EA~~ORNEY GENERAL 

OF-TEXAS 

PRICE DANIEL 

ATTORNEY GENERA,. 

December 20. 1950 ’ 

Non. Robert S. Calvert 

Comptroller of Fublic Accounts 

Audin, Texas Opinion No. V-l 135 

Ra: Eligibility of a hounc or 

house trailer located ,on 

leased land for residence 

homestead tax exemption. 

Dear Mr. Calvert: 

Your request states that a recent audit of the 1950 

Tax Roll from Victoria County reflector that the tax ,a8sessor- 

“‘,’ collector of that county has in a number of in&awes allowe’d the 

taxpayer to claim a homestead exemption on a house located on 

leased land. In other instances the exemption war, allowed on 

house trailers located on leased land. Based on theB,e facb you 

have requested our opinion on the following queltionr: 

1. Does the homertead exemption with reference to taxation (Article VIII, Section l-a. Con&itution of Texas; Article TQ4%, Section 2, Vernon’s 

Civil Statutes) extend to a dwelling located on leased 

land and occupied by the family as a home? 

2. Is a house trailer of ouch a nature and eubject to such use as to acquire the stattu of a dwelling 

and come witbin the homestead exemption? 

Section 51 of Article XVI of the Texas Constitution 

rete out the constitutional requirements of a homestead as follows: 

“The homestead, not in a town or city, shall 

consist of not more than two hundred acres of land, 

which may be in one or more parcelr, with the improvements thereon; the homestead in a city, town 

or village. shallconsistof lot or lots, not to exceed 

in value five thousand dollars, at the time of their 

designation as the homestead, without reference to 

tbe value of any improvements thereon; provided, 

that the same shall be used for the purposes of a 
,. 

Your second question canuot be answered cahlpr- 

.icr;r&. The queationof whether a particular dw@ug ir entitled 

_ 

4z,~, ~,,tuexemption ,from taxation as the hotMntead of Oe owner OCcUpp- 

,i‘ng the same am such is one of fact requiring indepeudent deter- 

~miuatiti in each instance. Arto v. Maydole, 54 Ten. 244 (188l)t 

#%hper Co. v. Werner, 11 S-d U&3 (Tax. Civ. App. 1937). Like-’ 

~a, whether the homestead &trader has become fixed l e t0 

Hon. Robert 6. Calve& page 2 (V-1135) 

home, or as a place to exercise the calling or 

business of the head of a family; provided alao, 

that any temporary renting of the homestead 

shall not change the character of the same, when 

no other homestead has been acquired.. 

Article 3833, Vernon.8 Civil Statutes, repose there 

l arue proviaioru in defining the term ‘homertead.e 

13 ia well settled that the homertead exem$ioa doei 

not. red upon ownership in fee of the land upon which $be etructure ir rituated. Wheatlay v. Griffin, 60 Tex. 209 (1883); Cullerr v. James, 66 ‘I’ex. 494 1 S W 314 (1886)f Fir& NatiBBank 

V. 0 mua4r, k41 S.W. 199 iTex.‘Civ. App. 1922). Any poreeuory 

Tiatereet rn%nd less than the fee simple title ie eufficient to entitle a claimant to the benefito of the provi#iona of the homertead 

law and ‘it followa logically that the homestead right and privila~ 

attacher to a tenement or building, coupled with the required occupancy, erected upon leaned or rented premieee.” Firrt National Banh v. Dismukes. su ra. Further, a poase~aory%Itetest, even 

%hOUgh Only permissive+ I) wafficient to support the cbini of homestead exemption where it ia peaceably held and occupied a8 a home 

by tie family. Birdwell v, &rleeon,~lt S.W. 446 (Tex. Civ. Aep. 

1,902:irror refq. 

Nor would it appear that the leaae on a pwticular lot 

or tract of land would have to be of long tima duration. Aa raid 

in First National Bank v. Dismukes, au ra, “where a head of a 

faniily is in the exclusive posireasion, -5 aa ere, of a lot. . . OcCOpied by him as a . . . homestead, it does uot concern the judgment ~’ 

creditor whether such claimant possessee a leare for a kmg term 

‘of pars or of less duration.” 

You are therefore advised in aamwer to yoor fir8t ~ 

uertion that the homestead exemption with reference to taxation 

? Article VIII, Section 1-a; Con&it&on of Texan, and Article 78488, 

*3&8.~) does apply to a dwelling located on leaeed laud aud OCCU- 

,$h&bf,,a family under such condition9 a6 to mahe it a &nemtiad.’ 
Hon. Robert S. hlvert, page 3 (v-1135) 

specific property i8 a fact question. Alamo Lumber Co, v. 

Walkarc 103 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. A&TV?). 

In common acceptance the term ‘homestead* meanm 

the residence of the family, the place where tb honn is. 40 

C.J.S. 430, Homesteads, Sec. 1. “A homestead necessarily includea the idea of a house for a reeideace, or maneion house. 

The dwellings may be a splendid mansion, a cabin, or tent.” 

Garret v. Getaendaner, 115 Okla. It, 242 Pac. 525 (1925). 

Coming now to a determination of whether a house 

trailer may meet the requiremeate necessary to make it a homertead, we find only two Texas calem which have pamed on the 

question. In the firat came, Clark v. Vitz, 199 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 

Civ. App. 1945, error ref.), &e nemption wao allowed, but the 

factr clearly ertablished that the house traileF had in effect 

been made a part of the claimant’s home and ‘1188 wed by the 

family as a part of tbe home. In the l ecoud came, Gann v. Moutl!F= 

210 S.W.td 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948, error ref. n.r.o.), 

e court refused the homelrtead exemption, sayiug~ 

“Aseuming for tbe purpose of argument that 

appellant did have such poamermory i&exert la the 

land upon which tbe trailer warn parked l o would oupport the homestead claim, we muet decide wketker 

the trailer was ouch type of l trucume as to aome within the rule which regard6 the houae a# part of the land, 

witbin tbe contemplation of the coustitutioru%l provision. 

u 

. . . 

“It is settled that the exemption may be claimed in 

a house owned by the claimant, tboughtbe Iaad bslong to 

another. Where the ownership of ,a hotme is in one person, 

and the ownership of the land is in mother, tie house may 

properly be referred to for some purposes aa a chattel, 

and in such a case it might properly, be aaid tbat the homertead exemption can attach to a chattel. Etut it does not 

follow that the exemption can attach to any kind of chattel, 

merely because the chattel rests on a tract of land by permission of the owner of tbe land. . . . 

. 

. . . To hold that the homestead exemption applieo to tbe trailer in tbe case before us would be to 
. 

~Rcn. Robert S. Calvert, pa~ge 4 (V-1135) 

hold, as a practical matter, that it applies to almost every trailer which is occupied by the owners, 

if they constitute a family which does not own another 

home. It is not unreasonable to assume:that they are 

usually parked, when they are not traveling along the 

highways, on some plot of ground with the permission .~ 

of the owner of the ground. It might be consistent with 

the policy of our homestead laws to enact another law 

exempting automobile trailers wbich,are occupied.as 

homes, but. . . there are no exemptions except those 

provided by law, and the courts cannot protect that 

which is not a homestead.” 

Thus it is to be observed that the question of homestead status with respect to house trailers must be determined 

from all the facts and circumstances, in each individual case,. 

It may or ‘may not acquire a homestead status, depending upon 

the particular facts and circumstances. In our opinion the courts 

” of Texas would find a house trailer to be a homestead if located 

on land owned by or in which the claimant held a possessory interest. and was so used in connection with the land and occupied 

by a,far&)y in such a manner as to give it the factual characteristics of a home. On the other hand, were the trailer not so 

used, as in the Gann case, it would not be held to be a homestead. # 

SUMMARY 

The exemption’from taxation 'as a homestead 

(Article VIII, Section l-a, Constitution of Texas,, and 

Article 7084a, V.C.S.) extends to a dwelling’ located 

on leased land and occupied by the family as a home. 

Firat National Bank v. Dismukes, 241 S.W. 199 (Tex. 

cb. App;9 ouse al er may become exempt 

as a homestead, depending upon the facts and circumstances in each’individual case. Clark v. Vitz, ~190 

S.W.td 736 (Tex. Civ.~App. 1945, error ref.); Gami 
. 

:;r~r~wt~~10 8.W.2d 255 (Tix.Cb. App.,1948, ” _I,, 

j 

Vert,bd) mm ,,,. / 

: ;~ 

‘PRIcEpANiEL 

Attorney Oeneral ‘,,‘.’ 

I: ., 

APPROmDt 

Charles D. Mathawi 

-w. v. oeppert Fir& Aarirtant 

Tsxation Divhfoa 

Everett Hutchi~Ison 

Executiw Assistant 

Price Daniel 

Attorney General 

CD&&b 

, 

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