NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

BRITTANY P., ANDRES G., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, N.G., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0456

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD529462

The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant Brittany P.

The Stravris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant Andres G.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 5-10-2018
BRITTANY P., ANDRES G. v. DCS, N.G.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Brittany P. ("Mother") and Andres G. ("Father") appeal the

juvenile court's order of termination of their parental rights to N.G. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are the parents of N.G., born March 3, 

2008.

¶3 N.G. was placed in temporary physical custody on November 

18, 2015, after Mother had an encounter with law enforcement and tested 

positive for methamphetamine, opiates, and marijuana. Mother admitted 

her struggle with substance abuse, particularly methamphetamine. Mother 

reported that she did not know how to contact Father and informed the 

Department of Child Safety (the "Department") that he had not been 

involved with the child for an extended time.

¶4 On November 20, 2015, the Department filed a dependency 

petition as to Mother and Father on alleged grounds of substance abuse and 

neglect. The Department subsequently located Father who reported that he 

was unemployed, living with a friend, and last used methamphetamine 

about a month before.

¶5 The juvenile court adjudicated N.G. dependent as to Mother 

and Father on January 20, 2016, established a case plan of family 

reunification, and ordered Mother and Father to participate in services. The 

Department made arrangements for Mother to have supervised parenting 

time, parent aide services, psychological evaluation, TERROS substance 

abuse assessment and treatment services, random urinalyses testing, and 

transportation services. Similarly, the Department provided Father with

supervised parenting time, parent aide services, TERROS substance abuse 

assessment and treatment services, random urinalyses testing, and 

transportation services.
BRITTANY P., ANDRES G. v. DCS, N.G.

Decision of the Court

3

¶6 In April 2016, N.G. was placed in out-of-home kinship 

placement with his maternal aunt, where he remained throughout the 

dependency.

¶7 Mother and Father participated in services inconsistently and 

never established sobriety or remedied the circumstances causing the child 

to be placed in out-of-home placement. As a result, in April 2017, the 

juvenile court changed the case plan to severance and adoption as to both 

parents, and the Department then filed to terminate both Mother's and 

Father's parental rights. On August 7, 2017, Mother engaged in an inpatient 

substance abuse treatment program, where she remained until the

September 6, 2017 severance trial.

¶8 The juvenile court terminated Mother's and Father's parental 

rights on September 27, 2017, based upon the statutory grounds of 

substance abuse and time-in-care. The court also found the termination of 

both parents' rights to be in the child's best interests. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

("A.R.S.") §§ 8-533(B)(3), -533(B)(8)(c), -533(B).

¶9 Mother and Father timely appealed and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. REASONABLE EVIDENCE WITHIN THE RECORD 

SUPPORTS THE JUVENILE COURT'S BEST INTERESTS 

FINDINGS

¶10 Mother and Father have not challenged the statutory bases for 

severance on appeal, arguing only that the juvenile court erred in finding 

that termination of their parental rights was in N.G.'s best interest. "The 

juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the best 

position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of 

witnesses, and make appropriate findings." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. 

Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We will affirm a severance order 

unless clearly erroneous. Id.

¶11 The juvenile court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances when making a best interests finding. Dominique M. v. Dep't 

of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 99, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). The best interests inquiry 

requires a court to balance the parent's rights "against the independent and 

often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life." Kent K. 

v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 35 (2005). The inquiry "focuses primarily 

upon the interests of the child, as distinct from those of the parent." Id. at 
BRITTANY P., ANDRES G. v. DCS, N.G.

Decision of the Court

4

287, ¶ 37. "[A] determination of the child's best interest must include a 

finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by 

the continuation of the relationship." In re Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. 

JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990).

¶12 "When a current placement meets the child's needs and the 

child's prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a 

juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit 

adoption, is in the child's best interests." Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 

Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016); see Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 

43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004) (finding that the best interests requirement may be 

satisfied if there is credible evidence of an adoptive plan or the child is 

adoptable). "Of course, a court need not automatically conclude that 

severance is in a child's best interests just because the child is adoptable; 

there may be other circumstances indicating that severance is not the best 

option." Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 14; see Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 

778 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24, *8, ¶¶ 33, 37 (App. Nov. 14, 2017) (holding 

adoptability alone was not sufficient to support the best interests finding, 

in light of the other factors that weighed against severance).

A. Mother

¶13 Mother challenges the juvenile court's finding that 

termination was in N.G.'s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Mother argues

that the Department "failed to prove beyond a preponderance of the 

evidence that the child would derive an affirmative benefit from 

termination or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship." Mother 

claims that the evidence presented at the severance hearing" showed that 

the presence of Mother in the child's life was an affirmative benefit to the 

child," and that Mother "remained an active part of N.G.'s life throughout 

[the] case," regularly "fully assume[d] parenting responsibilities" and 

provided financial assistance, such as "books, clothing, food and other items 

her son needs."

¶14 The juvenile court considered the evidence upon which 

Mother relies and ultimately determined that the totality of the 

circumstances established that severance was in N.G.'s best interests. The 

evidence supports the juvenile court's decision.

¶15 The juvenile court considered Mother's and maternal aunt's 

testimony regarding Mother's bond with N.G. and maternal relationship 

with the child. Maternal aunt also testified about her belief that severance 

would be traumatizing to the child and may cause "emotional problems,"
BRITTANY P., ANDRES G. v. DCS, N.G.

Decision of the Court

5

and her belief that it would be in N.G.'s best interests to delay severance to 

see whether Mother continued her sobriety and demonstrated her ability to 

adequately parent the child.

¶16 However, the Department case manager testified that 

Mother's "long history of chronic [drug] abuse" caused concern that Mother 

may not "follow up with [her parental] obligations" or succeed in a case 

plan.

¶17 The juvenile court considered and carefully weighed the 

evidence regarding Mother's history during the dependency and recent 

efforts toward rehabilitation. The guardian ad litem opined that stability 

and permanency for N.G. should not be delayed. As the court noted,

Mother failed to demonstrate sobriety during the nearly 23-month 

dependency and had not "gone more than a month without missed tests in 

the past 20 months." There was "no evidence that the mother can provide 

for the child," and Mother did not "have stable income or stable housing at 

[the] time" of the severance hearing. The Department case manager noted 

that there was "really no indication" whether Mother would maintain her 

recent inpatient-attained sobriety, as she was "still working on her sobriety 

after having two years length of time on this case." The case manager also 

noted that Mother had an apparent "pattern of wanting to participate in 

services right before hearings and then stop participating . . . right after the 

hearings." Based upon Mother's chronic substance abuse, "a significant 

amount of time being sober, proven sobriety[,]" would still be required 

following Mother's departure from inpatient treatment.

¶18 The juvenile court found that N.G. was adoptable and a case 

plan for adoption by maternal aunt was in place, the current placement that 

was the least restrictive placement consistent with N.G.'s needs. Maternal

aunt was "providing the child with a loving and nurturing home 

environment and the child ha[d] been thriving in her care." N.G. would 

benefit from termination by remaining in the current placement with 

maternal aunt because it not only met all his needs, but also allowed the 

child to potentially maintain family relationships, "even with his Mother to 

some degree," if his aunt deemed it appropriate. The child's adoption by 

maternal aunt would "provide the child with the added benefit of stability 

and permanency."

¶19 A child should not be forced to wait for a parent to develop 

necessary parenting skills. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 

373, 378, ¶ 25 (App. 2010). Although Mother relies upon In re Maricopa 

County Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 4-5, to argue her "right to 
BRITTANY P., ANDRES G. v. DCS, N.G.

Decision of the Court

6

maintain the parent-child relationship" is fundamentally important and 

should be preserved, her right to parent N.G. is not absolute and the court 

found that severance should not be delayed. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 24. 

"[I]t is not the function of this court to interfere with the juvenile court's 

findings of fact in severance proceedings unless they are clearly erroneous, 

i.e., there is no reasonable evidence to support them." Anonymous v. 

Anonymous, 25 Ariz. App. 10, 11-12 (1975). "In most cases, the presence of 

a statutory ground will have a negative effect on the children." In re 

Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 559 (App. 1988).

¶20 Having "considered whether the child would either benefit 

from the severance or be harmed by maintaining the parental relationship," 

the juvenile court found that, given Mother's history of substance abuse and 

its interference with her ability to adequately parent N.G., it was not in the 

child's best interest to maintain the parent-child relationship with Mother. 

"[A]n alternative case plan that stops short of severance and adoption" 

would "delay[] permanency while gambling on Mother's achieving long 

term sobriety," which was "clearly not in [N.G.'s] best interest." Despite 

Mother's "current period of approximately one month of sobriety," the 

juvenile court found "her history suggests that long-term sobriety is far 

from a certainty" and "[o]ne month of sobriety in a controlled environment, 

while commendable is far from convincing or definitive given that history."

¶21 Because a preponderance of the evidence within the record 

supports the juvenile court's finding that severance of Mother's parental 

rights is in N.G.'s best interests, we affirm the juvenile court's best interests 

finding and order of termination.

B. Father

¶22 Likewise, Father argues that the juvenile court erred in its 

determination that severance was in N.G.'s best interests and supported by 

sufficient evidence. A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Father claims that it would not be in 

the child's best interests to discontinue the parental relationship. Father 

also argues the juvenile court "did not make mention in its findings any of 

the testimony by the maternal aunt regarding the detriment the child would 

suffer from the parental rights being terminated." Father claims that 

"although the child is in an adoptive placement, insufficient evidence was 

presented to show that the child would benefit from the termination of 

parents['] rights" and, therefore, the Department "failed to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights would be 

in the best interest of the child."
BRITTANY P., ANDRES G. v. DCS, N.G.

Decision of the Court

7

¶23 Contrary to Father's claims, the juvenile court was well within 

its discretion to find that severance served the child's best interests. Here, 

the juvenile court considered both the affirmative benefit of severance to 

N.G. and the detriment he would incur by continuing the parent-child 

relationship. Although Father had ongoing contact with N.G. during the 

dependency, and maternal aunt testified that severance would be 

detrimental to N.G., the juvenile court also took into account that Father 

failed to remedy the circumstances causing N.G. to be in out-of-home 

placement, and his instability and inability to adequately parent N.G. at the 

time of the severance trial.

¶24 Upon full consideration of the case, evidence, and testimony 

before it, the juvenile court found the evidence weighed in favor of 

severance and any further delay would be unfavorable to N.G. Beyond

finding N.G. adoptable, the juvenile court found the evidence weighed in 

favor of severance. He was thriving in the placement with maternal aunt

and the plan of adoption would benefit him by adding stability and 

permanency in a drug-free environment meeting all of the child's needs, as 

opposed to maintaining the status quo of the dependency through which 

he "would still not have permanency" until some future time when it might 

be established.

¶25 Because a preponderance of the evidence within the record 

supports the juvenile court's finding that severance of Father's parental 

rights is in N.G.'s best interests, we affirm the juvenile court's best interests 

finding and order of termination.

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the abovementioned reasons, we affirm the termination 

of Mother's and Father's parental rights.