AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed August 5, 2019.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-18-00617-CV

MARK SMITH, MARK & TAMMY SMITH, LLC,

TEE DANIEL, AND DARIN KIDD, Appellants

V.

NERIUM INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-03726

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Whitehill, Molberg, and Reichek

Opinion by Justice Whitehill

This is an interlocutory appeal from a temporary injunction. 

Appellants were formerly associated with appellee Nerium International, LLC, a multilevel marketing. After they left Nerium and joined a competitor, Nerium sued appellants and 

obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting them from recruiting or soliciting any of Nerium’s 

sales force to join any other direct sales, multi-level, or network marketing company. 

Appellants raise six issues on appeal. The case largely concerns the nature and extent of 

(i) benefit a multi-level marketing company provides for its independent contractor sales force and 

(ii) such company’s interest in protecting its relationships with its sales force. Based on the record 

before us, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude at this early 
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stage that a temporary injunction was warranted. Accordingly, we reject appellants’ issues and 

affirm without opining on the case’s ultimate outcome.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Except as otherwise noted, we draw the following facts from the evidence admitted at the

temporary injunction hearing.

1. Nerium and Its Policies and Procedures

Nerium International, LLC, is a multi-level marketing company that sells skin care and 

wellness anti-aging products. Nerium started in August 2011 in the United States and now operates 

in twelve countries. 

Nerium relies on independent contractors called “brand partners” (BPs) to sell its products 

to customers and to recruit other BPs. A BP’s recruits, and all recruits who flow from those 

recruits, make up the BP’s “downline.” BPs receive commissions on both their own sales and their 

downline’s sales.

A new BP receives a launch kit that includes brochures for customers and training 

materials. A new BP also gets a personalized web site that he or she can use to enroll both 

customers and new BPs. Most Nerium product orders come through the BPs’ websites. Nerium

BPs may work as much or as little as they want. They do not have assigned sales territories and 

can market anywhere in the world through social media. BPs also get computer access to “the 

back office,” which (i) gives them access to marketing materials and training and (ii) shows them 

sales performance data for themselves and everyone on their teams. They also have access to 

ongoing training, public relations supports, promotions, incentives, and other events.

BPs must comply with the terms found in the Nerium policies and procedures manual.
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This case involves § 11.06 of Nerium’s policies and procedures, which concerns 

solicitation and competition. The case particularly focuses on the following non-solicitation 

clause:

[I]n consideration for all of the rights granted by this Agreement, including the 

protection this non-solicitation provision affords to Brand Partner, for the term of 

this Agreement and for two (2) years after termination hereof, for any reason, Brand 

Partner agrees not to, directly or indirectly, recruit or solicit any of Company’s other 

Brand Partners to join other direct sales, multi-level or network marketing 

companies. 

2. Appellants’ Relationships with Nerium

Appellant Mark Smith joined Nerium in 2011 soon after it launched. Smith and his wife 

later formed Mark & Tammy Smith, LLC. 

Smith became acquainted with Nerium founder and CEO Jeff Olson when they were both 

working with a different multi-level marketing company called Prepaid Legal Services. When he 

was preparing to start Nerium, Olson reached out to Smith and asked him to join Nerium. 

Smith testified that he and Olson agreed that Smith and his wife would each get 5% equity 

in Nerium, they would receive 15% of the “back office fees,” and they would be considered 

“master distributors” entitled to a percentage of revenue. 

Smith succeeded at Nerium, working his way up to the level of “diamond national 

marketing director” and “gold international marketing director.” In less than seven years with the 

company, he received compensation of approximately $14 million. Smith was featured in many 

Nerium videos and at “huge” Nerium events both in the United States and abroad.

Appellant Darin Kidd became a Nerium BP in 2011 and a Nerium five star national 

marketing director. 

Appellant Tee Daniel’s wife, Cassie, started with Nerium in 2012. Daniel himself became 

a Nerium BP no later than 2016 and became a Nerium one star national marketing director. 
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By early 2018, Smith was unhappy at Nerium and was thinking about leaving. In early 

March 2018, Smith, Kidd, and others visited another company called Jeunesse. According to the 

parties’ briefs, Jeunesse is also a “multi-level marketing” or “network-marketing” company.

On or about March 13, 2018, Smith and Kidd “enrolled” with Jeunesse. Cassie Daniel 

signed up with Jeunesse in mid-March, and Tee Daniel engaged in marketing and training to 

support Cassie’s Jeunesse account. 

B. Procedural History

On March 20, 2018, Nerium sued Smith, Mark & Tammy Smith, LLC, and others. 

Several days later, Nerium filed an amended petition that added Kidd and others as 

defendants. 

On April 24, 2018, Nerium filed a second amended petition that added Daniel and others 

as defendants. That petition included claims against appellants for contract breach and tortious 

interference with contract, and it requested injunctive relief. That same day, the trial judge signed 

a temporary restraining order against appellants. 

The trial judge held an evidentiary temporary injunction hearing at which Amber Rourke

(Nerium’s chief marketing officer) and appellant Smith testified. 

After the hearing, the trial judge signed a temporary injunction, which provides:

The Injunction Restrained Parties [i.e., appellants and certain categories of people 

affiliated with them] are prohibited from directly or indirectly recruiting or 

soliciting any of Nerium’s Brand Partners to join any other direct-sales, multi-level 

marketing, or network-marketing company, including but not limited to Jeunesse 

Global Holdings, LLC. 

This interlocutory appeal followed.

II. LAW OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS AND

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy granted to preserve the status quo of 

the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 
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198, 204 (Tex. 2002). It does not issue as a matter of right. Id. Rather, the applicant must plead 

and prove the following elements: (i) a cause of action against the defendant, (ii) a probable right 

to the relief sought, and (iii) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Id.

Appellants don’t contest the first element, so we start with the probable right to recovery 

element. That element does not require the applicant to show that it will prevail at trial, nor does 

it require the trial court to evaluate the probability that the applicant will prevail at trial. Austin v. 

Mitchell, No. 05-18-00052-CV, 2018 WL 2949443, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 13, 2018, no 

pet.) (mem. op.); Intercontinental Terminals Co., LLC v. Vopak N. Am., Inc., 354 S.W.3d 887, 897 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Rather, it requires the applicant to present enough 

evidence to raise a bona fide issue as to its right to ultimate relief. Austin, 2018 WL 2949443, at 

*3. This requires the applicant to produce some evidence supporting every element of at least one 

valid legal theory. Id.; Tex. Health Res. v. Pham, No. 05-15-01283-CV, 2016 WL 4205732, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 3, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The irreparable injury requirement is sometimes described in terms of the injured party 

having an inadequate legal remedy. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 (“[A] party can rarely establish 

an irreparable injury and an inadequate legal remedy when damages for breach of contract are 

available.”); see also id. at 204 (“An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately 

compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary 

standard.”).

We review a temporary injunction for abuse of discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its 

discretion if (i) it misapplies the law to established facts or (ii) the evidence does not reasonably 

support the court’s determinations as to probable right of recovery or probable injury. Loye v. 

Travelhost, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 615, 619 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). In our review, we draw 

all legitimate inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the order, and the trial 
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court does not abuse its discretion if it makes a decision based on conflicting evidence. Id. We 

review any legal determinations de novo. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Issue One: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to conclude that the nonsolicitation clause is unreasonable and therefore unenforceable?

Appellants argue that Nerium failed to show a probable right to recover because the nonsolicitation clause is unreasonable, and therefore unenforceable, for several reasons. But first we 

address two procedural issues that Nerium raises.

1. Is enforceability a relevant issue at the temporary injunction stage?

In a supplemental letter brief, Nerium suggests that we recently held that a non-solicitation 

agreement’s (un)enforceability is not a relevant consideration in determining whether the applicant 

has shown a probable right of recovery. See White v. Impact Floors of Tex., LP, No. 05-18-00384-

CV, 2018 WL 6616973, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, 

Nerium suggests, we should decline to consider appellants’ arguments that the non-solicitation 

agreement in this case is unenforceable. Appellants disagree.

Because we conclude for the reasons discussed below that the trial court could reasonably 

rule that this non-solicitation clause is enforceable, we need not decide whether Nerium’s 

interpretation of White is correct.

2. Which side bears the burden of proof on § 15.50’s enforceability criteria?

Under Texas law, the general rule regarding covenants not to compete is this:

[A] covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise 

enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it 

contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be 

restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary 

to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a). Which party bears the burden of proof on these criteria 

depends on the facts of the case:
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If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is to 

obligate the promisor to render personal services, for a term or at will, the promisee

has the burden of establishing that the covenant meets the criteria specified by 

Section 15.50 of this code. If the agreement has a different primary purpose, the 

promisor has the burden of establishing that the covenant does not meet those 

criteria.

Id. § 15.51(b).

Nerium argues that (i) § 15.51(b) applies at the temporary injunction stage of the case, 

(ii) under § 15.51(b), appellants bore the burden of proof to negate the § 15.50(a) criteria, and 

(iii) because the criteria are defensive matters in this case, the trial court has the discretion to defer 

considering them at all at the temporary injunction stage. Appellants disagree, arguing that Nerium 

bore the burden of proof on the § 15.50(a) criteria because (i) § 15.51(b)’s burden-shifting 

provisions do not apply at the temporary injunction stage and (ii) even if § 15.51(b) applies at the 

temporary injunction stage, Nerium still bore the burden of proof.

As will be seen below, we conclude that Nerium adduced sufficient evidence of the 

§ 15.50(a) enforceability criteria to support the temporary injunction. Accordingly, for purposes 

of this appeal, we assume without deciding that Nerium bore the burden of proof on the § 15.50(a) 

criteria.

3. The Law Governing Covenants Not to Compete

By statute, the general rule is that every contract “in restraint of trade or commerce” is 

unlawful. Id. § 15.05(a). “Trade” is broadly defined and includes not only the sale of services but 

also any economic activity that (i) is undertaken in whole or in part for financial gain and (ii) 

involves or relates to goods or services. Id. § 15.03(5). Nerium does not dispute that the nonsolicitation agreement involved here is a contract in restraint of trade.

Section 15.50, discussed above, excepts from § 15.05 covenants not to compete that meet 

certain criteria. Id. § 15.50.
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Appellants contend, and Nerium does not dispute, that the non-solicitation agreement in 

this case—which forbids appellants from soliciting Nerium’s BPs—are legally equivalent to 

covenants not to compete. Although the statute does not define “covenant not to compete,” the 

supreme court holds that a covenant restricting former employees from soliciting their “former 

employers’ customers and employees” is a restraint of trade subject to § 15.50. Marsh USA Inc. 

v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Tex. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 

Drennan, 452 S.W.3d 319, 327 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Marsh).

Here, Nerium doesn’t have salespeople as employees but instead relies solely on its 

independent BPs for customer sales. Thus, recruiting current Nerium BPs to work for another 

company is itself a form of competing with Nerium—competing for salespeople, not directly for 

customers or clients. Consistent with Marsh and its progeny, we hold that appellants’ agreement

not to solicit Nerium’s BPs is a covenant not to compete covered by § 15.50.

Section 15.50(a) makes non-competition covenants enforceable if certain criteria are met. 

The threshold requirement is that the covenant must be “ancillary to or part of an otherwise 

enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made.” BUS. & COM. § 15.50(a); see also

Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 771, 773. Moreover, the supreme court has said that the “otherwise 

enforceable agreement” must give rise to “an interest worthy of protection” or reasonably relate to 

the promisee’s “legitimate interest being protected.”1 See Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 775, 778. 

“Business goodwill, confidential or proprietary information, trade secrets, customer information, 

and specialized training are examples of interests that can be, in appropriate circumstances, worthy 

of protection by a covenant not to compete.” Neurodiagnostic Tex, L.L.C. v. Pierce, 506 S.W.3d 

153, 164 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.).

 

1 Marsh describes this additional requirement as a “common law requirement that . . . bolsters the ancillary requirement.” 354 S.W.3d at 776. 

It is not clear how this common law requirement interacts with § 15.52, which provides that § 15.50’s enforceability criteria are exclusive and 

preempt any other criteria, including common law criteria. BUS. & COM. § 15.52.
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If this threshold requirement is met, the covenant is enforceable “to the extent that it 

contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that [i] are 

reasonable and [ii] do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or 

other business interest of the promisee.” BUS. & COM. § 15.50(a) (romanettes added). These 

standards are the same as existed at common law. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. 

Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 854 (Tex. 2009).

4. Did Nerium show that it has a legitimate business interest in protecting its BPs 

from being solicited by appellants?

Yes, Nerium adduced evidence that its non-solicitation agreements were justified by its 

legitimate business interests, including protecting its goodwill and confidential information.

Appellants argue under issues one and two that Nerium has no legitimate business interest 

in preventing them from soliciting Nerium BPs. They cite Nerium’s own policies and procedures 

as evidence that BPs (and not Nerium) are responsible for recruiting, training, and supervising 

other BPs. They also state that BPs are free to disregard the training and marketing materials that 

Nerium offers them. They argue that BPs “work first and foremost for themselves, not for 

Nerium.” Thus, appellants conclude, Nerium has made no investment in its BPs that it has a 

legitimate interest in protecting from solicitation.

We disagree with appellants’ position. In Marsh, the court recognized that goodwill is a 

protectable interest under § 15.50(a), and it held that the non-competition and non-solicitation 

agreement in that case sought to protect the employer’s goodwill in the form of “relationships that 

the company has developed with its customers and employees and their identities, due in part to 

[the employee’s] performance.” 354 S.W.3d at 777 (emphasis added). Marsh also quoted Black’s 

Law Dictionary’s definition of goodwill as “[a] business’s reputation, patronage, and other 

intangible assets that are considered when appraising the business.” Id. at 778 (quoting BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY 703 (7th ed. 1999)). Nerium presented evidence that its goodwill was important 
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for its success and that it had invested time and money into building its brand through publicity, 

website, social media marketing materials, community involvement, and the quality of Nerium’s 

products themselves. Additionally, Nerium both built its goodwill and facilitated its BPs’ success 

by providing the BPs with training, marketing materials, products, and personalized websites. 

We also agree that Nerium introduced some evidence showing that it provided confidential 

information to its BPs. See id. at 775 (identifying confidential information as a possible interest 

worthy of protection). Specifically, Nerium gave its BPs access to a computerized “back office” 

through which BPs could obtain non-public information about their own and their downline BPs’ 

performance. By using the back office, BPs could tell which members of their downlines were 

performing well and which ones weren’t. 

Appellants argue that Nerium’s goodwill, in the form of its salesforce of BPs, is not a 

protectable interest because the BPs built that salesforce, not Nerium. But appellants acknowledge 

that Nerium provided a “platform” for the BPs to build their businesses and downlines. There was 

evidence that Nerium contributed many things useful for a BP seeking to build a business, such as 

training, marketing materials, internet resources, and of course the products themselves and the 

Nerium brand. Additionally, the back office gave BPs access to confidential information that BPs 

could use to grow their businesses by identifying BPs in their downlines who needed help. The 

trial court could reasonably conclude that Nerium’s goodwill was a legitimate business interest 

worthy of protection.

Appellants also argue that Nerium’s confidential information is not a protectable interest 

because that information is adequately protected by a nondisclosure agreement in the policies and 

procedures. But Nerium seeks to enforce its non-solicitation clause to prevent appellants from 

competing with Nerium, not to prevent them from disclosing confidential information. Although 

there was evidence that the identities of at least some Nerium BPs could be obtained from public 
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sources, confidential information in Nerium’s back office revealed to appellants which Nerium

BPs in their downlines were the most successful ones and, thus, the ones most valuable to Nerium 

and most worth recruiting.

We conclude that the evidence supported a finding that Nerium had legitimate, protectionworthy business interests in preventing appellants from soliciting Nerium BPs.

5. Is the non-solicitation clause unreasonable to the extent it prevents appellants 

from recruiting Nerium BPs that they do not know and had no contact with 

during appellants’ tenures at Nerium?

Next, appellants argue that the non-solicitation clause is overbroad and unreasonable to the 

extent it bars appellants from soliciting Nerium BPs that they do not know and had no contact with 

while they were at Nerium.

Nerium responds that it is reasonable to bar appellants from contacting all Nerium BPs.

We agree with Nerium that the trial court could have appropriately found the clause 

reasonable at this stage because appellants had access to confidential information about Nerium’s 

other BPs, appellants would have enhanced credibility in recruiting Nerium BPs because of 

appellants’ prominence in the company, and even BPs who joined Nerium after appellants left 

would have access to Nerium’s confidential information and goodwill.

a. Law Concerning Overbreadth and Unreasonableness

Most decided cases involve clauses that restrain former employees from soliciting their 

former employers’ clients. In such cases, Texas courts hold that the clauses are overbroad and 

unreasonable if they forbid the former employees from soliciting clients (i) that were acquired after 

the employee left or (ii) that the former employee had no contact with while working for the former 

employer. E.g., Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 387–88 (Tex. 1991).
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Only a few cases address the reasonableness of clauses that forbid the solicitation of a 

former employer’s employees rather than its clients.

2

 Nerium cites two federal district court 

opinions holding that a non-solicitation clause extending to all current employees is a reasonable 

protection of the employer’s interest in maintaining its employees and thus is not overbroad. 

Everett Fin., Inc. v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1028-D, 2016 WL 7378937, 

at *8 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2016); Merritt Hawkins & Assocs., LLC v. Gresham, 79 F. Supp. 3d 625, 

639–40 (N.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 861 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2017).

On the other hand, appellants rely on two recent decisions by our sister courts: (i) Ally 

Financial, Inc. v. Gutierrez, No. 02-13-00108-CV, 2014 WL 261038 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 

23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) and (ii) Cooper Valves, LLC v. ValvTechnologies, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 

254 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

In Ally Financial, Gutierrez was a supervisor in Ally’s IT department, and she agreed not 

to solicit or employ any of Ally’s employees for two years after leaving. 2014 WL 261038, at *1. 

She left Ally’s employ and went to work for a competitor, Ally sued her for soliciting Ally’s 

employees, and Gutierrez won summary judgment. Id. at *2, 4. The court of appeals affirmed, 

holding that the non-solicitation agreement was unenforceable because it was unreasonable in 

scope:

While it might be considered reasonable to limit Gutierrez’s solicitation of Ally’s 

employees located in the IT department, which was where Gutierrez worked, the 

non-solicitation covenant in the [contract] was not so limited. . . . This covenant 

goes beyond what was necessary to protect Ally’s goodwill or other business 

interest of Ally.

Id. at *8. Unlike Ally, the temporary injunction here is limited to only Nerium’s sales force and 

does not apply to every Nerium employee.

 

2 We recognize that Nerium BPs are independent contractors rather than employees, but the Nerium–BP relationship is at least analogous to 

the employer–employee relationship. To the extent we refer in this opinion to Nerium and its BPs as “employer” and “employees,” we do so only 

for convenience and not to suggest that BPs are legally employees.
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The Cooper Valves case adds nothing to the Ally Financial analysis. In Cooper Valves, a 

former employee agreed not to solicit any then-current employee of his former employer, VTI. 

531 S.W.3d at 258. VTI sued the former employee and obtained a temporary injunction barring 

him from soliciting any then-current VTI employee. Id. at 262. The court of appeals reversed, 

holding that the non-solicitation provision was unenforceable because it contained no restrictions 

as to time, geography, or types of employees that were off-limits. Id. at 265.

b. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the non-solicitation 

clause is reasonable.

Appellants argue that Nerium’s legitimate interest in protecting its BP salesforce extends

no further than those relationships that Nerium played some role in forming. According to 

appellants, it is unreasonable to bar them from soliciting a BP if they had no contact with a 

particular BP while they were both at Nerium, or if a BP joined Nerium after that appellant left. 

They especially rely on Ally Financial to support the premise that a non-solicitation covenant must 

be limited to employees with whom the defendant had contact. See 2014 WL 261038, at *8.

Nerium argues that the non-solicitation clause’s scope is reasonable because a clause

limited to BPs that appellants knew or had dealt with would be difficult or impossible to enforce. 

Nerium contends that there is no way to verify whether an appellant knew a particular BP and that 

appellants could easily feign ignorance of whether a recruit is a Nerium BP. Nerium also identifies

evidence that BPs might know the appellants through Nerium events and conference calls even if 

the appellants don’t know the BPs.

In reply, appellants argue that ease of application is not the test for reasonableness and 

enforceability. They reiterate that Nerium has no legitimate interest in barring appellants from 

recruiting BPs that appellants had no contact with while appellants worked for Neirum or that 

joined Nerium after appellants left.
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We conclude that the trial court could reasonably determine that the non-solicitation clause 

does not impose a greater restraint than necessary to protect Nerium’s legitimate business interests. 

As to BPs who worked for Nerium at the same time appellants did, the restraint is reasonable

because appellants had access to the Nerium back office and could thereby learn which BPs in 

their downlines were the most successful and the most desirable to recruit even if appellants did 

not personally know the BPs. Also, appellants could have enhanced credibility in the eyes of 

Nerium BPs that they never personally met because appellants appeared on Nerium’s behalf at 

various events attended by Nerium BPs. This further distinguishes Ally Financial from the present 

case in which the injunction is not company-wide but instead applies more narrowly to the types 

of employees that appellants’ knowledge and relationships could exploit. We conclude that the 

trial court could reasonably decide that Nerium has a legitimate interest in restraining appellants 

from recruiting BPs who worked for Nerium at the same time as appellants.

The trial court could also reasonably conclude that Nerium has a legitimate interest in 

restraining appellants from recruiting BPs who joined Nerium after appellants cut their ties with 

Nerium. Because these new BPs would acquire Nerium’s confidential information and make use 

of its goodwill as soon as they joined the company, the trial court could reasonably decide that 

Nerium has a legitimate interest in restraining appellants from recruiting them. See Everett Fin., 

2016 WL 7378937, at *8 (“an employee non-solicitation covenant extending to all current 

employees is a reasonable protection of the employer’s interest in maintaining its employees”).

6. Is the non-solicitation clause overbroad because it is not limited to a relevant 

industry, a relevant geographic area, or a reasonable duration?

Finally, appellants argue that the non-solicitation clause is overbroad because it is not 

limited to a relevant industry or geographic area or to a reasonable duration. We disagree.
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a. Relevant Industry

First, appellants argue that the clause is unreasonably broad because it is not limited to any 

particular industry. Rather, it bars appellants from recruiting Nerium BPs to work for any other 

direct sales, multi-level, or network marketing company, regardless of what that company sells. 

Appellants rely on our precedent that “[a]n industry-wide bar is unreasonable.” U.S. Risk Ins. 

Grp., Inc. v. Woods, 399 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (citing Haass, 818 

S.W.2d at 386–88). In U.S. Risk, for example, we held invalid a clause that barred the former 

employee from working for any business that competed in the business engaged in by his former 

employer’s parent company or any of its subsidiaries. Id.

Nerium responds that its non-solicitation clause isn’t an “industry-wide bar.” Under its

clause, appellants can work for any company in any industry they choose, and they can recruit 

anyone they please—except for Nerium BPs.

We agree with Nerium. This clause does not bar appellants from selling products that 

compete directly with Nerium’s, from working for a competing multi-level marketing company,

or from recruiting salespeople for such a company. It restrains appellants only from recruiting 

Nerium BPs. Thus, the clause is not an industry-wide bar, and we reject appellants’ argument.

b. Relevant Geographic Area

Next, appellants argue that the non-solicitation clause is unenforceable because § 15.50(a) 

requires such a clause to have a reasonable geographic limitation but this clause contains no 

geographic limitation at all.

Nerium responds that the Texas Supreme Court has upheld a covenant that expressly 

applied “regardless of geographic location.” Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 

S.W.3d 644, 656–57 (Tex. 2006). But it does not appear that the former employee attacked the 
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covenant on that basis, so the supreme court did not consider whether the lack of a geographic 

limitation was a problem. See id. Thus, the Alex Sheshunoff case is unhelpful.

Nerium also responds that some courts have held that other limitations can substitute for a 

missing geographic limitation. In particular, “[a] number of courts have held that a non-compete 

covenant that is limited to the employee’s clients is a reasonable alternative to a geographical 

limit.” Gallagher Healthcare Ins. Servs. v. Vogelsang, 312 S.W.3d 640, 654 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

At first glance, Nerium’s argument seems counter to our holding that a non-competition 

covenant containing no geographical limitation is unenforceable. Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 

S.W.2d 654, 660–61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ); see also Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. 

Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 662–63 (Tex. 1990) (unenforceable covenant with no limits 

on geographic area or scope of activity); Gen. Devices, Inc. v. Bacon, 888 S.W.2d 497, 503–04 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) (covenant with no geographic limitation and no definite 

duration was unenforceable).

But these cases are distinguishable. Each case involved a typical covenant not to compete 

for the former employer’s clients or customers. Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at 662; Bacon, 

888 S.W.2d at 503; Zep Mfg., 824 S.W.2d at 660. This case, however, involves a covenant not to 

compete for the former employer’s salespeople. Given Nerium’s structure, appellants’ downlines 

could include BPs located virtually anywhere. And because people can move, the BPs will not 

necessarily stay in any particular location. Indeed, at the time of the temporary injunction hearing, 

Nerium was operating in the United States and eleven other countries. Thus, the trial court could 

have reasonably concluded that crafting a suitable geographic restriction for this non-solicitation 

clause was not feasible.
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Because Nerium’s interest is in protecting its salesforce and goodwill, and because 

Nerium’s BPs are widespread and inherently mobile, restraining appellants from soliciting 

Nerium’s BPs the trial court could have concluded that its order was a reasonable alternative to 

restraining appellants from competing in a particular geographic area. See Vogelsang, 312 S.W.3d 

at 655. As in Vogelsang, appellants can work anywhere in the world and can work in the same 

industry as Nerium; they simply cannot solicit Nerium’s BPs to work for another direct sales, 

multi-level, or network marketing company.

Accordingly, we reject appellants’ argument.

c. Reasonable Duration

Finally, appellants argue that the non-solicitation clause’s two-year duration is 

unreasonably long. But “[t]wo to five years has repeatedly been held as a reasonable time in a 

noncompetition agreement.” Vogelsang, 312 S.W.3d at 655; see also Weber v. Hesse Envelope 

Co., 342 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1960, no writ) (two-year period “well within the 

period generally upheld as enforceable”). Appellants cite no authority or record evidence tending 

to show that two years is unreasonable here. We thus conclude that appellants have not shown an 

abuse of discretion.

7. Conclusion

For the preceding reasons, we overrule appellant’s first issue.

B. Issue Two: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to conclude that the nonsolicitation clause is unenforceable because Nerium provided no consideration 

reasonably related to an interest worthy of protection?

Under issue two, appellants reiterate their argument that the non-solicitation clause is 

unenforceable because Nerium lacks a legitimate business interest in its salesforce. We have 

already rejected that argument in Part III.A.4 above.
–18–

Appellants also argue that the non-solicitation covenant is unenforceable because Nerium 

neither promised nor gave appellants consideration that is reasonably related to a legitimate 

business interest that Nerium seeks to protect. We disagree because there is evidence that Nerium 

furnished appellants with goodwill and confidential information, which are both interests worthy 

of protection.

1. Applicable Law

As previously noted, the supreme court holds that the “otherwise enforceable agreement” 

must give rise to “an interest worthy of protection” or reasonably relate to the promisee’s 

“legitimate interest being protected.” See Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 775, 778. Thus, “the 

consideration given by the employer in the [otherwise enforceable] agreement [must be] 

reasonably related to an interest worthy of protection.” Neurodiagnostic Tex, L.L.C. v. Pierce, 506 

S.W.3d 153, 164 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.).

Goodwill is an interest worthy of protection. Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 778; see also BUS. &

COM. § 15.50(a). Confidential or proprietary information, trade secrets, customer information, and 

specialized training are other examples of interests that can be, in appropriate circumstances, 

worthy of protection. Neurodiagnostic Tex, 506 S.W.3d at 164.

2. Applying the Law to the Facts

Nerium argues that it gave appellants essentially two kinds of consideration that are 

reasonably related to Nerium’s interest in guarding its salesforce. First, it gave appellants “Brand 

Partner status,” which included the rights to market themselves as Nerium BPs, sell Nerium 

products, build a downline, network with other BPs at “massive national events put on by” Nerium, 

and make money on their sales and their downlines’ sales. Nerium posits that these interests are 

strengthened by the non-solicitation clause because the clause protects BPs from having their 
–19–

downlines recruited away. Second, Nerium argues that it gave appellants confidential information, 

specifically the detailed information about their downlines available in the back office. 

Appellants argue that the first kind of consideration is inadequate because it is nothing 

more than giving appellants a job, and merely giving someone a job opportunity will not support 

a covenant not to compete. However, even if appellants’ assessment of the law were correct, we 

disagree with their application of it to the evidence. Nerium adduced evidence from which the 

trial court could have reasonably found that Nerium provided appellants more than just products 

and marketing materials. It also encouraged BPs to network, to function as a team, and to attend 

company events. As the supreme court said in Marsh, a company can seek a non-competition 

agreement to protect its goodwill, including the relationships the company has developed with its 

employees. 354 S.W.3d at 777. Nerium undertook to build its BPs into a unified team, and its 

non-solicitation clause is reasonably related to that goodwill. More fundamentally, Nerium 

provides a marketable and apparently desirable brand to sell.

Additionally, appellants argue that Nerium’s confidential information cannot satisfy the 

consideration requirement either. They assert that (i) confidential information can serve as 

consideration only if departing employees retain the confidential information and can take it to a 

competitor and (ii) appellants no longer have access to Nerium’s confidential information, which 

is stored in Nerium’s back office. Again assuming that appellants’ statement of the law is correct, 

we disagree with their application of it to this case. The confidential information in Nerium’s back 

office consists of performance data concerning the BPs in appellants’ downlines. This was 

information that appellants could use to improve their downlines’ performance and thus to enhance 

their own compensation. The trial court could reasonably conclude that this consideration was 

related to Nerium’s business interest in protecting its salesforce from poaching. Moreover, 

although appellants may have lost direct access to the back office when they quit Nerium, they 
–20–

could have made notes or simply remembered information that would give them a competitive 

advantage—specifically, information about who the best salespeople were and thus who should be 

targeted for recruitment.

Appellants also argue that the supposedly confidential information is not confidential 

because the identities of Nerium’s BPs are public information. But there was evidence that the 

back office also contains nonpublic information about the BPs’ performances, and this information 

is quite relevant to Nerium’s interest in protecting its salesforce.

3. Conclusion

We conclude that the trial court could reasonably determine that Nerium provided 

consideration that was reasonably related to protecting its goodwill and its salesforce. We thus 

overrule appellants’ second issue.

C. Issue Three: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by issuing a temporary injunction 

that prohibits certain conduct that the parties’ contract expressly allows? 

Next, appellants argue that the non-solicitation clause is inconsistent with another much 

less restrictive provision in Nerium’s policies and procedures and that the trial court erred by not 

incorporating the other provision’s terms into the temporary injunction.

Nerium argues that appellants are misinterpreting the other provision and that the trial court 

did not err.

We agree with Nerium because its contract interpretation is reasonable and the trial court 

could reasonably have decided to maintain the status quo consistent with that interpretation.

1. The Law of Contract Interpretation

When we interpret a contract, our goal is to ascertain the parties’ intent as expressed in the 

instrument. URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex. 2018); Hackberry Creek 

Country Club, Inc. v. Hackberry Creek Home Owners Ass’n, 205 S.W.3d 46, 55 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2006, pet. denied). Objective, not subjective, intent controls. URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 757. 
–21–

Thus, “our quest is to determine, objectively, what an ordinary person using those words under the 

circumstances in which they are used would understand them to mean.” Id. at 764.

“We give contract terms their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meanings unless the 

contract itself shows them to be used in a technical or different sense.” Mikob Props., Inc. v. 

Joachim, 468 S.W.3d 587, 594–95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).

“The use of different language in different parts of a contract generally means that the 

parties intended different things.” PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo, LLC, 350 S.W.3d 699, 

708 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).

“We examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to 

all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless.” Burlington Res. Oil 

& Gas Co. LP v. Tex. Crude Energy, LLC, 573 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. 2019) (internal quotation 

and citation omitted); accord Hackberry Creek, 205 S.W.3d at 55.

If contract provisions conflict, we apply rules such as the following: “(1) specific 

provisions control over general provisions; (2) provisions stated earlier in an agreement are favored 

over subsequent provisions; and (3) the interpretation of an agreement should not render any 

material terms meaningless.” Sefzik v. Mady Dev., L.P., 231 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2007, no pet.).

The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court. In re 

Marriage of I.C. & Q.C., 551 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex. 2018); Hackberry Creek, 205 S.W.3d at 56. 

A contract is ambiguous if it has more than one reasonable interpretation after we apply the 

pertinent rules of construction. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858, 874 (Tex. 

2018); Hackberry Creek, 205 S.W.3d at 56. The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is 

also a question of law for the court. ConocoPhillips Co., 547 S.W.3d at 874; Hackberry Creek, 

205 S.W.3d at 56. But, the interpretation of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact. See Royal 
–22–

Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. James, 146 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) 

(“Once a contract is found to be ambiguous, the interpretation of the contract becomes a fact 

issue.”); accord Hackberry Creek, 205 S.W.3d at 56.

2. Applying the Law to the Facts

Appellants argue that the trial court erroneously interpreted Nerium’s policies and 

procedures by failing to give effect to § 1.16, which they contend allows them to promote a 

competing company like Jeunesse to Nerium’s BPs that appellants had personally sponsored. 

Nerium disagrees with appellants’ contract interpretation. We reject appellants’ argument because 

(i) the two sections are not necessarily incongruent and (ii) the trial court could have reasonably 

concluded that temporary injunctive relief was proper to maintain the status quo.

For convenience, we place the relevant provisions side by side:

§ 1.16 § 11.06

1.16 Other Products. . . . During the 

term of the Brand Partner Agreement, and 

for a period of six months thereafter, 

Brand Partner is prohibited from selling 

or promoting any competing products or 

services or marketing programs to any of 

[Nerium’s] Brand Partners, except those 

Brand Partners personally sponsored by 

Brand Partner.

11.06 Non-Solicitation and NonCompetition. . . . [F]or the term of this 

Agreement and for two (2) years after 

termination hereof, for any reason, Brand 

Partner agrees not to, directly or 

indirectly, recruit or solicit any of 

[Nerium’s] other Brand Partners to join 

other direct sales, multi-level or network 

marketing companies.

According to appellants, § 1.16 means that upon quitting Nerium they could immediately 

start promoting Jeunesse, a “marketing program,” to Nerium BPs that appellants had personally 

sponsored. If § 1.16 and § 11.06 conflict and thereby create an ambiguity, appellants further argue, 

the contract must be construed against Nerium as its drafter. See Gonzalez v. Mission Am. Ins. 

Co., 795 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. 1990). Consequently, the trial court should not have enjoined 

them from recruiting BPs that they had personally sponsored at Nerium.
–23–

Nerium responds that appellants misinterpret the phrase “marketing program” in § 1.16 by 

equating it with § 11.06’s phrase “direct sales, multi-level or network marketing companies.” 

Nerium offers several supporting arguments.

First, the words are different, suggesting different meaning was intended.

Second, interpreting the two phrases to mean the same thing, as appellants suggest, creates 

a conflict that requires one clause or the other to be rendered meaningless.

Third, the clauses are harmonized by giving “marketing program” in § 1.16 its commonly 

understood meaning. But as to its third argument, Nerium doesn’t offer a plain meaning definition 

of “marketing program”; at most, it suggests that “marketing program” means “generic networkmarketing training.” 

In their reply brief, appellants argue that a multi-level marketing company is “a distinct 

type of marketing business model, i.e., a marketing program.” They also point out other uses of 

the word “program” in the Nerium policies and procedures and argue that their context shows that 

“‘marketing program’ refers to the multi-level marketing business model.” 

Nerium’s interpretation is a reasonable one, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by implicitly adopting it when it granted the temporary injunction to maintain the status quo. 

Several factors make Nerium’s interpretation reasonable. To begin, § 1.16 and § 11.06 

indisputably use different words, and contracting parties generally mean different things when they 

use different words. See PopCap Games, Inc., 350 S.W.3d at 708. More importantly, appellants’ 

interpretation would make § 11.06’s non-solicitation clause meaningless. Appellants focus on 

their position that § 1.16 allows them to immediately start recruiting BPs that they personally 

sponsored at Nerium, but their interpretation also means that § 1.16 lets them start recruiting all 

other Nerium BPs six months after they quit Nerium. This makes the two-year non-solicitation 

clause meaningless (and nonsensical), which is an interpretation we should avoid if possible. See
–24–

Burlington Res., 573 S.W.3d at 203. If we can give “marketing programs” in § 1.16 a different 

meaning, both clauses can be given effect.

Finally, the canon that specific terms prevail over general terms, Sefzik, 231 S.W.3d at 462,

lends some support to Nerium’s interpretation. The activity in question—recruiting Nerium BPs 

to join another multi-level marketing company—is clearly and specifically covered by § 11.06. 

By contrast, § 1.16’s terms are somewhat more general, barring appellants “from selling or 

promoting any competing products or services or marketing programs” to Nerium’s BPs. All these 

factors weigh against interpreting § 1.16 as permitting appellants to recruit Nerium’s BPs either 

immediately or starting six months after appellants left Nerium.

Further, the context of the agreement as a whole supports Nerium’s interpretation. 

Section 1.16’s prohibition is much less severe than the two-year prohibition found in § 11.06: 

§ 1.16’s prohibition applies for only six months after a BP quits Nerium, and not at all as to BPs 

that the BP personally sponsored at Nerium. This is consistent with the premise that Nerium is 

more concerned about former BPs poaching other Nerium BPs than is it about former BPs sharing 

competitors’ products, services, and marketing methodologies with other Nerium BPs.

Although Nerium’s interpretation does not on this record clearly answer the question of 

what “competing . . . marketing programs” means in § 1.16, its burden at this stage of the case is 

not to show that its interpretation of the agreement is the only reasonable one. Rather, it suffices 

to hold that Nerium’s interpretation is a reasonable one, and that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by adopting that interpretation for purposing of preserving the status quo.

3. Conclusion

Nerium’s interpretation of the policies and procedures is reasonable, and the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by adopting it when crafting a temporary injunction to preserve the status 

quo. We reject appellants’ third issue.
–25–

D. Issue Four: Did the trial court abuse its discretion because Nerium didn’t

demonstrate, and the temporary injunction doesn’t specify, the likelihood of 

irreparable harm? 

Appellants’ fourth issue involves two similar arguments. First, appellants argue that 

Nerium failed to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm, which is an essential element of a 

temporary injunction. Second, they argue that the temporary injunction itself fails to state how 

Nerium will be harmed without the injunction, which it must do under Rule 683.

We reject appellants’ arguments because (i) the injunction specifies that Nerium will suffer 

irreparable injury to its relationships with BPs and customers that will be difficult to discover and 

assess and (ii) Nerium adduced evidence to support that premise.

1. Is the injunction specific enough to satisfy Rule 683?

We address appellants’ second argument first, and we conclude that the injunction is 

specific enough to satisfy Rule 683 because it supplies details about why Nerium would suffer 

injury if the injunction were not granted, tells appellants why the court issued the injunction, and 

allows us to review it.

Per the rule, an injunction “shall set forth the reasons for its issuance [and] shall be specific 

in terms.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. Thus, “a trial court must set out in the temporary injunction order 

the reasons the court deems it proper to issue the injunction, including the reasons why the 

applicant will suffer injury if the injunctive relief is not ordered.” El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, 

Inc., 356 S.W.3d 740, 744 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). The court should supply enough 

detail to (i) allow the enjoined party to understand the injunction’s basis and evaluate a possible 

appeal and (ii) provide an adequate basis for appellate review. Id. at 748. A conclusory statement 

that the applicant will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no adequate legal remedy does 

not suffice. Id. at 747.
–26–

Here, the injunction contained the following paragraph regarding Nerium’s injury:

Without this injunction, Nerium will suffer a probable, imminent, and irreparable 

injury in the interim before a final trial on the merits. The non-solicitation covenants 

protect Nerium’s goodwill, confidential information, and other valuable business 

interests, including by protecting the company’s relationship with its salesforce of 

independent contractors (“Brand Partners”) and customers, and information about 

them. Because Nerium is a direct-sales company, interference with Nerium’s 

relationship with even a single Brand Partner can have damaging effects that extend 

to a Brand Partner’s network of associated Brand Partners and customers, and 

imminently threaten far-reaching injury that is difficult to discover and fully assess. 

Once a Brand Partner is directly or indirectly solicited or recruited, their 

organization can become destabilized, risking the departure of others as well 

through further recruitment or otherwise.

We conclude that the order is specific enough to satisfy Rule 683. It explains that violations 

of the non-solicitation clause injure Nerium because (i) interfering with even a single BP can have 

ripple effects through that BP’s associated BPs and customers and (ii) recruiting a BP can 

destabilize that BP’s organization, risking additional BP departures. This is sufficient to allow 

appellants to understand why the court issued the injunction and to allow us to review it. We have 

upheld an injunction based on similar statements. See Miller v. Talley Dunn Gallery, LLC, No. 

05-15-00444-CV, 2016 WL 836775, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(upholding injunction that identified harm as “jeopardiz[ing] appellees’ confidential information, 

employment relations, existing and prospective business relationships, reputation and goodwill”).

2. Did Nerium adduce some evidence of irreparable injury?

The third element of a temporary injunction is a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury 

for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). An adequate remedy at law is one that is as complete, practical, and 

efficient to the prompt administration of justice as equitable relief. Id.

The interruption of business relations can constitute irreparable harm. Miller, 2016 WL 

836775, at *6. Using confidential information to gain access to customers for a competitor is 

another recognized ground for injunctive relief. White v. Impact Floors of Tex., LP, No. 05-18-
–27–

00384-CV, 2018 WL 6616973, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

Likewise, using confidential information to poach a former employer’s salespeople for a 

competitor is analogous to using confidential customer information because in both cases it is 

difficult to establish the amount of resulting damages. See id.; see also HMS Holdings Corp. v. 

Pub. Consulting Grp., Inc., No. 05-15-00925-CV, 2016 WL 1179436, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

Mar. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Evidence that a former employee possesses confidential 

information and is in a position to use it against the employer supports the issuance of an 

injunction.”).

Nerium chief marketing officer Amber Rourke testified about the difficulty in proving its 

injury in this case:

It’s almost impossible to estimate the damages while, first of all, we don't know 

everyone who quits. They are not required to tell us. They can silently start 

building a different sales team that we don't know. So that’s impossible for us to 

capture all of the people that have quit and started working somewhere else. There 

is a lot of intangibles of people who just might not leave and join a different 

company but they are so confused and have so much turmoil around them that they 

stop working stop performing, stop working, so we can’t capitalize on that. There 

is just a lot of moving variables that are hard to put an exact dollar amount in terms 

of when that one person leaves, what is the true impact? Because it’s just not in 

their sales force, we would have to know every single person that left and then 

every single person they recruited and onward, which has a massive ripple effect 

down, which is very impossible for us to wrap our hands around.

Rourke agreed that Nerium could determine some of its damages to the extent it knew which BPs 

quit directly due to appellants’ effort, but it could not determine its damages caused by “the ripple 

effect they created.” From this evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that a temporary 

injunction gave Nerium more complete, practical, and efficient relief than would an attempt to 

calculate damages after the fact. Thus, Nerium’s evidence of irreparable injury was sufficient such 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Appellants argue that Nerium’s irreparable injury claim is rebutted by evidence that 

Nerium’s president said that Nerium’s sales and BP recruitment went up after Smith and his wife 
–28–

left Nerium. But this evidence is not inconsistent with a finding that Nerium would probably suffer 

injury if appellants were allowed to solicit Nerium’s BPs in the future. That is, there is not 

necessarily a logical connection between the two concepts. For example, it could be difficult to 

assess whether Nerium’s performance would have been even better with appellant’s purported 

breaches or by how much.

Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ fourth issue.

E. Issue Five: Did the trial court abuse its discretion because (i) Smith was not a BP 

subject to the non-solicitation clause and (ii) Nerium approached the court with 

unclean hands?

1. Did the evidence compel the trial court to conclude that Smith was not a 

Nerium BP subject to § 11.06?

Under issue five, appellant Smith asserts that he was not a BP and thus was not subject to 

the non-solicitation clause. In support, he argues that under Nerium’s policies and procedures, a 

person cannot become a BP without (i) completing a Brand Partner Application and Agreement 

and (ii) buying a Brand Partner Launch Kit. He claims he never did either. He also argues that 

Nerium’s own pleadings show that he was brought into Nerium at a high level, was given a special 

title and staff, and was given a “seat at the table” with Nerium’s executive team. 

Nerium argues, and we agree, that there was evidence that Smith was a BP. That evidence 

included the following:

• Rourke was asked, “Was Mark Smith a brand partner at Nerium?” She 

answered, “Yes.” 

• Rourke was asked, “Did Mr. Smith ever tell you that he had personally 

confirmed acceptance of the policies and procedures in 2015?” She 

answered, “Yes.” 

• Deposition testimony was admitted indicating that Mark and Tammy Smith 

accepted the policies and procedures on July 7, 2017. 

• Smith joined in a motion to dissolve or modify the temporary restraining 

order that said he was a former Nerium BP. That motion was admitted into 

evidence at the hearing.
–29–

• A printout of a webpage with the address www.markandtammysmith.com/

work-with-us/ showed a button labeled “VISIT OUR BRAND PARTNER 

WEBSITE.” 

• Smith testified that he held himself out as a Nerium “diamond international 

marketing director,” which is a BP rank. 

Thus, there was some evidence before the trial court that Smith was a Nerium BP and thus 

subject to the Nerium policies and procedures. Even if Smith introduced conflicting evidence, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by resolving the conflict in Nerium’s favor. See Loye v. 

Travelhost, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 615, 619 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.).

2. Was the trial court required to deny injunctive relief because Nerium had 

unclean hands?

Next, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the injunction 

because Nerium breached its contracts with appellants and therefore came into court with unclean 

hands.

Even if appellants introduced some evidence that Nerium had unclean hands, we have held 

that “the trial court does not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction and reserving [defensive] 

matters to be determined along with the ultimate rights of the parties.” HMS Holdings Corp., 2016 

WL 1179436, at *3; see also Keystone Life Ins. Co. v. Mktg. Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 1985, no writ). Accordingly, we reject appellants’ argument.

We overrule appellants’ fifth issue.

F. Issue Six: Does Nerium’s tortious interference claim fail because there is no 

enforceable contract and no enticement to breach any contract? 

In their sixth issue, appellants argue that the temporary injunction could not properly be 

based on Nerium’s tortious interference with contract claims because Nerium failed to show that 

(i) the non-solicitation clause is likely enforceable and (ii) appellants induced anyone to breach a 

contract.
–30–

Based on our disposition of appellants’ first five issues, we affirm the temporary injunction

based on Nerium’s contract breach claim. Accordingly, we need not and do not address issue six. 

IV. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s temporary injunction.

180617F.P05

/Bill Whitehill/

BILL WHITEHILL

JUSTICE
–31–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

MARK SMITH, MARK & TAMMY 

SMITH, LLC, TEE DANIEL, AND 

DARIN KIDD, Appellants

No. 05-18-00617-CV V.

NERIUM INTERNATIONAL, LLC, 

Appellee

On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-03726.

Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. 

Justices Molberg and Reichek participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s temporary injunction 

is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee Nerium International, LLC recover its costs of this appeal 

from appellants Mark Smith, Mark & Tammy Smith, LLC, Tee Daniel, and Darin Kidd.

Judgment entered this 5th day of August, 2019.