alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Francine Montgomery et al., Appellants, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

[745 NYS2d 464]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated July 26, 2001, as granted their motion to strike the defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) only to the extent of directing that the answer be stricken unless the defendants produce a witness for an examination before trial by a date certain.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is granted in its entirety, the answer is stricken, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for an inquest on the issue of damages.

Although actions should be resolved on the merits wherever possible *(see Cruzatti v St. Mary’s Hosp.,*193 AD2d 579, 580), a court may strike the “pleadings or parts thereof’ (CPLR 3126 [3]) as a sanction against a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126). While the nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter of discretion with the court *(see Soto v City of Long Beach,*197 AD2d 615, 616; *Spira v Antoine,*191 AD2d 219), “striking an answer is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious or in bad faith” *(Harris v City of New York,*211 AD2d 663, 664).

In the instant case, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in not granting the motion to strike the defendants’ answer in its entirety *(see Herrera v City of New York,*238 AD2d 475). The defendants’ willful and contuma*387cious conduct can be inferred from their repeated failures to comply with court orders directing disclosure (see *Espinal v City of New York,*264 AD2d 806) and the inadequate excuses offered to justify the defaults (see *Porreco v Selway,*225 AD2d 752, 753; *DeGennaro v Robinson Textiles,*224 AD2d 574). Thus, the plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden of proving willfulness, shifting the burden to the defendants to offer a reasonable excuse for their failure to comply (see *Espinal v City of New York, supra).*At no time did the defendants offer a reasonable excuse for their repeated failures to comply with the plaintiffs’ outstanding discovery demands and the orders directing disclosure. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the answer should have been granted in its entirety, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for an inquest on the issue of damages. Santucci, J.P., Smith, Krausman, H. Miller and Adams, JJ., concur.
DISMISSED IN PART and DENIED IN PA RT and Opinion Filed July 19, 2023 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00668-CV IN RE BRADLEY B. MILLER, Relator Original Proceeding from the 330th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-13-02616-Y MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Goldstein Before the Court is relator’s July 10, 2023 petition for wr it of mandamus. Entitlement to mandamus relief requires re lator to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that rela tor lacks an adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Relator bears the burden of provi ding the Court with a sufficient record to show he is entitled to relief. Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see also T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A), 52.7(a). To the extent relator complains about the associate judge’s May 1, 2023 order on relator’s motion to compel discovery and the district judge’s purported rulings on–2– relator’s motion to compel, we conclude after reviewing the petition and record before us that relator’s petition does not co mply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and relator did not satisfy his burden to provide a sufficient record. See
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A), 52.7(a)(1)–(2); Walker , 827 S.W.3d at 837. Because relator’s petition does not meet the require ments of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure for consideration of mandamus relief, we deny these portions of relator’s petition. See In re Jones , No. 05-23-00492-CV, No. 05-23-00493-CV, 2023 WL 4101440, at *1 (Tex. App.—Da llas June 21, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). To the extent relator asks this Court to compel (1) the district judge to rule on relator’s motion to compel and (2) the tria l court to provide a reporter’s record, we conclude that relator did not satisfy his burden to provide a sufficient record and failed to provide any argumen t with appropriate citations to authorities and to the appendix or record to suppo rt the requested relief. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.3(h), (k)(1)(A), 52.7(a)(1); Walker , 827 S.W.3d at 837. Accordingly, we deny these portions of relator’s petition. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.8(a). To the extent relator simply asks for various declaratory and injunctive relief, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction and dismiss these portions of the petition. See
T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 22.221; see, e.g., In re Day Inv. Grp., LLC , No. 05-20- 00643-CV, 2020 WL 5036145, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 2, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (injunctive relief); In re Martin , No. 05-18-00542-CV, 2018–3– WL 2147949, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 10, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (declaratory relief).

230668F.P05 /Bonnie Lee Goldstein / BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE
First Amendment to Promissory Note Secured by Deed of Trust, dated April 5, 2004



 EXHIBIT 10.6 
  
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROMISSORY NOTE 
 SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST 
  
 (REVOLVING CREDIT FACILITY) 
  
 This First Amendment To Promissory
Note Secured by Deed of Trust (Revolving Credit Facility) is made and entered into this 5th day of April, 2004 by and between RANCON REALITY FUND IV, a California limited partnership (“Borrower”), and MID-PENINSULA BANK, part of Greater
Bay Bank, N.A., formerly known as MID-PENINSULA BANK, a California banking corporation (“Bank”). 
  
 Recitals 
  
 1. On April
25, 2001, Borrower executed and delivered to Bank a Promissory Note Secured by Deed of Trust (Revolving Credit Facility) (“Note”) evidencing a loan by Bank to Borrower in the face amount of Seven Million Two Hundred and No/100ths Dollars
($7,200,000.00), the repayment of the indebtedness being secured by the lien of a deed of trust, financing statement, security agreement and fixture filing (with assignment of rents and leases) dated April 25, 2001 and recorded on April 30, 2001 as
Instrument No. 162935 of the Official Records of San Bernardino County, California (“Deed of Trust”). 
  
 2. Borrower has requested and Bank has agreed to amend the Note to increase the maximum principal balance of the Note by Four Million Two Hundred Thousand
and No/ 100ths Dollars ($4,200,000.00) for a total maximum principal balance of Eleven Million Four Hundred Thousand and No/100ths Dollars ($11,400,000.00) and Borrower and Bank have agreed to make certain other revisions to the Note. 
  
 3. Borrower and Bank desire to amend the Note without in any way releasing
the lien of the Deed of Trust upon the real and personal property described therein. 
  
 Agreement 
  
 A. Recitals. The foregoing recitals
are true and correct and by this reference are incorporated herein. 
  
 B. Amount of Loan. The maximum principal amount of the Note is hereby increased to $11,400,000.00. 
  
 C. Maturity Date. The Maturity Date is hereby extended to April 15, 2007. 







 D. Loan Fees. On the date of this Amendment, Borrower shall pay to Lender a loan fee in the amount of
$85,500.00. On April 15, 2005 and on April 15, 2006, Borrower shall pay to Lender additional loan fees each in the amount of $28,500.00. 
  
 E. Note. Except as amended hereby, the terms of the Note remain in full force and effect. 
  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have agreed to the foregoing as of the date first set forth above. 
  

							
	BANK:	 	BORROWER:
		
	MID-PENINSULA BANK, part of
Greater Bay Bank, N.A., formerly known
as MID-PENINSULA BANK, a
California banking association	 	RANCON REALTY FUND IV,
a California limited partnership
				
	 	 	 	 	By:	 	Rancon Financial Corporation,
	 	 	 	 	 	 	a California corporation,
	 	 	 	 	 	 	a general partner
				
	By:	 	 /s/ Judy Paris

	 	By:	 	 /s/ Daniel Lee Stephenson


	Its:	 	Senior Vice President	 	 	 	Daniel Lee Stephenson
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Its President
				
	 	 	 	 	By:	 	 /s/ Daniel Lee Stephenson


	 	 	 	 	 	 	Daniel Lee Stephenson, a general partner

  

 2
**Exhibit 99.32**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

     Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of BCE Inc. (the “Company”), does hereby certify that:

the annual report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2011 of the Company (the “Form 40-F”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 40-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

| Date: March 14, 2012 | *(signed) George A. Cope* |
|----------------------|---------------------------|
|                 | George A. Cope            |
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

February 19, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135358 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135358 

 COA: 280478 

Genesee CC: 06-018209-FC 

TIEQUAN OMOND RILEY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 12, 2007 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0211 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

February 19, 2008 

 Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Honorable R. Brooke Jackson

Civil Action No. 11-CV-01751-RBJ-MEH

PHYLLIS NINAHUALPA,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAFEWAY, INC., a Delaware Corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER SETTING TRIAL AND TRIAL PREPARATION CONFERENCE

This matter has been scheduled for a five-day jury trial on the docket of Judge R.

Brooke Jackson in the U.S. District Courthouse, Courtroom A702, 7th Floor, 901 19th Street, 

Denver, Colorado, to commence on December 10, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. 

A Trial Preparation Conference is set for November 15, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. Counsel who 

will try the case shall attend in person. 

Fourteen days before the trial preparation conference, counsel and any pro se party shall 

submit proposed jury instructions and verdict forms. The jury instructions shall identify the 

source of the instruction and supporting authority, e.g. § 103, Fed. Jury Practice, O’Malley, 

Grenig, and Lee (5th ed.). The parties shall submit their instructions and verdict forms both via 

CM/ECF and by electronic mail to jackson_chambers@cod.uscourts.gov in Word format. 

Verdict forms shall be submitted in a separate file from jury instructions. Within the jury 

instruction file, each jury instruction shall begin on a new page.

Case 1:11-cv-01751-RBJ-MEH Document 16 Filed 10/14/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
Each instruction should be numbered (e.g., “Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1”) for purposes 

of making a record at the jury instruction conference. The parties shall attempt to stipulate to the 

jury instructions, particularly “stock” instructions and verdict forms. 

In diversity cases where Colorado law applies, please submit instructions and verdict 

forms that conform to CJI-Civ 4th.

Seven days before the trial preparation conference, the parties shall file via CM/ECF (1) 

their witness lists; and (2) their exhibit lists. Forms of the witness and exhibit lists are found at 

http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Judges/Judges.aspx. Please add at least ten additional blank rows 

at the end of the exhibit list to accommodate any additional exhibits that may be introduced at 

trial.

To the extent the deadlines and other provisions of this order conflict with this Court’s 

Practice Standards, this order shall control.

The parties shall be prepared to address the following issues at the Trial Preparation 

Conference:

1) jury selection;

2) sequestration of witnesses;

3) timing of presentation of witnesses and evidence;

4) anticipated evidentiary issues;

5) any stipulations as to fact; and

6) any other issue affecting the duration or course of the trial.

Case 1:11-cv-01751-RBJ-MEH Document 16 Filed 10/14/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 3
DATED this 14th day of October , 2011.

BY THE COURT: 

___________________________________

R. Brooke Jackson

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-01751-RBJ-MEH Document 16 Filed 10/14/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 3
Opinion issued June 20, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-23-00583-CV

———————————

MARTIN MBAKA, Appellant

V.

CHIOMA MBAKA, Appellee

On Appeal from the 387th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 16-DCV-231877

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant’s brief was due on April 18, 2024. The Court issued a notice on 

May 7, 2024, that the appeal might be dismissed unless appellant filed a motion for 

extension or a brief by May 17, 2024. Appellant filed no response or brief.
2

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3, 43.2(f). 

Any pending motions are dismissed as moot. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 3Federal Reserve Bank of: PhiladelphiaFilings received during the week ending December 13, 2008FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodNONE
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U. S. C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Community Bancorp. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Community Bancorp. and will be retained by Community Bancorp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





/s/ Stephen P. Marsh

Stephen P. Marsh, President & Chief Operating Officer

(Chief Financial Officer)

March 30, 2005
Exhibit 32.1





Certification of CEO and CFO

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002







In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Consolidated Capital Institutional Properties/2 (the "Partnership"), for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Martha L. Long, as the equivalent of the Chief Executive Officer of the Partnership, and Stephen B. Waters, as the equivalent of the Chief Financial Officer of the Partnership, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.





| |                        
| | -----------------------
| | /s/Martha L. Long      
| | Name: Martha L. Long   
| | Date: March 28, 2008   
| |                        
| | /s/Stephen B. Waters   
| | Name: Stephen B. Waters
| | Date: March 28, 2008   





This certification is furnished with this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Partnership for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/ Richard E.      Gathright                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Richard      E. Gathright                                         |
| Chairman      of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President |
| (Principal      Executive Officer)                                |
| May      15, 2009                                                 |
|                                                              |   |
|                                                              |   |
| /s/ Michael S. Shore                                              |   |
| Michael      S. Shore                                             |
| Chief      Financial Officer, Treasurer and Senior Vice President |
| (Principal Financial Officer)                                     |
| May      15, 2009                                                 |

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0212

JAMES JOSEPH MAIN, JR.,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including January 18, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

December 12 2022

12/12/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0305
#### STATE of Louisiana, Through the Department of Highways v. Oliver S. LA BAUVE and Jane Poche LaBauve. STATE of Louisiana, Through the Department of Highways v. Oliver Cullen HARRELL.

No. 3896.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Nov. 18, 1954.

Kermit B. Guidroz and H. Alva Brum-field, Baton Rouge, for appellants.

Jack L. Simms, D. Ross Bannister, W. Crosby Pegues, Jr., Jos. A. Lore! Baton Rouge, for appellees.

*865CAVANAUGH, Judge.

For the reasons this day assigned in the case of State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways v. LaBauve, La.App., 75 So.2d 862, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Exhibit 32.02

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Westside Energy Corporation
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2006 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof ("Report"),
the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to knowledge:

         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: August 21, 2006                               /s/ Sean J. Austin
                                                     ------------------
                                                     Sean J. Austin,
                                                     Chief Financial Officer
Case 1:02-cr-00535-CMA Document 29 Filed 01/26/06 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

September 21, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

133562 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 133562 

 COA: 274556 

Jackson CC: 05-000922-FC 

ANTONIO MONTEZ BAILEY, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 12, 2007 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

KELLY, J., would remand this case for resentencing. 

l0914 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 21, 2007 

Clerk