UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4873

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STANLEY LESSINGTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District 

Judge. (2:04-cr-01092-SB-1)

Submitted: February 25, 2010 Decided: March 18, 2010

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ray Coit Yarborough, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF RAY COIT YARBOROUGH, 

JR., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Rhett 

DeHart, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Stanley Lessington appeals from the 121-month sentence 

imposed following his jury conviction on two counts of 

conspiracy to make and pass counterfeit business checks, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006), one count of passing 

counterfeit checks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 513(a), 3147(1) 

(2006), and two counts of identity theft, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), (b)(1)(D) (2006). Lessington’s counsel 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal, but questioning whether the district court erred in 

denying Lessington’s motions to substitute counsel and for 

acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. 

Lessington filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing the same 

issues and raising several additional claims. The Government 

has not filed a brief. Finding no error, we affirm. 

We review the district court’s denial of a motion to 

substitute counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2004). Upon review, we 

consider the following factors: “(1) the timeliness of [the] 

[m]otion[]; (2) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into his 

complaint about counsel; and (3) whether [the defendant] and his 

counsel experienced a total lack of communication preventing an 

adequate defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We 
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then “weigh these factors against the trial court’s interest in 

the orderly administration of justice.” Id. at 157. 

Lessington’s trial was set to begin on Monday, 

October 30, 2006; however, he did not request a new attorney 

until Thursday, October 26, 2006. The day of trial, the 

district court allowed Lessington to explain the reasons he was 

dissatisfied with counsel, addressing each point Lessington 

raised in depth. The district court also questioned counsel, 

who admitted that he and Lessington had a breakdown in 

communication because they did not see the evidence in the same 

light. However, counsel believed he could articulate a defense 

nonetheless. On these facts, we find that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Lessington’s motion to 

substitute counsel.

We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 

motion for acquittal de novo. United States v. Perkins, 470 

F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 2006). A jury verdict must be upheld 

“if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Government, to support it.” Id. We consider 

both circumstantial and direct evidence, drawing all reasonable 

inferences from such evidence in the government’s favor. United 

States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Count 1 charged that Lessington and an unindicted coconspirator conspired, in violation of § 371, to possess and 
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pass counterfeit business checks with the intent to deceive 

another person and organization, in violation of § 513(a), based 

on a transaction at McElveen Chevrolet. A conviction under 

§ 371 requires the government to prove: “(1) an agreement 

between two or more people to commit a crime,” in this case a 

violation of § 513(a), and “(2) an overt act in furtherance of 

the conspiracy.” United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 922 (4th 

Cir. 1997). “The existence of a tacit or mutual understanding 

between conspirators is sufficient evidence of a conspiratorial 

agreement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To 

establish a violation of § 513(a), the government must prove 

that the defendant: (1) uttered or possessed; (2) a counterfeit 

security; (3) of an organization that operates in or affects 

interstate commerce; (4) with the intent to deceive another 

person or organization. 18 U.S.C. § 513(a), (c)(4). A security 

is counterfeit if it “purports to be genuine but is not, because 

it has been falsely made or manufactured in its entirety.” 18 

U.S.C. § 513(c)(1). 

At trial, a former McElveen salesman testified that 

Lessington came to McElveen to purchase a vehicle and that, at 

Lessington’s direction, he drew up the sales contract in the 

name of Michael Anthony, knowing the name was fictitious. 

Lessington forged Michael Anthony’s name on the contract and 

took possession of the vehicle, passing a business check for 
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$37,500 drawn on a construction company’s account as payment. 

The contract further provided that an excess payment in the 

amount of $5500 would be refunded to Lessington. Testimony from 

co-conspirators confirms that Lessington passed the counterfeit 

check with the intent to deceive McElveen. The following day, 

the salesman passed the check at the bank and returned $5500 to 

Lessington, as promised in the fraudulent sales contract. 

Count 2 charged Lessington and several named coconspirators with violating §§ 371 and 513(a) based on a 

conspiracy that took place between 2003 and October 2005. Two 

co-conspirators testified that they witnessed Lessington print 

counterfeit payroll and personal checks. Additionally, several 

co-conspirators testified that Lessington recruited them to pass 

counterfeit payroll checks at several stores and to open bank 

accounts to deposit counterfeit checks in exchange for payment. 

Further, a former cashier at the St. Stephen IGA testified that 

Lessington recruited her to cash a number of counterfeit checks 

for himself and others at the IGA in exchange for payment. 

Count 3 charged Lessington with knowingly passing a 

counterfeit security of Nationwide Insurance made payable to 

David Jones with intent to deceive the St. Stephen IGA, in 

violation of § 513(a), while on release, in violation of § 3147. 

At trial, the former IGA cashier testified that she cashed a 

counterfeit check from Lessington made out to David Jones at the 
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St. Stephen IGA on September 27, 2005. At the time Lessington 

passed the check, he was on pretrial release after entering a 

not guilty plea to the original indictment in this case. 

Finally, Counts 4 and 5 charged Lessington with 

identity theft, in violation of § 1028(a)(7), (b)(1)(D), for 

knowingly possessing, transferring, and using others’ Social 

Security numbers, dates of birth, names, driver’s licenses, and 

identification cards with the intent to commit, and to aid and

abet in the commission of, passing counterfeit business checks. 

To establish a violation of § 1028(a)(7), the government is 

required to prove that the defendant: (1) knowingly; 

(2) transferred, possessed, or used without lawful authority; 

(3) another person’s means of identification; (4) with intent to 

commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028(a)(7). 

Here, in executing the search warrant, officers found 

numerous forms of identification in Lessington’s bedroom, 

including a Social Security card and birth certificate belonging 

to Juan Francisco Arteaga. Law enforcement officials involved 

with the case confirmed that Juan Arteaga’s Social Security card 

and birth certificate were used to obtain the fraudulent 

driver’s license used by Lessington’s cousin to pass counterfeit 

checks and that Lessington used a fraudulent driver’s license in 

a relative’s name to cash a counterfeit check at the IGA. 
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Lessington admitted to obtaining and possessing the second

fraudulent driver’s license, though he denied using it to pass 

counterfeit checks. 

Based on the above, we conclude that there is 

substantial evidence supporting the jury verdict on each count. 

Therefore, the district court properly denied Lessington’s Rule 

29 motion for acquittal. We have also reviewed the issues 

raised in Lessington’s pro se supplemental brief and find them 

to be without merit. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Lessington, in writing, of his 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Lessington requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw 

from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy 

thereof was served on Lessington. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED