[Cite as Randolph v. Terra State Community College, 2013-Ohio-5929.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

BENJAMIN RANDOLPH 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

TERRA STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2012-04421 

Judge Dale A. Crawford 

DECISION

{¶ 1} This cause comes to be heard on Defendant’s June 3, 2013 Motion for 

Summary Judgment. On June 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a response. 

{¶ 2} Defendant moves for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims of age, 

sex, and disability discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02 and promissory estoppel 

regarding an alleged promise of continued employment with Defendant.1

 Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff cannot establish claims of sex and age discrimination or that he was 

“disabled” under R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). Defendant further argues that it had a legitimate 

non-discriminatory reason for reorganizing its organizational structure and that the nondiscriminatory reason was not a pretext for discrimination. Finally, Defendant argues 

that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim of promissory estoppel based upon an alleged 

promise by the President of Defendant, Terra State Community College (Terra), and 

that such a claim cannot be brought against Defendant. In support of its motion, 

 

In his memorandum contra, Plaintiff “withdraws” his claims for fraudulent inducement and breach 

of implied contract.
Case No. 2012-04421 - 2 - DECISION

Defendant attached the affidavits of Jerome Webster and Lisa Williams, along with 

various exhibits which were attached to the affidavits. 

{¶ 3} Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether 

Defendant’s “reorganization” was a pretext for age, sex, and disability discrimination. 

Plaintiff further argues that he can establish a claim of promissory estoppel and that 

such a claim may be brought against Defendant. In opposition to Defendant’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff attached his own affidavit, the depositions of Marsha 

Bordner, Lisa Williams, and Jerome Webster along with various exhibits. 

Summary Judgment Standard

{¶ 4} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, 

depositions, answer to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of 

evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Thus, in order to determine whether Defendant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the Court must ascertain 

whether the evidentiary materials presented by Defendant show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact involved in the case. In making this determination it is 

necessary to analyze the landmark Ohio Supreme Court decision which addresses the 

“standards for granting summary judgment when the moving party asserts that the 

nonmoving party has no evidence to establish an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s case.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 285 (1996); see also Saxton v. 

Navistar, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-923, 2013-Ohio-352, ¶ 7. 

{¶ 5} In Dresher, the Ohio Supreme Court held: 

{¶ 6} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court 

of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial 

court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 3 - DECISION

of the nonmoving party’s claim. * * * [T]he moving party bears the initial burden of 

demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning an essential 

element of the opponent’s case. To accomplish this, the movant must be able to point 

to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to consider in 

rendering summary judgment. * * * The assertion must be backed by some evidence of 

the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively shows that the nonmoving party has 

no evidence to support that party’s claims.” Dresher, supra, at 292-293. 

{¶ 7} In interpreting the United States Supreme Court decision in Celotex v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the Dresher Court found no express or implied 

requirement in Civ.R. 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other 

similar materials negating the opponent’s claim. Dresher, supra, at 291-292. 

Furthermore, the Dresher Court stated that it is not necessary that the nonmoving party 

produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary 

judgment. Id. at 289, quoting Celotex, supra. In sum, the Dresher Court held that the 

burden on the moving party may be discharged by “showing”–that is, pointing out to the 

Court– that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id.

{¶ 8} “If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary 

judgment most be denied.” Id. at 293. If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, 

the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden as outlined in Civ.R. 56(E): 

{¶ 9} “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 

in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his 

pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, 

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party 

does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the 

party.” 

Factual Background
Case No. 2012-04421 - 4 - DECISION

{¶ 10} Plaintiff began working as the Dean for Business, Engineering, and 

Workforce Development for Defendant, in August 2010. Prior to beginning his 

employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was interviewed by Marsha Bordner, President of 

Terra. According to Plaintiff, during the interview, Bordner stated that she would not 

hire anyone unwilling to remain at Terra for at least three years. Plaintiff assured her 

that he would remain at Terra at least until August 2014; 

{¶ 11} After beginning his employment as an academic dean, Plaintiff reported 

directly to the Vice-President for Academic Affairs, a position held by Lisa Williams 

(f.k.a. Jozwiak). As a dean, Plaintiff’s duties included identifying budgetary needs, 

recruiting staff members, developing class schedules, evaluating instructors, reviewing 

curriculum, and formulating and administering college policies and long rang goals; 

{¶ 12} In July 2011, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack, which necessitated the 

placement of stents in his arteries and a short leave of absence from work. Shortly after 

returning to work in August 2011, Plaintiff states that current President and former VicePresident for Student and Administrative Affairs, Jerome Webster, made embarrassing 

and humiliating comments to him regarding the necessity of being prepared for 

meetings during a meeting of the Council for Academic and Student Affairs. However, 

Webster did not make any comments regarding Plaintiff’s age, sex, or alleged disability; 

{¶ 13} In the summer of 2011, Terra officials began considering a reorganization 

of the academic organizational structure. Webster, avers that in July or August 2011, 

Bordner raised the issue of reorganizing Defendant’s administrative structure. Bordner 

testified in her deposition that in a small organization, like Terra, when individuals leave 

through retirement or resignation, it creates an ideal time to look to restructure the 

organization. According to Bordner, the idea of restructuring first surfaced about a year 

prior to implementing the actual reorganization. Webster stated that, after the initial idea 

was raised, discussions and brainstorming ideas to improve Terra continued on a 

weekly basis. Although there was no definitive plan at the early stage, discussions 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 5 - DECISION

focused on ways to better distribute administrative workloads while encouraging 

enrollment growth. Williams testifies that initial reorganization discussions recognized 

the growth of the health care field and its impact on Terra;2

{¶ 14} In September 2011, Plaintiff missed a board meeting as a result of a death 

in his family. Plaintiff also missed a building dedication ceremony while representing 

Terra at an academic conference. According to Plaintiff, after returning to campus from 

the conference, Williams accused Plaintiff of using poor judgment for attending the 

conference and not being available on campus. At a subsequent meeting with Bordner 

and Williams, Plaintiff was again accused of not being available on campus and missing 

meetings. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with Human Resources alleging sex 

discrimination and harassment by Williams;3

{¶ 15} At a Labor Management Committee Meeting in November 2011, Webster 

informed the participants about the possibility of academic affairs restructuring as a 

result of personnel changes and progression toward online classes; 

{¶ 16} In December 2011 at a cabinet retreat the first agenda item was to finalize 

plans for the reorganization. As a part of the reorganization, Terra would eliminate 

three dean positions and create four new dean positions with restructured academic 

divisions. According to Webster, the new academic structure would focus on the growth 

in the health care, entertainment, and hospitality industries in the area as well as 

provide opportunities for students to pursue business education related to the music 

and arts programs; 

{¶ 17} In February 2012, Bordner announced a reorganization of the academic 

side of the college. At a meeting announcing the reorganization to the deans, Plaintiff 

was informed that his position, along with two other dean positions, was being 

 

2

In an affidavit before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, Williams avers that in the fall of 2011, Terra 

began considering reorganization because of the continued growth at Terra. 

3

Plaintiff has not asserted a retaliation claim as a result of the filing of the sex discrimination claim. 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 6 - DECISION

eliminated. The two other dean positions were held by Sue Kajfasz, who had indicated 

she wanted to return to faculty status and Nancy Sattler who was retiring in June 2012. 

Plaintiff’s duties were to be divided among several newly-created dean positions. 

According to Webster, Plaintiff was encouraged to apply for a new dean position at 

Terra, but he declined to do so; 

{¶ 18} In March 2012, shortly after learning of the plan, Plaintiff took a medical 

leave of absence and did not return to campus. As a result of the reorganization, 

Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant ended June 30, 2012, at the end of the school 

year. Plaintiff’s duties were divided among three newly-hired deans: Andy Carroll, a 38 

year-old male, Michael Shirtz, a 33 year-old male, and Beth Hannam, a 39 year-old 

female. The reorganization was implemented for the Fall 2012 semester. 

 

Conclusions of Law

{¶ 19} Plaintiff claims discrimination on the basis of age, sex, and disability in 

violation of R.C. 4112.02(A), as well as promissory estoppel regarding an alleged 

promise of continued employment with Defendant. 

{¶ 20} R.C. 4112.02 states: “It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice: (A) For 

any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status, national origin, 

disability, age or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to 

hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment or any matter directly or indirectly related to 

employment.” 

 A) Discrimination on the basis of Age and Sex 

{¶ 21} Inasmuch as the evidentiary standards applicable to discrimination claims 

based upon age and sex are the same, the Court will jointly analyze Plaintiff’s claims. 

Disparate treatment discrimination has been described as “the most easily understood 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 7 - DECISION

type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than 

others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Teamsters v. 

United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-336 (1977) fn. 15. In a disparate treatment case, 

liability depends upon whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer’s 

decision. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). For example, the 

“employer may have relied upon a formal, facially discriminatory policy that required 

adverse treatment” of protected employees, or the “employer may have been motivated 

by the protected trait on an ad hoc, informal basis.” Id. “Whatever the employer’s 

decision making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the 

employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative 

influence on the outcome.” Id. 

{¶ 22} Plaintiff has not presented any direct evidence of age or sex discrimination 

in this case. Absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent, Ohio Courts resolve such 

discrimination claims using the evidentiary framework established by the Supreme 

Court of the United States in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 

See Canady v. Rekau & Rekau, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-32, 2009-Ohio-4974, ¶ 22. 

“Under the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework, a plaintiff bears the initial burden 

of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. In order to do so, plaintiff must 

present evidence that: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an 

adverse employment action, (3) he was qualified for the position in question and (4) 

either he was replaced by someone outside the protected class or a non-protected 

similarly situated person was treated better.” (Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 23. If a 

Plaintiff’s position is terminated as a part of a corporate reorganization or workforce 

reduction, the fourth element of the prima facie case is modified such that Plaintiff must 

present “additional, direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that 

the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.” Barnes v. 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 8 - DECISION

Gencorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.1990); see also Wise v. Ohio State 

University, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-383, 2011-Ohio-6566, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 23} Once a Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of age or 

sex discrimination is created. The burden of production then shifts to the Defendantemployer to overcome the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 123 Ohio St.3d 

216, 2009-Ohio-4231, ¶ 4. “If the employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, then 

the employer has successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination that was 

raised by the prima facie case.” Frick v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 3rd Dist. 

No. 1-09-59, 2010-Ohio-4292, ¶ 20, citing Weiper v. W.A. Hill & Assoc., 104 Ohio 

App.3d 250, 263 (1st Dist.1995). 

{¶ 24} As a general rule, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 

employer and will not second-guess the business judgment of employers regarding 

personnel decisions. Kirsch v. Bowling Green State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 95API11-1476 

(May 1996). Additionally, in a discrimination case, the Court must examine the 

employer’s motivation, not a Plaintiff’s perceptions. Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 502 

(6th Cir.1987). Plaintiff is an employee-at-will and can be terminated at anytime for a 

non-discriminatory reason. Sutton v. Tomco Machining, 129 Ohio St.3d 153 (2011). 

“The cornerstone of this analysis [whether there was discriminatory intent] is whether 

the employment action is the result of discrimination–not merely whether the action is 

unfair or the justification questionable.” Price v. Matco Tools, 9th Dist. No. 23583, 2007-

Ohio-5116, ¶ 31. “Even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless” that fact is 

not sufficient to justify a finding of discrimination. Hartley v. Wilson Bell Inc., 124 F.3d 

887, 890 (7th Cir.1997). Whether a personnel decision was correct is not the issue 

before this Court. The Court is asked to determine whether age or sex were factors in 

the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 9 - DECISION

{¶ 25} Plaintiff, who was 63 years old at the time of termination, has established a 

prima facie case of both age and sex discrimination. Plaintiff is a member of a 

protected class; he suffered an adverse employment action; he was qualified for the 

position; and his position was eliminated as a part of the reorganization with his duties 

divided among three newly-created dean positions. All three newly-hired deans were 

under the age of 40 and one dean was female. Additionally, there is no dispute that 

Defendant’s reorganization resulted in the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with 

Defendant. 

{¶ 26} Defendant has presented evidence that it had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the reorganization and elimination of Plaintiff’s position. 

Indeed, Bordner, Webster, and Williams each assert that Plaintiff’s position was 

eliminated as a part of the academic reorganization. 

{¶ 27} Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s “reorganization” is nothing more than a 

pretext for impermissible discrimination. Once an employer establishes a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken, a Plaintiff must present evidence that an 

employer’s stated justification was a mere pretext for impermissible discrimination. See 

Boyd v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-906, 2011-Ohio-3596, ¶ 27. 

To meet his or her burden, a Plaintiff must submit evidence that an employer’s proffered 

reason (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the employer's challenged 

conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct. Knepper v. Ohio 

State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1155, 2011-Ohio-6054, ¶ 12, citing Dews v. A.B. Dick 

Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir.2000). Under any of the three options, a Plaintiff 

must produce sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably reject an 

employer’s explanation and infer that the employer intentionally discriminated against 

him. Knepper, supra, at ¶ 12, citing Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th 

Cir.2003). “A reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is 

shown both that the reason was false, and the discrimination was the real reason.” 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 10 - DECISION

Crase v. Shasta Beverage, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-519, 2012-Ohio-326, ¶ 21; see 

also Sells v. Holiday Mgt. Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-205, 2011-Ohio-5974, ¶ 40. 

{¶ 28} Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s shifting rational for the reorganization is 

evidence of pretext. In support of his position, Plaintiff points to the allegedly conflicting 

reasons for reorganization offered by Bordner, Williams, and Webster. Plaintiff further 

argues that his position as a dean necessitated his participation in the reorganization 

process and that his exclusion from the process is evidence that Defendant was merely 

working to terminate his employment. However, it is not disputed that none of the three 

deans participated in the reorganization process. 

{¶ 29} Based upon the evidence presented by Plaintiff, the Court can only 

conclude that there is no issue of material fact that the reorganization was anything but 

legitimate. Indeed, Plaintiff failed to present the Court with any direct or circumstantial 

evidence that Defendant’s reasons for reorganization had no basis in fact, did not 

actually motivate the reorganization or were insufficient to warrant the reorganization. 

The only evidence before the Court is that Defendant began planning the reorganization 

in July or August 2011 and finalized the reorganization in December 2011. The 

reorganization was announced to the campus in February 2012, implementing the 

reorganization for the Fall semester 2012. Defendant presented evidence that 

personnel changes, industry growth, and growth at the college created an ideal time to 

reorganize the academic structure. There is no dispute that Plaintiff was not involved 

with the reorganization process and became aware of the reorganization after details 

had been finalized in December 2011. As a part of that reorganization process, all three 

deans’ positions, including Plaintiff’s position, were eliminated. Although Plaintiff was 

encouraged to apply for a position with Defendant, he did not apply for any of the newlycreated positions. The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is 

that Plaintiff’s position was eliminated solely as a result of Defendant’s reorganization. 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 11 - DECISION

Thus, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s claims for age 

and sex discrimination. 

 B) Disability Discrimination 

{¶ 30} Plaintiff’s claim of disability discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02 

which is based upon him being subjected to an adverse employment action is likewise 

analyzed through the burden shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas. 

Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination by showing: (1) 

that he was disabled; (2) that an adverse employment action was taken at least in part 

because of the disability; and (3) that he could safely and substantially perform the 

essential functions of the job despite his disability. Turner v. Shahed Enters., 10th Dist. 

No. 10AP-892, 2011-Ohio-4654, ¶ 13. Once a Plaintiff has established a prima facie 

case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged action. Allen, supra. If the employer 

articulates such non-discriminatory reasons, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff produce 

evidence that the reasons offered by the Defendant were not its true reasons, but were 

a pretext for discrimination. Knepper, supra, at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 31} Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that he was “disabled” 

under R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). Plaintiff argues that his heart attack and subsequent 

placement of stents qualify as a disability. 

{¶ 32} Ohio law defines “disability” to mean “a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities, including the functions of caring for 

one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 

learning, and working; a record of a physical or mental impairment; or being regarded 

as having a physical or mental impairment.” R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). The Court notes that 

“heart disease” is defined as an impairment under R.C. 4112.01(A)(16); however, 

Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered from “heart disease.” Plaintiff argues that he 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 12 - DECISION

suffered a heart attack, which required hospitalization, the placement of stents, and a 

leave of absence from work to recuperate. Plaintiff has presented the court with no 

authority expert or otherwise that someone who recovers from a heart attack, with no 

further heart disease, is disabled under R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). 

{¶ 33} Assuming that Plaintiff’s heart attack constitutes a physical impairment, 

such an impairment standing alone, does not necessarily constitute a disability. See 

Rongers v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, Inc., 8th Dist. No.91669, 2009-Ohio-2137. 

Temporary impairments, with little or no long-term or permanent impact, are usually not 

disabilities. Canady, supra, at ¶ 33. Thus, Plaintiff’s heart attack, standing alone, does 

not constitute a disability. Plaintiff must demonstrate that his impairment “substantially 

limits one or more major life activities * * *.” R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). An impairment 

substantially limits a major life activity when the ability of an individual to perform a 

major life activity is limited compared to most people in the general population. 29 

C.F.R. 1630.2(j). Major life activities include eating, walking, breathing, and standing. 

29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i). Plaintiff avers that his heart attack has substantially limited major 

life activities such as running, climbing stairs, walking for a long distance, and eating in 

that he must now eat a low cholesterol diet. However, Plaintiff has not provided the 

Court with evidence of how his heart attack substantially limits any major life activities 

compared with people in the general population. 

{¶ 34} Assuming a Court would hold that Plaintiff was “disabled” under R.C. 

4112.01(A)(13), as stated above, Defendant has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination and Plaintiff has failed to present the 

Court with any evidence that Defendant’s reason for reorganization had no basis in fact, 

did not actually motivate the reorganization or was insufficient to warrant the 

reorganization. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant’s 

reorganization was anything but legitimate. Thus, Defendant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination.
Case No. 2012-04421 - 13 - DECISION

 C) Promissory Estoppel 

{¶ 35} Promissory estoppel is defined as follows: “A promise which the promisor 

should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or 

a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice 

can be avoided only be enforcement of the promise.” Restatement of the Law 2d, 

Contracts, Section 90 (1973); McCroskey v. State, 8 Ohio St.3d 29, 30 (1983). To 

establish a claim for promissory estoppel, a Plaintiff must prove: “‘(1) a clear and 

unambiguous promise, (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise was made, (3) the 

reliance is reasonable and foreseeable, and (4) the party relying on the promise must 

have been injured by the reliance.’” Reif v. Wagenbrenner, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-948, 

2011-Ohio-3597, ¶ 42, quoting Callander v. Callander, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-746, 2008-

Ohio-2305, ¶ 33. 

{¶ 36} Plaintiff states that during the interview prior to being hired, Bordner 

“questioned whether I would stay at Terra for three years, and told me that she did not 

want to hire anyone who would not be there for at least three years. I assured her that 

my intentions were [to] stay until my normal retirement age of 66, and that I would 

commit to staying at Terra until at least August 31, 2014.” Plaintiff’s affidavit, ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff states that he turned down a second interview with Washington State 

Community College and an interview with North Central Community College in order to 

accept a position with Defendant. 

{¶ 37} The Court notes that it appears that Bordner merely questioned Plaintiff’s 

long-term commitment to employment with Defendant rather than promise a guaranteed 

three year term of employment. However, assuming, arguendo, Bordner promised 

Plaintiff that he would be employed for at least three years, such an oral employment 

agreement is barred by the statute of frauds, which applies to agreements that cannot 

be performed within one year. Olympic Holding Co., L.L.C., v. ACE Ltd., 122 Ohio St. 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 14 - DECISION

89 (2009); R.C. 1335.05. Moreover, reliance upon such an alleged promise would not 

be reasonable. Indeed, R.C. 3358.08 vests authority to employ administrative officers 

with the board of trustees, not the president. It is well-settled that public officers cannot 

bind the state by acts beyond their authority. See Drake v. Medical College of Ohio, 

120 Ohio App.3d 493, 495 (10th Dist.1997); Marbury v. Central State Univ., 10th Dist. 

No. 00AP-597 (Dec. 14, 2000). Likewise, promissory estoppel cannot be applied to 

contravene statutory authority. Id. Therefore, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s alleged 

three-year employment agreement is within the statute of frauds and is thus 

unenforceable. Moreover, Plaintiff could not have reasonably relied upon any alleged 

promise of continued employment with Defendant. Accordingly, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s claim of promissory estoppel fails as a matter of law. 

{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues 

of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted. 

 _____________________________________ 

 DALE A. CRAWFORD 

 Judge 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 15 - DECISION

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us 

BENJAMIN RANDOLPH 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

TERRA STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE 

 Defendant

Case No. 2012-04421 

Judge Dale A. Crawford 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

{¶ 39} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon Defendant’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently 

herewith, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and judgment is 

rendered in favor of Defendant. Court costs are assessed against Plaintiff. The clerk 

shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. 

 _____________________________________ 

 DALE A. CRAWFORD 

 Judge 
Case No. 2012-04421 - 16 - DECISION

cc: 

 

Francis J. Landry 

Katherine A. Pawlak 

300 Inns of Court Building 

405 North Huron Street 

Toledo, Ohio 43604-1449 

Velda K. Hofacker

Assistant Attorney General 

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130 

003

Filed July 11, 2013 

Sent to S.C. Reporter April 30, 2014