alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

08-15988

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RENE QUINTANILLA,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 08-15988

D.C. No. 1:06-CV-01454-LJODLB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Oliver W. Wanger, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 15, 2011 ** 

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Rene Quintanilla appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We dismiss.

FILED

JUL 8 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
08-15988

Quintanilla contends that the Board of Parole Hearings’ 2005 decision to

deny him parole was not supported by “some evidence” and therefore violated his

due process rights. After briefing was completed in this case, this court held that a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) is required to challenge the denial of parole. 

See Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 554-55 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Now

the Supreme Court has held that the only federal right at issue in the parole context

is procedural, and the only proper inquiry is what process the inmate received, not

whether the state court decided the case correctly. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.

Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam). Because Quintanilla raises no procedural

challenges regarding his parole hearing, a COA cannot issue, and we dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

We deny as moot Quintanilla’s motion to lift the stay.

DISMISSED.
EXHIBIT32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Sona MobileHoldings Corp. (the ‘‘Company’’) on Form10-KSB for the period ended December  31,  2005 as filed withthe Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the‘‘Report’’), we, John Bush, Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the Company, and John C. Rudy, Chief Financial Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §  1350, asadopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements ofsection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.

A signed original of this written statement hasbeen provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company andfurnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.

|                        |  |                                    |  |  |  |  |
|------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Date: March  31,  2004 |  | /s/ JOHN BUSH                      |
|                   |  | JohnBushChief Executive Officer    |
|                   |  | /s/ JOHNC. RUDY                    |
|                   |  | John C. RudyChief FinancialOfficer |
|                        |

A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typedform within the electronic version of this written statement requiredby Section 906, has been provided to Sona Mobile Holdings Corp. (the"Issuer’’) and will be retained by the Issuerand furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staffupon request.

In accordance with Item 601 of Regulation S-B,this certification is being ‘‘furnished’’ asExhibit  32.1 to the Issuer’s annual report and shall notbe deemed ‘‘filed’’ for purposes of Section 18of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘‘ExchangeAct’’) or otherwise subject to the liabilities of thatsection, nor shall it be deemed incorporated by reference in any filingunder the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except asexpressly set forth by specific reference in such afiling.

----
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Christine M. Arguello

Civil Action No. 11-CV-2409-CMA-MJW

THERMAPURE, INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISASTER RESTORATION, INC., a Colorado corporation,

RESTORATION LOGISTICS, INC., a Colorado entity, and

DURACLEAN MASTER CLEANERS, INC., a Colorado corporation

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ORDER ENFORCING SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENT AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Order Enforcing Settlement 

Agreement and Entry of Judgment by Plaintiff Thermapure, Inc. (Doc. # 21.) Pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 and to this Court’s Order regarding (1) Entry of Permanent 

Injunction, and (2) Dismissal without Prejudice Subject to Court’s Retention to Enforce 

Settlement Agreement (Doc. # 18). The Court having reviewed the Motion and 

supporting Affidavits, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises,

HEREBY enters judgment against Defendants in the principal amount of 

$34,019.34.

Post-Judgment interest shall accrue on this judgment amount at the rate of 3.25 

percent per annum.

Case 1:11-cv-02409-CMA-MJW Document 23 Filed 01/27/15 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
DATED: January 27, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO

United States District Judge

2

Case 1:11-cv-02409-CMA-MJW Document 23 Filed 01/27/15 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Action No. 11-cr-00376-WJM-3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

TOR OLSON,

Defendant.

 

ORDER RELEASING FUNDS

 Hearing was held on November 7, 2011 on Defendant’s Motion to Modify Conditions of

release. The Court granted the motion and allowed defendant to retrieve his passport to travel

provided he post $5,000 and return his passport to the clerk’s office by 12:00 noon on December 1,

2011. The defendant has re-surrender his passport as ordered. As a result, all the conditions of an

appearance bond imposed by the court as a pretrial matter to secure the defendant’s release, pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), have been satisfied. Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED that the bail funds or property deposited into the registry of the court shall

hereby be released by the clerk of the court, or a designated deputy, to the surety or the defendant.

However, since the case is still pending, the bond is not exonerated at this time.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 1st day of December 1, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

By:s/Michael J. Watanabe 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Case 1:11-cr-00376-WJM Document 32 Filed 12/01/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
#### Eddie J. SCHOUEST v. Fred M. SCHOUEST et al.

No. 2901.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

May 20, 1947.

Theodore H. McGiehan, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Harvey Peltier and Hubert A. Lafargue, both of Thibodaux, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

For the reasons this day assigned in the consolidated cases of Schouest v. Schouest et al. and Schouest v. Schouest et al., La. App., 30 So.2d 871, it is ordered that the judgment appealed from in the above entitled cause of Schouest v. Schouest et al. be and the same is hereby avoided, annulled and reversed, and it is now ordered that plaintiff’s suit be dismissed at his costs in both courts.
#### MOYE v. OSBORNE et al.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January Term 1954.

Dismissed without opinion.
#### Ramlochan Sirju, Appellant, v New York City Transit Authority, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Duberstein, J.), dated February 28, 1989, as, upon reargument of his motion for leave to serve an amended complaint with an increased ad damnum clause and to remove the action from the Civil Court, Kings County, to the Supreme Court, Kings County, adhered to its prior determination made in an order dated November 30,1988, denying the motion.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, this appeal is procedurally proper, inasmuch as it is an appeal from an order granting reargument and adhering to a prior order rather than to a prior *decision (cf., Harris v Harris,*154 AD2d 438; *Matter of A&S Transp. Co. v County of Nassau,*154 AD2d 456).

Turning to the merits, we find that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to increase the ad damnum clause and to remove the case to the Supreme Court, Kings County. The plaintiff has failed to establish that the requested increase in damages from $25,000 to $1,000,000 is *884warranted by facts which have only recently come to his attention *(see, Coerbell v City of New York,*132 AD2d 514; *Martin v Maimonides Med. Center,*125 AD2d 455; *Dolan v Garden City Union Free School Dist.,*113 AD2d 781). Rather, the record indicates that the amendment he seeks is premised upon injuries of which he became aware some three years before he made the instant motion *(see, e.g., Martin v Maimonides Med. Center, supra),*and there is no evidence indicating that he underwent any recent physical examination or testing which revealed additional injuries or aggravation of injuries which were previously known *(see, Portnow v Shelter Rock Pub. Lib.,*125 AD2d 382). Moreover, the plaintiff has presented neither a reasonable and acceptable explanation for his delay in seeking the amendment *(see, Sylvester v Stephens,*148 AD2d 523; *Coerbell v City of New York, supra)*nor an adequate demonstration of the merits of his case *(see, Martin v Maimonides Med. Center, supra; Dolan v Garden City Union Free School Dist., supra).*Finally, the medical affidavit submitted by the plaintiff fails to describe any "consistent course of treatment for the accident-caused injuries” *(Dolan v Garden City Union Free School Dist., supra,*at 785; *see, Coerbell v City of New York, supra).*Under these circumstances, his renewed motion was properly denied. Thompson, J. P., Eiber, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                      Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Amscan Holdings, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we, Gerald
C. Rittenberg, Chief Executive Officer and Michael A. Correale, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


                                        /s/ Gerald C. Rittenberg
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Gerald C. Rittenberg
                                        Chief Executive Officer


                                        /s/ Michael A. Correale
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Michael A. Correale
                                        Chief Financial Officer

August 15, 2005
1 “[#12]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific

paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this convention

throughout this order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-02448-REB-MEH

CHRISTOPHER TYRONE SALAZAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

DENVER POLICE OFFICER CARLOS CASTILLO,

DENVER POLICE OFFICER JOHN MEHRTENS,

DENVER POLICE OFFICER WILE MORGHEM,

DENVER POLICE OFFICER SCOTT RIGGS, Individually and Severally, and

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,

Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Blackburn, J.

The matter is before me on the Plaintiff’s Motion To Dismiss Without Prejudice [#12]1

filed January 13, 2012. After reviewing the motion and the file, I conclude that the motion

should be granted and that this action should be dismissed without prejudice.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That the Plaintiff’s Motion To Dismiss Without Prejudice [#12] filed January 13,

2012, is GRANTED; and

2. That this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Dated January 17, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

Case 1:11-cv-02448-REB-MEH Document 13 Filed 01/17/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 31.1

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
           SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Gary F. Kimmons, certify that:

1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report of M Power Entertainment Inc.;

2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.  The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

b)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c)  disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
quarterly report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5.  The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.

/s/  Gary F. Kimmons

Gary F. Kimmons
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Financial Officer

DATED this 21st August, 2006.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-88,099-01

EX PARTE JOSHUA STOCKER, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. W-15307-A-1 IN THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM RANDALL COUNTY

Per curiam. RICHARDSON, NEWELL AND WALKER, JJ., dissenting.

O R D E R

Applicant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life years’ imprisonment. The

Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Stocker v. State, No. 07-05-0284-CR (Tex. App.

— Amarillo May 16, 2007) (not designated for publication). Applicant filed this application for a

writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. 

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.

Applicant claims that two of his co-defendants, Tori Patrick and Guinn Garcia were granted

use immunity agreements two years before his trial took place and that both witnesses were

instructed to lie about the agreements. Applicant contends that the prosecutor sponsored his

investigator to lie about the existence of the agreements to bolster the testimony of the co-defendants
2

through aggravated perjury. In response to this Court’s remand order, the trial court conducted a live

habeas hearing and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court concludes that

Applicant has suffered a Brady violation by the untimely disclosure of the use immunity agreement

signed by co-defendant Tori Patrick, by the State’s denial of the existence of the agreement, and by

the State’s failure to correct misleading testimony about the agreement during Applicant’s trial. The

trial court concludes that it is likely that the jury might have reached a different conclusion had they

been informed of Tori Patrick’s signed use immunity agreement. 

This Court’s independent review of the entire record suggests that although the State did fail

to disclose the existence of the signed use immunity agreement with Tori Patrick, Patrick did testify

at Applicant’s trial that her understanding was that her testimonywould not be used against her. The

State did disclose to the defense the existence of a signed use immunity agreement with Guinn

Garcia, and there was testimony from the State’s investigator indicating that all the State’s witnesses

were given an opportunity to sign a use immunity agreement. Based on the entire trial record, it 

appears that the strength of the other evidence at trial was such that the result of the trial would not

likely have been different had the jury been informed that Tori Patrick had signed a use immunity

agreement. Relief is denied. 

Filed: April 1, 2020

Do not publish
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 198 (Friday, October 10, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 60296]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-23809]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention


Disease, Disability, and Injury Prevention and Control Special 
Emphasis Panel: Occupational Safety and Health Training Projects 
Grants, Request for Applications (RFA) 06-484; Occupational Safety and 
Health Educational Research Centers, RFA 06-485

    In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal 
AdvisoryCommittee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), the Centers for DiseaseControl 
and Prevention (CDC) announces the aforementioned meeting:
    Times and Dates:8:30 a.m.-5 p.m., December 11, 2008 (Closed).8:30 
a.m.-5 p.m., December 12, 2008 (Closed).
    Place: Harbour View Inn, 2 Vendue Range, Charleston, South Carolina 
29401, Telephone (843) 853-8439.
    Status: The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with 
provisions set forth in section 552b(c)(4) and (6), Title 5 U.S.C., and 
the Determination of the Director, Management Analysis and Services 
Office, CDC, pursuant to Public Law 92-463.
    Matters To Be Discussed: The meeting will include the review, 
discussion, and evaluation of ``Occupational Safety and Health Training 
Projects Grants, RFA 06-484; Occupational Safety and Health Educational 
Research Centers, RFA 06-485.''
    There will be a site visit at the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA), on November 11-13, 2008; to advise and make 
recommendations to the Disease, Disability, and Injury Prevention and 
Control SEP: Occupational Safety and Health Training Projects Grants, 
RFA 06-484; Occupational Safety and Health Educational Research 
Centers, RFA 06-485.
    Times, Dates, and Place of site visit:
    Times and Dates:7 a.m.-9 p.m., November 11, 2008.8 a.m.-6:30 p.m., 
November 12, 2008.8 a.m.-5 p.m., November 13, 2008.
    Place: UCLA Guest House, 330 Charles E. Young Drive East, Los 
Angeles, California 90095.
    Contact Person for More Information: Dr. M. Chris Langub, Ph.D., 
Scientific Review Administrator, 1600 Clifton Road NE., Mailstop E74, 
Atlanta, GA 30333, telephone (404) 498-2543.
    The Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, has been 
delegated the authority to sign Federal Register notices pertaining to 
announcements of meetings and other committee management activities, 
for both CDC and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.

    Dated: October 1, 2008.
Elaine L. Baker,
Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention.
 [FR Doc. E8-23809 Filed 10-9-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-18-P
10th
### No. 80-154 INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980

IN RE THEMARRIAGE OF: SHERYL 

### L. PARK, Petitioner and Respondent,
VS

# . STERLING C. PARK, Appellant and Respondent.

,Appealfrom: District Court of the Third Judicial District, In and for the County of Deer Lodge,Montana Honorable John 

### B. McClernan,Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: ForAppellant: Michael J. McKeon,Anaconda,Montana For Respondent: 

### C. F. Mackay, Anaconda,Montana

Submitted on briefs: November 6, 

### 1980 Decided: Fryr. ,. i1, 

## 3 

## 1980Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Sterling Park appeals from aDeer Lodge County District Court order directing him to pay maintenance and support for hiswife and children. The parties were married on April 20, 1971, inOrem, Utah. Three childrenwere born of the marriage and were of minor age at the time the cause was filed inDistrict Court. After hearingthe court entered a judgment ordering Sterling Park to pay $135 per week for the maintenance and support of his wife Sheryl and the couple's three children. No special findings of fact or conclusions of law were entered with the judgment. The issue we are asked to address iswhether the District Court judgment is sufficient and properly entered. We find that itwas not. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., commands the District Court to find the facts specially and state separately itsconclusions of law. The failure to comply with Rule 52, M.R.Civ.P., isfatal to the validity of the order. This Court disdains its role as the corrector of mistakes too obvious to question. We grow weary of continual disregard of the most basic rules of practice and procedure. These rules are clear, and this Court expects and demands that they be followed. The order isvacated and and remanded for the entry of a proper order.

### We concur: