COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

October 24, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP884-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CT469

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

 V.

JEFFERY SCOTT WIGANOWSKY,

 DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Jefferson County: 

WILLIAM F. HUE, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded. 

¶1 BLANCHARD, J.1 Under Wisconsin’s penalty structure for 

operating while intoxicated (OWI) offenses, the level of offense severity is 

determined in part by “the total number of [driving privilege] suspensions, 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2017-18). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2019AP884-CR

2

revocations, and other convictions counted under [WIS. STAT.] § 343.307(1).” 

WIS. STAT. § 346.65(2)(am)2. (emphasis added). Pertinent here, one paragraph in

§ 343.307(1) provides that “convictions” for counting purposes include those 

imposed under the law of another state that prohibits “an excess or specified range

of alcohol concentration” in the blood of an operator. Sec. 343.307(1)(d). 

¶2 Here, a Wisconsin prosecutor charged Wiganowsky with a second 

OWI offense based on the allegation that a Wyoming “Blood Alcohol Content 

violation”—not a formal conviction, but instead the result of a Wyoming 

administrative process—counts as a first OWI “conviction” under the Wisconsin 

OWI counting law. I will refer to this as “the Wyoming BAC violation.” 

Wiganowsky argued successfully in the circuit court that the Wyoming BAC 

violation should not count as a prior “conviction” under WIS. STAT.

§ 343.307(1)(d) and that, therefore, this case involves only a first offense. 

¶3 Following the reasoning of opinions of our supreme court and the 

court of appeals, I conclude that the State has carried its burden of establishing 

that the Wyoming BAC violation is a valid basis for imposition of the enhanced 

penalty, and accordingly reverse. See State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, ¶¶38, 43, 59, 

330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213 (interpreting “convictions” counted under WIS.

STAT. § 343.307(1)(d) to include administrative suspensions under Illinois law); 

State v. List, 2004 WI App 230, ¶¶2-3, 7, 10-11, 277 Wis. 2d 836, 691 N.W.2d 

366 (interpreting “convictions” counted under § 343.307(1)(d) to include an 

Illinois court’s placement of a person charged with OWI on court supervision).

¶4 As pertinent to the issues on appeal, the State charged Wiganowsky 

with second-offense OWI based on an alleged drunk driving incident in Jefferson 

County. The amended complaint alleged that this was a second offense due to the 
No. 2019AP884-CR

3

Wyoming BAC violation on Wiganowsky’s driving record. More specifically, the 

State took the position that Wyoming records establish that the Wyoming BAC 

violation is a “conviction” for purposes of counting under WIS. STAT.

§§ 343.307(1)(d) and 340.01(9r). I now summarize these two statutes. 

¶5 WISCONSIN STAT. § 343.307(1)(d) provides in pertinent part:

(1) The court shall count the following ... to 

determine the penalty ...:

....

(d) Convictions under the law of another 

jurisdiction that prohibits a person ... with an excess or 

specified range of alcohol concentration; ....

See Carter, 330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶29-30 (explaining that this is the correct way of 

excerpting § 343.307(1)(d), even though the provision is “not a model of clarity”). 

From this point forward, I refer to § 343.307(1)(d) as “(1)(d).”

¶6 WISCONSIN STAT. § 340.01(9r) provides in pertinent part:

“Conviction” or “convicted” means ... a 

determination that a person has violated or failed to comply 

with the law in ... an authorized administrative tribunal, ... 

in this state or any other jurisdiction. 

See Carter, 330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶31-43 (explaining that the definition of “conviction” 

in § 340.01(9r) applies to the term “convictions” in (1)(d); overruling the holding 

in State v. Machgan, 2007 WI App 263, 306 Wis. 2d 752, 743 N.W.2d 832, that 

the definition of “conviction” in § 340.01(9r) does not supply the definition of 

“convictions” in (1)(d)). I will refer to § 340.01(9r) as “(9r).”

¶7 Wiganowsky moved the circuit court to dismiss the amended 

complaint on the ground that the Wyoming BAC violation does not count for 

purposes of (1)(d), because it does not meet the definition of “conviction” in (9r). 
No. 2019AP884-CR

4

¶8 In response, the State conceded that the Wyoming records that the 

State relies on do not reflect a disposition that Wyoming would deem a criminal 

conviction—that is, Wiganowsky was not convicted of a violation of WYO. STAT.

ANN. § 31–5–233 (West 2019) (providing criminal penalties, including for a first 

offense, for “[d]riving or having control of vehicle while under influence of 

intoxicating liquor or controlled substances”).2 Instead, the State made 

representations to the following effects, none disputed by Wiganowsky. 

¶9 In 2015, Wiganowsky was charged in Wyoming with drunk driving 

as a first offense, an alleged violation of criminal law. But the Wyoming 

prosecuting authority permitted him to enter into a deferred prosecution 

agreement, which did not require him to enter a plea of guilty or no contest to the 

criminal charge. Wiganowsky successfully fulfilled his obligations under the 

deferral agreement and, as a result, the criminal case was dismissed, leaving no 

Wyoming criminal conviction on his record. At the same time, however, his 

conduct in the same incident resulted in the Wyoming BAC violation: his driving 

privileges were administratively suspended, based on the alleged blood test result 

of an alcohol concentration of .08 or greater.3 Wiganowsky failed to successfully 

contest this administrative suspension, as he could have at least attempted to do 

under Wyoming law.4

 

2

 All references to the Wyoming Statutes Annotated are to the July 2019 version unless 

otherwise noted. 

3

 Wyoming law provides that if an operator’s blood test reveals a blood alcohol 

concentration above .08 percent, the operator’s license is administratively suspended. WYO.

STAT. ANN. § 31–6–102(e).

4

 A suspended operator has the opportunity to challenge that status through an 

administrative review process. See Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. Haglund, 982 P.2d 699, 703 

(Wyo. 1999). Separately, Wiganowsky’s certified driving record, which was submitted to the 

(continued)
No. 2019AP884-CR

5

¶10 With that background, the State argued that the reasoning of our 

supreme court in Carter, which I discuss below, resolves this issue in the State’s 

favor. 

¶11 The court disagreed and dismissed the amended complaint based on 

arguments advanced by Wiganowsky. The State appeals.

¶12 “The proper interpretation of a statute and case law raises questions 

of law that we review de novo.” State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶28, 349 Wis. 2d 

274, 833 N.W.2d 146. 

¶13 I now summarize List and Carter in chronological order. Carter

cites List with approval, and reading the cases together resolves this appeal. I 

discuss List first because the court in List used broader language to explain its 

understanding of pertinent legislative intent than did the court in Carter, but the

broad language in List is not inconsistent with any statement in Carter, and List 

remains good law.5 

 

circuit court in this case, reflects that his operating privileges were suspended by Wyoming for 

the full “effective” period under the imposed administrative suspension. 

5

 I briefly observe that there may be theoretical tension on one point between the two 

opinions. One passage in State v. List, 2004 WI App 230, ¶¶9-10, 277 Wis. 2d 836, 691 N.W.2d 

366, seems to simply say that Wisconsin courts apply Wisconsin law to determine if 

administrative events in other jurisdictions are countable under Wisconsin statutes—that is, the 

question is not whether an out-of-state administrative action is a “conviction” under that state’s 

laws, but instead is a “conviction” under (9r) and (1)(d). However, parts of this passage, read in 

isolation, could possibly suggest that Wisconsin courts cannot examine the laws of other states to 

determine whether a prior offense counts as a conviction under the terms of (1)(d). But even 

assuming that dubious interpretation of that passage in List, our supreme court in State v. Carter, 

2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213, makes clear that Wisconsin courts may consider 

the laws of other states for this purpose and Carter controls. See id. at ¶¶9-14, 18, 24-25, 50-65; 

see also State v. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50, ¶14, 354 Wis. 2d 99, 851 N.W.2d 465 (“Carter

instructs that we are to determine whether the out-of-state law ... ‘prohibits conduct specified in 

[the applicable Wisconsin statute].’” (emphasis added) (quoting Carter, 330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶45)). 
No. 2019AP884-CR

6

¶14 Like Wiganowsky, List was charged in Wisconsin with second 

offense OWI and argued that an alleged prior violation occurring outside

Wisconsin should not count as a “conviction” under (1)(d). List, 277 Wis. 2d 836, 

¶1.6 Also as in Wiganowsky’s case, the prior out-state-violation against List had 

been generated by resolution of a drunk-driving charge. Id., ¶¶2-3, 5. In List’s 

case, however, this had not resulted in an outside-Wisconsin administrative 

suspension as in Wiganowsky’s case. Instead, an Illinois court had placed List on 

18 months of court supervision. Id. Upon successful completion of the court 

supervision, List was not adjudicated of guilt or convicted under Illinois law. Id. 

¶15 List argued that, under (1)(d), the only outside-Wisconsin OWI 

offenses that count are those that result in a formal conviction under the laws of 

the other state, and because his court supervision did not count as a formal 

conviction under Illinois law, it should not be counted under (1)(d). List, 277 

Wis. 2d 836, ¶5. This is so, List argued, because the opening phrase in (1)(d)—

“[c]onvictions under the law of another jurisdiction”—means that, under the laws 

of the other state, the disposition at issue must be a deemed a formal conviction, 

not something like court supervision. Id., ¶¶5, 7.

¶16 The List court rejected this argument. Interpreting the statutory 

language “in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 

whole,” see State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58,

¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, the List court determined that the phrase 

“under the law of another jurisdiction” does “not delimit[] ‘convictions,’” but 

 

6

 The court in List, interpreted both (1)(d) and (9r) from the 2001-02 version of the 

statutes, but there is no difference in language from the current version of the statute that could 

matter. 
No. 2019AP884-CR

7

instead “introduce[es] and pertain[s] to ‘that prohibits’ and the remainder of the 

paragraph.” List, 277 Wis. 2d 836, ¶7. As part of its analysis, the court observed 

that the final phrase in (1)(d)—“as those or substantially similar terms are used in 

that jurisdiction’s laws”—“indicates the broad scope of para. (d).” Id., ¶8. 

Significantly, the court noted that this means that “Wisconsin even counts prior 

offenses committed in states with OWI statutes that differ significantly from our 

own.” Id.

¶17 Turning to (9r), the List court determined that an Illinois disposition 

of court supervision is a “conviction,” because it “was a result of a determination 

that [List had] ‘violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original 

jurisdiction,’” and therefore counts as a conviction as defined by Wisconsin law. 

List, 277 Wis. 2d 836, ¶10 (quoting (9r)). 

¶18 What the court stated next is notable for purposes of this appeal, 

because it rejected the proposition that the Wisconsin legislature contemplated that 

a deferred prosecution agreement in a drunk driving case in another jurisdiction 

renders any disposition arising from the same incident uncountable:

Further, as the State notes, because Wisconsin does 

not permit deferred prosecution agreements for alcoholrelated driving offenses, to give preferential treatment at 

sentencing to those convicted in states that permit such 

agreements would be inconsistent with the policy choice of 

our legislature. Counting offenses committed in other 

states effectuates the purposes of OWI and repeater statutes 

in general. State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 193, 289 

N.W.2d 828 (1980) (“Because the clear policy of the 

statute is to facilitate the identification of drunken drivers 

and their removal from the highways, the statute must be 

construed to further the legislative purpose.”); State v. 

Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 49, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981) (“[T]he 

purpose of general repeater statutes is to increase the 

punishment of persons who fail to learn to respect the law 

after suffering the initial penalties and embarrassment of 

conviction.”).
No. 2019AP884-CR

8

List, 277 Wis. 2d 836, ¶11 (emphasis added). The first step of the reasoning here 

is that the legislature enacted the counting-related statutes, such as (1)(d) and (9r),

in pursuit of a broad policy purpose to deter and punish repeat drunk driving. The 

second step is that, with this broad purpose in mind, the statutes contemplate that, 

when defendants are arrested on drunk driving charges in other states and this 

results in alternatives to formal conviction (court supervision, deferred 

prosecution, diversion), this necessarily implies determinations by the other states

that the defendant “violated or failed to comply with the law” within the meaning 

of (9r) and these are countable “convictions.” And, the reasoning proceeds, 

Wisconsin courts should not give defendants “preferential treatment” for 

Wisconsin OWI counting purposes based on the fact that a defendant was able to 

take advantage of one of these alternatives available in the outside-Wisconsin

jurisdiction.

¶19 Turning to Carter, Carter was charged in Wisconsin with a fourth 

offense OWI and argued that it should be a second offense, because two prior 

Illinois suspensions of operating privileges on Carter’s driving record should not 

count as prior “convictions” under (1)(d).7 Carter, 330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶6-7, 28-65. 

Unlike the court supervision imposed on List, but like Wiganowsky’s Wyoming 

BAC violation, the suspensions in Carter’s Illinois cases were the products of an 

 

7

 The parties in Carter also disputed whether Carter’s Illinois suspensions counted under 

WIS. STAT. § 343.307(1)(e) (counting “[o]perating privilege suspensions ... under the law of 

another jurisdiction arising out of a refusal to submit to chemical testing”), but the court 

determined that Carter’s “driving record does not provide sufficient information to conclude that 

the suspensions arose from refusals to submit to testing.” Carter, 330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶22-27. I 

discuss § 343.307(1)(e) no further and focus on the court’s discussion of (1)(d). 

Separately, the court in Carter, interpreted both (1)(d) and (9r) from the 2007-08 version 

of the statutes, but there is no difference in language from the current version of the statutes that 

could matter. 
No. 2019AP884-CR

9

Illinois administrative process that Carter had not successfully challenged in either 

instance. Id., ¶¶10-14. 

¶20 As pertinent here, under the Illinois administrative process, when a 

chemical test showed that an operator under age 21 had a blood alcohol

concentration greater than 0.00 but less than 0.08, the operator’s privilege could be 

administratively suspended, but the operator “ordinarily” faced no criminal 

prosecution. Id. In the event of such an administrative suspension, the youthful 

operator could request a hearing before the Illinois Secretary of State to challenge 

it, and the secretary’s decision was subject to judicial review. Id., ¶¶11-13. Like 

Wiganowsky, Carter had failed to successfully challenge either of his 

administrative suspensions.

¶21 With that background, the Carter court held that “in the context of 

the language of WIS. STAT. § 343.307(1)(d),” an Illinois administrative suspension 

of the type Carter received “is a conviction under a law of another jurisdiction that 

prohibits ... using a motor vehicle with an excess or specified range of alcohol 

concentration.” Id., ¶55. That is, Carter’s suspensions “fall squarely within the 

prohibited conduct listed” in (1)(d). Id., ¶¶55-56. This is because the suspensions

“are convictions under WIS. STAT. §§ 340.01(9r) and 343.307(1)(d) as 

administrative determinations in an authorized administrative tribunal that a 

person has violated or failed to comply with a law and that the conduct prohibited 

under the Illinois law falls squarely within conduct specifically prohibited in” 

(1)(d). Id., ¶56; see also State v. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50, ¶14, 354 Wis. 2d 99, 

851 N.W.2d 465. 

¶22 Notably, the court in Carter recognized that Wisconsin has “absolute 

sobriety” statutes similar to the Illinois laws that resulted in Carter’s 
No. 2019AP884-CR

10

administrative suspensions, but also recognized that under WIS. STAT. § 343.307,

the similar Wisconsin sanctions are not counted under Wisconsin law.

8

 Carter, 

330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶15-17, 59-60. This did not prevent the court from proceeding to 

analyze whether, despite these differences, Wisconsin law recognizes the Illinois 

suspensions as prior “convictions” for counting purposes. Id., ¶18; see also id., 

¶¶63-64. 

¶23 Affirming the approach of the court in List, the court in Carter made 

the unqualified statement that the pertinent portion of (1)(d) “should be read” to 

provide that “convictions under the law of another jurisdiction that prohibits a 

person from using a motor vehicle with an excess or specified range of alcohol 

concentration” shall be counted. Id., ¶30. “This interpretation comports with the 

text (and its punctuation) and fulfills the objectives of the OWI statutes to prohibit 

both operating while intoxicated and operating when tests show a prohibited 

alcohol concentration in excess of that permitted by statute.” Id.

¶24 Also affirming the approach of the court in List, the court rejected 

Carter’s argument that the definition of “conviction” in (9r) does not apply in 

(1)(d). Carter, 330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36. “Applying the definition of ‘conviction’ under 

[(9r)] to the word ‘convictions’ in [(1)(d)] comports with the text of the statutes 

and the legislative policy choice evidenced in the legislative history of [(1)(d)] and 

[§ 343.307(1)(e)] to ensure that [(1)(d) and (1)(e)] apply broadly to prior out-ofstate conduct.” Id., ¶¶42-43 & n.16 (overruling Machgan, 306 Wis. 2d 752, ¶16, 

 

8

 The court cited revocation as a penalty for the youthful driver in Wisconsin who 

improperly refuses to submit to a test for prohibited alcohol concentration under WIS. STAT.

§§ 346.63(2m), 343.305(10)(em) and suspension as a penalty for the youthful driver in Wisconsin 

who operates a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00 but less than 0.08 

under WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1p). Carter, 330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶15-17; see also id., ¶¶59-60. 
No. 2019AP884-CR

11

which had held that a Missouri alcohol-related administrative suspension of 

driver’s license did not count under § 343.307(1)).

¶25 Consistent with the List court’s statement about not giving 

“preferential treatment” to those favored by outside-Wisconsin statutory schemes 

or practices, the court’s conclusion in Carter was based in part on legislative 

history of (1)(d), reflecting “that the legislature intended the scope of [(1)(d)] to be 

broad.” Id., ¶39. The history includes the decision of the legislature in 1989 to 

remove the requirement that “only violations of other statutes in conformity with 

Wisconsin law” are counted. Id., ¶39 & n.14.

¶26 In sum, the court in Carter held that the meaning of the phase 

“[c]onvictions” “under ‘the law of another jurisdiction that prohibits’” in (1)(d), 

means that the non-Wisconsin jurisdiction “need only have a law that prohibits 

conduct specified in WIS. STAT. § 343.307(1)(d),” which as pertinent here includes 

“operating with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentrations.” Id., ¶44-

45. 

¶27 All of the discussion in List and Carter summarized above 

establishes that the Wyoming BAC violation here, which is the prior conviction 

alleged in the amended complaint, must be counted under Wisconsin law. That is, 

under those cases, the Wyoming BAC violation was a “determination” by an 

authorized administrative tribunal that Wiganowsky failed to comply with a 

Wyoming law prohibiting a specified concentration of alcohol in his blood while

operating and Wiganowsky should not receive “preferential treatment” on the 

ground that Wyoming authorities had the ability to, and did, offer him a deferral 

option to resolve a criminal charge. On appeal Wiganowsky fails to present a 
No. 2019AP884-CR

12

developed argument to the contrary. I now discuss two brief contentions he 

makes.

¶28 Wiganowsky purports to base his first argument on a Wyoming 

court interpretation of a Wyoming statute in a case with facts that differ 

significantly from those presented here. See Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. 

Haglund, 982 P.2d 699, 702-03 (Wyo. 1999). Haglund holds that outright 

acquittal, based on affirmatively proven innocence, on a criminal drunk driving 

charge in Wyoming may preclude or truncate a Wyoming administrative 

suspension based on the same incident, under a Wyoming statute that establishes

the conditions that must be satisfied before authorities must return a driver’s 

license to a licensee following a suspension. Id. (interpreting WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 31–7–138(e)(i)(A)). Wiganowsky argues that, applying the reasoning in 

Haglund here, the decision of Wyoming prosecutors to defer Wiganowsky’s 

criminal charges had the effect of vacating the Wyoming BAC violation under 

Wyoming law, and therefore the Wyoming BAC violation could not be a 

“conviction” under (1)(d) and (9r). 

¶29 I reject this argument on the ground that the court in Haglund limits 

its analysis of the Wyoming statute to the acquittal-based-on-factual-innocence

scenario. There is no starting point for Wiganowsky’s argument, given this

limited holding in Haglund, because it explicitly rests on the determination that, 

when the trial court “accepted” Haglund’s defense that she had not driven drunk, 

this stood as a valid finding that she was not in fact intoxicated at the time at issue 

in the suspension, and therefore “there is no need to” continue with the 

suspension. See Haglund, 982 P.2d at 703. In sharp contrast, Wiganowsky was 

deferred, not “acquitted,” on the Wyoming criminal drunk driving charge, nor was 
No. 2019AP884-CR

13

there any finding by any court or agency that he did not have the alleged excess 

blood alcohol concentration. 

¶30 Wiganowsky’s second argument is that the allegations of the 

amended complaint fail to state or give rise to reasonable inferences sufficient to 

support the further allegation that the Wyoming BAC violation counts under 

Wisconsin OWI law. This argument may have two, alternative parts: (1) the 

amended complaint is too vague, or is incomplete, in referencing the Wyoming 

BAC violation; or (2) even if it makes sufficiently clear, complete references to 

the Wyoming BAC violation, it is insufficient to explain why the Wyoming BAC 

law counts under Wisconsin law.

¶31 The first possible part of this argument would have no merit. 

Wiganowsky fails to point to any missing element in what the amended complaint 

alleged: 

The defendant’s driving record/Criminal History 

reflects one (1) prior suspension as counted under 

§ 343.307(1)(d) and 340.01(9r), Wis. Stats., to wit: Blood 

Alcohol Content violation (Wyoming), 1st Offense

(12/25/2015 violation; 1/24/2016 suspension effective 

date). His certified driving record from the State of 

Wyoming reflects a per se administrative suspension for 

operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol 

concentration of .08 or greater.

(Emphasis in original.) If the purported missing element is that this language does 

not include reference to the criminal charge that resulted in a deferral, this 

argument would go nowhere. To repeat, the basis for the OWI-level determination 

is the valid Wyoming BAC violation alone.

¶32 The second possible part of this argument is completely 

undeveloped. And, in any case, the allegation in the amended complaint raises a 
No. 2019AP884-CR

14

clear inference that an authorized administrative entity in Wyoming had 

determined that Wiganowsky had operated with “an excess” alcohol 

concentration, and this would be sufficient to allege a prior conviction for 

Wisconsin OWI counting law purposes under List and Carter for the reasons 

discussed above. 

By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 

809.23(1)(b)4.