alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Ronell Dashawn P., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. St. Vincent’s Services, Inc., Respondent; Veronica P., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Rasheem Dayquan P., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. St. Vincent’s Services, Inc., Respondent; Veronica *503P., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[745 NYS2d 484]

In two related proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, inter alia, to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of neglect, the mother appeals from two orders of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Grosvenor, J.), dated May 3, 2000 (one as to each child), which, after a hearing, found that she permanently neglected her two children and terminated her parental rights.

Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

A review of the record demonstrates that the agency fulfilled its duty to encourage the parental relationship between the mother and her children. Consequently, the Family Court correctly determined that the agency exercised diligent efforts to strengthen that relationship *(see Matter of Alicia Shante H.,*245 AD2d 509).

In addition, the record supports the Family Court’s determination that the mother permanently neglected her children within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b (7). During the one-year period between December 1995 and December 1996, the mother only visited her children approximately 17 times out of 42 scheduled visits, failed to cooperate with drug screenings, failed to complete her drug rehabilitation program, and failed to take advantage of the housing services offered to her by the agency *(see Matter of Luno Scott A.,*292 AD2d 602; *Matter of Vincent M.,*255 AD2d 515; *Matter of Jeremy KK.,*251 AD2d 904; *Matter of Tina D. v Kenneth D.,*213 AD2d 714). Accordingly, the Family Court correctly determined that the mother permanently neglected her children and terminated her parental rights.

The mother’s remaining contentions are without merit. Ritter, J.P., Feuerstein, Smith and Adams, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Construction of the Will of Berta Gardini, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, New York County,

January 25, 1957.

*Nathaniel L. Rock*for petitioner.

Joseph A. Cox, S.

This is a petition for construction of a will. Testatrix by her last will bequeathed her residuary estate to petitioner “ in trust, nevertheless, to invest the same * * " for the purpose of keeping up and maintaining all the traditions, rights and privileges of the Gerster-Gardini School of Singing The petitioner, executrix and trustee under the will, “ is in doubt as to whether testatrix created a valid Trust, inasmuch as she seemingly had neither fixed the ‘ term ’ of the Trust nor indicated a residuary legatee upon the termination thereof.” The trust intended by the testatrix is a charitable trust, for the perpetual maintenance of the school established by the mother of testatrix and continued by the testatrix. This is a valid trust. It has been repeatedly held that pursuant to section 12 of the Personal Property Law, such trusts need not terminate or vest within the periods prescribed by section 11 of the Personal Property Law, and may continue indefinitely. *(Matter of MacDowell,*217 N. Y. 454; *Matter of Antoni, 186*Misc. 988; 3 Scott on Trusts, § 365 and cases cited therein.)

No objection having been made to the proposed distribution *336of gifts pursuant to paragraph Two of the will, the decree on an accounting may direct such distribution. No objection having been made to the statement in the schedule of proposed gifts that the family portraits have no value, the decree to be submitted may provide for their abandonment or the disposition proposed in the schedule.

The executor asks an allowance of $500 for services rendered in part to the deceased during her lifetime and in part for her estate. The executor is a minister who assisted the deceased in a variety of personal problems prior to her death. The services allegedly rendered prior to her death consisted of giving her advice in the disposition of her property, assisting her in making contacts for the development of her school of singing, bringing her to an attorney and prepare a will and “ keeping an eye on her affairs.” The executor does not allege that there was any agreement that he should be compensated for these services. As an explanation of her failure to pay, the executor merely alleges ‘ ‘ she somehow could not manage to pay me putting it off until she would have available funds, nor could I insist on it under the circumstances ”. On these facts and allegations the court cannot direct payment for such services. Nor is the executor entitled to an allowance as requested for services rendered the estate. For his services, an executor is paid commissions pursuant to section 285 of the Surrogate’s' Court Act. There is no authority other than a direction in the will itself to make additional payments for the services of an executor who is not a lawyer.

The request of the attorney for the executor for an allowance is granted in the amount of $500 for services rendered to the estate through the entry of a decree to be submitted herein.

Submit decree accordingly.
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1239 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the new markets 

tax credit through 2013, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 26, 2007 

Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. KERRY, Mr. 

BINGAMAN, Ms. STABENOW, Mr. SMITH, Mr. BROWN, and Mrs. DOLE) 

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend 

the new markets tax credit through 2013, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘New Markets Tax 

5 Credit Extension Act of 2007’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT. 

7 (a) EXTENSION.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (D) of section 

9 45D(f)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (reVerDate Aug 31 2005 21:57 Apr 27, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1239.IS S1239

pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
2 

•S 1239 IS

1 lating to national limitation on amount of invest2 ments designated) is amended by striking ‘‘2006, 

3 2007, and 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘each of calendar 

4 years 2006 through 2013’’. 

5 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 

6 45D(f)(3) of such Code is amended by striking 

7 ‘‘2014’’ and inserting ‘‘2020’’. 

8 (b) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT.—Section 45D(f) of the 

9 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting 

10 at the end the following new paragraph: 

11 ‘‘(4) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT.— 

12 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any cal13 endar year beginning after 2008, the dollar 

14 amount in paragraph (1)(D) shall be increased 

15 by an amount equal to— 

16 ‘‘(i) such dollar amount, multiplied by 

17 ‘‘(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment de18 termined under section 1(f)(3) for the cal19 endar year, determined by substituting 

20 ‘calendar year 2007’ for ‘calendar year 

21 1992’ in subparagraph (B) thereof. 

22 ‘‘(B) ROUNDING RULE.—If a dollar 

23 amount in paragraph (1)(D), as increased 

24 under subparagraph (A), is not a multiple of 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
3 

•S 1239 IS

1 $1,000,000, such amount shall be rounded to 

2 the nearest multiple of $1,000,000.’’. 

3 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

4 this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment 

5 of this Act. 

Æ 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
#### DEPARTMENT OF WILD LIFE AND FISHERIES v. THE BALTIMORE.

No. 2970.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Nov. 21, 1947.

Harry P." Gamble Sr., of New Orleans, for appellant. ,

Ellender & Wright, of Houma, for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

The above case was set for hearing at Thibodaux, Louisiana, on November 6, 1947; and counsel for plaintiff and appellant and defendant and appellee were present. It was suggested by the Court that since the cause appeared to involve an amount exceeding $2,000, that it might be transferred to the Supreme Court; and counsel, agreeing before the Court, were given time to prepare motions to that effect. :

It now appearing that counsel for all parties litigant in this proceeding have joined in a written motion for the transfer of the appeal to the Supreme Court; the averment being made therein that the object in dispute exceeds in value $2,000; it is concluded that the appeal is one for consideration of the highest court of this State, and the motion will be granted. Succession of Wengert, 178 La. 1027, 152 So. 747; Snyder Wagon Company v. Campbell Ice Cream Company, 173 La. 467, 137 So. 855; General Motors Truck Company et al. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Company, Inc., et al., La.App., 172 So. 178.

Accordingly, and pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 19 of 1912, it is ordered that the appeal in this case be transferred to the Louisiana Supreme Court; that a period of sixty .days is granted for the perfecting of the transfer, dating from the finality of this decree; and that on fail*624ure to make the transfer within that period, the appeal shall stand dismissed.

Appellant shall pay the cost of this appeal, and all other costs shall abide the final disposition of the case.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02323-BNB-KMT

DEJA FRANKS,

Plaintiff,

v.

NORTH AMERICAN ASSET SERVICES, LLC d/b/a FRONTIER FINANCIAL GROUP,

INC.,

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________________

MINUTE ORDER

______________________________________________________________________________

Minute Order Entered by Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland

This matter is before the Court on the Joint Stipulation for Withdrawal of Plaintiff’s

Motion to Compel Better Answers [docket no. 33, filed March 28, 2012].

IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Better Answers from

Defendant North American Asset Services, LLC [28] is DENIED AS WITHDRAWN.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions hearing set for April 2, 2012, is

VACATED.

DATED: March 28, 2012

Case 1:11-cv-02323-BNB-KMT Document 34 Filed 03/29/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 4Federal Reserve Bank of: ClevelandFilings received during the week ending July 1, 2006FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodFIFTH THIRD BANK                                                                                                        * BranchFifth Third Bank, Grand Rapids, MI to establish a branch at 5075 West Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN.Newspaper: 06/23/2006Federal Register: Not applicableS & T BANCORP, INC.                                                                                                     * 3A3Application by S&T Bancorp, Inc., Indiana, PA to acquire up to 9.9% of the voting shares of CBT Financial Corporation, Clearfield, PA pursuant to Section 3(a)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act.Newspaper: 07/21/2006Federal Register: 07/24/2006
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE COMPANY FOR THE THREE-MONTH PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31,
1998, AND SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY, SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         933,368
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,968
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               980,517<F1>
<PP&E>                                      24,697,351<F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                                 158,078
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              25,677,868
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          171,185
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    28,257,877
<OTHER-SE>                                 (3,596,391)<F3>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                25,677,868
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 9,047<F4>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               209,490<F5>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              20,583
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (221,026)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)
<FN>
<F1>Includes prepaid expenses and other current assets of $42,181.
<F2>Consists of properties and equipment, net of depreciation, of $1,146,635;
mineral properties of $22,652,354; and other long-term assets of $898,362.
<F3>Consists of $3,596,391 of deficit accumulated during the development stage.
<F4>Consists of interest income of $9,047.
<F5>Consists of general and administrative expenses of $205,854 and other expenses
of $3,636.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1

                                                                  Exhibit 23.1






                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of
The Learning Company, Inc. (formerly known as SoftKey International Inc.) on
Form S-3 (File Nos. 33-63073, 33-73422, 333-00145, 333-02385, 333-03271 and
333-10009) and Form S-8 (File Nos. 33-61931, 33-75134, 33-92920, 33-92922,
333-00107, 333-02337 and 333-04619) of our report dated March 27, 1997, on our
audits of the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule
of valuation and qualifying accounts of The Learning Company, Inc. as of January
4, 1997 and January 6, 1996 and for each of the three fiscal years in the period
ended January 4, 1997, which report is included in this Annual Report on Form
10-K.



                                                COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.


Boston, Massachusetts
April 3, 1997
#### Charles COOPER v. STATE.

8 Div. 126.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

May 21, 1935.

SAMEORD, Judge.'

Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 99.02**

Certification Pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of TheSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of iGate Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed withthe Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael Zugay, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (S) 1350, as adopted pursuant to (S) 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1)

The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

|                                                                |   |   |   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| /s/ MICHAEL ZUGAY                                                   |   |   |        |
|                                                                     |   |   |   |
| **Michael Zugay****Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer** |   |   |   |

 

May 15, 2003

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required bythe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposesof Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended.

26
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ERROL WILEY,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 483 EAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of May, 2021, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
|Exhibit 32.2                                                          
|----------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                      
|Certification Pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to
|Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002                          

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cannabis Science, Inc., (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended Septemer 30, 2013, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert Kane, Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                     
|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

By: /s/ Robert Kane Robert KaneChief Financial OfficerNovember 20, 2013



|
|
|
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01936-RPM-KMT 

RENEE RANSOM, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Washington limited 

liability company, 

Defendant.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE

THE COURT having reviewed the Stipulation of Dismissal with 

Prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and being fully advised in the 

premises, DOES HEREBY ORDER that this case is Dismissed with Prejudice, 

with each party to pay her or its own attorney’s fees and costs. 

BY THE COURT:

November 22, 2011     s/Richard P. Matsch

DATE Richard P. Matsch, Senior District Judge 

Case 1:11-cv-01936-RPM-KMT Document 12 Filed 11/22/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
194 La. 811

#### Earl K. LONG v. Frank J. LOONEY, Chairman of the State Democratic Central Committee, et al. In re James A. GREMILLION Applying for Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

No. 35754.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 12, 1940.

Eugene Stanley, of New Orleans, for relator.

George M. Wallace, of Baton Rouge, for respondents.

Frank J. Looney, of Shreveport, amicus curias.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

The facts and issues in this case are stated in the opinion rendered today in the case entitled Earl K. Long v. Wade O. Martin, Chairman of the State Central Committee, et al., In re: James A. Gremillion applying for Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, No. 35752 of the docket of this court, 194 So. 896. For the reasons given in that case:

The rule to show cause and the alternative writs of prohibition and mandamus issued by this court in these proceedings are now made peremptory; and, accordingly, the temporary restraining order granted by Judge James D. Womack on the 7th day of March, 1940, in the suit entitled Earl K. Long v. Frank J. Looney, Chairman of the State Central Committee, et al., No. 15138 of the docket of the 19th Judicial District Court, for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, is annulled and set aside; and the suit itself is ordered dismissed and the demands of the plaintiff rejected at his cost.

HIGGINS, J., concurs in the decree and hands down reasons in No. 35752, 194 So. 896.
Order filed December 3, 2020.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-20-00742-CV

____________

In the Interest of A.M.W. a/k/a A.W., K.R.W. a/k/a K.W., children

On Appeal from the 314th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2019-03213J

ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal from a judgment in a parental termination 

appeal. Appellant B.V.W.’s brief was due December 2, 2020. No brief has been 

filed. 

Appeals in parental termination cases and child protection cases are to be 

brought to final disposition within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed. 

See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (effective May 1, 2012). This accelerated schedule 

requires greater compliance with briefing deadlines. 

Therefore, we order appellant’s appointed counsel Angela Ellis, to file 

appellant’s brief no later than December 18, 2020. If the brief is not filed by that 

date, counsel may be required to show cause why she should not be held in 
contempt of court. In addition, the court may require appointment of new counsel 

due to the failure to timely file appellant’s brief. 

PER CURIAM

Panel Consists of Justices Christopher, Wise, and Hassan.
#### Wally Swanson, Respondent, *v.*Samuel Alter et al., Doing Business as The Food Family, Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

October 18, 1956.

*Leonard M. Henkin*for appellants.

*Melvel W. Snitow*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

Plaintiff failed to set forth a satisfactory explanation for the long delay in the trial of the action or for his failure to move promptly to vacate the dismissal after his default. The Appellate Division maintains a firm attitude against unwarranted delay in prosecuting cases. *(A. R. Hyde & Sons*v. *Roller Derby Skate Co.,*1 A D 2d 942.)

The retention of the check for the costs imposed as a condition for opening the default without depositing it for collection, is not a bar to this appeal under all the circumstances here.

The order opening the default was, in the face of the lack of due diligence without adequate reason therefor, improvidently made and should be reversed, and the plaintiff’s motion denied.

The order should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion denied.

Edeb, Heoht and Tilzeb, JJ., concur.

Order reversed, etc.