COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 21, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP2055-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF360

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JAE M. ROBINSON,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Sauk

County: MICHAEL P. SCRENOCK, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard, and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2018AP2055-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jae Robinson appeals a judgment of conviction for 

first-degree intentional homicide and for substantial battery as party to a crime. 

He also appeals the circuit court’s order denying his motion for post-conviction 

relief. Robinson argues that (1) the circuit court erred by admitting other-acts

evidence, (2) his trial counsel was ineffective, and (3) he should receive a new trial 

in the interest of justice. We affirm.

Background

¶2 The charges against Robinson arose from an incident occurring 

around bar time in Baraboo in which Robinson and two friends, Christopher Nash 

and Matthew Harvey, fought two other men, Anthony Inman and A.P. The fight 

occurred near a bar known as “Bumps.” 

¶3 Robinson’s case was tried to a jury. By the close of trial, many of 

the facts were undisputed. Prior to the fight, Inman and A.P. were outside Bumps 

while Robinson and his friends were about a block up the street. Inman and A.P. 

proceeded toward Robinson’s location, and the fight began almost immediately. 

During the fight, Robinson obtained a knife that Inman had been carrying. 

Robinson inflicted multiple stab wounds on Inman, and Inman died at the scene. 

A.P. suffered serious injuries. 

¶4 Who started the fight and why remained in dispute. Robinson 

testified and maintained that he wielded the knife against Inman in self-defense

after Inman ran at him with the knife. 
No. 2018AP2055-CR

3

Discussion

A. Circuit Court’s Admission Of Other-Acts Evidence

¶5 We turn first to Robinson’s argument that the circuit court erred by 

admitting other-acts evidence. “[T]he decision to admit other-acts evidence is 

reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion.” State v. Lock, 2012 WI App 

99, ¶43, 344 Wis. 2d 166, 823 N.W.2d 378. “‘A [trial] court properly exercises its 

discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law, 

and uses a demonstrably rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable 

judge could reach.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoted source omitted). “We 

generally look for reasons to sustain the trial court’s discretionary decisions.” Id.

¶6 In addressing the circuit court’s decision to admit other-acts 

evidence, we follow the three-prong test from State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 

576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). First, we ask whether the evidence is “offered for an 

acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), such as establishing 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident.” Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772. Second, we ask whether the 

evidence is relevant. Id. Finally, we consider whether “the probative value of the 

other acts evidence [is] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence[.] See Wis. 

Stat. § (Rule) 904.03.” Id. at 772-73.

¶7 The other-acts evidence that Robinson argues that the circuit court 

erroneously admitted consisted of: (1) evidence that Robinson verbally harassed a 

man at a Kwik Trip during the hours leading up to the fight, (2) evidence that 

Robinson punched a man in the jaw during the hours leading up to the fight; and 
No. 2018AP2055-CR

4

(3) statements by a witness that Robinson was “on a rampage” on the night of the 

fight. 

¶8 Applying the Sullivan test, we agree with the State that the circuit 

court reasonably concluded that this evidence satisfies the first two prongs of the 

test because it was offered to prove, and relevant to, Robinson’s motive and intent. 

The evidence was confined to events on the night of the fight resulting in Inman’s 

death, and it tended to support the State’s theory that Robinson was looking to get 

into fights that night and started the fight with Inman and A.P. The evidence 

tended to show that Robinson acted with the requisite intent when he killed Inman, 

and it also tended to disprove Robinson’s claim that he acted in self-defense. 

¶9 Robinson argues that there was “no connection” between the otheracts evidence and the fight, but Robinson bases this argument on an incomplete 

characterization of the State’s theory. Robinson points out that the State claimed 

at trial that he and his friends were waiting near Bumps to ambush two men named 

Templin and Schleichert, and that Robinson and his friends mistook Inman and 

A.P. for Templin and Schleichert. However, as noted above, the State also 

asserted more generally that Robinson was looking to get into fights that night. 

The other-acts evidence supported the State’s general assertion and, for that 

matter, it also supported the State’s more specific ambush theory. 

¶10 As to the third prong of the Sullivan test, we conclude that the 

circuit court reasonably determined that Robinson failed to demonstrate that the 

probative value of the other-acts evidence substantially outweighed the danger of 

unfair prejudice. See State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶58, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 

N.W.2d 174. The risk of unfair prejudice was low because the evidence was not 

likely to play on the jury’s sympathies when compared to other relevant, 
No. 2018AP2055-CR

5

admissible evidence that the jury would hear about the details of the homicide. 

That evidence included testimony that Robinson inflicted twenty-six knife wounds 

on Inman, including stab wounds that injured Inman’s lungs, heart, and liver; that 

Robinson suffered no knife wounds other than minor cuts on his fingers; that, 

shortly after he killed Inman, Robinson laughed as he stated that he had “stabbed 

the shit out of him”; and that Robinson later referred to Inman and A.P. as “trailer 

trash” during a conversation with Robinson’s sister in jail. 

B. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

¶11 We turn to Robison’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective. 

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show both that 

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish 

deficient performance, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To establish 

prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Id. at 694. “Whether counsel’s performance satisfies the 

constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law, 

which [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 

Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. 

¶12 Robinson argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

(1) object to additional other-acts evidence, (2) develop a theory that A.P. had a 

motive to fight Robinson, and (3) object to one of the prosecutor’s assertions 

during closing arguments. Robinson does not show ineffective assistance on any 

of these grounds. 
No. 2018AP2055-CR

6

1. Ineffective Assistance—Failure To Object To

Other-Acts Evidence

¶13 Robinson argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to 

additional other-acts evidence, namely, evidence that Robinson harassed two 

women at Bumps earlier on the night of the fight while Robinson and Nash were 

inside Bumps. We reject this argument because such an objection would not have 

had merit. See State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, ¶59, 261 Wis. 2d 633, 660 

N.W.2d 12 (“Trial counsel’s failure to bring a meritless motion does not constitute 

deficient performance.”). 

¶14 Our analysis here is similar to our analysis of the other-acts evidence 

we have already discussed. Robinson’s harassing conduct toward the two women 

was probative of his plan, motive, and intent. It showed his general level of 

belligerence that night. Additionally, along with other contextual evidence the 

jury heard, it explained why Robinson and his friends might have waited outside 

Bumps to ambush Templin and Schleichert. The jury heard that, on the night of 

the fight, around the same time that Robinson was harassing the two women at 

Bumps, Templin and Schleichert were also at Bumps and made their displeasure 

with Robinson clear. Schleichert, who was dating one of the women, nearly had a 

confrontation with Robinson, and Templin repeatedly asked Robinson to leave. 

¶15 In short, without the evidence of Robinson’s conduct toward the two 

women at Bumps, the jury would have lacked a complete picture of why Robinson 

might have returned to Bumps later that night intending to fight Templin and 

Schleichert. Thus, the evidence was highly probative. And, for the reasons 

already discussed, this evidence was unlikely to be unfairly prejudicial when 

considered in the context of other relevant, admissible damaging evidence the jury 

would hear. 
No. 2018AP2055-CR

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2. Ineffective Assistance—Failure To Develop Theory That

A.P. Had Motive

¶16 Robinson argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

develop the theory that A.P. was motivated to instigate a fight with Robinson out 

of jealousy over one of the women Robinson harassed at Bumps. We reject this 

argument because Robinson fails to show that it was unreasonable for counsel not 

to pursue this theory. 

¶17 As far as Robinson’s briefing shows, the jealousy theory had scant 

evidentiary support. It is true there was evidence that Robinson and A.P. were 

both interested in the woman. However, Robinson does not point to evidence that 

A.P. had any interaction with Robinson during the fight, or that A.P. was even 

aware of Robinson’s conduct toward the woman. Thus, we agree with the circuit 

court that it was reasonable for trial counsel not to pursue the jealousy theory and 

to instead pursue a theory that did not depend on ascribing any particular motive to 

A.P. Counsel chose to argue instead that the fight was fueled by alcohol and 

began with spontaneous “trash talking” when the two sets of men encountered 

each other on the street outside Bumps. Robinson does not dispute that there was 

evidence to support that argument. 

3. Ineffective Assistance—Failure To Object To Prosecutor’s

Assertion During Closing Arguments

¶18 Robinson argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

object to the prosecutor’s assertion during closing arguments that, immediately 

prior to the fight, Robinson and Nash parked their vehicle so they could see who 

was exiting Bumps. Robinson argues this assertion misrepresented the evidence 

as to the vehicle’s actual position, and unfairly fed into the State’s ambush theory. 
No. 2018AP2055-CR

8

¶19 Regardless of the accuracy of the prosecutor’s assertion, we 

conclude that Robinson fails to show prejudice. The car’s positioning was of 

comparatively little significance in the State’s ambush theory. No matter the car’s 

position, it was undisputed that, immediately prior to the fight, Robinson was not 

in the car but on foot in an area close enough to Bumps to see who was in the 

general area outside Bumps. Further, the jury heard other damaging evidence that 

supported the State’s ambush theory. This included evidence that Robinson and 

Nash had contacted Harvey in advance for “back-up”; that Robinson, Nash, and 

Harvey brought a BB gun, a tire iron, and a hammer that were used during the 

fight; and that, during the fight, Nash exclaimed, “these aren’t the right guys,” or 

that these are “the wrong guys.” 

C. New Trial In The Interest Of Justice

¶20 Finally, Robinson contends that we should exercise our discretionary 

authority to grant a new trial in the interest of justice because the real controversy 

was not fully tried. We exercise this authority only in “‘exceptional cases.’” See

State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶114, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98 (quoted 

source omitted). Robinson does not persuade us that this is an exceptional case. 

His arguments for reversal in the interest of justice add nothing new to the 

arguments we have already rejected. 

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 

809.23(1)(b)5. (2017-18).