### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J uly 09, 20 04 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1324 4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ IN RE: WILL C. DE AN, JR., Petitioner.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appl ic at ionf

or L eave to Fi le aS ec ond or Su cc es siv e Mot ionto V ac at e, S et A sid e, or Co rrec t Se nt en ce, 2 8 U.S.C. § § 2 25 5, 2 24 4( b) (3 )(A)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 9, 200 4) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , CA RN E S an d B A RKE T T , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. B Y T H E P A N E L: Purs uant t o 28 U . S. C. §§ 2 255 an d 22 44( b) (3 )( A ), a s am en de d by §§ 1 05 and 106 of the A ntiterrorism and Ef fective D eath Penalty

Ac t of 1996 (AE DP A) , W ill C. D ean, Jr. has filed an application seeking an order a utho rizing the district co urt t o c onsi de r a se co nd o r suc ce ssi ve m oti on t o va cate , se t a sid e, or c or re ct his fe de ra l se nte nc e, 28 U . S. C. § 22 55. S uc h auth or iz at ionm ay be gr an te d on ly

if thi s2

Co urt c er tif ie s th at the se co nd o r suc ce ssi ve m oti on c ont ai ns a c la im inv olv ing : (1 ) ne w ly dis co ve re d e vid en ce that, if pr ove n and v ie w ed

in lig ht o f the e vid en ce a s aw hol e, w oul d be suf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh b y cl ear an d c onvi nc ing e vid en ce that no r ea sona ble f ac tf ind er w oul d have f ound the m ovant g uil ty

of the of fe nse ; or (2) a newrule of constitutio nal law, m ade re troactive to cases on c oll at er al r ev ie wby

the S upr em e Co urt, that w as pr ev iou sly unavailable. 28 U . S. C. § 22 55. “ T he c ourt of appe al s m ay

auth or iz e the f

ili ng o f a se co nd o r s u c c e s s i v e ap p l i c a t i o no n l y i f i td e t e rmi n e s th a tth e a

p p l i c a t i o nmak e s ap r i ma facie showing that th e application satisfies the requirem ents of this su bsection.” 28 U. S. C. § 224 4(b)(3)(C ). Inhis appl ic at ion , D ean in dic at es that he w ish es to ra ise one c la im in a se co nd o r suc ce ssi ve § 22 55 m oti on, nam el y , that the dis tr ic t c ourt vi olate d hi s Sixth Am endm ent right to a jury trial by enhancing his sentence under the feder al Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s ba se d onhis le ad er shi p r ole in the of fe nse and h is r el ev an t conduct, when the f

acts suppo rting tho se guidelin e enhancem ents wer e neither m en tio ne d duri ng h is F ed . R. Cr im . P. 11 p le a co llo quy nor pr ove d to aj ur

y be y ond a re as ona ble doubt. D ean c ont en ds tha t hi s c la im r el ie s onane wr

ule of co nst itutio na l l aw , c iti ng the U nit ed S ta te s S upr em e Co urt’ s r ec en t op ini on i n Bl ak el y v. Wash in gt on , No. 0 2- 16 32 (U.S. Ju ne 24 , 20 04 ).3

InBl ak el y , the U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt r ev isi te d th e ru le in Appr en di v. N ewJe rs ey , 530 U . S. 466 , 490 , 120 S . Ct . 234 8, 236 2- 63, 147 L . E d. 2d 4 35 (2000), w hich held th at “ [o] ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fac t that inc re as es the pe na lty

f or ac ri m e be y ond the pr es cr ibe d st at uto ry m ax im um m ust b e s ub mi t t e dt o aju ry an dp r o v e db e yo n dar e a s o n ab l e d o ub t . ” B l a k e l y, N o. 02- 1632 , sli p op . a t 5. T he Co urt c onsi de re d whe the r the se nte nc ing pr oc ed ur e fo llo w ed

by c ourts i n th e St at e of

W as hin gto n de pr ive d B lake ly of his

“ fe de ra l c onst itutio na l r igh t t o have aj ur y de te rm ine be y ond a re as ona ble doubt a ll facts legally

essential to his s entence. ” Id. at 4. The state sentencing gu idelines schem e under w hich Blakely wa s sentenced perm itted sentencing j udges to depart upw ar d f ro m a“ standard ” se nte nc ing r an ge if the j udge f

ound “ subs tanti al and co m pe lli ng r ea sons j ust if

y ing an e xc ep tio na l se nte nc e. ” I d. a t 3 (c iti ng W as h. Rev . Cod e Ann . § 9 .94 A.12 0( 2) ). Blakely , having been charged w ith kid naping his estranged wife, pleaded guilt y to second-degree kidnapin g, a Class B fe lonyunder W ashingt on law that carr ie d ate n- y ear statut or y m ax im um se nte nc e. I d. a t 2 (c iti ng W as h. Re v. Co de A nn. §§ 9 A . 40. 030( 3) , 9A . 20. 021( 1) (b )) . W as hin gto n’ s S en te nc ing Re fo rm A ct , how ev er , spe ci fi ed

a“ standard

r an ge ” of

49 t o 53 m onths f

or Bl ak el y ’ s of

fe nse of se co nd- de gr ee kidna

pin g w ithaf

ir earm . I d. ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed ). A t se nte nc ing ,4

the c ourt r ej ec te d th is s tandard r an ge and i m

pose d an “ ex ce pti ona l se nte nc e” of 90 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t onthe gr ound that B lake ly

ha d a ct ed

w ith“ de lib er at e cru el ty,” a sta tu to ril y

en um erat edgro un d fo r de pa rtu re i n d om es ti c v io le nc e cas es . Id . a t 3 (c iti ng W as h. Re v. Co de A nn. § 9. 94A . 390( 2) (h )( iii )) . B lake ly obj ec te d to the trial court’ s sentencing p rocedure, and, in re spon se, the c ourt held a three-day be nc h he ar ing f

eatur ing te sti m ony

f ro m num er ous w itn es se s. I d. a t 4. A ft er the hearing, the c ourt issu ed 32 findin gs of fact, ultim ately rea ffirm ing its original de ci si on to im

po se th e 9 0- m on th en ha nc edsen te nc e. Id . O n a ppe al , Bl ak el y

arg ue d th at

the se nte nc ing pr oc ed

ur e de pr ive d hi m

of his r igh t t o have aj ur

y de te rm ine be y ond a re as ona ble doubt a ll fa ct s le ga lly es s en t i al t o h i s s en t en ce . Id . Th e s t at e ap p el l at e c o u rt s re je ct edBl ak el y’ s argum ent and affir

m ed. Id. at 4-5. O n certiorar i review , the United States Suprem e Court re versed in a 5-4 decision, holdin g that Blakely ’ s enhanced s en t en ce v i o l at edAp p re n d i . Id . a t9 . No t ab l y, th e C o u rtre je ct edth e s t at e’s ar gum en t tha t B lake ly ’ s c as e w as dis tin gui sha ble f ro m Appr en di b ec au se his 90- m onth se nte nc e did

not e xc ee d th e 10- y ear statut or y m ax im um f or Cl as s B fe lon ie s, e xpl ai nin g th at [o ] ur pr ec ed en ts m ak e cl ear . . . that the “ statut or y m ax im um ” fo r Appr en di p ur

pose s is the m ax im

um se nte nc e a j udge m ay

im pose solely on the basis o f the fa cts ref lected in the j ury

verdict or adm itted5

by the defendant. . . . In other wor ds, the rele vant “ statutory m axim um ” is not the m axim

um sentence a j udge m ay

im pose after fi ndi ng a ddi tio na l f

ac ts, but the m ax im

um he m ay im pose w ith out

any ad d i t i o n al fi n d i n g s . Wh en a ju d g e i n fl i ct s p u n i s h m en tth at th e ju ry’s ve rd ic t a lon e doe s no t a llo w , the j ur y ha s no t f ound a ll the f ac ts “ w hic h th e lawm ak es e sse nti al to the pun ish m en t , ” . . . and the j udge e x c e e d s h i s p r o p e r

au th o r i ty. Id. at 7 (em

phasis in original) (citations om itted). I n a footnote, the Court stressed that “ [the F ed er al G uid el ine s are not be fo re us, and w e expr es s no opi nio n on the m . ” I d. a t 9 n. 9. N o c ourt ha s y et

de te rm ine d whe the r Bl ak el y c re at ed ane wr ule of co nst itutio na l l awm ad e re tr oa ct ive to ca se s onc oll at er al r ev ie w . F or ane wr ule to b e re tr oa ct ive to ca se s onc oll at er al r ev ie wf or pur pose s of auth or iz ing ase co nd or successive § 2255 m otion or 28 U. S. C. § 225 4 petitio n, the Suprem e Court its el f m ust m ak e the r

ule r etro ac tiv e. T y le r v. Ca in, 533 U . S. 656 , 662 -6 3, 121 S. Ct . 247 8, 248 2, 150 L . E d. 2d 6 32 ( 2001 ). I t i s no t e noug h th at ane wr ule of co nst itutio na l l awis ap pli ed r etro ac tiv el y

by thi s C ourt or

that i t satis fi es the cr ite ri a fo r re tr oa ct ive appl ic at ionse t f orth b y the S upr em e Co ur

t i n T ea gue v. L an e, 489 U . S. 288 , 109 S . Ct . 106 0, 103 L . E d. 2d 3 34 ( 1989 ). I n r e Jos hua , 224 F. 3d 1 281, 128 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) . A ddi tio na lly , the S upr em e Co urt do es not m ak e a ru le r etro ac tiv e thr oughdic tum . T y le r, 533 U . S. a t 66 3 n. 4, 121 S . Ct . a t 24 82 n. 4. Mu lti ple c as es c an , tog ethe r, m ak e a ru le r etro ac tiv e, but onl y if the hol din gs6

in those c as es ne ce ssari ly dic ta te r etro ac tiv ity

of the ne wr ule . I d. a t 66 6, 121 S. Ct . a t 24 84. Regardless of whether Blakely established a “ new r

ule of constitu tional law” within the m eaning of §§ 22 44(b)(2)(A ) and 2255, the Suprem e Court has not expresslydeclare d Blakely to be retroac tive to cases on collateral re view. See ge ne ra lly Bl ak el y , N o. 02- 1632 , sli p op . a t 1- 18; T y le r, 533 U . S. a t 66 2- 63, 121 S. Ct . a t 24 82. Mo re ove r, no c om bin at ionof

c as es ne ce ssari ly

dic ta te r etro ac tiv ity of the Bl ak el y

de ci sio n. T y le r, 533 U . S. a t 66 6, 121 S . Ct . a t 24 84. B lake ly it se lf wa s decided in the context of a direc t appeal, and the Suprem e Court has not since applied it to a ca se on collateral re view. See id. I n fact, the Suprem e Court has str ongl y im pli ed that B lake ly

is not to be appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y . T he sam e day the Su pr em e Co urt de ci de d B lake ly , the Co urt a lso iss ue d it s de ci sio n inS ch ri ro v. Sum m er lin , N o. 03- 526 (U . S. Jun e 24, 200 4) , hol din g th at Ri ng v . A ri zo na , 536 U . S. 584 , 122 S . Ct . 242 8, 153 L . E d. 2d 5 56 ( 2002 ), w hic h e xte nde d a ppl ic at ionof Appr en di t o f

ac ts i nc re as ing ade fe ndant’ s se nte nc e fr om li fe im pr iso nm en t t o de ath, is not

r et ro ac tiv e to c as es on c oll at er al r ev ie w . S um m er lin , N o. 03- 526, sli p op. a t 10 ; se e al so B lake ly , N o. 02- 1632 , sli p op . a t 11 ( O ’ Co nnor , J. , dis se nti ng) (rec ogni zing the Court’ s hold ing in Sum m erlin “ that Ring (and a fortiori Appr en di) doe s no t a

ppl y r etro ac tiv el y

on h ab ea s r ev ie w ”) ; se e al so M cC oy v.7

U nit ed S ta te s, 266 F . 3d 1 245, 125 6- 58 ( 11 Ci r. 200 1) ( hol din g th at Appr en di i s th not r etro ac tiv e to c as es on c oll at er al r ev ie w ); I n r e Jos hua , 224 F . 3d at 12 83 (d eny ing the r etro ac tiv e ap pli catio n of Appr en di t o pe rm it se co nd o r suc ce ssi ve habe as pe tit ion s) . Be ca

use Bl ak el y , li ke Ri ng, is ba se d onan e xte nsi on o f Appr en di, D ean c annot

sho wthat the S upr em e Co urt ha s m ad e that de ci sio n retroac tive to cases alrea dy final on direct re view. A ccordingly , D ean’ s propos ed cl ai m f ai ls t o satis fy

the statut or

y c ri te ri a. 28 U . S. C. § 22 55. D ean ha s f

ai le d to m ak e a pr im a fa ci e show ing of the e xis te nc e of

e ith er of the gr ound s se t f

orth i n 28 U . S. C. § 22 55. A cc or din gly , his appl ic at ionf or le av e to fil e a s eco ndor s uc ces si ve m ot io n i s DENIED.