### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: FR E DR IK A BU LY A N (Dec eased) and K A R I N E GHA DY A N ,

Deb to rs. C O LBYIR ISH,

A ppellant, v. K A R I N E GHA DY A N , Appellee. BA P N o . N V-18-1219-KuLB Bk. N o . 2:15-b k-15667-GS A dv. N o . 2:15-ap-01197-GS

M E M O RA ND U M *

Sub m itted W itho ut A rgum ent * * o n Septemb er 26, 2019

at Pasadena, C alifo rnia Filed – Septemb er 27, 2019 A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt 

# FIL ED
SEP 27 2019
SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. P ANEL O F T H E NI NT H CI RCUI T

* Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue, see 9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.

* * By or d er enter ed on July 8, 2019, a moti ons panel deter mined thi s appeal sui table for submi ssi on on the br i efs and r ecor d wi thout or al ar gument.fo r the Distric t o f N evada

Ho no rab le Gary A . Spraker, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding A ppearanc es: A p pellant C o lb y Irish pro se o n b rief; David O lshan o f

N evada Legal Servic es o n b rief fo r appellee K arine Ghadyan.

Befo r e: KU RT Z , LA FFER TY, and BRA N D, Bankruptcy Judges. INT ROD U CT I ON A ppellant-c r edito r, C o lb y Irish, filed a no ndischargeab ility c o m plaint against chapter 7 1 deb t o rs, K arine Ghadyan and her husb and, Mr. Ab uylan, 2 alleging c laim s fo r fraud and em b ezzlem ent, am o ng o thers. The c laim s were b ased o n ac ts c o m m itted while Ms. Ghadyan was
o perating a wedding c lo thing rental b usiness o wned b y Mr. Irish. The parties settled their disputes fo r $48,000. Ho wever, Ms. Ghadyan had the o ptio n to pay a disc o unted am o unt o f $30,000 b y m aking m o nthly paym ents o ver a three-year perio d. If she defaulted o n a m o nthly paym ent and failed to c ure within a 15-day grac e perio d, Mr. Irish c o uld seek entry
o f judgm ent fo r the full am o unt o f the settlem ent ($48,000 less any am o unts paid), which wo uld b e no ndischargeab le. Ms. Ghadyan was one day late

1 Unless speci fi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532.

2 Mr
. Abulyan passed away in Mar ch 2017. 2with her A pril 2018 paym ent. A ltho ugh she tim ely c ured the paym ent, she

did no t pay the $25 late fee until after the grac e perio d expired. Mr. Irish
so ught entry o f judgm ent b ased o n Ms. Ghadyan’s b reach. The b ankruptc y
c o u rt denied his request, finding that paym ent o f the $25 late fee o utside the grac e perio d was no t a m aterial b reach o f the settlem ent. This appeal fo llo wed. Fo r the reaso ns set fo rth b elo w, we A FFIRM. FA CT S A ltho ugh there is an extensive fac tual and pro c edural b ac kgro und to this appeal, the issue o n appeal is narro w: whether the $25 late fee paym ent
o utside the grac e perio d c o nstitutes a m aterial b reach whic h entitles Mr. Irish to entry o f judgm ent. The few salient fac t s relevant to this issue are b riefly sum m arized b elo w. A . T he Settlem ent A g reem ent In Dec emb er 2017, Mr. Irish, his m o ther, Lo ri Irish, Bridal Eleganc e and Tuxedo s, Inc
. , and the Lo rtex Trust3 entered into a settlem ent and
m utual release with Ms. Ghadyan and Bridal Elegance, LLC, Ms. Ghadyan’s c o m pany. The parties settled the rem aining c laim s 4 alleged

3 Lor iIr i sh was the tr ustee of the Lor tex Tr ust whi ch was pr esumably establi shed for the benefi t of her son Colby. At the ti me of the acts complained of inthe nondi schar geabi li ty complai nt, Mr . Ir i sh was a minor and the owner of Br i dal Elegance and Tuxedos, Inc. The busi ness was ev entually sold to Ms. Ghadyan. It was after the sale that the alleged fr a ud was di scov er ed.

4 Ms. Ghadyan fi led a moti on for summary j udgment whi ch the bankr u ptcy (continued...) 3in Mr. Irish's no ndischargeab ility c o m p laint.

The settlem ent am o unt was $48,000, payab le, witho ut interest, at the rate o f $500 per m o nth o ver 96 m o nths. Ms. Ghadyan had the o ptio n to pay the disc o unted am o unt o f $30,000 (in m o nthly o r lum p sumpaym ents) within three years after the b ankruptc y c o urt appro ved the agreem ent. The agreem ent also pro vided: "Paym ents sho uld b e m a d e b y elec tro nic transm issio n to the ac c o unt o f C o lb y Irish at: TOBE SU PPLEMEN TED." In additio n, a fee o f $25 was due with any paym ent m ade after the paym ent due date, which was the 25th o f each m o nth. The agreem ent further pro vided: "In the event Ghadyan fails to m ake a paym ent when due, Irish m aym ail and transm it b y em ail a N o tic e o f Default to Ghadyan . . . . If Ghadyan fails toc ure a default (inc luding paym ent o f any applic ab le late fee) within the 15 days after Irish m a ils and
em ails the N o tic e o f Default, C o lb y Irish m ayfile with the C o u rt" a no tic e o f default and request fo r entry o f judgm ent. (Em phasis added.) Finally, the agreem ent c o ntained a c o nfidentiality/no ndisparagem ent pro visio n and a b ro ad release. The b ankruptc y c o urt appro ved the settlem ent in January 2018 and the adversary pro c eeding was c lo sed.

4 (...continued) cour t gr anted i n par t, eli minati ng many of the clai ms. 4B. Notic e of Failure to Cure D efault

In May 2018, Mr. Irish filed a no tic e o f failure to c ure default and request fo r entry o f judgm ent in the b ankruptc y c o urt. Mr. Irish
c o m p lained that the Feb ruary and March paym ents vio lated the settlem ent agreem ent b ec ause Ms. Ghadyan m ade themb y c hec k instead o f elec tro nic ally. He also argued that Ms. Ghadyan's c hec k dated A p ril 24, 2018, was returned b ec ause o f insuffic ient funds and he was charged $12 b y his b ank. A ltho ugh Ms. Ghadyan had depo sited ano ther c hec k into his
ac c o u nt b y A p r il 26, 2018, Mr. Irish c o ntended that this paym ent was late as paym ents were due o n the 24th o r 25th o f each m o nth. A c c o r dingly, Ms. Ghadyan o wed a $25 late fee which she did no t pay within the grac e perio d. Mr. Irish attached pro o f that he em ailed and m ailed a no t ic e o f default to Ms. Ghadyan, no tifying her o f the default and giving her 15 days to c ure it. Ms. Ghadyan o ppo sed the request, arguing that she did no t b reach the settlem ent agreem ent with regard to any paym ent. She c o ntended that elec tro nicpaym ents were no t required under the plain language o f the settlem ent agreem ent, b ut were perm issive. She also em phasized that Mr. Irish did no t pro vide b ank ac c o unt info rm atio n until after the signing
o f the agreem ent. Therefo re, the elec tro nicpaym ents were perm issive b ased o n the im p o ssib ility o rim prac tic ality o f m aking the elec tro nic paym ents witho ut the required b ank ac c o u nt info r m atio n.
5Ms. Ghadyan c o nc eded that paym ents were due o n the 25th o f each

m o nth, b ut no ted that her A pril paym ent was m a de o n the 26th and paym ent o f the $12 fee was m ade o n May 7, 2018. Therefo re, she c o ntended that b o th paym ents were m a de within the grac e perio d. Ho wever, she adm itted that the $25 late fee was paid o n May 25, 2019, which was after the grac e perio d ended. N o netheless, she argued that this vio latio n was no t
a m a terial b reach and, therefo re, Mr. Irish was no tentitled to entry o f judgm ent. C. T he Bankruptcy Court' s Finding s O n July 20, 2018, the b ankruptc y c o urt held a hearing o n Mr. Irish's request fo r entry o f judgm ent and entered its findings o f fac tand
c o nc lusio ns o f law o n the rec o rd. First, the c o urt c o nfirm ed that paym ents were due o n the 25th o f each m o nth. Ms. Ghadyan did no t dispute that this was the due date. N ext, in c o nstruing the settlem ent agreem ent, the c o urt agreed with Ms. Ghadyan that elec tro nicpaym ents were no ta requirem ent and ob ligato ry as sho wn b y the use o f the wo r d "sho uld" in the agreem ent, whic h was perm issive. The c o urt thus c o nc luded that paym ent b y c hec k
was no t a per se b reach. Third, the c o urt fo und that the A pril paym ent and paym ent fo r the $12 insuffic ient funds fee were m ade within the grac e perio d and therefo re c o uld no t c o nstitute a default under the term s o f the agreem ent. Last, the b ankruptc y c o u rt addressed the paym ent o f the $25 late fee o utside the grac e perio d. The c o urt fo und that this b reach was no t

6m aterial as it was de minim u s in the grand schem e o f things and cured.

The b ankruptc y c o urt entered an o rder denying Mr. Irish’s request fo r entry o f judgm ent and Mr. Irish tim ely appealed. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptc y c o urt had jurisdic tio n pursuant to 28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2) (A ) and (I). W e have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158. ISSU E Whether the b a nkruptcy c o urt erred in determ ining that Ms. Ghadyan's failure toc ure the $25 late fee paym ent within the 15-day grac e perio d was no t a m aterial b reach o f the settlem ent agreem ent. ST A ND A RD S OF RE V IE W Under N evada law, a settlem ent agreem ent is a c o ntrac t go verned b y general princ iples o f c o ntrac t law. The Po wer Co . v. H enry, 321 P.3d 858, 863 (N ev. 2014) (c iting M ayv. Anderso n , 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Nev. 2005)). Like a
c o ntrac t, the interpretatio n o f a settlem ent agreem ent is reviewed de no vo . Id. To suc c eed o n a b reach o f c o ntrac t c laimin N evada, a plaintiff m ust pro ve, am o ng o ther elem ents, that there was a m aterial b reach b y the defendant. Laguerre v. N ev. S ys. o f Higher Educ. , 837 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (D. N ev. 2011). Generally, whether a b reach is m aterial is a questio n o f fac t. F D IC
. v. Air F la . S ys., Inc. , 822 F.2d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that
o rdinarily whether a party has b r eached a c o ntrac t and whether that b reach

7is m aterial are triab le questio ns o f fac t); see a lso N ev. F irst Ba nco rp v. Highla nd A.V

.A., LLC , 367 P.3d 803 (Tab le), 2010 W L 3291754 at *1 (N ev. 2010) ("[W ]hether the ac tio ns o f a party c o nstitute a m aterial b reach is a questio n o f fac t

, no ta questio n o f law); Tho rnto n v. Aga s sizCo nstr., Inc. , 799 P.2d 1106, 1108 (N ev. 1990) (sam e). Ho wever, "where there is no dispute ab o ut the fac ts and the parties
o nly dispute 'the m eaning and effec t o f the [pro visio ns in a settlem ent agreem ent] [,the questio n] is a m atter o f law fo r the c o u rt to dec ide.'" N ev. F irst Ba nco rp , 2010 WL 3291754 at *1; Gilbert v. D ep’t o f Justice, 334 F.3d 1065, 1072 (Fed. C ir. 2003) ("[W ]here . . . fac ts are undisputed, the determ inatio n
o f whether there has b een a m aterial no n-c o m p lianc e with the term s o f a
c o ntrac t, and henc e b reach, nec essarily reduc es to a questio n o f law.") (c itatio n o m itted). Afac tual finding is c learly erro neo us if illo gic al, im plausib le, o r witho ut suppo rt in the rec o rd. Tra fficS cho o l.co m, Inc. v. Edriver Inc. , 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th C ir. 2011). "If twoviews o f the evidenc e are po ssib le, the trial judge's cho ic e b etween them c anno t b e c learly erro neo us." Anderso n v. Bessem er C ity, 470 U .S. 564, 573–575(1985); H a nsen v. Mo o re (In re H

a nsen) , 368 B.R . 868, 874–875 (9th Cir. BA P2007). W e m ay affirm "o n any gro und suppo rted b y the rec o rd.” AS AR C O, LLCv. Unio n Pa c. R . R . Co . , 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014).

8D ISCU SSION

A . L eg al Standards : M a teriality This is a b r each o f c o ntrac t m atter and N evada law c o ntro ls. Co m m ercia l Paper H

o lders v. H

ine (In re Beverly H

ills Ba nco r

p) , 649 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th C ir. 1981) (instruc ting that b ankruptc y settlem ent agreem ents are
c o ntrac ts to b e c o nstrued under state law); In re W o r ldco m, Inc. , 343 B.R . 486, 495 (S.D.N .Y . 2006) (c itatio ns o m itted) (Materiality is a questio n reso lved thro ugh applic atio n o f state law.). The elem ents o f a c ause o f ac tio n fo r b r each o f c o ntrac t under N evada law are: "(1) fo r m a t io n o f a valid c o ntrac t; (2) perfo rm anc e o rexc use o f perfo rm anc e b y plaintiff; (3) m aterial b reach b y the defendant; and (4) dam ages." Lag uerre

, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. A b reach o f c o ntrac t is the
m a teria l failure to perfo r m "a duty arising under o r im po sed b y agreem ent." S ta te D ep’t o

f Tra nsp. v. Eighth Jud. D ist. Co urt in a nd fo r C ty. o f C la rk , 402 P.3d 677, 682 (N ev. 2017) (c itatio n o m itted). N evada rec o gnizes that a m aterial b reach b y o ne party to a c o ntrac t discharges the no n-b reaching party’s duty to perfo rm . Ca in v. Price , 415 P.3d 25, 29 (N ev. 2018); Y o ung Elec. S ign Co . v. Fo hrm a n , 466 P.2d 846, 847 (N ev. 1970). C o nversely, a no n-m aterial b reach m ay give rise to a c laimfo r dam ages, b ut will no t relieve the no n-b reaching party fro mperfo rm ing its
ob ligatio ns under the c o ntrac t. S ee, e.g., S heeha n &S h e eha n v. N elso n M a lley
a nd Co . , 117 P.3d 219, 224 (Nev. 2005) (even if a party's failure to pro vide

9m o nthly repo rts was a b reach o f the agreem ent, the b reach was no t

m aterial); Gibby's Inc. v. Aylett , 615 P.2d 949, 950-51 (Nev. 1980) (no
m aterial b reach o f the c o venants and c o nditio ns in a lease such as to wo rk a fo rfeiture o f the lease); R o bert J. Go rdo n Co nstr. Co ., Inc., v. Meredith S teel Co nstr., Inc. , 537 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Nev. 1975) (finding that while a
c o nstruc tio n c o m p any m a y have b reached an agreem ent b y supplying
so m e girders m ade o f c o m p o site steel rather than o ne-piec e steel b eam s, the trial judge did no t err in finding suc h b reach no n-m aterial). These autho r ities dem o nstrate that in a variety o f c o ntexts a m aterial default o r b reach do es no t result sim ply b ec ause a party toa c o ntrac t vio lates o ne o f the agreem ent’s pro visio ns. N evada also rec o gnizes that equity requires so m ething m o re than a trivial b reach to justify fo rfeiture. 5 S ee Mo sso v. Lee, 295 P. 776 (N ev. 1931) (disc ussing the m a x imthat "Equity ab ho rs a fo rfeiture," inc luding equity’s preferenc e fo r c o m pensatio n, rather than fo rfeiture); D a v e npo rt v. R epublic Ins. Co . , 625 P.2d 574, 575 (Nev. 1981) (delay b y insured did no t prec lude
rec o very under the c o ntrac t). "Even where tim e is m ade m aterial, b y express stipulatio n, the failure o f o ne o f the parties to perfo r ma c o nditio n

5 For fei tur e i s defined as "The loss of a r i ght . . . because of a . . . br each of obli gati on. . . . A destr ucti on or depr i v ati on of some . . . r i ght because of the fai lur e to per f or m some contr a ctual obli gati on or condi ti on." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Her e, i f

Ms. Ghadyan’s payment of the late fee outsi de the gr ace per i od i s deemed a mater i al br each, she would lose not only the r i ght to pay the di s counted settlement amount but also her di schar ge. 10within the partic ular tim e lim it will no t in every c ase defeat his right to

spec ificperfo rm anc e, if the c o nditio n b e sub sequently perfo rm ed, witho ut
unreaso nab le delay, and no c irc um stanc es have intervened that wo u ld render it unjust o r inequitab le to give such relief." M o sso, 295 P. at 777. The M o sso c o urt went o n to say, "[t]he granting o f relief against fo rfeitures is
o ne o f legal disc r etio n." Id. at 780. N evada c o urts o ften apply the equitab le princ ipal against fo rfeiture in c ases invo lving sales o r leases o f real pro perty. A gainst this b ac kgro und, there is no prec ise definitio n o f what
c o nstitutes a m aterial b r each under N evada law, no r is there a c atego ric al rule stating when and to what extent a c o urt m ay refuse to enfo rc e a fo rfeiture o n equitab le gro unds sinc e the dec isio n is a disc r etio nary o ne. While we lo o k at the language o f the c o ntrac t in the first instanc e, the pro per analysis o f m ateriality m ay also b e info rm ed b y c o m m entaries and dec isio ns o utside N evada state law. S ee S tro ther v. S
. Ca l. Perm a nente Med. Gro up, 79 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 1996) ("If the state has no t addressed the partic u lar issue, a federal c o u rt m ust use its b est judgm ent to predic t ho w the highest state c o urt wo uld reso lve it using interm ediate appellate c o urt dec isio ns, dec isio ns fro mo ther jurisdic tio ns, statutes, treatises, and restatem ents as guidanc e."). A c c o rdingly, the b ankruptc y c o urt pro perly
c o nsidered c ase law o utside o f N evada state law when determ ining whether Ms. Ghadyan had m aterially b reached the settlem ent agreem ent.

11This c ase law is info rm ative, setting fo rth vario us usab le definitio ns

o f what c o nstitutes a m aterial b reach under a variety o f c irc um stanc es. The N inth C irc uit has stated: "Am aterial b reach is a b reach whic h is so sub stantial as to defeat the purpo se o f the entire transac tio n relieving the
no n-b reaching party o f its duty to perfo r munder the c o ntrac t." W a term ill V entures, Ltd. v. CappelloCa pita l Co rp. , 671 F.A pp'x 492, 493 (9th C ir. 2016) (quo ting Lipsk

y v. Co m m o nwea lth United Co rp. , 551 F.2d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 1976)); see a lso F D IC

, 822 F.2d at 840 (b reach is m aterial if it go es to the
essenc e o f the agreem ent). Two unpub lished N evada distric t c o u rt dec isio ns o ffer further guidanc e. "A m aterial b reach o f a c o ntrac t o c c urs when there is a b reach o f an essential and induc ing feature o f the c o ntrac t." 6 Ga m age v. N ev. Bo a rd o

f R egents o f N ev. S ystem o

f Higher Educ. , C ase N o . 2:12-c v-00290-GMN -VC F, 2014 W L 250245 at *12 (D. N ev. Jan. 21, 2014) (c iting R estatem ent (Sec o nd)
o f C o ntrac ts sec t io n 237). Whether a party has c o m m itted a m aterial b reach o f c o ntrac t turns upo n the serio u s ness o f the b reach and the likeliho o d that the injured party rec eived sub stantial perfo rm anc e o f the c o ntrac t pro m ise. Generally, a m aterial b reach o c c urs when there is a b reach o f an essential elem ent o f the c o ntrac t whic h induc ed the party to enter into it. Further, the b reach m ust go to

6 Although not bi ndin g pr ecedent, unpubli shed deci si ons hav e per suasiv e v alue and may be r eli ed upon. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Granite State Ins. Co. , 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 n.8 (9th Ci r . 2003) ("[W]e may consi der unpubli shed . . . deci si ons, ev en though such opini ons hav e no pr ecedenti al v alue"). 12the sub stanc e o f the c o ntrac t, o r defeat an essential purpo se o f

the c o ntrac t. BZ C la rity Tent S ub LLC v. R o ss Mo lliso n Int'l Pty, Ltd. , N o . 2:15-C V -1065 JC M, 2015 WL 3657249, at *4 (D. N ev. June 12, 2015) (c iting A MJU R C o ntrac ts sec t io n 706). O ther c o urts apply variatio ns o f these tests. S ee e.g., M itchell v. S tra ith , 698 P.2d 609, 612 (W ash. C t. A pp. 1985) (stating that a
m aterial b reach o f c o ntrac t is o ften defined "as o ne that sub stantially defeats the purpo se o f the c o ntrac t"); S p ecia liz e d Co m m e rcia l S ervs., Inc. v. W elsh, C ase N o . 1 C A -C V 08-0181, 2009 WL 532603 at *3 (A r iz. C t. A p p. Mar. 3, 2009) ("A

generally ac c epted definitio n o f m aterial b reach is a b reach that go es to the essenc e o f the c o ntrac t, defeating the parties' purpo se in entering the c o ntrac t.") (em phasis o m itted); M a rio n Fa m i ly Y M C A v. H ensel, 897 N .E.2d 181, 186 (Ohio C t. A pp. 2008) (defining a
m aterial b reach as "a failure todo so m ething that is so fundam ental to a
c o ntrac t that the failure to perfo rmdefeats the essential purpo se o f the
c o ntrac t”); S ta nsbury v. Fed. H o m eLo a n M o rtg. Co rp. , N o . 7:16-c v-00516, 2017 W L 3821669 at *3 (W .D. Va. Aug. 31, 2017) ("The Suprem e C o u rt o f Virginia has defined a 'm aterial b reach o f c o ntrac t' as 'a failure todo so m ething that is so fundam ental to the c o ntrac t that the failure to perfo rmthe o b ligatio n defeats an essential purpo se o f the c o ntrac t.'") (c itatio n o m itted). The R estatem ent (Sec o nd) o f C o ntrac ts is alsoa helpful reso urc e b ec ause N evada c o urts have frequently turned to the R estatem ent fo r
13guidanc e. Ca i n , 415 P.3d at 29 (m aterial b r each o f pro m ise discharges the

no n-b reaching party’s duty to perfo rm ) ( citing R estatem ent (Sec o nd) o f C o ntrac ts sec t io n 237 (A m . Law Inst. 1981)); D yna lectric C o . o f N ev., Inc. v. C la rk &S ulliva n Co nstructo rs, Inc. , 255 P.3d 286, 288 (Nev. 2011) (fo llo wing the R estatem ent (Sec o nd) o f C o ntrac ts in ho lding that a c o urt m ay award expec tatio n, relianc e, o r restitutio nary dam ages fo r pro m isso ry esto ppel
c laim s). The Restatem ent (Sec o nd) o f C o ntrac ts sec tio n 241 sets fo rth several c irc um stanc es fo r c o urts to c o nsider when determ ining whether a b reach is m aterial. In the end, the standard fo r dec iding m a teriality always starts with the language o f the c o ntrac t under a de no vo standard o f review. If there is
no definite language, the c o urt then determ ines as a fac tual m atter whether the b reach is m aterial b y applying the c irc um stanc es set fo rth in the R estatem ent and applic ab le c ase law. In any event, the duty mu st b e an essential and induc ing feature o f the c o ntrac t and its b reach m u st b e so sub stantial as to defeat the entire transac t io n. B. A nalys is 1. T he plain languag e of the s e ttlem ent ag reem ent It is undisputed that Ms. Ghadyan b reached the settlem ent agreem ent b y paying the late fee o utside the grac e perio d. To determ ine whether this b reach was m aterial, we lo o k to the express term s o f the agreem ent to determ ine the intent o f the parties.

14N evada c o u rts c o nstrue c o ntrac ts fro mthe written language and

enfo rc e them as written. The Po wer Co . , 321 P.3d at 863; K a ldi v. Fa rm ers Ins. Exch. , 21 P.3d 16, 20 (N ev. 2001). "[N ]either a c o urt o f law no r a c o urt o f equity c an interpo late in a c o ntrac t what the c o ntrac t do es no t c o ntain." Tra ffic Co ntro l S ervs., Inc. v. U nited R enta ls N

w ., Inc. , 87 P.3d 1054, 1059 (Nev. 2004); see a lso 23 Ric hard A . Lo rd, W illisto n o n C o ntrac ts sec tio n 63:3 (4th ed. July 2019) ("Where the c o ntrac t itself is c lear in m a king a c ertain event a
m aterial b reach o f that c o ntrac t, a c o urt m ust o rdinarily respec t that
c o ntrac tual pro visio n.") (c itatio ns o m itted). O n appeal, Mr. Irish argues that the c lear language o f the settlem ent agreem ent states when paym ents were to b e m ade, the pro c edure to fo llo w, and the c o nsequenc e o f late paym ents. A c c o rding to Mr. Irish, these pro visio ns went to the essenc e o f the c o ntrac t and, witho u t them, neither he
no r his m o ther wo uld have signed the agreem ent. In c o ntrast, Ms. Ghadyan c o ntends that the settlem ent do es no t reflec t the tim ing o f paym ent as a "c entral aspec t" b ec ause there was no"tim e is o f the essenc e" language. She m aintains that the tim ely paym ents were "ac c esso ry and no t
m aterial." W e start fro mthe prem ise that, under N evada law, "a fundam ental princ iple o f c o ntrac t law is that the tim e fo r perfo rm anc e under a c o ntrac t is no t c o nsidered o f the essenc e unless the co ntra ct expressly so pro vides o r the circum s ta nces o

f the co ntra ct so im ply. " M ayfield v. K o roghli , 184 P.3d 362, 366

15(N ev. 2008) (em phasis added). The N evada Suprem e C o urt explained: "[I]n

the ab senc e o f a c lause m aking tim e o f the essenc e, a party's failure to perfo rmwithin a reaso nab le tim e generally do es no t c o nstitute a m aterial b reach o f the agreem ent." Id. A ltho ugh M ay f ieldis fac tually distinguishab le fro mthis c ase, there is no indic a tio n that this "fundam ental princ iple o f
c o ntrac t law" has lim ited applic ab ility in N evada. C o ntrary to Mr. Irish’s b elief, the plain language o f the agreem ent do es no t m ake Ms. Ghadyan’s paym ent o f the late fee within the grac e perio d an essential elem ent o f the parties’ agreem ent. W e reach this
c o nc lusio n fo r several reaso ns. First, the settlem ent agreem ent do es no t
c o ntain an explic it "tim e is o f the essenc e" c lause no rdo es it plainly say that Ms. Ghadyan’s failure to pay am o unts past due, inc luding the late fee, within the grac e perio d will be co nsidered am a teria l defa ult . If the tim e o f paym ent is essential, the agreem ent sho uld c learly and expressly say so

. M ayfield , 184 P.3d at 366. N ext, the agreem ent do es no t m ake tim ely paym ents so essential that any delay gives Mr. Irish the im m ediate right to entry o f judgm ent. There are further ac t s required. Under the plain term s o f the agreem ent, if Ms. Ghadyan was late with her m o nthly paym ent, Mr. Irish had the unilateral disc retio n to p r o vide no tic e o f the default thereb y triggering the 15-day grac e perio d ("Irish m aym ail and transm it b y em ail a N o tic e o f Default . . . ."). He alsohad the unilateral disc retio n to file the no tic e o f

16default and request fo r entry o f judgm ent after the 15-day perio d expired

witho ut a cure ("Irish m ayfile with the C o urt . . . ."). In o ther wo r ds, explic it in the agreem ent is that Mr. Irish had the disc retio n to extend the 15-day grac e perio d if he wished. S ee Ja m a v. Im m igra tio n &C usto m s Enf’t, 543 U .S. 335, 346 (2005) ("The wo rd 'm ay'
c usto m a rily c o nno t es disc retio n.” (c itatio n o m itted)); Co na nt v. W ells Fa rgo Ba nk , N .A. , 60 F. Supp. 3d 99, 117-18 (D.D.C . 2014) (c o nc luding that c o ntrac t stating that "Lender m ay send [Plaintiff] a written no tic e" do es no t im po se
m andato ry ob ligatio n); S ta te v. Am . Ba nkers Ins. Co . , 802 P.2d 1276, 1278 (N ev. 1990) (in statuto ry c o nstruc tio n endeavo r, c o nstruing "m ay" as perm issive and "shall" as m andato ry, ab sent c o ntrary legislative intent). The po ssib ility o f Mr. Irish exerc ising his disc r etio n is c o ntrary to a "tim e is
o f the essenc e" intent. S e e K a tem is v. W

e sterline , 120 C al. A p p. 2d 537, 544 (C al. C t. A pp. 1953) (b u yer's agent's po wer to extend the perfo rm anc e o f any ac t to a tim e b eyo nd the date invo lved was "inc o nsistent" with the suppo sitio n that the prec ise tim e spec ified fo r b u yers’ perfo rm anc e was "o f the essenc e o f the c o ntrac t."). In sum, altho u gh Mr. Irish argues o therwise, the plain language o f the settlem ent agreem ent did no t m ake the tim eliness o f Ms. Ghadyan’s paym ents an essential part o f the b argain. N o r do the c ircum stanc es o f the agreem ent require us to so im ply. The parties were in litigatio n. Mr. Irish agreed to the settlem ent o f the adversary pro c eeding in exc hange fo r the

17paym ent o f m o ney. The essential purpo se o f the settlem ent agreem ent was

fo r Mr. Irish toavo id the risks and c o sts o f litigatio n and get paid either the disc o unted am o unt o f the settlem ent o r the full am o unt. Here, Ms. Ghadyan’s b reach was no t so fundam ental o r sub stantial as todefeat the essential purpo se o f the agreem ent. She paid the $25 within a
reaso nab le tim e after expiratio n o f the grac e perio d. In sum , we c anno t find that the agreem ent itself m ade Ms. Ghadyan’s b reach a m aterial o ne under these c irc um stanc es. 2. T he Res tatem ent Fac tors The b ankruptc y c o urt’s applic a tio n o f the fac t o rs in the R estatem ent (Sec o nd) o f C o ntrac ts sec tio n 241 gives us a b etter understanding as to why this was no t a m aterial b reach. The R estatem ent lists five fac to rs that m ay b e c o nsidered in determ ining whether a b reach is m aterial: (a) the extent to whic h the injured party will b e deprived o f the b enefit whic h he reaso nab ly expec ted; (b ) the extent to which the injured party c an b e adequately
c o m p ensated fo r the part o f that b enefit o f which he will b e deprived; (c ) the extent to which the party failing to perfo rmo r to o ffer to perfo rmwill suffer fo rfeiture; (d) the likeliho o d that the party failing to perfo rmo r to
o ffer to perfo r mwill c ure his failure, taking ac c o unt o f all the
c irc u m stanc es inc luding any reaso nab le assuranc es; and (e) the extent to whic h the b ehavio r o f the party failing to perfo rmo rto o ffer to perfo rm
c o m p o rts with standards o f go o d faith and fair dealing. The c o m m ents to

18the R estatem ent undersc o re that these "c irc um stanc es" are no t rules and are

to b e applied "in such a way as tofurther the purpo se o f sec u ring fo r each party [its] expec tatio n o f an exchange o f perfo rm a nc es." Here, the b ankruptc y c o urt pro p erly applied these fac to rs when dec iding, as a m a tter o f fac t, whether Ms. Ghadyan’s b reach was m a terial. W ith regards to fac t o rs (a) and (b ), the c o urt c o nsidered the degree o f harm
c aused b y Ms. Ghadyan’s b reach as c o m pared to the reaso nab le expec tatio ns o f Mr. Irish. The c o urt fo und that the $25 in the grand schem e
o f things was a de m inim us am o unt and was paid. Therefo re, the harmto Mr. Irish was slight and he rec eived all the perfo rm a nc e that was due. In applying fac to r (c ), the b a nkruptc y c o urt im p lic itly c o nsidered the harmto Ms. Ghadyan if it granted Mr. Irish’s request fo r entry o f judgm ent. Ms. Ghadyan wo uld b e required to pay a sub s tantial am o unt o ver and ab o ve the disc o unted am o unt o f the settlem ent and that am o unt wo uld b e
no ndischargeab le. A s to fac to r (d), Ms. Ghadyan had cured. A ll these findings are plausib le, lo gic al, and suppo rted b y inferenc es drawn fro mthe
rec o r d. R egarding fac to r (e), Mr. Irish c o ntends that Ms. Ghadyan vio lated the standards o f go o d faith and fair dealing. He raises this issue fo r the first tim e o n appeal. Generally, we do no tc o nsider issues raised fo r the first tim e o n appeal. S ee Kieslich v. U nited S ta tes (In re Kieslich) , 258 F.3d 968, 971 (9th C ir. 2001); Price v. Lehtinen (In re Lehtinen), 332 B.R
. 404, 411 (9th C ir.

19BA P 2005). W e have disc retio n to c o nsider argum ents raised fo r the first

tim e o n appeal, b ut do so o nly if there are "exc eptio nal c irc um stanc es.” El Pa so C ity o

f Tex. v. Am . W

. Airlines, Inc. (In re Am

. W . Airlines) , 217 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th C ir. 2000). There are noexc eptio nal c irc um s tanc es here, espec ially when Ms. Ghadyan’s go o d faith is a fac tual questio n. 3. Slig ht delay of paym ent is not always a m aterial breac h. Finally, we o b serve that num ero us c o urts o utside N evada have fo und in different c o ntexts that a slight delay o f paym ent is no t a m aterial b reach. A ltho ugh no t b inding and fac tually distinguishab le, these c a ses suppo rt the o utc o m e here. S ee, e.g., K o rb v. C utler Trucking, Inc. , C a se N o . A 099775, 2003 WL 21766238, at *1 (C al. A pp. July 30, 2003) (affirm ing the trial c o urt's c o nc lusio n that "neither C utler's delay in paying the relatively
sm all sumo verdue fo r June 1998 no r its relatively sho rt delay in paying K o rb ' s earnings fo r July 1998 c o nstituted a m aterial b reach o f the o ral agreem ent"); Asso cia ted Builders, Inc. v. C oggins , 722 A .2d 1278, 1280–81 (Me. 1999) (finding that a sho rt delay in paym ent, ab s ent any aggravating
c irc u m stanc es, was no t a m aterial b reach); Jenk ins v. U.S .A. Fo o ds , Inc ., 912 F. Supp. 969, 974 (E.D. Mic h. 1996) (c o ntrac t paym ent m ade two days after expiratio n o f grac e perio d no t a m aterial b reach where payee suffers little
o r no prejudic e); Edwa r d W a ters Co llege, Inc. v. Jo hnso n , 707 So . 2d 801, 802 (Fla. Dist. C t. A pp. 1998) (o ne day delay in paying settlem ent agreem ent
no t a m aterial b reach where agreem ent did no t state that tim e is o f the

20essenc e and payee inc urred no hardship b ec ause o f delay); A .E. Giro ux, Inc.

v. Co ntra ct S ervs. Asso cs. , 299 N .W .2d 20, 21 (Mich. C t. A p p. 1980) (ac c o rd satisfied b y o ne-day delay o f paym ent where no m aterial dam age to
ob ligee and paym ent am o unted to sub stantial perfo rm anc e); co m pa re S ervicio s Aereo s del Centro S .A. de C .V . v. H o neywell Intern., Inc. , 252 Fed. A ppx. 849 (9th C ir. O c t. 31, 2007) (late paym ents c o nstituted a m aterial b reach); Pla co Inv., LLC v. Iba rra, C ase N o . B196846, 2008 WL 2347730 at *5 (C al. A pp. June 10, 2008) (no ting that "it is reaso nab le to infer any delay in the paym ent o f m o ney am o u nts to a sub s tantial b r each when the party
no w denying b reach earlier ac kno wledged (in writing) that the delay
wo uld c o nstitute an 'incurab le' and 'm aterial' b reach as the appellants so
rec o gnized in the nego tiated settlem ent agreem ent"). In sum, as a m atter o f law we find the c o m plained o f b reach to b e
no n-m aterial under the plain language o f the settlem ent agreem ent. W e further c o nc lude that the b ankruptc y c o urt applied the pro per standards fo r determ ining whether Ms. Ghadyan’s b reach was m aterial and its findings o f fac t were no t c learly erro neo us. A c c o rdingly, the b ankruptc y
c o u rt did no t err b y denying Mr. Irish’s request fo r entry o f judgm ent under these c irc um s t anc es. 7

7We emphasi ze that our deci si on i s li mi ted to the facts befor e us. Conti nual payments outsi d e the gr ace per i od may di ctate a di ffer ent r esult. The bankr uptcy cour t wi sely ur ged Ms. Ghadyan to make electr oni c and ti mely payments for the dur a ti on. 21CONCL U SION

Fo r the reaso ns explained ab o ve, we A FFIRM.

22