*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 97-60651

Summary Calendar

_____________________

RUBY JEAN GORDON REID,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GRENADA SUNBURST SYSTEM

CORPORATION, ET AL.,

Defendants,

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY;

GRENADA SUNBURST SYSTEM

CORPORATION LONG TERM DISABILITY

PLAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Mississippi

(1:96-CV-73 SD)

_________________________________________________________________

May 19, 1998

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this case, Ruby Reid appeals from the district court’s

grant of summary judgment dismissing her claim for a violation of

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Finding no error, we affirm.
1Sometimes also known as Continental Casualty Company--the “C”

in CNA.

-2-

In her suit, Reid complained that CNA,1 the insurance company

fiduciary of the administrator for the Grenada Sunburst System

Corporation Long Term Disability Plan (the “Plan”), had improperly

denied her claim for long-term disability. In particular, Reid

argued that CNA’s determination that she was not “continuously

unable to perform the substantial and material duties of [her]

occupation,” as required by the terms of the Plan, was in error

because CNA relied on the fact that there was no “objective”

medical evidence of inability to perform.

Relying on our decision in Pierre v. Connecticut General Life

Insurance Co., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir. 1991), the district court

found that CNA’s denial was based on a factual determination, and

that this determination was subject to review only for an abuse of

discretion. Because it further found that CNA’s denial was

rational as a matter of law under the administrative record before

it, the district court granted the Plan’s motion for summary

judgment.

On appeal, Reid argues that the district court erred by

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review and by

restricting its review to the evidence in the administrative

record. In the alternative, Reid also asserts that CNA’s decision
-3-

was not rational. None of these contentions has merit under this

court’s long-standing ERISA jurisprudence.

First, with respect to the standard of review, it is clear

that the factual determinations of a plan administrator may only be

reviewed for an abuse of discretion in this circuit. Pierre, 932

F.2d at 1562. CNA’s determination that Reid was not “continuously

unable to perform the substantial and material duties of [her]

occupation” was a factual finding, and the district court did not

err in giving it the benefit of the deferential standard of review.

Second, with respect to scope, it is equally clear that in

evaluating the rationality of the administrator’s factual findings,

the district court may look only to the evidence that was before

the administrator at the time the decision was made. Widbur v.

Arco Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 1992). Any other

scope of inquiry would vitiate the deferential standard of review,

and it is at any rate beyond dispute that the district court did

not err in limiting its inquiry in this case.

Finally, with respect to the rationality of CNA’s decision, we

have stated that an administrator’s factual determinations must be

upheld so long as they “reflect a reasonable and impartial

judgment.” Pierre, 932 F.2d 1562. Where the plan’s terms require

a finding of continuous inability “to perform the substantial and

material duties of [an] occupation,” it is the very essence of
-4-

reasonable and impartial rationality to require objective evidence

of an inability to perform. We agree with the district court that

CNA’s decision to require some objective proof was rational as a

matter of law, and therefore find no error on this basis either.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court

is

A F F I R M E D.