NOTICE
 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellant, 

v. 

KENNETH JOHN JOUPPI and 

KEN AIR, LLC, 

Appellees. 

Court of Appeals Nos. A-11819, A-11829, 

and A-11830 

Trial Court Nos. 4FA-12-3228 CR 

and 4FA-12-3659 CR 

O P I N I O N 

No. 2551 — May 12, 2017 

Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 

Fairbanks, Patrick S. Hammers, Judge. 

Appearances: Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. 

Geraghty and Craig W. Richards, Attorneys General, Juneau, for 

the Appellant. Nelson Traverso, Fairbanks, for Appellee 

Kenneth Jouppi. Robert John, Fairbanks, for Appellee Ken Air, 

LLC. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard, Judge. 

Judge MANNHEIMER. 

The State of Alaska prosecuted Kenneth John Jouppiand the air carrier that 

he and his wife owned, Ken Air, LLC, for unlawful importation of alcoholic beverages 

into a “local option” community (i.e., a community that had exercised its option under 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AS 04.11.491 to prohibit the importation of alcohol). 1 Following a jury trial, both 

Jouppi and Ken Air were convicted of this crime. 

At sentencing, the district court denied the State’s request to order forfeiture 

of the airplane involved. The State appealed the district court’s refusal to order forfeiture 

of the airplane, and both Jouppi and Ken Air then filed cross-appeals, challenging their 

convictions on various grounds. 

For the reasons explained in this opinion, we affirm the defendants’ 

convictions, but we reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the forfeiture of the airplane. 

We conclude that, under the pertinent statutes, forfeiture of the airplane was mandatory. 

Underlying facts 

Kenneth Jouppi and his wife were the two principals of Ken Air, LLC, and 

Jouppi was the only pilot working for Ken Air. On April 3, 2012, Alaska State Troopers 

were conducting surveillance of Jouppi and his airplane at the Fairbanks airport. The 

troopers were there to execute a search warrant for the airplane (a warrant that had been 

issued in connection with another investigation). 

As the troopers watched, two women —Helen Nicholia and Irene Todd — 

drove up to Jouppi’s airplane. Jouppi was scheduled to fly Nicholia to Beaver, a local 

option village. 

Nicholia and Todd’s vehicle contained several boxes and semi-transparent 

grocery bags. The troopers observed Jouppi opening and closing these boxes and bags, 

and redistributing their contents to fill up the containers. Jouppi then loaded this cargo 

into his airplane (with no assistance from the women). Some of the boxes that Jouppi 

AS 04.11.499(a). 

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loaded into the plane were open, and the others were loosely closed. Based on the way 

Jouppi was carrying the boxes, they appeared to be heavy. 

Once the plane was loaded, Helen Nicholia entered the plane on the copilot 

side. Jouppi got into the pilot’s seat, started the engine, and prepared to take off. (The 

other woman, Irene Todd, drove away.) 

At this point, the troopers contacted Jouppi and had him shut off the engine. 

They then executed the search warrant. 

When the troopers looked through the plane’s windows, they could see beer 

in a plastic grocery bag sitting unsecured in the plane. The troopers later testified that 

this beer was in plain view, obvious to any observer. The troopers took additional 

photographs as they removed the cargo from the plane. 

The troopers found beer in various boxes and bags onboard the plane; they 

removed this beer from its containers and seized it as evidence. The troopers then 

returned the boxes and bags to Nicholia, since these boxes and bags contained Nicholia’s 

other groceries. 

Based on this incident, Jouppi, Ken Air, and Helen Nicholia were all 

charged with importation of alcoholic beverages into a local option community, in 

violation of AS 04.11.499. Nicholia pleaded guilty to this charge. Jouppi and Ken Air 

invoked their right to trial. 

The defendants’ request for a jury instruction on spoliation of evidence 

At trial, the defendants took the position that the troopers had improperly 

destroyed evidence by failing to take custody of, and preserve, the plastic grocery bags 

and the cardboard boxes that the beer was found in. (As described in the preceding 

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section, the troopers returned Nicholia’s boxes and bags to her after they removed the 

beer.) 

With respect to the Fred Meyer plastic grocery bags, the defendants argued 

that even though beer cans might be visible through the sides of a typical Fred Meyer 

grocery bag, there was a possibility that the grocery bags found in Jouppi’s airplane were 

less transparent than a typical grocery bag, and that the beer might not have been visible 

through the plastic film of these particular bags. 

With respect to the cardboard boxes, the defendants argued that, if the 

troopers had preserved these boxes, the defendants might have been able to demonstrate 

that all of the beer found in Jouppi’s plane might have fit within these boxes when their 

tops were folded over and closed. Such a demonstration would potentially support 

Jouppi’s position that Nicholia had concealed all of the beer in the cardboard boxes, and 

that none of it was visible to Jouppi. 

Based on these arguments, the defendants asked the judge to instruct the 

jurors that, because the State failed to collect and preserve the grocery bags and the 

boxes, the jurors should assume that the grocery bags and the boxes would have been 

favorable evidence for the defense. 

(This type of instruction is commonly referred to as a “Thorne” instruction, 

because this was the remedy granted in Thorne v. Department of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 

1326, 1331-32 (Alaska 1989).) 

The trial judge denied the defendants’ request for a Thorne instruction. He 

noted that the police generally have no duty to collect physical evidence — only a duty 

to preserve the evidence once they have actually collected it. See Selig v. State, 286 P.3d 

767, 772 (Alaska App. 2012). Here, the judge found that the troopers “did not lose or 

destroy any evidence”. Rather, the troopers chose not to collect the evidence: they 

photographed the grocery bags and the boxes, and then they returned these bags and 

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boxes (along with the non-alcoholic groceries in them) to Nicholia, who was the owner 

of this personal property. 

The judge concluded that the troopers had acted properly, and that the 

defendants were not entitled to the Thorne instruction that they requested. 

On appeal, the defendants renew their claim that they were entitled to a jury 

instruction telling the jurors that, because the State returned the plastic grocery bags and 

cardboard boxes to Nicholia, the jurors should assume that this evidence would have 

been favorable to Jouppi’s claim that he was unaware of any alcoholic beverages in his 

airplane. 

We reject the defendants’ argument for three reasons. First, we agree with 

the trial judge that, because the troopers never collected the bags and the boxes, they 

were not required to preserve them. 

Second, with respect to the Fred Meyer grocery bags, the defendants 

offered no evidence that these bags are not uniform — i.e., no evidence that there is a 

substantial variation in the coloration or thickness of Fred Meyer plastic film grocery 

bags, such that beer might be visible through the sides of one Fred Meyer grocery bag 

but not visible through the sides of another. 

Third, with respect to the cardboard boxes, we note that (according to the 

evidence) the boxes contained other groceries besides beer. The defendants claimed that 

they needed these boxes so that they could conduct a demonstration to show that the beer 

found in Jouppi’s airplane could have fit completely within the boxes when they were 

fully closed. But such a demonstration would be probative only if the parties reassembled the entire original contents of the boxes — including the other groceries that 

belonged to Nicholia, and that were returned to her. 

The defendants never claimed that the troopers were required to seize and 

preserve every item of Nicholia’s personal property. And without all those articles of 

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personal property, no meaningful demonstration could be conducted, even if the boxes 

themselves had been preserved (or could somehow be retrieved from Nicholia). 

Accordingly, we uphold the trial judge’s decision to deny the defense 

request for a Thorne instruction. 

The defendants’ claim that a state trooper was improperly allowed to offer 

an opinion on Jouppi’s mental state 

During trial, Trooper Sergeant Kevin Yancey testified about the events that 

took place at the Fairbanks airport and the discovery of the alcohol in Jouppi’s airplane. 

During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Sgt. Yancey, the prosecutor asked Yancey 

to offer an opinion as to whether Jouppi had been “willfully blind” to the presence of the 

alcohol in his plane. Sgt. Yancey responded that he would not offer an opinion on 

“willful blindness” in a legal sense. But Yancey added that, based on his observations 

of the plane and its cargo, Jouppi would have had to be physically blind not to see the 

alcohol in the airplane: 

Prosecutor: Based on your observations of Kenneth 

Jouppi’s interaction with the cargo in the back of [the] SUV 

[that Nicholia arrived in], and his loading of the aircraft ... , 

did you form any opinion as to willful blindness by Mr. 

Jouppi with regard to his knowledge of the alcohol in that 

plane? 

Sgt. Yancey: I wasn’t using the term — the legal term 

“willful blindness” in my thought process, but it would have 

to be — he’d have to be blind not to know what was on [the 

plane], and absolutely ignoring whatever he was putting in 

that airplane. Just — there’s just — pilots with that bad of 

eyesight don’t fly. 

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On appeal, the defendants argue that Sgt. Yancey’s above-quotedtestimony 

was improper because it amounted to an assertion about Jouppi’s mental state — an 

assertion that Jouppi acted with the mens rea required for the crime. 

We disagree with this characterization of the trooper’s testimony. Even 

though the prosecutor invited Sgt. Yancey to draw an inference about Jouppi’s mental 

state, the trooper responded by saying that he was not offering an opinion on the issue 

of “willful blindness” in a legal sense. Rather, Yancey testified that, given the fact that 

Jouppi loaded all of the cargo himself, Jouppi would certainly have seen the alcoholic 

beverages. 

The trial judge could reasonably conclude that Yancey’s inference was 

based upon, and represented a summation of, Yancey’s own observations of the cargo 

as it sat within the cabin of the aircraft. In the words of Alaska Evidence Rule 701, the 

judge could reasonably conclude that Yancey’s testimony on this point was an inference 

“rationally based on [his] perception ... and ... helpful to a clear understanding of [his] 

testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” 

For these reasons, we conclude that the admission of Yancey’s testimony 

was not error. 

Defendant Ken Air’s argument that it is entitled to a judgement of acquittal 

Defendant Ken Air argues that it is entitled to a judgement of acquittal 

because the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to establish that Jouppi 

was acting as an agent of Ken Air, and was acting within the scope of his employment, 

during the events of this case. More specifically, Ken Air argues that there is no 

evidence to show that Jouppi was flying that day as a Ken Air pilot, as opposed to flying 

on his own. 

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When a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a criminal conviction, we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we ask whether 

reasonable jurors could conclude that the State had proved its allegations beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 2 

Jouppi testified at trial that he started Ken Air in Ketchikan in 1992, and he 

converted the company to a limited liability company in 2004. According to Jouppi’s 

testimony, he was the “owner-operator” of Ken Air — i.e., both an owner of the business 

and an agent of the business. 

Jouppi testified that Helen Nicholia arranged a charter flight with him on 

the day at issue in this case, and that Nicholia had booked charter flights with him in the 

past. 

Jouppi agreed that, in his capacity as the “pilot/agent” of Ken Air, his 

activities “directly impact[ed] the bottom line of the organization” — that when he 

booked charter flights and collected fares, he was “making money for the organization 

and for [him]self.” Jouppi also acknowledged that he made a practice of not checking 

his passengers’ bags or boxes — partly because, if he searched his passengers’ 

belongings and cargo, he would lose customers. 

From this testimony, a fair-minded juror could reasonably infer that Jouppi 

was acting as an agent of Ken Air, and acting within the scope of his employment, when 

he came to the airport to pilot Helen Nicholia’s charter flight, and when he loaded 

Nicholia’s belongings onto the plane. 

We therefore conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the 

conviction of Ken Air. 

See, e.g., Augustine v. State, 355 P.3d 573, 587 (Alaska App. 2015). 

– 8 – 2551
 

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The State’s contention that the district court was required to order 

forfeiture of the airplane 

Before the sentencing hearing in this case, the State filed a pleading in 

which the State asserted that, under the pertinent statutes, the sentencing court was 

required to order forfeiture of the airplane used in this crime. The district court initially 

concluded that the State was correct — that the pertinent statutes required forfeiture of 

the plane. But Ken Air sought reconsideration of this ruling, arguing that the court had 

misinterpreted the forfeiture statute. After hearing further argument on this point, the 

district court changed its ruling — concluding that forfeiture of the plane was not even 

authorized, much less mandated, by the pertinent statutes. 

The question of whether the district court was required to order forfeiture 

of the airplane hinges on the interpretation of two statutes. 

The first of these statutes, AS 04.11.499(a), is the statute that Jouppi and 

Ken Air were convicted of violating. AS 04.11.499(a) states that when a community has 

banned the importation of alcoholic beverages, it is a crime to “send, transport, or bring” 

alcoholic beverages into that community, or attempt to do so, or solicit someone else to 

do so. 

Aseparate statute, AS 04.16.220, apparently authorizes the forfeiture of any 

aircraft used to facilitate a violation of AS 04.11.499. We say “apparently” because this 

forfeiture statute does not track the precise language of AS 04.11.499 when it defines 

which aircraft are subject to forfeiture. Rather, AS 04.16.220 declares that an aircraft is 

subject to forfeiture if it is used to “facilitate the transportation of alcoholic beverages 

imported into a [community] in violation of AS 04.11.499(a).” 

Based on these two italicized words, “imported into”, the district court ruled 

that even when an airplane is used to facilitate the unlawful transportation of alcoholic 

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beverages to a local option community, forfeiture of the airplane is not allowed under 

AS 04.16.220 unless the alcoholic beverages actually arrive in the local option 

community. 

In the present case, the alcoholic beverages were intercepted before Jouppi 

was able to take off from the Fairbanks airport. Based on its interpretation of 

AS 04.16.220, the district court ruled that it had no authority to order forfeiture of the 

airplane. 

The State argues that the district court misconstrued AS 04.16.220 — that 

forfeiture under this statute is not limited to instances where alcoholic beverages actually 

arrive illegally in a local option community. For the reasons we are about to explain, we 

agree with the State that the forfeiture statute should not be interpreted in this narrow 

fashion. Rather, the statute mandates forfeiture of any aircraft that is knowingly used to 

facilitate a violation of AS 04.11.499, regardless of whether the alcoholic beverages ever 

arrive in the destination community. 

The State’s right to pursue this appeal 

Before we begin our analysis of the forfeiture issue, we must address the 

defendants’ argument that the State has no right to appeal the district court’s decision on 

this issue. Both Jouppi and Ken Air contend that even if the State is correct in saying 

that forfeiture of the airplane was mandatory under the pertinent statutes, the double 

jeopardy clause bars the State from seeking relief because the district court has already 

pronounced the defendants’ sentences. 

In some sense, the resolution of the defendants’ double jeopardy claim has 

little practical importance, because the forfeiture statute — AS 04.16.220 — allows the 

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State to seek forfeiture of the airplane either as part of a criminal sentence or in a 

separate in rem proceeding against the airplane itself. See AS 04.16.200(d). 3 

The fact that Jouppi and Ken Air have already been sentenced for violating 

AS 04.11.499 does not bar the State from pursuing a separate in rem forfeiture action 

against the airplane — because the forfeiture statute declares, in subsection (g), that “it 

is no defense in an in rem forfeiture proceeding brought under (d)(2) of this [statute] that 

a criminal proceeding is pending or has resulted in conviction or acquittal of a person 

charged with violating ... [AS] 04.11.499”. 

Nevertheless, we will address the merits of the defendants’ argument that 

the State has no right to appeal their sentences. 

Under AS 22.07.020(d)(2), the State is entitled to appeal a final decision 

in a criminal case except “[as] limited by the prohibitions against double jeopardy 

contained in the United States Constitution and the Alaska Constitution.” 

If the State is correct that the pertinent statutes not only allow forfeiture of 

the airplane but actually mandate it, then the defendants’ sentences are unlawfully 

lenient. And as this Court has repeatedly held, if a sentence is unlawfully lenient, the 

double jeopardy clause does not bar a court from increasingthe sentence to the minimum 

extent required to correct the illegality. 4 

3 This subsection of the forfeiture statute reads: 

(d) Property subject to forfeiture under (a) of this [statute] may be forfeited 

(1) upon conviction of a person for a violation of ... 04.11.499 ... or 

(2) upon judgment by the superior court in a proceeding in rem that the property was 

used in a manner subjecting it to forfeiture under (a) of this section. 

4 Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 994 (Alaska App. 2016), and the other six cases cited 

in footnote 3 of Grant. 

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Under Alaska law, the State has a recognized right to seek appellate review 

of an illegal sentence (and to seek correction of that sentence) by filing a petition for 

review — i.e., a request for discretionary review. 5 The question here is whether the 

State is entitled to appeal an illegal sentence — i.e., whether the State has the right to 

demand appellate review of the State’s claim that a sentence is illegal. 

As this Court explained in Forster v. State, 236 P.3d 1157, 1173 (Alaska 

App. 2010), the legislature enacted AS 22.07.020(d)(2) for the purpose of bringing 

Alaska law in line with the corresponding federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3731. (See SLA 

1993, ch. 71, § 1.) The federalcourts of appeal are split as to whether this federal statute 

authorizes the government to appeal an illegal sentence, and the legislative history of 

AS 22.07.020(d)(2) is silent on this issue. It is therefore not clear whether, under Alaska 

law, the State has a right to appeal a sentence on the ground that it is illegally lenient (as 

opposed to the right to seek discretionary review of the sentence). 

But, as in Forster, we need not decide this point of law. Even assuming 

that the State has no right of appeal in the present case, the question of statutory 

construction that the State raises in this case has substantial public importance, not only 

in this case but in future cases. For this reason, even if we assume that the State’s notice 

of appeal in this case should have been treated as a late-filed petition for review, we 

would grant review and reach the merits of the State’s claim. 

We now turn to the merits of that claim. 

State v. Laporte, 672 P.2d 466, 469 (Alaska App. 1983). 

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A closer look at the offense of “importation” 

The statute that Jouppi and Ken Air were convicted of violating, 

AS 04.11.499(a), is titled “Prohibition of importation or purchase after election”. 

The “importation” portion of the statute makes it a crime to send or convey 

(or try to send or convey) alcoholic beverages into a community if that community has 

voted to ban the importation of alcoholic beverages. The “purchase” portion of the 

statute makes it a crime for a resident of a local option community to purchase 

unlawfully conveyed alcoholic beverages. 

The problem in the present case arises from the fact that, even though the 

title of AS 04.11.499 refers to the crime as “importation” of alcoholic beverages, the 

statute itself does not use the noun “importation” or any form of the verb “import” to 

define this crime. Instead, AS 04.11.499 declares that it is a crime for a person to 

knowingly “send”, “transport”, or “bring” an alcoholic beverage to a local option 

community. 

In Alaska, section headings and the captions of statutes are not part of the 

law. 6 Thus, the fact that the word “importation” is used in the title of the statute to 

describe this offense has no effect on the actuallegaldefinition of the offense. The crime 

is defined in terms of “sending”, “transporting”, or “bringing” alcoholic beverages into 

the local option community. 

In everyday usage, the verb “import” means “to bring in from the 

outside”. 7 Because the legislature has given communities the authority to ban the 

6 See AS 01.05.006; Ketchikan Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage 

Control Board, 602 P.2d 434, 438 (Alaska 1979); Lewis v. State, 195 P.3d 622, 638 (Alaska 

App. 2008). 

7 Webster’s New World College Dictionary (Fourth Edition, 2004), pp. 716-17. 

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importation of alcoholic beverages, the legislature could reasonably decide to enforce 

these community bans by penalizing all persons who are complicit in an unlawful 

importation. 8 We conclude that the legislature used the terms “send”, “transport”, and 

“bring” to define the scope of that complicity. 

The notion of importation obviously includes the act of “bringing” 

alcoholic beverages into the local option community, in the sense of a completed 

delivery. But by adding the verb “send” to the definition of the crime, the legislature 

broadened the statute to include people who knowingly initiate the unlawful delivery, 

even though they may play no personal role in the actual transportation and delivery of 

the beverages. Similarly, by adding the verb “transport”, the legislature broadened the 

statute to include middlemen who, at some stage, knowingly transport the alcoholic 

beverages toward the unlawful destination — even though these middlemen may not 

have initiated the sending of the beverages, and even though they may not personally 

complete the final delivery of the beverages into the community. 

The wordingof AS 04.11.499 actually goes farther than this — because the 

definitions of “send”, “transport”, and “bring” codified in subsection (c) of the statute 

additionally include any act of soliciting another person to do any of these three things, 

as well as any attempt to do any of these three things. 

The act of soliciting another person to “send”, “transport”, or “bring” 

alcoholic beverages to a local option community would, in any event, make the person 

See the definition of complicity found in AS 11.16.110(2)(B) and AS 11.16.110(3). 

Together, these two provisions declare that a person is legally accountable for the criminal 

conduct of another person if, acting “with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of 

the offense”, the person “aids or abets the other [person] in planning or committing the 

offense”; or if, “acting with [a] culpable mental state ... sufficient for the commission of the 

offense”, the person “causes an innocent person or a person who lacks criminal responsibility 

to engage in the proscribed conduct.” 

– 14 – 2551
 

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an accomplice to the crime under AS 11.16.110(2)(A). 9 Thus, it is unclear whether the 

legislature’s decision to include solicitation in the definition of the crime actually 

expanded the scope of criminal liability under the statute. 

Similarly, any attempt to commit a crime is already punishable as a crime 

under AS 11.31.100 — although the punishment for an attempt is normally lower than 

the punishment for the completed crime. Thus, by including attempts as part of the 

definition of the substantive crime, the legislature did not expand the category of people 

who could be prosecuted; rather, the legislature effectively increased the penalty for an 

attempt. 

Nevertheless, the legislature’s expansive definition of this offense makes 

it clear that the legislature intended to cast a wide net. Even though the title of 

AS 04.11.499, “importation”, might suggest a completed act of importation, the statute 

in fact authorizes the prosecution of practically all persons who knowingly involve 

themselves in any aspect of an endeavor to illegally import alcoholic beverages into a 

local option community — regardless of whether the alcoholic beverages are actually 

transported toward their destination, and regardless of whether the alcoholic beverages 

actually arrive in the community. 

We now turn to the other statute involved in this case — the forfeiture 

statute, AS 04.16.220. 

This statute declares that a person is legally accountable for the criminal conduct of 

another person if, acting “with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense”, 

the person “solicits the other [person] to commit the offense”. 

– 15 – 2551
 

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Our analysis of the forfeiture statute 

The specific forfeiture provisions at issue in this appeal are AS 04.16.­

220(a)(3)(C) and (i)(1). Subsection (a)(3)(C) of the statute authorizes the forfeiture of 

“aircraft, vehicles, or vessels” that are used to “transport or facilitate the transportation 

of ... alcoholic beverages imported into a [local option community] in violation of 

AS 04.11.499(a)”. Subsection (i)(1) of the statute declares that if the owner of an 

airplane is convicted of violating AS 04.11.499, and if the airplane is subject to forfeiture 

under subsection (a)(3)(C), then it must be forfeited. 10 

Taken together, these provisions mean that if the airplane in this case was 

subject to forfeiture under AS 04.16.220(a)(3)(C), then the district court was required to 

order forfeiture of that airplane. We must therefore decide whether the airplane in this 

case was subject to forfeiture under subsection (a)(3)(C) — in other words, whether the 

airplane was used to “transport or facilitate the transportation of ... alcoholic beverages 

imported into a [local option community] in violation of AS 04.11.499(a)”. 

As we have already explained, AS 04.11.499(a) was written to encompass 

practically all activities connected to the unlawful importation of alcoholic beverages 

into a local option community, whether those activities succeed or not — that is, 

regardless of whether those activities actually result in the delivery of alcoholic 

beverages into the local option community. 

But because subsection (a)(3)(C) of the forfeiture statute uses the phrase 

“imported into a [local option community] in violation of AS 04.11.499(a)”, the district 

10 More specifically, AS 04.16.220(i)(1) declares that, “upon [a person’s] conviction 

for a violation of ... AS 04.11.499(a), if an aircraft ... is subject to forfeiture under 

[subsection] (a) of this [statute], the court shall, subject to remission to innocent parties [as 

authorized by this statute], order the forfeiture of the airplane to the state[.]” 

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court ruled that the scope of forfeiture authorized by this provision of the statute does not 

encompass all airplanes used to facilitate the transportation of alcoholic beverages into 

a local option community. Rather, the court concluded that forfeiture of airplanes under 

subsection (a)(3)(C) is strictly limited to instances where those efforts succeed — i.e., 

where alcoholic beverages are actually delivered to the local option community. 

Thus, the district court concluded, AS 04.16.220(a)(3)(C) does not even 

authorize — much less mandate — a forfeiture of the airplane in the present case. 

It is true, as we noted earlier in this opinion, that the verb “import” normally 

means “to bring in from the outside”. And because neither the charging statute, 

AS 04.11.499, nor the forfeiture statute, AS 04.16.220, contains a special definition of 

“import”, it would normally make sense to apply this dictionary definition when 

interpreting the forfeiture statute. But we agree with the State that, in this particular 

context, the forfeiture statute’s reference to “imported” should not be interpreted so 

narrowly that forfeitures are strictly limited to instances where alcoholic beverages are 

actually delivered into a local option community. 

Although there are many rules of statutory construction, a court’s primary 

goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and, if that intent can reasonably be 

ascertained, to implement that legislative intent. 11 

This remains the goal of statutory construction even though the wording of 

a statute is seemingly “plain”. Even when a statute uses words or phrases that have a 

“plain” or commonly accepted meaning, Alaska law does not require a court to apply this 

meaning mechanically. Instead, Alaska courts use a sliding scale approach to statutory 

interpretation — analyzing the wording of the statute in light of the statute’s legislative 

11 Dickie v. State, 282 P.3d 382, 384-85 (Alaska App. 2012);Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 

190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992). 

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history, and in light of the statute’s context in the legislature’s greater statutory scheme 

— to see if this analysis reveals a legislative intent that differs from the “plain meaning” 

of the statutory language. 12 

In particular, when a statute is part of a larger framework or regulatory 

scheme, even seemingly unambiguous statutory language must be interpreted in light of 

the other portions of the regulatory whole. 13 

Here, the legislature enacted a trio of statutes that address the prosecution 

and punishment of people who are involved in the importation of alcoholic beverages 

into local option communities. 

We have already examined the first two of these statutes: AS 04.11.499 

(the statute that defines the offense) and AS 04.16.220 (the statute that governs related 

forfeitures). 

The third statute that we must consider — a statute which we have not 

mentioned before — is AS 04.16.200. Subsections (e) through (g) of this statute set forth 

the penalties for violating AS 04.11.499. These penalties vary according to how much 

alcohol is involved, and according to the defendant’s prior record. But this penalty 

statute draws no distinction between cases where the delivery of alcoholic beverages into 

a local option community is actually completed versus cases where the alcoholic 

beverages are intercepted before they reach the community. 

We now return to the specific question before us: What does 

AS 04.16.220(a)(3)(C) mean when it speaks of the forfeiture of aircraft that are used to 

12 See Alaska Public Employees Assn. v. Fairbanks, 753 P.2d 725, 727 (Alaska 1988); 

Stephan v. State, 810 P.2d 564, 566 (Alaska App. 1991). 

13 Lake v. Construction Machinery, Inc., 787 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Alaska 1990); Hafling 

v.Inlandboatmen’s Union of the Pacific, 585 P.2d 870, 872 (Alaska1978);Millman v.State, 

841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992). 

– 18 – 2551
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

transport or facilitate the transportation of alcoholic beverages “imported into” a local 

option community? 

We have already explained that, even though the title of AS 04.11.499 uses 

the word “importation” to describe the offense, the actual wording of the statute 

demonstrates the legislature’s intent to criminalize all aspects of any endeavor to bring 

alcoholic beverages into a local option community — all attempts to “send”, “transport”, 

or “bring” alcoholic beverages to these communities, regardless of whether those 

attempts succeed. 

AS 04.16.220(a)(3)(C) authorizes the forfeiture of aircraft that are used to 

“transport or facilitate the transportation of ... alcoholic beverages imported into a [local 

option community] in violation of AS 04.11.499(a)”. Based on the legislature’s intent 

to broadly prohibit all attempts to introduce alcoholic beverages into local option 

communities, we conclude that the phrase “imported” into a local option community 

should not be interpreted in the narrow sense of “physically delivered” into a local option 

community. Instead, we interpret the word “imported” as a shorthand reference to the 

crime defined in AS 04.11.499 — similar to the way the word “importation” is used in 

the title of AS 04.11.499. 

The defendants argue that the legislature might reasonably have concluded 

that the most serious violations of AS 04.11.499 are the cases where alcoholic beverages 

are actually delivered into a local option community — and that, for this reason, the 

legislature may have wanted to allow forfeitures of aircraft only in those cases. 

But other than the use of the words “imported into” in AS 04.16.220­

(a)(3)(C), there is nothing in the history or wording of the trio of interrelated statutes to 

suggest that the legislature intended to draw such a distinction — no indication that the 

legislature viewed cases where alcoholic beverages are actually delivered into a local 

option community as significantly more serious than cases where the alcoholic beverages 

– 19 – 2551
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

are intercepted by the authorities, or where the intended delivery fails for some other 

reason. Instead, as we have explained, the legislature intended to punish essentially all 

persons who knowingly involve themselves in any aspect of an endeavor to introduce 

alcoholic beverages into a local option community, regardless of whether the alcoholic 

beverages ever physically arrive in the community. 

For these reasons, we reverse the ruling of the district court on the issue of 

the airplane forfeiture. Under AS 04.16.220(a)(3)(C) and (i)(1), the court was required 

to order the forfeiture of the airplane in this case. We therefore direct the district court 

to amend the judgements against the two defendants by ordering the forfeiture of the 

airplane. 

Conclusion 

The judgements against the two defendants are AFFIRMED, with the 

exception that those judgements must be amended to include forfeiture of the airplane. 

– 20 – 2551