1

Filed 10/11/23 Azar v. Azar CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

INDRAWOUS AZAR, et al.

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

SHIBLI AZAR, et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants.

 A166609

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 18CIV01833)

This case concerns an interfamilial dispute over the ownership of a 

residential property located in San Bruno (“the property”). Indrawous 

(known as “Andy”), his brother Simon Azar, and Andy’s wife, Nadia Azar, are 

the plaintiffs in this case; we refer to Andy and Simon collectively as 

“plaintiff brothers.”1 A third brother, Shibli Azar, and his wife Naifeh Azar,

are the defendants. 

Following a bench trial, the court granted judgment in favor of plaintiff 

brothers on their cause of action for a resulting trust; the court found plaintiff 

brothers were the real (beneficial) owners of the property and that defendants 

1 To avoid confusion, and with no disrespect, we refer to the family 

members by their first names.
2

held legal title as trustees with no ownership interest. Because Simon 

waived any beneficial interest in the property, the legal title was quieted and 

confirmed to beneficial owner Andy and Nadia as his wife. The court also 

found, in pertinent part, that the resulting trust cause of action was not 

barred by the statute of limitations.

On Naifeh’s prior appeal, we reversed the judgment as the statement of 

decision included impermissible and/or irreconcilable findings concerning the 

resolution of two material issues: (1) Shibli’s apparent authority to act for 

Naifeh; and (2) Naifeh’s intent to purchase the property in trust for Andy and 

Simon. (Azar v. Azar (dec. Feb. 25, 2021, A159261) [nonpub. opn.].) Because 

the court’s decision on these two issues could not be separated from its 

rulings on the timeliness and merits of the resulting trust cause of action, we 

did not address Naifeh’s challenges to those rulings. (Id. at p. 2.) We 

directed the trial court to issue a new statement of decision and judgment, 

noting our decision should not be read as expressing any opinion as to how 

the trial court should resolve the material issues submitted by the parties, 

including Naifeh’s intent and Shibli’s apparent authority to act for Naifeh. 

(Id. at p. 8.) 

The case was remanded to the trial court and reassigned to a new judge 

as the judge who previously handled the matter had retired. A hearing was 

convened on July 12, 2022, at which plaintiffs and defendants were 

represented by counsel, to discuss the process moving forward. Following 

argument, the court found all parties had agreed no further evidentiary 

hearing was necessary for the court to issue an amended statement of 

decision. 

On August 22, 2022, the trial court issued its final statement of 

decision and judgment (one document), again imposing a resulting trust in 
3

favor of plaintiff brothers and finding that defendants held legal title as 

trustees with no ownership interest. Because Simon waived any beneficial 

interest in the property, the legal title was quieted and confirmed to 

beneficial owner Andy and Nadia as his wife. The court also found, in 

pertinent part, that (1) the resulting trust cause of action was not barred by 

the statute of limitations, and (2) in light of the imposition of a resulting trust 

the court made no findings on a cause of action for breach of contract 

premised on the parties’ alleged 1981 contract for the exchange of certain

properties. 

Naifeh filed a timely notice of appeal from the August 22, 2022 

judgment. Having considered her arguments, we conclude she has not 

demonstrated any basis for reversal and shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

This action was commenced in 2018 to resolve a dispute over the 

ownership of the property, which had been purchased in 1976. Defendants 

never took possession of the property or lived in the house. Instead, plaintiff 

brothers moved into the house along with other family members and used it 

as their home for the next 40 plus years. At the time this lawsuit was filed, 

Andy and his wife Nadia were still living in the house. 

Statement of Decision 

The trial court’s final statement of decision detailed the findings in 

support of its conclusion that plaintiff brothers met their burden of showing,

2 Because the record on appeal consists solely of a clerk’s transcript with 

limited documents, and with no reporter’s transcripts of the original bench

trial or the July 12, 2022 remand hearing, our factual and procedural 

background is taken from our prior opinion (Azar v. Azar (dec. Feb. 25, 2021, 

A159261) [nonpub. opn.]) and the trial court’s final statement of decision

under review on this appeal.
4

by clear and convincing evidence, that they were the real (beneficial) owners 

of the property under a resulting trust theory. 

In the 1970s, Shibli and Naifeh lived and worked in the San Francisco 

Bay Area. Shibli’s brothers, Andy and Simon, lived in Michigan and decided 

to move their families to the Bay Area. In December 1976, Andy (then 

unmarried), Simon and his wife and children, the brothers’ mother, and two 

sisters moved to San Bruno.

Before the move to the Bay Area, Simon and Shibli agreed Shibli and 

his wife Naifeh would obtain a loan to purchase a house (with title in their 

names) to be used by Andy and Simon as it would be difficult for Andy and 

Simon to obtain a home loan. In November 1976, Shibli purchased the 

property, a house in San Bruno. In January 1977, a grant deed for the 

property was recorded in the names of Shibli and Naifeh as husband and 

wife. The purchase price was $69,000; Shibli made a $13,800 cash down 

payment and took out loans.

Considering the evidence in full, the court found the property was 

purchased for Andy and Simon and their families and that it was the intent 

of the parties to eventually transfer title to Andy and Simon. The court found 

Naifeh’s testimony – that defendants had purchased the house for their own 

use and intended to use it as their personal residence, despite having just 

recently purchased a new house – not credible. And it found Shibli’s 

testimony – that he did not purchase the property for Andy and Simon –

unreliable due to very limited recall; his testimony was sprinkled with 

statements such as “ ‘I don’t know’ ” and “ ‘I don’t remember’ ”, and he had 

“total blanks on what transpired.” Shibli’s actions were also in conflict with 

any notion that the property was not for Andy and Simon's use as Shibli 
5

consistently told the parties, his mother, and several of plaintiffs’ children, 

that he (Shibli) was going to transfer title to Andy and Simon.

The parties disputed the source of the $13,800 cash down payment and 

the source of funds expended on the property over the relevant 40-year 

period. The brothers had a history of loaning money to each other “without 

anything in writing or specific expectations of repayment.” The court found 

Simon had provided sufficient funds (on behalf of himself and Andy) to Shibli 

to cover the down payment and that Shibli’s testimony that the down 

payment came entirely from his grocery store was not credible. The court 

also found that if Shibli used some of his own money toward the down 

payment, those funds were a repayment of previous loans from Simon and, 

therefore, credited as a payment made by Simon. 

The court found that, except for a brief time shortly after Andy and 

Simon moved into the property, plaintiffs had made all the mortgage, 

property tax, home insurance, utility, and remodeling payments; this finding 

was supported by extensive documentation. In contrast, Naifeh had virtually 

no documentation in support of her claim that she made extensive payments 

for the property. “It was this testimony by Naifeh that [led] the court to 

question the credibility of all of her testimony.”

In 1981, and after family disharmony caused by previous unsuccessful 

attempts to transfer title, the parties reached an agreement. Andy, Simon, 

and Shibli, with Naifeh present and not objecting, agreed that Shibli and 

Naifeh would sign over title to the property. In return, Andy and Simon 

would release their ownership interest in an apartment located in San 

Francisco. Andy and Simon followed through on their part of the agreement, 

but defendants never executed the deed to transfer the property. Two years 

later, defendants’ attorney recorded the deed plaintiff brothers had executed 
6

for the San Francisco property, and Shibli continued to promise that he 

intended to have the property transferred to Andy and Simon.

The trial court found “a conflict between what the Plaintiffs alleged 

occurred and what the parties intended and what the Defendants alleged 

occurred and what the parties intended. [Plaintiff brothers] had significant 

documentation and corroboration of their position; while Defendants had 

scarcely any credible or reliable documentation or corroboration of their 

position. In fact, it appears that defendants engaged in intentional 

falsehoods concerning their payments of expenses on the [San Bruno]

property. For this reason, the court has discounted the testimony from 

defendants and found that, by clear and convincing evidence, plaintiffs[’] 

allegations are supported by the evidence.”

The trial court specifically addressed the two material issues 

mentioned in our prior opinion: (1) Naifeh’s intent to purchase the property in 

trust for Andy and Simon; and (2) Shibli’s apparent authority to act for 

Naifeh,

3 as follows: 

“The parties dispute whether Naifeh intended to purchase the property 

in trust for Plaintiff brothers. They further dispute whether Shibli’s 

promises and actions can bind Naifeh, who purportedly (and secretly) 

objected to any agreement or understanding Shibli had with Plaintiffs in

regard to holding the property for Plaintiffs, and ultimately transferring title 

to them. Both questions are answered by the conduct of the parties. Naifeh 

remained silent in the presence of Shibli and Plaintiffs when they discussed 

the subject of transferring title. She never spoke up with any objection.

3 Accordingly, we reject Naifeh’s argument, made for the first time in her 

reply brief, that the trial court failed to address the issues mentioned in our 

prior appeal. 
7

“The Court finds that both Shibli’s and Naifeh’s actual intent was to 

hold title to the property for the benefit of Plaintiffs, and to eventually 

transfer the property to Plaintiffs. This intent is inferred by both Shibli’s and 

Naifeh’s conduct over the relevant 40-year period, during which time 

Plaintiffs resided in and made all payments toward the subject property. 

Naifeh testified that, because she feared for her safety from Shibli, she 

remained silent in the presence of Shibli and Plaintiffs when they discussed 

the subject of transferring title. The Court does not find Naifeh’s testimony 

regarding her purported fear for her safety to be credible. Rather, the Court 

finds that any silence on Naifeh’s part during discussions about the 

property’s beneficiary ownership, and during Shibli’s 

statements/representations that Defendants were holding title for Plaintiffs, 

and that Defendants intended to eventually convey title to Plaintiffs, was not 

due to any fear or reluctance to speak, but rather, it was because Naifeh 

consented to and agreed with [Shibli’s] comments that the Property would be 

conveyed to Plaintiffs. (Underlining and italics in original.)

“The Court further finds that Shibli had apparent/ostensible authority 

to act for Naifeh as her agent, and to bind her to the agreement he made with 

[his] brothers to purchase and hold the property in trust, and to eventually 

convey title to them as the real (beneficial) owners. To be clear, the Court 

does [not] conclude that Shibli had apparent/ostensible authority to speak or 

act for Naifeh merely by virtue of them being married, which . . . itself would 

be insufficient to speak or act for her. Rather, the Court reaches this finding 

based on Naifeh’s conduct over the roughly forty-year period, in which she 

repeatedly remained silent, and expressed no disagreement in the face of 

Shibli’s repeated statements and representations that Shibli and Naifeh were 

holding the property for Plaintiffs and would eventually convey title to 
8

Plaintiffs. Naifeh must have known that her failure to express disagreement 

with Shibli’s promises and representations would lead any reasonable person 

in Plaintiffs’ position to believe that Naifeh agreed with Shibli’s statements, 

and that Naifeh had the same intention. (See Lovetro v. Steers (1965) 234 

Cal.App.2d 461, 475.) (Underlining in original.) 

“Thus, this Court finds that Naifeh repeatedly and intentionally led 

Plaintiffs to believe that Shibli was speaking for her and expressing her 

intention as well. If Naifeh truly did not agree with Shibli’s repeated 

representations to Plaintiffs and others about the Property (which, again, the 

Court does not find credible), then Naifeh would have had a duty to speak up 

and express such disagreement, because she would have known that her 

failure to do so would be very misleading to Plaintiffs, or to any reasonable 

person in their position. As stated, the Court finds she did not express any 

disagreement because she in fact agreed with Shibli’s representations and 

statements.” (Italics in original.)

After making additional rulings which will be discussed below to the 

extent they are necessary to resolve Naifeh’s appellate arguments, the trial 

court concluded by explaining that any outcome other than a finding of a 

resulting trust in favor of plaintiff brothers and conveyance of title to them, 

“would be highly inequitable” and an “improper result.” “In the present case, 

Defendant Naifeh Azar claims that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to receive 

the title to the subject property, because she did not consent to the agreement 

to transfer the property to Plaintiffs. Essentially, she believes that she is 

entitled to retain the subject property, despite Plaintiffs having made (except 

for a brief period) all of the first and second mortgage payments, all of the 

property tax payments, all of the home insurance payments, and all of the 

utility payments for the property over a forty-year period. In other words, 
9

Defendant believes she may retain the benefits of all of Plaintiffs’ financial 

contributions to the property and the property itself by refusing to transfer 

the title thereto. This is a classic case of a Resulting Trust, and the intent of 

the holders of title (Defendants) is inferred by their conduct over the forty 

years Plaintiffs have treated the property as their own. [¶] If Defendants 

were allowed to retain title to the subject property in the face of the instant 

facts, this would result in a clear case of unjust enrichment, a profoundly 

inequitable and demonstrable wrong.”

DISCUSSION

Our review of this appeal is significantly impaired by Naifeh’s 

submission of an incomplete record and appellate briefs that fail to comply 

with our California Rules of Court. Naifeh, “[a] party proceeding in propria 

persona ‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but

no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (First 

American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.) 

Naifeh has perfected her appeal using a clerk’s transcript; she has filed 

no reporter’s transcript or settled statement of the initial bench trial or the 

July 12, 2022 remand hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122 [clerk’s 

transcript], 8.130 [reporter’s transcript], 8.137 [settled statement].) The

“trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law [in its final statement of 

decision] therefore are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence and 

are binding upon us, unless the judgment is not supported by the findings or 

reversible error appears on the face of the record.” (Krueger v. Bank of 

America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.) 

Additionally, Naifeh’s briefs are rife with factual assertions 

unsupported by any record citations “in dramatic noncompliance with 

appellate procedures.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; 
10

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [each appellate brief must “[s]upport 

any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page 

number of the record where the matter appears”].) Naifeh also raises 

numerous legal arguments without any legal authority or cogent analysis as 

to how or why the court erred or how she was prejudiced by the court’s 

rulings. We will disregard unsupported factual assertions and treat as 

forfeited any legal arguments made without record citations and/or cogent 

arguments and citations to legal authority. (See, e.g., Tellez v. Rich Voss 

Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [“[w]hen an appellant 

asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to 

authority, we treat the point as forfeited”]; Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, 

Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267 [“plaintiffs make numerous factual 

assertions in their briefs without record citation” but “[w]e are entitled to 

disregard such unsupported factual assertions”].) 

Moreover, and before the remand hearing, Naifeh filed a supplemental 

trial brief and related request for judicial notice of certain documents. The 

July 12, 2022 minute order indicates the court disregarded the supplemental 

trial brief and related request for judicial notice as all the issues raised in 

that brief were “irrelevant and not within the scope” of our order on remand. 

On appeal, Naifeh contends the court abused its discretion by doing so. 

However, we cannot meaningfully review Naifeh’s claim of error as we have 

no record of what occurred at the remand hearing and she has presented no 

argument supported by legal authority demonstrating how she was 

prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, we deem the claim of error 

forfeited and disregard Naifeh’s arguments premised on the factual 

assertions in her supplemental trial brief and the documents that were not 

judicially noticed in the trial court. (See Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 
11

Cal.App.3d 147, 154 [appellate court cannot review “evidence” contained in 

trial briefs]; The Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators 

Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 355 [appellate court did not 

consider a party’s appellate arguments that depended on documents for 

which the trial court denied a request for judicial notice ].)

With these limitations in mind, we now discuss some of the issues 

presented in Naifeh’s briefs. 

I. RESULTING TRUST CAUSE OF ACTION

The law applicable to the imposition of a resulting trust is well settled. 

“[T]he relationship between resulting trustee and beneficiary arises where 

one, in good faith, acquires title to property belonging to another. The law 

implies an obligation on the part of the one in whom title has vested to hold 

the property for the owner’s benefit and eventually convey it to the owner. 

The trustee has no duties to perform, no trust to administer, and no purpose 

to pursue except the single purpose of holding or conveying the property 

according to the beneficiary’s demands.” (Estate of Yool (2007) 151 

Cal.App.4th 867, 874; see Bainbridge v. Stoner (1940) 16 Cal.2d 423, 428

(Bainbridge).) In other words, “[t]he duties of a resulting trust[ee] are not 

active; a resulting trustee merely holds legal title for the beneficiary and, at a 

proper time, is bound to make a proper conveyance.” (Seabury v. Costello

(1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 640, 646, citing Bainbridge, at p. 428.) 

“ ‘Where the legal title rests in one person, to establish a resulting trust 

for the benefit of another against a presumption in favor of the legal title, the 

evidence must be clear and convincing, especially when an attempt is made to 

establish a resulting trust after the lapse of many years or where parol 

evidence alone is relied upon.’ ” (G.R. Holcomb Estate Co. v. Burke (1935) 4 

Cal.2d 289, 299.) 
12

A. Trial Court’s Final Statement of Decision Reflects Substantial 

Evidence Supports Factual Findings

Throughout her briefs, Naifeh asserts the trial court should have 

accepted the testimony and evidence proffered by defendants. Without a 

reporter’s transcript of the original bench trial, “the judgment must be 

conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. . . . The effect of 

this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no 

reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the 

sufficiency of the evidence.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.) 

In addition, based on our review of the portions of the trial transcript 

referenced in the trial court’s final statement of decision, we find the court 

acted well within its discretion in accepting plaintiffs’ testimony and evidence 

and rejecting defendants’ testimony as not being credible. 

We see no merit to Naifeh’s contentions that the trial court 

impermissibly applied “alleged Palestinian cultural values denying property 

rights to women,” and ignored “the rights of women and wives to make 

financial decisions” under California law. The court found Naifeh’s intent to 

hold the property in trust for plaintiff brothers was inferred solely from her 

own conduct over the course of the relevant 40 years during which time 

plaintiff brothers (and later Nadia as Andy’s wife) exclusively possessed and 

resided in the property making all financial expenditures (except for certain 

mortgage payments incurred when Andy and Simon first came to California); 

Naifeh failed to object to plaintiffs treating the property as their own; and 

Naifeh was silent during family discussions when Shibli made repeated 

statements and representations that the property belonged to Andy and 

Simon and title would be transferred to them. The trial court made no 

findings premised on either Naifeh’s status as Shibli’s wife or the parties’ 
13

cultural views concerning a husband’s right to speak for his wife concerning 

financial matters. 

B. Resulting Trust Is Not Barred by Statute of Frauds Requirement of a 

Writing for the Sale or Transfer of Real Estate

We see no merit to Naifeh’s argument that a resulting trust could not 

be imposed in this case as a matter of law because it violated the requirement 

of a writing for the sale or transfer of real estate as codified in Civil Code 

sections 1091 and 1624.

4 

The statutory requirement of a writing as expressed in the law cited by 

Naifeh does not apply to an estate in real property that is the subject of a 

resulting trust implied by law. As long ago explained by our Supreme Court: 

“The trust in this case arises purely by operation of law, and results from the 

acts and agreements of the parties. In such cases the trust need not be 

created by writing, or proved by written evidence, for it comes clearly within 

the exception of the [statute of frauds]. . . . [F]rom the facts that the 

purchase was made with the money of the plaintiffs, and the conveyance 

made to the defendant, the law implies that the title thus conveyed is held in 

trust for the person furnishing the money, and thus the trust is created by 

operation of law. . . . The law is well settled that in cases like the present the 

trust can be proved by parol evidence.” (Bayles v. Baxter (1863) 22 Cal. 575, 

579.) In other words, “[t]he fact that transferee and payor of the purchase 

price, and the claimant, made an oral agreement that the former was to hold 

4 Civil Code section 1091 reads in pertinent part: “An estate in real 

property, . . ., can be transferred only by operation of law, or by an 

instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by 

his agent thereto authorized by writing.” Civil Code section 1624, in 

pertinent part, lists several “contracts” that are “invalid, unless they, or some 

note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to 

be charged or by the party’s agent.”
14

the property in trust for the latter which was unenforceable under the statute 

of frauds or otherwise, does not prevent a resulting trust from arising. 

Indeed, such agreement supports the inference or presumption that the payor 

did not intend that the transferee should have the beneficial interest.” (Viner 

v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 270 (Viner), disapproved on another ground 

in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010.) 

C. Evidence of Plaintiff Brothers’ Financial Contributions Supports 

Imposition of Resulting Trust

We see no merit to Naifeh’s argument that a resulting trust could not 

be imposed in this case as a matter of law because plaintiffs presented no 

evidence establishing the precise amount or proportion of consideration they 

contributed to the purchase of the property and plaintiff brothers made only 

partial mortgage payments. 

Naifeh supports her argument with a citation to Lloyds Bank 

California v. Wells Fargo Bank (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1038 (Lloyds), which is 

factually distinguishable. In Lloyds, the appellate court found the resulting 

trust was not supportable as the purported beneficial owners made no 

attempt to submit evidence of the original purchase price or their individual 

financial contributions. (Id. at p. 1044.) Unlike that case, the trial court here 

found plaintiffs had submitted clear and convincing evidence demonstrating 

a “classic case” for the imposition of a resulting trust, based on their financial 

contributions to the purchase price including payment of the entire down 

payment and payment of the first and second mortgage payments (except for 

a brief time) as well as payment of all maintenance expenses over the more 

than 40 years when they exclusively possessed and resided in the residence 

and treated the property as their own. We disregard Naifeh’s citation to an 
15

unpublished opinion, namely Meyer v. Jeffries (Dec. 10, 2019, E070773), in 

violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a). 

Nor is there any merit to Naifeh’s related argument that no resulting 

trust arises unless the beneficial owner pays the purchase price before or at 

the time of the conveyance. As explained by our Supreme Court in Viner, 

supra, 26 Cal.2d 261, it is not always necessary that the beneficial owner pay 

the purchase price before or at the time of the conveyance because a resulting 

trust may be imposed where the trustee agrees to finance the purchase price 

in the form of a loan from the trustee to the beneficial owner. (Id. at pp. 269–

270.) Moreover, it is not necessary that there be an express agreement that 

the beneficiary repay the loan, as an agreement to repay the loan “may be 

implied,” with the trustee of the resulting trust holding the legal title as 

security for the loan. (Id. at p. 270.) Here, at the time of the commencement 

of the action seeking the transfer of title, Naifeh’s need to retain legal title as 

security for the mortgage loans had been rendered moot as the loans had 

been paid off in November 1985 and May 2006.

Hence, we conclude the trial court appropriately imposed a resulting 

trust based on the parties’ conduct both before and after the purchase of the 

property. The court found the only reasonable inference that could be drawn 

from the evidence, which included the 40-year period in which plaintiffs 

resided in and made all the payments toward the property (except for a brief 

time), was that both Shibli and Naifeh intended to hold the property in trust 

for the benefit of plaintiffs and to transfer title to them. The court also found 

that “Naifeh’s silence” during the 40-year period and “ Shibli’s assurances to 

everyone that his and Naifeh’s intent was to eventually transfer the 

property” to plaintiffs further supported the imposition of a resulting trust. 

We see no error in the trial court’s imposition of a resulting trust.
16

D. Resulting Trust Was Not Imposed in Violation of Law Governing 

Community Property 

Naifeh argues the imposition of a resulting trust was in violation of the 

law governing community property and the transmutation of community 

property (Fam. Code, §§ 852, 853). According to Naifeh, the property was 

purchased with community assets; as a result, she was an owner of an 

undivided one-half interest in that property and Shibli could not transfer her 

interest without her consent.

However, the trial court rejected Naifeh’s position that defendants had 

purchased the property with their own funds and for their own use as 

community property. The court found it was never community property; 

rather it was held in trust for plaintiff brothers, and therefore “ ‘[t]he 

property that we called community property,’ ” was “ ‘impinged by a trust.’ ” 

(Anderson v. Broadwell (1931) 119 Cal. App.130, 141 (Anderson).) Property 

acquired during a marriage on or after January 1, 1975, by either husband or 

wife, or both, including real property situated in this state, is subject to the 

general community property presumption. (See In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal.5th 

903, 924; Fam. Code, § 7605.) This law “does not, however, include property 

held in trust by a spouse [or spouses] for a third person.” (Dreher v. 

Rohrmoser (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 196, 199 (Dreher); see Bassett, William W., 

Cal. Community Property Law (2022 ed; Sept. 2022 update), Shared Property 

Rights in the Community Property System; IV. Contingent Future Interests, 

§3:41 Legal title in trust [“[l]egal title held in trust by a husband or wife for 

5 Family Code section 760 currently reads: “Except as otherwise provided 

by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a 

married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is 

community property.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 10, operative January 1, 1994.) 
17

the benefit of third parties is not community property,” citing in fn. 1 to 

Dreher, supra, 134 Cal.App.2d 196 and Anderson, supra, 119 Cal. App. 130].)6

In sum, plaintiff brothers “had the right to interpose any equitable 

claim which [they] possessed directed to the issues raised by [the complaint],” 

and “there was no error in admitting evidence showing the circumstances 

under which the property here was deeded to [defendants].” (Dreher, supra, 

134 Cal.App.2d at p. 199.) The trial court’s factual findings (discussed ante)

clearly classified the situation “as a voluntary resulting trust, continuing in 

nature as reflecting the intention of the parties at the time of its creation.” 

(Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447; see Bainbridge, supra, 16 

Cal.2d at p. 428.) Having found the legal title had been taken in the names 

of both defendants in trust for the plaintiff brothers, the court’s imposition of 

a resulting trust created a new relationship between the parties –one of 

trustees and beneficiaries – as a matter of law. The plaintiff brothers’ “right 

to obtain the legal title” merely became “an incident to” their recognized 

equitable title as beneficiaries of the resulting trust. (Love v. Watkins (1871) 

40 Cal. 547, 571.)

Once the trial court entered judgment granting a resulting trust in 

favor of plaintiff brothers (Andy and Simon) as the real (beneficial) owners, 

Naifeh was a trustee who held legal title for them. The court quieted title in 

the names of the beneficial owner Andy and Nadia as his wife; Simon’s name 

6 Family Code section 760 derived from Civil Code former section 164, 

enacted in 1872 and later Civil Code former section 5110, added in 1969. At 

the time Anderson supra, 119 Cal. App. 130 was decided in 1931 and Dreher, 

supra, 134 Cal.App.2d 196 was decided in 1955, Civil Code former sections

162 and 163 defined separate property of the spouses, and Civil Code former 

section 164 read: “All other property acquired after marriage by either 

husband or wife or both, including real property situated in this state . . . is 

community property.” (Stats. 1927, ch. 487, § 1; Stats. 1941, ch. 455, § 1; see 

Dreher, at p. 199.)
18

is not on the title as he waived any interest in the property. (See Juranek v. 

Juranek (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 276, 281 [in an action to impose a resulting 

trust as to property ownership between family members, the trial court could 

amend the complaint to conform to proof and direct title to be quieted in the 

names of certain plaintiffs and allow “the withdrawal of another member of 

this family” who had sued as a co-plaintiff].) 

II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT VIOLATED

We find no merit to Naifeh’s argument that the trial court committed 

prejudicial error by its finding that the resulting trust cause of action was not 

barred by the four-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure 

343.

7 As the trial court correctly explained: “The statute of limitation[s] for a 

resulting trust does not run against a [beneficiary’s] right to enforce the trust 

until the beneficiary has knowledge of repudiation or breach of the trust. (13 

Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Trusts, § 153, p. 744.) 

The statute begins to run upon a demand by the trustee[ ] or repudiation by 

the trustor. (Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 240–241.) There was 

neither an absolute or final demand for performance by plaintiffs nor an 

absolute or final repudiation by defendants. Therefore, the Statute of 

Limitations is not a bar to this cause of action.”

Naifeh asks us to consider certain factual assertions not supported by 

any record citations, and the cases of McCosker v. McCosker (1954) 122 

Cal.App.2d 498 and Rubinstein v. Minchin (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 115. As 

already noted, reversible error cannot be demonstrated by assertions of fact 

not supported by record citations or by citation to cases without a reasoned 

7 Code of Civil Procedure section 343 reads: “An action for relief not 

hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four years after the 

cause of action . . . accrued.”
19

argument as to why we should follow those cases. (See Allen v. City of 

Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; Regents of University of California 

v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 824, 826–827, fn. 1.) 

We also find unavailing Naifeh’s assertion that the trial court’s citation 

to Martin, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 228, is not relevant as it concerned a 

constructive trust and not a resulting trust. In resolving the case before it, 

the Martin court found that although the trial court could employ the remedy 

of a constructive trust to compel the defendant to convey a property interest 

for which the plaintiff had paid, the judgment could also be affirmed on the 

basis of a resulting trust since the express findings of the court would support 

the imposition of such a trust. (Id. at p. 238.) Indeed, the Martin court went 

on to hold that, “[e]ven if the facts pleaded and proved by plaintiff would not 

sustain the judgment on the theory of constructive trust, they were sufficient 

to uphold recovery under the resulting trust theory since that theory does not 

contemplate any factual situation different from that established by the 

evidence in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 239.) As the Martin court discussed the 

statute of limitations governing both constructive trusts and resulting trusts 

(id. at pp. 240–241), the trial court’s citation to that case was appropriate.

III. Fifth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract 

The trial court imposed a resulting trust and therefore granted no relief 

on the complaint’s fifth cause of action for breach of contract, a claim

premised on allegations that in 1981 the parties had entered into a separate 

contract for the exchange of titles to the San Bruno and San Francisco 

properties and defendants had breached that agreement by failing to transfer 

the San Bruno property title to plaintiffs. Because we are upholding the trial 

court’s grant of relief premised on a resulting trust theory, we do not address 

Naifeh’s arguments concerning the fifth cause of action.
20

IV. Conclusion

We have made a concerted effort to address Naifeh’s arguments. Any 

issue not specifically mentioned is omitted due to her failure to present the 

issue in compliance with the rules governing the adequacy of a record and the 

contents of briefs.

DISPOSITION

The August 22, 2022 judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs and respondents 

are awarded costs on appeal.
21

_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Rodríguez, J.

A166609/Azar et al., v. Azar et al.