IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LEO H. ODOM

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 96-B-946 Steve R. Dozier, Judge

No. M2016-00523-CCA-R3-CD – Filed December 9, 2016

_____________________________

Defendant, Leo H. Odom, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an 

illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 The State has 

filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. 

Said motion is hereby granted.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Order of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

Pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., joined.

Leo H. Odom, Whiteville, Tennessee, pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Counsel, 

for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The record on appeal before us reflects that in July 1997 Defendant pled guilty to 

second degree murder and was sentenced as a violent offender to thirty years

imprisonment to be served at 100%. On December 21, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to 

correct an alleged illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

36.1. The trial court summarily denied the motion on February 2, 2016. The Appellant 

timely filed notice of appeal. Following the filing of the record on appeal and 

Defendant’s brief, the State filed a motion to affirm the ruling of the trial court pursuant 

to Rule 20. For the reasons stated below, the motion is hereby granted.
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In the motion he filed in the trial court, Defendant argued that his sentence is 

illegal because he was sentenced outside the applicable range. The trial court disagreed 

because Defendant specifically waived his right to a range one sentence in his guilty plea.

Rule 36.1 permits a defendant to seek correction of an unexpired illegal sentence 

at any time. See State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015). “[A]n illegal 

sentence is one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly 

contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a). Our supreme court 

recently interpreted the meaning of “illegal sentence” as defined in Rule 36.1 and 

concluded that the definition “is coextensive, and not broader than, the definition of the 

term in the habeas corpus context.” State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 594-95 (Tenn. 

2015). The court then reviewed the three categories of sentencing errors: clerical errors

(those arising from a clerical mistake in the judgment sheet), appealable errors (those for 

which the Sentencing Act specifically provides a right of direct appeal) and fatal errors

(those so profound as to render a sentence illegal and void). Id. Commenting on 

appealable errors, the court stated that those “generally involve attacks on the correctness 

of the methodology by which a trial court imposed sentence.” Id. In contrast, fatal errors

include “sentences imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme, sentences 

designating release eligibility dates where early release is statutorily prohibited, sentences 

that are ordered to be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served 

consecutively, and sentences not authorized by any statute for the offenses.” Id. The 

court held that only fatal errors render sentences illegal. Id.

Defendant previously challenged the length of his sentence in a habeas corpus 

petition. He repeats that argument now in his Rule 36.1 challenge. In affirming the 

denial of habeas corpus relief, this Court stated as follows:

In support of his argument, [Defendant] asserts that at the time of his 

indictment for first degree murder, he had no prior felony convictions as an 

adult; thus, he argues his classification as a Range II offender, which 

requires a minimum of two prior felony convictions, was error. See T.C.A.

§ 40-35-106 (2003). [As noted by this Court in a footnote, Defendant was 

sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement as a violent offender, not as a 

Range II offender]. Indeed, [Defendant] contends that because he was a 

juvenile when the murder was committed and he had no prior felony 

convictions, he was entitled to be sentenced as an especially mitigated 

offender. See T.C.A. § 40-35-109 (2003). [Defendant] does not contest the 

requirement that he serve 100% of his sentence as a violent offender.

In ordering dismissal of the petition, the trial court entered the following 

findings:
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[It] appears . . . that the thirty (30) year sentence contested by 

[Defendant] was a compromise judgment on a plea to a 

charge of second degree murder reduced from a first degree 

murder indictment. The trial court could have the authority 

and jurisdiction to sentence petitioner to thirty (30) years on 

an agreed plea. At best this sentence would only be voidable, 

but not void. Nor has the sentence expired. For the reasons 

stated this petition is denied.

At the time [Defendant] was indicted, the law provided that premeditated 

murder “shall be punishable by . . . (2)[i]mprisonment for life without 

possibility of parole; or (3)[i]mprisonment for life.” T.C.A. § 39-13-

202(c)(2)-(3) (Supp. 1996). It is apparent from the record that [Defendant]

was successful in negotiating a plea agreement which eliminated his 

possible exposure to a life sentence and allowed him to receive a sentence 

of thirty years for a Class A felony. [Defendant] and the State may 

negotiate offender classifications, and even release eligibility, because they 

“are non-jurisdictional and legitimate bargaining tools in plea negotiations 

under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989.” Bland v. Dukes, 97 

S.W.3d 133, 134 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (citing McConnell v. State, 12 

S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tenn. 2002) (habeas corpus relief denied where guilty 

plea provided for “hybrid sentence” in which the length of one of 

petitioner’s sentences was in Range II, but his release eligibility date was in 

Range I); Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tenn. 1997) (postconviction relief denied; our supreme court held that sentence was valid 

where Petitioner’s plea bargain provided for “hybrid sentence” involving 

Range II length of incarceration and Range I release eligibility 

percentage)); see also State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987).

As found by the trial court, because “offender classifications” are nonjurisdictional and subject to waiver within the context of a guilty plea, there 

is nothing which appears on the face of the judgment or the record of the 

proceedings before us which indicates that [Defendant’s] thirty-year 

sentence is illegal or void. See William L. Smith v. Virginia Lewis, Warden, 

et al., No. E2004-01800-SC-R11-HC (Tenn., Sept. 14, 2006).

Leo H. Odom v. Tony Parker, Warden, No. W2006-00217-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 

3327822, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2006) (footnotes omitted), no perm. app. 

filed. 
4

As noted above, the supreme court recently interpreted the meaning of “illegal 

sentence” as defined in Rule 36.1 and concluded that the definition “is coextensive, and 

not broader than, the definition of the term in the habeas corpus context.” Wooden, 478 

S.W.3d at 594-95. Indeed, the court observed that the language of Rule 36.1 “mirrors” 

the definition of an illegal sentence for habeas corpus purposes. Id. Accordingly, this 

Court’s analysis in [Defendant’s] habeas corpus action controls the outcome herein. The 

trial court correctly ruled that [Defendant] did not state a colorable claim for relief 

pursuant to Rule 36.1. Clearly, the thirty-year sentence he received for second degree 

murder, a Class A felony, is within the applicable range of fifteen to sixty years 

authorized by statute. See T.C.A. § 40-35-11(b)(1). Our supreme court has specifically

held that “a plea-bargained sentence may legally exceed the maximum available in the 

offender Range so long as the sentence does not exceed the maximum punishment 

authorized for the plea offense.” Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tenn. 2007).

Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court is hereby affirmed pursuant to Court of 

Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

_________________________________

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE