IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2019-CP-00598-COA

RONALD WILSON A/K/A RONALD N. WILSON APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/14/2019

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RONALD WILSON (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

BY: BILLY L. GORE 

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/07/2020

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND C. WILSON, JJ.

C. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Ronald Wilson appeals fromthe Madison CountyCircuit Court’s denial and dismissal

of his motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. This appeal stemsfrom Wilson’s second PCR motion, which in turn seeks relief from

two guilty pleas Wilson entered in March 2017 on separate charges for simple assault on a

law enforcement officer and felony shoplifting. On November 8, 2006, a Madison County

grand jury indicted Wilson for simple assault on a law enforcement officer, which allegedly

occurred on June 5, 2006. On March 3, 2010, a Madison County grand jury again indicted
Wilson—this time for felony shoplifting, which allegedly occurred on September 11, 2009. 

Wilson, represented by counsel, pled guilty to both offenses on March 22, 2017. During his

plea hearing, the circuit court found that Wilson’s guilty pleas were knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily entered. The circuit court sentenced Wilson to serve five years for the simple

assault charge and ten years for the felony shoplifting charge. These sentences were set to

run consecutively and ordered to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of

Corrections.

¶3. On February 26, 2018, Wilson filed his first PCR motion. Wilson contended that he

was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because “[t]he time limitation had r[u]n out.” The

circuit court dismissed Wilson’s PCR motion on March 20, 2018, finding that Wilson waived

his claims by pleading guilty. Wilson did not appeal this dismissal.

¶4. Wilson filed a second PCR motion on February 21, 2019.1In this motion, Wilson

asserted that “[t]he court erred in accepting petitioner’s guilty plea[s] and sentencing

petitioner on May 22, 2017 . . . when the statute of limitation[s] [had] expired . . . .” Wilson

also asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. On March 14, 2019, the

circuit court denied and dismissed Wilson’s second PCR motion on the grounds that (1) the

second PCR motion was successive-writ barred; (2) both of Wilson’s prosecutions had

“commenced” within the applicable two-year statute of limitations; (3) Wilson’s knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary guilty pleas waived his right to raise any statute-of-limitations

issues; and (4) Wilson failed to present affidavits other than his own to support his

1

 Wilson filed both of his PCR motions pro se.

2
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

¶5. Wilson now appeals from the circuit court’s judgment. On appeal, Wilson re-urges

his arguments regarding the statute of limitations and alleged ineffective assistance of

counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court’s denial and dismissal of Wilson’s

second PCR motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. This Court reviews the denial or dismissal of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion. 

Hughes v. State, 106 So. 3d 836, 837 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). “We will only reverse if

the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing Crosby v. State, 16 So. 3d 74, 77

(¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. 

DISCUSSION

¶7. Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, any order denying or

dismissing a PCR motion is a bar to a second or successive PCR motion. Miss. Code Ann.

§ 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015). “Mississippi statutory law grants each movant ‘one bite at the

apple when requesting post-conviction relief.’” Hayes v. State, 282 So. 3d 1185, 1187 (¶8)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Dobbs v. State, 18 So. 3d 295, 298 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App.

2009)); cf. Fluker v. State, 170 So. 3d 471, 475 (¶9) (Miss. 2015) (noting that “res judicata

concerns attendant to a successive motion for PCR are governed by the statutory

successive-pleadings bar”). Wilson previously filed an unsuccessful PCR motion in 2018,

raising the same statute-of-limitations argument he asserts here. His current motion is

therefore successive-writ barred, and he cannot relitigate this issue. See Fluker, 170 So. 3d

3
at 475 (¶10) (applying section 99-39-23(6) to bar successive PCR motion that challenged

same revocation decision as prior PCR motion). 

¶8. As to Wilson’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we recognize

that “errors affecting ‘fundamental rights’ may be excepted from procedural bars.” Rowland

v. State, 42 So. 3d 503, 505-06 (¶7) (Miss. 2010). “Under ‘extraordinary circumstances,’

ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute an exception to [procedural bars].” Morales

v. State, No. 2018-CP-00737-COA, 2019 WL 3562031, at *5 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 6,

2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied, Order, No. 2018-CT-00737-SCT (Miss. Feb. 27,

2020); see also Hayes, 282 So. 3d at 1188 (¶9) (citing Bevill v. State, 669 So. 2d 14, 17

(Miss. 1996)). However, “the mere assertion of a constitutional right violation does not

trigger the exception.” Evans v. State, 115 So. 3d 879, 881 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)

(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Wicker v. State, 16 So. 3d 706, 708 (¶5) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2009)). 

¶9. Here, Wilson has failed to offer more than a “mere assertion,” based only on his own

affidavit, for his argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, we

find this issue lacks merit. See Vitela v. State, 183 So. 3d 104, 108 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App.

2015) (stating that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel supported only by the

movant’s own affidavit fails to meet the pleading requirements of the PCR statute). 

CONCLUSION

¶10. Upon review, we find that the circuit court did not err in denying and dismissing

Wilson’s second PCR motion. Wilson’s PCR motion is successive-writ barred. Wilson has

4
also failed to support his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claimwith more than his own bare

assertions. We accordingly affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶11. AFFIRMED. 

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,

WESTBROOKS, TINDELL AND LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J.,

CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN

OPINION. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE

WRITTEN OPINION. 

5