alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[743 NYS2d 482]

#### In the Matter of Henry Welt, an Attorney, Respondent. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner.

First Department,

June 18, 2002

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Sherry K. Cohen*of counsel *(Thomas J. Cahill,*attorney), for petitioner.

*Lawrence Iason*of counsel *(Morcillo, Abramowitz, Grand, la-son & Silcerberg, P.C.,*attorneys), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Respondent Henry Welt was admitted to the practice of law *155in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on January 15, 1973. At all times relevant, respondent has maintained an office in this Department.

Respondent submits his resignation, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.11, in response to a sua sponte investigation by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department. The Committee commenced this investigation in response to respondent’s former law firm’s disclosure of various acts of professional misconduct by respondent.

In an affidavit of resignation dated April 10, 2002, respondent admits that he received partial reimbursement from his law firm for charitable contributions he claimed he made to a museum, but which he never made. Respondent also avers that he received reimbursement from the firm for a contribution he alleged to have made, but never made, to a charity event and for the cost of conservation of a painting he had displayed in the firm, for which he never paid the payee. Further, respondent states that he sought and received reimbursement from the firm for his wife’s travel expenses involving a personal trip to attend a wedding of a foreign lawyer with whom he developed a relationship. Respondent acknowledges that if charges were predicated upon the misconduct under investigation, he could not successfully defend himself on the merits against those accusations.

The Departmental Disciplinary Committee now moves for an order, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.11, accepting respondent’s resignation and striking his name from the roll of attorneys effective immediately.

Since respondent’s affidavit of resignation acknowledges his professional misconduct and properly conforms to the requirements set forth in Rules of this Court (22 NYCRR) § 603.11, insofar as respondent offers his resignation freely and voluntarily, without coercion or duress, and that he is fully aware of the implications of submitting his resignation, the motion should be granted.

Accordingly, respondent’s resignation should be accepted and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York, nunc pro time to April 10, 2002.

Williams, P.J., Nardelli, Rosenberger, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ., concur.

Respondent’s resignation accepted and respondent’s name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselor-at-law in the *156State of New York, nunc pro tunc to April 10, 2002. Motion No. *6402*deemed withdrawn.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02323-BNB-KMT

DEJA FRANKS,

Plaintiff,

v.

NORTH AMERICAN ASSET SERVICES, LLC d/b/a FRONTIER FINANCIAL GROUP,

INC., 

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

______________________________________________________________________________

I am informed that this matter has been resolved by the plaintiff’s acceptance of the

defendant’s offer of judgment. The offer of judgment provides that the judgment shall include

the plaintiff’s “reasonable attorney’s fees now accrued through the date of service of this 

Offer . . ., as agreed to between counsel for the parties, or if they are unable to agree, as

determined by the Court upon motion. . . .” Offer of Judgment [Doc. # 43-1].

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The plaintiff shall file a fee application, if at all, on or before May 24, 2012. The

application must fully comply with the requirements of D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3.

(2) The defendant shall respond to the fee application on or before May 31, 2012.

(3) A hearing on the fee application is set for June 7, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., in

Courtroom 401, 4th floor, Alfred A. Arraj United States Courthouse, 901 19th Street, Denver,

Colorado. Counsel and parties must attend the hearing in person.

(4) The hearing will be vacated upon notice from the parties that the issue of

Case 1:11-cv-02323-BNB-KMT Document 45 Filed 05/10/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
2

attorney’s fees and costs has been resolved and the filing of a joint stipulation of the amount of

attorney’s fees and costs to be added to the judgment entered.

Dated May 10, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

 s/ Boyd N. Boland 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02323-BNB-KMT Document 45 Filed 05/10/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 982 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                     February 14, 2008.
    Resolved, That House Resolution 979 and House Resolution 980 are hereby 
adopted.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gardel Morales, Appellant.

[807 NYS2d 142]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme *625Court, Kings County (D’Emic, J.), rendered June 12, 2002, convicting him of arson in the second degree and assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The standard for analyzing whether a statement made prior to the administration of *Miranda*warnings *(see Miranda v Arizona,*384 US 436 [1966]) was the product of custodial interrogation is whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought that he or she was free to leave the presence of the police *(see People v Yukl,*25 NY2d 585 [1969], *cert denied*400 US 851 [1970]; *see also People v Centano,*76 NY2d 837; *People v Boyle,*239 AD2d 512 [1997]). Applying this standard and considering all of the relevant circumstances, we find that an innocent person in the defendant’s position would not have believed that he or she was free to leave while being questioned by fire marshals about a suspected arson. Accordingly, the hearing court should have suppressed the inculpatory statements that the defendant made to the fire marshals before he was advised of his constitutional rights *(see People v Vachet,*5 AD3d 700 [2004]; *People v Macklin,*202 AD2d 445 [1994]). Moreover, since there was no definite, pronounced" break between the statements that preceded the *Miranda*warnings and the additional statements that the defendant made immediately after the fire marshals advised him of his rights, all of the defendant’s statements to the fire marshals should have been suppressed *(see People v Bethea,*67 NY2d 364 [1986]; *People v Chapple,*38 NY2d 112 [1975]; *People v Vachet, supra; People v Rifkin,*289 AD2d 262 [2001]).

However, we reject the defendant’s contention that the hearing court should also have suppressed the videotaped confession that he subsequently gave to law enforcement officials. The videotaped confession, which the defendant made approximately 14 hours after all questioning by the fire marshals came to an end, and after *Miranda*warnings had again been administered, was sufficiently attenuated to remove any taint from the earlier questioning *(see People v Vachet, supra; People v Rifkin, supra; People v James,*253 AD2d 438 [1998]; *People v Schultz,*187 AD2d 466 [1992]), and was thus properly admitted at trial. In light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including the videotaped confession, the error in failing to suppress his earlier statements to the fire marshals was harmless *(see People v Vachet, supra; People v Thompson,*296 AD2d 513 [2002]; *People v Rifkin, supra).*

*626The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Cozier, J.P., Krausman, Goldstein and Lunn, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

November 20, 2012

t1113

Order 

November 20, 2012

145775

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 145775

COA: 310730 

Jackson CC: 10-006154-FH

PATRICK ALAN GIDDIS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 3, 2012 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### In the Matter of Daniel C., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Warren County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Connie D., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Debra C., Appellant, v Connie D. et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 2.) (And Another Related Proceeding.)

[810 NYS2d 227]

Mercure, J.P.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Warren County (Breen, J.), entered March 15, 2005, which, inter alia, dismissed petitioner’s application, in proceeding No. 2 pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, for custody of the subject child.

In October 2004, petitioner Warren County Department of Social Services (hereinafter DSS) temporarily removed the child *1046(born in 2004) from the custody of his mother, and commenced proceeding No. 1 pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, alleging that she had neglected the child. After a fact-finding hearing at which the mother failed to appear, Family Court sustained the allegations. Although the father was incarcerated at that time, he was later released from prison and petitioned for custody of the child. In addition, petitioner Debra C. (hereinafter petitioner), the child’s aunt, commenced proceeding No. 2 pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, also seeking custody. Following a dispositional hearing, Family Court denied the petitions for custody and determined that the child’s best interest would be served by his placement with DSS in foster care for a one-year period. Petitioner now appeals,* asserting that Family Court abused its discretion by failing to award custody to her. We disagree.

In any custody case, the primary consideration is the best interest of the child, and Family Court’s factual findings in that regard will not be disturbed upon appeal unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record *(see e.g. Matter of Fletcher v Young,*281 AD2d 765, 767 [2001]; *Matter of Schmidt v Schmidt,*234 AD2d 465, 466 [1996], *lv denied*89 NY2d 816 [1997]). Here, the record reflects that petitioner and her live-in boyfriend are both unemployed, disabled and unable to lift more than 15-20 pounds. A child protective services supervisor testified that petitioner’s home was found to be dirty and unkempt during an unannounced visit. Although the child has asthma and is sensitive to cigarette smoke and animals, petitioner and her boyfriend keep a number of animals and are cigarette smokers. Under these circumstances, we conclude that there is a sound and substantial basis in the record for Family Court’s conclusion that awarding custody to petitioner would not be in the child’s best interest *(see Matter of Meyers v Halladay,*242 AD2d 887, 887 [1997]; *Matter of Schmidt v Schmidt, supra*at 466; *cf. Matter of Harold EE. v Roger EE.,*17 AD3d 730, 731 [2005]; *Matter of Fletcher v Young, supra*at 767; *see generally Matter of Breitung v Trask,*279 AD2d 677, 679-680 [2001]).

Peters, Carpinello, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.

*

 Both DSS and the Law Guardian state that the father violated his parole and has been returned to prison.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          11,590
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   20,630
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                40,173
<PP&E>                                          27,912
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  86,330
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           12,562
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            17 
<OTHER-SE>                                      63,787
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    86,330
<SALES>                                         23,871
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                23,871
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   20,797
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 105
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,273
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,333
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,940
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .12
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT
      32.1






CERTIFICATION






Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350, as
      adopted), the undersigned, Charles J. Drake, Chairman of the Board and Chief
      Executive Officer of Integral Vision, Inc. (the *“Company”* ),
      hereby
      certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:






1. **** The
      Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2005
      (the *“Periodic
      Report”* ),
      to
      which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and






2. **** The
      information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition of the Company at the end of the period
      covered by the Periodic Report and results of operations of the Company for
      the
      period covered by the Periodic Report.




Date: April
                5, 2006
              By:
              /S/ Charles
                J. DrakeCharles
                  J. Drake
                Chairman of the Board and
                Chief Executive
                  Officer


42
#### Carol Ann Thomas, Appellant, v Leonard Smith et al., Respondents.

[808 NYS2d 745]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.), dated October 19, 2004, which granted the separate motions of the defendants, Leonard Smith and Foumba Limo Car Service and Rental Corp., Cory Jenkins and Clifford Jenkins, and Salvator Cento, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motions are denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

The defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345, 350 [2002]; *cf. Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 957 [1992]). The opinions of the defendants’ examining physicians were belied by those physicians’ own findings of the plaintiffs restrictions of range of motion, which, when compared to the normal range of motion, contradicted their conclusions that the plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Kaminsky v Waldner,*19 AD3d 370, 371 [2005]; *McDowall v Abreu,*11 AD3d 590, 591 [2004]). In light of the defendants’ failure to meet their initial burden, we need not consider whether the plaintiffs papers were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Black v Robinson,*305 AD2d 438, 439 [2003]; *Coscia v 938 Trading Corp.,*283 AD2d 538 [2001]; *Chaplin v Taylor,*273 AD2d 188 [2000]; *Mariaca-Olmos v Mizrhy,*226 AD2d 437, 438 [1996]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Krausman, Rivera and Lifson, JJ., concur.
Annual Microprocessor Price Index,2007,100.0002008,59.1452009,39.6672010,21.2612011,15.851See notes on data sources and index construction in accompanying text file.,
174 La. 803

#### J. P. BARNETT CO., Inc., v. LUDEAU.

No. 31090.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 25, 1932.

J. Hugo Dore, of Ville Platte, and Dubuis-son & Dubuisson, of Opelousas, for appellant.

Lewis & Lewis, of Opelousas, for appellee.

ST. PAUL, J.

Plaintiff sues for losses incurred on an alleged joint adventure in cotton. Defendant admits that there was such a joint adventure, but claims that it was between himself and J. P. Barnett individually, not with the J. P. Barnett Company. He further claims that said agreement was dissolved in the first three days of the season.

I.

The claim that the agreement was with Barnett individually is unfounded. At the time it was made Barnett had ceased for many years to operate individually in cotton, and had incorporated his business as the Barnett Company of which he was the sole owner and exclusive manager; and this was well known to defendant. The fact that Mr. Barnett signed the letter relating to the agreement in his individual name is readily explained by the fact he was then on his vacation and wrote on the stationery of the hotel at which he was then stopping, 1⁄8 mere informal confirmation of an oral agreement previously made.

Nor is there any merit in the claim that .the agreement was dissolved at the beginning of the cotton season. Defendant testifies it was, but this is denied by Barnett. And the following letter addressed to Barnett by defendant shows that this was only an afterthought, to wit:

“Referring to our recent telephone conversation regarding the statement you sent me on the Evangeline cotton I beg leave to say that I positively refuse to recognize this account as our joint account. *A joint account should he 1oept separate from any other account;*consequently I refuse to pay anything on the "statement furnished me.” (Italics ours.)

Had there been no joint, account between the parties, or had same been abrogated, it would have been so easy to say so instead of merely complaining of *the form, m which the account loas Icept.*

II.

The total loss on the joint adventure was $8,932.37. But defendant complains, and we think justly, of an item of $2,361.22 of *interest.*

There is nothing in the evidence either as to any agreement or as to any custom which would allow plaintiff interest on its advances, either at the rate charged (8 per cent.) or at any other rate; nor is there any evidence that plaintiff paid out said interest to any one else. This item must therefore be disallowed, and the judgment below amended accordingly.

*842Decree.

For the reasons assigned the judgment appealed from is amended by reducing the amount allowed plaintiff to $3,285.57, with legal interest from judicial demand until paid. Plaintiff to pay costs of appeal, and defendant to pay all other costs.
H. Res. 999 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

February 26, 2008. 

Resolved, That the following named Member be, and is 

hereby, elected to the following standing committee of the 

House of Representatives: 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Ms. Lee. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 11, 2021

No. 04-21-00146-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.M. AND M.J.C., CHILDREN,

From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020-PA-00682

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant has filed a motion for a twenty-day extension of time to file a brief. We grant the 

motion and order appellant’s brief filed by June 29, 2021. This is an accelerated appeal of an 

order in a suit for termination of the parent-child relationship that must be disposed of by this 

court within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal was filed in the trial court. See TEX. R. JUD.

ADMIN. 6.2. 

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 11th day of June, 2021.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
**Exhibit 10.3.7**

 

AMENDMENT NUMBER SEVENTO THEFIRSTBANK PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN

 

WHEREAS,FirstBank has changed its name to AccessBank; and

 

WHEREAS,Section 1.3.1(b] of the FirstBank Profit Sharing and Employee Stock OwnershipPlan (the “Plan”) provides that the Company may amend the Plan.

 

NOW THEREFORE,the Company hereby amends the Plan by the adoption of following amendments:

 

*1.                   Thename of the Plan is amended to read the “AccessBank Profit-Sharing and Employee**Stock Ownership Plan,” effective**June1, 2004.*

 

***2.                  ****Any **inconsistentprovisions**of the Plan shall be read consistent with this **amendment.***

 

IN WITNESSWHEREOF, the undersigned officers being duly authorized by the Board ofDirectors of AccessBank and Access Anytime Bancorp, Inc., hereby approve andadopt this Amendment as of the date first set forth below.

 

 
|   | ACCESSBANK                    |
|--------|-------------------------------|
|   | By:                           |    /s/   Don  K. Padgett |   |
|   | Title:                        | President |   |
|   | Date:                         | 06-25-04 |   |
|   |                          |   |
|   |                          |   |
|   | ACCESS  ANYTIME BANCORP, INC. |
|   | BY:                           |    /s/   N.R.  Corzine |   |
|   | Title:                        | Chairman |   |
|   | Date:                         | 06-25-04 |   |
|        |                               |  |  |  |

 

----