NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In Re the Marriage of: 

ROBERT W. JORGENSEN, 

Petitioner/Appellant, 

v.

KATE E. SANDOZ, 

Respondent/Appellee. 

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0205 FC 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. FC2014-001468 and FC2014-090990 (Consolidated) 

The Honorable Timothy J. Thomason, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Morley Mason, PLC, Mesa 

By Benjamin K. Mason 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant 

Rowley Chapman Barney & Buntrock, LTD, Mesa 

By Scott R. Rowley 

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
JORGENSEN v. SANDOZ 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Wayne Jorgensen (Father) appeals from the order setting his 

parenting time with his daughter, H.J., on Tuesday and Thursday evenings 

and alternate weekends. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Father and Katie Sandoz (Mother) have one child, H.J., who 

was born in October 2009. Father and Mother each filed a petition for 

dissolution of marriage in February 2014, and the cases were consolidated. 

The family court conducted a one-day trial to determine a parenting plan 

and the parties were the only witnesses. 

¶3

¶4 At trial, Father testified that the existing parenting 

arrangement, which had been in place for approximately one year, granted 

him custody of H.J. on Tuesday and Thursday evenings and every other 

weekend. However, he preferred to have custody of H.J. every other week. 

Father also testified regarding his work schedule, salary, home, his 

relationship with H.J., the relationship between H.J. and Father’s fiancée 

and her children, and his involvement with H.J.’s daily care and medical 

care. 

¶5 Mother similarly testified about her work, work schedule, 

salary, concerns regarding Father’s fiancée caring for H.J., H.J.’s best 

interests and H.J.’s daycare arrangements with maternal grandmother. 

Mother favored maintaining the existing parenting arrangement. 

¶6 Following the parties’ testimony, the court made limited 

findings on the record, stating “both parents . . . are good parents, wellintentioned people and they will do what’s in the child’s best interest.” The 

court ultimately found that “the schedule that the parties have been abiding 

by is in [H.J.’s] best interest and that . . . schedule should continue.” 
JORGENSEN v. SANDOZ 

Decision of the Court 

3 

¶7 After trial, the court made the following findings in a minute 

entry that considered the eleven factors set forth in Arizona Revised 

Statutes (A.R.S.) section 25-403.A: 

1. . . . The relationship of [H.J.] with both parents is excellent. 

2. . . . The interaction and interrelationship of [H.J.] with both 

parents is good. [H.J.] has a good relationship with Father’s 

fiancé and her children. [H.J.] also has a good relationship 

with Mother’s Mother, who has spent a large amount of time 

with [H.J.]. 

3. . . . [H.J.] has been spending the majority of time with 

Mother. She is in fact well-adjusted to home, school, and 

community at Mother’s home. [H.J.] also has spent significant 

time with Father and is well-adjusted to home and 

community while with Father. Mother claims that she is 

better able to provide for [H.J.] since she works less than 40 

hours per week. Mother, however, does work a significant 

amount of time. [H.J.] is well cared for when Father is 

working by Father’s fiancé. [H.J.] has been spending 

alternating weekends and Tuesday and Thursday evening 

with Father for the last year. Moving to 50/50 parenting time 

would be disruptive to [H.J.]. 

4. . . . [H.J.] would like to spend time with both parents. 

5. . . . The physical and mental health of all parties is good. 

6. . . . Both parents will provide [H.J.] with frequent, 

meaningful and continuing contact with the other parent. 

7. . . . There is no evidence [regarding parents’ bad faith]. 

8. . . . There is no evidence [regarding domestic violence]. 

9. . . . There is no evidence of coercion in the parties’ 

agreement on joint legal decision making. 

10. . . . Both parties have complied [with the Arizona 

Revised Statutes]. 

11. . . . There is no evidence [regarding false reporting of 

child abuse]. 
JORGENSEN v. SANDOZ 

Decision of the Court 

4 

The court’s findings were also incorporated in the divorce decree. 

¶8 Father filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, which the 

court denied as to the parenting time arrangement in an unsigned minute 

entry. Father filed a notice of appeal from the unsigned minute entry. This 

court then stayed the appeal to allow Father to obtain a signed final order. 

The family court signed the minute entry, and the appeal was reinstated. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona 

Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A (West 2015).1

DISCUSSION 

¶9 When physical custody of a child is contested, the family 

court must comply with A.R.S. § 25-403 and make specific findings as to 

why its decision is in the child’s best interests. Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 

273, ¶ 11 (App. 2013). We will not disturb the family court’s parenting time 

order absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion exists when 

the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s 

decision, is ‘devoid of competent evidence to support’ the decision.” Little 

v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5 (1999). 

¶10 Father argues that he “has scoured the record and there is no 

testimony offered by any party, nor any other evidence in the record, which 

would support [the] conclusion” that moving to a 50/50 parenting time 

arrangement would be disruptive for H.J. and not in her best interests. 

However, sufficient evidence supports the family court’s conclusion. See 

Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004) 

(“[T]his court will not reweigh evidence but will look only to determine if 

there is evidence to sustain the court’s ruling.”). 

¶11 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403, the family court made factual 

findings regarding parenting time in accordance with H.J.’s best interests. 

Cf. In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, 526, ¶ 5 (App. 2002) (holding that 

the trial court abused its discretion where the court’s order and record did 

not contain requisite findings under A.R.S. § 25-403). The family court 

found that “[m]oving to a 50/50 parenting time would be disruptive to 

[H.J.],” which is supported by the record. For example, Mother testified 

that she is home in the mornings, is able to make H.J. breakfast, get her 

ready and take her to school. In contrast, Father leaves for work “between 

6:00 and 7 o’clock,” before H.J. wakes up. Mother also gave unrefuted 

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
JORGENSEN v. SANDOZ 

Decision of the Court 

5 

testimony that H.J. had never been away from her for more than five days 

and she believed a week-on week-off schedule “would be very traumatic” 

and “hard on [H.J.]. I think she’ll have terrible ups and downs, mood 

swings, confusion of where she should be living. There’s no home base.” 

¶12 Father next contends that the family court erred by continuing 

the existing parenting plan because it does not maximize his parenting time 

as required by A.R.S. § 25-403.02.B. Under A.R.S. § 25-403.02.B, “the court 

shall adopt a parenting plan . . . that maximizes [each parent’s] respective 

parenting time,” but the parenting plan must be “[c]onsistent with the child’s 

best interests.” (Emphasis added). As explained above, sufficient evidence 

supported the family court’s conclusion that a 50/50 parenting time 

arrangement would be disruptive for H.J. and therefore would not be in 

H.J.’s best interests. Accordingly, the family court did not abuse its 

discretion by continuing the existing parenting plan. 

¶13 Father also argues that the parenting plan restricts his 

parenting time in violation of A.R.S. § 25-411.J, because the family court did 

not find that his “parenting time would endanger seriously [H.J.’s] 

physical, mental, moral or emotional health.” See A.R.S. § 25-411.J. This 

statute is not applicable for two reasons. First, Father’s parenting time was 

not restricted, because the family court’s ruling continued the same 

parenting plan that had been in place for approximately a year. Second, 

A.R.S. § 25-411 governs motions to modify parenting time when there has 

been a material change in circumstances or endangerment of the child’s 

welfare. See A.R.S. § 25-411.A. Because this case does not involve a change 

in circumstances or endangerment of H.J.’s welfare, the statute does not 

apply. 

¶14 Finally, Mother requests attorney fees under A.R.S. § 25-324. 

In our discretion we deny Mother’s request for attorney fees, because Father 

did not take an unreasonable position on appeal, and there is no significant 

disparity of income between the parties. See A.R.S. § 25-324.A. However, 

as the prevailing party, Mother is entitled to her costs on appeal, upon 

compliance with Rule 21, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. 
JORGENSEN v. SANDOZ 

Decision of the Court 

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CONCLUSION 

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the family court’s ruling.