[Cite as Lotz v. Lotz, 2014-Ohio-5625.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

AUGLAIZE COUNTY 

 

RICKIE LOTZ, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

 CASE NO. 2-14-06 

 v. 

ALICE LOTZ, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, 

 -and- 

 O P I N I O N 

DONNA J. LOTZ, 

 INTERVENOR-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court 

Domestic Relations Division 

Trial Court No. 2012-DR-074 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: December 22, 2014 

 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

James C. King for Appellant 

Matthew J. Kentner for Appellee, Alice Lotz 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-2- 

PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Rickie Lotz (“Rickie”), appeals the April 22, 2014 

“judgment entry – orders on divorce” of the Auglaize County Court of Common 

Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, in which the trial court concluded, among 

other things, that real property located at 20086 Wapakoneta-Cridersville Road in 

Wapakoneta, Ohio (the “Property”) was “marital property in its entirety.” On 

appeal, Rickie argues that the Property was an advance on his inheritance and 

separate property. He also argues that even assuming the Property was marital, 

the trial court should have valued the Property at ten dollars based on a right of 

first refusal held by Rickie’s mother, intervenor-appellee, Donna J. Lotz 

(“Donna”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} On May 22, 2012, Rickie filed a complaint for divorce against 

defendant-appellee, Alice Lotz (“Alice”). (Doc. No. 1). On June 18, 2012, Alice 

filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce. (Doc. No. 15). 

{¶3} On November 28, 2012, Donna filed a “motion to intervene as party 

defendant.” (Doc. No. 49). In her motion, Donna argued that a right of first 

refusal gave her a contractual interest in the Property. (Id.). 

{¶4} On December 19, 2012, the trial court granted Donna’s motion to 

intervene. (Doc. No. 50). 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-3- 

{¶5} On December 4, 2013, the trial court held a hearing at which the 

parties notified the trial court of their agreement concerning some of the issues in 

the case. (Dec. 4, 2013 Tr. at 4). The trial court accepted the parties’ partial 

agreement. (Doc. No. 97). 

{¶6} On February 25, 2014, the trial court held a final hearing on the 

merits. (Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 4). 

{¶7} On April 22, 2014, the trial court filed its “judgment entry – orders on 

divorce” that is the subject of this appeal. (Doc. No. 124). Among other things, 

the trial court concluded that the Property was “marital property in its entirety,” 

subject to a lien on the Property in the amount $149,575.56, and that the 

Property’s value was $440,000. (Id.). Concerning Donna’s purported right of first 

refusal, the trial court stated “that the domestic relations division has no power to 

settle a contract dispute between the parties.” (Id.). 

{¶8} Rickie filed his notice of appeal on May 21, 2014. (Doc. No. 129). 

He raises two assignments of error for our review, which we elect to address 

together. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

The trial court erred in finding that the marital residence is 

marital property in its entirety. 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-4- 

Assignment of Error No. II 

The trial court erred in finding that the court had no power to 

determine the validity of the right of first refusal agreement 

previously executed between the parties. 

{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Rickie argues that the Property is 

separate property, not marital property, because Donna gifted the Property to 

Rickie as an advance on his inheritance. He argues, “It is clear from the evidence 

presented that it was Donna[’s] intent for this transfer to be an advance on 

[Rickie]’s inheritance as she was making similar gifts to her other children and 

that she intends to equalize the life-time gifts with the amount of inheritance each 

child receives upon her death.” (Appellant’s Brief at 7). He also argues that 

Alice’s name was included on two deeds transferring the Property “as part of a 

misguided estate planning measure.” (Id. at 5). 

{¶10} In his second assignment of error, Rickie argues that Donna held a 

right of first refusal on the Property, which was “[f]urther evidence” that Donna 

intended the transfer to be an advance on Rickie’s inheritance. (Id. at 7). He also 

argues that if the Property is marital, then the trial court should have valued it at 

ten dollars based on Donna’s right of first refusal. Rickie argues that the trial 

court erred when it determined “that it had no power to settle a contract dispute 

between the parties.” (Id. at 8). Based on what Rickie describes as “some 

discrepancy as to the timing of the execution of both deeds and the Right of First 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-5- 

Refusal Agreement,” he argues in the alternative “that, at a minimum, the Right of 

First Refusal Agreement applies to 70.2% of the entire interest” in the Property. 

(Id. at 7-8). 

{¶11} In a divorce proceeding, the division of marital and separate property 

involves a two-step process governed by R.C. 3105.171. Forman v. Forman, 3d 

Dist. Marion No. 9-13-67, 2014-Ohio-3545, ¶ 13; Iacampo v. Oliver-Iacampo, 

11th Dist. Geauga No. 2011-G-3026, 2012-Ohio-1790, ¶ 16. First, the trial court 

must determine whether property is marital or separate property, and, second, the 

trial court must equitably allocate the marital and separate property. Forman at ¶ 

13, citing Schalk v. Schalk, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-07-13, 2008-Ohio-829, ¶ 6, 

citing Gibson v. Gibson, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-07-06, 2007-Ohio-6965, ¶ 29, 

citing R.C. 3105.171(B), (D); Iacampo at ¶ 16, citing R.C. 3105.171(B). 

{¶12} At issue under Rickie’s first assignment of error is the first step of 

the two-step process set forth in R.C. 3105.171—the trial court’s determination of 

whether property is marital or separate. Under R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a), “marital 

property” includes: 

(i) All real and personal property that currently is owned by either 

or both of the spouses * * * and that was acquired by either or both 

of the spouses during the marriage; 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-6- 

(ii) All interest that either or both of the spouses currently has in 

any real or personal property * * * and that was acquired by either or 

both of the spouses during the marriage * * *.” 

R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i), (ii). “Property acquired during a marriage is 

presumed to be marital property unless it can be shown to be separate.” Hall v. 

Hall, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-10-01, 2010-Ohio-4818, ¶ 6, citing Barkley v. 

Barkley, 119 Ohio App.3d 155, 160 (4th Dist.1997). Under R.C. 

3105.171(A)(6)(a), “separate property” includes: 

[A]ll real and personal property and any interest in real or personal 

property that is found by the court to be any of the following: 

* * * 

(vii) Any gift of any real or personal property or of an interest in 

real or personal property that is made after the date of the marriage 

and that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been 

given to only one spouse. 

R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii). 

{¶13} “The essential elements of an inter vivos gift are: ‘(1) [the] intent of 

the donor to make an immediate gift, (2) delivery of the property to the donee, 

[and] (3) acceptance of the gift by the donee.’” Williams v. Williams, 3d Dist. 

Seneca No. 13-12-17, 2012-Ohio-6116, ¶ 16, quoting Barkley at 161, fn. 2, citing 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-7- 

Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 132 Ohio St. 21 (1936). “‘The gift exception in 

division (A)(6)(a)(vii) requires proof that not only did the donor intend to benefit 

one of the spouses, but that the donor also intended to exclude the other spouse 

from acquiring any interest in the property through the gift that was made.’” 

Butler v. Butler, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 12CA009, 2012-Ohio-6085, ¶ 24, quoting 

Kotch v. Kotch, 178 Ohio App.3d 358, 2008-Ohio-5084, ¶ 30 (5th Dist.), citing 

Marshall v. Marshall, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2000 CA 95, 2001 WL 468407, *2 

(May 4, 2001). 

{¶14} “Additionally, R.C. 3105.171(H) provides that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided in this section, the holding of title to property by one spouse individually 

or by both spouses in a form of co-ownership does not determine whether the 

property is marital property or separate property.” Strasburg v. Strasburg, 3d Dist. 

Auglaize No. 2-10-12, 2010-Ohio-3672, ¶ 20, quoting R.C. 3105.171(H). 

“However, ‘title can be some evidence of the parties’ intent as to the nature of the 

asset being marital or separate.’” Id., quoting Gallo v. Gallo, 11th Dist. Lake No. 

2000-L-208, 2002-Ohio-2815, ¶ 25. 

{¶15} “A party who wants an asset classified as separate property bears the 

burden of tracing that asset to his or her separate property.” Chawla v. Chawla, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-399, 2014-Ohio-1188, ¶ 43, citing Alexander v. 

Alexander, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-262, 2009-Ohio-5856, ¶ 24. As set forth 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-8- 

in R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii), “[w]hen a party claims the separate property to be 

a gift, the burden is clear and convincing.” Butler at ¶ 24, citing Eikleberry v. 

Eikleberry, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 00 BA 13, 2002-Ohio-438. “Clear and 

convincing evidence is ‘[t]he measure or degree of proof that will produce in the 

mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to 

be established.’” Williams at ¶ 15, quoting In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 

101, 104 (1986). 

{¶16} This court reviews the trial court’s classification of property as 

marital or separate under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Reed v. 

Reed, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-63, 2010-Ohio-4550, ¶ 7, citing Gibson, 2007-Ohio6965, at ¶ 26. Accordingly, we will not reverse the trial court’s judgment if it is 

supported by some competent, credible evidence. Id., citing Barkley, 119 Ohio 

App.3d at 159. “‘This highly deferential standard of review permits the 

affirmation of the trial court’s judgment if there is even ‘some’ evidence to 

support the court’s finding.’” Id., quoting Huelskamp v. Huelskamp, 185 Ohio 

App.3d 611, 2009-Ohio-6864, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.). 

{¶17} In his second assignment of error, Rickie challenges the trial court’s 

valuation of the Property. “R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) mandates that a trial court divide 

marital property equally, or, if an equal division is inequitable, that the court 

divide the marital property equitably.” Schwarck v. Schwarck, 3d Dist. Auglaize 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-9- 

No. 2-11-24, 2012-Ohio-3902, ¶ 26. “To comply with that duty, a trial court must 

generally assign and consider the values of marital assets in order to equitably 

divide those assets.” Id., citing Beagle v. Beagle, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

07AP-494, 2008-Ohio-764, ¶ 41 and Hightower v. Hightower, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 02AP-37, 2002-Ohio-5488, ¶ 22. “The valuation of property in a divorce case 

is a question of fact.” Id. at ¶ 27, citing Herron v. Herron, 3d Dist. Allen No. 

1-04-23, 2004-Ohio-5765, ¶ 23. “Accordingly, a trial court’s decision pertaining 

to the valuation of property will be reviewed under a manifest weight of the 

evidence standard and will not be reversed so long as it is supported by some 

competent and credible evidence.” Id., citing Herron at ¶ 23. See also Snell v. 

Snell, 5th Dist. Richland No. 13CA80, 2014-Ohio-3285, ¶ 50 (“Although the trial 

court’s division of property is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, 

factual determinations such the value of the property subject to division are 

reviewed under a manifest weight of the evidence standard.”), citing Brown v. 

Brown, 4th Dist. Pike No. 02CA689, 2003-Ohio-304.1

 

1

 We acknowledge that this court and other Ohio courts have applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of 

review to a trial court’s valuation of property in a divorce case. See, e.g., Link v. Link, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 

10-11-21, 2012-Ohio-4654, ¶ 53 (“A trial court’s valuation of marital property is only disturbed upon a 

showing of abuse of discretion.”), citing Stringfield v. Stringfield, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 05 Mo. 16, 

2007-Ohio-1116, ¶ 17. However, we have stated, “It is not an abuse of discretion when the trial court 

assigns value to [property] in an amount that is supported by competent, credible evidence.” Huelskamp, 

185 Ohio App.3d 611, at ¶ 27, citing Osting v. Osting, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-03-88, 2004-Ohio-4159, ¶ 21. 

Therefore, the case law establishes that the ultimate inquiry under either the manifest-weight standard or 

the abuse-of-discretion standard is whether “competent, credible evidence” supports the trial court’s 

valuation determination. 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-10- 

{¶18} The trial court “is not required to adopt any particular method of 

valuation.” Huelskamp at ¶ 27, citing James v. James, 101 Ohio App.3d 668, 680 

(2d Dist.1995). See also Davis v. Davis, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2011-G-3018, 

2013-Ohio-211, ¶ 41, citing Huelskamp at ¶ 27. “‘Rigid rules to determine value 

cannot be established, as equity depends on the totality of the circumstances.’” 

Dollries v. Dollries, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2012-08-167 and CA2012-11-234, 

2014-Ohio-1883, ¶ 10, quoting Baker v. Baker, 83 Ohio App.3d 700, 702 (9th 

Dist.1992). “‘[W]hen the parties present substantially different valuations of an 

asset,’ [the trial court] may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony.” 

Huelskamp at ¶ 27, citing Covert v. Covert, 4th Dist. Adams No. 03CA778, 2004-

Ohio-3534, ¶ 29. “Furthermore, ‘[a] reviewing court should be guided by a 

presumption that the findings of a trial court are correct, since the trial judge is 

best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice 

inflections, and use those observations in weighing the credibility of the 

testimony.’” Id., quoting DeWitt v. DeWitt, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-02-42, 2003-

Ohio-851, ¶ 11. 

{¶19} We begin our analysis by addressing whether the trial court’s 

conclusion that the Property was marital property is supported by some competent, 

credible evidence. Contrary to Rickie’s assertion that Alice bore the burden of 

proving that the Property was marital property, it was he who bore the burden of 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-11- 

demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that because Donna gifted the 

Property to him only, the Property was separate property. See Butler, 2012-Ohio6085, at ¶ 24. 

{¶20} A review of the record reflects that Rickie and Alice married on June 

18, 1990. (Doc. No. 15). They moved into the residence on the Property on 

January 1, 2007. (Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 197). On April 3, 2007, Donna executed a 

general warranty deed for a 70.2% interest in the Property “to Rickie L. Lotz, and 

Alice Lotz, married, for their joint lives, remainder to the survivor of them.” 

(Defendant’s Ex. F). (See also Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 192-193). That deed was 

recorded with the Auglaize County Recorder on August 13, 2007. (Defendant’s 

Ex. F). (See also Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 193). 

{¶21} Donna testified that “probably a few days before Mother’s Day” in 

2007, she “heard about that Alice had said that as soon as she got the deed she was 

going to sell the property and go to Georgia where her brother lives.” (Feb. 25, 

2014 Tr. at 195). After learning that, Donna had her counsel prepare a “right of 

first refusal agreement,” which Donna, as “Grantee,” executed on June 28, 2007, 

and which Rickie and Alice, as “Grantors,” executed on July 5, 2007. (Plaintiff’s 

Ex. 7); (Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 35, 124-126, 195-197, 243-244, 307-308). In it, 

Rickie and Alice granted to Donna “an exclusive right of first refusal to purchase 

the real property owned by Grantor [sic] and legally described on ‘Exhibit A’ 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-12- 

attached hereto and incorporated herein * * *.” (Plaintiff’s Ex. 7). The agreement 

provided that Donna could purchase for ten dollars the real property described in 

Exhibit A if Rickie and Alice received a bona fide offer to purchase it. (Id.); (Feb. 

25, 2014 Tr. at 35). No “Exhibit A” was attached to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7, the twopage right of first refusal agreement. (Id.); (Id. at 125, 317). Alice testified that 

when she signed the right of first refusal agreement, it was a two-page document; 

however, she could not recall if “Exhibit A” was attached to it. (Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. 

at 248). Alice testified that the right of first refusal agreement was never recorded, 

and Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 does not bear a recorder’s stamp. (Id. at 251); (Plaintiff’s 

Ex. 7). 

{¶22} On March 6, 2008, Donna executed a general warranty deed for the 

remainder of her interest in the Property “to Rickie L. Lotz and Alice Lotz, 

husband and wife.” (Defendant’s Ex. G). (See also Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 193-194). 

That deed was recorded with the Auglaize County Recorder on March 12, 2008. 

(Defendant’s Ex. G). 

{¶23} On July 19, 2008, Rickie and Alice executed a survivorship deed for 

the Property “to RICKIE L. LOTZ and ALICE L. LOTZ, husband and wife, for 

their joint lives, remainder to the survivor of them * * *.” (Defendant’s Ex. H). 

(See also Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 129). Rickie and Alice executed the survivorship 

deed so that they could obtain a home-equity loan against the Property. (Feb. 25, 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-13- 

2014 Tr. at 129, 250). Rickie and Alice obtained the home-equity loan together, 

and when they did, they did not notify the bank of the right of first refusal 

agreement. (Id. at 129-130, 159-160, 250-251). Donna never discussed the right 

of first refusal agreement with the bank from which Rickie and Alice obtained 

their home-equity loan. (Id. at 200). 

{¶24} At the February 25, 2014 hearing, Alice’s counsel asked Donna 

about her intent at the times she deeded the Property: 

[Alice’s Counsel]: Mrs. Lotz, there was obviously Exhibits F and 

G, the deeds, they speak for themselves, but 

was it your intent to deed the property to Rickie 

and Alice, wasn’t it, Ma’am? 

[Donna]: Originally, yeah, but not once I heard what 

Alice said. 

[Alice’s Counsel]: Oh, that you heard Alice wanted to move to 

Georgia? 

[Donna]: Yeah, was going to sell it. 

(Id. at 199). On direct examination, Donna testified that she gifted the Property to 

Rickie and Alice: 

[Donna’s Counsel]: You were the owner of property on 20086 

Wapak-Cridersville Road; is that correct? 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-14- 

[Donna]: Yes. 

[Donna’s Counsel]: And you decided to give it as a gift to Rick and 

Alice; is that right? 

[Donna]: Yes. 

* * * 

[Alice’s Counsel]: Now the only property you gave to Rick and 

Alice consisted of the property at 20086 

Cridersville Road, the seventy (70) acres; is that 

right? 

[Donna]: Yeah. 

(Id. at 307-309). According to Donna, the Property was transferred in two deeds 

“because of the gift tax law.” (Id. at 312). Donna identified Third Party Exhibit A 

as “an ongoing thing” tallying the gifts she makes to her children and the gifts’ 

respective values. (Id. at 310). Donna acknowledged that the total value of the 

gifts she has given to Rickie, as reflected on Third Party Exhibit A, includes “the 

entire gift of that seventy (70) acres to him.” (Id. at 311). 

{¶25} Finally, Rickie admitted on cross-examination that in his “affidavit 

of property,” which he filed on May 22, 2012 when he filed his complaint for 

divorce, he listed nothing under the section for “separate property claims,” which 

includes “gifts to one spouse only.” (Id. at 130-131); (Defendant’s Ex. C). (See 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-15- 

also Doc. No. 9). Rickie testified that he “didn’t have an attorney present when 

[he] filled * * * out” his affidavit of property. (Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 130). And 

while he admitted that he was represented by counsel at the time he filed his 

complaint for divorce and his affidavit of property, his counsel “don’t really look 

at it.” (Id. at 131). 

{¶26} Based on the evidence above, we conclude that the trial court’s 

conclusion that the Property was marital property is supported by some competent, 

credible evidence. Rickie was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that Donna gifted the Property only to him and intended to exclude Alice from 

acquiring any interest in the Property through the gift. See Butler, 

2012-Ohio-6085, at ¶ 24. Notably, Rickie did not call Donna as a witness at the 

February 25, 2014 hearing—his only two witnesses were himself and Alice. Later 

at the hearing, Donna testified that she gifted the Property to Rickie and Alice. At 

one point, Donna testified that it was her intent to gift the Property to Rickie and 

Alice until she heard Alice wanted to sell the Property—something she learned 

after execution of the first deed but before execution of the second deed. The 

record reflects, however, that Donna addressed her concerns by executing the right 

of first refusal agreement. Indeed, the second deed transferred the Property to 

Rickie and Alice notwithstanding Donna’s learning earlier that Alice wanted to 

sell the Property. Moreover, Rickie and Alice executed a survivorship deed to 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-16- 

transfer the Property to themselves so that they could obtain a home-equity loan. 

While we acknowledge that, under R.C. 3105.171(H), “the holding of title to 

property by one spouse individually or by both spouses in a form of co-ownership 

does not determine whether the property is marital property or separate property,” 

title can be some evidence of the parties’ intent concerning the nature of the asset. 

Strasburg, 2010-Ohio-3672, at ¶ 20. Finally, even at the outset of this case, Rickie 

did not disclose the Property as separate property in his affidavit of property. 

Shipley v. Shipley, 5th Dist. Licking No. 02CA59, 2003-Ohio-17, ¶ 27 (“The 

parties treated the $50,000.00 as a joint gift and appellant did not even list the 

amount as separate property in her own affidavit.”). Between Donna’s testimony, 

the deeds transferring the Property from Donna to Rickie and Alice, Rickie and 

Alice’s joint-survivorship deed, and Rickie’s not listing the Property as separate 

property on his affidavit of property, the trial court’s characterization of the 

Property as marital property is supported by some competent, credible evidence 

and therefore not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶27} Not lost on us is Rickie’s argument that the Property was not just a 

gift from Donna to him, but an advancement on his inheritance, which is a specific 

type of gift. “An advancement of inheritance is an irrevocable gift made by a 

person during his or her lifetime to an heir, by way of anticipation of the whole or 

part of the estate which the heir would receive in the event of the person’s death.” 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-17- 

Dudley v. Dudley, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 07CA000027, 2008-Ohio-3760, ¶ 65, 

citing King v. King, 82 Ohio App.3d 747 (2d Dist.1992). See also Crish v. Crish, 

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 02CA93, 2003-Ohio-4465, ¶ 14, citing King at 750, citing 

Moore v. Freeman, 50 Ohio St. 592, 593 (1893). “A gift is an advancement 

against a share of an estate only if it is declared in a contemporaneous writing by 

the decedent or acknowledged in writing by the heir to be an advancement.” 

Dudley at ¶ 65, citing R.C. 2105.051. See also Crish at ¶ 14, citing R.C. 

2105.051. Therefore, perhaps without realizing it, Rickie created an extra 

requirement for himself by arguing that the Property was not only a gift but also 

an advancement on his inheritance. 

{¶28} Nevertheless, the distinction between the elements of an inter vivos 

gift and the elements of an advancement on inheritance are immaterial in this case. 

See Pudlo v. Pudlo, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-2000-29, 2001 WL 730986, *5 (June 

29, 2001). As we discussed above, Rickie failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that, under R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii), the Property was a separate gift 

to him only. Adopting the advancement-on-inheritance framework urged by 

Rickie, he likewise failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence 

of a contemporaneous writing declaring that the Property was an advancement on 

his inheritance from Donna. First, Rickie did not call Donna as a witness or offer 

as an exhibit Donna’s “ongoing” tally sheet recording her gifts to her children. 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-18- 

Second, there was no evidence that the tally sheet, which Donna offered as an 

exhibit, was prepared contemporaneously with the gift of the Property. 

{¶29} We next address whether the trial court’s valuation of the Property is 

supported by some competent, credible evidence. The trial court assigned a value 

of $440,000 to the Property and, after factoring in the $149,575.56 lien on the 

Property, found the Property’s net value to be $290,424.44. (Doc. No. 124). 

Rickie argues that the trial court should have relied on the right of first refusal 

agreement to conclude that the Property’s value was ten dollars. He also argues 

that the trial court erred when it concluded that it “had no power to determine the 

validity of the right of first refusal agreement previously executed between the 

parties.” (Appellant’s Brief at 7). 

{¶30} Rickie mischaracterizes the trial court’s conclusion regarding its 

ability to determine the validity of the right of first refusal agreement. The trial 

court’s judgment entry reflects that, after detailing the “number of problems with 

the right of first refusal”—including its lack of an “Exhibit A,” which the right of 

first refusal agreement references as describing the property subject to the right of 

first refusal—the trial court concluded “that the domestic relations division has no 

power to settle a contract dispute between the parties and has no power to hear a 

partition action to carve up the real estate interests of the parties, under these 

unusual circumstances.” (Doc. No. 124). 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-19- 

{¶31} By concluding that it had “no power to settle a contract dispute 

between the parties” and “no power to hear a partition action to carve up the real 

estate interests of the parties,” the trial court was merely saying that the issue of 

whether Donna would be entitled to purchase the Property for ten dollars if the 

Property is sold was not an issue before the trial court. Rather, as the trial court 

noted, its duty is to determine what property is marital and “assess and divide the 

values thereof.” (Id.). To that end, the trial court examined the evidentiary value 

of the right of first refusal agreement and noted “a number of problems” with it. 

Indeed, the right of first refusal agreement introduced at trial did not contain the 

“Exhibit A” referenced in that agreement, so it is impossible to determine from the 

agreement to which property the agreement applies. And while the parties 

testified to their understanding of what property was subject to the right of first 

refusal agreement, the trial court was free, as it apparently did, to assign greater 

evidentiary weight to the appraisal—offered and identified by Rickie as Plaintiff’s 

Exhibit 6—valuing the Property at $440,000. (Feb. 25, 2014 Tr. at 27-28). See 

Huelskamp, 185 Ohio App.3d 611, at ¶ 27. 

{¶32} In support of his second assignment of error, Rickie relies heavily on 

Lindsay v. Lindsay, which is distinguishable from this case. 6th Dist. Sandusky 

No. S-11-055, 2013-Ohio-3290. In that case, the Sixth District Court of Appeals 

concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion “in finding the fair market 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-20- 

value of the family farm to be $234,000.” Id. at ¶ 12. The Sixth District noted, 

“The purchase agreement gave the intervening parties a 20 year right of first 

refusal to purchase the property for $234,000. Thus, the property, encumbered, 

could not be sold on the open market for more than $234,000 at the time of the 

divorce.” Id. The appellant apparently did not dispute the validity of the right of 

first refusal but argued that the trial court should have instead valued the property 

based on an appraisal in the amount of $385,000 that did not account for the right 

of first refusal. Id. at ¶ 10, 12. Unlike the right of first refusal in Lindsay, the right 

of first refusal agreement in this case was riddled with multiple evidentiary issues. 

Much like the Sixth District in Lindsay concluded that the trial court did not err in 

basing the property’s value on a right of first refusal that was apparently free of 

evidentiary issues, we conclude that the trial court did not err in basing the 

Property’s value on an appraisal rather than a right of first refusal agreement that it 

found problematic in multiple respects. 

{¶33} For the reasons above, we conclude that the trial court’s valuation of 

the Property is supported by some competent, credible evidence and therefore not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶34} Rickie’s assignments of error are overruled. 
Case No. 2-14-06 

-21- 

{¶35} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ROGERS and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/jlr