UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Barbara Ann Haines

v. Civil No. 08-cv-505-SM

State of New Hampshire, Department

of Health and Human Services/Division 

of Children, Youth and Families, et al.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pro se petitioner Barbara Ann Haines has filed a complaint,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the termination of her

parental rights and seeking custody of her two minor children

(document no. 1). Named as defendants are the State of New

Hampshire, Department of Health and Human Services/Division of

Children, Youth and Families (“DCYF”) and the Attorney General

for the State of New Hampshire. The complaint is before me for

preliminary review to determine whether, among other things, it

states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915A; U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire

Local Rule (“LR”) 4.3(d)(2). For the reasons stated below, I

recommend that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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Background

The claims in this action arise from state court child

custody proceedings involving Haines and her minor children,

Liberty Ann Justice Haines and Robert Edward Haines. Haines

alleges that on April 30, 2004, her children were wrongfully

removed from her custody by the police, without notice, and

placed into protective custody. During that time, Haines

alleges, her house was search illegally and without a warrant,

and information derived from the illegal search was used against

her during the parental termination proceedings. She further

alleges that the DCYF failed to determine and/or evaluate “the

appropriateness” of her home.

The New Hampshire Probate Court allegedly terminated Haines’

parental rights and “condemned” her for failing to submit to a

mental health evaluation on the basis of her Christian beliefs. 

Although Haines references separate proceedings in the New

Hampshire Superior Court, the record is silent as to the precise

nature of those proceedings. She alleges that when she refused

to submit to a court-ordered mental health evaluation on the

basis of her religious beliefs, the superior court ignored her

explanation for her actions and charged her with neglect. 

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Subsequently, Haines filed an appeal with the New Hampshire

Supreme Court (“NHSC”) in which she challenged the lower court’s

termination of her parental rights. The NHSC denied her appeal

on September 30, 2008 and denied her motion for reconsideration

on November 6, 2008. 

Haines alleges that she has not seen her children in four

years, because the DCYF terminated her visitation rights when she 

refused to sign a statement that would abridge her right to free

speech. She now brings the instant complaint, alleging that the

termination of her parental and/or custodial rights constitutes a

violation of her federally protected rights, including her First

Amendment right to freedom of religion. She requests this court

to restore her parental rights and to grant her custody of her

minor children. 

Standard of Review

In conducting a preliminary review, the court liberally

construes pro se pleadings, however inartfully pleaded. See

Erickson v. Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) to construe pro se

pleadings liberally in favor of the pro se party). See also

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Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (noting that

courts may construe pro se pleadings so as to avoid

inappropriately stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals of

claims). “The policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal

interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts, the

court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was

imperfectly pled.” Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st

Cir. 1997).

At this preliminary stage of review, all factual assertions

made by the plaintiff and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

must be accepted as true. See Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3

(1st Cir. 1996)(stating the “failure to state a claim” standard

of review and explaining that all “well-pleaded factual

averments,” not bald assertions, must be accepted as true). This

review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and

meaningful consideration.

Discussion

I. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The state court custody proceedings at issue raise a

question of subject matter jurisdiction that this court is

obligated to consider and resolve sua sponte. See Hicks, Muse &

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Co. v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int’l), 136 F.3d 45, 50 n.4 (1st

Cir. 1998). For the reasons articulated below, this court is

precluded from exercising jurisdiction over this action under the

Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), which precludes 

federal district and circuit courts from reviewing a final

judgment entered in a state court, and from considering claims

that are inextricably intertwined with those raised in the state

court proceeding. See Picard v. Members of Employee Ret. Bd.,

275 F.3d 139, 145 (1st Cir. 2001). See also Federacion de

Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410

F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that under the RookerFeldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over

“federal complaints . . . [that] essentially invite[] federal

courts of first instance to review and reverse unfavorable statecourt judgments.”)(citations omitted). Claims are inextricably

intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that

the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. See

Picard, 275 F.3d at 145.

As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman

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doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising

jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’

challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,

460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). See also Geiger v. Foley Hoag

LLP Ret. Plan, 521 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008). The doctrine

applies when a plaintiff complains of injury from the state court

judgment itself. Id. at 65. Where the relief sought would, if

granted, effectively void the state court’s judgment, a

plaintiff’s claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

See Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1999);

accord Ellison v. Brock, 122 Fed. Appx. 519 (1st Cir. 2004). 

“The doctrine applies to attempts to relitigate state court

judgments entered before the federal suit was filed; it does not

abrogate concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state courts, nor

is it analogous to a preclusion doctrine.” Corrion v. Latreille,

No. 08-cv-15272, 2009 WL 56057, slip op. at *1 (E. D. Mich. Jan.

8, 2009)(citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292).

Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, I

conclude that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court lacks

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subject matter jurisdiction over Haines’ claims. Haines requests

this court to restore her parental rights and to grant her

custody of her two minor children. She seeks review of adverse

state-court decisions terminating her parental and custodial

rights. Thus, the injury complained of is solely traceable to

the state court custody proceedings. The relief sought by Haines

in this federal action challenges the same custody decisions made

by the New Hampshire state courts. The relief requested would

necessarily require this court to void the contrary state court

decisions or determine that they were wrong. To the extent the

state courts have entered final judgment(s) with regard to the

termination of Haines’ parental and custodial rights, the RookerFeldman doctrine applies and deprives this court of jurisdiction

over this action.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the complaint be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

If this report and recommendation is approved, the claims as

identified in this report and recommendation, will be considered

for all purposes to be the claims raised in the complaint. If

plaintiff disagrees with the identification of the claims herein,

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she must do so by objection filed within ten (10) days of receipt

of this report and recommendation, or she must properly move to

amend. 

Any further objection to this report and recommendation must

be filed within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure

to file objections within the specified time waives the right to

appeal the district court’s order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

see also Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Gordon, 979

F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Valencia-Copete,

792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986). 

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: February 19, 2009

cc: Barbara Ann Haines, pro se

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