UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JASON CHRISTOPHER LUJAN, Defendant - Appellant. No. 21-6088 (D.C. No. 5:10-CR -00053-PRW-1) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , KELLY , and ROSSMAN , Circuit Judges. **

________________ _________________ Defendant-Appellant Jason Christopher Luja n, a federal inmate, appeals from the district court’s denial of his moti on for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Lujan, No. CR-10-00053, 2021 WL 3204492 (W.D. Okla. July 28, 2021). On appeal, Mr. Lujan challenges the district court’s conclusion that the waiver contained in his plea agreemen t is enforceable. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
** After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 3, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 12 Background In June 2010, Mr. Lujan pled guilty to a two-count superseding information charging him with being a felon in posse ssion of a firearm and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substan ce. 1 R. 44–54. Mr. Lujan’s plea agreement contained the following waiver: “[D]efendant . . . know ingly and voluntarily waives his right to . . . [a]ppeal, collaterally ch allenge, or move to modify under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) or some other ground, his sentence as imposed by the Court . . . provided the sentence is within or below the advisory guideline range . . . .” 1 R. 51–52. In January 2011, the court sentenced Mr. Lujan within the guideline range to 324 months’ imprisonment with each count to be served concurrently. 1 R. 122–23. In August 2019, Mr. Lujan filed a mo tion to reduce his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). 1 R. 136. Mr. Lujan argued that his sentence should be reduced based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guide lines, which applies retroactively and reduces the base offense levels assigned to drug quantities under U. S.S.G. § 2D1.1. 1 R. 136. The government opposed the motion, conceding that Mr. Lujan was eligible for a sentence reduction but arguing that the c ourt must enforce the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. 1 R. 138–52. The dist rict court enforced th e waiver and denied the motion. Lujan, 2021 WL 3204492, at *1.
Discussion We review de novo whether a defendant’s appeal waiver as stated in his plea agreement is enforceable. United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2011). This court uses the fo llowing three-factor test to de termine an appeal waiver’s Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 23 enforceability: “(1) whether th e disputed appeal falls with in the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defenda nt knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would resu lt in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). A miscarriag e of justice results only in situations where: (1) the sentencing court “relied on an impermissible factor”; (2) “ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid”; (3) “the sentence exc eeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quoting United Stat es v. Elliot, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001)). A waiver is “otherwise unlaw ful” where it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 732 (1993)). On appeal, Mr. Lujan argues that to enforce his waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. Aplt. Br. at 4. Mr. Lujan claims th at the waiver is “otherwise unlawful” because it “prevent[s] [him] from pursuing a statutory right consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s goals of achiev ing consistency and un iformity.” Aplt. Br. at 6. However, our precedent squarely rejects this argumen t, and one panel may not overrule another. This c ourt has enforced a n early identical waiv er in the context of a § 3582(c)(2) motion based on Amendmen t 782. United States v. Amado, 841 F.3d 867, 871 (10t h Cir. 2016). “[A] defendant’s waiv er of the legal consequences of unknown future events are commonplace and enforceable. . . . To rule otherwise would make Defendant’s promise not to seek relief under § 3582(c)(2) purely Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 34 illusory.” Id. The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Lujan’s appeal waiver is enforceable.
AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 4