### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of: the Parentage of E.Z., a minor child. No

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- I DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION

D ÍAZ , J.

— Appellant , the mother, appeals a court’s decision, following trial, to grant a petition to place her child permanently in Texas with respondent , the father

. 1 The mother argues that the trial court improperly based its decision on what she argues was essentially a short

- term medical emergency , and that the court improperly relied on the temporary parenting plan in forming its permanent parenting plan. Further, she argues the tri al court erred in placing RCW 26.09.191 restrictions on her but not on the father

. Finding no error of law and concluding that substantial evidence support s the court’s decision, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND The mother and the father are parents of a now six

- year - old boy , E.Z. , born in May 2017. 2 On March 22, 2019, the trial court issued a f inal p arentage p lan ,

1 T o protect the privacy of E.Z., we refer to his mother as “the mother” and to his father as “the father .” 2 The mother originally believed another person was the father of E.Z., but a paternity test clarified that that person was not the father and the father’s paternity was confirmed in February 2019.No. 82745

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2 ordering that the mother had custody of E.Z. , and a c hild s upport o rder, ordering the father to pay child support to the mother

. The court did not approve a p arenting
p lan or residential schedule at that time because neither parent had requested

one. E.Z. lived with the mother in Washington State from his birth until Child Protective Services (CPS) intermitte nt ly placed him with the father in Texa s , beginning in December 2019 , because she experienced episodes of psychosis three or four times from November 2019 to July 2020 , in the following ways

. In November 2019, the mother took E.Z. to a 13 Coins restaurant in the middle of the night. While there, the mother met a man she did not know, took E.Z. to his house , consumed alcohol and marijuana , and stayed the night there with the child . She then refused to leave and was arrest ed for trespassing the next morning (“13 Coins Episode ”)

. She was admitted to Evergreen Hospital overnight on an involuntary commitment due to continued erratic behavior. CPS placed E.Z. in the temporary care of the mother ’s sister

. The 13 Coins Episode was the beginning of a manic episode that then lasted up through a second hospitalization o n December 2, 2019 , during which time she was disconnected from reality. On that date, the mother was admitted on an involuntary basis to Fairfax Behavioral Health for 36 hours, after police receiv ed several reports of child endangerment, involv ing allegations that the mother madeNo. 82745

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3 threats to kill her sister and herself (“Fairfax Episode”) . As before, t here was evidence of psychosis including paranoia and that h er s ymptoms occurred in the context of cannabis use

. E.Z. was placed in the temporary care of relatives. While she was in the hospital , the mother participated in a family meeting , after which it was agreed that E.Z. temporarily would reside with his father in Texas

. On January 1 7 , 2020, the mother filed a motion for a parenting plan and residential schedule, which had been lacking, and an ex parte motion for the father
to return E.Z. to her. On February 20, 2020, the court ordered the father to return E. Z. to the mother , because there was “no evidence of a court order placing” E.Z. with the father , and set up a visiting schedule

. In March and April 2020, the parties continued litigating cross

- motions for temporary and permanent parenting plans. In May 2 020, the court ordered the mother to undergo a full mental health and substance abuse evaluation, where the evaluators would have all necessary records to inform their evaluation. On June 23, 2020, the mother took E.Z. to an active protest zone , known as the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone or CHAZ , where she was found nude at or about 4:00 a.m. after having smoked (perhaps involuntarily) a formaldehyde

soaked cigarette

. Her behavior caused bystanders to be concerned about E.Z.’s safety and they to ok custody of him, despite her violent resistance (“ CHAZ Episode ”)

. T he mother was detained by Seattle P olice for indecent exposure andNo. 82745

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4 involuntarily admitted to Swedish Medical First Hill overnight

. CPS placed E.Z. in temporary foster care , but returned him the next day to the mother

. On or about July 13, 2020, the mother started calling law enforcement to make various “ persecutory ” and “ irrational ” claims about her family and about the father and posting a ggressive social media messages

. She would call police for assistance , t hey would show up , and she would act erratic ally and refuse to let them in the house. On July 18, 2020, the mother was arrested for assault ing her sister and detained involuntarily

. She was admitted to NAVOS for nine days (“NAVOS Episode”)

. CPS again temporarily placed E.Z. with the mother ’s relatives. On July 29, 2020, the father filed motion s for a temporary family law order,

a restraining order , and a parenting plan, asking the court to place E.Z. with him, place RCW 26.09.191 limitations on the mother , and make him the sole decision

maker of E.Z. The father represented that CPS informed him that , if he did not seek an order placing the child in his temporary custody, it would initiate a dependency action in order to protect the child from risk of imminent harm in his mother ’ s custody if/when she is released. In advance of the hearing on the motions, the Family Law CASA agreed with the father and recommended that he be the primary residential parent and sole decision

- mak er, and the mother’s residential time with E.Z. be restricted, perNo. 82745

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5 RCW 26.09.191, because of the mother ’s “history of mental health and substance abuse issues that place the child in potentially dangerous, high risk situations.” On August 13, 2020, the trial court issued a temporary p arenting p lan , which placed E.Z. in the custody and decision

- making authority of the father and limiting the mother ’s time with E.Z., finding that the mother had neglected, abused or threatened to abuse E.Z

. becau se of her behavioral health and substance abuse challenges. The court set for trial the motion for a permanent parenting plan for March 22, 2021. In February 2021, the mother ’s forensic psychological evaluator , Dr. Michael Stanfill , submitted an updated report

. He diagnosed the mother with bipolar disorder, severe with psychotic features, and found that her substance use

was more intense than initially understood

. At trial, he tes tifie d t hat it was difficult for him to say what the long

- term prognosis was for t he mother , but it was important to address those significant risks to help prevent the next episode. The mother further test ifie d that, just before trial, t he mother had follow ed th e last of his recommendation s and joined a bipolar support group , which met once or twice per week. The Family Law CASA submitted an updated report, indicat ing the ongoing

concern that , if E.Z. were placed back in t he mother ’s care, she could relapse due
to untreated triggers. At trial , the CASA reiterated those concerns and made theNo. 82745

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6 same recommendation s for t he father to maintain custody

. This recommendation included the CASA’s finding that there was no record that t he father had domestic violence charges filed against him, despite t he mother ’s claim that he rape d her

. Indeed, t he Bellevue Police Department investigated the rape allegations, but no charges were pursued against t he father

. Following a five

- day trial, the trial court orally ruled , on April 1, 2021, that
t he father would be the p ermanent p rimary residential parent and the sole decision

maker over E.Z

. The court held that since the parentage order was entered on March 22, 2019 , there was a substantial change in t he mother ’ s situation , and the
court conclude d that t he mother ’ s conduct advers ely affected E.Z.’s best interests, and constituted substantial nonperformance of parenting functions. In placing restrictions on t he mother ’s parenting time , t he court specifically recounted the 13 Coins Episode and the CHAZ Episode as the basis for its finding of neglect

. Furthermore, the court found that t he mother has a long

- term emotional impairment which presently interferes with her ability to parent , credit ing the Family Law CASA and Dr. Stanfill ’ s conclusion that t he mother suffers from bipol ar disorder , which , if not managed properly, could continue to impact her parenting

. The court also found that t he mother has a “heavy” substance abuse problem , which interferes with her ability to exercise appropriate judgment regarding the child's welfare , again crediting the Family Law CASA and Dr. Stanfill.No. 82745

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7 The court entered its orders, findings, and p arenting p lan on April 16, 2021. The mother timely filed a m otion for r econsideration , which the court denied

. The mother now appeals both ruli ngs. The father filed no brief in opposition. II. ANALYSIS The mother challenges each of the seven substantive decision s the trial court made in its final parenting plan

. However, she does not present substantive argument on each. Instead, t he mother argues fully only three to four of the seven assignments of err or

. 3 Specifically, s he claims that the trial court improperly based its decision on , what she argues was , a short

- term medical emergency , and that the court improperly relied on the temporary parenting plan in forming its permanent parenting plan

. Further, she argues the trial court erred in placing RCW 26.09.191 restrictions on her but not on t he father

. We will address each in turn. A. Standard s of review and Applicable Law Washington “recogn izes the fundamental importance of the parent

- child relationship to the welfare of the child, and that the relationship between the child and each parent should be fostered unless inconsistent with the child's best interests.” RCW 26.09.002.

3 Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument are insufficient to merit ju dicial consideration. Joy v. Dep ’ t of Labor & Indus. ,170 Wn. App. 614, 629, 285 P.3d 187 (2012) . Accordingly, we will consider only the arguments enumerated here.No. 82745

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8 The constru ction of a statute is a matter of law, and the construction given a statute by a trial court is reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Hansen , 81 Wn. App. 494, 498, 914 P.2d 799 (1996). While conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Z ier , 136 Wn. App. 40, 45, 147 P.3d 624 (2006). “Substantial evidence” is evidence sufficient to pers uade a fair

- minded person of the truth of the matter asserted. In re Marriage of Katare , 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012)

.

“ A trial court wields broad discretion when fashioning a permanent parenting plan

. ” I d. On appeal, this court reviews a paren ting plan for abuse of discretion, which “occurs when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” Id. The trial court ’ s findings of fact are treated a s verities on appeal, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. The Parenting Act requires that “the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties’ parental responsibilities.” RCW 26.09.002 (enumerating factors)

. B. Finding of L ong - T erm I mpairment The mother argues that the trial court erred in “ focus [ing] on [t he mother ] ’s mental health diagnosis ,” which she characterizes a s a short

- term medical
emergency , and she argues cann ot be a basis for a custodial parent to lose legal custody . She analogizes her challenges to those in In re Marriage of Thompson ,No. 82745

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9 32 Wn. App. 418, 647 P.2d 1049 (1982) and In re Marriage of Taddeo

- Smith , 127 Wn. App. 400, 110 P.3d 1192 (2005)

. In both cases, the mother

- appellant had temporarily placed the child with the respondent father. Thompson , 32 Wn. App. at 41 9; Taddeo

- Smith , 127 Wn. App. at 402 . In Taddeo

- Smith , the mother suffered a physical injury in a car accident , and asked the fat her “t o look after the children temporarily, while she was hospitalized .” 127 Wn. App. at 40 5

- 06. In both cases, neither party “consented” to a permanent placement. Thompson , 32 Wn. App. at 420 (defining consent as the “ voluntary acquiescence to surrend er of legal custody ”); Taddeo

- Smith , 127 Wn. App. at 40 6

- 07

. The mother argues that, without consent to permanent placement , a short

- term medical emergency cannot justify the court’s decision s

. The crux of the matter here is whether, under the substantial evidence standard, the trial court’s conclusion that t he mother suffers from a “long

- term impairment” is sufficiently founded

. Z ier , 136 Wn. App. at 45. If the conclusion is sufficiently founded, then this matter is faci ally distinguishable from both Thompson and Taddeo

- Smith

. It is an unchallenged verity that b oth the Family Law CASA and Dr. Stanfill concluded that t he mother suffers from severe bipolar disorder with psychotic features , which is a long

- term emotional imp airment, and which has , and if not managed properly w ould continue to , impact her parenting

. Dr. Stanfill alsoNo. 82745

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10 concluded , and t he court also found , that t he mother has a “heavy” substance abuse problem, which has and could continue to interfere with her ability to exercise appropriate judgment regarding E.Z.’s welfare

. Additionally, it is important to highlight that t he mother just had started attending a bipolar support
group very shortly before trial. The mother argues that the court “ relied on inci dents that had occurred nearly ten months prior [to trial] , within a discrete period of eight months. ” In other words, t he mother argues that the court did not focus on the evidence she wished it had. But, on the standard of review applicable here, that is not the inquiry. The inquiry is whether at the time of the court’s orders there was sufficient evidence “ to persuade a fair

- minded person of the truth of the matter asserted. ” Katare , 175 Wn.2d at 35

. On the basis of the clear diagnosis, r esulting behaviors, and uncertain prognosis, th at standard has been met here, even if it may be the case that, with proper and on

- going treatment , which had started shortly before trial , t he mother may be able to manage both of her disorders in the future

. Finally, w e need not reach whether t he mother consented to a permanent change in custody. Ultimately it was in the court’s “broad discretion ” to fashion a parenting plan seeking to achieve “ finality, ” to avoid “ping

- pong” litigation over custody , and to maximiz e “ the stability of a child ’ s environment. ” Katare , 175No. 82745

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11 Wn.2d at 35 ; Thompson , 32 Wn. App. at 422. Stability appropriately was the court’s focus. C. Reliance on Temporary Parenting Plan The mother next assert s that the trial court overly relied on the t emporary parenting p lan , which “o vershadowed ” the b est i nterest s of E.Z. 4 Indeed, RCW 26.09.060(10)(a) provides that a temporary order “ [ d ] oes not prejudice the rights of a party or any child which are to be adjudicated at subsequent hearings in the proceedings.” And, RCW 26.09.191(5) provides that

“ [ i ] n entering a permanent parenting plan, the court shall not draw any presumptions from the pro visions of the temporary parenting.” Finally, “ our legislature has expressed a preference that permanent orders rest on evidence presented at trial unprejudiced by temporary orders .” In re Marriage of Abbess , 23 Wn . App. 2d 479, 488, 516 P.3d 443 (2022)

. “ This is because temporary orders serve a different purpose than permanent orders and are issued based on different criteria and evidentiary standards. ” Id.

4 The mother mentions in passing that the court “premised its designation of the father as primary residential parent based on the temporary parenting plan” and, as such, compels this court to review this particular issue de novo. The mother does not cite to any autho rity for that statement. Where a party fails to provide citation to support a legal argument, we assume counsel, like the court, has found none. State v. Loos , 14 Wn. App. 2d 748, 758, 473 P.3d 1229 (2020) (citing State v. Arredondo , 188 Wn.2d 244, 262, 394 P.3d 348 (2017)).No. 82745

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12 In Abbess , the trial court “ us [ ed ] stale and discredited evidence from a negotiated temporary or der that both parties planned to contest at trial and ultimately deprived [the father] of a meaningful opportunity to litigate equal residential time

. ” Id. The mother argues that the trial court’s following two statements demonstrate the same overreliance on the temporary plan: (1) “ Given that the child has resided primarily with [t he father ] [

. . . ] [t he father ] has necessarily taken greater responsibility for performing parenting functions for the daily needs of the child

. ” 5 And (2) “what I’m doing is changing the parentage order, which was the only thing that previously reflected that the child would live prim arily with [t he mother ] . In fact, the child has not lived primarily with [t he mother ] for some time.” The mother takes b oth statements out of context and the statements , in fact, do not reference the temporary parenting plan. On the contrary , the trial court prefaced these statements by finding that “returning the child primarily to [t he mother ] ’s care would be harmful to the child's physical, mental or emotional health, and it would be better for the child to change the final parentage order to provide the child reside primarily with [t he father ] .” ( E mphasis added)

. In other words, the

5 We accept how the mother chose to paraphrase the court’s remarks , although it is telling that the full statement emphasizes the mother’s “neglect” and the “bonding” that occurred between the father and E.Z. as a result.No. 82745

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13 trial court was clear it was applying the “best interest of the child standard,” required by RCW 26.09.002

. Moreover, t he statement that the child primarily resided wit h t he father and
not t he mother was a mere uncontested factual observation. And, indeed, such a factual observation is an appropriate factor in the fashioning of a permanent residential schedule

. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) (iii) (“ the court shall consider

. . . whether a parent has taken greater responsibility for performing parenting functions relating to the daily needs of the child ”); Thompson , 32 Wn. App. at 421 (“ ‘ While time spent with each parent is not determinative, it is a factor. ’ ”) (quoting In r e Marriage of Timmons , 94 Wn .2d 594, 601, 617 P.2d 1032 (1980) ). In short, we can locate nothing in the record that provided t he father with an “unfair advantage when the permanent parenting plan was entered” because of the previously entered temporary p lan. In re Marriage of Kovacs , 121 Wn.2d 795, 808, 854 P.2d 629 (1993). In turn, there was no error. D. RCW 26.09.191 Restrictions Finally, t he mother argue s that the trial court erred in placing RCW 26.09.191 restrictions on her but not on t he father

. RCW 26.09.191 bars a trial court from precluding or limiting any provision of the parenting plan “unless the evidence shows that ‘[a] parent’s

. . . conduct may have an adverse effect on the child’s best interest.’” In re Marriage of Chandola ,No. 82745

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14 180 Wn .2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (20 14) (quoting RCW 26.09.191(3) ) (alteration in o riginal)

. “[E] vidence of actual damage is not required ” before imposing restrictions under RCW 26.09.191(3) , and a court may impose restrictions where substantial evidence shows “that a danger of

. . . damage exists.” In re Marriage of Burrill , 113 Wn. App. 863, 872, 56 P.3d 993 (2002)) (analyzing RCW 26.09.191(3) (e))

. The mother first claim s that there was “ no evidence ” proffered that E.Z. actually “ experienced physical, mental, or emotional harm or that the danger of damage currently continues to exist. ” 6
This is a significant overstatement. As test ifie d to by the Family Law CASA, CPS placed E.Z. temporarily with at least four different family members or friends between November 2019 and July 2020, and E.Z. underwent a short stint at temporary foster care

. The CASA further recommended that t he mother ’s residential time with E.Z. should be restricted per RCW 26.09.191 , because of t he

6 The mother mentions in passing that the court’s decision to place “ .191 restrictions upon the mother for her disability based on its interpretation of the statute ” compels this court to review this particular issue de novo. The mother does not explain how the trial court “premised” that decision on an interpretation of RCW 26.09.191 . Neither the oral nor the written ruling delineated any interpretation of RCW 26.09.191(3) which the mother argues is error. The court is not required to search the record to locate th e portions relevant to a litigant ’ s arguments. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley ,118 Wn.2d 801, 819, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). Thus , we will not consider this issue on that standard of review.No. 82745

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15 mother ’s “history of mental health and substance abuse issues that place the child in potentially dangerous, high risk situations.” Without repeating all the fact s reviewed above , these “high risk situations” included being in the apartment of a strange man while his caretaker ( t he mother )

wa s drugged and belligerent (the 13 Coins Episode) and the CHAZ E pisode, where bystanders were so concerned about E.Z.’s safety that they tried to take him away from t he mother

. When we combine this evidence with the substantial evidence that t he mother suffers from “long

- term impairment, ” we conclude a fair

- minded person can be persuaded that returning E.Z. primarily to t he mother ’ s care , at a minimum,

“ may have an adverse effect on the child's best interests

. ” RCW 26.09.191(3) (emphasis added). Additi onally, t he mother argue s that the court should have applied RCW 26.09.191 against t he father because he engaged in “d omestic v iolence ” and in the “abusive use of conflict.” As to the former allegations , t he mother again points to evidence that she wishes the trial court had credited more fully. Again , that is not the standard. The inquiry is whether at the time of the court’s orders there was sufficient evidence “ to persuade a fair

- minded person of the truth of t he matter asserted. ” Katare , 175 Wn.2d at 35

. Here, the CASA test ifie d that a search of the relevant databasesNo. 82745

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16 revealed that, while t he mother had accused t he father of rape, there was no record of any law enforcement agency charging t he father with rap e, even after conducting some investigation

. There was no court or any tribunal that substantiated that allegation. Finally, there was testimony that the rape allegation occurred only after E.Z. was placed with his father, as a means to ensure his return. Based on this standard of review, the trial court had ample evidence to not impose restrictions against t he father for domestic violence

. As to the latter allegations , t he mother also accused t he father of both demeaning her and “ weaponizing ” her mental health issues during the trial

. She claims that t he trial court “ completely ignored any evidence in support of [t he father ] engaging in such conflict .” Tellingly, t he mother provides no case law to support her claims that a party’s statements made during trial could constitute an abusive use of conflict. Where a party fails to provide citation to support a legal argument, we assume counsel, like the court, has found none. State v. Loos , 14 Wn. App. 2d 748, 758, 473 P.3d 1229 (2020) (citing S tate v. Arredondo , 188 Wn.2d 244, 262, 394 P.3d 348 (2017)). Having reached only those assignments of error fully argued, we need not reach the subsequent issues that depend on them (an order to pay child support and her attorney fees ), or those that were insufficiently argued

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17 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final parenting plan and denial of t he mother ’s motion for reconsideration

.

WE CONCUR: