Acc ordingto GoAmeric a, it hosts a website whe re individuals ca n instruct it to place a 1 pa rt ic ula r c a ll. A G oA me ri c a

op e rator “ pla c e s th e c a ll t o th e re c ipi e nt, the n a c ts a s a re a l ti me translator on be half of the user who inputs the c onversation tex t into a web-ba sed dialogue box such that the . . . [o] perator ca n rea d the text t o the ca ll recipient.” C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS
TOM RE TZLAFF, Ap pe lla nt,
v. GOAMERI CA COMMUNI CATI ONS C O R P O RA T IO N , A A R O N D A V ID DUB RI NSKI , J OHN AN D/OR J ANE DOE, Ap pe lle e s. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 09 -0 01 15 -C V

Appea l from the County Court at L aw Numbe r Thre e of B e xar County , T e xas (TC# 338432)

O P I N I O N Tom Retzl aff

appea ls from order s dismis sing a suit and decla

ringhim a vexatious litigant. We vac ate in par t, affir m in part, reve rse in par

t, and re mand. Go Am er i caC o m mun i ca t i o n s C o rp o ra t i o np ro v i d es t el ep h o n e r el ay s erv i ce s t o h ea ri n gimpaired a

nd speec h-impaired individuals. Retzl aff sued GoAme rica

in propria pe rsona, 1 alleg ing that it relay ed a pr ofane and thre ateningcall to his telephone in the middle of the night. He so ug ht d ama g e s f

or int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss a nd ne g lig e nc e . In a dd iti on

to GoAmer ica, Retzlaff na

med Aar on David Dubr inski and J ohn and/or Jane Doe a s defe ndants. Dubrinski filed a spe cial appe ara nce, ide ntifying himself a s the cha irman and f ounder of GoAmer ica ( and notingthat the cor rec t spelling of his name is “Dobrinsky”). The rec ord does-2-

not include a r

uling on the spe cial appe ara nce. I n his petition, R etzlaff desc ribed John and J ane Doe a s unidentified GoAmer ica e mploy ees who place d the offe nding c all. The re cord doe s not demonstrate that these def endants we re e ver se rved. GoAmer ica f

iled a motion to declar e Retzlaff a vexatious l itigant. The motion was
serve d on Retzl aff

by fax on J une 24, 2008. That evening , Retzl aff sent David De nton, one of Go Am e ri c a ’s atto rn e y s, an e ma il, c la imi ngthat th e fax wa s to o b igfo r h is f a x mac hin e to h and le and that, as a

result, he only

rec eived the f

irst few pa g es of the motion. Retzlaff also stated that he intended to sue Denton and his lawfirm in small claims court for damag e to the fax machine. The e mail, which was r eplete w ith vulgar languag e and e x clamation points, included the following passag e: Iam r e a lly , r e a lly

pis se d o ff

at you , D avid . So pis se d o ff that I jus t ma y c ome down to y our off

ice to per sonally

explain to y ou just how ang ry that Iam! You scre wed up my

fax machine e ven thoug h Ispecific ally told y ou not to be sending me su c h la

rg e faxes. Two day s later, at noon on J une 26th, GoAmer ica f iled a motion for an e x pedited hea ring on the vexatious li tiga

nt motion. As t he basis for this mot ion, GoAmeric a re lied on Retzl aff ’s email. GoAmer ica c hara cter ized the email as “a busive and thre atening ,” and r equeste d an expedited hear ing “ beca

use of the c ontinuing thre ats of additional vexatious lawsuits and the continuing thr eats to nee dlessly incre ase the cost of litigation.” The motion reque sted that the h ea ri n g b e s etfo r t h e m o rn i n g o f J un e 2 7 , 2 0 0 8
. Inth e a l t ern at i v e t o an ex p ed i t edh ea ri n g, GoAmer ica r equeste d that the cour t “enter temporar y order s” to prohibit Retz laff f rom appe aring at Denton’ s law firm’s of fice s and fr om filing a

ny litigation in any

court without first obtaining permission of the loca l administrative judge . The motion was ema iled to Retz laff, a ndRe tzla ff ha s a po st o ff ic e bo x, but r e fu se s to divulg e his str e e t a dd re ss. 2 Th is i s th e a dd

re ss o f a law f ir m th at w a s r e pr e se nti ngGo Am e ri c a in a n “ of c ouns e l” 3 c a pa c ity . G oA me ri c a ’s mot ion did no t a sk fo r t his re lie f o r f

or any re lie f f or Go Am e ri c a ’s pa st or pr e se nt p e rs onne l. Retzl aff admitted that he had se rved time in prison. 4 -3- Go Am e ri c a

re qu e ste d p e rm iss ion

to s e rv e no tic e of

the e xpe dit e d h e ari ngon Re tzla ff by e ma il. 2 At 2:13 p.m. on J une 26th, the cour t filed an orde r staying the case and prohibiting Retzl aff from filingany

motions or from filing a

ny litigation in this state unless the local administrative judg e g rants him permission. In addition, the order prohibits Retz laff “ from appea ring , contac ting, c ommunicating, or comingwithin 150 feet of a ny past or pre sent offic er, direc tor, employ ee, a g ent or attorney of GoAme rcia , Inc.,” or

from comingwithin 150 feet of Denton, his law fir

m’s San Antonio office s, or 30 Rockef eller Plaza in NewYork. The orde r 3 does not provide a

termination date f

or any of these pr ohibitions . The c ourt also g rante d the motion to ex pedite, allowe d substitut ed ser vice, a nd set a he aringfor 10:30 the ne x t morning-
- J une 27, 2008. Retzl aff appea red on June 27th and announc ed not re ady . He a sserted that he had not
rec eived the ve x atious liti g ant motion and that he did not g et notice of the hea ringuntil 6:30 t he previous eve ning. H e also objec ted to the J une 26th orde r on the g rounds that it was re ndere d ex parte and without any

statutory authority . Denton re sponded to Retlaff’ s arguments about the order by asser ting that Retzlaff is an “ ex-con” a nd, in the portion of the ema il quoted above, made “ a thre at ag ainst me.” Denton stated that he had pr ovided copies of the vexatious li tiga

nt 4 mot ion to R e tzla ff

by fax, e ma il, and

re g ula r m a il. Ne ve rt

he le ss, he ha

nd e d a no the r c op y

to Retzl aff in open cour

t and in the judg e’s pr esenc e.-4-

The c ourt allowed G oAmeric a to pre sent its argument and evide nce on the vexatious litigant motion. Howeve r, the c ourt order ed that the he aringwould rec onvene at 2 p.m. on J une 30th (the Monda

y following J une 27th) so Retzlaff c ould present his ar g uments and
e v i d e n c e . A tth e J un e 3 0 thh e ar i n g , R e t z l a f f p r e s e n t e d

ar g u m e n tan d

h i s o w nt e s t i m o n y. On August 22, 2008, the judge sent counsel a nd Retzl aff

an orde r statingthat she had
c on c lud e d th at Re tzla ff

is a ve xati ou s li tig ant a

nd tha t he sh ou ld b e re qu ir e d to po st s e c ur ity in the amount of $12,500. On O ctober 15, 2008, the cour

t signe d an orde r re flec ting these ruling s. The orde r re quired Retzlaff to fur nish the secur ity

within seven day s. The orde r also prohibited Retzl aff “fr om filing, in propr ia per sona, any new litigation in any

state or f eder al cour

t located in the State of Texas without first obtaining pe rmission of the local administrative judg e af ter the local administrative judg e finds that the pr oposed litigation has merit and is not filed for the purp os e of

ha ra ssm e nt o r d e lay .” On

No ve mbe r 2 4, 20 08 , Re tzla ff fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss without prejudice, notingthat he had not f urnished the r equire d secur ity . GoAmer ica f iled a cross-motion to dismiss the ca se with prejudice as to all defe ndants. The c ourt g rante d GoAmer ica’ s motion and dismi ssed the entire suit with prejudice. The rea fter, the court e ntere d le ng thy fi nd ing s o f f

a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw r e g ard ingthe de te rm inatio n th at Re tzla ff is a vexatious l itigant, a

nd then enter ed additional finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law re g arding the dismissal of the suit. This appeal followed. In his second issue, Retzlaff a sserts that the trial c ourt conduc ted an e x parte , off- therec ord hea

ringon J une 26th without any notice to him. I n consideringthis iss ue, it is important to understand what is--and what is not--an ex parte c ommunication: An ex parte c ommunication is one that conce rns the matter , that is betwee n a-5-

lawy er r epre senting a client a nd a judicial off

icer , and that occ urs outside of the pr e se nc e and

wi tho ut t he c on se nt o f o the r p art ie s to the lit ig atio n o r t he ir repr esentatives. A written communication to a judicial office r with a c opy sent timely to opposing pa

rties or their la

wy ers is not ex parte. The prohibition applies to c omm un ic atio n a

bo ut t he me ri ts o f t

he c a us e and to c omm un ic atio ns a

bo ut a proce dural matter

the re solution of which will provide the par ty makingthe communication substantial tactica l or strateg ic adva ntag e. The prohibition does not apply to routine and c ustomary communications for the purpose of scheduling a hea ringor similar communications, but does apply to communications for the purpose of

havinga matter

assig ned to a pa

rticular c ourt or judg e. R E S TA TE ME NT (T H I RD ) O F T HE L AW G OVE R NI NG L A WY ERS § 113 cmt. c (2000)
. Go Am e ri c a

c on te nd s th at D e nto n’ s c omm un ic atio n w iththe c ourt

wa s n ot e x part e be c a us e De nto n n oti fi e d Re tzla ff be fo re su bmi tti ngthe mot ion

to e xpe dit e . T he re c or d r e fl e c ts that Denton ema iled Retzl aff the motion to ex pedite at 11:20 a.m. on June 26th. He stated, “ Iam leavingfor the Courthouse rig ht now” to re quest that the motion to ex pedite be grante d. Denton also stated in the ema il that he had lef t a phone messa g e for

Retzl aff . No time for a

hear ing on the motion to ex pedite wa s stated in the email or in the motion. Even now, the re is nothingin the
rec ord to indicate when the he aringwas he ld, but it i s clea r that the c ourt conduc ted some sort of he ari ngat w hic h it

c on sid e re d e vid e nc e and argume nt b e y on d what w a s in c lud e d in the mot ion

to
e xpe dit e . D ur ingthe June 30 th h e ari ng , Re tzla ff a sk e d th e c ourt

a bo ut t he June 26 th pr oc e e din g s: The Court: All rig ht. Iam not a witness in this case. H e brought an

e ma il s ayingthat he wa s in fe ar, and he did n’ t w ant p e op le aro un d h im.

. . . Re tzla ff : Was the re a

c ourt re po rt e r p re se nt? The Court: There may have be en a c ourt repor

ter pre sent, but he -- Denton: Idon’t believe -- I don’t believe that Ireque sted a re cord,-6- Your Honor
. Th e Court : Ye ah. Al l r ig ht? Mo re ov e r, the c ourt

state d in its fi nd ing s o f f

a c t th at D e nto n “ fe lt thr e ate ne d a nd wa s v isi bly sh ake n b y the c omm e nts ma de in .
. . Re tzla ff ’s e ma il” and

that D e nto n w a s “ up se t.” No thi ngin the motion to ex pedite or its attac hments expressed Denton’ s emotional state, so these f actua l finding s must have bee n based on some e vidence prese nted to the cour t at the hea

ring . The
rec ord does not re flec t when the or der grantingthe motion to ex pedite wa s signe d, but it was filed less than thre e hours a fter D enton emailed Re tzl aff
. I t is “[a] n elementa

ry and funda

mental re quirement of due proce ss” that notice must be “re asonably

calc ulated, under

all the circ umstances, to appr ise intereste d parties of the pende ncy of the a ction and af

ford them a

n opportunity

to present their

objections.” Mu lla nev . Ce nt. Hanove r Bank &Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.C t. 652, 657, 94 L .Ed. 865 (1950). “ The notice must be of suc h nature as re asonably to convey

the re quired infor

mation and it must afford
a re asonable time for those intere sted to make their a ppear ance .” Id. . [I nterna l citations omit ted]. “[W ]hen notice is a per son’s due, proc ess which is a me re g esture is not due pr ocess.” Id . at 315, 70 S.Ct . At 657. We conclude that the notice provide d here was a mere g esture. Go Am e ri c a

a lso argue s th at th e June 26 th h e ari ngwa s n ot e x part e be c a us e the mot ion

to expedite was not submitted to influence the tria l court and be cause the merits of the ve x atious litigant motion were not considere d. GoAmer ica r elies on Sp ige ne r v . W all is , 80 S.W .3d 174 (Tex.App.--Waco 2002, no pe t.). That ca se involved a he aringto approve a re ceive r’s propose d sale at which the judg e ele cted not to hea r the mer its of the rec eiver ’s re quest and a hear ing at which the tria l court mere ly set a fina l hear ing on the rec eiver ’s application for conf irmation of-7-

sale. See Spige ner , 80 S.W .3d at 181-82. The appellate court he ld that these hea ring s were not ex parte bec ause the y

did not reac h the merits of the suit. Id
. This case would be similar to Spigener if all the cour

t had done on June 26th was to set the hea ringon the vexatious li tiga nt motion. SeeR E S TA TE ME NT (T H I RD ) O F T HE L AW G OVE R NI NG L A WY ERS § 113 cmt. c (“ The prohibition [aga inst ex parte communications] does not apply to routine and c ustomary communications for the purpose of schedulinga hea

ringor simil ar c ommunications . . . .”). B ut that is not all t hat the cour t did. I nstead, it g rante d a portion of the ultimate re lief soug ht in GoAmerica ’s vexatious li tiga nt motion by

enjoining Re tzl aff

from filing a ny future litig ation in Texas without obt ainingthe appr oval of the a dminist rative judg e. The c ourt also enjoined Retzlaff f rom g oing to c erta in places. This injunctive re lief af fec ted Re tzla ff ’s su bs tanti ve ri g hts
. Finally , GoAmer ica a

rgues that eve n if the communication was ex parte, it was justified by exigent cir cumstance s. Specifica lly , GoAmer ica a sserts, “Plaintiff Retzlaff, a n undisputed
c onvic te d f

e lon , c re ate d a

n e xtra or din ary

and e xig e nt s itu atio n b y

thr e ate nin gDe fe nd ants ’ counsel.” GoAmer ica r elies on Barnes v. W hittingt on , 751 S.W .2d 493 (Tex. 1988). In Barnes , the Texas Supreme Court stated, “ This court only allows [ex parte ] communications in limi ted, extraordinar y emer g ency

situations.” 751 S.W .2d at 495 n.1. As examples of exigent situations, the court c ited the Texas Rules of Civil P roce dure g overning writs of attac hment, g arnishment, and se questration. See B arnes , 751 S.W .2d at 495 n.1. L ikewise, ther e ar e rule s g overninginjunctive relief
. SeeT EX .R.C IV .P. 680-693a. These rules
are specific ally

desig ned to allow eme rg ency relief in exi g ent circ umstances, while pr otectingthe due proc ess rig hts of all parties. As de tailed below in our discussion of Retzlaff’ s fifth issue, the-8-

rules we re not followe d in this case. GoAme rica offe rs no re ason why

the rules we re not followed. Without any

showing as to why

these rule s were inadequate to protec t GoAmeric a or Denton, we cannot c ondone the e x parte hear ing that took place he re. Retzl aff ’s sec ond issue is sustained. In his fifth issue, Retzl aff contends that the June 26th order violate s his constitut ional rig hts, prevente d him from contac ting witnesse s, and wa s not authorized by the vexatious li tiga

nt statutes. The orde r conta ins three ty pes of injunctions. First, it stay ed this suit and prohibited Retzl aff from filingany

motions i n the suit. This part of the orde r wa s of no conse quence beca use the litigation was statutorily stay ed as soon a s GoAmeric a filed its vexatious li tiga nt motion. SeeT EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11.052(a) (West 2002). Second, the or der pr ohibits R etzlaff “f rom appe aring , contac ting, c ommunicating, or comingwithin 150 feet of a ny past or pre sent offic er, dire ctor, e mploy ee, a g ent or attorney of Go Am e rc ia , Inc ., ” or

fr om c omi ngwi thi n 1 50 fe e t of De nto n, his law f

ir m’ s Sa n A nto nio of

fi c e s, or 30 Rockef

eller Plaza in NewYork. GoA merica contends that this part of the order was
nece ssitated by

Retzl aff ’s threateningemail. I t is, in effec t, a re strainingorder
. See B LACK ’ S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 1428 (9th ed. 2009)( defining“re strainingorder ” as “ [a] court orde r prohibiting
or re stricting violenc e . . . an or der r estrictinga per son from har assing , threatening , and sometimes merely

contac ting or

approa chinganother

specifie d person.” ). The Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure se t forth spec ific re quirements for the g rantingof injunctive relief

, including e x parte restra ining or ders. “ Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e 680 and 684 require a trial c ourt issuing a temporar y restra ining or der to: (1) state why the orde r wa s g rante d without notice if it is gra nted ex parte; (2) state the re asons for the issuance of the orde r-9-

by definingthe injury

and desc ribing why

it is i rre para

ble; (3) state the date the order expires and set a he aringon a tempora ry injunction; and (4) set a

bond.” In re Officeof the Attorney Ge n. , 25 7 S. W.3 d 6 95 , 6 97 (T e x. 20 08 )( or ig . p ro c e e din g )( int e rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) . “ Or de rs that f a il to fulfill these requir ements ar e void.” Id . T he tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r d oe s n ot m e e t th e se
re qu ir e me nts . Be cause the orde r is void and does not conta in a termination date , we will vac ate it. Howeve r, we reje ct Retzlaff’s sug g estion that the prohibitions prevented him fr om rebutting GoAmer ica’ s vexatious l itigant motion. Although he points out t hat he ha d a rig ht to contact po te nti a l f

a c t w itn e sse s, inc lud ingGo Am e ri c a ’s pa st e mpl oye e s, he do e s n ot atte mpt to e xpla in ho w h e wo uld

have be e n a

ble to p re va il o n th e mot ion if he ha d b e e n a

ble to c on ta c t any

of the se witnesses. Ac cording ly , we c annot conc lude that the cour t’s err or proba

bly cause d the re ndition of an imprope r judg ment. SeeT EX .R.A PP .P. 44.1(a)( 1). The third par

t of the orde r prohibited Retzlaff “ from filingany litigations in any

court l o ca t edi nth e S t at e o f T ex as wi th o u tfi rs to b t ai n i n g p erm i s s i o no f t h e l o ca l ad m i n i s tra t i v e j u d ge afte r the loca l administrative judge finds that the proposed litig ation has merit and ha s not been filed for the purpose of

hara ssment and delay .” This languag e is drawn from the ve x atious lit ig ant s tatut e s. Pursuant to these statutes, a de fenda nt may move for a

n order deter mining that a pla intiff is a vexatious li tiga

nt and re quiring the plaintiff to furnish sec urity
. SeeT EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM . C ODE ANN . § 11 .0 51 . Upo n th e fi lin gof su c h a mot ion , th e tr ia l c ourt

“ sh a ll, a ft e r n oti c e to a ll parties, c onduct a he aringto determine whether to gr ant the motion.” Id . § 11.053(a) . The statutes set forth spec ific cr iteria that must be esta blished befor e a ve x atious liti g ant motion can-10-

be g rante d. Se e id . § 11 .0 54 . T he de fe nd ant m us t sh owthat th e re is n o r e a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that the plaintiff ca

n preva il in the inst ant litigation. Se e id . The de fenda nt must also show, by one of se vera l specified w ay s, that the plaintiff has a history of pursuingfrivolous litigation. See id . § 11.054(1), ( 2), (3) . “[A]fter hear ing the evidenc e on the motion,” the c ourt must order the pla int if f t o f ur nis h s e c ur ity

fo r t he de fe nd ant’ s b e ne fi t if

the c ourt de te rm ine s th at th e pla int if f i s a vexatious lit iga

nt. Id
. § 1 1
. 0 5 5 (a ). Inad d i t i o n , “i f t h e c o urtfi n d s , af t er n o t i ce an d

h ea ri n g” that th e pla int if

f i s a ve xati ou s li tig ant, the c ourt may pr oh ibi t th e pla int if

f f ro m f ili ng , in pr op ri a persona , any

new litigation in thi s state. Id . § 11.101(a) . I f the trial c ourt order s this prohibit ion, the plaintiff may

still file a ne w suit, but only if a loca l administrative judge deter mines that the suit has merit and has not bee n filed for purposes of ha

rassment or de lay
. Id . § 11.102(a)
. I t is appare nt from re adingthese statutes that they attempt “to strike a ba lance betwee n Te xan s’ ri g hts of

a c c e ss t o th e ir

c ourt s and

the pu bli c int e re st i n p ro te c tin gde fe nd ants fr om t ho se who abuse the Texas court sy stem by sy stematically

filing la wsuits with li ttle or no merit.” Sweed v . Nye , 319 S.W .3d 791, 793 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2010, pet. de nied). The statutes are
c are fu lly c ra ft e d to re qu ir e no tic e , a he ari ng , a

nd e vid e nc e to e sta

bli shthat th e ve ry

sp e c if ic criter ia in the statutes have been me t. Nothing in the ve x atious liti g ant statutes authorizes a tria l court to enjoin a pla intiff from filinglitigation base d mere ly on the fa ct that the plaintiff thr e ate ne d to su e the de fe nd ant’ s c ouns e l. B ut a s w e are a bo ut t o e xpla in, the c ourt did eventua lly

conduct a

valid hear ing on G oAmeric a’s ve x atious liti g ant motion and it entere d a
va lid or de r, su pp or te d b y e vid e nc e , g ra

nti ngthe mot ion . T he re fo re , th e po rt ion of the June 26 th
or de r p ro hib iti ngRe tzla ff fr om f ili nglit ig atio n is moo t. Re tzla ff ’s fi ft h is su e is s us ta ine d in

pa rt and ov e rr ule d in pa rt .-11-

In h is f ir st i ssu e , Re tzla ff

c on te nd s th at he did

no t ha ve pr op e r n oti c e of

the June 27 th hear ing. G ener ally , any

motion to t he cour

t for an or der a

nd any notice of a

hear ing on a

motion must be serve d upon the other pa rty at least thre e day s befor e the he aring . T EX .R.C IV .P. 21. The notice per iod is enlarg ed by three day s when ser

vice is made by

fax. T EX .R.C IV .P. 21a. The trial court may , howeve r, shorten the notice per iod. SeeT EX .R.C IV .P. 21 . T he c ourt ’s de c isi on to conduct a hear ing be fore the notice pe riod has expired will not be disturbed on appe al abse nt an abuse of discretion. Buruato v. Me rcy H osp. of Laredo , 2 S.W .3d 385, 387 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) . In exercisingits discretion, the court may consider a

ny exigent circ umstances pr esente d in the case
. Id. at 388. GoAmer ica attempted to serve the vexatious l itigant motion by fax on J une 24th. Retzl aff admits that he rec eived the f irst few pa g es of the motion at that time. This attempt at service cause d Retzl aff

to threate n additional litigation for a lleg ed dama g e to his fax machine. As a re su lt o f t

his thr e at, G oA me ri c a

so ug ht a n e xpe dit e d h e ari ng . A t a pp ro ximate ly

6:3 0 p .m.
o nJun e 2 6 th , Re tz la f

f le ar n e d th at t h e h e ar in go nth e mo ti o nw o u ld b e at 1 0 :3 0 th e n e xt morning . He immediately started to “put a

boilerplate r esponse tog ether ” bec ause, a s he told the trial court, “ this isn’t t he first time somebody ’s tried one of these ve x atious . . . liti g ant things on me bef ore.” I f he did not re ceive a complete copy of the ve x atious liti g ant motion before , he wa s g iven a c opy

in open cour

t on J une 27th. The c ourt allowed G oAmeric a to pre sent its moti on on J une 27th, but the cour

t did not require Retzlaff to c ome forw ard w ith his case. He mentioned that he would nee d witnesses, and the court invited him to subpoena anyone he w anted to appe ar. Af te r t he pr oc e e din g s e nd e d at 12 :41 p. m. o n Jun e 27 th, Re tzla ff ha d unti l 2 p .m. on

June 30 th t o prepa re his ar g uments and obtain evide nce. When the he aringrec onvened on the 30th, Retz laff-12-

did not identify

any witness he wa s unable to subpoena or any evidenc e he w as unable to obtain. At the end of

the hea ring , the trial cour

t ga ve the pa rties until J uly

29th to supply

additional briefing , specific ally

advising Retzl aff

, “[Y]ou’re also entitled to brief me on any

rea son y ou don’t fee l y ou’re a vexatious lit iga nt.” C o n s i d er i n g al l o f t h es e c i rc u m s t an ce s , we s ee n o ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o n . Al th o u gh Retzl aff ’s threat of additional litigation did not justify a summary

deter mination that he was vexatious, i t did just ify

an expedited hea

ringon the issue. The he aringbeg an with short notice, but the trial court r ece ssed the hea ringear ly on the first day

and continued the proce eding s so that Retzl aff would have a

n opportunity

to prepa re his def ense to the motion. The c ourt eve n invited Re tzla ff to s ub mit

a dd iti on a l br ie fi nga ft e r t he he ari ng . F ina lly , th e re is n oth ingin t he re c or d to sug g est that the ultimate outcome of the hear ing w ould have be en any differ ent if the he aringhad be e n d e lay e d b y

a fe w d ay s. Retzl aff ’s first issue is overr

uled. In h is thir d is su e , Re tzla ff argue s th at th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

de c lari nghim a vexatious lit iga

nt. A court may

find a plaintiff to be a vexatious lit iga nt if the defe ndant shows that ( 1) the re is n ot a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that th e pla int if

f w ill pr e va il i n th e lit ig atio n a g a ins t the def endant, a nd (2) “ the plaintiff, in the seve n-y ear period immediately

prec edingthe date the defe ndant makes the [vex atious liti g ant] mot ion . . ., has commenc ed, prose cuted, or maintained in propria pe rsona at least five litigations other than in a small claims cour t that have be en . . . finally deter mined adver sely

to the plaintiff.” T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11.054(1)( A). We reviewthe trial cour

t’s deter mination that Retz laff is a vexatious l itigant f

or an a buse of discretion. Sweed, 319 S.W .3d at 793.-13-

Reg ardingthe first par

t of the vexatious lit iga

nt analy sis, the trial court stated se vera l g ro un ds to s up po rt

its fi nd ingthat Re tzla ff

did no t ha ve a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity of pr e va ili ngin this suit . Retzl aff

only attacks one of the stated grounds--that GoAmeric a is immune from suit. An appe llant must attack all independe nt gr ounds that support an adve rse r uling. Fox v . W

ardy , 22 4 S. W.3 d 3 00 , 3 04 (T e x.Ap p. -- El Pa so 20 05 , p e t. d e nie d) . B e c a us e Re tzla ff

ha s f a ile d to attack a ll of the independe nt gr ounds supporting the trial court’ s determination that he did not have a rea sonable proba

bility of pre vailing on his c laims, we must uphold the trial court’s r uling on this iss ue. Se e id
. R e g ar d i n gth e s e c o n d

p arto f th e v e x at i o u s l i t i g an tan a l ys i s , th e tr i a l c o urtl i s t e d tw e n tysix case s that Retzl aff

commence d in propria pe rsona within the pre cedingseven year s. Some of these c ases we re dismissed or nonsuited with pre judice. The court spec ifically found that nine of the ca ses fit within the meaningof Section 11.054(1) (A). Re tzl aff asser ts that there is no proof that these suits were filed by him or that they

wer e filed in propr ia per sona. He also asser ts that some of the c ases we re nonsuits that resulted f rom settlements. He a

rgues that the trial c ourt
err ed in conc luding that c ases that we re dismissed or nonsuited with pre judice we re “ deter

mined adver sely” to him within the meaningof Section 11.054(1) (A). Re tzl aff further argues that appea ls should not be included. Go Am e ri c a

su bmi tte d c e rt if

ie d c op ie s o f d oc ke t sh e e ts r e latin gto f ive a pp e llate proce eding s. The trial c ourt included these five c ases in its list of cases that qua lify under the statut e . B e c a

us e on ly fi ve c a se s are re qu ir e d, we wi ll c on fi ne our r e vie w t o th e se c a se s a nd wi ll examine the docket she ets to determine whether the trial cour

t abused its discretion in conc luding that these c ases qua lify

under the statute.-14-

Four of the doc ket shee ts relate to a ppeals c ommenced in Te x as appe llate cour ts by Retzl aff , in propria pe rsona, within the seve n y ear s immediately prec edingthe date that the
ve xati ou s li tig ant m oti on

wa s f ile d. Re tzla ff

argue s th at a

pp e a ls s ho uld

no t c ount b e c a

us e litigation is commence d in a trial cour t, not an appellate court. Retzlaff ig nores the br oad langua g e us e d in

the ve xati ou s li tig ant s tatut e s. A litigant is vexatious if, in the applicable se ven-year period, he “has c ommenced, pr os e c ute d, or

ma int a ine d in

pr op ri a pe rs on a at le a st f ive lit ig atio ns oth e r t

ha n in a sma ll c la ims court that have bee n . . . finally deter mined adver sely

to” him. T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 1 1. 05 4( 1) (A ). “ L iti g atio n” is “ a c ivi l a c tio n c omm e nc e d, ma int a ine d, or pe nd ingin a

ny state or fe dera l court.” Id . § 11.001(2). The languag e of the se statutes plainly encompa sses appe als. T h e s t atu t es i n cl u d e “ an y s t at e o r f ed er al co urt , ” e x ce p t i n g o n l y s m al l cl ai m s co urt s . Al th o u gh “civil ac tion” is not defined in the statutes, “a ction” is g ener ally define d in law as a

“civil or criminal judicial proc eeding .” B LACK ’ S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 329 (9th ed. 2009). T hus, a per son
w h o f il e s a n o ti c e o f a p p e a l i s ma inta in in gli ti g ati o n . T h e p r im ar y me an in go f

“ ma inta in ” is “ [t ]o continue (something ).” Id . at 1039. We also note that California’ s vexatious l itigant statutes a re virtually identical to ours. SeeC AL .C IV .P R OC .C ODE § 391(a) , (b)( 1). Those statutes ha ve bee n held to apply

to appea ls, at least when the appellant wa s the plaintiff in the trial cour t. Se e In re R.H. , 8 8 Ca l.R

ptr .3 rd 65 0, 66 1- 63 (C a l.C t.A

pp . 2 00 9) ; McColm v. W

estwood Park Ass’n , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 288, 292-93 (Cal.Ct.App. 1998). Bu t se e Ma hd av i v . S up e rio r Co ur t , 82 Cal.Rptr.3rd 121, 126 (Cal.Ct.App. 2008)(“ A def endant who a

ppeals a n adver se rulingis not filing ‘ new’ litigation or ‘ma intaining’ litigation, but rathe r, is attempting to ‘ undo’ the re sults of litigation that has be en instituted ag ainst him or her.” ).-15-

Retzl aff expresses conc ern that if appea ls are inc luded, one c ase c ould be counted mor e tha n o nc e -- fi rs t w he n it

is f ile d in the tr ia l c ourt , a g a in whe n a n a pp e a l is fi le d, and

y e t a g a in when discr etionary

revie w is sought. We ar e countingonly the appe als, not the underly ing tr ial
c ourt c a se s. B e c a

us e no do ub le -c ounti ngis o c c ur ri nghe re , w e e xpre ss n o o pin ion re g ard ingthi s
conce rn. Sin c e a pp e a ls c ount a

nd the do c ke t sh e e ts s ho w that Re tzla ff fi le d f our a pp e a ls i n p ro pr ia persona within the applicable time f rame , the only

rema ining issue is whe ther the a ppeals we re “dete rmined adve rsely” to Retzlaff. Two of the doc ket shee ts refle ct that the trial c ourt judg ments were aff irmed, mea

ning that Retzl aff

, as the a ppellant, lost on the merits of his appea ls. See R etzlaff v. Tex. De p’t of Criminal Justi ce , 1 35 S.W. 3d 73 1 ( Te x.Ap p. -- Ho us ton [1st Di st. ] 200 3, no pe t.) ; Retzlaff v. Courteau , N o. 03 -0 1- 00 64 7- CV , 2 00 2 WL 31 38 60 42 (T e x.Ap p. -- Au sti n O c t. 2 4, 20 02 , p e t. de nie d) (n ot d e signate d f

or pu bli c atio n) . T he tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in deter mining that these appea ls were deter mined adver sely

to Retz laff. The ne x t two docket shee ts are f or appe als that wer e dismissed. See R etzlaff v. Tex. De p’t of Criminal

Justice , 01-04-00409- CV, 2004 WL2823168 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Dec . 9, 20 04 , n o p e t.) (m e m. o p. )( dis mis sin gdu e to R e tzla ff ’s fa ilure to p ay

the fi lin gfe e ); Retzlaff v. Ow us u , No. 01-03-001301- CV, 2004 WL1795146 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Aug . 12, 20 04 , n o p e t.) (m e m. o p. )( dis mis sin gdu e to R e tzla ff ’s fa ilure to f

ile a br ie f) . ACa lif

or nia appellate court ha s rejec ted the ar g ument that dismiss als should not be counted f or purpose s of a vexatious l itigant statute be cause the ar g ument runs contra ry to the underlying intent of the leg islation. Se e Tok

e ru d v . Ca

pitolB an k Sa c ra me nto , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 347 (Cal.Ct.App.-16-

1995). The c ourt stated:

An ac tion which is ulti mately dismiss ed by

the plaintiff, with or without prejudice , is neverthe less a burde n on the targ et of the litig ation and the judicial sy ste m, a lbe it l e ss o f a

burd e n th an if

the matte r h a d p ro c e e de d to tr ia l. Apa rt y who re peate dly

files base less actions only to dismi ss them is no less vex atious tha n th e pa rt y wh o f oll ow s th e a c tio ns thr ou g h to c omp le tio n. Th e dif fe re nc e is one of de g ree , not kind. Id . Howeve r, the c ourt sug g ested that a dismiss al should not count if it was part of a neg otiated settlement. Se e id . Nothing on the docket she ets indicates that these dismiss als wer e par t of neg otiated settlements. Althoug h Retzl aff filed an a ffidavit in the trial c ourt indicatingthat the Ow us u case was voluntarily nonsuited after

pay ment of an a dequate settlement, the trial cour t could have reje cted this ave rment base d on the docke t sheet, which shows a n involuntary dis mis sa l. Th e fi na l do c ke t sh e e t is fo r a n o ri g ina l pr oc e e din gc omm e nc e d b y Re tzla ff in p ro pr ia pe rs on a duri ngthe a

pp lic a ble tim e fr ame . A ft e r a

re sp on se and

a re ply we re fi le d, the a

pp e llate court de nied mandamus re lief to Retzlaff. Under the def initions g iven above , a per son who seeks mandamus re lief commenc es a c ivil action in the appellate c ourt. Althoug h the mandamus proce edingarose from the same under lying c ase a s the appe al in Ow us u , it was a sepa rate , orig inal proce edingthat did not challeng e the tria l court’s fina l decision in the underly ing c ase or relate to the merits of the unde rlying c ase. Se e In reRe tzlaff , 0 1
- 0 3
- 0 0 7 7 0
- CV , 2 0 0 3 WL 22 10 89 20 , at *1 (T e x.Ap p. -- Ho us ton [1st Di st. ] Sep t. 4 , 2 00 3, or ig . p ro c e e din g )( me m. op.)(de nying ma

ndamus relief

for tria l judge ’s purporte d failure to rule on motions). There fore , we think it is proper to count it as Retzlaff’s f ifth adver se dete rmination. Retzl aff ’s third issue is overrule d.-17-

In h is f ourt h is su e , Re tzla ff

argue s th at th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin gthe c a se be c a us e he fa iled to post security . Although the order requiringhim to postsecur ity was sig ned on October 15, 2008, he cla ims that he did not rece ive a c opy of it until November 18, 2008. Since the orde r re quired him to post the security within seven day s, Retzl aff contends that he did not
re c e ive the or de r i n ti me to c omp ly wi th i t. Under the doctrine of invited err or, a pa rty may not “ask somethingof the trial c ourt and then complain that the c ourt err ed in g rantingthe re lief soug ht.” Be rry v . S e ga ll , 315 S.W .3d 141, 143-44 (Te x .App.--E l Paso 2010, no pet.). On Nove mber 24, 2008, Retzlaff f iled a motion in which he noted that he had not posted the se curity require d by

the Octobe r 15th order

and “ask[ed] the court to sig n an orde r dismissing this case pur suant to Texas Civi l Practice & Remedies Code sec tion 11.056.” The re fer ence d statute requir es a tria l court to dismiss i f the plaintiff fa ils to post secur ity afte r beingorder ed to do so. See T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11.056. Thus, Retzl aff

asked the court for

the ver y thing that he complains about now-- a d i s m i s s a l f

o r f a i l ur e t o p o s ts e c ur i ty. Moreove r, “[a]s a prer equisite to prese nting a complaint for a

ppellate r eview, the rec ord must show that . . . the complaint was made to the trial court by a tim e ly reque st, objection, or motion . . . .” T EX .R.A PP .P. 33.1(a)( 1)[Emphasis added]. Although Retzlaff objec ted to the lack of notice in his motion for new tr ial, he did not mention it any time betwee n November 18, 2008 (which is whe n he cla ims to have rec eived the or der) and De cembe r 12, 2008 (whic h is when the
case was dismissed). Ther efor e, he f ailed to make a

timely objection. Se e Low v . H e nr y , 221 S.W. 3d 60 9, 61 8 ( Te x. 20 07 ); Landerman v. State Bar of Texas , 247 S.W .3d 426, 433 (Tex.App.--Da llas 2008, pet. denied)
.-18-

Retzl aff ’s fourth issue is over

ruled. In h is s e ve nth

iss ue , Re tzla ff

argue s th at th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin gthe c a se wi th prejudice as to all of the de fenda nts. W ithin thi s issue, he first arg ues that the ve x atious liti g ant statutes do not authorize a dismissal with prejudice. Ac tually , the applica ble statute does not sp e c if y wh e the r d ism iss a ls s ho uld be wi th o r w ith out pr e

jud ic e . It si mpl y

state s, “ Th e c ourt

sh a ll dismiss a litigation as to a moving de fenda nt if a plaintiff orde red to fur nish security

does not furnish the sec urity

within the time set by

the orde r.” T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11.056. Texas appellate c ourts have a ffirme d dismiss als with prejudice pursuant to this statute. See, e .g., Drum v. Calhoun , 299 S.W .3d 360, 374 (Tex.App.--Da llas 2009, pet. denied) , c e rt. denied, 1 31 S.Ct . 1 01 7, 17 8 L .E d. 2d 84 3 ( 20 11 ); Ne ll Na tio ns Fo ris t v . V an gu ar d U nd e rwr ite rs Ins. Co. , 141 S.W .3d 668, 670-71 (Te x .App.--San Antonio 2004, no pet.). Howe ver, the opinions in t hese c ases do not indicate that the appe llants argued that the dismissals should have been w ithout prejudice. Retzl aff offe rs no re asoningas to why the dismissal should have been w ithout prejudice. SeeT EX .R.A PP . P
. 3 8
. 1 ( i )
. A c c o r d i n g l y, w i th o u td e c i d i n gw h e th e r i tm ay eve r

be e rr or to d ism iss
a ca se under

the statute with prejudice , we se e no er ror in this case
. Retzl aff further argues that the trial c ourt err ed in dismissi ngthe suit as ag ainst Dubrinski (D ob ri nk sy

) a nd Johnand /or Jane Do e . A s n ote d a

bo ve , th e statut e re qu ir e d th e c ourt to d ism iss “as to a moving de fenda

nt.” T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11 .0 56 . “ ‘M ov ingde fe nd ant’
me ans a de fe nd ant who mov e s f

or an o rd e r u

nd e r S e c tio n 1 1. 05 1 d e te rm ini ng that a pla int if f i s a vexatious l itigant a

nd reque sting sec urity .” Id . § 11.001(4). GoA merica is the only

defe ndant that enter ed a g ener al appe ara nce in this ca se, and it is the only defe ndant that made a

motion-19-

un de r S e c tio n 1 1. 05 1. Whe n Re tzla ff fa ile d to po st s e c ur ity , it

fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss the c a se wi th p re jud ic e . Within

the bo dy of thi s mo tio n, Go Am e ri c a

so ug ht d ism iss a l “ a s to a ll Def endants,” but it provided no argument to demonstrate that it had standingto obtain a dis mis sa l f

or the oth e r d e fe nd ants . T he statut e s a re ve ry c le ar. B e c a

us e the oth e r d e fe nd ants did not make a motion under

Section 11.051, they

are not entitled to a dismiss al with prejudice
. Re tzla ff ’s se ve nth iss ue is o ve rr

ule d to the e xtent th at it

atta c ks the dis mis sa l w ith pr e jud ic e a s to Go Am e ri c a , b ut s us ta ine d a s to the oth e r d e fe nd ants . In his six th issue, Retz laff c halleng es the c onstitut ionality of the ve x atious liti g ant statutes on a number

of g rounds. He a sserts that his challeng es ar ise under the Texas Constit ution, as well as the United States Constitution. W hen a pr ovision of the Texas Constit ution has an ana logue in the United States Constit ution, we g ener ally construe the provisions the same in the abse nce of a showingas to why

the Texas provision should be construed mor e broa dly
. Se e Fo rt W or th O ste op ath ic Ho sp ., In c . v . R e ese , 148 S.W .3d 94, 98 (Tex. 2004). Wit h one exception, Retzlaff does not sug g est that the Texas provisions are broade r than their fe dera l analogues. Retzlaff also ra ises one g round that is unique to the Texas Constit ution. Theref

ore, w ith these exceptions, we assume that the fede ral a nd state constitutions pr ov ide the same pr ote c tio ns . Whe n w e are c on fr on te d w itha c ha lle ng e to t

he c on sti tut ion a lity

of a statut e , w e pr e sume that the statute is valid and that the leg islature did not act unr easona bly or ar bitrarily
. In re D.J.R. , 319 S.W .3d 759, 764-65 (Te x .App.--E l Paso 2010, pet. denied). T he per son challeng ing the leg islation bears the bur den to establish its unconstituti onality
. Id . at 765. In a fa cial challeng e to a statute, the challeng er must establish that no set of c ircumstance s exi sts under-20-

which the statute w ill be valid. Id . at 764. Since a statute may be valid as a

pplied to one set of fa c ts a nd inv a lid a s a pp lie d to ano the r, the c ha lle ng e r m us t f ir st s ho w that th e statut e is
un c on sti tut ion a l a s a

pp lie d to him ; th at th e statut e may be un c on sti tut ion a l a s a

pp lie d to oth e rs is insufficient to support a f acia l challeng e. Id . A claim that a statute is unconstituti onal as a pplied is a claim that the statute, a lthough g ener ally constitutional, operates unc onstitut ionally as to the challeng er. Id . at 765. An as- applied cha lleng er must only demonstrate that the statute operates unconstitutionally

when a pplied to his particular c ircumstance s. Id
. One f inal consideration guides us through Retzl aff ’s cha lleng es to the vexatious lit iga nt statutes: There is no constituti onal rig ht to file frivolous litigation. W olfe v. Ge orge , 486 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2007). Retzl aff argues that Section 11.054 is void for vagueness be cause it provides no g uidance as to the mea

ning of “re asonable probability

that the plaintiff will preva il” or as to who ha s the burden on this issue. Ther e is no requir ement that a statute define all words or te rms used. Rooms W ith a View, Inc. v. Priv ate Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Inc. , 7 S.W .3d 840, 845 (Tex.App.-- Austin 1999, pet. denied). “ Courts recognize the my riad of f actua l situations t hat may arise a nd allow statutes to be wor ded with flexibil ity ,” as longas they provide fa ir notice. Id . “ In th e c a se of civil or re g ulatory

statutes, no more than a

rea sonable de g ree of ce rtainty is require d.” Id
. The statute pr ovides that a c ourt may find a plaintiff to be a vexatious lit iga nt “if the defe ndant shows that there is not a rea sonable proba bility that the plaintiff will preva il.” T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11.054. This lang uag e cle arly place s the burden on the de fe nd ant. F ur

the rm or e , th e te rm

“ re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity” is c e rt a in e no ug h to pr ov ide fa ir notice. Se e W

olf e , 4 86 F .3 d at 11 24 (r e

je c tin gg e ne ra l va g ue ne ss c ha lle ng e to t he Ca lif or niaRetzl aff also argues that there is no evidence that the $12,500 in secur ity order ed by

the 5 tr ia l c ourt is a ne c e ssa ry or fa ir amou nt. To the c on tr ary , G oA me ri c a pr e se nte d e vid e nc e that it had incur red $12,500 in re asonable attorney ’s fe es just in respondingto Retz laff’ s motion for sanctions. Ther efor e, to the extent Retz laff is attempting to mount a no-e vidence challeng e, that c ha lle ng e fa ils
. -21- ve xati ou s li tig ant s tatut e , whic h a lso us e s th e “ re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity” sta nd ard ); Taliaf

erro v. Hoogs , 4 6 Ca l.R

ptr . 1 47 , 1 52 (C a l.C t.A

pp . 1 96 5) (r e

je c tin gargume nt t

hat “ re a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity” sta nd ard wa s f ata lly un c e rt a in) ; se e als o Le on ar d v . A bb ott , 171 S.W .3d 451, 456-57 (T e x.Ap p. -- Au sti n 2 00 5, pe t. d e nie d) (r e je c tin gargume nt t

hat “ re a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity” wa s v oid for va g ueness a s applied to the appe llant). Retzlaff has not demonstrated that the ter m operated
un c on sti tut ion a lly

a s a pp lie d to his c la ims
. Retzl aff next challeng es the sec urity require ment as a de nial of “a cce ss to the courts,” due proce ss, and equa l protection bec ause the statutes provide no guidance as to the amount of
secur ity and make no allowanc e for indige nt plaintiffs. Retzl aff is simpl y wrongin assertingthat no g uidance as to the amount is provided. The leg islation states that the secur ity is to assure pay ment of the movingdefe ndant’s re asonable expenses, including attorney ’s fe es. T EX .C IV . P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11.055(c)
. 5 On the fa c ts b e fo re us , w e a g re e wi th t ho se c ourt s th at ha

ve up he ld a

sim ila r s e c ur ity require ment under r ational basis re view. Se e W olf e , 4 86 F .3 d at 11 26 ; Moran v. M urtaugh Miller Me y e r &Ne lso n, LLP , 1 52 P.3 d 4 16 , 4 19 (C a l. 2 00 7) . In th is c a se , th e se c ur ity re qu ir e me nt d id not preve nt the vindication of a f undamental r ight, suc h as a r ight r elated to mar riag e. Se e W

olf e , 486 F.3d at 1125-26. Moreove r, althoug h Retzl aff points out t hat he f

iled an unconte sted aff idavit of indige ncy

at the outset of the c ase, he ignor es the fa ct that there was a contest to the aff idavit of indige ncy

that he filed at the end of the case in order to obtain a fre e appe llate re cord.-22-

The c ourt sustained this contest, findingRetzl aff ’s testimony

not cre dible. Acc ording ly , the
secur ity require ment does not violate due pr ocess or equal pr otection as a

pplied to Retz laff. Retzl aff does not explain what he mea ns by the term “ acc ess to the cour ts.” Howe ver, the term is ty pically used to descr ibe the rig ht of prisoners to attack their se ntence s or the conditions of their c onfinement. See, e .g., Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.C t. 2174, 2177, 135 L .Ed.2d 606 (1996). Retzlaff c ites one of the se minal Supreme Court ca se re cog nizi ngthis right. Se e Bo un ds v . S

mi th , 4 30 U. S. 8 17 , 8 28 , 9 7 S. Ct. 14 91 , 1 49 8, 52 L .E d. 2d 72 (1 97 7) . B e c a

us e Retzl aff is not an inmate and is not attempting to attack a pr ison sentence or conditions of confine ment, he ca

nnot establish that the secur ity require ment violates his rig ht of ac cess to the courts. Se e Le wis , 518 U.S. at 350-51, 97 S.Ct. at 2179-80. Retzl aff further argues that the ve x atious liti g ant statutes violate the r ight of acc ess to the courts, due pr ocess, a

nd equal pr otection bec ause the y bar a ll lawsuits, not j ust frivolous ones. We disag ree with this i nterpre tation of the leg islation. An administrative judge may g rant permission for a

vexatious l itigant to file litig ation if the litigation has merit and is not being broug ht for har assment. SeeT EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11 .1 02 (a ). An d, c on tr ary to Retzl aff ’s under standing , a vexatious lit iga nt may seek r eview of

the administrative judg e’s decision. See I

n re Johnson , No. 07-09-0035- CV, 2009 WL2632800, at *1-2 (T ex.App.-- Amarillo Aug . 27, 2009, orig . proce eding )(mem. op.) (providingmandamus re view of
a dmi nis tr ativ e jud g e ’s de nia l of pe rm iss ion ); se e als o T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 11.102(c) (ef

fec tive J an. 1, 2012)( expressly authorizing manda

mus review of

administrative jud g e ’s de nia l) . T hu s, wh ile the le g isl atio n p la c e s a n a dd iti on a l hu

rd le be fo re ve xati ou s li tig ants , it does not prevent them f rom pursuingmeritorious litigation.-23-

Retzl aff next arg ues that his rig ht to self-re prese ntation is viol ated by the prohibition on filing f uture law suits in propria persona . We disag ree beca use this restriction is rationally related to the leg islature’s g oal of c urbingfrivolous litigation. Se e W olf e , 486 F.3d at 1126 (“F reque nt pro se litiga

nts are not a

suspect cla ss meriting stric t scrutiny .”). A s another c ourt has stated, “Attorne y s are g overne d by presc ribed rule s of ethics a nd profe ssional conduct, and, a s office rs of the c ourt, are subject to disbarment, suspension, and othe r disciplinary sanctions not applicable to liti g ants in propria pe rsona.” Tal iaf e rro , 4 6 Ca l.R

ptr . at 15 1; se e als o Le on ar d , 171 S.W .3d at 458 (re

jectingargument that banningfuture in pr opria pe rsona suits violates equa l protec tion). Re tzla ff c on te nd s th at th e le g isl atio n d e nie s h is r ig ht t o f re e do m of

e xpre ssi on

purs ua nt t o the Fir st Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and Article I , section 8, of the T exas Constit ution. I n particula r, he a rgues that the re quirement of obta ining pe rmission to file future law suits is an invalid prior restra int. Se e Da v e np or t v . G arc ia , 8 3 4 S. W. 2 d 4 , 1 0 ( T e x. 1992)(holdingthat a prior r estraint is presumptively unconstitutional under the Te x as Constit ution). “Just as fa lse statements ar e not immuniz ed by the Fir st Amendment rig ht to free dom of speec h, basele ss liti g ation is not im muniz ed by the Fir st Amendment rig ht to petition.” Bi ll Johnson’s Re

sts., Inc. v. N.L.R.B. , 461 U.S. 731, 743, 103 S.C t. 2161, 2170, 76 L .Ed.2d 277 (1 98 3) [I nte rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d]. T he re fo re , “ c on te nti on s th at on e ’s fr e e do m of sp e e c h is violated ar e to no ava il ag ainst injunctions to prevent vexatious li tigation.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Baker , 838 S.W .2d 838, 842-43 (Te x .App.--T exarkana 1992, no writ). B e c a us e Re tzla ff

ha s n o r ig ht t o f

ile fr ivo lou s su its , h e ha s n ot d e mon str ate d th at r e qu ir inghim to-24-

obtain permission infring es any constitutionally

protec ted form of

expression. See B ill Johnson’s Re sts
. , 461 U.S. at 744, 103 S.Ctat 2170 (upholdingNL RB’s powe r to enjoin basele ss lawsuits); W olfgram v. W

ells Fargo Bank, 6 1 C al
. R p tr. 2 d 6 9 4 , 7 0 5 (C al
. C t . Ap p . 1 9 9 7 )( re j ec t i n g ch al l en ge to compara

ble California statute a s a prior r estraint). L a st, Re tzla ff

argue s th at th e le g isl atio n’ s b an o n la ws uit s c on sti tut e s o utl awr y , whic h is prohibited by

the Texas Constit ution. SeeT EX .C O N ST . art. I , § 20. This prohibition forbids the g overnme nt from deny

ing a citizen all lega l rig hts or transportinga citizen out of the state a s punishment for an of

fense
. Pee ler v. Hughe

s &Luce , 909 S.W .2d 494, 499 (Tex. 1995). B e c a u s e R e t z l a f

f h a s n o tb e e nd e n i e d

a l l l e g a l r i g h t s o r

b an i s h e d f r o mth e s t at e , th e “ o u t l aw r y” provision is not i mplicated. Se e id . Acc ording ly , the “outlawr y ” provision of the Te x as Constit ution is notimplicated. Retzl aff ’s six th issue is overruled. In conclusion, the trial c ourt’s orde r of June 26, 2008, which conta ined var ious injunctive provisions, is vacated in toto . T he c ourt ’s jud g me nt d ism iss ingthi s c a se wi th p re jud ic e is
reve rsed in par

t, as it pertains to any

defe ndants other than G oAmeric a. In all other re spects, the jud g me nt i s a ff

ir me d. Th e c a

us e is r e mand e d f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion. Nothing stated he rein should be c onstrued to ca st doubt on the trial court’s c onclusion that Retzl aff

is a vexatious li tiga

nt or on the cour

t’s prohibition ag ainst Retzl aff ’s filing any

new litigation in this state. The ca use is rema

nded solely

for the pur

pose of disposingof the
re ma ini ngde fe nd ants . October 7, 2011 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice-25-

B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ.