Filed 8/19/24 P. v. Shannon CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MATTHEW SCOTT SHANNON,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G062074

 (Super. Ct. No. 16NF2105)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of 

Orange County, Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark W. Frederick and Courtney L.C. Cefali, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. 

Swenson and Junichi P. Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

* * *

After a jury found appellant Matthew Scott Shannon guilty of 

committing various sex crimes against his daughter K.S. and his stepgranddaughter R.L., he was sentenced to 23 years to life. 

On appeal, he raises four arguments. First, Shannon contends 

the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped interview of R.L. in violation 

of his confrontation rights and Evidence Code section 1360 because she was 

effectively unavailable for cross-examination since she could not remember 

the questions asked and her answers during the interview.1 We find no error 

because R.L. testified and was responsive to defense counsel’s questions. 

Second, Shannon contends there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for committing a sex crime against R.L. We conclude the 

videotaped interview constitutes substantial evidence to support the jury’s 

verdict. Third, Shannon argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 

uncharged sexual misconduct. We conclude the evidence was admissible 

under sections 1101, subdivision (b), 1108, and 352 because the uncharged 

conduct was highly probative, but not more inflammatory than the charged 

crimes. Finally, Shannon contends the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence he reported an 

alleged extortion attempt by K.S.’s mother. We conclude Shannon has not 

shown the evidence could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence 

or that it casts doubt on the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code, unless 

otherwise stated.
3

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 18, 2022, the Orange County District Attorney filed 

an information alleging that Shannon engaged in oral copulation with R.L., a 

child 10 years of age or younger, between May 30, 2012, and June 29, 2016, 

(Pen. Code § 288.7, subd. (b); count 1); engaged in oral copulation with K.S., a 

person under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than appellant, 

between August 29, 2002 and August 28, 2006 (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. 

(c)(1); count 2)2; and committed a lewd and lascivious act upon K.S., a child 

under the age of 14 years, between August 29, 2002 and August 28, 2006 

(Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 3 and 4). The information also alleged 

that as to count 3, Shannon engaged in substantial sexual conduct with K.S., 

a child under 14 years of age, during the commission of count 3 (Pen. Code, § 

1203.066, subd. (a)(8)).3

A jury found Shannon guilty as charged, and found true the 

allegation of substantial sexual conduct. 

After denying Shannon’s motion for a new trial, the trial court 

sentenced him to 15 years to life, followed by eight years in state prison. 

DISCUSSION

I.

Admission of Victim’s Videotaped Interview

Shannon contends the trial court erred in admitting the 

videotaped interview of R.L. in violation of his confrontation rights and

section 1360. We find no error.

2 Penal Code section 288a later was renumbered to Penal Code 

section 287. 

3 The Orange County District Attorney charged Shannon with the 

same offenses in 2017. After a hung jury, the trial court declared a mistrial. 
4

A. Facts

R.L. is the granddaughter of Shannon’s second wife. On June 29, 

2016, when R.L. was four years old, she told her mother that Shannon had 

licked her vagina, which she referred to as her “powder puff.” 

The following day, R.L was interviewed at the Orange office of 

Child Abuse Services Team (CAST). During the CAST interview, R.L. stated 

that Shannon licked her powder puff when she was alone in her room, lying 

on her bed. It happened “lots of times.” R.L. demonstrated Shannon’s 

conduct using teddy bears.

Before trial, the prosecution moved to admit R.L.’s videotaped 

CAST interview pursuant to section 1360. The prosecution argued that R.L. 

“was able to distinguish between a truth and a lie,” “verbally describe[ ] what 

[Shannon] had done, and appropriately demonstrated what [he] had done to 

her body by using the bears.” The prosecutor asserted R.L. would be

available for trial and subject to cross-examination. 

Defense counsel moved to exclude or limit this evidence on 

confrontation clause grounds and section 1360. Based on R.L.’s trial 

testimony during the first trial, defense counsel argued there was “no 

confrontation available” and “no reasonable opportunity to cross-examine”

because R.L. “didn’t have answers for [the prosecutor’s] questions, didn’t 

recall, or doesn’t remember during the interview, et cetera.” Specifically as to 

section 1360, counsel argued R.L.’s responses did not constitute testimony 

because the responses did not provide a reasonable opportunity for crossexamination. 

The trial court admitted the interview, finding that R.L.’s 

interview fell “within the parameters of [section] 1360 in that the time, 

content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of 
5

reliability.” The court also found no confrontation clause violation since 

defense counsel would “have the opportunity to cross-examine [R.L.]” 

At trial, R.L., who was nine years old, testified she did not fully 

recall Shannon or her interactions with him. She did not remember his face, 

but remembered his hair color. She remembered going to his house, but did 

not remember where the house was located or what it looked like. As to her 

interactions with Shannon, she did not “remember what happened or what he

was like.” As to the CAST interview, she remembered “talking to an old lady” 

and playing with “puppets.” On cross-examination, R.L. testified she did not 

remember the questions that were asked or her answers during the CAST 

interview. 

After R.L.’s testimony, appellant renewed his objection to playing 

the recording of the CAST interview based on “Sixth Amendment grounds, 

confrontation issues.” Defense counsel acknowledged he was able to “crossexamine her on some peripheral matters,” but argued he “was not given a full 

and fair opportunity to cross-examine, since she had zero memory about 

being molested or about being questioned or any answers that she may have 

given during the CAST.” In response, the prosecution argued there was no 

Confrontation Clause problem where the declarant is available for crossexamination. Here, “the People made . . . [R.L.] available,” and “[s]he 

testified to what she could remember” and answered all of defense counsel’s 

questions. 

The trial court overruled the objection, again finding the 

interview was admissible under section 1360. 

B. Confrontation Clause

“The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the 

accused the right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ This has 
6

long been read as securing an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse 

witnesses. [Citations.]” (United States v. Owens (1988) 484 U.S. 554, 557

(Owens).) However, “‘[t]he Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that 

every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony 

that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the 

Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full 

and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through crossexamination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for 

giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony.’” (Id. at p. 558, quoting 

Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 21-22.) “The weapons available to 

impugn the witness’ statement when memory loss is asserted will of course 

not always achieve success, but successful cross-examination is not the 

constitutional guarantee.” (Owens, at p. 560.) In fact, the United States 

Supreme Court has never found a Confrontation Clause violation based 

“upon a witness’ loss of memory.” (Id. at p. 557.)

Although Owens predates Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 

U.S. 36 (Crawford), the U.S. Supreme Court did not overturn Owens in the 

latter case. Rather, in footnote 9 of its Crawford decision, the Court stated: 

“[W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at 

trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his 

prior testimonial statements. [Citation.] It is therefore irrelevant that the 

reliability of some out-of-court statements “‘cannot be replicated, even if the 

declarant testifies to the same matters in court.’” [Citations.] The Clause 

does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at 

trial to defend or explain it.” (Id. at p. 60, fn. 9; see also People v. GironChamul (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 932, 965 (Giron-Chamul) [“[A] witness’s 
7

failure to remember, whether real or feigned, generally does not deny the 

defendant an opportunity for effective cross-examination. [Citations.]”.)

Here, R.L. was subject to cross-examination at trial, and she 

answered questions from defense counsel. Unlike the child witness in GironChamul, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 932, R.L. did not refuse to answer counsel’s 

questions. In that case, the appellate court found a Confrontation Clause 

violation based on the victim’s “refusal” to answer questions on crossexamination. (Id. at pp. 961, 965.) The victim, who was five years old at the 

time of trial, refused to answer hundreds of questions that were posed to her 

by defense counsel. (Id. at p. 968.) In contrast, R.L., who was nine when she 

testified, sat on the witness stand, and answered the questions put to her by 

the prosecutor and defense counsel. At times she testified that she did not 

remember certain details, but she was cooperative and never refused to 

answer a question. There was no Confrontation Clause violation.

C. Section 1360

Section 1360, subdivision (a) provides in relevant parts: 

“In a criminal prosecution where the victim is a minor, a 

statement made by the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act of 

child abuse or neglect performed with or on the child by another, or 

describing any attempted act of child abuse or neglect with or on the child by 

another, is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if all of the following 

apply:

“(1) The statement is not otherwise admissible by statute or court 

rule.

“(2) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence 

of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement 

provide sufficient indicia of reliability.
8

“(3) The child either:

“(A) Testifies at the proceedings.

“(B) Is unavailable as a witness, in which case the statement may 

be admitted only if there is evidence of the child abuse or neglect that 

corroborates the statement made by the child.”

Shannon argues R,L. was effectively unavailable because at trial, 

she “failed to identify Shannon as her ‘Papa,’ had little memory of the CAST 

interview, and had no recollection of being inappropriately touched.” Those 

responses however constituted testimony because they were answers given 

under oath at trial. (See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) [defining 

“testimony” as “Evidence that a competent witness under oath or affirmation 

gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.”].) Moreover, R.L. testified that 

she remembered Shannon’s hair and going to his house. She also 

remembered “talking to an old lady” and playing with “puppets.” Thus, R.L. 

did testify for the purposes of section 1360.

Shannon also contends the trial court erred in determining the 

time, content, and circumstances of the CAST interview provided sufficient 

indicia of reliability. However, he forfeited this claim because trial counsel 

never objected to the trial court’s finding on reliability. Rather, counsel only 

objected on the ground that R.L. did not testify for the purposes of section 

1360, which we addressed above. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 

428, 435 [a party “may not argue on appeal that the court should have 

excluded the evidence for a reason different from the one stated at trial. A 

party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not 

asked to conduct.”]; see also § 353 [“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, 

nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 

erroneous admission of evidence unless: [¶] (a) There appears of record an 
9

objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely 

made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or 

motion . . . .”].)

Regardless, the record before us shows the time, content, and 

circumstances of the CAST interview provided sufficient indicia of reliability.

To determine whether a child witness’s hearsay statement is reliable, “any 

factor bearing on reliability may be considered.” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 1227, 1250.) These factors include: “(1) spontaneity and consistent 

repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology 

unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate,” and 

(5) “the child’s ability to understand the duty to tell the truth and to 

distinguish between truth and falsity.” (In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, 

30.) Here, our independent review shows several factors support the trial 

court’s finding of reliability. First, R.L. consistently told questioners that 

Shannon orally copulated her, both to her mother and the CAST interviewer

using similar childish terminology. Second, she was able to demonstrate the 

criminal act using teddy bears, something that would be unexpected of a fouryear-old child. Third, she lacked motive to fabricate. When asked about 

Shannon, her response was “I love him, and I miss him. He’s probably at 

work today.” Finally, her responses showed she understood the duty to tell 

the truth and distinguish between truth and falsity. In sum, we find no error 

in trial court’s decision to admit the videotaped interview of R.L.

II.

Sufficiency of the evidence

Next, Shannon contends there was insufficient evidence as to 

Count 1 (engaging in oral copulation with R.L.). Specifically, Shannon argues 

the victim’s statements to her mother and during the CAST interview were 
10

insufficient because they were uncorroborated and vague on when and where 

the crime occurred. 

“When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is 

challenged on appeal, we review the entire record in the light most favorable 

to the judgment to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 

Cal.4th 535, 585.) “Unless it describes facts or events that are physically 

impossible or inherently improbable, the testimony of a single witness is 

sufficient to support a conviction.” (Ibid.) In the context of child molestation 

cases, a child victim’s testimony is substantial evidence of guilt if the 

testimony describes “the kind of act or acts committed with sufficient 

specificity,” “the number of acts committed with sufficient certainty to 

support each of the counts alleged in the information or indictment,” and “the 

general time period in which these acts occurred . . . to assure the acts were 

committed within the applicable limitation period.” (People v. Jones (1990) 

51 Cal.3d 294, 316.) 

Here, in her CAST interview, R.L. specified the conduct (oral 

copulation) and its frequency (“lots of time”). Although she did not specify 

the time period, her testimony established that the criminal conduct occurred 

in the time period between her birth and when the crime was reported, 

between May 2012 and June 2016, as charged in the information. As the 

initial prosecution occurred in 2017, the sex crime fell within the applicable 

limitations period. (See Pen. Code, § 800 [“an offense punishable by 

imprisonment in the state prison for eight years . . . shall be commenced 

within six years after commission of the offense”]; Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. 

(b) [“Any person 18 years of age or older who engages in oral copulation . . . 
11

with a child who is 10 years of age or younger is guilty of a felony and shall 

be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to 

life.”].) In sum, R.L.’s statements in the CAST interview are sufficient to 

support the conviction on Count 1.

III.

Evidence of Uncharged Conduct

Shannon contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting evidence of uncharged conduct, namely, (1) Shannon’s possession 

of child pornography and sexually explicit stories, and (2) the complaints of 

his nieces J.B. and F.B. that he touched them inappropriately.

A. Facts

1. Child pornography and child erotica

M.S., Shannon’s first wife, testified that in 2000, she found 

several printed pornographic stories regarding “father/daughter incest” in 

their home office. She confronted appellant, who admitted the stories 

belonged to him. In 2003, in the midst of their bitter divorce and after 

Shannon had moved out, M.S. was looking for earnings statements from their 

business when she discovered 36 floppy discs and 25 compact discs, some of 

which contained pornographic images of young, nude children. She became 

worried and took the discs to the local police department. 

In 2020, the Orange County Regional Forensic Laboratory 

examined the floppy discs and compact discs. Some of the discs contained 

“thousands” of images of child pornography and child erotica, and “hundreds” 

of sexually explicit stories involving minors and incest. The jury saw seven 

photos and heard excerpts from one story. 
12

2. Uncharged acts against minors

J.B., who is the niece of Shannon’s second wife, testified she had 

several unusual interactions with Shannon when she was very young. The 

first was when she was in preschool, after she did not allow him to tie her 

shoes, he told her to go to her bedroom. After taking off her pants or telling 

her to take off her pants, he spanked her very hard. The other incident 

occurred about two years later, when J.B. was in first grade. Shannon drove 

the two of them to pick up pizza and allowed her to sit in the front passenger 

seat. Then, he had her suck on his thumb. While she did, he said, “deeper,” 

and “good girl.” J.B. did not tell anyone about these incidents until she was 

17 years old when her mother asked if anyone had ever touched her or done 

anything inappropriate to her. A few weeks after telling her mother, J.B. 

reported to the police in 2016. 

F.B., the younger sister of J.B., testified that when she was 

around four years old, she was at a party where Shannon was present. He

asked her to play hide-and-seek with him. While playing, the two of them 

went into a bedroom, and Shannon asked her “Oh, what’s in your diaper.” He 

then laid F.B. on the bed, pulled down her diaper, and inserted his fingers 

into her vagina. 

F.B. did not tell her mother about this incident until years later, 

after she began having nightmares about it. F.B. asked her mother not to tell 

anybody else. F.B. did not formally report the incident to the police until 

2020. 

3. Defense case

Shannon testified in his own defense. He denied ever molesting 

K.S., R.L., or J.B. and F.B. Regarding the child pornography and incest-
13

themed stories his first wife M.S. found in the office, Shannon asserted he 

had never seen any of it until he “saw them as evidence in this case.” 

B. Analysis

Generally, character evidence, including “evidence of specific 

instances of his or her conduct[,] is inadmissible when offered to prove his or 

her conduct on a specified occasion.” (§ 1101, subd. (a).) However, section 

1101, subdivision (b), allows evidence of a prior act to be used to prove a fact 

other than propensity, such as intent, motive, or a common scheme. Section 

1108, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]n a criminal action in which the 

defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s 

commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by 

Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” 

(§ 1108, subd. (b).) Section 352 provides that “[t]he court in its discretion 

may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time 

or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or 

of misleading the jury.” 

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining 

the accusations of J.B. and F.B., the child pornography, and the sexually 

explicit stories were not made inadmissible by section 352. The evidence was 

highly probative, establishing Shannon had a prurient interest in very young 

girls. Although inflammatory, the evidence was not more inflammatory than 

the charged crimes, which included one count of oral copulation committed 

against a step-granddaughter and multiple sex crimes against his biological 

daughter. Moreover, there was no undue consumption of time. The seven 

witnesses were not excessive. Nor was there a likelihood of confusing the 

jury. Shannon was not charged with possession of child pornography, and the 
14

incidents involving J.B. and F.B. were distinct from those involving R.L. and 

K.S. The trial court thus properly admitted the accusations of J.B. and F.B. 

and the child pornography under Section 1108. 

As to the sexually explicit stories and other child erotica, that 

evidence was admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b) to show intent. 

(Cf. People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 864 [evidence defendant 

possessed “sexually explicit stories, photographs and drawings of males 

ranging in age from prepubescent to young adult” were properly admitted 

under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to show defendant’s intent 

to molest a young boy in violation of Penal Code section 288].) In sum, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

IV.

New Trial Motion

Finally, Shannon contends the trial court erred in denying his 

new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence. 

A. Facts

1. Trial Testimony

At trial, during cross-examination, Shannon’s first wife M.S. 

testified meeting with Shannon on two occasions to discuss K.S.’s molestation 

accusations. At the second meeting, M.S. remembered Shannon claiming 

she was “threatening [him] financially.” When asked whether Shannon 

handed her “a police report that he [Shannon] had filed with Corona [Police 

Department],” M.S stated she did not recall, but later stated she believed she 

received a police report. On redirect examination, M.S. clarified Shannon 

gave her a paper which she thought was a police report, but the police never

contacted her, and “I don’t remember anything coming of it.” 
15

Shannon testified that when he met with M.S. to discuss K.S.’s 

accusations against him, she “threatened” him that he either needed to pay 

for K.S.’s college “tuition and support or there would be consequences with 

the police.” Because he believed he was being extorted, he went to the

Corona Police Department to report K.S.’s molestation allegations and M.S.’s 

threat. He requested a police report, which he later showed to M.S. 

However, he no longer has a copy of the report. 

In rebuttal, Silvia Hernandez, the records supervisor for the 

Corona Police Department, testified she ran a records check and found no 

report involving Shannon and extortion in July 2011. Hernandez 

acknowledged the records are regularly purged from the system, with 

misdemeanors being purged after five years. 

2. New Trial Motion

After the jury found him guilty as charged, Shannon moved for a 

new trial on the ground, among others, of newly discovered evidence 

pursuant to Penal Code section 1181, subdivision 8. The newly discovered

evidence was a computer printout of an “Incident Inquiry” prepared by the 

Corona Police Department documenting Shannon had stated his ex-wife M.S. 

had threatened to report him for molesting their daughter six years ago if he 

did not meet her financial demands. The document further stated Shannon 

did not desire prosecution, and concluded the accusations were “unfounded at 

this time as no contact has been made with ex-wife.” Shannon’s son 

discovered the document on an “old computer[ ]” while searching several 

computers for an unrelated document in April 2022. 

Shannon argued he and his defense counsel exercised reasonable 

diligence to locate the document when counsel hired an investigator to seek 

out the report. In the investigator’s declaration, he stated he contacted 
16

Corona Police Department in September 2019 and was informed that no 

report could be located using the names of Shannon or his first wife. 

Following a hearing, the trial court denied the new trial motion.

As to the newly discovered evidence, the court found it was not cumulative 

because it would support Shannon’s claim he made a police report. However, 

it “looks like it was available to everybody this whole time, especially to Mr. 

Shannon.” Thus, “with reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered on 

[Shannon’s] computer. It was with his attorney.” The court also did not 

believe “that that particular piece of paper would have changed the result” 

since “so much of [his] testimony relied on his credibility in regards to so 

much other conduct in this case.” 

B. Analysis

“In ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered 

evidence, the trial court considers the following factors: 1. That the evidence, 

and not merely its materiality, be newly discovered; 2. That the evidence be 

not cumulative merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different result 

probable on a retrial of the cause; 4. That the party could not with reasonable 

diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial; and 5. That these facts 

be shown by the best evidence of which the case admits.” (People v. Delgado

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328, internal quotations and citations omitted.) “In 

addition, ‘the trial court may consider the credibility as well as materiality of 

the evidence in its determination [of] whether introduction of the evidence in 

a new trial would render a different result reasonably probable.’ [Citation.]” 

(Id. at p. 329.) “‘“The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so 

completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed 

unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.”’ 

[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 328.)
17

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new 

trial motion based on newly discovered evidence. Shannon did not show he or 

his counsel exercised reasonable diligence. The document was located on 

computers available to Shannon or his counsel, but no attempt was made to 

search the computers. The only documented attempt to locate the document 

was a single inquiry with the Corona Police Department. Shannon also 

contends he searched for the document, but the record citation does not 

support this contention. 

Shannon also seeks to excuse his lack of diligence by noting he 

was in possession of a number of computers and a large amount of digital 

evidence. However, he documented no effort to search any of those computers 

or digital evidence. Moreover, the fact his son was able to locate the 

document by searching in April 2022 indicates a reasonable effort likely 

would have resulted in locating the document. 

Shannon further argues lack of diligence alone is not sufficient to 

justify a denying a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence. We 

disagree. While it is true "the standard of diligence may be relaxed when the 

newly discovered evidence would probably lead to a different result on

retrial,” (People v. Martinez (1984) 36 Cal.3d 816, 825, fn. omitted), we are 

not persuaded the document probably would have resulted in a different 

result on retrial. The best evidence against Shannon was K.S.’s trial 

testimony and the CAST interview. The criminal acts were not witnessed by 

M.S. Thus, her alleged extortion would not undermine the evidence against 

Shannon. In sum, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its broad 

discretion in denying the new trial motion based on newly discovered 

evidence.
18

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR: 

O’LEARY, P.J. 

SANCHEZ, J.