Affirmed and Opinion filed April 12 , 2022
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 19

- 00854

- CV
FACEBOOK, INC. , Appellant

V.
JANE DOE , Appellee
On Appeal from the 334th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2018

- 69816

OPINION In this interlocutory appeal, appellant Facebook, Inc., (“Facebook”) challenges the denial of its special appearance in appellee Jane Doe’s (“Doe”) lawsuit alleging that in 2012, a fter her abuser connected with her through Fa cebook , she b ecame a victim o f sex trafficking

. See Tex . Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(7). In four issues that we address as two, Facebook argues the trial court erred when it denied F acebook ’ s spe cial appearance because (1) Texas does not have general jurisdiction over Facebo o k, and (2) Texas does not have2

specific jurisdiction over F acebook as to Doe’s claim

. Because we conclude that Doe established specific jurisdiction over F acebook in Te xas , w e affir m the trial
court ’ s denial of Facebook ’ s special ap pearance
. I. B ACKGROUND
F a c ebook is a social media company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in California. Facebook has also been registered to do business in Texas as an online social

- networking bu siness since 2009

. On Oct ober 1, 2018, Doe filed a laws uit against Facebook alleging negligence, gross negligence, and violation s of Texas Civil Practice and Remedie s Code § 98.002. 1 See id. § 98.002(a)

. 2 Faceb ook filed a s pecial appearance challenging the tri al court’s personal jurisdiction and a Rule 91a mot io n seeking dismissal of all of Doe’s c laims

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a .1 ( “Except in a case brou ght under the Family Code or a case g overned by Ch apter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme dies Code, a party may move to dismiss a cause of act ion on the gr ounds that it has no bas is in law or fact.” ). Doe a mended her petition , adding claims for negli gent undertaking and prod uct s liabili ty, and filed response s to Facebook’s special appearance a nd motion to dismiss

. T he trial court denied Facebook’s moti on t o dismiss on May 23, 2019, and denied Fa c eboo k ’ s special appea rance on Oct ober 7, 2019

. On Oc tober 25, 2019, Facebo ok filed a notice of appeal s eeking review of the denial of its special

1 Doe’s l awsui t also included c laims against the follow ing defen dants: Backpage.com, LLC d/b/a Backpage; Carl Ferrer; Michael Lacey; Ja me s Larkin; John Brunst; America’s Inns, Inc. d/b/a A me rica’ s Inn 8 201 Southwest Fwy, Ho us ton, Tx 77074; and Texas Pearl, Inc.

2 Section 98.00 2( a) of t he Civi l Practice and Remedies C ode provides: “ A defendant who engages in the trafficking of per sons or wh o intentionally or knowingly benefits from par ticipating i n a venture that traffics anothe r person is liable to t he perso n trafficked, as provi ded by t his chapter, for dam ages arising from the trafficking of that person b y the defendant or ventur e.” Tex. C iv. Prac . & Rem. Code Ann. § 98.002(a ).3

appearance. That same day, Facebook filed a petition for writ of man damus in this court, seeking to compel the d is trict judge to set asi de th e order denying Facebook’s Ru le 91a motion to dis miss.
This cou rt denied Facebook’s mandamus petition

. S ee In re Facebook, Inc. , 607 S.W.3d 839, 83 9 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2 020, orig. proceeding) (per curiam)

. Facebo o k then filed petition s for w rit s of mandamus with the Supr eme Court of Texas in volving the underlying case and two other ca ses, one in the 334th District C ourt and another in the 151st District Cour t

. Our court a bate d th is special appeara nce appeal pending resol ution of the supreme court proceedings . The s upreme c ourt granted Facebook’s petition s in part and denied in part , di re cting the district court judges to dismiss Doe’s claims for n egligence,
gros s neglig enc e, negligen t undertaking, and pr oducts liability, but allowing her

s tatutory human

- trafficking claim to proceed

. See In re Facebook, Inc. , 625 S.W.3d 80 , 83 , 98 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)

. 3 We subsequently reinstated Facebook’ s appeal from the denia l o f i ts speci al appearance and are left to determin e whether Texas has personal jurisdiction over Fac ebook regarding Doe’s statutory h uman
- trafficking cla im

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 98.002(a)

.

3 The Supreme Court of Texas d i recte d the respondent district court j u d ge s to d ismis s Do e’s claim s for neglig ence, gross negligence, negligent undertaking, and products lia bility pursuant to § 2 30 of the F ederal C om munica tions A ct because Doe “ accused [Fac ebook ] on ly of ‘providing neutral too ls to carr y out what may be unlawful or illicit’ co mmun icati on by its
us ers.” In re Facebook , 625 S.W.3d 80, 98 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proc eeding) (emphasis in o riginal) ( quoting F

ai r Hou s
. Counc il of San Fernando Valley v . R oommate s.com, LLC , 521 F.3d 1157 , 1169 (9th C ir. 2008) (en banc) (op. on reh’g)); see 47 U .S.C

. § 230 . The Supreme Court of Texas did not di rect the respondent district court judges to dismiss Doe’s statutory se x traf ficking claim because this claim “is predicated on alleg ations of Facebook’s affirm ative acts encouraging trafficking on its plat fo rm s .” In re Facebook , 625 S.W.3d at 98.4

A. D OE ’ S L IVE P LEADING In her live pl eading, D oe all ege s that Facebook “ has long viewed its
compa n y mission to conn ec t p eople in order to create pro fit

. ” Faceboo k “ uses the detailed i nformation it c ollects and buys on its users to direct users to persons they likely want to meet , ” thereby f acilitating hu man trafficking by identifying po tenti a l targets like Doe and connecting traffickers with those individuals

. Facebook also

“ uses algorithms to categorize users into micro

- target able groups ” to enable marketers to reach people based o n a variety of factors

. Doe alleges, in conjuncti on with other allegations, that : Faceboo k is a social

networking business that provides social

- net working services ; Fa cebook t arget s customers and businesses in Texas ; Facebook has millions of users in Texas o n its platform ; Face book’s social

- media website allows users to create personalized

w ebpages that contain information about themselves, incl u ding i dentifyi ng in formation, photo graphs, videos, interests, recent activities, and links to content from other websites ; Fac ebook col lects data on its users’ activi ties through the website, including but not limited to inf ormation regarding con t act an d group

assoc iations, content that users post and interact with, and use of third party websites ; Facebook acc essed user information of Te xas residents and prov ided that information to third party marketing companies ; Facebook sell s infor mation

c ollec ted by Texas res idents to third party vendors ; Facebook allows advertisers t o use data gathered f

rom Facebo ok’s proprietary software to target spec ific customers and demogr aphics ; using proprietar y algorithms, Facebook genera tes targ eted recommendations for each user , promoting content, websites, advertisements, users, grou ps, and events that may appea l to a user based on their usage history ; eac h Facebook user has a personalized experienc e on Facebook and
no t w o user s have t he sa me exact experie nce ; Facebook sends advertisements to5

Texas customers and adve rtises its services to Texas customers ; Facebook derives sub stantial revenue from Tex as ; Fac ebo ok hires emplo yees in Texas and targ e ts pot ential e mploy ees in Texas, including but not limited to “managers, moderators, accountants, design s pecialist , IT su ppo rt, lawyer s, clerks, receptionists, financial advi sors, insurance companies, sanitation eng ineers, purchasin g agents, leasing
agen t s, hum an resou rces specialists, and other employees who are integral to Facebook’s operations throughout T exas and the Uni ted States” ; one of the largest target segme nts for advertisers on Facebook is chi ldren betwee n thirte en and seventeen years old ; Doe w as a Facebook user in Texas from the age of thirteen to seventeen years old ; F acebook profits off adver tise ments directed towards minors in Texas o n its platform ; and “Facebook marketed its platfo rm in Texas and
act ive l y soug ht out T exas as a marketplace for its platform (i.e. p roduct). ” Face book did not deny any of these allegation s in its special appear ance. 4 Doe allege d that she was “entrapped” into sex trafficking by a man that connected wit h her o n Facebook’s pl atform when s he was fi fteen years old

. Doe’s abuser h ad several friends in common with Doe and messa ged h er through Fac ebook’s m essag ing systems

. Doe alleged that Facebook knew of the dangers of

sex trafficking and did not warn her of the dangers of sex tr affic king on Facebook or of signs of sex tr affickers on Faceboo k

. Do e further alle ged that he r abuser ’ s account contained “ warning s igns of human trafficking ” ; that the nature of the messages she received from her ab us e r contained “red fla gs” tha t Faceboo k should

4 At oral argument bef ore this court , F acebook a rgued that it does not provide in for mation on Facebook use r s to outside third partie s and that , in 2012, the only offic e Facebook operated in Texas was an Austi n loc ation with seven empl oyees
. Howev er, it was Fac ebook ’ s burden to negat e th ese allegation s by Doe in its special appearance
. See Kelly v. Gen

. Interior Const., Inc. , 301 S.W .3d 653, 658

– 59 (Tex. 2010) ; Am. Type C ulture Collect ion, Inc. v. C oleman , 83 S .W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002); Tour ad ji v. Beach Cap

. P ’ ship , L.P. , 316 S.W.3d 1 5, 23 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 4th Dist.] 2010, no pet .)

. Facebook faile d to do so. Thus, we must accept th ese allegation s as true. See Kelly , 301 S.W.3d at 65 8

– 59 ; Tour ad ji , 316 S.W. 3d at 23

.6

have recogniz ed as grooming behavi or ; and that should have alerte d Facebook tha t Doe was in danger. “ T o date, Fac ebook has taken no reasonable steps to mitigate the use of Facebook by sex traffickers or exploiters using its platform. ”
As to Doe’s c laim against F acebook for violating § 98.002 , Doe’s petiti on st ated that she “incorporates each forego ing allegation.” Doe further stated that

“ Fa c ebook had a duty not to know ingly ben efit from trafficking of persons” and that Facebook breached t his duty “by k nowingl y facilitating the sex traffick ing of Doe

. ” Doe stated that Facebook fa cilitated the sex trafficking of Doe by:

a. Increasing profit s b y not using advertisi ng spac e for pub lic service announcements regarding the dangers of entr apment, gr ooming,
a nd recruiting methods used by se x traffickers on Fa cebook; b. Increasing profit margi ns due to lower operations cost of not implementing mandato ry public service announ cements for thos e who sign up for Facebook regarding the dangers of ent rapment an d groomin g used by sex traffickers on Fac e book;
c. Increas ing profit mar gins due to lower opera tion costs by not having to hire human trafficking experts to coordinate Facebook’s
awaren ess campa ign regarding the dangers of entrapment and grooming us ed by sex trafficke rs on Facebook; d. Raising advertis i ng fees by ex tending its “u ser base” to include se x traffickers by not engaging in a public service awareness c a mpaign regarding the dangers of entra pment and grooming used by sex traffickers on Facebook;
e. Increasin g profit ma rgins due to lower operation c o st by not imp lementing safe guards requiring verifi cation of the identity of all users on Facebook; f. Increasing p r ofit margins as a res ult of continued customer loyalty and therefore increased “user” number s used to extract h ig her advertiser fees by creatin g a breeding g round for sex traffickers to stalk an d entrap victims [; and] g. The “per user” profit gained from K in g Kid, which is estima ted yea rly by Fa cebook as the financial value of each Facebook user.
Doe state d that “Fac ebook has received f inancial ben efits as a resu lt of these acts and om issions by continuing to facilitate human trafficking and th e sexual7

exploitation o f minor s.”
B. F ACEBOOK ’ S S PECIAL A PPEARANCE In its special a ppearance, Facebook ar gued that Doe could not establ i sh that Texa s has either ge neral or specific juris diction over Facebook. Facebook argued that it is not subject to specific jurisdict ion in Texas bec ause Doe’s claims “arise from alleged omissions that t oo k place outs ide of T exas, if at all [

. ] ” A ccording to Facebook, “ th ere is no connection

— much less a substantial connection

— between Facebook ’ s contacts wit h Texas and the ope rative f acts alleg ed in the First Amend ed Petition. ” Facebook b ased this argument o n the fact that , in 2012, its
user opera ti ons and global safety teams , its globa l policy mana gement t eam, and all members of Facebook ’ s management team o vers eeing Facebook ’ s glo bal operation s were locate d outside of Texas. I n support of its spe cial appearance , Facebook attac hed the af fidavit of Mi chael Duffey, an eDiscovery and Litigation Project Lead in Facebook’s legal department, as well as v e rsions of its user
agreeme nt from 20 09 through 2 019.
Do e filed a response to Facebook’s special appearance a nd Faceboo k filed a reply. In its reply, Faceb ook again argued that Doe did not connect Faceboo k’s purposeful activity in T exas t o her claimed injury. Facebook f urther argued that operating a w ebsite accessible in Texas cannot be a purposeful c ontact as a matter of law, alleged failures to act are not purposeful contacts as a matter of law, and the stream

- of

- commer ce
- plus test does not a p ply beca use Facebo ok is not a
t angible product.
C
. T RIAL C OUR T ’ S R ULING On October 7, 2019, the trial court denied Facebook’s special appearan ce without issuing findi ngs of fact and conclusions of law

. Faceboo k timely appealed

.8 II. D ISCUSS ION In two issues, Face b ook argues tha t the trial court lac k ed general and specific jurisdi c tion over it.
A. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
Whether a court has perso nal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a question of law we review de novo. M oncrief Oi l Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom , 414 S.W.3d 142, 1 50 (Tex. 2013). The pl aintiff bears the initi al burde n of pleading allegatio n s sufficient to confer jur isdiction

. Luciano v. SprayFoamProducts .com, LLC , 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (T e x. 2021) . The burde n then s hifts to t he defendant to negate all bases of juri sdictio n in the allegations. Id. Because the plaintiff defin e s the scope and nature of the law suit, the defend ant’s correspon d ing burden to negate jurisdic tion is tied to the alle gations in the plai ntiff’s pleading. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Const., Inc. , 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010).
Th e defendant can negate juri s diction on either a factual or le gal basis. Factu ally, the defen d ant can present evidence that it has no contacts with Texas, effectively disprov ing the pl aintiff’s allegations. The plaintiff can then r espond with its own ev iden ce that affirms its allegat i ons, and it risks dismissal of it s lawsuit if it cannot present t he trial court with evidence establishing personal ju risdiction. Legally , the de fendant ca n show that even if the plaintiff’s alle ged fac ts are true, the evide nce is legally insufficient to e stablish jurisdiction

. . . . Id. at 659 (footnot es omitted).
B. A PPLICABLE L AW
A court must h ave personal jurisdictio n over the partie s to issu e a binding judgment. Luciano , 625 S.W.3d at 7

– 8

. “ A defen dant ’ s contacts with t he forum can give rise to eithe r general or specific jurisdiction.” Id. at 8 (cit ing Spir Star AG

v. Kimich , 310 S.W.3d 868, 8 72 (Tex. 2010) ). If a no nresident de fenda nt’s affi liations wi th the state are so “continuous and syst ematic” as to render it9

essen tially at home in the forum sta t e, then a court has general jurisdiction over tha t nonresident defen dant. Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 127 (201 4); Luciano , 62 5 S.W.3d a t 8; TV Azte ca v. Ruiz , 490 S.W.3d 29, 3 7 (Tex. 2016 ) . “By contrast, specific jur isdiction ‘covers defendants le s s intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.’” Luciano , 625 S.W.3d at 8 (quoting Fo rd Motor Co

. v. Mont

. Eig hth Jud

. Dis t. C t. , 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) ).
“Texas courts may assert pers onal jurisdiction over a nonres i dent if (1) the Texas long

- arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction an d (2) the exe rcise of jurisdiction is consistent wit h federal due

- process guaran tees.” Id. (citing TV Azteca , 490 S.W.3d at 36 ) ; see BMC Softwa re Belg

. , N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S .W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002) (noting that the Texa s long

- arm statute “permits Texas courts
to ex ercise jurisdiction over nonresiden t de fendants t hat ‘does bu siness ’ in Texas, and the statute lists some [n on
- exclusive] activiti es that constitute ‘doing busin e ss.’” (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042))). “Consistent with federal due

- proce ss protections, a state may assert pers onal juris diction over a

non resident defendant only if the def endant has established ‘minim um contacts’ with the foru m sta t e such that maintenance of the suit does not off end ‘traditional notions of fair play and subs tantial justice.’” Lucia no , 625 S.W. 3d at 8 (quoti ng Int’l Sh oe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) ; see All Star Enter., Inc. v. Buchanan , 298 S.W.3d 4 0 4, 411 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)

. Specific jurisdiction through minimum c ontacts with the forum s tate is esta blished when t h e defendan t (1) p urposefully avails itself of the privile ge of conducting activ ities in the forum state, and ( 2 ) the lawsuit arises or relates to the defendant ’s contacts with the forum. Luciano , 625 S.W.3 d at 8

– 9.10

1. Purposeful Ava ilment
The t ouchstone of j urisdiction al due process is purposeful availme nt. Id. at 9. “There must be ‘som e act by which the defendant pu r posefully avails itself of the privilege of cond ucting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits a nd p ro tecti on s of its laws

. ’ ” Id. (qu oting H anson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 23 5, 253 (195 8)). “Where the defend ant has ‘deliberately’ engage d i n significant activities within a state, he ‘man ifestly has availed himself of the privilege o f conducting business th ere. ’” Id. ( quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rud zewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475

– 76 (1985)). “A nd because such activi ties are shielded by the ‘benef i ts and protections’ of t he forum’s laws, it is ‘ presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of lit igati on in that for um as well. ” Id. ( citing Burger King Corp. , 471 U.S. at 47 5

– 76). When analyzing the defendant’s contacts, court s consider the quality an d nature of the contacts

. Moncrief Oil , 414 S.W.3d at 151; Retamco Ope r. , Inc. v. Republic D ri llin g Co. , 2 78 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. 2009) ; see, e.g. , TV Azteca , 490 S .W .3d at 43

– 5 2

. A nonresident defen dant does not need to have offi c es or employees in a forum state to p urposefully avail itself of the forum. Luciano , 625 S.W.3 d at 9 (citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W .3d 777, 7 85 (Tex. 2005) ). Bu t, the oper ation of a sales and d istribution netwo rk, or the dir e cting of marketing efforts to the forum State in the hope of soliciting sales, may

ren der a no nresident defendant subj ect to the S tate’s jurisdi ction in di sputes arising from that business. I

d. Alternat ively, contacts that a re fortuitous and attenuated do not satisfy the purposeful

- availment standard. I d.

a. Analysis
Doe ’ s unc hallenged allegations e stablish that F ace boo k does substa ntia l business in Texas ; serves the market for its social

- networking website i n Tex as11

through its employees and offices in Te xas ; markets its soci al

- networking webs ite in Tex as ; seeks new users in Te xas ; a ccesses and gen e ra tes substantial profits from Texans ’ data ; and purposefully d irect s tailo red advertisements to each Texas user , of which there are millions

. W e conclude th at the unchallenged alle ga tions in Doe ’ s p leading es t ablish that Fac ebook pur posefully avail s i tse l f of the privilege of conduct ing its soci al

- networking busi ness in Texas

. See Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. at 1 026; Luciano , 625 S.W.3d at 9

– 10 ; TV Azteca , 490 S. W.3d at 51

– 52

. 2
. Ne xus

a. Applicable L aw
The second prong of personal j urisd iction is “relatednes s .” Luciano , 625 S.W.3d at 14 (citing Bristol

- Myers Squibb C o. v. Superior Ct. of Cal

. , S.F. C n ty. , 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)); see Bristol

- Myers Squ i bb Co. , 137 S. Ct. at 1781 ( “When there is n o such connec tion, specific juris dicti on is lacking regardl e ss of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the St ate.”). “Despite a nonresident defendant’s flood of purposeful contacts with the foru m state, the exercise of sp ec ific jurisdictio n is pr ohibit ed if ‘the suit ’ doe s not ‘aris[e] out of or

r e lat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum .” Luciano , 625 S .W.3d at 14 ( emphasis in origin al) . “This so

- called relatedness inquiry defines the ap propriat e ‘nexus betwe en t he nonresident def endant, the l itigat ion, and the f orum. ’” Id. (quoting Moki M

ac , 221 S.W.3d at 579). The relatedness prong does not req uire a causal connection. Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. 1022. Instead, the relatedness inquiry d emands o nly that the suit “a rise out of or r elate t o the defend ant’s contact s with the forum.” Id. at 1 0 26 (“[W]e have never framed the specific jurisdiction inqui ry as requiring proof

. . . tha t the plaintiff’s claim came about bec ause of the defendant’s in

- state conduct.”) ; see L uc iano , 625 S.W.3d at 15

– 1 8

. “[ S] peci fic jurisdictio n re quires us to an alyze12

j urisdictional contacts on a claim

- by

- claim basis.” Moncrief Oil , 414 S.W.3d at 150

. b. Analysis Facebook argues that the relevant policies and decisi ons at issue in Doe ’ s lawsuit were made ou tside o f Texas , and thus, Doe ’ s l awsuit is no t connected to Facebo o k ’ s contacts with Texas. However, a causal connectio n is no t required f or specific personal jur isdiction. Se e Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Instead, the

r elatedness inquiry demands only that the suit ari se out of or relate to th e defendant’ s contact with the forum. Id. Here, Doe alle ged that : she wa s a Faceb ook user bet ween the age of thirteen and seventeen ye ars old and was fifteen years old in 201 2 ; sh e was a victim of sex trafficking by a n individual who connecte d with her through Fac ebook ; Facebo ok ’ s system e nabled Doe ’ s traffickers to targe t he r ; Facebook knew sex

trafficking occurred on its platform ; Facebook knew that Doe was in dang er and a likely target for sex traffic king ; and Fac ebook p rofited from her exp loitation through the use of its so cial

- net working plat form

. D oe further alleged that Facebook “crea t[ed] a breeding gr ound fo r sex traffickers to stalk and entrap victims” ; “knowingly aided, facilitated[,] and as sisted sex traffickers, including the sex traffi cker who rec ruited Jane Doe f rom Facebook” and “knowingly benefitted” from the sex tra fficking activity ; “Facebook has assisted and facilitated the traf ficking of Jane Doe and o ther minors on Faceboo k” ; a nd that Face book “uses the detailed i nformation i t collects and buys on its users to direct use rs to persons they likely want to meet” and, “[ i]n doing so,

. . . facilita tes human trafficking by identifying potential tar gets, like Jane Doe, a nd connecting traffickers with those indi viduals.” In re Faceboo k , 625 S.W.3d at 97

– 98.
Doe’s c ause of action for violation of § 98.002 is based on he r use of13

Facebook’s soci al

- networking platform a n d Facebook’s actions rela ted to the operation o f its social

- networking pl atform. Se e Tex. Civ. Pra c. & Rem. Co de An n. § 98.002; In re Facebook , 625 S.W. 3d a t 96

– 97

. Therefore, we conclude th at Doe’s suit ari ses from or relates to F acebook’s contact s with T exas
. See Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. at 1022 (“ [W]hen a company like Ford serves a market for a
pr oduct in a S tate and that product causes injury in the Sta te to one of its residents, the St ate’s court s may entertain the resulting suit.”); Luciano , 62 5 S.W .3d at 17 (“It is suffici ent that SprayFoam int ended to serve a Texas mar ket for the insulation tha t the Lucia nos allege injured them in this lawsuit.”)

. 3. Fa ir Play & Substantial Jus tice
“Onc e minimum cont acts have been established , we must still cons ide r whether, for other reas ons, exercising jurisd iction over the nonreside nt d efendant would neverthele ss run afoul of ‘traditional notions of f air play a nd subs tantial justice.’” Lucian o , 625 S. W.3d at 18 (qu oting Int’l Shoe , 326 U.S. at 316; TV Azteca , 490 S.W.3d at 55)). “Only in rare cases, however, will the exercise of juri sdic tion not comport with fai r play and s ubstantial justice when the n onresident defend ant has purposefully esta blished m inimum contact s with the forum state.” I d. (quoting Spir Sta r , 310 S.W.3d at 878); TV Az teca , 490 S.W.3d at 55

. We consider the nonresi dent defendant’s contacts in light of (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the i nterest s of the forum state in
a djudicati ng the dispute ; (3) the plaintiff’s inte rest in obtaining
co nve nient and effective relie f; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interes t in obtaining the most effic ient resolut ion of controversies; and (5) the share d inter est of several states in furtherin g fundamental substantive social policie s. Luciano , 625 S.W. 3d at 18

– 19.
Facebook does not argue that exerci sing j urisdiction over it wou ld offend
tra ditional not ions of fair play and substantial justice o r create a n undue burde n.14

“[T]o the extent th at a corporation e xercises the privilege of conducting activ ities

w ithin a state, it enjoys the benefits and p rote ction of the laws of that stat e.” Id. at 19 (quoting In t’l Shoe , 32 6 U.S. at 319). “Ex ercise of that pri v i lege may give rise to obligations, such as responding to suit, which cannot be said to be undue.” Id.
As n oted, Doe ’ s unchalle nged allegations in he r live pleading established tha t Fac ebook has exercised the privileg e of doing substantial business withi n Texas and enjoys th e benefits and protections of the laws of T exas; thus, the b urden on Facebook to de fend Doe’s suit is not un due. See id.
Fur ther, Texas has a s trong interest in protecting citizens of the State by

exe rcising jurisdiction over these ty p es of claims

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 9 8.002(a) ; Luciano , 625 S.W. 3d at 19 (“[B]y v irtu e of the Legislature’s en a ctment of t he Deceptiv e Trade Practices Act, the s tatutory s ource of one of the Luciano s ’ claims, Texas has demonstrated a spec i a l interest in protecting its citizens from the sort o f activity alleged here

. ” )

. Finally, Facebook do es not argue that Doe’ s c laims a gains t the othe r parties have been dismiss ed

. Texas is where the alleged s ex trafficking occur red, where Doe r esi des, an d where the majority of the witnesses are located

. See Luciano , 625 S .W.3d at 19; TV Azteca , 490 S.W.3d at 56. A djudicating Doe’s claims agai nst all de fendant s i n one forum provides the most eff icient means for resol ving this
controver sy. See TV Azteca , 4 90 S.W.3d at 56 ; Moncrief Oil , 414 S.W.3d at 155 ; Spir Star , 310 S.W.3d at 879

. We conclude that the exe rcise of personal jurisdi ction ove r Facebook in this ca se does not offend traditional notions of fair play and subs tantial justice. 4. Summary
We conc lu de that Texas has specific personal jurisdiction over Fa ceboo k a s15

to Doe ’ s § 98.002 cl aim . We o ver rule Facebook ’ s issues on app eal. 5
2. C O NCLUSION
We a ffirm the trial cou rt ’ s d enial of Facebook’s special appearance

.

/s/ Margaret “ Meg ” P oissan t Justice

P a nel con si s ts o f Chief Justic e Christopher an d Justi ces S pa in and Poissant

.

5 Because our concl usion that Te xas has sp ecific perso nal jurisdiction over Facebook is disp ositive, we need not addr es s Facebook’s other arguments on appe al

. See Tex. R. App. 4 7.1.