[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-15509

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cv-01338-EAJ

ROBERT JACOBS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(June 6, 2013)

Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, HULL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Appellant Robert Jacobs appeals from a magistrate judge’s judgment1

affirming an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Jacobs’s application for 

a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social 

Security Act, as well as the ALJ’s partial denial of Jacobs’s application for 

supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Among 

other severe impairments, the ALJ found that Jacobs suffered from the severe 

mental impairment of major depressive disorder, which caused moderate 

difficulties in maintaining his concentration, persistence, or pace. In assessing 

Jacobs’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ reviewed the medical 

evidence and found that Jacobs’s RFC included appropriate mental limitations to 

non-complex tasks. Accordingly, the ALJ included a limitation to one to three step 

non-complex tasks in Jacobs’s RFC assessment as a result of his depression. In 

relying upon the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Jacobs was 

not disabled until December 12, 2008, because, prior to that date, a significant 

number of jobs existed in the national economy that Jacobs could have performed. 

Accordingly, an ALJ found Jacobs wholly ineligible for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits and eligible for supplemental security income only as 

of December 12, 2008.

 1 The parties consented to have a magistrate judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including 

entry of a final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.

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On appeal, Jacobs argues that substantial evidence does not support the 

ALJ’s finding that he was not disabled before December 12, 2008, because he 

presented the vocational expert with incomplete hypothetical questions. 

Specifically, he argues that, pursuant to our decision in Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 2011), the ALJ’s hypothetical questions 

failed to account for his moderate difficulties in maintaining persistence or pace by 

simply restricting him to one to three step non-complex tasks.

We review the ALJ’s decision in order to determine whether it is supported 

by substantial evidence, and whether the ALJ applied proper legal standards. 

Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We may not reweigh the evidence and decide facts 

anew and must defer to the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial 

evidence even if the evidence may preponderate against it. See Dyer v. Barnhart, 

395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).

Eligibility for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income 

requires that the claimant have a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382(a)(1)-(2). In relevant part, a claimant is disabled if he is unable to engage 

in substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable impairment 

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that can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant bears the burden of proving his disability. See 

Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).

In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security 

Administration applies a five-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). This process includes an analysis of whether the claimant: 

(1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and 

medically-determinable impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets or 

equals a Listing, and meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform his past 

relevant work, in light of his RFC; and (5) can make an adjustment to other work, 

in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

In evaluating a claimant’s mental impairment, the ALJ must follow a special 

technique in which she evaluates the claimant’s degree of functional limitation in a 

number of areas, including the claimant’s concentration, persistence, or pace. See 

Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520a(a), (c)(3)-(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(a), (c)(3)-(4). Concentration, 

persistence, or pace refers to the claimant’s ability to sustain focused attention and 

concentration sufficiently long enough to permit him to timely and appropriately 

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complete tasks that are commonly found in work settings. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00(C)(3). The ALJ is required to incorporate the results of the 

special technique into her findings and conclusions. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213-14. 

This technique, however, is separate from the ALJ’s evaluation of the claimant’s 

RFC assessment, the latter of which is an assessment of the claimant’s ability to do 

work despite his impairments. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180; Lewis v. Callahan, 125 

F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.945(a)(1). The mental RFC assessment is a more detailed assessment of the 

claimant’s functionality. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p.

At the fifth step of the sequential evaluation, and after assessing the 

claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must determine whether a significant number of jobs 

exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 

1180; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). A claimant 

who can adjust to other work is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

(g)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g)(1). The ALJ may make this 

determination by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines, or by utilizing the 

testimony of a vocational expert. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180. When relying upon 

the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ must pose hypothetical questions to 

the vocational expert that encompass all of the claimant’s impairments. See id. If 

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the ALJ presents the vocational expert with incomplete hypothetical questions, the 

vocational expert’s testimony will not constitute substantial evidence. See id.

In Winschel, we held that an ALJ must account for any of the claimant’s 

identified limitations in his ability to maintain his concentration, persistence, or 

pace, and rejected the argument that an ALJ satisfies this obligation by restricting 

the hypothetical questions to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work. Id. 

Nonetheless, we clarified that limiting the hypothetical questions to include only 

unskilled work sufficiently accounts for the claimant’s limitations in maintaining 

his concentration, persistence, or pace where the medical evidence demonstrates 

that the claimant can engage in simple, routine tasks or unskilled work despite his 

limitations. Id. Turning to Winschel’s claim, we noted that the ALJ did not 

indicate that the medical evidence suggested that his ability to work remained 

unaffected by his limitations in his ability to maintain his concentration, 

persistence, or pace, nor did the ALJ otherwise explicitly or implicitly account for 

those limitations in the hypothetical questions. Id. at 1181. Thus, we concluded 

that the hypothetical questions were incomplete, and that the vocational expert’s 

testimony did not constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision. 

Id. 

Here, the ALJ found that the evidence demonstrated that Jacobs retained a 

limited ability to work despite his depression and associated moderate difficulties 

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in maintaining his concentration, persistence, or pace, and substantial evidence 

supports this finding. The ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert 

fully accounted for Jacobs’s moderate difficulties in maintaining his concentration, 

persistence, or pace by limiting him to one to three step non-complex tasks, 

consistent with the RFC assessment. Accordingly, after a careful and thorough 

review of the administrative record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the magistrate

judge’s judgment affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits.

AFFIRMED.

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