SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0341-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN A. WELLS, a/k/a

JOHNIE WELLS, JOHN 

ARTHUR WELLS, JR., 

SAFAR A. MUHAMMAD, 

JOHNNIE S. SHABAZZ, and 

JOHNNY SHABAZZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted January 6, 2021 – Decided February 19, 2021

Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 15-10-

1275.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Daniel Finkelstein, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant John A. Wells appeals from his July 10, 2018 conviction and 

extended sentence as a persistent offender. We affirm. 

We derive the following facts from the record. Defendant was implicated 

in two similar robberies of female victims, one successful and one not, that 

occurred two days apart in the parking lots of two different supermarkets located 

in adjoining municipalities. In each incident, the perpetrator would drive 

alongside a woman pushing a shopping cart and grab the woman’s purse before 

driving away. 

The first occurred on October 26, 2014, in the parking lot of a Stop & 

Shop in South Brunswick. The victim, Debra Dennuzzo, left the store while

pushing a shopping cart, carrying a small black purse on her right arm that

contained her cell phone, glasses, makeup, $120 in cash, and credit cards. As 

she walked towards her car, she "noticed a car behind [her]," and "the next thing 

[she knew], the pocketbook is going down [her] arm . . . and there was a male 

in the car that had the other end." Dennuzzo released the bag and the car drove 

off. The brief struggle broke her middle fingernail. 
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Dennuzzo immediately ran back to the grocery store to call the police. 

South Brunswick Police Officer William Bonura, Jr., arrived quickly and 

interviewed Dennuzzo. Afterwards, Bonura approached the store's security 

supervisor and requested the security footage. Bonura reviewed it, concluding 

the car in question was an early 2000's Saab, based on the car's distinct features. 

Bonura received a phone call later that day from a nearby resident who found a 

wallet near his house that matched Dennuzzo's description. It contained only 

her credit cards. Dennuzzo described the robber as a black male wearing

sunglasses, who drove a dark-colored car of a make and model that she did not 

recognize. 

The second incident occurred two days later in a parking lot of a ShopRite 

in North Brunswick. Kim Klose left the store, pushing a shopping cart back to 

her car, when a car approached her, and the driver grabbed the pocketbook 

hanging from her shoulder. She snatched it back and managed to hold onto it 

before the car drove off. Klose memorized the car's license plate number and 

wrote it down on a piece of paper. She described the driver as "a black man in 

his late 40s, early 50s" in an older, black car. 

Klose returned to the supermarket, gave an employee the plate number, 

and waited for police. North Brunswick Police Officer Alex Obando arrived on 
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the scene and interviewed Klose. Obando relayed the license plate number and 

collected video surveillance of the parking lot from the grocery store. 

North Brunswick Detective Robert Powell traced the registered owner of 

the vehicle with that license plate number to Victoria Reynolds, defendant's 

wife. Powell also discovered defendant and Reynolds had been occupants in the 

vehicle during a motor vehicle accident, and that defendant was issued a motor 

vehicle summons while driving the Saab. Detectives went to Reynolds's house 

to further investigate. 

On the same day as the second robbery, Michael Dooley, the used car 

manager at a local car dealership where defendant detailed cars, received a 

"Nixle," a police-related community messaging app text, detailing the Dennuzzo 

robbery. The message described the perpetrator as a black male driving a darkcolored Saab. The message caught Dooley's attention because the Stop & Shop 

was located in close in proximity to the dealership and he recalled an occasion 

where he helped defendant reenter the dealership to find his keys and leave the 

parking lot in a dark-colored Saab. 

Dooley recalled that during their brief conversation, defendant said he 

had just received a motor vehicle summons for [an]

amount of money, and his wife was very upset with him

because Christmas was coming and they weren't going

to have money for gifts, and he needed to find a way to 
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pay this money back as quick as possible, and that he 

was going to do that so it didn't ruin Christmas. 

Dooley noticed that defendant was driving a dark blue Saab that day, a car he 

characterized as "a rather rare vehicle." 

Reminded of their conversation and of the uniqueness of the dark blue

Saab, Dooley called his friend, South Brunswick Police Officer Brian Sites. 

Defendant and the Saab were at the dealership, so Dooley relayed the Saab's 

license plate number to Sites. Sites agreed that Dooley's interaction with 

defendant and the location and timing of the robbery were "way more than a 

coincidence" and called detectives from South Brunswick that were working the 

case. Defendant did not object to Sites' similar testimony regarding Dooley's 

interaction with defendant. 

Officers from both cases proceeded to Reynolds's house and, upon 

learning that defendant was at work, went to arrest him. Powell arrived at the 

dealership and briefly talked with defendant before arresting him. He recalled 

that defendant was "breathing heavily" and "sweating." Defendant stated that 

the blue Saab out front belonged to his wife, that he drove the car that day

(October 28, 2014), and that he never lends the car to anyone. When asked about 

the North Brunswick incident that day, defendant stated that he went to the 
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ShopRite during his break to get food and that "[he] might have bumped into 

some lady or something, but [he] didn't try to hurt anybody or [] take anything." 

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied committing either 

robbery but admitted having shopped at the ShopRite and going to a pizza parlor 

in that shopping center. He denied being at the Stop & Shop on October 26, 

2014. He denied telling Dooley that he needed money for Christmas, claiming

he did not celebrate Christmas because he is a Muslim. 

Defendant testified that after being arrested, he told the police they had 

the wrong car or the wrong person. Defendant admitted he had driven the Saab 

to work that day. He further testified that his wife, his wife's brother, and his 

brother also drove the Saab. Defendant denied going on lunch breaks or wearing 

sunglasses due to poor eyesight. 

On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that his wife owned a 

Saab, and identified the Saab depicted in exhibits as his wife's car. He admitted 

receiving a traffic summons in North Brunswick while driving it. Although he 

drove the Saab on October 28, 2014, he claimed that his brother borrowed it and

then wife's brother picked it up later from the dealership. Defendant denied ever 

seeing or speaking to Dooley. He also denied answering any questions posed 

by Powell at the dealership. 
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A Middlesex County grand jury returned an indictment charging 

defendant with two counts of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (counts 

one and three), third-degree attempted theft by unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-

1 and 2C:20-3(a) (count two), and third-degree theft by unlawful taking, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) (count four). Defendant moved to sever the trial of the two 

incidents, claiming that a single trial would unfairly prejudice him. The judge

indicated he would conduct a Rule 104 hearing. After that judge retired, another 

judge denied the motion to sever without conducting a Rule 104 hearing. After 

analyzing the Cofield1factors, the judge determined both incidents could be 

tried together as long as the evidence was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). He

concluded the evidence met the exception in Rule 404(b) allowing the admission 

of evidence of other bad acts to prove identity. 

The case proceeded to trial before a third judge. South Brunswick Officer 

Eric Tighelaar testified that on October 30, 2014, he interviewed Reynolds, who 

told him she was at a mosque on October 26, that she did not use the Saab that 

day, and that no one other than she and defendant drove it. Defense counsel 

made numerous hearsay objections to Tighelaar's testimony. The judge

eventually allowed a rephrased version of Tighelaar's testimony, that 

1

 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992). 
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"[Reynolds] had gotten up early in the morning, had gone to the mosque, and [] 

did not return until after 3:30 p.m." 

On the next day of trial, the judge stated that admission of Tighelaar's 

testimony regarding his conversation with Reynolds was a mistake, and that she

would attempt to mold a limiting instruction. Later that day, the judge read the 

jury its instructions but omitted any limiting instruction. Defendant did not 

object to the jury instructions. 

During deliberations, the jury asked the court to provide "the report of the 

officer who wrote Mrs. Reynolds's interview." The judge declined because it 

was inadmissible hearsay. The jury then sent the court a note, asking to "hear 

specifically the officer's interview with Ms. Reynolds." The judge sent the 

following written instruction to the jury: "What is said by a non-party witness, 

specifically Ms. Reynolds, is considered inadmissible hearsay and not to be 

considered during your deliberations." Defendant did not object to this 

instruction. 

The jury next asked the court to listen to the "intro" of Tighelaar's 

testimony and the "end portion" of the "[p]rosecutor part." The court played 

those segments and a juror asked "[i]s that it?" The court confirmed that was it. 

Defendant did not object to the playbacks or seek a further jury instruction. The 
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jury convicted defendant of the charges relating to the Klose attempted robbery 

and acquitted him of the charges relating to the Dennuzzo robbery. 

The State moved to sentence defendant to a discretionary extended term

as a persistent offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). The prosecutor noted 

that defendant had previously been sentenced to a twenty-year term with a tenyear period of parole ineligibility for a similar robbery and had been convicted 

of other robberies as well. Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant was 

eligible for a discretionary extended term but argued it should not be imposed 

because of the age of the prior convictions. The judge found defendant a 

persistent offender, noting defendant had nine prior convictions, including many 

robberies, and was last released from prison within ten years of the date of these 

offenses. 

The judge observed defendant had an "extensive juvenile and criminal 

history" and "has failed to respond affirmatively to prior periods of probation 

and incarceration." She also noted that defendant "exhibited . . . a pattern of 

violent behavior" and imposed an extended term "to protect the public from 

future offenses by the defendant."

The judge found aggravating factors three (risk of re-offense), N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(a)(3); six (prior criminal record), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and nine 
10 A-0341-18

(need for deterrence), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). The judge found no mitigating 

factors and that aggravating factors substantially outweighed the nonexistent 

mitigating factors. On the robbery count, the judge imposed an extended fifteenyear term, subject to the parole ineligibility and mandatory parole supervision 

imposed by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The attempted theft 

count was merged for sentencing purposes. This appeal followed. 

Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO

GRANT WELLS’S MOTION TO SEVER THE TWO 

ROBBERIES, AS THEY WERE SEPARATE 

INCIDENTS BASED ON UNCONVINCING 

EVIDENCE.

POINT II

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO A 

FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW DUE TO 

THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF HEARSAY 

EVIDENCE. 

POINT III

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE 

AFOREMENTIONED ERRORS DENIED WELLS A 

FAIR TRIAL.
11 A-0341-18

POINT IV

RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE 

TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBLY DOUBLECOUNTED AND USED THE SAME ROBBERIES AS 

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PERSISTENT 

OFFENDER EXTENDED TERM AND

AGGRAVATING FACTOR SIX. 

We first address the denial of defendant's motion to sever the two 

robberies. A defendant may be tried for two different crimes in the same trial if 

the crimes "are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or 

transaction or on [two] or more acts or transactions connected together or 

constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." R. 3:7-6. However, trial courts 

may order separate trials of counts if joinder of the offenses prejudices the 

defendant. R. 3:15-2(b). We review a decision to grant or deny severance for 

abuse of discretion. State v. Davis, 390 N.J. Super. 573, 591 (App. Div. 2007). 

"The test for assessing prejudice is 'whether, assuming the charges were 

tried separately, evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be 

admissible under [N.J.R.E. 404(b)] in the trial of the remaining charges.'" State 

v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 73 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996)). In addition, evidence of a different 

crime must pass the following four-factor test adopted in Cofield: (1) the 

evidence must be relevant to a material issue; (2) the evidence "must be similar 
12 A-0341-18

in kind and reasonably close in time"; (3) the evidence proffered "must be clear 

and convincing"; and (4) "the probative value of the evidence must not be 

outweighed by its apparent prejudice." Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338. 

N.J.R.E. 404(b) excludes evidence of other crimes or wrongs unless it is 

used to show "other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when 

such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute." 

The trial judge found that both robberies met the exception to Rule 404(b) 

for admission of "bad act evidence . . . for the purpose of proving identity." 

Defendant argues that evidence of both robberies was overly prejudicial, and a 

Rule 104 hearing was needed to weigh the credibility of the testimony. The 

State argues that severance was properly denied because evidence obtained from 

each robbery could be used to show defendant's identity for the other. 

Specifically, the State contends that defendant's admission at the dealership that 

he is the only person that drives the Saab could be used to prove defendant 

committed the Dennuzzo robbery, and that Dooley's statement about seeing 

defendant drive the Saab could be used to prove defendant committed the Klose 

robbery. It also argues that the alleged risk of unfair prejudice was disproved 

when the jury acquitted defendant of the Dennuzzo robbery. 
13 A-0341-18

Generally, evidence of a crime or bad act may be used to prove identity in 

two situations: (1) when specific evidence derived from one offense connects 

multiple offenses; or (2) when the crimes are signature crimes. Sterling, 215 

N.J. at 92-93. For example, joinder has been permitted where police found 

specific items stolen during the first burglary when they arrested defendant for 

the second burglary. State v. Pierro, 355 N.J. Super. 109, 117 (App. Div. 2002). 

Alternatively, courts have admitted signature-crime evidence to prove identity 

when the unique nature of the crimes is clear. State v. Fortin, 189 N.J. 579, 594 

(2007). "The conduct in question must be unusual and distinctive," and "there 

must be proof of sufficient facts in both crimes to establish an unusual pattern." 

State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517, 530 (2000) (quoting State v. Reldan, 185 N.J. 

Super. 494, 502-03 (App. Div. 1982)). However, "[t]he standard for admitting 

other-crimes evidence to prove identity becomes more stringent when the State 

attempts to link a particular defendant to a crime on the basis of modus operandi, 

or a signature way of committing the crime." Sterling, 215 N.J. at 93. 

Here, the judge allowed the State to try both crimes in one trial because 

she determined that either crime would be evidence used to prove defendant's 

identity. We discern no abuse of discretion. To be sure, the evidence for each 

incident included the similarities of the description of the perpetrator's car, the 
14 A-0341-18

identical modus operandi, the fact that both robberies occurred in supermarket 

parking lots, and the similarity of the victims (women pushing a shopping cart). 

This evidence, when coupled with the defendant's wife owning a dark blue Saab 

with a matching license plate that defendant had used on October 28 to go to the 

ShopRite during his break, and while there "might have bumped into some lady 

or something," provided powerful circumstantial evidence of identity and 

illustrated a similar plan and method of committing the robberies. In those ways 

the crimes were sufficiently connected to deny severance. 

Moreover, a trial court's decision may be harmless error where "any 

prejudice to defendant was not such that created a real possibility that the jury 

arrived at a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Marrero, 148 

N.J. 469, 492-93 (1997) (citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). The 

central inquiry for determining whether harmless error occurred is "whether in 

all the circumstances there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the error denied 

a fair trial and a fair decision on the merits." Macon, 57 N.J. at 338. 

We recognize that Rule 404(b) violations "are poor candidates for 

rehabilitation under the harmless error" rule because " other-crime evidence has 

a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant." State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 

252, 262 (2000) (quoting State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 (1979); State v. 
15 A-0341-18

Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 302 (1989)). We nonetheless view any alleged error in 

denying severance as harmless. The fact that defendant was found not guilty of 

the Dennuzzo robbery and theft demonstrates that the jury was not turned against 

the defendant by the other-crime evidence and was not denied a fair trial. 

We next address the admission of Site's and Tighelaar's hearsay testimony. 

First, defendant argues that Sites's testimony about his conversation with Dooley 

was inadmissible hearsay. The State argues that Sites's testimony, which relates 

to Dooley's conversation with defendant, is admissible as a statement by a partyopponent, and that it is otherwise plain error and harmless. 

"Evidentiary rulings made by the trial court are reviewed under an abuseof-discretion standard." State v. Scharf, 225 N.J. 547, 572 (2016) (citing Hisenaj 

v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008)). On the other hand, evidentiary issues not 

objected to at trial are subject to the plain error rule; that is, "error possessing a 

clear capacity to bring about an unjust result and which substantially prejudiced 

the defendant's fundamental right to have the jury fairly evaluate the merits of 

his defense." State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 444-45 (1989) (quoting State v. 

Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 396 (1962)). Accord R. 2:10-2 ("Any error or omission 

shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have 

been clearly capable of producing an unjust result . . . ."). 
16 A-0341-18

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement "offered in evidence to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted" and is inadmissible unless a recognized exception 

applies. N.J.R.E. 801, 802. A defendant's statement is generally admissible 

under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1), the party-opponent exception. However, when the 

defendant's statement is repeated by the person hearing it to another, who then 

testifies about the defendant's statement, it is inadmissible double hearsay. 

Sites's testimony about his conversation with Dooley has components of 

inadmissible hearsay. For example, Sites testified that Dooley stated, "what are 

the odds, it can't be a coincidence." He further testified that Dooley told him 

who defendant was working for and that the Saab was "a rare car." These

statements by defendant's coworker to a police officer are inadmissible hearsay. 

Importantly, defendant did not object to Site's testimony. We therefore review 

for plain error. 

Notably, Sites's testimony did not include directly incriminating 

statements defendant made to Dooley other than that defendant said, "he was 

hard up for money." Moreover, the impact of Sites's hearsay testimony is at 

least partially vitiated because Dooley himself testified about what he had said 

to Sites and what defendant had said to Dooley. See State v. Torres, 313 N.J. 

Super. 129, 158 (App. Div. 1998) (noting "the double hearsay impact of the 
17 A-0341-18

police testimony is at least partially vitiated because [co-defendant] Gambia 

himself testified that he had told [State's witness Javier] Garcia what had 

happened"). Since Dooley's testimony was admissible, Sites's recounting of 

what Dooley said is harmless error. See ibid. 

Defendant next argues that the court gave an ineffective curative 

instruction on Tighelaar's inadmissible testimony. The State argues the court 

properly instructed the jury to disregard Tighelaar's testimony about his 

conversation with defendant's wife, and that any error was nonetheless harmless. 

When inadmissible evidence is admitted in error, "a curative instruction 

may sometimes be a sufficient remedy." State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 586 (2018). 

Nevertheless, a proper instruction "must be firm, clear, and accomplished 

without delay." State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 134 (2009). The Court in Vallejo

emphasized the "importance of immediacy and specificity" of curative 

instructions to avoid the prejudice of inadmissible evidence "that has seeped into 

a trial." Id. at 135. Here, the curative instruction given by the trial court was 

not immediate. 

Tighelaar testified that Reynolds told him that she had been gone the 

entire day of October 26, 2014 and that defendant was not feeling well and 

stayed home. Tighelaar also recounted that Reynolds told him that she took "the 
18 A-0341-18

Hyundai and not the Saab," and that "just she and [defendant] were the only ones 

who would drive the two vehicles." Defense counsel objected to further 

questioning based on the conversation being inadmissible hearsay but the court 

allowed Tighelaar to state, "she had gotten up early in the morning, had gone to 

the mosque, and she did not return until after 3:30 p.m. that day." This testimony 

evidenced that the Saab was available to defendant at the time of the Dennuzzo 

robbery. 

The next day, defense counsel asked the court to instruct the jury to 

disregard Tighelaar's testimony regarding his conversation with Reynolds. The 

judge agreed and stated that she would "try to mold something" and allow 

counsel to review it. The judge gave the following curative instruction after the 

jury had begun deliberating: "What is said by a non-party witness, specifically 

Ms. Reynolds, is considered inadmissible hearsay and not to be considered 

during your deliberations." Hence, the jury was instructed to disregard 

Tighelaar's testimony about what Reynolds told him. "[T]he jury is presumed 

to follow the trial court's instructions." State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 335 (2007)

(citing State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 526 (1998)). Moreover, any perceived 

error was harmless since the jury acquitted defendant of the Dennuzzo robbery. 
19 A-0341-18

Defendant also argues that cumulative error warrants reversal of his 

conviction. "[T]he predicate for relief for cumulative error must be that the 

probable effect of the cumulative error was to render the underlying trial unfair." 

State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007). Given our rulings rejecting 

defendant's arguments or finding the error harmless, we discern no cumulative 

error warranting reversal. Defendant's trial was not rendered unfair. 

Lastly, we address defendant's argument that the trial court impermissibly 

double counted by using the same robberies as justification for the persistent 

offender extended term and applying aggravating factor six. We disagree. 

The court properly considered defendant's prior convictions, including his 

many robbery convictions, when deciding whether to impose a discretionary 

extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). Indeed, the court "must examine the 

defendant's prior record and his or her age at the time of any prior convictions," 

when "determin[ing] whether a defendant meets the definition of a 'persistent 

offender.'" State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 162 (2006). 

In turn, determining the length of the extended term "is a function of the 

court's assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the 

consideration of the deterrent need to protect the public." Id. at 168. The court

properly considered defendant's prior convictions when deciding whether to 
20 A-0341-18

apply aggravating factor six and the weight to be given to it. In doing so, the 

court did not engage in impermissible double counting. As we explained in State 

v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 576-77 (App. Div. 2017): 

[Defendant's] criminal history was not a "fact" that was 

a necessary element of an offense for which he was 

being sentenced. Further, it cannot be disputed 

[defendant] had more than the requisite number of 

offenses to qualify for an extended term. Indeed, the 

trial judge was not then required to ignore the extent of 

his criminal history when considering applicable 

aggravating factors. 

Defendants reliance on State v. Vasquez, 374 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 

2005), is misplaced. In that case, the trial judge "erred in concluding that [State 

v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987)], permitted him to raise the presumptive extended 

base term on account of defendant's only conviction, the very conviction which 

both allowed and required an extended term. To do so was a form of 'double 

counting.'" Id. at 267. Here, in contrast, the judge imposed an extended term 

and applied aggravating factor six based on defendant's numerous prior 

convictions, not the crime he was being sentenced for. 

"Appellate courts review sentencing determinations in accordance with a 

deferential standard." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). 

The appellate court must affirm the sentence unless (1) 

the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the 

aggravating and mitigating factors found by the 
21 A-0341-18

sentencing court were not based upon competent and 

credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application 

of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the 

sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the 

judicial conscience." 

[Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 

N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] 

Applying this deferential standard of review, we discern no basis to 

overturn the sentence imposed. Defendant does not dispute that he was eligible 

for an extended term. The judge imposed a mid-range extended term. See

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(3) (setting the extended term range between ten and twenty 

years for a second-degree crime). The judge followed the sentencing guidelines, 

her application of the aggravating and mitigating factors is supported by the 

record, and the sentence does not shock the judicial conscience. 

Affirmed.