16-1855 Ramirez-Gonzalez v. Sessions BIA Verrillo, IJ A206 629 325 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**  **ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED**  **WITH THIS**  **COURT, A**  **PARTY MUST**  **CITE EITHER**  **THE FEDERAL**  **APPENDIX OR**  **AN ELECTRONIC**  **DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY**  **OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States** 2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the** 3 **3 rd**  **day of October, two thousand seventeen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **DENNIS JACOBS,** 7 **PIERRE N. LEVAL,** 8 **RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **SAN HUMBERTO RAMIREZ-GONZALEZ,** 13 Petitioner **,** 14 15 **v. 16-1855** 16 **NAC** 17 **JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,** 18 **UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent **.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER:** Gregory Osakwe, Hartford, CT. 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy 25 Assistant Attorney General, Carl H. 26 McIntyre, Assistant Director, 27 Justin R. Markel, Senior Litigation 28 Counsel, Office of Immigration 29 Litigation, United States 30 Department of Justice, Washington, 31 DC. 322 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 3

DENIED. 4 Petitioner San Humberto Ramirez-Gonzalez, a native and 5 citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of a May 18, 2016, decision 6 of the BIA affirming a September 22, 2015, decision of an 7 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ramirez-Gonzalez’s 8 application for asylum and withholding of removal. 1 In re San 9 Humberto Ramirez-Gonzalez, No. A206 629 325 (B.I.A. May 18, 10 2016), aff’g No. A206 629 325 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Sept. 22, 11 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 12 facts and procedural history in this case. 13 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 14 the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 15 Wangchuck v. DHS , 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The 16 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1252(b)(4); Gjolaj v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration 18
Servs. , 468 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2006). 19

1 Ramirez-Gonzalez does not challenge the denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture. Norton v. Sam’s Club , 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”).3 To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of 1 removal based on membership in a particular social group, the 2 applicant must establish both that the group is legally 3 cognizable, see Paloka v. Holder , 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 4 2014), and that the applicant has suffered past persecution or 5 has demonstrated a well-founded fear or likelihood of future 6 persecution on account of her membership in that group, see 7 Rodas Castro v. Holder , 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010), i.e., 8 that the membership in the group is “at least one central reason 9 for persecuting the applicant,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 10 A particular social group is cognizable if it refers to “a 11 discrete class of persons” and “the relevant society perceives, 12 considers, or recognizes the group as a distinct social group.” 13 Matter of W-G-R- , 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 210, 217 (BIA 2014); see 14 Paloka , 762 F.3d at 195 (according deference to the BIA’s 15 construction of “particular social group”). 16 The agency reasonably determined that Ramirez-Gonzalez was 17 targeted by gang members for recruitment, and not because of 18 his membership in any particular social group. 19 Ramirez-Gonzalez testified that the gang members chased and 20 beat him because they wanted him to join their organization. 21 He presented no evidence that the gang members targeted him 224 because of his proposed particular social group, “young males 1 with discernible ability to earn money. The agency’s 2 determination that Ramirez-Gonzalez failed to establish past 3 persecution on account of a protected ground was supported by 4 substantial evidence. Paloka , 762 F.3d at 196-97 (whether 5 persecution occurs “on account of” a protected ground “depends 6 on the views and motives of the persecutor” (internal quotation 7 marks omitted)). Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey , 509 F.3d 70, 73-74 8 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting proposed social group where “harm 9 visited upon members of a group is attributable to the 10 incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to 11 persecution”). 12 Nor is the additional group that Ramirez-Gonzalez 13 proposes—“young Guatemalan men who face gang violence”—legally 14 cognizable. The U.S. State Department report he relies on 15 indicates that gang violence is widespread in Guatemala. Any 16 group premised on facing such violence lacks particularity. 17 See Matter of M-E-V-G- , 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (BIA 2014) 18 (particular social group cannot be “amorphous, overbroad, 19 diffuse, or subjective”). Individuals targeted for gang 20 recruitment “make up a potentially large and diffuse segment 21 of society.” Matter of S-E-G- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (BIA 225 2008). And a particular social group cannot be defined solely 1 by the harm its members have suffered. Ucelo-Gomez , 509 F.3d 2 at 73 (“[A] social group cannot be defined exclusively by the 3 fact that its members have been subjected to harm.” (internal 4 quotation marks omitted)). 5 Nor did the agency err in holding that Ramirez-Gonzalez did 6 not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution on 7 account of a protected ground. Ramirez-Gonzalez has failed 8 to establish any protected ground for which he might be 9 persecuted in the future. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 10 Because Ramirez-Gonzalez has not met his burden of proof 11 for his asylum claim, he has not met the higher standard required 12 to succeed on his claim for withholding of removal. See Paul 13 v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). 14 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 15 DENIED. As we have completed our rev iew, any stay of removal 16 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 17 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 18 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 19 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 20
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226 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and S econd Circuit Local Rule 1 34.1(b). 2
FOR THE COURT: 3 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4