United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-1147 

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Dawn Strope-Robinson; The Estate of David Clair Strope

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v. 

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

 Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: November 19, 2020

 Filed: February 5, 2021 

[Unpublished] 

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Before SHEPHERD, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Dawn Strope-Robinson, the grantee beneficiary of her uncle’s transfer on 

death deed, filed a claim with his homeowner’s insurance after a fire occurred a 

few days following his death. The insurer partially denied the claim and Strope- 
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Robinson filed this declaratory judgment action. The district court1 granted 

summary judgment to the insurer, and we affirm.

I.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company issued a homeowner’s insurance 

contract to David Strope for his house in Orr, Minnesota. On August 10, 2017, 

Strope executed a transfer on death deed to convey the property to his niece, Dawn 

Strope-Robinson. The transfer on death deed was then recorded on August 11. 

Strope died on August 14. Six days later, Strope’s ex-wife intentionally set the

house on fire, damaging the home and personal property inside.

Strope-Robinson was appointed special administrator and personal 

representative of the Estate. She filed a claim with State Farm for coverage of the 

loss of the house, loss of use forthe fairrental value of the house, and loss of personal 

property. State Farm granted the claim for the loss of personal property, but denied 

the other claims because Strope-Robinson was not a named insured under the

policy and the named insured, David Strope, had no insurable interest in the home 

at the time of the fire.

After Strope-Robinson sued, State Farm removed the suit to federal court 

under diversity jurisdiction. Strope-Robinson then amended her complaint and 

added the Estate of David Clair Strope as a plaintiff. After discovery, the parties 

filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary 

judgment to State Farm because the Estate did not have an interest in the property 

at the time it burned and Strope-Robinson was not a named insured. She 

appeals, asking us to grant her summary judgment. 

1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, Senior United States District Judge for 

the District of Minnesota.
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II.

The parties agree on the facts and that Minnesota law governs. “We review 

the district court’s summary-judgment decision, including its interpretation of the 

contract and state law, de novo.” Yang v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 898

F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2018). Strope-Robinson argues that the district court 

should have granted her or, in the alternative, the Estate summary judgment after 

considering Minnesota’s statutes on transfer on death deeds, the insurance 

contract, and her equitable concerns, including the reasonable expectations 

doctrine and estoppel.

We first look to applicable Minnesota statutes and the language of the 

contract. See Pepper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 813 N.W.2d 921, 927 

(Minn. 2012). We then address Strope-Robinson’s equitable arguments. See

Shannon v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 276 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. 1979). 

A.

Minnesota’s transfer on death deed statute, Minn. Stat. § 507.071, provides 

that the deed “transfers the interest to the grantee beneficiary upon the death of the 

grantor owner upon whose death the conveyance or transfer is stated to be 

effective, but subject to the survivorship provisions and requirements of section 

524.2-702.” Minn. Stat. § 507.071, subdiv. 2. 

Strope-Robinson first argues that the reference to Section 524.2-702, a 

provision within Minnesota’s version of the Uniform Probate Code, directly 

connects the transfer on death deed to a decedent’s estate and a probate process. 

App. Br. 13–14. But the survivor provisions of Section 524.2-702 only limit the 

transfer on death deed such that “a beneficiary named in a transfer on death deed 

under section 507.071 who fails to survive by 120 hours the grantor owner upon 

whose death the conveyance to the beneficiary becomes effective . . . is deemed

to have predeceased the . . . grantor owner testator . . . for purposes of determining
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title to property passing . . . by the transfer on death deed.” Minn. Stat. § 524.2-

702. The provisions do nothing to delay the transfer of interest upon the grantor 

owner’s death or to place the property into the probate estate under these facts.

Next, Strope-Robinson says that the transfer on death deed was still

executory when the home burned because she had not yet obtained a certificate 

described in the statute as clearance for public assistance claims and liens. App. 

Br. 14. Subdivision 23 of Section 507.071 provides that “[a]ny person claiming an 

interest in real property conveyed or transferred by a transfer on death deed, or the 

person’s attorney or other agent, may apply . . . for a clearance certificate for the

real property described in the transfer on death deed.” (emphasis added). The 

permissive language of Subdivision 23 precludes Strope-Robinson’s argument.

Finally, Strope-Robinson cites an unrelated provision, Minn. Stat. § 

256B.15, that addresses medical assistance liens and encumbrances on the 

property but does nothing to delay the transfer of the grantor owner’s interest. But 

appellants do not argue that Strope’s property was subject to such an obligation. 

Section 256B.15 does not apply because it only addresses the continuing 

encumbrance on a property if it is subject to a medical assistance lien or other type 

of obligation. 

The plain language of Section 507.071, considered as a whole, says that a 

grantor owner’s property interest transfers “upon the death of the grantor owner.” 

Minn. Stat. § 507.071, subdiv. 2. David Strope died on August 14, 2017, after 

executing and recording a transfer on death deed naming Strope-Robinson as the 

grantee beneficiary. Under Minnesota law, we conclude that Strope-Robinson was 

the sole owner of the property named in that deed when it burned on August 20, 

2017. 

B.

State Farm’s contract with Strope does not provide coverage for StropeRobinson or for Strope-Robinson as the personal representative of the Estate of 
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David Clair Strope. Minnesota’s “‘well-settled general rule in the construction of 

insurance contracts’ permits parties ‘to contract as they desire, and so long as 

coverage required by law is not omitted and policy provisions do not contravene 

applicable statutes, the extent of the insurer’s liability is governed by the contract 

entered into.’” Pepper, 813 N.W.2d at 927 (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn.1983)). 

“The general nature of the relation between an insurer and an insured is

purely a contractual one personal to the insured, even though the policy must in 

form comply with statutory or standard policy provisions.” Closuit v. Mitby, 56 

N.W.2d 428, 431 (Minn. 1953). “[I]n the absence of assignment or express 

stipulation of the parties . . . [,] policies of insurance do not attach to or run with 

the property insured. . . [and] [i]n case of a conveyance or assignment of the

property, they do not go with it as an incident thereto . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).

The homeowner’s policy defines “insured” as: “you and, if residents of your 

household: (a) your relatives, and (b) any other person under the age of 21 who is

in the care of a person described above.” D. Ct. Dkt. 42-1 at 17. Another provision 

addresses the effect of any insured’s death: 

If any person shown in the Declarations or the spouse, if a resident 

of the same household, dies: (a) we insure the legal representative of 

the deceased. This condition applies only with respect to the premises 

and the property of the deceased covered under this policy at the time 

of death; (b) insured includes: (1) any member of your household 

who is an insured at the time of your death, but only while a resident 

of the residence premises; and (2) with respect to your property, the 

person having proper temporary custody of the property until

appointment and qualification of a legal representative.

Id. at 36.

Here, the property insurance was a personal contract between David and 

Denise Strope, the named insureds, and State Farm, the insurer. Id. at 13. Denise 
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Strope, David’s ex-wife, is not a claimant or a party. David Strope’s death triggered 

the transfer of his property interest to Strope-Robinson, so Strope’s estate had no 

interest in the real property or dwelling at the time of the fire. No policy provision 

assigned or stipulated transfer to Strope-Robinson of the insurance contract after

the land’s conveyance. Under Closuit, State Farm did not enter into an insurance 

contract with Strope-Robinson and State Farm’s policy did not run with the

property after it was conveyed, so State Farm properly denied the claim.

C.

Finally, Strope-Robinson raises the equitable arguments of reasonable 

expectations and estoppel. Neither is colorable here.

The doctrine of reasonable expectations applies only in cases involving 

contracts with hidden exclusions, Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41, 49

(Minn. 2008), and Strope-Robinson points to no such language hiding an

exclusion. Strope-Robinson’s estoppel argument is equally unavailing. She argues 

that because State Farm did not cancel the policy or return a pro-rata premium 

paid, it should be estopped from denying coverage. Neither the policy provisions 

nor Minnesota law support this theory. Plus, Strope-Robinson, as special 

administrator and personal representative for the Estate, never sought to cancel the

policy. 

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to State Farm.

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