NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_______________________ 

No. 22-1391 

_______________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v.

TYREE STEELE, 

Appellant 

_______________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

District Court No. 2-20-cr-00121-001 

District Judge: The Honorable Michael M. Baylson 

__________________________ 

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

 February 10, 2023 

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed March 23, 2023) 

__________________________ 

OPINION*

__________________________ 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

constitute binding precedent.
2

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

In February 2020, Appellant Tyree Steele walked into a Citizens Bank wearing a 

ski mask. He then pulled out his wallet and handed the teller a note. When the teller told 

him she could not read the note, Steele demanded: “empty your top drawer, give me all 

your money.” He also warned her not to push any emergency buttons. After the teller 

handed over $5,043, Steele fled, accidentally leaving his wallet behind.

At the time of the robbery, Steele was on supervised release for a federal 

conviction for a series of eight bank robberies he had committed in Pennsylvania and 

New Jersey in 2010. When he reported to probation for a meeting five days after the 

Citizens Bank robbery, Steele was arrested. Steele pled guilty to one count of bank 

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).

For purposes of sentencing, the government and the Probation Office 

recommended that the District Court apply the career offender enhancement under U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 because Steele had two prior robbery convictions that 

constituted “crimes of violence.” Steele argued, as he does on appeal, that his 

Pennsylvania robbery conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(ii) was not a 

crime of violence, thereby rendering him ineligible for the career offender enhancement.

The District Court imposed a 120-month sentence, supported by two alternative 

rulings. First, the District Court stated that if the enhancement applied, it would grant a 

downward variance from the Guidelines range of 151–188 months to 120 months. 

Alternatively, if the enhancement did not apply, the District Court stated that it would 

impose an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 46–57 months to 120 months. 
3

Steele timely appealed his sentence and raises two issues.1 First, he argues that the 

District Court imposed a 120-month sentence for the improper purpose of rehabilitation 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) and Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).

Second, Steele argues that his Pennsylvania state court conviction for robbery is not a 

“crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines and thus does not trigger the career 

offender enhancement. 

I.

Steele did not raise any Tapia-based objection before the District Court. We 

therefore review that issue for plain error. United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252 (3d 

Cir. 2002). On plain error review, the appellant must show an (1) error, (2) that is plain or 

obvious, and (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Even if plain error is shown, a court should exercise its 

discretion to correct the forfeited error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity 

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 

U.S. 1, 15 (1985)) (cleaned up).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), a sentencing court may not consider the defendant’s 

rehabilitation when imposing or lengthening a sentence. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 327. But 

§ 3582(a) does not prohibit judges “from mentioning rehabilitation during the sentencing 

hearing,” and the sentencing court may discuss “the opportunities for rehabilitation 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
4

within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” United States v. 

Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 391 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334).

The District Court did not plainly err in citing Steele’s need to “get rid of drugs” 

and to “learn . . . to follow rules and regulations” when explaining Steele’s sentence.

JA 68–69. The District Court no doubt was expressing hope that prison time would help 

Steele to change his behavior. Section 3582(a) does not bar a sentencing court from 

expressing such a hope or from mentioning rehabilitation. See Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 391. 

Moreover, the District Court explained that 120 months was an appropriate sentence

because Steele’s criminal history revealed serious recidivism, 2 disregard for the law, and 

a sense of “entitle[ment] to money that doesn’t belong to [him].” JA 67–68. The District 

Court also emphasized that bank robbery “is a serious crime” and that Steele “put the 

bank teller in a sense of fear.” Id. Considering that the District Court identified these nonrehabilitative factors, our review of the portion of the transcript discussing the benefits of 

imprisonment does not plainly show that rehabilitation was considered as a factor in the 

determination of Steele’s sentence. Rather, the District Court expressed a hope that the 

conditions of imprisonment would lead Steele toward a lawful, drug-free life.

2 We do not recount Steele’s criminal history in detail because we write only for the parties. We 

nevertheless note that Steele was convicted in federal court for committing eight bank robberies 

located in Pennsylvania and New Jersey and was also convicted in Pennsylvania state court for 

attempting to rob a convenience store at gunpoint. 
5

II.

Turning to the second issue, we need not decide whether Pennsylvania’s firstdegree robbery statute is a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines because any error 

would be harmless.3 The District Court imposed a 120-month sentence under two 

alternative rationales. If Steele’s Pennsylvania robbery conviction is a “crime of 

violence” and the career offender enhancement were to apply, the District Court 

explained that it would vary downward in imposing a sentence. Alternatively, if the 

career offender enhancement were not to apply, the District Court explained that it would 

still impose a 120-month sentence by imposing an upward variance.

We previously have recognized harmless error in nearly identical circumstances in 

United States v. Carter, 730 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2013). There, the Guidelines range also 

turned on the application of the career offender enhancement, and the district court 

imposed the same sentence under two alternative rulings. Id. at 189. We held that the 

error “was harmless because the District Court explained that it would have ordered the 

same sentence even without finding a ‘crime of violence.’” Id. at 193. But we also noted 

that a sentencing error is not harmless “where a district court simply states that it would 

have imposed the same sentence without pointing to the alternative Guidelines range and 

explaining its decision to arrive at the specific sentence.” Id.

3 A closely related issue—whether Pennsylvania’s first-degree robbery statute is a “violent felony” 

under the Armed Criminal Career Act—is pending before this Court in United States v. Harris, 

No. 17-1861.
6

Here, the District Court identified the two Guidelines ranges that could apply and 

explained why it would arrive at a 120-month sentence under either range. To justify an 

upward variance, the District Court emphasized the seriousness of Steele’s actions and 

the need for deterrence considering Steele’s history of serious recidivism. These reasons 

adequately justify an upward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, the District 

Court’s alternative rationale for imposing a 120-month sentence without the career 

offender enhancement was not erroneous. We therefore conclude that any error in 

applying the career offender enhancement was harmless.

III.

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.