Supreme Court of Florida

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No. SC14-383

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INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 13-25 RE: 

ANDREW J. DECKER, III.

[March 2, 2017]

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court for review of the determination of the Florida 

Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) that Circuit Judge Andrew J. Decker, 

III, has violated certain Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct before his 

judicial campaign and the Code of Judicial Conduct during his judicial campaign. 

We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 12, Fla. Const. We conclude that, with limited 

exceptions, the JQC Hearing Panel’s findings are supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. For the violations in this case, the Hearing Panel 

recommended a ninety-day suspension, public reprimand, and payment of costs of 

the proceedings. Article V, section 12(c)(1) of the Florida Constitution provides 

that this Court “may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations of the commission.” We modify in part the 
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sanction recommended by the Hearing Panel and impose the following discipline 

on Judge Decker: a six-month suspension, public reprimand, and payment of costs 

of the proceedings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Judge Andrew J. Decker, III, took office as a circuit judge in the Third 

Judicial Circuit after a contested election in November 2012. On May 3, 2013, the 

JQC Investigative Panel issued a Notice of Investigation to Judge Decker 

informing him that the Investigative Panel was conducting an investigation into

allegations of violation of a number of the Canons in the Code of Judicial Conduct

governing judicial candidates and of the Rules of Professional Conduct governing 

attorneys. On August 22, 2013, the Investigative Panel held a probable cause 

hearing pursuant to Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission Rule 6(b) at which

Judge Decker and his counsel appeared. On June 23, 2014, the Investigative Panel

filed its Second Amended Notice of Formal Charges pursuant to the findings of the 

Investigative Panel.1 The Second Amended Notice of Formal Charges alleged 

 

1. The first notice of charges was filed as “Amended Notice of Formal 

Charges” on February 25, 2014. On April 24, 2014, the Investigative Panel filed 

“First Amendment to Amended Notice of Formal Charges.” An “Amendment to 

Paragraph 7 of the Amended Notice of Formal Charges” was filed on May 23, 

2014. The final notice of charges, denominated the “Second Amended Notice of 

Formal Charges,” was filed on June 23, 2014, and served as the basis for the 

evidentiary hearing and the Hearing Panel’s final order in this case. 
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violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by then-attorney Decker’s conduct 

as a practicing attorney, and further alleged violations of the Code of Judicial 

Conduct when then-attorney Decker was campaigning for the judgeship.

Charge 1 of the Second Amended Notice of Formal Charges alleged that on 

July 31, 2012, when then-attorney Decker was a candidate for a circuit court 

judgeship in the Third Judicial Circuit, while at a televised debate with his 

opponent, then-attorney Decker stated that he had never been accused of having a 

conflict of interest. The notice alleged that the statement was false because less 

than four months earlier, a formal complaint was filed with The Florida Bar by 

Daniel Dukes, a former client, alleging conflict of interest. The notice alleged that 

then-attorney Decker responded to that complaint with a twelve-page letter only 

two and one half months before the debate, and that the false statement made at the 

debate was not corrected. The foregoing conduct was said to violate the Code of 

Judicial Conduct Canons 7A(3)(b) (candidate shall act with impartiality, integrity, 

and independence) and 7A(3)(e)(ii) (candidate shall not knowingly misrepresent 

qualifications or facts concerning the candidate or opponent), and the Rules of 

Professional Conduct 4-8.4(c) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
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dishonesty or misrepresentation) and 4-8.2(b) (candidate for judicial office shall 

comply with applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct).2 

Charge 3 alleged, in pertinent part, that at a judicial forum sponsored by the 

Lafayette County Republican Executive Committee, then-attorney Decker stated to 

the audience that he is a registered Republican, that his former affiliation with the 

Democratic Party was an error, and that he is “pro-life.” It was alleged that these

statements violated the Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 7A(1)(c) (candidate shall 

not make speeches on behalf of a political organization); 7C(3) (candidate should 

refrain from commenting on affiliation with any political party and must avoid 

conduct suggesting support of a political party or a political issue); Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-8.2(b) (lawyer who is a candidate shall comply with 

applicable Canons of Judicial Conduct); and section 105.071(3), Florida Statutes 

(2011) (candidate for judicial office shall not publicly represent himself or herself 

as a member of any political party). 

Charge 6 alleged that as an attorney, then-attorney Decker began 

representing Circuit Judge Paul Bryan in a lawsuit filed by TD Bank, N.A., against 

Judge Bryan, Daniel Dukes, and William Woodington, who were also represented 

 

2. We discuss only those charges on which Judge Decker was found guilty. 

The Hearing Panel directed a verdict in Judge Decker’s favor on Charge 2 and 

found him not guilty of Charges 4 and 5.
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by then-attorney Decker. Charge 6 alleged that during his representation of Judge 

Bryan, then-attorney Decker was engaged in trial preparation in a suit brought by 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., against two of his other clients, Jean and Joan Cornell. 

That case was being heard by Judge Bryan, and it was alleged that then-attorney 

Decker failed to inform Bart Valdes, opposing counsel in the Wells Fargo suit, that 

then-attorney Decker and Judge Bryan had an attorney-client relationship. Charge 

6 alleged that then-attorney Decker engaged in pretrial preparation and negotiation 

with Valdes up to a date very near the scheduled trial without ever disclosing his 

relationship with Judge Bryan. This conduct was alleged to violate Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-8.4(d) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to 

the administration of justice); Rule 4-8.4(c) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rules Regulating 

The Florida Bar Rule of Discipline 3-4.3 (commission by a lawyer of act that is 

unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may constitute cause for discipline).

Charge 7 alleged a number of matters concerning then-attorney Decker’s 

representation of Judge Bryan, Dukes, Woodington, and an entity owned by them 

called BWD Land Trust (BWD) arising out of the suit against these clients by TD 

Bank. The charge alleged that then-attorney Decker failed to explain to the three 

clients the implications of common representation and the advantages and risks 

involved. For example, the charge alleged that then-attorney Decker failed to 
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explain that joint guarantors are entitled to demand reimbursement from the others 

if one pays more than another. This failure was alleged to violate Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-1.7(c) (attorney representing multiple clients in a single 

matter must explain implications of common representation and advantages and 

risks involved). It was also alleged that in this litigation, BWD owed TD Bank 

approximately $1.3 million secured by property in Bradford County and that the 

three clients were guarantors of this debt. The charge contended that during this 

litigation, then-attorney Decker had Dukes and Woodington execute quitclaim 

deeds to Judge Bryan, which put them at a negotiating disadvantage. By doing so, 

he allegedly violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a) (attorney must not 

represent a client if the representation will be directly adverse to another client or 

there is a substantial risk that lawyer’s representation of one client will be 

materially limited by responsibilities to another client) and Rule 4-1.8(g) (lawyer 

of multiple clients shall not make an aggregate settlement unless each client gives 

informed consent in writing, and lawyer’s disclosure shall include the existence 

and nature of all claims and the participation of each person in the settlement).

It was further alleged in Charge 7 that on August 10, 2011, then-attorney 

Decker sent an e-mail to Scott Thomas, the attorney representing TD Bank, stating 

that Judge Bryan might file for bankruptcy, which created a conflict with thenattorney Decker’s other two clients, requiring his immediate withdrawal from 
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representing all three of them. This conduct was alleged to violate Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a) (attorney must not represent a client if the 

representation will be directly adverse to another client or there is a substantial risk 

that lawyer’s representation of one client will be materially limited by 

responsibilities to another client). 

When then-attorney Decker filed a bankruptcy petition for Judge Bryan, 

then-attorney Decker stated under oath that his law firm had no connection with

the debtor, his creditors, or any other parties of interest, which was alleged in 

Charge 7 to be false, and in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.3 (lack 

of candor toward the tribunal). Then-attorney Decker then filed an amended 

application to represent Judge Bryan in the bankruptcy case, clarifying that his firm 

had represented BWD, Dukes, Woodington, and Judge Bryan in the earlier-filed 

foreclosure action. However, in this amended application, then-attorney Decker

did not mention that he continued to represent BWD, which was alleged to be a

violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.3 (lack of candor toward the 

tribunal). 

In addition, in Charge 7, the Investigative Panel alleged that shortly after the 

bankruptcy petition was filed for Judge Bryan, and while then-attorney Decker was 

still counsel for Dukes and Woodington, then-attorney Decker sent an e-mail on 

March 14, 2012, to Scott Thomas, counsel for TD Bank in the foreclosure suit filed 
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against all three clients. Judge Decker admitted to the fact and the text of the email, which stated that then-attorney Decker consented to relief from the 

bankruptcy stay for TD Bank, but noted that TD Bank could still “pursue its 

remedies against the other two defendants,” who were Dukes and Woodington. 

This conduct was alleged to violate Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a)

(attorney must not represent a client if the representation will be directly adverse to 

another client), 4-1.8(b) (lawyer shall not use information relating to representation 

of one client to the disadvantage of another client without consent), and 4-1.9(b) 

(lawyer must not use information relating to representation of one client to the 

disadvantage of a former client).

Finally, Charge 7 contained allegations regarding four lawsuits filed on 

October 3, 2011, by John Vreeland, trustee of the Leland Bryan Revocable Living 

Trust, in Polk County. Three of the suits were filed against Judge Bryan and one

suit was filed against Dukes and Woodington. The Second Amended Notice of 

Formal Charges alleged that in this litigation, Dukes, who was not represented in 

that case by then-attorney Decker, contended his signature on a promissory note 

for $235,400 was forged, thus creating a conflict of interest for then-attorney 

Decker’s continued representation of the three clients, which was in violation of 

Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a) (lawyer must not represent a client if that 

representation is directly adverse to another client or the representation will be 
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materially limited by responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third 

person). Charge 7 alleged that the claim of forgery by Dukes required thenattorney Decker’s withdrawal from representation of all three clients. 

The Second Amended Notice of Formal Charges, in Charges 8 through 16, 

which were treated by the Hearing Panel as one charge, made certain allegations of 

misconduct concerning then-attorney Decker’s actions during litigation filed by 

Compass Bank. In that litigation, then-attorney Decker represented Woods 

Marina, LLC, Matthew Ellison, and Jennifer Ellison, who is also an attorney. It 

was alleged that in June 2010, then-attorney Decker filed an answer for these three 

clients and served Attorney Brent C. Siegel, who represented certain other 

defendants, including Job White and his wife, Frances Grace White, who were 

trying to reinstate, refinance, or buy the Compass Bank loan to save the 

condominium project for which the loan was made. It was alleged that unknown to 

Siegel’s clients, the Ellisons began negotiations with Compass Bank to buy the 

loan for their own benefit. 

During this litigation, then-attorney Decker and the attorney for Compass 

Bank moved to substitute the Ellisons’ new entity, MJE Family Investments

(MJE), as party-plaintiff, and the Ellisons, through MJE, voluntarily dismissed 

Siegel’s clients, defendants Job and Frances Grace White. It was alleged that these 

actions and this substitution occurred after then-attorney Decker and Jennifer 
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Ellison met secretly with Siegel’s client, Job White, at then-attorney Decker’s 

office to discuss possible settlement of the case as to the Whites, and that pursuant 

to the secret settlement, the Whites were to provide funds that the Ellisons would 

use to help buy the Compass loan. At the secret meeting, White informed thenattorney Decker he had discharged Siegel, his counsel of record, but then-attorney 

Decker did not confirm this. The agreement reached with the Ellisons and the 

Whites was protected by a confidentiality provision that allowed it to be revealed 

only to the parties’ counsel, even though White claimed he had no counsel. It was 

alleged that the Whites’ counsel, Siegel, only learned of the secret deal in 

November 2010 when then-attorney Decker sent demand letters to Siegel’s other 

clients to accept a settlement offer. All this conduct was alleged to violate Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-4.2(a) (lawyer must not communicate about the subject of 

the representation with persons the lawyer knows are represented by counsel unless 

consent is obtained); Rule 4-3.4(a) (lawyer must not obstruct another party’s 

access to documents or material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 

is relevant to the proceeding, or assist another person to do so); Rule 4-8.4(a) 

(lawyer shall not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or knowingly assist or 

induce another to do so); Rule 4-8.4(c) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule of Discipline
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3-4.3 (lawyer’s conduct that is unlawful or contrary to the administration of justice

is subject to discipline). 

Charge 17 of the Second Amended Notice of Formal Charges was simply a 

summation of the Judicial Canons, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and the 

statute that the foregoing conduct was alleged to have violated. 

After Judge Decker filed his answers to the charges, the parties engaged in 

extensive discovery and the case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing held 

December 10-12, 2014, before the Hearing Panel. The Hearing Panel issued its 

“Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations by the JQC Hearing Panel”

(Findings) on March 3, 2015. 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BY THE JQC HEARING PANEL

In its Findings, the Hearing Panel correctly noted that the burden of proof 

for violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and the Code of Judicial 

Conduct is clear and convincing evidence. See In re Turner, 76 So. 3d 898, 901 

(Fla. 2011). All the charges at issue, as set forth in the Second Amended Notice of 

Formal Charges, concern Judge Decker’s conduct as a private attorney and during 

his candidacy for circuit judge. The Hearing Panel also correctly determined that a

sitting judge can be disciplined through the JQC for rule and statutory violations 

that occurred before the judge took the bench. See In re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579, 

588 (Fla. 2005) (“Misconduct committed by an attorney who subsequently 
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becomes a judge falls within the subject-matter jurisdiction of this Court and the 

JQC, no matter how remote.”); see also In re Watson, 174 So. 3d 364, 369 (Fla. 

2015) (“[T]he Commission has constitutional authority to investigate pre-judicial 

acts and recommend to this Court the removal (for unfitness) or reprimand (for 

misconduct) of a sitting judge.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Davey, 645 

So. 2d 398, 403 (Fla. 1994))), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 863 (2016). The Hearing 

Panel’s Findings also noted that Judge Decker agreed that some of his conduct was 

in violation of the various rules and canons. Based on Judge Decker’s admissions 

and the evidence presented, the Hearing Panel found Judge Decker guilty of 

Charges 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8, which also encompasses Charges 9-16. 

The Hearing Panel found as to Charge 1 that then-attorney Decker’s 

statement at a televised debate that he had never been accused of a conflict of 

interest was false and was not corrected during the debate or publicly thereafter. 

The Hearing Panel found that Judge Decker admitted his guilt and that this conduct 

violated Judicial Canons 7A(3)(b) and 7A(3)(e)(ii), and Rules of Professional 

Conduct 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.2(b). 

The Hearing Panel found as to Charge 3, in pertinent part, that at a Lafayette 

County Republican Executive Committee candidates’ forum then-attorney Decker

publicly stated he was affiliated with the Republican Party and that his former 

affiliation with the Democratic Party was an error he had corrected. Judge Decker 
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admitted making the statements. The Hearing Panel found this conduct violated 

Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 7A(1)(c) and 7C(3), Rule of Professional 

Conduct 4-8.2(b), and section 105.071(3), Florida Statutes (2011). The Hearing 

Panel did not find a violation regarding then-attorney Decker’s statement that he is 

“pro-life.”

As to Charge 6, the Hearing Panel found Judge Decker guilty based on the

evidence of his failure to notify opposing counsel in the Wells Fargo case that he 

represented the presiding judge, Judge Bryan, in other litigation. The Hearing 

Panel found that in November 2010, Judge Bryan, the presiding judge in a 

foreclosure case brought by Wells Fargo Bank against then-attorney Decker’s 

clients, the Cornells, set the case for trial for January 25, 2011. The Hearing Panel

found that in December 2010, then-attorney Decker began representing Judge 

Bryan in the TD Bank suit brought against Judge Bryan, Dukes, and Woodington. 

The Hearing Panel found that during the time leading up to the trial date in the 

Wells Fargo case, then-attorney Decker and Wells Fargo’s attorney Bart Valdes 

engaged in trial preparation and settlement negotiations. The Hearing Panel found

that then-attorney Decker asked Valdes to agree to a continuance, which was 

agreed upon, and submitted an order for a continuance to Judge Bryan on January 

24, 2011. During this time, then-attorney Decker did not disclose to Valdes the 

fact that then-attorney Decker was representing Judge Bryan in separate litigation. 
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The Hearing Panel concluded that this conduct was proven and that it prejudiced 

opposing counsel. This conduct was found to have violated Rules of Professional 

Conduct 4-8.4(d) and 4-8.4(c), and Rule of Discipline 3-4.3.

The Hearing Panel found Judge Decker guilty of Charge 7, which involved 

then-attorney Decker’s common representation of Judge Bryan, Dukes, and 

Woodington, as well as their trust, BWD, in litigation arising from land purchases 

in Hamilton County and Bradford County. Judge Decker agreed that he failed to 

provide a proper explanation to these clients concerning his common 

representation of all of them, and that he should have withdrawn from representing 

all of them. The Hearing Panel found that then-attorney Decker failed to explain to 

them the advantages and, equally if not more importantly, the risks involved when

one joint guarantor is entitled to demand contribution from the other joint 

guarantors if one pays more than another. The Hearing Panel also found that thenattorney Decker failed to have the clients execute written waivers of conflict, did 

not have a written contract with the clients, and did not keep Dukes and 

Woodington advised in any respect about the litigation. This conduct was found to 

have violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(c). 

The Hearing Panel also found as part of Charge 7 that then-attorney 

Decker’s actions in sending an August 10, 2011, e-mail to the attorney 

representing TD Bank, stating that Judge Bryan might file for bankruptcy, created 
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a conflict with then-attorney Decker’s other clients and required then-attorney 

Decker’s immediate withdrawal from representing all three of them. This conduct 

was found to violate Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a). In addition, relative to 

Charge 7, the Hearing Panel found that in the TD Bank foreclosure suit against his 

clients, then-attorney Decker had Dukes and Woodington execute quitclaim deeds 

of the subject property to Judge Bryan, which the Hearing Panel found divested 

Dukes and Woodington of ownership and placed them at a negotiating 

disadvantage. This conduct was found to violate Rules of Professional Conduct 4-

1.7(a) and 4-1.8(g). These violations were found even though Judge Decker

explained that he sought the quitclaim deeds only to avoid additional judgment 

liens being placed against the property in order that he might more successfully 

negotiate a resolution of the case by deed in lieu of foreclosure.

The Hearing Panel also found that then-attorney Decker violated Rule 4-

1.7(a) by continuing to represent all three clients after separate lawsuits were filed 

in Polk County by the Leland Bryan Revocable Living Trust against Bryan, Dukes,

and Woodington, in which then-attorney Decker was not representing Dukes. In 

that litigation, Dukes claimed his signature had been forged on the note at issue, 

which the Hearing Panel concluded created a conflict among the defendants and 

that then-attorney Decker should have withdrawn from representing all these 

clients. The Hearing Panel also found that further conflict was created when then-
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attorney Decker filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for Judge Bryan, which 

created conflict between the three clients. In the filing, then-attorney Decker made 

inaccurate statements in the pleadings, which were filed while he still represented 

Dukes and Woodington, that then-attorney Decker’s firm had no connection with 

any creditor or other parties in interest. The Hearing Panel found that this conduct 

violated Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.7, 4-1.8(g), 4-3.3, and 4-1.9(b).

Also as to Charge 7, the Hearing Panel found, based on evidence and Judge 

Decker’s admitted conduct, that shortly after Judge Bryan’s bankruptcy petition 

was filed, and while then-attorney Decker was still representing Dukes and 

Woodington, then-attorney Decker sent an e-mail to counsel for TD Bank in the 

foreclosure suit consenting to relief from the bankruptcy stay for TD Bank, and 

noting that TD Bank could still “pursue its remedies against the other two 

defendants,” who were Dukes and Woodington. This conduct was found to violate 

Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a), 4-1.8(b), and 4-1.9(b).

The Hearing Panel found Judge Decker guilty of Charge 8 (including 

allegations in Charges 8 through 16) involving a foreclosure case brought by 

Compass Bank in which then-attorney Decker represented Matthew and Jennifer 

Ellison and their entity, Woods Marina, LLC. Attorney Brent Siegel represented, 

among others, Kelly Shore, Ted Burt, and Job and Frances Grace White. Siegel’s 

clients were attempting to reinstate, refinance, or buy the Compass Bank loan to 
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save the condominium project for which the monies were borrowed. The Hearing 

Panel found that unknown to Siegel and his other clients, the Ellisons began their 

own discussions to buy the Compass Bank note, thus becoming competitors with 

the other defendants. The Hearing Panel found that without Siegel’s knowledge or 

approval, then-attorney Decker and his client, Jennifer Ellison, met in secret with 

Siegel’s client, Job White, at then-attorney Decker’s office, with then-attorney 

Decker present, to discuss possible settlement, in which the Whites would provide 

some funds that the Ellisons would use toward purchasing the note. If this 

succeeded, the Ellisons would dismiss claims against the Whites. The Hearing 

Panel found based on testimony by Judge Decker and White that, at that meeting, 

White told then-attorney Decker he had no counsel, or had discharged his counsel, 

but then-attorney Decker made no effort to confirm that. The Hearing Panel

further found that a settlement, with a confidentiality clause, was reached with 

Ellison and the Whites, which resulted in MJE, a newly created entity by the 

Ellisons, being substituted as plaintiff in the Compass Bank litigation. Siegel 

testified, and the Hearing Panel found, that he did not learn of the secret deal until 

more than a month later when then-attorney Decker sent a letter to Siegel making 

demands of Siegel’s other clients. The Hearing Panel found that this conduct 

violated Rules of Professional Conduct 4-4.2(a), 4-3.4(a), 4-8.4(a), 4-8.4(c), and 

Rule of Discipline 3-4.3.
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In its Findings, the Hearing Panel concluded that Judge Decker exhibited a 

pattern of behavior that evidenced a lack of ethical judgment and a lack of 

understanding and concomitant contrition about the harm caused to his clients and 

the public’s trust. The Hearing Panel stated, “The cumulative effect of these 

misdeeds coupled with the fact that Judge Decker has been reprimanded by The 

Florida Bar in the past, evinces a lack of ability to identify situations that lead to 

the appearance of impropriety.”3 However, the Hearing Panel found based on 

testimony concerning Judge Decker’s present ability as a circuit judge that “he 

should be given an opportunity to continue to serve the citizens.” The Hearing 

Panel concluded by recommending a public reprimand, suspension without pay for 

ninety days, and an order to pay costs of the proceedings.

After the Hearing Panel’s Findings were filed, this Court issued an order to 

Judge Decker to show cause why the recommended action should not be granted. 

Judge Decker responded that he accepted the recommended discipline and “looks 

forward to continuing to serve the public as a circuit court judge following his term 

of suspension.” Thereafter, we issued a second order to Judge Decker to show 

cause as to why the Court should not disapprove the recommended sanction of a 

 

3. The details of the prior discipline were not made clear in the record and 

when asked about the earlier discipline, Judge Decker conceded he had been 

disciplined in 1985 but could not recall the reason.
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public reprimand, ninety-day suspension, and costs as well as consider a more 

severe sanction instead, including removal from office. Both Judge Decker and the 

JQC responded in detail to the second order to show cause.

ANALYSIS

We review the findings of the Hearing Panel to determine if they are 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. The “standard for clear and 

convincing evidence falls between ‘a preponderance of the evidence’ and 

‘beyond . . . reasonable doubt.’ ” In re Turner, 76 So. 3d at 901 (alteration in 

original) (quoting In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997)). “If the 

findings meet this intermediate standard, then they are of persuasive force and are 

given great weight.” Id. We further review the recommendation of discipline to 

determine “whether it should be approved or whether other discipline is 

appropriate.” In re Renke, 933 So. 2d 482, 486 (Fla. 2006). We conclude that—

except as to one rule violation found under Charge 3, one rule violation found

under Charge 7, and the five rule violations found under Charge 8—the Hearing 

Panel had before it clear and convincing evidence of the violations of those rules 

that the Hearing Panel found then-attorney Decker violated.

Then-attorney Decker’s conduct alleged in Charge 1—that while 

campaigning he falsely stated that he had never been accused of a conflict of 

interest—was proven by clear and convincing evidence. This false statement, 
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which he did not timely correct, violated Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 

7A(3)(e)(ii), which prohibits a candidate from knowingly misrepresenting facts 

concerning the candidate or opponent, and 7A(3)(b), which requires a candidate to 

act with integrity. By violating these Canons, then-attorney Decker also violated 

Rule of Professional Conduct 4-8.2(b), which requires candidates to comply with 

the applicable Canons of Judicial Conduct. Further, clear and convincing evidence 

established that the conduct violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-8.4(c), which 

prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation.

Then-attorney Decker’s conduct alleged in Charge 3—that he publicly 

announced his affiliation with the Republican Party—was also proven and violated

Canon 7C(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a candidate for 

judicial office to refrain from commenting on his or her affiliation with or support 

of a political party.4 By violating this Canon, then-attorney Decker also violated 

Rule of Professional Conduct 4-8.2(b), which requires candidates to comply with 

 

4. The Second Amended Notice of Formal Charges alleged that thenattorney Decker’s conduct set forth in Charge 3 also violated Canon of Judicial 

Conduct 7A(1)(c), which prohibits a judicial candidate from making speeches on 

behalf of a political organization. However, the Hearing Panel did not explain in 

its Findings how then-attorney Decker’s comment constituted a “speech” on behalf 

of a political organization. We do not find that the conduct alleged and proven in 

Charge 3 violated this particular subsection of Canon 7A.
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the applicable Canons of Judicial Conduct. Finally, this conduct violated section 

105.071(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits a candidate for judicial office from 

publicly representing himself as a member of a political party.5

The evidence of the conduct alleged in Charge 6 was clear and convincing

that then-attorney Decker violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-8.4(d), which 

prohibits conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice. The evidence was undisputed that in a case pending 

before Judge Bryan, then-attorney Decker failed to inform Wells Fargo’s counsel 

about his representation of Judge Bryan, even though the case was set for trial and 

the parties were both preparing for trial and attempting to negotiate a settlement, 

which ultimately occurred. Wells Fargo’s counsel testified that he did not learn 

 

5. Judge Decker contends that the rule and statute are a violation of his right 

to free speech. However, we decline to rule on the constitutionality of section 

105.071 or the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibit a candidate 

from publicly stating his or her affiliation with or support for a political party. The 

constitutional claim was not fully litigated in the JQC proceeding. Moreover, as to 

the challenge to section 105.071(3), the State of Florida was not given an 

opportunity to be heard as to the constitutionality of the state statute. Although this 

was not a state judicial proceeding for which notice to the State Attorney General 

is required, see section 86.091, Florida Statutes, we are reluctant to rule on the 

constitutionality of a statute without the State having had an opportunity to make 

its position known. We also decline to rule on Judge Decker’s constitutional claim 

pertaining to that portion of Charge 3 in which the JQC charged Judge Decker with 

violating Canon 7C(3) by stating his position as “pro-life.” This Canon cautions a 

candidate to avoid expressing an opinion on a political issue. The JQC did not 

expressly rule on this portion of the charge. Thus, we do not reach any 

constitutional issues regarding Canon 7C(3). 
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that then-attorney Decker was representing Judge Bryan at the time he presided 

over the Wells Fargo case until approximately one year later when it was 

mentioned to him by another attorney. If he had learned of it during the litigation, 

Wells Fargo’s counsel testified, he would have moved Judge Bryan to recuse 

himself and have the case assigned to another judge, which could have delayed 

getting a trial date, if such had been necessary. Accordingly, we find that thenattorney Decker’s conduct in this regard did violate Rule of Professional Conduct

4-8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 

We also find that then-attorney Decker’s conduct violated Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-8.4(c), which prohibits a lawyer, in pertinent part, from 

engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 

Failing to advise opposing counsel that he was representing Judge Bryan in another 

case and that Judge Bryan could not preside over the upcoming trial is a form of 

dishonesty or misrepresentation by silence. By asking Wells Fargo’s counsel for 

agreement to a short continuance, as then-attorney Decker did immediately before

the scheduled trial date, rather than advising counsel that the case would not be 

going to trial as scheduled because of then-attorney Decker’s attorney-client 

relationship with Judge Bryan, then-attorney Decker misled opposing counsel 

concerning the status of the litigation. Opposing counsel had an absolute right to 

know of the attorney-client relationship that the presiding judge had with then-
- 23 -

attorney Decker, and had the right to make the decision, along with his client, as to 

whether his client would be prejudiced by the existence of that relationship. 

Because of then-attorney Decker’s silence, this could not occur.

Judge Decker’s defense to Charge 6 that he did not notify Wells Fargo’s 

counsel about his representation of Judge Bryan because the case was likely to be 

settled—and that Judge Bryan’s actions in the case were essentially 

“ministerial”—are not defenses to violation of these rules. Nor is it a defense to 

this conduct, as asserted by Judge Decker, that he did not feel he was getting any 

benefit or advantage in the Wells Fargo litigation from his relationship with Judge 

Bryan. Regardless of whether then-attorney Decker believed the case would settle

or that he was not getting any benefit, the evidence established that Wells Fargo 

and its attorney expended time and energy preparing for a trial they believed was 

imminent when, in fact, Judge Bryan would not have been able to hold the 

scheduled trial. This occurred for no other reason than then-attorney Decker’s lack 

of candor with counsel and his misrepresentation by silence.

Rule of Discipline 3-4.3, also found to have been violated by then-attorney 

Decker’s conduct, is a general rule stating, in pertinent part, that commission of an 

act by a lawyer that is contrary to honesty or justice may constitute a cause for 

discipline. Because then-attorney Decker was found to have violated Rule of 
- 24 -

Professional Conduct 4-8.4, his conduct also falls within the purview of Rule of 

Discipline 3-4.3.

Then-attorney Decker’s conduct, as alleged in Charge 7, in the common 

representation of Judge Bryan, Dukes, and Woodington, was also proven by clear 

and convincing evidence to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct 

concerning conflict of interest and proper attorney conduct in common 

representation of multiple clients. Judge Decker testified that TD Bank’s suit 

against his three clients—Dukes, Woodington, and Judge Bryan as Trustees of the 

BWD—arose out of a loan made to secure the purchase of certain Bradford County 

property, and that each client had personally guaranteed the loan. Judge Decker

agreed that the BWD trust agreement contained an indemnification provision that 

if one trustee pays more than his share, the other trustees would owe the paying 

trustee pro rata. Accordingly, each client had the right to be fully informed about 

the risk of common representation in light of the possible conflicts that could arise 

due to the obligations of the trustees to each other. Judge Decker conceded during 

his testimony that he failed to adequately inform his clients concerning the benefits 

and risks of this common representation.

Judge Decker also testified that he had no fee agreement with any of the 

three clients, that he had no initial conference with Dukes or Woodington, as 

Trustees, and that procedurally, he would discuss matters with Judge Bryan, who 
- 25 -

then-attorney Decker believed would then communicate with Dukes and 

Woodington. Judge Decker testified that he thought this consultation with Judge 

Bryan was sufficient. Judge Decker also testified that he did not think there was 

any conflict in the common representation because Judge Bryan was the party who 

would pay most of the money owed pursuant to any judgment or settlement in the 

case. However, Judge Decker conceded that in light of the grievance filed 

claiming conflict of interest, and in light of the confusion he believed Dukes 

experienced, he should have met personally with the three clients and should have 

obtained a written waiver of conflict after explaining to them the common interests 

and risks involved. 

Clear and convincing evidence also established that then-attorney Decker 

had Dukes and Woodington execute quitclaim deeds to Judge Bryan in the 

Bradford County foreclosure suit brought by TD Bank against Judge Bryan, 

Dukes, Woodington, and BWD. Judge Decker explained that he sought these 

deeds because Dukes had several judgments against him, and was subject to others 

being placed, which would be a cloud on the title to the property that then-attorney 

Decker hoped to deed to the plaintiff in lieu of foreclosure in order to reduce any 

deficiency judgments against all three clients. Judge Decker testified that the 

deeds were not done to benefit Judge Bryan, but to benefit all three clients in any 

possible settlement of the foreclosure action. However, the evidence established 
- 26 -

that then-attorney Decker did not advise Dukes or Woodington that by doing so, 

they would lose their interest in the property but still be jointly and severally 

responsible for the debt owed. The Hearing Panel found this conduct violated Rule

of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a), which includes prohibition against representation 

of a client if that representation (1) will be directly adverse to another client or (2) 

there is a substantial risk that representation of one client will be materially limited 

by responsibilities to another client or former client.6

Even though then-attorney Decker had a benign reason for seeking the 

quitclaim deeds from two of his clients in favor of the third, this does not excuse 

then-attorney Decker’s failure to fully advise all his clients of not only the benefits, 

but the risks, of common representation, especially when, as here, the clients are 

jointly and severally responsible for payment of debt incurred to purchase the 

property. Thus, we agree with the Hearing Panel that clear and convincing 

evidence also demonstrated that then-attorney Decker’s conduct in his common 

 

6. The Second Amended Notice of Formal Charges alleged that thenattorney Decker’s conduct set forth in Charge 7 also violated Rule of Professional 

Conduct 4-1.8(g), which prohibits a lawyer who represents two or more clients 

from making an aggregate settlement unless each client gives informed consent 

after the lawyer discloses the existence and nature of all claims involved and the 

participation of each person in the settlement. However, the Hearing Panel did not 

explain in its Findings how the partial settlement between Decker’s clients 

constituted an “aggregate settlement” within the meaning of the rule. We do not 

find that the conduct alleged and proven in Charge 7 violated Rule of Professional 

Conduct 4-1.8(g).
- 27 -

representation of Dukes, Woodington, and Judge Bryan violated Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-1.7(c). That rule provides that when representing multiple 

clients in a single matter, “the consultation must include an explanation of the 

implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.”

The Hearing Panel also correctly found that then-attorney Decker violated 

Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a) by continuing to represent all three clients 

after separate litigation was brought by the Leland Bryan Revocable Living Trust 

against Judge Bryan, Dukes, and Woodington in Polk County, and when Dukes 

claimed his signature had been forged on the note at issue. Although then-attorney 

Decker was not representing Dukes in that case, Dukes’ claim of forgery raised 

conflicts among the three clients, whom then-attorney Decker continued to 

represent. The Hearing Panel correctly concluded that then-attorney Decker

should have withdrawn from representation of all three clients when these conflicts 

became apparent, and that his failure to do so violated Rule of Professional 

Conduct 4-1.7(a). Instead of withdrawing from representation of all three clients, 

then-attorney Decker ultimately withdrew from representing Dukes and 

Woodington but continued to represent Judge Bryan. Clear and convincing 

evidence established the facts underlying this portion of Charge 7 and we agree 

with the Hearing Panel that then-attorney Decker should have withdrawn from 

representing all three clients based on this obvious conflict among the three. 
- 28 -

As to Charge 7, clear and convincing evidence established that then-attorney 

Decker notified counsel for TD Bank some months before filing the bankruptcy 

action for Judge Bryan that Judge Bryan was contemplating bankruptcy. We agree 

with the Hearing Panel that this created an immediate conflict of interest between 

Judge Bryan and the other clients requiring then-attorney Decker to withdraw from 

representing all three of them. This conduct violated Rule of Professional Conduct 

4-1.7(a) because bankruptcy by Judge Bryan would shield him while leaving the 

other two clients vulnerable to the suit by TD Bank, and jointly and severally liable 

for the entire loan amount. Judge Decker testified in his defense that Woodington 

was also considering bankruptcy, but Judge Decker agreed that filing bankruptcy 

for Woodington would have adversely affected the substantial debt Woodington 

owed to Judge Bryan. Judge Decker testified he did not think this was a conflict 

because Judge Bryan “did not ask me to do anything with respect to that [debt]” 

and because Dukes and Woodington had their own bankruptcy counsel. Even so, 

the defense that Dukes and Woodington could have filed for bankruptcy too, or 

that Woodington sought other counsel to advise him on bankruptcy, does not 

excuse or eliminate the conflict of interest violation established by the foregoing 

conduct.

Clear and convincing evidence also established that then-attorney Decker

filed a bankruptcy petition and an application to appear as counsel in the 
- 29 -

bankruptcy case for Judge Bryan in which then-attorney Decker incorrectly stated 

that he had no connection with any creditors of Judge Bryan or other parties of 

interest. An amended application for representation was filed noting then-attorney 

Decker’s former representation of Dukes, Woodington, and BWD in a suit brought 

by TD Bank, but failing to disclose that then-attorney Decker continued to 

represent the BWD trust and that then-attorney Decker had previously represented 

Judge Bryan, Dukes, and Woodington in other lawsuits. This conduct violated 

Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.3, which makes it a violation for a lawyer to 

make a false statement of material fact to a tribunal or fail to correct such a false 

statement. These facts were admitted by Judge Decker and this violation was 

established by clear and convincing evidence. However, Judge Decker’s defense 

that the omissions were inadvertent, which was also the opinion of the bankruptcy 

judge who testified on Judge Decker’s behalf, diminishes the fact that the violation 

occurred.

Also in Charge 7, the Hearing Panel alleged and the evidence demonstrated 

that before being allowed to withdraw as counsel for Woodington and Dukes, and 

shortly after the bankruptcy petition was filed for Judge Bryan, then-attorney 

Decker sent an e-mail to counsel for TD Bank in the foreclosure suit related to the 

loan on the Bradford County property. Judge Decker admitted that in the e-mail he 

stated that he consented to relief from the bankruptcy stay for TD Bank, but noted 
- 30 -

that TD Bank could still “pursue its remedies against the other two defendants.” 

Judge Decker denied that this e-mail to TD Bank counsel was an “invitation” for 

TD Bank to pursue claims against Dukes and Woodington, and said that the e-mail 

was just a statement of the law and that TD Bank was already going to look to 

them for payment. The attorney for TD Bank also testified at the hearing that he 

understood the e-mail as simply stating a known fact regarding those two 

defendants. 

Regardless of whether it was a known fact that TD Bank was pursuing and 

would continue to pursue its remedies against Dukes and Woodington, defendants 

who were not protected by a bankruptcy stay, this e-mail violated Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a), which prohibits a lawyer from representing a client 

if that representation is directly adverse to another client. Even though both 

lawyers knew that TD Bank was pursuing and would continue to pursue Dukes and 

Woodington, the e-mail pointedly reminded TD Bank’s counsel of that fact to the 

possible detriment of Dukes and Woodington. The Hearing Panel correctly found 

that the e-mail also violated Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.8(b) and 4-1.9(b), 

which prohibit a lawyer from using information relating to the representation of

one client, or former client, to the disadvantage of another client or former client.

In sum, as to Charge 7, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence 

supports the Hearing Panel’s findings that then-attorney Decker’s conduct in 
- 31 -

relation to his common representation of clients Dukes, Woodington, and Judge 

Bryan violated a number of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar concerning 

representation of multiple clients, conflicts of interest, and candor to the tribunal.

Consolidated Charges 8 through 16 dealt with a foreclosure case brought by 

Compass Bank in which then-attorney Decker represented Matthew and Jennifer 

Ellison and their entity, Woods Marina, LLC. The Hearing Panel concluded that 

“[t]hrough a complex series of events, Judge Decker became involved in secret 

meetings with some, but not all, parties” and violated Rule of Professional Conduct 

4-4.2(a), which prohibits communication with a person represented by other 

counsel without consent of that counsel. The Hearing Panel found relative to these 

same facts that then-attorney Decker violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-

3.4(a), which, in pertinent part, prohibits a lawyer from obstructing another party’s 

access to evidence or concealing a document or material that the lawyer knows or 

reasonably should have known is relevant to a pending matter, or assisting another 

person in doing so.

We conclude that one of the most serious violations found by the Hearing 

Panel—Charge 8 relating to prohibited communication with a represented party—

is not supported by the evidence. Rule of Professional Conduct 4-4.2(a) requires 

that an attorney not meet with a person counsel knows is represented about the 

subject of the representation without permission from that person’s counsel. The 
- 32 -

evidence established that then-attorney Decker, along with his client, Jennifer 

Ellison, who is also an attorney, met with Job White to discuss possible settlement 

of a portion of the Compass Bank litigation. However, the evidence is 

uncontroverted that then-attorney Decker was directly and unequivocally informed 

by White that he was no longer represented by counsel of record Brent Siegel.7

We conclude that then-attorney Decker did not have an obligation to confirm 

that White was no longer represented by counsel. We also conclude that White’s 

status as an unrepresented party was not dependent upon his former counsel’s 

compliance with the requirements of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 

2.505(f)(1) regarding withdrawal of an attorney. A party who like White has 

decided that he no longer desires to be represented by counsel should not be 

chained to counsel for purposes of Rule of Professional Conduct 4-4.2(a) until 

counsel withdraws under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.505(f)(1). And 

a lawyer like then-attorney Decker should not be required to further investigate the 

status of the representation once the party has stated unequivocally that he is not 

represented by counsel. See In re Users Sys. Servs, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 331, 334-35 

(Tex. 1999) (holding both that (a) rule of professional responsibility prohibiting 

communication by an attorney with a person represented by other counsel 

 

7. Siegel had represented Job and Frances Grace White, Frederic and Kelly 

Shore, and others in the foreclosure action.
- 33 -

ordinarily “does not require an attorney to contact a person’s former attorney to 

confirm the person’s statement that representation has been terminated before 

communicating with the person” and that (b) “the client’s right to terminate the 

relationship” is not “limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to a court as counsel 

of record for the client”). We therefore disagree with the Hearing Panel’s 

conclusion that then-attorney Decker’s conduct violated Rule of Professional 

Conduct 4-4.2(a).

8

We further conclude that the related violation for improperly withholding 

information from White’s prior counsel is not supported by the evidence. Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-3.4(a), in pertinent part, prohibits a lawyer from 

obstructing another party’s access to evidence or concealing a document or 

material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should have known is relevant to a 

pending matter, or assisting another person in doing so. The evidence established 

that then-attorney Decker facilitated a confidential settlement agreement between 

 

8. The concurrence erroneously relies on The Florida Bar v. Feinberg, 760 

So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2000), to support the conclusion that then-attorney Decker

violated Rule 4-4.2(a). Feinberg is readily distinguishable. First, in Feinberg there

was no challenge to the referee’s conclusion that a violation of the rule had been

committed. Our analysis in Feinberg therefore necessarily took the violation as

established, and the case contains no holding regarding the circumstances that

support finding a violation of the rule. Second, we concluded that Feinberg

“exercised poor judgment by affirmatively misleading and being untruthful with

opposing counsel, and continuing to meet with the defendant after realizing that,

contrary to the defendant’s statements, he was represented by counsel.” Id. at 939. 

The circumstances present here are wholly dissimilar.
- 34 -

his client and the Whites to protect the document from disclosure. However, there 

is no evidence that then-attorney Decker unlawfully obstructed access to evidence 

or concealed any document from opposing counsel. We therefore disagree with 

the Hearing Panel’s conclusion that then-attorney Decker’s conduct in this regard 

violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.4(a); Rule 4-8.4(a), which prohibits a 

lawyer from violating the Rules of Professional Conduct or assisting another to do 

so; Rule 4-8.4(c), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and Rule of Discipline 3-4.3, which 

prohibits the commission of an act contrary to justice.

The forgoing violations found in Charges 1, 3, 6, and 7 were established by 

clear and convincing evidence and support the imposition of a serious sanction in 

this case, which we discuss next.

DISCIPLINE

The Hearing Panel recommended a ninety-day suspension, public

reprimand, and payment of costs of the proceedings as the discipline to be imposed

for the numerous violations discussed above. We are aware that in the past, a

single instance of campaign violation has warranted only a public reprimand, or a

reprimand and a fine. See, e.g., In re Dempsey, 29 So. 3d 1030, 1031, 1034 (Fla.

2010) (public reprimand warranted where Dempsey misrepresented her position

and qualifications during her campaign); In re Colodny, 51 So. 3d 430, 432-33
- 35 -

(Fla. 2010) (campaign finance violation based on advice of counsel and

interpretation of statutes warranted a reprimand and a fine). For multiple campaign

finance violations, this Court has imposed more severe discipline. See, e.g., In re

Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 2002) (imposing a four-month suspension,

$40,000 fine, costs, and a public reprimand for multiple campaign violations).

Judge Decker’s misconduct unquestionably warrants the imposition of a 

serious sanction. In addition to campaign violations, then-attorney Decker (1) 

violated the Rules of Professional Conduct in failing to advise opposing counsel in 

the Wells Fargo litigation that he was currently representing the presiding judge in 

other litigation; (2) violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct concerning 

conflict of interest in common representation, including failing to counsel and 

advise the three clients of the risks and advantages of common representation, 

failing to withdraw when conflicts were apparent, engaging in representation of 

one client to the detriment of other current or former clients, reminding opposing 

counsel in the TD Bank case that even though Judge Bryan was in bankruptcy 

court, TD Bank could still pursue its claims against Dukes and Woodington; and 

(3) violated the Rules of Professional Conduct requiring candor to the tribunal by 

incorrectly stating the status of his representation of Dukes, Woodington, and 

BWD trust on filings made with the bankruptcy court in Judge Bryan’s case.
- 36 -

When it became apparent numerous times that there was conflict among 

then-attorney Decker’s clients, then-attorney Decker should have immediately 

withdrawn from all representation. His inability to understand the serious conflict 

that existed, and to recognize that conflict when it became apparent on more than

one occasion, demonstrates a critical lack of care concerning his clients.

In addition, there were other serious violations of the Rules of Professional 

Conduct, including then-attorney Decker’s failure to advise opposing counsel in 

the Wells Fargo case that then-attorney Decker had undertaken representation of 

Judge Bryan, the presiding judge in the Wells Fargo case. All the violations 

established by the evidence in this case demonstrate a pattern of poor judgment,

and lack of concern for jointly represented clients and for other counsel and their 

clients. Judge Decker violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct and 

Canons of Judicial Conduct, as well as a state statute, and has “exhibited a pattern 

of behavior that evidences a lack of ethical judgment, along with a lack of 

understanding and concomitant contrition about the harm caused to his clients and 

to the public’s trust in the legal system,” as the Hearing Panel found. The Hearing 

Panel was also concerned, as are we, by the fact that Judge Decker was 

reprimanded by The Florida Bar in the past. This prior discipline, along with the 

numerous violations proven in this case, demonstrate that Judge Decker “evinces a 

lack of ability to identify situations that lead to the appearance of impropriety.”
- 37 -

However, no evidence suggests that any of Judge Decker’s misconduct in

the practice of law caused significant harm to a client or another party. Significant

harm is, of course, not necessary to establish an ethical violation. But the absence

of such harm is a relevant consideration in determining the appropriate sanction to

be imposed. Similarly, simple errors should be treated less severely than willful

misrepresentations. So Judge Decker’s culpability for bankruptcy court filings

containing misstatements is certainly diminished by the fact that the misstatements

were inadvertent.

This proceeding is not for the purpose of inflicting punishment, but to gauge

a judge’s fitness to serve. See, e.g., In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla.

2001). To make this determination, we examine judicial misconduct for present

fitness to hold office “from two perspectives: its effect on the public’s trust and

confidence in the judiciary as reflected in its impact on the judge’s standing in the

community, and the degree to which past misconduct points to future misconduct

fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.” In re

Murphy, 181 So. 3d 1169, 1177 (Fla. 2015) (quoting In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046,

1055 (Fla. 2006)). Although the series of acts by Judge Decker involving

misconduct requires the imposition of a significant sanction, we have concluded

that it does not merit removal from office. The conduct unquestionably is

“conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary” but it does not “demonstrat[e] a
- 38 -

present unfitness to hold office.” Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const. For all these

reasons, and based on the seriousness and cumulative nature of the numerous

violations proven, we impose on Judge Decker a six-month suspension, public

reprimand, and payment of costs of the proceedings.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, due to the pattern of misconduct involving numerous separate 

and cumulative violations proven, Judge Andrew J. Decker, III, is hereby 

suspended without pay for six months from his duties as a judge of the Third 

Judicial Circuit effective immediately. We order Judge Decker to pay the costs of 

these proceedings, and we remand this case to the JQC for a determination of the 

amount of such costs. We also command Judge Decker to appear before this Court 

for the administration of a public reprimand at a time to be set by the Clerk of this 

Court.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., 

concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which LEWIS, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 

I agree with the majority that “Judge Decker’s misconduct unquestionably 

warrants the imposition of a serious sanction.” Majority op. at 35. I also agree 
- 39 -

with the increase of sanctions from the JQC’s recommended 90-day suspension 

without pay to a six-month suspension without pay. The increase in sanctions is 

appropriate given the seriousness of the multiple charges against Judge Decker, 

which would have warranted a rehabilitative suspension.9 As the JQC found, the 

“cumulative effect of these misdeeds coupled with the fact that Judge Decker had 

been reprimanded by [T]he Florida Bar in the past, evinces a lack of ability to 

identify situations that lead to the appearance of impropriety.” 

Although I agree with the sanctions the majority imposes, as I explain in 

further detail below, I cannot agree with the majority that consolidated Charge 8 

found by the JQC, relating to prohibited communication with a represented party, 

“is not supported by the evidence.” Majority op. at 31. Accordingly, I concur in 

result because I disagree with the majority’s rejection of that charge. 

I would not reject the JQC’s findings regarding consolidated Charge 8, 

which relates to then-attorney Decker’s prohibited communication with a 

 

9. With a rehabilitative suspension, when an attorney is suspended for a 

period of time of more than ninety days but less than three years, the attorney is 

required to petition The Florida Bar for readmission to practice law and “shall 

require proof of rehabilitation.” Std. 2.3, Fla. Std. for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 

The Florida Bar (last updated May 2015). If he had been under a rehabilitative 

suspension, Judge Decker would have been ineligible to become a judge unless he 

had been readmitted to the practice of law. See In re Advisory Op. to Governor re 

Comm’n of Elected Judge, 17 So. 3d 265, 267 (Fla. 2009) (explaining that “a 

lawyer who is suspended from the practice of law fails to satisfy the constitutional 

eligibility requirements for a circuit court judgeship”). 
- 40 -

represented party, Job White, during “secret meetings” between then-attorney

Decker’s clients, Jennifer and Matthew Ellison, and Job White. As the JQC found, 

then-attorney Decker’s clients were defendants in a foreclosure action brought by 

Compass Bank. In June 2014, then-attorney Decker “served an answer on Brent C. 

Siegel . . . who represented Fred and Kelly Shore, Ted Burt, and Job White and his 

wife, Frances Grace White, and various entities in which Burt and Shore were 

involved.” Some of these parties who Seigel represented “were actively involved 

in efforts to reinstate, refinance, or even buy the Compass Bank loan, probably 

through a third party, in an effort to save the condominium project for which the 

loan was made.” Unknown to Siegel’s clients, however, is that in October 2014 

“the Ellisons began their own discussions and negotiations with Compass Bank to 

buy the loan for their own benefit,” thereby becoming competitors with Siegel’s 

clients seeking to purchase the Compass Bank loan. 

The JQC found that, in attempting to purchase the Compass Bank loan, thenattorney Decker and Jennifer Ellison, also a lawyer, “met in secret” with Job 

White. The purpose of the meeting was “to discuss a possible settlement of the 

Compass Bank case as to the Whites only. Pursuant to this settlement the Whites 

would provide funds that the Ellisons would use to help them buy the Compass 

loan, and, if the Ellisons were successful in doing so, the Ellisons as the new 

owners of the Compass loan, would dismiss all claims against the Whites.” When 
- 41 -

then-attorney Decker met with Job White, he knew that the Whites already had 

counsel, Siegel, who had not sought or been given leave to withdraw from 

representing the Whites. Nonetheless, one day after the initial “secret meeting” 

between the Whites, the Ellisons, and then-attorney Decker, “a deal was reached, 

was reduced to writing and was executed.” 

Judge Decker’s defense to his actions, which the majority accepts, is that 

White told then-attorney Decker he was no longer represented by counsel. But, 

then-attorney Decker knew White had been represented by Siegel. Indeed, thenattorney Decker had “served an answer on” Siegel in the ongoing litigation just 

four months prior to secretly meeting with White. After then-attorney Decker was 

informed by Job White that he was not represented in forming the secret 

agreement, then-attorney Decker made no attempt to verify whether the Whites

had indeed discharged Siegel or whether Siegel had filed a motion to withdraw 

with the circuit court. Siegel did not learn of the secret agreement that his clients 

had entered into with then-attorney Decker’s client for more than a month after it 

was executed. In fact, as the JQC noted, the settlement agreement between the 

Ellisons and the Whites contained, in “an apparent effort to protect the secrecy of 

the settlement,” a confidentiality provision which stated “that the parties shall not 

disclose the terms of the agreement except to their respective legal counsel.” This 

provision makes little sense if Job White was no longer represented by Siegel. 
- 42 -

Indeed, Siegel testified at the JQC hearing that he was still representing the Whites 

when then-attorney Decker met with Job White, did not give any consent to thenattorney Decker to meet with his client, and that he was “stunned” when he learned 

of the “secret meeting.” 

The majority excuses this violation by stating that a “party who like White 

has decided that he no longer desires to be represented by counsel should not be 

chained to counsel for purposes of Rule of Professional Conduct 4-4.2(a) until 

counsel withdraws under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.505(f)(1).” 

Majority op. at 32. However, as the JQC’s finding reflects, after a party claims he 

or she has discharged counsel of record, there are important reasons to verify with 

the counsel of record that counsel has, in fact, been discharged or has withdrawn. 

In fact, in this case, there appears to be a factual dispute as to whether White had 

actually discharged Siegel from representation.

We have emphasized the utmost importance of this verification in criminal 

cases. See The Florida Bar v. Feinberg, 760 So. 2d 933, 939-40 (Fla. 2000) 

(holding that a prosecutor’s actions in meeting with a defendant who had counsel 

after the defendant told the prosecutor he had discharged his counsel “cast a 

shadow over the integrity of our adversarial system,” and explaining “that 

attorneys must be extremely cautious in determining whether to speak with an 

individual who appears to be represented by counsel”). While the stakes are 
- 43 -

different in a civil matter, the importance of confirming with opposing counsel that 

counsel has actually withdrawn or has been discharged before proceeding to meet 

with the formerly represented party ensures that a shadow is not cast over the 

integrity of our adversarial system. 

According to Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-4.2(a), “a lawyer must 

not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer 

knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter.” The comment to Rule 

4-4.2 further provides, “This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the 

fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the 

circumstances. . . . Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the 

consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious.” 

In this case, Judge Decker alleges that he had “actual knowledge” that White 

was not represented because White personally advised him of that fact. Yet, this 

was not the full extent of then-attorney Decker’s knowledge about White’s 

representation. Then-attorney Decker also knew that White had been previously 

represented in the litigation. Furthermore, as the JQC found, the settlement 

agreement between the parties provided that the terms of the agreement could only 

be discussed with legal counsel. White would have no need for a provision 

allowing him to inform counsel of the settlement agreement if he did not already 

have counsel. Therefore, especially in the context of these “secret meetings,” 
- 44 -

which could have undermined Siegel’s other clients who also sought to purchase 

the Compass Bank loan, Judge Decker should not be shielded from professional 

responsibility by “closing [his] eyes to the obvious.” Judge Decker was not 

cautious in this regard, and his good intentions pertaining to his clients do not 

overcome the harm that is, or can be, occasioned by meeting with someone who is 

represented by counsel without counsel’s permission during ongoing litigation. 

Lastly, Judge Decker’s ethical missteps as an attorney, in my view, are 

compounded by the false and otherwise unethical statements he made on the 

campaign trail. First, he stated “at a televised debate that he had never been 

accused of a conflict of interest.” Majority op. at 12. This was false, as “less than 

four months earlier, a formal complaint was filed with The Florida Bar by Daniel 

Dukes, a former client [of then-attorney Decker’s], alleging conflict of interest.” 

Id. at 3. Then-attorney Decker knew that he had been previously accused of a 

conflict of interest because he had “responded to that complaint with a twelve-page 

letter only two and one half months before the debate.” Id. While Judge Decker 

admitted his guilt as to this misconduct, he has, as the JQC noted in its findings, 

maintained his “steadfast position that he has done nothing wrong.” 

Additionally, while campaigning for his judicial seat, then-attorney Decker 

affiliated himself with the Republican Party. At a judicial forum sponsored by the 

Lafayette County Republican Executive Committee, then-attorney Decker stated to 
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the audience that he is a registered Republican and that his former affiliation with 

the Democratic Party “was an error.” Id. at 4. I agree with the majority that this 

conduct “was also proven and violated Canon 7C(3) of the Code of Judicial 

Conduct,” as well Rule 4-8.2(b) and section 105.071(3), Florida Statutes. Majority 

op. at 20-21. 

This Court has “often pointed out that judges should be held to higher ethical 

standards than lawyers by virtue of their position in the judiciary and the impact of 

their conduct on public confidence in an impartial justice system.” In re 

McMillian, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001). Boldly stating that one is a member 

of a political party while campaigning for a nonpartisan judicial office and 

misrepresenting to voters one’s record on ethics is discordant with the “high 

standard of ethical and professional conduct” required of judges. In re Murphy, 

181 So. 3d 1169, 1177 (Fla. 2015).

Unlike past instances when this Court has removed a judge from the bench, 

however, Judge Decker’s conduct is not so “fundamentally inconsistent with the 

responsibilities of judicial office” as to erode confidence in the judiciary and 

thereby necessitate removal. Id. at 1179. For all these reasons, I concur in the 

strong message this Court sends by imposing a six-month suspension without pay 

and a public reprimand. As the JQC remarked, “it is imperative that Judge Decker 

spend a period of time reflecting upon the far-reaching consequences of his 
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actions.” Unfortunately, this suspension will negatively affect the other judges of 

the Third Judicial Circuit, who will have to absorb Judge Decker’s workload. 

However, the purpose of the JQC proceedings is to “gauge a judge’s fitness to 

serve,” majority op. at 37, and by all accounts, despite his professional misconduct 

as an attorney, Judge Decker has ably served the citizens of the Third Judicial 

Circuit since assuming the bench. The sanction this Court imposes ensures that the 

Third Judicial Circuit will not be deprived of Judge Decker’s judicial service on a 

permanent basis.

LEWIS, J., concurs.

Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission

Ricardo Morales, III, Chair, and Michael Louis Schneider, Executive Director and 

General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida; Fred Wallace Pope, Jr., Special Counsel, 

Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP, Clearwater, Florida; Judge Krista 

Marx, Chair of the Hearing Panel, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida; and John R. 

Beranek, Counsel to the Hearing Panel, Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner

Andrew Joseph Decker, IV of The Decker Law Firm, P.A., Live Oak, Florida, and 

Scott Kevork Tozian and Gwendolyn H. Daniel of Smith, Tozian, Daniel & Davis, 

P.A., Tampa, Florida,

for Judge Andrew J. Decker, III, Respondent