64790 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

1 ‘‘Sensitive Security Information’’ or ‘‘SSI’’ is 

information obtained or developed in the conduct 

of security activities, the disclosure of which would 

constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, 

reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential 

information, or be detrimental to the security of 

transportation. The protection of SSI is governed by 

49 CFR part 1520. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Transportation Security Administration 

49 CFR Parts 1515, 1520, 1522, 1540, 

1542, 1544, and 1550 

[Docket No. TSA–2008–0021] 

RIN 1652–AA53 

Large Aircraft Security Program, Other 

Aircraft Operator Security Program, 

and Airport Operator Security Program 

AGENCY: Transportation Security 

Administration, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) proposes to 

amend current aviation transportation 

security regulations to enhance the 

security of general aviation by 

expanding the scope of current 

requirements and by adding new 

requirements for certain large aircraft 

operators and airports serving those 

aircraft. TSA is proposing to require that 

all aircraft operations, including 

corporate and private operations, with 

aircraft with a maximum certificated 

takeoff weight (MTOW) above 12,500 

pounds (‘‘large aircraft’’) adopt a large 

aircraft security program (LASP). This 

security program would be based on the 

current security program that applies to 

operators providing scheduled or 

charter services. 

TSA also proposes to require large 

aircraft operators to contract with TSAapproved auditors to conduct audits of 

the operators’ compliance with their 

security programs and with TSAapproved watch-list service providers to 

verify that their passengers are not on 

the No Fly and/or Selectee portions of 

the consolidated terrorist watch-list 

maintained by the Federal Government. 

This proposed rule describes the 

process and criteria under which 

auditors and companies that perform 

watch-list matching would obtain TSA 

approval. 

TSA also proposes further security 

measures for large aircraft operators in 

all-cargo operations and for operators of 

passenger aircraft with a MTOW of over 

45,500 kilograms (100,309.3 pounds), 

operated for compensation or hire. TSA 

also proposes to require that certain 

airports that serve large aircraft adopt 

security programs and amend the 

security program for full program and 

full all-cargo operators. 

DATES: Submit comments by December 

29, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by the TSA docket number to 

this rulemaking, to the Federal Docket 

Management System (FDMS), a 

government-wide, electronic docket 

management system, using any one of 

the following methods: 

Electronically: You may submit 

comments through the Federal 

eRulemaking portal at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the online 

instructions for submitting comments. 

Mail, In Person, or Fax: Address, 

hand-deliver, or fax your written 

comments to the Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC 

20590–0001; Fax 202–493–2251. The 

Department of Transportation (DOT), 

which maintains and processes TSA’s 

official regulatory dockets, will scan the 

submission and post it to FDMS. 

See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for 

format and other information about 

comment submissions. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

program questions: Erik Jensen, Branch 

Chief—Policy, Plans & Stakeholder 

Affairs, Office of General Aviation, 

TSNM, TSA–28, Transportation 

Security Administration, 601 South 

12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202–4220; 

telephone (571) 227–2401; facsimile 

(571) 227–2920; e-mail LASP@dhs.gov. 

For questions regarding Sensitive 

Security Information (SSI): Andrew 

Colsky, Director, SSI Office, Office of 

the Special Counselor (OSC), TSA–31, 

Transportation Security Administration, 

601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 

22202–4220; telephone (571) 227–3513; 

facsimile (571) 227–2945; e-mail 

SSI@dhs.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

TSA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. We also invite comments relating 

to the economic, environmental, energy, 

or federalism impacts that might result 

from this rulemaking action. See 

ADDRESSES above for information on 

where to submit comments. 

With each comment, please identify 

the docket number at the beginning of 

your comments. TSA encourages 

commenters to provide their names and 

addresses. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

rulemaking, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. You may submit 

comments and material electronically, 

in person, by mail, or fax as provided 

under ADDRESSES, but please submit 

your comments and material by only 

one means. If you submit comments by 

mail or delivery, submit them in an 

unbound format, no larger than 8.5 by 

11 inches, suitable for copying and 

electronic filing. 

If you want TSA to acknowledge 

receipt of comments submitted by mail, 

include with your comments a selfaddressed, stamped postcard on which 

the docket number appears. We will 

stamp the date on the postcard and mail 

it to you. 

TSA will file in the public docket all 

comments received by TSA, except for 

comments containing confidential 

information and Sensitive Security 

Information (SSI).1 TSA will consider 

all comments received on or before the 

closing date for comments and will 

consider comments filed late to the 

extent practicable. The docket is 

available for public inspection before 

and after the comment closing date. 

Handling of Confidential or Proprietary 

Information and Sensitive Security 

Information (SSI) Submitted in Public 

Comments 

Do not submit comments that include 

trade secrets, confidential commercial, 

or financial information, or SSI to the 

public regulatory docket. Please submit 

such comments separately from other 

comments on the rulemaking. 

Comments containing this type of 

information should be appropriately 

marked as containing such information 

and submitted by mail to the address 

listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section. 

Upon receipt of such comments, TSA 

will not place the comments in the 

public docket and will handle them in 

accordance with applicable safeguards 

and restrictions on access. TSA will 

hold them in a separate file to which the 

public does not have access, and place 

a note in the public docket that TSA has 

received such materials from the 

commenter. If TSA receives a request to 

examine or copy this information, TSA 

will treat it as any other request under 

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

(5 U.S.C. 552) and the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) FOIA 

regulation found in 6 CFR part 5. 

Reviewing Comments in the Docket 

Please be aware that anyone is able to 

search the electronic form of all 

comments received into any of our 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 64791 

2There is no statutory or regulatory definition of 

‘‘general aviation.’’ For the purposes of this NPRM, 

we use the term to refer to aircraft operations that 

are not air carriers or commercial, governmental or 

military operators. 

3 In general, aircraft that weigh over 12,500 

pounds MTOW are those aircraft equipped with 

twin turboprop or turbojet engines. Typically 

corporate and charter aircraft have a seating 

configuration for 6–8 passengers, while similar 

aircraft used in scheduled passenger service would 

likely have 18 or more seats. 

4Although aircraft operators that are subject to 

the full program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a), or the 

full all-cargo program under § 1544.101(h), operate 

large aircraft, TSA does not include them in 

Continued 

dockets by the name of the individual 

submitting the comment (or signing the 

comment, if submitted on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

You may review the applicable Privacy 

Act Statement published in the Federal 

Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477), or you may visit http:// 

docketinfo.gov. 

You may review TSA’s electronic 

public docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. In addition, DOT’s 

Docket Management Facility provides a 

physical facility, staff, equipment, and 

assistance to the public. To obtain 

assistance or to review comments in 

TSA’s public docket, you may visit this 

facility between 9 a.m. 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, excluding legal 

holidays, or call (202) 366–9826. This 

docket operations facility is located in 

the West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140 at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, 

SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

Availability of Rulemaking Document 

You can get an electronic copy using 

the Internet by— 

(1) Searching the electronic Federal 

Docket Management System (FDMS) 

Web page at http://www.regulations.gov; 

(2) Accessing the Government 

Printing Office’s web page at http:// 

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; or 

(3) Visiting TSA’s Security 

Regulations web page at http:// 

www.tsa.gov and accessing the link for 

‘‘Research Center’’ at the top of the page. 

In addition, copies are available by 

writing or calling the individual in the 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section. Make sure to identify the docket 

number of this rulemaking. 

Abbreviations and Terms Used in This 

Document 

AICPA—American Institute of Certified 

Public Accountants 

ALJ—Administrative Law Judge 

AOSC—Aircraft Operator Security 

Coordinator 

AOSSP—Aircraft Operator Standard Security 

Program 

ATSA—Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act 

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations 

CHRC—Criminal History Records Check 

CJIS—Criminal Justice Information Services 

CBP—U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

DHS—U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security 

FAMs—Federal Air Marshals 

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration 

FACAOSSP—Full All-Cargo Aircraft 

Operator Standard Security Program 

FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FISMA—Federal Information Security 

Management Act 

GA—General Aviation 

HME—Hazardous Materials Endorsement 

IPA—Independent Public Accounting firm 

IT—Information Technology 

LASP—Large Aircraft Security Program 

LEO—Law Enforcement Officer 

MTOW—Maximum Certificated Take-Off 

Weight 

NIST—National Institute of Standards and 

Technology 

PPSSP—Partial Program Standard Security 

Program 

PCSSP—Private Charter Standard Security 

Program 

SSI—Sensitive Security Information 

STA—Security Threat Assessment 

TSC—Terrorist Screening Center 

TSA—Transportation Security 

Administration 

TWIC—Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential 

TFSSP—Twelve-Five Standard Security 

Program 

Outline of the Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking 

I. Introduction 

A. Current Standard Security Programs 

B. Current Security Programs for Large 

Aircraft 

C. Implementation and Compliance 

Schedule 

II. Major Proposed Elements in This NPRM 

A. Major Requirements in the Proposed 

Large Aircraft Security Program 

B. Proposed Requirements for Certain 

Airports 

C. Passenger Checking Against the Watchlist 

D. Third-Party Audits for Large Aircraft 

Operators 

E. Proposed Amendments to the Full 

Program and the Full All-Cargo Program 

III. Section-by-Section Analysis 

IV. Regulatory Requirements 

A. Paperwork Reduction Act 

B. Regulatory Impact Analyses 

1. Regulatory Evaluation Summary 

2. Executive Order 12866 Assessment 

3. Regulatory Flexibility Act Assessment 

4. International Trade Impact Assessment 

5. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

C. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

D. Environmental Analysis 

E. Energy Impact Analysis 

List of Subjects 

The Proposed Amendments 

I. Introduction 

The aviation industry is composed of 

thousands of operators that conduct 

different types of operations in 

numerous different types of aircraft. 

Many aircraft operators are air carriers 

or commercial operators that offer 

transportation to the public for 

compensation or hire. Others are general 

aviation (GA) operators that do not offer 

transportation to the public. These 

operators often are corporate or private 

owners of aircraft that operate their 

aircraft for their own use or provide 

transportation for compensation or hire 

only to certain customers without 

offering transportation to the public in 

general.2

To date, the Federal Government’s 

primary focus with regard to aviation 

security has been on air carriers and 

commercial operators that offer 

transportation for compensation or hire 

to the public. TSA requires these 

carriers and operators to develop and 

operate under a particular security 

program depending on the precise 

nature of their operations. A security 

program is a set of security procedures 

that will meet the requirements of 

applicable TSA regulations. For 

example, a security program would 

include specific measures to screen 

cargo, to transport Federal Air Marshals, 

to use personnel identification systems, 

and to provide training to employees, if 

the operator were subject to those 

requirements in TSA’s regulation. 

With few exceptions, TSA does not 

currently require security programs for 

GA aircraft operators. As vulnerabilities 

and risks associated with air carriers 

and commercial operators have been 

reduced or mitigated, terrorists may 

view general aviation aircraft as more 

vulnerable and thus attractive targets. If 

hijacked and used as a missile, these 

aircraft would be capable of inflicting 

significant damage. 

The Federal Aviation 

Administration’s (FAA) long-standing 

definition of ‘‘large aircraft’’ is an 

aircraft with a maximum certificated 

takeoff weight (MTOW) of over 12,500 

pounds. See 14 CFR 1.1. Based on the 

aviation industry’s familiarity with this 

definition and TSA’s belief that aircraft 

of this size pose a potential risk, TSA is 

proposing to require security programs 

for all operators of aircraft—GA or 

otherwise—that have a MTOW of over 

12,500 pounds, excluding certain 

governmental operations (collectively, 

‘‘large aircraft operators’’).3

Currently, TSA requires many large 

aircraft operators that are air carriers or 

commercial operators to implement 

security programs such as the TwelveFive Security Program or the Private 

Charter Security Program.4 TSA is 


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64792 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

references to operators of large aircraft and large 

aircraft operators for purposes of this NPRM. Full 

program operators are generally known as the 

commercial airlines. 

5The regulations are in 49 CFR 1542.101. 

6 49 CFR 1544.101(a). 

7A standard security program is a security 

program issued by TSA that serves as the baseline 

for a particular type of operator. An aircraft 

operator’s security program consists of the 

appropriate standard security program, together 

with any amendments and alternative procedures to 

the security program, if approved by TSA. 

8 49 CFR 1544.101(h). 

9 49 CFR 1544.101(b). 

10 49 CFR 1544.101(f). 

11 49 CFR 1544.101(d). 

12 49 CFR 1544.1. 

13 49 U.S.C. 40102 and 14 CFR 119.21. 

14 14 CFR 119.23. 

15 69 FR 61516 (Oct. 19, 2004). 

16 14 CFR 119.3 and 119.23. After TSA adopted 

the full all-cargo program, it required part 125 

operators in all-cargo operations using aircraft over 

45,500 kg to have and carry out a full all-cargo 

program. See 71 FR 30478 (May 26, 2006). 

proposing to expand this requirement to 

include previously unregulated large 

aircraft operators—namely, GA with a 

MTOW of over 12,500 pounds. Doing so 

will expand the large aircraft operator 

population required to have a TSAapproved security program to 

approximately 10,000 operators from 

the approximately 650 operators today. 

In addition, TSA is proposing to 

establish a single large aircraft security 

program (LASP) to replace the various 

security programs used by currently 

regulated large aircraft operators, such 

as air carriers and commercial operators. 

It is TSA’s view that the proposed rule 

would enhance security significantly. 

TSA recognizes that this would 

greatly increase the number and type of 

operators subject to a TSA-approved 

security program. TSA invites 

comments on the weight threshold of 

aircraft covered by this proposed rule. 

For instance, parties may choose to 

comment on whether the security goals 

discussed herein would be met if 

security programs were required for GA 

aircraft only over some greater weight 

threshold. For example, we explain 

below that aircraft over 45,500 kg 

(100,309.3 pounds) MTOW are currently 

covered by the ‘‘private charter’’ 

security program, which includes 

security measures in addition to those 

outlined in the ‘‘twelve-five’’ security 

program. Since incidents involving 

heavier aircraft have the potential to 

lead to greater damages and loss of life 

under one of the scenarios studied in 

our regulatory impact analysis, we 

specifically solicit comment on whether 

this would be a logical alternative 

weight threshold to consider for the 

increased security requirements for 

general aviation. Although TSA has 

concluded in this NPRM that the 

security benefits of the lower weight 

threshold of 12,500 lbs are justified by 

the risk and therefore justify the 

additional cost of the lower threshold, 

we welcome commenters’ views on that 

topic, as well as on the cost-benefit 

impact of alternate weight thresholds. 

Below is a list of the major 

requirements GA aircraft operators 

would be required to adopt under the 

LASP; a more detailed discussion of the 

LASP and the individual requirements 

is in sections II and III of this preamble: 

• Ensure that their flight crew 

members have undergone a fingerprintbased criminal history records check 

(CHRC). 

• Conduct watch-list matching of 

their passengers through TSA-approved 

watch-list matching service providers. 

• Undergo a biennial audit of their 

compliance by a TSA-approved third 

party auditor. 

• Comply with the current cargo 

requirements for the twelve-five allcargo program if conducting an all-cargo 

operation. 

• For aircraft with a MTOW of over 

45,500 kilograms operated for 

compensation or hire, screen passengers 

and their accessible property. 

• Check property on board for 

unauthorized persons. 

In addition, TSA is proposing 

amendments to its regulations regarding 

airport security programs.5 TSA is 

proposing to require additional airports 

to adopt security programs, because 

these airports serve aircraft operators 

that either currently must carry out a 

security program or would be required 

to have a security program under the 

proposed rule. TSA proposes to require 

the following airports to adopt a 

security program: 

• Reliever airports, which perform 

the function of relieving congestion at 

commercial service airports and provide 

more GA access to the overall 

community. 

• Airports that regularly serve large 

aircraft with scheduled or public charter 

service. 

A. Current Aircraft Operator Security 

Programs 

TSA requires security programs for air 

carriers and commercial operators that 

require security measures for 

individuals, property, and cargo aboard 

aircraft. Currently TSA requires security 

programs for full program, full all-cargo, 

partial, private charter, and twelve-five 

program operators. For full program 

operators,6 the standard security 

program 7 is called an aircraft operator 

standard security program (AOSSP). For 

the full all-cargo program operators 8

operating all-cargo aircraft over 45,500 

kg MTOW, the standard security 

program is the full all-cargo aircraft 

operator standard security program 

(FACAOSSP). The partial program 9

applies to scheduled passenger or 

public charter operations in an aircraft 

with 31 or more, but 60 or fewer 

passenger seats that does not enplane 

from or deplane into a sterile area. The 

standard security program for private 

charters is the private charter standard 

security program.10 For other scheduled 

or charter flights, or all-cargo 

operations, in an aircraft with a MTOW 

of over 12,500 pounds, the standard 

security program is the twelve-five 

standard security program.11

The full program, the full all-cargo 

program, the partial program, the 

private charter program, and the twelvefive program aircraft operators all are 

covered under TSA regulations in 49 

CFR part 1544. They all must hold FAA 

air carrier operating certificates or FAA 

operating certificates in accordance with 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) regulations in 14 CFR part 119.12

They all engage in interstate common 

carriage or intrastate common 

carriage.13 TSA has also required certain 

operators not engaged in common 

carriage to hold and carry out security 

programs. Operators of aircraft with a 

MTOW of over 12,500 pounds must 

conduct operations in accordance with 

the FAA rules in 14 CFR part 125 (part 

125 operators).14 By notice published in 

the Federal Register, TSA required 

these operators to carry out the twelvefive standard security program for 

operations in aircraft over 12,500 

pounds but not over 45,500 kg, and to 

carry out the private charter standard 

security program for operations in 

aircraft over 45,500 kg.15 These part 125 

operators conduct operations when 

common carriage is not involved. They 

may conduct operations for 

compensation or hire, however, and 

they may also conduct operations not 

for compensation or hire.16

Finally, all civil aircraft must operate 

under FAA regulations 14 CFR part 91, 

Air Traffic and General Operating Rules. 

These operators, when not also subject 

to another FAA regulation, such as part 

119 or part 125, are often referred to in 

the industry as part 91 operators. TSA 

generally has not required such 

operators to carry out security measures. 

The main objectives of the proposed 

rule are: (1) To merge the partial, private 

charter and twelve-five programs into a 

large aircraft security program and to 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 64793 

expand its scope to include general 

aviation operators using aircraft with a 

MTOW of over 12,500 pounds; and (2) 

to enhance the security of these 

operations. 

B. Current Security Programs for Large 

Aircraft 

Large aircraft are operated by a 

diverse group of air carriers, commercial 

operators, and GA operators. As stated 

above, to date, TSA has mandated 

security programs for the air carrier and 

commercial operator segments of the 

aviation industry including scheduled 

passenger operations, private charters, 

public charters, and all-cargo operations 

in large aircraft through the twelve-five 

program, the partial program, and the 

private charter program. With limited 

exceptions, TSA has not required 

security programs for large aircraft in 

general aviation. 

Large GA aircraft are most often 

operated by corporate entities, though 

some large GA aircraft are operated by 

individuals. Corporate aviation, with a 

population of approximately 10,000 

operators flying 15,000 aircraft, is 

largely unregulated for security 

purposes. Yet many of these aircraft are 

of the same size and weight of the air 

carriers and commercial operators that 

TSA regulates, and they could be used 

effectively to commit a terrorist act. 

Complicating the situation is the fact 

that many GA operators have the 

authorization to function under several 

different FAA regulations and operating 

certificates, which may require different 

TSA security programs or no TSA 

security program at all. 

TSA considered developing a new 

regulatory program to be used solely on 

GA aircraft and their potential security 

risks. This decision would have created 

yet another security program applicable 

to large aircraft operators. Instead of five 

separate security programs that would 

apply to large aircraft operators 

depending on the type of service they 

provide, TSA is proposing one security 

program that would apply to all large 

aircraft operators (except certain 

government operations) and would 

replace the current security programs 

for partial program operators, twelvefive program operators, and private 

charter operators. The LASP would 

establish a consistent set of regulations 

for air carriers and commercial 

operators, as well as GA operators using 

large aircraft. Indeed, LASP would 

provide large aircraft operators not 

covered under the full program, or the 

full all-cargo security program, with one 

set of regulations that would form the 

core of their security programs distinct 

to their operational and security needs. 

Table 1 below identifies the different 

types of large aircraft operators that 

currently are required to have a security 

program and the major security 

requirements for these operators. It also 

identifies the types of operators that 

would be subject to the new proposed 

LASP. 

TABLE 1—STANDARD SECURITY PROGRAMS APPLICABLE TO AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

An aircraft operator 

that operates this 

type of service, other 

than all-cargo 

In this size aircraft And Must have this 

program # 

Currently using this 

standard security 

program 

Would be using this 

standard security 

program under the 

NPRM 

Scheduled passenger or public 

charter passenger *.

61 or more passenger seats.................................................. Full Program 

§ 1544.101(a)(1).

AOSSP ................... No change. 

Scheduled passenger or public 

charter passenger *.

60 or fewer passenger seats.It enplanes from, or deplanes 

into, an existing sterile area.

Full Program 

§ 1544.101(a)(2).

AOSSP ................... No change. 

Scheduled passenger or public 

charter passenger *.

31 or more but 60 

or fewer passenger seats.

It does not enplane from, or 

deplane into, an existing 

sterile area.

Partial Program 

§ 1544.101(b)(1).

Partial Program 

Standard Security 

Program (PPSSP).

Proposed 

LASSP **** with 

component for 

aircraft greater 

than 45,500 kg (if 

applicable). 

Scheduled, public 

charter, or private 

charter; passenger *.

More than 12,500 

pounds MTOW.

It does not enplane from, or 

deplane into, an existing 

sterile area, and it is not 

under a Full Program or a 

Partial Program.

Twelve-Five Program 

§ 1544.101(d).

Twelve-Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP).Proposed LASSP. 

Private charter * ....... Any size .................. It enplanes from, or deplanes 

into, an existing sterile area.

Private Charter Program 

§ 1544.101(f)(1)(i).

Private Charter 

Standard Security 

Program 

(PCSSP).

Proposed LASSP 

with component 

for aircraft greater 

than 45,500 kg (if 

applicable) and 

alternative procedures for enplaning from or 

deplaning into an 

existing sterile 

area. 

Private charter * ....... More than 45,500 

kg, OR 61 or 

more passenger 

seats.

It does not enplane from, or 

deplane into, an existing 

sterile area, and it is not a 

government charter.

Private Charter Program 

§ 1544.101(f)(1)(ii).

PCSSP ................... Proposed LASSP 

with component 

for aircraft greater 

than 45,500 kg. 

Under an FAA certificate issued under 

14 CFR part 125 **.

More than 45,500 

kg MTOW.

It is carrying passengers or 

property for compensation 

or hire and is not under another TSA security program.

§ 1550.7; (69 FR 

61516, 10/19/ 

2004).

PCSSP ................... Proposed LASSP 

with component 

for aircraft greater 

than 45,500 kg or 

61 or more seats. 


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64794 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 1—STANDARD SECURITY PROGRAMS APPLICABLE TO AIRCRAFT OPERATORS—Continued 

An aircraft operator 

that operates this 

type of service, other 

than all-cargo 

In this size aircraft And Must have this 

program # 

Currently using this 

standard security 

program 

Would be using this 

standard security 

program under the 

NPRM 

Under an FAA certificate issued under 

14 CFR part 125 **.

61 or more passenger seats.It is carrying passengers or 

property for compensation 

or hire and is not under another TSA security program.

§ 1550.7; (69 FR 

61516, 10/19/ 

2004).

PCSSP ................... Proposed LASSP 

with component 

for aircraft greater 

than 45,500 kg or 

61 or more seats. 

Under an FAA certificate issued under 

14 CFR part 125 **.

More than 45,500 

kg MTOW.

It is not carrying passengers 

or property for compensation or hire and not under 

another TSA security program.

§ 1550.7; (69 FR 

61516, 10/19/ 

2004).

PCSSP ................... Proposed LASSP. 

Under an FAA certificate issued under 

14 CFR part 125 **.

61 or more passenger seats.It is not carrying passengers 

or property for compensation or hire and not under 

another TSA security program.

§ 1550.7; (69 FR 

61516, 10/19/ 

2004).

PCSSP ................... Proposed LASSP. 

Under an FAA certificate issued under 

14 CFR part 125 **.

More than 12,500 

pounds MTOW.

It is not under another TSA 

security program.

§ 1550.7 .................. TFSSP .................... Proposed LASSP. 

Operating under 14 

CFR part 91 

only **.

More than 12,500 

pounds.

It enplanes from, or deplanes 

into, an existing sterile area.

General Aviation 

Operations using 

a sterile area 

§ 1550.5.

No standard program.Proposed LASSP 

with alternative 

procedures for 

enplaning from or 

deplaning into an 

existing sterile 

area. 

Operating under 14 

CFR part 91 

only **.

12,500 pounds or 

less.

It enplanes from, or deplanes 

into, an existing sterile area.

General Aviation 

Operations using 

a sterile area 

§ 1550.5.

No standard program.No change. 

Operating under 14 

CFR part 91 

only **.

More than 12,500 

pounds.

It is not under another TSA 

security program, and does 

not enplane from or deplane 

to an existing sterile area.

Not required to 

have a security 

program.

Not required to 

have a security 

program.

Proposed LASSP. 

Operating under 14 

CFR part 91 

only **.

12,500 pounds or 

less.

It is not under another TSA 

security program, and does 

not enplane from or deplane 

to an existing sterile area.

Not required to 

have a security 

program.

Not required to 

have a security 

program.

No change. 

Passenger operations into and out 

of Ronald Reagan 

Washington National Airport 

(DCA) ***.

Any size .................. It is not under a Full Program DCA Access Program part 1562.DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP).No change. 

Other operations ** .. Any size .................. Is not under any other required program but aircraft 

operator requests a security 

program.

Limited program 

§ 1544.101(g).

No standard program.No change. 

* These aircraft operators are considered air carriers or commercial operators. 

** These aircraft operators are considered general aviation. 

*** May be air carriers, commercial operators, or general aviation operators. 

**** After issuing the LASP final rule, TSA would develop and issue a standard security program to implement the LASP called the Large Aircraft Standard Security Program (LASSP). 

# Cites in this column are to 49 CFR. 

An all-cargo aircraft 

operator that 

operates this type of 

service: ## 

In this size aircraft And Must have this 

program # 

Currently using this 

standard 

security program 

Would be using this 

standard security 

program under the 

NPRM 

All-cargo ..................... Greater than 45,500 

kg, OR 61 or more 

passenger seats.

Operating under a 

FAA certificate 

issued under 14 

CFR part 119 or 

125.

Full All-Cargo Program.

§ 1544.101(h) ............

Full All-Cargo Aircraft 

Operator Standard 

Security Program 

(FACAOSSP).

No change. 

All-cargo ..................... Over 12,500 lbs but 

not over 45,500 kg.

................................... Twelve-Five Program 

in all-cargo operations.

§ 1544.101(d) ............

TFSSP in all-cargo 

operations.

LASSP with all-cargo 

component. 


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17There are no airport operators that currently 

hold a partial program. 

An all-cargo aircraft 

operator that 

operates this type of 

service: ## 

In this size aircraft And Must have this 

program # 

Currently using this 

standard 

security program 

Would be using this 

standard security 

program under the 

NPRM 

All-cargo under an 

FAA certificate 

issued under 14 

CFR part 125.

More than 45,500 kg ................................... FACAOSSP .............. FACAOSSP + ........... No change. 

# Cites in this column are to 49 CFR. 

## All-cargo operations carry cargo and authorized persons, but no passengers. 

In developing the proposed rule, TSA 

analyzed the existing security programs 

to determine which security measures 

have been effective and would be 

appropriate for inclusion in the 

proposed LASP. The LASP would 

combine the essential elements of some 

of the current security programs into 

one consolidated and comprehensive 

program. 

In this rulemaking, TSA is also 

proposing to reorganize certain existing 

regulations in 49 CFR part 1544. 

Specifically, TSA has clarified the 

meaning of the rule, simplified the text, 

and harmonized regulations between 

the different industry populations. This 

reorganization may affect the currently 

regulated population in addition to the 

proposed newly regulated population. 

TSA is also proposing to reorganize 

certain sections in 49 CFR part 1544 to 

account for the proposed addition of the 

LASP. The reorganization would not 

make any substantive changes to the 

regulations. 

C. Implementation and Compliance 

Schedule 

Based on industry data, TSA 

anticipates that this proposed rule 

would require approximately 10,000 

aircraft operators and 315 airport 

operators, most of whom are not 

currently required to do so, to 

implement security programs. Due to 

the large number of aircraft operators 

and airport operators that would be 

required to implement security 

programs, TSA proposes using a phased 

approach in the implementation of the 

proposed rule. The proposed 

compliance schedule would allow for 

proper and adequate support and 

staffing within TSA and also would 

allow sufficient time for compliance on 

the part of the newly regulated aircraft 

operators and airport operators. 

Following issuance of a final rule, TSA 

would implement a communication 

plan commencing with a wide 

distribution of press releases, web-site 

postings, and industry association 

briefings and meetings. These briefings 

and meetings would communicate, 

educate, and confirm which operators 

would be affected by the final rule, what 

actions the aircraft operators and airport 

operators would be required to take to 

comply with the rule, and the time 

period within which the aircraft 

operator and airport operators would be 

required to submit their applications 

and other supporting documents. At 

that time, TSA would provide the 

process, procedures, and necessary 

forms to the aircraft operators and 

airport operators to enable the operators 

to apply for the large aircraft program, 

or the airport partial program, via a 

secure web-board. 

TSA’s implementation schedule 

would divide the country into five 

areas, taking into account which areas of 

the country contain the largest affected 

populations of aircraft operators and 

airport operators. TSA anticipates six 

phases of compliance, targeting 

approximately 20 percent of the large 

aircraft operator and airport operators 

population that currently do not hold 

security programs in each of the first 

five phases. The sixth and final phase 

would include aircraft operators that 

currently hold a security program.17 The 

following timeline for compliance 

would start upon the effective date of 

the final rule, which would be 60 days 

after publication of the final rule in the 

Federal Register: 

Phase 1, Mid-Atlantic region—months 

1–4 after the effective date of the final 

rule. 

Phase 2, North-East region—months 5– 

8 after the effective date of the final 

rule. 

Phase 3, Southern region—months 9–12 

after the effective date of the final 

rule. 

Phase 4, Mid-West region—months 13– 

16 after the effective date of the final 

rule. 

Phase 5, Western region—months 17–20 

after the effective date of the final 

rule. 

Phase 6, Existing security program 

holders—months 21–24 after the 

effective date of the final rule. 

The phase in which a large aircraft 

operator would fall would be 

determined by where the aircraft is 

based. For large aircraft operators that 

have multiple bases for their aircraft, the 

phase would be determined by the 

location of the large aircraft operator’s 

headquarters. We seek comment on this 

phased approach and on determining 

which phase would be applicable to 

each large aircraft operator based on the 

location of the aircraft or headquarters. 

II. Major Elements in This NPRM 

A. Major Requirements in the Proposed 

Large Aircraft Security Program 

To provide greater consistency across 

all large aircraft operations, the 

proposed regulation would create the 

Large Aircraft Standard Security 

Program (LASSP) to replace the current 

security programs for partial program 

operators, twelve-five program 

operators, and private charter program 

operators. The major requirements in 

this proposed rule are based on the 

requirements in the Twelve-Five and 

the Private Charter Security Programs. 

The proposed LASP provides a core 

security program for all large aircraft, 

irrespective of the FAA regulations 

under which they operate, whether they 

are air carriers, commercial operators, or 

GA. Beyond the core requirements for 

large aircraft with a MTOW of over 

12,500 pounds, the proposed LASP 

would include a component for large 

aircraft with a MTOW of over 45,500 

kilograms operated for compensation or 

hire. The following is a summary of the 

major security measures in the proposed 

LASP. 

1. Proposed Core Requirements of the 

Large Aircraft Security Program in 

§ 1544.103(e) 

In TSA’s experience, the current 

Twelve-Five Security Program has 

proven to be effective in safeguarding 

the operations of scheduled and charter 

operations in aircraft with MTOW of 

over 12,500 pounds without unduly 

burdening the aircraft operators. 

Accordingly, TSA would base the core 

requirements of the LASP on the 

Twelve-Five Security Program. The 

LASP, however, would include 

additional requirements that would 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
64796 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

18Public Law 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec. 17, 

2004; 49 U.S.C. 44903 (j)(2). 

19For example, proposed § 1560.1(a) may be 

amended to include large aircraft operators. See 

Secure Flight NPRM, 72 FR at 48387. 

strengthen the existing security 

measures. Below is a discussion of the 

major requirements of the LASP. 

Security Threat Assessment With 

Criminal History Records Check for 

Flight Crew Members 

Under the current security programs 

that apply to large aircraft operators, 

TSA requires aircraft operators to ensure 

that their flight crew members have 

undergone a fingerprint-based criminal 

history records check (CHRC). TSA 

views this as an important security 

measure that should apply to flight crew 

members of all large aircraft. Pilots are 

in control of the aircraft and other flight 

crew members are in the cockpit and 

could obtain control of the aircraft. 

Consequently, TSA proposes to require 

that large aircraft operators ensure that 

all of their flight crew members undergo 

a security threat assessment (STA) that 

includes a CHRC and other analyses, 

including checks of appropriate terrorist 

watch-lists and other databases. The list 

of disqualifying crimes of the CHRC 

would be the same as for the full and 

full all-cargo operations. 49 CFR 

1544.229 and 1544.230. 

After TSA adopted the Twelve-Five 

Security Program requirements, it 

became clear that most operators of that 

size were not well-prepared to conduct 

adjudication of the CHRCs. Accordingly, 

while the twelve-five operators have 

been ensuring that their flight crew 

members submit their fingerprints, TSA 

has been adjudicating the criminal 

histories; that is, TSA reviews the 

history to determine whether the flight 

crew member has a disqualifying 

criminal offense. TSA is proposing to 

codify that practice and to charge a fee 

for the services. See the section-bysection analysis for proposed part 1544, 

subpart G. 

TSA recognizes that a flight crew 

member may be contracted to work for 

more than one large aircraft operator. 

We seek comment on whether the STA 

should be transferable so that the flight 

crew member would need to undergo 

only one STA every five years, 

regardless of the number of employers 

the flight crew members may have 

within the five-year period. Potential 

employers would check the status of the 

flight crew member’s STA through a 

mechanism required by TSA. 

TSA also is considering ways to 

positively identify pilots conducting 

both domestic and international flight 

operations and effectively link them to 

the aircraft they are operating. We seek 

comment and recommended methods 

for positively identifying pilots and 

effectively linking them to the aircraft 

they are operating. 

Watch-List Matching of Passengers 

The Federal Government maintains a 

terrorist watch-list. The watch-list, 

which includes the No Fly List and the 

Selectee List components of the 

Terrorist Screening Database maintained 

by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), 

is the basis for the pre-flight passenger 

watch-list matching currently 

conducted by certain aircraft operators. 

Watch-list matching of passengers on 

large aircraft is an important security 

measure, because it can prevent 

individuals who are believed to pose a 

risk from boarding a large aircraft and, 

potentially, gaining control of the 

aircraft, to use it as a weapon. TSA 

studies have shown that significant loss 

of lives and other damage could result 

from such an incident. Matching 

passenger information against the No 

Fly List component of the terrorist 

watch-list would identify individuals 

who, if permitted to board aircraft, may 

pose a threat to the aircraft and/or 

persons on board. Matching passenger 

information against the Selectee List 

component of the terrorist watch-list 

also would identify individuals who 

may be potential threats and would 

allow TSA and/or the aircraft operators 

to take appropriate action, if necessary. 

Under the current watch-list matching 

process, TSA provides the No Fly and 

Selectee List to twelve-five, partial 

program, and private charter aircraft 

operators to enable them to conduct the 

watch-list matching. When an aircraft 

operator receives passenger information 

that is similar to, or the same as, a name 

on the No Fly or Selectee List, the 

aircraft operator is required to notify 

law enforcement personnel and TSA in 

order to determine whether that 

passenger is in fact the individual listed 

on the No Fly or Selectee List. The 

aircraft operator may not board a 

passenger until TSA has instructed the 

aircraft operator that the passenger is 

clear to board the aircraft. 

a. Removing watch-list from aircraft 

operators. Per Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-16/National 

Security Presidential Directive-47, 

section 4012(a) of the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,18

and in support of 9/11 commission 

recommendations, the U.S. government 

is in the process of assuming control 

over watch-list matching in the aviation 

environment. TSA is concerned that 

providing the watch-list to 

approximately 10,000 large aircraft 

operators as part of the LASP program 

would increase the risk that the watchlist would be disseminated to 

unauthorized persons and that the 

watch-list would be misused and/or 

compromised. Since it is not possible to 

bring the watch-list matching function 

into the federal government in one step, 

TSA is considering ways to provide this 

list to a more limited set of holders 

while TSA considers the most effective 

method to assume the watch-list 

matching responsibility from all aircraft 

operators required to conduct watch-list 

matching through the Secure Flight 

program. 

TSA recognizes that the Secure Flight 

program has not yet achieved the 

operational capability to conduct watchlist matching for general aviation, nor is 

such capability anticipated by the time 

TSA would require large general 

aviation and charter aircraft operators to 

implement the LASP. Therefore, TSA is 

proposing a solution for watch-list 

matching in this NPRM for the time 

period in which the Secure Flight 

program does not have the capability to 

conduct watch-list matching for large 

aircraft passengers. If TSA is able to 

develop the capability for the Secure 

Flight program to conduct watch-list 

matching for large aircraft passengers, 

TSA may amend the scope of the Secure 

Flight program to include large aircraft 

operators in the final rule for this 

NPRM.19

b. Watch-list Service Providers. Under 

the proposed rule, TSA would not 

provide the No Fly List to large aircraft 

operators, which means that TSA would 

no longer provide the watch-list to the 

approximately 800 aircraft operators 

now receiving it under the twelve-five 

program, partial program and private 

charter operators and would not begin 

providing it to the additional 

approximately 9,300 general aviation 

operators that would be under the 

LASP. Instead, TSA would provide the 

watch-list to watch-list service 

providers approved by TSA. Large 

aircraft operators would transmit their 

passenger information to these watchlist service providers, who would 

conduct the automated watch-list 

matching function and transmit the 

results back to the large aircraft 

operators. 

TSA is proposing this approach for 

two reasons. First, this would greatly 

reduce the number of entities receiving 

the watch-list, thus reducing the risk 

that it would be disseminated to 

unauthorized persons or misused. 

Second, having a small number of 

watch-list service providers conduct 

watch-list matching in accordance with 


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20 19 CFR 122.1(d) defines ‘‘commercial aircraft’’ 

as any aircraft transporting passengers and/or cargo 

for some payment or other consideration, including 

money or services rendered. 

21 19 CFR 122.1(h) also defines a private aircraft 

as any aircraft leaving the United States carrying 

neither passengers nor cargo in order to lade 

passengers and/or cargo in a foreign area for 

commercial purposes; or returning to the United 

States carrying neither passengers nor cargo in 

ballast after leaving with passengers and/or cargo 

for commercial purposes. 

22The redress number is the number assigned by 

DHS to an individual processed through the redress 

procedures described in 49 CFR part 1560, subpart 

C, as proposed in the Secure Flight NPRM. 23See Secure Flight NPRM, 72 FR at 48364. 

TSA standards would result in greater 

consistency in the application of the 

watch-list matching function. These 

watch-list service providers will have 

been determined to have appropriate 

security, including Information 

Technology (IT) security and 

performance capabilities, to perform 

this important function in the interim. 

TSA invites comments on the role that 

watch-list service providers may 

continue to have if the responsibility for 

watch-list matching shifts to the U.S. 

Government in the future. For example, 

would watch-list service providers offer 

their services to consolidate passenger 

information from large aircraft operators 

and to transmit the passenger 

information to Secure Flight? 

While the watch-list service providers 

would perform the watch-list matching 

function, large aircraft operators would 

have several responsibilities under the 

proposed rule. Large aircraft operators 

would be responsible for all costs 

associated with watch-list matching, 

including any fee charged by the watchlist service providers. 

c. Compliance with CBP programs. 

Large aircraft operators would not be 

required to transmit passenger 

information to their watch-list service 

providers for any flight for which the 

large aircraft operator has submitted 

advance passenger information to U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

under 19 CFR part 122. For passengers 

on flights in commercial aircraft, as 

defined in 19 CFR 122.1, the large 

aircraft operator are required to submit 

advance passenger information under 19 

CFR 122.49a and 122.75a and comply 

with the CBP boarding instruction 

regarding each passenger. 

TSA notes that CBP published a 

notice of proposed rulemaking, 

‘‘Advance Information on Private 

Aircraft Arriving in and Departing from 

the United States,’’ proposing to 

implement certain passenger manifest 

and advance passenger screening 

requirements for private aircraft 

departing foreign ports for U.S. 

destinations or departing the United 

States for foreign ports. Under the CBP 

proposed rule, a private aircraft, in 

contrast to a commercial aircraft,20 is 

generally any aircraft engaged in a 

personal or business flight to or from the 

United States that is not carrying 

passengers and/or cargo for commercial 

purposes.21 See 19 CFR 122.1(h). CBP’s 

Advance Passenger Information System 

(APIS) requirements and proposed 

eAPIS requirements apply to both U.S.- 

operated and foreign-operated aircraft. 

To avoid process redundancies, DHS 

would require operators and pilots of 

private large aircraft that would be 

subject to this TSA proposed rule and 

CBP’s eAPIS private aircraft regulations 

to submit their passenger manifest to 

CBP only and not to watch-list service 

providers. TSA would deem U.S. 

operators of private large aircraft to be 

in compliance with the proposed rule’s 

requirements to submit passenger 

information for watch-list matching for 

international flights if the pilot submits 

passenger information required under 

the proposed eAPIS regulations. See 

proposed 19 CFR 122.22. 

The TSA and CBP screening processes 

work in tandem for flights departing 

foreign ports destined for the United 

States and flights departing the United 

States for foreign destinations. If CBP 

grants the pilot landing rights under 19 

CFR 122.49a, 122.75a, or 122.22, TSA 

would allow the large aircraft operator 

to permit all passengers, for whom the 

aircraft operator submitted advance 

passenger information to CBP, to board 

the aircraft. If CBP identifies a passenger 

as a selectee under 19 CFR 122.49a, 

122.75a, or 122.22, TSA would allow 

the large aircraft operator to permit the 

passenger to board the aircraft, and TSA 

would require the large aircraft operator 

to comply with the procedures in its 

security program pertaining to 

passengers that are identified as 

selectees, as discussed in further detail 

below. If CBP identifies a passenger as 

‘‘not cleared’’ under 19 CFR 122.49a, 

122.75a, or 122.22, TSA would not 

allow the large aircraft operator to 

permit the passenger to board the 

aircraft. CBP would instruct the large 

aircraft operator to contact TSA 

regarding the passenger who has been 

identified as ‘‘not cleared’’ for further 

resolution. 

d. Passenger information. This 

proposed rule would require large 

aircraft operators to request full name, 

gender, date of birth, and redress 

number 22 (if available) from all 

passengers. TSA has determined that an 

individual’s full name, gender, and date 

of birth are critically important for 

effective automated watch-list matching 

of that individual against those 

individuals on the watch-list.23 The full 

name is the primary attribute used to 

conduct watch-list matching and would 

be required for all passengers. Partial 

names would increase the likelihood of 

false positive matches, because partial 

names are more likely to match a 

number of different entries on the 

watch-list. As a result, this proposed 

rule would require individuals to 

provide their full names and would 

prohibit aircraft operators from boarding 

a passenger who does not provide a full 

name. Date of birth and gender would 

be optional for the passenger. This 

proposed requirement on passengers to 

provide the full name is consistent with 

TSA’s proposal in the Secure Flight 

NPRM. In the Secure Flight NPRM, TSA 

proposes to require passengers on 

commercial flights operated by full 

program operators and foreign air 

carriers to provide their full name when 

they make a reservation for a flight. See 

proposed § 1540.107(b) in the Secure 

Flight NPRM, 72 FR at 48386. 

Many names do not indicate gender, 

because they can be used by either 

gender. Additionally, names not derived 

from the Latin alphabet, when 

transliterated into English, often do not 

denote gender. Providing information 

on gender will reduce the number of 

false positive watch-list matches, 

because the information will distinguish 

persons who have the same or similar 

names but who are of a different gender. 

The date of birth is also helpful in 

distinguishing a passenger from an 

individual on a watch-list with the same 

or similar name, thereby reducing the 

number of false positive watch-list 

matches. 

This proposed rule would also require 

aircraft operators to request an 

individual’s redress number, if 

available. DHS will assign this unique 

number to individuals who use the DHS 

Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS 

TRIP), because they believe they have 

been incorrectly delayed or denied 

boarding. Individuals may be less likely 

to be delayed by false positive matches 

to the watch-list if they provide their 

redress number, if available. 

Under the proposed rule, individuals 

would not be compelled to provide their 

gender, date of birth, or redress number 

when requested by the aircraft 

operators. However, without this 

information, the watch-list service 

provider may be unable to perform 

effective automated watch-list matching 

and, as a result, the individuals may be 

more likely to be denied boarding, or 

under certain circumstances, be subject 


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24The proposed rule would define ‘‘continuous 

vetting’’ as the process in which the passenger’s 

information is continuously matched against the 

most current watch-list. 

to additional screening. TSA is 

considering whether to require all 

individuals to provide their gender and 

date of birth to assist in the watch-list 

matching and resolution process. 

The proposed rule would require 

large aircraft operators to transmit to the 

watch-list service provider the 

passengers’ full names and also transmit 

the passengers’ genders, dates of birth, 

and redress numbers, to the extent they 

are available. In addition, the proposed 

rule would require large aircraft 

operators to transmit certain 

information from an individual’s 

passport (full name, passport number, 

country of issuance, expiration date, 

gender, and date of birth), if it is 

available and was provided to the 

aircraft operator. Based on TSA’s 

experience in conducting security threat 

assessments that include watch-list 

matching, TSA has determined that 

passport information would help 

resolve possible false positive matches 

and make the watch-list matching 

process more accurate. 

TSA is not proposing a minimum 

time in advance of the flight that large 

aircraft operators would be required to 

submit passenger information to the 

watch-list service provider. TSA 

anticipates that the large aircraft 

operators would work with their service 

providers to establish a minimum time 

that the service provider would need to 

complete watch-list matching in 

advance of a flight. Nevertheless, TSA 

seeks comment on whether it should 

establish a minimum time for 

submission of passenger information to 

the service providers, what that 

minimum time should be, and the 

reasons supporting the suggested 

minimum time. 

Upon submission of the passenger 

information by the aircraft operator to 

the watch-list service provider, the 

service provider would conduct the 

automated vetting of the passenger 

information provided against the watchlist which is comprised of the No Fly 

and Selectee List components of the 

Terrorist Screening Database. The 

watch-list service provider would 

inform the aircraft operator of the 

results of the watch-list matching by 

transmitting instructions to the large 

aircraft operator for each passenger. The 

large aircraft operator would not be able 

to permit a passenger aboard an aircraft 

until the large aircraft operator receives 

the instructions from the watch-list 

service provider that would allow the 

aircraft operator to board the passenger. 

The large aircraft operator would be 

required to comply with the 

instructions. 

Upon submission of the passenger 

information by the aircraft operator to 

the watch-list service provider, the 

service provider would conduct the 

automated comparison using the 

passenger information provided. If an 

automated comparison indicates that 

the passenger is not a match to the 

watch-list, the service provider would 

instruct the aircraft operator that the 

passenger is cleared to board the 

aircraft. If the automated comparison 

using the passenger information 

identifies a potential match to the 

watch-list, the watch-list service 

provider would contact TSA for 

resolution of the potential match. TSA 

would coordinate with the TSC for 

resolution if necessary and would 

provide further instructions concerning 

the passenger to the service provider. 

If TSA cannot determine from the 

information provided by the watch-list 

service provider whether the individual 

is a match to the watch-list, it may be 

necessary for the passenger to provide 

additional information to resolve the 

possible match. In these instances, TSA 

would inform the watch-list service 

provider to instruct the large aircraft 

operator to contact TSA directly to 

resolve the possible match between the 

passenger and the watch-list record, and 

TSA would provide final instructions 

concerning the possible match and the 

passenger’s status to the large aircraft 

operator. 

e. Aircraft operator procedures. TSA 

believes that it is important for large 

aircraft operators and their pilots, as the 

in-flight security coordinators, to know 

whether a passenger is identified as a 

selectee so they can make appropriate 

security decisions. If the passenger is 

identified as a selectee, TSA would 

allow the large aircraft operator to 

permit the passenger to board the 

aircraft. However, TSA would require 

the aircraft operator to comply with the 

procedures described in its security 

program pertaining to passengers 

identified as selectees. Although TSA 

would not require large aircraft 

operators to conduct screening of 

selectees and their accessible property 

on a normal basis, if warranted by 

security considerations, TSA may 

require some or all large aircraft 

operators to screen selectees and their 

accessible property. In this 

circumstance, TSA would coordinate 

with the large aircraft operators on the 

appropriate screening protocols. 

If the watch-list service provider 

instructs the large aircraft operator that 

a passenger must be denied boarding, 

the large aircraft operator would not be 

able to permit the passenger to board 

unless explicitly authorized by TSA. 

Additionally, if the aircraft operator 

becomes aware that any data element in 

the passenger information has changed, 

the large aircraft operator would be 

required to transmit to the watch-list 

service provider updated passenger 

information, which includes the full 

name, and if available, gender, date of 

birth, redress number, and passport 

information. If the large aircraft operator 

sends updated passenger information to 

the watch-list service provider for a 

passenger for whom the service provider 

has already transmitted instruction, the 

large aircraft operator would not be able 

to permit the passenger on board until 

the large aircraft operator receives 

updated instructions from the watch-list 

service provider. Any previous 

instruction regarding the passenger 

would be void; the large aircraft 

operator would be required to comply 

with any updated instruction from the 

service provider. 

f. Master passenger list. TSA 

recognizes that many large aircraft 

operators carry the same passengers on 

most or all of their flights and that it 

would be burdensome for the large 

aircraft operators to send the required 

information for the same individuals on 

each flight. Consequently, the proposed 

rule includes a provision for a master 

passenger list. Under this optional 

proposed provision, individuals on a 

master passenger list would be subject 

to continuous vetting of their names 

against the watch-list.24 TSA would not 

require large aircraft operators to 

transmit information on these 

passengers every time they are on a 

flight operated by the large aircraft 

operator. This master list would be 

applied for domestic flights only; CBP 

would require aircraft operators and 

their pilots to transmit advance 

passenger information to CBP for 

international flights departing from or 

arriving in the United States under 

CBP’s eAPIS NPRM, and passengers 

would need to present their passports 

pursuant to CBP regulations. 

Prior to collecting passenger 

information from an individual to place 

that individual on a master passenger 

list, the large aircraft operator would be 

required to inform the individual that 

he or she would have the option of 

being placed on the master passenger 

list, to provide the individual with 

notice of the purpose and procedures 

related to a master passenger list, and to 

obtain from the individual a signed, 

written statement affirmatively 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 64799 

25See Secure Flight NPRM, 72 FR at 48363. 26 72 FR at 48388. 

requesting that he or she be placed on 

a master passenger list. These 

requirements would ensure that 

individuals would be informed that 

their inclusion in a master passenger list 

would be voluntary and contingent 

upon their providing written consent 

and that a watch-list service provider 

would continuously maintain their 

passenger information and compare the 

information against the watch-list. 

In order to place an individual on the 

master passenger list, the large aircraft 

operator would be required to comply 

with the following: (1) Request and 

obtain the full name, gender, date of 

birth, redress number, and passport 

information of the individual; (2) 

transmit the passenger information and 

any updated passenger information to a 

watch-list service provider and 

designate the individual for continuous 

vetting; (3) ensure that the watch-list 

service provider is responsible for 

continuous vetting for that individual at 

the time the individual boards an 

aircraft; (4) receive an instruction that 

the individual is cleared in response to 

the initial transmission of passenger 

information or transmission of updated 

passenger information; and (5) receive 

any instruction to prohibit the 

individual from boarding an aircraft. 

g. Aircraft operators under a full 

program. Under 49 CFR 1544.101(a), 

TSA requires full program aircraft 

operators to conduct watch-list 

matching of their passengers under their 

security program. Some of the full 

program aircraft operators also operate 

flights under the other security 

programs in 49 CFR 1544.101. Many of 

these aircraft operators use the same 

system or process to conduct watch-list 

matching for their flights operated 

under their full security program, as 

well as flights operated under their 

other security programs. Under the 

proposed rule, TSA would require full 

program aircraft operators to transmit 

the passenger information for 

passengers on their flights operated 

under the LASP to watch-list service 

providers approved by TSA to conduct 

the watch-list matching on their behalf. 

TSA requests comment on whether full 

program aircraft operators should be 

permitted to conduct watch-list 

matching for passengers on flights 

operated under their LASP using the 

system or process that they use for 

flights operated under their full security 

program, including TSA’s Secure Flight 

Program when it is available. 

h. Privacy notice and data retention. 

TSA would only receive passenger 

information if the watch-list service 

provider’s automated vetting system 

identifies an individual as a potential 

match to the watch-list; this is much 

like the current practice where aircraft 

operators conduct watch-list matching 

pursuant to their security programs. 

TSA is considering requiring aircraft 

operators to provide a privacy notice to 

passengers in the LASP. Most LASP 

aircraft operators do not have a 

reservation system and are on-demand 

operations, such as charter, corporate, 

fractional, and recreational (friends and 

family) operations. LASP aircraft 

operators may find it challenging and 

burdensome to provide a privacy notice 

to their passengers when collecting the 

information. TSA is seeking comments 

on how a privacy notice could be 

provided during the collection of 

information while considering the 

feasibility, costs, and effectiveness of 

providing such notice. Should TSA 

require large aircraft operators to 

provide a privacy notice on web sites 

through which passenger service is 

offered, either on their own web site or 

through an internet travel web site that 

offers seats on charter flights, or via 

other means that would provide notice 

to passengers on aircraft operated by 

LASP operators? 

TSA is considering data and record 

retention requirements for records for 

watch-list service providers and large 

aircraft operators. TSA seeks comment 

on whether the proposed record 

retention for the Secure Flight Program 

should be applied to large aircraft 

operators and watch-list service 

providers to ensure that personally 

identifiable information is not retained 

for longer than necessary. As explained 

in the Secure Flight NPRM, TSA would 

retain passenger information for seven 

days for passengers that are cleared, 

seven years for passengers that have 

been identified as potential matches to 

the watch-list, and 99 years for 

passengers who are confirmed matches 

to the watch-list under the Secure Flight 

Program.25 If TSA were to require a 

similar record retention schedule for 

records collected, transmitted, and 

received under proposed § 1544.245 and 

part 1544, subpart F, large aircraft 

operators’ watch-list service providers 

would retain and destroy passenger 

information and watch-list matching 

results in accordance to this schedule. 

TSA is also considering requiring large 

aircraft operators and watch-list service 

providers to retain passenger 

information for passengers who are 

cleared, for three years, to facilitate the 

audit that large aircraft operators would 

undergo every two years under 

proposed § 1544.243 and compliance 

oversight. 

i. Secure Flight. As noted above, the 

long-term plan is for TSA to assume the 

watch-list matching responsibility from 

all aircraft operators required to conduct 

watch-list matching and to conduct the 

watch-list matching through the Secure 

Flight Program. Under the current stage 

of Secure Flight development, Secure 

Flight will not have the capability to 

conduct watch-list matching for large 

aircraft operators for several years. 

Under the Secure Flight NPRM, TSA 

would assume the watch-list matching 

only for full program operators and 

certain foreign air carriers. If the Secure 

Flight Program is capable of assuming 

the watch-list matching responsibility 

from large aircraft operators when TSA 

would require implementation of the 

LASP, TSA may amend the scope of the 

Secure Flight regulations to include 

large aircraft operators in the final rule 

for this NPRM. 

Under the Secure Flight Program, 

TSA may require large aircraft operators 

to collect and transmit the same data 

elements, called Secure Flight Passenger 

Data (SFPD), to TSA for all passengers 

that full program operators must collect 

and transmit for their passengers. 

Although, in the Secure Flight NPRM, 

TSA did not propose to cover the large 

aircraft population in the Secure Flight 

Program, TSA is proposing, in this 

LASP NPRM, to align the LASP 

passenger information requirements 

with those of the Secure Flight Program. 

Consequently, the passenger 

information requirement in proposed 

§ 1544.245 of this LASP NPRM is 

similar to proposed § 1560.101 in the 

Secure Flight NPRM.26 TSA’s intent is 

to align the data requirements of LASP 

and the Secure Flight Program, so that 

they match when the final rules are 

implemented. 

The methods for transmitting SFPD to 

TSA would be described in the standard 

security program for large aircraft 

operators. Possible methods of 

transmission may include a direct 

connection to TSA, similar to the 

connection that some full program 

operators will establish, and an internetbased application. Similar to the 

requirements proposed for the watchlist service provider, large aircraft 

operators would not be able to board 

passengers until they received boarding 

instructions from TSA. TSA would also 

require large aircraft operators to 

comply with the boarding instructions. 

TSA would transmit the boarding 

instructions after conducting the watchlist matching of the passengers. 


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64800 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

27Private charters and twelve-five operators 

currently must ensure there are no prohibited items 

accessible in the cabin. 

TSA has determined that watch-list 

matching of passengers on large aircraft 

is an important security measure, 

because it can prevent individuals who 

are believed to pose a risk from boarding 

a large aircraft and, potentially, gaining 

control of the aircraft, to use it as a 

weapon or to cause harm to aviation or 

national security. Such considerations 

extend beyond the simple use of aircraft 

as missiles, but also include aircraft as 

delivery vectors for other catastrophic 

payloads (e.g., chemical, biological, 

radiological or nuclear materials). Given 

the security concerns, TSA believes a 

reliable mechanism for watch-list 

matching for large aircraft must be 

operational without undue delay. The 

watch-list matching service providers 

would provide the needed security and 

do so in a timely fashion. While the 

Secure Flight Program would also 

provide a reliable mechanism, its ability 

to absorb the watch-list matching 

function for the large aircraft population 

is likely to be several years away, and 

it is likely that it would not be available 

to address this important security need 

when TSA would be ready to 

implement the LASP. Thus, TSA 

believes that the using the watch-list 

service providers will be the more 

viable security solution for watch-list 

matching when TSA is ready to 

implement the LASP. 

While TSA anticipates that Secure 

Flight would be the long-term 

mechanism for conducting watch-list 

matching of passengers, TSA seeks 

comments on whether the watch-list 

matching service providers should serve 

as part of the long-term solution to large 

aircraft watch-list matching, such as by 

gathering the passenger information 

from the aircraft operators and 

submitting it to TSA for watch-list 

matching, then receiving the results 

from TSA. One possible advantage of 

the watch-list service providers may be 

that the master passenger list system 

developed by these providers would 

remain undisturbed, a convenience for 

passengers on those lists and the large 

aircraft operators. Additionally, TSA 

seeks comment on whether maintaining 

the watch-list matching service 

providers may reduce the costs 

associated with a transition to the 

Secure Flight Program. There may also 

be benefit to TSA in limiting the 

number of different entities to which the 

Secure Flight program would maintain 

direct links, requiring only links with 

the watch-list service providers, not all 

large aircraft operators. 

Audit Requirement 

Due to the large size and widelydispersed geographical locations of the 

aircraft operator population that would 

be subject to this proposed rule, TSA 

would need an effective mechanism to 

verify large aircraft operators’ 

compliance with the large aircraft 

program. While TSA intends to develop 

a compliance program for, and conduct 

inspections of, large aircraft operators, it 

is not possible for TSA to visit 

approximately 10,000 large aircraft 

operators on a regular basis. 

TSA proposes the use of TSAapproved third-party auditors. These 

TSA-approved third-party auditors 

would support existing TSA resources 

and would enhance compliance with 

TSA regulations and the aircraft 

operator’s security program. Auditors 

would conduct audits of large aircraft 

operators for their compliance with 

their security program and TSA 

regulations. The auditors would submit 

their findings in the manner and form 

prescribed by TSA. Auditors’ reports 

would assist TSA inspectors in the 

conduct of compliance inspections as 

necessary. TSA would use the thirdparty auditors’ reports as one tool in 

establishing inspection priorities. The 

audits would also assist large aircraft 

operators in assessing the security 

measures in place for their own aircraft. 

TSA proposes to require large aircraft 

operators to contract with TSAapproved auditors to conduct a biennial 

audit of their compliance with TSA 

regulations and their security programs. 

Large aircraft operators would initially 

undergo an audit within 60 days of 

TSA’s approval of the large aircraft 

operators’ security program and then 

every two years thereafter. Large aircraft 

operators would also be required to 

provide auditors access to their records, 

equipment, and facilities necessary for 

the auditor to conduct an audit. The 

aircraft operators would receive a copy 

of the audit report and would be 

provided an opportunity to submit 

comments on the audit report to TSA. 

In this NPRM, TSA is proposing that 

large aircraft operators may select any 

TSA-approved auditor to perform the 

audit function. However, TSA is 

considering instituting a system that 

would assign auditors to large aircraft 

operators on a random basis in order to 

assure overall consistency of the 

auditing program, thereby enhancing 

security. TSA seeks comment on 

whether to include a system of assigning 

auditors in the final rule and on 

methods of doing so. 

As stated above, many full program 

aircraft operators also operate flights 

under the private charter program. TSA 

routinely conducts inspections of full 

program aircraft operators, and these 

inspections include any private charter 

operations the aircraft operators may 

have. Given these TSA inspections, TSA 

requests comment on whether it is 

necessary to require full program 

aircraft operators that also operate 

flights under a LASP to contract with a 

third party auditor to conduct a biennial 

audit of their operations for compliance 

with their security program and TSA 

regulations. 

Unauthorized Persons and Accessible 

Weapons on Board Large Aircraft 

TSA would require large aircraft 

operators to apply security measures in 

their security program to prevent or 

deter the carriage of unauthorized 

persons and unauthorized weapons, 

explosives, incendiaries, and other 

destructive substances or items on board 

a large aircraft. This proposed security 

measure is designed to prevent 

unauthorized persons, such as a 

stowaway, or accessible weapons, from 

being placed in a large aircraft. Under 

the proposed security measure, the large 

aircraft operator would check for 

weapons and check any container, 

cargo, or company material that may be 

used to hide a stowaway, or explosives, 

incendiaries, or other destructive 

substances or items. The security 

program would describe the method for 

conducting the checks, such as visual 

inspection of the exterior of the persons 

or containers of certain sizes and 

weights, with further evaluation if 

necessary. This proposed rule would 

only apply to property that may be 

accessible to the cabin of the aircraft. 

For example, if the property is stowed 

in a cargo hold that would not allow 

access to the cabin of the aircraft, then 

that property would be exempt from 

inspection. 

For purposes of screening passengers 

on air carrier flights under a full 

program, TSA considers weapons to 

include items on its prohibited items 

list, which is posted on TSA’s Web site 

at http://www.tsa.gov. This list includes, 

among other things, guns, firearms, and 

certain sharp objects or tools such as 

knives, including steak knives and 

pocket knives. TSA is proposing to 

require large aircraft operators to adopt 

and carry out procedures to prevent 

passengers from carrying prohibited 

items onto the aircraft. We understand, 

however, that large aircraft operators 

currently not subject to a TSA security 

program 27 may have special 

circumstances that should be 

considered. TSA seeks comment on the 

following issues: First, for large aircraft 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 64801 

28The effective date of the final rule was Oct. 23, 

2006. 

operators that are not carrying persons 

or property for compensation or hire, 

should ‘‘weapons’’ be limited to guns 

and firearms? Further, should there be 

a different requirement depending on 

whether the aircraft has a MTOW of 

45,500 kg or less or more than 45,500 

kg? 

TSA understands that a significant 

portion of the large aircraft population 

may not have inaccessible cargo hold 

compartments, but may have a need to 

transport weapons, such as when 

transporting hunters. Therefore, TSA 

proposes that weapons may be stored in 

a cargo hold, if the aircraft has such a 

cargo hold, or may be stored in a locked 

box in the cabin under the direct control 

of the in-flight security coordinator. In 

these instances, the weapons would be 

considered inaccessible to the persons 

on board. 

Additional Requirements 

The LASP would also include the 

following requirements: designation of 

Aircraft Operator Security Coordinators, 

Ground Security Coordinators, and InFlight Security Coordinators; 

regulations concerning law enforcement 

personnel; the carriage of TSA Federal 

Air Marshals (FAMs) onboard an 

aircraft; the aviation security 

contingency plan; and procedures for 

handling bomb and air piracy threats. 

These proposed requirements are 

discussed in further detail in the 

Section-by-Section Analysis portion of 

the preamble. 

The economic analysis for this NPRM 

suggests that the aircraft operator 

security coordinator requirement is the 

highest-cost measure in this proposed 

rule, and TSA invites comment on 

whether there is a more cost-effective 

means of meeting the same or 

substantially similar security goals as 

detailed herein. Although our 

preliminary view is that the benefits of 

the security coordinator requirements as 

proposed justify their costs, we are 

interested in comment on alternatives. 

Is there a current industry practice that 

could provide a suitable alternative? 

Should certain general aviation 

operators be exempted from the 

requirements or portions of the 

requirements? Are there operational 

limitations that prevent aircraft 

operators from designating security 

coordinators for multiple flight 

segments? TSA also invites comments 

on the use of a single individual for 

multiple security coordinator roles. 

Comments that specifically address the 

costs and benefits of alternatives to the 

security coordinator requirements 

would be welcome. 

2. Aircraft of MTOW Over 45,500 kg or 

With a Passenger Seating Configuration 

of 61 Seats or More Operated for 

Compensation or Hire 

TSA has determined that aircraft over 

45,500 kilograms or with a passenger 

seating configuration of 61 seats or more 

operated for compensation or hire 

should be subject to increased security 

requirements. The current private 

charter program, which applies to 

aircraft of this size and weight, includes 

more security measures than the current 

twelve-five program. Part 125 (14 CFR) 

operators using this size aircraft also 

currently must comply with the private 

charter program. This approach is 

supported by the International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO), which 

requires that aircraft of more than 60 

passengers, or with a MTOW of over 

45,500 kilograms, be regulated and 

protected from intrusion and ballistic 

threats. 

Although the private charter program 

would be merged into the large aircraft 

program, TSA believes that maintaining 

a higher level of security for aircraft 

over 45,500 kilograms, or with a 

passenger seating configuration of 61 

seats or more, operated for 

compensation or hire would be an 

important security measure. Thus, for 

these aircraft, the proposed rule would 

continue the requirements now in the 

Private Charter Program for the 

operators to inspect passengers and 

their property and to perform CHRCs on 

their employees who conduct screening. 

3. All-Cargo Operations 

TSA recently issued a final rule 

regarding air cargo security, including 

all-cargo operations in an aircraft with 

a MTOW over 12,500 pounds. See Final 

Rule for Air Cargo Security 

Requirements, 71 FR 30478 (May 26, 

2006).28 Because cargo security remains 

an important part of aviation security, 

TSA proposes to retain the requirements 

for all-cargo operations in the LASP. 

Consequently, large aircraft all-cargo 

operations would be required to comply 

with the cargo requirements in 49 CFR 

1544.202 and 1544.205(a), (b), (d), and 

(f) in addition to the core requirements 

of the LASP. 

The large aircraft all-cargo program 

would replace the existing Twelve-Five 

All-Cargo Program. Current aircraft 

operators that are subject to the TwelveFive All-Cargo Program would be 

subject to the proposed requirements for 

large aircraft in all-cargo operations. 

Additionally, 14 CFR part 125 operators 

in all-cargo operations, which currently 

are required to comply with the TwelveFive All-Cargo Program, would also be 

subject to § 1544.202. 

All-cargo operations with an aircraft 

with an MTOW of over 45,500 

kilograms currently must use the full 

all-cargo program and this would be 

reflected in the rule. 

4. Sensitive Security Information 

Protection of Sensitive Security 

Information (SSI), as codified at 49 CFR 

part 1520, would apply to each aircraft 

operator operating under the large 

aircraft program. Airport and aircraft 

operator security programs and related 

amendments, Security Directives and 

Information Circulars, technical 

specifications of security screening and 

detection systems and devices, among 

other types of information, constitute 

SSI under current 1520.5 and are 

prohibited from public disclosure. 

Watch-list service providers’ 

instructions to the large aircraft 

operators would also be SSI. The SSI 

regulations would apply to LASPs as 

well. 

Access to SSI is strictly limited to 

those covered persons with a need to 

know, as defined in 49 CFR 1520.7 and 

1520.11. In general, a person has a need 

to know specific SSI when he or she 

requires access to the information to 

carry out transportation security 

activities that are government-approved, 

-accepted, -funded, -recommended, or 

-directed, including for purposes of 

training on, and supervision of, such 

activities or to provide legal or technical 

advice to airport operators, aircraft 

operators or their employees regarding 

security-related requirements. 

Accordingly, the protection of SSI 

would apply to each large aircraft 

operator operating under a security 

program pursuant to 1544.101(b). 

5. Existing and Proposed Requirements 

for Large Aircraft 

Table 2 below illustrates the 

requirements for large aircraft operators 

and whether these requirements would 

be new or modified for current holders 

of security programs. The table indicates 

how the proposed rule would affect the 

current large aircraft operators. The first 

column describes the proposed content 

requirements for the LASP. The 

remaining five columns list five types of 

aircraft operators that would be required 

to adopt and implement the large 

aircraft security program under the 

proposed rule. The table indicates 

whether each type of aircraft operator is 

currently required to comply with each 

content requirement of the proposed 

LASP or whether the proposed content 

requirement is a new requirement for 


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64802 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 211 / Thursday, October 30, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

the aircraft operator. Additionally, as 

part of this rule, TSA would modify 

some of the content requirements for the 

current Twelve-Five Security Program 

and the Private Charter Security 

Program. The table also indicates 

existing requirements that would be 

modified under the proposed rule. 

Table 3 compares the proposed large 

aircraft program with the Full Program 

and the Full All-Cargo Program. 

TABLE 2—REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR LARGE AIRCRAFT

Description of proposed LASP 

requirement 

Scheduled or charter operations required to have a 

twelve-five 

program 

All-cargo operations required to 

have a twelve-five 

program 

Private charters 

required to have a 

private charter 

program 

Scheduled or charter operations in 

aircraft with 31–60 

seats required to 

have a partial 

program 

Large aircraft operators not currently required to 

have a security 

program 

Acceptance & screening of individuals 

and accessible property 

(§ 1544.201).

Does not apply ..... Does not apply ..... Currently applies 

and would continue.

Does not apply ..... Does not apply. 

Acceptance and screening of cargo 

(§ 1544.205).

Does not apply ..... Currently applies 

and would continue.

Does not apply ..... Does not apply ..... Does not apply. 

Persons and property on board a 

large aircraft (§ 1544.206).

New requirement .. Does not apply ..... New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement. 

Screening of individuals and property 

(§ 1544.207).

Does not apply ..... Does not apply ..... Currently applies 

and would continue.

Does not apply ..... Does not apply. 

Required to have security coordinators (§ 1544.215).Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement. 

Provision of law enforcement personnel at airports serving the aircraft operators (§ 1544.217).Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement. 

Carriage of accessible weapons on 

board aircraft (§ 1544.219).

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement. 

Requirement to transport FAMs 

(§ 1544.223).

Currently applies; 

would be modified.

Currently applies; 

would be modified.

New requirement .. Currently applies; 

would be modified.

New requirement. 

Provide for security of aircraft and facilities (§ 1544.225).New requirement .. New requirement .. Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement .. New requirement. 

Security training for security coordinators and crew (§ 1544.233).New requirement .. New requirement .. Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement .. New requirement. 

Training Program—Individual securityrelated duties (§ 1544.235).Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement. 

Program to permit passengers to provide volunteer emergency services 

(§ 1544.241).

New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement. 

Required to undergo third-party audits 

(§ 1544.243).

New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement. 

Required to send flight manifest to 

approved vendor for watch-list 

matching of passengers 

(§ 1544.245).

New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement. 

Security threat assessment with criminal history records check for flight 

crew (part 1544, subpart G).

New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement .. New requirement. 

Develop and implement contingency 

plan in response to threats 

(§§ 1544.301(a) & (b)).

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement. 

Bomb and hijacking threats 

(§ 1544.303).

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement. 

Comply with security directives and 

information circulars (§ 1544.305).

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

Currently applies 

and would continue.

New requirement. 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
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29 49 CFR 1544.101(a), (b), and (f), and 

1546.101(a), (b), (c), and (d). However, there are no 

airports that currently hold a security program 

because they regularly serve an aircraft operator 

holding a partial program or a private charter 

program, or their foreign air carrier equivalent. 

TABLE 3—COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT OPERATOR SECURITY PROGRAMS

Description of security requirement Full program 

operators 

Full all-cargo 

program operators 

Proposed 

large aircraft 

program 

operators 

Acceptance & screening of individuals and accessible property (§ 1544.201) ........................... X ........................ X

Screening of individuals and property (watch-list & accessible weapons) (§ 1544.202) ............ ........................ X X 

Acceptance and screening of checked baggage (§ 1544.203) .................................................. X ........................ ........................

Acceptance and screening of cargo and accessible property (§ 1544.205) .............................. X X X 

Check property on board (§ 1544.206) ........................................................................................ ........................ ........................ X 

Screening of individuals and property (§ 1544.207) .................................................................... X X X 

Use of metal detection devices (§ 1544.209) .............................................................................. X X ........................

Use of X-ray systems (§ 1544.211) ............................................................................................. X X ........................

Use of explosives detection systems (§ 1544.213) ..................................................................... X ........................ ........................

Required to have security coordinators (§ 1544.215) ................................................................. X X X 

Provision for law enforcement personnel at airports serving the aircraft operators 

(§ 1544.217) ............................................................................................................................. X X X 

Carriage of accessible weapons on board aircraft (§ 1544.219) ................................................ X X X 

Carriage of prisoners under the control of armed law enforcement officers (§ 1544.221) ......... X ........................ ........................

Requirement to transport FAMs (§ 1544.223) ............................................................................. X X X 

Provide for security of aircraft and facilities (§ 1544.225) ........................................................... X X X 

Exclusive area agreements (§ 1544.227) .................................................................................... X X ........................

Access to cargo and security threat assessments for cargo personnel in the United States 

(§ 1544.228) ............................................................................................................................. X X ........................

CHRC: Unescorted access to SIDA, screening, baggage/cargo checks (§ 1544.229) .............. X X ........................

CHRC: Flight crew members (§ 1544.230) ................................................................................. X X ........................

Airport-approved and exclusive area personnel identification systems (§ 1544.231) ................. X X ........................

Security training for security coordinators and crew (§ 1544.233) .............................................. X X X 

Training Program—Individual security-related duties (§ 1544.235) ............................................ X X X 

Flight deck privileges (§ 1544.237) .............................................................................................. X X ........................

Program to permit passengers to provide volunteer emergency services (§ 1544.241) ............ X ........................ X 

Required to undergo third-party audits (§ 1544.243) .................................................................. ........................ ........................ X 

Required to send flight manifest to approved vendor for watch-list matching of passengers 

(§ 1544.245) ............................................................................................................................. ........................ ........................ X 

Security threat assessment with criminal history records check for flight crew, individuals authorized to perform screening functions, applicants to become TSA-approved auditors, and 

watch-list service provider cover personnel (Part 1544, subpart G) ....................................... ........................ ........................ X 

Develop and implement contingency plan in response to threats (§ 1544.301) ......................... X X X 

Bomb and hijacking threats (§ 1544.303) .................................................................................... X X X

Comply with security directives and information circulars (§ 1544.305) ..................................... X X X 

B. Proposed Requirements for Certain 

Airports 

Currently, the regulations extend 

airport security program requirements to 

airports that regularly serve aircraft 

operations using full programs, partial 

programs, private charter programs, and 

corresponding foreign air carriers.29

These regulations for airport operators 

provide for the safety and security of 

persons and property on an aircraft 

operating in air transportation against 

an act of criminal violence and aircraft 

piracy. An enhanced security 

environment at the airports where large 

aircraft operate would support 

enhanced security for the large aircraft. 

Thus, as part of the proposal to provide 

security for large aircraft through a large 

aircraft program for aircraft operators, 

TSA also proposes to require certain 

airports that serve large aircraft to adopt 

a security program. 

There are thousands of GA airports 

that serve large aircraft. TSA considered 

the heavy burden involved for all these 

airports to adopt a security program. 

Many are very small and may have 

limited resources and limited large 

aircraft activity. TSA proposes to 

require two types of airports to hold a 

security program because of the type of 

service they provide. 

The first type of airport that would be 

required to hold a partial program is a 

GA airport that is designated as a 

‘‘reliever’’ airport by the Secretary of 

Transportation, as defined in 49 U.S.C. 

47102(22). These airports perform the 

function of relieving congestion at a 

commercial service airport by diverting 

GA from the commercial services airport 

to the reliever airport and provide more 

GA access to the overall community. 

Reliever airports are generally near 

metropolitan areas and thus serve and 

are close to large populations—thus the 

need for greater security at these 

airports. 

The second type of airport is an 

airport that regularly serves scheduled 

or public charter operations in large 

aircraft. These operations have farepaying passengers on a regular basis. 

TSA proposes to require these airports 

to adopt the partial program. This 

program would provide a basic level of 

security enhancement to compliment 

and support the security measures that 

TSA would require large aircraft 

operators to adopt and implement. 

Table 4 below illustrates how the 

proposed rule would affect the various 

types of airports. Table 5 compares the 

three types of airport security 

programs—complete program, 

supporting program, and partial 

program. TSA believes that the 

requirements of the partial program for 

airport operators would not be 

burdensome for reliever airports, and 

airports that regularly serve scheduled 

or public charter operations, to adopt 

and carry out. TSA also believes that the 

requirement for these airports to 

implement security programs will not 

place a significant burden on local law 


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enforcement agencies, because TSA 

expects that there will be few incidents 

requiring law enforcement response at 

these airports. 

TABLE 4—AIRPORT OPERATOR SECURITY PROGRAMS

An airport operator must have this 

program 

Current: If it regularly serves aircraft operations 

under these security programs in 49 CFR Proposed: If it meets the following criteria: 

Complete program § 1542.101(a) ..... full program under § 1544.101(a)(1); or foreign air 

carrier program under § 1546.101(a).

No change. 

Supporting program § 1542.101(b) ... full program under § 1544.101(a)(2); or .................... Regularly serves full program aircraft operator 

under § 1544.101(a)(2) (no change); or 

private charter program under § 1544.101(f); or ...... Regularly serves foreign air carrier aircraft operator 

program under § 1546.101(b) (no change); or 

foreign air carrier program under § 1546.101(c) ....... Regularly serves foreign air carrier under 

§ 1546.101(c) (no change). 

Partial program § 1542.101(c) .......... partial program under § 1544.101(b); or ................... Regularly serves large aircraft operator in scheduled or public charter passenger operations 

under § 1544.101(b); or 

foreign air carrier program under § 1546.101(d) ...... Is a reliever airport. 

None required * ................................. twelve-five program under § 1544.101(d) ................. Large aircraft not described above. 

None required * ................................. limited program under § 1544.101(g) ........................ No change. 

None required * ................................. full all-cargo program under § 1544.101(h) .............. No change. 

* TSA may enter airports to inspect an aircraft operator that is operating under a part 1544 or 1546 security program. 49 CFR 1542.5(e). 

TABLE 5—COMPARISON OF AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMS

Description of security requirement Complete 

program 

Supporting 

program 

Partial program 

Designate Airport Security Coordinator (§ 1542.3) .................................................................................. X X X 

Description of secured areas of the airport ............................................................................................. X .................... ....................

Description of the Airport Operations Area ............................................................................................. X .................... ....................

Description of the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) ............................................................... X .................... ....................

Description of the sterile area ................................................................................................................. X .................... ....................

Criminal history records check of airport operator, airport user, individuals with unescorted access to 

a SIDA, and individuals seeking unescorted access authority ............................................................ X .................... ....................

Description of personnel identification systems (§ 1542.211) ................................................................. X .................... ....................

Escort procedures (§ 1542.211(e)) .......................................................................................................... X .................... ....................

Challenge procedures (§ 1542.211(d)) .................................................................................................... X .................... ....................

Training program for individuals performing security-related functions for the airport operator 

(§ 1542.213) ......................................................................................................................................... X .................... ....................

Training program for law enforcement personnel (§ 1542.217(c)(2) ....................................................... X X X 

Description of law enforcement support .................................................................................................. X X X 

System for maintaining records (§ 1542.221) .......................................................................................... X X X 

Procedures and description of facilities and equipment used to support TSA inspection of individuals, 

property, and aircraft operator and foreign air carrier screening functions ......................................... X .................... ....................

Contingency plan (§ 1542.301) ................................................................................................................ X X ....................

Procedures for the distribution, storage, and disposal of Sensitive Security Information (including security program, Security Directives, Information Circulars, and implementing instructions), and, as 

appropriate, classified information ....................................................................................................... X X X 

Procedures for posting of public advisories (§ 1542.305)) ...................................................................... X X X 

Incident management procedures (§ 1542.307) ...................................................................................... X X X 

Alternate security procedures, if any, that the airport intends to use in the event of natural disasters, 

and other emergency and unusual conditions. .................................................................................... X .................... ....................

Exclusive area agreement (§ 1542.111) .................................................................................................. X .................... ....................

Airport tenant security program (§ 1542.113) .......................................................................................... X .................... ....................

In addition to the two types of 

airports in the proposed rule text, TSA 

requests comments on whether other 

types of airports should also be required 

to adopt a security program, such as the 

partial program. For example, should 

TSA require airports that regularly serve 

aircraft used in private charter 

operations-aircraft with MTOW of over 

45,500 kilograms or a passenger seating 

configuration of 61 or more seats—to 

adopt a partial program? If TSA were to 

adopt such an approach, how should 

TSA determine whether an airport 

‘‘regularly serves’’ a large aircraft with 

MTOW of over 45,500 kilograms or a 

passenger seat configuration of 61 or 

more seats? Should TSA require airports 

that serve any large aircraft with MTOW 

of over 45,500 kilograms or a passenger 

seat configuration of 61 or more seats to 

adopt a partial program, regardless of 

frequency? 

In addition to the proposed 

amendments to § 1542.101(b) and (c), 

TSA is seeking comments on whether 

the content requirements of the partial 

program and the supporting program 

should be amended. For example, TSA 

is considering whether it should require 

airport security coordinators at locations 

with partial programs to undergo the 

same security training that airport 

security coordinators at locations with a 

supporting or complete program under 

§ 1542.3 undergo or whether a shorter 

training program would be appropriate. 

TSA is also considering whether 

airport operators should be required to 


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undertake a risk-based self assessment 

of their security programs. The ‘‘TSA 

Information Publication (A–001), 

Security Guidelines for General 

Aviation,’’ includes the Airport 

Characteristic Measurement Tool, which 

lists the most significant airport 

characteristics that can potentially affect 

a facility’s security posture. 

TSA may develop a computer based 

training, available online or in a DVD 

format, which incorporates GA security 

awareness, elements of the existing 

‘‘TSA Information Publication (A–001), 

Security Guidelines for General 

Aviation Airports,’’ and industry best 

practices. Airport operators may be able 

to use this training and accompanying 

self-assessment tool to fulfill a riskbased self assessment should TSA 

decide to include it as part of the partial 

program. 

C. Passenger Checking Against the 

Watch-List 

As discussed above in section II.A of 

the preamble, the proposed rule would 

require large aircraft operators to 

transmit passenger information to thirdparty entities called watch-list service 

providers to conduct watch-list 

matching of their passengers. Because 

watch-list service providers would 

perform an important security function, 

TSA is proposing to require potential 

watch-list service providers to obtain 

approval from TSA prior to conducting 

watch-list matching for any large aircraft 

operator. The proposed approval 

process would ensure that the watch-list 

service provider has the appropriate 

personnel and systems to process and 

keep secure sensitive and personally 

identifiable information. 

The following are the major 

requirements that potential watch-list 

matching service providers would have 

to satisfy to obtain approval from TSA. 

The individual requirements are 

described and discussed in further 

detail in the section-by-section analysis 

of proposed § 1544.503. 

• Demonstrate ability to conduct 

automated watch-list matching and 

continuous vetting. 

• Adopt and implement a system 

security plan for the system that 

contains personally identifiable 

information or is used to conduct 

watch-list matching. 

• Demonstrate ability to receive 

passenger information from large 

aircraft operators and transmit watchlist matching results back to large 

aircraft operators. 

• Successfully undergo a suitability 

assessment by TSA. 

• Watch-list service provider’s 

covered personnel would be required to 

successfully complete security threat 

assessments. 

• Adopt a security program that 

complies with TSA requirements. 

The proposed rule describes the 

approval process that would apply and 

includes a provision allowing 

prospective watch-list service providers 

to seek reconsideration of an initial 

disapproval. 

Once TSA approves a watch-list 

service provider, the provider would 

have several responsibilities. TSA lists 

the major responsibilities below and 

then describes them in greater detail in 

the section-by-section analysis of 

proposed §§ 1544.513 and 1544.515. 

• Carry out its security program, 

which details the requirements for 

conducting watch-list matching, 

security of the systems and physical 

property used to conduct watch-list 

matching, and training of personnel. 

• Develop and execute procedures to 

identify, handle, and protect Sensitive 

Security Information and maintain the 

confidentiality of other information 

provided by TSA and aircraft operators. 

• Submit to inspection by TSA. 

Under the proposed rule, TSA would 

retain the authority to withdraw a 

watch-list service provider’s approval to 

conduct watch-list matching if the 

watch-list service provider failed to 

meet the qualification requirements or 

its responsibilities under the rule or if 

it were in the interest of transportation 

or national security. Watch-list service 

providers would be able to seek 

reconsideration of the withdrawal of 

approval to conduct watch-list matching 

from the Assistant Secretary or 

designee. 

D. Third-Party Audits for Large Aircraft 

Operators 

As described in section II.A of this 

NPRM, TSA would require large aircraft 

operators to contract with TSAapproved auditors to conduct audits of 

their compliance with TSA regulations 

and their security programs. To ensure 

that auditors have the qualification and 

responsibilities to produce audits that 

would be useful to TSA and the large 

aircraft operators and to identify, 

handle, and protect Sensitive Security 

Information and other sensitive 

information, TSA proposes the 

following major qualifications and 

responsibilities that would apply to 

auditors. These qualifications and 

responsibilities, as well as other 

requirements, are described and 

discussed in further detail in the 

section-by-section analysis of proposed 

part 1522. 

• Successfully undergo a TSA 

security threat assessment. 

• Currently hold or be able to obtain 

a certification or accreditation from an 

organization recognized by TSA. 

• Have sufficient knowledge and 

skills to conduct a security audit of an 

aircraft operator. 

• Receive initial and biennial 

training. 

• Conduct independent and impartial 

audits, submit audit reports to TSA, and 

retain audit reports for 36 months. 

• Identify, handle, and protect 

Sensitive Security Information and keep 

confidential other information provided 

by TSA and large aircraft operators. 

• Submit to inspection by TSA. 

The proposed rule describes the 

approval process that would apply to 

auditors. Auditors would be able to seek 

reconsideration of the disapproval to be 

a TSA-approved auditor from the 

Assistant Secretary or designee. 

Under the proposed rule, TSA would 

be able to withdraw approval of an 

auditor or responsibilities under the 

proposed rule or in the interest of 

transportation or national security. 

Auditors would be able to seek 

reconsideration of the withdrawal of 

approval to conduct audits from the 

Assistant Secretary or designee. 

E. Proposed Amendments to the Full 

Program and the Full All-Cargo Program 

As part of this NPRM, TSA is also 

proposing a few minor amendments to 

the full program and the full all-cargo 

program. TSA proposes to require these 

aircraft operators to provide the 

following information when they submit 

their security program for approval 

under § 1544.105: business name; other 

names including ‘‘doing business as’’; 

state of incorporation; tax identification 

number; and the address of the aircraft 

operator’s primary place of business or 

headquarters. This information would 

provide TSA the means to identify the 

aircraft operators and to obtain basic 

information about the aircraft operator 

in the course of reviewing a new 

security program for approval. 

Additionally, TSA proposes to add a 

provision of voluntary services to the 

full program and the full all-cargo 

program, as explained in further detail 

in the section-by-section analysis of 

proposed § 1544.241. Finally, as 

explained in the section-by-section 

analysis of § 1544.101, TSA proposes to 

clarify that the full program applies to 

operators holding FAA operating 

certificates under 14 CFR part 119 and 

that the full all-cargo program applies to 

operators holding FAA operating 

certificates under 14 CFR part 119 or 

part 125. 


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III. Section-By-Section Analysis 

The proposed rule sets forth the 

security regulations that would apply to 

large aircraft operators, including the 

requirements for the security program. 

TSA is also proposing to amend several 

other sections of part 1544 and adding 

new subparts F and G to set forth the 

procedures for watch-list service 

providers to obtain TSA approval and 

for large aircraft flight crews, auditors, 

and watch-list service providers’ 

covered personnel to obtain security 

threat assessments, respectively. TSA is 

proposing to add a new provision in 

part 1540 to govern withdrawals of 

approved security programs. In 

addition, TSA is proposing to add a new 

part 1522, which establishes procedures 

for accrediting third-party auditors and 

for prescribing their functions in the 

LASP program. With respect to airports 

serving large aircraft, TSA is proposing 

to amend portions of part 1542 by 

regulating reliever airports, as 

designated by the Secretary of 

Transportation. TSA is also proposing 

changes to part 1520 to include the 

proposed LASP in the coverage of the 

regulations regarding Sensitive Security 

Information and minor changes to part 

1550 to maintain consistency between 

regulations. 

Part 1520—Protection of Sensitive 

Security Information 

Section 1520.5 Sensitive Security 

Information 

TSA proposes to amend 

§ 1520.5(b)(1)(i) to protect watch-list 

service provider security programs as 

Sensitive Security Information. The 

watch-list service provider would have 

access to, and handle information on, 

the No Fly and Selectee Lists, which are 

SSI. The proposed change to this section 

would protect this SSI from 

unauthorized disclosure by the TSAapproved auditor, the watch-list service 

provider, the aircraft operator, or any 

other covered person. 

Section 1520.7—Covered Persons 

As explained in the section-by-section 

analysis of proposed part 1522 and 

§ 1544.243, TSA would require large 

aircraft operators to engage independent 

TSA-approved auditors to audit their 

compliance with their security programs 

and TSA regulations. TSA-approved 

auditors would have access to and 

handle SSI regarding the aircraft 

operator and TSA security standards as 

they relate to large aircraft operators. 

Similarly, the watch-list service 

provider would have access to and 

handle the No Fly and Selectee Lists, 

which are SSI. Accordingly, TSA would 

amend § 1520.7(a) to include TSAapproved auditors and watch-list 

service providers as covered persons 

that are subject to the requirements of 

part 1520 as they apply to SSI. 

Part 1522—TSA Approved Auditors 

As described in section II.D, aircraft 

operators subject to this rule would 

need to engage independent TSAapproved auditors to audit their 

compliance with their security 

programs. TSA is proposing a new part 

1522 to establish a framework for this 

new third-party auditor program. This 

third-party auditor program would 

initially apply only to aircraft operators 

under the LASP. TSA may expand its 

use to other programs in the future. The 

broad scope of part 1522 would allow 

TSA to use the process set forth in part 

1522 for other programs that it may 

determine may benefit from an audit 

program. 

Part 1522 would have two 

components: (1) qualifications and 

procedures for individuals who seek 

TSA’s approval for conducting audits; 

and (2) specific qualifications and 

required content of audit reports for the 

LASP. The first of these components 

would apply to all programs in which 

TSA would require third-party auditors. 

The second component would apply to 

the LASP. 

Subpart A—General 

Section 1522.1 Scope and Terms Used 

in This Part 

Proposed § 1522.1 explains that 

individuals who wish to conduct audits 

of operators’ compliance with security 

programs must obtain TSA’s approval in 

accordance with part 1522. Section 

1522.1 also defines terms used in the 

subpart. Proposed § 1522.1 defines 

‘‘applicant’’ to mean the individual who 

is seeking to become a TSA-approved 

auditor. 

Section 1522.1 defines ‘‘conflict of 

interest’’ as a situation when the TSAapproved auditor has a personal 

impairment that might affect their 

ability to do their work and report their 

findings impartially. This definition is 

derived from the Government Auditing 

Standards established by the 

Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) for ensuring that auditors do not 

have personal impairments that would 

interfere with their ability to maintain 

their independence. The proposed 

definition includes examples of conflict 

of interest situations, such as family or 

employment relationships. 

Relationships with family members that 

may be a conflict of interest would 

include relationships with parents, 

children, and siblings. 

Other proposed examples of conflict 

of interest include financial 

relationships and business relationships 

between the auditor and the operators to 

be audited. Financial interest would 

include, for example, the auditor 

owning stocks or bonds of the operator 

or the auditor having an employment, 

rather than a contractual, relationship 

with the operator. Examples of business 

relationships that would give rise to a 

conflict of interest would be where the 

auditor had previous decision-making 

or managerial authority that would 

affect current operations or program 

being audited. Additionally, an auditor 

or the company that employs the 

auditor would not be able to provide 

non-audit services to the operator if the 

non-audit services relate to the 

operator’s security program. TSA seeks 

comments on these examples as well as 

suggestions for other examples that TSA 

should consider. TSA is also 

considering expressing the conflict of 

interest concept as auditor 

independence. Rather than defining and 

prohibiting conflicts of interest, TSA 

would define independence and would 

require an auditor to have independence 

from the entity the auditor would audit. 

If TSA were to adopt a definition of 

‘‘independence’’ in the final rule, the 

definition of ‘‘independence’’ would 

describe circumstances similar to those 

described in the proposed definition of 

‘‘conflict of interest.’’ This approach 

would be consistent with the GAO’s 

Government Auditing Standards and the 

Securities and Exchange Commissions 

regulations at 17 CFR 210.2–01 

concerning audits by certified public 

accountants. 

The final definition in proposed 

§ 1522.1 is ‘‘TSA-approved auditor’’ or 

‘‘auditor.’’ These terms would mean an 

individual who has been approved 

under proposed part 1522 to conduct an 

audit under 49 CFR chapter XII. 

Section 1522.3 Qualifications 

Section 1522.3 would establish 

qualifications for third-party auditors 

that would apply to such auditors in 

any program in which TSA would 

require their use. These qualifications 

are designed to ensure that auditors 

have the resources and expertise 

required to conduct an audit and to 

prepare the required reports. With 

respect to qualifications, TSA is 

proposing that auditors have experience 

with Federal statutes and regulations 

and have a certification or accreditation 

from a highly-regarded organization in 

the appropriate field. Such an 

organization might include, for 


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example, the International Standards 

Organization. For auditors that would 

be involved with the large aircraft 

program, the International Civil 

Aviation Organization or the 

International Business Aviation Council 

would also be acceptable. TSA would 

make publicly available a list of 

acceptable accreditation or certification 

organizations. TSA requests comments 

on whether this qualification is 

appropriate and on other organizations 

that might have the stature to provide 

the necessary certification or 

accreditation. 

Finally, applicants would be required 

to undergo a successful security threat 

assessment that includes a criminal 

history records check. 

The proposed rule text does not 

require auditors to be U.S. citizens, U.S. 

nationals, or lawful permanent residents 

of the United States. We invite 

comments on whether individuals with 

these important duties should be subject 

to such a qualification. 

Section 1522.5 Application 

Proposed § 1522.5 describes the 

information and documentation that 

applicants would be required to submit 

to TSA. The information would include 

the applicant’s name, business address, 

business phone number, and business email address. TSA would also require 

the applicant to submit a copy of his or 

her accreditation or certification from 

one of the organizations TSA 

determines are acceptable for this 

purpose and a statement of how he or 

she meets the requirements in proposed 

§ 1522.3. 

Section 1522.7 TSA Review and 

Approval 

Proposed § 1522.7 describes the 

review and approval process which TSA 

would carry out upon receipt of the 

auditor’s application. The procedures by 

which TSA would review applications 

for the third-party auditor program may 

involve several steps. After TSA 

receives an application, TSA would 

decide whether to approve or 

disapprove the application and would 

send a written notice of approval or 

disapproval to the applicant. If the 

application is disapproved, the 

applicant would be able to seek 

reconsideration under proposed 

§ 1522.9. 

Section 1522.9 Reconsideration of 

Disapproval of an Application 

Proposed § 1522.9 describes the 

review and petition process for 

reconsideration of disapproval of the 

auditor’s application. If an applicant 

seeks to challenge the disapproval of his 

or her application, the applicant would 

be required to submit a written petition 

for reconsideration within 30 days of 

receipt of the notice of disapproval. The 

petition would include a statement 

explaining why the applicant believes 

he or she meets the criteria in § 1522.3 

with any supporting documentation. 

Reconsideration may result in 

confirmation of the disapproval or in a 

determination that the application 

should be approved. 

Section 1522.11 Withdrawal of 

Approval 

Under proposed § 1522.11, TSA 

would be able to withdraw the approval 

of an auditor if the auditor ceased to 

meet the qualification standards, the 

auditor failed to meet his or her 

responsibilities, or it is in the interest of 

security or the public. If TSA withdraws 

an auditor’s approval, the auditor would 

no longer be able to perform an audit 

under TSA regulations. 

Under proposed § 1522.11, before 

revoking an auditor’s authority, TSA 

would provide the auditor with a 

proposed notice of withdrawal of 

approval that would include the basis 

for the withdrawal of approval. The 

auditor would be able to file a written 

petition for reconsideration to challenge 

the proposed notice. To challenge the 

proposed notice of withdrawal of 

approval, an auditor would be required 

to submit the petition for 

reconsideration within 30 days of 

receipt of the proposed notice. 

Reconsideration may result in 

confirmation of the disapproval or in a 

determination that the application 

should be approved. If the auditor does 

not file a petition for reconsideration, 

the proposed notice of withdrawal of 

approval would become a final notice 

31 days after the auditor receives the 

proposed notice. 

In emergency situations, proposed 

§ 1522.11 would allow TSA to issue an 

emergency notice of withdrawal of 

approval that would be effective upon 

receipt by the auditor. The auditor 

would be able to challenge the 

emergency notice of withdrawal of 

approval by submitting a written 

petition for reconsideration but 

submission of the petition would not 

stay the withdrawal of approval. 

Section 1522.13 Responsibilities of 

TSA-Approved Auditors 

Proposed § 1522.13 prescribes the 

responsibilities of TSA-approved 

auditors. Auditors would not be allowed 

to undertake an audit where the auditor 

had a conflict of interest as defined in 

proposed § 1522.1. Auditors would be 

required to submit reports to TSA that 

meet TSA standards for the particular 

program. Auditors would be required to 

comply with TSA’s regulations for 

identifying, handling, and protecting 

SSI. Under this section, auditors would 

also be prohibited from disclosure of 

any proprietary information. 

Importantly, if an auditor conducting an 

audit believes that there is an instance 

of noncompliance that presents an 

imminent threat to transportation 

security or public safety, the auditor 

would be required to notify TSA 

immediately. The auditor would not be 

authorized to require any remedial 

action. 

Section 1522.15 Fraud and Intentional 

Falsification of Records 

Proposed § 1522.15 includes 

provisions that would prohibit any 

person from making or providing any 

fraudulent statements, reports, records, 

access mediums, or identification. Any 

falsification of records or fraudulent 

actions would be a violation of the 

regulations and 18 U.S.C. 1001, and it 

would be a basis for TSA to withdraw 

the auditor’s approval under proposed 

§ 1522.13. 

Section 1522.17 Inspections 

Under proposed § 1522.17, auditors 

would be required to permit TSA to 

inspect their facilities and copy records. 

This section would allow TSA to 

evaluate the auditor’s performance and 

an operator’s compliance with TSA 

regulations and its security program. 

Subpart C—Auditors for the Large 

Aircraft Security Program 

Section 1522.201 Applicability 

Proposed § 1522.201 states that 

subpart C would apply to auditors 

seeking to obtain TSA’s approval to 

conduct audits for the large aircraft 

program. 

Section 1522.203 Additional 

Qualification Requirements 

Proposed § 1522.203 describes the 

additional requirements that auditors 

for the LASP would be required to meet 

to be considered for approval. These 

requirements would include: 

• At least five years of experience in 

inspection or auditing relating to 

governmental programs in security or 

aviation; 

• Three professional references; 

• Accreditation from an outside 

organization within the last ten years; 

and 

• Knowledge and ability to assess 

compliance with Federal statutes and 

regulations. 

These additional requirements would 

demonstrate that the auditor possesses 


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30 ‘‘Covered flight’’ is defined as a flight operated 

by an aircraft operator subject to a full program 

under 49 CFR 1544.101(a) or by a foreign air carrier 

subject to 49 CFR 1546.101(a) or (b). Proposed 

§ 1560.3, 72 FR at 48387. 

sufficient experience and knowledge in 

auditing compliance with governmental 

programs and that the auditor has 

credentials that reflect knowledge of the 

aviation industry. Auditors would be 

able to satisfy the five-year experience 

requirement as a government employee 

or private consultant or contractor. TSA 

requests comments on these 

requirements as well as other 

requirements that TSA should consider 

for auditors of LASPs. 

Section 1522.205 Audit Report 

Section 1522.205 would require an 

auditor to prepare an audit report that 

would include information about the 

audit process and the auditor’s findings 

and conclusions of the audit. TSA 

would require the auditor to submit the 

audit report within 30 days after the 

audit was conducted. TSA would also 

require the auditor to sign an attestation 

that the audit was performed 

professionally and impartially. The 

audit report would be an important tool 

in TSA’s compliance program by 

enabling TSA to evaluate a large aircraft 

operator’s compliance with TSA 

regulations and the operator’s security 

program and to ascertain if additional 

TSA action is required. 

Section 1522.207 Training 

Under proposed § 1522.207, TSA 

would require auditors to undergo 

initial and recurrent training. Through 

the initial training, auditors would 

acquire the necessary information on 

the process, procedures, and forms 

associated with the TSA-required audit. 

Recurrent TSA prescribed training 

would provide auditors with up-to-date 

information and would ensure that the 

auditor has maintained the necessary 

expertise to continue to perform audits. 

Recurrent training would be required 

every 24 months. 

Section 1522.209 Biennial Review 

To ensure that a TSA-approved 

auditor continues to possess the 

requisite qualification and expertise to 

conduct audits, TSA would require the 

auditor to submit to a biennial review. 

The review would consist of submitting 

evidence that an auditor’s training has 

been successfully completed and is 

current and that an auditor continues to 

hold the necessary accreditation or 

certification. 

Part 1540—Civil Aviation Security: 

General Rules 

Section 1540.107 Submission to 

Screening and Inspection 

As discussed in section II.A, TSA 

would require large aircraft operators to 

contract with a watch-list service 

provider to determine whether their 

passengers may board the aircraft. 

Watch-list service providers, who must 

be approved by TSA, would compare 

passenger names against the watch-list. 

Under proposed § 1544.245(b), large 

aircraft operators would be required to 

request and obtain the full name of their 

passengers to transmit their passengers’ 

information to a watch-list service 

provider to conduct watch-list matching 

prior to the passengers boarding the 

aircraft. Because full name is essential 

in conducting effective watch-list 

matching, TSA proposes to require 

passengers to provide their full name 

when the large aircraft operator requests 

their full name. 

TSA has published the Secure Flight 

NPRM, which also includes a proposal 

to require individuals who make 

reservations for a covered flight to 

provide their full names.30 Under the 

proposed Secure Flight Program, full 

name would be the full name that 

appears on the individual’s verifying 

identity document. A verifying identity 

document would be an unexpired photo 

identification issued by a government 

(Federal, State, or tribal) bearing the 

individual’s full name and date of birth 

or an unexpired foreign passport. 

Examples of verifying identity 

documents are driver’s licenses and 

passports. Accordingly, proposed 

§ 1540.107(c) would apply the same 

requirements to passengers of large 

aircraft operators. 

Section 1540.301 Withdrawal of 

Approval of a Security Program 

Various entities, such as airport 

operators and aircraft operators, must 

submit their security programs to TSA 

for approval. Once TSA approves a 

security program, the operator must 

implement and operate under its 

approved security program. The 

regulations, however, do not specifically 

address the process through which TSA 

may withdraw its approval of a security 

program, when appropriate. 

TSA currently has withdrawal 

procedures only for indirect air carriers 

in 49 CFR 1548.7(f). To standardize the 

regulations, TSA proposes a new 

§ 1540.301 to codify procedures for TSA 

to withdraw approval of any operator’s 

security program held under subchapter 

C. The proposed standard for 

withdrawal would be a TSA 

determination that the operation is 

contrary to security and the public 

interest. Proposed § 1540.301 provides 

procedures for notice, response, and 

appeal of a TSA decision to withdraw 

approval. The affected airport operator, 

aircraft operator, or large aircraft 

operator would also be able to request 

a stay of the withdrawal pending appeal 

of the notice. 

TSA further proposes the codification 

of emergency withdrawal procedures. 

This proposal would create procedural 

guidelines to implement withdrawal of 

a security program and affords due 

process to the airport operator, aircraft 

operator, and large aircraft operator. The 

emergency procedures would allow the 

operator to appeal the withdrawal, but 

the filing of the appeal would not stay 

the effective date of withdrawal because 

of the extant circumstances giving rise 

to the emergency. 

Part 1542—Airport Security 

Section 1542.103 Content 

Section 1542.103 describes the 

airports that TSA requires to adopt a 

security program. TSA requires airports 

that regularly serve full program aircraft 

operators described in § 1544.101(a)(1) 

or foreign air carriers described in 

§ 1546.101(a) to adopt a complete 

program. 49 CFR 1542.103(a). TSA also 

requires airports that regularly serve full 

program aircraft operators described in 

§ 1544.101(a)(2), private charter aircraft 

operators described in § 1544.101(f), or 

a foreign air carrier described in 

§ 1546.101(b) or (c) to adopt a 

supporting program. 49 CFR 

1542.103(b). Additionally, TSA requires 

airports regularly serving operations of 

an aircraft operator or foreign air carrier 

described in § 1544.101(b) or 

§ 1546.101(d) to adopt a partial program. 

49 CFR 1542.103(c). 

As explained in section II.B of this 

NPRM, TSA proposes to expand the 

types of airports that would be required 

to adopt a partial program to include 

reliever airports and airports that 

regularly serve large aircraft with 

scheduled or public charter service. 

Furthermore, TSA would amend 

§ 1542.103(b) to remove airports 

regularly serving aircraft operators that 

are subject to the private charter 

program under § 1544.101(f) from 

among the airport operators that are 

subject to the supporting program. 

An airport that would not be required 

to adopt a security program under 

§ 1542.101(a), (b), or (c) may 

nevertheless seek TSA approval for its 

security program. To address this 

situation, TSA proposes to adopt 

§ 1542.101(e), which would allow TSA 

to approve a security program for this 

type of airport, if the airport makes a 

request to TSA. 


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31FAA limits many of its regulations to operation 

of civil aircraft, which do not include public 

aircraft. For example, see 14 CFR part 91, subpart 

E—Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, and 

Alterations. 

Part 1544—Aircraft Operator Security 

Section 1544.1 Applicability of This 

Part 

Currently, § 1544.1(a)(1) limits part 

1544 to aircraft operators that hold a 

FAA operating certificate under 14 CFR 

part 119. Because part 1544 would 

apply to other aircraft operators under 

this NPRM, TSA would amend 

§ 1544.1(a)(1) to clarify that part 1544 

applies to all aircraft operators engaged 

in civil aviation in an aircraft with a 

MTOW of more than 12,500 pounds, not 

just those that hold a operating 

certificate under 14 CFR part 119. 

Section 1544.101 Adoption and 

Implementation 

TSA is proposing this rulemaking to 

regulate any civil aviation operations. 

To ensure consistent treatment of 

similar aircraft operators, TSA proposes, 

in § 1544.101(b), to apply the same 

threshold by requiring that the existing 

partial program, twelve-five program, 

and private charter program operations 

be consolidated and covered under a 

single LASP. Note that the LASP would 

replace the above stated programs in 

§§ 1544.101(b) through (f). 

Operations under the LASP would 

include civil operations of aircraft, 

including passenger and all-cargo 

operations, and scheduled, charter, or 

other service, with a MTOW over 12,500 

pounds, that do not operate under the 

full program (§ 1544.101(a)) or the full 

all-cargo program (§ 1544.101(h)), and 

do not operate as a public aircraft as 

described in 49 U.S.C. § 40102 or as a 

government charter under the definition 

of private charter in § 1540.5 of this 

chapter. ‘‘Public aircraft’’ is defined in 

49 U.S.C. 40102(37) as follows: 

‘‘public aircraft’’ means any of the following: 

(A) Except with respect to an aircraft 

described in subparagraph (E), an aircraft 

used only for the United States Government, 

except as provided in section 40125(b). 

(B) An aircraft owned by the Government 

and operated by any person for purposes 

related to crew training, equipment 

development, or demonstration, except as 

provided in section 40125(b). 

(C) An aircraft owned and operated by the 

government of a State, the District of 

Columbia, or a territory or possession of the 

United States or a political subdivision of 

one of these governments, except as provided 

in section 40125(b). 

(D) An aircraft exclusively leased for at 

least 90 continuous days by the government 

of a State, the District of Columbia, or a 

territory or possession of the United States or 

a political subdivision of one of these 

governments, except as provided in section 

40125(b). 

(E) An aircraft owned or operated by the 

armed forces or chartered to provide 

transportation to the armed forces under the 

conditions specified by section 40125(c). 

The government maintains direct 

responsibility for the operation of public 

aircraft. Public aircraft are not subject to 

many of the safety regulations that cover 

other aircraft operations.31 They are not 

included in the statutory definition of 

‘‘civil aircraft’’ and thus are not subject 

to many of the same requirements that 

apply to civil aircraft. See 49 U.S.C. 

40102(16). There are strict limitations 

on how such aircraft may be used. See 

49 U.S.C. 40124. Many of the operations 

are highly specialized and require 

unique procedures, including security 

procedures. TSA is proposing to make 

clear that public aircraft would not be 

subject to the LASP. 

A government private charter under 

TSA regulations means any aircraft 

operator flight— 

(2) For which the total passenger capacity 

of the aircraft is used for the purpose of 

civilian or military air movement conducted 

under contract with the Government of the 

United States or the government of a foreign 

country. 

See 49 CFR 1540.5. Currently TSA 

regulations exempt most such 

operations from the Private Charter 

Security Program. See 49 CFR 

1544.101(f)(1)(ii). The rationale has been 

that such charters can, and do, carry out 

procedures on a regular basis to address 

the security concerns at issue. The U.S. 

Department of Defense (DOD) and 

Federal agencies use private charter 

operations to transport persons and 

property in furtherance of their 

government missions. See 67 FR 41635 

(June 19, 2002). TSA is concerned, 

however, that the chartering government 

agency may not always understand that 

it would be responsible for security of 

the operation. Unlike with public 

aircraft discussed above, a government 

charter may be for a short duration, even 

one flight at a time, and thus normal 

safety regulations continue to apply. 

Accordingly, the rule would make clear 

that TSA would exempt government 

charter operations from complying with 

the LASP, only if the government takes 

security responsibility for the following: 

(A) The aircraft; 

(B) Persons onboard; and 

(C) Property onboard. 

See proposed § 1544.101(b)(3)(iv). If the 

chartering government agency does not 

take responsibility for the security of the 

operation, the normal TSA requirements 

would apply. 

Note, however, that under the current 

rule, government charters must comply 

with the Private Charter Program if the 

charter enplanes passengers from, or 

deplanes passengers into, a sterile area 

at an airport. This minimizes the risk 

that any weapon or other prohibited 

item the government personnel may be 

carrying could inadvertently or 

purposefully be used to taint the sterile 

area. This requirement would continue 

under the proposed rule. TSA would 

require government charters that 

deplane into, or enplane from, sterile 

areas to comply with the LASP, 

including obtaining an alternate 

procedure for deplaning into, or 

enplaning from, a sterile area. 

The full program, the limited 

program, and the full all-cargo program 

would not be included in the large 

aircraft regulations. However, because 

TSA proposes to amend § 1544.1(a) to 

make part 1544 applicable to operators 

of aircraft with MTOW of over 12,500 

pounds, TSA would also need to amend 

§§ 1544.101(a) and (h) to maintain the 

status quo as to which aircraft operators 

are subject to the full program. 

Consequently, TSA would amend 

§ 1544.101(a) to state that aircraft 

operators that hold a FAA certificate 

under 14 CFR part 119 would have to 

adopt and carry out a full program if 

they meet the conditions described in 

§ 1544.101(a)(1) or (a)(2). Similarly, TSA 

would amend § 1544.101(h) to state that 

the full all-cargo program applies to 

aircraft operators that hold a FAA 

certificate under 14 CFR part 119 or part 

125. The limited program is for aircraft 

operators that have unique operations 

that do not fall within any other 

category of operations requiring a 

security program under other sections of 

part 1544. Nevertheless, the aircraft 

operator adopts a security program for 

its operations and TSA approves the 

security program and classifies it as a 

limited program. 

Section 1544.103 Form, Content, and 

Availability 

Proposed § 1544.103 sets forth the 

form, content, and availability 

requirements for the security programs 

required under § 1544.101. There have 

been standard security programs for 

certain aircraft operators since 1976. 

TSA is proposing to recognize the use 

of standard security programs by TSA 

and aircraft operators in current 

requirements for aircraft operators and 

proposed under part 1544. This 

proposed rule would clarify that each 

particular operator’s security program 

would be the standard security program 

issued by TSA, together with any 

amendments and alternate procedures 


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approved or accepted by TSA for that 

aircraft operator. 

Currently, § 1544.103(c) lists the 

content requirements of a security 

program for a full program aircraft 

operator. The specific security 

regulations are set forth in part 1544, 

subpart C—Operations. TSA proposes to 

add new paragraphs (d), (e), and (f) to 

describe the content requirements for 

full all-cargo and LASPs, respectively. 

Also, TSA would amend paragraph (c) 

to add the new requirements of 

proposed § 1544.241 regarding 

volunteer emergency services for full 

program operators. 

The content requirements for the full 

all-cargo security programs in proposed 

paragraph (d) are essentially the same 

requirements in the current 

§ 1544.101(i), except for the addition of 

proposed § 1544.241 concerning 

volunteer emergency services. The 

content requirements for the LASP are 

described in section II.A of the 

preamble. The individual elements, not 

discussed in this section of the 

preamble, are discussed in further detail 

in the section-by-section analysis of 

§§ 1544.202, 1544.205, 1544.206, 

1544.207, 1544.215, 1544.217, 1544.223, 

1544.225, 1544.233, 1544.235, 1544.241, 

1544.245, and subpart G. 

The existing partial program and 

private charter program include a few 

security measures that would not be 

part of the LASP, because these 

measures would be unnecessary under 

the LASP. First, the partial program 

requires that aircraft operators under 

that program participate in any airportsponsored exercise of the airport 

contingency plan in § 1544.301(c). 

Currently, there are very few aircraft 

operators that hold a partial program 

and are subject to § 1544.301(c). Also, 

most large aircraft operators operate out 

of GA airports that are not required to 

have a contingency plan, including 

those that TSA proposed to require to 

adopt and carry out a partial program 

under proposed § 1542.103(c). Thus it 

would be unnecessary to require large 

aircraft operators to participate in an 

airport-sponsored exercise of the airport 

contingency plan and to include this 

security measure in the LASP. 

TSA is also proposing not to include 

the requirements in §§ 1544.209 and 

1544.211 regarding the use of metal 

detection devices and X-ray systems 

that are in the current private charter 

program. Because private charter 

operators currently do not use these 

devices or systems in their screening 

processes, it would be unnecessary to 

include those requirements in the LASP. 

If a large aircraft operator plans to use 

a metal detection device or an X-ray 

system, the operator would apply for an 

amendment or alternate procedure to its 

security program, which would describe 

the requirements and procedures for 

using such devices or systems. 

Section 1544.105 Approval and 

Amendments to the Security Program 

Aircraft operators that are required to 

adopt a security program under 

§ 1544.101 must apply for a security 

program from TSA. TSA provides the 

standard security program and may 

amend the program on its own 

initiative, or as requested by the aircraft 

operator and approved by TSA. 

Similarly, TSA would provide large 

aircraft operators with a standard 

security program. At that time, the 

aircraft operator would be able to 

submit any amendment to their security 

program to TSA for approval. If the 

aircraft operator fully accepts the 

standard TSA security program, they 

would not be required to submit any 

amendments to TSA. Accordingly, TSA 

proposes to amend § 1544.105 to apply 

to large aircraft operators. 

Unlike the full program and full allcargo program operators, a large aircraft 

operator would need to submit 

additional information, such as the 

names, addresses, and phone numbers 

of the owners and aircraft operator 

security coordinator of the large aircraft, 

and the FAA certificate number if the 

aircraft operator holds an FAA 

certificate, when it submits its 

application for approval of its security 

program. Full program and full all-cargo 

program operators hold certificates from 

the FAA and DOT, and the Federal 

Government has reviewed the operators, 

including their key personnel, in 

connection with the certification 

processes; thus the operators are known 

to the Federal Government. Large 

aircraft operators, however, are a diverse 

group of operators that range from 

individuals who own and operate their 

aircraft to large corporations that 

operate aircraft using owned and/or 

leased aircraft. As a result, TSA would 

need the additional information to 

identify the owners and operators of 

large aircraft and to evaluate their 

security programs for approval. 

TSA believes that aviation security 

will be enhanced if TSA conducts an 

analysis to determine whether operators 

of aircraft subject to this proposed 

regulation are legitimate business 

entities and whether their owners are 

individuals who appear to pose a risk to 

aviation security. Accordingly, TSA is 

considering various options to achieve 

the objective. For checking on whether 

the aircraft operator is a legitimate 

business entity, TSA may rely on a 

check against Dun & Bradstreet or a 

similar commercial database and/or 

governmental databases, such as the 

FAA’s Aircraft Registration Database. 

For individuals who would be 

identified as a proprietor, general 

partner, officer, director, or owner in 

proposed section 1544.105(a)(1)(ii)(B), 

TSA does not intend to use commercial 

or publicly available data to determine 

whether the individuals pose or may 

pose a threat to transportation or 

national security. For these individuals, 

TSA seeks comment on whether it 

should require these individuals to 

undergo the security threat assessment 

(STA) described in proposed part 1544, 

subpart G. TSA requests public 

comment on these options and on other 

approaches that would achieve the 

desired result. 

TSA would also use the information 

to identify and contact aircraft and their 

respective operators for operational or 

security reasons. 

The proposed rule would not change 

the process for amending a security 

program, either by the aircraft operator 

or TSA. Proposed § 1544.105(f) would 

provide TSA with a mechanism to 

withdraw its approval of an aircraft 

operator’s security program pursuant to 

the procedures set forth in proposed 

§ 1540.301. 

Section 1544.107 Fractional 

Ownership of Large Aircraft 

Proposed § 1544.107 addresses 

situations in which a large aircraft is 

under fractional ownership program 

under the FAA rules in 14 CFR part 91, 

subpart K, for purposes of determining 

who would be the aircraft operator 

under proposed § 1544.101(b). We 

propose to use essentially the same 

requirements that apply in the FAA 

rules for this purpose. See 14 CFR 

91.1011. Each owner in operational 

control of a program flight would be 

ultimately responsible for safe 

operations and for complying with all 

applicable requirements, including 

those related to security issues. An 

owner would be considered in 

operational control when the owner has 

the legal rights to the aircraft, has 

directed that the aircraft carry 

passengers or property designated by 

the owner, and the aircraft is carrying 

those passengers or property. 

Although TSA would consider each 

owner as the aircraft operator, the owner 

would be able to delegate some or all of 

the performance of the tasks associated 

with carrying out this security 

responsibility to the program manager. 

For operations where the owner in 

operational control delegates 

performance of security tasks to the 


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program manager, the TSA would 

consider the owner and the program 

manager to be holding the security 

program jointly, and the owner and the 

program manager would be jointly and 

individually responsible for 

compliance. In the event that a program 

manager manages multiple aircraft, the 

program manager would have one large 

aircraft program that applies to all its 

operations. 

An owner would be considered not in 

operational control when an aircraft is 

used for a flight for administrative 

purposes, such as demonstration, 

positioning, ferrying, maintenance, or 

crew training, and no passengers or 

property that were designated by the 

owner are being carried. Further, if the 

aircraft is operated under 14 CFR part 

121 or 135, then the owner would be 

considered not to be in operational 

control. 

This approach to determining the 

party that would be considered the 

aircraft operator for purposes of the 

LASP is based on the FAA regulations 

found in 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, 

regarding fractional ownership 

operations. TSA invites comments on 

whether we should provide additional 

features of subpart K in these 

regulations, such as the requirement in 

14 CFR 91.1013 that the program 

manager brief the fractional owner. 

Section 1544.202 Persons and Property 

Onboard All-Cargo Aircraft 

Current § 1544.202 requires each 

aircraft operator operating under the full 

all-cargo program and the twelve-five 

program in all-cargo operations to apply 

the security measures in their security 

programs to persons who board the 

aircraft and their property. ‘‘Cargo’’ is 

defined as property tendered for air 

transportation accounted for on an air 

waybill. Company materials and other 

property not under an air waybill are 

not cargo; Rather, they are property that 

would be subject to proposed 

§ 1544.206, as discussed in section II.A 

of this preamble and below. 

Section 1544.202 is intended to 

prevent persons who may pose a 

security threat from boarding and to 

prevent or deter the carriage of any 

unauthorized persons and unauthorized 

explosives, incendiaries, and other 

destructive substances or items. This 

provides the opportunity for aircraft 

operators to conduct an on-site check of 

persons and property for compliance, 

and provides TSA with the means to 

perform security database checks. 

Section 1544.202 remains an important 

security measure for aircraft with 

MTOW of over 12,500 pounds in allcargo operation. Consequently, we 

propose to revise § 1544.202 to apply to 

aircraft operated under the LASP in an 

all-cargo operation and to remove the 

references to the twelve-five program in 

all-cargo operations. 

Section 1544.205 Acceptance and 

Screening of Cargo 

Section 1544.205 sets forth the 

requirements for screening cargo on full 

program operations that carry cargo, full 

all-cargo operations, and twelve-five allcargo operations. As with § 1544.202, 

cargo under § 1544.205 is property 

tendered for air transportation 

accounted for on an air waybill. As 

discussed above, TSA would require 

operators of large aircraft that are allcargo operations to screen persons, 

accessible property, and cargo onboard 

the aircraft to prevent and deter the 

carriage of any unauthorized persons or 

the unauthorized carriage of weapons or 

explosives. Sections 1544.205(a), (b), 

(d), and (f) would apply to all large 

aircraft with an MTOW of over 12,500 

pounds in all-cargo operations. 

Section 1544.206 Persons and Property 

on Board a Large Aircraft 

As discussed in section II.A of the 

preamble, TSA proposes § 1544.206, 

which would require aircraft operators 

operating under a large aircraft program 

under § 1544.101(b) to apply security 

measures in its security program to 

prevent or deter the carriage of 

unauthorized persons or unauthorized 

weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and 

other destructive substances or items. 

TSA also notes that 18 U.S.C. 922(e) and 

(f) impose criminal penalties for the 

unlawful transport or delivery of 

firearms or ammunition by any person 

or by common or contract carriers, 

respectively. 

Section 1544.207 Inspection of 

Individuals and Property 

Current § 1544.207 describes which 

entities conduct screening under which 

circumstances: TSA, a foreign 

government, or the aircraft operator. 

TSA is proposing to amend § 1544.207 

to clarify which aircraft operator is 

subject to this section and which entity 

is responsible for conducting the 

required screening. 

TSA would amend § 1544.207(a) to 

state clearly that this section applies to 

full program operators, full all-cargo 

program operators, and operations in a 

large aircraft with a MTOW over 45,500 

kilograms operated for compensation or 

hire, as described in proposed 

§ 1544.103(f)(1). 

Proposed § 1544.207(b) applies to full 

program operators and is substantively 

the same as the current requirements for 

these operators. This section originally 

was written before TSA assumed the 

responsibility for all passenger and 

checked baggage screening in the United 

States and does not currently clearly 

state where TSA conducts the screening. 

TSA proposes to clarify this section. For 

locations in the United States, each full 

program operator must not board a 

passenger, or load his or her accessible 

or checked property, unless TSA or a 

TSA contractor has conducted the 

necessary inspection. In locations 

outside of the United States where the 

foreign country conducts the screening, 

each full program operator must not 

board a passenger, or load his or her 

accessible or checked property, unless 

the foreign country has conducted the 

necessary screening. TSA may require 

supplemental screening of some 

passengers. In locations outside of the 

United States where the foreign country 

does not conduct part or all of the 

required screening, each full program 

operator must not board a passenger, or 

load his or her accessible or checked 

property, unless the operator or its 

authorized representative has conducted 

the required screening. 

Proposed § 1544.207(c) applies to full 

all-cargo programs and to operations in 

a large aircraft with a MTOW over 

45,500 kilograms operated for 

compensation or hire, which currently 

are referred to as private charters. These 

aircraft operators are generally required 

to conduct their own screening. They 

would be required to follow the security 

procedures in their security programs 

and the requirements in 49 CFR part 

1544, subpart E, regarding screener 

qualifications when the aircraft operator 

conducts the screening. 

In the event that the aircraft enplanes 

or deplanes from a sterile area, the large 

aircraft operator would be required to 

obtain an alternate procedure for its 

security program. 

Section 1544.217 Law Enforcement 

Personnel 

Section 1544.217 currently requires 

aircraft operators under the partial 

program, the twelve-five program, the 

private charter program, and the full allcargo program to provide for law 

enforcement personnel that meet TSA’s 

requirements. TSA proposes to replace 

the referenced partial program, the 

twelve-five program, and the private 

charter program, with the LASP, 

requiring large aircraft operators to 

perform the same duties required under 

§ 1544.217. TSA proposes that large 

aircraft operators must provide their 

employees, including crewmembers, 

current information regarding 

procedures for obtaining law 


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enforcement assistance, to enable them 

to contact local law enforcement 

personnel expeditiously in the event of 

a security need. 

Section 1544.223 Transportation of 

Federal Air Marshals 

Current § 1544.223 requires that full 

program operators and large aircraft 

over 45,500 kilograms that operate for 

compensation or hire under 

§ 1544.103(f) carry Federal Air Marshals 

(FAMs). In this NPRM, TSA proposes to 

add § 1544.223(g) to require other large 

aircraft operators not covered by 

§ 1544.103(f)(1) to carry FAMs only 

upon notification by TSA. This would 

affect mostly private/corporate aircraft 

owners. The regulation change would 

provide TSA with the ability to require 

these operators to put a FAM on board 

a large aircraft, pursuant to prior 

notification, if the need arises. TSA 

understands that maintaining the 

confidentiality of the FAM onboard a 

large aircraft may not be possible, and 

therefore TSA proposes to limit 

§ 1544.223(g) to those operating under a 

full program or a LASP in an aircraft 

with MTOW over 45,500 kilograms. 

Section 1544.237 Flight Deck 

Privileges 

Section 1544.237(b) currently allows 

for access to the flight deck by FAA air 

carrier inspectors, authorized 

representatives of the National 

Transportation Safety Board, and U.S. 

Secret Service agents. This NPRM 

proposes to amend § 1544.237(b) to 

include Department of Defense (DOD) 

commercial air carrier evaluators who 

may seek admittance to the aircraft 

flight deck. TSA proposes to amend 

§ 1544.237 to harmonize with FAA 

regulations at 14 CFR 121.547. DOD 

commercial air carrier evaluators will 

assess the effectiveness of a carrier’s 

operations department, including crew 

coordination and safety awareness. DOD 

evaluators are required to pre-arrange all 

flight deck evaluations. 

Section 1544.241 Voluntary Provision 

of Emergency Services 

Congress has enacted statutory 

provisions that provide certain 

exemptions from liability for qualified 

law enforcement officers, firefighters, 

and emergency medical technicians 

who provide emergency services during 

emergencies; and that directs TSA to 

establish a program to allow such 

individuals to volunteer to provide such 

emergency services. 49 U.S.C. 44944. 

TSA has already incorporated this 

program into the AOSSP for full 

program operators and now proposes to 

codify the provisions in new § 1544.241. 

Because the statute limits these 

provisions to air carriers, TSA proposes 

to limit the application of § 1544.241 to 

aircraft operators that hold an air carrier 

operating certificate under 14 CFR part 

119. 

The statute provides that a qualified 

individual shall not be liable for 

damages in any action brought in 

Federal or State court which arises from 

the act or omission of that individual in 

providing or attempting to provide 

assistance in an in-flight emergency, 

absent gross negligence or willful 

misconduct. TSA must establish the 

requirements for qualifications of these 

individuals. Consistent with the statute, 

TSA’s proposed regulation requires air 

carriers operating under a full program 

to implement a method or a program for 

qualified individuals who are law 

enforcement officers, firefighters, or 

emergency medical technicians to 

present their credentials to the carrier 

and to give their consent to be called 

upon during an in-flight emergency. 

As required in the statute, 

§ 1544.241(b) sets out proposed 

qualifications for the law enforcement 

officers, firefighters, and emergency 

medical technicians who would be 

exempted from liability under the 

statute and who would be able to 

volunteer under this section. TSA 

proposes that an individual is qualified 

for purposes of this section if the 

individual is qualified under Federal, 

State, local, or tribal law, or under the 

law of a foreign government, has valid 

standing with the licensing or 

employing agency that produced the 

credentials, and is a scheduled, on-call, 

paid, or volunteer employee, as one of 

the following: 

1. A law enforcement officer who is 

an employee or authorized by the 

Federal, state, local or tribal government 

or under the law of a foreign 

government, with the primary purpose 

of the prevention, investigation, 

apprehension, or detention of 

individuals suspected or convicted of 

Government offenses. 

2. A firefighter who is an employee, 

whether paid or a volunteer, of a fire 

department of any Federal, state, local, 

or tribe who is certified as a firefighter 

as a condition of employment and 

whose duty it is to extinguish fires, to 

protect life, and to protect property. 

3. An emergency medical technician 

who is trained and certified to appraise 

and initiate the administration of 

emergency care for victims of trauma or 

acute illness. We request comments on 

whether these are the appropriate 

qualifications to carry out the purposes 

of the statute. 

This exemption from liability 

provided in the statute is stated for 

information in proposed 

§ 1544.241(b)(1). The statutory 

exemption from liability applies only to 

the three named groups above. The 

proposed rule in § 1544.241(b)(2) 

includes the statutory provision that the 

exemption shall not apply in any case 

where an individual provides or 

attempts to provide assistance in a 

manner that constitutes gross negligence 

or willful misconduct. The statute does 

not require the individual volunteer to 

identify himself or herself before 

departure to be subject to this 

exemption. Proposed § 1544.241(b)(3) 

states expressly that the exemption 

would apply regardless of whether the 

individuals identify themselves in 

advance of departure. The proposed rule 

also makes clear that an individual need 

not have his or her credentials with 

himself or herself at the time of 

providing assistance for the exemption 

from liability to apply. For instance, if 

a firefighter who did not volunteer 

before the flight as provided in 

paragraph (c), and who did not have his 

credentials with him, were to provide 

assistance in the case of an in-flight 

emergency, the statutory exemption 

from liability would apply. After the 

incident, to show that the exemption 

applied, the firefighter may have to 

establish that he was qualified as 

provided in paragraph (a), but the lack 

of credentials present at the time of the 

emergency would not preclude the 

application of the exemption. 

Proposed § 1544.241(c) contains the 

requirement for aircraft operators to 

implement a program for individuals 

who meet the qualifications in 

paragraph (a) to volunteer, prior to 

departure, to be called on by a 

crewmember or flight attendant to 

provide emergency services in the event 

of an in-flight emergency. The required 

procedures would include a check of 

the credentials of individuals 

identifying themselves pre-departure. 

Under this program, TSA would not 

expect FAMs and LEOs who are flying 

armed under § 1544.219 to volunteer to 

assist in an emergency situation prior to 

departure. Since the FAMs and LEOs 

must identify themselves to the aircraft 

operator prior to departure and must 

have taken appropriate training to fly 

armed, it is not necessary for the aircraft 

operator or the FAM or LEO to carry out 

§ 1544.241. The flight crew knows 

where each FAM and armed LEO is 

seated and is able to request their 

assistance if the need arises. The 

statutory exemption from liability 

would apply if a FAM or LEO were to 

assist during an emergency. 


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Proposed § 1544.241 would not 

preclude passengers from assisting in an 

emergency, even if they did not meet 

the qualifications in paragraph (a). We 

note that any passenger may assist in an 

emergency, and in the past, physicians, 

nurses, and others have provided vital 

help when needed, and they will 

continue to be able to do so. 

Generally, the aircraft operator will 

determine whether to request assistance 

and from whom to request it based on 

all the circumstances and information 

available to the aircraft operator. For 

instance, while the statute does not 

apply to doctors or nurses, if there is a 

medical emergency and the aircraft 

operator is aware that a doctor or a 

nurse is on board, the aircraft operator 

may request assistance of them instead 

of other individuals who may have 

volunteered under this program. 

However, the statute limits liability 

protection to qualified law enforcement 

officers, firefighters, and emergency 

medical technicians. State Good 

Samaritan Laws and other protections 

may apply to other individuals, not 

mentioned in the statute, who assist in 

an emergency. 

Additionally, in accordance with 49 

U.S.C. 44944(a), the aircraft operator 

must keep all information of the identity 

or personal information of the qualified 

individual confidential and must not 

provide such information to any 

individual, other than the appropriate 

aircraft operator personnel. 

Section 1544.243 Third Party Audit 

As discussed in section II.A of the 

preamble, proposed § 1544.243 would 

require a large aircraft operator to 

contract with a TSA-approved auditor to 

audit its compliance with the 

requirements of 49 CFR chapter XXII 

and its security program. The 

regulations include procedures for 

obtaining TSA approval and for 

conducting audits. 

Section 1544.245 Passenger Vetting for 

Large Aircraft Operators 

TSA would require large aircraft 

operators to contract with watch-list 

service providers to conduct watch-list 

matching of their passengers before 

allowing them to board. Passengers 

determined to be on the No Fly list 

would not be able to board an aircraft. 

Proposed § 1544.245 establishes the 

procedures that large aircraft operators 

would be required to follow in order to 

comply with the requirements for 

watch-list matching. Section II.A of this 

preamble provides a detailed discussion 

of the requirements and process. 

Subpart F—Watch-List Service 

Providers 

Under proposed § 1544.245, large 

aircraft operators would submit 

passenger information to watch-list 

service providers approved by TSA to 

conduct watch-list matching. Proposed 

part 1544, subpart F, sets forth the 

proposed requirements and procedures 

for entities to obtain and maintain TSA 

approval to conduct watch-list 

matching. TSA would require watch-list 

service providers to maintain high IT 

system security, to develop and 

implement a robust system capable of 

conducting automated watch-list 

matching quickly and continuous 

vetting of master passenger lists, to 

protect personally identifiable 

information and sensitive security 

information, and to adopt and 

implement a security program. Because 

of these requirements, TSA expects that 

limited number of entities would be 

approved to be watch-list service 

providers. TSA is also considering 

whether to limit in the final rule the 

number of watch-list service providers 

that it would approve. This would 

preserve the security of the watch-list by 

restricting the distribution of the watchlist to a small number of entities that 

would have access to the watch-list. 

TSA seeks comment on limiting the 

number of entities that would be 

approved watch-list service providers, 

including what criteria would be used 

to determine which applicants would be 

approved and how many watch-list 

service providers should be approved. 

For instance, TSA is considering criteria 

such as the level of IT system security, 

the type of watch-list matching system, 

and the ability of the service provider to 

quickly conduct the service. 

Section 1544.501 Scope and Terms 

Used in This Subpart 

Subpart F would apply to watch-list 

service providers who conduct watchlist matching on behalf of large aircraft 

operators. The definition of ‘‘applicant’’ 

would mean the entity that is seeking 

approval from TSA to conduct watchlist matching for large aircraft operators. 

‘‘Large aircraft operators’’ are defined as 

those operators described in 

§§ 1544.101(b) or 1544.107. The final 

definition in proposed § 1544.501 is 

‘‘covered personnel.’’ This term would 

mean an employee, officer, principal, or 

program manager of the watch-list 

service provider who collects, handles 

or uses passenger information or watchlist matching results or who conducts 

watch-list matching. 

Section 1544.503 Qualification 

Standards for Approval 

Proposed § 1544.503 would establish 

qualification standards for approval of 

applicants to conduct watch-list 

matching. The applicant would need to 

demonstrate the ability to receive 

passenger information from large 

aircraft operators and to conduct 

automated watch-list matching, 

including using continuously updated 

information from TSA, and to transmit 

the watch-list matching results to the 

large aircraft operator in a secure 

manner. The applicant would be 

required to obtain an attestation from an 

independent public accounting (IPA) 

firm that the system that the applicant 

would use to contain SSI and personally 

identifiable information collected as 

part of the watch-list matching process 

and to perform the necessary 

transmissions and matching are in 

compliance with the applicant’s 

approved system security plan and TSA 

standards. In addition, TSA would 

require the applicant to successfully 

undergo a suitability assessment by 

TSA, and the applicant’s covered 

personnel to successfully undergo a 

security threat assessment by TSA. 

Finally, TSA would require the 

applicant to be incorporated within the 

United States, and the applicant’s 

operations and systems for conducting 

the watch-list matching to be located in 

the United States. Under this proposal, 

eligibility to be a watch-list service 

provider would be limited to U.S. 

companies and U.S. subsidiaries of 

foreign corporations that are 

incorporated and located in the United 

States. This requirement would lessen 

the possibility that the SSI and the 

personally identifiable information that 

would be part of the watch-list matching 

process would be exported to a foreign 

country, which would limit the U.S. 

Government’s ability to protect that 

information. The requirement would 

also allow for better TSA oversight and 

control over this watch-list matching 

process. Because the watch-list 

matching process involves personally 

identifiable information and SSI, TSA 

seeks comments on whether to require 

covered personnel to be U.S. citizens, 

U.S. nationals, or lawful permanent 

residents of the United States. 

Section 1544.505 Application 

Proposed § 1544.505 would require 

every applicant to submit an application 

in a form and manner prescribed by 

TSA. The application would include the 

following: (1) Applicant’s full name, 

business address, business phone, and 

business email address; (2) a statement 


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32 ‘‘The Registered Traveler Security, Privacy and 

Compliance Standards for Sponsoring Entities and 

Service Providers,’’ including all appendices, is 

available on TSA’s Web site at www.tsa.gov. 

and other supporting documentation 

providing evidence of the applicants’ 

abilities and satisfaction of the required 

qualifications; (3) a system security plan 

that would satisfy standards set forth by 

TSA; and (4) a security program that 

meets the requirements set out in 

§ 1544.515. 

TSA proposes to require watch-list 

service providers to adopt a system 

security plan that satisfies TSA 

standards to ensure that watch-list 

service providers protect personally 

identifiable information and SSI. TSA 

standards would be based on the 

National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) Special Publication 

800–53, ‘‘Recommended Security 

Control for Federal Information 

Systems,’’ (NIST Special Publication 

800–53). The objective of NIST Special 

Publication 800–53 is to provide 

security controls that are consistent 

with and complementary to other 

established security standards. The 

catalog of security controls provided in 

NIST Special Publication 800–53 can be 

effectively used to demonstrate 

compliance with a variety of 

governmental, organizational, or 

institutional security standards. NIST 

Special Publication 800–53 is a widely 

recognized body of security criteria for 

Federal systems. 

TSA standards for the systems 

security plan would likely be organized 

into three classes: Management, 

Operational, and Technical. 

Management controls would focus on 

security systems program risk. 

Operational controls would address 

security methods of mechanisms that 

people (as opposed to systems) would 

implement and execute. Technical 

controls would manage security controls 

that the watch-list service provider’s 

systems would execute. These controls 

would provide automated protection 

from unauthorized access or misuse, 

facilitate detection of security 

violations, and support security 

requirements for applications and data. 

Furthermore, the NIST Federal 

Information Processing Standards 

Publication 199, ‘‘Standards for Security 

Categorization of Federal Information 

and Information Systems,’’ February 

2004, establishes security categories for 

both Federal information and 

information systems. The security 

categories are based on potential impact 

should certain events occur. Based on 

analysis of potential impacts, TSA 

believes that security categorization for 

confidentiality, integrity, and 

availability would be ‘‘High.’’ 

Consequently, security controls that 

should be applied are those that are 

commensurate with a High security 

category system. NIST Special 

Publication 800–53 contains 

implementation requirements for this 

categorization. 

Under proposed §§ 1544.505 and 

1544.515, TSA would require watch-list 

service providers to submit a system 

security plan as part of their application 

for TSA approval, and that system 

security plan would be part of the 

watch-list service providers’ security 

program. TSA requests comments on 

which standards and controls in the 

NIST Special Publication 800–53 should 

apply to watch-list service providers’ 

systems. TSA would develop the 

specific standards for the system 

security by reviewing all of the 

standards and controls in NIST Special 

Publication 800–53 and the comments 

received in response to this NPRM. 

Based on its review, TSA would issue 

a system security plan template that 

would incorporate the standards and 

controls that TSA determines would be 

appropriate to require of the watch-list 

service providers for their systems, 

similar to the process that TSA used to 

develop the information systems 

security standards for the Registered 

Traveler Interoperability Pilot.32 Watchlist service providers would have an 

opportunity to comment on the template 

including the standards. 

Section 1544.507 TSA Review and 

Approval 

Section 1544.507 proposes procedures 

for TSA’s review and approval of 

applications to perform watch-list 

matching. Upon receipt of the 

application, TSA would review the 

application and might conduct a site 

visit of the applicant’s place of business 

to determine whether the applicant 

meets TSA’s qualifications. Upon final 

review of the application by TSA, TSA 

would notify the applicant of approval 

or disapproval by written notice. After 

TSA approves an application and 

receives an attestation report for an IPA 

firm opining that the watch-list service 

provider’s system is in compliance with 

its system security plan and TSA 

standards, the watch-list service 

provider would be able to begin 

passenger vetting pursuant to the 

regulations. 

Section 1544.509 Reconsideration of 

Disapproval of an Application 

Proposed § 1544.509 would allow an 

applicant whose application has been 

disapproved to petition for 

reconsideration of TSA’s decision by 

submitting a written petition to the 

Assistant Secretary or designee within 

30 days of the notice of disapproval. 

The petition for reconsideration would 

need to include the applicant’s contact 

information and any documentation that 

the applicant believes may assist the 

Assistant Secretary in making a final 

decision. The Assistant Secretary or 

designee would also be able to request 

additional information from the 

applicant that may assist in disposing of 

the petition. 

Section 1544.511 Withdrawal of 

Approval 

Proposed § 1544.511 would state the 

procedure for TSA to withdraw the 

approval of the watch-list service 

provider if it ceases to meet the 

standards for approval, fails to fulfill its 

responsibilities, or if it is in the interest 

of security or the public. If TSA decides 

to withdraw the approval of a service 

provider, TSA would provide the 

service provider with a written notice of 

proposed withdrawal of approval, 

which would include the basis of the 

withdrawal of approval. The initial 

notice would become a final notice of 

withdrawal of approval if TSA does not 

receive a written petition of 

reconsideration within 31 days after the 

service provider’s receipt of TSA’s 

notice of proposed withdrawal of 

approval. Except in an emergency, 

during the 31 days prior to the TSA’s 

receipt of the written petition, the 

service provider would be able to 

continue conducting watch-list 

matching. Additionally, if the watch-list 

service provider did file a timely written 

petition for reconsideration, the service 

provider would be able to continue 

conducting watch-list matching, unless 

and until the service provider receives 

a final notice of withdrawal of approval. 

Once the watch-list service provider 

received a final notice of withdrawal of 

approval, the service provider would 

not be able to continue conducting 

watch-list matching. 

If TSA found an emergency situation 

requiring immediate withdrawal of the 

service provider’s approval, the 

proposed rule would allow TSA to 

withdraw the approval without prior 

notice. The emergency notice would 

include the basis of the emergency 

withdrawal of approval and would be 

effective upon receipt by the watch-list 

service provider. As above, the service 

provider would be able to file a written 

petition for reconsideration within 30 

days of receipt of the emergency notice; 

however, this would not stay the 

effective date of the emergency notice of 

withdrawal of approval. 


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Section 1544.513 Responsibilities of 

Watch-List Service Providers 

Proposed § 1544.513 describes the 

responsibilities of watch-list service 

providers under this part. These 

responsibilities would ensure that the 

watch-list service providers are 

conducting watch-list matching in a 

manner that is consistent with TSA 

standards and that protects personally 

identifiable information and SSI. Under 

proposed § 1544.513, watch-list service 

providers would have the following 

responsibilities: (1) Adopt and carry out 

a security program that meets the 

requirements of proposed § 1544.515; 

(2) comply with the system security 

plan; (3) contract with an IPA firm to 

perform periodic attestation of their 

compliance with their systems security 

plan and TSA standards, as explained in 

further detail below; (4) identify, 

handle, and protect SSI in accordance 

with 49 CFR part 1520; (5) not disclose 

information received from or sent to the 

aircraft operator or to TSA, unless 

otherwise authorized by TSA; (6) allow 

TSA to inspect watch-list service 

providers to determine their compliance 

with TSA regulations and their security 

programs; (7) adopt and make public a 

privacy policy; (8) provide 

documentation establishing compliance 

if requested by TSA; and (9) only use 

the watch-list for watch-list matching 

under proposed part 1544, subpart F. 

Because watch-list matching involves 

security and privacy issues, TSA 

proposes to require watch-list service 

providers to contract with a qualified 

IPA firm to perform an attestation of 

their compliance with their system 

security plan and TSA standards. TSA 

would consider an IPA firm qualified if 

their selection is consistent with the 

American Institute of Certified Public 

Accountants’ (AICPA) guidance 

regarding independence, and the firm 

demonstrates the capability to assess 

information system security and process 

controls. TSA would reserve the right to 

reject the IPA firm’s attestation if, in 

TSA’s judgment, the IPA firm is not 

sufficiently qualified to perform these 

services. 

TSA proposes to require that the IPA 

firm conduct the attestation in 

accordance with AICPA ‘‘Statement for 

Standards on Attestation Engagements’’ 

No. 10 and TSA standards. TSA would 

also require the IPA firm to prepare and 

submit a report, in a form and manner 

prescribed by TSA. 

As stated above, TSA would require 

watch-list service providers to obtain an 

attestation report prior to 

commencement of operations to 

conduct watch-list matching. 

Additionally, TSA would require watchlist service providers to obtain periodic 

attestation reports for the duration of 

their watch-list matching. TSA would 

require watch-list service providers to 

undergo an attestation every year and 

the IPA firm would submit an 

attestation report to TSA approximately 

12 months after submission of the 

previous attestation report. 

Section 1544.515 Security Program 

Proposed § 1544.515 would set forth 

the content requirements for a security 

program. These requirements would 

ensure that watch-list service providers 

have the capability and proper 

procedures to conduct watch-list 

matching under this subpart. Watch-list 

service providers would be required to 

adopt and carry out security programs 

that include the procedures for 

receiving passenger information from 

the aircraft operators, conducting watchlist matching of the passengers, 

including continuous vetting of 

passengers, and transmitting the watchlist matching results to the operator. The 

security program would also contain 

procedures for the service provider to 

contact TSA for resolution of passengers 

who are potential matches to the watchlist. 

Because a watch-list service 

provider’s system would contain 

personally identifiable information 

about passengers and SSI, the security 

program would include various security 

requirements to protect this 

information. These requirements 

include procedures for compliance with 

the watch-list service provider’s system 

security plan, and procedures for the 

physical security of the system used to 

conduct watch-list matching. 

Under proposed § 1544.515, TSA 

would require service providers to 

provide personnel who are available to 

TSA 24-hours a day, 7-days a week. 

TSA would operate on a 24-hour basis, 

and therefore TSA would require the 

service providers to be available at all 

times for resolution of potential watchlist matches. 

The service provider would also be 

responsible for training its covered 

personnel on the requirements in the 

TSA regulations and the security 

program. TSA training requirements 

would also include topics related to 

identifying, handling, and protecting 

SSI and personally identifiable 

information, and the procedures used to 

perform the watch-list matching and to 

resolve any potential matches. 

Subpart G—Security Threat 

Assessments for Large Aircraft Flight 

Crew, Applicants to Become TSAApproved Auditors, and Watch-List 

Service Providers Covered Personnel 

As stated in section II of the preamble, 

TSA proposes to require that flight 

crews for large aircraft operators, 

individuals authorized to perform 

screening functions, applicants to 

become TSA-approved auditors, and 

key employees to watch-list service 

providers undergo a TSA security threat 

assessment (STA). The STA would 

include fingerprint-based criminal 

history records checks and other 

analyses, including checks of 

appropriate terrorist watch-lists and 

other databases. The proposed 

information required and the 

procedures used for the STA are very 

similar to the procedures that apply to 

applicants for a hazardous materials 

endorsement (HME) on their 

commercial driver’s licenses, or a 

Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential (TWIC) under 49 CFR part 

1572. The proposed rule would add 

subpart G to part 1544 to set forth the 

requirements and procedures that 

would apply to these individuals. 

Section 1544.601 Scope and 

Expiration 

Subpart G would apply to flight crews 

of large aircraft operators, individuals 

authorized to perform screening 

functions, applicants to become TSAapproved auditors, and key employees 

of watch-list service providers that TSA 

would require to undergo security threat 

assessments. The same requirements 

and procedures would apply to all of 

these individuals. However, flight crew 

members or individuals authorized to 

perform screening functions who have 

undergone a criminal history records 

check under § 1544.229 or 1544.230 

would be grandfathered on a limited 

basis, such that they would not be 

required to undergo a STA until five 

years after TSA provided the results of 

their original CHRC. 

A Determination of No Security 

Threat would be valid for five years 

unless TSA withdraws the 

determination. Prior to the expiration of 

the five years, TSA would require flight 

crew members, applicants to become 

TSA-approved auditors, and watch-list 

service providers’ key employees to 

reapply for a new STA to continue with 

their No Security Threat status. 

Section 1544.603 Enrollment for 

Security Threat Assessments 

For TSA to conduct a comprehensive 

STA, individuals would need to provide 


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TSA with biographic information and 

their fingerprints. TSA is proposing 

§ 1544.603 to require individuals to 

provide biographic and biometric 

information necessary for TSA to 

complete the fingerprint-based checks 

and other analyses. These applicants 

would provide the information 

necessary for enrollment, including 

personal information such as gender 

and date of birth. 

To ensure that correct and accurate 

information is provided to TSA, the 

application would include, and the 

individual would sign, a statement 

providing that the statements made on 

the application are true, complete, and 

correct pursuant to penalty of law. TSA 

would also require the individual to 

include a statement that he or she has 

not been convicted, or found not guilty 

by reason of insanity, of any of the 

disqualifying crimes listed in 

§ 1544.229(d) during the 10 years before 

submission of the individual’s 

application. These are the same 

disqualifying criminal offenses that 

currently apply to flight crew members 

under § 1544.230 and to many persons 

at airports under § 1542.209. The 

statement would also include language 

that the individual understands that he 

or she must immediately inform TSA of 

any conviction of a disqualifying offense 

that occurs while he or she is a TSAapproved auditor or a watch-list service 

provider. 

TSA anticipates that the individuals 

would provide their information though 

an enrollment provider under contract 

with TSA. The enrollment provider 

would verify the identity of the 

individual, advise the individual that a 

copy of the criminal record would be 

provided if requested, and identify a 

point of contact for any questions the 

individual may have, prior to 

fingerprinting. The enrollment provider 

would then collect, control, and process 

the fingerprints of the individual and 

submit the data and the application to 

TSA. 

Section 1544.605 Content of Security 

Threat Assessment 

TSA proposes that the STA would 

include a criminal history records 

check, other analyses, and a final 

disposition. 

Section 1544.607 Criminal History 

Records Check 

As part of the security threat 

assessment, TSA proposes to perform a 

CHRC. TSA would submit the 

fingerprints provided by the individuals 

as part of the enrollment process to the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 

Criminal Justice Information Services 

(CJIS) to obtain any criminal history 

records that correspond to the 

fingerprints. Upon receipt of the results 

from FBI/CJIS, TSA would adjudicate 

the results based on the disqualifying 

criminal offenses in § 1544.229(d). 

At times, a CHRC may result in data 

that discloses an arrest for a 

disqualifying offense, but does not 

provide a disposition for the offense. 

The individual would be required to 

provide further documentation that the 

arrest did not result in a disqualifying 

offense. A conviction of a disqualifying 

offense would be reason to disqualify 

the individual. However, if the 

disposition did not result in a 

conviction, or in a finding of not guilty 

by reason of insanity, of a disqualifying 

offense, the individual would then not 

be disqualified under this section, 

provided that the applicant explains 

how the arrest was resolved. 

If the results received from the FBI 

provide a reason for disqualifying the 

individual, TSA would notify the 

individual of the disqualifying reasons. 

The individual may request a copy of 

the record on which TSA’s 

determination is based. The individual 

would be able to contact the FBI in 

order to complete or correct his or her 

record, if the individual contacts TSA 

within 30 days of being notified that the 

FBI record disclosed a disqualifying 

offense. Otherwise, TSA would make a 

Final Determination of Threat 

Assessment. 

TSA also proposes to require a 

continuing obligation of individuals 

who receive a Determination of No 

Security Threat, by requiring immediate 

notice (within 24 hours) to TSA of any 

conviction of a disqualifying offense 

that occurs while he or she holds a 

determination of no security threat that 

has not expired. 

Section 1544.609 Other Analyses 

TSA proposes to conduct other 

analyses through domestic and 

international government databases to 

confirm the individual’s identity and 

whether he or she poses a security 

threat. These would include checks 

against terrorist-related and immigration 

databases, as well as other governmental 

information sources such as those that 

identify open wants and warrants. TSA 

would adjudicate the results of all 

searches conducted including searches 

that reveal extensive foreign or domestic 

criminal convictions, convictions for a 

serious crime not listed in 49 CFR 

1572.103, or periods of foreign or 

domestic imprisonment that exceeds 

365 consecutive days. 

If an individual who has successfully 

undergone an initial security threat is 

subsequently found not to meet TSA’s 

criteria, TSA may withdraw its 

Determination of No Security Threat 

under proposed § 1544.613. 

Section 1544.611 Final Disposition 

TSA proposes that after conducting a 

CHRC and other analyses, it would 

serve a Determination of No Security 

Threat if TSA determines that an 

individual meets the STA standards. 

TSA also proposes to serve an Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment on 

the individual if TSA determines that 

the individual does not meet the STA 

standards. The Initial Determination of 

Threat Assessment would include the 

following: 

1. A statement that TSA has 

determined that the individual poses, or 

is suspected of posing, a security threat 

warranting disapproval of the 

application for which a STA is required; 

2. The basis for the determination; 

3. Information about how the 

individual may appeal the 

determination, as described in 

§ 1544.615; and 

4. A statement that if the individual 

chooses not to appeal TSA’s Initial 

Determination within 30 days after 

receipt of the Initial Determination, or 

does not request an extension of time 

within 30 days after receipt of the Initial 

Determination in order to file an appeal, 

the Initial Determination becomes a 

Final Determination of Security Threat 

Assessment. 

TSA also proposes to serve a 

Withdrawal of the Initial Determination 

of Threat Assessment or a Withdrawal 

of Final Determination of Threat 

Assessment on the individual, if the 

appeal results in a finding that the 

individual does not pose a threat to 

security. 

Section 1544.613 Withdrawal of 

Determination of No Security Threat 

TSA would be able to withdraw a 

Determination of No Security Threat at 

any time under proposed § 1544.613, if 

it determines that a TSA-auditor or 

watch-list service provider poses, or is 

suspected of posing, a security threat 

warranting withdrawal of the 

Determination of No Security Threat. If 

TSA determines that the individual 

does not meet the STA standards, TSA 

would serve a withdrawal of the 

Determination of No Security Threat on 

the individual. The notice would 

include the following: 

1. A statement that TSA has 

determined that the individual poses, or 

is suspected of posing, a security threat 

warranting disapproval of the 

application for which a STA is required; 

2. The basis for the determination; 


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3. Information about how the 

individual may appeal the 

determination; and 

4. A statement that if the individual 

chooses not to appeal TSA’s Initial 

Determination within 30 days after 

receipt of the withdrawal of the 

Determination of No Security Threat, or 

does not request an extension of time 

within 30 days after receipt of the 

withdrawal of the Determination of No 

Security Threat to file an appeal, the 

withdrawal of the Determination of No 

Security Threat becomes a Final 

Determination of Security Threat 

Assessment. 

TSA also proposes to serve a 

Withdrawal of Final Determination of 

Threat Assessment on the individual, if 

the appeal results in a finding that the 

individual does not pose a threat to 

security. 

Section 1544.615 Appeals 

If the individual appeals the Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment or 

a Withdrawal of the Determination of 

No Security Threat as discussed above, 

the procedures in 49 CFR part 1515 

would apply. The section-by-section 

analysis of part 1515 discusses which 

provisions of part 1515 would apply. 

Section 1544.617 Fees 

To comply with the mandates of sec. 

520 of the 2004 DHS Appropriations 

Act, 2004 (Pub. L. 108–90, 117 Stat. 

1137, 1156, Oct. 1, 2003), TSA proposes 

to establish fees for individuals who are 

required to complete background 

investigations under this program. 

Costs 

TSA proposes that individuals 

required to undergo a STA would be 

required to pay a fee to cover the 

following costs: 

Operational year 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year Total 

Estimated Annual Applicants ........................................... 27,918 21,034 10,074 9,975 10,115 79,116 

Cost Components 

Enrollment Costs .............................................................. $418,776 $315,507 $151,108 $149,626 $151,728 $1,186,745 

Security Threat Assessment Cost 

FBI Criminal History Records Check ........................ 481,592 362,833 173,774 172,070 174,488 1,364,757 

Other analyses .......................................................... 139,592 105,169 50,369 49,875 50,576 395,582 

System Costs ............................................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Personnel Costs ....................................................... 579,593 579,593 579,593 579,593 579,593 2,897,965 

Security Threat Assessment Cost-Subtotal .............. 1,200,777 1,047,594 803,736 801,539 804,657 4,658,303 

Grand Totals ...................................................... 1,619,553 1,363,102 954,844 951,164 956,385 5,845,049 

1. Enrollment. Part of the fee for the 

STA covers the cost for TSA or its agent 

to enroll applicants, collect, format, and 

process the required information and to 

submit the information accordingly. The 

STA process would require individuals 

who apply for a STA to submit their 

fingerprints and biographic information 

to TSA or its agent. Based on TSA’s 

research of the costs of both commercial 

and government fingerprint and 

information collection services, as well 

as a prior competitive bidding and 

acquisition process for similar services, 

TSA preliminarily estimates that the per 

applicant cost to collect and transmit 

fingerprints and other required data 

electronically is likely to be $15. TSA 

may adjust this estimated amount 

upwards or downwards in the final rule 

based on its final calculations of its 

costs. This cost would also cover related 

administrative support, help desk 

services, quality control, and related 

logistics. 

2. Security Threat Assessment. Part of 

the fee for the STA covers the cost for 

TSA to conduct a STA. For the STA, 

each applicant’s information would be 

checked against multiple databases and 

other information sources so that TSA 

would be able to determine whether the 

applicant poses a security threat that 

warrants denial of approval. The threat 

assessment would include an appeals 

process for individuals who believe that 

the records upon which TSA bases its 

determination are incorrect. 

As part of the STA, TSA would 

submit fingerprints to the FBI to obtain 

any criminal history records that 

correspond to the fingerprints. The FBI 

is authorized to establish and collect 

fees to process fingerprint identification 

records. See Title II of the Judiciary 

Appropriations Act, 1991 (Pub. L. 101– 

515, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 2112), 

codified in a note to 28 U.S.C. 534. 

Pursuant to Criminal Justice Information 

Services Information Letter 07–3 (Jun. 1, 

2007), this fee is currently set at $17.25, 

effective October 1, 2007. If the FBI 

increases or decreases its fee to 

complete the criminal history records 

check, the increase or decrease would 

apply to this regulation on the date that 

the new FBI fee becomes effective. 

TSA would need to implement and 

maintain the appropriate systems, 

resources, and personnel to ensure that 

fingerprints and applicant information 

are appropriately linked and that TSA 

would be able to receive and act on the 

results of the STA. TSA would need to 

have the necessary resources—including 

labor, equipment, database access, and 

overhead—to complete the STA process. 

TSA estimates that the total cost of 

threat assessment services will be 

$4,658,303 over five years. This estimate 

includes $1,364,757 for FBI criminal 

history records checks, $395,582 for 

other analyses, and $2,897,965 for 

personnel necessary to facilitate the 

STA processing. These estimates are 

initial estimates and the final costs may 

be higher or lower depending on the 

final calculations which would be 

discussed in the final rule. 

Population 

TSA estimates that approximately 

79,116 applicants would be required to 

complete a STA during the first five 

years of the program. This estimate is 

derived from the following population 

figures that have been gathered for 

specific segments of the regulated 

population. 


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Operational year 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year Total 

Flight Crew Estimate* 

Part 91s ............................................................................................ 19,440 16,189 5,427 5,503 5,580 52,139 

Part 125s .......................................................................................... 293 244 82 83 84 785 

Part 135s .......................................................................................... 7,886 4,586 4,550 4,374 4,436 25,831 

Flight Crew Estimate-Subtotal ................................................................. 27,618 21,018 10,058 9,960 10,100 78,755 

Third-Party Auditor Estimate .................................................................... 150 8 8 8 8 180 

Watch-list Service Provider Estimate ...................................................... 150 8 8 8 8 182 

Grand Total ....................................................................................... 27,918 21,034 10,074 9,975 10,115 79,116 

* Cites are to FAA regulations, 14 CFR. 

Total Fee 

TSA would charge a fee to recover its 

STA and other program management 

and oversight costs associated with the 

implementation of this rule. TSA 

estimates that applicant charge would 

be $74 per applicant. The estimate is 

based on the following preliminary 

calculations by TSA: the cost of services 

provided ($5,845,049) divided by the 

estimated population (79,116) receiving 

the service would equal $74 per 

applicant. As TSA continues to review 

and develop the STA program for the 

large aircraft program and to work to 

minimize all costs, some or all of its 

preliminary calculations may change 

resulting in an increase or decrease of 

the per applicant cost. In the final rule, 

TSA will publish the fee based on its 

final calculations, and the fee may 

remain $74 or it may be more or less. 

TSA proposes to establish the $74 fee 

to recover all enrollment costs and STA 

costs. As part of the $74 fee, TSA would 

collect the current FBI Fingerprinting 

Fee of $17.25 for the criminal history 

records checks in the STA process and 

forward the fee to the FBI. If the FBI 

increases or decreases that fee in the 

future, TSA would collect the increased 

or decreased fee. 

Additionally, pursuant to the Chief 

Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 

101–576, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2838), 

DHS is required to review fees no less 

than every two years. 31 U.S.C. 3512. 

Upon review, if it is found that the fees 

are either too high (i.e., total fees exceed 

the total cost to provide the services) or 

too low (i.e., total fees do not cover the 

total costs to provide the services), the 

fee would be adjusted. Finally, TSA 

would be able to adjust the fees for 

inflation following publication of the 

final rule. If TSA were to adjust the fees 

for this reason, TSA would publish a 

Notice in the Federal Register notifying 

the public of the change. 

Section 1544.619 Notice to Employers 

TSA would notify employers of flight 

crew members, individuals authorized 

to perform screening functions, and 

watch-list service provider covered 

personnel of the results of the security 

threat assessment under proposed 

§ 1544.619. This notification would 

allow aircraft operators or watch-list 

service providers to know whether an 

individual may be employed to perform 

the functions that would require a 

successful STA. Although TSA would 

notify an aircraft operator or a watch-list 

service provider that an individual 

received a Final Determination of Threat 

Assessment, TSA would not inform the 

aircraft operator or watch-list service 

provider of the basis of that 

determination to protect the privacy of 

that individual. 

TSA proposes to require aircraft 

operators and watch-list service 

providers to retain the notification of 

the results of the STA for five years. The 

notification would serve as 

documentation that an individual has 

undergone a STA if the aircraft operator 

or watch-list service provider is asked to 

produce such documentation as part of 

an audit or inspection. 

Part 1515—Appeals and Waiver 

Procedures for Security Threat 

Assessment for Individuals 

For individuals who may want to 

appeal an Initial Determination of 

Threat Assessment, a Final 

Determination of Threat Assessment, or 

a Withdrawal of an Initial or Final 

Determination of Threat Assessment, 

TSA proposes to apply the appeals 

procedures in current part 1515. These 

are the same procedures that apply to 

applicants for a hazardous materials 

endorsement on their commercial 

driver’s license or a Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential under 

49 CFR part 1572, or for certain air cargo 

workers under 49 CFR part 1540, 

subpart C. 

Section 1515.1 Scope 

TSA proposes to add individuals 

subject to proposed part 1544, subpart G 

to the scope of part 1515 to provide 

these individuals with a process to 

appeal an Initial Determination of 

Threat Assessment, a Final 

Determination of Threat Assessment, or 

a Withdrawal of an Initial or Final 

Determination of No Security Threat. 

Section 1515.5 Appeal of Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment 

Based on Criminal Conviction, 

Immigration Status, or Mental Capacity 

Because the STAs for flight crew 

members, individuals authorized to 

perform screening functions, auditors, 

and watch-list service provider covered 

personnel involve criminal history 

records checks, TSA proposes to apply 

the procedures in § 1515.5 for these 

individuals to appeal an Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment 

based on a disqualifying criminal 

offense. 

An individual would be able to 

appeal an Initial Determination of 

Threat Assessment under § 1515.5 if he 

asserts that he does not have a 

disqualifying criminal offense. These 

procedures would also apply to appeals 

of a Withdrawal of Determination of No 

Security Threat based on a disqualifying 

criminal offense. An individual would 

initiate an appeal by providing TSA 

with a written request for the releasable 

materials upon which the Initial 

Determination was based, or by serving 

TSA with a written reply to the Initial 

Determination. The individual would be 

required to serve TSA with the written 

request for the releasable material or the 

written reply with 60 days after the date 

of service of the Initial Determination. 

TSA’s response would be due no later 

than 60 days after the individual is 

served with a written request or the 

written reply. 

In response, TSA cannot provide any 

classified information, as defined under 

6 CFR part 7 (DHS Classified National 

Security Information); or under E.O. 

12958, Classified National Security 

Information, as amended by E.O. 13292 

(68 FR 15315, Mar. 28, 2003); and E.O. 

12968, Access to Classified Information, 

(60 FR 40245, Aug, 7, 1995); or any 

other information or material protected 

from disclosure by law. Classified 

national security information is 


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information that the President or 

another authorized Federal official has 

determined, pursuant to E.O. 12958, as 

amended, and E.O. 12968, must be 

protected against unauthorized 

disclosure to safeguard the security of 

American citizens, the country’s 

democratic institutions, and America’s 

participation within the community of 

nations. See 60 FR 19825 (Apr. 20, 

1995). E.O. 12958, as amended, and E.O. 

12968 prohibit Federal employees from 

disclosing classified information to 

individuals who have not been cleared 

to have access to such information 

under the requirements of that E.O. See 

also 6 CFR part 7. If TSA determines 

that an applicant is requesting classified 

materials, TSA would deny the request 

for classified information. 

In the written reply to the Initial 

Determination, the individual should 

explain why he or she is appealing the 

Initial Determination and provide 

evidence that the Initial Determination 

was incorrect. In an applicant’s reply, 

TSA would consider only material that 

is relevant to whether he or she meets 

the standards for the STA. If an 

individual does not dispute or reply to 

the Initial Determination, the Initial 

Determination would become a Final 

Determination of Threat Assessment. 

An individual would have the 

opportunity to correct a record on 

which an adverse decision is based. As 

long as the record is not classified or 

protected by law from release, TSA 

would notify the applicant of the 

adverse information and provide a copy 

of the record. If the individual wishes to 

correct the inaccurate information, he or 

she would need to provide written proof 

that the record is inaccurate. The 

individual should contact the 

jurisdiction responsible for the 

inaccurate information to complete or 

correct the information contained in the 

record. The individual would be 

required to provide TSA with the 

revised record or a certified true copy of 

the information from the appropriate 

entity before TSA can reach a 

determination that the applicant does 

not pose a security threat. 

In considering an appeal, the 

Assistant Secretary would review the 

Initial Determination, the materials 

upon which the Initial Determination is 

based, the applicant’s reply and other 

materials or information available to 

TSA. The Assistant Secretary would be 

able to affirm the Initial Determination 

by concluding that an individual poses 

a security threat. If this occurs, TSA 

would serve a Final Determination of 

Threat Assessment on the applicant. 

The Final Determination would include 

a statement that the Assistant Secretary 

has reviewed the Initial Determination, 

the materials upon which the Initial 

Determination was based, the reply, if 

any, and other available information 

and has determined that the individual 

has a disqualifying criminal offense. For 

purposes of judicial review, a Final 

Determination based on a disqualifying 

criminal offense is a final TSA order. 

If TSA determines that the individual 

does not have a disqualifying criminal 

offense, TSA would serve a Withdrawal 

of the Initial Determination on the 

individual and a Determination of No 

Security Threat on the individual’s 

employer if the individual is a flight 

crew member, an individual authorized 

to perform screening functions, or a 

watch-list service provider covered 

personnel. 

As noted above, TSA is proposing to 

apply to flight crew members, 

individuals authorized to perform 

screening functions, auditors, and 

watch-list service provider covered 

personnel the same disqualifying 

criminal offenses that now apply to 

certain other aviation workers under 49 

CFR 1542.209 and 1544.229. These 

sections are based on a statutory 

provision, 49 U.S.C. 44936. The appeal 

process in § 1515.5 addresses whether 

or not the applicant has a disqualifying 

criminal offense, that is, whether the 

applicant has a conviction or a finding 

of not guilty by reason of insanity of one 

or more of the crimes listed in the rule 

within the time specified in the rule. If 

the individual does have a disqualifying 

criminal offense, there is no waiver. 

Accordingly, the waiver provisions that 

apply to applicants for an HME or a 

TWIC in § 1515.7 would not apply. 

Section 1515.9 Appeal of Security 

Threat Assessment Based on Other 

Analyses 

The STA for flight crew members, 

individuals authorized to perform 

screening functions, auditors, and key 

employees of watch-list service 

providers would also include other 

analyses, including checks of 

appropriate terrorist watch-lists and 

related databases under proposed 

§ 1544.609. TSA proposes to use the 

appeals procedures in § 1515.9 for 

individuals who wish to appeal an 

Initial Determination of Threat 

Assessment or a withdrawal of a 

Determination of No Security Threat 

based on the other analyses. 

The procedures in § 1515.9 are similar 

to the procedures in § 1515.5. However, 

unlike a Final Determination of Security 

Threat Assessment based on a 

disqualifying criminal offense, a Final 

Determination based on other analyses 

would not be a final TSA order unless 

the individual fails to file an appeal to 

an administrative law judge (ALJ) under 

§ 1515.11. 

Further, because other analyses are 

often based on classified and other 

sensitive information, there would be 

limits on what TSA would release in 

response to a request for materials. If 

TSA determines that an applicant who 

is appealing the other analyses is 

requesting classified materials, TSA 

would deny the request for classified 

information. 

The denial of access to classified 

information under these circumstances 

is also consistent with the treatment of 

classified information under the 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 

which specifically exempts such 

information from the general 

requirement under FOIA that 

government documents are subject to 

public disclosure. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). 

Similarly, under 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the 

Assistant Secretary of TSA shall, 

notwithstanding the FOIA statute, 

prescribe regulations prohibiting the 

public disclosure of information that 

would be detrimental to the security of 

transportation. Information that is 

designated as SSI must only be 

disclosed to people with a need to 

know, such as those needing to carry 

out regulatory security duties. 49 CFR 

1520.11. The Assistant Secretary has 

defined information concerning threats 

against transportation as SSI by 

regulation. See 49 CFR 1520.5. Thus, 

information that TSA obtains indicating 

that an applicant poses a security threat, 

including the source of such 

information and the methods through 

which the information was obtained, 

will commonly be at least SSI and may 

be classified information. The purpose 

of designating such information as SSI 

is to ensure that persons who seek to 

harm the transportation system do not 

obtain access to information that will 

enable them to evade the government’s 

efforts to detect and prevent their 

activities. Disclosure of this 

information, especially to an individual 

specifically suspected of posing a threat 

to the transportation system, is precisely 

the type of harm that Congress sought to 

avoid by authorizing the Assistant 

Secretary to define and protect SSI. 

Other pieces of information also are 

protected from disclosure by law due to 

their sensitivity in law enforcement and 

intelligence. In some instances, the 

release of information about a particular 

individual or his or her supporters or 

associates could have a substantial 

adverse impact on security matters. The 

release by TSA of the identities or other 

information regarding individuals 

related to a security threat 


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determination could jeopardize sources 

and methods of the intelligence 

community, the identities of 

confidential sources, and techniques 

and procedures for law enforcement 

investigations or prosecution. See 5 

U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(D) and (E). Release of 

such information also could have a 

substantial adverse impact on ongoing 

investigations being conducted by 

Federal law enforcement agencies, by 

revealing the course and progress of an 

investigation. In certain instances, 

release of information could alert coconspirators to the extent of the Federal 

investigation and the imminence of 

their own detection, thus provoking 

flight. 

For the reasons discussed above, TSA 

would not provide classified 

information or SSI to an individual, and 

TSA reserves the right to withhold SSI 

or other sensitive material protected 

from disclosure under law. As noted 

above, TSA expects that information 

would be withheld only for 

determinations based on § 1572.107, 

which list databases that indicate 

potential terrorist activity or threats. 

The procedures for appeals of Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment 

would also apply to appeals of a 

Withdrawal of Determination of No 

Security Threat. 

Section 1515.11 Review by 

Administrative Law Judge and TSA 

Final Decision Maker 

An individual who has received an 

Initial Determination of Threat 

Assessment or a withdrawal of 

Determination of No Security Threat 

based on the other analyses under 

§ 1544.609 would first appeal that 

determination using the procedures in 

§ 1515.9. If after that appeal TSA 

continues its determination that the 

applicant is not qualified, the applicant 

would be able to seek review by an ALJ 

under § 1515.11. 

The procedures would provide an 

individual with 30 calendar days from 

the date of service of the determination 

to request a review. An ALJ who 

possesses the appropriate security 

clearances to review classified 

information would conduct the review. 

Section 1515.11 provides detailed 

requirements for the conduct of the 

review, such as information that 

individuals must submit, requests for 

extension of time, and the duties of the 

ALJ. 

Within 30 calendar days after the 

conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ 

would issue an unclassified decision to 

the parties. The ALJ may issue a 

classified decision to TSA. The ALJ may 

decide that the decision was supported 

by substantial evidence on the record or 

that the decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence on the record. If 

neither party requests a review of the 

ALJ’s decision, TSA would issue a final 

order either granting or denying the 

waiver or the appeal. 

Either TSA or the individual would 

be able to petition for review of the 

ALJ’s decision to the TSA Final 

Decision Maker. The TSA Final 

Decision Maker would issue a written 

decision within 60 calendar days after 

receipt of the petition or within 30 days 

of receipt of the other party’s response, 

if a response is filed, unless a longer 

period is required. The TSA Final 

Decision Maker may issue an 

unclassified opinion to the parties and 

a classified opinion to TSA. For 

purposes of judicial review, the decision 

of the TSA Final Decision Maker would 

be a final agency order. 

Part 1550—Aircraft Security Under 

General Operating and Flight Rules 

Section 1550.5 Operations Using a 

Sterile Area 

TSA proposes to remove the reference 

to scheduled passenger operations, 

public charter passenger operations, and 

private charter passenger operations, 

and replace the language with ‘‘aircraft 

operators that have a security program’’ 

to maintain consistency between 

regulations. TSA also proposes to delete 

the compliance date section since the 

date has passed. Operators that must 

follow this section should currently be 

adhering to the applicable regulations. 

Section 1550.7 Operations in Aircraft 

Over 12,500 Pounds 

TSA proposes to amend references to 

‘‘12,500 pounds or more,’’ and replace 

the language with ‘‘over 12,500 pounds’’ 

to maintain consistency between 

regulations. The proposed changes 

would provide that § 1550.7 only 

applies to aircraft over 12,500 pounds, 

excluding operations specified in § 

1550.5 and operations under a security 

program under part 1544 and 1546. The 

aircraft that remain subject to this 

regulation are the foreign aircraft with 

an MTOW of over 12,500 pounds that 

are not an all-cargo operation or are 

under a security program under part 

1546. 

IV. Regulatory Requirements 

A. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.) requires 

that TSA consider the impact of 

paperwork and other information 

collection burdens imposed on the 

public and, under the provisions of PRA 

section 3507(d), obtain approval from 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for each collection of 

information it conducts, sponsors, or 

requires through regulations. 

This proposed rule contains amended 

information collection activities subject 

to the PRA. TSA is revising a collection 

that OMB has previously approved and 

assigned OMB Control Number 1652– 

0003 (Aircraft Operator Security). 

Accordingly, TSA has submitted the 

following information requirements to 

OMB for its review. 

Title: Large Aircraft Security Program. 

Summary: TSA proposes to amend 

current aviation transportation security 

regulations (49 CFR part 1544) to 

enhance and improve the security of GA 

by issuing this NPRM that would 

require revisions to a currently 

approved information collection. 

Through this NPRM, TSA is proposing 

the following seven required 

information collections in addition to 

those already approved under this OMB 

control number: (1) Require security 

programs for all operators of aircraft that 

have a maximum certificated takeoff 

weight of over 12,500 pounds, except 

for aircraft operators under a full 

program, full all-cargo program, limited 

program, or certain government aircraft 

(‘‘large aircraft’’); (2) require that aircraft 

operator flight crews, individuals 

authorized to perform screening 

functions, TSA-approved auditors, and 

TSA-approved watch-list service 

providers’ key personnel undergo STAs 

that include a fingerprint-based criminal 

history records check; (3) require large 

aircraft operators to submit to an 

independent, third-party audit 

conducted by TSA-approved auditors 

(i.e., large aircraft operators would be 

required to maintain records, and 

provide auditors access to their records, 

equipment, and facilities necessary for 

the auditor to conduct an audit); (4) 

require TSA oversight of auditors (i.e., 

TSA-approved auditors would submit to 

any TSA inspection, include copying of 

their records, to determine their 

compliance with TSA regulations); (5) 

require large aircraft operators to 

transmit passenger information to TSAapproved watch-list service providers to 

conduct watch-list matching against the 

No-Fly and Selectee Lists; (6) require 

auditors and watch-list service 

providers to submit applications to 

become TSA-approved; and (7) require 

watch-list service providers to submit 

security programs for approval. 

Use of: The LASP requirement would 

replace some existing security programs 

for large aircraft operators and would 

include additional GA operators, such 

that TSA would apply consistent 


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security procedures to operators of large 

aircraft. TSA would use the identifying 

information and fingerprints collected 

from flight crew members, auditors, and 

key employees of TSA-approved watchlist service providers to conduct STAs 

that include a criminal history records 

check. The TSA-approved auditors 

would review and inspect the records 

aircraft operators would be required to 

maintain to demonstrate compliance 

with TSA requirements during their 

audits. TSA would inspect the records 

maintained by the auditors to determine 

their compliance with TSA regulations 

and to ensure that auditors have the 

qualification to produce useful audits to 

TSA and the aircraft operators. The 

watch-list service providers would use 

the passenger information transmitted 

by the aircraft operators to conduct 

watch-list matching against the No Fly 

and Selectee Lists. TSA would use the 

applications submitted by auditors and 

watch-list service providers to ensure 

the entities are eligible and qualified. 

TSA would require watch-list service 

providers to adopt and carry out a 

security program to ensure that they are 

taking appropriate security measures 

and are consistent and accurate in 

performance of their duties. 

Respondents (including number of): 

The likely respondents to this proposed 

information requirement are: operators 

of aircraft that have a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight of over 

12,500 pounds, except for aircraft 

operators under a full program, full allcargo program, limited program, or 

certain government aircraft (‘‘large 

aircraft’’); individuals authorized to 

perform screening functions; entities 

seeking to become TSA-approved 

auditors; and entities seeking to become 

TSA-approved watch-list matching 

service providers and key personnel. 

Frequency: The proposed 

recordkeeping requirements would be 

ongoing and continuous. The 

requirement that operators ensure their 

flight crewmembers, other employees, 

and individuals authorized to perform 

screening functions undergo a security 

threat assessment, which includes a 

criminal history records check, would 

be a frequency of every five years. The 

aircraft operators would be required to 

transmit passenger information to 

watch-list service providers to conduct 

watch-list matching on a per flight basis. 

The watch-list service providers would 

be required to report matches to the 

Federal watch-list as matches occur. 

Individuals and firms desiring to 

become TSA-approved auditors as well 

as firms seeking approval to become 

watch-list service providers would be 

required to send TSA an application 

only once. Watch-list service providers 

also would be required to submit a 

security program to TSA once, and 

would be required to ensure their 

covered personnel undergo a STA 

conducted by TSA once every five 

years. Auditors would be required to 

submit an audit report to the aircraft 

operator and to TSA for every audit that 

they perform. 

Annual Burden Estimate: TSA is 

amending this information collection to 

reflect the addition of approximately 

9,544 new respondents, as well as new 

collection burdens, for an estimated 

total 10,374 respondents. Over three 

years, the new population includes 

9,363 new large aircraft operators, 166 

TSA-approved auditors, and 15 watchlist service providers. TSA estimates 

that the large aircraft operators would 

spend approximately 1 million hours 

annually establishing and/or 

maintaining appropriate security 

programs, completing passenger watchlist matching in the prescribed manner, 

completing STAs on flight 

crewmembers, and completing third 

party audits of established security 

programs. 

TSA estimates that the TSA-approved 

auditors would spend approximately 

19,660 hours annually, with an annual 

4,990 responses, submitting application 

materials and profiles, completing STAs 

on their employees, and writing up their 

findings and submitting copies to the 

aircraft operator and TSA. TSA 

estimates that the total annual hour 

burden for watch-list service providers 

would be approximately 88 hours, 

which includes submitting application 

materials (including a security program 

and profile information) and conducting 

STAs on their employees in order to 

receive TSA approval. 

TSA is also amending the cost burden 

for this information collection to reflect 

an expanded respondent population and 

new information collection costs. As a 

result of the LASP, non-AOSSP 

operators would be required to pay fees 

to submit passenger information to 

watch-list service providers, conduct 

security threat assessments on their 

flight crew members and individuals 

authorized to perform screening 

functions, and contract with TSAapproved auditors. TSA-approved 

auditors and watch-list service 

providers would also pay fees to 

conduct STAs on their employees. In 

total, these requirements would add 

$10.5 million to the average annual cost 

of this information collection, bringing 

the total annual cost of the information 

collection (which includes costs to 

AOSSP aircraft operators) to $12.9 

million. 

TSA is soliciting comments to— 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

information requirement is necessary for 

the proper performance of the functions 

of the agency, including whether the 

information will have practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including using 

appropriate automated, electronic, 

mechanical, or other technological 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology. 

Individuals and organizations may 

submit comments on the information 

collection requirements by December 

29, 2008. Direct the comments to the 

address listed in the ADDRESSES section 

of this document, and fax a copy of 

them to the Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs, Office of 

Management and Budget, Attention: 

DHS–TSA Desk Officer, at (202) 395- 

5806. A comment to OMB is most 

effective if OMB receives it within 30 

days of publication. TSA will publish 

the OMB control number for this 

information collection in the Federal 

Register after OMB approves it. 

As protection provided by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act, as amended, 

an agency may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a collection of information unless it 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

B. Regulatory Impact Analyses 

1. Regulatory Evaluation Summary 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866, Regulatory 

Planning and Review (58 FR 51735, 

October 4, 1993), directs each Federal 

agency to propose or adopt a regulation 

only upon a reasoned determination 

that the benefits of the intended 

regulation justify its costs. Second, the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 

U.S.C. 601, et seq., as amended by the 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996) requires 

agencies to analyze the economic 

impact of regulatory changes on small 

entities. Third, OMB directs agencies to 

assess the effect of regulatory changes 

on international trade. Fourth, the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

(2 U.S.C. 1531–1538) requires agencies 

to prepare a written assessment of the 

costs, benefits, and other effects of 

proposed or final rules that include a 

Federal mandate likely to result in the 


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33U.S. Department of Transportation 

memorandum, Treatment of the Economic Value of 

a Statistical Life in Departmental Analyses. Office 

of the Secretary of Transportation, February 5, 2008. 

expenditure by State, local, or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $100 million or more 

annually (adjusted for inflation). 

TSA has prepared a separate detailed 

analysis document, which is available to 

the public in the docket. With respect to 

these analyses, TSA provides the 

following conclusions and summary 

information. 

• TSA has determined that this is an 

economically significant rule within the 

definition of E.O. 12866, as estimated 

annual costs or benefits exceed $100 

million in any year. The mandatory 

OMB Circular A–4, Regulatory Analysis, 

accounting statement is included in the 

separate complete analysis and is not 

repeated here. 

• As a normal practice, we provide 

the Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis (IRFA) to the public, but 

withhold the final formal certification of 

determination as required by the RFA 

until after we receive public comments 

and publish the Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis. The IRFA reflects 

substantial gaps in data where TSA was 

unable to identify either impacted 

entities or revenues for those that are 

businesses. TSA has provided the 

analysis based upon available data and 

requests public comment on all aspects 

of the analysis. As a result, TSA makes 

no preliminary finding as to whether 

there is or is not a significant impact on 

a substantial number of small 

businesses. 

• The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 

prohibits Federal agencies from 

establishing any standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 

safety, are not considered unnecessary 

obstacles. The statute also requires 

consideration of international standards 

and, where appropriate, that they be the 

basis for U.S. standards. TSA has 

assessed the potential effect of this 

notice of proposed rulemaking and has 

determined this rule would not have an 

adverse impact on international trade. 

• The regulatory evaluation provides 

the required written assessment of 

Unfunded Mandates. The proposed rule 

is not likely to result in the expenditure 

by State, local, or tribal governments, in 

the aggregate, of $100 million or more 

annually (adjusted for inflation). 

However, because the rule is 

economically significant as defined by 

E.O. 12866, it does have an unfunded 

mandate impact on the economy as a 

whole. 

2. Executive Order 12866 Assessment 

Benefits 

The proposed rule would yield 

benefits in the areas of security and 

quality governance. The security and 

governance benefits are four-fold. First, 

the rule would enhance security by 

expanding the mandatory use of 

security measures to certain operators of 

large aircraft that are not currently 

required to have a security plan. These 

measures would deter malicious 

individuals from perpetrating acts that 

might compromise transportation or 

national security by using large aircraft 

for these purposes. Second, it would 

harmonize, as appropriate, security 

measures used by a single operator in its 

various operations and between 

different operators. Third, the new 

periodic audits of security programs 

would augment TSA’s efforts to ensure 

that large aircraft operators are in 

compliance with their security 

programs. Finally, it would consolidate 

the regulatory framework for large 

aircraft operators that currently operate 

under a variety of security programs, 

thus simplifying the regulations and 

allowing for better governance. When 

taken together, the security-related 

benefits would act as part of the larger 

benefits yielded by TSA’s layered 

security approach. 

At this time, TSA cannot quantify 

these benefits; however, TSA conducted 

a ‘‘break-even’’ analysis to determine 

what reduction of overall risk of a terror 

attack and resulting reduction in the 

expected losses for the nation due to a 

terror attack would be necessary in 

order for the expected benefits of the 

rule to exceed the costs. Because the 

types of attacks that would be prevented 

by this regulation vary widely in their 

intensity and effects, depending both on 

the intent of those undertaking the 

attack and their effectiveness in 

completing it, TSA considered three 

example attack scenarios and the 

monetized losses associated with each. 

Similar break-even analyses have been 

undertaken in support of other DHS 

rules, and TSA has coordinated the 

current analysis with these earlier ones, 

with the aim of maintaining consistency 

in DHS analyses and results. In the case 

of the LASP proposed rule, some of the 

types of terror attacks that might be 

undertaken using aircraft operated by 

those covered under the proposed rule 

are similar to those that were considered 

by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), and this similarity has informed 

the current analysis and examples. For 

one scenario, however, TSA has relied 

on DHS research into the effects of 

successful delivery of a weapon of mass 

destruction (WMD) by an aircraft of the 

type affected by the proposed rule. The 

conclusions of this DHS research are 

consistent with results from existing 

academic and think tank research into 

similar issues. 

In order to compare the losses 

associated with each scenario to the cost 

of the proposed rule, TSA converted 

casualties into a monetary total. TSA 

used the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) 

of $5.8 million that is used by the 

Department of Transportation (DOT), 

and which was recently revised to 

reflect current academic and other 

research into this quantity.33 The VSL 

represents an individual’s willingness to 

pay to avoid a fatality onboard an 

aircraft, based on economic studies of 

the value individuals place on small 

changes in risk. Similarly, based on the 

same DOT guidance, TSA valued 

moderate injuries at 1.55 percent of the 

VSL and severe injuries at 18.75 percent 

of the VSL. TSA emphasizes that the 

VSL is a statistical value of a unit 

decrease in expected fatalities to be 

used for regulatory comparison, and 

does not suggest that the actual value of 

a particular individual’s life can be 

stated in dollar terms. 

The following paragraphs present a 

description of the four scenarios 

considered by TSA with corresponding 

estimates of their monetary 

consequences. These scenarios make up 

a wide range of possible consequences, 

which reflects the varied opportunities 

for attack and targeting that may exist 

for those intent on doing the nation 

harm. In order to compare direct costs 

to direct benefits, TSA presents only the 

direct economic losses estimated to 

result from the attack scenarios and has 

omitted economic ‘‘ripple effects’’ and 

economic transfers from its calculations. 

Scenario 1 contemplates a situation 

where a large aircraft is used as a 

missile to attack an unpopulated or 

lightly populated area, resulting in 

minimal loss of life, moderate injuries 

and destruction of the aircraft. Of the 

scenarios considered, this is the most 

restrained in its level of envisioned 

harm. It is assumed that a loss of 3 lives 

occurs, along with 10 moderate injuries 

and the complete hull loss of the 

aircraft. Using the DOT VSL of $5.8 

million, the monetary estimate 

associated with the loss of life is $17.4 

million. Again using DOT guidance, 

moderate injuries to those affected are 

valued at 1.55% of the VSL, or $89,900. 

To estimate the value of the lost aircraft, 


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34Federal Aviation Administration. 2007. 

Economic Values for FAA Investment and 

Regulatory Decisions, A Guide. Prepared by GRA, 

Inc. December 31, 2004 (updated). Table 5–7. This 

table reports 2003 value estimates, and the 2003 

estimate of $7.2 million was brought to the 2008 

value of $9.3 million using the FAA recommended 

method described in the document in Section 9.6 

(page 9–9), which relies on the BLS producer price 

index series for civil aircraft, available in the 

producer price index values for commodities at 

http://stats.bls.gov/ppi/home.htm. 

35Regulatory Assessment & Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis for the Final Rule, Passenger 

Manifests for Commercial Aircraft Arriving in and 

Departing from the United States; Passenger and 

Crew Manifests for Commercial Vessels Departing 

from the United States. Table 12, page 35. 

36Regulatory Assessment & Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis for the Final Rule, Passenger 

Manifests for commercial Aircraft Arriving in and 

Departing from the United States; Passenger and 

Crew Manifests for Commercial Vessels Departing 

from the United States. Table 13, page 36. 

37Thompson, Jr., William C. Comptroller, City of 

New York. ‘‘One Year Later: The Fiscal Impact of 

9/11 on New York City.’’ September 4, 2002. 

38 ‘‘Economic Consequences of a Nuclear 

Detonation in an Urban Area’’ undated DHS draft. 

TSA used $9.3 million, which is the 

2008 average market value of a General 

Aviation jet aircraft weighing between 

12,500 and 65,000 pounds.34 Taken 

together, the monetary consequence of 

this scenario totals $32 million, or 

$0.032 billion. 

Scenario 2 also contemplates a 

situation where a large aircraft is used 

as a missile to attack a populated area, 

resulting in significantly greater loss of 

life and injuries, and destruction of the 

aircraft. It is assumed that a loss of 250 

lives occurs, along with 250 severe 

injuries and the complete hull loss of 

the aircraft. Using the DOT VSL of $5.8 

million, the monetary estimate 

associated with the loss of life is $1.45 

billion. Again using DOT guidance, 

severe injuries to those affected are 

valued at 18.75% of the VSL, or $1.1 

million, the monetary impact of these 

injuries total $272 million. To estimate 

the value of the lost aircraft, TSA used 

$9.3 million, which is the 2008 average 

market value of a General Aviation jet 

aircraft weighing between 12,500 and 

65,000 pounds. Taken together, the 

monetary consequence of this scenario 

totals $1.73 billion. The level of damage 

in this type of scenario is consistent 

with the scenarios considered for the 

CBP APIS Final Rule analysis, although 

the current analysis also includes a 

component of severe injuries.35

Scenario 3 contemplates a situation 

where a large aircraft is used as a 

missile to carry out a direct attack on a 

building in a densely populated urban 

area. Because of these locational details, 

a successful attack would result in 

much more severe consequences, 

including significantly increased loss of 

life and widespread real property 

damage, compared to Scenario 1. For 

valuation purposes for this scenario, 

TSA assumes 3,000 fatalities, valued at 

$17.4 billion using the DOT VSL of $5.8 

million. To maintain consistency with 

existing DHS analyses, in particular the 

APIS analysis,36 TSA assumes property 

losses totaling $21.8 billion; this total is 

motivated by comparison to the City of 

New York Comptroller’s estimate of 

direct losses to the city due to the 

September 11 attacks.37 However, TSA 

also assumes that 9,000 severe injuries 

would also result from such an attack. 

These severe injuries, valued at 18.75% 

of the VSL based on the DOT guidance, 

have a monetary valuation of $9.79 

billion. Finally, based on the FAA 

estimate of aircraft value, losses in 

Scenario 3 include $9.3 million due to 

complete hull loss of the aircraft used in 

the attack. The scenario elements 

aggregate to a total consequence of $49.0 

billion. 

Finally, Scenario 4 contemplates a 

catastrophic situation in which a large 

aircraft is used to deliver a nuclear or 

biohazard device to an urban center. 

The costs associated with a scenario 

such as this have been examined by 

DHS in detail for a nuclear device.38

This research concludes that the 

consequences of such an event would be 

immense, with a wide range of 

uncertainty. For the present analysis, 

TSA is using a value of $1 trillion for 

the direct consequences of an attack of 

this severity. This value falls in the 

midrange of the values developed in the 

DHS research, and is consistent with 

results obtained from a review of 

academic and think tank research into 

the consequences of nuclear and 

bioterror attacks on urban areas. The 

value of $1 trillion results from loss of 

life in an attacked urban area in the 

hundreds of thousands and enormous 

loss of property and productive assets. 

Figure 1 below displays the impacts 

and monetary consequences identified 

for each of these scenarios. TSA 

compared the monetary consequence 

from a successful attack with the cost of 

the proposed LASP. To judge the value 

or effectiveness of the LASP proposed 

rule in the context of these scenarios, it 

is necessary to compare the extent of 

monetary consequence from a 

successful attack with the cost of a 

program like LASP that would be 

deployed to reduce the risk or 

likelihood of such an attack being 

successfully undertaken. The annual 

risk reductions required for the 

proposed rule to break even under each 

of the four scenarios are presented 

below. In this analysis the comparison 

is made between the estimated scenario 

consequence and the LASP discounted 

annualized cost of $194.1 million, using 

a discount rate of 7%; the ‘‘required risk 

reduction’’ for breakeven is simply the 

ratio between this annualized program 

cost and the scenario consequence total. 

As shown, depending on the attack 

scenario, underlying baseline risk of 

terror attack would have to be reduced 

less than 1 percent (Scenarios 3 and 4) 

to 11 percent (Scenario 2) in order for 

the rule to break even. If only avoidance 

of quantified direct losses is considered, 

preventing the impact characterized in 

Scenario 1 is not sufficient to offset the 

LASP program’s annualized costs, even 

if a Scenario 1 outcome were a certainty, 

expressed as a baseline risk of 100%, 

and the chance of this were eliminated 

entirely (100 percent risk reduction). 


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FIGURE 1—REQUIRED REDUCTION IN ANNUAL RISK NECESSARY (%) FOR LASP ANNUALIZED DISCOUNTED COSTS

($194.1 M) TO EQUAL EXPECTED BENEFITS, BY ATTACK SCENARIO

Scenario Scale Loss of life 

Valuation at 

VSL of $5.8 

M ($ B) 

Hull loss ($ 

B) 

Property loss 

($ B) 

Injuries 

($ B) Total ($ B) 

Required risk 

reduction by 

LASP (%) 

1 .................. Minimal ......... 3 $0.02 $0.009 None $0.005 $0.03 N/A 

2 .................. Moderate ...... 250 1.45 0.009 None 0.27 173 11.0 

3 .................. Major ............ 3000 17.4 0.009 21.8 9.79 49.0 0.7 

4 .................. Catastrophic Large and Variable across Studies 1,000 0.019 

Costs 

The following summarizes the 

estimated costs of this rulemaking by 

general category of who pays. A 

summary table provides an overview of 

the cost items and a brief description of 

cost elements. Both in this summary 

and the economic evaluation, 

descriptive language is used to try and 

relate the consequences of the 

regulation. Although the regulatory 

evaluation attempts to mirror the terms 

and wording of the proposed rule text, 

no attempt is made to precisely replicate 

the regulatory language and readers are 

cautioned that the actual regulatory text, 

not the text of the evaluation, would be 

binding. Throughout the evaluation 

rounding in displayed values may result 

in minor differences in displayed totals. 

Aircraft operators, airport operators, 

and TSA would incur costs to comply 

with the requirements of the proposed 

LASP rule. TSA estimated the total 10- 

year cost of the program at $1.4 billion, 

discounted at 7%. At this rate, the 

annualized total rule cost per flight is 

estimated at $44. Aircraft operator costs 

comprise 85 percent of all estimated 

costs. This is due to the large number of 

newly regulated aircraft operators and 

the amount of time security 

coordinators are anticipated to spend on 

their duties. 

TSA estimated approximately 9,000 

GA aircraft operators use aircraft with a 

maximum takeoff weight exceeding 

12,500 pounds and would thus be 

subject to the proposed rule. These 

aircraft operators are currently not 

required to operate under any existing 

TSA security programs. Costs to these 

newly regulated aircraft operators 

represent 84 percent of total estimated 

costs, with security coordinator duties 

and training making up 89.5 percent of 

those new aircraft operator costs. 

Security coordinator duties and training 

for these operators are estimated at $1.0 

billion over 10 years, discounted at 7 

percent. The following figure provides 

the total 10-year costs as well as 

annualized costs at the 0, 7, and 3 

percent discount rates for the principal 

populations affected by the proposed 

rule. 

TOTAL AND ANNUALIZED COSTS BY AFFECTED ENTITY

Affected entity 

10-year total costs Annualized costs 

0% 3% 7% 0% 3% 7% 

New Aircraft Operators ............................................................................ $1,655.8 $1,402.3 $1,143.5 $165.6 $164.4 $162.8 

Existing Aircraft Operators ....................................................................... 19.6 16.7 13.6 2.0 2.0 1.9 

Airport Operators ..................................................................................... 7.5 6.5 5.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 

TSA .......................................................................................................... 194.4 165.9 136.6 19.4 19.4 19.5 

Passengers (Opportunity) ........................................................................ 91.9 78.2 64.1 9.2 9.2 9.1 

Total, Primary ................................................................................... 1,969.3 1,669.5 1,363.4 196.9 195.7 194.1 

Total, High ........................................................................................ 2,720.7 2,305.9 1,882.3 272.1 270.3 268.0 

Total, Low ......................................................................................... 1,239.1 1,051.2 859.2 123.9 123.2 122.3 


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Given several areas of uncertainty in 

the cost estimates, TSA estimates of the 

total cost of the rule range from $859 

million to $1.9 bilion, discounted at 7 

percent. TSA was unable to model some 

requirements, such as aircraft operator 

expenses to collect and submit 

passenger information for watch-list 

matching. TSA is requesting detailed 

comments to enable quantification of 

this impact for new and existing 

operators. The figure below displays the 

cost segments of the proposed rule 

grouped into four major cost categories: 

Security coordinator duties and 

training; audits and inspections; STAs; 

and security programs. 


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TSA estimated covered aircraft 

operators would expend $1.1 billion 

over 10 years to comply with the 

proposed LASP, discounted at 7 

percent. All covered aircraft operators 

would incur costs to develop and 

submit security programs and profiles. 

Newly regulated aircraft operators 

would be required to designate security 

coordinators who would perform a 

variety of security-related duties and 

complete annual security training. 

These aircraft operators also would be 

required to ensure that their flight 

crewmembers successfully undergo 

STAs conducted by TSA. All aircraft 

operators would need to control access 

to any weapons and check property in 

the cabin for possible stowaways. 

Further, aircraft operators would be 

required to submit names of passengers 

aboard their flights to TSA-approved 

service providers for purposes of 

matching names against terrorist watchlists. Finally aircraft operators would 

contract with TSA-approved auditors to 

undergo biennial reviews demonstrating 

compliance with their security 

programs. 

Since TSA views security programs as 

a package, this rule would also require 

a partial airport security program for 

non-federalized airports regularly 

serving large aircraft, in scheduled or 

public charter operations and airports 

designated by the Secretary of 

Transportation as ‘‘Reliever Airports.’’ 

TSA has determined these airports 

frequently serve as a base for aircraft 

operators covered by the LASP. Covered 

airports would be required to develop 

and submit security programs to TSA 

and comply with program requirements. 

This would include the designation of 

airport security coordinators and 

completion of attendant training. TSA 

estimated airport operators would 

expend $5.5 million over 10 years, 

discounted at 7 percent. 

To implement and oversee this new 

security program regime, TSA would 

expend monies to conduct outreach to 

covered aircraft and airport operators 

and process security programs and 

profiles, enforce compliance with the 

proposed requirements, and enroll 

auditors and watch-list service 

providers. TSA estimated its 10-year 

costs to implement the proposed 

regulation would range from $133.5 

million to $139.8 million, discounted at 

7 percent, with a primary estimate of 

$136.6 million. 

Entities wishing to participate as 

auditors or watch-list service providers 

would incur voluntary costs to apply to 

TSA for authorization to provide those 

services. These service entities would 

likely pass their enrollment expenses to 

subscribing aircraft operators; thus, in 

the regulatory evaluation TSA assesses 

the costs directly to the affected aircraft 

operators. To avoid double-counting, 

the analysis does not provide a separate 

estimate of auditor and watch-list 

service provider enrollment costs. 

However, TSA has included a 

description of the enrollment process 

and anticipated unit costs within the 

discussion of TSA’s costs to process 

auditor and watch-list service provider 

applications. 

Passengers on covered aircraft would 

incur opportunity costs from the time 

spent providing personal information to 

aircraft operators, for use in Watch List 

Matching, and, to a much more modest 

degree, from time spent delayed when 

pre-flight Watch List Matching issues 

need to be resolved in real time. TSA 

estimated that these passenger 

opportunity costs total $64 million, 

discounted at 7 percent. 

As previously noted, TSA estimates 

that the total 10-year cost of the program 

would be $1.4 billion, discounted at 7 

percent; the annualized cost (at a 7 

percent discount rate) per flight would 

be $44. 

3. Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Assessment (IRFA) 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

establishes ‘‘as a principle of regulatory 

issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 

consistent with the objective of the rule 

and of applicable statutes, to fit 

regulatory and informational 

requirements to the scale of the 

business, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, 

the RFA requires agencies to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions. The RFA covers a wide range of 

small entities, including small 

businesses, not-for-profit organizations, 

and small governmental jurisdictions. 

When issuing a rulemaking, agencies 

must perform a review to determine 

whether a proposed or final rule will 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities. If 

the determination is that it will, the 

agency must prepare a regulatory 

flexibility analysis as described in the 

RFA. However, if an agency determines 

that a proposed or final rule is not 

expected to have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities, section 605(b) of the RFA 

provides that the head of the agency 

may so certify and a regulatory 

flexibility analysis is not required. The 

certification must include a statement 

providing the factual basis for this 

determination, and the reasoning should 

be clear. 

As part of implementing this NPRM, 

TSA conducted this Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis. The IRFA describes 

the reasons for and objectives of the 

proposed rule; includes a description 

and estimate of the number of small 

entities that would be impacted by the 

proposed rule; estimates the cost of 

complying with requirements for small 

entities; addresses significant 

alternatives to the rulemaking 

considered by TSA; and, identifies 

duplicative, overlapping, and 

conflicting rules. 

Reason for the Proposed Rule 

The Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act (ATSA) (Pub. L. 107–71, 

115 Stat. 597, Nov. 19, 2001) granted 

TSA broad statutory authority to take 

measures to increase the security of civil 

aviation in the United States. Since the 

passage of ATSA, TSA has used its 

authority to implement an array of 

aviation security programs, focusing 

mainly on the commercial aviation 

segment of the industry. 

TSA is aware that as vulnerabilities 

within the air carrier and commercial 

operator segment of the aviation 

industry are reduced, GA operations 

may become more attractive targets. 

With thousands of operators flying over 

100,000 aircraft, firms operating in the 

GA market—including some smaller 

airports—are largely unregulated with 

respect to security. Many GA aircraft, 

however, are of the same size and 

weight of the commercial operators that 

TSA regulates, meaning that they 

potentially and effectively could be 

used to commit a terrorist act. 

Consequently, this portion of the 

aviation industry may be vulnerable to 

exploitation by terrorists. Except for 

limited security requirements for certain 

classes of GA aircraft, TSA does not 

currently require security programs for 

many GA aircraft operators. This 

situation presents a security risk. 

The proposed rule would mitigate this 

risk by requiring GA aircraft operators 

and certain airports to enact an 

assortment of security measures. 

Objectives of the Proposed Rule 

The objective of the proposed rule is 

to strengthen the security of civil 

aviation. 

Description and Estimate of the Number 

of Small Entities 

The proposed rule would impact 

certain firms flying aircraft with a 

maximum take-off weight greater than 

12,500 pounds in the civil aviation 

market. It would also impact certain 


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publicly- and privately-owned airports. 

This section of the IRFA attempts to 

describe and identify all small entities 

within the aforementioned industries, 

including those operating under existing 

security regulations and those that are 

currently not regulated. 

Currently Regulated Aircraft Operators 

The proposed rule would affect 

aircraft operators currently offering 

services under existing security 

regulations. Aircraft operators utilizing 

TSA-required security programs, 

including the Twelve-Five Standard 

Security Program (TFSSP), the All Cargo 

Twelve-Five Standard Security Program 

(TFSSP–AC), the Partial Program 

Standard Security Program (PPSSP), and 

the Private Charter Standard Security 

Program (PCSSP) would be covered by 

the proposed rule. 

Aircraft operators offering services 

under the TFSSP and the TFSSP–AC 

utilize aircraft with a maximum takeoff 

weight of more than 12,500 pounds; 

offer scheduled or charter service; carry 

passengers or cargo or both; and do not 

operate under a PPSSP or PCSSP. 

The PPSSP is used by scheduled 

passenger or public charter passenger 

operations using aircraft with seating 

configurations of 31 or more, but 60 or 

fewer seats that do not enplane from or 

deplane into a sterile area, and by 

scheduled passenger or public charter 

passenger operations using aircraft with 

seating configurations of 60 or fewer 

seats engaged in operations to, from, or 

outside the United States that do not 

enplane from or deplane into a sterile 

area. 

The requirements of the PPSSP are 

identical to those of the TFSSP, with the 

exception that the PPSSP requires 

operators to participate in airport 

operator-sponsored exercises of airport 

contingency plans. TSA estimated that 

approximately 649 operators, utilizing 

4,540 large aircraft, were conducting 

operations either solely or primarily 

under the TFSSP or PPSSP at the time 

of writing. (Within the text of this IRFA, 

Twelve-Five and Partial Program 

operators may be referred to collectively 

as TFSSP operators due to the extremely 

small number of Partial Program 

operators, the similarities between the 

two groups, and the fact that they would 

be merged under the proposed 

regulation.) 

Conversely, aircraft operators using 

privately chartered aircraft (aircraft 

hired by, and for, one specific group of 

people), having a MTOW greater than 

45,500 kg (100,309.3 pounds); or, a 

passenger seating configuration of 61 or 

more seats, or, that enplane from or 

deplane into a sterile area, operate 

under the PCSSP. To be considered a 

private charter, the charterer must have 

engaged the total passenger capacity of 

the aircraft, invited all of the passengers, 

borne all of the costs of the charter, and 

must not have advertised to the public, 

in any way, to solicit passengers. 

In conducting research for the 

Regulatory Evaluation, TSA generated 

estimates of the number of operators 

offering services under each security 

program described above. The estimates 

are shown in the figure below. 

LASP AIRCRAFT OPERATORS CURRENTLY OPERATING UNDER A TSA SECURITY PROGRAM

Existing security program or operating certificate Number of aircraft operators 

Twelve-Five Standard Security Program ............................................................................................................................................. 649 

All Cargo Twelve-Five Standard Security Program ............................................................................................................................ 48 

Private Charter Standard Security Program ........................................................................................................................................ 77 

Total .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 774 

To determine if the firms identified in 

the figure above qualify as small entities 

as defined by the RFA and the Small 

Business Administration (SBA), TSA 

first attempted to classify each firm 

using North American Industry 

Classification System (NAICS) codes 

maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. 

After analyzing the various operators’ 

characteristics and the NAICS codes, 

TSA determined that the aircraft 

operators described above would 

broadly fall into the nonscheduled air 

transportation market. Firms in NAICS 

code 481211, Nonscheduled Chartered 

Passenger Air Transportation, and code 

481212, Nonscheduled Charter Freight 

Air Transportation, are classified as 

large or small based on employee 

measures. Firms in these markets with 

less than 1,500 employees are 

considered small by the SBA. 

Unfortunately, TSA could not obtain 

current, detailed employee data for the 

respective firms, making it difficult to 

discern whether the firms are small or 

large according to standards set by the 

SBA. In light of the lack of current 

employee data on these firms, TSA 

turned to U.S. Census Bureau 

information to gauge the number of 

currently regulated entities affected by 

the proposed rule that may be 

considered small. 

NAICS 481211—Nonscheduled 

Chartered Passenger Air Transportation 

As stated above, the SBA defines any 

firm in the Nonscheduled Chartered 

Passenger Air Transportation industry 

with less than 1,500 employees as small. 

Using 2002 data maintained by the U.S. 

Census Bureau, TSA determined that 

there are 1,400 firms in the industry, 

and at least 1,178 of these firms are 

small entities. The average annual 

revenue for firms in this industry in 

2002 was approximately $3.9 million. 

The data that TSA accessed from the 

Census Bureau to make this 

determination did not have enough 

detail for the Agency to draw a 

conclusion on the remaining 222 firms. 

See the figure below. 


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NAICS 481212—Nonscheduled 

Chartered Freight Air Transportation 

As previously stated, the SBA defines 

any firm in the Nonscheduled Chartered 

Freight Air Transportation industry 

with less than 1,500 employees as small. 

Again using Census Bureau data, TSA 

determined that there are 231 firms in 

the overall industry, and at least 162 of 

these firms are small entities. The 

average annual revenue for firms in this 

industry in 2002 was approximately 

$5.0 million. The data that TSA 

accessed from the Census Bureau to 

make this determination did not have 

enough detail for the Agency to draw a 

conclusion on the remaining 69 firms. 

Firms operating aircraft under the 

TFSSP and the PCSSP likely fall into 

NAICS code 481211, Nonscheduled 

Chartered Passenger Air Transportation, 

described above. As previously stated, 

TSA estimated that there are 649 and 77 

TFSSP and PCSSP operators, 

respectively, that would be affected by 

the NPRM. In all likelihood, these 


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39U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 

Aviation Administration, ‘‘Categories of Airports,’’ 

Available from: http://www.faa.gov/ 

airportslairtraffic/airports/planninglcapacity/ 

passengerlallcargolstats/categories/. Accessed on 

February 28, 2007. 

operators represent a subset of the firms 

TSA identified using the Census data. 

So while TSA identified 1,178 small 

entities (and 222 potentially small 

entities) in the overall Nonscheduled 

Chartered Passenger Air Transportation 

market, it is not likely that all of those 

firms would be impacted by the 

proposed rule. 

Firms operating under the TFSSP–AC 

most likely are classified by the Census 

Bureau by NAICS code 481212, 

Nonscheduled Chartered Freight Air 

Transportation. As stated above, TSA 

estimated that the proposed rule would 

only affect 48 of these operators. It is 

likely that the 48 operators represent a 

subset of the firms TSA identified in the 

Census data described above. 

By adding the estimated number of 

TFSSP, PCSSP, and TFSSP–AC 

operators together, TSA was able to 

conclude that the proposed rule would 

affect a total of 774 currently regulated 

operators. In 2003, pursuant to another 

rulemaking, TSA estimated that of 767 

TFSSP, TFSSP–AC, and PCSSP 

operators, all but 15 were small entities. 

Typically, these types of operators are 

independently owned and operated, and 

rarely employ more than 1,500 

employees, making them small entities 

according to the SBA. Given that TSA 

has not received any new data on these 

operators since 2003, and given the lack 

of detail in the Census Bureau data, the 

Agency assumed for the purposes of this 

analysis that all but 15 of the 774 

operators that would be affected by this 

NPRM are small entities. The Agency 

seeks comment on this preliminary 

conclusion. 

Newly Regulated Aircraft Operators 

The proposed rule would also cover 

any aircraft operator using an aircraft 

having a MTOW greater than 12,500 

pounds. Such operators primarily 

conduct operations under 14 CFR part 

91 and 14 CFR part 125. Currently, these 

types of operators are generally not 

covered by existing security regulations. 

Part 91 operations, commonly referred 

to as GA operations, can be undertaken 

for a wide range of purposes, but a basic 

distinction is drawn between flight 

activity used to provide ‘‘common 

carriage’’ and other flight activity. 

Common carriage means any operation 

for compensation or hire where the 

operator holds itself out as willing to 

furnish transportation to any member of 

the public seeking the services offered. 

The operator openly offers a service for 

a fee (by advertising or any other means) 

to members of the public. 

In contrast, ‘‘private’’ or ‘‘noncommon carriage’’ does not involve 

offering or holding out by the operator 

through advertising or any other means. 

Non-common carriage includes the 

following: 

• Carriage of operator’s own 

employees or property. 

• Carriage of participating members 

of a club. 

• Carriage of persons and property, 

which is only incidental to the 

operator’s primary business. 

• Carriage of persons or property for 

compensation or hire under a 

contractual business arrangement that 

did not result from the operator’s 

holding out or offering. In this situation, 

the customer seeks out an operator to 

perform the desired service and enters 

into an exclusive mutual agreement; the 

operator does not seek out the customer. 

Under the proposed rule, both 

common carriage and non-common 

carriage large aircraft operators would 

be required to establish and implement 

the security requirements of the LASP. 

Those firms operating under common 

carriage have been discussed in the 

currently regulated section of this IRFA; 

the following discussion relates to noncommon carrier operations. 

Part 125 of 14 CFR applies to some 

large aircraft operations that may 

provide private carriage (but not 

common carriage). Part 125 governs the 

operation of large aircraft that are able 

to carry 6,000 pounds or more of 

payload capacity and 20 or more 

passenger seats. 

In conducting research for the 

Regulatory Evaluation, TSA subject 

matter experts determined that the 

proposed rule would affect 9,000 

aircraft operators regulated by 14 CFR 

part 91, and 61 aircraft operators 

regulated by 14 CFR part 125. Due to the 

unique conditions under which these 

firms conduct operations, TSA could 

not identify the respective NAICS codes 

for these operators. Consequently, TSA 

could not determine the small entity 

size standards for these businesses. 

Without this information, TSA could 

not reliably estimate the number of 

small entities operating aircraft in these 

operating categories. Moreover, TSA 

could not find reliable revenue and 

employee data for these firms, further 

complicating the effort. 

Given the constraints discussed 

above, TSA could only conclude that 

the proposed rule would affect between 

0 and 9,000 small entities currently 

regulated by 14 CFR part 91, and 

between 0 and 61 small entities 

currently regulated by 14 CFR part 125. 

TSA seeks comment on information that 

would allow it to refine its estimate of 

small entities as defined by the RFA. 

Airport Operators 

Airports that would be affected by the 

proposed rule include airports regularly 

serving scheduled or public charter 

operations in large aircraft and ‘‘reliever 

airports,’’ as designated by the Secretary 

of Transportation. TSA determined 

approximately 42 airports regularly 

serving scheduled or public charter 

operations and 273 reliever airports 

would be subject to the proposed rule, 

a total of 315 airports. 

The 42 affected airports TSA has 

identified that regularly serve scheduled 

or public charter operations and do not 

already have a TSA security program are 

all owned by public entities. Because 

the airports are publicly owned, the 

Census Bureau classifies them using 

NAICS Code 926120, Regulation and 

Administration of Transportation 

Programs. 

Reliever airports are airports 

designated by the FAA to relieve 

congestion at commercial service 

airports and to provide improved GA 

access to members of the local 

community.39 The 273 reliever airports 

that would be impacted by the rule are 

owned by public entities—such as State 

and local governments—and private, 

for-profit concerns. The publicly—and 

privately-owned airports, due to their 

different ownership characteristics, are 

classified by different NAICS codes by 

the U.S. Census Bureau. Privatelyowned airports are classified by NAICS 

code 48811, Airport Operations, while 

publicly owned airports are classified 

by NAICS code 926120, Regulation and 

Administration of Transportation 

Programs. 

NAICS 48811—Airport Operations 

Private firms operating reliever 

airports fall into NAICS code 48811, 

Airport Operations. The SBA defines 

firms in this industry with less than 

$6.5 million in annual revenues as 

small. To discern the number of small 

firms likely to be impacted by the 

proposed rule, TSA first obtained data 

on the total number affected reliever 

airports from FAA. From the FAA 

information, which identified 273 total 

reliever airports that would be subject to 

the rule, TSA was able to identify 46 

privately-held reliever airports. 

Unfortunately, TSA could not find 

any revenue information on the 46 

privately-owned reliever airports, 

making it impossible to determine if 


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40Regulatory Flexibility Act, Public Law 96–354, 

Sep. 19, 1980, 94 Stat. 1164 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 

601). 

they are classified as small entities. 

However, given that the average annual 

revenues in the industry were $3.8 

million in 2002, well below the $6.5 

million threshold set by SBA, it is likely 

that some of the affected firms are small 

entities. Due to the lack of available 

revenue data, TSA assumed for the 

purposes of this analysis that there are 

between 0 and 46 small entities in this 

industry that would be impacted by the 

rule. TSA seeks comment on this 

assumption. 

NAICS 926120—Regulation and 

Administration of Transportation 

Programs 

As previously stated, publicly owned 

reliever airports likely fall into NAICS 

code 926120, Regulation and 

Administration of Transportation 

Programs. Because firms in this industry 

are not privately held, for-profit 

companies, the SBA does not use 

revenue or employment measures to 

determine if they are small entities. 

Instead, the SBA uses the population 

of the government jurisdiction that 

owns the firm to determine if it is a 

small governmental jurisdiction. 

Specifically, sec. 601(5) of the RFA 

defines small governmental 

jurisdictions as governments of cities, 

counties, towns, townships, villages, 

school districts, or special districts with 

a population of less than 50,000.40

To determine if the proposed rule 

would have an impact on any small 

governmental jurisdictions, TSA again 

accessed the FAA airport data. Of the 

315 affected airports, TSA discerned 

that 269 are owned by governments. 

After researching the population of all 

the affected governments using U.S. 

Census Bureau population data, TSA 

concluded that between 68 and 74 small 

governmental jurisdictions would be 

impacted by the proposed rule. See the 

figure below. 

Summary of Number of Small Entities 

Using the data discussed above, TSA 

concluded that the NPRM would impact 

between 827 and 9,955 small entities. 

The ambiguous nature of the revenue 

and employee data for the firms in some 

of the affected industries, coupled with 

the lack of information on operators 

covered by 14 CFR part 91 and 14 CFR 

part 125, prevented TSA from making a 

more refined estimate. See the figure 

below. 

TOTAL ESTIMATE OF SMALL ENTITIES POTENTIALLY AFFECTED BY THE LASP *

Operator 

classification 

NAICS 

code Industry SBA size standard 

Low 

estimate 

High 

estimate 

Currently Regulated Aircraft Operators (TFSSP, PCSSP, TFSSP– 

AC).

481211 Nonscheduled Chartered Passenger 

Air Transportation.

1,500 employees ............................. 759 774 

481212 Nonscheduled Chartered Freight Air 

Transportation.

.......................................................... ............ ............

Newly Regulated Aircraft Operators 

(14 CFR part 91, 14 CFR part 

125).

U U ...................................................... U ...................................................... 0 9,061 

Privately-Owned Airports .................. 48811 Airport Operations ............................ $6.5 million in annual revenue ........ 0 46 


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TOTAL ESTIMATE OF SMALL ENTITIES POTENTIALLY AFFECTED BY THE LASP *

Operator 

classification 

NAICS 

code Industry SBA size standard 

Low 

estimate 

High 

estimate 

Public Airports ................................... 926120 Regulation and Administration of 

Transportation Programs.

50,000 population of governmental 

jurisdiction.

68 74 

Total ........................................... .............. .......................................................... .......................................................... 827 9,955 

* Total Small Entities Impacted: The NPRM would impact between 827 and 9,957 small entities. 

Source: 2002 Economic Census, FAA, SBA, TSA calculations. 

Notes: U means data unavailable. 

The data used to determine the 

number of impacted small entities in 

this analysis exhibit some critical 

shortcomings. First, TSA did not have 

access to any comprehensive 

employment data for some of the 

affected aircraft operators in the 

nonscheduled air transportation 

industry. 

Second, TSA was unable to access 

comprehensive revenue or employment 

data for the aircraft operators offering 

services under 14 CFR part 91 and 14 

CFR part 125. Additionally, TSA could 

not identify the appropriate NAICS 

codes for these operators, making it 

impossible to identify the size standard 

that would be necessary to determine if 

the firms are large or small. 

Third, TSA could not obtain revenue 

data for firms operating privately-owned 

reliever airports, making it impossible to 

generate an accurate estimate of the 

number of small entities in that 

industry. 

Finally, TSA was unable to find 

reliable information on some of the 

governmental jurisdictions operating 

covered airports. This situation 

prevented TSA from making a more 

accurate estimate of the number of small 

governmental jurisdictions that would 

be subject to the proposed rule. 

Due to the reasons described above, 

TSA may have under- or over-estimated 

the number of affected small entities. 

TSA seeks comment on this possibility. 

Description and Estimate of Compliance 

Requirements 

The proposed rule would require 

firms operating certain classes of aircraft 

and airports to undertake a number of 

measures aimed at increasing civil 

aviation security. This section of the 

analysis provides a brief description of 

each requirement, followed by an 

estimate of the unit cost per operator to 

comply with each requirement. This 

part of the analysis also attempts to 

make an initial determination on 

whether the proposed rule would have 

a significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

Given the operational and regulatory 

differences between the various firms 

that would be affected by the proposed 

rule, compliance requirements and their 

attendant costs are described separately 

for currently regulated aircraft 

operators, newly regulated aircraft 

operators, and airport operators. 

Furthermore, costs are estimated as 

ranges rather than absolute values in 

order to reflect the uncertainty 

surrounding different estimates. 

Currently Regulated Aircraft Operators 

Security Programs and Profiles 

Currently regulated aircraft operators 

affected by the proposed rule would be 

required to submit a profile containing 

several pieces of information and to 

develop and submit a security program. 

TSA would make available to all 

covered aircraft operators a template 

Large Aircraft Standard Security 

Program that operators would have the 

option to either accept without 

modification or use as the basis of 

developing their own security program. 

In estimating costs for this requirement, 

TSA assumed that nearly all covered 

operators would choose to adopt the 

template security program. These 

requirements would impose costs on 

currently regulated aircraft operators, 

which are shown in the figure below. 

For a more robust discussion on how 

TSA estimated these costs, see the 

section on security programs and 

profiles located above in the Regulatory 

Evaluation. 

UNIT COST: SECURITY PROGRAMS/PROFILES, CURRENTLY REGULATED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

Hourly compensation 

Hours Total unit cost 

Low Primary High Low Primary High 

a b c d (a) × (b) (a) × (c) (a) × (d) 

$62.43 .................................................................................................................. 2 4 6 $125 $250 $375 

Security Coordinator Duties 

Currently regulated aircraft operators 

have existing security coordinators and 

would not incur new costs as a result of 

this requirement. 

Security Threat Assessments for Flight 

Crews 

Aircraft operators offering services 

under existing security regulations must 

utilize flight crew personnel that have 

undergone a criminal history records 

check. The proposed rule would require 

LASP aircraft operators to begin 

ensuring that their flight crewmembers 

undergo STAs and would limit the 

validity of a STA to five years. As 

proposed, the STA would consist of a 

CHRC and a check against government 

terrorism watch-lists and related 

databases. Existing aircraft operators 

currently pay an estimated $30 to $35 

for CHRCs; however, the collection 

system used by these operators does not 

include the terrorism check component 

of the proposed STA. As a result, TSA 

intends to establish a new system to 

enable it to process STA applications 

from covered aircraft operators. TSA is 

thus proposing a fee of $74 to recover 

its costs associated with this new 

system and the processing of STAs. 

Flight crewmembers of currently 

regulated aircraft operators would be 

required to submit a new STA 

application upon publication of a final 


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41The flight crew wage reported here is a 

weighted average of the following occupations from 

the 2006 NBAA Salary Survey: Aviation 

Department Manager II (does some flying), Chief 

Pilot, Senior Captain, and Copilot. 

42 49 CFR 1544.202. 

rule if their most recent CHRC had been 

completed five or more years prior to 

the compliance date of the final rule. 

Flight crewmembers having CHRCs 

completed within five years prior to the 

compliance date in a final rule would be 

required to submit a STA application 

once five years had passed since their 

CHRC. Since TSA instituted the existing 

operator security programs in early 

2003, several existing operators may 

need to conduct a STA on their flight 

crewmembers in the first year of the 

LASP. 

Because this represents a new 

requirement, TSA used the full 

proposed fee, plus opportunity costs, to 

estimate a unit cost to existing operator 

small entities. As noted above, the 

proposed fee is $74. TSA estimated 

opportunity costs would consist of 0.5 

hours of flight crewmember time to 

provide the information required for the 

STA application and to have 

fingerprints taken. Using an average 

wage rate of $51.40 for aircraft operator 

flight crews,41 30 minutes represents an 

opportunity cost of $25.70 per STA, for 

a total STA unit cost of $99.70. TSA 

estimated existing operators each 

employ an average of 18 flight 

crewmembers based on data provided 

by TSA subject matter experts and the 

American Association of Airport 

Executives, the entity that processes 

existing operator CHRCs. Based on an 

assumed turnover rate of 15 percent, 

however, TSA estimated that on average 

an existing operator would have only 

about eight crewmembers whose CHRCs 

would be expired under the proposed 

rule. Thus, the maximum per-operator 

cost for STAs would be approximately 

$800. 

UNIT COST: SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENTS, CURRENTLY REGULATED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

Unit fee (inc. opportunity costs) 

Flight crewmember 

STAs 

Total unit 

cost per 

operator 

a b (a × b) 

$99.70 ............... 8 $800 

Control of Access to Weapons 

Aircraft operators utilizing the 

TFSSP-All Cargo would be required to 

control access to weapons. Presently, 

these operators are required to ‘‘apply 

the security measures in its security 

program for persons who board the 

aircraft for transportation, and for their 

property, to prevent or deter the carriage 

of any unauthorized persons, and any 

unauthorized weapons, explosives, 

incendiaries, and other destructive 

devices, items, or substances.’’ 42 The 

proposed rule modifies current law by 

inserting between ‘‘unauthorized 

weapons’’ the words ‘‘or accessible.’’ 

TSA has determined this requirement 

would have a de minimis impact, 

because few passengers are carried 

aboard such flights and operators are 

already required to screen them. 

Further, operators would have a variety 

of means of rendering weapons 

inaccessible to passengers. 

Check of Accessible Property 

The proposed rule would require an 

aircraft operator to inspect, pursuant to 

the terms and method in its security 

program, any property brought on board 

that would be accessible to the cabin. 

Property, for this section, is defined as 

any container, cargo, or company 

material that may be used to hide a 

stowaway or explosives, incendiaries or 

other destructive devices. 

TSA has determined that in most 

cases affected operators already comply 

with the anticipated inspection 

requirements during the normal course 

of the pre-flight check. Costs associated 

with this responsibility are captured in 

the security coordinator duties above. 

Because currently regulated aircraft 

operators are not expected to incur any 

marginal costs for security coordinators, 

this requirement also would not add any 

additional costs for these operators. 

Watch-List Matching 

The proposed regulation would 

require each aircraft operator to request 

and obtain certain passenger 

information from every passenger on 

each flight operated by the aircraft 

operator, and transmit the information 

to an entity approved by TSA to 

conduct watch-list matching (known as 

a watch-list service provider). Any 

changes to the passenger information 

prior to boarding would be required to 

be resent to the watch-list service 

provider. 

TSA has estimated the compliance 

costs for this requirement as the 10-year 

undiscounted cost of WLSP averaged 

over the forecast number of flights. This 

average cost per flight multiplied by the 

average flights per operator produces an 

estimated annual cost per operator for 

WLSP. TSA estimates the cost for 

compliance would range from $245 to 

$736 per operator with a primary cost 

estimate of $491 per operator. To the 

extent that small entities may make 

fewer flights per year than large entities, 

the actual impact to small entities may 

be lower. However, TSA believes these 

costs provide a conservative estimate of 

the impact to small operators. For more 

discussion on the costs of this 

requirement, see the section on watchlist matching above, located in the 

Regulatory Evaluation. 

Components 

Cost estimates 

Low Primary High 

WLSP Costs .......................................................................................................................... $22,787,364 $45,574,727 $68,362,091 

Flight Forecast ....................................................................................................................... 87,932,347 87,932,347 87,932,347 

Cost per Flight ....................................................................................................................... $0.26 $0.52 $0.78 

Flights per Operator ............................................................................................................... 946 946 946 

Cost per Operator .................................................................................................................. $245 $491 $736 

Audits of Aircraft Operators 

Under the proposed rule, each aircraft 

operator must contract with an auditor 

approved by TSA to conduct an audit of 

the aircraft operator’s compliance with 

its security program. 

Based on similar audits undertaken 

relative to other federal aviation 

programs, TSA estimated the cost for 

these audits to be approximately $2,257 

per audit, on average. Currently, audits 

are performed to review safety, 

operations, and maintenance. TSA 

anticipates that many of these firms will 


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offer the ‘‘security’’ audit as part of their 

offerings to their current customers and, 

perhaps, where feasible, bundle the 

security audit with already scheduled 

audits. 

Based on interviews with 3 

International Standard for Business 

Aircraft Operations auditors, TSA 

estimated costs for audits could range 

from $1,464 to $3,050. As stated above, 

TSA adopted the average of $2,257 as its 

primary estimate. For more discussion 

on these costs, see the section in the 

Regulatory Evaluation that describes 

this requirement. 

Total Cost per Currently Regulated 

Aircraft Operator 

The following figure is a summary of 

the requirements and compliance costs 

of the proposed rule for currently 

regulated aircraft operators. As 

described above, TSA estimated that 

between 759 and 774 currently 

regulated small entities would be 

impacted by the proposed rule. 

TOTAL COMPLIANCE UNIT COST, CURRENTLY REGULATED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

Requirement 

Unit cost 

Low Primary High 

Security Programs and Profiles ................................................................................................................................. $125 $250 $375 

Security Coordinator Duties ....................................................................................................................................... .............. .............. ..............

STAs for Flight Crew ................................................................................................................................................. 800 800 800 

Control Access to Weapons ...................................................................................................................................... .............. .............. ..............

Screening of Accessible Property ............................................................................................................................. .............. .............. ..............

Watch-list Matching ................................................................................................................................................... 245 491 736 

Audits ......................................................................................................................................................................... 1,464 2,257 3,050 

Total .................................................................................................................................................................... 2,634 3,797 4,960 

Given the uncertainty in this analysis, 

it was difficult for TSA to conclusively 

determine if the proposed rule would 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of currently 

regulated aircraft operators. Although 

neither the RFA nor the SBA define the 

term ‘‘significant economic impact,’’ 

TSA attempted to compare compliance 

costs to average firm revenues to 

determine if the rule would have a 

considerable economic impact on 

covered small entities. Unfortunately, 

this review proved difficult due to the 

lack of revenue data on covered firms. 

As previously stated, currently 

regulated aircraft operators are likely 

categorized by the Census Bureau using 

NAICS codes 481211, Nonscheduled 

Chartered Passenger Air Transportation, 

and 481212, Nonscheduled Chartered 

Freight Air Transportation. In 2002, 

according to the Economic Census, 

firms in these industries earned annual 

revenues of approximately $3.9 million 

and $5.0 million, respectively. For a 

firm with average annual revenues in 

either of these industries, a compliance 

cost of approximately $2,634 to $4,960 

would not likely constitute a significant 

economic impact, given that the cost 

would equal less than 1 percent of 

annual revenues. 

For the proposed rule to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

currently regulated aircraft operator, the 

aircraft operator would likely have to 

earn annual revenues of approximately 

$367,000 or less. In this scenario, the 

highest estimated compliance costs 

associated with the proposed rule 

would represent approximately 1 

percent of the firm’s annual revenue. 

While conducting research for this 

analysis, TSA was unable to acquire 

comprehensive revenue data on 

currently regulated aircraft operators, 

and therefore could not make a 

conclusive determination on whether 

these firms would experience a 

significant economic impact under the 

proposed rule. However, in light of the 

average annual revenues of firms in the 

respective industries in 2002, TSA does 

not believe the proposed rule would 

represent a significant economic impact 

on a substantial number of currently 

regulated aircraft operators. TSA 

requests comment on this preliminary 

determination. 

Newly Regulated Aircraft Operators 

Security Programs and Profiles 

As described above, covered aircraft 

operators would be required to submit 

a profile to TSA and to develop and 

submit a security program. TSA 

estimated it would take newly regulated 

aircraft operators between 8 and 16 

hours to review the template security 

program, assemble the requisite profile 

information, and submit the requisite 

documents to TSA for review. TSA 

assumed an average of 12 hours for its 

primary estimate. To calculate costs for 

newly regulated aircraft operators to 

review security programs and submit 

the required profile information, TSA 

again multiplied the estimated hourly 

range by the hourly wage of $62.43. 

UNIT COST: SECURITY PROGRAMS/PROFILES, NEWLY REGULATED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

Hourly compensation 

Hours Total unit cost 

Low Primary High Low Primary High 

a b c d (a × b) (a × c) (a × d) 

$62.43 .................................................................................................................. 8 12 16 $500 $750 $1,000 

Security Coordinator Duties 

Newly regulated large aircraft 

operators would be required to 

designate Aircraft Operator Security 

Coordinators (AOSC), Ground Security 

Coordinators (GSC), and In-Flight 

Security Coordinators (ISC), and ensure 

they are properly trained. Each security 

coordinator position would have unique 

responsibilities; however, aircraft 

operator employees could be trained to 


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serve as one or all three of these 

positions. 

The principal AOSC or an alternate, if 

applicable, must be available for contact 

by TSA 24 hours a day, seven days a 

week to ensure TSA is able to quickly 

disseminate any intelligence of a threat 

to a specific aircraft operator or industry 

segment. The AOSC bears the further 

responsibility for maintaining any and 

all records necessary to demonstrate to 

an auditor or TSA inspector the aircraft 

operator’s compliance with its security 

program. In addition to these AOSC 

duties, security coordinators are 

responsible for the enforcement of 

policies and procedures relative to the 

security of the aircraft, including the 

vetting of crew (where required) and 

passengers which must be carried out in 

accordance with the operator’s security 

program. Many of the aircraft operator 

requirements discussed in the following 

cost sections fall under the 

responsibility of the security 

coordinators. 

TSA estimated the amount of time 

security coordinators of newly regulated 

aircraft operators would spend on their 

duties. For a detailed discussion of 

these estimates, see the section on 

security coordinator duties in the 

Regulatory Evaluation. The figure below 

displays the annual cost per operator of 

having an AOSC. 

UNIT COST: SECURITY COORDINATOR DUTIES, NEWLY REGULATED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

Hourly 

compensation 

Hours Total unit cost 

Low Primary High Low Primary High 

a b c d (a × b) (a × c) (a × d) 

$53.59 .................................................................................................................. 164 284 404 $8,780 $15,210 $21,650 

Newly regulated aircraft operators 

would also need to ensure that security 

coordinators underwent appropriate 

security training in order to carry out 

their required functions. The AOSC 

would thus coordinate with TSA to 

provide training to GSCs and ISCs. 

Training would cover topics such as 

procedures to notify authorities when 

dealing with suspect items, 

unauthorized access to the aircraft, 

threat notification and response, 

implementation of security directives, 

and other security related topics. 

Security coordinators would be required 

to complete both an initial training 

course and annual recurring training. 

TSA again provided a range of estimates 

of the amount of time newly regulated 

operators would spend conducting new 

and recurring training. 

For the purposes of estimating costs 

for this IRFA, TSA assumed that an 

operator would need to conduct an 

initial and recurring training of GSCs 

and ISCs in one year. Although this 

timeframe is unlikely, TSA feels that it 

is a conservative assumption that 

accounts for the maximum potential 

cost of this requirement. 

UNIT COST: SECURITY COORDINATOR TRAINING, NEWLY REGULATED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

Requirement 

Unit cost 

Low Primary High 

New Training .............................................................................................................................................................. $460 $680 $890 

Recurring Training ..................................................................................................................................................... 230 340 440 

Total .................................................................................................................................................................... 690 1,020 1,330 

Security Threat Assessments for Flight 

Crews 

The proposed rule would also require 

newly regulated aircraft operators to 

ensure that their flight crewmembers 

undergo security threat assessments. 

The STA process would require each 

flight crewmember to submit 

fingerprints, along with information 

such as name, date and place of birth, 

Social Security Number (voluntary), and 

other information necessary for TSA to 

determine whether an applicant has 

committed a disqualifying crime or 

poses a threat to transportation or 

national security. For a comprehensive 

discussion of how TSA derived the total 

cost of this provision, see the section of 

the Regulatory Evaluation that describes 

this requirement. 

For the purposes of estimating costs 

for this IRFA, TSA estimated the cost of 

flight crews obtaining STAs on a per 

operator basis. Based on input from TSA 

subject matter experts, TSA assumed 1.5 

flight crewmembers per aircraft, and 1.8 

aircraft per Part 91 operator and 4 

aircraft per part 125 operator. The figure 

below displays the average cost that 

each newly regulated operator would 

incur as a result of this NPRM. 

UNIT COST: SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENTS, NEWLY REGULATED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

Requirement 

Total unit cost 

Low Primary High 

Security Threat Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... $580 $580 $580 


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Control of Access to Weapons 

As described in the more 

comprehensive Regulatory Evaluation 

and in the section on currently 

regulated aircraft operators of this IRFA, 

this requirement is anticipated to have 

a de minimis impact on covered 

operators. 

Check of Accessible Property 

As previously stated, TSA determined 

that in most cases affected operators 

already comply with the anticipated 

inspection requirements during the 

normal course of the pre-flight check. 

Costs associated with this responsibility 

are captured in the security coordinator 

duties above. 

Watch-List Matching 

The estimated cost for WLSP 

compliance is the same for the newly 

covered and existing operators. TSA 

utilizes the same methodology as above 

to estimate the total unit compliance 

cost for newly regulated aircraft 

operators. TSA estimates the cost for 

compliance would range from $245 to 

$736 with a primary cost of $491 per 

operator. 

Audits of Aircraft Operators 

Under the proposed rule, each aircraft 

operator must contract with an auditor 

approved by TSA to conduct an audit of 

the aircraft operator’s compliance with 

its security program. The cost of this 

requirement for newly regulated aircraft 

operators would be identical to the cost 

for currently regulated operators. TSA 

estimated that the unit cost of an audit 

would range from $1,464 to $3,050, with 

$2,257 being TSA’s primary estimate for 

the cost of this requirement. 

Total Cost per Newly Regulated Aircraft 

Operator 

The following figure is a summary of 

the requirements and compliance costs 

of the proposed rule for newly regulated 

aircraft operators. TSA estimated that 

the cost of complying with the proposed 

rule would range from $12,259 to 

$28,356 for newly regulated aircraft 

operators. As described above, TSA 

estimated that between 0 and 9,061 

small entities in this operator category 

would be impacted by the proposed 

rule. 

TOTAL COMPLIANCE UNIT COST, NEWLY REGULATED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

Requirement 

Unit cost 

Low Primary High 

Security Programs and Profiles ..................................................................................................................... $500 $750 $1,000 

Security Coordinator Duties ........................................................................................................................... 9,470 16,230 22,990 

STAs for Flight Crew ..................................................................................................................................... 580 580 580 

Control Access to Weapons .......................................................................................................................... .................. .................. ..................

Screening of Accessible Property ................................................................................................................. .................. .................. ..................

Watch-list Matching ....................................................................................................................................... 245 491 736 

Audits ............................................................................................................................................................. 1,464 2,257 3,050 

Total ........................................................................................................................................................ $12,259 $20,308 $28,356 

TSA again encountered analytical 

difficulties when attempting to 

determine if the proposed rule would 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of newly regulated 

aircraft operators. As previously stated, 

TSA was unable to acquire annual 

revenue data for these operators. This 

lack of information prevented TSA from 

making a conclusive determination of 

the rule’s impact on small entities in 

this operator category. 

For the proposed rule to have a 

significant economic impact on a newly 

regulated aircraft operator, the aircraft 

operator would likely have to earn 

annual revenues of $2.7 million or less. 

If a firm with this level of annual 

revenues incurred compliance costs of 

$28,356 (the high estimate in the figure 

above), it would represent 1 percent of 

annual revenue. Given the uncertainty 

in its estimates, TSA requests comment 

on whether the proposed rule would 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of newly regulated 

aircraft operators. 

Airport Operators 

Security Programs and Profiles 

The proposed rule would require 

certain privately-owned airports to 

develop security programs and submit 

security profiles to TSA. TSA would 

make available a template partial airport 

security program that operators would 

have the option to either accept without 

modification or use as the basis of 

developing their own security program. 

To calculate the unit cost for airports 

to comply with this requirement, TSA 

assumed that nearly all covered airport 

operators would choose to adopt the 

template security program, thereby 

minimizing the cost of implementing 

this requirement. Second, TSA 

estimated it would take these newly 

regulated private airport operators 

between 8 and 16 hours to review and 

implement the template security 

program and assemble the requisite 

profile information. TSA adopted an 

average of 12 hours as its primary 

estimate. Finally, TSA multiplied each 

hour estimate by a middle management 

wage rate of $31.24 per hour to generate 

a unit cost between $250 and $500, with 

a primary estimate of $375. The 

requirement to adopt and submit 

security programs and profiles is not 

recurring; therefore, airport operators 

would only incur this cost once over the 

ten-year period of analysis. This 

estimate does not include completion of 

a risk-based self-assessment tool that 

may complement the security program. 

TSA has requested comments on 

whether such a tool should be 

mandatory but has not set it forth as a 

requirement in the proposed rule. 


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UNIT COST: SECURITY PROGRAMS/PROFILES, AIRPORT OPERATORS

Hourly compensation 

Hours Total unit cost 

Low Primary High Low Primary High 

a b c d (a × b) (a × c) (a × d) 

$31.24 .................................................................................................................. 8 12 16 $250 $375 $500 

Airport Security Coordinators 

The proposed rule would also require 

airport operators to maintain airport 

security coordinators (ASC). For a more 

in-depth discussion of this requirement, 

see the airport security coordinator 

section of the Regulatory Evaluation. 

TSA estimated airport security 

coordinators would spend an average of 

between 0.5 and 1 hour per week on 

their duties, adopting 0.75 hours per 

week as its primary estimate. To 

calculate the cost on an annual basis, 

TSA translated the weekly hour 

estimates into annual estimates of 26, 

39, and 52 hours, respectively. Finally, 

to calculate the unit cost associated with 

this requirement, TSA multiplied the 

anticipated number annual hours by the 

ASC average hourly cost of 

compensation. See the figure below. 

UNIT COST: SECURITY COORDINATOR DUTIES, AIRPORT OPERATORS

Hourly compensation 

Hours Total unit cost 

Low Primary High Low Primary High 

a b c d (a × b) (a × c) (a × d) 

$31.24 .................................................................................................................. 26 39 52 $810 $1,220 $1,620 

Airport security coordinators would 

need to undergo training to comply with 

the proposed rule. TSA training 

requirements for airport security 

coordinators differ from those for 

aircraft operator security coordinators. 

ASC training is only offered twice per 

year by the American Association of 

Airport Executives. This 8-hour training 

course is taught by professional trainers 

and requires payment of a $350 

registration fee. Since this training is 

offered at a single location, TSA 

estimated ASCs would need to expend 

an additional $450 to cover travel and 

other incidental expenses. TSA assumed 

the need to travel to and from the 

training would effectively add an 

additional eight hours to the training. 

To estimate the cost of this 

requirement, the eight hours of class 

time are added to the eight hours of 

assumed travel time for a total of 16 

hours of compensated ASC time. TSA 

estimated airports would need to train 

between one and three ASCs in order to 

meet the requirements that an ASC be 

available 24-hours per day. Without 

more detailed information, TSA adopted 

the average for its primary estimate. See 

the figure below for a summary of the 

costs of complying with this 

requirement. TSA has requested 

comments on whether it should adopt a 

self-paced training program for these 

airports that would reduce the impact of 

this requirement. For the purposes of 

the RFA, however, TSA estimated costs 

for this requirement as it is proposed in 

the NPRM. 

UNIT COST: SECURITY COORDINATOR TRAINING, AIRPORT OPERATORS

Training cost item 

Unit cost 

Low Primary High 

Training Course Fee ............................................................................................................................................ ................ $350 ................

Travel Expenses .................................................................................................................................................. ................ 450 ................

ASC Compensation ............................................................................................................................................. $500 1,000 $1,500 

Total .............................................................................................................................................................. 1,300 1,800 2,300 

Total Cost per Airport Operator 

Using the estimates described above, 

TSA concluded that the proposed rule 

would impose a compliance cost of 

between approximately $2,360 and 

$4,420 per airport operator. The range of 

compliance costs reflects the 

uncertainty surrounding many of the 

variables used to generate the estimates. 

See the figure below. 

TOTAL COMPLIANCE UNIT COST, AIRPORT OPERATORS

Requirement 

Unit cost 

Low Primary High 

Security Program and Profile .................................................................................................................................... $250 $375 $500 

ASC Duties ................................................................................................................................................................ 810 1,220 1,620 


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TOTAL COMPLIANCE UNIT COST, AIRPORT OPERATORS—Continued 

Requirement 

Unit cost 

Low Primary High 

ASC Training ............................................................................................................................................................. 1,300 1,800 2,300 

Total .................................................................................................................................................................... 2,360 3,395 4,420 

After making the estimates described 

above, TSA has initially concluded that 

the proposed rule would not impose a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of privately-owned 

airport operators. In 2002, the latest year 

for which data are available, firms in 

this industry earned on average 

approximately $3.8 million in annual 

revenue according to the U.S. Census 

Bureau. The cost of complying with the 

proposed rule, as calculated above, 

would therefore represent less than 1 

percent of revenue for a firm with 

average industry revenues. 

Alternatively, if an airport operator 

incurred the highest estimated 

compliance cost described above 

($4,420), it would need annual revenues 

of less than $442,000 for the proposed 

rule to impose costs of 1 percent of firm 

revenue. Consequently, TSA has 

initially determined that the rule would 

not impose a significant economic 

impact on these types of firms. TSA 

seeks comment on this preliminary 

conclusion. 

As stated above, the proposed rule 

would also affect publicly owned 

airports. These airport operators would 

have to follow the same requirements as 

privately-held airport operators: adopt 

security programs, submit security 

profiles to TSA, and designate and 

maintain airport security coordinators. 

Because the requirements for these 

airports are the same as for the 

privately-owned airports, TSA 

estimated the unit compliance costs 

using the same methodology. As stated 

above, TSA calculated that the proposed 

rule would impose a cost of between 

$2,360 and $4,420 per airport operator. 

Although these airports are publicly 

owned, TSA was unable to locate 

revenue information for them. The 

Agency was thus unable to compare 

compliance costs to revenue in order to 

make a judgment on whether the costs 

represent a significant economic impact 

to these firms. 

TSA therefore requests comment on 

whether the proposed rule would have 

a significant economic impact on the 68 

to 74 publicly owned small airport 

operators that TSA identified in its 

research. Specifically, TSA requests any 

information that would allow it to 

compare estimated compliance costs to 

revenues typically earned by these types 

of airport operators. 

Significant Alternatives Considered 

TSA considered four substantive 

alternatives to the proposed regulation 

that would have reduced compliance 

costs for small businesses. First, TSA 

considered using the current method of 

watch-list matching employed by 

aircraft operators under the TFSSP and 

PCSSP rules. Second, TSA considered 

using TSA inspectors to conduct audits 

instead of TSA approved third party 

auditors. Third, TSA considered 

leveraging the Secure Flight program 

currently under development, which 

would use a web-based application for 

transmission of passenger information 

to the Secure Flight vetting engine. 

Fourth, TSA evaluated the incremental 

impact of raising the aircraft weight 

threshold from 12,500 pounds MTOW 

to 16,500 pounds MTOW and the 

incremental impact of lowering the 

aircraft weight threshold to 10,500 

pounds MTOW. This section describes 

those alternatives relative to the 

proposed regulation. TSA invites 

comments on these or other substantive 

alternatives to the proposed rule. 

TSA Inspectors 

TSA considered using TSA inspectors 

instead of approved third-party auditors 

to complete the audits proposed in the 

rule. Under such a scenario, TSA would 

need to hire several new employees to 

complete the inspections. Each operator 

would complete a TSA inspection every 

other year. Because TSA would conduct 

all of the inspections, aircraft operators 

would no longer pay a biennial fee for 

audits. This arrangement would reduce 

the primary unit cost estimate for newly 

regulated small aircraft operators from 

$20,308 to $18,051. Assuming a 

‘‘significant impact’’ is 1 percent of an 

operator’s revenues, this change would 

reduce the number of affected small 

entities to those having annual revenues 

less than $2.5 million. Unfortunately, 

TSA was unable to estimate how many 

operators would be affected by this 

change and, as noted in the alternatives 

analysis in the Regulatory Evaluation, 

TSA requests comments that would 

enable it to quantify these impacts. 

Watch-List Matching 

TSA considered requiring all large 

aircraft operators to conduct watch-list 

matching as currently done under the 

Twelve-Five and Private Charter Rules. 

These aircraft operators currently run 

their passengers against the No Fly List, 

which they retrieve from TSA. The 

proposed rule would require aircraft 

operators to send passenger information 

to a TSA-approved watch-list service 

provider. The alternative to the 

proposed rule is to extend the current 

method of watch-list matching under 

the Twelve-Five and Private Charter 

Rules to large aircraft operators that are 

not currently required to have a security 

program. Operationally, this would 

require that a total of approximately 

9,835 aircraft operators have direct 

access to the watch-list from TSA. 

TSA has rejected this alternative 

based on security grounds. Expanding 

direct access to the watch-list from 750 

aircraft operators today to 9,835 under 

this alternative increases the 

opportunity for the list to be 

compromised and would contradict 

other TSA initiatives to limit 

distribution of the watch-lists. To limit 

the number of entities that have access 

to the watch-list, TSA proposes to 

require large aircraft operators to submit 

passenger information to a TSAapproved watch-list service provider. 

The proposal would reduce the number 

of entities with direct access to the 

watch-list, thus improving security. 

Secure Flight Web-Based Application 

TSA has indicated the use of a webbased application for some 

transmissions of passenger information 

to the Secure Flight vetting engine. 

While the design and development of 

the Secure Flight web-based application 

is in its early stages, TSA subject matter 

experts have provided two approaches 

to extending an already established 

web-based application. These costs 

reflect an early stage of development 

and cannot, given this early stage, 

include costs that may be identified as 

TSA proceeds with system 

development. The first approach would 


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be developed and implemented with the 

absence of an implemented LASP and 

would amount to $23.2 million 

undiscounted over ten years. This 

approach posits that without an 

implemented LASP, Secure Flight 

would be required to establish a 

relationship with each of the aircraft 

operators. TSA would work with aircraft 

operators to develop the formatting and 

transmission procedures for not only for 

the upload of passenger information but 

also the download of passenger vetting 

results. These out-reach or ramp-up 

activities will be borne by the Secure 

Flight process. The second approach 

would be developed and implemented 

with the ability to leverage activities 

associated with a fully implemented 

LASP and would amount to $24.2 

million undiscounted over ten years. 

This approach posits that an 

implemented LASP would establish a 

relationship with each of the aircraft 

operators during the initial deployment 

of the watch-list service provider 

process. During this period both TSA 

and the watch-list service providers 

would work with aircraft operators to 

develop the formatting and transmission 

procedures for not only for the upload 

of passenger information but also the 

download of passenger vetting results. 

As a result, Secure Flight would assume 

a relatively mature process. 

Comparison of the First Three 

Alternatives 

TSA opted for the proposed plan as 

the more efficient and effective way of 

applying its limited compliance and 

enforcement resources towards the 

objective of increasing security. The use 

of third-parties would allow TSA to 

meet its security mission into four 

important ways. 

First, third-party auditors would 

increase effective TSA oversight by 

reviewing each aircraft operator’s 

compliance with its security program 

six months after TSA approves its 

security program and every two years 

thereafter. 

Second, given the number of large 

aircraft operators (approximately 

10,000), the third-party auditor program 

would allow TSA to ramp up more 

quickly thereby obtaining the 

assessment of all large aircraft operators 

more quickly relative to a program that 

relied solely on TSA inspectors, given 

the associated hiring and training 

associated with new hires. 

Third, the third-party auditor program 

would allow TSA to focus more of its 

compliance and enforcement resources 

on aircraft operators that are 

experiencing problems with 

implementing and complying with their 

security programs. 

Fourth, the watch-list matching 

service providers would provide the 

needed security and do so in a timely 

fashion. Given the security concerns, 

TSA believes a reliable mechanism for 

watch-list matching for large aircraft 

must be operational without undue 

delay. While the Secure Flight Program 

would also provide a reliable 

mechanism, its development is likely to 

be several years away and it is likely 

that it would not be available to address 

this important security need when TSA 

would be ready to implement the LASP. 

This proposal is consistent with 

current practices in the aviation 

industry, which frequently rely on the 

Federal Aviation Administration’s 

designee program. This type of program 

has been successfully implemented in 

other related aviation requirements. 

Additionally, the GA industry is very 

familiar with the third party auditor 

concept as it relates to safety 

inspections. Many GA operators 

undergo third party audits each year to 

comply with customer requirements. 

The proposal should be easily integrated 

into most GA operator’s existing audit 

schedules. 

Evaluating Different Aircraft Weight 

Thresholds 

The determination of weight must 

take into account a number of factors 

such as the effect on international 

harmonization, existing policies and 

programs, and the economic effect on 

the GA community. Discussed below are 

two alternatives to the threshold weight 

issue. 

Alternative 1: Lower threshold weight 

to 10,500 pounds MTOW. This solution 

will reduce the associated risk and 

number of unknown aircraft operators 

by incorporating an additional 3,000- 

5,000 aircraft into a mandatory security 

program. This alternative would also 

include a portion of currently 

unregulated types of aircraft, including 

large turboprops and smaller jet aircraft. 

However, in order to successfully 

implement this threshold weight, 

significant modifications to existing 

security programs and new rulemaking 

would be required, which would result 

in delayed program/rule timelines. 

These additional aircraft require TSA 

oversight and place an additional strain 

on existing TSA resources. Furthermore, 

this change would require additional 

international coordination, since TSA 

would be moving away from the 

globally accepted International Civil 

Aviation Organization standards. 

TSA estimates the cost impact of 

option one, in terms of undiscounted 

annualized dollars would add $23.7 

million to the undiscounted annualized 

cost of the rule as proposed. 

Alternative 2: Raise threshold weight 

to 16,000 pounds MTOW. This option 

would reduce the number of regulated 

aircraft and parties by approximately 

9,000 aircraft which would ultimately 

decrease the inspection requirements on 

TSA resources. However, excluding 

these aircraft would increase the 

potential risk and could result in higher 

damage potential. TSA believes that this 

increased risk and damage potential of 

aircraft between greater than 12,500 

pounds MTOW and 16,000 pounds 

MTOW are not justified by the 

reduction in cost. Furthermore, moving 

away from the common greater than 

12,500 pounds MTOW threshold will 

yield the same concerns discussed in 

alternative one. 

TSA estimates the cost impact of 

option two, in terms of undiscounted 

annualized dollars would subtract $26.4 

million from the undiscounted 

annualized cost of the rule as proposed. 

Based on the above discussion and 

analysis by TSNM-GA technical experts, 

the program office recommends that the 

threshold of greater than 12,500 pounds 

MTOW be maintained as the recognized 

security threshold weight standard for 

current and future GA security programs 

and policies. Selecting a lower 

threshold weight would improve 

security because more aircraft would be 

subject to the LASP but would also 

increase the burden to industry to the 

point where the burden may not be fully 

supported by increased security. 

Selecting a higher threshold weight 

would lower the burden on the industry 

because a lower number of aircraft 

would be subject to the LASP. However, 

with this higher threshold weight, the 

proposed LASP would not cover many 

aircraft that can cause significant 

damage if used as a missile or to deliver 

a biological, chemical, or nuclear 

weapon. TSA believes that mitigating 

the potential security risk and damage 

potential of large aircraft 16,000 pounds 

MTOW or under outweighs the cost 

difference. Consequently, TSA believes 

that the weight threshold of greater than 

12,500 pounds MTOW is the 

appropriate balance of risk and burden. 

Identification of Duplication, Overlap, 

and Conflict With Other Federal Rules 

TSA has identified an overlap 

between the proposed LASP and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) 

regulations governing its Advance 

Passenger Information System (APIS). 

CBP requires certain aircraft flying to or 

from the United States to submit 

passenger manifests to APIS for 


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comparison to the watch-lists. CBP’s 

watch-list comparison would thus 

duplicate TSA’s proposed requirement 

that large aircraft operators submit 

passenger information to watch-list 

service providers for comparison to the 

watch-lists. 

In recognition of this overlap, TSA 

would exempt a flight from its watchlist requirement flights covered by its 

NPRM that also are subject to APIS 

regulations. 

Preliminary Conclusion 

Based on this preliminary analysis, 

TSA has made no determination 

whether the proposed rule would have 

a significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities 

under section 605(b) of the RFA. TSA 

requests comment on all aspects of this 

analysis. TSA will make a final 

determination in the Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis for the Final Rule. 

3. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 

prohibits Federal agencies from 

establishing any standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 

safety, are not considered unnecessary 

obstacles. The statute also requires 

consideration of international standards 

and, where appropriate, that they be the 

basis for U.S. standards. TSA has 

assessed the potential effect of this 

notice of proposed rulemaking and has 

determined this rule would not have an 

adverse impact on international trade. 

4. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

of 1995 is intended, among other things, 

to curb the practice of imposing 

unfunded Federal mandates on State, 

local, and tribal governments. Title II 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more 

(adjusted annually for inflation) in any 

one year by State, local, and tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector; such a mandate is 

deemed to be a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action.’’ This notice of proposed 

rulemaking does not exceed this 

threshold for State, local, and tribal 

governments; however, proposed 

security measures for city- or countyowned airports may nevertheless 

impose a burden on some small 

municipalities. The impact on the 

overall economy does exceed the 

threshold, resulting in an unfunded 

mandate on the private sector. This 

regulatory evaluation documents costs 

and alternatives. TSA will publish a 

final analysis, including its response to 

public comments, when it publishes a 

final rule. 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

TSA has analyzed this notice of 

proposed rulemaking under the 

principles and criteria of E.O. 13132, 

Federalism. We determined that this 

action will not have a substantial direct 

effect on the States, or the relationship 

between the National Government and 

the States, or on the distribution of 

power and responsibilities among the 

various levels of government, and 

therefore, does not have federalism 

implications. 

B. Environmental Analysis 

TSA has reviewed this action for 

purposes of the National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321– 

4347) and has determined that this 

action will not have a significant effect 

on the human environment. 

C. Energy Impact Analysis 

TSA has assessed the energy impact 

of the action in accordance with the 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act 

(EPCA), Public Law 94–163, as amended 

(42 U.S.C. 6362). We have determined 

that this rulemaking is not a major 

regulatory action under the provisions 

of the EPCA. 

List of Subjects 

49 CFR Part 1515 

Appeals, Commercial drivers license, 

Criminal history background checks, 

Explosives, Facilities, Hazardous 

materials, Incorporation by reference, 

Maritime security, Motor carriers, Motor 

vehicle carriers, Ports, Seamen, Security 

measures, Security threat assessment, 

Vessels, Waivers. 

49 CFR Part 1520 

Air transportation, Law enforcement 

officers, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Security measures. 

49 CFR Part 1522 

Accounting, Aircraft operators, 

Aviation safety, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Security 

measures. 

49 CFR Part 1540 

Aircraft operators, Airports, Aviation 

safety, Law enforcement officers, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Security measures. 

49 CFR Part 1542 

Airports, Arms and munitions, 

Aviation safety, Law enforcement 

officers, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Security measures. 

49 CFR Part 1544 

Aircraft, Aircraft operators, Airmen, 

Airports, Arms and munitions, Aviation 

safety, Explosives, Freight forwarders, 

Law enforcement officers, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Security 

measures. 

49 CFR Part 1550 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Security 

measures. 

The Proposed Amendments 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Transportation Security Administration 

proposes to amend Chapter XII of Title 

49, Code of Federal Regulations, as 

follows: 

SUBCHAPTER A—ADMINISTRATIVE AND

PROCEDURAL RULES

PART 1515—APPEAL AND WAIVER 

PROCEDURES FOR SECURITY 

THREAT ASSESSMENTS FOR 

INDIVIDUALS 

1. The authority for part 1515 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 46 U.S.C. 70105; 49 U.S.C. 114, 

5103a, 40113, and 46105; 18 U.S.C. 842, 845; 

6 U.S.C. 469. 

2. Amend § 1515.1 by revising 

paragraph (a) to read as follows: 

§ 1515.1 Scope. 

(a) Appeal. This part applies to 

applicants who are appealing an Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment or 

an Initial Determination of Threat 

Assessment and Immediate Revocation 

in a security threat assessment as 

described in: 

(1) 49 CFR part 1572 for a hazardous 

materials endorsement (HME) or a 

Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential (TWIC); 

(2) 49 CFR part 1540, subpart C, for 

air cargo workers; or 

(3) 49 CFR part 1544, subpart G, for 

large aircraft flight crew members, 

individuals authorized to perform 

screening functions, TSA-approved 

auditors and watch-list service provider 

covered personnel. 

* * * * * 

3. Amend § 1515.5 by revising 

introductory text in paragraphs (a), (c), 

and (h), and adding paragraphs (a)(4) 

and (h)(3) to read as follows: 


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§ 1515.5 Appeal of Initial Determination of 

Threat Assessment based on criminal 

conviction, immigration status, or mental 

capacity. 

(a) Scope. This section applies to 

applicants appealing from an Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment 

that was based on one or more of the 

following: 

* * * * * 

(4) TSA has determined that a large 

aircraft flight crew member, an 

individual authorized to perform 

screening functions, an applicant to 

become a TSA-approved auditor, or a 

watch-list service provider covered 

personnel has a disqualifying criminal 

offense described in 49 CFR 

1544.229(d). 

* * * * * 

(c) Final Determination of Threat 

Assessment. (1) If the Assistant 

Administrator concludes that an HME 

or TWIC applicant does not meet the 

standards described in 49 CFR 

1572.103, 1572.105, or 1572.109, or that 

a large aircraft flight crew member, an 

individual authorized to perform 

screening functions, an applicant to 

become a TSA-approved auditor, or a 

service provider covered personnel does 

not meet the requirements in 49 CFR 

607, TSA serves a Final Determination 

of Threat Assessment upon the 

applicant. In addition— 

* * * * * 

(h) Appeal of immediate revocation. If 

TSA directs an immediate revocation, 

the applicant may appeal this 

determination by following the appeal 

procedures described in paragraph (b) of 

this section. This applies— 

* * * * * 

(3) If TSA withdraws a Determination 

of No Security Threat issued to a large 

aircraft flight crew member, an 

individual authorized to perform 

screening functions, a TSA-approved 

auditor, or a service provider covered 

personnel. 

4. Amend § 1515.9 by revising the 

introductory text in paragraphs (a) and 

(f), and adding paragraphs (a)(3) and 

(f)(4) to read as follows: 

§ 1515.9 Appeal of security threat 

assessment based on other analyses. 

(a) Scope. This section applies to an 

applicant appealing an Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment as 

follows: 

* * * * * 

(3) TSA had determined that a large 

aircraft flight crew member, an 

individual authorized to perform 

screening functions, an applicant to 

become a TSA-approved auditor, or a 

watch-list service provider covered 

personnel poses a security threat as 

provided in 49 CFR 1544.609. 

* * * * * 

(f) Appeal of immediate revocation. If 

TSA directs an immediate revocation, 

the applicant may appeal this 

determination by following the appeal 

procedures described in paragraph (b) of 

this section. This applies— 

* * * * * 

(4) If TSA withdraws a Determination 

of No Security Threat issued to a large 

aircraft flight crew member, an 

individual authorized to perform 

screening functions, a TSA-approved 

auditor, or a service provider covered 

personnel. 

5. Amend § 1515.11 by revising the 

introductory text in paragraph (a) and 

adding paragraph (a)(4) to read as 

follows: 

§ 1515.11 Review by administrative law 

judge and TSA Final Decision Maker. 

(a) Scope. This section applies to the 

following applicants: 

* * * * * 

(4) A large aircraft flight crew 

member, an individual authorized to 

perform screening functions, a TSAapproved auditor, or a service provider 

covered personnel, or an applicant to 

become one, who has been issued a 

Final Determination of Threat 

Assessment after an appeal as described 

in 49 CFR 1515.5 or 1515.9. 

* * * * * 

SUBCHAPTER B—SECURITY RULES FOR ALL

MODES OF TRANSPORTATION

PART 1520—PROTECTION OF 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

6. The authority citation for part 1520 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 46 U.S.C. 70102–70106, 70117; 

49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 44901–44907, 44913– 

44914, 44916–44918, 44935–44936, 44942, 

46105. 

7. Amend § 1520.5 by revising 

paragraph (b)(1)(i) to read as follows: 

§ 1520.5 Sensitive security information. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(i) Any aircraft operator, airport 

operator, watch-list service provider, or 

fixed base operator security program, or 

security contingency plan under this 

chapter; 

* * * * * 

8. Amend § 1520.7 by revising the 

introductory text and paragraph (a) to 

read as follows: 

§ 1520.7 Covered persons. 

Persons subject to the requirements of 

part 1520 are: 

(a) Each airport operator, aircraft 

operator, TSA-approved auditor, 

independent public accounting firm 

attesting to compliance under part 1544, 

subpart F, watch-list service provider, 

and fixed base operator subject to the 

requirements of subchapter C of this 

chapter, and each armed security officer 

under subpart B of part 1562. 

* * * * * 

9. Add new part 1522 to subchapter 

B to read as follows: 

PART 1522—TSA-APPROVED AUDITORS 

Subpart A—General 

Sec. 

1522.1 Scope and terms used in this part. 

1522.3 Qualifications. 

1522.5 Application. 

1522.7 TSA review and approval. 

1522.9 Reconsideration of disapproval of an 

application. 

1522.11 Withdrawal of approval. 

1522.13 Responsibilities of TSA-approved 

auditors. 

1522.15 Fraud and intentional falsification 

of records. 

1522.17 TSA Inspection authority. 

Subpart B [Reserved] 

Subpart C—Auditors for the Large Aircraft 

Security Program. 

Sec. 

1522.201 Applicability. 

1522.203 Additional qualification 

requirements. 

1522.205 Audit report. 

1522.207 Training. 

1522.209 Biennial Review. 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44907, 44913–44914, 44916–44918, 

44932, 44935–44936, 44942, 46105. 

PART 1522—TSA-APPROVED 

AUDITORS 

Subpart A—General 

§ 1522.1 Scope and terms used in this 

part. 

(a) This part governs the approval and 

responsibilities of persons conducting 

security audits of large aircraft operators 

that are required to have a security 

program under part 1544. 

(b) In addition to the terms in §§ 

1500.3 and 1540.5 of this chapter, the 

following terms apply in this part: 

Applicant means an individual who 

seeks to become a TSA-approved 

auditor under this part. 

Conflict of interest means a situation 

when the TSA-approved auditor has 

impairments that might affect their 

ability to do their work and report their 

findings impartially. Examples of 

situations where a TSA-auditor would 

have a conflict of interest include but 

are not limited to any of the following: 

(1) The TSA-approved auditor has 

official, professional, personal, or 


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financial relationships that might cause 

an auditor to limit the extent of the 

inquiry, to limit disclosure, or to 

weaken or distort audit findings in any 

way. 

(2) The TSA-approved auditor had 

previous responsibility for decisionmaking or managing an entity that 

would affect current operations of the 

entity or program being audited. 

(3) The TSA-approved auditor 

currently or previously maintained the 

official records that are the subject of 

the audit. 

(4) The TSA-approved auditor has 

financial interest that is direct, or is 

substantial though indirect, in the 

audited entity or program. 

(5) An immediate family member of 

the TSA-approved auditor is an officer 

of the operator that is the subject of the 

audit. 

(6) The TSA-approved auditor or an 

entity with which the TSA-approved 

auditor has an employment relationship 

provides to the operator being audited 

non-audit services that relate to the 

operator’s security program. 

TSA-approved auditor or auditor 

means any individual who has been 

approved under this part to conduct an 

audit required under this chapter. 

§ 1522.3 Qualifications. 

To be considered for approval as an 

auditor, the applicant must— 

(a) Have sufficient facilities, 

resources, and personnel to perform the 

required audit responsibilities; 

(b) Have knowledge of the Federal 

statutory and regulatory requirements 

and experience understanding and 

interpreting Federal statutes and 

regulations; 

(c) Have sufficient, relevant 

experience to perform the required audit 

responsibilities; 

(d) Obtain a certification or 

accreditation from an organization that 

TSA recognizes as qualified to certify or 

accredit an auditor for the type of audit 

that the applicant seeks to perform; and 

(e) Demonstrate the ability to prepare 

clear and thorough written reports and 

other documents required for the 

auditing function they will perform and 

demonstrate excellent oral 

communication skills. 

§ 1522.5 Application. 

(a) Each applicant must submit an 

application in a form and manner 

prescribed by TSA. 

(b) An application must include the 

following information: 

(1) The applicant’s full name, 

business address, business phone 

number, and business email address; 

(2) A copy of the applicant’s 

certification from an organization that 

TSA recognizes as qualified to certify or 

accredit an auditor for the type of audit 

that the applicant seeks to perform; and 

(3) A statement of how the applicant 

meets the qualifications set forth on 

§ 1522.3. 

§ 1522.7 TSA review and approval. 

(a) Review. Upon receiving an 

application, TSA will review the 

application. TSA will approve the 

application if the applicant meets the 

qualifications described in § 1522.3 and 

other applicable qualifications 

described in this part and TSA 

determines that approval is in the 

interest of safety and the public. 

(b) Approval. If an application is 

approved, TSA will send the applicant 

a written notice of approval. Once 

approved, an auditor may conduct 

audits in which he or she does not have 

a conflict of interest. 

(c) Disapproval. TSA will send a 

written notice of disapproval to an 

applicant whose application is 

disapproved. The notice of disapproval 

will include the basis of the disapproval 

of the application. 

§ 1522.9 Reconsideration of disapproval of 

an application. 

(a) Petition for reconsideration. If an 

application is disapproved, the 

applicant may seek reconsideration of 

the decision by submitting a written 

petition for reconsideration to the 

Assistant Secretary or designee within 

30 days of receiving the notice of 

disapproval. The written petition for 

reconsideration must include a 

statement and any supporting 

documentation explaining why the 

applicant believes the reason for 

disapproval is incorrect. 

(b) Review of petition. Upon review of 

the petition for reconsideration, the 

Assistant Secretary or designee disposes 

of the petition by either affirming the 

disapproval of the application or 

approving the application. The 

Assistant Secretary or designee may 

request additional information from the 

applicant prior to rendering a decision. 

§ 1522.11 Withdrawal of approval. 

(a) Basis for withdrawal of approval. 

TSA may withdraw approval of a TSAapproved auditor if the auditor ceases to 

meet the standards for approval, fails to 

fulfill his or her responsibilities under 

§ 1522.11, or it is in the interest of 

security or the public, such as failure to 

report an imminent threat under 

§ 1522.11(c). 

(b) Notice of withdrawal of approval. 

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (c) 

of this section, TSA will provide a 

written notice of proposed withdrawal 

of approval to the auditor. 

(2) The notice of proposed withdrawal 

of approval will include the basis of the 

withdrawal of approval. 

(3) Unless the auditor files a written 

petition for reconsideration under 

paragraph (d) of this section, the notice 

of proposed withdrawal of approval will 

become a final notice of withdrawal of 

approval 31 days after the auditor’s 

receipt of the notice of proposed 

withdrawal of approval. 

(c) Emergency notice of withdrawal of 

approval. (1) If TSA finds that there is 

an emergency requiring immediate 

action with respect to a TSA-approved 

auditor’s ability to perform audits, TSA 

may withdraw approval of that auditor 

without prior notice. 

(2) TSA will incorporate in the 

emergency notice of withdrawal of 

approval a brief statement of the reasons 

and findings for the withdrawal of 

approval. 

(3) The emergency notice of 

withdrawal of approval is effective upon 

the TSA-approved auditor’s receipt of 

the notice. The auditor may file a 

written petition for reconsideration 

under paragraph (d) of this section; 

however, this petition does not stay the 

effective date of the emergency notice of 

withdrawal of approval. 

(d) Petition for reconsideration. An 

auditor may seek reconsideration of the 

withdrawal of approval by submitting a 

written petition for reconsideration to 

the Assistant Secretary or designee 

within 30 days of receiving the notice of 

withdrawal of approval. 

(e) Review of petition. Upon review of 

the written petition for reconsideration, 

the Assistant Secretary or designee 

disposes of the petition by either 

affirming or withdrawing the notice of 

withdrawal of approval. The Assistant 

Secretary or designee may request 

additional information from the auditor 

prior to rendering a decision. 

§ 1522.13 Responsibilities of TSAapproved auditors. 

(a) Standards for audit. Each auditor 

must perform an audit, in a form and 

manner prescribed by TSA, to 

determine whether the operator is in 

compliance with applicable TSA 

requirements. 

(b) Conflict of interest. No auditor 

may undertake an audit in which he or 

she has a conflict of interest as defined 

in § 1552.1. 

(c) Audit report. Each auditor must 

prepare and submit a report, in a form 

and manner prescribed by TSA, for each 

audit that he or she performs. 

(d) Immediate notification to TSA. If 

during the course of an audit the auditor 

believes that there is or may be an 

instance of noncompliance with TSA 


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requirements that presents an imminent 

threat to transportation security or 

public safety, the auditor must report 

the instance immediately to TSA. 

(e) Change in information. Each 

auditor must inform TSA of any change 

in the information described in § 1522.3 

and 1522.5. 

(f) No authorization to take remedial 

or disciplinary action. The auditor is not 

authorized to require any remedial or 

disciplinary action against the person 

subject to the audit. 

(g) Sensitive Security Information. 

Each TSA-approved auditor must 

comply with the requirements in 49 

CFR part 1520 regarding the handling 

and protection of Sensitive Security 

Information. 

(h) Non-disclosure of proprietary 

information. Unless explicitly 

authorized by TSA, each auditor may 

not make an unauthorized release or 

dissemination of any information that 

TSA or a large aircraft operator indicates 

as proprietary information and provides 

to the auditor. 

§ 1522.15 Fraud and intentional 

falsification of records. 

No auditor may make, or cause to be 

made, any of the following: 

(a) Any fraudulent or intentionally 

false statement in any application under 

this part. 

(b) Any fraudulent or intentionally 

false entry in any record or report that 

is kept, made, or used to show 

compliance with this subchapter, or 

exercise any privileges under this part. 

(c) Any reproduction or alteration, for 

fraudulent purpose, of any report, 

record, security program, access 

medium, or identification medium 

issued or submitted under this part. 

§ 1522.17 TSA inspection authority. 

(a) Each TSA-approved auditor must 

allow TSA, at any time or place, to make 

any inspections, including copying 

records, to determine compliance of a 

TSA-approved auditor or an operator 

required to submit to an audit under 

this subchapter with: 

(1) This subchapter and any security 

program under this subchapter, and part 

1520 of this chapter; and 

(2) 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, as amended. 

(b) At the request of TSA, each TSAapproved auditor must provide 

evidence of compliance with this part. 

Subpart B [Reserved] 

Subpart C—Auditors for the Large 

Aircraft Security Program 

§ 1522.201 Applicability. 

This subpart applies to auditors who 

seek to obtain approval from TSA to 

conduct audits of operators of large 

aircraft that are required to have a 

security program under 49 CFR 

1544.101(b). 

§ 1522.203 Additional qualification 

requirements. 

In addition to the requirements set 

forth in § 1522.3, an applicant seeking to 

obtain approval to audit aircraft 

operators that are required to have a 

security program under 49 CFR 

1544.101(b) must have the following 

qualifications: 

(a) The applicant must have at least 

five years of experience in inspection or 

auditing compliance with State or 

Federal regulations in the security 

industry, the aviation industry, or 

government programs. The five years of 

experience must have been obtained 

within 10 years of the date of the 

application. 

(b) The applicant must present three 

professional references that address the 

applicant’s abilities in inspection or 

auditing and written communications. 

(c) Maintain a current accreditation or 

certification required in § 1522.3(d). 

(d) The applicant must have sufficient 

knowledge of, and ability to determine 

compliance with, regulations, policies, 

directives, rules, and regulations, 

pertaining to the large aircraft security 

program. 

(e) The applicant must have sufficient 

knowledge of and ability to apply the 

concepts, principles, and methods of 

compliance with the requirements of the 

large aircraft security program to 

include assessment, inspection, 

investigation, and reporting of 

compliance with the large aircraft 

security program. 

(f) The applicant must successfully 

undergo a security threat assessment 

under 49 CFR part 1544, subpart G, and 

have a valid Determination of No 

Security Threat. 

§ 1522.205 Audit report. 

(a) Each TSA-approved auditor must 

prepare and submit a written audit 

report to TSA in a manner and form 

prescribed by TSA within 30 days of 

completing an audit. 

(b) The audit report must include the 

following information: 

(1) A description of the facilities, 

equipment, systems, processes, and/or 

procedures that were audited. 

(2) The auditor’s findings regarding 

the operator’s compliance with TSA 

requirements. 

(3) Conclusions on the systems, 

processes, and/or procedures that were 

audited. 

(4) Signed attestation by the auditor 

that he or she did not have any conflicts 

of interest in conducting the audit and 

that the audit was conducted 

impartially, professionally, and 

consistent with the standards set forth 

by TSA. 

(5) The third party auditor must retain 

copies of completed audit reports for 36 

calendar months. 

§ 1522.207 Training. 

(a) Initial training. Each TSAapproved auditor must complete the 

initial training prescribed by TSA before 

conducting any audit under this 

subchapter. 

(b) Recurrent training. Each TSAapproved auditor must complete 

recurrent training prescribed by TSA 24 

months after his or her most recent 

TSA-prescribed training. If the TSAapproved auditor completes the 

recurrent training in the month before or 

the month after it is due, the TSAapproved auditor is considered to have 

taken it in the month it is due. 

§ 1522.209 Biennial review. 

(a) Initial review. Except as otherwise 

required by TSA, each TSA-approved 

auditor must submit the following 

information within 24 months after the 

auditor is approved under § 1522.5. If 

the TSA-approved auditor submits the 

following information in the month 

before or the month after it is due, the 

TSA-approved auditor is considered to 

have submitted the information in the 

month it is due: 

(1) Evidence that the auditor 

successfully completed the initial 

training under § 1522.207(a) and any 

recurrent training described 

§ 1522.207(b); and 

(2) Evidence that the auditor 

continues to be certified or accredited 

by an organization that TSA recognizes 

as qualified to certify or accredit an 

auditor for the large aircraft security 

program. 

(b) Recurrent review. Except as 

otherwise required by TSA, each TSAapproved auditor must submit the 

following information 24 months after 

the auditor submitted the information 

required under paragraph (a) or (b) of 

this section. If the TSA-approved 

auditor submits the following 

information in the month before or the 

month after it is due, the TSA-approved 

auditor is considered to have submitted 

the information in the month it is due: 

(1) Evidence that the auditor 

successfully completed the initial 

training under § 1522.207(a) and any 

recurrent training described 

§ 1522.207(b); and 

(2) Evidence that the auditor 

continues to be certified or accredited 

by an organization that TSA recognizes 


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as qualified to certify or accredit an 

auditor for the large aircraft security 

program. 

SUBCHAPTER C—CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

PART 1540—CIVIL AVIATION 

SECURITY: GENERAL RULES 

10. The authority citation for part 

1540 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44907, 44913–44914, 44916–44918, 

44935–44936, 44942, 46105. 

Subpart A—General 

11. Amend § 1540.5 by adding the 

definition of ‘‘Standard security 

program’’ in alphabetical order to read 

as follows: 

§ 1540.5 Terms used in this subchapter. 

* * * * * 

Standard security program means a 

security program issued by TSA that 

serves as a baseline for a particular type 

of operator. If TSA has issued a standard 

security program for a particular type of 

operator, unless otherwise authorized 

by TSA, each operator’s security 

program consists of the standard 

security program together with any 

amendments and alternative procedures 

approved or accepted by TSA. 

* * * * * 

Subpart B—Responsibilities of 

Passengers and Other Individuals and 

Persons 

12. Revise § 1540.107(c) to read as 

follows: 

§ 1540.107 Submission to screening and 

inspection. 

* * * * * 

(c) An individual must provide his or 

her full name, as defined in § 1560.3, 

when— 

(1) The individual makes a 

reservation for a covered flight, as 

defined in § 1560.3. 

(2) The individual makes a request for 

authorization to enter a sterile area. 

(3) An aircraft operator described in 

§ 1544.101(b) requests the individual’s 

full name under § 1544.245(b). 

13. Add new subpart D to part 1540 

to read as follows: 

Subpart D—Responsibilities of Holders 

of TSA-Approved Security Programs 

§ 1540.301 Withdrawal of approval of a 

security program. 

(a) Applicability. This section applies 

to holders of a security program 

approved or accepted by TSA under 49 

CFR chapter XII, subchapter C. 

(b) Withdrawal of security program 

approval. TSA may withdraw the 

approval of a security program, if TSA 

determines continued operation is 

contrary to security and the public 

interest, as follows: 

(1) Notice of proposed withdrawal of 

approval. TSA will serve a Notice of 

Proposed Withdrawal of Approval, 

which notifies the holder of the security 

program, in writing, of the facts, 

charges, applicable law, regulation, or 

order that form the basis of the 

determination. 

(2) Security program holder’s reply. 

The holder of the security program may 

respond to the Notice of Proposed 

Withdrawal of Approval no later than 

15 calendar days after receipt of the 

withdrawal by providing the designated 

official, in writing, with any material 

facts, arguments, applicable law, and 

regulation. 

(3) TSA review. The designated 

official will consider all information 

available, including any relevant 

material or information submitted by 

the holder of the security program, 

before either issuing a Withdrawal of 

Approval of the security program or 

rescinding the Notice of Proposed 

Withdrawal of Approval. If TSA issues 

a Withdrawal of Approval, it becomes 

effective upon receipt by the holder of 

the security program, or 15 calendar 

days after service, whichever occurs 

first. 

(4) Petition for reconsideration. The 

holder of the security program may 

petition TSA to reconsider its 

Withdrawal of Approval by serving a 

petition for consideration no later than 

15 calendar days after the holder of the 

security program receives the 

Withdrawal of Approval. The holder of 

the security program must serve the 

Petition for Reconsideration on the 

designated official. Submission of a 

Petition for Reconsideration will not 

stay the Withdrawal of Approval. The 

holder of the security program may 

request the designated official to stay 

the Withdrawal of Approval pending 

review of and decision on the Petition. 

(5) Assistant Secretary’s review. The 

designated official transmits the Petition 

together with all pertinent information 

to the Assistant Secretary for 

reconsideration. The Assistant Secretary 

will dispose of the Petition within 15 

calendar days of receipt by either 

directing the designated official to 

rescind the Withdrawal of Approval or 

by affirming the Withdrawal of 

Approval. The decision of the Assistant 

Secretary constitutes a final agency 

order subject to judicial review in 

accordance with 49 U.S.C. 46110. 

(6) Emergency withdrawal. If TSA 

finds that there is an emergency with 

respect to aviation security requiring 

immediate action that makes the 

procedures in this section contrary to 

the public interest, the designated 

official may issue an Emergency 

Withdrawal of Approval of a security 

program without first issuing a Notice of 

Proposed Withdrawal of Approval. The 

Emergency Withdrawal would be 

effective on the date that the holder of 

the security program receives the 

emergency withdrawal. In such a case, 

the designated official will send the 

holder of the security program a brief 

statement of the facts, charges, 

applicable law, regulation, or order that 

forms the basis for the Emergency 

Withdrawal. The holder of the security 

program may submit a Petition for 

Reconsideration under the procedures 

in paragraphs (b)(4) through (b)(5) of 

this section; however, this petition will 

not stay the effective date of the 

Emergency Withdrawal. 

(c) Service of documents for 

withdrawal of approval of security 

program proceedings. Service may be 

accomplished by personal delivery, 

certified mail, or express courier. 

Documents served on the holder of a 

security program will be served at its 

official place of business as designated 

in its application for approval or its 

security program. Documents served on 

TSA must be served to the address 

noted in the Notice of Withdrawal of 

Approval or Withdrawal of Approval, 

whichever is applicable. 

(1) Certificate of service. An 

individual may attach a certificate of 

service to a document tendered for 

filing. A certificate of service must 

consist of a statement, dated and signed 

by the person filing the document, that 

the document was personally delivered, 

served by certified mail on a specific 

date, or served by express courier on a 

specific date. 

(2) Date of service. The date of service 

is— 

(i) The date of personal delivery; 

(ii) If served by certified mail, the 

mailing date shown on the certificate of 

service, the date shown on the postmark 

if there is no certificate of service, or 

other mailing date shown by other 

evidence if there is no certificate of 

service or postmark; or 

(iii) If served by express courier, the 

service date shown on the certificate of 

service, or by other evidence if there is 

no certificate of service. 

(d) Extension of time. TSA may grant 

an extension of time to the limits set 

forth in this section for good cause 

shown. A security program holder’s 

request for an extension of time must be 

in writing and be received by TSA at 

least two days before the due date in 

order to be considered. TSA may grant 


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itself an extension of time for good 

cause. 

PART 1542—AIRPORT SECURITY 

14. The authority citation for part 

1542 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44907, 44913–44914, 44916–44918, 

44935–44936, 44942, 46105. 

15. Amend § 1542.103 by revising 

introductory text of paragraphs (a) and 

(b), revising paragraphs (c) and (d), and 

adding new paragraphs (e) and (f) to 

read as follows: 

Subpart B—Airport Security Program 

§ 1542.103 Content. 

(a) Complete program. Except as 

otherwise approved by TSA, each 

airport operator regularly serving 

operations of an aircraft operator or 

foreign air carrier described in 

§ 1544.101(a)(1) or § 1546.101(a) of this 

chapter, must adopt and carry out a 

complete program, and include in its 

security program the following: 

* * * * * 

(b) Supporting program. Except as 

otherwise approved by TSA and except 

for airports that are required to adopt a 

complete program under paragraph (a) 

of this section, each airport regularly 

serving operations of an aircraft operator 

or foreign air carrier described in 

§ 1544.101(a)(2) or § 1546.101(b) or (c) 

of this chapter, must adopt and carry 

out a supporting program, and include 

in its security program a description of 

the following: 

* * * * * 

(c) Partial program. Except as 

otherwise approved by TSA and except 

for airports that are required to adopt a 

complete program under paragraph (a) 

of this section or a supporting program 

under paragraph (b) of this section, each 

of the following airports must adopt and 

carry out a partial program, and must 

include in its security program the 

requirements in paragraph (d) of this 

section. 

(1) Each airport regularly serving large 

aircraft operations of an aircraft operator 

described in § 1544.101(b) with 

scheduled or public charter operations. 

(2) Each reliever airport as defined in 

49 U.S.C. 47102(22). 

(d) Partial program content. Except as 

otherwise approved by TSA, each 

airport described in paragraph (c) of this 

section must include in its security 

program a description of the following: 

(1) Name, means of contact, duties, 

and training requirements of the airport 

security coordinator as required under 

§ 1542.3. 

(2) A description of the law 

enforcement support used to comply 

with § 1542.215(b). 

(3) Training program for law 

enforcement personnel required under 

§ 1542.217(c)(2), if applicable. 

(4) A system for maintaining the 

records described in § 1542.221. 

(5) Procedures for the distribution, 

storage, and disposal of Sensitive 

Security Information (which, as defined 

in § 1520.5, includes security programs, 

Security Directives, Information 

Circulars, and implementing 

instructions), and, as appropriate, 

classified information. 

(6) Procedures for public advisories as 

specified in § 1542.305. 

(7) Incident management procedures 

used to comply with § 1542.307. 

(e) Provisional program. (1) An airport 

operator that is not subject to paragraph 

(a), (b), or (c) of this section may request 

TSA to review and approve its security 

program. 

(2) TSA may approve the security 

program if it determines that approval is 

in the interest of safety and the public 

using the procedures described in 

§ 1544.105(a). 

(3) The airport operator must comply 

with the security program approved 

under this paragraph (e). 

(4) An airport operator or TSA may 

amend an approved security program 

using the procedures described in 

§ 1544.105. 

(5) TSA may withdrawal approval of 

a security program using the procedures 

described in § 1540.301 if it determines 

that withdrawal of approval is in the 

interest of safety and the public. 

(f) Use of appendices. The airport 

operator may comply with paragraphs 

(a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section by 

including in its security program, as an 

appendix, any document that contains 

the information required by paragraphs 

(a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section. The 

appendix must be referenced in the 

corresponding section(s) of the security 

program. 

PART 1544—AIRCRAFT OPERATOR 

SECURITY 

16. The authority citation for part 

1544 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44905, 44907, 44913–44914, 44916– 

44918, 44932, 44935–44936, 44942, 46105. 

Subpart A—General 

17. Amend § 1544.1 by revising 

paragraph (a)(1) to read as follows: 

§ 1544.1 Applicability of this part. 

(a) * * * 

(1) The operations of aircraft operators 

engaged in any civil operation in an 

aircraft with a maximum certificated 

takeoff weight of over 12,500 pounds. 

* * * * * 

Subpart B—Security Program 

§ 1544.101 [Amended] 

18. Amend § 1544.101 as follows: 

a. Revise paragraph (a) introductory 

text; 

b. Revise paragraph (b); 

c. Remove and reserve paragraphs (c), 

(d), (e), and (f); 

d. Revise paragraph (g) to read as 

follows; 

e. Revise paragraph (h) introductory 

text; and 

f. Remove paragraph (i). 

The revisions read as follows: 

§ 1544.101 Adoption and implementation. 

(a) Full program. Each aircraft 

operator holding an operating certificate 

under 14 CFR part 119 must carry out 

the requirements in subparts C, D, and 

E of this part specified in § 1544.103 (c) 

and must adopt and carry out a security 

program that meets the requirements of 

§§ 1544.103(a), (b), and (c) for each of 

the following operations: 

* * * * * 

(b) Large aircraft program. Each 

aircraft operator must carry out the 

requirements in subparts C, D, and E of 

this part specified in §§ 1544.103(e) and 

(f) and must adopt and carry out a 

security program that meets the 

requirements of §§ 1544.103(a), (b), (e), 

and (f) for each operation that meets all 

of the following: 

(1) Is an aircraft with a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight of over 

12,500 pounds. 

(2) Is in any civil operation. 

(3) Is not one of the following: 

(i) Operating under a full program 

under paragraph (a) of this section; 

(ii) Operating under a full all-cargo 

program under paragraph (h) of this 

section; 

(iii) A public aircraft as described in 

49 U.S.C. 40102, provided that the 

aircraft operator obtains security 

procedures from TSA if the aircraft 

deplanes into or enplanes from a sterile 

area; or 

(iv) A government charter under 

paragraph (2) of the definition of private 

charter in § 1540.5 of this chapter, 

provided that aircraft does not deplane 

into or enplane from a sterile area and 

the government takes security 

responsibility for the following: 

(A) The aircraft; 

(B) Persons onboard; and 

(C) Property onboard. 

* * * * * 

(g) Limited program. Each aircraft 

operator that is not required to have a 


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full program, a large aircraft program or 

a full all-cargo program, as identified in 

paragraphs (a), (b), and (h) of this 

section respectively, may request a 

security program from TSA. Each 

aircraft operator with a limited program 

must carry out selected provisions of 

subparts C, D, and E of this part, as 

provided by TSA and must adopt and 

carry out the provisions of § 1544.305, 

as specified in its security program. 

(h) Full all-cargo program. Each 

aircraft operator holding an operating 

certificate under 14 CFR part 119 or 14 

CFR part 125 must carry out the 

requirements in subparts C, D, and E of 

this part specified in § 1544.103(d) and 

must adopt and carry out a security 

program that meets the requirements of 

§§ 1544.103(a), (b), and (d) for each 

operation that is— 

* * * * * 

19. Amend § 1544.103 by adding 

paragraph (a)(4), revising paragraph (c), 

and adding paragraphs (d), (e), and (f) to 

read as follows: 

§ 1544.103 Form, content, and availability. 

(a) * * * 

(4) Includes the standard security 

program issued by TSA, together with 

any amendments and alternate 

procedures approved or accepted by 

TSA for the aircraft operator. 

* * * * * 

(c) Content of a security program for 

a full program aircraft operator. The 

standard security program for a full 

program aircraft operator described in 

§ 1544.101(a) is the Aircraft Operator 

Standard Security Program (AOSSP). 

The security program must include the 

following: 

(1) Section 1544.201, Acceptance and 

screening of individuals and accessible 

property. 

(2) Section 1544.203, Acceptance and 

screening of checked baggage. 

(3) Section 1544.205, Acceptance and 

screening of cargo. 

(4) Section 1544.207, Inspection of 

individuals and property. 

(5) Section 1544.209, Use of metal 

detection devices. 

(6) Section 1544.211, Use of X-ray 

systems. 

(7) Section 1544.213, Use of 

explosives detection systems. 

(8) Section 1544.215, Security 

coordinators. 

(9) Section 1544.217, Law 

enforcement personnel. 

(10) Section 1544.219, Carriage of 

accessible weapons. 

(11) Section 1544.221, Carriage of 

prisoners under the control of armed 

law enforcement officers. 

(12) Section 1544.223(a) through (h), 

Transportation of Federal Air Marshals. 

(13) Section 1544.225, Security of the 

aircraft and facilities. 

(14) Section 1544.227, Exclusive area 

agreements. 

(15) Section 1544.228, Access to cargo 

and security threat assessments for 

cargo personnel in the United States. 

(16) Sections 1544.229 and 1544.230, 

Fingerprint-based criminal history 

records checks. 

(17) Section 1544.231, Airportapproved and exclusive area personnel 

identification systems. 

(18) Sections 1544.233 and 1544.235, 

Security coordinators and crewmember 

training and training for individuals 

with security-related duties. 

(19) Section 1544.237, Flight deck 

privileges. 

(20) Section 1544.241, Regarding 

voluntary provision of emergency 

services. 

(21) Section 1544.301, Contingency 

plan. 

(22) Section 1544.303, Bomb or air 

piracy threats. 

(23) Section 1544.305, Security 

directives and information circulars. 

(d) Content of a security program for 

a full all-cargo program. The standard 

security program for a full all-cargo 

aircraft operator described in 

§ 1544.101(h) is the Full All-Cargo 

Aircraft Operator Standard Security 

Program (FACAOSSP). The security 

program must include the following: 

(1) Section 1544.202, Persons and 

property onboard an all-cargo aircraft. 

(2) Section 1544.205, Acceptance and 

screening of cargo. 

(3) Section 1544.207, Inspection of 

individuals and property. 

(4) Section 1544.209, Use of metal 

detection devices. 

(5) Section 1544.211, Use of x-ray 

systems. 

(6) Section 1544.215, Security 

coordinators. 

(7) Section 1544.217, Law 

enforcement personnel. 

(8) Section 1544.219, Carriage of 

accessible weapons. 

(9) Section 1544.223(a) through (h), 

Transportation of Federal Air Marshals. 

(10) Section 1544.225, Security of the 

aircraft and facilities. 

(11) Section 1544.227, Exclusive area 

agreements. 

(12) Section 1544.228, Access to cargo 

and security threat assessments for 

cargo personnel in the United States. 

(13) Sections 1544.229 and 1544.230, 

Fingerprint-based criminal history 

records checks. 

(14) Section 1544.231, Airportapproved and exclusive area personnel 

identification systems. 

(15) Sections 1544.233 and 1544.235, 

Security coordinators and crewmember 

training and training for individuals 

with security-related duties. 

(16) Section 1544.237, Flight deck 

privileges. 

(17) Section 1544.301, Contingency 

plan. 

(18) Section 1544.303, Bomb or air 

piracy threats. 

(19) Section 1544.305, Security 

directives and information circulars. 

(20) Other provisions of subpart C of 

this part that TSA has approved upon 

request. 

(21) The remaining requirements of 

subpart C of this part when TSA notifies 

the aircraft operator in writing that a 

security threat exists concerning that 

operation. 

(e) Content of a security program for 

a large aircraft operator. The standard 

security program for large aircraft 

operators described in § 1544.101(b) is 

the large aircraft security program 

(LASP). The security program must 

include the following and any 

applicable requirements in paragraph (f) 

of this section: 

(1) Section 1544.206, Person and 

property onboard a large aircraft. 

(2) Section 1544.215, Security 

coordinators. 

(3) Section 1544.217, Law 

enforcement personnel. 

(4) Section 1544.219, Carriage of 

accessible weapons. 

(5) Section 1544.223(i), 

Transportation of Federal Air Marshals. 

(6) Section 1544.225, Security of the 

aircraft and facilities. 

(7) Sections 1544.233 and 1544.235, 

Security coordinators and crewmember 

training. 

(8) Section 1544.241, Voluntary 

provision of emergency services if the 

large aircraft operator holds an Air 

Carrier Certificate under 14 CFR part 

119. 

(9) Section 1544.243, Third party 

audit. 

(10) Section 1544.245, Passenger 

vetting for large aircraft operators. 

(11) Sections 1544.301(a) and (b), 

Contingency plan. 

(12) Section 1544.303, Bomb or air 

piracy threats. 

(13) Section 1544.305, Security 

directives and information circulars. 

(14) Part 1544, subpart G, Security 

threat assessment for flight crew. 

(15) Except as provided in paragraph 

(f)(1) of this section, an aircraft operator 

must seek alternative procedures from 

TSA for the screening of individuals 

and property for an aircraft that 

enplanes from or deplanes into a sterile 

area. 

(16) Other provisions of subparts C, D, 

and E of this part that TSA has 

approved upon request. 


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(17) The remaining requirements of 

subparts C, D, and E of this part when 

TSA notifies the aircraft operator that a 

security threat exists concerning that 

operation. 

(f) Additional requirements for large 

aircraft operators. In addition to the 

requirements in paragraph (e) of this 

section each aircraft operator described 

in § 1544.101(b) must include in its 

security program, the applicable 

requirements of this paragraph (f). 

(1) Large aircraft over 45,500 

kilograms (100,309.3 pounds) or with a 

passenger-seating configuration of 61 or 

more. For large aircraft operated for 

compensation or hire with a maximum 

certificated take-off weight of over 

45,500 kilograms (100,309.3 pounds), or 

a passenger-seating configuration of 61 

or more, each aircraft operator must 

include in its security program the 

following: 

(i) Section 1544.201, Acceptance and 

screening of individuals and their 

accessible property. 

(ii) Section 1544.207(c), Inspection of 

individuals and property. 

(iii) Section 1544.223(a) through (h), 

Transportation of Federal Air Marshals. 

(iv) Procedures for ensuring that each 

of the following individuals have 

successfully undergone a security threat 

assessment under subpart G of this part 

before granting the individual authority 

to perform screening functions: 

(A) Individuals who screen 

passengers or property that will be 

carried in a cabin of the aircraft. 

(B) Individuals who serve as 

immediate supervisors or the next 

supervisory level to those individuals 

described in paragraph (a)(1)(iv)(A) of 

this section. 

(2) All-Cargo operations for aircraft 

with an MTOW of over 12,500 pounds. 

A large aircraft operator in an all-cargo 

operation must include the following in 

its security program: 

(i) Section 1544.202, Persons and 

property onboard an all-cargo aircraft. 

(ii) Sections 1544.205(a), (b), (d), and 

(f), Acceptance and screening of cargo. 

20. Revise § 1544.105 to read as 

follows: 

§ 1544.105 Approval and amendments to 

the security program. 

(a) Initial approval of security 

program. (1) Application. Unless 

otherwise authorized by TSA, each 

aircraft operator required to have a 

security program under this part must 

apply for a security program in a form 

and a manner prescribed by TSA at least 

90 days before the intended date of 

operations. The application must be in 

writing. 

(i) Each aircraft operator must include 

in its application the following: 

(A) The aircraft operator’s business 

name and other names, including 

‘‘doing business as’’; 

(B) Address of the aircraft operator’s 

primary place of business or 

headquarters; 

(C) The aircraft operator’s state of 

incorporation, if applicable; and 

(D) The aircraft operator’s tax 

identification number. 

(ii) Each aircraft operator under the 

large aircraft program as described in 

§ 1544.101(b) must include the 

following in its application: 

(A) The business name and other 

names, including ‘‘doing business as.’’ If 

the applicant holds or is applying for a 

FAA operating certificate, the business 

name must be the same as the name on 

the FAA operating certificate. 

(B) The names and addresses of each 

proprietor, general partner, officer, 

director, and owner of an aircraft 

identified under § 1544.101(b). 

(C) A signed statement from each 

person listed in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of 

this section stating whether he or she 

has been a proprietor, general partner, 

officer, director, or owner of a large 

aircraft that had its security program 

withdrawn or suspended by TSA. 

(D) If the applicant holds a FAA 

operating certificate, the FAA operating 

certificate number. 

(E) If the applicant does not have a 

FAA operating certificate, the type of 

operation under which the applicant 

operates, for example operating under 

14 CFR part 91. 

(F) The name, title, address, phone 

number, and electronic mail address of 

the Aircraft Operator Security 

Coordinator (AOSC) and any alternates. 

The telephone number provided must 

be a number where at least one AOSC 

may be reached. 

(G) A statement acknowledging and 

ensuring that each employee and agent 

of the aircraft operator, who is subject 

to training under § 1544.233 and 235, 

will have successfully completed the 

training outlined in its security program 

before performing security-related 

duties. 

(2) Standard security program. TSA 

will provide to the aircraft operator 

security coordinator the appropriate 

standard security program, any security 

directives, and amendments to the 

security program and other alternative 

procedures that apply to the aircraft 

operator. The aircraft operator may 

either accept the standard security 

program or submit a proposed modified 

security program to the designated 

official for approval. TSA will approve 

the security program under paragraph 

(a)(3) of the section or issue a written 

notice to modify under paragraph (a)(4) 

of this section. 

(3) Approval. TSA will approve the 

security program upon determining 

that— 

(i) The aircraft operator has met the 

requirements of this part, its security 

program, and any applicable Security 

Directives; 

(ii) The aircraft operator is able and 

willing to carry out the requirements of 

its security program; 

(iii) The approval of the security 

program is not contrary to the interests 

of security and the public interest; and 

(iv) The aircraft operator has not held 

a security program that was withdrawn, 

unless otherwise authorized by TSA. 

(4) Modification. (i) If a security 

program does not satisfy the 

requirements in paragraph (a)(3) of this 

section, TSA will provide the aircraft 

operator written Notice to Modify the 

security program to comply with the 

applicable requirements of this part. 

(ii) The aircraft operator may either 

submit a modified security program to 

TSA for approval, or a petition for 

Reconsideration of Notice to Modify 

within 30 days of receipt of the Notice 

to modify. A Petition for 

Reconsideration must be filed with the 

designated official. 

(iii) The designated official, upon 

receipt of a Petition for Reconsideration, 

either amends or withdraws the Notice, 

or transmits the Petition, together with 

any pertinent information, to the 

Assistant Secretary for reconsideration. 

The Assistant Secretary may dispose of 

the Petition within 30 days of receipt by 

either directing the designated official to 

withdraw or amend the Notice to 

Modify, or by denying the Petition and 

affirming the Notice to Modify. 

(5) Commencement of operations. The 

aircraft operator may operate under an 

approved security program when it 

meets all requirements, including but 

not limited to successful completion of 

training and Security Threat 

Assessments by relevant personnel, if 

applicable. 

(b) Amendment requested by an 

aircraft operator. An aircraft operator 

may submit a request to TSA to amend 

its security program as follows: 

(1) The request for an amendment 

must be filed in writing, with the 

designated official at least 45 days 

before the date the aircraft operator 

proposes for the amendment to become 

effective, unless a shorter period is 

allowed by the designated official. 

(2) Within 30 days after receiving a 

proposed amendment, the designated 

official, in writing, either approves or 

denies the request to amend. 


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(3) An amendment to an aircraft 

operator security program may be 

approved if the designated official 

determines that security and the public 

interest will allow it, and the proposed 

amendment provides the level of 

security required under this part. 

(4) If the proposed amendment is 

denied, within 30 days after receiving a 

denial, the aircraft operator may petition 

the Assistant Secretary to reconsider the 

denial. A Petition for Reconsideration 

must be filed with the designated 

official. 

(5) Upon receipt of a petition for 

reconsideration, the designated official 

either approves the request to amend or 

transmits the petition, together with any 

pertinent information, to the Assistant 

Secretary for reconsideration. The 

Assistant Secretary disposes of the 

petition within 30 days of receipt by 

either directing the designated official to 

approve the amendment, or denying the 

Petition and affirming the denial. 

(6) Any aircraft operator may submit 

a group proposal for an amendment that 

is on behalf of it and other aircraft 

operators that co-sign the proposal. 

(c) Amendment by TSA. If security 

and the public interest require an 

amendment, TSA may amend a security 

program as follows: 

(1) The designated official notifies the 

aircraft operator, in writing, of the 

proposed amendment, fixing a period of 

not less than 30 days within which the 

aircraft operator may submit written 

information, views, and arguments on 

the amendment. 

(2) After considering all relevant 

material, the designated official notifies 

the aircraft operator of any amendment 

adopted or rescinds the notice. If the 

amendment is adopted, it becomes 

effective not less than 30 days after the 

aircraft operator receives the notice of 

amendment, unless the aircraft operator 

petitions the Assistant Secretary, in 

writing, to reconsider no later than 15 

days before the effective date of the 

amendment. The aircraft operator must 

send the written Petition for 

Reconsideration to the designated 

official. A timely Petition for 

Reconsideration stays the effective date 

of the amendment. 

(3) Upon receipt of a Petition for 

Reconsideration, the designated official 

either amends or withdraws the notice 

or transmits the Petition, together with 

any pertinent information, to the 

Assistant Secretary for reconsideration. 

The Assistant Secretary disposes of the 

Petition within 30 days of receipt by 

either directing the designated official to 

withdraw or amend the amendment, or 

by denying the Petition and affirming 

the amendment. 

(d) Emergency amendments. If the 

designated official finds that there is an 

emergency requiring immediate action 

with respect to security in air 

transportation or in air commerce that 

makes procedures in this section 

contrary to the public interest, the 

designated official may issue an 

emergency amendment, without the 

prior notice and comment procedures in 

paragraph (c) of this section, effective 

without stay on the date the aircraft 

operator receives notice of it. In such a 

case, the designated official will 

incorporate in the notice a brief 

statement of the reasons and findings for 

the amendment to be adopted. The 

aircraft operator may file a written 

Petition for Reconsideration under 

paragraph (c) of this section; however, 

this does not stay the effective date of 

the Emergency Amendment. 

(e) Requirement to report changes in 

information. Each aircraft operator with 

an approved security program under 

this part must notify TSA, in a form and 

manner approved by TSA, of any 

changes to the information submitted 

during its initial application under 

paragraph (a)(1) of this section. 

(1) This notification must be 

submitted in writing to the designated 

official not later than 30 days after the 

date the change occurred. 

(2) Changes included in the 

requirement of this paragraph include, 

but are not limited to, changes in the 

holder of a security program’s contact 

information, owners, business addresses 

and locations, and form of business 

entity. 

(f) TSA may withdraw its approval of 

an aircraft operator’s security program 

under § 1540.301. 

21. Add new § 1544.107 to subpart B 

to read as follows: 

§ 1544.107 Fractional ownership of large 

aircraft. 

(a) This section applies to aircraft 

operators operating aircraft under a 

large aircraft program under 

§ 1544.101(b) that are under a fractional 

ownership program under 14 CFR part 

91, subpart K. For operations where the 

owner in operational control delegates 

performance of security tasks to the 

program manager, the security program 

is considered to be held jointly by the 

owner and the program manager, and 

the owner and the program manager are 

jointly and individually responsible for 

compliance. 

(b) A fractional program manager that 

manages multiple aircraft may have one 

large aircraft program that applies to all 

its operations. 

Subpart C—Operations 

22. Amend § 1544.201 by adding 

introductory text to read as follows: 

§ 1544.201 Acceptance and screening of 

individuals and accessible property. 

This section applies to each aircraft 

operator required to comply with this 

section under 49 CFR 1544.103. 

* * * * * 

23. Revise § 1544.202 to read as 

follows: 

§ 1544.202 Persons and property onboard 

all-cargo aircraft. 

Each aircraft operator operating under 

a full all-cargo program or a large 

aircraft program in an all-cargo 

operation as described in 

§ 1544.103(f)(2) must apply the security 

measures in its security program for 

persons who are carried on the aircraft, 

and for their property, to prevent or 

deter the carriage of any unauthorized 

persons, and any unauthorized or 

accessible weapons, explosives, 

incendiaries, and other destructive 

substances or items. 

24. Amend § 1544.205 by revising 

paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) to read as 

follows: 

§ 1544.205 Acceptance and screening of 

cargo. 

(a) Preventing or deterring the carriage 

of any explosive or incendiary. Each 

aircraft operator operating under a full 

program, a full all-cargo program, or a 

large aircraft program in an all-cargo 

operation as described in 

§ 1544.103(f)(2) must use the 

procedures, facilities, and equipment 

described in its security program to 

prevent or deter the carriage of any 

unauthorized persons, and any 

unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, 

and other destructive devices, 

substances or items in cargo onboard an 

aircraft. 

(b) Screening and inspection of cargo. 

Each aircraft operator operating under a 

full program or a full all-cargo program, 

or a large aircraft program in an allcargo operation, as described in 

§ 1544.103(f)(2), must ensure that cargo 

is screened and inspected for any 

unauthorized person, and any 

unauthorized explosive, incendiary, and 

other destructive substance or item as 

provided in the aircraft operator’s 

security program and § 1544.207, and as 

provided in § 1544.239 for operations 

under a full program, before loading it 

on its aircraft. 

* * * * * 

(d) Refusal to transport. Except as 

otherwise provided in its program, each 

aircraft operator operating under a full 


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program, a full all-cargo program, or a 

large aircraft program in an all-cargo 

operation as described in 

§ 1544.103(f)(2) must refuse to transport 

any cargo if the shipper does not 

consent to a search or inspection of that 

cargo in accordance with the system 

prescribed by this part. 

* * * * * 

25. Add new § 1544.206 to subpart C 

to read as follows: 

§ 1544.206 Persons and property on board 

a large aircraft. 

Each aircraft operator operating under 

a large aircraft program under 

§ 1544.101(b), except for a large aircraft 

operator in an all-cargo operation as 

described in § 1544.103(f)(2), must 

apply the security measures in its 

security program for any persons and 

accessible property onboard the aircraft, 

including company materials (COMAT), 

to prevent or deter the carriage of any 

unauthorized persons, and any 

unauthorized or accessible weapons, 

explosives, incendiaries, and other 

destructive devices, substances or items. 

26. Revise § 1544.207 to read as 

follows: 

§ 1544.207 Inspection of individuals and 

property. 

(a) Applicability of this section. This 

section applies to the inspection of 

individuals, accessible property, 

checked baggage, and cargo by each full 

program operator under § 1544.101(a); 

the inspection of individuals, accessible 

property and cargo by each full all-cargo 

program operator under § 1544.101(h); 

and the inspection of individuals and 

accessible property by a large aircraft 

program operator under § 1544.103(f)(1), 

as required under this part. 

(b) Full program aircraft operators. 

Each aircraft operator must ensure that 

passengers and their accessible property 

do not board an aircraft and that 

checked baggage is not loaded onto an 

aircraft unless inspection is conducted 

as follows: 

(1) Locations within the United States. 

The inspection of passengers, accessible 

property, and checked baggage is 

conducted by TSA. 

(2) Locations outside the United 

States. (i) In non-U.S. locations where 

the foreign country conducts inspection 

of passengers, accessible property, and 

checked baggage, the aircraft operator 

must ensure that the foreign country or 

its designee conducts such inspection. 

TSA may require aircraft operators to 

conduct supplemental inspection 

operations. 

(ii) In non-U.S. locations where the 

foreign country does not conduct 

inspection of passengers, accessible 

property, and/or checked baggage, an 

aircraft operator must conduct any 

inspection not conducted by the foreign 

country or must not permit noninspected individuals on the aircraft. 

The aircraft operator’s personnel must 

be trained and authorized to inspect 

individuals, accessible property, and 

checked baggage, as provided in subpart 

E. 

(3) All locations. Each aircraft 

operator must ensure the inspection of 

all cargo prior to loading on the aircraft. 

The cargo must be inspected as 

provided in each aircraft operator’s 

security program or by TSA, or by the 

foreign country. Where the foreign 

country does not conduct inspection of 

cargo, the aircraft operator must conduct 

the inspection or must not permit noninspected cargo on the aircraft. 

(c) Full all-cargo aircraft operators 

and large aircraft operators. Each 

aircraft operator must use the measures 

in its security program and in subpart E 

of this part to inspect individuals and 

property. 

27. Amend § 1544.217 by revising the 

introductory text of paragraphs (a)(2) 

and (b) to read as follows: 

§ 1544.217 Law enforcement personnel. 

(a) * * * 

(2) For operations under a large 

aircraft program under § 1544.101(b) or 

a full all-cargo program under 

§ 1544.101(h), each aircraft operator 

must— 

* * * * * 

(b) This paragraph (b) applies to 

operations at airports required to hold 

security programs under part 1542 of 

this chapter. For operations under a 

large aircraft program under 

§ 1544.101(b), or a full all-cargo program 

under § 1544.101(h), each aircraft 

operator must— 

* * * * * 

28. Amend § 1544.219 by adding 

introductory text, and revising the 

introductory text of paragraphs (a) and 

(b) to read as follows: 

§ 1544.219 Carriage of accessible 

weapons. 

This section applies to each aircraft 

operator required to comply with this 

section under 49 CFR 1544.103. 

(a) Flights for which screening is 

conducted. The provisions of 

§§ 1544.201(d) and 1544.202, with 

respect to accessible weapons, do not 

apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) 

traveling armed aboard a flight for 

which screening is required, if the 

requirements of this section are met. 

* * * * * 

(b) Flights for which screening is not 

conducted. The provisions of 

§§ 1544.201(d) and 1544.202, with 

respect to accessible weapons, do not 

apply to a LEO aboard a flight for which 

screening is not required if the 

requirements of paragraphs (a)(1), (3), 

and (4) of this section are met. 

* * * * * 

29. Amend § 1544.223 by adding 

introductory text and a new paragraph 

(i), and revising paragraphs (b), (f), and 

(g) to read as follows: 

§ 1544.223 Transportation of Federal Air 

Marshals. 

Each aircraft operator under the full 

program as described in § 1544.101(a), 

full all-cargo program as described in 

§ 1544.101(h), or the large aircraft 

program and required to comply with 

§ 1544.103(f)(1), must comply with 

paragraphs (a) through (h) of this 

section. Each aircraft operator under the 

large aircraft program as described in 

§ 1544.101(b), other than large aircraft 

operators described in § 1544.103(f)(1), 

must comply with paragraph (i) of this 

section. 

* * * * * 

(b) Each aircraft operator must carry 

Federal Air Marshals, in the number 

and manner specified by TSA. 

* * * * * 

(f) The requirements of §§ 1544.219(a) 

and 1544.241 do not apply for a Federal 

Air Marshal on duty status. 

(g) Each aircraft operator operating 

under a security program pursuant to 

§§ 1544.101(a), (b) and (h), must restrict 

any information concerning the 

presence, seating, names, and purpose 

of Federal Air Marshals at any station or 

on any flight to those persons with an 

operational need to know. 

* * * * * 

(i) Upon prior notification from TSA, 

large aircraft operators must carry 

Federal Air Marshals, in the number 

and manner specified by TSA. 

30. Amend § 1544.237 by adding 

introductory text and revising paragraph 

(b) to read as follows: 

§ 1544.237 Flight deck privileges. 

This section applies to each aircraft 

operator required to comply with this 

section under 49 CFR 1544.103: 

* * * * * 

(b) This section does not restrict 

access for an FAA air carrier inspector, 

a DOD commercial air carrier evaluator, 

an authorized representative of the 

National Transportation Safety Board, or 

an Agent of the U.S. Secret Service, 

under 14 CFR parts 121, 125, or 135, or 

a Federal Air Marshal under this part. 

31. Add new § 1544.241 to subpart C 

to read as follows: 


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§ 1544.241 Voluntary provision of 

emergency services. 

This section applies to each aircraft 

operator that is required to comply with 

this section under 49 CFR 1544.103 and 

that is an air carrier. 

(a) Qualification under this section. 

An individual is qualified for purposes 

of this section if the individual is 

qualified under Federal, State, local, or 

tribal law, or under the law of a foreign 

government, has valid standing with the 

licensing or employing agency that 

issued the credentials, and is a 

scheduled, on-call, paid, or volunteer 

employee, as one of the following: 

(1) A law enforcement officer who is 

an employee or authorized by the 

Federal, state, local, or tribal 

government or under the law of a 

foreign government, with the primary 

purpose of the prevention, investigation, 

apprehension, or detention of 

individuals suspected or convicted of 

government offenses. 

(2) A firefighter who is an employee, 

whether paid or a volunteer, of a fire 

department of any Federal, state, local, 

or tribal government who is certified as 

a firefighter as a condition of 

employment and whose duty it is to 

extinguish fires, to protect life, and to 

protect property. 

(3) An emergency medical technician 

who is trained and certified to appraise 

and initiate the administration of 

emergency care for victims of trauma or 

acute illness. 

(b) Exemption from liability. (1) Under 

49 U.S.C. 44944(b), an individual shall 

not be liable for damages in any action 

brought in a Federal or State court that 

arises from an act or omission of the 

individual in providing or attempting to 

provide assistance in the case of an inflight emergency in an aircraft of an air 

carrier if the individual meets the 

qualifications described in paragraph (a) 

of this section. 

(2) Under 49 U.S.C. 44944(c), 

exemption described in paragraph (b)(1) 

of this section shall not apply in any 

case in which an individual provides, or 

attempts to provide, assistance in a 

manner that constitutes gross negligence 

or willful misconduct. 

(3) The exemption described in 

paragraph (b)(1) of this section applies 

whether or not the individual has 

volunteered prior to departure under the 

program described in paragraph (c) of 

this section. 

(4) For purposes of this paragraph (b), 

the qualified individual need not have 

his or her credentials present at the time 

of providing or attempting to provide 

assistance. 

(c) Program for pre-departure 

volunteers. Each aircraft operator must 

adopt and carry out a program for 

qualified individuals to volunteer, prior 

to departure, to be called upon by a 

crew member or flight attendant to 

provide emergency services in the event 

of an in-flight emergency. Prior to 

accepting an offer of voluntary 

emergency services from a qualified 

individual prior to departure, the 

aircraft operator must request and 

review any credential, document, and 

identification offered by the individual 

to determine whether he or she meets 

the definition of a qualified individual. 

(1) The credential, document, or 

identification must identify the service 

category and bear the individual’s name, 

clear full-face picture, and signature and 

must not have expired, except as 

provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this 

section. 

(2) If the credential does not bear an 

expiration date, the qualified individual 

must also present an official letter 

identifying current employment in the 

relevant service category. 

(3) If the credential does not bear a 

full-face image of the individual, the 

individual must also present a photo 

identification issued by a government 

authority. 

(4) An individual whose credential 

bears an expiration date that has passed 

on the date of the intended flight is not 

considered a qualified individual for 

purposes of paragraph (c) of this section. 

(d) Law enforcement officers flying 

armed and federal air marshals. The 

aircraft operator need not apply the 

requirements of paragraph (c) to a law 

enforcement officer traveling armed 

pursuant to § 1544.219 or to a Federal 

Air Marshal on duty status pursuant to 

§§ 1544.219 and 1544.223. 

(e) Discretion of the aircraft operator. 

The aircraft operator has full discretion 

to request, accept, or reject a qualified 

individual’s offer of assistance. Nothing 

in this section prohibits or requires any 

passenger’s assistance in an emergency. 

(f) Confidentiality. The aircraft 

operator must not provide any 

individual, other than the appropriate 

aircraft operator personnel who need to 

know, the identity or any other personal 

or professional information of any 

qualified individual offering to provide 

emergency services. 

32. Add new § 1544.243 to subpart C 

to read as follows: 

§ 1544.243 Third party audit. 

(a) Applicability. This section applies 

to aircraft operators operating under a 

large aircraft program under 

§ 1544.101(b). 

(b) General. Each aircraft operator 

must contract with an auditor approved 

under 49 CFR part 1522 to conduct an 

audit of the aircraft operator’s 

compliance with this chapter and its 

security program in accordance with 

this section. 

(c) Timing. (1) Initial audit. Except as 

approved by TSA, each aircraft operator 

must cause the initial audit to be 

conducted within sixty days of the 

approval of the aircraft operator’s 

security program under § 1544.105. 

(2) Biennial audit. Each aircraft 

operator must cause an audit to be 

conducted 24 months after the aircraft 

operator’s most recent audit conducted 

to meet the requirements in paragraph 

(c)(1) of this section or this paragraph 

(c)(2). If the aircraft operator completes 

the audit in the month before or the 

month after it is due, the aircraft 

operator is considered to have 

completed the audit in the month it is 

due. 

(d) Auditor’s access. Each aircraft 

operator must provide the auditor 

access to all records, equipment, and 

facilities necessary for the auditor to 

conduct an audit of the aircraft 

operator’s compliance with this chapter 

and its security program. 

(e) Audit report. Each aircraft operator 

will receive a copy of the audit report 

from its auditor. 

(f) Comments on audit report. Within 

30 days of receiving a copy of an audit 

report from the auditor, an aircraft 

operator may submit written comments 

on the report to TSA. 

33. Add new § 1544.245 to subpart C 

to read as follows: 

§ 1544.245 Passenger vetting for large 

aircraft operators. 

(a) Applicability and terms used in 

this section. (1) Applicability. (i) Except 

as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this 

section, this section applies to aircraft 

operators operating under a large 

aircraft program described in 

§ 1544.101(b). 

(ii) This section does not apply to any 

flight operated by a large aircraft 

operator for which the large aircraft 

operator has submitted advance 

passenger information to U.S. Custom 

and Border Protection (CBP) under 19 

CFR 122.49a, 122.75a, or 122.22 and has 

complied with CBP’s instructions. If 

CBP grants the pilot landing rights 

under 19 CFR 122.49a, 122.75a, or 

122.22, the large aircraft operator may 

permit all passengers for whom the 

aircraft operator submitted advance 

passenger information to CBP to board 

the aircraft. If CBP identifies a passenger 

as a selectee under 19 CFR 122.49a, 

122.75a, or 122.22, the large aircraft 

operator may permit the passenger to 

board the aircraft and the large aircraft 

operator must comply with the 


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procedures in its security program 

pertaining to passengers that are 

identified as selectees. If CBP identifies 

a passenger as ‘‘not cleared’’ under 19 

CFR 122.49a, 122.75a, or 122.22, the 

large aircraft operator must not permit 

the passenger to board the aircraft. 

(2) Terms used in this section. In 

addition to the terms in §§ 1500.3 and 

1540.5 of this chapter, the following 

terms apply in this section: 

Continuous vetting means the process 

in which an individual’s full name, date 

of birth, gender, passport information, 

and Redress Number (if available) are 

continuously matched against the most 

current watch-list in a manner 

prescribed by TSA. 

Passenger information means: 

(1) Full name of the passenger. 

(2) Date of birth of the passenger, if 

available. 

(3) Gender of the passenger, if 

available. 

(4) Passport information, if available. 

(5) Redress Number of the passenger, 

if available. 

Passport information means the 

following information from an 

individual’s passport: 

(1) Passport number. 

(2) Country of issuance. 

(3) Expiration date. 

(4) Gender. 

(5) Full name. 

Redress Number means the number 

assigned by DHS to an individual 

processed through the redress 

procedures described in 49 CFR part 

1560, subpart C. 

Watch-list refers to the No Fly List 

and Selectee List components of the 

Terrorist Screening Database maintained 

by the Terrorist Screening Center. 

Watch-list service provider is an entity 

that TSA has approved under 49 CFR 

part 1544, subpart F, to conduct watchlist matching for large aircraft operators 

required under this section. 

(b) Request for and transmission of 

passenger information. (1) Passenger 

information list. Except as provided in 

paragraph (b)(2) of this section, each 

aircraft operator must: 

(i) Request and obtain the full name 

of every passenger on each flight 

operated by the aircraft operator; 

(ii) Request the gender, date of birth, 

and Redress Number for every passenger 

on each flight operated by the aircraft 

operator; 

(iii) Transmit the full name and other 

available passenger information, and 

any available passport information, to 

an entity approved to conduct watch-list 

matching under 49 CFR part 1544, 

subpart F (‘‘Watch-list service 

provider’’); and 

(iv) Transmit updated passenger 

information to its watch-list service 

provider if there are revisions to the 

passenger’s full name, date of birth, 

gender, passport information, or Redress 

Number. 

(2) Master passenger list. An aircraft 

operator does not need to transmit 

passenger information required under 

paragraph (b)(1) of this section or await 

boarding instructions required under 

paragraph (c) of this section for 

individuals who satisfy all of the 

following: 

(i) Prior to obtaining and transmitting 

passenger information under paragraphs 

(b)(2)(ii) and (iii) of this section, the 

aircraft operator must inform the 

individual that inclusion in the master 

passenger list is voluntary, provide the 

individual with notice of the purpose 

and procedures related to a master 

passenger list, and obtain from the 

individual a signed, written statement 

affirmatively requesting that he or she 

be placed on the master passenger list. 

(ii) The aircraft operator has obtained 

the full name, gender, date of birth, and 

Redress Number (if available) of the 

individuals. 

(iii) The aircraft operator has 

transmitted the full name, gender, date 

of birth, passport information, and 

Redress Number (if available) of the 

individual and any updated passenger 

information to a watch-list service 

provider and identified the individual 

as an individual that should be subject 

to continuous vetting. 

(iv) The aircraft operator ensures that 

the watch-list service provider has 

responsibility for conducting 

continuous vetting of the individual at 

the time that the individual boards a 

flight operated by the aircraft operator. 

(v) The watch-list service provider 

that conducts the continuous vetting of 

the individual has informed the aircraft 

operator that the individual is cleared to 

board an aircraft after the aircraft 

operators transmits the initial passenger 

information to the watch-list service 

provider. If the aircraft operator 

transmits updated passenger 

information, the aircraft operator must 

wait until the watch-list service 

provider informs the aircraft operator 

that the individual is cleared to board 

an aircraft. 

(vi) The watch-list service provider 

that conducts the continuous vetting of 

the individual has not informed the 

aircraft operator that the individual 

must be inhibited from boarding the 

aircraft, unless explicitly authorized by 

TSA to permit boarding of the 

individual. 

(c) Watch-list matching results. An 

operator must not permit a passenger to 

board an aircraft until the aircraft 

operator’s watch-list service provider 

informs the aircraft operator of the 

results of watch-list matching for that 

passenger in response to the aircraft 

operator’s most recent submission of 

passenger information for that 

passenger. The aircraft operator must 

comply with instructions transmitted by 

the watch-list service provider under 

this paragraph (c), unless explicitly 

instructed otherwise by TSA. 

(1) Cleared to board an aircraft. If the 

aircraft operator’s watch-list service 

provider instructs the aircraft operator 

that a passenger is cleared, the aircraft 

operator may permit the passenger to 

board an aircraft. 

(2) Passenger identified as a selectee. 

If the aircraft operator’s watch-list 

service provider instructs the aircraft 

operator that a passenger is a selectee, 

the aircraft operator may permit the 

passenger to board an aircraft. The 

aircraft operator must comply with the 

procedures in its security program 

pertaining to passengers that are 

identified as selectees. 

(3) Denial to board an aircraft. If the 

aircraft operator’s watch-list service 

provider instructs the aircraft operator 

that the passenger must be inhibited 

from boarding an aircraft, the aircraft 

operator must not permit the passenger 

to board an aircraft. If the aircraft 

operator’s watch-list service provider 

instructs the aircraft operator to contact 

TSA for further resolution of the watchlist matching results, the aircraft 

operator must contact TSA in 

accordance with procedures set forth in 

its security program. 

(4) Override by an aircraft operator. 

No aircraft operator may override an 

instruction to inhibit a passenger from 

boarding an aircraft, unless explicitly 

authorized by TSA to do so. 

(5) Updated passenger information 

from an aircraft operator. When an 

aircraft operator sends updated 

passenger information to its watch-list 

service provider under paragraph 

(b)(1)(iv) of this section for a passenger 

for whom the watch-list service 

provider has already transmitted an 

instruction, all previous instructions 

concerning that passenger are voided. 

The aircraft operator may not permit the 

passenger to board an aircraft until it 

receives an updated instruction 

concerning the passenger from its 

watch-list service provider. Upon 

receiving an updated instruction from 

its watch-list service provider, the 

aircraft operator must comply with the 

updated instruction and disregard all 

previous instruction. 

(d) Use of the watch-list matching 

results. An aircraft operator must not 

use any watch-list matching results 

provided by the watch-list service 


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provider or TSA for purposes other than 

those provided in paragraph (c) of this 

section and security purposes. 

34. Add new subparts F and G to part 

1544 to read as follows: 

Subpart F—Watch-List Service Providers 

Sec. 

1544.501 Scope and terms used in this 

subpart. 

1544.503 Qualification standards for 

approval. 

1544.505 Application. 

1544.507 TSA review and approval. 

1544.509 Reconsideration of disapproval of 

an application. 

1544.511 Withdrawal of approval. 

1544.513 Responsibilities of watch-list 

service providers. 

1544.515 Security program. 

Subpart F—Watch-List Service 

Providers 

§ 1544.501 Scope and terms used in this 

subpart. 

(a) This subpart applies to entities 

that conduct watch-list matching for 

large aircraft operators under §1544.245. 

(b) In addition to the terms in §§ 

1500.3 and 1540.5 of this chapter, the 

following terms apply in this part: 

Applicant means an entity that seeks 

approval from TSA to conduct watchlist matching for large aircraft operators 

under § 1544.245. 

Covered personnel means: 

(1) Employees who have access to 

passenger information, the watch-list, or 

watch-list matching results; and 

(2) Officers, principals, and program 

managers responsible for access of 

passenger information, the watch-list, or 

watch-list matching results. 

Large aircraft operator means an 

aircraft operator described in 

§§ 1544.101(b) or 1544.107. 

Passenger information means— 

(1) Full name of the passenger. 

(2) Date of birth of the passenger, if 

available. 

(3) Gender of the passenger, if 

available. 

(4) Passport information, if available. 

(4) Redress Number of the passenger, 

if available. 

Passport information means the 

following information from an 

individual’s passport: 

(1) Passport number. 

(2) Country of issuance. 

(3) Expiration date. 

(4) Gender. 

(5) Full name. 

Continuous vetting means the process 

in which an individual’s full name, date 

of birth, gender, passport information, 

and Redress Number (if available) is 

continuously matched against the most 

current watch-list in a manner 

prescribed by TSA. 

Redress Number means the number 

assigned by DHS to an individual 

processed through the redress 

procedures described in 49 CFR part 

1560, subpart C. 

Watch-list refers to the No Fly List 

and Selectee List components of the 

Terrorist Screening Database maintained 

by the Terrorist Screening Center. 

Watch-list service provider is an entity 

that TSA has approved under this 

subpart to conduct watch-list matching 

for large aircraft operators under 

§ 1544.507. 

§ 1544.503 Qualification standards for 

approval. 

To be considered for approval to 

conduct watch-list matching under 

§ 1544.245, the applicant must satisfy 

all of the following requirements. 

(a) The applicant must demonstrate 

the capability to receive passenger 

information from large aircraft operators 

described in § 1544.101(b). 

(b) The applicant must demonstrate 

the capability to conduct automated 

watch-list matching and continuous 

vetting of individuals in a system that 

satisfies standards set forth by TSA for 

the protection of personally identifiable 

information and the security of the 

system. 

(c) The applicant must demonstrate 

the capability to transmit watch-list 

matching results to the large aircraft 

operator. 

(d) The applicant must successfully 

undergo a suitability assessment 

conducted by TSA including a 

determination that it does not pose or is 

suspected of posing a threat to 

transportation or national security. 

(e) Every covered personnel of the 

applicant must successfully undergo a 

security threat assessment under 49 CFR 

part 1544, subpart G and have a valid 

Determination of No Security Threat. 

(f) The applicant is incorporated 

within the United States. The 

applicant’s operations and systems for 

conducting watch-list matching under 

this subpart must be located in the 

United States. 

§ 1544.505 Application. 

(a) Each applicant must submit an 

application in a form and manner 

prescribed by TSA. 

(b) An application must include the 

following information: 

(1) The applicant’s full name, 

business address, business phone 

number, and business email address. 

(2) A statement and other 

documentary evidence of how the 

applicant meets the qualification 

standards set forth on § 1544.503. 

(3) A system security plan for its 

information technology system that 

contains personally identifiable 

information collected under this part 

and § 1544.245 or is used to conduct 

watch-list matching. The system 

security plan must comply with 

standards established by TSA. 

(4) An attestation report of the 

attestation conducted under 

§ 1544.513(c)(1)(i). 

(5) A security program that meets 

requirements in § 1544.515. 

§ 1544.507 TSA review and approval. 

(a) Review. Upon receiving an 

application, TSA will review the 

application including the system 

security plan as described in 

§ 1544.505(b)(3). TSA may conduct a 

site visit as part of its review process. At 

its discretion, TSA may approve or 

disapprove the application. 

(b) Approval. If an application is 

approved, TSA will send the applicant 

a written notice of approval. Once 

approved, the watch-list service 

provider may perform passenger vetting 

in accordance with this subpart after 

TSA receives an attestation report for an 

attestation conducted under 

§ 1544.513(c)(1)(i) in which the 

independent public accounting (IPA) 

firm opines that the watch-list service 

provider’s system is in compliance with 

its system security plan and TSA 

standards. 

(c) Disapproval. TSA will send a 

written notice of disapproval to an 

applicant whose application is 

disapproved. 

§ 1544.509 Reconsideration of disapproval 

of an application. 

(a) Petition for reconsideration. If an 

application is disapproved, the 

applicant may seek reconsideration of 

the decision by submitting a written 

petition for reconsideration to the 

Assistant Secretary or designee within 

30 days of receiving the notice of 

disapproval. 

(b) Review of petition. Upon review of 

the petition for reconsideration, the 

Assistant Secretary or designee disposes 

of the petition by either affirming the 

disapproval of the application or 

approving the application. The 

Assistant Secretary or designee may 

request additional information from the 

applicant prior to rendering a decision. 

§ 1544.511 Withdrawal of approval. 

(a) Basis for withdrawal of approval. 

TSA may withdraw approval to conduct 

watch-list matching if a watch-list 

service provider ceases to meet the 

qualification standards for approval, 

fails to fulfill its responsibilities, or in 

the interest of security or the public. 

(b) Notice of withdrawal. (1) Except as 

provided in paragraph (c) of this 


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section, TSA will provide a written 

notice of proposed withdrawal of 

approval to the watch-list service 

provider. 

(2) The notice of withdrawal of 

approval will include the basis of the 

withdrawal of approval. 

(3) Unless the watch-list service 

provider files a written petition for 

reconsideration under paragraph (d) of 

this section, the notice of proposed 

withdrawal of approval will become a 

final notice of withdrawal of approval 

31 days after the watch-list service 

provider’s receipt of the notice of 

proposed withdrawal of approval. 

(c) Emergency notice of withdrawal of 

approval. (1) If TSA finds that there is 

an emergency requiring immediate 

action with respect to a watch-list 

service provider’s ability to conduct 

watch-list matching, TSA may withdraw 

approval of that watch-list service 

provider without prior notice. 

(2) TSA will incorporate in the 

emergency notice of withdrawal of 

approval a brief statement of the reasons 

and findings for the withdrawal of 

approval. 

(3) The emergency notice of 

withdrawal of approval is effective upon 

the watch-list service provider’s receipt 

of the notice. The watch-list service 

provider may file a written petition for 

reconsideration under paragraph (d) of 

this section; however, this does not stay 

the effective date of the emergency 

notice of withdrawal of approval. 

(d) Petition for reconsideration. A 

watch-list service provider may seek 

reconsideration of the withdrawal of 

approval of approval by submitting a 

written petition for reconsideration to 

the Assistant Secretary or designee 

within 30 days of receiving the notice of 

withdrawal of approval. 

(e) Review of petition. Upon review of 

the petition for reconsideration, the 

Assistant Secretary or designee disposes 

of the petition by either affirming or 

withdrawing the withdrawal of 

approval. The Assistant Secretary or 

designee may request additional 

information from the watch-list service 

provider prior to rendering a decision. 

§ 1544.513 Responsibilities of watch-list 

service providers. 

(a) Security program. Each watch-list 

service provider must adopt and carry 

out a security program that meets the 

requirements of § 1544.515. 

(b) System security plan. Each watchlist provider must comply with its 

approved system security plan. 

(c) Authorized watch-list matching. 

Each watch-list service provider may 

only conduct watch-list matching for 

aircraft operators that hold a large 

aircraft program, as described in 

§ 1544.101(b), that is approved by TSA 

under § 1544.105. Each watch-list 

service provider must confirm with TSA 

that an aircraft operator holds an 

approved large aircraft program prior to 

commencement of watch-list matching 

for that aircraft operator. 

(d) Attestation of compliance. (1) 

Each watch-list service provider must 

contract with a qualified IPA firm to 

conduct an attestation of the watch-list 

service provider’s compliance with its 

system security plan and TSA standards 

for systems that are used to conduct 

watch-list matching as follows: 

(i) An attestation must be conducted 

prior to commencement of watch-list 

matching operations; 

(ii) An attestation must be conducted 

6 months after commencement of 

watch-list matching operations; and 

(iii) An attestation must be conducted 

12 months after the watch-list service 

provider’s most recent attestation 

conducted to meet the requirements in 

paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section or this 

paragraph (c)(1)(iii). If the watch-list 

service provider completes the 

attestation in the month before or the 

month after it is due, the watch-list 

service provider is considered to have 

completed the attestation in the month 

it is due. 

(2) The IPA firm conducts the 

attestation in accordance with the 

American Institute of Certified Public 

Accountants’ (AICPA) Statement for 

Standards on Attestation Engagements 

10 and TSA standards; 

(3) The IPA firm must prepare and 

submit a report, in a form and manner 

prescribed by TSA, for each audit 

conducted under paragraph (c)(1) of this 

section. 

(4) An IPA firm is qualified for 

purposes of paragraph (c)(1) of this 

section if: 

(i) The selection of the IPA firm was 

in accordance with the relevant AICPA 

guidance regarding independence; and 

(ii) The IPA firm demonstrates the 

capability to assess information system 

security and process controls. TSA 

reserves the right to reject the IPA firm’s 

attestation if, in TSA’s judgment, the 

IPA firm is not sufficiently qualified to 

perform these services. 

(e) Sensitive Security Information. 

Each watch-list service provider must 

comply with the requirements in 49 

CFR part 1520 regarding the handling 

and protection of Sensitive Security 

Information. 

(f) Non-disclosure of proprietary 

information. Unless explicitly 

authorized by TSA, each watch-list 

service provider may not further release 

or disseminate any information that 

TSA or a large aircraft operator indicates 

as proprietary information and provides 

to the watch-list service provider. 

(g) Privacy policy. Each watch-list 

service provider must adopt and make 

public a privacy policy. 

(h) TSA inspection authority. (1) Each 

watch-list service provider must allow 

TSA, at any time or place, to make any 

inspections or tests, including copying 

records, to determine compliance of a 

watch-list service provider or a large 

aircraft operator with— 

(i) This subpart, 49 CFR 1544.245, and 

part 1520 of this chapter; and 

(ii) 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, as 

amended. 

(2) At the request of TSA, each watchlist service provider must provide 

evidence of compliance with this 

subpart. 

(i) Use of watch-list. Watch-list 

service providers may not use the 

passenger information transmitted 

under § 1544.245 and obtained under 

this subpart, the watch-list, or the 

watch-list matching results for any 

purpose other than to conduct watchlist matching under this part in 

accordance with their security 

programs. 

§ 1544.515 Security program. 

(a) Each watch-list service provider 

must adopt and carry out a security 

program that includes all of the 

following requirements: 

(1) Procedures for conducting watchlist matching in a manner prescribed by 

TSA. 

(2) Procedures for sending 

instructions back to aircraft operators 

based on the results of the watch-list 

matching. 

(3) Procedures for contacting TSA for 

resolution of passengers that are 

potential matches to the watch-list. 

(4) Procedures for identifying 

passengers about whom a large aircraft 

operator must contact TSA for 

resolution of a potential match to the 

watch-list. 

(5) Procedures for complying with its 

system security plan. 

(6) Procedures for ensuring the 

physical security of the system used to 

conduct watch-list matching and the 

space and furniture used to receive 

passenger information from aircraft 

operators, to conduct watch-list 

matching, to transmit watch-list results 

to aircraft operators, and to store 

documents related to watch-list 

matching. 

(7) Procedures for training covered 

personnel on the requirements of this 

subpart. 

(8) Procedures for conducting 

continuous vetting of individuals. 


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(9) Procedures for providing 

personnel that is available to TSA 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week. 

(10) Procedures to identify, handle, 

and protect Sensitive Security 

Information. 

(11) Procedures to maintain 

confidentiality of proprietary 

information. 

(b) A watch-list service provider or 

TSA may amend an approved security 

program using the procedures in 

§ 1544.105. 

(c) TSA may withdraw approval of a 

security program using procedures in 

§ 1540.301. 

Subpart G—Security Threat Assessments 

for Large Aircraft Flight Crew, Applicants 

To Become TSA-Approved Auditors and 

Watch-List Service Providers Covered 

Personnel 

Sec. 

1544.601 Scope and expiration. 

1544.603 Enrollment for security threat 

assessments. 

1544.605 Content of security threat 

assessment. 

1544.607 Criminal history records check 

(CHRC). 

1544.609 Other analyses. 

1544.611 Final disposition. 

1544.613 Withdrawal of Determination of 

No Security Threat. 

1544.615 Appeals. 

1544.617 Fees. 

1544.619 Notice to employers. 

Subpart G—Security Threat 

Assessments for Large Aircraft Flight 

Crew, Applicants To Become TSAApproved Auditors and Watch-List 

Service Providers Covered Personnel 

§ 1544.601 Scope and expiration. 

(a) Scope. This subpart applies to the 

following individuals who must 

undergo a security threat assessment: 

(1) Flight crew member for aircraft 

operators required to hold a large 

aircraft security program under 

§ 1544.101(b); 

(2) Individuals authorized to perform 

screening functions under 

§ 1544.103(f)(1); 

(3) Applicant to become a TSAapproved auditor under § 1522.203; and 

(4) Watch-list service provider 

covered personnel under § 1544.503. 

(b) Expiration. A Determination of No 

Security Threat issued under 

§ 1544.611(a) is valid for five years from 

the date that the individual receives the 

determination unless TSA issues a 

withdrawal of Determination of No 

Security Threat under § 1544.613 that 

results in a Final Determination of 

Security Threat Assessment. An 

individual may renew a Determination 

of No Security Threat using the 

procedures set forth in this subpart. 

(c) Individuals who have undergone a 

CHRC under § 1544.229 or 1544.230. 

Flight crew members or employees or 

contract employees authorized to 

perform screening functions who have 

undergone a fingerprint-based criminal 

history records check under §§ 1544.229 

or 1544.230 within five years of the 

effective date of this rule are not 

required to undergo a security threat 

assessment under this part until 5 years 

after the date of their notification of the 

results of their criminal history records 

check. 

§§ 1544.603 Enrollment for security threat 

assessments. 

(a) Except for paragraphs (a)(4) and 

(a)(12)–(16) of this section, an 

individual who is required to undergo a 

security threat assessment under this 

subpart must provide the following 

information to TSA in a manner and 

time prescribed by TSA: 

(1) Legal name, including first, 

middle, and last; any applicable suffix; 

and any other name used previously. 

(2) Current mailing address and 

residential address if it differs from the 

mailing address; and the previous 

residential address. 

(3) Date of birth. 

(4) Social security number. Providing 

the social security number is voluntary; 

however, failure to provide it will delay 

and may prevent completion of the 

threat assessment. 

(5) Gender. 

(6) Height, weight, hair and eye color. 

(7) City, state, and country of birth. 

(8) Immigration status and date of 

naturalization if the individual is a 

naturalized citizen of the United States. 

(9) Alien registration number, if 

applicable. 

(10) The name, telephone number, 

and address of the individual’s current 

employer(s). If the individual’s current 

employer is the U.S. military service, 

include the branch of the service. 

(11) Fingerprints in a manner 

prescribed by TSA. 

(12) Passport number, city of 

issuance, date of issuance, and date of 

expiration. This information is 

voluntary and may expedite the 

adjudication process for individuals 

who are U.S. citizens born abroad. 

(13) Department of State Consular 

Report of Birth Abroad. This 

information is voluntary and may 

expedite the adjudication process for 

individuals who are U.S. citizens born 

abroad. 

(14) If the individual is not a national 

or citizen of the United States, the alien 

registration number and/or the number 

assigned to the applicant on the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection ArrivalDeparture Record, Form I–94. This 

information is voluntary and may 

expedite the adjudication process for 

individuals who are not U.S. citizens. 

(15) Whether the applicant has 

previously completed a TSA threat 

assessment, and if so the date and 

program for which it was completed. 

This information is voluntary and may 

expedite the adjudication process for 

applicants who have completed a TSA 

security threat assessment. 

(16) Whether the applicant currently 

holds a federal security clearance, and 

if so, the date of and agency for which 

the clearance was performed. This 

information is voluntary and may 

expedite the adjudication process for 

applicants who have completed a 

federal security threat assessment. 

(b) The individual must certify and 

date receipt of the following statement: 

Privacy Act Statement: Authority: 49 

U.S.C. 114, 40113. Purpose: This information 

will be used to verify your identity and to 

conduct a security threat assessment to 

evaluate your suitability for a position for 

which this security threat assessment is 

required. Furnishing this information, 

including your SSN, is voluntary; however, 

failure to provide it will delay and may 

prevent the completion of your security 

threat assessment. Routine Uses: Includes 

disclosure to the FBI to retrieve your criminal 

history record; to appropriate governmental 

agencies for licensing, law enforcement, or 

security purposes, or in the interests of 

national security; and to foreign and 

international governmental authorities in 

accordance with law and international 

agreement. For further information, see TSA 

002 System of Records Notice. 

(c) The individual must provide a 

statement, signature, and date of 

signature that he or she— 

(1) Was not convicted, or found not 

guilty by reason of insanity, of a 

disqualifying criminal offense identified 

in § 1544.229(d) in any jurisdiction 

during the 10 years before the date of 

the individual’s application for a 

security threat assessment under this 

subpart. 

(2) Is not wanted, or under 

indictment, in a civilian or military 

jurisdiction, for a disqualifying criminal 

offense identified in § 1544.229(d); 

(3) Has, or has not, served in the 

military, and if so, the branch in which 

he or she served, the date of discharge, 

and the type of discharge; and 

(4) Has been informed that Federal 

regulations under 49 CFR 1544.607 

impose a continuing obligation on the 

individual to disclose to TSA if he or 

she is convicted, or found not guilty by 

reason of insanity of a disqualifying 

crime. 


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(d) Each individual must complete 

and sign the application prior to 

submitting his or her fingerprints. 

(e) The individual must certify and 

date receipt of the following statement, 

immediately before the signature line: 

The information I have provided on this 

application is true, complete, and correct, to 

the best of my knowledge and belief, and is 

provided in good faith. I understand that a 

knowing and willful false statement, or an 

omission of a material fact on this 

application, can be punished by fine or 

imprisonment or both (see section 1001 of 

Title 18 United States Code), and may be 

grounds for denial of approval for the 

position or privilege for which this security 

threat assessment is required. 

(f) A flight crew member for a large 

aircraft, an individual authorized to 

perform screening functions, or a watchlist service provider covered personnel 

must certify the following statement in 

writing: 

I acknowledge that if the Transportation 

Security Administration determines that I 

pose a security threat, my employer may be 

notified. 

(g) If an Enrollment Provider enrolls 

an individual, the Enrollment Provider 

must: 

(1) Verify the identity of the 

individual through two forms of 

identification prior to fingerprinting, 

and ensure that the printed name on the 

fingerprint application is legible. At 

least one of the two forms of 

identification must have been issued by 

a government authority, and at least one 

must include a photo. 

(2) Advise the individual that a copy 

of the criminal record received from the 

FBI will be provided to the individual, 

if requested by the individual in 

writing; 

(3) Identify a point of contact if the 

individual has questions about the 

results of the CHRC; and 

(4) Collect, control, and process one 

set of legible and classifiable 

fingerprints under direct observation by 

the enrollment provider or a law 

enforcement officer. 

(5) Submit the biographic or biometric 

data and the application to TSA in the 

manner specified by TSA. 

§ 1544.605 Content of the security threat 

assessment. 

The security threat assessment TSA 

conducts under this subpart includes a 

criminal history records check, other 

analyses, and a final disposition. 

§ 1544.607 Criminal history records check 

(CHRC). 

(a) Fingerprints and other information 

used. In conducting criminal history 

record checks under this subpart, TSA 

uses fingerprints and may use other 

identifying information. 

(b) Submission of fingerprints to FBI/ 

CJIS. In order to conduct a fingerprintbased criminal history records check, 

TSA transmits the fingerprints to the 

FBI/CJIS in accordance with the FBI/ 

CJIS fingerprint submission standards, 

receives the results from the FBI/CJIS, 

and adjudicates the results of the check 

in accordance with this section. 

(c) Adjudication of results. (1) TSA 

determines that an individual does not 

pose a security threat warranting denial 

of approval based on a disqualifying 

criminal offense if the individual does 

not have a disqualifying criminal 

offense described in § 1544.229(d). 

(2) An applicant who is wanted, or 

under indictment in any civilian or 

military jurisdiction for a felony listed 

in this section, is disqualified until the 

want or warrant is released or the 

indictment is dismissed. 

(d) Determination of arrest status. 

When a CHRC on an individual 

described in this subpart discloses an 

arrest for any disqualifying criminal 

offense listed in § 1544.229(d) without 

indicating a disposition, the individual 

must provide documentation 

demonstrating that the arrest did not 

result in a disqualifying offense before 

the individual may assume a position or 

perform a function for which a criminal 

history records check under this 

Subpart is required. If the disposition 

did not result in a conviction or in a 

finding of not guilty by reason of 

insanity of one of the offenses listed in 

§ 1544.229(d), the individual is not 

disqualified under this section. 

(e) Limits on dissemination of results. 

Criminal record information provided 

by the FBI may be used only to carry out 

this section and § 1544.229. No person 

may disseminate the results of a CHRC 

to anyone other than: 

(1) The individual to whom the record 

pertains, or that individual’s authorized 

representative. 

(2) Entities who are determining 

whether to grant the individual a 

position or function for which the 

criminal history records check in this 

subpart is required. 

(3) Others designated by TSA. 

(f) Correction of FBI records and 

notification of disqualification. (1) 

Before making a final decision to deny 

a position or privilege to an individual 

required to undergo a criminal history 

records check prescribed by this section, 

TSA will serve an Initial Determination 

of Threat Assessment and advise him or 

her that the FBI criminal record 

discloses information that would 

disqualify him or her from the position 

or privilege and will provide the 

individual a copy of the FBI record if he 

or she requests it. 

(2) The individual may contact the 

local jurisdiction responsible for the 

information and the FBI to complete or 

correct the information contained in his 

or her record, subject to the following 

conditions— 

(i) Within 30 days after being advised 

that the criminal record received from 

the FBI discloses a disqualifying 

criminal offense, the individual must 

notify TSA of his or her intent to correct 

any information he or she believes to be 

inaccurate. 

(ii) If no notification, as described in 

paragraph (f)(3)(1) of this section, is 

received within 30 days, TSA will make 

a final determination to deny the 

individual the position or privilege. 

(g) Continuing obligations to disclose. 

An individual who received a 

Determination of No Security Threat 

under this subpart must disclose to TSA 

or to another entity identified by TSA 

within 24 hours if he or she is convicted 

of any disqualifying criminal offense 

that occurs while he or she is has a 

Determination of No Security Threat 

that has not expired. 

§ 1544.609 Other analyses. 

To conduct other analyses, TSA 

completes the following procedures: 

(a) Reviews the individual 

information required in 49 CFR 

1544.603. 

(b) TSA may search domestic and 

international Government databases to 

determine if an individual meets the 

requirements of 49 CFR 1572.107 or to 

confirm an individual’s identity. TSA 

may determine that an applicant poses 

a security threat based on a search of the 

following databases: 

(1) Interpol and other international 

databases, as appropriate. 

(2) Terrorist watch-lists and related 

databases. 

(3) Any other databases relevant to 

determining whether an applicant 

poses, or is suspected of posing, a 

security threat, or that confirm an 

applicant’s identity. 

§ 1544.611 Final disposition. 

Following completion of the 

procedures described in §§ 1544.607 

and 1544.609, the following procedures 

apply, as appropriate: 

(a) TSA serves a Determination of No 

Security Threat to the individual if TSA 

determines that an individual meets the 

security threat assessment standards 

described in §§ 1544.607 and 1544.609. 

(b) TSA serves an Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment on 

the individual if TSA determines that 

the individual does not meet the 


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security threat assessment standards 

described in §§ 1544.607 and 1544.609. 

The Initial Determination of Threat 

Assessment includes— 

(1) A statement that TSA has 

determined that the individual poses or 

is suspected of posing a security threat 

warranting disapproval of the 

application to assume a position or 

perform a function for which a security 

threat assessment under this subpart is 

required; 

(2) The basis for the determination; 

(3) Information about how the 

individual may appeal the 

determination, as described in 

§ 1544.615; and 

(4) A statement that if the individual 

chooses not to appeal TSA’s 

determination within 30 days after 

receipt of the Initial Determination, or 

does not request an extension of time 

within 30 days after receipt of the Initial 

Determination in order to file an appeal, 

the Initial Determination becomes a 

Final Determination of Threat 

Assessment. 

(5) TSA serves a Withdrawal of the 

Initial Determination of Threat 

Assessment or a Withdrawal of Final 

Determination of Threat Assessment on 

the individual, if the appeal results in 

a finding that the individual does not 

pose a threat to security. 

§ 1544.613 Withdrawal of Determination of 

No Security Threat. 

(a) TSA may withdraw a 

Determination of No Security Threat 

issued under § 1544.611(a) at any time 

it determines that a flight crew member, 

an individual authorized to perform 

screening functions, a TSA-approved 

auditor, or a watch-list service provider 

poses or is suspected of posing a 

security threat warranting withdrawal of 

the Determination of No Security 

Threat. 

(b) TSA serves withdrawal of the 

Determination of No Security Threat on 

the individual if TSA determines that 

the individual does not meet the 

security threat assessment standards 

described in §§ 1544.607 and 1544.609. 

The withdrawal of the Determination of 

No Security Threat includes— 

(1) A statement that TSA has 

determined that the individual poses or 

is suspected of posing a security threat 

warranting disapproval of the 

application to assume a position or 

perform a function for which a security 

threat assessment under this subpart is 

required; 

(2) The basis for the determination; 

(3) Information about how the 

individual may appeal the 

determination, as described in 

§ 1544.615; and 

(4) A statement that if the individual 

chooses not to appeal TSA’s Initial 

Determination within 30 days after 

receipt of the withdrawal of the 

Determination of No Security Threat, or 

does not request an extension of time 

within 30 days after receipt of the 

withdrawal of the Determination of No 

Security Threat in order to file an 

appeal, the withdrawal of the 

Determination of No Security Threat 

becomes a Final Determination of 

Threat Assessment. 

(5) TSA serves a Final Determination 

of Threat Assessment on the individual, 

if the appeal results in a finding that the 

individual does not pose a threat to 

security. 

§ 1544.615 Appeals. 

If the individual appeals the Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment or 

a withdrawal of the Determination of No 

Security Threat, the procedures in 49 

CFR part 1515 apply. 

§ 1544.617 Fees. 

(a) Individuals required to undergo a 

security threat assessment must pay the 

Security Threat Assessment fee of 

$56.75 and the cost for the FBI to 

process fingerprint identification 

records under Public Law 101–515. 

(b) The Security Threat Assessment 

fee described in paragraph (a) of this 

section may be adjusted annually on or 

after October 1, 2007, by publication of 

an inflation adjustment. A final rule in 

the Federal Register will announce the 

inflation adjustment. The adjustment 

shall be a composite of the Federal 

civilian pay raise assumption and nonpay inflation factor for that fiscal year 

issued by the Office of Management and 

Budget for agency use in implementing 

OMB Circular A–76, weighted by the 

pay and non-pay proportions of total 

funding for that fiscal year. If Congress 

enacts a different Federal civilian pay 

raise percentage than the percentage 

issued by OMB for Circular A–76, the 

Department of Homeland Security may 

adjust the fees to reflect the enacted 

level. 

(c) If the FBI amends its fee to process 

fingerprint identification records under 

Public Law 101–515, TSA or its agent 

will collect the amended fee. 

(d) When an individual submits the 

enrollment information, as required 

under 1544.603, to obtain or renew a 

security threat assessment, the fee must 

be remitted to TSA or its approved agent 

in a form and manner approved by TSA. 

(e) TSA will not issue any refunds of 

fees required under this section. 

(f) Information about payment options 

is available though the designated TSA 

headquarters point of contact. 

Individual personal checks are not 

acceptable. 

§ 1544.619 Notice to employers. 

(a) If the individual is a large aircraft 

flight crew member, an individual 

authorized to perform screening 

functions, or a watch-list service 

provider covered personnel, TSA will 

notify the individual’s employer that it 

has served a Determination of No 

Security Threat, a Final Determination 

of Threat Assessment, or a Withdrawal 

of Final Determination of Threat 

Assessment, as applicable, to the 

individual. 

(b) Each employer must retain a copy 

of the notification described in 

paragraph (a) of this section for five 

years. 

PART 1550—AIRCRAFT SECURITY 

UNDER GENERAL OPERATING AND 

FLIGHT RULES 

35. The authority citation for part 

1550 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44907, 44913–44914, 44916–44918, 

44935–44936, 44942, 46105. 

36. Amend § 1550.5 by revising 

paragraph (a), and removing and 

reserving paragraph (d) to read as 

follows: 

§ 1550.5 Operations using a sterile area. 

(a) Applicability of this section. This 

section applies to all aircraft operations 

in which passengers, crewmembers, or 

other individuals are enplaned from or 

deplaned into a sterile area, except for 

aircraft operators that have a security 

program accepted or approved under 

part 1544 or 1546 of this chapter. 

* * * * * 

(d) [Reserved] 

* * * * * 

37. Amend § 1550.7 by revising 

paragraph (a) to read as follows: 

§ 1550.7 Operations in aircraft over 12,500 

pounds. 

(a) Applicability of this section. This 

section applies to each aircraft operation 

conducted in an aircraft with a 

maximum certificated takeoff weight of 

over 12,500 pounds except for those 

operations specified in § 1550.5 and 

those operations conducted under a 

security program under part 1544 or 

1546 of this chapter. 

* * * * * 

Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on October 2, 

2008. 

Kip Hawley, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E8–23685 Filed 10–29–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–52–P 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS