451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). 1 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 1552- 07

TH E ST A TE O F T EX A S

v . D A V I D M A L D O N A D O , A ppel l ee ON APP ELLEE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE THI RTEENTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

NUECES CO UNTY

K ELL ER , P. J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t i n w hi c h M E YE RS , P RI CE , W OMACK , K EASLE R , H ERVEY , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . W OMACK , J ., f i l e d a conc ur r i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h C OCHR AN , J ., jo in e d . J OHNS ON , J ., f i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o p in io n . H OL C OM B , J ., f i l e d a di s s e nt i ng o pi ni on.

We m us t de c ide wh e the r a

n o ff ic e r i ntr od

uc inghim se lf

a t th e jai l to a d e fe nd a nt w ho is repr esente d by counsel constitutes a n “initiation of

communications” unde r Michigan v. Jack son . 1 We h old that it do e s n ot, a nd

c on se qu e ntl y , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls.MALDONAD O – 2

I n summary form, the c ourt of appe als rec ited Detec tive Ramirez’s acc ount of eve nts and 2 conclude d that the “only

issues to be deter

mined here are under what circ umstances the suspect may communicate with police absent counsel afte r the attorne y -client re lationship has attache d and what acts a nd statements constitute an ‘initiation’ of communication betwee n a suspec t and the police” an d that these issues “must be r eviewe d de novo.” State v. Maldonado , 2 0 0 7 T ex . Ap p . LE X IS 6581, 1-3 (Tex. A

pp.– Corpus Christi, Aug ust 16, 2007). Rely ing upon Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853 (Tex. Cr im

. A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) , th e d is s e n t c o n te n d s th a t th e te s ti mo n y p r e s e n ts c o n f li c ti n g fac tual infere nces suc h that the trial cour t could have be lieved that eve nts oc curr ed diffe rently than outlined in t he c ourt of a pp e a ls’ s o pin ion . B ut a

pp e llee ad opts the c ourt

of a pp e a ls’ s r e c itatio n o f t

he fa c ts verbatim. He is not claiming be fore us that the court of appea ls f ailed to follow Ro ss . Rather, he is simpl y claiming that the cour

t of appe als came to the wrong leg al conc lusion based upon its own fac t rec itation. W e point out that the trial court’ s fi n d i n gs o f fac t do not deal with the question befor e us, the S tate had reque sted a suppl emental fact finding that Detec tive Ramirez’s acc ount of the se qu e nc e of

e ve nts wa s c re dib le , a

nd the tr ia l c ourt

did no t r e sp on d to the re qu e st. The c lerk’s r ecor d contains an or der a ppointing counse l that is dated May 4, 2006, but 3 the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s st a te that c ouns e l w a s a pp oin te d in

op e n c ourt

on Ma y 8, 20 06 . T his dis c re pa nc y do e s n ot a ff

e c t ou r a na ly sis

. This quotation is not contained in the court of appeals’s opini on but is consistent with and 4 su pp or tiv e of its su mma

ry of e ve nts

. I. BACKG ROUND The fa cts are not in disput e. On May 4, 2006, appellee was indicted f or indec ency

with a 2 child. That same da

y , he submitted a written reque st for the appointment of counse l, and counse l was appointed. On May

9, Detec tive Serg io Ramirez went t o t h e j ai l to speak with appe llee. At that 3 time, Detec tive Ramirez was unaw are that counsel ha d been a ppointed or that appe llee had be en ind ic te d. De te c tiv e Ra mir e z re qu e ste d that a pp e lle e be br ou g ht o ut t o a larg e op e n a

re a in t he ja il, which wa s used fo r processing new a rrivals. I mmediately

afte r the de tective introduc ed himself, appellee handed ove r a f

olded letter a

nd said that he ha d been w aiting to talk to somebody

. Spe c if ic a lly , D e te c tiv e Ra mir e z te sti fi e d a s f oll ow s r e g a rd ingthe se qu e nc e of e ve nts : 4 Q. [B y the pr os e c uto r] Wh e n y ou a rr ive d at th e ja il, wh a t ha pp e ns ? A

. W e a r r i v e , I w e n t u p t o t h e j a i l e r a n d s a i d I a m h e r e f

o r D a v i d

. H e s a i d , o k a y,MALDONAD O – 3

Nothing in the later testimony set out in the dissent, occurr ing on c ross-examination, 5 indicates that the que stions or answer s were a chr onologic al desc ription of events. The final question in the excerpt does not eve n purport to ask whe n the eve nts occurr ed in re lation to each other. The answe r, howe ver, c onfirms that appe llee g ave D etec tive Ramirez the letter dire ctly on the hee ls of his introduction: Q. So when Mr. Ma ldonado was br oug ht up to y ou, did y ou tell him who y ou wer e? A. Ye s, ma ’a

m. Q. I dentified y ourself? A. Yes ma ’am – y es sir. Q. Did y ou tell him why

y ou wer e ther e? A. I told him t hat I

was g oing to talk to him or we wer e g oing to talk. W hen I int ro du c e d m

y se lf, he ga v e methefor

m, thedo c um e nt. we’ s g ot him ready . They broug ht him out. I introduced my self and told him Iam Detec tive Ramirez and thi s is Detec tive Flore s. At that ti me , he hande d me a letter that was folded. He said, Ibeen w aiting to talk to somebody , waiting to talk to y ou, something to that e ffe ct, and he handed me the letter. I asked him what is thi s. He say s, that’s what ha

ppened that nig ht. So I said, y ou want to talk to me about what ha pp e ne d a nd he sa id y e s. Ok a y . We have to g o to the statio n. I f you wa nt t o g o to the station with me and he sa id y es. So we took him to the station. Q. L et’s bac k up. Did y ou identify y ourself a s a police of

fice r? A. Ye s. Q. An d wh at d

id y ou sa yto t he de fe nd an t be for e he ha nd

e d y ou thele tte r? A. Just intro d

u ce d myself. Iam Dete ctive Ramirez. This is Detec tive Flore s. He

sa id I have be e n w a iti ngto t a lk t o s ome bo dy or ta lk to y ou

g uy s a nd he ha nd e d me the letter. (Emphasis adde d.) The a bove colloquy , occur

ring on direc t examination, reveal s that Detec tive Ramirez did not bring up the s ubject of talking to appellee until af ter a ppellee ha nded him the letter. 5MALDONAD O – 4

(Emphasis adde d). Miranda v. Arizona , 3 84 U. S. 4 36 (1 96 6) ; see also Tex. Code Crim. P roc. a rt. 38.22. 6 Maldonado , 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 6581 at 1. 7 Id. at 3 -4 (c i t i n g Gu

zm an v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). 8 Id. at 8 -1 1 (d i s cu s s i n g Rh od e Is lan d v . I

nn is , 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 9 Id. at 11-17. 10 Appellee had written the letter befor e his me eting with D etec tive Ramirez, voluntarily and without prompting fr om the police. At the police station, the detec tive took appellee ’s statement by vid e o. B e fo re g ivi nghis state me nt, a pp e lle e wa s a dv ise d o f h is Miranda rig hts, which he wa ived. 6 On May 10 , a pp e lle e fi rs t me t w ithc ouns e l. I n a mot ion to s up pr e ss, a

pp e lle e c on te nd e d th a t hi s v ide ota pe d c on fe ssion was take n in vio la tio n o f his Sixth Ame ndme nt r ig ht t o c ouns e l. T he tr ia l ju dg e g ra nte d th e mot ion , a

nd the Sta te appea led. The c ourt of appeals addressed the following two issues: “(1) unde r what circumstanc es a suspec t may

communicate w ith the police absent counsel a fter the attorney -client re lationship has attache d, and (2) whether the appe llee’s a ctions while in custody constitut ed an i nitiation of communication with the police.” Finding that both issues were mix ed questions of lawand fa ct that 7 did no t turn on c re dib ili ty

a nd de me a no r, the c ourt

of a pp e a ls r evi ewed

the iss ue s de novo

. 8 De te rm ini ngthat de te c tiv e Ra mir e z’s int ro du c tio n o f h ims e lf

to a pp e ll ee di d no t c on sti tut e

“ int e rr og a tio n” be c a

us e Ra mir e z ha d no re a so n to know that suc h co nd uc t w a s r e a so na

bly lik e ly to elicit an incr iminating re sponse, the cour t of appe als conclude d that appellee , not Ramirez, init iated 9 the communication lea ding to the c onfession. Consequently , the cour t of appe als reve rsed the tr ial 10MALDONAD O – 5

Id. at 17. 11 Jack son , 451 U.S. at 484-85. 12 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 13 Id. at 631. 14 Id. at 6 3 2 (qu o t i n g Maine v . Moulton , 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). 15 c ourt ’s jud g me nt g ra

nti ng the mot ion to sup pr e ss an d r e mand e d th e c a se fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. 11 II. AN AL YSI S The pa rties ag ree that the outcome of this case turns upon who “initiated communications.” Appellee contends that the police initiated communications by arr ang i n g for a

ppellee to mee t Detec tive Ramirez at the jail

. T h e State contends that a ppellee initiated c ommunications by prese nting the le tter and voluntee ring his desire to speak with the authorities. The que stion of who initiated a commun i ca t ion betwee n an ac cused a nd law enf

orce ment first bec ame important in Edwards v. Arizona , which held that an acc used in custody who invokes his Fifth Amendment rig ht to counsel under Miranda may no t be qu e sti on e d b y

law e nf or c e me nt ( in the abse nce of

counsel) unle s s and unti l “the ac cused himself initiates fur ther c ommunication, exchang es, or c onversations with t he police.” I n Michigan v. J ackson , the Supreme Court e x tended 12 the Edwards ini tiatio n r

ule to a n a c c us e d’ s in vo c a tio n o f h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht to c ouns e l, which attac hes af

ter a defe ndant has be en formally char g ed. The Court extended the rule to the

13 Six th Amendment conte x t beca use it found “the r easons f or prohibiting inter

rog ation of an uncounsele d prisoner w ho has aske d for the help of a lawy er” to be “e ven strong er a fter he has bee n formally char g ed with an of

fense than bef

ore.” Be cause the Six th Amendment g uara ntees the 14

a c c us e d “the ri g ht t o r e ly on c ouns e l a s a

‘m e dium’ be tw e e n h im a nd the Sta te ,” “ the Sixth

15MALDONAD O – 6

Id. (c i t i n g Massiah v. United States , 377 U.S. 201 (1964), Un ite d S tat es v . H e nr y , 447 16 U.S. 264 (1980), and Moulton in s up po rt ingdis c us sio n c on ta ine d in ne xt para g ra

phof its opinion). Id. at 636.

17 Pa tte rso n v . I

lli no is , 487 U.S. 285, 296 n.9 (1988). 18 Amendment rig ht to counsel” at an “inter rog ation” that occur s afte r formal char g es have be en filed “re quires at lea st as m u ch protec tion as the Fifth Ame ndment rig ht to counsel at any custodial interrog ation.” Consequently , the Cour t h e ld th a t “ if p o lic e initiate interrog ation afte r a de fenda nt’s 16

a sse rt ion

. . . o f h is [Si xth A me ndme nt] r ig ht t o coun sel , a ny wa ive r o f t

he de fe nd a nt’ s r ig ht t o counsel for

that police-initiated interr og ation is invalid.” 17 I n articulating its holding in Jack son , th e Sup re me Cou

rt did no t sa y that th e ru le s in

the F if th

a nd Sixth A me ndme nt c on te xts w e re ide nti c a l; rat her th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld t hat th e Sixth Am e ndme nt c on te xt re qu ir e d a ru le that w a s at l e as t

as protec tive. Jack

son set a “ floor” f

or what the S ix th Amendment required, but the Supreme Court and other c ourts would be lef t to determine whether and to wh at ex t en t the Six th Amendment rule w ould exceed that floor, c onfer ring more protec tion than its Fifth Amendment counter part. Obviously , the Six th Amendment rule w ould not

r e qu ir e a c u s to d ia l s e tt in g : t

he Jack son i nitiation rule would apply , for e x ample, eve n if the int e rr og a tio n w a s no t c us tod ia l be c a us e it w a s p e rf

or me d b y a n und e rc ov e r o ff

ic e r o r i nf or mant. 18 Th e qu e sti on

the Sup re me Cou

rt wo uld ne xt con fro nt wa s w he the r, a ft e r t he Sixth Amendment rig ht to counsel has a t t ac h ed, the accuse d must invoke that right in orde r to trig g er Jack son ’s protec tions. T h e S u p reme Court ga ve a qua lified answe r to that question in Patterson

v . I lli no is

. There , the Court he ld that la w enfor ceme nt could validly initiate communication and see k

a wa iver of c ouns el af

t er a defe ndant’s rig ht to counsel had attached w hen the de fenda nt had notMALDONAD O – 7

487 U.S. at 290 n.3, 291. 19 Id. at 291 (e mphasis in origina l). 20 Id. at 290 n.3. 21 492 U.S. 680 (1989). 22 780 S.W .2d 787, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). We do not address in this case w hether 23 a def endant who ha d not reque sted counsel would have to do some ac t to acce pt an appointment or mee t with counsel in order for a n attorney -client re lationship to be established. See Patterson , 487 U.S. at 290 n. 3 (noting “as a matter of some signific ance ” that the a ccuse d “had not re ta ine d, or

a c c e pte d b y

a pp oin tme nt, a

lawy e r t o r e pr e se nt h im” ); Holloway , 780 S.W .2d at 796 (obser ving that the defe ndant “ha d been a ppointed counsel” and “ha d met with counsel”)

. alre ady invoked his rig ht to counsel and wa s not y et re p resented by counsel. “Prese rving the

19 integ rity of an a ccuse d’s choice to c ommunicate with police only throug h counsel” did not require “bar ring an ac cused f

rom making an initial

elec tion as to whether he w i l l fac e the State’ s office rs during questioning w ith the aid of counse l, or g o it a lone.” The Supreme Court sugg ested that the 20

case would be differ ent, even absent an invocation of the rig ht to couns el , i f a l aw y er- client relation s h ip had alr eady

been e stablished: in that sit uation, “a distinct set of c onstitut ional safe g uards

a ime d at pr e se rv ingthe sanc tity of the a tto rn e y -c lie nt r e la tio ns hip take s e ff e c t.” Re lyinghe a vil y 21

on Patterson and Powell v. Texas , we conclude d in Ho llo way v . S tat e that the Six th Amendment 22 did not permit the “police- initia t ed i n t err og ation of an indicte d acc used who ha s retaine d or bee n

a pp oin te d d e fe ns e c ouns e l” a bs e nt n oti c e to d e fe ns e c ouns e l. 23 Th e Sup re me Court la te r ma de c le a r, ho we ve r, that an e xistin g a tto rn e y -c lie nt r e la tio ns hip

un de r t he Sixth A me ndme nt di d no t preve nt a de fe nd a nt f

ro m un ilate ra lly

wa ivi nghis ri g ht t o

co un s e l, s o lo n g a s th e d e f e n d a n t in it iate d th e c o mm u n ic a ti o n . I n a n s w e r in g a defe ndant’s contention that statements take n in violation of Jack son should not be admissible f or impeac hment purposes, the Supre me Court said in Michigan v. H arvey , albeit in dic ta : “B ut n oth ingin t he SixthMALDONAD O – 8

494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990). 24 Id. (q u o t i n g Adams v. United States e x rel. Mc Cann , 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)). 25 61 S.W .3d 378, 384-87 (Te x . Crim. App. 2001). 26 Id. at 387. 27 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 28 Am e ndme nt p re ve nts a su sp e c t c ha rg e d wi th a c ri me a nd

re pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l f ro m vo lun tari ly choosing , on his own, to speak with police in the a bsence of an attorney .” “Althoug h a def endant 24

may so me tim e s late r r e g re t hi s d e c isi on to s pe a k w ithpo lic e , th e Sixth A me ndme nt d oe s n ot d isa ble

a c ri min a l de fe nd a nt f

ro m e xer c isi nghis fr e e wi ll. To ho ld that a de fe nd a nt i s inhe re ntl y inc a pa ble of re linquishi ng his right to counse l once it is invoked would be ‘to imprison a man in his privilege s and ca ll it t he Constituti on.’” I n R i p k o ws k i v . S t ate , we ad op te d th is dic ta i n an s we ri n g a 25 de fe nd a nt’ s c la im that hi s r ig ht t o c ouns e l pr e ve nte d th e Sta te fr om u sin g state me nts ma de by him to a ja il p s y c h iatr is t w h o s e s e r v ic e s th e d e f

e n d a n t h a d s o u g h t. We f o u n d th a t th e d e f

e n dant had 26

“ e ff ect iv ely relinq

uis he d h is c ouns e l’ s a ssi sta nc e by se e kin g ou t me nta l he a lthtr e a tme nt o n h is own.” 27 Al t h o u g h t h e S u

p r e m e C o u rtc a s e s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e f o c u s e d m a i n l y u p o n w h i c h p a rt y pr e c ipi ta te d a

n “ int e rr og a tio n, ” the Sup re me Court ’s Sixth A me ndme nt “ ri ght to c ouns e l” jurisprudenc e has historica lly employ ed diffe rent a

nd broade r terminolog y

for th e t y

p es of

c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r

c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n d

u c tt h a tw i l l t r i g g e r

a S i x t h A m e n d m e n tv i o l a t i o n . In Massiah v. United States , a case invol ving the use of an undercove r i nformant to elicit a de fenda nt’s incriminating statements, the Court pointed to c oncurr ing opinions in Sp an o v . Ne w York for the 28 proposition that a confe ssion should be excluded as unconstitutionally obtained in violation of theMALDONAD O – 9

Massiah , 377 U.S. at 204. 29 430 U.S. 387, 392-93, 398-401 (1977)

. 30 Id. at 399. We note that the Court had no pr oblem extending the holding of Massiah 31 bey ond the under cover

informant sce nario: “That the incriminating statements wer e elicited surre ptitious ly

in the Massiah case , and other wise her e, is constitutionally irrele vant.” Brewer , 430 U.S. at 400.

Id. at 400. 32 451 U.S. at 484 n.8 (empha sis added). 33 Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel when that confe ssion was “de liberatel y el i cited” by law enfor ceme nt. I n Brewer v. W illiams , the Court found that a police office r’s “ C h ristian burial 29 speec h”

– in w h ic h n o qu e s ti o n s w e r e a s k e d

– r e s u lt e d in a Si xth A me n d me n t v io lati o n w h e n the defe ndant re sponded by

g iving the of

fice rs direc tions to t he body of the victim. The Court found

30 that th e of

fi c e r h a d “d elib e rate ly

a nd de sig ne dly

se t out to e lic it i nf

or ma tio n f ro m [th e de fe nd a nt] just as sur e ly

a s – a n d p e r h a p s mo r e e f

f e c ti v e ly th a n – if h e h a d f o r ma ll y in te r r o g a te d h im .” 31 Whether the Court’s use of the words “ deliberately and desig nedly

. . . elicit” wa s intended to conve y broade r mea

ning tha n mere “interr og ation” may be uncle ar g iven the Court’s acknow ledg ment that state c ourt s in

the c a se be low

re c og nize d th e “ Chr ist ian b ur ia l sp e e c h” as “ta nt a mou nt t o interrog ation.” But subseque nt case s have a ccor ded more swee ping sig nificanc e to t he 32 “deliber ately

elicited” la

ng uag e. C i t i n g Massiah and Brewer , the Court in Edwards su gg este d th a t a wa ive r o f t

he Sixth Amendment rig ht to counsel could not be infer red “ from the mer e re sponse by the ac cused to ove rt or more subtle f

orms of interr og ation or other efforts to elicit incriminat ing informati on .” I n Rhode 33 Is lan d v . I

nn is , the Supreme Court re jected the n o t i o n that the Brewer c a se wa s r e le va

nt t o deter mining the mea

ning of “interr og ation” under

the Fif th Amendment bec ause Brewer wa s a SixthMALDONAD O – 10

In nis , 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. 34 He nr y , 4 47 U. S. at 27 1; see also Moulton , 4 74 U. S. at 17 5 n .1 1 ( re je c tin g same 35 c on te nti on

ma de by Sol ic ito r G e ne ra l a s amic us , q uo tin g fr om He nr

y ) 540 U.S. 519 (2004). 36 Id. at 521. 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Am e ndme nt c a se : “ Th e de fi nit ion s o f ‘ int e rr og a tio n’ un de r t he F if th a nd Sixth A me ndme nts , if indeed th e te rm

‘i nte rr og a tio n’ is e ve n a pt i n th e Sixth A me ndme nt c on te xt, are no t ne c e ssa ri ly intercha ng eable , since the policies underly ing the two constitutional protections are quite distinct.” 34 I n Un ite d Sta te

s v . H e nr y , the Court re sp on de d to a Go ve rn me nt c la im that Brewer had imposed an

“ a f f ir mati v e in te r

r o g a ti o n ” r e qu ir e me n t a s p a rt of a Si xth Am e ndme nt i nq

uir y by statin g : “ Whil e

a f f i r m a t i v e i n t e r

r o g a t i o n , a

b s e n t w a i v e r , w o u l d

c e rt a i n l y s a t i s f

y Massiah , we a

re not pe rsuade d . . . th a t Brewer

modified Massiah ’s ‘de liberate ly elicited’ te st.” 35 The Supreme Court ag ain confronted the question of t he scope of the “ deliberately elicited” test in Fellers v. U

nited States

. I n Fe lle rs , police off icer s cam e t o t h e d efendant’s home a nd 36 advised him that “they

had come to discuss his invol vement in methamphetamine distribution.” 37 They also told the defe ndant that they had a f eder al war

rant for his arre st, that he had be en indicted, and that the indictment re fer red to c oconspirator s, whom the offic ers pr ocee ded to n am e. The 38 defe ndant “then told the officer s that he knewthe four pe ople and ha d used methamphe tamine during his association with them.” Und er t hose circ umstances, the Supre me Court held, there was no 39MALDONAD O – 11

Id. a t 52 4; see also Moulton , 4 74 U. S. at 17 7 n .1 3 ( re se rv ingqu e sti on of ho w t o tr e a t 40 informant who “ acts simply as a ‘ listening post’” and “doe s not participate in a ctive conve rsation and prompt par

ticular re plies”). Id. at 524. 41 Id. (q u o t i n g Jack

son )(e llipsi s in Fe lle rs , o ri g ina l lo we r c a se fr om Jack son used instead 42 of bra ckete d capitalization in Fe lle rs ). 447 U.S. at 271 n.9. 43 477 U.S. 436 (1986). 44 Id. at 459. 45 question that the offic ers ha d “deliber ately elicited ” t h e d efendant’s stateme nts. The Court 40 expli citly reje cted a

lower c ourt’s dete rminati o n that “interr og ation” wa s a re quired e lement of a Six th Amendment “r ight to counse l” violation. I n its discussion, t he Supreme Court cited a 41 statement made in Jack

son that “the Six th Amendment provides a r ight to counse l . . . even whe n there is no interrog ation.” 42 B ut t he Sup re me Co urt ’s pr e c e de nts re c og nize that “ de lib e ra te e lic itatio n” inv olv e s so me conduct designe d to obtain incriminating statements. I n He nr y , the Court spe cifica lly ref raine d from addre ssing the situation in which a device serve s merely

as a pa ssive “listening post” or “w here an inf or mant i s p la c e d in

c los e pr oximi ty bu t make s no e ff or t to s timulate c on ve rs a tio ns a bo ut t he c ri me

c h a r g e d

. ” T h is latt e r s it u a ti o n w a s a d dr e s s e d

in K u hlman v. W

ilson

. Th e Sup re me Court he ld 43 44 there that, to showa Six th Amendment violation, “the def endant must demonstrate that the police

a nd the ir inf or mant t oo k s ome a c tio n, be y on d me re ly lis te nin g , th a t w a s d e sig ne d d e lib e rate ly to elicit incriminating rema

rks.” 45 So, to determine whe ther a n office r initiated a c ommunication for Six th Amendment purposes, we must determine wh ether the offic er e ng ag ed in conduc t desig ned to elicit anMALDONAD O – 12

R el y ing upon Moulton , th e d is s e n t c o n te n d s th a t D e te c ti v e Ra mi r e z’ s a c ts o f

a r r a n g ing 46 a pp e lle e to b e br ou g ht to the op e n ar e a of the ja il at a time wh e n co un se l w a s n ot p re se nt a mou nts to a vio la tio n o f t

he ri g ht t o c ouns e l. B ut Moulton explained that the rig ht to counsel was violated when “ the State’s ag ent eng ag ed Moulton in conver sation about the cha rg es pendingag ainst him.” 474 U.S

. at 177 n.14. Her e, the de tective ha d not y et eng ag ed appe llee in conve rsation about the pending char g es whe n appellee handed ove r the letter and initiated the conver sation on his ow n. The dissent say s that Detec tive Ramirez intended to talk to appellee , but his subjective in t en t i s not enoug h by

itself to e stablish a violation of the rig ht to counsel, and we cannot a g ree that subjective intent c a n tr a n sform into rig ht-to-counse l violations acts that otherwise f all short. Finally , the dissent complains that the letter w as not a c onfession, but was a self-se rving explanation of t he eve nts that occurre d t h at nig ht. But a se lf-ser ving initiation of communications by the ac cused is still an initiation of communications by the acc used. I f the acc used initiates c ommunications, the n he ca n un ilate ra lly

wa ive the ri g ht t o c ouns e l. incriminating response from the a ccuse d befor e the a ccuse d communicated inf ormatio n about the offe nse or his desire t o co n v ey i n formation about the of fense . The que stion we confr ont in the prese nt case , then, i s whether Detec tive Ramirez, by mere ly introducing himself, eng ag ed in conduc t d e s i g n e d t o e l i c i ti n c r i m i n a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . W e r e a d i l y a n s w e r t h a tqu e s t i o n “ n o . ” O b v i o u s l y, Detec tive Ramirez intended to talk with a ppellee, and if he had followe d throug h with that intention befor e appe llee had c ommu n i ca t ed his own intent to talk, then the Jack son rule c ould have be en trig g ere d. I f De tective Ramire z had simpl y told appellee that he was investigating the offe nse for which appe llee had been ch ar ged, without asking any questions, before appellee ’s own communication, that might we ll ha v e bee n sufficie nt to constitut e a “ deliberate elicitation” unde r Fe lle rs . But in this case , Detec tive Ramirez did not have the opportunity to do so beca use appe llee spoke up so quickly

. We conclude that appellee initiated the communi cation, and as a re sult, was 46 in a po sit ion to u nil a te ra lly

wa ive his Sixth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c ouns e l.MALDONAD O – 13

The judg ment of the c ourt of appe als is affir med. Deliver ed: J une 4, 2008 Publis h