SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2602-15T4

A-2815-15T4

IN THE MATTER OF NEW JERSEY

SPORTS AND EXPOSITION

AUTHORITY RESOLUTION 2016-70.

_________________________________________

Submitted October 3, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Mawla.

On appeal from the New Jersey Sports and 

Exposition Authority.

Castano Quigley LLC, attorneys for appellant

Town of Kearny in A-2602-15 and respondent

Town of Kearny in A-2815-15 (Gregory J. 

Castano, Jr., on the briefs).

Pearce Law, LLC, attorneys for respondent

Borough of North Arlington in A-2602-15 and 

appellant Borough of North Arlington in 

A-2815-15 (Randy T. Pearce and Gregory A. 

Randazzo, of counsel and on the briefs).

Basile Birchwale & Pellino, LLP, attorneys for 

intervenor Borough of Ridgefield (Stephen F. 

Pellino, on the brief).

Lowenstein Sandler LLP, attorneys for 

respondent New Jersey Sports and Exposition 

Authority (James Stewart and Rachel Warren, 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 9, 2017
2 A-2602-15T4

On January 14, 2016, the New Jersey Sports and Exposition 

Authority (Authority) adopted Resolution 2016-70 (2016 

Resolution), which certified the 2016 meadowlands adjustment 

payments for constituent municipalities, pursuant to the 

Hackensack Meadowlands Agency Consolidation Act (Act), N.J.S.A.

10A-1 to -68. The Town of Kearny and the Borough of North Arlington 

appeal from the 2016 Resolution. Thereafter, we granted the 

Authority's motion to consolidate the appeals, and permitted the 

Borough of Ridgefield to intervene.1

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Ridgefield may 

not challenge its 2015 adjustment payment; the Authority erred by 

failing to calculate the 2016 adjustment payments in the manner 

prescribed by N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a); and the Authority did not err 

by including a $1.1 million payment that North Arlington received 

in 2012 when determining the amount of North Arlington's preadjustment payment for 2012 and the adjustment payments for 2015 

and 2016. Accordingly, we reverse Resolution 2016-70 and remand 

for recalculation of the 2016 adjustment payments in accordance 

with N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a).

 

1 East Rutherford also was granted leave to intervene, but did not 

file a brief and is no longer participating in the appeal.
3 A-2602-15T4

I.

The Hackensack Meadowlands District is comprised of fourteen 

constituent municipalities, which include Kearny, North Arlington, 

and Ridgefield. The Act provides in pertinent part for the 

establishment of an intermunicipal account and requires the 

Authority to compute the amounts that the constituent 

municipalities should pay to the account and be paid from the 

account each year. N.J.S.A. 5:10A—59(a). The Authority then must 

certify the adjustment payments for each constituent municipality. 

Ibid. The payments are

determined by adding all the payments payable 

to that municipality from the intermunicipal 

account for school district service payments, 

guarantee payments, and apportionment 

payments, if any, and by subtracting therefrom 

the obligations of that municipality to the 

intermunicipal account, as calculated 

pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 5:10A-53 to -58]. The 

amount so derived shall be referred to as the 

meadowlands pre-adjustment payment. For 

calendar year 2015, the meadowlands adjustment 

payment shall be the average of the 

meadowlands pre-adjustment payments for 

calendar years 2012, 2013, and 2014. For 

calendar year 2016 and subsequent years, the 

meadowlands adjustment payment shall be the 

average of the meadowlands pre-adjustment 

payments for the prior three calendar years. 

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]

The adjustment payments are funded primarily through the 

Meadowlands Regional Hotel Use Assessment, which is imposed 
4 A-2602-15T4

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 5:10A-85(a). The Act provides that in the 

event the assessment generates insufficient revenue for the 

adjustment payments, the State Treasurer must provide the 

Authority with the funds needed to make up the shortfall. N.J.S.A.

5:10A-85(d).

For calendar year 2015, the Authority calculated the 

adjustment payments by taking the average of each municipality's

pre-adjustment payments for 2013, 2014, and 2015. On January 30, 

2015, the Authority adopted Resolution 2015-01, certifying the 

payments due to the constituent municipalities for that calendar 

year. Based on information received from a constituent 

municipality, the Authority revised the payments for 2015 and on 

April 16, 2015, adopted Resolution 2015-12, which certified a

revised payment schedule for 2015. 

The Authority then paid the designated amounts to the 

municipalities, as required by N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(b). None of the 

constituent municipalities filed an appeal challenging the 

approved payments for 2015.

For calendar year 2016, the Authority calculated the 

adjustment payments using the average of the municipality's preadjustment payments for years 2014, 2015, and 2016. The Authority 

then adopted Resolution 2016-70 certifying the payments for 2016. 

These appeals followed.
5 A-2602-15T4

On appeal, Kearny, North Arlington, and Ridgefield argue that 

the Authority erred by calculating the adjustment payments for 

2016 because the Authority did not use the average of the preadjustment payments for the three prior calendar years, as required 

by N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a). Ridgefield challenges the 2015 adjustment 

payments for the same reason. In addition, North Arlington argues 

that the Authority erroneously calculated its 2016 adjustment 

payment by applying the amount of a payment North Arlington 

received in 2012 pursuant to a settlement of a tax appeal. 

II.

The Authority argues that Ridgefield is precluded from

challenging its 2015 adjustment payment because it failed to file 

a timely appeal from the resolutions the Authority adopted in 

2015, which approved the adjustment payments for that calendar 

year. The Authority also argues that the doctrine of laches bars 

Ridgefield from challenging its 2015 adjustment payment. 

Rule 2:4-1(b) states that appeals must be taken from final 

decisions or actions of state administrative agencies within 

forty-five days after "the date of service of the decision or 

notice of the action taken." When an appeal is not filed within 

the time prescribed by the rule, the court lacks jurisdiction to 

decide the matter on the merits. Alberti v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
6 A-2602-15T4

41 N.J. 147, 154 (1963); In re Hill, 241 N.J. Super. 367, 372 

(App. Div. 1990). 

The forty-five-day filing requirement applies to an 

administrative "agency's quasi-judicial decisions that adjudicate 

the rights of a particular individual." Nw. Covenant Med. Ctr. v. 

Fishman, 167 N.J. 123, 135 (2001) (quoting Pressler, Current N.J. 

Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 2:4-1 (2001)). In determining whether 

an agency's decision is a quasi-judicial act, the key question is 

"whether the fact finding involves a certain person or persons 

whose rights will be directly affected." Id. at 136 (quoting 

Cunningham v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 69 N.J. 13, 22 (1975)). 

The Authority's 2015 resolutions are quasi-judicial acts

because those resolutions represent factual determinations 

pertaining to the adjustment payments due to the District's 

constituent municipalities in 2015. Because Ridgefield did not 

file a timely appeal from the Authority's 2015 resolutions, it may 

not challenge its adjustment payment, which was authorized by 

those actions.

In view of our decision, we need not address the Authority's 

argument that the laches doctrine also precludes Ridgefield from 

challenging the 2015 adjustment payment.
7 A-2602-15T4

III.

Kearny, North Arlington, and Ridgefield argue that the 

Authority erred in calculating their 2016 adjustment payments. 

These municipalities argue that the Authority erroneously based 

the payments on the average of each municipality's pre-adjustment 

payments for 2014, 2015, and 2016, rather than the pre-adjustment 

payments for 2013, 2014, and 2015, as expressly required by 

N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a).

The scope of our review in an appeal from a final 

determination of an administrative agency is strictly limited. In 

re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 

216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013). An agency's decision will not be reversed 

unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Ibid. (citing 

In re Petition for Rulemaking, N.J.A.C. 10:82-1.2 & 10:85-4.1, 117 

N.J. 311, 325 (1989)). Therefore, the court's role in reviewing 

an agency's decision is limited to three inquiries:

(1) whether the agency's action violates 

express or implied legislative policies, that 

is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether 

the record contains substantial evidence to 

support the findings on which the agency based 

its action; and (3) whether in applying the 

legislative policies to the facts, the agency 

clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that 

could not reasonably have been made on a 

showing of the relevant factors.

[Id. at 385-86 (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 

143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]
8 A-2602-15T4

Furthermore, we are "not bound by the agency's legal

opinions." A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 407

N.J. Super. 330, 340 (App. Div.) (quoting Levine v. State Dep't

of Transp., 338 N.J. Super. 28, 32 (App. Div. 2001)), certif.

denied, 200 N.J. 210 (2009). The construction of a statute is "a

purely legal issue [that is] subject to de novo

review." Ibid. (citing Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 

N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).

Here, the municipalities challenge the Authority's

interpretation and application of N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a). When the

court interprets statutory language, "the goal is to divine and

effectuate the Legislature's intent." State v. Shelley,

205 N.J. 320, 323 (2011) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J.

477, 492 (2005)). We begin our inquiry with the language of the

statute, giving the words used therein their ordinary and accepted

meaning. Ibid. (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492). If the

statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must "construe and 

apply the statute as enacted." In re Closing of Jamesburg High 

Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980). 

N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a) states that for calendar year 2015, the 

adjustment payments "shall be the average of the meadowlands preadjustment payments for calendar years 2012, 2013, and 2014." The 

statute also states that for calendar year 2016 and all subsequent 
9 A-2602-15T4

years, "the meadowlands adjustment payment shall be the average 

of the meadowlands pre-adjustment payments for the prior three 

calendar years." Ibid.

Thus, N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a) plainly and unambiguously requires 

that the 2016 adjustment payments must be based on the average of 

the pre-adjustment payments for 2013, 2014, and 2015. It is 

undisputed that for 2016, the Authority based the adjustment 

payments upon the average of each municipality's pre-adjustment 

payments for 2014, 2015, and 2016. Therefore, the Authority did 

not calculate the payment in accordance with N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a).

The Authority maintains, however, that its calculation of 

the 2016 adjustment payments was reasonable. According to the 

Authority, it calculated the 2016 payments in accordance with the

prior statutory formula, which required the Authority to base the 

adjustment payments upon the average of the pre-adjustment 

payments for three calendar years — the current year and the two 

prior years. See N.J.S.A. 13:17-74(a).2 The Authority asserts its 

continued use of the prior statutory formula is entitled to 

deference. We disagree. 

 

2 N.J.S.A. 5:10A-2(j) provides that in the event there is any 

conflict between the Act and L. 1968, c. 404 (codified at N.J.S.A.

13:17-1 to -86), the provisions of the Act will control. 
10 A-2602-15T4

The Authority's action is inconsistent with the plain 

language of N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a). Although the Authority may have 

made its calculations based on the former statutory formula, the 

Act established a new formula and required that it be applied 

beginning in 2015. Ibid. The Authority was required to apply the 

new formula in determining the adjustment payments for 2016. It 

erred by failing to do so.

The Authority further argues that if the court determines 

that the 2016 adjustment payments should have been calculated 

based on the average of the pre-adjustment payments for the three 

prior calendar years, it should be allowed to address any issues 

resulting from the erroneous calculation of the 2016 payments, 

including any underpayments or overpayments, when it calculates 

the next annual adjustment payments, which now would be in February 

2018. We conclude it would be reasonable for the Authority to 

address these issues when it next calculates the adjustment 

payments.

Accordingly, the 2016 Resolution is reversed and the matter 

remanded to the Authority to recalculate the 2016 adjustment 

payments in accordance with N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a). Furthermore, the 

Authority may address any issues arising from the erroneous

calculation of the 2016 adjustment payments when it calculates the 

payments for 2018.
11 A-2602-15T4

IV.

In addition to arguing that the Authority erred by basing its 

2016 adjustment payment on the basis of the average of the preadjustment payments for 2014, 2015, and 2016, North Arlington 

argues that the Authority erred by including $1.1 million that it 

received in 2012 pursuant to a settlement of a tax appeal.

A constituent municipality's adjustment payment is based in 

part on the amount that municipality is required to pay into the 

intermunicipal account. Ibid. The amount payable to the account 

is based in part upon the increase, if any, in the aggregate true 

value of taxable real property in the municipality in a comparison

year. N.J.S.A. 5:10A-53(f).3 Any payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT)

on real property that the municipality has received are taken into 

account in determining the increase or decrease in the aggregate 

true value of taxable real property in the municipality. N.J.S.A.

5:10A-53(e). 

The record shows that in April 2011, the New Jersey 

Meadowlands Commission (Commission) filed a tax appeal challenging

North Arlington's real estate tax assessment upon property that 

the Commission owned in that municipality. The parties eventually 

 

3 The term "comparison year" is defined as "the second calendar 

year preceding the adjustment year." N.J.S.A. 5:10A-3.
12 A-2602-15T4

settled the appeal, and the Commission agreed to pay North 

Arlington $1.1 million. 

The settlement agreement required North Arlington to execute

a PILOT agreement, which states in part that the $1.1 million

would be paid to the municipality as a payment in lieu of taxes 

"for the period from May 2008 through December 31, 2011[,] and in

settlement of all future payments in lieu of taxes on the

[p]roperty through December 31, 2030[,] or until such time as use

of the [p]roperty changes . . . [.]" The PILOT agreement also

states that the parties agreed the payment would be made "in

satisfaction of all past and future taxes or payments in lieu of

taxes on the [p]roperty for the period through December 31, 2030[,]

. . . ." It is undisputed that the $1.1 million was paid to North

Arlington in 2012.

On appeal, North Arlington argues that the Authority 

erroneously included the $1.1 million it received in 2012 in 

calculating its pre-adjustment payment for 2012. North Arlington 

contends that if the Authority had not included the $1.1 million 

payment in determining that pre-adjustment payment, its adjustment 

payments for 2015 and 2016 would have been significantly greater. 

We reject North Arlington's arguments because they are not 

supported by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 5:10A-53(e). As noted, 

the statute expressly provides that if a constituent municipality 
13 A-2602-15T4

has received in any comparison year "a payment in lieu of real 

estate taxes on property located within the district," that payment 

must be taken into account when determining whether there has been 

an increase or decrease in the aggregate true value of all taxable 

real property in the municipality. Ibid.

As noted, the aggregate true value of all taxable property 

is part of the calculation that ultimately results in the 

determination of the municipality's adjustment payment. N.J.S.A.

5:10A-53(b)-(f); N.J.S.A. 5:10A-59(a). The 2012 payment was 

properly considered in determining North Arlington's preadjustment payment for 2012, and therefore properly taken into 

account in calculating the adjustment payments for 2015 an 2016.

North Arlington contends that, at best, the payment it 

received in 2012 was largely for unpaid real estate taxes and not 

future tax assessments. It argues that the revenue was not related 

to any 2012 tax assessments. North Arlington further contends that 

the Commission labeled the payment a PILOT payment for its 

"internal purposes." North Arlington therefore maintains that the 

payment should not have been used in determining its 2012 preadjustment payment, or the adjustment payments for 2015 and 2016. 

We are not persuaded by these arguments. As noted, the PILOT

agreement declares the payment to be a PILOT payment, and North 

Arlington received the payment in 2012. The Authority's decision 
14 A-2602-15T4

to take the 2012 payment into account when calculating North 

Arlington's 2012 pre-adjustment payment was consistent with the 

plain language of N.J.S.A. 5:10A-53(e) and supported by sufficient 

credible evidence in the record. 

Reversed and remanded to the Authority for recalculation of 

the 2016 adjustment payments in accordance with this opinion. We 

do not retain jurisdiction.