NO. 13-15-00452- CV 

IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 

CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG, TEXAS 

SANDEEP PATEL, 

Appellant 

v. 

HARBOR HOSPICE OF BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL, 

Appellees 

On Appeal from the 172ndJudicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. E-192,576 

The Honorable Donald J. Floyd, Presiding 

BRIEF OF APPELLANT 

PORTNER ♦ BoND, PLLC 

Chris M. Portner 

State Bar No. 24007858 

cportner@portnerbond.com 

J. Trenton Bond 

State Bar No. 00785707 

tbond@portnerbond.com 

1905 Calder Avenue 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 838-4444 

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, 

SANDEEP PATEL 

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 

NO. 13-15-00452- CV 

IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 

CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG, TEXAS 

SANDEEP PATEL, 

Appellant 

v. 

HARBOR HOSPICE OF BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL, 

Appellees 

On Appeal from the 172ndJudicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. E-192,576 

The Honorable Donald J. Floyd, Presiding 

BRIEF OF APPELLANT 

PORTNER ♦ BoND, PLLC 

Chris M. Portner 

State Bar No. 24007858 

cportner@portnerbond.com 

J. Trenton Bond 

State Bar No. 00785707 

tbond@portnerbond.com 

1905 Calder Avenue 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 838-4444 

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, 

SANDEEP PATEL 

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 

NO. 13-15-00452- CV

IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG, TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________

SANDEEP PATEL,

Appellant

v.

HARBOR HOSPICE OF BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL,

Appellees

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 172nd Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. E-192,576

The Honorable Donald J. Floyd, Presiding

__________________________________________________________________

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

__________________________________________________________________

PORTNER ♦ BOND, PLLC

Chris M. Portner

State Bar No. 24007858

cportner@portnerbond.com

J. Trenton Bond

State Bar No. 00785707

tbond@portnerbond.com

1905 Calder Avenue

Beaumont, Texas 77701

Telephone: (409) 838-4444

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,

SANDEEP PATEL

ORAL ARGUMENTREQUESTED

ACCEPTED

13-15-00452-CV

THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

10/13/2015 10:43:12 AM

Dorian E. Ramirez

CLERK

 FILED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS 10/13/2015 10:43:12 AM DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Clerk
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 

APPELLANT 

Sandeep Patel 

APPELLANT'S COUNSEL(S) 

Chris M. Portner 

State Bar No.: 24007858 

cportner@portnerbond.com 

J. Trenton Bond 

State Bar No.: 00785707 

tbond@portnerbond.com 

PORTNER ♦ BOND, PLLC 

1905 Calder Avenue 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 838-4444 

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240 

Anthony Malley, III 

State Bar No.: 24041382 

tony@mallaw.com 

MALLEY LAW FIRM, PLLC 

905 Orleans, Suite 110 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 212-8888 

Facsimile: (409) 212-8002 

Jamie Matuska 

MATUSKA LAW FIRM 

State Bar No.: 24051062 

jamie@matuskalaw.com 

2809 Highway 69 North 

Nederland, Texas 77627 

Telephone: (409) 722-5600 

Facsimile: (409) 727-1290 

i 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 

APPELLANT 

Sandeep Patel 

APPELLANT'S COUNSEL(S) 

Chris M. Portner 

State Bar No.: 24007858 

cportner@portnerbond.com 

J. Trenton Bond 

State Bar No.: 00785707 

tbond@portnerbond.com 

PORTNER ♦ BOND, PLLC 

1905 Calder Avenue 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 838-4444 

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240 

Anthony Malley, III 

State Bar No.: 24041382 

tony@mallaw.com 

MALLEY LAW FIRM, PLLC 

905 Orleans, Suite 110 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 212-8888 

Facsimile: (409) 212-8002 

Jamie Matuska 

MATUSKA LAW FIRM 

State Bar No.: 24051062 

jamie@matuskalaw.com 

2809 Highway 69 North 

Nederland, Texas 77627 

Telephone: (409) 722-5600 

Facsimile: (409) 727-1290 

ii 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

APPELLANT

Sandeep Patel

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL(S)

Chris M. Portner

State Bar No.: 24007858

cportner@portnerbond.com

J. Trenton Bond

State Bar No.: 00785707

tbond@portnerbond.com

PORTNER ♦ BOND, PLLC

1905 Calder Avenue

Beaumont, Texas 77701

Telephone: (409) 838-4444

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240

Anthony Malley, III

State Bar No.: 24041382

tony@mallaw.com

MALLEY LAW FIRM, PLLC

905 Orleans, Suite 110

Beaumont, Texas 77701

Telephone: (409) 212-8888

Facsimile: (409) 212-8002

Jamie Matuska

MATUSKA LAW FIRM

State Bar No.: 24051062

jamie@matuskalaw.com

2809 Highway 69 North

Nederland, Texas 77627

Telephone: (409) 722-5600

Facsimile: (409) 727-1290
APPELLEE(S) 

Harbor Hospice of Beaumont, L.P. 

Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC 

Arfeen Properties, L.P. 

Qamar Arfeen 

APPELLEES COUNSEL(S) 

David Gaultney 

State Bar No.: 07765300 

davidgaultney@mehaffyweber.com 

MEHAFFYWEBER, P.C. 

823 Congress Avenue, Suite 200 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Telephone: (512) 394-3840 

Facsimile: (512) 394-3860 

David E. Bernsen 

State Bar No.: 02217500 

dbernsen@bernsenlaw.com 

Christine L. Stetson 

State Bar No.: 00785047 

cstetson@bernsenlaw.com 

BERNSEN LAW FIRM 

420 North MLK, Jr., Pkwy 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 212-9994 

Facsimile: (409) 212-9411 

Glen W. Morgan 

State Bar No.: 14438900 

gmorgan@rmqlawfirm.com 

John Werner 

State Bar No.: 00789720 

jwerner@rmqlawfirrn.com 

REAUD, MORGAN & QUINN, LLP 

P.O. Box 26005 

Beaumont, Texas 77720-6005 

Telephone: (409) 838-1000 

Facsimile: (409) 833-8236 

ii 

APPELLEE(S) 

Harbor Hospice of Beaumont, L.P. 

Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC 

Arfeen Properties, L.P. 

Qamar Arfeen 

APPELLEES COUNSEL(S) 

David Gaultney 

State Bar No.: 07765300 

davidgaultney@mehaffyweber.com 

MEHAFFYWEBER, P.C. 

823 Congress Avenue, Suite 200 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Telephone: (512) 394-3840 

Facsimile: (512) 394-3860 

David E. Bernsen 

State Bar No.: 02217500 

dbernsen@bernsenlaw.com 

Christine L. Stetson 

State Bar No.: 00785047 

cstetson@bernsenlaw.com 

BERNSEN LAW FIRM 

420 North MLK, Jr., Pkwy 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 212-9994 

Facsimile: (409) 212-9411 

Glen W. Morgan 

State Bar No.: 14438900 

gmorgan@rmqlawfirm.com 

John Werner 

State Bar No.: 00789720 

jwerner@rmqlawfirrn.com 

REAUD, MORGAN & QUINN, LLP 

P.O. Box 26005 

Beaumont, Texas 77720-6005 

Telephone: (409) 838-1000 

Facsimile: (409) 833-8236 

iiii 

APPELLEE(S)

Harbor Hospice of Beaumont, L.P.

Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC

Arfeen Properties, L.P.

Qamar Arfeen

APPELLEES COUNSEL(S)

David Gaultney

State Bar No.: 07765300

davidgaultney@mehaffyweber.com

MEHAFFYWEBER, P.C.

823 Congress Avenue, Suite 200

Austin, Texas 78701

Telephone: (512) 394-3840

Facsimile: (512) 394-3860

David E. Bernsen

State Bar No.: 02217500

dbernsen@bernsenlaw.com

Christine L. Stetson

State Bar No.: 00785047

cstetson@bernsenlaw.com

BERNSEN LAW FIRM

420 North MLK, Jr., Pkwy

Beaumont, Texas 77701

Telephone: (409) 212-9994

Facsimile: (409) 212-9411

Glen W. Morgan

State Bar No.: 14438900

gmorgan@rmqlawfirm.com

John Werner

State Bar No.: 00789720

jwerner@rmqlawfirm.com

REAUD, MORGAN & QUINN, LLP

P.O. Box 26005

Beaumont, Texas 77720-6005

Telephone: (409) 838-1000

Facsimile: (409) 833-8236
TRIAL COURT 

Honorable Donald J. Floyd 

Judge Presiding 

172nd Civil District Court 

Jefferson County Courthouse 

1001 Pearl Street 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 835-8485 

iii 

TRIAL COURT 

Honorable Donald J. Floyd 

Judge Presiding 

172nd Civil District Court 

Jefferson County Courthouse 

1001 Pearl Street 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 835-8485 

iii iii 

TRIAL COURT

Honorable Donald J. Floyd

Judge Presiding

172nd Civil District Court

Jefferson County Courthouse

1001 Pearl Street

Beaumont, Texas 77701

Telephone: (409) 835-8485
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS iv 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES vii 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE x 

ISSUES PRESENTED xi 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 12 

ARGUMENT 15 

I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Appellees' Amended 

Motion for Summary Judgment ..15 

A. ISSUE ONE: Appellees Did Not Establish a Statute 

of Limitations Defense as a Matter of Law 16 

1. Summary Judgment Evidence Establishes Patel 

Was a Partner in Harbor Hospice After June 15, 

2008 ..18 

2. Appellees Failed to Establish As a Matter of Law 

That Patel Was No Longer a Partner in Harbor 

Hospice On or Before June 15, 2008 ..20 

a. The Parker Letter does not terminate 

Patel's limited partnership interest 20 

b. Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement 

was executed on November 10, 2011 ..22 

c. Undated Amendment 4 No. 4 22 

iv 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS iv 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES vii 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE x 

ISSUES PRESENTED xi 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 12 

ARGUMENT 15 

I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Appellees' Amended 

Motion for Summary Judgment ..15 

A. ISSUE ONE: Appellees Did Not Establish a Statute 

of Limitations Defense as a Matter of Law 16 

1. Summary Judgment Evidence Establishes Patel 

Was a Partner in Harbor Hospice After June 15, 

2008 ..18 

2. Appellees Failed to Establish As a Matter of Law 

That Patel Was No Longer a Partner in Harbor 

Hospice On or Before June 15, 2008 ..20 

a. The Parker Letter does not terminate 

Patel's limited partnership interest 20 

b. Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement 

was executed on November 10, 2011 ..22 

c. Undated Amendment 4 No. 4 22 

iviv 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ..............................................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................vii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...................................................................................x

ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................xi

STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................12

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................15

I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Appellees’ Amended

Motion for Summary Judgment ............................................................... .........15

A. ISSUE ONE: Appellees Did Not Establish a Statute

of Limitations Defense as a Matter of Law ...............................16

1. Summary Judgment Evidence Establishes Patel

Was a Partner in Harbor Hospice After June 15,

2008 ........................................................................................ .........18

2. Appellees Failed to Establish As a Matter of Law

That Patel Was No Longer a Partner in Harbor

Hospice On or Before June 15, 2008................................ ........20

a. The Parker Letter does not terminate

Patel’s limited partnership interest.............................. .........20

b. Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement

was executed on November 10, 2011........................... .........22

c. Undated Amendment 4 No. 4 ...................................22
d. Appellees failed to establish as a Matter of 

Law that Patel knew or should have known 

of any injury on or before June 15, 2008 23 

e. Patel never testified that his limited 

partnership interest was terminated, 

redeemed or transferred to Defendant 

Arfeen .24 

3. Appellees Failed to Establish as a Matter of 

Law that Patel's Cause of Action for 

Conversion and Under the Texas Theft 

Liability Act Accrued on or Before June 15, 

2010 ..24 

4. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Establish 

Under the Discovery Rule that Patel Knew or 

Reasonably Should Have Known That His 

Interest Was Terminated by June 15, 2008 ........26 

5. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Negate 

Patel's Affirmative Defense of Fraudulent 

Concealment ..31 

B. ISSUE TWO: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding 

that No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists on 

Any of Patel's Asserted Claims ..32 

1. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's breach of fiduciary 

duty claims because the summary judgment 

evidence raises questions of material fact 33 

2. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's breach of contract 

claim because the summary judgment evidence 

raises questions of material fact ..36 

d. Appellees failed to establish as a Matter of 

Law that Patel knew or should have known 

of any injury on or before June 15, 2008 23 

e. Patel never testified that his limited 

partnership interest was terminated, 

redeemed or transferred to Defendant 

Arfeen .24 

3. Appellees Failed to Establish as a Matter of 

Law that Patel's Cause of Action for 

Conversion and Under the Texas Theft 

Liability Act Accrued on or Before June 15, 

2010 ..24 

4. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Establish 

Under the Discovery Rule that Patel Knew or 

Reasonably Should Have Known That His 

Interest Was Terminated by June 15, 2008 ........26 

5. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Negate 

Patel's Affirmative Defense of Fraudulent 

Concealment ..31 

B. ISSUE TWO: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding 

that No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists on 

Any of Patel's Asserted Claims ..32 

1. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's breach of fiduciary 

duty claims because the summary judgment 

evidence raises questions of material fact 33 

2. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's breach of contract 

claim because the summary judgment evidence 

raises questions of material fact ..36 

v

d. Appellees failed to establish as a Matter of

Law that Patel knew or should have known

of any injury on or before June 15, 2008..................... .........23

e. Patel never testified that his limited

partnership interest was terminated,

redeemed or transferred to Defendant

Arfeen................................................................ .........24

3. Appellees Failed to Establish as a Matter of

Law that Patel’s Cause of Action for

Conversion and Under the Texas Theft

Liability Act Accrued on or Before June 15,

2010 .................................................................................. .........24

4. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Establish

Under the Discovery Rule that Patel Knew or

Reasonably Should Have Known That His

Interest Was Terminated by June 15, 2008........................ .........26

5. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Negate

Patel’s Affirmative Defense of Fraudulent

Concealment................................................................ .........31

B. ISSUE TWO: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding

that No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists on

Any of Patel’s Asserted Claims.................................................. .........32

1. The trial court erred in granting summary

judgment regarding Patel’s breach of fiduciary

duty claims because the summary judgment

evidence raises questions of material fact ........................33

2. The trial court erred in granting summary

judgment regarding Patel’s breach of contract

claim because the summary judgment evidence

raises questions of material fact.........................................36
3. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's conversion claim 

because the summary judgment evidence raises 

questions of material fact ..37 

4. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's claim for Texas Theft 

Liability Act violations because the summary 

judgment evidence raises questions of material 

fact 38 

5. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's claim for fraud 

because Appellees did not seek summary 

judgment regarding Patel's fraud claim 40 

C. ISSUE THREE: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding 

Appellees Conclusively Established that Patel Did 

Not Suffer Damages 40 

D. ISSUE FOUR: The Trial Court Erred in Granting 

Summary Judgment Because Appellee's Failed to 

Authenticate Any of Their Summary Judgment 

Evidence 43 

E. CONCLUSION and PRAYER for RELIEF 44 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 46 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE, TEX. R. APP. PROC. 9.4(1)(3) 47 

APPENDIX 

June 18, 2015 Order on Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment 1AB A 

vi 

3. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's conversion claim 

because the summary judgment evidence raises 

questions of material fact ..37 

4. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's claim for Texas Theft 

Liability Act violations because the summary 

judgment evidence raises questions of material 

fact 38 

5. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment regarding Patel's claim for fraud 

because Appellees did not seek summary 

judgment regarding Patel's fraud claim 40 

C. ISSUE THREE: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding 

Appellees Conclusively Established that Patel Did 

Not Suffer Damages 40 

D. ISSUE FOUR: The Trial Court Erred in Granting 

Summary Judgment Because Appellee's Failed to 

Authenticate Any of Their Summary Judgment 

Evidence 43 

E. CONCLUSION and PRAYER for RELIEF 44 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 46 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE, TEX. R. APP. PROC. 9.4(1)(3) 47 

APPENDIX 

June 18, 2015 Order on Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment 1AB A 

vi vi 

3. The trial court erred in granting summary

judgment regarding Patel’s conversion claim

because the summary judgment evidence raises

questions of material fact....................................................... .........37

4. The trial court erred in granting summary

judgment regarding Patel’s claim for Texas Theft

Liability Act violations because the summary

judgment evidence raises questions of material

fact .......................................................................................... .........38

5. The trial court erred in granting summary

judgment regarding Patel’s claim for fraud

because Appellees did not seek summary

judgment regarding Patel’s fraud claim................................ .........40

C. ISSUE THREE: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding

Appellees Conclusively Established that Patel Did

Not Suffer Damages ................................................................ .........40

D. ISSUE FOUR: The Trial Court Erred in Granting

Summary Judgment Because Appellee’s Failed to

Authenticate Any of Their Summary Judgment

Evidence...................................................................................... .........43

E. CONCLUSION and PRAYER for RELIEF .......................................................44

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................46

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE, TEX. R. APP. PROC. 9.4(1)(3)...................47

APPENDIX

June 18, 2015 Order on Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment.................................................................................................. TAB A
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES 

Alaniz v. Hoyt, 

105 S.W.3d 330, 344 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 2003, not pet.) 15 

Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 

297 S.W.3d 768, 775-776 (Tex. 2009) 42 

Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp. 

74 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. App. Dallas 2002) 44 

Bliss v. NRG Industries, 

162 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2005, pet. denied) 15 

BP America Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 

342 S.W.3d 59, 67-69 (Tex. 2011) 31 

Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein, 

312 S.W.3d 864, 878 (Tex. App.—Houston [1St Dist.] 2009, no pet.) 31 

Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 

907 S.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Tex. 1995) 16 

Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co., 

926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. 1996) 15 

Gaddis v. Smith, 

417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1977) 26 

G&H Towing Co. v. Magee, 

347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011) 40 

Graham Morg. Corp. v. Hag 

307 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010, no pet) 33 

Groves v. Hanks, 

546 S.W.2d 638, 647 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1976) 42 

vii 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES 

Alaniz v. Hoyt, 

105 S.W.3d 330, 344 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 2003, not pet.) 15 

Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 

297 S.W.3d 768, 775-776 (Tex. 2009) 42 

Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp. 

74 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. App. Dallas 2002) 44 

Bliss v. NRG Industries, 

162 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2005, pet. denied) 15 

BP America Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 

342 S.W.3d 59, 67-69 (Tex. 2011) 31 

Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein, 

312 S.W.3d 864, 878 (Tex. App.—Houston [1St Dist.] 2009, no pet.) 31 

Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 

907 S.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Tex. 1995) 16 

Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co., 

926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. 1996) 15 

Gaddis v. Smith, 

417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1977) 26 

G&H Towing Co. v. Magee, 

347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011) 40 

Graham Morg. Corp. v. Hag 

307 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010, no pet) 33 

Groves v. Hanks, 

546 S.W.2d 638, 647 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1976) 42 

vii vii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alaniz v. Hoyt,

105 S.W.3d 330, 344 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2003, not pet.)...............15

Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc.,

297 S.W.3d 768, 775-776 (Tex. 2009)..........................................................42

Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp.

74 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. App. Dallas 2002) ..............................................44

Bliss v. NRG Industries,

162 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2005, pet. denied) ..............................15

BP America Prod. Co. v. Marshall,

342 S.W.3d 59, 67-69 (Tex. 2011)................................................................31

Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein,

312 S.W.3d 864, 878 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)..........31

Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc.,

907 S.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Tex. 1995)............................................................16

Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co.,

926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. 1996) .................................................................15

Gaddis v. Smith,

417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1977) .................................................................26

G&H Towing Co. v. Magee,

347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011) .................................................................40

Graham Morg. Corp. v. Hall,

307 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010, no pet)...............................33

Groves v. Hanks,

546 S.W.2d 638, 647 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1976)........................42
Haas v. George, 

71 S.W.3d 904, 913 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) 32 

Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 

289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009) 15 

Messner v. Boon, 

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 747, *30 (Tex. App. Texarkana Jan. 28, 2015) 17 

Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 

787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990) 26 

Nautilus Training Center No. 2, Inc. v. Seafirst Leasing Corp., 

647 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) 16 

Qaddura v. Indo-European Foods, Inc, 

141 S.W.3d 882, 888-890 (Tex. App. Dallas 2004) 41 

Punts v. Wilson, 

137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2004) 42 

Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 

997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (1999) 16 

Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations, 

954 S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. denied) 17, 31 

Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 

147 S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex. 2004) 21 

Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 

356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) 31 

S.V. v. R.V., 

933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996) 26, 27 

Willis v. Maverick, 

760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988) 26 

viii 

Haas v. George, 

71 S.W.3d 904, 913 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) 32 

Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 

289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009) 15 

Messner v. Boon, 

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 747, *30 (Tex. App. Texarkana Jan. 28, 2015) 17 

Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 

787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990) 26 

Nautilus Training Center No. 2, Inc. v. Seafirst Leasing Corp., 

647 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) 16 

Qaddura v. Indo-European Foods, Inc, 

141 S.W.3d 882, 888-890 (Tex. App. Dallas 2004) 41 

Punts v. Wilson, 

137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2004) 42 

Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 

997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (1999) 16 

Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations, 

954 S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. denied) 17, 31 

Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 

147 S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex. 2004) 21 

Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 

356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) 31 

S.V. v. R.V., 

933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996) 26, 27 

Willis v. Maverick, 

760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988) 26 

viii viii 

Haas v. George,

71 S.W.3d 904, 913 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) ........................32

Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding,

289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009) .................................................................15

Messner v. Boon,

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 747, *30 (Tex. App. Texarkana Jan. 28, 2015) ......17

Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,

787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990) .................................................................26

Nautilus Training Center No. 2, Inc. v. Seafirst Leasing Corp.,

647 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1982, no writ)..........16

Qaddura v. Indo-European Foods, Inc.,

141 S.W.3d 882, 888-890 (Tex. App. Dallas 2004)......................................41

Punts v. Wilson,

137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2004) ......................................42

Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel,

997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (1999)..........................................................................16

Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations,

954 S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. denied).........17, 31

Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates,

147 S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex. 2004) .................................................................21

Shell Oil Co. v. Ross,

356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011) .................................................................31

S.V. v. R.V.,

933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996) ...................................................................26, 27

Willis v. Maverick,

760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988) .................................................................26
RULES 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a 15 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) 15 

ix 

RULES 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a 15 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) 15 

ixix 

RULES

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a.................................................................................................15

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ............................................................................................15
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

This is an appeal by Plaintiff Sandeep Patel ("Patel") from a motion for 

summary judgment granted in favor of Appellees, disposing of all of Patel's claims 

against Appellees in a lawsuit for fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 

duty, conversion, for violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act, and for 

declaratory relief. 

x 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

This is an appeal by Plaintiff Sandeep Patel ("Patel") from a motion for 

summary judgment granted in favor of Appellees, disposing of all of Patel's claims 

against Appellees in a lawsuit for fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 

duty, conversion, for violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act, and for 

declaratory relief. 

x x

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal by Plaintiff Sandeep Patel ("Patel") from a motion for

summary judgment granted in favor of Appellees, disposing of all of Patel's claims

against Appellees in a lawsuit for fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary

duty, conversion, for violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act, and for

declaratory relief.
ISSUES PRESENTED 

1. Issue One: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based upon 

Appellees' affirmative defense of statute of limitations because the summary 

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

2. Issue Two: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment upon all 

Appellees' alleged causes of action because the summary judgment evidence 

raises questions of material fact regarding the merits of each alleged claim. 

a. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

breach of fiduciary duty claim because the summary judgment 

evidence raises questions of material fact. 

b. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

breach of contract claim because the summary judgment evidence 

raises questions of material fact. 

c. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

conversion claim because the summary judgment evidence raises 

questions of material fact. 

d. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act claim because the summary 

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

e. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

claim for fraud because Appellees did not seek summary judgment 

regarding Patel's fraud claim. 

6. Issue Three: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment and 

finding that Patel did not suffer damages because the summary judgment 

evidence raises questions of material fact. 

7. Issue Four: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because 

Appellees' failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment evidence. 

xi 

ISSUES PRESENTED 

1. Issue One: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based upon 

Appellees' affirmative defense of statute of limitations because the summary 

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

2. Issue Two: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment upon all 

Appellees' alleged causes of action because the summary judgment evidence 

raises questions of material fact regarding the merits of each alleged claim. 

a. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

breach of fiduciary duty claim because the summary judgment 

evidence raises questions of material fact. 

b. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

breach of contract claim because the summary judgment evidence 

raises questions of material fact. 

c. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

conversion claim because the summary judgment evidence raises 

questions of material fact. 

d. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act claim because the summary 

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

e. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's 

claim for fraud because Appellees did not seek summary judgment 

regarding Patel's fraud claim. 

6. Issue Three: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment and 

finding that Patel did not suffer damages because the summary judgment 

evidence raises questions of material fact. 

7. Issue Four: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because 

Appellees' failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment evidence. 

xi xi

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Issue One: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based upon

Appellees’ affirmative defense of statute of limitations because the summary

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact.

2. Issue Two: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment upon all

Appellees’ alleged causes of action because the summary judgment evidence

raises questions of material fact regarding the merits of each alleged claim.

a. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's

breach of fiduciary duty claim because the summary judgment

evidence raises questions of material fact.

b. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's

breach of contract claim because the summary judgment evidence

raises questions of material fact.

c. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's

conversion claim because the summary judgment evidence raises

questions of material fact.

d. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's

violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act claim because the summary

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact.

e. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding Patel's

claim for fraud because Appellees did not seek summary judgment

regarding Patel’s fraud claim.

6. Issue Three: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment and

finding that Patel did not suffer damages because the summary judgment

evidence raises questions of material fact.

7. Issue Four: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because

Appellees' failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 

Patel and Qamar Arfeen ("Arfeen") were limited partners in Harbor Hospice 

of Beaumont, LP ("Harbor Hospice"). (C.R. 42-88). The general partner of 

Harbor Hospice is Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. (C.R. 84, 87, 126-129, 135-

140, 171-203). 

Patel received a 3% Class A Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice 

of Beaumont, LP in 2005. (C.R. 79, 83) Several amendments were allegedly then 

made to the Harbor Hospice Limited Partnership Agreement (the "Partnership 

Agreement"). (C.R. 126 - 129, 135- 140, 171 - 203). Patel's Class A Limited 

Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice was increased to 6% in Amendment No. 2 

to Agreement of Limited Partnership of Harbor Hospice. (C.R. 176-180). 

At some point, the Appellees' decided to implement a plan for Arfeen to 

improperly take possession of Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor 

Hospice. Appellees' had several options about how to try to take possession of 

Patel's limited partnership interest. First of all, Harbor Hospice could attempt to 

terminate Patel's limited partnership interest for alleged wrongful conduct and 

forfeit the limited partnership interest back to the partnership. If this occurred, 

Patel's limited partnership interest would be returned to the partnership and all of 

the partners would benefit on a pro-rata basis. Secondly, Harbor Hospice could 

attempt to redeem Patel's interest. If this occurred, Patel's interest would be 

1 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

Patel and Qamar Arfeen ("Arfeen") were limited partners in Harbor Hospice 

of Beaumont, LP ("Harbor Hospice"). (C.R. 42-88). The general partner of 

Harbor Hospice is Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. (C.R. 84, 87, 126-129, 135-

140, 171-203). 

Patel received a 3% Class A Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice 

of Beaumont, LP in 2005. (C.R. 79, 83) Several amendments were allegedly then 

made to the Harbor Hospice Limited Partnership Agreement (the "Partnership 

Agreement"). (C.R. 126 - 129, 135- 140, 171 - 203). Patel's Class A Limited 

Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice was increased to 6% in Amendment No. 2 

to Agreement of Limited Partnership of Harbor Hospice. (C.R. 176-180). 

At some point, the Appellees' decided to implement a plan for Arfeen to 

improperly take possession of Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor 

Hospice. Appellees' had several options about how to try to take possession of 

Patel's limited partnership interest. First of all, Harbor Hospice could attempt to 

terminate Patel's limited partnership interest for alleged wrongful conduct and 

forfeit the limited partnership interest back to the partnership. If this occurred, 

Patel's limited partnership interest would be returned to the partnership and all of 

the partners would benefit on a pro-rata basis. Secondly, Harbor Hospice could 

attempt to redeem Patel's interest. If this occurred, Patel's interest would be 

1 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Patel and Qamar Arfeen ("Arfeen") were limited partners in Harbor Hospice

of Beaumont, LP ("Harbor Hospice"). (C.R. 42-88). The general partner of

Harbor Hospice is Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. (C.R. 84, 87, 126-129, 135-

140, 171-203).

Patel received a 3% Class A Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice

of Beaumont, LP in 2005. (C.R. 79, 83). Several amendments were allegedly then

made to the Harbor Hospice Limited Partnership Agreement (the “Partnership

Agreement”). (C.R. 126 - 129, 135- 140, 171 - 203). Patel's Class A Limited

Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice was increased to 6% in Amendment No. 2

to Agreement of Limited Partnership of Harbor Hospice. (C.R. 176-180).

At some point, the Appellees' decided to implement a plan for Arfeen to

improperly take possession of Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor

Hospice. Appellees' had several options about how to try to take possession of

Patel's limited partnership interest. First of all, Harbor Hospice could attempt to

terminate Patel’s limited partnership interest for alleged wrongful conduct and

forfeit the limited partnership interest back to the partnership. If this occurred,

Patel's limited partnership interest would be returned to the partnership and all of

the partners would benefit on a pro-rata basis. Secondly, Harbor Hospice could

attempt to redeem Patel’s interest. If this occurred, Patel's interest would be
returned to the partnership and all of the partners would benefit on a pro-rata basis. 

Finally, Arfeen could seek to acquire Patel's interest directly from Patel and 

transfer the shares to Arfeen. However, if Arfeen acquired Patel's limited 

partnership interest directly, he would have to pay Patel the fair value for the 

shares. 

Apparently, none of these options were appealing to Arfeen. Therefore, 

instead of complying the terms of the Partnership Agreement, Appellees decided to 

wrongfully transfer Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, to pay Patel 

nothing, to not inform Patel that the transfer occurred, and to ultimately create false 

documents in an effort to conceal this improper transaction. 

Arfeen Wrongfully Took Possession of Patel's Limited Partnership Interest 

In Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees' assert 

that Patel's Limited Partnership Interest was terminated or redeemed by Harbor 

Hospice. However, in reality, Patel's Limited Partnership Interest was not 

redeemed, terminated or otherwise returned to Harbor Hospice in any manner. It 

was improperly transferred directly to Arfeen. This improper transfer was made 

without consideration and without ever informing Patel. Appellees failed to 

produce summary judgment evidence demonstrating that Patel was ever informed 

that his limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was transferred directly to 

Arfeen. 

2 

returned to the partnership and all of the partners would benefit on a pro-rata basis. 

Finally, Arfeen could seek to acquire Patel's interest directly from Patel and 

transfer the shares to Arfeen. However, if Arfeen acquired Patel's limited 

partnership interest directly, he would have to pay Patel the fair value for the 

shares. 

Apparently, none of these options were appealing to Arfeen. Therefore, 

instead of complying the terms of the Partnership Agreement, Appellees decided to 

wrongfully transfer Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, to pay Patel 

nothing, to not inform Patel that the transfer occurred, and to ultimately create false 

documents in an effort to conceal this improper transaction. 

Arfeen Wrongfully Took Possession of Patel's Limited Partnership Interest 

In Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees' assert 

that Patel's Limited Partnership Interest was terminated or redeemed by Harbor 

Hospice. However, in reality, Patel's Limited Partnership Interest was not 

redeemed, terminated or otherwise returned to Harbor Hospice in any manner. It 

was improperly transferred directly to Arfeen. This improper transfer was made 

without consideration and without ever informing Patel. Appellees failed to 

produce summary judgment evidence demonstrating that Patel was ever informed 

that his limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was transferred directly to 

Arfeen. 

22 

returned to the partnership and all of the partners would benefit on a pro-rata basis.

Finally, Arfeen could seek to acquire Patel’s interest directly from Patel and

transfer the shares to Arfeen. However, if Arfeen acquired Patel’s limited

partnership interest directly, he would have to pay Patel the fair value for the

shares.

Apparently, none of these options were appealing to Arfeen. Therefore,

instead of complying the terms of the Partnership Agreement, Appellees decided to

wrongfully transfer Patel’s limited partnership interest to Arfeen, to pay Patel

nothing, to not inform Patel that the transfer occurred, and to ultimately create false

documents in an effort to conceal this improper transaction.

Arfeen Wrongfully Took Possession of Patel’s Limited Partnership Interest

In Appellees’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees' assert

that Patel’s Limited Partnership Interest was terminated or redeemed by Harbor

Hospice. However, in reality, Patel’s Limited Partnership Interest was not

redeemed, terminated or otherwise returned to Harbor Hospice in any manner. It

was improperly transferred directly to Arfeen. This improper transfer was made

without consideration and without ever informing Patel. Appellees failed to

produce summary judgment evidence demonstrating that Patel was ever informed

that his limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was transferred directly to

Arfeen.
The Harbor Hospice General Ledger for the year 2009 conclusively 

establishes that Patel's limited partnership interest was transferred directly to 

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206). The 2009 General Ledger states: 

01/01/09 "Transfer of 2008 partnership interest from 

Chaudhury & Patel to Arfeed'. (C.R. 204 - 205) 

("emphasis added'). 

Clearly, if Patel's limited partnership interest was transferred directly to 

Arfeen, then Patel's limited partnership interest could not have been terminated, 

forfeited, or redeemed. 

The transfer of Patel's limited partnership interest is explained in an e-mail 

dated April 6, 2009 from Harbor Hospice's accountant, Monica Surratt: 

Paul pointed out that Sandeep Patel & Trip Chaudhury were 

included in the Due from Partners account. Since both of them are 

out as of 1/1/08, what should I do with these balances? 

Since the partnership did not buy their interest back (it was 

transferred to Qamar instead of re-allocated among the other 

partners), then any purchase/payment should have happened 

outside of the partnership. (C.R. 207)("emphasis added'). 

After the direct transfer of Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, 

Harbor Hospice filed Form 8308, Report of a Sale or Exchange of Certain 

Partnership Interests ("Form 8308") with the Internal Revenue Service. (C.R. 

208). Form 8308 was filed with the Internal Revenue Service on April 7, 2009. 

(C.R. 209). In Form 8308, Harbor Hospice informed the Internal Revenue Service, 

3 

The Harbor Hospice General Ledger for the year 2009 conclusively 

establishes that Patel's limited partnership interest was transferred directly to 

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206). The 2009 General Ledger states: 

01/01/09 "Transfer of 2008 partnership interest from 

Chaudhury & Patel to Arfeed'. (C.R. 204 - 205) 

("emphasis added'). 

Clearly, if Patel's limited partnership interest was transferred directly to 

Arfeen, then Patel's limited partnership interest could not have been terminated, 

forfeited, or redeemed. 

The transfer of Patel's limited partnership interest is explained in an e-mail 

dated April 6, 2009 from Harbor Hospice's accountant, Monica Surratt: 

Paul pointed out that Sandeep Patel & Trip Chaudhury were 

included in the Due from Partners account. Since both of them are 

out as of 1/1/08, what should I do with these balances? 

Since the partnership did not buy their interest back (it was 

transferred to Qamar instead of re-allocated among the other 

partners), then any purchase/payment should have happened 

outside of the partnership. (C.R. 207)("emphasis added'). 

After the direct transfer of Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, 

Harbor Hospice filed Form 8308, Report of a Sale or Exchange of Certain 

Partnership Interests ("Form 8308") with the Internal Revenue Service. (C.R. 

208). Form 8308 was filed with the Internal Revenue Service on April 7, 2009. 

(C.R. 209). In Form 8308, Harbor Hospice informed the Internal Revenue Service, 

3 3

The Harbor Hospice General Ledger for the year 2009 conclusively

establishes that Patel’s limited partnership interest was transferred directly to

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206). The 2009 General Ledger states:

01/01/09 “Transfer of 2008 partnership interest from

Chaudhury & Patel to Arfeen”. (C.R. 204 - 205)

(“emphasis added”).

Clearly, if Patel’s limited partnership interest was transferred directly to

Arfeen, then Patel’s limited partnership interest could not have been terminated,

forfeited, or redeemed.

The transfer of Patel’s limited partnership interest is explained in an e-mail

dated April 6, 2009 from Harbor Hospice’s accountant, Monica Surratt:

Paul pointed out that Sandeep Patel & Trip Chaudhury were

included in the Due from Partners account. Since both of them are

out as of 1/1/08, what should I do with these balances?

Since the partnership did not buy their interest back (it was

transferred to Qamar instead of re-allocated among the other

partners), then any purchase/payment should have happened

outside of the partnership. (C.R. 207)(“emphasis added”).

After the direct transfer of Patel’s limited partnership interest to Arfeen,

Harbor Hospice filed Form 8308, Report of a Sale or Exchange of Certain

Partnership Interests (“Form 8308”) with the Internal Revenue Service. (C.R.

208). Form 8308 was filed with the Internal Revenue Service on April 7, 2009.

(C.R. 209). In Form 8308, Harbor Hospice informed the Internal Revenue Service,
under penalty of perjury, that Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice 

was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208) 

These documents clearly establish that Patel's limited partnership interest 

was transferred directly from Patel to Arfeen. Unfortunately, the Appellees never 

informed Patel that his interest was transferred to Arfeen. This is not disputed. 

Ultimately, Arfeen transferred Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor 

Hospice to Arfeen Properties, LP. (C.R. 193-198). There is no summary judgment 

evidence suggesting that Patel was ever informed that his limited partnership 

interest was transferred to Arfeen and then to Arfeen Properties, LP. 

Patel's Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice Was Never Terminated 

Section 10.2 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement provides: 

All of the general partners may unanimously terminate the 

interest of a limited partner and expel him(a) for interfering in the 

management of the partnership affairs or otherwise engaging in 

conduct which could result in the partnership losing its tax status as a 

partnership, (b) if the conduct of a limited partner brings the 

partnership into disrepute, or (c) for failing to meet any commitment 

to the partnership or manager in accordance with any written 

undertaking signed by such limited partner, but the general 

partners shall not be required to so terminate. In each of the 

foregoing events, the expulsion and termination may, in the sole 

discretion of the general partners in order to compensate for any 

damages caused to the partnership, result in a forfeiture to the 

partnership of all or a portion of the value of the partnership interest 

of the expelled partner at the time of such expulsion or termination. 

(C.R. 62)("emphasis added"). 

4 

under penalty of perjury, that Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice 

was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208) 

These documents clearly establish that Patel's limited partnership interest 

was transferred directly from Patel to Arfeen. Unfortunately, the Appellees never 

informed Patel that his interest was transferred to Arfeen. This is not disputed. 

Ultimately, Arfeen transferred Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor 

Hospice to Arfeen Properties, LP. (C.R. 193-198). There is no summary judgment 

evidence suggesting that Patel was ever informed that his limited partnership 

interest was transferred to Arfeen and then to Arfeen Properties, LP. 

Patel's Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice Was Never Terminated 

Section 10.2 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement provides: 

All of the general partners may unanimously terminate the 

interest of a limited partner and expel him(a) for interfering in the 

management of the partnership affairs or otherwise engaging in 

conduct which could result in the partnership losing its tax status as a 

partnership, (b) if the conduct of a limited partner brings the 

partnership into disrepute, or (c) for failing to meet any commitment 

to the partnership or manager in accordance with any written 

undertaking signed by such limited partner, but the general 

partners shall not be required to so terminate. In each of the 

foregoing events, the expulsion and termination may, in the sole 

discretion of the general partners in order to compensate for any 

damages caused to the partnership, result in a forfeiture to the 

partnership of all or a portion of the value of the partnership interest 

of the expelled partner at the time of such expulsion or termination. 

(C.R. 62)("emphasis added"). 

4 4

under penalty of perjury, that Patel’s limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice

was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208).

These documents clearly establish that Patel’s limited partnership interest

was transferred directly from Patel to Arfeen. Unfortunately, the Appellees never

informed Patel that his interest was transferred to Arfeen. This is not disputed.

Ultimately, Arfeen transferred Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor

Hospice to Arfeen Properties, LP. (C.R. 193-198). There is no summary judgment

evidence suggesting that Patel was ever informed that his limited partnership

interest was transferred to Arfeen and then to Arfeen Properties, LP.

Patel's Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice Was Never Terminated

Section 10.2 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement provides:

All of the general partners may unanimously terminate the

interest of a limited partner and expel him(a) for interfering in the

management of the partnership affairs or otherwise engaging in

conduct which could result in the partnership losing its tax status as a

partnership, (b) if the conduct of a limited partner brings the

partnership into disrepute, or (c)for failing to meet any commitment

to the partnership or manager in accordance with any written

undertaking signed by such limited partner, but the general

partners shall not be required to so terminate. In each of the

foregoing events, the expulsion and termination may, in the sole

discretion of the general partners in order to compensate for any

damages caused to the partnership, result in a forfeiture to the

partnership of all or a portion of the value of the partnership interest

of the expelled partner at the time of such expulsion or termination.

(C.R. 62)(“emphasis added”).
There is no summary judgment evidence to establish that the general 

partners of Harbor Hospice unanimously terminated Patel's interest as required by 

Section 10.2 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement. The general partner of 

Harbor Hospice is Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. (C.R. 84, 87, 126-129, 135-

140, 171-203). There is no summary judgment evidence that Harbor Hospice 

Managers, LLC ever took any action to terminate the interest of Patel. 

Furthermore, there is no summary judgment evidence to establish that 

Patel's Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice was ever terminated. No 

witness testimony alleges Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice 

was ever terminated. No document establishes that Patel's limited partnership 

interest in Harbor Hospice was ever terminated. The only summary judgment 

evidence that even mentions termination is a letter dated March 4, 2008 to Patel 

from Maggie Parker (the "Parker Letter"). (C.R. 121-125)1 

When presented with a copy of this letter in his deposition and a copy of the 

green card showing his wife's signature evidencing receipt of the letter, Patel 

acknowledged his wife's signature and receipt as evidenced by the documents. 

(C.R. 94-95). However, Patel did not recall seeing the letter or whether his wife 

brought the letter to his attention; he further testified that his wife handled their 

' The Parker Letter attached to Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment is missing 

the second page. However, the full letter is in the Defendant's original motion for summary 

judgment filed as a supplemental clerk's record in this Court 

5 

There is no summary judgment evidence to establish that the general 

partners of Harbor Hospice unanimously terminated Patel's interest as required by 

Section 10.2 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement. The general partner of 

Harbor Hospice is Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. (C.R. 84, 87, 126-129, 135-

140, 171-203). There is no summary judgment evidence that Harbor Hospice 

Managers, LLC ever took any action to terminate the interest of Patel. 

Furthermore, there is no summary judgment evidence to establish that 

Patel's Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice was ever terminated. No 

witness testimony alleges Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice 

was ever terminated. No document establishes that Patel's limited partnership 

interest in Harbor Hospice was ever terminated. The only summary judgment 

evidence that even mentions termination is a letter dated March 4, 2008 to Patel 

from Maggie Parker (the "Parker Letter"). (C.R. 121-125)1 

When presented with a copy of this letter in his deposition and a copy of the 

green card showing his wife's signature evidencing receipt of the letter, Patel 

acknowledged his wife's signature and receipt as evidenced by the documents. 

(C.R. 94-95). However, Patel did not recall seeing the letter or whether his wife 

brought the letter to his attention; he further testified that his wife handled their 

' The Parker Letter attached to Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment is missing 

the second page. However, the full letter is in the Defendant's original motion for summary 

judgment filed as a supplemental clerk's record in this Court 

55 

There is no summary judgment evidence to establish that the general

partners of Harbor Hospice unanimously terminated Patel’s interest as required by

Section 10.2 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement. The general partner of

Harbor Hospice is Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. (C.R. 84, 87, 126-129, 135-

140, 171-203). There is no summary judgment evidence that Harbor Hospice

Managers, LLC ever took any action to terminate the interest of Patel.

Furthermore, there is no summary judgment evidence to establish that

Patel’s Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice was ever terminated. No

witness testimony alleges Patel’s limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice

was ever terminated. No document establishes that Patel’s limited partnership

interest in Harbor Hospice was ever terminated. The only summary judgment

evidence that even mentions termination is a letter dated March 4, 2008 to Patel

from Maggie Parker (the “Parker Letter”). (C.R. 121-125).1

When presented with a copy of this letter in his deposition and a copy of the

green card showing his wife’s signature evidencing receipt of the letter, Patel

acknowledged his wife’s signature and receipt as evidenced by the documents.

(C.R. 94-95). However, Patel did not recall seeing the letter or whether his wife

brought the letter to his attention; he further testified that his wife handled their

1 The Parker Letter attached to Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment is missing

the second page. However, the full letter is in the Defendant’s original motion for summary

judgment filed as a supplemental clerk’s record in this Court.
financials and that he was certain that his wife or his accountant would have taken 

care of it after receiving the letter. (C.R. 97, 98). Appellees presented no 

summary judgment evidence conclusively establishing that Patel failed to comply 

with Parker's request for financials 

Additionally, Appellees presented no summary judgment evidence that 

Harbor Hospice's general partner took any action against Patel's interest as a result 

of any alleged noncompliance with the letter. Although the Parker Letter clearly 

threatens termination if certain conduct did not occur, it does not provide any 

evidence whatsoever that the termination actually occurred. Furthermore, the 

Parker letter does not provide any evidence that the general partner of Harbor 

Hospice unanimously terminated the interest of Patel and expelled him. The 

Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more. There is no summary judgment 

evidence that the general partner took any action to terminate Patel's limited 

partnership interest and expel him after the Parker Letter. 

Patels' Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice Was Never Redeemed 

Section 8.5 provides: 

(a) The partnership interests of all limited partners are subject to 

redemption by the partnership at the election of the general 

partners. In the event the general partners make such an 

2The only arguably controverting evidence that Appellees submitted was the inconclusive 

deposition testimony of Joe Chapman wherein he testified that he was aware there were some 

issues with getting partners to provide financials to the bank prior to the refinance, and 

speculated, but could not say for certain, that Patel failed to provide financials. (C.R. 117) 

6 

financials and that he was certain that his wife or his accountant would have taken 

care of it after receiving the letter. (C.R. 97, 98). Appellees presented no 

summary judgment evidence conclusively establishing that Patel failed to comply 

with Parker's request for financials 

Additionally, Appellees presented no summary judgment evidence that 

Harbor Hospice's general partner took any action against Patel's interest as a result 

of any alleged noncompliance with the letter. Although the Parker Letter clearly 

threatens termination if certain conduct did not occur, it does not provide any 

evidence whatsoever that the termination actually occurred. Furthermore, the 

Parker letter does not provide any evidence that the general partner of Harbor 

Hospice unanimously terminated the interest of Patel and expelled him. The 

Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more. There is no summary judgment 

evidence that the general partner took any action to terminate Patel's limited 

partnership interest and expel him after the Parker Letter. 

Patels' Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice Was Never Redeemed 

Section 8.5 provides: 

(a) The partnership interests of all limited partners are subject to 

redemption by the partnership at the election of the general 

partners. In the event the general partners make such an 

2The only arguably controverting evidence that Appellees submitted was the inconclusive 

deposition testimony of Joe Chapman wherein he testified that he was aware there were some 

issues with getting partners to provide financials to the bank prior to the refinance, and 

speculated, but could not say for certain, that Patel failed to provide financials. (C.R. 117) 

6 6

financials and that he was certain that his wife or his accountant would have taken

care of it after receiving the letter. (C.R. 97, 98). Appellees presented no

summary judgment evidence conclusively establishing that Patel failed to comply

with Parker’s request for financials.2

Additionally, Appellees presented no summary judgment evidence that

Harbor Hospice’s general partner took any action against Patel’s interest as a result

of any alleged noncompliance with the letter. Although the Parker Letter clearly

threatens termination if certain conduct did not occur, it does not provide any

evidence whatsoever that the termination actually occurred. Furthermore, the

Parker letter does not provide any evidence that the general partner of Harbor

Hospice unanimously terminated the interest of Patel and expelled him. The

Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more. There is no summary judgment

evidence that the general partner took any action to terminate Patel's limited

partnership interest and expel him after the Parker Letter.

Patels' Limited Partnership Interest in Harbor Hospice Was Never Redeemed

Section 8.5 provides:

(a) The partnership interests of all limited partners are subject to

redemption by the partnership at the election of the general

partners. In the event the general partners make such an

2 The only arguably controverting evidence that Appellees submitted was the inconclusive

deposition testimony of Joe Chapman wherein he testified that he was aware there were some

issues with getting partners to provide financials to the bank prior to the refinance, and

speculated, but could not say for certain, that Patel failed to provide financials. (C.R. 117)
election, the general partners shall provide the limited partner 

whose partnership interest is to be redeemed (the "Redeemed 

Partner") with a least sixty days' prior written notice of the 

redemption. 

(b)The purchase price of the Redeemed Partner's LPI shall equal the 

balance of the Redeemed Partner's capital account established 

under Section 5.1 hereof, determined as of the end of the calendar 

month immediately preceding the month in which the closing of 

the redemption transaction takes place. (C.R. 57-58)(tmphasis 

added"). 

The summary judgment record establishes that the general partners failed to 

provide sixty days prior written notice of redemption to Patel. Therefore, Section 

8.5 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement does not apply. The only 

summary judgment evidence that was ever allegedly sent to Patel was the Parker 

Letter. The Parker Letter (i) does not address redemption, (ii) does not provide 60 

days notice of anything (the deadline in the letter actually passed before the letter 

was received), (iii) threatens termination, and (iv) does not even mention the 

general partner, Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. Patel's interest was not 

redeemed in compliance with Section 8.5 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership 

Agreement. Most importantly, Appellees have failed to establish that Patel's 

limited partnership interest was actually redeemed by the partnership or the date of 

the alleged redemption. Instead of redeeming Patel's limited partnership interest to 

the partnership, Appellees decided to transfer Patel's limited partnership interest 

directly to Arfeen. 

7 

election, the general partners shall provide the limited partner 

whose partnership interest is to be redeemed (the "Redeemed 

Partner") with a least sixty days' prior written notice of the 

redemption. 

(b)The purchase price of the Redeemed Partner's LPI shall equal the 

balance of the Redeemed Partner's capital account established 

under Section 5.1 hereof, determined as of the end of the calendar 

month immediately preceding the month in which the closing of 

the redemption transaction takes place. (C.R. 57-58)(tmphasis 

added"). 

The summary judgment record establishes that the general partners failed to 

provide sixty days prior written notice of redemption to Patel. Therefore, Section 

8.5 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement does not apply. The only 

summary judgment evidence that was ever allegedly sent to Patel was the Parker 

Letter. The Parker Letter (i) does not address redemption, (ii) does not provide 60 

days notice of anything (the deadline in the letter actually passed before the letter 

was received), (iii) threatens termination, and (iv) does not even mention the 

general partner, Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. Patel's interest was not 

redeemed in compliance with Section 8.5 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership 

Agreement. Most importantly, Appellees have failed to establish that Patel's 

limited partnership interest was actually redeemed by the partnership or the date of 

the alleged redemption. Instead of redeeming Patel's limited partnership interest to 

the partnership, Appellees decided to transfer Patel's limited partnership interest 

directly to Arfeen. 

77 

election, the general partners shall provide the limited partner

whose partnership interest is to be redeemed (the “Redeemed

Partner”) with a least sixty days’ prior written notice of the

redemption.

(b)The purchase price of the Redeemed Partner’s LPI shall equal the

balance of the Redeemed Partner’s capital account established

under Section 5.1 hereof, determined as of the end of the calendar

month immediately preceding the month in which the closing of

the redemption transaction takes place. (C.R. 57-58)(“emphasis

added”).

The summary judgment record establishes that the general partners failed to

provide sixty days prior written notice of redemption to Patel. Therefore, Section

8.5 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement does not apply. The only

summary judgment evidence that was ever allegedly sent to Patel was the Parker

Letter. The Parker Letter (i) does not address redemption, (ii) does not provide 60

days notice of anything (the deadline in the letter actually passed before the letter

was received), (iii) threatens termination, and (iv) does not even mention the

general partner, Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC. Patel's interest was not

redeemed in compliance with Section 8.5 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership

Agreement. Most importantly, Appellees have failed to establish that Patel's

limited partnership interest was actually redeemed by the partnership or the date of

the alleged redemption. Instead of redeeming Patel's limited partnership interest to

the partnership, Appellees decided to transfer Patel's limited partnership interest

directly to Arfeen.
The Coverup 

Though Appellees contend Patel's partnership interest was "forfeited" 

before June 15, 2008, several significant documents contradict their contentions. 

A Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet dated December 31, 2008 establishes that Patel 

was still a limited partner as of that date. (C.R. 217). A Harbor Hospice General 

Ledger from 2009 establishes that Arfeen wrongfully took possession of Patel's 

limited partnership interest in 2009. (C.R. 204-206). 

An email from Harbor Hospice's accountant, Monica Surratt, from April of 

2009 confirms Arfeen's improper direct transfer stating, "[Once the partnership 

did not buy their interest back (it was transferred to Qamar instead of reallocated 

among the other partners), then any purchase/payment should have happened 

outside of the partnership.° (C.R. 207). Arfeen's improper transfer is further 

evidenced by Harbor Hospice's 8309 Form filed with the Internal Revenue Service 

stating that Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was transferred 

directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208). Though the form states the limited partnership 

interest was transferred as of 1/1/08 that date is inconsistent with the balance sheet 

3Arfeen's improper transfer is further confirmed by Harbor Hospice's 8309 Form filed with the 

Internal Revenue Service stating that Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was 

transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208). 

8 

The Coverup 

Though Appellees contend Patel's partnership interest was "forfeited" 

before June 15, 2008, several significant documents contradict their contentions. 

A Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet dated December 31, 2008 establishes that Patel 

was still a limited partner as of that date. (C.R. 217). A Harbor Hospice General 

Ledger from 2009 establishes that Arfeen wrongfully took possession of Patel's 

limited partnership interest in 2009. (C.R. 204-206). 

An email from Harbor Hospice's accountant, Monica Surratt, from April of 

2009 confirms Arfeen's improper direct transfer stating, "[Once the partnership 

did not buy their interest back (it was transferred to Qamar instead of reallocated 

among the other partners), then any purchase/payment should have happened 

outside of the partnership.° (C.R. 207). Arfeen's improper transfer is further 

evidenced by Harbor Hospice's 8309 Form filed with the Internal Revenue Service 

stating that Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was transferred 

directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208). Though the form states the limited partnership 

interest was transferred as of 1/1/08 that date is inconsistent with the balance sheet 

3Arfeen's improper transfer is further confirmed by Harbor Hospice's 8309 Form filed with the 

Internal Revenue Service stating that Patel's limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was 

transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208). 

8 8

The Coverup

Though Appellees contend Patel’s partnership interest was “forfeited”

before June 15, 2008, several significant documents contradict their contentions.

A Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet dated December 31, 2008 establishes that Patel

was still a limited partner as of that date. (C.R. 217). A Harbor Hospice General

Ledger from 2009 establishes that Arfeen wrongfully took possession of Patel's

limited partnership interest in 2009. (C.R. 204-206).

An email from Harbor Hospice’s accountant, Monica Surratt, from April of

2009 confirms Arfeen’s improper direct transfer stating, “[s]ince the partnership

did not buy their interest back (it was transferred to Qamar instead of reallocated

among the other partners), then any purchase/payment should have happened

outside of the partnership.”3(C.R. 207). Arfeen’s improper transfer is further

evidenced by Harbor Hospice’s 8309 Form filed with the Internal Revenue Service

stating that Patel’s limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was transferred

directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208). Though the form states the limited partnership

interest was transferred as of 1/1/08 that date is inconsistent with the balance sheet

3 Arfeen’s improper transfer is further confirmed by Harbor Hospice’s 8309 Form filed with the

Internal Revenue Service stating that Patel’s limited partnership interest in Harbor Hospice was

transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 208).
and general ledger, and the form does not appear to have been prepared until April 

of 2009. (C.R. 207, 209). 

In 2011, apparently Appellees realized that they had not completed an 

appropriate paper trail regarding this improper transaction. The Partnership 

Agreement had never been amended to reflect Arfeen's wrongful acquisition of 

Patel's limited partnership interest. Therefore, Appellees created two different 

Amendment No. 4's to Agreement of Limited Partnership of Harbor Hospice. 

(C.R. 126-129, 135-140). One of the Amendment No. 4's is dated November 10, 

2011 (the "Dated Amendment No. 4"). (C.R. 135-140). The Dated Amendment 

No. 4 states: 

(1) Section 12.2(a) of the Partnership Agreement provides that each limited 

partner authorizes and empowers the general partners to amend the 

Partnership Agreement; 

(2) The General Partner has elected to redeem the limited partner interests of 

Triptesh Chaudhury and Sandeep Patel in accordance with Section 8.5 of 

the Partnership Agreement; 

(3) The General Partner desires to amend the Partnership Agreement to 

adjust the limited partnership percentages following the effective date of 

the redemption; 

(4)The effective date of the redemption shall be January 1, 2008; 

(5) Exhibit "A" to the Partnership is hereby amended so that from and after 

the effective date, the limited partners and their respective interest in the 

partnership shall be as set forth in such exhibit; and 

(6) Exhibit "A" appears to reflect all Class C Limited Partners. 

9 

and general ledger, and the form does not appear to have been prepared until April 

of 2009. (C.R. 207, 209). 

In 2011, apparently Appellees realized that they had not completed an 

appropriate paper trail regarding this improper transaction. The Partnership 

Agreement had never been amended to reflect Arfeen's wrongful acquisition of 

Patel's limited partnership interest. Therefore, Appellees created two different 

Amendment No. 4's to Agreement of Limited Partnership of Harbor Hospice. 

(C.R. 126-129, 135-140). One of the Amendment No. 4's is dated November 10, 

2011 (the "Dated Amendment No. 4"). (C.R. 135-140). The Dated Amendment 

No. 4 states: 

(1) Section 12.2(a) of the Partnership Agreement provides that each limited 

partner authorizes and empowers the general partners to amend the 

Partnership Agreement; 

(2) The General Partner has elected to redeem the limited partner interests of 

Triptesh Chaudhury and Sandeep Patel in accordance with Section 8.5 of 

the Partnership Agreement; 

(3) The General Partner desires to amend the Partnership Agreement to 

adjust the limited partnership percentages following the effective date of 

the redemption; 

(4)The effective date of the redemption shall be January 1, 2008; 

(5) Exhibit "A" to the Partnership is hereby amended so that from and after 

the effective date, the limited partners and their respective interest in the 

partnership shall be as set forth in such exhibit; and 

(6) Exhibit "A" appears to reflect all Class C Limited Partners. 

9 9

and general ledger, and the form does not appear to have been prepared until April

of 2009. (C.R. 207, 209).

In 2011, apparently Appellees realized that they had not completed an

appropriate paper trail regarding this improper transaction. The Partnership

Agreement had never been amended to reflect Arfeen's wrongful acquisition of

Patel's limited partnership interest. Therefore, Appellees created two different

Amendment No. 4’s to Agreement of Limited Partnership of Harbor Hospice.

(C.R. 126-129, 135-140). One of the Amendment No. 4's is dated November 10,

2011 (the "Dated Amendment No. 4"). (C.R. 135-140). The Dated Amendment

No. 4 states:

(1)Section 12.2(a) of the Partnership Agreement provides that each limited

partner authorizes and empowers the general partners to amend the

Partnership Agreement;

(2)The General Partner has elected to redeem the limited partner interests of

Triptesh Chaudhury and Sandeep Patel in accordance with Section 8.5 of

the Partnership Agreement;

(3)The General Partner desires to amend the Partnership Agreement to

adjust the limited partnership percentages following the effective date of

the redemption;

(4)The effective date of the redemption shall be January 1, 2008;

(5)Exhibit “A” to the Partnership is hereby amended so that from and after

the effective date, the limited partners and their respective interest in the

partnership shall be as set forth in such exhibit; and

(6)Exhibit “A” appears to reflect all Class C Limited Partners.
The other Amendment No. 4 (the "Undated Amendment No. 4") states an 

effective date but does not state the date it was executed. (C.R. 126-129). The 

Undated Amendment No. 4 states: 

(1)The same information set forth in (1) — (5) from the Dated Amendment 

No. 4 above; 

(2) The document is not dated but states that it was "EXECUTED to be 

effective as of the 1stday of January, 2008"; and 

(3)Exhibit "A" does not reflect the Class C Limited Partners. (C.R. 126-

129). 

The inconsistencies in the two amendment No. 4's evidence a blatant 

attempt to cover up the improper transfer. The second Amendment No. 4 deletes 

the November 10, 2011 date of execution and deceptively attempts to make the 

amendment effective as of January 1, 2008, nearly four years earlier, without 

stating that the document was actually executed in 2011. (C.R. 126-129, 135-140). 

Regardless of Appellees' futile attempt to legally effectuate Arfeen's improper 

transfer, there is no summary judgment evidence indicating that the Limited 

Partnership Agreement of Harbor Hospice was amended to remove Patel before 

November 10, 2011. (C.R. 135 - 140). 

Both Amendment 4's state that Patel's interest was redeemed. (C.R. 126-

129, 135-140). Both Amendment 4's are inconsistent with the 2009 General 

Ledger of Harbor Hospice, the 2008 Tax Return of Harbor Hospice (including 

Form 8308), and the notes of the accountant of Harbor Hospice. (C.R. 204 - 206, 

10 

The other Amendment No. 4 (the "Undated Amendment No. 4") states an 

effective date but does not state the date it was executed. (C.R. 126-129). The 

Undated Amendment No. 4 states: 

(1)The same information set forth in (1) — (5) from the Dated Amendment 

No. 4 above; 

(2) The document is not dated but states that it was "EXECUTED to be 

effective as of the 1stday of January, 2008"; and 

(3)Exhibit "A" does not reflect the Class C Limited Partners. (C.R. 126-

129). 

The inconsistencies in the two amendment No. 4's evidence a blatant 

attempt to cover up the improper transfer. The second Amendment No. 4 deletes 

the November 10, 2011 date of execution and deceptively attempts to make the 

amendment effective as of January 1, 2008, nearly four years earlier, without 

stating that the document was actually executed in 2011. (C.R. 126-129, 135-140). 

Regardless of Appellees' futile attempt to legally effectuate Arfeen's improper 

transfer, there is no summary judgment evidence indicating that the Limited 

Partnership Agreement of Harbor Hospice was amended to remove Patel before 

November 10, 2011. (C.R. 135 - 140). 

Both Amendment 4's state that Patel's interest was redeemed. (C.R. 126-

129, 135-140). Both Amendment 4's are inconsistent with the 2009 General 

Ledger of Harbor Hospice, the 2008 Tax Return of Harbor Hospice (including 

Form 8308), and the notes of the accountant of Harbor Hospice. (C.R. 204 - 206, 

10 10

The other Amendment No. 4 (the "Undated Amendment No. 4") states an

effective date but does not state the date it was executed. (C.R. 126-129). The

Undated Amendment No. 4 states:

(1)The same information set forth in (1) – (5) from the Dated Amendment

No. 4 above;

(2)The document is not dated but states that it was “EXECUTED to be

effective as of the 1st day of January, 2008”; and

(3)Exhibit “A” does not reflect the Class C Limited Partners. (C.R. 126-

129).

The inconsistencies in the two amendment No. 4’s evidence a blatant

attempt to cover up the improper transfer. The second Amendment No. 4 deletes

the November 10, 2011 date of execution and deceptively attempts to make the

amendment effective as of January 1, 2008, nearly four years earlier, without

stating that the document was actually executed in 2011. (C.R. 126-129, 135-140).

Regardless of Appellees’ futile attempt to legally effectuate Arfeen’s improper

transfer, there is no summary judgment evidence indicating that the Limited

Partnership Agreement of Harbor Hospice was amended to remove Patel before

November 10, 2011. (C.R. 135 - 140).

Both Amendment 4's state that Patel's interest was redeemed. (C.R. 126-

129, 135-140). Both Amendment 4's are inconsistent with the 2009 General

Ledger of Harbor Hospice, the 2008 Tax Return of Harbor Hospice (including

Form 8308), and the notes of the accountant of Harbor Hospice. (C.R. 204 - 206,
C.R. 208, and C.R. 207). The Dated Amendment No. 4 was created nearly four 

years after the alleged transfer. It is unclear when the Undated Amendment 4 was 

created. When confronted with the conflicting Amendment 4's, the Harbor 

Hospice representative designated to testify regarding the alleged termination of 

Patel's ownership interest in Harbor Hospice stated that he was concerned that 

someone might have done something unethical, immoral or illegal. (C.R. 212-

213). 

Appellees persuade the trial court to grant summary judgment 

Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment did not seek summary 

judgment on no-evidence grounds. Instead, Appellees sought to establish as a 

matter of law that (i) Patel's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, (ii) there 

was no genuine issue of material fact as to Patel's claims for breach of partnership, 

breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, or Texas Theft Liability Act violations, and 

(iii) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages. (C.R. 26-141). 

Patel responded with evidence establishing that Appellees did not meet their 

burden of proof under any of these theories and by establishing that fact issues 

existed that precluded summary judgment. (C.R. 145-238 and C.R. 248-254). On 

April 29, 2015, a hearing was held on Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (C.R. 291). The summary judgment motion was taken under 

advisement. (C.R. 291). On June 18, 2015, the trial court granted Appellees' 

11 

C.R. 208, and C.R. 207). The Dated Amendment No. 4 was created nearly four 

years after the alleged transfer. It is unclear when the Undated Amendment 4 was 

created. When confronted with the conflicting Amendment 4's, the Harbor 

Hospice representative designated to testify regarding the alleged termination of 

Patel's ownership interest in Harbor Hospice stated that he was concerned that 

someone might have done something unethical, immoral or illegal. (C.R. 212-

213). 

Appellees persuade the trial court to grant summary judgment 

Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment did not seek summary 

judgment on no-evidence grounds. Instead, Appellees sought to establish as a 

matter of law that (i) Patel's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, (ii) there 

was no genuine issue of material fact as to Patel's claims for breach of partnership, 

breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, or Texas Theft Liability Act violations, and 

(iii) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages. (C.R. 26-141). 

Patel responded with evidence establishing that Appellees did not meet their 

burden of proof under any of these theories and by establishing that fact issues 

existed that precluded summary judgment. (C.R. 145-238 and C.R. 248-254). On 

April 29, 2015, a hearing was held on Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (C.R. 291). The summary judgment motion was taken under 

advisement. (C.R. 291). On June 18, 2015, the trial court granted Appellees' 

11 11

C.R. 208, and C.R. 207). The Dated Amendment No. 4 was created nearly four

years after the alleged transfer. It is unclear when the Undated Amendment 4 was

created. When confronted with the conflicting Amendment 4’s, the Harbor

Hospice representative designated to testify regarding the alleged termination of

Patel’s ownership interest in Harbor Hospice stated that he was concerned that

someone might have done something unethical, immoral or illegal. (C.R. 212-

213).

Appellees persuade the trial court to grant summary judgment

Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment did not seek summary

judgment on no-evidence grounds. Instead, Appellees sought to establish as a

matter of law that (i) Patel's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, (ii) there

was no genuine issue of material fact as to Patel's claims for breach of partnership,

breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, or Texas Theft Liability Act violations, and

(iii) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages. (C.R. 26-141).

Patel responded with evidence establishing that Appellees did not meet their

burden of proof under any of these theories and by establishing that fact issues

existed that precluded summary judgment. (C.R. 145-238 and C.R. 248-254). On

April 29, 2015, a hearing was held on Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment. (C.R. 291). The summary judgment motion was taken under

advisement. (C.R. 291). On June 18, 2015, the trial court granted Appellees'
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. (C.R. 255). Patel then submitted a 

Motion for New Trial that was denied. (C.R. 256-282, C.R. 283). This appeal 

followed. (C . R. 287-288). 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

Appellees have not established that they are entitled to summary judgment 

as a matter of law on any ground. Appellees sought to establish as a matter of law 

that (i) Patel's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, (ii) there was no 

genuine issue of material fact as to Patel's claims for breach of partnership, breach 

of fiduciary duty, conversion, or Texas Theft Liability Act violations, and (iii) 

there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages. However, facts issues 

exist regarding each and every ground on which Appellees moved for summary 

judgment. 

In support of their affirmative defense of statute of limitations, Appellees 

claimed they could prove as a matter of law that Patel's claims for (i) breach of 

fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, fraud and declaratory relief accrued on or 

before June 15, 2008 (4 years before suit was filed), and (ii) conversion and Texas 

Theft Liability Act violations accrued before June 15, 2010 (2 years before suit 

was filed). However, Appellees failed to meet their burden of proof. Furthermore, 

Patel presented summary judgment evidence that establishes that Patel's claims for 

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, fraud and declaratory relief accrued 

12 

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. (C.R. 255). Patel then submitted a 

Motion for New Trial that was denied. (C.R. 256-282, C.R. 283). This appeal 

followed. (C . R. 287-288). 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

Appellees have not established that they are entitled to summary judgment 

as a matter of law on any ground. Appellees sought to establish as a matter of law 

that (i) Patel's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, (ii) there was no 

genuine issue of material fact as to Patel's claims for breach of partnership, breach 

of fiduciary duty, conversion, or Texas Theft Liability Act violations, and (iii) 

there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages. However, facts issues 

exist regarding each and every ground on which Appellees moved for summary 

judgment. 

In support of their affirmative defense of statute of limitations, Appellees 

claimed they could prove as a matter of law that Patel's claims for (i) breach of 

fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, fraud and declaratory relief accrued on or 

before June 15, 2008 (4 years before suit was filed), and (ii) conversion and Texas 

Theft Liability Act violations accrued before June 15, 2010 (2 years before suit 

was filed). However, Appellees failed to meet their burden of proof. Furthermore, 

Patel presented summary judgment evidence that establishes that Patel's claims for 

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, fraud and declaratory relief accrued 

12 12

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. (C.R. 255). Patel then submitted a

Motion for New Trial that was denied. (C.R. 256-282, C.R. 283). This appeal

followed. (C.R. 287-288).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Appellees have not established that they are entitled to summary judgment

as a matter of law on any ground. Appellees sought to establish as a matter of law

that (i) Patel's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, (ii) there was no

genuine issue of material fact as to Patel's claims for breach of partnership, breach

of fiduciary duty, conversion, or Texas Theft Liability Act violations, and (iii)

there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages. However, facts issues

exist regarding each and every ground on which Appellees moved for summary

judgment.

In support of their affirmative defense of statute of limitations, Appellees

claimed they could prove as a matter of law that Patel’s claims for (i) breach of

fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, fraud and declaratory relief accrued on or

before June 15, 2008 (4 years before suit was filed), and (ii) conversion and Texas

Theft Liability Act violations accrued before June 15, 2010 (2 years before suit

was filed). However, Appellees failed to meet their burden of proof. Furthermore,

Patel presented summary judgment evidence that establishes that Patel’s claims for

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, fraud and declaratory relief accrued
after June 15, 2008 and that Patel's claims for conversion and Texas Theft 

Liability Act violations accrued after June 15, 2010. Accordingly, Appellees failed 

to prove their statute of limitations defense as a matter of law and the trial court 

should have denied Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based 

upon Appellees' statute of limitations defense. 

Appellees also claimed that their conduct was proper under the Partnership 

Agreement and Texas law and therefore no genuine issue of material fact existed 

regarding Patel's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion 

or violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act. Appellees argument is premised 

solely on the claim that Patel's partnership interest was terminated or redeemed by 

Harbor Hospice. However, the summary judgment evidence clearly demonstrates 

that Patel's interest was not terminated or redeemed. Patel's limited partnership 

interest was improperly transferred directly to Arfeen. Not only did Appellees 

improperly transfer Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, they did so 

without informing Patel, without complying with the terms of the Partnership 

Agreement, and did not provide Patel any compensation for this limited 

partnership interest. Accordingly, Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law 

that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Patel's claims for breach of 

fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion or violations of the Texas Theft 

Liability Act. 

13 

after June 15, 2008 and that Patel's claims for conversion and Texas Theft 

Liability Act violations accrued after June 15, 2010. Accordingly, Appellees failed 

to prove their statute of limitations defense as a matter of law and the trial court 

should have denied Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based 

upon Appellees' statute of limitations defense. 

Appellees also claimed that their conduct was proper under the Partnership 

Agreement and Texas law and therefore no genuine issue of material fact existed 

regarding Patel's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion 

or violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act. Appellees argument is premised 

solely on the claim that Patel's partnership interest was terminated or redeemed by 

Harbor Hospice. However, the summary judgment evidence clearly demonstrates 

that Patel's interest was not terminated or redeemed. Patel's limited partnership 

interest was improperly transferred directly to Arfeen. Not only did Appellees 

improperly transfer Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, they did so 

without informing Patel, without complying with the terms of the Partnership 

Agreement, and did not provide Patel any compensation for this limited 

partnership interest. Accordingly, Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law 

that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Patel's claims for breach of 

fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion or violations of the Texas Theft 

Liability Act. 

13 13

after June 15, 2008 and that Patel’s claims for conversion and Texas Theft

Liability Act violations accrued after June 15, 2010. Accordingly, Appellees failed

to prove their statute of limitations defense as a matter of law and the trial court

should have denied Appellees’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based

upon Appellees’ statute of limitations defense.

Appellees also claimed that their conduct was proper under the Partnership

Agreement and Texas law and therefore no genuine issue of material fact existed

regarding Patel's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion

or violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act. Appellees argument is premised

solely on the claim that Patel's partnership interest was terminated or redeemed by

Harbor Hospice. However, the summary judgment evidence clearly demonstrates

that Patel's interest was not terminated or redeemed. Patel's limited partnership

interest was improperly transferred directly to Arfeen. Not only did Appellees

improperly transfer Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, they did so

without informing Patel, without complying with the terms of the Partnership

Agreement, and did not provide Patel any compensation for this limited

partnership interest. Accordingly, Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law

that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Patel's claims for breach of

fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion or violations of the Texas Theft

Liability Act.
Additionally, Appellees claimed that no genuine issue of material fact 

existed regarding Patel's claim for damages for any cause of action. Appellees 

allege that pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, a partner that leaves the 

partnership either voluntarily or through expulsion leaves with nothing more than 

his capital account. However, the provisions cited by Appellees do not apply to an 

improper transfer from Patel directly to Arfeen. Moreover, a fact issue exists 

regarding Patel's capital account balance. Therefore, Appellees failed to prove that 

no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Patel's claim for damages for 

any cause of action. 

Finally, Appellees failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment 

evidence. No affidavit was attached to Appelles' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment attempting to authenticate any of the summary judgment evidence. 

Accordingly, Appellees' summary judgment evidence was not authenticated and 

should not have been admissible as summary judgment evidence. 

For all of these reasons, the trial court's judgment should be reversed. 

14 

Additionally, Appellees claimed that no genuine issue of material fact 

existed regarding Patel's claim for damages for any cause of action. Appellees 

allege that pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, a partner that leaves the 

partnership either voluntarily or through expulsion leaves with nothing more than 

his capital account. However, the provisions cited by Appellees do not apply to an 

improper transfer from Patel directly to Arfeen. Moreover, a fact issue exists 

regarding Patel's capital account balance. Therefore, Appellees failed to prove that 

no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Patel's claim for damages for 

any cause of action. 

Finally, Appellees failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment 

evidence. No affidavit was attached to Appelles' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment attempting to authenticate any of the summary judgment evidence. 

Accordingly, Appellees' summary judgment evidence was not authenticated and 

should not have been admissible as summary judgment evidence. 

For all of these reasons, the trial court's judgment should be reversed. 

14 14

Additionally, Appellees claimed that no genuine issue of material fact

existed regarding Patel's claim for damages for any cause of action. Appellees

allege that pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, a partner that leaves the

partnership either voluntarily or through expulsion leaves with nothing more than

his capital account. However, the provisions cited by Appellees do not apply to an

improper transfer from Patel directly to Arfeen. Moreover, a fact issue exists

regarding Patel's capital account balance. Therefore, Appellees failed to prove that

no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Patel's claim for damages for

any cause of action.

Finally, Appellees failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment

evidence. No affidavit was attached to Appelles' Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment attempting to authenticate any of the summary judgment evidence.

Accordingly, Appellees' summary judgment evidence was not authenticated and

should not have been admissible as summary judgment evidence.

For all of these reasons, the trial court’s judgment should be reversed.
ARGUMENT 

I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Appellees' Amended Motion for 

Summary Judgment. 

The function of summary judgment procedure is not to deprive litigants of 

their right to a full hearing on the merits of fact issues or their right to a jury trial. 

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a; see also Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 344 (Tex. App. 

— Corpus Christi 2003, not pet.). The goal of the summary judgment procedure is 

the elimination of patently unmeritorious claims or unmeritorious defenses and the 

summary termination of a case when it clearly appears there are no issues of fact. 

See Bliss v. NRG Industries, 162 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2005, pet. 

denied). 

Appellate courts review a trial court's grant of summary judgment under a 

de novo standard of review. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. 

Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). To prevail on a traditional motion for 

summary judgment, the movant must prove that "there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law[.]" Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Therefore, when a defendant moves for summary 

judgment, he must either disprove at least one essential element of each theory of 

recovery pleaded by the plaintiff, or he must plead and conclusively prove each 

essential element of an affirmative defense. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade 

15 

ARGUMENT 

I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Appellees' Amended Motion for 

Summary Judgment. 

The function of summary judgment procedure is not to deprive litigants of 

their right to a full hearing on the merits of fact issues or their right to a jury trial. 

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a; see also Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 344 (Tex. App. 

— Corpus Christi 2003, not pet.). The goal of the summary judgment procedure is 

the elimination of patently unmeritorious claims or unmeritorious defenses and the 

summary termination of a case when it clearly appears there are no issues of fact. 

See Bliss v. NRG Industries, 162 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2005, pet. 

denied). 

Appellate courts review a trial court's grant of summary judgment under a 

de novo standard of review. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. 

Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). To prevail on a traditional motion for 

summary judgment, the movant must prove that "there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law[.]" Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Therefore, when a defendant moves for summary 

judgment, he must either disprove at least one essential element of each theory of 

recovery pleaded by the plaintiff, or he must plead and conclusively prove each 

essential element of an affirmative defense. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade 

15 15

ARGUMENT

I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Appellees' Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment.

The function of summary judgment procedure is not to deprive litigants of

their right to a full hearing on the merits of fact issues or their right to a jury trial.

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a;see also Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 344 (Tex. App.

– Corpus Christi 2003, not pet.). The goal of the summary judgment procedure is

the elimination of patently unmeritorious claims or unmeritorious defenses and the

summary termination of a case when it clearly appears there are no issues of fact.

See Bliss v. NRG Industries, 162 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2005, pet.

denied).

Appellate courts review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment under a

de novo standard of review. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v.

Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). To prevail on a traditional motion for

summary judgment, the movant must prove that “there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law[.]” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Therefore, when a defendant moves for summary

judgment, he must either disprove at least one essential element of each theory of

recovery pleaded by the plaintiff, or he must plead and conclusively prove each

essential element of an affirmative defense. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade
& Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. 1996); Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, 

Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Tex. 1995). 

"If there is any genuine issue of material fact, a motion for summary 

judgment must be denied." Nautilus Training Center No. 2, Inc. v. Seafirst 

Leasing Corp., 647 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 1982, no 

writ). In determining whether Appellee met its summary judgment burden, this 

Court must resolve every reasonable inference in favor of Patel, resolve all doubts 

in favor of Patel, and take all evidence favorable to Patel as true. Rhone-Poulenc, 

Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d at 223 (1999). 

A. ISSUE ONE: Appellees Did Not Establish a Statute of Limitations 

Defense as a Matter of Law. 

Appellees did not establish their statute of limitations defense as a matter of 

law. In their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees relied upon the 

affirmative defense of statute of limitations. (C.R. 31-33). Appellees alleged that 

they had uncontroverted evidence that Patel knew or should have known of any 

alleged injuries before June 15, 2008 (4 years before suit was filed) for breach of 

fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, and fraud claims and before June 15, 2010 (2 

years before suit was filed) for the alleged conversion and Texas Theft Liability 

Act violations. (C.R. 31-33). Appellees failed to address Patel's claim for 

declaratory relief in their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based upon 

16 

& Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. 1996); Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, 

Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Tex. 1995). 

"If there is any genuine issue of material fact, a motion for summary 

judgment must be denied." Nautilus Training Center No. 2, Inc. v. Seafirst 

Leasing Corp., 647 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 1982, no 

writ). In determining whether Appellee met its summary judgment burden, this 

Court must resolve every reasonable inference in favor of Patel, resolve all doubts 

in favor of Patel, and take all evidence favorable to Patel as true. Rhone-Poulenc, 

Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d at 223 (1999). 

A. ISSUE ONE: Appellees Did Not Establish a Statute of Limitations 

Defense as a Matter of Law. 

Appellees did not establish their statute of limitations defense as a matter of 

law. In their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees relied upon the 

affirmative defense of statute of limitations. (C.R. 31-33). Appellees alleged that 

they had uncontroverted evidence that Patel knew or should have known of any 

alleged injuries before June 15, 2008 (4 years before suit was filed) for breach of 

fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, and fraud claims and before June 15, 2010 (2 

years before suit was filed) for the alleged conversion and Texas Theft Liability 

Act violations. (C.R. 31-33). Appellees failed to address Patel's claim for 

declaratory relief in their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based upon 

16 16

& Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. 1996); Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas,

Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Tex. 1995).

“If there is any genuine issue of material fact, a motion for summary

judgment must be denied.” Nautilus Training Center No. 2, Inc. v. Seafirst

Leasing Corp., 647 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1982, no

writ). In determining whether Appellee met its summary judgment burden, this

Court must resolve every reasonable inference in favor of Patel, resolve all doubts

in favor of Patel, and take all evidence favorable to Patel as true. Rhone-Poulenc,

Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d at 223 (1999).

A. ISSUE ONE: Appellees Did Not Establish a Statute of Limitations

Defense as a Matter of Law.

Appellees did not establish their statute of limitations defense as a matter of

law. In their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment,Appellees relied upon the

affirmative defense of statute of limitations. (C.R. 31-33). Appellees alleged that

they had uncontroverted evidence that Patel knew or should have known of any

alleged injuries before June 15, 2008 (4 years before suit was filed) for breach of

fiduciary duty, breach of partnership, and fraud claims and before June 15, 2010 (2

years before suit was filed) for the alleged conversion and Texas Theft Liability

Act violations. (C.R. 31-33). Appellees failed to address Patel's claim for

declaratory relief in their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based upon
statute of limitations or any other theory. Therefore, summary judgment disposing 

of the declaratory judgment action was improper. 

In order to prevail on a statute of limitations claim, Appellees had to (1) 

conclusively prove that Patel's cause of action accrued before the commencement 

of the statute of limitations period, and (2) negate the discovery rule by proving as 

a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of material fact about when Patel 

discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 

injury. See Messner v. Boon, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 747, *30 (Tex. App. 

Texarkana Jan. 28, 2015). Furthermore, Appellees had to negate Patel's claim of 

fraudulent concealment. See Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations, 954 

S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. denied). Appellees failed to 

establish any of these points as a matter of law. 

Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law that Patel's limited 

partnership interest was terminated or otherwise transferred on or before June 15, 

2008. Significantly, Appellees have not conclusively established when Patel's 

limited partnership interest was taken from him, whether by termination, 

redemption, forfeiture, or improper transfer. Viewing all evidence in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant, Patel, and resolving all reasonable inferences in his 

favor, the improper transfer does not appear to have occurred until sometime in 

2009 and does not appear to have been legally effectuated through amendment of 

17 

statute of limitations or any other theory. Therefore, summary judgment disposing 

of the declaratory judgment action was improper. 

In order to prevail on a statute of limitations claim, Appellees had to (1) 

conclusively prove that Patel's cause of action accrued before the commencement 

of the statute of limitations period, and (2) negate the discovery rule by proving as 

a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of material fact about when Patel 

discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 

injury. See Messner v. Boon, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 747, *30 (Tex. App. 

Texarkana Jan. 28, 2015). Furthermore, Appellees had to negate Patel's claim of 

fraudulent concealment. See Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations, 954 

S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. denied). Appellees failed to 

establish any of these points as a matter of law. 

Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law that Patel's limited 

partnership interest was terminated or otherwise transferred on or before June 15, 

2008. Significantly, Appellees have not conclusively established when Patel's 

limited partnership interest was taken from him, whether by termination, 

redemption, forfeiture, or improper transfer. Viewing all evidence in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant, Patel, and resolving all reasonable inferences in his 

favor, the improper transfer does not appear to have occurred until sometime in 

2009 and does not appear to have been legally effectuated through amendment of 

17 17

statute of limitations or any other theory. Therefore, summary judgment disposing

of the declaratory judgment action was improper.

In order to prevail on a statute of limitations claim, Appellees had to (1)

conclusively prove that Patel's cause of action accrued before the commencement

of the statute of limitations period, and (2) negate the discovery rule by proving as

a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of material fact about when Patel

discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the

injury. See Messner v. Boon, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 747, *30 (Tex. App.

Texarkana Jan. 28, 2015). Furthermore, Appellees had to negate Patel's claim of

fraudulent concealment. See Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations, 954

S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. denied). Appellees failed to

establish any of these points as a matter of law.

Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law that Patel's limited

partnership interest was terminated or otherwise transferred on or before June 15,

2008. Significantly, Appellees have not conclusively established when Patel’s

limited partnership interest was taken from him, whether by termination,

redemption, forfeiture, or improper transfer. Viewing all evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-movant, Patel, and resolving all reasonable inferences in his

favor, the improper transfer does not appear to have occurred until sometime in

2009 and does not appear to have been legally effectuated through amendment of
the Partnership Agreement until 2011. Further, Appellees failed to establish as a 

matter of law that Patel discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence 

should have discovered the injury on or before June 15, 2008. In addition to 

having failed to conclusively establish that Patel's interest was terminated or 

otherwise transferred before June 15, 2008, Appellees likewise failed to establish 

their statute of limitations defense as a matter of law because of the discovery rule 

and because of Appellees' fraudulent concealment. 

1. Summary Judgment Evidence Establishes Patel Was a Partner in 

Harbor Hospice After June 15, 2008 

The following chart clearly demonstrates the timeline of events in this 

matter: 

DATE Description of Document 

March 4, 2008 Maggie Parker Threatening Letter (does not 

establish anything for statute of limitations 

purposes)(C.R. 121-125) 

4 year statute — June 15, 2008 

December 31, 2008 

January 1, 2009 

Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet (C.R. 217-219). 

This balance sheet establishes that as of 12/31/08, 

Patel was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice. 

2009 General Ledger of Harbor Hospice (C.R. 

204-206). The 2009 General Ledger establishes 

that Patel was still a limited partner on January 1, 

2009. 

18 

the Partnership Agreement until 2011. Further, Appellees failed to establish as a 

matter of law that Patel discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence 

should have discovered the injury on or before June 15, 2008. In addition to 

having failed to conclusively establish that Patel's interest was terminated or 

otherwise transferred before June 15, 2008, Appellees likewise failed to establish 

their statute of limitations defense as a matter of law because of the discovery rule 

and because of Appellees' fraudulent concealment. 

1. Summary Judgment Evidence Establishes Patel Was a Partner in 

Harbor Hospice After June 15, 2008 

The following chart clearly demonstrates the timeline of events in this 

matter: 

DATE Description of Document 

March 4, 2008 Maggie Parker Threatening Letter (does not 

establish anything for statute of limitations 

purposes)(C.R. 121-125) 

4 year statute — June 15, 2008 

December 31, 2008 

January 1, 2009 

Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet (C.R. 217-219). 

This balance sheet establishes that as of 12/31/08, 

Patel was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice. 

2009 General Ledger of Harbor Hospice (C.R. 

204-206). The 2009 General Ledger establishes 

that Patel was still a limited partner on January 1, 

2009. 

18 18

the Partnership Agreement until 2011. Further, Appellees failed to establish as a

matter of law that Patel discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence

should have discovered the injury on or before June 15, 2008. In addition to

having failed to conclusively establish that Patel’s interest was terminated or

otherwise transferred before June 15, 2008, Appellees likewise failed to establish

their statute of limitations defense as a matter of law because of the discovery rule

and because of Appellees’ fraudulent concealment.

1. Summary Judgment Evidence Establishes Patel Was a Partner in

Harbor Hospice After June 15, 2008

The following chart clearly demonstrates the timeline of events in this

matter:

DATE Description of Document

March 4, 2008 Maggie Parker Threatening Letter (does not

establish anything for statute of limitations

purposes)(C.R. 121-125)

******* 4 year statute – June 15, 2008 *******

December 31, 2008 Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet (C.R. 217-219).

This balance sheet establishes that as of 12/31/08,

Patel was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice.

January 1, 2009 2009 General Ledger of Harbor Hospice (C.R.

204-206). The 2009 General Ledger establishes

that Patel was still a limited partner on January 1,

2009.
******* 2 year statute — June 15, 2010 ******* 

November 10, 2011 Amendment 4 to the Partnership Agreement (C.R. 

135-140). This document establishes that Patel 

was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice until 

November 10, 2011. 

As set forth above, the following documents demonstrate that Patel was still 

a partner after June 15, 2008: 

(a) Dated Amendment No. 4 dated November 10, 2011 (C.R. 135-140). 

This document establishes that Patel was still a limited partner in 

Harbor Hospice until November 10, 2011. 

(b) Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2008 (C.R. 217 

- 219). This balance sheet establishes that as of December 31, 2008, 

Patel was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice. 

(c) 2009 General Ledger of Harbor Hospice (C.R. 204 - 206). The 

2009 General Ledger establishes that Patel was still a limited partner on 

January 1, 2009. 

There are multiple documents in the summary judgment record that indicate Patel 

was still a Limited Partner as of June 15, 2008 and remained a Limited Partner for 

a period of time after that date. Therefore, Appellees failed to establish as a matter 

of law that they are entitled to judgment on Patel's claims for breach of fiduciary 

duty, breach of the Partnership Agreement and Fraud, under their statute of 

limitations defense. The trial court should have denied summary judgment on 

limitations grounds based on these documents alone. Nevertheless, even 

considering the remainder of Appellees' arguments and evidence on this issue, 

Appellees' failed to establish their limitations defense as a matter of law. 

19 

******* 2 year statute — June 15, 2010 ******* 

November 10, 2011 Amendment 4 to the Partnership Agreement (C.R. 

135-140). This document establishes that Patel 

was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice until 

November 10, 2011. 

As set forth above, the following documents demonstrate that Patel was still 

a partner after June 15, 2008: 

(a) Dated Amendment No. 4 dated November 10, 2011 (C.R. 135-140). 

This document establishes that Patel was still a limited partner in 

Harbor Hospice until November 10, 2011. 

(b) Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2008 (C.R. 217 

- 219). This balance sheet establishes that as of December 31, 2008, 

Patel was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice. 

(c) 2009 General Ledger of Harbor Hospice (C.R. 204 - 206). The 

2009 General Ledger establishes that Patel was still a limited partner on 

January 1, 2009. 

There are multiple documents in the summary judgment record that indicate Patel 

was still a Limited Partner as of June 15, 2008 and remained a Limited Partner for 

a period of time after that date. Therefore, Appellees failed to establish as a matter 

of law that they are entitled to judgment on Patel's claims for breach of fiduciary 

duty, breach of the Partnership Agreement and Fraud, under their statute of 

limitations defense. The trial court should have denied summary judgment on 

limitations grounds based on these documents alone. Nevertheless, even 

considering the remainder of Appellees' arguments and evidence on this issue, 

Appellees' failed to establish their limitations defense as a matter of law. 

19 19

******* 2 year statute – June 15, 2010 *******

November 10, 2011 Amendment 4 to the Partnership Agreement (C.R.

135-140). This document establishes that Patel

was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice until

November 10, 2011.

As set forth above, the following documents demonstrate that Patel was still

a partner after June 15, 2008:

(a) Dated Amendment No. 4 dated November 10, 2011 (C.R. 135-140).

This document establishes that Patel was still a limited partner in

Harbor Hospice until November 10, 2011.

(b) Harbor Hospice Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2008 (C.R. 217

- 219). This balance sheet establishes that as of December 31, 2008,

Patel was still a limited partner in Harbor Hospice.

(c) 2009 General Ledger of Harbor Hospice (C.R. 204 - 206). The

2009 General Ledger establishes that Patel was still a limited partner on

January 1, 2009.

There are multiple documents in the summary judgment record that indicate Patel

was still a Limited Partner as of June 15, 2008 and remained a Limited Partner for

a period of time after that date. Therefore, Appellees failed to establish as a matter

of law that they are entitled to judgment on Patel’s claims for breach of fiduciary

duty, breach of the Partnership Agreement and Fraud, under their statute of

limitations defense. The trial court should have denied summary judgment on

limitations grounds based on these documents alone. Nevertheless, even

considering the remainder of Appellees’ arguments and evidence on this issue,

Appellees’ failed to establish their limitations defense as a matter of law.
2. Appellees Failed To Establish As a Matter of Law That Patel Was No 

Longer a Partner in Harbor Hospice On Or Before June 15, 2008 

The evidence relied upon by Appellees was insufficient to justify summary 

judgment. Appellees relied upon the following exhibits to establish their statute of 

limitations defense (i) the Parker Letter (C.R. 121 - 125), (ii) the Certified Mail 

Receipt for the Parker Letter dated March 29, 2008 (C.R. 134), (iii) the Dated 

Amendment No. 4 (C.R. 135 - 140), (iv) the Undated Amendment No. 4 (C.R. 126 

- 129), and (v) deposition excerpts from Patel (C.R. 89 - 100). 

a. The Parker Letter does not terminate Patel's limited 

partnership interest 

The Parker Letter does not terminate Patel's limited partnership interest. 

Therefore, the Parker Letter is of no significance for statute of limitations 

purposes. The letter is dated March 4, 2008 and was signed for by Patel's wife on 

March 29, 2008. (C.R. 134). The Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more. 

Further, in order to terminate Patel's limited partnership interest pursuant to 

Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement of Harbor Hospice, the general 

partners had to unanimously terminate Patel's limited partnership interest 

and expel him. (C.R. 62). The summary judgment record does not contain 

any evidence that the general partner ever terminated Patel's interest in 

Harbor Hospice. 

20 

2. Appellees Failed To Establish As a Matter of Law That Patel Was No 

Longer a Partner in Harbor Hospice On Or Before June 15, 2008 

The evidence relied upon by Appellees was insufficient to justify summary 

judgment. Appellees relied upon the following exhibits to establish their statute of 

limitations defense (i) the Parker Letter (C.R. 121 - 125), (ii) the Certified Mail 

Receipt for the Parker Letter dated March 29, 2008 (C.R. 134), (iii) the Dated 

Amendment No. 4 (C.R. 135 - 140), (iv) the Undated Amendment No. 4 (C.R. 126 

- 129), and (v) deposition excerpts from Patel (C.R. 89 - 100). 

a. The Parker Letter does not terminate Patel's limited 

partnership interest 

The Parker Letter does not terminate Patel's limited partnership interest. 

Therefore, the Parker Letter is of no significance for statute of limitations 

purposes. The letter is dated March 4, 2008 and was signed for by Patel's wife on 

March 29, 2008. (C.R. 134). The Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more. 

Further, in order to terminate Patel's limited partnership interest pursuant to 

Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement of Harbor Hospice, the general 

partners had to unanimously terminate Patel's limited partnership interest 

and expel him. (C.R. 62). The summary judgment record does not contain 

any evidence that the general partner ever terminated Patel's interest in 

Harbor Hospice. 

2020 

2. Appellees Failed To Establish As a Matter of Law That Patel Was No

Longer a Partner in Harbor Hospice On Or Before June 15, 2008

The evidence relied upon by Appellees was insufficient to justify summary

judgment. Appellees relied upon the following exhibits to establish their statute of

limitations defense (i) the Parker Letter (C.R. 121 - 125), (ii) the Certified Mail

Receipt for the Parker Letter dated March 29, 2008 (C.R. 134), (iii) the Dated

Amendment No. 4 (C.R. 135 - 140), (iv) the Undated Amendment No. 4 (C.R. 126

- 129), and (v) deposition excerpts from Patel (C.R. 89 - 100).

a. The Parker Letter does not terminate Patel's limited

partnership interest

The Parker Letter does not terminate Patel's limited partnership interest.

Therefore, the Parker Letter is of no significance for statute of limitations

purposes. The letter is dated March 4, 2008 and was signed for by Patel's wife on

March 29, 2008. (C.R. 134). The Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more.

Further, in order to terminate Patel's limited partnership interest pursuant to

Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement of Harbor Hospice, the general

partners had to unanimously terminate Patel's limited partnership interest

and expel him. (C.R. 62). The summary judgment record does not contain

any evidence that the general partner ever terminated Patel's interest in

Harbor Hospice.
The Parker Letter is not sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations to 

begin to run. "Generally, a cause of action accrues when facts exist that authorize 

a plaintiff to seek judicial relief." See Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates 147 

S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex. 2004). The Parker Letter, without further action by the 

general partner of Harbor Hospice, was not sufficient to authorize a plaintiff to 

seek judicial relief. Therefore, for statute of limitations purposes, the Parker Letter 

is meaningless. 

In Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees assert 

that the Parker Letter was a "notice of forfeiture". (C.R. 31). However, this 

statement is clearly incorrect and demonstrates why Appellees failed to meet their 

summary judgment burden to establish that Patel was on actual notice of the loss of 

his interest. The Parker Letter never states that Patel's limited partnership 

interest had been forfeited. Because the Parker Letter was nothing but a threat, 

an additional act had to occur to put Patel on notice of his alleged loss before June 

15, 2008. Clearly, this additional act did not occur. 

Additionally, Appellees argue in their Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment that Patel ignored the letter. (C.R. 29). However, Appellees failed to 

establish as a matter of law that Patel did not comply with the letter. Patel testified 

in his deposition that he did not recall whether his wife brought the letter to his 

attention, that his wife handled the financials, and that whatever was required he 

21 

The Parker Letter is not sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations to 

begin to run. "Generally, a cause of action accrues when facts exist that authorize 

a plaintiff to seek judicial relief." See Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates 147 

S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex. 2004). The Parker Letter, without further action by the 

general partner of Harbor Hospice, was not sufficient to authorize a plaintiff to 

seek judicial relief. Therefore, for statute of limitations purposes, the Parker Letter 

is meaningless. 

In Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees assert 

that the Parker Letter was a "notice of forfeiture". (C.R. 31). However, this 

statement is clearly incorrect and demonstrates why Appellees failed to meet their 

summary judgment burden to establish that Patel was on actual notice of the loss of 

his interest. The Parker Letter never states that Patel's limited partnership 

interest had been forfeited. Because the Parker Letter was nothing but a threat, 

an additional act had to occur to put Patel on notice of his alleged loss before June 

15, 2008. Clearly, this additional act did not occur. 

Additionally, Appellees argue in their Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment that Patel ignored the letter. (C.R. 29). However, Appellees failed to 

establish as a matter of law that Patel did not comply with the letter. Patel testified 

in his deposition that he did not recall whether his wife brought the letter to his 

attention, that his wife handled the financials, and that whatever was required he 

2121 

The Parker Letter is not sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations to

begin to run. "Generally, a cause of action accrues when facts exist that authorize

a plaintiff to seek judicial relief.” See Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147

S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex. 2004). The Parker Letter, without further action by the

general partner of Harbor Hospice, was not sufficient to authorize a plaintiff to

seek judicial relief. Therefore, for statute of limitations purposes, the Parker Letter

is meaningless.

In Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees assert

that the Parker Letter was a "notice of forfeiture". (C.R. 31). However, this

statement is clearly incorrect and demonstrates why Appellees failed to meet their

summary judgment burden to establish that Patel was on actual notice of the loss of

his interest. The Parker Letter never states that Patel's limited partnership

interest had been forfeited. Because the Parker Letter was nothing but a threat,

an additional act had to occur to put Patel on notice of his alleged loss before June

15, 2008. Clearly, this additional act did not occur.

Additionally, Appellees argue in their Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment that Patel ignored the letter. (C.R. 29). However, Appellees failed to

establish as a matter of law that Patel did not comply with the letter. Patel testified

in his deposition that he did not recall whether his wife brought the letter to his

attention, that his wife handled the financials, and that whatever was required he
was certain his wife, or his accountant, would have taken care of it. (C.R. 97). 

Chapman was only able to speculate that Patel had not complied with this 

obligation, but admitted that he could not say for sure. (C.R. 117). Appellees 

argument that the Parker letter put Patel on notice that his interest may be 

terminated, or a duty to investigate, is based on the inconclusive and 

undocumented assumption that he did not comply with its request. Finally, even if 

the Parker letter was sufficient to give rise to a duty to investigate further — and it 

was not — had Patel obtained a copy of the partnership agreement and all its 

amendments at that time, it would not have evidenced a termination of his interest. 

Thus, the Parker Letter is of no consequence. 

b. Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement was executed on 

November 10, 2011 

According to the Dated Amendment No. 4, the Appellees had not taken any 

action to take Patel's limited partnership interest until November 10, 2011. (C.R. 

135-140). This is less than one year before Patel filed his lawsuit. The Dated 

Amendment No. 4 was enough to create a fact issue by itself regarding Appellees' 

statute of limitations claim. 

c. Undated Amendment 4 No. 4. 

The Undated Amendment No. 4 that is effective January 1, 2008 does not 

establish a date that Patel's cause of action accrued. (C.R. 126 - 129). The 

Undated Amendment No. 4 gives no indication of when it was prepared. 

22 

was certain his wife, or his accountant, would have taken care of it. (C.R. 97). 

Chapman was only able to speculate that Patel had not complied with this 

obligation, but admitted that he could not say for sure. (C.R. 117). Appellees 

argument that the Parker letter put Patel on notice that his interest may be 

terminated, or a duty to investigate, is based on the inconclusive and 

undocumented assumption that he did not comply with its request. Finally, even if 

the Parker letter was sufficient to give rise to a duty to investigate further — and it 

was not — had Patel obtained a copy of the partnership agreement and all its 

amendments at that time, it would not have evidenced a termination of his interest. 

Thus, the Parker Letter is of no consequence. 

b. Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement was executed on 

November 10, 2011 

According to the Dated Amendment No. 4, the Appellees had not taken any 

action to take Patel's limited partnership interest until November 10, 2011. (C.R. 

135-140). This is less than one year before Patel filed his lawsuit. The Dated 

Amendment No. 4 was enough to create a fact issue by itself regarding Appellees' 

statute of limitations claim. 

c. Undated Amendment 4 No. 4. 

The Undated Amendment No. 4 that is effective January 1, 2008 does not 

establish a date that Patel's cause of action accrued. (C.R. 126 - 129). The 

Undated Amendment No. 4 gives no indication of when it was prepared. 

2222 

was certain his wife, or his accountant, would have taken care of it. (C.R. 97).

Chapman was only able to speculate that Patel had not complied with this

obligation, but admitted that he could not say for sure. (C.R. 117). Appellees

argument that the Parker letter put Patel on notice that his interest may be

terminated, or a duty to investigate, is based on the inconclusive and

undocumented assumption that he did not comply with its request. Finally, even if

the Parker letter was sufficient to give rise to a duty to investigate further – and it

was not – had Patel obtained a copy of the partnership agreement and all its

amendments at that time, it would not have evidenced a termination of his interest.

Thus, the Parker Letter is of no consequence.

b. Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement was executed on

November 10, 2011

According to the Dated Amendment No. 4, the Appellees had not taken any

action to take Patel's limited partnership interest until November 10, 2011. (C.R.

135-140). This is less than one year before Patel filed his lawsuit. The Dated

Amendment No. 4 was enough to create a fact issue by itself regarding Appellees'

statute of limitations claim.

c. Undated Amendment 4 No. 4.

The Undated Amendment No. 4 that is effective January 1, 2008 does not

establish a date that Patel's cause of action accrued. (C.R. 126 - 129). The

Undated Amendment No. 4 gives no indication of when it was prepared.
Furthermore, the Undated Amendment No. 4 is inconsistent with the Dated 

Amendment No. 4. Finally, there is no summary judgment evidence that Undated 

Amendment No. 4 was ever provided to Patel. Clearly Appellees failed to 

establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action accrued prior to June 15, 

2008. 

d. Appellees failed to establish as a Matter of Law that Patel 

knew or should have known of any injury on or before June 

15,2008 

If Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC terminated, forfeited, redeemed or 

otherwise transferred Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would have been 

required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor Hospice 

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66-67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC failed to 

do so. Furthermore, Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement 

required Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership 

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). Finally, 

Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly provides that no 

modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be effective unless 

made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby. (C.R. 68). 

Appellees failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in 

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest 

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply 

23 

Furthermore, the Undated Amendment No. 4 is inconsistent with the Dated 

Amendment No. 4. Finally, there is no summary judgment evidence that Undated 

Amendment No. 4 was ever provided to Patel. Clearly Appellees failed to 

establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action accrued prior to June 15, 

2008. 

d. Appellees failed to establish as a Matter of Law that Patel 

knew or should have known of any injury on or before June 

15,2008 

If Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC terminated, forfeited, redeemed or 

otherwise transferred Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would have been 

required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor Hospice 

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66-67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC failed to 

do so. Furthermore, Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement 

required Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership 

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). Finally, 

Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly provides that no 

modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be effective unless 

made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby. (C.R. 68). 

Appellees failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in 

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest 

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply 

2323 

Furthermore, the Undated Amendment No. 4 is inconsistent with the Dated

Amendment No. 4. Finally, there is no summary judgment evidence that Undated

Amendment No. 4 was ever provided to Patel. Clearly Appellees failed to

establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action accrued prior to June 15,

2008.

d. Appellees failed to establish as a Matter of Law that Patel

knew or should have known of any injury on or before June

15, 2008

If Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC terminated, forfeited, redeemed or

otherwise transferred Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would have been

required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor Hospice

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66-67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC failed to

do so. Furthermore, Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement

required Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). Finally,

Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly provides that no

modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be effective unless

made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby. (C.R. 68).

Appellees failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply
with the partnership agreement and provide him with the notice required under the 

partnership agreement if his interest was taken from him in any manner. 

Furthermore, Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply with the 

Partnership Agreement and secure Patel's signature before any effort was made to 

modify the Partnership Agreement. 

e. Patel never testified that his limited partnership interest was 

terminated, redeemed or transferred to Defendant Arfeen 

Appellees' claim that Patel was on notice of his impending expulsion and 

that Patel simply choose to ignore the notification and warning. (C.R. 32). 

However, these assertions are not supported by the summary judgment evidence 

and are certainly not supported by the testimony of Patel. (C.R. 89 - 100). 

3. Appellees Failed to Establish as a Matter of Law that Patel's Cause 

of Action for Conversion and Under the Texas Theft Liability Act 

Accrued on or Before June 15, 2010 

Appellees' claim that Patel's causes of action for conversion and for 

violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act accrued before June 15, 2010 and that 

Patel knew or should have known that his cause of action for conversion and under 

the Theft Liability Act accrued before June 15, 2010. However, Appellees failed 

to establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action for conversion or under 

the Theft Liability Act accrued on or before June 15, 2010. As set forth above, the 

Dated Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement dated November 10, 2011 (C.R. 

24 

with the partnership agreement and provide him with the notice required under the 

partnership agreement if his interest was taken from him in any manner. 

Furthermore, Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply with the 

Partnership Agreement and secure Patel's signature before any effort was made to 

modify the Partnership Agreement. 

e. Patel never testified that his limited partnership interest was 

terminated, redeemed or transferred to Defendant Arfeen 

Appellees' claim that Patel was on notice of his impending expulsion and 

that Patel simply choose to ignore the notification and warning. (C.R. 32). 

However, these assertions are not supported by the summary judgment evidence 

and are certainly not supported by the testimony of Patel. (C.R. 89 - 100). 

3. Appellees Failed to Establish as a Matter of Law that Patel's Cause 

of Action for Conversion and Under the Texas Theft Liability Act 

Accrued on or Before June 15, 2010 

Appellees' claim that Patel's causes of action for conversion and for 

violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act accrued before June 15, 2010 and that 

Patel knew or should have known that his cause of action for conversion and under 

the Theft Liability Act accrued before June 15, 2010. However, Appellees failed 

to establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action for conversion or under 

the Theft Liability Act accrued on or before June 15, 2010. As set forth above, the 

Dated Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement dated November 10, 2011 (C.R. 

2424 

with the partnership agreement and provide him with the notice required under the

partnership agreement if his interest was taken from him in any manner.

Furthermore, Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply with the

Partnership Agreement and secure Patel's signature before any effort was made to

modify the Partnership Agreement.

e. Patel never testified that his limited partnership interest was

terminated, redeemed or transferred to Defendant Arfeen

Appellees' claim that Patel was on notice of his impending expulsion and

that Patel simply choose to ignore the notification and warning. (C.R. 32).

However, these assertions are not supported by the summary judgment evidence

and are certainly not supported by the testimony of Patel. (C.R. 89 - 100).

3. Appellees Failed to Establish as a Matter of Law that Patel's Cause

of Action for Conversion and Under the Texas Theft Liability Act

Accrued on or Before June 15, 2010

Appellees' claim that Patel's causes of action for conversion and for

violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act accrued before June 15, 2010 and that

Patel knew or should have known that his cause of action for conversion and under

the Theft Liability Act accrued before June 15, 2010. However, Appellees failed

to establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action for conversion or under

the Theft Liability Act accrued on or before June 15, 2010. As set forth above, the

Dated Amendment 4 to the partnership agreement dated November 10, 2011 (C.R.
135-140) is summary judgment evidence that Patel was still a limited partner in 

Harbor Hospice until November 10, 2011. 

Appellees alleged that simple due diligence would have revealed the alleged 

harm after Patel's receipt of the Parker Letter. (C.R. 32). However, if Patel had 

reviewed that Partnership Agreement and all amendments thereto between 2008 

and November 20, 2011, it appears he would have been listed as a partner. (C.R. 

42 -88, 135-140, 171-185). Appellees have failed to establish as a matter of law 

that Patel could have discovered he was not a partner by reviewing the Partnership 

Agreement and amendments thereto. 

Furthermore, if Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC terminated, forfeited, 

redeemed, or otherwise transferred Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would 

have been required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor 

Hospice Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66-67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC 

failed to do so. Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement required 

Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership 

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). This did 

not occur. Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly 

provides that no modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be 

effective unless made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby. 

(C.R. 68). This also did not occur. 

25 

135-140) is summary judgment evidence that Patel was still a limited partner in 

Harbor Hospice until November 10, 2011. 

Appellees alleged that simple due diligence would have revealed the alleged 

harm after Patel's receipt of the Parker Letter. (C.R. 32). However, if Patel had 

reviewed that Partnership Agreement and all amendments thereto between 2008 

and November 20, 2011, it appears he would have been listed as a partner. (C.R. 

42 -88, 135-140, 171-185). Appellees have failed to establish as a matter of law 

that Patel could have discovered he was not a partner by reviewing the Partnership 

Agreement and amendments thereto. 

Furthermore, if Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC terminated, forfeited, 

redeemed, or otherwise transferred Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would 

have been required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor 

Hospice Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66-67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC 

failed to do so. Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement required 

Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership 

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). This did 

not occur. Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly 

provides that no modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be 

effective unless made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby. 

(C.R. 68). This also did not occur. 

2525 

135-140) is summary judgment evidence that Patel was still a limited partner in

Harbor Hospice until November 10, 2011.

Appellees alleged that simple due diligence would have revealed the alleged

harm after Patel's receipt of the Parker Letter. (C.R. 32). However, if Patel had

reviewed that Partnership Agreement and all amendments thereto between 2008

and November 20, 2011, it appears he would have been listed as a partner. (C.R.

42 -88, 135-140, 171-185). Appellees have failed to establish as a matter of law

that Patel could have discovered he was not a partner by reviewing the Partnership

Agreement and amendments thereto.

Furthermore, if Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC terminated, forfeited,

redeemed, or otherwise transferred Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would

have been required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor

Hospice Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66-67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC

failed to do so. Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement required

Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). This did

not occur. Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly

provides that no modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be

effective unless made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby.

(C.R. 68). This also did not occur.
Appelleees failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in 

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest 

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply 

with the partnership agreement and provide him with the notice required under the 

Partnership Agreement and secure his signature if his interest was taken from him 

in any manner. 

4. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Establish Under the Discovery Rule 

that Patel Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known That His 

Interest Was Terminated by June 15, 2008. 

The discovery rule defers the time a cause of action accrues, and the 

limitation period begins, for certain types of tort cases. This deferral of accrual is 

an exception to the general rule under which a cause of action accrues when a 

wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered 

until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. See S. V. v. 

R. V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996). Under the discovery rule, the limitation period 

starts running from the date the injury is actually discovered or the date when the 

injury should have been discovered if the plaintiff had exercised reasonable 

diligence, whichever is earlier. See Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 

348, 351 (Tex. 1990); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988); 

Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1977). The discovery rule applies to 

cases in which the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable and the 

26 

Appelleees failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in 

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest 

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply 

with the partnership agreement and provide him with the notice required under the 

Partnership Agreement and secure his signature if his interest was taken from him 

in any manner. 

4. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Establish Under the Discovery Rule 

that Patel Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known That His 

Interest Was Terminated by June 15, 2008. 

The discovery rule defers the time a cause of action accrues, and the 

limitation period begins, for certain types of tort cases. This deferral of accrual is 

an exception to the general rule under which a cause of action accrues when a 

wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered 

until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. See S. V. v. 

R. V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996). Under the discovery rule, the limitation period 

starts running from the date the injury is actually discovered or the date when the 

injury should have been discovered if the plaintiff had exercised reasonable 

diligence, whichever is earlier. See Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 

348, 351 (Tex. 1990); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988); 

Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1977). The discovery rule applies to 

cases in which the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable and the 

2626 

Appelleees failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply

with the partnership agreement and provide him with the notice required under the

Partnership Agreement and secure his signature if his interest was taken from him

in any manner.

4. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Establish Under the Discovery Rule

that Patel Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known That His

Interest Was Terminated by June 15, 2008.

The discovery rule defers the time a cause of action accrues, and the

limitation period begins, for certain types of tort cases. This deferral of accrual is

an exception to the general rule under which a cause of action accrues when a

wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered

until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. See S.V. v.

R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996). Under the discovery rule, the limitation period

starts running from the date the injury is actually discovered or the date when the

injury should have been discovered if the plaintiff had exercised reasonable

diligence, whichever is earlier. See Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d

348, 351 (Tex. 1990); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988);

Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1977). The discovery rule applies to

cases in which the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable and the
evidence of injury is objectively verifiable. Both of these circumstances exist in 

this case. Injuries arising from a breach of fiduciary duty are considered inherently 

undiscoverable. S. V., 933 S.W.2d at 8. 

Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law that there was no genuine 

issue of material fact that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable 

diligence should have discovered the injury before June 15, 2008. Appellees also 

failed to establish as a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of material 

fact that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 

discovered the injury before June 15, 2010. Significantly, Appellees have failed to 

conclusively establish the date the injury accrued, which should defeat summary 

judgment on limitations in and of itself. 

The only document that Appellees are relying upon to establish that Patel 

discovered or should have or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 

discovered the injury before June 15, 2008 is the Parker Letter. As explained 

above, the Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more and did not put Patel on 

notice that his interest was terminated. 

Moreover, generally, a party who is owed a fiduciary duty is relieved of the 

responsibility of diligent inquiry into the fiduciary's conduct as long as the 

relationship exists. Id. Patel was reasonably entitled to rely upon Sections 3.4, 

12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement and (i) he should have received 

27 

evidence of injury is objectively verifiable. Both of these circumstances exist in 

this case. Injuries arising from a breach of fiduciary duty are considered inherently 

undiscoverable. S. V., 933 S.W.2d at 8. 

Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law that there was no genuine 

issue of material fact that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable 

diligence should have discovered the injury before June 15, 2008. Appellees also 

failed to establish as a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of material 

fact that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 

discovered the injury before June 15, 2010. Significantly, Appellees have failed to 

conclusively establish the date the injury accrued, which should defeat summary 

judgment on limitations in and of itself. 

The only document that Appellees are relying upon to establish that Patel 

discovered or should have or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 

discovered the injury before June 15, 2008 is the Parker Letter. As explained 

above, the Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more and did not put Patel on 

notice that his interest was terminated. 

Moreover, generally, a party who is owed a fiduciary duty is relieved of the 

responsibility of diligent inquiry into the fiduciary's conduct as long as the 

relationship exists. Id. Patel was reasonably entitled to rely upon Sections 3.4, 

12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement and (i) he should have received 

2727 

evidence of injury is objectively verifiable. Both of these circumstances exist in

this case. Injuries arising from a breach of fiduciary duty are considered inherently

undiscoverable. S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8.

Appellees failed to establish as a matter of law that there was no genuine

issue of material fact that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable

diligence should have discovered the injury before June 15, 2008. Appellees also

failed to establish as a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of material

fact that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have

discovered the injury before June 15, 2010. Significantly, Appellees have failed to

conclusively establish the date the injury accrued, which should defeat summary

judgment on limitations in and of itself.

The only document that Appellees are relying upon to establish that Patel

discovered or should have or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have

discovered the injury before June 15, 2008 is the Parker Letter. As explained

above, the Parker Letter was a threat and nothing more and did not put Patel on

notice that his interest was terminated.

Moreover, generally, a party who is owed a fiduciary duty is relieved of the

responsibility of diligent inquiry into the fiduciary’s conduct as long as the

relationship exists. Id. Patel was reasonably entitled to rely upon Sections 3.4,

12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement and (i) he should have received
notice promptly after Appellees allegedly terminated his interest, and (ii) his 

written signature was required before the Partnership Agreement could be 

modified to transfer his interest. Since Appellees failed to comply with Sections 

3.4, 12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement, the injury was inherently 

undiscoverable (the transfer may also be void). 

Finally, there is clearly a fact issue based upon the summary judgment 

record that well after June 15, 2008, Patel was still the owner of his limited 

partnership interest. See 2009 General Ledger (C.R. 204 - 206), Harbor Hospice 

Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2008 (C.R. 217 - 219), and Dated Amendment 

No. 4 dated November 10, 2011(C.R. 135 - 140). Appellees have failed to 

establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action accrued before June 15, 

2008 or that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 

have discovered the injury before June 15, 2008. 

Apparently, the only additional document Appellees relied upon to establish 

that Patel discovered or should have in the exercise of reasonable diligence 

discovered the injury before June 15, 2010 is Patel's 2008 K-1. Appellees assert in 

the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment that since Patel received his K-1 

sometime in 2009, his claims for conversion and theft are time barred. (C.R. 33). 

However, Appellees have failed to establish as a matter of law that Patel should 

28 

notice promptly after Appellees allegedly terminated his interest, and (ii) his 

written signature was required before the Partnership Agreement could be 

modified to transfer his interest. Since Appellees failed to comply with Sections 

3.4, 12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement, the injury was inherently 

undiscoverable (the transfer may also be void). 

Finally, there is clearly a fact issue based upon the summary judgment 

record that well after June 15, 2008, Patel was still the owner of his limited 

partnership interest. See 2009 General Ledger (C.R. 204 - 206), Harbor Hospice 

Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2008 (C.R. 217 - 219), and Dated Amendment 

No. 4 dated November 10, 2011(C.R. 135 - 140). Appellees have failed to 

establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action accrued before June 15, 

2008 or that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 

have discovered the injury before June 15, 2008. 

Apparently, the only additional document Appellees relied upon to establish 

that Patel discovered or should have in the exercise of reasonable diligence 

discovered the injury before June 15, 2010 is Patel's 2008 K-1. Appellees assert in 

the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment that since Patel received his K-1 

sometime in 2009, his claims for conversion and theft are time barred. (C.R. 33). 

However, Appellees have failed to establish as a matter of law that Patel should 

2828 

notice promptly after Appellees allegedly terminated his interest, and (ii) his

written signature was required before the Partnership Agreement could be

modified to transfer his interest. Since Appellees failed to comply with Sections

3.4, 12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement, the injury was inherently

undiscoverable (the transfer may also be void).

Finally, there is clearly a fact issue based upon the summary judgment

record that well after June 15, 2008, Patel was still the owner of his limited

partnership interest. See 2009 General Ledger (C.R. 204 - 206), Harbor Hospice

Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2008 (C.R. 217 - 219), and Dated Amendment

No. 4 dated November 10, 2011(C.R. 135 - 140). Appellees have failed to

establish as a matter of law that Patel's cause of action accrued before June 15,

2008 or that Patel discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should

have discovered the injury before June 15, 2008.

Apparently, the only additional document Appellees relied upon to establish

that Patel discovered or should have in the exercise of reasonable diligence

discovered the injury before June 15, 2010 is Patel's 2008 K-1. Appellees assert in

the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment that since Patel received his K-1

sometime in 2009, his claims for conversion and theft are time barred. (C.R. 33).

However, Appellees have failed to establish as a matter of law that Patel should
have known that his interest in Harbor Hospice was being taken from him as a 

result of a K-1. 

Patel testified that: 

(i) he was shocked that Dr. Arfeen took his ownership interest away 

(C.R. 222); and 

(ii) he discovered he was no longer a partner in Harbor Hospice right 

before he retained his attorney (C.R. 96). 

Furthermore, as explained above, if Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC 

terminated, forfeited or redeemed Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would have 

been required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor Hospice 

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66 - 67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC failed to 

do so. Furthermore, Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement 

required Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership 

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). Section 

13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly provides that no 

modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be effective unless 

made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby. (C.R. 68). 

Defendants failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in 

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest 

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply 

with the Partnership Agreement and provide him with the notice required under the 

29 

have known that his interest in Harbor Hospice was being taken from him as a 

result of a K-1. 

Patel testified that: 

(i) he was shocked that Dr. Arfeen took his ownership interest away 

(C.R. 222); and 

(ii) he discovered he was no longer a partner in Harbor Hospice right 

before he retained his attorney (C.R. 96). 

Furthermore, as explained above, if Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC 

terminated, forfeited or redeemed Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would have 

been required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor Hospice 

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66 - 67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC failed to 

do so. Furthermore, Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement 

required Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership 

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). Section 

13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly provides that no 

modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be effective unless 

made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby. (C.R. 68). 

Defendants failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in 

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest 

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply 

with the Partnership Agreement and provide him with the notice required under the 

2929 

have known that his interest in Harbor Hospice was being taken from him as a

result of a K-1.

Patel testified that:

(i) he was shocked that Dr. Arfeen took his ownership interest away

(C.R. 222); and

(ii) he discovered he was no longer a partner in Harbor Hospice right

before he retained his attorney (C.R. 96).

Furthermore, as explained above, if Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC

terminated, forfeited or redeemed Patel's interest in Harbor Hospice, it would have

been required to notify Patel pursuant to Section 12.2(b) of the Harbor Hospice

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 66 - 67). Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC failed to

do so. Furthermore, Section 3.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement

required Harbor Hospice to secure Patel's initials on Exhibit "A" to the Partnership

Agreement if his partnership interest was changed or deleted. (C.R. 45). Section

13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly provides that no

modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement shall be effective unless

made in a writing signed by parties sought to be bound thereby. (C.R. 68).

Defendants failed to take any of these actions. These safeguards were in

place to make sure that a limited partner would be placed on notice if his interest

was changed or deleted. Patel could reasonably rely upon the Appellees to comply

with the Partnership Agreement and provide him with the notice required under the
Partnership Agreement if his interest was taken from him in any manner. 

Attempting to slide information past Patel in a K-1 is certainly not sufficient under 

the Partnership Agreement or in light of the fiduciary nature of the parties' 

relationship. 

It would have been reasonable for Patel to believe that unless he received the 

notice required under the Partnership Agreement and signed documents 

terminating or otherwise transferring his partnership interest, that he was still a 

limited partner and that no cause of action had yet accrued. After all, there is no 

summary judgment evidence suggesting that Patel ever signed a document 

transferring his interest in Harbor Hospice. 

Finally, according to Dated Amendment 4 to the Partnership Agreement, 

executed November 10, 2011, the Appellees had not taken any action to take or 

transfer Patel's limited partnership interest until November 10, 2011. This is less 

than one year before Patel filed his lawsuit. 

When one considers the requirements of the Harbor Hospice Partnership 

Agreement, the fiduciary nature of the parties' relationship, and Amendment 4 to 

the Partnership Agreement dated November 10, 2011, a fact issue clearly exists 

regarding whether or not Patel discovered or should have in the exercise of 

reasonable diligence discovered the injury before June 15, 2010. Patel never 

received the notification he was required to receive from the general partner, Patel 

30 

Partnership Agreement if his interest was taken from him in any manner. 

Attempting to slide information past Patel in a K-1 is certainly not sufficient under 

the Partnership Agreement or in light of the fiduciary nature of the parties' 

relationship. 

It would have been reasonable for Patel to believe that unless he received the 

notice required under the Partnership Agreement and signed documents 

terminating or otherwise transferring his partnership interest, that he was still a 

limited partner and that no cause of action had yet accrued. After all, there is no 

summary judgment evidence suggesting that Patel ever signed a document 

transferring his interest in Harbor Hospice. 

Finally, according to Dated Amendment 4 to the Partnership Agreement, 

executed November 10, 2011, the Appellees had not taken any action to take or 

transfer Patel's limited partnership interest until November 10, 2011. This is less 

than one year before Patel filed his lawsuit. 

When one considers the requirements of the Harbor Hospice Partnership 

Agreement, the fiduciary nature of the parties' relationship, and Amendment 4 to 

the Partnership Agreement dated November 10, 2011, a fact issue clearly exists 

regarding whether or not Patel discovered or should have in the exercise of 

reasonable diligence discovered the injury before June 15, 2010. Patel never 

received the notification he was required to receive from the general partner, Patel 

30 30

Partnership Agreement if his interest was taken from him in any manner.

Attempting to slide information past Patel in a K-1 is certainly not sufficient under

the Partnership Agreement or in light of the fiduciary nature of the parties’

relationship.

It would have been reasonable for Patel to believe that unless he received the

notice required under the Partnership Agreement and signed documents

terminating or otherwise transferring his partnership interest, that he was still a

limited partner and that no cause of action had yet accrued. After all, there is no

summary judgment evidence suggesting that Patel ever signed a document

transferring his interest in Harbor Hospice.

Finally, according to Dated Amendment 4 to the Partnership Agreement,

executed November 10, 2011, the Appellees had not taken any action to take or

transfer Patel's limited partnership interest until November 10, 2011. This is less

than one year before Patel filed his lawsuit.

When one considers the requirements of the Harbor Hospice Partnership

Agreement, the fiduciary nature of the parties’ relationship, and Amendment 4 to

the Partnership Agreement dated November 10, 2011, a fact issue clearly exists

regarding whether or not Patel discovered or should have in the exercise of

reasonable diligence discovered the injury before June 15, 2010. Patel never

received the notification he was required to receive from the general partner, Patel
never received an amended Partnership Agreement, and Patel was never asked to 

sign a document stating that his partnership interest was taken away. 

5. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Negate Patel's Affirmative Defense 

of Fraudulent Concealment. 

The fraudulent concealment doctrine applies when a defendant makes 

fraudulent misrepresentations or, if under a duty to disclose, conceals facts from 

the plaintiff and thereby prevents the plaintiff from discovering the cause of action 

against the defendant. See Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations, 954 

S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. denied). As with the 

discovery rule, this doctrine tolls the statute of limitation until the fraud is 

discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. See Shell Oil 

Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011). The elements of fraudulent 

concealment include the following: (1) the existence of the underlying tort; (2) the 

defendant's knowledge of the tort; (3) the defendant's use of deception to conceal 

the tort; and (4) the plaintiffs reasonable reliance on the deception. See BP 

America Prod. Co. v. Marshall 342 S.W.3d 59, 67-69 (Tex. 2011). A breach of a 

fiduciary duty of disclosure is tantamount to concealment for purposes of the 

doctrine. See Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein, 312 S.W.3d 864, 878 (Tex. 

App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). Stated differently, silence constitutes 

fraudulent concealment when a defendant has a duty to disclose and its silence 

31 

never received an amended Partnership Agreement, and Patel was never asked to 

sign a document stating that his partnership interest was taken away. 

5. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Negate Patel's Affirmative Defense 

of Fraudulent Concealment. 

The fraudulent concealment doctrine applies when a defendant makes 

fraudulent misrepresentations or, if under a duty to disclose, conceals facts from 

the plaintiff and thereby prevents the plaintiff from discovering the cause of action 

against the defendant. See Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations, 954 

S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. denied). As with the 

discovery rule, this doctrine tolls the statute of limitation until the fraud is 

discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. See Shell Oil 

Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011). The elements of fraudulent 

concealment include the following: (1) the existence of the underlying tort; (2) the 

defendant's knowledge of the tort; (3) the defendant's use of deception to conceal 

the tort; and (4) the plaintiffs reasonable reliance on the deception. See BP 

America Prod. Co. v. Marshall 342 S.W.3d 59, 67-69 (Tex. 2011). A breach of a 

fiduciary duty of disclosure is tantamount to concealment for purposes of the 

doctrine. See Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein, 312 S.W.3d 864, 878 (Tex. 

App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). Stated differently, silence constitutes 

fraudulent concealment when a defendant has a duty to disclose and its silence 

3131 

never received an amended Partnership Agreement, and Patel was never asked to

sign a document stating that his partnership interest was taken away.

5. Appellees Failed to Conclusively Negate Patel’s Affirmative Defense

of Fraudulent Concealment.

The fraudulent concealment doctrine applies when a defendant makes

fraudulent misrepresentations or, if under a duty to disclose, conceals facts from

the plaintiff and thereby prevents the plaintiff from discovering the cause of action

against the defendant. See Santanna Natural Gas v. Hamon Operations, 954

S.W.2d 885, 890-891 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, pet. denied). As with the

discovery rule, this doctrine tolls the statute of limitation until the fraud is

discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. See Shell Oil

Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 2011). The elements of fraudulent

concealment include the following: (1) the existence of the underlying tort; (2) the

defendant's knowledge of the tort; (3) the defendant's use of deception to conceal

the tort; and (4) the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the deception. See BP

America Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 67-69 (Tex. 2011). A breach of a

fiduciary duty of disclosure is tantamount to concealment for purposes of the

doctrine. See Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein, 312 S.W.3d 864, 878 (Tex.

App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). Stated differently, silence constitutes

fraudulent concealment when a defendant has a duty to disclose and its silence
prevents the plaintiff from discovering the injury. See Haas v. George, 71 S.W.3d 

904, 913 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). 

Appellees failed to present summary judgment evidence demonstrating that 

they ever informed Patel that his partnership interest was taken from him, or even 

conclusively demonstrating when it was taken away from him. Appellees 

concealed the fact that Patel's interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 

126 - 129, 1353 - 140). Appellees were required pursuant to the Harbor Hospice 

Partnership Agreement to disclose this to Patel and did not do so. See Section 

12.2(b) the Partnership Agreement (C.R. 66 - 67). Appellees were required to 

secure Patel's signature on any document transferring his interest to Arfeen but 

failed to do so (C.R. 45 and 68). This conduct violated the Partnership Agreement 

and was a breach of fiduciary duty. Instead, Appellees created two Amendment 4's 

in an effort to conceal the improper transfer to Arfeen. (C.R. 135 - 140 and 126 - 

129). The documentary evidence in the record, coupled with Appellees failure to 

comply with the notice provisions of the Partnership Agreement, constitutes some 

evidence of fraudulent concealment. Appellees did not conclusively negate Patel's 

affirmative defense of fraudulent concealment as a matter of law. 

B. ISSUE TWO: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that No 

Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists on Any of Patel's Asserted 

Claims. 

32 

prevents the plaintiff from discovering the injury. See Haas v. George, 71 S.W.3d 

904, 913 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). 

Appellees failed to present summary judgment evidence demonstrating that 

they ever informed Patel that his partnership interest was taken from him, or even 

conclusively demonstrating when it was taken away from him. Appellees 

concealed the fact that Patel's interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 

126 - 129, 1353 - 140). Appellees were required pursuant to the Harbor Hospice 

Partnership Agreement to disclose this to Patel and did not do so. See Section 

12.2(b) the Partnership Agreement (C.R. 66 - 67). Appellees were required to 

secure Patel's signature on any document transferring his interest to Arfeen but 

failed to do so (C.R. 45 and 68). This conduct violated the Partnership Agreement 

and was a breach of fiduciary duty. Instead, Appellees created two Amendment 4's 

in an effort to conceal the improper transfer to Arfeen. (C.R. 135 - 140 and 126 - 

129). The documentary evidence in the record, coupled with Appellees failure to 

comply with the notice provisions of the Partnership Agreement, constitutes some 

evidence of fraudulent concealment. Appellees did not conclusively negate Patel's 

affirmative defense of fraudulent concealment as a matter of law. 

B. ISSUE TWO: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that No 

Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists on Any of Patel's Asserted 

Claims. 

32 32

prevents the plaintiff from discovering the injury. See Haas v. George, 71 S.W.3d

904, 913 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.).

Appellees failed to present summary judgment evidence demonstrating that

they ever informed Patel that his partnership interest was taken from him, or even

conclusively demonstrating when it was taken away from him. Appellees

concealed the fact that Patel’s interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R.

126 - 129, 1353 - 140). Appellees were required pursuant to the Harbor Hospice

Partnership Agreement to disclose this to Patel and did not do so. See Section

12.2(b) the Partnership Agreement (C.R. 66 - 67). Appellees were required to

secure Patel's signature on any document transferring his interest to Arfeen but

failed to do so (C.R. 45 and 68). This conduct violated the Partnership Agreement

and was a breach of fiduciary duty. Instead, Appellees created two Amendment 4's

in an effort to conceal the improper transfer to Arfeen. (C.R. 135 - 140 and 126 -

129). The documentary evidence in the record, coupled with Appellees failure to

comply with the notice provisions of the Partnership Agreement, constitutes some

evidence of fraudulent concealment. Appellees did not conclusively negate Patel’s

affirmative defense of fraudulent concealment as a matter of law.

B. ISSUE TWO: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that No

Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists on Any of Patel’s Asserted

Claims.
1. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's breach of fiduciary duty claims because the summary 

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

Appellees allege that their actions in wrongfully taking possession of Patel's 

limited partnership interest were appropriate under that Harbor Hospice 

Partnership Agreement. Appellees also allege that since their conduct was proper 

under the Partnership Agreement and under Texas law, there cannot be a breach of 

fiduciary duty claim. However, in order to support this argument, Appellees 

assume that Patel's partnership interest was terminated or redeemed by Harbor 

Hospice. (C.R. 33 -36). As explained above, a fact issue exists regarding whether 

Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or transferred directly to 

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). 

Appellees assert that the elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim are (i) 

plaintiff and defendant had a fiduciary relationship, (ii) defendant breached this 

duty, (iii) this breach resulted in harm to plaintiff or benefit to defendant. See 

Graham Morg. Corp. v. Hag 307 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010, no 

pet). (C.R. 33). Appellees allege that there is no requirement in law or in the 

Partnership Agreement that prevents them from rejecting Patel as their partner. 

(C.R. 35). Relying upon Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement 

(Expulsion/Termination Provision), Appellees assert that exercising a right under 

the Partnership Agreement is not a breach of fiduciary duty. (C.R. 30). 

33 

1. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's breach of fiduciary duty claims because the summary 

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

Appellees allege that their actions in wrongfully taking possession of Patel's 

limited partnership interest were appropriate under that Harbor Hospice 

Partnership Agreement. Appellees also allege that since their conduct was proper 

under the Partnership Agreement and under Texas law, there cannot be a breach of 

fiduciary duty claim. However, in order to support this argument, Appellees 

assume that Patel's partnership interest was terminated or redeemed by Harbor 

Hospice. (C.R. 33 -36). As explained above, a fact issue exists regarding whether 

Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or transferred directly to 

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). 

Appellees assert that the elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim are (i) 

plaintiff and defendant had a fiduciary relationship, (ii) defendant breached this 

duty, (iii) this breach resulted in harm to plaintiff or benefit to defendant. See 

Graham Morg. Corp. v. Hag 307 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010, no 

pet). (C.R. 33). Appellees allege that there is no requirement in law or in the 

Partnership Agreement that prevents them from rejecting Patel as their partner. 

(C.R. 35). Relying upon Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement 

(Expulsion/Termination Provision), Appellees assert that exercising a right under 

the Partnership Agreement is not a breach of fiduciary duty. (C.R. 30). 

33 33

1. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding

Patel's breach of fiduciary duty claims because the summary

judgment evidence raises questions of material fact.

Appellees allege that their actions in wrongfully taking possession of Patel's

limited partnership interest were appropriate under that Harbor Hospice

Partnership Agreement. Appellees also allege that since their conduct was proper

under the Partnership Agreement and under Texas law, there cannot be a breach of

fiduciary duty claim. However, in order to support this argument, Appellees

assume that Patel's partnership interest was terminated or redeemed by Harbor

Hospice. (C.R. 33 -36). As explained above, a fact issue exists regarding whether

Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or transferred directly to

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208).

Appellees assert that the elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim are (i)

plaintiff and defendant had a fiduciary relationship, (ii) defendant breached this

duty, (iii) this breach resulted in harm to plaintiff or benefit to defendant. See

Graham Morg. Corp. v. Hall, 307 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010, no

pet). (C.R. 33). Appellees allege that there is no requirement in law or in the

Partnership Agreement that prevents them from rejecting Patel as their partner.

(C.R. 35). Relying upon Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement

(Expulsion/Termination Provision), Appellees assert that exercising a right under

the Partnership Agreement is not a breach of fiduciary duty. (C.R. 30).
Apparently, Appellees asserted that there was no breach of fiduciary duty as a 

matter of law. However, the summary judgment evidence clearly demonstrates 

that Patel's partnership interest was not terminated in accordance with the terms of 

the Partnership Agreement, rather it was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 

206, 207, 208). In light of this summary judgment evidence, Appellees' reliance 

upon Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement is misplaced and cannot support 

summary judgment. 

Appellees assertion that they did not violate the terms of the Partnership 

Agreement is also incorrect. A cursory review of the Partnership Agreement 

shows that Appellees violated the following provisions: 

(a) Section 3.4 requires all general partners and limited partners whose 

interest has changed to initial Exhibit "A". (C.R. 45). This did not 

occur. Section 3.4 is in place to protect a limited partner such as Patel 

to prevent his interest from being taken without his knowledge. 

(b) Section 7.2(iii) prevents the general partner from amending the 

Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement without the approval of the 

limited partners owning more than 50% of the aggregate limited 

partnership interest. (C.R. 51). Appellees wrongful transfer of Patel's 

Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen violates this provision. 

Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without informing 

Patel. 

(c) Section 7.2(iv) prevents the general partner from permitting any 

assignment or transfer of any portion of the partnership agreement 

without the approval of the limited partners owning more than 50% of 

the aggregate limited partnership interest. (C.R. 51). Appellees 

wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership Interest violates this 

provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without 

informing Patel. 

34 

Apparently, Appellees asserted that there was no breach of fiduciary duty as a 

matter of law. However, the summary judgment evidence clearly demonstrates 

that Patel's partnership interest was not terminated in accordance with the terms of 

the Partnership Agreement, rather it was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 

206, 207, 208). In light of this summary judgment evidence, Appellees' reliance 

upon Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement is misplaced and cannot support 

summary judgment. 

Appellees assertion that they did not violate the terms of the Partnership 

Agreement is also incorrect. A cursory review of the Partnership Agreement 

shows that Appellees violated the following provisions: 

(a) Section 3.4 requires all general partners and limited partners whose 

interest has changed to initial Exhibit "A". (C.R. 45). This did not 

occur. Section 3.4 is in place to protect a limited partner such as Patel 

to prevent his interest from being taken without his knowledge. 

(b) Section 7.2(iii) prevents the general partner from amending the 

Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement without the approval of the 

limited partners owning more than 50% of the aggregate limited 

partnership interest. (C.R. 51). Appellees wrongful transfer of Patel's 

Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen violates this provision. 

Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without informing 

Patel. 

(c) Section 7.2(iv) prevents the general partner from permitting any 

assignment or transfer of any portion of the partnership agreement 

without the approval of the limited partners owning more than 50% of 

the aggregate limited partnership interest. (C.R. 51). Appellees 

wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership Interest violates this 

provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without 

informing Patel. 

34 34

Apparently, Appellees asserted that there was no breach of fiduciary duty as a

matter of law. However, the summary judgment evidence clearly demonstrates

that Patel's partnership interest was not terminated in accordance with the terms of

the Partnership Agreement, rather it was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 -

206, 207, 208). In light of this summary judgment evidence, Appellees' reliance

upon Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement is misplaced and cannot support

summary judgment.

Appellees assertion that they did not violate the terms of the Partnership

Agreement is also incorrect. A cursory review of the Partnership Agreement

shows that Appellees violated the following provisions:

(a) Section 3.4 requires all general partners and limited partners whose

interest has changed to initial Exhibit "A". (C.R. 45). This did not

occur. Section 3.4 is in place to protect a limited partner such as Patel

to prevent his interest from being taken without his knowledge.

(b) Section 7.2(iii) prevents the general partner from amending the

Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement without the approval of the

limited partners owning more than 50% of the aggregate limited

partnership interest. (C.R. 51). Appellees wrongful transfer of Patel's

Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen violates this provision.

Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without informing

Patel.

(c) Section 7.2(iv) prevents the general partner from permitting any

assignment or transfer of any portion of the partnership agreement

without the approval of the limited partners owning more than 50% of

the aggregate limited partnership interest. (C.R. 51). Appellees

wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership Interest violates this

provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without

informing Patel.
(d) Section 8.1 prevents any limited partner from assigning any portion of 

his limited partnership interest without the prior written consent of all 

of the general partners. (C.R. 53 - 54). Furthermore, section 8.1 

provides that any attempted assignment which is not permitted by 

Section 8.1 shall be automatically void and ineffective, except to the 

extent otherwise required by law. Appellees wrongful transfer of 

Patel's Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen violates this provision. 

Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without informing 

Patel. 

(g) Defendants failed to satisfy Section 8.5 and 10.2 as has been 

explained above. 

(h) Section 12.2(a)(iv) provides that the general partners shall not reduce 

the rights or interests, or enlarge the obligations, or the limited 

partners without the prior written consent of all of the limited partners. 

(C.R. 66). Appellees wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership 

Interest violates this provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer 

was committed without informing Patel. 

(i) Section 12.2(b) provides that the general partner shall promptly notify 

the limited partners of any such amendments. (C.R. 66). Appellees 

wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen 

violates this provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was 

committed without informing Patel. 

(j) Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly 

provides that no modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement 

shall be effective unless made in a writing signed by parties sought to 

be bound thereby. (C.R. 68). Clearly, this did not occur. 

Appellees have failed to establish that their conduct was proper under the 

Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement. 

Appellees concede that a partner's fiduciary duty includes: (i) a duty of 

loyalty to the concern, (ii) a duty of good faith, fairness and honesty in dealing 

with each other on matters pertaining to the partnership, (iii) duty of full disclosure 

35 

(d) Section 8.1 prevents any limited partner from assigning any portion of 

his limited partnership interest without the prior written consent of all 

of the general partners. (C.R. 53 - 54). Furthermore, section 8.1 

provides that any attempted assignment which is not permitted by 

Section 8.1 shall be automatically void and ineffective, except to the 

extent otherwise required by law. Appellees wrongful transfer of 

Patel's Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen violates this provision. 

Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without informing 

Patel. 

(g) Defendants failed to satisfy Section 8.5 and 10.2 as has been 

explained above. 

(h) Section 12.2(a)(iv) provides that the general partners shall not reduce 

the rights or interests, or enlarge the obligations, or the limited 

partners without the prior written consent of all of the limited partners. 

(C.R. 66). Appellees wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership 

Interest violates this provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer 

was committed without informing Patel. 

(i) Section 12.2(b) provides that the general partner shall promptly notify 

the limited partners of any such amendments. (C.R. 66). Appellees 

wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen 

violates this provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was 

committed without informing Patel. 

(j) Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly 

provides that no modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement 

shall be effective unless made in a writing signed by parties sought to 

be bound thereby. (C.R. 68). Clearly, this did not occur. 

Appellees have failed to establish that their conduct was proper under the 

Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement. 

Appellees concede that a partner's fiduciary duty includes: (i) a duty of 

loyalty to the concern, (ii) a duty of good faith, fairness and honesty in dealing 

with each other on matters pertaining to the partnership, (iii) duty of full disclosure 

3535 

(d) Section 8.1 prevents any limited partner from assigning any portion of

his limited partnership interest without the prior written consent of all

of the general partners. (C.R. 53 - 54). Furthermore, section 8.1

provides that any attempted assignment which is not permitted by

Section 8.1 shall be automatically void and ineffective, except to the

extent otherwise required by law. Appellees wrongful transfer of

Patel's Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen violates this provision.

Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was committed without informing

Patel.

(g) Defendants failed to satisfy Section 8.5 and 10.2 as has been

explained above.

(h) Section 12.2(a)(iv) provides that the general partners shall not reduce

the rights or interests, or enlarge the obligations, or the limited

partners without the prior written consent of all of the limited partners.

(C.R. 66). Appellees wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership

Interest violates this provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer

was committed without informing Patel.

(i) Section 12.2(b) provides that the general partner shall promptly notify

the limited partners of any such amendments. (C.R. 66). Appellees

wrongful transfer of Patel's Limited Partnership Interest to Arfeen

violates this provision. Furthermore, the wrongful transfer was

committed without informing Patel.

(j) Section 13.4 of the Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement clearly

provides that no modification, waiver of termination of the Agreement

shall be effective unless made in a writing signed by parties sought to

be bound thereby. (C.R. 68). Clearly, this did not occur.

Appellees have failed to establish that their conduct was proper under the

Harbor Hospice Partnership Agreement.

Appellees concede that a partner’s fiduciary duty includes: (i) a duty of

loyalty to the concern, (ii) a duty of good faith, fairness and honesty in dealing

with each other on matters pertaining to the partnership, (iii) duty of full disclosure
on all matters, (iv) accounting for partnership profits and property, and (v) 

refraining from competing or dealing with the partnership in a manner adverse to 

the partnership. (C.R. 34 at paragraph 28). Appellees violated their fiduciary duty 

to Patel by improperly transferring Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, by 

failing to inform Patel of the same, and by failing to pay Patel any consideration 

for the limited partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Appellees have 

failed to establish as a matter of law that Appellees did not breach their fiduciary 

duty to Patel. 

Appellees did not even suggest in their Amended Summary Judgment 

Motion that they were entitled to summary judgment if Patel's interest was 

transferred directly to Arfeen. On the record before court, Appellees failed to 

establish as a matter of law that Appellees did not breach their fiduciary duty to 

Patel. 

2. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's breach of breach of contract claim because the 

summary judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for breach of 

contract by asserting that Patel could not establish a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding the element of breach. (C.R. 36). Appellees again asserted that (i) they 

were entitled to terminate or expel Patel from Harbor Hospice pursuant to Section 

10.2 of the Partnership Agreement (C.R. 36), and (ii) no provision of the Texas 

36 

on all matters, (iv) accounting for partnership profits and property, and (v) 

refraining from competing or dealing with the partnership in a manner adverse to 

the partnership. (C.R. 34 at paragraph 28). Appellees violated their fiduciary duty 

to Patel by improperly transferring Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, by 

failing to inform Patel of the same, and by failing to pay Patel any consideration 

for the limited partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Appellees have 

failed to establish as a matter of law that Appellees did not breach their fiduciary 

duty to Patel. 

Appellees did not even suggest in their Amended Summary Judgment 

Motion that they were entitled to summary judgment if Patel's interest was 

transferred directly to Arfeen. On the record before court, Appellees failed to 

establish as a matter of law that Appellees did not breach their fiduciary duty to 

Patel. 

2. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's breach of breach of contract claim because the 

summary judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for breach of 

contract by asserting that Patel could not establish a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding the element of breach. (C.R. 36). Appellees again asserted that (i) they 

were entitled to terminate or expel Patel from Harbor Hospice pursuant to Section 

10.2 of the Partnership Agreement (C.R. 36), and (ii) no provision of the Texas 

36 36

on all matters, (iv) accounting for partnership profits and property, and (v)

refraining from competing or dealing with the partnership in a manner adverse to

the partnership. (C.R. 34 at paragraph 28). Appellees violated their fiduciary duty

to Patel by improperly transferring Patel's limited partnership interest to Arfeen, by

failing to inform Patel of the same, and by failing to pay Patel any consideration

for the limited partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Appellees have

failed to establish as a matter of law that Appellees did not breach their fiduciary

duty to Patel.

Appellees did not even suggest in their Amended Summary Judgment

Motion that they were entitled to summary judgment if Patel's interest was

transferred directly to Arfeen. On the record before court, Appellees failed to

establish as a matter of law that Appellees did not breach their fiduciary duty to

Patel.

2. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding

Patel's breach of breach of contract claim because the

summary judgment evidence raises questions of material fact.

Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for breach of

contract by asserting that Patel could not establish a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the element of breach. (C.R. 36). Appellees again asserted that (i) they

were entitled to terminate or expel Patel from Harbor Hospice pursuant to Section

10.2 of the Partnership Agreement (C.R. 36), and (ii) no provision of the Texas
Business Organizations Code prohibits partners from agreeing to expulsion 

provisions in a partnership agreement (C.R. 37). However, as explained above, a 

fact issue exists regarding whether Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, 

terminated, or transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). 

Clearly, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, as 

evidenced by the documents in the summary judgment record, Appellees violated 

Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv), 12.2(b), and 13.4 of the 

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68). It is also clear that if 

Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Section 10.2 of the 

Partnership Agreement does not apply. Substantial summary judgment evidence 

exists demonstrating that Patel's interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 

204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial summary judgment evidence also exists 

indicating that Appellees failed to inform Patel of the transfer and failed to pay 

Patel any consideration for the limited partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 

235). Therefore, a fact issue exists regarding Patel's claim for breach of contract. 

3. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's conversion claim because the summary judgment 

evidence raises questions of material fact. 

Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for conversion 

by asserting that Patel could not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether expulsion was justified under Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement 

37 

Business Organizations Code prohibits partners from agreeing to expulsion 

provisions in a partnership agreement (C.R. 37). However, as explained above, a 

fact issue exists regarding whether Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, 

terminated, or transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). 

Clearly, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, as 

evidenced by the documents in the summary judgment record, Appellees violated 

Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv), 12.2(b), and 13.4 of the 

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68). It is also clear that if 

Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Section 10.2 of the 

Partnership Agreement does not apply. Substantial summary judgment evidence 

exists demonstrating that Patel's interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 

204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial summary judgment evidence also exists 

indicating that Appellees failed to inform Patel of the transfer and failed to pay 

Patel any consideration for the limited partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 

235). Therefore, a fact issue exists regarding Patel's claim for breach of contract. 

3. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's conversion claim because the summary judgment 

evidence raises questions of material fact. 

Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for conversion 

by asserting that Patel could not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether expulsion was justified under Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement 

37 37

Business Organizations Code prohibits partners from agreeing to expulsion

provisions in a partnership agreement (C.R. 37). However, as explained above, a

fact issue exists regarding whether Patel's partnership interest was redeemed,

terminated, or transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208).

Clearly, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, as

evidenced by the documents in the summary judgment record, Appellees violated

Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv), 12.2(b), and 13.4 of the

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68). It is also clear that if

Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Section 10.2 of the

Partnership Agreement does not apply. Substantial summary judgment evidence

exists demonstrating that Patel's interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R.

204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial summary judgment evidence also exists

indicating that Appellees failed to inform Patel of the transfer and failed to pay

Patel any consideration for the limited partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and

235). Therefore, a fact issue exists regarding Patel's claim for breach of contract.

3. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding

Patel's conversion claim because the summary judgment

evidence raises questions of material fact.

Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for conversion

by asserting that Patel could not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether expulsion was justified under Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement
and therefore termination of Patel's interest cannot constitute conversion (C.R. 38). 

In support of this Argument, Appellees claimed that Patel violated the Partnership 

Agreement and triggered Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 38). 

Appellees also allege that they had every right to take control of Patel's shares. 

(C.R. 38). However, as explained above, a fact issue exists regarding whether 

Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or transferred directly to 

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). 

If Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Appellees 

violated Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv), 12.2(b), and 13.4 

of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68). Further, if Patel's 

partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Section 10.2 of the 

Partnership Agreement does not apply. 

Substantial summary judgment evidence exists demonstrating that Patel's 

interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial 

summary judgment evidence also exists indicating that Appellees failed to inform 

Patel of the transfer and failed to pay Patel any consideration for the limited 

partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Therefore, a fact issue exists 

regarding Patel's claim for conversion. 

4. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's claim for Texas Theft Liability Act violations because the 

summary judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

38 

and therefore termination of Patel's interest cannot constitute conversion (C.R. 38). 

In support of this Argument, Appellees claimed that Patel violated the Partnership 

Agreement and triggered Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 38). 

Appellees also allege that they had every right to take control of Patel's shares. 

(C.R. 38). However, as explained above, a fact issue exists regarding whether 

Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or transferred directly to 

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). 

If Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Appellees 

violated Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv), 12.2(b), and 13.4 

of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68). Further, if Patel's 

partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Section 10.2 of the 

Partnership Agreement does not apply. 

Substantial summary judgment evidence exists demonstrating that Patel's 

interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial 

summary judgment evidence also exists indicating that Appellees failed to inform 

Patel of the transfer and failed to pay Patel any consideration for the limited 

partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Therefore, a fact issue exists 

regarding Patel's claim for conversion. 

4. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's claim for Texas Theft Liability Act violations because the 

summary judgment evidence raises questions of material fact. 

3838 

and therefore termination of Patel's interest cannot constitute conversion (C.R. 38).

In support of this Argument, Appellees claimed that Patel violated the Partnership

Agreement and triggered Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 38).

Appellees also allege that they had every right to take control of Patel's shares.

(C.R. 38). However, as explained above, a fact issue exists regarding whether

Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or transferred directly to

Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208).

If Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Appellees

violated Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv), 12.2(b), and 13.4

of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68). Further, if Patel's

partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, Section 10.2 of the

Partnership Agreement does not apply.

Substantial summary judgment evidence exists demonstrating that Patel's

interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial

summary judgment evidence also exists indicating that Appellees failed to inform

Patel of the transfer and failed to pay Patel any consideration for the limited

partnership interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Therefore, a fact issue exists

regarding Patel's claim for conversion.

4. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding

Patel's claim for Texas Theft Liability Act violations because the

summary judgment evidence raises questions of material fact.
Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for violations 

of the Texas Theft Liability Act by asserting that Patel could not establish a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether expulsion was justified under Section 

10.2 of the Partnership Agreement and therefore termination of Patel's interest 

cannot constitute theft (C.R. 38). In support of this Argument, Appellees claimed 

that Patel violated the Partnership Agreement and triggered Section 10.2 of the 

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 38). Appellees also allege that had every right to 

take control of Patel's shares. (C.R. 38). However, as explained above, a fact issue 

exists regarding whether Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or 

transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). 

As is set forth above, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to 

Arfeen, Appellees violated Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv), 

12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68). 

Additionally, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, 

Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement does not apply. 

Substantial summary judgment evidence exists demonstrating that Patel's 

interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial 

summary judgment evidence also exists that Appellees failed to inform Patel of the 

transfer and failed to pay Patel any consideration for the limited partnership 

39 

Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for violations 

of the Texas Theft Liability Act by asserting that Patel could not establish a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether expulsion was justified under Section 

10.2 of the Partnership Agreement and therefore termination of Patel's interest 

cannot constitute theft (C.R. 38). In support of this Argument, Appellees claimed 

that Patel violated the Partnership Agreement and triggered Section 10.2 of the 

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 38). Appellees also allege that had every right to 

take control of Patel's shares. (C.R. 38). However, as explained above, a fact issue 

exists regarding whether Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or 

transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). 

As is set forth above, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to 

Arfeen, Appellees violated Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv), 

12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68). 

Additionally, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen, 

Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement does not apply. 

Substantial summary judgment evidence exists demonstrating that Patel's 

interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial 

summary judgment evidence also exists that Appellees failed to inform Patel of the 

transfer and failed to pay Patel any consideration for the limited partnership 

39 39

Appellees sought summary judgment regarding Patel's claim for violations

of the Texas Theft Liability Act by asserting that Patel could not establish a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether expulsion was justified under Section

10.2 of the Partnership Agreement and therefore termination of Patel's interest

cannot constitute theft (C.R. 38). In support of this Argument, Appellees claimed

that Patel violated the Partnership Agreement and triggered Section 10.2 of the

Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 38). Appellees also allege that had every right to

take control of Patel's shares. (C.R. 38). However, as explained above, a fact issue

exists regarding whether Patel's partnership interest was redeemed, terminated, or

transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208).

As is set forth above, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to

Arfeen, Appellees violated Sections 3.4, 7.2(iii), 7.2(iv), 8.1, 8.5, 10.2, 12.2(a)(iv),

12.2(b), and 13.4 of the Partnership Agreement. (C.R. 45, 51, 53-54, 66, and 68).

Additionally, if Patel's partnership interest was transferred directly to Arfeen,

Section 10.2 of the Partnership Agreement does not apply.

Substantial summary judgment evidence exists demonstrating that Patel's

interest was transferred directly to Arfeen. (C.R. 204 - 206, 207, 208). Substantial

summary judgment evidence also exists that Appellees failed to inform Patel of the

transfer and failed to pay Patel any consideration for the limited partnership
interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Therefore, a fact issue clearly exists 

regarding Patel's claim for violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act. 

5. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's claim for fraud because Appellees did not seek 

summary judgment regarding Patel's fraud claim. 

Appellees did not independently seek summary judgment regarding Patel's 

claim for fraud by non-disclosure in Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (C.R. 26-141). Appellees only sought summary judgment regarding 

Patel's fraud claim in the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the 

theory that (i) the fraud claim is barred by statute of limitations, and (ii) Patel did 

not suffer damages as a result of Patel's fraud claim. These arguments are without 

merit and are discussed elsewhere in this brief. It would be reversible error for the 

trial court to grant Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment 

independently regarding Patel's fraud claim because this relief was not requested 

in the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. See G&H Towing Co. v. Mage4 

347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011). 

C. ISSUE THREE: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding Appellees 

Conclusively Established that Patel Did Not Suffer Damages. 

Appellees alleged that Patel could not establish injury from any alleged 

cause of action. (C.R. 38 at paragraph 37). In fact, Appellees alleged that"[i]t is 

clear that the partnership agreement, the terms of which Plaintiff agreed to, 

provides that any partner who leaves the partnership, either voluntarily or through 

40 

interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Therefore, a fact issue clearly exists 

regarding Patel's claim for violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act. 

5. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding 

Patel's claim for fraud because Appellees did not seek 

summary judgment regarding Patel's fraud claim. 

Appellees did not independently seek summary judgment regarding Patel's 

claim for fraud by non-disclosure in Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (C.R. 26-141). Appellees only sought summary judgment regarding 

Patel's fraud claim in the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the 

theory that (i) the fraud claim is barred by statute of limitations, and (ii) Patel did 

not suffer damages as a result of Patel's fraud claim. These arguments are without 

merit and are discussed elsewhere in this brief. It would be reversible error for the 

trial court to grant Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment 

independently regarding Patel's fraud claim because this relief was not requested 

in the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. See G&H Towing Co. v. Mage4 

347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011). 

C. ISSUE THREE: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding Appellees 

Conclusively Established that Patel Did Not Suffer Damages. 

Appellees alleged that Patel could not establish injury from any alleged 

cause of action. (C.R. 38 at paragraph 37). In fact, Appellees alleged that"[i]t is 

clear that the partnership agreement, the terms of which Plaintiff agreed to, 

provides that any partner who leaves the partnership, either voluntarily or through 

40 40

interest. (C.R. 96, 222, 223 and 235). Therefore, a fact issue clearly exists

regarding Patel's claim for violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act.

5. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding

Patel's claim for fraud because Appellees did not seek

summary judgment regarding Patel’s fraud claim.

Appellees did not independently seek summary judgment regarding Patel’s

claim for fraud by non-disclosure in Appellees’ Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment. (C.R. 26-141). Appellees only sought summary judgment regarding

Patel’s fraud claim in the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the

theory that (i) the fraud claim is barred by statute of limitations, and (ii) Patel did

not suffer damages as a result of Patel’s fraud claim. These arguments are without

merit and are discussed elsewhere in this brief. It would be reversible error for the

trial court to grant Appellees’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment

independently regarding Patel’s fraud claim because this relief was not requested

in the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. See G&H Towing Co. v. Magee,

347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011).

C. ISSUE THREE: The Trial Court Erred in Concluding Appellees

Conclusively Established that Patel Did Not Suffer Damages.

Appellees alleged that Patel could not establish injury from any alleged

cause of action. (C.R. 38 at paragraph 37). In fact, Appellees alleged that"[i]t is

clear that the partnership agreement, the terms of which Plaintiff agreed to,

provides that any partner who leaves the partnership, either voluntarily or through
expulsion, leaves with nothing more than his capital account." (C.R. 39). 

However, Patel did not leave the partnership voluntarily or though expulsion. 

There is no provision in the Partnership Agreement that provides Patel was entitled 

to nothing more than his capital account if his shares were improperly transferred 

directly to Arfeen. Pursuant to Sections 3.4, 8.1, and 13.4 of the Partnership 

Agreement of Harbor Hospice, the alleged transfer to Arfeen is void and that Patel 

is entitled to retain his limited partnership interest. (C.R. 42-88). Therefore, under 

the Partnership Agreement Patel is entitled to the return of his limited partnership 

interest in Harbor Hospice. Furthermore, since Arfeen and Arfeen Properties have 

wrongfully taken the distributions that Patel was entitled to, Patel is entitled a prorata share of the distributions made to Arfeen and/or Arfeen Properties since 2008 

(financial amounts redacted pursuant to Order from the 5g1i District Court in 

Chapman v. Arfeen, et. al.)(C.R. 227 - 233). Arfeen wrongfully received a 

substantial amount of distributions and Arfeen Properties, LP wrongfully received 

an even greater amount of distributions that clearly belonged to Patel. Appellees 

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment did not address these claims at all. 

Patel is also entitled to the value of his limited partnership interest under 

Texas law on the date it was improperly acquired by Arfeen.See Qaddura v. IndoEuropean Foods, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 882, 888-890 (Tex. App. Dallas 2004); 

Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc, 297 S.W.3d 768, 775-776 (Tex. 2009); 

41 

expulsion, leaves with nothing more than his capital account." (C.R. 39). 

However, Patel did not leave the partnership voluntarily or though expulsion. 

There is no provision in the Partnership Agreement that provides Patel was entitled 

to nothing more than his capital account if his shares were improperly transferred 

directly to Arfeen. Pursuant to Sections 3.4, 8.1, and 13.4 of the Partnership 

Agreement of Harbor Hospice, the alleged transfer to Arfeen is void and that Patel 

is entitled to retain his limited partnership interest. (C.R. 42-88). Therefore, under 

the Partnership Agreement Patel is entitled to the return of his limited partnership 

interest in Harbor Hospice. Furthermore, since Arfeen and Arfeen Properties have 

wrongfully taken the distributions that Patel was entitled to, Patel is entitled a prorata share of the distributions made to Arfeen and/or Arfeen Properties since 2008 

(financial amounts redacted pursuant to Order from the 5g1i District Court in 

Chapman v. Arfeen, et. al.)(C.R. 227 - 233). Arfeen wrongfully received a 

substantial amount of distributions and Arfeen Properties, LP wrongfully received 

an even greater amount of distributions that clearly belonged to Patel. Appellees 

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment did not address these claims at all. 

Patel is also entitled to the value of his limited partnership interest under 

Texas law on the date it was improperly acquired by Arfeen.See Qaddura v. IndoEuropean Foods, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 882, 888-890 (Tex. App. Dallas 2004); 

Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc, 297 S.W.3d 768, 775-776 (Tex. 2009); 

41 41

expulsion, leaves with nothing more than his capital account." (C.R. 39).

However, Patel did not leave the partnership voluntarily or though expulsion.

There is no provision in the Partnership Agreement that provides Patel was entitled

to nothing more than his capital account if his shares were improperly transferred

directly to Arfeen. Pursuant to Sections 3.4, 8.1, and 13.4 of the Partnership

Agreement of Harbor Hospice, the alleged transfer to Arfeen is void and that Patel

is entitled to retain his limited partnership interest. (C.R. 42-88). Therefore, under

the Partnership Agreement Patel is entitled to the return of his limited partnership

interest in Harbor Hospice. Furthermore, since Arfeen and Arfeen Properties have

wrongfully taken the distributions that Patel was entitled to, Patel is entitled a prorata share of the distributions made to Arfeen and/or Arfeen Properties since 2008

(financial amounts redacted pursuant to Order from the 58th District Court in

Chapman v. Arfeen, et. al.)(C.R. 227 - 233). Arfeen wrongfully received a

substantial amount of distributions and Arfeen Properties, LP wrongfully received

an even greater amount of distributions that clearly belonged to Patel. Appellees

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment did not address these claims at all.

Patel is also entitled to the value of his limited partnership interest under

Texas law on the date it was improperly acquired by Arfeen.See Qaddura v. IndoEuropean Foods, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 882, 888-890 (Tex. App. Dallas 2004);

Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768, 775-776 (Tex. 2009);
Punts v. Wilson, 137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2004); Groves v. 

Hanks, 546 S.W.2d 638, 647 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1976); e.g. Business 

Organization's Code Section 152.602.. There is no provision in the Partnership 

Agreement of Harbor Hospice to the contrary. (C.R. 42 - 88). Appellees 

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment likewise did not address this claim at all. 

Appellees also argued that if Patel's limited partnership interest was 

redeemed then the purchase price of his redeemed interest is limited to his capital 

account. First of all, Patel's interest was not redeemed (see above). Secondly, the 

Business Organization Code provides: 

. . . a partnership agreement governs the relations of the partners and 

between the partners and the partnership. To the extent that the 

partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this chapter 

and the other partnership provisions govern the relationship of the 

partners and between the partners and the partnership Business 

Organization's Code Section 152.002(a)('emphasis added'). 

. . . the redemption price of a withdrawn partner's partnership interest is 

the fair value of the interest on the date of withdrawal. Business 

Organization's Code Section 152.602(a). 

Therefore, if Patel's limited partnership interest was redeemed, Section 8.5 

of the Partnership Agreement would not apply because Appellees failed to provide 

Patel with 60 days notice as required. Since Appellees failed to comply with the 

terms of the partnership agreement, Texas law applies and Patel would be entitled 

to the fair value of his limited partnership interest pursuant to section 152.602(a) of 

the Business Organization's Code. 

42 

Punts v. Wilson, 137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2004); Groves v. 

Hanks, 546 S.W.2d 638, 647 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1976); e.g. Business 

Organization's Code Section 152.602.. There is no provision in the Partnership 

Agreement of Harbor Hospice to the contrary. (C.R. 42 - 88). Appellees 

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment likewise did not address this claim at all. 

Appellees also argued that if Patel's limited partnership interest was 

redeemed then the purchase price of his redeemed interest is limited to his capital 

account. First of all, Patel's interest was not redeemed (see above). Secondly, the 

Business Organization Code provides: 

. . . a partnership agreement governs the relations of the partners and 

between the partners and the partnership. To the extent that the 

partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this chapter 

and the other partnership provisions govern the relationship of the 

partners and between the partners and the partnership Business 

Organization's Code Section 152.002(a)('emphasis added'). 

. . . the redemption price of a withdrawn partner's partnership interest is 

the fair value of the interest on the date of withdrawal. Business 

Organization's Code Section 152.602(a). 

Therefore, if Patel's limited partnership interest was redeemed, Section 8.5 

of the Partnership Agreement would not apply because Appellees failed to provide 

Patel with 60 days notice as required. Since Appellees failed to comply with the 

terms of the partnership agreement, Texas law applies and Patel would be entitled 

to the fair value of his limited partnership interest pursuant to section 152.602(a) of 

the Business Organization's Code. 

42 42

Punts v. Wilson, 137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2004); Groves v.

Hanks, 546 S.W.2d 638, 647 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1976); e.g. Business

Organization’s Code Section 152.602.. There is no provision in the Partnership

Agreement of Harbor Hospice to the contrary. (C.R. 42 - 88). Appellees

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment likewise did not address this claim at all.

Appellees also argued that if Patel's limited partnership interest was

redeemed then the purchase price of his redeemed interest is limited to his capital

account. First of all, Patel's interest was not redeemed (see above). Secondly, the

Business Organization Code provides:

. . . a partnership agreement governs the relations of the partners and

between the partners and the partnership. To the extent that the

partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this chapter

and the other partnership provisions govern the relationship of the

partners and between the partners and the partnership. Business

Organization’s Code Section 152.002(a)("emphasis added").

. . . the redemption price of a withdrawn partner’s partnership interest is

the fair value of the interest on the date of withdrawal. Business

Organization’s Code Section 152.602(a).

Therefore, if Patel's limited partnership interest was redeemed, Section 8.5

of the Partnership Agreement would not apply because Appellees failed to provide

Patel with 60 days notice as required. Since Appellees failed to comply with the

terms of the partnership agreement, Texas law applies and Patel would be entitled

to the fair value of his limited partnership interest pursuant to section 152.602(a) of

the Business Organization's Code.
Finally, even if Section 8.5 of the Partnership Agreement applied, Patel is 

entitled to damages. Patel's K-1 for the year 2008 states that Patel received a 

distribution from Harbor Hospice in the amount of $28,575.00. (C.R. 141). 

However, the Harbor Hospice general ledger for the year 2008 does not reflect any 

distributions to Patel. (C.R. 234). Patel testified that he never received any 

money. (C.R. 223 and 235). Therefore, Appellees have wrongfully asserted that 

$28,575 was paid to Patel even though it was not. Clearly, this would increase 

Patel's capital account by $28,575. Once this inaccurate entry is removed from the 

K-1 of Patel, Patel's capital account balance would be $28,575. Therefore, even 

under Appellees' theory of damages, Patel would be entitled to at least $28,575 in 

damages. Appellees are unable to establish that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact regarding Patel's claim for damages. 

D. ISSUE FOUR: The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary 

Judgment Because Appellees' Failed to Authenticate Any of Their 

Summary Judgment Evidence. 

Appellees failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment evidence. 

(C.R. 26 - 141). No affidavit was attached to Appelles' Amended Motion for 

Summary Judgment attempting to authenticate any of the summary judgment 

evidence. (C.R. 26 - 141). Accordingly, Appellees' summary judgment evidence 

was not authenticated and should not have been admissible as summary judgment 

evidence. See Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp, 74 S.W.3d 444, 451 

43 

Finally, even if Section 8.5 of the Partnership Agreement applied, Patel is 

entitled to damages. Patel's K-1 for the year 2008 states that Patel received a 

distribution from Harbor Hospice in the amount of $28,575.00. (C.R. 141). 

However, the Harbor Hospice general ledger for the year 2008 does not reflect any 

distributions to Patel. (C.R. 234). Patel testified that he never received any 

money. (C.R. 223 and 235). Therefore, Appellees have wrongfully asserted that 

$28,575 was paid to Patel even though it was not. Clearly, this would increase 

Patel's capital account by $28,575. Once this inaccurate entry is removed from the 

K-1 of Patel, Patel's capital account balance would be $28,575. Therefore, even 

under Appellees' theory of damages, Patel would be entitled to at least $28,575 in 

damages. Appellees are unable to establish that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact regarding Patel's claim for damages. 

D. ISSUE FOUR: The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary 

Judgment Because Appellees' Failed to Authenticate Any of Their 

Summary Judgment Evidence. 

Appellees failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment evidence. 

(C.R. 26 - 141). No affidavit was attached to Appelles' Amended Motion for 

Summary Judgment attempting to authenticate any of the summary judgment 

evidence. (C.R. 26 - 141). Accordingly, Appellees' summary judgment evidence 

was not authenticated and should not have been admissible as summary judgment 

evidence. See Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp, 74 S.W.3d 444, 451 

4343 

Finally, even if Section 8.5 of the Partnership Agreement applied, Patel is

entitled to damages. Patel's K-1 for the year 2008 states that Patel received a

distribution from Harbor Hospice in the amount of $28,575.00. (C.R. 141).

However, the Harbor Hospice general ledger for the year 2008 does not reflect any

distributions to Patel. (C.R. 234). Patel testified that he never received any

money. (C.R. 223 and 235). Therefore, Appellees have wrongfully asserted that

$28,575 was paid to Patel even though it was not. Clearly, this would increase

Patel's capital account by $28,575. Once this inaccurate entry is removed from the

K-1 of Patel, Patel's capital account balance would be $28,575. Therefore, even

under Appellees' theory of damages, Patel would be entitled to at least $28,575 in

damages. Appellees are unable to establish that there is no genuine issue of

material fact regarding Patel's claim for damages.

D. ISSUE FOUR: The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary

Judgment Because Appellees' Failed to Authenticate Any of Their

Summary Judgment Evidence.

Appellees failed to authenticate any of their summary judgment evidence.

(C.R. 26 - 141). No affidavit was attached to Appelles' Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment attempting to authenticate any of the summary judgment

evidence. (C.R. 26 - 141). Accordingly, Appellees' summary judgment evidence

was not authenticated and should not have been admissible as summary judgment

evidence. See Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp., 74 S.W.3d 444, 451
(Tex. App.--Dallas 2002, no pet.). Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting 

Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. 

E. Conclusion 

It is clear that fact issues exist regarding Patel's claims for fraud, breach of 

contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, for violations of the Texas Theft 

Liability Act, and for declaratory relief. The summary judgment evidence 

establishes fact issues regarding each of Patel's claims, Appellees' statute of 

limitations defense, Patel's fraudulent concealment defense, and Patel's claim for 

damages. The trial court's summary judgment ruling was unwarranted, improper 

and constitutes reversible error. 

PRAYER 

For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant, Patel, respectfully requests pray 

that this Honorable Court reverse the summary judgment granted by the trial court 

in its entirety and remand this case to the trial court for a trial on the merits. 

44 

(Tex. App.--Dallas 2002, no pet.). Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting 

Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. 

E. Conclusion 

It is clear that fact issues exist regarding Patel's claims for fraud, breach of 

contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, for violations of the Texas Theft 

Liability Act, and for declaratory relief. The summary judgment evidence 

establishes fact issues regarding each of Patel's claims, Appellees' statute of 

limitations defense, Patel's fraudulent concealment defense, and Patel's claim for 

damages. The trial court's summary judgment ruling was unwarranted, improper 

and constitutes reversible error. 

PRAYER 

For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant, Patel, respectfully requests pray 

that this Honorable Court reverse the summary judgment granted by the trial court 

in its entirety and remand this case to the trial court for a trial on the merits. 

4444 

(Tex. App.--Dallas 2002, no pet.). Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting

Appellees' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.

E. Conclusion

It is clear that fact issues exist regarding Patel's claims for fraud, breach of

contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, for violations of the Texas Theft

Liability Act, and for declaratory relief. The summary judgment evidence

establishes fact issues regarding each of Patel's claims, Appellees' statute of

limitations defense, Patel’s fraudulent concealment defense, and Patel’s claim for

damages. The trial court's summary judgment ruling was unwarranted, improper

and constitutes reversible error.

PRAYER

For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant, Patel, respectfully requests pray

that this Honorable Court reverse the summary judgment granted by the trial court

in its entirety and remand this case to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted, 

/4/ &4414711, 7) of tea e t 

Chris M. Portner 

State Bar No.: 24007858 

cportner@portnerbond. corn 

J. Trenton Bond 

State Bar No.: 00785707 

tbond@portnerbond.com 

PORTNER . BOND, PLLC 

1905 Calder Avenue 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 838-4444 

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240 

Anthony Malley, III 

State Bar No.: 24041382 

tony@mallaw.com 

MALLEY LAW FIRM, PLLC 

905 Orleans, Suite 110 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 212-8888 

Facsimile: (409) 212-8002 

Jamie Matuska 

MATUSKA LAW FIRM 

State Bar No.: 24051062 

j amie@matuskalaw. corn 

2809 Highway 69 North 

Nederland, Texas 77627 

Telephone: (409) 722-5600 

Facsimile: (409) 727-1290 

45 

Respectfully submitted, 

/4/ &4414711, 7) of tea e t 

Chris M. Portner 

State Bar No.: 24007858 

cportner@portnerbond. corn 

J. Trenton Bond 

State Bar No.: 00785707 

tbond@portnerbond.com 

PORTNER . BOND, PLLC 

1905 Calder Avenue 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 838-4444 

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240 

Anthony Malley, III 

State Bar No.: 24041382 

tony@mallaw.com 

MALLEY LAW FIRM, PLLC 

905 Orleans, Suite 110 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Telephone: (409) 212-8888 

Facsimile: (409) 212-8002 

Jamie Matuska 

MATUSKA LAW FIRM 

State Bar No.: 24051062 

j amie@matuskalaw. corn 

2809 Highway 69 North 

Nederland, Texas 77627 

Telephone: (409) 722-5600 

Facsimile: (409) 727-1290 

45 45

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Chris M. Portner

Chris M. Portner

State Bar No.: 24007858

cportner@portnerbond.com

J. Trenton Bond

State Bar No.: 00785707

tbond@portnerbond.com

PORTNER ♦ BOND, PLLC

1905 Calder Avenue

Beaumont, Texas 77701

Telephone: (409) 838-4444

Facsimile: (409) 554-0240

Anthony Malley, III

State Bar No.: 24041382

tony@mallaw.com

MALLEY LAW FIRM, PLLC

905 Orleans, Suite 110

Beaumont, Texas 77701

Telephone: (409) 212-8888

Facsimile: (409) 212-8002

Jamie Matuska

MATUSKA LAW FIRM

State Bar No.: 24051062

jamie@matuskalaw.com

2809 Highway 69 North

Nederland, Texas 77627

Telephone: (409) 722-5600

Facsimile: (409) 727-1290
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on October 12, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

instrument was provided to all known counsel of record in accordance with the 

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 

David Gaultney 

MehaffyWeber, P.C. 

823 Congress Avenue, Suite 200 

Austin, Texas 78701 

David E. Bernsen 

Christine L. Stetson 

Bernsen Law Firm 

420 North MLK, Jr., Pkwy 

Beaumont, Texas 77701 

Glen W. Morgan 

John Werner 

Reaud, Morgan & Quinn, LLP 

P.O. Box 26005 

Beaumont, Texas 77720-6005 

/4/ &wad 712, Peewit 

Chris M. Portner 

46 46

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 12, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

instrument was provided to all known counsel of record in accordance with the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

David Gaultney

MehaffyWeber, P.C.

823 Congress Avenue, Suite 200

Austin, Texas 78701

David E. Bernsen

Christine L. Stetson

Bernsen Law Firm

420 North MLK, Jr., Pkwy

Beaumont, Texas 77701

Glen W. Morgan

John Werner

Reaud, Morgan & Quinn, LLP

P.O. Box 26005

Beaumont, Texas 77720-6005

/s/ Chris M. Portner

Chris M. Portner
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

This document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 

9.4(e), it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for 

text and no smaller than 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with 

the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3) because it contains 7,034 

words. 

/4/ &4414711, 7) of tea e t 

Chris M. Portner 

47 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

This document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 

9.4(e), it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for 

text and no smaller than 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with 

the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3) because it contains 7,034 

words. 

/4/ &4414711, 7) of tea e t 

Chris M. Portner 

4747 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P.

9.4(e), it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for

text and no smaller than 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with

the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3) because it contains 7,034

words.

/s/ Chris M. Portner

Chris M. Portner
NO. 13-15-00452- CV 

IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 

CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG, TEXAS 

SANDEEP PATEL, 

Appellant 

v. 

HARBOR HOSPICE OF BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL, 

Appellees 

On Appeal from the 172ndJudicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. E-192,576 

The Honorable Donald J. Floyd, Presiding 

APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 

TAB 

A June 18, 2015 Order on Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment 

NO. 13-15-00452- CV 

IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 

CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG, TEXAS 

SANDEEP PATEL, 

Appellant 

v. 

HARBOR HOSPICE OF BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL, 

Appellees 

On Appeal from the 172ndJudicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. E-192,576 

The Honorable Donald J. Floyd, Presiding 

APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 

TAB 

A June 18, 2015 Order on Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment 

NO. 13-15-00452- CV

IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG, TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________

SANDEEP PATEL,

Appellant

v.

HARBOR HOSPICE OF BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL,

Appellees

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 172nd Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. E-192,576

The Honorable Donald J. Floyd, Presiding

__________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT

__________________________________________________________________

TAB

A June 18, 2015 Order on Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment
CAUSE NO. E-192, 576 

FILED 

DISTRICT CLERK OF 

JEFFERSON CO TEXAS 

6/18/2015 2:29:33 PM 

JAMIE SMITH 

DISTRICT CLERK 

E-192576 

SANDEEP PATEL IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 

VS. JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS 

HARBOR HOSPICE OF 

BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL 172ndJUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

ORDER ON 

DEFENDANTS' AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

, 2015 the Court considered Qamar 

Arfeen, Harbor H pice of Beaumont LP, Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC and Arfeen Properties, 

LLP's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, and ORDERS that Defendants' Motion is in all 

things GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed in their entirety 

All other relief not herein granted is expressly denied. This Order is final and appealable. 

SIGNED on this 18 day of C:)<L-t.-4t.sl-.---- , 2015. 

JUDGE PRESIDING 

On i8 

255 

CAUSE NO. E-192, 576 

FILED 

DISTRICT CLERK OF 

JEFFERSON CO TEXAS 

6/18/2015 2:29:33 PM 

JAMIE SMITH 

DISTRICT CLERK 

E-192576 

SANDEEP PATEL IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 

VS. JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS 

HARBOR HOSPICE OF 

BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL 172ndJUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

ORDER ON 

DEFENDANTS' AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

, 2015 the Court considered Qamar 

Arfeen, Harbor H pice of Beaumont LP, Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC and Arfeen Properties, 

LLP's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, and ORDERS that Defendants' Motion is in all 

things GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed in their entirety 

All other relief not herein granted is expressly denied. This Order is final and appealable. 

SIGNED on this 18 day of C:)<L-t.-4t.sl-.---- , 2015. 

JUDGE PRESIDING 

On i8 

255

255 

CAUSE NO. E-192, 576 

FILED 

DISTRICT CLERK OF 

JEFFERSON CO TEXAS 

6/18/2015 2:29:33 PM 

JAMIE SMITH 

DISTRICT CLERK 

E-192576 

SANDEEP PATEL § 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 

vs. JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS 

HARBOR HOSPICE OF 

BEAUMONT, L.P., ET AL 172nd nJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

ORDER ON 

DEFENDANTS' AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

1"'# 

On ---¥~~-___:1:.......::8::._. _______ , 2015 the Court considered Qamar 

Arfeen, Harbor H pice of Beaumont LP, Harbor Hospice Managers, LLC and Arfeen Properties, 

LLP's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, and ORDERS that Defendants' Motion is in all 

things GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed in their entirety 

All other relief not herein granted is expressly denied. This Order is final and appealable. 

,.i( 

SIGNEDonthis /8 dayof ~d ~ ,2015.