J-S20009-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

FRANCOIS HENDERSON,

Appellant No. 1383 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered on September 27, 2011

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004125-2010.

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J. and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 31, 2018

Francois Henderson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

after a jury convicted him of third-degree murder, possessing a firearm 

without a license, possessing an instrument of crime, and possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver. Henderson appeals the trial 

court’s denial of his claims that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. Upon review, we affirm.

The facts as summarized by the trial court, and previously adopted by 

a panel of this court, are as follows: 

On the evening of August 26, 2007, Chauncey Pringle was fatally 

shot outside of the Bookbindery Apartments in the city of 

Reading, Berks County. [Henderson] and David Troy Johnson 

were charged with homicide in connection with Mr. Pringle’s

murder. Latoya Aponte testified that on August 26, 2007 at 

approximately 8:00 p.m., Mr. Pringle visited her apartment 

located at the Bookbindery Apartments to watch a television 

show. She had known the victim for only a few weeks and the 
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two were friends. Ms. Aponte testified that while she was 

watching television with Mr. Pringle, she received several 

telephone calls from David Troy Johnson. According to Ms. 

Aponte, Johnson repeatedly asked about Mr. Pringle and tried to 

confirm that he was present in the apartment. In an attempt to 

stop the phone calls and persuade Johnson to leave the area, 

Ms. Aponte met Johnson outside of the Bookbindery Apartments. 

After a short conversation, Ms. Aponte returned to her 

apartment. She observed Johnson walk in the direction of the 

parking lot’s exit. 

At approximately 9:00 p.m., after the television show ended, Mr. 

Pringle and Ms. Aponte left the apartment to go to the comer 

tavern. When Ms. Aponte exited the building, she saw Johnson 

and another person she knew as ‘Rose,’ later identified as 

[Henderson], sitting on a nearby bench. Johnson and Pringle 

started conversing about giving each other alleged ‘looks’ and 

‘stares.’ At the same time, Ms. Aponte observed [Henderson] 

edging around a parked car in Pringle’s direction. When 

[Henderson] was approximately four to six feet away from 

Pringle, Ms. Aponte testified that she saw [Henderson] point a 

handgun at Mr. Pringle. Mr. Pringle held his hands up and began 

to retreat away from [Henderson] toward Fourth Street. Ms. 

Aponte testified that she turned and ran for the safety of her 

apartment building. Ms. Aponte heard several shots but did not 

see what happened to Mr. Pringle. She later learned that Mr. 

Pringle had become the victim of a homicide. 

At approximately 11:30 p.m., Reading Police responded to the 

100 block of North Fourth Street for reports of a shooting. The 

body of Chauncey Pringle was discovered in front of 122 North 

Fourth Street. Mr. Pringle was unresponsive and laying in the 

middle of the street. Emergency medical services personnel 

responded to the scene, but Mr. Pringle was pronounced 

deceased at 12:10 a.m. on August 27, 2007 in the Reading 

Hospital Emergency Room. 

Police recovered $68,900 in cash from the victim’s body as well 

as three cell phones and a Ruger P90 handgun. Evidence 

technicians photographed and collected several bullet casings 

and projectiles from the parking lot of the Bookbindery 

Apartments. These items were later submitted to the 

Pennsylvania State Police Crime Laboratory for analysis. 
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An autopsy of the victim was performed by pathologist Neil 

Hoffman, M.D. on August 27, 2007. Dr. Hoffman testified that 

the cause of the victim’s death was ‘perforation of bifurcation of 

the aorta due to gunshot wound to the abdomen.’ Dr. Hoffman 

was unable to recover ballistics evidence from the body, as the 

projectile entered the right side victim’s body and exited the left 

side. 

Police spoke with residents of the Bookbindery Apartments, 

including Ms. Aponte, and identified [Henderson] as a person of 

interest in Mr. Pringle’s death. Officers received information that 

[Henderson] was staying with a girlfriend at 511 North Court. On 

August 28, 2007, Reading Police located [Henderson] at that 

residence and took him into custody. After receiving consent to 

search the room where [Henderson]’s [sic] was arrested, police 

found a .45 caliber semi-automatic Sig Sauer handgun, 

additional .45 caliber rounds and twenty-nine (29) baggies of 

suspected crack cocaine. The evidence was secured and 

submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Laboratory for 

analysis and comparison with the items recovered from the 

Pringle homicide.[FN] 

___________________ 

[FN] Forensic Scientist James DiFlorio of the Pennsylvania 

State Police Crime Lab testified that the substance inside 

the baggies tested positive as cocaine and weighed 2.17 

grams. N.T. at 189. Criminal Investigator John Lackner of 

the Reading Police Department was qualified as an expert 

witness in the area of illegal drug trafficking and opined 

that the 29 baggies were possessed by [Henderson] with 

intent to distribute and not for mere possession. 

On December 4, 2007, Officer Christopher Dinger of the Reading 

Police Department recovered a Heckler & Koch .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun while assisting another officer in the arrest of 

David Troy Johnson. In a search incident to arrest, officers also 

recovered a fully-loaded [sic] magazine containing .45 caliber 

rounds from Johnson's pocket. These items were also submitted 

to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Laboratory for testing and 

comparison to evidence found at the scene of Mr. Pringle’s 

homicide. 

Sergeant Kurt Tempinski of the Pennsylvania State Police was 

qualified by the court as an expert in the area of firearms and 

toolmark examination. Sgt. Tempinski explained to the jury the 
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various tests that he performed on the ballistics evidence 

recovered from the shooting of Chauncey Pringle, including all 

three firearms involved in the incident as well as the shell 

casings, projectiles and bullet fragments. Sgt. Tempinski found 

that each firearm was operable and capable of firing the 

appropriate ammunition. Sgt. Tempinski testified that one of the 

casings (T-4) and a projectile (K-2) were fired from the Sig 

Sauer allegedly possessed by [Henderson] and used on August 

26, 2007. Additionally, another projectile (K-4), though too 

damaged for a conclusive match, was consistent with having 

been fired from [Henderson’s] Sig Sauer or the victim’s Ruger 

P90. 

The projectile marked as K-2, referred to by Tempinski as a 

‘discharged metal-jacketed bullet’ or ‘lead bullet core,’ was 

significantly less damaged than the other fragments. When 

asked to explain this difference, Sgt. Tempinski opined ‘[I]t’s 

been my experience that sometimes when bullets pass into soft 

tissue of a human being, that they remain pristine and intact.’ 

[Henderson] took the stand in his own defense and asserted that 

Mr. Pringle was the first to show a weapon and begin shooting. 

[Henderson] testified that, when he observed a gun in the 

victim’s waistband, he drew his own firearm and told Mr. Pringle 

to ‘stop reaching.’ [Henderson] stated that Mr. Pringle ‘started 

backing up screaming for help. He said - help they trying to kill 

me.’ 

[Henderson] admitted on cross-examination that on August 26, 

2007, he possessed the Sig Sauer .45 caliber firearm, concealed 

on his person, without a valid license. [Henderson] also 

explained that he did not believe his life was threatened until Mr. 

Pringle allegedly began shooting. [Henderson] stated that he 

was not trying, to intentionally kill the victim, but ‘trying to back 

Mr. Pringle off me.’ However, [Henderson] admitted that he 

drew his firearm first and held it on Mr. Pringle, as he believed 

that Pringle was ‘reaching’ for a concealed weapon. After the 

shooting, [Henderson] and Johnson fled the area. 

Commonwealth v. Henderson, 492 MDA 2013 unpublished memorandum 

at 1-5 (January 31, 2014) (citations omitted). 
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On September 8, 2011, a jury found Henderson guilty of third-degree 

murder, possessing a firearm without a license, possessing an instrument of 

crime, and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver,

1 but 

acquitted him of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit criminal 

homicide.2 On September 27, 2011, the trial court sentenced him to an 

aggregate term of 281⁄2 to 57 years imprisonment. 

From this judgment of sentence, Henderson filed a notice of appeal 

with this Court on October 27, 2011. The appeal was dismissed, however, 

based upon Henderson’s counsel’s failure to file the required docketing 

statement. Henderson filed a timely PCRA petition, which resulted in the 

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. A panel of this Court affirmed 

Henderson’s judgment of sentence. Id. at 10.

On October 24, 2014, Henderson filed another pro se PCRA petition 

raising ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failure to preserve weight of the 

evidence claims in his post-sentence motion. Counsel was appointed to 

represent Henderson on his PCRA. With the agreement of the 

Commonwealth, relief was granted in the form of reinstatement of 

Henderson’s post-sentence and direct appeal rights with respect to his 

weight claims. Henderson filed a post-sentence motion on March 31, 2017, 

which was denied by operation of law on August 2, 2017. Henderson 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 6106(a)(1), 907(b); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 903.
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appealed again, filing his Notice of Appeal on August 31, 2017. Henderson 

complied with the trial court’s directive to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. Thereafter, on October 23, 2017, the trial court 

issued its Rule 1925(a) Opinion. This matter is now before the court.

On appeal, Henderson raises the following issues for our review:

A. The trial court erred in denying [Henderson’s] post-sentence 

motion where all of the verdicts were against the weight of 

the evidence as it is clear from the record that no witness was 

able [to] affirmatively identify [Henderson] as the 

perpetrator.

B. The trial court erred in denying [Henderson’s] post-sentence 

motion where all of the verdicts were against the weight of 

the evidence as it is clear from the record that no physical 

evidence was presented by the Commonwealth to 

affirmatively establish [Henderson] as the perpetrator where 

the Pennsylvania State Police testified that any potential DNA 

evidence on the projectile from [Henderson’s] handgun was 

washed away prior to being tested and therefore it could not 

be determined if the projectile from [Henderson’s] handgun 

came into contact [with] the victim’s body.

C. The trial court erred in denying [Henderson’s] post-sentence 

motion where all of the verdicts were against the weight of 

the evidence as it is contrary to justice to believe that the 

jury and the trial court found credibility in most, if not all of 

the testimony of Latoya Aponte, witness for the 

Commonwealth, for the following reasons:

1. That it is clear from the record that Ms. Aponte could 

not have seen [Henderson] sufficiently enough to be 

able to affirmatively identify him as the perpetrator 

because it was nighttime and the area was poorly lit;

2. That is clear from the record that the trial testimony of 

Ms. Aponte, the only witness to the incident, was the 

product of an admitted liar; and,
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3. That it is clear from the record that Ms. Aponte did not 

see [Henderson] fire his weapon as she had turned her 

back on the situation and had run into her residence.

Henderson Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). All of 

Henderson’s issues challenge the weight of the evidence. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth the following standard 

of review for weight of the evidence claims:

The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie 

in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support. 

Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the 

trial court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

* * *

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a 

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the 

role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the 

facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore 

them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 

justice.

* * *

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight 

claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054–55 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). 
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In order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence before the trial court, “the evidence must be ‘so tenuous, vague 

and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.’” 

Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citations omitted). “Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear 

and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest 

consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when 

reviewing the trial court’s determination that the verdict is [or is not] against 

the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 

546 (Pa. Super. 2015) appeal denied, 138 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2016). Absent an 

abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed.” See

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 515 A.2d 865, 869 (Pa. 1986). 

Initially we note, as pointed out by the Commonwealth, that, although 

Henderson acknowledged application of the abuse of discretion standard by 

this Court, he does not specify how the trial court so abused its discretion. 

Rather, he asks this Court to reassess the credibility of the eyewitnesses and 

reweigh the testimony and evidence presented at trial. In view of the 

foregoing standard, it is clear that we cannot. Notwithstanding this, our 

review of the record and consideration of the trial court’s rationale for 

concluding that the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to “come 

as a shock to [the] court”, and, thus, denying Henderson’s motion, reveals 

no abuse of discretion. 
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Henderson first claims that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence because no witness directly identified him as the shooter. He 

argues a proper reweighing of the evidence would reveal this. 

In reaching its conclusion that the verdict was not against the weight 

of the evidence, the trial court stated that, although no one directly 

identified Henderson as the shooter that killed Mr. Pringle, the circumstantial 

evidence presented at trial clearly would allow the jury to conclude that 

Henderson killed Mr. Pringle. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/17, at 7. It is 

well established that the Commonwealth may meet its burden of proof 

wholly with circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Craybill, 926 A.2d 

488, 490 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Henderson admitted to being at the scene that night. An eyewitness 

saw Henderson point his gun at Mr. Pringle. Henderson himself admitted 

shooting his gun at Mr. Pringle. A Sig Sauer casing and projectile, which 

likely passed through human tissue, was found at the scene. At the time of 

his arrest, Henderson had a Sig Sauer in his possession. No evidence was 

presented that his counterpart, Johnson, had a gun on him that evening. 

His claim that no one identified him as the perpetrator fails. 

Henderson next claims that the sole eyewitness to the shooting, 

Latoya Aponte, was not credible, for several reasons, and therefore, the 

verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The trial court’s review

of the record recognized that, despite some weaknesses in Ms. Aponte’s 

testimony, it was within the province of the trier of fact to weigh the 
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credibility of the witnesses and to believe all or part, or none of their 

testimony, including Ms. Aponte’s. See Commonwealth v. Zingarelli, 

839 A.2d 1064, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2003). The trial court concluded that the 

jury believed all or some of Ms. Aponte’s testimony in reaching their verdict. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/17, at 10. Thus, Henderson’s challenge to 

Ms. Aponte’s credibility fails.

Lastly, Henderson claims that the jury’s verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence because there was no physical evidence to affirmatively 

establish him as the shooter. The DNA evidence on the projectile from 

Henderson’s gun was washed away prior to testing. Therefore, it could not 

be determined that it came into contact with Mr. Pringle. Moreover, 

Henderson claims, the destruction of such potentially exculpatory evidence 

dictates a new trial.

In addressing this issue, the trial court concluded that DNA evidence 

was not necessary to conclusively establish guilt. The Commonwealth 

presented other physical and circumstantial evidence, which taken together,

made a strong case in support of the jury’s finding of guilt. We agree. 

Henderson’s claims regarding the absence of physical evidence also fail.

In sum, the trial court’s conclusion, that the verdict was not so 

contrary to the evidence so as to shock the conscience of the court, was 

supported by the record in this case. We, therefore, find that the trial court 

properly exercised its discretion, and affirm Henderson’s judgment of 

sentence.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/31/18