Honorable Wilson E. Speir Opinion No. H-999

Texas Department of Public Safety 5805N. Lamar -Box 4087 Re: Authority of theDepartment Austin, Texas 78773 of Public Safety to suspend a driver's license for failure to pay a judgment arising out of a motor vehicle accident.
Dear Col. Speir:
You inquire about certain provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act, article 6701h,V.T.C.S., which the Department of Public Safety administers. TheAct seeks to promote safe driving and todeny theprivilege of driving to financially irresponsible persons. Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 259 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.1953). Itrequires thedeposit of security after accidents under thepenalty of suspension of thedriver's license and registration certificate. A person who fails topay a judgment arising out ofhis use of amotor vehicle risks license suspension under the following provisions:

"Judgment"--Any judgment which shall have become final

. . .upon a cause of action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of anymotor vehicle, for damages, including damages for care and loss of services, because ofbodily injury toor death of any person, or for damages because of injury toor destruction ofproperty, including the loss of use thereof, or upon a cause of action on an agreement of settlement for such damages.
V.T.C.S. art. 6701h, § l(2).

Whenever any person failswithin sixty (60)days to satisfy any judgment, upon thewritten request of the judgment creditor orhis attorney it shallbe the duty

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of the clerk of the court, or of the judge of a courtwhich has no clerk, in which any such judgment is rendered within this State, to forward to the Department immediately after the expiration of said sixty (60)days, a certified copy of such judgment. Id. § 12(a). - Upon the receipt of a certified copy

of a judgment, the Department shall forthwith suspend the license and all registrations and any nonresident's operating privilege of any person against whom such judgment was rendered, except as hereinafter otherwise provided in this Section and in Section 16 of thisAct. Id. 513(a). - You state that the Department has always construed the Safety Responsibility Act to apply only to accidents on highways. You askwhether the Department must take the action outlined in section 13(a)when itreceives a judgment for damage to amotor vehicle where there isno indication that the damage arose out of an accident on the highways of Texas. We note that "highways," as defined by theAct, includes any streets and thoroughfares "notprivately owned or controlled

. . .over which the State has legislative jurisdiction under itspolice power." V.T.C.S. art. 6701h, § l(1). The construction of a statute by the agency responsible for enforcing it is entitled to great weight. Neubert v. Chicago, R.I. &G. Ry. Co., 296 S.W. 1090 (Tex.1927). We believe your construction is consistent with thepurpose of theAct as stated in the caption and emergency clause. The caption reads inpart:

AnAct toencourage safer use ofmotor vehicles on the streets and highways of Texas.
. . . Acts 1951, 52ndLeg., ch. 498 at 1210. (Emphasis added). The emergency clause provides inpart:

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The fact that thousands of motor vehicles are being operated on the highways of Texas by financially irresponsible owners and drivers who are causing untold loss of life and property andwho are failing to pay for the damages thus caused
. . . . Id. § 45 at 1227. (Emphasisadded). The supreme court has described these orovisions as declarative of theAct's ourpose. See Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, supra at 180.

Although the courts have not squarely faced the issue ofwhether theAct applies only to accidents occurring on the highways, they have assumed it tobe so limited. One court discussed theAct as follows:

The purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting the Texas Safety Responsibility Lawwas to
. . .require such owners and operators [of motor vehicles] todischarge their financial responsibility toothers for damage topersons orproperty occasioned by the exercise

. . .of the privilege or license of usingxhe public highways of the State. (Emphasisadded). Gonzalez v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 340 S.W.2d 860, 863-64 (Tex.Civ. App. -- El Paso 1960, nowrit). See also Home Indemnity Co. v. Humble Oil -- &Refining Co., 314 S.W.2d 861 ( Tex. Civ.App. -- Dallas), writ ref'd n.r.e., 317 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1958).
A prior opinion of this office dealt with the accident report requirement of the Safety Responsibility Act, and determined that it applied only to accidents on highways. Attorney General Opinion V-1440 (1952). The opinion stated as follows:[Ilnview of the general purpose and

scheme of the act, it is reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended to require a report and tomake applicable the resultant suspension of the privileges only if the accident occurred on a "highway" as that term isdefined therein.

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Id. at 4. The reasoning ofV-1440 is consistent with judicial statements about theAct and inour opinion it applies to the suspension of a license for failure topay a judgment. It is therefore our opinion that the judgment forwhich the Department is to suspend a license under section 13(a)must arise out of amotor vehicle accident on the highways'as defined in section l(1).
SUMMARY

The provision of the Safety Responsibility Act for suspending thedriver's license of a person failing'to pay a judgment does not apply unless the judgment arises out of a motor vehicle accident on thehighways as they are defined in theAct. truly yours,

Attorney General of Texas APPROVED:

KENDALL, First Assistant

C. ROBERT HEATH, Chairman Opinion Committee km1

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