Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2593 | April 20, 2020 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ruth A. Johnson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Evan Matthew Comer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Anthony Epeards,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 20, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2593

Appeal from the Greene Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Erik C. Allen, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

28C01-1901-F4-1

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2593 | April 20, 2020 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] Anthony Epeards (“Epeards”) pleaded guilty to Sexual Misconduct with a 

Minor, as a Level 4 felony,1 and received a nine-year sentence. He now 

appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by omitting 

mitigating factors. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In January 2019, the State charged Epeards with two counts of Level 4 felony 

Sexual Misconduct with a Minor and one count of Level 5 felony Child 

Solicitation.2 A jury trial was scheduled for August 6, 2019, prior to which the 

count of Child Solicitation was dismissed. On the day of the scheduled jury 

trial, Epeards and the State reached a plea agreement under which Epeards 

would plead guilty to one count of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor in 

exchange for dismissal of the remaining count, with sentencing left to the 

discretion of the court. The court then held a change-of-plea hearing at which

Epeards admitted that, when he was twenty-nine years old, he performed or 

submitted to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with fourteen-year-old 

H.G. The trial court accepted the plea and entered a judgment of conviction.

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a).

2

I.C. § 35-42-4-6.
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[3] A sentencing hearing was held in October 2019. At the hearing, there was 

evidence that H.G. struggled with depression and confided in Epeards, who 

was a neighbor of her family member. Epeards and H.G. communicated 

through an online messaging program. In the messages, Epeards called H.G.

his “one and only,” Ex. at 22, and his “sexy baby,” id. at 129. He said that he 

loved her and missed her. At one point, Epeards told H.G., “I really plan on 

giving you a way better life as soon as you’re able to leave.” Id. at 22. He told 

her they would “be able to travel around” and “see stuff and do stuff.” Id. In 

another message, Epeards said, “I really hope your feelings for me never change 

as you get older.” Id. at 25. He assured H.G. that he was “here forever.” Id.

[4] Epeards called several witnesses, and elicited testimony that Epeards had been 

consistently employed and that he was a hard worker and a valued employee.

[5] The court identified two aggravating factors—(1) that Epeards has a criminal 

history and (2) that he “groomed and took advantage of [H.G.] while she was 

in a very vulnerable position.” App. Vol. II at 18. The trial court assigned 

“substantial aggravating weight” to the latter aggravating factor. Id. The court 

also identified one mitigating factor—that Epeards chose to plead guilty. The 

court assigned this mitigating factor minimal weight, noting that Epeards 

waited to plead guilty until the day of the scheduled trial. Determining that the 

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor, the court imposed a nineyear sentence, with six years executed and three years suspended to probation.

[6] Epeards now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2593 | April 20, 2020 Page 4 of 6

Discussion and Decision

[7] Sentencing is principally a discretionary function, and we give “considerable 

deference” to the court’s decision. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 

(Ind. 2008). We review its decision for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs if 

the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances

before the court.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Ind. 2013).

[8] In accordance with Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-3, “[b]efore sentencing a 

person for a felony, the court must conduct a hearing to consider the facts and 

circumstances relevant to sentencing.” If the court identifies aggravating or 

mitigating circumstances, then the court must enter a “statement of the court’s 

reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes.” I.C. § 35-38-1-3. A court 

abuses its sentencing discretion by omitting a mitigating circumstance that is 

“clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration.” Anglemyer v. 

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g. A court need not 

identify every mitigating circumstance, but it must “identify all significant

mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 492-93 (emphasis added). Moreover, a court 

is not obligated to explain why it did not find a circumstance to be significantly 

mitigating. Id. at 493. Furthermore, “[a]n allegation that the trial court failed 

to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the 

mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id.

[9] Here, the court identified two aggravating factors and one mitigating factor. It

imposed an aggravated sentence of nine years, which is within the statutory 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2593 | April 20, 2020 Page 5 of 6

range for a Level 4 felony. See I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5 (setting forth a sentencing 

range of two years to twelve years with an advisory sentence of six years).

[10] Epeards briefly suggests—for the first time in his Reply Brief—that the court

abused its discretion by failing to consider evidence that Epeards has a helping 

nature and is a caring friend. Epeards has waived this argument by raising it for 

the first time in his Reply Brief. See Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1179-80 

(Ind. 2016). Waiver notwithstanding, the circumstances of the offense are that 

Epeards took advantage of a child who confided in him. Thus, we cannot say 

the trial court abused its discretion in its treatment of this character evidence.

[11] Epeards chiefly argues that the trial court should have identified an additional 

mitigating factor—i.e., that Epeards has an “outstanding work ethic” with a 

“steady record as a productive member of society.” Br. of Appellant at 7.

[12] Notably, a court “does not abuse its discretion by declining to find alleged 

mitigating factors that are ‘highly disputable in nature, weight or significance.’” 

Jackson v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1123, 1130-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Rawson 

v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1049, 1056 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. 

Moreover, as this Court has previously observed, “[m]any people are gainfully 

employed such that this would not require the trial court to note it as a 

mitigating factor.” Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2593 | April 20, 2020 Page 6 of 6

[13] Ultimately, the court acted well within its discretion in rejecting the proposed 

employment-related mitigating factor. We discern no abuse of discretion here.3

[14] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.

3 To the extent Epeards suggests that the court improperly weighed the aggravating circumstances and the 

mitigating circumstances, we note that “[t]he relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or 

those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.