### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 509 -CR

Be nit o G ar c ia H inojo sa , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-08 -90 4010 , HO NORAB LE JO N N. WISSER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted B enito Ga rcia Hinojosa of voluntary

manslaug hter, see Act of May 23 , 1 97 3, 63 rd

L e g ., R.S. , c h. 39 9, § 1 9. 04 , 1 97 3 Te x. Ge n. L aws 88 3, 91 3, and se nte nc e d h im to twenty y ear s in prison. Hinojosa argues that there was e rror in the j ury char g e, that he w as denie d due proc ess when his attorney made a misstatement of the law, a nd that the evidence wa s insufficient to support the conviction. We aff irm the judg ment of convic tion. Appellant B enito Gar cia Hinojosa be came acqua inted with Edward Chavez, J r., throug h their employ

ment in construction wor k
. One of the companie s for whic h they worke d provided housing for them at an Exel I nn in Austin. Hinojosa and Chavez wer e roommates. On the night of Aug ust 6, 1993, the two men went to a da nce. B oth men beca

me hig hly intox icate d and,
on the wa y ho me , b e g an a

rguin g . T he y

fo ug ht v iol e ntl y

in t he pa rk inglot of

the ho te l and

a g a in i n the hotel room. Eventually , Hinojosa bec ame “ desper ate” and attempted to r estrain Chave z with a2

telephone c ord. Hinojosa then left the premises in Chavez’s car . Acc ording to Hinojosa, when he left, Chavez was moving and talking. When H inojosa returne d to the I nn, he saw police , assumed he wa s in trouble, and lef t for Mexico, where he lea rned of Chavez’s death. Acc ording to the m edica l examiner, Chavez died of asphy x ia re sulting fr om injuries to the fac e and ne ck and f

rom the manne r in which he had bee n tied—his body was found fa ce down wi th t he ph on e c or d loo pe d fr om his mouth to his fe e t, w ithhis fe e t su sp e nd e d in the a ir be hin d h im. Th e me dic a l exam ine r furt he r opi ne d th a t Ch a ve z ha d b e e n unc on sc iou s w he n ti e d u p b e c a us e his hands we re not tied, and Chavez could have —and pre sumably would have—r emoved the c ord fr om his mouth i f h e ha d b e e n c on sc iou s.

Two y ear s later, on F ebrua ry 10, 1995, Hi n o

jo s a w as indicted on one count of murde r. Twelve y ear s later, on F ebrua ry 7, 2007, Hinojosa contac ted the Austin police de partment a nd g ave a voluntar y

statement, which w as substantially the same a s his testim ony at trial. On Mar ch 20, 2007, Hinojosa was re-indicted on two counts of murde r, one c ount of voluntary manslaug hter, a

nd one count of ag g ravated robbery . The State e ventually abandone d the ag g ravated robbe ry char g e and dismiss ed the 1995 indictment. F ollowing tria l, a jury found Hinojosa not guilty of the two murde r counts but g uilty

of the lesser- included offe nse of voluntary manslaug hter. The jury

also found that Hinojosa had used a deadly wea pon—his hands and a “ ligature.” Punishm ent was a ssessed by the jury at twenty y ear s in prison and a $10,000 fine

. I n his first point of error , Hinojosa argues that inconsisten c ie s betwee n the indictment and the jury

char g e violated h i s rig ht to due proce ss. More spec ifically , the due pr ocess violation resulted f rom the use of

the disjunctive in the jury char g e desc ribing the offe nse rather than the3

conjunctive, a s used in the indictment—“[t] he alleg ed mea ns of com m i s sion of murder ha d been chang ed from hand and ligature, to ha nds or strang ling with a lig ature .” Hinojosa c ontends that he

“ did no t r e c e ive no tic e tha

t th e state a lle g e d th a t th e me ans of the c omm iss ion of the a lle g e d o ff

e ns e included striking with hands only , in addition to hands and ligatures.”

Wh en re v i ewing alleg ations of cha rg e er ror, a n appellate court must undertake a two-step r eview: f

irst , the cour

t must determine whethe r er ror a ctually

exis ts in the charg e, and
se c on d, the c ourt

mus t de te rm ine wh e the r su ff ic ie nt ha rm re su lte d f ro m th e e rr or

to r e qu ir e re ve rs a l. Ab dn orv. S tate , 8 71 S.W. 2d 72 6, 73 1- 32 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). Whe n a tim e ly ob je c tio n is mad e, error i n th e jur

y c ha rg e re qu ir e s r e ve rs a l if

the e rr or wa s “ c a lc ulate d to inj ur e the ri g hts of def endant”—that the er

ror wa s not harmless. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.19 (We st 2 00 6) ; see also Abdnor , 871 S.W .2d at 731-32.

Where, a s her e, n o timely objection was ma de at tria l, any err or found will not
war rant re versa l unless the err or is so eg reg ious that the defe ndant was not g iven a fa ir and impartial trial. Se e Al

ma nz a v . S

tate , 686 S.W .2d 157, 17 4 (T ex . C ri m . App. 1984). An er ror in the jury
c ha rg e is eg r e g i o u s i f

“ i ta f f e c t s t h e v e r

y b a s i s o f t h e c a s e , d e p r i v e s t h e d e f e n d an to f a v a l u a ble rig ht, or vitally

aff ects a defe nsive theory .” Id. We determine the actua l deg ree of har m in light of the entire jury

char g e, the state of the e vidence , including the contested issues a nd weig h t of probative e vidence , the ar g ument of counsel , and any other re levant information revea led by the
rec ord of the tr ial as a w hole. Al ma nz a , 686 S.W .2d at 171. Ba sed on the indictment, the jury was require d to find bey ond a re asonable doubt that Hi no jos a c a us e d Ch a ve z’s de a th b y

us ingbo th a ha

nd and a lig a tur e a s d e a dly

we a po ns . We fi rs t4

note that the off

ense f or which H in o

j o s a wa s convicted w as voluntary manslaug hter, not murder , and the languag e about which he complains appea rs nowher e in the voluntary manslaug hter portion of the jury

char g e. Rather , afte r the jury had found H inojosa not guilty o f m u rd er , the jury was ins tr uc te d to de te rm ine , “ a s a ll e g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e nt , ” whe the r H ino

jos a “ int e nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly
c a us e [d] th e de a th o f” Cha

ve z by “ str iki ng [him ] a

bo ut t he fa c e or ne c k o r b y

ho g -t ying[him ], w hil e actingunder the influence of sudden pa ssion arising from and [si c] adequate cause.” Hinojosa was not convicted of

the g reater off

ense in whic h th e co m p l ai n ed-of lang uag e appe ars, but of a lesser offe nse in which the c omplained-of la ng uag e does not a

ppear . Thus, even if

there is charg e er

ror, it is pa rt of a g re a te r of

fe ns e fo r wh ic h Hi no

jos a wa s n ot c on vic te d a

nd , th e re fo re , c a

us e d n o h arm . See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 3 6. 19 ; see also Abdnor , 871 S.W .2d at 731-32. Even if the lang uag e about which Hinojosa complains had a ppear ed in the voluntary manslaug hter portion of the char g e, ther e would have be en no cha rg e er ror. The Texas Consti tution
re qu ir e s a un anim ou s ve rd ic t in fe lony c a se s, Te x. Cons t. art . V, § 13; se e als o Te x. Cod e Cr im. Proc. Ann. art. 36.29(a) (West Supp. 2008), but a defe ndant’s rig ht to unanimity is not viol ated whe n the jury is disjunctively instructed on alternate m eans or theories of committing the same offe nse. J e ffe rso n v . S

tate , 189 S.W. 3d 30 5, 31 1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Ma rti ne z v . S tate , 129 S.W .3d 101, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). I f, as he re, the disjunctive para g raphs mer ely inform of diff

ere nt means of committing a

single offe n s e, t h en the jury does not have to unanimously ag ree on which alternative means the def

endant use d to commit the offense
. Kitc he ns v . S tate , 823 S.W .2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). I n addition, the Court of Criminal A ppeals has found no e rror wher e, asBe fore expressly asser t i n g h is ineffe ctive assistanc e ar g ument and without citing to a ny 1 authority or spec ifying a

ny particula r point a t w h ic h reve rsible er

ror wa s committed, Hinojosa argues that “constitutional err or” oc curr ed. He argues, for instance:

5 here , t he indictment alleg es the diff eringmethods of committing the of fense in the conjunctive, while the jury

is charg ed in the disjunctive. See id. We overrule Hinojosa’s first point of er ror. I n his second point of er

ror, Hinojosa a

rg ues that the district cour t erre d by adopting and followingdefe nse counse l’s misstatement of the law r eg ardinga condition of pro bation
e lig ibi lity . O n th e re c or d at tr ia l, b ut o uts ide the pr e se nc e of the jur y , de fe ns e c ouns e l tol d H ino jos a that “ if y ou te sti fy , the n y ou are su bje c t to c ro ss- e xami natio n” bu t “ if y ou do n’ t te sti fy , th e n you

wi ll
no t be e lig ib le f

or c omm un ity su pe rv isi on .” Hi no

jos a re sp on de d th a t he un de rs too d, that he did not want to testify , and that he wanted j ust to “finish wit h this.” Acc ording to Hinojosa, the fact that he wa s sentence d to the maxi mum sentence available for voluntar y manslaug hter:

was c aused by

two err ors that ar e the f

oll o wi n g : 1) a misstatement of the la w by Mr. Hinojosa’s trial c ounsel, and a dopted by the cour

t an d s tate, pre vented Mr . H ino jos a fr om se e kin g pr ob a tio n fr om the jur y ; and 2) by no t be inga llo we d to in tr o d u c e mi ti g a ti n g e v id e n c e ma k in g h im e li g ib le f

o r p r o b a ti o n , M r . H in o

josa ’s rig ht to allocution was violated.
I t appea rs that Hinojosa is arguing that, although he was e l i g ible for pr obation, beca use of a misstatement of the law by defe nse counse l—an d ad o p tion of this mi sstatement by the pr os e c uto r a

nd the dis tr ic t c ourt

—th e jur y wa s una ble to c on sid e r p ro batio n a s a n o pti on . Wh ile Hinojosa attempts to impli ca t e t h e d i s trict court a nd the prosec utor, his argument is one based on ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. 1I f t he state sh ou ld a

tte mpt to a rgue that Mr . Hi no

jo sa’ s tr ia l c ouns e l w a s at f a ult alone, Mr. H inojosa wishes to remind them t h at t h ey adopted suc h misstatement of the lawwhen they

failed to objec t or corr ect the er ro r, an d the same r easoning holds the court responsible, as well. Howeve r, should the revie wing court find that Mr. Hinojosa’s trial attorney failed to g et the re quisite evidence into the rec ord that would war

rant a jury elig ibilit y

char g e, then Mr. H inojosa reque sts that the review ing court find sua spont e that his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive under the Du ffy standard under W ar e . Hino j o s a urg es us to apply

the Du ffy standard, which includes no re quirement that 2 the def endant show pr ejudice. Se e Ex pa rteDu ffy , 607 S.W .2d 507, 5 16 (1980). How ever , the Court of Criminal App ea l s h as expressly overr uled Du ffy on that po int , a s c on fl ic tin g wi th fede ral c onstitut ional law: Strickland

clea rly require s a showing o f p re j u d i ce f or all cla ims alleg ing de ficient attorney perf ormanc e primar ily

beca use the g overnme nt is n ot responsible for an d ca n n o tp re v en td ef

i ci en tat t o rn ey

p er fo rm an c e . . . . As s u m i n g Strickland left open the que stion of whether a defenda nt is require d to show prejudice from def icient a tto rn e y pe rf or manc e a t non c a

pit a l se nte nc ingpr oc e e din g s, we pe rc e ive no va lid r e a s o nw h y Strickland c an n o t a p p l y , o r w h y a d i f

f e r e n t r u l e s h o u l d a

p p l y , to no nc a pit a l se nte nc ingpr oc e e din g s. He rn an de z v . S tate , 988 S.W .2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 6 We e va luate c la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l a g a ins t th e sta nd ard se t f or th in Strickland v. W

ashington
. See 46 6 U .S. 66 8, 68 7 ( 19 84 ); He rn an de z v . S tate , 988 S.W .2d 770, 2 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). I n deciding a claim of i neff ective assistance of

counsel at a nonca

pital
se nte nc ingpr oc e e din g , w e mus t de te rm ine wh e the r an a tto rn e y ’s pe rf or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt a

nd , if so, whether that defic iency prejudice d the def

ense. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 7; Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
. An attorne y ’s per formanc e is defic ient if it falls below an objec tive standard of

rea sonablene ss. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 8; Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 812. De fi c ie nt p e rf

or manc e is pr e

jud ic ia l wh e n, bu t fo r the a tto rn e y ’s un pr of e ssi on a l c on du c t, the re is a
rea sonable proba

bility that the out co m e o f the proc eedingwould have be en diffe rent. Strickland ,7

46 6 U .S. a t 69 4; Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 812. A rea sonable probability is a probability s u ff i ci ent to unde rmine conf

idence in the outcome. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4; Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 812. I n deter mining whe ther a

n attorney ’s per formanc e wa s defic i en t , we a pply a strongpresumption that the attorne y ’s conduc t was within the rang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 814. We revie w the ef fec tiveness of counsel in light of the totality of the re prese ntation and the c ircumstance s of ea ch ca se. Id. at 813.

I n most cases, a

n undevelope d rec ord on direc t appea l is insufficient to satisfy the dual prong s of Strickland

beca use the re asonable ness of c ounsel’s dec isions often involves fac ts not appea ring in the appellate record. Ry lan de r v . S tate , 101 S.W .3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Wit hout evidence of the strateg y and methods involved c o n ce rn i n g counsel’s a ctions at trial, an appellate court should pre sume a sound trial strateg y . See Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 814. Where a n alleg ation of ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel is not raised in a m otion for new tr ial, trial counsel ha s n o o pp ort un it y to e xpla in h is c on du c t, a nd a bs e nt s uc h o pp or

tun ity , a n a pp e llate c ourt

sh ou ld not find defic ient perf

ormanc e unless the challeng ed conduct was “so outrag eous that no competent attorne y wo u l d h ave eng ag ed in it.” Go od sp e e d v . S

tate , 187 S.W .3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Ga rc ia v . S tate , 57 S.W .3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), cert. de nied , 5 37 U. S. 1195 (2003))
. To be e l igible f or probation, a defe ndant’s sworn a pplication for pr obation and the evidenc e must show that he has never been c onvicted of a felony
. Gr e e n v . S

tate , 658 S.W .2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). The mere filing of a sworn a

pplication is not sufficient to show elig ibilit y for pr obation. Id. a t3 0 9
. In a n a t t e m p t t o i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e o f

p r o b a t i o ne l i g i b i l i t y,8

defe nse counse l instructed Hinojosa outside the prese nce of the jury that “if you don’t testify , then y ou will not be elig ible for community supervision.” Althoug h Hinojosa dec lined to testify during the punishment phase, de fense counsel introduce d no other evidence that would support Hinojosa’s elig ibilit y for pr obation. Hinojosa now contends that defe nse counse l could have pr esente d evidenc e of Hinojosa’s pr obation elig ibilit y in “numerous wa

y s.” Ac cordingto Hinojosa:
Th e state c ou ld h a ve sti pulate d to the fa c t th a t he did no t ha ve pr ior fe lon ie s. Be cause his mother was ill, his trial attorney o r t h e court could have reque sted a cont i n u an ce f

or the sente ncing , or orde r to obtain a witness who c ould testify to M r . H in o

jo s a ’ s la c k o f p r io r f

e lo n ie s . M r . H in o

jo s a ’ s tr ia l a tt o r

n e y c o u ld have reque sted a judicial findingo r n o t i ce reg ardingthe lack of prior fe lonies, and such reque st could have be en supported by a TCI C/NCI C criminal his t o ry re port for Mr
. Hi no jos a . Th e c ourt wo uld

have ne e de d to or de r t

he state to p ro vid e su c h r e po rt , or the state c ould have of

fer ed the history

repor t on their own. The state should have offe red this re port in compliance with their profe ssional responsibility to s eek justice
. I f t he y we re c on fi de nt that th ey wo uld have g ott e n a

ja il s e nte nc e , th e state should have ha d no problem “doingthe rig ht thing,” in this reg ard. Mr. Hinojosa’s trial counsel did not have acc ess to officia l la w en fo rce ment data ba ses that ar e a va ila ble to t he c ourt and the state
. Ha d M r. Hi no jos a ’s tr ia l c ouns e l kn ow n th a t hi s fam i l y wo uld be unava ilable, he would have questioned the probation off icer te sti fy ingon the state ’s be ha lf

, o r c a lle d M r. Hi no

jos a ’s br oth e r, wh o w a s ava ila ble the da y be fo re the fi na l se nte nc ingpr oc e e din g . M r. Hi no jos a ’s tr ia l c ouns e l sh ou ld have c onsidered submitting a n aff idavit of his ow n, stating that Mr. Hinojosa did not have pr ior felonies, or

submitt ed information on the basis that any other witness wa s unavailable , reque sting that the court find other e vidence admissible for this issue as an exception the hea

rsay evidentiar

y rule. Although H inojosa filed a motion for ne w trial, he did not raise inef fec tive assistance of c ouns e l a s a

g ro un d f or re lie f, and

the re for e , n o r e c or d w a s e ve r d e ve lop e d in su pp or t of thi s
c la im. Hi no

jos a re lie s so le ly

up on the re po rt e r’ s r e c or d, wh ic h c on ta ins no e vid e nc e of de fe ns e counsel’s r easoning or t houg ht proce ss. Whil e Hinojos a sugg ests “numer ous way s” by which the
e vid e nc e c ou ld h a ve be e n p re se nte d, wi tho ut a de ve lop e d re c or d on ap pe a l, w e may on ly sp e c ulateWe also note that sever al of Hinojosa’ s sugg ested methods of introd u ci ng evidenc e of 3 pr ob a tio n eli g ibi lity wo uld have re qu ir e d ac tio n by the pr os e c uto r or the dis tr ic t c ourt , n ot d e fe ns e c ouns e l. 9 a s to wh e the r a

ny of the se me tho ds wa s f

e a sib le in l ig ht o f t

he c ir c ums tanc e s. B a se d o n th e a va ila ble
rec ord on appe al, we could also speculate as to any number of rea sons why defe nse counse l did not pursue a ny of Hinoj osa’s sugg estions for pr esentingevidenc e of pr obation elig ibilit y . Howeve r, as Hinojosa’s motion for new t rial failed to raise ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, we ha ve no re cord from which to de termine why defe nse counse l acted in the w ay that he did. I n the abse nce of such
r e c o r d , w e p r e s u m e a

s o u n d t r i a l s t r a t e g y. Se e Or tiz

v . S tate , 93 S.W .3d 79, 88-89 (Te x . Crim. App. 3 20 02 ); Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 814.

F ur ther, Hi no jo sa h as n ot pro ven by

a pre po nd eran ce of

th e evi den ce t hat the ou

tc ome would have be en diffe rent but for t he lac k of evide nce of

probation elig ibilit y . See Strick land , 46 6 U .S. a t 68 7. Th e jur y imp os e d a sen te nc e of

tw e nty y e ars , th e ma ximumse nte nc e a va ila ble for voluntar

y manslaug hter. In light of the twenty -y ear sentenc e, Hinojosa would not have been statutorily elig ible for pr obation, and the rec ord i ndicates no reasona ble proba bility the twenty -y ear sentenc e imposed would have been dif fer ent if probation had been c onsidered. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Proc. Ann. a

r t. 4 2
. 1 2, § 3(e) (1) ( West S upp. 2008) (de fenda nt not eligible f

or community

supervision if sentenc ed to a term of imprisonment exceeding ten y ear s). Acc ording ly , we ove rrule H inojosa’s second point of e rror .

I n h is thir d p oin t of er

ro r, Hi no jos a argue s tha t the e vid e nc e wa s leg a lly and fa c tua lly insufficient to support the judg ment of convic tion. I n revie wing a leg al suffic iency challeng e, we view the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of10

fac t c ould ha

ve found the essential elements of a crime be y ond a re asonable doubt. Sa lin as v . S tate , 163 S.W .3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The jury , as the trier of fa ct, “is the sole judg e of the cr edibility

of the witnesse s and of the stre ng th of the evide nce.” Fu e nte s v . S tate , 991 S.W .2d 267, 271 (Tex. C ri m. App. 1999). The jur y may choose to be lieve or disbelieve any portion of the testimony
. Sh ar

p v . S tate , 7 07 S.W. 2d 61 1, 61 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ). Th e jur y may a lso draw rea sonable infere nces from basic fac ts to ult imate fa cts. Cle wis v . S tate , 922 S.W .2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). When face d with co n fl i ct i n g evidenc e, we presume the trier of fac t resolved c onflicts in favor o f t he pre vailing pa rty
. Turro v . S

tate , 8 67 S.W. 2d

43 , 4 7 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1993). I n e va luatin g the fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the evi den c e , w e vie w a ll the e vid e nc e in
a ne utr a l li g ht a

nd wi ll se t a sid e the ve rd ic t on ly if we are a ble to s ay , w ithso me ob

je c tiv e ba sis in the r e c o r d , th a t t

h e c o n v ic ti o nis c le ar ly

w r o n g o r

ma n if e s tl y u n ju s t b e c a u s e th e g r e a t w e ig ht and prepondera

nce of the evidenc e contr adicts the jury ’s ver dict. W ats on v . S tate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-17 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). We cannot conclude that a conf lict in the evidence justifies a new trial simp ly

b e c a u s e w e d is a g r e e w it

h th e ju r y ’ s r e s o luti o no f

th a t c o n f li c t, an d w e d o n o t i n tr

ude upon the fact-finde r’s role as the sole judg e of the weig ht and cr edibility of witness testimony
. See id. a t 41 7; Fuentes , 991 S.W .2d at 271. The f act- finder ma

y choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony

prese nted. Cha mb e rs v . S tate , 805 S.W. 2d 45 9, 46 1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Bargas

v . S tat e , 252 S.W .3d 876, 888 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2008, no pet.). I n our re view, we discuss the ev i d ence that, ac cordingto appellant, under mines the jury ’s ver dict. Sim s v . S tate , 99 S.W .3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).11 For sufficie ncy

revie ws, the startingpoint of the an al y s i s is the char g e that wa s submitt ed to the jury , absent c omplaint on appeal. Ma lik v . S tate , 953 S.W. 2d 23 4, 24 0 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1997). The jury

found Hinojosa guilty

of “intentionally

or knowing ly caus[ing] the death of . . . Edwar d Chavez, J r., while a cting under the influence of sudden passion arising from and [sic] adequate ca

use.” The evidenc e shows tha t , on the nig ht of Chavez’s death, Hinojosa and Chavez
wer e hig hly

intox icate d and foug ht violently , both in the parking lot of the hotel and in the hotel room. Whil e Hinojosa c laims that he bound Chavez with the phone cor d in a “de sperate”
a tte mptt o r e s t r a i n h i m an d t h a t C h a v e z w a s s t i l l c o n s c i o u s w h e n H i n o j o s a l e f t t h e p r e m i se s in Chavez’s ca

r, the medic al examiner t es t i fi ed that Chavez died of asphy x ia re sulting fr om injuries to the fac e and ne ck and f rom the m an n er i n wh i ch he had be en tied. Ac cordingto the medical
e xami ne r, Cha

ve z’s inj ur ie s, inc lud inga br ok e n thy

ro id c art ri dge, b ru isi ngof

the ne c k mu sc le s,
and he mor rh a g ingin t

he e y e s, we re c on sis te nt w ithde a th by a sp hy xiat ion
. I n fu

rt he r su pp or t of his
co n cl u sion that Chavez was alre ady unconscious whe n bound by Hinojosa, the medica l examiner noted that Ch av ez ’s hands ha d not been bound a nd that Chavez would presumably have r emoved the c or d f ro m hi s mo uth

ha d h e be e n c on sc iou s. Hinojosa ref

ers to “suspicious c ircumstance s reg ardingthe eleme nts of dece dent’s death” such that “[a] jury

could not have r easona

bly inferr ed that Mr. Hinojosa did not [sic] in fac t kill decede nt, or leg ally

possessed [sic] the re quisite mens rea .” The jury is the ex clusive j udg e of the cr edibility

of witnesses a

nd of the weig ht to be g iven their testimony
. J on es v . S tate , 944 S.W .2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). As such, the jury was fr ee to be lieve or d isbelieve Hinojosa’ s version of e vents. Hinojos a, h i m s el f, admits that, while the re cord c ontains conflicting evidenc e,12

“it is possible that Mr. Hinojosa’s a ctions in restrainingdece dent contributed to his death.” Viewe d in its totality , the evidenc e is le g ally and fac tually sufficie nt to support the judgment of conviction. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule H inojosa’s third point of err or.

Havingoverr

uled Hinojosa’s points of er ror, we aff

irm the judg ment of convic tion.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 27, 2009 Do No t Pu

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