IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 53141-1-II

Respondent,

v. PUBLISHED OPINION

TODD RICHARD MARJAMA, JR.,

Appellant.

MAXA, J. – Todd Marjama appeals the trial court’s order imposing an exceptional 

sentence for his first degree manslaughter conviction based on an aggravated domestic violence 

circumstance.

Marjama shot and killed his wife while she was holding their infant child. RCW 

9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii)1allows a trial court to impose an exceptional sentence based on a jury 

finding that the “offense occurred within sight or sound of the victim’s or the offender’s minor 

children under the age of eighteen years.” The jury made such a finding, and the trial court 

imposed an exceptional sentence. 

Marjama claims that the term “children” in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) means that the 

aggravator applies only if two or more minor children witnessed or heard the offense. Based on 

 

1 RCW 9.94A.535 has been amended since the events of this case transpired. Because these 

amendments do not impact the statutory language relied on by this court, we refer to the current 

statute. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 6, 2020
No. 53141-1-II

2

this claim, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove the aggravating circumstance 

beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction defining the

aggravating circumstance.

We conclude that the term “children” in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) includes a single 

minor child witnessing or hearing the offense. Therefore, we hold that (1) the evidence was 

sufficient to prove the aggravating circumstance, and (2) the trial court did not err in instructing 

the jury on all the essential elements of the aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, we affirm 

the trial court’s imposition of Marjama’s exceptional sentence.

FACTS

Marjama and Amanda Marjama were married with three children, but they were 

separated. While Marjama was visiting Amanda2at her home, the two got into a verbal 

altercation. Marjama was in the master bedroom, and Amanda and their infant daughter AKM 

were in the master bathroom with the door closed.

While they were fighting, Marjama took out a handgun and threatened to commit suicide. 

Eventually, Marjama calmed down and attempted to uncock his gun. While doing so, the gun

accidentally discharged. The bullet went through his hand and then through the bathroom door, 

fatally striking Amanda in the head as she was holding their daughter.

The State charged Marjama with first degree murder and an aggravated domestic 

violence offense under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii). Marjama asserted an accident defense.

The trial court gave a jury instruction on the elements of an aggravated domestic violence 

offense: 

 

2 We refer to Amanda Marjama by her first name to distinguish her from Marjama. No 

disrespect is intended.
No. 53141-1-II

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To find that this crime is an aggravated domestic violence offense, each of the 

following two elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) [t]hat the 

victim and the defendant were family or household members; and (2) [t]hat the 

offense was committed within the sight or sound of the victim’s child who was 

under the age of 18 years.

Clerk’s Papers at 172. 

The jury convicted Marjama of the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter and 

returned a “yes” verdict to the question of whether the evidence supported the elements of the 

aggravated domestic violence offense. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence above 

the standard range.

Marjama appeals the trial court’s exceptional sentence.

ANALYSIS

A. INTERPRETATION OF RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii)

Marjama claims that the term “children” in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) means that the 

aggravating circumstance applies only if two or more minor children witnessed or heard the 

offense. We disagree. 

Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State v. Wolvelaere, 195 

Wn.2d 597, 600, 461 P.3d 1173 (2020). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to 

ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. This requires looking at the plain 

language of the statute, the context of the statute, any related statutory provisions, and the 

statutory scheme as a whole. Id. If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous, we apply 

that meaning. Id.

RCW 9.94A.535 states that a court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence 

range for an offense if it finds substantial and compelling reasons that justify an exceptional 

sentence. RCW 9.94A.535(3) provides an exclusive list of aggravating circumstances that can 
No. 53141-1-II

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support a sentence above the standard range if found by a jury. Under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii), 

an aggravating circumstance exists if the offense involved domestic violence and “occurred 

within sight or sound of the victim’s or the offender’s minor children under the age of eighteen 

years.” (Emphasis added.) The question here is whether the term “children” includes a single 

child.

“[A] recognized rule of statutory [construction] is that courts generally ‘may construe 

singular words in the plural and vice versa, unless such a construction would be repugnant to the 

context of the statute or inconsistent with the manifest intention of the Legislature.’ ” State v. 

Baggett, 103 Wn. App. 564, 570-71, 13 P.3d 659 (2000) (quoting Queen City Sav. & Loan Ass’n

v. Mannhalt, 111 Wn.2d 503, 508, 760 P.2d 350 (1988)). 

The legislature has codified this general principle of statutory interpretation. RCW 

1.12.050 states, “Words importing the singular number may also be applied to the plural of 

persons and things; words importing the plural may be applied to the singular.”3 Under RCW 

1.12.050, the plural term “children” in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) necessarily includes the 

singular term “child.” 

In addition, such an interpretation is consistent with the legislature’s intent. It is 

inconceivable that the legislature intended to allow an exceptional sentence for a domestic 

violence offense within the sight and sound of multiple children, but not within the sight and 

sound of a single child. See State v. Schwartz, 194 Wn.2d 432, 443, 450 P.3d 141 (2019) (stating 

that courts presume that the legislature did not intend absurd results).

 

3

In addition, RCW 9A.04.110(30) states, “Words . . . in the singular shall include the plural; and 

in the plural shall include the singular.” We need not decide whether this provision applies to 

chapter 9.94A RCW because RCW 1.12.050 contains the same language.
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Interpreting “children” to include “child” also is consistent with case law. In Baggett, the 

court addressed RCW 9.41.270(1), which defines the offense of unlawful display of a firearm to 

include displaying a firearm in a manner that “ ‘warrants alarm for the safety of other persons.’ ”

103 Wn. App. at 570 (quoting RCW 9.41.270(1)). The defendant argued that this statute was 

inapplicable because only one person, not two or more persons, was present when he displayed 

his rifle. Id. The court rejected this argument, applying the general rule of statutory construction 

that plural words may be construed as singular. Id. at 570-71. The court also could see no 

reason why the legislature would not include handling a firearm in a manner that warrants alarm 

for the safety of a single person in the scope of the statute. See id. at 570. 

In State v. Smith, this court declined to interpret the word “some” as plural only, rather 

than also in the singular. 7 Wn. App. 2d 304, 310-11, 433 P.3d 821, review denied, 193 Wn.2d 

1010 (2019). The State requested an exceptional sentence under the free crimes aggravator, 

which applies when “some of the current offenses” would go unpunished due to defendant’s high 

offender score. RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c). However, the defendant argued that the free crimes 

aggravating factor did not apply because he only had one offense that would go unpunished, and 

the statutory language required that “some” of the current offenses would go unpunished. Smith, 

7 Wn. App. 2d at 309. Considering the definition of “some” in Webster’s Dictionary and the 

strained consequences of the defendant’s interpretation, the court held that the word “some” 

included a single crime. Id. at 310-11. 

We conclude that the term “children” in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) includes a single child.

B. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Marjama argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding under 

RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) because his offense was committed within the sight and sound of only 
No. 53141-1-II

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a single child. However, the term “children” in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) includes a single child 

and it is undisputed that Marjama’s offense was committed within the sight and sound of his 

child. Therefore, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding.

C. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE JURY INSTRUCTION

Marjama argues the trial court’s jury instruction regarding RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) was 

erroneous because it allowed the State to prove that the crime occurred within the sight or sound 

of the victim’s “minor child” rather than the victim’s “minor children.” However, because the 

term “children” in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) includes a single child, the trial court’s instruction 

was a correct statement of the law.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s imposition of Marjama’s exceptional sentence.

MAXA, J.

We concur:

LEE, C.J.

GLASGOW, J.