IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 57512-4-II

Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

RAYMOND J. FEMLING,

Appellant.

CHE, J. ⎯ Raymond Jay Femling appeals the trial court’s denial of his CrR 7.8 motion to 

vacate his felony bail jumping conviction. In 2008, Femling did not attend a court date related to 

his charge for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (UPCS), which resulted in a felony 

bail jumping charge and conviction. In 2021, the trial court vacated Femling’s conviction for 

UPCS pursuant to State v. Blake.

1

 Femling then moved under CrR 7.8 to vacate his conviction 

for bail jumping or, in the alternative, to reclassify his felony bail jumping conviction as a 

misdemeanor. After a show cause hearing, where the State did not assert the motion was 

untimely, the trial court denied Femling’s motion.

For the first time on appeal, the State argues that Femling’s motion should have been 

transferred to this court as a personal restraint petition (PRP). The State asks us to convert this 

appeal to a PRP and dismiss it as time barred. Femling argues that his motion is timely because 

 

1

197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). Blake held convictions under former RCW 69.50.4013, 

Washington’s strict liability drug possession statute, were unconstitutional. 197 Wn.2d at 174.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

May 29, 2024
No. 57512-4-II

2

his judgment and sentence for felony bail jumping is facially invalid and, in the alternative, that 

the time bar does not apply because the Blake decision is a fundamental change in the law 

material to his judgment for felony bail jumping. Femling raises additional claims in a statement 

of additional grounds (SAG). 

We hold (1) Femling’s judgment and sentence is not facially invalid, (2) Blake is not 

material to Femling’s bail jumping conviction under former RCW 10.73.100(6), so the time bar 

exception for a significant retroactive change in law material to a conviction or sentence does not 

apply, (3) Femling’s CrR 7.8 motion was therefore an untimely collateral attack on his judgment 

and sentence, and (4) the trial court should have transferred the untimely motion to this court for 

consideration as a PRP.

We vacate the trial court’s order denying Femling’s CrR 7.8 motion, and in this unique 

case, we exercise our discretion to convert Femling’s appeal to a PRP, and we dismiss it as time

barred. 

FACTS

In 2007, the State charged Femling with UPCS and Femling subsequently entered drug 

court based on the charge. The drug court contract required Femling to attend all drug court 

dates. In 2008, Femling failed to appear at a required drug court date and the State charged 

Femling with class C felony bail jumping. In 2009, Femling pleaded guilty to class C felony bail 

jumping and the trial court sentenced him.

2

 In 2021, the trial court vacated Femling’s conviction 

for UPCS pursuant to Blake. 

 

2

It appears that on the same date, the trial court also entered a guilty finding for Femling’s 

UPCS. 
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In 2022, thirteen years later, Femling moved under CrR 7.8 to vacate his conviction for 

felony bail jumping or, in the alternative, to correct his judgment and sentence to reflect that the 

felony bail jumping offense should have been punished as a misdemeanor because it was 

predicated on a void offense. The State did not assert that the motion was time barred. The trial 

court held a show cause hearing to determine whether Femling’s bail jumping conviction should 

be vacated or, alternatively, whether he should be resentenced. The trial court denied Femling’s 

motion. 

Femling appeals the trial court’s denial of his CrR 7.8 motion. In his SAG, Femling 

argues that the classification of his bail jumping conviction as a felony violated his due process 

rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

ANALYSIS

I. CRR 7.8 MOTION

For the first time, the State argues that Femling’s CrR 7.8 motion is time-barred. The 

State argues that we should convert Femling’s appeal to a PRP and dismiss it as time barred. 

Femling argues that the State did not file a cross-appeal to argue timeliness, that it waived its 

right to argue timeliness by not raising it at the trial court level, and that even if it did not waive 

it, the CrR 7.8 motion is timely because Femling’s judgment is facially invalid and the Blake

decision is a fundamental change in the law material to his felony bail jumping conviction. We 

agree with the State. 

A. Legal Principles

CrR 7.8 governs collateral attacks filed at the trial court level. State v. Molnar, 198 

Wn.2d 500, 508, 497 P.3d 858 (2021). A trial court must transfer a CrR 7.8 motion to this court 
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for consideration as a PRP “unless the court determines that the motion is not barred by 

RCW 10.73.090 and either (i) the defendant has made a substantial showing that they are entitled 

to relief or (ii) resolution of the motion will require a factual hearing.” CrR 7.8(c)(2). Thus, the 

trial court must transfer a CrR 7.8 motion to the Court of Appeals without reaching the merits if 

it determines that the motion is untimely. Molnar, 198 Wn.2d at 509. 

A CrR 7.8 motion that collaterally attacks a judgment and sentence must be brought no 

more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its 

face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, unless one of the exceptions to the 

time bar in RCW 10.73.100 applies. CrR 7.8(b)(5); RCW 10.73.090(1). A judgment becomes 

final on the last of the following dates: the date it is filed with the clerk of the trial court, the date 

an appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction, or 

the date the United States Supreme Court denies a timely petition for certiorari for review. RCW 

10.73.090(3)(a)-(c). 

The time bar of RCW 10.73.090 is a mandatory statutory limitation period that cannot be 

waived. In re Pers. Restraint of Fowler, 9 Wn. App. 2d 158, 167, 442 P.3d 647 (2019), rev’d on 

other grounds, 197 Wn.2d 46, 479 P.3d 1164 (2021). However, there are some exceptions to the 

time bar, including when there is a significant retroactive change in the law that is material to the

petitioner’s conviction or sentence. Former RCW 10.73.100(6).
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B. Femling’s CrR 7.8 Motion is Time-Barred and Should Have Been Transferred to This 

Court

As a preliminary matter, the State is not required to file a cross-appeal to raise the issue 

of timeliness because the statutory limitation period of RCW 10.73.090 is not waivable. See

Fowler, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 167. We therefore consider the timeliness of Femling’s motion. 

The trial court entered Femling’s judgment and sentence for felony bail jumping in 2009. 

Femling filed his CrR 7.8 motion in 2022, more than one year after his judgment and sentence 

became final. CP at 35. Thus, Femling’s CrR 7.8 motion is untimely unless his judgment and 

sentence is facially invalid, the trial court lacked jurisdiction, or one of the exceptions to the time

bar in RCW 10.73.100 applies. 

Femling claims his motion is not time-barred because it is facially invalid under RCW 

10.73.090. Specifically, he argues that the unconstitutionality of Washington’s former felony 

UPCS statute invalidates his felony bail jumping conviction because his underlying crime has 

always been a legal nullity. Femling contends this rendered the classification of his bail jumping 

conviction undefined, such that his conviction should be dismissed. We disagree. 

Here, Femling was not convicted of a nonexistent crime because bail jumping is still a 

crime in existence today. See RCW 9A.76.170; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 152 

Wn.2d 853, 857-58, 100 P.3d 801 (2004) (A judgment and sentence is invalid on its face when a 

defendant is convicted of a nonexistent crime.).
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Under former RCW 9A.76.170(3)(c), bail jumping3is “[a] class C felony if the person 

was held for, charged with, or convicted of a class B or class C felony.” Former RCW 

9A.76.170(3)(c) does not require Femling to be found guilty of or to later be found guilty of the 

underlying class C felony (UPCS) charge for his bail jumping charge to be a class C felony. 

Instead, Femling’s bail jumping classification only requires that Femling be “held for, charged 

with, or convicted of a class B or class C felony,” which he was at the time he failed to appear 

for his drug court date. Former RCW 9A.76.170(3)(c) (emphasis added). We reject the 

contention that the later determination that the underlying crime was a “nullity” means that it 

could not support a bail jumping conviction when it was a crime at the time the defendant failed 

to appear.

In State v. Paniagua, Division Three held that the defendant’s felony bail jumping 

conviction, which was predicated on a pre-Blake UPCS conviction, was not facially invalid, even 

though the underlying UPCS offense was later found to violate due process. 22 Wn. App. 2d 

350, 356, 511 P.3d 113 (2022). The court reasoned that former RCW 9A.76.170 (2001) did not 

require the accused to have later been found guilty of a pending charge at the time of release on 

bail, only that the accused be under charges at the time of the failure to appear; thus the court 

concluded “a predicate crime does not constitute an element of bail jumping.” Id. 

The court found the issue of whether the underlying charge of a bail jumping allegation 

must be valid, sufficiently analogous to the charge of escape because “our courts have rejected 

 

3 A person is guilty of bail jumping if they “[are] released by court order or admitted to bail with 

knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state, 

or of the requirement to report to a correctional facility for service of sentence, and [ ]fail[] to 

appear or fail[] to surrender for service of sentence as required.” Former RCW 9A.76.170(1).
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arguments that the invalidity of the underlying conviction is a defense to the crime of escape.” 

Id. at 357-58 (quoting State v. Downing, 122 Wn. App. 185, 193, 93 P.3d 900 (2004)). The court 

adhered to the universal rule that a statute’s unconstitutionality under which a defendant is 

convicted or charged does not justify escape from imprisonment; it did not discern any reason to 

distinguish a charge for escape from one for bail jumping in this context. Id. at 358. Likewise,

here, Femling’s felony bail jumping conviction is not facially invalid just because Femling’s preBlake UPCS conviction was later found unconstitutional and was vacated. 

Femling claims that Paniagua is distinguishable because it “did not address whether the 

classification of the offense or punishment imposed was invalid.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 11. 

We find the underlying rationale of Paniagua persuasive here. As we discussed above, bail 

jumping’s classification and penalty is based on the classification of the underlying crime the 

defendant is “held for, charged with, or convicted of” when they have failed to meet the 

requirement to personally appear before a court once released by court order or admitted to bail. 

Former RCW 9A.76.170(1), (3)(a)-(d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Coucil, 151 Wn. App. 

131, 133, 210 P.3d 1058 (2009) (“Bail jumping is classified according to when it occurs.”). 

Dismissal of the underlying crime to a bail jumping charge does not invalidate the bail jumping 

conviction. Downing, 122 Wn. App. at 192-93. We find these additional authorities persuasive. 

For these reasons, Femling’s bail jumping classification and resulting punishment does not make 

his judgment and sentence facially invalid. 

Alternatively, Femling argues that his bail jumping conviction should be classified only 

as a misdemeanor under RCW 9A.20.010(2)(a), which provides that when an act is prohibited by 

a statute and no penalty is imposed for the violation of said statute, “the committing of such act 
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shall be a misdemeanor.” Br. of Appellant at 6. Femling provides no citations to support his 

argument that the court has authority to reclassify a crime from a felony to a misdemeanor more 

than a decade after the fact. In re Pers. Restraint of Campbell, 27 Wn. App. 2d 251, 264, 533 

P.3d 144 (2023) (“If a party provides no citation in support of a proposition, we may assume that 

counsel, after diligently searching, has found none”); see also RAP 10.3(a)(6). We too are aware 

of no authority that would allow reclassification as a remedy.

Femling also argues that the information charging him with felony bail jumping was 

constitutionally deficient because his UPCS offense is void. Because Femling’s argument relies 

on the false premise that the nullity of an underlying offense invalidates the information for bail 

jumping, it fails. See Paniagua, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 356. Thus, we hold that Femling’s judgment 

and sentence is not facially invalid.

Next, Femling argues that his CrR 7.8 motion is not time-barred under the exception 

found in former RCW 10.73.100(6)—that there has been a significant change in the law, whether 

procedural or substantive, that is material to his conviction—because Blake is a significant 

retroactive change in the law that is material to his bail jumping conviction. We disagree.

Regardless of whether Blake is a significant retroactive change in law, Blake is not 

material to Femling’s bail jumping conviction. Blake invalidated only convictions under the 

former UPCS statute, not convictions for bail jumping. It did not change the law regarding bail 

jumping. Furthermore, as discussed above, the trial court did not convict Femling of a

nonexistent crime. We hold that Blake is not material to Femling’s bail jumping conviction, so

the time bar exception for a significant retroactive change in law material to a conviction or 

sentence does not apply to Femling.
No. 57512-4-II

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Because Femling filed his CrR 7.8 motion more than one year after his judgment and 

sentence became final, his judgment and sentence is facially valid and was rendered by a court of 

competent jurisdiction; and no exception to the time bar applies, the trial court should have 

transferred Femling’s CrR 7.8 motion to this court as a PRP. 

Rather than remand this matter as we normally would, we exercise our discretion to

convert Femling’s appeal to a PRP4and dismiss it as time barred based on the unique 

circumstances presented. See Molnar, 198 Wn.2d at 511-12 (Where procedural and substantive 

missteps that were made in the case presented unique circumstances, the Supreme Court declined 

to reverse the Court of Appeals because the defendant’s motion for resentencing was clearly an 

untimely collateral attack.). Here, the trial court held a full show cause hearing wherein Femling 

was represented by counsel, and the timeliness issue was raised in the State’s appellate briefing. 

Furthermore, Femling has counsel on appeal but has not withdrawn his CrR 7.8 motion or appeal 

despite the State’s time bar argument. We decline to remand this matter and instead convert 

Femling’s motion to a PRP and dismiss it as time barred for the reasons above. 

CONCLUSION

We vacate the trial court’s order denying Femling’s CrR 7.8 motion, convert Femling’s 

appeal to a PRP, and dismiss it as time barred.

 

4 We do not consider Femling’s SAG. See RAP 10.10 (We do not consider a SAG filed in a 

PRP).
No. 57512-4-II

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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Che, J.

We concur:

Glasgow, P.J.

Price, J.