Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 3 , 2015.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 14

- 00098

- CR NO. 14

- 14

- 00099

- CR

LAJOHN FITZGERALD WI LSON , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the Crim inal Dist rict C our t

Jefferson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 12

- 13927 & 12

- 13930

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Lajohn Fitzgerald Wilson appeals the trial court’s revocation of
his probation for aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). In two issues he contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s revocation. We affirm. 1

1 Appellant initially appealed to the Ninth Court of Appeals. Pursuant to a docket2 I. B ACKGROUND Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in exchange for ten years’ deferred adjudication probation. The State subsequently filed a “Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated Probation” in each case in which the State alleged that appellant violat ed his probation by committing the offense of burglary
of a habitation. At the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke probation, D

. M

. , a thirteen

year

- old boy who lived in the burglarized house, testified that he was in his room playing a game when he h eard a noise that sounded like someone knocking on the
window with a hammer or crowbar. D. M. grabbed the phone, went into his
mother’s bedroom closet and called 911

. D. M. heard glass break and heard voices of more than one person discussing the n umber of televisions in the house

. D. M. heard the men try to open the locked closet, but did not exit the closet until the police arrived.
When police arrived, appellant and his co

- defendant , Jarord Johnson, fled
from the house. Officers saw Johnson leave the ho use carrying a pillowcase. Using dogs trained to track, officers found appellant hiding under a house, which had a
raised foundation. Officers located Johnson at his residence, which was across the street from the burglarized house.
Martha Washington, D. M

. ’s mother and the complainant in the burglary charge, testified that appellant approached her in front of her house three days before the burglary a nd was in front of her house for approximately twenty
minutes. Appellant told Washington that he had a mes sage from her ex

- boyfriend,

equalization order, this appeal was transferred to this court. See Tex. Gov ’ t Code Ann. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through 2013 C.S.). We must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the Ninth Court of Appeals in the event there is a conflict with precedent from this court

. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3

.3

Eddie. W hen Washington arrived home on the day of the burglary she discovered a pillowcase in the driveway
, which contained several of D. M. ’s electronic game
controllers and a laptop computer

. In a statement to police appellant stated that he went into Washington’s
house at Johnson’s invitation. Appellant stated he did not know the house belonged to Washington, but assumed it was Johnson’s house. Although appellant saw Johnson putting items in a pillowcase , he claimed not to have known a burglary was taking place

. While in the house appellant heard noises coming from the closet and opened the door. He saw the “little boy,” and asked whether he had called the police. At that time, appellant looked out of the window, saw the patrol car, walked outside, heard the police say, “freeze,” and “took off running across the street away
from the officers.”
At the revocation hearing Johnson testified that he had asked appellant to come to his house. When appe llant arrived Johnson was in the process of burglarizing the complainant’s house. Johnson testified that appellant did not know he was burglarizing the house. Johnson testified that he lied to the police at the time of the burglary
, and t estified that appe llant did not know about the burglary. This testimony is contrary to Johnson’s prior written statement in which he
averred :
On 8

- 20

- 13 at approximately 11 00 am a subject who I know as BJ ( La john Wilson) came to my house to help him return an item from Wal mart. I have known BJ for approximately 2 months and met him in county jail. I told BJ to come back later. BJ returned to my house at approximately 1 00 pm and knocked on my bedroom window. BJ told me the house across the street was unlocked and to help him do this LICK. Lick is street slang for burglary. BJ was wearing a white muscle shirt and [black] nike slippers. When I walked out of my house I observed BJ walk to the back of 5140 Minnie [Washington’s house] which is directly across the street4

from my house. I walked to the back of 5140 Minnie and BJ was already inside the residence. BJ handed me a tan pillow case threw [sic] the back window of the residence. I continued standing outside the residence holding the pillow case. After several minutes I obs erved the Police pull up in a SUV and an Officer was walking to the back of the residence. I dropped the pillow case in the yard and took off running west bound beside the drainage ditch. I then doubled back and went back to my house at 5121 Minnie. I went in through the back door and changed my wet clothes in the laundry room. I we n t into my room and the Police came and got me several minutes late r

. I was placed under arrest and voluntary [sic] came to the Police station to speak with Investigator Croak. I told Investigator Croak the truth about what happened.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the State proved the allegation of burglary by a preponderance of the evidence. Finding that appellant violated his probation by committin g the offense, the court sentenced him to confinement for 50 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

II. A NALYSIS In two issues appellant contend s the trial court violated his rights to due process and fundamental fairness because the State did not prove that appellant committed the offense of burglary of a habitation , and abused its discretion in revoking his probation because there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he violated a condition of pr obation by committing the offense of burglary of a habitation. We will address appellant’s issues together.

Our review of the trial court’ s order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Ca rdona v. State , 665 S. W.2d 492, 493 (Tex

. Crim. App. 198 4 ). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support revocation of probation, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision to revoke. See Hart v. State ,5

264 S .W.3d 364, 36 7 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d)

. The State’ s burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is by a preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State , 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The State satisfies its burden when the greater weight of cre dible evidence before the trial court creates a reasonable belief demonstrating it is more probable than not that the defendant has violated a condition of his probation

. Rickels v. State , 202 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Staten v. State , 328
S. W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 2010, no pet.)

. When the State fails to meet its burden, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to issue a revocation
order. Cardona , 665 S.W.2d at 493

– 94. In a revocation proceeding, the trial court is the sole trier of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to witnesses’ testimony. Mattias v. State , 731 S.W.2d 936
, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 8 7). Appellant’s argument rests on his own testimony and that of his co

defendant, Johnson. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in crediting the police officer’s testimony and Johnson’s prior statement over that of appellant, and Johnson’s testimony at the hearing . As the sole trier of facts and credibility of witnesses, the trial court w as within its discretion in crediting the police officers
and D. M. ’s testimony, especially in light of the fact that their testimony was corroborated by Johnson’s first statement made to the police.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretio n in c rediting the
officer s ’ testimony over that of appellant and his co

- defendant. The record contains
sufficient evidence for the trial court to have formed a reasonable belief that appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by entering th e complainant’s house with the intent to commit theft. The State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant violated the terms of his6

probation. See Johnson v. State , 943 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n o pet.) (State meets its burden when the greater weight of the credible
evidence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a condition of his probation as the State alleged). We overrule appellant’s two issues and affirm the trial court’s jud gment.

/s/ John Donovan Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Donovan, and Wise. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App

. P. 47.2( b).