alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Letter Agreement dated as of 04/30/04



 Exhibit 10.71 
  
 April 30, 2004 
  
 Thanh Tran 
 Vice President Enterprise Business Unit 
 100 Enterprise Way 
 Scotts Valley, CA 95066-3249 
  
 Re: Extension of the Microsoft Corporation Open Tools License Agreement 
  
 Dear Thanh, 
  
 Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) and Borland Software Corporation (then Inprise Corporation) (“Borland”) entered into the Microsoft Corporation Open Tools License Agreement effective as of March
2, 1999 as amended from time to time (“Agreement”). The Agreement was originally extended to March 2, 2004 and is now set to expire on May 2, 2004. Since Borland needs additional time to review Microsoft’s proposed amendment to the
Agreement, which would extend the Agreement until August 2, 2004. 
  
 Pursuant to this letter agreement, Microsoft and Borland agree to extend the term of the Agreement until May 17, 2004. Neither party will be obligated to make any payments to the other party as a result of this extensions. Extension of the
Agreement beyond May 17, 2004 will be subject to agreement between the parties. 
  
 Please signify Borland’s agreement to the terms of this letter by countersigning where indicated below. 
  

			
	 	 	 Best Regards,

		
	 	 	 /s/ DAVID BURGGRAAF

		
	 	 	 David Burggraaf

	 	 	 Product Unit Manager

		
	 	 	 ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED TO BY BORLAND:

		
	 	 	 /s/ THANH TRAN


	 	 	 By:

		
	 	 	 Thanh Tran


	 	 	 Name:

		
	 	 	 Vice President/General Manager/Enterprise Business Unit


	 	 	 Title:

		
	 	 	 April 29 / 04


	 	 	 Date:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM the
Company's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the three-month period
ended March 31, 1997, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       2,750,352
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,766
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,793,434<F1>
<PP&E>                                      18,417,706<F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              21,211,140
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,609,585
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    21,043,281
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                21,211,140
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                54,970<F3>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               199,074<F4>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              23,750
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (167,854)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (167,854)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.01)
<FN>
<F1>Includes prepaid expenses and other current assets of $31,316.
<F2>Consists of:  properties and equipment, net of depreciation, of $1,146,833;
mineral properties of $5,139,461; deferred exploration and development of
$11,777,912; and other assets of $353,500.
<F3>Consists of interest income.
<F4>Consists of general and administrative expenses of $198,621 and other expenses
of $453.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Rubye Lee PERRY, Appellant, v. Bobbie Lee PERRY, Appellee.

No. 5159.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Waco.

July 20, 1972.

Herbert Green, Jr., Dallas, for appellant.

Charles Shavers, Jr., Dallas, for appel-lee.

HALL, Justice.

This is a divorce action. A non-jury trial resulted in a judgment granting the plaintiff a divorce and awarding him “one twin bed, one 1967 Thunderbird automobile, and one Sona TV.” Defendant, who also sought the divorce by cross-action, was awarded “one twin bed, one color TV, one portable bar, one refrigerator and lot and improvements located at 6832 Atha Drive (in Dallas).”

Defendant contends on appeal that, for sundry reasons set forth in her points of error, the refusal of the trial court to grant her attorney’s motion to withdraw from the case, which was filed four days before the hearing on the merits, resulted in an improper judgment.

The record does not show that the motion to withdraw was presented to or acted upon by the trial court. Therefore, nothing is presented for review. Barnett v. Woodland, Tex.Civ.App., 1958, writ ref., n. r. e., 310 S.W.2d 644, 648.

Moreover, the case is before us without a complete statement of facts, although the record does contain a transcription of a conversation between counsel and the court which was had at the hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial.

To obtain á reversal based upon an alleged error committed on the trial of the case, an appellant has the burden of showing the commission of the error and that, from an examination of the entire record, the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendi*951tion of an improper judgment. Rule 434, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 267 S. W.2d 808, 813. Obviously, this burden cannot be met without the production on appeal of a complete statement of facts.

Defendant’s points and contentions are overruled. The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 10.4

                        LETTER FOR APPLICATION FOR SHARES


From:      Pet Health Systems,Inc.
           4400 Route 9, 2nd Floor
           Freehold, NJ 07728

The Board of Directors
Europe Investor Direct.com Limited ("the Company")
27 Green Street
London

WE HEREBY APPLY for the issue of 100 ordinary shares of (pound)1.00  each in the
capital of the  Company  ("the  Shares")  to be issued and  (pound)1,522.47  per
shares  fully  paid and  hereby  request  you to allot  such  shares to us.  The
subscription funds totaling (pound)152,247 have already been transferred to you.

We agree to take the said  shares  on the  terms  set out  below  and  otherwise
subject to the  Memorandum  and  Articles  of  Association  of the  Company  and
authorize  you to enter my name in the  register of members as the holder of the
said shares.

In this letter,  the term "Flotation"  means the admission of ally or any of the
equity  share  capital of the Company to trading on the  alternative  Investment
Market of the London  Stock  Exchange  or the  admission  of the same to, or the
grant of permission for the same to be dealt in, any other  recognized  exchange
or share market.

We agree that until such time as a flotation takes place (if at all) we will not
dispose, charge or otherwise deal with the Shares.

In the event of the listing of a Flotation, we will:

(1)  Vote in favor of any  resolutions  which may be required to facilitate  the
     same;

(2)  Enter into  irrevocable  undertakings as to the subsequent  disposal of the
     shares on such terms as the  directors  of the Company may require so as to
     comply with the regulatory  requirements of the relevant exchange or as the
     brokers or advisors to the Company may require.

Dated:     January 19, 2000

PET HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.


By:   /s/ Richard I.  Anslow
      RICHARD I.  ANSLOW, President
#### Adam DeHART v. Harry BOURG.

No. 2394.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

June 30, 1942.

C. A. Blanchard, of Donaldsonville, for appellant.

Robt. B. Butler, Jr., of Plouma, for ap-pellee.

LeBLANC, Judge.

For the reasons stated in the opinion this day handed down in the companion case of Esse Blanchard v. Harry Bourg, 8 So.2d 807, the judgment appealed from' in this case is hereby affirmed at the costs of the appellant herein.

DORE and OTT, JJ., concur.
Case No. 1:11-cv-02414-PAB-MJW Document 16-1 filed 11/23/11 USDC Colorado pg 1 of

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Case No. 1:11-cv-02414-PAB-MJW Document 16-1 filed 11/23/11 USDC Colorado pg 2 of

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Case No. 1:11-cv-02414-PAB-MJW Document 16-1 filed 11/23/11 USDC Colorado pg 3 of

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Case No. 1:11-cv-02414-PAB-MJW Document 16-1 filed 11/23/11 USDC Colorado pg 4 of

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Case No. 1:11-cv-02414-PAB-MJW Document 16-1 filed 11/23/11 USDC Colorado pg 5 of

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#### HADSOCK v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January Term 1954.

Dismissed without opinion.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent

 v.

BOBBIE LIONEL HENDERSON III,

 Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 135 MAL 2015

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 23rd day of July, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
#### Ernest NOFAL, Appellant, v. Walter PIPER and Angela Piper, City of Miami, Florida, and Donald R. Fox, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division B.

Dec. 7, 1954.

On Rehearing Jan. 28, 1955.

Graham C. Miller, Emanuel Levenson, Miami, for appellant.

L. J. Cushman, Miami, for Walter Piper and Angela Piper.

Olavi M. Hendrickson, Miami, for City of Miami.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on the authority of Benn v. Key West Propane Gas Corp., Fla., 72 So.2d 910, and the authorities there cited.

ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, HOB-SON and DREW, JJ., concur.

Order on Petition for Rehearing Granted.

The petition for rehearing in this cause sets forth that this Court did not have the benefit of certain original exhibits of the appellant at the time the decision in this case was rendered. These exhibits were ordered sent to the Court but were not in the record at the time the opinion of the Court was rendered.

The exhibits have now been forwarded to this Court by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County and have been examined by this Court. We find nothing in the exhibits which alters our view that there was no error in the decree appealed from. It is thereupon ordered that the Per Curi-am opinion filed December 7, 1954, affirming the judgment of the lower court on the authority of Benn v. Key West Propane Gas Corp., Fla., 72 So.2d 910, and the authorities there cited, be and the same is hereby adhered to.

MATHEWS, C. J., HOBSON, ROBERTS concur. and THOMAS, and DREW, JJ.,
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jerome Sandy, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Quinones, J.), rendered February 18, 1987, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. By order of this court dated May 15, 1989, the case was remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to hear and report on the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges, and the appeal was held in abeyance in the interim *(People v Sandy,*150 AD2d 625). The Supreme Court (De Lury, J.), has now complied.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered. No questions of fact have been raised or considered.

Because the prosecutor at the hearing held in November 1989 was unable to recall his reasons for challenging five black prospective jurors, the People failed to meet their burden of overcoming the presumption of discrimination found by this court *(see, People v Jackson,*152 AD2d 706; *People v Mims,*149 AD2d 948; *People v Knight,*144 AD2d 1020). Brown, J. P., Eiber, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.
#### The State, ex rel. Gannon, *v.*Industrial Commission of Ohio.

(No. 25000

Decided February 6, 1935.)

*Messrs. Woodle S Wachtel,*for relator. .

*Mr. John W. BricJcer,*attorney general, and *Mr. B. B. Zurmehly,*for respondent.

The relator, Ray Gannon, on January 8, 1932, sustained an injury, resulting in the loss of his right eye ball, while in the employ of The Consolidated Iron Steel Manufacturing Company, a self-insuring employer, which had furnished a surety bond in accordance with Section 1465-69, General Code. On March 23, 1932, the Industrial Commission approved an agreement between the employer and the relator for payment of compensation for such injuries, and on March 28,1932, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the employer. On August 10, 1933, the relator filed an application for additional award for the violation of specific requirement W of the Code of Specific Requirements, governing polishing and grinding machines, as promulgated in Bulletin No. 208 of the Division of Factory and Building Inspection, of the Department of Industrial Relations, requiring either fixed glass shields or goggles to be furnished operators on grinding wheels. Following a hearing by the commission on the application for an additional award, the commission, on May 12, 1934, found from the proof on file that the employer was in bankruptcy under the jurisdiction of the United States District Court, and therefore the commission did not have *195authority or jurisdiction in law to make an additional award in the claim.

The relator instituted mandamus in this court, praying that a peremptory writ issue compelling the Industrial Commission to assume jurisdiction of his application for an additional award for violation of a specific requirement by his employer, and to make a final ruling on the merits of said application.

On consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged that the demurrer to the petition be, and the same hereby is, overruled, and a peremptory writ of mandamus issue as prayed for in the petition, for the reason that the insolvency of an employer does not deprive the Industrial Commission of power and authority to determine the right of an employee to an award. *(State, ex rel. Rudd,*v. *Industrial Commission,*116 Ohio St., 67; *State, ex rel. Davis,*v. *Industrial Commission,*118 Ohio St., 340.)

*Demurrer to petition overruled and writ allowed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Williams, Jones, Matthias, Day and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03-05-00561- CR
P hill ip Ly le Tig nor , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY , 51ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. 13,893 -A, H ONO RAB LE CURT F . STEIB , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Phil l i p L y l e Tig nor filed a “re quest for nunc pro tunc orde r” in the district c ourt seekinga re storation of time cre dits he lo st when his parole was re voked. The court de nied the mot ion and Ti g no r f ile d n oti c e of

a pp e a l. We do not have jurisdiction ex ce p t as expressly g rante d by

law. See A

polinar v. Sta te , 82 0 S.W. 2d 79 2, 79 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). No a pp e a l lie s f

ro m an o rd e r d e nyinga

re qu e st for judg ment nunc pro tunc . Ev e re tt v . S tat e , 82 S.W .3d 735 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. re f’d) . We a re no t awa

re of a ny statut e ve sti ngthi s Co ur

t w ithjur isd ic tio n o ve r t

his a pp e a l.2 The a ppeal is dismissed.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P atterson a nd Pury ear Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: September

23, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of MainSource Financial Group, Inc. on
Form S-8 (Nos. 333-58295, 33-45395, 333-131824)) and on Form S-3 (No. 333-157441) of our report,
dated March 10, 2011, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of MainSource Financial Group, Inc. and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which
appears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of MainSource Financial Group, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2010.

/s/ Crowe Horwath LLPLouisville, Kentucky
March 10, 2011


---



QuickLinks
#### Davis *v.*Keasey, Appellant.

*Contracts*— Oral *contracts*— Evidence—Past *services as consideration*— Relevancy.

Whore in an ¡action on an oral contract for commissions alleged to be due plaintiff for leasing land belonging to defendants it was alleged that under the contract in suit plaintifE was to be paid for past services rendered under a former contract which had been rescinded, if he should succeed in leasing the land, evidence relating to the terms of the first contract and the services rendered thereunder was relevant to show the circumstances under which the second contract was made and a part of the consideration therefor.

Argued Oct. 13, 1914.

Appeal, No. 26, Oct. T., 1914, by defendants, from judgment of C. P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., Oct. T., 1911, No. 18, on verdict for plaintiff in case of John D. Davis v. Webster Keasey and S. M. Jones.

Before Pell, C. J., Brown, Mestrezat, Potter and Moschzisker, JJ.

Affirmed.

Assumpsit for commissions alleged to be due under an oral contract. Before Davis, J.

The facts appear in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Verdict for plaintiff for $1,708.50 and judgment thereon. Defendants appealed.

*Error assigned*was in admitting evidence referred to in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

*Stephen Cummings,*with him *E. B. Scull,*for appellants.

*H. S. McKinley,*with him *Hill Burgwin*and *George C. Burgwin,*for appellee.

January 2, 1915:

Per Curiam,

This action was on an oral contract for commission for *304the leasing of a tract of limestone. A contract by the defendants to pay the plaintiff a fixed amount, if he sold or leased the land, had been rescinded by the defendants and it was alleged by the plaintiff that a new contract had been entered into by which he was to be paid for past services and services to be rendered if they led to a sale or lease. Whether a second contract had been made was the question of fact at the trial and it was submitted to the jury in a manner to which no exception was taken by the defendants. The only assignment of error is to the admission of testimony in relation to the terms of the first contract and the services rendered under it. This testimony was relevant to show the circumstances under which the second contract was made, and a part of the consideration therefor.

The judgment is affirmed.
No. 72-6031.

#### Kubitsky *v.*United States.

C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 

Appeal of--

KiewitPhelps 

Under Contract No. W9128F-12-C-0023 

APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 

ASBCA No. 60850 

Vivian Katsantonis, Esq. 

Richard G. Mann, Jr., Esq. 

John F. Finnegan III, Esq. 

Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, L.L.P. 

McLean, VA 

Michael P. Goodman, Esq. 

Engineer Chief Trial Attorney 

Thomas J. Ingram, Esq. 

Engineer Trial Attorney 

U.S. Army Engineer District, Omaha 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

The dispute has been settled. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice. 

Dated: 23 May 2018 

~M 

Administrative Judge 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Order of Dismissal of the Armed 

Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60850, Appeal ofKiewitPhelps, 

rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 

Dated: 

JEFFREY D. GARDIN 

Recorder, Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Christine M. Arguello

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02547-CMA-KLM

BOND SAFEGUARD INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JIMMY CAMP DEVELOPMENT, INC., a/k/a JIMMY CAMP DEV., INC.,

 a/k/a JIMMY CAMP, LLC,

ALLEN D. VAN WHYHE,

CARY L. CARPENTER, and 

GEORGE KRAMER,

Defendants.

ORDER ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Renewed Motion for Entry of Default

Judgment Against Defendant Jimmy Camp Development, Inc.” (Doc. # 20) and “Motion

for Entry of Default Judgment Against [Defendants] Allen D. Van Wyhe and Cary L.

Carpenter” (Doc. # 23). The Court, having reviewed these two motions and being fully

advised in the premises, hereby

ORDERS that Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default judgment (Doc. ## 20, 23)

are GRANTED. Default judgment shall enter in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants

Jimmy Camp Development, Inc., Allen D. Van Wyhe, and Cary L. Carpenter, jointly

and severally, in the sum certain amount of $333,355.15 as of the date of this Order,

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).

DATED: January 25 , 2012

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02547-CMA-KLM Document 24 Filed 01/25/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Honorable Marcia S. Krieger

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02508-MSK-MEH

ELIZABETH HUDSPETH,

Plaintiff,

v.

ASSET ACCEPTANCE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability,

Defendant.

ORDER REGARDING CUSTODY OF EXHIBITS AND DEPOSITIONS USED IN

EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND TRIALS

IT IS ORDERED that, as to any exhibits and depositions used during evidentiary

hearings or trials, counsel for the parties shall retrieve the originals of such exhibits and

depositions from the Court following the evidentiary hearing or trial, and shall retain same for 60

days beyond the later of the time to appeal or conclusion of any appellate proceedings. The

Court will retain its copy of the exhibits for the same time period after which the documents will

be destroyed.

DATED this 28th day of September, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

Marcia S. Krieger

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02508-MSK-MEH Document 3 Filed 09/28/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

(SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)



In connection with Annual Report of SI Technologies, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-KA for the period ending July 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Marvin Moist, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:



1. The Report fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



Date: November 29, 2004



|                   
|-------------------
|/s/    MARVIN MOIST
|Marvin Moist       
|President and CEO