J-S12026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ONEARL ISSAC PARKER, III 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1458 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0000823-2020

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2023

Onearl Isaac Parker, III (Appellant), appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, following 

his open guilty plea and convictions of criminal attempt (attempted homicide), 

aggravated assault, persons not to possess a firearm, firearms not to be 

carried without a license, delivery of marijuana, and possession with intent to 

deliver (PWID).1 The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 18 1/2 to 

40 years’ incarceration. Appellant complains the trial court’s aggregate 

sentence, including consecutive sentences, was so manifestly excessive as to 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1)(4), 6105(a)(1), and 6106(a)(1); see 

also 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(30). 
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constitute an abuse of the court’s discretion. Based on the following, we 

affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

At his open guilty plea, Appellant agreed to the following material facts 

as presented by the Commonwealth: 

On Christmas night of 2019, the victim [Simon Joseph] and 

[Appellant] had a long-standing relationship of approximately four 

to five years where the victim would [meet up with] [Appellant] 

on a somewhat weekly basis, purchase a small amount of 

marijuana. On this particular night, [Joseph] met up with 

[Appellant] and purchased this amount of marijuana where he 

gave [Appellant] $70 in exchange for approximately 10.62 grams 

of marijuana. He did question the amount of the marijuana that 

he had been given. [Appellant] began to act strange, wanted to 

take the marijuana back from the victim, and started walking in 

circles. At one point, [Joseph tried] to leave the scene. When he 

turned his back to leave, [Appellant] began to shoot him multiple 

times. Once [Joseph] was down on his knees, he was pistolwhipped in the back of his head with the gun. 

[Appellant] then pointed the gun at [Joseph’s] head and 

pulled the trigger; however, the gun was out of bullets at this 

point. 

[Appellant] took off running at which point [Joseph] was 

rushed to Lancaster General Hospital where he received lifesaving 

medical treatment, and without this treatment he would have 

died.

After an investigation by the Manheim Township Police 

Department, [Appellant] was arrested the following day. [A 

s]ubsequent search warrant of [Appellant]’s apartment yielded 

over two pounds of marijuana and drug paraphernalia along with 

a firearm that was found on [Appellant]’s bathroom floor. This 

firearm was tested ballistically and found to match the fired shell 

casings that were found at the shooting scene. 
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It was determined that [Appellant] was a person not to 

possess as he had two prior adjudications in 2011, one for 

aggravated assault and one for a robbery.

He also did not possess a valid license to carry this firearm.

N.T., 3/21/22, at 9-10.2

Appellant was subsequently charged with criminal attempted homicide, 

aggravated assault, prohibited possession of a firearm, carrying a firearm 

without a license, delivery of marijuana, and PWID. See Information, 

2/28/22. 

On March 21, 2022, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to all six 

counts. See N.T., 3/21/22, at 9. The trial court ordered the completion of a 

pre-sentence investigation (PSI), including a mental health evaluation. See 

id. at 14; see also Order, 3/22/22. On September 8, 2022, the trial court 

imposed an aggregate sentence of 18 1/2 to 40 years’ incarceration. 

Specifically, Appellant was sentenced to the following: (1) a term of 17 1/2 to 

35 years’ incarceration for the attempted homicide conviction; (2) a 

concurrent term of six to 12 years’ imprisonment for persons not to possess 

firearms; (3) a concurrent term three-and-one-half to seven years’ 

incarceration for firearms not to be carried without a license; (3) a concurrent 

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2 Appellant disputed the allegations that he “pistol-whipp[ed] [Joseph] and 

[stood] over him with the empty gun,” but otherwise agreed with the 

Commonwealth’s recitation of the facts. N.T., 3/21/22, at 11. Counsel noted 

that despite the factual dispute, “the elements of the crime are still present.” 

Id.
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term of one to five years’ imprisonment for delivery of marijuana; and (4) a 

consecutive term of one to five years’ incarceration for PWID. See N.T., 

9/8/22, at 18-19. The aggravated assault conviction merged with the 

attempted homicide conviction for sentencing purposes.3

On September 15, 2022, Appellant filed a timely motion to reconsider 

his sentence. He alleged it was “shocking, cruel, and totally insensitive” that 

the trial court inflicted a near-maximum sentence, despite the presence of 

mitigating factors including his “acceptance of responsibility, remorse, mental 

and emotional health issues, and the lack of any significant record or violence.” 

Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider Sentence, 9/15/22, at 1. The trial court 

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion the next day.4

Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a 

timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on 

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3 The court also ordered Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $454.52. 

See N.T., 9/8/22, at 19.

4 Nearly two weeks later, the trial court received a handwritten pro se 

submission from Appellant amending his post-sentence motion to include an 

ineffective counsel claim, based on counsel’s “fail[ure] to have a mental health 

professional/expert evaluate [Appellant] after the court’s evaluator diagnosed 

[him],” allegedly prejudiced remarks by defense counsel during sentencing, 

and a breakdown in communication with defense counsel about subpoenas 

and his first plea offer. He also reiterated the discretionary sentencing claims 

already set forth by defense counsel. Appellant’s Pro Se Letter, 9/27/22, at 1 

(unpaginated). The court ordered the pro se correspondence be entered on 

the docket on October 11, 2022, and served on the parties. See Order, 

10/11/22, at 1. 
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appeal. See Notice of Appeal, 10/17/22; see also Appellant’s Statement of 

Errors Complained of On Appeal, 11/15/22.5 The trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) opinion on December 7, 2022. 

II. Statement of Issue on Appeal

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

I. Was the trial court’s aggregate sentence of 18.5 to 40 years 

of incarceration so manifestly excessive under the circumstances 

of the instant case, especially considering [Appellant]’s 

circumstances, and was the imposition of consecutive sentences 

an abuse of the court’s discretion?

Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

Appellant’s argument that his sentence was manifestly excessive in light 

of his personal circumstances and the court’s imposition of consecutive 

sentences presents an issue regarding the discretionary aspects of sentencing. 

III. Standard of Review

The standard of review for discretionary aspects of sentencing is wellsettled as an abuse of discretion. “[T]here is no absolute right to appeal when 

challenging the discretionary aspect of a sentence. . . . Rather, an [a]ppeal 

is permitted only after this Court determines that there is a substantial 

question that the sentence was not appropriate under the sentencing code.” 

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5 Additionally, on April 24, 2023, Appellant filed a letter with this Court, 

requesting copies of his guilty plea transcripts. See Pro Se Letter, 4/23/23. 

That same day, this Court forwarded Appellant’s pro se letter to his counsel 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011). See Jette

Letter, 4/24/23.
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Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations & quotation marks omitted). Further, it merits mention that a guilty 

plea without any sentencing restrictions does not bar a discretionary 

sentencing claim. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. 

2013). In order to successfully preserve a discretionary sentencing challenge, 

an appellant must satisfy the following test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under 

the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted).

The determination of whether a substantial question has been raised is 

made “on a case-by-case basis; the fact that a sentence is within the statutory 

limits does not mean a substantial question cannot be raised.” 

Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(internal citation omitted). We have held before that a substantial question is 

raised where an appellant notes “an excessive sentence claim [ ] in

conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating

factors.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citation omitted); see also Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1271-72 (holding that a

substantial question was found where [an a]ppellant challenged
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unreasonableness of sentence in combination with trial court’s failure to

consider nature of the defendant’s offenses, despite aggregate sentence

falling within standard guidelines range).

Here, the record reflects that Appellant has fulfilled the first three 

requirements required to warrant appellate review of a discretionary 

sentencing claim. Appellant satisfied the first two prongs by timely filing both 

a motion to reconsider his sentence and notice of appeal.6 Appellant also 

included a compliant Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. See

Appellant’s Brief at 10. Finally, Appellant has raised a substantial question by 

combining his claim of an excessive sentence with an allegation that the trial 

court failed to consider his mitigating factors and rehabilitative needs when 

assigning his sentence. See Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770. Appellant has 

therefore satisfied all elements required to grant appellate review. 

IV. Analysis

In his sole argument on appeal, Appellant avers that the trial court failed 

to adequately consider his personal mitigating circumstances and 

rehabilitative needs and, as a result, imposed a sentence that was “so 

manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 16. Appellant claims the court should have considered the following 

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6 See Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider Sentence at 1-2; see also Notice of 

Appeal, 10/17/22.
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mitigating evidence: (1) his substance abuse problems; (2) he erroneously 

believed he was being robbed by the victim; (3) his mental health issues in 

addition to his drug and alcohol usage “triggered a paranoia attack and false 

belief, causing him to do what he did[;]”7 and (4) he expressed remorse at 

sentencing and accepted responsibility by pleading guilty to all charges. See

id. at 18-20. Appellant concludes, “Although the [trial c]ourt claims to have 

taken the above mitigation into consideration, the resulting sentence does not 

reflect that. There was no need to warehouse [Appellant] for that extreme 

length of time.” Id. at 20.

The trial court’s breadth of discretion at sentencing is well-settled:

[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Moreover, the 

sentencing court has broad discretion in choosing the range of 

permissible confinements which best suits a particular defendant 

and the circumstances surrounding his crime. . . . [I]n imposing 

a sentence, the trial judge may determine whether, given the facts 

of a particular case, a sentence should run consecutive to or 

concurrent with another sentence being imposed.

Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 365, 370 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). We have held that the trial court’s 

sentence is presumed to be thoroughly reasoned and should be upheld except 

in extreme circumstances: 

When imposing sentence, the trial court is required to 

consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the 

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7 Appellant’s Brief at 19.
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character of the defendant. The trial court should refer to the 

defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics, 

and potential for rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing 

judge had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report 

(“PSI”), it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the 

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory 

factors.

[Moreover,] [w]hen imposing a sentence, the sentencing 

court must consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), 

that is, the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation

to impact on the victim and community, and rehabilitative needs 

of the defendant. . . . Furthermore, [a] trial court judge has wide 

discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and 

for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing 

a sentence[.] The sentencing court, however, must also consider 

the sentencing guidelines.

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959-960 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(internal citations omitted). 

Here, a review of the record reveals the following. The trial court had 

the benefit of the PSI. See N.T., 3/8/22, at 3. Appellant had a prior record 

score (PRS) of five. See N.T., 9/8/22, at 4; see also Guideline Sentence 

Forms, 4/27/22. The offense gravity score (OGS) for each of his convictions 

are as follows: (1) criminal attempt (attempted homicide) was 14, (2) 

aggravated assault was 11, (3) persons not to possess a firearm was 11, (4) 

possession of a firearm without a license was nine, (5) delivery of marijuana 

was three, and (6) PWID was five. The applicable sentencing guidelines 

provide that the standard ranges were: (1) 210 to 240 months’ imprisonment 

for attempted homicide; (2) 90 to 108 months’ incarceration for aggravated 
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assault;8 (3) 72 to 90 months’ imprisonment for persons not to possess a 

firearm; (4) 42 months’ incarceration for possession of a firearm without a 

license;9 (5) six to 16 months’ imprisonment for delivery of marijuana, and 

(6) 12 to 18 months’ incarceration for PWID. See Pennsylvania Commission 

on Sentencing Guideline Sentence Form, 4/27/22, at 1-7. Each sentence fell 

within the standard guidelines range for the corresponding offense. See Trial 

Ct. Op., 12/7/22, at 5. 

Moreover, at the September 8, 2022, sentencing proceeding, the 

Commonwealth emphasized the gravity of Appellant’s conduct, stating “the 

only set of circumstances . . . that makes us not here for a homicide 

sentencing as opposed to an attempted homicide sentencing is the fact that 

[Appellant] ran out of bullets[.]”. N.T., 9/8/22, at 5. The Commonwealth 

further stated the victim “is very lucky to be alive” because he “suffered 

serious bodily injury.” Id. at 6. The Commonwealth asked the court to hold 

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8 A deadly weapon enhancement was applied to the attempted homicide and 

aggravated assault sentences.

9 Our review of the sentencing guidelines indicates that the standard range for 

the offense of possession of a firearm without a license — where the OGS is 

nine and the PRS is five — is a term of 48 to 60 months. See 204 Pa. Code § 

303.16(a). Appellant does not raise an argument regarding the different 

ranges. In any event, Appellant received the benefit because his sentence 

would have fallen in the mitigated range.
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Appellant “accountable for what he’s done and fashion a sentence that is in 

accordance with the sentencing guidelines.” Id.10

Defense counsel argued that Appellant is not “a person that has been 

engaged in violent behavior[.]” N.T., 9/8/22, at 7. Counsel also highlighted 

the purported role played by mental illness and addiction in Appellant’s 

wrongful conduct, as well as Appellant’s acceptance of responsibility. See 

N.T., 9/8/22, at 6-10. Counsel stated: “[T]here’s no doubt in my mind that 

something happened there that triggered the paranoia in [Appellant] where 

[he] felt that he was going to be robbed [by the victim].” Id. at 7-8.

Appellant also invoked his right to allocution, reciting a letter he wrote 

to the victim and the trial court: 

I want to apologize to the victim for the pain I caused and 

inflicted. I’m deeply sorry. I’m remorseful. I also want to 

apologize to the victim’s parents because I have a son and I don’t 

know what I would do in [a] situation like this if it happened to 

my son. I also want to apologize to everybody here, like the 

courts and everybody, for exhausting your resources on a crime 

that . . . should not have been committed in the first place.

I’m not a bad person. I made a mistake. Some mistakes 

are worse than others. I’m truly sorry for everything. 

Your Honor, I inflicted a lot of people with a bad decision I 

made. I ask that you shed a light on my lack of record and the 

fact that this is my first time being incarcerated in Lancaster 

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10

 The Commonwealth also raised at sentencing that a prior “psychiatrist 

[gave] the implication that [Appellant] was playing up some [of] the [mental 

health] criteria that he presented because that was a court-ordered 

evaluation,” referring to a discrepancy in some diagnoses between his 2011 

and 2022 evaluations. N.T., 9/8/22, at 5.
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County Prison, and I’m going to make it my last. I don’t want to 

waste my life in jail. And just I hope I can get a second chance. 

I hope I can get a second chance because I still have goals I want 

to accomplish. 

My first goal is to get another trade and a job. I want to be 

a productive person in society and still have a chance to see my 

kids grow up and everything, do everything the right way, raise 

them the right way. And I apologize. That’s all.

N.T., 9/8/22, at 10-11. 

Later in the proceeding, the trial court extensively discussed Appellant’s 

background and its reasoning behind the sentencing, even lamenting the 

difficulty of determining an appropriate sentence:

I will note for the record that I have considered the penalties 

authorized by the legislature. I’ve considered the sentencing 

guideline as submitted and applicable ranges. I’ve considered 

facts and circumstances of the underlying offenses. I’ve 

considered the entirety of the presentence investigation, including 

all attachments, those attachments being court documentation 

regarding the current offenses, a 2011 psychological evaluation 

conducted by Dr. Hugh Smith[, Ph.D.], and a 2022 psychological 

evaluation ordered as part of the presentence investigation by Dr. 

[Zoë Selhi, M.D.]. I’ve also considered, with great consideration, 

the extent of the sentencing memorandums submitted by counsel 

for the [Appellant] and all of the letters attached thereto. I’ve 

considered the position of the [prosecutor], the comments of 

[defense counsel] and the [Appellant]’s comments here today. 

I’ve considered the [Appellant]’s rehabilitative needs, the need for 

there to be a deterrence and the need for the protection of the 

entire community.

* * *

It is noted that the troubled foster placements led to certain 

emotional and mental distress on the part of [Appellant], 

aggressive outbursts on the part of [Appellant] and a delayed 

ability to speak. In addition, [Appellant] was subject to violence 

as a child in Philadelphia.
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* * *

As noted, [Appellant] is high school graduate, having 

graduated from the Warwick School District in 2015. There was 

also certain vocational technical training [Appellant] received 

during his academic years. It is noted that [Appellant] did and 

was subject to an Individualized Education Plan and there was a 

noted history of certain emotional behavior difficulties during his 

academic years. 

As discussed, [Appellant] has a 2011 juvenile conviction for 

aggravated assault and robbery. There’s another juvenile 

misdemeanor conviction. As an adult there’s a 2014 disorderly 

conduct and paraphernalia, in 2015 a small amount of marijuana, 

and in 2016 criminal trespass, theft from a motor vehicle and 

other minor offenses. 

[Appellant] does have a notable mental health history that 

was reflected in detail in the [PSI] and in all reports that I 

reviewed. [Appellant] was diagnosed with [attention-deficit 

disorder (ADD), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)], 

Mixed Reception Expressive Language Disorder and potential 

academic concerns at a young [age]. There was some treatment 

of those as a teen. In a 2011 [Doctor] Hugh Smith report it spoke 

about the potential diagnosis of Disruptive Behavior Disorder and 

cannabis abuse. 

In 2020, the most recent report, reflected [post traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD)], substance abuse disorder, ADD, potential 

persuasive development disorder and potential intellectual 

development disorder. There were additional evaluations 

contained in [Appellant’s] sentencing memorandum, which also 

reflected similar diagnoses. 

In addition, [Appellant] has a notable drug and alcohol 

history, again, using alcohol sporadically between the ages of 13 

and 14. From the ages of 20 and 21 until his current incarceration, 

[Appellant] was using alcohol on a daily basis. It is noted that 

[Appellant] considers himself to be an alcoholic and three times 

suffered from alcohol poisoning. [Appellant] began using 

marijuana at age 12 and there’s a long-term daily usage of 

marijuana. In addition, there was use of Xanax beginning at ages 

13 and 14 that was daily between the ages of 18 and 21, Percocet 

beginning at age 18 daily until the time of his current incarceration 
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and certain other experimentation between the ages of 20 and 21 

involving the use of Ecstasy, methamphetamine, [phencyclidine 

piperidine (PCP)] and cough syrup. There’s no history of any drug 

or alcohol counseling or treatment. 

It is noted that [Appellant] has a sporadic employment 

history having worked in packing facilities, demolition work and 

food service, however, [Appellant] also has a demonstrable 

history of receiving Social Security disability payments.

[Appellant], I will tell you when I was a practicing attorney 

maybe I thought judges had it easy. I thought judges would look 

at the sentencing guidelines and make sentencing decisions 

easily. I have learned over the last nine years this job is far from 

easy because I have to take into account the entirety of the 

situation, the entirety of what happened, the entirety of who you 

are as a person and what your needs may be. And I will tell you 

that that is not an easy job. . . . 

I have no doubt you are remorseful. . . . And [defense 

counsel] is right that you stepped up and accepted responsibility. 

And that will be considered. . . .

[B]ut on the other hand, everything [the prosecutor] said is 

absolutely correct too. But for running out of bullets, we can only 

fear where we would have been today. . . .

As much as I’m sympathetic to your situation, I can tell you 

that selling drugs, whether it be other drugs or whether it be 

marijuana, has an absolutely detrimental effect on his community. 

And all of that, in its entirety, is what I have to weigh and what I 

have weighed. I have no doubt that a sentence of incarceration 

is warranted, because a lesser sentence would depreciate[] the 

seriousness of your actions.

N.T., 9/8/22, at 16-18.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court again cited the seriousness 

of Appellant’s conduct as a determining factor in assigning his sentence, 

stating:
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In sentencing Appellant in the instant matter, the court was 

guided by an extensive [PSI]. In fashioning sentence, the court 

gave thoughtful consideration to: the penalties authorized by the 

Legislature; the sentencing guidelines and all of the applicable 

ranges, including the standard aggravated and mitigated ranges; 

the facts and circumstances of the current offenses; the [PSI] and 

all attachments thereto, including a 2011 psychological evaluation 

conducted by Dr. Hugh Smith and a 2022 psychological evaluation 

. . . by Dr. [Selhi]; the comments made by the attorney for the 

Commonwealth; the comments of Appellant’s attorney; the 

position of Appellant; the sentencing mitigation memorandum 

submitted by Appellant; Appellant’s rehabilitative needs; the need 

for there to be a deterrence; and, the need for the protection of 

the entire community. 

The court extensively considered and discussed Appellant’s 

age, the troubled nature of his formative years, the abuse that 

Appellant had witnessed and suffered, Appellant’s positive 

relationship with his mother, the strong bond that Appellant 

shares with his two children, his educational background, his 

criminal history, his mental health history, his drug and alcohol 

history, his sporadic employment history, his physical health, and 

the sincerity of his remorse for his actions. In addition, the court 

openly discussed the difficulty that was presented by sentencing 

in this matter. 

As reflected in the aforementioned comments and 

considerations noted by the court, th[e] court found sentencing in 

this matter to be a difficult task. The court believes that sentences 

in the standard range were appropriate and that any lesser 

sentences would depreciate the seriousness of this conduct. In 

addition, th[e] court could not overlook the fact that Appellant 

both attempted to end the life of a fellow citizen and engaged 

extensively in dealing drugs within the community. As such, the 

imposition of a sole consecutive sentence is not excessive or 

unreasonable.

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8 (citations omitted).

Pursuant to our standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion with regard to Appellant’s sentence for several reasons. 

First, we note that “[w]here the sentencing court impose[s] a standard-range 
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sentence with the benefit of a pre-sentence report, we will not consider the 

sentence excessive.” Bankes, 286 A.3d at 1307-1308 (internal quotation 

omitted). As mentioned above, the trial court had the benefit of a PSI when 

it imposed Appellant’s standard range sentences. 

Second, contrary to Appellant’s assertions, it is clear the trial court 

carefully considered his personal history and rehabilitative needs, as well as 

his personal letter, openly acknowledging them at the sentencing hearing and 

in its Rule 1925(a) opinion as recited above. Furthermore, with respect to 

Appellant’s complaint that the trial court failed to consider his expression of 

remorse, the court explicitly stated it took that into consideration. See Trial 

Ct. Op. at 8. Appellant fails to accept that even considering the mitigating 

factors detailed in the PSI and at the sentencing hearing, the trial court found, 

after careful deliberation, a significant sentence of incarceration was 

warranted in light of the seriousness of Appellant’s conduct and the protection 

of the community. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959-

960. Nonetheless, the trial court acknowledged Appellant’s difficult past and 

circumstances, ultimately imposing standard range sentences based on the 

gravity of the offense. See id. For the foregoing reasons, we discern the trial 

court was within its discretion regarding Appellant’s aggregate sentence. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/28/2023