IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2019-CP-00598-COA RONALD WILSON A/K/A RONALD N. WILSON APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/14/2019 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RONALD W ILSON (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/07/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND C. WILSON, JJ. C. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Ronald W ilson appeals f r o m the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial and dism issal of his m otion f

o r post-conviction relief

(PCR). Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. This appeal stem s f rom W ilson’s second PCR m otion, which in turn s e eks r elief f rom two guilty

pleas W ilson entered in March 2017 on separate charges f or sim ple assault on a law e nf orcem ent of

f icer and f elony shoplif

ting. O n Novem

ber 8, 2 006, a Madison County grand jury indicted W ilson f o r sim ple assault o n a law enf

orcem ent of

f icer, which allegedly occurred on June 5, 2006. On March 3, 2010, a M adison County grand jury a gain indictedW i lson—this tim e f or f elony shoplif

ting, which allegedly occurred on Septem ber 11, 2009.
W i lson, represented by counsel, pled guilty to both of f e nses on March 22, 2017. During his plea hearing, the circuit court f o u nd that W i lson’s guilty pleas were knowingly , intelligently , and voluntarily entered. T he circuit court sentenced W ilson to serve f ive y ears f o r the sim ple assault charge and ten y ears f o r the f elony shoplif ting charge. These sentences were set to

run consecutively and ordered to be served i n the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections. ¶3. On February 26, 2018, W ilson f iled his f irst PCR m otion. W ilson contended that he

was entitled to an ev i d e n t i a ry hearing because “[ t]he tim e lim itation had r[ u]n o ut.” The circuit court dism issed W ilson’s PCR m otion on March 20, 2018, f i nding that W ilson waived his claim s by

pleading guilty . W ilson did not appeal this dism issal. ¶4. W i lson f

ile d a s e c ond P CR m otion on February 21, 2019. 1 In this m otion, W ilson asserted that “ [ t]he court erred in accepting petitioner’s g uil t y p lea[ s] and s e ntencing petitioner on May 22, 2017

. . . when the statute of lim itation[ s] [ had] expired

. . . .” W ilson also asserted that he received inef f ective assistance of counsel. On M arch 14, 2 0 1 9 , the circuit court denied and dism issed W ilson’s second PCR m otion on the grounds that (1) the second PCR m o tion was successive-writ barred; (2) both of W i lson’s prosecutions had “com m enced” within the applicable two-y ear statute of lim itations; (3) W i lson’s knowing, intelligent, a nd volunt ary guilty pleas waived his right to raise a n y statute-of -lim itations issues; a nd (4) W i lson f ailed to present af

f ida v i t s o t h e r than his o wn to support his

1 Wilso n f

iled b o th o f

h is P C R m o tio n s p ro se. 2inef

f ective-assistance-of

-counsel claim

. ¶5. W i lson now appeals f rom the circuit court’s judgm ent. On appeal, W ilson re-urges his a rgum ents regarding the statute of lim itations and a l l e g ed inef f ective assistance of

c o u n s e l

. Finding no error, we af f irm the circuit c ourt’s denial a nd d ism issal of W ilson’s second PCR m otion. S TANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6. This Court reviews the denial or dism issal of a PCR m otion f

or abuse o f discretion. Hughes v. State , 106 So. 3d 836, 837 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). “W e will only r everse if the trial court’s d ecision is clearly erroneous.” Id. ( citing Crosby v. S tate , 16 S o. 3d 74, 77 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id

. DISCUSSION ¶7. Under the Unif

orm P ost-Conviction Coll a t e r a l R e l i e f A c t , any order d eny ing or dism issing a PCR m otion is a bar to a second or s uccessive PCR m otion. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015). “Mississippi statutory law grants each m ovant ‘one bite at the apple when requesting p o st-conviction relief .’” Hayes v
. S

tate , 282 So. 3d 1 185, 1187 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Dobbs v. State , 18 S o. 3d 295, 298 (¶9 ) ( M i s s . Ct. App. 2009)); cf. Fluker v. State , 170 So. 3d 471, 475 ( ¶9) ( Miss. 2015) (noting that “res judicata

concerns attendant to a successive m otion f or P C R a re governed by the statutory successive-pleadings bar”). W ilson previously f iled an u nsuccessf

ul PCR m otion in 2018, raising the sam e statute-of

- lim itations argum ent he asserts here. H is current m otion is theref ore successive-writ barred, and he cannot relitigate this issue. See Fluker , 170 So. 3d

3a t 475 (¶10) (apply ing section 99-39-23(6) to bar successive PCR m otion that challeng e d

sam e revocation decision as prior PCR m otion). ¶8. As to W ilson’s claim that he received i nef f ective assistance of c ounsel, we recognize that “errors af

f ecting ‘f undam ental rights’ m ay be excepted f rom procedural bars.” Rowland

v. State , 42 S o . 3 d 503, 505-06 (¶7) (Miss. 2010). “Under ‘extraordinary circum stances,’ inef f ective assistance o f counsel can constitute an exception t o [ procedural bars].” Morales

v. State , No. 2018-CP-00737-COA, 2019 W L 3562031, at * 5 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2019) (citations om i tted), cert. de n i e d , O r der, No. 2018-CT-00737-SCT (Miss. Feb. 27, 2020); see also Hayes , 282 So. 3d at 1188 (¶9) (citing Bev i l l v. State , 669 S o. 2d 14, 17 (Miss. 1996)). However, “the m ere assertion of a constitutional right violation does not trigger the exception.” Evans v. S t a t e , 115 So. 3d 879, 881 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation m ark om itted) (quoting W i cker v. State , 16 So. 3d 7 06, 708 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). ¶9. Here, W ilson has f ailed t o o f f er m ore than a “m ere assertion,” based only on his own af f idavit, f o r h i s argum e nt that h e received inef f ective assistance of counsel. As such, we f ind this issue lacks m erit. S e e Vitela v. State , 183 So. 3d 104, 108 (¶14) (Miss. C t

. App. 2015) (stating that a claim of inef f e ctive assistance o f counsel s u p p o rted o nly by the

m ovant’s own af

f idavit f ails to m eet the pleading requirem ents of the PCR statute). CONCLUSION ¶10. Upon review , w e f i n d that the c ircuit c o urt did not err in deny ing and dism issing
W i lson’s second PCR m o tion. W ilson’s PCR m otion is s u ccessive-writ barred. W ilson has

4also f

ailed to support his inef

f ective-assistance-of

-counsel claim with m ore than h i s o w n b are assertions. W e accordingly af f i rm the circuit court’s judgm e n t. ¶11. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL AND LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN P A RT AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN O P I N I O N . M c D O N ALD, J ., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

5