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No. 123,086

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

CATHERINE A. JORITZ,

Appellant,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS,

Appellee.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

Under federal caselaw, pro se litigants' pleadings are held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.

2.

Under Kansas caselaw and rules, pro se litigants in a civil case are required 

to follow the same rules of procedure and evidence which are binding upon 

litigants who are represented by counsel. Pro se litigants in civil litigation cannot 

expect the trial judge or an attorney for the other party to advise them of the law or 

court rules, or to see that their case is properly presented to the court. Pro se 

litigants in a civil case cannot be given either an advantage or a disadvantage 

solely because of proceeding pro se. 
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Appeal from Douglas District Court; JAMES R. MCCABRIA, judge. Opinion filed January 21, 

2022. Affirmed.

Catherine A. Joritz, appellant pro se. 

Derek T. Teeter and Michael T. Raupp, of Husch Blackwell LLP, of Kansas City, Missouri, for 

appellees.

Before BRUNS, P.J., GREEN and ISHERWOOD, JJ.

GREEN, J.: Catherine A. Joritz appeals the district court's denial of her petition for 

judicial review filed under the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA), in which she alleged 

that the University of Kansas wrongly terminated her tenure track employment. On 

appeal, Joritz asserts that the University violated its rules for evaluating a tenure 

candidate's progress toward tenure before terminating her tenure track employment for 

inadequate progress toward tenure. Based on this, she contends that in denying her 

petition for judicial review, the district court ignored the University's violations, made 

multiple errors of law, and made an error of fact. She also contends that the district judge 

who denied her petition for judicial review committed judicial misconduct. The 

University responds that there are procedural problems with Joritz' arguments and that 

Joritz' arguments are baseless. 

Joritz has taken a scattershot approach to making her arguments in her briefs.

Regardless of Joritz' pro se status, it is not our job to piece together Joritz' scattered and 

improperly raised arguments in her briefs. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 

persuasively pointed out when discussing appellants who include sequences of 

unreasoned arguments in their briefs, the court appropriately stated: "Judges are not like 

pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs." United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 

(7th Cir. 1991). Judges should not have to scour an appellant's briefs or the record on 

appeal to understand the appellant's arguments. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 
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747, 759 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, "[a] brief must make all arguments accessible to the 

judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record." DeSilva v. 

DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 1999). That responsibility falls to the advocates 

"to make it easy for the court to rule in [their] favor." Dal Pozzo v. Basic Machinery Co., 

Inc., 463 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir 2006).

Joritz is not entitled to special treatment as a pro se appellant. Kansas caselaw 

establishes that Joritz' pro se status entitles her only to the liberal construction of 

arguments that are properly before us. Accordingly, she cannot avoid complying with

appellate procedure because she is pro se. For if she were allowed to do so, she would 

gain an unfair advantage over the University because it has argued in its brief that these

procedural deficits in her brief should be one of the grounds for affirming the district

court's decision. For reasons set forth later, we affirm the district court's denial of Joritz' 

petition for judicial review.

FACTS

The University hired Joritz as an assistant professor in the Film and Media Studies 

(FMS) Department in 2012. Her job as an assistant professor was a tenure track position.

Before the University hired Joritz, she had worked in the film industry, 

specializing in animation, for many years. Also, before the University hired Joritz, she

had emigrated to Germany, living there for many years. Once at the University, Joritz 

continued her work in animation. In addition to teaching FMS courses, some on 

animation, Joritz started researching Lotte Reiniger; Reiniger was a 20th century German 

silhouette animator, whom Joritz intended to write a book about. Significantly, Joritz' 

research on Reiniger was part of her efforts to obtain tenure at the University. 
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A Review of the Relevant Agency Rules

Under the FMS Department's rules on Promotion and Tenure Procedure and the 

University's Faculty and Senate Rules and Regulations, a tenure candidate must undergo 

an initial review, commonly called a Progress Toward Tenure Review (PTTR), of the 

candidate's teaching, service, and research work before the candidate applies for tenure. 

For a FMS Department tenure candidate specifically, the FMS Department's rules state 

that a candidate seeking tenure status is "expected to engage in scholarly and/or creative 

research." Concerning books, the rules explain that "[s]cholarly books and monographs 

shall be considered important evidence of research capability." But the rules further state: 

"Scholarship that merits tenure is defined as a researched or creative monograph, or a 

combination of published articles, edited books, or research-based textbooks equivalent 

to a monograph in quantity and quality."

As for the FMS Department's review procedures, the FMS Department's Initial 

Review Committee (IRC) completes the PTTR. In doing so, the IRC evaluates a tenure 

candidate's efforts in teaching, service, and research based, in part, on the candidate's 

dossier, which details the candidate's historical work and University work as an assistant 

professor. Also, during the PTTR process, the IRC "shall" seek the opinions of "outside 

reviewers," including faculty and students, about the candidate's qualifications. Yet, in 

completing the tenure candidate's PTTR, the candidate's efforts in teaching, service, and 

research are not given the same weight. An FMS Department's tenure candidate's 

teaching evaluation constitutes 40% of the candidate's review. The candidate's research 

evaluation constitutes 40% of the candidate's review, while the candidate's service 

evaluation constitutes 20% of the candidate's review.

In the end, the IRC rates a tenure candidate's performance in teaching, service, and 

research as excellent, very good, good, marginal, or poor before making a 

recommendation—by simple majority—whether the candidate has made enough progress 
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toward tenure to continue the candidate's tenure track employment. After doing this, the 

IRC forwards its recommendation to the FMS Department's committee as a whole, which 

does not vote on the rating of performance, but only on a recommendation of whether the 

candidate should continue their tenure track employment. The committee as a whole 

prepares the PTTR candidate's evaluation form before forwarding it to the FMS 

Department Chair. The Chair must then "indicate separately, in writing, whether he or 

she concurs or disagrees with the recommendations of the committee of the whole." And 

after this, the FMS Department Chair should notify the candidate of the IRC's 

recommendation.

When the IRC gives a tenure candidate a favorable recommendation, that 

recommendation is automatically forwarded to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences' 

College Committee on Appointments, Promotion, and Tenure (CCAPT) for approval. 

The IRC also forwards its recommendations to the CCAPT (1) when the FMS 

Department Chair seeks further review of the IRC's favorable or unfavorable 

recommendation or (2) when the tenure candidate seeks review of the IRC's unfavorable 

recommendation. Regardless of why the CCAPT is reviewing the IRC's recommendation, 

the CCAPT engages in an independent review that neither affirms nor reverses the IRC's 

PTTR recommendations.

According to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences' bylaws, during the 

CCAPT's review, the CCAPT must "[c]onsider all recommendations for advancement in 

academic rank and granting of continuous tenure for members of the College Faculty." 

Also, according to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences' PTTR purpose statement, the 

purpose of CCAPT's review is "to determine whether departmental standards of 

evaluation and assessment of the individual are in line with those of the College and 

University promotion and tenure committees." In doing so, its "special concern" involves 

reviewing cases where it appears the department gave the tenure candidate a favorable 

review but the CCAPT "would [have] evaluate[d] the candidate more critically." 
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Ultimately, the CCAPT makes its own recommendation on whether a particular tenure 

candidate has made sufficient progress toward tenure, and it forwards this 

recommendation to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences' Dean. After this, the Dean 

writes a letter to the tenure candidate's department chair, notifying the chair of the 

CCAPT's recommendation on the candidate's continued employment with the University. 

And after this, the department chair should notify the candidate of the CCAPT's decision.

When the CCAPT recommends termination of a candidate's tenure track 

employment, the Dean should also send the CCAPT's recommendation to the Provost. 

Upon receiving this letter, the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences' PTTR purpose 

statement provides that the Provost should notify the unsuccessful tenure candidate "in 

writing of the [CCAPT's] recommendation and the reasons for it" before forwarding this 

recommendation to the Chancellor for final agency action. In the Provost's letter, 

however, the Provost must also tell the unsuccessful tenure candidate about the right to 

appeal to the Faculty Rights Board (FRB). 

Should an unsuccessful tenure candidate appeal to the FRB, the University's 

Faculty and Senate Rules and Regulations states that the candidate must prove that the 

CCAPT erred by recommending that the University terminate his or her tenure-track 

employment. Those rules further provide that during the unsuccessful tenure candidate's 

appeal, the FRB has a limited review:

"The Function of the FRB in the promotion and tenure context is not to review the merits 

of promotion and tenure recommendations, nor to substitute its judgment on the merits, 

but rather to identify specifically defined appealable errors that undermine the evaluation 

process itself and to recommend appropriate accommodations or adjustments to the 

Chancellor for consideration in making the final promotion and tenure decision."

As indicated by the preceding rule, after the FRB engages in its limited review, it 

forwards its written recommendation to the Chancellor for final agency action. The rules 
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state that during the Chancellor's review, the Chancellor has access to the entire agency 

record, which includes "the recommendations of the initial, intermediate, and university 

level review." It also provides that in making the decision whether to terminate a 

candidate's tenure track employment, the Chancellor may consider any other 

"information" the Chancellor "deems appropriate." After doing this, the Chancellor 

decides whether to continue or terminate the candidate's tenure track employment before 

notifying the Provost of his or her decision. Then, the Provost must notify the candidate 

of the Chancellor's decision. 

Because the Chancellor's decision is the final agency action, upon the Chancellor's 

decision, there are no more levels of administrative review. Thus, following the 

Chancellor's decision, dissatisfied unsuccessful tenure candidates must challenge their 

termination by suing the University under the KJRA.

The University Terminates Joritz' Tenure Track Employment

During the 2014-2015 academic year, which was Joritz' third year as an assistant 

professor in the FMS Department, Joritz' underwent her first PTTR. At that time, the 

FMS Department found that Joritz' record was "insufficient to demonstrate progress 

toward tenure in the areas of teaching and research." Also, although her service record 

was better than her teaching and research record, the FMS Department identified Joritz' 

service record as another "area of concern."

Because Joritz failed to prove sufficient progress toward tenure during her initial 

PTTR, the CCAPT "required [her] to undergo a subsequent probationary review" during 

the 2015-2016 academic year. When the CCAPT notified Joritz that she had failed her 

first PTTR, it told Joritz that she should "increase [her] service commitments on both the 

national and international level." Additionally, it told her that she would need to complete 

her important projects related to obtaining tenure—the book on Reiniger and a couple of 
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ongoing film projects, including Film Feed—at least one year in advance of her 

mandatory tenure review. Although not entirely clear from the record on appeal, based on 

Joritz' assertions, it seems that her mandatory tenure review year was during the 2018-

2019 academic year.

In any case, during the 2015-2016 academic year, Joritz underwent another PTTR. 

In her dossier for this PTTR, Joritz stated that the projected completion for her book on 

Reiniger was 2019. Meanwhile, she stated that Film Feed's projected finish was 2017. 

At the FMS Department level, the IRC ultimately found that Joritz' had done 

enough during the past year in the areas of teaching, service, and research to demonstrate 

progress toward tenure. As a result, the IRC committee recommended that Joritz keep her 

tenure track employment with the University. In making its decision, the IRC outlined 

Joritz' recent efforts to improve her teaching. And it explained that Joritz' service was 

adequate.

As for her research, the IRC discussed Joritz' ongoing work on the Reiniger book 

and Film Feed. In doing so, it noted that in her dossier, Joritz had stated that she planned 

to complete her Reiniger book in 2019. It then provided the following explanation why 

Joritz' research work had demonstrated sufficient progress toward tenure during the past 

academic year:

"The Committee recognizes the scope and number of projects [that Joritz] is 

engaged in, and to the extent that she can complete these and have them adjudicated in a 

timely manner, the Committee believes she 'Demonstrates progress toward tenure.' Many 

of [Professor] Joritz's creative and scholarly projects are the result of years of planning, 

and in some cases, she has masterfully incorporated her research into her animation 

production classes, as the silhouette animation by Reiniger exemplifies. Moreover, the 

Hall Center Creative Work Fellowship for 2016 should aid her in completing Film 

[Feed], which she will send out for vetting and screenings at film festivals. We 
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understand that finishing a 2-minute piece such as Film Feed is extremely laborious and 

time consuming, and are encouraged that the Hall Center Fellowship will provide her the 

time required to bring the project to completion. If this piece and others come to fruition 

as publications and at juried festivals the Committee trusts that her publications, her 

presentations, and her outreach will grow her reputation and contribute to that of the 

University of Kansas and the Department of Film and Media Studies."

Still, the Chair of the FMS Department did not agree with the IRC's 

recommendation. As a result, upon completion of Joritz' second PTTR evaluation, the 

FMS Chair wrote the CCAPT a letter, explaining that he disagreed with the IRC's finding 

that Joritz' work demonstrated sufficient progress toward tenure. In this letter, although 

the FMS Chair agreed with the IRC's assessment on Joritz' teaching, he disagreed with 

the IRC's assessment on Joritz' service and research record. The FMS Chair's specific 

concern about Joritz' service record involved Joritz' treatment of others, which he alleged 

violated the University's rule about not engaging in activities that disrupt "operations of 

the academic unit." He alleged that the IRC "members recognized an ongoing pattern of 

disrespectful, combative, and disruptive behavior from [Joritz] directed towards other 

faculty, students, and staff as a topic of concern." But he alleged that when conducting 

her PTTR, the IRC disregarded Joritz' behavioral issues because it was "unsure as to how

or whether the matter should be formally addressed." 

On Joritz' research, the FMS Chair explained that he believed Joritz' research work 

was inadequate:

"In its deliberations, the Committee unanimously agreed that the quantity of [Joritz'] 

major works did not meet expectations and seemed to have advanced very little during 

her four years at [the University]. Some members, however, felt that recent progress 

made by [Joritz]—specifically, two public presentations and a non-peer reviewed review 

of a museum exhibit—indicated a trend of improvement. To reflect this plurality, the 

Committee considered 'Improvement Required for Continued Progress' but as that 
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category seemed to indicate a further—in this case, fifth year—review, the Committee 

settled on 'Demonstrates progress toward tenure.'

"In my own evaluation, however, I remain unconvinced that [Joritz'] record of 

accomplishments indicates a sustainable program of major scholarly activity. 

Specifically, there are several problems with the candidate's book project on Lotte 

Reiniger as it is presented. In terms of conception and organization, the candidate 

acknowledged to me last week that none of the manuscript has been written nor does she 

have a clear conception of the project's basic organization. She is still collecting materials 

and requires a greater grasp of the archival holdings before she can begin analysis of the 

data and formulate a book proposal. By her admission, a substantial portion of the Lotte 

Reiniger archive at the Stadtmuseum in Tubingen, Germany remains un-cataloged and 

unknown to her and officials there have denied her requests for access to those materials. 

Further, she said even her access to the private collection of [G.M.] in Canada is 

becoming limited due to his declining mental and physical condition. Questions of 

organization and access aside, considering [Joritz'] minimal record of scholarly 

publication to date, the demands of several labor-intensive film production projects in 

progress, and her other ongoing commitments, I doubt whether she will be able to 

complete the project in a timely manner or, I regret to say, at all. [Professor Joritz'] area 

of specialization is not my own, but as a published film/media historian whose research 

includes animation, I believe that presenting this book project as a sustainable major 

scholarly work is unrealistic and the candidate's research record warrants only 'Record 

not sufficient for progress to tenure.'" (Emphasis added.)

Because the IRC gave Joritz a favorable recommendation, the IRC's PTTR 

evaluation was forwarded to the CCAPT as required by the FMS Department's rules on 

Promotion and Tenure Procedure. And in accordance with the FMS Department rules, the 

FMS Chair's letter disagreeing with the IRC's recommendation of sufficient progress 

toward tenure was also forwarded to the CCAPT. 

Eventually, as required by the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences' purpose 

statement, the Chair of the CCAPT sent the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and 

Sciences a letter with the CCAPT's recommendation to terminate Joritz' tenure track 
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employment. Shortly thereafter, and also in accordance with the College of Liberal Arts 

and Sciences' purpose statement, the Dean sent a letter to the Interim Provost notifying 

her of the CCAPT's recommendation for nonreappointment. He also sent another letter to 

Joritz, which was mostly identical to the letter the CCAPT Chair suggested the Dean send 

to Joritz.

Importantly, although the Dean's letter to the Interim Provost summarized the 

CCAPT's findings, the Dean's letter to Joritz included a more detailed explanation of why 

the CCAPT recommended termination of her tenure track employment. In the Dean's 

letter to Joritz, he explained that Joritz' teaching record was "the strongest component of 

[her] dossier." After saying this, however, the Dean took issue with Joritz' service and 

research record. He alleged that Joritz' service record was "weakened by the repeated 

instances of dismissive, defensive and inappropriate behavior towards colleagues, staff, 

and [graduate teaching assistants]" as described in the FMS Chair's letter. As for Joritz' 

research record, the Dean told Joritz the following:

"Your research record indicates serious deficits. Though you have recently 

presented two public presentations and a non-peer reviewed review of a museum 

exhibition, there was agreement among [the IRC, the FMS Chair], and CCAPT that, even 

with this recent activity, the quantity of your major works was not sufficient as evidence 

of progress to tenure. Moreover, the status of your proposed book on Lotte Reiniger is 

unclear. Given that you do not envisage completion of the project until 2019, and given 

the limited additional evidence of research productivity, CCAPT is very concerned about 

your lack of progress towards tenure."

In the Dean's letter, although he did not explicitly state what all of Joritz' concerns 

were, he also noted that he had spoken to Joritz about some concerns that she had with 

her PTTR. He explained that although Joritz had "raised a number of concerns with [him] 

(and several others), including that prejudicial statements were included in the [IRC] 

review," he alleged that Joritz' specific concerns had no bearing on the IRC's, the 
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CCAPT's, or his recommendation. In doing so, he stressed that the IRC "gave [her] a 

favorable recommendation." Additionally, he asserted that the "CCAPT did not have 

access to any information that stemmed from issues [Joritz] raised and the faculty 

member [Joritz] identified as biased was recused" from the CCAPT review.

Once the Interim Provost received the Dean's letter, she sent a letter to Joritz 

explaining that she agreed with the Dean's recommendation to terminate her tenure track 

employment because her service and research record were inadequate. In this letter, the 

Interim Provost also told Joritz that unless she appealed to the FRB, she was forwarding 

her recommendation to the Chancellor for final agency action. 

Joritz exercised her right to appeal to the FRB. In her appeal, Joritz made 

numerous arguments about procedural violations that occurred at every level of her PTTR 

process. She also took issue with the FMS Chair's letter disagreeing with the IRC's 

finding that she had made sufficient progress toward tenure. In doing so, although she 

stressed that she had not yet received a copy of the FMS Chair's letter, Joritz alleged that 

it contained factually inaccurate information based on the content of the letters that she 

had received from the Dean and the Interim Provost. In particular, she took issue with the 

FMS Chair's assertion that G.M., the last living coworker of Reiniger, was senile. She 

alleged that this person was healthy and emphasized that she had already conducted hours 

of audio interviews with him. She further took issue with the FMS Chair's assertion that 

she had limited access to the museum in Germany containing important primary sources 

on Reiniger. As evidence that this assertion was false, she alleged that she had spoken to 

the museum's curator within the past week, who had told her that she could access "any 

materials [Joritz] may need from their archive."

Eventually, the FRB Chair wrote the Chancellor a letter explaining that the FRB 

found a single procedural violation during Joritz' PTTR process. She explained that 

contrary to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences' PTTR purpose statement, the FMS 
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Chair did not meet with Joritz to discuss her PTTR evaluation after the Dean notified her 

of the CCAPT's recommendation of nonreappointment. But she further explained that the 

FRB did not believe that this procedural violation "significantly prejudiced Professor 

Joritz in the PTTR process." Relatedly, although she never alleged that the FMS 

Department violated its PTTR procedures, she suggested that the FMS Department 

amend its PTTR rules so that its Chair could no longer serve as a nonvoting member of 

the IRC to avoid the appearance of "a lack of independent judgment of the candidate's 

record."

Concerning Joritz' assertion that the FMS Chair's letter contained factually 

inaccurate information, the FRB Chair told the Chancellor that the FRB found that the 

following statements were incorrect: (1) the FMS Chair's statement that G.M. was 

"'lapsing into senility and ill health'" and (2) the FMS Chair's statement that "officials at 

the Stadtmuseum in Tubingen, Germany have denied Professor Joritz access to an 

archive of materials necessary to the completion of the project" on Reiniger. She also told 

the Chancellor that these factually inaccurate statements likely influenced the CCAPT's 

as well as the Dean's conclusion that the status of Joritz' proposed book on Reiniger 

remained unclear. As a result, the FRB recommended that the Chancellor disregard those 

statements in her "independent judgment of the [candidate's] record." For this same 

reason, the FRB Chair told the Chancellor that she should "take[] into account" the 

CCAPT's and the Dean's "mistaken reliance" on those factually inaccurate statements 

when considering whether Joritz' research record demonstrated sufficient progress toward 

tenure to continue her tenure-track employment.

Yet, except for the preceding problems, the FRB rejected Joritz' many arguments. 

The FRB chair told the Chancellor that outside from the issues outlined in her letter, the 

FRB found no violation of Joritz' faculty rights during her PTTR process.
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A couple of days after the Chancellor received the FRB Chair's letter, the Interim 

Provost sent Joritz a letter stating that the Chancellor had decided to accept the 

recommendation for nonreappointment. Regarding the Chancellor's reason for 

terminating Joritz' tenure track employment, the Interim Provost provided the explanation 

below:

"In my letter dated April 13, 2016, you were advised that [the Dean] had 

recommended that you be given notice of non-reappointment for the reasons stated in his 

April 8, 2016 letter to you, and that I concurred with his recommendation. You appealed 

the notice of non-reappointment to the [FRB], which recommended that the Chancellor 

disregard two statements contained in the Department [Chair's] letter and take into 

account the impact of those statements on the Dean's and CCAPT's recommendations in 

her independent review of your record. The recommendation for non-reappointment and 

letter from the FRB were forwarded to the Chancellor who, after careful review, has 

decided to accept the recommendation for non-reappointment. In doing so, the 

Chancellor determined that FRB went beyond its jurisdiction in its recommendation. 

Nonetheless, even excluding consideration of the information in the Chair's letter, the 

Chancellor determined that your research record demonstrated insufficient progress 

toward tenure, warranting non-reappointment."

The District Court Denies Joritz' Petition for Review

After the Chancellor decided to terminate Joritz' tenure track employment with the 

University, Joritz filed a petition for judicial review under the KJRA with the district 

court. As she did in her appeal to the FRB, in her petition, Joritz made numerous 

arguments about procedural violations occurring at every level of her PTTR process. She 

asserted that certain agency officials, including the FMS Chair, intentionally violated 

PTTR procedural rules so the University would terminate her tenure track employment. 

And she took issue with the fact that a professor who served on the IRC was also a 

member of the CCAPT. 
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Based on all this, Joritz argued that the University violated the KJRA in five ways 

when terminating her tenure track employment: (1) by erroneously interpreting the law 

contrary to K.S.A. 77-621(c)(4); (2) by failing to follow prescribed procedures contrary 

to K.S.A. 77-621(c)(5); (3) by allowing persons who should have been disqualified from 

membership of the CCAPT on this committee contrary to K.S.A. 77-621(c)(6); (4) by 

basing her termination on evidence that was not substantial when viewed in light of the 

record as a whole contrary to K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7); and (5) by terminating her in the first 

place as this decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious contrary to K.S.A. 77-

621(c)(8). She then asked the district court to grant her the following relief: (1) to 

reinstate her tenure track employment with the University, (2) to reinstate the fellowship 

that she lost because of her termination and its corresponding $1,000 award, (3) to order 

the FMS Department to give her a semester without teaching classes to research Reiniger,

(4) to order the University to give her another year to prepare for her next PTTR, (5) to 

order the University to allow her "the right to assemble impartial evaluators consisting of 

University faculty and administrators for her future evaluations"; and (6) to order the 

University to remove all "discriminatory, factually inaccurate, and libelous material"

from her University employment record.

In its response, the University denied violating the KJRA when terminating Joritz' 

tenure track employment. In addition to largely denying the fact statements that Joritz had 

included in her petition, the University argued that many of Joritz' fact statements were 

irrelevant to deciding her specific KJRA claims. Likewise, it noted that Joritz devoted 

much of her facts section to legal arguments, which it would not respond to because those 

arguments should not have been included in her facts section. As a result, the University 

asked the district court to deny Joritz' petition and all of her requested relief. 

Eventually, both parties filed briefs with the district court to support their 

respective positions. In her brief, Joritz largely repeated her complaints contained in her 

petition for review. Nevertheless, she also made a new argument. Although she did not 
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explain what provision the University relied on that was unconstitutional, in addition to 

her other KJRA claims, Joritz now argued that the University relied on an 

unconstitutional rule or statute when terminating her tenure track employment contrary to 

K.S.A. 77-621(c)(1). In its brief, the University countered that each of Joritz' arguments 

were meritless. It stressed that Joritz carried the burden of proof, and it stressed that the 

harmless error rule applies to lawsuits filed under the KJRA. It then argued that Joritz had 

failed to prove that the University or its officials committed any prejudicial error during 

her PTTR process during the 2015-2016 academic year. In making this argument, the 

University also argued that our Supreme Court's decision in Harsay v. University of 

Kansas, 308 Kan. 1371, 430 P.3d 30 (2018), supported the denial of Joritz' petition for 

judicial review.

After the parties briefed their respective positions, the district court held oral 

arguments. At oral arguments, the parties largely repeated the arguments made in their 

briefs. Yet, at this time, Joritz also took issue with the University's reliance on Harsay

because Harsay involved a person who would have actually been awarded tenure had the 

University not terminated her tenure track employment.

In the end, however, the district court issued a memorandum decision denying 

Joritz' petition for judicial review. Even though Joritz argued that the Harsay decision 

was distinguishable from her case, the district court rejected this argument. It ruled that 

Joritz' specific complaint about Harsay involving a person who would have actually been 

awarded tenure did not mean the law within Harsay was inapplicable to her case. 

Afterwards, it made the following fact-findings: (1) that during her initial PTTR in the 

2014-2015 academic year, Joritz had been warned that she needed to complete her major 

research projects at least a year before she applied for tenure, (2) that in her dossier for 

her second PTTR in the 2015-2016 academic year, Joritz had conceded that her Reiniger 

book would not be finished until 2019 and that Film Feed would not be finished until 

2017, and (3) that from the agency record, nothing indicated that the Chancellor violated 
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any University rules or procedures when terminating Joritz' tenure track employment. 

Then, it ruled that Joritz had failed to establish that the University violated any provision 

of the KJRA in terminating her tenure track employment for the following reasons:

"There is no evidence to find that the agency action, or any regulation on which 

the agency acted is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Professor Joritz as 

contemplated by K.S.A. 77-621(c)(1). Nor are there facts to find that [the University] 

erroneously interpreted or applied the law to support a violation under subsections (c)(4) 

or (5). To whatever degree any review board or committee did not conform to 

[University] policy, none of those bodies were the decision-makers so as to support a 

violation of K.S.A. 77-621(c)(6). As more fully discussed with regard to the analysis of 

subsection (c)(7), the evidence does not permit the conclusion that the agency action was 

otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious as prohibited by subsection (c)(8). 

"The record reflects that [the Chancellor] provided a May 13, 2016, letter that set 

forth the basis for her decision—to include concurrence with the reasons articulated in 

her prior notice of non-reappointment—but stated her own, independent conclusion that 

reappointment was not warranted. A review of the record here provides substantial 

support, as set forth in [the fact-findings], that the process afforded Professor Joritz was 

sufficient to justify the decision. While this Court can and must defer to the established 

law that such decisions are imbued with a presumption of validity, the deficiencies 

recited above, considering the record as a whole, make clear that when [the Chancellor] 

references the inadequacy of [Professor] Joritz' research record reflected inadequate 

progress, the evidence exists to support this conclusion. Whether [Professor] Joritz 

agrees, or can convince others to agree, is no evidence that merits relief under the KJRA. 

"At each stage of the review process, concerns were articulated as to the lack of 

sufficient research and scholarship—despite any aspirational comments in support of 

Professor Joritz' goals. The record as a whole reflects these recurring statements and, in 

fact, fair notice to Professor Joritz that these expectations existed and were in jeopardy of 

not being met. [Citations omitted.]"

Joritz timely appealed the denial of her petition for judicial review to this court. 
18

ANALYSIS

Did the District Court err by denying Joritz' petition for review?

In her appellant's brief, Joritz makes numerous arguments why we should reverse 

the district court and grant her petition for judicial review. Even so, her arguments can be 

broken down into three broad categories: First, Joritz argues that the district judge who 

denied her petition for judicial review committed judicial misconduct when doing so. 

Second, Joritz argues that the district court made multiple legal errors when denying her 

petition for judicial review. Those errors include misapplying our Supreme Court's 

precedent in Harsay and misunderstanding its scope of review as stated under K.S.A. 77-

621. Third, Joritz argues that the district court wrongly determined that the University's 

termination of her tenure track employment was supported by substantial evidence when 

viewed in light of the record as a whole as stated under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7). In making 

this argument, Joritz' complaints focus on alleged inadequacies with the Chancellor's 

decision to terminate her tenure track employment with the University, which she says 

that the district court ignored.

The University counters that we should affirm the district court's denial of Joritz' 

petition for judicial review both because there are procedural problems with her 

arguments and because her arguments are groundless. The University starts its appellee's 

brief by pointing out that Joritz has raised many arguments in the facts section of her 

appellant's brief. In citing Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 

35), the University asks us to disregard all arguments that Joritz raised in her facts 

section. Next, it contends that each of Joritz' arguments about the district court

committing judicial misconduct largely hinges on her misunderstanding of the applicable 

law. As for Joritz' other arguments, the University contends that Joritz has not met her 

burden of proving that it or its officials violated the KJRA during her second PTTR 

process and agency-level appeal so as to cause harm. As with Joritz' judicial misconduct 
19

arguments, the University contends that Joritz' specific complaints about KJRA violations 

largely hinge on her misunderstanding of the applicable law.

In her reply brief, Joritz challenges the University's recitation of the facts, arguing 

that the University included many "false and/or misleading statements" in its appellee's 

brief. At the same time, she contends that we should apply the "pro se standard of 

review" to her appeal. According to Joritz, it would be unfair for us to ignore her 

arguments within her facts section because she is pro se. Citing federal caselaw, she 

asserts that under this pro se standard, "[p]ro se litigants' court submissions are to be 

construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers." 

Then, relying on this assertion, she contends that if we can reasonably understand her 

arguments, we should address each argument that she has included in her appellant's 

brief, no matter where she has included it in her appellant's brief.

1. Joritz is not Entitled to Special Treatment because she is a Pro Se Appellant.

Before turning to the specific problems with Joritz' chief arguments in her 

appellant's brief, we address the problematic arguments raised by Joritz in her reply brief. 

Most significantly, although Joritz asks us to use a special standard of review because she 

is pro se, Joritz is not entitled to special treatment as a pro se appellant. As just noted, in 

her reply brief, Joritz argues that pro se litigants' court submissions are to be construed 

liberally and held to less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. To support this 

argument, Joritz cites only federal caselaw, which has held that pro se parties' pleadings 

are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007). She 

asserts that since she is pro se, it would be unfair for us to ignore some of her arguments 

because they are "inartfully drawn." So, Joritz wants us to liberally construe all her 

arguments and consider all of her arguments no matter where they are located in her 

appellant's brief. 
20

Although Joritz candidly acknowledges that some of her arguments are "inartfully 

drawn," she fails to recognize that some of her arguments suffer from a glaring 

procedural problem. Her problem is that she failed to comply with the procedural rules 

allowing us to consider some of her arguments on appeal. And as stressed by the 

University, one of the more obvious procedural rules that Joritz has violated is Kansas 

Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4). This rule explicitly states that an appellant's brief must 

contain "[a] concise but complete statement, without argument, of the facts that are 

material to determining the issues to be decided in the appeal." (Emphasis added.) Rule 

6.02(a)(4) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 36).

Under Kansas law, the pro se liberal construction rule does not mean that pro se 

litigants can ignore procedural requirements. Instead, "[w]hile pro se pleadings are to be 

liberally construed so that relief may be granted if warranted by the facts alleged, this 

simply means that the substance of the pleading controls over its label." In re Estate of 

Broderick, 34 Kan. App. 2d 695, 701, 125 P.3d 564 (2005). As a result, we have 

explained:

"'A pro se litigant in a civil case is required to follow the same rules of procedure and 

evidence which are binding upon a litigant who is represented by counsel. Our legal 

system cannot function on any basis other than equal treatment of all litigants. To have 

different rules for different classes of litigants is untenable. A party in civil litigation 

cannot expect the trial judge or an attorney for the other party to advise him or her of the 

law or court rules, or to see that his or her case is properly presented to the court. A pro se 

litigant in a civil case cannot be given either an advantage or a disadvantage solely 

because of proceeding pro se.' Mangiaracina v. Gutierrez, 11 Kan. App. 2d 594, 595-96, 

730 P.2d 1109 (1986)." 34 Kan. App. 2d at 701.

See also Guillory v. State, 285 Kan. 223, 229, 170 P.3d 403 (2007) (citing the preceding 

precedent with approval). 
21

Joritz here argues otherwise. But she is not entitled to special treatment as a pro se 

litigant when it concerns her failure to follow procedural rules. While we should liberally 

construe her arguments when properly raised, we cannot address arguments that are not 

properly before us. See also K.S.A. 60-2101(a) (explaining this court's limited 

jurisdiction). Nor can we bolster arguments that are properly before us but inadequately 

briefed. See Russell v. May, 306 Kan. 1058, 1089, 400 P.3d 647 (2017) (holding that a 

point raised incidentally in a brief and not argued therein is inadequately briefed and thus

waived and abandoned); see also In re Adoption of T.M.M.H., 307 Kan. 902, Syl. ¶ 6, 416 

P.3d 999 (2018) (holding that a point raised without pertinent authority or without 

analysis explaining why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority is inadequately 

briefed and thus abandoned). 

Also, we note that this is not the first time Joritz has asked a court to apply a 

special pro se standard of review. Highly summarized, Joritz sued the University as well 

as some of its officials in federal court, alleging that the University discriminated against 

her contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when terminating her tenure 

track employment. Joritz eventually lost her lawsuit. But before she was denied relief, the 

federal district court issued two orders rejecting Joritz' request to treat her pleadings 

differently because she was pro se. See Joritz v. University of Kansas, No. 17-4002-SACJPO, 2020 WL 6286351, at *3 (D. Kan. 2020); and Joritz v. University of Kansas, 

No. 17-4002-SAC-JPO, 2020 WL 5253396, at *4 (D. Kan. 2020); see also Joritz v. GrayLittle, 822 Fed. Appx. 731 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished opinion). In the order issued by 

the federal district court about three months before Joritz filed her appellant's brief in this 

case, the court explicitly denied Joritz' request to ignore the University's persuasive claim 

preclusion argument because she was a pro se litigant. It explained it would not do so 

because "[t]he Tenth Circuit has stated over and again that while a court may liberally 

construe pro se filings, it must not assume the role of advocate or search the record and 

construct arguments for a pro se litigant." 2020 WL 6286351, at *3.
22

So unlike many pro se appellants who may not fully realize the risks of 

representing themselves, Joritz knew about the risks of proceeding pro se. Despite 

knowing those risks, Joritz continued to represent herself in this appeal. Then, in addition 

to the Kansas caselaw barring Joritz' request to impose a special pro se standard of 

review, Joritz' arguments about using a special pro se standard of review are particularly 

unpersuasive since she knew that her pro se status entitled her only to the liberal 

construction of her arguments on filing her appellant's brief in this case. 

In turn, it is readily apparent that Joritz' other reply brief arguments are also 

flawed. First, her pro se status does not allow her to ignore appellate procedures, 

including Rule 6.02(a)(4). Because Rule 6.02(a)(4) explicitly prohibits arguments in fact 

sections, there is no excuse for Joritz' failure to follow this rule. For this reason, we will

not consider the approximately 10 arguments that Joritz has included in her facts section.

Next, in her reply brief, Joritz briefly contends that the University raised a new 

argument in its appellee's brief by pointing out her facts section's deficiencies. Based on 

this contention, she suggests that she is not raising a new argument in her reply brief by 

requesting a special pro se standard of review. Nevertheless, appellees may note 

procedural problems with the appellant's arguments. By doing this, appellees merely 

point out inadequacies with the appellant's arguments as included in the appellant's briefs. 

Also, if anything, it is Joritz who has raised a new argument in her reply brief by 

asserting that there is a pro se standard of review requiring us to ignore her failure to 

follow procedures. Hence, in addition to the other problematic arguments in her reply 

brief, Joritz' reply brief violates Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.05 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 

37), which states that a reply brief may contain only arguments "made necessary by new 

material contained in the appellee's or cross-appellee's brief." 

In summary, Joritz argues that we should use a special pro se standard of review 

where she is held to less stringent standards than lawyers when considering arguments on 
23

appeal. Nevertheless, Kansas caselaw establishes that Joritz' pro se status entitles her only

to the liberal construction of arguments that are properly before us. She cannot avoid 

complying with appellate procedure because she is pro se. If she were allowed to do so, 

she would gain an unfair advantage over the University since it relied on the procedural 

deficits in her appellant's brief when responding to her arguments in its appellee's brief. 

In addition, as stated previously, it is not our duty to unearth and then address all the 

various arguments that Joritz has included in impermissible places within her appellant's 

brief. See Rule 6.02(a)(1)(A), (5) (explaining that appellants must divide their arguments 

by issue with citation to the appropriate standard of review). Once again, "[j]udges are 

not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs." Dunkel, 927 F.2d at 956. Nor are they 

archeologists searching for buried treasure. DeSilva, 181 F.3d at 867. Hence, we hold 

three things: (1) that Joritz is not entitled to a special pro se standard of review, (2) that 

Joritz' facts section arguments are impermissible under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 

6.02(a)(4), and (3) that Joritz' reply brief arguments are impermissible under Kansas 

Supreme Court Rule 6.05.

2. Joritz' Underlying Arguments are Improperly Raised, Inadequately Briefed, or 

Baseless.

Having established that Joritz is not entitled to the special treatment she has 

requested because of her pro se status, we will address Joritz' underlying arguments

concerning whether the district court wrongly denied her petition for judicial review. 

Because Joritz is suing the University under the KJRA, K.S.A. 77-621 defines the scope 

of our review. K.S.A. 77-621(a)(1); see also K.S.A. 77-606 (stating that the KJRA is the 

exclusive means of judicial review of an agency action). Notably, when considering 

appeals under the KJRA, we exercise the same statutorily limited review of the disputed 

agency action as does the district court. Bd. of Cherokee County Comm'rs v. Kansas 

Racing & Gaming Comm'n, 306 Kan. 298, 318, 393 P.3d 601 (2017). Also, in making 
24

determinations under K.S.A. 77-621, all courts reviewing the disputed agency action 

must take "due account . . . of the rule of harmless error." K.S.A. 77-621(e).

Unless some provision says differently, parties challenging the agency action carry 

the burden of proving the invalidity of the disputed agency action. K.S.A. 77-621(a)(1). 

Subsection (c) of K.S.A. 77-621 lists the limited circumstances in which courts may grant 

relief to parties under the KJRA. In relevant part, K.S.A. 77-621(c) states:

"The court shall grant relief only if it determines any one or more of the 

following:

(1) The agency action, or the statute or rule and regulation on which the agency 

action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;

. . . .

(4) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;

(5) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or has failed to follow 

prescribed procedure;

(6) the persons taking the agency action were improperly constituted as a 

decision-making body or subject to disqualification;

(7) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the 

agency, that is not supported to the appropriate standard of proof by evidence that is 

substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole, which includes the agency 

record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court 

under this act; or

(8) the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious."

When considering whether disputed agency actions were supported by evidence 

that was substantial "in light of the record as a whole" as stated under K.S.A. 77-

621(c)(7), the phrase "'in light of the record as a whole'" means:

"[T]he adequacy of the evidence in the record before the court to support a 

particular finding of fact shall be judged in light of all the relevant evidence in the record 

cited by any party that detracts from such finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in 
25

the record, compiled pursuant to K.S.A. 77-620 [the provision controlling agency 

records], and amendments thereto, cited by any party that supports such finding, 

including any determinations of veracity by the presiding officer who personally 

observed the demeanor of the witness and the agency's explanation of why the relevant 

evidence in the record supports its material findings of fact. In reviewing the evidence in 

light of the record as a whole, the court shall not reweigh the evidence or engage in de 

novo review." K.S.A. 77-621(d). (Emphasis added.) 

And when considering whether disputed agency actions were "unreasonable, arbitrary or 

capricious" as stated under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(8), the phrase "unreasonable, arbitrary or 

capricious" concerns whether the agency action was justified. Kansas Dept. of Revenue v. 

Powell, 290 Kan. 564, 569, 232 P.3d 856 (2010).

Thus, in this appeal, Joritz carries the burden of proving that the district court

wrongly denied her petition for judicial review because the University's disputed actions 

during her second PTTR and agency-level appeal constituted impermissible agency 

actions under K.S.A. 77-621(c) that caused actual harm during those proceedings. 

a. Judicial Misconduct Arguments

For Joritz' judicial misconduct arguments, her main complaint on appeal is that the 

district judge who considered her petition for review committed misconduct by "basing 

its ruling on false, fabricated facts, distorted facts, misleading statements and material 

misrepresentations" when it made certain fact-findings while denying her petition for 

review. She then dissects the district judge's fact-findings, making approximately 18 

arguments why the district judge falsified, misrepresented, or omitted certain facts from 

his fact-findings when denying her petition for review. Overall, Joritz' judicial 

misconduct complaints focus on her belief that the district judge ignored the evidence 

that she presented proving that the University violated its PTTR procedures because he 

was biased in favor of the University. 
26

In making her judicial misconduct claim, Joritz merely alleges that the district

judge was biased in favor of the University without presenting any analysis of why the 

district judge would be biased. Yet, what we expect from Joritz' argument are reasons for 

believing the district judge committed judicial misconduct. Indeed, we expect 

independent evidence for the claim made in her conclusion and in her premise. Joritz' 

argument presupposes what she endeavors to prove, namely, that the district judge was 

biased in favor of the University. This is what is being begged. Nevertheless, this is 

something, of course, that Joritz should prove: that the district judge was biased in favor 

of the University. Joritz' claim, however, is entirely unsupported in her brief. So Joritz' 

argument assumes just what she needed to prove.

Appellants do not meet their burden of establishing error on appeal by making 

conclusory contentions without any analysis, let alone evidence, to support their claims. 

RAMA Operating Co. v. Barker, 47 Kan. App. 2d 1020, 1031, 286 P.3d 1138 (2012). It 

follows that, by making conclusory contentions on appeal, appellants necessarily raise 

their arguments incidentally in their briefs, which results in abandonment of their 

arguments. 47 Kan. App. 2d 1020, Syl. ¶ 14. Plainly, because Joritz provides no analysis 

or evidence why the district court was biased in favor of the University, Joritz' judicial 

misconduct arguments are fatally flawed. Simply put, Joritz' misconduct claims against 

the district judge, as well as most of her complaints against University officials involved 

in her termination, are actually unsupported ad hominem attacks on their personal 

character that do not address why the district court affirmed the University's termination 

of her tenure track employment. 

Notwithstanding the preceding, Joritz cannot establish that the district court

committed misconduct just because she disagrees with the district court's fact-findings 

against her. For example, many of Joritz' judicial misconduct complaints involve her 

belief that the district court somehow acted inappropriately by finding that her research 

record contained deficits because, by her own admission, she would not complete her 
27

Reiniger book until 2019 and her Film Feed project until 2017. In making these 

misconduct complaints, Joritz tries to pick apart this finding (1) because she may have 

completed those projects before her mandatory tenure review year and (2) because 

completion of those projects was not a requirement of her second PTTR during the 2015-

2016 academic year. But Joritz' arguments misrepresent the district court's fact-findings 

and the record on appeal. 

Joritz never clearly explained when her mandatory tenure review year was in her 

petition for judicial review. Instead, her petition implied that her mandatory tenure review 

year would have been three years after her second PTTR during the 2015-2016 academic 

school year, which would have been sometime during the 2018-2019 academic school 

year. And her complaints either ignore or misrepresent the evidence that the district court

relied on in making the disputed fact-finding. The Dean's letter to Joritz following the 

CCAPT's review of Joritz' initial PTTR by the FMS Department, explicitly told Joritz 

that it was important for her to complete her ongoing research projects "in time for juried 

exhibition and peer evaluation at least one year in advance of [Joritz'] mandatory tenure 

review," that is, at least one year before 2019 at the latest. Yet, in her dossier for her 

second PTTR during the 2015-2016 academic school year, Joritz explicitly stated that her 

projected completion of her book on Reiniger was 2019 and her projected finish for the 

movie Film Feed was 2017.

In short, a review of some of Joritz' judicial misconduct arguments supports that 

Joritz has misrepresented the district judge's fact-findings, as well as the record before the 

district judge, to support her misconduct arguments. Although Joritz may disagree with 

the district court's fact-findings against her, her disagreement with those fact-findings or 

the omission of other fact-findings does not mean that the district court engaged in 

misconduct. Additionally, Joritz' failure to cite any authority supporting her allegation of

judicial misconduct—based on her disagreement with the district judge's fact-findings—
28

shows she has inadequately briefed her judicial misconduct argument. This failure is akin 

to abandoning her argument. See Russell, 306 Kan. at 1089. 

Most importantly, though, Joritz never argued that the district judge committed 

misconduct below. Instead, as stressed by the University, she has raised this argument for 

the first time on appeal.

Generally, we do not consider issues raised by appellants for the first time on 

appeal. In re Adoption of Baby Girl G., 311 Kan. 798, 801, 466 P.3d 1207 (2020). This 

includes when appellants have argued that the district judge engaged in judicial 

misconduct for the first time on appeal. See State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 787, 47 P.3d 

783 (2002); Bohanon v. Werholtz, No. 104,490, 2011 WL 2135163, at *4 (Kan. App. 

2011) (unpublished opinion). Also, although there are a few exceptions to this general 

rule, our Supreme Court has held that appellants must invoke one of those exceptions 

since Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) requires appellants to explain why an issue 

not raised below should be considered for the first time on appeal. The court has further 

warned that appellants who violate this rule risk a ruling that their arguments are 

inadequately briefed and thus waived and abandoned. In re Adoption of Baby Girl G., 

311 Kan. 802-03. 

In conclusion, although Joritz has spent the bulk of her appellant's brief arguing 

that the district judge committed misconduct when denying her petition for judicial 

review, Joritz has waived and abandoned all her judicial misconduct arguments by failing 

to adequately brief those arguments.

b. Legal Error Arguments

As for Joritz' legal error arguments, throughout her appellant's brief, Joritz argues 

that the district court made many legal errors when denying her petition for judicial 
29

review. Even so, her chief legal arguments are as follows: (1) that the district court

wrongly relied on our Supreme Court's precedent in Harsay, (2) that the district court

wrongly limited its review to evidence that only supported the University's termination of 

her tenure track employment, and (3) that the district court wrongly limited its review to 

the Chancellor's decision to terminate her tenure track employment. A review of Joritz' 

arguments as compared to the district court's memorandum decision denying her petition 

shows that each of Joritz' legal error arguments are unfounded. 

Joritz arguments about the district court's reliance on Harsay concerns the district 

court's discussion of the applicable standard of review in its memorandum decision. She 

asserts that the district court's reliance on Harsay was misplaced because she is appealing 

from her termination following an unsuccessful PTTR while Harsay was appealing from 

her termination following an unsuccessful final tenure review. She also takes issue with 

the district court's finding that if there was a distinction between her case and Harsay, the 

distinction was that "'tenure [was] a decision that justifies greater court scrutiny than the 

tenure track decision simply because the tenure candidate has invested more time and 

effort in the ultimate decision under review.'" Of note, in making this argument, Joritz 

further argues that the district court's misapplication of our Supreme Court's precedent in 

Harsay violated her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. 

In its entirety, the district court's standard of review discussion within its 

memorandum decision stated:

"The decision under review is one that involves a great deal of particular 

experience and judgment by persons familiar with the caliber and nature of the skills, 

expertise and qualities required of a University of Kansas Professor. It is the product of 

input from numerous colleagues, review committees and, ultimately, the Chancellor. In 

that way, it is distinct from fact determinations of the kind involved in inherently more 

objective decisions such as disability determinations, Herrera-Gallegos v. H&H Delivery 
30

Service[], Inc., 42 Kan. App. 2d 360[, 212 P.3d 239] (2009)[,] or a Board of Tax Appeals 

[decision] considering classification or valuation of land, In re Protests of Oakhill Land 

Co., 46 Kan. App. 2d 1105[, 269 P.3d 876] (2012).

"For that reason, the standard of 'substantial competent evidence' that must exist 

to support a decision such as that under consideration here is most appropriately stated in 

Harsay . . . . The decision of whether to grant tenure, or whether to continue someone on 

the track towards tenure, are both very much matters of 'business judgment' that a court 

should not disturb by substituting its judgment for that of the [U]niversity.

"Professor Joritz disputes the application of this conclusion from Harsay to her 

case because the issue is not tenure but the continued path towards tenure. One could say 

this is a distinction without a difference. Yet, one difference that arguably exists would be 

this: [T]enure is a decision that justifies greater court scrutiny than the tenure track 

decision simply because the tenure candidate has invested more time and effort in the 

ultimate decision under review.

"The Court is unpersuaded that a distinction exists. And, in any event, [the 

University] need only show that there is substantial competent evidence to support its 

decision. This determination by the court must be based in light of the record as a whole. 

That Professor Joritz can make a strong case for a different conclusion does nothing to 

affect the outcome given the deference this Court must extend if that substantial evidence 

burden is met."

Although Joritz argues that the district court's reliance on Harsay was misplaced 

since she and Harsay were terminated at different times during their tenure track 

employment, the district court correctly found that Joritz' complaint involved a 

distinction without a difference. As explained when outlining our scope of review, parties 

seeking judicial review of an agency action must sue under the KJRA, and K.S.A. 77-621 

defines the scope of review for all courts reviewing agency actions. It therefore follows 

that the same standard of review that applied in Harsay's lawsuit against the University 

applies in Joritz' lawsuit against the University. And, indeed, the Harsay court considered 

Harsay's specific complaints under K.S.A. 77-621(c)'s limited scope of review. 308 Kan. 

at 1382-85. On top of this, the district court's standard of review discussion was 

consistent with our Supreme Court's Harsay decision, which held: (1) that the substantial 
31

competent evidence burden of proof was "essentially equivalent" to evidence that is 

substantial in light of the record as a whole as meant under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7) and (2) 

that University tenure decisions are based partly on the University's subjective "business 

judgment." 308 Kan. at 1382-83. And the district court, like us, was duty-bound to follow 

our Supreme Court's precedent. Farmers Bank & Trust v. Homestead Community 

Development, 58 Kan. App. 2d 877, 897, 476 P.3d 1 (2020) (holding that lower courts are 

duty-bound to follow our Supreme Court's precedent absent some indication that our 

Supreme Court is moving away from such precedent). 

Besides, Joritz' entire argument about the district court's reliance on Harsay

ignores that the district court also ruled that substantial evidence supported the 

University's termination of Joritz' tenure track employment regardless of the Harsay

precedent. It explained that even disregarding the Harsay precedent, Joritz was not 

entitled to the relief she requested because substantial evidence in light of the record as a 

whole supported the University's termination of her tenure track employment. Thus,

Joritz' specific complaints about the district court's reliance on Harsay are rendered 

irrelevant by her failure to address the district court's alternative ruling about substantial 

evidence supporting the University's termination of her tenure track employment. See In 

re Marriage of Williams, 307 Kan. 960, 977, 417 P.3d 1033 (2018) (holding that issues 

not briefed by appellants are deemed waived and abandoned). 

Next, Joritz' argument that the district court wrongly limited its review to evidence 

that only supported the University's termination of her tenure track employment is 

similarly unpersuasive. Although her argument is not entirely clear, Joritz seemingly 

contends that the district court's comparison of the substantial evidence standard to a 

business judgment proves that it wrongly limited its review of the record to only evidence 

that supported the University. But as just noted, the Harsay court held that University 

tenure decisions are based partly on the University's subjective "business judgment." 308 

Kan. at 1383. Also, nothing within the district court's memorandum decision supports 
32

that it refused to consider evidence supporting Joritz' KJRA claims. On top of this, it 

appears that Joritz has merely misunderstood the district court's discussion about 

reviewing agency actions for substantial evidence in light of the record as a whole. In its 

standard of review discussion, the district court never implied that it would review the 

evidence only supporting the University's termination of her tenure track employment. 

Instead, consistent with K.S.A. 77-621(d)'s rule barring courts from "reweigh[ing] the 

evidence or engag[ing] in de novo review" when considering whether substantial 

evidence in light of the whole supported the agency's disputed action, it explained it 

would not "substitut[e] its judgment for that of the University['s]" during its review. 

Likewise, Joritz has also misunderstood the district court in arguing that the 

district court wrongly limited its review to the Chancellor's decision to terminate her 

tenure track employment with the University. She challenges the district court's ruling 

that "[t]o whatever degree any review board or committee did not conform with 

[University] policy" during her second PTTR and ensuing agency-level appeal, "none of 

those bodies were the decision-makers so as to support a violation of K.S.A. 77-

621(c)(6)." She seemingly contends that because the FMS Chair, the Dean, the Provost, 

the IRC, the CCAPT, and the FRB all acted on behalf of the University, the University 

violated K.S.A. 77-621(c)(6)'s rule barring persons without authority from taking agency 

action.

Yet, when it pointed out that any review board or committee was not the decision 

maker to support a violation of K.S.A. 77-621(c)(6), the district court was simply 

explaining that any error that occurred during Joritz' second PTTR or earlier stage of 

Joritz' agency-level appeal was harmless because it was the Chancellor who took the final 

agency action on the University's behalf. Then, immediately after the district court made 

the disputed ruling, it rejected Joritz' argument about substantial evidence in light of the 

record as a whole not supporting the University's termination of her tenure track 

employment since the record showed two things: (1) that the Chancellor recognized the 
33

potential impact of the FMS Chair's inaccurate statements when engaging in her 

independent review and (2) that Joritz' research record was inadequate.

As a result, despite Joritz' arguments otherwise, nothing supports that the district 

court made multiple legal errors when denying her petition for judicial review. 

c. Factual Error Argument

In Joritz' factual error argument, Joritz takes issue with evidence that the district 

court purportedly ignored when denying her petition for judicial review. According to 

Joritz, the Chancellor's decision to terminate her tenure track employment with the 

University could not have been supported by substantial evidence in light of the record as 

a whole as required under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7) because the FMS Chair's factually 

inaccurate statements prejudiced her second PTTR process and her agency-level appeal. 

But there are a couple of problems with Joritz' argument. 

As just noted, in denying Joritz' petition for judicial review, the district court

implicitly ruled that any error occurring during Joritz' second PTTR and agency-level 

appeal was harmless because the Chancellor—the final agency actor on the University's 

behalf—explicitly recognized the potential impact of the FMS Chair's inaccurate 

statements when terminating Joritz' tenure track employment. Stated another way, the 

district court effectively determined that the FMS Chair's factually inaccurate statements 

did not prejudice Joritz because the Chancellor had adequately considered the impact of 

the FMS Chair's disputed statements during her independent review. 

Yet, in her appellant's brief, Joritz never addresses the actual reason why the 

district court affirmed the University's termination of her tenure track employment. 

Instead, she has created and then knocked down her own strawman argument that hinges 

on asserting that the district court ignored critical evidence, without proving that the 
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evidence was, in fact, ignored. As a result, Joritz has abandoned her ability to argue that 

the district court wrongly ruled that substantial evidence in light of the record as a whole 

supported the University's decision to terminate her tenure track employment. See In re 

Marriage of Williams, 307 Kan. at 977 (holding that issues not briefed by appellants are 

deemed waived and abandoned). 

Also, even if Joritz had not abandoned this argument, the district court's ruling was 

consistent with the applicable law and record before it. Again, under K.S.A. 77-621(e), 

all courts reviewing the validity of agency actions under the KJRA must take "due 

account . . . of the rule of harmless error." Additionally, in the Interim Provost's letter to 

Joritz outlining the Chancellor's reason for terminating her tenure track employment with 

the University, the Interim Provost explained that "even excluding consideration of the 

information in the [FMS] Chair's letter, the Chancellor determined that your research 

record demonstrated insufficient progress toward tenure, warranting non-reappointment."

So Joritz' factual error argument is unpersuasive for two reasons: (1) because she 

has abandoned it by failing to address the district court's harmless error argument and (2) 

because the record definitively establishes that the Chancellor did not ignore the potential 

impact of the FMS Chair's factually inaccurate statements during her second PTTR and 

agency-level appeal. 

CONCLUSION

To conclude, although Joritz asks us to consider her arguments under a special pro 

se standard of review, Kansas caselaw establishes that pro se appellants must comply 

with all procedural rules regardless of their pro se status. Appellants like Joritz cannot 

rely on their pro se status to violate court procedural rules. It is not our job to dig for 

Joritz' arguments or to address Joritz' improperly briefed arguments. As a result, when it 
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comes to procedure, Joritz is not entitled to any liberal application of our procedural 

rules.

Under this proper standard of review, Joritz has waived and abandoned her 

judicial misconduct arguments by failing to adequately brief those arguments. In addition 

to some procedural problems with her legal error arguments, the record on appeal does 

not support Joritz' arguments about the district court making legal errors. It is also clear 

that Joritz has abandoned her argument that the district court wrongly determined that 

substantial evidence in light of the record of the whole supported the University's 

termination of her tenure track employment by ignoring critical evidence. The district 

court's memorandum decision disproves Joritz' contention that the district court ignored 

any critical evidence. 

For these reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of Joritz' petition for judicial 

review. 

Affirmed.