### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-01-00575-CV
Sar ah Lo gsdo n/Tho mas H. Mill er , M.D., Appe ll ants
v. Thomas H. Mille r, M.D. and Col umbia/St. Dav

id's Heal thcar e System

d/b/a St. David's Medical Center/Sar ah Logsdon, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 201S T JUDICIAL DIST RICT NO. 99-14401, H ONORABLE CHARLES F. CAMPBELL, JUDGE PRESIDING

Sar ah Lo gsd on a ppe als t he di stri ct c ourt’ s r en

di ti on of a ta ke -nothi ng j udg men t on her medi cal mal practi ce c l ai m s. In two issues , Lo gs do n c o nt en ds t ha t t he dis t r ict co ur t er r ed in gr ant ingsum

ma ry j udgme nt in fav or o f Dr. Thom

as H. Mill er and St. Davi d’s Medi

cal Cen ter. Mi ll er and St. David’s

fi le d cr os s-a ppe als challenging t he dist rict co ur t ’s r uling gr ant ingLog sdon’ s m oti on f orex tens i on of tim e f or fi l i ng h er ex pert m edi cal report pur sua nt t o t he Te xas Me dical Liability and Insuranc e Im

prove men t Act. See Tex. Rev. Ci

v. Stat. An

n. art. 4590i, § 13 .01(d), (f )-(g ) (West Supp. 200 2) . We hold t he dis t r ict co ur t ( i) imp r o pe r ly gran ted sum mary j udgm en t in f av or of M i l l er, ( ii) pr o pe r ly

gr an t ed su mmar y jud gme nt in fa vo ro f St
. Da vid ’s , an d ( iii) di d n ot ab us e i ts d i screti on in allowing Logsd

on to fi l e h er ex pert m edi cal report. A cc ordi

n gl y , w e a f f i rm i n pa rt, rev er se i n pa rt, and reman

d the cause t o t he di strict co urt for further pro ceedings.2 BACKGROUND Log sdon fi l ed sui t agai nst Mi l l er and St . Dav id’s o n Dec ember 1 0, 199 9, alleging
me dic al mal pra cti ceari si ng f rom the de ve l opm

en t of ref l ex sy m path eti c dy

strophy i n h er lef t arm and ha nd f oll owi ng r econ structi

ve j aw surgery

. On the day of the su rgery , Mi l l er, th e a n es th es i ol ogist, and a ci rculati ng nurs e em

ploy ed by S t . Da vid ’s pr ep ar ed Lo gs do n t o un de r go an es t he sia durin g her ja w surgery. The

prepar at ion i nc lud ed po sit io ning , su pp o r t ing , an d p ad din g L o gs do n t o av o id pote nti al com pl i ca ti ons f rom l y i ng sti l l on t he o per at ing t able for a long per iod of t ime. Miller and t he nu r se pla ce d L o gs do n o n he rba ck wit h he rar ms at h er si de , e l b ows strai gh t, and the pal

ms of her han ds faci ng he r hi ps. Af ter t he surgery

, Logsdon woke up f

eel i ng n um bn ess and pai n i n h er lef t arm and han d. Af ter Logsdo n adv

is ed hi m of her symp t o ms, Mille rno t ed in Lo gs do n’s ch ar t his d iag no sis that “[h ]er pa i n, I th i nk, i s f rom a ntec ubi tal tend on stretch s econ

dary to prolon ged w ri st ex tens i on.” The con trover sy un derl y i n g th i s s ui t i n v ol v es wh eth er Log sd on ’s wri sts were pla ced in a “j oint-neutral ” or “extended posi tion.” Logsdon’s peti

tion al le ged that Mill

er was negligent in faili ng t o pr o pe r ly

pad, tuck, po si

tion, and m

onitor her durin

g the seven

-hour surgical

pr oc edu re ; she al le ged t hat St . D avid’s, “act ing by and through its [operating room nurse ],” was negl ige nt in that it fai le d t o e nsur e its “op er at ing ro om nu rsing s t aff was a deq uat ely tr ained in po sitio ning, p add ing and tucking, and mo nito ring .
. . a pa t ient u nder go ing a se ven- hou r r eco nst ru ct ive jaw su rg er y.” T he
essen ce of he r c laim, how ever , is t hat Mill er and the nurse i

mproperl y posi tioned he rwr ist, t her eby
r es ul t ing in h er de ve lo pm en t o f r ef lex symp at he t ic d yst r o ph y. A f te r a de qua

te di sc ove

ry ti me, M i l l er a

nd St. D av i d’ s f i l ed se pa rate moti ons f or sum mary judgm en t. Assert ing both t raditional and no- evidence gro unds, Mill er and S t. David’s3

contended

that ea ch was entitled to judgmen t as a ma tt er of l aw under

Tex as R ul e of Ci vi l Procedu re 166a(c) an d, alt er na t ive ly, u nd er T ex as Ru le o f Civ il Procedu re 166a(i), that Logsdon could produce
no evi den ce of a b reach i

n the appropri ate stan

dard of c are or prox

i mate ca use . See Tex. R. C i

v. P. 166a (c), (i). The

di stri ct courtgr an t ed , in

a ge ner al or der , su mmary judgment in favor of Miller a nd St. Davi d’s. From that judgment, Log sdon now appeals. DISCUSSI ON Summary Judgment

By two i ss ue s, Logs don

chal le nges the proprie

ty of the district court ’s ordergr ant ing
sum mary j udgm en t in f av or of b oth Mi

l l er an d St. Dav i d’s . At the

sum mary j udgm en t h ea ri n g, S t. Da v i d’ s a ss er

ted th at i ts “mot ion fo r su mmary judgment is primar ily base d o n t he fac t t ha t t he r e is
no evi dence of any negl ige nce.” Mi ll er contended that hi s two grounds for sum ma ry j udgme nt related to “ i n adeq ua te ev i de nc e of a b rea ch of sta nd ard of care and . . . c ausat ion.” Becau se the t rial court ’s order does not specif

y the ground or gro unds reli ed on for its r ulin g, we wi l l af f i rm the s um mary judg ment i f

an y of the theori es M i l l er or St. Dav i d’s advanced a

re m eri torious
. See Carr v. Brasher , 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). Bo th traditional and no-e vi den ce s um mary j udgm en t motions a

re urgedhere; th er ef

ore , th i s C our t m ay up h ol d th e s um mar y j udgm en t i f Mi l l er an d S t. Da vid ’s pr ev ail under ei the r Ru l e 1 66a (c) orRu l e 1 66 a( i ). B ec au se

Mi l l er an d S t. D av i d’ s b oth f ocu s p ri mari l y on their no-eviden

ce gro unds, we brief

ly address t hei

r tr aditional

summ ary j udgment motions. Traditional Summary Judgment

The st anda rd for re viewing a mo t ion fo r su mmary judgment is wel l e stablis

hed: (1) The mova nt for sum

ma ry j udgme nt hasthe burden of

showi ng that no genui

ne i ssue of m

aterial fact4

ex ist s a nd t ha t t he mo va nt is entitled to judgme nt as a m atter of law; (2) i

n de cidi ng w hether there is a disp ut ed mat er ial fact iss ue p re cluding sum ma ry j udgme nt, evi dence

favo ra ble to t he no n-mo vant will be t ake n as t ru e; and (3 ) e ver y reas ona ble inferenc e must be indulge d in favo r o f the non- movant and any doubts resolved

i n i ts f av or. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (T ex. 1985)
. W he n a de f en da nt s ee ksto obta

i n s um mary j udg men t ba se d on a plaint iff ’s inability to pr ove it s case, t he de fen da nt mus t co nc lus ive ly dis prove at least one elem

ent of each

of the plai

ntif f’ s causes of a cti on. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez , 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991)
. To pr ev ail on a me dic al malp r ac t ice cla im

in Tex as, a pl ai nti f f m ust establ i sh that a b reach i n the appropri ate stan

dard of care proxim

ately caused the i nj ury . See Duff v. Yelin , 751 S.W .2d 175 , 176 (Tex. 19 88). I n t his case, Mille ran d S t . Da vid ’s ba se d t he ir moti ons f or s um mary j udg men t on th e a bs en ceof evi dence sho wing a br eac h in the s t anda rd of c ar e o r c aus at ion. Neit her par t y addu ced evidenc e neg at inga sp ec ific element of Lo gsd on’ s claims or est ablishing concl usi vel y a n af fi rmati ve def ense; rather, each reli ed on Logsdon’s f

ai lure to produce eviden

ce rai si ng f act iss ues re l ati n g to the a ppropri ate stan dard of care and cau sati

on. Thus, w e hold that , as a mat ter of law, neither Mill er no r St . David’s proved ent itlement to judgm

ent as a m atter of lawund

er the stan dards f or a tradi tion al m otion f or sum mary j udgm en t. No-Evidence Summary Judgment

Unl ike a traditional

sum ma ry j udgme

n t movan t , a no- evidenc e su mmary judgment movant does not bearthe burden of establ is hi ng a ri ght to judgm

ent by provin g each cl ai m or def ense. SeeHolmstrom v. Lee , 26 S.W .3d 52 6, 5 30 (Tex . A

pp .—A us ti n 20 00 , no pet.). In ste ad , a pa rty
see ki ng a no-ev i den ce s um mary j udgm en t mu st ass ertth at n

o ev i den ce ex i sts as to one or m ore of t he essential elem

ents o f the non-movant ’s cl ai m s on wh i ch i t woul d have the b

urden of pr o o f at t r ial.5

McCombs v. Children’ s Med. Ctr. , 1 S.W .3d 256 , 258 (Tex. A pp.—Texa

rkan a 199 9, pet. de

ni ed). If t he no n-mo vant fails to pr od uce mor e t han a scint ill a o f pro bat ive evidenc e r aising a genui ne i ssue of fac t as t o an es se nt ial e leme nt o f a c laim on w hi ch the non -m ova nt h asthe bu rde n of proof at t r ial,
sum mary j udgm en t is appropri ate. SeeTex . R. Ci

v. P. 1 66a(i

); Holmstrom , 26 S.W .3d at 53 0. In contr ast to the de novo st anda rd app lied t o t ra dit iona l s umm ar y judgme

nt motions, a n

o-eviden ce sum ma r y judgm ent is essen tial ly a di rected verdict granted pret rial, to whi ch we appl

y a l ega l suf fi ci ency stan dard of revi ew. SeeJackson v. Fiesta M art , 979 S.W.2d 68 , 70 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 1998, n o pet.). By

f i l i ng n o-evi den ce m otion s f or sum mary j udgm en t, Mi ll er and St. Davi d’s pl

aced t he bur den o n Lo gsd on t o c ome fo rw ar d wit h some evi dence sh owing tha t a breach i n th e a pp rop riate stan dard o f ca r e c au se d h er inju r y. W e fir st ad dr es s M ille r’ s m otion . In h

i s m otion f or sum mary j udgm en t, Mi ll er all eged that Logsdon “fai

le d t o pr o du ce an y leg ally a dmis sible ev ide nc e w hic h w o uld de m on str ate that [Mil le r] breached

the applic abl

e standard of care” or “that t he ac t ions o r o missions of [ Mille r ] pr o ximat ely

caused i nj ury to” Logsdon. Attachedt o he r r esp ons e, Lo gsd on includ ed t he affid av it o f he rmed ic al exp ert, Dr. Th eod ore H . Sta nl ey , al ong wi th th e d ep osi ti on tr an scri pts of Mi l l er , Sta n l ey , a n d D r. D av

i d W . M orl

ed ge , h er tre ati n g n eu rol ogist. Al though Lo gsd on s ubmitt ed t he se three dep osi ti on tra n scri pts an d S tan l ey ’s af f i da v i t, t he par t ies’ main dispu t e ce nt er s o n whet her St anley’s t est imony and affidavit ar e su ffi cient to av o id
sum mary judgm ent. Logsdon contends that St anley ’s depositi on and af fi davi t raise f act iss ues. Mill er responds that St anl

ey ’s concl

usory statemen

ts are in suf

fi ci ent, as a m

atter of law, to rais e a fa ct1 Mi ll

er als o ch alle ng es St an ley’ s a ffid av it as a “ sha m” an d c o nt r ad ict o r y t o his depos i ti on t es t imo ny. Alt ho ug h Miller o bjec t ed t o t he a ff ida vit at the summ

ary j udgme

nt heari ng, he n ever obtaine d a rul i ng onhi s obj ections. Nonethel ess, these contenti ons are wi thout me rit. Mi ll er mi sunderstands

th e c as e l

aw pertai n i n g to sh am

af f i dav i ts. See Cantu v. Peacher , 53 S.W .3d 5, 7 (T ex. App .— Sa n Ant o nio 20 01 , p et . d enie d) (e xpla ining if a wit ne ss ’s o wn affid av it co nt ra dict s t he earli er dep os itio n t est imony it must explain t he r eas on fo r t he cha ng e, o t he r wis e t he co ur t will cons i der th e af

f i dav i t an a ttempt to create a “ sham

” f act i ssue). Stanley ’s af

fi davi t do es no t cle ar ly contradicthi s earlier depo siti on test im ony; i t merely stat es in less eq uiv o ca l t er ms his expe rt op inion. ThatSt an ley’ s e xp er t o pin io n in h is a ffida vit diffe r s s ligh t ly fro m his res pon se s a t depos i ti on d oesnot alo ne mak e t he affid av it a s ha m. 6 is sue. 1 See Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood , 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam ) (stat in g that “c oncl usory af f i dav i ts are n ot enough to rai se f act i ssues” ). We f

in d Mi ll er’s argum

ent unpersuasi

ve. St anley ’s statem

en ts stem f rom th e cul m i na tion of h i s ex pert me dic al opinion after r eviewi

ng Mil ler’s depos i ti on and Logsdon’s

me dic a lre cords . Sta

n l ey as se rtsh i s f am i l i ari ty wi th th e a pp rop riate stan dard o f ca re and t hat t he p o sit io ning o f “Lo gs do n’s left ar m wit h t he e lbo w s t ra ight and t he le ft wrist extended f

or a pro longe d

pe ri od of ti me”con sti

tuted ne gl i ge nc e on Mille r ’s pa r t . Ac co r di ng ly, St anley ’s af

f i da v i t co nt ains suf

f i ci en t non-c oncl

usory statem en ts to consti

tute proper s

um mary judg ment pr oo f. T he question rem ai ns, however, whether Logsdon’s sum ma ry j udgme nt proo f raises mor e t han a s cintilla o f evidence cr eat ing a fact que st ion.

Mi ll er contends that Stanley ’s onl y c riti ci sm of Mi ll er’s conduct

is based on St anley ’s
assu mpt ion t hat Mill

er mispos itio ned L og sdo n’s wr ist d ur ingsurge ry. Mil ler assert s that St anley ’s
as su m ption is fl awed beca

us e S t an le y “did no t an d c an no t dis pu t e t he t es t imo ny o f Dr
. Mille rin rel ati on to Dr. M ille r ’s int er pr et at io n o f t he t er ms ‘ ne ut r al p o sit io n’ a nd ‘w r ist ex t en sio n’ u se d in [Lo gsdo n]’s me dic al

records.” Mil

le rf ur th er argu es th at, because St anley

did not cont ro vert Mil

ler’s evi dence t hat positi onal

in juri es occur despi

te pro per positioni

ng, he is enti

tled to judgm

ent as a7

ma tt er of l aw . W e di sa

gre e. T o av

oi d s um mary j udg men t on Mi l l er’ s n

o-ev i de nc e m oti on, Log sdon need o nly pr od uce mor e t han a s cintilla o f evidence sup po rt ing t he cha llenged e lement in t he mot ion. T his mea ns , t he n, t he ev id en ce mu st r ais e a fa ct qu es t io n, no t t ha t he rinju r y could not have occurred ab se nt ne glig en ce , as Mille rco nt en ds , bu t t ha t it did occur because of Mil

le r’s negl ige nce. Stanley st at es u nequ ivoca lly

in hi s d ep os i

ti on th at M i l l er

b re ach ed th e a pp rop riate stan dard of ca re f oran anesthesiolog ist and t hat suc h breach pro xim ate ly caused Lo gsdo n’s inju r y. Mi l l er wrote i

n L ogsdon ’smedi

cal ch artthat her i

nj ury wa s l i ke l y the res ul t of “ an tec ub i tal ten don stretch se co nd ar y t o pr o lo ng ed wr ist ex t en sio n. ” I n his de po sit io n, Mille rat t emp t s t o ex pla in his defi ni tion of wristex t en sio n a nd ho w it dif fers f rom Stanl ey ’s. That Stanle y a nd Mi ll er dis agree as t o w hat co nst itu t es ne gligent wr ist e xt ensio n is pre cisely the ty pe of di spute best suit ed for a jury’s det er minatio n. Despi

te Mil le r’s contentions

that Stanl

ey ’sdepos i

tion and af f i dav i t are i n con siste n t, it is c lea rt ha t S t an ley nev er chan ged his opini on t hat Lo gsdo n’s in

jury resulted fro m Mi

ll er’s negligent positi onin

g of her wri st. Therefore, we ho ld t ha t Lo gs do n p r o du ce d mo r e t ha n a sc int illa of e vidence ra ising a fact issue a s t o t he st anda rd of c ar e and ca us ati on el em en ts relati ng to Mi l l er, thereby precludi ng sum ma ry j udgme nt in hi s f avor. Accordin

gly , we sustain

Logsdon’s f

irst i ssue. W i th respect to St. Davi d’s, however, we f in d that Logsdon fai

le d to rais e m

ore t han
a scint ill a o f evidence est ablishing a fact iss ue regardin

g the appropriate standard of care f or an ope rat ing roo m nurse. In its mot ion, St . David’s as se r t ed t ha t , be ca us e “ [ i]t is undisp ut ed t hat t he i nj ury made t he subj ect of this

la wsui t could have occurred absent any negl ige ncewhatsoever—eve

n if t he pa t ient w as p os itio ned c or re ct ly i n ever y way and c ons iste nt wit h t he st anda rd of c ar e” a nd2 St. Dav i d’s ch al l enged Sta

nl ey ’saf f i dav i t on the s am

e groun ds a s Mi l l er. See supra note 1. 8 “[t]h ere is no e vidence in this ca se t hat t he injury suffere d by [Lo gsd on] wo uld no t have occurred but f or an a ct of n egl i gen ce . . . St. Da

vi d’s i s en titl ed to sum mary j udgm en t.” In response, Log sd

on su b m i tted Sta n l ey ’s de pos i ti on an d a f f i da v i t. 2 I n his dep os itio n, Stanley stated t hat he woul d not expect an operating room nurs e to intervene in a doct or’ s po sit io ning o f a p at ien t “[ o ] t he rt ha n if she se es so mething that is reall y upsetting to her. ” He also expl ai ned t hat a t en- deg re e ext ensio n of t he wr ist— t he de gre e of ex ten si on cl ai me d to have caused Logsd on’s injury—wa s su bt le, “maybe not even det ect able by a nur se’s eye, assu ming she has a ll the usual act ivities she ’s do ing.” In his affidavit , ho weve r, St anley st at es “t ha t t he co nduc t of t he op er at ingroom

nurse, [], in posi

tioni ng Sara Logsdon duri

ng the surgery

in question . . . amounted to n eg l i gen ce , a

n d w as a p rox i mate ca us e” of h er i n j ur y . Th es e s tate men ts ar e t he o nly s um

mary judg ment proof re l ati

ng to the nur se’ s stan

dard of care . And un like his statem en ts conc ern

i ng Mi l l er, Stanley never set s for t h, eithe r in his affidavit o r d epo sitio n, t he appropriate nursi ng standard of c are, how he is fa milia

r w i thi t, or how i

t di f f ers f rom th at of a n a ne sthe siologi

st. Stan l ey ’sconc l

usory sta tem en ts i n h i s af f i dav i t regard i ng the nurse are t herefore not evidence and are in suff ici ent, as a
matter of l

aw, to rai se a

f act i ssue. See Ryland Group, Inc. , 924 S.W.2d at 12 2. Be ca us e t he o nly proof co ncer ning t he nu r se is c o nc lus o r y, L o gs do n fa iled t o pr o du ce ev en a s cin t illa of evi dence that St. Da vid ’s in

an y wa y b re ach ed th e a pp rop riate

st an da r d o f c ar e o rca us ed he rinju r y. Ac co r di ng ly, we overrule L ogsdon’s second i ssue. 4590i Expert Rep ort3 Logsdon’s 180-day deadlin e expi red June 7, 2000.
4 The Ju ne 7, 20 00 ag r ee men t , dr af t ed by L o gs do n’s co un se l, states in pe rt inent p ar t : “We further agreet hat t his ext ensio n co nst itu t es P laintiff’s only st at ut or y thirt y-da y exte nsion. ” At t he he ari ng and on appe al , Mil

le r and St. Davi d’s contend that thi s agreem ent constitutes a Rul e 11 agr eement that must be en forced to deny Logsdon any

further ex tensi ons. Thi s contention is wi thout meri t. Pu rs ua n t to s ec ti on

13 .01 (g ), a

di str i ct c our t doe s n ot h av e d i scre ti on to refuse an

ex ten si on when t he plaint iff

est ablishes t hat its failur e t o t imely fil e its expe rt re po rt was not intent ional o r t he r es ult o f co nsc io us ind iffer en ce bu t wa s t he r es ult of a ccide nt or mistak e. Te x. R ev. Civ. S t at . Ann. ar t. 4590i, § 13.01( g). Theref ore, t hei r agreemen

t—whatever the parties m

ay call i t—cannot override the d i stri ct court’s

obl i gati on to fol

l ow the l egi slati ve mandate of

section 13.01( g). 9 Log sdon en tered i n to a written agreem

ent wi th Mi ll er and St. David’s on Jun

e 7, 2000 to extend the 180-day

deadlin e for f il in g her expe rt medi cal report until

Jul y 7, 2000. 3 See Te x. R ev. Civ. Sta t. An n. a rt. 4590i , § 13.01 (d) (req

ui ri ng e xpe rt medi cal rep ort to b e f

i l ed wi thi n 1 80 d ay s of fil ingmedi cal mal practi ce s ui t); id. § 1 3.0 1( h ) (p er

m i tti n g p ar ti es to en ter i n to wri tten ag re em en t to ext end 180-day

dead l i ne by thi rty d ays). Unab le

to fi le the report by

the agreed

date, Logsdo n f

il ed
a m oti on f or a f urth er exte ns i on wi th the di stri ct courton Ju

l y 7, 2000
. See id. § 13 .0 1( f) (p er mitt ing t he co ur t , fo r g oo d ca use , t o e xt end t he 18 0- day fili ng r equ irement by

thirty day s). On Jul

y 13, 2000, Mi ll er and St . David’s fi

led responses to Logsdo n’s m ot ion and also fil

ed separat e motions to dism iss her cause pursuan

t to secti on 13.0 1(e). See id. § 13 .01 (e) (m an da ti ng di sm i ss al wi th prej udi cef or f ail ure to co mply with 18 0- day fili ng requiremen

t). Prior t o t he Jul

y 21, 2000 hearing on the m ot ions, Logsd on f i l ed a s uppl em en tal motion f or exten sion un der s ecti on 13.0 1(g). See id. § 13.01 (g). At the heari

ng, Mi ll er and St . David’s argu ed t hat Lo gsdo n’s June 7, 200 0 ag re ement preclude d her f

rom seeki ng an ot her t ime exte nsion. 4 Logsdon’s counsel asserted that she qual

if ie d for an extensi on under sect ion 13.01(g) because (i) t he expert and sub stitute counsel tha t she lin ed5 Logsd on’s ori gi n al cou n se l sou gh t to ob tai n su b sti tute counsel because she st o pp ed t ak in g medi cal m alpractice cases and was attempting to r efer out her remai ni ng cases. 6 Mil le rand St. David’s also argue that a go od- cause ex tens i on un der s ecti on 13.0 1(f ) i s un av aila ble to Logsdo n because tha t se cti on only permi ts a sin gle thirty-day ex

tensi on of the 180-day fi li ng re quir ement , t her eby pr eclud ing an ext ensio n beyond 210 days fro m Log sdo n’s o riginal pe t itio n. Be cause we agree that section 13.01(f) precl udes an ex

tensi on bey

ond 210 day s f

rom the d at e Log sdon fil ed he r o riginal pe t itio n, see Pfeiffer v. Jacobs , 29 S.W .3d 193 , 19 7 (T ex . A

pp. —H ous ton [14th D i st.] 2000 , pet. den i ed), we di scu ss on

l y thei r cl ai m pertai ni ng to se cti on 13.0 1(g). 10 up fel l through two weeks prior to t he f il in g deadlin e, 5 and (ii) t he su bst itu t e co unse l gave t he ex pert witnessth e i

n cor re ct date for submitt ing t he r epo rt . T he district cour t denied the motions to dism iss
an d g ra n ted Log sd on ’s moti on f or e xtensi on of ti me to f i l e h er ex pert re por t. Mi ll er an d S t. D av

i d’ s b oth f i l ed cross -a pp ea l s c on ten di n g th at th e d i str i ct c ourt
er r o ne o us ly

gra n te d L ogs don ’s

moti on f or e xtensi on to f i l e h er ex pert re por t. Th ey con ten d th at, because Logsdon did n

ot establ is h he rfailure t o file t he report was not in tentional or due t o conscious in dif feren ce, an ex tensi on under secti on 13.01(g) was im permissi ble. 6 We rev

ie w a district cou rt ’s de ci si on to g ran t an extension un der s ection 13.0 1(g) f

or an a bus e of di scre tion
. See American Transitional

Care Ctrs. of Tex. v. Palacios , 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. 2001) (reviewi ng cl ai m un der
se cti on 13.01( e) f

or abu se of

di scre tion ); Nguyenv. Kim , 3 S .W .3d 146 , 15 1 (T ex . A

pp. —H ous ton [1 4th Di st. ] 1 99 9, n

o pet.). A trial cou rt a b us es i ts dis cretion whe

re it acts wi

thout re fere nce t o a ny guid ingrul es or pri

nc i pl es, i.e. , i f

i t acts arbi

trari l y and un reas onab l y . See K

-Ma rt Corp. v. Honeyc utt , 24 S. W. 3d 35 7, 36 0 ( T ex . 20 00 )
. We de fer t o t he co ur t ’s fac t ua l d et er minat io n but review questions

of law de novo
. See Walker v. Pac ker , 827 S.W .2d 833 , 839-4 0 (Tex . 1992)
. An extensi on under secti on 13.01(g) is not dis cretionary . See Te x . Rev . C i

v . Sta t. A n n . a rt. 4 59 0i , § 1 3.0 1( g) . Th e s tatu te sta tes : “ th e c our t shall grant a grace per iod ” if it finds t he11

pl ai n ti f f ’s f ai l ur e to fi le an ex pert repo rt “was not intentional or t he resul

t o f cons ci ous in

dif feren ce but was the resul

t o f an acci dent or mi stake.” Id. (emph asi s added). Once the pl

ai ntif f es tabli shes t he exi stence of acc ide

nt or mi stake, the tr ia

l c our t is requ ired to grant the requested thirty-day ext ensio n. Id. The

question f or our determ

i na tion , then, i s wh

ethe r t he dis tri

ct c our t ab us ed i ts dis cretion i

n f in din g that Logsdon established the ex is tence of acci

dent or mi stake. Co mpar ingsection

13.01( g) wi

th Tex as R ul e of Ci vi l Procedu re 165 a( 3) , r elat ingto
re insta t ement of c ase s dismissed for want of p ro sec ut ion, and t he r ules g ove rning e quit able mot ions f ornew trial

, we find the l anguag e to be v i rtual l y i den tic al
. Compare Te x . Rev . C i v . Sta t. A n n . a rt. 45 90 i, § 13.01 (g), with Tex . R. Ci v. P. 1 65a(3 ), and Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. , 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex . 1939)
. Be ca

us e th e L eg i sl atu rei n ten de d th e l an gu ag e of se cti on 13 .01 (g ) to ap ply
an alo go us ly, cas es d

i scu ssi ng r ul e 165 a(3) a

nd eq uit abl e mo t io ns f

o rne w t r ial a r e in st ruc t ive in
asc er t aining

wh et he rLo gs do n is en

titl ed to a grace pe

ri od und er se cti on 13.0 1(g). McClure v. Landis , 959 S.W .2d 679 , 681 (Tex. A pp.—A usti n 19 97, pet. deni ed). Proo f of acci dent or mi stake precludes a fin din g t ha t o ne ac t ed int en t io na lly or w i th conscious i

ndi f f eren ce. Smith v. Babcock &

Wilcox Constr. Co. , 913 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. 1995) (“ Proof of
. . . a ccide nt , mist ake or ot her re aso nable exp lanat ion [ ] ne gat es t he in tent or conscious in dif feren ce for whi ch [an ext ensio n] c an be d enied. ”) . T o e st ablish ent itlement t o a gr ace per iod , t he movant mus

t pro vi de some ex

cuse j ustif yi ng the del ay so that t he di strict

court can determi ne wh ether t he ex cus e qua

l i f i es a s an acc i den t or mistake
. SeeFinley v. Steenkamp , 1 9 S .W. 3d 5 33, 539 (T ex. App.—F ort Worth

2000, n o pet.); Nguyen , 3 S.W.3d at 152 . In thi s c onte xt, an ac ci de nt or mi stake is gene ra lly

char act er ized by eit her inadeq uat e kno wledg e o f the facts or an un expected happen in g. Tesch v. Stroud , 2 8 S .W. 3d 7 82, 787 (T ex. App. —Co rp us C hr is ti 2000, pet. den i ed); Finley , 1912

S.W.3d at 5 39 . In

mak i n g th i s dete rm i n ati on , c our ts l ook to th e k

n owl ed ge an d acts of th e m ov an t. Pfeiff er v. Jacobs , 2 9 S .W. 3d 1 93, 198 (T ex. App. —Ho ust on [ 14t h Dist .] 200 1, pet . d enied) . T he pa rty see king t he ex

tens i on has the burden

to dem onstra te acc i den t or mistake
. Roberts

v. Medical City Dallas Hosp., Inc. , 988 S.W.2d 398, 403 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied). The burden th en sh i f ts to th e op

pos i n g p ar ty to ne ga te the m ova nt’ s p roof an d, u n l es s th e op pos i n g p ar ty prevails, t he court m

ust gra nt the reque sted extension. Landry v. Ringer , 4 4 S .W. 3d 2 71, 275 (T ex. App.—Houston [14th

Di st.] 2001 , no pet.). At the heari

ng, Logsdon’s couns el

represented that two weeks pri or t o t he J ul y 7, 2000 deadlin

e, he rex pe r t an d s ub st it ut e c o un se l “fell th rou gh .” She a

l so s tate d th at th e s ub sti tute counsel in correct ly advi sed the new e

xpert of the f

il in g deadlin e. Mi l l er an d S t. D av i d’ s a rgue d to t he dis t r ict co ur t t ha t Lo gs do n c o uld no t cla im acc i den t or mistake

be caus e sh

e kn ew f or more than four months about t he im

pending deadlin

e. Ho wever, their arg ument do es not cont ro vert Logsd on’s repres en tation t ha t he rex pe r t an d s ub st it ut e c o un se l un ex pe ct ed ly bec ame unavai la ble. On ap pe al, Mi ll er and S t . D avid’s r ely on Landry and Pfeif fer for t he pro posit ion that Logsd on’s inab ilit y t o procure an ex pert report and sub stitute counsel does n ot entitle her to a grace peri od. See gen erally Pfeiff er , 29 S .W.3 d 19 3; Landry , 44 S. W. 3d 27 1. T he ir r eli ance i s misplaced . I n Landry , t he plai ntif f, despite hi s best

at t emp t s, co uld no t lo ca t e a n ex pe rt t o t es t ify on hi s beh

al f. 44 S.W.3d at 276. Pfei ff er’s ex pert, o n the other hand, was unwi ll in g, after ex aminingPf

eif f er on threepri or occasions, to provide a

reportwi thout cond

ucti ng f urthe r ex am i na tion s. Pfeiff

er , 29 S.W.3d at 198. Nei ther of th ose ca se s i n v ol v ed an un ex pe cte d e v en

t, i.e. , lo sing an ex

pert and substi

tut e counsel

two weeks prior to t he f

il in g deadlin e, and are theref

ore not anal

ogous t o the si

tuati on here. F

urthe r, because Mi ll

er and St. Davi d’s f

ai le d to contro vert Logsdon’s testim ony c oncerni

ng an unex pected13

happen in g, the statut e requi

r ed t he dist rict co ur t t o g ra nt her an ext ensio n onc e t he co ur t fou nd
acc ident or mi stake. Be ca us e the c ourt c ond

uc ted a h ea ri ng an d i m pl i edl y f oun d c au se , we

ca nn ot concl ude that the

di stri ct court ab

use d i ts di scre tion
. Th ere f

ore, weove

rrul e thei r s ol e i ss ueoncrossappeal an d hol d that the tri

al cou rt di d n ot ab us e i ts d i screti on i n g ran ti ng Log sdon a

n e xte ns i on und er se cti on 13.0 1(g). CONCLU SION

We hold that the di strict

court erred

i n gr an tin g sum mary j udgm en t in f av or of M i l l er, but c orrectl

y gran ted sum mary j udgm en t in f av or of St. Da

vi d’s
. Therefo re, we sust ain Logsdo n’s first issue a nd

ove rrul e h er s ec ond i ss ue . F urth er, be ca us e L ogs don

prop erl y rec ei ve d a n e xte ns i on under se ct io n 1 3. 01 ( g) , we o ve r rule Mil ler’s an d St. Davi d’s’ cross-appeal i ssues. Accordingl

y, we af f i rm in part and reverse i

n part the district court ’s order and re m an d th e cause f or further pro ceedings.

Jan P. Patterson, Justice Bef ore Justices K

idd, Patterson and Puryear Af f i rmed i n Pa rt; Re versed and Rem anded i n Pa rt File d: March 21, 2002 Do No t Publis

h