An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-511

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 October 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

J.K.U. Guilford County

No. 12 JT 168

Appeal by respondent mother from order entered 24 January 

2014 by Judge Angela Foster in Guilford County District Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 September 2014.

Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County 

Department of Social Services.

Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Jaye E. Bingham-Hinch,

for guardian ad litem.

Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant mother.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Respondent mother appeals from the trial court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to the minor child, J.K.U. 

(“Jack”)1. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the 

trial court’s order.

I. Background

 

1A pseudonym is used for ease of reading and to protect the 

privacy of the juvenile.
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On 3 November 2011, Guilford County Department of Social 

Services (“DSS”) received a neglect report alleging 

inappropriate supervision, possible lack of care, and 

inappropriate sexual contact between 11-year-old Jack and his 

younger female cousin. On 4 November 2011, DSS conducted an 

initial investigation of the allegations and the family denied 

any inappropriate contact between the children. The children’s 

mothers entered into a safety agreement to provide appropriate 

supervision at all times and to cooperate with DSS.

On 26 January 2012, DSS received another report alleging 

inappropriate sexual contact between Jack and his cousin. 

Jack’s cousin stated that Jack “touched her private parts” and 

that “it hurt.” Jack was interviewed by a police detective and 

admitted that he engaged in some sexual behavior with his 

cousin. Based on Jack’s statements to the detective, Jack and 

respondent were provided temporary housing at a motel. Detailed 

safety agreements were made with the children’s mothers 

indicating there was to be no contact between the children. On 

6 February 2012, DSS learned that the children had contact in 

violation of the safety agreements.

On 8 February 2012, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging 

Jack was neglected and dependent and the trial court entered an 
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order placing Jack in nonsecure custody with DSS. Respondent 

entered into a case plan on 1 March 2012 and agreed to the 

following conditions: (1) complete a parenting assessment and 

follow the recommendations, complete parenting classes, attend 

scheduled visits, and maintain contact with the social worker; 

(2) complete a substance abuse assessment and follow 

recommendations, and submit to random drug screens; (3) obtain 

and maintain stable housing; (4) obtain a psychiatric evaluation 

to determine if medication is needed, comply with individual 

therapy, and comply with joint family therapy once recommended 

by the child’s therapist; and (5) obtain and maintain stable 

employment. By order entered 27 April 2012, Jack was 

adjudicated dependent. The trial court ordered that custody of 

Jack remain with DSS. Respondent was ordered to comply with her 

case plan and cooperate with DSS.

The matter came on for a permanency planning hearing on 24 

October 2012. By order filed 14 November 2012, the trial court 

found respondent “has the ability to work the objectives in her 

case plan when she decides to do so.” The permanent plan for 

the case was reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. 

The trial court concluded it was in Jack’s best interest to 

remain in the custody of DSS.
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Following a subsequent permanency planning hearing held on 

26 April 2013, the trial court found respondent was not engaged 

in her case plan. Specifically, respondent continued to test 

positive for marijuana and was not participating in drug 

treatment, she did not have safe and secure housing or income, 

she was not participating in individual therapy on a consistent 

basis, and she had not completed positive parenting classes. As 

a result, the trial court changed the permanent plan to adoption

with a concurrent plan of reunification and ordered DSS to 

proceed with filing a termination of parental rights petition.

On 24 June 2013, DSS filed a petition to terminate parental

rights alleging grounds existed to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights based upon neglect, failure to make reasonable 

progress, failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of 

care, and dependency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), 

(3), and (6) (2013). The termination hearing was held on 26 

November 2013, after which the trial court found the existence 

of all grounds alleged by DSS. The court determined that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Jack’s best 

interest and entered an order terminating respondent’s parental 

rights. Respondent appeals.

II. Discussion
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Respondent argues the trial court reversibly erred in 

finding and concluding that grounds existed to terminate her 

parental rights because the evidence failed to support the 

findings and the findings failed to support the conclusions. 

“The standard for review in termination of parental rights cases 

is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent 

and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, 

support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 118,

124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984).

We note that although the trial court concluded that more 

than one ground existed to terminate respondent’s parental 

rights, we find it dispositive that the evidence supports 

termination of her parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

7B-1111(a)(3), willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of 

the cost of care. See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 

577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) (“A finding of any one of the 

enumerated grounds for termination of parental rights under 

N.C.G.S. 7B–1111 is sufficient to support a termination.”).

A trial court may terminate parental rights where:

The juvenile has been placed in the custody 

of a county department of social services, . 

. . or a foster home, and the parent, for a 

continuous period of six months next 

preceding the filing of the petition or 

motion, has willfully failed for such period 
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to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of 

care for the juvenile although physically 

and financially able to do so.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3).

This Court as recognized that the use of “willfully” in the 

statute “imports knowledge and a stubborn resistance[.]” In re 

Matherly, 149 N.C. App. 452, 455, 562 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2002) 

(quotation marks omitted). “Manifestly, one does not act 

willfully in failing to make support payments if it has not been 

within [her] power to do so.” In re Adoption of Maynor, 38 N.C. 

App. 724, 726, 248 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1978). “A parent’s ability 

to pay is the controlling characteristic of what is a 

‘reasonable portion’ of cost of foster care for the child which 

the parent must pay.” In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 604, 281 

S.E.2d 47, 55 (1981). “A parent is required to pay that portion 

of the cost of foster care for the child that is fair, just and 

equitable based upon the parent’s ability or means to pay.” Id. 

“[N]onpayment would constitute a failure to pay a ‘reasonable 

portion’ if and only if respondent were able to pay some amount 

greater than zero.” In re Bradley, 57 N.C. App. 475, 479, 291 

S.E.2d 800, 802 (1982).

Here, respondent argues there is no finding that respondent 

was able to pay some amount greater than zero. Respondent 
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contends the trial court reversibly erred in failing to 

specifically address respondent’s ability to pay. We disagree.

The trial court found that “[t]he mother is under an order 

to pay child support for the juvenile but has failed to pay any 

child support or otherwise contribute to the juvenile’s cost of 

care since he has been in custody.” The trial court further 

found that during the relevant six month period respondent 

“willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the juvenile’s 

cost of care under the circumstances despite having been 

physically and financially able to do so.” These findings are 

supported by the evidence as the social worker testified that

respondent entered into a voluntary support order to pay $50 per 

month effective 1 January 2013, and respondent never paid any 

child support. The social worker further testified that 

respondent “is an able body and is under no physical or mental 

disability to prevent her from working[.]”

Respondent’s ability to pay was established by her child 

support order.

Because a proper decree for child support 

will be based on the supporting parent’s 

ability to pay as well as the child’s needs, 

there is no requirement that petitioner 

independently prove or that the termination 

order find as fact respondent’s ability to 

pay support during the relevant statutory 

time period.
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In re Roberson, 97 N.C. App. 277, 281, 387 S.E.2d 668, 670 

(1990) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the trial court’s 

findings establish that respondent had the ability to pay some 

amount greater than zero. The trial court did not err in 

finding grounds exist to terminate respondent’s parental rights 

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3).

“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for 

terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine 

whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s 

best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). The court 

must consider the following factors and make written findings 

regarding those that are relevant:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the 

juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental 

rights will aid in the accomplishment of the 

permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the 

parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between 

the juvenile and the proposed adoptive 

parent, guardian, custodian, or other 

permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.
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Id. “We review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental 

rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 

94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). “A trial court may be 

reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its 

actions are ‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’” Davis v. 

Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006) (quoting 

Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980)).

In this case, respondent concedes that the trial court made 

findings concerning the enumerated factors, but contends the 

trial court failed to address the fact that Jack was of an age 

that his consent to adoption was necessary. Respondent argues 

the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her 

parental rights because the evidence showed that Jack had a 

strong bond with her, wanted to return to her custody, and was 

unlikely to consent to adoption. We are not persuaded.

In this case, the trial court found that “[Jack] has a 

strong bond with his mother[.]” However, the trial court also 

found that “[Jack] deserves permanency.” Jack’s guardian ad 

litem testified that Jack had expressed to her that he was tired 

of the case “dragging out.” She further testified that he was 

frustrated by “being in limbo.” Although Jack expressed a 

desire to return to his mother, he also wanted permanence and 
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stability. Moreover, the Juvenile Code does not require that 

termination of parental rights lead to adoption in order for it 

to be in the child’s best interest. See In re M.M., 200 N.C. 

App. 248, 258, 684 S.E.2d 463, 470 (2009) (stating there’s no 

requirement within N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 that termination lead to 

adoption), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 241, 698 S.E.2d 401 

(2010).

Here, the trial court properly considered the section 7B1110(a) factors and made written findings as required. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Jack’s best 

interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order 

terminating respondent’s parental rights.

Affirmed.

Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).