alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 194 (Monday, October 6, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58162-58169]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-23344]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal Nos. 08-26]


36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text 
of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to 
fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated 21 
July 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. B. English, DSCAIDBO/CFM, (703) 
601-3740.
    The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Transmittals 08-26 with attached transmittal, policy 
justification, and Sensitivity of Technology.

    Dated: September 25, 2008.
Patricia L. Toppings,
OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
BILLING CODE 5001-06-M

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[FR Doc. E8-23344 Filed 10-3-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
#### Blain KING v. STATE.

7 Div. 125.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

June 4, 1935.

RICE, Judge.

Affirmed.
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 17-1295V 

Filed: May 15, 2018

UNPUBLISHED

PAMELA M SHAFFER, 

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Special Processing Unit (SPU); 

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine 

Administration (SIRVA)

Stephen S. Crandall, Crandall, Pera, & Wilt LLC, Chagrin Falls, OH, for petitioner.

Darryl R. Wishard, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

Dorsey, Chief Special Master:

On September 20, 2017, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the 

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,

2 (the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine 

administration (“SIRVA”) as a result of a September 30, 2016 influenza vaccination. 

Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of 

Special Masters.

On May 15, 2018, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that 

petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 1. 

Specifically, respondent states that petitioner had no history of pain, inflammation, or 

dysfunction of her left shoulder; pain occurred within 48 hours after receipt of an 

 

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the 

undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with 

the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to 

identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits 

within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 300aa (2012).
intramuscular vaccination; pain was limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine was 

administered; and no other condition or abnormality has been identified to explain 

petitioner’s shoulder pain. Id. at 5. Respondent further agrees that petitioner suffered 

the residual effects of her condition for more than six months and states, “petitioner has 

satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the Act.” Id.

In view of respondent’s position and the evidence of record, the 

undersigned finds that petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Nora Beth Dorsey

Nora Beth Dorsey

 Chief Special Master
#### Mark Henry QUERY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 45239.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 25, 1972.

*925Scott & Devlin, by Robert R. Scott, Houston, for appellant.

Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., James C. Brough and William Burge, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is felony theft; the punishment, enhanced under Article 63, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., life.

Appellant’s sole ground of error is that the court erred in admitting that portion of his confession which related to an extraneous offense.

Dorothy Nelson testified that on December 14, 1969, her yellow and black Chevrolet automobile was stolen from the Ashland Street parking lot of her employer, the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

The State introduced appellant’s confession admitting that he stole a black and yellow Chevrolet on the date in question from a parking area of a telephone company on Ashland and “used it to rob a grocery store at 16th and Rutland”.

Appellant offered no evidence in his own behalf.

Generally, evidence of an extraneous offense in a confession is inadmissible. Sellers v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 560, 294 S.W.2d 813; Martinez v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 51, 134 S.W.2d 276. However, evidence of an independent crime is admissible, where, as in the case at bar, the offense with which the appellant is charged and the extraneous offense are part of the same transaction.1 Sustaita v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 396 S.W.2d 381; Coomer v. State, 97 Tex.Cr.R. 100, 260 S.W. 568; Eurine v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 463 S.W.2d 2.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.

1

. Although a limiting instruction is not required in the case at bar, the trial court limited the jury’s consideration of the evidence of the extraneous offense for the purpose of showing motive and intent.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

IL/RESEARCH

09-15220

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SERGEI PORTNOY,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

CITY OF WOODLAND; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-15220

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02526-JAMJFM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 16, 2010 

Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Sergei Portnoy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging civil rights violations in connection with his

FILED

MAR 03 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
IL/RESEARCH

2 09-15220

arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. 

Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the claims against the district attorney

who made the decision to prosecute Portnoy because that decision is protected

under the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522

U.S. 118, 129 (1997)

The district court properly dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims that

police officers lacked probable cause to arrest Portnoy because the record

establishes that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue at his

preliminary hearing; consequently he is collaterally estopped from re-litigating this

issue in a subsequent action. See Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 288-90 (9th Cir.

1994) (concluding that a full and fair opportunity to litigate probable cause to

arrest at preliminary hearing in a criminal case collaterally estops re-litigation of

that issue in a subsequent action).

Portnoy’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Appellee’s request for judicial notice of the criminal information in

Portnoy’s criminal case is granted.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM YEAR ENDED
NOVEMBER 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<CIK> 0000719722
<NAME> CARDIODYNAMICS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT (23.1)--CONSENT OF CROWE, CHIZEK AND COMPANY LLP

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form S-8 and Form S-4 of Indiana United Bancorp, File Nos. 33-45395 and
333-33032, respectively, of our report, dated February 4, 2000, on the
consolidated financial statements of Indiana United Bancorp as of and for the
year ended December 31, 1999, which report is incorporated by reference in this
Form 10-K.



Crowe, Chizek and Company LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

March 30, 2000
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-2164

CHRISTOPHER ARLANDO NEWMAN,

Petitioner,

versus

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U. S. Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A75-843-593)

Submitted: March 19, 2007 Decided: March 29, 2007

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marc Seguinót, SEGUINÓT & ASSOCIATES, P.C., McLean, Virginia, for

Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Linda S.

Wernery, Assistant Director, Kelly J. Walls, Office of Immigration

Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,

for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Arlando Newman, a native and citizen of

Jamaica, petitions for review of an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying his motion to reconsider. We

review the Board’s decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider

for abuse of discretion. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24

(1992); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2006). A motion for

reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier

decision, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993),

and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the

prior Board decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2006); Matter of

Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (BIA 1991) (noting that a motion to

reconsider questions a decision for alleged errors in appraising

the facts and the law). The burden is on the movant to establish

that reconsideration is warranted. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110

(1988). “To be within a mile of being granted, a motion for

reconsideration has to give the tribunal to which it is addressed

a reason for changing its mind.” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247,

249 (7th Cir. 2004). Motions that simply repeat contentions that

have already been rejected are insufficient to convince the Board

to reconsider a previous decision. Id. 

We find the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding

that Newman’s conviction for unlawful conversion of merchandise was

a crime of moral turpitude. We further find the Board did not
- 3 -

abuse its discretion in finding that the immigration judge

specified the charges for which he was ordered removed. In

addition, the immigration judge’s failure to rule on other charges

of removability was harmless error.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
EXHIBIT 32.2



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Obie Media Corporation (the Company )
on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended August 31, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report ), I, Brian B.
Obie, President and Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that to the
best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


By: /s/BRIAN B. OBIE
    ----------------
    Brian B. Obie
    President
    Chief Executive Officer































                                       28
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Derrick Jenkins, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alfred Kleiman, J.), rendered August 12, 1986, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law §220.39 [1]) and sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term of 1 to 3 years, to run consecutively to an indeterminate term of 1 to 3 years which he was then serving for an unrelated conviction, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s conviction was based on the testimony of a police officer who observed the transaction while stationed on the roof of a building and using high-powered binoculars. The officer observed the defendant take money from a buyer, deliver the money to a man, later identified as Jose Menendez, receive a tin-foil packet and then give the packet to the buyer.

Defendant argues that his identification was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony as to his distance from defendant and as to whether the officer mentioned the defendant’s name as part of the description of the defendant given to the backup team. Defendant further attacks the credibility of the officer on the grounds that defendant did not flee when the buyer was apprehended and that no drugs were found in defendant’s possession.

"It is well established that it is the function of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” *(People v Lozado,*157 AD2d 630, 631 [1st Dept 1990], citing *People v Parks,*41 NY2d 36, 47.) "Great deference is accorded to the fact-finder’s oppor*771tunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor.” *(People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987].)

Moreover, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the People *(People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), reveals that the crime occurred at 4 o’clock in the afternoon on a clear day, the officer’s view of the defendant was unobstructed, and the officer was acquainted with the defendant prior to the crime. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Ellerin, Wallach and Smith, JJ.
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</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 13, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-40440

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GABRIEL LOREDO-PECINA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:03-CR-976-ALL

--------------------

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before KING, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This court affirmed the sentence of Gabriel Loredo-Pecina

(Loredo). United States v. Loredo-Pecina, 149 F. App’x 312 (5th

Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further

consideration in light of Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625

(2006). Mendoza-Torres v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 826 (2006). 

Loredo argues that his prior Texas felony conviction for

possession of a controlled substance does not qualify as an

aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, in light of Lopez. He
No. 04-40440

-2-

also contends that his appeal is not moot despite his release

from imprisonment and subsequent deportation. 

In United States v. Rosenbaum-Alanis, ___ F.3d ___, No. 05-

41400, 2007 WL 926832, *1-2 (5th Cir. 2007), we held that an

appellant’s challenge to the characterization of a state offense

as an aggravated felony under § 2L1.2 was moot when the appellant

had completed his term of imprisonment and had been deported. 

The court could not grant relief because the defendant was barred

from entering the United States, and therefore could not be

resentenced. Rosenbaum-Alanis, 2007 WL 926832 at *2. Because

Loredo is barred from entering the United States and cannot be

present for a resentencing proceeding as required by FED. R. CRIM.

P. 43, we cannot grant his request to be resentenced. See id. 

Accordingly, Loredo’s appeal is DISMISSED as moot.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FELIPE DE JESUS DE LA CRUZ

GALVAN,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney

General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-71222

Agency No. A097-866-462

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 25, 2010** 

San Francisco, California

Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Felipe de Jesus de la Cruz Galvan, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions

for review of the decision of the Board of Appeals denying his motion to reopen

FILED

JUN 03 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-71222

the underlying denial of his application for cancellation of removal, based on his

application for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT).

Petitioner’s claim for protection under CAT failed to present evidence of

changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and his

circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207,

1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that CAT applicant must establish that it is more

likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country).

Petitioner therefore failed to establish prima facie eligibility for protection under

CAT.

We lack jurisdiction to review petitioner’s contention that he is entitled to

asylum and withholding of removal because he failed to raise this contention

before the BIA and he thereby failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See 8

U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, petitioner’s claim - that he was entitled to asylum and withholding relief

based on being a Mexican alien who would be targeted upon returning home from

the United States - lacks merit because this does not qualify as a cognizable social

group, and thus, could not support a grant of asylum or withholding of relief. See
3 08-71222

 Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.