United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 4, 2014 Decided August 29, 2014

No. 13-7049

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. BRADY FOLLIARD,

APPELLANT

v.

GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS, INC. AND GOVPLACE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-00719)

H. Vincent McKnight, Jr. argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellant. 

Christopher M. Loveland argued the cause for appellee 

Govplace. With him on the brief was Jonathan S. Aronie. 

Timothy K. Halloran was on the brief of amicus curiae 

Coalition for Government Procurement. With him on the 

brief was Jason N. Workmaster. Daniel G. Jarcho entered an 

appearance.

Before: KAVANAUGH and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS. 

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Under the Trade Agreements 

Act of 1979 (TAA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–2581, the federal 

government is barred from purchasing products that do not

originate from “designated countries.” See id. § 2512; 48 

C.F.R. §§ 25.003, 52.225-5(a) (listing the designated 

countries). Appellee Govplace sold Hewlett-Packard (“HP”) 

products to the federal government. To determine whether 

the HP products originated from designated countries, 

Govplace relied on its distributor, Ingram Micro, which

expressly certified that the HP products complied with TAA 

requirements. Govplace also sold other products to the 

federal government, but claimed that these products were 

exempt from TAA requirements. 

Appellant Brady Folliard, a qui tam relator, brought suit 

under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733, 

alleging that the HP products Govplace sold to the federal

government originated from non-designated countries, in 

violation of the TAA. The FCA imposes liability only if a

person “knowingly” makes a false claim. To satisfy the 

FCA’s scienter requirement, Appellant claimed that Govplace 

acted in reckless disregard to the falsity of its sales to the 

federal government because Govplace’s reliance on Ingram 

Micro’s certification was not reasonable. Appellant also 

sought discovery regarding the products Govplace claimed 

were exempt from TAA requirements. 

Through a series of orders and opinions, the District 

Court rejected all of Appellant’s claims on the merits and thus 

granted summary judgment to Govplace, while denying some 

of Appellant’s discovery requests. Appellant challenges some 

of those rulings. Because we conclude that the District Court 
3

properly exercised its discretion in managing discovery, and 

that Govplace reasonably relied on Ingram Micro’s 

certification, we affirm.

I.

A.

Appellee Govplace is a small business provider of IT 

integration and product solutions, and delivers enterprise IT 

solutions exclusively to the public sector. J.A. at 467. 

Govplace has been a recipient of a General Services 

Administration (GSA) schedule contract (“GSA schedule” or 

“GSA contract”) since August 1, 1999. J.A. 468. The GSA 

Schedules Program “provides Federal agencies . . . with a 

simplified process for obtaining commercial supplies and 

services at prices associated with volume buying.” 48 C.F.R. 

§ 8.402. All products sold pursuant to a GSA schedule must 

comply with the TAA. See Trade Agreements, GSA iGuide, 

https://vsc.gsa.gov/iGuide/iGuide/Trade_Agreements.html

(last visited July 11, 2014); J.A. 362. The TAA requires that

“only U.S.-made or designated country end products [can] be 

offered and sold under Schedule contracts.” Id.; 48 C.F.R. 

§ 25.403(c)(1).

Govplace is not a manufacturer of the products it lists for 

sale and does not acquire products directly from a 

manufacturer. J.A. 468. Instead, Govplace acquires products 

from distributors. J.A. 468. Ingram Micro, the largest 

technology products distributor, is the distributor from which

Govplace acquires the vast majority of the products it sells on 

its GSA schedule. J.A. 468, 972. Govplace acquires products 

from Ingram Micro by participating in Ingram Micro’s GSA 

Pass Through Program (“the Program”). J.A. 972-73. 

According to Ingram Micro, its Program “helps solution 
4

providers obtain Letters of Supply from manufacturers, a 

requirement to include products on a GSA Schedule,” and 

“helps resellers maintain their GSA contracts by regularly 

passing through manufacturer-certified information such as 

updated pricing and product documentation.” J.A. 972. For 

example, in providing Govplace with the “current GSA 

product/price list for Hewlett Packard” in January 2007,

Ingram Micro “passe[d] through” five manufacturer 

certifications, including: “Products offered by the 

manufacturer are compliant with the Trade Agreements Act.” 

J.A. 516. Through its participation in the Program, Govplace 

obtained Letters of Supply from both Ingram Micro and HP, 

allowing it to resell HP products to the federal government. 

J.A. 973. 

GSA has implicitly approved of Govplace’s reliance on 

Ingram Micro’s Program to demonstrate compliance with the 

GSA schedule contract requirements. Since 2003, GSA has 

conducted several “Contractor Administrative Visits” of 

Govplace to evaluate its compliance with GSA schedule

contract requirements. J.A. 470. During those visits, 

Govplace has explained to GSA that it relies on the Ingram 

Program “for [Country of Origin (COO)] information and 

certifications for the items” listed in its GSA schedule. J.A. 

470. Upon finishing its evaluation, GSA typically issues an 

Administrative Report Card. J.A. 470. In each of the 

Administrative Report Cards evaluating Govplace, GSA has 

determined that Govplace demonstrated compliance with the 

TAA. J.A. 470.
5

B.

Relator Brady Folliard brought a qui tam suit under the 

FCA, alleging that Govplace and other companies1 sold 

products to the federal government that “did not originate in 

designated countries under the [TAA], and therefore are 

making material false statements and presenting false claims”

to the federal government for payment. J.A. 75. Specifically, 

Appellant alleged that Govplace knowingly listed twentythree products on its GSA schedule as having originated in the 

United States when they allegedly originated in nondesignated countries, and that Govplace sold ten products that 

originated in non-designated countries. J.A. 115-119. 

Through three separate opinions and orders, the District Court 

ultimately denied Appellant’s claims on the merits and thus 

granted Govplace summary judgment, while denying in part

Appellant’s discovery requests. We briefly summarize each 

of the three opinions as relevant to his appeal.

In its May 3, 2012 opinion, the District Court addressed 

Appellant’s initial request for additional discovery pursuant to 

Rule 56(d) of the federal rules of civil procedure,2 which he 

 1 Appellant does not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of the 

other defendants, so those claims are not before us.

2 This rule states: “If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration 

that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify 

its opposition, the court may:

 (1) defer considering the motion or deny it;

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take 

discovery; or

 (3) issue any other appropriate order.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d).
6

filed in connection with his opposition to Govplace’s motion 

for summary judgment. United States ex rel. Folliard v. 

Government Acquisitions, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84–85

(D.D.C. 2012). In his Rule 56(d) request, Appellant asserted 

that Govplace had refused to respond to his discovery 

requests prior to filing its motion for summary judgment, J.A. 

755, rendering him “unable to adequately respond to each of 

[Govplace’s] purported undisputed material issues,” J.A. 756.

The court rejected Appellant’s request, describing it as 

“improperly framed” because he did not “state concretely why 

additional discovery is needed.” Government Acquisitions, 

Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The court did permit Appellant to amend his opposition to the

summary judgment motion, “limited to the specific sales the 

complaint alleges as to each defendant.” Id. The court also 

stated that “[i]f Folliard invokes Rule 56(d) in his opposition, 

the request must describe the necessary discovery with 

specificity.” Id. Finally, the court left open the possibility of 

granting Appellant discovery regarding sales not specifically 

identified in his complaint, explaining that “if Folliard 

prevails as to either or both defendants on the specific sales 

alleged in the complaint, the question of further discovery will 

be ripe.” Id.

Then, in a subsequent opinion, the District Court 

addressed Appellant’s Rule 56(d) request in his amended 

opposition to Govplace’s summary judgment motion. 

Through his amended Rule 56(d) request, Appellant sought 

additional discovery related to four categories of sales: (1) 

Govplace’s sales under its FirstSource contract, (2) 

Govplace’s sales in the “open market,” (3) sales made by 

New Tech Solutions, Inc. (“New Tech”) pursuant to an

“authorized government teaming agreement” it had entered 

into with Govplace, and (4) Govplace’s sales of HP products 
7

that it had received from distributor Ingram Micro. United 

States ex rel. Folliard v. Government Acquisitions, Inc., 880 

F. Supp. 2d 36, 46–48 (D.D.C. 2012).

Govplace opposed Appellant’s Rule 56(d) request, 

arguing that the first three categories of sales were exempt 

from TAA requirements. As to the FirstSource contract,

Govplace claimed that it was awarded this contract from the 

federal government as a “Small Business Set-Aside.” Id. at 

46. Govplace asserted that such contracts are exempt from 

TAA requirements. Id.; 48 C.F.R. § 25.401(a)(1) (“This 

subpart does not apply to . . . Acquisitions set aside for small 

businesses[.]”). The District Court agreed. It stated that 

Govplace “provided the [FirstSource] contract as Exhibit E to 

its Motion for Summary Judgment,” and that “Plaintiff fails to 

specify what particular discovery he desires regarding the 

FirstSource contract.” Government Acquisitions, Inc., 880 F. 

Supp. 2d at 46. After denying Appellant’s Rule 56(d) request, 

the court granted Govplace summary judgment as to sales 

made under its FirstSource contract, reasoning that “[s]ince 

plaintiff offers absolutely no evidence refuting [Govplace’s] 

motion for summary judgment, there is no genuine issue of 

material fact.” Id.

As for its open market sale, Govplace contended that the 

product at issue “was not listed on its GSA Schedule Contract 

and was sold on the ‘open market’ without any representation 

of its COO.” Id. at 48. It also asserted that “the sale totaled 

less than the TAA threshold of $193,000 at the time of sale.” 

Id. Appellant responded “by simply requesting to depose 

[Govplace’s affiant, Adrianne] Angle and a 30(b)(6) 

representative about ‘[Govplace’s] Open Market Sales.’ ” Id. 

The court denied this request as well, explaining that he 

“fail[ed] to explain what precisely he wishe[d] to garner from 

a deposition and why it would be necessary for the litigation.” 
8

Id. The court then granted summary judgment as to the open 

market sale. Id.

The court also denied Appellant’s Rule 56(d) request and 

granted Govplace summary judgment with respect to the sales 

made by New Tech pursuant to its teaming agreement with 

Govplace. Govplace had asserted that summary judgment 

was proper because it did not actually sell the product—it 

“was sold by a third party, [New Tech.]” Id. The District 

Court also denied this request. It stated that Appellant’s 

“boilerplate discovery request” seeking information regarding 

Govplace’s various transactions and “all other claims for 

exemptions from TAA requirements” was “inappropriately 

vague.” Id. Crediting Govplace’s “uncontroverted” 

assertions, the court granted it summary judgment as to the 

product sale by New Tech. Id.

The District Court did, however, grant Appellant’s Rule 

56(d) request with respect to the HP products that Govplace

received from Ingram Micro. Govplace had claimed that it 

was entitled to summary judgment on sales of the HP

products because Ingram Micro had expressly certified that 

the products complied with the TAA, and therefore, Govplace 

argued, even if the products did not comply with the TAA 

(which Govplace did not concede), it could not have 

“knowingly” made a false sale. Id. at 47. The court 

disagreed, finding “summary judgment to be premature 

regarding these five products until plaintiff has an adequate 

opportunity to conduct focused discovery on [Govplace’s]

reliance on Ingram Micro.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Finally, in a third opinion, after Appellant had an 

opportunity to take discovery on the HP products Govplace 

received from Ingram Micro, the District Court addressed the 

remaining issue of whether Govplace’s reliance on Ingram 
9

Micro precluded a finding that Govplace knowingly sold HP 

products that did not comply with the TAA. The court 

emphasized that in order to establish “reckless disregard” 

under the FCA, Appellant was required to demonstrate not 

merely negligence on the part of Govplace, but a standard the 

court referred to as “gross negligence-plus.” United States ex 

rel. Folliard v. Govplace, 930 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 

2013). The court explained that “absent some reason to 

question Ingram Micro’s representations, it was not gross 

negligence-plus for Govplace not to separately certify that the 

products were TAA-compliant.” Id. at 134. Appellant 

offered two reasons why Govplace’s reliance was 

unreasonable, both of which the court rejected.

First, Appellant pointed to an email from an HP 

employee purportedly establishing that Govplace sold a 

product that was made in China, a non-designated country. 

Id. at 135. The court rejected this argument because 

Govplace received this email after the alleged sale occurred, 

and therefore the information supplied in the email did not 

have any bearing on Govplace’s knowledge at the time of the 

sale. The court also rejected this argument because the email 

indicated that, while some versions of the product in question 

were made in China, there was a version that was made in a 

TAA-compliant country, and it was far from clear that the 

product Govplace sold was actually made in China. Id.

Second, Appellant relied on unsolicited price lists that 

Tech Data Corporation (“Tech Data”), a competitor of Ingram 

Micro, sent to Govplace. Id. These price lists, Appellant 

asserted, “show[] critical inconsistencies regarding the origin 

of the disputed products.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The court found this argument unpersuasive, 

pointing first to the fact that “[t]here is no indication that 

Govplace ever read or even opened these price lists,” id. at 
10

136, and thus this information could not have undermined 

Govplace’s reliance on Ingram Micro’s representations. In 

addition, and more fundamentally, the court noted that, in 

contrast to Ingram Micro’s express certifications regarding 

the COO in its communications to resellers, the “Tech Data 

price lists, on their face, disclaim their reliability.” Id. Thus, 

even if Govplace had reviewed the price list, Govplace could 

have disregarded the information given Tech Data’s 

disclaimer. Concluding in turn that Govplace’s “actions 

cannot amount to gross negligence plus, deliberate ignorance, 

or reckless disregard,” the court granted Govplace summary 

judgment as to this remaining claim, thereby dismissing the 

complaint with prejudice. Id. at 137. 

Appellant appeals the District Court’s denial of his Rule 

56(d) requests and its granting of summary judgment to 

Govplace, asserting that the court improperly limited the 

scope of his discovery and erred in its assessment of whether 

Govplace reasonably relied on Ingram Micro’s certification. 

II.

Because summary judgment may not be granted until “all 

parties have ‘had a full opportunity to conduct discovery,’ ” 

Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 684 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 257 (1986)), we begin our analysis by determining

whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying

Appellant’s Rule 56(d) discovery request. If so, then its 

summary judgment rulings were premature and thus cannot 

stand. See id.

We review “a district court’s refusal to grant a Rule 56[d]

request under an abuse of discretion standard.” Messina v. 

Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2006). We review 
11

de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment, 

see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors of Cal., 

Inc., 393 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and its factual 

findings for clear error, Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 750 

(D.C. Cir. 2010).

A.

1.

Under the abuse of discretion standard that governs 

discovery disputes, a trial court’s authority is at its zenith. 

See Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 580 (D.C. Cir. 

2010); see also Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 507 (D.C. Cir. 

2007) (“The basis for our deferential, abuse-of-discretion 

review of district court discovery rulings is the recognition 

that supervising the to-and-fro of district court litigation falls 

within the expertise, in the first instance, of district courts and 

not courts of appeals.”). Our decision in Convertino provides 

the standard for ruling on Rule 56(d) requests.3

 In Convertino

we explained that the “movant must submit an affidavit which 

states with sufficient particularity why additional discovery is

necessary.” Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99 (quoting Ikossi v. 

Dep’t. of Navy, 516 F.3d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2008))

(internal quotation marks omitted). We also outlined the three 

criteria that the affidavit must satisfy: (1) “[I]t must outline 

the particular facts [the non-movant] intends to discover and 

describe why those facts are necessary to the litigation,” id. at 

99; (2) “it must explain ‘why [the non-movant] could not 

produce the facts in opposition to the motion for summary 

 3 The Convertino decision discusses then-Rule 56(f), which is now 

Rule 56(d). Rule 56(d) “carrie[d] forward without substantial 

change the provisions of former subdivision (f).” FED. R. CIV. P. 

56 advisory committee’s notes to 2010 Amendments.
12

judgment,’ ” id. at 99–100 (quoting Carpenter v. Fed. Nat’l 

Mortg. Ass’n, 174 F.3d 231, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); and (3) “it 

must show the information is in fact discoverable,” id. at 100.

Before beginning our discussion, we pause to clarify the 

import of the statement in Convertino that a Rule 56(d) 

request should be granted “almost as a matter of course unless 

the non-moving party has not diligently pursued discovery of 

the evidence,”4 id. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted), a 

remark Appellant emphasizes in urging reversal. Appellant’s 

Br. at 23, 25. Appellant appears to interpret this statement as 

conveying the principle that, so long as the non-movant has 

diligently pursued discovery, courts should routinely grant 

their request. This is incorrect because it suggests that the 

non-movant’s diligence in pursuing discovery trumps the 

three requirements outlined in Convertino. While the nonmovant’s diligence is certainly a factor a district court may 

consider,5 it is not a sufficient basis, standing alone, to grant a 

Rule 56(d) request. Instead, district courts must assess all the 

requirements discussed in Convertino.

It is also incorrect to conclude, as Appellant suggests,

that district courts are supposed to grant Rule 56(d) requests

more often than not. District courts should resolve each 

request based on its application of the Convertino criteria to

 4 We first announced this principle in Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co., 68 

F.3d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1995), quoting from the Fifth Circuit’s 

decision in Wichita Falls Office Assocs. v. Banc One Corp., 978 

F.2d 915, 919 n.4 (5th Cir.1992). And it appears that the Fifth 

Circuit adopted this principle from the Third Circuit. See, e.g., 

Costlow v. United States, 552 F.2d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 1977).

5 A district court may find the non-movant’s diligence relevant to 

the requirement that the non-movant “explain why he could not 

produce the facts in opposition to the motion for summary 

judgment.” Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99-100. 
13

the specific facts and circumstances presented in the request. 

Indeed, in tracing the genesis of the phrase “granted almost as 

a matter of course” to the Third Circuit’s decision in Ward v. 

United States, 471 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1973), it is clear 

that the court made this statement based on the specific facts 

before it, and thus was not placing a thumb on the scale in 

favor of non-movants. 

In Ward, the court held that the district court should 

have granted the plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) request in its 

negligence action against the United States, because “the facts 

respecting possible . . . negligence [were] solely in the 

possession of [the alleged tortfeasor].” Id. at 670; see also

Costlow v. United States, 552 F.2d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 1977) 

(“[W]here the facts are in possession of the moving party a 

continuance of a motion for summary judgment for purposes 

of discovery should be granted almost as a matter of 

course.”). The Third Circuit thus reached the conclusion that 

when the facts giving rise to the cause of action are in the sole

possession of the moving party, courts should grant the Rule 

56(d) request “almost as matter of course.”6

 It is easy to see 

why the Convertino factors would likewise lead to the same 

ruling under those facts. 

Having clarified the Rule 56(d) criteria, we turn now 

to whether the District Court abused its discretion in resolving 

the discovery disputes in this case. 

 6 We also note that similar language appears in Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 15(a)(2): a court “should freely give [a party] leave 

[to amend its complaint] when justice so requires.” Yet there, as 

well, despite this permissive language, a district court must assess 

all factors we have deemed relevant. See Atchinson v. Dist. of 

Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
14

2.

The District Court denied Appellant’s Rule 56(d) request 

with respect to (1) the products Govplace sold pursuant to its 

FirstSource contract, (2) its “open market” sale, and (3) a sale 

by New Tech, which had entered into a “teaming agreement” 

with Govplace. The court also confined Appellant’s 

discovery, at least at the outset, to the sales specifically 

identified in Appellant’s complaint. We find no abuse of 

discretion in any of those rulings.

Appellant claims that he was entitled to discovery related 

to sales by Govplace that were not specifically identified in 

his complaint, because the sales he identified in his complaint, 

he contends, were “representative” of other allegedly 

fraudulent sales. See Appellant Br. at 17. Appellant’s 

argument is factually incorrect. He never alleged that the 

Govplace sales identified in his complaint were representative 

of other, yet-discovered Govplace transactions. Had he 

sought to allege as much, he clearly knew how to do so. His 

allegations against Govplace stand in stark contrast to his

allegations against some of the other defendants, in which he 

expressly claimed that the transactions identified in his 

complaint were representative. Compare, e.g., Pl.’s Second 

Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶ 101 (J.A. 106-07) (asserting that the 

“following chart summarizes confirmed sales of products by 

Defendant Government Acquisitions to the US Government 

in September 2007 that did not originate in designated 

countries: These sales represent false claims presented by the 

defendant to the United States Government, and further 

auditing will uncover more”) (emphasis added), with SAC ¶¶ 

117-18 (J.A. 113-118) (identifying sales made by Govplace

but nowhere does Appellant allege that these specific sales

were “representative” of other procurements); see also

Government Acquisitions, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d at 85 & n.2
15

(stating that “Folliard’s complaint identifies GAI’s allegedlyimproper sales as ‘representative’ of GAI’s behavior,” but 

observing in a footnote that “[n]o such allegation is made 

towards Govplace[,]” as the “complaint only lists a specific 

set of sales without reference to other sales to be 

discovered”). In conclusion, the District Court did not abuse 

its discretion in confining Appellant’s discovery to the 

transactions listed in his complaint, especially considering 

that the court left open the possibility of permitting Appellant 

to engage in additional discovery “if [he] prevail[ed] as to 

either or both defendants on the specific sales alleged in the 

complaint.” Government Acquisitions, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 

at 85.7

The court also did not abuse its discretion in denying in 

part Appellant’s Rule 56(d) requests as to certain products. 

Turning to the first request the court denied, Appellant

contends that the court should have granted discovery 

regarding the products Govplace sold under its FirstSource 

contract. Govplace had asserted before the District Court that 

 7 Because Appellant’s argument is factually incorrect, it is 

unnecessary to decide whether Appellant should have been afforded 

discovery regarding transactions that were not listed in his 

complaint. We note that our sister circuits have addressed this 

issue, with somewhat varying conclusions. Compare U.S. ex rel. 

Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 719 F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 

2013) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in “limit[ing] discovery to those allegations, contained in paragraph 

211 of the amended complaint, which satisfied Rule 9(b)’s 

particularity requirement”), with U.S. ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. 

Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 510 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[W]here a 

relator pleads a complex and far-reaching fraudulent scheme with 

particularity, and provides examples of specific false claims 

submitted to the government pursuant to that scheme, a relator may 

proceed to discovery on the entire fraudulent scheme.”).
16

the FirstSource contract was exempt from TAA requirements 

because it was awarded as a 100% Small Business Set-Aside. 

Government Acquisitions, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 46. 

Govplace also disclosed the contract to Appellant. Id. 

Nonetheless, in his Rule 56(d) request Appellant sought

information related to the product—for example, the 

procurement number, the number of units sold, and the 

country of origin abbreviation of the products. J.A. 758. He 

also sought to depose Adrianne Angle, the contracts manager 

for Govplace, and a Rule 30(b)(6) representative, see FED. R.

CIV. P. 30(b)(6), regarding “[Govplace’s] FirstSource 

Contract and how transactions under that agreement are 

allegedly exempt from the TAA.” J.A. 903. Appellant’s 

argument misses the point. 

If the contract is exempt from the TAA, then any 

products sold under the contract do not have to comply with 

the TAA. Accordingly, any discovery related to “transactions 

under that agreement” is immaterial. The discovery 

Appellant sought, then, “ ‘would [not] create a triable issue.’ ” 

Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99 (quoting Byrd v. U.S. EPA, 174 

F.3d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Appellant needed, instead, 

to produce facts that contradicted Govplace’s claim that its 

contract is exempt from the TAA. He failed to do this. The 

District Court therefore correctly denied his request, and, 

there being no genuine dispute as to any material fact, granted 

Govplace summary judgment as to these products. 

Appellant’s request for discovery related to Govplace’s 

sales to the federal government in the “open market” was also 

deficient. Govplace had claimed that the product at issue 

“was not listed on its GSA Schedule Contract and was sold on 

the ‘open market’ without any representation of its COO,” 

and it also claimed that the sales “totaled less than the TAA 

threshold of $193,000 at the time of sale.” Government 
17

Acquisitions, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 48. Govplace again 

disclosed the relevant contracts to Appellant. J.A. 711-730. 

Appellant responded by requesting to depose Adrianne Angle 

and a Rule 30(b)(6) representative regarding “GP’s Open 

Market Sales.” J.A. 903. This request lacked the particularity 

required by Convertino. Given that Appellant already had a 

copy of the relevant contracts, this vague request does not 

indicate why the depositions would reveal any information 

beyond what is apparent on the face of the contracts—that the 

product was not listed on Govplace’s GSA schedule and the 

total value of sales ($181,358.00), J.A. 728, was below the 

then-applicable TAA threshold. See Convertino, 684 F.3d at 

99 (stating that the non-movant must state with “sufficient 

particularity” why the discovery sought is necessary) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the District Court 

correctly denied his request and granted Govplace summary 

judgment as to these products. 

We turn briefly to the remaining request for discovery, 

which concerned the sale by New Tech pursuant to its 

authorized government teaming agreement with Govplace. 

Govplace argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on 

this sale because it did not actually sell the product—“it was 

sold by” New Tech, “a third party,” who “made all relevant 

representations about the product.” Government Acquisitions, 

Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 48. Govplace also asserted that the

“product was not listed on its GSA Schedule Contract,” id., 

and it disclosed its contract with New Tech. J.A. 731-735. 

Appellant did not explain at all—let alone with sufficient 

particularity—why he sought discovery related to these 

products. As the District Court observed, nowhere does 

Appellant’s “boilerplate discovery request” mention the 

relevant product by name, “New Tech, third party contract, or 

‘Teaming Agreement.’ ” Government Acquisitions, Inc., 880

F. Supp. 2d at 48. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
18

court’s denial of this discovery request, and the court 

correctly granted summary judgment as to these products. 

 

B.

We turn now to the remaining issue: whether Govplace

reasonably relied on Ingram Micro’s certification regarding 

the COO information for the four HP products it sold to the 

federal government. If Govplace’s reliance was reasonable, 

the District Court correctly granted Govplace summary 

judgment as to these products, because Govplace did not 

“knowingly” sell HP products that originated from nondesignated countries.

Under the FCA, a person acts “ ‘knowingly’ by (1) 

having actual knowledge, (2) acting in deliberate ignorance, 

or (3) acting in reckless disregard.” U.S. ex rel. K & R Ltd. 

P’ship v. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 530 F.3d 980, 

983 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)). “Reckless 

disregard under the FCA is ‘an extreme version of ordinary 

negligence.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 

934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). “To successfully oppose 

summary judgment,” Appellant Folliard “must show that a 

reasonable factfinder, drawing all ‘justifiable inferences’ from 

the evidence in [his] favor, could find [that Govplace] at least 

recklessly disregarded the falsity of its claims.” Id. (citations 

omitted). Applying these standards here, we conclude that 

Appellant’s evidence fell short.

As we have discussed, see supra Part I.A., Govplace 

acquired the HP products at issue from Ingram Micro, the 

largest technology products distributor, by participating in 

Ingram Micro’s Program. J.A. 468, 972-73. Through the 

Program, Ingram Micro expressly certifies to resellers, such 

as Govplace, that COO information is accurate, and more 
19

generally that the products it distributes comply with the 

TAA. J.A. 516. 

Equally important, GSA has implicitly approved of 

Govplace’s reliance on Ingram Micro’s certification: 

Govplace has informed GSA during multiple Contractor 

Administrator Visits that it relies on Ingram Micro’s Program 

in representing that the COO information for the items listed 

in its GSA schedule is accurate, and GSA’s Administrative 

Report Cards evaluating Govplace have all concluded that 

Govplace has complied with the TAA. J.A. 470. We think a 

contractor like Govplace is ordinarily entitled to rely on a 

supplier’s certification that the product meets TAA 

requirements. 

Appellant contends, nonetheless, that Govplace’s reliance 

on Ingram Micro’s certifications in this case was 

unreasonable for primarily two reasons: (1) Govplace 

received an email from an HP employee indicating that some 

of Govplace’s products were produced in China, a nondesignated country, Appellant Br. at 28; and (2) a competitor 

of Ingram Micro sent Govplace an unsolicited price list

which, according to Appellant, contradicts the COO 

information Govplace received from Ingram Micro, id. We 

address, and ultimately reject, each argument in turn.

Appellant’s reliance on the email from the HP employee 

is misplaced. First and most fundamentally, as the District 

Court noted, “Govplace received this information after the 

alleged sales of Q5983A took place,” therefore Appellant

“cannot use this to show that Govplace acted knowingly, at 

the time of sale, for product number Q5983A.” Govplace, 

930 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (emphasis in original). Second, as the 

District Court also explained, the email demonstrates that 

multiple versions of the product were made; and while the 
20

email indicates that some versions of the product were made 

in China, a non-designated country, “the products intended for 

the public sector were made in a TAA-compliant country.” 

Id. Thus, this email did not undermine Govplace’s reliance 

on Ingram Micro’s certification. 

Appellant also relies on an unsolicited price list that Tech 

Data, a competitor of Ingram Micro, sent to Govplace, 

purportedly showing inconsistencies in the origin of the 

disputed products. This argument is equally flawed. 

Govplace claimed that, “[b]ecause of [its] relationship with 

Ingram Micro and its participation in the GSA Pass Through 

Program, [it] had no need for Tech Data’s unsolicited 

information and disregarded it.” Appellee Br. at 50. And the 

District Court concluded that Appellant provided “no 

evidence—such as an email from a Govplace employee 

forwarding or commenting on a Tech Data list—that would 

show Govplace actually read these price lists.” Govplace, 

930 F. Supp. 2d at 136. We find no error in this factual 

conclusion. 

Furthermore, unlike Ingram Micro’s express certification

regarding the COO information, Tech Data’s price list 

includes disclaimers regarding the same information.8

 

Therefore, even if Govplace had reviewed Tech Data’s price 

list, it did not provide any basis for Govplace to question the 

 8 Compare J.A. 978 (“Tech Data is not responsible for compliance

with regulations, requirements or obligations associated with any 

contract resulting from this quotation unless said regulations, 

requirements or obligations have been passed to Tech Data and 

approved in writing by an authorized representative of Tech 

Data.”), with J.A. 516 (“Ingram Micro passes through the following 

manufacturer certifications: . . . Products offered by the 

manufacturer are compliant with the Trade Agreements Act.”). 
21

accuracy of Ingram Micro’s COO information.9

 In 

conclusion, none of the evidence presented by Appellant 

undermines Govplace’s reliance on Ingram Micro’s 

certification regarding the COO information for the four HP 

products. 

III.

The District Court properly exercised its significant 

discretion in managing discovery when it denied in part

Appellant’s Rule 56(d) discovery request as to certain 

products. With the request denied, there was not any genuine 

dispute as to material facts. We therefore do not find any

error in its grant of summary judgment to Govplace as to 

products it sold to the federal government under its

FirstSource contract, in the open market, and as to the sale by 

New Tech pursuant to their government authorized teaming 

agreement with Govplace. 

 9 Appellant also relied on the declaration of Dr. Jeremy Albright to 

demonstrate the unreasonableness of Govplace’s reliance on 

Ingram Micro’s certification. Appellant Br. at 28. Dr. Albright’s 

declaration asserts that “Govplace sold 1,375 goods to the federal 

government that were manufactured in non-designated countries.” 

J.A. 912. In arriving at his conclusions, Dr. Albright relied in part 

on COO information produced in the course of another litigation 

that did not involve Govplace. J.A. 913. Thus, even assuming Dr. 

Albright’s declaration is admissible, see Govplace, 930 F. Supp. 2d 

at 128-29 (discussing its “serious concerns” regarding the 

admissibility of Dr. Albright’s declaration), and accurate, Appellee

Br. at 59 (“[T]he Albright report failed to acknowledge, let alone 

even consider, the numerous exceptions to TAA compliance, 

including small business set aside contracts for small businesses . . . 

.”), it does not have any bearing on what Govplace knew at the time 

of the transactions because Appellant failed to produce evidence 

indicating that Govplace had knowledge of this COO information. 
22

We conclude that Govplace reasonably relied on Ingram 

Micro’s COO certification. Appellant has thus failed to raise 

a genuine issue of material fact whether Govplace knowingly 

sold to the federal government products that did not comply 

with TAA requirements, a prerequisite to FCA liability. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

So ordered.