FI L ED
U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S

EL EVENTH CI RCUI T APR 2, 2010

J OHN L EY
CL ERK [DO N OT PUBLISH]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

No. 0 9- 11 56 8

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D. C. Dock et No. 0 8- 21 73 7- CV-J LK

CRIS TOBAL NAVA RRO,

an d a ll ot he rs si m il arl y

si tu at ed

,

Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t,

ve rs us

SANTOS FURNITURE CUSTOM DESIGN, INC., DOMINGO SANTOS, ROBERTO SANTOS, ROSA M. SANTOS,

Defen da nt s- App el le es

.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t fo r th e So ut he rn Dis tri ct of F lo rid a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _
(Ap ril 2, 2 01 0)Befo re DUBINA, Ch ie f Ju dg e, KRAVITCH, Ci rcu it Ju dg e, an d EDENFIELD, *

Dis tri ct Ju dg e.

EDENFIELD, Dis tri ct Ju dg e:

A pp el la nt Cri st ob al Nav arro br ou gh t a cl ai m fo r un pa id ov ert im e w a g e s

pu rs ua nt to th e Fai r Lab or St an da rd s Act (“ FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 20 1 et se q. , ag ai ns t

App el le es San to s Fu rn it ur e Cu st om Des ig n (“ San t o s Fu rn it ur e”), Ro be rto San to s,

Dom in go San to s, an d Ro sa San to s. At tri al

, th e di st ric t co ur t gr an te d App el le es ’

m ot io n fo r jud gm en t as a m at te r of la w as to Dom in go an d Ro sa San to s, an d th e jury

ul ti mat e l y ret ur ne d a ve rd ic t in fav or of App el le es San to s Fu rn it ur e an d Ro be rto

San to s. Nava rro no w a pp eal s th e di st ric t co ur t’s di sm is sa l of Dom in go San to s an d

Ro sa San to s, as w el l as the jury ve rd ic t. He as se rts th at bo th ru li ng s were th e res ul t

of th e di st ric t co ur t’s im

pr op er ap pl ic at io n of th e ti m e li m it at io n se t fo rth in 29 U.S.C.

§ 2 55 (a).

In hi s co m

pl ai nt

, N av ar

ro so ug ht da m ag es fo r un pa id ov ert im e wag es sp an ni ng

hi s fo ur te en -y ear em

pl oym en t wit h Sa n t o s F u r ni tu re. Sect io n 25 5( a) of th e FLSA

pr ov id es , in pe rti ne nt pa rt: “ Any act io n

. . . to en fo rce an y cau se of act io n fo r un pa id

m in im um wag es , un pa id ov ert im e co m pe ns at io n, or li qu id at ed da m ag es , un de r th e

Fai r Lab or St an da rd s Act

. . . m ay be co m m en ced wit hi n two y ears aft er th e cau se of

Honora ble B. Av an t E denfie ld, United States District J udg e for the Southern District of *

Geor g ia, sitting by

desig nation.

2act io n accr ue d, an d ev ery su ch act io n sh al l be fo rev er ba rred u n le ss co m m en ced

wit hi n two y ears aft er th e cau se of act io n ac c r u e d

, ex cep t th at a cau se of act io n

ari si ng ou t of a wil lfu l vi ol at io n m ay be co m m en ced wit hi n th ree y ears aft er th e cau se

of act io n a ccru ed .” 29 U.S.C. § 2 55 (a).

At tri al

, Nav arro in tro du ced te st im on y in an at te m pt to sh ow th at Dom in go an d

Ro sa San to s qu al ifi ed as e mp l o y ers un de r th e FLSA. Fo ll owi ng th e cl os e of

Nav arro ’s cas e-i n- ch ie f, App el le es m ov ed th e co ur t fo r jud gm en t as a m at te r of la w

as to th e in di vi du al li ab il it y of Do m in go an d Ros a San to s. Ap pe ll ees urg ed th at , at

m os t, th ey co ul d on ly be li ab le fo r lo st wag es fo r th e pe rio d be gi nn in g th ree y ears

pr io r to th e fil in g o f th e co m pl ai nt

, an d it was un di sp ut ed th at Nav arro ha d no t

pr es en te d an y ev id en ce th at Dom in go an d Ro sa San to s ha d ex erci se d act iv e

su pe rv is or y co nt ro l ov er San to s Fu rn it ur e du rin g th at th ree- y ear pe rio d. The di st ric t

co ur t ag reed an d gr a n t e d th e m ot io n, di sm is si ng Dom in go an d Ro sa San to s as

de fen da nt s. The tri al co nt in ue d as to San to s Fu rn it ur e an d Ro be rto San to s. The

di st ric t co ur t i ns tru ct ed th e jury as fo ll ows :

The Pl ai nt iff is en ti tl ed to reco ve r lo st wag es fro m th e pr es en t ti m e ba ck

to no m or e th an two y ears be fo re th is la wsu it was fil ed on Ju ne 1 8,

20 08

, un le ss y ou fin d th e em pl oye r ei th er kn ew, or sh owe d reck le ss

3di sr eg ard fo r th e m at te r o f w h e t he r it s co nd uc t was pr oh ib it ed by th e

FLSA. If y ou fin d th at th e em pl oyer kn ew, or sh owe d reck le ss di sr eg ard

fo r th e m at te r of w h e th er it s co nd uc t was pr oh ib it ed by th e FLSA, th e

Pl ai nt iff is en ti tl ed to reco ve r lo st wage s fr om th e pr es en t tim e ba ck to

no m or e th an th ree years b efo re t hi s l aws ui t was fil ed

.

The jury an swe red “ no ” to th e fir st qu es ti on on th e ve rd ic t fo rm , co nc ern in g whe th er

App el le es fai le d to pa y Nav arro ov e r t i me w ag es as req ui red by la w. The reaf te r,

Nav arro fil ed th is ap pe al

.

On ap pe al

, Nav arro u r g e s th at th e di st ric t co ur t’s ap pl ic at io n of § 25 5( a)’s

li m it at io n was im

pr op er be cau se App el le es ha d waiv ed t he li m it at io n by fai li ng to

pr op erl y pl ead it in th ei r Ans wer. App el le es , on th e ot he r ha nd

, ur ge th at § 25 5( a) is

no t a tra di ti on al st at ut e of li m it at io ns th at m us t be rais ed as an affi rm at iv e de fen se

.

In th e al te rn at iv e, th ey cl ai m th at th ey ad eq ua te ly rai se d th e li m it at io n in th ei r Ans wer

an d i n t he pre tri al st ip ul at io ns su bm it te d t o t he di st ric t co ur t.

The Co ur t rev ie ws a di st ric t co ur t’s in st ru ct io ns to th e jury fo r a b us e of

di sc ret io n. U.S. v. Lo

pe z , 59 0 F.3 d 12 38

, 12 47 -4 8 (1 1t h Ci r

. 2 0 0 9 )

. The Co ur t

rev ie ws de no vo a di st ric t cou rt’s gran t of a F.R.Ci v.P

. 50 m ot io n for judg m en t as a

m at te r of law. D’Ang el o v . Sch . Bd. , 49 7 F .3d 12 03 , 12 08 (11 th Cir . 20 07 ).

4Thi s Co ur t ha s he ld th at th e § 25 5( a) st at ut e o f li m it at io ns is “ an affi rm at iv e

de fen se whi ch m

us t be sp eci fic al ly pl ed .” Day v. Li be rt y Na t’l Li fe In s. Co

. , 12 2 F.3 d

10 12

, 10 15 (1 1t h Ci r. 19 97 ) (ci ti ng F.R.Ci v.P

. 8( c)). In Day

, th e Co ur t ru le d th at th e 1

de fen da nt ha d waiv ed th e § 25 5( a) st at ut e of li m it at io ns by fai li ng t o a s s ert it un ti l

aft er th e jury ha d ren de red a ve rd ic t. As a res ul t, t h e C o u r t rev ers ed th e di st ric t

c o u rt’s gr an t of a jud gm en t no twi th st an di ng th e ve rd ic t ba se d on th e st at u t e o f

li m it at io ns de fen se

. Id

. at 10 1 5

- 1 6 The Day Co ur t em ph as iz ed th e fact th at th e

de fen da nt ’s fai lu re to rai se th e de fen se un ti l aft er th e jury ren de red a ve rd ic t de pr iv ed

th e pl ai nt iff of th e op po rtu ni ty to co nt es t th e ap pl ic at io n of th e li m it at io n. Id

. at 10 15

(“ [I]f [th e de fen da nt ] ha d br ou gh t th e li m it at io ns is su e to th e co ur t du rin g th e

. . . tri al

,

[th e pl ai nt iff

] co ul d ha ve of

fere d ev id en ce th at th e st at ut e was t o l l ed du rin g so m e

p eri od of ti m e, or ha ve in si st ed th at th e jury in st ru ct io ns refl ect th e ef f e c t o f t h e

st at ut e of li m it at io ns on an y po ss ib le reco ve ry by hi m .”). In fin di ng a waiv er, th e Day

Co ur t rel ie d on th e Fi fth Cir cu it ’s earl ie r op in io n i n Pea rc e v. W ic hi ta Co un ty , 5 90

The Court notes that the plaintiff in Day broug ht suit pursuant to the Ag e Discrimination 1

in Employ

ment Act (“A DEA” ) and not the FL SA. T h i s d i s t i n ct ion is of no eff ect on the Court’s analy sis, howeve r, as, at t he ti me of Day ’s t ermination, § 255(a) ap p l i ed to ADEA cases just as i t does to FL SA case s. See Day

, 122 F. 3 d at 1 0 1 4 (“A t the time of the events g iving rise to this litigation, the ADEA incorpora ted the two-tiere d statute of limit ations containe d in the
Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1). That statute provided that an action
would be ‘for ever barr ed unless commence d within two y ear s afte r the cause of ac tion acc rued,
except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commence d within three y ear s afte r the c ause of

action ac crue d....’ 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).” ).

5F.2 d 1 28 , 13 4 (5 th Cir . 19 79 ). The Pea rc e Co ur t ha d ad dr es se d a si tu at io n a lm os t 2

id en ti cal to th at in th e Day cas e. In Pea rc e , th e de fen da nt ha d no t rais ed th e st at ut e

of li m it at io ns de fen se in it s pl ead in gs or in ob jecti on to th e co ur t’s jury in st ru ct io ns

.

Id

. It ha d wait ed un ti l afte r th e jury ve rd ic t, fin al ly br in gi ng th e li m it at io ns is su e to

th e Co ur t’s at te nt io n in a m ot io n fo r jud gm en t no twi th st an di ng th e ve rd ic t. Id

. The

Pea rc e Co ur t he ld th at su ch a d e l a y c o ns ti tu te d waiv er of an y ob jecti on to th e

li m it at io ns pe rio d t ha t was ap pl ie d. Id

.

The cas e at ha nd is cl earl y di st in gu is ha bl e fro m th e Da y an d Pea rc e cas es ,

ho wev er, as App el le es rai se d § 25 5( a) se ve ral ti m es be fo re th e cas e was su bm it te d

to th e jury. Fi rs t, Appe ll ees st at ed in th ei r Ans wer (un de r th e he ad in g “ Affi rm at iv e

De f en se s” ) th at “ [a]ny vi ol at io n of th e [FLSA] by Defen da nt s was no t wil lfu l, an d

was who ll y un in te nt io na l. Defen da nt s co nt in uo us ly act ed in go od fai th wit h reg ard

to th e ad m in is tra ti on of it s [s ic ] pa y pl an .” Nex t, m or e th an a m on th be fo re tri al

, th e

t w o -o r-t hr ee-year li m it at io n was refe ren ced m or e th an on ce in th e pa rti es ’ J o i n t

Pret ria l St ip ul at io n. Sp eci fic al ly, u nd er th e he ad in g “ Defen da nt s’ S ta te m en t of th e

Cas e,” App el le es st at ed th at “ Defen da nt s di sp ut e

. . . t ha t Pl ai nt iff was no t pa id fo r

an y ov ert im e he m ay ha ve wor ke d du rin g th e la st two or th ree y ears of hi s

The Eleventh Circuit, in an en banc decision, Bonner v. City of Pritchard

, 661 F.2d 1206, 2

1209 (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as prec edent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit r ender ed prior to October 1, 1981.

6em

pl oym en t.” Als o, in th e St ip ul at io n, th e pa rti es st at ed th at th e fo ll owi ng fact was

ag reed up on an d wou ld no t req ui re pr oo f at tri al : “ The co rp or at e Defen da nt gr os se d

in ex ces s of $5 00 ,00 0.0 0 pe r y ear d u r i n g th e la st th ree y ears of Pl ai nt iff ’s

em pl oym e n t

. ” F i n al ly, th e pa rti es an d th e co ur t ad dr es se d th is m at te r du rin g tri al

,

whe n, fo ll owi ng th e cl os e of Nav arro ’s cas e, th e App el le es ba se d se ve ral m ot io ns fo r

di rect ed ve rd ic t on th e th ree- y ear m ax im um li m it at io ns pe rio d. Nav arro ’s c ou ns el

,

arm ed wit h cas e la w, res po nd ed wit h th e co nt en ti on th at th e App el le es ha d no t pl ed

§ 25 5( a) as an affi rm at iv e de fen se

. The Co ur t rev ie wed th e pr of fere d cas e, bu t

ul ti m at el y ru le d th at § 25 5( a) wou ld ap pl y so th at

, at m os t

, Nav arro wou ld reco ve r

fo r a th ree- y ear ti m e pe rio d. Thu s, th is cas e st an ds in st ark co nt ras t t o t he Day an d

Pea rc e cas es , wh ere de fen da nt s ha d waiv ed th e de fen se by n ot rai si n g i t un ti l aft er

th e jury had ren de red a ve rd ic t.

The Co ur t fin ds th at App el le es ti m el y rai se d th e § 25 5( a) st at ut e of li m it at io ns

.

Eve n if App el le es ’ as se rti on s in th ei r Ans wer di d no t co m pl y wit h a st ric t read in g of

F.R.Ci v.P

. 8( c), un de r t h i s C o u rt’s pr eced en t, th e li m it at io n was st il l no t waiv ed

.

Tha t is

, al th ou gh Ru le 8( c) req ui res th at a st at ut e of li m it at io ns de fen se be rai se d as

an affi rm at iv e de fen se , th is Co ur t ha s no te d th at “ th e pu rp os e of Ru le 8( c) is to gi ve

th e op po si ng pa rty no ti ce of th e affi rm at iv e de fen se an d a ch an ce to reb ut it ,” an d, as

a res ul t, “ if a pl ai nt iff rece iv es no ti ce of an affi rm at iv e de fen se by so m e m ean s ot he r

7th an th e pl ead in gs , ‘the de fen da nt ’s fai lu re to co m pl y wit h Ru le 8( c) do es no t cau se

th e pl ai nt iff an y pr ejud ic e.’” Gra nt v. Pref er re d Res ea rc h, In c. , 88 5 F.2 d 79 5, 79 7

(1 1t h Cir. 19 89 ) (q uo ti ng Has sa n v. U.S. P os ta l S er v. , 84 2 F.2d 26 0, 26 3 (11 th Ci r.

19 88 )). In Gra nt

, th e de fen da nt rai se d th e st at ut e of li m it at io ns de fen se fo r th e fir st

ti m e in a m ot io n fo r su m

m ary jud gm en t fil ed ap pr ox im at el y on e m on th be fo re tri al

.

Id

. Thi s co ur t ru le d t ha t, be cau se th e pl ai nt iff was “ fu ll y

aware” th at th e d efen da nt

in te nd ed to rel y on th e de fen se , an d be cau se th e pl ai nt iff di d no t as se rt an y pr ejud ic e

fro m th e la te ne ss of th e pl ead in g, th e de fen da nt ’s fai lu re to co m pl y wit h Ru le 8( c) di d

no t re su lt in a waiv er. Id

. at 7 97 -9 8.

As de m on s t r a t e d ab ov e, in th is cas e, Nav arro was gi ve n am pl e no ti ce of

App el le es ’ in te nt to rel y on § 25 5( a) in se ve ral in st an ces pr io r to tri al

. Mo reo ve r,

whe n th e is su e was de ba te d in li gh t of th e App el le es ’ di rect ed v e r d ic t m ot io ns ,

Nav arro ’s c ou ns el m ad e a th or ou gh arg um en t (in cl ud in g c as e ci ta ti on s) ag ai ns t t he

st at ut e’s ap pl ic at io n. He ne ve r cl ai m ed d u r i ng th at arg um en t th at he ha d be en

su r p r is ed or so m eh ow ot he rwis e pr ejud ic ed by de fen se co un se l’s rel ia nc e up on §

25 5( a) at tri al

. As a res ul t, th e di st ric t c o u r t di d no t err in li m it in g th e jury’ s

co ns id erat io n o f un pa id ov ert im e to th e two - or th ree- y ear pe rio d pr io r to th e fi li ng

of th e co m

pl ai nt

. Fu rth er, be cau se it was un co nt es te d th at th ere was no ev id en ce th at

Dom in go or Ro sa San to s ex erci se d an y act iv e su pe rv is or y co nt ro l ov er th e co m pa ny

8fo r th e pe rio d th ree y ears pr io r to th e fil in g of th e co m pl ai nt

, th e di st ric t co ur t di d no t

err in gr an ti ng App el le es ’ m ot io n fo r jud gm en t as a m at te r of la w on th e is su e of th e

in di vi du al li ab il it y of ei th er of th em . Accor di ng ly, we affi rm th e jud gm en t en te red

on th e jury’ s v erd ic t.

AFFIRMED.

9