alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Case 2:15-cr-00015-RSL Document 1 Filed 02/02/15 Page 1 of 1

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 379 filed 02/09/15 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

 

WILLIAM M. McCOOL 700 STEWART ST, SUITE 2310 

CLERK SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101

February 4, 2015 

Office of the Clerk 

Alfred A. Arraj United States Courthouse 

901 19th Street, Room A105 

Denver, CO 80294-3589

RE: Probation Jurisdiction Transfer of John Phillip Gallegos

 Our Case 2:15-cr-00015-RSL 

 Your Case 11-cr-00355-MSK-02 

Dear Office of the Clerk: 

Enclosed please find an original signed order accepting the jurisdiction transfer of defendant John 

Phillip Gallegos to the Western District of Washington. Please forward certified copies of the 

docket sheet, indictment or information, judgment, and plea agreement on this individual so that we 

may statistically terminate our file. 

Additionally, please forward copies of the payment history and, if restitution is involved, names and 

addresses of victims. 

 Sincerely, 

 WILLIAM M. McCOOL, Clerk 

 By: Rachel Evans, Deputy Clerk 

Enclosures 

cc: USPO 

 file

Case 2:15-cr-00015-RSL Document 2 Filed 02/04/15 Page 1 of 1

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 379 filed 02/09/15 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01756-DME-MJW

MARCUS L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

WOOLSTON, Vocational Instructor, and

LIKEN, Education Department,

Defendants.

MINUTE ORDER

Entered by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe

It is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Make Inquiry Into Order

(Docket No. 75) by the Court as to the Status of Appointment of Counsel (Docket No.

109) is denied. 

This court previously advised plaintiff “that the granting of his request for

appointed counsel does not necessarily mean an attorney will appear on his behalf in

this case. . . . This Order [granting plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel] merely

gives the attorneys on the pro bono panel notice that this case might be appropriate for

pro bono representation and gives them an opportunity to volunteer their time to assist

the plaintiff. . . . [T]his Order does not guarantee that a pro bono attorney will ultimately

appear for the plaintiff . . . .” (Docket No. 75 at 2). Plaintiff’s case has been placed on

the list of civil actions eligible for pro bono counsel. If an attorney is interested in the

possibility of representing plaintiff, plaintiff will be contacted by such attorney. There is

thus no need for the court to ask the Clerk of Court about the status of plaintiff’s

appointment and/or the good faith effort being made by the Clerk of Court.

Date: June 25, 2012

Case 1:11-cv-01756-DME-MJW Document 111 Filed 06/25/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
VI 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1127 

For the relief of Alexandrea S. Banks Desutter and Nicholas S. Banks 

Desutter. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 17, 2007 

Mr. LEVIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Alexandrea S. Banks Desutter and Nicholas 

S. Banks Desutter. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. RELIEF OF ALEXANDREA S. BANKS DESUTTER 

4 AND NICHOLAS S. BANKS DESUTTER. 

5 The adoption of Alexandrea S. Banks Desutter and 

6 Nicholas S. Banks Desutter by their grandmother, Sue 

7 Ellen Desutter, shall be deemed to have satisfied the re8 quirements of section 216(e) of the Social Security Act 

9 (42 U.S.C. 416(e)) for purposes of establishing the entitle10 ment of Alexandrea S. Banks Desutter and Nicholas S. 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
2 

•S 1127 IS

1 Banks Desutter to survivors insurance benefits based on 

2 the wages and self-employment income of their grand3 father, Thomas A. Desutter, under section 202(d) of that 

4 Act (42 U.S.C. 402(d)). The date of such entitlement shall 

5 be based on the application for benefits dated October 1, 

6 2003. 

Æ 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
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Case 1:11-cv-02370-CMA-MJW Document 12 Filed 11/04/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
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```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1696 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H.R. 1696

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                 May 16 (legislative day, May 15), 2001

                                Received

                              May 21, 2001

    Read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 
                               Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To expedite the construction of the World War II memorial in the 
                         District of Columbia.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXPEDITED COMMENCEMENT BY AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS 
              COMMISSION OF CONSTRUCTION OF WORLD WAR II MEMORIAL.

    Section 2113 of title 36, United States Code, as added by section 
601(a) of the Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits Act (Public 
Law 106-117; 113 Stat. 1576), is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
    ``(i) Congressional Direction to Commence Construction.--(1) The 
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), the Commemorative Works Act (40 U.S.C. 1001 et 
seq.), and all other laws pertaining to the siting and design for the 
World War II memorial having been met, the Commission shall 
expeditiously proceed with the construction of the World War II 
memorial at the dedicated Rainbow Pool site in the District of 
Columbia.
    ``(2) The construction of the World War II memorial authorized by 
paragraph (1) shall be consistent with--
            ``(A) the final architectural submission made to the 
        Commission of Fine Arts and the National Capital Planning 
        Commission on June 30, 2000, as supplemented on November 2, 
        2000; and
            ``(B) such reasonable construction permit requirements as 
        may be required by the Secretary of the Interior, acting 
        through the National Park Service.
    ``(3) The decision to construct the World War II memorial at the 
dedicated Rainbow Pool site, decisions implementing this subsection, 
and decisions regarding the design for the World War II memorial are 
final and conclusive and shall not be subject to administrative or 
judicial review.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 15, 2001.

            Attest:

                                                 JEFF TRANDAHL,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
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**C H**  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 2 3 - 0463 CITY OF BOZEMAN ,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SHEA TARYN SAMPSON ,

Defendant and Appellant.

**GRANT OF EXTENSION** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30 - day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is granted an extension of time to and including December 31 , 202 3 , within which to prepare, file, and serve the State’s response brief

.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court November 29 2023

11/29/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0463
196 La. 156

#### STATE v. WILSON.

No. 35991.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 1940.

Eugene Stanley, Atty. Gen., and J. Bernard Cocke, Dist. Atty., and Beuker F. Amann, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of New Orleans, for the State, appellee.

M. E. Culligan and Lawrence Michel, both of New Orleans, for defendant, appellant.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

The defendant stands convicted of a felony and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary for two years. In a motion for a new trial he pleaded that the State had not offered any evidence whatever to prove a certain alleged fact, the proof of which was essential to a valid conviction of the crime charged in the bill of information. The motion was overruled and a bill of exception was reserved.

The evidence that was offered before the jury consists of the testimony of five witnesses for the State, and is very brief The defendant did not offer any evidence. All of the testimony of the five witnesses for the State is annexed to and forms part of the defendant’s motion for a new trial and his bill of exception. The evidence tends to prove affirmatively — especially by certain circumstances which were proved by the State’s witnesses and are not disputed — that the crime charged was not committed. It is sufficient, however, to say that there was no evidence whatever of the fact which the defendant contends was not proved, and the proof of which was essential to a valid conviction of the crime with which he was charged and of which he was convicted. In a case where the jury has convicted the defendant on some evidence on which the jury might have concluded that he committed the crime, the appellate court has not jurisdiction to decide whether the evidence was sufficient; but, where a conviction is *890had without any evidence at all of a certain fact the proof of which is essential to a valid conviction, the error is an error of law, which the appellate court must correct. State v. Wells, 147 La. 822, 86 So. 268; State v. Edwards, 155 La. 305, 99 So. 229; State v. Gani, 157 La. 231, 102 So. 318; State v. Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429; State v. Dunnington, 157 La. 369, 102 So. 478. The same rule is applicable to cases tried by the judge without a jury. State v. Rogers, 152 La. 905, 94 So. 439; State v. Bush, 156 La. 973, 101 So. 382; State v. Gremillion, 160 La. 121, 106 So. 716; State v. Russell, 161 La. 167, 108 So. 324; State v. Daniels, 164 La. 737, 114 So. 636; State v. Singley, 195 La. 519, 197 So. 218.

In the statement per curiam it appears that the judge instructed the jury that the defendant should not be convicted unless the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt the fact which the defendant now contends was not shown by any evidence. We infer from the record that the jury misunderstood the judge’s instruction and committed an error of law in finding the defendant guilty.

The verdict and sentence are annulled and the case is ordered remanded to the criminal district court for a new trial.
#### In the Matter of the Application of Pasquale Fierro, Petitioner. Rita Ljubicich, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County,

January 18, 1957.

*Evelyn R. Lawrence*for petitioner.

*William James Lubich*for respondent.

Walter R. Hart, J.

Petitioner, Pasquale Fierro, by writ of habeas corpus, seeks custody of a child born out of wedlock to Genevieve Diamond and himself on July 14, 1954. The mother of the infant died as the result of an accident on October 31, 1956. The infant, at the present time, is in the custody of respondent, the sister of the deceased mother.

Certain definite principles have been established to guide the courts in deciding custody of a child where that issue is raised by habeas corpus proceedings. The first and basic one is the welfare and best interests of the child *(Matter of*Lee, 220 N. Y. 532; *Finlay*v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429). However, “No court *203can, for any but the gravest reasons, transfer a child from its natural parent to any other person (* * * *People ex rel. Hausler*v. *Stegmeier,*240 App. Div. 901, affd. 264 N. Y. 483; *Matter of Thorne,*240 N. Y. 444; Domestic Relations Law, § 81), since the right of a parent, under natural law, to establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental one and beyond the reach of any court *(Meyer*v. *Nebraska,*262 U. S. 390, 399).” *(People ex rel. Portnoy*v. *Strasser,*303 N. Y. 539, 542.)

The rule above set forth “ applies to illegitimate, as well as legitimate, children ” *(People ex rel. Meredith*v. *Meredith,*272 App. Div. 79, 82, affd. 297 N. Y. 692).

It is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that on the death of the mother the natural father is entitled to custody of an illegitimate child if he is a fit person. *(Guardianship of Smith,*42 Cal. 2d 91; 37 A. L. R. 2d 867, and annotations thereto; *People ex rel. Meredith*v. *Meredith, supra.)*

Upon the hearing of this writ respondent attempted to establish that petitioner, the father, was not a fit person to have custody of the child. The evidence adduced fell short of its mark and did not, in the court’s opinion, impugn the character of the respondent or his fitness to be a proper and suitable repository of the custody of his child. Though the court was highly impressed by the respondent, her mother and sisters, it feels constrained under the circumstances and by law to sustain the writ.

Respondent is hereby directed to deliver the infant forthwith to the custody of the petitioner. Submit order on notice.
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Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 12Federal Reserve Bank of: San FranciscoFilings received during the week ending February 17, 2018FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodALLEGIANT UNITED HOLDINGS, LLC                                                                                          * 3A1Allegiant United Holdings, LLC and Nano Financial Holdings, Inc., both of Irvine, California, propose to become bank holding companies through Nano Financial Holdings, Inc. acquiring 100 percent of the outstanding common stock of Commerce Bank of Temecula Valley, Murrieta, California.Newspaper: Not availableFederal Register: 03/15/2018HERITAGE BANK OF COMMERCE                                                                                               * 18C
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EXHIBIT 23

 

 

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S CONSENT

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (File Nos. 33-61949, 33-52786, 33-36609 and 33-23837) of the A.G. Edwards, Inc. 1988 Incentive Stock Plan on Form S-8 of our report dated April 18, 2001,appearing in and/or incorporated by reference in the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of A.G. Edwards, Inc. for the year ended February 28, 2001.

 

 

 

 

 

 

June 6, 2001

St. Louis, Missouri
EXHIBIT 32.2

 

**CERTIFICATION**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Media Sciences International, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified (the “Report”), I, Kevan D. Bloomgren, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

 
| (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 
| (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

Date:  May 14, 2009

 
|   | /s/ Kevan D. Bloomgren  |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Kevan D. Bloomgren      |
|   | Chief Financial Officer |