1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti me th e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th e C o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200 U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### KIRC HE R ET AL


### . v . PUTNAM FUNDS TR U S T ET AL


### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVE NT H CIRCUIT No. 05–4 09. Ar g u ed Apr il 24, 200 6—D e c i ded Ju n e 15, 200 6 Th e Sec u r i ties Litig ationUn ifor m Stan dar d s Ac t of 1998 (Ac t) spec ifies

th at pr iv ate st ate-law “c ov er ed” c l ass ac tio n s alleg i n gu n tr u t horma nipula t i on “ i n conne ct ion wit ht h e p urcha s e or s a le” of a “ c overed” s e curity may not “be maintained in any State or Federal court,” 1 5 U. S

. C. §7 7 p (b ), a n d a u t h orizes remova l t o federa l dist rictcourtof “[a]n yc o v e r e d c l ass ac tionbr ou g h t inanyState c o u r tin v o lv in ga c o v e r e d secu r i ty , as set for t hinsu bsec tion(b),” §77p(c ). “A ‘c ov er ed cla s s a c t i on’ is a la ws uitin which da ma ges a r e s o ughton b e ha lf of mor e th an50 people. A ‘cov er ed sec u r i ty ’ is on e tr aded n ation ally an d liste d ona r e g u lated n ation al ex c h a n g e.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dab i t, 547 U. S.

_ __, ___ . Petition er s, m u tu al fu n dinv e stor s, filed separ ate sta t e - c o u r tac tion s, eac hseekin gto asser tstate- l aw c l a i ms onbeh a lf of a c l ass of inves t ors a llegedly inj uredb ydeva lu ati onof th eirholdin g s byr e s p ondentmutua lfunds

. The funds filed not i ces of remova l in ea ch c a se sta t in g , amon goth e r th in g s , th at th e ac tion s w e r e r e mov able u n d eran d pr ec lu ded byth e Ac t. O n c e r e m o v e d , h o w e v e r , th e Feder a l Dis t rictCourtrema nded ea ch ca s e t o s t a t e courto nt h e grou nd t h a t it l a c k ed su bj ec t-matter ju r i sdic tiononr e mov a l bec a u s e th e Ac t di d notpreclude t h e inves t ors ’ cla i ms . Since they were s a id t o ha ve b e en inj ured a s “ h olders ” of mut u a lfund s h a r es , notpu rcha s e rs or s e llers , t h e courtrea s oned, t h eir cla i ms did notsat i s f y §7 7p(b )’s “ i n connec tionw i thth e pu r c h a se orsale” r e qu ir e m en t, an d th e c l aims c o u l d therefore pro c eed in state c o urt. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged t h a t 2 8 U. S

. C. §1 44 7 ( d) b a rs review of dis t rictcourtorders rema nd

in gr e mov e d cases forlac ko f su bjec t-m att erju r i sdic tion , bu t dec i de d t h a tt h e Dis t rictCourtha d the la s t word neit her on t h e cha ra ct eriza

t i on of it s decis i on a s j uris d ict i ona lnor ont h e corre ct ne s s of its con -2 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Sy llabu s clus ion t h a trema nd wa s req u ired. The a ppea l s courtcons idered a l l covered cla s s a c t i ons involving cove red s e curit i es , whet h er precluded or not, to be r e movable und er th e Act, and therefor e thought the pre

clus ion is s u e dis t inctfrom t h e j uri sdic tio n al issu e w h e th erth e c a se b e longed in fe dera l courta ta ll. Itheld t h a torders rema nding “p r o p erly re mo ve d”su its a s n o t p r e c l u d e d are substan tiv e an d unaff ec te d by §1447(d), a n d therefor e reviewabl e. Pr oposi n g th att h e A c t r e s e r v e s t o th e Feder a l Ju dic i ar yth e ex c l u s iv e au th or ityto make th e pr ec lu sion dec i sion , th e cou r tsaid th at tr eatin gr e man dor der s in th is c o n t ex t as immu n i zed fr om appeal by§1447(d) w o u l d meanth at a majorsu b

s t a n t i ve iss u e would es ca pe review , s i nc e itwould no tb e open t o r e solu tioninth e state c o u r tsu bjec t to r e v i ew byth is Cou r t
. Th e Sev

ent hCircuit s u b s eq uent ly cons olida t e d the funds ’ a ppea l s a n d de

c i ded, onth e mer i ts, th at th e Ac t pr ec lu des th e in v e stor s’ c l aims. Held: Orde r s r e ma nding for wa ntof pr eclusion under the Act are sub

jec tto §144 7(d ) an d its g e n e ral r u l e of n o n a ppeala b ili ty
. Pp. 5–14.

( a) S e ction 1447 (d), wh i ch s t a t e s t h a ta n“ o r d e rr e m a n d i n gac a s e t o th e State c o u r tfr om w h i c hit w a s r e mov e d is n o t r e v i ew able onap peal,” appl ies to all r e ma n d s based on th e gr ou n d s spec ified in §144 7(c ) , in c l u d in glac kof su bjec t-ma tt erju r i sdic tion

. Thermtron Produc ts, Inc. v. Her m ansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 , 3 4 3

– 3 4 5

. I ta p p l i e s eq ua lly t o cases removed under t h e gene ra l remova l s t a t u t e , §1 44 1 , a n d t o t h os e removed unde rot her p r ovis ions , s ee Things Re me m b ered, Inc. v. Pet ra rca , 516 U. S

. 124 , 128 , and its force isnots ubjec t t o a ny stat u t ory exception th atmigh t cov e r th is c a s e . The D i stric tCour t said th atit w a sr e ma nding forla c k of ju ris dic tion , a n unrevi ew able gr o u n d

. Wh er e a r e man dor deris ba sed o non e of §1447 (c )’s g r ou n d s, review is una va ilab l e no matt er how pla i n t h e lega l error in ordering t h e rema nd. Bris coev. Be ll , 432 U. S

. 404 , 41 3, n. 13

. T h e S e v e n t h Circuitdid no toverlook ca s e s like Brisc o e, but relied instead on cases s uch a s Kontr i ckv. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, w h i c hobser v ed th at some rulings loos ely ca lled j uris d ict i ona la r e pat e nt ly notj uris d ict i ona l in t h e s t ricts e nse. Viewing t h is as s uch aca s e , t h e a ppea l s courtun der s tood th e D i str i c tCou r t ’s pr ec lu siondec i sionto be su bs tan tiv e , n o t ju r i sdic tio n al, an d c o n s e q u e n t lysu bjec t to r e v i ew . Bu t th e D i s t r ictCourtwas correctin unders t a n ding it s rema nd order t o b e dic

tated bya fin d in gth at it lac k ed r e mov a l ju r i sdic tion

. Sec t ion7 7 p (c) ’ s a u t h oriza t i on for remova l, on whi ch di s t rict -courtj u ris d ict i on de

pends , is confined t o ca s e s “ s et forth in su bsection (b),” i.e., those with cla i ms of unt rut h orma nipula t i on. Tha tphra s e immedia t e ly follows t h e § 7 7 p (c) langua ge des crib i ng remova b l e ca s e s as covered cla s s a c t i ons involvin g co vereds e cu rit i es , a n d t h e la ngua ge ha s no a ppa rent funct ion unles s itlimit s remova l t o covered cla s s a c t i ons involvin g cla i ms like unt rut h or decep t ion. Leg i sla t i v e h i stor yten d s to sh o w3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s th at th i s w a s ju st w h at Con g r e ss u n d er stood. Th e pr ec lu siondeter

min ationis ju r i sdic tion al, as is th e or deri m plemen tin git. Pp. 5–11.

(b ) The S e ven t h Circuit ’ s r e a d ing wa s in pa rtmot i va t e d b yt h e court ’s er rone ous a s s u mpt i on t h a tt h e Actgives federa lcourt s excl u siv e ju r i sdic ti onto dec i de t h e pr ec l u sion issu e. A c o v e r e d ac tionis r e mov able if i tis pr ec lu ded, an d a defen d an t c a nen listth e Feder a l Ju dic i ar yto dec i de pr ec lu sion , bu t h e c a nelec t to le av e th e c a se w h e r e th e plai n t iff filedita n d tr u s t th e s tate c o u r tto make th e pr e c l u s iondeter m in ation

. Wh at a st ate courtcould do in the firs tpla c e itma y a l s o do on rema nd; here, t h e f und s ca n a s k for dis m is sa l on pr ec lu siong r ou n d s w h e ntheyr e tu rnto state c o u r t
. Collater a l e s toppel shouldbe no bar to such a revisitation, given that §1447(d) prevents the funds from a ppealing t h e Dis t rictCour t ’ s decis i on. While t h e st a t e courtca nnotreview t h e decis i on t o remand in a na p pella t e wa y, it is free t o rej e ctt h e rema nding court ’s rea s oning. Id., at 5 83. Th er e is n o r e asonto dou bt th at t h e state c o u r tinth is litig a tion will duly apply Dab i t ’s h o ldin gth at holderc l aims a r e embr ac ed by§77p(b), bu t th is Cou r tc a nr e v i ew an y claim of er r o ronth at poin t. Pp. 11–1 4. 403 F. 3d 47 8, v a c ated an d r e man d ed.

S OUTER , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whi ch R OBERTS , C. J., and S TE VENS , K ENNEDY , T HOMAS , G INS B URG , B REY ER , an d ALITO , J J ., j o ined, a n d in which S CALI A , J., joine das to Parts I, III, and IV. S CALI A , J ., filed a nopinion conc ur ring i npa rta n d co ncu rrin gin t h e ju dg men t
._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h e Court
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rma l rev i si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad e b e f o r e th e p r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–4 09 

### CARL KIR C HE R, ET AL 

### ., PETITIONE R S v. PUTNAM FUN D S T R UST ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SEVE NTH CIRCUI T [Ju n e 15, 2006 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S OUTER

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. Title 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) limits appellate review of a district court orderre manding a case from f e deral to st ate court. The question here is whether an order remanding a case removed under t h e Securiti es Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 is appea l able, n o twithstanding §1447(d). We hold it i s not. I The Priva t e Securities Litigatio nReform Act of 199 5 (Reform Act), 109 Stat. 737, targeted “perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in li tigation involving nationally traded secu rities,” Merr ill Lync h, Pierce, Fe nner & Smith Inc. v. Da bi t, 547 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 8), an d p u tlimits on federal securities class actions. B u t C o n gr e s s s o o ndi sc ove r edth at“ [r] ath e rth an fac eth e ob st ac l e s s e t i n the i r p a th b y th e Refo r m Ac t , p l ai nt if fs an d t h ei r re p r ese n ta tiv e s [ w e r e] br in gi n g cl ass a c tio n s u n d e r s t a t e la w , o f te n in stat e c o urt,” id. , at ___ (slip o p ., at 9). T o b l o c k t h i s bypass of the Reform Act, Congre ss enacted t h e Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ( Act), 112 Stat. 3227; see Dab i t, su p ra, a t___ (s l i p op ., at8– 10 ).2 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Opinion of t h e Court 

### The Act has a preclusion provisio n 1 

### and a removal pro

vision 2 

### : it p r ovides tha tpri v ate st ate-law “co vered” class actions alleging untru th or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a “covered” security may not “be maintai n ed in anyState or Federal court,” 112 Stat. 3228 (codified at 15 U. S. C. §77p(b)), 3 

### and it authorizes removal to federal district co ur t of “[a]ny covered cla s s action brought in an ySta t e cou rt involvin g a covered security, as set forth i nsubsection (b),” 112 Stat. 3228 (codified at §77p(c)). “A ‘ c overed class action’ is a lawsuit in which damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 people. A ‘ c overed security’ is on e traded na tionally and listed ona regulated national exc hange.” Dabit, supra, at

——————

1 “No c o v e r e d c l ass ac tion bas ed u p onth e st atu tor yorc o mmonlaw o f an ySta t e or su bdiv ision th er eof maybe main ta in ed in an ySt ate o r Federa l court b ya n y pri v a t e pa rt y a lleging — “(1) anu n t r u e state men toromiss i onof a mater i a lfac ti nc o nn ec tion w i thth e pu rch ase orsale of a c o v e r e d secu r i ty ; or

“(2) that the d efendant usedor em ployed any manipulative or decep

t i ve device or cont riva nce i nconne ct ion wit ht h e purc ha s e or s a le of a c o v e r e ds e c u r i t y . ” 1 1 2 Stat

. 3228 (c odified at 1 5 U

. S

. C

. § 7 7 p (b ) )

.

The precl u sion provision is often called a preemption provision; the Act , however , does not its e lf displa ce s t at e la w wit hfedera l la w b u t ma kes s o me st a t e-la w cla i ms nona ct iona b l e t hrough t h e cla s s a c t i on device in federa la s well as s t a t e court
. S e e Merr ill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547U. S

. ___, ___ (2006) ( s l i p o p . , a t 1 5 ) (“The Act doe s not deny any individualplaintiff, or indeed any group of few erth an5 0 plain t iff s , t h e r i gh t to en for c e an ystate-law c a u s e of ac tionth at ma yex ist”).

2 “An yc o v e r e d c l ass ac tion br ou g h t inanyState c o u r t in v o lv in ga c o v e r e d sec u r i ty , as set for t hinsu bsec tio n(b) of th is s e c t ion , sh all b e remova b l e t o t h e Federa l dis t rict courtfor t h e dis t rict in which t h e ac tionis pen d i n g , an d sh all be su bjec t to s u bsec tion(b) of th is sec t ion

. ” 112 Stat . 3228(codifi e d at 1 5 U

. S

. C

. § 7 7 p ( c ) )

.

3 Th e Ac t amen ds “insu bst a n t ial l yiden tic a l w a y s ,” Dab i t, sup ra, at ___, n. 6 (slip op., at 10, n. 6), both the Securities Act o f 1933, 48 Stat. 7 4 , a n d t h e S e curit i es Excha nge Actof 1 9 3 4 , 4 8 St at . 8 8 1

. For t h e s a ke of s i mplicit y, the S e vent h Circuitrelie d exclus ively on t h e a m endments to the Securities Act of 1933, and forease of refe rence we will do the same.3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h e Court 

### ___ (sl i p op. , at 10–11) (footnotes omitted). Petitioners are eight groups of investors holdi n g mutual fund shares, who filed separate actions inIllin ois state courts, each group seeking to represent a class of investor s allegedly in jured by devaluatio n of their hold ings by re

spondents (mutual funds, investment advisors, and an insurance company) (hereinafter collectively the funds). 4 

### The eight c o mplaints asserted only state-law claims, such as negligen ce and breach of fiduciary duty. The funds filed notices of removal to federal district court in each case stating, among other things, that t h e actions were removabl e under and precluded by the Act. Once in the Distric t Court, howeve r, the inves t ors argued that the c a ses should be remanded for lack of subj ect matter juri sdiction, and in se parate orders the Distri ct Court for the Southern District o f Illinois remanded each case to stat e court on the groundthat the D i strict Cour t lacked subj ect matter j u risdiction on removal because the Act did not preclude the investors’ claims. Since the in

vestors were said to have been injured as “holders” of mutual fund shares, n o t purchase r s or sellers, the Distri c t Court reaso n ed, their cl aims did not satisfy the “in connec

tion with t h e purchas e or sale” requirementof the Ac t’s preclusion provision, § 77p(b), 5 

### and the claims could there

fore proceed in state court. The Distric tC o urt did no t decide whether the claims ot herwise met the Act ’ s condi

tions for preclusion.

——————

4 Th e inv e stor s c l aim th at th e fu n d s fac ilitat ed th e pr ac tic e of “mar ket timin g ,” w h e rebytr ader s of mu tu al fu n dsh ar es ex ploit br ief disc r e pan cies between the stock price s used to calculate the shares’ value once a day , an d th e pr ic es at w h i chth ose stoc ks ar e ac tu allytr adin ginth e in ter i m. Br ief forPetition er s 6. Th e in v e stor s s a yth at mar k et ti min g is h a r m fu l to lon g -ter m h o lder s of mu tu al fu n dsh ar e s an d th a tth e funds negligently or reckles s ly failed to adopt procedures to protect the value of the investors’ lo ng-t erm investments.

5 As discussed i nPart III, infra , we ha ve s i nce rej e ct ed t h is rea s oning, see Dab i t, sup ra, at ___ (slip op., at 16).4 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Opinion of t h e Court 

### The funds filed notices of appealfrom the remand or

ders, and in one of the cases, Kircherv. Pu tnam Fund s Trus t, the Seventh Ci rcuit issued an opinion addressin g the threshold question of its appellate jurisdiction. 373 F. 3d 847 (2 004). The Court of Appeals acknowledged th at 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) bars review of district court orders remanding for lack of subj ect matter ju risdiction, 37 3 F. 3d, at 8 49 (citing Gravi ttv. Southwestern Bell Tele

phone Co., 430 U. S. 723 (1977) (per cu riam)), but decided that the District Court had the last word neither on the characteriz a tion of its decision as jurisdictional nor on the correctness of its conc lusion that remand w a s required, see 373 F. 3 d , at 849. The Court of Appeals considered all covered class ac

tions involving covere d securi ties, whether precluded or not, to be removable u n der the Act, and for that reason thought the preclusion issue to be distinct fro m the juris

dictional issue of whether th e case bel o nged in federal court at all. Id., at 84 9–850. In the view of the Court of Appeals, if the District Court remanded because, for ex ample, the class comprised too few investors to make the case a covered class ac tion, t hat would be a jurisdictional decision th at the case had been r e moved im properly, and the order would therefore be unreviewable in accordan ce with §1447(d). Id., at 8 49. But th e court heldthat or ders remanding “ p r o p e r l y r e m o v e d” s u i t s as not precluded b y the Ac t a r e sub s tan t iv e, “un a f f e c te dby §1 44 7( d) ,” id., at8 51, an d the r efo r e subj ec tt oa ppe lla tej u r i s di c tio ni n theno r m al co ur se. As the Court of Appea l s put it, once the District Cour t had made that substantive decision of n o p r eclusion i n this case, it was time f o r the court to bow out, not becaus e it had lacked “adjudica t ory compet ence” to begin with but because it had completed its work: “Once a court does all that the statute authorizes, there is no adjudicatory co m petence to do more. That is not t h e ‘lack of s ubject-matt er5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h e Court 

### jurisdiction’ that authorizes a remand. Otherwise every federal suit, havingbeen decided on the merits, would b e dismissed ‘f or lack of jurisd iction’ because the court’s job was finished.” Id., at 850. This remand, the court con

cluded, wa s therefore not for w ant of juri sdiction, and review was not barred by §1447(d). To satisfy itself that its de cision made “prac t ical sense, ” the court p r oposed that the Act reserves to the Federal Judiciary the exclusive authority to mak e the preclusion decision. Ibid. Treating remand orders in this context as immunized from appeal by §1447(d) would thus mean that “a major s ubstantive issue in the case [would] escape review,” since it would not be open to resolution in the state court subject to r e view by th is Court. Ibid. The Seventh Circuit subsequ e ntly consol idated the funds’ appeals and decided, on the merits, that the Act does preclude the investors’ claims. 403 F. 3 d478 (2005). We grantedcertiorari t o resolve a split of authority on th e question whether §1447(d) bars review of remand orders in cases removed under the Act, 6

### 546 U. S. ___ (2006), an d we now va c a te for wan tof jurisdic tion on the part of the Court of Ap peals. II The policy of Congress opposes “interruption of the litigation of the merits of a remo ved cause by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the dist rict court t o which the cause is removed,” Un ited S t a t es v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742, 751 (1946), and nearly three years of jurisdic

tional advocacyin the cases before us confirm the congres

sional wisd om. For over a century now, s t atutes have accordingly limited the power of fe deral appellate courts t o

——————

6 Compare 373F. 3 d847(CA72004) ( c a s e b e l o w ) , w i t h Spielman v. Mer r ill Lync h, Pierce, Fen n e r& Smith, In c., 332 F. 3d 1 16 (C A2 20 03) ; Ab adav. Cha r les Schwab & Co., 300 F. 3d 11 12 (C A9 200 2); Williams v. AFC En te rprise s, I nc. , 389 F. 3d 1185 (C A11 2 0 0 4 ).6 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Opinion of t h e Court 

### review orders remanding ca ses removed by defendants from state to federal court, see id., at 748–752 ; Thermtron Products, Inc. v. H e r m ansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 346–348 (1976). The current i n carnation is 28 U. S. C. §1447(d), which prov ides that an “order remanding a case to the State court from whic h it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 7

### I n Thermtron , we held that the bar of §14 47(d) applies on ly to remands based onthe grounds specified in§1447(c), that is, a def e ct in remova l procedure or lack of su bject matte r jurisdictio n . 423 U. S., at 343–345; see also T h ingsRe membere d, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 1 24, 12 7–1 28 (19 9 5 )

. S o , w e h a v e a p p r o v e da p pellate review of a remand expressly based on the District Court’s cro wded docke t , see Thermtron, su pra, at 340–3 41, and one bas ed on abstention under Bu rfo r d v. Su n Oil C o . , 319 U. S. 3 15 (1 94 3), s ee Q u ac kenb us hv. Allstate Ins. Co ., 517 U. S. 7 06, 71 0– 71 2 (199 6). B u t w e h a v e r e l e n t l e s s l y repeated that “any re mand order issued on the grounds specified in§1447(c) [is immunized from all forms of ap

pellate review], whet her or not that orde r might b e deemed err o neous by a nappellate court.” The r mtron, 423 U. S., at 35 1; see also id

. , at 343 (“If a trial ju dge purports to remand a case on the ground that it was removed ‘i m providentlyand with out jurisdi ction,’ his order is n o t subject to challenge in the court of appeals” (quoting §1447(c) (1976 ed.))). The bar of §1447(d) applies equa lly to cases removed under the general removal statute, §1441, and to th ose removed under other provisions, s ee T h ing sReme mbered, In c., su pra, at 1 2 8 , an d the fo r c e of the ba r is n o t subj e c t to an y s t a t u t o ry e x ce p t io nth a tm i gh t co ve r th is c a se. 8 

### Os te n -

——————

7 Title 28 §14 4 7 ( d) spec ific allyex c e pts c e r tainc i v il r i g h ts a c tion s fr om its b a r ; c f. §1443.

8 “Ab s ent aclear s t at ut ory comma nd t o t h e cont ra ry, we a s s u me t h at Congress is aware of the unive rsa lityof th[e] pra c tice of denyi n g a ppella t e review of rema nd orders whe n C o ngres s c r ea t e s anew gro u n d7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h e Court


### s ib l y, th en , §1 44 7(d) st and s in the way of re vi ew i n g th e Di s t r i ct Co u r t ’ s o r de rs o f re ma n dinthe p r es en tca ses. Th e Di s t r i ctCo ur t sa idtha t i twas re man di n g fo r l a c k o f ju r i s di ct i o n , an u n r e vi ewab legr ou nd , an dev enif iti s p e rm i ssi

ble to l o o kbe yon d th e co u r t’s o w n label , the o r de rs a r e u n m i s t a k abl y pr em i s ed o nth e vi ewth atr e mo va lj u ri s d ic

tio n u n de r 15 U. S. C. §77 p (c) is limit edt o c a ses precluded by §77p(b); on the D i strictC o urt’ s un d e rsta ndi n g th at
“h old e r”cl a i m s ar e n o ts ubj ectt opr ec lu s i on un d e r§ 7 7p( b ) of t h e Ac t, the c o u r t ha d no subj e c t ma t t e rju ris di c tio n . 9 

### S i nc eth er e wa s n o in di cat i onth atr e m o v a l juri sdict i o n m i gh texis t o ns o m e gr ou ndoth e r th a n§ 77p (c) (c o m p l ete dive rs it y , f o r e x a m ple ) , 10

### the re ma n dor de rs we r ene cess a r ily b a se d o nth e tria lcou r t’s conc lusion that jurisdict i on u n d e r § 7 7 p (c) w a s w a n t i n g . An d “[ w]here the order is based on o n e of the [grounds enumerated in 28 U. S. C. §1447(c)], review is unavailable no matter h o w plain th e legal error in ordering the remand,” Br isc o ev. Be ll , 43 2

—————— for removal,” Things Reme mb ered, 516 U

. S., at 1 2 8 (in t er n a l qu ot ati on ma rks omit t e d), like 15 U. S

. C. §7 7 p (c). Congres s ha s , when itwis h ed, ex pr esslymad e 28 U. S. C. § 144 7(d) in app l ic able to par t i c u l arr e man d orders. See, e.g . , §1447(d); 12 U. S. C. §144 1a(l)( 3 )(C); §1819(b)(2)(C ); 25 U. S. C. §4 87(d); c f. n . 6, supra . T h ere is no such “clear statutor y c o mman d” h e r e , an d th at silen c e tells u s w e mu st look to 28 U. S. C. §144 7(d) to d e termine the reviewability of remand orders under the Act.

9 We take a pa ss onJu stic e Sc alia’s po sit i onth at w e mayn o t look bey o n dth e la bel, see post , at3 ; t h e res u lt here is t h e same whet h er we look near or far.

10 Th ese c a ses r a ise ex c l u s ivelystate-l aw c l aims seekin gdamag e s ins u fficientt o s a t i s f y t h e a m ount -in-con t rovers y req u irementof 28 U. S. C. §1332 ; inth ose in st an c e s inwh ichth e fu n d s asser t ed div e r s it y a s aba sis for s u bj ect ma tt er j uris d ict i on, the Dis t rictCourtdet e rmined th at n o n a med plain t iff h a d a c l aim th at m e t §133 2’s $75, 000 th r e sh old. See, e.g. , Part hasart hyv. T. Rowe Pri ce I n ter n ational F unds, In c., No. 03– CV– 06 73– D R H (SD Ill., Jan . 30, 200 4) , App. to Pet. forCer t . 34a– 37a; Spurgeonv. Pacific Lif eIns. Co., No. 04–C V–0 3 5 5

–M J R (SD Ill., Ju n e 24, 2004) , App. to Pet. forCer t . 59a–6 0a.8 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Opinion of t h e Court 

### U. S. 4 04, 4 13 –4 14 , n.1 3 (19 7 7 )

. The Court of Appeals did not, of course, ov erlookthe cases holdi n g that eve na remand premised on an errone

ous conclusion of no jurisdiction is unappealable; it relied instead oncases like Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443 (2004), and Scarborough v. Princi pi, 541 U. S. 401 (2004), which observed tha tsome rulings loosely called jurisdic

tional are patently not jurisdictio nal in the strict sense, see 373 F. 3 d , at 849 (ci t ing Kontri ck, supra ; Scarborough, supra). T h e appeals court saw this as such a case; it understood that a district court h a d removal jurisdiction over any covered action undersubsection (c), with th e consequenc e that a su bsequent order dismissing because of preclusion under subsection (b), or remanding because the action was not pre c luded, rested simply on an applica

tion of substantive law under subsection (b), law that wa s not jurisdictional at all

. We think, however, th at the Dist rict Cour t was correc t in understanding its remand order to be di ctated by i t s finding that it lacked removal jurisdiction. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we re ad aut horiz a tion for th e removal in subsection (c), on which the Dist rict Cour t’s jurisdiction depends, as confined to cases “set forth in subsection (b),” §77p(c), namely, those with claims of untruth, manipula

tion, and s o on. The quoted phrase immedi ately follow s the subsection (c) lang uage describing removable cases as covered class actions involvin g covered securities, and t h e language has no appa rent functi on unless i tlimits re

moval to c o vered class actions involving cl aims like un

truth or deception. And legi slati v e history tends to show that this was just wha tCongress understood. See S. Rep. No. 105–182, p. 8 (199 8) (§77p(c) “provides that any cla ss action described in Subsection (b) that is brought in a State court shall be r e movable to Federal district cou rt, and may be dismissedpursuant to the provisions of su b

-9 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h e Court 

### section (b)”); H. R. Rep. No. 105–640, p. 16 (1998) (same). 11 

### The funds argue that removal jurisdiction is broader b y emphasizing the ad jec t ive that introduces su bsection (c): “Any” cover e d action. §77p(c). B u t that sug g estion would be persuasive only if we sto pped reading righ t there, an d we do not stop there; we do not read statutes in little bites. A n d , a s j u s tn o t e d , i f w e d i d readthe removal power th at broadly there would be no poin t to the phrase “as set forth in subsection (b),” for subse ction (b) cases would be remov

able anyway as a subset of covered class actions. Ibid

. The funds purport to counter this objection with their argument that on our reading the last phrase of subs ec tion (c) is redundant in providing that rem o ved cases “shall be s ubject to subsection (b ),” since s ubsection (b ) cases woul d in any ev ent be so s ubject. Ibi d

. T h e f u n d s are in fact right about that redundancy, but th e point does not count for their side, because the phrase is redundant on their reading, too: any subsection (b) case removed as falling within the broa d category of covered class action s would be treated in accordance wi th subsection (b) if the subsection applied to that case. In sum, we see no reason to reject th e straightfo rwar d read ing: removal and juris

diction to deal with remove d cases is limited to thos e precluded by the terms of subsection (b). Once remov a l jurisdiction under subsection (c) is under

stood to be restricted to pr ecl u ded actions definedby subsection (b), a motion to remand claiming the action is not preclu ded must be seen as posing a jurisdictional issue. If the action is precluded, neither the District Cour t nor the stat e court ma yentertain i t , and the p r oper cours e

——————

11 Like t h e Courtof Appea l s h e re, we s a id in Dab i tth at a “keypr ov i

sionof th e [Ac t ] makes all ‘c ov er ed c l ass ac tion s’ filed instate c o u r t r e m o v a b l e . ” 547U. S , at___, n. 7(sli p op., at10 , n. 7) (qu o ti ng 112 Stat

. 3230). We sket ch ed th e removalprovisi o n i nb r oad strokesth en b e caus e the qu e s tion of its sco p e w a s not befo re u s . Now th at it is, we spe a k more c a ut i o us ly .10 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Opinion of t h e Court 

### is to dismiss. If the action is not precluded, the federal court likewi s e has no j u risdiction to touch the case on t h e merits, and the proper course is t o remand to the state court that c an deal wit hit. In either event, as the Court of Appeals said, the district court’s o r der comes because it s adjudicator ypower has been ex ercised and its work is done. But its adjudicat o ry power i s simply its authority t o determine its own jur i sdiction to deal furth er with th e case, see United S t a t es v. Shipp, 2 03 U. S. 56 3, 573 (1906) (opinion for the Cour t byHolm es, J.) (A f e deral court “necessarily ha[s] juris d iction to d e cide whet her the cas e [is] properly before it”). Th e work done is jur i sdictional, 12

——————

12 Th e fu n d s ar gu e 15 U. S. C. §77p c o n f er s ju r i sdic tiong r eaterth an th at n e c e ssar yto r e n d erth e pr ec lu siondecision , an alog iz in g§77p(c ) to th e feder al offic err e mov a l s tatu te, 28 U. S. C. §1442( a). If th er e is an y c o lor able c l ai m th a tan ac tionis pr ec lu ded, th e ar g u men tg o es, th e dis t rictcourt ca n keep t h e ca s e for a d j u dica t i on, even a f t e r concluding onth e mer i ts th at th e s tate- l aw c l aim s ar e n o t pr ec lu ded; bu t bec a u s e itha s dis cret i on t o keep t h e ca s e or remand t o s t a t e court , arema nd is n o t ju r i sdic tio n al an d h e n c e is r e v i ew able. Th e ar g u men tis flaw ed fo r t w o rea s ons . The Dis t rictCourthe re did notindica t e it t h oughtt h e r e wa s a n y b a s is t o keep t h e ca s e for furt he r development ; rightorwro ng , itunders t ood t h a titwa s ma king aj uris d ict i ona lruling. Nor is t h e analogy with f e deral officer cases sound. Sec t ion1 442( a) is anex c e p t ionto th e “w ell-pleadedc o mplain t ” r u l e, under which ( absent d i versity) “a d efendant may not remove a case to feder al c o u r tu n l ess th e pla i n t iff’s c o mpla in t est abli s h e s th at th e c a s e ‘arises under’ federal law.” Franch ise T a

x Bd. of Cal. v. Constr uction Laborers V a c a tion Trust for SouthernCal., 463U. S

. 1 , 10 (1983 ) (emph a sis del e ted). The federaloffi c e r r e m o v a lstat u t e all o w s “s u i tsa g ai n s t fe der a l off ic er s [t o] be r e mov e d de sp ite th enonf e d er al c a st o f th e co m pl ain t , ” Je ffe rs on Coun tyv. A c k er, 527U. S

. 423 , 431 (1999), a n d reflec tsa co ngressi onalp o li cy th at “f ed e r al of fi ce rs , a n d inde ed th e Fe de ralGo v ern m en t itself, requ ir e th e p r otec tion o f a f e d e r al f o ru m, ” Will ingh a mv. Morgan, 395 U. S

. 402 , 407 (1969). An offi c e r’sfeder al defen se need b e only color able t oas sure th e feder al cour t th atit h a sj u r i sdi c ti on to adjudi

catethe c a se, see Ac k e r , su pra, at431

. The fun d s assert th at a pre c lu sion d e f e n s e ne ed be on ly co lor ableas w e l l , bu t th e Ac t i sdiff er e n t
. It av a i ls a d efe n d an t o f a f e d e r al for u mi n con t e m plation not of fur th e r litig atio n over the merits o f a claim br ough t11 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h e Court 

### as is th e conclusion reached and the order i m plementi ng it. 13

—————— i nstat e c o ur t , b u tof ter m i n ati on of the proceedi ng saltogeth er, a n d a m e rely c o l o rab l eclai mof p r e c l u s i o ndo esnots at i s f y

adis tric tc o u r t th a tit may dismissa case aspr ec lu ded b y th e Ac t. There is no r o om for s uch a c a seto ex i s t i na li m b o of c o lor ab l epr ec lu sion ; if a c l aim is prec lu de d, it
“ m ay [n o t] bem a in ta in ed ,” 1 5U. S

. C. §7 7 p (b ), an d i f th ec l ai m i s n o t, th e fe der a l c o ur ts no lon g er h ave an y bu sine ss be ing invo lv ed, as ther e is no long er a ny federal qu estion on which t o moor th e district cour t ’ sj u r i sdic

t i on . Norh a sCon gr e s sex p r e s s e d in th e Ac t, a si tdi d w i th 28 U. S. C. §1442(a) , a ny poli cy of h avi ng par t i c u l ar s u its tried in afeder alc o ur t ; th e r e i s n o i n di c a t i onw h at s o e v er i nth e Ac t t h a t , a p ar t fr o mi t s pu r p o s e t o prec lu de c e r t ain vexing stat e-law classa c ti ons , Congress int e nded t oadd oth e r state- law case s to th e fe der a l d o c k et s, an d th er eis n oa p p ar e n t feder a l in terestins p ending time on such cas e s ak in to th e in t e r e stin adjudi c ati ng suitsa g ai n s t feder aloffi c er s .

13 Th e fu n d s su gg est, inth e a l ter n ativ e , th atappel l ate ju r i sdic tionin t h is ca s e wa s proper under Waco v. Unite dStates Fid e l i ty & Guarant y Co., 293 U. S. 140 (1 93 4). With ou t pass i n gonth e c o n t in u e d v i talityof th at c a se in li g h t of §14 47(d ) , w e n o te th at onit s ow nter m s i t is dis t in

g u ish able.

In Waco, aca s e wa s removed t o federa l courto na ni n voca t i on of divers it y j uris d ict i on, id., at 141, an d th e D i str i c tCou r tth er eafter “entered a sin g le decree embodying . . . sep a rate orders.” Id., at 142. I n one order , t h e Dis t rictCourtdis m iss e d a cros s - compla inta g a i ns tone pa rt y. In a n ot her, t h e Dis t rictCourtco ncluded t h a tb e ca us e of t h e dis m is sa l t h ere wa s no divers it y of cit i zens hip a n d itt hus la cked ju r i sdic tion , an d so it r e man d ed th e c a se t o state c o u r t
. Anappeal w a s taken from the order of di smissal. Th is Cou r tdeter m in ed th at t h e appeal w o u l dlie, bec a u s e “th e dec r e e of dismi s s a l pr ec eded th at o f rema nd,” a n d b e ca us e t h e Dis t rictCou r t ’ s orderof dis m is sa l wa s conclus ive upo nt h e pa rt ies

. Id., at 1 43. We n o ted th a ta “r ev er sal [o f the dism issal] cannot affect the order of remand, but i t will at least, i f t h e dis m iss a l .

. . wa s errone ous , remi tt h e ent i re cont rovers y, wit ht h e [pr e v i ou slydismis sed p a r t y] sti ll apar t y , to th e s tate c o u r tfor

. . . furt herprocee dings

. ” Id., at 143 –1 44.

The order appealed in Waco wa s nota rema nd order; t h e order he re is, an d th u s f a lls w i th in§1 447(d)’s baro nappeal s of “ [ a]nor derr e man d in ga c a s e ” to s tate c o u r t. M o r e ov er , th e fu n d s do n o t ex plainh o w t o recon c ile t h eir a r g u men twit h Waco ’s ac kn ow ledg emen t th at th e order of remand “cannot [be ] affect[ed]” no twithstanding any re versal of a separ a te or der , id., a t1 4 3

. The Dis t rictCourt ’s rema nd order he r e12 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Opinion of t h e Court 

### III We have yet to deal with one objection to our application of §1447(d), which if well-taken would be a serious on e. The Seventh Circuit’s reading of subsection (c) so as to treat the application of the preclusion rule as nonjurisdictional was in part motiv a ted by its assumption that the Ac t gives fede ral courts e x clusive jur i sdiction to decide the preclusion issue. If t hat is so, and §1447( d) applies, aremand order based on a finding that an action is not precluded would arguably b e immune f r om review. This is wh at the fund s in effect contend here when th ey say that a district co urt’s findin g of no su bsection (b) preclusion would collaterally estop the state court on remand; the district court would have the lastword. And of course the funds’ discomfort is made acute by our rece n t decision in Dabi t , which expre ssly disavows the district cour t’s limited v i ew of the scope of subsection (b) preclusion. But a distri ct court doe s not have the last word on pre

clusion under the Act, for nothing in the Act gives the federal courts exclusive jurisd iction over pre c lusion deci

sions. A covered actio nis removable if it is p r ecluded, and a defendant can enlis t the Federal Judiciary to decide preclusion, but a defendant can elect to leave a case where the plaintiff filed it an d trust the state court (an equall y competent body, see Missouri P a cific R. Co. v. Fit z gerald, 160 U. S. 556, 583 (1896)) to make the preclusion determi

nation. And what a state court could do in the first place it may also do on remand; in this case, the funds can presentl y argue the significance of Dabitan d ask for dismissal on grounds of preclusion when they return to th e state court.

—————— c a n n o t be di s a g g r eg ated as th e Waco orders could, a n d if t h e S e vent h Circuit ’ s preclus i on decis i on s t a n ds , t h ere is not h ing t o r e ma nd t o st a t e court
.13 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h e Court 

### Collateral estoppel should be no bar to such a revisitation of the preclusion issue, 14

### given tha t §1447(d) prevents the funds from appealing the DistrictCourt’s de cision. Se e Standeferv. United Sta t es, 447 U. S. 10, 23 (1980) (“[C]ontemp o rary prin ciples of collateral estoppel .

. . strongly militat[e] against gi ving an [unreviewable judg

ment] preclusive effect” (citing R e statement (Second) of Judgments §68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976)); see als o Re

statement (Second) of Judgments §28(1) (1980) (“Althou gh an issue is actually li tigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, an d the determination is essential t o the judgment, relitigation of the issue inasubsequ e nt action between the parties is notprecluded [when t]h e party a g ainst whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of la w, have obt a ined re view of the judgment in the initial action”). Whil e the state c o urt cannot review the decision to remand in an appella te way, it is perfectly fr ee to reject th e remanding court ’ s re asoning, as we explained over a century ago in Missouri P a cific Rail way : “[A]s to applications for remo val on the groundth at the cau s e arose under the Constitution, laws, or tre aties of the United Sta t es,” the finality acco rded rema nd orders is appropriate because qu estions of this character “if decided against the claimant” in state court are “open to revision

. . ., irrespective of the ruling of the [federal court] in that regard in th e matter of removal.” 160 U. S., at 583. Nor is there any reason to s e e things differently just because the remand’s b a sis coincides entire ly with the m e rits of the federal question; it is only the forum designation that is conclusive. Here, we have no reason to doubt that th e state court will duly apply Dabi t ’s holding that holder

——————

14 Moder nus a g e ca lls for t h e des cript ive term, “issue preclusion,” in place of “collateral estoppel.” But we are backsliders out of pity for the t i red rea d er; “preclus ion” b ys t a t u t o ry fiat is enough pre c lus i on for one opinion.14 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Opinion of t h e Court 

### claims are embraced by subsection (b), 15 

### but a n y claim of error on th at point ca n be considered on review by this Court. See Fra n chiseTa x B d

. of Ca l. v. C o nstr ucti onLa

borersVacation Tr ustfor Southern Cal., 46 3 U. S. 1 , 12 , n . 1 2 ( 1 9 8 3 ) (“ If the state courts rejec ta claim of federal pre

emption, that decision may ultimately be reviewed on appeal by t h is Court” (citing Fidelity Fed. Sa v. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cues ta, 4 58 U. S. 141 (1982))). IV We hold that the Act does not exempt remand order s from 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) and its general rule of nonap

pealability. We ther efore vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap peals and remand the case with i n structions to dismiss the appeal for lack of juris d iction. It is so orde red.

——————

15 The p ar t ie s fu rth e r di spu t e whe ther th e i nvestor s ’claims s atis f y th e oth e r 15 U. S. C. § 77p( b ) prec lu sion p r er e qu i site s, p ar t icu l ar ly th e alleg a t i o n o f f r a u d ; t h einves t ors ta ke is s u e wit h t h e S e vent h Circuit ’ s cha ra c ter i zationof t h eirc l aims as c h a r g ingfr au d orman i pu lation , n o t m i s ma na gement
. Beca us e t h e Courtof Appeals lacked a ppellate ju r i sdic tion , i t s r e adin gof th e in v e stors’ litiga t ion position i s n o t binding in fut ure pro c eedings and i so p e n t oc o n s i d e r a t i o no nr e m a n d

._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of S CALI A , J. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–4 09 

### CARL KIR C HE R, ET AL 

### ., PETITIONE R S v. PUTNAM FUN D S T R UST ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SEVE NTH CIRCUI T [Ju n e 15, 2006 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALI A 

### , concu rring in pa rt and conc urring i n the judgme nt. I join the ju dgment of the Court, and Parts I, III, and IV of the Cour t’s opinion; I do not j o in Part II for the reasons set forth below. The Distric tCourt or dered these cases remanded to state court for want of jurisdiction. We know this because the orders say so: “Beca u se the Court lac k s subj ect matte r jurisdiction, the Court REMANDS this action to the Madison County, Illinois Circuit Court.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a; see also id. , at 30a, 40a, 46a, 51a, 57a, 64a. Even if those decisions were inco rrect, the Court of A p peals lacked jurisdic tion to review them because 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) bars appellate r e view of remand orders based on lack of subj ect-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Things R e membered, Inc. v. Petrarc a, 5 16 U. S. 12 4, 12 7– 128 (19 9 5 )

. T h e C o u r tc o r r e c t l y c o n c l u d e s t h a tt h e S e v enth Circui t ’s review o f the remand orders ov erstepped it s appellate authority. I disagree with the Court’s reasoning in Part II, however, because it holds only thatthe Court of Appeals’ recharacteriz a tion was incorrect, a n d not (as I believe) that recharacterization—being a for m of review

— is categorically forbidden. The Court of Appeals reje cted the District Court’s de

scription of its orders because it believed the Distric t2 KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST Opinion of S CALI A , J. 

### Court had been too lo ose in its use of the term “jurisdic

tion.” 373 F. 3d 847, 849–850 (2004). What the Distri ct Court ac t u al l y did, the Court of A p peals concluded, was to remand on nonjurisdictional gro unds ( not s ubject to t h e appellate-review bar of §1447(d)) after deciding that peti

tioners’ suits were not preclude d. Such recha r acterizatio n seems to me flatly inconsistent with §1447(d). Under tha t section, an “order re manding a case to the State co urt from which it was rem o ved is not revie wabl e on appeal or otherwise.” Ibid. (emphasis added). But appe llate review is exactly what is involved in looking behind the face of an order to determine its truebasis: In order to reject a di s trict court ’ s own chara cterization, a court of a ppeals must decide, as the Seventh Circuit didhere, that the distric t court was wrong. W e have therefore held, in language that ma kes plain the correct out c ome here, that “[i]f a tri al judge pu rpo r ts to remand a case on the ground that it wa s removed ‘improvidently and wi thout juris d iction,’ his order is not subject to challenge in the court of appeal, by mandamus, or otherwise.” Th erm t ron Prod ucts, In c. v. He rm a n sdo r f

e r

, 4 2 3 U

. S

. 3 3 6 , 3 4 3 ( 1 9 7 6 ) (quoting §1447(c) (1970 ed.); emphasis a dded). Wh ether the District Court was right o rwrong—even if it was so badly mistaken that it misunderstood the true basis forits orders—it purported to remand for lack of jurisdiction, and §1447 (d) bars any further revi ew.* Review of the sort engaged in by the Court o f Appeals threatens to defeat the purpose of §1447(d). As we reco g nized in Thermtron Pro ducts , the appellate-review bar was enacted “to prevent delay in the tri al of remanded cases by

——————

* Tosa y t h atwe ca nnotrec h a r a c t e r i ze t h e Dis t r i ct Cou r t ’ srema nd for la ck of j uris d ict i on is nott o s a y t h a tt h e ba s i s for t h e re ma nd is forever insulated from review. Part III of the Court’s opinion makes clear that the underlying legal is sue of preclusi on rema ins open in s t a t e court , a n d need notb e res o lved in a ccorda n ce wit ht h e (u nre viewa b l e) views of t h e Dis t rictCourt

.3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of S CALI A , J. 

### protrac t ed l i tigation of jurisdictional issues.” Id. , at 351. Such delay can be created just as e a sily by asking whethe r the district court corre ctly c hara c terized the basis for it s order as it can by askin gwhether that basis was correct— which even the Court of Appeals recognized was beyond its jurisdiction, 373 F. 3d, at 849

. See also The r mtron Products , supr a , at 343 (noting that §1447( d) “prohibits review of all remand orders [based on lackof subjectmatter ju risdiction] w h ether err o neous or not”). Th e remand orders in these cases date back to early 2004; ove r two years later, federal cou rts are still engaged in appel

late review. The Court should end this delay b yholding that appel

late courts cannot look behind the stated basis for the district court’s remandorder. In stead, it co ncludes that “the Distric tCourt wa s corr ectin understanding its re

mand order to be dictated by a finding that it lacked re

moval jurisdiction.” Ante , at 8 (e mphasis added). It seems to me no more within our autho rity to declar e the District Court’s views correct than it was within the Court of Appeals’ au thority to r eject them. Eitherdecision is an exercise of appellate review barred by the pl ain terms of §1447(d).