alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Eugene P. Brandon, Appellant.

County Court, Westchester County,

March 29, 1957.

*Allen Ducker*for appellant.

*Joseph F. Gagliardi, District Attorney (Warren J. Schneider*of counsel), for respondent.

Harold T. Garrity, J.

On this appeal from a conviction for violating subdivision 9 of section 14 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, defendant avers that the trial court improperly admitted two certificates which purportedly attested to and established the accuracy of the scales used by the police in weighing the vehicle involved.

The District Attorney, in his memorandum in opposition, concedes that the appellant, has properly set forth the applicable law in the first point of his brief in that error was committed in admitting proof of the weight of the truck over defendant’s objections that it was obligatory first to prove the accuracy of the scales. *(People*v. *Du Shane,*125 N. Y. S. 2d 9.)

In connection with this appeal, the court has consulted scientific reference material on the problem of accurate weight measuring of these large vehicles. It obviously is rather complex and involved. As is developed in the publication *Fleet Owner,*published by McGraw-Hill, determining the weight of a loaded truck encompasses more than proof of the accuracy of the scales. There are several basic principles of physics to be considered. There must, however, be adequate legal proof of the accuracy of the weighing devices before the other factors can be considered.

Under the circumstances, we are not considering the question of the sufficiency of the information since this, as well as other questions, will necessarily have to be passed upon by the lower court upon the retrial.

The judgment of conviction is reversed. Submit order on notice.
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Case No. 1:11-cv-02106-PAB-CBS Document 78-4 filed 10/24/13 USDC Colorado pg 1 of

1
EXHIBIT 10.27

CANCELLATION AGREEMENT AND  UNSECURED SUBORDINATED PROMISSORY NOTE

|$209,421.00 |  | Orinda, California
|----------- |  | ------------------
|            |  | April 16, 2001    

Intraware, Inc., a Delaware corporation (herein the "Company" or the "Holder"), located at 25 Orinda Way, Orinda, California, 94563 hereby cancels the
outstanding balance payable under a promissory note dated February 1, 2000, executed by Mark Long (the "Borrower"). For value received as a result of such cancellation, Borrower promises to pay
the Company the principal sum of $209,421.00 (the "Principal"), payable in equal monthly installments of $17,975.00, with the entire amount to be paid in full on, or at the election of Borrower
before, April 17, 2002 (the "Maturity Date"). The effective interest rate for this Note shall be 0.541% per month, for an approximate annual rate of 6.5%.

Borrower
may prepay all or any portion of the Principal sum of this Note at any time prior to the Maturity Date, with no premium or penalty. All amounts payable hereunder shall be
payable in lawful money of the United States of America. Borrower may offset any amount payable hereunder against any payments earned from the Company pursuant to any other agreement or arrangement.

This
Note may not be assigned or transferred in any manner without the prior written consent of Borrower, including, but not limited to, in the case of any Change of Control, as
defined below. Further, the Company agrees that all of the amounts outstanding under this Note, including all principal and interest, shall be cancelled and the Company shall have no remedy for
collection and no legal redress in the event of a "Material Adverse Change" as defined below.

For
the purposes of this Note, a Material Adverse Change shall be defined as any event, or series of events, that results in, or could reasonably be foreseen as likely to result in
any of the following:

---

Borrower
may waive any Material Adverse Change in writing, but failure to exercise any rights granted under this Note to Borrower shall not constitute a waiver or forfeiture of such
right or rights, including in the event that Borrower made further payments hereunder following a Material Adverse Change. Under such circumstances, all rights of the Borrower shall be reserved.

This
Note shall be construed and enforced in accordance with, and the rights of the parties shall be governed by, the laws of the State of California.

INTRAWARE

|By: |  |                                    |  | 
|--- |  | ---------------------------------- |  | 
|    |  | Don Freed, Chief Financial Officer |  | 

BORROWER

|             |  | 
|------------ |  | 
|Mark P. Long |  | 

2

---

QuickLinks
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 194 (Monday, October 6, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 58252]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-23451]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; Notice of 
Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases Special Emphasis Panel; T Cell Co-Stimulation Pathways-PO1.
    Date: October 29, 2008.
    Time: 11 a.m. to 2 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, 6700B Rockledge Drive, 
Bethesda, MD 20817 (Telephone Conference Call).
    Contact Person: Rebecca L. Jorgenson, PhD, Scientific Review 
Officer, Scientific Review Program, DEA/NIAID/NIH/DHHS, Room 2217, 
6700B Rockledge Drive, MSC-7616, Bethesda, MD 20892-7616, 301-496-2550, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ff95908d989a918c90918dbf91969e969bd1919697d1989089"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c8a2a7baafada6bba7a6ba88a6a1a9a1ace6a6a1a0e6afa7be">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.855, 
Allergy, Immunology, and Transplantation Research; 93.856, 
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases Research, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS)

    Dated: September 26, 2008.
Jennifer Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. E8-23451 Filed 10-3-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant *

to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is

not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,

and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and

judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and

conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 8, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

KENNETH L. YORK,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JUANITA A. McCULLEY,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-1395

(D.C. No. 05-CV-1250-ZLW)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

Before KELLY, MCKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

Kenneth L. York, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the

dismissal without prejudice of his application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because York is a federal prisoner and this proceeding

arises under § 2241, he does not need a certificate of appealability. See McIntosh

v. United States Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 810 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997). We

review the district court's decision de novo, see Patterson v. Knowles, 162 F.3d
- 2 -

574, 575 (10th Cir. 1998), and AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons set

forth by the district court.

York filed a petition under § 2241 that failed to identify any constitutional

violations or facts giving rise to a constitutional violation. A magistrate judge

ordered York to file an amended habeas corpus petition clarifying his claims. The

district court reviewed the amended petition and found that York again failed to

allege which of his constitutional rights had been violated and how they had been

violated. Having reviewed the record, this determination is clearly correct. 

Although he does argue that the United States Department of Defense needs to

accept responsibility for his previous convictions, but is willing to concede that

the Central Intelligence Agency was “not much of a problem,” York’s petition,

even when construed liberally because he is proceeding pro se, does not even hint

at what constitutional violations may have taken place with regard to the

execution of his sentence. As such, the district court’s decision dismissing the

petition is AFFIRMED. Further, because York does not raise “a reasoned,

nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on

appeal,” McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 812, we DENY his motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. His letters, construed as motions, filed March 6, March 14, and May 
- 3 -

22, 2006, are also DENIED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Carlos F. Lucero

Circuit Judge
-1-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02430-WYD-KMT

LUCAS DeMAESTRI,

Plaintiff,

v.

VERIFACTs, INC.,

Defendant.

FINAL JUDGMENT

Pursuant to and in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) and the Order Affirming

and Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation, filed on April 10, 2012, by the

Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, Chief United States District Judge, and incorporated herein

by reference as if fully set forth, it is

ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge, dated

March 16, 2012 (ECF Doc. No. 27), is affirmed and adopted. It is further

ORDERED that judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant, Verifacts, Inc.,

and against Plaintiff, Lucas DeMaestri, on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff’s complaint and action are dismissed.

Case 1:11-cv-02430-WYD-KMT Document 33 Filed 04/10/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
-2-

DATED at Denver, Colorado this 10th day of April, 2012.

FOR THE COURT:

GREGORY C. LANGHAM, CLERK

s/ Edward P. Butler 

Edward P. Butler,

Deputy Clerk

Case 1:11-cv-02430-WYD-KMT Document 33 Filed 04/10/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
Case 1:11-cv-01745-REB-MJW Document 24 Filed 11/17/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 1Federal Reserve Bank of: BostonFilings received during the week ending April 28, 2018FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodHARBORONE BANCORP, INC.                                                                                                 * 3A5
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 1Federal Reserve Bank of: BostonFilings received during the week ending April 19, 2014FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodBLUE HILLS BANCORP, INC                                                                                                 4c8
<PAGE>

ADDENDUM
to Employment Agreement




The validity of the employment agreement between Marine Shuttle Operations Inc.
(the "Corporation") and Mr. Franz Eder (the "Employee") signed on 1/6/98 will be
extended up to 30/6/01 on the existing terms and conditions.







10/4/2000





-----------------------------------          -----------------------------------
Marine Shuttle Operations Inc.               Franz Eder
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

June 23, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 135763 Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 135763 

 COA: 277960 

Jackson CC: 04-000684-FH 

ROBERT PHILLIP CARICO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 14, 2007 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

d0616 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

June 23, 2008 

 Clerk
# **EXHIBIT 23**

#  

# **CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED CERTIFIEDPUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We have issued our report dated June 9,2005, accompanying the consolidated financial statements of Arctic Cat Inc. andsubsidiaries included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of ArcticCat Inc. for the year ended March 31, 2005. We hereby consent to theincorporation by reference of said report in the Registration Statements ofArctic Cat Inc. on Forms S-8 (File No. 33-37065, effective October 1,1990, File No. 33-69916, effective October 4, 1993, File No. 33-97244,effective September 22, 1995 and File No. 333-99253, effective September 6,2002).

 
| /s/ GRANT THORNTON LLP |   |
|------------------------|--------|
|                   |
|                   |
| Minneapolis, Minnesota |
| June 9, 2005      |

 

----
[No. 34571.

Department Two.

July 17, 1958.]

#### *In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of*Geither Horn, *Petitioner,*v. The State of Washington *et al., Respondents.**1*

*Horrigan, Horrigan & Sullivan,*for petitioner. ,

*The Attorney General*and *Michael R. Alfieri, Assistant,*for respondent.

1

Reported in 328 P. (2d) 159.

Per Curiam.

This is an original application in this court for a writ of *habeas corpus.*Petitioner was charged, on May 30,1935, in the superior court for Franklin county, with the crime of murder in the first degree. He was tried, found guilty by a jury, and sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary.

Petitioner alleges that he was denied due process of law at the time of his trial in 1935, in that, as a result of fear, coercion, and threats of bodily injury, he signed a confession which was admitted in evidence, over his objection.

The record discloses that the jury was properly instructed with reference to the written confession, and, specifically, that the jury must disregard the confession, if it was found by them to have been given as a result of fear, coercion or *614threats of . bodily harm. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty.' '

Since the application for the issuance of the writ presents a factual issue, this court, by order of reference, requested the trial court to take additional evidence and make findings of fact as to whether the petitioner’s confession was the result of coercion. After considering the evidence, the trial court found that “There is doubt as to whether the defendant was *taken to an open grave*...” The burden of establishing coercion rests upon the one who asserts it. *State v. Bird,*31 Wn. (2d) 777, 781, 198 P. (2d) 978 (1948).

Since this application for a writ is an original proceeding before this court, we find that, upon the record before us, the petitioner’s written confession was not obtained as the result of coercion, and that it was properly admitted into evidence.

For the reasons stated, petitioner’s application for a writ of *habeas corpus*is denied.

Hill, C. J., did not participate.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge John L. Kane

Civil Action No. 11-cv-2425-AP

GLORIANNE MERCADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

ORDER

Kane, J.

Defendant’s Motion to Remand (doc. #18), filed March 13, 2012, is GRANTED. 

This civil action is remanded to Defendant for additional administrative proceedings

pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Dated: March 14, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

s/John L. Kane

JOHN L. KANE, SENIOR JUDGE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 1:11-cv-02425-JLK Document 19 Filed 03/14/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
#### Jodi Samoraj et al., Appellants, v Richard Waldman, M.D., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[744 NYS2d 751]

Appeal from that part of a judgment of Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Nicholson, J.), entered June 6, 2001, that dismissed part of the 17th cause of action against defendants Richard Waldman, M.D. and Douglass N. Powell, M.D.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is affirmed without costs for reasons stated at Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Nicholson, J.

All concur except Hayes, J., who dissents and votes to reverse in the following memorandum.

Hayes, J.

(dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgment insofar as appealed from and grant a new trial on the issue of the negligence of Richard Waldman, M.D. and Douglass N. Powell, M.D. (defendants) in the allegedly unnecessary removal of the ovaries of Jodi Samoraj (plaintiff). Less than two weeks before trial, plaintiffs served a second supplemental expert witness disclosure stating that their expert would testify that defendants performed unnecessary surgery by removing plaintiff’s healthy ovaries without plaintiffs consent and beyond the scope of the consent to surgery given by plaintiff. In my view, Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting defendants’ application to strike the second supplemental expert witness disclosure. The court thereby erred in precluding plaintiffs’ expert witness from testifying concerning that alleged act of negligence, particularly where, as here, the court could have offered defendants a continuance rather than imposing the harsh remedy of preclusion. Preclusion is an inappropriate remedy where the failure to serve timely notice is neither willful nor prejudicial *(see Gallo v Linkow,*255 AD2d 113, 116-117; *see also Peck v Tired Iron Transp.,*209 AD2d 979, 979). In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were negligent in that they “performed *831unnecessary surgery * * * and with neither permission nor informed consent unnecessarily removed [plaintiff’s] ovaries.” In the verified bill of particulars, plaintiffs again alleged that defendants were negligent in that they “performed unnecessary surgery.” There is no showing that the late disclosure was willful or intentional, and there was no prejudice to defendants because they were aware of the allegation concerning the unnecessary removal of plaintiff’s ovaries *(see Silverberg v Community Gen. Hosp. of Sullivan County,*290 AD2d 788, 788-789; *Shopsin v Siben & Siben,*289 AD2d 220, 221; *Manes v Manes,*277 AD2d 359, 361-362, *appeal dismissed*96 NY2d 790). Present — Green, J.P., Hayes, Hurlbutt, Brums and Gorski, JJ.
Case 1:11-cv-01967-LTB Document 9 Filed 08/05/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 4
Case 1:11-cv-01967-LTB Document 9 Filed 08/05/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 4
Case 1:11-cv-01967-LTB Document 9 Filed 08/05/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 4
Case 1:11-cv-01967-LTB Document 9 Filed 08/05/11 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 4
1

 “[#55]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a

specific paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this

convention throughout this order.

2

 This standard pertains even though plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter. MoralesFernandez, 418 F.3d at 1122. In addition, because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, I have construed his

pleadings more liberally and held them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007);

Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th

Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No.11-cv-02291-REB-MJW

VERNE JAY MERRELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID ALLRED, D.O. FCC Health Services, and

PATRICIA MITCHELL, Program Mgt Officer, Health Services,

in their individual and professional capacities,

Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Blackburn, J.

The matter before me is the magistrate judge’s Recommendation on Plaintiff’s

Motion for Injunctive Relief (Docket No. 3) and Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (Docket

No. 34) [#55]1

 filed July 17, 2012. I approve the unopposed recommendation.

No objections have been filed to the recommendation. Thus, I review it only for plain

error. See Morales-Fernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 418 F.3d 1116,

1122 (10th Cir. 2005).2

 Finding no such error in the magistrate judge’s recommended

disposition, I find and conclude that the recommendation should be approved and adopted. 

Case 1:11-cv-02291-REB-MJW Document 66 Filed 08/24/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
2

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That the Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Docket No.

3) and Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (Docket No. 34) [#55] filed July 17, 2012, is

APPROVED AND ADOPTED as an order of this court;

2. That plaintiff’s Prisoner’s Motion for Injunctive Relief [#3] filed August 31, 2011, is

DENIED AS MOOT; and

3. That Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss [#34] filed February 16, 2012, is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. That the motion is GRANTED to the extent that the Prisoner Complaint [#1] filed

August 31, 2011, can be construed to assert a cause of action arising under the Free Exercise

Clause of the First Amendment and Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403

U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and any such claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE; and

b. That in all other respects, the motion is DENIED.

Dated August 24, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

Case 1:11-cv-02291-REB-MJW Document 66 Filed 08/24/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2