alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0644-10

TOMMY CORONADO, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

DEAF SMITH COUNTY

HERVEY, J., filed a concurring opinion in which KEASLER, J., joined.

CONCURRING OPINION

I respectfully concur. While I do agree that the written interrogatories propounded

by the neutral interviewer in this case did not constitute a sufficient method of crossexamination to satisfy a defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses, I also

believe there must be a balance between a defendant’s right to confrontation and a

societal need to protect child victims.
Coronado concurring opinion - 2

Surely we cannot overlook the plausible option of presenting child victim

testimony via closed circuit television in the manner proscribed by this Court in Gonzales

v. State, 818 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). There we held that use of a two-way

closed circuit television system to obtain the testimony of a child witness did not violate

the defendant’s state and federal confrontation rights. Use of this particular system was

employed after a determination that the system was necessary to protect the child’s wellbeing and that she would suffer severe trauma if forced to testify in the courtroom. The

system provided a live two-way presentation of the child’s sworn testimony, and allowed

for rigorous and contemporaneous objection and cross-examination. The witness and

defendant could view one another and could be observed by the judge and jury. The

witness was merely in another room.

To me, this option is clearly constitutional and satisfies the concerns of both

Crawford v. Washington and Maryland v. Craig because the evidence presented is being

1 2

subjected to rigorous (contemporaneous), adversarial testing while safeguarding a

3

compelling state interest to protect a child witness from the severe trauma of testifying in

4

the courtroom.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 1

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 2

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 74; Craig, 497 U.S. at 845, 857. 3

Craig, 497 U.S. at 852. 4
Coronado concurring opinion - 3

I respectfully concur.

Filed: September 14, 2011

Publish
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Karen L. Bartlett

v. Civil No. 08-cv-358-JL

Mutual Pharmaceutical

Company, Inc.

ORDER FOLLOWING

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

Stern/Valuck depositions

In connection with the upcoming depositions of Drs. Valuck

and Stern, which have been reopened by order of this court

(document no. 251), the court orders each of the witnesses to

produce forthwith the following documents, insofar as they are

within his possession, custody, or control:

1. All documents concerning, discussing, relating or

referring to the draft version of Dr. Stern’s manuscript

(document no. 230-2); and

2. All communications between either witness and any

attorney for Mutual Pharmaceutical Company, Inc. concerning that

witness’s depositions in this matter, or the draft version of Dr.

Stern’s manuscript (document no. 230-2). 

Motion to bifurcate

The plaintiff’s objection to the motion to bifurcate

(document no. 280) is due July 29, 2010.

Case 1:08-cv-00358-JL Document 281 Filed 07/27/10 Page 1 of 3
Negligence claim

On or before August 9, 2010, the parties shall brief the

following three issues (25 page limit, not including exhibits or

attachments):

1. Whether Bartlett has a trialworthy negligence claim

based on defective design;

2. Aassuming the answer to the first question is no,

whether Bartlett has a trialworthy claim for enhanced

compensatory damages in connection with her strict liability

claim; and 

3. Assuming the answer to both the first and second

questions is no, whether (or to what extent) Bartlett may

introduce evidence of Mutual's conduct, such as its failure to

survey the medical literature for information about Sulindac's

safety risks.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Joseph N. Laplante

United States District Judge

Dated: July 27, 2010

cc: Keith M. Jensen, Esq.

Bryan Ballew, Esq.

Patrick J. O’Neal, Esq.

Eric Roberson, Esq.

Christine M. Craig, Esq.

2

Case 1:08-cv-00358-JL Document 281 Filed 07/27/10 Page 2 of 3
Timothy P. Beaupre, Esq.

Joseph P. Thomas, Esq.

Paul J. Cosgrove, Esq.

Jeffrey D. Geoppinger, Esq.

Linda E. Maichl, Esq.

Stephen J. Judge, Esq.

3

Case 1:08-cv-00358-JL Document 281 Filed 07/27/10 Page 3 of 3
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 7Federal Reserve Bank of: ChicagoFilings received during the week ending March 30, 2013FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodCENTRAL STATE BANK                                                                                                      * 18C
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 5Federal Reserve Bank of: RichmondFilings received during the week ending March 2, 2019FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodMAINSTREET BANK                                                                                                         * BranchMainStreet Bank, Fairfax, Virginia, to establish a branch at 1130 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, DC.Newspaper: 03/10/2019Federal Register: Not applicable
#### Michael Pagillo, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Sue Pagillo, Deceased, Respondent, v City of Oneonta, Appellant.

[807 NYS2d 489]

Rose, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Dowd, J.), entered November 10, 2004 in Otsego County, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Sue Pagillo* and plaintiff, her husband, brought this action to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained in June 2002 when she fell after stepping into a depression containing loose gravel and water on a public sidewalk in the City of Oneonta, Otsego County. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that, among other things, it had not received prior written notice of the allegedly dangerous condition of the sidewalk as required by defendant’s Charter. Finding that prior written notice was irrelevant because defendant had actual notice of the defective condition, Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals.

As the proponent of the motion for summary judgment, defendant met its initial burden by presenting undisputed proof that it did not receive prior written notice. This shifted the burden to Pagillo and plaintiff to demonstrate the availability of a recognized exception to this notice requirement. We have acknowledged that there are now only two such recognized *1045exceptions, neither of which is applicable here *(see Amabile v City of Buffalo,*93 NY2d 471, 474 [1999]; *Dalton v City of Saratoga Springs,*12 AD3d 899, 900 [2004]; *Hendrickson v City of Kingston,*291 AD2d 709, 709 [2002], *appeal dismissed and lv denied*98 NY2d 662 [2002]). Further, all of the Appellate Divisions have now held that a municipality’s actual notice of the condition which allegedly caused a plaintiffs fall does not avoid the statutory written notice requirement *(see Oswald v City of Niagara Falls,*13 AD3d 1155, 1157 [4th Dept 2004]; *Lysohir v County of Suffolk,*10 AD3d 638, 639 [2d Dept 2004]; *Campisi v Bronx Water & Sewer Serv.,*1 AD3d 166, 167 [1st Dept 2003]; *Bornt v Town of Pittstown,*248 AD2d 854, 855 [3d Dept 1998], *lv denied*92 NY2d 803 [1998]).

To the extent that the earlier cases cited by Supreme Court *(Jackson v City of Mount Vernon,*213 AD2d 892 [1995], *lv denied*85 NY2d 812 [1995]; *Karkowski v County of Madison,*241 AD2d 882 [1997]) suggest to the contrary, they predate *Amabile*and are not to be followed.

This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider defendant’s remaining contention.

Mercure, J.P., Peters, Spain and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of the absence of prior written notice; motion granted to that extent; and, as so modified, affirmed.

*

 While this appeal was pending, Sue Pagillo died and her husband was substituted as administrator of her estate.
Exhibit
      32.2








CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U. S. C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the Annual Report of Community Bancorp. (the "Company") on
      Form
      10-K for the period ended December 31, 2006, filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned Chief
      Financial Officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
      1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that: 1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the information contained
      in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered
      in
      the Report.





A
      signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
      provided to Community Bancorp. and will be retained by Community Bancorp. and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.








/s/
      Stephen P.
      Marsh


Stephen
      P. Marsh, President & Chief Operating Officer


(Chief
      Financial Officer)





March
      20,
      2007
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of US Unwired Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2004 (the Report), I, Robert W. Piper, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert W. Piper                  
|                                     
|Robert W. Piper                      
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|November 1, 2004
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 12Federal Reserve Bank of: San FranciscoFilings received during the week ending March 9, 2019FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodCOMMERCEWEST BANK                                                                                                       CICNotice of Change in Control filed by Ivo A. Tjan, North Tustin, California, to retain voting shares of CommerceWest Bank, Irvine, California.Newspaper: 03/06/2019Federal Register: 03/14/2019PACIFIC PREMIER BANK                                                                                                    * BranchPacific Premier Bank, Irvine, California, to establish a branch office located at 790 E. Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California.Newspaper: Not availableFederal Register: Not applicable
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with theQuarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of World Heart Corporation (the “Corporation”)for the quarter ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Jal S.Jassawalla, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, herebycertifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

(1) TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

(2) The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Corporation as of March 31, 2007.

 
| Dated:  May 14, 2007 |   | /s/ * JAL S. JASSAWALLA                |
|---------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|                      |   | Jal S. Jassawalla, President and Chief |
|                      |   | Executive Officer                      |
|                      |   | (Principal Executive Officer)          |

----

*******                **A signedoriginal of this written statement required by section 906 has beenprovided to the Corporation and will be retained by the Corporation andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

HONORABLE MARCIA S. KRIEGER

Courtroom Deputy: Patricia Glover Date: September 17, 2012

Court Reporter: Terri Lindblom

Criminal Action No. 0-cr-0-MSK

Parties: Counsel Appearing:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

WAUNITA WEINGART, 

JOHN PHILLIP GALLGEGOS, and

ALOIS CRAIG WEINGART,

Defendants.

Linda Kaufman

Martha Paluch

Martin Stuart

William Taylor

Darlene Bagley (by telephone)

Paula Ray

COURTROOM MINUTES

HEARING: Motions

9:11 a.m. Court in session.

Defendants present on bond.

The Court addresses the parties Amended Joint Rule 702 Motion (Doc. #136)

Statements from counsel.

9:41 a.m. Court in recess

9:57 a.m. Court in session

ORDER: Amended Joint Rule 702 Motion (Doc. #136) is DENIED. The filing of a new

joint 702 motion and any responsive briefing will be filed by October 17, 2012. 

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 146 filed 09/17/12 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 2
Courtroom Minutes

Judge Marcia S. Krieger

Page 2

The hearing is set on November 27, 2012 at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom A901, 901

19th Street and may, if necessary, continue on November 28, 2012.

ORDER: Bond is continued.

10:03 a.m. Court in recess.

Total Time: 36 minutes.

Hearing concluded.

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 146 filed 09/17/12 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 2
#### BUATT v. PETTY.

No. 6614.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Dec. 2, 1943.

J. Norman Coon, of Monroe, for appellant.

M. C. Redmond, of Monroe, for appellee.

HARDY, Judge.

Plaintiff sued to recover the value of a cow alleged to have died of poisoning as the result of eating commercial fertilizer, a poisonous substance alleged to have been made accessible by the negligence of defendant’s employee.

It is claimed that on or about July 5, 1942, plaintiff’s Jersey milk cow, while grazing on the public range, ate a quantity of nitrate of soda, which had been spilled outside of defendant’s fence by defendant’s employees while unloading the same onto the premises of defendant.

The record discloses that prior to the date fixed upon which the death of the animal occurred, defendant’s employees had been occupied in unloading sacks of nitrate of soda to be used as fertilizer upon the premises of the defendant. Plaintiff claimed that a portion of the nitrate of soda was spilled outside of the fence of defendant on public property adjacent to the roadway; that the cow in question, which was allowed to run on the public range, was attracted by the substance which resembled salt, ate the same and died as the result thereof.

It is established that nitrate of soda is poisonous, and that the eating of the- same could have been responsible for the death of plaintiff’s cow. However, we are impressed with the fact, as was the trial Judge, that plaintiff has failed to establish with sufficient certainty the facts which would entitle him to recovery.

The chain of circumstances from which plaintiff would establish his right to recovery rests upon purely circumstantial evidence. It is indeed true that plaintiff has established a hypothetical case, but it is equally true that the conclusion remains predicated upon hypothesis alone.

There is no direct testimony in the record to show that the cow died of eating nitrate of soda, and, as a matter of fact, the conclusion which would indicate that the cow had actually eaten any substance resembling nitrate of soda, rests upon a rath*826er vague and uncertain identification of the cow by one single witness.

The probabilities are in favor of the contentions made by plaintiff, but probabilities alone are not sufficient. As has been many times stated, courts are bound by facts established by the evidence, not by percentage, speculation or likelihood.

Since we are quite in accord with the finding below, that plaintiff has failed to establish his allegations by a preponderance of the testimony, it is unnecessary to discuss the law which would be applicable to plaintiff’s right to recover as cited in brief of plaintiff’s able counsel.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellant’s cost.
AMENDED EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT





Agreement
entered into as of this 15 day of January 2006, between Andrew Makrides
(“Employee”) and Bovie Medical Corporation, (“Employer”)





WHEREAS, the parties have
heretofore entered into an Employment Agreement (the “Agreement”) dated February
1, 2000, as the same has been amended pursuant to the Board Resolutions dated
January 23, 2002, January 6, 2004; and November 15, 2006; and





WHEREAS, the parties are
desirous of memorializing the effect of the aforementioned resolutions and
further amending said Agreement on the terms hereinafter set forth.





NOW THEREFORE, in
consideration of the premises and covenants herein contained,





IT
IS HEREBY AGREED:





1.
            Paragraph
      3 of the Agreement is hereby amended in its entirety to read as
      follows:





TERM:
The initial term of employment under this Agreement shall be effective as of the
1st
day of February, 2000, and shall continue until January 31, 2011 or until
terminated as hereinafter provided. After January 31, 2009, the term of this
Agreement shall be automatically extended for continuous terms of one year each
unless the Employer provides the Employee with written notice of termination at
least nine months prior to the date the Employer plans to
terminate.





2.
            Except
      as amended hereby, the Agreement is hereby ratified and
      approved.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties
have set forth their signatures this ____ day of November, 2006.





BOVIE
      MEDICAL CORPORATIONBy:
                      /S/ Andrew MakridesAndrew
      Makrides,
President




/S/ Andrew MakridesAndrew
      Makrides
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       3,055,144
<SECURITIES>                                   235,163<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                               10,915,059
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            14,205,366
<PP&E>                                       3,496,345<F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                                 818,698
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              16,883,013
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,763,981<F3>
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        58,399
<OTHER-SE>                                   9,060,633
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                     20,035,506
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            28,035,506
<CGS>                                       20,676,602
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                7,358,904
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,165,521
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              86,556
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,106,827
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,197,801
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,909,026
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.33
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.31
<FN>
<F1>DOES NOT REPRESENT SECURITIES. INCLUDES PREPAID EXPENSES @ $52,472 + dEFERRED
INCOME TAX @ $182,691
<F2>INCLUDES PP&E @ $1,999,123 + S/W DEV. COSTS @ $1,485,551 + MISC. DEPOSITS @
$11,671
<F3>INCLUDES CAPITAL LEASES PAYABLE/LONG-TERM @ $748,446
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Second, Tarragano argues that his sentence of 28-72 months' 

imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree. 

The statute fixing Tarragano's punishment is not unconstitutional, his 

sentence is within statutory limits, see NRS 202.360(1)(a), and his term of 

incarceration is not "so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to 

shock the conscience" when considering the nature and circumstances of 

his crime and his criminal history. See Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 

915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting CuIverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 

596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 

1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion). 

Having considered Tarragano's contentions and concluded 

that they lack merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

ksut 

Cherry 

cc: Hon. Kimberly A. Wanker, District Judge 

Harry R. Gensler 

Nye County District Attorney 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Nye County Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 73M07' 

2 

J. 

J. 

J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Nancy Duhaime

v. Civil No. 09-cv-00018-JL

HMSHost Corporation

O R D E R

The Preliminary Pretrial Conference currently scheduled for

May 15, 2009 at 2:00 p.m. will include a substantive, meaningful

discussion of the parties’ claims and defenses. Counsel are

expected to be prepared to engage in an open, cooperative

discussion in good faith. Counsel are reminded of the

obligations imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) and (4), and

should be prepared to explain the factual basis underlying any

claims or defenses they have pleaded.

Each party shall be represented at the Preliminary Pretrial

Conference by counsel authorized to bind the party on all

matters.

To the extent that the substance of this order constitutes a

departure from the customary Preliminary Pretrial practice to

Case 1:09-cv-00018-JL Document 7 Filed 05/08/09 Page 1 of 2
2

which counsel are accustomed, the court apologizes for the short

notice, and will bear this in mind at the conference.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Joseph N. Laplante

United States District Judge

Dated: May 8, 2009

cc: Brian C. Shaughnessy, Esq.

Peter G. Callaghan, Esq.

Case 1:09-cv-00018-JL Document 7 Filed 05/08/09 Page 2 of 2