alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 00-30137

Summary Calendar

_____________________

FREDDIE TAYLOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DEWAYNE CROWELL; MAXIE, Sergeant;

VIVIAN, Sergeant; PERKINS, Sergeant;

G. HILLMAN, Assistant Warden,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 99-CV-1751

_________________________________________________________________ August 17, 2000

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Freddie Taylor, Louisiana state prisoner # 100971, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). A dismissal of a complaint as

frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. S ee Ruiz v. United States

, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir.

1998). A dismissal for failure to state a claim under1 Parratt v. Taylor

, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981), overruled in

part not relevant here

, Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327 (1986);

Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).

2 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed under the same de novo standard as

is employed in reviewing dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Black v. Warren , 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998).

The district court reasoned that Taylor’s due process claims

were barred under the Parratt/Hudson 1 doctrine. Because Taylor

does not argue his due proces s claims on appeal and does not

address the dismissal of the claims as barred by Parratt/Hudson

, he

has abandoned his due process claims for purposes of this appeal.

See Yohey v. Collins

, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). He

also has abandoned any claim of the denial of his right to freedom

of speech by failing to raise the claim on appeal.

Taylor argues that the defendants’ interference with his legal

mail denied him access to the courts. He contends that the

defendants hindered his ability to litigate his claim of cruel and

unusual punishment in Cause No. 99-1639, which is currently pending

in the Western District of Louisiana. Taylor does not suggest that

his position as a litigant actually was prejudiced by the purported

interference with his legal mail. S ee Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S.

343, 350-51 (1996). Taylor has not demonstrated error in the

district court’s dismissal of his claim of denial of access to the

courts.3

For the first t ime on appeal, Taylor argues that the

defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by interfering with his

legal mail, that in an effort to hinder his ability to litigate a

claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Taylor has not demonstrated

plain error. S ee Robertson v. Plano City of Texas

, 70 F.3d 21, 22

(5th Cir. 1995).

A F F I R M E D.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 23, 2009 

l0316 

Order 

 

March 23, 2009 

137388 

JAMES R. SHAWL and MARY B. 

SHAWL, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v SC: 137388 

 COA: 275271 

Saginaw CC: 06-060834-NO 

SPENCE BROTHERS, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

J. RANCK ELECTRIC, INC., 

 Defendant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 19, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Corey Henry, certify that:

1.             I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be
filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2019-1 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

2.             Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3.             Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4.            Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report
under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

5.             All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and
15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association.



| | By:    | /s/ Corey Henry                                                                          | 
| | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
| | Name:  | Corey Henry                                                                             
| | Title: | President and Chief Executive Officer Santander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, as Depositor
| |        | (senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)                           
| | Date:  | March 30, 2020
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 6Federal Reserve Bank of: AtlantaFilings received during the week ending September 15, 2012FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodEDBANCORP, INC.                                                                                                         * 3A5EdBancorp, Inc. and its parent company, Educational Services of America, Inc., both of Knoxville, Tennessee, to merge with SouthEast Bancshares, Inc., and its subsidiary, SouthEast Bank & Trust, both of Athens, Tennessee.Newspaper: 09/30/2012Federal Register: 10/12/2012
EXHIBIT 8.1
 CAMPBELL RESOURCES INC.
SIGNIFICANT SUBSIDIARIES
  Jurisdiction of
    
    Percentage of VotingIncorporation
    
    Securities OwnedControlled by Campbell Resources Inc.:Meston Resources Inc.
    
    Québec
    
    
    100
    %MSV Resources 2007 Inc.
    
    Canada
    
    
    100
    %MSV Resources Inc.
    
    Québec
    
    
    99.999
    %GéoNova Explorations Inc.
    
    Canada
    
    
    100
    %Sotula Gold Corporation Inc.
    
    Canada
    
    
    100
    %Controlled by Meston Resources Inc.Meston Investments Limited
    
    Cayman Islands
    
    
    100
    %
#### Ralph Neal, Respondent, v Energy Transportation Group, Inc., et al., Appellants.

[744 NYS2d 672]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane Solomon, J.), entered on or about July 26, 2001, which, insofar as appealed from, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted and the complaint dismissed, without prejudice to commencement of a proper action. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants-appellants dismissing the complaint.

It has been held that Judiciary Law § 470 requires all nonresident attorneys to maintain offices in New York in order to practice law in this state (see, *Lichtenstein v*Emerson, 171 Misc 2d 933, *affd*251 AD2d 64). In *Lichtenstein,*upon finding that the plaintiffs attorney did not maintain such an office, the court explained that, “institution [of the action] based on [the attorney’s] license to practice * * * is a nullity” (171 Misc 2d at 938, *supra).*Dismissal is therefore required here, albeit without prejudice to commencement of a new action (see, *Cheshire Academy v Lee,*112 Misc 2d 1076; *Rosenberg v JohnsManville Sales Corp.,*99 Misc 2d 554). Concur — Tom, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Adam H. Nagle

v. Civil No. 08-cv-413-JL

NH State Prison

O R D E R

I herewith approve the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Muirhead dated February 17, 2009, no objection having been filed.

SO ORDERED.

March 13, 2009 _________________________________

Joseph N. Laplante

United States District Judge

cc: Adam H. Nagle, Pro se

Deborah B. Weissbard, Esq.

Case 1:08-cv-00413-JL Document 18 Filed 03/13/09 Page 1 of 1
H. Res. 991 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

March 13, 2008. 

Whereas the 69th Infantry Regiment, or the Fighting 69th, 

with citizen-soldiers from Brooklyn, Queens, Manhattan, 

the Bronx, Staten Island, and Long Island, has faithfully 

answered America’s call to arms since its formation in 

1851; 

Whereas the Fighting 69th was one of the first units to assist in the recovery effort at the World Trade Center in 

New York following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, where they lost a comrade, a firefighter; 

Whereas the 69th Infantry Regiment, while deployed to Iraq 

as ‘‘Task Force Wolfhound’’, its first overseas combat 

since World War II, fought to defend the city of Al Taji 

against al-Qaeda terrorists, protected Iraq’s first free 

elections, and secured the infamous ‘‘Route Irish’’, the 

most dangerous road in Baghdad; 

Whereas 19 members of the Fighting 69th were killed in action and over 78 were wounded in Operation Wolfhound; 

and 

Whereas the Fighting 69th has now served the Nation in 5 

wars and over 20 campaigns, and Congress has awarded 

6 members with the Congressional Medal of Honor: Now, 

therefore, be it 
2 

•HRES 991 EH 

Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

(1) recognizes the 69th Infantry Regiment, or the 

Fighting 69th, as one of the great regiments in American military history; 

(2) recognizes that America owes a tremendous 

debt for the exceptional service, patriotism, and fidelity 

of the soldiers of the Fighting 69th; 

(3) recognizes that the Fighting 69th has continually participated in the Global War on Terror since the 

attack on September 11, 2001; and 

(4) acknowledges that as the 69th Infantry Regiment deploys to Afghanistan to fight in the central front 

in the Global War on Terror, that the proud traditions 

of the regiment will be respected and that the sacrifices 

of one of America’s most storied combat units will not 

go unnoticed. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
ACCEPTED12-15-00104-CRTWELFTH COURT OF APPEALSTYLER, TEXAS7/23/2015 8:03:10 AMCATHY LUSKCLERK
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

AUGUSTUS ROSE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-871

[March 31, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, 

Okeechobee County; Michael J. McNicholas, Judge; L.T. Case No. 47-

2013-CF-000579-A.

Robert David Malove of Robert David Malove, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GROSS, MAY and CIKLIN, J.J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
|   | 1. | the      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended March      31, 2009 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section      13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (U.S.C. 78m or      78o(d)); and |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |           |                         |
|--------|-----------|------------------------------|
|   |      |                         |   |
|        | BY:  | /s/      John Lackland       |   |
|   |      | John      Lackland           |   |
|   |      | Chief      Financial Officer |   |

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles Thomas, Appellant.

[807 NYS2d 298]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Eduardo Padre, J., at plea; John Cataldo, J., at sentence), rendered on or about September 29, 2003, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833 [1976]). We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal.

Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 460.20, defendant may apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals by making application to the Chief Judge of that Court and by submitting such application to the Clerk of that Court or to a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of this Department on reasonable notice to the respondent within 30 days after service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry.

Denial of the application for permission to appeal by the judge or justice first applied to is final and no new application may thereafter be made to any other judge or justice. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Nardelli, Sweeny and McGuire, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Richard L. Duncan

v. Civil No. 08-cv-244-JL

Lakes Region Facility, Warden

O R D E R

I herewith approve the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Muirhead dated 8/19/08, no objection having been filed.

SO ORDERED.

September 23, 2008 _________________________________

Joseph N. Laplante

United States District Judge

cc: Richard L. Duncan, Pro se

Case 1:08-cv-00244-JL Document 10 Filed 09/23/08 Page 1 of 1
**BOVIE
MEDICAL CORPORATION**
 
 
 EXHIBIT
32.1
 
 Certification
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report of Bovie Medical Corporation (the “Company”)
on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Andrew Makrides,
President and Chairman of the Board of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 USC
§1350 as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
(1) the annual report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained
in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 
 Date: August
25, 2005
 
 
 
 /s/
      Andrew MakridesPresident,
      ChiefExecutive
      Officer, Chairmanof
      the Board and Director
 
 
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
213 La. 814

#### SAMPOGNARO v. SAMPOGNARO.

No. 38699.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 26, 1948.

Joseph C. Brocato, of Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellant.

Dhu Thompson, of Monroe, for defendant-appellee.

PONDER, Justice.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Sarah Cordaro Sam-pognaro, brought suit against her husband, Russell Sampognaro, for separation from bed and board on the ground of abandonment. Upon trial, the lower court rejected her demands and the plaintiff has appealed.

After the judgment was rendered in the lower court and while the appeal was pending in 'this Court, the husband brought suit against his wife for divorce on the ground of their having lived separate and apart for more than two years. On trial of this subsequent suit and during the pendency of this appeal, the lower court gave judgment granting the husband an absolute divorce. The community of acquets and gains was dissolved, the custody of the two minor children, born of the marriage, was awarded" to the husband, the wife was awarded alimony in the sum of $25.00 per month, and her attorney was awarded a fee of $50.00, to be paid out of the assets of the community. The judgment also provided that the wife would have the right to see the minor children at all reasonable times and places.

Russell Sampognaro moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the suit for separation from bed and board went out of legal existence when he was granted an absolute divorce. He has attached to his motion a certified copy of the judgment of the lower court granting him an absolute divorce.

The same question presented by the motion to dismiss the appeal was considered by this Court in the case of Cotton v. Wright, 193 La. 520, 190 So. 665, and it was held that a suit for separation from bed and board had no legal existence after a divorce was granted. Therein, it wa-s stated in effect that the bonds of mat*743rimony were completely severed by a judgment of divorce and the wife could proceed no further with a suit for separation from bed and board because the defendant was no longer her husband.

For the reasons assigned, the appeal is dismissed at defendant’s, appellant, cost.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Juan Gonzalez, Appellant.

[808 NYS2d 643]

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (David Stadtmauer, J.), rendered March 12, 2003, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of attempted robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of five years, and order, same court and Justice, *358entered on or about November 5, 2003, which denied defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment, unanimously affirmed.

After a thorough evidentiary hearing, the court properly denied defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment, made on the ground that counsel was allegedly ineffective in his efforts to locate defendant’s proposed alibi witness. There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations *(see People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]), including its implicit finding that defendant never mentioned the prospective alibi witness to his counsel until after the trial had already begun. The record supports the court’s conclusion that counsel made reasonably diligent efforts to locate the witness, given that defendant first mentioned the witness to counsel during trial, provided an incorrect name and otherwise useless contact information, and, despite being free on bail before and during trial, did nothing to contact his “friend” *(see People v Castaneda,*198 AD2d 292 [1993], *lv denied*83 NY2d 870 [1994]).

On appeal, defendant also attacks various aspects of his counsel’s trial performance. However, these claims were not included in his motion to vacate judgment, and they are not reviewable on direct appeal since they turn on matters outside the record concerning counsel’s strategy *(see People v Love,*57 NY2d 998 [1982]). To the extent the existing record permits review, it establishes that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; *People v Hobot,*84 NY2d 1021, 1024 [1995]; *see also Strickland v Washington,*466 US 668 [1984]).

The People established a proper foundation for the receipt of a prior identification pursuant to CPL 60.25. Defendant’s other contentions regarding the admissibility of evidence received at trial are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find no basis for reversal. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Nardelli and Catterson, JJ.
#### TYLER v. PHILLIPS et al.

No. 13976.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Nov. 13, 1933.

See, also, 18 La. App. 654, 139 So. 35.

Louise Louque Burton and James J. Landry, both of New Orleans, for appellant.

Prowell, McBride & Ray, of New Orleans, for appellees.

WESTERFIELD, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment maintaining an exception of prescription of one year.

The plaintiff herein filed suit for damages for the wrongful seizure of her household property under a writ of provisional seizure. The seizure occurred September 19,1922, and the litigation which followed, in which the legality of the seizure was successfully attacked, finally terminated on December 4, 1925. This suit was filed November 17, 1926, within one year of the conclusion of the litigation, but several years after the issuance of the writ of seizure.

The question before us is whether prescription begins to run from the seizure, September 19, 1922, or from the date of the termination of the litigation, December 4, 1925. The learned judge, a quo, held that the date of the beginning of the prescription was the day on which the seizure issued, basing his conclusion upon the case of Edwards v. Turner et al., 6 Rob. 382. Counsel for plaintiff, in their oral argument and in their brief filed in this court, contend that the cited case is not applicable, for the reason that it is principally concerned with the question of whether the form of action considered there was one for damages ex delicto or ex contractu. The damages claimed in this suit, it is insisted, are for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit.

Whatever may be the holding- in the Edwards Case, the Supreme Court in a very recent decision, reversing this court, held that prescription on a claim for damages for the illegal issuance of a writ of injunction did not commence to run “until it was judicially determined that the injunction was obtained wrongfully.” Burglass v. Villere, 170 La. 805, 129 So. 209, 211. In the cited case the court quoted the following from Pothier (Prescription, No. 37): “Although the action has accrued (soit ouverte), so long as it cannot be usefully prosecuted, prescription does not run. The reason is that prescription is founded on the negligence of the creditor; and a creditor cannot be held to have been negligent in bringing his suit, so long as it was not possible for him to bring it usefully.”

It results, from the application of the principle of the Burglass Case to this case, that *682the judgment appealed from must be reversed.

For the reasons assigned it is therefore ordered that the judgment appealed from he reversed, the plea of prescription overruled, and this ease remanded to the civil district court for the parish of Orleans for further proceeding's according to law and consistent with the views herein expressed.

Revei-sed.
Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 266-2 filed 04/22/13 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 3
Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 266-2 filed 04/22/13 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 3
Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 266-2 filed 04/22/13 USDC Colorado pg 3 of 3