FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PLANET AID, INC., A Massachusetts

Corporation which has its principal

place of business in Howard County,

Maryland; LISBETH THOMSEN, An

alien and permanent resident of

Chilangoma, Malawi,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

REVEAL; CENTER FOR

INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING; MATT

SMITH; AMY WALTERS,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-15690

D.C. No.

3:17-cv-03695-

MMC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 14, 2022

San Francisco, California

Filed August 11, 2022

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Ronald M. Gould, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge S.R. Thomas
2 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

SUMMARY*

California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute

The panel affirmed the district court’s order granting the

Reporters with the Center for Investigative Reporting

(“CIR”)’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint alleging

defamation under California law.

Matt Smith and Amy Waters were reporters with CIR

(“Reporters”) and they published stories alleging misuse of

funds by two charitable organizations, Planet Aid, Inc., and

Development Aid from People to People Malawi (“DAPP

Malawi”). In response, Planet Aid and the director of DAPP

Malawi, Lisbeth Thomsen, filed a defamation suit.

In a number of decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court

established that public officials and public figures claiming

defamation must prove that an allegedly defamatory

statement was made with “actual malice.” The Supreme

Court identified two types of public figures: all purpose

public figures and limited-purpose public figures. Allpurpose public figures must prove actual malice for virtually

any subject of defamation, while limited-purpose public

figures, who have assumed prominence on a limited range of

issues, need only prove actual malice for speech touching

upon those issues. In Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d

242 (9th Cir. 2013), this court articulated a three-prong test to

determine whether an individual or entity is a limited-purpose

figure.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 3

The panel held that the district court correctly found that

Planet Aid and Thomsen were limited-purpose public figures

and that the Reporters did not act with “actual malice” within

the meaning of New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376

U.S. 254 (1964). The panel agreed with the district court’s

determination in applying the Makaeff test that: (i) there was

an existing public controversy with respect to Planet Aid and

Lisbeth Thomsen’s use of charitable funds; (ii) the Reporters’

alleged defamation was relevant to this preexisting

controversy; and (iii) the voluntariness requirement—which

examines whether the plaintiff voluntarily injected itself into

the controversy for the purpose of influencing the

controversy’s ultimate resolution—was satisfied. The panel

further agreed with the district court, for the reasons stated by

the district court in its order, that a reasonable factfinder

could not find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

Reporters acted with actual malice. The panel therefore

affirmed the district court’s grant of the Reporters’ motion to

strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.

COUNSEL

Samuel Rosenthal (argued), Nelson Mullins LLP,

Washington, D.C.; James M. Wagstaffe and Michael von

Loewenfeldt, Wagstaffe von Loewenfeldt Busch & Radwick

LLP, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thomas R. Burke (argued), Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, San

Francisco, California; Ambike K. Doran, Davis Wright

Tremaine LLP, Seattle, Washington; Brendan Charney and

Andrew G. Row, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Los Angeles,

California; Simon J. Frankel, Alexa Hansen, Alison Wall,

Annie Shi, and Miriam Arghavani, Covington & Burling
4 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

LLP, San Francisco, California; Eric Chung, Covington &

Burling LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

Deborah J. Dewart, Hubert, North Carolina, for Amicus

Curiae Liberty, Life, and Law Foundation.

Elizabeth M. Locke, Joseph R. Oliveri, and Daniel D. Mauler,

Clare Locke LLP, Alexandria, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae

Clare Locke LLP.

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. and Michael H. Dore, Gibson Dunn

& Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, California; Katie Townsend,

Sarah S. Matthews, and Charles Hogle, Reporters Committee

for Freedom of the Press, Washington, D.C.; for Amici

Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and

32 Media Organizations.

OPINION

S.R. THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we must determine whether a charity and

the director of a charity are limited-purpose public figures

under the First Amendment. Reporters with the Center for

Investigative Reporting published stories alleging misuse of

funds by two charitable organizations, Planet Aid, Inc.

(“Planet Aid”) and Development Aid from People to People

Malawi (“DAPP Malawi”). In response, Planet Aid and the

director of DAPP Malawi, Lisbeth Thomsen, filed a

defamation suit. The district court granted the Reporters’

motion to strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP

statute, correctly finding that Planet Aid and Thomsen are

limited-purpose public figures and that the reporters did not
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 5

act with “actual malice” within the meaning of New York

Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). We affirm.

I

The Center for Investigative Reporting (“CIR”) is a

California-based, nonprofit, investigative news organization. 

CIR publishes its reporting on various platforms, including its

news website Reveal (www.revealnews.org), national radio

show, and podcast. Matt Smith and Amy Walters were

reporters with CIR. Between 2014 and 2017, CIR, Smith,

and Walters (collectively, “CIR” or the “Reporters”)

investigated and published a series of articles and podcasts

reporting on the misuse of charitable funds by Planet Aid and

its affiliate organization DAPP Malawi.

A

Planet Aid is a nonprofit charitable organization

headquartered in Maryland with the stated mission of helping

impoverished populations throughout the world. Planet Aid

is recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)

as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charity. It resells used clothing

donated by the public, obtains government grants, and solicits

corporate donations to generate funds. Since its inception in

1997, Planet Aid claims to have provided more than

$100 million to support projects on three continents in the

areas of education, teacher training, nutrition, and agricultural

and economic development.

Planet Aid’s fundraising efforts are highly successful and

recognizable. It fundraises by going door to door to solicit

donations as well as setting up clothing donation bins that

have become nearly ubiquitous across the United States. In
6 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

partnership with schools, business groups, religious

institutions, nonprofits, and various organizations across the

country, Planet Aid placed over 20,000 donation bins

nationwide. Its signature, bright-yellow bins are present in

20 states and have achieved a degree of celebrity in popular

culture. For example, the bins were featured in an episode of

the popular television series “The Big Bang Theory,” which

Planet Aid eagerly promoted on its social media pages.

Planet Aid regularly engages with the press and actively

cultivates a public image. It issues frequent press releases to

generate attention regarding its charitable programs and

activities. For instance, Planet Aid issued numerous press

releases over the years to advertise the environmental benefits

of its efforts to collect and resell donated clothing. Other

examples of Planet Aid’s public self-promotion abound. In

March of 2014, Planet Aid distributed press releases

regarding a teacher training program it helped fund in

Malawi. In June of 2016, it issued press releases regarding

dignitaries’ visits to a nutritional program it was running for

schoolchildren in Mozambique. It has hosted large galas to

celebrate its charitable successes and promoted those galas to

the press. Planet Aid also publicizes itself through social

media. It has a YouTube page featuring videos about its

charitable activities, some of which have thousands of views. 

Additionally, it regularly posts on Facebook and Twitter to its

thousands of followers.

From its inception, Planet Aid has drawn public attention

and comment. For decades, the global press has reported on

its relationship with a controversial web of charitable

organizations accused of misusing funds and its association

with a Danish cult. In 1993, a few years before Planet Aid

was incorporated, the Edmonton Journal reported that “an
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 7

international organization that specializes in collecting used

clothes for southern Africa,” was “attracting criticism from

Denmark to the Arctic Circle” because many “Europeans who

donate their old [clothes] don’t know the garments end up

being sold at market prices in Africa—with much of the profit

filtered into what seem less than altruistic causes.” This

organization, known as “Humana” was reportedly affiliated

with the Development Aid People to People (“DAPP”)

network. According to the article, “[t]hrough a complex web

of financial interests, the Humana/DAPP network runs a

financial system out of the Cayman Islands” that includes

“holding companies,” “Caribbean fruit plantations,” and “a

yacht dealership.” The article further alleged that Humana

and DAPP began as a group of radical Danish school teachers

in the early 1970s, called “Tvind.”

Then, according to a Danish newspaper, “after the Danish

government fund slammed the door on subsidies,” Tvind

“beg[an] an unprecedented, mammoth expansion drive in the

USA and Canada to raise millions for its international

activities,” including “found[ing] the organization Planet

Aid.” In 2001, Tvind’s founder, Mogens Amdi Petersen, was

prosecuted by Danish authorities for “using his control of

Tvind and its related [organizations] to divert funds that were

supposedly intended for charitable and other public

purposes.”

Multiple major news organizations in the United States

and overseas reported on the trial and raised concerns about

Planet Aid’s connection to Tvind and its use of charitable

funds. In 2002, the Boston Globe linked Planet Aid to

Petersen, who faced “charges of tax fraud and embezzlement

of millions of dollars from a vast international network of

charities,” and reported that “only about 6 percent of the
8 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

money [Planet Aid] raises is spent on charity.” Several other

publications reported that the American Institute of

Philanthropy and the Better Business Bureau were critical of

Planet Aid’s use of funds. These concerns reverberated from

The Washington Post (May 2003 article), to the Chicago

Tribune (Feb. 2004 and May 2011 articles), to the Los

Angeles Times (Aug. 2015 article).

1 Several international

publications also covered the controversy.

B

Lisbeth Thomsen is the director of DAPP Malawi, a

nonprofit charitable organization based in Malawi. Thomsen

has worked in Malawi for nearly three decades and has

worked specifically for DAPP Malawi for over two decades. 

Thomsen helped lead the organization’s poverty reduction

and humanitarian efforts, establishing pre-schools, teacher

training colleges,HIV/AIDs counseling centers, door-to-door

educational campaigns, and other initiatives.

As the director of DAPP Malawi, Thomsen was its

spokesperson. When DAPP Malawi opened a school or

unveiled a new charitable program, she spoke at public

gatherings before local officials and community members to

promote the initiative. Thomsen regularly spoke to the press

1

In addition to the above articles, numerous other U.S. news

organizations have also reported on this controversy, including the

following: The Wisconsin State Journal (Apr. 2002); The Brattleboro

Reformer in Vermont (Apr. 2005); The Sacramento Bee (Nov. 2006);

Lancaster Online in Pennsylvania (Jul. 2007); the Rochester Democrat

and Chronicle in New York (Sep. 2007); Citizens’ Voice in Pennsylvania

(Dec. 2007); The Times-Tribune in Pennsylvania (Dec. 2007); The

Lebanon Daily News in Pennsylvania (Jan. 2008); The Burlington Free

Press in Vermont (Oct. 2008); The Philadelphia Inquirer (Dec. 2012).
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 9

to generate attention regarding the successes of DAPP

Malawi’s programs. She was featured regularly on DAPP

Malawi’s Facebook and Twitter pages and appeared in

promotional YouTube videos about DAPP Malawi’s work. 

Thomsen employed a public relations team, which helped her

seek out positive press coverage and public appearances, and

develop responses to negative publicity.

Like Planet Aid, DAPP Malawi was long embroiled in the

Tvind controversy. The press repeatedly linked DAPP

Malawi to the Danish cult leader who was prosecuted for

charity fraud. Additionally, several articles in Malawi

newspapers raised concerns or made allegations about DAPP

Malawi’s misuse of charitable funds under the leadership of

Lisbeth Thomsen. In 2002, the Malawi News linked Tvind,

Humana, and DAPPMalawi,reporting allegations that “Dapp

Malawi uses its second hand clothes shops to raise funds

which are later transferred back to Denmark through . . . a

dubious scholarship scheme.” In 2003, The Chronicle

Newspaper reported that “[i]n Malawi, government is now

probing activities of DAPP Malawi, following . . .

[accusations that] scholarships and other funds meant for

Malawian students allegedly have been channeled to

Denmark.” In 2011, the Nyasa Times reported that

“employees at [DAPP Malawi] have turned against their

employers, accusing them of secretly swindling money for

unknown activities.”

C

In June of 2005, the U.S. Department of Agriculture

(“UDSA”) awarded Planet Aid a grant through its “Food for

Progress” program. The grant gave Planet Aid approximately

$23 million to administer poverty reduction programs in
10 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

Malawi including building, staffing, and operating schools to

train teachers in Malawi; educating the Malawian population

about risks associated with HIV and AIDs; teaching farmers

about agricultural techniques to improve crop yields; and

educating the population about nutrition. Planet Aid asked

Thomsen to help administer the USDA grant in her role as

director of DAPP Malawi.

In 2014, reporters at CIR began to investigate Planet Aid

and DAPP Malawi’s use of the USDA grant funds. Between

March and May 2016, they published a podcast, along with

several news articles and social media posts, alleging that

Planet Aid, DAPP Malawi, and Lisbeth Thomsen misused the

funds. The publications alleged that Planet Aid and Lisbeth

Thomsen stole USDA funds by diverting funds from their

intended recipients, falsifying invoices, failing to provide

livestock and agricultural inputs to local farmers, and

extracting kickbacks from the salaries of DAPP Malawi

employees.

In August of 2016, Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen filed

a defamation suit against the Reporters. In July of 2018, the

Reporters moved under California’s anti-SLAPP law,

California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, to strike the

defamation claim.

2 After significant discovery was

conducted, in March of 2021, the district court granted the

motion to strike. The district court found that several

statements by the Reporters were false, but recognized that

Planet Aid and Thomsen are limited-purpose public figures

2 Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen forfeited any argument that

California’s anti-SLAPP statute may not be applied in federal court by

failing to specifically and distinctly argue this issue in their opening brief. 

See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994).
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 11

in connection with their use of charitable funds and that the

Reporters did not act with “actual malice.” N.Y. Times,

376 U.S. at 280.

II

“California law provides for the pre-trial dismissal of

certain actions, known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public

Participation, or SLAPPs, that masquerade as ordinary

lawsuits but are intended to deter ordinary people from

exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for

doing so.” Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261

(9th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see

also Wilcox v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1994). We have jurisdiction to review the district

court’s grant of the Reporters’ anti-SLAPP motion under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the motion challenges the factual

sufficiency of Planet Aid and Thomsen’s defamation claim,

“the motion must be treated as though it were a motion for

summary judgment.” Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc.

v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted).

We review de novo whether summary judgment was

properly entered. L.F. v. Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. #414,

947 F.3d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 2020). Whether a plaintiff is a

public figure is a legal question to be reviewed de novo. 

Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., 830 F.3d 881, 888

(9th Cir. 2016). Moreover, we “must make an independent

examination of the whole record, so as to assure ourselves

that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on

the field of free expression.” Suzuki Motor Corp. v.

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.
12 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

2003) (citing N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 284 (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

III

The Supreme Court has long enshrined “a profound

national commitment to the principle that debate on public

issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open and that

it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes

unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public

officials,” N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270, as well as “public

figures,” Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154

(1967). Thus, an action for defamation can be maintained

only to the extent it does not interfere with First Amendment

rights of free expression.

In the landmark decisions of New York Times Company

v. Sullivan, and Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, the

Supreme Court established that public officials and public

figures claiming defamation must prove that the allegedly

defamatory statement was made with “actual malice”—that

is, “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless

disregard of whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times,

376 U.S. at 280; Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 134. The

Court recognized that actual malice standard would bar some

plaintiffs from recovering damages for erroneous and

injurious statements. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270–72. 

Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the law of defamation

must provide a degree of “breathing space” to avoid chilling

constitutionally valuable speech. Id. at 271–72.

Subsequently, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme

Court identified two types of public figures: (1) all-purpose

public figures, who occupy “positions of such persuasive
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 13

power and influence that they are deemed public figures for

all purposes,” and (2) limited-purpose public figures, who

achieve their status by “thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront

of particular public controversies in order to influence the

resolution of the issues involved.” 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 

Both categories of public figures, the Court noted, “have

assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of

society” and “invite[d] attention and comment.” Id. Allpurpose public figures must prove actual malice for virtually

any subject of defamation. Limited-purpose public figures,

who have assumed prominence on a limited range of issues,

need only prove actual malice for speech touching upon those

issues.

The Court articulated two justifications for requiring

public figures to show actual malice. The first was self-help. 

Public figures enjoy “greater access to the channels of

effective communication” than private individuals and are

therefore better able to “contradict the lie or correct the

error.” Id. at 344. The second and “[m]ore important”

justification was the notion of assumption of risk. Id. Public

figures, who have thrust themselves into the public eye,

“must accept certain necessary consequences” of that

conduct, including “the risk of closer public scrutiny than

might otherwise be the case.” Id. at 344–45. The Gertz

Court also emphasized the critical importance of “lay[ing]

down broad rules of general application” in order to avoid

“unpredictable results and uncertain expectations,” which

might discourage freedom of expression. Id. at 343–44;

Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,

686 (1989) (“Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional

protection can only dissuade protected speech—the more

elusive the standard, the less protection it affords.”).
14 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

A

In Makaeff v. Trump University, drawing from Gertz and

other case law, we articulated a three-prong test to determine

whether an individual or entity is a limited-purpose public

figure:

In undertaking this inquiry, we consider

whether (i) a public controversy existed when

the statements were made, (ii) whether the

alleged defamation is related to the plaintiff’s

participation in the controversy, and

(iii) whether the plaintiff voluntarily injected

itself into the controversy for the purpose of

influencing the controversy’s ultimate

resolution.

Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 266 (citing Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 752, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). In its decision

below, applying Makaeff, the district court determined (i) that

there was an existing public controversy with respect to

Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen’s use of charitable funds;

(ii) that the Reporters’ alleged defamation was related to this

preexisting controversy; and (iii) that the voluntariness

requirement was satisfied. We agree.

1

Under the first Makaeff prong, we consider whether “a

public controversy existed when the [allegedly defamatory]

statements were made.” Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 266 (citation

omitted). Public interest or attention alone is not sufficient to

create a public a controversy. Time, Inc. v. Firestone,

424 U.S. 448, 454–55 (1976). A public controversy must be
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 15

“a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general

public or some segment of it.” Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 267

(quoting Waldbaumv.FairchildPubl’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287,

1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297

(“If the issue was being debated publicly and if it had

foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants,

it was a public controversy.”).

We have little difficulty in concluding that genuine public

controversies existed at the time the Reporters published their

statements about Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen. Long

before the Reporters published any articles about Planet Aid,

countless news outlets published articles questioning Planet

Aid’s integrity and examining the extent to which its

charitable funds were being used for their intended purposes. 

Planet Aid was repeatedly linked by the press to the founder

of a Danish charity who was prosecuted for illegally diverting

charitable funds. Additionally, Planet Aid raised over a

$100 million in charitable funds. It received tax exemptions

from the U.S. government to help the poor. This was a

genuine public controversy; the extent to which Planet Aid’s

funds were being used for their intended purposes has

ramifications both for American taxpayers and for the

advertised recipients of those charitable funds. See Makaeff,

715 F.3d at 267; Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.

Additionally, beforeCIR’sreporting onLisbethThomsen,

numerous articles had been published about DAPP Malawi’s

use of charitable funds under Thomsen’s leadership. DAPP

Malawi was linked by the press to the Danish criminal

prosecution. Various articles questioned its integrity, the

extent to which it was using its funds to aid the poor, and the

extent to which it was channeling funds towards controversial

organizations known for misusing charitable funds. Like
16 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

Planet Aid, DAPP Malawi received donations and grants to

aid impoverished communities in Malawi. This too was a

genuine public controversy. See Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 267;

Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.

2

Makaeff also asks us to consider “whether the plaintiff

voluntarily injected itself into the controversy for the purpose

of influencing the controversy’s ultimate resolution.” 

715 F.3d at 266. This voluntariness requirement has been

interpreted broadly, both by Makaeff and by other courts. 

Voluntariness is not confined to those who seek to influence

the resolution of a single issue. Rather, voluntariness can also

be satisfied by a showing that a person or entity engaged in a

course of conduct that foreseeably put themselves at risk of

public scrutiny with respect to a limited range of issues.

In Makaeff, we deemed Trump University a limitedpurpose public figure for issues arising from its advertising

efforts. Trump University had long been engaged in an

“aggressive advertising campaign,” promoting its educational

products and services on “social media, local and national

newspaper, [and the] radio.” Id. at 268–69. After a

disgruntled former customer disparaged Trump University

and sued it for deceptive business practices, it filed a

defamation counterclaim. Id. at 267. In classifying Trump

University a limited-purpose public figure, we held that

“large scale, aggressive advertising can inject a person or

entity into a public controversy that arises from the subject of

that advertising.” Id. at 267. Because Trump University’s

“extensive advertising efforts ‘invited public attention,

comment, and criticism,’” the voluntariness requirement was

satisfied with respect to issues related to those advertising
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 17

efforts. Id. at 269 (quoting Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner,

623 F.2d 264, 274 (3d Cir. 1980)).

Other circuits have also interpreted the voluntariness

requirement broadly. For example, the Third Circuit deemed

an architect-engineer a limited-purpose public figure with

respect to his participation in controversial public building

projects. McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 944 (3d

Cir. 1985). McDowell regularly contracted with the

government of the Virgin Islands to build public projects. Id.

at 945. Subsequently, McDowell was criticized by the media

for his performance on several projects and possible conflicts

of interests involved in his being awarded various contracts. 

Id. at 948. The court designated McDowell a limited-purpose

public figure for the purpose of his defamation claim. Id.

at 949. By repeatedly working on high-profile, controversial

public building projects, the court explained, McDowell “can

be considered to have voluntarily assumed a position that

invited attention.” Id. at 950. This was “sufficient to

transform him into a public figure for the limited purpose of

his work on publicly financed building projects.” Id.

The Fifth Circuit likewise deemed Louis Rosanova a

limited-purpose public figure in the context of his connection

to organized crime. Rosanova, 411 F. Supp. at 440, aff’d,

580 F.2d at 862. Rosanova had longstanding relationships

with various members of organized crime as well as with the

Teamsters union and its president. Id. at 444. Rosanova filed

a defamation suit after being characterized as a “California

mobster” in a magazine article. The court classified

Rosanova as a limited-purpose public figure, rejecting his

argument that he had not thrust himself into the vortex of any

single public issue. Id. at 445. By associating with organized

crime, the court explained, “Rosanova voluntarily engaged in
18 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

a course [of conduct] that was bound to invite attention and

comment” with respect to those relationships. Id.; 580 F.2d

at 862; see also Clyburn v. News World Commc’ns, Inc.,

903 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that plaintiff,

Clyburn, satisfied the voluntariness requirement in part by

“hobnob[ing] with high officials”).

Under this “course of conduct” approach to the

voluntariness requirement reflected in McDowell, Rosanova,

and the other cases identified above, it is quite clear both

Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen actively engaged in conduct

that invited public comment and attention. Planet Aid

regularly engages with the press in an effort to cultivate a

public image, including by issuing press releases, hosting

galas, and publicizing itself to thousands of followers through

social media. Additionally, Planet Aid aggressively solicits

donations from the public. Nat’l Found. for Cancer Rsch.,

Inc. v. Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, Inc., 705 F.2d 98, 101

(4th Cir. 1983) (finding that a charity “thrust itself into the

public eye” by soliciting donations from the public). It is

clear from the record that Planet Aid “attempted, through

various means at its disposal, to put itself and its methods

before the public.” Id. at 102; see also Ampex Corp. v.

Cargle, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t

is sufficient that the plaintiff attempts to thrust him or herself

into the public eye.”). Thus, by inviting public attention

regarding its charitable activities and charitable funds, Planet

Aid satisfied the voluntariness requirement for those limited

purposes.

Similarly, as the director of DAPP Malawi, Thomsen

served as its spokesperson. She spoke at public gatherings to

promote DAPP Malawi’s programs and initiatives, she spoke

to the press to generate attention regarding its programs, and
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 19

she employed public relations staff to cultivate her public

image. Like Planet Aid, DAPP Malawi also solicited

donations and grants. By taking on the role of DAPP

Malawi’s spokesperson and regularly engaging in publicfacing and attention-generating activities, Thomsen invited

public scrutiny, thereby satisfying the voluntariness

requirement.

Classifying Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen as limitedpurpose public figures through a course of conduct that

invites public attention is consistent with the rationales

articulated in Gertz. By actively seeking attention from the

press, promoting themselves through social media, employing

public relations staff, and soliciting donations and grants,

Planet Aid and Thomsen assumed a risk of public scrutiny. 

By regularly providing statements to the press, Planet Aid and

Thomsen both demonstrate a greater access to channels of

effective communication than private individuals, and

therefore an ability to counteract false statements through

self-help.3

3 Planet Aid and Thomsen, relying on Hutchinson v. Proxmire,

443 U.S. 111 (1979), seek to portray themselves as victims of the

Reporters’ attempt to create a defense from defamation by turning the

plaintiffs into public figures. There are two major distinguishing factors

between Hutchinson and the present case. First, in Hutchinson, the

plaintiff was a relatively obscure scientist prior to the allegedly

defamatory statements. By contrast, in this present case, Planet Aid and

Thomsen were the subject of significant public notoriety and scrutiny well

before the allegedly defamatory publications. Second, unlike the plaintiff

in Hutchinson, Planet Aid and Thomsen did not unwittingly become the

subject of publicity with respect to its charitable activities and use of

funds. To the contrary, they both actively thrust themselves into the

public eye.
20 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

3

Finally, under Makaeff, we consider “whether the alleged

defamation is related to the plaintiff’s participation in the

controversy.” Id. at 266; see also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d

at 1298 (“Misstatements wholly unrelated to the controversy

. . . do not receive the New York Times protection.”). Here,

there was a preexisting public controversy about Planet Aid

and Lisbeth Thomsen’s misuse of charitable funds generally. 

CIR subsequently reported on their misuse of a particular

grant from the USDA. Moreover, Planet Aid and Lisbeth

Thomsen invited public attention regarding their use of

charitable funds through press releases, promotion of

charitable programs, soliciting donations fromthe public, and

other activities. Thus, the alleged defamation is related to

Planet Aid and Thomsen’s participation in the controversy.4

In sum, the district court correctly designated Planet Aid

and Thomsen as limited-purpose public figures with respect

to their use of charitable funds.

4

In an attempt to defeat the relatedness requirement, Planet Aid and

Thomsen advocate for narrow definitions of the relevant public

controversies under the first prong of Makaeff. They argue that the

preexisting controversies concerned “the use of recycling bins for used

clothing” and “charges brought against Peterson in Denmark.” They

further argue that the Reporters’ defamatory publications concerned only

“USDA funding” and, therefore, that the prior controversies and the

defamation are unrelated. This argument is unpersuasive and unsupported

by the law. The preexisting public controversy need not be narrowly

defined or limited to the exact factual contours of the alleged defamation. 

The “narrow controversy” about Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen’s

misuse of USDA funding is “a phase of another, broader” controversy

about their practice of misusing of charitable funding generally. Jankovic

v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 822 F.3d 576, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also id.

(“Indeed, courts often define the public controversy in expansive terms.”).
PLANET AID V. REVEAL 21

B

Because Planet Aid and Thomsen are limited-purpose

public figures, their defamation claim can survive an antiSLAPP or summary judgment motion “only if the evidence

in the record would permit a reasonable finder of fact, by

clear and convincing evidence, to conclude that [the

Reporters] published a defamatory statement with actual

malice.” Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 508

(1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255–256 (1986). Actual malice is a subjective test; it

means that the Reporters must have published a statement

with “knowledge that it was false” or “reckless disregard of

whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 280. 

Reckless disregard, in turn, means that the Reporters “in fact

entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the statement in

question. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 

The district court undertook a thorough and detailed analysis

of the actual malice assertions. The record supports the

district court’s conclusion. Therefore, we agree with the

district court that, for the reasons stated by the district court

in its order, a reasonable fact finder could not find, by clear

and convincing evidence, that the Reporters acted with actual

malice.

IV

Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen are public figures for the

limited purpose of the public controversy surrounding their

use of charitable funds. The district court correctly concluded

that a reasonable fact finder could not find, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the Reporters acted with actual

malice in publishing the allegedly defamatory statements. 

We therefore affirmthe district court’s grant of the Reporters’
22 PLANET AID V. REVEAL

motion to strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP

statute.

AFFIRMED.