NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

BARBARA BROOKS, Petitioner/Appellant, 

v.

ZOEY CARDOZA and TORRIN BRASWELL, Respondents/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0604 FC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County 

No. B8015DO202004098 

The Honorable Kenneth Gregory, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Barbara Brooks, Bullhead City 

Petitioner/Appellant 

Zoey Cardoza, Bullhead City 

Respondent/Appellee

Torrin Braswell, Bullhead City 

Respondent/Appellee

FILED 08-01-2024
BROOKS v. CARDOZA/BRASWELL 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe 

joined. 

C A T L E T T, Judge: 

¶1 Barbara Brooks (“Brooks”) appeals the superior court’s 

decision terminating her legal decision-making authority over M.B. The 

superior court did not err in concluding that Brooks failed to rebut the 

presumption that it was in M.B.’s best interests to award legal decisionmaking authority to M.B.’s mother (“Mother”). We therefore affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 M.B. was born in May 2019. When M.B. was about four 

months old, Mother left M.B. with Brooks, who is the mother of one of 

Mother’s former boyfriends. Brooks then petitioned for third-party legal 

decision-making authority over M.B. After conducting an ex parte hearing 

and finding Mother was “unable to parent due to a heroin addiction,” the 

superior court gave Brooks temporary legal decision-making authority. 

Several months later, the court held another hearing, during which Brooks 

and Mother testified. After that hearing, the court awarded Brooks legal 

decision-making authority, partly because Brooks, on behalf of M.B., had 

obtained an injunction against Mother, preventing Mother from exercising 

parenting time with M.B. 

¶3 Two years later, Mother sought to re-obtain legal decisionmaking authority. The court initially rebuffed that request because the law 

required it to presume Mother, at the time, was an unfit parent due to her 

history of substance abuse. See A.R.S. § 25-403.04. The court noted, 

however, “that [Mother] ha[d] made significant headway towards 

rebutting the presumption of unfitness” because she was participating in 

an adult recovery court program and was “90 days clean.” The court 

instead allowed Mother unsupervised parenting time with M.B., and it 

informed her that “successful completion of the Recovery Court program 

will be sufficient . . . to rebut the statutory presumption of unfitness and 

restore her rights as [M.B.’s] parent.” 
BROOKS v. CARDOZA/BRASWELL 

Decision of the Court 

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¶4 In 2023, Brooks was arrested and incarcerated. So Mother 

requested temporary orders giving her legal decision-making authority 

over M.B. The court granted Mother’s request. 

¶5 Later, after an evidentiary hearing, the court revisited 

Mother’s request for legal decision-making authority. The court recognized 

that Mother had overcome the presumption of parental unfitness because 

she was “in Phase 4 of the adult recovery court and [wa]s 232 days clean 

and sober, as verified by random drug testing[.]” The court explained that 

it, therefore, had to presume that “awarding legal decision-making to 

Mother is in the best interest of [M.B.].” See A.R.S. § 25-409(B). The court 

concluded that Brooks “ha[d] not rebutted this presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence” and awarded Mother legal decision-making 

authority. 

¶6 Brooks timely appealed; we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 12-

2101. 

DISCUSSION 

¶7 Brooks challenges the superior court’s order restoring 

Mother’s parental rights as to M.B. Mother did not file an answering brief 

with this court. When an appellee does not file an answering brief and 

debatable issues exist, we may consider such failure a confession of 

reversible error. Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259 ¶ 9 (App. 2014). But 

because, here, the best interests of a child are at issue and Brooks has not 

raised a debatable issue, we address the merits of her arguments. 

¶8 We review an award of legal decision-making authority for 

an abuse of discretion. Olesen v. Daniel, 251 Ariz. 25, 29 ¶ 14 (App. 2021). 

We review the court’s interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 25-409 de 

novo. Chapman v. Hopkins, 243 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 14 (App. 2017). The superior 

court has a “duty to independently assess evidence” presented at a hearing. 

Leslie C. v. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Ct., 193 Ariz. 134, 135 (App. 1997). Where 

there is conflicting evidence, the superior court is in the best position to 

weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 

Ariz. 343, 347–48 ¶ 13 (App. 1998). We also note that Brooks failed to order 

transcripts of the superior court’s proceedings. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 

11(b)(1). Without transcripts, we assume the record supports the superior 

court’s findings and conclusions. Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 572 ¶ 33 (App. 

2009). 

¶9 When deciding whether to award legal decision-making 

authority to a third party, there is “a rebuttable presumption that awarding 
BROOKS v. CARDOZA/BRASWELL 

Decision of the Court 

4 

legal decision-making to a legal parent serves the child’s best interests[.]” 

A.R.S. § 25-409(B). This presumption is only rebutted “by clear and 

convincing evidence that awarding legal decision-making to a legal parent 

is not consistent with the child’s best interests,” as outlined in A.R.S. § 25-

403. A.R.S. § 25-409(B); see also Chapman, 243 Ariz. at 241 ¶ 18. 

¶10 After the superior court heard testimony from Mother and 

one of her treatment providers, the court found Mother was in Phase 4 of 

the adult recovery court, had undergone random drug tests showing she 

was “232 days clean and sober,” and was “stable and doing well.” The 

record adequately supports the superior court’s conclusion that Mother 

rebutted the presumption that, due to her previous substance abuse, 

awarding her legal decision-making authority was not in M.B.’s best 

interests. See A.R.S. § 25-403.04. 

¶11 That conclusion triggered a second presumption, this time in 

Mother’s favor—“that awarding legal decision-making to [Mother] serves 

[M.B.’s] best interests.” See A.R.S. § 25-409(B). Brooks could only overcome 

that presumption with “clear and convincing evidence that awarding legal 

decision-making to [Mother] [was] not consistent with [M.B.’s] best 

interests.” Id. The superior court determined that Brooks did not 

sufficiently show that awarding Mother legal decision-making would be 

inconsistent with M.B.’s best interests. The court instead found that M.B. 

was doing well in Mother’s care. Without a transcript of the hearing, we 

assume the record supports those findings and conclusions. Kline, 221 Ariz. 

at 572 ¶ 33. 

¶12 Finally, Brooks argues the superior court judge should have 

recused himself because, according to Brooks, the judge previously dated 

one of Mother’s aunts, making him more likely to award Mother legal 

decision-making authority. Rule 2.11 of the Arizona Code of Judicial 

Conduct instructs that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any 

proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned,” including when the judge’s spouse or certain other close 

relatives are party to the proceeding. A party challenging a judge’s 

impartiality “must overcome the presumption that [superior court] judges 

are ‘free of bias and prejudice.’” Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. v. City of 

Benson, 232 Ariz. 562, 568 ¶ 21 (App. 2013) (citations omitted). To do so, the 

party must “set forth a specific basis for the claim of partiality and prove by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the judge is biased or prejudiced.” 

Simon v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 225 Ariz. 55, 63 ¶ 29 (App. 2010); Stagecoach 

Trails MHC, L.L.C., 232 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 21 (“Judicial rulings alone do not 
BROOKS v. CARDOZA/BRASWELL 

Decision of the Court 

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support a finding of bias or partiality without a showing of an extrajudicial 

source of bias or a deep-seated favoritism.”). 

¶13 The niece of an individual a judge once dated is not among 

the relationships listed in Rule 2.11. In any event, Brooks does not establish 

that the judge was aware who Mother’s aunt was or, more importantly, that 

the purported former relationship between the judge and Mother’s aunt 

otherwise rendered the judge impartial. Brooks has not established judicial 

bias requiring recusal. 

CONCLUSION 

¶14 We affirm.