1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8154, *

DARRELL REID WILSON, Plaintiff, v. ALBERT M. SESSOMS, individually and doing business as 

STREET & CO.; MAUREEN SESSOMS, individually and doing business as STREET & CO.; 

EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION SERVICES, INC.; and CREDIT BUREAU OF GREATER 

GREENSBORO, INC., Defendants. 

CIVIL NO. 4:96CV01031 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, 

SALISBURY DIVISION 

1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8154 

March 16, 1998, Decided 

March 16, 1998, Filed 

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Citation: 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8154

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff consumer filed an action against defendants, owners of a 

skip tracing company, credit bureau, and credit reporting agency, and alleged violations of 

the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq. The consumer alleged that 

the owners accessed his credit report without a permissible purpose and alleged negligence 

on the part of the bureau and the reporting agency. The bureau and the agency sought 

summary judgment. 

OVERVIEW: The court found that the consumer had not presented any evidence from which 

a reasonable juror could conclude that either the agency or the bureau had a reason to 

believe that the owners accessed his report for an improper purpose. It was undisputed that 

one of the owners certified to the bureau that the skip tracing company would seek 

consumer reports only for permissible purposes and that the owners understood what 

constituted a permissible purpose under the FCRA. In addition, the bureau understood that 

the company's primary business was skip tracing, which was a permissible purpose. The 

agency also acted reasonably as a matter of law because of the bureau's FCRA certifications 

to it. Neither the bureau nor the agency were negligent with respect to the oversight of the 

skip tracing company. Even though the owners denied accessing the consumer's report, 

there was no evidence to support that the report was accessed by an unknown party, who 

broke into the system, and the consumer's mere speculation was insufficient to overcome 

summary judgment. The agency and the bureau's certification procedures were reasonable 

as a matter of law and there was no willful violation of the FCRA. 

CASE SUMMARY

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OUTCOME: The court granted the bureau's and the agency's motions for summary 

judgment.

CORE TERMS: consumer report, consumer, accessed, customer, reporting, summary 

judgment, pulled, computer systems, skip-tracing, improper purpose, subscriber, accessing, 

password, matter of law, impermissible, willfully violated, undisputed, codeword, verify, 

billed, stolen, authorization, non-moving, oversight, certify, genuine, willful, credit report, 

business purpose, private investigator

Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Burdens of Production & Proof > Movants

Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > Appropriateness

Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > Genuine Disputes

Banking Law > Consumer Protection > Fair Credit Reporting > General Overview

Banking Law > Consumer Protection > Fair Credit Reporting > Consumer Reports

Torts > Negligence > Standards of Care > Appropriate Standard > Objectivity

Banking Law > Consumer Protection > Fair Credit Reporting > General Overview

LEXISNEXIS® HEADNOTES Hide

HN1 Summary judgment must be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). The moving party bears the burden of persuasion on the relevant issues. The 

non-moving party may survive a motion for summary judgment by producing 

evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. When the motion is 

supported by affidavits, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In considering all the 

evidence, all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving 

party. More Like This Headnote

HN2 The Fair Credit Reporting Act imposes on consumer reporting agencies the duty of 

following reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of customer reports and 

limits uses for which a consumer report may be released. More Like This Headnote | 

Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote

HN3 Consumer reporting agencies are required to maintain reasonable procedures to 

limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under 15 U.S.C.S. § 

1681b and are prohibited from furnishing reports to a person which it has reason to 

believe will use the report for an improper purpose. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681e(a). These 

procedures include requiring prospective users of the information to identify 

themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify 

that the information will be used for no other purpose. The standard of conduct for 

determining whether the consumer reporting agency maintained reasonable 

procedures is what a reasonably prudent person would do under the 

circumstances. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote

HN4 To establish willfulness, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted under 

circumstances which amount to a willful or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights 

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COUNSEL: [*1] For DARRELL REID WILSON, plaintiff: JEFFREY S. LISSON, WINSTON-SALEM, 

NC. 

ALBERT M. SESSOMS, defendant, Pro se, GREENSBORO, NC. 

MAUREEN SESSOMS, defendant, Pro se, NORTH CHARLESTON, SC. 

For EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., defendant: CHRISTOPHER C. FOX, 

KILPATRICK STOCKTON, L.L.P., WINSTON-SALEM, NC. 

For CREDIT BUREAU OF GREATER GREENSBORO, INC., defendant: AMIEL J. ROSSABI, DENA 

BETH LANGLEY, ADAMS KLEEMEIER HAGAN HANNAH & FOUTS, GREENSBORO, NC. 

For CREDIT BUREAU OF GREATER GREENSBORO, INC., cross-claimant: AMIEL J. ROSSABI, 

DENA BETH LANGLEY, ADAMS KLEEMEIER HAGAN HANNAH & FOUTS, GREENSBORO, NC. 

ALBERT M. SESSOMS, cross-defendant, Pro se, GREENSBORO, NC. 

MAUREEN SESSOMS, cross-defendant, Pro se, NORTH CHARLESTON, SC. 

For EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION SERVICES, INC, cross-claimant: CHRISTOPHER C. FOX, 

KILPATRICK STOCKTON, L.L.P., WINSTON-SALEM, NC. 

JUDGES: Frank W. Bullock, Jr., United States District Judge. 

OPINION BY: Frank W. Bullock, Jr. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BULLOCK, Chief Judge 

Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act 

("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 1 Plaintiff alleges [*2] that Defendants Albert M. Sessoms 

and his wife, Maureen Sessoms, individually and doing business as Street & Co., accessed 

Plaintiff's consumer report through Defendants Credit Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc., 

("Credit Bureau") and Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc. , ("Equifax") without a 

permissible purpose. Plaintiff further alleges that Credit Bureau and Equifax negligently and 

willfully failed to maintain reasonable procedures to ensure that only those parties with a 

permissible purpose could access Plaintiff's consumer report. 

FOOTNOTES

1 The named defendants in Plaintiff's original complaint were Equifax, Inc., Albert 

Sessoms, and Maureen Sessoms doing business as Street & Co. The original complaint 

alleged violations of the FCRA. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint which added Credit 

Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc., as a defendant. The amended complaint also added a 

state law tort claim against all defendants. Then, apparently after recognizing that 

Equifax, Inc., was an improper party, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint which 

named Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc. , as a defendant. Plaintiff also took a 

under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. More Like This Headnote

OPINION

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voluntary dismissal as to all claims against Equifax, Inc. Plaintiff's second amended 

complaint dropped the state law tort claim, leaving only the FCRA claim against the 

remaining defendants. 

[*3] Before the court are Credit Bureau's and Equifax's motions for summary judgment. 2

Credit Bureau and Equifax each contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

because all evidence indicates that Plaintiff's consumer report was pulled for a permissible 

purpose and, even if the report was pulled for an impermissible purpose, they maintained 

reasonable procedures to ensure that consumer reports would be obtained only for permissible 

purposes. For the following reasons, the court will grant both Credit Bureau's and Equifax's 

motions for summary judgment. 

FOOTNOTES

2 Also before the court are: Plaintiff's motion to strike Roch Smith, Jr., as an expert upon 

whom Defendants may rely [Doc. # 53]; Equifax's and Credit Bureau's motions to strike 

Robert Biggerstaff and David Szwak as experts upon whom Plaintiff may rely [Docs. # 60, 

63]; and Equifax's and Credit Bureau's motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 against 

Plaintiff [Docs. # 87, 74]. Although not discussed in this opinion, the court will deny the 

parties' respective motions to strike expert testimony. The court will also deny Equifax's and 

Credit Bureau's motions for sanctions. 

[*4] FACTS 

The following facts are established in the pleadings, affidavits, deposition testimony, and 

exhibits offered by the parties. Where there are disputes, each party's position is given. 

Equifax and Credit Bureau are consumer reporting agencies as defined in the FCRA in that they 

regularly engage, in whole or in part, in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer 

credit information for the purpose of producing consumer reports to third parties. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681a(f). Equifax is in the business of receiving consumer credit histories from credit grantors 

and storing them via computer database. Independent credit reporting agencies, like Defendant 

Credit Bureau, enter into contracts permitting them to use Equifax's computer systems. Credit 

Bureau, in turn, sells access to this data to its various customers. 

Equifax and Credit Bureau have entered into an agreement which provides that Credit Bureau is 

deemed to own the credit data for all consumers within Credit Bureau's territory, which includes 

five counties in North Carolina and two counties in Virginia. In essence, Credit Bureau owns and 

controls all of the data on the consumers for these counties, and Equifax provides [*5] 

computer facilities by which Credit Bureau stores its information. Credit Bureau's agreement 

with Equifax obligates Credit Bureau to comply fully with the FCRA and to conduct background 

checks on its customers to assure that its customers also comply with the FCRA. The agreement 

also requires that Creditor Bureau perform credit check and background investigation on Credit 

Bureau's new prospective customers; verify on customer applications that the customers are 

obtaining credit data only for permissible purposes as defined by the FCRA; conduct on-site 

inspections of its new business customers; and obtain a written agreement for service from 

every customer which agreement includes requirements necessary to meet all federal and state 

regulations applicable to the credit reporting industry. 

Credit Bureau has done business with Equifax through a series of previous agreements for many 

years prior to its existing agreement. In all the years that Credit Bureau has purchased data 

from Equifax, Credit Bureau has received only one complaint indicating that a Credit Bureau 

customer had pulled a credit report for an impermissible purpose. This complaint was some tento-twelve years ago. 

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Credit [*6] Bureau has thousands of customers with whom it has signed agreements which 

allow the customers to access Credit Bureau's consumer data on Equifax's computer system. 

Two of these customers were Defendants Albert and Maureen Sessoms. The Sessoms, who do 

business as Street & Co., entered into agreements with Credit Bureau in the fall of 1984 which 

indicate that Street & Co. conducted business in insurance investigations. In these agreements 

the Sessoms certify that they would comply with all provisions of the FCRA, including but not 

limited to the provisions which require that they access Credit Bureau data for permissible 

purposes only. The Sessoms were also made aware that if they accessed a report under false 

pretenses and for an impermissible purpose they would be in violation of the criminal provisions 

of the FCRA and could be fined in an amount up to $ 5,000.00 and/or be imprisoned for up to 

one year. At his deposition, Albert Sessoms stated that he knew that credit reports could be 

pulled only for permissible purposes and that he has studied the FCRA. 

Sessoms was not successful in the insurance investigation business and moved into the 

business of skip-tracing. As a skip-tracer, [*7] Street & Co. worked primarily with banks, 

credit unions, and financial institutions to locate consumers who had "skipped" on their loans. 

While the skip-tracing business did differ from the original insurance investigation business, 

Credit Bureau understood that skip-tracing was in fact what Street & Co. was doing. 3 In 

addition, approximately six or seven years ago, Credit Bureau requested and obtained from 

Street & Co. all of Street & Co.'s business forms, including its skip-tracing forms, to verify its 

permissible business purpose. There is no evidence that Credit Bureau or Equifax had ever 

received any complaints, nor that Credit Bureau or Equifax had any reason to believe, that 

Street & Co. had accessed a consumer report for an impermissible purpose until Plaintiff's 

complaint. 

FOOTNOTES

3 Indeed, Miller, the vice-president of Credit Bureau, was not aware that Sessoms had ever 

intended to conduct insurance investigations and understood that skip-tracing had been 

Street & Co.'s intended business purpose from the beginning. 

[*8] In 1996, Plaintiff became involved in litigation in the state courts of North Carolina which 

arose from his work as head of security for a company which provided money management 

services for a family from Colombia, South America. In this litigation, Plaintiff, along with a 

number of other defendants, are accused of misconduct related to the embezzlement and/or 

misappropriation of tens of millions of dollars. In this same time period, Plaintiff twice found a 

private investigator trespassing on his property. Plaintiff believes that the private investigator is 

involved in or was hired because of the state court litigation. 

As a result of his encounter with the private investigator and based on the allegations made 

against him in the state court litigation, Plaintiff decided to check his credit report. The inquiry 

section on the report, which identifies all parties who have accessed the report in the preceding 

six months, indicated that Street & Co. had accessed his report on October 2, 1996. However, 

after Plaintiff confronted the Sessoms about the inquiry, the Sessoms denied that Street & Co. 

had ever accessed Plaintiff's report. On November 11, 1996, Plaintiff contacted Credit 

Bureau [*9] to investigate the matter further. Credit Bureau confirmed that Street & Co. had 

pulled Plaintiff's report because Street & Co.'s subscriber password and codeword were used to 

access the report via computer. Credit Bureau billed the Sessoms for accessing Plaintiff's report 

and the Sessoms paid the bill. 

While the Sessoms deny that they pulled Plaintiff's report, it is undisputed that only the 

Sessoms had access to the two computers they used to connect to Equifax's computer system. 

Those computers are located in the Sessoms home. There is no evidence that the Sessoms' 

password and codeword have ever been stolen or compromised. Moreover, during the entire 

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period that Street & Co. was a subscriber of Credit Bureau, the Sessoms never complained that 

their password had been stolen and never complained that they were billed for reports they did 

not access. 

As a result of the investigation, Credit Bureau disconnected the Sessoms and Street & Co. from 

its service on November 13, 1996. Credit Bureau has not reconnected the Sessoms' service to 

date. 

DISCUSSION 

HN1 Summary judgment must be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 

and the moving party is entitled to judgment [*10] as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The moving party bears the burden of persuasion on the relevant issues. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The non-moving party 

may survive a motion for summary judgment by producing "evidence from which a jury might 

return a verdict in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 91 L. Ed. 2d 

202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). When the motion is supported by affidavits, the non-moving party 

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

In considering all the evidence, all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

HN2 The FCRA imposes on consumer reporting agencies, such as Equifax and Credit Bureau, 

the duty of following reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of customer reports and 

limits uses for which a consumer report may be released. In this case, Plaintiff claims that 

Credit Bureau and Equifax willfully or negligently failed to maintain appropriate procedures to 

ensure that his report would be furnished only for a permissible purpose. See [*11] 15 U.S.C. 

§§ 1681b(3), 1681n, and 1681o. For the purposes of Equifax's and Credit Bureau's motions, 

the court will assume that Plaintiff's consumer report was furnished for an impermissible 

purpose. 

The court will first address whether Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether 

Equifax or Credit Bureau were negligent in allowing Plaintiff's consumer report to be accessed 

for an improper purpose. HN3 Consumer reporting agencies are required to maintain 

reasonable procedures to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under 

Section 1681b and are prohibited from furnishing reports to a person which it has reason to 

believe will use the report for an improper purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). These 

procedures include requiring "prospective users of the information to identify themselves, 

certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify that the information will be 

used for no other purpose." Id. The standard of conduct for determining whether the consumer 

reporting agency maintained reasonable procedures is what a reasonably prudent person would 

do under the circumstances. See [*12] Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 

1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1022, 97 L. Ed. 2d 766, 107 S. Ct. 3267 (1987). 

Plaintiff offers two alternative theories as to how Equifax and Credit Bureau were negligent in 

allowing his consumer report to be pulled for an improper purpose. First, based on the premise 

that Street & Co. pulled the report, Plaintiff argues that Equifax and Credit Bureau were 

negligent in connection with the authorization and oversight of Street & Co. Second, based on 

the premise that someone other than the Sessoms accessed his report, Plaintiff argues that 

Equifax and Credit Bureau lacked appropriate security measures to ensure that unknown 

individuals cannot break into the Defendants' computer systems. 

Beginning with the authorization and oversight of Street & Co., Plaintiff has not presented any 

evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that either Equifax or Credit Bureau had 

a reason to believe that the Sessoms accessed Plaintiff's report for an improper purpose. It is 

undisputed that the Albert Sessoms certified to Credit Bureau that Street & Co. would seek 

consumer reports only for permissible purposes and that the Sessoms understood what 

constituted a permissible purpose [*13] under the FCRA. In addition, Credit Bureau 

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understood that Street & Co.'s primary business was skip-tracing, which is generally a 

permissible purpose under the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(A); Korotki v. Attorney Servs. 

Corp., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Md. 1996) (defendants attempting to collect an account of a 

consumer had a permissible purpose for obtaining the consumer report), aff'd, 131 F.3d 135 

(4th Cir. 1997). 

Under these circumstances, Credit Bureau clearly had a "reason to believe" that Street & Co. 

accessed Plaintiff's report for a permissible purpose. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3). Numerous courts 

in virtually identical factual circumstances have held that consumer reporting agencies such as 

Credit Bureau in this case acted reasonably as a matter of law. See, e.g., Boothe v. TRW Credit 

Data, 557 F. Supp. 66, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (judgment granted in favor of consumer reporting 

agency where subscriber had certified that it would access reports for permissible purposes and 

where there was no showing that the consumer reporting agency had notice of subscriber's 

improper purpose for accessing the Plaintiff's report); [*14] Klapper v. Shapiro, 154 Misc. 2d 

459, 586 N.Y.S.2d 846, 850 (1992) (summary judgment granted in favor of consumer reporting 

agency that had furnished a consumer report to an otherwise legitimate subscriber who had 

certified that it would seek reports for permissible purposes and where there was no showing 

that the agency was aware that the subscriber was accessing reports for improper purposes); 

Dobson v. Holloway, 828 F. Supp. 975 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (same); Anderson v. Ray Brandt 

Nissan, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14550, 1991 WL 211627 (E.D. La. Oct. 9, 1991) (same). 4

Similarly, because of the certifications made by Credit Bureau to Equifax as to compliance with 

the FCRA and the absence of any evidence that Equifax was aware that Credit Bureau or any of 

Credit Bureau's subscribers were in violation of the FCRA, Equifax acted reasonably as a matter 

of law. 

FOOTNOTES

4 Plaintiff attempts to distinguish these cases by pointing out that the Sessoms' 1984 

contract with Credit Bureau stated that Street & Co. was in the business of insurance and 

business investigations, not skip-tracing, and that Credit Bureau may never have made a 

site visit to the Sessoms' home to verify their permissible purpose. These facts may have 

been significant if there was evidence that the Sessoms operated a business which did not 

have a permissible purpose for accessing consumer reports and that Credit Bureau was 

unaware of this activity. However, it is undisputed that Credit Bureau understood that 

Street & Co. was operating as a skip-tracing business, which is permissible under the FCRA, 

and that Credit Bureau never had notice that Street & Co. had ever accessed a report for an 

improper purpose. Thus, even if Credit Bureau may have failed to verify Street & Co.'s 

business purpose in 1984, that failure in no way caused any damage to Plaintiff in this case. 

[*15] In addition to claiming Equifax and Credit Bureau were negligent with respect to the 

authorization and oversight of Street & Co., Plaintiff also argues that Equifax and Credit Bureau 

were negligent with respect to computer security. Plaintiff bases this argument on two points: 

first, the fact that the Sessoms denied accessing Plaintiff's report despite the fact that the 

billing records indicate that Plaintiff's report was accessed with Street & Co.'s password and 

codeword; second, the testimony of an expert on computer security, Robert Biggerstaff, who 

concludes that the computer systems utilized by Equifax and/or Credit Bureau are inadequate. 

While it is true that the Sessoms have denied accessing Plaintiff's report, there is simply no 

evidence in the record to support the argument that Plaintiff's report was accessed by an 

unknown party breaking into the computer system. The report was pulled using Street & Co.'s 

password and codeword. Credit Bureau billed Street & Co. for the report and Street & Co. paid 

the bill. The Sessoms had never complained that their password had been stolen and never 

complained that they were billed for reports that they did not access. Indeed, one of [*16] 

Plaintiff's own experts, David Szwak, and Plaintiff himself have stated that they believe that 

Sessoms in fact pulled the report. Moreover, if some unknown party had broken into the 

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computer system to access credit information, the most likely motive, as Plaintiff himself 

suggests, would have been identity theft. However, Plaintiff admits that there has been no 

unauthorized activity on any of the accounts listed on his October 1996 report. There is no 

evidence that any of the information on Plaintiff's report has been misused. In short, Plaintiff's 

speculation that an unidentified third party may have broken into Equifax's and Credit Bureau's 

computer system and stolen Plaintiff's credit information is not sufficient to withstand summary 

judgment. Accordingly, the court finds that Equifax and Credit Bureau are entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim. 

The court now turns to Plaintiff's claim that Equifax and Credit Bureau willfully violated the 

provisions of the FCRA. HN4 To establish willfulness, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 

acted "under circumstances which amount to a willful or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's 

rights" under the FCRA. [*17] Yohay v. City of Alexandria Employees Credit Union, Inc., 827 

F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1987). 

Here, Plaintiff has not presented any affirmative evidence that either Equifax or Credit Bureau 

willfully violated any provision of the FCRA. Instead, Plaintiff contends that these Defendants 

have willfully violated the FCRA as a result of their willful blindness to the problem of improper 

access to consumer reports. This argument is based primarily on a theory advanced by one of 

Plaintiff's experts, David Szwak, an attorney who routinely represents plaintiffs in FCRA cases. 

However, as previously discussed, it is undisputed that Equifax and Credit Bureau follow FCRA 

certification procedures which courts from numerous jurisdictions have uniformly held are 

reasonable as a matter of law. In view of these circumstances and in the absence of any 

evidence that either Equifax or Credit Bureau have willfully violated any provision of the FCRA 

in this case, the court finds that Equifax and Credit Bureau are entitled to summary judgment 

on Plaintiff's claim for willful violations of the FCRA. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court will (1) grant Credit Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc.'s 

motion for [*18] summary judgment [Doc. # 47]; (2) grant 

Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 49]; (3) 

deny Plaintiff's motion to strike Roch Smith, Jr., as an expert [Doc. # 53]; (4) deny Credit 

Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc.'s and Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc.'s motions 

to strike Robert Biggerstaff and David Szwak as experts [Docs. # 63 and # 60]; and (5) deny 

Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc.'s and Credit Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc.'s 

motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 [Docs. # 87, 74]. 

An order and judgment in accordance with this memorandum opinion shall be entered 

contemporaneously herewith. 

Frank W. Bullock, Jr. 

United States District Judge 

March 16, 1998 

ORDER and JUDGMENT

BULLOCK, Chief Judge 

For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion filed contemporaneously herewith, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to strike Roch Smith, Jr., as an expert [Doc. # 53] is 

DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Credit Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc.'s motion to strike 

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Robert Biggerstaff and David Szwak as experts [Doc. # 63] is DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Equifax Credit Information [*19] Services, Inc.'s motion to 

strike Robert Biggerstaff and David Szwak as experts [Doc. # 60] is DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Credit Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc.'s motion for sanctions 

pursuant to Rule 11 [Doc. # 74] is DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc.'s motion for sanctions 

pursuant to Rule 11 [Doc. # 87] is DENIED; 

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Credit Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc.'s motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. # 47] is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice as 

to Credit Bureau of Greater Greensboro, Inc.; and 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc.'s 

motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 49] is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED with 

prejudice as to Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc. 

Frank W. Bullock, Jr. 

United States District Judge 

March 16, 1998 

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