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2018 IL App (3d) 150679 

Opinion filed February 27, 2018 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT 

2018 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

) Peoria County, Illinois, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) Appeal No. 3-15-0679 

v. ) Circuit No. 13-CF-1075
 

)
 

BLAIR A. JOHNSON, ) Honorable
 

) Kevin W. Lyons, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Carter and Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Blair A. Johnson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea following his conviction for home invasion. Specifically, defendant argues that his 

plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because plea counsel allegedly failed to advise 

him that agreeing to a sentencing cap would bar him from appealing his sentence. We affirm. 

¶ 2	 FACTS 
 

 

 

 

 

¶ 3 Defendant was charged with home invasion (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(3) (West 2012)) in that 

he knowingly entered the residence of Ronald and Mari Halliday with reason to know that one or 

more persons were present while armed with a handgun and threatened the imminent use of force 

upon Ronald. Defendant was also charged with two counts of armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)) 

(one for each victim), two counts of aggravated unlawful restraint (id. § 10-3.1(a)) (one for each 

victim), and residential burglary (id. § 19-3(a)). 

¶ 4 Defendant pled guilty to home invasion in exchange for the State’s agreement to a 

sentencing cap of 40 years’ imprisonment and the dismissal of the remaining charges. The court 

stated: “And People are agreeing to a cap of 40. It would normally be 45, is that correct?” The 

prosecutor replied: “That is correct.” The court admonished defendant regarding his rights. 

¶ 5 The court asked defendant if he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. 

Defendant replied, “Not really, but I’ll have to deal with it.” The court asked defendant what he 

meant, and defendant said, “I just don’t feel like I was represented right.” The court took a 20­

minute break for defendant to discuss the matter with his attorney. After the recess, plea counsel 

stated that defendant did not want him to withdraw. Defendant said that was correct. Plea 

counsel said that defendant was not upset with his representation. Rather, defendant was upset 

with the State’s plea offer and believed plea counsel should have negotiated him a better deal. 

Plea counsel explained that the State had only offered the 40-year sentencing cap and would not 

budge. The court asked defendant again if he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, and 

defendant said yes. Defendant stated he wished to proceed with the partially negotiated plea. 

¶ 6 The court read the home invasion charge from the indictment and asked defendant if he 

understood the charge he was pleading guilty to. Defendant said yes. The following exchange 

occurred: 

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“THE COURT: Now, this is a special Class X felony in that it is a class— 

we call Class X plus 15. That means the minimum mandatory prison sentence is 

21 years. And normally a Class X plus 15 would be 21 to 45 but because of your 

partially negotiated plea agreement calls for a cap of 40 years in the Department 

of Corrections, your sentence will be an exact term between 21 and 40 years, and 

when you are released it will be followed immediately by mandatory supervised 

release of three years. Do you understand that, sir? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.” 

The court continued admonishing defendant as to the trial rights he was relinquishing by 

pleading guilty. 

¶ 7 The State read the factual basis for the plea. The State stated that Ronald and Mari 

Halliday told a police officer that they were sleeping in their home on the night of the incident. 

After 2 a.m., the Hallidays were awoken by two unknown black males wearing ski masks. Both 

men were armed with handguns and held flashlights. The two men told the Hallidays to roll over 

or they would be killed. The men tied up Ronald’s hands and feet. Approximately one hour later, 

the men tied up Mari. Ronald and Mari could hear other people downstairs. The incident lasted 

over two hours. At least one of the men stayed inside the bedroom with the Hallidays the entire 

time. The men laughed about the Hallidays living in a gated community. They held the barrels of 

their handguns to the Hallidays’ heads. The men told the Hallidays that if they reported the 

incident to the police, they would come back and kill them. The Hallidays heard at least four 

other individuals in their home throughout the incident. After the men left, the Hallidays fled to a 

neighbor’s house and called the police. The Hallidays determined that the men had taken several 

items of property from their residence, including jewelry and televisions. 

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¶ 8 The State said that Perry Rosetto told the police that he and several other individuals, 

including defendant, were involved in the Halliday home invasion. Rosetto reported that he and 

defendant were involved in tying up the Hallidays. The State said that it would call Ahmed 

Malik as a witness. Malik had purchased items from defendant and Rosetto that the Hallidays 

later identified as property stolen from their home. 

¶ 9 The court found the factual basis sufficient and accepted defendant’s guilty plea. 

¶ 10 Defendant hired new counsel to represent him during sentencing. 

¶ 11 A presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared. The PSI showed that defendant 

was 21 years old. Defendant had a prior misdemeanor conviction for theft of motor fuel and two 

ordinance convictions for fireworks and disorderly conduct. Defendant was previously employed 

at a bowling alley for approximately four years. After that, he worked as “a maintenance/van 

driver” at a hotel for approximately one year. Defendant reported abusing marijuana and 

prescription drugs. Defendant began consuming alcohol when he was 16 years old. The PSI 

included a victim impact statement from Mari requesting that the court give defendant the 

maximum sentence. A supplemental PSI contained letters from defendant’s friends and family. 

¶ 12 A sentencing hearing was held. As evidence in aggravation, the State offered a certified 

copy of the testimony of Mari and Ronald. The court noted that it had presided over the trial of 

defendant’s codefendant and heard the Hallidays’ testimony. The transcript was entered into 

evidence. The State argued that defendant should be sentenced to the “higher end of 40 years” 

based on the terror he inflicted on the Hallidays. Defense counsel argued that defendant should 

receive a minimum sentence in light of his employment history, his lack of a criminal record, his 

family’s support, and his cooperation with law enforcement. Defendant gave a statement in 

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allocution in which he apologized to the Hallidays for the emotional stress he caused them. 

Defendant said he was grateful that no one was physically hurt during the incident. 

¶ 13 The court sentenced defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment. The court stated that it had 

considered the PSI, the arguments of the parties, defendant’s statement in allocution, the 

statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, and defendant’s history and character. The court 

discussed defendant’s employment history. The court stated: “The crime [defendant] committed 

is not the worst crime in the world, but it’s close.” The court reasoned: 

“[H]ere are the things I find particularly aggravating: You just couldn’t stop. At 

least you stole and ransacked their home and took six televisions, yanked them 

right off the wall, two laptops, handbags, all handbags, jewelry, watches, rings, 

heirlooms, two cars, an SUV and a BMW; and apparently these were so upscale 

and apart from you and your cohorts, that you had to come back in and ask them 

how to start the car.” 

The court stated: “The Hallidays were terrorized and you, sir, were the terrorist. They were 

terrorized with guns to their heads and made them feel as though you would decide if they would 

live or die.” 

¶ 14 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing that the 40-year sentence 

was excessive in light of various mitigating factors and the fact that defendant’s codefendant 

received a sentence of only 12 years’ imprisonment for “essentially committing the exact same 

crime.” 

¶ 15 Five days later, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea arguing that plea 

counsel failed to advise him as to the effect of the sentencing cap on defendant’s ability to appeal 

his sentence. The motion argued: 

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“That the plea itself had a cap of only five (5) years under the maximum 45 year 

sentence given the Defendant’s circumstances it is almost per se ineffective 

assistance of counsel in the sense that it was a marginal benefit gained for a 

significant waiver of his ability to appeal the length of his sentence from the 

sentencing hearing.” 

¶ 16 A hearing was held on defendant’s motion. The State argued that defendant could not 

challenge his sentence with a motion to reconsider because defendant’s 40-year sentence was 

within the agreed-upon sentencing cap. The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider his 

sentence. 

¶ 17 The hearing proceeded to defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant 

testified on his own behalf. Defendant said that plea counsel never advised him that agreeing to a 

sentencing cap would affect his ability to appeal his sentence. Defense counsel asked defendant 

if his plea counsel had discussed his options of pleading guilty or going to trial prior to 

defendant’s guilty plea. Defendant replied: “No. He just said that if I didn’t take [the plea] today 

that we had to go to trial, and that I would receive 90 years or something.” On crossexamination, the following exchange occurred between defendant and the prosecutor: 

“Q. Okay. So when the Court asked you [at the plea hearing], ‘Have [you] 

discussed this partial plea agreement fully with your attorney ***,’ you answered, 

‘Yes’ so that answer was yes? 

A. Yeah, just to [plea counsel] telling me that it was the 21 to 40. 

Q. Okay. So did you have some misunderstanding of discussing the 

agreement fully? 

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A. I didn’t know that if I was to go to trial that the most I could receive 

was 45. 

Q. Okay. Now you indicated—well, how do you know that’s necessarily 

true? You were potentially subject to a consecutive sentence on these charges. 

A. Because they said that considering I’m only charged with one incident, 

that it would only be the one incident I could get charged with at the most was 

45.” 

¶ 18 The court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court noted that it 

had read the transcript of defendant’s plea proceedings, which had been held in front of another 

judge. The court remarked that the plea “was as by the book as it could be.” The court reasoned: 

“And although there may be regrets, I don’t see that there’s anything that would support the 

motion for withdrawing the plea.” 

¶ 19 ANALYSIS 

¶ 20 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea because his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Specifically, defendant 

contends: 

“Where defendant gave uncontradicted testimony at the hearing on his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea that he was never told his agreement to a 

sentencing cap barred him from subsequently challenging his sentence on appeal, 

his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily, and this Court 

should therefore reverse the order denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea.” 

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¶ 21 Initially, we reject defendant’s contention that his argument on appeal was not a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel such that he was required to establish the factors set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Defendant argues: 

“The instant defendant does not make a Strickland claim on appeal. Rather, he 

argues his guilty plea should be withdrawn because it was entered based on a 

misapprehension of the law, specifically, that he did not understand his agreement 

to a sentencing cap precluded him from challenging his sentence as excessive on 

appeal.” 

However, the only evidence defendant presented in support of his claim was his own testimony 

that his plea counsel failed to explain the significance of the sentencing cap as it related to his 

ability to appeal his sentence. Defendant also relies heavily on the holding in People v. 

Edmonson, 408 Ill. App. 3d 880 (2011), a case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, in support of his argument. 

¶ 22 Defendant does not argue that the court had a duty to advise him as to the effect of the 

sentencing cap on his ability to appeal his sentence. In fact, defendant acknowledges that Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012) does not require courts to admonish a defendant 

pleading guilty as to the ramifications of a sentencing cap. Defendant contrasts Rule 402(a) with 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N), which requires federal courts to admonish 

defendants pleading guilty about “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to 

appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). Defendant then 

argues: 

“Presumably, the presumption in Illinois is that trial counsel will advise his client 

about the impact of an agreement to a sentencing cap. Counsel’s failure to provide 

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his client with such information, then, is just as bad as counsel’s mis-advising his 

client that he can challenge his sentence regardless of the sentencing cap.” 

¶ 23 Thus, defendant essentially argues that his plea counsel should have advised him as to the 

consequences of his sentencing cap on his appeal rights but failed to do so. Under these 

circumstances, we find that defendant’s argument on appeal is a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel in substance if not form, and we will treat it as such. 

¶ 24 “A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done 

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant 

circumstances and likely consequences.’ ” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) 

(quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). “A defendant does not have an 

automatic right to withdraw a plea of guilty. [Citation.] Rather, defendant must show a ‘manifest 

injustice’ under the facts involved.” People v. Baez, 241 Ill. 2d 44, 110 (2011) (quoting People v. 

Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 520 (2009)). “Withdrawal is appropriate where the plea was entered 

through a misapprehension of the facts or of the law or where there is doubt as to the guilt of the 

accused and justice would be better served through a trial.” People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, 

¶ 32. 

¶ 25 “A defendant might enter a guilty plea because of counsel’s erroneous advice or 

omissions, but this fact alone does not destroy the voluntary nature of the plea.” Edmonson, 408 

Ill. App. 3d at 884. Rather, “[w]hether the defendant’s plea was voluntary depends on whether 

the defendant had effective assistance of counsel.” Id.; see also People v. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d 1, 14 

(1993). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show 

“(1) counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable; and (2) the defendant suffered 

prejudice as a result.” Edmonson, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 884; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

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¶ 26 “To establish prejudice in the guilty plea context, ‘the defendant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial.’ ” People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29 (quoting Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of plea 

counsel involves “a claim that [the defendant] relied on his counsel’s erroneous advice about a 

consequence of his plea, the defendant ‘ “must convince the court that a decision to reject the 

plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” ’ ” People v. Brown, 2017 IL 

121681, ¶ 48 (quoting Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29, quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 

372 (2010)). A defendant may not “satisfy the requisite prejudice prong based solely on the bare 

allegation that the defendant would have rejected the plea if his guilty-plea counsel had provided 

accurate advice.” Id. ¶ 47; Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) 

(“Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about 

how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look to 

contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.”). 

¶ 27 Here, we find that defendant has failed to establish prejudice. That is, defendant failed to 

show that rejecting the plea would have been rational under the circumstances if counsel had 

advised him that he would be unable to appeal his sentence. If defendant had gone to trial on all 

six charges and been found guilty of both home invasion and armed robbery, he would have 

received multiple convictions. The convictions would not have merged under the one-act, onecrime doctrine because the offenses were carved from different physical acts and neither offense 

was a lesser included offense of the other. See People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12. 

Specifically, the home invasion charge was based on the act of unlawful entry into the Halliday 

residence, and the armed robbery charge was based on the act of taking property from the person 

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or presence of Ronald and/or Mari. Arguably, both offenses contained the common act of 

threatening the use of force. However, “ ‘ “[a] person can be guilty of two offenses when a 

common act is part of both offenses” ’ ” (id. ¶ 15(quoting People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 

188 (1996), quoting People v. Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d 248, 252 (1983))) “ ‘or part of one 

offense and the only act of the other offense’ ” (id. ¶ 15 (quoting Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 

252)). Neither armed robbery nor home invasion is a lesser-included offense of the other, as 

armed robbery contains an element that home invasion does not (namely, taking property from 

the person or presence of another), and home invasion has an element that armed robbery does 

not (namely, unlawful entry). 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), 19-6(a)(3) (West 2012). 

¶ 28 Because defendant would have been subject to separate convictions on home invasion 

and armed robbery, defendant would have potentially been subject to permissive consecutive 

sentencing on the two offenses if the court found that it was necessary for protection of the 

public. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(1) (West 2012). Taking the applicable firearm enhancements into 

consideration, defendant faced maximum sentences of 45 years’ imprisonment for each offense. 

See 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b), 19-6(a)(3), (c) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25 (West 2012). 

Thus, defendant would have been subject to a possible maximum aggregate sentence of 90 years’ 

imprisonment on the two offenses. Although defendant had little to no criminal history, it is 

highly unlikely that he would have received a lower-range sentence considering the severity of 

the offenses. By accepting the plea agreement, defendant received only one conviction and a 

sentencing cap of 40 years’ imprisonment, as opposed to a possible second conviction and 

potential 90-year sentence. Under these circumstances, defendant has failed to show that 

rejecting the plea would have been rational under the circumstances. 

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¶ 29 Because defendant could have received a maximum sentence of 90 years’ imprisonment 

had he gone to trial, this case is distinguishable from the scenario posited by the Court in Lee, 

582 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1966-67, where “a defendant with no realistic defense to a charge 

carrying a 20-year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if the prosecution’s plea offer is 18 

years.” 

¶ 30 We also find it significant that defendant failed to present any evidence that the ability to 

appeal his sentence played an important role in his decision to accept the plea agreement. In Lee, 

determining that the defendant had established that he was prejudiced by his plea counsel’s 

erroneous advice that he would not be deported as a result of his plea agreement, the Lee Court 

found it significant that the defendant had demonstrated through his testimony and the testimony 

of his plea counsel that deportation was the determinative issue in the defendant’s decision to 

accept the plea deal. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1967-68. Similarly, in Edmonson, a case heavily 

relied upon by defendant, the defendant and his plea counsel testified that plea counsel 

erroneously advised defendant that he would be able to appeal a sentence entered under a plea 

agreement with a sentencing cap. Edmonson, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 883. In determining that the 

Edmonson defendant had established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found 

it significant that “[t]estimony from [plea counsel] and defendant clearly showed that defendant 

relied on the misinformation when he entered his plea and that it played a key role in his 

decision.” Id. at 886. 

¶ 31 In the instant case, on the other hand, defendant testified only that his plea counsel failed 

to advise him that agreeing to the sentencing cap would preclude him from appealing his 

sentence. Defendant presented no evidence—not even his own testimony—that a belief that he 

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would be able to appeal his sentence played a key role in his decision to accept the plea 

agreement. 

¶ 32 CONCLUSION 

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

¶ 34 Affirmed. 

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