IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

NO ON I-502, ARTHUR WEST, No. 46640-6-II

Appellants,

v.

WASHINGTON NORML, PIERCE COUNTY 

NORML, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 

UNION, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, ACLU 

FOUNDATION, ACLU ENDOWMENT,

PUBLISHED OPINION

Respondents.

JOHANSON,J. — Arthur West appeals a superior court order dismissing his complaint that 

alleged a violation of the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), ch. 42.17A RCW. The superior 

court ruled that West could not bring an FCPA action as a self-represented (pro se) litigant because 

the FCPA requires that such actions be maintained in the name of the state. West argues that the 

trial court erred by dismissing his suit because the FCPA contemplates that individuals may file 

“citizen’s actions” under the statute without representation of legal counsel. Although the FCPA 

speaks of “persons” and “individuals,” a citizen’s action under the FCPA precludes suits by pro se 

litigants because such actions must be brought in the name of the state. Therefore, we hold that 

the superior court did not err in dismissing West’s suit and we affirm. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

April 12, 2016
No. 46640-6-II

2

FACTS

In 2012, Washington voters approved Initiative 502 (I-502), the legislation which legalized 

marijuana for recreational use. LAWS OF 2013, ch. 3. In December 2012, West, on behalf of “No 

on I-502,” an organization that opposed I-502, sued the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 

and the Pierce County and Washington Chapters of the National Organization for the Reform of 

Marijuana Laws (NORML). West attempted to sue under the “citizen’s action” provision of the 

FCPA. 

West’s complaint alleged that the ACLU and NORML, in supporting I-502, had engaged 

in electoral politics without registering as political action committees in violation of state law. 

West alleged that by so acting, NORML violated its own articles of incorporation and engaged in 

conduct prohibited to entities registered as nonprofit organizations under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c). 

In response, the ACLU, joined by NORML, moved to dismiss West’s suit based in part on 

what it alleged was West’s inability to maintain the action as a pro se litigant. In the ACLU and 

NORML’s view, although the FCPA authorizes “citizen’s actions” for alleged violations of the 

Act, the statute requires that such actions be filed in the name of the state. Therefore, West was 

representing the state’s interests. Because West is not a licensed attorney, NORML argued that 

his prosecution of the alleged FCPA violations would amount to the unauthorized practice of law, 

which Washington law forbids. NORML asked the superior court to dismiss West’s complaint 

under CR 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and also under CR 12(b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

The superior court agreed that West could not sue in the name of the state as a pro se litigant 

and entered an order dismissing the action if West did not obtain legal representation within two 
No. 46640-6-II

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weeks. The superior court ruled that it would not permit West to proceed without counsel in this 

action because doing so would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. A licensed attorney 

then appeared on behalf of West, but shortly thereafter withdrew. 

Subsequently, West moved for voluntary dismissal of the ACLU but maintained his claims 

against NORML. Nearly a year later, when West had still failed to secure the services of an 

attorney, the superior court dismissed the case, consistent with its original order. West appeals.

ANALYSIS

West argues that the superior court erred in dismissing his complaint by failing to construe 

the applicable statutory provisions liberally to effectuate the statute’s remedial intent. He asserts 

further that the superior court erred by misinterpreting the citizen’s action provision of the FCPA, 

which states that “persons” and “individuals” may bring such actions. We disagree. 

An order granting a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b) is subject to de novo review. 

McMarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wn.2d 936, 941, 347 P.3d 872 (2015). The FCPA “shall be 

liberally construed to promote complete disclosure of all information respecting the financing of 

political campaigns and lobbying, and the financial affairs of elected officials and candidates, and 

full access to public records so as to assure continuing public confidence of fairness of elections 

and governmental processes, and so as to assure that the public interest will be fully protected.” 

RCW 42.17A.001; Utter v. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash., 182 Wn.2d 398, 406, 341 P.3d 953, cert. 

denied, 136 S. Ct. 79 (2015). 

A provision within the FCPA gives Washington citizens the right to sue for unfair 

campaign practices provided that certain prerequisites have been met. Utter, 182 Wn.2d at 407. 

The “citizen’s action” is permitted when the attorney general and the prosecuting attorney of a 
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certain county either fail to commence or opt not to commence an action under the FCPA within 

a specified period of time. RCW 41.17A.765(4)(a)(i). 

Specifically, the citizen’s action provision provides, 

A person who has notified the attorney general and the prosecuting attorney in the 

county in which the violation occurred in writing that there is reason to believe that 

some provision of this chapter is being or has been violated may himself or herself 

bring in the name of the state any of the actions (hereinafter referred to as a citizen’s 

action) authorized under this chapter. 

. . . .

(b) If the person who brings the citizen’s action prevails, the judgment 

awarded shall escheat to the state, but he or she shall be entitled to be reimbursed 

by the state of Washington for costs and attorneys’ fees he or she has incurred. 

RCW 42.17A.765(4) (emphasis added). For the FCPA, “person” “includes an individual, 

partnership, joint venture, public or private corporation, association, federal, state, or local 

governmental entity or agency however constituted, candidate, committee, political committee, 

political party, executive committee thereof, or any other organization or group of persons, 

however organized.” RCW 41.17A.005(35).

West relies on the language of the statute and the definition of “person” to support his 

argument that the law permits him to maintain a citizen’s action as a pro se litigant. According to 

West, the references to “persons” as individuals and using “himself” or “herself” in the controlling 

provision combined with the FCPA’s stated policy of liberal construction, compel the conclusion 

that the superior court erred by dismissing his case solely because he failed to obtain representation 

by a licensed attorney.

West, however, fails to reconcile this argument with the long-standing rule that, with 

limited exception, Washington law requires individuals appearing before the court on behalf of 

another party or entity to be licensed in the practice of law. Dutch Vill. Mall v. Pelletti, 162 Wn. 
No. 46640-6-II

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App. 531, 535, 256 P.3d 1251 (2011). Ordinarily, only those persons licensed to practice law in 

this state may do so without liability for unauthorized practice. See RCW 2.48.170. Practicing 

law without a license is a gross misdemeanor in Washington. RCW 2.48.180(3)(a); Advocates for 

Responsible Dev. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 155 Wn. App. 479, 485, 230 P.3d 608, 

rev’d on other grounds, 170 Wn.2d 577, 245 P.3d 764 (2010). 

There is a recognized “pro se exception” to these general rules where a person “‘may 

appear and act in any court as his own attorney without threat of sanction for unauthorized 

practice.’” Cottringer v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 162 Wn. App. 782, 787, 257 P.3d 667 (2011)

(quoting Wash. State Bar Ass’n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 56, 586 

P.2d 870 (1978)). But this pro se exception is limited, applying “‘only if the layperson is acting 

solely on his own behalf’ with respect to his own legal rights and obligations.” Cottringer, 162 

Wn. App. at 787-88 (quoting Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 91 Wn.2d at 57). 

Here, notwithstanding a person’s right to bring a citizen’s action under the FCPA, the Act 

itself expressly provides that any such action may be brought only in the name of the state. RCW 

42.17A.765(4). The person has a right to sue if certain criteria are met, but the underlying claim 

always belongs to the state. The FCPA also provides that any judgment awarded based on an 

alleged violation of the Act escheats to the state. RCW 42.17A.765(4)(b). Thus, by maintaining 

this action, West is not acting “‘solely on his own behalf’ with respect to his own legal rights and 
No. 46640-6-II

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obligations.”1 Cottringer, 162 Wn. App. at 787-88 (quoting Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 91 Wn.2d at 

57). Instead, he is necessarily acting on behalf of the state, implicating rights that belong to the 

state. 

West makes no attempt to demonstrate that the pro se exception applies nor does he provide 

any analogous authority to support his argument. Although the citizen’s action provision speaks 

in terms of individuals, corporations are also included in the definition of “person” under the 

FCPA. RCW 42.17A.005(35). And our courts have long held that corporations must appear in 

court through an attorney. Advocates for Responsible Dev., 155 Wn. App at 484-85. This is true 

even when a pro se litigant is the sole owner, member, and officer of a limited liability company. 

Dutch Vill. Mall, 162 Wn. App. at 534, 539. These rules lend credence to NORML’s assertion 

that the legislature did not intend to carve out a pro se exception specific to citizen’s actions merely 

because it provides “persons” the right to maintain actions under FCPA. 

Although no Washington court has addressed this specific question, a decision from the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is instructive and analogous. In Stoner v. Santa Clara County 

Office of Education, 502 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit held that a pro se party 

could not prosecute a qui tam action on behalf of the United States. Stoner involved an alleged 

violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. 502 F.3d at 1119. The statute at issue 

there provided that a “person may bring a civil action . . . for the person and for the United States 

 

1

In his complaint, West claims to be an officer of “No on I-502” who is authorized by its board to 

maintain this action. It is not clear from the record whether “No on 1-502” still exists. But to the 

extent West brings this suit as an agent of “No on I 502,” he also acts on that group’s behalf and 

not solely on his own behalf. Therefore, the pro se exception would not apply for this reason as 

well.
No. 46640-6-II

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Government” and stated that such an action would be brought in the name of the government. 31 

U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). In holding that this language did not authorize Stoner to proceed pro se, the 

Stoner court reasoned that a party suing under the statute is not prosecuting only their “‘own case.’” 

502 F.3d at 1126-27. Instead, the party also represents the United States, binding it to any adverse 

judgment. Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126-27. 

The Ninth Circuit then noted that while the legislation at issue there gave an individual a 

“‘right to conduct the action,’” Stoner could point to no language which would permit him to 

conduct the action without a licensed attorney. Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1127 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 

3730(c)(3)). The court concluded that because congress did not expressly authorize a party to 

proceed pro se when acting on behalf of the United States, “it ‘must have had in mind that such a 

suit would be carried on in accordance with the established procedure which requires that only one 

licensed to practice law may conduct proceedings in court for anyone other than himself.’” Stoner, 

502 F.3d at 1127 (quoting United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1951)). 

The circumstances here are similar. The FCPA provides “persons” the right to bring a 

citizen’s action, but mandates that such actions be brought in the name of the State. RCW 

42.17A.765(4). As in Stoner, West here seeks to prosecute an alleged FCPA violation not solely 

as his “own case,” but necessarily on behalf of the state of Washington. Although the state would 

not be bound to an adverse judgment under this statutory scheme, it would be entitled to the award 

of any favorable judgment. RCW 42.17A.765(4)(b). In this way, West is not acting solely on his 

own behalf regarding his own legal rights and obligations. 

As in Stoner, West can point to no language which permits him to proceed pro se and the 

legislature here did not specifically authorize citizen’s actions to be maintained by pro se litigants. 
No. 46640-6-II

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It appears as though the legislature envisioned that such actions would be carried on by licensed 

attorneys because the statute expressly provides for an award of attorney fees if the person who 

sues prevails. RCW 42.17A.765(4)(b).

We hold that no pro se exception applies here because West is not acting solely on his own 

behalf. Therefore, permitting him to maintain this action without representation by a licensed 

attorney would amount to the unauthorized practice of law. We affirm the superior court’s 

dismissal of West’s suit against NORML.2 

JOHANSON, J.

We concur:

WORSWICK, P.J.

LEE, J.

 

2 West also attempts to argue the substantive merits of his underlying claim regarding NORML’s 

alleged violation of the FCPA. But because it dismissed his complaint, the superior court never 

reached those issues and made no ruling related to them. As a result, these issues are not properly 

before us and we decline to address them.