IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-2285-MSK-BNB

CENTER FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY, 

d/b/a THE LEGAL CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH 

DISABILITIES AND OLDER PEOPLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

REGGIE BICHA, 

in his official capacity as Executive Director 

of the Colorado Department of Human Services, and 

TERESA A. BERNAL, 

in her official capacity as Interim Superintendent 

of the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo,

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 

COMPLAINT

Defendants Reggie Bicha, in his official capacity as Executive Director for 

the Colorado Department of Human Services, and Teresa A. Bernal, in her 

official capacity as Interim Superintendent of the Colorado Mental Health 

Institute at Pueblo (collectively “Defendants”), by and through counsel Office of 

the Colorado Attorney General, hereby submits their reply in support of the 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) (hereafter “Motion”) and Memorandum in 

support thereof (Doc. No. 12-1) (hereafter “Memorandum”).

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 20
2

INTRODUCTION

In its Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint 

(Doc. No. 14) (hereafter “Response”), The Legal Center contends it has standing 

to sue on behalf of criminal defendants waiting for competency evaluations and 

criminal defendants awaiting restorative treatment. However, The Legal Center

misconstrues or too narrowly applies the law it relies upon, and much of the law 

cited by The Legal Center is distinguishable from the present case. Thus, 

despite making numerous allegations of fact intended to distract this Court with

the merits of their case: 1) The Legal Center’s status as Colorado’s protection 

and advocacy system does not per se confer standing upon it to prosecute this 

lawsuit; and 2) The Legal Center cannot meet the requirements for establishing 

associational standing. As such, Defendants’ Motion should be granted and this 

matter should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT

I. The Legal Center Fails to Meet Its Burden to Establish Standing 

Standing requires in essence a showing that the plaintiff has alleged such 

a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to justify exercise of the 

court’s remedial powers on its behalf. Oregon Advocacy Center v Mink, 322 F.3d 

1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003). Before addressing the issue of whether The Legal 

Center has met the three prongs for associational standing, The Legal Center

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 20
3

must demonstrate its close relationship to the case or controversy. Plaintiff has 

the burden of establishing the requirements of standing. Indiana Protection and 

Advocacy Services Comm’n v. Commissioner, Indiana Dep’t of Correction, 642 

F.Supp.2d 872, 876 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 

A. The Legal Center Fails to Establish Case or Controversy

In its Complaint, The Legal Center gives details about its board and policy 

committee, but it fails to show that any member or constituent represented in 

this lawsuit has any relationship to The Legal Center. The Legal Center has 

obligations under the PAIMI Act to advocate on behalf of its constituents; 

however, nothing in the Complaint sets forth that any members of its board or 

its committee have any relationship to pre-trial detainees with mental illness. 

No affidavit supports that The Legal Center has done any investigating of this 

issue or has met with any pre-trial detainees. It appears The Legal Center has 

no personal knowledge of the issues presented in the Complaint. The Legal 

Center relies on third party affidavits. Nothing in the Complaint itself, even 

assuming the allegations are true, establishes that The Legal Center has such a 

personal stake in the outcome of this controversy that federal court jurisdiction 

is warranted. 

The doctrine of standing requires that federal courts recognize their 

limited powers and requires that there be (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 3 of 20
4

relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood 

that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Oregon v. Mink, 322 

F.3d at 1108. Addressing the three components of traditional standing doctrine, 

The Legal Center fails to meet at least two if not all three prongs. The first, an 

injury in fact, has been alleged as to at least five individuals. None of the five 

individuals are also named as plaintiffs, and more importantly, nothing in the 

Complaint shows that The Legal Center has any relationship with any of these 

five individuals, or any other pre-trial detainee. The Legal Center provides no 

supporting affidavit or allegation in the Complaint that they interviewed or met 

with any individual pre-trial detainee, that they have any direct knowledge 

about the alleged delays in receiving competency evaluations or restoration 

treatment, or that they have conducted their own investigation into the 

allegations. 

Secondly, a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged 

conduct is also absent from the Complaint. The Fifth Circuit has found that a 

federally funded program that must redirect some of its resources is insufficient 

to impart standing on the organization. Association for Retarded Citizens of 

Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Center Board of 

Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994). The Legal Center argues that the 

resources expended to protect the rights of constituents in county jails diverts 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 4 of 20
5

resources from other priorities. Complaint, at ¶ 6. This is not sufficient. To 

establish the requisite causal relationship between the alleged individual pretrial detainees’ due process liberty interests and the Colorado Mental Health 

Institute is also not established. Under Colorado law, the court determines the 

location for a competency evaluation. Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-8.5-105(1)(a) (2011). A 

defendant may be released on bond or referred or committed to the state hospital 

for the evaluation. Id. The Colorado Mental Health Institute plays no role in 

determining whether the individual will be incarcerated while waiting for the 

competency evaluation, and the courts decide where such evaluations will be 

done. The Complaint attaches an affidavit from the Arapahoe County Sheriff, 

which alleges that it costs more to house pre-trial detainees with mental illness 

than others. This additional cost, even if true, does not demonstrate how the 

Mental Health Institute can be responsible for those costs. While the Complaint

seeks relief in the form of an order requiring that competency evaluations and 

restorative treatment be completed within seven (7) days, the sheriff’s affidavit 

already provides evidence that this is impossible. The sheriff states that he can 

transport a detainee within seven days of a court’s order. Complaint Affidavit B

at ¶ 13. The relief requested would only allow for transportation and no time to 

conduct any evaluation or treatment. The supporting affidavit from the sheriff 

informs how the delays affect the sheriff’s department, but it does not provide 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 5 of 20
6

any support for The Legal Center’s involvement. Nothing in the affidavit 

addresses The Legal Center or its relationship to pre-trial detainees. 

Third, the likelihood that a favorable decision will address the alleged 

injuries has not been established. In a budget crisis and recession economy, 

resources are scarce. Nothing in the Complaint alleges that individuals have 

been denied admission for acute treatment, only that there are delays. Whether 

action by this Court can redress the alleged injuries has not been demonstrated. 

The Complaint alleges that untimely court-ordered competency evaluations and 

restorative mental health treatment violates criminal defendants’ due process 

right to be free from incarceration without a conviction. The Mental Health 

Institute does not make the determination as to where individuals must remain 

while waiting for evaluation or treatment. The decision as to incarceration is 

made by the courts. Pre-trial detainees may be released with or without bond to 

await a competency evaluation or restorative treatment. Competency 

evaluations can be done on an outpatient basis. It is not clear from the 

Complaint that a favorable decision from this Court will change the state’s 

budget crisis or affect state court orders holding pre-trial detainees in jail rather 

than releasing them with conditions. 

The doctrine of standing under Article III of the United State constitution 

contains both constitutional and prudential limitations as outlined in the 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 6 of 20
7

opening memorandum. Those still must be met even if the Court were to find 

that PAIMI Act confers associational standing. Indiana Protection and Advocacy 

Services Comm’n v. Commissioner, Indiana Dep’t of Correction, 642 F.Supp.2d 

872, 877 (S.D. Ind. 2009). Even where courts have found that the PAIMI Act 

confers standing, there is recognition that constitutional standing requirements 

cannot be waived. Id.at 878. This is not a case where the protection and 

advocacy system is filing suit to obtain records or to improve conditions in care. 

This Court is being asked to review state statutes and make a determination 

about what is untimely, where the statutes are silent on the issue. 

The Legal Center heavily relies on the Ninth Circuit ruling in Mink to 

support the P&A system’s standing. However, that court rejects that PAIMI 

necessarily confers standing outright. Oregon v Mink, 322 F.3d at 1110. 

“Although we agree that PAIMI is relevant to OAC’s standing, it cannot override 

constitutional standing requirements.” Id. at 1109. Although the Complaint

contains allegations about individuals, the support for those allegations is 

provided by third party affidavits and nothing from the The Legal Center itself. 

The Legal Center must establish a relationship between the constituents named 

or described and the organization. 

B. The Legal Center Fails to Show the Close Nexus Required for Standing

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 7 of 20
8

The eleventh circuit finds that under the PAIMI Act there are two theories 

under which the protection and advocacy system may sue: 1) by establishing 

that defendant’s actions caused injury to the system itself or 2) on behalf of its 

constituents during the course of their treatment or within ninety days after 

discharge. Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 883-884 (11 Cir. 1999). Although the 

Stincer court finds that the PAIMI Act confers standing for the purpose of 

protecting and litigating the rights of individuals with mental illness and that 

no individual need be named, the Stincer court still recognizes that there must 

be “a close nexus between the organization and its members and an allegation of 

injury to its members as a result of the action.” Id. at 884-885. Even if The 

Legal Center is not required to name any individual, it must still establish this 

close nexus. The Legal Center fails to do so. Nothing in the Complaint shows 

that The Legal Center has ever met with the individuals described, that The 

Legal Center has anyone on its board who has ever been a pre-trial detainee 

found incompetent to proceed or a family member of a pre-trial detainee

awaiting restorative treatment, or that The Legal Center has gone out and 

visited detention centers to establish any of the harms alleged in the Complaint. 

Generally advocating for the mentally ill does not establish any nexus between 

the organization and the specific allegations in the Complaint. 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 8 of 20
9

The Legal Center asserts generally a claim based on third party 

representations, which is insufficient to confer standing. Generally a party must 

assert his or her own legal rights or courts would be called upon to decide 

abstract questions even though other governmental institutions may be more 

competent to address the questions. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129, 125 

S.Ct. 564, 567 (2004). In establishing Article III standing, one must show that 

they have a close relationship with the person who possesses the right. Id. at 

130, 567. Attorneys attempting to assert the rights of pro se defendants in 

challenging a state statute were found to lack a close relationship where they 

were not representing actual clients. Id. at 131-132, 568. The concurring opinion 

makes clear that where there is no relationship at all, one cannot assert thirdparty standing. Id. at 135, 570-571. 

In its most recent decision the Supreme Court does not address standing 

at all although cited by The Legal Center for this issue. In that case, the court 

examines whether Ex parte Young allows a federal court to hear a lawsuit for 

prospective relief against state officials brought by another agency of the same 

state. Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 

1636 (2011). In that case Virginia elected to designate a government entity as 

their protection and advocacy system, and the court analyzes whether sovereign 

immunity bars the suit. In this case, no Colorado statute gives The Legal Center

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 9 of 20
10

any authority under state law. The Legal Center is only designated as the 

protection and advocacy system by the governor. Complaint at ¶ 3. 

Leaving aside the issue of whether Congress intended to confer standing, 

the Complaint itself fails to demonstrate essential standing elements. The Legal 

Center has not alleged sufficient facts to support any relationship with the 

constituents on whose behalf it brings suit. The PAIMI Act does not 

automatically confer standing, as found by several courts, including the Mink 

case relied on by The Legal Center. The Legal Center still needs to meet the 

constitutional dimension of standing and make out a case or controversy by 

showing it has sufficient stake in the outcome. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 

498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975). Plaintiff fails to meet its burden. The Legal 

Center alleges no relationship to any individual named in the Complaint, alleges 

no investigation or attempt to understand the issue for itself. The Legal Center

is an advocacy organization for the mentally ill, but how that confers standing to 

sue for criminal due process violations is not made clear. The Legal Center’s own 

alleged injury of having to divert resources is not sufficient as found by the Fifth 

Circuit. Justice Scalia’s recent decision finds the plaintiff in that case has 

standing because of its own state statutes. Virginia Office for Protection & 

Advocacy, 131 S.Ct. at 1643. Colorado has no such corresponding statutes. The 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 10 of 20
11

only allegation in the Complaint of diverting of resources is not sufficient to 

demonstrate any close relationship with those who are allegedly being harmed. 

The Court has the power to allow or require a plaintiff to amend the 

Complaint or provide supporting affidavits to support a plaintiff’s claim of 

standing. If after this opportunity standing does not adequately appear from the 

record, the Complaint must be dismissed. Id. at 2206-227, 501-502. The Legal 

Center may seek this relief, but when consulted prior to filing the motion to 

dismiss, counsel for The Legal Center declined to amend the Complaint. 

Accordingly, because The Legal Center has failed to demonstrate standing to 

pursue the claim alleged, the complaint must be dismissed.

II. The Legal Center Does Not Meet the Requirements for 

Associational Standing

It is undisputed that associational standing is found when: 1) the 

organization’s members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 

2) the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to the 

organization’s purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 

requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Hunt v. 

Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

As established in the Motion and Memorandum, The Legal Center cannot 

satisfy the first, threshold element of the test for associational standing. First, 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 11 of 20
12

The Legal Center asserts that it is “well-settled that PAIMI organizations [such 

as it] have associational standing to sue on behalf of their constituents.” 

Response at p. 8. In support of this proposition, The Legal Center directs this 

Court to Oregon v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2002), Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 

879 (11th Cir. 1999), and Advocacy Center for the Elderly and Disabled v. 

Louisiana Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 731 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D. La. 2010). 

However, none of these cases are Tenth Circuit decisions, and thus are not 

binding on this Court. Regardless, each of them is distinguishable from the case 

at hand.

In Oregon v. Mink, A.J. Madison, a mentally incapacitated criminal 

defendant who was detained in a county jail while awaiting transfer to the state 

mental health hospital, was named as an individual plaintiff. Oregon, 322 F.3d 

at 1105. Mr. Madison requested that the PAIMI organization bring suit on his 

behalf. Id. at 1105. Thus, A.J. Madison’s status as a constituent of the PAIMI 

organization was clear, and the PAIMI organization demonstrated that at least 

one of its constituents would have standing to sue. 

Similarly, in Advocacy Center for the Elderly and Disabled v. Louisiana, 

the plaintiffs included W.B., an individual incompetent detainee awaiting 

transfer to the state mental health hospital. Advocacy Center for the Elderly 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 12 of 20
13

and Disabled, 731 F.Supp.2d at 587, 597. Thus, again, in that case, at least one 

of the PAIMI organization’s constituents had standing to sue in his own right.

Both of these cases established the organization’s individual members’ 

right to sue, by including, one such member as a plaintiff bringing suit. The 

Legal Center states that its constituents include pre-trial detainees awaiting 

competency evaluations or treatment. However, unlike the plaintiff PAIMI 

organizations in the cases it relies upon, The Legal Center has failed to identify 

even one individual pre-trial detainee whom it represents. In fact, the 

individuals identified in its Complaint are specifically being advocated for by the 

Colorado Public Defender. Complaint at ¶¶ 22-26. Thus, even assuming

arguendo, that the law is well-settled that PAIMI organizations have 

associational standing to sue on behalf of their constituents, here The Legal 

Center has failed to demonstrate a nexus between its constituents and the 

specific individuals it alleges are being harmed by the Defendants’ action or 

inaction. By failing to identify any individual constituent who has been 

aggrieved by the Defendants’, The Legal Center has distinguished this case 

from those it relies upon, and has not demonstrated that any of its members 

would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. 

A similar situation was considered by the court in Doe v. Stincer, a case 

which The Legal Center also relies upon in support of its claim of associational 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 13 of 20
14

standing. There, the plaintiffs included a PAIMI organization and Chris Doe, an 

individual who had been examined and treated by two psychiatrists at a 

psychiatric hospital. Stincer, 175 F.3d at 881. The Stincer court recognized that 

a PAIMI organization, in general, has the right to sue on behalf of its 

constituents. Id. at 886. The court further opined that “the right to sue on 

behalf of its constituents, however, does not relieve [the PAIMI organization] of 

its obligation to satisfy Hunt’s first prong by showing that one of its constituents 

otherwise has standing to sue...” Id. In reviewing the evidence before it, the 

Stincer court concluded, in part, that because the Advocacy Center failed to state 

that any of the aggrieved persons were its clients, it failed to satisfy the first 

prong of the test for associational standing. Here, The Legal Center similarly 

cannot escape the fact that they have failed to show that any of pre-trial 

detainees were or are their clients.

A. The Legal Center does not satisfy the first element of the test for 

associational standing

Despite failing to make such a showing, The Legal Center still contends 

that it has satisfied the first element of the test for associational standing. The 

Legal Center further asserts that Defendants’ argument is limited to whether a 

group’s members have standing to sue in their own right. Response at p. 11. 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 14 of 20
15

This mischaracterizes Defendants’ arguments.1

However, The Legal Center has failed to show that its constituents possess 

such indicia of membership.

 As discussed above, The Legal 

Center has failed to demonstrate whether any of its members would have 

standing to sue in their own right. Defendants do not assert, as The Legal 

Center would have this Court believe, that traditional membership is required 

for an organization to have associational standing. In fact, Defendants agree 

that there must be “indicia of membership” in an organization for associational 

standing to exist. 

2

 

1 While the Motion and Memorandum focuses on this point, Defendants’ have 

not conceded, implicitly or otherwise, that The Legal Center meets the second 

and third factors of the Hunt test. 

 In its Complaint, The Legal Center distinguishes 

2 The Legal Center also erroneously assert that Defendants “fail to acknowledge” 

decisions that support the rejection of Defendants’ constitutional standing 

arguments. Response at p. 10. However, The Legal Center does not advise this 

Court that the alleged rejected arguments do not pertain to standing under the 

Hunt test as The Legal Center claims, but instead they address the prudential 

element of standing. See Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services Commission v. 

Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 642 F.Supp.2d 872, 878 (S.D. Ind. 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 15 of 20
16

between its members and its constituents, and does not make a showing that its 

constituents bear the same “indicia of membership” as its expressly identified 

members. Complaint at ¶¶ 4-8. 

Interestingly, The Legal Center continues to rely on case law where a 

specific individual constituent of the plaintiff PAIMI organization is named as a 

plaintiff, in support of its argument that it satisfies the first element of Hunt. 

See discussion regarding Mink, supra., Stincer, supra., Advocacy Center for the 

Elderly and Disabled, supra at p. 4-6 above. See also LaFlamme v. New 

Horizons, 605 F.Supp.2d 378, 380 (D.Conn. 2009) (severely physically disabled 

individual plaintiff bringing lawsuit together with the plaintiff PAIMI 

organization); Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F.Supp.2d 211, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)

(individual plaintiff serving as a representative for the claims brought by 

plaintiff PAIMI organization).3

 

2009). Thus, each of the cases relied upon by The Legal Center is 

distinguishable as to the issue of constitutional standing, which is argued here.

 Thus, while other courts have found the plaintiff 

PAIMI organizations’ constituents had the requisite indicia of membership, each 

3 As The Legal Center is well aware, its citation to unpublished opinion N.J. 

Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Davy, 2005 WL 2416962 (D.N.J. 2005) is 

inappropriate and carries no precedential weight.

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 16 of 20
17

court did so following an express demonstration of said constituent’s standing to 

sue in their own right. Again, The Legal Center fails to make such a showing 

and its position that Defendants’ arguments are “overly formalistic” is

unpersuasive and inappropriately dismissive. In that The Legal Center has 

failed to demonstrate the requisite standing to pursue this case, this matter 

should be dismissed.

B. The Legal Center mischaracterizes Carnahan, which is persuasive law

Finally, The Legal Center attempts to summarily dismiss the Eighth 

Circuit’s ruling in Missouri Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc. v. Carnahan, 

499 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2007). In doing so, The Legal Center misconstrues the 

basis for that court’s decision. Specifically, The Legal Center erroneously states 

that the Carnahan court “based its denial of associational standing on its 

conclusion that the constituents of the PAIMI organization there ‘have no 

relationship’ to the organization.” Response at 15. This quote misstates and 

mischaracterizes the basis of that court’s decision. In reality, the Carnahan

court stated that “the ‘constituents’ of [the PAIMI organization] have no such 

relationship to the organization.” Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 810. In stating that 

there was “no such relationship”, that court was referring to the indicia of 

membership specified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hunt. Id. The Carnahan

court’s ruling is still good law, and is as persuasive as other law among the 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 17 of 20
18

various circuits. As stated in Defendants’ Memorandum, The Legal Center has 

failed to demonstrate that its constituents, as opposed to its members, possess 

the indicia of membership necessary to confer associational standing on it. It is 

up to this Court, not The Legal Center, to determine what weight to provide all 

of the law presently before it.

CONCLUSION

The Legal Center has failed to allege facts sufficient to support 

constitutional standing requirements and associational standing requirements. 

The Legal Center has demonstrated no nexus between the criminal defendants

who are waiting for competency evaluations or restorative treatment and their 

organization other than a broad federal statutory authority to advocate the 

rights of the mentally ill. The Legal Center has not satisfied the first element of 

the test for associational standing and mischaracterization of other courts’

rulings does not change its failures. The Legal Center has the burden and has 

not met it. 

WHEREFORE, Defendants request that this Court enter an Order 

granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, and 

for any other relief the Court deems necessary in the circumstances.

Respectfully submitted this 31st day of October, 2011.

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 18 of 20
19

JOHN W. SUTHERS

Attorney General

/s/ Alicia R. Calderón

ALICIA R. CALDERÓN*

First Assistant Attorney General

TANYA E. SMITH*

Assistant Attorney General

Human Services Unit

State Services Section

Attorneys for Defendants

1525 Sherman Street, 7th Floor

Denver, Colorado 80203

Telephone: 303-866-5228

FAX: 303-866-5671

E-Mail: tanya.smith@state.co.us

Alicia.calderon@state.co.us

*Counsel of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have duly served the within DEFENDANTS’ REPLY 

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT upon all parties herein 

by electronic service delivery using the PACER/ECF system, this 31st day of

October, 2011, addressed as follows:

Iris Eytan

Jason Lynch

Caleb Durling

REILLY POZNER LLP

1900 Sixteenth Street, Suite 1700

Denver, Colorado 80202

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 19 of 20
20

Marcus Lock

BRATTON HILL WILDERSON & LOCK, LLC

525 North Main Street

Gunnison, Colorado 81230

/s/ Alicia R. Calderón

Alicia Calderón

Case No. 1:11-cv-02285-NYW Document 15 filed 10/31/11 USDC Colorado pg 20 of 20