UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4255

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DEMARCUS MANDELL BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Michael F. Urbanski, District 

Judge. (7:13-cr-00068-MFU-1)

Submitted: October 30, 2014 Decided: November 14, 2014

Before DUNCAN and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul G. Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer Scott DeGraw, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

DeMarcus Brown appeals the district court’s judgment 

sentencing him to one year of imprisonment pursuant to his 

conviction of assault on a government employee, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2012). Brown’s counsel filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating 

that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

questioning whether (1) Brown’s conviction is unsupported by 

sufficient evidence or otherwise unlawful, (2) the district 

court abused its discretion in imposing Brown’s sentence to run 

consecutively to his preexisting sentence, (3) the district 

court erred in failing to give Brown’s requested instruction on 

justification and (4) the district court erred in failing to 

instruct that willfulness was an essential element of the 

offense. Although advised of his right to do so, Brown has not 

filed a supplemental brief. The Government declined to file a 

brief. We affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United 

States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). We affirm 

if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Government, “the conviction is supported by substantial 

evidence.” United States v. Hickman, 626 F.3d 756, 763-64 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial 
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evidence” is defined as such “evidence that a reasonable finder 

of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant challenging 

evidentiary sufficiency “bears a heavy burden,” as reversal of a 

conviction is limited to those circumstances in which “the 

prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Foster, 507 

F.3d 233, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Any individual who “forcibly assaults, resists, 

opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with [a federal 

officer] while engaged in . . . official duties . . . shall, 

where the acts in violation of this section constitute only 

simple assault, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 

than one year, or both[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 111. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there 

was ample evidence that Brown forcibly assaulted, resisted, 

opposed, impeded, intimidated, or interfered with United States 

Marshals while they were attempting to transport him from his 

cell to his change of plea hearing. We thus conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying Brown’s motion for 

acquittal.
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Brown next challenges his sentence. We review a 

sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 46 (2007). There we presume that a within-Guidelines range 

sentence is reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 347 (2007). We review the decision whether to impose a 

concurrent or consecutive sentence for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir. 2012).

Our review of the record reflects that it was 

reasonable to impose upon Brown a consecutive, rather than 

concurrent, sentence. We thus conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in imposing its sentence.

Brown next challenges the district court’s refusal to 

instruct the jury as to the justification defense. “[A] 

defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized 

defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a jury to 

find in his favor.” United States v. Ricks, 573 F.3d 198, 200 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We review a district court’s refusal to instruct the 

jury on an affirmative defense de novo. United States v. 

Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1995). To warrant a 

justification instruction, a defendant must show that he:

(1) was under unlawful and present threat of 

death or serious bodily injury;
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(2) did not recklessly place himself in a 

situation where he would be forced to engage 

in criminal conduct;

(3) had no reasonable legal alternative (to 

both the criminal act and the avoidance of 

threatened harm); and

(4) a direct causal relationship between the 

criminal action and the avoidance of the 

threatened harm.

Ricks, 573 F.3d at 202.

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the 

district court did not err in refusing to give a justification

instruction. Brown did not show that he faced “death or serious 

bodily injury,” or that he had “no legal alternative” to his 

conduct. We thus hold that the district court correctly refused 

to give the instruction.

Brown’s final challenge is that the district court 

should have instructed the jury that “willfulness” is an 

essential element of the charged offense. We consider de novo 

“whether a district court has properly instructed a jury on the 

statutory elements of an offense.” United States v. Powell, 680 

F.3d 350, 355 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the

district court’s decision was correct. Specific intent to 

violate the statute is not required to be convicted under 18 

U.S.C. § 111. United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 277, 279 (4th 
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Cir. 1979). We thus hold that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury that willfulness 

was an essential element of the charged offense.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, 

we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires 

that counsel inform Brown, in writing, of the right to petition 

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 

Brown requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on

Brown. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED