IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02389-WYD-MJW

JOHN STAUFFER,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAREN E. HAYES, D.O.,

A WOMAN’S PLACE OF FORT COLLINS, PLLP,

PETER DUSBABEK,

TODD VRIESMAN,

MONTGOMERY KOLODNY AMATUZIO & DUSBABEK, LLP,

J. BRADFORD MARCH, III,

MARCH, OLIVE & PHARRIS, LLP,

CHRISTINE SKORBERG,

CHERYL TRINE, and

CHERYL TRINE LAW FIRM, LLC

Defendants.

RECOMMENDATION ON

(1) TRINE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS BROUGHT

PURSUANT TO 42 USC § 1983 AND PLAINTIFF’S PENDENT STATE CLAIMS

(Docket No. 29),

(2) MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 34) FILED BY DEFENDANTS KAREN E.

HAYES, D.O. AND A WOMAN’S PLACE OF FORT COLLINS, PLLP,

(3) MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 48) FILED BY DEFENDANTS PETER

DUSBABEK, TODD VRIESMAN, AND MONTGOMERY KOLODNY AMATUZIO &

DUSBABEK, LLP,

(4) DEFENDANTS J. BRADFORD MARCH AND MARCH, OLIVE & PHARRIS, LLC’S

MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 57),

(5) MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 74) FILED BY DEFENDANT CHRISTINE

SKORBERG.

ORDER ON

 (6) PLAINTIFF STAUFFER’S MOTION TO VACATE MAGISTRATE MINUTE ORDER

ENTERED MARCH 14, 2012 (DOCKET NO. 83), 

(7) PLAINTIFF STAUFFER’S MOTION FOR STAY IN PROCEEDINGS UNTIL AFTER

“PERSONAL JURISDICTINAL [SIC]” ISSUE IS RESOLVED (DOCKET NO. 84),

(8) PLAINTIFF STAUFFER’S MOTION FOR REPRESENTATION BY AN ATTORNEY

OF PARTNERSHIP’S CHOICE (DOCKET NO. 85),

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(9) PLAINTIFF STAUFFER’S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE SUA SPONTE

DETERMINATION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION ISSUE AT TIME OF STATE

COURT RECEIVER’S PROPERTY DEPRIVATION (DOCKET NO. 86),

AND 

(10) PLAINTIFF’S STAUFFER’S MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON

PERSONAL JURISDICTINAL [SIC] ISSUE (DOCKET NO. 88).

 

MICHAEL J. WATANABE

United States Magistrate Judge

This case is before this court pursuant to an Order of Reference to United States

Magistrate Judge issued by Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on September 14, 2011. 

(Docket No. 2).

PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS

The operative pleading is the pro se plaintiff’s Verified Amended Complaint

(Docket No. 5) in which plaintiff asserts the following. On July 5, 2007, final judgment

was entered in favor of defendant Karen E. Hayes, D.O. (“Hayes”) and against plaintiff

John Stauffer and defendant Christine Skorberg (f/k/a Christine Stauffer) (“Skorberg”) in

Larimer County District Case No. 03-CV-1729 (the “Underlying Case”) following a jury

trial. Seven remaining third-party defendants were dismissed with prejudice from the

Underlying Case on October 4, 2007. 

On December 19, 2007, as part of post-judgment proceedings in the Underlying

Case, defendant J. Bradford March (“March”) was appointed by the court to act as a

receiver. To satisfy the judgment against plaintiff and Skorberg, March took property

from the seven dismissed third-party defendants and four additional non-parties to the

Underlying Case (the “Eleven Parties”). Plaintiff filed one or more motions challenging

the court’s appointment of the receiver including an “Emergency Motion to Vacate Order

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Appointing Receiver” on January 7, 2008. These challenges were denied by the court

in a series of orders dated January 15, 2008, January 28, 2008, and February 15, 2008.

On February 28, 2008, plaintiff appealed the trial court’s orders to the Colorado

Court of Appeals. Shortly thereafter on April 21, 2008, plaintiff also filed a case in the

U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado (Case No. 08-cv-815) alleging violations

of his constitutional rights stemming from the Underlying Case. Plaintiff’s federal case

was dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine due to the pendency of his state

case appeal. On February 18, 2010, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s post-judgment orders. On September 13, 2010, the Colorado Supreme Court

denied plaintiff’s petition for certiorari. 

In the present matter, Claim One asserts violations of the 4th, 5th, and 14th

Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants excluding Cheryl Trine and

Cheryl Trine Law Firm, LLC (collectively “Trine”) and Skorberg. Plaintiff asserts

defendants, acting under color of law, and without first acquiring personal jurisdiction,

knowingly and intentionally deprived the Eleven Parties of property without due process

of law. (Docket No. 5 at 14-15, ¶ 53).

Claim Two asserts violations of the 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments and 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants excluding Trine and Skorberg. Plaintiff asserts

defendants, acting under color of law, knowingly and intentionally deprived the Eleven

Parties of property without due process of law, thus depriving plaintiff and the Eleven

Parties of their right and ability to retain an attorney in this case, the Underlying Case,

and the appeal of the Underlying Case. (Docket No. 5 at 16, ¶ 56).

Claims Three through Fifteen, inclusive, are supplemental state claims. Claim

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Three asserts violations of the Colorado State Constitution by all defendants excluding

Skorberg and Trine. Claims Four through Fourteen, inclusive, assert claims for breach

of contract, intentional interference with a contractual obligation, and nondisclosure and

concealment against Skorberg and Trine. Finally, Claim Fifteen asserts a claim for civil

theft against Skorberg.

PENDING MOTIONS

Now before the court for a report and recommendation are the following five

dispositive motions: (1) Trine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Brought

Pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 and Plaintiff’s Pendent State Claims (Docket No. 29); (2)

Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 34) filed by defendants Karen E. Hayes, D.O. and A

Woman’s Place of Fort Collins, PLLP; (3) Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 48) filed by

defendants Peter Dusbabek, Todd Vriesman, and Montgomery Kolodny Amatuzio &

Dusbabek, LLP; (4) Defendants J. Bradford March and March, Olive & Pharris, LLC’s

Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 57); and (5) Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 74) filed by

defendant Christine Skorberg. Plaintiff filed a response titled “Plaintiff Stauffer’s

Response to All Parties’ Motions to Dismiss” (Docket No. 50) presumably in response to

the first three motions to dismiss. Plaintiff did not file a response to the last two motions

to dismiss. Each defendant other than Skorberg filed a reply. (Docket Nos. 60, 62, 63,

and 67).

Also pending are the following motions filed by plaintiff: (1) Plaintiff Stauffer’s

Motion to Vacate Magistrate Minute Order Entered March 14, 2012 (Docket No. 83); (2)

Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Stay in Proceedings until After “Personal Jurisdictinal [sic]”

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Issue is Resolved (Docket No. 84); (3) Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Representation by

an Attorney of Partnership’s Choice (Docket No. 85); (4) Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for

Immediate Sua Sponte Determination of Personal Jurisdiction Issue at Time of State

Court Receiver’s Property Deprivation (Docket No. 86); and (5) Plaintiff’s Stauffer’s

Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Personal Jurisdictinal [sic] Issue (Docket No. 88).

The court has carefully considered the Verified Amended Complaint, the abovementioned motions, the court’s file, and applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

case law. The court now being fully informed makes the following findings of fact,

conclusions of law, recommendations, and orders.

There is substantial overlap between defendants’ motions to dismiss. Primarily,

defendants rely on the following arguments for dismissal of the federal claims pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6): (1) plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because he

fails to allege that defendants are state actors; (2) plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed

under the doctrine of res judicata; and (3) plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Several defendants argue plaintiff’s supplemental state

claims should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if his federal claims are

dismissed.

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint for “lack of jurisdiction over

the subject matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co.,

495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). Motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) take

two forms. First, a party may attack the facial sufficiency of the complaint, in which case

the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Holt v. United States, 46

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F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1995). Second, if a party attacks the factual assertions

regarding subject matter jurisdiction through affidavits and other documents, the court

may make its own findings of fact. See id. at 1003. A court’s consideration of evidence

outside the pleadings will not convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56. See id.

Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plaint statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) alleges that the complaint fails “to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must be dismissed

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of

his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Id. at 555 (citations

omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Id. “[A] plaintiff must ‘nudge [] [his] claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible’ in order to survive a motion to dismiss. . . . Thus, the mere

metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of

the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe

that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these

claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held “that plausibility refers ‘to the scope

of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide

swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims

across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d

1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012). The court has further “noted that ‘[t]he nature and

specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on

context.’” Id. The court thus “concluded the Twombly/Iqbal standard is ‘a middle

ground between heightened fact pleading, which is expressly rejected, and allowing

complaints that are no more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action, which the Court stated will not do.’” Id.

For purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must

accept all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and resolve all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo.,

154 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 1998); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231-32

(10th Cir. 1996). However, “when legal conclusions are involved in the complaint ‘the

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to [those] conclusions’ . . . .” Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “Accordingly, in examining a complaint under Rule

12(b)(6), [the court] will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the

remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Id.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The court, therefore, reviews his pleadings and

other papers liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

attorneys. Trackwell v. U.S. Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007). See Haines

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v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding allegations of a pro se complaint to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers). However, a pro se

litigant's conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to

state a claim upon which relief can be based. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110

(10th Cir. 1991). A court may not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that have not

been alleged or that a defendant has violated laws in ways that a plaintiff has not

alleged. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74

(10th Cir. 1997) (court may not supply additional factual allegations to round out a

plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff’s behalf); Drake v. City of Fort

Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (the court may not “construct arguments

or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues”).

ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), “federal review of state court judgments can be

obtained only in the United States Supreme Court.” Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v.

Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 1998). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stems

from two United States Supreme Court cases which interpret this limitation on the

review of state court judgments. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). “The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine precludes ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Tal v. Hogan, 453

F.3d 1244, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

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Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Accordingly, the doctrine forecloses on “appellate

review of [a] state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s

claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. De

Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Challenges brought pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine are challenges to a federal district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2004). The

doctrine “applies only to suits filed after state proceedings are final.” Guttman v. G.T.S.

Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1173 (10th Cir. 2006).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not limited to the preclusion of claims actually

litigated and decided on the merits by the state court, it also precludes claims which are

inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Tal, 453 F.3d at 1256. “A claim is

inextricably intertwined if ‘the state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately, the

injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress.’” Id. (quoting Kenmen Eng’g v.

City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 478 (10th Cir. 2002)). “[I]f a favorable resolution of a claim

would upset a [state court] judgment, the claim is [barred under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine] if it is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the judgment, even if the underlying

judgment issue was not raised or addressed in the state court that handed down the

judgment.” Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1140 (10th Cir. 2006). 

However, if the plaintiff presents an independent claim, even if it denies a legal

conclusion that a state court has reached, the federal district court has jurisdiction. Id.

at 1143 (citing Exxon, 544 U.S. at 1527).

Here, several defendants argue plaintiff’s claims are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. Plaintiff’s response does not directly address the Rooker-Feldman

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doctrine. The court agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s claims are barred.

Plaintiff’s claims brought in state court were final as of September 13, 2010 when

his petition for certiorari was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court. Therefore, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s requirement for finality of the state proceedings is met. See

Erlandson v. Northglen Mun. Court, 528 F.3d 785, 788 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting the

finality requirement was met when plaintiff filed his federal case eight days after his

petition for certiorari was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court). 

 Plaintiff’s federal claims assert violations of due process based on the

contention that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Eleven Parties when

the receiver was appointed. More specifically, plaintiff asserts that because the state

court lacked jurisdiction over the Eleven Parties, any orders entered when the court

lacked jurisdiction, including most significantly the order appointing the receiver, are

void. Accordingly, plaintiff argues that the receiver’s taking of property was carried out

without due process.

The court finds that plaintiff’s federal claims are inextricably intertwined with the

state court judgment. Plaintiff’s claimed injury, namely the taking of property from the

Eleven Parties by the receiver, flows directly from the judgment entered by the state

court. The appointment of the receiver and the receiver’s subsequent actions were a

natural and expected consequence of the judgment entered by the state court,

especially in view of the extent of the property and the accusations of fraudulent

transfers. See Colo. R. Civ. P. 66(a)(2) (stating that a receiver may be appointed by the

court after judgment to dispose of property according to the judgment); Jouflas v. Wyatt,

646 P.2d 946, (Colo. App. 1982) (stating that the appointment of a receiver is within the

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sound discretion of the trial court). Consequently, plaintiff’s claimed injury is caused,

actually and proximately, by the state court judgment. 

It is important to note that plaintiff’s claims do not challenge the constitutionality

of a state law. See Tal, 453 F.3d at 1256 (“A federal case does not involve an

‘inextricably intertwined’ state court judgment if the complaint challenges the

constitutionality of the state law . . . .”). More specifically, plaintiff does not challenge

the constitutionality of a Colorado state post-judgment rule, such as the rule allowing for

the appointment of a receiver. Rather, by asserting that the receiver lacked jurisdiction

over the Eleven Parties, plaintiff challenges the merit of actions taken under the rule, not

the rule itself. Accordingly, plaintiff asserts that actions inextricably intertwined with the

state judgment violated his federal rights; plaintiff’s claims are not independent from the

state judgment. Therefore, regardless of whether plaintiff’s claims were addressed on

the merits at the state level, such claims are precluded under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.

In making this determination, the court is mindful of the holding in Kiowa Indian

Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 1998). In Kiowa, the Tenth

Circuit determined, in the context of the sovereign immunity of the appellant tribe, that a

post-judgment proceeding was “separable from and collateral to” the state court

judgment, and therefore not inextricably intertwined with the judgment. 150 F.3d at

1170. At first glance, Kiowa may appear to hold that many or even all post-judgment

proceedings by their very nature are not inextricably intertwined with the preceding

judgment. This, however, is not the case.

Relying heavily on Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), the court

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noted that “if the purpose of a federal action is ‘separable from and collateral to’ a state

court judgment, then the claim is not ‘inextricably intertwined’ merely because the action

necessitates some consideration of the merits of the state court judgment.” Kiowa, 150

F.3d at 1170. However, the court noted that Pennzoil involved a challenge to the

constitutionality of certain Texas post-judgment rules, and not a challenge to a

determination made by the state court. Id. More importantly, the tribe in Kiowa was

challenging the state post-judgment rules as they related to the tribe’s sovereign

immunity. In other words, the constitutionality of the post-judgment rules were

challenged; the tribe did not challenge actions taken under those rules. Given the

nature of the tribe’s challenge, the court noted that a federal court could review the

availability of a particular post-judgment rule without disturbing the underlying state

judgments.. Id. at 1171.

Here, plaintiff’s challenge to the trial court and receiver’s jurisdiction over the

Eleven Parties is not separable and collateral to the decisions made in the Underlying

Case. As explained earlier, plaintiff does not argue that one of the post-judgment rules

utilized in the Underlying Case is unconstitutional. Rather, plaintiff’s challenge goes to

actions taken under the post-judgment rules, and thus involves matters inextricably

intertwined with decisions made by state courts. If the court were to consider plaintiff’s

arguments, the court would be forced to directly consider the merits of actions taken by

the state trial court. Conversely, if plaintiff’s claims were independent of the state

judgment, the court would likely not be required to consider the merits of the state

judgment, and even if the court was so required, the merits of the judgment would be

collateral to the court’s determination. 

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In addition, plaintiff previously challenged the post-judgment proceedings at the

both at the state trial and appellate level. Regardless of the reasoning adopted by the

trial court or the Colorado Court of Appeals in deciding against plaintiff, and regardless

of whether plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument was addressed on its merits, if this court

were to find in favor of plaintiff in this matter, this court would necessarily have to disturb

determinations made at the state level. See Penobscot Nation v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,

254 F.3d 317, 324 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing Kiowa and finding the plaintiff’s claims

were not separable and collateral when the federal court would necessarily have to

disturb determinations made by the state court); See also Narragansett Indian Tribe of

Okla. v. Hoover, 294 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172-73 (D.R.I. 2003) (discussing Kiowa and

finding that an issue was not separable and collateral when in order to grant the relief

sought by the plaintiff, the court would have to reverse a decision made by the state

court). Therefore, even in view of Kiowa, plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined

with the state judgment.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATE CLAIMS

Several defendants argue plaintiff’s supplemental state claims should be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if his federal claims are dismissed. 

Plaintiff’s response does not address this argument.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) grants supplemental or pendent jurisdiction to federal district

courts over a plaintiff’s state law claims which arise out of the same transaction or

occurrence as the federal claims. However, a district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “When all federal claims have been

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dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any

remaining state claims.” Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151,

1156 (10th Cir. 1998). 

Here, because the court recommends that plaintiff’s federal claims be dismissed,

the court also recommends the dismissal of plaintiff’s remaining state claims pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED that the Trine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims

Brought Pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 and Plaintiff’s Pendent State Claims (Docket No.

29) be granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and denied as moot in all other respects. It is further 

RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 34) filed by defendants

Karen E. Hayes, D.O. and A Woman’s Place of Fort Collins, PLLP be granted insofar

as it seeks dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied as

moot in all other respects. It is further

RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 48) filed by defendants

Peter Dusbabek, Todd Vriesman, and Montgomery Kolodny Amatuzio & Dusbabek, LLP

be granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and denied as moot in all other respects. It is further 

RECOMMENDED that the Defendants J. Bradford March and March, Olive &

Pharris, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 57) be granted insofar as it seeks

dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied as moot in all

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other respects. It is further

RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 74) filed by defendant

Christine Skorberg be granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of this case for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and denied as moot in all other respects. It is further

RECOMMENDED that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over plaintiff’s state law claims (Claims Three through Fifteen, inclusive), and that

plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed in its entirety. It is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion to Vacate Magistrate Minute Order

Entered March 14, 2012 (Docket No. 83) is denied as moot. It is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Stay in Proceedings until After

“Personal Jurisdictinal [sic]” Issue is Resolved (Docket No. 84) is denied as moot. It is

further 

ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Representation by an Attorney of

Partnership’s Choice (Docket No. 85) is denied as moot. It is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Immediate Sua Sponte

Determination of Personal Jurisdiction Issue at Time of State Court Receiver’s Property

Deprivation (Docket No. 86) is denied as moot. It is further 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Stauffer’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Personal

Jurisdictinal [sic] Issue (Docket No. 88) is denied as moot.

NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),

the parties have fourteen (14) days after service of this recommendation to serve

and file specific written objections to the above recommendation with the District

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Judge assigned to the case. A party may respond to another party’s objections

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. The District Judge need

not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party’s failure to file

and serve such written, specific objections waives de novo review of the

recommendation by the District Judge, Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148-53

(1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. 

Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse,

91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996).

Date: April 24, 2012 s/ Michael J. Watanabe 

Denver, Colorado Michael J. Watanabe

United States Magistrate Judge

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