IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02389-WYD-MJW 

JOHN STAUFFER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

KAREN E. HAYES, D.O.; 

A WOMAN=S PLACE OF FORT COLLINS, P.L.L.P.; 

PETER DUSBABEK; 

TODD VRIESMAN; 

MONTGOMERY, KOLODNY, AMATUZIO & DUSBABEK, L.L.P.; 

J. BRADFORD MARCH, III; 

MARCH, OLIVE, & PHARRIS, L.L.P.; 

CHRISTINE SKORBERG; 

CHERYL TRINE; AND 

CHERYL TRINE LAW FIRM, LLC, 

Defendants. 

ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION 

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the following five dispositive motions: 

(1) Trine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29); (2) Defendants Karen E. Hayes, 

D.O. and A Woman’s Place of Fort Collins, P.L.L.P.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34); 

(3) Defendants Peter Dusbabek, Todd Vriesman, and Montgomery Kolodny, Amatuzio 

& Dusbabek, L.L.P.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 48); (4) Defendants J. Bradford 

March and March, Olive & Pharris, L.L.C.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 57); and (5) 

Defendant Christine Skorberg’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 74). 

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Also pending are the following motions filed by Plaintiff: (1) Plaintiff Stauffer’s 

Motion to Vacate Magistrate Minute Order Entered March 14, 2012 (ECF No. 83); (2) 

Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Stay in Proceedings Until After “Personal Jurisdictinal [sic]” 

Issue is Resolved (ECF No. 84); (3) Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Representation by an 

Attorney of Partnership’s Choice (ECF No. 85); (4) Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for 

Immediate Sua Sponte Determination of Personal Jurisdiction Issue at Time of State 

Court Receiver’s Property Deprivation (ECF No. 86); and (5) Plaintiff’s Stauffer’s Motion 

for Evidentiary Hearing on Personal Jurisdictinal [sic] Issue (ECF No. 88). 

The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Watanabe for a Recommendation 

by Order of Reference dated September 14, 2011. On April 24, 2012, Magistrate Judge 

Watanabe issued a Recommendation (ECF No. 91), which is incorporated herein by 

reference. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), D.C.COLO.LCivR. 72.1. 

Magistrate Judge Watanabe recommends therein that Defendants’ various motions to 

dismiss be granted to the extent that Plaintiff’s federal claims should be dismissed. 

Magistrate Judge Watanabe also recommends the dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining 

state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Magistrate Judge Watanabe advised 

the parties that they had fourteen (14) days to serve and file written, specific objections 

to the Recommendations. After seeking leave from the Court for an extension of time, 

Plaintiff filed objections to the Recommendation which necessitates a de novo 

determination as to those specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made since the nature of the matter is dispositive. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 

U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1). 

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II. BACKGROUND 

In 2003, Plaintiff and his former wife, Dr. Christine Skorberg (f/n/a/ Christine 

Stauffer), sued Dr. Karen Hayes in Larimer County, Colorado based upon the 

dissolution of a medical partnership (“underlying state court action”). On July 5, 2007, 

following a jury trial, the state trial court entered a final judgment in the amount of $2.2 

million in favor of Hayes and against both Stauffer and Skorberg. On October 4, 2007, 

seven third-party defendants to the underlying state court action were dismissed with 

prejudice. The parties dismissed with prejudice were: (1) A Woman’s Place Healing 

Center, P.L.L.P.; (2) A Woman’s Center, P.C.; (3) JCJH, Inc.; (4) Carly, L.P.; (5) 

Christine L.P.; (6) Lassie Dog, L.L.L.P.; and (7) A Woman’s Place Medical Leasing, L.P. 

On December 17, 2007, during post-judgment proceedings, the state trial court 

appointed a receiver, J. Bradford March, pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 69. At the same 

time, the trial court also issued an injunction prohibiting Stauffer and Skorberg from 

dealing with any assets in their names or entities in which they held an interest. 

From December 19, 2007 to February 15, 2008, March took control of assets 

held by the seven entities that had been dismissed with prejudice to partially satisfy 

Hayes’ judgment. Also, March took control of assets held by four other parties who 

were never part of the case: the Stauffer’s two minor daughters, Jasmine Stauffer and 

Hannah Stauffer; Colorado Medical Billing Corp.; and Christine, R.L.L.P.1

 The property 

originally held by the nine entities and the Stauffer’s daughters was transferred to Dr. 

Hayes, in partial satisfaction of the judgment entered against John Stauffer and 

 

1

 The seven dismissed third-party defendants and four additional non-parties to the 

underlying state court action are hereinafter referred to as the “Eleven Parties”.

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Christine Skorberg. On February 28, 2008, all nine entities, Dr. Skorberg, and the 

Stauffer children transferred their entire interests in this litigation to John Stauffer. 

Between January 2008 and January 2009, Plaintiff filed one or more challenges 

to the appointment of the receiver, which the state trial court denied in various orders. 

On February 28, 2008, Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s orders to the Colorado Court of 

Appeals. Additionally, on April 21, 2008, Plaintiff filed a case in this Court, which was 

assigned to me, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights arising out of the 

underlying state court action. In an order dated March 19, 2009, I dismissed the case 

without prejudice finding that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the 

Younger abstention doctrine due to the pendency of Plaintiff’s state appeal. (Case No. 

08-cv-00815-WYD-BNB, ECF No. 97). On February 18, 2010, the Colorado Court of 

Appeals affirmed the state trial court’s post-judgment orders. On September 13, 2010, 

the Colorado Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for certiorari. On September 12, 

2011, Plaintiff commenced the instant action, which is pending before me. In this 

matter, Plaintiff brings fifteen claims for relief. Claims One and Two assert various 

constitutional violations of the 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against all Defendants excluding Cheryl Trine, the Cheryl Trine Law Firm, L.L.C. and 

Skorberg. Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants knowingly and intentionally deprived the 

Eleven Parties of property without due process of law. Plaintiff’s remaining thirteen 

claims are supplemental state law claims. 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 Magistrate Judge Watanabe noted that in their motions, the Defendants all 

primarily rely on the following arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims pursuant 

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to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6): (1) Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants are state 

actors; (2) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (3) Plaintiff’s 

claims must be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Recommendation at 4-

4-6). 

A. Standard of Review 

As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts may only adjudicate cases that the 

Constitution and Congress have granted them authority to hear. Todd Holding Co., Inc. v. 

Super Value Stores, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (D. Colo. 1990). Thus, the court must 

satisfy itself of subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of a claim. Gold 

v. Local 7 United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d 1307, 1309-10 (10th 

Cir. 1998). "[T]he burden is on the party claiming jurisdiction to show it by a 

preponderance of the evidence." Celli v. Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 327 (10th Cir.1994). "Mere 

conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough." United States, ex rel. Hafter v. 

Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1196, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999). Where a party 

moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(1), the attack can be either a facial attack to the allegations of the complaint or a 

factual attack. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990). Where 

there is a facial attack, the court must look to the factual allegations of the Complaint. 

Groundhog v. Keller, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971). In a factual attack, the court 

may consider matters outside the pleadings, and the motion is not converted to a motion 

for summary judgment. Id.; Cizek v. United States, 953 F.2d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 1992). 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to 

dismiss a claim for Afailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.@ Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). AThe court=s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh 

potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the 

plaintiff=s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be 

granted.@ Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to Rule 8, A[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). AA pleading that 

offers >labels and conclusions= or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do. Nor does the complaint suffice if it tenders >naked assertion[s]= devoid 

of >further factual enhancement.=@ Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). 

Furthermore, conclusory allegations are Anot entitled to the assumption of truth.@ Id. at 

1950. 

B. Discussion 

Magistrate Judge Watanabe found that Plaintiff’s claims assert violations of due 

process based on the argument that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 

Eleven Parties when the receiver was appointed. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge 

Watanabe recommends that Defendants’ motions to dismiss be granted because 

Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Magistrate Judge 

Watanabe also recommends that since Plaintiff’s federal claims should be dismissed, 

the remaining state claims should also be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

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 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “operates as a subject-matter jurisdictional bar 

that may be raised at any time.” Guttman v. Khalsa, 401 F.3d 1170, 1173 n.2 (10th Cir. 

2005). The Rooker-Feldman argument presents a factual challenge to this Court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction. As such, Magistrate Judge Watanabe did not presume the 

truth of the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Verified Amended Complaint. Holt, 46 F.3d 

at 1003. Instead, he had wide discretion to allow affidavits and other documents to 

resolve any disputed jurisdictional facts. Id.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional prohibition based on 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1257 which holds that federal review of state court judgments may be obtained only in 

the United States Supreme Court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 

(1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar “a party losing in state court . . . from seeking 

what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States 

district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the 

loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). In other 

words, it applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused 

by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced 

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.@ Exxon Mobil Corp. 

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 

Here, Magistrate Judge Watanabe initially found that Plaintiff’s claims brought in 

state court were final as of September 13, 2010 when Plaintiff’s petition for certiorari 

was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s 

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requirement for finality of the state proceedings is satisfied. (Recommendation at 10). 

Second, Magistrate Judge Watanabe thoroughly explained that Plaintiff’s “federal 

claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Plaintiff’s claimed 

injury, namely the taking of property from the Eleven Parties by the receiver, flows 

directly from the judgment entered by the state court.” (Recommendation at 10). “The 

appointment of the receiver and the receiver’s subsequent actions were a natural and 

expected consequence of the judgment entered by the state court, especially in view of 

the extent of the property and the accusations of fraudulent transfers.” 

(Recommendation at 10). Magistrate Judge Watanabe went on to clarify that Plaintiff 

“does not challenge the constitutionality of a Colorado state post-judgment rule, such as 

the rule allowing for the appointment of a receiver. Rather, by asserting that the 

receiver lacked jurisdiction over the Eleven Parties, plaintiff challenges the merit of 

actions taken under the rule, not the rule itself.” (Recommendation at 11). Magistrate 

Judge Watanabe concluded that these claims are precisely the type barred by 

Rooker-Feldman. Thus, he recommends dismissal of Claims One and Two. 

On May 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Watanabe’s 

Recommendation. In his objection, Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Watanabe 

erred on six primary grounds: (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to void 

judgments; (2) Plaintiff’s claims are not intertwined with the state court proceedings, 

thus they are not subject to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (3) Magistrate Judge 

Watanabe should have granted Plaintiff’s motion in limine, which requested an 

immediate dispositive ruling on his claims; (4) the state court deprived Plaintiff of his 

right to counsel; (5) the state court’s actions were barred by claim preclusion; and (6) 

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Plaintiff incorporates his briefing from the various state court proceedings. (Objection at 

at 10-12). 

1. Objections One and Two 

After carefully reviewing the record in this matter, I find that Plaintiff=s arguments 

raised in his first two objections regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are new and 

have never been raised before. In the motions to dismiss, several Defendants raised 

the argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

However, Magistrate Judge Watanabe noted that “Plaintiff’s response does not directly 

address the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (Recommendation at 9). 

Now, in his objection, Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not 

apply to this case because the state court judgments were void for various reasons. 

Plaintiff also argues that Magistrate Judge Watanabe erred in finding that his claims are 

inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Plaintiff claims that “only the void 

 . . . judgment was intertwined with the state court’s only valid judgment entered.” 

 (Objection at 14). 

Based on my review of the relevant record including the Verified Amended 

Complaint, I find that Plaintiff filed this action seeking to overturn or invalidate the state 

court’s post-trial orders, arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the Eleven 

Parties. Plaintiff contends that any order entered when the state court lacked 

jurisdiction, including the order appointing the receiver, is void. Thus, the receiver’s 

taking of property was carried out without due process. (Objection at 10-15). I agree 

with Magistrate Judge Watanabe that Claims One and Two directly challenge the 

validity of the state court actions. Thus, I find that Magistrate Judge Watanabe properly 

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concluded that these claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Moreover, 

A[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge=s recommendation 

are deemed waived.@ Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations 

(citations omitted). Thus, I find that Plaintiff has waived his right to make new 

arguments in his objection, and they are overruled. 

2. Remaining Objections 

In his third objection, Plaintiff claims that Magistrate Judge Watanabe should 

have immediately adjudicated his claims, as requested in his motion in limine. 

However, as I previously found, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine, therefore, Magistrate Judge Watanabe does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction to rule on such motions. 

Plaintiff’s remaining objections raise various challenges related to the underlying 

state court action including Plaintiff’s argument that is entitled to counsel, which was 

both considered and rejected by the state court. Plaintiff also argues that Magistrate 

Judge Watanabe should have applied claim preclusion to invalidate the state court’s 

order. However, I overrule these objections pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Because Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional doctrine, neither Magistrate Judge 

Watanabe nor I can consider these challenges. I agree with Magistrate Judge 

Watanabe that “[i]f the court were to consider plaintiff’s arguments, the court would be 

forced to directly consider the merits of actions taken by the state trial court.” 

(Recommendation at 12). 

Finally, I note that Plaintiff raised no objections to the portion of Magistrate Judge 

Watanabe’s Recommendation that his supplemental state claims be dismissed pursuant 

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to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). No objections having been filed, I am vested with discretion 

to review the Recommendation Aunder any standard [I] deem[] appropriate.@ Summers 

v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 

150 (1985) (stating that "[i]t does not appear that Congress intended to require district 

court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other 

standard, when neither party objects to those findings"). Nonetheless, though not 

required to do so, I review that portion of the Recommendation to "satisfy [my]self that 

there is no clear error on the face of the record."2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) Advisory 

Committee Notes. 

Having reviewed the Recommendation, I am satisfied that there is no clear error 

on the face of the record. I find that Magistrate Judge Watanabe’s Recommendation is 

thorough, well reasoned and sound. I agree with Magistrate Judge Watanabe that 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss should be granted for the reasons stated in both the 

Recommendation and this Order. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, it is 

ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge 

Watanabe (ECF No. 91) is AFFIRMED AND ADOPTED. In accordance therewith, it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that the Trine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Claims Brought Pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 and Plaintiff’s Pendent State Claims (ECF 

No. 29) is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of this case for lack of subject 

 

2

 Note, this standard of review is something less than a "clearly erroneous or contrary 

to law" standard of review, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which in turn is less than a de novo 

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matter jurisdiction and is DENIED AS MOOT in all other respects. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Karen E. Hayes, D.O. and A Woman’s 

Place of Fort Collins, P.L.L.P.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED to the 

extent that it seeks dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and is 

DENIED AS MOOT in all other respects. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Peter Dusbabek, Todd Vriesman, and 

Montgomery Kolodny Amatuzio & Dusbabek, L.L.P.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 48) is 

GRANTED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and is DENIED AS MOOT in all other respects. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants J. Bradford March and March, Olive & 

Pharris, L.L.C.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 57) is GRANTED to the extent that it 

seeks dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and is DENIED AS 

MOOT in all other respects. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Christine Skorberg’s Motion to Dismiss 

(ECF No. 74) is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of this case for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction and is DENIED AS MOOT in all other respects. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s state law claims (Claims Three through Fifteen, inclusive). Thus, 

Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. 

Accordingly, in light of my findings in this Order, I affirm and find no error with the 

following orders entered by Magistrate Judge Watanabe: 

 

review, Red. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

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It is ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion to Vacate Magistrate Minute Order 

Entered March 14, 2012 (ECF No. 83) is DENIED AS MOOT. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Stay in Proceedings 

until After “Personal Jurisdictinal [sic]” Issue is Resolved (ECF No. 84) is DENIED AS 

MOOT. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Representation by an 

Attorney of Partnership’s Choice (ECF No. 85) is DENIED AS MOOT. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Motion for Immediate Sua Sponte 

Determination of Personal Jurisdiction Issue at Time of State Court Receiver’s Property 

Deprivation (ECF No. 86) is DENIED AS MOOT. It is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Stauffer’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on 

Personal Jurisdictinal [sic] Issue (ECF No. 88) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

Dated: August 8, 2012 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Wiley Y. Daniel 

Wiley Y. Daniel 

Chief United States District Judge 

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