[Cite as Columbus v. Asomani, 2017-Ohio-812.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

City of Columbus, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 16AP-255 

v. : (M.C. No. 2015 ERB 073705)

Eric Asomani, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on March 7, 2017 

 

On brief: Richard C. Pfeiffer, Jr., City Attorney, and Orly 

Ahroni, for appellee. Argued: Orly Ahroni. 

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and

Timothy E. Pierce, for appellant. Argued: Timothy E. 

Pierce. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Eric Asomani, appeals from the judgment entry of the 

Franklin County Municipal Court finding appellant guilty of violating former Columbus 

General Code 590.02(a)(3) and sentencing him to a $100 fine plus court costs. For the 

following reasons, we affirm the trial court. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} In July 2014, plaintiff-appellee, City of Columbus, enacted laws regulating 

peer-to-peer transportation network companies, such as Uber, including licensing 
No. 16AP-255 2 

requirements codified in Chapter 590 of the Columbus General Code. Pertinent to this 

appeal, Columbus General Code 590.02(a)(3) provided: 

No person shall solicit, arrange, dispatch, drive, operate, or 

otherwise be in physical control of any peer-to-peer 

transportation network vehicle for the purpose of carrying 

passengers for hire, gift, donation, or other consideration 

unless: 

* * * 

The current decal issued by the License Section is clearly and 

properly displayed on the passenger side of the front and rear 

windshield of the approved vehicle. 

Under the penalties section of the law, Columbus General Code 599(a), a violation of 

Columbus General Code 590.02(a)(3), was classified as a misdemeanor of the first degree. 

{¶ 3} On September 16, 2015, a complaint was filed alleging that appellant 

violated Columbus General Code 590.02(a)(3). A second count of the complaint, which 

alleged that appellant violated Columbus General Code 590.11(B)(5) by soliciting 

passengers, is not at issue in this appeal.1

{¶ 4} On December 22, 2015, the Ohio General Assembly enacted legislation 

regulating transportation network companies, stating that the regulation of such 

companies was a matter of general statewide interest that required statewide legislation. 

As such, the legislation stated an intent to preempt any local ordinance adopted to 

regulate transportation network companies. R.C. 4925.09(A)(1).

{¶ 5} Before the statewide legislation took effect, Columbus City Council enacted 

legislation that repealed and replaced various sections of its code in order to bring the 

Columbus City Code in line with state legislation regulating transportation networks. The 

city utilized an emergency measure procedure that resulted in the city's legislation taking 

effect on the date of passage, January 25, 2016, rather than the normal effective date 30 

days after the date of passage. As a consequence, Columbus General Code 590.02(a)(3) 

and 599(a) were repealed effective January 25, 2016, and no new legislation was enacted 

by the city to penalize the same conduct. 

 

1 The trial court found appellant not guilty of this offense. 
No. 16AP-255 3 

{¶ 6} Appellant's case proceeded, and no motion or objection was put forward to 

the trial court to challenge his continued prosecution after the repeal of Columbus 

General Code 590.02(a)(3) and 599(a). After several continuances, a bench trial was 

ultimately held on March 7, 2016. At trial, in his opening statement, defense counsel 

mentioned that one "peripheral issue" is that "this law is no longer on the books. [J]ust 

done away with." (Tr. at 7.) Defense counsel did not make any corresponding objection 

or motion and did not otherwise frame an argument at any point during trial based on 

this statement. 

{¶ 7} Appellee then called its first and only witness, Jennifer Shicks, to testify on 

behalf of the prosecution. Shicks, a licensing officer with the City of Columbus Division of 

Public Safety Support Services, testified that on September 12, 2015, she was on duty 

"working the Ohio State football game for commercial sales enforcement, Uber 

enforcement and vehicle for hire taxi enforcement." (Tr. at 8.) She was wearing a cityissued sweatshirt with a city emblem and had a badge and ID card on a chain around her 

neck. According to Shicks, her attention was drawn to appellant because "[h]e had an 

Uber decal hanging from his rearview mirror, but did not have the city-issued decals that 

showed it was a licensed Uber in the front and rear passenger window on the passenger 

side." (Tr. at 10.) Shicks described a city-issued decal as a "four by four square, colored," 

and described the conditions at the time as daylight with clear and dry weather. (Tr. at 

10.) 

{¶ 8} According to Shicks, she approached appellant's vehicle and stood within 

two feet of the passenger side window. Appellant rolled the window down and asked if 

she needed a ride. She identified herself as an officer and asked to see his Uber ID card, 

which was visible inside of the vehicle. When appellant did not comply, Shicks attempted 

to retrieve the ID card, but, while her arm was still in the window, appellant drove away. 

The interaction took approximately 30 seconds. Later that day, Shicks and her partner, 

who was also present at the scene, were able to contact appellant through his license plate 

information. 
No. 16AP-255 4 

{¶ 9} The city rested its case, and appellant made a Crim.R. 29 motion asking the 

court to find the city presented insufficient evidence to prove the crimes as charged. The 

trial court denied appellant's motion, and appellant then testified in his own defense. 

{¶ 10} Appellant is a medical records clerk who, on September 12, 2015, was an 

Uber driver licensed with the city of Columbus.2 On his way to pick up a passenger at the 

Ohio State football stadium, appellant stopped at a stoplight at the crowded intersection 

of Lane Avenue and High Street. According to appellant, when Shicks waived at his 

vehicle he rolled down his window and asked if she was his rider. He did not see her 

badge. Through the window Shicks attempted to grab his ID, which also had his key to 

his apartment, and, after about 20 to 30 seconds, he had to pull away because the light 

turned green and cars were honking from behind him. 

{¶ 11} According to appellant, he had purchased the required city-issued decals 

and displayed them "[o]ne in the front, one in the rear." (Tr. at 38.) Appellant further 

testified that defense exhibit A, a photograph depicting the rearview of his vehicle, and 

exhibit B, a "close capture of the same picture" as in exhibit A, are true and accurate 

copies of how the rear of his vehicle looked on September 12, 2015. (Tr. at 39.) Appellant 

testified that the decal is not visible in exhibit A, but the decal is visible in the exhibit B 

close-up photograph "but it's not that clear" because his rear window is "very tinted, so it's 

become hard to see through." (Tr. at 39.) According to appellant, after the incident, he 

went to the police officers, and the officers took his Uber license and decals. On crossexamination, appellant confirmed that he did not have a photograph of the front window 

of his vehicle. 

{¶ 12} Defense counsel did not admit the exhibits, rested its case, and renewed its 

Crim.R. 29 motion. The trial court again overruled the motion. In his closing argument, 

defense counsel argued that appellant was not guilty under the requirements of the city 

ordinances. At the close of the trial, and by judgment entries dated that same day, 

March 7, 2016, the trial court found appellant guilty of violating Columbus General Code 

590.02(a)(3) and sentenced appellant to a financial sanction of $100 plus court costs. 

 

2 Appellant testified that he is no longer an Uber driver. 
No. 16AP-255 5 

After appellant's conviction, on March 23, 2016, the statewide legislation regulating 

transportation network companies went into effect. 

{¶ 13} Appellant filed a timely appeal to this court. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 14} Appellant presents three assignments of error: 

[1.] While Appellant's case was pending the Columbus City 

Council on January 27, 2016 enacted Ordinance 0249-2016 

which repealed in its entirety Columbus City Code (C.C.C.) 

590.02(a)(3) (prohibitions regarding decal display for peerto-peer transportation network vehicles) and 590.99(a) 

(penalties for violating 590.02(a)(3)). The application of 

C.C.C. 101.05 ("Effect of repeal of ordinances") cannot control 

because it plainly conflicts with City Council's intent to 

immediately remove peer-to-peer decal offenses as criminal 

acts within the City of Columbus. Appellant's conviction for 

violating C.C.C. 590.02(a)(3) and the accompanying sentence 

must therefore be vacated. 

[2.] Inasmuch as Appellant's conviction for violating C.C.C. 

590.02(a)(3) was not supported by sufficient evidence it must 

be set aside and he must be discharged from these 

proceedings. 

[3.] The Appellant's conviction must be set aside because it 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence (passim). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. First Assignment of Error 

{¶ 15} Under the first assignment of error, appellant contends that his conviction 

and sentence must be vacated because the ordinance that he was charged with violating, 

former Columbus General Code 590.02(a)(3), and the corresponding sentencing 

ordinance, was repealed while his prosecution was pending. For the following reasons, we 

disagree. 

{¶ 16} As a preliminary matter, appellee asserts that appellant waived this issue. 

Generally, " 'an appellate court will not consider any error which counsel for a party 

complaining of the trial court's judgment could have called but did not call to the trial 

court's attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the 
No. 16AP-255 6 

trial court.' " State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122 (1986), quoting State v. Childs, 14 

Ohio St.2d 56 (1968), paragraph three of the syllabus. However, an appellate court has 

discretion to recognize "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights" although 

they were not raised to the trial court. Crim.R. 52(B). "To prevail under this standard, the 

defendant must establish that an error occurred, it was obvious, and it affected his or her 

substantial rights." State v. Spaulding, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-8126, ¶ 64, citing 

Crim.R. 52(B) and State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002) (an error affects 

substantial rights only if it "affected the outcome of the trial"). "We take '[n]otice of plain 

error * * * with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a 

manifest miscarriage of justice.' " Spaulding at ¶ 64, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 

91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶ 17} In this case, it is undisputed that although defense counsel mentioned that 

the law was "no longer on the books," defense counsel did not, by motion or otherwise, 

argue against appellant's conviction and sentence due to the repeal of the charged statute. 

(Tr. at 7.) In his brief on appeal, appellant does not argue that trial counsel raised the 

issue of the repeal at trial but, rather, asserts that the issue inherently involves whether 

the trial court acted without subject-matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time 

or, alternatively, that appellant's conviction rises to the level of plain error under Crim.R. 

52(B). Considering the above, we find that appellant waived the issues presented in his 

first assignment of error, except to the extent that they relate to subject-matter 

jurisdiction and the plain error doctrine as discussed below. 

{¶ 18} We will first address appellant's argument that the city's repeal of the 

pertinent laws while his prosecution was pending deprived the trial court of subjectmatter jurisdiction over his case. The Supreme Court of Ohio described subject-matter 

jurisdiction of a municipal court in State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880. 

The Mbodji court stated: 

The term "jurisdiction" refers to the court's statutory or 

constitutional authority to hear a case. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 

Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11. The 

concept encompasses jurisdiction over the subject matter of a 

case as well as jurisdiction over the person. Id. Because 

subject-matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to hear a 
No. 16AP-255 7 

case, the issue can never be waived or forfeited and may be 

raised at any time. Id.

Id. at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 19} "Municipal courts are created by statute, R.C. 1901.01, and their subjectmatter jurisdiction is also set by statute." Id. at ¶ 11. Per R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), a municipal 

court "has jurisdiction to hear misdemeanor cases committed within its territory and has 

jurisdiction over the violation of any ordinance of any municipal corporation within its 

territory." Thus, pertinent to this case, the Franklin County Municipal Court has subjectmatter jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases committed within Franklin County and 

violations of city of Columbus ordinances defining criminal misdemeanors. R.C. 

1901.20(A); R.C. 1901.02(A)(5) and (B); Mbodji at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 20} To invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the municipal court, a plaintiff 

must file a complaint that is valid under Crim.R. 3. Id. at ¶ 12-13 and paragraph one of 

the syllabus ("A complaint that meets the requirements of Crim.R. 3 invokes the subjectmatter jurisdiction of a trial court."). Crim.R. 3 states: 

The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts 

constituting the offense charged. It shall also state the 

numerical designation of the applicable statute or ordinance. 

It shall be made upon oath before any person authorized by 

law to administer oaths. 

{¶ 21} Thereafter, a defendant must raise before trial any challenge to either the 

validity of the complaint or a defect in the institution of the prosecution that is not a 

"jurisdictional barrier." Mbodji at ¶ 19; Crim.R. 12(C). The failure of the defendant to 

raise such defenses or objections constitutes a waiver. Crim.R. 12(H); Mbodji at ¶ 18-19 

(finding that the defendant's argument regarding the trial court's lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction based on a complaint alleged to be procedurally defective under R.C. 2935.09 

was waived where the defendant failed to file a Crim.R. 12(C) motion prior to trial). 

However, where the flaw in the complaint or indictment is a jurisdictional barrier, such as 

failing to charge a valid criminal offense, the trial court is divested of subject-matter 

jurisdiction and any resulting conviction is void. State v. Chessman, 188 Ohio App.3d 

428, 2010-Ohio-3239, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.) (finding that trial court should have granted 
No. 16AP-255 8 

appellant's motion to dismiss for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the statute 

charged in the indictment had no accompanying statutory penalty, and, therefore, the 

indictment did not charge a criminal offense). 

{¶ 22} Here, appellant does not argue that the complaint as initially filed was 

invalid, and, on our own review, we find that the complaint in this case was valid under 

Crim.R. 3. The complaint is made on oath and states the numerical designation of the 

applicable ordinance and the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Thus, 

unlike Mbodji, subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court was properly invoked at the 

outset of the case. Mbodji at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 23} Even so, appellant contends in essence that the complaint became invalid 

on the city's repeal of the ordinance charged in the complaint, thereby divesting the trial 

court of subject-matter jurisdiction at that later point in time. We disagree. 

{¶ 24} At common law, when a criminal statute was repealed, pending 

prosecutions of that crime were "abated," meaning "there could be no further criminal 

prosecution for its violation." Landen v. United States, 299 F. 75, 78 (6th Cir.1924); 

Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1973); State v. Raynovich, 7th Dist. No. 

12 MA 65, 2014-Ohio-2246, ¶ 8. However, governing bodies may abrogate the common 

law by expressing their general intent that a repeal of a criminal statute shall not affect 

pending prosecutions. Bradley; Raynovich; State v. Lawrence, 74 Ohio St. 38, 46-47 

(1906). As stated by Summit Beach, Inc. v. Glander, 153 Ohio St. 147, 150 (1950), quoting 

50 American Jurisprudence, Section 527, at 534: 

Such general saving provisions are declarative of a continuing 

policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not 

release or extinguish any liability incurred, or affect any right 

accrued or claim arising, before the repeal takes effect, unless 

the repealing act expressly otherwise provides. They operate 

to make applicable in the designated situations the law as it 

existed before the repeal, and are upheld as a rule of 

construction to be applied, where not otherwise provided, as a 

part of all subsequent repealing statutes. 

{¶ 25} Thus, where a legislature passes such a "general savings provision," 

prosecutions pending at the time of a repeal may advance under the former law, unless 

the governing body repealing the law demonstrates a contrary intent. Id. at 150-52; 
No. 16AP-255 9 

Lawrence at paragraph one of the syllabus. State ex rel. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 

174 Ohio St. 257, 260 (1963) ("Although the repeal of a statute renders it inoperative, the 

repeal ordinarily does not set aside acts which were consummated or deprive persons of 

rights which accrued under the statute. * * * To undo such results by a repeal is to give it 

retroactivity."). 

{¶ 26} Under Ohio law, to overcome the presumption of proactive application and 

demonstrate an intent contrary to the general savings provision, the language of the 

repeal must expressly and clearly require its application to pending prosecutions and legal 

proceedings. Id.; Lawrence at paragraph one of the syllabus; Kelley v. State, 94 Ohio St. 

331, 338-39 (1916); State v. Heston, 5th Dist. No. 2009-CA-0086, 2010-Ohio-2939, ¶ 16. 

See also State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, paragraph one of the 

syllabus; Johnston v. State, 144 Ohio St.3d 311, 2015-Ohio-4437, ¶ 22. But see Dorsey v. 

United States, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2331-36 (2012) (finding that Congress intended, by 

implication, for lower mandatory minimums of a new sentencing act to apply to "pre-Act 

offenders" who were sentenced after the act). 

{¶ 27} Here, both the state of Ohio and the city of Columbus have general savings 

provisions.3 R.C. 1.58; Columbus City Code 101.05. Pertinent to this case, the general 

savings provision for the city of Columbus states that "[t]he repeal of an ordinance shall 

not affect any punishment or penalty incurred before the repeal took effect, nor any suit, 

prosecution or proceeding pending at the time of the repeal, for an offense committed 

under the ordinance repealed." (Emphasis added.) Columbus City Code 101.05. We find 

that the plain language of Columbus City Code 101.05 applies to save prosecutions 

pending for Columbus General Code 590.02(a)(3). As such, the municipal court retained 

authority over prosecutions pending at the time of the repeal of Columbus General Code 

590.02(a)(3), absent city council's intent to the contrary. In this case, it is undisputed 

that the repealing act of the city does not expressly state that it should apply to pending 

actions or have retroactive effect. Although appellant argues that the city's emergency 

measures and implications to the contrary arise from city council's actions, we disagree 

 

3 Under the Ohio general savings statute, "the crime does not abate, but any reduced penalties are applied 

retroactively." Raynovich at ¶ 8, citing R.C. 1.58(B). The city of Columbus's general savings ordinance does 

not include a similar provision to reduce penalties retroactively. 
No. 16AP-255 10 

that the record here shows that city council intended the repeal of Columbus General 

Code 590.02(a)(3) and 599(a) to affect pending prosecutions ordinarily preserved by the 

city's general savings ordinance. Considering the facts of this case, we find the 

municipal court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence appellant, 

pursuant to Columbus General Code 590.02(a)(3) and 599(a), for acts committed and a 

complaint filed prior to the repeal of those city ordinances. 

{¶ 28} Appellant additionally contends that his conviction and sentencing under a 

repealed law constitutes plain error. In support of his argument, appellant cites to State 

v. Thompson, 2d Dist. No. 2003-CA-5, 2003-Ohio-4432. In Thompson, the defendant 

was charged by a complaint filed on December 31, 2002, with domestic violence, pursuant 

to R.C. 2919.25, and attempting to purchase or consume beer or intoxicating liquor 

pursuant to R.C. 4301.632. The appellate court sua sponte reversed the defendant's 

conviction and sentence for violating R.C. 4301.632 as plain error because the statute had 

been repealed on October 11, 2002. 

{¶ 29} Here, unlike Thompson, the repeal of the pertinent statute occurred after 

the offending conduct and filing of the complaint. As a result, the application of plain 

error in Thompson does not support appellant's argument on the facts of the case at hand. 

Moreover, appellant has not otherwise demonstrated that an obvious error occurred that 

affected his substantial rights. As such, we find that appellant failed to establish plain 

error. Spaulding at ¶ 64; Crim.R. 52(B). 

{¶ 30} Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. 

B. Second Assignment of Error 

{¶ 31} Under the second assignment of error, appellant contends that his 

conviction for violating Columbus General Code 590.02(a)(3) was not supported by 

sufficient evidence. We disagree. 

{¶ 32} Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal standard that tests whether the 

evidence is legally adequate to support a verdict. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

386 (1997). Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict is a question of 

law, not fact. Id. In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a 

conviction, " '[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 
No. 16AP-255 11 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' " State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio 

St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-5937, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. A verdict will not be disturbed unless, after viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it is apparent that reasonable minds 

could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 

460, 484 (2001). 

{¶ 33} In a sufficiency of the evidence inquiry, appellate courts do not assess 

whether the prosecution's evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence 

supports the conviction. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, ¶ 79-

80 (evaluation of witness credibility not proper on review for sufficiency of evidence); 

State v. Bankston, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-668, 2009-Ohio-754, ¶ 4 (noting that "in a 

sufficiency of the evidence review, an appellate court does not engage in a determination 

of witness credibility; rather, it essentially assumes the state's witnesses testified 

truthfully and determines if that testimony satisfies each element of the crime"). Further, 

"the testimony of one witness, if believed by the jury, is enough to support a conviction." 

State v. Strong, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-874, 2011-Ohio-1024, ¶ 42. 

{¶ 34} In order to find appellant guilty of former Columbus General Code 

590.02(a)(3), appellee had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 

(1) solicited, arranged, dispatched, drove, operated, or otherwise was in physical control 

of any peer-to-peer transportation network vehicle, (2) for the purpose of carrying 

passengers for hire, gift, donation, or other consideration, (3) without the current decal 

issued by the license section clearly and properly displayed on the passenger side of the 

front and rear windshield of the approved vehicle. 

{¶ 35} Appellant does not contest that he operated, drove, or at least was in 

physical control of an approved peer-to-peer transportation network vehicle for the 

purpose of carrying passengers for hire, and our review of the transcript confirms these 

requirements of the ordinance were met. Rather, appellant argues that Shicks did not 

testify that she examined the passenger side or rear of the vehicle to determine whether 

the decals were displayed on the windshields and that the testimony appears to position 
No. 16AP-255 12 

Shicks at the driver's side window on the opposite side from where the decals were 

supposed to be placed. We find appellant's argument contrary to the record. 

{¶ 36} Shicks testified that in daylight and clear conditions, her attention was 

drawn to appellant because "[h]e had an Uber decal hanging from his rearview mirror, 

but did not have the city-issued decals that showed it was a licensed Uber in the front and 

rear passenger window on the passenger side." (Tr. at 10.) Furthermore, Shicks testified 

that she approached the vehicle and stood "[w]ithin two feet" of the vehicle's window. (Tr. 

at 20.) Defense counsel specifically asked Shicks whether she was "standing beside his 

passenger side window," which Shicks confirmed. (Tr. at 26.) If believed, this evidence 

supports appellant's conviction. 

{¶ 37} Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. 

C. Third Assignment of Error 

{¶ 38} Under the third assignment of error, appellant contends that his conviction 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we disagree. 

{¶ 39} "Even though supported by sufficient evidence, a conviction may still be 

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence." State v. McCombs, 10th 

Dist. No. 15AP-245, 2015-Ohio-3848, ¶ 3, citing Thompkins at 387. "While sufficiency of 

the evidence is a test of adequacy regarding whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 

support the verdict as a matter of law, the criminal manifest weight of the evidence 

standard addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief." State v. Cassell, 10th Dist. 

No. 08AP-1093, 2010-Ohio-1881, ¶ 38. 

{¶ 40} When presented with a manifest-weight challenge, an appellate court may 

not merely substitute its view for that of the trier of fact but must review the entire record, 

weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, 

and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost 

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio 

App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). An appellate court should reserve reversal of a conviction 

as being against the manifest weight of the evidence for only the most " 'exceptional case 
No. 16AP-255 13 

in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.' " Thompkins at 387, quoting 

Martin at 175. 

{¶ 41} Appellant argues that the conviction is against the weight of the evidence 

because Shicks did not testify that she viewed the front and rear windshields and only had 

contact with appellant on the driver's side, that the trial court apparently did not consider 

Shicks credible in finding appellant not guilty of the soliciting offense, and that appellant's 

testimony that he displayed the decals, that defense exhibit B depicted the rear decal, and 

that he turned in the decals to the license section at a hearing after the incident indicates 

that the decals were properly mounted to his vehicle. We disagree. 

{¶ 42} First, appellant's testimony is not complete in showing he met the 

requirement of "clearly and properly display[ing] [the decals] on the passenger side of 

the front and rear windshield[s] of the approved vehicle." (Emphasis added.) Columbus 

General Code 590.02(a)(3). Appellant testified that he displayed the decals "[o]ne in the 

front, one in the rear." (Tr. at 38.) Appellant did not testify that the decals were on the 

passenger side windshields. Furthermore, during appellant's testimony regarding the 

photographs of his vehicle, appellant admitted that he did not have a photograph of the 

front windshield of the vehicle and described his rear windshield as "very tinted" and 

"hard to see through." (Tr. at 39.) Appellant's contention that he turned in the decals to 

police supports that he possessed the decals but does not provide evidence as to the 

proper display of the decals. 

{¶ 43} As stated in the second assignment of error, Shicks testified that she 

observed that appellant did not have the city-issued decals displayed in the front and rear 

passenger windows and confirmed that she observed appellant's vehicle from the 

passenger side of the car, within two feet of the window and in the daylight. Contrary to 

appellant's argument, the trial court did not base its determination that appellant was not 

guilty of the solicitation charge on Shicks' lack of credibility. The trial court stated that the 

evidence was "close" on that charge and that the discrepancy between Shicks' and 

appellant's accounts was due to a situation where a "miscommunication" occurred. (Tr. at 

54, 55.) Moreover, based on our review of the entire record and, after weighing the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences and considering the credibility of witnesses, in 
No. 16AP-255 14 

resolving the conflict in the evidence, the trial court did not clearly lose its way and create 

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered. 

{¶ 44} Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 45} Having overruled appellant's three assignments of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court. 

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur. 

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