alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 [PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-4748
D. C. Docket No. 93-8500-CIV-KLR RITA STROCHAK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, KEEVILY, SPERO-WHITELAW, INC., Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (April 13, 1998) Before BARKETT, Circuit Judge, KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and HARRIS*, Senior District Judge.

________________________ *Honorable Stanley S. Harris, Senior U.S. Distri ct Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.2 BARKETT, Circuit Judge: Appellant Rita Strochak appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment on her contract claim for excess uninsured motori st coverage based on Florida Statute § 627.727(2) (1996) in favor of Appellee Federal Insurance Company (FIC). Strochak alleged that FIC’s failure to offer uninsured motorist covera ge for her 1984 Lincoln violated § 627.727(2). Although the 1984 Lincoln was not registered or pr incipally garaged in Florida in 1985 when her husband, Donald Strochak, took out the insurance policy with FIC, Strochak argued that when she registered and principally garaged the 1984 Li ncoln in Florida, FIC had a duty to offer her uninsured motorist coverage under § 627.727(2). In our initial decision in this case, we concluded that this dispositive question of Florida law was not dictated by the clear and controlling precedent of the Florida Supreme C ourt. Accordingly, we certified the follwing question to the Florida Supreme Court: WHETHER AN EXCESS CARRIER HAS A DUTY TO MAKE AVAILABLE THE UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE REQUIRED BY FLORIDA STATUTE § 627.727(2) TO AN INSURED UNDER AN EXISTING POLICY ON VEHICLES WHICH HAD NEVER BEEN REGISTERED OR PRINCIPALLY GARAGED IN FLORIDA WHENEVER ANY VEHICLE, COVERED OR SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED, FIRST BECOMES REGISTERED OR PRINCIPALLY GARAGED IN FLORIDA.
Strochak v. Federal Ins. Co. , 109 F.3d 717, 720-21 (11th Cir. 1997). The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. Strochak v. Federal Ins. Co. , No. 90, 298 (Fla. March. 19, 1998). Based on this opinion, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to FIC and REMAND this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court.3
Exhibit
      32.2











CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Mobius Management Systems, Inc. (the
      “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2006 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Raymond
      F. Kunzmann, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and




(2)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.









A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.














/s/
      Raymond F. Kunzmann


Raymond
      F. Kunzmann


Chief
      Financial Officer


May
      9,
      2006
#### In the Matter of Raphael Jackson, Petitioner, v Robert J. Murphy, as Acting Director of Special Housing of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[744 NYS2d 914]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge a determination rendered after a tier III disciplinary hearing finding him guilty of violating the prison disciplinary rule prohibiting inmates from using controlled substances. This determination was administratively reversed and all references to it and to the hearing were expunged from petitioner’s institutional records on May 1, 2002. Therefore, since petitioner has received all the relief to which he is entitled and is no longer aggrieved, the petition is dismissed as moot *(see, Matter of Curtis v Goord,*274 AD2d 808; *Matter of Maldonado v Miller,*259 AD2d 912).

Cardona, P.J., Peters, Spain, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the petition is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEUDLE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY TO REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          46,790
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   33,731
<ALLOWANCES>                                       675
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                86,360
<PP&E>                                           5,709
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,524
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  90,551
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           36,690
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           222
<OTHER-SE>                                      49,355
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    90,551
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               165,682
<CGS>                                          121,053
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  151,506
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   875
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   300
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  9,712
<INCOME-TAX>                                     5,291
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,421
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,421
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.11
        

</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01734-PAB-BNB

DANIEL LEROY RHODEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

RYAN O’HAYRE and

STUART RUYBAL, 

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________________________

ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RECOMMENDATION

_____________________________________________________________________

This matter is before the Court on the Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland filed on March 4, 2014 [Docket No. 82]. The

Recommendation states that objections to the Recommendation must be filed within

fourteen days after its service on the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

Recommendation was served on March 4, 2014. No party has objected to the

Recommendation. 

In the absence of an objection, the district court may review a magistrate judge’s

recommendation under any standard it deems appropriate. See Summers v. Utah, 927

F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985)

(“[i]t does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a

magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when

neither party objects to those findings”). In this matter, the Court has reviewed the

Case 1:11-cv-01734-PAB-BNB Document 83 Filed 03/24/14 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
This standard of review is something less than a “clearly erroneous or contrary 1

to law” standard of review, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which in turn is less than a de novo

review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Plaintiff’s second and third claims for relief were previously dismissed. Docket 2

No. 51. 

2

Recommendation to satisfy itself that there is “no clear error on the face of the record.”1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes. Based on this review, the Court has

concluded that the Recommendation is a correct application of the facts and the law. 

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1. The Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 82] is

ACCEPTED. 

2. Defendants Ryan O’Hayre and Stuart Ruybal’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [Docket No. 77] is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s first claim for relief is dismissed with

prejudice. Plaintiff’s fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims for relief are dismissed

without prejudice.2

3. This case is CLOSED.

DATED March 24, 2014.

BY THE COURT:

 s/Philip A. Brimmer 

PHILIP A. BRIMMER

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-01734-PAB-BNB Document 83 Filed 03/24/14 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 18, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-01034-CR

JOSE ERNEST ADAME, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 177th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 1426474 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant Jose Ernest Adame pleaded guilty to assault of a family member 

with bodily injury. Appellant and the State agreed appellant’s punishment would not 

exceed three years’ imprisonment. On June 9, 2014, the trial court sentenced 

appellant in accordance with the terms of his agreement with the State. Appellant 

filed a notice of appeal on November 12, 2018. 

We lack jurisdiction over this appeal for two reasons: the notice of appeal was

not filed timely, and this is a plea bargain case with no appealable matters and 
2

appellant has not been granted permission to appeal. 

First, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after 

sentence is imposed when the defendant has not filed a motion for new trial. See

Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). A notice of appeal that complies with the requirements 

of Rule 26.2 is essential to vest the court of appeals with jurisdiction. Slaton v. State, 

981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If an appeal is not timely perfected, a 

court of appeals does not obtain jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal. 

Under those circumstances it can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal. Id.

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed more than four years after sentence was 

imposed. Therefore, the appeal was not timely perfected, and we lack jurisdiction. 

Second, in a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was 

guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment 

recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant may 

appeal only matters raised by a written, pretrial motion or with the trial court’s 

permission. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).

Appellant’s punishment does not exceed the agreed length of confinement. 

The record does not contain any appealable pretrial rulings, and the trial court did 

not grant appellant permission to appeal.

Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal. 

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Christopher, and Jewell.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Exhibit 32





Certification of Chief Executive Officer
and Principal Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



I, Thomas McConnell, certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the quarterly report on Form 10-Q
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2014 of Fuelstream, Inc. fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of Fuelstream, Inc.



Date: August 19, 2014



|By: /s/ Thomas McConnell        | 
|------------------------------- | 
|Thomas McConnell                | 
|Chief Executive Officer         | 
|and Principal Financial Officer |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIR E

Rosemarv A . Gilro V

v . Civil No. 07-cv-0074-JD

Ameriauest Mortgage CompanV, et al .

O R D E R

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Rosemary A . Gilroy

brought suit against Ameriquest Mortgage Company ("Ameriquest"),

Ameriquest Mortgage Company Mortgage Services, Inc . ("AMC

Services"), and Citi Residential Lending, Inc . ("Citi"), alleging

predatory lending practices in violation of New Hampshire law .

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on

Counts I, II, III, IV, and VI of Gilroy's amended complaint, and

the only remaining claim in this case is the harassment claim, as

alleged in Count V . The defendants move to amend the scheduling

order and continue the trial date scheduled for the period

beginning March 17, 2009, so that they may file an untimely

motion for summary judgment on Count V . Although Gilroy has not

yet responded to the defendants' motion to amend the scheduling

order, to avoid further delay, the court will address the motion .

The deadline for submitting summary judgment motions was

November 17, 2008 . The defendants submitted their motion for

summary judgment on November 17, in which they expressly excluded

Case 1:07-cv-00074-JD Document 89 Filed 03/03/09 Page 1 of 2
Count V from their request for summary judgment . The defendants'

current motion states that in light of the court's order granting

summary judgment on all other counts (Order, Feb . 20, 2009 ,

document no . 82), they now intend to seek summary judgment on

Count V .

The defendants had the opportunity to address Count V in

their November 17 summary judgment motion but expressly declined

to do so . The summary judgment deadline expired over three

months ago and trial is scheduled for the period beginning on

March 17, 2009 . The defendants have not shown good cause for

allowing their untimely motion, which would require the trial to

be rescheduled .

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to amen d

the scheduling order and continue the trial (document no . 85) is

denied .

SO ORDERED .

/s/ Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr .

Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr .

United States District Judge

March 3, 200 9

cc : Rosemary Gilroy, pro se

Thomas Tretter, Esq .

2

Case 1:07-cv-00074-JD Document 89 Filed 03/03/09 Page 2 of 2
## NUMBER 13 - 2 2 - 00 1 49 - C V COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF TAHNEE ANN MCQUEEN AND MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER MCQUEEN AND IN THE INTEREST OF

A.J.M AND N.A.M, CHILDREN
On appeal from the 414 th District Court of McLennan C ounty, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

T his cause is before the Court on its own motion. 1 On March 2 1 , 2022, appellant Tahnee Ann McQueen filed a pro se notice of appeal regarding a final decree of divorce signed in trial court cause number 2021

- 1959

- 5 in the 414 th District Court of McLennan County, Texas

. On May 3, 2022, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that her brief

1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco pursuant to a docket equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See T EX

. G OV ' T C ODE A NN . § 73.001

.2

had not been timely filed. The Clerk advised appellant that the appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution unless, within ten days from the date of this letter, appellant reasonably explained the failure and the appellee was not significantly injure d by the appellant’s failure to timely file a brief. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 38.8(a). Appellant did not respond to the Clerk’s notice or file a brief in this matter. Appellate courts possess the authority to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution
when an a ppellant in a civil case fails to timely file the appellant’s brief and gives no reasonable explanation for the failure. See id . R. 38.8(a)(1); id. R. 42.3(b); Am. Bail Bonds v. City of El Paso , 225 S.W.3d 612, 612 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2006, no pet.) ; Newman v. Clark , 113 S.W.3d 622, 623 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2003, no pet.) (per curiam). Similarly, courts may dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution generally or because the appellant has failed to comply with a requirement of the appellate rules, a court order, or a notice from the appellate court clerk requiring a response or other action within a specified time. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.3 (b), (c). The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file and appellant’s failure to file a brief, is o f the opinion that this appeal should be dismissed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See id. R. 38.8(a), 42.3(b), (c).
JAIME TIJERINA Justice

Delivered and filed on the 7th day of July , 202 2

.
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Magistrate Judge David L. West

Criminal Case No. 11-PO-00137-DLW

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

1. CATHERINE ROST,

Defendant.

 

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME

 

ORDER ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID L. WEST

The Defendant has requested an extension of time within which to comply with item 2 of the

Additional Conditions of Judgment, therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant’s request is GRANTED and she shall have

an extension of time to December 10, 2011 to complete the alcohol evaluation and furnish a copy

of the evaluation and recommendations to the Court.

DATED: November 23, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

s/David L. West 

United States Magistrate Judge
2

 

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

 

I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of November , 2011, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Order was placed in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:

Catherine Rost

411 Marilla Street

Buffalo, New York 14220

By: s/Shirley W. Dills 

 Assistant to Magistrate Judge
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-40756

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Daniel Colado-Garcia, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:22-CR-963-1

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Daniel ColadoGarcia has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Colado-Garcia has not filed a response. We have 

reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 15, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-40756 Document: 00516788518 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/15/2023
No. 22-40756

2

therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no 

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for 

leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further 

responsibilities herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. 

R. 42.2.

Case: 22-40756 Document: 00516788518 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/15/2023
Exhibit Number 10.01

                          WEST TELESERVICES CORPORATION

To:    Tom Barker

From:  Troy Eaden

Date:  December 9, 1999

Re:    2000 Compensation Plan
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The compensation plan for 2000 while you are employed as President and Chief
Executive Officer for West TeleServices Corporation is outlined below:

1.   Your base salary will be $450,000.00. Should you elect to voluntarily
     terminate your employment, you will be compensated for your services
     through the date of your actual termination per your Employment Agreement.
     This will be reviewed on an annual basis and revised, if necessary in
     accordance with the consumer price index.

2.   Effective January 1, 2000, you will be eligible to receive a performance
     bonus based on year-to-date growth of profits over the same period of the
     prior year.  This bonus will be calculated by multiplying the year-to-date
     growth in profits for each quarter by the corresponding profit growth
     participation factor from the table below, minus bonus paid year-to-date
     for the respective calendar year.

          Profit Growth              Profit Growth Participation Factor
          -------------              ----------------------------------
            0% - 12%                                     0
           12% - 14.99%                                 .0125
           15% - 16.99%                                 .015
           17% - 19.99%                                 .0175
           20% - 22%                                    .02
               22%+                                     .025

     Please note that a negative year-to-date profit calculations at the end of
     any given quarter will result in "loss carry forward" to be applied to the
     next quarterly year-to-date calculation.  All bonuses will be paid within
     thirty (30) days of the end of the quarter.

3.   You will be eligible for a bonus of $50,000.00 for every net new analyst
     that initiates coverage with a report on West TeleServices in the year
     2000.  This will include new analysts as a result of a secondary offering.
     The maximum bonus to be earned as a result of new analysts' coverage in the
     year 2000 is $250,000.00.

4.   For the purposes of this Exhibit A, profit shall be defined as pre-tax
     profit growth of the Company on a consolidated basis.

<PAGE>

                                                       Exhibit Number 10.01

Exhibit A - T. Barker
December 9, 1999
                                    Page Two

5.   At the discretion of management, you may receive an additional bonus based
     on the Companies' and your individual performance.

6.   Your Compensation Plan for the year 2001 will be presented no later than
     December 1, 2000.

                    /s/ Tom Barker
                    ---------------------
                    Employee - Tom Barker