FILED

December 31, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

AUGUST SESSION, 1997

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9702-CR-00067

)

Appellee, )

)

) SHELBY COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. JAMES C. BEASLEY, JR.

VICKIE R. HERRON, ) JUDGE

WANDA L. GRIFFIN, )

Appellants. ) (Direct Appeal - Aggravated Robbery 

) and Aggravated Assault)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

TONY N. BRAYTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Assistant Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter

201 Poplar, Suite 2-01

Memphis, TN 38103 KENNETH W. RUCKER

(Attorney for Vickie R. Herron) Assistant Attorney General

425 Fifth Avenue North

MICHAEL E. SCHOLL Nashville, TN 37243-0493

200 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 202

Memphis, TN 38103 WILLIAM L. GIBBONS

(Attorney for Wanda L. Griffin) District Attorney General

JAMES A. WAX

Assistant District Attorney

201 Poplar Avenue, Third Floor

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED ________________________

CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AFFIRMED; CONVICTIONS

FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
-2-

OPINION

On June 20, 1996, a Shelby County jury convicted Appellants Vickie R.

Herron and Wanda L. Griffin of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault.

After a sentencing hearing on July 12, 1996, the trial court sentenced both

Appellants as a Range I standard offenders to consecutive sentences of twelve

years for aggravated robbery and six years for aggravated assault. Appellants

challenge both their convictions and their sentences, raising the following issues:

1) whether the trial court properly denied Appellant Griffin’s motion to sever

her trial from the trial of Appellant Herron;

2) whether Appellants’ convictions for both aggravated robbery and

aggravated assault violate principles of double jeopardy;

3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant Herron’s

conviction for aggravated robbery;

4) whether the trial court erred when it admitted credit cards and a credit

card receipt into evidence;

5) whether the trial court erred when it failed to strike the State’s notice of

enhancement factors;

6) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant Griffin.

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and

reverse in part.

I. FACTS

Bettye Knight, a sixty-nine year old resident of Memphis, Tennessee,

testified that on September 28, 1995, she drove her car to a Memphis grocery

store and parked in the second space from the door. Before Knight could exit her

car, another car driven by Appellant Herron pulled up next to her and parked at

a “funny angle.” Because Knight had recently received her car as a gift, she

waited for the occupants of the other car to get out of first so that her car would
-3-

not be dented. When Appellant Herron and her passenger, Appellant Griffin,

made no attempt to exit their car, Knight got out of her car and locked the door.

Knight testified that when she walked between the two cars, Griffin reached

out the window of the other car and grabbed Knight’s purse that contained $60

and three credit cards. Knight then lost her balance and fell to the pavement.

Herron backed up her car, pulled forward and ran over Knight, and then drove

away. Knight testified that she sustained a broken arm as well as various injuries

to her legs during this incident. 

Lieutenant William Walsh of the Memphis Police Department testified that

on October 1, 1995, he received a report that two females were heard arguing in

an apartment building about some credit cards that were taken in a robbery.

Walsh then went to the apartment building where he located Griffin in the parking

lot. Griffin then took Walsh into her apartment, where W alsh discovered three

credit cards in the name of Bettye Knight. Walsh testified that the credit cards

were in a trash can along with some receipts and clothing tags. 

II. SEVERANCE

Appellant Griffin contends that the trial court erred when it denied her

motion to sever her trial from that of Appellant Herron after it became clear that

Herron was going to testify. Rules 14(c)(2)(I) and (ii) of the Tennessee Rules of

Criminal Procedure provide that the trial court shall grant a severance of

defendants if deemed appropriate to promote or achieve a fair determination of
-4-

a defendant’s guilt or innocence. “Whether to grant a severance is within the trial

judge’s sound discretion.” State v. Ensley, 956 S.W .2d 502, 508 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1996). “The exercise of that discretion will not be reversed absent an

affirmative showing of prejudice.” Id. “In other words, the record must

demonstrate that the defendant was clearly prejudiced to the point that the trial

court’s discretion ended and the granting of [a] severance became a judicial

duty.” Parham v. State, 885 S.W.2d 375, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (citation

omitted). “The trial court, however, must not only protect the rights of the

accused, it must also protect the rights of the state prosecution, and ‘when

several persons are charged jointly with a single crime . . . the state is entitled to

have the fact of guilt determined and punishment assessed in a single trial,

unless to do so would unfairly prejudice the rights of the defendants.’” State v.

Wiseman, 643 S.W.2d 354, 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (citation omitted).

Griffin essentially contends that severance was required in this case

because after Herron testified, the State cross-examined her about a pre-trial

statement she had made in which she stated that both Appellants had used

Knight’s credit cards to purchase clothing. However, Griffin has failed to indicate

how she was prejudiced by the cross-examination about this statement. Griffin

merely makes the conclusory allegation that evidence of how the proceeds of the

crime were used could not have been introduced in separate trials. However,

even before Herron’s testimony, the State had already introduced evidence about

how the proceeds were used. Indeed, Lieutenant Walsh had already testified

that he found Knight’s credit cards, some receipts, and some clothing tags inside

Griffin’s apartment. There is no indication that Walsh would not also have given

this testimony in a separate trial. Because Griffin has failed to show that she was
-5-

prejudiced, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

the motion for severance.

III. MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS

Appellant Herron contends that convictions for both aggravated robbery

and aggravated assault for the same course of conduct violate principles of

double jeopardy. We agree.

In State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1996), the Tennessee Supreme

Court fashioned a method by which courts should analyze a double jeopardy

claim under the Tennessee Constitution:

(1) a Blockburger analysis of the statutory offenses; (2) an analysis, guided

by the principles of Duchac[ v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn. 1973) ], of

the evidence used to prove the offenses; (3) a consideration of whether

there were m ultiple victims or discrete acts; and (4) a comparison of the

purposes of the respective statutes. None of these steps is determinative;

rather the results of each must be weighed and considered in relation to

each other. 

938 S.W.2d at 381.

Initially, we must start with an analysis of the statutory offenses as provided

in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 2d 306

(1932). The Blockburger test states that “where the same act or transaction

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied

to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each

provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” 284 U.S.

at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182. A Blockburger violation is a violation of the double

jeopardy provisions of the constitutions of both the United States and Tennessee.
-6-

In order to prove aggravated robbery, the State must show that the

defendant intentionally or knowingly committed a theft of property from the person

of another by violence or putting that person in fear and that the victim suffered

serious bodily injury. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-401(a), -402(2) (1997). An

aggravated assault is com mitted where a defendant intentionally or knowingly

causes serious bodily injury to another. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101(a),

-102(a)(1)(A) (1997 & Supp. 1998). The offense of aggravated robbery requires

proof of a theft of property, whereas aggravated assault does not. However, the

offense of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury to another does not

require proof of any additional element distinct from the elements of aggravated

robbery where the victim suffers serious bodily injury.

Aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury to another is a lesser

included offense of aggravated robbery where the vic tim suffers serious bodily

injury. An offense is a lesser included offense “only if the elements of the

included offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense and only if

the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser

offense.” State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1996). By committing the

aggravated robbery in this case, Appellants necessarily caused serious bodily

injury to Knight. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a)(2). Thus, aggravated

assault was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery under the facts of

this case.

Under the double jeopardy provisions of both the United States and

Tennessee constitutions, a defendant may not be convicted of two offenses if one

is a lesser included offense of another. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168, 97 S.
1

The State argu es that the evidenc e used to prove e ach off ense w as not ide ntical. First, the S tate

argues that the aggravated robbery convictions were established by proof that when Griffin grabbed

Knight’s purse, Knight fell to the ground and skinned her face. We cannot agree that, without more,

scrapes on the faces constitute “serious bodily injury.” Second, the State argues that the aggravated

robbery convictions were established by proof that Herron seriously injured Knight when she ran over her

while backing the car and that the aggravated assault conviction was supported by proof that Herron

seriously injured Knight when she ran over her again while driving the car forward. There is no such proof

in the record. Knight testified two different times that she was only run over once when the car moved

forward. Contrary to the State’s representations that Herron testified that she ran over Knight twice, the

record indicates th at Herro n denied running o ver Knigh t even on e time. 

-7-

Ct. 2221, 2226–27, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977); State v. Black, 524 S.W.2d 913, 915

(Tenn. 1975); State v. Green, 947 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Therefore, only one conviction may stand.

Further analysis under State v. Denton also indicates that double jeopardy

under the Tennessee Constitution is violated by Appellants’ dual convictions.

The evidence used to prove each offense is virtually identical. For aggravated

robbery, the state proved that Appellants approached Knight, caused her to fall

down by grabbing her purse, and then caused serious bodily injury by running

over her. The State’s proof for aggravated assault was that Appellants

approached Knight, caused her to fall down by grabbing her purse, and then

caused serious bodily injury by running over her.1

Additionally, the offenses arose out of the same incident and involved only

one victim. Moreover, the purposes of the statutes are similar in that both

offenses involve causing serious bodily injury to another person. The harm

sought to be punished in aggravated assault that causes serious bodily injury is

encompassed in aggravated robbery that causes serious bodily injury, even

though aggravated robbery also involves a theft and aggravated assault does not.
2Although only Appellant Herron raised this issue in her brief, Appellant Griffin’s conviction for

aggrava ted assault m ust also be reversed in ord er “to prevent prejud ice to the ju dicial p roce ss” a nd in

order “to do substantial justice.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b); Tenn. R. Crim . P. 52(b).

3Both Appellants also contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for

aggravated assault. Because we have reversed Appellants’ convictions for aggravated assault, we need

not address this issue.

-8-

We find that aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated

robbery under the particular facts of this case. We conclude that Appellants’

convictions for both aggravated robbery and aggravated assault violate their

protection against double jeopardy under the United States Constitution and the

Tennessee Constitution. Only one conviction can, therefore, be sustained.

Accordingly, Appellants’ convictions for aggravated assault are reversed and the

charges for that offense are dismissed.2

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Appellant Herron contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her

conviction for aggravated robbery.3 We disagree.

When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court

is obliged to review that challenge according to certain well-settled principles. A

verdict of guilty by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony

of the State's witnesses and resolves all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the

State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris, 839

S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Although an accused is originally cloaked with a

presumption of innocence, a jury verdict removes this presumption and replaces

it with one of guilt. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence,

on appeal, the burden of proof rests with Appellant to demonstrate the
-9-

insufficiency of the convicting evidence. Id. On appeal, “the [S]tate is entitled to

the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and

legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Id. (citing State v. Cabbage,

571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)). Where the sufficiency of the evidence is

contested on appeal, the relevant question for the reviewing court is whether any

rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris, 839 S.W .2d at 75; Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In

conducting our evaluation of the convicting evidence, this Court is precluded from

reweighing or reconsidering the evidence. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1990). Moreover, this Court may not substitute its own inferences “for those

drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 779. Finally, Rule

13(e) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, “findings of guilt

in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the

evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact beyond a

reasonable doubt.” See also Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 780.

Herron essentially argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict her

of aggravated robbery because there was no evidence that she knew that Griffin

was going to rob Knight. We disagree. There was ample evidence, when viewed

in the light most favorable to the State, for a rational jury to conclude that Herron

knew that Griffin was going to rob Knight and that Herron acted with the intent of

helping Griffin commit the offense. The record indicates that before they

approached Knight, both Appellants walked around in the grocery store for a long

period of time without picking up or buying anything. Appellants then went
-10-

outside, got in their vehicle, and Herron subsequently drove the vehicle over by

Knight’s car and parked at a “funny angle.” After Griffin grabbed Knight’s purse,

Herron pulled forward and ran over and seriously injured Knight. Thereafter,

Herron and Griffin divided the money between them and used Knight’s credit

cards to purchase clothing. A rational jury could infer from this evidence that

Herron and Griffin waited in the parking lot for the purpose of robbing someone,

that Herron drove over and parked by Knight so that Griffin could take her purse,

that Herron ran over Knight in an attempt to escape, and that Herron and Griffin

later split up the proceeds of the robbery as they had agreed. A rational jury

could certainly infer that Herron had acted with the intent to aid Griffin in the

aggravated robbery of Knight in order to share in the proceeds. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-11-402 (1997) (“A person is criminally responsible for an offense

committed by the conduct of another if . . . [a]cting with intent to promote or assist

the comm ission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the

offense, the person . . . aids or attempts to aid another person to commit the

offense.”). This issue has no merit.

V. ADMISSION OF THE CREDIT CARDS AND RECEIPT

Appellant Griffin contends that the trial court erred when it admitted credit

cards and a receipt into evidence. Specifically, Griffin claims that the credit cards

and receipt were irrelevant to the State’s case and thus, this evidence was
4Rule 403 s tates that “[a]ltho ugh relevant, e viden ce m ay be e xcluded if its pro bative value is

substan tially outweighed by the dang er of unfa ir prej udice, confus ion of the is sues, or m islead ing the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pre sentation of cumulative evidence.” 

Tenn. R. Evid. 403.

-11-

inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence4 because its

probative value was substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.

“The admission of evidence is largely discretionary with the trial judge, and

her discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is clearly an abuse of

that discretion.” State v. Gray, 960 S.W.2d 598, 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

In this case, we see no reason to disturb the trial court’s ruling. The credit cards

were clearly relevant because they directly linked Griffin with the aggravated

robbery of Knight. The credit card receipt was also relevant because it showed

that Griffin had used the credit cards within three hours of the robbery and thus,

showed that Griffin did not merely come into possession of the credit cards at

some later date. Finally, the trial court instructed the jury that they were not to

consider this evidence for any other purpose than how it related to the alleged

robbery and assault of Knight. We presume that the jury follows the instructions

of the trial court. See State v. Alvarado, 961 S.W.2d 136, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1996). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the credit

cards and the receipt into evidence. This issue has no merit.

VI. NOTICE OF ENHANCEMENT FACTORS

Appellant Griffin contends that the trial court committed reversible error

when it failed to strike the State’s notice of enhancement factors which was filed

after the trial began. Specifically, Griffin argues that under Tennessee Code
-12-

Annotated section 40-35-202(a) and Rule 12.3 of the Tennessee Rules of

Criminal Procedure, the State was required to give notice of enhancement factors

at least ten days before trial. We disagree.

Under section 40-35-202(a), “[i]f the district attorney general believes that

a defendant should be sentenced as a multiple, persistent or career offender, the

district attorney general shall file a statement thereof with the court and defense

counsel not less than ten (10) days before trial.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

202(a) (1997). By its very terms, this statute applies to situations in which the

State seeks to have the court sentence a defendant in a greater range, not

situations in which the State seeks to have the court enhance a sentence within

a range. In fact, section 40-35-202(b) states that “[i]n all cases following a finding

of guilt, the court may require that: [t]he district attorney general file a statement

with the court setting forth any enhancement or mitigating factors the district

attorney general believes should be considered by the court.” Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-35-202(b)(1) (1997). Thus, section 40-35-202 clearly allows the filing of

enhancement factors “after a finding of guilt.”

Under Rule 12.3, “[w]ritten statements of the district attorney giving notice

that the defendant should be sentenced to an enhanced punishment, for an

especially aggravated offense, and/or as a persistent offender shall be filed not

less than ten (10) days prior to trial.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.3(a). This Rule

applies to notice under section 40-35-202(a), not to notice of enhancement

factors. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. (Advisory Committee Comments). See also State

v. Lowe, 811 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tenn. 1991) (stating that Rule 12.3 applies to

notice under section 40-35-202(a)).
5Griffin also challeng es the len gth of he r aggrav ated as sault sen tence a nd both A ppellants

challenge the imposition of consecutive sentences. Because we have reversed Appellants’ convictions for

aggravated assault, we need not address these issues.

-13-

In this case, the trial court classified Griffin as a Range I standard offender.

In filing its notice of enhancement factors, the State sought to have the court

increase Griffin’s sentence within the range, the State did not seek to enhance

the sentencing range itself. Thus, neither section 40-35-202(a) nor Rule 12.3(a)

is applicable to this case. This issue has no merit.

VI. LENGTH OF SENTENCE

Appellant Griffin contends that the trial court erroneously imposed a longer

sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction than she deserves.5 Specifically,

Griffin contends that the trial court misapplied several enhancement factors in

determining the length of her sentence.

“When reviewing sentencing issues . . . including the granting or denial of

probation and the length of sentence, the appellate court shall conduct a de novo

review on the record of such issues. Such review shall be conducted with a

presumption that the determinations made by the court from which the appeal is

taken are correct.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (1997). “However, the

presumption of correctness which accompanies the trial court’s action is

conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court

considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.”

State v. Ashby, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In conducting our review, we

must consider all the evidence, the presentence report, the sentencing principles,

the enhancing and mitigating factors, arguments of counsel, the appellant’s
-14-

statements, the nature and character of the offense, and the appellant’s potential

for rehabilitation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103(5), -210(b) (1997 & Supp.

1998); Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169. “The defendant has the burden of

demonstrating that the sentence is improper.” Id. Because the record in this

case indicates that the trial court failed to properly consider the sentencing

principles and all relevant facts and circumstances, our review is de novo without

a presumption of correctness.

In sentencing Griffin to twelve years for aggravated robbery, the trial court

found that only one mitigating factor applied. The trial court found that mitigating

factor (9) applied because, at some point, Griffin helped the police locate Herron.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(9) (1997). We agree that none of the other

enumerated mitigating factors of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-113

were applicable.

The trial court found that enhancement factor (1) applied because Griffin

had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to

those necessary to establish the appropriate range. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-114(1) (1997). Griffin contends that this factor was inapplicable because her

previous record consisted of only misdemeanor convictions. However, the

application of this factor is not limited to previous felony convictions. See State

v. Millbrooks, 819 S.W.2d 441, 446–47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Thus, the trial

court correctly applied this factor.

The trial court found that enhancement factor (2) applied because Griffin

was the leader in an offense involving two or more criminal actors. See Tenn.
-15-

Code Ann. § 40-35-114(2) (1997). Griffin does not challenge the application of

this factor and we agree that it was correctly applied.

The trial court found that enhancement factor (4) applied because the

victim was particularly vulnerable because of age or disability. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-114(4) (1997). In State v. Adams, the Tennessee Supreme Court

provided a framework for application of this factor:

[T]he vulnerability enhancement relates more to the natural physical and

mental limitations of the victim than merely to the victim’s age. . . . The

factor can be used . . . if the circumstances show that the victim, because

of his age or physical or mental condition was in fact “particularly

vulnerable,” i.e., incapable of resisting, summoning help, or testifying

against the perpetrator. This is a factual issue to be resolved by the trier

of fact on a case by case basis. The State bears the burden of proving the

victim’s limitations rendering him or her particularly vulnerable. 

864 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tenn. 1993). In State v. Poole, the supreme court stated that

in order for the State to prove that this factor is applicable, “there must be

evidence in the record in addition to the victim’s age.” 945 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tenn.

1997). In this case, the trial court essentially found that Knight was “particularly

vulnerable” because she was sixty-nine years old at the time of the robbery.

Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that, other than her age, Knight had

any other physical or mental limitations. Because the State failed to meet its

burden of showing that Knight was “particularly vulnerable,” the trial court erred

when it applied this factor.

The trial court found that enhancement factor (5) applied because

Appellants treated the victim with exceptional cruelty. See Tenn. Code Ann. §

40-35-114(5) (1997). In Poole, the supreme court stated that

[E]nhancement factors must be “appropriate for the offense” and “not

themselves essential elements of the offense.” These limitations exclude
-16-

enhancement factors “based on facts which are used to prove the offense”

or “[f]acts which establish the elements of the offense charged.” The

purpose of the limitations is to avoid enhancing the length of sentences

based on factors the Legislature took into consideration when establishing

the range of punishment for the offense.

945 S.W.2d at 98. In this case, the trial court found that Appellants had treated

Knight with exceptional cruelty because they seriously injured her when they ran

over her with a car. However, this was the very fact which was used to prove

that Appellants had comm itted the offense of aggravated robbery by causing

“serious bodily injury” to the victim. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-401(a),

-402(2) (1997). Thus, application of this enhancement factor was not

appropriate.

The trial court found that enhancement factors (10) and (16) applied

because Griffin had no hesitation in committing a crime when the risk to human

life was high and there was great potential for bodily injury to the victim. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(10), (16) (1997). This Court has stated that

absent any proof establishing risk to life other than the victim’s, enhancement

factors (10) and (16) are essential elements of the offense of aggravated robbery

and cannot be used for enhancement. State v. King, 905 S.W.2d 207, 213

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). There is no proof in the record that Appellants placed

the life of anyone other than Knight at risk during the aggravated robbery. Thus,

application of these two enhancement factors was not appropriate.

Even though we hold that the trial court erred in applying some of the

enhancement factors, a finding that enhancement factors were erroneously

applied does not equate to a reduction in the sentence. State v. Keel, 882

S.W.2d 410, 423 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Only one mitigating factor applies to
-17-

the sentence for aggravated robbery, and we conclude that it is entitled to little

weight. Although Griffin eventually told the police about Herron’s involvement in

the offense, the record indicates that she initially lied to the police and made

several inconsistent statements. Further, two enhancement factors are

applicable. Not only was Griffin a leader in this offense, she also has a previous

record of criminal offenses. We conclude that in light of the fact that Griffin has

been convicted of three prior theft offenses, her prior record is entitled to

significant weight. Thus, we hold that the twelve year sentence for aggravated

robbery is appropriate in this case.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Because we hold that the convictions for both aggravated robbery and

aggravated assault in this case violate principles of double jeopardy, Appellants’

convictions for aggravated assault are reversed and the charges are dismissed.

In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

___________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE