IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

May 22, 2013 Session

PEARLIE MAE DUNIGAN, Next of Kin/Personal Representative of Estate of

GROVER DUNIGAN, Deceased v. STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Direct Appeal from the Claims Commission of the State of Tennessee

No. 20110513 Nancy Miller-Herron, Commissioner

No. W2012-01245-COA-R3-CV - Filed June 27, 2013

This appeal involves a claim for damages filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission,

arising out of the death of an inmate while he was housed in a state penitentiary. The Claims

Commission denied the claimant’s motion for a default judgment. Thereafter, the Claims

Commission determined that the gravamen of the complaint wasfor medical malpractice, and

consequently, it granted the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the claimant’s failure to

comply with various provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act. The claimant appeals. For

the following reasons, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Claims Commission

Affirmed

ALAN E.HIGHERS,P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DAVID R. FARMER,

J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., joined.

Pearlie Mae Dunigan, Chattanooga, Tennessee, pro se

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, William Young, Solicitor General,

Pamela S. Lorch, Senior Counsel, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee
MEMORANDUM OPINION

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I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 16, 2009, Grover Dunigan died while he was housed as an inmate at

the West Tennessee State Penitentiary in Henning, Tennessee. In November of 2010,several

members of Mr. Dunigan’s family filed claims with the State of Tennessee Division of

Claims Administration seeking to recover damages based upon Mr. Dunigan’s death. At

least five separate claims were filed by Mr. Dunigan’s sisters, his brothers, and his mother.

One of the claims was filed by Annette Jackson (Mr. Dunigan’s sister) on behalf of Pearlie

Mae Dunigan (Mr. Dunigan’s mother). The claim alleged that Mr. Dunigan “met an

untimely death due to prison officials blatant gross negligence & deliberate indifference to

the serious/sever[e] medical condition” of Mr. Dunigan. (capitalization and internal

quotation marks omitted). The claim contained the following factual allegations:

On December 10, 2009, Mr. Dunigan reported to what the prison

system labels "Sick-Call" {note; this is a procedure all TDOC inmates must

follow in order to be seen by the nurse, doctor and or nurse practitioner} A

Donna Chisholm whose signature is shown on the "sick-call" form that Mr.

Dunigan Filled out, - diagnosed Mr. Dunigan and ordered that he report back

to his housing unit and be placed on an AVO = "Restricted/limited activity" for

three days, due to his medical problem" . . . {note; this doctor's order was

applicable until the 10th day of December 2009}... Obviously sometime during

that period of time Mr. Dunigan became "Too sick to remain" in his regular

housing unit and was placed in the infirmary. {note; this is an area where

inmates who become so seriously sick that they require more closely monitored

medical attention are placed/housed, even to the extent of sending the inmate

to an outside health care facility}...

This was an obvious "Mis-Judgment" medical call by one of the prison

system's medical staff members, and inevitably led to the untimely demise of

Mr. Dunigan.

TDOC's own policy mandatesthat "If and whenever an inmate becomes

severely ill, he/she must be moved to an outside hospital. Mr. Dunigan Died

 Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee states: 1

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall

be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and shall not be cited

or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case. 

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while the prison system debated over whether or not they should send him to

an outside hospital. A Thyroid problem could have been easily cured if prison

administrators had acted pursuant to the severe medical need/condition of Mr.

Dunigan.

The other four claims contained essentially the same allegations.

On February 4, 2011, the claims were transferred from the Division of Claims

Administration to the Tennessee Claims Commission pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated

section 9-8-402(c). On February 11, 2011, the Claims Commission entered an “Initial Order

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Governing Proceedings,” which directed the claimants to file a formal complaint. Two

separate complaints were filed on March 10, 2011. Mr. Dunigan’s sister Pearlene Kelly filed

one complaint, purportedly “for the Estate of ‘Former Inmate Grover Dunigan,’” and a

second complaint was filed by his sister Annette Jackson on behalf of his mother Pearlie Mae

Dunigan, also stating that it was “for [the] Estate of Grover Dunigan.” The complaint filed

by Mr. Dunigan’s mother alleged that Mr. Dunigan “met an un-timely death while in the

custody of the State OF Tennessee Department OF Corrections' [hereinafter referred to as

the TDOC] West Tennessee State Penitentiary, located in Henning Tennessee, as a direct

result of TDOC's Gross Negligence & Deliberate Indifference to the Serious immediate

medical needs/care of former inmate Grover Dunigan.”

On April 20, 2011, the State of Tennessee filed a motion for an extension of time to

respond to the complaints, stating that further time was needed to investigate the matter and

to file a proper response. The Claims Commission entered an order granting the motion and

extending the time for the State to respond until May 20, 2011. On May 19, 2011, the State

filed a motion to strike, in which it noted that two separate complaints had been filed by

different parties. The State asked the Commission to direct the claimants to submit proof as

to which of them had the legal authority to represent the Estate of Grover Dunigan. The

State asked the Commission to determine the proper person to represent the Estate and to

strike the complaint submitted by the person who lacked authority, so that the State could

then respond to the remaining complaint.

Before the Commission ruled on the motion to strike, a motion for default judgment

 Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(c) provides, in relevant part:

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The division of claims administration shall investigate every claim and shall make every

effort to honor or deny each claim within ninety (90) days of receipt of the notice. . . . If the

division fails to honor or deny the claimwithin the ninety-day settlement period, the division

shall automatically transfer the claim to the administrative clerk of the claims commission.

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was filed by Annette Jackson acting on behalf of Pearlie Mae Dunigan. She argued that a

default judgment should be entered against the State because it still had not filed a response

to the original complaint she filed with the Commission. The State filed a response in which

it pointed out that it had appeared and filed a motion to strike the dual complaints.

On June 15, 2011, the Commission entered an order finding that “in order for this

claim to proceed before the Commission, the Estate’s legal representative must be

established.” The Commission ordered the various claimants to submit proof of their

authority to represent Mr. Dunigan’s Estate, and it explained that once the Commission made

a determination as to the proper representative of the Estate, it would rule on the State’s

motion to strike the improper complaint. In response, Mr. Dunigan’s sisters submitted

affidavits in which they “yielded” to the right of Mr. Dunigan’s mother, Pearlie Mae

Dunigan, to pursue the claim as his next of kin.

On July 11, 2011, the Commission entered an order granting the State’s motion to

strike the complaint filed by Pearlene Kelly, and it ordered the State to file its responsive

pleading by August 15, 2011. The order also denied the motion for default judgment filed

by Pearlie Mae Dunigan.

On August 12, 2011, the State filed a motion to dismiss the remaining complaint, filed

by Pearlie Mae Dunigan (hereinafter, “Claimant”), for failure to state a claim, because her

formal complaint failed to state any facts other than that Mr. Dunigan died while

incarcerated, as a result of negligence and deliberate indifference, and it did not specify what

events occurred that allegedly constituted negligence or indifference. Claimant filed a

response and a “Supplemental Pleading,” in which she sought to supplement the record with

Mr. Dunigan’s medical records and a letter from a registered nurse who had reviewed Mr.

Dunigan’s medical records. In the letter, the nurse opined that the diagnosis made by the

prison’s medical doctor indicated a “medical emergency,” for which the medical doctor

should have transferred Mr. Dunigan to an emergency facility. The supplemental pleading

filed byClaimant alleged that “the Tennessee Department of Corrections owed the Deceased,

Grover Dunigan a duty of due care to provide adequate medical care and treatment” while

he was an inmate. (emphasis in original). In an attempt to demonstrate that the

“Defendants” had breached that duty, Claimant’s pleading alleged six facts:

1. The medical testing and reports conducted by Defendant medical

personnel together with the Autopsy report of the decedent indicate

Squamous Cell Carcinoma.

2. The Autopsy reports that the pathology most likely contributed to the

death of Claimant was Atherosclerotic Coronary Artery Disease.

3. Based on the lab findings of December 15, 2009 indicated

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“inflam[m]atory process”, abnormal Urinalysis- increased protein,

incre[a]sed specific gravity, Keotones and occult blood sug[g]esting

acute kidney injury.

4. Claimant was diagnosed with symptoms of a “Thyroid Storm[”]

indicating a medical emergency.

5. Claimant was not transported to an Emergency Facility in accordance

with departmental policies and procedures.

6. Although Claimant presented Fever greater than 101 multiple times

Blood Cultures were not performed even though symptoms of Sepsis

were present multiple times and Claimant was not transported to an

Emergency Facility in accordance with departmental policies and

procedures.

The supplemental pleading alleged that the “Defendant’s negl[i]gent breach of duty was the

direct and proximate cause” of Mr. Dunigan’s death.

After the supplemental pleading was filed, the State filed a motion to dismiss based

upon the Claimant’s failure to comply with various provisions of the Tennessee Medical

Malpractice Act, including Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, which requires

sixty-day notice to defendant health care providers prior to the filing of a complaint for

medical malpractice, and section 29-26-122, which requires that a certificate of good faith

be filed along with the complaint. The State asserted that Claimant had not demonstrated

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any extraordinary cause for failing to comply with the Act’s requirements.

Claimant filed a response to the motion to dismiss, basically arguing that her claim

was not one for medical malpractice. She argued, “Adequate medical care is not the same

as negligent medical treatment.”

On April 26, 2012, the Claims Commission entered an order granting the State’s

motion to dismiss the complaint. The order included the following relevant findings:

Under Tennessee law, where a complaint alleges facts relating to

services that require specialized training, such as a determination of whether

medical symptoms require emergency transport to an outside hospital, the

attendant duty to such services is the professional duty arising from the

In 2012, while this case was pending, numerous sections of the Medical Malpractice Act were

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amended to replace the “medical malpractice” language with the phrase “health care liability.” Because the

term “medical malpractice” was used in the relevant statutes at the time of this action, we will continue to

use it throughout this opinion.

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provision of medical care. It is clear, and the Commission therefore FINDS,

that the gravamen of the Claimant’s claim is one for medical malpractice.

The Commission pointed out that Claimant’s initial claim, filed with the Division of Claims

Administration, alleged that a “‘Mis-Judgment’ medical call by one of the prison system’s

medical staff members” led to Mr. Dunigan’s demise, and her supplemental pleading

outlined the ways that the State allegedly failed “to provide adequate medical care.” The

Commission noted that a failure to comply with the requirements of the Medical Malpractice

Act can only be excused upon a showing of extraordinary cause, or if the defendant failed

to comply with a request for medical records, and it stated, “Under the facts of this case, the

Commission regrettably has no authority to excuse compliance with § 29-26-121.”

Claimant timely filed a notice of appeal. That same day, Claimant filed a motion to

reconsider with the Claims Commission, in which she claimed that she was “prevented from

knowing and/or ascertaining who the parties were to be sued” until she received the State’s

discovery responses while this case was pending, and she “was therefore prevented [from]

complying with TCA 29-[2]6-122.” Claimant also argued, in her motion to reconsider, that

“TDOC Wardens are not healthcare providers but administrators.” Claimant argued that the

prison warden is responsible for ensuring that inmates have timely access to healthcare

pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-603 and -606, and she claimed that the warden’s duty was

“over and above the healthcare provider(s).” She again asserted that “adequate medical care

is not the same as negligent medical treatment.”

The Commission entered an order denying the motion to reconsider on July 13, 2012.

The Commission again recited the aforementioned allegations from Claimant’s initial claim

and her supplemental pleading and found that the gravamen of the complaint was medical

malpractice. The Commission found that no certificate of good faith had been filed pursuant

to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122, and it stated:

Claimant references no cause justifying waiver of the certificate of good

faith other than the contention that this cause of action is not one for medical

malpractice but for negligent care, custody and control of persons under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(e). Although the Commission recognizes the

difficulty of handling a medical malpractice claim pro se, Claimant has

demonstrated no cause that would support the waiver of Tenn. Code Ann. §

29-26-122, much less extraordinary cause. Thus, it is simply not in the

discretion of the Commission to waive the requisites of the aforementioned

statute.

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II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Claimant presents the following issues, as we perceive them, for review on appeal:

1. Whether the Commission erred in denying Claimant’s motion for default judgment;

2. Whether the Claimant properly asserted a claim against the warden; and

3. Whether the Claimant’s failure to file a certificate of good faith should have been

excused on the basis of extraordinary cause.

For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Default Judgment

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 55.01 provides that “[w]hen a party against whom

a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided

by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, judgment by default

may be entered[.]” On appeal, Claimant argues that the Claims Commission should have

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granted her motion for default judgment against the State due to its delay in filing a

responsive pleading in this matter. She claims that the State failed to respond for more than

six months after her initial claim was filed. A short recap of the timeline of events is helpful

in reviewing this issue:

• November 2010 Five separate claims were filed with the Division of

Claims Administration on behalf of Grover Dunigan

• Feb. 2, 2011 The claims were transferred to the Claims Commission

Although Claimant was the appellant in this matter, she did not appear at oral argument before this

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Court on May 22, 2013. On June 10, 2013, Claimant filed a written “Notice” with this Court stating that she

was not notified of the date of oral argument, and therefore, she asked this Court to consider additional

written arguments, which she submitted along with her “Notice.” We have considered Claimant’s additional

written arguments in resolving the issues before us.

With certain exceptions, proceedings before the Claims Commission are conducted pursuant to 5

the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Hembree v. State, 925 S.W.2d 513, 515 n.5 (Tenn. 1996);see Tenn.

Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(1); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0310-01-01-.01. Because the Commission's Rules of

Procedure do not modify Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 55, it applies to claims before the Commission

in the same manner as it would to a claim brought in circuit or chancery court. Cf. Madison v. State, No.

E2003-01537-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 101633, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2004).

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• Feb. 11, 2011 The Commission ordered the filing of a formal complaint

• Mar. 10, 2011 Two separate complaints were filed on behalf of the

Estate of Grover Dunigan

• Apr. 20, 2011 The State filed a motion for extension of time to respond

to the complaints

• Apr. 20, 2011 The Commission granted an extension of time until May

20, 2011

• May 19, 2011 The State filed a motion to strike, asking the court to

determine which claimant had authority to represent the

estate and to strike the unauthorized complaint

• June 10, 2011 Claimant filed a motion for default judgment

• June 15, 2011 The Commission entered an order finding that it was

necessary to establish the proper legal representative of

the estate before the claim could proceed, and ordered

the claimants to submit proof on that issue

• June 20, 2011 Claimant’s daughters submitted affidavits “yielding” to

Claimant’s rights

• July 11, 2011 The Commission entered an order striking the complaint

filed by Claimant’s daughter, ordering the State to

respond to the Claimant’s complaint, and denying

Claimant’s motion for default judgment

In short, at the time when Claimant filed the motion for default judgment, the Claims

Commission had already entered an order granting the State’s motion for an extension of

time within which to respond to the complaint, and during that extended time period, the

State had filed a motion to strike based on the fact that there were two complaints pending.

The Claims Commission determined that it was necessary to establish the proper

representative of the Estate before the claim could proceed, and it ultimately granted the

State’s motion to strike and ordered the State to respond to the remaining complaint filed by

the Claimant.

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A default judgment is a drastic sanction that is not favored by the courts. Henry v.

Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Tenn. 2003). A decision as to whether to enter a default

judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Jones v. Looper, 86 S.W.3d 189,

193 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Patterson v. Rockwell Int'l, 665 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tenn.

1984)).

A party seeking to have a lower court's holding overturned on the basis

of abuse of discretion undertakes a heavy burden. The abuse of discretion

standard is intended to constrain appellate review and implies “less intense

appellate review and, therefore, less likelihood of reversal.” BIF v. Service

Constr. Co., No. 87-136-II, 1988 WL 72409, at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13,

1988)[.] As a general principle, an appellate court will not reverse a decision

that lies within the discretion of the trial court unless it affirmatively appears

that the lower court's decision was against logic or reasoning and caused

injustice to the complaining party. See Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652,

661 (Tenn. 1996). The fact that a decision is discretionary with a trial court

necessarily implies that the trial court has a choice of alternatives among a

range of acceptable ones; the reviewing court's job is to determine whether the

trial court's decision is within the range of acceptable alternatives, given the

applicable legal principles and the evidence in the case. See BIF, 1988 WL

72409, at * 3.

Id. at 193-94. We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying Claimant’s motion

for a default judgment.

B. The Prison Warden

Next, Claimant argues that “TDOC Wardens are not healthcare providers but

administrators.” She essentially argues that the warden had a duty “that supersede[d] that of

the healthcare provider,” to ensure that Mr. Dunigan received adequate medical care.

Despite these arguments on appeal, there is not a single factual allegation referencing the

prison warden in Claimant’s formal complaint filed with the Commission, in her

supplemental pleading, or in her initial claim filed with the Division of Claims

Administration. Her first attempt to construe her claim as one against the prison warden

came in her “Motion to Reconsider,” which was filed after the Commission dismissed her

complaint, and which was denied by the Commission. Because Claimant failed to allege a

discernible claim against the prison warden, we find no merit in this issue as it is presented

on appeal.

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C. Failure to File a Certificate of Good Faith

Finally, Claimant’s brief presents an issue regarding whethershe “was prevented from

knowing and/or ascertaining who the parties were to be sued and was therefore prevented

from complying with TCA 29-[2]6-122.” However, the section of Claimant’s brief that

should address this issue fails to provide any citations either to the record or to any relevant

authority. Instead, she diverges into another discussion of why she believes her motion for

default judgment should have been granted. She ends her argument by stating that this issue

“should require no citation[.]” We disagree. “‘Courts have routinely held that the failure to

make appropriate references to the record and to cite relevant authority in the argument

section of the brief as required by Rule 27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of the issue.’” Forbess

v. Forbess, 370 S.W.3d 347, 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d

52, 55-56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Tellico Village Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v.

Health Solutions, LLC, No. E2012-00101-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 362815, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Jan. 30, 2013) (“‘Where a party makes no legal argument and cites no authority in

support of a position, such issue is deemed to be waived and will not be considered on

appeal.’”) (quoting Hawkins v. Hart, 86 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). “[P]arties

must thoroughly brief the issues they expect the appellate courts to consider.” Waters v.

Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 919 (Tenn. 2009). “It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate,

to research or construct a litigant's case or arguments for him or her, and where a party fails

to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal

argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of Sup. Ct., 301

S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010).

Because Claimant failed to develop an argument regarding this issue and did not

provide any citations to the record or to relevant authority, we deem this issue waived. While

we realize the “legal naivete” of a pro se litigant, “we must not allow him an unfair

advantage because he represents himself.” Frazier v. Campbell, No. W2006-00031-COAR3-CV, 2006 WL 2506706, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.31, 2006) (citing Irvin v. City of

Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d 649, 651-52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)). “Pro se litigants who invoke

the complex and technical procedures of the courts assume a very heavy burden.” Irvin, 767

S.W.2d at 652 (citing Gray v. Stillman White Co., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I.1987)). They are

entitled to fair and equal treatment, but they must follow the same substantive and procedural

requirements as a represented party, and they may not shift the burden of litigating their case

to the courts. Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Pearlie Mae Dunigan, next of kin/personal

representative of the Estate of Grover Dunigan, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.

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