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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED August 11, 2016

v No. 327559 Ionia Circuit Court TERRY REESE DARNELL, LC Nos. 2014-016193-FH; 2014-016197-FH Defendant-Appellant.

Before: S ERVITTO , P.J., and M ARKEY and G LEICHER , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant, Terry Reese Darnell, was convicted by a jury of thr ee counts of failure to comply with the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.7 21, et seq . Defendant was sentenced to 14 to 96 months’ imprisonment on each of his convi ctions. We vacate one of defendant’s convictions for failure to comply with SORA but aff irm his remaining convictions, and remand to correct the judgmen t of sentence and the presente nce investiga tion report.

Defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence pre sented at trial. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. People v Ericksen , 288 Mich App 192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). Viewing th e evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to justif y the jury’s finding that the essential elements of the charged crimes were proven beyond a r easonable doubt. People v Harverson , 291 Mich App 171, 175; 804 NW2d 757 (2010). In making this d etermination, we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecuti on. Ericksen , 288 Mich App at 196. Circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn the refrom constitute satisfactory proof of the crime. People v Carines , 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

MCL 28.729(1) states that, except as otherwise provided, “an i ndividual required to be registered under [the SORA] who willfully violates this act is guilty of a felony . . . .” An individual required to be regis tered under the SORA must report as follows:

(1) An individual required to be registered under this act who is a resident of this state shall report in person and notify the registering authori ty having jurisdiction where his or her residence or domicile is located immediately a fter any of the following occur:

(a) The individual changes or va cates his or her residence or d omicile.-2- * * *

(g) The individual purchases or begins to regularly operate any vehicle, and when ownership or operation of the ve hicle is discontinued. [MCL 28 .725.]

As used in MCL 28.725(1), the term “immediately” means “within 3 business days.” MCL 28.722(g).

Two of defendant’s convictions u nder the SORA were based on hi s failure to report a change in address. The jury h eard testimony that defendant mov ed into a new residence on December 3, 2013, but a certified record of his sex offender re gistration documentation established that he did not repor t his change in address until December 18, 2013. Thus, defendant failed to report his change in address within three b usiness days as required by MCL 28.725(1)(a). Testimony further es tablished that defendant cha nged residences again in late April or early May 2014. None of the witnesses knew the exact date of defendant’s move; however, regardless of whether defendant moved in April or May 2014, defendant did not report his change of address until June 2, 2014. Accordingly, the evi dence was that defendant did not report his change of address “w ithin 3 business days.” MCL 28. 722(g).

Nevertheless, defendant argues that even if the evidence estab lished his failure to report the changes in address in a timely manner, the evidence was ins ufficient to show that he willfully violated the act. We disagree. In People v Lockett (On Rehearing) , 253 Mich App 651, 655; 659 NW2d 681 (2002), this Court found that the district court did n ot err in concluding that the term “willfully” “requires something less than specific intent, but requires a knowing exercise of choice.” The defendant in Lockett knew that he was required to update his address when he moved, but he failed to do so. Id. at 655-656. Similarly here, the prosecutor entered into evidence a form that defendant signed that explained his report ing requirements when he changed or vacated a residence. Additionally, defendant’s cert ified sex offender registration records showed that he had reported a change in address more th an 20 times since he was first required to register in 1999. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, Harverson , 291 Mich App at 175, we find that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant willfully violated the SORA by failing to report his changes in address.

Defendant’s remaining conviction for violating the SORA was pr emised on his failure to report his vehicle information under MCL 28.725(1)(g). This re porting requirement was added by 2011 PA 17 and took effect on July 1, 2011. Plaintiff conce des on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain this conviction because there was n o evidence presented to show that defendant purchased or began to regularly operate any vehicle after this reporting requirement went into effect. Before that time, defendant was not required by statute to report when he purchased or began to operate a vehicle. See MCL 28.725, as am ended by 2006 PA 402. While there was evidence that defendant owned and operated a vehicle after 2011, defendant testified that he acquired the vehicle in 2005. Accordingly, we agree wi th plaintiff and vacate defendant’s conviction for faili ng to comply with the SORA on t his basis.

Lastly, defendant argues that the verdict was against the grea t weight of the evidence. Because defendant did not preserve this argument by moving for a new trial, People v Winters

, 225 Mich App 718, 729; 571 NW2d 764 (1997), we review defendant ’s claim for plain error-3- affecting his substantial rights, People v Brantley , 296 Mich App 546, 553; 823 NW2d 290 (2012).

A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence when the evidence so heavily preponderates against the verdic t that a serious miscarriage of justice would result if a new trial is not granted. Id . Generally, a verdict may only be vacated when it is not reas onably supported by the evidence, and it “is more likely attributable to factors outside the record, such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or other extraneous considerations.” People v Plummer , 229 Mich App 293, 306; 581 NW2d 753 (1998). “[C]onflicting testimony or que stions concerning the credibility of the witnesses ar e not sufficient grounds for gra nting a new trial,” Brantley , 296 Mich App at 553, because it is th e role of the fact-finder to d etermine questions of fact and assess credibility, People v Lemmon , 456 Mich 625, 637; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Questions regarding credibility are not s ufficient grounds for relief unl ess the “testimony contradicts indisputable facts or laws”; the testimony is “patently incredi ble or defies physical realities”; the testimony is “material and . . . so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror”; or the testimony “has been seriously impeach ed and the case is marked by uncertainties and discrepancies.” Id. at 643-644 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Defendant fails to establish th at the evidence presented at tr ial preponderated so heavily against the verdict such that a miscarriage of justice would re sult if he were not afforded a new trial. Although defendant claims that no witness established t hat he failed to timely register his address changes under the SORA, th e record refutes his claim. Several witnesses testified about the dates or time frame that defendant moved in and out of his different residences. When one compares those dates with the certified record of defendant’s s ex offender registration, it is evident that he had failed to re port his address changes within the requisite three-day time period. Defendant fails to point to any testimony that contradicted ind isputable facts, was patently incredible, or was inherently implausible. Id. Therefore, the evidence submitted to the jury did not preponderate heavil y against the verdic t such that a miscar riage of justice would result if defendant were not granted a new trial. See Brantley , 296 Mich App at 553.

We vacate defendant’s convicti on for failing to report his veh icle information under MCL 28.725(1)(g); we affirm defendant ’s other convictions. We rema nd to the trial court to correct the judgment of sentence and pres entence investigation report. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto /s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher