NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAIF KHORSHED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

PAULA ADAMS, LAWA Director of 

Human Resources, an individual; JOSEPH 

Y. AVRAHAMY, Attorney at Law, an 

individual,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-55165

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-03435-GW-JPR

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 25, 2016**

Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Saif Khorshed appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing 

his employment action alleging violations of Title VII, the Americans with 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 7 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-55165 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and various 

other claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a 

dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 2015). 

We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside 

Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Khorshed’s ADA and Title VII claims 

because these statutes do not impose liability on individual defendants. See Walsh 

v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2006).

Dismissal of Khorshed’s FLSA claim for failure to pay overtime wages was 

proper because Khorshed failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim 

for unpaid overtime. See Landers, 771 F.3d at 644-46 (setting forth requirements 

to state a plausible FLSA claim for overtime payments); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally 

construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief).

The district court properly dismissed Khorshed’s “human rights” claim 

because Khorshed failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for 
3 15-55165 

relief. See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42; Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121-22 (9th Cir. 

2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable 

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 

theory.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Khorshed’s motion 

to alter or amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) without first holding 

a hearing for the parties to present oral argument. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 

Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting 

forth standard of review and grounds for relief); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By 

rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on 

briefs, without oral hearings.”); C.D. Cal. L. R. 7-15 (“The Court may dispense 

with oral argument on any motion except where an oral hearing is required by 

statute. . . .”); Delange v. Dutra Const. Co., Inc., 183 F.3d 916, 919 n.2 (9th Cir. 

1999) (setting forth standard of review of a district court’s interpretation and 

application of its local rules).

Khorshed’s contentions regarding alleged bias of the district court judge are 

unpersuasive. 

AFFIRMED.