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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

October 2, 2018

v No. 338887

Wayne Circuit Court

CHRISTINA WALKER, LC No. 16-005679-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and TUKEL, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

Defendant appeals as of right her bench trial convictions of intentional discharge of a 

firearm at a building, MCL 750.234b, three counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. 

Defendant was sentenced to four years’ probation for the intentional discharge of a firearm at a 

building and three felonious assault convictions, and a two years’ imprisonment for felonyfirearm. We affirm. 

On appeal, defendant does not directly seek a new trial, but rather, seeks a remand to the 

trial court so that the trial court can conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether she is 

entitled to a new trial. Specifically, defendant argues that her case should be remanded to the 

trial court on the basis of newly discovered evidence that Demika Lamb, the prosecution’s key 

witness, gave false testimony at defendant’s trial. We disagree. 

Generally, an issue must be raised before, addressed, and decided by the lower court in 

order to be preserved for appellate review. People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 

376, 382; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). Defendant failed to argue in the trial court that, based on newly 

discovered evidence, she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in order to develop the record in 

support of her claim that she is entitled to a new trial. Therefore, defendant did not preserve the 

issue for appellate review. 

This Court reviews unpreserved issues for plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial 

rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Under the plain error 

standard, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., 

it was clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 

763. “The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error 

affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id. Even if all three requirements are met, 
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reversal is only warranted when the plain error resulted in an innocent defendant’s conviction, or 

it “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” People 

v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). 

Defendant never filed a motion for a new trial in the trial court. As a result, defendant 

cannot demonstrate plain error affecting her substantial rights because the trial court never made 

a ruling in regard to defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 

evidence. Further, this Court cannot consider defendant’s evidence in support of her motion to 

remand because her motion was denied by this Court. MCR 7.210(A)(1). Nonetheless, this 

Court will analyze defendant’s arguments under the four-factor test articulated in People v Cress, 

468 Mich 678; 664 NW2d 174 (2003), as it seemingly appears that defendant intended to request 

a new trial as opposed to a remand for an evidentiary hearing. However, even assuming 

arguendo that defendant did request a new trial, and that this Court could consider the evidence 

that she now presents on appeal, the evidence does not support defendant’s argument that she is 

entitled to a new trial. 

A new trial may be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence if the defendant 

can show: 

(1) [T]he evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the 

newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using 

reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) 

the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Cress, 468 Mich at 

692.] 

The defendant bears the burden of satisfying all four requirements. People v Rao, 491 Mich 271, 

279; 815 NW2d 105 (2012). “The discovery that testimony introduced at trial was perjured may 

be grounds for a new trial.” People v Mechura, 205 Mich App 481, 483; 517 NW2d 797 (1994). 

However, a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is not regarded with 

favor, Rao, 491 Mich at 279-80, and newly discovered evidence in the form of recanted 

testimony is traditionally considered suspect and untrustworthy, People v Patmore, 264 Mich 

App 139, 153; 693 NW2d 385 (2004), quoting People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 559; 496 

NW2d 336 (1992). 

The evidence that defendant proffers does not show that Lamb lied at trial. At the outset, 

it is important to note that not only did defendant fail to provide the prosecution with a copy of 

the audio recording of the supposed conversation between Lamb and defendant’s daughter, 

Tanyetta Thomas, the transcript is riddled with errors, and is difficult to comprehend. Without 

the necessary identifying information, it is impossible to know whether the conversation actually 

took place. More importantly, nowhere in the transcript does Lamb admit that she lied at trial, or 

that she is in a romantic relationship with defendant’s ex-husband, David Walker, Sr. When read 

in its entirety, the transcript is generally consistent with Lamb’s testimony at trial. Lamb repeats 

several times that defendant was involved in the shooting. Lamb mentioned the laundromat fight 

as a catalyst for the shooting, and repeatedly stated that defendant broke her windows. While 

Lamb did admit that she lied at trial when she testified that her phone was dead because she did 

not want to call the police, that fact does not mean she lied about defendant’s involvement with 

the shooting. Neither does the fact that defendant was willing not to testify at trial if defendant 
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and Walker, Sr. paid to fix her windows. This evidence actually supports Lamb’s testimony as it 

would be odd to ask defendant and Walker, Sr. to pay for her windows if they never shot at her 

house. 

The affidavits that defendant attached to her offer of proof are no more supportive of her 

arguments than the transcript of the phone conversation. Thomas’ and Monique Jenkin’s 

affidavits do not support defendant’s arguments because both merely state that Lamb recanted 

her testimony, but the transcript does not include a recantation. Neither does David Walker, Jr.’s 

affidavit support defendant’s argument that Lamb committed perjury at defendant’s trial. 

Walker, Jr. does not assert that he overheard Lamb recant her testimony, and only states that 

Lamb started dating Walker, Sr. in the weeks leading up to his trial. Further, the fact that 

Walker, Sr. allegedly paid Lamb to not appear at his trial does not support defendant’s allegation 

that Lamb perjured herself at defendant’s trial. 

Even assuming that the transcript of the cell phone conversation was newly discovered 

not cumulative, and defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced 

the evidence at trial, defendant’s argument still fails because the evidence on retrial would 

probably not cause a different result. See Rao, 491 Mich at 279. “[I]mpeachment evidence may 

be grounds for a new trial” so long as it satisfies the Cress factors and there is a “material, 

exculpatory connection . . . between the newly discovered evidence and significantly important 

evidence presented at trial.” People v Grissom, 492 Mich 296, 299-300; 821 NW2d 50 (2012). 

However, newly discovered impeachment evidence relating to collateral matters is not a proper 

basis for a new trial. Id. 

Arguably, the evidence that Lamb was willing to not testify at trial if she was given 

money to pay for her broken windows—the only assertion that is supported by the phone call 

transcript—would call Lamb’s credibility into question. However, defendant fails to argue that 

Lamb’s willingness to not testify is general credibility evidence that would support an inference 

that Lamb had a tendency to lie, but argues that it is evidence that Lamb made a false statement 

at trial. However, there is nothing exculpatory about this impeachment evidence. Even if the 

veracity of the impeachment evidence were accepted, it would not shed light on whether 

defendant shot at Lamb’s house. It would actually support Lamb’s testimony that defendant and 

Walker, Sr. shot at her house – why else would Lamb want defendant and Walker, Sr. to pay for 

her windows? Thus, the impeachment evidence would not make a different result probable upon 

retrial because Lamb never recanted her testimony that defendant and Walker, Sr. shot her house 

on May 18, 2016. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly 

discovered evidence. Furthermore, Carter and Jordan largely corroborated Lamb’s testimony. 

Specifically, both Jordan and Carter testified that they saw defendant and Walker, Sr. outside 

their house right before the shooting began. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Jonathan Tukel