No. 89-216 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

LANA JEAN GALLANT, 

Petitioner and. Respondent, 

and 

HARRY GALLANT, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Thomas McKittrick, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Mark A. Vucurovich; Henningsen, Purcell, Vucurovich 

& Richardson, Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

J. Mark Stahly; Jackson, Murdo & Grant, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Dec. 1, 1989 

Decided : February 15, 1990 
Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Harry Gallant appeals from a judgment of the District Court, 

Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, finding him liable for 

$6,367.38 in child support arrearages, medical expenses and 

attorney fees. We affirm the District Court. 

The sole issue presented is whether the court erred in finding 

the father liable for $4,050 in child support arrearages. 

Harry and Lana Jean Gallant were divorced in September, 1980. 

Lana Jean Gallant was awarded custody of the minor child, and Harry 

was required to pay all reasonable medical, optical and dental 

bills incurred on behalf of the child, as well as $75 per month in 

child support. The court recognized the fatherls disability as a 

result of an industrial accident, and allowed him to forego payment 

until he received his disability benefits. 

The father began receiving $1,000 per month in Workers1 

Compensation benefits in the fall of 1981. It is uncontroverted 

that he helped pay his son's medical expenses from 1981 to 1985. 

In 1981 or 1982, father agreed to turn over a trailer to the mother 

as partial payment of back child support. Mother subsequently sold 

the trailer for $6,000. 

In April, 1985, father began receiving Social Security 

benefits of $850 per month, as well as union retirement benefits 

of $330 per month, making his total monthly income approximately 

$1,180. In addition, he received a lump sum payment of past Social 

Security benefits totalling $36,000.00. 

Father made no child support payments, and no medical payments 

from 1986 on, despite requests from the mother. Subsequently, 

mother retained counsel and filed a motion for order to show cause 

why contempt should not issue for the father's failure to pay child 

support and reasonable medical bills. Hearing on the matter took 

place on November 17, 1987, and judgment and order issued on 
February 21, 1989. The District Court found that the father was 

86 months behind in child support, amounting to $6,450. The court 

credited him with $2,400, the amount the mother testified she had 

netted on the sale of the mobile trailer. The court found the 

father also owed $1,238.09 in medical expenses. The court noted 

that the parties1 child had been receiving $325 per month in Social 

Security benefits since 1985, but declined to discharge the child 

support obligation in light of those benefits. This appeal ensued. 

Appellant appeals'only the child support ruling. 

The father contends that the District Court erred in finding 

he owes child support arrearages. Father argues that he has 

substantially complied with the decree's child support obligations 

by turning the house trailer over to his ex-wife, and by obtaining 

Social Security payments for the child. 

The mother testified that she received $2,400 from the sale 

of the trailer after costs were deducted. This testimony is 

unrefuted. The court took into consideration statements by both 

parties that the transfer of the property was in lieu of child 

support payments. The court then subtracted $2,400 from its 

calculation of arrearages: 

86 months at $75/month $6,450.00 

Less: Credit from transfer 

of property $2,400.00 

Father has raised no objection to the $2,400 figure offered 

by the wife. Rather, he asserts that the parties agreed that the 

transfer would absolve husband of all arrearages. The District 

Court properly disregarded the claim, as such modification requires 

the written consent of the parties. Section 40-4-208 (2) (b) (ii) , 

MCA. Thus, after crediting father for $2,400, the court properly 

adjudged the remaining $4,050 due and owing. 
Father also contends that his obtaining of Social Security 

payments for the child serves as substantial complaince with the 

support obligation. He states that the parties agreed at the 

decree's inception to terminate child support upon obtainment of 

Social Security benefits. No such provision is contained with the 

partiesf dissolution decree. 

The father's claim of substantial compliance with the child 

support order does not meet the standard of Ifsubstantial 

complianceIf set forth in In Re the Marriage of Sabo (1986), 224 

Mont. 252, 256, 730 P.2d 1112, 1114 and Williams v. Budke (1980), 

186 Mont. 71, 74-5, 606 P.2d 515, 517. The surrender of the 

trailer here accounted for only one-third of the outstanding child 

support debt. Further, the attainment of Social Security benefits 

for the child is not an "expenditure [by the father] which 

constitutes substantial compliance with the spirit and intent of 

the decree." In Re Marriage of Cook (1986), 223, 299 Mont. 293, 

725 P.2d 562, 566. Such benefits in no way constitute an 

expenditure from the father. The father has neither shown nor 

pleaded substantial and continued changed circumstances that would 

serve to allow modification. Section 40-4-208 (2) (b) (i) , MCA. 

Conversely, the mother shown actual need for the support. The 

parties1 child has accrued substantial medical bills due to his 

physical disability. This Court is reticent because of statutory 

limitation to relieve an obligor parent of past due child support 

obligations. State ex. re1 Blakeslee v. Horton (1986), 222 Mont. 

351, 722 P.2d 1148 1150-51; Sabo, supra. 
We affirm the District Court. 

We Concur: A 

hief Justice 

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i/; Justice f 

i