58520 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 195 / Tuesday, October 7, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

will agree as to the period of contract 

performance which will be covered by 

the funds. The provisions of paragraphs 

(b) through (d) of this clause will apply 

in like manner to the additional allotted 

funds and agreed substitute date, and 

the contract will be modified 

accordingly. 

(e) If, solely by reason of failure of the 

Government to allot additional funds, 

by the dates indicated below, in 

amounts sufficient for timely 

performance of the contract line item(s) 

identified in paragraph (a) of this clause, 

the Contractor incurs additional costs or 

is delayed in the performance of the 

work under this contract and if 

additional funds are allotted, an 

equitable adjustment will be made in 

the price or prices (including 

appropriate target, billing, and ceiling 

prices where applicable) of the item(s), 

or in the time of delivery, or both. 

Failure to agree to any such equitable 

adjustment hereunder will be a dispute 

concerning a question of fact within the 

meaning of the clause entitled 

‘‘Disputes.’’ 

(f) The Government may at any time 

prior to termination allot additional 

funds for the performance of the 

contract line item(s) identified in 

paragraph (a) of this clause. 

(g) The termination provisions of this 

clause do not limit the rights of the 

Government under the clause entitled 

‘‘Default’’ or ‘‘Termination for Cause.’’ 

The provisions of this clause are limited 

to the work and allotment of funds for 

the contract line item(s) set forth in 

paragraph (a) of this clause. This clause 

no longer applies once the contract is 

fully funded except with regard to the 

rights or obligations of the parties 

concerning equitable adjustments 

negotiated under paragraphs (d) and (e) 

of this clause. 

(h) Nothing in this clause affects the 

right of the Government to terminate 

this contract pursuant to the clause of 

this contract entitled ‘‘Termination for 

Convenience of the Government’’ or 

paragraph (l) entitled ‘‘Termination for 

the Government’s Convenience’’ of the 

clause at FAR 52.212–4, ‘‘Commercial 

Terms and Conditions-Commercial 

Items.’’ 

(i) Nothing in this clause shall be 

construed as authorization of voluntary 

services whose acceptance is otherwise 

prohibited under 31 U.S.C. 1342. 

(j) The parties contemplate that the 

Government will allot funds to this 

contract in accordance with the 

following schedule: 

On execution of contract $ ll 

(month) (day), (year) $ ll 

(month) (day), (year) $ ll 

(month) (day), (year) $ ll 

(End of clause) 

ALTERNATE I (DATE). If only a 

certain line item(s) will be 

incrementally funded, substitute the 

following paragraph (a) for paragraph (a) 

of the basic clause: 

(a) Contract line item(s) ll is 

incrementally funded. The sum of 

$ll*ll is presently available for 

payment and allotted to this contract. 

An allotment schedule is contained in 

paragraph (j) of this clause. 

* To be inserted after negotiation. 

[FR Doc. E8–23660 Filed 10–6–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6820–EP–S 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION 

SAFETY BOARD 

49 CFR Part 830 

Notification and Reporting of Aircraft 

Accidents or Incidents and Overdue 

Aircraft, and Preservation of Aircraft 

Wreckage, Mail, Cargo, and Records 

AGENCY: National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The NTSB is proposing to 

amend its regulations concerning 

notification and reporting requirements 

with regard to aircraft accidents or 

incidents. The existing regulations (49 

CFR 830.5) do not include certain 

events that the NTSB has determined to 

be necessary. The NTSB anticipates that 

these proposed amendments will 

enhance aviation safety by providing the 

NTSB with direct notification of events 

that involve safety concerns, thereby 

enabling the NTSB to conduct 

investigations, identify necessary 

corrective actions in a timely manner, 

and work to prevent transportation 

accidents. 

DATES: Submit comments on or before 

December 8, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments 

using any of the following methods: 

1. Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

2. Mail: Mail comments concerning 

this proposed rule to Deepak Joshi, AS– 

40, National Transportation Safety 

Board, 490 L’Enfant Plaza, SW., 

Washington, DC 20594–2000. 

3. Fax: (202) 314–6308, Attention: 

Deepak Joshi 

4. Hand Delivery: 6th Floor, 490 

L’Enfant Plaza, SW., Washington, DC, 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Deepak Joshi, Lead Aerospace Engineer 

(Structures), Office of Aviation Safety, 

(202) 314–6348. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Regulatory History 

On December 27, 2004, the NTSB 

published a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) titled, ‘‘Notification 

and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or 

Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and 

Preservation of Aircraft Wreckage, Mail, 

Cargo, and Records,’’ in the Federal 

Register (69 FR 77150). The December 

2004 NPRM proposed various changes 

to 49 CFR Part 830, all of which affected 

the types of accidents and incidents that 

individuals and entities must report 

under 49 CFR Part 830. The NTSB 

received numerous comments on the 

NPRM and carefully considered each 

comment. In light of some commenters’ 

suggestions and concerns, and to ensure 

that the NTSB engages in all requisite 

statutory and regulatory analyses, the 

NTSB elected to revise the proposed 

regulations and issue a new NPRM. The 

NTSB has declined to implement some 

commenters’ suggestions in some 

proposed sections, and the preamble for 

each proposed section explains the 

NTSB’s reasoning. Each proposed 

revision and addition, as well as 

summaries of and responses to some 

comments from the prior NPRM, is 

discussed in detail below. The NTSB 

does not plan to issue a final notice or 

proceed in any way with the NPRM that 

was published on December 27, 2004. 

The NTSB intends to finalize and 

proceed with the NPRM herein. 

Statutory and Regulatory Evaluation 

This proposed rule would amend the 

requirements for providing immediate 

notification to the NTSB of certain 

aviation events, to include certain 

events that were not previously 

reportable. These amendments will 

enhance aviation safety by providing the 

NTSB with direct notification of these 

events and, thereby enabling the NTSB 

to conduct investigations, identify 

corrective actions, and propose safety 

recommendations in a timely manner. 

This rule is not a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ under section 3(f) of 

Executive Order 12866, Regulatory 

Planning and Review, and does not 

require an assessment of the potential 

costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) 

of that Order. As such, the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) has not 

reviewed this rule under Executive 

Order 12866. Likewise, this rule does 

not require an analysis under the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 

United States Code (U.S.C.) 1501–1571, 

or the National Environmental Policy 

Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347. 


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In addition, the NTSB has considered 

whether this rule would have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 

U.S.C. 601–612). The NTSB certifies 

under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule 

would not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. The NTSB acknowledges that 

many commenters who submitted 

comments to the NTSB’s previous 

NPRM regarding 49 CFR Part 830 

opined that the NTSB’s alteration of the 

definition of ‘‘substantial damage’’ 

would have resulted in an increased 

burden on small entities that engage in 

the operation of helicopters, via 

increased insurance rates. In this 

present NPRM, however, the NTSB does 

not propose an alteration to the 

definition of ‘‘substantial damage’’ or 

any definitions in 49 CFR Part 830; 

therefore, the NTSB does not foresee the 

proposed rule herein affecting insurance 

rates or causing any financial burden on 

small entities. Indeed, the changes to 49 

CFR Part 830 that the NTSB proposes 

herein will only result in a potential 

increase in the number of reports that 

small entities must submit to the NTSB; 

the NTSB does not anticipate that 

submitting such reports will have any 

economic impact on small entities. 

Moreover, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

605(b), the NTSB has submitted this 

certification to the Chief Counsel for 

Advocacy at the Small Business 

Administration. 

This rule proposes no new collection 

of information under the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501– 

3520) but will increase the number of 

instances in which the public provides 

specific information after notifying the 

NTSB of a reportable event. As such, the 

NTSB has submitted this NPRM to OMB 

for review under the Paperwork 

Reduction Act. The NTSB will continue 

to use Form No. 6120.1 to collect 

additional information when the NTSB 

decides to conduct an investigation 

arising out of an event that is reportable 

under 49 CFR Part 830. OMB last 

approved the use of Form No. 6120.1 on 

June 30, 2006, and this approval will 

expire on June 30, 2009 (OMB Control 

No. 3147–0001). The NTSB estimates 

that the annual number of respondents 

for the submission of this notification 

using the aforementioned form will 

increase from about 2,100 to about 

2,200. All other information regarding 

the use of Form No. 6120.1 will remain 

the same. The public may submit 

comments regarding the collection of 

this information to the OMB desk officer 

for the NTSB. 

The NTSB recognizes that Congress’ 

intent in promulgating the Paperwork 

Reduction Act was to reduce the burden 

on individuals and ensure that the 

information collected would not be 

duplicative of other Federal information 

collections. The NTSB notes that some 

individuals or entities from which the 

NTSB must receive notification of an 

event under Sec. 830.5 may also be 

required to report the event to the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 

The NTSB asserts, however, that such 

duplicative reporting is necessary for 

the NTSB to fulfill its statutory mission 

of improving safety. For example, with 

regard to receiving reports of engine and 

propeller failure data, the NTSB must 

receive immediate notification of events 

in which debris has escaped the engine 

via a path other than the exhaust path, 

in order to make a timely decision 

regarding the appropriate type of 

response. The NTSB’s response to such 

events could include immediately 

dispatching an investigator to the 

location of the damaged airplane or, 

depending on the circumstances, 

allowing the operator to remove the 

engine and have it shipped to a repair 

facility where the engine would be 

examined. Such a response would not 

be possible if the operator only reported 

the event to the FAA because the 

corresponding FAA regulations allow 

more time for reporting events when the 

event occurs on a weekend or holiday. 

See, for example, 14 CFR 21.3; 14 CFR 

121.703; 14 CFR 135.415. In addition, 

the NTSB notes that 14 CFR 

21.3(d)(1)(iii) does not require a report 

to the FAA if the event has been 

reported to the NTSB. Furthermore, 

immediate notification also allows the 

NTSB to comply with 49 CFR 830.10 

and 831.12, which require return of an 

aircraft’s wreckage to its owner in a 

more timely manner, thereby allowing 

the owner to arrange for expeditious 

repair of the parts. The NTSB also notes 

that it has experienced impediments to 

some investigations, such as inability to 

recover and examine critical parts, 

when the NTSB belatedly received 

notification of the event. Overall, the 

NTSB does not anticipate that 

duplicative reporting will be 

commonplace, and, to the extent that 

duplicate reports occur, the NTSB 

asserts that such reports are necessary 

and will not cause an undue burden on 

the public. 

Moreover, the NTSB does not 

anticipate that this rule will have a 

substantial, direct effect on state or local 

governments or will preempt state law; 

as such, this rule does not have 

implications for federalism under 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. 

This rule also complies with all 

applicable standards in sections 3(a) 

and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, 

Civil Justice Reform, to minimize 

litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and 

reduce burden. In addition, the NTSB 

has evaluated this rule under: Executive 

Order 12630, Governmental Actions and 

Interference with Constitutionally 

Protected Property Rights; Executive 

Order 13045, Protection of Children 

From Environmental Health Risks and 

Safety Risks; Executive Order 13175, 

Consultation and Coordination With 

Indian Tribal Governments; Executive 

Order 13211, Actions Concerning 

Regulations That Significantly Affect 

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use; and 

the National Technology Transfer and 

Advancement Act, 15 U.S.C. 272 note. 

The NTSB has concluded that this rule 

does not contravene any of the 

requirements set forth in these 

Executive Orders or statutes, nor does 

this rule prompt further consideration 

with regard to such requirements. The 

NTSB invites comments relating to any 

of the foregoing determinations and 

notes that the most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

Discussion of Proposed Revisions and 

Additions 

Proposed Revision to Introductory 

Paragraph of § 830.5 

The NTSB proposes to revise the 

introductory paragraph of Sec. 830.5 to 

reflect a change in nomenclature for the 

term ‘‘regional office,’’ to identify a 

recently established regional office in 

Ashburn, Virginia, and to include a 

reference to NTSB Headquarters in 

Washington, DC. In addition, the NTSB 

proposes to remove the reference to 

telephone books as a source of contact 

information for NTSB offices and, 

instead, direct the public to the NTSB 

Web site, which contains up-to-date 

instructions for reporting events listed 

in Sec. 830.5. Operators, or other 

persons or entities, who need to notify 

the NTSB of a reportable event under 49 

CFR Part 830 may notify any NTSB 

regional office or NTSB Headquarters. 

Proposed Revision to § 830.5(a)(3) 

The NTSB proposes to revise Sec. 

830.5(a)(3), which currently requires 

notification of an event in which a 

‘‘[f]ailure of structural components of a 

turbine engine[,] excluding compressor 

and turbine blades and vanes[,]’’ occurs. 

The NTSB’s proposed revision of Sec. 

830.5(a)(3) would result in notification 


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of an event in which ‘‘[f]ailure of any 

internal turbine engine component that 

results in the escape of debris other than 

out the exhaust path’’ occurs. 

The NTSB believes that such a 

revision will assist the NTSB with 

improving aviation safety. The NTSB 

notes that it has investigated several 

incidents in which liberated engine 

fragments penetrated the adjacent inlet 

or exhaust ducts before impacting the 

airplane. While some engine 

manufacturers have argued that such 

events were not uncontained engine 

failures because the debris did not 

penetrate the engine’s cases, the NTSB 

asserts that the danger of liberated 

engine debris is cause for concern. 

Specifically, such debris could affect the 

aircraft’s structure or systems or the 

occupants of the aircraft, even though 

the debris did not penetrate any of the 

engine’s casings. Indeed, debris that 

escapes an engine other than out the 

exhaust path can pose a hazard to the 

airplane by damaging the structure, 

disabling systems, or injuring the 

occupants of the aircraft. Such 

occurrences certainly concern the 

NTSB, given the potential effects on the 

aircraft’s overall safety of flight. Thus, 

the proposed revision to Sec. 830.5(a)(3) 

will require the reporting of all events 

in which debris escapes other than out 

the exhaust path, not simply those 

events that result in penetration of the 

engine casing. 

In addition, the NTSB notes that 

recent generations of turbine engines do 

not have inlet guide vanes. Therefore, 

broken blades can escape forward of the 

engine’s containment case. Further, new 

airplanes often have inlet ducts 

composed of composite material that 

may provide less containment resistance 

to a ballistic projectile than older metal 

structures. Therefore, the NTSB is 

equally concerned about both debris 

that exits forward of the inlet case 

through the inlet duct and debris that 

exits aft of the turbine case through the 

exhaust duct because it is debris that 

penetrates the side of the engine 

through a primary case. 

The NTSB recognizes that some 

entities or individuals in the aviation 

community may be concerned that 

identifying the location from which the 

debris exited the engine may be too 

difficult and may, therefore, render this 

proposed revision to Sec. 830.5(a)(3) 

futile. The NTSB has considered this 

concern and asserts that such 

identification will be possible. 

Specifically, the NTSB is concerned 

with uncontained events in which 

internal engine pieces separate and 

penetrate a primary engine case or 

penetrate the adjacent inlet or exhaust 

duct, rather than contained failures, 

which involve a cascade of broken 

pieces exiting the rear of the engine 

exclusively through the exhaust path. In 

general, when engine debris penetrates 

an engine case or the adjacent inlet or 

exhaust duct, an obvious hole in the 

case or duct, along with the internal 

damage to the engine, will exist. 

The NTSB also recognizes that some 

entities or individuals in the aviation 

community may contend that the NTSB 

should continue to include all 

compressor and turbine blade and vane 

failures. The NTSB has considered this 

potential viewpoint and believes that 

investigating every compressor or 

turbine blade or vane failure would 

likely not result in significant 

improvements in aviation safety. In 

addition, the NTSB acknowledges that 

some interested individuals or entities 

may suggest that the NTSB exclude the 

requirement of reporting events in 

which the debris escaped forward of the 

fan containment case. The NTSB is not 

inclined to implement such a 

suggestion, based on NTSB 

investigations of numerous events in 

which fragments that exited forward of 

the fan containment case or aft of the 

turbine case did so at such an acute 

angle that they were able to penetrate 

the airplane, thereby causing substantial 

damage. The NTSB recognizes that some 

fragments that exit forward of the fan 

containment case may do so at an angle 

that is tangential to the fuselage and, 

thus, would have insufficient energy to 

result in substantial damage to the 

aircraft; however, the NTSB remains 

interested in any event in which the 

failure of an internal turbine engine 

component results in the escape of 

debris other than out the exhaust path. 

Therefore, based on the foregoing 

reasons, the NTSB proposes to revise 

Sec. 830.5(a)(3) to require reporting of 

any ‘‘[f]ailure of any internal turbine 

engine component that results in the 

escape of debris other than out the 

exhaust path.’’ 

Proposed Revisions to § 830.5(a)(4), 

(a)(5) 

The NTSB proposes to revise Sec. 

830.5(a)(4) to remove the word ‘‘or,’’ the 

inclusion of which was a minor 

typographical error. In addition, the 

NTSB proposes to revise Sec. 830.5(a)(5) 

to correct the grammar and punctuation 

of this section. Given that these 

proposed revisions are insignificant, the 

NTSB believes that further discussion is 

unwarranted. 

Proposed Addition of § 830.5(a)(8) 

The NTSB proposes to add Sec. 

830.5(a)(8) to 49 CFR Part 830 to require 

the reporting of any ‘‘release of all or a 

portion of a propeller blade from an 

aircraft, excluding release caused solely 

by ground contact.’’ The NTSB seeks to 

add this section because a loss of a 

propeller blade presents a significant 

hazard to an aircraft and its occupants, 

given the amount of energy a propeller 

blade creates and maintains. In this 

regard, the NTSB’s concern about the 

release of a propeller blade is similar to 

its concern for an uncontained engine 

failure, in that the liberated blade can 

strike the fuselage, damaging an 

airplane’s structure and resulting in the 

disabling of a system or injury to the 

passengers and crew. The NTSB 

recognizes that, if the liberated blade 

struck the airplane, then the NTSB 

would receive notification and consider 

investigating the occurrence, in 

accordance with the current regulations. 

See 49 CFR 830.5(a) (requiring reporting 

of an ‘‘aircraft accident,’’ as defined at 

49 CFR 830.2). The NTSB, however, has 

determined that events could occur in 

which a liberated propeller blade does 

not strike the airplane. In such 

circumstances, the NTSB is concerned 

that operators may determine that the 

current regulations do not require them 

to report to the NTSB an event in which 

they shut down the engine and 

accomplish an engine-out landing, if the 

airplane did not sustain any damage. 

Because propeller blade separations 

have the potential to cause substantial 

damage and have previously caused 

aircraft accidents, the NTSB would like 

to receive notification of every occasion 

in which a propeller blade separates, 

even if the event did not damage the 

airplane. 

Furthermore, the NTSB has learned of 

events in which the separation of a 

propeller blade has raised safety 

concerns that the NTSB could have 

helped to prevent, had the NTSB 

received notification of such events. For 

example, in March 1994, a propeller 

blade fractured and separated from an 

Embraer EMB–120 operating in Brazil; 

however, because no significant damage 

to the airplane occurred, the NTSB did 

not receive notification of the event. In 

August 1995, a propeller blade 

separated from another Embraer EMB– 

120 operating in the United States; the 

separation caused damage to the 

airplane that was so severe that the 

pilots were required to make an offairport forced landing, and several 

fatalities resulted (NTSB Investigation 

No. DCA95MA054). Had the NTSB been 

advised of the event in Brazil, the NTSB 

could have investigated the event and 

considered issuing safety 

recommendations that may have 


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ultimately prevented the August 1995 

crash. Conversely, the NTSB received 

notification of a propeller blade 

separation in an ATR 42–500 that 

occurred in Colombia in January 2002, 

even though the airplane did not sustain 

any significant damage (NTSB 

Investigation No. DCA02WA018). The 

ensuing investigation revealed that a 

significant corrosion problem existed on 

that particular type of propeller blade; 

as a result, the NTSB issued several 

safety recommendations. Had the NTSB 

not received notification and 

participated in the investigation, the 

corrosion problem may have continued 

until another airplane’s blade separated, 

which could have led to an accident. 

The NTSB acknowledges that, in 

many cases, a failure of the propeller 

blade itself causes the loss of the blade. 

The NTSB notes, however, that a failure 

of the propeller hub could also instigate 

the release of a blade. The NTSB has 

investigated accidents in which failure 

of the blade itself or failure of the hub 

to which the blade was attached caused 

the loss of a propeller blade and 

resulted in an accident. Specifically, 

one such accident resulted in five NTSB 

safety recommendations to the FAA 

regarding manufacturing practices and 

proper blade maintenance, repair, 

testing, and inspection procedures. See 

Safety Recommendations A–96–142 

through A–96–146, available at http:// 

www.ntsb.gov. Another subsequent 

accident resulted in two NTSB safety 

recommendations concerning the 

inspection and repair of the propeller 

blades. See Safety Recommendations A– 

02–03 and A–02–04, also available at 

http://www.ntsb.gov. Overall, the NTSB 

has concluded that it should receive 

notification of such events and 

determine whether to conduct an 

investigation, independent of whether 

such an event has resulted in an 

accident, in the interest of fulfilling 

Congress’ intent. 

Finally, in this proposed section, the 

NTSB proposes to exclude propeller 

blade separations that result solely from 

ground contact. While the NTSB 

acknowledges that liberated propeller 

blades or blade segments pose a 

significant hazard to the airplane’s crew 

and passengers, as well as to bystanders, 

the NTSB notes that contact with the 

ground is well beyond the normal 

operating environment and design 

intent of a propeller blade. As a result, 

operators should not expect a propeller 

blade to remain intact after striking the 

ground. Therefore, the NTSB would 

receive notification of events in which 

a propeller blade contacted the ground 

when the event resulted in an accident, 

pursuant to the NTSB’s existing 

notification requirements. See 49 CFR 

830.5(a) (requiring reporting of an 

‘‘aircraft accident,’’ as defined at 49 CFR 

830.2). Therefore, propeller blade 

separations that result solely from 

ground contact are not within the scope 

of this proposed Sec. 830.5(a)(8). 

Proposed Addition of § 830.5(a)(9) 

The NTSB seeks to add Sec. 

830.5(a)(9) to 49 CFR Part 830, to 

require the reporting of: ‘‘[a] complete 

loss of information, excluding 

flickering, from more than 50 percent of 

an aircraft’s certified electronic primary 

displays.’’ Through this proposed 

language, the NTSB seeks to require the 

reporting of the loss of information from 

a majority of an aircraft’s certified 

electronic displays. 

With regard to the terminology in this 

proposed section, the NTSB notes that 

the Federal Aviation Regulations define 

the term ‘‘primary display’’ as ‘‘the 

display of a parameter that is located in 

the instrument panel such that the pilot 

looks at it first when wanting to view 

that parameter.’’ See 14 CFR 23.1311(c). 

In addition, the NTSB asserts that the 

term ‘‘flickering’’ is sufficiently 

descriptive; the NTSB expects that a 

considerable majority of operators will 

interpret the rule correctly and provide 

notification when appropriate. As 

explained below, the NTSB seeks to 

receive notification of events in which 

a majority of an aircraft’s electronic 

displays become completely blank and 

display no data or information. 

The NTSB’s principal intention in 

proposing this reporting requirement is 

to become informed of all instances in 

which more than 50 percent of primary 

displays go totally blank. The NTSB has 

determined that a series of totally blank 

displays in modern aircraft that were 

subject to reliability considerations 

during certification indicates a 

significant failure of redundancy for that 

aircraft system. The NTSB is concerned 

that this type of redundancy failure may 

lead to complete loss of displayed 

information in the future if the causes 

of the failure are not identified. 

Therefore, the NTSB emphasizes that 

establishing this proposed reporting 

requirement is necessary for improving 

transportation safety. 

The NTSB acknowledges that, 

because some aircraft have a 

certification requirement that requires 

continued flight to remain possible with 

all electronic primary displays 

inoperative, the reporting of a partial 

loss of these displays may seem 

counterintuitive. However, while some 

aircraft do have a certification 

requirement for continued flight 

following the loss of all electronic 

primary displays, the NTSB has 

determined that a significant 

degradation of safety margin results 

from inoperative primary displays. For 

example, as a result of a loss of 

electronic failure displays, an aircraft 

crew may not be able to deal with the 

failure appropriately by solely using the 

stand-by displays. In addition, NTSB 

investigators have noted during 

investigations into a number of actual 

display loss events that the crews did 

not transition to the stand-by 

instruments and instead continued to 

use only a portion of the information 

available to them while waiting for the 

primary electronic displays to return to 

operation. Such a practice could 

compromise the safety of operation of 

the aircraft because crews would 

operate the aircraft in the absence of 

necessary information, such as 

navigation data, flight information, and 

information regarding potential failures 

of systems. Therefore, the NTSB 

proposes to require notification of such 

events, in the interest of investigating 

the circumstances of such events and 

assisting in preventing them. 

In addition, the NTSB does not intend 

to narrow the scope of this proposed 

requirement to cover only those events 

that occur while the aircraft is airborne 

because the loss of redundancy that 

would cause displays to go blank on the 

ground could also occur while the 

aircraft is airborne. For example, the 

NTSB recognizes that a display loss 

event that resulted from an auxiliary 

power unit failure while both engines 

were shut down during deicing before 

takeoff could occur. The NTSB 

acknowledges that some unique events 

may result in the loss of the displays 

while on the ground that do not 

represent significant safety events; 

however, the NTSB anticipates that 

these types of events will be infrequent 

and remain in the minority of such 

occasions. The NTSB must take 

advantage of the opportunity to 

investigate causes of display blanking, 

even when the aircraft at issue was not 

airborne when the event occurred. 

Proposed Addition of § 830.5(a)(10) 

The NTSB seeks to add Sec. 

830.5(a)(10) to 49 CFR Part 830, to 

require the reporting of: Airborne 

Collision and Avoidance System 

(ACAS) advisories issued either: 

(A) When an aircraft is being operated 

on an instrument flight rules flight plan 

and corrective or evasive action is 

required to maintain a safe distance 

from other aircraft; or 

(B) To an aircraft operating in class A 

airspace. 


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58524 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 195 / Tuesday, October 7, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

The NTSB anticipates that this 

proposed reporting requirement will 

notify the NTSB of the limited number 

of encounters that may evidence a 

serious safety risk and warrant further 

investigation, in accordance with the 

NTSB’s statutory purpose and mission. 

This proposed addition will not 

necessitate the reporting of resolution 

advisories that arise from benign events 

but will capture the incidents that are 

more likely to warrant further safety 

investigation. 

The NTSB acknowledges that 

resolution advisories are transmitted 

over mode S data link and may, 

therefore, be subject to recording at 

ground-based receivers. The NTSB 

recognizes that, while such a method of 

data collection is technically possible, 

the infrastructure to provide this 

capability is not sufficiently common to 

ensure that the NTSB would receive 

notification of the event through this 

method. The NTSB also recognizes that 

pilots involved in loss-of-separation 

incidents also may make verbal reports 

to air traffic control (ATC) facilities or 

may file formal near-midair collision 

reports through the FAA. The NTSB has 

determined, however, that the internal 

process for such reporting of safety 

events occurring within the ATC system 

may not be entirely reliable. Further, not 

all aircraft proximity events that 

provoke safety concerns meet the FAA’s 

criteria for formal reporting as an 

operational error or other incident. 

Therefore, the NTSB has concluded that 

a source of safety reports not solely 

dependent on ATC will provide a useful 

means of ensuring that serious incidents 

receive adequate attention and will 

enable improvements to the ATC 

reporting process, where needed. 

Furthermore, the NTSB notes that 

operators and other reporting 

individuals or entities should not be 

concerned that this proposed addition 

will require frequent removal and 

retention of aircraft recorders after 

submission of the required reports. 

While the NTSB may require operators 

to provide flight data recorder data as 

part of incident investigations, the 

NTSB does not anticipate that this will 

normally be necessary after ACAS 

incidents occur, unless other 

information indicates that a very serious 

threat of collision clearly existed. 

Overall, the NTSB is aware that recorder 

access can be problematic for aircraft 

operators and will make every effort to 

minimize the need for such information 

following incidents reported under this 

requirement. 

The NTSB anticipates that this 

proposed reporting requirement will 

assist the NTSB in improving aviation 

safety by preventing future accidents 

and incidents because it will provide 

the NTSB with information concerning 

events in which aircraft crews perceived 

that they had been exposed to a 

collision hazard. As the International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 

recently noted, current NTSB 

regulations do not specifically require 

the notification of air proximity events. 

In response to this finding, the NTSB 

notes that this proposal to require 

notification of such events is consistent 

with the ICAO standard, which seeks 

immediate notification of ‘‘near 

collisions requiring an avoidance 

[maneuver].’’ 

Proposed Addition of § 830.5(a)(11) 

The NTSB seeks to add Sec. 

830.5(a)(11) to 49 CFR Part 830, to 

require that the public report ‘‘[d]amage 

to helicopter tail or main rotor blades, 

including ground damage, that requires 

major repair or replacement of the 

blade(s).’’ The NTSB’s previous NPRM 

sought to amend the definition of 

‘‘substantial damage’’ such that the 

NTSB would consider damage that a 

helicopter tail or main rotor blade 

sustained to be ‘‘substantial damage’’ 

and, therefore, reportable. In light of the 

comments that the NTSB received on 

this proposed change, the NTSB 

determined that such an amendment to 

the definition of ‘‘substantial damage’’ 

was not necessary and that the NTSB 

could instead achieve its purpose of 

receiving notification of damage that a 

helicopter tail or main rotor blade 

sustains by adding this proposed 

subsection to Sec. 830.5(a). In 

accordance with this proposed change, 

the NTSB intends to require owners, 

operators, and other individuals or 

entities to report as incidents all rotor 

blade strikes that result in damage, 

regardless of what the blades struck. 

Receiving reports of damage to rotors 

under Sec. 830.5 will allow the NTSB 

and the aviation industry to work 

cooperatively on these occurrences, and 

such cooperation is paramount in 

addressing and resolving operational or 

mechanical safety issues. In addition, 

the NTSB’s proposal to add this 

subsection to Sec. 830.5 will resolve the 

NTSB’s concern that operators are 

misinterpreting 49 CFR Part 830 and are 

failing to report instances in which 

collateral damage to other dynamic or 

structural components of helicopters 

occurs during blade strikes. 

Including damage to rotor blades as 

reportable incidents will serve to 

improve safety and to accomplish the 

NTSB’s mission in a number of ways. 

For example, such notification will help 

the NTSB collect data for further 

refinement and standardization of 

categorizing helicopter accidents and 

incidents. The NTSB believes that this 

proposed addition will, as a result of 

consistent notification, serve to identify 

those events that may indicate or 

identify flight safety issues. In 

particular, some operational 

occurrences of tail and main rotor blade 

damage could adversely affect the 

structural strength, performance, or 

flight characteristics of a helicopter, and 

Congress has charged the NTSB with 

assisting with the prevention of 

occurrences such as these. 

The NTSB also notes that events 

involving damage to rotor blades may 

present legitimate safety issues. For 

example, on May 3, 2003, a California 

police helicopter struck power lines 

during a forced landing that followed an 

engine malfunction (NTSB Investigation 

No. LAX04TA202). The tail rotor blade 

sustained damage, and the operators 

flew the helicopter to another 

destination; the flight crew initially 

reported the damage as minor. The 

NTSB investigated the occurrence and 

noted that the engine malfunction 

resulted from an inadequate overhaul of 

an engine component. As a result of this 

finding, the engine manufacturer 

revised its overhaul procedures to 

provide for more detailed instructions, 

thereby improving transportation safety. 

In addition, the NTSB investigated a 

helicopter accident that occurred on 

July 7, 2006, in Hawaii (NTSB 

Investigation No. LAX06CA227). During 

the course of this accident, all main 

rotor blades of the helicopter sustained 

damage upon striking a tree while 

landing during an animal eradication 

flight. The NTSB identified safety issues 

regarding inadequate preflight planning 

and in-flight decision-making and 

notified the operator and the FAA of 

these deficiencies. 

As these examples demonstrate, the 

NTSB works to improve transportation 

safety by investigating accidents and 

making safety recommendations to a 

variety of entities and organizations. 

Such safety improvements can occur 

without a formal safety recommendation 

and may result from either the NTSB’s 

identification of a trend that may inhibit 

safe transportation or the NTSB’s 

investigation into the circumstances and 

facts of a specific occurrence. In this 

regard, the proposed addition of 

requiring the public to report 

occurrences in which a helicopter 

sustains damage to its tail or main rotor 

blade will allow the NTSB to obtain 

data to identify potential trends in 

helicopter transport that may be of 

concern and to consider investigating 

the facts of a specific occurrence. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 195 / Tuesday, October 7, 2008 / Proposed Rules 58525 

With regard to the NTSB’s intent to 

collect data regarding helicopter 

occurrences in the interest of improving 

safety, the NTSB plans to analyze such 

data and findings, identify potential 

trends or areas of concern, and 

subsequently work through the safety 

recommendation process to improve 

safety. Congress has directed the NTSB 

to collect accident data, and the NTSB 

has created searchable databases for 

such data. See 49 U.S.C. 1116. The 

NTSB may store the data and findings 

from occurrences of rotor blade damage 

in a similar manner, to allow 

investigators to analyze these data and 

findings in the aggregate. In any event, 

such data collection will allow the 

NTSB to identify trends that could 

indicate potential safety deficiencies 

and to simplify and accelerate the 

process of issuing potential safety 

recommendations. 

While this proposed addition will 

require notification of events in which 

a helicopter tail or main rotor blade 

sustains damage, the NTSB notes that it 

is not seeking the reporting of minor 

damage that does not adversely affect 

the performance of the helicopter, such 

as minor foreign object damage or 

damage confined to blade balance tabs. 

Overall, this proposed addition to Sec. 

830.5 will enable the NTSB to improve 

safety with regard to helicopter 

operations. 

Proposed Addition of § 830.5(a)(12) 

The NTSB seeks to add Sec. 

830.5(a)(12) to 49 CFR Part 830, to 

require the reporting of: 

Any runway incursion event in which 

an operator, when operating an aircraft 

as an air carrier: 

(A) Lands or departs on a taxiway, 

incorrect runway, or other area not 

designed as a runway; or 

(B) Experiences a reduction in 

separation that requires the operator or 

the crew of another aircraft or vehicle to 

take immediate corrective action to 

avoid a collision. 

In this proposed notification 

requirement, the NTSB proposes to use 

the definition of ‘‘runway incursion’’ 

that the FAA and ICAO currently use; 

however, the NTSB proposes to require 

the reporting of only certain types of 

runway incursions. Under FAA and 

ICAO guidance, a runway incursion is 

‘‘any occurrence at an [airport] 

involving the incorrect presence of an 

aircraft, vehicle or person on the 

protected area of a surface designated 

for the landing and take-off of an 

aircraft.’’ See FAA Notice NJO7050.1, 

Air Traffic Organization Policy (Oct. 1, 

2007); ICAO Procedures for Air 

Navigation Services—Air Traffic 

Management, PANS ATM Document 

4444 (January 2003). The NTSB’s 

proposed notification requirement 

would require reports of a subset of 

runway incursions, as specifically 

designated at proposed subsections (A) 

and (B). 

Moreover, the NTSB’s proposed use of 

the term ‘‘air carrier’’ is also consistent 

with that of the FAA, which defines ‘‘air 

carrier’’ as ‘‘any person or organization 

who undertakes, whether directly or 

indirectly, or by lease or any other 

arrangement, to engage in air 

transportation and conducts operations 

in accordance with 14 CFR [Parts] 121 

and 135.’’ See FAA Order 8020.11B and 

14 CFR 1.1. 

With regard to the intended 

interpretation of subsection (B) in the 

NTSB’s proposed addition of Sec. 

830.5(a)(12), the NTSB notes that crews 

often may not be aware that they were 

involved in a situation in which 

separation between their aircraft and a 

nearby or adjacent aircraft decreased. 

Therefore, the NTSB attempts to 

exclude reports of separation decreases 

that are nominal or so minor that the 

operator is not aware of the event. As 

such, the NTSB intends to add the 

phrase ‘‘requires the operator to take 

immediate corrective action to avoid a 

collision’’ to exclude separation 

decreases in which neither operator 

notices or is aware of any separation 

decrease, or no maneuvering is required 

to avoid a collision. Therefore, with 

regard to subsection (B) of the proposed 

addition of Sec. 830.5(a)(12), the NTSB 

intends to require notification of 

separation decreases about which an 

operator involved becomes aware and 

takes action to avoid a collision. 

Moreover, concerning subsection (B) 

of the proposed requirement, the NTSB 

notes that this requirement would apply 

to certain situations in which a non-air 

carrier operator must take evasive action 

to avoid a collision with an air carrier 

aircraft. For instance, if a Cessna 172 

aircraft on departure must take evasive 

action to avoid a Boeing 747 aircraft that 

has inadvertently entered the runway, 

this proposed rule would require a 

report of the incident. The flight crew of 

a large air carrier aircraft may not even 

be aware that a smaller aircraft was in 

close proximity to it and had to take 

evasive action. The proposed rule 

would, nevertheless, require a report of 

the incident because an air carrier was 

involved and at least one of the aircraft 

had to take evasive action to avoid a 

collision. 

Furthermore, the NTSB notes that this 

proposed notification requirement does 

not include runway incursions in which 

ample time and distance exist to avoid 

a collision. The NTSB seeks to receive 

notification of events that require the 

crew to take evasive action to avoid 

another aircraft, a vehicle, a person, 

equipment, or the like; therefore, the 

NTSB intends to interpret the term 

‘‘reduction in separation’’ in the 

proposed requirement to include a 

decrease in separation with any object 

or person. In addition, as stated above, 

this proposed requirement would only 

apply to air carriers that operate under 

14 CFR Parts 121 or 135, not operators 

who operate under 14 CFR Part 91. 

Overall, while the NTSB is aware that 

numerous runway incursions occur 

each day, the NTSB notes that this 

proposed notification requirement 

would not include a substantial number 

of such incidents, given the limitations 

that the proposed regulatory language 

includes. 

The NTSB is aware that operators may 

be concerned about the time limits for 

such notification. The NTSB intends to 

enforce this proposed notification 

requirement as one that requires 

notification as soon after the incident as 

such notification is practicable and safe. 

For example, as defined above, an 

aircraft that has experienced a runway 

incursion upon taking off should notify 

the NTSB as soon as the aircraft lands 

at its next destination, if the incursion 

occurs within the time period that 

immediately precedes takeoff and the 

operator is unable to notify the NTSB 

immediately without compromising the 

safe operation of the aircraft. Likewise, 

an aircraft that experiences a runway 

incursion as defined above upon 

landing should notify the NTSB as soon 

as the operator is able to provide such 

notification without compromising the 

safe operation of the aircraft. Overall, 

the NTSB intends to interpret this 

proposed rule to require notification as 

soon as the operator is able to provide 

such notification safely. 

The NTSB notes that this proposed 

reporting requirement is consistent with 

the NTSB’s statutory mission of 

investigating aviation accidents and 

incidents and improving transportation 

safety for the public. The proposed 

requirement would require notification 

of circumstances in which an operator 

narrowly avoided a collision. In 

addition, this proposed requirement 

would mandate notification of incidents 

in which a significant potential for a 

collision existed and in which an 

operator aggressively swerved, abruptly 

slowed or stopped, or rotated and lifted 

off earlier than planned in the aircraft to 

avoid a collision. Such events could be 

the result of operator error, mechanical 

malfunctions, air traffic controller 

errors, or a variety of other potential 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with PROPOSALS
58526 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 195 / Tuesday, October 7, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

1NTSB regional offices are located in the 

following cities: Anchorage, Alaska; Atlanta, 

Georgia; West Chicago, Illinois; Denver, Colorado; 

Arlington, Texas; Gardena (Los Angeles), California; 

Miami, Florida; Parsippany, New Jersey 

(metropolitan New York City); Seattle, Washington; 

and Ashburn, Virginia. In addition, NTSB 

headquarters is located at 490 L’Enfant Plaza, SW., 

Washington, DC 20594. Contact information for 

these offices is available at http://www.ntsb.gov. 

factors or causes. The NTSB’s act of 

investigating and identifying such 

factors and causes, and issuing safety 

recommendations to prevent future 

occurrences, is the NTSB’s principal 

statutory mission. In particular, 

notification of such events will greatly 

enhance the NTSB’s ability to improve 

aviation safety via the NTSB’s 

investigations and safety 

recommendations; in the absence of 

such notification, the NTSB must rely 

on news media sources or the FAA. 

While such resources are helpful, they 

do not comprise or amount to timely, 

direct notification of such events to the 

NTSB, which is critical for the NTSB’s 

purpose of conducting timely, thorough, 

effective investigations that are 

independent. Furthermore, indirect 

notification also fails to meet ICAO 

standards and recommended practices. 

The NTSB has investigated several 

incidents of runway incursions and 

issued safety recommendations as a 

result of such incidents. For example, 

the NTSB’s investigation into a runway 

incursion that resulted in a fatal 

aviation accident on August 27, 2006, in 

Lexington, Kentucky, determined that 

the crew’s failure to use available cues 

and aids to identify the airplane’s 

location on the airport surface during 

taxi, and their failure to cross-check and 

verify that the aircraft was on the correct 

runway, resulted in the accident. As a 

result of this investigation, the NTSB 

issued several safety recommendations 

to the FAA: to revise work scheduling 

policies to reduce the potential of air 

traffic controllers performing duties 

while fatigued, to establish initial and 

recurrent training programs for all air 

traffic controllers, and to prohibit the 

issuance of a takeoff clearance during an 

airplane’s taxi to its departure runway 

until after the airplane has crossed all 

intervening runways. 

In addition, the NTSB also 

investigated a runway incursion that 

occurred on June 9, 2005, in Boston, 

Massachusetts, in which two transportcategory aircraft nearly collided due to 

an air traffic controller’s failure to 

follow an FAA order and the standard 

operating procedures for the ATC tower. 

This determination resulted in a safety 

recommendation that the NTSB issued 

directly to the Boston ATC facility, in 

which the NTSB recommended that 

controllers engage in a specific dialogue 

to ensure that the receiving controller 

has a timely reminder that the runway 

is in use and prompt the receiving 

controller to resolve immediately any 

conflicts concerning presence on the 

runway. The NTSB has also issued other 

safety recommendations to the FAA as 

the result of several runway incursions 

that the NTSB has investigated, 

specifically involving procedural 

changes, such as ensuring that all 

runway crossings be authorized only by 

specific ATC clearance, and ensuring 

that pilots receive adequate notification 

of clearance changes. See Safety 

Recommendations A–00–067 and A– 

00–068, which are available at http:// 

www.ntsb.gov. The NTSB anticipates 

that these recommendations will assist 

in reducing the number of runway 

incursions and, therefore, will improve 

transportation safety. Such a practice is 

consistent with the NTSB’s statutory 

purpose and Congress’s intent. See 49 

U.S.C. 1116(b); H.R. Rep. No. 103–239(I) 

at 1 (1993) (emphasizing the importance 

of the NTSB’s safety recommendations 

and stating that such recommendations 

‘‘have saved countless human lives’’). 

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 830 

Aircraft accidents, Aircraft incidents, 

Aviation safety, Overdue aircraft 

notification and reporting, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the NTSB proposes to amend 

49 CFR Part 830 as follows: 

PART 830—NOTIFICATION AND 

REPORTING OF AIRCRAFT 

ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS AND 

OVERDUE AIRCRAFT, AND 

PRESERVATION OF AIRCRAFT 

WRECKAGE, MAIL, CARGO, AND 

RECORDS 

1. The authority citation for part 830 

is revised to read as follows: 

Authority: Independent Safety Board Act 

of 1974, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1101–1155); 

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85– 

726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 

U.S.C. 40101). 

2. Sec. 830.5 is amended by revising 

the introductory text, paragraphs (a) 

introductory text, (a)(3) through (5), and 

adding paragraphs (a)(8) through (12) to 

read as follows: 

§ 830.5 Immediate notification. 

The operator of any civil aircraft, or 

any public aircraft not operated by the 

Armed Forces or an intelligence agency 

of the United States, or any foreign 

aircraft shall immediately, and by the 

most expeditious means available, 

notify the nearest National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

office,1 when: 

(a) An aircraft accident or any of the 

following listed serious incidents occur: 

* * * * * 

(3) Failure of any internal turbine 

engine component that results in the 

escape of debris other than out the 

exhaust path; 

(4) In-flight fire; 

(5) Aircraft collision in flight; 

* * * * * 

(8) Release of all or a portion of a 

propeller blade from an aircraft, 

excluding release caused solely by 

ground contact; 

(9) A complete loss of information, 

excluding flickering, from more than 50 

percent of an aircraft’s certified 

electronic primary displays; 

(10) Airborne Collision and 

Avoidance System (ACAS) resolution 

advisories issued either: 

(i) When an aircraft is being operated 

on an instrument flight rules flight plan 

and corrective or evasive action is 

required to maintain a safe distance 

from other aircraft; or 

(ii) To an aircraft operating in class A 

airspace; 

(11) Damage to helicopter tail or main 

rotor blades, including ground damage, 

that requires major repair or 

replacement of the blade(s); 

(12) Any runway incursion event in 

which an operator, when operating an 

aircraft as an air carrier: 

(i) Lands or departs on a taxiway, 

incorrect runway, or other area not 

designed as a runway; or 

(ii) Experiences a reduction in 

separation that requires the operator or 

the crew of another aircraft or vehicle to 

take immediate corrective action to 

avoid a collision. 

* * * * * 

Dated: October 1, 2008. 

Vicky D’Onofrio, 

Federal Register Liaison Officer. 

[FR Doc. E8–23665 Filed 10–6–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7533–01–P 


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