In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-3137

HENRY FIORENTINI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

a Massachusetts Corporation, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:15–cv–03292 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 11, 2018 — DECIDED JUNE 21, 2018

____________________

Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Henry Fiorentini is the owner and 

president of Panatech, Inc., a small technology company. 

When cancer treatment left him unable to perform his job, he 

received total disability benefits under a policy he held with 

the Paul Revere Life Insurance Company. Five years later, 

after Fiorentini was back at work and exercising full control 

of the company, Paul Revere notified him that he no longer 
2 No. 17-3137

qualified for the benefits. Fiorentini argued that he still satisfied the policy’s requirements for total disability, because 

even though he could perform most of his job duties, he was 

unable to do what it takes to generate new business. Paul 

Revere rejected that argument, and Fiorentini sued it for 

breach of contract. We agree with the district court that 

Fiorentini does not qualify for total disability coverage under his policy.

I.

In 1982, Henry Fiorentini founded Panatech Computer 

Management, Inc., a small information-technology company 

that specializes in providing customized software to small 

businesses. In 1998, he was diagnosed with invasive basal 

cell carcinoma of the right ear. After minor surgeries failed to 

remove the cancer, Fiorentini had his right ear amputated in 

2008. Several more surgeries and radiation followed, leaving 

him with permanent hearing loss, fatigue, migraines, dry 

mouth, tinnitus (a constant ringing sound), and an inability 

to localize sound. To compensate for the amputation, Fiorentini received a prosthetic ear that is virtually indistinguishable from his left ear.

After the surgery, Fiorentini submitted a claim for “total 

disability” benefits under an occupational disability insurance policy he had purchased from the Paul Revere Life Insurance Company. The policy defines the key terms for total 

disability coverage as follows:

“Total Disability” means that because of Injury or Sickness ... You are unable to perform the important duties 

of Your Occupation. 

“Your Occupation” means the occupation in which You 

are regularly engaged at the time You become Disabled. 
No. 17-3137 3

Fiorentini listed his occupation as “President & Owner” of 

Panatech and said that his occupation entailed four “important duties”: sales (6–8 hours per week), consulting/meetings (7–10 hours per week), programming (15–25 

hours per week), and administrative work (2–3 hours per 

week). Concluding that Fiorentini was unable to perform 

these duties, Paul Revere approved his claim and began paying total disability benefits in February 2009. 

Five years later, Paul Revere notified Fiorentini that he 

no longer met the total disability requirements of his policy. 

He had been cancer-free since 2009 and was working regularly again. He continued to suffer side effects from the surgery and worked fewer hours than he had before. Nonetheless, he was now well enough that he was exercising full 

control over Panatech.

While it found him ineligible for total disability benefits, 

Paul Revere invited Fiorentini to apply for “residual disability” benefits under his policy. Coverage under that provision 

would have required Fiorentini to show that he was either 

unable to perform “one or more of the important duties” of 

his occupation or could only perform his important job duties for “80% of the time normally required to perform 

them” and that he earned at least 20% less than he did predisability. Fiorentini did not submit that information; instead, he let his policy lapse and sued Paul Revere, seeking

damages for breach of contract, statutory penalties for unreasonable and vexatious conduct under Illinois law, and a 

declaratory judgment. The district court entered summary 

judgment for Paul Revere.
4 No. 17-3137

II.

Fiorentini argues vigorously that the “total disability” 

clause covers him even though he can still do almost everything his occupation requires him to do. He does not dispute 

that he is able to perform three of the important duties listed 

on his claim for total disability benefits: consulting with clients, programming, and administrative duties. His claim 

turns on his alleged inability to perform the fourth, which he 

characterizes as essential: sales. Ever since Fiorentini’s surgery, Panatech has survived exclusively on work from its existing clients. Fiorentini says that he is the only one who can 

bring in new clients, and that he can do so only by meeting

personally with prospects, giving presentations, and attending seminars. That kind of face-to-face contact is allegedly 

impossible for him because of his continuing symptoms, including tinnitus and fatigue. He dismisses the suggestion 

that he could solicit new business through phone calls, 

emails, the internet, or a marketing company; for his small 

business, he says, only in-person contact will do.

Fiorentini’s claim that his inability to execute one task 

renders him “unable to perform the important duties of [his] 

Occupation” seizes upon an opening in our case law. While

we have refused to hold that the inability “to perform one 

task is always sufficient for total disability,” Cheney v. Standard Life Insurance Co., 831 F.3d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 2016), we 

have acknowledged that the inability to perform one task 

might sometimes qualify under similarly worded policies. 

For example, in McFarland v. General American Life Insurance

Co., we noted that a shortstop who could no longer throw 

would be unable to do his job even if he could still run, hit, 

and catch. 149 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016). Fiorentini asserts 
No. 17-3137 5

that in-person solicitation is to him what throwing is to a 

shortstop—utterly essential. And because he can’t sell, he 

can’t do his job even if he can program, consult with existing 

clients, and do administrative tasks.

Fiorentini’s analogy is inapt. A shortstop who can’t throw 

can’t be a shortstop; Fiorentini, on the other hand, functions 

daily as Panatech’s president. While his capacity as Panatech’s president has been diminished by his inability to perform one of his important duties, he is not unable to continue his occupation. And critically, the total disability provision does not cover the insured who has a diminished ability

to perform his occupation, but rather the insured who is unable to continue it. See McFarland, 149 F.3d at 587 (interpreting a similar total disability policy to “protect[] the insured

from disabilities that prevent his continuing in his regular 

occupation”). The unambiguous language of an insurance 

policy controls in a coverage dispute. See Founders Ins. Co. v. 

Munoz, 930 N.E.2d 999, 1003–04 (Ill. 2010).

Fiorentini’s ineligibility for benefits under the total disability provision of the policy is underscored by the policy’s 

provision for residual disability benefits. Fiorentini says that 

he cannot perform one of his four important duties; the residual disability provision applies when “You are unable to 

perform one or more of the important duties of Your Occupation.” This is the clause that fits a claim like Fiorentini’s. It 

protects an insured whose disability has reduced but not 

eliminated his capacity to work, so long as he is earning at 

least 20% less as a result.

All of this said, we would affirm the district court even if 

we agreed with Fiorentini that making sales is essential to 

his occupation—and, for that matter, that face-to-face contact 
6 No. 17-3137

is the only way he can do it. Even if the language of the policy were on his side, Fiorentini has a problem of proof: the 

evidence would not permit a reasonable juror to conclude

that he is unable to meet with potential clients in person.

Fiorentini’s own testimony contradicts his claim that he is

unable to make face-to-face sales pitches. He admits that he 

meets regularly with existing clients at their businesses or 

over lunch; he also visits job sites weekly to discuss and address computer problems. Fiorentini offers no explanation 

for why he can meet with existing clients but not potential 

clients. Indeed, his own vocational expert conceded that he 

is currently able to conduct face-to-face meetings on a “limited basis,” and his own surgeon confirmed that he can 

“hear and communicate” in one-on-one meetings.

Fiorentini’s off-the-job activities also undercut his contention that his symptoms render him mentally and physically 

unable to meet personally with potential clients. In 2013, 

Fiorentini renewed his pilot’s license—which he had originally obtained in the 1980s but had permitted to lapse—and 

bought an airplane. He spends 75–80 hours a year flying 

around the Midwest, primarily to have breakfast with other 

recreational pilots. And while Fiorentini claims that he can’t 

put on work-related presentations to sell Panatech’s product, 

he conducted a 90-minute seminar for other flying enthusiasts about an iPad application called ForeFlight. Nor is flying Fiorentini’s only hobby. Just as his symptoms have not 

kept him out of the air, they have not kept him off the ice: 

Fiorentini plays in a weekly adult hockey league. 

To be sure, the record supports the inference that Fiorentini cannot discharge his duties as Panatech’s president in 

precisely the same manner as he did before. The ongoing ef-
No. 17-3137 7

fects of his surgery—hearing loss, tinnitus, migraines, and 

difficulty localizing sound—have had an adverse impact on 

his daily functioning. But as we have already said, a reduced 

capacity to perform job duties is addressed by the policy’s 

“residual disability” provision. Fiorentini chose not to apply 

for those benefits.

III.

Fiorentini bears the burden of proving that his loss falls 

within the terms of his insurance policy. St. Michael’s Orthodox Catholic Church v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 496 N.E.2d 

1176, 1179 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). His alleged inability to perform one of his four important job duties—sales—does not. 

Even if it did, and even if we credit the claim that he cannot 

make sales without in-person meetings, the evidence construed most favorably to him would not permit a reasonable 

juror to conclude that he is unable to meet with potential clients face-to-face. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.