FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D23-1888

LT Case No. 2020-CF-6115

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DAMIEN O. CALDWELL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

R. Anthony Salem, Judge.

Damien Caldwell, Lake City, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

October 20, 2023

PER CURIAM.

Damien O. Caldwell appeals the summary denial of his 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 amended motion for 

postconviction relief, in which he raised two grounds. We affirm 

the postconviction court’s denial of ground one of the amended 

motion on the merits without further discussion. For the following 

reasons, we reverse the denial of ground two and remand for 

further consideration.
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Caldwell is presently serving a prison sentence in this case 

following his guilty plea to one count of armed robbery, committed 

when he was sixteen years old. Caldwell did not appeal his 

judgment and sentence, but he did timely file the subject rule 3.850 

motion for postconviction relief, initially raising a single ground in 

his motion. The court dismissed Caldwell’s motion under rule 

3.850(f)(2) for being facially insufficient but did so without 

prejudice to Caldwell filing an amended motion within sixty days 

of the order.

Caldwell timely filed his amended motion. In the motion, 

Caldwell raised a second ground for relief, not previously made, in 

which he essentially attempted to assert that his counsel was 

ineffective for not having him evaluated for competency to proceed 

or understand the process. In the order now on review, the 

postconviction court denied this ground as “unauthorized,” 

explaining that its prior nonfinal order dismissing Caldwell’s 

original motion provided that no new claims could be added to the 

motion without leave of court.

We hold that the postconviction court erred in doing so. When, 

as here, the two-year filing requirement under rule 3.850 had not 

yet expired and the court had not issued a final order on the rule 

3.850 motion, it must consider any additional claims raised in the 

amended motion. See Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 517–18 (Fla. 

1999) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s 

rule 3.850 amended motion for postconviction relief on the ground 

that the new claims raised in the amended motion were 

procedurally barred, when the motion was filed within the time 

limit under the rule and before the trial court had ruled on the 

original motion), receded from in part on other grounds, Nelson v. 

State, 875 So. 2d 579, 582–83 (Fla. 2004); Padro-Guerrero v. State, 

123 So. 3d 670, 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“As long as the two-year 

limitation period [of rule 3.850] has not expired, the trial court 

must consider any additional claims raised prior to the court’s final 

order on a rule 3.850 motion.”). 

In a footnote contained in its denial order, the court also 

separately observed that ground two of Caldwell’s amended motion 

“lack[ed] specific supporting facts,” but that since Caldwell had 
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already been given leave to amend his original motion, he was “not 

entitled to another.”

When an amended motion filed under rule 3.850 remains 

facially insufficient, as ground two was here, the postconviction 

court, in its discretion, may either permit the defendant an 

additional opportunity to amend the motion or enter a final order 

summarily denying the motion with prejudice. Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.850(f)(2); see also Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 761 (Fla. 2007) 

(holding that a trial court’s striking of further amendments that 

are insufficiently pled “is subject to an abuse of discretion standard 

that depends on the circumstances of each case”). As it is unclear 

from its order and the circumstances whether the postconviction 

court fully understood that it possessed the discretion to allow 

Caldwell to amend his second ground for relief, we reverse that 

aspect of the order and remand for further consideration. 

AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED. 

HARRIS and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

LAMBERT, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
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LAMBERT, J., concurring specially.

I concur with the majority’s summary denial of ground one 

and its reversal on ground two. Under the circumstances of this 

case—specifically, (1) Caldwell being sixteen years old when he 

committed the crime, (2) Caldwell being seventeen years old when 

he pleaded guilty, (3) ground two raising the issue of Caldwell’s

competency when he pled, (4) ground two having not previously 

been amended, and (5) the expiration of the two-year filing 

requirement under rule 3.850 since Caldwell filed his amended 

motion—I believe that it was an abuse of discretion for the 

postconviction court to not have allowed Caldwell an opportunity 

to amend his deficiently-pled ground two claim, assuming that he 

can do so in good faith. That said, the majority opinion provides 

the postconviction court with the opportunity to do exactly that.