COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1034-97-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 NOVEMBER 18, 1997 

GAIL HOWARD BLOWE 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Ingrid E. Olson (Richard Cullen, Attorney 

General; Peter R. Messitt, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellant. 

 Gregory Camden (John H. Klein; Matthew H. 

Kraft; Rutter & Montagna, L.L.P., on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Virginia Commonwealth University (employer) appeals an award 

of temporary total disability, and related benefits, by the 

Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) to Gail H. Blowe 

(claimant). Employer argues that the evidence failed to 

establish that claimant's "psychological problems were a 

compensable consequence" of an earlier injury which was 

compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). We 

disagree and affirm the award. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 Guided by well-established principles, we construe the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing 

below, claimant in this instance. Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner 

Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. App, 503, 504, 339 S.E.2d 916, 916 (1986). 

"If there is evidence, or reasonable inferences can be drawn from 

the evidence, to support the commission's findings, they will not 

be disturbed on review, even though there is evidence in the 

record to support a contrary finding." Morris v. Badger 

Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876, 

877 (1986); Code § 65.2-706(A). This Court does not "retry the 

facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own 

determination of the credibility of the witnesses." Wagner 

Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 

(1991) (citation omitted). A "determination of causation is a 

factual finding." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 684, 

688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). 

 [W]here a causal connection between the 

initial compensable injury and the subsequent 

injury is established, the doctrine of 

compensable consequences extends the coverage 

of the [Act] to the subsequent injury . . . 

"as if it occurred in the course of and 

arising out of the . . . employment." 

Bartholow Drywall Co. v. Hill, 12 Va. App. 790, 794, 407 S.E.2d 

1, 3 (1991) (citation omitted). Thus, psychological injury 

resulting from compensable physical injury is likewise 

compensable, Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 14 Va. App. 45, 

48-49, 415 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1992), provided claimant establishes 

the requisite nexus. Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va. App. 357, 
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362, 412 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1991). 

 Claimant was originally awarded benefits resulting from 

carpal tunnel syndrome.1

 Subsequently, she was compensated for 

several periods of related temporary total and partial 

disability, the most recent award concluding on May 19, 1995. On 

March 20, 1996, claimant again sought temporary total benefits, 

commencing February 29, 1996, for a psychiatric disability and 

attendant treatment, as a "reasonable and natural consequence of 

her work-related injury . . . ." The commission concluded that 

claimant had "met her burden of proving a compensable consequence 

of the industrial accident" and awarded benefits, prompting this 

appeal by employer. 

 Immediately before claimant's psychiatric consult, she had 

visited Dr. Adelaar, her treating orthopaedic/hand surgeon, 

complaining of "a lot of swelling in her hand," which had 

persisted for a "period of time," and "continu[ed] . . . problems 

in her employment position."2 Dr. Adelaar "detect[ed]" no 

"problems" and claimant began treating with Dr. Agarwal, a 

psychiatrist, on February 29, 1996, following a referral by her 

"primary care physician." 

 Dr. Agarwal initially noted that claimant reported 

 1Employer does not challenge this award in the instant 

proceeding. 

 2In an effort to accommodate claimant's restrictions and 

discomfort, employer changed her work assignment on several 

occasions. 
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"work-related stress" and "continue[d] . . . pain" and 

"disability due to pain" which rendered her "[un]able to do 

original work." In correspondence to claimant's counsel, Dr. 

Agarwal observed that claimant was "still . . . encountering much 

pain" in "doing her job" and "daily duties" as a result of her 

"work-related injury," "creat[ing] much difficulty," including 

"depression-related . . . job stress," and the need for 

psychiatric care. Dr. Agarwal's evidence was consistent with 

claimant's testimony and other evidence before the commission. 

 Accordingly, the commission's finding that claimant's 

psychological disorder was a compensable consequence of an 

earlier compensable injury is supported by the record, and we 

affirm the attendant award. 

 Affirmed.