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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2003 Decided April 25, 2003

No. 01-1228

SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, ADMINISTRATOR,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

01-1231, 01-1232, 01-1237, 01-1238

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

–————

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.
2

James S. Pew argued the cause for petitioners Sierra Club,

et al. With him on the briefs were Howard Fox, David B.

Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey.

Rachel Zaffrann, Assistant Attorney General, New York

State Attorney General’s Office, argued the cause for petitioners States of New York and Connecticut. With her on

the briefs were Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Peter H.

Lehner, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal,

Attorney General, Connecticut Attorney General’s Office, and

Mark Kindall, Assistant Attorney General. Kimberly P.

Massicotte, Assistant Attorney General, entered an appearance.

Claudia M. O’Brien argued the cause for petitioner International Truck and Engine Corporation. With her on the

brief were Laurence H. Levine and Robert M. Sussman.

David W. Marshall was on the brief for amicus curiae

Clean Air Task Force in support of environmental petitioners.

Angeline Purdy and David J. Kaplan, Attorneys, U.S.

Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents.

With them on the brief was Patrice Simms, Counsel, U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency. John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, entered

an appearance.

Claudia M. O’Brien argued the cause for intervenors International Truck and Engine Corporation, et al. in support of

respondent. With her on the brief were Laurence H. Levine,

Robert M. Sussman, Janice K. Raburn, David Thomas Deal,

Richard A. Penna, Howard E. Shapiro, Jed R. Mandel and

Timothy A. French.

James S. Pew and Howard I. Fox were on the brief for

intervenors Sierra Club, et al. in support of respondent.

Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.
3

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: In the 1990 Amendments

to the Clean Air Act Congress directed the Environmental

Protection Agency to regulate emissions of what the agency

calls Mobile Source Air Toxics—that is, toxic chemicals emitted by motor vehicles. Section 202(l ) of the amended Clean

Air Act requires the Administrator first to complete a study

assessing the ‘‘need for, and feasibility of, controlling emissions of toxic air pollutants TTT associated with motor vehicles

and motor vehicle fuels,’’ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(l )(1), and then to

promulgate regulations ‘‘based on’’ that study, id.

§ 7521(l )(2). The regulations are to contain standards

which the Administrator determines reflect the greatest

degree of emission reduction achievable through the

application of technology which will be available, taking

into consideration the standards established under subsection (a) of this section, the availability and costs of the

technology, and noise, energy, and safety factors, and

lead time.

Id. In March 2001 EPA released the regulations, Control of

Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile

Sources, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,230 (March 29, 2001) (the ‘‘Final

Rule’’). Here we review challenges brought by the Sierra

Club and several other environmental groups; by the states

of New York and Connecticut, also seeking greater stringency; and by the International Truck Corporation, seeking

removal of ‘‘diesel particulate matter and diesel exhaust organic gases’’ (in sum, diesel exhaust) from the EPA’s list of

toxics. Finding most of the claims of the first two sets of

petitioners ill founded, and International Truck’s claim unripe, we uphold all aspects of the rule, save one—the agency’s

unexplained rejection of proposals to require ‘‘on-board diagnostics’’ for very heavy heavy-duty vehicles.

* * *

Before delving into the environmental and state petitioners’

attacks on specific features of the rule, we begin by addressing three general statutory issues. The environmental peti-
4

tioners say that the whole rule violated the statutory mandate

because it was not ‘‘based on’’ a study meeting the requirements of § 202(l )(1). Petitioners acknowledge that the EPA

did conduct a study (several studies, in fact), and that the

agency used information gleaned from those studies in the

rulemaking. But they claim that the studies were inadequate. As we understand the claim, petitioners do not ask us

to grade the study against the substantive standards of (l )(1),

but rather to find that its alleged inadequacies doom the

Final Rule.

But we do not read the statute as making the validity of the

rule depend on that of the study. In the first place, petitioners do not propose a method of review for determining

whether a rule was or was not ‘‘based on’’ a study, nor does

any seem immediately apparent; moreover, the statute

doesn’t say that the rule must be based exclusively on the

study. More importantly, for purposes of assessing the

EPA’s rule, the requirement that the rule be ‘‘based on’’ the

study bears no plausible relationship to the criteria that

obviously govern the agency—those of § 202(l )(2), quoted

above. The study subsection, § 202(l )(1), directs the Administrator only to evaluate the ‘‘need for’’ and ‘‘feasibility of’’

‘‘means and measures’’ for controlling mobile air toxics. To

the extent that a ‘‘feasibility’’ analysis in the study involves

the same considerations as § 202(l )(2), it adds nothing; to

the extent that it involves something else, we do not think it

can override (l )(2)’s explicit requirements. Thus, the agency’s failure to have studied ‘‘feasibility’’ per se would not

affect the validity of the rule.

The state petitioners’ attacks on EPA’s exposure modeling

similarly fail to undermine the rule. EPA acknowledges that

its modeling can be improved, updated and refined, but

petitioners have identified no portion of the Final Rule in

which the agency specifically relied on the exposure modeling

for justification, and haven’t pointed to any decision that

would have turned out differently but for the modeling’s

flaws.

Finally, petitioners point out that § 202(l )(2) is ‘‘technology-forcing,’’ so that the agency must consider future advances
5

in pollution control capability. See, e.g., Husqvarna AB v.

EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This is not disputed, but doesn’t take petitioners far. The statute also intends

the agency to consider many factors other than pure technological capability, such as costs, lead time, safety, noise and

energy. And its language does not resolve how the Administrator should weigh all these factors in the process of finding

the ‘‘greatest emission reduction achievable.’’ Petitioners

offer no construction of the statute contradicting the agency’s

overall approach, and thus present no occasion for us to

attempt any final analysis of the statutory meaning. The sole

possible exception to this is a short passage in the environmental petitioners’ brief attacking the agency’s observation

that the ‘‘anti-backsliding program [imposed by the agency

and discussed below] at negligible cost is the most stringent

program that we can justify in the near term.’’ Final Rule,

66 Fed. Reg. at 17,245/2 (emphasis added); see Environmental Petitioners’ Initial Brief at 17 n.11. Petitioners imply that

the agency regarded ‘‘more than negligible’’ cost as automatically disqualifying a standard under § 202(l )(2), but the

reference plainly doesn’t express that idea. Petitioners also

quote to us a fragment from National Lime Ass’n v. EPA,

627 F.2d 416, 431 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1980), purportedly to show

that we have previously ruled that achievability means ‘‘capable of being met.’’ But that snippet merely pointed out that

achievability cannot mean something stronger than ‘‘capable

of being met’’; the rest of the discussion is not on point.

Thus, there is no real issue before us on the degree to which

the statute constrains consideration of cost. Compare the

very severe constraints that we found under the ‘‘feasibility’’

standard of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. United

Steel workers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272–73 (D.C. Cir.

1980). Except for certain explicit statutory questions, therefore, our review will be under the familiar APA standard of

‘‘arbitrary and capricious.’’

* * *

We now turn to petitioners’ attacks on specific elements (or

omissions) of the Final Rule.
6

1. Fuel Controls

EPA concluded that in light of the drastic regulatory

requirements that it was already imposing on the automobile

and fuel industries through prior rulemakings, namely ‘‘Tier

2,’’ Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2

Motor Vehicle Emission Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb.

10, 2000) and ‘‘Heavy–Duty,’’ Control of Air Pollution from

New Motor Vehicles: Heavy–Duty Vehicle and Engine Standards, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002 (Jan. 18, 2001), it should for the

time being limit anti-toxics regulation of motor vehicle fuel to

an ‘‘anti-backsliding’’ provision, also called the ‘‘Toxic Performance Requirement’’ (‘‘TPR’’). This provision prevents a

refinery or importer from increasing the toxicity of its fuel’s

emissions over a baseline level determined by its emissions

performance from 1998–2000. Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at

17,245/2. Many refiners have voluntarily overcomplied with

existing regulations, finding it economically advantageous to

strip their fuel of more toxic chemicals than necessary, evidently because the market value of the extracted chemicals in

certain regions more than covers the extra removal costs.

Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 17,245/3. Absent the regulation,

backsliding would presumably occur if the chemicals’ market

prices fell. The rule measures backsliding by reference to

the agency’s ‘‘Complex Model,’’ which calculates the expected

toxicity of emissions as a function of the concentrations of five

toxic chemicals in the fuel—benzene; formaldehyde; 1,3 butadiene; acetaldehyde; and polycyclic organic matter. Thus

the standard aggregates chemicals; a refiner could, for example, offset an increase in benzene with a decrease in acetaldehyde.

The environmental petitioners challenge both the agency’s

allowance of aggregation and its failure to impose emissions

caps rather than merely preventing backsliding. As to aggregation, they stress that § 202(l )(2) requires that the regulations ‘‘shall, at a minimum, apply to emissions of benzene and

formaldehyde.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(l )(2). The anti-backsliding

rule, of course, does apply to benzene and formaldehyde, as

well as to the three other chemicals, so it achieves literal

compliance with the statute. Nor does the agency interpreta-
7

tion appear unreasonable on the facts. We can imagine a

case where it would not make sense merely to include benzene or formaldehyde in a basket of toxics. For example, it

might be shown that the Complex Model weights chemicals

incorrectly in light of their adverse health effects, or that

differences among the chemicals, in terms of the relation

between health effects and achievable controls, called for

some sort of weighting adjustment or even ranking. But no

such claim is made. Thus we see neither statutory violation

nor capriciousness in the agency’s decision to allow companies

to trade benzene or formaldehyde increases against less

costly reductions in other toxics.

As for the agency’s choice of a mere anti-backsliding rule

rather than a more aggressive emissions cap, petitioners

argue first that the rule achieves no actual ‘‘reduction’’ in

emissions, and so cannot be considered the statutorily required ‘‘greatest possible reduction achievable.’’ But this

errs at the outset by assuming that the emissions level

prevailing at some historic point of time is the only permissible baseline against which ‘‘reductions’’ might be measured.

The statute does not state any such baseline. Of course, a

regulation allowing higher than historic levels could not qualify as a ‘‘reduction’’ if the projected increase were purely

hypothetical; but petitioners make no such contention. Furthermore, even if there were no risk that emissions might

increase above the status quo, reduction below that level

might not be ‘‘achievable’’ in light of the various criteria for

assessing achievability.

This takes us to petitioners’ argument that more stringency

is achievable, namely an emissions cap rather than the agency’s anti-backsliding rule. As we noted, petitioners have not

argued that the statute embodies some specific system for

balancing the relevant variables. But they find a statutory

hook in the concept of ‘‘lead time.’’ Specifically, they argue

that the EPA arbitrarily decided that any regulation it would

adopt must take effect by January 1, 2002; this faulty decision, they believe, wrongly tilted the balance against an

emissions cap, which would have been impossible to achieve in
8

that short time frame. More broadly, petitioners assert that

the agency’s choice of time frame dictated an outcome without

meaningful reductions.

In fact, however, we see no evidence that the agency’s

choice of time frame preceded its evaluation of alternatives.

Rather, it focused on the short term because it found itself

confronting a situation where—for a brief time—it wouldn’t

be able to realistically assess achievability on a longer term

basis. Its recently promulgated Tier 2 and Heavy–Duty

standards required, among other things, deep reductions in

the sulfur content of gasoline. Compliance with these regulations can be expected to impose substantial costs on refiners

well into this century. Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 17,253/2.

Moreover, at the time it issued these earlier requirements,

the agency didn’t know what technological fixes refiners and

vehicle manufacturers would use to meet them. See, e.g.,

Tier 2 Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 6774–77. Hence, the

regulations’ effects on industry are still unknown, and the

agency held off socking refiners with drastic additional regulations that could interfere with planning on investments and

other compliance matters. With relatively mild action now, it

would be able later to assess, in a rulemaking actually scheduled for 2003–04, the impact of the earlier rules and the

benefits and costs of further controls. Final Rule, 66 Fed.

Reg. at 17,253/2. Given that the agency was shooting at a

rapidly moving target (whose mobility was largely driven by

its own prior regulation), its temporary rejection of regulations with long or intermediate lead times was not arbitrary.

Petitioners chide the agency for relying on future rulemakings, citing cases to the effect that labeling an action ‘‘interim’’ can’t save an invalid rule. See Chlorine Chemistry

Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But of

course cases of that sort were not ones where the agency

decision made sense on the data then available.

2. Vehicle Based Controls

The state petitioners primarily challenge the agency’s decision not to impose controls on certain motor vehicles already

on the road—‘‘in-use’’ vehicles as opposed to new ones. The
9

states favor a series of such regulations for in-use heavy-duty

vehicles, such as mandatory retrofitting of certain diesel

engines with particulate matter traps, and inspection and

maintenance requirements on heavy-duty vehicles. EPA

gave no real answer in the rulemaking, but now argues that

§ 202(l )(2) gives it no authority to promulgate regulations for

in-use vehicles. Petitioners note that an agency cannot normally prevail on the basis of a justification offered merely by

counsel rather than by the agency, see SEC v. Chenery, 318

U.S. 80, 93–94 (1943); but that limit is inapplicable when the

agency’s conclusion is one ‘‘to which it was bound to come as

a matter of law,’’ United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173,

1190 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Section 202(l )(2) instructs the Administrator to ‘‘promulgate TTT regulations under subsection (a)(1) of this section

TTT to control hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles

and motor vehicle fuels.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(l )(2) (emphasis

added). The emphasized portions create something of an

internal contradiction. The statute defines ‘‘motor vehicle’’

separately from ‘‘new motor vehicle,’’ see 42 U.S.C. § 7550(2),

(3), suggesting that any use of the term ‘‘motor vehicle’’

simpliciter encompasses in-use vehicles; but as ‘‘subsection

(a)(1)’’ authorizes regulations only for ‘‘new motor vehicles,’’

that reference seems to limit § 202(l )(2) to new ones.

There are various rather inconclusive linguistic arguments

on each side. Petitioners point out that in the neighboring

§ 202(m), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m), added to the Clean Air Act in

the same set of amendments as (l )(2), and governing ‘‘emissions control diagnostics,’’ Congress provided both that the

regulations were to be promulgated ‘‘under subsection (a)’’

and that they were to apply only to ‘‘new light duty trucks.’’

But the usage in § 202(m) may have been intended only to

make assurance double sure, and any inference from the

difference between (l ) and (m) is somewhat offset by the

wording of 42 U.S.C. § 7554(d), in which Congress authorized

regulations ‘‘under’’ subsection (a) of § 202 and then made

explicit that it was authorizing a limited retrofit mandate for

the urban buses at issue there. While that section itself

indicates that Congress has sometimes intended that
10

§ 7521(a) regulations should apply to in-use vehicles, it is

equally consistent with the idea that when Congress intends

such an override, it says so.

The EPA’s reading has its own difficulties. The first, of

course, is the reference to ‘‘motor vehicles’’ in § 202(l )(2).

This might reflect a purposeful triggering of the definitional

section, and thus override the limitation to new vehicles

seemingly required by the cross-reference to subsection

(a)(1). The government’s view has the advantage of giving

a clear utility to the term ‘‘under subsection (a)(1),’’ but petitioners suggest an alternative function, namely, making

various other statutory cross-references apply to the toxics

regulations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g)(2) (disallowing issuance of certificates of conformity for new car models that

do not meet standards promulgated under § 7521(a)); 42

U.S.C. § 7417 (requiring the Administrator to consult with

advisory committees and independent experts before promulgating regulations under § 7521(a)). So while petitioners may have little evidence supporting their interpretation,

they at least point out problems in the agency’s view.

The structure of the statute as a whole, however, seems to

us to fatally undermine petitioners’ reading. Subchapter II,

Part A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–54, serves

primarily to authorize EPA to impose an elaborate regulatory

system on fuel refiners and motor vehicle manufacturers—

not motor vehicle owners. As we have seen, § 7521(a) sets

forth the general authorization. Section 7525 sets up a

system for testing of vehicle and engine prototypes, to be

followed by issuance of compliance certificates, without which

sale of a new vehicle is unlawful, see § 7522(a)(1). Section

7541 requires warranties by manufacturers and carefully

limits the risk that a vehicle purchaser will have to pay

directly for significant emissions-related repairs. See

§§ 7541(a)(3), (g). Section 7521(a)(1) makes the requirements

applicable for vehicles’ ‘‘useful life,’’ which is to be implemented in the system for certification of compliance.1

1 Ironically petitioners argue that § 202(l )(2)’s cross-reference

to § 202(a) can be found to serve a purpose independent of the
11

In a small number of cases, Congress explicitly departed

from that model, granting the EPA carefully hedged authority to impose a direct cost on auto owners and users (rather

than one buried in the purchase price of a vehicle). For

instance, § 7521(a)(3)(D) allows EPA regulations for the ‘‘control of rebuilding practices’’ of heavy-duty engines, though

only after a study of rebuilding practices. And § 7554(d)

provides for a mandate, to be adopted by November 15, 1991,

requiring retrofitting of urban buses—but only ones having

their engines rebuilt or replaced more than three years after

January 1, 1995. A possible exception to Congress’s great

precision in allowing EPA to impose burdens directly on

vehicle users is 42 U.S.C. § 7521(j)(4), authorizing regulation

‘‘under subsection (a)(1)’’ of ‘‘cold start’’ carbon monoxide

emissions of heavy-duty vehicles and engines. Even if this is

intended to encompass in-use vehicles (a point we need not

resolve), the linguistic case for such a reading is stronger

than for § 202(l )(2), as the authorized regulations’ scope is

far more confined (to heavy-duty vehicles, likely to be owned

primarily by firms), and an argument can be drawn from the

contrasting language of the other subsection of § 7521(j), with

their explicit spelling out of lead times. All we need resolve

here is that, given § 7521’s focus on new vehicles, and Congress’s restraint and precision in allowing direct EPA burdens on vehicle owners, we cannot read § 202(l )(2)’s omission

of the word ‘‘new’’ as carte blanche to regulate in-use vehicles

in connection with toxics.

The state and environmental petitioners also attack the

EPA’s decision not to require on-board diagnostic equipment

(‘‘OBD’’) for new heavy-duty vehicles over 14,000 pounds.

EPA’s explanation of this decision did little more than point

out that it had previously established such requirements for

heavy-duty vehicles under 14,000 pounds, and that it ‘‘expect[ed] to propose similar requirements for all other heavylatter’s restriction to new vehicles, namely incorporation of the

useful life concept. But through its connection to compliance

certification, that concept itself is logically pertinent only to manufacturers’ responsibilities.
12

duty vehicles in the near future.’’ See Technical Support

Document: Control of Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Fuels (December 2000) at 152.

To be sure, the agency had previously pointed out the

existence of technical barriers to the implementation of OBD

requirements for large vehicles. It had explained in 1999, for

instance, that a relatively high proportion of large heavy-duty

vehicles, such as cement mixers and refrigerator trucks, have

‘‘power take-off units,’’ which use engine energy to operate

ancillary equipment that users keep running much of the

time; as EPA’s OBD rules for covered vehicles (i.e., ones

under 14,000 pounds) allow diagnostics to be disabled during

such power take-off operations, imposition of the same requirement on the very heavy ones would be largely ineffective. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From 2004 and

Later Model Year Heavy–Duty Highway Engines and Vehicles, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,472, 58,515 (Oct. 29, 1999). In addition,

EPA had said that the lack of vertical integration in the field

made it hard to coordinate the ‘‘engine, transmission, chassis,

and safety related diagnostics.’’ Id.

But even assuming these explanations are enough, EPA

failed to provide them in the rulemaking, depriving petitioners of an opportunity to offer rebuttal or to show that some

sort of requirement might still make sense—a point that EPA

seems implicitly to have conceded in its reference to likely

future proposals. See Technical Support Document at 152;

see also Respondent’s Br. at 30. Indeed, those assurances

raise the question whether its 1999 observations, on which its

brief relies here, fully reflected its thinking at the time of this

rulemaking. The decision being at best inadequately explained, we remand for further explanation, though not necessarily for further notice-and-comment rulemaking. See, e.g.,

Nat’l Grain and Feed Ass’n v. OSHA, 903 F.2d 308, 310–11

(5th Cir. 1990) (applying the ‘‘usual rule that a reviewing

court should leave the agency free on remand to determine

whether supplemental fact-gathering is necessary’’).
13

3. Listing of Diesel Exhaust

Finally, we turn to International Truck’s contention that it

was unlawful for EPA to list diesel exhaust as a mobile air

toxic that may be regulated in the future. The listing makes

clear that it excludes nontoxic components of diesel exhaust,

and that EPA intends the ‘‘listing’’ simply to focus its own

and others’ attention on emissions ‘‘potentially responsible’’

for adverse health effects, or posing a ‘‘potential concern for

public health.’’ See Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 17,236/1–2.

We dismiss this complaint, however. Under the familiar test

of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967),

looking to the fitness of the issues for judicial review and the

hardship to the parties of withholding such review, the mere

listing of diesel exhaust for purposes of future consideration

presents no ripe issue.

Petitioners claim that the issue is purely legal, and thus

presumptively fit for review. Specifically, they argue that

§ 202(l )(2) authorizes regulations of ‘‘hazardous air pollutants,’’ and that diesel exhaust is not a ‘‘hazardous air pollutant’’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(6). That

section defines ‘‘hazardous air pollutants’’ as ones initially

listed as such in § 7412(b) or that the agency has listed by

going through an elaborate process set out in § 7412(b). But

this definition applies only ‘‘[f]or purposes’’ of § 7412 itself

(except for subsection (r)), and has no bearing on the term as

it appears in § 202(l )(2). Thus the only issue is the propriety

of deciding whether a particular chemical is worthy of further

study, an issue for the review of which we can see no legal

benchmark.

And as to hardship, International Truck points us only to

various initiatives of the EPA and the Department of Defense

to study the health effects of diesel exhaust. But these are

not, so far as appears, actions legally triggered by the listing,

as were the regulatory consequences that flowed from an

agency listing of dioxin as a substance ‘‘known to be a human

carcinogen,’’ which in Tozzi v. HHS, 271 F.3d 301, 310 (D.C.
14

Cir. 2001), we found enough to show ripeness. Nor do they

match the consequences that flow from inclusion of a site on

CERCLA’s ‘‘National Priorities List’’—a drastic reputational

loss and sharply heightened exposure to very costly enforcement actions—which in Mead v. Browner, 100 F.3d 152, 155

(D.C. Cir. 1996), we found adequate for a different issue,

standing. Thus we dismiss International’s petition for want

of jurisdiction.

* * *

In sum, the claims of the environmental and state petitioners are denied on the merits, except for the remanded issue

of on-board diagnostics, and that of International is dismissed

as unripe.

So ordered.