United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-4059

___________________________

James L. Dean; Lois P. White, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Joseph

White, deceased; Kathleen A. Gonzalez; Thomas W. Winslow; Ada Joann Taylor;

Debra Shelden

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

Burdette Searcey, Dep., in his official and individual capacities; Wayne R. Price,

PhD., in his official and individual capacities; County of Gage, Nebraska, a

Nebraska political subdivision

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

Ryan L. Timmerman, Personal Representative of the estate of Jerry O. DeWitt

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

------------------------------

The Nebraska Association of County Officials; Nebraska Sheriffs Association;

National Sheriff's Association; International Municipal Lawyers Association; The

Nebraska Intergovernmental Risk Management Association

lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellant(s)

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln

____________
 Submitted: November 16, 2017

 Filed: June 11, 2018

____________

Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge. 

This case is familiar to us, as it is to Nebraskans and much of the nation. It

returns after three prior opinions by this Court, two trials, and, now, one jury verdict

that is contested on this appeal. We are asked here, in large part, to sweep the pieces

off the board—to overturn our prior rulings—in order to vacate the jury’s verdict. 

We decline to do so. And, after careful examination of the remaining claims on

appeal, we find no other reason to disturb the verdict or rulings by the district court.1

Thus, we affirm. 

I.

The underlying facts in this case have been discussed at length in past appeals. 

See Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2012); White v. Smith, 696 F.3d 740

(8th Cir. 2012); Dean v. Cty. of Gage, 807 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136

S. Ct. 2490 (2016). We provide a brief procedural summary to orient our discussion. 

Appellees are six individuals—Joseph White, Ada JoAnn Taylor, Thomas

Winslow, Debra Shelden, Kathleen Gonzalez, and James Dean—who were arrested

for the gruesome February 1985 rape and murder of Helen Wilson in Beatrice,

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District 1

of Nebraska. 

-2-
Nebraska. All pled guilty to various charges in relation to the crime with the

2

exception ofJoseph White—he went to trial and was convicted for first-degree felony

murder. Shelden, Gonzalez, and Dean served around five years; the rest served nearly

twenty years. Appellees were exonerated by DNA evidence in 2008, and the State

3

of Nebraska formally pardoned them in 2009. That same year, they filed this lawsuit

on the grounds that their deprivations of liberty were preventable: they argued that

their arrests and imprisonment were the result of a reckless investigation,

manufactured false evidence, and coerced confessions. They assert claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, as well as parallel conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, against

Gage County (where Beatrice is located) and three individuals in the Gage County’s

Sheriff Department—Sheriff Jerry DeWitt, Deputy Burdette Searcey, and Deputy

Wayne Price. 

4

On prior appeals, we narrowed the scope of Appellees’ claims against Sheriff

DeWitt and Deputies Searcey and Price to reckless investigation, manufacture offalse

evidence, and conspiracy. We also found that the officials were not entitled to

qualified immunity. The case then proceeded to trial where it initially ended in a

mistrial. After that, the district court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), certified its

rulings on county liability and the conspiracy claims for appellate review. We

reversed the district court on both claims, finding that Gage County could be liable

We refer to them collectively as the “Appellees.” During the pendency of 2

these proceedings, Ada JoAnn Taylor changed her name to Ada JoAnn Custard. 

Joseph White is now deceased. His wife, Lois White, is the representative of 3

his estate in these proceedings. 

Richard Smith, the former Gage County attorney, was among the others 4

initially sued. We affirmed the district court’s finding that he was entitled to absolute

immunity and dismissed him from the suit. Winslow, 696 F.3d at 739. DeWitt,

Searcey, and Price are the only individuals who remain in the suit.

-3-
for acts committed under policiesinstituted by Sheriff DeWitt, as county sheriff, and

that the conspiracy claims could go forward.

5

Appellees once again proceeded to trial after three interlocutory opinionsfrom

this Court. This time the trial ended in a verdict and awards for each of the Appellees

totaling approximately $28.1 million. The verdict is summarized in the chart below: 

 

Dean White Gonzalez Winslow Taylor Shelden

Searcey (Reckless

Investigation)

Dean White Gonzalez Winslow Taylor Shelden

Price (Reckless

Investigation)

Dean Price Price Price Taylor Shelden

DeWitt (Reckless

Investigation)

DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt

Searcey (Manufactured Evidence) Searcey White Gonzalez Winslow Taylor Searcey

Price (Manufactured

Evidence)

Dean White Gonzalez Price Price Shelden

DeWitt (Manufactured Evidence) DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt

Searcey (Conspiracy) Searcey Searcey Searcey Searcey Searcey Searcey

Price (Conspiracy) Price Price Price Price Price Price

DeWitt (Conspiracy) DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt DeWitt

County Liability Dean White Gonzalez Winslow Taylor Shelden

Damages $2,190,000 $7,300,000 $2,190,000 $7,300,000 $7,300,000 $1,825,000

On this appeal, Gage County, Searcey, and Price raise four distinct claims in

their opening brief, with the continued viability of our prior rulings being their

DeWitt, Searcey, and Price also cross-appealed, asking us to re-examine the

5

qualified immunity determination. We found the evidence introduced at the first trial

continued to support our prior determination that they should not be granted qualified

immunity. Dean, 807 F.3d at 937. 

-4-
primary focus. Cf. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 751 (8thCir. 2008) (“Claims not

6

raised in an opening brief are deemed waived.”). Gage County argues that judgment

as a matter of law should be entered for it because our prior opinion on its liability

was erroneous and, in any case, liability is not supported by the trial record. The

deputies argue much the same with regards to qualified immunity. Failing that, the

Appellants argue for a new trial because of (1) allegedly prejudicial behavior by

Appellees’ counsel; and (2) an alleged failure of the district court to properly define

“reckless investigation” in the jury instructions. We address each claim in turn. 

II.

As noted above, Gage County launches a two-prong attack on its liability. It

first argues that we are not bound by Dean and that we should re-examine that ruling.

Alternatively, even if Dean applies, Gage County asserts that the evidence was

insufficient to find it liable. 

A.

According to Gage County, we are not bound by our holding in Dean under the

law-of-the-case doctrine because that decision applied controlling law incorrectly. 

As a reminder, Dean held that Nebraska county sheriffs “made final policy with

regard to law enforcement investigations and arrests.” 807 F.3d at 941. For that

reason, we held that it was for the jury to decide in this case “whether Sheriff

DeWitt’s decisions caused the deprivation of rights at issue by policies which

affirmatively command that it occur.” Id. at 942 (internal quotation marks omitted).

7

We refer to Searcey and Price collectively asthe “deputies.” We refer to Gage

6

County and the deputies as the “Appellants.” Sheriff DeWitt is now deceased. His

estate does not appeal from the jury’s verdict. 

Gage County also suggests that the evidentiary record no longer supports the

7

decision in Dean. Yet, Dean did not hinge its holding on any specific facts; instead,

it examined Nebraska law and applicable precedent (including McMillian v. Monroe

-5-
Our decision in Dean is not simply law of the case. It is the law of this circuit. 

Hence, we would only re-examine the decision if it were “repudiated or undermined

by later authority, such as a statute, an intervening Supreme Court decision, or en

banc decision.” Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 38 (West

2016). It is not. Gage County simply seeks to re-litigate Dean on this appeal. So, the

traditional rule applies: “as a decision of a panel . . . [Dean] binds other panels.” 

Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 73 F.3d 201, 205 (8th Cir. 1996).

8

B.

Next, Gage County argues that the evidence isinsufficient to support a finding

of liability. Our review of jury verdicts is extremely deferential given “the danger

that the jury’s rightful province will be invaded when judgment as a matter of law is

misused.” Bavlsik v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 870 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, we only overturn a verdict when “‘the evidence is

such that, without weighing the credibility of witnesses, there is a complete absence

of probative facts to support the verdict.’” Id. (quoting Browning v. President

Riverboat Casino-Mo., Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 634 (8th Cir. 1998)). With these

principles in mind, we examine Gage County’s arguments. 

A municipal entity, like Gage County, “may not be found liable unless action

pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”

County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)) to reach its holding that Nebraska county sheriffs were

final policymakers in “law enforcement investigations and arrests.” Id. at 941. And

while it did list certain decisions made by Sheriff DeWitt that a jury could reasonably

construe as establishing policy that caused the constitutional violations in this case,

it left the ultimate decision to the jury. Id. at 943. 

Gage County previously asked this Court to consider Dean en banc. That

8

request was denied. It also petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case. That

request was also denied. See Gage Cnty. v. Dean, 136 S. Ct. 2490 (2016).

-6-
S.M. v. Lincoln Cnty., 874 F.3d 581, 585 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Gage County contends that there is insufficient evidence of causation,

arguing that “[t]here is no evidence that DeWitt [asfinal policymaker] created policy

that caused a constitutional violation.” Appellant Br. 27. According to the County, 9

the manner in which the jury returned its verdict—finding for Sheriff DeWitt, now

deceased, on all counts and finding for all defendants on the conspiracy

counts—means that Appellees’ “primary theory of municipal liability . . . [which is]

that the County wasliable because DeWitt, asfinal policymaker, directly participated

in violations of Appellees’ constitutional rights or in a conspiracy regarding the

same” is no longer valid. And, the County continues, “[t]he record contains no

evidence of a policy to support any other theory of municipal liability.” AppellantBr.

29. To sum up: Gage County argues that there is “no evidence” linking the jury’s

finding of seventeen constitutional torts across the six Appellees to county policy. 

We disagree. The jury was correctly instructed—in an instruction that the

County did not object to or appeal from—that Gage County was only liable if, after

finding a constitutional violation, “Sheriff DeWitt (a) directed that the violation

occur, or (b) authorized the violation, or (c) agreed to a subordinate’s decision to

engage in the violation.” 

10

Active involvement in constitutional torts by Sheriff DeWitt, in other words,

is not the only evidence probative of the County’s liability. The jury found that

Sheriff DeWitt did not personally (1) engage in reckless investigatory tactics, (2)

In its sufficiency argument, Gage County again takes issue with Dean,

9

asserting that Sheriff DeWitt was not the relevant policymaker at the time of these

events and that a Nebraska sheriff is “not a county policymaker.” Dean squarely

forecloses those arguments, and our discussion in Section II.A and note 7 address

why there is no reason to reconsider Dean here. 

Gage County did ask for special interrogatories in regards to this instruction. 10

That request was denied by the district court and not appealed here. 

-7-
manufacture false evidence, or (3) enter into a “knowing agreement or knowing

mutual understanding”—a conspiracy as defined in this case—to violate

constitutional rights. But, the jury still found that he “directed,” “authorized,” or

“agreed to” the constitutional torts committed by the deputies. See Kelly v. City of

Omaha, 813 F.3d 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting municipal liability attaches if

“policymaking officials had notice of or authorized” unconstitutional acts). Simply

put, the jury could have drawn a logical distinction between Sheriff Dewitt’s

investigatory role and his policymaking and managerial role. The question, then, 11

is whether there is evidence showing DeWitt created policy which caused at least one

constitutional violation—enough for the County to be liable for damages—for each

Appellee. 

We find that there is not “a complete absence of probative facts,” Bavlsik, 870

F.3d at 805 (internal quotation marks omitted), that Sheriff DeWitt “directed,”

“authorized,” or “agreed to” at least one constitutional tort committed against each

Appellee. The jury had sufficient evidence to believe that the investigation would

have fizzled out without Sheriff DeWitt’s continued approval of arrests. Evidence

at trial showed he allowed the investigation to continue with full vigor despite

knowing the deputies arrested individuals who did not match the physical evidence

found at the crime scene. On top of that, the jury could believe he permitted the

continued interrogation of arrestees, regardless of the knee-jerk, baffling statements

We find no inconsistency in the distinction the jury drew in the verdict. But, 11

even if there were one, we have a “duty to harmonize [apparently] inconsistent

verdicts when we can.” SEC v. Quan, 817 F.3d 583, 591 (8th Cir. 2016) (alteration

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, specifically, where “a verdict

or decision exonerat[es] [an] individual governmental actor[],” we inquire whether

that decision can be “harmonized with a concomitant verdict or decision imposing

liability on the municipal entity.” Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980, 986 (8th

Cir. 2002). Here, there is no doubt that the verdicts can be harmonized. As we have

articulated above, the jury found liability flowing from Sheriff DeWitt’s managerial

and policymaking role, but not his investigatory role. 

-8-
they gave—many of which contradicted physical evidence and statements made by

fellow arrestees. In some cases, it was documented (and shown to the jury) that he

approved the arrests of individuals solely on the basis of self-conflicting statements

his deputies elicited from those in detention. In this way, he gave oxygen to the

reckless investigation largely led by Searcey and the jury found for all plaintiffs and

against Searcey on the recklessinvestigation claim. That alone is enough to find the

12

County liable as to all Appellees. DeWitt’s managerial impact, however, was felt in

a number of other ways. 

Sheriff DeWitt initially opened the investigation. The jury heard he did so four

years after the events in question—and four years after the Beatrice Police

Department (“BPD”) and the FBI had done an extensive investigation—on the basis

of a witness that Deputy Searcey had met while moonlighting as an unpaid private

investigator.

Sheriff DeWitt, the jury could believe, knew of the investigatory tactics used

and affirmatively directed their usage. The jury was presented evidence that Sheriff

DeWitt sat in on multiple interviews conducted by Deputy Price. They could

reasonably infer he knew of Price’s methods, including encouraging subjects to use

“unconscious recall” to remember facts. The jury could also reasonably conclude that

DeWitt assigned Deputy Price to speak to stubborn arrestees to elicit favorable, but

demonstrably false, statements. 

And Sheriff DeWitt, as the district court notes, insulated and protected the

investigation. The jury could have reasonably credited the testimony of BPD Officer

Sam Stevens that Sheriff DeWitt acted to protect the investigation from his criticisms

and believed this effort eventually led to Stevens’s removal from it. 

We further discuss the reckless investigation led by Searcey in Section III.A. 12

-9-
While this is certainly not all of the evidence of Sheriff DeWitt’s hierarchical

impact on the investigation, it demonstrates that the jury had enough to find the

County liable for the Appellees’ damages. 

III.

Fromcounty liabilitywe move to another issue that we have ruled on but which

is now contested on this appeal: qualified immunity. We first examine whether the

trial record continues to support our prior qualified immunity determinations before

turning to whether intervening Supreme Court precedent undermines the legal

foundation on which our prior rulings rest. 

A.

Qualified immunity is an issue we rarely examine after trial “‘because once the

defendant has had to proceed to trial, he or she has lost the benefit of qualified

immunity, that is, the entitlement to be free from suit.’” Payne v. Britten, 749 F.3d

697, 700 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Parton v. Ashcroft, 16 F.3d 226, 228 (8th Cir.

1994)). Prior to trial in this case, and in two separate opinions, we applied the

standard qualified immunity test, looking to see (1) if the Appellees had offered facts

that sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation, and (2) if the law defining that

violation was clearly established. See Winslow, 696 F.3d at 731-40; White, 696 F.3d

at 753-59. Based on the record presented to us, we made a legal judgment and

answered both questions in the affirmative—which meant that the deputy sheriffs did

not have immunity from suit. 

Now, after trial—when we have a fully developed record—the “decisive

question” is whether the facts continue to support the legal judgments we made

previously. See Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 184 (2011) (holding post-trial “the

defense [of qualified immunity] must be evaluated in light ofthe character and quality

-10-
of the evidence received in court”). After the 2014 mistrial, we found that “[t]he trial

testimony does not support the [deputies’] entitlement to qualified immunity.” Dean,

807 F.3d at 937. That statement continues to hold true on the current (and now

complete) trial record. 

On this appeal, the deputies have offered twelve particularized facts that they

argue appeared in White and Winslow, but were not proven at trial. In their eyes, this

means our qualified immunity decisions are no longer supported by the facts. Even

accepting their dubious argument—that the twelve facts they point to were not proven

at trial—and examining the record without them, our holdingsin White and Winslow

remain amply supported. 

After summary judgment, we observed that:

[A] factfinder [could] identify a pattern whereby: Defendants first

convinced a suspect that he or she was at the scene of the crime through

lies, threats, leading questions, manipulative ‘therapy’ sessions, and the

alleged accusations of several other ‘accomplices’; and then if the

suspect’s blood was not a match for the blood found at the crime scene,

Defendants manipulated the suspect into implicating yet another

individual, thus beginning the process again.

White, 696 F.3d at 755. On our review of the record, evidence of this “pattern” was

borne out at trial, supporting each of the constitutional violations the jury found.13

The evidence behind each violation is discussed below. 

Furthermore, it continues to support our prior determination that the deputies’ 13

conduct “shocks the conscience.” See Winslow, 696 F.3d at 736; White, 696 F.3d at

758.

-11-
Reckless Investigation (Searcey)

The jury found against Searcey, and for all plaintiffs, on the reckless

investigation claim. In White, we found that one of the tell-tale signs of a reckless

investigation was “evidence that investigators purposefully ignored evidence

suggesting the defendant’s innocence.” 696 F.3d at 758 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The jury was shown evidence that quite early in his investigation, Searcey

knew that his initial arrestees, White, Taylor, and Winslow, were not matches for the

blood found at the crime scene. The jury could have found that, despite professing

that the investigation centered on finding evidence of a match to the blood at the

crime scene, Searcey “purposefully ignored” the fact that he had no matches and

pressed on with his investigation. To be sure, Searcey cannot be liable “merely for

14

aggressively investigating the crime” by continuing the investigation at thisjuncture. 

Winslow, 696 F.3d at 734. But, as we describe below, the fact that no match for

physical evidence was found before the case was closed—and that the jury was

shown that no coherent theory was built or even pursued against White, Taylor, and

Winslow—supports the jury’s reckless investigation finding against Searcey and for

White, Taylor, and Winslow. 

After Searcey’s investigation hit a wall, having arrested and detained three

suspects who did not match the physical evidence at the crime scene, evidence was

presented that Searcey turned to a notoriously unreliable witness to provide a spark:

Cliff Shelden. Cliff, in turn, implicated his wife, Debra Shelden. The evidence

For example, in his initial interview with White, Searcey stated that he was 14

“going to want you know blood test, hair, we maybe even want some sperm,” which

“would positively identify [White.]” White responded: “Yep. And it can also

positively prove I wasn’t there.” Searcey did the same with Winslow as well. In one

of his interviews with Winslow, Searcey told him: “we’re looking for a certain type

of blood, do you know what type that is?” After Winslow said he did not, Searcey

responded that “we’re looking for Type B positive.” 

-12-
presented to the jury showed that Cliff told Searcey that Shelden was shoved into a

mirror at the crime scene, the mirror broke, and Shelden bled everywhere. A broken

mirror was not found at the crime scene. Nevertheless, Shelden was picked up and

interviewed by Searcey. During the interview, she confessed to being at the crime

scene, but the jury was shown that her confession contained glaring inconsistencies

with her husband’s statement. More importantly, when her blood was tested the

15

next day, evidence presented to the jury showed that it did not match the blood at the

crime scene. 

Dean was arrested shortly after Shelden. Dean maintained his innocence for

16

22 days, and, again, his voluntary blood sample did not match the blood at the crime

scene. During the course of interrogating Dean, the jury was shown that Searcey

received lab reports confirming that the semen found at the crime scene did not match

Winslow or White—his only two suspects with respect to the rape of the victim. 

Searcey made no attempt to find the source of the semen after this. Instead, he

arrested Gonzalez. As the jury heard, Gonzalez proved an imperfect match to the

blood found at the crime scene. While she had Type B blood—which was the same

type found at the scene—certain genetic markers differed from the sample found at

the scene. This meant she was not a match for the blood at the crime scene. The jury

heard evidence that Searcey learned and understood this because he received a

detailed analysis of Gonzalez’s blood from the Nebraska State Police. Gonzalez

eventually confessed after her request for DNA analysis of her blood was denied on

the grounds that it was cost prohibitive. At that point, the jury was presented

For instance, the jury was shown that Shelden never confirmed that she

15

crashed into a mirror. Instead, she claimed that she fell behind the bed. One of the

starkest inconsistencies presented to the jury, however, was her arrival time at the

crime scene: her husband said Shelden had been with him at the hospital at the time

she said she arrived at the crime scene. 

We discuss the evidence used to arrest Dean when evaluating the

16

manufactured evidence verdict. 

-13-
evidence that Searcey’s investigation—which he started as unpaid investigator and

later continued under official authority as a deputy sheriff—came to an end. The jury 

was shown that it ended without a single match to the physical evidence at the crime

scene. Instead, it was wrapped up with one out of six arrestees, Gonzalez, matching

the blood type of the blood found at the scene—but not the actual blood itself. 

We find the jury had sufficient evidence that Searcey conducted a reckless

investigation as to all six plaintiffs by “purposefully ignor[ing]” the physical

evidence—which he admitted was crucial—at the crime scene. 

Reckless Investigation (Price)

The jury also found for Dean, Taylor, and Shelden on Price’s reckless

investigation claim. 

Based on the evidence presented, in finding for Dean, the jury could have

concluded that Price deliberately ignored his protestations of innocence and instead

encouraged him to dream up evidence of his presence at the crime scene. In other

words, the jury was presented with “evidence of systematic pressure to implicate the

defendant in the face of contrary evidence.” White, 696 F.3d at 758 (internal

quotation marks omitted). For example, evidence at trial showed that, after weeks of

Dean protesting his innocence, Price pushed past that and instead found a way for

Dean to “reconcile his [unconscious awareness of] being present with the conscious

belief that he was not there.” 

The jury also could have found the same “systematic pressure” at work in

finding for Taylor and Shelden. Price had previously treated both of them as a

practicing psychologist in Beatrice. Evidence presented at trial, for example, showed

he had met with, and evaluated, Shelden when she was considering giving up her

-14-
child. In the course of that evaluation, he had noted that she “seems to live on a

principle by which she acts out impulsively and responds to her actions only if there

are negative consequences.” And he had previously diagnosed Taylor with borderline

personality disorder. 

17

Despite his prior encounters with both Taylor and Shelden in a therapeutic

context, Price worked with them both in the course of the investigation. Evidence

presented before the jury suggested that he “counseled” Shelden who “initially . . .

had no memory of being at the scene of the crime” into subsequently “remember[ing]

all of the events on the night in question.” Price also counseled Taylor after her

18

arrest. From this, the jury could have reasonably concluded that it was reckless for

Price to take advantage of his prior clinical relationship with both Taylor and Shelden

in order to get them to speak and implicate themselves in the crime “in the face of

contrary evidence.” Id.

Manufacturing Evidence (Searcey)

The jury found for White, Gonzalez, Winslow, and Taylor against Searcey on

the manufacturing evidence claim. In an instruction that is unchallenged on appeal,

the jury was told that three elements must be met to prevail on the manufactured

evidence claim. First, the “Defendant fabricated, that is, made-up, false evidence

against one or more of the Plaintiffs during the investigation.” Second, “the

Defendant intentionally fabricated false evidence.” And, third, “as a direct result of

such action, the Plaintiff suffered some damage.” There was sufficient evidence

supporting the findings against Searcey. 

Price admitted learning over the course of his treatment of Taylor thatshe was 17

sexually and physically abused as a child.

This statement was made in an affidavit by Dean’s attorney. Furthermore, 18

Price had one consultation with Shelden for which no records were kept. 

-15-
For White and Taylor, the jury was presented with evidence of Searcey’s false

affidavit for arrest. The jury had basis to believe that a number of false statements

were included in the affidavit, including a flat-out lie about Winslow corroborating

another witness. Given that White and Taylor were arrested on that basis, the jury

had ample evidence in finding for them and against Searcey. 

As we noted in a prior opinion, “there is evidence that suggests Searcey . . .

coached witnesses to supply false evidence about . . . Winslow.” Winslow, 696 F.3d

at 734. Perhaps the most telling example of this presented to the jury was the

supposed identification provided by Taylor which led to Winslow’s arrest. After

intense interrogation, Taylor was asked to pick from a lineup an individual who was

purportedly with her at the crime scene. She was shown four individuals unknown

to her, one who Searcey specifically told her was not there, and Winslow whom she

knew and had previously told officers she had feared. She picked Winslow and

Winslow was arrested on that basis. A jury could reasonably infer from this evidence

that the identification was manufactured. 

Finally, Gonzalez was arrested because Shelden and Dean had come to believe,

based on dreams, that another individual was at the crime scene. Reviewing the

evidence at summary judgment, we observed “[a] reasonable inference is that

Gonzalez’s identification was not a coincidence; instead, a reasonable factfinder

could find that Defendants coached or coerced [Shelden] and Dean to implicate

Gonzalez.” Id. at 733. One example that came out at trial bears this out. The jury

was presented evidence showing Shelden and Dean gave wildly differing statements

initially as to what they recalled in their dreams. But—in curiously timed recorded

statements after prior unrecorded meetings—they both identified similar pieces of

clothing that Gonzalez was allegedly wearing. The jury was shown that the arrest

warrant filed by Searcey prominently featured thatsole bit of corroboration. The jury

could reasonably infer from this, and from the sequencing of the interviews and the

pattern of recorded versus unrecorded statements, that Searcey “coached or coerced

[Shelden] and Dean to implicate Gonzalez.” Id.

-16-
Manufacturing Evidence (Price)

The jury found for Dean, White, Shelden, and Gonzalez against Price on the

manufacturing evidence claim. In our prior opinions, we held that it was proper for

the jury to consider whether the “indoctrination” and pressure placed by Price on

some of the Appellees to dream up evidence constituted the manufacture of false

evidence. See, e.g., Winslow, 696 F.3d at 733. Similar to what we observed after

summary judgment, the jury was presented evidence from which it could infer Price

actively cajoled and encouraged certain Appellees, some of whom (like Taylor and

Shelden) were mentally infirm, to simply make up evidence from their dreams. 

The evidence presented at trial showed that Dean was arrested solely on the

basis of a dream that Shelden had after a “therapy” session with Price. Price had told

Shelden to “relax” and that she may begin to recall other individuals at the crime

scene based on her dreams. After that, she told Searcey she dreamed that Dean was

at the crime scene. A reasonable jury—presented with expert testimony that dreams

do not constitute tangible evidence—could find that Price deliberately manipulated

Shelden to “dream” another name and that Dean was harmed by this because this was

the sole basis on which he was arrested. The jury could have also reasonably inferred

that Price caused Shelden to manufacture testimony, as was discussed above, thatshe

was at the crime scene when she initially had no memory of being there. 

As for Gonzalez, Dean placed her at the crime scene only after speaking with

Price. The jury was presented evidence that Price told Dean that evidence of the

murder would come back to him in dreams. Indeed, in a recorded interview where

he identified Gonzalez, Dean stated that he “remembered [Gonzalez’s presence] in

[his] sleep.” White was perhaps the most impacted by Price’s tactics because he

insisted on a trial. Evidence presented showed that at White’s criminal trial, Dean,

Shelden, and Taylor took the stand and testified as to what they were able to gather

from their dreams after “working” with Price. 

-17-
More than sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to find that Price’s

manipulation through “therapy” caused the manufacture of false testimony which

materially affected Dean, Shelden, Gonzalez, and Price. 

B.

In addition to the factual findings, the deputies also take aim at the legal

conclusions reached in White and Winslow. But, as with Dean, the legal conclusions

represent binding precedent. And only if they were “repudiated or undermined by

later controlling authority,” Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 38, would

we have occasion to revisit them. Such an occasion would be rare indeed because the

intervening authority would have to raise questions about the “substance and clarity

of pre-existing law”—the state of the law in 1989 in this case. Jordan, 562 U.S. at

190. Appellants do, however, purport to raise such authorities by citing the Supreme

Court’s decisions in White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017), and City & County of San

Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015), both of which, it is argued, raise

questions about the “clarity” of the law with regards to reckless investigation in

1989. Stated differently, they do not argue that the Constitution excuses their

17

conduct. Their only point on appeal is that new decisions by the Supreme Court

suggest that the unconstitutionality of their acts was not sufficiently clear in 1989. 

To start, Pauly and Sheehan do not announce inherently new principles: as

Pauly itself stated, the decision “reiterate[d] the longstanding principle that ‘clearly

established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’” 137 S. Ct. at

552 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). The reason behind this

rule, asthe Supreme Court has explained, isto ensure public officials can “reasonably

. . . anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” Ziglar v.

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). While “[i]t

The deputies do not (and did not previously) contest that the right to be free 17

from the use of manufactured evidence was clearly established in 1989. 

-18-
is not necessary, of course, that the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful,” id. at 1866 (internal quotation marks omitted), the dispositive question is

whether there was a “fair and clear warning of what the Constitution requires,” 

Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1778 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nothing in these cases alters the conclusion we reached in our prior opinions. 

In both White and Winslow, we examined the deputies’ actions and found that a jury

could believe that they “conducted a conscience-shocking reckless investigation . .

. that was used to box” Appellees in. Winslow, 696 F.3d at 736. And we

held—relying on Supreme Court precedent and this Court’s holding in Wilson v.

Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2001)—that the prohibitions against their

actions were clearly established in 1989. The deputies argue that it was improper to

rely on “general statements of the law” in reaching the latter conclusion. But, Pauly

explicitly reaffirmed that “generalstatements of the law are not inherently incapable

of giving fair and clear warning” so long as “the unlawfulness . . . [is] apparent.” 137

S. Ct. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no doubt that the conduct

we described above and in prior opinions is (and was) unlawful. Indeed, “if any

20

concept is fundamental to our American system of justice, it is that those charged

with upholding the law are prohibited from . . . framing individuals for crimes they

did not commit.” Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004). The jury

was warranted in concluding that this is exactly what happened through the reckless

investigation here. 

The prohibition on using official power to frame individuals is deeply

embedded in the historical roots of due process. See, e.g., 1 E. Coke, The Second

The deputies also suggest our prior opinions ran afoul of Pauly by “look[ing] 20

at all the defendants’ conduct collectively.” Appellant Br. 48. Our prior opinions,

however, identified specific acts by each deputy that ran afoul of the Constitution. 

As discussed above as well, the evidence at trial was specific enough to highlight

individual violations by each deputy. 

-19-
Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 44 (1797) (quoting Magna Carta of 1225

as saying “No bailiff from henceforth shall put any man to his open law . . . upon his

own bare saying, without faithful witnesses brought in for the same” (emphasis

added)); see also People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82 (N.Y. 1978) (noting

“application of due process to outrageous conduct of law enforcement agents such as

to warrant a restraint of the government from invoking judicial procedures in

obtaining a conviction” is a practice “traceable to Magna [Carta]”). The Supreme

21

Court—long before 1989—recognized this as well. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan,

294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (recognizing a process which “contrived a conviction”

violates “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and

political institutions”).

To put it simply, this is not a case like many Fourth Amendment cases, where

the “specificity of the rule is especially important” because “officers will often find

it difficult to know how” the Constitution applies in “the precise situation

encountered.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018). Instead,

this is an “‘obvious case,’” where the “unlawfulness of the [deputies’] conduct is

sufficiently clear.” Id. The evidence supports the conclusion that the deputies

“knowingly violate[d],” id. at 589, the due process rights of the Appellees by

applying “systematic pressure” to implicate the Appellees and by “purposefully

ignor[ing]” exonerating evidence. White, 696 F.3d at 758 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The illegality of this was well-established long before 1989. Thus, our

prior determination holds: qualified immunity does not shield the deputies. Wesby,

138 S. Ct. at 589 (holding qualified immunity does not protect the “plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).22

It has been noted that “[b]oth of the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses reach

21

back to Magna Carta.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632 (2015) (Scalia,

J., dissenting) (collecting authorities and cases). 

In a post-trial submission, Appellants draw our attention to Manuel v. City

22

of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017). There, the Supreme Court held that the start of legal

-20-
IV.

We now turn to whether a new trial is warranted. The denial of a new trial by

the district court is reviewed “for a clear abuse of discretion, with the key question

being whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Bamford

Inc. v. Regent Ins. Co., 822 F.3d 403, 410 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The Appellants first argue that the Appellees had an “improper and

prejudicial focus on ‘actual innocence,’” and thus they were deprived of the right to

a fair trial. The district court rejected that argument. We review to ensure the district

court was within the bounds of its discretion. Id.

As a threshold matter, we define the scope of our review. While the parties

were instructed not to argue “actual innocence,” the district court did allow the

Appellees to argue that the confessions made during the course of this investigation

were false. Appellants do not take issue with this on appeal. And so the existence

of witness testimony that goes to the falsehood of the confessions is not grounds for

a new trial. Appellants do take issue with three actions undertaken by one attorney 23

process does not vitiate a claim of unlawful detention under the Fourth Amendment. 

But, it once again affirmed that “once a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment

drops out.” Id. at 920 n.8.

With one exception, the witness testimony that Appellants point to all goes 23

to the falsehood of the confessions. In addition, much of the testimony counsel points

to went unobjected to at trial. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum OilCo., 310 U.S.

150, 239 (1940) (holding counsel “cannot as a rule remain silent, interpose no

objections, and after a verdict has been returned seize for the first time on the point

that the comments to the jury were improper and prejudicial”). The one piece of

testimony from Appellees’ expert, Dr. Richard Leo, that did go to actual innocence

is not preserved for our review because Appellants’ counsel was specifically asked

if she was moving for a mistrial on those grounds and she declined. See Tr. 725. 

Instead, counsel agreed to the district court’s remedy of having the remarks stricken

from the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 46 (“When the ruling or order is requested or

made, a party need only state the action that it wants the court to take or objects to

. . . .”). Even if it were preserved for our review, it would not be the basis for a new

-21-
for the Appellees during opening and closing. First, Appellants point to a statement

made by Appellees’ counsel during opening that “[Appellants] won’t even

acknowledge that[Appellees] are innocent.” Second, during closing,the same lawyer

used a slide that said “innocent.” And, finally, counsel asked the Appellees and their

families to stand during closing arguments.

 

The first two actions were timely objected to. The last action was not objected

to at the time and was only cited in a mistrial motion over three hours after the case

was submitted to the jury. It is not preserved for our review. See Ventura v. Kyle,

825 F.3d 876, 884 (8th Cir. 2016)(noting that where alleged misconduct occurs

during closing argument, “counsel . . . should[] make his objection, take his

exception, or ask for remedial action at the close thereof and before the case is

submitted to the jury” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)),

cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 667 (2017) . 

In all, we examine whether (1) the reference to innocence in the opening and

(2) the use of the “innocent” slide during closing warrant a new trial. 

A.

When the actions and statements by counsel are submitted as the basis for a

new trial, we examine four factors while keeping in mind that “the district court is in

the best position to determine whether the alleged error affected the substantial rights

of any party sufficient to warrant a new trial.” Townsend v. Bayer Corp., 774 F.3d

446, 460 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, we consider

whether the actions were “minor aberrations made in passing.” Kyle, 825 F.3d at 885

(internal quotation marks omitted). Next, we examine whether “the district court took

specific curative action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, we look at

whether “the size of the damage award . . . suggest[s] that counsel’s comments had

trial for the reasons we articulate in Section IV.A. 

-22-
a prejudicial effect.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

And, finally, we examine the overall trial record—the “weight of the evidence”—to

determine “whether the improper argument deprived a party of a fair trial.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

In this case, only the first factor weighs in favor of Appellants. In their brief,

Appellees admit that “actual innocence was properly a damages issue,” which

forecloses a conclusion that the statements at issue were simply made off the cuff. 

The rest of the factors, however, weigh against Appellants. The district court took

specific curative actions. For example, after the “innocent” slide went up during

closing, the district court stated: “Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve been instructed that

it’s not your responsibility and you should not try to determine whether plaintiffs are

guilty or innocent. Take that thing down please.” See Tr. 4042; see also Tr. 45

(similar instruction given in opening). The specific curative instructionsin this case

24

went beyond the simple “reminder that counsel’s arguments are not evidence” that we

have previously found insufficient. See, e.g., Gilster v. Primebank, 747 F.3d 1007,

1012 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding general reminder about counsel’s argumentation

insufficient as a curative instruction). The size of the award in this case, as well, does

not indicate prejudice. It was below what Appellees’ counsel argued for in closing,

suggesting that the remarks and slide did not inflame the passions of the jury. At

closing, Appellees’ counsel asked the jury to award $500,000 per year spent in prison

for each individual Appellee. No individual Appellee received an award equaling

$500,000 per year in prison—in fact, some, like Joseph White, were awarded sums

significantly less than that. 

25

The district court sanctioned the attorney involved. In addition, Appellants

24

did not walk away from trial with clean hands: they, too, were reprimanded during

closing for bringing up “actual innocence.” See Tr. 4085-86 (district court twice

instructing jury not to consider “guilt or innocence” during Appellants’ closing). 

The district court correctly notes that the overall award pales in comparison 25

to other similar cases. 

-23-
In the end, we are convinced that a “miscarriage of justice,” Regent Ins. Co.,

822 F.3d at 410, did not occur because of the overwhelming evidence in this case. 

Unlike Kyle, this was not simply a “credibility contest” between the Appellees and

Appellants. 825 F.3d at 885; see also Primebank, 747 F.3d at 1013 (finding record

indicated remarks had prejudicial effect where the district court noted it was a “‘tough

case’” that “‘could go either way’”). The record here is replete with concrete

historical evidence—affidavits, memos, interview transcripts—supporting the

Appellees’ claims and supplementing the credible testimony in this case. We decline

to disturb the district court’s judgment that a new trial is not warranted because of

alleged improper actions and remarks.

B.

The Appellants’ second basis for a new trial is that the reckless investigation

instruction improperly included reference to the gathering of “unreliable” evidence. 

They argue that this allowed the jury to find liability on the basis of negligence, rather

than recklessness. Only if an error in the jury instructions “misled the jury or had a

probable effect on its verdict” will we order a new trial on that basis. Acuity v.

Johnson, 776 F.3d 588, 596 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, there was no error. The instruction explicitly stated that the jury must

find, as a required element, that the “Defendant acted recklessly in gathering such

[false or unreliable] evidence.” It then went on to define “recklessly” as “when the

person proceeds without heed or concern for the consequences.” On our review,

“jury instructions must be read as a whole.” Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 846

(8th Cir. 1997) (en banc). In order to accept Appellants’ argument here, we would

have to believe that jurors stopped “reading after the complained-of sentence.” Id.

As in Ryther, we reject this argument. This court “presume[s] juries to be composed

of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard

the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.” United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634,

647 (8th Cir. 2006). The intricate and thoughtful verdict in this case only strengthens

that presumption. We decline to order a new trial on the basis of the jury instruction. 

-24-
V.

To conclude, we note that there are certain types of law enforcement conduct

that “do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism

about combatting crime” and which the Constitution forbids. Rochin v. California,

342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Over the course of now four opinions, and our multiple

meticulous reviews of the evidence presented, we have recognized this case is an

example of such conduct—and a jury has agreed. For this, § 1983 offers a measure

of recourse. Indeed, the only measure of recourse: “[f]or people in [Appellees’]

shoes, it is damages or nothing.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 

Having carefully reviewed the record and claims on appeal, we affirm. 

______________________________

-25-