alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Gayle Morris, Also Known as Gayle Kemper, Respondent, v Gary Hochman et al., Appellants.

[745 NYS2d 549]

In an action, inter alia, to recover a down payment, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Alpert, J.), entered June 6, 2001, as granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, denied their cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and is in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sum of $83,750.

Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, by (1) deleting the provision thereof granting the motion for *482summary judgment and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion, and (2) deleting the provision thereof which is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in the principal sum of $83,750; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendants.

Pursuant to the parties’ residential contract of sale, the plaintiff made a down payment of $83,750 and subsequently obtained a mortgage commitment. Prior to the closing date, the plaintiff accepted a new position offered by her employer and relocated to Atlanta, Georgia. Apprised of this change in circumstance, the bank revoked its commitment since the plaintiff could no longer occupy the home as her primary residence. Thereafter, the plaintiff notified the defendants of this sudden change and demanded the return of her down payment. The defendants refused and later sold the property to another buyer. The plaintiff then commenced this action to recover the down payment and moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff acted in good faith.

The plaintiff failed to establish her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851). The plaintiff’s motion was made before the defendants had any opportunity to conduct discovery, and there are essential issues of fact which are within her exclusive knowledge *(see Plaza Invs. v Kim,*208 AD2d 704). Thus, her motion was premature and should have been denied *(see*CPLR 3212 [f|). Santucci, J.P., Florio, Smith and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
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###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health 

                    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the Cancer Genetics Study Section, October 9, 2008, 8 a.m. to October 9, 2008, 5 p.m., Le Meridien San Francisco, 333 Battery Street, San Francisco, CA, 94111 which was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on September 19, 2008, 73 FR 54408-54411.                 

The meeting will be held October 9, 2008 to October 10, 2008. The meeting time and location remain the same. The meeting is closed to the public. 

Dated: September 25, 2008. 

Jennifer Spaeth, 

Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

 [FR Doc. E8-23182 Filed 10-1-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
1

“[#10]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific

paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this convention

throughout this order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-02406-REB-CBS

DANIEL STEWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEGAL COLLECTION CO LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,

Defendant.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Blackburn, J.

The matter is before me on the Stipulated Motion To Dismiss With Prejudice

[#10]1

 filed December 5, 2011. After reviewing the motion and the file, I conclude that

the motion should be granted and that this action should be dismissed with prejudice.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That the Stipulated Motion To Dismiss With Prejudice [#10] filed

December 5, 2011, is GRANTED; and

2. That this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE with the parties to pay

their own attorney fees and costs. 

Dated December 6, 2011, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

Case 1:11-cv-02406-REB-CBS Document 11 Filed 12/06/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
1 Defendant opposes the Motion to Stay. See Hartford’s Opp. [#57].

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02306-WJM-KLM

LARRY D. FREDERICK,

Plaintiff,

v.

HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

_____________________________________________________________________

MINUTE ORDER

_____________________________________________________________________

ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion For Stay [Docket No. 55; Filed

December 17, 2012] (the “Motion”). Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Motion For Stay on

December 27, 2012 [Docket No. 57]. Defendant filed a Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s

Motion For Stay on January 7, 2013 [Docket No. 58]. This matter is also before the Court

on Defendant’s Notice of U.S. Supreme Court Decision Mooting Plaintiff’s Motion for

Stay [Docket No. 60; Filed March 19, 2013] (the “Notice”). The basis for Plaintiff’s Motion

was a pending United States Supreme Court case, Standard Fire Insurance Co. v.

Knowles, 2013 WL 1104735 (March 19, 2013). Motion at 1. Defendant argues the United

States Supreme Court decision entered March 19, 2013 renders Plaintiff’s Motion [#55]

moot.1

 Since Plaintiff’s Motion requested a stay “pending the issuance of the United States

Supreme Court’s opinion in Knowles v. Standard Fire Insurance Company,” and that

decision has issued, the Motion is moot. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay [#55] is DENIED as moot.

Dated: April 5, 2013

Case 1:11-cv-02306-WJM-KLM Document 61 Filed 04/05/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

INGRAM HARPER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-259

[April 12, 2018]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Ernest A. Kollra, Jr., 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 12-11968CF10A.

Ingram Harper, Pahokee, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, TAYLOR, and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-18-00372-CR 

BAOQUOC TRAN NGUYEN, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6 

Tarrant County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 1546160, Honorable John Weeks, Presiding 

 

April 15, 2020 

 

CONCURRING OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ. 

I concur in the result for the reasons stated in Chief Justice Quinn’s concurring 

opinion, and for the further reason stated below.

In Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), abrogated in part 

on other grounds by Wilson v. State, 448 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), the 

Court of Criminal Appeals held that the plain language of TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.07(a)(4) 

“does not implicate the free-speech guarantee of the First Amendment” because it 
prohibits conduct. As an example, the statute prohibits a person, with the requisite intent 

to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another, from causing the 

telephone of another to ring repeatedly. Id. This prohibition is separate and distinct from 

the remainder of section 42.07(a)(4), including the expressive activity that appellant 

complains is protected by the First Amendment.

The evidence shows the appellant encouraged others to engage in call flooding: 

he provided telephone numbers so “people from all over the world can immediately start 

calling in and flood the phone lines disrupting utilities, disrupting the police, disrupting 

anybody that they have thus targeted with that phone number.” The jury could therefore 

reasonably conclude from the evidence that appellant caused the telephone number of 

another to ring repeatedly, and that he did so with the intent to intent to harass, annoy, 

alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another. Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 715 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007) (holding that jury may find alternate forms of commission of an offense 

when the charging offense lists them in the disjunctive). As appellant fails to show how 

this non-expressive conduct affects a protected right to speak freely or petition the 

government, I would affirm the conviction because a discussion of constitutional issues 

is not necessary to disposition of the appeal.

Lawrence M. Doss

 Justice

Do not publish.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5  
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          20,973
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,638
<ALLOWANCES>                                       527
<INVENTORY>                                      3,876
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                29,129
<PP&E>                                          11,860
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (6,776)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  37,441
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           16,998
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     18,110
<COMMON>                                        69,205
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    37,441
<SALES>                                         20,644
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                20,644
<CGS>                                           10,523
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   29,303
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 273
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (18,909)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (15)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (18,924)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (18,924)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.93)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.93)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           7,218
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   42,344
<ALLOWANCES>                                       994
<INVENTORY>                                     24,767
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                74,652
<PP&E>                                         243,879
<DEPRECIATION>                                 138,040
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 284,641
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           46,983
<BONDS>                                        120,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         14
<COMMON>                                            31
<OTHER-SE>                                    (32,286)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   284,641
<SALES>                                        230,245
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               230,245
<CGS>                                          166,950
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  204,906
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (1,235)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              24,943
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,631
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (66)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,697
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,697
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (5.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (5.33)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 23


                            INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT





          The Board of Directors
          El Chico Restaurants, Inc.:


          We  consent to  incorporation  by reference  in the  registration
          statement (No.  33-63474) on  Form S-8 of  El Chico  Restaurants,
          Inc.  of our  report  dated February  7,  1996, relating  to  the
          consolidated  balance sheets  of El  Chico Restaurants,  Inc. and
          subsidiaries  as of December 31,  1995 and 1994,  and the related
          consolidated statements of  operations, changes in  stockholders'
          equity, and  cash flows for each  of the years in  the three year
          period  ended December  31,  1995, which  report  appears in  the
          December  31, 1995  annual  report  on  Form  10-K  of  El  Chico
          Restaurants, Inc.





                                               KPMG Peat Marwick LLP



          Dallas, Texas
          March 17, 1996
<PAGE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lonnie Pfaudler, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Orange County (Paño Z. Patsalos, J.), both rendered April 28, 1989, convicting him of attempted burglary in the third degree under indictment No. 247/87, and bail jumping in the second degree under indictment No. 290/88, upon his pleas of guilty, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of 2 to 6 years’ imprisonment under indictment No. 247/87, and a conditional discharge under indictment No. 290/88, the condition being that within nine months of being released from prison, the defendant pay the sum of $1,900 to the County of Orange or to the office of the District Attorney of Orange County.

Ordered that the appeal from the judgment rendered under indictment No. 247/87 is dismissed as abandoned; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment rendered under indictment No. 290/88 is modified by vacating the sentence imposed; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Orange County, for the imposition of a new sentence.

A law enforcement agency is not a "victim” as defined in Penal Law § 60.27 such that it is qualified to receive restitution for " 'public monies * * * expended in the pursuit of solving crimes’ ” *(People v Rowe,*152 AD2d 907, 908, *affd*75 NY2d 948). Although the defendant did not previously object to this aspect of his sentence, "it has long been the law that the 'essential nature’ of the right to be sentenced as provided by law, though not formally raised at the trial level, preserves *874a departure therefrom for review” *(People v Fuller,*57 NY2d 152, 156).

The matter is therefore remitted for a new sentence on the defendant’s bail jumping conviction. Mangano, P. J., Kunzeman, Hooper, Sullivan and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Action No. 11-cr-355-MSK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1. WAUNITA WEINGART,

2. JOHN PHILLIP GALLEGOS,

3. ALOIS CRAIG WEINGART,

Defendants.

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO RESTRICT DOCUMENT

The United States of America, by and through United States Attorney John F. Walsh

and Assistant United States Attorneys Linda Kaufman and Martha Paluch, respectfully

moves to restrict Attachment 8 to Government’s Objections to Presentence Report, any

order revealing the contents of that document, and the brief filed in support of this motion,

for the reasons stated in the brief filed in support of this motion. The United States

requests a “Level 2" Restriction which would make the document, any order revealing the

contents of that document and the brief filed in support of this motion, “Viewable by

Selected Parties and Court” only. 

Respectfully submitted this 18 day of April, 2013. th 

1

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 259 filed 04/18/13 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 3
JOHN F. WALSH

United States Attorney

By: s/ Linda Kaufman 

Linda Kaufman

Assistant United States Attorney

1225 Seventeenth Street, Suite 700

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 454-0100

Facsimile: (303) 454-0404

E-mail: Linda.Kaufman@usdoj.gov

By: s/ Martha Paluch 

Martha Paluch

Assistant United States Attorney

1225 Seventeenth Street, Suite 700

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 454-0100

E-mail: Martha.Paluch@usdoj.gov

2

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 259 filed 04/18/13 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 18th day of April, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO RESTRICT DOCUMENT with the Clerk of the Court using

the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following e-mail

addresses:

Martin Adam Stuart 

Email: martinstuartlaw@solucian.com

William Lewis Taylor 

Email: wltaylorpc@gmail.com

Darlene Ann Bagley

Email: bagley@ridleylaw.com

Ms. Paula M. Ray

E-mail: paulamray@earthlink.net

 

By: s/ Solange Reigel 

SOLANGE REIGEL

Legal Assistant to AUSA Linda Kaufman

United States Attorney’s Office

1225 - 17 Street, Suite 700 th

Denver, CO 80202

Telephone: (303) 454-0244

Fax: (303) 454-0402

E-mail: solange.reigel@usdoj.gov

 

3

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 259 filed 04/18/13 USDC Colorado pg 3 of 3
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-14-0000767 27-FEB-2015 07:45 AM
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T SANTOS ERNEST O V I LL A M ARTINEZ, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 08- 74777 A ge nc yN o. A 088- 423- 365 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

a n O r de rof

the B o a r do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d J anua ry10, 2011 ** B e f o r e : B E E Z E R , T A L L M A N , an dC A L L A H A N , C ir c u it Ju d g e s . S a nt os E rne s t o V i l l aM a rt i ne z , ana t i ve a nd c i t i z e n of M e xi c o, pe t i t i ons f

or re vi ew of the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ (“ B IA ”) order di sm i ss i ng hi s app ea l fr om an i m m i grat i on j ud ge’ s ( “ IJ ”) deci si on denyi ng hi s m ot i on t o reopen pr oc e e di ngs . W e ha ve j ur i s di c t i on unde r8 U . S . C . § 1252. W e r e vi e w de novo 

# FI LED JAN 25 2 011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 74777 2 q u e s tio n s o f

law , a n dr e v ie w f

o rab u s e o f

d is c r e tio n th e d e n ia l o f am o tio n to r e o p e n . Moh am m ed v. G on zales , 400 F . 3d 785, 791- 92 ( 9th C i r . 2005) . W e de ny th e p e titio n f

o rr e v ie w . V i l l aM a rt i ne z w a s notde ni e d hi s r i ghtt o c ouns e l be c aus e he know i ngl yand vo l un t ar i l y w ai ved h i s r i gh tt o cou nselw hen h e t ol d the IJhe w ant ed t o p roce ed w ith h is h e a r in g w ith o u t c o u n s e l a f te rth e I Jo f

f e r e dto c o n tin u e h is h e ar in g in o r d e rto e n s u r e c o u n s e l’s p r e s e n c e . See B i w otv. G on zales , 403 F . 3d 1094, 1100 (9th C i r. 20 05 ) ( “ [A ] n al i en cann otappear pro se w i tho uta kno w i ng and v ol un t ary w a iv e ro f

th e r ig h t to c o u n s e l.” ) . W e a gree w i th the B IA thatV i l l a M art i nez w as no tprej ud i ce d b y f orm er c o u n s e l’s f

a ilu r e to ap p e a ra t h is h e ar in g b e c au s e V illaM artin e z w a s n o t e lig ib le f o ra n yr e lie f

a t th a t tim e . See M

oh am m ed , 4 0 0 F .3 da t 7 9 3 - 9 4 . V illaM a rtin e z ’s c o n te n tio n s u n d e r8 C .F .R . § 2 8 7 .8 ( b ) ( 2 ) a r e u n a v a ilin g . T h e B I A d idn o t ab u s e its d is c r e tio n in d e n y in g V illaM artin e z ’s m o tio n to re op en on the grou nd thathe fa i l ed t o d em on strat e the evi dence he subm i tt ed w as p r e v io u s lyu n a v a ilab le a n dm a te r ia l. See 8 C .F .R . § 1 0 0 3 .2 ( a ) , ( c ) ; B ha si n v. G on zales , 42 3 F . 3d 97 7, 98 4 (9th C i r. 20 05 ).08- 74777 3 V illaM a rtin e z ’s r e m a in in g c o n te n tio n s a r e u n a v a ilin g . P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W D E N I E D .
#### Regina Dombrower et al., Respondents, v Maharia Realty Corp., Appellant.

[745 NYS2d 167]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Janice Bowman, J.), entered November 7, 2001, which, in an action to recover for, inter alia, personal injuries sustained in a slip and fall on defendant’s premises, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant-appellant dismissing the complaint.

In order to constitute constructive notice, “a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant [ ] * * * to discover and remedy it” *(Gordon v American Museum of Natural History,*67 NY2d 836, 837). Neither the injured plaintiff Regina Dombrower nor her husband, plaintiff Morris Dombrower, could identify the substance on which she slipped. Moreover, plaintiffs offered no testimony disclosing how long the allegedly slippery condition existed on the floor where the injured plaintiff fell. Therefore, there is no evidence to permit a finder of fact to infer, without speculating, that defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition *(see, Joseph v Chase Manhattan Bank,*277 AD2d 96; *Pinto v Little Fish Corp.,*273 AD2d 63). Plaintiffs further claim that defendant created the unidentified condition on which the injured plaintiff slipped. That claim, however, is wholly speculative as it is unsupported by any evidence in the record, and therefore insufficient to defeat summary judgment *(see, Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562; *Smith v Johnson Prods. Co.,*95 AD2d 675, 676). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Lerner, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ.