NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0363n.06 F ile Nam e: 09a0363n.06 No. 08-1301 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
SUZ AN NE CO NT I, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. AME RI CAN AXL E A ND MA NUFACT URI NG, INC., Defendan t-Appellee, SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P C, Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On App eal from the United St at e s D ist r ic t C our t fo r th e Eastern Distr ict of Michigan

Be for e : G UY , C LA Y, and C OOK , C ir c uitJudg e s. CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, Suzanne Conti (“ Conti”), appea ls the order of the United States Dis t ri ct C o u rt for the E astern D istrict of Michig an g rantingsummary judgme nt in favor Defen d ant, American Axle & Ma nufac turing , I nc. (“ Americ an Axle” or “ AAM”) , as to Conti’s
e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min a tio n a

nd re ta liatio n c la ims a sse rt e d und e r M ic hig an’ s E lli ott -L ars en Civil Rights Act (“EL CRA”), Mich. Comp. L aws § 37.2101, et seq. (2008), and the Fe dera l Equal Pay Act (“ EPA ” ), 29 U. S.C. § 2 06 (d ). Con ti a lso c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r d eny in g he r r e qu e st t o d e p o s e A m e r i c anA x l e C o - F o u n d e r , C h a i r m an , an d C E O R i c h ar d

D a u c h ( “ D a u c h ” )
. F i n a l l y,No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 2 - Conti challeng es the district cour t’s order permitting he r for

mer c ounsel in th i s action, Sommers Sc hw art z PC, t o w ith dr aw a s c ouns e l ov e r h e r o bje c tio n a nd ini tiate a lie n a g a ins t any dama g e s Co nti may rec over in this action. F o r t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s , w e h e r e b y RE VE RSE the judg ment of the district cour t reg arding Conti’s request to depose CEO D auch, VA CA TE the district court ’s decision to g rant summary judgme nt in favor of

Americ an Ax l e, and VA CA TE the district court’s judg ment aff irming the
ma g istrate jud g e ’s den ia l of Con ti’ s mo tio n f

or de c lara tor y jud g me nt r e g ard inghe r d isp ute wi th Sommers Schwartz PC. I. BACK GR OUND Am e ri c an Axle is a mul ti- natio na l c or po ratio n, he a dq

ua rt e re d in Mic hig an, sp e c ia lizin g in
manu fa c tur inga

uto mob ile pa

rt s. I n thi s a c tio n, Con ti, a fe ma le e xec uti ve a t A me ri c an A xle, a sse rt s claims of g ender

discrimination and re taliation ag ainst her e mploy er. Conti j oined AAM in 1997 as a Salaried Executive in Trai n i n g (“SEI T”), be coming Commodi ty

Manag er in the Procureme nt depar tment. I n 2003, Abdullah Shanti (“Shanti”), the nVi c e Pr e sid e nt o f P ro c ur e me nt, pr omo ted C on ti t o c o- Di re c tor of I nd ir e c t Mate ri a l Str a te g ic Sourcing . I n that position, Conti wa s a peer to c o-Dire ctor L arr y Earha rt (“Ea rhar t”). Until Cont i’s promotion, Earha

rt had be en ac ting a s the lone Dire ctor of that d ep ar tment since 2001, and w as Conti’s direct supervisor. A few months a fter Conti’s promotion, i n J une 2003, Conti and Ear hart both wer e “transfe rre d” out of t he department and into newpositions. Earhart wa s transfe rre d to a non-executive position in the Quality Deve lopment depar tment, while C onti was transfer red to theNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 3 - New Mode l L aunch division of the Materia ls Depar tment. Although Conti retaine d her c o-Dire ctor salary , she wa s demoted b ac k t o an SEI T position, a titl e she ha d not held since she f irst joined AAM. Afte r her

demotion and transf

er, Conti repor

ted dire ct l y to Mike Pannucci (“ Pannucci” ), Direc tor of Ne w Model L aunch at that time. I n J anuar y of 2004, af

ter Pannuc ci vac ated the D irec tor position, Conti wa s promoted to the vaca nt position, but w as g iven the title of “Mana g er” rathe r than “Dire ctor.” I n her c omplaint, Cont i claims that she has hit a “g lass ceiling ” at Ame rica n Axl e, and that he r e xpe ri e nc e is a

dir e c t pr od

uc t of the c omp any ’s g e nd e r- bia se d p ro mot ion and pa y pr act ic e s. Cont i complains that she has not re ceive d the same sa lary incre ases or

the same oppor

tunity for advanc ement and tr aining as her mal e co u n t erp ar ts. I n particula r, Conti alleg es that she wa s pro mo te d to th e c o - D ir e c to r p o s it io n o n ly a f te r A me r ic an A xle p r o mo te d a le s s - qu a li f ied male, Earha rt, nea rly two y ear s befor e her
. She also asser ts that, althoug h she re ceive d approximately the same sala

ry as Ear hart, he was promoted to a highe r salar

y “band” which af

forde d him the op po rtun i t y t o r e c e i v e l ar g e r e xe c u t i v e b o nu s e s . I n a d d i t i o n , C o n t i a l l e g e s t h a t h e r p r o m o t ionto Manag er r ather

than Dire ctor of the New Mode l L aunch divisi o n was discr iminatory beca use she
rec eived a

lower title and le ss pay

than her immediate m ale pr edec essor, Pannuc ci, despite the f act that sh e pe rf

or ms e sse nti a lly

the same wo rk . A c c or din g to C on ti, sh e wa s tr e a te d une qu a lly be c a us e of her sex, and also as reta liation for her d ec i s i o n t o t est ify ag ainst the company ’s intere sts in a deposition in a prior discrimination suit also arising out of g ender -biased hir ing pr ac t i ces at Americ an Axle. Conti further claims that Americ an Axle’s discriminato ry empl oy ment prac tices
are a re flec tion of the discriminatory attitudes of its CEO.No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 4 - Conti also challeng es the district cour t’s decis i o n t o deny

her r equest to depose Dauc h, AAM’s Co-F ounder, Chair man, and CEO. Dur ing discovery , Conti t imely noticed the de position of Da uc h. AA M, ho we ve r, mov e d for a pr ote c tiv e or de r to str ike the de po sit ion no tic e . Wh ile thi s motion was p en d ing, the discovery period c losed. On January 17, 2007, the district court e ntere d an order ex tending the di scover y period for the l imited purpose of permitting Conti to serve written interrog atories on Dauc h
. On M arc h 16, 2007, the mag istrate judg e denie d AAM’s motion for
re c on sid eration

and re a ff ir me d it s o rd e r. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt su bs e qu e ntl y

a ff ir me d th a t ju dg me nt. J .A. 986-89. Af te r Da uc h ans we re d the int e rr og a tor ie s se rv e d by Con ti, Con ti a g a in so ug ht to depo se Dauc h, and AAM a g ain soug ht a protec tive order . When the mag istrate judge finally ruled on the issue on J une 27, 2007, it dismiss ed AA M ’s reque st for a pr otective or der “ without decision” beca use, by that time, Conti ’s counse l had withdrawn from the c ase a nd thus she was unre prese nted. Th a t or de r e xpre ssl y

anti c ipate d th a t, a ft e r C on ti’ s n e w c ouns e l e nte re d a n a pp e ara nc e , “ it i s li ke ly that a new

schedulingorder

will be enter ed.” J.A. 1097. Although the Dauc h deposition issue was pending, the discovery period ha d closed a

nd thus Americ an A x l e m o v ed for summary judgme nt. When Cont i’s new c ounsel eve ntually enter ed an appea ranc e, the court lifted the s tay and set a response deadline with respe ct t o AAM’s motion for summary judgme nt. Conti’s ne w counsel there afte r filed an “Emer g ency Motion for Ext ension of Dates,” seekingto ext end the d i s co v ery period so that new ly

enter ed counse l would have a n
o p p o rt u n i t y

t o re n ew C o n t i ’s re qu es tt o d ep o s e D au ch
. On S ep t em b er 2 0 , 2 0 0 7 , t h e ma gi s t ra t e j u d ge reje cted that r equest. Cont i ’s new c ounsel then moved the c ourt for le ave to “ extend/re-openNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 5 - discovery ,” esse ntially

seeking to rene w C onti’s reque st to pursue the Da uch deposition. J .A. 1426- 36. AAM ag ain opposed Conti’s reque st, but not on t he g rounds that a p rotec tive order was
war rante d, but r ather

beca use the motion for lea

ve to re open amounted to a n improper motion for
rec onsideration of the court’s Septe mber 20, 2007 orde r. J.A. 1437-61. On Octobe r 25, 2007, wel l o v er a y ear afte r Conti origina lly

soug ht to depose Da

uch, the mag istrate judg e denie d Conti’s request to re- open discovery in or der to de pose Dauc h. Despite the fac t that t h e co u rt’s January 17, 2007 order

expressly

anticipated that Conti ’s substitute counsel might re new Conti’s reque st to depose Da uch, and notwithstandingthat the cour t never g rante d AAM’s motion for a

protec tive order , J .A. 1097-98, the mag istrate judge rea ffirme d its S eptember 20, 2007 order

denying Cont’s re quest to reope n discovery . The district cour t affir med the mag istrate judg e’s pr ocedur al appr oach and denial of Conti’s motion to r eopen discovery in order to depose Da

uch. J.A. 2508-10. After bri ef i n g o n AAM’s summary judgme nt motion was completed, the district cour t g rante d summary

judgme nt in favor of

Americ an Axle, denying Conti relief on all claims. This timely

appea l followed. II. CO NT I’ S DI SCO VE RYCL AI M “The scope of

discovery

is, of course , within the broad discretion of the trial court. . . . An order denying f

urther disc overy

will be g rounds for r evers al only if it was an a

buse of discr etion resulting in substantial prejudice.” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., I nc. , 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). There fore , the decision to issue a protec tive order is left to “the broa d discretion of the district court in manag ing the case .” Le we lli ng v . F ar me rs I ns .No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 6 - of Columbus, Inc. , 879 F.2d 212, 218 ( 6th Cir. 1989). Neve rtheless, although the district court has discretion in m anag ing disc overy , “[t] he scope of discover

y under the Fe dera l Rules of Civil P ro cedure is traditionally quite broad.” Le wis , 135 F .3 d at 40 2. As the Sup re me Court has in st ruc te d, be c a us e “ dis c ov e ry

its e lf is d e sig ne d to he lp de fi ne and

c lari fy the iss ue ,” the lim its se t fo rt h in Rul e 26 mus t be “ c on str ue d br oa dly to e nc omp a ss any matter that bear s on, or that rea sonably could lead to othe r matters that could bear on, any issue that is or m ay be in the ca se.” Op pe nh e im e r F

un d, In c . v . S

an de rs , 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). The operative test in determining whether discovery

on a particula

r matter is pe rmissible is “whether the line of interr og ation is reasona bly calc ulated to lead to the di s co v er y of admissible evidenc e.” Mellon v. Cooper-

Jarrett, Inc

. , 424 F.2d 499, 501 ( 6th Cir. 1970). AA M ar g u e s th a t Co n ti s h o u ld n o t b e p e r mi tt e d to d e p o s e D a

u c h b e c a u s e he wa s not persona lly

involved in and did not have pe rsonal knowledg e of the employ ment decisions at issue he re , a ndth a t t h e i n f

o r m a t i o n C o n t i s e e k s w a s a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h o t h e r d e p o n e n t s . A c c o r d i n g to AA M, Da

uc h “ ha s n ot b e e n invo lve d in any sig nif ic ant d e c isi on

pe rt a ini ngto [Co nti ’s ] employ ment,” and “Conti never repor ted t o Mr. Dauc h and Mr. Da uch neve r super

vised her w ork.” J.A. 34
. I n re sp on se , Con ti po int s to re c or d e vid e nc e sh ow ingthat D a uc h h ir e d h e r, int e ra c te d w ith her r egularly , and likely

was a war e of he r dec ision to t estify against t he compa ny ’s intere sts in a de po sit ion in an oth e r d isc ri min a tio n s uit . Co nti a lso c la ims that th e re c or d s ho ws that D a uc h li ke ly
wa s invo lve d in

or had kn ow le dg e of

the pa rt ic ula r e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on s at is su e he re , n a me ly Conti’s 2003 demotion and he r 2004 “promotion” to ma nag er, as opposed to dire ctor, of the New Model L aunch division. Fina l l y , C o n ti alleg es that she should be pe rmitted to question DauchNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

Con ti c la ims that, i n 2 00 3, sh e info rm e d c ouns e l f or AA M th a t sh e int e nd e d to dis c los e 1 L ang enbac h’s statements duringa deposition which wa s schedule d in a discrimination suit brought ag ainst AAM by

a for m er employ ee, T err i Van Z oest (“V an Z oest”). Conti alleg es that AAM reta liated ag ainst her f

or this protecte d conduct, c laiming that he r deposit i o n in that case was c anc e lle d a

nd the su it s e ttl e d a lmo st i mme diate ly a ft e r A AM be c a me awa

re of Con ti’ s in te nti on

to testify about these a lleg ed stateme nts, and that she wa s demoted shortly there afte r. - 7 - reg ardinghis writings e vincing his ge nder- biased attitudes, a s well as the role that his manag ement sty le has played in her

stalled adva

nceme nt at the company
. Al tho ug h th e re c or d s up po rt s A AM ’s c la im that Con ti ne ve r re po rt e d d ir e c tly to D a uc h, it do e s n ot s up port

its br oa de r s ug g e sti on

that D a uc h h a s n ot b e e n invo lve d in de c isi on s r e latin g to Co n ti ’ s e mp lo y

me n t. For instance, Cont i c la im s th a t A A M d e mo te d h e r a s r e ta liation for her pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

re late d to her de c isi on to te sti fy “ tr uth fu lly” but ag a ins t the c omp any ’s int e re sts in a prior discr imination sui t broug ht ag ainst the company . The district cour t rejec ted this argument on the g rounds that Conti had failed to demonstrate t h at h er direc t superiors we re a war e of he r decision to provide de position t estimony t h at would have be en adve rse to the c ompany . But the
re c or d s ug g e sts oth e rw ise . A c c or din g to C on ti, sh e inf or me d in -h ou se c ouns e l fo r A me ri c an A xle that Ro y L ang e nb a c h, he r f

or me r b os s, ins tr

uc te d h e r n ot t o h ir e tw o f

e ma le a pp lic ants , w ho m Co nti judge d to be “ve ry

capa ble ca ndidates,” be cause “one wa s a mother [and anothe r] one was
overw eig ht.” J .A. 98. Althoug h it is unclear whether Shanti, he r direc t supe rvisor at the time, was

1

a wa re o f C o n t i ’ s i n t e n t i o n s , t h e r e c o r d s u g g e s t s t h a t D a u c h w a s aw ar e o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . I n h is
r e s p o n s e to Co n ti ’ s w r itte ninte r r o g a to r ie s , D a

u c ha c kn o w le d g e d

th a t h e “ r e ta in e d

tr ia l c ounsel repor ts to AAM staff c ounsel,” a nd rec eived “per iodic repor ts on litig ation matters” f rom AAM’sNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 8 - staff c ounsel. J .A. 1494. From this, it follows that he would have been a war e of Conti’s dec ision to t e sti fy a g a ins t th e c omp any ’s int e re sts
. As to th is p arti c u la

r is s u e , A A M ar g u e s th at th e d e n ia l o f Co n ti ’ s d is c o v e r y r equest wa s proper beca use, “w hile Mr. Dauc h rec eived pe riodic update s on liti g ation matters, ther e is no
e vid e nc e that he re c e ive d a ny sp e c if ic inf or matio n r e g ard ingConti ’s a lle g e d d isc us sio ns wi th counsel.” Def

. Br . at 41. Bu t t h at argume nt seems to put the car t before the horse ina smuch as deposing Dauc h is nece ssary to determine pr ecise ly

what information wa s rela y ed to him by

AAM’s staff c ounsel. As the re cord stands, the re is no dis p u t e that Da uch re ceive d updates re g arding pending litigation, and e veryone ag ree s that Conti m ade c lear her intention to testify

agai n s t the company ’s intere st in a scheduled de position i n a pendinglawsuit. Shortly there afte r, the c ase w as settled, and a

fewmonths late r Conti was demoted. Althoug h the fa ctual re cord c urre ntly may be insufficient to support a cla im of retaliation, see W est v. Ge n. Motors Corp. , 665 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Mich. 2003) ( “S o m et h ing mor e than a temporal c onnection betwe en prote cted c onduct and a n
a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n is re qu ir e d to sh owc a us a tio n w he re dis c ri min a tio n- ba se d r e ta liatio n is claimed.” ), it is more than suffic ient to support further discovery
. That i s espec ially true considering that, contra ry to AAM’s portra

y al of Da uch as a n aloof, hands-of f CEO, sig nificant re cord e vidence attests to D auch’ s persona l involveme nt in and control
over a ll aspects of his compa ny . For example, Conti points to a 2006 ar ticle cha rac terizing Da

uch as “r un[ni ng ] hi s empire like a front-line g ener al, re ly ing on a mix ture of f ear and re spect.” J .A. 79. Deposition testimony from AAM executives confir ms that chara cter ization. SeeJ .A. 114-18. F or instance, at least one AA M executive testified that Da u ch persona lly identified “g oals andNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 9 - objectives” f

o r h is e xe c u ti v e s . J. A
. 1 1 6
. M o r e o v e r , E ar h art, w h o w a s Co n ti ’ s d ir e c t s u p e r v is or befor e her

promotion to the c o-Dire ctor position in 2003, admitted that his perfor mance revie ws of Conti were influe nced by the “pr essure of that re lationsh i p , ” presumably ref err ing to Da

uch’s involvement in Conti ’s ca ree r. J.A. 115. Such testimony

casts ser ious doubt on the dissent’s co n t en tion that Dauch’ s overa rching influence and mana g ement style had “ no rea l be aring on decisions about Conti.” D issenting Op. at 3. I n fac t, Conti testified that her supervisors infor

med her that cer tain employ

ment decisions re lated to t his su it “ c ame fr om t

he ve ry top .” J.A. 95 . I n su ppor t of that c la im, Con ti p oints t o h e r d a ily notes from Mar ch 2004 which indicate that she wa s told that “the only one who [ can c hang e her bo nu s p e rc e nta g e ] is ‘ the old man’ Di c k D a

uc h. ” J.A. 12 9. L ike the dis tr ic t c ourt , th e dis se nt s imp ly ignor es this rec ord evide nce. Our c onclusion also finds support in the fac t that D auch play ed a direc t r ole in the decision to hire Con ti i n 1 99 7. Ev e n A me ri c an A xle d oe s n ot d isp ute Da uc h’ s p e rs on a l invo lve me nt i n Conti’s hiring. Althoug h the district court ac k n o wl edg ed this fac t, it failed to rec og nize the signific ance of this evidence . Obviously , the fac t D auch play ed a direc t r ole in Conti’s hiring does
n o t co nclusively

show that he wa s involved in any of the a dverse employ

ment decisions at issue he re , ma ny of wh ic h o c c ur

re d se ve ra l y e ars late r. Ne ve rt he le ss, Da

uc h’ s pe rs on a l invo lve me nt i n C o n t i ’s hiring does direc tly contra dict his statement that he has “ no independe nt or unique knowledg e of e mploy

ment decisions made w ith respec t to Ms. C onti’s empl o y m en t with AAM.” I t also casts ser ious doubt on AAM’s portrayal of Da uch as a loof and un i n v o l v ed in employ mentNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 10 - decisions. Indeed, D auch himself a cknowledg es that he “ was inform ed o f” a nd “appr oved” employ ment decisions re lating to Conti. J .A. 1495. Do wn pla yingthe se state me nts, AA M r e pe a te dly ins ist s th a t D a

uc h w a s o nly

marg ina lly
awa re of iss ue s re late d to Con ti’ s e mpl oy me nt s tatus be c a

us e , a s A AM puts i t, D a

uc h is “ the hig he st rankingofficia l” at “a

company

employing mor e than 10,000 e mploy ees in nine c oun tries worldwide.” J .A. 34. B ut Conti and Da uch we re not separated geographic ally , as bot h worke d at AAM’s c orporate headqua rters in Mic higa

n. And althoug h AAM is a larg e company , only one dire ct supervisor se parated Conti fr om D auch. Moreove r, the re cord sug g ests that the two intera cted on
numerous occ asions, and per haps frequently . Despite AA M’s claims to the contra ry , the re cord thus sug g ests that Dauc h likely has knowledg e that is direc tly rele vant to Conti’s claims. At the ve ry le a s t , D a

u c h w i l l b e a

b l e t o t e s t i f

y a s t o w h y

h e h i r e d C o n t i and ini tia lly supported her

advanc ement, a topic dir ectly rele vant to AAM’s claims that Conti was less qua lified for pr omotion than some of her ma le pee rs. L ike the district c ourt, the dissent e ntirely ignor es the rele vance of this l i n e o f questioni ng , an issue about whic h Dauc h undoubtedly has per sonal knowledg e. Tak en t o get h er , t h i s re co rdev i d en ce ca s t s s er i o u s d o u b to nt h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s conclusion that Da uc h w a s n ot a

wa re of and pla y e d n o r ole in a

ny dec isi on

re le va nt t o th is a c tio n. Con tr ary to AAM’s c hara cter ization of Dauch as al o o f and uninvolved, a char acte rization that the dissent
un c ri tic a lly

a c c e pts , th e re c or d in ste a d s ug g e sts that Da uc h pla y e d a n a c tiv e and

dir e c t r ole in a

t le a st
cer atin employ

ment decisions. In our opinion, the district court abused its discretion by prec ludingNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 11 - Con ti f ro m de po sin g Da

uc h a s to whe th er th e pa rt ic ula r e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on s at is su e he re fe ll within that categ ory . The dissent conte nds that this evidence, e ven take n cumulatively , shows only that “fur ther discovery might provide a more thoroug h rec ord,” but falls s hort of showing t hat “the district court
a b u s e d it s disc r e ti o nto th e p o int o f c a u s in g s u b s ta n ti a l p r e ju d ic e . ” D is s e n ti n g O p . a t 3
. We dis a g re e . T he re c or d d e mon str a te s th a t Da uc h lik e ly wa s awa

re of Con ti’ s de c isi on

to t e sti fy a g a ins t the company , and that the a dverse employ ment decisions at issue her e likely “ca me from the ve ry top .” Al tho ug h th e re c or d at th is p oint sh ow s o nly that D a uc h’ s invo lve me nt w a s li ke ly , th a t is on ly beca use the district cour

t improperly

prec luded Conti from deposing Dauc h on these issues. The case s on which AAM relies are not to the contra ry as mo s t involve corpor ate of fice rs who had little if any

interac tion with the em p l o y ee s bring ing c laims ag ainst the company . For instance, in Bush v. DictaphoneCorp. , 161 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1998) , this Court affirmed the district court’s de cision to allow only a limited deposition of the President and Chief O perating Of fice r of Pitney Bow es, and denied deposition of its CEO. Id. at 366. In that case , howeve r, we found that the re cord did not show that these office rs “eve n knew that [t he plaintiff] had been te rminated, much less that they

in some way

cause d it.” Id. at 367. Neve rtheless, even on that thinnest of rec ords, we found that limited discovery of one of the office rs was appropr iate, rea soning that the district court’s
a p p r o a c h w a s “ a r e a s o n a

b le w ay to b a lance Bush’ s rig ht to discovery with the need to pr event ‘fishing expeditions .’” Id. (empha sis added). I n light of the far m ore significa nt evidence sug g esting Dauc h ’ s kn o w le d g e o f d e c is io n s r e lati n g to Co n ti ’ s e mp lo y me n t a t A A M , w e c o n c lu d e th at the balanc e of inter ests sug g ests that rea sonable discove ry should have be en per

mitted here.No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

This is another issue which the district court impro p er l y fa i led to consider, a nd further 2 demonstrates that it abused its discretion in prec luding Conti from deposingDauc h. - 12 - Th e c a se s o n w hich th e di sse nt r e lie s are e qu a lly ina pp os ite . F or

e xamp le , th e Te nth Circuit’s decision in Thomas v . IBM , 48 F.3d 478 (10th Cir. 1995), sheds very littl e lig ht on the issue we confront here. I n addition to the same lac k-of- knowledg e cla im raised by Dauc h and AAM he re, the def endant in Thomas also argued that a pr otective or der w as wa rra nted bec ause pla intiff’s discovery reque st (1) violated the court’s local dis cover y rules, (2) the plaintiff fa iled to depose a ny other I BM pe rsonnel, including direc t supervisors, and ( 3) the de position would have i mposed a “seve re ha

rdship” on the intended deponent, I BM’ s Chairman of the B oard. Id. at 483-84. None of tho se thr e e sig nif

ic ant fa c tor s is pr e se nt in thi s c a se . To the c on tr ary , a s the re c or d d e mon str a te s, Con ti p ro vid e d mo re than ampl e no tic e of he r i nte nt t o d e po se Da uc h, atte mpt ingto a sc e rt a in Da uc h’ s ava ila

bil ity fo r d e po sit ion

a s e arl y a s Apr il o f 2 00 6, and

ma int a ini ngc omm

un ic a tio n w ith defe nse counse l on this i ssue t hroug hout that summer. In fac t, it was defe nse counse l who decide d to seek a protec tive order

at the ele venth hour, c ance lling a de position scheduled for Septe mber 29, 2006 with only

a fe w day s notice, and just bef ore the close of discovery
. Consequently , the fa ct that the dis c ov e ry

pe ri od c los e d b e fo re the c ourt

ru le d o n th e dis c ov e ry

iss ue thu s w e ig hs ag

ain st Americ an Axle, not in it s favor
. Conti’s counsel also exp re ssly ag ree d to depose other

AAM 2 employ ees f

irst, thereby

satisfying the s ec o n d conce rn ra ised in Thomas . Finally , AAM’s motion for a protec tive order

never provided any substantive basis for its re peate d claim that this deposition would pose a ha

rdship on Dauc h. I n fac t, give n that other e x ecutives at AAM who work along sideNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

Contrary to the dissent’s sug g estion, we a naly ze the prejudice element be low in discussing 3 ho w D a uc h’ s d e po sit ion

c ou ld p ro vid e inf

or matio n c ri tic a l to pa

rt ic ula r c la ims ra ise d b y

Con ti. - 13 - Dauc h on a daily

basis wer e able to make time to appea r, it seems more tha

n rea sonable to conc lude that Dauc h could have been de posed without unrea sonable inconve nience
. Unlike the dissent, we are not inclined to cre dit Dauch’ s bald asser tion that being de posed would prese nt a s u

b s ta nti a l b u r den, espe cially

when his deposition could provide infor mation critical to C on ti’ s c la ims
. To a llo w a de fe nd ant t o avo id h is dis c ov e ry ob lig a tio ns on

su c h a thi n b a sis 3 frustrates the purpose of discover y , and runs c ounter to the Supreme Court’s expli cit instruction that discovery privileg es should be “c onstru ed b roadly .” Oppenhe imer Fund , 437 U.S. at 351 (citing Hickm an v. Taylor , 3 29 U. S. 495 , 501 (1 94 7) (o bs e rv ing that disc ov e ry wa s inte nd e d s o th a t “ c ivi l tr ia ls i n th e fe de ra l c ourt s n o lo ng e r n e e d b e c arr ie d o n in the da rk ” by a llo wi ng“ the pa

rt ie s to ob ta in the fullest possible knowledg e of the issues and fa cts befor e trial” )). Absent any substantive basis to support Dauc h’s hardship claim, and in light o f D au ch’s likely knowledg e of infor

mation releva

nt to Cont i’s claims, we f ind that the denial of Conti’s deposition r equest was an abuse of discre tion. See Salter v. Upjohn Co. , 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979) (“ I t is very

unusual for a

court to prohi b i t t h e t ak i ng of a de position altogethe r and a bsent extraordinary

circ umstances, suc h an orde r would likely be in er ror.” ). We there fore re v er s e the judgme nt of the district court a s to this i ssue.

III . SU M M AR

Y J UD G M EN T STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW Th is C ourt

re vie ws a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo
. He rm an Mi lle r, Inc. v . Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc. , 270 F.3d 298, 307-08 (6th Cir. 2001)
. Summary judgme ntNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 14 - is a pp ro pr iate wh e re “ the ple a din g s, the dis c ov e ry a nd dis c los ur e mate ri a ls o n f ile , a nd any a ff ida vit s show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt
as a matter of law .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As the moving party , Americ an Axle bear s the burden of showing t he absence of a g enuine is s u e o f mate r ia l f

a c t a s to a t le a s t o n e e s s e n ti a l e le me n t o f Co n ti ’ s c la ims. S ee Celotex Corp. v. Ca tret t , 4 7 7 U
. S. 3 1 7 , 3 2 4 ( 1 9 8 6 )
. I f A me r ic an A xle me e ts th a t b u r d e n , Co n ti mu s t th en pre sent sufficie nt evidenc e from which a jury could re asonably find for he r. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). This Court must deter mine “whe ther the evidence prese nts sufficient dis a g re e me nt t o r e qu ir e su bmi ssi on to a jur y or wh e the r i t is so on e -s ide d th a t on e pa rt y mus t pr e va il as a matter of law .” Id. at 251-52. I n evaluating the e vidence , the Court must draw all infe renc es in the light mo s t fa v o ra b l e to the non-moving party
. Ma tsu sh ita El e c . I nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Thus, in re viewingthe district court’s de cision, we “ must view the entire rec ord in the light most fa vorable to” Conti. Fieger v . U.S. Attorney Ge n. , 542 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 2008). IV. CONTI’S EL CRA CLAIM S Mic hig an’ s E lli ot- L ars e n Ci vil Rig hts Ac t pr oh ibi ts dis c ri min a tio n “ on the ba sis of se x with respe ct to a term, condition, or privileg e of employ ment.” M.C.L
. 37.2202(1) (c ). T h i s provision includes “the entire spe ctrum of dispar ate tre atment of men a nd women in employ

ment . . . .” Do wne y v . Char le v oix

Cou nty Bd . o f Co un ty Rd Com m’rs , 576 N.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 15 - Michig an cour

ts have re cog nized that EL CRA claims ge nera lly are to be eval uated on summary dispositi on in the same manne r as Title VIIclaims, and that both state a nd fede ral prec edents a

re r eleva nt. See H arri s o n v. Olde Financial Corp. , 5 72 N. W.2 d 6 79 , 6 81 (M ic h. Ct. App. 1997). L ike Title VI I , an EL CRA discr imination cla im may be established by direc t or indirect evidenc e. See M

eagher v . W

ayne State U

niv. , 5 65 N. W.2 d 4 01 , 4 10 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. 19 97 ). Thus , in a dd iti on

to b e inga

ble to re ly on dir e c t pr oo f of int e nti on a l di sc ri min a tio n, EL CRApla int if fs a lso may rely o n th e in d ir e c t, b urden- shifting a pproac h sanctioned in McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Gree n , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See M eagher , 565 N.W.2d at 410.

Direct Proof

“ Th e e le me nts of a mixe d mot ive c a se are (1 ) the pla int if f’ s me mbe rs hip in a

pr ote c te d c la ss, (2 ) a n a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n, (3 ) t

he de fe nd ant w a s p re dis po se d to dis c ri min a tin g a g a ins t members of the pl aintiff' s protec ted class, and (4) the def endant a ctually

acte d on that predisposition in visit ing the adver se employ ment action on the plaintiff.” W ilcoxon v. 3M

, 597 N.W.2d 250, 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). Direc t e vidence of intentional disc rimination is “evide nce that, if believe d, require s the conc lusion that unlaw ful discrimination was at lea st a motivating fa ctor.” Downey , 576 N. W.2 d at 71 8; Jack

lyn v. Sc hering-Plough He althcare Products Sales Corp. , 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir. 1999). On this approac h, a plaintiff must offe r “c redible, dire ct evidenc e of discr iminatory animus.” Te rb ov itz

v . F isc al C ou rt o f A da ir C ou nty , 825 F.2d 111, 114-15 (6th Cir. 1987). “[O]nce the plaintiff has me t the i nitial burden of proving that the illeg al conduc t . . . was more likely than not a ‘substantial’ or

‘motivating’ fac tor in the defe ndant’s dec i s i on, the def endant ha s theNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

I n particula

r, Conti focuses on Da

uch’s state m en t in a published book that Germa n and 4 J apane se mana g ement styles “c an t ea ch us a lesson,” while simultaneously acknow ledg ing that women “[do] not get equa l consideration or special de fer ence in either.” J .A. 1687-89. The d is s e nt c h a ll e n g e s Co nti ’ s s ta tisti cal e vidence as “subjec tive,” and c riticizes it for failing 5 to “ ana ly ze a ny c omp on e nt o f A AM ’s hir ingpr oc e ss. ” Di ss ent in g Op. a t 6. Th e se c ri tic ism s, howeve r, ar e misplaced, at least at this stag e, bec ause w e ar e oblig ed to interpre t the evidenc e in the light most favor able to Conti and to make a ll inferenc es in her f avor. - 16 - opportunity

to show by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidence that it would have rea ched the same de cision without consideration of the protec ted cha rac teristic.” Harrison , 572 N.W.2d at 683. To establish a case of intentional disc rimination, Conti points to four items she c ontends are dir e c t e vid e nc e of

dis c ri min a tio n: ( 1) Da

uc h’ s wr iti ng s pr a isi ng g e nd e r- bia se d ma na g e me nt s tyle s; 4 (2) Da uch’s r ole as a

decision-make r; (3) a

n alleg ed stateme nt by

Earha rt in 2001 that Conti was not promoted to a Dire ctor posit i on at that time beca use she “ did not have a pe nis;” and (4) alleg ed statements from Conti’s prior super visor, Roy L ang enbac h, instructing her not to hire a woman who
was ove rwe ight or a woman who was a mother. Conti also offers statistical evide nce show ing that AA M h as n ev er

h ada f em al e ex ec u t i v e d i re ct o r o r v i ce p re s i d en t , an d t h at o n l y a s m al l p er ce n t age of its executives, all at the lowest sala ry bands, ar e fe male. 5 The district cour

t declined to consider evidence from Dauch’s “ unsworn wr itings conta ined in a book int en d ed fo r t h e g ener al public as e vidence in this m atter of what occ urre d to Plainti ff while emplo y e d

w it h D e f e n d an t. ” J. A
. 2 5 1 5
. A s to Co n ti ’ s o th e r e v id e n c e , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt conclude d that, even a cce pting these alleg ations as true, they failed to suppor t a “dire ct” showingof discrim i n at i o n . J .A. 2520. In enter ing summar y judgme nt in favor of

AAM, the district cour

t
c on c lud e d th a t, a lth ou g h s uc h e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t “ g e nd e r m ay have pla y e d a ro ll [si c ] in the ov e ra llNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 17 - manag ement and hir ing de cisions of Def endant,” it doe s not “‘re quire the c onclusion’ that Plaintiff’s g ender was a motivating fa ctor in employ ment decisions spec ifically aff ectingher.” J .A. 2520. Contrary to the conclusion rea ched by the district court, we conclude that the re cord doe s not permit summ ar y

dispositi on at this tim e. To the e x tent that Conti’s claims rely on the role that Dauc h and his alleg edly

biased mana g ement style play ed i n h er s t alled adva nceme nt, summary judgme nt at this point would be pre mature g iven that C o n t i has y et to depose D auch. Without question, information that Conti obtains duringthat deposition may be re levant to both her dire ct and indirect e vidence claims. But e ven setting aside our c onclusion reg ardingthe deposition issue, the district court’s g rant of summa ry dis po sit ion

wa s in a pp ro pr iate . Co nti te sti fi e d th a t E arh art e xpre ssl y state d that Co nti was pa ssed over

for a promotion based on her

sex. J.A. 2142. I f Conti had relied on this statement as evide nce of Earhart’s discriminatory attitudes toward Conti, we may ag ree with the distr i ct court’s c onclusion that such sentiments cannot s u p p o rt Conti’s claims because it is evident that Earha rt play ed no role in any

employ ment decisions af

fec ting he r, see Sm ith v. Leggett W ire Co. , 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Statements by nondecisionmake rs . . . [cannot] suffice to satisfy the p l ai n t i ff ’s burde n . . . of demonstrating a nimus.” (citations omitted)), and be cause Earha rt’s sentiments cannot be imputed to C o n t i ’s s uperiors, see W ilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc. , 952 F.2d 942, 94 5-4 6 (6t h Cir. 1 99 2) (h old ingtha t r a c ia l anim

us by pla nt m ana g e r c ou ld n ot b e imp ute d to upper- level mana g er w ho made de cision to terminate abse nt proof of a connec tion). But Conti does not rely on this statement to show Earha rt’s animus, but rathe r to s h o w h i s understandingof the motives of other ex ecutive s who did make the de cision not to promote Conti
.No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 18 - Takin g Con ti’ s c la im a s tr ue , as we mu st at th is s ta g e , th is s tate me nt s pe a ks dir e c tly to C o n t i ’s cl ai m t h at s ex wa s a m o t i v at i n g fa ct o r i nAA M ’s d ec i s i o nn o tt o p ro m o t e h e r . Al t h o u gh AAM cha lleng es whe ther Earha rt ever made such a statement, and if he did, whether that statement is c re dib le , th a t iss ue is pr e c ise ly the ty pe of dis pute d is su e of

fa c t th a t pr e c lud e s summa ry jud g me nt. See H arrison , 572 N.W.2d at 681 n.5 (“The defe ndant’s employees in que stion deny making the comments, which, in turn, ca lls int o question plaintiff’s cr edibility . When cre dibi l i t y i s at issue,
summa ry dis po sit ion

ra re ly is a pp ro pr iate .” ). Th e oth e r d ir e c t e vid e nc e on wh ic h Co nti re lie s is to the same e ffe ct. Ta k i n g al l o f this evidence toge ther, we find it sufficient to survive summary judgme nt. Al tho ug h s ome of

Con ti’ s c la ims do no t r e late to a dv e rs e e mp lo y me nt a c tio ns dir e c tly
a ff e c tin g he r, su c h a

na rr owre a din g of

the c a se la

w i s im pr op e r. Mic hig an c ourt s h a ve he ld t hat a plaintiff proc eedingon a dire ct evidenc e t h eo ry must point to alleg ations that “‘r equire the conclusion that unlawf

ul discrimination was at lea st a motivating fa ctor in the e mploy er’ s actions.’” S n ie c insk i v. BlueCro ss &

Bl ueSh ie ld , 6 6 6 N. W
. 2 d 1 8 6 , 1 9 2 (M i ch
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Jack lyn v. Sc he rin g-Pl ou

gh He alt hc ar e Pr od

uc ts S ale s Co rp ., 176 F.3d 921, 926 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). B ut that
me re ly re qu ir e s th a t th e pla int if

f sho w that “th e de fe nd ant’ s disc ri min a tor y anim us wa s mo re lik e ly than not a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ fac tor in the dec ision,” or that defe ndant’s “disc riminatory anim us was ca

usally related to the adve rse de cision.” Id. at 1 9 3 (q u o t i n g Price W aterhouse v. Hopkins , 4 9 0 U
. S. 2 2 8 , 2 4 4 ( 1 9 8 9 ) )
. T h e “ r e qu ir e s th e c o n c lu s io n ” s ta n d ar d d o e s n o t imply

that
ever y alleg ation and every piece of evidence pertain directly to the adver se ac tions taken ag ainst the plaintiff. A dire ct evidenc e cla im may be supported by more g ener alized e vidence , so long a s theNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 19 - evidenc e whe n taken a s a whole require s the conc lusion that the defenda nt’s discriminatory

animus
was a motivating fa ctor in the a dverse employ ment action. See H

arrison , 572 N.W.2d at 683 (citing Kre sn ak v . Ci ty of Mus kegon He igh ts , 956 F. Supp. 1327, 1335 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (notingthat neg ative stateme nts and rac ial slurs are sufficie nt to estab l i s h a prima facie case and survive
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n te v e ni f

t h o s e c o m m e n t s w e r e n o td i r e c t e d a t o r m a d e a b o u tt h e p l a i n t i f

f d i r e c t l y) (c i t i n g LaPointe v. United A u t o w o rke r s Local 600 , 8 F.3d 376, 380 ( 6th Cir. 1993), and Talley v. Bravo Pit ino Restaurant, Inc. , 61 F.3d 1241, 1249 ( 6th Cir. 1995))). As this Court has noted in a simil ar c ontext , “[ d ] i scriminatory statements may

ref lect a c umulative manag eria l attitude among the d e f e n d an t- e mp lo y e r ’ s ma

n a g e r s th a t h a s in f

lu e n c e d th e d e c is io n ma k in g p r o c e ss for a considera ble time. Thus, manag e me nt’ s considera tion of an impermissible fac tor in one conte x t may
su pp or t th e inf e re nc e tha

t th e imp e rm iss ible fa c tor e nte re d in to t

he de c isi on makin g pr oc e ss i n another context.” Ercegov ich v. Goody ear Tire and Rubber Co. , 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998). Be cause Conti’s alleg ations, when considere d toge ther a nd taken a s true, ra ise a triable issue of fa c t a s to wh e the r h e r s e x w a s a su bs tanti a l mot ivatin g fa c tor in the a dv e rs e a c tio ns take n a g a ins t her, summar

y judgme nt is inappropriate. Indirect Proof I n th e a lte rn a tiv e , Co nti of fe rs ind ir e c t e vid e nc e to s up po rt he r m ixed -m oti ve c la ims . As i n the d i r e c te v i d e n c e c o n t e xt , a p l a i n t i f f r e l yi n g o ni n d i r e c te v i d e n c e s t i l l m u s tm a k e a p r i m a fa c ie showing of discrimination. To make a n indirect “ prima facie” case , a plaintiff must demonstrate that sh e su ff e re d a n a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt ac tio n, and

that sh e did

so “ un de r c ir c ums tanc e s th a t g ive ri se to an infer ence of unlawf ul discrimination.” W

ilcoxon , 597 N.W.2d at 257. T h e u s e of the termNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 20 - “prima f acie case ” in this context, howeve r, may be misleadinginasmuch as this threshold showing “does not mea

n that the plaintiff produc ed suff icient evidenc e to allow the c ase to g o to a jury , but rathe r that the plaintiff pr oduced en o u gh ev idence to cre ate a rebuttable presumption of . . . discrimination.” Meaghe r , 5 65 N. W.2 d at 41 0; see also Tex

. Dep’ t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981) (“ The phra se ‘pr ima fac ie case’ not only may denote the establishment of a leg ally mandatory , rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by

courts to des cr i be the plaintiff’s burde n of produc ing enoug h evidenc e to pe rmit the trier of fac t to infer the f

act at issue. McD onnell Douglas sh ou ld have ma de it a pp are nt t hat in the Ti tle VI Ic on te xt we us e ‘p ri ma fa c ie
case ’ in the for

mer sense.” (citation omitted)). I n other wor ds, a plaintiff’s “ prima fa cie” showing in t his c on te xt “d oe s n ot d e sc ri be the pla int if f’ s b ur de n o f p ro du c tio n, but me re ly e sta bli sh e s a rebuttable presumption.” Hazle v. Ford M otor Co. , 628 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Mich. 2001). To survive summary

judgme nt in this context, a plaintiff a lso must s atisfy the additional burdens se t out in McD onnell Douglas
. See Ha zle , 628 N.W.2d at 520-21. Under that familiar fr am ew o rk , “the c ourt then examines whether the def endant ha s articulate d a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory

rea son for its action. I f that ar ticulation is made, the cour t next considers whether the plaintiff has proved by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the r eason of fer ed by the def endant
was a mere prete x t for discrimination.” Harrison , 572 N.W.2d at 682 (interna l c itations omi tted). Conti attempts t o makes he r “pr ima fac ie” showingby p o i n ting to the f ollowing a lleg ed adver se employ

ment actions: (1) unlike Earha rt, she was not place d in salary band 15 whe n she wa s promoted to a co-Direc tor position in 2003; (2) she was demoted in 2003; (3) she wa s not affor ded the same tra ining a

nd advanc ement opportunities as male co-w orker s; and (4) she was pa id less thanNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

Confusingly , the dissent argues that “Ea rhar t’s role a s a Di re ctor prior to becoming 6 co-D irec tors with Conti is not rele vant t o his later role as co-D irec tor.” DissentingOp. at 9. B ut that argument misses the poi nt. Whil e not relevant “to his later role a s co-Dir ector ,” Ea

rhar t’s promotion tw o y e ars ahe a d o f C on ti c e rt a inl y is r e le va nt t o d e te rm ini ngwh ethe r A AM pr omo te d a le ssqualified male employ ee over Conti base d on her se x . The dissent also ig nores that, e ven whe n she finally was promoted to the same position as Earhar t two y ear s later, Conti was not promoted to the same sa lary

ba nd . A g a in, we mus t r e a d th is e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to C on ti. - 21 - he r i mme diate ma le pr e de c e sso r, Pannuc c i, wh e n s he too k o ve r t he Ne w M od e l L a

un c h d e pa rtme nt. See Conti Br. at 34. Re a din g the re c or d in

the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to C on ti, the se c la ims c e rt a inl y de mon str a te adver se employ

ment actions that g ive rise to an inf ere nce of unlawful discr imination. For instance , the record d o e s s h o w th a t A A M p r o mo te d Co n ti ’ s ma le c o - w o r

k e r , E ar h art, to a v a c an t d ir e c tor position t wo y ear s befor e Conti. The re cord a lso supports her claim that when she eventua lly was 6 made a co-D irec tor two y ear s later, she wa s not elevate d to a hig her sa lary band as w as Ear

hart whe n he wa s promoted. There also is no dispute that Conti was demoted back to an SEI T position in t he summer of 2003, only a few months after he r promotion. And the re cord a lso is clear that, in 2004 wh e n Co nti wa s p ro mot e d to he a d o f t he Ne w Mod e l L a

un c h d e pa

rtme nt, sh e wa s a ssi g ne d th e tit le of mana g er r ather

than direc tor, a distinction which agai n p re cl u d ed her from beingelig ible for highe r executive bonuses. The rec ord also is une quivocal that Conti di d not rec eive the sa me salar y
as h er i m m ed i at e m al e p re d ec es s o r u p o n h er p ro m o t i o n . E ac ho f t h es e c l ai m s i s s u ff i ci en tt o al l ege an adve rse e mploy

ment action. Se e Bu rli ng ton In du s. v . E lle rth , 524 U.S
. 7 4 2 , 7 61 (1998) (re cog nizi ng that a “ta

ng ible employ

ment action” includes “a denial of a

raise or a promotion”); Jordan v. City of Cl eve land , 464 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[D]enial of money would more thanNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 22 - amply qualify as a materia lly adver se action to any rea sonable e mploy ee f

or Title VI Ipurposes.” ); Nguyen v . City of Cl eve land , 229 F.3d 559, 5 6 5 (6th Cir. 2000) (a cce pting that the de nial of the proper pay incre ase w ith the plaintiff’s promotion consti t u t ed an adverse e mploy ment action). Acc ording ly , Conti’s clai m s are sufficie nt to create a r ebuttable pr esumption of unlawful discrimination. Under McD onnell Douglas , the burd e n thu s sh if ts to Am e ri c an Axle to d e mon str a te that it had leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea sons for these employ ment decisions. I f AAM make s such a showing , Conti assumes the b u rd en of showing prete x t. Reviewing the re cord, w e conc lude that AAM has pr ovided sig nificant, nondiscr imi n atory rea sons for these employ ment actions, but that Con ti h a s in tr od

uc e d s uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to r a ise a mate ri a l qu e sti on of fact as to wh e the r t he se justifications are me rely

prete x t for unlawf

ul discrimination. As to Conti’s d el ay ed promotion and e ventual demotion, the compa ny argues that Conti’s
ma n a g e me n t s ty

le w a s a b r a s iv e an d

in e f f e c tu a l, th at h e r

s u b o r d in a te s o f

te nc o mp la in e d , an d

tha t
sever al of he r subordinate s either lef t her sect i o n o r the company entirely . I n response , howeve r, Conti poi nts out that many of these employ ment revie ws are from 1997, see J .A. 354, while a 2000 revie w, the y ear

immediately

prior to Ear

hart’s promotion, indicates that Cont i’s work g ener ally was

“ c omm e nd a

ble ” or “ c omp e te nt, ” J.A. 16 49 -5 1. Con ti a lso po int s o ut t hat, i f s he wa s so inc omp e te nt, why was she pr omoted to a co- Di re ct o r p o s ition in 2003, and then ag ain promoted to a ma nag er position i n 2004. We cannot merely discount these posit ive performanc e reviews and Conti ’s other rebuttal e vidence , as the district cour t seems to have done , but instead must read this evidenc e in the light most favor able to Conti. At a minimum , these c onflicting acc ounts of Conti ’s performanc eNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 23 - raise a triable issue of f

act a s to whether A AM’s prof fer ed justifications are prete x tual, and thus summary judgme nt is inappropriate. See A nderson , 477 U.S. at 249 (“[T]he judge ’s func tion is not to w e ig h th e evi den ce an d d e te rm ine the tr uth of the matte r b ut t o d e te rm ine wh e the r t he re is a g e nu ine iss ue fo r t

ri a l.” ); Ha zle , 628 N.W.2d at 522 n.10 (makingclea r that, “in re sponse to a motion fo r summa

ry dis po sit ion [in the ind ir e c t e vid e nc e c on te xt], th e no nmo vin g pa rt y ’s ob lig a tio n is on ly to show the exist ence of a ‘ g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t’” a s to the pretext element). AAM also ar g ues that Conti was not as qualified as m any of t he male executives to which sh e se e ks to c omp are he rs e lf
. Con ti re je c ts that a sse rt ion . In c omp ari so n to Ea rh art , Co nti c la ims that she wa s just as qualified for the promotion. The fac t that A AM eventua lly promoted her to the same position as Earha

rt, making them co-D irec tors of the same depar tment, seems to support that contention. In reg ards to Pannucc i, Conti acknow ledg es that Pannucc i had an eng ineer ing de g ree and plant mana g ement experienc e, but disputes wh ether these ar e re levant conside rations for the he a d o f t he Ne w M od e l L a

un c h d e pa

rtme nt. Ag a in, the re c or d doe s n ot p ro vid e an a ns we r t o th is d i s p u t ed q uestion, and thus summary dispositi on is improper. Ha zle , 6 2 8 N
. W. 2 d

a t 5 2 2 ( “ [F ]or purposes of a

motion for summary

dispos i t i o n o r d i rected ver dict, a plaintiff ne ed only cre ate a question of mater ial fa c t u p o n wh ic h r e a sonable minds could diffe r re g ardingwhether discrimination
was a motivating fa ctor in the e mploy er’ s decision.”)
. Retaliati on Conti also allege s that t h ese a dverse employ ment actions we re taken in re taliation for her protec ted conduc t in the Va n Zo est case . I n order to show causation in a re taliatory discrimination
case , “plaintiff must s h o w s o m ethi ng more than me rely a coinc idence in time between pr otectedNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 24 - activity and adve rse e mploy

ment action.” W

est v. Gen. M

otors Corp. , 665 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Mich. 20 03 ). “ Som e thi ngmor e tha n a te mpo ra l c onne c tio n b e tw e e n p ro te c te d c on du c t and an a dv e rs e employ ment action is req

u ir e d to s how ca

usation where discrimination-based r etaliation is claimed.” Id. The district cour

t gr anted summ ary judgme nt on this issue beca use i t found t hat, other tha n the fa ct that Conti was demoted a f ew months afte r her

protec ted act ivity , Conti failed to produce any evidenc e af

firmatively

showing that her demotion, or any other adver se employ ment action, wa s related to her decision to te stify about discriminatory hiring prac tices in the Va n Zo est case . As the dis tr ic t c ourt

fr ame d th e iss ue , A AM is enti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt e sse nti a lly

be c a us e Con ti failed to show that Shanti, her direc t supervisor at the time, wa s awa re of her pr otected c onduct. As discussed above, howeve r, the rec ord does sug g est that Dauc h likely was a war e of Conti’s protec ted ac tivity

and that he ma intained a very hands-on manag ement approac h. Be cause Conti has not y et had the oppor

tunity to depose Da

uch on this matter , we conclude that it would be premature at this juncture to g rant summary judgme nt as to her r etaliation claim. We there fore vacat e the judgme nt of the district court on this claim as we ll. V. CO NT I’ S EQU AL P AYAC T C LA IM Th e Eq ua l Pay Ac t pro hib its e mpl oy e rs fr om paying an emp loye e a t a ra te le ss tha n th a t pa id to employ ees of

the opposite sex for equal wor k. See29 U.S .C. § 206(d)(1) . Thus, to establish a prima fa cie c ase of wag e dis crimination, Conti must show that “an employ er pay s differ ent wag es to em p l o y ee s o f o pposite sexes ‘for equa l work on jobs the per formanc e of which re quires equa l skill, effort, and r esponsibility , and which a re pe rfo rm ed under

simil ar w orking conditions.’”No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 25 - Corning Glass W

orks v. Bre nnan , 417 U. S. 188 , 195 (1 97 4) (q uo tin g 29 U. S.C. § 2 06 (d )( 1) ); Balmer

v . H CA , 4 23 F .3 d 6 06 , 61 2 (6 th Cir
. 20 05 ). “ ‘E qu a l w or k’ do e s n ot r e qu ir e tha

t th e job s b e ide nti c a l, but only that there exis t ‘substantial equality of ski ll, eff ort, responsibility

and wor king c onditions.’” Buntin v. Breat hitt County Bd. of Educ. , 1 3 4 F. 3 d 7 9 6 , 7 9 9 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Odomes v

. Nucare, Inc

. , 6 53 F .2 d 2 46 , 2 50 (6 th C ir . 1 98 1) ). W het her th e wor k o f t wo e mpl oy e e s is substantially

equal “ must be resolved by an over all compar ison of the work, not its i n d i v i d u al seg ments.” Id. An E P A p l a i n t i f f m ay m ee th er p ri m a f ac i e b u rd en b y

d em o n s t ra t i n g a w age differ ential betwee n herse lf and her pr edec essor. See G andy v. Sullivan County, Tenn. , 24 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 1994) (pre sum i n g t h at there was “ substantial simi larity ” betwe en plaintiff a nd her immediate male pr edec essor’s job). I f C onti car

ries her burden, “the burden shifts to the employ er to show that the dif fer ential is justi fied unde r one of

the Act’ s four e x ceptions.” Co rn ing Glas s , 4 17 U. S. at 19 6; Kovace vich v. Kent State Univ. , 2 24 F .3 d 8 06 , 8 26 (6 th Cir
. 20 00 ). One of the Ac t’ s f

our e xce pti on s is a “g ener al catchall provision,” Cor nin g G las s , 4 1 7 U.S. at 196, which pre cludes liability wher e the
e mpl oy e r c an s ho w that th e dif fe re nt p ay me nt t o e mpl oy e e s o f o pp os ite se xes “ is m a de purs ua nt t o

. . . a d i f f e r e n t i a l b a s e d o n an y o t h e r f a c t o r o t h e r t h an s e x , ” 2 9 U
. S
. C
. 2 0 6 ( d ) ( 1 ) ( i v )
. C o n s e qu e n t l y, AA M is no t li a

ble un der th e EP A i f i t is a ble to d e mon str a te that th e a lle g e d w a g e dif fe re nti a l is predic ated on a

fac tor other than se x . See Timmer v. Mic higan Dept. of Commerce , 104 F.3d 833, 843 (6th Cir. 1997). I n moving f

or summary

judgme nt, AAM argued that, at l east in m ost instances, Conti earne d
a hig he r annual sa lary than her male counterpar ts. In those instances where Conti ear ned less, AAMNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 26 - argues that t he differe nce in pay and/or ti tle was based on factors other tha n her se x , pointing to the purportedly

g reater e x perie nce, e d

u c a ti o n , a n d o th e r qualifications of her male counter parts. In many respe cts, AAM’s a

rgument is well taken. F or instance , the re cord shows that Conti did ear n more money than most of her male counter parts when she was hired into AAM as an SEI T in 1997. And the re cord a lso shows that Conti ear ned more money

than Earha

rt when the two wer e co- Direc tors of Indirec t Material Purchasing for the first half of 2003. Although Conti alleg es that Ear hart wa s promoted to salar

y band 15 in that position, AAM responds that Ear hart wa s demoted to band 13 when Conti was made a co- direc tor. AAM also points out that Co n t i ea rn ed s ignif icantly more
mon e y a s th e mana g e r o f N e w Mod e l L a un c h than Sati sh Rahe

ja , the pr ior ma le e mpl oy e e wh o h e ld that po sit ion

le ss t ha n a y e ar b e fo re Con ti. Up on c los e r s c rutiny , h ow e ve r, AA M’ s a rgume nt f a ils in o ne c ri tic a l in sta

nc e . Whe n Co nti was promoted to mana g er of the New Model L aunch de partment, she r ece ived a sig nificantly lower salary than her immediate male pr edec essor, Pannuc ci. I f the positions held by Conti and Pannucci
wer e “substantially simil ar,” this differ ence alone is sufficie nt to establish a prima facie case under th e E PA. See Bun tin , 134 F.3d at 799 (“The plaintiff may meet her

prima fa cie bur den by demonstrating a wag e differe ntial betwee n herse lf and her prede cessor .”). At that point, t he burde n
wo uld fa ll o n A AM to “p ro ve ” its c la im that th e dif fe re nc e in p ay

and tit le wa s b a se d o n le g iti mate fac tors other than se x . Id. Primarily , AAM conte nds that Conti receive d less pay than Pannucc i beca

use, althoug h she was promoted oste nsibly to the position l eft v ac an t by Pannucci, she was g iven the title and
re sp on sib ili ties of

a mana g e r r a the r t

ha n a dir e c tor . A c c or din g to A AM , th e dif fe re nc e in t itl eNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

As the di ssent points out, in support of her claim that she a ssumed additional responsibilities 7 over a nd above t hose per formed by Pannucci, Conti “hig hlights that she ha ndled Sarba

nes-Oxley audits and I T s y s t em administration—duties Pannucci did not have—w ithout the benefit of Pannucci’ s two direct r eports.” D issenting Op. a t 12. The dissent c riticizes this claim on the g round that “Conti g ives us no rea son why audits and I T sy stem administration should warra nt a diffe rent pay scale .” Id. This cri t i cis m entirely misunderstands Conti’s argument. Conti obvi ously is not arguing that her wor

k perf orming Sarbane s-Oxley

audits and I T administration warr ants a different pa ysc ale , but rather

that these a dditional tasks support her over ar ch i n g claim t hat she pe rfor med
“ su bs tanti a lly sim ila

r” dutie s as Pannu c c i, an d thus sh ow s tha t sh e de se rv e d to be pa id at the same pay s c ale
. I t is revea ling that the dissent r efuse s to acc ept Conti’s “bald alleg ations” that she perf ormed these additional tasks—despite the fac t that nothing in the rec ord is to the c ontrary , and notwithstanding our oblig ation to make all infere nces in Conti’s favor —and y et, at the same time, is mor e tha

n wi lli ng to a c c e pt Da

uc h’ s c omp le te ly un su

bs tanti a te d c la im that be ingde po se d w ou ld impose a substantial hardship on him, when w e owe no such def ere nce to Da

uch’s c laims. - 27 - ref lects a c ritical distinction i n t h e duties perf ormed by Pannucci a

nd Conti. But this C ourt consistently has recog nized that the plaintiff is not require d to demonstrate that the duties pe rfor med
are “identica l,” but only

“that ther e exist ‘substantial equali ty of skill, effor

t, responsibility

and workingconditions.’” Bu nti n , 1 3 4 F. 3 d at 7 9 9 (q u o t i n g Odomes , 653 F.2d at 250). “Whether the work of two e mploy ees is substantiall y equal ‘ must be resolved by an over all compar ison of the work, not its individual segme nts.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Odomes , 653 F.3d at 250). Applying that standard, we find that Conti has raised a m at er i al issue as to whethe r she pe rf or me d s ub sta

nti a lly e qu a l wo rk fo r le ss pa

y . Con ti t e sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s r e qu ir e d to pe rf or m a ll of the du tie s p re vio us ly

a ssi g ne d to he r p re de c e sso r, as wel l a s so me a dd iti on a l r e sp on sib ili tie s. 7 Neve rtheless, Conti rec eived signific antly less pay , and ag ain was not e ligible f or the same executive bonuses. Although A AM argues that there is a signif icant diffe renc e in the re sponsibili ties assig ned to Pannucci and Conti in their respe ctive positions, the only evidenc e to that ef

fec t comes fr om theNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

I n concludingthat Conti fails to m ake he r pr im a fa c ie case , the dissent relie s h ea v i ly on 8 Pannucci’ s testimony

that Conti di d not perfor

m the same ta sks as he did as Dir ector of Ne w Model L aunch. See Dissenting Op. at 12-13. Conti, howe ver, direc tly challeng es that testimony , and in fa ct ide nti fi e s a

numbe r o f a dd iti on a l ta sk s that sh e wa s re qu ir e d to pe rf or m. C on ti a lso po int s o ut t hat, unlike Pannucci, she did not have the be nefit of two dire ct re ports in running the New Model L aunch depar tment. Whi le we a g ree that Pannucci’ s testimony is releva nt to Cont i’s claim, and that a jury eventua lly

could find it pe rsuasive, it would be improper at this stage to cre dit Pannucci’s testimony over Conti’s. Ag ain, as the non-movi ng party , Conti is entitled to have us r ead the evidenc e in the light most favor able to her position. - 28 - self-se rving testimony

offe red by

Pannucci himself. AAM offe rs no other evidenc e to re but Conti ’s claim that she pe rfor

med “substantially ” the same func tions as Pannucci. Be cause the cour

t was re quired to construe the re cord in the lig ht most favorable to Conti at this stage , it was improper f or the district cour

t to credit Pannucc i’s testimony over Conti’s without any other supportingevidenc e. I n light of the competing claims as to this particular issue, we f

ind 8 that it was improper to g rant summary judgme nt a s to Conti’s re taliation claim. See Timme r , 104 F.3d at 844 (“[A]s wit h all aff irmative d ef

en s es under the Act, the e mploy er must prove that ‘sex pr ov ide s no pa rt of the ba sis for the wa g e diffe rential [in order to pre vail on summary judgme nt] .’” (q u o t i n g Brennan v. Owensboro-Dav iess Co u n t y Hosp. , 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 ( 6th Cir. 1975) (empha sis in Timmer)). I n our vi ew, Cont i has raised a prima f acie case under the EPA with respec t to her c laim of unequa l pay in this contex t, and the disputed i ssues of fa ct re g ardingthe diffe renc e in responsibiliti es betwe en her and Pannucc i cannot be r esolved on summary judgme nt. VI . C ON TI’ S DI SP UT E WI TH SO M M ER S SC HWA RT Z Con ti a lso c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t cou rt ’s pr ior de c isi on to p e rm it h e r f or me r c ouns e l in

thi s action, Sommers Schwar tz P C, to withdraw and y et still file a lien ag ainst any damag es she mayNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

I n the Retainer

Ag ree ment enter ed into be tween Conti and Sommers Schw artz, J .A. 1073- 9 76, the par

ties ag ree d that the “Firm shall reta in a li en on any and all proper ty provided to the Fir

m by Client to pursue his/her claims , i n cludi ng all persona l paper s, investigations paid for by Client and documents.
. . . This lien shall rema in in eff ect until all fee s, expenses and court costs o wi ng to the Fir m ar e p ai d in full.” J .A. 1074. Howe ver, the Retainer A g ree ment also provided that the
“ F i r m s h a l l n o t s u

b s t i tu t e C l i e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n an d / o r t h e i r r o l e s w i t h o ut C l i e n t c o n s e n t
. If repr esentation and/or roles c hang e without Client c onsent, this Agr eeme nt becomes null and void, and the Client will not [be] liable for any of the Firm’s expenses, court costs and/or fe es. All liens will be canc elled and r ecor ded by the Fir m and all Client property i n cl u ding inve stigations and studies will be returne d to the Client.” J .A. 1075. - 29 - re c ov e r i n th is act ion . In 2 00 4, Con ti r e ta ine d th e Som me rs Sc hw art z fi rm to p ur su e he r c la ims ag ainst AAM. Attorney

J oseph Golden ( “Golden” ) served as lead c ounsel on Conti’s case. A fter actingas lea d counsel for over 2 y ear s, Golden re signe d and lef t the firm ef

fec tive Fe bruar

y 14, 20 07
. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, on Ap ri l 4, 20 07 , Som me rs Sc hw art z a dv ise d Con ti via e -mail th at it intended to withdrawas counse l, noting that the “ sticking point” in continuing the relationship was

“ the qu e st i o no f

[C o n t i ’ s ] r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

f o r o n g o i n g an t i c i p a t e d

f i l e c o s t s . ” J. A
. 1 0 3 1
. C o nti
re sp on de d v ia

le tte r o n Apr il 5 , 2 00 7 that sh e di d no t c on se nt o r a g re e to t he fi rm ’s pr op os a l to withdraw a s counsel, and advising the firm that she intende d to invoke her r ights unde r the Retaine r Ag ree ment should the firm seek to withdra w. J .A. 984-85. 9 Ov e r C on ti’ s o bje c tio n, Som me rs Sc hw art z fi le d a mot ion to w ith dr aw a lle g ing a

c omp le te “bre akdown” in the attorney -client re lationship. J .A. 1066-70. Althoug h Sommers Schwartz’s motion advised the court that it had attempted to contac t defe nse counse l, it did not inform the cour t that Conti had objected to its proposal to withdraw a nd it did not mention Conti’s letter of April 5, 2007. And althoug h Sommers Schwartz’s motion advised the court that Golden continued to serveNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

I n it s p aper s to th is C ourt , So mme rs Sc hw art z cl a ims on ly tha t it is e nti tle d to c os ts, 10 expressly disavowing its claim reg ardingattorney fee s. - 30 - as counse l for Conti, Golden filed a motion to withdraw a s counsel on Apr il 24, 2007. Conti did not file a r esponse to the motion. On April 30, 2007, af

ter the e x pi ra t i o n of the time per iod for filing a re sponse and a fter Golden filed his motion to w ithdraw, the court enter ed a “stipulated” order permitt i n g S o mmers Schwar tz t o withdraw a s counsel. Although s o titled, Conti plainly had not “stipulated” to the order. A wee k later, on May 8, 2007, Golden, despite having alre ady filed his own motion to wi t h draw , filed a be lated motion on Conti ’s beha lf opposing the court’s or der. J.A. 968-78. After Conti obt ained r eplac ement counse l, Somm ers Schwa rtz asse r te d a li e n for its costs and attorney fee s ag ainst any

damag es Conti may

rec over in this action. On May 31, 2007, Conti’s new 10 counsel filed a

motion f o r d ec l ar atory

judgme nt arguing that Somm ers Schwa rtz was prec luded
un de r Para g ra

ph 13 of the Re ta ine r A g re e me nt f ro m a sse rt inga

lie n f or its outst a nd ingc os ts b e c a

us e it withdrew fr om the case without Cont i’s consent. S ommers Schwar tz’s response ar g ued that Conti’s “failure to file an objec tion to S ommers S chwa rtz’s withdrawal motion repr esents her
consen t ( o r

a t a mi n im u m h e r a b an d o n me n t o f

an y o b je c ti o n ) to th e r e li e f

o r d e r e d b y th is Court.” J
. A
. 1 0 4 8
. S o m m e r s S c h w art z a l s o ar g u e d t h a tP ar a g r a

p h1 3 w a s v o i d

a s a m a t t e r o f p u b l i c p o l i c y. On J une 25, 2007, the mag istrate judg e held a hear ing on the issue. At t h e h ea ri ng , the mag istrate judg e expressly acknow ledg ed that the “ stipulated” order was enter ed in err or “ba sed on what [the court] saw as a

n unobjected to order.” J .A. 2593. Despite acknowledg ing this error, the mag istrate judg e neverthele ss enter ed a written order approving the lien as t o all costs incurre d upNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

Although our

reque st was direc ted g ener ally to the counsel for

all parties, the only

parties 11 with an ac tual interest in this dispute are Conti and S ommers Schwar tz; Americ an Axle has no stake in the outcome of this dispute. Acc ording ly , we strike the brief submitted by Americ an Axle for lac k of standing
. - 31 - un til Som me rs Sc hw art z wi thd re w as c ouns e l. J.A. 10 99 . Cr iti c a lly , h ow e ve r, the or de r e xpre ssl y set aside the issue of

attorney fee s for resolution at a later date. J .A. 1099. The order also reje cted Conti’s objections under Parag raph 13, finding that that provision “ is void a s a matter of Michig an public policy .” J.A. 1103. On Con ti’ s a pp e a l, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

a pp ro ve d th e ma g is tr a te jud g e ’s or de r, a g re e ingwi th Sommers Schwartz that Parag raph 13 of the Retainer Ag ree ment did not a pply beca use Conti had failed to objec t to the motion to withdraw. Critical to that r uling was the court’s de termination that Conti “was re prese nted by counsel whe n Sommers Schwartz filed i t s m o t i o n to withdraw.” J .A. 1263. Significa

ntly , howeve r, the c ourt did not address any issues relate d to the mag istrate judg e’s deter mination that Parag raph 13 is void as a matter of public policy . Rather, the c ourt deter mined only that, beca

use Conti fa iled to f

ile timely objections to Somm ers Schwa rtz’s moti on to withdraw, Parag raph 13 of

the Retainer

Ag ree ment did not apply

beca use Sommers Schwar

tz did not withdraw “without the conse nt” of Conti. J .A. 1263. Jurisd ic tio nal Cons ide ra tio ns Pri o r t o o ral a

rgument, this Court requested that the pa rties submit supplemental briefs
re g ard ing thi s dis pute a dd re ssi ng“ bo th t

he fi na lity of the ma g ist

rate jud g e ’s or de r a

nd the tim e lin e ss of t he noti ce of

appea l,” re fer

ring the par

ties to our decision in Gnesy s, Inc. v . Gree ne , 437 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2005). The question underly ing that reque st was whether Cont i’s appea l from the district 11No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 32 - court’s July

27, 2007 order

is untimely beca

use, although i t was filed within 30 day s of the district court’s or der g rantingAAM summary judgme nt, it was filed se vera l months after the c ourt enter ed its order on this distinct iss ue. After consideration, we conc lude that we ha ve jurisdiction to consider Con ti’ s a pp e a l f ro m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r d e nyinghe r m oti on fo r d e c lara

tor y jud g me nt. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, thi s Court has jurisdiction t o consider a ppeals “ from all fina l de c isi on s o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt s o f t

he Un ite d St a te s. ” I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a dec isi on is “ fi na l” for pur poses of § 1291, the Supre me Cou rt h as i nstructed that we consider whether the dec ision “ends the litigation on the merits and lea ves the c ourt nothing to do but execute the judgme nt.” Catli n v. United States , 3 24 U. S. 2 29 , 2 33 (1 94 5) . “ Whe n a n a c tio n p re se nts mor e tha n one c la im fo r r e lie f .
. . the c ourt may dir e c t e ntr

y of a fi na l ju dg me nt a s to on e or mor e , b ut fe we r t

ha n a ll, claims
. . . only if the court expressly deter mines that there is no just rea son for de lay .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (e mphasis added) . “Other wise, any order . . . that adjudicate s few er than all the claims or the ri g hts and

lia bil iti e s o f f

e we r t ha n a ll the pa

rt ie s does not e nd the action as to any of the claims
or pa rt ie s and may be re vis e d a t any tim e be fo re the e ntr

y of a jud g me nt a dju dic a tin g a ll the c la ims and all the pa

rties’ rig hts and liabiliti es.” Id. (empha sis added). I n this case, the ma g istr at e judge ’s J une 27, 2007 orde r deny ing Conti’s motion for decla ratory judgme nt did not finally

resolve the issue of Sommers Schwar tz’s entitlement to attorney fe e s. I n f a c t, t hat or de r e xpre ssl y

“ sta y e d” the iss ue of fe e s “in or de r to pe rm it Ms. Con ti to o bta in
new c ounsel and pre sent any aff idavit reg ardingthe ef

fe ct o f [ Sommers Schwartz’s] li en on the repres en t at i o n . ” J .A. 1099. B eca use a ma g istrate judg e’s or der is not subject to appe al under § 1291, Conti appropr iately appea led t hat order t o the di strict court. Se e Un ite d S tates v . W alte rs , 638No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 33 - F .2 d 9 47 , 9 49 -5 0 ( 6th

Cir . 1 98 1) (“ Di re c t a

pp e a ls f ro m th e ma g ist

rate jud g e ’s fi nd ing s a

re c or re c tly denied, be cause only

final orde rs of the dis trict court a re a ppeala ble pursuant to 29 U.S.C. [§] 1291.”). On J uly 27, 2007, the district c ourt aff irmed the mag istrate judg e’s r esolution of the matter, al s o s et t i n g as i d e r es o l u t i o no f t h e d i s p u t e o v er at t o rn ey ’s fe es . J
. A. 1 2 6 3 (“ M agi s t ra t e J u d ge Mo rg an is no t in

e rr or in h e r d e c isi on

to c on sid e r t

he iss ue of

a tto rn e y fe e s at a late r d a te .” ). B e c a

us e that order did not resolve all issues relating to that dispute, it is not a “f inal” orde r subject to appe al under § 1291. Our prior decision in Gn e sy

s i s n o t t o the contra

ry . I n that case , we he ld that a notice of appea l was untimely

beca use it was filed a lmost a y ear afte r the district cour

t entere d an orde r finding defe ndant in c ontempt a nd awa rding plaintiff damag es, eve n though it wa s filed within 30 da y s o f the c ourt ’s e ntr

y of an o rd e r r e so lvi ngdis pute d atto rn e y fe e s th a t r e late d to the pr e vio us ly enter ed dama g es aw ard. Gnesy s , 437 F.3d at 485. Rely ing on Budinich v. Becton Dickinson &Co. , 486 U.S. 196 (1988), we conclude d that the claim for fee s was “not pa

rt of the mer its of the action,” and thus held that the dispute over fee s did not preclude the order awa rding of dama g es fr om eff ectively rende ring a fina l decision. Gnesy s , 437 F.3d at 486-87. I n this case, howe ver, the fac ts are a lmost completely reve rsed. Rathe r than re solving the merits first and the fee dispute later, the court resolved Conti’s dispute with Sommers Schwar tz as to costs first, p r i o r

to gra n t i n g Americ an Axle’s summary judgme nt motion. Beca

use the district court ha d y et to enter an order resolving the merits of t he action, the holding of Gnesy s is inapposite. Whil e Gnesy

s instructs that the dispute betwee n Conti and Sommers Schw artz reg ardingcosts andNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 34 - fe e s is se pa

rate fr om t

he me ri ts of th e un de rl ying a c tio n, the fa c t th a t su c h a n o uts tand ingdis pu te does not toll the tim e for filing an appea l from an order that fully resolves the merits of the a ction simply does not speak to whether the re solution of that disput e constitutes a se parate final orde r for purposes of § 1291. Nor wa s the district court’s July 27, 2007 order subject to appe al under the collater al orde r do c tr ine . A lth ou g h 2 8 U .S. C. § 12 91 ve sts the Cou rt s o f Ap pe a ls wi th jur isd ic tio n ov e r a pp e a ls o nly from “f inal decisions” of

the district courts, “a decision ‘final’ within the meaningof § 1291 does not nece ssarily

mean the la st order possible to be ma de in a c ase.” Gillespie v. United States Stee l Corp. , 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964). A decision also is appea lable if it falls within “that small class [of
or de rs ] wh ic h f

ina lly de te rm ine c la ims of ri g ht se pa ra ble fr om, and

c oll a te ra l to , r ig hts a sse rt e d in the ac tion, too im portant to be de nied re view and too indepe ndent of the cause itself to r equire that ap pellate c onsideration be de fer red until the whole c ase is adjudicated.” Co h e n v . B e n e fi cial Industrial L oan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). That “small class” of dec isions includes orders g ranting or de n yin g a

c la im e d r ig h t t h a t “ c an n o t b e e f

f e c ti v e ly v in d ic a te d

a f te r th e tr ia l h as
occur red.” Mi tc he ll v . F

or sy th , 4 7 2 U
. S
. 5 1 1 , 5 2 5 ( 1 9 8 5 )
. The re quireme nt s fo r bringing an appe al under Cohen ’s collater al orde r doctrine “have been distil led down to three conditions: that an order ‘[1 ] co nc lus ive ly

de te rm ine the dis pute d q

ue sti on , [2] r e s o l v e a

n i m p or tant i ssu e c omp le te ly

se pa rate from the mer its of the action, and [3] be effe ctively unrevie wable on appea l f

rom a fina l judgment.’ ” W ill v. Hallock, 5 4 6 U. S
. 3 4 5 , 3 4 9 (2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Pu e rto Ri c o A qu e du c t an d S e we r A uth . v . M

e tc alf & Eddy, Inc

. , 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)).No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 35 - The district cour

t’s order thus was not subject to collater al appe al b ec ause it di d not “conc lusively deter

mine” the dispute in question inasmuch as it specific ally left the issue of attorney fe e s unr e so lve d. Mo re ov e r, a s Gn esy s demonstrates, disputes a s to c o s ts a n d f ees, a lthough c ollatera l to the underlying dispute, c an still be “ef fec tively vindicated a fter the trial has occ urre d.” Me rit s Ana ly sis Th is C ourt

re vie ws the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to p e rm it a

n atto rn e y to w ith dr aw f

or an a bu se of discre tion. Un ite d S

tates v . Ch am be rs , 441 F.3d 438, 446 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 6 ). “A district cour t abuses its discre tion when it relies on cle arly err oneous finding s of fac t, improperly applies the law , or uses a n err oneous leg al standard.” Tuc k e r v . Ci ty of F air fie ld , 398 F.3d 457, 461 ( 6th Cir. 2005). T h i s a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n s t an d ar d a p p l i e s e v e nw h e r e a

m o t i o ns e e k i n g s u

b s t i tu t e c o u n s e l i s u n t i m e l y. See U nited States v. W

illiams , 176 F.3d 301, 314 ( 6th Cir. 1999). This Court reviews the district court’s c onclusions of law de novo
. United States v. Foster , 376 F.3d 577, 583 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Conti opposed the lien asserte d by Sommers Schw artz based on Parag raph 13 of the Retainer Ag re e me nt. Re

je c tin g that argume nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d th at th a t pr ov isi on did no t a pp ly beca use Conti failed to object to Sommers Schwar tz’s motion to withdraw. Critica l to that ruling
wa s the c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat Co nti wa s r e pr e se nte d b y c ouns e l w he n So mme rs Sc hw art z mov e d to withdraw. After

revie wing the re cord, w e now c onclude that the district c ourt’s conc lusion was an abuse of discretion. I n permitting the Sommers Schwartz firm to withdraw a s counsel, the district cour t and mag istrate judg e made sever al procedura l err ors and f indings that a

re c ontrary

to the rec ord. Perha

ps
mos t no ta

bly , th e ma g ist rat e ju dg e e nte re d a “ sti pu late d” or de r gra

nti ngthe fi rm ’s mot ion

toNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 36 - withdraw de spite t h e fa ct that Conti had not acknowledg ed in any way her c onsent to the motion. Fr om the rec ord, it is appare nt that Conti bear s no responsibility for this oversig ht. Despite re ceiving
a le tte r f ro m Co nti un e qu ivo c a lly

op po sin g its thr e a t to wi thd ra w a s h e r c ouns e l, S omm e rs Sc hw art z
never theless fa iled to inform the cour t of C onti’s position, failed to attach her letter, and submitted
a pr op os e d “st ipulate d” or de r. As a re su lt, the ma g istra

te jud g e e nte re d th a t or de r c omp le te ly
unawa re of Conti’s posit ion, acknowle dg ing a s much at the he aringon this iss ue. Al t h oug h this mi stake wa s broug ht to the district court’s attention, the district cour t
ne ve rt he le ss a ff ir me d th e ma g istrate jud g e ’s or de r on t he g ro un ds that Co nti fa ile d to tim e ly op po se the mot ion

to w ith dr aw. Ap pa

re ntl y , th e cou rt c on c lud e d th a t Co nti wa s n ot p re jud ic e d b y

thi s
ov e rs ig ht be c a

us e sh e wa s re pr e se nte d b y c ouns e l at th e tim e and

the re fo re re ma ine d f

re e to o pp os e Sommers Schwartz’s motion and co rr ect the omissi on. But we have se rious doubts about that
c on c lus ion . Alth ou g h G old e n w a s a c tin g a s le a d c ouns e l on Con ti’ s c a se , h e wa s h e r atto rn e y on ly by virtue of the retaine r ag ree ment she sig ned with Sommers Schwar tz, which Som mers Schwa rtz’s mot ion e ff e c tiv e ly wa s se e kin g to t e rm inate . M or e ov e r, Go lde n a lso su bmi tte d h is o wn

mot ion to withdraw prior to the mag istrate judg e ente ring its order g rantingSommers Schwartz’s motion. Be cause the district court ove rlooked thes e er rors, we find its decision to be an a buse of discretion. Ac cording ly , we va cate that judgme nt an d rema nd to the district court for further consideration of the merits of Conti’s claims under Par ag raph 13 of the Retainer

Ag ree ment. VI I. F o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d

h e r e i n , w e h e r e b y RE VE RSE the judg m en t o f t he district cour t reg ardingConti’s request to depose CEO D auch, VAC ATE o n a ll c ounts the district court’s dec isionNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 37 - to gr ant summary

judgme nt in fav o r o f Am eric an Axle, VA CA TE the district court’s judg ment denying Conti’s motion for dec laratory judgme nt r e g a

r d ingher dispute with Sommers Schwar tz, and REMAND for f

urther c onsideration in light of this opini on.No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 38 - COOK, Circuit Judge, concurring i n part an d dissentin g in p art. Al tho ug h Ia g re e wi th much of the ma

jority ’s opinion, I respe ctfully dissent from it s conclusion that the district cour t: (1) imp ro pe rl y

de nie d Co nti the op po rt un ity to d e po se AA M CE O R ic ha rd Da uc h a nd (2 ) e rred in g rantingsummary

judgme nt for AAM on Conti’s g ender -discrimination claims. I. As the majority

acknow ledg es, a district c o u rt h o l d s broad discr etion over discove ry decisions, and “ [a] n order denying f

urther disc overy

will be g rounds for r ever sal o n l y i f it was an abuse of discretion re sulting in substantial prejudice .” Bush v. DictaphoneCorp. , 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998). Be cause I believe that the district c ourt acte d well within its di scre tion in deny ing Conti an opportunity

to depose Da

uch, I would aff

irm the court’ s discovery

order
. The re cord f

ails to corrobor ate a

n argument that Dauc h play ed a significa nt decisionmaking role e ither in Conti’s alleg ed 2003 demotion or the 2004 transfe r t o the manag eria l positi on in the New Mode l L aunch division. Conti contends that d efense counse l questioned her at leng th about Dauc h, asking “scor es of que stions” over for ty -eight pag es of her deposition. But Conti overstates the scope and value of t hese questions. Def ense counsel m ere ly

elicited that Da

uch met and hir ed Con ti i n Jan

ua ry 19 97 and that Conti ’s late fathe r h a d a pr of e ssi on a l r e latio ns hip wi th D a uc h. Con ti does m ention a mee ting with Da uch duringher f

irst y ear at AAM, whic h she initiated when A AM require d her to switch mana g eria l positi ons, but Conti expli citly disavows that employ ment transfe r as t he basis for

her c urre nt lawsuit. Neither Conti’s brief ing nor the majority ’s ana ly sis attach Conti’s meeting w ith Dauch to the a dverse employ ment actions t hat prompt her c urre nt liti g ation.No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 39 - The majority

conc ed es t h at “the rec ord supports AAM’s c laim that Conti never repor ted direc tly to Dauch,” but maintains that the rec ord fails to suppor t a “broa der sug g estion that Dauc h has not bee n involved in decisions relating to Conti’s employ ment.” Maj. Op. at 7. Specifica lly , the majority points out t hat Conti’s demotion occurr ed af ter she inf ormed AA M’s in-house counse l that
on e of he r s up e ri or s, Roy

L ang e nb a c h, ins tr

uc te d h e r n ot t o hir e tw o fe ma le a pp lic ants wh o Co nti judge d to be “ve ry

capa ble ca ndidates” be cause “one w as a mo t her [and anothe r] one was
ov e rw e ig ht. ” Al tho ug h the ma jor ity c la ims that “ the re c or d su g g e sts that Da uc h w a s awa

re of thi s inf or matio n, ” the on ly

re c or d e vid e nc e the maj ori ty po int s to is D a

uc h’ s a c kn ow le dg me nt— in
answe ring Conti’s int err og atories—that he “re tained trial c ounsel repor ts to AAM staff c ounsel [and that] AAM staff counse l [ sent him] periodic updates on litigation m atters.” But in the same se t of response s, Dauc h also stated tha t h e d i d n ot rea d any witness deposition transcripts re lated to the
case and that he had no knowledg e through any other source as to what prior witnesses had said on the re cord. U nlike the m ajority , I would not hold that from these brief comments, “it seems to follow that [Dauch] would have bee n awa re of Conti’s decision to testify ag ainst the company ’s intere sts.” Maj. Op. at 8. The majority

also holds that “contra

ry to AAM’s portra

y al of Da uch as a n aloof, ha

nds-off CEO , s ig nif

ic ant r e c or d e vid e nce atte sts to D a uc h’ s p e rs on a l invo lve me nt i n a nd c on tr ol o ve r a ll aspec ts of his company .” Maj. Op. at 8. I n s u p p o rt , t h e m ajorit y points to a business article that char acte rized Dauc h as “r un[ni ng ] hi s empire like a front-line ge nera l, rely

ing on a mi x ture of f

ear
and re sp e c t to c ra ft

an unli ke ly

su c c e ss s tor

y out of a bu sin e ss t

he sk e pti c s longa g o w e re re a dy to
wr ite of f. ” B ut th e dep os iti on

te sti mony

that th e ma

jor ity su g g e sts “ c on fi rm s” that de sc ri pti on isNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 40 - insubstantial. E v en though Ear hart a lluded to some trepidation in writing a per formanc e re view about Conti due to Dauc h’s relationship with Conti ’s father, he also conc eded that he didn’t know whether Dauc h would ever

see the perf

ormanc e review in the normal course of business. And to the extent that C o n ti cites rec ord evide nce sug g esting that Dauc h define s the company ’s g oals and objectives, de termines bonus structure , and appr oves final pr omotion decisions, these ac tions repr esent ty

pical CEO re sponsibili ties and have no rea l bear ing on de cisions about Conti. Although the majority

comments that the re cord e vidence , taken cumulatively , “ca sts serious doubt on the notion that Dauc h was not a war e of and pla

y ed no ro le in a

ny de c isi on re le va nt t o th is action,” Ma

j. Op. at 9, it bear s repe ating that our re view is gu i d ed b y a differ ent metric. The question befor e us is not simply whether further discovery

might provide a more thoroug h rec ord;
our analy sis a sks whether the district c ourt abused its discr etion to the point of causingsubstantial prejudice
. Se e Bu sh , 161 F.3d at 367. The majority ’s ana ly sis virtually ignor es the prejudice aspect of not deposing Dauc h, much less the “substantial” pr ejudice r equire d to reve rse an order denying disc overy . See id. a t3 6 7
. In his ans we rs to C on ti’ s in te rr og a tor ie s, Dau c h e mph a size d th a t th e de c isi on to d e mot e Con ti a

ro se “without [hi s] i nvolvement,” an d i n his sworn aff idavit, Dauch te stified that he had “ no persona l kn ow le dg e of

any a lle g e d g e nd e r d isc ri min a tio n a gains t Ms . Co nti ,” that he ha d “ ne ve r b e e n M s. Conti’s direct or indirec t supervisor,” that he had “ no independ en t o r u n i que knowledg e of employ ment decisions made with r espec t to Ms. Conti’s employ ment with AAM,” and that deposing him would be “unduly

burdensome, hara ssing, and annoying beca use [he w ould] be distracted f rom [hi s] dut ies and re sponsibili ties.” Se e Tho mas v. Int ’l Bu s. Ma c hs

. , 48 F.3d 478, 483 ( 10th Cir.No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 41 - 1995) (a cce pting the a ffidavit of I BM’ s Chairman as support f or his lack of direc t knowledg e of the fac ts in disput e). The district court ac ted well withi n its “broad discr etion” whe n it denied a deposition for a CEO who “had no knowledg e as to fa cts pertinent to [Conti ’s] action.” Lewelling v. Farme rs Ins. of Columbus, Inc. , 879 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 1989)
. I would aff irm t h e d i s t ri ct court’s discove ry

decision. II. Reviewingde novo, I

would also aff

irm the district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt for AAM on Conti’s ge nder- discrim i n at ion claims. See Tuck er v. Tenne

ssee , 5 39 F .3 d 5 26 , 5 31 (6 th Cir. 2008) (apply

ing de -novo re view). A. The majority

clai ms that Conti provided suff icient evidenc e—both direc t and circ umstantial—to support her EL CRA ge nder- discrimination claims. First, Conti arg ues that the
rec ord conta ins direct evide nce of AAM’s g ender discrimination. Namely , that (1) Da uch author ed a book in which he expressed admiration for J apane se and G erma n cultures, whe re, “ [i ]f y ou are a woman . . . y ou will not get e qual consider ation;” (2) c o-Dire ctor L arr y Earha rt all ege d l y told her that she could not be promoted beca use she didn’t “have a penis;” ( 3) one of Conti’s superiors, Roy L ang enbac h, alleg edly

instructed her

not to hire overw eig ht w omen or mothers; and (4) statistical evidenc e il lustrates t hat AAM ha s y et to hire a fema le Executive Direc tor, Plant Manag er, or Vice President, and that only

a small perc entag e of A AM’s lower -leve l executives are fema le. But these claims do not constitute evidence that “re quires the c onclusion that unlawful discrimination was at lea st a motivating fa ctor i n t h e employ er’ s actions.” Jack lyn v. Sc hering-No. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 42 - Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp. , 176 F.3d 921, 9 2 6 (6 t h Cir. 1999). As discussed a bove, Conti does not point to evidence sug g esting that Dauc h acte d as a de cision-maker with respec t to her
c are e r. Mo re ov e r, the re le va nt p a ssa g e s in

Da uc h’ s Passion for Manufacturing mere ly descr ibe the “g eog raphy , demog raphic s, and cultures of Ge rmany and Japan,” a

nd even la

bel the enf

orce d ho mog e ny

a s “ int ole ra

nc e .” Th e se state me nts be ar l itt le re le va nc e to C on ti’ s si tuatio n in sp e c if ic and fa il to substantiate discriminatory manag ement prac tices. As for Earha rt’s alleg ed comment that Conti di d not rec eive a

2001 promotion b ec au s e she “did not have a penis,” the re cord c itation pr ov ide d b y

bo th Con ti and the ma

jor ity c on ta ins no su

pp or t fo r (o r e ve n re fe re nc e to) thi s st a te me nt. L ang enbac h’s comment about overwe ight women or mothers likewise doe s not rise to the level of direc t discrimination because it does not require the conclusion that g ender discrimination “was at least a motivating fac tor.” See J ackly n , 1 76 F .3 d at 92 6; Cushman-Lagerstrom v . Citi zens Ins. Co. of Am. , 72 F. App’x 322, 331–32 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgme nt where “dispara g ing
rema rks” a bout “fe male employ ees who wer e over weig ht” did not constitute direct evide nce of g ender discriminati o n ). Moreover, L ang enbac h’s comments ca nnot constitute direct evide nce be c a us e Con ti f

a ils to argue L ang e nb a c h’ s invo lve me nt i n th e e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on s sh e c ha lle ng e s. See Cushman-

Lagerstrom , 7 2 F. Ap p ’x at 332 (a ffirmingsummary judgme nt on a g ender

discrimination claim wher e alleg ed comments did not come f rom a “ primary

decision-make r” in the plaintiff’s termination). F inally , Conti’s statis tical evidenc e is inapposite. Althoug h she ar g ues that AAM neve r hired f

emale a s a top-ra

nking e x ecutive, a

nd that only

a small perc entag e of low- ranking
e xec uti ve s are fe ma le , h e r e xplanatio n o f what c on sti tut e s a “ top -ranki ng ” e xec uti ve is e nti re ly subjective—AA M hired Conti h er s el f d i re ct l y i n t o ex ec u t i v e r an k s
— an d t h e s t at i stical evidenc e doesNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 43 - not analy ze any component of A AM’s hiring proce ss. The statis tical evidenc e is thus unreliable a s direc t proof of g ender discrimination. See id. at 331 (re jectingstatistical evidence as unper suasive wher e th e f

a c to r s an a ly

ze d p r o v e d u n h e lp f

u l)
. Co n ti c an n o t d e mo n s tr a te th a t th e r e c o r d supplies direc t evidence that AAM discriminates on the ba sis of g ender
. Con ti s imi larl y

fa ils to su pp ort h e r c la im v ia c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e . A s th e ma jor ity acknow ledg es, when considering circ umstantial e vidence of discrimination, this court employ s the familiar burden- shifting fra mework articulated by the Supreme Court in McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Gre en , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Cont i bear s the initial burden of e stablishing a pr ima fac ie ca se of discrimination. I f she suc cee ds in doing so, the bur den shifts to AAM to articulate a legi timate, nondiscriminatory

rea son for its a ctions. Finally , should A AM satisfy its burde n, the burden r eturns to C on ti t o p ro ve by

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e tha

t th e le g iti mate re a so ns of fe re d w e re on ly a pre text for discr imination. Id. a t 80 2; DiCarlo v. Potter , 358 F.3d 408, 414–15 ( 6th Cir. 2004). To e sta bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se of g e nd e r dis c ri min a tio n, Con ti must de mon str a te tha

t sh e is: (1) a member of

the protec ted class; (2) subject to an a dverse employ ment action; (3) qua lified for the job; a nd (4) treated differ ently than simil arly situated male employ ees for the s am e o r s imilar conduct. Humenny

v. Ge nex Corp. , 390 F.3d 901, 906 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Although Conti contends that AAM subjecte d her to a varie ty of adve rse e mploy

ment actions—fa i l i n g to promote her, demoting he r in J une 2003, pay i n g h er an i n commensurate salar y , and fa iling to train he r—she waived a ll but her failure -to-promote c laim by failing to argue them in the district court. In fac t, the dis tr ic t c ourt

on ly a dd re sse d Co nti ’s EL CRAc la ims a s f a ilure -t o- prom ote a

nd re ta liatio n c la ims
. See St. M arys Foundry, Inc. v. Employ ers Ins. of W ausau , 332 F.3d 989, 996 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (notingNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 44 - that this court ex erc ises “discre tion to rule on an is sue not decide d below only in exceptional case s”) (citation and inter

nal quotation marks omitted). Conti’s failure-to- promote cla im f ails on the first prong of the Mc Do nn e ll D ou

gla s ana ly sis , larg ely for the r easons se t forth i n the di strict court’s opinion. Specifica lly , Conti’s alleg ations that AAM neg lected to pr omote her to Vice Pre sident or Dire ctor positions in the Procureme nt and Materia ls Depar

tments cannot support a pr ima fac ie c as e o f g ender discrimination beca

use she cannot de monstrate that AAM tre ated her di ffe rently than s imilarly situated male e mploy ees. See Humenny , 390 F.3d at 906 (“To show that she was tre ated diff ere ntly than similarly

situated males for the same or simil ar conduct, Appellant must show that ‘all re levant aspe cts’ of he r employ ment situation are ‘ near ly

identical’ to those of

the alleg ed similarly

situated male e mploy ees.” ). To be “ s i m i l ar l y

s i tu a t e d , ” t h e m a l e e mp l o y e e s w i t hw h o mC o n t i c o mp ar e s h e r s e l f “ mus t have de alt with the same super visor, have be en subjec t to the same standar ds, and eng ag ed in the
same c on du c t w ith out su c h d if fe re nti a tin g or

mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s that wo uld dis tin g uis h th e ir conduct or the employ er’ s treatment of t hem for it.” Id. at 906 (interna l c itation and quotation marks omitted). But, as the district cour t rig htly noted, Conti does not have a similar leve l of educ ation or pr of e ssi on a l e xpe ri e nc e wh e n c omp are d to tho se wh o h e ld V ic e Pr e sid e nt or Di re c tor po sit ion s in her r espec tive depar

tments. Unlike others name d to highe r executive positions, Conti did not have g raduate-leve l deg ree s in eng ineer ing or other tec hnical fie lds (she holds an under g raduate deg ree in communication and adve rtising and an MBA). Although the majority joins Conti in disputi ng the rele vance of these considera tions for the VP of Procure ment position, the fac t that the two men who held the position during the p eriod in question, Abdallah Shanti and A lberto Satine, both hadNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 45 - a dv anc e d e du c a tio n in

sp e c ia li z e d e ng ine e ri ngfi e lds , c or ro bo ra te s th e re le va

nc e of tho se pr of e ssi on a l qu a lif

ic a tio ns fo r t

he po sit ion . I

wo uld c on c lud e that Co nti fa ile d to se t f or th a pr ima fa c ie c a se of EL CRA g e nd e r dis c ri min a tio n be c a us e sh e do e s no t pr ov e that A AM tr e a te d s imi larl y
s i tu a t e d m a l e e mp l o ye e s d i f

f e r e n t l y. B. Conti nex t alleg es that her J u n e 2003 tra nsfer to the position of SEI T-Ne w Model L aunch in the Materia ls Depar

tment constituted r etaliation beca use it oc curr ed shortly afte r she told outside counsel in an unr elated disc rimination case that L ang enbac h told her not to hire wome n who wer e
overw eig ht or mothers. The me eting with outside counsel occ urre d on April 11, 2003. To support
a p r i m a f a c i e r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m , C o n t i m u s t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t : ( 1 ) s h e e n g a g e d i np r o t e c t e d

a c t i v i t y; (2) AA M kn e w o f th e p r o te c te d a c ti v it y ; ( 3 ) A A M to o k an a dv e r s e a c ti o n a g a in s t h e r ; and (4) a
causa l connec tion ex ists between the pr otected a ctivity and the a dverse action. Nisw ander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. , 529 F.3d 714, 720 ( 6th Cir. 2008). With out di sc us sin g or ar g uin g a g a ins t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion that Co nti fa ile d to demonstrate that Shanti, her direc t supervisor a t t h e time, knew of he r protec ted conduc t, the majority relies lar g ely

on the nec essity

of deposingDauc h to vacate the district cour t’s decision on Conti’s retaliation claim. As set for th above, I

disag ree with the majority ’s pos ition on the discover y
or de r; and

re g ard le ss, the dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y dis po se d o f C on ti’ s r e ta liatio n c la im. I n support of her

claim, Conti point s to: ( 1) the fac t that E arha rt reta ined his Direc tor position fo r n e arl y tw o y e ars de sp ite pr ob le ms with his pe rf or manc e ; and (2 ) t

he c los e te mpo ra l r e latio ns hipNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 46 - betwee n her A

pril 11, 2003 meeting with outside counsel and her June 9, 2003 transfer . But, a s the dis tr ic t c ourt

c on c lud e d, the se argume nts c ann ot s us ta in C on ti’ s r e ta liatio n c la im. Ea rh art ’s ro le a s a

Di re c tor pr ior to b e c omi ngc o- Di re c tor s w ithCon ti i s n ot r e le va nt t o h is late r r ole a s c o- Di re c tor
. An d on c e the tw o b e c a me c o- Di re c tor s, Sha nti tr ans fe rr e d b oth

on the same day . I n fac t, AAM t ransf

err ed Earhar

t to a non-ex ecutive positi on (without elig ibilit y for bonuse s), while AAM plac ed Conti in a differ ent executive-le vel position. Fur thermore , without more, temporal pr ox imity “does not demonstrate a

causa l connec tion betwee n the protec ted activity and any adver se employ

ment action.” W

est v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mic h. 17 7, 18 6 ( 20 03 ); se e Ar e nd alev . Ci ty

of Memphis , 519 F.3d 587, 606 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]emporal proxim ity

alone will not support an infe renc e of r etaliatory discrimination when ther e i s n o other c ompelling e vidence .”) ( citation and interna l quotation marks omitted). This court previously

held that two months is not necessar ily a suff iciently close tempora l connec tion. See Ar e nd ale , 519 F.3d at 606 (reje cting the plaint i ff’s claim t hat a two- month prox imity betwee n an EEOC cha

rg e and a n alleg ed adve rse e m p l o y m ent ac tion constitut ed—without more—suff icient
e vid e nc e of

c a us atio n) ; Hafford v. Seidner , 183 F.3d 506, 515 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (dee ming “ two to five months” to be a “loose temporal proxi mity
. . . insufficient to cr eate a triable issue [on causation]”). Iwo uld a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re

je c tio n o f C on ti’ s r e ta liatio n c la im o n s umm ary jud g me nt. C . Next, Conti a lleg es that she is able to support a pr ima fac ie claim under the Equal Pay

Act beca use she rec eived a lower salary than her immediate male pre dece ssor afte r AAM pr omoted her to the position of Manag er of the New Model L aunch depar tment. Specifica lly , when she took onNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 47 - the New -Model-L aunch position , s h e received a $117,000 annual sa lary , while Mike Pannucc i
re c e ive d $ 17 1, 00 0 b e fo re va c a tin g his ro le a s D ir e c tor of the Ne w M od e l L a

un c h d e pa

rtme nt. The EPA prohibits employ ers f rom pay ing two e mplo y ee s wh o perf orm equa l work at unequal r ates of pa

y on the basis of g ende r. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
. As the ma jor ity no te s, establishing a

prima fac ie EPA claim re quires Conti to demonstrate that AAM pa y s male employ ees at a hig her r ate “ for e qual work on jobs the p er fo rm an ce of which r equire s equal skill, effor t, and responsibility , and which are perf ormed under simil ar workingconditions.” Corning Glass W orks v. Brennan , 417 U. S. 188 , 195 (1 97 4) . N ota bly , th is c ourt

a sse sse s w he the r a

job is “ su bs tanti a lly equal” f o r E PA p u r

p o s e s o n a c a s e - b y - c a s e b a s is , an d d o e s n o t r e qu ir e th a t jo b s b e id e n ti c a l f or a plaintiff t o make out an E PA claim. Bec k-W ilson v. Principi , 441 F.3d 353, 359–60 (6th Cir. 2006). And unlike Conti’s Title VI Iclaims, the EPA does not re quire a plaintiff to show discriminatory intent. Id. at 3 6 0
. I f C o n t i i s ab l e t o s et fo r t h a p r i m a f a ci e c as e, AA M m ay

s t i l l j u s t i fy

t h e w age differ ence under a

ny of four aff irmative def

enses: (1) a seniority s y s t em; (2) a merit sy stem; (3) a sy stem that measure s ear

nings by quantity or quality of produc tion; or (4) any

other factor othe r than g ender
. Id. at 3 6 0 (c i t i n g Buntin v. Breath itt County Bd. of Educ. , 134 F.3d 796, 799 ( 6th Cir. 19 98 )) . I c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y re je c te d Co nti ’s EPAc la im. Conti fails to m ake out a

prima fa cie c laim beca

use she c ompare s her job with other jobs that
are not “substantially

equal” for EPA purpose s. Rely ing on Bu nti n , the majority holds that Conti met her pr ima fac ie burde n “by demonstrating a wa g e diffe rential be tween he rself a nd her pr edec essor”
a ft e r s he be c ame Mana g e r o f t he Ne w M od e l L a

un c h d e pa

rtme nt. 13 4 F .3 d at 79 9. B ut t he ma jor ity
re a ds Bu nti n out of context. The Bu nti n court he ld that a wag e diffe rential is suff i ci ent where aNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 48 - plaintiff als o demonstrates that “substantial simil arity” ex ists betwee n the compar ed jobs. See id. (c iti ngto a

c a se re qu ir ing“ su

bs tanti a l si mil ari ty” be tw e e n th e job s h e ld by the pla int if f a nd he r m a le prede cessor ). I n other wo rds, Bu nti n mere ly aff irms the require ment of substantial similarity ; the
ma jor ity inc or re c tly su g g e sts that a

wa g e dif fe re nti a l—w ith out mor e —s uf fi c e s to su

pp or t a pr ima fa c ie EPAc la im. Conti arg ues that as the Ma nag er of the New Model L aunch de partment, she “ perf ormed the
s a m e w o r k P an nu c c i p e r f

o r m e d o r m o r e an d

w i t hf e w e r r e s o u r c e s . ” Ap p e l l an t ’ s B r . a t4 7
. In support , C o n t i highlig hts that she handled Sar banes- Oxl ey

audits and I T sy stem
a dmi nis tr a tio n— dutie s Pa nnuc c i di d n ot h a ve —w ith out th e be ne fi t of Pannu c c i’ s two dir e c t r e po rt s. But Conti give s us no rea son why audits and I T sy stem administration should warra nt a diffe rent pa

y scale , and viewing the facts in Conti’s favor does not require us to cre dit “bald asser tions” or leg al conclusions. An sp ac h e

xre l. A ns pa c h v . Ci ty

of Phil ad e lph ia , 5 03 F .3 d 2 56 , 2 60 (3 d Ci r. 20 07 ); see also Burch v. Cit

y of Nacogdoche

s , 17 4 F .3 d 61 5, 62 1 n. 11 (5 th Cir
. 19 99 ) (“ Con str uin g the fa c ts in the light most favor able to B urch does not require us to credit other wise unsupported a ssertions.”). Mo re ov e r, a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt po int e d o ut in re

je c tin g Con ti’ s EPA c la im, Con ti “ wa s p a id more in the New

Model L aunch position than Satish Raheja, who he ld the position [ as a Ma nag er] for more than eig ht y ear s befor e she did, a nd whose tenur e in the positi o n en d ed l es s than a y ear be fo re [Con ti] too k it ov e r. ” F ur the rm or e , Pannuc c i ha d an e ng ine e ri ng ba c kg ro un d a nd ov e r f or ty y ear s of experienc e in the industry , and whe n he tra nsfer red to the r ole as Dire ctor of N ew Mode l L aunch, A AM mere ly

prese rved his pre vious salary . And althoug h Conti concede s that Pannucci added responsibiliti es t o Raheja’ s job, which accounted for the adjusted pay and diffe rent role , sheNo. 08-1301

Con ti v . A me ric an Ax le

- 49 - fails to note that Pannucc i also deeme d Conti incapa ble of fulfilling the job r esponsibiliti es he took
on wh e n h e a c te d a s th e Di re c tor of Ne w M od e l L a

un c h, sa ying : She didn’t have the knowledg e base or skill sets to a sk the rig ht que stions, to l ook at [m echa nical] processe s and be a

ble to tell if they

wer e func tioning properly , if they we re do ingthe ri g ht j ob , if—I me an, it w a s ju st b a se d o n p ro du c t and pr oc e ss kn ow le dg e . Sh e wa s— sh e wa s g oo d at w hat th e job wa s o ri g ina lly be fo re Ic a me into it, it was tracking more or less the t rail, the pa perw ork trail, wa s this—was the billing mater ial done? Was the purchase orders put in place ? You know, those kinds of thi ng s. B ut to loo k be y on d that, to loo k a t the too lin g , to loo k a t the e qu ipm e nt, to look at the fix tures, to look at the desig n and question what thi s was goingto mean to t he pla nt, wh a t it

wa s g oin g to m e an to the too lin g , what it wa s g oin g to m e an to the equipment, what it was going to mean to the financial bottom line. She did not compre hend and she couldn’t ask those que stions. Iwould conclude that Conti fails t o demonstrate her prima fac ie case because she cannot pr ove that she shouldere d the same r esponsibiliti es as Ma nag er a s did Pannucci as Dir ector
. III
. I respe c tf u ll y d is s e n t f r o m t h e ma jo r it y ’ s d e c is io nto r e v e r s e th e d is tr ic t c o u rt o nConti’s dis c ov e ry c la im a nd summa ry jud g me nt c la im.