Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A05-1411-PC-524 | June 24, 2015 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Joshua Brazzel

Carlisle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Karl M. Scharnberg

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joshua Brazzel,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent

June 24, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

47A05-1411-PC-524

Appeal from the Lawrence Superior 

Court.

The Honorable William G. Sleva, 

Judge.

Cause No. 47D02-1109-PC-1117

Baker, Judge.
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[1] Joshua Brazzel appeals the post-conviction relief court’s denial of his petition 

for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in 

finding that one of his claims was barred by res judicata and quashing 

subpoenas for certain witnesses. In addition he argues that he received 

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, as well as ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Facts

[2] The facts underlying this case are as follows: On January 31, 2008, officers from 

the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Department and the Bedford Police Department 

executed search warrants on Brazzel’s home and storage unit. They found two 

large trash bags filled with marijuana weighing a total of 3394.9 grams. In the 

storage unit, they discovered several firearms and 666.6 grams of 

methamphetamine. A search of a second storage unit revealed two trash bags 

containing 52.5 pounds and 38.5 pounds of marijuana respectively. Brazzel was 

charged with dealing in methamphetamine, a class A felony; dealing in 

marijuana, a class C felony; and receiving stolen property, a class D felony. He 

was convicted as charged. Brazzel v. State, No. 47A04-0907-CR-426, slip op. at 

p. 1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. April 26, 2010) (Brazzel I). Brazzel was sentenced to fifty 

years for the Class A felony conviction, but the trial court did not impose 

sentences on the two remaining convictions. 

[3] Brazzel appealed his convictions, arguing that: 1) the search warrant for his 

home and storage unit were not supported by probable cause; 2) the officers 
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who conducted the search exceeded the scope of the warrant; 3) the trial court 

erred in instructing the jury that intent to deliver may be inferred from the 

amount of drugs found; and 4) the trial court erred in its sentencing. See id. A 

panel of this Court found that the post-conviction court had erred in failing to 

sentence Brazzel for his convictions for possession of marijuana and receiving 

stolen property; we affirmed in all other respects. 

[4] On September 9, 2011, Brazzel, pro se, filed his petition for post-conviction 

relief. On March 4, 2014, the State filed an answer to Brazzel’s petition, along 

with a motion for summary disposition asserting the affirmative defenses of 

latches, waiver, and res judicata with regard to his claims regarding ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. 

[5] On May 16, 2014, Brazzel submitted a potential witness list, along with a 

request for subpoenas. On May 21, 2014, the State filed an objection to the 

issuance of the subpoena, renewing its motion for summary disposition. On 

May 28, 2014, the post-conviction court granted Brazzel’s requests for 

subpoenas for Eric Hackney, Keygan Matheny, Donny Matheny, Sophia 

Keller, Andrew Phillips, and Michael Murphy.

[6] However, on August 6, 2014, the post-conviction court quashed the subpoenas 

for Hackney, Keygan Matheny, Donny Matheny, Keller, and Phillips, finding 

that Brazzel’s purpose in calling them was to attempt to attack the sufficiency of 

the probable cause supporting the search warrants for his home and storage 

unit, an issue that had been litigated and determined by this court in Brazzel I. 
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The post-conviction court found against Brazzel on this issue and did not allow 

him to present evidence regarding the search warrant. 

[7] On August 11, 2014, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing. At 

the hearing, the post-conviction court noted on the record that it had denied 

Brazzel’s request for subpoenas for Aaron Shouls, Phil Wigley, Dave Flynn, 

and Michael Branham because Brazzel had failed to comply with postconviction rules by failing to submit an affidavit with his request. Brazzel

acknowledged that he had not attached affidavits and did not ask for a 

continuance or an opportunity to provide affidavits. Brazzel was then allowed 

to present evidence on his claims that his trial counsel and appellate counsel

were ineffective. 

[8] At the post-conviction hearing, Alicia Cooper, Brazzel’s girlfriend, testified that 

a juror spoke to her during Brazzel’s trial. She testified that she and the juror 

discussed Brazzel and that the juror seemed to disapprove of Brazzel. Trial 

counsel testified that he did not remember this exchange with a juror. He also 

testified that if he had knowledge of any such exchange, he would have 

informed the trial court to protect his client from a juror who could not be 

impartial. 

[9] On October 17, 2014, the post-conviction court denied Brazzel’s petition for 

post-conviction relief. Brazzel now appeals. 
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Discussion and Decision

[10] Brazzel argues that the post-conviction court erred when it found that his claim 

regarding the probable cause underlying the search warrant for his home and 

storage space was barred by res judicata. He also argues that he received 

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel and appellate counsel. 

I. Standard of Review 

[11] Post-conviction proceedings are not “super appeals” through which convicted 

persons can raise issues they failed to raise at post-conviction or on direct 

appeal. Turner v. State, 974 N.E.2d 575, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Rather, postconviction proceedings afford petitioners a limited opportunity to raise issues 

that were unavailable or unknown at post-conviction and on direct appeal. 

Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ind. 2002). A post-conviction petitioner 

bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. 2008). To prevail on 

appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner must show that 

the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion 

opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. at 643-44.

[12] Where, as here, the post-conviction court makes findings of fact and 

conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post–Conviction Rule 1(6), we 

cannot affirm the judgment on any legal basis, but rather, must determine if the 

court’s findings are sufficient to support its judgment. Graham v. State, 941 

N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We will not reweigh the evidence or 
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judge the credibility of witnesses, and will consider only the probative evidence 

and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom that support the post-conviction 

court’s decision. Id.

II. Subpoenas and Res Judicata

[13] Brazzel first argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his request 

for certain subpoenas and limiting his claims to ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Whether to deny or grant a party’s request for a subpoena is within 

the discretion of the post-conviction court. Allen v. State, 791 N.E.2d 748, 757 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We review the post-conviction court’s decision to grant 

or deny that request for an abuse of discretion; an abuse of discretion occurres if

the court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court. Id. 

[14] As noted above, the post-conviction court, on its own motion, quashed 

subpoenas it had issued at Brazzel’s request, because it found that Brazzel was 

attempting to retry certain issues—whether there was probable cause supporting 

the search warrant for his home and storage unit and whether officers exceeded 

the scope of the warrant—that were determined in Brazzel I. The postconviction court found that, although Brazzel was attempting to frame the issue
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as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, he was, in fact, attempting to relitigate the issue at the post-conviction level. PCR. App. p. 32-34.

1 2

[15] In his affidavits requesting subpoenas for Hackney, Keygan Matheny, Donny 

Matheny, Keller, and Phillips, Brazzel clearly indicated that his underlying 

purpose for calling these witnesses was to re-litigate his claims regarding the 

search warrant and re-try his case. In his request for subpoenas, Brazzel stated 

that: 

1. Eric Hackney was a necessary witness because he could “testify 

that all the information he supplied to the police [regarding the 

warrant] was second-hand, hearsay information . . . this 

testimony strikes at the heart of the probable cause provided to 

the court[.]” PCR. App. p. 57. 

2. Keygan Matheny likewise had only second-hand knowledge. 

Id. at 59. 

3. Donny Matheny would testify that he told his son that Brazzel 

was selling drugs, and this testimony would support Keygan 

Matheny’s testimony that his knowledge was second-hand. Id.

at 61. 

4. Sophia Keller’s testimony was also necessary to support 

Keygan Matheny’s testimony that his knowledge was secondhand. Id. at 63. 

 

1 Brazzel first argues that the post-conviction court erred by determining that these issues were res judicata

because the State did not assert res judicata. This is simply not true. The State asserted that these issues were 

barred by res judicata when it moved for summary disposition. See PCR App. p. 86. 

2 Brazzel also argues that he was denied due process when the post-conviction court issued an order quashing 

the subpoenas a week before his hearing. He points to no legal authority, and we find none, that suggests the 

post-conviction court was not within its authority in doing so. 
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5. Andrew Phillips’s testimony was necessary to show that the 

confidential informant information supporting the search 

warrant was “subterfuge.” Id. at 65. 

Brazzel maintains that the post-conviction court’s failure to allow him to 

subpoena the above witnesses was an abuse of discretion. 

[16] It is well established that, if an issue was raised and determined on direct 

appeal, it is res judicata and not subject to consideration for post-conviction 

relief. Holt v. State, 656 N.E.2d 495, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Here, it could 

not be clearer that this Court resolved Brazzel’s claims regarding the probable 

cause supporting the search warrant in Brazzel I. No. 47A04-0907-CR-426, slip 

op. at p. 6. Therefore, to the extent that Brazzel was attempting to re-litigate the

issue of whether probable cause supported the search warrant for his home and 

storage unit, the post-conviction court did not err in determining that this issue 

was res judicata. 

[17] To the extent that Brazzel was attempting to argue that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to call or depose witnesses at the suppression hearing prior 

to his trial, Brazzel has failed to make an adequate record to allow us to address 

this issue. Brazzel’s affidavits provide us with nothing more than his statement 

regarding what he hoped each witness might say. Furthermore, he failed to 

preserve the issue by making an offer of proof regarding what each of these 
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witnesses might testify to and has therefore waived it. Dowdell v. State, 720 

N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind. 1999). 3 4 5

II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

[18] Brazzel next argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He 

maintains that trial counsel was ineffective: 1) for failing to inform the postconviction court about communications between a juror and his girlfriend, 

Alicia Cooper; and 2) for failing to request that the prosecutor in the case be 

disqualified due to a conflict of interest.6 Our Supreme Court has instructed:

A defendant claiming a violation of the right to effective assistance of 

counsel must establish the two components set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, the defendant must show that 

counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires a showing that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that the errors were so serious that they resulted in 

a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

 

3 Although Brazzel did make an offer to prove at the post-conviction hearing that was refused by the postconviction court, nothing kept him from filing an offer in writing after the hearing or requesting a hearing on 

the matter. However, we do opine the best practice would have been for the post-conviction court to allow 

Brazzel to make an offer to prove at the post-conviction hearing. 

4 Brazzel acknowledged that he did not submit affidavits with his request for subpoenas for Shouls, Wigley, 

Flynn, and Branham and had failed to comply with post-conviction rules. He did not ask for a continuance 

or an opportunity to provide affidavits. 

5 Brazzel also argues that he was denied due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution. This argument centers around the post-conviction court’s refusal to hear his 

offer of proof at the hearing or to allow him to present evidence regarding the witnesses mentioned above. 

Again, we note that nothing prevented Brazzel from filing an offer in writing after the hearing or requesting a 

hearing on the matter. Therefore, Brazzel did not exhaust his remedies in this matter and we do not find that 

he was denied due process. 

6 As noted above, Brazzel also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly litigate the 

suppression hearing prior to his trial because he failed to call certain witnesses. Again, we note that Brazzel 

failed to provide us with an adequate record to consider his claim. 
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Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. To establish prejudice, a 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and 

tactics, and we will accord those decisions deference. A strong 

presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment. The Strickland Court recognized that even the finest, most 

experienced criminal defense attorneys may not agree on the ideal 

strategy or the most effective way to represent a client. Isolated 

mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment 

do not necessarily render representation ineffective. The two prongs of 

the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. Thus, [i]f it 

is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed.

Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d at 603.

[19] Brazzel first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the 

post-conviction court about improper communications that occurred between 

Cooper and a juror. Cooper testified at the post-conviction hearing that an 

impaneled female juror approached her and asked her to lunch. PCR Tr. p. 22. 

Cooper testified that, although she refused the juror’s invitation, the juror 

discussed Cooper’s relationship with Brazzel and seemed to have a negative 

opinion of him. Id. Brazzel argues that trial counsel knew about this 

interaction and should have reported it to the trial court. 

[20] However, at the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that, if he had been 

told about such a communication, he would have reported it to the trial court. 

Id. at 92. Indeed, during Brazzel’s trial, a similar allegation was brought to the 
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trial court’s attention and trial counsel expressed concern about the impartiality 

of the juror, who was excused. PCR. App. 6. The post-conviction court clearly 

noted that he did not find Cooper’s testimony to be credible, and that he did 

find trial counsel to be credible. Brazzel’s argument is merely a request to judge 

the credibility of the witnesses and reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. 

Therefore, this argument fails.

[21] Brazzel next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that 

the prosecutor in the case be disqualified due to a conflict of interest.7 He points 

out that the prosecutor, at one time, was a “juvenile referee” in a custody battle 

between Cooper and Donny Matheny. Appellant’s Br. p. 38. Brazzel argues 

that the prosecutor knew the “key players” in the instant case and could have 

obtained information from them. Id. However, Brazzel has not explained what 

kind of information the prosecutor could have gleaned from the custody case 

that would have been relevant to his trial. This argument also fails.8

 

7 Brazzel also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for representing both himself and Cooper. Trial 

counsel’s representation of Cooper is entirely irrelevant as trial counsel did not begin representation of 

Cooper until after Brazzel’s first sentencing hearing. 

8 Brazzel also contends that he was denied due process when the post-conviction court did not allow him to 

present evidence regarding this alleged conflict of interest. However, the court found that Brazzel was not 

attempting to elicit evidence in questioning the prosecutor, but to discover evidence. The post-conviction 

court gave Brazzel the opportunity to present evidence by asking what information he wished to elicit from 

the prosecutor, and only stopped the questioning when Brazzel stated that he did not know what information 

he was seeking. PCR Tr. p. 32-35. 
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II. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

[22] Brazzel also contends that he received ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel. He maintains that appellate counsel was ineffective when he 

submitted to this Court an appendix in which the pagination ran off the page. 

Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims generally fall into three 

categories: 1) denial of access to an appeal; 2) waiver of issues; and 3) failing to 

prevent issues well. Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ind. 2008). The 

standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the 

appellate level is the same two-prong Strickland standard used for trial counsel. 

466 U.S. at 668; Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1166–67 (Ind. 2001). 

Therefore, Brazzel must prove that appellate counsel performed deficiently and 

that he was prejudiced as a result. Id.

[23] Brazzel has failed to show that appellate counsel’s actions prejudiced him. This 

Court decided to hear the merits of his direct appeal, despite any mistakes in the 

pagination of this appendix. Therefore, this argument fails. 

[24] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.