JEREMIAH BUTLER,

Appellant,

v.

JULIE L. JONES, FLORIDA 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-5779

_____________________________/

Opinion filed August 14, 2017.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Charles W. Dodson, Judge.

Jeremiah Butler, pro se, Appellant.

Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Pamela Jo 

Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the denial of his “Petition for Writ of Mandamus And 

Or Alternative Habeas Corpus.” The circuit court dismissed the Petition because it 

found it had no jurisdiction to consider what it deemed a collateral challenge to a 

judgment and sentence. The Petition is not a collateral challenge to a judgment 
2

and sentence, and we are therefore constrained to reverse for the circuit court’s 

further consideration. 

Where a prisoner challenges the Department’s calculation or interpretation 

of his or her sentence, the prisoner must first exhaust administrative remedies 

through the Department. See Massey v. Crosby, 860 So. 2d 529, 529 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2003) (mem.) (citing Bedford v. State, 775 So. 2d 402, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2000)); Brown v. State, 13 So. 3d 1087, 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (mem.). After, 

the prisoner may seek review of that administrative decision via extraordinary 

writ—mandamus if the prisoner is not seeking entitlement to immediate release. 

Head v. McNeil, 975 So. 2d 583, 584-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see Bush v. State, 

945 So. 2d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2006). The prisoner has one year from the date of 

exhausting administrative remedies to file the petition and venue is proper in Leon 

County—where the Department is located. Bush, 945 So. 2d at 1213-14; Head, 

975 So. 2d at 584-85. 

Appellant filed a Petition replete with references to how the Department 

calculated his gain time, forfeited gain time, and arrived at a tentative release date 

(TRD). Appellant further suggested the Department erred in failing to restore 

forfeited gain time due to an errant sexual offender classification. Appellant 

attached various administrative grievances and Department responses to the 

Petition—all discussing gain time and TRD calculations. Appellant calculated a 
3

2036 TRD, the Department calculated 2058. Appellant was not collaterally 

challenging his judgment or sentence. He raised no issue as to the court, its 

rulings, or the legality of his thirteen and fifty year sentences. His claims were 

directed at the Department and its implementation of sentences he agrees he has 

and does not challenge.

However inartful the Petition1 and whatever the merits may be,2 Appellant 

challenged the Department’s calculation of his TRD. The circuit court dismissed 

the Petition on the sole ground it was not the sentencing court and therefore lacked 

jurisdiction to hear a collateral challenge. This was error, and it requires our 

reversal.

Accordingly, the court’s dismissal order is REVERSED, and the cause is 

REMANDED for the circuit court’s further consideration.

WOLF and ROWE, JJ., and GRIFFIS III, STANLEY H., ASSOCIATE JUDGE, 

CONCUR.

 

1 For example, the first page of the Petition asserts Appellant is seeking review of 

orders entered in criminal cases and cites separation of powers and the ex post 

facto prohibition.

2 We express no opinion as to the merits of Appellant’s Petition. That is entirely

for the circuit court.