alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.49

                                 AMENDMENT NO. 1
                                       TO
                              EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

         This Amendment No. 1 to Employment Agreement ("Agreement") is entered
into between LOWRANCE ELECTRONICS, INC., a Delaware corporation having offices
at 12000 East Skelly Drive, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74128 ("Employer" or "Company"), and
March C. McQuown, an individual currently residing at 12210 E. 79th Court North,
Owasso, Oklahoma 74055 ("Employee"), to be effective as of April 7, 2004.

         In consideration of the mutual promises, covenants, and obligations
contained herein, the parties agree as follows:

         1. RECITALS.

                  (a) Employer and Employee entered into a certain Employment
Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") dated as of April 7, 2000 (the "Effective
Date"). Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings
ascribed to them in the Employment Agreement.

                  (b) The Initial Term of the Employment Agreement ended on
April 7, 2002, without either party having provided the other party with written
notice of termination.

                  (c) The Renewal Term of the Employment Agreement automatically
began on April 7, 2002, and will expire on April 7, 2004.

                  (d) Employer and Employee desire to enter into this Agreement
to extend the Renewal Term of the Employment Agreement for one (1) additional
year.

         2. AMENDMENT. The definition of "Renewal Term", as such term is used in
Exhibit A to the Employment Agreement, is hereby amended to mean the period
commencing on the expiration of the Initial Term and terminating on April 7,
2005. For purposes of the Employment Agreement, "Term" shall mean the period
commencing on the Effective Date and terminating upon the expiration of the
Renewal Term, as amended herein.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Employer and Employee have duly executed this
Agreement in multiple originals to be effective on the date first written above.

LOWRANCE ELECTRONICS, INC.                    EMPLOYEE

By: ________________________________          ______________________________
    Darrell J. Lowrance, President            Mark C. McQuown

This ____ day of ___________, 2004.           This ____ day of __________, 2004.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02272-BNB

GERUN L. SCURLOCK,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOWES HIW, INC.,

Defendant.

ORDER DRAWING CASE

Following review pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 8.1C, the court has determined

that this case does not appear to be appropriate for summary dismissal. Therefore, the

case will be drawn to a district judge and to a magistrate judge. See D.C.COLO.LCivR

8.1D. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that this case shall be drawn to a district judge and to a magistrate

judge.

DATED November 21, 2011, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

 s/ Boyd N. Boland 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02272-WJM-MEH Document 9 Filed 11/21/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
#### FRANCOIS v. WASHINGTON NAT. INS. CO.

No. 14390.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

March 13, 1933.

William A. Green, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Harry R. Cabral, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

 Our attention is called to the fact that' defendant neither appealed from the judgment rendered below nor answered the appeal taken by plaintiff. Our decree, therefore, should not have amended the judgment appealed from in defendant’s favor, for whereas under C. P. art. 888, an appellee who has cause to complain against any part of a judgment may “3⁄8 * * without appeal on his part, state in his answer the points on which he thinks he has sustained wrong, 3⁄8 3⁄8 *» ke cannot he heard to complain unless he has answered or has hipiself appealed, because, as is provided in C. P. art. 889, “if the appellee, on the appeal of the other party, neglect to pray that the judgment be reversed on those points which are prejudicial to him, he shall not afterwards be allowed to appeal, but the judgment shall remain irrevocable for or against him.”

“An appellee cannot have a judgment amended in his favor unless he has prayed for it in his answer to the appeal.” Morris v. Cain’s Ex’rs, 39 La. Ann. 712, 1 So. 797, 806, 2 So. 418.

In Talle v. De Monasterio et al., 48 La. Ann. 1232, 20 So. 687, 690, the Supreme Court said: “The appeal submits to this court the’ errors in the judgment which the appellant conceives operate to his prejudice. If the other party to the suit complains of the judgment, to obtain relief, he must appeal, or, answering the appeal of his adversary, claim an amendment. It results that this court, on the appeal, cannot disturb the judgment, except to the extent asked at our hands by the appellant, unless there is an answer from the appellee demanding an amendment of the judgment. In other words, the judgment of the lower court becomes final, as to the party who takes no appeal, and asks no amendment in the mode pointed out by the Code of Practice. In this case, there being no appeal by the defendants, and no answer by them to the appeal, the judgment of the lower court, in favor of plaintiffs for the property, could not be' called in question on this appeal of the plaintiffs, or disturbed by us.”

See, also, Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. C. T. Patterson & Co., 130 La. 557, 58 So. 336; City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Jockey Club, 115 La. 911, 40 So. 331; Gathe v. Broussard, 49 La. Ann. 312, 21 So. 839; Commercial Bank v. Shanks, 129 La. 861, 56 So. 1028.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that our original decree be; and it is, recalled and annulled, and it is further ordered that the judgment appealed from be, and it is, affirmed'; plaintiff-appellant to pay all costs of appeal; defendant-appellee to pay all other costs.

Original decree recalled.

Judgment appealed from affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Stonyfield Farm, Inc.

v. Civil No. 08-cv-488-JL

Agro-Farma, Inc.

ORDER OF RECUSAL

Because Arnold Rosenblatt, who entered an appearance on

behalf of Schreiber Foods, Inc. on November 3rd, is on my recusal

list, I hereby recuse myself from presiding over this case, and

request that the clerk reassign this matter. 

SO ORDERED.

 

Joseph N. Laplante

United States District Judge

Dated: November 4, 2009 

cc: Peter S. Cowan, Esq.

Kevin M. Kearney, Esq.

Robert J. Fluskey, Jr., Esq.

Thomas J. Donovan, Esq.

Arnold Rosenblatt, Esq.

Case 1:08-cv-00488-JD Document 45 Filed 11/04/09 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>
<CIK> 0000717238
<NAME> MSC.SOFTWARE CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          10,822
<SECURITIES>                                    16,481
<RECEIVABLES>                                   43,279
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (3,605)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                82,919
<PP&E>                                          29,388
<DEPRECIATION>                                (20,493)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 140,617
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           59,395
<BONDS>                                         56,574
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        31,754
<OTHER-SE>                                    (14,067)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   140,617
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               125,397
<CGS>                                           46,255
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  135,438
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,134
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,203
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,461
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (13,175)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (196)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,979)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (12,979)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.95)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.95)


</TABLE>
Lexter Kossie#700661 William McConnell Unit 

### 3001 South EmilyDrive Reeville, Texas 78102
April 6, 2015 

# lOtflf-zi

MffOPflBIMINftAf 

# APR§82015

Texas Supreme Court Attn: Clerk P.p.; BOX 12308,Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711

RE: Court InquiryInformation orForms

Dear Clerk:
I have good reasons to believe that my attorney 

### and the district attorneyconspired to get me a life sentence because I would not cop-out for an aggravated robbery in which I did not have a gun or a weapon of any sort. I have recently acquired an affidavit from the State's onlywitness who at trial testified that she sawa brown handle hanging out of mywaistband and when the district attorney asked her what it was she said it was a gun but now claim that prior to trial she consistantly told the D.;A.; prior to trial that it couldhave been a gun but that she never sawa gun of any sort=..only a brownhandle. 

### Prior to trial I consistantly told the D.;A.; andmyattorney that I did not have a gun in which the D.A. responded with 

### the question,."Who do you think the jury is going tobelieve .-.you or that 18 year old young lady?" I never had a gun 

### and the onlyreason I went to trial was because that young lady continued to lie about seeing a gun, I would like for a court to conduct a court inquiry 

### because Tbelieve a crimehas been committed bymy attorney and the district attorneywho prosecutedmy case based on some 

### additional evidence that Thave acquired sincemy conviction in November of 1994. 

### Please send me whatever forms or information youmay have on filing a court inquiry. Thank you for your kind assistaance. Sincerely.-

cc:file Lexter Kossie Texas Lifer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 08-cr-116-02-PB

Laura Moore

O R D E R

Defendant appeared for a bail revocation hearing pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3148. Defendant left the drug program and has used

cocaine since. She has violated her bail conditions. Given the

number of failed opportunities to comply with conditions I find

that the defendant is unlikely to abide by any condition or

combination of conditions. The conditions of release are

revoked.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant be detained

pending trial. 

The defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney

General or his designated representative for confinement in a

corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from

persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody

pending appeal. The defendant shall be afforded a reasonable

opportunity for private consultation with defense counsel. On

order of a court of the United States or on request of an

Case 1:08-cr-00116-PB Document 17 Filed 10/31/08 Page 1 of 2
2

attorney for the government, the person in charge of the

corrections facility shall deliver the defendant to the United

States Marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection

with a court proceeding. 

SO ORDERED.

___________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 31, 2008 

cc: James D. Gleason

 U.S. Marshal

 U.S. Probation

Case 1:08-cr-00116-PB Document 17 Filed 10/31/08 Page 2 of 2
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 5Federal Reserve Bank of: RichmondFilings received during the week ending January 9, 2016FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodCAPITAL BANK FINANCIAL CORP.                                                                                            * 3A5Capital Bank Financial Corp., Charlotte, North Carolina, to acquire 100% of the voting shares of CommunityOne Bancorp, Charlotte, North Carolina, and thereby indirectly acquire CommunityOne Bank, National Association, Charlotte, North Carolina.Newspaper: Not availableFederal Register: 01/28/2016ESSEX BANK                                                                                                              * BranchEssex Bank, Richmond, Virginia, has submitted an application to establish a new branch at 10509 Judicial Drive, Suite 100, Fairfax, Virginia.Newspaper: 01/07/2016Federal Register: Not applicableSOUTHERN BANCSHARES (N.C.), INC.                                                                                        4c8Southern Bancshares (N.C.), Inc., Mount Olive, North Carolina, to engage de novo in extending and servicing loans.Newspaper: Not applicableFederal Register: Not applicable
#### BRUNO v. SEIGEL.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A.

July 6, 1954.

Lewison & Engel, Miami, for appellant.

Wicker, Brown & Smith, Miami, for ap-pellee.

SEBRING, Justice.

Jerry Bruno, the plaintiff below, instituted suit against the defendant, Harry Seigel, to recover damages for injuries sustained when the plaintiff slipped and fell on a concrete areaway owned by the defendant. The complaint in the cause alleged, in substance, that the defendant owned and operated a gasoline filling station and that many people walked across the premises as a short cut to a public bus stop; that early in the morning of September 28, 1952, while walking across the defendant’s property on the way to board a bus, the plaintiff slipped and fell on some slippery substance and was injured. The complaint further alleged, “upon information and belief,” that the defendant had knowledge of the fact that many persons walked across the premises in going to and from the bus stop, yet so carelessly and negligently maintained the premises as to cause the accident.

The defendant Seigel filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He also took the plaintiff’s deposition, and, thereafter, moved the court for the entry of a summary judgment on the complaint and deposition, on the ground that there was no genuine issue as to any material facts and that consequently the defendant was entitled to a judgment in his favor as a matter of law. The motion for summary judgment was granted and this appeal followed.

We find no error in the judgment appealed from. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff slipped and fell on defendant’s premises while he was on his way to catch a bus. The deposition reveals that the plaintiff was transported by *a*friend from his home to the corner where the defendant’s filling station was located. After he got out of the automobile, the plaintiff walked onto the defendant’s premises, which, at that hour of the day, were not open for business, in order “to relax there and to wait for to catch the bus.” When he slipped and fell on what he thought was a grease spot approximately two or three inches in size, he was going out to the curb to catch a bus.

It is plain from the *allegations*of *the*complaint and the undisputed facts developed by the deposition that the plaintiff was not on the premises for the purpose of transacting business with the defendant *but was*there solely for his own convenience and benefit. Under these circumstances the plaintiff was a licensee and the *675defendant owed him no duty except not to harm him wilfully or wantonly, or to set traps for him, or to expose him to danger recklessly or wantonly.’ ” Stewart v. Texas Co., Fla., 67 So.2d 653, 654; Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 185 S.W.2d 820.

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, €. J., and TERRELL and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

Senior District Judge Richard P. Matsch

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01761-RPM

THE ESTATE OF CARLOS BASSATT,

CARLOS BASSATT, JR.,

Personal representative,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER and

PATRICK SANCHEZ,

Defendants.

____________________________________________________________________________________

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’ AWARD OF COSTS

____________________________________________________________________________________

After review of Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendants’ Award of Costs, filed June 26, 2013 [93] and

the Bill of Costs, entered June 20, 2013 [88], it is

ORDERED that the plaintiff’s objection is denied. 

DATED: July 1st , 2013

BY THE COURT:

s/Richard P. Matsch

________________________________

Richard P. Matsch, Senior District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-01761-RPM-BNB Document 94 Filed 07/01/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 182

To amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to designate a segment of the

Eight Mile River in the State of Connecticut for study for potential

addition to the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and for other

purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 3, 2001

Mr. SIMMONS (for himself, Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut, Mr. SHAYS, Mr.

LARSON of Connecticut, Mr. MALONEY of Connecticut, and Ms.

DELAURO) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Resources

A BILL

To amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to designate

a segment of the Eight Mile River in the State of Connecticut for study for potential addition to the National

Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Eight Mile River Wild

5 and Scenic River Study Act of 2001’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 The Congress finds that—
2

•HR 182 IH

1 (1) the Eight Mile River in the State of Con2 necticut possesses important resource values, includ3 ing wildlife, ecological, and scenic values, and his4 toric sites and a cultural past important to Amer5 ica’s heritage;

6 (2) there is strong support among State and

7 local officials, area residents, and river users for a

8 cooperative wild and scenic river study of the area;

9 and

10 (3) there is a longstanding interest among

11 State and local officials, area residents, and river

12 users in undertaking a concerted cooperative effort

13 to manage the river in a productive and meaningful

14 way.

15 SEC. 3. DESIGNATION FOR STUDY.

16 Section 5(a) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16

17 U.S.C. 1276(a)) is amended by adding at the end the fol18 lowing new paragraph:

19 ‘‘(138) EIGHT MILE RIVER, CONNECTICUT.—The

20 segment from its headwaters downstream to its confluence

21 with the Connecticut River.’’.

22 ‘‘(18) The study of the Eight Mile River, Con23 necticut, named in paragraph (138) of subsection (a) shall

24 be completed by the Secretary of the Interior and the re-
3

•HR 182 IH

1 port thereon submitted to Congress not later than 3 years

2 after the date of the enactment of this paragraph.’’.

3 SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

4 There are authorized to be appropriated such sums

5 as may be necessary to carry out this Act.

Æ
STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

GABRIELLE C. JAMESON AND KIM

L. JAMESON WIFE OF/AND BOBBY

A. JAMESON

VERSUS

HONORABLE WARREN L. 

MONTGOMERY, IN HIS

INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS THE DISTRICT

ATTORNEY OF ST. TAMMANY

PARISH, IAIN DOVER, IN HIS

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND

UNDERWRITERS OF LLOYD'S, 

LONDON

NO. 2022 CW 1339

JANUARY 5, 2023

In Re: Warren Montgomery, individually and in his official

capacity as District Attorney, 22nd Judicial District, 

State of Louisiana, Iain Dover in his individual

capacity, and Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's, London, 

applying for supervisory writs, 22nd Judicial District

Court, Parish of St. Tammany, No. 201609230. 

BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ. 

WRIT DENIED. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT

FOR THE COURT

MRT

WRC

CHH
#### In the Matter of Henry Gonzalez et al., Petitioners, v Warden of Rikers Island, C.F., Respondent.

[806 NYS2d 873]

Proceedings brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, Bronx County [Robert A. Sackett, J.], entered on or about May 20, 2005), challenging determinations of respondent, dated February 22, 2005 and February 23, 2005, finding that petitioners violated respondent’s rule 130.11, unanimously dismissed as moot, without costs.

In light of respondent’s announced abandonment of the challenged drug testing protocol and the voiding of the infractions found against petitioners on the basis of tests conducted under the abandoned protocol, these proceedings are moot, and we find no exception to the mootness doctrine warranting their continuation *(see Matter of David C.*69 NY2d 796 [1987]; *Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,*50 NY2d 707, 713-715 [1980]; *cf. Matter of Doe v Coughlin,*71 NY2d 48 [1987]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Mazzarelli, Sullivan, Nardelli and McGuire, JJ.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-3013

___________ Henrice Taylor, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District v. * of Minnesota. * National Marrow Donor Program, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: May 13, 1999

Filed: May 20, 1999

___________ Before McMILLIAN, BRIGHT, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Henrice Taylor appeals the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on Taylor's race-based employment discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims. Having reviewed the record and the materials submitted by the parties, we see no error by the district court. We also conclude that an extended discussion is unnecessary in this fact-intensive case. We believe the district court correctly granted summary judgment, andwe affirm on the basis of the district court's memorandum opinion and order. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.-2-

A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
**EXHIBIT 23**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference inRegistration Statements Nos. 333-89317, and 333-86809 on Form S-3 and Registration Statement Nos. 33-51744, 33-65239, 333-12189, 333-62187, 333-84219, 333-38884, 333-68760, 333-68762, 333-110948, 333-100254, 333-100255, 333-139142, and 333-139143 onForm S-8 of our report on the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of MSC.Software Corporation and subsidiaries (the “Company”) dated March 1, 2007 (which report expresses an unqualified opinion andincludes an explanatory paragraph relating to the Company’s adoption in 2006 of a.) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123(R), *Share-Based Payment,*and b.) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158,*Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans – an amendment of FASB Statement No. 87, 88, 106 and 132(R)* and of our report on internal control over financial reporting of MSC.SoftwareCorporation dated March 1, 2007 appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of MSC.Software Corporation for the year ended December 31, 2006. 

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP 

Costa Mesa, California 

March 1, 2007