IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No.115A19

Filed 27 September 2019

IN THE MATTER OF: C.B.C

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered 13 

December 2019 by Judge Monica M. Bousman in District Court, Wake County. This 

matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 11 September 2019 but determined 

on the records and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 

Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for petitionerappellees.

J. Thomas Diepenrock for respondent-appellant father.

HUDSON, Justice. 

Respondent appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights 

to his minor child, C.B.C. (Catherine),1 on the grounds of neglect and willful 

abandonment. We affirm.

 

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading.

See N.C.R. App. P. 42(b)(1).
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Opinion of the Court

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Respondent is the biological father of Catherine and petitioners are the 

maternal grandparents. In 2010, respondent and Catherine’s biological mother, J.F., 

were involved in a relationship when J.F. became pregnant with Catherine. In March 

2011, before Catherine’s birth, respondent was convicted of felony theft charges and 

began serving a 15 month sentence.

J.F. gave birth to Catherine on 26 June 2011, and moved in with petitioners in 

July 2011. During respondent’s incarceration, J.F. brought Catherine to visit him in 

prison “a few” times, and she sent him pictures of Catherine. Respondent finished 

serving his sentence in June 2012.

After his release, respondent had limited visitation with Catherine until J.F. 

passed away from a suspected accidental drug overdose on 7 July 2012. Following 

J.F’s death, respondent and petitioners became involved in a custody dispute, and 

petitioners were granted temporary custody of Catherine, with respondent having 

visitation. On 19 November 2015, the trial court entered a permanent child custody 

order granting petitioners legal and physical custody of Catherine and ordering that 

respondent have no right to visitation. At the time the order was entered, respondent 

was incarcerated for felony breaking and entering and misdemeanor assault and had 

a projected release date of 16 October 2016. In the decretal section of the custody 

order, the trial court provided that respondent may petition the court for visitation 

after his release from incarceration as long as he could demonstrate to the court that

his ongoing substance abuse and mental health issues had been appropriately 
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Opinion of the Court

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addressed. The custody order also provided that respondent may continue to 

communicate in writing with Catherine, and that petitioners “shall deliver all 

appropriate communications” to Catherine.

On 4 March 2016, petitioners filed a petition to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights alleging the grounds of dependency and willful abandonment. See 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) and (7) (2017). Respondent participated in the hearing held 

13 July 2017 and opposed the termination of his parental rights. On 21 September 

2017, the trial court entered an order denying the petition. The trial court found that 

respondent “ha[d] consistently attempted to assert custodial rights with respect to 

[Catherine] and ha[d] consistently desired to maintain a relationship with her.” The

trial court also found that there was no evidence that respondent’s substance abuse 

issues rendered him incapable of providing for Catherine’s care, and that 

respondent’s “periodic imprisonments [did] not constitute a ‘disability’ or clear, cogent 

and convincing evidence of incapability.”

On 31 August 2017, respondent was charged with multiple felonies, including 

larceny of firearms and breaking and entering. Respondent spent approximately 

three weeks in jail before he posted bond. He remained out of jail from September 

2017 through March 2018. In April 2018, respondent pled guilty to multiple felonies 
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Opinion of the Court

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resulting from the August 2017 charges, and began serving his active sentence.

Respondent’s projected release date is in April 2022.2

Petitioners filed a second petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights on 

12 June 2018 alleging the grounds of neglect, dependency, and willful abandonment. 

See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (6), and (7). Following a 30 October 2018 hearing, the 

trial court entered an order on 13 December 2018, finding that grounds existed to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights based on neglect and willful abandonment, 

and that termination was in Catherine’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court 

terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent gave timely notice of appeal to 

this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(a)(5) and 7B-1001(a1)(1) (2017).

Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of 

parental rights. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2017). At the adjudicatory stage, the 

petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the 

existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the 

General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f). “If [the trial court] determines that one or 

more grounds listed in section 7B-1111 are present, the court proceeds to the 

dispositional stage, at which the court must consider whether it is in the best 

interests of the juvenile to terminate parental rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 

 

2 Respondent testified at the hearing that his projected release date is 2 April 2020,

while later arguments by counsel, and the trial court’s finding of fact indicate a projected 

release date in 2022. Respondent does not challenge this finding.
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842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 

612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110).

We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 “to determine 

whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 

findings support the conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 

S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984) (citation omitted). The trial court’s conclusions of law are 

reviewable de novo on appeal. In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146, 669 S.E.2d 55, 59 

(2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368, 677 S.E.2d 455 (2009) (citation omitted).

Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in concluding grounds 

existed to terminate his parental rights based on willful abandonment. We conclude 

otherwise.

A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights when “[t]he parent has 

willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition or motion[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).

“Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful 

determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the 

child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. at 251, 485 S.E.2d at 617 (citation omitted). “Wilful [sic] 

intent is an integral part of abandonment and this is a question of fact to be 

determined from the evidence.” Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 

608 (1962). “[I]f a parent withholds [that parent’s] presence, [ ] love, [ ] care, the 

opportunity to display filial affection, and willfully [sic] neglects to lend support and 
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maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.”

Id. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608.

Here, the relevant six-month period preceding the petitioners’ filing of the 

petition is 12 December 2017 to 12 June 2018. Respondent was incarcerated for 

approximately three of the relevant six months. However, the Court of Appeals has 

held3 that “incarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a 

termination of parental rights decision. . . . Although a parent’s options for showing 

affection while incarcerated are greatly limited, a parent will not be excused from 

showing interest in [the] child’s welfare by whatever means available.” In re D.E.M., 

810 S.E.2d 375, 378 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The trial court made the following findings of fact regarding abandonment:

9. From the time the Respondent bonded out on his felony 

charges in mid-September, 2017 until March 2018, the 

Respondent earned $600 per week performing repairs and 

handy man services. Despite earning regular income, the 

Respondent sent no support to or on behalf of [Catherine] 

during the same time period. The Respondent paid no 

support to or on behalf of [Catherine] since the time of this 

[c]ourt’s last hearing in July, 2017 through the time of this 

proceeding.

10. The Respondent made no efforts to communicate with 

[Catherine] from the time of this [c]ourt’s last hearing in 

July, 2017 to the time of the Petitioners’ filing of their 

Petition on June 12, 2018. The Respondent did send one 

birthday card to [Catherine] from prison after he had been 

 

3 This Court has not previously addressed this issue. 
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Opinion of the Court

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served with the Petitioners’ termination petition.

Otherwise the Respondent made no efforts to communicate 

with [Catherine] since the time of the July, 2017 hearing 

despite Judge Walczyk’s 2015 Custody Order providing 

him the opportunity to send written communications to 

[Catherine]. Prior to his incarceration in March 2018 

following a guilty plea, Respondent had a telephone, access 

to transportation, had his own vehicle, and had access to a 

post office. Respondent testified that he or his girlfriend 

mailed cards to the child prior to March 2018. His 

testimony was uncertain as to when and how many cards 

were sent. His testimony was contradictory and is not 

credible. After his incarceration in March 2018, he received 

approximately five (5) cards per month from the prison 

chaplain at no cost to him. He used only one of these cards 

to mail to [Catherine] and this card was mailed after he 

was served with the petition to terminate his parental 

rights.

11. The Respondent made no effort from the time of this 

[c]ourt’s hearing in July, 2017 through the time of this 

hearing to contact either of the Petitioners to determine 

how [Catherine] was doing, how her health was, how she 

was doing in school, or any other inquiry regarding her 

well-being. The Petitioners continue to reside at the 

address that they resided at the time of the July, 2017 

hearing and continue to have the same telephone numbers 

and contact information since the time of that hearing. The 

Petitioners did not prevent the Respondent from contacting 

them in order for the Respondent to obtain information 

about [Catherine]. Judge Walczyk’s Custody Order does 

not contain any prohibition on the Respondent contacting 

the Petitioners to obtain information concerning 

[Catherine].

12. Since the time of this [c]ourt’s hearing in July, 2017 

the Respondent has taken no steps to have Judge 

Walczyk’s 2015 Custody Order reviewed, modified or to 

otherwise present evidence to that [c]ourt that he has 

complied with the conditions of the 2015 Custody Order 

that would permit him once again to have visitation with 
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Opinion of the Court

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[Catherine].

13. Respondent has willfully withheld his love, care, and 

affection from the child. He has done nothing to attempt to 

develop and maintain a relationship with her since his last 

release from prison in November 2016. He has not 

attempted to resume any direct contact with the child in 

compliance with the permanent custody order. He has not 

attempted to resume and [sic] parental rights or 

responsibility for the child. He has abandoned and 

neglected the child. There is a reasonable probability that 

he will continue to neglect the child in the future.

Respondent challenges finding of fact number 13 as not being supported by 

clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, respondent objects to the portion of the 

finding stating that he has willfully withheld his love, care, and affection and “has 

done nothing to attempt to develop and maintain a relationship with [Catherine]”

since his release from incarceration in November 2016. Respondent argues that after 

his November 2016 release, he opposed the first petition to terminate his parental

rights, and he sent a birthday card to Catherine in June 2018 after he had been served 

with the second termination petition.

However, respondent’s participation in the first termination hearing in 2017 

did nothing to aid in the development or continuation of his relationship with 

Catherine. Indeed, following the denial of the petition, respondent did not send 

Catherine any cards or letters, and did not take any steps to resume visitation with 

her. Additionally, respondent’s opposition to the original petition to terminate his 

parental rights does not preclude the trial court from later finding that he has 
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willfully withheld his love, care, and affection from Catherine during the 

determinative six-month period. While the trial court found that respondent sent one 

card to Catherine after being served with the termination petition in June 2018, the 

court also found that the card was sent outside of the relevant six-month period, and 

thus not determinative in adjudicating willful abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(7). See also In re D.M.O., 794 S.E.2d 858, 861 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he 

‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive 

months preceding the filing of the petition.” (emphasis added) (citing In re Young, 346 

N.C. at 251, 485 S.E.2d at 617).

Nevertheless, even setting aside the portion of finding of fact number 13 

stating that respondent has done nothing to attempt to develop or maintain a 

relationship with Catherine since his release from prison in 2016, there are ample 

other findings demonstrating that respondent had no contact with Catherine or 

petitioners for nearly one year prior to the filing of the termination petition on 12 

June 2018, and that he had the ability to make at least some contact during that time 

but chose not to. Respondent has not challenged these findings, and they are binding 

on appeal. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) 

(“Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is 

presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.”).

Respondent argues that the evidence and findings of fact do not support the 

court’s conclusion that he willfully abandoned Catherine because his actions do not 
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evince “a settled purpose to forego all parental duties or to relinquish all parental 

claims” to Catherine. Respondent further contends that it was “imperative” the trial 

court consider his actions over the years leading up to the termination petition in 

order to determine whether his actions demonstrated a settled purpose to forego all 

parental duties. Respondent maintains that he has consistently sought a relationship 

with Catherine since 2012, and argues that his “longstanding and continuing efforts 

and actions to pursue a relationship with his daughter negate the trial court’s 

conclusion that he willfully abandoned her.”

However, while “the trial court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the 

six-month window in evaluating a parent’s credibility and intentions, the 

‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive 

months preceding the filing of the petition.” In re D.M.O., 794 S.E.2d at 861 (N.C. Ct. 

App. 2016) (emphasis added) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations 

omitted); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Thus, while the court may consider respondent’s 

prior efforts in seeking a relationship with Catherine to determine his credibility and 

intentions, respondent’s prior actions will not preclude a finding that he willfully 

abandoned Catherine pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) if he did nothing to 

maintain or establish a relationship with Catherine during the determinative sixmonth period. See In re B.S.O., 234 N.C. App. 706, 713 n.4, 760 S.E.2d 59, 65 n.4

(2014) (disregarding the respondent-father’s assertion that he had “close contact”

with his children and the social worker prior to his deportation in determining 
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Opinion of the Court

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whether he willfully abandoned the children because it occurred outside the sixmonth period). 

Here, the findings demonstrate that in the six months preceding the filing of 

the termination petition, respondent made no effort to pursue a relationship with 

Catherine. The trial court found that respondent did not send any cards or letters to 

Catherine, did not contact petitioners to inquire into Catherine’s well-being, did not 

take any steps to modify the custody order or resume visitation after the trial court’s

denial of the first termination petition, and did not provide financial support for 

Catherine despite earning $600 per week from September 2017 until he was 

incarcerated in March 2018. The trial court also found that although respondent 

received five free cards per month while in custody, he only sent Catherine one card

after being served with the termination petition.

These uncontested findings demonstrate that respondent willfully withheld his 

love, care, and affection from Catherine and that his conduct during the 

determinative six-month period constituted willful abandonment. See In re B.S.O., 

234 N.C. App. at 711, 760 S.E.2d at 64 (affirming termination of the respondentfather’s parental rights based on willful abandonment where, in the relevant sixmonth period, the respondent-father “made no effort” to remain in contact with the 

children or their caretakers and did not provide anything toward their support).

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
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The trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(7) is sufficient in and of itself to support termination of respondent’s parental 

rights. See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) 

(citation omitted) (“A finding of any one of the enumerated grounds for termination 

of parental rights under N.C.G.S. 7B-1111 is sufficient to support a termination.”).

Respondent did not challenge the trial court’s determination that termination was in 

Catherine’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating 

respondent’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.