SECONDDIVISION                                               February25, 1997                                                                   Nos. 1-94-4314 & 1-94-4315 (Consolidated)HAROLD F. KRAVCIK, II, and SANDRAKRAVCIK,          Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-          Appellees,     v.GOLUB & COMPANY, INC., a corporation,          Defendant-Appellee and Cross-          Appellant,     andPACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCECOMPANY, a foreign corporation,          Defendant-Appellee and Cross-          Appellant.�))))))))))))))))))))�Appeal from theCircuit Court ofCook County.HonorableEdward G. Finnegan,Judge Presiding.�                     MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING     PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiffs, Harold Kravcik (hereinafter Harold), and his wife, Sandra Kravcik(hereinafter Sandra), brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County againstdefendants, Golub & Company, Inc. (hereinafter Golub), the on-site managementcompany, and Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereinafter Pacific Mutual),the mortgagee-in-possession of the premises, to recover damages for personal injuriesHarold sustained on an outdoor deck adjacent to the office building where he worked. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, awarding anet amount of $32,772.07 to Harold and $19,000 to Sandra and the trial court enteredthe judgment upon the verdict.  Plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion seeking a new trialon the issue of damages only, which the circuit court denied.  It is from this orderthat plaintiffs now appeal to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill.2d R. 301).  In addition, defendants filed a post-trial motion seeking setoffs forplaintiffs' prior settlement amounts, which the trial court denied and from which theycross-appeal to this court under Supreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303).     For the reasons which follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remandwith directions.                                FACTUAL BACKGROUND     We will limit our discussion to the facts pertaining to the issues on appeal.  Noquestions regarding liability are raised.  Harold was employed as an insurance agentfor the John Hancock Insurance Company located at 85 West Algonquin Road,Arlington Heights, Illinois.  On December 15, 1986, as Harold was walking across thepatio deck adjacent to the building housing his workplace, he tripped and hit his headon a brick planter.  The mortgagee-in-possession of the building was Pacific Mutual,and it had retained Golub as the on-site property manager.       At trial, Dr. Robert Eilers, Dr. Jerry Sweet, and Dr. James Harrison testifiedon behalf of plaintiff.  Dr. Eilers testified that as a result of the occurrence, Haroldsuffered a mild to moderate closed head injury, multiple cognitive deficits,impairment to his memory and problem solving abilities, insight into his own deficitsand a seizure disorder.         Dr. Sweet, a treating neuropsychologist, testified that after the incident,Harold suffered from depression, headaches, memory difficulties, verbal learning andmemory problems, as well as deficits in organizing behavior and functioning.  Dr.Sweet explained that the occurrence aggravated Harold's prior psychological problemsand learning deficits.  He also stated that he is unable to conduct normal dailyactivities and would be unable to work in the future.       Dr. Harrison, Harold's regular physician, testified via videotaped evidencedeposition that he was treating Harold for a seizure disorder and memory problems. His role was to monitor the blood levels of the medication which had been prescribedto Harold.  In sum, all three doctors stated that Harold's condition was permanent.      Dr. David Shenker, Ronald Ganellan, Ph.D. and Dr. James Cavanaugh testifiedon behalf of defendants.  Dr. Shenker, a neurologist, testified concerning Harold'sprior medical history and his condition after the occurrence.  Dr. Shenker stated thathe examined Harold on October 6, 1992, and found Harold had suffered a mildconcussion due to the fall.  Dr. Shenker stated that Harold did not suffer any braindamage, ongoing neurologic consequences, memory problems, seizures, visionproblems or headaches as a result of the accident, but had physical and mentalproblems prior to the accident.       Ganellan, a neuropsychologist, treated Harold during his post-occurrencetreatment, and testified that he had a mild head injury.  He opined that Harold'sdifficulties were the result of a psychiatric condition, rather than the result of a headinjury.      Defendants presented a videotaped evidence deposition of Dr. Cavanaugh, apsychiatrist who examined Harold.  He testified that Harold's difficulties werepresent before as well as after the incident of December 15, 1986.  Dr. Cavanaughopined that Harold could not have returned to work in his condition.  He found thatHarold demonstrated a dysfunction whereby he complains of physical or organicsymptoms, which are actually based on underlying psychological problems.  Dr.Cavanaugh testified that he found no evidence of any closed head injury or organicmental disorder or permanent injury.  Dr. Cavanaugh proceeded to list a litany ofconditions Harold suffered prior to the occurrence, including black-outs, "seizures," depression, poor memory, migraine headaches, numbness in parts of body, change inpersonality, vertigo and fatigue, nervous break-downs, pain and blurring in eyes andnausea.      Harold has not returned to any substantive employment since the date of theincident.  Dr. Cavanaugh, Dr. Eilers, and Dr. Sweet all testified that Harold wasunable to work.         At the jury instruction conference, plaintiffs tendered Plaintiffs' InstructionNo. 20, which included Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) Civil 3d. 30.03, 30.04,30.05, 30.06, 30.07.  Plaintiffs also tendered a verdict form based on IPI B45.03.A.,Plaintiffs' Instruction No. 31, which included an itemization for the aggravation ofany pre-existing ailment or condition as a separate item of damages. The trial courtrefused both of plaintiffs' instructions.  The jury was given Pacific Mutual'sInstruction No. 7, which was identical to plaintiffs' instruction No. 20, except that itdid not contain reference to aggravation of a pre-existing condition as a separatecompensable element of damages.  Plaintiffs' Instruction No. 22 was also givencontaining IPI-Civil 3d 30.21, which instructed the jury that it may not limit or denyplaintiffs' damages because any injury resulted from an aggravation of a pre-existingcondition or a pre-existing condition which rendered plaintiff more susceptible toinjury.      The jury's verdict allocated negligence as follows: Golub - 65%; Pacific Mutual - 30%; and Kravcik - 5%.  The jury awarded damages in the gross amount of $34,497to Harold Kravcik: $25,000 for pain and suffering, $8,297 for medical expenses, and$1,200 for lost wages.  The jury awarded damages in the gross amount of $20,000 toSandra Kravcik.       The following pertinent facts relate to the cross-appeal.  Harold and his spouse,Sandra, filed a suit against defendants, Golub, Pacific Mutual, Osmond ConstructionCorporation (hereinafter Osmond), Crossfield Products, and Dex-O-Tex.  Golub fileda third-party complaint against Hascek-Melville Corporation.  Plaintiffs settled theirsuit against Osmond, the contractor who constructed the patio deck, for $5,000. Plaintiffs also settled their action against third-party defendant Hascek-MelvilleCorporation, the installer of the patio surface, for $15,000.  On October 8, 1992, thetrial court entered two separate orders, finding both settlements to be in good faith. The trial court dismissed Osmond with prejudice and dismissed Golub's third-partycomplaint against Hascek-Melville Corporation with prejudice.  Furthermore,plaintiffs reached a settlement with Crossfield Products and Dex-O-Tex, themanufacturers of the patio surface, for a total of $45,000.  The trial court entered anorder on November 4, 1992, which found the settlement to be in good faith anddismissed both defendants from the suit with prejudice.  Subsequent to the jury'sverdict and prior to the entry of a judgment order, Golub and Pacific Mutual eachrequested that the trial court set off the prior settlement amounts, totaling $65,000,against the jury's net award of $32,772 to Harold and $19,000 to Sandra.  The trialcourt ultimately denied the motion.  Defendants now cross-appeal.                        ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW     On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed reversible error, andabused its discretion, in denying plaintiffs' post-trial motion which stated it failed toprovide the jury with a verdict form that included an itemization for "aggravation ofany pre-existing ailment or condition."  In addition, plaintiffs argue that the trialcourt erred because it did not instruct the jury that aggravation of a pre-existingcondition is a separate compensable item of damages.  Plaintiffs assert that they areentitled to a new trial on the issue of damages only.  On cross-appeal, defendantsargue that they are entitled to set-off the amounts paid to plaintiffs by settling co-defendants in order to reduce or eliminate plaintiffs' judgments.                                  OPINION     A reviewing court will only reverse a trial court's denying a motion for a newtrial if there exists an abuse of discretion.  See Natalino v. JMB Realty Corp., 277 Ill.App. 3d 277, 660 N.E.2d 138 (1995).      Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred by giving improper juryinstructions and an improper verdict form.  Specifically, plaintiffs argue that theinstructions did not instruct the jury to consider the aggravation of Harold's pre-existing condition as an element of damage and the verdict form did not include anitemization for "the aggravation of any pre-existing ailments or condition."  Plaintiffsclaim that they are entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages only.      Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 239(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 239(a)), "[w]heneverIllinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI) contains an instruction applicable in a civilcase, giving due consideration to the facts and the prevailing law, and the courtdetermines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, the IPI instruction shallbe used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law."(Emphasis added.)(134 Ill. 2d R. 239(a).)  IPI Civil 3d 30.03 provides that "theaggravation of any pre-existing ailment or condition" is a separate element ofcompensable damages in Illinois.  Behles v. Chicago Transit Authority, 346 Ill. App.220, 231, 104 N.E.2d 635, 640 (1952); Wheeler v. Roselawn Memory Gardens, 188 Ill.App. 3d 193, 543 N.E.2d 1328, 1335 (1989).  However, this court in Smith v. City ofEvanston, 260 Ill. App. 3d 925, 631 N.E.2d 1269 (1994), held that aggravation of apre-existing condition is not a separate element of damage because it duplicates oroverlaps recovery for other elements of damage in violation of the holding in Powersv. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 91 Ill. 2d 375, 438 N.E.2d 152 (1982).  But see Ficken v.Alton & Southern Ry. Co., 255 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 625 N.E.2d 1172 (1993) (the trialcourt committed reversible error when it refused this instruction on the basis of thePowers rationale).  The "Notes on Use" state that this element may be insertedbetween the two paragraphs of IPI Civil 3d 30.01 if the court determines that the lawand the evidence justify its use.  If this instruction is given, IPI Civil 3d 30.21 shouldalso be given.     Plaintiffs rely on Balestri v. Terminal Freight Cooperative Association, 76 Ill.2d 451, 394 N.E.2d 391 (1979) and Ficken to support their contention thataggravation of pre-existing conditions is a separate compensable element of damages. First, our supreme court in Balestri held that a tortfeasor is liable for injuries hecauses, even though the injuries consist of the aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Proper judicial guidance should be given to the jury when considering the damageaward.  Giving a general instruction, such as IPI Civil 2d 30.03 was inadequate, andadditional  instruction was needed.  The Balestri decision is the basis for what is nowIPI Civil 30.21.  Thus, the supreme court affirmed the appellate court's decision ingranting a new trial on the issue of damages only.     In Ficken, the plaintiff, having a previous history of back trouble, injured hisback while working in the defendant's railroad yard and brought an action againsthis employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. � 51 et seq.(1988)).  Ficken, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 1052, 625 N.E.2d 1172.  The jury returned ageneral verdict in favor of the defendant-employer.  Upon review, the appellate courtfound a cumulation of errors that denied the plaintiff a fair trial.  Ficken, 255 Ill.App. 3d at 1053, 625 N.E.2d 1172.  Specifically, the appellate court held that the trialcourt committed reversible error when it refused to give IPI Civil 3d No. 30.03, aspart of IPI Civil 3d No. 30.01, yet allowed IPI Civil 3d No. 30.21.  Ficken, 255 Ill.App. 3d at 1053, 625 N.E.2d 1172.  The appellate court stated:          "[t]he law is clear that a tortfeasor is liable for injuries he          causes, including the aggravation of any pre-existing          condition. [Citations.]  The aggravation of a pre-existing          ailment or condition is a separate element of compensable          damages.  [Citations.]  We do not agree with the trial court          that IPI Civil 3d No. 30.03 permits a double recovery.           Instead, we believe that the combination of IPI Civil 3d No.          30.03 and IPI Civil No. 30.21 correctly states the law in          Illinois[.]  To give IPI-Civil 3d No. 30.21 without IPI-Civil          No. 30.03 is confusing."  (Emphasis added.) Ficken, 255 Ill.          App. 3d at 1056, 625 N.E.2d 1172.The Ficken court found the inadequate jury instruction to be reversible error, andgranted a new trial.  Ficken, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 1056, 625 N.E.2d 1172.       One recent decision, the Smith case, has deviated from the plethora of casesholding that the aggravation of a pre-existing condition is a separate element ofcompensable damages, and thus has caused confusion.  Defendants rely heavily onthe Smith ruling.  However, we believe that the Smith court ignored prior caselawand ignored the IPI Civil instructions.  In Smith, the court adopted the Powersrationale.  Our supreme court in Powers held that the "nature, extent, and duration"of a plaintiff's injury may be considered by a jury in determining damages but maynot be the basis for a separate award in addition to other elements of damage suchas pain and suffering, economic loss through lost earnings, and disability, eventhough the nature of a plaintiff's injury is listed as a separate element in the patternjury instructions (IPI Civil 3d No. 30.02).  Powers, 91 Ill. 2d at 384, 438 N.E.2d 152. Thus, the Powers court concluded that duplication or overlapping of the compensableelements for which the jury is to allow damages will be avoided.  Powers, 91 Ill. 2dat 384, 438 N.E.2d 152.  This decision came only after searching all relevant legalprecedent in Illinois and the United States. Powers, 91 Ill. 2d at 378-84, 438 N.E.2d152.  We further note that the issue of whether the aggravation of pre-existingcondition was a separate compensable element of damages was never an issue beforethe Powers court.     In Smith, the trial court had granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial ondamages only to correct misleading jury instructions with regard to the legal meaningof definitional damage terms.  The plaintiff had been awarded damages for medicalcosts, lost earnings, past pain and suffering and for aggravation of pre-existingconditions.  The defendants appealed.  Upon review, the appellate court did not findthat the trial court abused its discretion.  Smith, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 935, 631 N.E.2d1269.  It stated:          "Just as the court in Powers could find no measure for the          nature of the injury as a separable element of damages, we          find no measure for the value of aggravation of pre-existing          condition that is separate from the other elements of          damages ***.  An award for aggravation of a pre-existing          condition overlaps with awards for all of the other elements          of damages, so inclusion of aggravation of conditions as a          separate element leads to the same possibility of          overcompensation that led the court in Powers to rule          against the use of nature of the injury as a separate          element of damages, despite the approval of that as a          separate category of damages in the IPI instructions then          in effect.  Insofar as Parvin v. Sill, 138 Ill. App. 3d 325,          329-30, 486 N.E.2d 262, conflicts with our assessment of          the meaning of Powers, we decline to follow Parvin."           Smith, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 935, 631 N.E.2d 1269.We decline to follow the Smith case, as it ignored prior well-reasoned caselaw and theestablished pattern jury instructions.  The Smith ruling is an aberration of theexisting Illinois authority.  Accordingly, we find that defendants' reliance on this caseis misguided.       In the case sub judice, plaintiff's instructions No. 20 should have been given. The trial court violated Rule 239(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 239(a)) by not instructing the juryas such.  We find that IPI Civil 3d 30.03 accurately states the law in the instant caseand that the jury should have been instructed to take into account the aggravationof pre-existing condition as a separate compensable element of damages.  IPI 30.03is applicable because Harold suffered from many pre-existing mental and physicalconditions before the accident on December 15, 1986.  Dr. Sweet provided extensiveexpert testimony that the occurrence on December 15, 1986, aggravated Harold'sprior psychological problems, learning deficits and depression.  The evidence amplysupports that a head injury, whether slight or severe, aggravated Harold's pre-existing conditions.  Thus, IPI Civil 30.03 should have been given.     To instruct the jury only under IPI Civil 30.21, where the jury may not denyor limit Harold's right to damages resulting from the occurrence because any injuryresulted from an aggravation of a pre-existing condition or a pre-existing conditionwhich rendered him more susceptible to injury, without IPI Civil 30.03 is inadequate. It did not present a complete view of the law to the jury.  We find that the trial courtfailed to sufficiently set forth the applicable law on aggravation of a pre-existinginjury.  In the notes to Use of IPI Civil 30.03, it states that when IPI Civil 30.03 isgiven, IPI Civil 30.21 should also be given.  Therefore, we conclude that IPI Civil30.21 and IPI Civil 30.03 go hand-in-hand.  In light of the foregoing, we reverse thetrial court's decision, finding that the court abused its discretion when it failed toproperly instruct the jury as to IPI 30.03, but we affirm the trial court's rejection ofthe instruction regarding the itemization for the aggravation of any pre-existingailment or condition as a separate item of damages in the verdict form.     Plaintiffs' second contention is that it is proper for this court to grant theirmotion for a new trial on the issue of Harold's damages only.  A reviewing court maygrant a new trial limited to damages where: (1) the jury's verdict on the question ofliability is amply supported by the evidence; (2) the questions of damages and liabilityare so separate and distinct that a trial limited to the question of damages is notunfair to the defendant; and (3) the record suggests neither that the jury reached acompromise verdict, nor that, in some other identifiable manner, the error whichresulted in the jury's awarding inadequate damages also affected its verdict on thequestion of liability.  Balestri v. Terminal Freight Cooperative, 76 Ill. 2d 451, 457,394 N.E.2d 391.  In the present case, the record amply supports the jury's verdict onthe liability issue.  The issues of damages and liability are separate and distinct, asboth parties conceded this during the oral argument of this case.  Furthermore, therecord shows that the jury did not reach a compromise verdict, nor did the verdictaffect the liability question.  We, therefore, find that the requisite elements arepresent in this case, and accordingly grant a new trial as to the issue of damages onlyin regard to Harold's claims.  We note that our decision does not impact the damagesaward and judgment entered in favor of Sandra Kravcik.      On cross-appeal, defendants argue that the judgments in favor of each plaintiffmust be reduced by the prior settlements in order to prevent double recovery and toprotect the financial interests of non-settling defendants.  Plaintiffs respond bystating that the burden is on defendants to prove the allocation of the settlementsbetween Harold and Sandra.  Since this burden was not met, plaintiffs submit thatdefendants are not entitled to a setoff.  We agree.       The Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par.300 et seq. (now 740 ILCS 100/1 et seq. (West 1992))) provides that a settlementbetween one joint tortfeasor and a plaintiff will result in a setoff in the amount of thesettlement against any judgment entered against nonsettling tortfeasors, even if theplaintiff's award is thereby reduced to zero dollars.  Pasquale v. Speed ProductsEngineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 368, 654 N.E.2d 1365; Kipnis v. Meltzer, 253 Ill. App.3d 67, 68, 625 N.E.2d 320 (1993).  Under the Act, while a nonsettling tortfeasor mightseek to utilize the entire amount of a prior settlement as a setoff, the only amountsthat may normally be applied are those which compensated for the same injury forwhich the tortfeasor was ultimately found liable.  Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 369, 654N.E.2d 1365; Patton v. Carbondale Clinic, 161 Ill. 2d 357, 366, 641 N.E.2d 427 (1994). The Act codifies the hoary tenet that a plaintiff may have only one satisfaction for aninjury, regardless of whether multiple theories of recovery are sought for the injury. Kipnis, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 68.  Furthermore, our supreme court has emphasized twopolicy considerations for the issue of setoff for prior settlements; they are to preventdouble recovery and to protect the financial interests of non-settling defendants. Wilson v. Hoffman, 131 Ill. 2d 308, 322, 546 N.E.2d 524.      A recent supreme court case held that, generally, the party seeking the setoffbears the burden of proving what portion of a prior settlement was allocated or isattributable to the claim for which he is liable.  Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 369, 654N.E.2d 1365 (1995) citing Kipnis, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 68, 625 N.E.2d 320.  Setoffsmust normally be pleaded.  The supreme court, however, has previously found thatwhere a plaintiff recovers for several injuries in a previous lawsuit and fails toapportion damages accordingly, a subsequent defendant may be relieved of thisburden.  Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 369, 654 N.E.2d 1365 citing Patton v. CarbondaleClinic, 161 Ill. 2d 357, 641 N.E.2d 427 (1994).       Defendants rely on Patton to support their arguments.  Yet, we believe thatPatton was a narrow ruling and will not be broadened by this court.  It is alsofactually distinguishable from the case before us.  In Patton, Susanne Patton, nowdeceased, was a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident.  The decedent wastaken to a hospital, where she was negligently treated by the medical staff.  Thedecedent had been released prematurely, and was readmitted for emergency surgeryshortly thereafter and died three days later.  The plaintiff's decedent, Susanne'smother, filed suit against the driver of the car, the maker of the car, and the doctorswho treated Susanne.  Two of the defendants settled with the plaintiff in good faithand were dismissed.  The nonsettling tortfeasors, the doctors, proceeded to trial. Ultimately, the jury awarded the plaintiff $700,000 in damages and the court heldthat the defendants were not entitled to a setoff.  The supreme court reversed thetrial and appellate courts upon finding that two separate injuries existed: (1) theinjury from the accident; and (2) the injury from the defendants' negligent treatmentof the first injury.  Patton, 161 Ill. 2d at 366.  Susanne's injuries were divisible, yetit was impossible for the court to determine the amount of the settlement recoveredfor each injury.  Patton, 161 Ill. 2d at 370.  Since several injuries existed, thesupreme court held that the defendants should not bear the burden of the plaintiff'sfailure to properly allocate the settlement.  Patton, 161 Ill. 2d at 371, 373. Accordingly, it held that the defendants were entitled to an entire setoff of the priorsettlements.  Patton, 161 Ill. 2d 373.     Unlike Patton, Harold and Sandra were awarded damages for Harold's headinjury sustained on December 15, 1986, which was a single indivisible injury.  Theredid not exist several injuries, but rather multiple theories of recovery.  Thus, underboth Patton and Pasquale, it is defendants who have the burden of establishing theamount of the settlements which Harold actually received from Hascek-Melville,Osmond, Crossfield Products, and Dex-O-Tex in order to be entitled to a setoff. Defendants have not met this burden.  Defendants have failed to establish thatplaintiffs have in fact been compensated twice.  Most importantly, defendants havefailed to request a good faith hearing to determine the allocation of the damagesaward between plaintiffs.  Thus, defendants have not proved nor plead theirentitlement to setoffs.  We are not persuaded by defendants arguments that ourdecision creates "an impossible solution" nor does it create loopholes.  We simplyapplied the law as it stands.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision infinding that as a matter of law, defendants are not entitled to a set-off against theverdict entered in favor of each plaintiff for the amounts recited in the priorsettlements.       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgmentof the circuit court and remand this cause to the circuit court for a new trial on theissue of Harold's damages only, and for further proceedings consistent with the viewscontained herein.     Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded with directions.      GREIMAN and CERDA, JJ., concur.