This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,901 9 KENNETH LEON MILLS, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY 12 Kevin R. Sweazea, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee 18 Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C. 19 Robert E. Tangora 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellant 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 242 Following a jury trial, Defendant Kenne th Mills was convicted of kidnapping, 1 criminal sexual contact of a minor, aggravated burglary, intimidation of a witness, and 2 three counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor (CSPM). Defendant raises five 3 arguments that he contends re quire reversal, all pursuant to State v. Franklin , 78 N.M. 4 127, 428 P.2d 982 (1967) and State v. Boyer , 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 5 1985). We affirm. 6 DISCUSSION 7 Defendant argues that his conviction wa s not supported by substantial evidence, 8 that there were errors in jury selection, that he was prejudiced when an officer stood 9 behind him during trial, that Child’s pantie s should not have been admitted, and that 10 his three CSPM counts should have been merged. We address Defendant’s arguments 11 in the order they were raised, includi ng facts throughout the opinion as necessary. 12 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 13 Defendant first argues that his convictions must be reversed because they were 14 not supported by sufficient evidence. We note that Defendant bases this argument on 15 a long-discredited standard requiring thatthe evidence exclude all reasonable doubts. 16 See State v. Garcia , 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 18, 138 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72 (observing that 17 this standard has been untenable since 1984); State v. Huber , 2006-NMCA-087, ¶ 12, 18 140 N.M. 147, 140 P.3d 1096 (noting that a contention “that the evidence used to 193 support the conviction must be devoid of any reasonable inference of innocence. . . . 1 has been disavowed by our Supreme Court.”). Under the correct standard, 2 Defendant’s conviction was s upported by substantial evidence. 3 To decide whether there was su fficient evidence, we conduct the 4 following analysis: initially, the evid ence is viewed in the light most 5 favorable to the verdict. Then the appellate court mu st make a legal 6 determination of whether the evid ence viewed in this manner could 7 justify a finding by any rational trier of fact that each element of the 8 crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” 9 State v. Trossman , 2009-NMSC-034, ¶ 16, 146 N.M. 462, 212 P.3d 350 (alteration 10 omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[ I]t is well established that 11 contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because 12 the jury is free to reject [the d] efendant’s version of the facts.” State v. Marquez , 13 2009-NMSC-055, ¶ 17, 147 N.M. 386, 223 P. 3d 931 (alteration omitted) (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted). 15 Defendant advances three arguments that he claims require us to conclude that 16 the evidence was insufficient: (1) that the jury ignored Defendant’s testimony that he 17 was not present when the crime was committed, (2) that the jury ignored “obvious 18 tampering with [the] evidence (panties),” and (3) that the jury incorrectly ignored a 19 shoe print near the crime scene that was a different size than Defendant’s. These 20 arguments fail because, as we have notedabove, contrary evidence does not support 21 reversal because the jury is free to re ject Defendant’s version of the facts. 224 Additionally, we have reviewed the record and are in agreement with the explanation 1 set forth by the State showing how the eviden ce is sufficient to support the conviction 2 under our deferential st andard of review. 3 B. Jury Selection 4 Defendant makes two arguments regarding the jury: (1) that it was error for the 5 district court to dismiss for cause a ju ror who had been arrested by the police 6 witnesses in this case, and (2) that African-Americans had been systematically 7 excluded from the jury pool. 8 The district court did not err in rejec ting juror 4 for cause. “We review the 9 [district] court’s rulings regarding the sel ection of jurors for an abuse of discretion 10 because the [district] court is in the be st position to assess a juror’s state of mind, 11 based upon the juror’s demeanor and credibility.” State v. Johnson , 2010-NMSC-016, 12 ¶ 31, 148 N.M. 50, 229 P.3d 523 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks and 13 citation omitted). “The [district] court, however, has a great deal of discretion in 14 dismissing a juror for cause, and its decisi on will not be disturbed absent a manifest 15 error or clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Wiberg , 107 N.M. 152, 156, 754 P.2d 16 529, 533 (Ct. App. 1988). Here, the juror in question acknowledge d that he had been 17 arrested by Sergeant Lopez and Detective Cr ockett, the police witnesses in this case. 18 However, he stated that the arrest would not affect his decision and that he could be 195 fair. The district court determined that , because the Sergeant and the detective had 1 been responsible for the juror’s prior convic tion, the juror would not be able to remain 2 impartial. The district court was in the be st position to assess the situation, and we 3 cannot say it abused its discre tion in declining to seat a juror who had been previously 4 arrested by the police witnesses in this case. 5 Defendant also has not show n error in the selection of the jury pool. After the 6 jury was selected, Defendant requested a mi strial on the basis that there had been no 7 African-Americans in the jury pool. His request was denied. 8 In order to show a prima facie vi olation of the fair cross-section 9 requirement, a defendant must demons trate that (1) the group alleged to 10 be excluded is a “distinctive” gr oup in the community, (2) the group’s 11 representation in venires from which ju ries are selected is not fair and 12 reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community, 13 and (3) this under-representation resu lts from the systematic exclusion 14 of the group in the jury-selection process. 15 State v. Casillas , 2009-NMCA-034, ¶ 13, 145 N.M. 783, 205 P.3d 830. We assume 16 without deciding that African-Americans are a distinctive group. Even so, Defendant 17 has not argued, either here or below, that th e other two factors were met. As he has 18 not shown a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement find no error. 19 C. Position of the Officer 20 Defendant argues that his due process rights were violated when an officer 21 stood behind him while the videotaped tes timony of Child was played for the jury. 226 Defendant cites to no authority to support this argument, but instead cites two 1 California cases against it. Furthermore, Defendant’s argument is limited to a single 2 bare assertion. We do not address arguments that are not developed and are not 3 supported by authority. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 4 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076; In re Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 5 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984). 6 D. Admission of Evidence 7 Defendant next contends that the district court abused its discretion by 8 admitting Child’s panties into evidence. Specifically, Defendant contends that the 9 evidence shows that a stain appeared on the panties betweenthe time they were taken 10 into custody and the time they were admitted into evidence. Once again Defendant 11 cites no authority in support of his argument, but instead points us to contrary 12 authority. In State v. Belcher , 83 N.M. 130, 131-32, 489 P. 2d 410, 411-12 (Ct. App. 13 1971), we rejected an argument that a wallet should not have been admitted because 14 the chain of custody evidence did not precludethe possibility that the wallet had been 15 tampered with, reasoning that concerns about tampering went to the weight, not the 16 admissibility, of the evidence. We see no reason that Belcher should not apply 17 equally in this case. 187 E. Double Jeopardy 1 Defendant’s final argument is that it was error for the district court to deny his 2 request that the three CSPM charges be merg ed. Specifically, he contends that merger 3 was required because the three penetrations of different orifices happened in a short 4 period of time and without interruption. Th e State responds that serial penetrations 5 of different orifices constitute different o ffenses, and that there were intervening acts. 6 In Herron v. State , our Supreme Court set forth six factors to evaluate the 7 number of offenses committed during a sexual assault: 8 (1) temporal proximity of penetrati ons (the greater the interval between 9 acts the greater the likelihood of separate offenses); (2) location of the 10 victim during each penetr ation (movement or repositioning of the victim 11 between penetrations tends to show separate offenses); (3) existence of 12 an intervening event; (4) sequencing of penetrations (s erial penetrations 13 of different orifices, as opposed to repeated penetrations of the same 14 orifice, tend to establish separate offenses); (5) defendant's intent as 15 evidenced by his conduct and utterances ; and (6) number of victims. . . . 16 111 N.M. 357, 361, 805 P.2d 624, 628 (1991). The Court went on to note that 17 “[e]xcept for penetrations of separate orifices with the same object, none of these 18 factors alone is a panacea.” Id. at 362, 805 P.2d at 629. 19 Child testified to the following. Defendant put her on top of a garbage 20 dumpster and penetratedher vaginally with his penis. Defendant then placed her on 21 the ground and put his penis into her mouth. Defendant also at some point penetrated 22 her anally with his penis. The evidence supports a conclusion th at Defendant serially 238 penetrated three of Child’s orifices with his penis. Sin ce our cases indicate that this 1 conduct supports three charges, we find no error. 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court and remand for further 4 proceedings consistent with this opinion. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 8 WE CONCUR: 9

10 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 11

12 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 13