Docket No. 87286–Agenda 5–March 2001.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

								ARTHUR DALE HICKEY, Appellant.

Opinion filed September 27, 2001.

	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

	Defendant, Arthur Dale Hickey, appeals an order of the circuit

court of Will County dismissing his amended post-conviction

petition without an evidentiary hearing and denying defendant’s

requests to review and to test certain evidence. Because defendant

was sentenced to death for his underlying murder conviction, his

appeal lies directly with this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For

the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

BACKGROUND

	This court has previously set forth the evidence presented at

defendant’s trial in our opinion on defendant’s direct appeal. See People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256 (1997). Therefore, we discuss only those facts and evidence necessary to the disposition of this

appeal. Defendant’s convictions arose from the murder of Jeff

Stephens and the sexual assault and attempted murder of Jeff’s

wife, Heather, on November 25, 1991. That morning, Jeff got up

between 5 and 5:30 a.m. to go to work. He went downstairs to

take the garbage out to the end of the driveway for pickup. Shortly

thereafter, Heather heard yelling outside the house, followed by a

gunshot. Heather got up and began putting on her bathrobe. As she

was putting on her bathrobe, a man wearing a ski mask and holding

a gun came into the bedroom, forced Heather onto the bed and tied

her wrists to the bedposts. The man sexually assaulted Heather,

then later shot her in the side of her face. Heather said that she

tried not to look at her assailant while he was assaulting her

because she was frightened.

	Heather was never able to identify anyone as her attacker,

although she initially told the police that her attacker was in his

20s, was between 5 feet and 5 feet, 4 inches tall, weighed 130

pounds, had medium length, stringy blond hair and no facial hair.

At the time, defendant was 40 years old, 5 feet 6 inches tall, weighed 180 to 190 pounds, had a full mustache, and dark hair on

his head with some grey in it. A composite sketch of the

perpetrator was prepared based upon Heather’s description. The

officer that prepared the composite sketch testified that Heather

was in a great deal of pain and was being treated for a gunshot

wound at the time that she gave the description.

	Heather viewed numerous photo lineups and mug shots

following the assault, but never was able to identify her assailant.

Defendant’s photo was included in some of the photo lineups

shown to Heather. Although Heather told the officer she thought

she would be able to identify the perpetrator if she saw him, she

also testified at trial that she was not certain of the man’s hair color

and was not certain whether he had facial hair. She explained that

is was dark in the bedroom, she was under stress, and she was not

wearing her glasses. Without her glasses, Heather could see up

close but not far away.

	Heather was taken to Riverside Medical Center in Kankakee,

Illinois. A registered nurse collected samples from Heather for a

rape kit, including vaginal smears on slides and swabs. The nurse

also collected additional vaginal and rectal swabs. The samples, as

well as Heather’s underwear and Jeff’s sweatshirt, were sent to the

Illinois State Police’s Joliet, Illinois, crime lab. The rape kit and

Heather’s underwear then were sent to the State Police’s Metro

East crime lab. There, blood and semen were detected on

Heather’s underwear, and semen was detected on certain vaginal

and rectal swabs. After the samples from the rape kit and Heather’s

underwear tested positive for the presence of semen, they were

sent to the State Police crime lab in Springfield, Illinois, for DNA

testing.

	David Metzger, a forensic scientist employed by the

Springfield crime lab in the DNA unit extracted DNA from the

evidence received, including a blood sample from Heather, a

vaginal swab, a swatch from Heather’s underwear, a rectal swab

and swatch from Jeff Stephens’ sweatshirt. During his testing of

the DNA, however, Metzger mistakenly exposed the DNA

evidence too long to restriction enzyme, which damaged the DNA

extractions to the point where they no longer were useable.

	Metzger then requested additional samples and obtained

Heather’s underwear and the additional swabs containing semen.

Metzger extracted DNA from the samples and produced four

developed autoradiograms, or autorads, which indicated that the

suspect DNA was inconsistent with Jeff Stephens’ DNA. The

suspect DNA could not be matched with anyone involved in the

case at the time.

	However, in April 1993, while defendant was incarcerated for

the criminal sexual assault of his stepdaughter, a preliminary

correlation was made between defendant’s DNA and the DNA of

the perpetrator in the Stephens case by State Police indexing

personnel. Accordingly, blood samples were obtained from

defendant pursuant to a search warrant and were sent to Metzger.

Metzger ran a series of autorads with defendant’s DNA. He then

ran a series of autorads on defendant’s DNA and the DNA from

the suspect in the Stephens case, producing nine autorads. All nine

autorads showed a match between defendant’s DNA and that of

the perpetrator in the Stephens case. The frequency of such a

match was 1 in 15 billion people.

	Thereafter, defendant was charged with the crimes. Following

a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder,

attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm,

aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion. At a

separate sentencing hearing, the same jury found defendant eligible

for the death penalty and found that there were no mitigating

circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death

penalty. Accordingly, defendant was sentenced to death for the

murder and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60 years

for the remaining offenses. On direct appeal, this court affirmed

defendant’s convictions and sentences. People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256 (1997). The United States Supreme Court denied

defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari. Hickey v. Illinois, 524 U.S. 955, 141 L. Ed. 2d 742, 118 S. Ct. 2375 (1998).

	Defendant then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and a motion for appointment of counsel. After counsel was

appointed, defendant’s attorneys filed a motion to preserve DNA

evidence, which was granted. Defense counsel also served

subpoenas on the Will County sheriff and the State Police. Counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief and filed a

motion to produce DNA evidence. The State filed a motion to

dismiss the amended post-conviction petition on the ground that

the matters raised therein either were matters of record or did not

raise issues of constitutional magnitude. Defendant then filed a

second amended post-conviction petition. The trial court denied

defendant’s discovery motion, quashed his subpoenas, and

dismissed his second amended post-conviction petition without an

evidentiary hearing. The trial court later denied defendant’s motion

to reconsider. The instant appeal followed. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).

ANALYSIS

	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 through

122–7 (West 1998)) provides a defendant with a means through

which he can challenge his conviction or sentence for violations of

federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1997). An action seeking post-conviction relief is a

collateral proceeding and not an appeal from the earlier judgment. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must demonstrate a substantial

deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the

proceedings that produced the challenged conviction or sentence. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). The scope of post- conviction relief is limited, through considerations of waiver and

res judicata, “to constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated.” People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Accordingly, issues that a defendant

raised in his appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction, or

issues that could have been raised but were not, generally will not

be considered in a post-conviction proceeding. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).

	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his

post-conviction petition as a matter of right. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 370-71 (1996). An evidentiary hearing on a post-

conviction petition is warranted only where the allegations of the

post-conviction petition, supported by the trial record or

accompanying affidavits where appropriate, make a substantial

showing that a defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d at 528. All well-pleaded facts in the petition and accompanying affidavits, if any, are taken as true for the

purpose of determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing.

People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 244-45 (1995). This court reviews a circuit court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of

allegations in a post-conviction petition de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).

	At the outset, we observe that with regard to each issue raised

by defendant, the State maintains that defendant has waived that

issue because he did not raise the issue on direct appeal, nor does

he now claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing

to raise those issues on direct appeal. Although any issue that could

have been presented on direct appeal but was not is deemed

waived, the doctrine of waiver will be relaxed where fundamental

fairness so requires, where the facts relating to the claim do not

appear on the face of the original appellate record, or where the

alleged waiver stems from the incompetence of appellate counsel. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998). Upon review of the pleadings and record in this case, we agree with the State that

defendant has waived the issues raised on appeal because those

issues could have been raised in his direct appeal. However,

because defendant makes the claim that due to the trial court’s

rulings, his post-conviction counsel could not determine whether

defendant’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, we will

examine those issues under principles of fundamental fairness.

I. Discovery

	Defendant first contends that he was denied due process of

law when the trial court denied his production requests and

quashed his subpoenas. Defendant argues that the trial court’s

ruling denied him a chance to investigate and present his post-

conviction claims, such that his post-conviction counsel could not

certify in good faith that they had performed the duties imposed

upon them by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R.

651(c)).

	Defendant had filed a motion to produce DNA evidence

requesting the vaginal swab which formed the basis of comparison to defendant’s DNA sample. Defendant also sought items of

evidence recovered in the case which had not been tested, including

vaginal smears on slides from the rape kit, Heather’s blood sample,

a Kool cigarette butt, and Heather’s robe and terrycloth gown.

Defendant later amended his motion to produce DNA evidence to

request a sample of his blood taken in connection with his arrest

for the sexual assault of his stepdaughter. Defendant also served a

subpoena duces tecum on the Will County sheriff seeking evidence logs which would show the chain of custody of the DNA evidence

and of defendant’s blood sample. In addition, defendant served a

subpoena duces tecum to the State Police seeking David Metzger’s complete personnel file. The circuit court denied defendant’s

discovery requests and quashed the subpoenas to the Will County

sheriff and the State Police.

	Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible

error in violation of his constitutional rights when it quashed his

subpoenas and denied his discovery requests. Defendant claims that

based upon Heather Stephens’ description of the perpetrator, as

well as the composite sketch prepared based upon Heather’s

description, he cannot be the offender in this case. Defendant

argues that the DNA evidence in this case, which was critical to his

conviction, is suspect in light of Metzger’s destruction of the first

samples and Metzger’s “fortuitous” discovery of additional

samples. Defendant also questions the State’s failure to test all the

evidence in this case, including Heather’s robe and a Kool cigarette

butt. Defendant notes that Heather had initially told police

investigators that the perpetrator had ejaculated onto her robe,

although at trial she testified that although she first thought the

perpetrator did not ejaculate inside her, when she went to the

bathroom later, she saw what looked like sperm coming from her

vagina. Defendant also notes that neither Heather nor Jeff were

smokers, and defendant smoked only Camel cigarettes.

	In addition, defendant claims he should have been permitted

to investigate Metzger’s background in light of Metzger’s

destruction of the first samples in this case and the fact that

Metzger had been disciplined by the State Police shortly before he

testified in this case. Finally, defendant claims that his post-

conviction counsel had a duty to investigate the possibility of tampering with regard to his blood sample. Defendant states that

the Will County sheriff had taken two samples of his blood in

connection with the sexual assault of his stepdaughter, and

suggests that the Will County sheriff may have substituted those

samples with that of the offender in the Stephens case. Defendant

argues that his production requests were proper given that the

State has the exclusive control and custody of unexamined items

of crime scene evidence.

	Although neither the civil nor criminal discovery rules apply to

post-conviction proceedings, a circuit court nonetheless has

inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in post-

conviction proceedings. People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264 (2000). However, because post-conviction proceedings afford a

defendant only limited review, and because there is an opportunity

for abuse of discovery, a circuit court must be cautious in the

exercise of its authority to order discovery. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 415 (2000). A circuit court, then, should allow discovery

only if the moving party has demonstrated “good cause” for the

discovery request. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 264-65. Consequently, this court has upheld a circuit court’s denial of a defendant’s discovery

request where that request went beyond the limited scope of post-

conviction proceedings and amounted to, in essence, a “fishing

expedition.” Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 415. A circuit court’s denial of a request for discovery in a postconviction proceeding will not be

reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 265.

	Upon review, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its

discretion in denying defendant’s discovery requests. Although

defendant claims that his discovery requests were narrow and

circumspect, we find that the requests amounted to nothing more

than a fishing expedition. Post-conviction proceedings are limited

to considerations of constitutional matters which have not been,

and could not have been, previously adjudicated. People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Here, the evidence requested by

defendant was known to exist at the time of trial, and the questions

regarding the evidence raised by defendant in support of his

discovery requests were all raised at defendant’s trial.

	For example, police officers testified and were cross-examined

concerning the chain of custody of the evidence in the case, as well as the chain of custody regarding the samples taken from

defendant. With regard to the testing of evidence, an employee of

the State Police crime lab testified that the State Police works on

a deferred examination system with regard to evidence, meaning

that when there is a lot of evidence in a case, the crime lab

examines the best evidence first, then tests additional evidence if

further testing is needed. In addition, Metzger testified and was

cross-examined concerning his destruction of the first samples in

this case, as well as his testing of the additional samples.

Defendant’s two expert witnesses criticized Metzger’s testing of

the DNA samples, including his destruction of the first samples.

Defendant’s experts also testified that Metzger’s results matching

defendant’s DNA to that of the perpetrator in the Stephens case

were not reliable.

	Defendant, however, denies that the discovery requests were

a fishing expedition, and argues that the discovery was necessary

in order for his post-conviction counsel to determine whether

defendant’s trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective.

Likewise, defendant argues that his post-conviction counsel could

not certify that they had made the necessary amendments to

defendant’s pro se post-conviction petition without the requested discovery. This, however, is exactly the sort of fishing expedition

that is not permitted in post-conviction proceedings.

	In support of his claim, defendant cites this court’s recent

decision in Fair. In Fair, the defendant was convicted of two murders and was sentenced to death. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 259. Following the defendant’s conviction, it was discovered that the

judge who had presided over the defendant’s trial and sentencing

had engaged in extensive criminal conduct and corruption during

the time before and after the defendant’s trial. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 260. This court held that the defendant was entitled to discovery

of evidence obtained by the Cook County State’s Attorney during

the investigation of the trial judge in order to establish a nexus

between the judge’s criminal conduct and the defendant’s trial.

Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 267. We noted that because the trial judge had pled guilty, all the evidence concerning the judge’s criminal

conduct was in the exclusive control of the State, and it would be

virtually impossible for the defendant to establish a nexus between the judge’s criminal conduct and the defendant’s trial without

access to that evidence. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 266.

	We find this case to be distinguishable from our decision in

Fair. As noted, the fact of the judge’s corruption in Fair was not discovered until some time after defendant had been convicted and

sentenced. Here, in contrast, all evidence sought by defendant in

his motion for DNA evidence and in his subpoenas was available

at the time of his trial. Defendant’s subpoenas and discovery

requests, then, went well beyond the limited scope of a post-

conviction proceeding and, therefore, were properly denied.

	Defendant also claims that the trial court’s decision in this case

was “contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of” an order this court

entered in People v. Enoch, Nos. 59390, 70254, 83298 cons.

(November 17, 1998). In the order, this court allowed the

defendant’s motion for stay of execution and remanded the cause

to the circuit court. In addition, the State was ordered to produce

the underlying data for DNA testing in the case and to provide

access to evidentiary material for independent testing.

	In defendant’s motion for reconsideration, he attached the

relevant pleadings from the Enoch case to establish the similarities

between that case and his case. We have reviewed the pleadings in

that case and disagree with defendant that his case is similar. In

Enoch’s case, DNA technology was not available, and thus was not

done, at the time of defendant’s trial. In addition, in late 1996,

defense counsel noted that a critical piece of evidence used against

the defendant at his 1983 trial, a bloodstained and sweat-stained

shirt, was missing a swatch of fabric from the underarm. The State

admitted that the swatch had been taken from the shirt before the

defendant’s 1983 trial, but denied the defendant’s request to

perform DNA tests on the sweat stains. The defendant’s counsel

had argued that the swatch of fabric constituted newly discovered

evidence supporting a claim of actual innocence.

	Here, in contrast to the Enoch case, DNA testing was

performed on the evidence at issue in defendant’s trial. Further, the

evidence requested by defendant in his motion to produce, in

contrast to the evidence at issue in People v. Enoch, was known to

exist at the time of defendant’s trial. Consequently, the trial court in this case did not violate the spirit of this court’s order in People

v. Enoch when it denied defendant’s discovery request.

	We note, however, that defendant suggests that the trial court

committed reversible error because it did not allow defense counsel

to investigate defendant’s claim that he is actually innocent. Claims

of actual innocence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act require

that the supporting evidence be “new, material, noncumulative and,

most importantly, ‘ “of such conclusive character” ’ as would

‘ “probably change the result on retrial”.’ “ People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996), quoting People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 368 (1987), quoting People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 134 (1984). Thus, in Washington, this court found that the defendant’s claim of newly discovered evidence could be raised in the

defendant’s post-conviction petition to entitle the defendant to a

new trial. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475. The newly discovered evidence was the affidavit of a woman who testified that she had

been present when her then boyfriend and a friend had shot the

victim and had fled to Mississippi for six years following the

murder. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 477.

	Although defendant in this case alleges that the evidence

requested in his discovery motions and subpoenas may go to a

claim of actual innocence, we note that none of the material sought

was new, material and noncumulative. Nor can we say that the

materials sought were of such conclusive character that it likely

would change the result upon retrial. Even though defendant

suggests problems with contamination of the second sample sent

to Metzger and suggests tampering with his blood sample, he

offers no evidence in support of these claims. Nor does defendant

establish how questions concerning Metzger’s methods and

qualifications would change the result upon retrial. As noted, two

expert witnesses testified at trial on behalf of defendant criticizing

Metzger’s methodology, qualifications and conclusions. Because

defendant has failed to show that his discovery requests were

necessary for the litigation of constitutional claims that were not

presented in the original proceedings, the trial court properly

denied those requests.

II. Testimony of Prosecution DNA Expert

	Defendant next contends that his amended petition for post-

conviction relief raised numerous Brady violations with regard to the testimony of David Metzger, the State’s DNA expert witness.

Defendant claims that the prosecution violated Brady where it: (1) permitted Metzger to testify falsely concerning his qualifications;

(2) suppressed evidence that Metzger had been reprimanded in the

past for sloppy or unprofessional work; and (3) suppressed

Metzger’s written statement to the Will County sheriff explaining

how he had destroyed the first DNA samples. These claims arise

from information contained within Metzger’s personnel file. Prior

to Metzger’s testimony, defendant had moved for the disclosure of

Metzger’s personnel file. The trial court reviewed Metzger’s

personnel file in camera, but stated that it found no impeaching information that required the file to be turned over to the defense.

The trial court stated, however, that it would impound the file and

include it in the record.

	Included within Metzger’s personnel file was information

regarding a disciplinary incident. Metzger had been charged by the

State Police with stealing a microscope in January 1995. In May

1995, Metzger entered into a settlement agreement with the State

Police, which provided that Metzger would receive a 100-day

suspension without pay, would perform 120 hours of community

service, would forfeit his accrued vacation time, and during the

period of his suspension, would contact the research and

development program coordinator each day by telephone and

would not access work facilities without an escort. Shortly after he

had returned to work following his suspension, Metzger testified

in this case.

	In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), the United States Supreme Court set forth the

government’s affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a

defendant. The general rule, as set forth in Brady, provides that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good

faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 218, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97. A defendant is not entitled to relief under Brady unless he can establish that the evidence improperly withheld was both favorable to the defense and

material.

	In this context, favorable evidence is material “only if there is

a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). A reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been

different is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 105 S. Ct. at 3383.

	With regard to defendant’s claim that Metzger testified falsely,

defendant claims that the materiality element of Brady is met where the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony. Specifically,

defendant contends that Metzger committed perjury when he

testified that he was a DNA research coordinator and had held that

title for the previous five years, and when he testified that he had

been continuously employed by the State Police for the previous 14

years. Defendant alleges that Metzger must have been demoted to

the position of DNA research coordinator, because the personnel

file showed that Metzger had held more senior positions, including

forensic science administrator and public service administrator,

shortly before he testified. In addition, defendant argues that

Metzger had not been continuously employed by the State Police

for the previous 14 years because he had just returned to work

following a 100-day suspension.

	It is well established that the State’s knowing use of perjured

testimony in order to obtain a criminal conviction constitutes a

violation of due process of law. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 345 (1997). If there is any reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the jury’s verdict, a conviction

obtained through the knowing use of perjured testimony must be

set aside. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, citing People v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 491-92, 105 S. Ct. 3375,

3381-82 (1985). Likewise, where the State allows false testimony

to go uncorrected, the same principles apply. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173 (1959). However, the State’s obligation to correct

false testimony does not amount to an obligation to impeach its

witnesses with any and all evidence bearing upon their credibility. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 312-14 (1997).

	Contrary to defendant’s claim, we find no evidence in the

record that Metzger committed perjury when he testified that he

had been a DNA research coordinator for the past five years.

Although defendant notes that Metzger held the titles of forensic

science administrator and public service administrator prior to

testifying in this case, we note that the job descriptions of both

positions were virtually identical, providing in relevant part that

Metzger “coordinates statewide integration of genetic marker (DNA) technology into the forensic serology program; [and] coordinates research efforts conducted by other forensic scientists within the specialty area.” (Emphases added.) It is clear from

Metzger’s job description, then, that he was, in fact, a DNA

research coordinator. The fact that Metzger testified to his job

description rather than to his job title did not amount to perjury.

	Likewise, there is no evidence in the record that Metzger had

been demoted prior to testifying in this case. In fact, in connection

with the disciplinary incident, the Director of Central Management

Services for the State of Illinois sent Metzger a notice of approval

of written charges dated May 19, 1995. That notice had spaces to

be marked if discharge, demotion or suspension were part of the

settlement agreement. Although there was a mark in front of the

space for suspension, there were no marks in front of the spaces

for discharge or demotion.

	We likewise find no evidence that Metzger testified falsely

when he stated that he had been continuously employed by the

State Police for the previous 14 years. As noted above, the notice

of approval of charges established that defendant had been

suspended, but had not been discharged or demoted. We do not

equate a suspension with a termination, and thus cannot say that

Metzger committed perjury when he said that he had 14 years’

continuous employment with the State Police. Absent any evidence

of perjury then, defendant has failed to establish a Brady violation with regard to Metzger’s testimony concerning his qualifications.

	Defendant’s next claim with regard to Metzger’s testimony is

that the State violated Brady because Metzger did not testify concerning the terms of his settlement with the State Police.

Defendant argues that the terms of the settlement agreement were

both favorable to the defense and material. Defendant claims that

the evidence was material because there is a reasonable likelihood

“that the suppressed evidence that David Metzger was dishonored

and punished by the [State Police], and is a thief, could have

affected the outcome.” Defendant contends that the evidence also

was favorable because that evidence could have been used to

impeach Metzger. Defendant maintains that the evidence at issue

would have shown Metzger’s bias in favor of the government

because Metzger’s natural bent would have favored law

enforcement, which would have been heightened because he would

have viewed his testimony against defendant as an opportunity to

make amends for his misconduct.

	Although defendant attributes great weight to Metzger’s theft

of the microscope and the possibility that Metzger’s settlement

with the State would establish his bias against defendant, we find

that any connection between Metzger’s actions and his testimony

against defendant to be tenuous at best. This court has previously

found that any connection between Metzger’s theft of a state-

owned microscope and a DNA analysis prepared two years prior

to the theft was too remote and speculative to be used to impeach

Metzger. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998).

	Here, the State Police brought administrative charges against

Metzger for an incident that occurred in January 1995, and the

settlement agreement was entered into in May 1995. Metzger

testified that he received the additional DNA samples in this case

on October 23, 1992, and ran tests on those samples which

indicated that an unknown assailant had committed the crimes. On

April 15, 1993, Metzger received blood samples from defendant.

Metzger then determined that defendant’s DNA matched that of

Heather Stephens’ assailant. Metzger testified in defendant’s case

in October 1995.

	Although Metzger testified in this case after he had completed

his suspension period with the State Police, his testimony was

based upon a DNA analysis completed two years before the disciplinary action regarding the microscope. Consequently, we fail

to see what incentive Metzger would have to fabricate DNA

evidence based upon disciplinary proceedings that had not yet

occurred. As in Bull, evidence concerning Metzger’s settlement agreement was too remote and uncertain to be used to impeach

Metzger. Accordingly, that evidence was neither material nor

favorable to defendant. Defendant, therefore, has failed to establish

a Brady violation with regard to that evidence.

	Similarly, we find that defendant’s other Brady claims are not supported by the record. Defendant alleges that the State

suppressed evidence that Metzger had been reprimanded in the past

concerning sloppy or unprofessional work, suppressed evidence

that Metzger was not certified in the use of DNA methodology

when he began work in this case, and suppressed Metzger’s

statement explaining how he had destroyed the original DNA

evidence in the case. Defendant argues that the suppression of all

this evidence violated Brady because the prosecution’s ability to convict defendant of capital murder depended upon its ability to

convince the jury that Metzger was believable.

	The reprimand for sloppy and unprofessional work, however,

appears to be related to the destruction of the first DNA samples

in this case. That reprimand, then, would be neither material nor

favorable under Brady, as defendant’s trial counsel knew that the evidence had been destroyed. Defendant’s trial counsel cross-

examined Metzger concerning his destruction of the evidence. In

addition, defendant’s expert witnesses were critical of Metzger’s

destruction of the evidence in their testimony. Consequently, we

cannot say that had the reprimand been disclosed, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.

	Likewise, there is no evidence to support defendant’s claim

that Metzger was not certified in DNA methodology before he

began work in this case. In fact, Metzger testified on cross-

examination that he started doing DNA case work at the Illinois

State Police crime lab in August of 1992. When questioned

concerning whether he had taken a proficiency test prior to

conducting the DNA testing in this case, Metzger said that he had

taken such a test prior to August 1992, and explained that he knew

he had taken such a test because he “wouldn’t have been allowed to do DNA analysis unless I’m certified.” The portion of Metzger’s

personnel file cited by defendant in support of his claim that

Metzger was not DNA certified is date stamped June 2, 1992, and

states that “Mr. Metzger is working on becoming certified in DNA

methods.” As this document is dated prior to August 1992, we fail

to see how it could have been used to impeach Metzger.

	Finally, with regard to defendant’s claim that the State

suppressed Metzger’s written statement to the Will County sheriff

explaining how he had destroyed the first DNA sample, the State

responds that there is no evidence that such a document exists.

Reference to a written statement appears in Metzger’s handwritten

notes, which stated that the Will County sheriff wanted him to

provide a written explanation for the destruction of evidence.

There is no evidence, however, that Metzger ever actually wrote

the letter. In any event, such a letter merely would have been

cumulative of the evidence at defendant’s trial. As the State

observed, Metzger testified at trial that the first DNA samples in

this case were destroyed when he left them in restrictive enzyme

too long. Defense counsel cross-examined Metzger concerning the

destruction of evidence, and defendant’s expert witnesses criticized

Metzger’s actions. While we agree with the State that there is no

evidence that Metzger ever wrote the letter, we note that because

the letter, if written, would have been cumulative of the evidence

at trial, such evidence was neither material nor favorable under

Brady.

	Defendant raises three additional issues with regard to

Metzger’s personnel file. Defendant claims that: (1) he was denied

the effective assistance of counsel when his lawyers were denied

access to those files; (2) he was denied his right to present a

defense when his attorneys were denied access to Metzger’s

personnel file; and (3) he was denied his right to confront witnesses

in violation of the Illinois Constitution and the United States

Constitution when his attorneys were denied access to his

personnel file.

	As noted, this court has had an opportunity to address

Metzger’s misconduct as to the microscope vis-a-vis his testimony in a criminal case. In People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), Metzger also testified as the prosecution’s DNA expert. On direct appeal of the defendant’s conviction and death sentence in that

case, defendant argued that he had been denied a fair trial because

the trial court had barred cross-examination of Metzger concerning

his disciplinary record with the State Police. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 205. The disciplinary record concerned the same incident at issue

in this case, Metzger’s theft of a State Police microscope and the

subsequent settlement agreement. There, as here, the defendant

argued that Metzger’s disciplinary record established his motive to

testify falsely or to embellish his testimony to please the State

Police because he remained under a cloud of disgrace and had

perilous job security, so that he would be strongly motivated to

testify falsely in a biased manner in defense of his performance.

Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 206. The defendant claimed he had the right to cross-examine Metzger regarding his biases, interests or motives

to testify falsely. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 206.

	This court agreed with the trial court that Metzger’s

disciplinary record would have been inadmissible to impeach him,

noting that the record was too speculative and remote to infer that

Metzger had something to gain or lose by his testimony. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 207. Metzger had completed and reported his DNA

analysis two years before the disciplinary event, and testified one

year after the event. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 207. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in barring the cross-examination of Metzger

concerning his disciplinary record. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 207.

	Following Bull, this court again addressed a defendant’s right to cross-examine a State expert witness with regard to the theft of

a state-owned microscope. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592 (2000). In Sims, the State’s DNA expert, Phillip Sallee, entered into a predisciplinary agreement with the State Police in connection with

his theft of a state-owned microscope. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 624. Like Metzger, Sallee’s agreement required him to perform

community service, to be suspended from work without pay, and

to forfeit vacation benefits. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 624. The circuit court granted the State’s motion in limine to bar evidence of the predisciplinary agreement. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 624. The defendant argued that because Sallee was performing DNA testing in his case

at the time that he was the subject of disciplinary proceedings,

Sallee “had a motive to curry favor with his employer by giving results favorable to the State’s case.” Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 626. The defendant therefore argued that the circuit court erred when it

barred him from impeaching Sallee with evidence of the

predisciplinary agreement. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 624.

	This court affirmed the circuit court’s order granting the

motion in limine, noting that any incentive on Sallee’s part to fabricate DNA evidence because of his disciplinary proceedings

was remote and uncertain. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 627-28. We noted:

		“Defendant’s contention is that Sallee had a motive to

fabricate DNA results which implicated defendant because at

the time of the DNA testing, Sallee was facing disciplinary

proceedings in the State Police crime lab. For this contention

to be correct, a number of assumptions would have to be true.

For example, it would have to be assumed that, having been

discovered stealing microscopes and with his livelihood in

jeopardy, Sallee’s immediate reaction would be to start

fabricating evidence in a case which he was currently working

on; that Sallee would begin fabricating evidence, with all the

attendant risks of doing so, even though he did not yet know

whether defendant’s case would be tried, or whether some

other disposition, such as defendant pleading guilty or being

exonerated by other evidence, would occur; that Sallee would

risk fabricating evidence even though he did not yet know if

he would, in fact, be called to testify at defendant’s trial; that

he would risk fabricating evidence even though by doing so,

he would be helping only the prosecutors in St. Clair County,

who would have no control or ‘leverage’ over the disciplinary

proceedings in the crime lab in Springfield; and that he would

risk fabricating evidence as a means of lessening his

administrative discipline even though the crime lab might

reasonably be expected to be concerned about its reputation

and integrity, and, therefore, might not look favorably upon

one of its employee’s fabricating evidence.” Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 627.

	Similar assumptions have to be true in this case in order to

establish a connection between the theft of the microscope and

Metzger’s DNA analysis. Moreover, in contrast to Sims, where Sallee was performing DNA testing at the time he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings, Metzger prepared his DNA analysis two

years prior to his testimony in defendant’s case, rendering the

likelihood that Metzger would fabricate evidence even more

uncertain and remote. For that same reason, defendant’s attempt

to distinguish Bull on the ground that Metzger testified in this case shortly after he had returned to work following his suspension,

fails. Even if Metzger testified in this case shortly after he returned

to work following his suspension, his testimony was based upon an

analysis prepared more than two years prior to his theft of the

microscope.

	Defendant also attempts to distinguish Bull and Sims on the grounds that: (1) the evidence in this case was not overwhelming;

and (2) Metzger had destroyed the first DNA sample during

testing. Neither factor, however, renders the connection between

Metzger’s DNA analysis and his disciplinary incident any less

speculative or remote. For that reason, we find that defendant was

not denied an opportunity to present a defense or to cross-examine

a witness when his attorneys were denied access to Metzger’s

personnel file. It further follows that defendant was not denied the

effective assistance of counsel when his attorneys were not

permitted to review the personnel file.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

	Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel because his trial attorney failed to

conduct an adequate investigation into mitigation evidence and

failed to develop mitigation evidence sufficient to preclude

imposition of the death penalty.

	Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the

standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To establish a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant first must establish

that his counsel’s performance was so deficient that his

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Once a defendant establishes that his counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he also must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. With regard to mitigating evidence,

defense counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation into

the mitigating evidence he will present at a defendant’s capital

sentencing hearing, or he must have a sound reason for failing to

make a particular investigation. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 541 (1999). Nonetheless, courts reviewing trial counsel’s decisions

regarding the presentation of mitigating evidence are highly

deferential. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 513-14 (1998).

	Strategic choices made by defense counsel following a

thorough investigation into the law and facts relevant to a

defendant’s plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 514. Thus, an informed decision by defense counsel

not to present certain mitigating evidence can be a valid strategic

choice, entitled to judicial deference, where the evidence

potentially is damaging to the defendant. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 514. Where the lack of mitigating evidence presented at a defendant’s

trial is not attributable to strategy, but instead to counsel’s failure

to properly investigate mitigating evidence and to prepare a

defense, such deference is not warranted. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 514.

	At the second stage of defendant’s death penalty hearing in

this case, the State presented evidence in aggravation that

defendant began sexually abusing his stepdaughter, Michelle

Adermann, when she was nine years old. The sexual abuse

continued until Michelle was 17 years old. Defendant also

attempted to sexually abuse his other stepdaughter, Christine

Adermann. Both Christine and Michelle told the officer

investigating the sexual abuse that defendant had a violent temper.

David Hickey, defendant’s son and the half brother of Christine and

Michelle, also told the officer that defendant had a violent temper

and frequently threatened Michelle. Defendant was arrested for the

offense of criminal sexual assault based upon the incident with

Michelle, and pled guilty to a felony count of sexual assault. On

cross-examination, the officer said that defendant had admitted

having a sexual relationship with Michelle, but had claimed that

Michelle had initiated sexual intercourse twice because she was being grounded. The State also introduced evidence that defendant

had a prior burglary conviction.

	Harold Barnes, a social worker, testified on defendant’s behalf

at the sentencing hearing. Barnes had been retained by defense

counsel to investigate mitigating evidence in defendant’s case. In

connection with that investigation, Barnes interviewed 16 members

of defendant’s family and 21 neighbors and friends of defendant.

Barnes testified that defendant was the fourth of six children born

to Chester and Opal Hickey. When defendant was three years old,

he was stricken with polio and had to wear a brace on one leg for

two years. When defendant was around seven years of age, his

mother began suffering nervous breakdowns and was hospitalized

on a number of occasions. Defendant received poor to average

grades and dropped out of school in high school.

	Defendant was active in the Nazarene church during his

adolescence. Defendant fell in love, got married and had two

children, but eventually divorced because his wife was unfaithful.

Sometime after his divorce, defendant began working for a salvage

company. While working for that company, defendant and a man

named William Conner both fell into a well. Because Conner was

stunned as a result of the fall, defendant held onto Conner until

help arrived and they were rescued.

	Barnes said that defendant was convicted of burglary in 1978

and served seven months of confinement. During that time, he was

a model prisoner. Barnes testified that everyone felt that defendant

had learned from his mistakes. Sometime after he was released

from prison, defendant married Linda Adermann and treated her

three minor children as his own. Linda eventually left defendant,

and left her children behind in defendant’s care.

	Defendant was sentenced to the Illinois Department of

Corrections in 1992 for the sexual assault of Michelle Adermann.

During his incarceration, defendant received only one ticket for

breaking rules, when he was late for a class. Barnes explained that

this was “incredible” because penal institutions have so many rules.

Barnes testified that he had done an exhaustive search of

defendant’s background and found nothing to suggest violent

behavior on defendant’s part.

	Defendant’s younger sister, Diana Clover, also testified on

defendant’s behalf. Diana testified that defendant supported Linda

Adermann’s children financially and cared for them after Linda left

him. Diana said that she currently was caring for Christine

Adermann and David Hickey and said that both children loved their

father.

	Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to contact any professionals, such as school personnel,

social service personnel, or psychological experts, and in failing to

obtain defendant’s medical records, school records, social service

records or prison records. Defendant claims that school records

would have revealed that defendant was a poor student, not an

average student. In addition, the records would have revealed that

defendant suffered from hearing and speech impairments.

Defendant further claims that the mental illness of defendant’s

mother and the physically abusive environment in which he was

raised were grossly minimized. Defendant also contends that there

was evidence that defendant suffers from neurological deficits and

is borderline retarded. Defendant argues that evidence concerning

his neurological and mental deficits would have diminished

defendant’s culpability for his crimes.

	Defendant argues that his trial counsel also was ineffective for

failing to present evidence concerning the risk of defendant’s future

dangerousness. Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel should

have asked William Conner to testify that defendant had saved his

life. Defendant claims that but for counsel’s failure to introduce the

foregoing testimony, the outcome of defendant’s capital sentencing

hearing would have been different.

	In support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to present mitigating evidence, defendant attached two

affidavits to his amended post-conviction petition. The first

affidavit was from Alice Washington, a forensic social worker

employed by the State Appellate Defender’s office. Washington

testified that defense counsel “seriously minimized the mental

illness” of defendant’s mother, noting that defendant’s sister once

observed her mother eat wallpaper off the wall. In addition,

Washington stated that both of defendant’s parents were extremely

abusive. Washington also stated that defendant was a poor student who was socially promoted from second through eighth grade, and

that he had hearing and speech impairments. Washington further

claimed that defendant’s medical records revealed that defendant

had symptoms that were consistent with post-polio syndrome,

which can have a profound physical and neurological impact.

Finally, Washington stated that defendant had been examined by

Dr. Harry Gunn, and was found to have a full scale IQ of 73, which

is borderline retarded.

	The second affidavit attached to defendant’s post-conviction

petition was the affidavit of Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D., a clinical

and forensic psychologist. Cunningham stated that “important

perspectives” regarding defendant’s risk of violence in prison could

have been presented at his sentencing hearing. Cunningham based

the violence risk assessment on actuarial data that capital offenders

have a low rate of institutional violence. In addition, defendant had

multiple factors which would be expected to reduce his prison

violence risk. These factors included his age, his prior adaptation

to prison, the absence of violent disciplinary write-ups during his

incarceration, the absence of prison gang involvement, and his

continued relationship with his family. Cunningham opined that

defendant’s violence risk assessment could have been critically

important mitigating evidence.

	Based upon the information contained within the affidavits of

Washington and Cunningham, defendant argues that this case is

similar to People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999). In Morgan, this court held that defense counsel’s failure to investigate and

present mitigating evidence failed to satisfy the reasonably

objective standard of Strickland and that the deficient performance of defense counsel was so prejudicial that the defendant was denied

a fair sentencing hearing. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d at 548-49.

	Defense counsel in Morgan was told of the defendant’s seizures and related medical problems shortly after counsel was

retained. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d at 542. In his opening statement during the defendant’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel told the

court he would present evidence regarding medical problems the

defendant had suffered and still suffered. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d at 542. The defendant attached affidavits to his post-conviction

petition indicating that defense counsel had not contacted the affiants during trial and never asked defendant’s family for

potential mitigating evidence or witnesses. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d at 543. Defense counsel also failed to inquire about defendant’s

family history, which showed defendant’s abusive and violent

childhood. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d at 543. In finding that defense counsel’s conduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we

noted that the trial judge indicated that his sentence was clearly

influenced by the lack of evidence in mitigation. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d at 549.

	We find this case to be distinguishable from Morgan. Here, Barnes interviewed 16 members of defendant’s family and 21

neighbors and friends of defendant during his investigation into

mitigating evidence. Contrary to defendant’s claim that defense

counsel did not present evidence that defendant did poorly in

school, we note that Barnes did testify that defendant was a poor

to average student and dropped out of school entirely in high

school.

	Nor do we agree that defense counsel “seriously minimized the

mental illness” of defendant’s mother. Barnes testified that

defendant’s mother began having nervous breakdowns when

defendant was seven, and was hospitalized several times as a result

of those nervous breakdowns. Although defense counsel did not

present evidence suggesting that defendant’s parents were abusive,

we note that evidence of a defendant’s turbulent childhood is not

inherently mitigating. People v. Montgomery, 192 Ill. 2d 642, 673 (2000). A sentencing authority might regard such evidence as

aggravating, especially if the evidence suggests that the defendant

might present a danger in the future. Montgomery, 192 Ill. 2d at 673. Further, the jury was told that defendant had saved the life of

William Connor. Connor’s testimony in this regard, then, would

have been cumulative. See People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 248 (1995) (counsel not ineffective for failing to introduce cumulative

testimony).

	In addition, nothing in the record suggests that defense

counsel was aware or should have been aware that defendant may

have suffered brain damage or “post-polio syndrome.” There is no

evidence to suggest that defense counsel was aware at the

sentencing hearing that defendant may have suffered brain damage. Defendant never made any claim that he was mentally ill or insane

at the time of the crimes. Moreover, we find defendant’s reliance

on Washington’s affidavit to be misplaced. Washington, who was

not a medical doctor, stated that “[a] review of [defendant’s]

medical records (which the defense did not obtain) and an

interview with [defendant] reveal symptoms which are consistent

with Post-Polio Syndrome. The late effects of polio can have a

profound physical and neurological impact.” Washington also

claimed that defendant had been examined by Dr. Harry Gunn, a

psychologist, and had achieved a full scale IQ of 73, which is

borderline retarded. The State responds that post-polio syndrome

is a muscular problem, not a neurological problem.

	Washington’s affidavit is speculative at best. As noted, she

was not a medical doctor and thus was not qualified to determine

whether defendant had a neurological problem. In addition, we

observe that in the report prepared by Dr. Gunn, Dr. Gunn clarifies

that with regard to defendant’s IQ test, “there are questions about

the validity since [defendant] had only one free hand.” Given the

speculative nature of Washington’s affidavit, as well as the fact that

defendant never placed his sanity or mental condition at issue, we

cannot say that defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to pursue evidence that defendant may have suffered some type of

brain damage or post-polio syndrome.

	We also have examined the reports of Dr. William Adair and

Jonathan Hess, a clinical neuropsychologist, which were attached

to defendant’s motion to reconsider. We find nothing in these

reports to suggest that defendant’s trial counsel should have

investigated or presented evidence of defendant’s possible brain

damage. “A sentence will not be vacated on speculation of what a

mental examination may have revealed, when the defendant failed

to raise the issue of his mental condition.” Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d at 252.

	Finally, we find no evidence to support defendant’s claim that

his counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence regarding

the risk of defendant’s future dangerousness. The affidavit of Mark

Cunningham was prepared approximately three years after

defendant was sentenced. Although defendant maintains that the

information contained within Cunningham’s affidavit was based upon data available at the time of defendant’s sentencing, we

cannot say that counsel was ineffective in failing to gather such

“actuarial data.” In any event, defense counsel did introduce

evidence that defendant was a model prisoner when he served time

on his burglary conviction and had received only one ticket since

his 1992 incarceration, which was “incredible.” Barnes also

testified that he had done an exhaustive search of defendant’s

background and found nothing to suggest that defendant was

violent. Nonetheless, the jury apparently found that defendant’s

good behavior in prison did not offset the aggravating factors. It is

well established that a defendant’s good behavior in prison is

insufficient to offset the aggravating evidence against the

defendant. People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 495 (2000).

	We find nothing in the record to establish that defendant’s trial

counsel was ineffective with regard to the mitigating evidence

presented on behalf of defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did

not err in dismissing this claim without an evidentiary hearing.

IV. Defendant’s Absence from a Portion of Juror Deliberations

	Defendant next claims that he was denied his constitutional

right to due process, to the effective assistance of counsel, and his

right to a reliable sentencing hearing, under the fifth, sixth, eighth

and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.

Const., amends. V, VI, VIII and XIV), because he was not present

in court when the trial jury sent out five notes during its

deliberations. In the notes, the jury requested numerous items of

evidence. The trial court’s written response to the notes did not

address some of the requested items and, with regard to other

items, told the jury that the items were not evidence and that the

jury should recall the testimony concerning those items. In

addition, with regard to requests for witness testimony, the trial

court told the jury that no transcripts were available. Defendant

contends that he could have had some input into the nature of the

communication with the jury, so that his absence from the

courtroom violated his constitutional rights.

	A criminal defendant has a general right to be present at every

stage of his trial. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 201 (1998). However, the situations where a defendant’s rights under the

Illinois and the United States Constitutions are violated due to the

denial of his right to be present at every stage of his trial are

limited. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 201. It is only where the defendant’s absence results in the denial of an underlying substantial right that

error is committed. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 201. Thus, defendant’s right to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United

States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) would be

implicated only where the defendant’s absence resulted in the

denial of a fair and just trial. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 201.

	A defendant, then, “ ‘is guaranteed the right to be present at

any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome

if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ “

People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 83 (1990), quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987). Consequently, if it does not appear that a

defendant’s absence resulted in an unfair trial, a defendant’s

constitutional rights were not violated by his absence. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 83.

	Although defendant claims that he could have had some

“input” into the nature of the communication with the jury,

defendant has not alleged or established how his absence from the

courtroom when the jury sent out five notes denied him a fair and

just trial. As in Bean, “[d]efendant’s argument is based on broad principles and is not adapted to the specifics of this case.” Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 84. We find nothing in the record indicating that

defendant’s presence would have contributed to the fairness of the

procedure. Because the fairness of defendant’s trial was not

affected by defendant’s absence from this portion of the trial,

defendant was not denied his due process rights.

V. Death Penalty Instructions

	Finally, defendant claims error with regard to the jury

instructions submitted at his trial. Defendant claims that those

instructions were unconstitutionally vague and confusing, in

violation of his right to due process. Defendant further claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his trial

attorneys failed to tender alternative jury instructions.

	In support of this claim, defendant cites studies conducted by

Professor Hans Zeisel and by Professor Shari Diamond, which

purported to test the ability of potential jurors to comprehend

Illinois death penalty instructions. Defendant concedes that this

court previously has found that the conclusions of both Professor

Zeisel and Professor Diamond did not establish that the Illinois

death penalty instructions were constitutionally infirm. See People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 93 (1998); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1996). Defendant also concedes that this court

previously has declined to reconsider its views concerning the

Zeisler and the Diamond studies. See Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30; People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 468 (1998). Nonetheless, defendant has asked this court to reconsider the Illinois death

penalty instructions in light of the recent renewed concerns

regarding the procedural safeguards in place with regard to the

imposition of death.

	We decline the invitation to reconsider our views concerning

the Zeisler and Diamond studies. Aside from raising general

concerns about procedural safeguards surrounding the imposition

of the death penalty, which this court has addressed in its

comprehensive new rules governing capital cases, defendant has

failed to set forth any argument persuading this court to reexamine

its views concerning the Zeisler and Diamond studies.

	Defendant also makes a related claim that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel where his trial attorneys did not

tender alternative jury instructions. As noted, to establish that

counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant must show that

counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the

counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Defendant argues

that his trial counsel was ineffective in accepting jury instructions

which half of tested subjects misunderstood, and further argues

that had his counsel tendered alternative instructions, the result of

his sentencing hearing would have been different.

	We disagree. As discussed, this court has rejected the studies

concluding that half of the tested subjects misunderstood the death penalty instructions. Consequently, defense counsel was not

deficient in failing to tender alternative jury instructions.

NEW SUPREME COURT RULES

	As a final matter, we address the issues raised in the dissents.

The Chief Justice, in his dissent, makes the dire statement that the

system for capital punishment has collapsed. While we certainly are

aware of those cases in which a defendant had been convicted and

sentenced to death, but later was exonerated and released from

prison, we do not infer from these cases that the entire system has

collapsed. The Governor declared a moratorium on future

executions after several death row defendants were exonerated.

We do not infer from the moratorium, however, that every capital

trial has been unreliable and that all appellate review has been

haphazard.

	Chief Justice Harrison, also contends that this case illustrates

the shortcomings of the system because the DNA evidence used to

convict defendant was of dubious validity. Citing this court’s

opinion on direct appeal, Chief Justice Harrison notes that the

“quality assurance standards of the laboratory were questionable. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 271 [hereinafter Hickey I].” Slip op. at 3567 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). He further notes that the “discovery of

additional samples raised suspicions” and that “[v]irtually all of the

samples had degraded or were of poor quality. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 272.” Slip op. at 3675 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).

	Taking the Chief Justice’s dissent at face value, the

uninformed reader might justifiably assume that, in Hickey I, this court made affirmative findings as to the “dubious validity”of the

DNA evidence. Indeed, the Chief Justice supports his assertion as

to the “dubious validity” of this evidence with pinpoint citations to Hickey I. What the Chief Justice fails to point out, however, is that the cited portions of Hickey I come not from this court’s holding but rather straight from the mouths of defendants’ experts. See

Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 271-72. The Chief Justice conveniently ignores the portions of Hickey I summarizing the State’s expert witness, who testified that the Illinois State Police laboratory procedures and protocol were scientifically valid and that there was no evidence of degradation of the DNA in this case. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 270-71.

	Given the conflicting expert testimony as to the quality of the

DNA evidence, the issue became one for the jury to decide.

Indeed, this court noted as much in addressing defendant’s claim

that the trial court should have held a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), holding that the issues defendant raised concerning the caliber of Metzger’s work,

“including laboratory protocol and the manner in which it was

followed, the various quality control and quality assurance

measures which Metzger employed, and the possible contamination

or degradation of the DNA samples,” go to the weight of that

evidence. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 279. In convicting defendant, the trial jury, as the trier of fact, apparently found the testimony of the

State’s expert witnesses to be more credible than the testimony of

defendant’s expert witnesses, a finding which this court affirmed on

direct appeal. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice now relies upon the

testimony of the defendant’s trial experts as providing factual

support for the reversal of defendant’s conviction.

	We recognize that Chief Justice Harrison strongly and

sincerely disagrees with the majority’s conclusion concerning

retroactive application of the new supreme court rules. The

strength of that conviction, however, hardly justifies a conscious

effort to pass off the controverted testimony of certain defense

experts as the official position of this court.

	That said, throughout the years, this court and the General

Assembly have worked to include additional safeguards to the

many protections awarded a criminal defendant. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 216. To that end, this court recently adopted a comprehensive

set of new rules governing capital cases. The Chief Justice

interprets these rules as establishing “[a] new, irreducible

standard,” such that any conviction obtained prior to the adoption

of the rules cannot stand. Slip op. at 387 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).

Under that analysis, the failure to follow the new rules establishes

a per se constitutional violation warranting relief under the Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 (West 1998)). The problem with this

interpretation is that if we were to assume that a violation of the

new rules amounted to a per se constitutional violation entitling a defendant to post-conviction relief, then we would have to assume

the converse to be true: that adherence to the new rules would

preclude post-conviction relief because a defendant could not show

a constitutional violation. This conclusion is contrary to both the

spirit and the letter of the Act.

	Both dissents find that the new rules are of such constitutional

magnitude that retroactive application of the rules is required. The

Chief Justice states that the new rules “are so essential to the

fairness and accuracy of capital cases” that any conviction obtained

under the old rules cannot stand. Slip op. at 397 (Harrison, C.J.,

dissenting). Likewise, Justice Kilbride concludes that the new rules

“establish a watershed rule of criminal procedure” which “implicate

the fundamental fairness and the accuracy of a trial.” Slip op. at 39-

410-4138 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). These conclusions, however, are at

odds with the rules themselves, which provide that the new rules

are immediately effective, “except when in the opinion of the trial,

Appellate, or Supreme Court the application of the amended

provisions in a particular case pending at the time the amendment

becomes effective would not be feasible or would work an

injustice, in which case former procedures would apply.” See 188

Ill. 2d Rs. 411, 412, 416, 417. If the new rules in fact were of the

constitutional magnitude proposed by dissents, the new rules

would not, and indeed could not, contain a provision allowing a

court, in its discretion, to apply the former rules. Quite simply, the

positions taken by the dissents are at odds with the plain language

of the new rules.

	Nonetheless, based upon the dissents’ findings that the new

rules set a new constitutional standard, the dissents conclude that

because the new rules had not been enacted at the time of

defendant’s conviction and sentencing, defendant’s conviction and

sentence must be vacated, and the cause must be remanded “for a

new trial in conformity with our new rules.” Slip op. at 4037

(Harrison, C.J., dissenting). In fact, the Chief Justice would have

this court vacate all convictions in capital cases which were

obtained prior to March 1, 2001, the effective date of the new

rules. Such a result was never intended by this court in adopting

the rules.

	The new rules governing capital cases create rules of

procedure. The safeguards set forth in the new rules are broader

than the constitutional rights they protect. A violation of

procedures designed to secure constitutional rights should not be

equated with a denial of those constitutional rights. This court

could decide to repeal the new rules, or we could further amend

the rules to delete some provisions and to add others, something

we could not do if those rules established constitutional rights. The

new rules do not set a constitutional standard. Alleged violations

of rules of procedure which do not violate a defendant’s

constitutional rights do not warrant post-conviction relief. People v. Hangsleben, 43 Ill. 2d 236, 238 (1969).

	As noted, in order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must demonstrate a substantial deprivation of federal or

state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the

challenged conviction or sentence. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999); 725 ILCS 5/122–1 (West 1998). In affirming defendant’s conviction, we have found that defendant did not

suffer a deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights. It is

well settled that post-conviction relief is impossible if no

constitutional right is implicated in the claim asserted. People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 486 (1996). The Chief Justice concludes that the defendant is entitled to a new trial because he

“was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new

rules” (slip op. at 4037 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting)) but does not

point to any deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in

defendant’s trial, conviction and sentence that mandate post-

conviction relief. Thus, even if we were to agree with the Chief

Justice that the new rules apply to post-conviction cases pending

at the time the rules became effective, defendant nonetheless would

not be entitled to post-conviction relief because he has not shown

that he suffered a substantial deprivation of federal or state

constitutional rights.

	As noted, in order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must demonstrate a substantial deprivation of federal or

state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the

challenged conviction or sentence. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999); 725 ILCS 5/122–1 (West 1998). In affirming defendant’s conviction, we have found that defendant did not

suffer a deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights. It is

well settled that post-conviction relief is impossible if no

constitutional right is implicated in the claim asserted. People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 486 (1996). The Chief Justice concludes that the defendant is entitled to a new trial because he

“was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new

rules” (slip op. at 40 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting)) but does not

point to any deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in

defendant’s trial, conviction and sentence that mandate post-

conviction relief. Thus, even if we were to agree with the Chief

Justice that the new rules apply to post-conviction cases pending

at the time the rules became effective, defendant nonetheless would

not be entitled to post-conviction relief because he has not shown

that he suffered a substantial deprivation of federal or state

constitutional rights.

	In support of his proposition that the new rules establish a

“watershed rule of criminal procedure,” Justice Kilbride cites the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 356-57, 109 S. Ct. 1060,

1076 (1989).   However, that our new rules “establish a watershed

rule of criminal procedure” is not, under Teague, the linchpin of retroactivity. In Teague, the United States Supreme Court held that decisions establishing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on

collateral review unless the new rule either (i) places certain kinds

of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the

criminal-law-making authority to proscribe, or (ii) requires the

observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of

ordered liberty. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 353, 109 S. Ct. At 1073. This court has adopted the Teague test. See People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990).

	As noted, the new rules of this court are not of constitutional

dimension in and of themselves. They function solely as devices to

further protect those rights given to defendants by the federal and

state constitutions, such as, for example, the right to counsel and

the right to a fair trial. Our new rules were designed to help remedy

some of the problems that were perceived to be the root cause of

past erroneous convictions. For example, most reversals occur

because of (i) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (ii)

prosecutorial misconduct which deprives a defendant of a fair trial,

and (iii) trial judge error. Recognizing this, this court adopted rules designed to minimize these problems in future. These rules

therefore help to avoid future reversals based on instances of

constitutionally incompetent representation and improper

prosecutorial conduct, among other things. Notwithstanding the

promulgation of these rules, errors will occur. These errors may

well require reversal–not because the rules themselves were

violated–but because certain fundamental constitutional violations

occurred. It is the departure from constitutional principles that

make a criminal proceeding unreliable, not failure to observe rules

of this court. For this reason, we do not believe that the rules can

or should be viewed as constitutional such as to implicate a Teague analysis.

	Moreover, Justice Kilbride states that Rule 714, which

imposes standards on attorneys who will appear in capital trials,

“implicitly eliminates a defendant’s right to proceed pro se in a capital trial, effectively overruling People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995).” According to Justice Kilbride, this fact is reason alone

to find that the new rules are “of significant constitutional

dimension” Slip op. at 401 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). Justice Kilbride

further maintains that, contrary to Coleman, capital defendants do not enjoy the right to self-representation.

	The United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), held that

the right to counsel provided by the sixth amendment (U.S. Const.,

amend. VI) includes within it the right to self-representation in

criminal trials. In addition, a criminal defendant has a constitutional

right to refuse state-provided counsel if the choice to proceed on

his or her own is made intelligently and voluntarily.   Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 573-74, 95 S. Ct. at 2534. In Illinois,

our state constitution provides similar protections to defendants

and likewise protects a defendant’s right to self-representation.

This court has rejected the notion of forcing a capital defendant

who elects to proceed pro se to be represented by counsel. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995). In so holding, we cited expressly to Faretta. To hold, as the dissent would, that Rule 714 overrules Coleman would call into question the legitimacy of Faretta. As this court stated in People v. Simpson, Nos. 85084, 86926 cons. (September 71327, 2001), slip op. at 29, “the new rules create neither a constitutional standard that overrules established

constitutional rights nor invalidate prior decisions upholding those

rights.”

	In light of the above, we do not believe that the rules can or

should be viewed as constitutional such as to implicate a Teague analysis.

	Finally, we note that the Chief Justice cites to our recent case

of People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, No. 90114 (June 21, 2001), in support of his contention that the new rules should be applied here.

We believe the Chief Justice’s position is wide of the mark. The

capital proceeding at issue in Bakalis was in the pretrial stage when the matter was brought to this court. During the pendency of

the appeal in this court, the new rules took effect. Certainly the

rules, to the extent applicable, will govern a case in that procedural

posture as well as any other case now coming to trial in the circuit

courts of this state. As such, the Bakalis case is inapposite.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of

Cook County dismissing defendant’s post-conviction petition

without an evidentiary hearing and denying defendant’s discovery

requests, is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an

order setting Tuesday, January 15, 2002, as the date on which the

sentence of death shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed

in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119–5 (West 2000).

The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of this mandate

to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms

Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where

defendant is now confined.

Affirmed.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:

	I agree with the court that the order of the circuit court must

be affirmed in this case. I write separately to express my views on several points regarding the retroactivity of this court’s new rules

concerning capital cases.

	I note that in arguing for the retroactive application of our new

rules, Justice Kilbride refers to the new rules as establishing a

“watershed rule of criminal procedure.”  Slip op. at 40. In support

of this proposition, Justice Kilbride cites the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311- 12, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 356-57, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1076 (1989).

	That our new rules “establish a watershed rule of criminal

procedure” is not, under Teague, the linchpin of retroactivity. In Teague, the United States Supreme Court held that decisions establishing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review

unless the new rule either (i) places certain kinds of primary,

private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal-law-

making authority to proscribe, or (ii) requires the observance of

those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 353, 109 S. Ct. At 1073. This court has adopted the Teague test. See People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990).

	In my view, the new rules of this court are not of

constitutional dimension in and of themselves. They function solely

as devices to further protect those rights given to defendants by the

federal and state constitutions, such as, for example, the right to

counsel and the right to a fair trial. As I see it, our new rules were

designed to help remedy some of the problems that were perceived

to be the root cause of past erroneous convictions. For example,

most reversals occur because of (i) ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, (ii) prosecutorial misconduct which deprives a defendant

of a fair trial, and (iii) trial judge error. Recognizing this, this court

adopted rules designed to minimize these problems in future. These

rules therefore help to avoid future reversals based on instances of

constitutionally incompetent representation and improper

prosecutorial conduct, among other things. Notwithstanding the

promulgation of these rules, errors will occur. These errors may

well require reversal–not because the rules themselves were

violated–but because certain fundamental constitutional violations

occurred. It is the departure from constitutional principles that make a criminal proceeding unreliable, not failure to observe rules

of this court. For this reason, I do not believe that the rules can or

should be viewed as constitutional such as to implicate a Teague analysis.

	Moreover, Justice Kilbride states that Rule 714, which

imposes standards on attorneys who will appear in capital trials,

“implicitly eliminates a defendant’s right to proceed pro se in a capital trial, effectively overruling People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995).” According to Justice Kilbride, this fact is reason alone

to find that the new rules are “of significant constitutional

dimension.” Slip op. at 41 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). Justice Kilbride

further maintains that, contrary to Coleman, capital defendants do not enjoy the right to self-representation.

	The United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), held that

the right to counsel provided by the sixth amendment (U.S. Const.,

amend. VI) includes within it the right to self-representation in

criminal trials. In addition, a criminal defendant has a constitutional

right to refuse state-provided counsel if the choice to proceed on

his or her own is made intelligently and voluntarily.  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 573-74, 95 S. Ct. at 2534. In Illinois,

our state constitution provides similar protections to defendants

and likewise protects a defendant’s right to self-representation.

This court has rejected the notion of forcing a capital defendant

who elects to proceed pro se to be represented by counsel. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995). In so holding, we cited expressly to Faretta. To hold, as the dissent would, that Rule 714

overrules Coleman would call into question the legitimacy of

Faretta. As this court stated in People v. Simpson, Nos. 85084, 86926 cons. (September 13, 2001), slip op. at 29, “the new rules

create neither a constitutional standard that overrules established

constitutional rights nor invalidate prior decisions upholding those

rights.”

	In light of the above, I do not believe that the rules can or

should be viewed as constitutional such as to implicate a Teague analysis.

	Finally, I note that the Chief Justice cites to our recent case of People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, No. 90114 (June 21, 2001), in support of his contention that the new rules should be applied here.

I believe the Chief Justice’s position is wide of the mark. The

capital proceeding at issue in Bakalis was in the pretrial stage when the matter was brought to this court. During the pendency of

the appeal in this court, the new rules took effect. Certainly the

rules, to the extent applicable, will govern a case in that procedural

posture as well as any other case now coming to trial in the circuit

courts of this state. As such, the Bakalis case is inapposite.

	In all other respects, I join in the court’s decision.

	JUSTICES McMORROW, FITZGERALD, and GARMAN

joins in this special concurrence.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:

	The system for imposing capital punishment in Illinois has

collapsed. Trial proceedings had become so unreliable and

appellate review so haphazard that the Governor was eventually forced to step in and declare a moratorium on future executions.

That moratorium, announced on January 31, 2000, remains in

effect. See People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 432 (2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).

	Legislative and executive branch committees are investigating

whether the failures in our death penalty law can be remedied or

whether the death penalty should simply be abolished.1 As we await their conclusions, our court has formed its own committee to

examine the problem. Based upon the work of that committee, we

have adopted a comprehensive set of new rules governing the

conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty.

With certain exceptions, the new rules took effect March 1, 2001. 

	The new rules clarify the duty of prosecuting attorneys

(amended Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct), establish

mandatory programs to improve the knowledge and skill of trial

judges who may be called upon to preside over capital cases (Rule

43), extend criminal discovery rules to capital sentencing hearings

(Rule 411), and impose on the State a duty to make a good-faith

effort to identify material or information which tends to negate the

guilt of the accused or reduce his punishment (Rule 412). The rules

also create a new set of procedures that must be followed in capital

cases. Among theses are rules which require the State to give

prompt notice of its intention to seek or reject imposition of the

death penalty, limit eligibility to serve as defense counsel to

attorneys who meet stringent new minimum qualifications,

authorize discovery depositions in capital cases, mandate case

management conferences after the State has disclosed its intention

to seek the death penalty, and obligate the State to certify before

trial that it has complied with its disclosure duties (Rule 416). In addition, new pretrial disclosure rules are imposed with respect to

DNA evidence (Rule 417).

	As the committee comments to these rules indicate, they are

designed “to ensure that capital defendants receive fair and

impartial trials and to minimize the occurrence of error in capital

trials.” 188 Ill. 2d R. 416, Committee Comments, at lxxii. These

are objectives that were clearly not being met under the old law.

Indeed, in many cases under the old law, there was no longer even

a pretense of fairness or accuracy. A majority of this court

expressly conceded the inherent unreliability of the system. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 215-18 (1998). Utter ineptitude was accepted as adequate representation. People v. Rissley, No. 82536, slip op. at 11 (March 15, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).

Appeals were illegally and summarily dismissed. People v. Kokoraleis, M.R. 15833, Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 11, at 4-7 (June 2, 1999).

	The case before us today illustrates many of the system’s

shortcomings. Defendant is a polio victim with hearing and speech

impediments whose intelligence is borderline retarded. The

surviving victim’s initial description of her assailant bore no

similarity to defendant, and when asked to identify defendant later,

she stated that she had never seen him before. People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 263-64 (1997). No fingerprints, shoe impressions

or fiber evidence connected defendant to the crime. The murder

weapon was not linked to him. A man seen by the victims’

automobile after the crime did not resemble defendant. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 264-67, 273-74.

	What convicted defendant was DNA evidence. The DNA

evidence used against him, however, was of dubious validity. The

quality assurance standards of the laboratory were questionable.

Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 271. The initial samples were destroyed through mishandling. The discovery of additional samples raised

suspicions. Virtually all of the samples had degraded or were of

poor quality. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 272. In addition, the State employee who performed the tests was reprimanded for sloppy and

unprofessional work, was found to have been dishonest, and was

disciplined for stealing state property. 	

	Despite the weaknesses in the State’s case, the jury convicted

defendant and he was sentenced to death. Despite the array of

problems that developed before and during defendant’s trial, the

majority has found a way to affirm the conviction and sentence.

The formal process was honored. If the capital punishment debacle

of the last few years has taught us anything, however, it is that

adherence to the formal process, as it existed under the old law,

can produce results that seem rational but are, in fact, completely

unreliable.

	In addressing the shortcomings of the past, the new supreme

court rules for capital cases reflect a basic shift in this court’s

conception of what is necessary to provide capital defendants with

a fair trial. Our tolerance for prosecutorial gamesmanship and

professional incompetence has evaporated. From now on, the

success of prosecutors will be gauged by how well they cooperate

in the search for truth and justice, not by the number of convictions

they secure. It cannot be any other way. The old priorities do not

work. When convictions are prized above justice, innocent men are

sentenced to die. It has happened too often in Illinois It must stop.

	The evidence presented to our committee and the committee’s

subsequent recommendations have persuaded us that the

procedures contained in the new rules are indispensable for

achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt. Those

procedures will not necessarily assure that error will be eliminated

from every murder case in which the State seeks the death penalty.

Without them, however, no capital proceeding can be deemed

reliable.

	As a general rule, changes in the law which are procedural in

nature, as these rules are, apply to all cases pending on direct

review without regard to whether the claims arose before or after

the change in the law occurred. People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151, 162 (1996), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000); Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education, 82 Ill. 2d 373, 390 (1980). That is unquestionably so where the new law

expressly defines its temporal reach to include pending cases. See Commonwealth Edison v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 38 (2001) (where legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal

reach of an amended statute should be, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect absent a constitutional

prohibition).

	The same is true of rules promulgated by this court. Our court

has the authority to specify the particular date new rules or

amendments to rules take effect. If we so specify, the effective date

of the new rules “shall be as ordered.” 188 Ill. 2d R. 3(g). Once the

effective date has been reached, the new rules are applicable to all

cases pending on direct review, even cases which commenced

before the rules were enacted. That is so because, as with new

procedural statutes, rules of court which are procedural in nature

have retroactive application. See Jarmon v. Jinks, 165 Ill. App. 3d 855, 863 (1987).

	Because rules of procedure apply retroactively, we have not

hesitated to apply our new rules governing capital cases to cases

coming before us on direct review. See People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, No. 90114, slip op. at 2 (June 21, 2001). We should take the same approach in cases such as this one which come before us

in the context of post-conviction proceedings.

 	A court’s adoption of new rules of court governing criminal procedure is analogous to its issuance of a judicial opinion

recognizing new rules of criminal procedure. Where the court

issues an opinion announcing new rules of criminal procedure and

the rules are of constitutional dimension, the new rules may be

invoked by other defendants in other cases on collateral review

where such rules implicate the fundamental fairness and accuracy

of the trial. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997). To qualify for application under this principle, the new rules must

be aimed at improving the accuracy of trial and be of such

importance that they alter our understanding of the bedrock

procedural elements essential to a fair trial. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 211, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831

(1990). For the reasons previously discussed, the new rules

governing capital cases plainly meet this requirement. They

represent a basic and unprecedented shift in our conception of what

we must do to afford defendants a fair trial in death penalty cases

and to assure that the results of such trials are consistently reliable.

A new, irreducible standard has been set.

	Now that the new standard is in place, we cannot countenance

any conviction or sentence in a capital case where the standard has

not been followed. If the new rules are so essential to the fairness

and accuracy of capital cases and if we are serious about our

intention to improve the reliability of capital proceedings, we must

disavow any presumption as to the fairness and accuracy of death

penalty cases prosecuted under the old law. The only presumption

to be made at this point is that any conviction and sentenced

obtained without the aid of the new rules is invalid. Because the

defendant in the case before us was tried, convicted and sentenced

without the benefit of the new rules, his conviction and sentence

should therefore be vacated and the cause should be remanded to

the circuit court for a new trial in conformity with our new rules.

	Even if defendant were not entitled to a new trial, I still could

not join in the majority’s opinion. For the reasons set forth in my

partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and

fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.

Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). At a minimum,

defendant’s sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and the

cause should be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a

sentence of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/ 9–1(j) (West 1994).

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:

	I agree with Chief Justice Harrison’s conclusion that the new

supreme court rules governing capital cases should be applied

retroactively.   Like many other capital convictions tried under the

old rules, defendant’s conviction in this case remains suspect

because it was obtained through procedures that were inherently

unreliable and did not adequately protect a defendant’s

constitutional rights.   See 188 Ill. 2d   R. 714, Committee

Comments, at cxiii (acknowledging “problem” in capital trials

under old system and the need to safeguard fairness and accuracy). 

In remedying this monumental wrong, the new rules establish a

watershed rule of criminal procedure (see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 356-57, 109 S. Ct. 1060,

1076 (1989)), particularly with regard to the new mandatory minimum eligibility standards established by Rule 714 for the

Capital Litigation Trial Bar (see 188 Ill. 2d   Rs. 714(a) through

(g)).

	While imposing substantial standards on capital attorneys,

Rule 714, on its face, provides no exception to these standards for

defendants who choose to represent themselves.   As a result, Rule

714 implicitly eliminates a defendant’s right to proceed pro se in a capital trial, effectively overruling People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995), on that point.   For this reason alone, contrary to the

majority’s conclusion, the new rules are of significant constitutional

dimension.   Moreover, by imposing minimum standards on capital

attorneys and establishing other procedural safeguards for capital

cases, the new rules implicate the fundamental fairness and the

accuracy of a trial, thus necessitating retroactive application.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356-57, 109 S. Ct. at 1076; People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997); People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990).

	Those who disagree with my conclusion will undoubtedly

argue that Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), afforded all defendants the right to proceed at trial without counsel.   Faretta did not, however, decide whether the right of self-representation applies to capital defendants.   In fact, Faretta was decided in 1975 when the death penalty was unconstitutional. See Furman v. Georgia,   408 U.S. 238, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972). Thus, I disagree that we are

constrained by Faretta to hold that capital defendants possess a federal constitutional right to self-representation. See People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 287 (2001) (while bound to follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution

of the United States, we are not bound to extend those decisions

to issues not specifically decided).   More importantly, a broadening

of the Faretta right to encompass capital defendants is fundamentally at odds with the   stated purpose of   the new rules of

assuring the accuracy and fairness of capital trials.   The problems

pro se defendants pose to the accuracy of trials were partially articulated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932):

		“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and

sometimes no skill in the science of law.   If charged with

crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for

himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is

unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid

of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge,

and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence

irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.   He lacks

both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his

defense, even though he [has] a perfect one. He requires

the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the

proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not

guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does

not know how to establish his innocence.   If that be true of

men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the

ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.”

Therefore, in view of the significant number of capital defendants

who have been defended with the assistance of counsel and

erroneously convicted, I   cannot countenance the notion that a pro se capital defense is sufficiently competent   in the face of the most serious proceeding in our criminal justice system.

	In rejecting the conclusion that the new rules should apply

retroactively, the majority partially relies upon a curious rationale,

namely, that to accept Chief Justice Harrison’s view would mean

that the simple “adherence to the new rules would preclude post-

conviction relief because a defendant could not show a

constitutional violation.” Slip op. at 31.   The majority incorrectly

assumes this conclusion to be a natural extension of Chief Justice

Harrison’s view that nonadherence to the new rules is a per se constitutional violation.   As the committee comments indicate, the

new rules were designed to minimize, not eliminate, the occurrence

of errors. 188 Ill. 2d R. 416, Committee Comments, at lxxii.   

 Plainly

put, adherence to the new rules will not result in the trial of every

capital case occurring without constitutional error. 

 Unfortunately,

errors of constitutional dimension will continue to occur, including

the types alleged to have occurred in this case. 

 Therefore, under

Chief Justice Harrison’s view of the new rules, 

 post-conviction

petitions would continue to be a viable means for aggrieved defendants to bring to light alleged violations of their constitutional

rights.     

	The dire need for the establishment of the minimum safeguards

established by the new rules is evidenced by two capital cases

recently reviewed by this court: People v. Rissley, No. 82536 (March 15, 2001), and People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506 (2001).   As detailed by Chief Justice Harrison, the appointed defense

counsel in Rissley was woefully unqualified and unprepared to represent a capital defendant.   Rissley, slip op. at 51   (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).   Witnesses at the post-conviction hearing testified that,

among other slightly less egregious conduct, defense counsel failed to file a motion to suppress; conducted no investigation; slept

through some of the proceedings; and persuaded the defendant into

pleading guilty while the late-appointed co-counsel was out of

town attempting to prepare defense testimony. See Rissley, slip op. at 20-51 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Even though Chief Justice

Harrison’s dissent in Rissley may be read as critical of the prosecutor, I view the record in that case as partially illustrating the

extreme difficulties faced by all parties when an untrained,

appointed defense attorney is allowed to defend a capital

defendant.   The conduct of the appointed defense counsel in

Barrow was no less objectionable.   In that case, among other transgressions, the attorney failed to present any defense whatsoever. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d at 520.   Thus, the new rules were promulgated to remedy such fundamental problems as were

presented in each of these cases.

	At a bare minimum, the resolution of the retroactivity issue

should have been more fully addressed by this court following the

submission of supplemental briefs on the issue.   If we are to err, we

should err on the side of caution.   Unless we are confident that a

capital defendant, or any defendant for that matter, has received a

fair trial with competent counsel, we should not proceed without

being fully apprised of the applicable legal arguments.   Our sense of 

decency as a humane society demands no less than prudence in the

face of the ultimate criminal penalty of death.   For these reasons, I

respectfully dissent. 

		Through this dissent, I express no opinion regarding the

propriety of the death penalty, nor do I express any opinion in relation to the other issues raised by Chief Justice Harrison’s

dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998).