IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-2134

Filed March 22, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF H.W.F., a/k/a M.F.,

Minor Child,

C.F., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Louise M. Jacobs, 

District Associate Judge.

A father appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental 

rights. AFFIRMED. 

Alexander D. Smith of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles Gribble Gentry 

Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant father. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Congarry D. Williams of the State Public Defender’s Office, Des Moines, 

attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MULLINS, Presiding Judge.

A father appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental 

rights to his child, M.F.

1

 He argues (1) the State failed to prove the statutory 

grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, (2) termination is not 

in the child’s best interests, and (3) exceptions to termination exist because the 

child is placed with a relative and shares a bond with the father. Upon our de 

novo review, we affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

M.F. was born in July 2015. The Iowa Department of Human Services 

(DHS) became involved with the family prior to M.F.’s birth due to a previous 

founded child protective services assessment against the father after his older 

child tested positive for an illegal drug in 2014. DHS became involved with M.F. 

when he tested positive for marijuana at birth. M.F.’s mother admitted to using 

marijuana while pregnant. M.F. was removed from the father’s custody in August 

2015 due to the father’s drug abuse. The juvenile court adjudicated the child 

CINA in October 2015. 

For the majority of the case, the father did not attempt to make any 

progress on the case plan or maintain sobriety. He participated in some 

substance-abuse treatment, but he tested positive for multiple drug screens 

during that time. In July and August 2016, the father refused to participate in 

drug screenings. In September 2016, there was another founded assessment 

against the father after his older child again tested positive for methamphetamine 

 

1 Throughout the child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceedings, the parties and the 

juvenile court referred to the child as M.F. After filing the termination petition in August 

2016, the State learned the child’s legal name is H.W.F. We refer to the child as M.F. 
3

after being in his care in August. The father admitted to using methamphetamine 

during that time. From August until October, the father attended only one visit 

with M.F. 

At the termination hearing in November 2016, the father submitted 

unverified, clean urine screenings from the previous two months and also 

presented evidence he was in outpatient substance-abuse treatment. Prior to 

the hearing, DHS and the court had been unaware of the father’s involvement in 

these services. The DHS worker testified that, outside of the father’s substanceabuse issues, there were no major parenting concerns. Despite this testimony, 

the DHS worker recommended termination of the father’s parental rights and 

permanency for the child. 

In December 2016, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the 

father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2016).2 

The father appeals. 

II. Standard of Review

We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re 

M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). “We are not bound by the juvenile 

court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the 

credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quoting In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 

2014)). Our primary consideration is the best interests of the child. In re J.E., 

723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). 

 

2 The juvenile court also terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1)(h). She does not appeal. 
4

III. Analysis

“Our review of termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 

is a three-step analysis.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 219. First, we must 

determine whether the State established the statutory grounds for termination by 

clear and convincing evidence. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1); In re M.W., 876 

N.W.2d at 219. Second, if the State established statutory grounds for 

termination, we consider whether termination is in the child’s best interests under 

section 232.116(2). See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 219–20. Finally, we consider 

whether any exceptions under section 232.116(3) weigh against termination. 

See id. at 220. 

A. Statutory Grounds

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) provides the court may terminate a 

parent’s parental rights if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence the 

child (1) is three years old or younger; (2) has been adjudicated CINA; (3) has 

been removed from the physical custody of the parent for at least six of the last 

twelve months, or the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home 

has been less than thirty days; and (4) cannot be returned to the custody of the 

parent at the time of the termination hearing. 

The father does not dispute the State proved the first three elements 

required under section 232.116(1)(h): At the time of the termination hearing, M.F. 

was age three or younger; M.F. was adjudicated CINA in October 2015; and M.F. 

had been removed from the father’s custody since August 2015, with no trial 

periods at home. Instead, the father claims the State failed to prove adjudicatory 

harm to the child due to the father’s drug use and the child could not be returned 
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to his custody at the time of the termination hearing. He cites the holdings in In 

re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Iowa 2014), and In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 682, 

(Iowa Ct. App. 2016), in support of his claims. 

In In re J.S., the supreme court determined “general statements about 

methamphetamine addiction are [not] enough by themselves to prove that a child 

is imminently likely to suffer physical harm under [Iowa Code] section 

232.2(6)(b).” 846 N.W.2d at 42. In re J.S. is important because it highlights the 

distinction between sections 232.2(6)(b)3and 232.2(6)(c)(2)4—a CINA 

determination under paragraph (b) may lead to the termination of parental rights 

under section 232.116(1)(d) before the statutory time period contained in section 

232.116(1)(h) has passed. See id. at 41. In In re M.S., our court reversed a 

juvenile court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights after determining

“the mere fact of [marijuana] use does not establish adjudicatory harm.” 889 

N.W.2d at 682. Instead, our court found “the State must establish a nexus 

between the father’s cannabis use and an appreciable risk of adjudicatory harm 

to the child within the meaning of section 232.102.” Id. 

 

3 Under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b), a court may adjudicate a child CINA when the 

court finds a “parent . . . has physically abused or neglected the child, or is imminently 

likely to abuse or neglect the child.” 

4 Under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2), a court may adjudicate a child CINA if the 

court finds the child “has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a 

result of . . . [t]he failure of the child’s parent . . . to exercise a reasonable degree of care 

in supervising the child.” 
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Here, M.F. was adjudicated CINA under section 232.2(6)(c)(2), (n),

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and 

(o).6 The father regularly used methamphetamine throughout the CINA cases

involving his older child and M.F. “[A] juvenile court could reasonably determine 

that a parent’s active addiction to methamphetamine is ‘imminently likely’ to 

result in harmful effects to the physical, mental, or social wellbeing of the children 

in the parent’s care.” In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d at 42; see also In re A.B., 815 

N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (noting “an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug 

addiction can render a parent unfit to raise children”). Given the father’s lengthy 

history of substance-abuse issues, and the more important fact that he has 

previously used methamphetamine while caring for a child, which resulted in that

child testing positive for the drug on two separate occasions two years apart, we 

conclude M.F. was “imminently likely” to suffer harmful effects because of his 

father’s substance abuse. “Our statutory termination provisions are preventative 

as well as remedial. Their goal is to prevent probable harm to the child; they do 

not require delay until after the harm has happened.” In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 

480, 483 (Iowa 1993) (citation omitted). We do not need to wait for M.F. to suffer 

the same harm suffered by his half-sibling. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778 

(explaining “[e]vidence of the parent’s past performance . . . may be indicative of 

the quality of the future care that parent is capable of providing” (citation 

 

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Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(n) provides a court may adjudicate a child CINA if the court 

finds the “parent’s . . . drug or alcohol abuse results in the child not receiving adequate 

care.” 

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Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(o) provides, in pertinent part, a court may adjudicate a 

child CINA if the court finds evidence of “an illegal drug present [in the child’s body] as a 

direct and foreseeable consequence of the acts or omissions of the child’s parent.” 
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omitted)). The State proved by clear and convincing evidence M.F. could not be 

returned to the custody of his father at the time of the termination hearing. 

We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights to M.F. under Iowa 

Code section 232.116(1)(h). 

B. Best Interests

The father next contends termination of his parental rights was not in the 

child’s best interests under Iowa Code section 232.116(2). Even if a statutory 

ground for termination is met under section 232.116(1), a decision to terminate 

must still be in the best interests of the child under section 232.116(2). In re 

M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 224. 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us, “giv[ing] primary 

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the longterm nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional 

condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). As discussed above, 

the father has a history of serious substance abuse and has exposed one of his 

children to illegal drugs more than once. He failed to successfully complete 

meaningful substance-abuse treatment and maintain sobriety. He was dishonest 

with DHS and the court about his drug abuse and failed to see the impact it had 

on his family. He did not begin to address his substance-abuse issues until the 

two months leading up to the termination hearing and did not notify DHS or the 

court of his treatment until the hearing. Furthermore, the father regularly made 

excuses to not participate in visits with M.F. 

We cannot ask this child to continuously wait for his father to become a 

stable parent. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). “Time is a 
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critical element,” and parents “cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the 

statutory time periods for reunification have expired, to begin to express an 

interest in parenting.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). “It is simply 

not in the best interests of children to continue to keep them in temporary foster 

homes while the natural parents get their lives together.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 

at 778 (quoting In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997)). Termination is in 

M.F.’s best interests. 

C. Exceptions to Termination

“Once we have established that the termination of parental rights is in the 

[child’s] best interests, the last step of our analysis is to determine whether any 

exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude the termination.” In re M.W., 

876 N.W.2d at 225. The father asserts the juvenile court should not have 

terminated his parental rights because he shares a bond with the child and the 

child is placed with a relative. 

Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a) provides “[t]he court need not terminate 

the relationship between the parent and child if . . . [a] relative has legal custody 

of the child.” Section 232.116(3)(c) provides a court may decide not to terminate 

a parent’s parental rights if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the 

termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of 

the parent-child relationship.” The application of section 232.116(3) is 

permissive, not mandatory. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113. “The court has 

discretion, based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best 

interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save the 

parent-child relationship.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 475 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). 
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After reviewing the record in its entirety, we agree with the juvenile court 

that any exception to termination should not be applied in this case. See In re 

C.K., 558 N.W.2d at 174 (“An appropriate determination to terminate a parentchild relationship is not to be countermanded by the ability and willingness of a 

family relative to take the child.”). M.F. is currently placed with his maternal aunt 

and is thriving in her care. The aunt is willing to adopt him. M.F. needs and 

deserves permanency and stability. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 777 (“It is 

well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has 

proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a 

parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the 

child.” (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010))). 

Furthermore, the record does not show the father shares a bond with M.F.

such that termination would be detrimental to the child. The child has been 

removed from the father’s care and custody since he was one month old. The 

father has not taken advantage of all the offered visits with M.F. and did not 

always engage and interact with him. M.F. has been placed with his maternal 

aunt since the removal and is comfortable and well-adjusted in her home. In this 

case, no permissive factors under section 232.116(3) apply to preclude

termination of the father’s parental rights. 

D. Additional Time

Additionally, the father appears to argue the juvenile court should have 

granted him additional time to work toward reunification with his child. Under 

Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b), a court may authorize a six-month extension if 
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it determines “the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no 

longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” 

We must now view this case with a sense of urgency. See In re C.B., 611 

N.W.2d at 495. “[A]t some point, the rights and needs of the child[] rise above 

the rights and needs of the parent.” In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 2009). Based upon our de novo review of the record, including the father’s 

history of substance abuse and failure to maintain sobriety for any length of time, 

we are not persuaded the need for removal would no longer exist at the end of 

six months. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). 

IV. Conclusion

We have carefully reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the 

juvenile court’s ruling. Upon our de novo review, we conclude the State proved 

the statutory grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights by clear and 

convincing evidence and termination is in the child’s best interests. We further 

find no permissive factors weighing against termination exist so as to preclude 

termination. Finally, the juvenile court correctly denied any request for additional 

time to work toward reunification. Accordingly, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.