alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32









CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Golden Cycle Gold Corporation (the Company) does hereby certify with respect to the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003 (the Report) that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:  April 14, 2004

/s/ R. Herbert Hampton__________

R. Herbert Hampton

Chief Executive Officer





Dated:  April 14, 2004

/s/ R. Herbert Hampton__________

R. Herbert Hampton

Chief Financial Officer



The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 4Federal Reserve Bank of: ClevelandFilings received during the week ending August 5, 2006FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodSKY BANK                                                                                                                Foreign BranchSky Bank, Salineville, Ohio, to establish a foreign branch in GeorgeTown, Grand Cayman Island, Cayman Islands, pursuant to Section 211.3(b)(2) of Regulation KNewspaper: Not applicableFederal Register: Not applicable
#### In the Matter of Karen E. Fowler, Appellant, v Oswaldo Rivera, Respondent.

[745 NYS2d 457]

In a consolidated child custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (McElligott, J.), entered February 20, 2001, as, after a hearing, denied her respective petitions for sole custody of each of the subject children and awarded joint custody to the parties.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the mother’s petitions for sole custody are granted.

The sole criterion in a custody case is the “best interests of the child and what will best promote [his or her] welfare and happiness” *(Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 171 [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see Lincoln v Lincoln,*24 NY2d 270, 272; *Prete v Prete,*193 AD2d 804, 805). An award of joint custody is appropriate only where the parties involved are relatively stable, amicable parents who can behave in a mature, civilized fashion *(see Braiman v Braiman,*44 NY2d 584, 589-590). Further, the parties “must be capable of cooperating in making decisions on matters relating to the care and welfare of the children” *(Trolf v Trolf,*126 AD2d 544).

It is well settled that this Court’s authority in custody determinations is as broad as that of the hearing court *(see Matter of Louise E.S. v W. Stephen S.,*64 NY2d 946, 947). Moreover, an appellate court may not allow a custody determination to stand where it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record *(see Coyne v Coyne,*150 AD2d 573, 574; *Skolnick v Skolnick,*142 AD2d 570). While mindful of the hearing court’s advantage in being able to observe the demeanor and assess *410the credibility of the witnesses *(see Matter of Louise E.S. v W. Stephen S., supra),*nevertheless, the joint custody award cannot be justified on the basis of this record. Indeed, the evidence adduced at the hearing demonstrated that joint custody is not appropriate under the circumstances, and that the mother is the more fit custodian of the children.

Accordingly, the Family Court erred in denying the mother’s petitions for sole custody. Santucci, J.P., Altman, S. Miller and McGinity, JJ., concur.
1 “[#21]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific

paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this convention

throughout this order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-02456-REB-MJW

ORLANDO J. GUERRERO,

Plaintiff,

v.

PATRICK R. DONAHOE, in his Official Capacity as Postmaster General of the U.S.

POSTAL SERVICE,

Defendant.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Blackburn, J.

The matter is before me on the Stipulation of Dismissal [#21]1

 filed January 18,

2012. After reviewing the stipulation and the file, I conclude that the stipulation should

be approved and that this action should be dismissed with prejudice.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 

1. That the Stipulation of Dismissal [#21] filed January 18, 2012, is

APPROVED;

2. That the Trial Preparation Conference set for September 28, 2012, is

VACATED;

3. That the jury trial set to commence October 22, 2012, is VACATED; and

Case 1:11-cv-02456-REB-MJW Document 22 Filed 01/18/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
2

4. That this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE with the parties to pay

their own attorney fees and costs. 

Dated January 18, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

Case 1:11-cv-02456-REB-MJW Document 22 Filed 01/18/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
Case 1:09-cv-00075-SM   Document 4   Filed 03/25/09   Page 1 of 1
#### CHARLES WIRTH REALTY & INVESTMENT CO., Inc., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. TROPICAL CLOTHING & MFG. CO., Inc., Defendant (BONDHOLDERS’ PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE, Intervenors and Appellee).

No. 16065.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans,

June 10,1935.

For former opinion, see 160 So. 455.

Buck, Walshe & Buck and Woollen H. Walshe, all of New Orleans, for appellant.

, Lavinius L. Williams, of New Orleans, for appellee.

WESTERFIELD, Judge.

A reconsideration of this case convinces us of the correctness of our former decree.

Eor the reasons assigned, our original opinion and decree in this case are reinstated as the final judgment of this court.

Original decree reinstated.

JANVIER, J., concurs.

JANVIER,. Judge

(concurring).

I agree with my associates in their view that on April 5, 1934, the taxes in question, were not due, and, consequently, I concur in the decree.

I believe, however, that the statement in the original opinion that, in all instances, taxes in the parish of Orleans become due on June 1st of each year is not correct, and I write this merely to call attention to my belief- that such taxes are not due on June 1st unless, at that time, in compliance with section 31 of Act No. 170 of 1898, the assessment rolls have been filed with the recorder of mortgages. That statute provides in section 34:

> “That said filing in the recorder’s office shall be full notice to each tax-payer and to each other person whom it may in any manner concern, that the listing, assessment and valuation of the taxable property has been completed, that the tax rolls are on file in the sheriff or tax collector’s office and in the office where the mortgage records are kept; that the said taxes are due and collectible, as provided by law.”

Although in section 31 it is made the duty of the assessors to file the said rolls in the office of the recorder of mortgages on June 1st, section 34, it will be noted, provides, as I interpret it, that the taxes do not become due until the said rolls are filed. Therefore, if on June 1st the rolls have not been filed, the taxes are not due and do not become due until the filing of the said rolls in the office of the recorder of mortgages.

However, in no case can taxes become due prior to June 1st, and therefore in the instant case the taxes were not due when the sale was made.

I concur in the decree.'
**Exhibit 99.3**

Reports on Internal Control

**MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING**

The management of BCE Inc. (BCE) is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting. Our internal control over financial reporting is a process designed under the supervision of the President and ChiefExecutive Officer and the Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of BCE to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordancewith generally accepted accounting principles.     Due to its inherent limitations, internal control over financial reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements on****a timely basis. Also, projections of any evaluation of the effectiveness to future periods aresubject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.     Management evaluated, under the supervision of and with the participation of the President and Chief Executive Officer and the Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer, the effectiveness of our internalcontrol over financial reporting as of December 31, 2009, based on the framework and criteria established in *Internal Control – Integrated Framework* issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).Management’s evaluation of and conclusion on the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting did not include an evaluation of the internal control over financial reporting of BCE’s wholly-owned subsidiary The Source(Bell) Electronics Inc. (The Source). We acquired the assets held by The Source on July 1, 2009. The Source’s contribution to our consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2009 was less than 2% of consolidated revenuesand less than 1% of consolidated earnings. Additionally, at December 31, 2009,The Source’s current assets and current liabilities were 7% and 2% of consolidated current assets and current liabilities, respectively, and its long-term assets and long-term liabilities were both less than 1% of consolidated long-term assetsand long-term liabilities.      Based on that evaluation, which excluded The Source’s internal control over financial reporting, the President and Chief Executive Officer and the Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer concluded thatour internal control over financial reporting was effective as of December 31, 2009. There were no material weaknesses that have been identified by management as of December 31, 2009.     Our internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2009 has been audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Independent Registered Chartered Accountants, who also audited our consolidated financial statementsfor the year ended December 31, 2009. Deloitte & Touche issued an unqualified opinion on the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting.

**(signed) George A. Cope**
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Senior District Judge Richard P. Matsch

Date: March 28, 2013

Courtroom Deputy: J. Chris Smith

FTR Technician: Kathy Terasaki

____________________________________________________________________________________

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02515-RPM

YOLANDA HANSON, Robert M. Liechty

Plaintiff,

v.

COLORADO JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, Stephanie L. Scoville

4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROBATION DEPARTMENT, Jeannette W. Kornreich

Defendant.

____________________________________________________________________________________

COURTROOM MINUTES

____________________________________________________________________________________

Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment

10:28 a.m. Court in session.

Plaintiff present.

Court’s preliminary remarks.

Argument by Mr. Liechty.

Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law made as stated on record.

ORDERED: Motion for Summary Judgment [12], is granted.

10:43 a.m. Court in recess.

Hearing concluded. Total time: 15 min.

Case 1:11-cv-02515-RPM Document 20 Filed 03/28/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Honorable Marcia S. Krieger

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02324-MSK-BNB

NEAL EASON,

Plaintiff,

v.

BELGIAN ELECTRONIC SORTING TECHNOLOGY USA, INC., a Colorado corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER REGARDING CUSTODY OF EXHIBITS AND DEPOSITIONS USED IN

EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND TRIALS

IT IS ORDERED that, as to any exhibits and depositions used during evidentiary

hearings or trials, counsel for the parties shall retrieve the originals of such exhibits and

depositions from the Court following the evidentiary hearing or trial, and shall retain same for 60

days beyond the later of the time to appeal or conclusion of any appellate proceedings. The

Court will retain its copy of the exhibits for the same time period after which the documents will

be destroyed.

DATED this 22nd day of September, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

Marcia S. Krieger

United States District Judge
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

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orpr ot e c t i on unde rC A T f a i l e d t o pr e s e nte vi de nc e of c h a n g e dc o u n tryc o n d itio n s in M e x ic o th a t ar e m a te r ia l to p e titio n e ra n dh is c ir c u m s tan c e s . S ee 8 C .F .R . § 1 0 0 3 .2 ( c ) ( 3 ) ( ii) ; N uru v. G on zales , 404 F . 3d 1207, 12 16 (9th C i r. 20 05 ) ( ho l di ng thatC A T appl i cantm ustes t abl i sh thati ti s m ore l i kel y than n otthathe w ou l d b e t ortured i f r em ov ed t o h i s nat i ve coun try ). P et i t i on erthere fore fa i l ed t o est abl i sh pri m a f ac i e e l i gi bi l i ty f

or prot ec t i on un der CAT. W e la c kju r is d ic tio n to r e v ie w p e titio n e r ’s c o n te n tio n th a t h e is e n title dto a s y l um and w i thhol di ng of r e m ova l be c aus e he f

a i l e d t o r a i s e thi s c ont e nt i on b e f o r e th e B I A a n dh e th e r e b yf a ile dto e x h au s t h is a d m in is tr a tiv e r e m e d ie s . See 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 5 2 ( d ) ( 1 ) ; B a rr o n v . A s h c r o ft , 3 5 8 F .3 d6 7 4 , 6 7 7 - 7 8 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 4 ) . M oreover, pet i t i on er ’ s c l ai m - thathe w as ent i t l ed t o asy l um and w i thh ol di ng re l i ef ba s e d on be i ng aM e xi c an a l i e n w ho w oul d be t ar ge t e d upon r e turni ng hom e f r om the U ni t ed S t at es - l ac ks m er i tbecause thi s does notqu al i fyas a c og ni zabl e s oci al grou p, and thu s, coul d n otsupp orta grantof as ylum or w i thh ol di ng of re l i ef . See08- 71222 3 D el ga do -O rt i

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* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-11047 Summary Calendar

RICHARD ALLEN SWARTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES; GARY SWAIN, Hearing Officer; ERIC TRAINER, Parole Officer, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:94-CV-2793-G

- - - - - - - - - - June 12, 1997 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHE’ and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Richard Allen Swartz, Texas inmate #93108227, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). The PLRA requires a prisoner appealing IFP in a civil action to pay the full amount of the filing fee, $105. As Swartz does not have funds for immediate payment of this fee, he is assessed an initial partialNo. 96-11047 - 2 - filing fee of $57.17, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Following payment of the initial partial filing fee, funds shall be deducted from Swartz’s prisoner account until the full filing fee is paid. See § 1915(b)(2). IT IS ORDERED that Swartz pay the appropriate initial filing fee to the Clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Swartz shall authorize the appropriate prison authorities to withdraw this fee from his trust fund account in accordance with their policy and local procedures and to forward the fee to the Clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Swartz’s inmate account shall collect the remainder of the $105 filing fee and forward for payment, in accordance with § 1915(b)(2), to the Clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of Texas each time the amount in Swartz’s account exceeds $10, until the appellate filing fee is paid. Swartz challenges the dismissal of his civil rights complaint by arguing that the district court erred by dismissing the damages claim with prejudice because the presently running statute of limitations will bar his claim once he has successfully sought habeas relief. Limitations cannot run on a claim which has yet to accrue. See Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994). No error is detected. This appeal is frivolous and is therefore DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. We caution Swartz that any additionalNo. 96-11047 - 3 - frivolous appeals filed by him will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Swartz is further cautioned to review all pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are frivolous because they have been previously decided by this court.
APPEAL DISMISSED. IFP GRANTED. INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE ASSESSED. SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
#### Stuart Realty Co. et al., Appellants, v Rye Country Store, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[745 NYS2d 72]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of a commercial lease, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Barone, J.), dated April 26, 2001, as granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that the action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the motion is denied.

*456In June 1999 the plaintiff Stuart Realty Co. commenced an action in the City Court of the City of Rye to recover unpaid rent due from the defendant Rye Country Store, Inc. (hereinafter Rye Country). The parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which Rye Country paid $10,000 to Stuart Realty Co. The plaintiffs subsequently commenced this action in the Supreme Court, Westchester County, against, among others, Rye Country and its shareholders for future rent payments due under the lease, as well as for the difference between the rent owed under the former lease and the rent being paid by a subsequent tenant.

The intent of the parties in entering the settlement agreement in the prior action cannot be determined from the record (see CPLR 2104; *Gustaf v Fink,*285 AD2d 625; *Avaltroni v Gancer,*260 AD2d 590; *Johnson v Four G’s Truck Rental,*244 AD2d 319; *Kraker v Roll,*100 AD2d 424). In addition, the record does not reflect the entry of an order or judgment dismissing the prior action which would serve as the basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata in the subsequent action (see *Gallo v Teplitz Tri-State Recycling,*254 AD2d 253; *Berkshire Nursing Ctr. v Len Realty Co.,*168 AD2d 475, 476; *Dunleavy v First Am. Tit. Ins. Co. of N.Y.,*117 AD2d 952, 953).

The complaint sufficiently alleged wrongdoing by the defendant shareholders to pierce the corporate veil and hold them personally liable (see *Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin.,*82 NY2d 135, 141; *Aetna Elec. Distrib. Co. v Homestead Elec.,*279 AD2d 541; *Hyland Meat Co. v Tsagarakis,*202 AD2d 552, 553). On a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs had no obligation to demonstrate evidentiary facts to support the allegations contained in the complaint (see *Paulsen v Paulsen,*148 AD2d 685, 686; *Palmisano v Modernismo Publs.,*98 AD2d 953, 954). Santucci, J.P., Friedmann, H. Miller and Schmidt, JJ., concur.