Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1611-PC-2620 | June 28, 2017 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Stephen M. Haines

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Stephen M. Haines,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1611-PC-2620

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G01-1209-PC-13

Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue

[1] In 2010, Stephen Haines entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant 

to which Haines pleaded guilty to murder and robbery in exchange for the 

State’s agreement not to seek a sentence of life without parole and dismissal of a 

felony murder charge. Thereafter, Haines filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief. The post-conviction court denied Haines’ petition. Haines, pro se, now 

appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Haines raises two issues for our 

review, which we restate as: (1) whether the post-conviction court erred in 

denying his petition for post-conviction relief, and (2) whether his convictions 

violate Indiana’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Concluding the post-conviction court did not err in denying his petition and his 

convictions do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Pursuant to his guilty plea, Haines stipulated to the following facts. On June 

14, 2009, Haines and three confederates formed a plan to rob a gas station in 

Gary, Indiana. The four men entered the store and Haines pointed a gun at the 

gas station clerk. Haines advanced toward the clerk and shot him in the back. 

The store clerk later died from his wounds. The four men took cartons of 

cigarettes, a VCR, and other items from the store.

[3] The State originally charged Haines with felony murder and murder and sought 

a sentence of life without parole. Prior to trial, Haines and his attorneys, 
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Angela Jones and Sonya Scott-Dix, entered into plea negotiations with the 

State. Both Jones and Scott-Dix believed it was in Haines’ best interest to 

negotiate a plea because the State possessed a “videotape which showed Mr. 

Haines shooting the . . . clerk as the . . . clerk was turned around with his back 

to him with his hands up. And then Mr. Haines taking items from the store 

thereafter and exiting.” Transcript, Volume 2 at 12 (Attorney Jones’ 

testimony). After numerous rounds of negotiations, the parties reached a plea 

agreement. The plea agreement provided the State would file an amended 

information adding a charge of robbery as a Class B felony. Haines then 

pleaded guilty to murder and robbery in exchange for the State’s agreement to 

dismiss the charge of felony murder and to not seek a sentence of life without 

parole. The plea agreement also provided Haines would be sentenced to the 

Indiana Department of Correction for an aggregate term of eighty years; sixtyfive years for murder and fifteen years for robbery. At the guilty plea hearing, 

the trial court instructed Haines on the length of his sentence:

Court: The parties agree that you’ll be sentenced to 65 

years in the Department of Correction [for murder] 

and fifteen years in the Department of Correction 

[for robbery], with the sentences to be served 

consecutively, meaning one after the other, total 

being, of course, 80 years in the Department of 

Correction . . . . Mr. Haines do you understand this 

portion of the agreement that I reviewed with you?

[Haines]: Yes.

Court: If I decide to accept your agreement your sentence 

is indicated within this document. To be very clear. 

You are asking me to accept a plea agreement in 
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your . . . case that will put you in prison for eighty 

(80) years. If I decide to accept your agreement, this 

will be your sentence, 80 years in the Department of 

Correction. Do you follow me?

[Haines]: Yes.

Court: Do you have any questions on that?

[Haines]: No.

Guilty Plea Hearing Transcript at 5-7.

[4] In 2012, Haines filed his petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel and that his convictions violated the prohibition 

against double jeopardy. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on March 31, 2015, and heard additional evidence on April 23, 2015. 

On October 19, 2016, the post-conviction court issued its findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon denying Haines’ petition for post-conviction relief. Haines, 

pro se, now appeals. Additional facts will be added as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Post-Conviction Relief

A. Standard of Review

[5] A post-conviction proceeding affords the petitioner an “opportunity to raise 

issues that were unknown or unavailable at the time of the original trial or the 

direct appeal.” Maymon v. State, 870 N.E.2d 523, 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), 

trans. denied. However, a post-conviction proceeding does not constitute “a 
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super appeal,” and it “provide[s] only a narrow remedy for subsequent 

collateral challenges to convictions.” Id.

[6] Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and the petitioner bears the 

burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 830 

(2003). On appeal from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief, the 

petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. 

Willoughby v. State, 792 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

In order to prevail, the petitioner must show that the evidence is 

without conflict and leads unerringly and unmistakably to a 

conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. It 

is only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but 

one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the 

opposite conclusion, that the decision will be disturbed as being 

contrary to law.

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We will not reweigh 

evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Id.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[7] Haines first asserts he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Specifically, he claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing (1) to properly 

advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty, which subsequently caused 

him to enter a guilty plea that was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and 

(2) to properly advise him regarding available sentence reductions within the 

Department of Correction.
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[8] We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the principles 

enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):

[A] claimant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness based on 

prevailing professional norms, and that the deficient performance 

resulted in prejudice. Prejudice occurs when the defendant 

demonstrates that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” A reasonable probability arises 

when there is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.”

Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694). 

[9] There is a “strong presumption” that counsel rendered adequate service. Myers 

v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1077, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “We afford 

counsel considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and ‘[i]solated 

mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not 

necessarily render representation ineffective.’” State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 

151 (Ind. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 

591, 603 (Ind. 2001)). 

[10] Moreover, in the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner must establish a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have instead insisted on going to trial. Scott v. State, 986 

N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “A reasonable probability is one that is 
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sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Kubsch v. State, 934 

N.E.2d 1138, 1147 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

[11] Haines first alleges his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

because his attorneys “led him to pled [sic] guilty without either fully 

investigating or explaining all of the possible valid defenses in this case.” 

Amended Appellant’s Brief at 17-18. However, Haines offers no explanation 

for what defenses may have been available to him that his attorneys failed to 

investigate. In addition, both of Haines’ attorneys testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that they explained his plea agreement and 

sentence to him on multiple occasions. When asked how she ensured Haines 

understood his plea of guilty and the consequences of that plea, Attorney Jones 

stated, “[b]y going over it[,] each and every paragraph in the plea agreement, 

reading it aloud. Not just having him read it silently, but reading it aloud with 

him there in my presence.” Tr., Vol. 2 at 18. Attorney Jones testified she 

believed Haines had a complete and full understanding of his guilty plea. 

Likewise, Attorney Scott-Dix testified that she discussed the plea agreement 

with Haines and was satisfied he understood the guilty plea and its 

consequences. Scott-Dix testified, “I believed him to have understood it, only 

because we went over it several times to insure [sic] that he understood it.” Id.

at 51.

[12] Further, at the guilty plea hearing, the trial court discussed the guilty plea with 

Haines prior to accepting it.
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Court: Mr. Haines, because you are a defendant in a 

criminal case, you have significant and important 

legal rights that are guaranteed to you. All these 

rights are found within your plea agreement. Upon 

your review of this plea document with your 

attorneys, you should be aware that you have a right 

to a speedy and public trial by a jury. . . . With the 

plea agreement that you’re asking me to accept, you 

will never have that trial. . . . You understand me?

[Haines]: Yes.

Court: By giving up your right to a trial by a jury, you are 

giving up rights that you would have if we had that 

trial. For example, you are also giving up the right 

to require the State of Indiana to prove you guilty 

by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. You 

are giving up the right to confront and crossexamine State’s witnesses at trial. You are giving 

up the right to use the Court’s subpoena power to 

have evidence or witnesses assist you at trial. . . . 

Do you understand these rights that you’re giving 

up by pleading guilty?

[Haines]: Yes.

Court: To be clear on this jury-trial issue, you have a right 

to a trial by jury not only as to the charges that have 

been filed, you have the right to—all the rights that 

go along with a trial by jury, but you also have a 

right to a trial by jury on the enhancement, which is 

a—which is the life without parole. . . . And only if 

they—if a jury were to find you guilty of these two 

charges, at that point it would be the obligation of 

the State to present further information to the jury 

to determine whether you should be sentenced to 

life without parole. So your trial would come in 

two parts. You are giving up the—this two-part 

requirement by pleading guilty today. You 

understand me?

[Haines]: Yes.
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Court: All these rights you are giving up by asking me to 

accept a plea agreement today. You understand 

me?

[Haines]: Yes.

Court: Do you still want to plead guilty?

[Haines]: Yes.

Guilty Plea Hearing Tr. at 15-18. Simply put, there is ample evidence in the 

record that Haines’ guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently. Because the record supports the post-conviction court’s 

determination that trial counsel and the trial court adequately informed Haines 

of the nature and consequences of his guilty plea, we find that Haines argument 

is simply a request to reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of 

witnesses, neither of which are functions of this court. Willoughby, 792 N.E.2d 

at 562.

[13] Haines also alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise him 

regarding available sentence reduction programs while imprisoned. 

Specifically, Haines contends counsel led him to believe he could reduce his 

sentence by up to twelve years by taking advantage of rehabilitation programs 

while in prison. After he pleaded guilty, Haines claims he discovered the 

maximum amount of credit time he may earn is four years. See Ind. Code § 35-

50-6-3.3(i)(1) (2010). However, this argument too, is a request to reweigh 

evidence and judge witness credibility, which our standard of review does not

permit. Willoughby, 792 N.E.2d at 562. At the post-conviction evidentiary 
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hearing, both Attorney Jones and Attorney Scott-Dix testified they never told 

Haines he could reduce his sentence by up to twelve years. They stated Haines 

requested information about available sentence reduction programs and they 

compiled the relevant information, including Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.3, 

and reviewed it with him. Other than Haines’ own testimony, there is no 

evidence either attorney informed Haines he would be able to reduce his 

sentence by twelve years.

1

[14] In sum, Haines has not demonstrated deficient performance by his trial counsel

and the record supports the conclusion reached by the post-conviction court.

II. Double Jeopardy

[15] Next, Haines appears to argue his convictions for murder and robbery violate 

Indiana’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Haines states the 

“victims of the robbery and the murder were the same individual and occurred 

in the same course of conduct on the same date.” Amended Appellant’s Br. at 

23. However, Haines has waived this claim by entering into a plea agreement. 

See Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Ind. 2001) (holding a defendant 

who enters a plea agreement to achieve an advantageous position must keep the 

bargain and cannot then challenge the sentence on double jeopardy grounds).

 

1 Haines also alleges his attorneys coerced him into signing a plea agreement by misleading him into 

believing he would automatically receive a sentence of life without parole if the jury found him to be guilty as 

charged. There is no evidence in the record to support this assertion. That Haines prudently listened to the 

advice of his attorneys and negotiated a term of years rather than face the risk of life imprisonment, which the 

State originally intended to seek, does not equate with coercion or misrepresentation.
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[16] Waiver notwithstanding, Haines’ convictions do not violate the prohibition 

against double jeopardy. Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution 

provides that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” 

The standard for evaluating an alleged double jeopardy violation is well-settled:

two or more offenses are the “same offense” in violation of 

Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect 

to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the 

actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one 

challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another 

challenged offense.

Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999).

[17] Haines appears to argue his convictions for murder and robbery violate the 

actual evidence test. To establish a violation under the actual evidence test, the 

defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts 

used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may 

also have been used to establish the elements of a second challenged offense. 

Id. at 53.

[18] Our supreme court has specifically determined that when there is a “reasonable 

possibility that the jury may have used evidentiary facts establishing all the 

essential elements of robbery as a Class A felony to establish also all the 

essential elements of murder,” a violation of the Indiana Double Jeopardy 

Clause results. Gross v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2002). The court 

noted that “where a single act forms the basis of both a Class A felony robbery 

conviction and also the act element of the murder conviction, the two cannot 
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stand.” Id. (citing Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 495-96 (Ind. 1995)). In such 

cases, the appropriate remedy is to reduce the robbery conviction to a Class B 

felony, if supported by the evidence. Id. at 1139-40.

[19] Here, Haines did not plead guilty to robbery as a Class A felony, which would 

require proof he caused serious bodily injury. Haines pleaded guilty to robbery 

as a Class B felony which requires the use of a deadly weapon. Ind. Code § 35-

42-5-1 (1984). Haines stipulated to the fact he used a gun during the 

commission of his crimes. Therefore, independent facts support his convictions 

for robbery as a Class B felony and murder, and his convictions do not violate

the prohibition against double jeopardy. See Gross, 769 N.E.2d at 1139-40.

Conclusion

[20] The post-conviction court did not err in concluding Haines did not receive 

ineffective assistance of counsel and his convictions do not violate the 

prohibition against double jeopardy. We therefore affirm the judgment of the 

post-conviction court.

[21] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.