UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CLAYTON L. RIGGINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 01-1769

STEEL TECHNOLOGIES,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.

James C. Fox, Senior District Judge.

(CA-00-128-7-F)

Argued: September 23, 2002

Decided: October 17, 2002

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge

Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Michael W. Patrick, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Donald E. Britt, Jr., BRITT LAW FIRM, Wilmington,

North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Clayton Riggins appeals from an order of the district court dismissing with prejudice his action against his former employer, Steel Technologies. The district court dismissed Riggins’ action as a sanction for

failure to obey an order to provide or permit discovery under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (2000). Because the district court failed to articulate the reasons for its decision, we are unable to review its ruling. We

therefore vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I.

In 1997, Clayton Riggins was fired from his job with Steel Technologies. On June 29, 2000, he initiated this action by filing a pro se

complaint, alleging that, in firing him, Steel Technologies discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2002). 

After Riggins failed to attend one scheduled deposition (he eventually did appear for a later deposition) or answer interrogatories and

document requests, Steel Technologies filed a motion for sanctions

and a motion to compel. The magistrate judge scheduled a hearing on

these motions for January 11, 2001. Riggins failed to appear at the

hearing. The magistrate judge then entered an order granting Steel

Technologies’ motions — ordering Riggins to respond to the interrogatories and document requests and assessing Riggins $3,114.00

(expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by Steel Technologies) for his

previous failure to attend the first scheduled deposition. 

On January 22, 2001, Steel Technologies filed a second motion for

sanctions, alleging that Riggins failed to comply with the magistrate

judge’s order, and requesting that Riggins’ complaint be dismissed

with prejudice. Riggins responded with a request for additional time

to find a lawyer to represent him, which the magistrate judge denied.

On February 15, 2001, Steel Technologies filed a third motion for

sanctions, reiterating its request that Riggins’ complaint be dismissed

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with prejudice. On the same day, Riggins appealed the magistrate

judge’s order denying him additional time to the district court. The

district court denied the appeal, finding it untimely and the magistrate

judge’s order not clearly erroneous. On March 20, 2001, Riggins filed

a response to Steel Technologies’ motion for sanctions, attempting to

explain his failure to respond to the discovery requests. 

Eight days later, on March 28, 2001, the magistrate judge issued

a short (1-1/4 page) memorandum & recommendation ("M&R") that

the motion for sanctions be granted, and Riggins’ complaint be dismissed with prejudice. The court noted that Riggins had failed to

respond to Steel Technologies’ discovery requests despite the court’s

order, that Riggins had failed to attend the first scheduled deposition,

and that Riggins had failed to pay the court-ordered sanctions. The

court concluded by stating:

When a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, one of the sanctions that may be imposed is dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (2000).

In this court’s opinion, the Plaintiff’s failure to abide by the

Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and his failure

to obey the court’s order to provide discovery warrants dismissal of his claim. 

Riggins filed an objection to the sanctions. In two short paragraphs,

the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation,

explaining:

After an independent and thorough review of the Magistrate

Judge’s M&R and a de novo review of the record, the court

concludes that the M&R is correct and in accordance with

law. Consequently, the court hereby adopts the Magistrate

Judge’s M&R . . . . Therefore, the defendant’s motion for

sanctions is allowed, and the plaintiff’s complaint hereby is

dismissed with prejudice. 

Riggins timely appealed. 

II.

Riggins argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint without applying the four-factor test required

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in this circuit before a sanction of default may be imposed under Rule

37(b)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Rule 37 permits a court to impose sanctions, including dismissal of

a case with prejudice, if a party fails to comply with a discovery

order. Hatchcock v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 40 (4th

Cir. 1995). Generally, we review an imposition of sanctions for abuse

of discretion. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey

Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976). When the sanction imposed is

a default judgment, however, "the range of discretion is more narrow

than when a court imposes less severe sanctions." Hatchcock, 53 F.3d

at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Richards & Associates,

Inc., 872 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 1989), we established four factors that a

court must consider before imposing default judgment as a sanction.

The factors are:

(1) whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith; (2)

the amount of prejudice his noncompliance caused his

adversary, which necessarily includes an inquiry into the

materiality of the evidence he failed to produce; (3) the need

for deterrence of the particular sort of noncompliance; and

(4) the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions. 

Id. at 92 (citing Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494,

503-06 (4th Cir. 1977)). 

In the instant case, neither the magistrate judge, nor the district

court made any findings relating to the four Mutual Federal factors.

Neither court discussed bad faith, prejudice, the need for deterrence,

or the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions. It is particularly difficult

on the record before us to discern any basis for a finding of either bad

faith or prejudice. Consequently, we are unable to assess whether the

district court acted within its discretion when it dismissed Riggins’

complaint with prejudice as a sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(C). 

If, in exercising its discretion, a court determines to require a pro

se litigant to follow the rules of civil procedure or suffer a default

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judgment, it seems only fair that the court itself explain the rationale

for its decision to render the default judgment, by following the procedure established in Mutual Federal, before imposing this drastic

sanction. Because the district court did not follow the procedure set

forth in Mutual Federal or apply any part of its four-factor test to the

circumstances of this case, we vacate the default judgment order and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

Except for attending a twice-rescheduled deposition after earlier

refusals to do so, the plaintiff in this case has failed to comply with

every other duty imposed on him by the district court, including the

district court’s scheduling order for the case and its order requiring

him to pay sanctions for his failures in discovery. He has failed to

supply any answers to interrogatories and to file any response to a

request for documents. When the defendant filed a motion to compel

discovery and a motion for sanctions, the plaintiff failed to attend the

hearing. In short, despite the entry of orders and notices necessary for

the preparation of this case for trial, the plaintiff has frustrated the district court and defendant at every step. 

While I agree that it would have facilitated our review had the district court followed our procedure, set forth in Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Richards & Associates, Inc., 872 F.2d 88 (4th

Cir. 1989), in the particular circumstances of this case, I cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in determining that

the plaintiff had forfeited his right to prosecute this case further and,

therefore, in dismissing the case. I would, accordingly, affirm.

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