Honorable Wilson E. Speir Opinion No. H- 999 

Texas Department of Public Safety 

5805 N. Lamar - Box 4087 Re: Authority of the Department 

Austin, Texas 78773 of Public Safety to suspend a 

driver's license for failure to 

pay a judgment arising out of a 

motor vehicle accident. 

Dear Col. Speir: 

You inquire about certain provisions of the Safety 

Responsibility Act, article 6701h, V.T.C.S., which the 

Department of Public Safety administers. The Act seeks to 

promote safe driving and to deny the privilege of driving to 

financially irresponsible persons. Gillaspie v. Department 

of Public Safety, 259 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. 1953). It requires 

the deposit of security after accidents under the penalty of 

suspension of the driver's license and registration certificate. A person who fails to pay a judgment arising out of his 

use of a motor vehicle risks license suspension under the 

following provisions: 

"Judgment "--Any judgment which shall 

have become final . . . upon a cause of 

action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, for 

damages, including damages for care and 

loss of services, because of bodily injury to or death of any person, or for 

damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of 

use thereof, or upon a cause of action on 

an agreement of settlement for such damages. 

V.T.C.S. art. 6701h, § l(2). 

Whenever any person fails within sixty 

(60) days to satisfy any judgment, upon 

the written request of the judgment creditor or his attorney it shall be the duty 

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Honorable Wilson E. Speir - page 2 (H-999) 

of the clerk of the court, or of the 

judge of a court which has no clerk, in 

which any such judgment is rendered within this State, to forward to the Department immediately after the expiration of 

said sixty (60) days, a certified copy 

of such judgment. 

Id. § 12(a). - 

Upon the receipt of a certified copy 

of a judgment, the Department shall forthwith suspend the license and all registrations and any nonresident's operating 

privilege of any person against whom such 

judgment was rendered, except as hereinafter otherwise provided in this Section 

and in Section 16 of this Act. 

Id. 5 13(a). - 

You state that the Department has always construed the 

Safety Responsibility Act to apply only to accidents on 

highways. You ask whether the Department must take the 

action outlined in section 13(a) when it receives a judgment 

for damage to a motor vehicle where there is no indication that 

the damage arose out of an accident on the highways of Texas. 

We note that "highways," as defined by the Act, includes any 

streets and thoroughfares "not privately owned or controlled 

. . . over which the State has legislative jurisdiction under 

its police power." V.T.C.S. art. 6701h, § l(1). 

The construction of a statute by the agency responsible 

for enforcing it is entitled to great weight. Neubert v. 

Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. Co., 296 S.W. 1090 (Tex. 1927). We 

believe your construction is consistent with the purpose of 

the Act as stated in the caption and emergency clause. The 

caption reads in part: 

An Act to encourage safer use of motor 

vehicles on the streets and highways 

of Texas. . . . 

Acts 1951, 52nd Leg., ch. 498 at 1210. (Emphasis added). The 

emergency clause provides in part: 

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Honorable Wilson E. Speir - page 3 (H-999) 

The fact that thousands of motor vehicles 

are being operated on the highways of 

Texas by financially irresponsible owners 

and drivers who are causing untold loss of 

life and property and who are failing to 

pay for the damages thus caused . . . . 

Id. § 45 at 1227. (Emphasis added). The supreme court has 

described these orovisions as declarative of the Act's ourpose. See Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, supra 

at 180. Although the courts have not squarely faced the 

issue of whether the Act applies only to accidents occurring 

on the highways, they have assumed it to be so limited. One 

court discussed the Act as follows: 

The purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting the Texas Safety 

Responsibility Law was to . . . require such owners and operators [of 

motor vehicles] to discharge their 

financial responsibility to others 

for damage to persons or property 

occasioned by the exercise . . . of 

the privilege or license of usingxhe 

public highways of the State. 

(Emphasis added). Gonzalez v. Texas Department of Public 

Safety, 340 S.W.2d 860, 863-64 (Tex. Civ. App. -- El Paso 

1960, no writ). See also Home Indemnity Co. v. Humble Oil -- 

& Refining Co., 314 S.W.2d 861 ( Tex. Civ. App. -- Dallas), 

writ ref'd n.r.e., 317 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1958). 

A prior opinion of this office dealt with the accident 

report requirement of the Safety Responsibility Act, and 

determined that it applied only to accidents on highways. 

Attorney General Opinion V-1440 (1952). The opinion stated 

as follows: 

[Iln view of the general purpose and 

scheme of the act, it is reasonable 

to assume that the Legislature intended to require a report and to make 

applicable the resultant suspension of 

the privileges only if the accident 

occurred on a "highway" as that term 

is defined therein. 

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Honorable Wilson E. Speir - page 4 (H-999) 

Id. at 4. The reasoning of V-1440 is consistent with judicial 

statements about the Act and in our opinion it applies to the 

suspension of a license for failure to pay a judgment. It is 

therefore our opinion that the judgment for which the Department is to suspend a license under section 13(a) must arise out 

of a motor vehicle accident on the highways'as defined in section l(1). 

SUMMARY 

The provision of the Safety Responsibility 

Act for suspending the driver's license of 

a person failing'to pay a judgment does not 

apply unless the judgment arises out of a 

motor vehicle accident on the highways as 

they are defined in the Act. 

truly yours, 

Attorney General of Texas 

APPROVED: 

KENDALL, First Assistant 

C. ROBERT HEATH, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

km1 

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