alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 194 (Monday, October 6, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 58248]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-23606]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2005-N-0098] (formerly Docket No. 2005N-0349)

Agency Information Collection Activities; Announcement of Office 
of Management and Budget Approval; Survey of Current Manufacturing 
Practices in the Food Industry

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is announcing that a 
collection of information entitled ``Survey of Current Manufacturing 
Practices in the Food Industry'' has been approved by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jonna Capezzuto, Office of Information 
Management (HFA-710), Food and Drug Administration, 5600 Fishers Lane, 
Rockville, MD 20857, 301-796-3794.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the Federal Register of May 8, 2007 (72 
FR 26132), the agency announced that the proposed information 
collection had been submitted to OMB for review and clearance under 44 
U.S.C. 3507. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not 
required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays 
a currently valid OMB control number. OMB has now approved the 
information collection and has assigned OMB control number 0910-0628. 
The approval expires on August 31, 2011. A copy of the supporting 
statement for this information collection is available on the Internet 
at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain.

    Dated: September 29, 2008.
Jeffrey Shuren,
Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning.
[FR Doc. E8-23606 Filed 10-3-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4160-01-S
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANTS FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           4,299
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     8
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     47,634
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            44,967
<LOANS>                                         58,993
<ALLOWANCE>                                        690
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 117,267
<DEPOSITS>                                     101,256
<SHORT-TERM>                                     9,557
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                449
<LONG-TERM>                                        192
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           405
<OTHER-SE>                                       5,407
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 117,267
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  5,613
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,896
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   104
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 8,613
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               4,191
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,567
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            4,046
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      269
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  4,823
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (436)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       (436)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (270)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.07)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.74
<LOANS-NON>                                        592
<LOANS-PAST>                                     2,609
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    281
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   927
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      582
<RECOVERIES>                                        76
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  690
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               690
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40414 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus LUIS GUSTAVO RIOS-GARZA, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-97-CR-498-1

- - - - - - - - - - April 15, 1999 Before JONES, SMITH, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Luis Gustavo Rios-Garza appeals the sentence he received following his guilty-plea conviction for being present in the United States without permission following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Rios-Garza argues that the district court erred and acted in violation of his right to due process by imposing a sixteen-point enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), for his prior Texas felony conviction for possession of cocaine. Rios-Garza’s contention that the district court erred in applying the guideline is foreclosed byNo. 98-40414 -2- our opinion in United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez , 130 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1997). Rios-Garza’s constitutional argument is unfounded because his challenge is to a sentencing guideline, not to a criminal statute. “Due process does not mandate . . . notice, advice, or a probable prediction of where, within the statutory range, the guideline sentence will fall.” United
States v. Pearson , 910 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                           EXHIBIT 10.62.3

                             TERMINATION AGREEMENT

        This Termination Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into and is
effective as of February 28, 2000 (the Effective Date"), by and between Tritel
Management, LLC, a Mississippi limited liability company ("Manager"), and
TRITEL,INC., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"). Capitalized terms used but
not defined in this Agreement shall have the meanings given to such terms in the
Stockholders Agreement of the Company, dated as of the date hereof (the
"Stockholders Agreement").

                                  WITNESSETH:

        WHEREAS Manager and Company have previously entered into a management
agreement, dated January 7, 1999 (the "Management Agreement") by which Manager
agreed to provide management services to Company in exchange for compensation;
and

        WHEREAS Company has entered into a merger agreement, dated February ___,
2000 (the "Merger Agreement") with TeleCorp PCS, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
and desires to end the management of Company's business by Manager.

        NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises, the covenants
and agreements set forth herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and sufficiency of which are acknowledged by the execution and delivery
hereof, the parties agree as follows:

        Section 1. Termination. As of the effective date, Company and Manager
hereby agree to terminate the Management Agreement, including, without
limitation, their respective rights, privileges and obligations relating
thereto. Company and Manager shall be relieved of all liabilities and
obligations of any type with respect to the Management Agreement.

        Section 2. Entire Agreement. The Agreement, constitutes the entire
agreement and understanding between the parties hereto regarding the subject
matter addressed therein.

        Section 3. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in multiple
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which
together shall constitute one and the same instrument.


               [THE REST OF THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

<PAGE>



        IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hands effective as of
the date first written above.


                                                COMPANY:

                                                TRITEL, INC.

                                                    /s/  E.B. Martin, Jr.
                                                By:____________________________
                                                Name:
                                                Title:


                                                MANAGER:

                                                TRITEL MANAGEMENT, LLC

                                                    /s/ E.B. Martin, Jr.
                                                By:____________________________
                                                Name:
                                                Title:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02318-BNB

ROBERT LAWRENCE CROSS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,

NICHOLAS STASI, Durango Police Dept.,

DUKE SCHIRARD, La Plata County Sheriff,

SHERIFF DEPUTIES, La Plata County Jail,

TODD RISBERG, #24763, District Attorney’s Office,

REID STEWART, #37729, District Attorney’s Office,

LA PLATA COUNTY SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

JEFFERY WILSON, District Court Judge

LA PLATA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT,

JERRY LITTLE, Pre-Trial Services,

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION,

HILLTOP HOUSE SOUTHWESTERN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS CENTER, and

ANY AND ALL OTHER KNOWN AND UNKNOWN PARTIES IN THE MATTER OF

CAUSE NO. 10CR508,

Defendants.

MINUTE ORDER

ORDER ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE BOYD N. BOLAND

Plaintiff’s “Petition to Appoint Advisory Counsel” (Doc. #8) filed on October 24,

2011, is construed as a motion for appointment of counsel and is DENIED as

premature. Plaintiff’s “Petition for Court Order” (Doc. #9) filed on October 24, 2011, in

which Plaintiff requests a court order directing jail officials to allow Plaintiff to receive

legal books and writing paper from state-appointed advisory counsel, is DENIED. 

Plaintiff’s “Petition to Merge Inferior Tribunal Case No. 11CR98 Within Superior Court

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02318-BNB” (Doc. #10) filed on October 24, 2011, is DENIED.

Dated: October 25, 2011

Case 1:11-cv-02318-LTB Document 12 Filed 10/25/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 1Federal Reserve Bank of: BostonFilings received during the week ending March 10, 2018FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodNONE
#### LAWLESS v. SMITH.*

No. 14233.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans

Jan. 2, 1934.

J. A. Woodville, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Jos. Rosenberg and C. F. Dumaine, both of New Orleans, for appellee.

*

Rehearing- denied January *15, 195Í*

WESTERFIELD, Judge.

Leon M. Smith operated a gasoline station, and had as one of his employees Christopher J. Lawless. Smith had made a contract with the Liberty Oil Company whereby a discount on the gasoline bought from that company of 4 cents a gallon was allowed, 2 cents on-delivery of the gasoline- at the station upon payment of the price, and 2 cents upon the total gallonage bought each month, payable monthly. Smith, who owned the property subject to a heavy mortgage, made an arrangement with his mortgagee under which he agreed to pay the monthly rebate allowed him by the oil company on account of his indebtedness. For reasons best known to Smith, he leased the station to his employee, Lawless, for $5.40 a day. Lawless operated the station for nineteen days and paid his daily rent, when, apparently by mutual consent, the rental agreement was terminated. Lawless had received the 2 cents cash discount on gasoline which he bought during his control of the business, but did not get the monthly rebate, which, during the nineteen days, had amounted to $135.92. In fact, Lawless did not know of this rebate which was being credited by the Liberty Oil Company to Smith’s account until some .time after the termination of his léase agreement. However, when he did find it out, he made demand upon Smith for payment, which was refused, and this suit followed.

The defense, which was successfully urged below and is now repeated in this court in oral argument and in brief, is not easily understood. It seems to be based upon the fact that Smith had a contract with the Liberty Oil Company at the time he ran the station, and that,, since the oil company saw fit to sell gasoline to his successor on the same basis, he (Smith) should receive the monthly rebate, which was erroneously credited to his account. It is also argued that, because Smith had agreed to pay the avails of this rebate to the holder of the mortgage note bearing on the property in which the oil station was conducted, some sort of a lien or other right to the rebate on the gasoline which Lawless bought and sold was created.

We can find no merit whatever in these defenses. The rebate claimed was allowed on gasoline paid for by Lawless as the lessee and operator of the oil station, and the fact that the same terms were given Lawless as had been formerly allowed Smith is of no consequence. The rebate belongs to Lawless, the purchaser of the gasoline, since there was no agreement to the contrary.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is now ordered that there be judgment herein in favor of the plaintiff, Christopher J. Lawless, and against the defendant, Leon M. Smith, in the full sum of $135.92, with legal interest from January 8, 1929, until paid, and all costs.

Reversed.
Exhibit 99.6

NOTICE OF RELIANCESECTION 13.4 OF NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 51-102 CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS

| To: | Alberta Securities Commission		British Columbia Securities Commission 		Manitoba Securities CommissionFinancial and Consumer Services Commission, New Brunswick  Office of the Superintendent of Securities, Newfoundland and LabradorNova Scotia Securities Commission 		Ontario Securities Commission  Office of the Superintendent of Securities, Prince Edward Island  Autorité des marchés financiersFinancial and Consumer Affairs Authority of Saskatchewan 		Toronto Stock Exchange |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Notice is hereby given that Bell Canada relies on the continuous disclosure documents filed by BCE Inc. pursuant to the exemption  from the requirements of National Instrument 51-102 – Continuous Disclosure Obligations (“NI 51-102”) provided in Section 13.4  of NI 51-102.

The continuous disclosure documents of BCE Inc. can be found for viewing in electronic format at www.sedar.com.

Attached to this notice and forming part thereof is the consolidating summary financial information for BCE Inc. as required bySection 13.4 of NI 51-102.

Dated: March 11, 2015

| BELL CANADA
 By:*(signed) Thierry Chaumont*Name:Thierry ChaumontTitle:Senior Vice-President and Controller
 
  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-31275, 333-65331, 333-69669, 333-69663,333-69659, 333-86475, 333-88311, 333-88307, 333-88309, 333-31702, 333-44226, 333-66396, 333-69456, 333-69458, 333-70916, 333-104236 and 333-117486 on Form S-3 and Registration Statement Nos. 333-40969, 333-38920, 333-38922, 333-70902 and 333-119044on Form S-8 of our reports dated February 28, 2006, relating to the financial statements and the financial statement schedule of CardioDynamics International Corporation and management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal controlover financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of CardioDynamics International Corporation, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of CardioDynamics International Corporation for the year endedNovember 30, 2005. 

 

 

/s/ Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C. 

 

San Diego,California 

February 28, 2006
AGREEMENT, dated as of March 9, 2000, by and between Acubid.com Inc., a Delaware
corporation with offices at 1947 Camino Vida Roble, Suite 102, Carlsbad,
California 92008 ("Acubid") and Kristin M. Cano, with offices at One Corporate
Plaza Suite 110, Newport Beach, California 92660.

                              W I T N E S S E T H:

         WHEREAS, Kristin has performed legal services for Acubid and Acubid is
presently indebted to Kristin in the amount of Eighteen Thousand, Fifty Five and
25/100 dollars ($18,055.25) for services rendered through January 20, 2000; and,

         WHEREAS, Acubid desires to issue and deliver to Kristin twenty five
thousand (25,000) Shares of Common Stock, $.001 par value, of Acubid in payment
of the aforementioned $18,055.25, and Kristin desires to accept 25,000 Shares of
Acubid Common Stock in satisfaction of the aforesaid $18,055.25;

         NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the provisions herein contained,
the parties hereto herby agree as follows:

         1.       Acubid acknowledges that it is indebted to Kristin in the
                  amount of $18,055.25 for services rendered through February
                  29, 2000 to Acubid and hereby agrees to issue and deliver to
                  Kristin 25,000 Shares of its Common Stock, $.001 par value, in
                  payment of the aforesaid $18,055.25 debt and Kristin hereby
                  agrees to accept 25,000 Shares of Acubid Common Stock, $.001
                  par value, as payment of the aforesaid $18,055.25.



<PAGE>



         2.       Acubid hereby agrees to use its best efforts to register the
                  25,000 Shares of Acubid Common Stock issued to Kristin here
                  under with the Securities and Exchange Commission by filing a
                  registration statement of Form S-8 with respect to such Shares
                  as soon as practicable following the issuance of such Shares.

         3.       This Agreement contains the entire understanding of the
                  parties hereto with respect to the subject matter contained
                  herein and supercedes all prior agreements and understandings
                  between the parties.

                  IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have duly executed this
agreement as of the day and year first above written.

                                           ACUBID.COM INC.




                                           By: /s/ Lawrence Schaffer
                                              -------------------------------
                                                  LAWRENCE SCHAFFER
                                                  President


                                               /s/ Kristin M. Cano
                                               ---------------------------------
                                                 KRISTIN M. CANO
                                                 Attorney at Law
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02381-PAB-KLM

SALVADOR MAGLUTA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER 

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal

[Docket No. 54], in which he states that he “files his Notice of Voluntary Dismissal as to

the Defendant Patrick Whalen” “pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.”

Despite Rule 41(a)(1)’s reference to the dismissal of an “action,” the weight of

authority permits a dismissal of all claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A) against fewer

than all defendants. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 614 F.3d

145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010); Blaize-Sampeur v. McDowell, 2007 WL 1958909, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007) (noting that, although the Second Circuit had previously

stated otherwise, it had “since adopted the approach of the majority of courts in other

circuits – that is, that Rule 41(a) does not require dismissal of the action in its entirety”

and permits dismissal of all claims as to a single defendant). Upon the filing of

plaintiff’s notice [Docket No. 54], this action was dismissed without prejudice as to

defendant Patrick Whalen. 

Case 1:11-cv-02381-RM-KLM Document 58 Filed 06/25/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
2

DATED June 25, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

 s/Philip A. Brimmer 

PHILIP A. BRIMMER

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02381-RM-KLM Document 58 Filed 06/25/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
#### FRIEDMAN et al. v. TEXAS & P. R. CO.

No. 6723.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 30, 1944.

Rehearing Denied July 17, 1944.

John G. Gibbs, of Natchitoches, for appellants.

Frank H. Peterman, of Alexandria, for appellee.

DREW, Judge.

The lower Court in a written opinion has set out the issues in this case and has correctly stated the proven facts and determined the case in accordance with the law and jurisprudence of this State. Its opinion is as follows:

“This is a suit for damages by plaintiff against defendant in the sum of $300.00, the value of a bull killed by one of defendant’s trains in Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana, near the village of Natchez, on March 6, 1942.

“The evidence is brief and uncontra-dicted. Plaintiff proved that the bull was worth $300.00; that it was killed by defendant’s train on March 6, 1942, and that the track at the point where the bull was killed was not fenced. The engineer swore that the condition of his equipment on the night the bull was killed was good; that he was driving at the rate of 65 miles per hour; that he first saw the animal 350 or 400 feet away coming out from behind the depot and west of the depot, and that it ran on the track and was struck; that he applied the brake, blew the whistle and rang the bell and that there was nothing he could do to avoid striking the animal.

“This evidence was corroborated by the fireman and was not contradicted. Under the law the railroad, when it kills an animal and no fence is maintained, has the burden of proving that it is not negligent. Under the evidence in this case, the Court believes it has sustained that burden.

“Therefore, let there be judgment dismissing plaintiff’s suit at his cost.”

Since all the authorities of the Supreme Court and other appellate courts of this State sustain the finding of the lower Court, it would only be surplusage to cite them.

The judgment is correct and is affirmed with costs.