IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

W.W., :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 239 M.D. 2020

: Argued: October 15, 2020

Pennsylvania State Police, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge1

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: January 15, 2021

Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are Respondent 

Pennsylvania State Police’s (PSP) Preliminary Objections (POs) to Petitioner 

W.W.’s Petition for Review (Petition), in which W.W. challenges his sex offender 

registration obligations under Subchapter I of the current version of the law requiring 

registration of sexual offenders, the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29, 42 

Pa. C.S. §§9799.10-9799.75 (commonly known as “Act 29”).2 The PSP objects on 

1This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 4, 2021, when Judge Brobson 

became President Judge.

2 Act 29 reenacted and amended the Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, 42 Pa. C.S. 

§§9799.10 - 9799.75 (commonly known as “Act 10”), which had replaced the Sexual Offender 

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§9799.10-9799.41. The evolution of 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

the grounds that W.W.’s claims cannot stand against the PSP based upon binding 

precedent. Upon review, we sustain the PSP’s POs and dismiss W.W.’s Petition. 

I. Background

On September 7, 2004, W.W. pled guilty to aggravated indecent assault 

and indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age. At the time of his plea 

and sentence, Megan’s Law II was in effect. Megan’s Law II mandated lifetime 

registration based on W.W.’s conviction for aggravated indecent assault. See former

the law preceding SORNA was outlined in Dougherty v. Pennsylvania State Police, 138 A.3d 152, 

155 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016):

Courts have also referred to SORNA as the Adam Walsh Act. 

SORNA is the General Assembly’s fourth enactment of the law 

commonly referred to as Megan’s Law. Megan’s Law I, the Act of 

October 24, 1995, P.L. 1079 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), was enacted on 

October 24, 1995, and became effective 180 days thereafter. 

Megan’s Law II[, the Act of May 10, 2000, P.L. 74,] was enacted 

on May 10, 2000[,] in response to Megan’s Law I being ruled 

unconstitutional by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. 

Williams, [733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999)]. Our Supreme Court held that 

some portions of Megan’s Law II were unconstitutional in 

Commonwealth v. Gomer Williams, [832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003)], and 

the General Assembly responded by enacting Megan’s Law III[, the 

Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 1243,] on November 24, 2004. The 

United States Congress expanded the public notification 

requirements of state sexual offender registries in the Adam Walsh 

Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§16901-16945, 

and the Pennsylvania General Assembly responded by passing 

SORNA on December 20, 2011[,] with the stated purpose of 

“bring[ing] the Commonwealth into substantial compliance with the 

Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.” 42 Pa. C.S. 

§9799.10(1). SORNA went into effect a year later on December 20, 

2012. Megan’s Law III was also struck down by our Supreme Court 

for violating the single subject rule of Article III, Section 3 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution [(Pa Const. art. III, §3)]. Commonwealth 

v. Neiman, [84 A.3d 603, 616 (Pa. 2013)]. However, by the time it 

was struck down, Megan’s Law III had been replaced by SORNA.
3

42 Pa. C.S. §9795.1(b)(2)(i). W.W. has been registering as a sex offender since 

2008 when he was released from incarceration. 

On April 10, 2020, W.W. filed a two-count Petition seeking: (1) a 

declaration under the Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA)3that Subchapter I of Act 29 

does not apply to him because it is an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied 

to him and deprives him of his procedural due process, substantive due process, and 

contractual rights; and (2) a writ of mandamus to compel the PSP to permanently 

remove his name from the sexual offender registry. More particularly, W.W. claims 

that Subchapter I and any future iteration of Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration 

scheme is an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him under the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 

(Pa. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018). He asserts that Act 29 deprives him 

of substantive due process because it does not narrowly tailor its punishment by the 

least restrictive means available. He maintains that Act 29 deprives him of 

procedural due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption that he is incapable 

of rehabilitation, which encroaches upon his fundamental right to reputation, without 

any mechanism for proving otherwise. He claims that the PSP has violated his 

contractual rights by applying Act 29 to him when this law was enacted long after 

he entered his guilty plea. 

In response, the PSP filed POs. The PSP objects to W.W.’s ex post 

facto, substantive due process, procedural due process, and contractual claims on the 

ground that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted based on 

binding precedent. The PSP also demurs on the ground that the existence of an 

3 42 Pa. C.S. §§7531-7541.
4

independent federal obligation to register precludes the mandamus relief requested 

in this matter.

4

 Both parties filed briefs in support of their respective positions.5 

II. Issues

First, the PSP argues that W.W.’s ex post facto claim fails as a result of 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 

234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020). Second, the PSP argues that W.W.’s substantive due 

process claim similarly fails under Lacombe. Third, the PSP contends that W.W.’s 

procedural due process claim fails because Acts 10 and 29 do not implicate the 

irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Fourth, the PSP maintains that W.W.’s Petition 

should be dismissed because W.W.’s contract claim cannot lie against the PSP based 

on Dougherty v. Pennsylvania State Police, 138 A.3d 152 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016),

because the PSP was not a party to W.W.’s plea agreement. Finally, the PSP argues 

that W.W.’s mandamus count fails because, even if the Court was to grant relief 

under state law, W.W. still has an independent obligation under federal law to 

register as a sexual offender. Consequently, he is not entitled to have his name 

permanently removed from the registry. 

4 The PSP also objected on the grounds of mootness and improper service, which it has 

since withdrawn. PSP’s Brief at 1 n.1. 

5 On July 21, 2020, shortly after the PSP filed its POs, the Supreme Court filed its decision 

in Lacombe, which the PSP argues is controlling in its brief. We note that W.W. filed his brief on 

July 16, 2020, just days before the Supreme Court decided Lacombe (July 21, 2020), and in direct 

response to the PSP’s POs as opposed to the PSP’s brief in support. While the PSP’s brief 

addresses Lacombe, W.W.’s brief does not. However, at oral argument, W.W.’s counsel had the 

opportunity to address Lacombe before the panel.
5

III. Discussion

A. Ex post facto

First, the PSP argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lacombe is 

binding precedent that fatally undercuts many of W.W.’s arguments, particularly his 

ex post facto claim. We agree. 

In Lacombe, the Supreme Court determined that Subchapter I of Act 29 

is nonpunitive and its retroactive application does not violate the constitutional 

prohibition against ex post facto laws. Lacombe; see T.S. v. Pennsylvania State 

Police (Pa., No. 34 MAP 2020, filed December 22, 2020) (per curiam order). In 

Lacombe, the petitioners argued that, because their offenses were completed before 

Act 29 took effect, retroactive application of Act 29 constituted an ex post facto

violation under Muniz. However, Act 29 was enacted after Muniz to address the 

constitutional infirmities identified therein. The General Assembly declared its 

intent that Act 29 is nonpunitive. 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.51(b)(2). To achieve its dual 

goals of ensuring public safety without creating another unconstitutionally punitive 

scheme, the General Assembly made a number of material changes. In this new 

statutory scheme, the General Assembly eliminated a number of crimes that 

previously triggered registration requirements and reduced the frequency with which 

an offender must report in person to the PSP. Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 615. 

In determining whether Subchapter I of Act 29 constitutes criminal 

punishment, the Lacombe Court applied the two-part test espoused in Muniz. That 

test considers whether the General Assembly’s intent was to impose punishment and, 

if not, whether the statutory scheme is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or 

effect as to negate the legislature’s nonpunitive intent. Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 614. 

The parties conceded that the legislative intent was nonpunitive. Id. The issue then 

turned on its effect. 
6

For this, the Supreme Court relied on the following Mendoza-Martinez6

factors: (1) whether the law involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) 

whether the legislative requirements have been historically regarded as punishment; 

(3) whether the law comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether 

operation of the law promotes traditional aims of punishment; (5) whether the 

behavior to which the law applies is already a crime; (6) whether there is an 

alternative purpose to which the law may be rationally connected; and (7) whether 

the law is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Lacombe, 234 

A.3d at 606 n.3. The Court found that three of the five factors (nos. 1, 6 and 7) 

weighed in favor of finding Subchapter I nonpunitive. Id. at 626. The Court gave 

little weight to the fact that Subchapter I promotes traditional aims of punishment, 

scienter and whether the behavior is already a crime (nos. 3, 4, 5). Id. The Supreme 

Court gave significant weight to the fact that Subchapter I is narrowly tailored to its 

nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public and legislative intent. Id. Balancing 

these factors, the Court held that “Subchapter I is nonpunitive and does not violate 

the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.” Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 

605-06.

Insofar as W.W.’s claims are predicated on the argument that 

Subchapter I is punitive in nature, such claims are no longer viable based on 

Lacombe. This clearly includes W.W.’s ex post facto claim. Thus, we sustain the 

PSP’s PO to W.W.’s ex post facto claim. 

B. Substantive Due Process Claim

Next, the PSP argues that Lacombe also renders meritless W.W.’s 

substantive due process claim because Subchapter I is nonpunitive. 

6 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
7

Notwithstanding, the PSP alternatively argues that substantive due process is not the

proper analysis. Although the right to reputation is a fundamental right, Act 29 is 

not making a determination as to W.W.’s likelihood to reoffend but to sex offenders 

as a cohort. Even if this Court was to address the merits of W.W.’s substantive due 

process claim, Act 29 satisfies constitutional muster under both intermediate and

strict scrutiny. Unlike its predecessors, Act 29 allows offenders an opportunity to 

be removed from the registry after 25 years. 

The Lacombe Court noted that, while a substantive due process 

challenge to Subchapter I was not squarely before it, this claim would be dependent 

upon a finding that Subchapter I is punitive. The Court opined, “given our ultimate 

holding that Subchapter I is nonpunitive, the claim[] would fail in any event.” 

Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 608 n.5. Because Subchapter I is nonpunitive, W.W.’s 

substantive due process claim likewise fails. See id. Therefore, we sustain the PSP’s 

PO in this regard. 

C. Procedural Due Process Claim

Next, the PSP argues that, to the extent that Lacombe does not cast aside 

W.W.’s procedural due process claim, this claim fails for other reasons. Contrary to 

W.W.’s assertions, Act 29 does not implicate the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. 

Therefore, no due process is required at all. Even if the doctrine applies, the 

presumption that adult sex offenders as a cohort have a high likelihood of 

reoffending is still accepted as universally true and any policy-related arguments to 

the contrary should be rejected by the Court. There is no reasonable alternative for 

assessing the dangerousness of sexual offenders as a cohort. 

The Lacombe Court did not comment upon the merits of a procedural 

due process claim. Since W.W.’s procedural due process claim is not predicated
8

upon his argument that Subchapter I is punitive, we examine his claim under the 

irrebuttable presumption doctrine.

Under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, the presumption violates 

due process if “the presumption is deemed not universally true and a reasonable 

alternative means of ascertaining that presumed facts are available.” In re J.B., 107 

A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014). In J.B., the Supreme Court determined that SORNA as 

applied to juvenile sex offenders violated due process rights through the use of an 

irrebuttable presumption. The law imposed lifetime registration on juvenile 

offenders without considering the differences between juveniles and adults or the 

individual characteristics of each juvenile offender. The presumption relied upon 

was not universally true. Unlike adult sex offenders, juvenile sex offenders have a 

much lower rate of re-offense than their adult counterparts. Given that few juvenile 

sexual offenders recidivate, registration of juvenile sexual offenders did not improve 

public safety. Juveniles subject to registration suffered irreparable harms, including 

difficulty obtaining housing, employment, schooling, etc. SORNA did not provide 

juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to challenge the presumption. A 

reasonable alternative means of ascertaining the presumed fact was already in use in 

Pennsylvania for assessing which juvenile offenders pose a high risk of recidivism. 

The Court concluded: 

Given that juvenile offenders have a protected right to 

reputation encroached by SORNA’s presumption of 

recidivism, where the presumption is not universally true, 

and where there is a reasonable alternative means for 

ascertaining the likelihood of recidivating, we hold that the 

application of SORNA’s current lifetime registration 

requirements upon adjudication of specified offenses 

violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing

an irrebuttable presumption.
9

J.B., 107 A.3d at 19-20.

The difference here is that we are not dealing with juvenile sex 

offenders, but adult sex offenders. Although there are some studies to the contrary, 

the presumption that adult sex offenders as a cohort pose a higher risk of recidivism 

is still accepted as universally true. See Lacombe; Muniz. 

In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), 

the United States Supreme Court considered a similar challenge to the presumption 

regarding adult sex offenders under Connecticut’s version of Megan’s Law. 

Therein, the United States Supreme Court held that individuals “who assert a right 

to a hearing under the Due Process Clause [(U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1)] must 

show that the facts they seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the 

statutory scheme.” Id. at 8. “[T]he fact that respondent seeks to prove that he is not 

currently dangerous is of no consequence under Connecticut’s Megan’s Law.” Id.

at 7. 

Similarly, Subchapter I does not signal the dangerousness of any 

particular offender. It merely provides that adult sex offenders, as a group, have a

high risk of recidivism. A hearing on his individual dangerousness or likelihood to 

reoffend is irrelevant to the universal truth of the group as a whole. Therefore, the 

irrebuttable presumption doctrine does not apply.

Even if it did, this Court is not the proper forum to challenge the 

presumption. In Lacombe, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the finding in Muniz that 

“[a]lthough there are contrary scientific studies, we note there is by no means a 
10

consensus, and as such, we defer to the General Assembly’s findings on this issue.”

Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 625 (citing Muniz) (emphasis added).7 

Finally, unlike in J.B., there is no reasonable alternative for assessing 

the dangerousness of sexual offenders as a cohort. The question before the Court is 

not whether there is an alternative means for assessing the risk of an individual 

offender’s recidivism; the question is whether there is an alternative means for 

assessing the risk of recidivism of sexual offenders as a cohort. At this juncture, 

there is no reasonable method of doing so. We, therefore, sustain the PSP’s PO to 

W.W.’s procedural due process claim. 

D. Contract Claim

Next, the PSP argues that W.W.’s contract claim cannot lie against the 

PSP because it was not a party to the plea agreement. Even assuming there was a 

term in W.W.’s plea agreement mandating a certain period of registration, an 

7 Our Supreme Court recently examined the irrebuttable presumption doctrine in the 

context of a post-sentence motion challenging the constitutionality of the revised Subchapter H of 

Act 29, 42 Pa. C.S. §§9799.10-9799.42. Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020). 

While reaffirming its position of judicial deference to the General Assembly’s findings on matters 

of public policy as stated in Muniz, the Court opined that such deference “is not boundless.” 

Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 583. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had authority to 

consider the sex offender’s scientific evidence to address whether a scientific consensus has 

developed to overturn the legislative determinations in regard to sexual offenders’ recidivism rates. 

Id. Thus, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order declaring Subchapter H 

unconstitutional and remanded the matter for further development of the record. Id. 

However, Torsilieri does not alter our analysis here. While we recognize that the 

presumption may change based on new scientific evidence, at the present time, the presumption 

that adult sex offenders as a cohort pose a higher risk of recidivism is still accepted as universally 

true. See Lacombe; Muniz. In the context of a petition seeking declaratory and mandamus relief, 

W.W. cannot establish a clear legal right in this regard. See Allen v. Department of Corrections, 

103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (the purpose of mandamus is to enforce legal rights already 

established, not to establish them). 
11

offender does not have a remedy against the PSP. Dougherty. Any remedy would 

be against the Commonwealth in a court of common pleas. Id. W.W. does not argue 

that he agreed to a different period of registration than actually imposed. Rather, 

W.W. argues that he impliedly agreed to register under the laws that existed at the 

time he entered his guilty plea, which was Megan’s Law II, which has since been 

repealed. 

In Dougherty, this Court entertained a similar contract claim against the 

PSP. Therein, the petitioner filed a petition for review in the nature of a writ of 

mandamus seeking to compel the PSP to change his sexual registration status in 

accordance with the terms of his plea agreement with the Commonwealth. The PSP 

objected alleging that the petitioner’s contract-based claims failed because the PSP 

was not a party to the plea agreement. In sustaining the PSP’s PO, this Court 

explained that “it is the Commonwealth, acting through the appropriate prosecutor, 

not the PSP, [that] is a party to the plea agreement.” Dougherty, 138 A.3d at 160. 

We determined: 

[T]he PSP has no duty to inquire into the content or intent 

of any underlying plea agreement. The PSP is not a party 

to the plea agreement and disputes over the alleged breach 

of a plea agreement, and the impact of the plea agreement 

on a [sex offender’s] duty to register with the PSP, are 

properly resolved through the criminal justice system in 

the appropriate sentencing court.

Id. (emphasis in original). We further explained that, in determining the appropriate 

period of registration, the PSP must comply with the registration terms outlined in 

the sentencing order. Id. at 159-60. Consequently, “if[ ] the sentencing order is 

silent on the term of registration imposed upon the offender, the PSP must apply the 

appropriate registration period based on the offense of conviction” under the 

applicable sex offender statute. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
12

Although Dougherty was decided shortly before Muniz, Dougherty

continues to remain valid precedent despite recent changes in the landscape of sex 

offender registration. See Huu Cao v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

512 M.D. 2015, filed October 16, 2019); Huyett v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 516 M.D. 2015, filed August 17, 2017);8see also Konyk v. 

Pennsylvania State Police of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 183 A.3d 981, 986 

(Pa. 2018) (rejecting a petitioner’s contract claim against Commonwealth and the 

PSP based on federal plea bargain agreement to which respondents were not parties 

or third-party beneficiaries and rejecting theory of an implied contract); see also 

Konyk, 183 A.3d at 991-92 (Todd, J., concurring) (citing Dougherty favorably for 

the precept that the PSP was not a party to the federal plea agreement and 

consequently not a proper defendant in the petitioner’s contract-based case). Thus, 

we decline W.W.’s invitation to overrule Dougherty. 

Because the PSP was not a party to W.W.’s plea agreement, the PSP is 

not liable for breach of such agreement. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the 

sentencing court imposed a shorter period of registration than that mandated by 

statute. The PSP must apply the appropriate registration period based on the offense 

of conviction under the applicable sex offender statute, which is Subchapter I. See 

Dougherty. There is no basis upon which to conclude that the registration period in 

effect at the time of sentencing would remain intact notwithstanding the enactment 

of amendatory or replacement legislation. See Konyk, 183 A.3d at 989. Therefore, 

we sustain the PSP’s PO to W.W.’s contractual claim. 

8 Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures authorizes the citation of 

unreported panel decisions issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value, but not as 

binding precedent. 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a). 
13

E. Federal Registration Obligation

Finally, the PSP argues that W.W. has an independent federal 

obligation to register, which precludes his ability to obtain mandamus relief in this 

Court. The PSP maintains that the federal registration requirement applies 

irrespective of state law. Mandamus is appropriate only when an individual has a 

clear right to relief. Even if this Court was to grant W.W. relief from registering 

under state law, W.W. is compelled to register under federal law. In essence, W.W. 

is seeking an advisory opinion, which this Court should not entertain. 

A proceeding in mandamus is an extraordinary remedy at common law, 

designed to compel the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty. Duncan 

v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 137 A.3d 575, 576 (Pa. 2016); Allen v. 

Department of Corrections, 103 A.3d 365, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). “The purpose 

of mandamus is not to establish legal rights, but to enforce those rights already 

established beyond peradventure.” Allen, 103 A.3d at 369 (quoting Detar v. Beard, 

898 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)). “This Court may only issue a writ of 

mandamus where: (1) the petitioner possesses a clear legal right to enforce the 

performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty; (2) the [respondent] possesses a 

corresponding duty to perform the act; and (3) the petitioner possesses no other 

adequate or appropriate remedy.” Id. at 370; accord Duncan, 137 A.3d at 576. 

“Mandamus can only be used to compel performance of a ministerial duty and will 

not be granted in doubtful cases.” Allen, 103 A.3d at 370. 

W.W. asks this Court to compel the PSP to remove his name from the 

sex offender registry. However, W.W.’s substantive obligation to register as a sex 

offender arises under both state and federal law. Under federal law, “[a] sex offender 

shall register . . . in each jurisdiction where the offender resides . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 

§20913. A “sex offender” is “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense,”
14

and the definition of “sex offense” includes “a criminal offense that is a specified 

offense against a minor.” 42 U.S.C. §20911(1) and (5)(A)(ii). 

In Thomas v. Blocker, 799 F. App’x 131 (3d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 

__ U.S. __ (U.S., No. 19-1275, filed June 29, 2020),

9

the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether a sex offender had a duty to 

register as a sex offender under the federal law, even though he claimed to be exempt 

under Pennsylvania’s scheme. The appellant argued that state officials could not 

compel him to register. The Third Circuit Court rejected this argument and ruled 

that the sex offender’s federal duty to register under federal law was independent of 

Pennsylvania law. Thomas, 799 F. App’x at 135. 

We similarly conclude that, even if W.W. prevailed with his state 

claims, his independent federal obligation to register remains. Within the context of 

mandamus, W.W. does not have a clear right to relief to have his name removed 

from the registry and the PSP is under no duty to do so. Thus, we sustain the PSP’s 

demurrer in this regard.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review, we sustain the PSP’s POs to W.W.’s Petition seeking 

declaratory and mandamus relief, and we dismiss his Petition. 

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

9 This opinion may be cited for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent, consistent 

with Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Fed.R.App.P. 32.1. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

W.W., :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 239 M.D. 2020

: 

Pennsylvania State Police, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 15th day of January, 2021, we SUSTAIN 

Respondent’s Preliminary Objections to Petitioner’s Petition for Review (Petition)

in accordance with the foregoing opinion and we dismiss Petitioner’s Petition. 

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge