J-S58037-14

_________________________ 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

JEFFREY R. RITENOUR 

 Appellant No. 581 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 1, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000209-2013 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 6, 2014

 Appellant, Jeffrey R. Ritenour, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial 

convictions for statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, 

corruption of minors, and simple assault.1

 We affirm. 

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

The minor victim and Appellant are distant cousins who have known each 

other for a long time. The victim testified that on May 24, 2012, she and 

Appellant went on a walk together. While they were walking, Appellant 

asked the victim to have sex with him; and the victim refused. Appellant 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(b), 3125(a)(8), 6301(a)(1)(ii), and 2701(a)(3), 

respectively. 
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then pushed the victim to the ground, climbed on top of her, and removed 

her shorts. Appellant touched the victim all over her body, including her 

breasts and vaginal area, and inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina. 

The victim testified that she and Appellant walked on the same trail and 

engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse on two other occasions, in 

June and July of 2012. Appellant was fifty-one (51) years old at the time of 

the offenses. The victim was fourteen (14) years old at the time of the first 

assault, and fifteen (15) years old at the time of the second and third 

assaults. 

 The victim told her ex-boyfriend about the assaults. The victim’s exboyfriend then told the victim’s parents, and they contacted the police. At 

trial, a Pennsylvania State Trooper testified that he went to Appellant’s 

residence as part of the investigation. Appellant initially denied the assaults, 

but he eventually confessed to the first assault, which occurred on May 24, 

2012. The trooper read Appellant his Miranda2 warnings, and Appellant 

repeated his verbal confession to the trooper. At Appellant’s request, the 

trooper wrote down Appellant’s statement, which Appellant signed. 

 A jury convicted Appellant on January 9, 2014, of statutory sexual 

assault, aggravated indecent assault, corruption of minors, and simple 

assault. On April 1, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to three (3) to ten 

____________________________________________ 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
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(10) years’ imprisonment, and informed Appellant of his lifetime registration 

requirement under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(“SORNA”).3

 Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions. Appellant 

timely filed a notice of appeal on April 11, 2014. That same day, the court 

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely complied. 

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

DID THE COMMONWEALTH FAIL TO PROVE BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT HAD ANY 

UNLAWFUL CONTACT WITH THE MINOR VICTIM? 

IS IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO 

REGISTER FOR A LIFETIME WHEN SAID REGISTRATION 

REQUIREMENT EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM 

PENALTY FOR APPELLANT’S OFFENSE? 

IS [SORNA] UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN REQUIRING 

APPELLANT TO REGISTER FOR A LIFETIME? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 7). 

 In his first issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth provided 

insufficient evidence to prove his guilt. Appellant contends the victim did not 

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3

“[SORNA], commonly referred to as the Adam Walsh Act, became effective 

on December 20, 2012. By its terms, any individual who was then being 

supervised by the board of probation or parole was subject to its provisions.” 

Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245, 246 (Pa.Super. 2014). SORNA 

replaced Megan’s Law as the statute governing the registration and 

supervision of sex offenders. SORNA designates a conviction for statutory 

sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(b), as a “Tier III” sexual offense, 

subjecting a defendant to a lifetime registration requirement. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9799.14(d)(3); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(3). 
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go to a doctor for a physical examination, and the Commonwealth presented 

no medical evidence that the victim had intercourse with Appellant or 

anyone else. Appellant alleges the record does not include any evidence 

that the victim resisted or attempted to fight off Appellant. Appellant claims 

the victim continued to go on walks alone with Appellant and did not fear 

Appellant. Appellant maintains the Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim ever 

had intercourse with Appellant. Appellant concludes this Court should set 

aside the verdict. We disagree. 

 Initially, we observe: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted...in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 
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denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)). 

 Instantly, the trial court concluded: 

It cannot be disputed that the age of consent for sexual

relations in Pennsylvania is 16 years. [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3122.1]. In light of the evidence adduced at trial...which 

includes both the victim’s testimony and [Appellant’s] 

signed, written confession to one of the three sexual 

encounters, this ground of insufficiency is so utterly 

without merit as to be frivolous. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed May 2, 2014, at 2-3). A review of the record 

supports the trial court’s conclusions. Therefore, Appellant’s first issue 

merits no relief. See Hansley, supra. 

 In his second and third issues combined, Appellant argues his lifetime 

registration requirement under SORNA is unconstitutional. Appellant 

concedes his sentence is legal; however, he contends that imposition of an 

additional lifetime registration requirement is an illegal sentence and 

unconstitutional. Appellant claims the lifetime registration requirement is 

not merely civil in nature because the court imposes the requirement during 

sentencing, and a failure to comply can result in incarceration. Appellant 

maintains the additional registration requirement exceeds the statutory 

maximum penalty proscribed for his convictions. Appellant asserts the 

lifetime registration requirement does not accomplish rehabilitation, and 

constitutes an unusual punishment. Appellant concludes this Court should 

declare SORNA’s lifetime registration requirement as unconstitutional and 
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illegal. We disagree. 

 Preliminarily, we recognize that an appellant may not successfully 

advance a new theory of relief for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth 

v. Haughwout, 837 A.2d 480, 486 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

“An appellate court should not address constitutional issues unnecessarily or 

when they are not properly presented and preserved in the trial court for our 

appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Berryman, 649 A.2d 961, 973 

(Pa.Super. 1994) (citation omitted). Thus, “[c]onstitutional issues, even if 

they go to the legality of the sentence, can be waived.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

 In the present case, Appellant challenged the constitutionality of his 

lifetime registration requirement for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement. Appellant failed to raise these issues at sentencing or in a postsentence motion. Therefore, Appellant’s second and third issues are 

arguably waived. See id.; Haughwout, supra. See generally 

Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (reaffirming principle that defendant cannot rectify failure to preserve 

issue at trial by proffering it in Rule 1925(b) statement). 

 Moreover, the trial court disposed of these claims as follows: 

The determination that a particular statute is 

unconstitutional must be made by the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court only upon a very clear showing that the

statute or sentencing provision is not within constitutional 

parameters, since constitutionality is presumed. 

Nevertheless, the claim of unconstitutionality is waived in 
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that [Appellant] did not raise it in a post-sentence motion 

of any type to allow this [c]ourt to address it. 

[T]his [c]ourt hereby acknowledges the very recent 

holding in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 

2013), which declared Act 152 of 2004, 42 Pa.C.S. § 101-

9913, unconstitutional as violative of Article III, Section 3, 

of the Pennsylvania State Constitution, because it 

legislatively enacted law for many separate and disparate 

subjects. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then 

determined that the Megan’s Law provisions contained 

therein were not severable so as to continue in effect. This 

[c]ourt notes that the Pennsylvania legislature had already 

passed [SORNA]..., effective immediately, to re-enact the 

provisions of Megan’s Law, bringing those provisions into

compliance with the federal Adam Walsh requirements so 

as [to] better protect the citizens of this Commonwealth. 

Although all parts of Act 152 of 2004, including Megan’s 

Law III, are now unconstitutional, the reasons for such 

declaration have nothing to do with Megan’s Law itself

and/or any of its requirements. The current statute is now 

popularly known as “Megan’s Law IV” [or SORNA] and, by

its own terms, is retroactive. The appellate courts have 

previously determined that the registration requirements 

of Megan’s Law are not criminally punitive, but rather 

serve the important purpose of protecting the citizens of 

this Commonwealth from a certain class of offender—those 

sexual predators who commit a predicate offense and who

also suffer from a volitional impairment that makes them 

likely to become recidivists. The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court more recently reiterated that the registration 

requirements are not an ex post facto violation under the 

United States Constitution, because they do not punish the 

offender...[.] [T]he legislature has acted swiftly and 

promptly to re-enact the registration requirements of 

Megan’s Law, and has now expressly stated that the 

provisions are not punitive, but rather are for the public’s 

protection. 

(Trial Court Opinion at 3-5) (footnotes and some citations omitted). We 

accept this reasoning and see no reason to disturb the trial court’s decision 
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to deny relief. Accordingly, we affirm. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/6/2014