United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 30, 2015*

Decided March 30, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐3477

HARVEY HOOVER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 3:13‐cv‐217

Theresa L. Springmann,

Judge.

O R D E R

In 2003 Harvey Hoover received a reward of $65,146.07 from the Internal

Revenue Service for helping it collect unpaid tax from another taxpayer. See 26 U.S.C.

§ 7623. The IRS applied the entire award to Hoover’s outstanding tax liabilities, which

stemmed from his own prior tax fraud. See United States v. Hoover, 240 F.3d 593 (7th Cir.

2001); United States v. Hoover, 175 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1999). Eight years later Hoover filed

an administrative claim with the IRS under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14‐3477    Page 2

§§ 2671–2680, principally contending that the IRS should have written him a check for

the sum instead. The IRS rejected his claim, concluding that it was barred because the

FTCA does not cover claims arising out of the assessment or collection of taxes.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). Hoover then sued the agency in federal court, adding a claim of

false imprisonment stemming from his prior sentence for tax fraud and disputing the

collection of his United States savings bonds as payment for unpaid tax liabilities

following his conviction. The district judge dismissed the suit on grounds that the FTCA

did not apply to claims relating to tax collection or false imprisonment and that Hoover

had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under both the FTCA and 26 U.S.C.

§ 7433, the statute that provides a mechanism for taxpayers to recover damages for

unlawful collection of taxes.

Hoover asserts generally that the district court erred in dismissing his suit, but his

argument has no merit. As the district court explained, Hoover cannot state a claim

under the FTCA regarding the collection of either the savings bonds or his 2003 reward

because the statute does not waive the government’s sovereign immunity for claims

relating to the assessment or collection of taxes. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c); Voelker v. Nolen,

365 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 2004). The district court also correctly determined that

Hoover’s suit could not proceed under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 because he had not exhausted

his administrative remedies by first submitting his claim to the regional area director of

the IRS. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7433‐1(d)–(e); Gray v. United States, 723 F.3d 795, 802 (7th Cir.

2013). We also note that any claim under § 7433 would be barred by the applicable

two‐year statute of limitations because Hoover did not file this suit until eight years after

the IRS applied his reward to his unpaid tax liabilities. See 26 U.S.C. § 7433(d)(3);

26 C.F.R. § 301.7433‐1(g); Kovacs v. United States, 614 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 2010).

Hoover also continues to challenge aspects of his earlier criminal proceedings,

insisting, for example, that he was falsely imprisoned for tax fraud. But these assertions

imply the invalidity of his conviction, and thus his claims related to those proceedings

are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 530

(7th Cir. 2014).

To the extent he raises other arguments, we have considered them and they are

without merit.

AFFIRMED