NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 14-3345

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ROBERT LAMAR WHITFIELD

a/k/a LAMAR WHITFIELD

a/k/a GOAT,

 Appellant 

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-12-cr-00418-001

District Judge: The Honorable Juan R. Sanchez

_____________ 

Argued February 29, 2016

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: May 5, 2016)

Eric B. Henson [ARGUED]

Robert Zauzmer

Virginia P. Pratter

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee
2

J. Michael Farrell [ARGUED]

Suite 402N

718 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant

________________

OPINION

________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

This appeal stems from a stash-house robbery sting operation that took place 

in Philadelphia from June to July of 2012. Of the eight individuals caught in the 

operation, three pled guilty prior to trial.1 Following their convictions in a joint 

trial, the remaining five,2including Appellant Robert Lamar Whitfield, filed 

separate appeals, each contesting various issues relating to their convictions (and, 

for some, their sentences). For the reasons explained below, we will uphold 

Whitfield’s convictions and corresponding sentence.

 

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.

1 These were Najee Murray, Lafayette Rawls, and Jamie Dales.

2 Whitfield’s co-defendants at trial were Marlon Graham, Kareem Long, Kenneth 

Parnell, and Frank Thompson. Separate opinions resolving each co-defendant’s 

appeal will be filed. See United States v. Graham, No. 14-3717; United States v. 
3

I.

In June of 2012, a confidential informant (CI) contacted Whitfield and asked 

for help getting in touch with a mutual acquaintance so that the CI could invite the 

acquaintance to rob a drug stash house. Whitfield instead volunteered to take care 

of the robbery himself, claiming that he had significant experience robbing stash 

houses in the past. The CI then put Whitfield in touch with the CI’s “uncle,” who 

turned out to be an undercover agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 

Firearms (ATF). Whitfield met with the agent on several occasions to discuss the 

robbery. Whitfield recruited others to join in the scheme, and these in turn 

recruited still more. 

Plans came to a head on July 18, 2012, when Whitfield and seven others met 

with the undercover agent in the parking lot of a Hilton Hotel where the agent once 

again told those present about the robbery, including that he expected ten 

kilograms of cocaine to be inside the stash house, and that he expected the house to 

be guarded by two men, one with a pistol and the other within reach of an assaultstyle rifle. The agent then made clear that any who wished to withdraw should do 

so at that time. After no one expressed hesitation about the plan, the group 

proceeded to a junkyard, presumably to check out a van that the agent was to have 

 

Long, No. 14-3703; United States v. Parnell, No. 14-4100; United States v. 

Thompson, No. 14-4512.
4

rented for use during the robbery. There, the group continued making preparations 

for the robbery, with several individuals arranging and inspecting firearms and 

Whitfield distributing gloves to all present. At the undercover agent’s signal, law 

enforcement officials then swarmed the yard and arrested the group. 

A grand jury returned an indictment charging each of the co-conspirators 

with multiple inchoate Hobbs Act robbery and drug distribution offenses, as well 

as with the crime of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence 

or a drug trafficking crime.

3 The jury convicted Whitfield and his co-defendants 

on all counts for which they were mutually charged. Whitfield was subsequently 

sentenced to 188 months in prison. He then timely filed this appeal.4

II.

Whitfield raises a number of issues for our consideration on appeal. First, he 

argues that the government failed to prove that the plan to rob a fictitious stash 

house “obstruct[ed], delay[ed], or affect[ed] commerce,” as is required for a Hobbs 

Act robbery conviction, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); second, he asserts that the 

District Court should have granted his and his co-defendants’ request for discovery 

 

3 The indictment also charged Long, Thompson, and Dales with being felons in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Long and 

Thompson were acquitted at trial on this count. 
5

to support a possible selective enforcement claim; third, he claims that the 

indictment should have been dismissed due to “outrageous government conduct”; 

fourth, he argues that the District Court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by 

prohibiting him from cross-examining a cooperating witness about his mental 

health issues; and fifth, he claims that he was the victim of sentencing entrapment 

and/or sentencing factor manipulation, thereby resulting in an enhanced sentence. 

We will address each argument in turn below.

A.

Whitfield argues that the planned stash-house robbery could not possibly 

have “affect[ed] commerce” because the stash house and the cocaine were purely 

fictitious. Accordingly, he claims that the District Court erred by denying a motion 

to dismiss the Hobbs Act counts in the indictment,

5

as well as motions for acquittal

 

4 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742(a).

5 Section 1951(a) of the Criminal Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce 

or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by 

robbery . . . or attempts or conspires so to do, . . . shall be fined under 

this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The effect-on-commerce requirement is a “jurisdictional 

element,” United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 2003), the absence 

of which prevents prosecution under the Hobbs Act. 
6

and/or a new trial.

This Court has already squarely rejected this argument. In United States v. 

Jannotti, we considered whether federal jurisdiction existed over Hobbs Act 

conspiracy and attempt charges arising from a sting operation featuring similarly 

fictitious elements. 673 F.2d 578, 581 (1982) (en banc). We concluded that it was 

“irrelevant that the ends of the conspiracy were from the very inception of the 

agreement objectively unattainable.” Id. at 591. Because “the defendants agreed 

to do acts which, had they been attainable, would have affected commerce,”6it did 

not matter whether their agreement or attempt had “an actual effect on commerce.” 

Id. at 592.

7

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s orders denying Whitfield’s 

 

6 At the trial of Whitfield and his co-defendants, the government’s expert witness 

testified that it is impossible to produce cocaine in Pennsylvania (or anywhere else 

in the United States), and that ten kilograms of cocaine have a street value of at 

least $360,000. Thus, the government presented ample evidence that, had the 

object of the conspiracy been accomplished, the robbery would have satisfied the 

Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional element. See United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 

181 (3d Cir. 2011).

7 Whitfield and his co-defendants argue that Jannotti was impliedly overturned by 

our decision in United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2011). This is clearly 

incorrect. Not only does Third Circuit procedure prohibit a panel of this Circuit 

from overturning an earlier precedent of a different panel, see Third Circuit I.O.P. 

9.1, Manzo explicitly endorsed Jannotti’s continuing vitality. See Manzo, 636 F.3d 

at 68 (stating that “Jannotti represents the proper circumstances that support a 

charge for conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act violation,” and distinguishing the 

facts in the case at bar from Jannotti). 
7

motions that were premised on our lack of jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. 

B.

Whitfield next argues that the District Court erred in denying defendants’

post-trial motion for discovery to support a claim of selective enforcement.8 To 

support the motion for discovery, defendants cited statistics to the effect that every 

one of the approximately twenty people charged in stash-house robbery sting cases 

in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania since 2009 was African American. The 

District Court denied the motion because (i) defendants forfeited their selective 

enforcement claim by failing to raise it before trial, and (ii) even absent forfeiture, 

they failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy the standard enunciated in 

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), and thus did not qualify for 

discovery into possible selective enforcement. 

We agree with the District Court that Whitfield and his co-defendants 

forfeited their selective enforcement claim. Claims or defenses based on a “defect 

in instituting the prosecution” must be raised before trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

 

8 Though Whitfield and his co-defendants sometimes use the phrase “selective 

prosecution,” it is clear that their allegations of possible racial discrimination are 

directed toward law enforcement and their decisions about which individuals to 

target for stash-house stings rather than toward prosecutors and their decisions 

about which stash-house sting targets to ultimately prosecute. Thus, we will refer 

to their claim as one sounding in “selective enforcement.”
8

12(b)(3)(A)9; United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 350 (3d Cir. 2014)

(treating as forfeited selective prosecution claim not raised before trial). 

Nevertheless, Whitfield and his co-defendants did not file their motion seeking 

discovery to support their selective enforcement claim until months after trial. 

They also failed to show “good cause” for the delay, Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e),

10 as 

they pointed to no material evidence to support their claim that was not available 

before trial. See Salahuddin, 765 F.3d at 350. We will thus affirm the District 

Court’s order denying defendants’ motion for discovery.11

 

9 Rule 12 was amended after the District Court denied defendants’ motion for 

discovery to pursue a claim of selective enforcement. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 

advisory committee notes to 2014 Amendments. None of these changes impact the 

District Court’s decision to deny the motion, nor our analysis of that decision. 

10 The “good cause” provision of Rule 12 has since been relocated to subdivision 

(c)(3).

11 While we need not reach the issue, we also think the District Court did not abuse 

its discretion in applying the Armstrong standard to deny defendants’ discovery 

request. Although Armstrong dealt only with a discovery request into possible 

selective prosecution, and although it appears that the Third Circuit has not 

reached the precise question of whether the Armstrong standard for discovery 

applies equally to claims of selective enforcement, the prima facie elements for 

both selective prosecution and selective enforcement are the same: discriminatory 

effect and discriminatory intent. Compare Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (elements 

for selective prosecution claim) with Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 

(3d Cir. 2005) (elements for selective enforcement claim). Thus, it is unsurprising 

that other courts have used the Armstrong discovery standard in analyzing 

discovery requests related to selective enforcement. See United States v. Barlow, 

310 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A] defendant seeking discovery on a 

selective enforcement claim must meet the same ‘ordinary equal protection 
9

C.

Whitfield also claims that the District Court erred by denying his post-trial 

motion to dismiss the indictment due to outrageous government conduct. We need 

not discuss the merits of this argument, however, because, like the motion for 

discovery to pursue a claim of selective enforcement, Whitfield forfeited this issue 

 

standards’ that Armstrong outlines for selective prosecution claims.”); United 

States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006).

The above said, we acknowledge that the Armstrong standard poses a hurdle that

is, in most cases, effectively insurmountable. See United States v. Thorpe, 471 

F.3d 652, 663 (6th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases and commentary discussing 

difficulty of satisfying Armstrong burden); Richard H. McAdams, Race and 

Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Chicago-Kent L. 

Rev. 605, 618-23 (1998) (arguing that the Armstrong standard for discovery raises 

an effectively “insuperable” barrier to even meritorious selective prosecution 

claims because the only evidence regarding the non-prosecution of similarlysituated persons of a different race is typically within the prosecutor’s sole 

possession and control). This seems especially true in reverse-sting cases like this 

one: even assuming defendants were targeted because of their race, it defies reality 

to think that they could ever make “a credible showing” that “similarly situated

persons” of other races “could have been [targeted] for the offenses for which the 

[defendants] were [targeted], but were not so [targeted].” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 

470. Perhaps this concern is what motivated the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision 

in United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc), a stash-house 

robbery sting case much like this one in which the court held that Armstrong did 

not apply to the defendants’ discovery requests related to a possible selective 

enforcement claim. See id. at 722 (“[S]ome of the discovery asks for information 

from supervisors or case agents of the FBI and ATF, and this is outside the scope 

of Armstrong.”). 

Whether or not the court in Davis was correct that Armstrong should not apply to 

selective enforcement claims is a question for another day. We simply note our 

concern regarding law enforcement tactics like those in this case, and add our 
10

by failing to raise it before trial.12 See United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 760 (3d 

Cir. 1999) (holding that the defense of outrageous government conduct “is covered 

by the provisions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b),” and therefore must be raised pretrial). 

D.

Whitfield next claims that the District Court violated his rights under the 

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by preventing him from crossexamining a government witness regarding the witness’ mental health issues. We 

review for abuse of discretion any limitation that a district court places on the 

scope of cross-examination. United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 

2005). We will reverse only when the limitation “is so severe as to constitute a 

 

voice to others who have expressed doubts about the seemingly impossible burden 

facing those attempting to challenge these tactics as racially discriminatory.

12 In an attempt to show “good cause” for the untimely motion, Whitfield points to 

United States v. Hudson, 3 F. Supp. 3d 772 (C.D. Cal. 2014), in which the district 

court for the Central District of California concluded that the government’s 

conduct in a stash-house sting operation similar to the operation underlying this 

case violated the defendant’s due process rights. See id. at 788. Whitfield’s 

attempt fails for two reasons. First, Hudson does not provide any previously 

unavailable evidence to support his claim of outrageous government conduct. See

Pitt, 193 F.3d at 761 (noting that outrageous government conduct defense forfeited 

because defendant “was always aware of the facts upon which he now claims this 

defense”). Second, the Ninth Circuit subsequently overturned Hudson, thereby 

undercutting any persuasive force it once had. United States v. Dunlap, 593 F.

App’x 619, 621 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the government’s conduct “did 

not violate fundamental fairness or shock the universal sense of justice mandated 

by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)).
11

denial of the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him and . . . is 

prejudicial to [his] substantial rights.” United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 169 

(3d Cir. 1996).

At trial, the government called Najee Murray to testify about, among other 

subjects, several robberies that Whitfield had committed prior to the stash-house 

robbery opportunity in this case, including a robbery that Whitfield and Murray 

committed in concert. Prior to trial, the government disclosed to defense counsel 

that Murray had been receiving treatment for depression. During his crossexamination of Murray, Whitfield attempted to question Murray about his mental 

health problems, including any diagnoses other than depression. After the 

government objected, however, the District Court instructed Whitfield, in no 

uncertain terms, that he was not allowed to ask Murray about any other mental 

health diagnoses or the symptoms of any mental ailments that might have affected 

Murray’s ability to accurately perceive and/or recall the events to which he was 

testifying. Instead, Whitfield was permitted to ask Murray only about the effects, 

if any, that his depression medication had on his perception or memory.

Preventing Whitfield from cross-examining Murray about how the 

symptoms of his depression or other potential mental impairments affected his 

perception or memory indeed constituted a significant limitation. Nevertheless, we 

do not think the District Court abused its discretion in imposing this limitation, nor 
12

do we think it was “so severe as to constitute a denial of [Whitfield’s] right to 

confront [Murray].” Conley, 92 F.3d at 169. Other than his attorney’s observation 

that Murray “look[ed] . . . sedated” while on the stand, Whitfield never attempted 

to present evidence to the District Court outside the presence of the jury suggesting 

that Murray suffered from any mental infirmities other than depression, or that his 

depression impacted his credibility in any way.13 Furthermore, the limitation did 

not represent a total ban on questions relating to Murray’s mental health, as 

Whitfield was allowed to elicit testimony confirming that Murray indeed was 

undergoing treatment for depression during the period in question, and to crossexamine Murray about the effect of his depression medication on his memory and 

perception. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1265, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 

 

13 This is not to say that depression can never affect a witness’ credibility. Indeed, 

some courts have recognized that, at least in some severe cases of depression, it 

can have such an effect. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 516-17 &

n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing medical literature regarding “Major Depressive 

Disorder” to reject assertion that “a patient suffering from depression would not 

necessarily be subject to symptoms that might cast doubt on his testimony as a 

witness”). But where a defendant fails, as Whitfield did below, to point to any

indication that a witness’ particular case of depression was so severe that it may 

have impaired his memory or perception, we think it is well-within the sound 

discretion of the district court to restrict cross-examination related to the witness’ 

depression. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (“[T]rial 

judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to 

impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, 

among other things, harassment, prejudice, . . . or interrogation that is . . . only 

marginally relevant.”). 
13

2009) (concluding that, “viewed against the backdrop of the [witness’] centrality to 

the government’s case,” district court’s “categorical” prohibition against crossexamination regarding witness’ mental health and use of prescription medications 

violated Confrontation Clause). Thus, we will uphold the District Court’s 

restriction on Whitfield’s cross-examination of Murray as a valid exercise of the 

court’s discretion.

E.

Finally, Whitfield argues that ATF engaged in sentencing factor 

manipulation14 by selecting ten kilograms as the quantity of cocaine to be obtained, 

thereby triggering the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A) and resulting in a higher range under the Sentencing Guidelines. 

We review criminal sentences for reasonableness. United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 

224, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). We examine for clear error a district court’s factual 

 

14 In his appellate brief, Whitfield uses the phrases “sentencing manipulation” and 

“sentencing entrapment” essentially interchangeably. To the extent he refers to 

sentencing entrapment as short-hand to argue that he was “indisposed” to 

committing the offenses presented to him by ATF in this case, United States v. Sed, 

601 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th 

Cir. 2010), we hold that Whitfield has forfeited this argument by failing to 

adequately raise it on appeal. Simply put, despite his repeated invocation of the 

phrase “sentencing entrapment,” he never points to facts related to, or even 

mentions, his criminal predisposition (or lack thereof). Mere passing reference to 

an issue without argument or supporting citations waives the issue before this 

Court. United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 290 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013). 
14

findings in support of the sentence imposed, and its legal conclusions de novo. Id. 

Whitfield had the burden of proving sentencing factor manipulation. United States 

v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009).

As Whitfield acknowledges, this Circuit has “neither adopted nor rejected 

the doctrines of sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation.” Sed, 

601 F.3d at 229. In contrast to the defense of sentencing entrapment, which

“focuses on the defendant’s predisposition,” “sentencing factor manipulation

focuses on the government’s conduct.” United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 

1414 (11th Cir. 1998). According to “its broadest formulation . . . it is ‘a violation 

of the Due Process Clause,’ that ‘occurs when the government unfairly exaggerates 

the defendant’s sentencing range . . . .’” Sed, 601 F.3d at 231 (quoting United 

States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009)). 

We need not decide whether to adopt the doctrine of sentencing factor 

manipulation at this time, however, because the District Court did not clearly err in 

finding that ATF had legitimate reasons for depicting the stash house as containing 

at least ten kilograms of cocaine. Specifically, ATF selected this quantity based on 

information received from the Drug Enforcement Agency–Philadelphia Division 

and the Philadelphia Police Department-Narcotics Division to the effect that ten 

kilograms fairly represented the amount of cocaine one could expect to find in a 

real stash house in Philadelphia at the time. Thus, it was not the case that ATF 
15

chose the quantity solely, or even principally, in order to inflate defendants’ 

sentences. Cf. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007).

We will therefore affirm Whitfield’s sentence as reasonable. Cf. Sanchez, 138 

F.3d at 1414. 

III.

We will affirm the District Court’s judgment and sentence as to Whitfield.