J-S05014-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

FREDERICK J. MANGONE, :

:

 Appellant : No. 1270 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 29, 2014,

Court of Common Pleas, Fayette County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-26-CR-0002312-2013 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, SHOGAN and STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2015 

 Frederick J. Mangone (“Mangone”) appeals from the July 29, 2014 

judgment of sentence entered by the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas 

following his conviction by a jury of accidents involving death or personal 

injury (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3742(a)), and his convictions by the trial court of 

improper class of license (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1504), failure to stop and render 

aid (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3744(a)), and failure to notify police of accidental injury 

or death (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3746(a)(1)).1

On appeal, he claims that “the Commonwealth fail[ed] to establish 

that [Mangone] did not leave the scene in order to go for aid for the injured 

person[.]” Mangone’s Brief at 7. It is not clear whether Mangone intended 

 

1

 On July 29, 2014, the trial court sentenced Mangone to one to two years 

of incarceration for accidents involving death or personal injury. The trial 

court imposed no additional penalty on the remaining convictions. 
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to challenge the weight or the sufficiency of the evidence to support one or 

more of his convictions. In his appellate brief, he argues that “the record 

shows that the Commonwealth presented no evidence that [Mangone] was 

not attempting to go for help,” which would suggest a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence. Mangone’s Brief at 11-12. He subsequently 

states, however, that “the jury’s verdict is one that would shock the 

conscience,” and requests a new trial, which suggests a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence. Id. at 12. The scope and standard of review 

included in his appellate brief does not provide any guidance, as it is a 

generic statement of the manner an appellate court reviews a case without 

citation to authority. See Mangone’s Brief at 5. Nor does the prayer for 

relief in the conclusion of the brief provide clarity, as Mangone seeks “an 

arrest of judgment and/or a new trial.” Id. at 13; see Commonwealth v. 

Ruffin, 463 A.2d 1117, 1118 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1983) (stating that the 

appropriate remedy for insufficient evidence to support a conviction is 

dismissal and discharge of the defendant; the remedy for a verdict against 

the weight of the evidence is a new trial). 

 As we have previously explained, weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence are distinct arguments: 

Weight and sufficiency of the evidence are not 

one and the same legal concepts. As our Court has 

summarized in a prior case: Weight of the evidence

and sufficiency of the evidence are discrete 

inquiries[.] In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
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evidence, we must view the evidence presented and 

all reasonable inferences taken therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict 

winner. The test is whether the evidence, thus 

viewed, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt[.] 

A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict 

is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes 

that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict 

but contends, nevertheless, that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence. Whether a new 

trial should be granted on grounds that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to 

the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his 

decision will not be reversed on appeal unless there 

has been an abuse of discretion. The test is not 

whether the court would have decided the case in 

the same way but whether the verdict is so contrary

to the evidence as to make the award of a new trial

imperative so that right may be given another 

opportunity to prevail. 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 799 A.2d 860, 864-65 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(citation omitted). 

Our review of the record reveals that Mangone did not preserve a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence at sentencing or in a post-sentence 

motion, resulting in waiver of this claim. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). We 

therefore treat his issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Further complicating appellate review, however, is Mangone’s failure to 

identify which of his convictions he is attacking. Mangone does not cite to 

any statute or indicate how, if at all, the question of whether he left the 

scene to summon aid for his injured passenger would require reversal of his 
J-S05014-15 

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conviction. He simply states: “In the instant case, the Commonwealth was 

required to prove that [Mangone] did not render aid or leave the appropriate 

information after an accident occurred.” Mangone’s Brief at 10. Although 

we could find waiver of his argument on this basis, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-

(b), we decline to do so. Our research reveals that this contention relates to 

his convictions of accidents involving death or personal injury and failure to 

stop and render aid. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3742(a), 3744(a)-(b).2 Upon 

 

2

 The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code defines accidents involving death or 

personal injury, in relevant part, as follows: 

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident 

resulting in injury or death of any person shall 

immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the 

accident or as close thereto as possible but shall 

then forthwith return to and in every event shall 

remain at the scene of the accident until he has 

fulfilled the requirements of section 3744 (relating to 

duty to give information and render aid). 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3742(a). Section 3744 of the Motor Vehicle Code states, in 

relevant part: 

(a) General rule.--The driver of any vehicle 

involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death 

of any person or damage to any vehicle or other 

property which is driven or attended by any person 

shall give his name, address and the registration 

number of the vehicle he is driving, and shall upon

request exhibit his driver’s license and information 

relating to financial responsibility to any person 

injured in the accident or to the driver or occupant of 

or person attending any vehicle or other property 

damaged in the accident and shall give the 

information and upon request exhibit the license and 

information relating to financial responsibility to any 
J-S05014-15 

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reviewing the record and the law, we find Mangone’s sufficiency claim to be 

without merit and affirm. 

 Appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is de 

novo. Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420 (Pa. 2014). “[O]ur 

scope of review is limited to considering the evidence of record, and all 

reasonable inferences arising therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner.” Id. at 420-21. “The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 718 (Pa. 2014) 

 

police officer at the scene of the accident or who is 

investigating the accident and shall render to any 

person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, 

including the making of arrangements for the 

carrying of the injured person to a physician, 

surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment 

if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if

requested by the injured person. 

(b) Report of accident to police.--In the event 

that none of the persons specified are in condition to 

receive the information to which they otherwise 

would be entitled under subsection (a) and no police 

officer is present, the driver of any vehicle involved 

in the accident after fulfilling all other requirements 

of section 3742 (relating to accidents involving death 

or personal injury) and subsection (a), in so far as 

possible on his part to be performed, shall forthwith 

report the accident to the nearest office of a duly

authorized police department and submit to the 

police department the information specified in 

subsection (a). 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3744(a)-(b). 
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(citation and quotation omitted). “Further, we note that the entire trial 

record is evaluated and all evidence received against the defendant is 

considered, being cognizant that the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, 

or none of the evidence.” Id. It is for the finder of fact to pass upon the 

credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence presented. 

Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 40 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

 The trial court accurately summarized the facts presented at trial, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner: 

On July 18, 2013, Susan Riffle was a passenger 

on a motorcycle being operated by [Mangone]. The 

motorcycle hit some loose gravel and went down and 

Riffle, who sustained numerous injuries as a result of 

the accident, was “Life Flighted.”[] When Riffle saw 

[Mangone] leave the scene of the accident, her belief 

was that he was going for help because she told him

that help was needed. 

Andrew Franko, a first responder, responded to 

the scene and observed a female, who was not in 

good condition, lying on the roadway. Observing 

[Mangone] going towards his motorcycle, Franko 

said to him that “she is hurt. You can’t go nowhere.” 

Franko also advised [Mangone] that he was a first 

responder and could provide help. Nonetheless, 

[Mangone] picked up his motorcycle and left. 

Also providing testimony was Summer Prinkey, a 

first responder who arrived at the accident scene 

with Franko. After the brush truck from the fire 

department arrived, and firemen were helping Riffle, 

Prinkey observed Franko and [Mangone] having a 

disagreement. Although Franko tried to stop 

[Mangone] from leaving the scene of the accident, 

[Mangone] pushed Franko aside and left on his 

motorcycle. 
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When Trooper Adam Sikorski arrived at the scene, 

he immediately tried to find the operator of the 

vehicle and discovered that the operator and his 

motorcycle were not at the scene of the accident. 

Further, the operator of the motorcycle had not left 

any needed information with anyone at the scene. 

Four days later, the [t]rooper found the motorcycle

at issue. On the sixth day after the accident, the

[t]rooper spoke with [Mangone] who admitted that 

he was driving the vehicle[,] [] that Riffle was a 

passenger[,] and that he did not stay at the scene of 

the accident. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/14, at 2-3 (record citations omitted). 

 Our review of the record reveals that apart from Riffle’s unconfirmed 

belief that Mangone left the scene of the accident to secure aid, only 

Mangone testified that he left the scene to “get help.” N.T., 5/6-7/14, at 33, 

82, 86. Mangone’s testimony on this issue was of dubious credibility, 

however, because he further testified that he had “no recollection of what 

happened” because he “was hit so hard” during the accident. Id. at 82. He 

did not remember speaking with Riffle at the scene of the accident and 

stated that he could only testify to what others told him occurred; he had no 

independent recollection because he “was knocked out.” Id. at 84. 

 As stated above, the factfinder passes upon the credibility of witnesses 

and is free to believe all, part or none of the testimony presented. Martin, 

101 A.3d at 718; Melvin, 103 A.3d at 40. Despite Mangone’s testimony to 

the contrary, the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, supports a finding that he did not leave the scene with the 
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intention of summoning aid for Riffle. Rather, the record when so viewed 

reflects that Mangone was the driver of a vehicle that was in an accident 

resulting in his passenger’s serious injury. Although first responders and 

firefighters were present to render aid and informed him that he could not 

leave the scene, he left in violation of section 3742(a) without providing the 

information required by section 3744(a) or reporting the accident to the 

police as required by section 3744(b). See supra n.2. We therefore affirm 

the judgment of sentence. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/6/2015