** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

---oOo---

ESTATE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES LLC, Interim Personal 

Representative for the Estate of Philip Finn, 

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

SIONE P. MOHULAMU, FALAULA TINOGA, SR., and SAMANTHA KALIKO, 

Respondents/Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

CHRISTY TIGILAU, 

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

SCWC-19-0000050

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-19-0000050; CASE NO. 1RC181008145) 

JUNE 19, 2020

McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ., WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J., 

DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-19-0000050

19-JUN-2020

02:54 PM
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I. Introduction

This certiorari proceeding arises out of the Intermediate 

Court of Appeals’ (“ICA”) dismissal of a January 23, 2019 appeal 

filed by Christy Tigilau (“Tigilau”). Tigilau appealed a 

judgment and writ of possession filed on January 10, 2019 by the 

District Court of the First Circuit, Waiʻanae Division (“district 

court”) in an ejectment case.1

Pursuant to Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 607-3 (2016), 

Hawaiʻi state courts have discretionary power to waive the 

prepayment of court costs where payment appears onerous.2 Court 

rules also provide judges with discretion to waive costs, 

1 According to Queen Emma Found. v. Tingco, 74 Haw. 294, 300 n.5, 845 

P.2d 1186, 1189 n.5 (1992):

Ejectment is a common law action once used to recover 

possession of land and for damages for the unlawful 

detention of its possession. The lessor or real party in 

interest had to establish title in order to warrant 

recovery. The common law action for ejectment has been 

modified by statute in many states and may come under the 

title of action for summary process, action for eviction, 

or forcible entry and detainer actions. See Black’s Law 

Dictionary 516 (6th ed. 1990).

74 Haw. at 300 n.5, 845 P.2d at 1189 n.5. According to Hawaiʻi Revised 

Statutes § 604-6 (2016), district courts have jurisdiction over ejectment 

proceedings where title to real estate does not come in question. 

2 HRS § 607-3 (2016) states, “The judges of all the courts of the State 

shall have discretionary power to waive the prepayment of costs or to reduce 

or remit costs where, in special or extraordinary cases, the cost of any 

suit, action, or proceeding may, to the judges, appear onerous.”
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including Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule (“HRAP”) Rule 

24 (2016),3 which provides in relevant part as follows:

(a) Leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis from 

the . . . district . . . court . . . to the Hawaiʻi 

appellate courts. A motion for leave to proceed on 

appeal in forma pauperis from the . . . district . . .

court . . . shall ordinarily be made in the first instance 

to the court . . . appealed from.

A party to an action in the . . . district . . . 

court . . . who desires to proceed on appeal in forma 

pauperis may file in the appellate court a motion for leave 

to so proceed. The motion shall be accompanied by an 

affidavit or declaration, showing, in the detail prescribed 

by Form 4 of the Appendix of Forms, the party’s inability 

to pay the required filing fees or to give security for 

costs, the party’s belief that [the party] is entitled to 

redress, and a statement of the issues that the party 

intends to present on appeal. If the appeal is from a 

court, the motion shall show that application to the court 

appealed from for the relief sought is not 

practicable . . . .

. . . .

(c) Effect of denial of motion for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis. If the motion to proceed in forma pauperis

is denied the movant shall, within 10 days after the denial 

of such a motion, pay all unpaid filing fees and shall give 

security for costs. Failure of the unsuccessful movant to 

pay the unpaid filing fees or to give security for costs 

shall not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground 

for such action as the appellate court having jurisdiction 

over the appeal deems appropriate, and may include 

dismissal of the appeal.

Tigilau filed two motions to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) on appeal to the ICA. The first motion provided little 

information regarding Tigilau’s financial status, but the second 

3 Other rules include Rule 2.2(19) (2013) of the Rules of the Circuit 

Courts of the State of Hawaiʻi and Rule 2.2(13) (2013) of the Rules of the 

District Courts of the State of Hawaiʻi, which both provide in part that 

“[t]he court may waive costs and fees for good cause shown.” 
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motion provided much greater detail. In denying both motions, 

the ICA ordered Tigilau to follow the portion of HRAP Rule 24(a) 

stating that “[a] motion for leave to proceed on appeal [IFP] 

. . . shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to the 

court . . . appealed from.” The ICA ordered Tigilau to either 

file an IFP motion in the district court within ten days or pay 

the filing fees in full. The ICA also did not address whether 

requiring Tigilau to pay the filing fees would be onerous under

HRS § 607-3. After Tigilau did not file an IFP motion or pay 

filing fees within ten days of the second order, on June 20, 

2019, the ICA dismissed Tigilau’s appeal on that basis. 

Tigilau is a self-represented defendant appealing a writ of 

possession in a residential ejectment case. We hold that, under 

the circumstances, the ICA abused its discretion in ordering 

Tigilau to file IFP motions in the district court, in denying 

Tigilau’s second IFP motion based on HRS § 607-3 and HRAP Rule 

24, and then in dismissing her appeal. We further hold that, 

consistent with the fundamental tenet of Hawaiʻi law that 

submissions of self-represented litigants should be interpreted 

liberally, see Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc., 140 Hawaiʻi 226, 239, 

398 P.3d 815, 828 (2016), when courts have discretion in 

applying court rules or statutes, they must consider the access 
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to justice principle of reducing barriers to the civil justice 

system for self-represented litigants. 

We therefore vacate the ICA’s June 20, 2019 “Order 

Dismissing Appeal,” grant Tigilau’s motion to this court for IFP 

status on appeal, and remand this case to the ICA for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. Background

A. District court proceedings 

On December 7, 2018, Estate Administrative Services, LLC, 

Interim Personal Representative for the Estate of Philip Finn 

(“Estate Services”) filed a complaint for ejectment in district 

court. The complaint alleged that Philip Finn was the owner of 

a property and that various people, including Tigilau, were 

occupying the property without a rental agreement or an 

ownership interest in the property and refused to vacate. After 

various proceedings, on January 10, 2019, the district court 

entered a judgment for possession and issued a writ of 

possession as to Tigilau. On January 20, 2019, Tigilau was 

served with the judgment for possession and writ of possession, 

as well as notice of Estate Services’ intent to execute the writ 

of possession. On February 13, 2019, Tigilau was removed from 

the property by deputy sheriffs.
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B. ICA proceedings

On January 23, 2019, Tigilau filed a notice of appeal in 

the ICA. 

Tigilau filed a motion to proceed IFP along with her notice 

of appeal, stating that she could not afford the costs of the 

appeal (“first IFP motion”).4 On January 25, 2019, the ICA 

entered an order denying Tigilau’s first IFP motion. The order 

stated in relevant part:

(2) “A motion for leave to proceed on appeal

[IFP] . . . shall ordinarily be made in the 

first instance to the court . . . appealed 

from.” HRAP Rule 24(a). Exceptions exist if 

the motion shows “that application to the court 

appealed from for the relief sought is not 

practicable, or that the court appealed from 

has denied an application, or has failed to 

afford the requested relief, with the reasons 

given by the court appealed from for its 

action.” Id.; and

(3) Tigilau fails to demonstrate compliance with 

HRAP Rule 24(a), or that any exceptions apply 

here.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is 

denied without prejudice to Tigilau seeking relief in 

the underlying case, as follows:

(1) Within ten (10) days from the date of this 

order, Tigilau shall either (i) file in the 

underlying case a motion for leave to proceed 

4 In deciding whether an IFP motion should be granted, with the obvious 

exception of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it is an abuse of 

discretion for a court to address the merits of the legal issues a party 

seeking IFP status seeks to raise. See Blaisdell v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 

113 Hawaiʻi 315, 320-21, 151 P.3d 796, 801-02 (2007). We therefore do not 

address the merits of Tigilau’s defenses in the district court or the issues 

she seeks to raise on appeal.
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on appeal [IFP] that complies with HRAP Rule 

24(a), or (ii) pay the filing fees in the full 

amount to the Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. 

Failure to file in the underlying case a motion 

for leave to proceed on appeal [IFP] or pay the 

filing fees may result in the appeal being 

dismissed. See HRAP Rule 24(c)[.]

Thus, the ICA ordered Tigilau to file an IFP motion in the 

district court or pay the filing fee within 10 days. She did 

neither. Instead, on February 7, 2019, Tigilau filed a second 

motion for leave to proceed on appeal IFP in the ICA (“second 

IFP motion”). This time, Tigilau submitted a notarized Form 4 

to the HRAP, an “Affidavit to Accompany Motion for Leave to 

Appeal [IFP].” In the affidavit, Tigilau attested under oath 

that January 6, 2011 had been the last date she had been 

employed and that her monthly wage at the time had been $560.00. 

She also attested that she had not received any income within 

the last twelve months; she did not have any cash or a checking 

or savings account; and she did not own any real estate, stocks, 

bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding 

ordinary household furnishings and clothing).

On June 4, 2019, the ICA entered an order denying Tigilau’s 

second IFP motion.5 The ICA denied the second IFP motion on the 

5 In the meantime, Tigilau filed a jurisdictional statement on February 

7, 2019, and another jurisdictional statement and a motion for a thirty-day 

extension to file her opening brief on May 20, 2019. The district court 

(continued. . .)
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same grounds as the first, and again ordered Tigilau to file an 

IFP motion in the district court or pay the filing fees within 

ten days or risk dismissal of her appeal.6 The ICA stated in 

relevant part:

(1) On January 25, 2019, the court denied Tigilau’s 

January 23, 2019 motion for leave to proceed on appeal 

[IFP] without prejudice to her seeking relief in the 

underlying district court case . . . because she did not 

demonstrate that she first sought relief in the underlying 

case, consistent with [HRAP Rule 24(a)] or that any 

exceptions applied;

(2) Tigilau again seeks leave to proceed on appeal 

[IFP];

(3) “A motion for leave to proceed on appeal 

[IFP] . . . shall ordinarily be made in the first instance 

to the court . . . appealed from.” HRAP Rule 24(a). 

Exceptions exist if the motion shows “that application to 

the court appealed from for the relief sought is not 

practicable, or that the court appealed from has denied an 

application, or has failed to afford the requested relief, 

with the reasons given by the court appealed from for its 

action.” Id. Again, Tigilau fails to demonstrate 

compliance with HRAP Rule 24(a), or that any exceptions 

apply here;[7]

(continued. . .)

clerk filed a record on appeal and amended records on appeal on February 27 

and 28, and May 23, 2019. 

6 Both orders of denial also did not give Tigilau the option of stating 

whether filing a motion in the district court would not be practicable, as 

provided by HRAP Rule 24(a).

7 The ICA also stated as follows, which is not relevant based on 

Blaisdell, supra note 4, and which, in any event, was not a basis upon which 

Tigilau’s appeal was eventually dismissed, as the dismissal was based solely 

on Tigilau’s alleged failure to comply with HRAP Rule 24:

(4) In addition, Tigilau is required to serve a filed copy 

of the notice of appeal on each other party, and file a 

proof of service within seven days after filing the notice 

of appeal. HRAP Rule 3(e)(1). Further, Tigilau is 

required to serve all other parties with all documents she 

(continued. . .)
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. . . .

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is 

denied without prejudice to Tigilau seeking relief in the 

underlying district court case . . . as follows:

(1) Within ten (10) days from the date of 

this order, Tigilau shall either (i) file in 

the underlying case a motion for leave to 

proceed on appeal [IFP] that complies with HRAP 

Rule 24(a), or (ii) pay the filing fees in the 

full amount to the Supreme Court Clerk’s 

Office. Failure to file in the underlying case 

a motion for leave to proceed on appeal [IFP]

or pay the filing fees may result in the appeal 

being dismissed. See HRAP Rule 24(c)[.8]

. . . .

Tigilau did not pay the appellate filing fee or file a 

motion for leave to proceed on appeal IFP in the district court 

case within ten days.9 Then, on June 20, 2019, the ICA entered 

(continued. . .)

files in this appeal, and file proof of service of the 

documents. See HRAP Rule 25(b)-(d). The record does not 

reflect that Tigilau served Defendants-Appellees Sione P. 

Mohulamu, Falaula Tinoga, Sr., or Samantha Kaliko with the 

notice of appeal, the instant Motion, or any other 

documents she filed in this appeal. 

 

8 The ICA furthered ordered as follows, which is not relevant to the 

issues in this certiorari proceeding, see supra notes 4 and 7: 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within ten days from the 

date of this order, Tigilau shall file a certificate 

of service, consistent with HRAP Rule 25(b) through

(d), indicating she served Defendants-Appellees Sione 

P. Mohulamu, Falaula Tinoga, Sr., and Samantha Kaliko 

with filed copies of every document she filed in this 

appeal. Failure to timely comply with this order may 

result in sanctions.

9 On June 18, 2019, in response to the portion of the ICA’s order

discussed in note 7, supra, Tigilau filed a motion requesting the addresses 

of all the other named defendants. Tigilau explained that she needed 

(continued. . .)
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an “Order Dismissing Appeal.”10 In this order, the ICA repeated 

the procedural history above regarding Tigilau’s motions to 

proceed IFP. The ICA stated in relevant part as follows:

(8) On June 4, 2019, the court, among other things, 

denied Tigilau’s February 7, 2019 motion for 

leave to proceed [IFP] again without prejudice 

to Tigilau, within ten days from the order, 

either filing in the underlying case a motion

for leave to proceed on appeal [IFP] that 

complied with HRAP Rule 24(a), or paying the 

filing fees in the full amount. . . . The 

court again cautioned Tigilau that “[f]ailure 

to file in the underlying case a motion for 

leave to proceed on appeal [IFP] or pay the 

filing fees may result in the appeal being 

dismissed. See HRAP Rule 24(c);”

(9) Tigilau has not paid the filing fees, filed in 

the underlying case a motion for leave to 

proceed on appeal [IFP], or taken any further 

action in this appeal.[11] Consistent with the 

(continued. . .)

addresses for Sione P. Mohulamu, Falaula Tinoga, Sr., and Samantha Kaliko in 

order to serve them, in compliance with the ICA’s order. Tigilau included a 

declaration stating the following:

(1) That I am not a lawyer;

(2) That I was only defending myself;

(3) That I have not been given adequate, effective 

and meaningful access to any of the courts in 

the State of Hawaii.

(4) That I need the addresses of Sione P. Mohulamu, 

Falaula Tinoga Sr., Samantha Kaliko to gain 

adequate, effective and meaningful access to 

this Honorable Court.

10 Although no stipulation existed, the document signed by the ICA was 

actually captioned “Order Approving Stipulation to Dismiss Appeal.” On July 

12, 2019, a single-judge order was entered correcting the title of the 

document to “Order Dismissing Appeal.” On February 13, 2020, after this 

court’s August 26, 2019 acceptance of certiorari, Tigilau filed a document 

requesting information regarding this correction. 

11 But see supra notes 9 and 13.
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June 4, 2019 order and HRAP Rule 24(c), 

dismissal of the appeal is warranted.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal 

is dismissed.[12]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions

are dismissed.[13]

The ICA concluded that dismissal of Tigilau’s appeal was 

warranted based on its prior rulings and HRAP Rule 24(c), and it 

dismissed Tigilau’s appeal. 

12 The ICA also stated as follows:

(5) On February 27, 2019, the district court clerk 

filed the record on appeal and the appellate 

clerk notified Tigilau that the statement of 

jurisdiction and opening brief were due on or 

before March 11, 2019, and April 8, 2019, 

respectively;

(6) Tigilau failed to timely file either document 

or request an extension of time, and therefore 

is in default;

(7) On May 20, 2019, Tigilau filed a late statement 

of jurisdiction without the court’s permission, 

and a motion for extension of time for the 

opening brief[.]

As Tigilau had never been placed on notice that these issues could result in 

dismissal of her appeal, which would have made dismissal on any of these 

bases improper, see In re Marn Family Litig., 132 Hawaiʻi 165, 170, 319 P.3d 

1173, 1178 (2014), and because the language of the ICA’s dismissal order 

indicates that dismissal of Tigilau’s appeal was based solely HRAP Rule 24, 

we do not further discuss these matters. 

13 Tigilau had filed a motion for a thirty-day extension to file her 

opening brief on May 20, 2019 and a motion for the clerk of the court to give 

her the addresses of the other parties on June 18, 2019.
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C. Certiorari application

On July 10, 2019, Tigilau filed an application for writ of 

certiorari. In relevant part, Tigilau explains that she “feels 

that this Honorable Court is prejudice[d] against her for not 

having the funds necessary to pay [the appellate filing fee].” 

Tigilau also states she “knows that she must file a motion for 

leave to proceed on appeal [IFP] per court that she enters.[14] 

Therefore as mentioned she did file her motion for leave to 

proceed on appeal [IFP].” 

Along with her certiorari application, Tigilau filed a 

motion to proceed IFP on appeal, which we grant. 

III. Standards of review

A. Interpretation of statutes and court rules 

“When interpreting rules promulgated by the court, 

principles of statutory construction apply.” Kawamata Farms, 

Inc. v. United Agri Products, 86 Hawaiʻi 214, 255, 948 P.2d 1055, 

1096 (1997) (quoting State v. Baron, 80 Hawaiʻi 107, 113, 905 

P.2d 613, 619 (1995)). “The standard of review for statutory 

construction is well-established. The interpretation of a 

14 It thus appears Tigilau’s understanding was that the IFP motion must be 

filed in the court she seeks to access, which is not an unreasonable 

understanding. 
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statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo.” 

Id. (quoting State v. Wells, 78 Hawaiʻi 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 

73 (1995)).

B. Ruling on a motion to proceed IFP

A court’s ruling on a motion to proceed IFP is reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion. Blaisdell, 113 Hawaiʻi at 319, 151 P.3d 

at 800. An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court has 

clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or has disregarded rules 

or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of 

a party litigant. State v. Davia, 87 Hawaiʻi 249, 253, 953 P.2d 

1347, 1351 (1998) (internal quotation mark and citations 

omitted).

IV. Discussion

A. Under the circumstances, the ICA abused its discretion in 

requiring Tigilau to file an IFP motion in the district court, 

by denying her second IFP motion, and by dismissing her appeal

Tigilau filed two motions to proceed IFP on appeal. The 

ICA denied both motions based solely on language in HRAP Rule 

24(a), which provides in part that “[a] motion for leave to 

proceed on appeal [IFP] . . . shall ordinarily be made in the 

first instance to the court . . . appealed from.” 

In denying Tigilau’s two IFP motions, the ICA ordered that 

she either file an IFP motion in the district court within ten 
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days or pay filing fees in full. The ICA also stated in both 

orders that her failure to comply could result in a dismissal of 

Tigilau’s appeal pursuant to HRAP Rule 24(c). As the ICA orders 

denying Tigilau’s first and second IFP motions recognized, 

however, HRAP Rule 24 does not require a litigant to file an IFP 

motion in the court appealed from. 

Although subsection (a) of HRAP Rule 24 provides (with 

emphasis added) that an IFP motion “shall ordinarily be made in 

the first instance to the court . . . appealed from[,]” it also 

provides that “[a] party to an action in the . . . 

district . . . court . . . who desires to proceed on 

appeal [IFP] may file in the appellate court a motion for leave 

to so proceed” and that an IFP motion filed in an appellate 

court “shall show that application to the court appealed from

for the relief sought is not practicable” if an IFP motion has 

not been filed in the court appealed from. Thus, HRAP Rule 

24(a) does not actually require the filing of an IFP motion in 

the lower court, and it allows an IFP motion to be granted if 

filing a motion in the court appealed from would not be 

practicable.15

15 The dissent asserts that HRAP Rule 24(a) is unambiguous. For these 

reasons, we disagree. 
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In this regard, the language of HRAP Rule 24(a) indicating 

that an IFP motion shall ordinarily be made in the first 

instance to the court appealed from contemplates that the 

appellant was a party who was required to pay some costs below. 

That party is usually the plaintiff. At minimum, the structure 

of the rule contemplates that the court being appealed from 

would have greater information than the appellate court as to an 

appealing party’s ability to pay filing fees. This is not 

always the case, especially in an appeal brought by a selfrepresented defendant in an ejectment case. An appellate court 

would generally be just as readily able to evaluate whether a 

self-represented defendant would qualify for IFP status, based 

on financial information submitted to the appellate court. 

In addition, especially because Tigilau is a selfrepresented defendant appealing a writ of possession in a 

residential ejectment case, even if the ICA had discretion to 

order a remand, HRAP Rule 24(a) states that the appellant has 

the option of explaining why filing a motion in the lower court 

would not be practicable. This option was not provided to 

Tigilau, and the ICA had the discretion to address 

practicability on its own accord. 
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Moreover, ordering an appellant to file an IFP motion in

the district court does not promote efficiency. It takes very 

little time for an appellate court to address and decide an IFP 

motion. An appeal of a judgment and writ of possession is an 

urgent matter. And whether or not an appeal concerns an urgent 

matter, the interests of judicial economy make an order 

requiring an appellant to refile an IFP motion in a lower court 

even more impracticable, when the appellate court is readily 

able to evaluate an appellant’s IFP application. Unless there 

is a real concern that the financial information provided by an 

appellant is misleading or insufficient, and the appellate court 

has reason to believe that the lower court may be in a better 

position to evaluate the information, there would be little 

reason to require that an appellant first file a motion in the 

lower court. 

In Tigilau’s case, because of the urgency of her appeal in 

relation to the time it would take the district court to finally 

determine whether she would be granted IFP status, the ICA 

should have exercised its discretion to rule on her IFP motion. 

The ICA entered orders with instructions. The ICA orders would 

have required Tigilau to ascertain where and how to file an IFP 

motion in the district court. If such motion were filed, a 
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district court clerk would need to refer it to a district court 

judge, preferably the judge that entered the writ and judgment 

of possession. The district court judge would then need to 

review and decide the motion. The judge or clerk would 

thereafter need to enter an order granting or denying the 

motion, and also file a notice of its entry so that the ICA 

would be alerted. If the IFP motion were granted, the order 

granting IFP status would then need to come to the attention of 

ICA staff or judges so that the appeal could proceed. If the 

IFP motion were denied, Tigilau would have had the option of 

then filing another motion in the ICA pursuant to HRAP Rule 

24(a). Almost all of these intermediary steps would be avoided 

if the ICA ruled on the motion in the first instance, as it has 

discretion to do.16 

16 The dissent cites to Goo v. Arakawa, 132 Hawaiʻi 304, 317, 321 P.3d 655, 

668 (2014), for the proposition that “[r]emand to the lower court [for 

factual determinations] protects the ‘orderly operation of the judicial 

system’ by leaving fact-finding powers with the trial courts and review of 

the trial courts’ discretion to the appellate courts.” Goo addressed

situations where a fact-intensive inquiry could be required in order to 

determine whether mootness on appeal was the result of happenstance or a 

party’s voluntary action; Goo indicated that in such circumstances, it would 

be appropriate for an appellate court to remand the case to the trial court 

for its evaluation. 132 Hawaiʻi at 317-18, 321 P.3d at 668-69. Goo

addressed a special situation in which the appellate court may lack 

sufficient information. In this case, the ICA had sufficient information to 

rule on Tigilau’s IFP motion. Therefore, Goo is inapposite. 
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Thus, under the circumstances of this case, with Tigilau 

being a self-represented defendant, and because she submitted 

sufficient financial information, the ICA should have addressed 

her IFP motions without requiring her to file a motion in 

district court.

Further, it is also significant that Tigilau did not cite 

to HRAP Rule 24 in either of her IFP motions as a basis for her 

request for waiver of costs on appeal. The ICA analyzed 

Tigilau’s IFP motions strictly according to the language of HRAP 

Rule 24(a). HRS § 607-3, however, also provides an independent 

basis for the grant of an IFP motion.17 Blaisdell analyzed a 

self-represented prisoner’s IFP motion in a civil case solely 

under the “onerous” standard of HRS § 607-3, 113 Hawaiʻi at 319, 

151 P.3d at 800, despite the existence of a specific circuit 

court rule governing IFP requests based on “good cause.”18 Based 

on the financial information provided in Tigilau’s second IFP 

motion, payment of appellate filing fees would clearly have been 

“onerous” to Tigilau, as “excessively burdensome so as to cause 

17 See supra note 2. Thus, an amendment to HRAP Rule 24 was not necessary 

for the ICA to address Tigilau’s motion, as maintained by the dissent. We 

agree with the dissent, however, that HRAP Rule 24 should be amended to 

obviate the inefficiencies inherent in the structure of the rule. 

18 See supra note 3.
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hardship.” Id. Hence, the ICA abused its discretion in denying 

Tigilau’s second IFP motion based on both HRAP Rule 24(a) and 

HRS § 607-3.19 

The ICA’s dismissal of Tigilau’s appeal, based on its 

denial of her second IFP motion, which should have been granted, 

contravenes the policy of determining cases on the merits. The 

ICA therefore also abused its discretion in dismissing Tigilau’s 

appeal. 

B. When courts have discretion in applying court rules or 

statutes, they must consider the access to justice 

principle of reducing barriers to the civil justice system

Tigilau also argues on certiorari that “DefendantAppella[nt] Christy Tigilau doesn’t have any funds and the 

courts know that. They know that Christy Tigilau DefendantAppella[nt] doesn’t have any funds therefore she feels the 

courts won’t let her state her side of the case which is a 

denial of access to this court.” Tigilau also highlights the 

19 The dissent maintains that HRS § 607-3 is not an independent basis for 

granting an IFP motion because HRAP Rule 24(a) merely sets out a process for 

invoking HRS § 607-3, which provides the standard for granting an IFP motion. 

Yet, HRAP Rule 24(a) is much more than a mere rule of process, as it requires 

an appellant to also show “the party’s inability to pay the required filing 

fees or to give security for costs, the party’s belief that [the party] is 

entitled to redress, and a statement of the issues that the party intends to 

present on appeal.” Thus, HRAP Rule 24(a) provides standards for IFP status 

that do not exist in HRS § 607-3, which only requires a showing that payment 

of filing fees would be “onerous.”
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20

fact that she is not an attorney and relies on Haines v. Kerner, 

404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam), for the proposition that 

courts should be more lenient with self-represented litigants 

than with trained attorneys. 

In Haines, the United States Supreme Court made clear that 

complaints by self-represented litigants are to be held “to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” 

404 U.S. at 520. Similarly, a fundamental tenet of Hawaiʻi law 

is that submissions of self-represented litigants should be 

interpreted liberally. Waltrip, 140 Hawaiʻi at 239, 398 P.3d at 

828. In addition, this court has stated that “[i]n some 

instances, a plaintiff’s [self-represented] status might warrant 

a court’s refusal to impose any costs or attorney’s fees,” 

although “the right of self-representation is not . . . a 

license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and 

substantive law.” Lepere v. United Pub. Workers, Local 646, 

AFL-CIO, 77 Hawaiʻi 471, 473 n.2, 887 P.2d 1029, 1031 n.2 (1995) 

(citations, internal quotation marks, and original brackets 

omitted).

As contended by Tigilau, the denial of IFP status to those 

like her affects access to justice in civil matters for those 

unable to afford legal representation. Our judiciary has taken 
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21

an active role in seeking to advance access to justice in civil 

cases, especially for self-represented litigants. Rule 21 

(2015) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi 

created the Hawaiʻi Access to Justice Commission, whose purposes 

under subsection (b) include reducing barriers to the civil 

justice system by giving input on existing laws and court rules 

that may affect meaningful access to justice for low-income 

Hawaiʻi residents (subsection 7) and encouraging judges to take a 

leadership role in expanding access to civil justice (subsection 

8). 

This court has long adhered to the policy of affording 

litigants the opportunity to be heard on the merits whenever 

possible. Morgan v. Planning Dep’t, 104 Hawaiʻi 173, 180-81, 86 

P.3d 982, 989-90 (2004) (citation omitted). Yet, the dissent 

supports an application of HRAP Rule 24 that would deny Tigilau 

any review of the merits her appeal.20 The dissent supports the 

ICA’s dismissal of appeals “where litigants have not paid the 

appropriate fees or secured IFP status[,]” even if a litigant 

20 We note that pursuant to HRS § 641-1(a) (2016), civil appeal deadlines 

are prescribed by court rule. As Tigilau was appealing January 10, 2019 

decisions, the ICA would have been without appellate jurisdiction over a new 

notice of appeal filed by Tigilau after the ICA’s June 20, 2019 dismissal of 

her appeal. Thus, adoption of the dissent’s position would have denied

Tigilau access to our appellate courts regarding the merits of her appeal.
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22

could have secured IFP status if the ICA had chosen to exercise 

its discretion to rule on the IFP motion itself.

Our state courts should embrace access to justice 

principles in practice. In furtherance of such principles, we 

therefore now hold that, consistent with the fundamental tenet 

of Hawaiʻi law that submissions of self-represented litigants 

should be interpreted liberally, Waltrip, 140 Hawaiʻi at 239, 398 

P.3d at 828, when courts have discretion in applying court rules 

or statutes, they must consider the access to justice principle 

of reducing barriers to the civil justice system for selfrepresented litigants. 

V. Conclusion

We therefore grant Tigilau’s July 10, 2019 motion for IFP 

status on appeal, vacate the ICA’s June 20, 2019 “Order 

Dismissing Appeal,” and remand this case to the ICA for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Christy Tigilau /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

petitioner pro se

/s/ Richard W. Pollack 

/s/ Michael D. Wilson