J-S46031-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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TERRENCE SNEAD,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 987 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 13, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003643-2008

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E, OTT, and STRASSBURGER,* J.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 04, 2016

Terrence Snead (Appellant) appeals from the March 13, 2015 order 

which denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.1 We affirm.2

 

1 Also before us is Appellant’s “motion for stay of appeal and for remand to 

the lower court,” in which he avers that PCRA counsel failed to address all of 

Appellant’s issues in her Turner/Finley and that there were additional 

issues he wished to raise. On December 23, 2015, this Court denied 

Appellant’s request without prejudice, allowing him to re-apply for the 

requested relief within his brief. In his brief, Appellant lists the issues and 

states that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine if counsel’s 

actions were “reasonable.” However, Appellant has failed to address the 

merits of any of the issues or develop an argument in support of them. 

Accordingly, we deny this motion. 

2 We note with disapproval that the Commonwealth has not filed a brief in 

this matter despite having requested and received an extension of time to 

do so.
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The PCRA court summarized the background underlying this matter as 

follows. 

On November 13, 2009, following a jury trial before [the 

trial court, Appellant] was found guilty of murder of the first 

degree (H-1) and criminal conspiracy (F-1). Sentencing was 

deferred until November 16, 2009, at which time [Appellant] was 

sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment. 

[Appellant was also sentenced to a consecutive term of not less 

than ten years nor more than twenty years of imprisonment for 

criminal conspiracy]. On November 23, 2009, [Appellant] filed 

post-sentence motions, which were denied by [the trial court] on 

March 19, 2010. [Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal on 

April 5, 2010. On September 29, 2011, [this Court] affirmed 

[Appellant’s] judgment of sentence, and on March 23, 2012, our

Supreme Court denied [Appellant’s] petition for allowance of 

appeal. [Commonwealth v. Snead, 34 A.3d 241 (Pa. Super. 

2011), appeal denied, 40 A.3d 1236 (Pa. 2012)].

On January 22, 2013, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition 

under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Counsel was 

appointed and, on September 24, 2014, filed a 

[Turner/Finley3] “no merit” letter and motion to withdraw as 

counsel. On January 29, 2015, [the PCRA court] sent 

[Appellant] notice of its intent to deny and dismiss his PCRA 

petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (907 

Notice). 

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/9/2015, at 1-2 (citations and footnotes removed). 

Appellant pro se filed a response to the 907 notice, objecting to the 

court’s intent to dismiss his petition and asserting PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. On March 13, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s 

 

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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petition and permitted counsel to withdraw. This timely-filed appeal 

followed.4

On appeal, Appellant challenges the PCRA court’s decision to permit 

counsel to withdraw and the court’s conclusion that Appellant’s issues were 

without merit.5 As such, we will address these claims mindful of the 

following standard. “Our standard of review of a [PCRA] court order 

granting or denying relief under the PCRA calls upon us to determine 

“whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence 

of record and is free of legal error.’” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 

185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 

1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011)). This Court grants great deference to the 

findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those 

findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

 

4 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with the mandates of 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

5 We observe that the issues presented and argued within Appellant’s brief 

are different from those raised in his concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal, which are different from the issues raised in his pro se 

response to the PCRA court’s 907 notice and his pro se PCRA petition. 

Consequently, in accordance with our case law, we will only review those 

issues which have been properly preserved and argued within his brief. See 

Commonwealth v. Butler, 812 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa. 2002) (“[A]ny issues

not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement are waived.”). See also

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 641 A.2d 1176, 1184 (Pa. Super. 1994) 

citing Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. Super. 1992) 

(“[W]e must deem an issue abandoned where it has been identified on 

appeal but not properly developed in the brief.”).
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Appellant contends PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley letter was 

insufficient and failed to meet the requirements as set forth by our courts. 

Specifically, Appellant contends counsel’s letter failed to address all issues 

raised in Appellant’s pro se petition,6 did not state with specificity which files 

and transcripts counsel reviewed, and did not raise additional meritorious 

issues that were not included in the pro se petition, but “were present on the 

face of the record.” Appellant’s Brief at 12-15.

The procedural requirements set forth in Turner/Finley, govern 

withdrawal by counsel from representation on PCRA appeals. To withdraw 

from representation at the PCRA court level,

counsel must review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel 

must then submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial court ... detailing 

the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, 

listing the issues which the petitioner wants to have reviewed, 

explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting 

permission to withdraw.

Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the 

“no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to 

withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to 

proceed pro se or by new counsel. 

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007).

In responding to Appellant’s contention that PCRA counsel’s 

Turner/Finley letter failed to meet the applicable standards, the PCRA 

court stated the following: 

 

6 While Appellant failed to state within his brief which issues PCRA counsel 

neglected to address, he has done so in other filings and the PCRA court has 

addressed this issue. As such, we will not find waiver. 
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In the instant case, PCRA counsel complied with all of the 

requirements set forth in Turner/Finley. Contrary to 

[Appellant’s] assertion, PCRA counsel’s Finley letter adequately 

detailed the nature and extent of her review: “Pursuant to [PCRA 

counsel’s] appointment, [PCRA counsel] reviewed the Quarter 

Sessions’ file in Room 206, Criminal Justice Center, [Appellant’s] 

pro se PCRA petition, the docket entries and exchanged 

correspondence with [Appellant].” Throughout the Finley letter, 

PCRA counsel makes reference to, and cites to the record. 

[Appellant] claims that PCRA counsel failed to adequately detail 

the nature of her review by failing to state which transcripts she 

reviewed specifically; yet fails to cite to any authority requiring 

PCRA counsel to detail specifically which transcripts were 

reviewed. The citations to the trial record in counsel’s Finley

letter provide sufficient support for counsel’s review of the trial 

transcripts. PCRA counsel stated that she reviewed the entire 

Quarter Sessions’ file, [Appellant’s] pro se PCRA petition, and all 

of the docket entries in this case. PCRA counsel also provided a 

summary of the facts of this case, and cited applicable case law 

to explain why [Appellant’s] claims lacked merit. Therefore, 

PCRA counsel did in fact adequately review the record. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/9/2015, at 15-16. 

After a review of counsel’s Turner/Finley letter, we agree with the 

PCRA court that counsel provided ample detail regarding her review of 

Appellant’s case. Thus, we conclude the PCRA court did not err by 

concluding that counsel’s Turner/Finley letter was adequate to permit 

withdrawal on this basis. 

Appellant also argues that PCRA counsel’s petition was deficient 

because it failed to address two issues he raised in his pro se petition. 

Specifically, Appellant contends counsel failed to address trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to object to misstatements made by the 

Commonwealth and for failing to object to the trial court’s jury instruction on 
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accomplice testimony. In response, the PCRA court directed Appellant to 

counsel’s Turner/Finley letter where she addressed the “misstatements” 

made by the Commonwealth and detailed the reasoning the issue held no 

merit.7 

The PCRA court did concede that counsel failed to address the issue 

raised in Appellant’s pro se petition regarding the jury instruction. We note 

at the outset that accepting PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley letter when she 

failed to address all of Appellant’s issues raised in his pro se petition was a 

clear error. See Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 721 (providing counsel must, among 

other requirements, list “the issues which the petitioner wants to have 

reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit ... If counsel fails 

to satisfy the foregoing technical prerequisites of Turner/Finley, the court 

will not reach the merits of the underlying claims but, rather, will merely 

deny counsel’s request to withdraw”). In response to its absence, the PCRA 

court found that the omission was harmless because the issue lacked merit. 

As such, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant was not prejudiced by its 

 

7 See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/9/2015, at 15 (citing Turner/Finley Letter, 

9/24/2014, at 5 (pages unnumbered) (“Second, [Appellant] claims in 

paragraphs seven, eight, twelve, twenty-nine, and thirty of his pro se PCRA 

petition that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct when he made certain 

arguments to the jury.”)). PCRA counsel continued, averring she had 

analyzed these statements and determined the issue surrounding these 

statements held no merit. Id. at 5-7 (pages unnumbered). 
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absence. PCRA court opinion, 9/9/2015 at 16.8 We agree. After reviewing 

the court’s thorough analysis of the issue, we are satisfied with the court’s 

conclusion. Accordingly, there would be no point in remanding for counsel to 

address this issue. This claim fails. 

Lastly, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred in accepting PCRA 

counsel’s no-merit letter, when meritorious issues existed and the court 

failed to conduct its own independent examination of the record. Appellant’s 

Brief at 12. A review of the record directly contradicts Appellant’s assertion. 

Along with its 907 notice dismissing Appellant’s petition, the PCRA court 

included an opinion setting forth its own analysis and included its own 

reasoning why the issues lacked merit. See Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, 1/29/2015, at 2-9.9 The PCRA court also 

stated within its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1925 that the court

“independently reviewed the record and concluded thereafter that 

[Appellant’s] PCRA petition was meritless.” PCRA court opinion, 9/9/2015, 

at 16. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s averment that other meritorious 

 

8

In addressing this issue within its opinion, the PCRA court found that the 

instruction closely mirrored that of the Pennsylvania Standard Suggested 

Jury Instruction on accomplice testimony and that it favored Appellant “in 

explaining to the jury that it should consider the accomplice testimony of 

Jermaine Rippy, who implicated [Appellant in the] crime, with caution.” 

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/9/2015, at 10-11.

9 Although the PCRA court did not include an analysis of Appellant’s issue 

regarding trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to object to the trial court’s 

jury instruction within its 907 notice, the court did thoroughly address this 

issue within its 1925 opinion.
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issues existed when Appellant has only listed issues he contends could have 

been raised, but fails to provide any meaningful arguments to support their 

merit. We find the PCRA court adequately examined the record and did not 

wholesale adopt counsel’s Turner/Finley letter. No relief is due.

Accordingly, we find that the PCRA court properly dismissed 

Appellant’s petition, and as such, we affirm.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/4/2016