IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-60589

KELLY BAKER, Guardian for Aaron Wayne Page,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

RR BRINK LOCKING SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before JOLLY, GARZA, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Aaron Wayne Page (“Page”) was allegedly raped while in jail when he was

nineteen years old. He sued RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc. (“Brink”), among

others, claiming the rape occurred as a result of ineffective locks on cell doors. 

In this interlocutory appeal, Brink argues that the district court erred in

rejecting its contention that the statute of limitations began running against

Page at the moment the alleged torts occurred because, even though at nineteen

years old he was under the age of majority, he was emancipated at this time by

operation of law based upon his felony record. The district court held that Page

continued to suffer from the disability of minority at the time of the torts, despite

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 9, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

being emancipated, and, thus, that he timely commenced this action by filing

less than three years after his twenty-first birthday. We AFFIRM.

I.

On August 2, 2007, Page was a nineteen-year-old pre-trial detainee at the

Harrison County Adult Detention Center. Page alleges that in the early

morning hours, another inmate was able to leave his own cell and enter Page’s,

where he assaulted and raped Page. Page further contends these events were

made possible, in part, by faulty locks Brink manufactured. 

Page initially filed suit in February 2009. In February 2011, he amended

his complaint adding Brink as a party and claims of negligence, strict liability,

and breach of implied warranty against it. Brink moved for summary judgment,

contending Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations period, applicable to

personal injury and products liability, applied. Brink argued Page was an

emancipated minor when the alleged events occurred, because he was arrested

and charged as an adult more than sixteen times before turning 21. See MISS.

CODE. ANN. § 93-11-65(8)(a). As such, the statute of limitations began to run at

the time the alleged events occurred. Page countered that he continued to suffer

from the disability of infancy until he turned 21, and thus that his February

2011 amendment was timely. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-59.

The district court found Brink’s arguments unpersuasive. It examined

Mississippi’s statute and case law, and determined that emancipation is a

concept separate and distinct from the disability of infancy. Accordingly, it

denied Brink’s motion for summary judgment. Brink timely filed an

interlocutory appeal.

II.

We have appellate jurisdiction to decide this interlocutory appeal under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “Questions of statutory interpretation are, of course,

reviewed de novo.” Carder v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 636 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir.

2

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

2011). Where, as here, a federal court exercises jurisdiction over state law

causes of action based upon diversity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, we

apply state substantive law as stated in the final decisions of the state’s highest

court. Shanks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 169 F.3d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1999). “When

there is no ruling by the state’s highest court, it is the duty of the federal court

to determine as best it can, what the highest court of the state would decide.” 

Lampton v. Diaz, 661 F.3d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The question presented in this appeal is whether an emancipated

minor—who is emancipated only based upon his record of felonies—is entitled

to the protection of the Mississippi savings statute, under which the disability

of infancy is not removed until a person reaches age twenty-one.1

 MISS. CODE.

ANN. § 15-1-59. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has not answered this

question, but after thoroughly analyzing decisions in similar Mississippi cases,

as well as the Mississippi Code, we conclude that the answer is yes.

A.

We begin by examining the relevant provisions of the Mississippi Code,

which provide the framework for evaluating this case. There are several code

provisions that are applicable in reaching the answer to today’s question. First,

we consider Chapter 1, Title 15 of the Mississippi Code, establishing the savings

statute, which provides: 

If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned

shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the

disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, he may bring the

1 As discussed below, the Mississippi Code allows for a court to remove the disability

of infancy prior to an individual reaching age twenty-one in certain circumstances. See MISS.

CODE ANN. § 93-19-1 et seq. In this appeal, however, there is no argument that a chancery

court ever issued a decree of removal of minority as to Page.

3

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after

his disability shall be removed as provided by law.2

MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-59. An “infant” for purposes of the savings statute is

any person under twenty-one years of age. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-21.

Title 93, meanwhile, deals with domestic relations, a seemingly distant

subject from our domain today. Section 93-11-65(8)(a) is entitled “Enforcement

of Support of Dependents,” and establishes the situations under which a child

may become emancipated, thus relieving obligations of parental support. It

states in relevant part:3

The duty of support of a child terminates upon the emancipation of

the child. Unless otherwise provided for in the underlying child

support judgment, emancipation shall occur when the child:

(i) Attains the age of twenty-one (21) years, or

(ii) Marries, or

(iii) Joins the military and serves on a full-time basis, or

(iv) Is convicted of a felony and is sentenced to incarceration

of two (2) or more years for committing such felony.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65(8)(a) (Supp. 2010). 

Next, we look at Chapter 19 of Title 93, entitled “Removal of Disability of

Minority,” which details circumstances whereby the chancery court may remove

the disability of minority as to real estate rights and transactions for an

individual under twenty-one. The statute further provides how such an

individual may apply for removal of disability, that the disability of minority

does not apply to married minors for purposes of actions involving marital

2 This provision only applies to statutes of limitations within Chapter 1, Title 15 of the

Mississippi Code. Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 955 So. 2d 764, 770 n.6 (Miss. 2007).

Page’s claims of products liability and personal injury are within reach of the savings statute

because they are encompassed by § 15-1-49’s three-year statute of limitations. Lincoln Elec.

Co. v. McLemore, 54 So. 3d 833, 835-36 (Miss. 2010).

3 The statute also provides other situations in which a court may determine

emancipation has occurred, including when a child discontinues full-time enrollment in school

and is at least eighteen years old.

4

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

rights, and that persons eighteen years of age or older are competent to contract

in matters affecting personal property.4 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-19-1 et seq. 

Importantly, § 93-19-9 describes the terms of a chancery court’s decree of

removal of minority:

The decree may be for partial removal of the disability of the minor

so as to enable him to do some particular act proposed to be done

and specified in the decree; or it may be general, and empower him

to do all acts in reference to his property, and making contracts, and

suing and being sued, and engaging in any profession or avocation,

which he could do if he were twenty-one years of age; and the decree

made shall distinctly specify to what extent the disability of the

minor is removed, and what character of acts he is empowered to

perform, notwithstanding his minority, and may impose such

restrictions and qualifications as the court may adjudge proper.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-19-09.

The plain language of the Code distinguishes between the two terms

“disability of infancy” and “emancipation,” as evidenced by the separate

treatment afforded to each under the provisions above. Each entails its own

consequences; and the Code provides for different means by which the disability

may be removed and emancipation may be effected.

B.

In this appeal, however, Brink contends that Page’s alleged emancipation5

had consequences outside those ascribed to emancipation in the Code. 

Essentially, it argues that when Page was emancipated, the effect was to remove

his disability of infancy. The Code itself provides no support for this argument. 

Thus, Brink relies upon Mississippi case law, which it argues establishes a rule

that a child who is emancipated ceases to suffer the disability of infancy because

4 This chapter also notes that persons eighteen years of age or older may participate

in physiological training.

5 Brink alleges Page was emancipated, but the court below did not render a finding on

this issue; instead, it held that emancipation does not remove the disability of infancy.

5

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

of his emancipation. This argument cannot prevail because it rests on a

predicate that mischaracterizes Mississippi law.

Brink looks primarily to Ladner v. Logan, 857 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 2003), for

sustenance. That case, however, is no lifeline for Brink. Brink contends the

Mississippi Supreme Court “affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the

children’s ‘disabilities of infancy’ had been removed prior to them turning 21

years old and that, as such, only the youngest son had a viable claim.” See Br.

of Appellant at 9-10. But the trial court made no such finding, and neither did

the Mississippi Supreme Court. In Ladner, Cheryl Ladner sought payment of

unpaid child support for her four children from her ex-husband, Woodrow Logan. 

857 So. 2d at 765. The trial court chancellor noted both the dates at which each

child was emancipated6

and the date at which each reached the age of majority,

i.e., twenty-one. Ladner v. Logan, No. 19,882-D, at * 3 (Ch. Ct. Pearl River Cnty.

Miss. Mar. 27, 2002). It then held the child support claims of the three older

children were time-barred, as more than seven years had elapsed from the time

each reached the age of majority to the time they were joined as proper parties

in Ladner’s suit. Id. at *5-6. 

On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed, inter alia,

“[w]hether the chancellor erred in his application of the statute of limitations as

it applied to the adult children.” 857 So. 2d at 771. Ladner’s argument on

appeal was that “since the youngest child of four children became emancipated

at the time of high school graduation, May of 1995, the statute cannot commence

to run against any Plaintiff or any of the children until May of 2002.” Id. at 772. 

Thus, the issue before the court was not whether the statute began to run either

upon a child’s emancipation or upon his reaching the age of majority; instead,

6 The trial court does not clearly state the cause of each child’s emancipation, but the

dates appear to coincide with each child’s high school graduation or his ceasing full-time

enrollment in school after turning eighteen.

6

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

the question was whether the statute remained tolled as to all the children until

the youngest child was emancipated.7Id. The court found no support for the

proposition that the statute of limitations began to run against all the children

only after the youngest child became emancipated, and held that the trial court

correctly found the statute of limitations had run upon the claims of the three

oldest children. Id.

In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon Brown v. Brown, 822 So.

2d 1119 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), in which Mrs. Brown sought payment of child

support for her two then-adult children from her ex-husband, Mr. Brown. Id. at

1120. The Brown court first noted § 15-1-59 tolls the statute of limitations until

the disability of infancy is removed. Id. at 1121. It then found that more than

seven years had elapsed since the Browns’ son reached age twenty-one, and thus

that his claim was barred. Id. It found the daughter’s claim was still viable,

however, as she had not yet turned twenty-eight. Id. Accordingly, the court

looked to whether each child had reached the age of majority to determine

whether the statute of limitations had run, not whether either had been

emancipated more than seven years prior.8In neither Ladner nor Brown, then,

did the court find emancipation was tantamount to removal of the disability of

infancy for purposes of applying the statute of limitations.

Next, Brink looks to the decision of the Mississippi Court of Appeals in

White v. Abel, 802 So. 2d 98 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), and again fails to make a

persuasive connection in support of its argument. In that case, the question was

7

It is noteworthy that Ladner elected to argue that the statute was tolled until her

youngest child was emancipated—not when he reached the age of majority, a later

date—despite that the chancellor clearly held the statute was tolled until this child reached

majority.

8 The court does not mention emancipation, and it appears neither party contended

either child was emancipated prior to reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, this case is

not helpful to Brink’s argument, as it does not equate emancipation with the removal of the

disability of infancy, as Brink seeks to do in this appeal.

7

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

“[w]hether the lower court erred by admitting into evidence the affidavit of

minor, Tonya Able, which the [trial] court relied upon in holding the minor was

emancipated at age seventeen and the statute of limitations had run on this

action.” Id. at 100. Tonya’s mother, who brought the suit for back child support,

did not argue on appeal that the statute of limitations was tolled until Tonya

turned twenty-eight, but instead she argued that the lower court erroneously

had considered Tonya’s affidavit, executed when Tonya was approximately

twenty-six. The affidavit had undermined the mother’s claim for child support

because in it Tonya had waived all her rights and claims to any back child

support that her father may have owed. Id. at 100-01. 

On appeal, the court held that Tonya’s mother did not have standing to sue

for arrearage, because her capacity to sue only served as a conduit for Tonya,

and, at the time the suit was filed and the affidavit was executed, Tonya was an

adult (age twenty-six) and she had explicitly disclaimed any right to sue after

she reached majority. Id. at 102-03. It is true that the court concluded that, in

any event, the statute of limitations had run on the claim. Id. at 103. Brink

takes this statement and argues it clearly demonstrates that the statute of

limitations begins to run when a child is emancipated, not when she reaches the

age of majority—as Tonya’s claim would have been viable if the seven-year

statute of limitations were tolled until she turned twenty-one. The court’s

remark, however, was clearly non-binding dictum unrelated to the issue

addressed by the decision of the court. See In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc.,

109 F.3d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 1997) (describing dictum as a statement that “‘could

have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the

holding–[and], being peripheral, may not have received the full and careful

consideration of the court that uttered it’” (quoting Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods.

Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986))). Whatever its classification,

however, this court of appeals statement in White certainly can not now be relied

8

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

upon for the proposition that emancipation of a child has the effect of removing

the disability of infancy when this question was never raised in the case;

furthermore, the state supreme court cases are in conflict with the consequences

of such a broad holding.9

Finally, we should observe that Brink has relied solely upon cases that

have arisen in the context of domestic relations, and has referred us to no case

addressing the savings clause as it relates to tort claims similar to those at issue

here. Indeed, each case upon which Brink relies addressed whether an

emancipated child’s claim for unpaid child support remained viable or had been

extinguished by the statute of limitations. Thus, even assuming each case

stands for the proposition Brink attributes to it, Brink at best has demonstrated

that emancipation, occurring before reaching majority age, may allow the statute

of limitations to begin to run against a child for purposes of collecting back child

support. This demonstration is not ultimately helpful for Brink, as the

Mississippi Code makes clear that the disability of minority may be removed for

some purposes while remaining in place for other purposes. See MISS. CODE

ANN. § 93-19-9 (noting the decree of removal must “distinctly specify to what

extent the disability of the minor is removed, and what character of acts he is

empowered to perform notwithstanding his minority”). Furthermore, the

Mississippi statutes explicitly require a Chancellor to remove the disability of

minority from an individual under twenty-one before that individual can be

deemed not to suffer from the disability. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-19-9; Miss.

Unif. Ch. Ct. R. 7.03 (“In all cases for the removal of disability of a resident

minor, the minor must be produced before the Chancellor for observation and

9 Brink proffers one final case, Burt v. Burt, 841 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 2001), for support of

its argument. Again, however, the issue we are now addressing was not raised in that case.

Moreover, the language helpful to Brink’s argument comes from the partial concurrence and

partial dissent that two justices joined, and the majority opinion does not make any reference

to the savings statute.

9

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

examination unless specially excused from doing so.”); Miss. State Tax Comm’n

v. Reynolds, 351 So. 2d 326, 328 (Miss. 1977) (holding the chancellor must find

a minor of “maturity, sound judgment and intelligence” to remove disability). 

These statutes and cases make clear that removal of the disability of minority

does not arise automatically upon the occurrence of specified events except for

reaching the age of twenty-one; this limitation stands in stark contrast with

emancipation, which may be deemed to have automatically arisen upon the

occurrence of statutorily designated events. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-

65(8)(a) (detailing the conditions under which emancipation occurs). Brink’s

argument that emancipation triggers the automatic removal of disability of

minority is thus at odds with the Code’s plain requirements. Brink has offered

no reason to suggest that the courts of Mississippi would rule in its favor by

reading such a tension into the Mississippi Code.

III.

In sum, the Mississippi Code clearly distinguishes between the concepts

of emancipation and the disability of infancy, as well as the implications of each,

and Mississippi cases do not illustrate an intent to deviate from this clear

distinction. We thus hold that, under Mississippi law, the statute of limitations

did not begin to run against Page until he reached the age of majority. The

judgment of the district court is, therefore,

AFFIRMED.

10

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

OWEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

This case was briefed to our court based on the argument that Page’s

disability of minority was removed by section 93-11-65(8)(a) of the Mississippi

Code.1

I agree that this section did not remove Page’s disability of minority for

purposes of permitting him to sue for his personal injuries. That is because, by

its own terms, section 93-11-65(8)(a) deals only with the duty of child support

upon emancipation of a child.2It is found in Chapter 11 of the Mississippi Code,

which is entitled “Enforcement of Support of Dependents.” However, I do not

think it necessary to draw a sweeping distinction between “removal of disability”

and “emancipation,” as the panel opinion does, to decide the only issues that are

presented by this appeal. I therefore do not join the panel majority’s opinion in

this latter regard and concur only in the judgment. 

Chapter 19 of the Mississippi Code is entitled “Removal of Disability of

Minority” and addresses a number of circumstances in which the disability of a

minor may be removed. I note that it is at least arguable that Page’s disability

of minority may be partially removed by a provision found in Chapter 19, section

93-19-13,3 which is self-effectuating and does not require a decree from the

chancery court.4 Section 93-19-13 may have the effect of removing Page’s

disability of minority as to his personal injuries, at least under some

circumstances. That section of the Mississippi Code provides as follows:

All persons eighteen (18) years of age or older, if not otherwise

disqualified, or prohibited by law, shall have the capacity to enter

into binding contractual relationships affecting personal property.

1 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65(8)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2012).

2

Id. (“The duty of support of a child terminates upon the emancipation of the child.”)

3

Id. § 93-19-13.

4 See Garrett v. Gay, 394 So. 2d 321, 322-23 (Miss. 1981).

11

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/09/2013
No. 12-60589

Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any contracts

entered into prior to July 1, 1976.

In any legal action founded on a contract entered into by a person

eighteen (18) years of age or older, the said person may sue in his

own name as an adult and be sued in his own name as an adult and

be served with process as an adult.5

A cause of action for personal injuries is personal property under

Mississippi law.6 A person eighteen years of age or older may enter into a valid

and enforceable contract to settle a claim for personal injuries, even if suit has

not been filed.7 However, we do not and should not reach questions regarding

the potential effect of this statute on Page’s claim in the case before us because

no arguments regarding this statute were presented to the district court, and

this provision of Mississippi law was not raised in Brink’s initial briefing in this

court.

5 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-19-13.

6 See e.g., Garrett 394 So. 2d at 322-23 (Miss. 1981).

7

Id.

12

 Case: 12-60589 Document: 00512301296 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/09/2013