NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1997-17T1

ISAIAH CARDINALE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

POLICE AND FIREMEN'S

RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

Respondent-Respondent.

____________________________

Argued February 4, 2019 – Decided March 1, 2019

Before Judges Messano, Fasciale and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees, Police and 

Firemen's Retirement System, PFRS No. 3-98613.

Steven J. Kossup argued the cause for appellant 

(Feeley & LaRocca, LLC, and Steven J. Kossup,

attorneys; John D. Feeley, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Robert E. Kelly, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Robert E. Kelly, on the 

brief).

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

March 1, 2019

APPELLATE DIVISION
A-1997-17T1 2

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FASCIALE, J.A.D.

This appeal requires us to decide whether, as a matter of law, a police 

officer is ineligible for ordinary disability benefits as a member of the Police 

& Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) if the officer separates from service by 

irrevocably resigning from employment to resolve pending drug-related 

disciplinary charges. We answer this question recognizing that N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-8(2) requires disability retirees to return to duty once their disability 

has "vanished or has materially diminished." Of course, permanently resigning 

from employment makes returning to duty impossible. 

Isaiah Cardinale (Cardinale) – the officer who resigned from the police 

department (the Police Department) – argues that the Board of Trustees (the 

Board) of PFRS acted arbitrarily by refusing to process his application seeking 

ordinary disability benefits. He maintains that the Board's declaration that he 

was ineligible misapplies N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2), and its refusal to consider his 

application amounts to a failure to turn square corners. Cardinale urges us to 

direct the Board to consider his application on the merits. 

We hold that when a PFRS member – here a police officer – voluntarily 

irrevocably resigns from active service, such a separation from employment 

automatically renders the individual ineligible for ordinary disability benefits. 
A-1997-17T1 3

Generally, for individuals whose disability has vanished or materially 

diminished, benefits cease when the retiree refuses to return to duty after the 

Board has so ordered. In this sense, disability retirees are unique. But here, 

Cardinale can never return to duty solely because of his final resignation, 

rather than his refusal to do so upon disability rehabilitation. Under the 

governing legislative framework, the inability to return to duty – due solely to 

an irrevocable resignation – prevents the Board from statutorily terminating

any granted benefits, a result which would contravene important public policy 

underlying disability retirement benefits. 

We therefore affirm. 

I.

In August 2004, Cardinale began working as a police officer. On 

December 16, 2013, he submitted to a random drug test. Two days later, 

Cardinale admitted to using cocaine. The Police Department immediately 

suspended him pending the results of the test, and Cardinale successfully 

completed drug and alcohol treatment in Florida. In February 2014, the 

toxicology report demonstrated that he had tested positive for cocaine. 

On February 21, 2014, the Police Department issued a Preliminary 

Notice of Disciplinary Action (PNDA). Before that, Cardinale had performed 

his job without any documented problems. The PNDA charged him with 
A-1997-17T1 4

violating the following sections of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a) and the Police 

Department's rules and regulations: 

N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a):

1. Incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform 

duties;

3. Inability to perform duties;

6. Conduct unbecoming a public employee;

7. Neglect of duty; [and]

1[2]. Other sufficient [c]ause.

. . . Department Rules & Regulations:

Oath of Office; 

1:5 Code of Ethics; 

2:24 Employee Drug Testing;

3:1.1 Standards of Conduct;

3:1.11 Obedience to Laws and Regulations;

3:2.2 Alcoholic Beverages and Drugs; [and]

5:1.1 Disciplinary Action. 

Eleven days later, on March 4, 2014, while on suspension, Cardinale 

applied for ordinary disability benefits. In August 2014 – after a hearing 

officer conducted a disciplinary hearing – the Police Department issued its 

Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA) and removed him as a police 

officer effective February 21, 2014. Cardinale appealed the FNDA (the 

disciplinary action) to the Civil Service Commission (the Commission), which 

transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a 

contested case.

In February 2015, Cardinale and the Police Department settled the 

disciplinary action and entered into a settlement agreement. The Police 
A-1997-17T1 5

Department withdrew the FNDA's recommended termination, Cardinale 

withdrew his appeal from the FNDA, and Cardinale signed a letter irrevocably 

resigning from the Police Department. The letter stated, "Effective June 15, 

2015, I am voluntarily separating from my employment as a [p]olice [o]fficer 

with the [Police Department and] I understand that this letter of separation 

from employment is not revocable." In the settlement agreement, Cardinale

acknowledged that he would proceed with his application for ordinary 

disability benefits at his "sole risk," and that the outcome of the application 

would not affect his resignation. In March 2015, the disciplinary action was 

terminated. 

In November 2015, the Board declined to process Cardinale's 

application. The Board explained that the only obstacle to his reemployment 

was not the purported disability, but rather, his irrevocable resignation. The 

Board therefore concluded – assuming Cardinale was disabled but later 

became rehabilitated – that it would have no statutory authority to stop paying 

benefits. In February 2016, Cardinale administratively appealed the Board's 

refusal to process his application, and the OAL listed the matter as a contested 

case (the benefits action). 

In March 2017, an administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing

in the benefits action. Cardinale, the only witness who appeared at the 
A-1997-17T1 6

hearing, testified that performing his job as a police officer caused posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He alleged that the PTSD led him to drink 

alcohol and use cocaine. Notwithstanding that allegation, the record reflects 

no prior disciplinary problems or disruptions in his ability to do his job before 

he tested positive for cocaine. 

At the hearing, Cardinale conceded that he was recovering and no longer 

disabled. Indeed, in his application for ordinary disability benefits, which he

had filed three years before the hearing, Cardinale admitted that he was 

"sober" and that his main concern was that due to his duties as a police officer,

he would "again become depressed to the point of using alcohol and/or drugs." 

On direct examination, he gave the following testimony:

Q: And what was the reason for your leaving the 

[Police] [D]epartment?

A: My disability.

Q: [W]hat was your disability?

A: PTSD. . . .

Q: And . . . did you have a substance abuse problem?

A: Yes.

Q: And did that include alcohol?

A: Yes.

Q: And you still have that disability?
A-1997-17T1 7

A: No.

Cardinale added that he was not drinking alcohol "right now," and that he was 

in recovery and taking medication. 

The ALJ determined that the settlement agreement did not bind the 

Board. He found "Cardinale's separation from the . . . Police Department was 

due solely to the exchange of the parties' respective rights arising out of [the]

disciplinary charges." That said, the ALJ concluded that there was no 

disability issue for the Board to consider. The ALJ noted that Cardinale 

agreed to proceed with his application for ordinary disability benefits at his 

sole risk. The ALJ stated further that the Board, which was not a party to the 

settlement agreement, was under no obligation to process the application, 

especially because in the ALJ's opinion, the Board was not legally required to 

do so. 

The ALJ explained that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) requires an employer to 

reinstate a member who returns from disability status, but that here, 

Cardinale's execution of his irrevocable letter of resignation made any such 

return impossible. He elaborated further that because Cardinale could not 

return to work at the Police Department, the Board would statutorily be unable 

to stop paying benefits, assuming such benefits were appropriate in the first 

place. He said:
A-1997-17T1 8

The PFRS Board was of the opinion that . . . it should 

not put itself into a position where, by considering and 

perhaps granting disability benefits, it would run the 

risk of never being able to stop the payment of said 

benefits . . . when Cardinale['s] . . . disability vanishes 

or materially diminishes . . . . [T]he Board may 

properly decline to process an application on the 

grounds that the cessation of employment arose solely 

out of disciplinary charges and was not based on an 

issue of disability. 

In the final agency decision under review, the Board adopted the ALJ's 

findings and conclusions. 

On appeal, Cardinale contends that the Board's refusal to process his 

application for ordinary disability benefits deprived him of the opportunity to 

show he suffered from a disability. He argues therefore that the Board acted 

arbitrarily and failed to turn square corners. Emphasizing the remedial nature 

of pension statutes, which he maintains the Board must liberally construe, 

Cardinale asserts that the Board misinterpreted N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2). He 

argues essentially that the statute gives the Board discretion to discontinue any 

payment of disability benefits, even if his irrevocable resignation solely 

prevents him from returning to duty. 

II.

Pertinent to our standard of review, it is undisputed that Cardinale 

signed the settlement agreement to resolve the disciplinary action. The 

agreement does not mention Cardinale's alleged PTSD-addiction disability, 
A-1997-17T1 9

which has since vanished or materially diminished. Rather, the Police 

Department dropped the disciplinary charges in exchange for Cardinale 

irrevocably resigning, and for no other reason. 

Our review of the Board's decision is very limited. Caminiti v. Bd. of 

Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 394 N.J. Super. 478, 480 (App. Div. 2007). 

Generally, we may overturn the decision if it is unsupported by sufficient 

credible evidence in the record, but such an inquiry is unnecessary because the 

facts are undisputed. We focus instead on the legal question of whether 

Cardinale is ineligible to seek ordinary disability benefits as a matter of law 

due to his irrevocable resignation. 

We are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or its 

determination of a strictly legal issue. We review such questions de novo. See

Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 604 (2018); see also Mount v. Bd. of 

Trs., 233 N.J. 402, 418-19 (2018). In arriving at its decision not to process the 

application for ordinary disability benefits, the Board interpreted N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-8(2). Ordinarily, we defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute 

unless it is "plainly unreasonable," contrary to the statutory language, or 

"subversive of the Legislature's intent." N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. AFSCME, Council 

73, 150 N.J. 331, 352 (1997); see also Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of ManalapanEnglishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 24 (2009) (stating that 
A-1997-17T1 10

"interpretations of the statute and cognate enactments by agencies empowered 

to enforce them are given substantial deference in the context of statutory 

interpretation"). 

III.

For purposes of our analysis, we assume Cardinale suffered from PTSD,

which allegedly resulted in a substance abuse problem. We further accept, as 

we analyze the issues presented, that he would have satisfied the requirements 

of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1), which provides in pertinent part that a member may 

retire on ordinary disability benefits provided

that the medical board, after a medical examination of 

such member, shall certify that such member is 

mentally or physically incapacitated for the 

performance of his usual duty and of any other 

available duty in the department which his employer is 

willing to assign to him and that such incapacity is 

likely to be permanent and to such an extent that he 

should be retired. 

Of course, we make these assumptions fully understanding that they are

completely unsupported in the record by any medical or other credible 

evidence whatsoever. 

Nevertheless, we assume the disability existed because it is irrelevant to

our holding that his irrevocable resignation made him ineligible for benefits in 

the first place. We acknowledge the longstanding principle that "eligibility for 

disability retirement benefits requires members to make a prima facie showing 
A-1997-17T1 11

that they cannot work due to a disability." In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-

6.4, 454 N.J. Super. 386, 394 (App. Div. 2018) (addressing the 2016 readoption of amended regulations after Cardinale's application, but 

acknowledging the principle that eligibility for benefits depends on a prima 

facie showing of an inability to work due to a disability). But even if he was

disabled – as a matter of law – the consequence of his irrevocable resignation 

is determinative. 

That brings us to the heart of the case. The premise of our assumption –

that Cardinale would have preliminarily qualified for ordinary disability 

benefits because he suffered from his alleged PTSD-addiction disability – begs 

the question of whether his irrevocable resignation from active service as a 

police officer to settle his drug-related disciplinary charges nevertheless made

him legally ineligible. For decades, PFRS disabled retirees were uniquely 

required to return to active service when their disability had abated. Id. at 

400-01. 

If the retired employee regains the ability to perform 

his or her duties, the Legislature mandated that he or 

she be returned to the former position. The 

Legislature clearly recognized that individuals 

returning from a disability retirement are in a unique 

situation, plainly different from all other employees 

returning to active service. Their separation from 

employment is unlike the voluntary separation of other 

civil servants whose seniority is not aggregated. In 

our view, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) contemplates that a 
A-1997-17T1 12

restoration to employment return the formerly 

disabled individual as nearly as possible to the status 

held at the time he or she was pensioned. The 

aggregation of seniority complies with the legislative 

mandate that disabled employees return to their former 

position upon cessation of their disability.

[In re Allen, 262 N.J. Super. 438, 444 (App. Div. 

1993) (emphasis added).]

Although members are eligible for benefits if they can show they left 

work because of a disability, N.J.A.C., 454 N.J. Super. at 398-402, the 

Legislature clearly understood the importance of restoring formerly disabled 

retirees to work when it passed N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2), which in pertinent part 

unambiguously states that 

Any beneficiary under the age of [fifty-five] 

years who has been retired on a disability retirement 

allowance under this act, on his request shall, or upon 

the request of the retirement system may, be given a 

medical examination and he shall submit to any 

examination by a physician or physicians designated 

by the medical board once a year for at least a period 

of five years following his retirement in order to 

determine whether or not the disability which existed 

at the time he was retired has vanished or has 

materially diminished. If the report of the medical 

board shall show that such beneficiary is able to 

perform either his former duty or any other available 

duty in the department which his employer is willing 

to assign to him, the beneficiary shall report for duty; 

such a beneficiary shall not suffer any loss of benefits 

while he awaits his restoration to active service. . . .

[(Emphasis added).] 
A-1997-17T1 13

Assuming he satisfies the requirements of this statute, Cardinale must return to 

duty. Along those lines, and certainly at the time of the hearing before the 

ALJ, Cardinale testified that he is no longer disabled, he stopped drinking 

alcohol, was in recovery, and was on medication. Hence, a strong case can be 

made that he would inevitably be required to return to duty. See N.J.A.C., 454 

N.J. Super. at 400-02 (reiterating that rehabilitation statutes – like N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-8(2) – expressly condition reinstatement for disability retirees upon 

disability rehabilitation, and that under such statutes, "the only obstacle to . . .

reemployment is the disability itself"). The obstacle for Cardinale is not his 

disability, but rather, his irrevocable resignation.

Cardinale's permanent inability to return to duty is fatal. The purpose of 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) is to return the previously disabled retiree to work as if 

that individual had never suffered a disability or interruption of service. In re 

Terebetski, 338 N.J. Super. 564, 570 (App. Div. 2001). The statute is not 

simply an anti-fraud measure. It provides for a system of taxpayer-funded 

relief by allowing disability benefits but requiring retirees to return to duty

upon disability rehabilitation. The Legislature obviously did not devise a 

disability retirement system that, on the one hand, would grant ordinary 

disability benefits to PFRS members who could never return to active service, 

and on the other hand, require that other PFRS members return to duty when 
A-1997-17T1 14

their purported disability vanishes or materially diminishes. That would be 

absurd. Instead, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) balances a worker's interest with those

of an employer and the public by requiring PFRS workers – upon rehabilitation 

– to forgo the benefits and return to work. See Klumb, 199 N.J. at 34-35 

(reaching the same conclusion by applying a similar rehabilitation statute). 

Importantly, a member's irrevocable resignation presents a practical 

problem that strains the workability of the system. N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) 

envisions only one circumstance when disability benefits may cease. That 

situation, which does not apply to members who irrevocably resign from work,

arises when the Board grants retirement benefits to a PFRS retiree, that 

retiree's disability vanishes or materially diminishes, and then that retiree fails 

to return to duty after the Board orders the retiree to do so. N.J.S.A. 43:16A8(2) addresses this scenario by stating: 

If the beneficiary fails to submit to any such medical 

examination or fails to return to duty within [ten] days 

after being ordered so to do, or within such further 

time as may be allowed by the [B]oard of [T]rustees

for valid reason, as the case may be, the pension shall 

be discontinued during such default.

[(Emphasis added).]

Thus, the statute authorizes the Board to discontinue disability benefits only 

under this explicit sequence of events. 
A-1997-17T1 15

Nevertheless, Cardinale argues that his benefits could cease within ten 

days after he recovers from his disability. N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) does not 

permit that result. To hold otherwise would require us to re-write the text, 

which would change not only the meaning of the statute, but also, the policy 

implications associated with the unique status disabled retirees enjoy. And 

such a result would contravene the purpose for limiting the only circumstance

under which benefits cease. 

The Legislative purpose for granting limited authority to stop payment 

of benefits is such 

that persons on disability retirement who are no longer 

disabled, i.e., no longer entitled to disability 

retirement, and who are under the age of fifty-five, be 

returned to either their prior positions or any available 

duty that their employers are willing to assign to them. 

In other words, the employee should be returned to his 

or her position as if the employee's service was never 

interrupted and as if the disability retirement had 

never occurred.

[Terebetski, 338 N.J. Super. at 568-69 (footnote 

omitted).]

We have explained that "[t]he purpose of this legislation is to return the 

previously disabled employee to work as if the officer had never been disabled 

and the officer's service had never been interrupted." Id. at 570.

Cardinale's interpretation of the statute would be repugnant to the entire 

legislative framework. "Our task is to give that language a fair and practical 
A-1997-17T1 16

interpretation with reference to the purposes of the retirement act." Hillman v. 

Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970). 

We have explained that "the Legislature granted the Division discretion to 

decide the circumstances in which it will order a medical examination of a 

disability retiree to determine if he or she is fit for employment in any capacity 

with the former employer." N.J.A.C., 454 N.J. Super. at 416. This is 

indicative of the legislative goal of returning employees to work whenever

possible.

We acknowledge that, "pension statutes are 'remedial in character' and 

'should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons 

intended to be benefited thereby.'" Klumb, 199 N.J. at 34 (quoting Geller v. 

N.J. Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Annuity Fund, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 

(1969)). But, "eligibility is not to be liberally permitted." Smith v. Dep't of 

Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 

2007). Moreover, "[i]n spite of liberal construction, an employee has only 

such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the 

provisions of the statute." Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 415 

N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration in original). "An 

inappropriate allowance of benefits tends 'to place a greater strain on the 

financial integrity of the fund in question and its future availability for those 
A-1997-17T1 17

persons who are truly eligible for such benefits.'" Id. at 350 (quoting Smith, 

390 N.J. Super. at 215). A PFRS member irrevocably resigning from work is 

not within the scope of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2). In other 

words, a PFRS member, like Cardinale, who irrevocably resigned from work is 

not of a class "intended to be benefited" by the statute. Geller, 53 N.J. at 597-

98 (applying remedial statutes only in favor of the persons "intended to be 

benefited"). 

Thus, from a practical standpoint, the Board cannot statutorily cease 

paying any approved disability benefits, once they have begun, for an 

individual who voluntarily resigns from duty to settle disciplinary charges and 

agrees never to return. Allowing ongoing benefits under these circumstances 

unquestionably places a strain on the financial integrity of the fund and its 

future availability for those persons who are truly eligible for such benefits. 

Doing so would drain, weaken, and overburden the disability retirement 

system available to PFRS members. Entertaining an ordinary disability 

retirement application – as the Board recognized – for members who 

irrevocably resign from service to settle disciplinary charges flowing from 

illegal use of drugs would violate public policy, contravene the rehabilitation 

statute, and encourage abuse of the disability retirement system. 
A-1997-17T1 18

We therefore conclude that when a PFRS member separates from 

employment by deliberately and irrevocably resigning from active duty to 

settle pending disciplinary charges – like Cardinale – that person is ineligible 

for ordinary disability benefits because he or she can never return to work as 

contemplated by the unique disability retirement statutory framework.

IV.

We flatly reject Cardinale's contention that the Board failed to turn 

square corners. "When dealing with the public, 'government must "turn square 

corners" rather than exploit litigational or bargaining advantages that might 

otherwise be available to private citizens.'" Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water 

Supply Comm'n, 127 N.J. 344, 378 (1992) (quoting W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. 

N.J. Dep't of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 561 (1989)). "The government must act 

fairly and 'with compunction and integrity.'" Id. at 379 (quoting W.V. 

Pangborne, 116 N.J. at 562). The doctrine is "always subject to the guiding 

principles of fundamental fairness." Milligan v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 29 N.J. 

Tax 381, 399 (Tax 2016). There is no such equitable failure here. 

There is no evidence that anyone at the Police Department made any 

statements on which Cardinale reasonably could have detrimentally relied 

when negotiating the settlement agreement. The settlement reflected 

Cardinale's decision to proceed with his application. But the settlement 
A-1997-17T1 19

agreement does not represent – nor could it have – that the Board would 

process the application. Cardinale understood that by executing the settlement

agreement, he would proceed with his application at his "sole risk," and the

outcome of the application would not affect the enforceability of the 

settlement. Instead of permanently resigning, he could have fought the 

disciplinary action and run the risk of the Police Department terminating him 

for cause for his illegal use of drugs. But he knowingly chose not to do that.

Affirmed.