J-S42007-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFREY L. BLAND,

Appellant No. 1304 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 14, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0305581-1984

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2015

Appellant, Jeffrey L. Bland, appeals pro se from the order denying his 

sixth petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On October 18, 1984, a jury found [Appellant] guilty of 

second degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and 

possessing an instrument of crime. Thereafter, [Appellant] was 

sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction2and two 

consecutive, [sic] terms [of] 2.5 to 5 years for the remaining 

convictions. Post sentence motions were filed and denied. 

[Appellant] filed an appeal to the Superior Court which affirmed 

the judgment of sentence on March 23, 1987, the Supreme 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Court of Pennsylvania denied [Appellant’s petition for allowance 

of appeal] on November 17, 1987. 

2 For sentences [sic] purposes the robbery conviction 

merged with the murder conviction.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/14/14, at 1. 

On June 18, 2013, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his sixth. 

On February 7, 2014, the PCRA court issued a dismissal notice pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant filed a response, and the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA petition by order entered April 14, 2014. Appellant timely 

appealed. 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we 

reproduce verbatim:

A. Should not this case be remanded for a hearing on the 

allegation of trial, appellate and post conviction counsel 

ineffectiveness.

1. Was not trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the 

erroneous and improper jury instruction in that the trial court 

committed error, instruction in that the trial court committed 

error when giving and expounding on the law to sustain a felony 

murder, there was a complete lack of instruction on the issue of 

proof of corpus delicti before a jury can consider an accused and 

or an accomplice confession.

2. Petitioner was further denied due process of law and 

effective representation in that prior trial counsel failed to 

request these points of charge that were imperative to the case 

at hand, furthermore Petitioner suffered layered ineffectiveness 

of counsels given none of these attorneys that this court 

appointed conducted any factual review of the record or lower 

courts (i.e. trial and jury instruction) and file an amended 

petition citing prior trial counsels of ineffectiveness as cited 

herein.
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Appellant’ Brief at 3 (unnumbered) (full capitalization omitted).1

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA 

court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 

A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 

A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 

2001)).

We must first address whether Appellant satisfied the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA. The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a 

jurisdictional threshold and may not be disregarded in order to reach the 

merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is untimely. 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000)). Effective 

January 16, 1996, the PCRA was amended to require a petitioner to file any 

PCRA petition within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes 

final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence “becomes final at 

____________________________________________

1 We note with disapproval that despite the Commonwealth’s request for an 

extension of time within which to file its brief, and our entry of an order 

granting the Commonwealth an extension of time until April 20, 2015, to file 

a brief, (Order, 3/9/15), the Commonwealth has failed to submit a brief in 

this matter.
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the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3). Where a petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final on or 

before the effective date of the amendment, a special grace proviso allowed 

first PCRA petitions to be filed by January 16, 1997. See Commonwealth 

v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056-1057 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining 

application of PCRA timeliness proviso).

However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to 

the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), 

and (iii), is met.2 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed 

____________________________________________

2 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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within sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the 

PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove 

specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time 

frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Carr, 768 A.2d at 1167.

Our review of the record reflects that Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

became final on January 18, 1988,3sixty days after the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s appeal and the time for filing a petition for 

review with the United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20.1.4 Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final prior to the effective date of the PCRA amendments. 

Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, filed on June 18, 2013, does not qualify for 

the grace proviso as it was neither Appellant’s first PCRA petition, nor was it 

filed before January 16, 1997. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is patently 

untimely.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).

3 We note that because January 16, 1988 fell on a Saturday, Appellant had 

until January 18, 1988, to file his petition for review. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 

(stating that, for computations of time, whenever the last day of any such 

period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be 

omitted from the computation.); see also Commonwealth v. Green, 862 

A.2d 613, 618 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

4 We observe that the Rules of the United States Supreme Court pertaining 

to the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari have been renumbered and the 

time-period altered several times since the applicable Rule in this case.
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As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA 

petition, his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three 

limited exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file his 

petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be asserted. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

Our review of the record reflects that Appellant has attempted to 

invoke the third exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements, i.e., “the 

right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme 

Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the 

time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b)(1)(iii). Appellant relies upon the United 

States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 

(2012). However, Appellant’s reliance upon Martinez is misplaced and 

entitles him to no relief.

In Martinez, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized, for 

purposes of federal habeas corpus relief, that “[i]nadequate assistance of 

counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a 

prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” 

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. Moreover, the Martinez Court specifically 

cast its holding as “equitable” rather than “constitutional,” stating “[t]his is 

not the case ... to resolve whether that exception exists as a constitutional 
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matter.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. Therefore, Martinez does not 

provide a basis for Appellant to assert the section 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception 

to the PCRA’s jurisdictional timeliness requirements. See Commonwealth 

v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that “[w]hile 

Martinez represents a significant development in federal habeas corpus law, 

it is of no moment with respect to the way Pennsylvania courts apply the 

plain language of the time bar set forth in section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA”). 

Accordingly, the ruling in Martinez fails to provide Appellant an exception to 

the time bar of the PCRA. Thus, the PCRA court did not err in denying 

Appellant’s untimely sixth PCRA petition.

Consequently, because the PCRA petition was untimely and no 

exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the claims 

presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 

396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to 

hear untimely petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the 

merits of any substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition. See 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007) 

(“[J]urisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency to adjudicate

a controversy.”).

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2015