FIFTH DIVISION February 10, 2011 No. 1-10- 1228 DEB OR AH O RL A ND O C OONEY , In

di vi dua l l y an d on Beh al f of A l l Others Si m i l arl y Si tuated, Pl ai n ti f f -A pp el l an t,
v. LE SL EY M

A GN ABO SC O, Ind

i vi dua l l y an d on Beha l f of Al l Othe rs Sim il arly Situated, THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND F

AMILY SERVICES, and THE DE PART MEN T O F FIN ANCI AL AND P ROFE SS IO NAL REGU LA TION, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appe al fro m the Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Coo k C oun

ty No. 09 CH 22744 Ho no r ab le Mar y Anne Maso n, Judge Presidin

g.
JUDGE EPSTEIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice s Joseph Gordon and Howse concurred in the judgment and opinion
. OPINION Plaintiff-appellant, Deborah Orlan do Coone y, appe als the involuntary

dismissal of her com plaint with prejudic epursuant to sectio ns 2-615 and 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Ci vil Proc edure (735 ILCS 5

/2-615, 2-619 (West

2008)). She maintains, inter alia , that the tri al court erroneou sly cons trued th e Illino is Certifi ed ShorthandReport

ers Act of 1984 ( 225 ILCS 415/1 et seq . (West 200 8)) (the Act), o n which all her claims are based, andthat the trial court abused its discretion in denying her leave to amend her complaint. For the reasons below, we affirm. BACK GROUND In 20 05 pla int iff

appeal ed an

indicat ed finding o f abuse aga inst he r by t he I lli nois D epa rt ment of Ch i l dren and Fa m i l y Serv i ces (DCF S). Le sle y Ma

gn ab osc o, w

h o i s n ot ce rtif i ed un der the A ct, alle ge dly “r ep o r t ed ” t ho se pr o ce ed ing s. I n Ju ly 20 09 pla int iff filed t he inst an t law su it ag ain s t1-10-1228

2

Ma gnab osc o, DC FS , a

n d th e I l l i n oi s D ep ar

tmen ts of Financ ial and

Prof ess i onal Regu l ati on (IDFPR), maint ain in g, in

di vidually and o n behalf of a ll ot her s simil ar ly si t uat ed, t hat DCFS violat ed a nd continue s to vi

ol atethe A ct b y us i ng un certi f i ed i nd i vi dua l s l i keMa gnab osc o to r ep ort i

ts administr at iveprocee di

ngs . Section 3 of the A

ct pro hi bi ts any one from “prac t ic[ in g] sho rt hand
re po rt ingon a t empo ra ry o r p er manent basis i n thi s State without bein

g certif ie d under thi s Act. Th[e] Act doe s n ot proh i b i t an y n on re si den t pr ac ti cing sh or t hand r epo rt er fro m pra ct icing sho rt hand
re po rt ingi n thi s St ate on a purely temporary b asi s wi

th referen ce to o ne si

ngle proceedin

g.” 225 ILCS 415/3 (We

st 2008)
.

“‘The pract ice of sh

ort hand report in

g’ mean s repor ting, by

the use of

an y sy stem of
manual or mechanica l shor t hand w rit ing, o f *** pr oc eed ings o f an administr at ive agency wh en t he fin al dec ision o f the age ncy with r efer ence t her et o is likely to be
su b j ec t to judi

ci al review under the provi si ons of the A dmi ni strative Rev

ie wLaw .” 225 IL CS 41 5/4(4) (We

st 2008)
. Plaintiff claimed b reachof the Act (co unt I) an d aiding and bet t ing violat ions o f the Act (c ou nt II ), and she sou gh t a dec l ar ati

on th at def en da n ts’ con du ct v i ol ate s t he A

ct (count III). Defendan

ts each
move d to dism i ss the comp l ai nt. IDFPR

ma in taine d, pursu ant t o sec tion 2- 619( a)(1 ), t hat plaintiff ’s cl ai ms are barred by

the doctr in

e of soverei

gn i mm uni ty an d that t he A

ct do es no t au t ho r ize cla ims agains t IDFPR. DCFS co nt ende d, pur sua nt t o s ect ion 2 -6 19( a) (1 ), t hat t he inst ant lawsu it w as o ne of seve ra l ret aliato ry lawsu its by plaint iff aga inst it , t hat t her e is no pri va te ri gh t of act ion u nder t he A ct, an d that p l ai nti f f ’s cl ai m s a re b arred by the doc tri ne of so ve r eig n immu nit y. Magnab osco argued that no priv

ate right of action exi sts under the Act. She al so clai me d, pu rs ua n t to section 2-615, that1-10-1228

3

plain tiff ’s con cl us ory al l eg ati ons di d n ot sta te a cl ai m un der the Act, and that, pursuant to section 2- 619, Ma gn ab o sc o did no t en ga ge in sho rt hand repo rt ing because she was not present at p lai ntiff ’s administr at iveproceedin

gs and m erely transcrib ed an audi

o tape DF CS prov

i ded to h er em

ploye r. Magnab osco su

bm i tted a n a f f i da vi t i n s upp ort of he r m oti on, aswe l l

a c opy of the certi f i ca ti on all egedly pro vided to plai

ntif f wi th the t ranscript of her pro ceedings that stat es: “I, Lesley Mag nabo sco , ha ve t ra nscr ibed t he pr oc eed ings o f said hea ring by liste ning to an au dio cas set t e t ape , a nd t hat t he foregoin g is a true and correct t ranscri pt o f my typewritten notes so taken aforesai d off said audi o cassette t ape and c on tai n s the proceedin gs give n at sa id he ar ing o ff of sa i d a udi o ca ss ette

tap e a s c oul

d b e h ea rd to the b est of

m y ab i l i ty.” Pla int iff responded

by seekin g discovery pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 191(b) (Ill . S. Ct . R. 191 (b) (e ff. Jul y 1, 2002) cl

ai mi ng Magn abosco’s af

fi davi t and certif

ic ation were concl

usory an d that disco ver y was nee ded t o d et er mine “e xa ct ly how Magnabosc o transcrib es the tapes and wh ether the ma

chi ne sh e uses co uld be deem

ed a ‘s y ste m of mechanica l shor t hand w rit ings’ und er t he Act . As Magnabosco ’s o wn affid av it in dicates, her transcri

ption process too k pla

ce oustide of Plai ntif f’ s presenc e. (See, Magnab osco aff ida vi t ¶ 14). Plai

ntif f n eeds to conduct di scovery to lea rn ex ac tl y h ow M ag n ab osc o gen er ate s D CF S re por ts of proceed

i ngs .” The tri al cou rt sta yed Ma gnab osc o’s

se cti on 2 -61 9 m

oti on and den ie d pl ai ntif f ’sm otion f or di scovery as mo o t . I t ne ve r t he le s s considered Magnabosco’s cert if ication i n ruli ng on defendan

ts’ motions, stating:1-10-1228

4

“I know that I s aid I was

n’ t goin g to requi re y ou to bri ef

the 2 -6 19, but I can take judi ci al noti ce of thi s ce rt i f i ca ti on th at M s. Ma

gn ab osc o atta

ch ed to h er Mot i on to Dis miss , an d it says ‘I, Lesl ey Magnab osco, have transcri bed t he pr o ce ed ing o f sa id hear ingby

l i sten i ng to an audi o cass ette tape.’ That’s not usin g a system of

ma nual or mecha nical shorthand.” The trial court then di sm

is sed plai ntif f’ s clai ms agai nst Magna

bosco with prej udic e, stating: “[T ]he Compl

ai nt all eges sum ma ril y tha t [Ma gnabo sco ] p er for med t he func t io n o f a sho rt hand repo rter , but her cer tifi cation of the pro ceedings i ndi cates t h at she h

ad li stened to an audi

o t ape. Certi f

i ed sh orth an d re porti ng i s l i cens ed un de r th e Sta

te of Il l i noi s. Li sten i ng to an audi o tape i s n

ot. I do not find tha t listening t o a n aud io t ape falls within t he am b i t of a s tatu te whi ch governs the m

anual or mecha

nical use o f a sy stem of s hortha nd r eporti ng. I be l i eve that al l eg ati

on i s u na va i l i ng asa m atte r of l aw . A nd so f ort hos e r eas ons t he
m otion s to di sm

i ss a re gra nted wi thout l eav e to re-pl ead. * * * To the exten

t that I have ta ken judici al notice o f Ms. Magnabosco ’s
ce r t ifica t io n, t o t ha t ex t en t t he 2- 61 9 mo t io n is g r an t ed as we ll. * * * [P ]la int iffs do n

ot con tes t tha t sh e l i ste d to a n a udi o tap e, th at s he wa s n ot pr ese nt at the p roce edi

ng s, th at s he di d n ot appear at the proceedings as a sho rt hand reporter, I b eliev e t he p laint iffs in good faith do not contest t hat. Herce r t fc iat io n s t ays1-10-1228

5

‘I l i stened to an

audi o tape an d this i s wh

at I he ard on

the tap e.’ I fi nd that those m at ters , as

to wh i ch the re real l y i s n o con trov ers y , do n ot bring her wit hin the s co pe o f the st at ut e t hat t he p lai ntif fs rel y on, and f

or t hose
reas ons th

e m otion i s gra nted .” The trial court al so granted the departments’ se ction 2-619 m ot ions to dis mi ss, concl udi n g that pl ai nti f f ’s cl ai m s a re b arred by the doc tri ne of sov ere i gn i m m un i ty . Pl ai nti f f ’s m oti on to reconsi der
orfi le an am ended com

pla in t was deni ed. She now appea ls, cla iming t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r o ne o us ly construed the Act and erroneousl y c onsi dered Magnab osco’s certif ic ation, that her

cla ims d o no t fall wit hin the sovereign i

mm uni ty doct ri ne, and that the trial court should have allowed h er proffered
am ended c omp l ai

nt. AN AL YSIS A. Pla int iff Ha s N o t Ple d a Se ct io n 2 3. 1( b) Cla im While de f en da n ts m ov ed to dism i ss pl ai n ti f f ’s cl ai m s pur suan

t to both sections 2-615 an d 2- 619, we need n

ot reach the section 2-619 grounds f or dism is sal , for it i s clear pla

in tif f h as not stated a cl ai m un der section 2-615. “A se ct io n 2- 61 5 mo t io n t o dis miss c halle nge s t he le ga l su fficienc y of a
co mplaintba sed

on de f ects a ppare nt on i ts f ace . [Ci tation .] A ca us e of ac ti on sho uld not be di sm i ss ed pur su an t to a s ec ti on 2 -61 5 m

oti on unless i t is cl early apparent that
no set of f ac ts c an be prov ed tha t wou ld e ntitl e the p l ai

ntif f to rel i ef . [Ci tation .] In
ru ling on such a m oti on , on l y th os e facts apparent fro m the f ace of the pleadin

gs, matters of whi

ch the court ca nta ke jud icial not ice, and jud icial admissions in t he1-10-1228

6

record ma y b e considered. [ Cit at io n. ] We ac ce pt as t rue all we ll-p lea de d fa ct s a nd all
r ea so na ble in

feren ces that may

be drawn

from those facts. [Ci

tat i on.] Howev

er, a pla int if f ma y no t r ely o n me r e c o nc lus io ns o f law o rfac t un su pp o r t ed by sp ec ific factual al le gations. [Ci

tation.] We revi

ew de novo an order grantin g a section 2-615
m oti on to dis mi ss.” Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook , 232 Ill . 2d 463, 473 (2 009). Here, IDPFR and DCFS m ai ntain that plai ntif f’ s compl ai nt was properly

dis mi ssed wi th prejudi ce b ecause, inter al

ia , t he Ac t do es no t pr o vid e a n imp lied o rex pr es s p r iva t e r igh t o f ac t io n a ga in s t t he m, and pl

ai ntif f h as not stated a section 23.1( b) (225 ILCS 4 15/23. 1(b) (West 2008)) clai m agai nst Ma gnab osc o. Plai

nti f f res pon dstha t thi s a rgu men t ha s b een wai

ve d b ec au se

i t wa s n ot rai sed be f ore the trial court and that she “

never asserted that she had an im pli ed priv ate right of action as a b as is f orhe rcla ims, bu t inst ea d c lea r ly bro ught he

r cl ai m s u nd er th e e xpres s p rovi si

ons set f orth i n s ec ti on 23.1(b) of the Act.” “While an appel

la nt who fai ls to rais e an i ssue i

n the trial court wai ves that i ssue, an appe ll

ee ma y rai se an i ss ueon r ev i ew tha t wa s n ot pr es en t ed t o t he t r ial c o ur t in ord er to s us tai n th e j udgm

en t, as long a s the f

actual ba si s f or the i ssue was

be f ore the trial

court .” DOD Technologies v. Mesirow Insurance

Services, Inc. , 381 Ill . App. 3d 1042, 1050 (2008). In any even t, “the rule of

wai ver is a l i m i tation on the parties an

d not t he courts.” Farmer v. Countr y Mutual Insurance Co. , 365 Ill . App. 3d 1046, 1050 (2006). We “can aff irm the trial court on any

basis that appears in

the reco rd , regardless of whether the tri al co ur t r elie d u po n su ch gr o un d o rwh et he rit s r at io na le wascorrect.” Bowers v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile

Insurance Co. , 403 Ill . App. 3d 173, 176 (2010). It is cl ear1-10-1228

7

here t hat plaint iff

has no t st at ed a claim under sec t ion 2 3. 1( b), an issue of st at ut or y inter pr et at ion t he tria l court did not rea

ch
. “The pri ma ry go al of co nst ru ing t he meaning o f a st at ut e is t o a sce rt ain and g ive eff ect t o t he inte nt of t he legislat ur e. The most re liable indicato r o f such int ent is the statutory l anguag e, wh

i ch m ust b e gi ven i ts plai n a nd ord i na ry mea ning
. A st at ut e is viewed as a whole. The re for e, wo rd s and phr ase s must be inte rp re t ed in light of other
re levant pro vi sions of the statut e and must not be construed i

n isol ati on. [Ci

tations.] Ac co r di ng ly, i

n de term i ni ng l egi slati ve i nten t, a court ma

y pr o pe r ly co nsid er no t o nly the la nguage of the

statut e, but also t

h e pur pos e a n d n ec es si ty fo rt he law , t he ev ils
so ught t o be re medied a nd t he go als t o be ac hie ve d, an d t he co nse qu en ce s t ha t wo uld
r es ult f rom con str ui n g th e statu te o ne way

or t he other.” Hubble v . Bi-State Development

Agency of

the Illi nois-Mi ssouriMetropolitan District , 238 Ill . 2d 262, 268 (2 010). “W hen undertaking the interpret ation of a stat ute, we must presum e that when the l

egi sl ature enacted t he l aw , i t did n ot i nte nd to prod uc e a bs urd , i nc onv en i en t or unj ust resul

ts.” In re Estate of Wilson , 238 Il l . 2d 519 , 560 (2 010). Secti on 23 m

anda tes, i n rel eva nt part: “(a) I f an y pe r so n vio lat es t he pr o visio ns o f t his Act , t he Dire ct or may, in the
na me of t he Pe opl

e of th e S tate of Il l i n oi s, th rou gh th e A ttorn ey Gen er al of th e S tate of Il l i noi s, p et itio n for an o rd er enjoining su ch violat ion o r fo r a n or der enfo rc ing compl ia nce wi th th i s A ct. U pon the f i l i ng of a v er ified pe t it io n insuch c ourt, the court1-10-1228

8

ma y i ssue a tem

porary restrai ni ng order, w itho ut not ic e or bond, and m ay pr elimina r ily

an d p er man en tl y enj oin s uch v iolation. If i

t is establ

is hed that such pe rs on has v i ol ate d or is v iolati ng the in jun ction, t he court may

punis h the off ender f orcon tem pt of cou rt. Proc ee di

ng s u nd er th i s S ec ti on s

ha l l be i n a ddi ti on to, an

d n ot i n l i eu of , a l l oth er re med i es an d p en al ti es pr ov i de d b

y th i s A ct. (b) If any pe rso n sha ll p ractice as a certifi ed shorthand repo rter o rho ld himse lf out as a certifi ed shorthand repo rter wi th out b eing licensed unde r t he pr ovisio ns o f t his Ac t t he n a ny ce rti f i ed sh orth an d re porte r, a ny i nte res ted pa rty or any pers on i nj ured th ere by ma y , in addi tion to t he Di

rector , petition f

or reli ef as provided in subse c t i on (a).”

(Em pha si s ad ded.) 2 25 IL CS 41 5/23.1 (a), (b ) (West 2008)
. Agai n, “ ‘ [s]horthand report er’ m eans a pe rson who i s techni

cally qual if ie d and certif

ie d under t his Ac t to practi ce shortha

nd r eporti ng.” 225 IL CS 41 5/4(5) (We

st 2008) . The A

ct furthe r provi des: “Ev ery person to whom a val

id e xi stin g certif ic ate as a certif

ie d shorthand reporter has been is sued under this Act shal l b e desi gnated as a Certif

ie d Shorthand Reporter and not o therwis e, and an y such certi f i ed sh orth an d re porte r m ay , i n c onn ec ti on wi thhi s or he r prac ti ceof sho rt hand report in

g, use the a bb revi ati on ‘ C.S.R.’ or the ti tle ‘Cour t Reporter.’ No p ers on ot her tha n th e h ol de r of a v ali d e xi

sti ng certi f i ca te u nd er th i s A ct s ha l l us e the ti

tl e or de si gnati on of ‘Cert if ied Short hand Repo rt er’, ‘C o ur t Re po r t er ’, o r‘C
. S. R. ’, eit he rdir ec t ly
ori nd i rectl y i n c onn ec ti on w i th h i s or he r prof es si on or busi ness .” 225 ILCS 415/5 (West 2008)
.1-10-1228

9

Co nseq uent ly, unlike t he broadau thor i ty tha t i s g ran ted to the Di rector of Prof es si ona l Re gul ati on unde r se ct ion 2 3. 1( a) , t he pr ivate right of a ct ion in sec t ion 2 3. 1( b) is li mited t o e nfor cing t he Act’s proh i bi ti on aga inst t he unauthorized practiceas a certified short hand report er or the unautho rized use of that t itle. Plai

ntif f does n ot al le ge here i

n ei ther her origi

nal or pro ff ered am ended com

pla in t t hat Magnab osco practiced, or held hersel f out, as a shorthand reporter, let al one a certified sho rt hand report . Plai

ntif f argues in stead: “As explained in P la i

n ti f f [-] A pp el l an t’s Br i ef an d al l eg ed i n h er Com pl ai n t, Magnab osco en

ga ge d i n th e p racti ceof

shorthand reporting. (See, App. Br. , se cti on I; and R. C00006; A. 00004)
. The A ct p rovides that ‘[n]o person may pr actice shorthand repor

ting on a temporary o r per manent bas is in thisState without beingcert ified und er this Act .’ 225 ILCS 4 15/3. Theref ore, if M agnab osco was engaged in the practiceof sh

ort han d report in g, she was i

mpl ic itl y h oldi ng he rsel f out to be l i cen se d u

n der the A

ct. Pl ai n ti f f wa s n ot ab l e to conduct discovery on the is sue as to the extent Magna

bosco ac tua

l l y repr es en ted h er se l f to be cert if

ied, as Plaintif

f’s reque st f or di scovery

on thi s v ery i ssue was den i ed.” (E m pha si s i n ori gi na l .) T his ar gument fai

ls. We r eje ct t he no t io n t ha t an yo ne wh o us es sho r t ha nd t o r ep o r t a p r o ce ed ing in t his state is automatic al ly

practici ng asa “ce rt ifi

ed s hor t hand re po rt er ” o r ho lding her self ou t as su ch. In order to state a c l ai

m und er the na rrow con f i ne s of section 23.1(b), plaint iff

must plead and p ro ve that de f en da nt a ctu al l y pra cti ce d a nd /or hel d hersel f out as a certif

ie d shorthand reporter. P la in tif f h as not and cann ot do so here, for she adm its sh e does not know whether Magnab osco engaged i n such
con du ct. Di scovery

canno t be us ed a s fishing expe dit ion t o bu ild spec ulat ive claims. We affirm the1-10-1228

10

dis mi ssal of plai ntif f’s com plai nt with prejudi ce pursuant t o sect ion 2-615. All her clai ms, which she ad m i ts are b rough t pursua nt to sec tion

23.1(b), can

not li e. We the

ref ore need not , a nd

do not , reach the othe r grounds addres sed

by the p arti es a

nd th e tri al court. B. The Tri al Cou rt Di d N ot Ab us e Its Di screti on “In Ill i noi s, c ourts are en cou rag ed to f ree l y an d l i be ral l y al l owt he amendment of pleadings. [Citat ions.] No twit hstanding that li beral policy

, a pa rt y’s right t o a mend is no t ab so lut e a nd un limit ed
. [ Cit at io n. ] T he de cis io n w he t he rt o gr an t le a v e to amend a pl eading res ts wi thi n the soun

d di scre tion of the tri al

court. [Ci

tation .] Absent an

abuse of that di scre

tion , i ts dec i sion wi

l l not be di sturb ed o n r ev ie w. [Ci tation .] A mong the f ac tors to b e c ons i de red

i n d ete rm i ni ng whether or

no t to pe r mit an am

endm ent to t he pl

eadi ngs are wh

ether the am

endm en t would cure a defec t in the p leadings ; whet her t he oth er pa rty wo uld be p re

judiced or sur pr ised by t he proposed

am endm en t; ti mel i ne ss of the p roposed a

mendm en t; an d whethe r there
were pr eviou s o ppo rt unit ies t o a mend t he ple adi ngs.” Lee v. Chi cago Tra nsit Authority , 152 Ill . 2d 432, 467-68 (1992)

. “Of course , if the am

endm en t woul d not hav e cure d a de f ect i n the pl eadi ng, th e other f actors a re superfl uous.” Bates v. R ichland Sa les Corp ., 346 Il l . Ap p. 3d 22 3, 230 ( 2004)
. Here, pla int iff’s pr o ffer ed ame nd ed co mpla in t re ass erts h

er se cti on 23.1 (b) c l ai

m s, wh i ch were properl y di sm i sse d wi th pre j udice, a nd i t adds a f ourth cl ai m f or mandamus
. “Mandamus reli

ef i s an ex trao rdin ary rem edy to en f orc e, as a m atte r of ri gh t, t he performa

nce of of fi ci al dutiesby

a p ub l i c of

f i ci al where the of f i ci al i s n ot1-10-1228

11

exer cising discr et ion. A co ur t will not gr ant a w ri t of mandamus unless the peti tioner can d emons t ra t e a c lear, affirmative rig ht t o re lief, a c l ea r d uty of th e of f i ci al to act,
an d c l ea r a uth ori ty i n th e of f i ci al to co mply w it h t he wr it
. T he wr it will no t lie when it s ef f ec t i s to s ub sti tute th e c ourt’ s j udg

men t or discreti

on f orthe o ff icial’sjudg ment ordiscr et ion. Mandamus reli ef, theref ore, is not appropriate to regulate a cou rs e of off ic ia l conduct or to enf

orce the perf orma nc e of off i ci al duti es g en eral

l y . [Ci tation .] An ex ce pti on to thi s g en

er al ru l e, h owev er , i s th

at mand amus wil l l i e to pre v en

t a cl ear ab us e of di screti on or to con trol the exerc i se of di screti on in a manner c ons iste nt wi th the a ppl i cab l e rul e of l aw.” Hatch v. S

zy manski , 325 Ill . App. 3d 736, 739 (2001 ). Pla int iff al le ges in her p ro ffered amende d co mplaintthat, inter al ia , the “ De pa rtm en t h as a c l ea r d uty to invest igat e violat ions o f the Act ,” and that she tri ggered that duty by compl yi ng wi th section 2105- 100(b) of the Il l i noi s Ci vi l Adm i ni strativ e Code, wh

i ch prov i des: “The De pa rtm en t may upon i ts ow n m oti on a nd sh al l upon t he ve r ified co mpla int in
wr iting of a

ny pers on, prov

i ded the com

pl ai nt or t he co m

pl ai n t toge th er wi th evi dence, doc um

en tary orot herwi se, pr ese nt ed in co nnect ion wit h t he co mplaint
ma kes a pri ma f aci e ca se, investigate the actions of any person holding or

claiming to hold a ce

rtificate .” (Em

pha si s ad ded.) 2 0 ILC S 2105 /2105 -100(b) (We st 2008)
. Pla in t iff do es not, however, all

ege i n he r pleadi ng that Magnab osco holds or clai ms to hold a
certif i ca te with IDPFR, absent whi ch section 2105-100( b) is i na pp lic abl

e. Plai ntif f’ s proff ered
am ended com pl ai n t doe s n ot s tate a cl ai m f or reli ef . The tria l courtcor re ctl y den i ed pl ai n ti f f l ea v e to1-10-1228

12

f i l e tha t pl eadi ng. CONCLUSION We aff irm the trial court ’s di sm

is sal of pl ai nti f f ’s origi na l com pl ai nt. Plai nti f f di d n ot state a cla im und er se cti on 23.1 (b). M oreover , the tri al courtpr o pe r ly

dis al lowed pl

ai ntif f’ s proff ered
ame nde d c o mplain t . T hat ple ad ing d o es no t st at e a cla im for re lief. Af fi rmed.