alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

 “[#87]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a

specific paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this

convention throughout this order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-01961-REB-KMT

ENERGY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, INC., and

ENERGY INTELLIGENCE GROUP (UK) LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC, f/k/a Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC,

Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Blackburn, J.

The matter before me is the Recommendation of United States Magistrate

Judge [#87]1

 filed May 23, 2012, recommending a continuance of the trial in this matter. 

No objection having been filed to the recommendation, I review the recommendation for

plain error only. See Morales-Fernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,

418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005). Finding no such error in the recommendation, I

find and conclude that the recommendation should be approved and adopted.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

Case 1:11-cv-01961-REB-KMT Document 90 Filed 06/08/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
2

1. That Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [#87] filed May

23, 2012, is APPROVED AND ADOPTED as an order of this court;

2. That the Trial Preparation Conference set for Friday, September 7, 2012, at

3:00 p.m., and the trial set to commence September 24, 2012, at 8:30 a.m., are

VACATED and CONTINUED, pending further order of the court; and

3. That the Trial Preparation Conference and trial SHALL BE RESET during a

telephonic setting conference on June 19, 2012, at 10:00 a.m. (MDT); provided,

furthermore, that counsel for plaintiffs SHALL ARRANGE and COORDINATE

the conference call necessary to facilitate the setting conference.

Dated June 8, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

Case 1:11-cv-01961-REB-KMT Document 90 Filed 06/08/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7688

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ERNEST RAYMOND ROBERTS, a/k/a Balla Walla, a/k/a Balowala,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. 

Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00178-MGL-1; 1:19-cv-00621-MGL)

Submitted: February 18, 2020 Decided: February 21, 2020

Before MOTZ, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ernest Raymond Roberts, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Ernest Raymond Roberts seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on 

his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2018). A 

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2018). When the district court denies relief 

on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists 

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. 

See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on 

procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

Limiting our review of the record to the issues raised in Roberts’ informal brief, we 

conclude that Roberts has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see also 

Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important 

document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that 

brief.”). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 953 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                        March 12, 2008.
Whereas it was through the brave and noble efforts of the Nation's forefathers 
        that the United States first gained freedom and became a sovereign 
        nation;
Whereas there are more than 1,354,000 active component and more than 1,100,000 
        reserve component members of the Armed Forces serving the Nation in 
        support and defense of the values and freedom that all Americans 
        cherish;
Whereas the members of the Armed Forces deserve the utmost respect and 
        admiration of their fellow Americans for putting their lives in danger 
        for the sake of the freedoms enjoyed by all Americans;
Whereas the families of members of the Armed Forces make sacrifices commensurate 
        with the men and women of the Armed Forces;
Whereas members of the Armed Forces are defending freedom and democracy around 
        the globe and are playing a vital role in protecting the safety and 
        security of all Americans;
Whereas the Nation officially celebrates and honors the accomplishments and 
        sacrifices of veterans, patriots, and leaders who fought for freedom, 
        this resolution pays tribute to those who currently serve in the Armed 
        Forces;
Whereas all Americans should participate in a moment of silence to support our 
        troops and their families; and
Whereas March 26th, 2008, is designated as ``National Support Our Troops Day'': 
        Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that all 
Americans should participate in a moment of silence to reflect upon the service 
and sacrifice of members of the United States Armed Forces both at home and 
abroad, and their families.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
Exhibit-21

SUBSIDIARIES OFREGISTRANT

| Subsidiaries                                                  |  | Place of Incorporation |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|--|------------------------|
|                                                               |  |                        |
| First Citizens National Bank

                           |  | Tennessee

       |
| First Citizens Financial Plus, Inc.

                    |  | Tennessee

       |
| White and Associates/First Citizens Insurance, LLC  

   |  | Tennessee

       |
| First Citizens/White and Associates Insurance Company

  |  | Arizona

         |
| First Citizens Investments, Inc.

                       |  | Nevada

          |
| First Citizens Holdings, Inc.

                          |  | Nevada

          |
| First Citizens Properties, Inc.

                        |  | Maryland

        |
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-21-00236-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV-2021-02362-JP

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

STEPHEN NORMANDIN, AND ALL OCCUPANTS OF 5029 ARBOR GLEN 

ROAD, THE COLONY, TEXAS, Appellant

V.

KENNETH HUGGINS, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

On December 14, 2021, we notified appellant that his brief had not been filed 

as the appellate rules require. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.6(a). We stated that we could 

dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution unless, by December 27, appellant filed 

with the court an appellant’s brief and an accompanying motion reasonably explaining 

the brief’s untimely filing and why an extension was needed. See Tex. R. App. P. 

10.5(b), 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b). We have received no response.

Because appellant has failed to file a brief even after we afforded an 

opportunity to explain the initial failure, we dismiss the appeal for want of 

prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), 43.2(f).

Per Curiam

Delivered: January 20, 2022
EXHIBIT 

25 

Case 1:11-cv-02268-WJM-KLM Document 8 Filed 08/30/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
EFILED Document 

CO Denver County District Court 2nd JD 

Filing Date: Nov 9 2010 3:36PM MST 

Filing ID: 34271276 

Review Clerk: Kari S Elizalde

Case 1:11-cv-02268-WJM-KLM Document 8 Filed 08/30/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 3
Case 1:11-cv-02268-WJM-KLM Document 8 Filed 08/30/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 3
1

 In criminal cases originating from the Grand Junction or Durango Jury Divisions of this Court, counsel

shall be prepared to advise the Court at the time of the change of plea hearing whether a written request to have the

sentencing hearing conducted at the courthouse in either Grand Junction or Durango will be filed. See

Administrative Order 2007-8.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Honorable Marcia S. Krieger

Criminal Action No. 11-cr-00371-MSK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1. MARTIN JOHNSON,

Defendant.

 

ORDER AND NOTICE OF CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING

 

THIS MATTER comes before the Court following the filing of a Notice of Disposition 

(#13) on November 7, 2011, by Defendant. The Court construes this Notice as a motion to

change his plea and to have the Court consider the terms of the parties’ plea agreement.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) and (I), the speedy trial clock is tolled

pending determination of those matters. 

2. A Change of Plea hearing is set for January 23, 2012, at 1:30 p.m. in the United

States District Court for the District of Colorado, Courtroom A901, Alfred A.

Arraj U.S. Courthouse, 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado.1

DATED this 9th day of November, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

Marcia S. Krieger

United States District Judge
#### Maiden Lane Service Stations, Inc., Respondent, *v.*Helen C. Rubin et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

December 20, 1956.

*329
      *Thomas I. Brennan*for appellants.

*Max Tachna*and *Paul Bauman*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

In the absence of allegation and proof of plans for the erection of the new structure, the landlord was not entitled to a final order for the purpose of demolishing the existing building.

Upon the termination of the written lease, the tenants became statutory tenants and the jury waiver clause of the lease was carried over into the statutory tenancy *(Jamaica Investors*v. *Blacharsh,*193 Misc. 949).

The final order should be reversed, with $30 costs, and final order directed for tenants, with costs. The intermediate order should be affirmed.

Hofstadter, Aurelio and Tilzer, JJ., concur.

Final order reversed, etc.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Action No. 11-cr-00375-CMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

5. EDWARD R. GOLL,

Defendant.

ORDER

______________________________________________________________________________

THE COURT, upon review of the oral motion of the United States requesting an Order,

under the terms of the Plea Agreement, that calls for the forfeiture of four firearms as follows:

1) One Marlin 22-caliber rifle bearing serial number 03240407; 

2) One Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun bearing serial number P461874;

3) One Western 12 gauge shotgun (etched #4475); and

4) One Smith & Wesson 9mm pistol bearing serial number A312580l.

The Court, having being sufficiently advised, hereby

ORDERS that said firearms are forfeited pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement

under the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3365. 

DATED this 13th day of April, 2012

BY THE COURT:

____________________________________

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO

United States District Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02327-WJM-MEH

AVAYA, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED PACIFIC (USA) CORP., a New York corporation,

Defendant.

MINUTE ORDER

Entered by Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge, on June 6, 2012.

The Joint Status Report and Stipulated Motion to Vacate Settlement Conference [filed June

5, 2012; docket #44] is granted. Because the parties represent that they have reached a tentative

settlement, the Settlement Conference scheduled in this case for June 12, 2012, is hereby vacated.

The parties shall file a status report updating the Court on the status of their settlement agreement

on or before July 2, 2012, if the parties have not already filed dismissal papers by that date. 

Case 1:11-cv-02327-WJM-MEH Document 46 Filed 06/06/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya

Civil Action No. 11–cv–01991–REB–KMT

JACQUELINE L. DEGARMO, and

ALISIA E. BLYTHE,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

MICHAEL YORTY, both in his individual capacity and as a Glenwood Police Officer, and

CITY OF GLENWOOD SPRINGS, as the city of Glenwood Spring Co.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs’ “Clarification Letter” (Doc. No. 15, filed

November 2, 2011), construed by this court as a motion for reconsideration of Judge Lewis T.

Babcock’s “Order to Dismiss in Part” filed on October 18, 2011. (Doc. No. 11.) 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion to reconsider or rescind

a previous court order. A litigant subject to an adverse judgment, and who seeks reconsideration

by the court of that adverse judgment, may “file either a motion to alter or amend the judgment

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or a motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(b).” See Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). Rule

59(e) applies when the motion for relief is filed within twenty-eight days of the order or

judgment; Rule 60(b) governs all other motions. 

Case 1:11-cv-01991-REB-KMT Document 18 Filed 11/03/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
2

The Court’s Order granting in part Defendants’ Motion for Entry of Protective Order was

entered on October 18, 2011. Therefore, because Plaintiffs’ present Motion was filed on

November 2, 2011, this court will consider Plaintiffs’ Motion under Rule 59(e).

Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is committed to

the court’s discretion. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997). The three

major grounds that justify reconsideration are: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2)

the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest

injustice. See Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiffs do not argue or demonstrate that there has been an intervening change in controlling

law, that there is new evidence, or that there is a need to correct clear error or to prevent

injustice.

Instead, the plaintiffs appear to request legal advice or clarification as to why their claims

against various Jane and John Doe defendants and the Garfield Sheriff’s Office have been

dismissed. To the extent that Plaintiffs do not understand the basis for, purpose of, or legal

ramifications of the Court’s Order dismissing various defendants, they may choose to obtain

counsel or legal advice. However, the court is not permitted to give legal advice to litigants. 

Accordingly, it is 

Case 1:11-cv-01991-REB-KMT Document 18 Filed 11/03/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 3
3

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Plaintiffs’ “Clarification Letter” or motion for

reconsideration (Doc. No. 15) is DENIED.

Dated this 3rd day of November, 2011.

Case 1:11-cv-01991-REB-KMT Document 18 Filed 11/03/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Christine M. Arguello

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02409-CMA-MJW

THERMAPURE, INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISASTER RESTORATION, INC., a Colorado corporation, and

RESTORATION LOGISTICS, INC., a Colorado entity,

Defendants.

ORDER RE [1] ENTRY OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION; AND

[2] DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE SUBJECT TO COURT’S

RETENTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Stipulation Re [1] Entry of

Permanent Injunction; and [2] Dismissal Without Prejudice Subject to Court’s Retention

to Enforce Settlement Agreement (Doc. # 15). Upon review of the filing and the case

file, the Court finds as follows:

WHEREAS, Plaintiff Thermapure, Inc. and Defendants Disaster Restoration, Inc.

and Restoration Logistics, Inc. have entered into a Settlement Agreement dated

November 23, 2011 (“Agreement”);

WHEREAS, based on the terms of the Agreement, the Parties have stipulated

that the Court shall enter the following orders:

Case 1:11-cv-02409-CMA-MJW Document 18 Filed 12/07/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
2

1) A permanent injunction shall be entered enjoining Defendants from

directly infringing, contributing to the infringement, or inducing

infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,327,812; and

2) The action will be dismissed without prejudice subject to the Court’s

retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Agreement.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. A permanent injunction shall be entered enjoining Defendants Disaster

Restoration, Inc. and Restoration Logistics, Inc. from directly infringing, contributing to

the infringement or inducing infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,327,812; and

2. The action against Defendants Disaster Restoration, Inc. and Restoration

Logistics, Inc. is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

3. The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Settlement

Agreement entered into between the Parties on November 23, 2011.

DATED: December 07 , 2011

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02409-CMA-MJW Document 18 Filed 12/07/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 32.2
                                                                    ------------


   CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION TO U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the accompanying Form 10-QSB of ZAP for the three months
ended March 31, 2004

William Hartman, Chief Financial Officer of ZAP, hereby certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, to my knowledge, that:

(1)  such Form Type of ZAP for the three months ended March 31, 2004,fully
     complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the
     Securities Exchange of 1934; and

(2)  the information contained in such Form 10-QSB of ZAP for the three months
     ended March 31, 2004, fairly presents, in all material respects, the
     financial condition and results of operations of ZAP.





/s/ William Hartman
----------------------
William Hartman
Chief Financial Officer


May 14, 2004
#### Bernard Wilson, as Guardian ad Litem of Eleanor Wilson, an Infant, et al., Plaintiffs, *v.*James Algeria et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County,

January 14, 1957.

*Griffing, Smith, Tasker & Lundberg*for plaintiffs.

*John E. Asch*for defendants.

L. Barron Hill, J.

The facts as alleged in the complaint indicate Eleanor Wilson, plaintiff, while a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by the defendant Smith, was injured as a result of a collision between Smith’s car and the defendant Algeria’s automobile. This accident occurred at about 7:45 p.m. Thereafter, at about 8:55 p.m. of the same day, plaintiff, while a passenger in an ambulance owned by the defendant De Freist and operated by defendant Busch, was further injured when the ambulance collided with an automobile owned and operated by the defendant Jarvis.

Defendant Jarvis moves to sever the cause of action relating to the first accident from that relating to the second. The complaint has alleged only one cause of action against all defendants. No motion is made under rule 90 of the Buies of Civil Practice to require plaintiffs to separately state and number the causes of action.

*521Section 212 of the Civil Practice Act permits plaintiff to join all persons in one action as defendants ‘ ‘ if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them would arise in the action. Judgment may he given according to their respective liabilities, against one or more defendants as may be found to be liable upon all the evidence, without regard to the party by whom it has been introduced.”

Assuming defendant Jarvis is liable to plaintiffs, his liability is only for the injuries arising or aggravated by the collision in which Jarvis was involved. The same is true for the defendants involved in the first collision. A common question of fact exists to be determined at the trial as to the extent of the damages suffered by plaintiffs in the first collision and those suffered by them in the second collision. It is patent that defendants individually will urge upon the trier of the facts that plaintiff Eleanor Wilson’s injuries were suffered, in part at least, as the result of the collision in which such individual defendant was not involved. It is, therefore, obvious that there should be but one trier of the facts of the situation involved in this action so that the liabilities, if any, of the respective defendants can be determined in fairness to all parties.

Movant asserts that he will be prejudiced if the actions are not severed. We hear much today concerning the sanctity of the jury trial in negligence actions. This court cannot conceive of a situation in which the role of one single jury would be more important to determine the issues presented so that justice is accorded all parties, plaintiffs and defendants.

Accordingly, the motion is denied. Submit order.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Christine M. Arguello

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01950-CMA-CBS

TERESA GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARAPAHOE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

J. GRAYSON ROBINSON, in his personal capacity,

DAVID WALCHER, in his personal capacity,

VINCE LINE, in his personal capacity,

DAVID WELLMAN, in his personal capacity,

TOM McNEVIN, in his personal capacity, and

MARK CAMPBELL, in his personal capacity,

Defendants.

ORDER OF RECUSAL

This matter is before me on a review of the file. Based on my personal and past

professional relationship with plaintiff’s counsel, I believe that I should recuse myself. 

It is, therefore,

ORDERED that the judge’s file be returned to the clerk and that the case be

reassigned by random draw.

DATED: July 28 , 2011

BY THE COURT:

________________________________

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-01950-RBJ-CBS Document 2 Filed 07/28/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1