. 1944). 

3

 In his supplemental brief, plaintiff complains that defendant should not have been given further

opportunity to address the Eleventh Amendment issues. As I noted in my previous order, however, the

interests protected by the Eleventh Amendment are not so easily waived. (See Order at 12 n.10 [#55],

filed November 14, 2012.) Moreover, because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the court’s jurisdiction

and is not merely a defense to liability, but actually insulates the state from suit, see Puerto Rico

Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145, 113 S.Ct. 684, 688, 121

L.Ed.2d 605 (1993), it is imperative for this court to ensure that these issues are fully and properly

considered and resolved.

4

 The fund covers all “state agencies,” a category which, as noted below, encompasses principal

departments of the state such as CDOT. §24-30-1502(5)(a), C.R.S. (See also Def. Motion App., Exh.

A.) The fund is a program of self-insurance maintained by the state of Colorado, §24-30-1501, C.R.S., to

pay, inter alia, claims brought against the state, its officials, and its employees, see §24-30-1510(3)(a),

C.R.S. 

3

(2003); Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000). The question

whether CDOT is an arm of the state appears to be one of first impression.2

 Defendant

bears the burden to prove its status as an arm of the state. See Thomas v. Guffy,

2008 WL 2884368 at * 4 & nn.1-4 (W.D. Okla. July 25, 2008).3

Whether an entity is an arm of the state – as opposed to a political subdivision

such as a county or municipality – depends on the “nature of the entity created by state

law.” Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 & n. 5, 117

S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997). Primary among the several factors that may impact

the analysis is whether any judgment against the entity will be paid by the state. In an

attempt to answer this question, defendant notes that any judgment taken against

CDOT will be paid out of the Colorado Risk Management Fund.4 Yet as I noted

previously, this fact alone has been found insufficient to conclusively answer the arm-ofthe-state question. (See Order at 11 [#55], filed November 14, 2012.) See also

Sturdevant, 218 F.3d at 1165; Simon v. State Compensation Insurance Authority,

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 11
4

946 P.2d 1298, 1308-09 (Colo. 1997) (finding entity not to be an arm of the state

despite participation in the risk management fund). Moreover, defendant fails to

address the key inquiry that proved problematic in Sturdevant: the extent to which the

fund is comprised of state funds, rather than commingled state and local funds. 

Sturdevant, 218 F.3d at 1165. The fact that the General Assembly appropriates money

to the fund annually, see §24-30-1510(1)(a), C.R.S., does not speak to this more

precise inquiry. 

Perhaps a definitive answer to this question is impossible, or varies from year to

year (a fact which in itself would not favor a finding that CDOT shares the state’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity). Nevertheless, as in Sturdevant, the other factors

which inform my analysis themselves may be sufficient to determine whether CDOT is

an arm of the state. See Sturdevant, 218 F.3d at 1166. These considerations include: 

(1) “the degree of autonomy given to the agency, as

determined by the characterization of the agency by state

law and the extent of guidance and control exercised by the

state,” Watson v. University of Utah Medical Center, 75

F.3d 569, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1996); 

(2) “the extent of financing the agency receives independent

of the state treasury and its ability to provide for its own

financing,” id., and, more specifically “whether the entity has

the ability to issue bonds or levy taxes on its own behalf,”

Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Agricultural Insurance Co.,

507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007); and 

(3) “whether the entity in question is concerned primarily with

local or state affairs” given its “function, composition, and

purpose,” id. 

Even so, the Tenth Circuit has warned against “becom[ing] caught up in the minutiae of

state law,” allowing them to “eclipse a fundamental distinction” between

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 11
5

instrumentalities of the state and political subdivisions: “political control by some

community other than the state as a whole.” Sturdevant, 218 F.3d at 1170.

Mindful of these legal precepts, my examination and analysis of the relevant

considerations leads me to conclude that CDOT is an arm of the state, and thus entitled

to the benefit of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.

A. CHARACTERIZATION UNDER STATE LAW

The first relevant inquiry is how CDOT is characterized under state law, with an

eye particularly toward quantifying how much autonomy it enjoys from the state. This

step entails “a formalistic survey of state law to ascertain whether the entity is identified

as an agency of the state.” Steadfast Insurance Co., 507 F.3d at 1253. The more

autonomy an entity enjoys from state control, the more likely it is to be found not to be

an arm of the state. See Watson, 75 F.3d at 574. 

Article IV, section 22, of the Colorado Constitution provides that

All executive and administrative offices, agencies, and

instrumentalities of the executive department of state

government and their respective functions, powers, and

duties . . . shall be allocated by law among and within not

more than twenty departments. Subsequently, all new

powers or functions shall be assigned to departments,

divisions, sections, or units in such manner as will tend to

provide an orderly arrangement in the administrative

organization of state government. 

In accordance with this provision, §24-1-110(1), C.R.S., allocates the functions, powers,

and duties of the executive department to 19 “principal departments,” one of which is

the Department of Transportation, §24-1-110(1)(v), C.R.S. Pursuant to state law, a

“state agency” is defined to include any principal department of the state. §24-30-

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 11
5

 The commission is designated as a “body corporate,” §43-1-106(7), C.R.S., a term which

typically “denote[s] entities such as counties and municipalities that are not arms of the state,” Simon, 946

P.2d at 1308. Nevertheless, the choice of a corporate form for a particular state entity is not dispositive. 

See Graham v. State of Colorado, 956 P.2d 556, 563 (Colo. 1998). Moreover, and contrary to plaintiff’s

argument, the commission does not have authority to contract or provide financing to CDOT. (See Def.

Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶ 6 at 2.) Cf. Simon, 946 P.2d at 1308-09 (CCIA not an arm of the state because,

inter alia, it had power to enter into contracts). Its responsibility, rather, is to authorize CDOT to enter into

any such contracts and to allocate funds appropriated by the General Assembly for CDOT. (Def. Reply

Br. App., Exh. A ¶¶ 7-8 at 2.)

6

1502(5)(a). 

The head of CDOT is its executive director, who is appointed by the Governor

with the consent of the state senate and serves at the pleasure of the Governor. §§24-

1-128.7 & 43-1-103(1), C.R.S. The executive director is guided in the exercise of his

duties by a transportation commission, consisting of eleven members appointed by the

Governor.5 See Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226,

1233 (10th Cir. 1999). Among its myriad duties, the commission formulates general

policy relating to CDOT’s mission, prescribes administrative practices to be followed by

the executive director, makes studies and advises the executive director in the exercise

of his duties, and promulgates and adopts all department budgets. See §43-1-

106(8)(a)-(s), C.R.S. 

The commission adopts CDOT’s budget, which is then presented to committees

of the General Assembly, returned to the commission for preparation of a final proposal,

and ultimately forwarded to the Governor for approval. §§43-1-113(2) & 43-1-

113(9)(c)(1). (Def. Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶ 7 at 2.) The General Assembly then

appropriates funds to CDOT for its operations, and subsequent expenditures are

allocated by the transportation commission. §§43-1-112.5 & 43-1-113(1), C.R.S. 

CDOT is incorporated into the state’s Annual Financial Report as a component of the

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 6 of 11
7

Colorado state government. (Def. Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶ 9 at 2.) 

Other factors indicate further that CDOT is part and parcel of the state and not a

separate, autonomous entity. CDOT must report its expenditures monthly to the state

controller, who has the power to disallow any expenditures not within the budget. §43-

1-113(10)-(12). Although CDOT has authority to enter into contracts, it may do so only

if the state controller either co-signs the contract or delegates authority to CDOT to sign

the contract. (Def. Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶ 9 at 2.) CDOT employees participate in

the state personnel system. COLO. CONST., art. XII, § 13. Cf. Simon, 946 P.2d at

1308-09 (noting that Colorado compensation insurance authority’s “autonomy from the

state is emphasized by the fact this its employees are exempted from the state

personnel system”). In addition, the state attorney general provides legal services to

both CDOT and the commission. §43-1-112(1), C.R.S. 

Thus, although CDOT undoubtedly has autonomy in how it conducts its day-today operations, it is subject to significant oversight by the state. It is a creature of the

state constitution, accountable to the General Assembly, and many of its most basic

functions are intimately intertwined with those of the state executive and legislative

branches. In light of these considerations, this factor weighs strongly in favor of a

finding that CDOT is an arm of the state. See East West Resort Transportation, LLC

v. Sopkin, 371 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1258-59 (D. Colo. 2005) (weighing similar factors in

determining that Colorado Public Utilities Commission is an arm of the state). 

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 7 of 11
6

 The rates for these fees and assessments are set by the General Assembly and collected by

the state Department of Revenue, then transferred to the state treasurer, who allocates them monthly to

CDOT. §43-4-205(1). (See also Def. Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶ 13 at 2.) HUTF funds may be used

exclusively for the construction, maintenance, and supervision of state highways. COLO. CONST. Art. X, §

18.

7

 Another 7.9% of CDOT’s 2012-2013 budget is attributable to the High Performance

Transportation Enterprise (HPTE), see §43-4-806, C.R.S, and the State Bridge Enterprise, see §43-4-805,

C.R.S.. Plaintiff points out that the Enterprises can issue revenue bonds and seek financing. Although

defendant argues that this is not entirely true (see Def. Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶ 18 at 4), I find the issue

not relevant because the Enterprises “operate as a government-owned business[es] within the department

[of transportation].” §§43-4-805(2)(a)(I) & 43-4-806(2)(a)(I). They are governed by separate boards and

operate independently of CDOT. (See Def. Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶ 18 at 4.) Their budgets are adopted

and approved internally. Although CDOT can lend money to the Enterprises, it does not have access to

any funds which they may collect, largely through the imposition of tolls and fares, in the case of the

HPTE, or a bridge safety surcharge, in the case of the Bridge Enterprise. (Id., Exh. A ¶ 19 at 4.) 

8

B. SOURCES OF FUNDING

The second relevant consideration is the degree to which CDOT receives funding

from the state. For the most recent fiscal year (2012-2013), CDOT received the

majority of its funding from two sources in almost equal shares: forty-one percent (41%)

from the state Highway Users Tax Fund (HUTF), comprised of state motor fuel excise

taxes, state registration fees, and other state fees and assessments,6

 and forty percent

(40%) from Federal Highway Administration apportionments. The remainder of the

budget comes from other miscellaneous sources, most significantly interest income

from the State Highway Fund.7 (Def. Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶ 19 at 4.)

CDOT therefore relies on state funding for nearly sixty percent (60%) of its

budget. None of these funds are available to satisfy judgments against CDOT. (Def.

Reply Br. App., Exh. A ¶¶ 15 & 16 at 3.) See Pierce v. Delta County Department of

Social Services, 119 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1148 (D. Colo. 2000). Although it has the ability

to issue bonds for limited purposes, subject to voter approval as contemplated by

TABOR, it has no ability to levy taxes to fund its operations. (Def. Reply Br. App., Exh.

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 8 of 11
9

A ¶¶ 16-17 at 3-4.) See Steadfast Insurance Co., 507 F.3d at 1253; Sturdevant, 218

F.3d at 1170.

I thus find and conclude that these factors, taken as a whole, likewise support a

conclusion that CDOT is an instrumentality of the state

C. STATEWIDE FOCUS

Finally, I conclude that CDOT’s mission is clearly a statewide one. By statute,

CDOT is charged to

(a) Provide strategic planning for statewide transportation

systems to meet the transportation challenges to be faced by

Colorado in the future;

(b) Promote coordination between different modes of

transportation;

(c) Integrate governmental functions in order to reduce the

costs incurred by the state in transportation matters;

(d) Obtain the greatest benefit from state expenditures by

producing a statewide transportation policy to address the

statewide transportation problems faced by Colorado; and

(e) Enhance the state's prospects to obtain federal funds by

responding to federal mandates for multi-modal

transportation planning.

§43-1-101(1)(a)-(e), C.R.S. All these aspects of CDOT’s mission clearly favor a finding

that it is an instrumentality of the state.

IV. CONCLUSION

My analysis of the relevant factors leads me to conclude that CDOT is an arm of

the state and thus entitled to the benefit of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

As I noted in my previous order, CDOT has not waived its right to insist on its rights in

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 9 of 11
10

this regard. (See Order at 12 n.10 [#55], filed November 14, 2012.) Accordingly,

plaintiff’s remaining claims, for alleged violation of his First Amendment rights and for

unlawful discrimination under state law, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That Defendant's Memorandum Brief in Support of Combined Motion To

Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment [#19], filed June 29, 2012, is GRANTED

IN PART;

2. That the motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

3. That plaintiff’s claims arising under the First Amendment (Third, Fourth, and

Fifth Claims for Relief) and under state law (Sixth Claim for Relief) are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE;

4. That the Trial Preparation Conference scheduled for Friday, April 12, 2013, at

2:30 p.m., and the trial, currently scheduled to commence on Monday, April 29, 2013,

are VACATED;

5. That judgment SHALL ENTER on behalf of defendant, the Colorado

Department of Transportation, against plaintiff, David C. Ross, on plaintiff’s claims

arising under the First Amendment (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Claims for Relief) and under

state law (Sixth Claim for Relief);

6. That judgment also SHALL ENTER in accordance with my previous order

granting the motion for summary judgment (see Order ¶ 4 at 24 [#55], filed November

14, 2012); and

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 10 of 11
11

7. That defendant is AWARDED its costs to be taxed by the clerk of the court

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1.

Dated March 14, 2013, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

Case 1:11-cv-02603-REB-KMT Document 66 Filed 03/14/13 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 11