This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0042

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Mae Norma Przymus, 

Appellant.

Filed September 2, 2014

Affirmed

Halbrooks, Judge

Lyon County District Court

File No. 42-CR-11-726 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Tricia B. Zimmer, Assistant County Attorney, 

Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Chutich, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HALBROOKS, Judge

On appeal from the revocation of her probation, appellant argues that the district 

court abused its discretion in determining that her probation violation was intentional and 
2

inexcusable and that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. 

We affirm. 

FACTS

Under the terms of a plea agreement, appellant Mae Norma Przymus entered an 

Alford plea to one count of check forgery in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(1) 

(2010). Przymus received a downward dispositional departure from the guidelines 

sentence, which was a presumptive commitment to the commissioner of corrections. The 

district court imposed and stayed a sentence of 25 months, placed Przymus on probation, 

and ordered her to serve 90 days in the Lyon County jail beginning no later than July 8, 

2013. Przymus failed to report to jail, and probation recommended that her sentence be 

executed. 

At her probation-revocation hearing, Przymus admitted that she had received a 

dispositional departure and had been required as a condition of her probation to report to 

jail by July 8, that she had failed to report as required, that this was a violation of her 

probation, and that she knew that “there would probably be a warrant” for her arrest. 

Przymus testified that on July 7, she had called the jail and stated that she lacked 

transportation to report to the jail, which was 40 miles from her home. The state noted 

that in addition to failing to report, Przymus had “done zero” on her other probation 

requirements, including failing to make contact with probation agents or to pay fines and 

restitution. After reviewing Przymus’s memorandum in support of her dispositional 

recommendation and hearing Przymus’s testimony and the arguments of counsel, the 

district court stated on the record:
3

I would make findings that the Defendant knew the 

specific condition that was violated; that was her requirement 

to report to jail. I would find that the violation is intentional 

or inexcusable and at this point the need for confinement 

outweighs policies favoring probation. The offender is in 

need [of] correctional treatment [that] can most effectively be

provided if she is confined, and to fail—fail to execute the 

Defendant’s sentence at this time would seriously depreciate 

the significance of the violation itself.

Ms. Przymus, if you’re going to be on probation, you 

have to have a desire and want to do the things that you must 

do to successfully complete probation. By your behaviors 

here, you have demonstrated that you do not—you either are 

unwilling or unable to do so. I have no alternative but to 

execute sentence on this matter. 

This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

After an offender violates probation, the district court may continue probation, 

impose intermediate sanctions, or revoke probation and impose the stayed sentence. 

Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 3(2) (2012). A district court’s determination that sufficient 

evidence exists to revoke probation is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Austin, 

295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). 

Under Austin, the district court must make findings1on three factors before 

revoking probation: (1) designating the specific condition of probation that was violated; 

(2) finding that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and (3) finding that the need 

for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. 

 

1

 The district court may satisfy this requirement by “stating its findings and reasons on 

the record, which, when reduced to a transcript, is sufficient to permit review.” State v.

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 n.4 (Minn. 2005). 
4

Przymus concedes that she violated her probation by failing to report to jail. And the 

district court made a clear finding on the record that the violation at issue was Przymus’s 

failure to report to jail. The first Austin factor is therefore satisfied. 

Przymus argues that the district court abused its discretion in revoking her 

probation because the second and third Austin factors were not satisfied. With respect to 

the second Austin factor, the district court found that Przymus’s failure to report to jail 

was “intentional or inexcusable.” Przymus argues that because she did not have 

transportation and alerted the jail to this obstacle, the district court abused its discretion in 

finding that her failure to report was intentional or inexcusable. 

The district court rejected this argument, finding that Przymus was “unwilling or 

unable” to satisfy the conditions of her probation. Przymus had 12 days after her 

sentencing hearing to arrange transportation to the Lyon County jail. She nevertheless 

failed to report, with full knowledge of the July 8 deadline. Under these circumstances, 

the district court acted within its discretion in determining that Przymus’s violation was 

“intentional or inexcusable.”

The third Austin factor is whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies 

favoring probation. Id. When assessing whether revocation is proper under the third 

Austin factor, the district court should consider whether (1) “confinement is necessary to 

protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender”; (2) “correctional 

treatment . . . can most effectively be provided if [the offender] is confined”; or (3) “it 

would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.” 
5

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607. The district court need only find the existence of one of 

these sub-factors. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251. 

Here, the district court found that “at this point the need for confinement 

outweighs policies favoring probation.” The court specifically found that “to . . . fail to 

execute [Przymus’s] sentence at this time would seriously depreciate the significance of 

the violation itself” and that Przymus is “in need [of] correctional treatment [that] can 

most effectively be provided if she is confined.” Given Przymus’s criminal history and 

her failure to comply with the conditions of her probation, these findings are supported 

by the record. 

The record reflects that despite Przymus’s extensive criminal history, the district 

court gave her another chance when it sentenced her to a downward dispositional 

departure. But Przymus failed to take advantage of the probation opportunity by 

disregarding the terms of her probation. Przymus not only failed to report to jail in July, 

she failed to make any contact with probation or to pay restitution or fines. We conclude 

that the district court acted within its discretion in revoking Przymus’s probation and 

executing her sentence. 

Affirmed.