UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS
No. 98-100

P A U L L. F A U ST , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. T OGO D. W EST , J R
. S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided F ebrua

ry 15, 2000 )
Stephen M

. Needham , o f M ilw a

uk e e , Wis c on sin , w a s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt. Leigh A. Bradley , Ge ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Jacque line M. Sims , ActingDeputy

Assistant G ener al Counsel, a ll of Washington, D.C., wer e on the plea ding for the a ppellee.
Be fore FARL EY, I VERS, and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. ST E I N B ERG, Judge : The appe llant, vetera n Paul L . Fa

ust, appea ls through c ounsel an October 28, 1997, decision of the Boa rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (BV A or B oard) that reduc ed fr om 100% to 70% his Depa

rtment of Ve tera

ns Af fa i rs (VA) disability

rating for se rvice -conne cted p o s t -traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Recor d (R.) at 2. The appellant ha s filed a br ief, the Secre tary has filed a

motion for single -judg e af firmanc e, and the appellant ha s filed what he styles as a motion in opposition to the S ecr etar y ' s motion and reque sting sing le-judg e re versa l. This appeal is ti me ly , an d th e Co u rt h a s ju r is d ic ti o n p u r s u an t to 3 8 U

. S. C. § § 7 2 5 2 ( a ) an d 7 2 6 6 ( a )

. F o r the

re a so ns that f

oll ow , the Court wi ll de ny the pa rt ie s' mot ion s f

or sin g le -j ud g e dis po sit ion

and , b y thi s panel opinion, af

firm the B VA dec ision.

I. Re le va nt Bac kgr ound The ve te r anh a d

a c ti v e s e r

v ic e in th e U

. S. A r

my f r o m M ay 1 9 6 8 to M ay

1 9 7 2 , in cluding2

service as a he licopt er p ilot in Vietnam for which he rec eived, inter alia, the Air

Medal with Oak L e a f C lus te r a

nd the Di sti nguis he d F lyingCr os s. R. at 23 . H is s e rv ic e me dic a l r e c or ds (S MRs ) ref lected no psychiatric conditions. See R. at 26-189. I n October

1991, he filed w ith a VA re g ional office (RO) a claim for V A servic e conne ction for " Pos t T ra u m atic Stress" . R. at 191. I n J une 1992, the VA RO awa rded se rvice connec tion for PTSD and assig ned a 50% rating , eff ective O ctober

1991. R. at 370-71. The f ollowing month, the veter an submitted a Notice of Disag ree ment (NOD ). R. at 372. I n April 1993, he testified unde r oath at a he aringbefor e the RO. He descr ibed havingnightmar es t h at h e s ai d were trig g ere d by seeinghelicopter s on television ( R. at 449- 50) and indicated that he wa s "ve ry susceptible to loud noises" ( R. at 450), had diff iculty conce ntrating (R. at 452), a nd had proble ms with ang er ( R. at 453) and depr ession (R. at 449-55). He further testified that he had, "ove r the y ear s", sold insuranc e and investments b u t had not sold any "in pr obably

three y ear s and the re newa ls are de cre asing ever y y e ar"

. R. at 45 6. He a lso a pp are ntl y su bmi tte d d oc ume ntatio n in su pp or t of his te sti mony

that hi s t a x a b l e i n c o m e i n1 9 9 1 h a d b e e n $ 6 7 5 , w h e r e a s i n1 9 8 7 h e h a d e ar n e d $ 5 2 , 0 0 0

. R

. a t4 5 6

- 5 7

. In May 1993, a boar d of two VA psychiatrists opined that the ve tera n' s PTSD "is quite sever e and that he appe ars to be ne arly

completely

disabled sec ondary

by [si c] it" and also stated: " [W ]e would like to emphasize that we be lieve [that] he is more than 50% disabled sec ondary to [ PTSD] ". R. at 482. Ba sed on the Apr il 1993 hearing , the hea ring office r in J uly

1993 issued a decision in which he state d: The e vidence in its entire ty demonstrated that the veter an' s [P TSD] results i n a seve re social and industrial impairment a nd war rants . . . a 70% e valuation pursuant to the provisions of 38 C.F.R. [§] 4.132, Diag nostic Code [(DC)] 9411 [(1996)] . . . . Ho we ve r, wh e n a

pp ly ingthe pr ov isi on s o f 3 8 C. F .R. [§] 4. 16 ([c ]) the ve te ra n is entitled to a 100% evaluation since the evidenc e shows as substantiated by his 1991 income tax return that he is una ble to eng ag e in substantially g ainful employ

ment. R. at 491. The RO then issued a n Aug ust 1993 deci s i o n t h at , "[ i] n acc ordanc e with the [h] ear ing [o] ffice r [' s ] d e c is io n " , a s s ig n e d a 1 0 0 % r a ti n g , e f f e c ti v e O c to b e r 1 9 9 1 , f

o r PT SD , b a s e d o nthe hear ing of

fice r' s having "f

ound [a] rea sonable ba sis for i n cr ea s ed rating f or ser vice[-]connecte d PTSD inc lud ingtot a l ( 10 0% ) e va luatio n und er pro visio ns of 38 C.F .R. [§] 4. 16 (c ) r e la te d to veter an' s inability

to eng ag e in substantially g ainful employ ment." R. at 494. An Aug ust 1993 letter from the RO then infor

med the veter an that, beca use it had " g rante d the bene fits sought" , his appea l3

was " considere d to be withdraw n". R. at 498. I n J uly 1994, the veter an' s former spouse, Ms. J ohnson, filed a c laim for appor tionment of the veter an' s benef

its on behalf of his son; Ms. J ohnson submitt ed do cumentation -- including fi na nc ia l st a te me nts fr om a

bu sin e ss t

hat sh e and

the ve te ra

n h a d o pe ra

te d to g e the r a

nd do c ume nts related to family -cour

t proce eding s -- that i n d i ca t ed that the veter an had e arne d $48,000 in 1993. R. at 504-40. I n Aug ust 1994, the veter an confirme d under oath before the RO that he ha d ear ned $48,000 in 1993. R. at 554. As part of a S eptember 1994 VA socia l and industrial survey , the veter an re lated that he w as self-e mploy ed and that "he pull[ ed] a hig h salary . . . [, but beca

use] the business i t self [was] not making money " his business wa s "ba rely brea king e ven"

. R. at 570. I t was noted that he "a ppear ed aler t, oriented, a

nd cooper ative" and showe d "no sig ns of p s y chotic beha vior" but "wa s tearf

ul at times throughout the inter view and spoke of hig h levels of a nx iety , both in the se ssion . . . and for the past several months". T he surve y included a r ecommendation that the vetera n underg o ong oing thera py and a f uture re evaluation. Ibid. I nM ar ch 1 9 9 5 , th e v et er an s u b m i t t edt o t h e R O a re qu es tfo r c o p i es o f M s
. J o h n s o n 's statements in support of her claim for a

pportionment. R. at 574. I n April 1995, a " Veter ans Service Of fi c e r" (V SO) a t th e RO no tif ie d th e ve te ra

n a s f oll ow s: Un de r c on fi de nti a li ty

rul es, Imay

no t r ele ase d ocu men ts con cern in g o ne pa rt y to another w ithout written permission. I do not have Ms. Johnson's writt en permission to relea se copie s of her documents to y ou. As a re su lt, I mus t de ny y our re qu e st un de r the pr ov isi on s o f t he Pr iva c y

Ac t, Title 5, United S tates C ode, S ection 552a, and Title 38, United States Code, Section 5701. If y ou d o no t ag re ewith this de c ision, y ou may ap pe al i n wri ting t o : [ VA 's O f f ic e o f G e n e r a l C o u n s e l ( O G C) ( a d dr e s s p r o v id e d ) ]. R. at 560 (emphasis adde d). At a VA PTSD e x amination undertaken in A pril 1995, the veter an descr ibed him s el f as h a v i n g u n ch an gedP T S D s y mp t o m at o l o gy
. R

. at 5 7 8

. I nt h e e x am i n er 's re p o rt , fo l l o wi n g a discussion of that sy

mptomatology , it was noted: " Per the patient's history , and in compar ison to the pr ior

. . . e xam[in a tio n] do ne 5/ 20 /9 3, the on ly sig nif ic ant c ha ng e fo r t he be tte r t

hat th e patie nt i s4

repor ting is that he is making more money and [ is] able to support himself a little better. . . . I cannot

se e any sig nif ic ant c ha ng e s at th is t ime oth e r t

ha n th e inc re a se d in c ome ." R. at 57 9. Th e RO in April 1995 deter

mined that the veter an met the c riteria f or a 100% PTSD rating, w hich then re quired, int e r a lia , th e fo llo wi ng : " Th e a tti tud e s o f all c on ta c ts e xce pt t he mos t in tim a te are so a dv e rs e ly aff ecte d as to result in virtual isolation in the community [,] . . . [t ]ot ally incapa citating ps y c h o n e u r o t i c s y

mp t o m s b o r d e r i n g o ng r o s s r e p u d i a t i o no f r e a l i t y [, an d ] .

. . . [d ]e m o n s tr a bly unable to obtain or r etain employ ment". R. at 582 (citing "38 C.F .R. [ §] 4.132, DC 9411"). I n May 1995, the veter an testified unde r o at h at a he aringbefor e the RO re g ardingthe apportionment cla im. R. at 585-94. He indicate d t h at h i s s alary was $3,000 a

month and his VA

c omp e ns ati on was $2 ,0 65 a mon th. R. at 58 5. L a te r t hat mo nth , th e RO re c e ive d d oc ume nts , a p p ar e n t l y f r o m t h e v e t e r a n , i n d i c a t i n g t h a th e h a d e ar n e d $ 3 8 , 0 0 0 i n1 9 9 4

. R

. a t5 9 6

- 6 1 2

. In J uly 1995, he re quested " copies of the income and e x pense r eport(s) submitt ed by [Ms .] J ohnson." R. at 615. I n J uly

1995, the VSO ag ain re fused to provide copies of those documents t o the veter an and notified him of hi s rig ht to appea l the VS O' s decision t o VA' s OGC; the VSO also indicated that Ms. J ohnson had " repor

ted her net income a s $566.42 m o n t h l y p l u s chil d support [and that her] expenses . . . wer e $2561 monthly ." R. at 617. The RO issued a June 1995 decision concluding that the veteran' s PTSD was "g reatly over
e va luate d ba se d on his c ur re nt e mpl oy

me nt status " , and

statin g that a

ps y c hiatr ic e xami natio n s ho uld be conduc ted " at once ". R. at 619. At an August 1995 VA P TSD examination, the veter an re ported that he had ear

ned $36,000 in 1994, "ba sed on business that he de veloped pr ior to PTSD becoming a proble m for him in 1991", a nd that since 1991 he had not experienc ed grow th in his i ncome. R. at 622. He a lso stated that he wa s "una ble to work more than two day s a we ek on ave rag e bec ause of his PTS D." R. at 623. The ex am i n er diag nosed the ve tera n as continuing to have PTSD and indicated that he suffe red " [m ]ajor impairment in work, mood[,] and fa mily relations." R. at 625. I n a September 1995 decision, the RO, noting that the ve tera n was " self-e mploy ed and that he [wa s] e arn ing

mor e tha

n ma rg ina l in c ome fr om h is b us ine ss" , p ro po se d th a t hi s

" se rv ic e [-]c on ne c te d n e rv ou s d iso rd e r, wh ic h is c ur re ntl y 10 0[% ] dis a

bli ng , . . . be de c re a se d to 70[%] ." R. at 628. The RO specific ally noted as well t hat the vete ran ha d "indicated that there had been no c hang e in the fr equenc y or the seve rity

of his PTSD sy

mptoms." R. at 629. He wa s notified5

of the rating- reduc tion proposal (R. at 632) and reque sted the opportunity to be hear d reg ardingthe proposed de cre ase ( R. at 635). He also reque sted in November 1995 a copy of the tra nscript of the May 1995 testimony

of Ms. J oh n s o n , an d was a g ain denied a cce ss to Ms. J ohnson' s rec ord and notified that he ha d a rig ht to appeal that VSO de termination to VA' s OGC. R. at 651. At a F ebrua

ry 1996 hear ing be fore the RO, the v eteran testified unde r oath that he "mig ht

e ff e c tiv e ly wo rk thr e e da

y s a we e k" . R. a t 65 6- 57 ; se e als o R. at 661 (veter an' s sworn testimony that in t he pa st he ha d b e e n a

ble to w or

k 6 0- 70 ho ur s p e r w e e k, bu t, d ue to t he PTSD , w a s o nly

a ble to work 16 hours pe r we ek). H e stated that his salary was then $36,000/y ear

(R. at 657) but asse rted that if he " would be able to work ef fec tively [he]

. . . should be able to do we ll in ex cess of $1 00 ,0 00 " (R . at 66 0) ; he a pp e ars to h a ve be e n a sse rt ingthat if he we re no t the ow ne r of the bu sin e ss he would have been f

ired fr om his posit ion due to his short work hours and the fac t that "since 1991" he had not " added any new clients" (R. at 668). In Marc h 1996, the RO reduc ed fr om 100% to 70% the veter an' s rating for service -conne cted PTSD, e ffe ctive J une 1996. R. at 676. The RO noted that such a r eduction " may

be made when the e vidence shows that improvement has be en made in the

sev eri ty of t he P TS D s y

mp to ms ." Ibid. The RO also stated: "T he veteran' s [P TSD] is not considered static (uncha

ng ing) ; there fore , a future examination will be scheduled to re view this disability ." R. at 677. The ve tera

n filed an N OD in April 1996. R. at 683. An April 1996 VA outpatient psy chiatric rec ord noted that the ve tera n had indicate d that he

wa s una ble "to wo rk

wi th o the rs " bu t a lso ha d " on g oin g c omp uls ive wo rk ha bit s to a vo id de pr e ssi on ." R. at 69 5. I n M ay 19 96 , h e ma de a

fo urt h att emp t to ob ta in i nf or ma tio n f ro m Ms

. J ohnson' s claims file and w as ag ain notified by the VSO that such information was " protec ted" and that he could a

ppeal to VA' s OGC. R. at 691. I n September 1996, the RO issued an SOC as to the reduc tion of his PTS D rating, c iting, inter a lia, "38 C.F .R. [ §] 3.343". R. at 732-43. I n Augus t 19 97 , th e Board recei ved th e fol lo wi ng st ate men t fro m M s. J oh ns on : "I HERE BY
R EQ UE S T TO W I THDR AW MY AP PE AL F OR AP PO R TI ONMEN T ." R. at 831. Al s o in Aug ust 1997, the veter an testified unde r oath be fore the B oard that his PTSD c ondition had not "cha ng ed at a ll" since 1991. R. at 835. He reiter ated that during "a rea lly g ood wee k" he was a ble to work a s much as 16 ho ur s ( R. at 83 6) and

state d t hat hi s b us ine ss h a d d e c lin e d s inc e 19 91 and wa s o pe ratin g a t a y e ar- to- date los s o f $ 40 ,0 00

. R. a t 84 2- 45

. I n the Oc tob e r 28 , 1 99 7, B VAde c isi on he re on a pp e a l,6

the B oard note d that the veter an' s 100% PTSD rating , assig ned by the RO in Aug ust 1993 (R. at 494), had be en " based on nonme dical evide nce w hich re veale d that the veter an was incapa ble of

e mpl oy me nt ( pr ima

ri ly his W-2 fo r 1 99 1) " (R . at 16 ) a nd tha t mo re re c e nt e vid e nc e sh ow e d h im t o b e e ar n i n g " $ 4 8 , 0 0 0 i n1 9 9 3 an d t h a th i s i n c o m e f

o r 1 9 9 4 w a s $ 3 , 0 0 0 p e r

m o n t h " ( R

. a t1 8 )

. In addition, the Boa

rd stat ed t hat the fa ct that the vete ran " is not meeting his full potential in the workplac e" did not support an awa rd of a rating of 100% for his se rvice -conne cted PTSD. R. at 17. The B oard c onclude d t h at the " preponde ranc e of the evidenc e support[ed] a reduc tion in the evaluation of the veter an' s PTSD from 100 to 70[ %]." R. at 2.

II. Ana lys is Th e a pp e lla nt m a ke s mu lti ple argume nts . F ir st, he argues th at the B oa rd e rr e d w he n it reduc ed his 100% rating in " the abse nce of any s t at em ent [indi cating ] . . . t hat [his] medical diag nosis and/or medica l condition had improved" (B rief ( Br .) at 4) a nd wh en it "r el[ied] on information submitted by the ex-wife [(Ms. J ohn s o n ), an d ] . . . then depr iv[ ed him] of that information in his own defe nse" (B r. at 8). H e re lies on arguments based on VA' s failure to follow its own r e g ulatio ns ( see, e .g., B r. a t 4- 7) and on " du e pr oc e ss" (w ith ou t c iti ngto a ny du e pr oc e ss provision(s) i n the U.S . Constit ution) ( see, e .g., Br

. at 8). As to the latter a rg uments, the Court is not inclined to addre ss such vague " due proc ess" arguments. Se e Br e we r v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 228, 236- 37 (1998) (Court need not a ddress "me re asser tions of constitutional im propriety for whic h he has not provided any

leg al support" , citing, inter alia, Gov't and Civic Employee s Organizing Comm., CI Ov
. W in d sor , 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957) (" Fe dera l courts will not pass upon constituti onal contentions prese nted i n an abstra ct rather than in a concr ete f

orm" ), and U.S. v. M

. Genzale Plating, Inc. , 723 F. Supp. 877, 885 (E.D.N .Y. 1989) (" [v ] agu e as s er t i o ns of unfa irness on the pa rt of the g ov e rnme nt, wi tho ut m or e , c a nn ot b e mol de d in to con st itutio na l vi olatio ns " )) ; se e als o Ch as tai n
v . W est , _

_ Ve t

. Ap p
. _

_ , _

_ , No

. 9 7 -1 1 6 1 , s l i p o p
. at 6 (J an
. 2 4 , 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Br e we r, su pra ). As to the appe llant's a ssertions that VA fa iled to f ollow its own reg ulations in thi s case , "[t]he BV A is not f

ree to ig nore regulations that the Secre tary has promulg ated consistent with his statutory

a uth or ity

. . . . Ra the r, ' [t]he B VA is re qu ir e d to a pp ly a ll r e le va nt s ta tut e s and

re g ulatio ns a

pp ro pr ia te to th e par ti cul ar cas e bef

ore i t. '" W

ils on ( Me rri tte ) v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 383, 385 ( 1998) (c itations7

omitted) (holding that failure of VA to follow i t s own re g ulations in terminating de pendenc y and indemnity

compensation be nefits, based on se vera nce of service connec tion, constitut ed pre judicial

e rr or ); se e als o P atton v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 272, 283 (1999) (" the Court be lieves t h at s u bstantial interests of justice dictate that the Court r equire the Secre tary to a dhere to hi s o wn regulatory pr ov isi on s" ); Bu

zin sk i v . B ro wn , 6 Ve t.A

pp
. 36 0, 36 7 (1 99 4) (" we a g re e that

. . . VAis o bli g a te d to fo l l o w t h e r egu l at i o n s i tp ro m u l gat es " ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es e xre l. Ac c ar

di v . S ha ug hn essy , 3 47 U. S. 26 0, 26 9 ( 19 54 ); Vitarelli v. Seaton , 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959)) ). The Court ha s specific ally require d V A to f o ll o w it s o w n r e g u lati o n s w h e n it a tt e mp ts to r e d u c e a v e te r an ' s r a ti ng
. Se e Fu ge re v. De rwinski , 1 Ve t.A

pp . 1 03 (1 99 0) (h old ingthat V A w a s r e qu ir e d to g ive no tic e and op po rt un ity to be hea rd p ri or to deleting provision of VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 that had provi d e d r e g u la to r y - li k e p r o c e d

u r a l p r o te c ti o ns prior to reduc ing ve tera n' s rating , and noting : "Where the rig hts of individuals a

re aff ecte d, it is incumbent upon ag encie s to f ollow their own proc edure s." (citations omitted)), a

ff 'd , 972 F.2d 331 ( Fe d. Cir. 1992). The Court dete rmines de novo whe ther VA has followed and applied it s own reg ulations in reduc ing or terminating VA bene fits. See W ilson ( Merritte) (making deter

mination de novo without so stating) a nd Fu ge re (same) , both su

pra ; Br own ( Ke vin ) v. Brow n , 5 Ve t.A

pp . 4 13 , 4 16 -2 1 ( 19 93 ) ( same ); c f. B uz ins k

i, s up ra (re viewing de novo compliance with VA re g ulation reg ardingmortg ag e for eclosure ). I f VA a ffor ds to a vet er an the applicable proce dural prote ctions and nonethe less deter mines that a reduc tion in rating is warr anted, the deter mination as to the deg ree of disability under the applicable diag nostic code is a f inding of fac t subject to the " clea

rly err oneous" standard of

revie w. See Sm all

woo d v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 93, 97 (1 99 7) ; Gilbert v. De rwinski , 1 Ve t.A pp . 4 9, 53 (1 99 0) . In d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a fi nd ingis clea rly err oneous, " this Court i s not permitted to substit ute its j u d gm en t for that of the BV A on issues of mater ial fac t; if the re is a < plausible basis' in the rec ord for the fa ctual dete rminations of the BVA .

. . , [ th e C ou rt ] cann ot ov ert urn th em. " Ibid. A. G e ne ra l Ra ting

-R e duc tio n Ma tte rs Prior to reduc ing a

veter an' s disability rating , the Board is required to comply with severa l general VA re g ulations applicable to a ll rating -re duction case s, reg ardle ss of the rating level or the leng th of time that the ratinghas bee n in effe ct. See 38 C. F.R . §§ 4 .1 , 4 .2 , 4 .1 0 ( 19 99 ); Br own ( Kevin) , 5 Ve t.A

pp . at 420

. " Th e se pr ov isi on s im po se a c le ar r e qu ir e me nt t

hat V A r a tin g re du c tio ns ,8

as with all VA rating decisions, be based upon revie w of the entire history of the ve tera

n' s disability ." Ibid. (c i t i n g Schafrath v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 589, 594 ( 1991)). [S uch re view re quires VA] to asce rtain, base d upo n revie w of the e ntire re corde d history of th e co n d i t i on, whether the evidenc e re flec ts an ac tual chang e in the disability and whe ther the e x amination repor ts ref lecting such cha

ng e ar e base d upon thoroug h examinations . . . . Thus, i n an y ra ting- reduc tion case not only must it be deter mined that an improvement in a disability has actua lly occur red but a lso that that improvement ac tually

ref lects an improvement in the veter an' s ability to function under the ordinary

conditions of life and w ork. Brown ( Kevin) , 5 Ve t.A

pp . at 42 1; se e als o S

c ha fra th , su pra (" [t ]hese require ments for e valuation of the c omp le te me dic a l hi sto ry of the c la ima

nt' s c on dit ion

op e rate to p ro te c t c la ima nts a g a ins t adver se decisions based on a si ng le, i ncomplete[,] or inac curate re port and to ena ble VA to make a more pre cise e valuation of the le vel of disability and of a ny chang es in the condition" ). Although it is true that the record on appea l (ROA) c ontains no m edical ev i d en ce o f a ch an ge in the veter an' s PTSD sy

mptomatology , the B oard note d that the RO had orig inally (in Aug ust 1993) assig ned a 100% rating "ba sed on nonm edical evidenc e which r evea led that the v et er an was inc a pa ble of e mpl oy

me nt (p ri mari ly his W-2 fo r 1 99 1) ." R. at 16 (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o R. at 493-94 (August 1993 RO decision relying on July 1993 hear ing of

fice r dec ision that had conclude d that 100% rating wa s warr anted ba sed on vet er an' s "1991 inc ome tax return that [showed that] he is una ble to eng ag e in substantially g ainful employ

ment") . There afte r, evide nce w as submitted that he was in f

act employ ed and ea

rned substantial income

. See, e .g., R. at 554 (veter an' s Aug ust 1994 sworn testimony

that he had e arne d $48,000 in 1993); R. at 5 7 9 (A p ri l 1 995 VA examination at wh ic h v e te ra

n r e po rt e d " that he is m a kin g m ore mo ney and [is] a ble to s up po rt

him se lf a lit tle better" ); R. at 622 (August 1995 V A PTSD ex amination repor t indicating that vetera

n stated that he had ea rned $36,000 in 1994 a nd worke d two day s per we ek). A lthough none of that evide nce indicated a

chang e or me dical improveme nt in the vetera n' s PTSD sy

mptomatology , that evidenc e did show improvement as mea sured by the nonme dic al c rit

e ria -- his ea

rning s -- that ha d been use d b y t h e R O i ni t s Au gu s t1 9 9 3 as s i gn m en to f a 1 0 0 % P T S D r at i n g. B a s edo nt h e B VA 's deter mination that the RO had relied upon nonmedical evidenc e such as the veter an' s 1991 tax return

c it e d b y th e h e ar in g o f

f ic e r , th e evidenc e d

o es ref lect " an ac tual chang e in the disability ", Br own ( Kevin) , 5 Vet.App. at 520, beca use the ve tera

n' s ear ned income ha d dramatic al l y i n creased f rom9

"$675" in 1991 to "$48,000" in 1993 and was still "$36,000 in 1994" (R. at 456-57, 554, 622). Th e a pp e lla nt argue s that the us e of pure ly e c on omi c e vid e nc e to f ind an im pr ov e me nt i n h is disability violat es t h e require ment that a disability underg o an " actual change . . . based upon th oro ugh ex ami nat io ns ", B r o w n (K ev i n ), 5 Ve t.A pp
. a t 42 1 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) , b e fo re a re du c tio n in

ratin g may be ins tit

ute d; how e ve r, the re is nothin g in t he re g ulatio ns c ite d a

bo ve that requires that the " actua l chang e" be one measure d in te rms of medica l improvement or that it be base d on medical data de rived fr om examinations rathe r than on the " entire e vidence of re cord" , 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a); see also 38 C.F.R. § 19.7(a) (1999) ( requiringthat BV A dec ision be "ba sed on a r eview of the entire

re c or d" ). I n th e ins tant c a se , to a llo w th is veter an to c on tin ue to r e c e ive a

10 0% ratin g wh e n h is 100% rat i n g had bee n orig inally assig ned base d solely

on "nonme dical" , financ ial evidenc e (R. at 16) would for ce V A to continue to pr ovide benef its a s though the veter an wer e unemploy able whe n, in fac t, he had a

job and was r ece iving a s u b s t an t i al i ncome. On the se fa cts, the Court will not require VA to continue the veter an' s rating at 100% beca use "suc h interpre tation [ of the re g ulations rel ati ng to general rat in g red uct io ns , i. e., 38 C. F.R

. §§ 4. 1, 4. 2, and4. 10 ] lea ds to abs urdres ul ts ". Norman J. Si ng er, Sutherland on Statutory Const ruction § 4 6. 07 (5 th e d. 19 92 ); see United States

v . B ro wn , 3 33 U. S. 1 8, 25 -2 6 ( 19 48 ); Brooks v. D onovan , 699 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1983); Ba rre ra v . W

est , 13 Vet.App. 139, 141 ( 1999) (Kr amer , J ., concur ring ). The Court also notes that i f w e w er e t o re qu i re t h at m ed i ca l ev i d en ce o f i m p ro v em en tb e p re s en t p ri o r t o re d u ci n g t h e v et er an 's rating , we would a

ppare ntly be for ced to disre g ard the provisio ns of 38 C.F.R. § 3.343 (1999), d i s c u s s e d i np artII

. B

. , b e l o w , t h a t p r o v i d e t h a ti nc e rt a i nc a s e s e v i d e n c e o f e mp l o ya b i l i t y sho uld

be used as a basis to reduc e a r ating of total disability based on individual unemploy ability (TDIU). As to t he v e t e r an ' s a s s e rt i o n s t h a t i f h e w e r e n o t d i s a b l e d b y P T S D h e w o u l d " b e a b le to [earn] . .

. well in e x cess of $100,000", that his business has been in a steady decline, a

nd that if he

wer e not the owne r of his own business he w ould be unable to wor k for that business or f

or any other

e mpl oy e r ( R. at 66 0, 66 8 ( F e br ua ry 19 96 te sti mony

); se e als o R. at 83 6- 40 ), the B oa rd state d: Th e B oa rd no te s th a t th e ve te ra

n h a s argue d that a s a re su lt of his PTSD he is u

na ble to ear n the ty pe of sa lary consistent with his education a nd backg round. I n addition, the veter an asser

ts that this business has not g rown since 1991 and is on the dec line. The B oard note s that the criter ia for a 100[%] evaluatio n re q u ires [sic] that the veter an is demonstrably

unable to obtain or retain employ ment (old criter ia [ sic]) or has total occ upational impairment (ne w cr iteria [ sic]). Howeve r, the Board fin ds10

tha t the v e te ra n do es no t mee t thi s c rit e ria [si c] m erely by showi ng th at he is n ot m eeting his full pote ntial in th e workplace

. Moreove r, the B oard a cknowledg es that the veter an has sever e occupa tional impairment and a 70[%] evaluation takes suc h impairment into consideration. R. at 17 (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he B oa rd c on sid e re d th e ve te ra

n' s P TS D dis a

bil ity " in r e la tio n to its history ", 38 C.F .R. § 4.1, and discussed the evidenc e of r ecor d in detail "f rom the point of view of the veter an wor

king or seekingwork" , 38 C

. F. R

. § 4

. 2. See Brown ( Kevin) , 5 Vet.App. at 420; Sc ha fra th , 1 Vet.App. at 594. I n view of the fore g oing disc ussion, the Court holds t hat the B oard complied with the general regulatory provisions reg arding rating -re duction case s and did not err by

c on sid e ri ngno nme dic a l evi de nc e wh e n it a c te d to r e du c e the ve te ra n' s r a tin g , w hic h w a s o ri g ina lly assig ned base d on nonmedical e vidence

. See W ilson (M erritte) , Brown (

Kevin) , and Fu

ge re , a ll

su pra . Howeve r, our a

naly sis does not end here

. B. Special Protections for 100% Ratin gs I n c e rt a in r atin g -r e d

u c t i o n c a s e s , V A

b e n e f i t s r e c i p i e nts a

re to b e a ff

or de d g re a te r p ro te c tio ns , set forth in 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.343, 3.344 (1999), than those g ener al protec tions discussed in part I I .A., above. F or example, " it is clear that the r equire ments for d e c r e as e o f a d i s ab ility

rating for disabiliti es which ha

ve continued f

or long periods of time at the same leve l are more string ent than those for a

n initial award or

an incr ease in rating s". Ol so n v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 430, 433-34 (1993) (c i t i n g Colli er v. D erwinski , 2 V e t.A pp . 2 47 , 2 49 (1 99 2) ); see also T ucke r v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 20 1, 20 3 ( 19 92 ) ( Ste inb e rg , J., c on c ur ri ng ) (" VAre g ulatio ns re qu ir e that sp e c ia l st and ard s a pp ly to reduc tions of 100% rating s" ( citing 38 C.F .R. §§ 3.343(a), 3.344( a), ( c))

. 1. 38 C.F.R
. § 3.344. The appellant asser ts that his 100% P TSD rating was protected unde r 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a) and (b) , which provide g ener ally that cert ai n steps and spec ial car e must be taken be fore VA re duces disability rati n gs i n certain specif

ied instance s. See Br . at 4. Howe ver, subsection (c) of

§ 3 .3 44 , n ot a dd

re sse d b y the a pp e lla nt, pr ov ide s in

pe rt ine nt p art : (c) Disabilit ies which are likely to improv e. The provisions of pa rag raphs ( a) and (b) of this sec tion a

pply to r ating s which have continued for long pe riods at the same leve l (5 y ear s or more)

. 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(c)

. I n this case , the veteran' s 100% P TSD rating was a ssigne d in Aug ust 1993 and was made eff

ective a s of Octobe r 1991. R. at 494. The reduc tion oc curr ed in Ma rch 1996 a

nd was made eff ective as of J une 1996. R. at 676; see Brown ( Kevin) , 5 Vet.App. at 417 (holding that five-11

y ear period in § 3.344(c) is to be measure d from eff ective date of rating not f

rom date of RO dec ision assig ning that rating ). He nce, a s the Boa rd cor rec tly found (R. at 13) and the Secre tary points out in his mot ion (Motion at 17, 25-26), the veter an' s 100% rating had been in eff ect from October

1991 to J une 1996, a pe riod of four y ear s and eight mont hs, four months short of the five y ear s ref err ed to in the regulation. T his Court held in Lehman v. De rwinski that the " five[-]y ear time frame [set forth in 38 C .F.R. § 3.344(c )] is m ere ly a g uideline, not a mandate"

. Lehman , 1 Vet.App. 339, 342 (1 99 1) ( ho ldi ngthat f

ive -y e ar r e qu ir e me nt d id n ot b ar a pp lic a bil ity of § 3 .3 44 (a ) a

nd (b ) i n c a se wher e " appellant' s rating ha[d] bee n i n ex i s t ence . . . for f our y ear s and either

363 or 364 day s")

. Ho we ve r, we have a lso he ld t hat Lehman was limited to "' the particularly compelling fac ts of that

case ' . . . [and] did not warra nt a conclusion that the five-y ear provision was satisfied by a rating that h ad bee n in effe ct . . . for f our y ear s [and] ten months". Br own ( Ke v in) , s up ra ( qu o ti n g and d i s cu s s i n g Sm ith (

Ra y mo nd ) v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 335, 339 ( 1993)). The circ umstances of the instant case mor e close ly

rese mble those in Br own ( Ke v in) , s up ra , wher e a rating had been in effe ct for a period of f

our y ear s and t en mont hs, which is two months longe r than the ve tera n' s PTSD rating had bee n in effe ct in the instant case , than t hey rese mble those in Lehman , w he re the ratin g wa s in eff ect f or the full five y ear s less a day or two. Acc ording ly , we hold he re, on de novo re view, that the B VA' s conclusion that the vete ran doe s not meet the threshold re quirement of § 3.344(c) -- a nd is thu s n ot p ro te c te d b y

§ 3 .3 44 (a ) o r ( b) (R . at 13 ) - - w a s c or re c t. 2
. 3 8 C. F. R. §

3
. 3 43
. Addi tional proce dural prote ctions for total disability rating s are set fo rt h in 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 43 , w hic h p ro vid e s: (a) Gene ral. Total disabil ity ratin gs , when war

rante d by the seve rity

of the condition and not granted purely because of ho sp ita l, sur g ic a l, o r h ome tr e a tme nt, or ind iv idu al u ne mploy ab ili

ty wi ll not b ere duc e d, in the ab se nc eof

c le ar e rro r, with out exam inati on sh owin g m ater i a l im provement i n physical or m ental condition
. Ex amination repor ts showing mate rial improvement must be e valuated in conjunction with all th e fa ct s of re cord, a nd consideration must be g iven particula rly to whether

the veter an attaine d improvement under the ordinary conditions of life, i.e., while w orki n g o r actively seekingwork or w hether the s y mptoms have bee n broug ht under c ontrol by prolong ed re st, or g ener ally , by following a re g imen which pre cludes wor k, and, if t h e latter, re duction from total disabi li ty r a ti n g s w il l n o t b e c o n s id e r e d p e n d in g r e e xa mi n a ti o n a f te r a p e r io d

of employ ment (3 to 6 months).12 . . . . (c) In div idu al u ne mplo

y ab ili ty . (1) In reduc ing a rating of 100 per cent s e r v i c e - c o n n e c t e d

d i s a b i l i t y ba se d o n ind

iv idu al u ne mploy ab ili

ty , the provisions of § 3.105(e) are for a

pplication but caution must be exercised in such a deter mination that actual em

ployability is establis hed by clear and convincing evidence

. . . . (2) I f a ve tera

n with a total disability

rating for c ompensation purposes ba sed on individual unemploy ability beg ins to eng ag e in a substantially g ainful occ upation during the per iod beg inning a fter J anuar y 1, 1985, the veteran's ratin g m ay not be re du ced sole ly

on t he ba sis of hav ing se c ure d a nd f

oll owe d s uc h sub sta ntia lly gainful occupation un less the veteran m aintai ns the occupation for a period of 12 consecutive mon ths. F or purp os e s of this su

bp ara g ra ph , te mpo ra

ry int e rr up tio ns in e mpl oy me nt w hic h a

re of sh or t du ratio n s ha ll n ot b e c on sid e re d b re a ks in o the rw ise c on tin uo us e mpl oy

me nt. 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(a) , (c) (empha sis added). Acc ording to the lang uag e of t h e re g ulation, para g raph ( a) of § 3.343 would apply

to a veter an who has rec eived a "[t]ot al disability

rating . . . based on the sever ity of the c ondition and

no t g ra nte d p ur e ly

be c a us e of

. . . indi vid

ua l une mpl oy a

bil ity " , whe re a s p ara g ra

ph(c ) w ou ld a

pp ly to a veteran who has receive d a total rating " based on individual unemploy ability ", a lthough pe rhaps not based pure ly on su c h une mpl oy a bil ity . I t is c on c e iva

ble , th e n, that bo th para g raph ( a) a nd (c) could apply

in a ca se whe re a

veter an' s 100% ra t i n g h ad b ee n based in pa rt on individual unemploy ability

and also in par

t on the sever ity

of the rated condition. I n this case, the ba sis of the veter an' s 100% rating is uncle ar. The Aug ust 1993 RO decision (R. at 494) and J uly 1993 hear ing office r' s decision (R. at 489) both cited to 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c ) as the basis for the 100% rating then a ssigne d. That re g ulation, which "was dele ted ef fec tive November

7, 1996", Nor

ris ( Ro be rt) v . W

est , 1 2 V e t

. A p p
. 4 1 3 , 4 1 8 (1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g 6 1 Fe d

. R eg. 52,695, 52,699 (1996)) , had provided that cer tain mental disorder s that "pr eclude [d] a vete ran f rom
secur ing or

following a substantially g ainful o cc u p ati on . . . . shall be assig ned a 10 0 p e rc e nt schedular evaluation un de r t he a pp ro pr ia te dia g no sti c c od e ." 38 C.F .R. § 4 .1 6( c ) ( 19 96 ) ( e mph a sis added) . The e mphasized lang uag e appe ars to mea n that a rating assigne d pursuant to § 4.16(c) was schedula r in nature . Howeve r, in J oh ns on ( Ga ry ) v . B ro wn , the C ourt held t hat i t was " rea sonable" for the Sec reta

ry to interpret § 4.16( c) a s a " pro ce d u ra l device " that, in essence , made a 100%

sc he du lar r a tin g a

pp lic a ble to a ve te ra n w ho se so le dis a

bil ity wa s a me nta l di so rd e r

t hat r e nd e re d h im13

unemploy able. Johnson ( Gary) , 7 Vet.App. 95, 97, 99 (1994). I n this re spect, then, it would appear t h a tt h e 1 0 0 % r a t i n g aw ar d e d p u r s u an t t o § 4

. 1 6 ( c ) w a s o n e b a s e d o n i n d i v i d u a l u n e mp l o ya

b i l i t y. Henc e, the ba sis fo r t h e v eter an' s 100% rating in this case is unclear and, ther efor e, it is not clear whether the B oard should have considere d the application of para g raph ( a) of § 3.343 (which a pplies to a total rating "not g rante d purely beca use of . . . individual unemploy ability), or of pa rag raph ( c) of § 3.343 (whic h applies to 100% ratings " based on individual unemploy ability ")

. I t is clea r, howe ver, that the Board should have disc ussed the application of at least one of those para g raphs and that it failed to discuss either. Cf. R. at 12 (reiter ating the contents of, but not ap p l y i n g, p ar agr ap h (a ) o f § 3

. 3 4 3 ). I n v i ew o f t h at fa i l u re , we wo u l d gen er al l y re v er s e t h e B o ar d 's decision and r emand the matter t o the Board for i t to reinstate the veter an' s rating

. See D offlemyer v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 277, 282 (1992) (holding that BV A rating r eduction that fa iled to consider 38 C.F .R. §§ 3. 34 3( a ) a

nd 3. 34 4( a ) w a s v oid

a b in iti o) . H ow e ve r, we are re qu ir e d b y statut e fi rs t to consider the a

pplication of the rule of pre judicial err or. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b) (Court shall take du e a c c ount o f r

ule of pr e jud ic ia l e rr or ); Edenf

iel d v. Br own , 8 Vet.App. 384, 390- 91 (1995) ( en ba nc ). F or the purp os e of

unde rt a kin g su c h c on sid e ratio n o f p re jud ic e to t

he a pp e lla nt, we wi ll analy ze this appeal under

both para g raphs ( a) a

nd (c) of § 3.343, assuming for that pur pose that

e ith e r p ara g ra

phor bo th p ara g ra

ph s ma y have a pp lie d to thi s a

pp e a l.

a. 38 C.F.R . § 3.343(a) : The Boa rd reiter ated the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(a) on the fi rs t pa g e of

the " [l]eg a l [a]n a ly sis " se c tio n of its de c isi on
. R. a t 12

. Al tho ug h th e B oa rd did no t c ite to that provision at any

other plac e in its decision, it did include the following para g raph: The B oard note s that the medica l evidence of rec ord at the time of the Marc h 1 9 9 6 r a t i n g r e d

u c t i o n d i d n o t i n d i c a t e a c h an g e i n t h e v e t e r a n ' s s ymp t o m a t o l o g y; howeve r . . . , t h e v eter an' s total evaluation wa s not based on medica l evidence orig inally , bu t on evidence that the veter an wa s incapa ble of supporting himself as a re sult of his P TSD. However, the me dical evide nce of rec ord at the time of the Marc h 1996 deter

mination indicated that the vetera n h ad a hig h salary (September 1994 [ S o ci al an d I ndustrial] survey [(R. at 570)] ), re ported more income and w as able to support him self better (April 1995 VA ex amination [(R. at 578)] ), and ma de $3 6, 00 0 in

19 94 (Augus t 19 95 VA e xami natio n [(R. a t 62 2) ]). Ac c or din g ly , th e se examination reports ref

lected mate ria l impro v e ment i n the v e te ra n's c ond

ition. R. at 16 (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e re qu ir e me nt of " e xami natio n[s] sh ow ingma te ri a l im pr ov e me nt" is set forth in § 3.343(a ) and, the ref ore, the Boa

rd did make a finding in acc ordanc e with the ter ms of14

that r e g ulatio n, a lbe it w ith ou t c itatio n o r s pe c if ic re fe re nc e the re to, and the Court fi nd s a pla us ibl e basis in the rec ord for

that finding . I n this ca se, the August 1995 VA PTSD ex amination repor t indicated that the veteran had ear ned $36,000 in 1994 (R. at 622), a n amount well in excess of the $675 that he ha d e arn e d in 19 91 (R . at 45 6- 57 ). I n a dd iti on , a VAe xami natio n r e po rt

fr om A pr il 1995 rec og nized as a " s i g nificant c hang e for the better

that the patient is . . . making more money and [is] able to support himself a littl e better"

. R. at 579. As we c oncluded r eg ardingthe g ener al rating -re duction provisions discussed in part I I .A., above, there is nothing in § 3.343(a) that require s that the " mat er i al improvement" discussed there in have a medical ba sis -- only

that the " materia l improvement" be re flec ted in "e x amination repor ts". Thus, the fact that the latter examiner wa s not able to " see a

ny signific ant chang es at th[ at] time other than the i ncre ased income" (R. at 579) doe s
no t un de rc ut t

he B oa rd ' s f ind ing that " the se e xami natio n r e po rt s r e fl e c te d mate ri a l im pr ov e me nt i n the veter an' s condition" (R. at 16). Ba sed on that finding , the Court holds that the require ments of § 3

. 3 4 3 ( a ) w e r e i n f

a c t m e t i n t h i s c a s e
. H e n c e , n o t w i t h s t an d i n g t h e B o ar d ' s f a i l u r e to d isc us s § 3.343(a) expli citly , the B oard' s decision contains finding s that meet the require ments of § 3.343(a ). Moreove r, the B oard de cision is supported by a plausible ba sis in the recor d and is ther ef o re not

c le arl y e rr on e ou s. See Sm allwood and Gi lbe rt , both su

pra . b
. 3 8 C
. F . R . § 3.343(c) : W e n o w tu

r nto th e a p p li c a ti o no f

§ 3

. 3 4 3 ( c ) , w h ic h s ta

rts by

r e qu i r i n g t h e B o ar d

t o c o mp l y

w i t h " t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f

§ 3

. 1 0 5 ( e ) "

. 3 8 C

. F

. R

. § 3

. 3 4 3 ( c ) ( 1 )

. In Brown ( Kevin) , w e su mma

ri zed tho se re qu ir e me nts a s f

oll ow s: Pur su ant t o 3 8 C. F .R. § 3.1 05 (e ), wh e n the RO de te rm ine s th a t a ratin g re du c tio n is war rante d, it is required to issue a proposed r ating reduc tion, setting for th the rea sons fo r t he pr op os e d r e du c tio n, and to a llo w t

he ve te ra n a pe ri od of a t least 60 da

y s to submit additi onal evidenc e to show that the ra ting should not be re duced. Fu rt h er m o re , wh en , af

t er s u ch p er i o d , th e R O i s s u es a d ec i s i o nre d u ci n g t h e r at i n g, that reduct ion

do e s n ot b e c ome e ff

e c tiv e un til the " [l]as t da y of [the ] mon th fo llo wi ng60 da

y s a ft e r n oti c e to [the] pa y e e " of the re du c tio n d e c isi on . 3 8 C. F .R. § 3 .4 00 (r ) ( 19 9[8]) ; see 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(e)

. The e ffe ct of §§ 3.105( e) an d 3.400(r) combined is that a rating r eduction cannot be made effe ctive for a minimum of 120 day s after it is proposed in writing to the veter an. Brown ( Kevin) , 5 Vet.App. at 418. I n this case, the RO pr oposed in September 1995 that the veter an' s rating be dec rea sed fr om15

100% to 70%. R. at 628. The RO de cision eff ectuating that reduction was not issued until March 1996 (R. at 676), we ll over " 60 day s" after the September 1995 RO decision (38 C.F.R. § 3.105(e )), and the r eduction wa s made only afte r a hear ing was held befor e the RO in Febr uary 1996 (R. at 655- 71). He nce, the veter an wa s provided with at least 60 day s' advanc e notice of the rating r eduction and with the opportunity to b e h ea rd at a hea

ring reg ardingthat reduc tion, as require d by the ref ere nce to 38 C.F .R. § 3.105(e) in § 3.343(c ). More over, the eff ective date of the r eduction wa s J une 1996 (R. at 676), well over 120 day s afte r t he reduction had been "proposed in writing to the vet eran ." Brown (

Kevin) , supra. Thus, the Court holds that the require ments of § 3.105(e ) we re me t in this case. I n addition to requiring that the B oard c omply with § 3.105(e), the provisions of § 3.343(c) (1)

re qu ir e that in

re du c inga

ve te ra n' s r a tin g the B oa

rd e xer c ise " c a

uti on
. . . that a c tua l e mpl oy a bil ity i s e s t a b l i s h e d b y c le a r a nd c o nv in c in

g e vidence

. " I n this case, the f act of the veter an' s actua l employ ment has not been disputed a nd he himself has pr ovided VA with evide nce of that employ ment. See, e .g., R. at 585 (veter an' s M ay 1995 sworn testimony

that he ea

rned a salary of $3,000/month). Howeve r, for the purposes of the reduction of a TDIU rating, a ctual employ ment is not sy nony mous with actua l employ

ab ili ty , beca use a TDIU rating such as was awa rded here (i.e., a 100% r ating awa

rded ba sed on 38 C.F.R. § 4.16) considers more t han si mply whether the claimant

c an o r c ann ot wo rk a t a ll. Th e re fo re , a fi nd ing of " a c tua l e mpl oy a bil ity " un de r § 3. 34 3( c )( 1) , a s in this case, must enc ompass a finding that the veteran is no longe r unemploy able -- t hat i s, is no longe r "unab l e to secure or follow a substantially g ainful occ upation as a r esult of servic e-c onnecte d disabiliti es" -- unde r 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a ) (1999)

. Simi larly , 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(c) ( 2 ) re quires that when "a vetera n with a tot al di sability

rating fo r c omp e ns a tio n p ur

po se s ba se d on ind

iv idu al u ne mploy ab ili

ty be g ins to e ng a g e in a

su bs tanti a lly g ainful occupation during the per iod beg inning a fter January 1, 1985, the veteran's ratin g m ay not be re duc e d s o l

e l y o n t h eb a s i s o f h a v i n g s e c u r e d a n d f o l l o w e d s u c h s u b s t

a n t ia l l y ga i n f ul occupation unl

ess t he vete ran m aintai ns the occupation for a period of 12 consec utive m onth s." 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(c) (2) (emphasis added)

. When rea d together , then, as to a post-J anuar y 1, 1985, reduc ti o n o f a 1 0 0 % r a ti n g b a s e d o n in d iv id u a l u n e mp lo y a

b il it y , s u b p ar a g r a p h s ( 1 ) an d ( 2) of § 3.343(c) ma

n d a te th a t ( 1 ) a

1 0 0 % r a ti n g ma

y b e r e d u c e d o n ly w h e n" c le ar

an d c o n v in cing16

e vid e nc e " sh ow s th e ve te ra n' s " a c tua l e mpl oy a

bil ity " fo r a pos iti on that con sti tut e s a " su bs tanti a lly g ainful occupation", and ( 2) such r eduction may not be made ba sed so le ly on the veter an' s having "se cure d and followe d such substantially g ainful occ upation unless the veter an maintai ns the

oc c up a tio n f

or a pe riod of 12 c on se c uti ve mon ths " (d isr e g ard ing any " te mpo ra ry int e rr up tio ns in employ ment which ar e of shor

t duration" ). 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(c )(1) , (2). I n order to determine w hether

in this case ther e is clea r and c onvincing evidenc e under § 3.3 43 (c )( 1) that the ve te ra n w a s a c tua lly

e mpl oy a ble a t a su bs tanti a lly

g a inf ul o c c up a tio n, we mus t de fi ne the te rm

" su bs tanti a lly

g a inf ul oc c up a tio n" . Se c tio n § 3. 34 3 it se lf do e s n ot d e fi ne the te rm
. Howeve r, par ag raph ( c) of § 3.343 applies only when there ha s been a n underlying a

war d of a total rating "ba sed on individual employ ability ", i.e

. , b as ed o n § 4.16. Henc e, we look to § 4.16 for a de f i n i t i o n o f a " s u

b s t an t i a l l y g a i n f

u l o c c u p a t i o n " u n d e r § 3

. 3 4 3 ( c ) ; t h a t r e g u l a t i o n p r o vid e s in para g raph ( a) that "[m] ar gi n al employ ment shall not be consider ed substantially g ainful

em p l o y m en t ", an d

t h at "m ar gi n al em p l o y

m en tgen er al l y

s h al l b e d ee m ed t o ex i s t wh en a v et er an 's

ear ned annua l income does not excee d the amount established by the U.S. Depa

rtment o f Commerce , Bur eau of

the Census, as the pove rty threshold for one person." 38 C

. F. R

. § 4.16(a) . (Ne ither para g raph ( b) nor f

ormer pa rag raph ( c) of

§ 4.16 contains any information pertinent to an inquiry as to the meaningof t he terms "e mploy ability " or "substantially g ainful occupation" under § 3.343 a s applied to TDIU rating- reduc tion cases.) Al tho ug h § 4. 16 (a ) d oe s n ot de fi ne sp e c if ic a lly wh a t su

bs tanti a lly g a inf

ul e mpl oy me nt i s, it do e s pro vid e tha

t " marg ina l e mpl oy

me nt" is not substantially g ainful employ ment and thus impl ies that employ

ment that is more t han mar g inal may be conside red to be "substantially g ainful employ ment". I n Moore (

Robert) v. De rwinski , the Court rec og nized the need f or a c lear definition of unemploy ability

but was, at that time, " not y et p re p ar ed t o impose a Court-cr eate d rule on the BV A"

. Mo or e (

Ro be rt) , 1 Ve t.A

pp . 3 56 , 3 59 (1 99 1) ; see also id. at 358 (stating that, for the purp os e s o f § 4. 16 (a ), " [s]ub sta nti a lly g a inf ul e mpl oy

men t

. . . . s ug g e sts a

liv ingwa g e " ); Be aty

v . B ro wn , 6 Ve t

. Ap p
. 5 3 2 , 5 3 8 (1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Mo or e ( Ro be rt) ). Ne verthe less, in Mo o r e (R o b er t ),

su pra , we " sug g est[ed] to the Secre tary t h at t h er e is much that could be borrowe d from [opinions

o f o t h er fe d er al co urt s re gar d i n g]

. . . wh et h er a s o ci al s ec u ri t y

d i s ab i l i t y cl ai m an ti s ab l e t o en gage in a ' substantial ga inful activity ' ". Cf. Fe rr a r o v. De r winski , 1 Vet.App. 326, 332- 33 (1991)17

(discussing possible definitions of substantially

g ainful employ

ment including nonma

rg inal employ ment but con cl u d ing that disposing of that c ase did " not require that we a dopt a def inition of ' substantially

g ainful employ

ment' ") . I n view of the fac t that the Secr etar y has y et to issue a cle ar def i n i t i on of substantially

g ainful employ

ment, despite the Court' s encour ag ement to that ef fec t provided in Mo or e (

Ro be rt) almost a dec ade a g o, to d ay we ar ticulate such a definition for the purpose of

dealingwith the fac ts of this case. We first consider the "a

mount established by

the U.S. Depa

rtment of Commerce , Bur eau of the Census, as t h e p o v er t y threshold for one person" . 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) . Acc ording to curre nt statis tic s p ro vid e d b y

the U. S. D e pa

rtme nt of Co mm e rc e , B ur e a u o f t he Ce ns us , th e po ve rt

y threshold for one person unde r the a g e of 65 in 1993, at the t ime when the veter an was first assig ned a 100% rating , was $7,518/y ear
. See U.S. Depar tment of Commerce , Bur eau of the Census, Current Population Survey, Pov erty Thr es h o lds: 1999 (last modified Jan. 27, 2000) <http://www.census.g ov/hhes/poverty /threshld/thresh93.html>

. I n this case, a lthough the ve tera n had bee n ear

ning only $675/y ear

in 1991 (R. at 456), evide nce submitt ed following the Aug ust 1993 RO decision showed him ea rning $48,000 in 1993 ( R. at 504- 40, 554) and $36,000 in 1994 ( R. at 62 2, 65 7) , w e ll i n e xce ss o f t he po ve rt y thr e sh old fo r o ne pe rs on . H e nc e , th e ve te ra n w as at le a st

no t margi nal ly employ ed. I n addition, we note that a determination whether a person is capa ble of

e ng a g ingin a

su bs tanti a lly

g a inf ul occ up a tio n mu st c on sid e r b oth that pe rs on ' s a

bil iti e s and

his employ ment history

. See G leicher v . Derwinski , 2 Vet.App. 26, 28 (1991). I n this case, the ve tera n has bee n employ ed in the same occupation since at lea st 1987, albeit that he is making less money now than he did then. R. at 456-57 (vetera n' s April 1993 sworn testimony that in 1987 he had e arne d $52,000 and in 1994 he ha d ear ned $36,000). Moreove r, we find appropr iate g uidance in -- albe it that we ar e not bound by -- the de finition of " su bsta nti a lly

g a inf ul a c tiv ity " pr ov ide d in

re g ulatio ns pr omu lg a te d b y the Soc ia l Se c ur ity Administration (SS A). See Murincsak v . Derwinski , 2 Vet.App. 363, 370-71 (1992) (compa ring the

us e of te rm s " su bs tanti a lly " and

" g a inf ul" c on ta ine d in VAre g ulatio ns wi th t he us e of the same te rm s in SS A re g ulations); Mo or e ( Ro be rt) , s up ra (sug g esting that Secre tary ref er to SSA case law for de fi nit ion of un e mpl oy a

bil ity ); c f. B e aty , 6 Ve t.A

pp . at 53 8 ( no tin g that VA cannot "in ce rtain ca ses
c ho os e to a

pp ly SSA re g ulatio ns tha

t ha ve ne ve r b e e n ad op te d by

the Se c re tary

[of Ve te ra ns Af fa ir s]18

as applica ble to VA cla ims adjudication" while "not a dopt[ ing] ce rtain [other] S SA regulations that would g ener ally

be bene ficial to a c laimant")

. Un d er SS A re g ulations, "[s] ubstantially g ainful activity " is de fined a s "w ork that -- (a) [i ]nvol v es d o i n g s ignif icant produc tive phy sical or menta l duties; and (b) [i] s done . . . for pay or prof it." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (1999) . On this recor d, the exact nature of the ve tera n' s day -to-day

work a ctivities is unclear; howe ver, it is n o t d i s puted that he runs his own business mana g ing pe nsion investments. R. at 842. He i s re s ponsible for hiring

e mpl oy e e s ( ibid. ) and me ets individually at least four times pe r y ear with eac h of his "20 inve stment clients" (R. at 843). In the conte x t o f the entire SSA reg ulatory conce pt of " substantially g ainful activity ", it appe ars that the f act that a person believes that he should be ea rning "$100,000" and that he is no t ab l e t o work a 40-hour wor

kwee k (R. at 660-61) w ould not render him incapable of eng ag ing in substantially g ainful activity , beca use those SSA regulations clear ly provide that " work

may be su bs tanti a l even if it is do ne on a pa rt -t ime ba sis or

if [a c la ima

nt i s] . . . p a id l e ss, or

[is g ive n] . . . le ss r e sp on sib ili ty tha n when [th e same c la ima nt] w or ke d b e fo re ." 20 C.F .R. § 404.1572(a) (1999). I n v iew of § 4.16(a) and of the g uidance set forth in the Court's prec edents and dra wi n g a helpful but not binding or de terminative a nal o gy fr o m t he full conte x t of the SSA reg ulations discussed above , the Court holds that where , as in this case, the veter an bec ame e mploy ed, as shown by clea r and convincing evidenc e, at a substantially g ainful occupation - - i.e., one that p ro v i des annual income that exceeds the poverty threshold for one person, irrespe ctive of the number of hour s
or da y s th a t th e ve te ra

n a c tua lly wo rk s and

wi tho ut re g ard

to t he ve te ra n' s e arn e d a

nnua l in c ome prior to his h aving bee n awa rded a 100% rating ba sed on individual unemploy ability -- suc h employ ment constitutes, as a matter of law, a

substantially

g ainful occ u p at i on and thus " actua l emp l o y ab ility " f

or the purpose s of 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(c )(1)

. See M urincsak , Gleiche r , Mo or e ( Ro be rt) , and Fe rra ro , a ll su pra . As to the requir ement under § 3.343(c) (2) that the ve tera n have "ma i n t ai n [ ed] " suc h substantially

g ainful occ upation "f

or a pe riod of 12 consecutive months" ( disreg ardingany "te mporary

interruptions in employ

ment wh ic h are of short duration"), the veter an has te stified under

oath t hat he ha s b e e n s e lli ngins ur anc e and inv e stm e nts sin c e 19 85 , a nd a pp e ars to h a ve do ne so wi tho ut a ny sig nif ic ant i nte rr

up tio n s inc e a t le a st 199 1. R. at 45 6. Th e re is no ind ic a tio n tha t he h a s,19

in the t welve months prior to the ef fec tive date of

his reduce d rating , experience d any interruption in his employ

ment, nor does he argue to this Court that any such interr

uptions have occ urre d. Henc e, the Court holds, as a matter of law, that even if § 3.343(c) applies to this vetera n (that is, beca use the ve tera

n' s 100% rating may

have be en base d in pa

rt on individual unemploy ability and also in part on the se verity of his rate d condition), the eviden ce ov e rwhe lmingly shows that that

re gu l at i o n , j u s tas wa s t h e c as e w i t h § 3

. 3 4 3 (a ), af fo rd s h i m n o p ro t e c t i o n f o r h i s 1 0 0 % r at i n g. There fore , the B oard' s failure to provide an a dequate discussion of § 3.343(c) could not have be en prejudicia l to this appellant. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1( b) ; E denfield an d Soyini , both su pra ; se e als o W ilson (M erritte) , Brown (

Kevin) , and Fu

ge re , a ll supra. C. Reduction of Rating from 100% to 70% I t is not clear, ba sed on the pleading s prese nted to the Court, that the appellant c halleng es the Boa rd' s fac tual predic ate, a s distinguished fr om the Boa rd' s compliance with the leg al protec tions

a ff or de d to e xistin g ra

tin g s und e r t

he a pp lic a ble VA re g ulatio ns , for ma kin g the ratin g re du c tio n in this case. In any

event, the Court f

inds a plausible basis in the rec ord for the B oard' s determinations that the veter an had or igin al ly been e valuated a s 100% disabled ba sed on nonmedica l criteria and that he no longe r meets those nonmedical criter ia, and thus, in light of the leg al conc lusions that we

re a c he d in

pa rt s I I .A . a nd B ., a bo ve , th e Cou

rt hold s th at th e Boa

rd wa s n ot c le arl y

e rr on e ou s in deciding to reduc e, as of t he date of t he March 1996 RO decision, t he veteran' s 100% rating to 70%

-- wh ic h is the ne xt-h ig he st ratin g a ft e r 100 % p ro vid e d f or un de r t he c ur re nt a nd fo rm e rl y a pp lic a ble dia g no sti c c od e s ( see 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, DC 9411 (1996); 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, DC 9411 (1999)). See Smallwood

and Gi lbe rt , both su

pra . D. BV A's C onsideration of Evidence Not Made Available to V eteran I n a d d it io n to a s s e rti n g th a t th e p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e s s e t f o rth in V A r e g u lati o n s were not followed in this case , the appellant asser ts that the BVAimproperly considere d evidenc e that it had ob ta ine d in c on ne c tio n wi th Ms. John so n' s a pp or tio nme nt c la im bu t that w a s n ot m a de a pa rt of his

c la ims fi le and

ha s n ot at any

po int be e n p ro vid e d e ith e r t o hi m, or, f or that matte r, to t

his Court

. Br ief at 7-9. Reg ardingits consideration of information contained in Ms. J ohnson' s claims file, the Boa rd stated: The B oard note s that information reg ardingthe veteran' s business and ea rning s was20

no t on ly c on ta ine d in evi de nc e su

bmi tte d by the ve te ra

n' s f or me r s po us e , b ut a lso in the veter an' s own testimony at an August 1994 personal he aringbefor e the RO. . . .

. . . [T]he B oa

rd no tes that evide nce subm itted regarding on e claim m ay be considered by V

A in any m atter pertainin g to the veteran

. . . . As thi s e vid e nc e is rele vant to the veter an' s claim, it cannot be ignored. R. at 18 (emphasis adde d). B ased on our revie w of the B VA dec ision, it appea rs to the Court that all of the e vidence actua lly discussed by the Board in support of i ts decision i n this matter -- i.e., that the veter an had e arne d $675 in 1991, $48,000 in 1993, and either $36,000 or $38,000 in 1994 -- wa s pr ov ide d b y

the ve te ra

n him se lf a t V A h e ari ng s a

nd me dic a l e xami natio ns and in c on ne c tio n w ith a September

1994 VA socia l and industrial s u rv ey
. See R. at 456-57, 554, 570, 596-12, 622. Be cause this evidence was c lear ly available from sourc es other tha n Ms. J ohnson' s claims file, the Boa rd' s statement that that claims file " cannot be ignor ed" (R. at 18) is, on its face , simply not true. Moreove r, as a g ener al matter, VA should not consider in its decisions any evidence n ot mad e ava ila

ble to t he c la ima nt. Se ve ra l pr ov isi on s o f t itl e 38 of the U. S. Co de re qu ir e VAto disclose to a cla imant and/or to summarize the contents of the evidenc e re levant to his own ca se. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5104(b) (" [i ]n any case wher e the Sec reta ry denies a benef it sought, [he shall provide]

. . . a sum mary of t he evidence considere d by the S ecr etar y ") , 5701 (re quiring rele ase to c laimant of VA re cords c ontained in claimant' s own claims file), 7015(d)(1)( A) (requiring RO to include in S OC "[a] summary

of t he evidence in the case pertinent to the issue or issues with which the disa g ree ment ha s b e e n e xpre sse d" ); se e als o A nd e rso n ( He rse y ) v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 491, 493- 95 (1999) (discussing Secre tary ' s obligation to provide to c laimants copies of documents in custody of VA) ; Su tto n v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 553, 564 ( 1996) (" befor e the BVA re lies on any evidenc e deve loped

or o b ta in e d b y it s u

b s e qu e n t to th e is s u an c e o f th e mo s t r e c e n t St a te me n t o f th e Ca s e ( SOC) or Supplemental SOC . . . , the BVA must provide the claimant with re asonable notice of suc h evidenc e and of the relianc e that the B oard pr oposes to place on it and provide a rea sonable opportunity

for t h e c l ai m an tt o re s p o n d

t o i t " ( ci t i n g Thurber , inf

ra )) ; Ha y re v . W est , 188 F.3d 1327 ( Fe d. Cir. 1999) (" if the cla imant is t o ap p ea l ef fe cti vely his or her c ase, the claimant must be cog nizant of all the evidenc e conside red by

the [RO] " ( dictum)); c

f. W ilh oit e v . W

est , 11 Vet.App. 251, 252 ( 1998) (pe r curiam order) (whe re " rele vant" documents re lating to ve tera n' s claim wer e w it

h in Se c r e ta r y ' s c o ntr ol prior to B VA decision on appea l a nd could re asonably

have be en expected to be part of ROA , such21

d o cu m en t s ar e "i nco n t em p l at i o no f l aw " co n s t ru ct i v el y p ar to f t h e r ec o rd o f t h o s e p ro ce ed i n gs (c i t i n g Sim ing ton v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t

. Ap p
. 3 3 4 , 3 3 5 (1 9 9 6 ) ( p er cu ri am o rd er ) ( qu o t i n g Bell v. Derwinski , 2 Vet.App. 611, 612-13 (1992) ( per c uriam orde r)) , and Hulsey v . Principi , 3 Vet.App. 48 6, 48 7 ( 19 92 ) ( pe r c ur iam or de r) )) ; Au sti n v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 547, 550- 52 (1994) ( noting that

a lth ou g h B VAmay " be a

uth or ize d to de ve lop and c on sid e r c e rt a in n e w e vid e nc e " , it mus t do so wi th

re g ard to f a ir pr oc e ss) ; Thu rb e r v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 119, 122- 24 (1993) ( emphasizing importanc e to "f air proc ess" of opportunity t o b e h ea rd re g ardingevidenc e conside red in a djudication of veter an' s claim). As to the inclusion in the ROA of evidenc e relied upon by the Boa rd, that is, the provision to t his C ourt of such e vidence (as oppose d to t he provision of that e vidence to the veter an during the cour se of the a dminist rative proce eding s below), the Secre tary is obliged by a standing order

of this Court t o, "in a ll . . . procee dings be fore the Court, transmit without furt h er order of the Court . . . all rec ords and other

materia ls that are not sub j ec t t o t h e prote ction of 38 U.S.C. § 4132 [ (not applicable to this case)] and which a re r equire d to be t ransmitted pursuant to [ this Court's Rules of Practice and P roce dure]". In re M otion for St anding Order , 1 Ve t.A pp
. 55 5, 56 0 ( 19 90 ); se e als o U. S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 10(a) (" [w] ithin 60 day s after the date of

the Clerk's No tice of D ocketing , the Secre tary shall file with the Clerk and se rve on the appellant a desig nation of all mater ial in the

re c or d of pr oc e e din g s b e fo re the Se c re tary and the B oa rd that w a s re lie d up on b

y the Boa rd in ruling ag ainst the appe llant on the issues listed by the Board a nd any other mate rial fr om the rec ord which the Secr etar

y considers r eleva

nt" ( emphasis adde d)). N o tw it h s ta n d in g o u r d is a p p r o v a l o f

th e B o ar d ' s in sistence that it c o u ld n o t " ig n o r e [ ]"

e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in

Ms. John so n' s c la ims fi le that ma y no t ha ve be e n p ro vid e d to the ve te ra n in thi s c a se , e sp e c ia lly

wh e n it a pp e ars that th e e vid e nc e re qu ir e d to adj ud ic a te thi s cla im w a s a c tua lly pr ov ide d to VAby

the ve te ra

n him sel f, and no tw ith sta nd inga s w e ll the fa c t th a t th e Se c re tary is require d to pr o v i d e to t his Court copies of any evidenc e re lied upon by

the B oard ba sed on In re Standing Order , s u

p ra , and this Court's Rules of Pra ctice a nd Procedur e, we will not vacate the B oa rd ' s d e c isi on

on thi s b a sis fo r s e ve ra l r e a so ns
. First, reg ardingany

possible violation by

the Secr etar

y of In re Sta nd

ing Or de r, su pr a , the Court notes that the R OA in this case does in fac t contain copies of Ms. J ohnson' s orig inal claim for22

apportionment as we ll as sever al documents that appea r to ha ve been submitt ed to VA in connec tion with that claim. R. at 500-22. Thus, as a fac tual matter, i t ap pear s that at least some infor mation from Ms. J ohnson' s claims file i s in fac t included in the R OA filed by the Secr etar y in this case and thu s th a t th e Se c re tary

may no t in fa c t ha ve a c te d in

vio la tio n o f t

he Court ' s Standing Order

. As to the appe llant's c omplaints that he was not provided w ith copies o f docume nts contained in M s. John so n' s c la ims fi le duri ngVA ' s a dju dic a tio n b e low of the c la im h e re inv olv e d, we no te fi rs t that the ROA is unclea

r as to whe ther Ms. J o h n s o n 's M ay 1994 statement (R. at 500-22) was pr ov ide d to the ve te ra

n p ri or to its inc lus ion in the RO A be fo re thi s Cour t. H ow e ve r, e ve n if

tho se documents we re not provide d to the veter an prior to t h ei r inclusion in the ROA, the vete ran w as notified on at least four separ ate occa sions of his r ight to a ppeal to V A' s OGC the VSO' s decision not to provide him with copies of such evidenc e, and the veter an appa rently never broug ht such an appea l. R. at 560, 617, 651, 691. His failure to exhaust available administrative re medies by bring ing suc h an appe al of the V SO's de termination is disposit ive of his c ontention to this Court that the Boa rd improperly relied on that evidenc e. See H erzog v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 502, 503 ( 1992) (" an appe llant ordinarily

must ex haust all administrative re medies bef ore a n application for

revie w
c an be a c c e pte d by

a c ourt " ); se e als o Le dfo rd

v . W est , 136 F.3d 776, 781 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998) (stressing importance of ra ising a

rg uments to BVA pur suant to "doc trine of e x haustion of admini strative

reme dies" ). Moreove r, beca

use, as discussed above, it a ppear s to the Court that the evidenc e re lied upon by the B oard - - i.e., the ve tera n' s income in 1993 and 1994 -- had been provided t o VA by the veter an himself on sever al diffe rent oc casions (R. at 554, 570, 596-612, 622, 657), it is unclea r to the Court h o w h e c an n o w c l ai m t o b e p re j u d i ce d b y t h e B o ar d 's co n s i d er at i o no f e v i d en ce i nM s
. J o h n s o n 's claims file showing t he same such income. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b) (Court shall take due ac count of ru le of pr e jud ic ia l e rr or ); Ed

e nfi e ld, su pra . I n vie w of the la c k of any app aren t ba sis fo r pr e jud ic e to the a

pp e lla nt he re a s we ll a s h is appar ent failure to e x haust his a dminist rative reme dies, and in view of the ov e rwhe lming

evidenc e contained in the ROAreg ardingthe veter an' s income that, as a matter of la

w, justified the re duction of his rating from 100% to 70%, the Court rejec ts this arg um en t by the appe llant for vac ating the BV A decision on appea l. See W int e rs v . W

est , 12 Vet.App. 203 (1999) (e n banc) (" even w here the23

Court c oncludes that an err or has been committed, it need not -- indee d mu st no t -- va c a te or re ve rs e th e BV A d ecision if it is clear that the claimant would have bee n unsucce ssful irrespe ctive of the

erro r" (c i t i n g So

y ini , s up ra )) ; Ed

e nfi e ld, su pra .

III. Conclusi on Upon consider ation of t he foreg oing analy sis, the R OA, and the parties' pleading s, the Court ho lds that th e a

pp e lla nt h a s n ot d e mon str a te d th a t th e B VAc omm itt e d e rr or -- in i ts f ind ing s o f f

a c t, conclusions of law , proce dural proc esses, a rticulation of re as o ns or base s, or consider ation of the benef it-of-the- doubt rule -- that would war rant re versa l or remand under 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107(a), 7104(a) or (d) (1), or

7261, 38 C.F.R. § 4

. 1 3 2 , DC 9 4 11 (1996), or 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.105(e) , 3.343, 3.344, 4.1, 4.2, 4.10, or 4.130, DC 9411 (1999). The ref ore, the Court affir

ms the October

28, 1997, BV A dec ision. The parties' motions for single- judge dispositi on are denied. AFF I RMED.