PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-1654

In re: GRAND JURY 2021 SUBPOENAS.

-----------------------------

UNDER SEAL 1; UNDER SEAL 2,

Movants – Appellants,

and

UNDER SEAL 3; UNDER SEAL 4; UNDER SEAL 5; UNDER SEAL 6; UNDER 

SEAL 7

Movants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent – Appellee.

No. 22-1655

In re: GRAND JURY 2021 SUBPOENAS.

------------------------------

UNDER SEAL 1; UNDER SEAL 2,

Movants – Appellants,

and

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UNDER SEAL 3; UNDER SEAL 4; UNDER SEAL 5; UNDER SEAL 6; UNDER 

SEAL 7,

Movants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent – Appellee.

No. 22-1656

In re: GRAND JURY 2021 SUBPOENAS.

------------------------------

UNDER SEAL 1; UNDER SEAL 2,

Movants – Appellants,

and

UNDER SEAL 3; UNDER SEAL 4; UNDER SEAL 5; UNDER SEAL 6; UNDER 

SEAL 7

Movants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent – Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

Stephanie A. Gallagher, District Judge. (1:21-cv-00556-SAG)

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Argued: March 9, 2023 Decided: November 22, 2023

Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by published opinion. Senior Judge Floyd wrote 

the opinion in which Judge Gregory and Judge Wynn joined.

ARGUED: Arnold Weiner, RIFKIN WEINER LIVINGSTON LLC, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellants. Leo Joseph Wise, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

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FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge:

Appellant John Doe is a medical malpractice attorney. While representing a client, 

Jane Roe, he engaged in settlement negotiations with the University of Maryland Medical 

System (UMMS). Four additional appellants assisted Doe in his representation of Roe:

Law Firm 1; Lawyer 1 (a principal of Law Firm 1); Law Firm 2; and Lawyer 2 (a principal 

of Law Firm 2).1

 

The negotiations between Doe and UMMS proceeded poorly, as what Doe

purported to be a good faith, legal settlement offer was perceived by UMMS as 

surreptitious extortion. Generally speaking, Doe sought $25 million for Roe. But, among 

other things, Doe also made any settlement between Roe and UMMS contingent on his 

personal receipt of an additional $25 million that would effectuate his retention by UMMS 

as a private consultant of sorts. Also accompanying the settlement offer was Doe’s threat 

of initiating a smear campaign targeting the hospital system if it did not acquiesce to his 

terms. 

A grand jury indicted Doe, charging him with attempted extortion in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 1952. While the grand jury investigation remained ongoing, a 

discovery dispute ensued in Doe’s active criminal case, culminating in a district court’s 

denial of the government’s request for compelled reciprocal discovery. Shortly 

thereafter—at the government’s request—the grand jury issued multiple subpoenas duces 

tecum to the lawyers and firms that assisted in Doe’s representation of Roe—and in the 

1 For purposes of this opinion, we refer to Law Firm 1 and Lawyer 1 collectively as 

“Law Firm 1,” and Law Firm 2 and Lawyer 2 collectively as “Law Firm 2.”

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formation of the alleged extortion scheme. Doe and Roe moved to quash the subpoenas, 

which the district court overseeing the grand jury proceedings denied. That court then 

granted in part a subsequent motion filed by the government to compel production. 

Doe and Roe now ask this Court to reverse the district court’s orders first denying 

their motions to quash and then compelling production. Law Firm 2 and Law Firm 1 also 

ask us to reverse the district court’s order compelling production, but only insofar as it 

pertains to one particular privilege log. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal 

as to Doe for lack of appellate jurisdiction. We otherwise affirm the district court on all 

remaining grounds. 

I.

Doe brought medical malpractice claims against UMMS for decades. Multiple of 

his clients suffered catastrophic injuries from failed organ transplants performed by UMMS 

surgeons. Roe is the widow of a man who died following a kidney transplant performed 

by UMMS. Following her husband’s death, Roe engaged Doe on January 27, 2018, to 

represent her in a negligence and fraud case against UMMS, alleging that a UMMS surgeon 

misrepresented the risks associated with the transplant. 

Doe commenced settlement negotiations on Roe’s behalf. Generally speaking, Roe

sought six things: (1) UMMS’s termination of the doctors involved in her husband’s 

treatment; (2) a personal meeting between Roe and Doctor 1, Chief Surgeon at UMMS and 

head of the Transplant Department; (3) UMMS’s assumption of all medical bills related to 

her husband’s treatment; (4) the creation of a training video featuring Roe to be shown to 

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healthcare professionals that would close with Roe stating, “this is being prepared in 

memory of [my] late husband, []”; (5) Doe’s retention by UMMS as a private consultant 

to its Department of Transplantation; and (6) $25 million in “punitive damages.” Joint 

Appendix (J.A.) 1988, 2186. At one point, Roe explained that she sought a consultancy 

agreement between Doe and UMMS so that Doe “would sit in at UMM[S] board meetings, 

. . . would be compensated for the consultancy[,] and . . . could be aware if doctors that 

were fired from the UMMC kidney transplant center [were ever] re-hired.” J.A. 1988. 

Doe communicated frequently with Doctor 1 between February and May of 2018. 

These communications included multiple meetings for dinner or drinks during which they 

discussed the facts of Roe’s case. In a witness interview, Doctor 1’s wife, who attended 

some of these dinners, effectively stated that Doe adopted a sort of carrot-stick approach 

to the discussions—offering to have her and Doctor 1 to his Miami home to drive his Rolls 

Royce, but also insisting that Doctor 1 did what Doe demanded so that they could “be 

friends” and so that “everything [was] going to be ok.” J.A. 2054. Doe and Doctor 1 also 

exchanged texts during this period, including one message from Doctor 1 stating, “I 

explained everything [to Employee 12

] that we are in jeopardy for fraud and punitive 

damages. She understands. The ball is in your court.” J.A. 2052. According to Appellants, 

Doctor 1 also informed Doe that UMMS faced other potential claims for failed transplants 

under similar circumstances. Opening Br. 9 (citing J.A. 1979, 1981–82). 

2 Employee 1 was the Senior VP of Claims Litigation at UMMS at this time.

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On April 24, 2018, Doe engaged Law Firm 2 to aid in his representation of Roe. 

Law Firm 2 was to provide services including “research, the writing of a letter(s)[,] and 

other assistance in connection with the potential resolution of [the] matter involving [Roe] 

in the[] dispute with [UMMS].” J.A. 2056. 

On April 30, after delivering a proposed settlement agreement to Employee 1, Doe

and an associate in his employ, Lawyer 3, met with Employee 1, Doctor 2, and Lawyer 4. 

Doctor 2 was the head of the Maryland Medicine Comprehensive Insurance Program used 

by UMMS, and Lawyer 4 was outside counsel for UMMS. During the meeting, Doe

presented his settlement demands. He emphasized that, given the numerosity of cases 

against UMMS that he had recently received, “UMMS would have to pay a premium for 

confidentiality.” J.A. 2060. He threatened to “do a great deal of damage to [Doctor 1’s]

international reputation,” and to “put advertisements [about UMMS] on the internet unless 

a deal was struck.” Id. Doe elaborated on all of the flaws that he perceived in the transplant 

process, and stated that Doctor 1 “already admitted that ‘they screwed up the underlying 

case.’” J.A. 2061. 

In addition to describing where he would advertise and publish unsavory 

information about UMMS, Doe played a mock television commercial that he and Roe

created, which explained Roe’s story and showed images of her husband’s necrotic 

fingertips and amputated leg—both symptoms attributable to the failed transplant. J.A. 

2062. Doe effectively threatened to go public with the video—in particular, he threatened 

to create an “internet bomb” whereby he would fund disparaging advertisements that would 

display to prospective patients on the UMMS website itself. Id. When asked whether 

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such a plan was legal, Doe and Lawyer 3 did not respond to the question, and instead stated 

that they would not commence this plan until UMMS “had an opportunity to consider their 

demand.” Id. Doe reiterated the $25 million demand for Roe, as well as the demand that 

he be retained—with an additional $25 million payout to him personally—as a consultant 

to UMMS in exchange for his confidentiality, and to conflict him out of future cases.3

 The 

meeting concluded when the UMMS representatives told Doe that they had a hard-stop 

time that day, but not before they advised Doe to cease contact with Doctor 1.

In June 2018, Doe retained Law Firm 1 to provide a variety of services in connection 

with the Roe case, including advising on the consultancy portion of the proposed settlement 

agreement. On June 22, 2018, Doe and Lawyer 3 again met with Employee 1, Lawyer 4, 

and Employee 1’s associate Employee 2. Doe presented a more detailed consultancy 

proposal than he had previously. In Employee 2’s contemporaneously recorded notes, she 

wrote that Doe sought to “become consultant for [the] hospital,” and “defend cases over a 

[period] of time.” J.A. 2159. Per Employee 2’s notes, Doe sought a $25 million payment 

for his consulting services, though he stated that he “could make [it] $100 [million].” J.A. 

2162. Doe reiterated many of the same advertising and reputational threats from the prior 

meeting. He explained that his threats were not threats because “I don’t want to do it, so 

don’t make me do it[.] [T]hat means it’s not a threat [because] I don’t want to do it.” J.A. 

3 Doe seemed to request a consultancy arrangement “like the Murphy firm.” J.A. 

2062. At that time, UMMS and the “Murphy firm” had a retainer agreement by which the 

Murphy firm provided advice and occasional defense of malpractice cases to UMMS. 

Opening Br. 10. 

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2164. He also explained that without the consultancy agreement for him, there would be 

no settlement of Roe’s case against UMMS. 

On August 13, 2018, UMMS contacted the U.S. Attorney’s Office, complaining that 

it was the victim of attempted extortion. The FBI began scheduling and surreptitiously 

recording meetings and telephone conversations between Doe and UMMS representatives. 

During an August 23, 2018, meeting, UMMS representatives asked Doe if his proposed 

consultancy amounted to extortion. He responded, in part, “Uh, it’s not extortion. Because 

the – the – the – the – I’m not using any facts that aren’t – or, excuse me, I’m gonna talk 

like . . . uh – uh, make, the truth and not the truth.” J.A. 462. He then referenced his hiring 

of Law Firm 1, explaining that the purpose of the firm’s involvement was to ensure that 

the agreement was legal. Notably, UMMS representatives voiced concern that even if the 

proposed consultancy was facially legal, it would represent a contrived fabrication, or a 

strawman of sorts, to, in a post-hoc manner, legitimize what was otherwise full-blown 

extortion. Doe relied heavily on Law Firm 1’s presence as an ethical consultant to rebut 

extortion-related comments. He eventually stated “if it can’t be done then it can’t be done. 

That’s – that’s just the bottom line.” J.A. 582. Doctor 2 then asked what would happen to 

Roe’s case if the consultancy did not manifest. Doe responded, in that context, “I’m going 

forward.” Id. This and other comments about the all-or-nothing nature of the settlement 

demands reified Doe’s position that he would not settle Roe’s claims against the hospital 

without his consultancy agreement.

On October 22, 2018, Doctor 2 and Employee 1 filed a complaint against Doe with 

the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (AGC). The complaint included 

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allegations of attempted extortion. On April 20, 2020, the AGC directed Bar Counsel to 

petition for disciplinary or remedial action in the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Bar 

Counsel filed the petition on July 13, 2020, and that proceeding is currently stayed. 

According to Doe, around August 2019, the government declined to prosecute the 

extortion allegations because of Law Firm 1’s participation as a purported ethics advisor

in the formulation of the consultancy agreement, and because of perceived difficulties in 

establishing criminal intent.4

 Opening Br. 15. But then, on October 5, 2020, the 

government indicted Doe. The indictment charged Doe with attempted extortion in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 1952. 

The criminal proceeding borne of that indictment is currently pending in the District 

of Maryland. Meanwhile, the separate grand jury investigation—the subject of this 

appeal—remains ongoing in the same district.

A discovery dispute commenced in the criminal proceeding. In essence, the 

government proposed a discovery schedule, offering dates by which each side would 

produce its respective discovery and deadlines for motion practice. Doe declined to 

participate in reciprocal discovery, contending that he had no obligation to disclose unless 

he first requested disclosure from the government, which he did not. See Fed. R. Evid. 

16(b)(1)(A) (“If a defendant requests disclosure . . . and the government complies, then the 

defendant must permit the government, upon request, to inspect and to copy” discoverable 

materials “if . . . the item[s are] within the defendant’s possession, custody, or control[]

4 Anecdotally, around the same time, Doe settled Roe’s case with UMMS.

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and . . . the defendant intends to use [them] in [his] case-in-chief at trial.”). In other words, 

Doe maintained that as long as he did not request discovery from the government, he 

needed not respond to any of the government’s discovery requests. 

The government was incensed by Doe’s position, stating at a hearing on the issue:

“To say I don’t want your documents, I want to be surprised so that I can surprise you, is 

just bonkers”—also noting that “we can’t have a trial by surprise” for practical reasons 

involving each side’s ability to prepare pre-trial motions, including motions in limine, and 

object in real time at trial. J.A. 175. The government further stated, “In 16 years as a 

prosecutor I have never seen a defense attorney say I don’t want your discovery so that I 

can surprise you with mine, and I think that is just not acceptable under the law or for 

practical reasons.” Id. 

In an oral decision issued on December 21, 2020, the district court declined to 

require Doe to engage in reciprocal discovery per the government’s request. It reasoned 

that the plain language of Rule 16 mandates a defendant’s production only if the defendant 

first requests production from the government. The district court squared the Rule’s 

framing with burdens of proof at trial. It reasoned that it could not “requir[e] the 

[d]efendant to provide information to the [g]overnment that the [g]overnment would 

subsequently be able to use in its case against the [d]efendant,” given that the government 

bears the ultimate burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and a defendant need 

not present any of his own evidence to prevail over the government’s case. J.A. 178. 

However, the court also noted that, certainly, the trial could be “extraordinarily 

cumbersome” given Doe’s position, and the court would likely be less sympathetic 

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regarding concerns of surprise raised by Doe than those raised by the government. J.A. 

177–78. The court emphasized that Doe should understand “the very thin waters that [he 

is] treading into.” J.A. 178. 

According to Doe, “[i]mmediately after [the district court] rejected the 

[g]overnment’s discovery requests, the prosecutors resorted to the grand jury [in No. 21-

cv-556] for the information and material they deemed necessary for the case against [Doe]

[in Crim. No. GLR-20-0337].” Opening Br. 23. On February 18, 2021, the grand jury 

issued subpoenas duces tecum to Law Firm 2, Law Firm 1, and Lawyer 3—approximately 

two months after the district court’s oral decision regarding the discovery dispute in Doe’s 

criminal proceeding. On March 3, 2021, Doe moved to intervene and to quash the 

subpoenas. He argued that the government was “abusing the grand jury process by using 

the grand jury subpoena power for the dominant purpose of preparing for motions and trial, 

and for gathering evidence, on an already pending indictment.” J.A. 21. In April 2021, 

Roe also moved to intervene and to quash. On June 3, 2021, the district court overseeing 

the grand jury investigation in No. 21-cv-556 granted the motions to intervene but denied 

the motions to quash. The court further directed Doe and the subpoena recipients to 

respond to the subpoenas and provide privilege logs for all potentially privileged 

information. 

Doe responded, but the government contended that his response lacked any 

meaningful production. According to the government, he claimed that nearly every 

substantive document requested was subject to some protection or privilege. He included 

a privilege log totaling more than 265 pages (the “Privilege Log 1”). Law Firm 1 submitted 

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an 8-page log (the “Firm 1 Privilege Log”). Law Firm 2 submitted a log totaling 4 pages 

(the “Firm 2 Privilege Log”). Wholly dissatisfied, the government moved to compel. 

Appellants opposed the motion, arguing that logged documents were protected by either 

attorney-client privilege or by work-product privilege.

On May 31, 2022, the district court granted in part and denied in part the 

government’s motion. As to the Privilege Log 1, the court held that communications 

between Roe and Doe regarding the proposed consultancy were discoverable because Roe

“waived her right to assert attorney-client privilege” by disclosing substantive 

communications to Bar Counsel during an interview conducted in the course of the 

Maryland Bar’s investigation into Doe. J.A. 2316. The court likewise found that the crimefraud exception applied to any claims of tangible or opinion work-product privilege that 

Doe and/or Roe might assert as to documents concerning the consultancy. 

Regarding the Firm 1 Privilege Log, the district court first found that “any attorneyclient relationship existed between [Law Firm 1] and [Doe], not between [Law Firm 1] and 

[Roe].” J.A. 2327. The court continued that the crime-fraud exception applied to any 

attorney-client privilege that Doe may claim. It likewise found that many documents 

contained in that log failed to qualify as work product because the consultancy itself sought 

to evade litigation—it was not sought in anticipation of litigation. Notably, though, the 

district court also recognized a subgroup of documents related to the consultancy that were 

prepared in anticipation of litigation, thus qualifying them for work-product privilege. 

Another subgroup of documents in the Firm 1 Privilege Log related to Law Firm 1’s 

representation of Doe in the Bar Counsel investigation, and were also protected.

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Regarding the Firm 2 Privilege Log, the court found that some documents 

constituted opinion work product because Law Firm 2 lawyers prepared them in 

anticipation of litigation in the Roe matter. But other documents were discoverable 

because they provided legal advice to Doe related to execution of the consultancy. 

Notably, prior to the court’s ruling, it conducted in camera review of both the Firm 

1 and Firm 2 Privilege Logs, but it did not conduct in camera review of Privilege Log 1,

despite ordering the production of most documents listed in that log. Opening Br. 33. On 

June 17, 2022, the district court issued a clarifying order because it realized that some 

documents that it ordered produced in the Privilege Log 1 also existed in the Firm 1 and 

Firm 2 Privilege Logs, and in the latter two, the court ordered those documents protected. 

Thus, the court explained that “if [Lawyer 3] has a copy of a document that this [c]ourt 

found was properly withheld by [Law Firm 1] or [Law Firm 2], he should not produce it, 

and this [c]ourt’s prior rulings should not be construed to require otherwise.” J.A. 2354. 

Appellants also argued that some documents ordered to be produced from the Privilege 

Log 1 are so substantially similar to documents ordered protected in the Firm 1 and Firm 

2 Privilege Logs that those, too, should be deemed excluded from the court’s order to 

compel. But the court did not address this additional argument in its clarifying order.5

5 Appellants do not seek our review of the district court’s alleged failure to clarify 

this issue. Regardless, when the district court extended its clarificatory protections to 

Privilege Log 1, it reasoned that “[i]t is the content of those [protected] documents [within 

the Firm 1 and Firm 2 Privilege Logs] that [the court] found warranted protection, 

irrespective of whether [Lawyer 3] also possesses a copy.” J.A. 2354. This clarification 

seems to convey the district court’s appropriate recognition that documents need not be 

perfectly duplicative across logs to warrant protection, so long as material content is 

substantially the same.

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This appeal followed, framed by Appellants as arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

which provides this Court’s jurisdiction to review “all final decisions of the district courts 

of the United States.” 

II.

We begin by laying out the parties’ positions. Doe and Roe appeal the district 

court’s denial of their motions to quash and its order compelling production. Law Firm 2

and Law Firm 1 only appeal the district court’s order compelling production insofar as it 

ordered production of documents held by Lawyer 3 over which Law Firm 2 and Law Firm 

1 claimed work-product privileges. Neither Law Firm 2 nor Law Firm 1 appeal the district 

court’s order compelling them to produce documents on their own privilege logs.6

 

With respect to the motion to quash, Doe and Roe argue that the court abused its 

discretion by refusing to conduct in camera review of documents that they contend would 

have proven that the government’s dominant purpose in seeking the grand jury subpoenas 

was trial preparation in Doe’s criminal case—instead, it found that they failed to meet their

burden of proving an abusive dominant purpose. They also argue that the court abused its 

discretion by denying the motions to quash while ignoring facts and surrounding 

6 Notably, the parties seem to agree that not every Appellant challenges the same 

components of the district court’s orders. But the consolidated briefing does little to 

delineate specifically which Appellant(s) raises which arguments, and to which portions of 

the district court’s ruling(s) those arguments apply. The government, too, generally 

attributes Appellants’ collective arguments to Doe for purposes of its briefing. Thus, for 

our purposes, we too shall simply refer to Appellants collectively when to do otherwise 

would be impossible or impractical based on their own framing of this appeal.

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circumstances that cast doubt on the legitimacy of the subpoenas—including the fact that 

the subpoenas came on the heels of a contentious discovery dispute in Doe’s criminal case.

Appellants allege several errors regarding the motion to compel. First, they argue 

that the court erred in rendering certain factual findings and then in effectuating this Court’s 

treatment of “dual-purpose” documents announced in National Union Fire Insurance Co. 

v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 967 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992). Second, they argue that the 

court erred by finding that the crime-fraud exception forfeited work-product protections 

held by Roe—an innocent client—pursuant to this Court’s precedent in In re Doe, 662 F.2d 

1073 (4th Cir. 1981), and Hanson v. United States Agency for International Development, 

372 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2004). Third, they argue that the court erred in finding that Roe

waived her attorney-client privilege when she cooperated with Bar Counsel in Doe’s ethics 

investigation under Maryland Rule 19-707(b)(1). Fourth, they argue that the court abused 

its discretion in finding a prima facie showing of the crime-fraud exception based only on 

the indictment of Doe, and without regard to the government’s alleged pre-indictment 

concession that criminal intent may be difficult to prove in Doe’s case. Fifth, they argue 

generally that the court erred by ordering the production of documents protected by 

attorney-client and work-product privileges.

The government first responds that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction over Doe

at this juncture, so he should be dismissed from the appeal. It further argues that Roe is 

not aggrieved by the grand jury process or the portion of the order compelling production 

that applied only to Doe, so she may not challenge them in his absence. Finally, the 

government contends that the district court did not abuse its discretion or err in any of its 

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remaining legal or factual analyses, and thus should be wholly affirmed. We address the 

parties’ positions in turn.

A.

We first address this Court’s jurisdiction to consider Doe’s challenges. The 

government argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction over Doe because, as to him alone,

the district court’s orders denying his motion to quash and granting the government’s 

motion to compel neither are “final” for purposes of appellate review nor qualify for an

exception to the final-judgment rule. Instead, the government contends that Doe should 

vindicate his challenges on direct appeal at the conclusion of his criminal case, if necessary. 

Despite the Supreme Court’s narrowing of interlocutory appellate review in the context of

the collateral-order doctrine, Doe responds that this Court retains jurisdiction over his 

appeal under the Perlman doctrine.

“Our first obligation is to ascertain whether we possess jurisdiction of an appeal, an 

issue we assess de novo.” Dickens v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 228, 231 (4th Cir. 2012) 

(simplified). Appellate courts generally only review “final decisions of the district courts.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also In re Naranjo, 768 F.3d 332, 342 (4th Cir. 2014). Final 

decisions are “those that end [a] litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the court to 

do but execute the judgment.” McCook Metals LLC v. Alcoa, Inc., 249 F.3d 330, 334 (4th 

Cir. 2001) (simplified). “This final-judgment rule aims to combine all reviewable stages 

from a proceeding into one appeal and thus to prevent the harassment and cost of 

interlocutory appeals.” United States v. Myers, 593 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2010)

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(simplified). The rule also “preserv[es] the primacy of the district court as the arbiter of 

proceedings before it.” GO Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir. 

2007) (quotation omitted). 

In the past, this Court has generally held that “[o]rders enforcing subpoenas issued 

in connection with civil and criminal actions, or with grand jury proceedings, are normally 

not considered final.” United States v. Search of 235 S. Queen St., Martinsburg, W. Va., 

319 F. App’x 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2008) (simplified); see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 

228 F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 2000). But an exception to this general rule exists in the form 

of the collateral-order doctrine. Under this doctrine, such non-final orders may be 

immediately reviewed when they: “(1) conclusively determine [a] disputed question, (2) 

resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) [are]

effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. 

Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 86 (4th Cir. 2014) (simplified). 

The Supreme Court has cautioned that the collateral-order doctrine must “never be 

allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred 

until final judgment has been entered.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 

U.S. 863, 868 (1994) (citations omitted). As particularly relevant here, that Court expressly 

narrowed the availability of collateral-order review in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. 

Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009). There, the Court declined to exercise collateral-order 

jurisdiction in a putative appeal involving a pretrial discovery order that rejected a claim 

of attorney-client privilege. See Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 108–09, 114 (holding that, although 

a privilege interest is certainly important, it can effectively be reviewed on direct appeal 

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without resorting to the collateral-order doctrine to bypass the final-judgment rule).

A second exception, the Perlman doctrine, also exists. See Perlman v. United 

States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). Generally speaking, a “long-recognized option” for a party to 

effectively receive immediate, interlocutory treatment of a disclosure order is to defy the 

order, receive a criminal contempt citation, and then seek review of that contempt ruling. 

Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 111. But under the Perlman doctrine, “a discovery order directed at 

a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order because the 

third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by 

refusing compliance.” Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 237 (6th Cir. 2011) 

(simplified); see also Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13 (recognizing the importance of the 

immediate appealability of disclosure orders directed at disinterested third parties because, 

under such circumstances, a party claiming a privilege is otherwise “powerless to avert the 

mischief of the order”). 

In Perlman, the Supreme Court allowed immediate review of an order directing a 

third party to produce documents that belonged to the appellant. 247 U.S. at 12–13. The 

appellant claimed that these documents were immune from production, but the third party

that possessed them, the clerk of court, had no interest in defying a disclosure order. Id. 

According to the Court, to have denied immediate review would have left the appellant 

without recourse because the clerk could not have been expected to risk a contempt citation 

to secure for the appellant an opportunity for immediate judicial review. Id. Conversely, 

if the documents had been in the appellant’s control, he could have secured a contempt 

ruling against himself for failure to produce, thereby acquiring a final order subject to 

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immediate review. Thus, immediate appealability under Perlman depends on a third

party’s control of the documents subject to a disclosure order. 

Importantly, though, the fate of the Perlman doctrine in the wake of Mohawk’s 

express narrowing of the collateral-order doctrine is up for debate. Compare In re Grand 

Jury Investigation, 966 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We recognize that Perlman was 

decided one hundred years ago. But the Supreme Court has given us no reason to suspect 

that it is no longer good law.”), and In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d 133, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2012) 

(“[W]e decline to hold that the Supreme Court narrowed the Perlman doctrine . . . sub 

silentio.” (citations omitted)), with Naranjo, 768 F.3d at 343 n.14 (“Perlman may no longer 

provide a viable rule in light of [Mohawk]. . . . Mohawk might be read to say that 

interlocutory appeals . . . should not be permitted when the privilege-holder has other 

means to protect his privilege rights.” (simplified)), Wilson v. O’Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 

(7th Cir. 2010) (ultimately declining to reach the issue, but explaining that Mohawk “calls 

Perlman . . . into question, because, whether the [discovery] order is directed against a 

litigant or a third party, an appeal from the final decision will allow review of the district 

court’s ruling. Only when . . . a non-litigant [asserts the privilege] will an appeal from the 

final decision be inadequate”), and Holt-Orsted, 641 F.3d at 238–40 (applying Mohawk to 

limit the application of the Perlman doctrine to situations in which non-litigants raise 

privilege issues, given that post-judgment appeals sufficiently protect any privilege 

concerns raised by litigants). 

Here, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohawk, there remains no doubt 

that this Court lacks jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. As the Supreme Court 

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expressly held, allegedly compromised privilege interests can be reviewed perfectly well 

on post-judgment appeal without resorting to the subjugation of the final-judgment rule. 

Any allegation of grand jury abuse is likewise effectively reviewed on direct appeal, and 

Doe need not resort to the collateral-order doctrine to vindicate his position in that regard.

The applicability of the Perlman doctrine is a closer question. Ultimately, we 

conclude that the doctrine likewise fails to justify this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 

Doe’s arguments at this stage.7

 Insofar as Doe himself seeks immediate review, Perlman’s 

applicability is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s extreme narrowing of interlocutory 

appeals via the collateral-order doctrine in Mohawk. This is because, even in the context 

of a disclosure order directed at a third party—of which Perlman would traditionally permit 

immediate review—an aggrieved litigant can still simply press the alleged privilege on 

direct appeal in a manner no different than that required by the Supreme Court in the 

context of the collateral-order doctrine.

The Supreme Court mandates that 28 U.S.C. § 1291, under which this appeal arises, 

be given “a practical rather than a technical construction.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 106 

7 True, this Court recognized the possible applicability of Perlman to cases similar 

to the instant appeal in United States v. Myers. See 593 F.3d 338, 345 n.11 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(noting in dicta that an appellant “might have” appealed under Perlman because an order 

compelling production directed a third party to provide items to the government); see also

In re Grand Jury 16-3817 (16-4), 740 F. App’x 243, 245 (4th Cir. 2018) (non-binding 

opinion finding jurisdiction under Perlman, neither contemplating nor reaching the 

doctrine’s viability post-Mohawk). But the precise issue of Mohawk’s impact on the 

Perlman doctrine was not before the Myers panel, nor did the panel consider the issue of 

its own volition. We decline to hold such dicta binding, particularly when this Court 

subsequently and explicitly questioned the doctrine’s continued viability in Naranjo. 768 

F.3d at 343 n.14. 

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(simplified). Mohawk recognized that “[p]ermitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . 

undermines efficient judicial administration and encroaches upon the prerogatives of 

district court judges, who play a special role in managing ongoing litigation.” Id. 

(simplified). Consequently, “[t]he justification for immediate appeal must . . . be 

sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation 

concludes.” Id. at 107. To that end, the Supreme Court concluded that even a justification 

as core to our adversarial system as a privilege interest was not so imperiled by deferral of 

review to the post-judgment stage that interlocutory review was warranted. See id. at 108–

09. Instead, the Court reasoned that post-judgment appeals “generally suffice to protect 

the rights of litigants and ensure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 109. 

With this framing in mind, and for our purposes here, any distinction between the 

collateral-order doctrine and the Perlman doctrine is one without a difference—the 

Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mohawk is equally applicable in both contexts. Rather, Doe

seeks to vindicate a privilege interest that Mohawk expressly recognized should be 

addressed on post-judgment review. Whether the compelled disclosure to which he objects 

ultimately comes from him (a collateral-order context) or from a third party (a Perlman

context) is entirely inconsequential insofar as his access to post-judgment review is 

unchanged either way. As such, we conclude that the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the 

collateral-order exception to the final-judgment rule in Mohawk applies equally to the 

Perlman doctrine—thereby excluding immediate litigant-sought review.

Of course, we remain cognizant of the fact that, where a privilege interest is 

concerned, once the cat is out of the bag, there is effectively no perfect remediation. “But 

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deferring review [of privilege interests] until final judgment does not meaningfully reduce 

the ex ante incentives for full and frank consultations between clients and counsel.” Id. at 

109. Furthermore, other tools likewise guard against particularly injurious outcomes. For 

example, here, the district court overseeing the grand jury investigation granted a stay of 

its order compelling disclosure using language consistent with certification of an 

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). J.A. 2366–67. Section 1292(b) provides 

that:

[w]hen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise 

appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves 

a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 

difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may 

materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state 

in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction 

of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal 

to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after 

the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal 

hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district 

judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.

Specifically, the district court explained that: 

[t]he issues decided in this Court’s opinion raised difficult legal issues, and 

at times involved fact-intensive analysis, about which reasonable minds 

could differ. The Movants’ arguments, therefore—on both the appealability 

of this Court’s decision and the merits of it—are certainly colorable and 

worthy of consideration by the Fourth Circuit. And the potential harm of 

unwarranted disclosure of protected information weighs strongly in favor of 

maintaining the status quo in the meantime. Thus, while this Court does not 

believe the Movants are likely to succeed, their arguments are legitimate 

enough, and the stakes are high enough, that this Court believes the Movants 

should be afforded a meaningful opportunity to seek appellate review.

J.A. 2366.

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As such, without deciding the issue, it seems at least plausible that this Court could 

have comfortably exercised jurisdiction over Doe’s arguments under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

But Appellants appealed pursuant to § 1291—or, rather, pursuant to an exception to the 

statute—not § 1292. The Supreme Court in Mohawk expressly recognized that litigants 

can—and should—pursue interlocutory appeals concerning privilege issues under 

§ 1292(b). Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 110–11 (“[W]ere attorneys and clients to reflect upon 

their appellate options, they would find that litigants confronted with particularly injurious 

or novel privilege rulings have several potential avenues of appellate review apart from 

collateral order appeal. First, . . . interlocutory appeal pursuant to [§ 1292(b)]. . . . Second, 

in extraordinary circumstances[,] . . . a writ of mandamus.”).

Although we conclude that Doe prematurely sought our review under Perlman’s 

exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we do not likewise foreclose review of the arguments 

presented by the remaining appellants. As the Sixth and Seventh Circuits discerningly 

note, Mohawk’s narrowing of the Perlman doctrine logically excludes, at this juncture, 

only immediate review sought by participating litigants. See Wilson, 621 F.3d at 643; HoltOrsted, 641 F.3d at 238–40. This exclusion only of litigant-sought review aligns with 

Mohawk’s chief purpose of mitigating excessive circumvention of the final-judgment rule, 

particularly when perfectly adequate post-judgment appeal opportunities exist. 558 U.S. 

at 103 (“[Post-judgment] appeals, together with other review mechanisms, suffice to 

protect the rights of litigants and preserve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege” 

without resort to exceptions to the final-judgment rule.) But such opportunities are fewer 

or entirely unavailable with respect to non-litigant third parties—i.e., a non-litigant cannot 

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pursue direct, post-judgment appeal. Thus, the Perlman doctrine remains crucial to the 

vindication of third-party rights. Accordingly, with Doe dismissed, we retain jurisdiction 

over the remaining non-litigant appellants.8, 9

B.

We next consider the implications of Doe’s absence from this appeal on the 

remaining challenges by Roe. The government argues that Roe, Doe’s client in the 

8 The government concedes to our jurisdiction over these remaining non-litigant 

third parties pursuant to the Perlman doctrine. See, e.g., Resp. Br. 2. Notably, courts have 

clarified that a third party’s mere possession of subpoenaed materials is not enough to 

warrant treatment under Perlman. Instead, “the subpoenaed third party’s lack of interest 

in protecting the confidentiality of the subpoenaed documents is the touchstone of the 

Perlman inquiry.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 56 F.4th 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2022); see also

Grand Jury 16-3817 (16-4), 740 F. App’x at 245 (holding that the Perlman doctrine applies 

only when a disclosure order is directed at “a disinterested third party”); Naranjo, 768 F.3d 

at 346 (holding that the exception only applies “when there exists a real possibility the third 

party will not risk being found in contempt and will turn over the subpoenaed documents” 

(simplified)). With that in mind, we note our skepticism that each non-litigant Appellant

here is truly “disinterested” for purposes of Perlman’s applicability—particularly when a 

grand jury investigation pends, and given the professional duties that may be owed between 

these remaining entities (and Doe). But we decline to delve into such uncontested matters. 9 The government also argues that, in Appellants’ jurisdictional statement, they seek 

review only of the district court’s May 31, 2022, order compelling production, and not 

review of prior orders denying Doe and Roe’s motions to quash and mandating preparation 

of privilege logs. Thus, according to the government, we may only review the order 

compelling disclosure dated May 31, 2022. Although we need not decide this issue with 

respect to Doe based on the foregoing jurisdictional analysis, we proceed to review all 

relevant orders with respect to Roe pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. 

Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4) (“The notice of appeal encompasses all orders that, for purposes of 

appeal, merge into the designated judgment or appealable order. It is not necessary to 

designate those orders in the notice of appeal.”); see also id. Advisory Committee Notes to 

2021 Amendments (“The general merger rule can be stated simply: an appeal from a final 

judgment permits review of all rulings that led up to the judgment.”). Although Appellants 

expressly appealed only the May 31 order, it cannot reasonably be said that the prior orders 

are not inextricably intertwined with that disclosure order.

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underlying malpractice case, is not aggrieved by any governmental abuse of the grand jury 

process or by the disclosure of communications between Doe and the lawyers representing 

him in his Maryland ethics hearings, so she lacks standing to challenge those issues in his 

absence from this appeal. Roe responds that the government raises this argument for the 

first time on appeal, and effectively challenges her very intervention—an issue not before 

this Court. She likewise seems to argue that some of her privileged material may be 

implicated by the grand jury investigation and the ethics proceedings, so she is sufficiently 

aggrieved to retain the right to raise these arguments in Doe’s absence.

“It is typically only parties who are bound by a judgment and sufficiently aggrieved 

by it who possess constitutional and prudential standing to seek appellate review of the 

district court’s decision.” Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 257 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation 

omitted); see also Newberry v. Davison Chem. Co., 65 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t 

is only a party affected by an order or decree who may appeal from it.” (citations omitted)). 

But we “have shown greater flexibility with respect to nonparty appellants.” United States 

v. Under Seal, 853 F.3d 706, 721 (4th Cir. 2017). “[A] nonparty may appeal a district 

court’s order or judgment when the appellant (1) possessed an interest in the cause litigated 

before the district court and (2) participated in the proceedings actively enough to make 

[her] privy to the record.” Id. (simplified). 

Here, the government’s argument that “[Roe] has no more than a general interest, 

shared by other members of society, in ‘wishing to curb abuses of the grand jury process’” 

is entirely unpersuasive. Resp. Br. 34 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 

Aug 1986, 658 F. Supp. 474, 483 (D. Md. 1987)). Roe’s interest is instead highly specific

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given that any abuse of the grand jury process almost assuredly implicates at least some 

privileged materials in which she arguably retains a confidentiality interest. Perhaps it 

could be said that Doe would be most aggrieved by any abuse, given that he retains similar

arguable privilege interests, while also being subject to criminal proceedings that any abuse 

would surely embroil. But we decline to allow our aggrievement analysis to devolve in

such a way that it recognizes only the rights of a single party to whom the risk of harm is 

greatest—and not the rights of others with interests just as concrete, if slightly less 

numerous. Furthermore, Roe actively participated in the proceedings below in hopes of 

vindicating her alleged interests. Thus, we decline to dismiss Roe’s challenges insofar as 

they relate to her privilege interests.

10, 11

C. 

Accordingly, we turn to the allegation of grand jury abuse as presented by Roe. Roe

argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing the request to conduct 

additional in camera review of documents to discern the dominant purpose of the 

government’s subpoenas. She further argues that this abuse of discretion continued when 

the court denied her motion to quash on the ground that she and Doe failed to meet their

burden under the dominant-purpose test. Finally, she contends that the facts below were 

10 Our holding is not to be understood as permitting Roe—in Doe’s absence—to 

assert privileges that exist solely between Doe and other parties, when those privileges are 

wholly untethered from the representation of Roe and materials in which she herself retains 

an interest. 11 We do not today opine on what, if any, preclusive effect our adjudication of the 

remaining Appellants’ arguments may have on a prospective appeal by Doe.

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generally sufficient to prove governmental abuse of the grand jury process. The 

government responds that the district court committed no clear error in concluding that the 

government lacked a dominant purpose of abuse when it sought the subpoenas. The 

government further responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

the motion to quash, particularly when Roe and Doe, relying on little more than speculation 

and shaky inferences, failed to meet their burden to rebut the presumption of regularity that 

attaches to grand jury proceedings.

This Court has reviewed allegations of grand jury abuse under both abuse-ofdiscretion and clear-error standards. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 175 F.3d 332, 

337 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that “we review the district court’s finding regarding [the 

government’s] purpose in seeking the [grand jury] subpoena for clear error”), and United 

States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Like questions involving intent, the 

finding of a district court regarding the sole or dominant purpose of the government in 

bringing additional witnesses before the grand jury for post-indictment questioning may be 

reversed only if it is clearly erroneous.” (simplified)), with United States v. Alvarado, 840 

F.3d 184, 188–89 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to allegations of 

grand jury abuse). To clarify, clear error applies to the district court’s factual determination 

of what a subpoena’s dominant purpose is, and abuse of discretion applies to the court’s 

derivative decision concerning how best to proceed with discovery given that initial factual 

determination.

The clear-error standard “requires a reviewing court to ask whether on the entire 

evidence, it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 

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United States v. Span, 789 F.3d 320, 325 (4th Cir. 2015) (simplified). We “will not reverse 

a lower court’s finding of fact simply because we would have decided the case differently, 

but we may find clear error where the factual determinations are not supported by 

substantial evidence.” Id. (simplified). Meanwhile, regarding the abuse-of-discretion 

standard, district courts enjoy “considerable discretion in overseeing discovery,” and “we 

will disturb a district court’s discovery rulings only if we find an abuse of discretion.” Va. 

Dep’t of Corr. v. Jordan, 921 F.3d 180, 188 (4th Cir. 2019) (simplified). “An abuse of 

discretion occurs [when] a decision is guided by erroneous legal principles . . . or rests 

upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.” United States v. Chikvashili, 859 F.3d 285, 292 

(4th Cir. 2017) (simplified). In applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, we review the 

district court’s factual conclusions for clear error, as described above, and its legal 

conclusions de novo. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 870 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2017). 

This Court “adheres to the universal rule that prosecutors cannot use grand jury 

proceedings for the sole or dominant purpose of preparing for trial on an already pending 

indictment.” Alvarado, 840 F.3d at 189 (simplified). Rather, “once a criminal defendant 

has been indicted, the government is barred from employing the grand jury for the sole or 

dominant purpose of developing additional evidence against the defendant.” Id.

(simplified). If a district court concludes that an improper sole or dominant purpose of a 

grand jury investigation exists, it has discretion to take appropriate remedial action. Id.

(simplified). 

However, we decline to diminish the importance of protecting the grand jury’s 

investigative function, on which district courts should not infringe absent “compelling 

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evidence of grand jury abuse.” Id. (citation omitted). Grand juries lack clairvoyance, and 

thus “must be allowed to investigate freely individuals suspected of involvement in crimes 

for which indictments have already been issued.” Moss, 756 F.2d at 332. The nature of 

grand jury investigations is such that they likely uncover evidence “pertinent to both 

already-indicted charges and new charges,” and the grand jury need not disregard the 

former when investigating the latter. Alvarado, 840 F.3d at 190. Thus, defendants alleging 

abuse “bear the burden of rebutting the presumption of regularity attached to a grand jury’s 

proceeding.” Id. at 189 (simplified). 

Here, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that abusive discovery was 

not the government’s sole or dominant purpose when it sought the disputed subpoenas. 

The district court clearly considered the record as a whole and rendered a well-reasoned 

conclusion under the dominant-purpose test. To begin, Roe’s theory of abuse revolves 

largely around the timing of the subpoenas’ issuance. She argues that these came directly 

on the heels of the district court in the criminal case declining to force reciprocal 

discovery—as sought by the government. But the timing of the subpoenas is of little 

moment here, particularly given that the productions sought by the subpoenas are wholly 

different from the disclosures sought by the government in the criminal proceeding. 

Rather, as the district court correctly recognized, the government largely sought reciprocal 

expert disclosures in the criminal case, not previously unacquired document production.12 

12 Even if subpoena timing was suspect, the government’s ex parte letter—discussed 

below—evinces a significant and legitimate purpose behind the subpoenas’ issuance. 

Thus, assuming that the grand jury investigation does indeed provide the government with 

(Continued)

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Thus, any additional disclosures acquired via grand jury subpoenas fail to resolve the crux 

of the government’s disagreement with the discovery ruling in the criminal proceeding—

weakening Roe’s theory of malicious intent.

Roe’s argument that the district court erred by declining to conduct an in camera

review of the entire Privilege Log 1 fairs no better. It is her burden to provide compelling 

evidence of grand jury abuse to rebut the presumption of regularity that accompanies grand 

jury subpoenas. Alvarado, 840 F.3d at 189. She effectively seeks to shift the burden to 

the district court (or the government), requiring it to search the totality of available 

evidence so as to itself accumulate sufficient support for her position. We demand no such 

undertaking by the court below.

But even if the court erred in declining to conduct in camera review of all possible 

evidence, this error was not clear given that the district court ultimately—and reasonably—

concluded that the government’s ex parte letter foreclosed a colorable argument that abuse 

was the government’s dominant purpose. “[W]here the [g]overnment makes a 

representation that an investigation is ongoing such that additional counts or additional 

defendants may be added, it cannot be said that the sole or primary motivating factor of 

the grand jury subpoena is to gather evidence on charges pending from an existing 

indictment.” United States v. Jinwright, No. 3:09-cr-00067-W, 2010 WL 99051, at *4 

(W.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2010) (citation omitted). Here, the court concluded that, after careful 

some discovery that it was otherwise denied by the district court in Doe’s criminal 

proceeding, the legitimate investigative purpose renders this result permissible. See

Alvarado, 840 F.3d at 190. 

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review of the government’s submission, it was “satisfied . . . that [the] investigation [was]

genuine and ongoing.” J.A. 742. Our own review of the government’s ex parte submission 

reifies our confidence that a legitimate investigative purpose underpinned the subpoenas. 

Thus, we cannot say with “definite and firm conviction that a mistake [was] committed” in 

the course of the district court’s dominant-purpose analysis. Span, 789 F.3d at 325

(simplified). Accordingly, the court neither clearly erred in its factual analysis, nor abused

its discretion by consequently denying Roe’s motion to quash.

D.

We next turn to the tangible work-product privilege. Appellants argue that the 

district court erred first by finding that Doe’s pursuit of a consultancy agreement with 

UMMS began prior to his representation of Roe in the underlying malpractice case, and,

second, by declining to grant work-product protections to communications pertaining to 

the consultancy because that agreement had a dual purpose that involved both the 

underlying litigation (a protected purpose) and a private business interest (an unprotected 

purpose). According to Appellants, the consultancy instead arose because of the Roe

litigation itself, and thus materials concerning the consultancy are protected by the workproduct privilege. Appellants further argue that, even if a private business purpose existed, 

the litigation purpose far outweighed it, and thus the materials should remain protected. 

The government first responds that the district court expressly assumed for the sake of 

argument that the documents pertaining to the consultancy were prepared in anticipation 

of litigation, but concluded that, despite this, they were discoverable under the crime-fraud 

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exception. The government further argues that the court correctly concluded that the 

documents that Appellants seek to protect did not arise because of the Roe litigation. 

Instead, according to the government, they were prepared because Doe sought advice, for 

his own benefit, related to his own pre-Roe desire to execute a consultancy.

“We review a district court’s ruling on privilege for abuse of discretion, factual 

findings as to whether a privilege applies for clear error, and the application of legal 

principles de novo.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 870 F.3d at 316 (simplified).

Under Rule 26, “[o]rdinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible 

things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its 

representative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). But those materials may be discovered if 

“they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1)” and the party seeking discovery 

“shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without 

undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii). This Court has clarified that, to be protected, “[t]he document must be 

prepared because of the prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual claim or a 

potential claim following an actual event or series of events that reasonably could result in 

litigation.” Nat’l Union, 967 F.2d at 984. Determining the “driving force behind the 

preparation of each requested document is therefore required in resolving a work product 

immunity question.” Id. “Materials prepared in the ordinary course of business or pursuant 

to regulatory requirements or for other non-litigation purposes are not documents prepared 

in anticipation of litigation . . . .” Id. (citation omitted). 

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Here, the district court correctly construed the consultancy agreement and related 

tangible work product as not arising because of the prospect of litigation. Thus, the court 

properly concluded that work-product privilege does not bar production. Reviewing the 

court’s factual determinations for clear error, it is apparent that Doe sought execution of 

the consultancy agreement separate and apart from the prospect of litigation in Roe’s 

underlying case. To be sure, Doe made several comments to UMMS representatives 

throughout their negotiations indicating that the consultancy agreement derived from, and 

was an intertwined component of, the settlement of Roe’s claims. See, e.g., J.A. 451 (Doe

effectively agreeing that the consultancy and settlement are intertwined); 560 (Doe

agreeing that the consultancy and settlement “go hand-in-hand, they’re in tandem. You 

know, we can’t sort of resolve one without the other”). But these positions amount to little 

more than negotiation tactics at best, or extortive pressures, at worst, geared towards the 

realization of his ideal outcome. When testifying under oath during his ethics proceeding 

and his deposition, his tune changed entirely, conveying instead that his consultancy 

scheme existed wholly apart from the Roe case. For example, he stated that the settlement 

and the consultancy “always were separate and apart, and we perceived her case as a 

separate entity and the consultancy as a separate entity, always.” J.A. 1798. He also stated 

that the consultancy and settlement “all along, [] were two separate things.” J.A. 1883. 

Appellants cannot have their cake and eat it too in this regard. Doe seemed to 

change positions depending on the context—when coercing UMMS to pay up, his story 

was that the consultancy was borne of the settlement, and thus manifested because of the 

prospect of litigation. But when seeking to avoid potential ethical exposure arising from 

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35

such a substantial personal stake in a painstakingly contrived outcome, he swore that the 

consultancy was a separate beast with absolutely no bearing on his representation of Roe. 

Certainly, a district court does not clearly err when relying on sworn statements over 

negotiation-driven puffery. So, the district court’s consequent legal determination that the 

“driving force behind the preparation” of documents relating to the consultancy was Doe’s 

own wholly independent business interest withstands de novo review. Nat’l Union, 967 

F.2d at 984. Thus, the court properly applied National Union’s “because of” test, 

concluding that tangible work product related to the consulting agreement is 

discoverable.13

E.

Turning to the opinion work-product privilege, Appellants argue that the district 

court erred by finding that the crime-fraud exception renders opinion work product 

discoverable despite the usual privilege. First, they contend that the court below 

misapplied this Court’s decisions in In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1981), and Hanson 

v. United States Agency for International Development, 372 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2004), by 

concluding that alleged misconduct by Doe forfeited the privilege held by his innocent 

client—Roe. Second, Appellants argue the district court abused its discretion by finding 

the crime-fraud exception applicable to Doe based solely on the criminal indictment—and 

13 Notably, even if the disputed material had been prepared because of the prospect 

of litigation—thus warranting protection as tangible work product—the crime-fraud 

exception, discussed below, would still render it discoverable.

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36

without regard for Doe’s evidence that he lacked criminal intent. The government responds 

first that the district court properly applied Doe and Hanson, and second that there is no 

reason to believe that the district court ignored Doe’s intent evidence or otherwise clearly 

erred by relying on the indictment when applying the crime-fraud exception.

As discussed, “we review a district court’s ruling on privilege for abuse of 

discretion, factual findings as to whether a privilege applies for clear error, and the 

application of legal principles de novo.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 870 F.3d at 316 

(simplified).

Under Rule 26(b)(3)(B), a district court ordering discovery “must protect against 

disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s 

attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.” Notably, this Court recognizes

that opinion work product “enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered by 

adverse parties only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances.” In re Search Warrant 

Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d 159, 174 (4th Cir. 2019) (simplified). One such privilegeeroding circumstance is when the protected material’s purpose is to further a crime or fraud. 

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings #5 Empanelled Jan. 28, 2004, 401 F.3d 247, 251 (4th 

Cir. 2005). This is colloquially known as the crime-fraud exception. 

“The party asserting the crime-fraud exception . . . must make a prima facie showing 

that the privileged communications fall within the exception.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Specifically, the invoker must show that “(1) the client was engaged in or planning a 

criminal or fraudulent scheme when he sought the advice of counsel to further the scheme, 

and (2) the documents containing the privileged materials bear a close relationship to the 

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client’s existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.” Id. (citation omitted). The 

first prong is satisfied by an evidentiary showing that “would establish the elements of 

some violation that was ongoing or about to be committed.” Id. (citations omitted). The 

second prong is satisfied by “a showing of a close relationship between the attorney-client 

communications and the possible criminal or fraudulent activity.” Id. (citation omitted).

In the context of tangible work product, a showing that the crime-fraud exception 

applies does not require proof either by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See id. Instead, the proof “must be such as to subject the opposing party 

to the risk of non-persuasion if the evidence as to the disputed fact is left unrebutted.” Id.

(simplified). But because opinion work product is more strictly protected, “more than 

prima facie evidence” is required to overcome the privilege. Id. at 252 n.3 (citation 

omitted). However, this Court has clarified that “[p]rima facie evidence of the illegal 

activities of an attorney clearly suffices as an extraordinary circumstance” justifying the 

discovery of opinion work product. Id. (citation omitted). Finally, although such a 

showing may warrant a finding in favor of the offering party—here, the government—it 

does not compel such a finding. Id. at 251. 

Appellants effectively argue that even if the crime-fraud exception would otherwise 

apply, the fact of Roe’s innocence in any scheme allows her to claim privileges otherwise 

lost to Doe—thereby protecting him, too. To be sure, this Court has recognized that “an 

attorney may not unilaterally waive the privilege that his client enjoys. ‘[T]he ability to 

protect work product normally extends to both clients and attorneys, and the attorney or 

the client, expressly or by conduct, can waive or forfeit it, but only as to himself.’” Hanson, 

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372 F.3d at 294 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 

1079). But this Court decided Hanson in the context of the client itself participating as the 

defendant in a litigation, and there existing a potential waiver by the defendant-client’s 

attorney. We have not yet addressed a situation in which an innocent, third-party client 

intervenes to assert a privilege otherwise lost to a defendant attorney. The situation here 

is especially unique given that the original suit implicating the innocent client’s interests

has concluded via settlement. In other words, Roe retains little personal stake in her 

privileges as they relate to her claims against UMMS because she and the hospital have 

settled. Thus, the continued confidentiality of Doe’s theories and opinions regarding her 

case is no longer strictly necessary for strategic purposes. 

Given the unique posture of this dispute, consideration of the policy behind workproduct protections is instructive. “The work product rule recognizes the lawyer’s services 

as an indispensable part of the judicial scheme, but it was not designed as a fringe benefit 

for protecting lawyers who, for their personal advantage, abuse it.” In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 

1079. To bar discovery here would frustrate this Court’s policy of preventing abuse, while 

simultaneously doing nothing to further our interest in protecting innocent clients because 

Roe needs no protection—her case has settled. 

As we explained in Grand Jury Proceedings #5, “[p]rima facie evidence of the 

illegal activities of an attorney clearly suffices as an extraordinary circumstance needed to 

discover opinion work product.” 401 F.3d at 252 n.3 (citation omitted). An innocent 

client’s willingness to go to bat for their lawyer—with little to no enduring personal stake 

in confidentiality—is not a compelling reason to disallow discovery. At least some of our 

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sister circuits agree. See, e.g., In re Impounded Cases (Law Firm), 879 F.2d 1211, 1213–

14 (3d Cir. 1989) (“It is not apparent to us what interest is truly served by permitting an 

attorney to prevent this type of investigation of his own alleged criminal conduct by 

asserting an innocent client’s privilege with respect to documents tending to show criminal 

activity by the lawyer. . . . [T]he values implicated, particularly the search for the truth, 

weigh heavily in favor of denying [] privilege in these circumstances.”); Drummond Co., 

Inc. v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP, 885 F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir. 2018) (crime-fraud 

exception applied when attorney or firm engaged in crime or fraud but client did not); 

Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795, 799–800 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (remanding for a district court to 

consider whether attorney’s alleged misconduct outweighed client’s legitimate interest in 

secrecy). Thus, we conclude that Roe’s innocence does not bar application of the crimefraud exception under these circumstances. 

Finally, we review for clear error the district court’s conclusion that sufficient 

evidence of fraud exists such that the exception applies. Nothing in the district court’s 

order indicates that it ignored evidence presented by Appellants portraying Doe’s lack of 

criminal intent. The court instead stated that it “carefully reviewed each of [the parties’] 

filings, their attached exhibits, and the recording of the meet and confer.” J.A. 2309. 

Simply because Appellants disagree with the ultimate outcome does not render the district 

court’s decision erroneous. We cannot thus conclude that the court clearly erred by relying 

on the criminal indictment as sufficient evidence of fraud, nor that the court abused its 

discretion by proceeding to apply the crime-fraud exception, rendering discoverable Doe’s 

opinion work product. 

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F.

Lastly, we consider the attorney-client privilege. Appellants argue that the district 

court erred by finding that Roe waived her attorney-client privilege by cooperating with 

Bar Counsel—pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-707(b)(1)—during Maryland’s ethics 

investigation into Doe. The government responds that the district court properly found that 

Roe’s numerous voluntary disclosures of substantive discussions with Doe to Bar Counsel

effectively waived any attorney-client privilege.

This Court reviews attorney-client-privilege determinations by district courts

“under a two-fold standard of review.” Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 382 (4th Cir. 

1998) (citation omitted). If the district court’s ruling relied on findings of fact, we review 

for clear error. Id. But if it relied on legal principles, we review de novo. Id. 

The attorney-client-privilege is “the oldest of the privileges for confidential 

communications known to the common law.” In re Search Warrant, 942 F.3d at 172–73 

(simplified). It empowers the client, as the privilege holder, to “refuse to disclose and to 

prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications between him and 

his attorney.” Id. at 173 (simplified). But the privilege “impedes the full and free discovery 

of truth,” and so must be “narrowly construed.” Hawkins, 148 F.3d at 383. 

“Any voluntary disclosure of privileged or protected information typically waives 

[] attorney-client privilege.” In re Grand Jury 16-3817 (16-4), 740 F. App’x at 246 (citing 

In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 622–23 (4th Cir. 1988)); see also Burlington 

Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974) (“Once [a] party begins to disclose 

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any confidential communication for a purpose outside the scope of the privilege, the 

privilege is lost for all communications relating to the same matter.”). The burden of 

establishing that the privilege applies is on its proponent. Hawkins, 148 F.3d at 383

(citation omitted). 

Here, the district court’s conclusion that Roe waived the attorney-client privilege 

relied on findings of fact that we review for clear error—and the court did not clearly err. 

First, the investigation during which Roe provided an interview implicated only Doe, and 

Roe was under no obligation to participate. She did so voluntarily. Second, her voluntary 

disclosures went to the heart of Doe’s representation of her and included express discussion 

of the consultancy scheme. See generally J.A. 2318–19 (district court citing specific 

portions of Bar Counsel’s interview memorandum that clearly demonstrate that Roe was 

entirely forthcoming regarding Doe’s representation of her). Finally, although Appellants

argue that Roe only “cooperated with Bar Counsel under the auspices of Maryland Rule 

19-707(b)(1),” Opening Br. 35, that rule clearly provides that interview confidentiality 

extends only “until Bar Counsel files a petition for disciplinary or remedial action” in a 

matter, which it did here on July 13, 2020. Md. R. P. 19-707(b)(1). Thus, Roe waived any

attorney-client privilege when she acquiesced to the interview by Bar Counsel, particularly 

in the wake of Bar Counsel’s July 13 petition.

III.

Because we lack jurisdiction to consider Doe’s arguments given the Supreme 

Court’s effective narrowing of the Perlman doctrine, we dismiss him from this appeal. We 

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otherwise discern no reversible error below, and the parties must proceed to comply with 

the disputed subpoenas duces tecum in accordance with the district court’s order 

compelling production and this opinion.

DISMISSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART

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