NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-3256

___________

LYNN A. VAN TASSEL,

Appellant

v.

HONORABLE JOHN W. HODGE, Judge, Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, in 

his official and individual capacities; HONORABLE THOMAS M. PICCIONE, Judge 

Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, in his official and individual capacities; 

LAWRENCE COUNTY DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTIONS; TRACY HROMYAK, 

Director of the Lawrence County Domestic Section in her official and individual 

capacities; JOSHUA LAMACUSA, District Attorney of Lawrence County in his official 

and individual capacities; DISTRICT ATTORNEY LAWRENCE COUNTY; 

LAWRENCE COUNTY ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE DEPARTMENT; 

JAMES E. MANOLIS, Esquire; ARTHUR R. VAN TASSEL

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-00024)

District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 1, 2014

Before: CHAGARES, GARTH and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 5, 2014 )

___________

OPINION

___________
PER CURIAM

Lynn Van Tassel (“Lynn”), proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing her declaratory 

judgment action pursuant to Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995). We will 

affirm the judgment of the District Court, but on other grounds. See Revell v. Port 

Authority of New York, New Jersey, 598 F.3d 128, 136 n.13 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that 

this Court may affirm on other grounds so long as the record supports the judgment).

In 2007 and 2008, Lynn filed praecipes for judgment against her former husband, 

Arthur Van Tassel, for child support arrearages in the Lawrence County, Pennsylvania 

Court of Common Pleas.1 Arthur Van Tassel disputed the judgments. The trial court 

found that the entries of judgment were improper and that Lynn’s conduct in the 

proceedings had been vexatious. In an order entered June 23, 2008, the trial court 

ordered Lynn to pay Arthur Van Tassel’s attorneys’ fees. Lynn appealed, but the appeal 

was quashed as untimely. Lynn also filed a civil rights action in federal court that was

dismissed on several grounds, including the Rooker-Feldman2doctrine. We affirmed. 

Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Dom. Rel. Sections, et al., 390 F. App’x 201 (3d Cir. 

2010) (per curiam) (non-precedential decision).

 

1

Like the District Court, we base our account of the procedural background on the state 

court decisions included in the record.

2Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Lynn did not comply with the June 23, 2008 order. On November 30, 2009, the 

trial court ordered that she pay additional attorneys’ fees in a contempt proceeding. The 

Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Superior Court also granted Arthur Van 

Tassel’s request for fees and costs in another appeal taken by Lynn. The trial court 

determined the amount of fees owed in an order issued May 24, 2010. On December 21, 

2010, Lynn was again found in contempt and, among other things, was sentenced to 90 

days in jail. Although Lynn was permitted to pay the fees owed in lieu of going to jail, 

she did not do so. Lynn failed to report to jail in November 2011 and was arrested. She 

was afforded house arrest and released in January 2012. 

In January 2013, Lynn filed the present declaratory judgment action pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2201. She filed an Amended Complaint on March 22, 2013. Lynn sought 

declarations that 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2503(7) and (9), and Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 2744 and 2741(1), the statute and rules under which attorneys’ fees 

and costs were imposed, are unconstitutional as applied in her case. Lynn also sought a 

declaration that the Pennsylvania State Intermediate Punishment Program, under which 

she was afforded house arrest, is unconstitutional as applied in her case. She also 

requested other relief that the court may deem proper, “including return of her ‘extorted’ 

monies . . . .” Am Compl. at 24. 

The defendants, including state court judges, the Lawrence County Domestic 

Relations Section (“DRS”), Arthur Van Tassel, and others, moved to dismiss the

Amended Complaint on various grounds. The District Court declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over Lynn’s action pursuant to Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 

(1995). The District Court noted, among other things, that many actions had been 

litigated or remained pending related to the child support obligation and that the issues 

involved are fundamentally based on state law. The District Court also denied Lynn’s 

motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District 

Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289. 

Wilton addressed the standard governing a district court’s decision to stay a 

declaratory judgment action in favor of parallel state litigation. Id. at 281. The Supreme 

Court applied its decision in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 

(1942), which established that a district court has discretion to determine whether to 

entertain a declaratory judgment action where another suit is pending in state court 

presenting the same issues of state law between the same parties. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 

282-83. Recognizing the limited nature of its holding, the Supreme Court stated that it

held “only that the District Court acted within its bounds in staying [an] action for 

declaratory relief where parallel proceedings, presenting opportunity for ventilation of the 

same state law issues, were underway in state court.” Id. at 290. We have stated that

Wilton allows a federal court to abstain from deciding a declaratory judgment claim if 

that court “believes that the state law questions in controversy between the parties are 

better suited for resolution in state court.” Marshall v. Lauriault, 372 F.3d 175, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2004). See also State Auto Ins. Co. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2001) 

(recognizing same). 

We are unable to conclude on the present record that Wilton applies here. It is not 

clear that Lynn’s present claims are pending in state court. Lynn has stated that she has 

two appeals pending in state court and that her support litigation is ongoing, but the 

record does not reflect the nature of her pending claims. See Marshall, 372 F.3d at 184 

(noting court’s inability to determine application of Wilton/Brillhart without state court 

complaints). Lynn also does not seek a declaratory judgment on a question of state law, 

but declarations that the state statute and court rules under which she was sanctioned

were applied in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and 

that the use of the intermediate punishment program to effectuate her house arrest 

violated the Due Process Clause. See Am. Compl. at 19-23. The Wilton court did not 

address whether its decision applies to cases raising issues of federal law. Wilton, 515 

U.S. at 290. See also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River 

Regulating Dist., 673 F.3d 84, 105 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding Wilton was inapplicable 

where case raised claim governed solely by federal law). 

While we are unable to conclude that the District Court properly declined to 

entertain Lynn’s Amended Complaint under Wilton, the Appellees assert in their briefs

that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

We agree. Under Rooker-Feldman, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that 

are essentially appeals from state-court judgments. Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. 
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, et al., 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). The doctrine requires 

that “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries 

caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the 

federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject 

the state judgments.” Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

These requirements are met here. Lynn lost in state court when she was 

sanctioned on June 23, 2008 and when she was assessed fees and costs on May 24, 2010.

Lynn complains of injuries caused by the state court’s orders. Lynn claims that “the 

court’s action in sanctioning” her, the court’s “assessment of additional attorney’s fees”

under the appellate rules, and the court’s “order[ing] Plaintiff into the [intermediate 

punishment program]” were unconstitutional. See also Great Western, 615 F.3d at 167.3

These orders were issued before Lynn filed her declaratory judgment action and she

invites the District Court to reject them. Lynn does not attack the constitutionality of the 

Pennsylvania statute and rules, but the state court’s application of the statute and rules to

the facts of her case. See Alvarez v Att’y Gen., 679 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(holding Rooker-Feldman barred an as-applied due process claim); McKithen v. Brown, 

626 F.3d 143, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2010) (same).

 

3

Lynn alleges in her Amended Complaint that DRS erred in preparing certificates of 

arrearages and that Arthur Van Tassel and his lawyer should not have pursued attorneys’

fees. The Amended Complaint, however, seeks relief based on injuries resulting from the 

court’s orders and its alleged unconstitutional application of state statutes and rules. 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District 

Court.