No. 2--00--0974				 						

___________________________________________________________________

						IN THE

				APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

					SECOND DISTRICT

___________________________________________________________________

BRADLEY D. WOOD,	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court 

	)	of Kane County.

	Plaintiff-Appellee,        )

		)	

v.                              )  No. 98--MR--0342

	)	No. 98--MR--0342

NATIONAL LIABILITY AND FIRE       )

INSURANCE COMPANY,	)

	)	

	Defendant and Third-Party	   )   

	Plaintiff-Appellant		)

		)	Honorable

(Larry Laux, Third-Party	)	Patrick J. Dixon,

Defendant-Appellee).	)	Judge, Presiding.

___________________________________________________________________ 

	JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

	This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment to

plaintiff, Bradley D. Wood, with respect to the limit of liability

insurance extended to him by defendant, National Liability & Fire

Insurance Company (National), and from an order dismissing the

third-party complaint against Larry Laux, the independent insurance

agent who procured the policy.  We affirm.  	

	The following facts are undisputed.  Plaintiff applied for

automobile liability insurance on December 30, 1996, through Laux. 

Wood's application did not contain an election form to reject the

limits of uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage.  Laux

completed the application on Wood's behalf and submitted it to

defendant National.  National issued Wood a policy of insurance on

December 31, 1996, for the period from December 31, 1996, to December 31, 1997, insuring Wood against loss resulting from

liability.  The bodily injury liability policy limit was $350,000.

	National forwarded Wood's application to Transcom, its general

agent.  Transcom notified Laux that the application was incomplete

because it did not include an election form allowing Wood to reject

UM/UIM limits higher than those statutorily required.  According to

Transcom, Wood's UM/UIM limits would automatically be increased to

match the liability limits if the form was not submitted by January

21, 1997.  Laux submitted the form on Wood's behalf the following

day.

	Wood was involved in an automobile accident several months

later and made a UM/UIM claim upon his National policy for the

policy amount of $350,000.  National asserted that, because Wood

rejected the higher amount, his UM/UIM policy coverage was reduced

to the statutory minimums of $20,000/$40,000.  Upon the denial of

his claim, Wood filed this action seeking the reformation of the

insurance contract to reflect the intended limit of $350,000. 

National filed a third-party complaint against Laux, alleging that,

if it was required to pay Wood the higher limit, then Laux was

liable for inappropriately handling the election form.

	Wood filed a motion for summary judgment.  He claimed that the

application process was complete when National accepted his

application and issued him a policy.  Wood also alleged that, even

if the application process was not completed, the election form

that rejected the higher limits did not contain an express

rejection of those limits, and therefore was statutorily

ineffective.  Pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 1998)), Laux filed a motion to

dismiss the third-party complaint, alleging that the duty to obtain

an appropriate rejection of the higher limits was exclusive to the

insurer and that Laux, as an independent agent, had no such duty.

	The trial court agreed with Wood's argument and entered

summary judgment on the complaint for reformation.  Because the

judgment also absolved Laux of any responsibility for the higher

limit, the court granted Laux's motion to dismiss the third-party

complaint.  National timely appeals.

	We begin our analysis by addressing the issue of whether the

trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment and

the motion to dismiss.  A court should enter summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits show there

is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.  735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 1998). 

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only

when the right of the moving party to relief is free from doubt.  Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 271 (1992).  The court must construe the evidence strictly against the

movant and liberally in favor of the opponent.  Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 293 (1990).  Even if the facts are undisputed, if

rational persons could draw different inferences from those facts,

summary judgment is inappropriate.  Stephen v. Swiatkowski, 263 Ill. App. 3d 694, 697 (1994).  

	As with a motion to dismiss, the standard of review of a summary judgment ruling is de novo.  Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1993); Holloway v. Meyer, 311 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822 (2000); Rodgers v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 340, 347 (2000).; Holloway v. Meyer, 311 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822 (2000).  

	National contends that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment because the UM/UIM election form was part of the

application process and therefore fulfills the statutory

requirement that the applicant be provided a place on the

application to reject UM/UIM limits above the statutory minimum. 

National maintains that the application in this case consists of

the four-page document and the UM/UIM election form. 

	National ignores that the linchpin of this case turns on the

salient fact that Wood never rejected the limits before the policy

of insurance was issued in the manner required by statute.  Section

143a--2(1) of the Illinois Insurance Code (Code) (215 ILCS 5/143a--

2(1) (West 1998)) requires that the amount of uninsured motorist

coverage be included in an insurance policy "in an amount equal to

the insured's bodily injury liability limits unless specifically

rejected by the insured."  The statute further provides:

		"(1) *** Each insurance company providing the coverage

must provide applicants with a brief description of the coverage and advise them of their right to reject the coverage

in excess of the [statutory minimum]. ***

		(2) *** [E]very application for motor vehicle coverage must contain a space for indicating the rejection of

additional uninsured motorist coverage.  No rejection of that

coverage may be effective unless the applicant signs or initials the indication of rejection."  (Emphasis added.)  215

ILCS 5/143a--2(1), (2) (West 1998).

Section 143a--2 mandates that the insurer providing coverage advise

the applicants of their right to reject the coverage in excess of

the statutory minimum and that every application must contain a

space for the rejection of additional UM/UIM coverage.  215 ILCS

5/143a--2 (West 1998).  The Code requires insurance policies to be

issued with UM/UIM coverage equal to the liability limits unless

there is a specific rejection of this coverage by the applicant. 

215 ILCS 5/143a--2 (West 1998).  It logically follows that, if the

insurer does not obtain the UM/UIM rejection at the time the policy

is issued, the UM/UIM limits must equal the bodily injury liability

limits.  

	In this case, National does not dispute that the initial

application Wood completed did not contain an election provision

for the rejection of additional UM/UIM coverage.  Nor does National

dispute that the policy of insurance had been issued before the

election form was completed.  Thus, because Wood had not rejected

the limits when the policy of insurance was issued, the UM/UIM

limits, by law, equaled the bodily injury liability limits of the

policy.  See 215 ILCS 5/143a--2 (West 1998).

	Moreover, it is clear that the legislature intended the

application process to cease once an insurance policy is issued. 

In 1990, the legislature modified section 143a--2 so that the word

"applicant" replaced the word "insured."  Pub. Act 86--1156, eff.

August 10, 1990.  Before the change, the "insured" had the right to

elect or reject UM coverage.  In its present form, the statute

"leaves no room for doubt as to whom UM coverage must be

explained."  Messerly v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 277 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1069 (1996).  We believe that the revision makes it clear that the applicant, not the insured, be

provided with a description of the UM coverage and that the

applicant be given an opportunity to reject the coverage.  The

alteration is significant because it is the applicant who needs to

know the extent and amount of his or her coverage before he or she agrees to enter into a contract of insurance.  

	On the date the election form was signed, Wood was no longer

an applicant because he had been issued a policy.  Therefore, the

election form could not serve as a valid rejection of the UM/UIM

coverage.  Because National failed to comply with the mandatory

provisions of the Code, the trial court correctly granted summary

judgment and reformed the contract.  See Nila v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 312 Ill. App. 3d 811 (2000)(insurer required to provide UM coverage equal to the amount of bodily injury coverage

provided by policy since insured never rejected such additional

coverage, regardless of continuous agreement included in policy

issued to deceased husband).

	National argues that the term "application" is not defined

under the Code and this supports its argument that the application

process was "ongoing."  We fail to see the logic of this argument.

No matter how "application" is defined, once the policy was issued,

the application process had ended.  Regardless, we find nothing

that would allow an interpretation of "application" in the manner

National suggests.

	We further find National's reliance on Cloninger v. National General Insurance Co., 109 Ill. 2d 419 (1985), and Meadows v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 237 Ill. App. 3d 240 (1992), in support of its argument that an application can be made up of

various documents, to be misplaced.  The Cloninger court did not refer to three separate documents as making up an "application

process."  The court merely stated that this was the insurance

company's argument.  More importantly, however, unlike in the

present case, neither Cloninger nor Meadows involved an application process that continued after the applied-for policy had been

issued.

	We note that National could have provided a separate document

accompanying the application form.  National could have refrained

from issuing the policy until it had all the documentation it

desired.  Moreover, once the rejection form had been executed,

National could have issued an addendum or a new policy reflecting

the change in UM/UIM limits.  It is clear, however, that National

was under no obligation to issue coverage if the application

process was incomplete, and, having done so, it is in no position

now to claim that the application was not complete until Wood

rejected the UM/UIM limits.  

	Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly granted

summary judgment to Wood.  We further find that the trial court

properly dismissed the complaint against Laux.  Based on our

decision, we need not address the issue of whether the election

form used by National was legally sufficient. 

	Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of

Kane County is affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	MCcLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.