alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
AMENDED EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT





Agreement
entered into as of this 15 day of January 2006, between J. Robert
Saron  (“Employee”) and Bovie Medical Corporation,
(“Employer”)





WHEREAS, the parties have
heretofore entered into an Employment Agreement (the “Agreement”) dated February
1, 2000, as the same has been amended pursuant to the Board Resolutions dated
January 23, 2002, January 6, 2004; and November 15, 2006; and





WHEREAS, the parties are
desirous of memorializing the effect of the aforementioned resolutions and
further amending said Agreement on the terms hereinafter set forth.





NOW THEREFORE, in
consideration of the premises and covenants herein contained,





IT
IS HEREBY AGREED:





1.
            Paragraph
      3 of the Agreement is hereby amended in its entirety to read as
      follows:





TERM:
The initial term of employment under this Agreement shall be effective as of the
1st
day of February, 2000, and shall continue until January 31, 2011 or until
terminated as hereinafter provided. After January 31, 2009, the term of this
Agreement shall be automatically extended for continuous terms of one year each
unless the Employer provides the Employee with written notice of termination at
least nine months prior to the date the Employer plans to
terminate.





2.
            Except
      as amended hereby, the Agreement is hereby ratified and
      approved.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties
have set forth their signatures this ____ day of November, 2006.





BOVIE
      MEDICAL CORPORATIONBy:
                    /S/ Andrew MakridesAndrew
      Makrides, President/S/ J. Robert SaronJ.
      Robert
Saron
#### The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, *v.*James Carroll, Defendant.

County Court, Queens County,

January 22, 1957.

*Frank R. Klein*for defendant.

*Frank D. O’Connor, District Attorney (Morton Greenspan*of counsel), for plaintiff.

Alfred J. Hofmann, J.

This is a motion on behalf of the defendant, for an order granting an inspection of the minutes taken before the Grand Jury of the County of Queens or in the alternative, for an order dismissing the indictment herein.

The defendant is indicted for violation of section 1053-a of the Penal Law and driving while intoxicated as a misdemeanor under an indictment filed November 30,1956.

That part of the motion which requests an order granting inspection of the Grand Jury minutes is denied.

The defendant, under the first count, is charged with operating and driving a car in a reckless and culpable and negligent manner, thereby causing the death of another. The hig'her courts have laid down the rules for interpreting the two phrases ££ reckless driving” and ££ culpable negligence.” *(People*v. *Grogan,*260 N. Y. 138,145.)

“ Reckless driving”, standing by itself, means the running or operation of an automobile under circumstances as to show a reckless disregard of the consequences. “ Culpable negligence ” is something more than the slight negligence necessary to support a civil action for damages. It means a disregard of consequences and indifference to the rights of others. *(People*v. *Gardner,*255 App. Div. 683.)

The court has inspected the Grand Jury minutes. Under section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: £ £ The grand jury ought to find an indictment, when all of the evidence before *278them, taken together, is such as in their judgment would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury.”

From the facts presented to the G-rand Jury, the court finds that there was not such a proof of such reckless and culpably negligent manner in the operation of the defendant’s motor vehicle as would sustain this indictment. Therefore, the first count of this indictment is dismissed.

Order entered accordingly.
EXHIBIT 31.1
CERTIFICATION
   I, Charles J. Drake, certify that:
 1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Integral Vision, Inc.;  2.  Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this annual report;  3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this annual report;  4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and15d-14) for the registrant and we have:
 a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this annual report is being prepared;  b)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual report(the “Evaluation Date”); and  c)  presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;
 5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’sboard of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
 a)  all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controlswhich could adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial data and have identified for the registrant’s auditors any materialweaknesses in internal controls; and  b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls; and
 6.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have indicated in this annual reportwhether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors thatcould significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recentevaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses.
Date: March 29, 2005      /S/ Charles J. Drake   Charles J. Drake   Chief Executive Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIR E

United States of America

V .

Frank Blake

Criminal No . 08-cr-167-01-JD

O R D E R

The assented to motion to reschedule jury trial (document no .

12) filed by defendant is granted . Due to the apparent extensive

discovery in this case, the continuance is granted until July 21,

2009 .

Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights within 10

days . The court finds that the ends of justice served by granting

a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the

defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U .S .C . § 3161 (h) (8) (B) (iv) , for the

reasons set forth in the motion .

SO ORDERED .

/s/Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr .

Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr .

United States District Judge

Date : May 11, 200 9

cc : Mark Howard, Esq .

Donald Feith, Esq .

U .S . Marsha l

U .S . Probation

Case 1:08-cr-00167-JD Document 13 Filed 05/11/09 Page 1 of 1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PHOTOFIXITPRO, INC. ,

Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v.
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION ,

Respondent

- Appellee

. No. 2 3

- 55548

D.C. No. 2:22

- cv - 08955

- PA

- MAA

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson , District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10 , 202 4 ** Pasadena , California
Before: W. FLETCHER , CHRISTEN , and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges

. Appellant PhotoFixItPro, Inc. (PFP) appeals from the district court’s order granting Appellee Costco Wholesale Corporation’s (Costco) Motion to Confirm the
Arbitration Award . W hile we generally have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUN 14 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

1332 , because PFP’s notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

. Subject to narrow exceptions not applicable here, a notice of appeal must be
filed within thirty days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). This “is a nonwaivable jurisdictional requirement.” Stephanie

- Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc. , 476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2007). PFP did not file the operative notice of appeal until ninety

- five days after the entry of the relevant order and judgment , significantly after
the thirty

- da y deadline

. While the notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the order granting fees, requests for attorneys’ fees are collateral to the main action and so “a judgment on the merits is final and appealable even though a request for attorney’s fees is
unresol ved.” Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, & Reinforcing
Ironworker’s Loc. Union 75 v. Madison Indus

. , Inc. , 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984). Nor did the motion for attorneys’ fees automatically toll the time to appeal. Such tolling occurs o nly “if the district court extends the time to appeal under Rule 58,” Nutrition Distrib. LLC v. IronMag Labs, LLC , 978 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iii)) , which the district court did not do here. We therefore lack jurisdiction to hear PFP’s claims.3

The only order we have jurisdiction to review is the order granting attorneys’ fees. Although PFP appealed this order, it failed to raise any arguments regarding fees in its brief and so waived any objections to the fee order. Tri

- Valley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy , 671 F.3d 1113, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Claims not made in an opening brief in a sufficient manner to put the opposing party on notice are deemed waived.”).
DISMISSED
.
|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/ Richard E. Gathright                                          |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Richard      E. Gathright                                         |   |
| Chairman      of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President |
| (Principal      Executive Officer)                                |   |
| May      17, 2010                                                 |   |
|                                                              |   |
| /s/ Michael S. Shore                                              |   |
| Michael      S. Shore                                             |   |
| Chief      Financial Officer, Treasurer and Senior Vice President |
| (Principal      Financial Officer)                                |   |
| May      17, 2010                                                 |   |

----
#### In the Matter of Dana Marie L., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Deborah L., Appellant.

[745 NYS2d 481]

In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, the *500mother appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition (one paper) of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Freundlich, J.), entered July 23, 2001, which, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, found that she had permanently neglected her child, terminated her parental rights, and transferred custody and guardianship of the child to the Suffolk County Department of Social Services for the purpose of adoption.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing supports the finding of permanent neglect of the child. The Suffolk County Department of Social Services established by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent attempts to assist the mother in her rehabilitation. However, although the mother made progress for a period of time, at some point she began abusing drugs again. Thereafter, the mother denied that she had a drug abuse problem and failed to avail herself of the drug treatment necessary to enable her to regain custody of her child *(see*Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [c]; *Matter of Samantha Bernadette Theresa V.,*287 AD2d 499; *Matter of Maldrina R.,*219 AD2d 723).

In addition, the evidence adduced at the dispositional hearing demonstrated that the child’s best interests would be served by terminating the mother’s parental rights and freeing her for adoption by her foster parents. Santucci, J.P., S. Miller, Goldstein and Townes, JJ., concur.
Paradise Music & Entertainment, Inc.
                         53 West 23rd Street, 11th Floor
                            New York, New York 10010

                                                   October 1, 1999

Mr. Jesse Dylan
President
Consolidated Entertainment, L.L.C.
1520 Second Street, Suite 2
Santa Monica, California 90401

      Re:   Terms of Interim Employment

Dear Jesse:

            You have been acting as the Chairman/Chief Executive Officer of
Paradise Music & Entertainment, Inc. ("Paradise"). In that capacity you have
been providing full time services for the benefit of Paradise.

            Since the commencement of your services Paradise has been
negotiating for the acquisition of Consolidated Entertainment, L.L.C. ("Straw
Dogs"). Among the terms of the Straw Dogs' acquisition are the execution of a
formal employment agreement with you ("Formal Agreement"). The purpose of this
letter is to set forth the terms for the payment to you of compensation for the
period from July 1, 1999 through the closing of the Straw Dogs' acquisition.

            During the interim period you will be paid on the basis of an annual
salary of $750,000.00 per year. Payment of the amounts due to you for the period
from July 1, 1999 through the date hereof shall be made promptly. Thereafter you
shall receive payment based upon the normal payroll periods until the closing of
the Straw Dogs' acquisition. All payments to be made to you will be subject to
all standard deductions for withholding taxes and the like. In order to induce
you to enter into this formal interim agreement you will be paid a one-time
signing bonus of $125,000.00, such amount to be paid subject to applicable
withholding taxes and the like within ten business days from the date hereof.
Upon the closing of the Straw Dogs' acquisition any compensation (other than the
signing bonus) made to you hereunder with respect to the period commencing July
1, 1999 will offset amounts otherwise payable to you under the Formal Agreement.
<PAGE>

            Will you please indicate your acceptance of these terms by signing a
copy of this letter in the space indicated below and returning it to me.

                                              Sincerely,

                                        Paradise Music & Entertainment, Inc.


                                        By:
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Richard Flynn
                                            Chief Financial Officer

Accepted and Agreed:

--------------------------
Jesse Dylan


                                       2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02277-PAB-MJW

JACK DANIEL’S PROPERTIES,

Plaintiff,

v.

BEVERAGE RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Colorado corporation,

JAKK’D HOLDINGS, LLC, , a Colorado limited liability company, and

JACK BARRECA, an individual,

Defendants.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

In accordance with orders filed during the pendency of this case, and pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b), the following Default Judgment is hereby entered.

Pursuant to the Order (Doc #64) of Judge Philip A. Brimmer entered on October

18, 2012 it is

ORDERED that default judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff and

against Defendant Jakk’d Holdings, LLC. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116, defendant Jakk’d

Holdings, LLC and its respective officers, agents, servants, employees, members, and

attorneys, and all other persons in active participation with them, or any of them, who

receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise are permanently

restrained from directly or indirectly: 

Case 1:11-cv-02277-PAB-MJW Document 65 Filed 10/19/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
A. Manufacturing, producing, advertising, promoting, displaying, shipping,

offering for sale, selling, and distributing the “JAKK’D” alcoholic beverages

depicted in [Docket Nos. 1-6, 1-7]; 

B. Using any promotional items or other materials bearing the mark

“JAKK’D,” as depicted in Docket No. 1-8, to advertise or promote alcoholic

beverages;

C. Using the trade name “Jakk’d Holdings, LLC,” the domain names

“getjakkd.com,” “get-jakkd.com” and “jakkd.com,” and maintaining any

domain name containing the mark “jakk’d” in connection with the

manufacture, production, advertisement, promotion, display, shipment,

offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any beverages;

D. Using “JAKK’D,” or any other colorable imitations of plaintiff’s federally

registered marks in connection with the manufacture, production,

advertisement, promotion, display, shipment, offering for sale, sale, or

distribution of any beverages;

E. Performing any other act that is likely to cause persons to believe that

Jakk’d’s goods or commercial activities originate with, or are licensed,

sponsored, or authorized by plaintiff.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 19th day of October, 2012.

FOR THE COURT:

JEFFREY P. COLWELL, CLERK

By: s/Edward P. Butler 

Edward P. Butler

Deputy Clerk

Case 1:11-cv-02277-PAB-MJW Document 65 Filed 10/19/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 7Federal Reserve Bank of: ChicagoFilings received during the week ending April 3, 2010FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodAMES COMMUNITY BANK                                                                                                     * 18C
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 206 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 206

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the child care 
    credit for lower-income working parents, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 3, 2001

 Mr. Sweeney introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the child care 
    credit for lower-income working parents, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Child Care Tax Credit Reform Act of 
2001''.

SEC. 2. CHILD CARE CREDIT AMENDMENTS.

    (a) Increase in Amount of Employment-Related Expenses Taken Into 
Account.--
            (1) 1 qualifying individual.--Paragraph (1) of section 
        21(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to dollar 
        limit on amount creditable) is amended by striking ``$2,400'' 
        and inserting ``$3,600''.
            (2) 2 or more qualifying individuals.--Paragraph (2) of 
        section 21(c) of such Code (relating to dollar limit on amount 
        creditable) is amended by striking ``$4,800'' and inserting 
        ``$5,400''.
    (b) Denial of Credit to Taxpayers Whose Adjusted Gross Income Is 
$50,000 or More.--Paragraph (2) of section 21(a) of such Code (defining 
applicable percentage) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(but not below 20 percent)'' and 
        inserting ``(but not below zero)'', and
            (2) by striking ``1 percentage point for each $2,000 (or 
        fraction thereof)'' and inserting ``1\1/2\ percentage points 
        for each full $2,000''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2000.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Antonio Moore, Appellant.

[745 NYS2d 542]

Appeals by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flaherty, J.), rendered May 5, 2000, convicting him of attempted robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the second degree under Indictment No. 3719/98, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2) an amended judgment of the same court, also rendered May 5, 2000, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon his admission, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon his previous conviction of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, under S.C.I. No. 12053/97. The appeal under Indictment No. 3719/98 brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (O’Dwyer, J.H.O.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment and amended judgment are affirmed.

We agree with the hearing court’s determination that the actions of the police officers in apprehending the defendant were reasonable under the circumstances. The defendant, who matched the general description of a suspect in an attempted robbery with a weapon, which had occurred within an hour earlier, was seen alone only a few blocks away from the crime scene. Once the defendant fled upon the approach of the officers, the officers had reasonable suspicion to pursue him *(see People v Largo,*282 AD2d 548). The momentary use of handcuffs to detain the defendant pending a showup identification by the complainant, fell short of the level of intrusion that constitutes an arrest *(see People v Allen,*73 NY2d 378; *People v Carney,*212 AD2d 721). Finally, the hearing court properly concluded that probable cause to arrest the defendant arose once the complainant identified him *(see People v Johnson,*66 NY2d 398; *People v Evans,*237 AD2d 458). Feuerstein, J.P., O’Brien, Townes and Cozier, JJ., concur.