UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4030

OLIVER PILGRIM HINDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.

William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge.

(CR-96-148)

Submitted: September 25, 1997

Decided: October 15, 1997

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Walter L. Jones, CLIFFORD, CLENDENIN, O'HALE & JONES,

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr.,

United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Oliver Pilgrim Hinds appeals his conviction for a violation of 18

U.S.C.A. § 844(i) (West 1976 & Supp. 1997). Hinds and an accomplice set fire to and destroyed the Pleasant Ridge United Church of

Christ in Greensboro, North Carolina. After waiving a jury trial,

Hinds stipulated that all elements of the offense were proven with the

exception of the church's effect on interstate commerce. After hearing

evidence on the issue, the district court denied Hinds' motion to dismiss and entered a verdict of guilty. Hinds appeals, arguing once

again that the Government failed to prove that the church affected

interstate commerce. Hinds also suggests on appeal that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) to the destruction of a church violates the

First Amendment. Because we find no merit to either of Hinds' contentions, we affirm.

To maintain its prosecution against under 18 U.S.C.§ 844(i), the

government was required to prove that Hinds: (1) maliciously; (2)

damaged or destroyed a building or other real property; (3) by use of

fire or explosives; and (4) the building was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. See United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S., Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-9274). Hinds

contests only the last element of the Government's case. He contends

that in the wake of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the

Government was required to provide evidence that the church "substantially affect[ed]" interstate commerce rather than merely affected

commerce. Id. at 559.

Hinds' argument relies on a mistaken interpretation of the central

thrust of Lopez. In determining whether the activity regulated by 18

U.S.C.A. § 922(q) (West 1976 & Supp. 1997),"substantially

affected" interstate commerce, the Supreme Court was concerned

with Congress's power to enact legislation concerning the possession

of firearms near schools, not the elements of a successful prosecution

under the statute. The requirement that an activity"substantially

affect[ ]" interstate commerce concerns the extent of Congress's

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Commerce Clause power and the validity of the statute, not the Government's burden in proving its case.

Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, § 844(i) contains the requisite

jurisdictional element because it applies only to crimes against property "used in . . . or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 18

U.S.C. § 844(i). In this case, we have no difficulty finding that the

Government proved the church Hinds destroyed was"used in . . . or

affect[ed] interstate or foreign commerce." Considering the evidence

in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient for

a rational finder of fact to have found that final element beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Brewer, 1 F.3d 1430, 1437 (4th

Cir. 1993); see also Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).

The church was a member of a national organization of churches to

which it annually transmitted funds raised from its members and other

sources. Those funds are further disseminated by the national organization in the form of aid to missionary work, seminaries, institutions

of higher education and other programs. Additionally, the church had

a full-time employee and two part-time employees. The full-time

employee received a benefits package which included insurance procured through companies outside of North Carolina. In sum, the dayto-day operations of the church including the purchase and use of utilities, insurance, various religious materials and numerous other goods

and services, affected interstate commerce to the degree necessary to

support Hinds' conviction. See United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602,

607 (4th Cir. 1994). We find no merit to Hinds' first contention.

Hinds also suggests that his prosecution somehow offended the

First Amendment's guarantee of a separation between church and

state. To the extent that Hinds' argument can be coherently distilled,

he contends that if a church can affect interstate commerce, then it

can be regulated, and government regulation of churches would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See Lemon v.

Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1962). Because the Government's

prosecution of Hinds under a facially neutral statute applied in a neutral manner does not present the difficulties that might arise if Congress were to attempt to exercise Commerce Clause power over

religious institutions, we decline to find that this conviction offended

the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom.

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Finding no merit to either of Hinds' contentions on appeal, we

affirm the conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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