Opinion filed Nov ember 21 , 2022



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ No. 11

- 2 2

- 00 27 9

- C V

__________
IN RE RINO

- K&K COMPRESSION, INC.

Original Mandamus Proceedin g

O P I N I O N
Relator , Rino

- K&K Compression, Inc., filed this original petition for writ of
mandamus asserting that Respondent, th e Honorable Elizabeth Byer Leonard, presiding judge of the 238th District Court of Midland County , abused her discretion
when she granted the motion to transfer venue filed by real parties in interest (RPI) , Global Compressor, L.P. and Compressor Management, LLC, without notice to the parties and without conducting a hearing as required by Rule 87 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure

. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 87 (1), (3)(b) ; Henderson v. O’Neill , 797 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus is the appropriate remedy when a trial court fails to give sufficient notice to a party as required by Rule 87)

. Relator requests that we order Judge Leonard to vacate the order of transfer that she2 signed on July 22, 2022. Because Judge Leonard did not comply with the procedural requirements mandated by Rule 87 for the trial court’s con sideration of a motion to

tra nsfer venue, w e agree with Relator and conditionally grant Relator’s petition.
I. Procedural History
Relator filed the underlying suit in the 238th Judicial District Court of Midland County on June 1, 2022. RPI answer ed and filed a motion on July 1, 2022,
to transfer venue to Harris County. Along with its motion to transfer venue , RPI submitted a proposed order. However, RPI did not request that Judge Leonard set

a hearing on its motion to transfer venue as required by Rule 87. See T EX

. R.
C IV

. P. 87 (1) (“The movant has the duty to request a setting on the motion to transfer.”).
On July 22, 2022, without either notice to the parties or a hearing on the
motion as required by Rule 87, Judge Leonard signed RPI’s proposed order transferring venue to Harris County

. Judge Leonard has filed a written response in this proceeding wherein she states that she “mistakenly ” believ ed that the proposed
order ha d been submitted for her signature pursuant to a local rule. See M IDLAND (T EX .) L OC

. R. 4

. 09 (a), (d)(2) ( after the rendition or announcement of the trial court’s ruling on a pending matter , if a party is unable to secure opposing counsel’s approval as to the form of a proposed order within the thirty

- day period prescribed by subsection (a) , counsel may submit a letter and the proposed order to the trial

court requesting that the trial court sign the order if no written objection has been
received from opposing counsel within ten days from the date of counsel’s letter and request )

. 1 The case was transferred to Harris County three days later.

1 T he parties in their submissions erroneously refer to Rule 2.6. c. 2 of the Local Rules of Practice for the Courts of Midland County. However, the Local Rules of Practice for the Courts of Midland County were revised, and the amended version became effective on February 28, 2022. Thus, we note that the applicable local rule for purposes of thi s proceeding is Rule 4.09(a), (d)(2).3 Although RPI claims that it received notice of a Transfer Certificate by
electronic notification on July 25, 2022 , 2 Relator asserts that it did not receive notice
or become aware of either the trial court’s order transferring venue or the Transfer
Certificate until Relator contacted Judge Leonard’s cou rt coordinator and the Midland County district clerk’s office on September 26, 2022. This lack of notice
i s support ed by Relator ’s later filings in the Midland County suit : a Certificate of Written Discovery on September 9 , 2022 , and an Agreed Stipulated Confidentiality Order on September 15, the latter of which was signed by Judge Leonard on September 20. On September 20, RPI filed a motion to withdraw the agreed
confidential ity order , stating that the order was “inadvertently and erroneously filed in Midland County, Texas although this case has been transferred to the 269th
Judicial District Court in Harris County , Texas per this Courts [ sic ] July 22, 2022,
Order.” 3 Judge Leonard granted RPI’s motion to strike the agreed confidentiality order on September 27. In its petition, Relator requests that we order Judge Leonard to, among other things, vacate the July 22, 2022 order transferring ve nue b ecause (1) she failed to comply with Rule 87’s procedural requirements and (2) she did not afford Relator

2 RPI avoids directly stating whether it received notice of the transfer order signed by Judge Leonard. In its submission s, RPI contends that RPI received notice “at the time the Transfer Certificate was filed and serv ed via e

- service from the Harris County District Court as a part y to the action.” It is unclear from RPI’s initial response whether RPI received notice of the order granting its motion to transfer venue, or whether RPI received only the Transfer Certifica te filed on July 25, 2022 and served electronically by Harris County

. In its supplemental response, RPI states that the “court presumably provided prompt notice to all parties as [RPI] received electronic notice from the court on or about July 27, 2022, t hat the case had been transferred to Harris County ,” citing Rule 306a. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 306a( 3) (requiring the clerk to immediately give notice to the parties after a judgment or order is signed). Therefore, we cannot discern whether RPI actually received notice of the transfer order.

3 To explain why the agreed confidentiality order was filed i n Midland County, RPI contends that Relator , during its review of the draft order, changed the heading of the order before it was filed “to list Midland County in the case style” ; RPI has attache d an “original draft” of the agreed order in support of its

c ontention . We note that, while the “ original draft ” does list the 269th District Court of Harris County in the heading, both the “original draft” and the file

- stamped order show the Midland County cause number.4 due process under such rule

. See Henderson , 797 S.W.2d at 905. Relator stresses that mandamus is “the only available remedy to address [Judge Leonard ’s ] oversight” because Relator was not aware of and did not receive notice of the trial
court’s transfer order until “well after her plenary power [had] expired.” 4 As previously noted, Judge Leonard has filed a respon se to Relator’s petition
and has graciously acknowledged the oversight. Judge Leonard agree s that we should grant Relator’s request for relief based on her mistake in signing the order transferring venu e without providing notice to the parties and setting a hearing on the motion. According to Judge Leonard, she “does not know why notice was not
sent to Relator.”
RPI responds that Relator’s petition for mandamus is “ barred by laches” and
that mandamus should not issue because Relator “provided no excuse or explanation for its failure to act in this case for over three (3) months given it was provided the
same notice as RPI.” In the alternative, RPI argu es that Judge Leonard “acted within
her discretion and reasonably ” in granting RPI’s motion to transfer venue because
she relied on a local rule that allows a party to file a motion for the entry of an order
if (1) the party is “unable to secure the approval as to form [of the order from] all opposing counsel and self

- represented litigants ” and (2) the trial cour t has not
received a party’s written objection to the proposed order within ten days of the trial court’s receipt of such order and request for signature

. See L OC

. R. 4.09(d)(2)

. As discussed in greater detail below, we conclude that Relator’s petition (1) is not barred
laches and (2) should be conditionally granted

. See Henderson , 797 S.W.2d at 905 (m andamus should issue when a trial court fails to follow the procedures required in

4 Judge Leonard’s plenary power presumably e xpired on August 2 2 , 2022, thirty days after she signed the transfer order. See HCA Health Serv s . of Tex

. , Inc. v. Salinas , 838 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. 1992) ( indicating that under Rule 87 a trial court has plenary power for thirty days after the transfer order is signed ). The record before us shows that Relator received actual notice of the transfer order on September 26, 2022 ; the instant mandamus petition was filed on October 19, 2022.5 Rule 87); Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye , 798 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (cond itionally granting a writ of mandamus where “the court effectively deprived Union Carbide of its fundamental due process right to notice and a hearing”)

. II. Standard of Review
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued at the discretion of the court. In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC , 627 S.W.3d 239, 247 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). To obtain relief by mandamus, a relator must show both that (1) the trial court clearly
abused its discretion and (2) the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re
Texan Millwork , 631 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P. , 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Mandamus relief should be granted only when a relator establishes “that only one outcome in the trial court was permissible under the law.” In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd. , 603 S.W.3d 53, 56 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding). “It is meant for circumstances ‘involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for gri evances that may be addressed by other remedies.’” Id. at 57 (quoting Walker v.
Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)).
A lthough mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its proceedings are guided by equitable principles

. In re Prudent ial Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) ( ci ting Rivercenter Asscos. v. Rivera , 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993)). Therefore, mandamus, “ [ a ] s a selective procedure,

. . . can correct clear errors in exceptional cases and afford appropriate guidance to the law without the disruption and burden of [an] interlocutory appeal. ” Id.
III. Analysis
Rule 87 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the trial court and
the movant follow certain procedures prior to, during, and after the trial court’s determination of a motion to transfer venue. First, the movant must request a setting6 on the motion. T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 87(1). Next, the trial court must give each part y to the action at least forty

- five days’ notice of the date the motion has been set for a hearing

. Id. A fter the hearing on the motion has concluded, the trial court then must determine the motion “promptly” based on the pleadings, stipulations, and affidavits.
Id. R

. 87 (1), ( 3 ) (b). In this context, t he question of v enue cannot be relitigated once
venue is either (1) “sustained as against a motion to transfer” or (2) transferred to a county of proper venue in response to such a motion , and interlocutory appeals of
venue determinations are not permitted

. Id. R. 87 ( 5 ) , (6) ; In re Team Rocket, L.P. , 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding)

. Fu r ther, Rule 89 similarly requires that certain actions be undertaken by the transferee county following the
transferor court’s venue determination. T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 89 ( e.g. , requiring the clerk of the transferee county to provide notice, collect fees, and advise the plaintiff or
counsel for the plaintiff that the cause can be dismissed if fees are not paid).
A. The Trial Court Clearly Abused its Discretion
We must first deci de if the trial court clearly abused its discretion. In that regard , we must determine whether the trial court’s order i s void or merely
“voidable.” An appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus if a trial court’s order is void even if a relator has an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Sw. Bell Tel.
Co. , 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding). Conversely , mandamus
will not issue to di rect a trial court to act on a voidable order unless a relator lacks an adequate remedy by appea l or “ exceptional circumstances ” exist that cause an appeal to become an inadequate remedy. In re Masonite Corp. , 997 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1999) (orig. procee ding). Here, Judge Leonard had jurisdiction to sign the transfer order, despite her
failure to follow the procedural requirements of Rule 87 ; therefore , the transfer order is “voidable,” not void. See i d. (“ [T] he mere fact that an action by a [trial] court . .

. is contrary to a statute, constitutional provision or rule of civil or appellate procedure7 makes it [not void but] ‘voidable’ or erroneous.” (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Mapco, Inc

. , v. Forrest , 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding)) ) ; see also Mapco , 795 S.W.2d at 703 (“ A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject ma tter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.”). We conclude that Judge Leonard clearly abused her discretion when she signed the transfer order without complying with the procedural requirements of
Rule 87 ; therefore , she sign ed a “voidable” order

. See Henderson , 797 S.W.2d at
905 ; Mapco , 795 S.W.2d at 703

. As such , we must next determine whether Relator has an adequate remedy by appeal as a result of the trial court’s clear abuse of
discretion

. In re Masonite Corp. , 997 S.W.2d at 198.
B. R elator Does N ot Have an Adequate Remedy by Appeal To challenge an adverse venue determination, a party ordinarily has an adequate appellate remedy through a direct appeal

. See T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE A NN

. § 15.064 (Wes t 2017 ). A s a general rule, mandamus will not issue for
venue determinati ons

. See In re Masonite Corp. , 997 S.W.2d at 198. However , the
Texas Supreme Court has promulgated exceptions to th is general rule when, as in the case before us, “ extraordinary circumstances ” exist

. See , e.g. , In re Team
Rocket , 256 S.W.3d at 262 ( the “trial court made no effort to follow” Rule 87); Union
Carbide , 798 S.W.2d at 793 ( the trial court “effectively deprived” the relator of due

process during the venue proceeding) ; Henderson , 797 S.W.2d at 905 ( the trial court
fail ed to follow the requirements of Rule 87)

. In Henderson , t he s upreme c ourt held that the relator was “ entitled to a w rit of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the defendants’
motion to transfer venue” because the trial court sign ed its order without giving the relator sufficient notice as required by Rule 87. Henderson , 797 S.W.2d at 9058 (emphasis added)

. The c ourt in Henderson , however, did not discuss the second

prong of the mandamus analysis

— whether the relator had an ade quate remedy by appeal. Based on th is record , w e believe that the circumstances in this case are “exceptiona l ” and cause a direct appeal to become an inadequate remedy. See id. ;

s ee also In re Masonite Corp. , 997 S.W.2d at 198.
A lthough , as stated above, a party may typically appeal a trial court’s venue determination through a direct appeal , this circumstance assumes that the trial court provided the appealing party with the requisite notice and due process that Rule 87
demands

. See C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. § 15.064(a) ( “In all venue hearings , no factual proof concerning the merits of the case shall be required to establish venue .” (emphasis added) ) . For example, in In re Team Rocket , the s upreme c ourt read Section 15.064 and Rule 87 togeth er to conclude that “once a venue determination has been made, that determination is conclusive as to those part ies and claims.” In
re Team Rocket , 256 S.W.3d at 260. Importantly , the court reasoned : Once a ruling is made on the merits, as in a summary judgment, that decision becomes final as to that issue and cannot be vitiated by nonsuiting and refiling the case

. . . . This concept is rooted in the long

standing and fundamental judicial doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which “promote judicial efficiency, protect parties from multiple lawsuits, and prevent inconsistent judgments by precluding the relitigation ” of matters that have already been decided or could have been litigated in a prior suit. Just as a decision on the meri ts cannot be circumvented by nonsuiting and refiling the case, a final determination fixing venue in a particular county must likewise be protected from relitigation

. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted)

. H ere, in the absence of receiving the requisite notice and a hearing that
Rule 87 requires , Relator was not provided the opportunity to challenge or litigate
the issue o f whether venue i s proper in Midland County or Harris County in the first
instance

. Further, Relator i s prohibited from seeking an interlocutory appeal of the9 trial court’s venue determination. See C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. § 15.064(a) ; T EX

. R.
C IV

. P. 87(6)

. Significantly , the issue of venue cannot be relitigated by the district court in Harris County because v enue has been “fixed” there by Judge Leonard’s order transferring venue. See In re Team Rocket , 256 S.W.3d at 260. Therefore, we conclude that Relator lack s an adequate remedy by appeal, and the facts in this case constitute “exceptional circumstances” that necessitat e action by this court

. See
Henderson , 797 S.W.2d at 905; see also I n re Masonite Corp. , 997 S.W.2d at 198.
C. Mandamus is not Barred by Laches or Midland Local Rule 4.09
W e next turn to RPI’s responses to Relator’s petition. RPI contends that
Relator’s mandamus request is barred by laches principles and, alternatively, that Judge Leonard appropriately granted the motion to transfer and sign ed the transfer
order pursuant to a local rule. We first consider RPI’s second assertion. It is t rue that l ocal court rules do not trump the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules of evidence, or any other statut ory requirement. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 3a(2) ( “no
time period provided by these rules may be altered by local rules”); cf.
T EX . R. A PP . P. 1.2 (c) ( “A court must not dismiss an appeal for noncompliance with

a local rule without giving the noncomplying party notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure [.] ”)

. In fact, t he Texas Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle when it amended Rule 3a to specify that local court rules must not be inconsistent with (1) the rules the Texas Supreme Court has adopted, including the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or (2) state or federal law

. See Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 3a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 10 of the Texas Rules of
Judicial Administration , Misc. Docket No. 22

- 9081 (Tex. Sept. 23, 202 2) , available

at h ttps://www.txcourts.gov/media/1454923/229081.pdf (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
Moreover , RPI’s reliance on Midland Local Rule 4.09 (d)(2) is clearly misplaced. The notice requirement in this local rule only applies when a trial court10 has actually rendered or announced it s ruling on a matter after the matter has been
submitted to it for determination

. See L OC

. R. 4.09( a ) ( within thirty days after the
trial court’s rendition and announcement of its rulings , counsel shall reduce to writing all judgments, decrees, or orders, and forward same to opposing counsel
for approval as to f orm , and deliver such orders for the trial court to sign );
Id. R. 4.09(d)(2) (if counsel is unable to secure the signature or approval from opposing counsel as to the form of a proposed order , counsel may present the trial court with the proposed order and a letter requesting that the trial court sign the proposed order if the trial court has not received a ny written objection from opposing
counsel wit hin ten days from the date of counsel’s letter). Contrary to RPI’s contention, Midland Local Rule 4.09 is not applicable to the circumstances before

us and would not bar Relator’s request for mandamus relief

. Because the motio n to transfer venue was n ot submitted to Judge Leonard for determination and because no hearing on the motion to transfer ever occurred, Judge Leonard did not render or

announce a ruling on the motion. Further, RPI never submitted a letter to Judge
Leonard requesting that she sig n a transfer order

. Above all, e ven if Midland Local
Rule 4.09 did apply , th is local rule can not override or supplant the dead lines, notice requirements , and due process requirements of Rule 87. T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 3a( 2).
W ith respect to RPI’s laches argument , RPI contends that we “may analogize to the doctrine of laches, which bars equitable relief

. ” For this assertion, RPI cites only to cases where courts have denied mandamus relief when mandamus petitions
were filed four or more m o nths after the trial court act ed

. See , e.g. , Rivercenter , 858
S.W.2d at 367 (four months) ; In re East Tex

. Salt Water Disposal Co. , 72 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. App

— Tyler 2002, orig. proceeding) (ten years)

. Undoubtedly , as stated above, m andamus proceedings are guided by equitable principles and “[o]ne such principle is that ‘ [ e ] quity aids the diligent and not those who slumber on their rights

. ’” In re Am. Airlines, Inc. , 634 S.W.3d 38, 43 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)11 (second alteration in orig inal) ( quoting Rivercenter , 858 S.W.2d at 367)

. In this

case , however, Relator did not “slumber on their rights.” Relator explains, and Judge
Leonard has confirmed , that Relator did not become aware of the trial court’s order transferring venue until September 26, 2022. O nce it became aware of the order,
Relator expeditiously filed this petition for writ of mandamus within eighteen business days. The record supports Relator’s reasonable explanation. Therefore,

w e canno t say that upon becoming aware of the transfer order , Relator’s subsequent

“ delay ” in filing this original proceeding would subject its petition to a laches bar.
See In re Am. Airlines , 634 S.W.3d at 43 ( conditionally granting the petition for
mandamus where a year
- long delay was “neither unexplained nor unreasonable”).
D. The Trial Court’s Plenary Power
F inally , we address the issue of the trial court’s plenary power

. Relator assert s that , as evidenced by RPI’s motion to transfer venue, the trial court sua sponte sign ed
the transfer order because RPI’s motion merely requested “limited discovery to establish evidence of the facts regarding venue” rather than requesting a hearing on
such motion. Relator submits that, b ecause the trial court sua sponte and without authority transferred venue of the underlying suit to H arris County, the trial court’s
transfer order is void and , therefore , her plenary power has not expired. See Robertson v. Gregory , 663 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1983 , orig. proceeding) ( a transfer order on the trial court’s own motion without notice to the parties was void); see also Dorchester Master Ltd. P ’ ship v. Anthony , 734 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, orig. proceeding) ( the trial court’s sua sponte reconsideration of its transfer order de nial was precluded by Rule 87(5) and therefore void). Irrespective of Relator’s assertion , Judge Leonard mistakenly signed the transfer order based on the mere filing of RPI’s motion to transfer venue,

not on her own motion

. Furthermore , statutory errors do not result in void orders, as Relator suggests, but instead result in “ voidable ” orders. In re Masonite Corp. ,12 997 S.W.2d at 198; Mapco , 795 S.W.2d at 703

. Th us , as we have said, because Judge Leonard had jurisdiction to sign the transfer order , the order is “voidable,” not
void. In re Masonite Corp. , 997 S.W.2d at 198; Mapco , 795 S.W.2d at 703

. Nevertheless , even though the trial court’s order i s voidable, we conclude that Relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.
RPI contends that the trial court’s plenary power expired thirty days after the
transfer order was signed , absent a “timely fil[ed] appropriate post judgment motion.” For this assertion, RPI cites to and relies on Rule 329b(d) and the s upreme

c ourt’s decision in Philbrook v. Berry

. 5 RPI claim s that a “post judgment motion” would have been timely if Relator had filed such a motion within the trial court’s

“ initial thirty

- day [plenary] period

. ” RPI’s assertions are flawed . First, although the

s upreme c ourt has referred to Rule 329b(d) in suppo rt of the argument that a trial court’s plenary power expires thirty days after a transfer order is signed , the c ourt also expressly overruled Philbrook in favor of “requir[ing] courts of appeals to find appellate jurisdiction” where possible. HCA Health Serv s

. , 838 S.W.2d at 248;
Mitschke , 645 S.W.3d at 258. 6 Second, and most importantly for purposes of our

5 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. 1985) , overruled by Mitschke v. Borromeo , 645 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. 2022)

.

6 In its responses, RPI also takes issue with Relator not filing either a motion to vacate or reconsider, a bill of review, or a motion for a new trial. Courts of appeals are divided on whether a motion for

reco nsideration pursuant to Rule 306a extends the trial court’s plenary power. Compare In re Ashley , No. 13

- 09

- 00022

- CV, 2009 WL 332312 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg Feb. 10, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (Rule 306a motion extended trial court’s plenary power) , with In re Chester , 309 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding) (motion for rehearing of transfer order does not extend trial court’s plenary power)

. Albeit in the context of a trial court denying a
m otion to transfer venue, courts of appeals are also divided on whether a trial court may reconsider its initial order in disposing of such a motion. See In re Lowe’s Home Ctrs., L.L.C , 531 S.W.3d 861, 877 n.4 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg 2017, orig. proceeding) (collecting cases). Some courts that favor allowing a trial court to reconsider its order cite to language in HCA Health Serv ices for support. See, e.g. , In re Reynolds , 369 S.W.3d 638, 647 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2012, orig. proceeding) (Rule 87(5 ) “does not preclude reconsideration of the ‘first and only motion to transfer scheduled for hearing’” ( quoting Orion Enters., Inc. v. Pope , 927 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1996, orig. proceeding), which quotes HCA Health Serv s

. , 838 S.W.2d at 248 ) )

. In any event, these holdings are of no consequence here because we conclude that Relator has pursued the only avenue for relief available to it based on the circumstances and the state of the law at the time its petition was filed.13 analysis, Relator did not have an opportunity to file a “timely” post

- judgment motion or other request while the trial court retained plenary power because Relator was unaware of and did not receive notice of the transfer order during that thirty

- day period . Relator filed its petitio n for a writ of mandamus because it received notice
of the trial court’s erroneous transfer order after the trial court’s plenary power had expired. Clearly, the lack of notice deprived Relator of the opportunity to advise Judge Leonard of her mistake within the thirty

- day plenary period.
E. Equitable Principles in Mandamus Proceedings Require Action Importantly, w e refer again to the equitable principles that guide us in mandamus proceedings. See I n re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d at 138

. We have concluded that Judge Leonard clearly abused her discretion when she sign ed the transfer order without following the procedures required by Rule 87. Equally troubling is that the Midland County district clerk failed to provide timely
notice of the signed transfer order to Relator , which further precluded Relator from filing a timely challenge to the trial court’s erroneous and voidable order. The district clerk’s error only enhances Relator’s argument and its entitlement to
mandamus relief. As we have said, mandamus will not issue to challenge a trial

co urt’s venue determination unless “extraordinary circumstances” exist. In this case,
such circumstances exist , and the equitable principles established by the supreme court compel the result that we announce today

. IV. This Court’s Ruling
W e conditionally grant Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus and direct Respondent to vacate the transfer order that she signed on July 22, 2022. Vacating
the transfer order will allow Judge Leonard to consider the motion to transfer venue pursuant to the requirements of Rule 87. A writ of mandamus will issue only if Judge Leonard fails to act by December 15, 2022

.14 In granting this relief, we do not express an opinion on whether venue is proper in Midland County or Harris County

.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
Nov ember 21 , 2022
Panel consists of: Bailey , C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.