UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4538

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

GERALD GARDNER, 

Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00619-JFM-1) 

Submitted: March 21, 2011 Decided: April 7, 2011

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Melissa M. Phinn, LAW OFFICE OF MELISSA PHINN, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States 

Attorney, Thiruvendran Vignarajah, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Gerald Gardner pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea 

agreement, to one count of possession with the intent to 

distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a) 

(West 2006 & Supp. 2010), and was sentenced to 180 months’ 

imprisonment. In the plea agreement, Gardner reserved the right 

to challenge the district court’s denial of the motion to 

suppress evidence seized from his vehicle. Gardner contends on 

appeal that the district court erred in denying the motion to 

suppress. We affirm. 

In reviewing the district court’s denial of Gardner’s 

suppression motion, we review the court’s factual findings for 

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 

Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 

130 S. Ct. 1104 (2010). Because the district court denied 

Gardner’s motion, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Government. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 

210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008). We also defer to the district court’s

credibility determinations. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 

210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008). 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee requires that 

“searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an 
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independent judicial officer.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 

386, 390 (1985). There are, however, “a few specifically 

established and well-delineated exceptions” to this general 

rule. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

With these standards in mind, and having reviewed the 

transcript of the suppression hearing and the parties’ briefs, 

we conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

Gardner’s motion to suppress. The record amply supports the 

district court’s finding that a law enforcement officer asked 

Gardner for consent to search his vehicle and that Gardner 

voluntarily consented to the search. See Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 227 (1973) (recognizing that 

consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that 

voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the 

circumstances); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (listing factors appropriate for 

consideration in reviewing whether consent was voluntarily 

given).*

 * Because we conclude that the evidence permitted the 

district court to conclude that Gardner voluntarily consented to 

the search of his vehicle, we need not evaluate whether the 

officers involved also possessed probable cause to conduct the 

search. 

 
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED