NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 13

- 3256

___________ LYNN A. VAN TASSEL ,

Appellant

v. HONORABLE JOHN W. HODGE , Judge, Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, in his official and individu al capacities ; HONORABL E THOMAS M. PICCIONE , Judge Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, in his official and individual capacities; LAWRENCE COUNTY DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTIONS; TRACY HROMYAK , Director of the Lawrence County Domestic Section in her offici al and individual capacities ; JOSHUA LAMACUSA , District Attorney of Lawrence County in his official and individual capacities ; DISTRICT ATTORNEY LAWRENCE COUNTY; LAWRENCE COUNTY ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE DEPARTMENT;

JAMES E. MANOLIS , Esquire ; ARTHUR R. VA N TASSEL

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ( W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2

- 13

- cv
- 00024 ) District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry

_________________________________ ___ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 1, 2014 Before: CHAGARES, GARTH and SLOVITER , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : May 5, 2014 )

___________ OPINION

___________PER CURIAM

Lynn Van Tassel (“ Lynn ”) , proceeding pro se , appeals an order of the Uni ted States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing her declaratory judgment action pursuant to Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. , 515 U.S. 277 (1995)

. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court, but on other grounds. See Revell v. Port Authority of New York, New Jersey , 5 98 F.3d 128 , 136 n.13 (3d Cir. 20 10 ) (noting that this Court may affirm on other ground s so long as the record supports the judgment ). In 2007 and 2008, Lynn filed praecipes for judgment against her former husba n d, Arthur Van Tassel, for child support arrearages in the Lawrence County, Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas. 1 Arthur Van Ta ssel disputed the judgments. T he trial court
found that the entries of judgment were improper and that Lynn ’s conduct in the
pro ceedings had been vexatious. I n an order entered June 23, 2008, the trial court
ordered Lynn to pay Arthur Van Tassel ’s attorneys ’ fees. Lynn appeal ed, but the appeal

was quashed as untimely

. Lynn also filed a civil rights action in federal court that w as dismissed on several grounds, including the Rooker

- Feldman 2 doctrine. W e affirmed.
Van Tassel v. Lawrence Co unty Dom. Rel. Sections , et al. , 390 F. App’x 201 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ( non
- precedential decision).

1 Like the Dis trict Court, we base our account of the procedural background on the state court decisions included in the record.

2 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983).Lynn did not comply with the June 2 3, 2008 o rder

. On November 30, 2009, t he

trial court ordered that she pay additional attorneys ’ fees in a contempt proceeding

. T he Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Superior Court also granted Arthur Van
Tassel ’s request for fees and costs in a n other appeal taken by Lynn

. The trial court
determined the amount of fees owed in an order issued May 24, 2010

. On December 21, 2010, Lynn was again found in contempt and , among other things, was sentenced to 90 days in jail . Although Lynn was permitted to pay the fees owed in lieu of going to jail , she did not do so

. Lynn failed to report to jail in November 2011 and was arrested. She

was afforded house arrest and release d in J anuary 2012

. In January 2013, Lynn filed the present declaratory ju dgmen t action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2201. She filed an Amended C omplaint on March 22, 2013. Lynn sought
declarations that 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § § 2503 (7) and (9), and Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 2744 and 2741(1), the statute and rules under whic h attorneys ’ fees and costs were imposed, are unconstitutional as applied in her case. Lynn also sought a declaration that the Pennsylvania State Intermediate Punishment Program, under which she was afforded house arrest, is unconstitutional as applied in her case. She also requested other relief that the court may dee m proper, “ including return o f her ‘extorted’
monies . . . .” Am Compl. at 24. The defendants, including state court judges , the Lawrence County Domestic
Relations Section (“DRS”) , Arthu r Van Tassel, and others, moved to dismiss the
Amended C omplaint on various grounds. T he District Court declined to exercisejurisdiction over Lynn ’s action pursuant to Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. , 515 U.S. 277

(1995) . T he District Court noted , among other things, that many actions had been litigated or remained pending related to the child support obligation and that the issues
involved are fundamentally based on state law. The District Court also denied Lynn ’s
motion for reconsideration. This appeal fol lowed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District
Court’s decision for abuse of discretion

. Wilton , 515 U.S. at 289.
Wilton addressed the standard governing a district court’s decision to stay a declaratory judgment act ion in favor of parallel state litigation. Id. at 281. The Supreme
Court applied its decision in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America , 316 U.S. 491 (1942), which established that a district court has discretion to determine whether to
entertain a decl aratory judgment action where another suit is pending in state court presenting the same issues of state law between the same parties. Wilton , 515 U.S. at
282

- 83. Recognizing the limited nature of its holding, the Supreme Court stated that it
held “only that the District Court acted within its bounds in staying [an] action for declaratory relief where parallel proceedings, presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues, were underway in state court.” Id. at 290. W e have stated that
Wilton allows a federal court to abstain from deciding a declaratory judgment claim if that court “believes that the state law questions in controversy between the parties are
better suited for resolution in state court.” Marshall v. Lauriault , 372 F.3d 1 75, 184 (3dCir. 2004). See also State Auto Ins. Co. v. Summy , 234 F.3d 131, 134

- 35 (3d Cir. 2001)

( recognizing same).
We are unable to conclude on the present record that Wilton applies here. It is not
clear that Lynn ’s present claims are pending in state court. Lynn has stated that she has two appeals pending in state court and that her support litigation is ongoing , but the
record does not reflect the nature of her pending claims

. See Marshall , 372 F.3d at 184 ( noting court’s inability to determi ne application of Wilton / Brillhart w ithout state court complaints)

. Lynn also does not seek a declaratory judgment on a question of state law , but declaration s that the state statute and court rules under which she was sanctioned

were applied in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution , and
that the use of the intermediate punishment program to effectuate her house arrest
violated the Due Process Clause

. See Am. Compl. at 19

- 23. The Wilton court did not
address whether its deci sion applies to cases raising issues of federal law. Wilton , 515
U.S. at 290. See also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River

- Black River Regulating Dist. , 673 F.3d 84, 105 (2d Cir. 2012) ( holding Wilton was inapplicable
where case rais ed claim gover ned solely by federal law )

. While we are unable to conclude that the District Court properly declined to
entertain Lynn ’s Amended C omplaint under Wilton , the Appellees assert in their brief s that the Amended C omplaint should be dismissed under the Rook er
- Feldman doctrine. We agree. Under Rooker

- Feldman , federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that

are essentially appeals from state

- court judgments. Great W estern Mining & Mineral Co.v. F ox Rothschild LLP , et al. , 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Ci r. 2010). The doctrine requires

that “ (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘ complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state

- court judgments ’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaint iff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments. ” Id. at 166 ( quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) )

. T hese requirements are met here. Lynn lost in state court when she was
sanctioned on June 23, 2008 and when she was assessed fees and costs on May 24, 2010. Lynn complains of injur ies caused by the state court’s orders. Lynn c laims that “the court’s action in sanctioning” her , the court’s “assessment of additional attorney’s fees”

un der the appellate rules, and the court’s “ order [ ing ] Plaintiff into the [intermediate punishment program]” were un constitutional

. See also Great Western , 615 F.3d at 167. 3
These orders were issued before Lynn filed her decl aratory judgment action and she
invite s the District C ourt to reject them. Lynn does not attack the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute and rules , but the state court’s application of th e statute and rules to
the facts of her case. See Alvarez v Att’y Gen. , 679 F.3d 1257, 12 63 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding Rooker

- Feldman barred an as
- applied due process claim) ; McKithen v. Brown , 626 F.3d 143, 154

- 55 (2d Cir. 2010) (same)

.

3 Lynn alleges in her Amended Complaint that DRS erred in preparing certificates of arrearages and that Arthur Van Tassel and his lawyer should not have pursued attorneys ’ fees. The Amended Complaint, however, seeks relief based on injuries resulting from the court’s orde rs and its alleged unconstitutional application of state statutes and rules.Accordingly, for the foregoing reason s , we will affirm the judgment of the District

Court.