Filed 1/12/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

TATIANA ARNOLD,

Real Party in Interest.

 B306519

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA455469)
2

THE PEOPLE,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

RONNIE CASE,

Real Party in Interest.

 B306520

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA455470)

THE PEOPLE,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

KELLY PARK,

Real Party in Interest.

 B306523

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA455469)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of mandate. 

William C. Ryan and Larry Paul Fidler, Judges. Petitions 

denied.
3

Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, John Niedermann and 

Matthew Brown, Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

James & Associates, Becky S. James, Lisa M. Burnett; The 

Kaufman Law Group, Gary Jay Kaufman and Noam Reiffman for 

Real Party in Interest Tatiana Arnold.

Spertus, Landes, & Umhofer, James W. Spertus, Samuel A. 

Josephs and Lindsey M. Hay for Real Party in Interest Ronnie 

Case.

James & Associates, Becky S. James and Lisa M. Burnett 

for Real Party in Interest Kelly Park.

_____________________

Real parties in interest Tatiana Arnold, Kelly Park, and 

Ronnie Case were arraigned on amended complaints on August 1, 

2018 with eight codefendants. The superior court continued the 

preliminary hearing numerous times, with Arnold, Park, and 

Case, out of custody, agreeing to limited time waivers under 

Penal Code1 section 859b. Ultimately, the defendants agreed to 

waive time to August 16, 2019 as a “zero of 90” date, thereby 

agreeing the preliminary hearing would be held no later than 

November 14, 2019. Although Arnold, Park, and Case refused 

further time waivers, the court continued the preliminary 

hearing past November 14, finding good cause based on time 

waivers by their codefendants and a pending motion to disqualify 

the district attorney’s office. The court denied the defendants’ 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
4

motions to dismiss, but the defendants successfully petitioned the 

superior court for a writ of mandate dismissing the complaints.

The People now petition for writs of mandate to compel the 

superior court to vacate its order dismissing the amended 

complaints. Although it is common in the superior courts for 

defendants to enter limited time waivers, agreeing, as here, to 

waive time to a new date as a “zero of 60” or “zero of 90” date, the 

People contend that under section 859b, if a defendant waives 

time beyond the initial 60-day period following arraignment, this 

constitutes a general time waiver, and the defendant loses his or 

her right to demand the preliminary hearing take place by a date 

certain. The People also assert there is a good-cause exception to 

the 60-day time limit allowing a continuance of the preliminary 

hearing to maintain joinder of the codefendants or to enable the 

defendants’ pending motion to disqualify the district attorney’s 

office be heard before the preliminary hearing. Neither 

contention has merit. We conclude section 859b permits a 

defendant to enter a limited waiver of time beyond the initial 60-

day time period by agreeing the preliminary hearing be held by a 

date certain. Absent a further time waiver by the defendant, the 

court may not continue the preliminary hearing beyond the 

agreed-upon date based on a finding of good cause. We deny the 

petitions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Arraignments and Time Waivers

In 2015 the grand jury returned multicount felony 

indictments against Arnold, Park, Case, and other defendants. 

On March 16, 2017 the People voluntarily dismissed the 
5

indictments and filed criminal complaints against Arnold and 

Park (Super. Ct. No. BA455469) and Case (Super. Ct. 

No. BA455470). After multiple amendments, on July 12, 2017 

the People filed a third amended complaint against Arnold and 

Park and a second amended complaint against Case. Arnold, 

Park, and Case have been out of custody since before the filing of 

the criminal complaints.

Following the sustaining of demurrers to multiple counts in 

both cases, on October 31, 2017 the People refiled the cases under 

case Nos. BA462349 (Arnold and Park) and BA455470 (Case). 

On the same day, Arnold, Park, and Case agreed to waive time 

for the arraignment to be held on February 16, 2018 and for the 

preliminary hearing to be held within 90 days of the 

arraignment.

On February 1, 2018 codefendant Paul Turley filed a 

motion to dismiss on behalf of all joining defendants, alleging the 

prosecution viewed legal documents seized from a storage unit in 

violation of defendants’ attorney-client privilege. The motion 

requested dismissal of all joining defendants or disqualification of 

the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office under section 

1424. Arnold and Park joined in Turley’s motion.2

2 Case appears to have signed on to a separate joinder in 

Turley’s motion to dismiss filed by codefendant Leticia Lemus 

Alvarez, but Case later claimed he did not join the motion. We 

need not resolve whether Case joined the motion to dismiss for 

purposes of this proceeding.
6

On February 16, 2018 the superior court arraigned Arnold, 

Park, and Case, and each pleaded not guilty to all charges.3 As 

part of a scheduling discussion, the prosecutor requested the 

court hear the People’s pending motion to consolidate the cases 

“prior to [when] the 10 days are up. If the court joins [the cases], 

then [it will be] good cause on one case. After [the cases are]

joined, it’s zero of ninety as to everything.” Turley’s attorney 

responded, “That’s wrong, Your Honor. It would actually be a 

reason to rule against joinder if it actually took away the client’s 

speedy trial rights. There is no law that allows joinder to 

basically gut the speedy trial statute.” The court responded, “Oh, 

but it does . . . . If it’s good cause for one and the case should be 

tried together, then it’s good cause . . . for all whether or not they 

agree to it . . . .” Turley’s attorney replied, “[T]hat rule does not 

apply to [preliminary hearings],” citing Ramos v. Superior Court

(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719 (Ramos). The court continued the 

hearing to February 20.

The court and counsel had a similar discussion on 

February 20, 2018 after Arnold, Park, Case, and other defendants 

declined to agree to a time waiver beyond May 17 (90 days from 

February 16). Turley’s attorney stated, “We are waiving the 60 

days from February 16th such that it expires on May 17th. We’re 

not waiving our 60-day right. We’re extending it.” The court 

responded, “Well, but that’s the same as waiving it.” But the 

court clarified, “You’re only waiving time to a specific date, which 

is May the 17th,” which the court noted was the “last day to 

3 Judge Larry Paul Fidler handled the arraignment and 

subsequent proceedings through denial of Arnold, Case, and 

Park’s joint motion to dismiss. Judge William C. Ryan later 

ruled on the petitions for writ of mandate.
7

proceed to preliminary hearing without a further waiver.” 

Turley’s attorney noted, “And Ramos will apply.” The court 

added, “Well, the bottom line is if you don’t get it within the 

statutory agreed date, you can’t without their agreement, then 

the case is dismissed, that’s what Ramos means. I don’t think we 

have to parse words.”

On August 1, 2018 the court granted the People’s motion to 

consolidate the cases.4 The same day Arnold, Park, and Case 

were arraigned on the consolidated amended complaints5 and 

pleaded not guilty. On August 1, 2018, December 7, 2018, and 

March 15, 2019 Arnold, Park, and Case agreed to waive time for 

the preliminary hearing to be held within 60 days of specified 

dates (setting new “zero of 60” dates), ultimately agreeing the 

preliminary hearing would be held within 60 days of May 17, 

2019.6

4 As relevant here, the court consolidated case No. BA462393 

with case No. BA455470 (Case), and case No. BA462349 with 

case No. BA455469 (Arnold and Park).

5 The consolidated fourth amended complaint filed against 

Arnold and Park alleged conspiracy to commit insurance fraud 

(§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 550, subd. (a)(6)), multiple counts of 

aggravated mayhem (§ 205), mayhem (§ 203), billing fraud (§ 550, 

subd. (a)(5) & (6)), money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)), patient 

referral fraud (§ 549; Lab. Code, § 3215), and tax fraud (Rev. &

Tax. Code, §§ 19705, subd. (a), 19706). The consolidated third 

amended complaint filed against Case alleged multiple counts of 

billing fraud (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (a)(5) & (6)) and patient 

referral fraud (§ 549).

6 On August 1, 2018 and March 15, 2019 the attorneys 

waived time on behalf of the defendants, and after an inquiry by 

the court, none of the defendants objected to the time waivers.
8

On May 17, 2019 the court again continued the preliminary 

hearing and inquired whether the defendants agreed to waive 

time for the preliminary hearing to be held within 90 days of 

August 16, “[u]nderstanding that they’re waiving and giving up 

their right to an earlier preliminary hearing date.” Arnold, Park, 

and Case personally agreed to waive time.

On August 16, 2019 the court continued the preliminary 

hearing to December 6, 2019 as a “zero of 90” date, such that the 

preliminary hearing would take place within 90 days of 

December 6. But Arnold, Park, and Case declined to waive time. 

The court made a finding of good cause, explaining “the case 

should remain joined together and good cause for one is good 

cause for anyone who is not waiving.”

B. Arnold, Park, and Case’s Joint Motion To Dismiss

On November 19, 2019 Arnold, Park, and Case filed a joint 

motion to dismiss under section 859b, arguing the statute 

mandated dismissal because the preliminary hearing was 

continued for longer than 60 days from their arraignments 

without their personal waiver because they had only agreed to a 

continuance to November 14, 2019 (90 days after August 16, 

2019). The People filed an opposition, arguing that once a 

defendant waives time past the initial 60-day period, he or she 

loses the right to demand the preliminary hearing take place 

within 60 days.

At the hearing on the motion, Case’s attorney argued the 

Court of Appeal in Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 719

On December 7, 2018 Arnold and Case personally waived time; 

Park’s attorney waived time on behalf of Park, who was not 

present, pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b).
9

interpreted section 859b to impose a 60-day “outer limit” by 

which the People have to commence the preliminary hearing, 

with no exception for good cause, and Case agreed to set the limit 

at November 14, 2019 by entering a waiver to August 16 as date 

“zero of 90.” He added, “[T]he record is clear that every single 

time we’ve been in court going through the colloquy with the 

court of entering a limited specific waiver that we’ve done so and 

especially have done so up to the date of . . . August 16 when we 

entered into a zero of 90 waiver.” Arnold and Park joined in 

Case’s arguments.

The superior court denied the joint motion to dismiss. The 

court found good cause as to Arnold and Park based on their 

joinder in the motion to dismiss for violation of the attorneyclient privilege because the preliminary hearing would become a 

“nullity” if the court later granted the motion. As to Case, who 

argued he did not join the motion to dismiss, the court reasoned 

“good cause for one is good cause for all,” and it found once Case 

waived time beyond the initial 60-day period, he was subject to 

the good cause provisions for a continuance under section 1050.1.

C. Case’s and Arnold and Park’s Petitions for Writs of 

Mandate in the Superior Court

On January 14, 2020 Case filed a petition for a writ of 

mandate in the superior court, seeking to set aside the court’s 

order denying the motion to dismiss under section 859b. On 

January 22 Arnold and Park jointly filed a similar petition. The 

three defendants again argued section 859b required dismissal 

because the preliminary hearing had not been conducted within 

60 days of their arraignments and pleas, section 859b did not 

provide a good cause exception to the 60-day requirement, and 
10

their limited waivers beyond the initial 60 days had expired on 

November 14, 2019.

On May 19, 2020 the superior court granted the petitions. 

The court found that under Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 

“section 1050.1’s usual ‘good cause for one is good cause for all’ 

provisions no longer apply when outside the 60 days even when 

one defendant does wish to waive time. This is because after the 

60 days, the personal ‘waiver requirement is absolute.’” Relying 

on our opinion in Garcia v. Superior Court (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 

631 (Garcia), the superior court concluded Arnold’s, Case’s, and 

Park’s time waivers were “limited time waivers to dates certain” 

the last of which “ma[de] November 14, 2019, day 90 of 90 for 

purposes of the preliminary hearing without a further waiver.”

On July 8, 2020 the People filed three petitions for writs of 

mandate directing the superior court to vacate its May 19, 2020 

orders granting Arnold’s, Park’s, and Case’s petitions. After 

receiving supplemental briefing, on August 26, 2020 we issued 

orders to show cause why relief should not be granted. Arnold, 

Park, and Case each filed a return, and the People filed a reply as 

to each defendant.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“We review questions of statutory construction de novo. 

Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the 

Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose.’” 

(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources 

Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041; accord, Akopyan v. 

Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1098.) “‘We first 
11

examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and 

commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in 

isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a 

whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to 

harmonize the various parts of the enactment.’” (Jarman v. HCR 

ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381; accord, California 

Building, at p. 1041.) “‘“If the statutory language permits more 

than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other 

aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public 

policy.”’” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 

608, 616-617; accord, People v. Smith (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 798

[“‘[T]he court may consider the impact of an interpretation on 

public policy, for “[w]here uncertainty exists consideration should 

be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular 

interpretation.”’”].)7

7 “[S]ection 871.6 specifically authorizes a petition for writ of 

mandate/prohibition in the superior court ‘[i]f in a felony case the 

magistrate sets the preliminary examination beyond the time 

specified in Section 859b, in violation of Section 859b, or 

continues the preliminary hearing without good cause and good 

cause is required by law for such a continuance.’ The statute also 

contemplates that the parties may ‘seek review in a court of 

appeal’ after the superior court rules. (§ 871.6.)” (Bullock v. 

Superior Court (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 134, 148-149.) Case 

contends writ relief is not appropriate, arguing the People will 

not suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted. However, 

“‘our issuance of the order to show cause determined, in effect, 

that petitioners’ remedy at law was inadequate [citation], thus 

making writ review proper.’” (Akopyan v. Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1099, fn. 4; accord, 

Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 476-477.)
12

B. Section 859b Required Dismissal of the Amended 

Complaints Against Arnold, Park, and Case

1. Section 859b

Section 859b governs the time limits for conducting a 

preliminary hearing and the consequences of failure to comply 

with those limits. (People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 866; 

Garcia, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 648.) The statute is 

“‘supplementary to and a construction of the constitutional right 

to a speedy trial.’” (Standish, at p. 870; accord, Garcia, at p. 648.) 

Section 859b has three primary components. First, “[b]oth the 

defendant and the [P]eople have the right to a preliminary 

examination at the earliest possible time, and unless both waive 

that right or good cause for a continuance is found as provided for 

in Section 1050, the preliminary examination shall be held within 

10 court days of the date the defendant is arraigned or pleads, 

whichever occurs later, or within 10 court days of the date 

criminal proceedings are reinstated [following a mental 

competency determination].” (§ 859b.) Second, “whenever the 

defendant is in custody for 10 or more court days on the pending 

complaint, ‘the magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the 

preliminary examination is set or continued beyond 10 court days 

from the time of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of 

criminal proceedings’ unless (a) ‘[t]he defendant personally 

waives his or her right to preliminary examination within the 10 

court days,’ or (b) ‘[t]he prosecution establishes good cause for a 

continuance beyond the 10-court-day period.’” (Garcia, at p. 644, 

quoting § 859b.) Third, “[t]he magistrate shall dismiss the 

complaint if the preliminary examination is set or continued 

more than 60 days from the date of the arraignment, plea, or 

reinstatement of criminal proceedings [following a mental 
13

competency determination], unless the defendant personally 

waives his or her right to a preliminary examination within the 

60 days.” (§ 859b.) “Accordingly, ‘the magistrate is required to 

dismiss the complaint if the court fails to adhere to the 

mandatory 10-court-day rule for incarcerated defendants or the 

60-day rule for all defendants.’” (Garcia, at p. 645.)

2. Arnold, Park, and Case did not enter general waivers 

of their right to a timely preliminary hearing

The People contend section 859b does not require dismissal 

because once Arnold, Park, and Case waived their right to a 

preliminary hearing within 60 days from the date of their 

arraignments on the amended complaints, they had no further 

right to demand a preliminary hearing within a new 60-day 

period. Arnold, Park, and Case assert they entered only limited

time waivers, which were always conditioned on having a 

preliminary hearing by a date certain, ultimately by 

November 14, 2019. Defendants have the better argument.

Our opinion in Garcia, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 631, although 

addressing an in-custody defendant’s right to a preliminary 

hearing within 10 days, is instructive. There, at his arraignment 

and plea on the original complaint, defendant Naason Garcia 

agreed to a time waiver of the 10- and 60-day limits under section 

859b. (Garcia, at p. 637.) But when Garcia was rearraigned on 

an amended complaint, he did not provide a time waiver. (Id. at

p. 638.) The court continued the preliminary hearing beyond the 

10-day limit but within the 60-day limit, at which time Garcia 

agreed to waive both the 10- and 60-day limits conditioned on the 

preliminary hearing being held within 30 days of August 23, 2019 

(the “zero of 30” date). (Id. at pp. 638-639.) When the 
14

preliminary hearing was continued to a date after September 23, 

Garcia moved for dismissal under section 859b. (Garcia, at

pp. 640-641.)

We held Garcia’s arraignment on the amended complaint 

was “a new triggering event under section 859b” requiring a 

preliminary hearing within 10 court days, absent good cause or a 

waiver. (Garcia, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 648.) The People 

argued that although Garcia had not waived time at his 

arraignment on the amended complaint, he subsequently waived 

the 10-day time limit. (Id. at p. 651.) We rejected this argument, 

explaining Garcia’s waiver “was not a general waiver of his right 

to a preliminary hearing within the statutory 10-day and 60-day 

periods.”8 (Garcia, at p. 651.) Rather, when a defendant “enter[s]

a specific and limited time waiver in which he agree[s] to 

continue the preliminary hearing to a date on or before” a date 

certain, it “d[oes] not constitute a general waiver of his statutory 

right to a timely preliminary hearing.” (Id. at pp. 651-652; see 

Irving v. Superior Court (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 596, 599 [incustody defendant’s agreement to preliminary hearing date 

outside 10-day period did not waive his right to a timely 

preliminary hearing because defendant conditioned his 

agreement to a later date on his stated assumption he was not 

waiving time, and therefore his waiver “was based upon a 

condition which was not met and could therefore not operate as a 

valid waiver”].)

8 In Garcia, although more than 10 court days passed 

between the defendant’s arraignment on the amended complaint 

and entry of his limited time waiver, we “assum[ed], without 

deciding, that a defendant may retroactively waive time under 

section 859b.” (Garcia, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 651.)
15

Here, as in Garcia, Arnold, Park, and Case entered specific 

and limited time waivers in which they agreed to continue the 

preliminary hearing on the condition the hearing occur on or 

before a date certain, ultimately, November 14, 2019—90 days 

from August 16, 2019.9 We discern no material difference in the 

text of section 859b as it pertains to waiver of the 10-court-day 

limit addressed in Garcia and the 60-day limit. Section 859b 

mandates a preliminary hearing be held within 60 days unless a 

defendant “personally waives” his or her right, just as it 

mandates a preliminary hearing within 10 court days for an incustody defendant unless the defendant “personally waives” his 

or her right (or the prosecution shows good cause). “[W]ords or 

phrases given a particular meaning in one part of a statute must 

be given the same meaning in other parts of the statute . . . .”

(Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979; accord, People v. 

Santa Ana (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1142 [“‘[I]t is . . .

“generally presumed that when a word is used in a particular 

sense in one part of a statute, it is intended to have the same

meaning if it appears in another part of the same statute.”’”].) 

We therefore interpret the phrase “personally waives” in section 

859b as we did in Garcia to authorize a defendant to enter a 

specific and limited waiver of his or her right to a preliminary 

hearing within 60 days of the arraignment or plea.

The People contend “the 10-day right is gone once it is 

waived,” relying on People v. Alvarez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 567, 

9 The People do not dispute that under Garcia the 

arraignment of Arnold, Park, and Case on the amended 

complaints was “a new triggering event under section 859b” 

requiring a preliminary hearing within 10 court days absent good 

cause or a new waiver. (Garcia, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 648.)
16

570 (Alvarez) and People v. Love (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 276, 283 

(Love), and therefore the right to a preliminary hearing within 60 

days is similarly lost once waived. Alvarez and Love are 

distinguishable in that both involved general time waivers. In 

Alvarez, the defendant waived his right to commencement of the 

preliminary hearing within 10 court days. (Alvarez, at p. 570.) 

The magistrate twice continued the hearing to a date within the 

60-day period, but the defendant did not enter a further waiver. 

(Id. at pp. 570-571.) The Court of Appeal concluded that once the 

defendant waived his right to commencement of the preliminary 

hearing within 10 court days of his arraignment, that right was 

waived for all purposes. (Id. at pp. 572-573.) Thus, the 

magistrate had authority to continue the preliminary hearing

beyond the 10-day limit without a new waiver, provided the 

matter was not continued beyond the 60-day period without the 

defendant’s further personal waiver. (Id. at p. 572.)10

In Love, the court considered whether an out-of-custody 

defendant who had waived her right to have a preliminary 

hearing within 10 court days and 60 days of her plea was entitled 

to a preliminary hearing within 10 court days of her first 

10 At oral argument the People argued Alvarez involved a 

limited time waiver. It did not. As the Court of Appeal 

explained, the defendant “agreed to waive his right to have his 

preliminary hearing heard within 10 court days of his 

arraignment pursuant to section 859b.” (Alvarez, supra, 

208 Cal.App.3d at p. 570; see id. at p. 570, fn. 2 [“[D]efendant has 

conceded on more than one occasion that he ‘waived his right’ to a 

preliminary examination within 10 court days of his 

arraignment.”].) Although the magistrate later continued the 

preliminary hearing to a specific date, that was not by agreement 

of the defendant. (Id. at p. 571.)
17

appearance in custody after she failed to appear and the court 

issued a bench warrant. (Love, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 281-283.) The Court of Appeal concluded she was not, 

explaining “[t]he Legislature has never codified a provision 

imposing a 10-court-day limit for defendants who, having 

previously waived time, find themselves in custody after a failure 

to appear. Nor has the Legislature created a provision for the 

withdrawal of properly entered waivers.” (Id. at p. 285.) The

Love court contrasted section 859b with section 1382 (the speedy 

trial statute), which the court noted specifically addresses both a 

defendant’s failure to appear and withdrawal of a time waiver. 

(Love, at pp. 285-286.) The court observed the Legislature did not 

insert “similar provisions in section 859b.” (Id. at p. 286.) Unlike 

in Alvarez and Love, Arnold, Park, and Case never entered a 

general waiver of the 60-day time limit following their 

arraignment on the amended complaint. And unlike the 

defendant in Love, Arnold, Park, and Case did not fail to appear.

The People seek to buttress their argument by contrasting

section 1382’s provisions for a general and limited waiver of the 

requirement a defendant be brought to trial within 60 days of 

arraignment on an information or indictment (see § 1382, subd. 

(a)(2)(A) [general waiver], (B) [limited waiver]) with the 

Legislature’s omission in section 859b of any reference to limited 

time waivers continuing the preliminary hearing outside the 60-

day period. The People argue the Legislature therefore must 

have intended not to allow limited time waivers that would 

preserve a defendant’s right to dismissal of a complaint if the 

preliminary hearing is continued beyond an agreed-upon date

outside the 60-day period. As the People point out, under section 

1382, if a defendant does not provide a general waiver of the 60-
18

day limit, the action must be dismissed if the defendant is not 

brought to trial within 60 days of his or her arraignment. (Id., 

subd. (a)(2).) If the defendant enters a general waiver of the 60-

day limit, the court may continue the trial without the sanction of 

dismissal unless the defendant personally withdraws the waiver, 

at which time the case must proceed to trial within 60 days, 

absent good cause shown. (Id., subd. (a)(2)(A).) Alternatively, 

the defendant may agree to the setting of the trial date beyond 

the 60-day period (a limited waiver), in which circumstance the 

case must be brought to trial within 10 days of the specified date

absent good cause shown. (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).)

The People’s argument ignores the legislative history of 

sections 859, subdivision (b), and 1382. Because there is more 

than one reasonable interpretation of section 859, subdivision (b), 

we consider this history. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 616-617.) The Legislature amended 

section 859b in 1980 to require a preliminary hearing be held 

within 60 days of arraignment or plea. (Stats. 1980, ch. 938, § 1.) 

Prior to the amendment, section 859b did not provide for any 

continuances of the preliminary hearing beyond 10 court days 

from the arraignment for an in-custody defendant. (Sen. Com. on 

Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 2383 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended June 26, 1980, p. 2.) Assembly Bill 2383 provided for a 

continuance of the preliminary hearing beyond the 10-day period 

for good cause, but it also added the requirement the preliminary 

hearing be held within 60 days. (Ibid.) As the Senate Judiciary 

Committee bill analysis described the amendment, it “provide[d] 

that the preliminary examination could not, under any 

circumstances, be continued beyond 60 days from date of 

arraignment, unless the defendant personally waived time.” 
19

(Ibid.)11 The legislative history does not show, as suggested by 

the People, any intent to prevent defendants from providing 

limited (or conditional) time waivers while preserving their right 

to demand dismissal of the action if the condition is not met.

Further, at the time of the amendment to section 859b in 

1980, former section 1382 provided only for limited time waivers, 

stating, “The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, 

must order the action to be dismissed in the following cases: 

[¶] . . . [¶] 2. When a defendant is not brought to trial in a 

superior court within 60 days after the finding of the indictment 

or filing of the information . . . ; except that an action shall not be 

dismissed under this subdivision if it is set for trial on a date 

beyond the 60-day period at the request of the defendant or with 

his consent, express or implied, or because of his neglect or 

failure to appear and if the defendant is brought to trial on the 

date so set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” (Stats. 1973, 

ch. 847, § 1, pp. 1513-1514.) There is no reason to assume the 

Legislature intended that section 859b’s 60-day rule would 

operate in a manner different from section 1382 by limiting a 

11 The principal focus of the 1980 amendment was to amend 

the Penal Code to provide that actions may be dismissed in 

specified circumstances by a magistrate, not only a “court,” after

the Supreme Court held in People v. Peters (1978) 21 Cal.3d 749 a 

magistrate is not a court within the meaning of section 1385, 

which allows dismissal of a criminal action in the “furtherance of 

justice.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 2383 

(1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 26, 1980, p. 4.)
20

defendant’s right to dismissal of the complaint only to the first 

60-day period.

12

Further, the relevant language of former section 1382 in 

effect in 1980 was enacted as part of a 1959 amendment that

addressed the Judicial Council’s concern the pre-1959 language 

could prevent a defendant from obtaining dismissal of the action 

where the defendant had requested or agreed to a continuance of 

his or her trial to a date outside the 60-day period. As the 

Judicial Council explained, the new language “will clarify the 

present rule by . . . establishing that dismissal under Section 

1382 may be had even though the defendant has previously 

consented to a delay beyond the statutory period.” (Judicial 

Council of Cal., 17th Biennial Rep. (1959) p. 32; see Owens v. 

Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238, 244 [observing the 

Legislature adopted the Judicial Council’s proposed language to 

amend § 1382 because the pre-1959 language “was unclear as to 

whether an accused who obtained a postponement of his trial to a 

date past the 60-day limit thereby lost forever his statutory

rights to a speedy trial and a dismissal”].)

13 Where a defendant 

12 The principal difference between a defendant’s right to 

dismissal under sections 859b and 1382 is that in the latter case, 

where the defendant provides a limited time waiver to a date 

certain, the People have an additional 10-day grace period in 

which to bring the case to trial. The 10-day grace period was 

added in 1959 at the request of the Judicial Council of California 

to “fix[] 10 days as a reasonable time for trial after expiration of 

the period consented to by the defendant.” (Judicial Council of 

Cal., 17th Biennial Rep., supra, p. 32.)

13 The pre-1959 version of former section 1382 provided, “The 

court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the 
21

has consented to a continuance to a date certain outside the 60-

day period, it would make little sense for the Legislature to 

protect a defendant’s right to dismissal of an action for failure to 

bring the case to trial within 60 days, but not for failure to hold a 

preliminary hearing within 60 days, both of which implicate a 

defendant’s speedy trial rights. (See § 859b [“Both the defendant 

and the people have the right to a preliminary examination at the 

earliest possible time . . . .”]; § 1050, subd. (a) [“The welfare of the 

people of the State of California requires that all proceedings in 

criminal cases shall be set for trial and heard and determined at 

the earliest possible time.”].)

The People’s reliance on the general waiver provision in 

section 1382 also fails. In 1991 former section 1382 was amended 

to allow a defendant to provide a “general waiver of the 60-day 

trial requirement,” under which a defendant may give up his or 

action to be dismissed in the following cases: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . If a 

defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his 

application, is not brought to trial in a superior court within 60 

days after the finding of the indictment, or filing of the 

information . . . .” (Stats. 1951, ch. 1674, § 140, p. 3856.) The

reference to a defendant “whose trial has not been postponed 

upon his application” was removed by the 1959 amendment and 

replaced with the limited waiver language. (Stats. 1959, ch. 

1693, § 3, p. 4093.) In proposing the 1959 amendment, the 

Judicial Council cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in In re 

Lopez (1952) 39 Cal.2d 118, 120, in which the court interpreted 

the former language to mean the defendant’s consent to a 

continuance outside the 60-day period resulted in his loss of the 

right to dismiss the action under section 1382 when the trial was 

later continued over his objection, although he preserved his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial. (See Judicial Council of 

Cal., 17th Biennial Rep., supra, at p. 32.)
22

her right to demand dismissal of the action if not brought to trial 

within 60 days, but the provision allows the defendant later to 

withdraw the waiver. (Stats. 1991, ch. 655, § 3, p. 3016.4.) The

1991 amendment preserved the limited time waiver (Stats. 1991, 

ch. 655, § 3, p. 3017), now found in section 1382, subdivision 

(a)(2)(B).14 Contrary to the People’s assertion, the purpose of the 

1991 amendment was to provide additional flexibility for courts 

and parties by allowing defendants to provide a general time 

waiver that affords more time to prepare for trial than the 10-day 

grace period applicable after a limited time waiver (that is, a full 

60 days from a defendant’s withdrawal of a general time 

waiver).

15 (See, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 

3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 651 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Apr. 8, 1991, p. 2 [“The purpose of this bill is . . . to 

clarify and remedy many of difficulties inherent in existing law 

pertaining to the time period in which defendants are to be 

brought to trial.”]; id. at p. 4 [noting the amendment to § 1382 

was sponsored by the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, 

which asserted the pre-amendment statute “has resulted in mass 

confusion in the Superior Courts and has severely restricted the 

14 As the Senate Judiciary Committee report explains, the 

amendment retains the right of a defendant to be brought to trial 

within 60 calendar days “but allows the setting of a date beyond 

60 days when the defendant requests or expressly/impliedly 

consents to such a date.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis on 

Sen. Bill No. 651 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 8, 1991, 

p. 3.) The 1991 amendment also changed the 10-day grace period 

from 10 calendar days to 10 court days. (Ibid.)

15 Section 1382 was amended several times after 1991, but 

those amendments do not affect our analysis or the result.
23

ability of trial courts to adequately supervise their calendars—

many of which are overwhelmed by pending criminal cases”].) 

Nothing in this history suggests the Legislature somehow 

intended in section 859b to restrict defendants to general time 

waivers.

Certainly section 859b does not contain the complex scheme 

for time waivers applicable to trials under section 1382, but 

neither does it contain former section 1382’s pre-1959 language 

that potentially eliminated a defendant’s right to dismissal of the 

action once he or she agreed to a time waiver outside the initial 

60-day period. Nor does it provide by its terms for a “general 

waiver” of a defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing with 60 

days. We conclude a reasonable reading of section 859b, in light 

of the clear legislative intent behind sections 859b and 1382 to 

protect a defendant’s statutory speedy trial rights, is that section 

859, subdivision (b), allows both general and limited time 

waivers, thereby preserving a defendant’s right to demand the 

preliminary hearing take place within 60 days of arraignment or 

plea, or an agreed-upon date certain. Where a defendant gives a 

limited time waiver conditioned on the preliminary hearing 

occurring by a specified date, if the preliminary hearing is 

continued beyond that date without the defendant’s consent, the 

defendant has not “personally waive[d] his or her right to a 

preliminary examination within the 60 days” because the 

condition of his or her waiver (holding the preliminary hearing by 

a date certain) has not been met. (§ 859b.) Thus, as here, the 

complaint must be dismissed.

The purpose of section 859b—to protect defendants from 

lengthy delays before a finding of probable cause—supports our 

construction of the statute. As the Supreme Court explained in 
24

Stroud v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 952, 964-965, “[T]he 

rule for prompt commencement of the preliminary examination”

is aimed “at ensuring that one does not languish unnecessarily in 

custody, or under the cloud of a criminal complaint, without a 

judicial finding of probable cause.” (Accord, Alvarez, supra, 

208 Cal.App.3d at p. 573 [“For a defendant not in custody, ‘[the]

60-day limit [of section 859b] acts to protect [his or her] right to a 

speedy preliminary examination by insuring . . . that, despite 

good cause for postponement beyond 10 days, the matter cannot 

be postponed indefinitely.’”].) Under the People’s interpretation, 

a defendant would have to demand a preliminary hearing within 

the first 60 days following his or her arraignment or lose the 

right to hold the prosecution to a preliminary hearing by a date 

certain. But there is nothing in section 859b or its legislative 

history that suggests the Legislature intended such a draconian 

rule that would force a defendant to refuse a time waiver at the 

arraignment or forever lose the right to dismissal of the action 

even where the preliminary hearing is serially or indefinitely

delayed. The history of the companion provision in section 1382 

suggests legislative intent to the contrary. Further, the People’s

reading of section 859b would not serve the efficient 

administration of criminal justice because a defendant would 

effectively be prevented from agreeing to a limited continuance to 

allow his or her attorney to prepare for the preliminary hearing

or to accommodate a reasonable request by the prosecution for a 

limited delay. As defense counsel explained at oral argument, 
25

defendants would never waive time if their waiver meant they 

were forever forfeiting their statutory speedy trial rights.16

3. There is no good cause exception to section 859b’s 

requirement a preliminary hearing be held within 60 

days of the defendant’s arraignment or plea

Alternatively, the People contend the court was authorized 

to continue the preliminary hearing for good cause once Arnold, 

Park, and Case entered personal time waivers to maintain the 

joinder of their codefendants under section 1050.1.17 We rejected 

this argument in Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at page 731.

In Ramos, the magistrate granted several continuances of 

the preliminary hearing to a date more than 60 days after the 

arraignment—over the defendant’s objection—at the request of 

her codefendants. (Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 724.) We 

16 A defendant would retain his or her constitutional right to 

a speedy trial, but this right does not provide the same certainty 

that section 859b provides to ensure the preliminary hearing is 

held by a specified date.

17 Section 1050.1 provides, “In any case in which two or more 

defendants are jointly charged in the same complaint, 

indictment, or information, and the court or magistrate, for good 

cause shown, continues the arraignment, preliminary hearing, or 

trial of one or more defendants, the continuance shall, upon 

motion of the prosecuting attorney, constitute good cause to 

continue the remaining defendants’ cases so as to maintain 

joinder. The court or magistrate shall not cause jointly charged 

cases to be severed due to the unavailability or unpreparedness of 

one or more defendants unless it appears to the court or 

magistrate that it will be impossible for all defendants to be 

available and prepared within a reasonable period of time.”
26

concluded the magistrate was not authorized to continue the 

preliminary hearing beyond the 60-day limit prescribed by 

section 859b, regardless of whether good cause supported the 

continuance under section 1050.1, in the absence of a personal 

waiver of the 60-day limit. (Ramos, at pp. 731, 735.) We 

reasoned, “[N]othing in section 1050.1 . . . signals an intent to 

provide a good-cause exception to the strict 60-day rule in section 

859b . . . .” (Ramos, at p. 722; accord, Lacayo v. Superior Court 

(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 396, 400 [“the 60-day rule is absolute and 

there is no good-cause exception to the rule”]; Del Castillo v. 

Superior Court (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1120 [“Although 

section 859b includes a good-cause exception to the 10-court-day 

rule, there is no exception from the 60-day rule, which indicates 

the Legislature did not intend a good-cause exception can apply 

to the 60-day rule.”].)

The People acknowledge the holding of Ramos but argue a 

magistrate may continue the preliminary hearing of a 

nonconsenting defendant under section 1050.1 to maintain 

joinder with codefendants if that nonconsenting defendant has 

previously entered a waiver of the 60-day rule. There is no 

support in the text of section 859b or section 1050.1 for the 

People’s position. Rather, as we observed in Ramos, “the plain 

language of section 859b’s 60-day rule establishes the right to a 

preliminary hearing within 60 days of arraignment is absolute 

absent a defendant’s personal waiver.” (Ramos, supra, 

146 Cal.App.4th at p. 729.) The People have not presented a 

convincing reason for us to reconsider our holding in Ramos, and 

we decline to do so.
27

4. The defendants’ disqualification motion did not toll 

the 60-day time limit

The People alternatively contend, relying on People v. Lind

(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 709, the pending defense motion to 

dismiss or disqualify the district attorney’s office effectively 

prevented the court from conducting the preliminary hearing 

given the possibly tainted prosecutor, thus tolling the 60-day 

period. The People’s reliance on Lind is misplaced. There, a 

defendant filed a motion to disqualify the magistrate, after which 

counsel agreed upon a continuance of the preliminary hearing so 

the motion could be heard. After the court granted the motion to 

disqualify, the defendant moved to set aside the information 

because the preliminary hearing was not held within the 60-day 

limit of section 859b. (Lind, at p. 712.) The trial court granted 

the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeal reversed, 

explaining “a defendant’s motion to disqualify the magistrate for 

cause tolls the time limit for a preliminary hearing.” (Id. at

pp. 711, 714-715; see Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4, subd. (d) [“Except 

as provided in this section, a disqualified judge shall have no 

power to act in any proceeding after his or her disqualification or 

after the filing of a statement of disqualification until the 

question of his or her disqualification has been determined.”].) 

The court reasoned, “It is absurd to construe section 859b to 

mean the 60-day time limit for a preliminary hearing continues 

to run when the magistrate is powerless to conduct the hearing 

because of a motion filed by the defendant.” (Lind, at p. 715.)

The People cite no authority for the proposition a 

defendant’s motion to disqualify the prosecutor’s office under 

section 1424 similarly divests the magistrate of jurisdiction to 

conduct a preliminary hearing. It does not. Rather, the 
28

magistrate has authority to resolve a motion to disqualify the 

district attorney for cause. (See § 1424, subd. (a)(1).) Here, the 

motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office was filed on 

February 1, 2018 and had been pending for over a year when 

Arnold, Park, and Case declined further to waive time. Further, 

the People had 90 days from the time Arnold, Park, and Case 

announced they would no longer waive time in which to obtain a 

hearing on the disqualification motion. Whatever the reason for 

the protracted adjudication of the defense motion, Arnold, Park, 

and Case had a right a timely preliminary hearing regardless of 

whether they joined the disqualification motion. They were 

denied this right.

DISPOSITION

The petitions are denied.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.