IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 19, 2016

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES LACKEY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for White County

No. 2012-CR-5631 David Alan Patterson, Judge

No. M2015-01508-CCA-R3-CD – Filed July 27, 2016

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, James Lackey, was convicted of one count of 

second degree murder, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-210, for which he 

received a sentence of twenty-two years to be served at one-hundred percent. On appeal, 

the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, 

arguing that the proof supported a finding that he acted in self-defense, and (2) that the 

twenty-two year sentence imposed was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Manuel Benjamin Russ, Nashville, Tennessee (on appeal), and John Philip Parsons, 

Cookeville, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, James Lackey.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; M. Todd Ridley, Assistant 

Attorney General; Bryant C. Dunaway, District Attorney General; and Gary McKenzie 

and Phillip Hatch, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 28, 2012, the Defendant was indicted for the first degree premeditated 

murder of the victim, James Caldwell. The case proceeded to trial in January 2014, 

where the following evidence was adduced. Around 1:30 a.m. on February 23, 2012, 
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Deputy Steven Daugherty of the Bedford County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”) received a 

phone call from the Defendant. According to Deputy Daugherty, the Defendant’s “voice 

was pretty shaken[,] and [he] could tell something was wrong.” The Defendant asked for 

Deputy Daugherty’s help, saying that the deputy “was the only one he could trust.” 

Deputy Daugherty explained that on that date, he had known the Defendant for 

approximately six months from their “shared hobby” of “work[ing] on Jeeps.” The 

Defendant told Deputy Daugherty that he had shot someone and that he needed help 

contacting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). 

Deputy Daugherty contacted his supervisor and “instructed [the Defendant] to 

meet [him] at the [BCSO].” The deputy estimated that the Defendant arrived at the 

BCSO two hours later. When the Defendant arrived, Lieutenant Nikia Elliott of the 

BCSO went to the Defendant’s truck, where he saw a gun in the front passenger seat; 

however, the gun was not removed at that time. Deputy Daugherty sat down with the 

Defendant and asked where the shooting had taken place. The Defendant was unable to 

provide a street address, but with the assistance of a global positioning system, the deputy 

was able to ascertain the location, which was in White County. Also, the Defendant 

confirmed that the victim was deceased. 

Agent Larry Davis of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) was 

dispatched to the BCSO to take the Defendant’s statement. The Defendant’s statement 

was recorded and played for the jury. In his statement, the Defendant told Agent Davis 

that he went to see the victim that night to talk to him. The Defendant explained that 

several weeks earlier, the Defendant had been at the victim’s home in Warren County

when the TBI conducted a drug raid. The Defendant’s brother, Tommy Lackey,1lived 

with the victim, and the Defendant was at the home to assist Tommy with repairing a 

horse trailer. About twenty minutes after the Defendant arrived, TBI drug task force 

agents arrived and searched the house. The Defendant claimed that after TBI agents left 

the victim’s home, there were drugs strewn throughout the house. In particular, the 

Defendant said there was methamphetamine and marijuana. The Defendant said that 

“didn’t seem right to [him]” and “made [him] suspicious of what was going on.” The 

Defendant also said that a gun had been confiscated from his truck during the raid, but it 

was returned to him within a week.

The Defendant told Agent Davis that he met with the victim several times after the 

drug raid to discuss what had happened. According to the Defendant, he was “trying to 

figure out . . . what was going on” and was concerned about Tommy. The Defendant 

explained that he was suspicious because no one had been arrested following the raid and 

 

1 Because the Defendant and his brother share a surname, we refer to Tommy by his given name to avoid 

confusion. We intend no disrespect in doing so.
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because drugs were left in the house. The Defendant wanted to ensure that “the victim 

didn’t get out of everybody’s reach.” The Defendant said that the victim was “trying to 

blame everything on [Tommy].” The Defendant told Agent Davis that he was keeping up 

with the victim for two reasons: (1) “there was something wrong with the [drug] bust” 

and (2) he “didn’t trust [the victim].” 

At some point after the raid, the Defendant was involved in a confrontation with 

the victim. The Defendant said that he was with Tommy when the victim showed up. 

The victim was angry, and the Defendant admitted pulling a gun on the victim. The 

victim told the Defendant that he did not have a gun and that the Defendant did not need 

to pull a gun on him. The Defendant told the victim that he did not trust him, that he

knew that the victim had previously been convicted of murder, and that he was just trying 

to protect his brother. According to the Defendant, at the time of this confrontation he 

had heard that the victim believed that the Defendant was a “snitch” and that he was 

responsible for the TBI’s raid at the victim’s home. The encounter ended, and the 

Defendant said that he lost contact with the victim after that.

The Defendant said that after losing touch with the victim for about a week, 

Tommy called the Defendant on February 22 and said that the victim was ready to talk. 

Tommy told the Defendant where the victim was staying, and the Defendant drove from 

his mother’s house in Manchester to the house where the victim was staying in White 

County, arriving around 12:00 a.m. The Defendant said that Tommy had been at the 

house earlier but was gone by the time he arrived. According to the Defendant, he “was 

real cautious” when he went to see the victim that night because he had been told that the 

victim and his family would “have snipers shoot him and all kinds of stuff.” The 

Defendant told Agent Davis “it was just a matter of time before somebody was killed,” 

and he knew he had “a target” on his back. 

The Defendant said that the door to the house was open, and he let himself in, 

telling Agent Davis that the victim’s “leg was bad,” so he did not expect him to answer 

the door. After entering the house, the Defendant called out to let the victim know he had 

arrived, and the victim said he was in the back. The Defendant went to a bedroom in the 

back of the house, where he found the victim who was sitting on the bed. The Defendant 

claimed he was “pretty nervous” and said that “it was just like [the victim] had it planned 

out for [the Defendant] to come up there.” The victim lit a cigarette, and then, according 

to the Defendant, the victim reached for a gun with his left hand from the “side of the 

bed.” The Defendant said that his gun was in a holster on his hip, which he took out as 

soon as he thought he saw the victim reach for his gun. According to the Defendant, 

“before [the victim] ever got a chance to point at [him], [the Defendant] fired.” The 

Defendant shot the victim in his chest, and the victim fell back on the bed. The 

Defendant claimed that the victim sat back up and pointed a gun at him, and the 
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Defendant fired a second shot, hitting the victim in his head. He estimated that he was 

eight to ten feet from the victim when he fired the shots.

The Defendant said that he checked the victim’s pulse and then left the house 

immediately because the victim had “kinfolk” nearby, and the Defendant was worried 

that someone might have heard the gunshots and would come after him. He estimated 

that he was in the house for a total of five minutes. The Defendant said that he did not 

see where the victim’s gun was and did not look for it after shooting him. After leaving, 

the Defendant called Tommy and instructed him to stay away from the house. The 

Defendant told Agent Davis that the victim was “known to keep a gun with him wherever 

he’s at.”

Sheriff Oddie Shoupe of the White County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”) was 

notified about the shooting and arrived at the scene at 4:15 a.m. Sheriff Shoupe parked at 

the bottom of the driveway and walked up to the house; he estimated the driveway was 

350 feet long. The door to the house was open, and the sheriff entered the residence. 

Sheriff Shoupe found the victim in a bedroom. He observed that the victim was lying on 

his back on the bed and that he was deceased. Sheriff Shoupe said that it was still dark 

outside when he arrived. According to the sheriff, the lighting in the bedroom was “low,” 

but he was able to “see the room and everything in it quite well.” After securing the 

house, Sheriff Shoupe exited the residence and taped off the area.

WCSO Detective Chris Isom was assigned as the lead investigator on the case. 

Detective Isom testified that the bedroom where the victim’s body was found was “welllit,” noting that a lamp and the television were on. The victim had two visible gunshot 

wounds—one to his chest and another under his right ear. Two shell casings were 

recovered from the room, one was located on a dresser, which was to the right of the bed, 

and the other was on the bed to the right of the victim’s body. Detective Isom said that 

the placement of the casings was unusual because, based on the Defendant’s account of 

what happened, he would have expected the casings to be in close proximity to one 

another. More specifically, Detective Isom said that one shell casing—the one recovered 

from the dresser—was consistent with the victim’s being shot while he was sitting on the 

bed. However, the second casing—which was on the bed—was more consistent with the 

shooter “stepp[ing] closer” to the bed, “invert[ing]” the gun, and lowering it. According 

to Detective Isom, the victim’s home was searched, but no guns were found. Also, 

Detective Isom said that the victim had a cell phone on his belt on his right side.

On cross-examination, Detective Isom admitted that it was possible that one of the 

casings could have hit and bounced off the wall, landing away from the other casing. 

Detective Isom opined that, based on the location of the victim’s head wound, he did not 

believe the victim was sitting up at the time he was shot in the head. On re-direct 
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examination, Detective Isom said that he thought it was unlikely that one of the casings 

bounced off the wall.

Agent Dan Friel of the TBI assisted with the investigation. He identified a text 

message sent from the Defendant’s cell phone to Tommy’s cell phone at 3:27 a.m. on 

February 22, 2012.2 The text message read, “tell big jim he can run but he cnt hide for 

lng i will be seeing yall in a few hes got yall fooled but not me hes a low life pos.”3 

Agent Friel said that “pos” meant “piece of s--t.” 

Agent Friel took a statement from the Defendant on the evening of February 23 at 

the WCSO, accompanied by Detective Isom. Agent Friel said that the statement was not 

recorded and that his recollection of the interview was based on notes he had taken. In 

that statement, the Defendant told Agent Friel that he had been present at a drug raid that 

occurred at the victim’s home on February 2. The Defendant said that the victim 

suspected that the Defendant was a snitch but that he and the victim met several times 

after the drug raid and before the shooting. The Defendant told Agent Friel that on the 

night of the shooting, he had been at his mother’s house and that Tommy had called him 

and told him the victim wanted to meet to “talk stuff out.” The Defendant was wearing a 

black shirt, black pants, and black boots and had a gun with him.

The Defendant went to the victim’s house, saw that the door was open, and went 

inside. He “called for [the victim],” who stated he was in the back. The Defendant also 

said that he yelled “U.S. Marshalls” when he entered the house, explaining that he knew 

the victim was wanted by the U.S. Marshall so he thought it would be funny. The 

Defendant told Agent Friel that he walked to the bedroom where the victim was, that the 

victim lit a cigarette, and that he saw the victim reach for something with his left hand. 

The Defendant then pulled out his gun and shot the victim in the chest, but the victim sat 

back up and pointed a gun at him. The Defendant said he was not sure, but he might 

have stepped closer to the victim before shooting the victim in the head. The Defendant

described the victim’s gun as a black “sub-compact.”

Agent Friel testified that the Defendant’s statement was inconsistent with the 

evidence at the scene, explaining that the location of the shell casings did not match the 

Defendant’s account. The Defendant told Agent Friel that he called Tommy after the 

murder. Agent Friel testified that the last call made from the Defendant’s cell phone to 

Tommy occurred at 11:54 p.m. Agent Friel said that the Defendant did not call law 

 

2 The cell phone records had been previously authenticated and introduced by a records custodian for 

Verizon Wireless.

3 We have reproduced the text message exactly as it appears in the cell phone records.
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enforcement to report what occurred until he arrived back at his mother’s house in 

Manchester. The Defendant told Agent Friel that he changed clothes before driving to 

the BCSO.

Agent Friel was aware that the Defendant had a firearm seized on February 2, 

2012, which had subsequently been returned to him. He said that when the gun was 

seized, a record was made of the serial number and make and model.

Dr. Adele Lewis testified as an expert in forensic pathology. She performed the 

victim’s autopsy. Dr. Lewis testified that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds. One 

wound was to the “middle part of his chest” and the other was to the right side of his head 

near his ear. According to Dr. Lewis, the bullet that entered the chest hit the aorta and 

left lung. She opined that this injury would have very likely been fatal. She further 

opined that it was very unlikely that someone with this type of injury would be able to sit 

up. She said that this bullet traveled from front to back and downward, which was 

consistent with the shooter standing over the victim. The bullet that entered the victim’s 

head entered below the right ear and traveled through the brain stem and exited the left 

side of the head. According to Dr. Lewis, the trajectory of this bullet went from behind 

the ear and up through the victim’s head. Dr. Lewis said that it was “very unlikely” and 

“not physically possible” for the bullet to have been fired downward. Rather, she opined 

that it was more likely that the victim was lying down when the bullet entered his head. 

Dr. Lewis testified that the gun was fired from an indeterminate range but was at least 

three feet away.

The Defendant testified that he met the victim through Tommy on the day of the 

February 2 drug raid. On that day, Tommy called the Defendant and asked him to work 

on a horse trailer located on the victim’s property. According to the Defendant, Tommy 

and his wife had been living with the victim for three to four months. The Defendant 

described Tommy and the victim’s relationship as being “like brothers.” The Defendant 

said that just after he arrived, members of the TBI Drug Task Force raided the victim’s 

house. According to the Defendant, the TBI found “a large amount of marijuana,” a 

shotgun, a rifle, and two handguns. The Defendant said that the TBI also searched his 

truck and seized his handgun, for which the Defendant had a permit. The Defendant said 

his gun was later returned to him.

After the raid, the Defendant met with the victim several times. On one occasion, 

they met at a motel in Manchester where they discussed the drug raid. The victim told 

the Defendant that he was “concern[ed] for his [own] life” and “thought that his family 

was going to have him killed.” Further, the victim told the Defendant that “he was not 

going back to prison.” According to the Defendant, the victim thought the Defendant 

could help connect him with law enforcement to protect him because the Defendant had 

previously worked as an informant, and the victim was considering testifying against 
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members of his family who were involved in the drug trade. The Defendant said that the 

victim “went on the run from there,” and he lost touch with the victim. 

When asked why he was meeting with the victim, the Defendant said it was 

because of “what [he saw] during the drug bust.” The Defendant elaborated, saying that 

he observed TBI agents move a suitcase from Tommy’s bedroom to the victim’s 

bedroom, where they took pictures of it, that no one was arrested, and that after the 

agents left, “there [were] drugs everywhere” in the house.

After the raid, the Defendant became aware that the victim thought he had been a 

“snitch” and was responsible for the TBI’s raid at his house. The Defendant admitted 

that he had been involved in an altercation with the victim, during which he pulled a gun 

on the victim. The Defendant said that he was with Tommy one day when the victim 

showed up and “was mad at [Tommy].” The Defendant said that he pulled a gun on the 

victim because he thought the victim “would probably have a gun” and was “coming . . . 

to shoot [Tommy].”

On the night of the murder, Tommy called the Defendant, telling him that he knew 

where the victim was staying. According to the Defendant, the victim had “a bad leg” 

and “was taking prescription medication,” which he had been unable to obtain while “on 

the run from law enforcement.” The Defendant alleged that he went to the victim’s that 

night to “see what the problem was,” surmising that the victim “was suicidal probably 

and homicidal.” The Defendant said that the victim was expecting him, and he parked at 

the bottom of the driveway and walked up to the house. He entered the house through the 

back door, which was open, and he “hollered” to let the victim know he was there. The 

victim responded that he was “in the back,” and the Defendant walked to a bedroom in 

the back of the house. According to the Defendant, when he entered the room the victim 

pulled a gun from his left side. The Defendant said that the victim’s gun “looked like a 

[.]380 or a sub-compact Glock.” Upon seeing this, the Defendant drew his gun and fired 

at the victim; he waited “a couple seconds” and then fired again. The Defendant 

estimated that he was six feet away from the victim when he fired the first shot and that 

he took a step backward before firing the second shot. The Defendant checked the 

victim’s pulse after the second shot and then left.

The Defendant said that he was afraid the victim had lured him to the house to kill 

him, but he went anyway because he thought the victim needed his help. According to 

the Defendant, he did not turn himself in to White County authorities because he “did not 

trust law enforcement in White County [or] [the victim’s] family.”

On cross-examination, the Defendant acknowledged that he had previously 

worked with the police as an informant, but he denied being paranoid about someone 

finding out. The Defendant said that he became worried after he found out that the 
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victim thought he was a “snitch.” The Defendant admitted that as a result of his gun 

being seized on the day of the drug raid, police had a record of the make, model number, 

and serial number of his gun. 

The Defendant agreed that after initially meeting with the victim following the 

drug raid, he lost touch with the victim. However, he denied looking for the victim. 

Nevertheless, he admitted that he called Tommy multiple times on February 22 and that 

Tommy told him where the victim was. 

Upon this proof, the jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser-included offense of 

second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years to 

serve at one-hundred percent.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant first contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction. The Defendant does not deny responsibility for the victim’s death. Rather, 

he asserts that the State failed to disprove his claim that he acted in self-defense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The State responds that there was adequate evidence that the 

Defendant did not act in self-defense and asks that we affirm the conviction.

An appellate court’s standard of review when the defendant questions the 

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319 (1979). This court does not reweigh the evidence; rather, it presumes that the jury 

has resolved all conflicts in the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence in favor of the State. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); 

State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions regarding witness 

credibility, conflicts in testimony, and the weight and value to be given to evidence were 

resolved by the jury. See State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).

A guilty verdict “removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a 

presumption of guilt, and [on appeal] the defendant has the burden of illustrating why the 

evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; State v. 

Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). A guilty verdict “may not be based solely 

upon conjecture, guess, speculation, or a mere possibility.” State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 

125, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). However, “[t]here is no requirement that the State’s 

proof be uncontroverted or perfect.” State v. Williams, 657, S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 
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1983). Put another way, the State is not burdened with “an affirmative duty to rule out 

every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

326.

The above standard “applies to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of [both] direct and circumstantial evidence.” 

State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Our supreme 

court has held that circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence. State v. 

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379-81 (Tenn. 2011). In doing so, the supreme court rejected 

the previous standard which “required the State to prove facts and circumstances so 

strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the 

defendant, and that beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 380 (quoting State v. Crawford, 

470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tenn. 1971)) (quotation marks omitted).

Instead, “direct and circumstantial evidence should be treated the same when 

weighing the sufficiency of such evidence.” Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 381. The reason 

for this is because with both direct and circumstantial evidence, “a jury is asked to weigh 

the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy 

or ambiguous inference . . . .” Id. at 380 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 

140 (1954)). To that end, the duty of this court “on appeal of a conviction is not to 

contemplate all plausible inferences in the [d]efendant’s favor, but to draw all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence in favor of the State.” State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 67

(Tenn. 2011).

The jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included-offense of second degree 

murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. There is no question that the Defendant 

killed the victim; rather, the crux of the Defendant’s sufficiency challenge is that the 

State failed to refute his claim that he acted in self-defense. Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 39-11-611(b)(2) provides as follows:

[A] person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where 

the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or 

using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if: 

(A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent 

danger of death or serious bodily injury; 

(B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious 

bodily injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and 

(C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.
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Self-defense is a factual question for the jury to resolve. State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 

737, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1993). When a defendant relies upon a theory of self-defense, it is the State’s burden to 

show that the defendant did not act in self-defense. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 

2001). However, it is within the prerogative of the jury to reject a claim of self-defense. 

State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). 

In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed that the victim 

suspected the Defendant had worked as an informant for the TBI and was responsible for 

a drug raid at the victim’s house that took place three weeks prior to the murder. 

Although the Defendant and the victim met several times to discuss the raid, the 

Defendant eventually lost touch with the victim. The Defendant was concerned that the 

victim was going to evade law enforcement and that his brother, Tommy, would be held 

solely responsible for the drugs and guns recovered during the raid. Prior to the murder, 

the Defendant and the victim were involved in an altercation where the Defendant pulled 

a gun on the victim. Despite the Defendant’s testimony that the victim was known to 

always carry a gun, the victim told the Defendant he was not carrying a weapon during 

that earlier altercation. 

Less than twenty-four hours before the murder, the Defendant sent Tommy a text 

message, referring to the victim as a “pos,” meaning “piece of s--t,” and stating that he 

could run but that he could not hide for long. The Defendant admitted to calling Tommy 

several times in an attempt to locate the victim, and on the evening of February 22, 2012, 

Tommy told the Defendant where the victim was staying. Despite feeling like he had “a 

target” on his back, the Defendant traveled alone to see the victim at approximately 12:00 

a.m., taking his gun with him. The Defendant gave conflicting stories as to why he went 

to see the victim that night: during his initial interview with Agent Davis, he alleged that 

he just wanted to talk to the victim, while at trial he testified that the victim had medical 

issues and the Defendant wanted to check on him. When he arrived at the house, rather 

than parking his car near the house, he parked at the bottom of the driveway and walked 

uphill approximately 350 feet.

Although the Defendant claimed that the victim had a gun, investigators found no 

guns in the house. Likewise, investigators testified that the Defendant’s account of what 

transpired was inconsistent with the physical evidence at the scene. Specifically, the 

location of the shell casings suggested that after the Defendant shot the victim in the 

chest, he stepped closer to the victim and lowered the gun when firing the second shot 

into the victim’s head. Likewise, the medical examiner opined that it was “not physically 

possible” that the bullet that entered the victim’s head traveled in a downward trajectory. 

Rather, she testified that it was more likely that the victim was lying down when that shot 

was fired, and she questioned whether the victim would have been capable of sitting up 
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after the first gunshot given the catastrophic nature of the wound sustained to the chest. 

This testimony contradicted the Defendant’s assertion that the victim sat back up after the 

first gunshot and pointed a gun at the Defendant.

In sum, the State provided sufficient evidence refuting the Defendant’s claim that 

he acted in self-defense, and the jury’s verdict shows that it also found the Defendant’s 

account lacking. The Defendant’s assertion that his version of events was 

“uncontroverted” is simply incorrect. We defer to the jury’s ultimate decision to reject 

the claim of self-defense, for which there is ample support in the record. Accordingly, 

the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

II. Sentencing

Next, the Defendant contends that his twenty-two-year sentence is excessive. He 

asserts that the trial court failed to engage in the requisite analysis when imposing his 

sentence, and he asks that we conduct a de novo review of his sentence. The Defendant 

further asserts that our supreme court’s decision in State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 

2012), whereby the court held that the appropriate standard of review for sentencing 

decisions is an abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness, is contrary to 

the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-401(d) and is incorrect. 

Therefore, the Defendant asserts that even if we conclude that the trial court’s analysis 

was sufficient, a de novo standard of review is appropriate. The State disagrees, asserting 

that the trial court’s sentencing decision should be affirmed upon review under the abuse 

of discretion standard and responding that this court has no authority to overrule the 

supreme court’s decision in Bise. On this second point, we agree with the State and 

decline the Defendant’s invitation to revisit Bise as we have no authority to overrule our 

supreme court. We proceed to consider whether the Defendant’s sentence is excessive 

based on currently applicable law.

Before a trial court imposes a sentence upon a convicted criminal defendant, it 

must consider: (a) the evidence adduced at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the 

presentence report; (c) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing 

alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) 

evidence and information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating 

factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; (f) any 

statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to 

Tennessee sentencing practices for similar offenses; and (g) any statement the defendant 

wishes to make in the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-210(b). To facilitate appellate review, “it is critical that trial courts adhere to the 

statutory requirement set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210(e)” and 
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articulate in the record its reasons for imposing the specific sentence. See Bise, 380 

S.W.3d at 705 n.41.

The 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act “served to increase the discretionary 

authority of trial courts in sentencing.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 708. Currently, upon a

challenge to the length of the sentence imposed, it is the duty of this court to analyze the 

issues under “an abuse of discretion standard of review, granting a presumption of 

reasonableness to within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of 

the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” Id. at 707. Those purposes and 

principles include “the imposition of a sentence justly deserved in relation to the 

seriousness of the offense,” Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102(1), a

punishment sufficient “to prevent crime and promote respect for the law,” Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 40-35-102(3), and consideration of a defendant’s “potential or 

lack of potential for . . . rehabilitation,” Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(5). 

State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Tenn. 2007). The burden of showing that a 

sentence is improper is upon the appealing party. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, 

Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.; see also State v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001).

Our amended Sentencing Act no longer imposes a presumptive sentence. Carter, 

254 S.W.3d at 343. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210 was amended to 

provide as follows:

(c) The court shall impose a sentence within the range of punishment, 

determined by whether the defendant is a mitigated, standard, persistent, 

career, or repeat violent offender. In imposing a specific sentence within 

the range of punishment, the court shall consider, but is not bound by, the 

following advisory sentencing guidelines:

(1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the 

sentence that should be imposed, because the general assembly set the 

minimum length of sentence for each felony class to reflect the relative 

seriousness of each criminal offense in the felony classifications; and

(2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as 

appropriate, by the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement 

factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.

(d) The sentence length within the range should be consistent with the 

purposes and principles of this chapter.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c), (d).
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“[T]he 2005 amendments rendered advisory the manner in which the trial court 

selects a sentence within the appropriate range, allowing the trial court to be guided by—

but not bound by—any applicable enhancement or mitigating factors when adjusting the 

length of a sentence.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. In accordance with the broad discretion 

now afforded a trial court’s sentencing decision,

misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate 

the sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 

Act, as amended in 2005. So long as there are other reasons consistent with 

the purposes and principles of sentencing, as provided by statute, a sentence 

imposed by the trial court within the appropriate range should be upheld.

Id.

As a Range I offender convicted of a Class A felony, the Defendant’s sentence 

range was fifteen to twenty-five years. See Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-112(a)(1). When

reaching its sentencing decision, the trial court noted it was “considering [Tennessee 

Code Annotated section] 40-35-210,” specifically mentioning the six criteria in that 

statute. The court stated that when determining the length of the Defendant’s sentence, it 

was bound to impose a sentence that was “no greater than that deserved for the offense 

and . . . the least severe necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence [was] 

imposed.”

The court began by addressing the Defendant’s social history, noting that he was 

thirty-nine years old and was married. The Defendant’s sister testified at the sentencing 

hearing that the Defendant had five children and that they were “a close knit family,”

which the court took into consideration. Further, the Defendant had no criminal history, 

a relatively stable employment history, and only minor health conditions. The court 

applied mitigating factor (10) of section 40-35-113, stating that the Defendant provided 

the murder weapon to and cooperated with law enforcement officers and “shortened the 

length of time that it took for certain issues to be resolved in this case.” The court 

recounted the circumstances of the offense, stating that it “place[d] a great deal of weight 

in its [sentencing] decision” on the details of the crime. The court applied enhancement 

factor (9)—that the Defendant possessed or employed a firearm during the commission of 

the crime.

The court concluded by stating that it “doesn’t begin at the end of the range [but] . 

. . applies enhancement and mitigating factors as an opportunity” to impose an 

appropriate sentence between fifteen and twenty-five years. It noted that based on “the 

enhancement factor and circumstances of the offense . . . in light of the mitigators [sic] 

and the social history of the [D]efendant,” the State’s recommendation of a twenty-twoyear sentence was “very appropriate.”
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The Defendant contends that the trial court failed to articulate how it weighed the 

applicable mitigating and enhancement factors. He asserts that this failure requires that 

this court undertake a de novo review of the sentence imposed. However, we note that 

“[m]ere inadequacy in the articulation of the reasons for imposing a particular sentence. . 

. should not negate the presumption [of correctness afforded the trial court’s sentencing 

decision].” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705-06. Accordingly, a sentence “should be upheld so 

long as the statutory purposes and principles, along with any applicable enhancement and 

mitigating factors, have been properly addressed.” Id. at 706. The record belies the 

Defendant’s claim that the trial court’s reasons for imposing a twenty-two-year sentence 

were inadequate. The trial court systematically went through the statutory requirements 

attendant to determining the length of the sentence. Therefore, we afford the trial court’s 

decision a presumption of reasonableness and review only for an abuse of discretion. 

The court found that one enhancement factor and one mitigating factor applied and

ultimately seemed more troubled by and placed considerable emphasis on the 

circumstances surrounding the offense. Although the Defendant contends that the trial 

court should have placed more emphasis on his cooperation with law enforcement and 

lack of previous criminal history, the court specifically weighed those factors when 

imposing the sentence. Accordingly, the Defendant has not carried his burden in 

showing that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a within-range, twentytwo-year sentence for second degree murder. Consequently, the Defendant is not entitled 

to relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

_________________________________ 

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE