NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DAVID S., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, K.S., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0031

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 528384

The Honorable Janice K. Crawford, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Ashlee N. Hoffmann

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
DAVID S. v. DCS, K.S.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Patricia K. Norris1 joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

The sole issue on appeal is whether Father’s untimely 

appearance at a pretrial conference regarding a motion to terminate 

parental rights constituted a “failure to appear” without good cause under 

Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 64(C). Because the

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Father failed to 

appear without good cause and entering an order terminating his parental 

rights, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

David S. (“Father”) is a biological parent to K.S., born in July 

2008. The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took temporary physical 

custody of K.S. in January 2015 and filed a dependency action alleging K.S. 

dependent due to Father’s neglect. The juvenile court subsequently

adjudicated K.S. dependent.

2 In October 2016, DCS moved to terminate the 

parent-child relationship, alleging fifteen or more months in out-of-home 

placement. 

At the initial hearing on DCS’s motion for termination, the 

juvenile court set a pretrial conference for January 11, 2017. Father was 

present and admonished, both verbally and in writing, of the possible 

consequences of his failure to appear at that hearing. Father was not present 

for the majority of the pretrial conference, which the court began 

approximately 25 minutes after the scheduled start time. At the 

 

1 The Honorable Patricia K. Norris, Retired Judge of the Arizona Court 

of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2 DCS filed its dependency action against both Mother and Father 

alleging neglect of K.S. The juvenile court adjudicated K.S. dependent as to 

both parents and terminated both parents’ legal rights; however, Mother is 

not a party to this appeal. 
DAVID S. v. DCS, K.S.

Decision of the Court

3

commencement of the hearing, the juvenile court asked if anyone had 

information regarding Father’s whereabouts. Father’s counsel stated he had 

“no idea” about Father’s whereabouts. The DCS caseworker informed the 

court she sent a taxi to pick up Father, but after arriving at the designated 

location, the driver was unable to locate Father. The court found “no good 

cause for Father’s failure to appear.” DCS advised the court it was prepared 

to proceed. It then presented evidence supporting the allegations in the

motion to terminate Father’s parental rights. See generally Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

64(C) (court may deem parent’s failure to appear without good cause at a 

pretrial conference on a pending termination motion as an admission of the 

allegations in the motion). Father’s counsel presented no evidence on 

Father’s behalf, but was given the opportunity to do so by the juvenile 

court.

After the juvenile court received the evidence, prior to 

entering its findings, the court confirmed Father had been advised of the 

consequences of failing to appear. The court then found there was “no good 

cause” for his failure to appear. While the court was making its statutory 

findings on the basis for termination, Father entered the courtroom. The 

juvenile court asked Father why he arrived late. Father responded that the 

taxi had not arrived to pick him up. The juvenile court informed Father that 

if he filed a motion, it would reconsider whether there was good cause for 

Father’s failure to appear. The court then found the ground for termination, 

fifteen months out-of-home placement, proven by clear and convincing 

evidence and that termination was in the best interests of the child. The 

juvenile court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights. 

Father moved for reconsideration. After considering the 

motion and DCS’s response, the juvenile court denied Father’s motion, 

again finding no “good cause” for his failure to appear. Without addressing 

any of the factual arguments offered by the parties in their motion papers,

3

the court focused on Father’s failure to communicate with his attorney or 

the court about his transportation issues the morning of the pretrial 

conference. Specifically, it found that Father failed to “provide any 

explanation as to why he did not try to reach his attorney or the [c]ourt if, 

 

3 The parties presented conflicting arguments about whether the taxi 

had arrived at the designated location at the requested time. Both parties

attached unsworn exhibits to their motion papers, which are not material 

to the juvenile court’s finding. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 45(A) (admissibility of 

evidence); Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a) (proponent of evidence required to produce 

evidence sufficient to support finding that item is what proponent claims it 

is). 
DAVID S. v. DCS, K.S.

Decision of the Court

4

as he contends, he was having transportation problems.” We have 

jurisdiction over Father’s appeal of termination under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding of a 

statutory ground for termination or its best interests finding. Instead, Father

argues that the juvenile court terminated his parental rights “because [he] 

appeared late for the pre-trial conference hearing,” or essentially

terminated his rights in “default.” We disagree. The juvenile court 

terminated Father’s rights because it found a ground for termination under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) and that termination was in K.S.’s best interest under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

Father next argues that in his motion for reconsideration he 

demonstrated good cause for failing to appear. Reviewing the juvenile 

court’s order for an abuse of discretion, Frank R. v. Mother Goose Adoptions, 

239 Ariz. 184, 190, ¶ 21 (App. 2016), we reject this argument.

I. Waiver of Rights

A court may terminate parental rights only after: (1) finding 

by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds 

for termination is met, and (2) finding by a preponderance of the evidence 

that termination is in the best interests of the child. Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 18 (App. 2007). 

A court may consider a parent’s failure to appear at a pretrial 

conference on a pending termination motion as an admission of the 

allegations of the motion and thus a waiver of the opportunity to contest 

the motion’s allegations if the parent has received proper notice of the 

hearing. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C).

4 A court may terminate parental rights,

based on the record and evidence presented, if the court finds: the parent

had notice of the proceeding; was properly served and admonished as to 

the possible consequences of failing to appear; was advised the hearing 

could proceed in his or her absence; was advised that a failure to appear 

may constitute a waiver of legal rights and admission of the allegations

contained in DCS’s petition. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C); see also A.R.S. 

§ 8-537(C).

 

4 Neither side argues the constitutionality of Rule 64(C). See Marianne 

N. v. DCS, 240 Ariz. 470 (App. 2016) (review granted in part April 18, 2017). 
DAVID S. v. DCS, K.S.

Decision of the Court

5

The record is clear: Father did not appear at the pretrial 

conference until after the court found there was no good cause for his 

failure to appear, after it received evidence from DCS supporting the 

allegations in the motion, and as it was setting forth its findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. This court has previously held that a juvenile court may 

treat a parent’s absence at a hearing as a waiver of his or her legal rights 

and deem the parent to have admitted the allegations in the petition if the 

parent “failed to appear by the time both parties have fully presented their 

case.” Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 761 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 41, 47, ¶ 18 (App. 

2017). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 

proceeding without Father and terminating his parental rights based on the 

record and evidence presented.

II. Good Cause

To demonstrate good cause for a failure to appear, a parent 

must show the existence of “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 

neglect” and “(2) a meritorious defense to the claim.” Christy A. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 304, ¶ 16 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

The juvenile court is in the best position to make findings as to what 

constitutes good cause for failure to appear. Bob H. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 225 Ariz. 279, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2010); see also Brenda D., 761 Ariz. Adv. 

Rep. at 47, ¶ 18 (juvenile court retains “full discretion” in determining what 

constitutes good cause for failure to appear) (citation and quotation 

omitted).

Here, as they did in the juvenile court, the parties dispute 

whether transportation issues outside Father’s control prevented him from 

appearing at the hearing. As discussed above, the juvenile court did not 

address the conflicting factual arguments of the parties, and found Father 

had failed to demonstrate good cause because he had not provided any 

explanation as to why he had not contacted the court or his own counsel. 

Importantly, Father has not contested this finding on appeal. Accordingly, 

Father has failed to show the juvenile court abused its discretion in making 

this finding, and rejecting Father’s good cause argument.

Further, Father failed to raise a meritorious defense to the 

termination of his parental rights in his motion to reconsider. Thus, Father 

failed to satisfy the second prong of the good cause analysis. See supra ¶ 11.

Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding Father 

had not shown good cause for his failure to appear at the pretrial 

conference.
DAVID S. v. DCS, K.S.

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Father’s parental rights to K.S.