The Honor able James S
. Gw i n, United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0789n.06 No. 09-2173 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. KENNET H J AMES J OHNSON, Defendan t-Appellant.

______________________________ _________ )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN
O P I N I O N

Before: M ARTIN and MOORE, Circuit Jud ges; GWIN, Distric t Judge. * KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Whe n th is p ane l pr e vio us ly c on sid e re d K e nn e th Jame s John so n’ s se nte nc e fo r co ns pir a c y to distribute and distribution of crac k coca ine, we r emande d for r esente ncingin light of Spears v. United States , — U.S. —, 129 S. C t. 840 (2009). Now, Johnson has been r esente nced to 110 months in prison, a term that is the same leng th a s his or igina l se ntence . Rather than e x pressingag ree ment or disag ree ment with the cra ck guidelines, the district c ourt asser ted that Cong ress ha d authorized t h e 1 0 0 -t o-one c rac k-to-powde r ratio and deeme d the cour ts an improper f

orum to rec onsider the ratio. K i mb rough dir e c tly

c on tr a dic ts t

ho se a sse rt ion s. B e c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t f ull yNo. 09-2173

United States v. J

ohnson

2 rec og nize the scope of its discre tion, we VA CA TE J ohnson’s sentenc e and REMAND for
re s en t en ci n g. I. BACKG ROUND In 2007, J ohnson pleade d g uilty to c onspiracy to distribute more than five g rams of c ocaine ba se (c ra c k) , o ne c ount o f c ra c k d istri butio n, and fo ur c ounts of dis tr ibutin g mor e tha

n fiv e g ra ms of cr ac k
. W e detailed the history of Johns on’s ca se in our prior de cision. See U nited States v. Johnson , 553 F.3d 990, 992–95 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Of re levanc e to this appea l is J ohnson’s criminal history , which includes twe nty -three convictions spanningover thre e dec ades. Ma ny of the cr imes from which his c riminal history was calculate d, such as operating while impaired and second- deg ree reta il fraud, we re r elatively minor. Others, such as ag g ravated domestic violence , wer e more sever e. Som e cri mes , in c lud ingun arm e d r ob be ry and a ssa ult , w e re too re mot e to i nc lud e in t he c ri min a lhi s t o ry co mp u t at i o n . T o t al ed , t h e d i s tri ct co urt i d en t i fi ed1 5 cr i m i n al-history points, placing

J ohnson in C ri min a l H ist or

y Cate g or y VI
. John so n ar g ue d th a t Cate g or y VI ov e rr e pr e se nte d th e se ri ou sn e ss of his offe nses, but the district court denied J ohnson’s reque st for a downwar d depar ture. Combined wi th ano f f e n s e le v e l o f

2 5 , th e Se n te n c in g G u id e li n e s p r o d u c e d a r an g e o f 1 1 0 to 1 3 7 mo n th s of imp riso nme nt. Ac kn ow le dg ingits a uth or ity to e mpl oy

a c ra c k- to- po wd e r r a tio oth e r t ha n 1 00 to
on e , th e dist ri ct c ourt

op te d to us e the 10 0- to- on e ratio in l ig ht o f C on g re ss’ s r e pe a te d f a ilure to adopt a diff

ere nt r atio. The district c ourt sentenc ed J ohnson to 110 months in prison, which was the same sente nce that it had imposed at J ohnson’s first sen t en ci n g. J o hnson has appe aled his new sentenc e.No. 09-2173

United States v. J

ohnson

3

II. AN AL YSI S A. Crim inal-Hi story Cat egory J ohnson contends that the district c ourt err ed by not depar ting downw ard when ca lculating his c ri min a l- his tor

y c a te g or y . A s w e e xpla ine d in

our pr ior de c isi on in Johns on ’s c a se , w e no rm a lly do “‘not re view a district c ourt’s dec ision not t o depar t downwar d unless the re cord shows that the district court wa s unawa re o f, or did not under stand, its discretion to make such a depar ture.’” Johnson , 5 5 3 F
. 3 d a t 9 9 9 (q u o t i n g United States v. Santillana , 540 F.3d 428, 431 ( 6th Cir.), c e rt. denied, —

U. S. — , 1 29 S. Ct . 4 69 (2 00 8) ). “ [W]e p re su me that th e dis tr ic t c ourt un de rs too d it s discretion, abse nt clear ev i d ence to the contra ry .” Santillana , 540 F.3d at 431. Here , the
rese ntencingtranscr ipt reflec ts the district court’s under standing and exerc ise of i ts discretion. The district court found that Cate g ory VI acc urate ly

ref lected Johnson’s “ver

y very substantial” cr iminal history , which ex cee ded the minimum require d for placement in Categ ory VI
. R. 100 (Resentenc ing Tr. at 31) . When determiningthe likelihood th at J ohnson would reof fend, the district court emphasized J ohnson’s failure to participate i n reha bilitation progra

ms in state prison and the number of crimes that wer e not factored into his criminal history
. Id. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re a so nin g re ve a ls
an und e rs tand ingof

its po we r t o d e pa

rt fr om t he Gu ide lin e s. We w ill no t r e vie w i ts de c isi on to ref rain fr om exercising that power. B. Spe ar s and S entencing Disparities We r e mand e d Joh ns on ’s c a se so that th e dis tr ic t c ourt c ou ld c on sid e r Johns on ’s se nte nc e in light of Sp e ar

s , in which the Supreme Court clarifie d its holdi ng in Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85 (2007). Sp e ar

s authorized district courts “to reje ct and va ry cate g orica lly

from the c rac k-No. 09-2173

United States v. J

ohnson

4 co ca i n e Gu i d elines base d on a policy disag ree ment with those Guidelines.” Sp e ar s , 1 2 9 S. Ct
. at 843–44. “Althoug h Kimbrough allows district courts to consider the policies of the Guidelines and potential disparities resultingfrom them whe n deter mining an a

ppropriate sentenc e, it by

no means held that the fa ilure to adopt one particula r pol icy perspe ctive renders a within-Guidelines sentenc e
s u b s ta n ti v e ly un r e a s o n a

b le .” United States v. J ones , 370 F. App’ x 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion). That conc lusion is equally true of Sp e ar

s . Using the Guidelines ratio is not automatically

unrea sonable. See U

nited States v. Simmons , 587 F.3d 348, 365–66 (6th Cir. 2009) (“ [T]he dis pa

rate tr e a tme nt o f c ra c k a

nd po wd e r c oc a in e advise d b y the Gu ide lin e s is no t pe r s e
unrea sonable or unc onstitut ional.”), cert. de nied , 130 S. Ct. 2116 (2010). “[W ]hen a district court observe s that the Guidelines are advisory and provides no indication that policy disag ree ments are
no t ap r o p e r

b a s i s t o v ar

y , th e na s e n t e n c e w i th i nth e G u i d e l i n e s r an g e r e m a i n s p r e s ump tiv e ly
rea sonable on a

ppeal.” Id. at 364. On the other hand, whe n a distri ct court indi cate s that policy dis a g re e me nts are no t a

pr op e r b a sis to v ary , th e n th e re su lti ngse nte nc e is n ot p re sumpt ive ly
rea sonable. More fundame ntally , in such a c ase, the district c ourt has committed proc edura l error by failingto a

pprec iate the scope of its discr etion. See U nited States v. Santillana , 540 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct . 469 (2008). At J ohnson’s rese ntencing , the district judge purported to r ecognize the advisory char acte r of the Guide lines. See R. 100 (Resentenc ing T r. at 25–26) (“I fully rec og nize my authority to vary from the c rac k/powder c ocaine g uidelines based sole ly on a policy

disag ree ment with the 100 to one ratio. . . . The ope rative w ord in the Kimbrough case is may , m-a-y .”). H oweve r, the district judg e’s
rema rks about the proper role of courts reve al his be lief that a policy disag ree ment is not a properNo. 09-2173

United States v. J

ohnson

5 basis for a judge to vary . The dist rict court ag ree d with the 100-to-one r atio, not for its substance, but beca use “Cong ress ha s said 100 to one is the appropr iate ra t i o b y d i rectly establishing the mandatory

min i m u ms, which in eff ect e ng raf ted a 100 to one r atio on the cr iminal statutes[ ,] or i n d i re ctly by not chang ing the law in the fa ce of many opportunities to do so.” Id. at 26. Afte r documentingthe history

of c ong ressional inac tion at leng th, the district judge rea soned that “the leg islative branc h of g overnme nt is precisely the corr ect forum for this policy judgme nt. Courts are ill-equipped to make the se dec isions.” Id. a t 28 ; see also id. at 30 (“ Ibelieve that decision is for the leg islative and e x ec u t i v e b ranc hes of the g overnme nt and not for this Court.”). The district court concl u d ed that deviating f rom the 100-to-one ratio would incre ase the probability of sentenc ing dis pa ri tie s amon g de fe nd ants wh o a re se nte nc e d f

or cr ack of fe ns e s b e c a

us e jud g e s d if

fe r “ wi thi n dis tr ic ts a nd a c ro ss t he c ountr y ” and be c a us e jud g e s c ann ot pr e dic t f utu re c ha ng e s th a t Co ng re ss might ena ct. Id. at 29. The district cour

t’s analy sis is contrary

to Kimbrough , which explained that t h e crac k g u i d e l i n e s w e r e n o tb a s e d o nt h e s o rto f

“ e mp i r i c a l d a t a a n d

n a t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e , g u i d e d b y a profe s s i o nal staff

with appropriate expertise,” that nor mally char acte rizes the instit utional competenc e of the Commi ssion. 552 U.S. at 109 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Kimbrough clar ified the irr eleva

nce of cong ressional defe renc e as well: the re levant statute “ say s nothing a bout the appr opriate se ntence s” for cra ck o ff

en d er s who fa ll between the statutory minimum and maxi mum and the Court “dec line[d] to rea d any implicit direc tive into
. . . cong ressional silence .” Id. at 103. In fac t, the absence of a c ong ressional mandate to use t h e 1 00-to-one r atio is what enable d the Supreme Court to aff ord discretion to district courts. Id. at 102–06. Finally , KimbroughNo. 09-2173

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ohnson

6 d en i ed that unwar

rante d disparities wer e a r eason to tie district cour ts to the 100-to-one ratio. I d. at 106–08 (de scribingdisparities as “a nece ssary

cost of the r emedy”). In light of Kimbrough , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on c onstitut e d p ro c e dura l e rr or . Wh ile dis tr ic t ju dg e s h ave wi de dis c re tio n in fi xing a c ra c k- to- po wd e r ratio , the y are no t f re e to c e de the ir discretion by

concludingthat their cour trooms are the wrongforum for setting a cra ck-to-pow der ratio. See U

nited States v. He rder , 594 F.3d 352, 363 ( 4th Cir. 2010) (holding that, when a district
c ourt us e s th e Gu ide lin e s r a tio be c a us e “ ‘C on g re ss h a s d e c ide d that that’ s an a pp ro pr iate ratio ,’ ” it ha s “ fa ile d to re c og nize its dis c re tio n to se nte nce outsi de the c ra c k c oc a ine Gu ide lin e s” ); United States v. Jone

s , 5 31 F .3 d 1 63 , 1 80 –8 2 ( 2d Cir
. 20 08 ) ( re mand ingfo r r e se nte nc ingdu e to a mbi g uit y
a bo ut t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s un de rs tand ingof its dis c re tio n w he n it

sa id t he c ra c k- po wd e r d isp ari ty is “‘what it is, and I think the C ourt in g ener al i s wise to follow that direc tive and not substitute its own vie w’ ” ); United States v. Tabor , 531 F.3d 688, 690–92 (8th Cir. 2008) (remandingfor r esente ncing beca use Kimbrough later r ejec ted ea ch re ason that the district judg e had g iven for usingthe 100-toon e rat io : con gress io nal in ten t, fear o f se nt enci ng di sp ari ti es, andlac k o f i ns ti tu ti on al c apaci ty). By failingto rec og nize the extent of i ts discretion, the district court did not comply with our instructions for the pr ior rema

nd. On remand from thi s decision, t he dis trict court may , as a matter of policy , ag ree or disag ree with the Guidelines ratio that desig nates c rac k offe nses as more serious than powde r off enses. B utNo. 09-2173

United States v. J

ohnson

In fac t, while J ohnson’s latest appe al was p en d ing be fore this court, Congr ess passed the 1 Fa ir SentencingAct of 2010 “ [t ]o resto re fa i rn ess t o Fe dera l coca ine sentenc ing.” SeeF a ir SentencingAct of 2010, Pub. L . No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug . 3, 2010). The a ct re duced the discrepa ncy in mandatory

minimum s betwee n cra ck and powder of fense s from 100 to 1 down to 18 to 1. The law doe s not apply retroa ctively , and a pa

nel of this court has held t hat “we m ust apply the penalty provision in place at the time [ that J ohnson] commi tted the cr ime.” Un i t ed S t a t es v. Carradine , 621 F.3d 575, 580 ( 6th Cir. 2010). Neve rtheless, its p assage demonstrates that even Congr ess has g ravitate d awa y from the 100- to-one ratio.

7 i tm u s tn o tr e l y

o nt h e G u i d e l i n e s f

o r r e a s o n s th a t K

i mbr ough reje cted, suc h as instituti onal
c omp e te nc e , d e fe re nc e to C on g re ss, or the ri sk that ot he r j ud g e s w ill se t di ff

e re nt r a tio s. 1 C. Re as ona ble ne ss J ohnson asserts that his sentenc e was both proce durally and subst antively unrea sonable. He
me nt i o n s o n e a l l e g e d

p r o c e d ur a l e r r o r : th e d i s tr i c tc o urts a i d th a ti tw o u l d

“ c o n s i d e r ” h is post-sentenc ing r ehabilitation y et imposed the same sentenc e as bef ore. R. 100 (Rese ntencingTr. at 35). Whe the r d istri c t c ourt s ma y va ry do wnwa rd ba se d o n p os ts ent encing re ha bil itatio n is a question on which the Supreme Court has g rante d cer tiorari. United States v. Pe pper , 570 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 1 30 S. Ct . 3 49 9 ( 20 10 ); see also Br ief of the United States at 29–51, Peppe r , N o. 09 -6 82 2 ( S. Ct . Aug . 2 01 0) (c on c e din g tha t po sts e nte nc ingre ha

bi litat ion is a pe rm iss ibl e c on sid e ratio n) ; c f. United States v. W

orley , 453 F.3d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that district courts may

not consider postsentencing reha bilitation on Bo ok

e r rema nds). B ut the district court her e, proc eedingas thoug h it h ad the lega l authority to consider postsentenc ing
re ha bil itatio n, e le c te d n ot t o v ary fr om t he Gu ide lin e s b a se d o n th e fa c ts o f Johns on ’s c a se . A s a
re su lt, re so lut ion

of the le g a l qu e sti on

pe nd ingbe fo re the Sup re me Court do e s no t a lte r t he outc omeNo. 09-2173

United States v. J

ohnson

The district cour

t also rec ommended that “Johnson be consid ere d for the 500[-]hour 2 prog ram” for dr

ug treatment in light of his postsentenci ng reha bilitation efforts. R. 100 (R e se nte nc ingTr . at 37 ). Th a t r e c omm e nd a tio n is no t be fo re us in t his a pp e a l. We a lso a sked the district c ourt to “show that it has ade quately considere d § 5G1.3(c ) and 3 the rele vant commentar

y in de termining whether J ohnson’s fede ral sentenc e should run consec utive 8 of John so n’ s a

pp e a l. See U

nited States v. Vicol , No. 08-2547, 2010 WL 4810215, at *4 (6th Cir. 2 Nov. 19, 2010) (unpublished opinion) (finding the refusal to consider postsentencingreha

bilitation, if err oneous, to be ha

rmless bec ause the district court sa id that the sentenc e would not have chang ed). Her e, the district cour

t did what it promised: it considered Johnson’s post sentencing reha bilitation. I t simpl y

found Johns o n ’s co n d u ct i nadequate to justify a lesser sentenc e. R. 100 (Resente ncingTr. at 35–36) (“[R] ecognizi ng Mr. J ohnson[’s] reha bilitative effor

ts[ ,] I also must be
conce rned a

bout specifica lly deter

ring Mr. J ohnson. He is star ting to make strides in that reg ard, but my conce rns still remain high c oncer ning whether Mr. J ohnson when re lease d will commit further
c ri me s. ” ); id. at 37 (“ Mr. J ohnson has made sig nificant strides . . . [b]ut . . . is writing on a rec ord here that, in the Court’s judgme nt, r equire s a signific ant period of incar cer ation to make su re t h at [he ] co nti nu e s h is r e ha

bil itativ e e ff

or ts .
. . .” ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t c omm it r e ve rs ibl e proce dural e rror

in rea chingthat conclusion. John so n a lso argue s th a t f a ilure to co ns ide r p os t- se nte nc ingre ha bil itatio n r e nd e re d h is sentenc e substantively

unrea sonable. B eca

use we have c oncluded that Johnson’s sentence was proce durally

unsound in light of Kimbrough , we do not addr ess whethe r the sente nce w as substantively

rea sonable. See U

nited States v. Garcia-Robles , 562 F.3d 763, 768 ( 6th Cir. 2009). 3No. 09-2173

United States v. J

ohnson

to his undischarg ed state se ntence.” Johnson , 553 F.3d a t 998. The district court c omplied, and John so n h a s n ot r a ise d th e iss ue on a pp e a l. 9 III . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons stated a

bove, we VA CA TE J ohn s o n ’s sentenc e and REMAND for
re s en t en ci n g.