[Cite as State v. Peeples, 2012-Ohio-1149.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO ) CASE NO. 10 MA 132 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE ) 

) 

VS. ) OPINION 

) 

REGINA PEEPLES ) 

) 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from the Court of 

Common Pleas of Mahoning County, 

Ohio 

Case No. 09 CR 1309 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Paul J. Gains 

Mahoning County Prosecutor 

Atty. Ralph M. Rivera 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Megan Graff 

Comstock, Springer & Wilson Co. 

100 Federal Plaza East 

Suite 926 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Dated: March 16, 2012
[Cite as State v. Peeples, 2012-Ohio-1149.]

WAITE, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Regina Peebles, entered a guilty plea immediately prior to 

trial on charges of endangering children and intimidation. On appeal she argues that 

the trial court should have found her incompetent, that her plea was not knowingly 

and voluntarily entered, and that she received ineffective assistance from trial 

counsel. Appellant’s three assignments of error are without merit. The judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

{¶2} Appellant was indicted by the Mahoning County Grand Jury on 

November 24, 2009. The indictment included two counts, the first, a violation of R.C. 

2919.22(B)(3), (E)(3), captioned: “Endangering children,” which provides in 

pertinent part: 

{¶3} “(B) No person shall do any of the following to a 

child under eighteen years of age or a mentally or 

physically handicapped child under twenty-one years of 

age: 

{¶4} * * * 

{¶5} “(3) Administer corporal punishment or other 

physical disciplinary measure, or physically restrain the 

child in a cruel manner or for a prolonged period, which 

punishment, discipline, or restraint is excessive under the 

circumstances and creates a substantial risk of serious 

physical harm to the child; 
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{¶6} * * * 

{¶7} “[(E)](3) If the offender violates division (B)(2), (B)(3) 

* * * endangering children is a felony * * * [i]f the violation 

results in serious physical harm to the child involved * * * 

endangering children is a felony of the second degree. 

{¶8} According to the indictment, the conduct that led to the charge occurred 

on or about August 24, 2009 and involved the punishment or restraint of N.J., a child 

less than seven years old. 

{¶9} The second count in the indictment is a violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(D), 

captioned: “Intimidation of attorney, victim or witness in criminal case,” which 

provides in part: 

{¶10} (B) No person, knowingly and by force or by 

unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, shall 

attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder the victim of a 

crime in the filing or prosecution of criminal charges or an 

attorney or witness involved in a criminal action or 

proceeding in the discharge of the duties of the attorney or 

witness. 

{¶11} * * * 

{¶12} (D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of 

intimidation of an attorney, victim, or witness in a criminal 

case. * * * A violation of division (B) of this section is a 

felony of the third degree. 
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{¶13} The second count involves statements made to Philip, Dorian, and 

Philip Chandler Cox around the dates of October 10, 2009 and November 19, 2009. 

{¶14} Appellant was arraigned on December 8, 2009, entered not guilty pleas 

on both counts, and was determined to be indigent. An attorney was appointed to 

represent her. A hearing was held on Appellant’s request to modify bond at which 

time trial was continued until February 22, 2010 on Appellant’s oral motion. 

Appellant’s subsequent motion for dismissal on speedy trial grounds was denied. On 

February 17, 2010 appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw, due to an 

irretrievable breakdown in communication. A hearing on counsel’s motion was held 

on February 19, 2010, the court denied the motion to withdraw but granted leave for 

a motion for determination of competency to be filed and continued the jury trial 

pending the competency determination. Appointed counsel’s motion for a 

competency determination was filed and on February 23, 2010 the court entered an 

order for forensic examination of Appellant’s competence to stand trial. The 

competency hearing was scheduled for March 25, 2010. On March 15, 2010, 

Appellant filed a pro se motion seeking to have appointed counsel replaced with new 

counsel. 

{¶15} The competency hearing was held on March 25, 2010. The trial court 

judge questioned Appellant about her understanding of the charges against her, her 

rights regarding trial, and her understanding of the functions of the judge, the 

prosecutor, and the jury relative to trial and court procedure. (Competency Tr., pp. 6-

8.) The judge also inquired as to Appellant’s medical and psychological history. 

(Competency Tr., pp. 9-11.) Appellant indicated that in 1995 she was under the care 
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of a physician for “a traumatic incident” that resulted in “delusional episodes” and 

hospitalization. At that time she was prescribed Risperdal for depression, “but they 

took me off of that.” (Competency Tr., pp. 9-10.) Appellant further explained that the 

treatment had concluded and that she was not currently under treatment, but she had 

been meeting with a counselor to discuss her feelings about the current proceedings. 

(Competency Tr., p. 10.) The judge confirmed with Appellant that she was no longer 

having delusions. Appellant stated: “No, I’m not having any delusions. I’m not 

suffering from a traumatic episode -- I didn’t suffer from something traumatic in this 

case like, you know, that case was.” (Competency Tr., pp. 10-11.) 

{¶16} The judge questioned Appellant about her agitation and outbursts at the 

competency hearing and in prior appearances. Appellant, who had repeatedly “fired” 

defense counsel when the hearing began, responded: “No one will listen * * * I been 

[sic] repeatedly trying to get across I have not been properly represented in this case. 

I feel that I’ve been treated unfair and unjust. * * * [T]he only way I’m getting attention 

here now is because of the outbursts. If I wouldn’t have outbursts like that, no one 

would even be listening to me right now.” (Competency Tr., pp. 8–9.) The judge 

responded that those were reasons to seek new counsel, not explanations of her 

behavior and admonished her that the behavior could not continue. The judge gave 

both the prosecutor and defense counsel the opportunity to question Appellant 

further, but both declined. The judge found that Appellant was competent. 

(Competency Tr., p. 11.) No further competence inquiry was ordered. After this 

ruling, the judge granted appointed counsel’s renewed motion to withdraw and 

admonished Appellant that she would have to be very cooperative when new counsel 
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contacted her because, due to the absence of a speedy trial waiver, time was of the 

essence. (Competency Tr., p. 12.) No reference to the evaluation ordered on 

February 23, 2010 was made during the competency hearing and no such evaluation 

was entered into evidence. 

{¶17} New counsel was appointed and trial was reset. On June 2, 2010, prior 

to trial, Appellant changed her plea to guilty. Appellant signed a Crim.R. 11(F) form 

and the state recommended less than the maximum sentences on each count. 

However, the transcript from the plea hearing indicates that although Appellant 

signed the form, and wished to plead “guilty,” defense counsel stated that he did not 

have an “agreement” with the state because the prosecutor intended to make a 

sentencing recommendation that the defense felt was excessive. Defense counsel 

emphasized that Appellant’s change of plea was not based on the prosecution’s 

recommendation, but was based on her desire to change her plea and defense 

counsel’s recommendation. (Change of Plea Tr., p. 3.) The judge then questioned 

Appellant at length as to her understanding of her change of plea, the offenses she 

was charged with, the possible penalties, the judge’s role as factfinder in sentencing, 

the document she signed, the rights she would forego by pleading without a trial, and 

confirmed that her plea was freely given. (Change of Plea Tr., pp. 3-10.) Appellant 

entered her plea on the record and the judge ordered a pre-sentence investigation. 

(Change of Plea Tr., pp. 10-11.) 

{¶18} On July 12, 2010, Appellant was sentenced to four years in prison on 

each count in the indictment, to be served concurrently. Appellant, who appeared 

with counsel, was given a written notice that she was subject to three years of 
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mandatory post-release control, which she refused to sign. On July 13, 2010, 

Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw and requested that substitute counsel 

again be appointed to investigate the possibility of filing a motion to withdraw the 

guilty plea, an appeal of the sentence, and a motion for judicial release. Appellant’s 

counsel believed that because Appellant blamed counsel for her incarceration, he 

would no longer be able to provide effective representation. Counsel’s motion to 

withdraw was granted and new counsel was appointed for a third time. Appellant 

filed her first notice of appeal, pro se, on August 5, 2010; a second notice of appeal 

was filed by counsel on August 11, 2010. Both notices were timely; the second 

motion was accompanied by a docketing statement and identified a final appealable 

order in compliance with App.R. 3. 

Assignment of Error No. One

{¶19} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

FAILING TO FIND MS. PEEPLES INCOMPETENT TO 

STAND TRIAL. 

Assignment of Error No. Two

{¶20} MS. PEEPLES’ GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, 

INTELLIGENTLY, NOR VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 

{¶21} Appellant contends that the “outbursts” and “lashing out,” discussed by 

the judge and explained by Appellant as frustration with counsel during the 

competency hearing, were in fact sufficient indicia of incompetence to necessitate a 

finding of incompetence by the trial court. Appellant further argues in her second 

assignment of error that due to her incompetency her guilty plea was not made 
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knowingly and intelligently. As the propriety of the trial court’s competency finding is 

determinative of both assignments, they will be considered together. 

A. Competence 

{¶22} “Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal 

defendant who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.” State v. Berry, 

72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995). An adult defendant is presumed to 

be competent to stand trial. R.C. 2317.01 and R.C. 2945.37. In a criminal 

proceeding the competence of the defendant may be raised by the court, sua sponte, 

by the prosecutor, or by the defense, both prior to and during trial. R.C. 2945.37(B). 

The defense bears the burden of production to rebut the presumption of competence. 

State v. Williams, 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 19, 490 N.E.2d 906 (1986). An appellant’s 

“failure to cooperate with counsel does not indicate that appellant was incapable of 

assisting in his defense.” Berry, supra, at 361. Similarly, “lack of cooperation with 

counsel does not constitute sufficient indicia of incompetence to raise doubt about a 

defendant’s competence to stand trial,” even when combined with a defendant’s 

continual erratic behavior which also “does not undermine the trial court’s findings of 

his competence to stand trial.” State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 189, 2003-Ohio3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, ¶29-30. A defendant may be “emotionally disturbed or even 

psychotic and still be capable of understanding the charges against him and of 

assisting his counsel.” State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 502 N.E.2d 1016 

(1986). 

{¶23} If the issue of competence is raised prior to trial, the court is required to 

hold a hearing; prior to the hearing the court may refer the defendant for an 
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evaluation, but is not required to do so. Id. At the competency hearing the defendant 

must be represented by counsel. R.C. 2945.37(D). Both the state and the defense 

are permitted, but not required, to submit evidence. Id. at (E). Neither the fact that a 

defendant is receiving or has received treatment for mental illness nor the fact that 

defendant has received or is receiving psychotropic drugs or other medication is 

sufficient to support an incompetence finding. R.C. 2945.37(F). A defendant may be 

found incompetent only if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

“because of the defendant’s present mental condition, the defendant is incapable of 

understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against the defendant or 

of assisting in the defendant’s defense.” R.C. 2945.37(G). A trial court’s 

competence finding will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Vrabel, 

supra, at ¶33. 

{¶24} In the matter at bar the trial court, on motion by defense counsel, 

ordered an evaluation and held a competency hearing. At the hearing, although no 

reference was made to a report, the court questioned Appellant extensively as to her 

understanding of the charges against her, the legal process, the role of the court, the 

jury, and the prosecutor, as well as her behavior before the court prior to and during 

the competency hearing. Appellant was responsive to the court, repeatedly indicated 

that she understood, and was able to coherently explain her behavior as well as her 

past treatment for depression following some earlier “traumatic event.” (Competency 

Tr., pp. 9-10.) Further, Appellant referred to her own pro se filing, on which the court 

had not yet ruled, demonstrating a clear understanding of the mechanics of court 

procedure. (Competency Tr., pp. 4-5.) Appellant offered nothing into evidence 
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during the hearing, prior to the hearing, or after the hearing indicating her alleged 

incompetence. Under the circumstances, where the record is “devoid of any 

objective indications” that Appellant’s competence should be questioned, and 

reliable, credible evidence supports a finding of competence, the trial court’s 

competency determination is well within the confines of discretion. State v. Chapin, 

67 Ohio St.2d 437, 441-442, 424 N.E.2d 317 (1981). Appellant’s first assignment of 

error is without merit and is overruled; the trial court’s finding of competence is 

affirmed. 

B. Validity of Appellant’s guilty plea 

{¶25} Appellant’s second assignment of error argues that because Appellant 

is incompetent, her plea was not knowingly or intelligently entered and therefore 

invalid. Because the record reflects Appellant’s competence, the only issue apparent 

with regard to the validity of Appellant’s change of plea is whether the court complied 

with the requirements of Crim.R. 11 when accepting her plea. State v. Kelley, 57 

Ohio St.3d 127, 128, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), (“When a trial court or appellate court is 

reviewing a plea submitted by a defendant, its focus should be on whether the 

dictates of Crim. R. 11 have been followed.”) 

{¶26} Section (C)(2) of Crim.R. 11 requires the court, prior to accepting a 

guilty plea, to determine that the defendant is “making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved,” 

and make the defendant aware of his or her eligibility for “probation or for the 

imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.” Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a). The trial court must further, prior to acceptance, inform the “defendant of 
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* * * the effect of the plea of guilty” and ascertain that the defendant understands that 

effect as well as the fact that the “court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed 

with judgment and sentence.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). Finally, the court must inform the 

defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, that “by the plea the 

defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, 

to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to 

require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at 

which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). 

{¶27} The record reflects that the court punctiliously adhered to Rule 11. 

(Change of Plea Tr., pp. 3-10.) Appellant testified that she went through the plea 

document, which includes all of the information required by Crim.R. 11, with her 

attorney, that her attorney read it for her in its entirety, and that she also read it 

herself. (Change of Plea Tr., pp. 9-10.) The record shows that the trial court, once it 

found Appellant competent, fully satisfied the requirements of Crim.R. 11 before 

accepting Appellant’s change of plea. Appellant’s second assignment of error is 

without merit and is overruled. 
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Assignment of Error No. Three

{¶28} MS. PEEPLES RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL. 

{¶29} Appellant acknowledges that the entry of a guilty plea ordinarily 

constitutes waiver of the right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Despite this, 

she argues that counsel’s substandard assistance rendered her plea “less than 

knowing and voluntary.” (Appellant’s Brf., p. 10.) Appellant claims that the fact that 

no independent evaluation of competence was requested by trial counsel and 

counsel presented no evidence of incompetence at the competency hearing, these 

failings somehow directly affected her decision to change her plea. Appellant’s 

argument misstates the nature of the requirement that the guilty plea be knowingly 

and intelligently entered. 

{¶30} As earlier discussed, unless the conduct of counsel prevented 

Appellant from understanding any of the elements identified in Crim.R. 11, counsel’s 

decisions as to the quantity and the nature of evidence up to that point in the 

proceeding are irrelevant to Appellant’s plea. Kelley, supra, at 130-131. The effect 

of the plea, absent evidence that the plea was in some way coerced, is to waive all 

errors that may have taken place prior to the entry of the plea. Appellant fails to 

establish any causal relationship between the absence of evidence of incompetence 

and her decision to change her plea. The record reflects full compliance with Crim.R. 

11 and includes Appellant’s statements that her plea was voluntary, that no one 

coerced her to change her plea, and that she had not received anything in exchange 

for making her plea. (Change of Plea Tr., p. 8.) Because Appellant has failed to 
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establish a connection between the alleged defects in assistance and the validity of 

her plea, she waived her right to argue counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness at the time 

she entered her plea. It is unnecessary for us to undertake our usual review of 

ineffective assistance claims pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 

(1984). Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit. The judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

CONCLUSION

{¶31} The trial court did not err in finding Appellant competent and Appellant’s 

guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently entered, in full compliance with Crim.R. 11. 

Appellant’s guilty plea waived any argument as to the effectiveness of counsel prior 

to the entry of her plea. Appellant’s three assignments of error are overruled and the 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Vukovich, J., concurs.