alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Accounting of Margaret C. Engelbach et al., as Executors of Mary A. Walters, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County,

April 8, 1957.

*Stanley F. Gordon*for petitioner.

*Carl H. Hoffman*for executors, respondents.

Edgar F. Hazleton, S.

In this proceeding for a compulsory accounting the petitioner alleges that he is a creditor of the decedent, having earned some $5,500 by virtue of his services as a real estate broker. The executors had formally rejected

*831this claim, and now deny the allegations in the petition and affirmatively state that petitioner is not a creditor and that an accounting cannot be ordered, since the estate tax proceeding is not completed. In essence, the answer puts in issue the status of the petitioner and the timeliness of the application.

Regarding the first issue, the executors assert they should be permitted to test petitioner’s status as a creditor upon a preliminary hearing. Petitioner argues to the ■ contrary, stating he may institute the proceeding and prove his claim upon the settlement of the account, citing *Matter of Mallin*(142 Misc. 520). However, it is now clear that the views expressed in the *Mallín*case are no longer generally accepted. In *Matter of Eisenberg*(279 App. Div. 868) the court held: “An allegation in a petition, in a proceeding such as this, that the petitioner is a creditor of the estate, does not in and of itself suffice to establish the petitioner’s right to maintain the proceeding as a creditor. The status of a ‘ creditor ’ is not the same as that of a *‘*person interested in the estate.’ (Cf. Surrogate’s Ct. Act. § 314, subds. 3, 10; see *Matter of Leahy,*184 Misc. 250.) The learned Surrogate should have conducted a hearing and determined, upon evidence there adduced, whether the petitioner was a creditor prima facie. *(Matter of Scheftel,*150 Misc. 3; see *Matter of Ahrens,*270 App. Div. 1038.) ”

There is no question that the proceedings are not premature in point of time. There has been no accounting since letters were issued on May 2, 1955, and, in fact, the Surrogate may upon his own initiative order an accounting after the expiration of 15 months. (Surrogate’s Ct. Act, § 257-a.) The remedy is available to a proper petitioner seven months after the issuance of letters, and, although this court might exercise some discretion where a tax proceeding was pending and the petition for a compulsory accounting was brought soon after the seven-month period, such is not the case here.

The petition is denied. Submit order on notice.
| (1)    | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                  |                                                                                                                             |
| (2)    | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

| /s/ William Hartman                                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| William Hartman                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |   |
| Title: Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |   |
| Date: May  13, 2010                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |   |
#### Gerard Rich, Respondent, v Colossal Carting Corp. et al., Appellants.

[745 NYS2d 451]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Weiss, J.), dated July 30, 2001, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants failed to establish prima facie their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955). Florio, J.P., Goldstein, Luciano and Cozier, JJ., concur.
CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the quarterly  report of Secure
      Netwerks,  Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the
      period  ending  March 31, 2007 as filed with
      the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the
      date hereof (the "Periodic Report"), I, Chene Gardner, Chief Executive
      Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
                Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of the Securities
                Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
            The
                information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
                all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
                of
                the Company.





Dated
      as
      of May 15, 2007





By
      /s/ Kenneth I. Denos


----------------------------------


Chene
      Gardner


Chief
      Executive Officer
      and


Chief
      Financial
      Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 123 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 123

  To authorize the project for hurricane and storm damage reduction, 
               Morganza to the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 4, 2007

 Ms. Landrieu introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To authorize the project for hurricane and storm damage reduction, 
               Morganza to the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MORGANZA TO THE GULF OF MEXICO PROJECT.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Army shall carry out the 
project for hurricane and storm damage reduction, Morganza to the Gulf 
of Mexico, Louisiana, substantially in accordance with the plans, and 
subject to the conditions, described in the Reports of the Chief of 
Engineers dated August 23, 2002, and July 22, 2003, at a total cost of 
$886,700,000, with an estimated Federal cost of $576,355,000 and an 
estimated non-Federal cost of $310,345,000.
    (b) Credit.--The Secretary shall credit toward the non-Federal 
share of the cost of the project elements the cost of design and 
construction work carried out by the non-Federal interest before the 
date of the partnership agreement for the project elements if the 
Secretary determines that the work is integral to the project elements.
    (c) Operations and Maintenance.--The operation, maintenance, 
repair, rehabilitation, and replacement of the Houma Navigation Canal 
lock complex and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway floodgate features of 
the project described in subsection (a) that provide for inland 
waterway transportation shall be a Federal responsibility, in 
accordance with section 102 of the Water Resources Development Act of 
1986 (33 U.S.C. 2212).
                                 <all>
```
#### Teborn Realty Corp., Respondent, *v.*Moritz Goldstein, Tenant, and Moritz Goldstein Travel Agency, Inc., Tenant-Appellant, et al., Undertenant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

December 13, 1956.

*Harris Koppelman*for appellant.

*Harry M. Krokow*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

Petitioner’s proof upon the trial failed to establish as required by the statute (Business Rent Law [L. 1945, ch. 314, as amd.], § 8, subd. [d], par. [1]) that a “ person ” consisting of a stockholder owning at least 90% of the corporate stock of the owner, of the property, in which the business space is sought, seeks same for his own immediate and personal uses. The cases of *Berk-Fink Realty Co.*v. *Goldman*(87 N. Y. S. 2d 345) and *Berk-Fink Realty Co.*v. *Stopnitsky*(90 N. Y. S. 2d 182) are controlling.

The final order should be reversed, with $30 costs, and final order directed in favor of tenant, with costs.

, Hopstadtee, Aubelio and Tilzeb, JJ., concur.

Final order reversed, etc.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 195 (Tuesday, October 7, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 58716]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-23633]



[[Page 58716]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service


Open Meeting of the Area 7 Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (Including the 
States of Alaska, California, Hawaii, and Nevada)

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: An open meeting of the Area 7 committee of the Taxpayer 
Advocacy Panel will be conducted via telephone conference call. The 
Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP) is soliciting public comments, ideas, and 
suggestions on improving customer service at the Internal Revenue 
Service.

DATES: The meeting will be held Wednesday, November 19, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Janice Spinks at 1-888-912-1227 or 
206-220-6096.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given pursuant to Section 
10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988) 
that an open meeting of the Area 7 Taxpayer Advocacy Panel will be held 
Wednesday, November 19, 2008, at 2 p.m. Pacific Time via a telephone 
conference call. The public is invited to make oral comments. 
Individual comments will be limited to 5 minutes. If you would like to 
have the TAP consider a written statement, please call 1-888-912-1227 
or 206-220-6096, or write to Janice Spinks, TAP Office, 915 2nd Avenue, 
MS W-406, Seattle, WA 98174. Due to limited conference lines, 
notification of intent to participate in the telephone conference call 
meeting must be made with Janice Spinks. Miss Spinks can be reached at 
1-888-912-1227 or 206-220-6096, or you can contact us at http://www.improveirs.org.
    The agenda will include the following: Various IRS issues.

    Dated: September 26, 2008.
Roy L. Block,
Acting Director, Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.
[FR Doc. E8-23633 Filed 10-6-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Joenia Hayes, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[745 NYS2d 287]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed October 17, 2001, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

Claimant was employed as a dental technician. On her last day of work, she became involved in an altercation with her employer while they were working on a dental patient. The *763employer sent claimant home, advising her to return the next day after she had “cooled off” and had more respect for him and his patients. Claimant requested her paycheck early but was told that she would have to wait until Monday which was payday. Claimant left the office stating that she was going to call unemployment. She came in on Monday, picked up her check and did not return. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board subsequently ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Substantial evidence supports that decision.

In general, the criticism or harsh words of an employer or supervisor do not constitute good cause for resigning from employment (see, *Matter of Grippi [Commissioner of Labor],*257 AD2d 883). In the matter under review, the employer and a secretary who had witnessed the events in question both testified that claimant left and did not return to work after her argument with the employer despite his having directed her to return to work the next day. Claimant’s assertion that she did not quit but was discharged from her employment raised an issue of credibility for resolution by the Board *(see, Matter of Simon [Commissioner of Labor],*276 AD2d 961, *lv dismissed and denied*96 NY2d 728; *Matter of Odock [Independent*Living—*Commissioner of Labor],*254 AD2d 551).

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Spain, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
_______________________________________ __ _____________ _______________ _____________ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

October 31, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
133013-4 & (62) Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver MORRIS PUMPS, a division of YEOMANS Marilyn Kelly CHICAGO CORPORATION, Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Plaintiff-Appellee, Stephen J. Markman, v SC: 133013 Justices COA: 268717 Wayne CC: 04-422970-CK CENTERLINE PIPING, INC., Defendant, and

EBI-DETROIT, INC., a/k/ a EBI DETROIT, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

R. VANDER LIND & SON, INC., and
CHEMINEER, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

ROBBINS & MEYERS, INC., Plaintiff,
v SC: 133014 COA: 268718 Wayne CC: 04-435014-CK CENTERLINE PIPING, INC., Defendant,

and

EBI-DETROIT, INC., a/k/ a EBI DETROIT, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for leave to file brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the December 12, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DE NIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be re viewed by this Court.

s1024 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 31, 2007

Clerk
#### Jaymax Precision Products, Inc., Respondent, *v.*Ship Tank Service Marine Corp., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

December 20, 1956.

*1048
      *Max Rosner*for appellant.

*Harold I. Meyerson*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

The defendant has shown a bona fide defense of substantial character sufficient to entitle it to a trial of the issues.

The judgment and order should be reversed, with $10 costs, and motion denied.

Hofstadter, Aurelio and Tilzer, JJ., concur.

Judgment and order reversed, etc.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-11-00708-CV

CHARLES E. SMITH AND BETTY M. SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEES 

FOR THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST

v.

LONG ISLAND VILLAGE OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. F/K/A OUTDOOR 

RESORTS/SOUTH PADRE OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC. AND PAST AND 

PRESENT BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LONG ISLAND OWNERS ASSOCIATION, 

INC. F/K/A OUTDOOR RESORTS/SOUTH PADRE OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC.

On Appeal from the

445th District Court of Cameron County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2011-DCL-7171-I

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are adjudged 

against appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

July 31, 2014
#### MICHAEL CAPPADONNA, PETITIONER-DEFENDANT, v. PASSAIC MOTORS, INC., RESPONDENT-PROSECUTOR.

Argued October 7, 1947

Decided November 7, 1947.

Before Justices Bodine, Heher and Wachenfeld.

*300For the petitioner-defendant, *Dominick DeMuro.*

For the respondent-prosecutor, *Kalisch & Kalisch (Isidor Kalisch).*

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Bodine, J.

This is a workmen’s compensation case.

There was an award in the Bureau and an affirmance thereof in the Court of Common Pleas.

There is but one factual question to be settled and that is whether the petitioner was an independent contractor or an employee. We think the former.

The rule of law was stated by Mr. Justice Trenehard in the ease of *Errickson*v. *Schwiers Co.,*108 *N. J. L.*481, 483, as follows:

> “An independent contractor is one who, carrying on an independent business, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, and without being subject to the control of his employer as to the means by which the result is to be accomplished, but only as to the result of the work.

> “The relation of master and servant exists whenever the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or in other words, not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done. * * * It will be seen, therefore, that the ultimate question in this case is, who had control of the operation.”

The Passaic Motors, Inc., had planned to make a coffee room for their employees. Thejr had emplo3red masons to do some of the work. The masons had finished the walls. One of the members of the firm asked the chief mason whom he would recommend to do the carpentry work. The injured man was recommended; he looked over the work to be done; said he would do it by the day and not by contract. He was employed at $15 a day and procured his materials, which were paid for by the Motor Compaq, except when he purchased them directly. He weekly presented a bill for his work and that of his son, who was his helper. These bills were paid. The record indicates the carpenter was perfectly free as to *301the means by which the result would be accomplished. The injured man was never carried on the payroll and he was paid each week for the days he had worked. He was never supervised or controlled in any way. No deductions were made for Social Security nor for unemployment compensation. He was employed to complete the carpentry work on a new project. It can make no difference that he was paid by the day. He chose not to make an estimate on the cost of the work. The record shows that he worked a few days one week and a few days the next. He had a business card and billheads.

The judgment under review will be reversed, but without costs.
AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

     This  Amendment No. 1 is made to that certain  Employment  Agreement  dated
July 1, 1991 (the "Employment  Agreement") between Conseco, Inc. (the "Company")
and Rollin M. Dick ("Executive").

     NOW THEREFORE,  in consideration  of the mutual covenants  contained herein
and in the Employment Agreement, Company and Executive agree as follows:

      1. Section 2 of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended in its entirety
to read as follows:

     "2.  Term.  The  effective  date of this  Agreement  shall be July 1, 1991.
Subject to the provisions for termination as provided in Section 10 hereof,  the
term of this  Agreement  shall be the period  beginning July 1, 1991, and ending
December 31, 2001 (hereinafter called the "Basic Employment Period")."

     2.  Except as  modified  by this  Amendment  and any  previous  addendum or
amendment  not in conflict  herewith,  the parties  confirm that the  Employment
Agreement remains in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF,  the Company and Executive have executed this Amendment
to be effective the 12th day of March, 1996.

                                     CONSECO, INC.



                                     By:/s/ Stephen C. Hilbert
                                        -------------------------
                                         Stephen C. Hilbert,
                                         Chairman of the Board

                                               "Company"



                                        /s/ Rollin M. Dick
                                        -------------------------
                                           Rollin M. Dick

                                              "Executive"
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

ST. MARY ’ S MEDICAL CENTER

, Appellant,

v.

DORIS BASIL

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 20 2 3

- 2651

[ May 16, 2024 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm

Beach County; Charles E. Burton , Judge; L.T. Case No.

502023GA000638XXXMB

.

Susanne E. Riedhammer of Chimpoulis & Hunter, P.A., Plantation, for

appellant.

Ibegbulam Basil, West Palm Beach, pro se.

P ER C URI A M

.

Affirmed

.

M AY

, D AMOORGIAN and C ONNER

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Credit Index, L.L.C., Respondent, v RiskWise International L.L.C. et al., Appellants.

[744 NYS2d 326]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Lowe, III, J.), entered on or about April 12, 2002, which, in an action for breach of contract, insofar as appealed from, granted plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the law firm representing defendants, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The law firm representing defendants was properly disqualified upon a record showing that plaintiffs majority shareholder was a current client of the firm when the firm first appeared in the action, and that the shareholder is personally involved in the litigation even though he is not a named party (Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105 [22 NYCRR 1200.24]). In the latter regard, we note the letters that defendants wrote to the shareholder, after the firm’s appearance on their behalf, suggesting that claims might be brought directly against him. In addition, the action is substantially related to at least one matter on which the firm represented the shareholder in the past, namely, the drafting of an operating agreement for plaintiffs predecessor. Such relationship also warrants the firm’s disqualification (Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-108 [22 NYCRR 1200.27]), regardless of whether the past representation gave it access to confidential information potentially adverse to plaintiff in this action *(see, Forest Park Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v Kraus,*175 AD2d 60, 62). We have considered defendants’ other arguments, including that plaintiff unduly delayed in moving for disqualification, and find them unavailing. Concur — Tom, J.P., Mazzarelli, Rosenberger, Ellerin and Rubin, JJ.