[Cite as State v. Howe, 2021-Ohio-1676.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

FULTON COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. F-20-008 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. 20CR000033 

v. 

Jennifer L. Howe DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: May 14, 2021 

* * * * * 

 Scott A. Haselman, Fulton County Prosecuting Attorney, 

 for appellee. 

 Adam H. Houser, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

DUHART, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Jennifer Howe, appeals the judgment entered by the Fulton 

County Court of Common Pleas on June 24, 2020, overruling her motion to suppress, 

and, further, appeals the judgment entry of sentencing entered by the Fulton County 

Common Pleas Court on August 10, 2020, which incorrectly states that appellant was 
2.

convicted on a plea of guilty. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court with respect to the motion to suppress, and remand the matter to the trial court 

for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc journal entry that accurately reflects 

that appellant entered a plea of no contest. 

{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignments of error: 

I. The Trial Court’s Decision was Against the Manifest Weight of 

Evidence when it Denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress. 

II. The Judgment Entry of Conviction of August 10, 2020 did not 

Comply with Criminal Rule 32(C), in that it Fails to State on Judgment 

Entry the Proper Plea that was Entered by the Appellant. 

Statement of the Case 

{¶ 3} On March 17, 2020, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated 

possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree. On 

April 9, 2020, appellant appeared without counsel and was found indigent by the trial 

court. On May 15, 2020, appellant was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea, and a 

pretrial was set. On June 23, 2020, the trial court held a suppression hearing, and 

ultimately denied appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant entered a plea of no contest 

to the sole count of the indictment on June 23, 2020. On August 7, 2020, the trial court 

sentenced appellant to two years of community control, with a ten-month reserved 

sentence. Appellant timely filed her appeal. 

 
3.

Statement of the Facts 

A. Issues Related to Motion to Suppress 

{¶ 4} In the early morning hours of October 17, 2019, at approximately 4:00 a.m., 

Deputy Joshua Rodriguez was informed by a Deputy Pennington that a woman named 

Jennifer Howe was sitting on the sidewalk on the west side of the Country Corral gas 

station on State Route 109, Delta, Fulton County. It was Deputy Rodriguez’s 

understanding that Deputy Pennington received this information from Delta Police 

Department Sergeant Walker, who had gone to the Country Corral to use the facilities 

and to make a purchase. It was Deputy Rodriguez’s further understanding that Sergeant 

Walter was informed by store clerks that a woman had been in the Country Corral’s 

bathroom for quite some time, and that the clerks were concerned about the woman’s 

welfare. Deputy Rodriguez did not know how Deputy Pennington or Sergeant Walker 

had come to identify the woman at issue as Ms. Howe. 

{¶ 5} Upon receiving Ms. Howe’s name, and prior to making contact with her, 

Deputy Rodriguez ran her name through his patrol car’s computer system, which is 

connected to a law enforcement database, and discovered that she had active warrants for 

her arrest. Deputy Rodriguez was also able to see a driver’s license photo of Ms. Howe, 

so he knew who he was looking for when he responded to the Country Corral. 

{¶ 6} After checking his patrol car’s computer system, and within five minutes of 

receiving the information from Deputy Pennington, Deputy Rodriguez arrived at the 

Country Corral. Upon his arrival, Deputy Rodriguez saw a blonde female sitting alone 
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on the sidewalk, on the west side of the property. The woman had with her a duffle bag 

and a purse. When Deputy Rodriguez saw the woman’s face, he recognized her as being 

Ms. Howe from the driver’s license photo that he had seen. Deputy Rodriguez 

approached Ms. Howe and asked her if she was okay. She indicated that she was. 

During the course of this “casual conversation,” Ms. Howe provided her name and 

verified her information for Deputy Rodriguez. Deputy Rodriguez then double-checked 

the information with dispatch, who verified that Ms. Howe had outstanding warrants. At 

that point, Ms. Howe was taken into custody. 

{¶ 7} Deputy Rodriguez conducted a pat down for weapons and Ms. Howe was 

placed in the back of his patrol car. At that point, Deputy Rodriguez and Deputy 

Pennington—who had recently arrived on the scene—searched Ms. Howe’s bags. As the 

search was being conducted, Ms. Howe stated that she had marijuana and instruments 

that are used to smoke marijuana in a baggie that she thought was in the zipper portion of 

her purse. When the deputies looked there and nothing was found, Ms. Howe provided 

that they might be inside of the purse. The deputies looked inside of the purse and found 

a tin containing a substance that they suspected was methamphetamine. Ms. Howe 

confirmed that the substance was crystal meth, but claimed that it belonged to her 

boyfriend. Deputy Rodriguez initially testified that Ms. Howe had been Mirandized prior 

to making the statement identifying the substance found as crystal meth and before 

claiming that it belonged to her boyfriend, but he later made clear that he could not recall 

exactly when he provided Ms. Howe with Miranda warnings. He further made clear that, 
5.

regardless of Ms. Howe’s statements and whether they were provided prior to Ms. Howe 

being Mirandized, he would have searched Ms. Howe’s purse and duffle bag incident to 

the arrest on the warrants, as required by the department’s policy. 

{¶ 8} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found that Deputy 

Rodriguez’s testimony was credible and overruled the motion to suppress. Thereafter, 

the trial judge issued a written judgment entry, which provided: 

The Court does not believe that the search constituted a violation of the 

Defendant’s 4th and 14th amendment rights. The initial purpose of the 

investigation was for a welfare check -- certainly within the province of 

appropriate and necessary exercise of the legitimate power. After the 

deputy was made aware of the warrants, he was obligated to arrest the 

Defendant and the subsequent search was within exceptions to the warrant 

requirements. 

B. Issues Related to Appellant’s Plea 

{¶ 9} On June 23, 2020, appellant entered into a no contest plea that contained a 

consent to a finding of guilt, a stipulation to a factual basis for the charge, and a waiver of 

the recitation of facts on the record. The August 10, 2020 judgment entry of sentencing, 

however, incorrectly stated that “* * * Defendant has been convicted upon a plea of 

guilty * * *.” 

 
6.

Analysis

{¶ 10} Appellant argues in her first assignment of error that the trial court’s 

decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence when it denied appellant’s 

motion to suppress. This court, in State v. Ruffer, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-11-007, 2012-

Ohio-4491, articulated the applicable standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a 

motion to suppress, as follows:

Review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress presents 

mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 

2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to 

suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in 

the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses. State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 

972.” Id. An appellate court defers to a trial court’s factual findings made 

with respect to its ruling on a motion to suppress where the findings are 

supported by competent, credible evidence. Id.; State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio 

St.3d 148, 154, 661 N.E.2d 1030 (1996). “[T]he appellate court must then 

independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial 

court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. 

McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539.” State v. 

Burnside at ¶ 8. 

Id. at ¶ 5. 
7.

{¶ 11} In the instant case, the trial court specifically determined that although the 

“initial purpose of the investigation was for a welfare check,” “[a]fter the deputy was 

made aware of the warrants, he was obligated to arrest [appellant] and the subsequent 

search was within exceptions to the warrant requirements.” Thus, it was the conclusion 

of the trial court that the search in this case was incident to appellant’s arrest on the 

outstanding warrants. 

{¶ 12} The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement “derives 

from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in 

arrest situations.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 

(2009). Therefore, a law enforcement officer who has made a lawful arrest may conduct 

a warrantless search of the arrestee’s person and of the area within the arrestee’s 

immediate control, which includes “the area from within which he might gain possession 

of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

{¶ 13} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “the right to search incident 

to arrest exists even if the item is no longer accessible to the arrestee at the time of the 

search[;] [a]s long as the arrestee has the item within his immediate control near the time 

of the arrest, the item can be searched.” State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 183. There are numerous examples where Ohio courts have held 

that a purse or a backpack that is within the immediate control of an arrestee is subject to 

a search incident to the arrest. See, e.g., State v. Mathews, 46 Ohio St.2d 72, 76, 346 
8.

N.E.2d 151 (1976) (upholding search of a purse that an arrestee was carrying at the time 

of her arrest); State v. Evans, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105687, 2018-Ohio-744, ¶ 9 (“The 

search of [the arrestee’s] purse fell within well-established law that a law enforcement 

officer may conduct a warrantless search of both the arrestee and the area within the 

individual’s immediate control whenever the search is incident to a lawful arrest.”); State 

v. Washington, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-663, 2001 WL 436062 (May 1, 2001) 

(upholding the search of a purse that the arrestee was in control of at the time of her 

arrest, with the search having been conducted contemporaneously with the arrest, even 

where the search took place after the arrestee was seized and placed in the police cruiser); 

State v. Whipple, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-06-036, 2017-Ohio-1094 (the search 

of the arrestee’s backpack was a lawful search incident to arrest even though the arresting 

officer searched the backpack after it had been removed from the arrestee’s person, since 

the arrestee was in control of the backpack at the time of his arrest and the search was 

conducted contemporaneously with the arrest). 

{¶ 14} Here, the facts of this case are simple and straightforward. Deputy 

Rodriguez arrived at the Country Corral and found appellant, whom he knew to have 

outstanding arrest warrants, sitting on the sidewalk with several bags in her possession. 

Appellant was arrested on those warrants, and the bags that she was sitting with were 

searched incident to that arrest. These facts, as found by the trial court, are supported by 

competent, credible evidence. See Ruffer at ¶ 5. In addition, the trial court’s decision to 

overrule appellant’s motion to suppress on the basis of these facts was supported by the 
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applicable law. Id. Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is found not welltaken. 

{¶ 15} Appellant argues in her second assignment of error that the August 10, 

2020 judgment entry of conviction does not comply with Crim.R. 32(C), in that it fails to 

state the proper plea that was entered into by appellant. The applicable version of 

Crim.R. 32(C) relevantly provides as follows: 

(C) Judgment. 

A judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of conviction and 

the sentence. * * * The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall 

enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the 

journal by the clerk. 

Id. (Emphasis added.) The Staff Notes for an amendment that was made in 2013 explain 

the meaning of the change as follows: 

Rule 32(C) sets forth the four essential elements required for a judgment of 

conviction as defined by the Supreme Court of Ohio. See State v. Lester, 

2011-Ohio-5204. The previous rule arguably required the judgment to 

specify the specific manner of conviction, e.g., plea, verdict, or findings 

upon which the conviction is based. The amendment to the rule allows, but 

does not require, the judgment to specify the specific manner of conviction. 

When a judgment of conviction reflects the four substantive provisions, as 

set forth by the Supreme Court of Ohio, it is a final order subject to appeal. 
10. 

Id. (Emphasis added.) Thus, under the current version of Crim.R. 32(C), a judgment 

entry of conviction is proper if it is in writing, is signed by the judge, is entered on the 

journal, and sets forth the fact of conviction and the sentence imposed. There is no 

longer any requirement that the judgment entry specify the specific manner of conviction. 

{¶ 16} That said, the law is well-settled that a trial court speaks through its journal 

entries. State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, 940 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 12. 

“[A] trial court may correct clerical errors at any time in order to conform to the 

transcript of the proceedings.” State v. Adhikari, 8th Dist. No. 103935, 2017-Ohio-460, 

¶ 63. Further, “[t]rial courts retain continuing jurisdiction to correct clerical errors in 

judgments with a nunc pro tunc entry to reflect what the court actually decided.” Id. 

Therefore, we find appellant’s second assignment of error to be well-taken, and we 

remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc 

journal entry that accurately reflects the fact that appellant entered a plea of no contest, 

and not a plea of guilty. 

{¶ 17} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Fulton County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

decision. Pursuant to App.R. 24, costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 
11. 

 State v. Howe 

 C.A. No. F-20-008 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Christine E. Mayle, J. _______________________________ 

 JUDGE 

Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. 

 _______________________________ 

Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.