*

After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 18, 2008*

Decided January 22, 2008

Before

 Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 07-2979

LYNNE M. MILLION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States 

District Court for the Northern 

District of Indiana, South Bend

Division

No. 3:06-CV-746 CAN

Christopher H. Nuechterlein,

Magistrate Judge

O R D E R

Lynn Million applied for Disability Insurance Benefits claiming that she

could not work because she suffers from mental illness, headaches, sinus problems,

and back and neck pain. An administrative law judge conducted two hearings,

continuing the first hearing to obtain additional medical records. The ALJ found

that Million was not disabled on or before March 31, 1984—the date she was last

insured, which is the relevant time period for purposes of DIB eligibility. 20 C.F.R.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance 

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07-2979 Page 2

§§ 404.131, 404.315(a)(1). The Social Security Appeals Council denied Million’s

request for review. A magistrate judge, sitting by consent of the parties, then

affirmed, holding that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. 

Million now appeals, and we also affirm.

Proceeding pro se at the hearings before the ALJ, Million provided

testimonial and documentary evidence to support her claim. She stated that she

had family problems as a child, began psychological treatment at an early age, has

battled depression most of her life, and is often suicidal. She testified that she often

skipped school and that her parents pushed her into a marriage when she was 16

years old. Million also said that her ex-husband physically abused her, and that

she experienced headaches and a curved coccyx (tailbone) as a result of the abuse. 

She then testified to medical problems occurring after her insurance expired,

including numerous problems resulting from a car accident in 1999, such as

degenerative disk syndrome and fibromyalgia. She maintained that at the time of

the hearing she could not work because she experiences pain in her neck when

looking up, lifting, driving, or sitting at a computer, and must often spend up to a

week in bed due to pain and fibromyalgia. 

Million also described her educational and work history. She received her

GED in 1980 and a bachelor’s degree in 1998, attending school full-time for part of

her undergraduate work. Although she has held several different part-time jobs,

she did not testify to any significant work experience before March 1984. Million

stated that her current source of income consisted only of Social Security Insurance

benefits, which she has received since 1992.

Million provided medical evidence documenting her physical and mental

health; however, very little of it was pertinent to the relevant period. At the first

hearing, the ALJ asked for the names of doctors that might have records supporting

Million’s claim from the relevant period before 1984 and granted a continuance to

obtain those records. Although Million and the ALJ were unsuccessful in obtaining

more records from the doctors, some documents were found in a file containing one

of Million’s previous applications for Social Security benefits. Records in that file

from 1974 show that Million, who was then 16 years old, received family counseling

to “help the process of communication among family members.” The records further

show that, at first, Million appeared to her social worker to be “obstinate,” but after

some sessions became “much better at home” and “much more cooperative.” The

family cancelled therapy after three months because of Million’s improvements. 

The records do not show whether Million was diagnosed with any medical or

psychological impairments. Other records in the Social Security file show that, four

years later, Million attended one treatment session with her husband that was

ordered by a judge as a result of his legal troubles, yet they did not receive a
No. 07-2979 Page 3

treatment plan because her husband refused further mental health treatment. 

Again, there is no record of a formal medical or psychological diagnosis.

The only other medical records offered for the insured period come from a

1982 doctor visit for persistent headaches. Records indicate that Million’s CT scan

and neurological work-up were negative, and that her headaches were on a “tension

and stress” basis. Several possible treatment courses were recommended, but it is

unclear what treatment, if any, Million received. The records do not show whether

her pain limited her ability to work or function in any way. Finally, at the time

Million filed the application currently under review, the SSA required her to consult

with a psychologist and physician, and they found that there was insufficient

evidence to determine whether she had a severe mental or physical impairment at

the time she was insured.

After considering the proffered evidence, the ALJ applied the five-step

analysis described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) to conclude that Million was

not disabled through the last date insured. In so doing, the ALJ determined that

she had not engaged in substantial gainful employment during the relevant time

period (step one); that her headaches constituted a severe physical impairment but

that she had no severe mental impairments through the date insured (step two);

and that her headaches did not qualify as any listed impairment (step three). The

ALJ placed particular emphasis on the absence of medical records corroborating her

reports of severe mental illness to conclude that Million’s testimony regarding her

pain and limitations was not credible. The ALJ then concluded that it is unclear

whether Million had any past relevant work during the insured period (step four),

and that, in any event, she could perform the full range of medium work through

the date last insured and that there are jobs in the national economy that she can

perform (step five). Because the Social Security Appeals Council denied Million’s

request for review, the ALJ’s decision is the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security. Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).

On appeal, Million argues that the ALJ failed to obtain a valid waiver of

counsel and therefore was under a heightened duty to develop the record, which the

ALJ failed to do adequately. Million also argues that the ALJ’s determination that

she was not disabled at any time through March 31, 1984, and could perform jobs in

the national economy was not supported by substantial evidence.

Million first argues that the ALJ failed to obtain a valid waiver of counsel. 

An applicant has a statutory right to be represented by counsel, see 42 U.S.C. § 406,

but the right may be waived if the ALJ obtains a valid waiver. Skinner, 478 F.3d at

841. To obtain a valid waiver, an ALJ must explain to the claimant “(1) the manner

in which an attorney can aid in the proceedings, (2) the possibility of free counsel or

a contingent arrangement, and (3) the limitation on attorney fees to 25 percent of
No. 07-2979 Page 4

past due benefits and required court approval of the fees.” Id. (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). If the ALJ fails to obtain a valid waiver of counsel, his

duty to develop the record is heightened, and he must “scrupulously and

conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts.” Id. at 841-

42 (quoting Smith v. Sec. of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 587 F.2d 857, 860 (7th Cir.

1978)). Further, if no valid waiver is obtained, the burden is then on the

Commissioner to show that the ALJ adequately developed the record, and there is

no presumption that the claimant has presented his or her best case before the ALJ. 

Id. at 842. Nonetheless, a “significant omission” is usually required before we will

find that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record. Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687,

692 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Here, the ALJ did not obtain a valid waiver of counsel from Million. The ALJ

informed Million that she could be represented if she so desired and that any fee

charged by an attorney would have to be approved by Social Security. Nonetheless,

he failed to inform her of the possibility of free counsel or counsel available on

contingency, the limits on fees, or the manner in which an attorney can aid the

proceedings. Thus, the ALJ had a heightened duty to develop the record. Skinner,

478 F.3d at 841.

The Commissioner has met the burden of showing that the ALJ satisfied its

heightened duty to develop the record. The ALJ not only had extensive discussions

with Million regarding the availability of medical records from the insured period,

but also offered to work with Million to obtain whatever records were available and

continued the hearing to allow time to do so. Moreover, the ALJ discussed Million’s

past and present medical and psychological problems, family problems, and medical

treatment at great length. Although the ALJ failed to obtain every single record

from the relevant period, Million herself acknowledged the difficulty in obtaining

the 30-year-old records, and at no point did she indicate how the missing records

might support her case or how she was prejudiced by their absence. See Schoenfeld

v. Apfel, 237 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2001) (“‘Mere conjecture or speculation that

additional evidence might have been obtained in the case is insufficient to warrant

a remand.’” (quoting Binion v. Shalala, 13 F.3d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1994))). In her

appellate brief, Million explains how this court can obtain additional medical

records that the ALJ did not locate. The function of this court, however, is not to

develop the factual record but to review the ALJ’s findings. Any information

regarding the whereabouts or availability of medical records from the insured

period should have been provided to the ALJ at the time he reviewed her

application.

Turning to Million’s primary argument, we review the ALJ’s decision to

determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means
No. 07-2979 Page 5

“‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.’” Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971)). Although we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ,

the ALJ must, at the very least, minimally articulate the analysis of the evidence

with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review. Boiles v.

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005).

As the ALJ pointed out, Million provided, and the record contains, an

abundance of medical information and documents, though very little of it pertains

to the insured period. Records from medical treatment that took place after

Million’s last date insured, March 1984, are relevant only to the degree that they

shed light on her impairments and disabilities from the relevant insured period. All

the other records that Million provides, such as the evidence of her 1999 car

accident and resulting medical care, are not relevant to the determination of her

disability benefits. See Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 1987)

(“While we sympathize with the claimant and her physical problems and we realize

that she was diagnosed as totally disabled . . . in 1984, these diagnoses simply are

not relevant to her physical condition some eleven years earlier when her insured

status expired.”). 

The three medical reports concerning the relevant period, however, support

the ALJ’s determination that Million had no severe mental impairments and that

her headaches did not qualify her as “disabled” under the Social Security Act. None

of the records show that Million was diagnosed with any psychological impairment

or disability, and they give no reason to believe that Million was severely limited in

any daily or work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a) (a severe impairment is one

that significantly limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities). 

The medical records regarding her headaches do not corroborate her testimony that

they were debilitating, as they were described by the doctor as being “stress” or

“tension” related and did not create any severe limitations on her ability to work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (“A physical or mental impairment must be established by

medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by

your statement of symptoms.”); see also Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505 (7th

Cir. 2004) (affirming ALJ’s finding that petitioner’s “testimony of constant

throbbing pain was not consistent with the finds of the specialists or with [his]

medical records”). Given the absence of evidence supporting Million’s claim that

she was disabled during the insured period, the ALJ’s determination that Million

was not disabled was supported by substantial evidence. 

AFFIRMED