NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-2313

___________

RANCE M. STRUNK, SR.; DARLENE STRUNK; CLIFFORD B. REPOTSKI; 

CYNTHIA M. YODER; R.A.Y. (Minor),

Appellants

v.

EAST COVENTRY TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

MISTIE GREENWALT, Officer; CHRISTOPHER JASON, Officer; 

CHESTER COUNTY DETECTIVE JOSEPH WALTON; D/C RICHARD

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-13-cv-00824)

District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 1, 2016

Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 20, 2016)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

The Appellants appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. For the 

following reasons, we will affirm.

In 2011, the police were provided with computer discs containing child 

pornography that had been left in a residence once used by Clifford Repotski. Based in 

part on those discs, the police obtained a warrant to arrest Repotski. The arrest was made 

at a home that Repotski shared with Rance Strunk, Sr., and Darlene Strunk (his 

grandparents), Cynthia Yoder (his mother), and a minor identified as “R.A.Y.” (his 

brother). Repotski was charged with possession with intent to distribute child 

pornography and related crimes. He later pleaded guilty to four of the five charges 

against him. 

Thereafter, Repotski, the Strunks, Yoder, and R.A.Y. filed a complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, which they later amended, alleging violations of their constitutional rights 

in connection with Repotski’s arrest. They named as defendants the Chester County 

Detectives Division, “D/C Richard,” Detective Joseph Walton, the East Coventry 

Township Police Department, Officer Mistie Greenwalt, and Officer Christopher Jason. 

The Chester County Detectives Division and Detective Walton moved to dismiss the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court 

granted that motion as to the Chester County Detectives Division, holding that a 

municipal police department is not a proper party defendant in a § 1983 action. The 

District Court also observed that the complaint “contain[ed] no facts and no numbered 
3

paragra[ph]s, merely setting forth vague and random citations to Pennsylvania and 

Federal law[,]” but permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. After the plaintiffs 

filed an amended complaint, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. The District Court 

granted those motions, concluding that (1) Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), 

barred the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; (2) 

Officers Greenwalt and Jason did not participate in the search of the home; (3) the 

Township was not liable because there were no underlying constitutional violations; and 

(4) various remaining claims failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 8. The plaintiffs appealed.1 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo the District 

Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Dique v. N.J. State 

Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). We accept as true all of the allegations 

contained in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). To survive dismissal, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We may affirm on any basis 

 

1 A notice of appeal in a civil case in which the United States is not a party must be filed 

within 30 days of the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1)(A). Although the plaintiffs failed to file their notice of appeal within 30 days of 

the order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the District Court subsequently 

granted the plaintiffs’ motion to extend the time to appeal under Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and deemed their appeal timely filed. See Ramseur v. Beyer, 
4

supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam). 

As noted, the District Court held that the Appellants’ false arrest, false 

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims were barred by Heck. Heck holds that, 

where success in a § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction 

or sentence, an individual’s suit for damages or equitable relief is barred unless he can 

demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 

486-87; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Thus, Heck bars only 

claims which “seek[] to recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction, 

imprisonment, or other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render the 

conviction or sentence unlawful.” Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 

1998). We have held that Heck requires District Courts to determine whether each claim 

– if successful – would imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence. Gibson v. 

Superintendent, 411 F.3d 427, 447-49 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a determination 

whether Heck applies to a Fourth Amendment claim requires a case-by-case fact-based 

inquiry). 

We agree that Heck barred the Appellants’ malicious prosecution claim because 

Repotski’s conviction has not been invalidated.2 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. But, 

 

921 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1990).

2 The malicious prosecution claims should have been dismissed without prejudice, 

however, and we will modify the District Court’s order to that effect. See Curry v. 

Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016).
5

contrary to the District Court’s conclusion, the claims for false arrest and false 

imprisonment are not the type contemplated by Heck. See Montgomery v. De Simone, 

159 F.3d 120, 126 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998). Dismissal of those claims was appropriate, 

however, because the Appellants failed to plausibly allege that Repotski’s arrest was not 

supported by probable cause. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d 

Cir. 1995) (stating that a plaintiff alleging false imprisonment must demonstrate that his 

arrest was unsupported by probable cause); cf. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 

514 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that although the issue of probable cause is usually a factual 

one, a court “may conclude that ‘probable cause did exist as a matter of law if the 

evidence, viewed most favorably to [the p]laintiff, reasonably would not support a 

contrary factual finding” (internal citation and quotations omitted)). 

Repotski was arrested pursuant to a warrant that was supported by an affidavit of 

probable cause, both of which were attached to the Appellants’ amended complaint. See

Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that a court may consider 

exhibits attached to the complaint in adjudicating a motion to dismiss). Where an arrest 

is made pursuant to a warrant, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for false arrest must 

adequately plead that “(1) that the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a 

reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a 

falsehood in applying for a warrant;’ and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are 

material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 

781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
6

1997)). The Appellants failed to meet this burden. Although they contended that the 

officers’ statements inaccurately referred to the computer discs containing child 

pornography as “abandoned,” the Appellants did not allege that the officers “‘must have 

entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [their] statements or had obvious reasons to 

doubt the accuracy of the information [they] reported.’” Id. at 788 (quoting United States 

v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995)). In fact, the Appellants appear to 

acknowledge that the officers characterized the discs as “abandoned” because the person 

who turned them in to the police explained that the discs had been left in Repotski’s 

former residence. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the District Court 

properly rejected the Appellants’ false arrest and false imprisonment claims. 

The District Court also correctly dismissed the Appellants’ remaining claims. In 

particular, we agree that the Appellants could not sustain their claims of an illegal search 

against Officers Jason and Greenwalt because they did not actively participate in the 

search of the home. Rather, other officers not named in the action executed the search. 

See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (liability under § 1983 

requires personal involvement in the alleged wrongs). In addition, the Appellants failed 

to adequately set forth a basis for relief against “D/C Richard” and Detective Walton. 

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “D/C Richard” was included in the caption and mentioned in 

one paragraph of the amended complaint. The only substantive reference to Detective 

Walton indicates that he was “going to be conducting forensic analysis of the items 

seized” after being contacted by another police officer. Even construing the complaint 
7

liberally and in a light most favorable to the Appellants, we discern no viable claims or 

grounds for relief based on these vague references to “D/C Richard” and Detective 

Walton. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 179 

(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that to plead a conspiracy claim properly, a plaintiff must allege 

“facts that plausibly suggest a meeting of the minds”). 

Furthermore, the Appellants appear to seek relief under various statutes – such as 

Pennsylvania criminal laws, the state Landlord and Tenant Act, and the Racketeering 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act – but, to the extent that these statutes allow a 

private cause of action, their allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for 

relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Finally, the Chester County Detectives 

Division is not a proper party, see Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 

(3d Cir. 1997), and the Appellants did not identify any official policy or custom of the 

East Coventry Township Police Department that was the cause of the alleged 

constitutional violations, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment, but we 

modify its order to reflect that the malicious prosecution claim is dismissed without 

prejudice. See supra note 2. The Appellants’ request for a certificate of appealability is 

denied, as is their request to introduce material not pleaded in the complaint. See Maio v. 

Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 485, n.12 (3d Cir. 2000).