* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-40999

Summary Calendar

 

BROOKS ROWE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DAVID WHITE; RON SCOTT; D. BALLARD,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:96-CV-209

- - - - - - - - - -

May 29, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Brooks Rowe, Arkansas inmate #159100, moves for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). The PLRA requires a

prisoner appealing IFP in a civil action to pay the full amount

of the filing fee, $105. As Rowe does not have funds for

immediate payment of this fee, he is assessed an initial partial

filing fee of $.07, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 
No. 96-40999

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Following payment of the initial partial filing fee, funds shall

be deducted from Rowe’s prisoner account until the full filing

fee is paid. See § 1915(b)(2).

IT IS ORDERED that Rowe pay the appropriate initial filing

fee to the Clerk of the District Court for the Eastern District

of Texas. Rowe shall authorize the appropriate prison

authorities to withdraw this fee from his trust fund account in

accordance with their policy and local procedures and to forward

the fee to the Clerk of the District Court for the Eastern

District of Texas. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having

custody of Rowe’s inmate account shall collect the remainder of

the $105 filing fee and forward for payment, in accordance with 

§ 1915(b)(2), to the Clerk of the District Court for the Eastern

District of Texas each time the amount in Rowe’s account exceeds

$10, until the appellate filing fee is paid.

Rowe challenges the district court’s dismissal of his civil

rights complaint as frivolous. He argues the following: 1) the

investigation leading to his placement in ad seg and the

disciplinary case resulting in a loss of privileges violated his

constitutional rights and the district court erred in dismissing

the claim; 2) the district court overlooked Rowe’s supplemental

pleading, which Rowe asserts clarifies the viability of his

liberty-interest claim arising from the disciplinary-case claim;

3) the district court failed to consider Rowe’s banishment from

the law library -- for unauthorized taking of a law book --
No. 96-40999

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before entering final judgment, which Rowe contends amounts to

denial of access to the courts; and 4) the district court erred

in dismissing his conditions-of-confinement claim, a claim which 

Rowe asserts is viable in light of his asthma condition, a

condition which Rowe alleges for the first time on appeal.

We have carefully reviewed the arguments and the appellate

record. For essentially the same reasons upon which the district

court relied by adopting the magistrate judge’s report, see Rowe

v. White, No. 5:96cv209 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 1996), we conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

dismissing the complaint as frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). This appeal is without arguable merit

and thus is frivolous. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. It is DISMISSED.

Rowe moves for injunctive and protective relief. The motion

is DENIED.

APPEAL DISMISSED. IFP GRANTED. FILING FEE ASSESSED. OTHER

MOTION DENIED.