alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Anthony Morales GARZA, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-10344. D.C. No. CR-00-01452-RCC.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 5, 2003.*

Decided Aug. 7, 2003.

*741Before ALDISERT,** TALLMAN, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM***

Anthony Morales Garza appeals his conviction for distributing and conspiring to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). Garza argues that the district court erred by admitting the statements of Garza’s alleged co-conspirator, Jose Gonzales.

We review the admission of a co-conspirator’s statements for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Bowman,*215 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir.2000). We review for clear error the district court’s factual determinations that form the basis for admitting the statements. *Id.*

A co-conspirator’s statements may be admitted if the government shows by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the defendant participated in a conspiracy existing at the time the statements were made, and (2) the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. *Id.*at 960-61.

Here, Gonzales’s statements were properly admitted. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Garza participated in an existing conspiracy and that Gonzales’s statements were in furtherance of that conspiracy.

Garza’s participation in an existing conspiracy was shown by several facts: (1) Garza was present at the scene of the drug transaction, and while there behaved as Gonzales said the supplier would; (2) one federal agent identified Garza as the driver of the vehicle containing the drugs, and another federal agent saw Garza walking away from the vehicle containing the drugs in a manner suggesting Garza had just exited the vehicle; (3) Garza owns a carpet business, consistent with Gonzales’s description of his supplier’s occupation; and (4) dozens of calls were exchanged between Gonzales’s phone and phones owned by Garza, including calls correlating with times that Gonzales was known to be contacting his supplier.

*742There is no question that Gonzales’s statement were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. All of the statements were made by Gonzales to an undercover federal agent for the purpose of arranging and negotiating the methamphetamine sale.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>






<ARTICLE>                            5
       
<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                        YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                    DEC-28-1996
<PERIOD-START>                       DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                         DEC-28-1996
<CASH>                                27,800,000
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                        280,700,000
<ALLOWANCES>                          13,700,000
<INVENTORY>                          389,700,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     727,900,000
<PP&E>                               618,600,000
<DEPRECIATION>                       299,500,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     1,336,300,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                409,600,000
<BONDS>                                        0
<COMMON>                             429,900,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                            6,000,000
<OTHER-SE>                            10,300,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       1,336,300,000
<SALES>                            1,729,700,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                   1,729,700,000
<CGS>                              1,298,500,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      1,298,500,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     320,100,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    29,800,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       81,300,000
<INCOME-TAX>                          15,000,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   66,300,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                          66,300,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                               1.73
<EPS-DILUTED>                               1.73
        


</TABLE>
#### The State, ex rel. Richardson, *v.*Industrial Commission of Ohio.

(No. 24875

— Decided October 17, 1934.)

*Mr. Stanley S. Stewart*and *Messrs. Chalfamt & Chalfant,*for relator.

*Mr. Jolm W. Bricher,*attorney general, and *Mr. B. B. ZurmeMy,*for respondent.

This cause came on to be heard upon the petition for mandamus and the demurrer thereto, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged by this court that the demurrer ■ be, and the same hereby is, sustained for the reason that the Industrial Commission having found that the provision of Section 60 of the Code of Specific Requirements, with reference to building construction work, relating to openings in floors, was not applicable to the facts in the proceeding wherein the claimant sought additional compensation for violation of a spe*571cific requirement, the decision of the Industrial Commission upon such questions of fact is final. *Slatmeyer*v. *Industrial Commission, 115*Ohio St., 654, 155 N. E., 484, proposition one of the syllabus. It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the writ of mandamus prayed for be, and the same hereby is, denied.

*Writ denied.*

Weygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Jones, Matthias, Bevis, Zimmerman and Wilkin, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Magill Associates Inc., Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[745 NYS2d 135]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 30, 2001, which assessed Magill Associates Inc. for additional unemployment insurance contributions.

Magill Associates Inc. is a staffing service for clients seeking to hire workers. To locate prospective workers, Magill hires recruiters with expertise in various areas of employment. Finding that these recruiters were Magill’s employees rather than independent contractors, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board assessed Magill for additional unemployment insurance contributions based upon the remuneration it had paid them *671during the period from January 1, 1996 through September 30, 1998.* Magill appeals.

This Court will not disturb a decision of the Board which finds that workers are employees rather than independent contractors provided there is substantial evidence in the record that the employer exercised “control over important aspects of the services performed” *(Matter of Concourse Ophthalmology Assoc. [Roberts],*60 NY2d 734, 736; *see generally, Matter of Troy Publ. Co. [Hudacs],*228 AD2d 877, *lv denied*89 NY2d 803). In the instant matter, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Magill exercised sufficient control over the services performed by the recruiters to establish their status as employees. Magill provided the recruiters with various indicia of employment, including office space, telephone reception service, business cards and stationery bearing Magill’s name *(see, Matter of Atac [Fashion Realty Grou*p—Commis*sioner of Labor],*265 AD2d 777). In addition, Magill reimbursed certain of the recruiters’ expenses incurred for entertaining clients and attendance at meetings. It reviewed and edited the recruiters’ advertising submitted to newspapers and it had final say over any placements suggested by the recruiters. The recruiters were required to identify themselves as representatives of Magill when making work-related contacts and were required to notify Magill of planned absences. We conclude that although there was evidence that might justify a contrary conclusion, the Board’s finding of an employment relationship is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, we will not disturb that determination *(see, Matter of Kaplan [Tupperware Distrib.*—Commissioner *of Labor],*257 AD2d 951, *lv dismissed*93 NY2d 920).

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Crew III, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.

*

 The amount originally assessed against Magill was reduced after four of its recruiters were dropped from the list of contested workers for reasons not relevant to the matter under review.
**Exhibit
      32.02**





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Westside Energy Corporation (the
      "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 as filed with
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof ("Report"),
      the
      undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
      certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:





1.           The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.           The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:
                August 15, 2007
            
            /s/
                Sean J. AustinSean
                J. Austin,Chief
                Financial Officer
DISTRICT COURT, JEFFERSON COUNTY, 

STATE OF COLORADO 

100 Jefferson County Parkway 

Golden, Colorado 80401 

Phone: (303) 271-6145 

Plaintiff: CROSSROADS COMMERCIAL CENTER, 

LTD., LLLP, a Colorado limited liability limited 

partnership, 

v. 

Defendant: GAROLD B. KRAFT (d.b.a. EXOTIC 

MOTORS), an individual, et al. ▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲

Case No.: 2010 CV 4988 

(consolidated with 10 CV 5138) 

Div.: 4 Ctrm: 5C 

ORDER GRANTING UNNOPPOSED MOTION TO AMEND CAPTION 

 

 THIS MATTER, having come before the Court on Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to 

Amend the Caption and the Court, having reviewed the pleadings and being fully advised 

thereof, hereby FINDS good cause for amending the caption, and ORDERS the caption in this 

case should be amended to read as follows: 

Plaintiff: CROSSROADS COMMERCIAL 

CENTER, LTD., LLLP, a Colorado limited 

liability limited partnership, 

v. 

Defendant: GAROLD B. KRAFT (d.b.a. 

EXOTIC MOTORS), an individual; 

and 

Plaintiff: BANK OF CHOICE, a Colorado 

corporation, 

v. 

Defendants: CROSSROADS COMMERCIAL 

SO 

ORDERED 

The moving party is hereby ORDERED 

to provide a copy of this Order to any pro 

se parties who have entered an 

appearance in this action within 10 days 

from the date of this order. ___________________________ 

Tamara S. Russell 

Jefferson District Court Judge 

DATE OF ORDER INDICATED ON ATTACHMENT 

EFILED Document 

CO Jefferson County District Court 1st JD 

Filing Date: Apr 28 2011 1:28PM MDT 

Filing ID: 37297950 

Review Clerk: Elena Gomez

Case 1:11-cv-02286-REB-CBS Document 15 Filed 08/31/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
68490 - 2 - 2010 CV 4988 

CENTER, LTD., LLLP, a Colorado limited 

liability limited partnership, and RANDOLPH 

CURRIER, an individual, 

v. 

Third-Party Defendants: GOLDEN 

APPRAISAL SERVICES, LLC, a Colorado 

limited liability company, GAROLD B. KRAFT, 

an individual, VAL SIMONE, an individual, and 

ERIC TUERS, an individual. 

Dated: April 26, 2011 

BY THE COURT: 

 

Tamara Russell 

District Court Judge 

Case 1:11-cv-02286-REB-CBS Document 15 Filed 08/31/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 3
Order Signed 4-28-2011 

/s/ Judge Tamara Russell 

Court: CO Jefferson County District Court 1st JD 

Judge: Tamara Russell 

File & Serve 

Transaction ID: 37259118 

Current Date: Apr 29, 2011 

Case Number: 2010CV4988 

Case Name: CROSSROADS COMMERCIAL CENTER LTD vs. KRAFT, GAROLD B et al 

Court Authorizer: Tamara Russell 

Court Authorizer 

Comments: 

Case 1:11-cv-02286-REB-CBS Document 15 Filed 08/31/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 3
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-60351

Summary Calendar

 

ORLANDO Y. SAY, 

also known as Orlando Yobani Say-Tuch, 

also known as Orlando Yobani Tuch,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

--------------------

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A76 428 121

--------------------

March 25, 2003

Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Orlando Y. Say, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions this

court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision

denying his application for political asylum and his request for

withholding of removal. Say asserts that he has suffered past

persecution and fears future persecution because of a statutorily

protected ground and that a reasonable fact-finder would have been
No. 02-60351 

-2-

compelled to conclude that he has a well-founded fear of

persecution in Guatemala. 

The BIA based its denial of Say’s application for

political asylum and his request for withholding of removal upon

the Immigration Judge’s finding that Say was not a credible witness

and that his claims of persecution were unbelievable. This court

does not review BIA decisions based purely on the Immigration

Judge’s assessment of the alien’s credibility. Chun v. INS, 40

F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Moreover, even taking Say’s testimony as true, this does

not establish a case for asylum. His testimony does not establish

a particularized connection between his political activity and his

current fear of persecution. See Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188

(5th Cir. 1994). Say’s petition for review of the BIA decision is

DENIED.
#### In the Matter of Dillon W., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Madeline W., Appellant.

[745 NYS2d 451]

In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, the mother appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Freundlich, J.), entered June 27, 2000, which, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, terminated her parental rights and transferred guardianship and custody of the subject child to the petitioner Suffolk *417County Department of Social Services for the purpose of adoption.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the mother’s contentions, the petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that she permanently neglected the subject child by failing to plan for his future, despite its diligent efforts to strengthen the relationship between the mother and the subject child and to reunite them (see Social Services Law § 384-b [7]; *Matter of Star Leslie W.,*63 NY2d 136, 140; *Matter of Angel Joseph S.,*282 AD2d 752; *Matter of Jeremiah R.,*266 AD2d 553; *Matter of La’Quan De’Vota H.,*259 AD2d 486). Moreover, the Family Court properly determined that it was in the best interests of the subject child to free him for adoption (see *Matter of Jeremiah R.,*supra; *Matter of Sylvia Esther O.,*253 AD2d 465).

The mother’s remaining contentions are without merit. Florio, J.P., Smith, Friedmann and H. Miller, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 08-cr-155-PB

Van Thi Nguyen

a/k/a/ “Michelle”

O R D E R

The defendant, through counsel, has moved to continue the

trial scheduled for February 3, 2009 citing the need for

additional time to complete discovery and prepare a defense. 

The government does not object to a continuance of the trial

date.

Accordingly, for the above reason and to allow the parties

additional time to properly prepare for trial, the court will

continue the trial from February 3, 2009 to June 2, 2009. In

agreeing to continue the trial, the court finds pursuant to 18

U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8)(A) that for the above-stated reasons, the

ends of justice served in granting a continuance outweigh the

best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 1:08-cr-00155-PB Document 20 Filed 01/08/09 Page 1 of 2
2

The January 27, 2009 final pretrial conference is continued

to May 21, 2009 at 3:45 p.m.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

January 8, 2009

cc: Kevin Sharkey, Esq.

Jennifer Davis, Esq.

United States Probation

United States Marshal

Case 1:08-cr-00155-PB Document 20 Filed 01/08/09 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending May 29, 2004 (the "Report"), I, Robert LaPenta, Vice President - Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section  1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge that:

(1)     The Report  fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/  Robert LaPenta
Robert LaPenta
Vice President - Chief Accounting Officer 
(Principal Financial Officer )
August 11, 2004
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Lonnie Gene Kinnett v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-18-01128-CR

Trial court case number: 17-CR-0916

Trial court: 212th District Court of Galveston County

This Court’s July 23, 2019 Order of Abatement had abated and remanded this case 

to the trial court to conduct a late-brief hearing to determine whether counsel Susan C. 

Norman and Holly Gail Crampton intended to continue to represent appellant or whether 

they have abandoned the appeal. On August 8, 2019, the supplemental clerk’s record was 

filed in this Court. This record attached the trial court’s August 8, 2019 abatement order 

hearing findings and recommendations finding that, among other things, Susan C. Norman 

and Holly Gail Crampton have not abandoned this appeal, have begun work on the brief, 

and intend to file the brief by August 20, 2019, and recommends that this case be reinstated. 

On August 13, 2019, the supplemental reporter’s record was filed of the abatement hearing.

Accordingly, the Court sua sponte directs the Clerk of this Court to REINSTATE

this case on the Court’s active docket. Appellant’s brief is ORDERED to be filed by 

August 20, 2019. See TEX. R. APP. P. 2, 38.6(a)(1). The State’s brief, if any, is 

ORDERED to be filed within 30 days of the date of the filing of appellant’s brief. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(b).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ___/s/ Evelyn V. Keyes____

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __August 20, 2019_
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02213-BNB

JOSEPH LOUIS DURAN, 

Plaintiff,

v.

DIRECTOR COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF PAROLE, Unknown,

TOM CLEMENTS,

DR. ANTHONY P. YOUNG,

JOHN SUTHERS, and

DR. JIM MAUCHAD,

Defendants.

 

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT AMENDED MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915

At the time Plaintiff, Joseph Louis Duran, initiated the instant action, he was

incarcerated at the San Carlos Correctional Facility in Pueblo, Colorado. On September

30, 2011, Plaintiff submitted to the Court a Notice of Change of Address indicating that

he no longer is incarcerated and now is residing in Denver, Colorado.

Plaintiff’s continuing obligation to pay the filing fee is to be determined, like any

nonprisoner, solely on the basis of whether he qualifies for in forma pauperis status. 

See Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1171 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997); see also McGore

v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612-13 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Prison Litigation Reform

Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1138-39 (6th Cir. 1997); McGann v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec.

Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 29-30 (2d

 Cir. 1996). Therefore, Plaintiff will be ordered to submit

an Amended Motion and Affidavit for Leave to Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Case 1:11-cv-02213-LTB Document 20 Filed 11/18/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
§ 1915. Alternatively, Plaintiff may elect to pay the $350.00 filing fee to pursue his

claims in this action. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that within thirty days from the date of this Order Plaintiff submit to

the Court an Amended Motion and Affidavit for Leave to Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. Alternatively, Plaintiff may elect to pay the $350.00 filing fee to pursue his

claims in this action. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall obtain the Court-approved form used by

nonprisoners to request leave to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, along with the

applicable instructions, at www.cod.uscourts.gov. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff fails to comply with the instant Order, within

thirty days of the date of the Order, the Complaint and action will be dismissed without

further notice.

DATED November 18, 2011, at Denver, Colorado.

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Boyd N. Boland 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 1:11-cv-02213-LTB Document 20 Filed 11/18/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
**Exhibit10.3.4**

 

**AMENDMENT NUMBER FOURTO THEFIRSTBANK PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN**

 

WHEREAS, Section13.1[b] of the FIRSTBANK Profit Sharing and Employee Stock Ownership Plan (the“Plan”) provides that the Company may amend the Plan.

 

NOW THEREFORE, theCompany hereby amends the Plan by the adoption of the following amendments:

 

*1.**                                      Thefollowing hereby is added to the end of Section 2.18*:

 

For Plan Years beginning on or after January 1, 2001,for purposes of the definition of Compensation in Section 2.18 of thePlan, compensation paid or made available during such limitation years shallinclude elective amounts that are not includible in the gross income of theemployee by reason of Code Section 132(f)(4) (qualified transportation benefits).

 

IN WITNESSWHEREOF, the undersigned officers being duly authorized by the Board ofDirectors of FIRSTBANK and Access Anytime BanCorp, Inc., hereby approve andadopt this Amendment as of the date set forth below.

 
|   | FIRSTBANK |                                  |
|--------|-----------|---------------------------------------|
|   |      |                                  |
|   | By:       |   /s/   Don K. Padgett |   |
|   | Title:    | President                             |   |
|   | Date:     | June 26, 2003                         |   |
|        |           |                                       |  |  |  |

 
| Attest:             |
|---------------------|
|                |
| /s/Kathy  Allenberg |   |
| Corporate Secretary |

 
|   | Access Anytime BanCorp, Inc. |
|--------|------------------------------|
|   |                         |   |
|   | By:                          |   /s/ Norm Corzine |   |
|   | Title:                       | Chairman of the  Board |   |
|   | Date:                        | June 26, 2003 |   |
|        |                              |  |  |  |  |

 
| Attest:             |   |   |
|---------------------|--------|--------|
|                |   |   |
| /s/Kathy  Allenberg |   |   |   |
| Corporate Secretary |   |   |
|                     |        |        |  |

 

----