In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-1035

ROBERT GUNVILLE and

RICHARD OAKLEY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ROGER WALKER, JR., Director of

the Department of Corrections of the

State of Illinois, and DONALD J. SNYDER, 

former Director of the Department of 

Corrections of the State of Illinois, 

in their individual and official capacities;

MICHAEL M. RUMMAN, former Director of

the Department of Central Management

Services of the State of Illinois, in his

individual capacity only; and JAMES P. SLEDGE,

Director of the Department of Central

Management Services of the State of Illinois,

in his official capacity only, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 05-3050—Jeanne E. Scott, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 9, 2009—DECIDED OCTOBER 9, 2009
2 No. 08-1035

Before MANION, ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Robert Gunville and Richard

Oakley were terminated from their employment with

the State of Illinois after a change in the governing

political party. Although they would have been eligible

to be reemployed at positions throughout the state

under prior interpretations of personnel rules, the new

administration applied the rules much more narrowly,

resulting in a lack of opportunities for reemployment

for the two men. They charged certain state officials

with violating their rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants and

we affirm.

I.

Gunville and Oakley were employees of the Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) when the Republican

party lost control of the governor’s office to Democrat

(now ex-governor) Rod Blagojevich in January 2003.

Gunville had been working forIDOC since 1985, beginning

as a stationary fireman and working his way up to the

position of plant maintenance engineer II by 1992. In 2002,

he was assigned to oversee the construction of two new

prison facilities: Hopkins Park Correctional Center in

Kankakee County, and Grayville Correctional Center in

White County. Gunville also retained some duties at

Thomson Correctional Center, but he was the only state

employee working at Hopkins Park and Grayville in

early 2003. His position description listed Kankakee
No. 08-1035 3

County as the his county of employment. Oakley too

began working for IDOC in 1985, and also rose through

the ranks to the position of statewide commander of the

Special Operations Response Team (“SORT”). Oakley held

the rank of colonel at the beginning of 2003, overseeing

three regional SORT commanders. Although he was the

state-wide SORT commander, his position description

listed Sangamon County as his county of employment.

When the new administration took office in January 2003, the governor directed all state agencies to find

ways to improve efficiencies and save money to address

a statewide budget crisis. In the ensuing months, the

new administration halted construction on the Hopkins

Park and Grayville correctional centers. Gunville, whose

main job responsibilities related to those new facilities,

was laid off as of May 30, 2003. Oakley was also laid off

on May 30, 2003, following a reorganization of the SORT

command structure. SORT was consolidated from three

regions into two. One of the regional commanders, Cecil

Polley, was demoted from captain to lieutenant and his

pay was cut. At this lower rank and pay, Polley was

then appointed the new statewide SORT commander,

although his duties changed little from his prior

regional position. Gunville and Oakley believed they

were targeted for layoffs because of their political affiliation. Gunville was an active member of the Republican

party; Oakley had voted as a Republican in some primaries. The Republicans had controlled the executive

branch in Illinois for twenty-six years when the new

Democratic governor took office.
4 No. 08-1035

In 2003, certain correctional facilities in Illinois were

empty because IDOC lacked operational funding for

them. Donald Snyder was the Acting Director of IDOC

until June 1, 2003, when Roger Walker became the Director. Michael Rumman was the Director of the Illinois

Department of Central Management Services (“CMS”)

from January 2003 through June 2005. James Sledge is

now the Director of CMS. CMS is the agency that administers the personnel rules for all state agencies. Julie

Curry, the new Deputy Chief of Staff for the new

governor, was responsible for several state agencies,

including IDOC. Snyder hired Jim Underwood as the

Personnel Manager of IDOC. At the time of his hiring,

Underwood had no experience in personnel matters

and was not interviewed for the job, but he had been a

political supporter of both Curry and Blagojevich.

Curry told Underwood to look for positions in IDOC that

could be eliminated, and Underwood, together with his

retiring predecessor, Nanci Bounds, compiled a list.

Underwood asked Bounds to provide a list of positions

created under the administration of George Ryan, the

outgoing Republican governor, and Bounds complied

with that request. Underwood and Bounds reviewed

the IDOC organizational chart and together identified

positions that were no longer needed. The two also considered for elimination certain positions that did not

appear on the organizational chart. Without discussing

the list with Snyder, Underwood presented the resultant

list to Curry. Underwood conveyed Curry’s ensuing

approval to Bounds, who then prepared the layoff package

for the May 2003 layoffs. In addition to layoffs, some
No. 08-1035 5

departments underwent reorganizations at the same

time. Snyder forwarded the layoff package to CMS in

early May 2003, and CMS approved the layoff, which

eliminated the positions held by Gunville and Oakley.

Twenty other IDOC positions were eliminated at the

same time, and all captains’ positions were eliminated, a

decision that affected more than two hundred IDOC

employees. Gunville and Oakley were eligible for recall

or reemployment under the personnel rules of the Illinois

Administrative Code, but neither were reemployed

by IDOC following the layoff.

Gunville had voted as a Republican in primaries from

1998 to 2003, and believed Snyder saw him at certain

Republican functions, including fundraisers. Oakley’s

only political activity was voting, and he consistently

voted in Republican primaries while he was working for

IDOC. Gunville and Oakley concede that Walker and

Rumman did not know them and had no personal role

in decisions concerning them. The district court declined

to consider an additional piece of evidence concerning

the defendants’ knowledge of the plaintiffs’ political

affiliation. Kathleen Danner, an assistant to the personnel manager at IDOC, testified in her deposition

that she had been told that voter records were pulled for

certain personnel decisions. The district court found this

testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and declined to

include it in the summary judgment analysis. The

evidence that the defendants even knew the plaintiffs’

political affiliation was thin; the evidence that political

affiliation motivated the layoff decisions is even thinner,

as we shall see.
6 No. 08-1035

Gunville and Oakley claim that their First Amendment

rights were violated when they were terminated because

of their political affiliation. They also alleged that their

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when they

were not placed on reemployment lists for all of the

counties in which they had been employed, but rather

were placed only on lists for their last county of employment. The district court granted judgment in favor of

the defendants on all counts, and the plaintiffs appeal.

II.

On appeal, the plaintiffs urge us to reconsider the

district court’s decision to exclude as hearsay the

testimony of Kathleen Danner that she had been told

that voter records were pulled for certain personnel

decisions. Gunville and Oakley also contend that they

have produced sufficient evidence to create an issue of

material fact regarding whether they were terminated

because of their affiliation with the Republican party, or

their lack of affiliation with the Democratic party.

Finally, they complain that the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when IDOC

interpreted the State’s personnel rules to place laid-off

employees on reemployment lists only for the last county

of their employment, rather than for all counties in

which they had ever been employed, as the prior administration had done.
No. 08-1035 7

Until the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross v. FBL 1

Financial Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), plaintiffs could

prevail in a First Amendment § 1983 action if they could

demonstrate that their speech was a motivating factor in the

defendant’s decision. After Gross, plaintiffs in federal suits

must demonstrate but-for causation unless a statute (such as

the Civil Rights Act of 1991) provides otherwise. See Fairley, 578

F.3d at 525-26. In this case, the outcome would be the same

with either measure of causation because the plaintiffs cannot

demonstrate any tie between their political affiliation and the

decision to terminate their employment.

A.

To make out a prima facie claim for a violation of First

Amendment rights, public employees must present

evidence that (1) their speech was constitutionally protected; (2) they suffered a deprivation likely to deter free

speech; and (3) their speech caused the employer’s

action. George v. Walker, 535 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir.

2008); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525-26 (7th Cir.

2009). The plaintiffs’ affiliation with the Republican 1

party is protected under the First Amendment, and they

both suffered the loss of their jobs. See Rutan v. Republican

Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990) (the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public

employees solely for not being supporters of the political

party in power, unless party affiliation is an appropriate

requirement for the position involved) (citing Branti v.

Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)). See also Powers v. Richards, 549

F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008) (termination of certain lowerlevel government employees because of their political
8 No. 08-1035

affiliation may violate the First Amendment); Carlson v.

Gorecki, 374 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 2004) (with limited

exceptions, public employees may not be made to suffer

adverse employment actions because of their political

beliefs); Nelms v. Modisett, 153 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1998)

(dismissals of public employees for reasons of political

patronage are violations of the First Amendment unless

party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the

position involved). The only factor at issue here is whether

those layoffs were caused by an improper consideration

of their political affiliation. In order to demonstrate that

the defendants were motivated by political affiliation in

determining which employees to terminate, the plaintiffs must first show that the defendants knew of their

association with the Republican party. Nelms, 153 F.3d

at 819.

We begin with the deposition testimony of Kathleen

Danner because, without this evidence, the plaintiffs

have virtually no evidence that any of the defendants

(except for Snyder, who was aware of Gunville’s party

affiliation) knew about their political affiliation, much

less any evidence that the defendants were motivated

by that affiliation in making layoff decisions. Danner

testified that, during this same time period, all of the

IDOC captains and all of the IDOC Assistant Deputy

Directors were also on the chopping block. She stated

that voting records were pulled during the captains’

layoff. She knew that voting records were obtained for

all of the IDOC captains but was not aware that

they had been pulled for any other employees. She did not
No. 08-1035 9

We have omitted an objection from opposing counsel im- 2

mediately before this answer, regarding the hearsay nature

of the potential answer.

know who pulled the records. Her testimony on how

she learned this information was brief and is worth repeating:

Q: How did you become aware that voting records

had been pulled?

A: It came up in a conversation with the captains’ layoff.

Q: Who was—who told you that?

A: Mr. Underwood.

Q: Did he pull them?

A: No, I don’t believe he had the ability to do that.

Q: What did Mr. Underwood say to you in regards to

the voting records?

A: He told me how many captains were registered

2

Republicans versus Democrats.

Q: Did you ask him how he knew that?

A: I knew he obtained that information from the Governor’s office.

Q: Did he say anything else to you about the voting

records?

A: No.

R. 53, Ex. 5, at 40-42.
10 No. 08-1035

The district court found that Danner’s testimony

about Underwood’s statements was inadmissible hearsay. The court also found that Danner’s statement

was irrelevant because it related to a different layoff—the

layoff of IDOC captains—and because the plaintiffs did not

tie Underwood’s claim to any of the defendants here.

Gunville and Oakley now argue that Danner’s testimony

was not hearsay. They characterize Underwood as a coconspirator of Snyder, and contend that Danner’s report

of Underwood’s statement falls under the co-conspirator

exception of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). They also cite

Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265 (3d

Cir. 2007), in support of their claim that this evidence

is both admissible and relevant.

Admissibility is the threshold question because a

court may consider only admissible evidence in

assessing a motion for summary judgment. Haywood v.

Lucent Technologies, Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir. 2003)

(inadmissible evidence will not overcome a motion for

summary judgment). See also Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996) (evidence

relied upon at the summary judgment stage must be

competent evidence of a type otherwise admissible at

trial). A party may not rely upon inadmissible hearsay

to oppose a motion for summary judgment. See Logan v.

Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 925 (7th Cir. 2001) (inadmissible hearsay is not enough to preclude summary

judgment); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742

(7th Cir. 1997) (hearsay is inadmissible in summary judgment proceedings to the same extent that it is inadmissible in a trial); Bombard, 92 F.3d at 562 (inadmissible
No. 08-1035 11

hearsay from an affidavit or deposition will not suffice

to overcome a motion for summary judgment).

When a district court’s decision to grant summary

judgment is premised on an evidentiary finding, we

use a combined standard of review. Schindler v. Seiler,

474 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 2007). We review the

district court’s decision that a particular statement is

not admissible as hearsay under an abuse of discretion

standard. Id. But we review the district court’s grant

of summary judgment de novo, considering all of

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. George, 535 F.3d at 538; Schindler, 474

F.3d at 1010. Danner’s deposition testimony was classic

hearsay. “ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); United States v. Harris, 281

F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Danner claimed to know

that voting records were accessed and used because

Underwood told her so. Underwood’s statement, as

repeated by Danner, was not made at a trial or hearing,

and the plaintiffs seek to use it to prove that voting

records were accessed and used to make layoff decisions.

Thus, Danner’s version of Underwood’s statements is

not admissible and will not overcome a motion for summary judgment. See Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 n.1

(7th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s refusal to

consider in its summary judgment decision an investigator’s summary of unsworn statements); Eisenstadt, 113

F.3d at 742. The district court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that the statement was inadmissible hearsay.
12 No. 08-1035

Nor are we persuaded that Danner’s statement would

be admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the

hearsay rule. Under Fed R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), a statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a

party and is a statement by a co-conspirator of a party

during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

See also United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir.

2009) (party seeking admission of statement under

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must demonstrate that a conspiracy

existed, that the defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy, and that the statement sought to

be admitted was made during and in furtherance of the

conspiracy). Gunville and Oakley argue that there was

an “implicit plan to eliminate longstanding employees

of the former republican administration . . . in order to

make room for democrats and supporters of the new

Governor.” Brief of Appellants, at 28. According to

Gunville and Oakley, circumstantial evidence shows

the “appearance of some undocumented conspiracy.”

Id. They posit that Underwood and Snyder, one of the

defendants here, were co-conspirators. In support of

this undocumented, implicit conspiracy between Underwood and Snyder, Gunville and Oakley offer literally no

evidence. They speculate that Underwood must have

been hired because of his political affiliation because

he was not otherwise qualified for his job. Snyder

initially refused to answer deposition questions based

on his Fifth Amendment privileges, and the plaintiffs

assert that (unspecified) negative inferences may be

drawn from that refusal. The plaintiffs fail to note that
No. 08-1035 13

After the defendants filed their motion for summary judg- 3

ment, Snyder’s attorney notified the plaintiffs’ counsel that,

because Snyder was the subject of a federal investigation,

he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privileges at any

deposition. Subsequently, Snyder’s counsel informed the

plaintiffs’ lawyers that Snyder would testify at a deposition

regarding matters contained in an affidavit he submitted in

support of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The

record contains no notice of deposition for Snyder nor any

motion to compel his testimony.

they never sent Snyder a notice for a deposition. They 3

assert that both Snyder and Underwood wished to

keep their jobs and therefore had an incentive to comply

with the governor’s wishes. But they fail to cite any

admissible evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy. Nor do they propose any theory of how Underwood’s statement to Danner was in furtherance of that

unnamed, unsupported conspiracy. In order to draw an

inference in favor of a nonmoving party, there must be

some evidence from which to draw the inference. But

there is nothing more here than speculation and innuendo. See Liu v. T & H Machine, Inc., 191 F.3d 790, 796 (7th

Cir. 1999) (a party must present more than mere speculation or conjecture to defeat a summary judgment motion).

We cannot construct this unsupported conspiracy out of

a void, and then assume that a particular statement

was made in furtherance of that conspiracy.

Galli advances the plaintiffs no further in seeking to

admit Underwood’s statement. The only similarity between Galli and this case is an allegation that public
14 No. 08-1035

On page 8 of the Appellants’ Brief, the plaintiffs attribute 4

this testimony to Oakley, citing R.47, Attachment 11, at pages

140-43. Nothing on those pages of Oakley’s deposition, however, references anyone in personnel working from a voter list

for any purpose. Gunville, however, did testify at pages 140-43

in his deposition, that George DeTella told him that a “gentleman working in personnel” was working from a voter list

produced by the governor’s office. R. 47, Attachment 10, at 140-

(continued...)

employees were terminated due to party affiliation. Galli,

490 F.3d at 269. In support of that claim, Galli produced

evidence that the vice chair of the defendant commission

admitted to her that the commission was “letting Republicans go” because “some Democrat wants the spot.” Id.

This statement was the admission of a party opponent,

admissible under Rule 801(d)(2). There was no co-conspirator statement at issue in Galli. Gunville and Oakley

have no viable legal theory that would support the admission of Danner’s statement.

Oakley concedes that he is unable to prove that any

of the defendants knew of his political affiliation.

Gunville’s only other evidence that the defendants

knew his political affiliation and used it to make layoff

decisions is his claim that Snyder saw him at Republican

functions. At most this shows that Snyder knew

Gunville was a Republican. As for evidence that

political affiliation was the cause of their termination,

Oakley claims he had been told that a “gentleman in

personnel” was working off of a voter list to determine

which positions to eliminate. The plaintiffs make no 4
No. 08-1035 15

(...continued) 4

43. This testimony suffers the same hearsay problems

whether it was uttered by Oakley or by Gunville. 

attempt to circumvent the obvious hearsay problems

with this claim. Gunville and Oakley also argue that the

persons determining which positions to eliminate had

no experience in personnel matters and did not understand the structure of IDOC. From this, the plaintiffs

ask us to infer that the stated reason for the layoffs, a

material reorganization to enhance efficiency, was a

pretext. That the decision-makers may have been unqualified to conduct the task of restructuring, however, tells

us nothing about whether the motive for the layoffs

was improper. There is a sizable leap from conducting

a restructuring ineptly to conducting it for improper

purposes. We decline to take that leap in the complete

absence of any evidence pointing in that direction. The

plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue of fact

regarding whether the defendants used political affiliation in determining who would be laid off. See Borcky v.

Maytag Corp., 248 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2001) (factual

disputes are “genuine” only if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmovant). Summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the First Amendment claims was therefore

appropriate.

B.

Gunville and Oakley also contend that the defendants

violated their due process rights when they failed to
16 No. 08-1035

place them on appropriate reemployment lists, thereby

preventing them from being rehired to other civil

service positions within IDOC. According to Gunville

and Oakley, before the Democrats gained control of the

governorship, CMS had interpreted the relevant

personnel rules in the Illinois Administrative Code

broadly to allow laid-off employees to qualify for positions in any former county of employment and also to

pick from a list of positions, within their job qualifications, that were available throughout the state. The

Illinois Administrative Code (“IAC”) governs the

process for the recall of laid-off employees:

The Department shall establish and maintain a

reemployment list, by class and agency and county, or

other designated geographical area approved by

the Director before layoff. A certified employee,

except those who are in the Senior Public Service

Administrator or the Public Service Administrator

classes who are covered by subsections (b) and (c)

below, who has been indeterminately laid off shall be

placed in order of length of continuous service as

defined in Section 302.190 on a reemployment list

for recall to the first available assignment to a

position in the class (or related classes with substantially similar requirements and duties) and agency,

and county, or other designated geographical location

or area in which the employee was assigned prior to

being placed on the reemployment list. Where circumstances warrant, at the discretion of the Director,

such reemployment list may be established by related classes whose duties are substantially similar

to the class from which the employee was laid off.
No. 08-1035 17

80 Ill. Admin. Code § 302.570. The “Department” referenced in the first sentence is CMS. Gunville and Oakley

assert that the provision quoted above, read with

another section of the IAC, allows employees to qualify

for appropriate jobs anywhere in the state:

Whenever there is any person available on a

reemployment list for recall to a vacant position for

the same class, or related classes where such have

been established pursuant to Section 302.570, agency

and county or other designated geographical area,

no temporary, provisional or probationary appointments shall be made to such vacancy.

80 Ill. Admin. Code § 302.580. The effect of these

personnel rules together, Gunville and Oakley argue, is

that an employee is entitled to be placed on reemployment lists not only for his last county of employment but

on reemployment lists for any county in the state. They

argue that prior Republican administrations interpreted

the rules broadly to allow their reading of reemployment

procedures. The Democratically-controlled governor’s

office, however, interpreted these provisions to place

a laid-off employee only on the reemployment list for

the single county designated as the work county on the

employee’s last job description. For Gunville, that interpretation was decisive: there were no prisons in his last

county of employment because construction had been

halted. Oakley also was unsuccessful in his quest for

reemployment.

Gunville and Oakley concede that the IAC also grants

the Director of CMS the discretion to interpret and

apply the rules:
18 No. 08-1035

The Director of Central Management Services shall

determine the proper interpretation and application

of each rule of the Department of Central Management Services. The decision of the Director as to the

proper interpretation or application of any such rule

shall be final and binding upon all agencies and

employees affected thereby unless or until modified

or reversed by the Civil Service Commission or the

courts. All agencies and employees shall comply

with the Director’s decision in the absence of a

written opinion of the Attorney General or a written

directive of the Civil Service Commission declaring

the Director’s decision to be unlawful.

80 Ill. Admin. Code § 304.110. They emphasize that the

courts may modify or reverse a CMS Director’s interpretation of the rules, but they neglect to cite the final

sentence of the provision, obligating all agencies to

follow the Director’s reading of the rules unless the

Attorney General or Civil Service Commission has

issued a written directive declaring the Director’s interpretation to be unlawful. Thus, IDOC officials were

legally obliged to follow the CMS interpretation of the

rules. That a court may modify or reverse the Director’s

reading of the IAC is irrelevant, in any event, in this case

because the plaintiffs never asked a court to modify or

reverse the Director’s interpretation. Instead they complained that the Democratic administration rigged the

system so that they would not be eligible for reemployment opportunities.

There are a number of problems with the plaintiffs’

arguments. First, due process is not implicated when
No. 08-1035 19

government employees are laid off due to a reorganization. Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir.

1986). In Misek, we noted that some government

employees have a property interest in their jobs and

may be dismissed only in accordance with federal due

process standards. 783 F.2d at 100. Due process generally

requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond

prior to termination. Id. But there is an exception to the

right to a hearing when the discharge is caused by a

reorganization. Id. Gunville and Oakley claim that any

reorganization here was a sham, however, and that they

are therefore still entitled to challenge their terminations.

But the defendants have produced evidence that the

terminations were the result of a reorganization of

IDOC, and Gunville and Oakley have produced no admissible evidence to dispute the legitimacy of that reorganization. Therefore, under Misek, Gunville and Oakley

had no right to a due process hearing prior to their terminations.

That said, it does not appear that Gunville and Oakley

sought a hearing, and they do not seek a hearing on

appeal. Rather, the crux of their due process claim is

that the Democratically-controlled administration interpreted the personnel rules in a manner that excluded

them from most opportunities for reemployment. They

contend that the rules should have been given the same

interpretation used under prior, Republican-controlled

administrations. That brings us to the second major

problem with the plaintiffs’ claim. “[T]he due process

clauses do not require hearings to resolve disputes
20 No. 08-1035

about the meaning and effect of laws, regulations, and

contracts.” Goros v. County of Cook, 489 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th

Cir. 2007). A plaintiff may not use a Section 1983 action

“to determine whether some statute or contract creates

a property interest in the abstract; unless the plaintiff

maintains that the state actor had to offer a hearing to

resolve some contested issue of fact, the dispute belongs

in state court under state law.” Goros, 489 F.3d at 860. As

in Goros, the plaintiffs here have not raised a substantive due process claim because no fundamental right is

at stake in the interpretation of the personnel rules. They

are simply challenging the interpretation of state rules

by state officials. Under Goros, a claim relating to the

interpretation of the personnel rules does not belong in

federal court.

To the extent that Gunville and Oakley argue that the

personnel rules were rigged to exclude them from

reemployment opportunities because of their political

affiliation, that claim suffers the same deficiency as the

argument on termination due to political affiliation.

The plaintiffs have literally no evidence that political

affiliation played a role in the decision to place laid-off

employees on reemployment lists only for the last

county of employment. There is no evidence that

Gunville and Oakley or only Republican employees were

singled out for this policy; it applied across the board to

all employees who had been laid off. With no evidence

of an improper motive in interpreting the personnel rules,

the plaintiffs cannot sustain their claims. We have reviewed the plaintiffs’ remaining claims and find no
No. 08-1035 21

merit in them. The district court was correct in granting

judgment in favor of the defendants.

AFFIRMED.

10-9-09