J-S48035-19

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

v.

JOED VALENTIN MORALES,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3106 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 11, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003710-2007

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2019

Joed Valentin Morales (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order entered 

October 11, 2018, dismissing his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.

In 2008, Appellant was convicted of attempted murder and related 

offenses in connection with his shooting two individuals.

1

 Appellant was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of 281⁄2 to 60 years of incarceration. This 

Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied his petition for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Morales, 

4 A.3d 697 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 8 

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1 At trial, Appellant conceded that he shot the victims, but asserted that he 

did so in self-defense.
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A.3d 899 (Pa. 2010). Appellant’s first and second PCRA petitions resulted in 

no relief. On August 23, 2018, Appellant pro se filed a third PCRA petition, 

which is the subject of this appeal. The PCRA court issued notice of its intent 

to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 

and Appellant filed a response. On October 11, 2018, the PCRA court 

dismissed that petition as untimely filed. This appeal followed. Both Appellant 

and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Before we can examine the substantive claims Appellant raises on 

appeal, we must determine whether the filing of his PCRA petition was timely. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280-81 (Pa. Super. 

2013). 

Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the 

date a judgment becomes final. There are three exceptions to this 

time requirement: (1) interference by government officials in the 

presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an 

after-recognized constitutional right. When a petitioner alleges 

and proves that one of these exceptions is met, the petition will 

be considered timely. A PCRA petition invoking one of these 

exceptions must be filed within [one year2] of the date the claims 

could have been presented. The timeliness requirements of the 

PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court 

cannot hear untimely petitions. 

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2 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). This statute was amended, effective December 

24, 2018, to provide that claims arising after December 24, 2017, were 

permitted to be filed within one year, rather than 60 days, of the date the 

claim could have been presented. Appellant filed the PCRA petition containing 

the letter at issue in 2018; thus, arguably, the amendment applies. However, 

based on our discussion infra, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
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Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

The instant petition, filed in August of 2018, is patently untimely. Thus, 

Appellant was required to plead and prove one of the exceptions set forth in 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Appellant does not explain in his pro se

petition,3 his response to the Rule 907 notice, or his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement, how he has satisfied the timeliness requirements. 

On appeal, Appellant sets forth the relevant sections of the PCRA 

relating to timeliness, see Appellant’s brief at vii, 2-3, but does not explain 

how these exceptions are applicable to him. Instead, he focuses solely on 

prior counsel’s ineffective assistance. See id. at 3-10. “It is well settled that 

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the 

jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. 

Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005). 

Thus, because Appellant did not plead facts that would establish an 

exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s petition without holding a hearing. See 

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3

In his pro se PCRA petition, Appellant referenced the exceptions and attached 

three exhibits. The first was a letter from Appellant’s brother-in-law

contradicting testimony about where Appellant obtained the stolen gun used 

to shoot the victims. The second was an affidavit from the Deputy District 

Attorney responsible for Appellant’s case, stating the terms of the plea 

agreement offered to Appellant. The third was a letter from an individual 

stating that Appellant’s trial counsel gave legal advice to witnesses. Appellant 

does not expound further on these claims in his petition, response to the Rule

907 notice, his concise statement, or in his brief on appeal.
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Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Pa. 2010) (affirming 

dismissal of PCRA petition without a hearing because the appellant failed to 

meet burden of establishing timeliness exception).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/6/19