[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Johnson v. Sloan, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2120.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-2120

JOHNSON, APPELLANT, v. SLOAN, APPELLEE. 

THE STATE EX REL. JOHNSON, APPELLANT, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY COURT OF 

COMMON PLEAS, APPELLEE, ET AL. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Johnson v. Sloan, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2120.] 

Habeas corpus—Prohibition and mandamus—Inmate fails to state claim 

cognizable in habeas corpus—Inmate failed to raise on direct appeal his 

challenge to adult court’s jurisdiction to convict him—Court of appeals’ 

judgments dismissing petitions affirmed. 

(Nos. 2016-1284 and 2017-0272—Submitted November 21, 2017—Decided June 

5, 2018.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashtabula County, No. 2016-CA-0009, 

2016-Ohio-5375. 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 104891, 

2017-Ohio-394. 

________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

 Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} These two appeals, which we consolidate for decision, arise out of the 

same underlying facts. In case No. 2016-1284, appellant, Robert L. Johnson, 

appeals the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissing his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. And in case No. 2017-0272, he appeals the 

judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for writs 

of prohibition and mandamus. We affirm both judgments. 

Background 

{¶ 2} For purposes of reviewing the court of appeals’ dismissals of 

Johnson’s petitions, we accept the following factual allegations as true. See

Coleman v. Portage Cty. Engineer, 133 Ohio St.3d 28, 2012-Ohio-3881, 975 

N.E.2d 952, ¶ 2, fn. 1. 

{¶ 3} In December 1986, when Johnson was 15 years old, he and his older 

brother Charles went on a crime spree. On December 12, they engaged in 

fraudulent transactions with the May Company. On December 23, they committed 

two armed robberies—one of the Lawson Milk Company and another of David 

Sotka. And on December 24, they murdered and robbed Christine Kozak. 

{¶ 4} These offenses resulted in Johnson’s convictions in two separate 

common pleas cases: one case involving the offenses committed against Kozak 

(“the Kozak case”) and the other case involving the robberies of Sotka and the 

Lawson Milk Company (“the Sotka case”). In his habeas petition, Johnson alleged 

that the general division of the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction in the Kozak 

case due to his allegedly defective transfer from the juvenile division. And in his 

prohibition-and-mandamus petition, Johnson challenged the jurisdiction of the 

general division of the common pleas court in the Sotka case, based on a different 

alleged bindover error. 

 
January Term, 2018 

3

The habeas petition (case No. 2016-1284) 

Background

{¶ 5} When a child is arrested for committing a felony or misdemeanor, 

proceedings regarding the child must initially be held in juvenile court. R.C. 

2152.03.1 As a result, the juvenile court has “exclusive jurisdiction over children 

alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a crime if 

committed by an adult.” In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 

N.E.2d 584, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 6} R.C. 2152.12(B) (formerly R.C. 2151.26(B)) allows for the 

discretionary transfer of certain juveniles to adult court to face criminal charges. A 

juvenile-court judge has the discretion “to transfer or bind over to adult court certain 

juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the 

juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public safety.” State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio 

St.3d 86, 90, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000). Before ordering a discretionary transfer, the 

juvenile court must conduct an investigation into whether the child is amenable to 

rehabilitation in the juvenile-justice system, and the investigation must include a 

mental examination of the child. R.C. 2152.12(C); State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 

434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 10-12. At the time of Johnson’s offenses, 

the investigation also had to include a “physical examination of the child made by 

a public or private agency, or a person qualified to make the examination.” Former 

R.C. 2151.26(A)(3), Am.S.B. No. 210, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 583, 586.2

{¶ 7} In January 1987, Johnson was charged with aggravated murder in the 

juvenile division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. On March 11, 

1987, the juvenile court held a bindover hearing for Johnson and journalized an 

 

1

 R.C. 2152.02(C)(1) defines “child” as a person under the age of 18. There is no dispute that 

Johnson was a child at the time of his offenses. 

2

 The General Assembly eliminated the physical-examination requirement as of January 1, 1996. 

Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 19, 98; State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 546, 692 

N.E.2d 608 (1998).
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

entry transferring him to the general division. Johnson alleges that he was never 

given the mandatory physical examination, even though the transfer order indicated 

that a physical examination had occurred. 

{¶ 8} Once he had been transferred, Johnson was indicted in adult court on 

charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery in connection with the death 

of Kozak. He pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated murder with a felonymurder specification and one count of aggravated robbery (of Kozak), and the court 

accepted the state’s recommendations to dismiss the remaining charges arising 

from the offenses committed against Kozak and to dismiss the charges relating to 

the fraudulent transactions with the May Company. Johnson was sentenced to a 

prison term of 20 years to life for aggravated murder, a concurrent prison term of 

10 to 25 years for aggravated robbery, and a consecutive prison term of 3 years for 

the gun specification (for a total of 23 years to life). 

{¶ 9} On September 19, 2016, he filed in the Eleventh District Court of 

Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against appellee Brigham Sloan, 

warden of Lake Erie Correctional Institution. Johnson asserted that the adult court 

lacked jurisdiction to sentence him, due to the juvenile court’s failure to abide by 

the physical-examination requirement of the former bindover statute. And if the 

sentencing court lacked jurisdiction in the Kozak case, he alleged, then he is entitled 

to immediate release from prison, because he has served the entirety of his sentence 

for aggravated robbery in the Sotka case (which is the subject of Johnson’s 

prohibition-and-mandamus petition, discussed below). 

{¶ 10} On August 15, 2016, the court of appeals granted Sloan’s motion to 

dismiss the habeas petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. According to the court of appeals, the juvenile court’s bindover order 

reflects that 
January Term, 2018 

5

the requirements for a proper bindover were met; therefore, any 

alleged lack of jurisdiction was not “patent and unambiguous.” Mr. 

Johnson possessed an adequate remedy at law to raise the physical 

examination issue in his direct appeal from his conviction and 

sentence, which he did not do. Therefore, even presuming these 

allegations as true, Mr. Johnson can prove no set of facts that would 

entitle him to relief, by means of a writ of habeas corpus, for lack of 

a physical examination prior to bindover. 

Johnson v. Sloan, 2016-Ohio-5375, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 11} Johnson appealed to this court. 

The request for oral argument

{¶ 12} Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02, Johnson requests oral argument on 

the issue of when a defective or incorrect judicial entry is susceptible to collateral 

attack (i.e., the entry is void) and when such an entry may be challenged only by 

seeking a nunc pro tunc correction in the court that issued the entry (i.e., the entry 

is voidable). In cases such as this, we have discretion to grant or deny a request for 

oral argument, and in exercising that discretion, we will consider whether the case 

involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a 

substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among the courts of appeals. State ex 

rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 

N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 13} We have considered the issue raised in this case on numerous 

occasions. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 

N.E.3d 234; State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, 999 N.E.2d 

557, ¶ 63-68. There is no reason to believe that additional oral argument on the 

issue will bring to light new facts or arguments that would help prevent the issue 

from recurring in the future. The motion for oral argument is therefore denied. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

Analysis

{¶ 14} Absent a proper bindover, the juvenile court has exclusive subjectmatter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be delinquent. 

State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). If the juvenile court 

fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of the bindover statute, its 

purported transfer to adult court is ineffective and any judgment issued by the adult 

court is void. Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 617, 752 N.E.2d 

1153 (2001). If the juvenile court fails to require a physical examination when 

mandated by statute, the resulting judgment in the adult court is void. State v. 

Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 547, 692 N.E.2d 608 (1998). 

{¶ 15} In Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282 

(1995), an inmate sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been 

transferred from juvenile court to adult court without the mandatory physical and 

mental examinations. We held that if the bindover was improper, his conviction in 

adult court would be void and Gaskins would be entitled to habeas relief. Id. at 

151. We remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the 

bindover was proper. 

{¶ 16} On remand, the court of appeals ordered the warden to respond to 

Gaskins’s petition and ultimately dismissed the petition based on a statement in the 

transfer order that Gaskins had waived his right to the physical and mental 

examinations. We affirmed, holding that 

[s]ince Gaskins’ claims of improper bindover below * * * are 

rebutted by the juvenile court journal entry incorporated in [the 

warden’s response], the court of appeals did not err in denying his 

requested habeas corpus relief without first holding a hearing, 

waiting for the completion of discovery, or requiring Gaskins’s 

presence before the court. 
January Term, 2018 

7

Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 76 Ohio St.3d 380, 382-383, 667 N.E.2d 1194 (1996) 

(“Gaskins II”). We also noted that habeas relief is not available to an inmate who 

has an adequate remedy at law and that Gaskins could have pursued other remedies 

to challenge the transfer order. Id. at 383. 

{¶ 17} The facts in Gaskins II are analogous to those presented by Johnson 

in this case. Based on that authority, the court of appeals was correct to dismiss his 

petition for failure to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. 

The prohibition-and-mandamus petition (case No. 2017-0272) 

Background

{¶ 18} In 1987, Johnson was charged in juvenile court with the aggravated 

robbery of Sotka and the aggravated robbery of the Lawson Milk Company. On 

October 2, the juvenile court held a bindover hearing and transferred Johnson to 

adult court. 

{¶ 19} On October 5, Johnson was charged with two counts of aggravated 

robbery in adult court. That same day, Johnson pleaded guilty to the aggravated 

robbery of Sotka and the court dismissed the count charging Johnson with the 

aggravated robbery of the Lawson Milk Company. On December 7, he was 

sentenced to a prison term of 10 to 25 years (to run concurrently with the sentences 

imposed on him in the Kozak case), plus 3 years in prison for a gun specification. 

{¶ 20} Although the juvenile court orally relinquished jurisdiction in the 

Sotka case on October 2, the court did not file entries transferring Johnson to the 

jurisdiction of the adult court until October 13, after Johnson had pleaded guilty to 

the aggravated robbery of Sotka in adult court. 

{¶ 21} Based on these facts, on August 29, 2016, Johnson filed a petition 

for writs of prohibition and mandamus against appellee Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas. He asked for a writ of prohibition declaring void and vacating his 

conviction for the aggravated robbery of Sotka. In addition, because the gun-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

specification sentence imposed on him in the Sotka case was tacked onto his 

sentence in the Kozak case, he requested a writ of mandamus to compel the 

common pleas court to conduct a new sentencing hearing in the Kozak case 

(assuming that his convictions in that case are not voided in his habeas action). 

{¶ 22} On January 27, 2017, the Eighth District Court of Appeals granted 

the common pleas court’s motion to dismiss. Johnson timely appealed. 

Analysis

{¶ 23} A transfer “abates” the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the 

delinquent acts alleged in the complaint and places jurisdiction over the case with 

the transferee court. R.C. 2152.12(I). As noted above, the juvenile court must 

comply with the requirements of the bindover statute in order to transfer a juvenile 

to adult court, Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d at 618, 752 N.E.2d 

1153, including the requirement that the juvenile court issue a statement of the 

reasons for the transfer, R.C. 2152.12(I); see also Jud.R. 30(G) (requiring that a 

juvenile court’s transfer order state the reasons for the transfer). As of October 5, 

1987, when Johnson pleaded guilty to the aggravated robbery of Sotka, there was 

no transfer order on file in the adult court. The court of appeals held that this 

oversight did not affect a substantial right of Johnson’s and did not deprive the adult 

court of subject-matter jurisdiction. State ex rel. Johnson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court 

of Common Pleas, 2017-Ohio-394, 83 N.E.3d 213, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 24} Generally, a relator is not entitled to extraordinary relief if he or she 

has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Huntington 

Natl. Park v. Kontos, 145 Ohio St.3d 102, 2015-Ohio-5190, 47 N.E.3d 133, ¶ 18 

(prohibition case); State ex rel. Ervin v. Barker, 136 Ohio St.3d 160, 2013-Ohio3171, 991 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 11 (mandamus case). Johnson had an adequate remedy 

by way of appeal to challenge the validity of the bindover. 

{¶ 25} The facts in this case are nearly identical to those in State ex rel. 

McCuller v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 143 Ohio St.3d 130, 2015-
January Term, 2018 

9

Ohio-1563, 34 N.E.3d 905. McCuller, who was 17 years old at the time, was 

charged in juvenile court with multiple felony offenses in three separate cases. 

Following bindover hearings, the juvenile court transferred the cases to adult court, 

where McCuller pleaded guilty to one count of rape, two counts of attempted rape, 

and one count of felonious assault. Id. at ¶ 4-6. Thirty-three years later, he filed a 

complaint for a “writ of mandamus/procedendo,” arguing that the bindover orders 

had not been signed by the juvenile-court judge or journalized. Id. at ¶ 9. We 

affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of the writ because McCuller “could have 

challenged these bindovers in his appeal of the criminal convictions, and therefore 

he had an adequate remedy.” Id. at ¶ 14. 

{¶ 26} As a general rule, even if an adequate remedy exists, a writ of 

prohibition may issue if the lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous. State 

ex rel. Mancino v. Tuscarawas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 151 Ohio St.3d 35, 

2017-Ohio-7528, 85 N.E.3d 713, ¶ 9. Johnson invokes this exception by arguing 

that the adult court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction when it 

convicted him. However, our jurisprudence has long established that even if a 

transfer order is facially invalid, prohibition will not issue because “ ‘any error 

complained of [in a transfer order] must be raised in an appeal from the judgment 

of the Court of Common Pleas.’ ” (Brackets sic.) State ex rel. Torres v. Simmons, 

68 Ohio St.2d 118, 119, 428 N.E.2d 862 (1981), quoting In re Becker, 39 Ohio 

St.2d 84, 87, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974); see also McCuller v. Common Pleas Court, 

Juvenile Div., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100143, 2013-Ohio-4929, ¶ 13 (“Any error 

in a juvenile bindover is reviewable only upon a direct appeal following a 

conviction of the offense or offenses after the juvenile is bound over to the court of 

common pleas”). 

{¶ 27} Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s request for a writ 

of prohibition. And because his mandamus claim is contingent on the success of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

his prohibition claim, we affirm the dismissal of his request for a writ of mandamus 

as well. 

Judgments affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in No. 2016-1284 and concurs in judgment only in 

No. 2017-0272, with an opinion. 

DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only. 

O’DONNELL and DEGENARO, JJ., not participating. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY, J., concurring in case No. 2016-1284 and concurring in 

judgment only in case No. 2017-0272. 

{¶ 28} I join the majority’s opinion to the extent that it affirms the Eleventh 

District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed 

by appellant, Robert L. Johnson, in case No. 2016-1284. However, because the 

majority fails to explain why the general division of the Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas did not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction 

to convict Johnson of aggravated robbery, I concur only in its judgment affirming 

the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of his petition for writs of 

prohibition and mandamus in case No. 2017-0272. 

{¶ 29} A ruling on the prohibition claim is determinative here. To be 

entitled to a writ of prohibition, Johnson must establish that the respondent is about 

to exercise or has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is 

unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 

other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. R.W. 

v. Williams, 146 Ohio St.3d 91, 2016-Ohio-562, 52 N.E.3d 1176, ¶ 13. However, 

“[w]here jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, relators need not 

establish the lack of an adequate remedy at law because the availability of alternate 

remedies like appeal would be immaterial.” State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. 
January Term, 2018 

11 

Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. 

And “[i]f an inferior tribunal patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, 

prohibition will lie to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and 

to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.” State ex rel. 

Baker v. State Personnel Bd. of Rev., 85 Ohio St.3d 640, 642, 710 N.E.2d 706 

(1999). 

{¶ 30} The majority acknowledges our caselaw holding that “[a]bsent a 

proper bindover procedure pursuant to R.C. 2151.26, the juvenile court has the 

exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is 

alleged to be a delinquent.” State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196 

(1995), paragraph one of the syllabus; accord Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 

Ohio St.3d 614, 617, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001). We explained in those cases that 

the general division of a court of common pleas lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to 

convict and sentence a child whose case has not been lawfully transferred to that 

court. Wilson at 44; Timmerman-Cooper at 617. 

{¶ 31} Nonetheless, the majority maintains that “our jurisprudence has long 

established that even if a transfer order is facially invalid, prohibition will not issue 

because ‘ “any error complained of [in a transfer order] must be raised in an appeal 

from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.” ’ ” (Brackets sic.) Majority 

opinion at ¶ 26, quoting State ex rel. Torres v. Simmons, 68 Ohio St.2d 118, 119, 

428 N.E.2d 862 (1981), quoting In re Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 84, 87, 314 N.E.2d 

158 (1974). The problem with that analysis, however, is that in Becker, we 

addressed only the question whether a transfer order is a final, appealable order, 

and both Torres and Becker predate our holdings in Wilson and TimmermanCooper that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the general division of the common 

pleas court depends on “a proper bindover procedure.” Therefore, neither Torres

nor Becker speaks to the question whether a transfer order that is invalid on its face 

comports with the “proper bindover procedure” required by our caselaw. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

{¶ 32} The majority’s reliance on State ex rel. McCuller v. Cuyahoga Cty. 

Court of Common Pleas, 143 Ohio St.3d 130, 2015-Ohio-1563, 34 N.E.3d 905, is 

similarly misplaced. There, the relator sought a writ of procedendo to compel the 

juvenile court to proceed to judgment based on its failure to journalize bindover 

orders issued decades earlier. That case did not involve the question whether a writ 

of prohibition should issue to the adult court to vacate the relator’s convictions. But 

to the extent that McCuller stands for the proposition that the failure to journalize 

an entry can be remedied on appeal, it runs counter to our precedent holding that 

an unjournalized order is not final and appealable. See Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 

85 Ohio St.3d 524, 526, 709 N.E.2d 1148 (1999). This court has long recognized 

that a “ ‘ “court of record speaks only through its journal and not by oral 

pronouncement or mere written minute or memorandum.” ’ ” State ex rel. White v. 

Junkin, 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 337, 686 N.E.2d 267 (1997), quoting State ex rel. 

Hanley v. Roberts, 17 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 476 N.E.2d 1019 (1985), quoting Schenley 

v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109, 113 N.E.2d 625 (1953), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

A trial court’s order is therefore effective only when journalized, id., and we have 

described the lack of journalization as an “egregious defec[t]” that “permit[s] a 

court to vacate its previous orders.” State ex rel. DeWine v. Burge, 128 Ohio St.3d 

236, 2011-Ohio-235, 943 N.E.2d 535, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 33} Although I disagree with the majority’s analysis, I agree that the 

general division of the common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously 

lack jurisdiction to convict Johnson. 

Background 

{¶ 34} In January 1987, a complaint was filed in the juvenile division of the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas alleging that Johnson was a delinquent 

child for committing acts that would constitute aggravated murder if committed by 

an adult. The juvenile court conducted an amenability hearing and transferred the 

case to the general division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on 
January Term, 2018 

13 

March 11, 1987, and a grand jury indicted Johnson on April 13, 1987, for the 

aggravated murder and aggravated robbery of Christine Kozak. That same month, 

a grand jury indicted Johnson on five counts each of uttering and forgery and two 

counts of theft, all crimes against the May Company. 

{¶ 35} Separate complaints were filed in the juvenile division of the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on July 8, 1987, and August 17, 1987, 

each alleging that Johnson was a delinquent child for committing acts constituting 

aggravated robbery if committed by an adult. The first complaint pertained to the 

robbery of David Sotka and the second pertained to the robbery of the Lawson Milk 

Company. 

{¶ 36} On September 28, 1987, in the general division of the common pleas 

court, Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated murder in exchange for 

the dismissal of a second count of aggravated murder and the aggravated-robbery 

count in the Kozak case, as well as the dismissal of the uttering, forgery, and theft 

counts charged in the May Company case. At the plea hearing, the parties informed 

the court that the plea agreement also encompassed the two pending juvenile 

cases—which were scheduled for an amenability hearing—and that Johnson would 

be pleading guilty to an additional count of aggravated robbery once those cases 

were transferred to the adult court. 

{¶ 37} On October 2, 1987, the juvenile court conducted the bindover 

hearing in the Sotka and Lawson Milk Company cases, found that Johnson was not 

amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system, and transferred both cases to the 

general division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. The juvenile 

court signed the bindover orders that same day. On October 5, 1987, Johnson 

waived his right to an indictment, and the state charged him with aggravated 

robbery by information. He then pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery 

pursuant to the plea agreement, and the state dismissed the second count. However, 

the juvenile court did not journalize the bindover orders until October 13, 1987. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

The adult court conducted the sentencing hearing for the aggravated-murder and 

aggravated-robbery counts on December 7, 1987; it journalized the sentence for 

aggravated robbery on March 18, 1988, and the sentence for aggravated murder on 

March 22, 1988. 

Analysis 

{¶ 38} The question now before us concerns what effect the delayed 

journalization of the bindover entry had on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 

general division of the common pleas court to convict Johnson of aggravated 

robbery. 

{¶ 39} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to 

adjudicate a particular class or type of case. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 

2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11-12, 34. It is a “ ‘condition precedent to the 

court’s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any 

proclamation by that court is void.’ ” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Tubbs Jones 

v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). However, when a specific 

action is within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the invocation 

and exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable. Id. at ¶ 12, 

21. A voidable judgment is not subject to collateral attack. State v. Filiaggi, 86 

Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999). 

{¶ 40} In former R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), the General Assembly provided that 

“[t]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code 

* * * [c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint is 

alleged to be a juvenile traffic offender, or a delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, 

or dependent child.” Sub.H.B. No. 428, 141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3672, 3838. 

Johnson was a child at the time he committed his offenses; therefore, the juvenile 

court had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over his cases. Wilson, 73 Ohio 

St.3d at 43, 652 N.E.2d 196. 
January Term, 2018 

15 

{¶ 41} However, as we explained in Wilson, the General Assembly 

established “a narrow exception” to the juvenile court’s exclusive subject-matter 

jurisdiction in former R.C. 2151.26. Wilson at 43. That statute provided for the 

transfer of the case to the court that would have had jurisdiction if the offense had 

been committed by an adult if the juvenile court found that the child was at least 15 

years old at the time of the offense, that there is probable cause to believe that the 

child committed the offense, that the child is not amenable to further care or 

rehabilitation in the juvenile system, and that the safety of the community may 

require legal restraint of the child beyond the age of majority. Id., citing former 

R.C. 2151.26(A), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 27, 144 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2745, 2745-2746. 

Construing these statutes in Wilson, we held, “Absent a proper bindover procedure 

pursuant to R.C. 2151.26, the juvenile court has the exclusive subject matter 

jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be a delinquent.” 

Wilson at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 42} In this case, it was a foregone conclusion that Johnson’s aggravatedrobbery cases would be transferred to the adult court for trial. In the murder case, 

the juvenile court had already found that Johnson was not amenable to 

rehabilitation in the juvenile system and that he appeared to be a threat to public 

safety. Johnson’s guilty plea to aggravated murder, which carried a minimum 

punishment of 20 years to life in prison pursuant to former R.C. 2929.03(E), 

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 13, foreclosed any possibility that he 

could be rehabilitated in a juvenile-delinquent facility and ensured that he would 

be confined beyond his attaining majority. Moreover, he had already agreed to 

plead guilty to the aggravated-robbery charge as part of the parties’ resolution of 

all pending cases. As the parties anticipated, the juvenile court held the amenability 

hearing and signed orders transferring the aggravated-robbery cases to the general 

division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

{¶ 43} It is undisputed that the state charged Johnson with—and the adult 

court accepted his guilty plea to—aggravated robbery before the juvenile court 

journalized the bindover entry. But in this extraordinary-writ action, Johnson is 

seeking an order compelling the adult court to vacate the judgment of conviction, 

and the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed to sentencing and final 

judgment once the juvenile case had been transferred pursuant to the journalized 

bindover order. Any error in invoking or exercising the court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction up to that point does not render the judgment of conviction void or 

make it subject to collateral attack in this writ action. 

{¶ 44} Therefore, the general division of the Court of Common Pleas had 

jurisdiction over the case. 

{¶ 45} While Johnson also challenges the validity of the information 

charging him with aggravated robbery, we have held that “ ‘extraordinary relief is 

not available to attack the validity or sufficiency of a charging instrument,’ ” State 

ex rel. Nelson v. Griffin, 103 Ohio St.3d 167, 2004-Ohio-4754, 814 N.E.2d 866, 

¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Bennett v. White, 93 Ohio St.3d 583, 584, 757 N.E.2d 364 

(2001). In Nelson, we affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for writs of mandamus 

and prohibition; we refused to vacate the relator’s convictions and sentence 

notwithstanding his allegations that his indictment had been dismissed before he 

was convicted and sentenced. We explained that the “ ‘manner by which an 

accused is charged with a crime is procedural rather than jurisdictional, and after a 

conviction for crimes charged in an indictment, the judgment binds the defendant 

for the crime for which he was convicted.’ ” Id., quoting Orr v. Mack, 83 Ohio 

St.3d 429, 430, 700 N.E.2d 590 (1998). 

{¶ 46} The court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over Johnson’s case was 

perfected on journalization of the bindover order. Any error in filing the criminal 

complaint is an error only in invoking the court’s jurisdiction, and any error in 

proceeding to sentencing is an error only in exercising that jurisdiction. Neither 
January Term, 2018 

17 

error deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction—“once conferred, it 

remains,” Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 34. 

{¶ 47} In the end, Johnson was bound over for trial as an adult in the general 

division of the court of common pleas, a court of general and competent 

jurisdiction. He waived his constitutional rights and pleaded guilty to committing 

aggravated robbery, and the court imposed sentence. The claim asserted now—

more than 30 years later—complaining of the delay in journalizing the bindover 

order does not change these facts or prove a denial of due process. 

{¶ 48} Accordingly, Johnson cannot show that the general division of the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas patently and unambiguously lacked 

jurisdiction over his criminal case at the time it sentenced him and issued the 

judgment of conviction. That judgment is not void, and Johnson had an adequate 

remedy by way of appeal or postconviction relief to challenge any error in bringing 

the charge or accepting his plea. For this reason, the court of appeals properly 

dismissed Johnson’s petition in this case, and I concur in the judgment affirming 

its decision. 

_________________ 

Stephen P. Hanudel, for appellant. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee Brigham Sloan. 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James 

E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas. 

_________________