In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-14-00032-CR

JONATHAN ALI CHTAY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 196th District Court

Hunt County, Texas

Trial Court No. 22,940

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2005, Johnathan Ali Chtay pled guilty to the offense of theft of property valued at 

$20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Chtay was placed 

on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years. On December 4, 

2013, Chtay’s guilt was adjudicated, and he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. The 

trial court set Chtay’s bond pending appeal at $75,000.00.1 In this case,2 Chtay appeals the trial 

court’s refusal to (1) further reduce the amount of his appellate bond and (2) amend the 

conditions of his existing bond.3

 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Chtay admitted that he could make one $75,000.00 surety bond. However, according to 

Chtay, the trial court should have further lowered the bond amount in this case because it also set 

a $75,000.00 bond pending appeal in a companion case on the same date. Chtay further 

contends that he cannot afford to make bond payments totaling $150,000.00. Due to the nature 

 1

The trial court initially set Chtay’s bond pending appeal in this case at $350,000.00. While this appeal was 

pending, the trial court entered an order under authority of Article 44.04(c) reducing Chtay’s bond to $75,000.00 

cash or surety. 

2

Chtay pled guilty in 2005 to two separate charges misapplication of trust fund money and theft of property valued 

at $20,000 or more but less than $100,000.00. On December 4, his deferred adjudication community supervision 

was revoked, and he was adjudicated guilty, under separate cause numbers, of both charges. He has appealed from 

the trial court’s decision to revoke his community supervision and proceed to adjudication in the misapplication of 

trust fund money case under our cause number 06-14-00018-CR and in the theft of property case under our cause 

number 06-14-00019-CR. Both of these matters are currently pending before this Court. In addition, Chtay has 

appealed from the trial court’s decisions regarding his bond pending appeal in each of these matters. This opinion 

resolves Chtay’s bond appeal related to the theft of property case, and his bond appeal related to the misapplication 

of trust fund money case is disposed of by our contemporaneously issued opinion in our cause number 06-14-00031-

CR. 

3

In cases in which the assessed punishment for a felony conviction is less than ten years, the trial court has discretion 

to impose reasonable conditions on bail. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(c) (West 2006). However, the 

trial court does not have “the authority to set excessive bail.” Ex parte Harris, 733 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1987, no pet.) (per curiam).
3

of Chtay’s argument, we addressed the merits of Chtay’s complaints in the companion case 

referenced in our opinion of this date in case number 06-14-00031-CR. For the reasons stated in 

that opinion, we likewise find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to set the bond 

amount in this case at $75,000.00 cash or surety, even though it had set another $75,000.00 bond 

in the companion case. 

Next, Chtay appeals the trial court’s refusal to amend the conditions of the appellate bond 

requiring him to (1) remain in Hunt County and not leave Hunt County without written 

permission from the court, (2) wear a SCRAM device on his leg at all times after release from 

jail, and (3) refrain from directly communicating with Sherrie Gibbs, the mother of his child.4 A 

trial court may impose reasonable conditions on bail pending appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 44.04(c). Chtay was an oilfield operations manager. In an affidavit filed with the trial 

court, Chtay averred (1) that his permanent place of residence was in Montgomery County, 

Texas, (2) that his employer, HDD Rotary Sales, LLC, was located both in Montgomery County 

and in Conroe, Texas, and (3) that his employment as an oilfield operations manager required 

him to travel outside of Texas and “as far away as North Dakota.” Chtay argued and had the 

burden to show that the conditions were unreasonable (1) due to the travel required by his 

employment and (2) because the restriction from Gibbs would prevent him from having a 

relationship with his child.5 

 4

We note that the State’s motion to proceed to adjudication alleged that Chtay caused bodily injury to Gibbs, the 

mother of his seventeen-month-old daughter, when he hit “her with the back of his right hand across the left side of 

her face.” 

5

“[T]he statutes treat conditions on pre-trial bond differently from conditions on bail pending appeal. A condition of 

pre-trial bond must meet three standards: Not only must it be ‘reasonable,’ but it also must be to ‘secure a 
4

The record in this case demonstrates that Chtay travelled often for work, had an out-ofstate residence, and did not appear to have significant community ties to Hunt County. In setting 

Chtay’s bond condition, the trial court expressed its apprehension that Chtay might be tempted to 

abscond. The history of the case supports the trial court’s apprehension. 

On April 29, 2009, Chtay was granted permission to move outside of the jurisdiction of 

Hunt County to Montgomery County, Texas, provided that he maintain contact with his Hunt 

County Community Supervision Officer (CSO) and report to the CSO in person when requested. 

On November 17, 2009, Chtay’s CSO reported the following: 

Fail to Change Address On Driver’s License, Violate Promise to Appear & 

Failure to Appear, The defendant has 4 warrants in Colleyville for offenses . . 

. . The defendant was instructed to return to the Hunt County CSCD on 

10/30/2009 to make a payment and bring in employment verification, the 

defendant failed to do so.

On October 22, 2010, Chtay’s CSO reported that Chtay, in violation of the seventh term 

of his community supervision, again failed to report a change of address. The report further 

indicated that the CSO could not verify the address of his residence. On November 9, 2010, the 

trial court amended Chtay’s conditions of community supervision and (1) required him to 

maintain a verifiable residence in Hunt County, (2) required him to report to the Hunt County 

community supervision office as required by the CSO, and (3) prohibited him from leaving Hunt 

County without obtaining prior written permission from his CSO. 

 

defendant’s attendance at trial,’ and also be related to the safety of the alleged victim or the community. The latter

two standards were not imposed on the trial court’s conditions of bail pending appeal, which must only be 

‘reasonable.’” Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398, 401–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 
5

On October 25, 2013, the State filed a motion to proceed to adjudication. On 

November 25, 2013, Chtay apprised the trial court that “his bank is in Rockwall. His family 

lives in Dallas. He has a job in Conroe that he works at and travels.” At the hearing on the 

motion to proceed to adjudication, Gibbs, testified that Chtay had a residence in Montgomery 

County and in North Dakota. According to Gibbs, Chtay claimed his late grandfather’s 

recreational vehicle (RV) as his required Hunt County residence. Gibbs testified that they 

stayed in the RV one or two times a month “when [Chtay] would come back to report for 

probation.” Gibbs could not remember the name of the park where the RV was located. 

At the hearing on the State’s motion to proceed to adjudication, Chtay told the trial court 

that his residence was in Hunt County and showed the court his driver’s license, which contained 

a Hunt County address. However, Chtay (1) asked at the first bond hearing that he be allowed to 

live in Montgomery County and, (2) at the second bond hearing, admitted that his residence 

during the first bond hearing was in Montgomery County. 

The trial court’s bond conditions must be reasonable. The trial court’s interest in 

securing Chtay’s presence after his conviction became final was paramount, and the first two 

bond conditions speak directly to that interest. In fact, whether as a previous condition of his 

community supervision or as a condition of a prior bond in this case, the trial court had typically 

required Chtay to obtain permission prior to leaving Hunt County.6

 At the revocation hearing, 

Kristina Stinnett, Chtay’s CSO, testified that Chtay had always complied with the trial court’s 

 6

On November 22, 2010 the trial court entered an order allowing Chtay to travel outside of the State for work 

conditioned that he provide (1) proof of the assignment on company letterhead, (2) a travel schedule to the CSO at 

least three days before the trip, (3) the address of his accommodations, and (4) telephone numbers of those who 

could confirm his whereabouts. 
6

requirement that he obtain permission to travel. Chtay’s appellate brief confirms that, for several 

years, he “never travelled anywhere or stayed anywhere other than Hunt County . . . with[out] 

the trial court’s permission.” Also, since October 31, 2013, Chtay has been required to wear “a 

properly functioning ankle monitor . . . at all times that reports to a monitor his GPS location at 

all times.” Again, Chtay’s appellate brief confirms his ability to comply with a the second bond 

condition. 

Chtay presents no successful argument why the first two conditions of his bond are 

oppressive or unreasonable. Instead, Chtay has shown that he was previously able to comply 

with such conditions, which were crafted to ensure Chtay’s return in the event his conviction 

becomes final. Moreover, Chtay would still be able to travel for work while complying with the 

bond requirements. We conclude that Chtay has failed to show that the first two bond conditions 

are unreasonable in light of his lack of ties to Hunt County. 

Also, the trial court’s decision to adjudicate Chtay’s guilt was based on the court’s 

finding that Chtay had assaulted Gibbs. Thus, we find that the trial court’s imposition of a bond 

condition requiring Chtay to refrain from directly contacting Gibbs was a reasonable response to 

its concern for Gibbs’ safety. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion 

in establishing the third condition of Chtay’s appellate bond.7

 

 7

Chtay argues that this condition is unreasonable only because it prevents him from seeing his daughter. However, 

(1) the trial court’s order places no restriction on Chtay’s ability to see his daughter, (2) the trial court allowed 

indirect communication with Gibbs, and (3) Chtay introduced no evidence demonstrating that his relationship with 

his daughter could not be secured through use of intermediaries. 
7

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: May 20, 2014

Date Decided: July 22, 2014

Do Not Publish