[J-48-2021]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF 

PENNSYLVANIA AND LORRAINE HAW

v.

VERONICA DEGRAFFENREID AS 

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE 

COMMONWEALTH

APPEAL OF: SHAMEEKAH MOORE, 

MARTIN VICKLESS, KRISTIN JUNE IRWIN 

AND KELLY WILLIAMS

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No. 4 MAP 2021

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court dated January 

7, 2021 at No. 578 MD 2019.

ARGUED: September 21, 2021

OPINION

JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: December 21, 2021

In this direct appeal, we review the Commonwealth Court’s entry of a permanent 

injunction blocking the Secretary of the Commonwealth from certifying the results of the 

November 5, 2019 election in which the voters of the Commonwealth were asked to 

approve a proposed “victim’s rights amendment,” described as “Marsy’s Law,” which 

would be added as a new provision of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution – Section 

9.1 (“Victim’s Rights Amendment”). The Commonwealth Court entered its injunction on 

the basis that the Victim’s Rights Amendment violated the requirement of Article XI, 

Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that, “[w]hen two or more amendments shall 

be submitted they shall be voted upon separately.” Pa. Const. art. XI, § 1. After careful 

review, we affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court, because, for the reasons we 
[J-48-2021] - 2

detail herein, the Victim’s Rights Amendment was, in actuality, a collection of 

amendments which added a multiplicity of new rights to our Constitution, and, because 

those new rights were not interrelated in purpose and function, the manner in which it was 

presented to the voters denied them their right to consider and vote on each change 

separately, as Article XI, § 1 mandates. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the 

Commonwealth Court.

I. Background

We emphasize at the outset that our decision does not address the wisdom of the 

multifarious provisions of the Victim’s Rights Amendment, or the policy choices giving rise 

to them; rather, our obligation in this matter is solely to resolve the question of whether 

the amendment, as presented to the voters of this Commonwealth in the November 5, 

2019 general election, complied with the inviolable “separate vote” requirement of Article 

XI, § 1 that “[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon 

separately.” Pa. Const. art. XI, § 1. 

In June 2019, after having been previously approved in the 2018 legislative 

session, Senate Bill 1011 of 2018 was adopted by both houses of the General Assembly

as Joint Resolution 1 of 2019 (hereinafter “Joint Resolution 2019-1.”). It amends Article I 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution by adding the following wholly new provision: 

§ 9.1. Rights of victims of crime.

(a) To secure for victims justice and due process 

throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim 

shall have the following rights, as further provided and as 

defined by the General Assembly, which shall be protected in 

a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded to the 

accused: to be treated with fairness and respect for the 

victim’s safety, dignity and privacy; to have the safety of the 

victim and the victim’s family considered in fixing the amount 

of bail and release conditions for the accused; to reasonable 

and timely notice of and to be present at all public proceedings 

involving the criminal or delinquent conduct; to be notified of 
[J-48-2021] - 3

any pretrial disposition of the case; with the exception of grand 

jury proceedings, to be heard in any proceeding where a right 

of the victim is implicated, including, but not limited to, release, 

plea, sentencing, disposition, parole and pardon; to be notified

of all parole procedures, to participate in the parole process, 

to provide information to be considered before the parole of 

the offender, and to be notified of the parole of the offender; 

to reasonable protection from the accused or any person 

acting on behalf of the accused; to reasonable notice of any 

release or escape of the accused; to refuse an interview, 

deposition or other discovery request made by the accused or 

any person acting on behalf of the accused; full and timely 

restitution from the person or entity convicted for the unlawful 

conduct; full and timely restitution as determined by the court 

in a juvenile delinquency proceeding; to the prompt return of 

property when no longer needed as evidence; to proceedings 

free from unreasonable delay and a prompt and final 

conclusion of the case and any related postconviction 

proceedings; to confer with the attorney for the government; 

and to be informed of all rights enumerated in this section.

(b) The victim or the attorney for the government upon 

request of the victim may assert in any trial or appellate court, 

or before any other authority, with jurisdiction over the case, 

and have enforced, the rights enumerated in this section and 

any other right afforded to the victim by law. This section does 

not grant the victim party status or create any cause of action 

for compensation or damages against the Commonwealth or 

any political subdivision, nor any officer, employee or agent of 

the Commonwealth or any political subdivision, or any officer 

or employee of the court. 

(c) As used in this section and as further defined by 

the General Assembly, the term “victim” includes any person 

against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is 

committed or who is directly harmed by the commission of the 

offense or act. The term “victim” does not include the accused 

or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best 

interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor or incapacitated 

victim. 

Joint Resolution 2019-1.1

 

1

 This package of proposed constitutional changes is also known as “Marsy’s Law,” 
[J-48-2021] - 4

The then-Secretary of the Commonwealth, Kathy Boockvar,2 drafted the text of the 

question for this proposed amendment as it appeared on the ballot in the November 5, 

2019 election (“Ballot Question”), and twice published it in newspapers in each county. 

The Ballot Question read in full: 

Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to grant 

certain rights to crime victims, including to be treated with 

fairness, respect and dignity; considering their safety in bail 

proceedings; timely notice and opportunity to take part in 

public proceedings; reasonable protection from the accused; 

right to refuse discovery requests made by the accused; 

restitution and return of property; proceedings free from delay; 

and to be informed of these rights, so they can enforce them?

Ballot Question (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 offered in Oct. 23, 2019 hearing in League of Women 

Voters v. Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)).

On October 10, 2019, Appellees3(collectively referred to as “the League”) filed a 

 

named after a murder victim, Marsalee (“Marsy”) Nicholas, who was murdered by her exboyfriend in 1983. Anna Roberts, “Victims, Right?,” 42 Cardozo Law Review 1449, 1458 

(2021). As of the beginning of 2021, eleven states have adopted a similar package of 

amendments. Id. However, in two other states, Montana and Wisconsin, the 

amendments, though approved by their voters, were deemed to have violated those 

states’ constitutions in the manner in which the proposed amendments were presented 

to the voters. See Montana Association of Counties v. State by & through Fox, 404 P.3d 

733 (Mont. 2017), and Wisconsin Justice Initiative v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 

2019-CV-3485 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County filed November 3, 2020). An appeal remains 

pending in the latter case.

2 Subsequently, Ms. Boockvar resigned, and her successor, acting Secretary Veronica 

DeGraffenreid, was substituted as a party in this suit. She has not filed a brief in this 

matter.

3

 Appellees are the League of Women Voters, Lorraine Haw, and Ronald Greenblatt. 

The League is a nonprofit organization whose central focus is the education of individuals 

on issues related to elections and voting. Haw is a registered voter whose brother was 

murdered, has a son serving a life sentence without parole, and who is seeking a pardon 

of her own for a criminal conviction. Greenblatt is a criminal defense attorney with over 

30 years of practice experience. They have filed a joint brief herein. Greenblatt, although 

granted the right to intervene below, was never added to the caption.
[J-48-2021] - 5

declaratory judgment action in the Commonwealth Court and sought to preliminarily 

enjoin the tabulation and certification of the votes on the Victim’s Rights Amendment, 

alleging that it violated Article XI, § 1.4 The matter was assigned to Judge Ellen Ceisler, 

who conducted an evidentiary hearing and heard argument on the motion. On October 

30, 2019, Judge Ceisler issued an order granting the requested preliminary injunction and 

enjoining the Secretary “from tabulating and certifying the votes in the November 2019 

General Election relating to the ballot question asking voters whether the Pennsylvania 

Constitution should be amended to include a new section providing for victims’ rights until 

final disposition of the Petition for Review, including appeals.” League of Women Voters 

v. Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Oct. 30, 2019) (order).

Thereafter, Appellants5filed an emergency motion with our Court seeking to 

overturn Judge Ceisler’s order. After expedited review, we affirmed the preliminary 

injunction. League of Women Voters v. Boockvar, 219 A.3d 594 (Pa. 2019) (order).6 

 

4

 Appellees also alleged that the Ballot Question violated Article XI, §1 because it failed 

to contain the actual text of the Victim’s Rights Amendment, and that it should be stricken 

because neither the Proposed Amendment, the Ballot Question, nor the Attorney 

General’s Plain English Statement, see 25 P.S. § 2621.1 (requiring that, for all proposed 

constitutional amendments, the Attorney General prepare a statement in plain English 

which indicates the purpose, limitations and effects of the ballot question,” and requiring 

the Secretary of the Commonwealth to publish it along with the proposed constitutional 

amendment), did not “fairly convey the substance of the proposed amendment.” Petition 

for Review filed in League of Women Voters v. Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019 (Pa. Cmwlth.), 

at 21.

5

 Appellants are four individuals who were granted intervenor status by the 

Commonwealth Court as victims of crimes.

6

 Then-Chief Justice Saylor authored a brief dissent to this order, joined by Justices 

Dougherty and Mundy, in which he expressed his disagreement with the legal standards 

employed by the Commonwealth Court to evaluate the League’s request for a preliminary 

injunction, i.e., whether they had presented a substantial question that a violation of 

Article XI, § 1 had occurred. Justice Saylor also indicated that he would have vacated 

the portion of the Commonwealth Court’s order which restrained the Secretary from 

tabulating or counting the votes cast.
[J-48-2021] - 6

However, we stressed that neither our order, nor the order of the Commonwealth Court, 

prohibited any voter from voting on the Ballot Question. Id.

Consequently, the Ballot Question appeared on the ballot in the November 5, 2019 

General Election. On the Secretary’s website, the unofficial tally of all votes cast on this 

question count was listed as 74.01% in favor of the question and 25.99% against; 

however, pursuant to the terms of Judge Ceisler’s order, the Secretary did not formally 

tabulate or certify these results.

Thereafter, the parties filed cross motions for summary relief, and, on January 7, 

2021, a divided en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court granted the League’s request 

for declarative relief based on its determination that the proposed Victim’s Rights 

Amendment violated Article XI, § 1, and, because it was unconstitutional, the court 

declared all votes cast on it to be invalid. League of Women Voters v. Boockvar, 578 

M.D. 2019 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Jan. 7, 2021) (order).

7 Accordingly, the court entered a 

permanent injunction enjoining the Secretary from tabulating or certifying the votes cast 

in the election.8

By way of background necessary for understanding the analysis employed by the 

Commonwealth Court below and the arguments advanced by the parties before us, we 

first discuss our Court’s jurisprudence addressing the separate vote requirement of Article 

XI, § 1. As here, in each of the decisions we discuss, the challenges to the proposed 

 

7 The court denied Appellees’ other bases for seeking declaratory relief, see supra note 

4, as moot.

8 The court’s order was accompanied by an unpublished memorandum decision by Judge 

Ceisler in support of the order, joined by Judge Wojcik and Judge McCullough. See 

League of Women Voters v. Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Jan. 7, 2021) 

(opinion announcing the judgment of the court). Judge McCullough also authored a 

concurring opinion. Then-President Judge Leavitt wrote a dissent, joined by Judge 

Fizzano Cannon. 
[J-48-2021] - 7

amendments at issue were reviewed by our Court after the electorate had voted. 

Over two decades ago, in Bergdoll v. Kane, 731 A.2d 1261, 1264-65 (Pa. 1999), 

we considered a ballot question with two aspects: one proposed amending Article I, § 9 

of our Constitution to replace the right of a person accused of a crime to “meet the 

witnesses face to face” with a right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him”; the 

other proposed amending Article V, § 10(c)9 – which governs our Court’s exclusive 

authority to establish rules of court procedure – to allow the General Assembly to enact 

laws regarding the manner by which children may testify in criminal proceedings, 

including to permit the use of videotaped depositions or testimony by closed-circuit 

television. 

 

9

 This section provides: 

The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general 

rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all 

courts, justices of the peace and all officers serving process 

or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or 

justice of the peace, including the power to provide for 

assignment and reassignment of classes of actions or classes 

of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice 

shall require, and for admission to the bar and to practice law, 

and the administration of all courts and supervision of all 

officers of the Judicial Branch, if such rules are consistent with 

this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the 

substantive rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the 

General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court or 

justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of 

limitation or repose. All laws shall be suspended to the extent 

that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these 

provisions. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the 

General Assembly may by statute provide for the manner of 

testimony of child victims or child material witnesses in 

criminal proceedings, including the use of videotaped 

depositions or testimony by closed-circuit television.

Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c).
[J-48-2021] - 8

In reviewing the text of the ballot question, we identified two purposes for that

proposed amendment: 

First, it seeks to ensure that the language of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution gives the accused no greater a right to confront 

witnesses than the right to confront witnesses given the 

accused under the United States Constitution. Second, it 

seeks to ensure that, notwithstanding the constitutional right 

of the accused to confront witnesses, the General Assembly 

is authorized by the Pennsylvania Constitution to enact laws 

regarding the manner by which children may testify in criminal 

proceedings.

Id. at 1270. Because of these disparate purposes, our Court ruled that the ballot question 

violated the separate vote requirement of Article XI, § 1 in that it “encompassed 

amendments to both Article I, § 9 and Article V, § 10(c), but did not permit the electorate 

to vote separately upon each of the amendments.” Id.

Justice Saylor authored a concurring opinion in which he agreed that the ballot 

question was “constitutionally infirm.” Id. at 1271 (Saylor, J., concurring). However, he 

indicated that he would have reached this conclusion by employing a different rationale –

specifically, that the provision of the proposed amendment which expanded the means 

by which child witnesses could offer testimony could have done so without altering the 

face-to-face requirement of Article I, § 8. Thus, in his view “the changes lacked the 

interdependence necessary to justify their presentation to voters within the framework of 

a single question.” Id. In support, he cited with approval decisions from Nevada and Utah 

which employed an analysis for determining whether a proposed amendment violates the 

separate vote requirements of their respective constitutions by examining both whether 

the proposed changes relate to each other in subject matter, and also whether each 

provision is dependent on the other to function. See id. (discussing Clark v. State 

Canvassing Bd., 888 P.2d 458, 462 (Nev. 1995) (ballot question violated the separate 

vote requirement of the Nevada Constitution where two proposed changes, while relating
[J-48-2021] - 9

to the subject of gambling, had no “rational linchpin” of interdependence); Lee v. 

State, 367 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1962) (holding that a two-part proposed amendment

granting the legislature special powers in the event of a war or other emergency violated 

the separate vote requirement, which was then part of the Utah Constitution, because the 

two provisions, though related, were not dependent upon each other)).10

Then, in Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 776 A.2d 971 (Pa. 2001) 

(“Prison Society”), we again considered the issue of whether a single ballot question 

proposing multiple revisions to our Constitution violated Article XI, § 1. The ballot question 

in that case asked the voters whether they approved amending Article IV, § 9(b) of our 

Constitution

to require a unanimous recommendation of the Board of 

Pardons before the Governor can pardon or commute the 

sentence of an individual sentenced in a criminal case to death 

or life imprisonment, to require only a majority vote of the 

Senate to approve the Governor’s appointments to the Board, 

and to substitute a crime victim for an attorney and a 

corrections expert for a penologist as Board members?

Id. at 974.

A majority of our Court agreed on the foundational legal principles governing our 

review of a claim that a proposed amendment violates Article XI, § 1. However, we did 

not reach a consensus on the proper analysis. In a lead opinion authored by Justice 

Zappala – joined by Justice Flaherty and joined, in part, by Justice Nigro – the plurality 

found that the analysis in Bergdoll was controlling, inasmuch as, in its view, the question 

before our Court was whether the proposed amendments, even though presented as 

 

10 Six years after the Lee decision, in 1969, the Utah Constitution was amended to remove 

the requirement, which existed at the time Lee was decided, that “If two or more 

amendments are proposed, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote 

on each of them separately.” Utah Const. art. XXIII, § 1 (1959-1969). 
[J-48-2021] - 10

changes to but a single article of our Constitution, nevertheless violated Article XI, § 1

because they constituted multiple amendments to our Constitution that the voters were 

not given the opportunity to vote on separately. Prison Society, 776 A.2d at 981. In 

conducting its analysis of this issue, the plurality explicitly rejected the appellants’ 

argument that the changes to Article IV did not violate the separate vote requirement 

because they all related to a single subject. The plurality noted that our Constitution 

differed from those of other states which explicitly require that proposed constitutional 

amendments all relate to a “single subject,” due to the fact that our Constitution contains 

no such requirement. Id. at 981 n.4.

Ultimately, the plurality found that the proposed amendment violated Article XI, §

1 because, even though the amendment purportedly changed only one article of our 

Constitution, it had two separate purposes: restructuring the pardoning power of the 

Parole Board, and altering the Pennsylvania Senate’s confirmation process for the 

governor’s appointees. The plurality found that “the senatorial process for confirming the 

governor’s appointees is separate and distinct from the functions performed by the 

Board.” Id. at 981. Correspondingly, in the plurality’s view, “[a]ny change to the Senate’s 

exclusive authority to confirm the appointees to the Board was required to be submitted 

for a separate vote by the electorate.” Id. However, despite this violation of Article XI, §

1, the plurality nonetheless determined that the amendment, while technically void, should 

stand because it did not actually alter the existing confirmation procedure under Article 

IV, § 9: in the plurality’s view, the Senate already had the power to appoint the Board’s 

members by majority vote. 

In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Nigro agreed that the proposed 

amendment violated Article XI, § 1, but he disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that it 

could nevertheless stand, and he would have stricken the amendment as void. 
[J-48-2021] - 11

Former Justice Cappy dissented. He first concluded that the amendment did alter 

the senatorial confirmation process, and, therefore, required a separate ballot question. 

He next repudiated the plurality’s conclusion that the constitutional violation was a form 

of “harmless error.” Id. at 987 (Cappy, J., dissenting). While agreeing with the plurality 

that Bergdoll requires that our Court strictly enforce the separate vote requirement of 

Article XI, § 1, he nevertheless considered the plurality’s excuse of this violation to 

circumvent this requirement.

Justice Saylor authored a single-sentence concurring opinion, joined by Justices 

Castille and Newman, in which he agreed with the plurality that the proposed 

amendments did not violate Article XI, § 1, but he also disavowed the plurality’s “rejection 

of a subject-matter focus to determine whether alterations are sufficiently interrelated to 

justify their presentation to the electorate in a single question.” Id. at 984 (Saylor, J.,

concurring). In a footnote, Justice Saylor, as in Bergdoll, briefly summarized 

jurisprudence from other jurisdictions that utilize such a single-subject test:

I note that jurisdictions interpreting virtually identical 

constitutional requirements have employed a single-subject test 

and examined the interdependence of the proposed 

constitutional changes in determining the necessity for separate 

votes. See, e.g., Korte v. Bayless, 199 Ariz. 173, 16 P.3d 200, 

203–05 (2001) (explaining a “common-purpose formulation” to 

inquire into whether the proposed amendments are sufficiently 

related to “constitute a consistent and workable whole on the 

general topic embraced”); Clark v. State Canvassing Bd.,

[supra] (applying a “rational linchpin” of interdependence test);

Sears v. State, 232 Ga. 547, 208 S.E.2d 93, 100 (1974)

(inquiring into whether all of the proposed changes “are 

germane to the accomplishment of a single objective”) 

(quotations and citations omitted); Fugina v. Donovan, 259 

Minn. 35, 104 N.W.2d 911, 914 (1960) (upholding separate 

propositions that, although they could have been submitted 

separately, were rationally related to a single purpose, plan, or 

subject).

Id. at 984 n.1.
[J-48-2021] - 12

In Grimaud v. Commonwealth, 865 A.2d 835 (Pa. 2005), our Court’s most recent 

opinion in this area, we addressed two ballot questions that were challenged as violating 

the separate vote requirement of Article XI, § 1.11 The first question (“Question 1”) 

proposed to amend Article I, § 14 to disallow the granting of bail “when the proof is evident 

or presumption great that the accused committed an offense for which the maximum 

penalty is life imprisonment or that no condition or combination of conditions other than 

imprisonment of the accused will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the 

community,” id. at 841 (emphasis added), and the second (“Question 2”) proposed 

amending Article I, § 6 of our Constitution to provide “that the Commonwealth shall have 

the same right to trial by jury in criminal cases as does the accused,” id. at 845.

In addressing appellants’ claim that Question 1 violated Article XI, § 1, our Court 

observed that our decision in Prison Society produced no clear majority regarding the 

applicable standard and, thus, we adopted in toto Justice Saylor’s brief concurring opinion 

from Prison Society:

We are persuaded by Justice Saylor's concurrence suggesting 

“a subject-matter focus to determine whether alterations are 

sufficiently interrelated to justify their presentation to the 

electorate in a single question.” [Prison Society, 776 A.2d] at 

984 (Saylor, J., concurring, joined by Castille and Newman, 

JJ.). Persuasive authority comes from other jurisdictions which 

have utilized

a single-subject test and examined the 

interdependence of the proposed constitutional 

changes in determining the necessity for separate 

votes. See, e.g., Korte v. Bayless, [supra

(Arizona)] (explaining a “common-purpose 

formulation” to inquire into whether the proposed 

amendments are sufficiently related to “constitute 

a consistent and workable whole on the general 

topic embraced”); Clark v. State Canvassing Bd.,

 

11

 Both questions appeared separately on the ballot used by the voters.
[J-48-2021] - 13

[supra (New Mexico)] (applying a “rational 

linchpin” of interdependence test); Sears v. State,

[supra (Georgia)] (inquiring into whether all of the 

proposed changes “are germane to the 

accomplishment of a single objective”) 

(quotations and citations omitted); Fugina v. 

Donovan, [supra (Minn.)] (upholding separate 

propositions that, although they could have been 

submitted separately, were rationally related to a 

single, purpose, plan, or subject).

Id., at 984 n. 1; see also Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 

Cal.4th 537, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3, 28 (2002) 

(various provisions must be reasonably related to common 

theme or purpose); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 990 

(Fla.1984) (amendment must manifest “a logical and natural 

oneness of purpose ...”).[12]

Although we are not bound by these decisions, we find them 

persuasive, and adopt the “subject matter test” for determining 

whether a ballot question violates Article XI, § 1.

Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 841.

Applying this test, we concluded that Question 1 did not violate the separate vote 

requirement of Article XI, § 1 because the proposed changes set forth in the ballot 

question – the first clause disallowing bail where the offense warrants life imprisonment, 

and the second disallowing bail where the public safety requires it – “were related to a 

single subject, bail” and “were sufficiently interrelated (all concerned disallowance of bail 

to reinforce public safety) to justify inclusion in a single question.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Notably, however, we did not specify what degree of interrelatedness between the 

 

12 This decision involved the article of Florida’s Constitution governing proposed 

amendments placed on the ballot by an initiative of the voters, and that portion of Florida’s 

Constitution, unlike Pennsylvania’s, contains a requirement that any amendment 

proposed by initiative “shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected 

therewith.” Fla. Const. art. 11, § 3. Also, unlike our Constitution, Florida’s Constitution 

contains no requirement that when two or more amendments are proposed by the 

legislature they shall be voted on separately. Id. §§ 1, 5. 
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proposed changes was required by Article XI, § 1, or how it should be measured.

Despite having found that the proposed changes set forth in Question 1 were 

sufficiently interrelated, we addressed the appellants’ argument that it violated Article XI, 

§ 1 because the question “implicitly amended” several provisions of the Constitution, 

specifically:

(1) Article I, § 1’s right to defend one’s self, by restricting the 

ability to prepare a defense; (2) Article I, § 9’s presumption of 

innocence, because preventive detention requires a 

presumption the accused will commit additional crimes if 

released on bail; (3) Article I, § 13’s right to be free from 

excessive bail, because preventive detention essentially 

eliminates that right; and (4) Article I, § 25’s reservation that 

Article I rights remain inviolate, because preventive detention 

punishes without trial and conviction, violating Article I, § 9.

Id. at 842. 

In addressing this claim, our Court opined:

We analyze the ballot question's substantive affect [sic] on the 

Constitution, examining the content, purpose, and effect.

Pennsylvania Prison Society, at 980. Here, the 

Commonwealth Court properly noted that merely because an 

amendment “may possibly impact other provisions” does not 

mean it violates the separate vote requirement. Grimaud [v. 

Commonwealth, 806 A.2d 923 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)] at 930. 

The test to be applied is not merely whether the amendments 

might touch other parts of the Constitution when applied, but 

rather, whether the amendments facially affect other parts of 

the Constitution. Indeed, it is hard to imagine an amendment 

that would not have some arguable effect on another 

provision; clearly the framers knew amendments would occur 

and provided a means for that to happen. The question is 

whether the single ballot question patently affects other 

constitutional provisions, not whether it implicitly has such an 

effect, as appellants suggest.

Id. (emphasis original). Ultimately, we concluded:

The bail amendments do not substantively affect the right to 

defend one’s self, the right to be free from excessive bail, or 

the reservation that Article I rights remain inviolate. The 
[J-48-2021] - 15

argument concerning the amendment of Article I, § 9’s 

presumption of innocence lacks merit because the 

“presumption” language is the same now as it was prior to the 

amendments. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 14 (1997). Because the 

proposed amendments only patently affected Article I, § 14, 

regarding when bail is disallowed in criminal cases, and no 

other part of the Constitution, the Commonwealth Court did not 

err in concluding the single bail ballot question was properly 

submitted to the electorate.

Id. (emphasis added).

We next addressed Question 2. Textually, Question 2 set forth only one change: 

providing the Commonwealth with a right to trial by jury in criminal cases. Nevertheless,

as with Question 1, we addressed the appellants’ argument that the question violated 

Article XI, § 1 because it implicitly amended several provisions. The appellants argued 

that granting the Commonwealth the right to trial by jury violated Article XI, § 1 because 

it also amended Article V, § 10(c) (governing judicial administration),

13 and Article I, § 

25,

14 which reserves all of the rights enumerated in Article I to the people. To resolve this 

claim, we examined whether the change to Article I, § 6 effectuated by the proposed 

amendment substantially altered those other constitutional provisions. Id. at 845. We

determined that it would not, inasmuch as “[o]nly one substantive change is made . . . to 

give the Commonwealth the right to trial by jury.” Id. (citing Prison Society, 776 A.2d at 

980).

 

13

 See supra note 10.

14

 This section provides:

To guard against transgressions of the high powers which we 

have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is 

excepted out of the general powers of government and shall 

forever remain inviolate.

Pa. Const. art. I, § 25.
[J-48-2021] - 16

Chief Justice Cappy authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in Grimaud, 

joined by Justice Nigro and then-Justice, now-Chief Justice, Baer. Chief Justice Cappy 

characterized the majority’s adoption of a “subject matter test” as conflicting with the 

analysis our Court employed in Bergdoll, which he interpreted as requiring only that a 

court examine how many ways a ballot question would change the constitution and then 

ascertaining whether “the ballot question permitted the electorate to vote separately 

upon each of the amendments.” Id. at 849 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting). Thus, he 

considered this apparent repudiation of Bergdoll to be unjustified under the doctrine of 

stare decisis. Chief Justice Cappy further expressed his concern that the “sufficiently 

interrelated” test adopted by the Majority would “make constitutional amendment a 

guessing game as to the predilections of a majority of Justices regarding just how 

‘sufficiently interrelated’ amendments need to be to pass constitutional muster.” Id.

Although Chief Justice Cappy found Question 2 not to violate Article XI, §, 1, he 

did so on the basis of his conclusion that it did not present separate amendments. He 

then sharply criticized the majority’s Article XI, § 1 analysis generally, calling it 

“hopelessly vague and therefore largely unhelpful, as it offers three different and 

seemingly inconsistent inquiries, i.e., whether the proposed amendments ‘facially’ affect, 

‘patently' affect and/or ‘substantively’ affect, other parts of the Constitution.” Id. at 850 

n.3.

In sum, our decision in Grimaud stands for the proposition that, under its single 

subject test, a determination of whether a proposed amendment making multiple changes 

to the Pennsylvania Constitution violates Article XI, § 1 requires a reviewing court to 

examine whether the changes are “sufficiently interrelated to justify their presentation to 

the electorate in a single question.” Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 841-842. We view this as the 

core holding of Grimaud. In addition, however, Grimaud also allows that a proposed 
[J-48-2021] - 17

amendment triggers the separate vote requirement of Article XI, § 1 if it substantively

effectuates more than one change to the Constitution. Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 842. 

With this background in mind, we turn to the Commonwealth Court’s decision in 

the case at bar. Because the question of whether the proposed Victim’s Rights 

Amendment violated Article XI, § 1 arose in the context of the League’s request for a 

permanent injunction, in her lead opinion, Judge Ceisler determined that the League had 

established the criteria for the entry of a permanent injunction set forth in Board of 

Revision of Taxes, City of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 4 A.3d 610, 627 (Pa. 2010)

(holding that “a permanent injunction will issue if the party establishes his or her clear 

right to relief” and “if such relief is necessary to prevent a legal wrong for which there is 

no adequate redress at law”). Specifically, she found that the League had met its burden 

for establishing a clear right to relief because it had established that the Victim’s Rights 

Amendment violated Article XI, § 1 of our Constitution. 

In her opinion, she first discussed Bergdoll and Prison Society and noted that, 

subsequent to those decisions, our Court in Grimaud adopted the interrelationship test 

set forth in Justice Saylor’s concurrence in Bergdoll as the governing standard for

challenges under Article XI, § 1, and she proceeded to apply that test.15 See League of 

 

15 Judge Ceisler remarked that she did not view Grimaud as directly controlling the 

outcome of this matter given that Grimaud involved amending an existing constitutional 

provision, whereas, here, an entirely new constitutional provision is being proposed. 

League of Women Voters v. Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019 at 15 (quoting Sprague v. Cortes, 

145 A.3d 1136, 1145 (Pa. 2016) (opinion in support of granting plaintiff’s relief) (“There is 

a categorical difference between the act of creating something entirely new and altering 

something which already exists.”) (emphasis deleted)). Appellants presently argue that 

Judge Ceisler disregarded the Grimaud subject matter test and, instead, improperly 

followed the test at issue in Sprague which examined whether the language of a ballot 

question was sufficiently clear so as to apprise the voter of what changes he or she is 

being asked to make. Appellants’ Brief at 19. We respectfully disagree, because we 

interpret Judge Ceisler’s citation to the opinion in Sprague merely as support for her 

general observation about the greater impact adding new provisions can have on existing 
[J-48-2021] - 18

Women Voters v. Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019 at 15 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Jan. 7, 2021) (opinion 

announcing the judgment of the court) (“These decisions instruct that in deciding whether 

a proposed amendment is constitutional, courts must determine whether it encompasses 

a single subject that is sufficiently interrelated.”) (emphasis original).16

Accordingly, Judge Ceisler proceeded to examine the content, purpose, and effect 

of the Victim’s Rights Amendment and whether all of its provisions were sufficiently 

interrelated to encompass a single subject. Based on the evidence she had received at 

the preliminary injunction hearing and the parties’ filings, she analyzed in great detail the 

sweeping and complex changes the Victim’s Rights Amendment would have on existing 

constitutional provisions and the criminal justice process in Pennsylvania. 

Judge Ceisler first observed that the Victim’s Rights Amendment would have 

significant effects on the right of the accused in a criminal prosecution to confront the 

witnesses against him and the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor 

secured by Article I, § 9 of the Constitution. She noted that the Victim’s Rights 

Amendment would allow not only a victim of a crime to refuse interviews, deposition, or 

discovery requests, but would also allow any person directly impacted by a crime to refuse 

to comply with such requests,17 as well as refuse to produce physical or documentary 

 

constitutional rights, inasmuch as, in our view, she applied the Grimaud interrelationship 

test in her analysis.

16

 Judge Ceisler also briefly noted the Commonwealth Court’s declaration in its own 

decision in Prison Society – which, as discussed above, we reversed – that the process 

set forth in Article XI, § 1 “should not be used to circumvent a constitutional convention, 

the process for making complex changes to the Constitution.” Pennsylvania Prison 

Society v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 632, 634 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). The Governor has 

filed a thoughtful and comprehensive amicus brief in which he endorses this principle. 

However, the issue we presently review does not require that we address that assertion.

17

 As we discuss herein, see infra, the proposed amendment actually uses the terms 

“directly harmed by the commission of the offense or act” in defining “victim.” See Joint 

Resolution 2019-1(c). 
[J-48-2021] - 19

evidence which would help the accused mount a defense. Thus, in her view, the granting 

of such a right of refusal to these individuals, rooted in the Victim’s Rights Amendment’s 

stated purpose of protecting the “safety, dignity and privacy” interests of the individual, 

would hinder attorneys representing an accused from obtaining evidence necessary to 

mount a defense, and from obtaining a court order to compel victims to produce evidence 

or testimony. League of Women Voters v. Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019 at 18 (opinion in 

support of order announcing the judgment of the court). She considered this to be an 

alteration of a defendant’s right of confrontation under Article I, § 9, and, because of the 

impact on the discovery process, a corresponding alteration of the right to a speedy trial 

under that same provision. These changes, she reasoned, could interfere with a 

defendant’s ability to negotiate plea agreements, and constrain his ability to effectively

cross-examine witnesses.

Judge Ceisler also found that the victim’s right to privacy conferred by the Victim’s 

Rights Amendment could affect the accused’s right to open court proceedings conferred 

by Article I, § 11 of the Constitution. In her view, this new privacy right could interfere 

with the ability of courts to conduct pretrial and trial proceedings, altering this Court’s 

exclusive rulemaking power under Article V.

Judge Ceisler next noted that the notification and participation rights conferred on

victims regarding prisoner releases would alter the operations of the Department of 

Corrections and county jails. In this regard, she reasoned that individuals who had

completed their sentence and who are scheduled for release would be the most impacted, 

as they would continue to be incarcerated until the requisite notice and opportunity to be 

heard was provided. Similarly altered, in her view, would be the right of the accused to 

bail secured by Article I, § 14, the right of the Governor to commute sentences and to 

 
[J-48-2021] - 20

grant pardons under Article IV, § 9, and a court’s power to order a prisoner’s release 

under rules established by our Court pursuant to Article V.

Judge Ceisler concluded that, because the Victim’s Rights Amendment, on its 

face, addresses a vast array of subjects – such as bail, discovery, due process, restitution, 

the right of privacy, and the courts’ powers to control the conduct of criminal proceedings

and to promulgate rules – the various provisions of the Victim’s Rights Amendment could 

not be deemed to be sufficiently interrelated so as to be brought under the subject of 

“victims’ rights.” As a result, she determined that the Victim’s Rights Amendment 

deprived the voters of their right to choose which of the multiple changes they approved 

or disapproved, and therefore violated Article XI, § 1.

In an opinion supporting the court’s order, Judge McCullough joined Judge 

Ceisler’s opinion, and she agreed that the wide range of subject matter covered by the 

Victim’s Rights Amendment lacked the required interdependence to be considered as 

pertaining to a single subject. She rejected the suggestion that these subjects could be 

grouped together under the broad and amorphous category of “victims’ rights” as, from 

her perspective, that was entirely too broad a category to encompass such seemingly 

unrelated changes. She analogized this to legislation which our Court found violative of

Article III, § 3 of the Constitution because it grouped together multiple unrelated subjects 

into the general class of “municipalities.” League of Women Voters v. Boockvar, 578 M.D. 

2019 at 4-5 (opinion in support of order announcing the judgment of the court) 

(McCullough, J) (citing City of Philadelphia v Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566 (Pa. 2003)).

Judge McCullough further opined that, even if all of these provisions could be 

grouped together under the umbrella of victims’ rights, the manner in which the Victim’s 

Rights Amendment was presented — as a single ballot question — still violated Article 

XI, § 1 because that constitutional provision requires that a voter be given a chance to 
[J-48-2021] - 21

vote on each amendment to the Constitution separately. Judge McCullough also 

discounted the argument that all of these proposed harms were merely speculative, given 

that, in her view, the deleterious impact on the right of the accused to obtain witnesses 

and other evidence necessary to prepare a defense secured by Article I, § 9 was patent.

Judge Leavitt dissented, contending that declaratory relief was inappropriate as 

the League had merely asserted speculative harms that may occur if the amendment was 

passed, but, in her view, it did not meet its burden of producing evidence showing 

concrete real-world injury that would transpire if the amendment took effect. Judge Leavitt

considered the mere possibility that an amendment would impact other constitutional 

provisions insufficient to violate Article IX, § 1; rather, she concluded it was necessary 

under Grimaud to show that there was a demonstrable deleterious effect on those other 

provisions, which, from her perspective, the League did not do. 

Appellants filed a direct appeal to our Court.

18

 We granted oral argument, which 

was held on September 21, 2021, limited to the following issue:

Whether the Commonwealth Court erred as a matter of law in 

declaring that the Proposed Amendment to Article I of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, as set forth in Joint Resolution No. 

2019-1, violated Article XI, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, because the Proposed Amendment was 

contained in only one ballot question?

League of Women Voters v. Boockvar, 4 MAP 2021 (Pa. filed June 22, 2021) (order)

II. Arguments of the Parties

Appellants argue that the Victim’s Rights Amendment comports with the 

“sufficiently interrelated” standard our Court articulated in Grimaud for Article XI, § 1 

 

18 Before us, and in response to the other two challenges raised by Appellees below, see 

supra note 4, Appellants argue that there is no requirement that a proposed amendment 

be recited verbatim in a ballot question, and that the Ballot Question adequately apprised 

the voters of the changes they were voting on. Given our resolution of Appellees’ 

challenge under Article XI, § 1, we need not address these other issues.
[J-48-2021] - 22

challenges. Appellants highlight the fact that, in Grimaud, our Court rejected the notion 

that proposed amendments violate Article XI, § 1 merely because they “implicitly” affect 

other provisions of the Constitution. Appellants point to a passage in that opinion where 

we stated that “[t]he test to be applied is not merely whether the amendments might touch 

other parts of the Constitution when applied, but rather, whether the amendments facially 

affect other parts of the constitution.” Appellants’ Brief at 12 (quoting Grimaud, 865 A.2d 

at 842). Hence, in their view, our Court categorized the determinative inquiry as “whether 

the single ballot question patently affects other constitutional provisions, not whether it 

implicitly has such an effect.” Id. Thus, Appellants proffer that, in Grimaud, we upheld 

the proposed amendment altering the conditions under which bail may be granted

because the amendment modified only Article I, § 14 of the Constitution, governing bail, 

but did not explicitly alter Article I, § 9, establishing the presumption of innocence.

Appellants posit this reasoning has particular relevance in the instant matter, given that

the Victim’s Rights Amendment does not alter the innocence presumption language in

Article I, § 9. Hence, in their view, to consider the Victim’s Rights Amendment’s effects 

on that section, like Judge Ceisler did in her lead opinion below, is improper.

Appellants contend that the multiplicity of rights conferred on victims by the Victim’s 

Rights Amendment are sufficiently interrelated to justify placing them in one ballot 

question as they serve one common purpose — “to enshrine a panoply of indispensable

victims’ rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Id. at 15-16. Appellants reiterate that,

because none of the language in any of the other provisions of the Constitution, which 

the lead opinion below discussed, is explicitly changed by the amendment, the Ballot 

Question meets the Grimaud standard. Appellants, thus, reject Judge Ceisler’s and 

Judge McCullough’s opinions as flawed for examining the amendment’s implicit effects 

on other constitutional provisions; conversely, they wholly endorse Judge Leavitt’s 
[J-48-2021] - 23

opinion as hewing faithfully to this standard, given that she would have required a 

demonstration of the Victim’s Rights Amendment’s patent effects on those constitutional 

provisions.

Appellants argue that “applying the formulations found ‘persuasive’ in Grimaud, 

the 15 victims’ rights clearly have a ‘common purpose’ and are ‘germane to the

accomplishment of a single objective’” which, they submit, is “to enshrine a panoply of 

related victims’ rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Id. at 16 (quoting Grimaud, 865 

A.2d 841). Appellants, thus, ask us to reverse the Commonwealth Court decision and 

order.

19

The League counters Appellants’ description of the Grimaud test by pointing out 

that, in that case we articulated a two-step analysis: the first step is to determine whether 

a proposed amendment encompasses a single subject – whether its provisions are 

sufficiently interrelated to justify inclusion in a single ballot question; the second step 

requires an examination of whether a proposed amendment patently affects other 

constitutional provisions. The League maintains that this inquiry is not, however, 

restricted only to assessing whether a proposed amendment alters the language of other 

constitutional provisions, but, rather considers the “content, purpose and effect” of the 

proposed amendment on those provisions to determine if it makes “more than ‘one 

substantive change’” to the Pennsylvania Constitution. League’s Brief at 19 (quoting

Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 842)). The League argues the Victim’s Rights Amendment fails 

both parts of this inquiry.

With respect to the single subject requirement, the League contends the Victim’s 

Rights Amendment fails this requirement, as, in its view, the amendment combines no 

 

19

 Amicus briefs were filed in support of Appellees by the Attorney General, the 

Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, and the Pennsylvania District Attorneys 

Association.
[J-48-2021] - 24

less than 14 separate amendments into one, by creating these particular new victim’s 

rights:

 to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s 

safety, dignity and privacy;

 to have the safety of the victim and the victim’s family 

considered in fixing the amount of bail and release 

conditions for the accused;

 to reasonable and timely notice of and to be present at all 

public proceedings involving the criminal or delinquent 

conduct;

 to be notified of any pretrial disposition of the case;

 to be heard in any proceeding where a right of the victim 

is implicated, including, but not limited to, release, plea;

sentencing, disposition, parole and pardon;

 to be notified of all parole procedures, to participate in the 

parole process, to provide information to be considered 

before the parole of the offender, and to be notified of the 

parole of the offender;

 to reasonable protection from the accused or any person 

acting on behalf of the accused;

 to reasonable notice of any release or escape of the 

accused;

 to refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery 

request made by the accused or any person acting on 

behalf of the accused;

 full and timely restitution from the person or entity 

convicted for the unlawful conduct;

 to the prompt return of property when no longer needed as 

evidence;

 to proceedings free from unreasonable delay and a prompt 

and final conclusion of the case and any related postconviction proceedings;

 to confer with the attorney for the government; and

 to be informed of all rights enumerated in this section.

Id. at 4-5 (quoting Joint Resolution 2019-1).

The League asserts that these rights affect the entire range and scope of the 
[J-48-2021] - 25

criminal process, from start to finish, and encompass multiple subject areas that are so 

complex they are taught as separate courses in law school, and are treated separately 

by our Constitution, statutes, and caselaw. In its view, grouping them together under the 

generic and amorphous category of “victims’ rights” would render the single subject 

requirement essentially meaningless, and it would allow a limitless number of 

constitutional amendments to be combined together in clear violation of Article XI, § 1.

The League proffers that Grimaud itself underscores what it characterizes as the

fallacy of Appellants’ argument, because, the League reasons, had we simply applied 

their overly broad formulation of a unifying category of “victim’s rights” in that case, there 

would have been no need for separate questions on the issue of amending the right to 

trial by jury and amending the right of the accused to bail, as both could have been unified 

under this capacious category, or another equally amorphous one such as 

“commonwealth rights” or “criminal justice procedures.” League Brief at 13, n.2. Instead, 

each separate ballot question in that case passed the requirement of Article XI, § 1 only 

because each pertained to one narrow constitutional provision — the right to trial by jury,

and the right to bail, respectively. By contrast, the Victim’s Rights Amendment affects 

multiple subjects, such as the right to bail, the parole process, discovery, and restitution.

The League also points out that Grimaud did not write on a clean slate, but, rather 

built on our Court’s earlier jurisprudence in Prison Society and Bergdoll. In Prison Society, 

the League highlights that our Court examined the purpose of each provision of the 

proposed amendment at issue and found that, because each provision accomplished a 

different purpose, the various provisions, when considered as a whole, could not be 

deemed to pertain to a single subject. Here, the League argues, each of the new victims’ 

rights enumerated above furthers a separate and distinct purpose and, thus, cannot be 

viewed as accomplishing the singular purpose of providing justice and due process for 
[J-48-2021] - 26

victims, as Appellants argue. 

Additionally, the League asserts that, in his concurrence in Bergdoll, Justice Saylor 

elaborated on the concept of the degree of interrelationship between various provisions 

necessary to group them under a single subject. The League notes that Justice Saylor 

focused on whether each provision could stand separately and independently of the 

others, which necessitated examining whether each provision implicated the same 

fundamental right. The League insists that Justice Saylor indicated that he did not find

the requisite degree of interdependence in that case between the provision eliminating 

the face-to-face requirement of Article I, § 9, and the provision permitting the legislature 

to enact procedures to present a child’s testimony at trial. Justice Saylor observed that 

the former provision affected only the manner in which an accused could confront a child 

witness, whereas the latter included a broader category of rights going beyond the right 

of confrontation; hence, because each provision could stand independently of the other,

they could not be viewed as interrelated.

The League posits that the provisions of the Victim’s Rights Amendment suffer 

from this same defect, in that they enumerate and target certain distinct rights covering 

distinct topics. For instance, the right to participate in parole proceedings is targeted at 

post-trial processes, whereas the right to refuse to participate in discovery is targeted at 

pretrial ones. Moreover, the right to privacy of the victim which the Victim’s Rights 

Amendment secures is much broader than the individual rights to participate in the 

aforementioned pretrial and post-trial processes. Thus, the League reasons that the 

Victim’s Rights Amendment, like the proposed amendment in Bergdoll, impermissibly 

affects two categories of rights – one specific, the right of participation, and one general, 

the right of privacy. Hence, it contends that the amendment fails to meet this

constitutional standard. 
[J-48-2021] - 27

Further, the League argues, each of the proposed new rights can stand 

independently of one another, thus, they should have been submitted as separate 

amendments. The League proffers that, for example, some voters may have wanted to 

allow a victim to participate in bail hearings, but may not have wanted to restrict the right 

of the accused to discovery. Consequently, the League reasons, each voter should have

been given the opportunity to vote separately on each of these constitutional changes. 

Turning to the question of whether the Victim’s Rights Amendment patently affects 

other provisions of the Constitution, the League emphasizes that this analysis cannot be 

restricted, as Appellants suggest, to a rote examination of whether a proposed 

amendment explicitly alters the language of other constitutional provisions. The League 

notes that, in Grimaud, we used the term “facially” in conjunction with the terms 

“substantively” and “patently,” and used the terms interchangeably. Id. at 20. Rather, the 

League contends this question turns on whether a proposed amendment “substantively 

affects” other provisions of the Constitution, requiring a consideration of the “content, 

purpose and effect” of a proposed amendment on those other provisions. Id. at 23. The 

League reasons that, had we intended in Grimaud to require an explicit textual change,

we would have simply said so, and would not have required a consideration of the 

substantive effect of the proposed changes on other constitutional provisions. 

The League also points out that Grimaud did not purport to overrule Bergdoll, 

which considered the substantive effect that the challenged amendment had in that case 

on our rulemaking power under Article V, and found that it constituted an “amendment” 

of that provision, even though the proposed amendment did not in any way alter the 

language and text of Article V. Id. at 21. The League posits that, if this were not the case, 

then the legislature could evade the requirement of Article XI, § 1 merely by taking care 

to craft an amendment that did not alter the text of other constitutional provisions, while
[J-48-2021] - 28

nevertheless effectuating wholesale changes to them in substance.

The League avers that the Victim’s Rights Amendment patently, i.e., substantively,

affects the following disparate constitutional provisions: (1) our Court’s exclusive 

rulemaking power under Article V § 10(c), given that the Victim’s Rights Amendment

would allow the General Assembly to establish procedures whereby victims could assert 

their rights under this amendment at various phases of court proceedings, such as bail, 

discovery, and the grant of pretrial release; (2) the right of the defendant to compulsory 

process secured by Article I, § 9, given that the Victim’s Rights Amendment would deprive 

an accused of the right to compel testimony or the production of documents in support of 

his defense when a victim asserts their right to not testify or to shield certain records; (3) 

the right to bail secured by Article I, § 14, as the Victim’s Rights Amendment would impose 

criteria beyond those currently provided for in that section for release on bail, such as 

providing the victim the right to participate in bail hearings and considering the wishes of 

the victim in setting bail; and (4) the Governor’s pardon powers under Article IV, § 9.

The League contends that these multiple substantive changes should have been 

presented to the voters individually, as Article XI, § 1 requires, so that they could have 

considered each of the changes separately. This, it argues, is in accordance with what 

the framers of that amendment intended: a clear, simple choice for voters when asked 

to amend their charter of governance, which they may exercise on careful reflection. This 

intent is not effectuated when, as here, the League asserts, the voter is forced to 

simultaneously consider multiple unrelated changes aggregated together.

20

 

20 In support of the League, amicus briefs were filed by the Juvenile Law Center, the 

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Pennsylvania Association of 

Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Pennsylvania News Media Association. 
[J-48-2021] - 29

III. Analysis

As we discussed above, under Grimaud’s subject matter test, a proposed 

constitutional amendment which makes multiple changes to our Constitution violates

Article XI, § 1 if those changes are not “sufficiently interrelated.” Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 

841-42, 845. We acknowledge, however, that we did not elaborate on the required 

degree of interrelationship between multiple changes made by a proposed amendment 

in order for it to comply with Article XI, § 1. As discussed at greater length infra, the cases 

from other jurisdictions enumerated in the footnote from Prison Society, which we adopted 

wholesale in Grimaud, reflect a divergence of views regarding the contours of the test to 

be employed to determine the requisite degree of interrelationship or interdependence. 

Moreover, the Grimaud court did not assess which of those states’ approaches to 

determining interrelatedness best effectuates the fundamental purpose of Article XI, § 1. 

Inasmuch as the parties in the present matter dispute the proper formulation and 

application of Grimaud’s subject matter test in analyzing the issue before us, we will begin 

by further explicating the parameters of this test.

A. Article XI, Section 1 and Interpretive Principles

We commence our analysis by reaffirming the bedrock principle that it is our 

Court’s duty under the Pennsylvania Constitution “to insure that the provisions of the 

Constitution establishing the procedure for the proposal and adoption of constitutional 

amendments are satisfied.” Prison Society, 776 A.2d at 977. Indeed, our “Constitution 

is the fundamental law of our Commonwealth, and in matters relating to alterations or 

changes in its provisions, the courts must exercise the most rigid care to preserve to the 

people the right assured to them by that instrument.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. 

Schnader v. Beamish, 164 A. 615, 616-17 (Pa. 1932) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Further, in analyzing issues involving alleged violations of Article XI, § 1, we are 
[J-48-2021] - 30

guided by the overarching principle that

the voters should be given free opportunity to modify the 

fundamental law as may seem to them fit, but this must be 

done in the way they themselves have provided, if stability, in 

the carrying on of government, is to be preserved. It is the 

duty of the courts to follow the rules fixed by the Constitution. 

If [these rules are] believed [by the people] to be unwise, in 

the provisions expressed, it should be rewritten, or modified, 

but as long as plain words are used, directing what shall be 

permitted, it is imperative on the courts to restrain any actions 

which are forbidden.

Id. at 978 (quoting Taylor v. King, 130 A. 407, 409–10 (Pa. 1925)).

Other than a constitutional convention, the only method by which our fundamental 

charter may be amended is that established by Article XI, § 1, which mandates a specific 

and detailed process that must be followed in order for an amendment to become a 

binding part of our organic law.21 Id. at 978. Our Court’s duty to ensure scrupulous 

adherence to the provisions of Article XI, § 1, is, therefore, of utmost importance as these 

provisions are indispensable for the stability of our peaceful, democratic system of 

governance. Id.; see also Gabbert v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Railway Co., 70 S.W. 891, 897 

(Mo. 1902) (“[T]he mode established by the constitution for its amendment must be 

followed; that it is a limitation upon the power of the legislature and people alike.”).

Article XI, § 1 provides, in relevant part:

§ 1. Proposal of amendments by the General Assembly 

and their adoption

Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the 

 

21

 The Pennsylvania Constitution establishes no formal procedure for the calling of a 

constitutional convention; however, our Court has reaffirmed the long-standing principle 

that “amendments to our prior and existing Constitution may be initiated by the calling of 

a Constitutional Convention, provided a majority of the electors vote in favor of such 

a call.” Stander, 250 A.2d at 478; accord in re: Angeles Roca First Judicial District 

Philadelphia County, 173 A.3d 1176, 1185 (Pa. 2017).
[J-48-2021] - 31

Senate or House of Representatives; and if the same shall be 

agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each 

House, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be 

entered on their journals with the yeas and nays taken 

thereon, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause 

the same to be published three months before the next 

general election, in at least two newspapers in every county 

in which such newspapers shall be published; and if, in the 

General Assembly next afterwards chosen, such proposed 

amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority 

of the members elected to each House, the Secretary of the 

Commonwealth shall cause the same again to be published 

in the manner aforesaid; and such proposed amendment or 

amendments shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the 

State in such manner, and at such time at least three months 

after being so agreed to by the two Houses, as the General 

Assembly shall prescribe; and, if such amendment or 

amendments shall be approved by a majority of those voting 

thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become a 

part of the Constitution; but no amendment or amendments 

shall be submitted oftener than once in five years. When two 

or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted 

upon separately.

* * *

Pa. Const. art. XI, § 1 (emphasis added).22 

 

22

 As discussed further herein, in 1967, the voters approved a proposed amendment 

adding present subsections a and b of Article XI, § 1 to allow the legislature, in the event 

of a “major emergency,” to propose amendments to our Constitution when the safety and 

welfare of the Commonwealth require such amendments. Although not at issue in this 

appeal, it is noteworthy that these provisions retain the requirement that, if two or more 

such emergency amendments are submitted to the electorate for a vote, they shall be 

voted on separately:

(a) In the event a major emergency threatens or is about to 

threaten the Commonwealth and if the safety or welfare of the 

Commonwealth requires prompt amendment of this 

Constitution such amendments to this Constitution may be 

proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives at any 

regular or special session of the General Assembly, and if 

agreed to by at least two-thirds of the members elected to 

each House, a proposed amendment shall be entered on the 

journal of each House with the yeas and nays taken thereon 

and the official in charge of statewide elections shall promptly 

publish such proposed amendment in at least two 
[J-48-2021] - 32

As discussed supra, the part of Article XI, § 1 at issue in this appeal is the above 

highlighted separate vote requirement, which commands that “two or more [proposed] 

amendments . . . shall be voted upon separately.” Id. In interpreting this provision, we 

are guided by the fundamental precept that “[t]he Constitution's language controls and 

must be interpreted in its popular sense, as understood by the people when they voted 

on its adoption.” League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 802 (Pa. 

2018) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

23

 Thus, “we must favor a natural 

reading which avoids contradictions and difficulties in implementation, which completely 

conforms to the intent of the framers and which reflects the views of the ratifying voter.” 

Id.

However, “[w]e must look not only to the letter of the words but also the spirit 

behind them.” Prison Society, 776 A.2d at 978 (quoting Beamish, 164 A. at 616). This is 

in furtherance of the important principle that:

Where multitudes are to be affected by the construction of an 

instrument, great regard should be paid to the spirit and 

intention. And the reason for it is an obvious one. A 

constitution is made, not particularly for the inspection of 

lawyers, but for the inspection of the million, that they may 

read and discern in it their rights and their duties; and it is 

consequently expressed in the terms that are most familiar to 

them.

 

newspapers in every county in which such newspapers are 

published. Such amendment shall then be submitted to the 

qualified electors of the Commonwealth in such manner, and 

at such time, at least one month after being agreed to by both 

Houses as the General Assembly prescribes. 

(b) If an emergency amendment is approved by a majority of 

the qualified electors voting thereon, it shall become part of 

this Constitution. When two or more emergency amendments 

are submitted they shall be voted on separately.

23

 Issues regarding an alleged violation of provisions of our Constitution are questions of 

law; hence, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Nextel 

v. Commonwealth, 171 A.3d 682, 689 n.9 (Pa. 2017).
[J-48-2021] - 33

Id.

Accordingly, to discern the intent of the framers of a constitutional provision and 

that of the people of the Commonwealth who approved it, we must examine the historical 

circumstances which gave rise to the constitutional provision in question. League of

Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d at 803. We may also consider “any relevant 

decisional law and policy considerations argued by the parties, and any extrajurisdictional case law from states that have identical or similar provisions, which may be 

helpful and persuasive.” Id.

B. Historical Background

With these principles in mind, we begin by examining the historical motivations of 

the framers of our Constitution in adding a “separate vote” requirement for constitutional 

amendments during the 1837-1838 Constitutional Convention. Prior to that convention, 

the Constitution, as originally adopted by Pennsylvania’s then-colonial government in 

1776, provided a very limited means for changing its provisions – only a 2/3 vote of a 

body known as the “Council of Censors” could call a convention for such a purpose. Pa. 

Const. ch. II, § 47 (1776). However, the Council met at only seven-year intervals, and it 

did not fairly represent the population of the Commonwealth as a whole, given that its 

members were allocated to each of the Commonwealth’s cities and counties equally, 

irrespective of their comparative populations. Id.

Such an amendment process was never successfully employed. A constitutional 

convention was called in 1790 by a vote of the General Assembly; however, that 

convention abolished the Council of Censors, while providing no alternate means of 

amendment. Kenneth Gormley et al., The Pennsylvania Constitution — A Treatise on 

Rights and Liberties 850 (1

st ed. 2004) (hereinafter, “Gormley”). The delegates to the 

1790 convention, nevertheless, strengthened the language in the Constitution’s 
[J-48-2021] - 34

Declaration of Rights to firmly establish the people’s sovereignty in choosing the manner 

in which they would be governed, declaring that:

all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments 

are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, 

safety and happiness; for the advancement of those ends, 

they have, at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right

to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as 

they may think proper.

Pa. Const. art. IX, § 2 (1790). 

Thus, the principle that the people have the inviolable right to make the ultimate 

choice on whether their Constitution will be changed was firmly enshrined in our organic 

charter of governance. This tenet remains a bedrock principle of our present-day 

constitution, which likewise affirms: 

All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments 

are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, 

safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends 

they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right 

to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as 

they may think proper.

Pa. Const. art. I, § 2.

Ironically, however, despite this declaration of popular sovereignty over matters of 

constitutional change, the 1790 constitution was never submitted to the people for a vote. 

Gormley at 850. Rather, it was first approved by vote of the delegates to the 1790 

convention on February 6, 1790. Pennsylvania Constitution, Official Website of the 

Pennsylvania General Assembly, available at 

https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/constitution.cfm. Thereafter, the convention 

recessed in order to let the people discuss it amongst themselves; however, there was 

no formal process for the people to indicate whether they approved or disapproved of it. 

Nearly seven months later, on September 2, 1790, the convention reconvened, and the 

constitution was formally adopted when 63 of the 69 delegates signed it, after which they 
[J-48-2021] - 35

adjourned. Id.

Subsequently, there was popular clamor for reform of that charter, motivated by 

concern over issues such as the scope of the governor’s appointment powers, and for the 

right to elect judges. Rosalind L. Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development 21 

(1960) (hereinafter, “Branning”). From 1810 to 1831, the legislature was “flooded” with 

petitions demanding a new constitutional convention. Id. at 21-22. Although the 

legislature assented in a limited capacity during its 1824-25 session, the referendum it 

presented to the voters calling for a convention was rejected by them because the 

referendum provided no mechanism for the people to approve any constitutional changes 

which the convention might propose. Id. at 22. Finally, however, in 1835, in response to 

continuing public pressure, the legislature submitted a referendum to the voters for a 

convention which required that any amendments proposed by the convention must be 

ratified by the voters. 

This convention assembled on May 2, 1837, and it worked for nearly seven months 

to make fundamental changes to the 1790 Constitution. The convention delegates 

divided into nine committees, each tasked with studying and preparing a report on a 

particular provision of the Constitution, one of which was the means and methods by 

which the Constitution could be amended. Id. at 23. 

When that committee finished its work, its report suggesting the adoption of a new 

article governing the amendment process sparked vigorous debate, because the 

committee had decided that the legislature, and not the people, would control the process 

of proposing amendments. This proposal conflicted with the perceived exclusive right of 

the people to change their charter of governance, as it transferred a key aspect of that 

procedure – the initiation and proposal of fundamental changes to the constitution – to 

the General Assembly. Many delegates were concerned this devolution of this power to 
[J-48-2021] - 36

the General Assembly would dilute the people’s fundamental right to decide whether, or 

how, their Constitution should be changed. See 12 Proceedings and Debates of the 

Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, To Propose Amendments to the 

Constitution, Commenced at Harrisburg on May 2, 1837, 78-84, 228-35, 307-11 (1837)

(hereinafter “Proceedings and Debates”).

The delegates’ spirited debates reflected their intent to address these concerns, 

and, ultimately, they achieved a compromise by adopting a number of provisions 

designed to constrain the legislature’s ability to propose amendments, and, at the same 

time, preserve the people’s right to make the final decision as to whether any 

amendments proposed by the legislature would become effective. Gormley at 852. 

These provisions required: all proposed amendments be approved by two successive 

sessions of the General Assembly, which ensured that the people had the opportunity to 

express their wishes on whether they desired the passage of the proposed amendments 

in an election for their representatives; a majority of the people to approve, through 

election, any proposed amendment passed by the General Assembly; and a five-year 

limitation on how often the legislature could submit proposed amendments. Branning at 

31. 

Consistent with these restrictions, and evidencing an intent on the part of the 

delegates to ensure that each person voting on a proposed constitutional amendment be 

given the opportunity to fully understand the nature of the change or changes to the 

constitution it would produce, the delegates considered, and adopted, with no debate, the 

separate vote requirement. 12 Proceedings and Debates at 101. The purpose of this 

provision, as articulated by its author, John J. M’Cahen, a delegate from Philadelphia, 

and memorialized in the written proceedings of the convention, was to “prevent the 

legislature from connecting two dissimilar amendments, one of which might be good and 
[J-48-2021] - 37

the other evil, and in consequence of which connexion [sic] the good which was wanted, 

might be rejected by the people rather than be taken with the evil which accompanied it.” 

Id. No delegate offered opposition to this stated purpose, nor to its form or intended 

effect, and this proposed language was adopted by majority vote of the assembled 

delegates.

Thus, it is evident that the approval of M’Cahen’s proposal by the delegates at the 

1837-1838 Constitutional Convention reflected their intent to prohibit the practice of 

“logrolling” by the legislature in the crafting of a proposed amendment to be submitted to 

the voters. See generally Cambria v. Soaries, 776 A.2d 754, 764 (N.J. 2001) (describing 

logrolling of proposed constitutional amendments as the “practice of combining unrelated 

popular and unpopular proposals because voters will support the entire proposal in order 

to secure the passage of the part they favor”); see also Kerby v. Luhrs, 36 P.2d 549, 552 

(Ariz. 1934) (“Two propositions cannot be united in the submission so as to have one 

expression of the vote answer both propositions, as voters might be thereby induced to 

vote for both propositions who would not have done so if the questions had been 

submitted singly.”). 

As the Supreme Court of Arizona cogently recognized in Kerby, logrolling is 

particularly “pernicious” when employed in the submission of proposed amendments to 

the electorate, inasmuch as a constitutional amendment has far-reaching consequences. 

Id. at 551. Indeed, unlike conventional legislation, undesired consequences of an 

amendment cannot be easily rectified by the people, as an amendment cannot simply be 

repealed by the legislature; instead, problematic amendments must be addressed by the 

adoption of a subsequent amendment, a lengthier process. 

Further, and most importantly, the court in Kerby observed that logrolling in the 

passage of constitutional amendments has been disfavored by courts because it 
[J-48-2021] - 38

constrains the ability of the electors to make a “free and mature judgment”, as it is 

impossible for voters to express assent only to the provisions which they favor, and reject 

those which they disapprove. Id. at 554; accord Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 449 

A.2d 1144, 1153 (Md. 1982); see also Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 849 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting) 

(“[T]he focal point of Article XI, Section 1 clearly is to grant the voter the greatest freedom 

to decide upon amendments to our fundamental law.”). 

The separate vote requirement, along with other precise standards to be followed 

in the amendment process, once ratified by the delegates to the 1837-1838 Constitutional 

Convention, was submitted to the voters on October 9, 1838. The text of the proposed 

amendment presented to the voters in that election provided:

Amendments how made.

Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be 

proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and if 

the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members 

elected to each House, such proposed amendment or 

amendments shall be entered on their journals, with the yeas 

and nays taken thereon; and the Secretary of the 

Commonwealth shall cause the same to be published three

months before the next election, in at least one newspaper in 

every county in which a newspaper shall be published; and if, 

in the Legislature next afterwards chosen, such proposed 

amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority 

of the members elected to each House, the Secretary of the 

Commonwealth shall cause the same again to be published 

in manner aforesaid; and such proposed amendment or 

amendments shall be submitted to the people in such manner, 

and at such time, at least three months after being so agreed 

to by the two Houses, as the Legislature shall prescribe; and 

if the people shall approve and ratify such amendment or 

amendments by a majority of the qualified voters of this State 

voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall 

become a part of the Constitution; but no amendment or 

amendments shall be submitted to the people oftener than 

once in five years: Provided, That if more than one 

amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in such 

manner and form that the people may vote for or against each 

amendment separately and distinctly.
[J-48-2021] - 39

Pa Const. art. X, § 1 (1838) (emphasis added).24 The amendment was approved by the 

voters in that election, and it became Article X, § 1 of the 1838 Constitution. 

This constitutional provision was moved to Article XVIII, § 1 in the 1874 

Constitution, which, as approved by the voters of the Commonwealth, maintained all of 

the restrictions from the 1838 amendment on the manner in which the legislature can 

propose new amendments, but also doubled the publication requirement for proposed 

amendments from one to two newspapers for each county, and changed the requirement 

“[t]hat if more than one amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner 

and form that the people may vote for or against each amendment separately and 

distinctly,” Pa. Const. art. X, § 1 (1838-1874) (emphasis added), to its present 

requirement that “[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted 

upon separately.” Pa. Const. XVIII, § 1 (1874-1967) (emphasis added).

25

 Its language 

 

24

 The voters in this election were also presented with a copy of the original 1790 

Constitution. See Dr. Roy Akagi, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838 at 331; The 

Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1924). This enabled 

the voter to compare the text of the proposed amendment with the text of the extant 1790 

charter.

25

 At that time, this constitutional provision read, in full:

Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be 

proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and, if 

the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members 

elected to each House, such proposed amendment or 

amendments shall be entered on their journals with the yeas 

and nays taken thereon, and the Secretary of the 

Commonwealth shall cause the same to be published, three 

months before the next general election, in at least two 

newspapers in every county in which such newspapers shall 

be published; and if, in the General Assembly next afterwards 

chosen, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be 

agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each 

House, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the 

same again to be published in the manner aforesaid; and such 

proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted to 
[J-48-2021] - 40

was unaltered for the next 93 years. 

In 1967 – a watershed year for constitutional change in Pennsylvania – the General 

Assembly considered a number of proposed revisions to our Constitution, and ultimately 

passed legislation authorizing the calling for a constitutional convention to conduct an indepth consideration of some of them. These included: making fundamental changes to 

the manner in which the then-extant constitution governed legislative apportionment, 

judicial administration, the organization of local governments, taxation, and any 

amendment “proposed but not approved at the May 1967 primary.” Act of Mar. 15, 1967, 

P.L. 2, No. 2, § 7. 

One of the amendments which was proposed by the General Assembly during 

1967, and approved by the voters of the Commonwealth in the May primary of that year, 

is the current version of Article XI, § 1, in which the language of the main section of Article 

XI, § 1 was changed from “amendments or amendment” to simply “amendment.” The 

most important change, as noted previously, see supra note 22, was the addition of 

present paragraphs a and b of Article XI, providing for an accelerated procedure to amend 

the Constitution in the event a “major emergency threatens or is about to threaten the 

Commonwealth, and if the safety or welfare of the Commonwealth requires prompt 

amendment of this Constitution.” Pa. Const. art. XI, § 1(a). Notably, these provisions 

also require that, whenever more than one emergency amendment is presented to the 

 

the qualified electors of the State in such manner, and at such 

time at least three months after being so agreed to by the two 

Houses, as the General Assembly shall prescribe; and, if such 

amendment or amendments shall be approved by a majority 

of those voting thereon, such amendment or amendments 

shall become a part of the Constitution; but no amendment or 

amendments shall be submitted oftener than once in five 

years. When two or more amendments shall be submitted 

they shall be voted upon separately.

Pa. Const. art. XVIII, § 1 (1874-1967).
[J-48-2021] - 41

voters for approval, the voters must vote on them “separately.” Id. § 1(b). 

A review of the floor debates surrounding the passage of this amendment in the 

General Assembly reveals that the principal point of contention between those who 

supported its passage and those who opposed it was whether the provisions of the 

existing Constitution were adequate for our Commonwealth’s government to mount an 

effective response in the event of a catastrophic event like a nuclear war or natural 

disaster. See Legislative Journal, Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 84-88 (Jan. 

30, 1967). However, at no time during these debates did any legislator indicate an intent 

to relax the separate vote requirement established in 1838 and continued in the 1874 

Constitution. See id. Indeed, we find it significant that the General Assembly, when 

considering the necessity of emergency amendment procedures to address sudden and 

severe existential calamities such as nuclear attack, nonetheless deemed the separate 

vote requirement to be of such importance that they included it as a requirement even for 

the adoption of a proposed emergency amendment. Critically, the voters signified their 

assent by approving these provisions. 

We consider these developments to be a strong indication of the continuing 

essential importance of the separate vote requirement in our Commonwealth’s 

constitutional amendment process. Consequently, we interpret and apply this 

requirement consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1838 Constitution: to prevent 

the pernicious practice of logrolling.

C. Caselaw

In delineating the parameters of our subject matter test which best effectuates this 

overarching purpose of Article XI, § 1 to prevent logrolling, we also find it instructive to 

briefly examine formulations of that test utilized by the high courts of our sister states for 

enforcement of provisions of their constitutions, which are the same as, or substantially 
[J-48-2021] - 42

similar to, Article XI, § 1 in requiring that more than one proposed amendment be 

presented separately to their voters.26 Of greatest relevance, in our view, are the tests 

employed by the high courts of 14 of those states which have specifically identified the 

prevention of the practice of logrolling as a primary purpose for their constitutions’ 

separate vote requirements.27 28 These tests are by no means uniform. 

The tests utilized by the high courts in four of those states employ a loose and 

deferential standard, which examines whether the various provisions of a proposed 

amendment make changes to the constitutions of those states that are reasonably 

related, or germane, to a common theme or subject, but they do not require that the 

provisions function in an interrelated manner to achieve that common purpose. See

Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson, 134 P.3d 299, 327 (Cal. 2006) (requiring 

“only a showing that the challenged provisions are reasonably germane to a common 

 

26

 By our count, at present, there are 27 states with such “separate vote” requirements 

in their constitutions. See Arizona Const. art. 21, § 1; Arkansas Const. art. 19, § 22; 

California Const. art. 18, § 1; Colorado Const. art. 19, § 2; Georgia Const. art. 10, § 1, 

Idaho Const. art. 20, § 2; Indiana Const. art. 16, § 2; Iowa Const. art. 10, § 2; Kansas

Const. art. 14, § 1; Kentucky Const. § 256; Louisiana Const. art. 13, § 1; Maryland Const. 

art. 14, § 1; Minn. Const. art. 9, § 1; Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273; Missouri Const. art. 12, 

§ 2(b); Mont. Const. art. 14, § XI; Nebraska Const. art. 16, § 1; New Jersey Const. art. 9, 

§ 5; New Mexico Const. art. 19, § 1; Ohio Const. art. 16, § 1; Oklahoma Const. art. 24, § 

1; Oregon Const. art. 17, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 3; Washington Const. art. 23, § 1; 

West Virginia Const. art. 14, § 2; Wisconsin Const. art. 12, § 1; and Wyoming Const. art.

20, § 2.

27

 These are Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, 

Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington.

28 As explained previously, see supra note 10, because Utah amended its constitution in 

1969 to remove the separate vote requirement from its constitution, we do not include the 

case of Lee v. State, 367 P.2d 861 (Utah 1962) in this discussion, as it no longer has any 

viability for comparison purposes. Likewise, as we highlighted previously, see supra note 

12, Florida’s Constitution contains no requirement that when two or more amendments 

are proposed by the legislature they must be voted on separately; thus, the case from the 

Florida Supreme Court cited in our Grimaud decision, Fine, supra, will not be included in 

this survey, as it has no relevance.
[J-48-2021] - 43

theme, purpose or subject,” but expressly rejecting a requirement of an additional 

“showing of ‘close’ or ‘functional’ relatedness”); Fugina, supra (Minnesota) 

(“[P]ropositions that might be submitted separately may be submitted in a single proposal 

if they are rationally related to a single purpose, plan, or subject.”); Fulton County v. City 

of Atlanta, 825 S.E.2d 142, 146 (Ga. 2019) (“courts to determine whether all of the parts

. . . of the constitutional amendment are germane to the accomplishment of a single 

objective” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 836 

N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ohio 2005) (“[A] proposal consists of one amendment to the 

Constitution only so long as each of its subjects bears some reasonable relationship to a 

single general object or purpose.” (emphasis original)).

Ten of the remaining 14 states, however, require interdependence between the 

constitutional changes various provisions of a proposed amendment would make in order 

for it to comply with their constitutions’ separate vote requirement. The genesis for this

requirement was the seminal case of Kerby, supra, in which the Arizona Supreme Court 

explained how this requirement was to be applied in examining the provisions of a 

proposed constitutional amendment, as well as the vital role of this requirement in 

safeguarding its electorate against logrolling:

If the different changes contained in the proposed amendment 

all cover matters necessary to be dealt with in some manner, 

in order that the Constitution, as amended, shall constitute a 

consistent and workable whole on the general topic embraced 

in that part which is amended, and if, logically speaking, they 

should stand or fall as a whole, then there is but one 

amendment submitted. But, if any one of the propositions, 

although not directly contradicting the others, does not refer 

to such matters, or if it is not such that the voter supporting it 

would reasonably be expected to support the principle of the 

others, then there are in reality two or more amendments to 

be submitted, and the proposed amendment falls within the 

constitutional prohibition.
[J-48-2021] - 44

Kerby, 36 P.2d at 554. The court deemed this requirement necessary to ensure that the 

decision of the voters on the proposed amendment would truly be the result of their “free 

and mature judgment” by ensuring they are not “constrained to adopt measures of which 

in reality they disapprove, in order to secure the enactment of others they earnestly 

desire.” Id.

The Arizona Supreme Court continues to examine the interrelatedness of various 

provisions of proposed constitutional amendments in order to determine their compliance 

with the separate vote requirement of its constitution, albeit with some slight enhancement 

of the Kerby test. For example, in McLaughlin v. Bennett, 238 P.3d 619 (Ariz. 2010), the 

court reiterated that it continues to “examine whether provisions of a proposed 

amendment are sufficiently related to a common purpose or principle that the proposal 

can be said to ‘constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic 

embraced,’ that, ‘logically speaking . . . should stand or fall as a whole.’” Id. at 622. 

However, the court also highlighted four specific factors it now considers in determining 

whether the provisions of a particular amendment are “sufficiently interrelated” so as to 

“form a consistent and workable proposition”:

whether various provisions are facially related, whether all the 

matters addressed by [the proposition] concern a single 

section of the constitution, whether the voters or the legislature 

historically has treated the matters addressed as one subject, 

and whether the various provisions are qualitatively similar in 

their effect on either procedural or substantive law.

Id. 

In addition to Arizona, nine states apply similar tests which are based on the 

interdependence requirement set forth in Kerby. These states require that, in order for a 

proposed amendment to comply with the separate vote requirements of their respective 

constitutions, all of the proposed changes must be both connected to each other and 
[J-48-2021] - 45

dependent on each other, such that the changes, if implemented, will function as part of 

an integrated whole. See Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 449 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Md. 

1982) (requiring that the proposed changes must be “functionally interrelated,” and their 

connection and interdependence must be such that they “constitute a consistent and 

workable whole.”); State ex rel. Clark v. State Canvassing Board, 888 P.2d 458, 462 (N.M. 

1995) (“[I]n order to constitute a single proposition or question there must exist a natural 

relationship between the objects covered by the ballot so that they form but one rounded 

whole or single plan” – characterizing this required connection as a “rational linchpin of 

interdependence.”); State ex rel. Board of Fund Commissioners v. Holman, 296 S.W.2d 

482, 488 (Mo. 1956) (requiring that the changes be “so related that, united, they form in 

fact but one rounded whole,” in order to be submitted to the voter as one proposition); 

Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 982 P.2d 358, 363 (Id. 

1999) (determining whether each change is “controlled, modified or qualified” by the other 

changes, and, if “the matters are ‘incongruous and essentially unrelated’” such that they 

“do not in any way depend upon one another,” then the amendment does not meet the 

separate vote requirement (citation omitted)); Ferris v. Munro, 662 P.2d 821, 825 (Wash. 

1983) (separate vote requirement is violated if the proposition submitted to the voters 

relates to “more than one subject, and [has] at least two distinct and separate purposes 

not dependent upon or connected with each other”); Loontjer v. Gale, 853 N.W.2d 494, 

513 (Neb. 2014) (requiring elements of a proposed constitutional amendment to have a 

“natural and necessary connection with each other and together [be] part of one general 

subject.” (emphasis deleted)).

The high courts of New Jersey, Oregon and Montana, also follow the principles of 

Kerby in requiring interdependence between constitutional changes in a proposed 

amendment, based on their respective conclusions that such a test best effectuates the 
[J-48-2021] - 46

intent of the framers of their states’ constitutions to protect voters from logrolling. In 

addition, these states also specifically require a close degree of interrelatedness between 

any constitutional changes a proposed amendment would effectuate. See Cambria,

supra (New Jersey) (“Put simply, to meet the separate vote requirement of the New 

Jersey Constitution, any proposed amendment must not make two or more changes to 

the constitution unless they are closely related to one another.”); Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 

959 P.2d 49, 64 (Or. 1998) (“[T]he proper inquiry is to determine whether, if adopted, the 

proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution that are substantive and 

that are not closely related. If the proposal would effect two or more changes that are 

substantive and not closely related, the proposal violates the separate-vote requirement 

of [the Oregon Constitution], because it would prevent the voters from expressing their 

opinions as to each proposed change separately.”); Montana Association of Counties v. 

State by & through Fox, 404 P.3d 733, 742 (Mont. 2017) (“[T]he proper inquiry is whether, 

if adopted, the proposal would make two or more changes to the Constitution that are 

substantive and not closely related.”). 

D. Governing Test

As discussed above, Grimaud’s subject matter test requires a court asked to

determine whether a proposed constitutional amendment violates Article XI, § 1 to 

examine whether the proposed amendment makes multiple changes to the Constitution, 

and, if so, whether those changes “are sufficiently interrelated to justify their presentation 

to the electorate in a single question.” Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 841-42. This is the principal 

inquiry. Grimaud also indicates, however, that a proposed constitutional amendment may 

nevertheless violate Article XI, § 1 if it effectuates more than one substantive change. Id.
[J-48-2021] - 47

at 845.

29

 

29 While we held in Grimaud that a proposed amendment which makes only one 

substantive change to the Constitution did not trigger the separate vote requirement, we 

emphasize that a determination of whether there is, in actuality, only one substantive 

change rests on a careful examination of the practical effects the proposed change will 

have on existing constitutional provisions. Therefore, the fact that a proposed 

amendment textually appears to make only one change to Constitution is not dispositive; 

rather, the question is whether the practical impact of the single proposed change, in 

actuality, affects multiple constitutional provisions. For example, a proposed amendment 

that repealed Article I of the Constitution would unquestionably have multiple substantive 

effects by, in essence, repealing each of the various amendments contained within that 

article.

It is for this reason that we reject the argument of Appellees, which has been 

embraced by the dissent. See Dissenting Opinion (Mundy, J.), at 7-8. The dissent

interprets our statement in Grimaud that changes to the Constitution made by a proposed 

amendment must “facially” or “patently” change other portions of the Constitution,

Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 842, 845, as requiring that, in order for a proposed amendment to 

have a substantive effect on existing provisions of the Constitution, it must facially change

the actual text of those provisions, or specifically refer to them. Amendments which 

expressly add text to, delete text from, or modify the language of existing provisions of 

the Constitution do, of course, substantively affect those provisions. However, this is not 

the only way a proposed amendment may make substantive changes to constitutional 

provisions. As the high court of Montana cogently observed in rejecting a similar 

interpretation of the single vote requirement of its constitution, “our reasoning would be 

fundamentally flawed if we limited the separate-vote requirement to only those 

multifarious amendments which expressly refer to other constitutional provisions. Such 

an interpretation would allow the separate-vote requirement to be easily undermined by 

simple drafting techniques.” Montana Association of Counties, 404 P.3d at 741. 

The constitutional right of the voters secured by Article XI, § 1 – to be protected 

from logrolling in voting on constitutional changes – is, as we have established, 

fundamental; consequently, in determining whether this right has been denied, “we must 

look at the substance of things rather than mere form.” Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v.

Patterson, 187 A.2d 278, 279 (Pa. 1963). In accordance with this principle, Grimaud 

indicated that the dispositive consideration in this determination is whether the changes 

to other constitutional provisions made by a proposed amendment are “substantive” or

“substantial.” Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 842, 845. Thus, Grimaud’s use of the terminology 

“facially affect” or “patently affects,” id., must be understood as requiring that the 

substantive changes be facially or patently apparent, i.e., readily discernable from an 

examination of the language of the proposed amendment and the text of the existing 

Constitution. This requirement ensures that reviewing courts consider the proposed 

amendment from the perspective of the voter. 

Thus, in determining whether a proposed amendment would make substantive 

changes to the Constitution, a reviewing court must assess whether the amendment, if 

implemented, would materially alter the manner in which an existing constitutional 
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Regarding Grimaud’s principal inquiry – assessing whether the multiple changes 

to the Constitution, either in the form of entirely new provisions or the alteration of existing 

provisions, are sufficiently interrelated – we will follow the lead of Arizona and the majority 

of our sister jurisdictions in requiring that such multiple changes be interdependent, or as 

the Maryland high Court termed it in Andrews, “functionally interrelated.” Andrews, 449 

A.2d at 1150. Thus, each change to our Constitution contained in a proposed amendment 

must, when viewed together, form an interlocking package necessary to accomplish one 

overarching objective, such that the amendment “stand[s] or fall[s] as a whole.” Kerby, 

36 P.2d at 554. If any of the multiple changes in a proposed amendment are independent 

of the others, and could stand alone, then Article XI, § 1 requires that they be presented 

separately to the voters so that they may individually vote on those changes. 

We conclude that this “functionally interrelated” standard best effectuates the 

paramount objective of the framers of Article XI, § 1, and the voters of this Commonwealth 

who ratified it, to protect the voters’ fundamental right to make a “free and mature 

judgment” in making the momentous decision as to whether to alter their Constitution. Id.

It safeguards against the pernicious practice of logrolling, which the framers deliberately 

sought to thwart, because it enables voters to make a genuinely free and deliberative 

evaluation of each change a proposed amendment will make to their Constitution, 

ensuring that they are able to fully perceive, and therefore fully evaluate, how those 

 

provision functions. This would include, for example, examining: whether the proposed 

amendment will materially alter rights which are secured by an existing provision, such 

as by expanding, contracting, or qualifying such rights; whether the proposed amendment 

will materially alter existing constitutionally-mandated procedures for the protection or 

exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights; or whether the proposed amendment will 

materially alter the powers or duties of the coequal branches of our Commonwealth’s 

government in the administration of procedures which impact constitutional rights.
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changes would operate, together, to alter the overall form and operation of the 

government under which they will live thereafter. 

We also consider this assessment to afford sufficient flexibility in the development 

of our Constitution in a positive manner, inasmuch as it ensures voters have the ability to 

readily discern, understand, and approve proposed amendments which they adjudge will 

make our Constitution and system of government better function to promote and advance 

their general welfare; this requirement also ensures that the voters can readily identify 

and reject proposed amendments which they conclude are detrimental to those 

objectives. It, thus, secures to voters their sacrosanct right to fully and accurately express 

their personal preferences on these vital matters of governance.

Accordingly, in sum, we hold that the subject matter test of Article XI, § 1 requires 

a court, when reviewing a challenge to a proposed amendment making multiple changes 

to our Constitution – either through the addition of new provisions to our organic charter, 

or through the alteration of its existing provisions – to examine whether these changes 

function in an interrelated fashion to accomplish one singular objective, which means that 

it must determine whether the changes depend on one another for the fulfillment of that 

objective. If the changes the proposed amendment would make do not have this requisite 

interrelationship, the proposed amendment must be stricken as violative of the clear 

mandates of Article XI, § 1.

E. Application

Having set forth the governing test, we now apply it to the amendment at issue 

here, the proposed Victim’s Rights Amendment. We requote the amendment in full: 

§ 9.1. Rights of victims of crime.

(a) To secure for victims justice and due process 

throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim 

shall have the following rights, as further provided and as 

defined by the General Assembly, which shall be protected in 
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a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded to the 

accused: to be treated with fairness and respect for the 

victim’s safety, dignity and privacy; to have the safety of the 

victim and the victim’s family considered in fixing the amount 

of bail and release conditions for the accused; to reasonable 

and timely notice of and to be present at all public proceedings 

involving the criminal or delinquent conduct; to be notified of 

any pretrial disposition of the case; with the exception of grand 

jury proceedings, to be heard in any proceeding where a right 

of the victim is implicated, including, but not limited to, release, 

plea, sentencing, disposition, parole and pardon; to be notified 

of all parole procedures, to participate in the parole process, 

to provide information to be considered before the parole of 

the offender, and to be notified of the parole of the offender; 

to reasonable protection from the accused or any person 

acting on behalf of the accused; to reasonable notice of any 

release or escape of the accused; to refuse an interview, 

deposition or other discovery request made by the accused or 

any person acting on behalf of the accused; full and timely 

restitution from the person or entity convicted for the unlawful 

conduct; full and timely restitution as determined by the court 

in a juvenile delinquency proceeding; to the prompt return of 

property when no longer needed as evidence; to proceedings 

free from unreasonable delay and a prompt and final 

conclusion of the case and any related postconviction 

proceedings; to confer with the attorney for the government; 

and to be informed of all rights enumerated in this section.

(b) The victim or the attorney for the government upon 

request of the victim may assert in any trial or appellate court, 

or before any other authority, with jurisdiction over the case, 

and have enforced, the rights enumerated in this section and 

any other right afforded to the victim by law. This section does 

not grant the victim party status or create any cause of action 

for compensation or damages against the Commonwealth or 

any political subdivision, nor any officer, employee or agent of 

the Commonwealth or any political subdivision, or any officer 

or employee of the court. 

(c) As used in this section and as further defined by 

the General Assembly, the term “victim” includes any person 

against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is

committed or who is directly harmed by the commission of the 

offense or act. The term “victim” does not include the accused 

or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best 
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interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor or incapacitated 

victim. 

Joint Resolution 2019-1.

Patently, this proposed amendment adds numerous new and broad constitutional 

rights for victims to the Pennsylvania Constitution, which anyone meeting the 

Amendment’s expansive definition of victim “may assert in any trial or appellate court, or 

before any other authority with jurisdiction over the case.”30 Id. Some of these rights

include the right to:

o to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety;

o to have the safety of the victim and the victim’s family considered 

in fixing bail and release conditions;

o to notice of and to be present at all public proceedings for the 

defendant or delinquent;

o to be notified of any pretrial disposition;

o to be heard in any proceeding implicating a victim’s right,

including release, plea, sentencing, disposition, parole, and 

pardon;

o to participate in the parole process;

o to be notified of the parole of the offender; 

o to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting 

on behalf of the accused;

o to reasonable notice of any release or escape of the accused;

o to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by 

the accused;

o to full and timely restitution and the return of property;

 

30

 The amendment defines a victim as “any person against whom the criminal offense or 

delinquent act is committed or who is directly harmed by the commission of the offense.” 

Joint Resolution 2019-1.
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o to proceedings free from unreasonable delay;

o to a prompt and final conclusion of the case and any 

postconviction proceedings; and

o to confer with the attorney for the government.

In our view, it is manifest that these separate new rights are not dependent on 

each other to be effective. To cite but a few examples, the right of a victim to restitution 

does not depend on the right of the victim to be informed of, and to participate in, parole 

proceedings. The right of a victim to be treated with respect for his or her privacy does 

not depend on the right of a victim to be heard in proceedings involving release, plea, 

sentencing, disposition, parole and pardon. The right of a victim to proceedings free from 

unreasonable delay does not depend on the right of the victim to refuse a pretrial 

discovery request, or the right to be notified of the escape of an accused. Many or all of 

these newly enumerated rights are independent of the others, and could operate 

independently. In short, they are not functionally interrelated. Indeed, we can easily 

envision a voter supporting one or more of these rights without approving of all of them. 

Consequently, Article XI, § 1 required the voters to have been given the opportunity to 

vote separately on each of them.

While that concludes our inquiry, regarding Grimaud’s proviso that a proposed 

constitutional amendment may nevertheless violate Article XI, § 1 if it effectuates more 

than one substantive change to the Constitution, we note that the Victim’s Rights 

Amendment fails that test as well, as it substantively alters the manner in which a wide 

variety of existing constitutional provisions function. Three of the more significant 

changes illustrate the point. These newly conferred victim’s rights, which the Amendment 

specifically provides “shall be protected in a manner no less vigorous than the rights 

afforded to the accused,” Joint Resolution 2019-1, would alter the following provisions of 
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our charter: the right of an accused to bail under Article I, § 14; the exclusive grant to our 

Court of the power to create rules of procedure within the courts of this Commonwealth 

under Article V, § 10(c); and the power of the Governor to issue pardons under Article IV, 

§ 9.

With respect to the change the proposed Victim’s Rights Amendment makes to the 

right of an accused to bail, Article I, § 14 currently specifies:

All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for 

capital offenses or for offenses for which the maximum 

sentence is life imprisonment or unless no condition or 

combination of conditions other than imprisonment will 

reasonably assure the safety of any person and the 

community when the proof is evident or presumption great.

Pa. Const. art. I, § 14. Notably, the amendment imposes the following additional condition 

on the granting of bail: that a victim of a crime has the right to “have the safety of the 

victim and the victim’s family considered in fixing the amount of bail and release conditions 

for the accused.” Joint Resolution 2019-1. We find that this additional condition 

substantively alters the manner in which Article I, § 14 governs the bail process. At 

present, an individual accused of a crime (except for individuals falling within the 

enumerated exceptions) is entitled to “be bailable by sufficient sureties,” and a court of 

this Commonwealth determines the amount of surety required to secure the presence of 

an accused at trial. However, under the proposed Victim’s Rights Amendment, a court, 

when imposing bail, would also need to determine whether the amount of bail chosen will 

be sufficient to secure the safety of the victim and the victim's family. Moreover, the 

Victim’s Rights Amendment authorizes a court, when setting bail, to impose additional

“release conditions” beyond merely requiring cash security. We deem these to be 

substantive changes to the bail process established by Article I, § 14.

Next, with respect to the changes the proposed Victim’s Rights Amendment makes 

to our Court’s exclusive authority to promulgate rules of procedure for the courts of this 
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Commonwealth under Article V, § 10(c),31 the amendment grants to the General 

Assembly the express power to “further provide” and “define” victim’s rights. Joint 

Resolution 2019-1. Those enumerated rights include the right to participate in court 

proceedings in criminal matters and the manner in which such participation would occur. 

Clearly then, this provision would substantively alter this Court’s power under Article V, § 

10(c), and would grant the legislature the authority to supplant our existing rules 

governing court proceedings, insofar as they pertain to proceedings involving victims. 

Finally, we address how the Victim’s Rights Amendment would substantively alter 

Article IV, § 9, which delineates the Governor’s pardon power.32 Presently, under this 

provision, except for criminal offenses in which a penalty of death or life imprisonment is 

imposed, the Governor may grant a pardon upon the written recommendation of a 

majority of the Board of Pardons. However, the Victim’s Rights Amendment confers on 

any individual who meets its definition of victim, which, as discussed above, includes 

anyone who has been “directly harmed” by a crime, a right “to be heard in any proceeding” 

including pardon proceedings. Joint Resolution 2019-1. Thus, under the Victim’s Rights 

Amendment, the Governor would be prohibited from exercising his pardon power until 

 

31 We have quoted the text of Article V, § 10(c) in full above. See supra note 9. 

32 Article IV, § 9(a) provides, in relevant part:

In all criminal cases except impeachment the Governor shall 

have power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, 

commutation of sentences and pardons; but no pardon shall 

be granted, nor sentence commuted, except on the 

recommendation in writing of a majority of the Board of 

Pardons, and, in the case of a sentence of death or life 

imprisonment, on the unanimous recommendation in writing 

of the Board of Pardons, after full hearing in open session, 

upon due public notice. The recommendation, with the 

reasons therefor at length, shall be delivered to the Governor 

and a copy thereof shall be kept on file in the office of the 

Lieutenant Governor in a docket kept for that purpose.

Pa. Const. art IV, § 9(a).
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and unless all individuals who meet these criteria are granted the right “to be heard,” 

which conceivably includes the right to be heard by the Governor himself and/or the Board 

of Pardons. We, therefore, deem this restriction placed on the Governor’s pardon power 

to be a substantive change to Article IV, § 9.

These substantive changes, like the litany of new enumerated rights themselves,

are not sufficiently interrelated so as to justify having been presented to the electorate in 

a single vote. In our view, for example, bail conditions could have been revised without 

also altering the Governor’s pardon power. Likewise, altering the Governor’s pardon 

power does not depend on also altering this Court’s authority to promulgate procedural 

rules for the courts of this Commonwealth. 

In sum, then, we conclude that the array of wide-ranging changes to the 

Pennsylvania Constitution made by the Victim’s Rights Amendment were not dependent 

on each other in order to function and thereby effectuate the overarching subject of this 

amendment, the protection of victim’s rights. Consequently, Article XI § 1 prohibited them 

from being joined together as a singular proposed amendment, because doing so denied

the voters of this Commonwealth their right to vote on each change separately, a

sacrosanct right that provision of our organic charter of governance guarantees. 

IV. Conclusion

We, therefore, affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court declaring that the 

proposed Victim’s Rights Amendment violated Article XI, § 1, and enjoining the Secretary 

of the Commonwealth from tabulating and certifying the results of the November 5, 2019 

General Election regarding that proposed amendment.

Chief Justice Baer and Justices Saylor, Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the 

opinion.

Justice Mundy files a dissenting opinion.