COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RICKY MASON DURRETTE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0541-95-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 MARCH 19, 1996 

COUNTY OF SPOTSYLVANIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

J. Peyton Farmer, Judge 

 Benjamin H. Woodbridge, Jr. (Woodbridge & 

Reamy, on brief), for appellant. 

 Stuart C. Sullivan, III, Assistant 

Commonwealth's Attorney, for appellee. 

 Ricky Mason Durrette (appellant) appeals his conviction for 

driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of 

Spotsylvania County Code § 12-86 and Virginia Code § 18.2-266. 

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing into 

evidence the Division of Forensic Science's certificate of 

analysis establishing his blood alcohol content, where such 

certificate was attested by a "division designated 

representative" instead of by the Division Director. Because the 

trial court did not err, we affirm the conviction. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 At approximately 3:00 p.m. on October 26, 1994, appellant's 

pickup truck struck Spotsylvania Deputy Sheriff Joseph Cagnina's 

patrol car head on. Deputy Sheriff E. E. Crawford was dispatched 
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to the accident scene and detected an odor of alcohol coming from 

appellant's person. Appellant told Crawford he had consumed "a 

few drinks with co-workers" and some bourbon prior to the 

collision. Police arrested appellant for driving under the 

influence of alcohol. A blood test, taken after police secured 

appellant's informed consent, revealed that his blood alcohol 

level was .12 percent. 

 At trial, appellant objected to the introduction of the 

blood test certificate, asserting that it was not properly 

attested by the Division Director or an employee to whom the 

Director delegated this duty. The Division's certificate of 

analysis was signed by R. D. Cook, "a division employee," who was 

also a "division designated representative," as noted directly 

underneath the signature block.1

 The trial court, sitting 

without a jury, overruled the objection and found appellant 

guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. 

 II. 

PROPER DELEGATION AND ATTESTATION 

 Code § 18.2-268.7 states: 

 Upon receipt of a blood sample 

 1 The certificate's signature block reads: 

TESTE __________________________________________________________ 

 (Division Director) (Division Designated Representative) 

A DIVISION EMPLOYEE 

 R. D. Cook's signature appears on the line marked "TESTE," 

and "Division Designated Representative" is circled. 
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forwarded to the Division for analysis 

pursuant to § 18.2-268.6, the Division shall 

have it examined for its alcohol or drug or 

both alcohol and drug content and the 

Director shall execute a certificate of 

analysis indicating the name of the accused; 

the date, time and by whom the blood sample 

was received and examined; a statement that 

the seal on the vial had not been broken or 

otherwise tampered with; a statement that the 

container and vial were provided by the 

Division and that the vial was one to which 

the completed withdrawal certificate was 

attached; and a statement of the sample's 

alcohol or drug or both alcohol and drug 

content. The Director shall remove the 

withdrawal certificate from the vial, attach 

it to the certificate of analysis and state 

in the certificate of analysis that it was so 

removed and attached. The certificate of 

analysis with the withdrawal certificate 

shall be returned to the clerk of the court 

in which the charge will be heard. . . . 

 When a blood sample taken in accordance 

with the provisions of §§ 18.2-268.2 through 

18.2-268.6 is forwarded for analysis to the 

Division, a report of the test results shall 

be filed in that office. Upon proper 

identification of the certificate of 

withdrawal, the certificate of analysis, with 

the withdrawal certificate attached, shall, 

when attested by the Director, be admissible 

in any court, in any criminal or civil 

proceeding, as evidence of the facts therein 

stated and of the results of such analysis 

. . . . 

* * * * * * * 

 The Director may delegate or assign 

these duties to an employee of the Division 

of Forensic Science. 

(Emphasis added). 

 Appellant asserts that in order for the certificate to meet 

the statutory requirements as an exception to the hearsay rule, 
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the certificate, on its face, must establish that the Director 

delegated his or her duties to the employee signing the 

certificate's attestation clause. Appellant argues that in this 

case, the certificate contains no information that R. D. Cook was 

an employee to whom the Director delegated the duties imposed by 

Code § 18.2-268.7. We disagree and hold that because the 

certificate complies with Code § 18.2-268.7, the trial court did 

not err in allowing the certificate into evidence. 

 As the Commonwealth contends, the Supreme Court's decision 

in Hurley v. Charles, 112 Va. 706, 72 S.E. 689 (1911) instructs 

our analysis. 

 The question before the Court in Hurley was 

whether a will had been properly certified. 

The will had been admitted to probate in the 

county court of Tazewell County, and the 

certificate of probate, attested by "A.B. 

Buchanan, Deputy Clerk for S.M. Graham, Clerk 

of the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, 

Virginia" was found to be in proper form and 

sufficient. The certificate accompanying the 

actual will, however, contained only the 

following: "A.B. Buchanan, D. Clerk." The 

Supreme Court concluded that the will had 

been properly certified because the two 

documents, when read together, met the 

requirements of Code § 3334. In reaching 

this conclusion, the court stated: "[U]nder 

these circumstances, it would be technical in 

the extreme to reverse the judgment of the 

circuit court when it plainly can be gathered 

from the certificate of probate and 

attestation of the copy of the will that A.B. 

Buchanan is the deputy clerk of Tazewell 

county, authorized by law to act in place of 

his principal." Id. at 710, 72 S.E. at 

 [690-91]. 

Carroll v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 686, 689-90, 396 S.E.2d 137, 
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139-40 (1990)(emphasis added). 

 In Hurley, the Court found that sufficient indicia proved 

the signator was the deputy clerk authorized to act on behalf of 

the clerk. See also Taylor v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 224 Va. 

562, 299 S.E.2d 340 (1983)(holding documents introduced into 

evidence were not properly certified where nothing showed that 

the certifying officer was the documents' custodian); Morgan v. 

Haley, 107 Va. 331, 58 S.E. 564 (1907)(holding a document would 

clearly be valid where the certificate stated that the person 

making it was clerk of the court, stated in whose office the deed 

was recorded, or used initials to show that fact); Carroll, supra

(holding that the trial court's order was not properly 

authenticated and certified as required by statute, where the 

order itself contained no evidence that the signator was 

authorized to act in the place of the clerk of court). 

 In this case, none of the problems posed in the cases cited 

above are presented. The Division's certificate of analysis was 

signed by R. D. Cook, "a division employee," who was also a 

"division designated representative," as noted directly 

underneath the signature block. Unlike Carroll, the certificate 

of analysis, on its face, reveals that R. D. Cook is not only "a 

division employee," but also was authorized as a "designated 

representative" for the Division. Although a more artful 

drafting of the certificate's attestation clause would have 

better satisfied Code § 18.2-268.7's directives, the language 
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contained underneath the signature block was nevertheless 

satisfactory in that regard. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

Affirmed.