UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4393

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RAYMOND MITCHELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District 

Judge. (2:11-cr-00144-RAJ-TEM-1)

Submitted: November 19, 2012 Decided: November 30, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Richard J. 

Colgan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, 

Appellate Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, V. Kathleen Dougherty, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Raymond Mitchell appeals the criminal judgment 

imposing a thirty-month sentence following Mitchell’s

conditional guilty plea to travelling in interstate commerce and 

failing to register or update a registration as required by the 

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006). Mitchell argues that 

Congress violated the non-delegation doctrine, the Ex Post Facto 

Clause, and the Commerce Clause in enacting SORNA. For the 

reasons that follow, we reject these arguments and affirm. 

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a 

motion to dismiss an indictment based purely on legal grounds. 

United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Properly preserved constitutional claims also are reviewed de 

novo. United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2009).

“The non-delegation doctrine is based on the principle 

of preserving the separation of powers between the coordinate 

branches of government.” United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 

1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 2009). Congress’s delegation of authority 

to another branch of government does not offend the 

non-delegation doctrine as long as Congress has delineated an 

“intelligible principle” guiding the exercise of that authority. 

J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 

(1928). Even a general legislative directive is a 
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constitutionally sufficient “intelligible principle” so long as 

Congress “clearly delineates the general policy, the public 

agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this 

delegated authority.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 

372-73 (1989).

Mitchell contends that there is no intelligible 

principle guiding the Attorney General’s exercise of his 

discretion to determine SORNA’s retroactive application. 

Although this court has not resolved this issue in published 

authority, we have consistently rejected this argument in 

unpublished decisions. See United States v. Clark, 2012 WL 

2109246 (4th Cir. June 12, 2012) (No. 11-5098), petition for 

cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Aug. 30, 2012) (No. 12-6067); 

United States v. Rogers, 468 F. App’x 359, 361-62 (4th Cir. 

2012) (No. 10-5099) (argued but unpublished), cert. denied, __ 

S. Ct. __ (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 11-10450); United States v. 

Stewart, 461 F. App’x 349, 351-52 (4th Cir.) (Nos. 11-4420/4471) 

(per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2446 (2012); United 

States v. Burns, 418 F. App’x 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 

09-4909) (argued but unpublished). Additionally, other circuits 

to consider the issue have concluded that this claim lacks 

merit. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 93 (2d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3487 (2010); United States v. 

Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir. 2009); Ambert, 561 F.3d at 
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1213-14. Based on these persuasive authorities, we likewise 

reject Mitchell’s non-delegation challenge.

Mitchell further challenges SORNA under the Ex Post 

Facto Clause and the Commerce Clause. However, as Mitchell 

concedes, these issues are foreclosed by this court’s decision 

in United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Because “a panel of this court cannot overrule, explicitly or 

implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of this court,” 

United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 564 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), we conclude 

that Mitchell’s challenges must fail.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED