### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 70 -C R

______________________________ HARRY EUGENE PETRI E, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 115th J udicial District Court

Upshur County , Texas Trial Court No. 14,008

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleySee T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22.021 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). 1 See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.072 (V ernon 2005)
. 2 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Har ry Eug ene Petr ie, Defenda

nt below, appeals hi s conviction by a jury for the a g g ravated sexual assault of V.J ., a child (Sec tio n 2 2
. 0 2 1 of the Te x as Penal Code) , claiming two points of 1
err or: (1) that the trial court e rre d in allowing a fore nsic interviewe r with a ch ild advocac y g roup to t e sti fy a s an o utc ry

wi tne ss, ma int a ini ngthat th e c hil d' s f a the r w a s th e so le pe rson to qu a lif y to te sti fy in t hat c a pa c ity and (2 ) that the De fe nd ant re c e ive d ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l at tr ia l. We a ff ir m. I. P RO P ER

OU TC RYWI TN ESS "H ear say " is a

statement, ot her than one made by the dec lara

nt while testifying at the trial or hear ing, of

fer ed in evidenc e to prove the truth of the matter asser ted. T EX . R. E V ID . 801(d). He arsa y testimony is ge nera lly

inadmissible at trial. See T EX . R. E V ID . 802. Ho we ve r, the Te xas L e g isl a tur e re c og nize d th e dif fi c ult y wh ic h th e pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t hear say testimony

presen t s i n some circ umstances a nd, in response, e nacte d Article 38.072 of the Te xas C od e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure . Th is A rt ic le is 2 a rule of evide nce a dmissibi lity , allowi n g trial courts to admit some hea rsay state me nts in t

he pr os e c uti on

of c e rt a in o ff

e ns e s a g a ins t c hil dr e n w he n th os e statements ar e made under the specifie d conditions. This statute serves the societa l interests of pr omoting the f air p ro s ecution of child abuse ca ses and of protec ting children in c ourt by

allowing the admission of their ca s u a l " street c orner " c onfidenc es3

to an adult as a

supplement to (or sometimes eve n a substitute for) what may be halting, inc ohere nt, or traumatic in- court testimony
. Ma rti ne z v . S tate , 178 S.W .3d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Restrictions to this exception to the hearsay rule ex ist. P ertinent to this case , it is required that the statements were made (a) by the child ag ainst whom the offe nse wa s alleg edly committed;
and (b ) t o th e fi rs t pe rs on , e ig hte e n y e ars of a g e or old e r, oth e r t

ha n th e de fe nd ant, to who m th e c hil d made a statement about the of

fense
. This kind of statement made by a child victim to an adult is usua lly called an "o u tcry state me nt" and

the pe rs on

to who m th e pr of

fe re d s ta te me nts are ma de by

the c hi ld is c omm on ly cal ledth e "out cry

wi tn ess ." Ro bin so n v . S

tate , 985 S.W .2d 584, 586 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 19 98 , p e t. r e f' d) . T he De fe nd ant ar g ue s tha t the fathe r o f t he c hil d v ic tim(a

nd no t Ma rt ha Dy ke s, the child fore nsic interviewe r) was the first per son to whom the child made a n outcry statement; the De fe nd ant, the re fo re, con tends that th e fathe r o f t he c hil d w a s th e pr op e r o utc ry wi tne ss. Acc ording ly , Petrie complains that the testimony of the for ensic intervie wer was inadmissible as hear say . A. F actual Circ um stance V.J ., the child victim, is the daughter of R icky and J oanna, who are divorce d. Ricky is the primary custodial pare nt of the child. Ricky has a live-in g irlfriend, Janie, who had thr ee sons pr ior t o h a v i n g b e g u nr e s i d e n c e w i t h R i c ky an d o n e s o n b y R i c ky a f t e r t h e y b e g ant o l i v e t o g e t h e r . R i c ky, J anie, a nd the four boy s reside in one mobile home
. V.J
. sleeps at her pater nal g randpa

rents' home,4

which is another

mobile home only

a short wa lk down a pa t h fr om Ricky ' s home; beca use of the proxi mity of the two homes, V.J
. spends a g ood portion of her day at Ricky ' s home. J anie does not work outside the home a

nd is present most of the time. J anie wa s ag hast when she enter ed the living room of the home and discove red V .J . (six y ear s
o l d at t h e t i m e o f t h i s i n ci d en tan d ei gh t y ea rs o l d at t h e ti m e of t ri al ) p er fo rm i n g fe l l at i o o nJ an i e's three -y ear -old son. J anie immediately telephoned Ricky , who was at his parents' home and Ricky and his pare nts all hurried ove r to Ricky ' s house. Ricky and V.J. discussed "what had taken place and ask(e d) why ," a talk which lasted about twenty to twenty -five minutes; during this talk, V.J. confided to Ricky that her materna l gr andfather (the De fenda

nt) had taug ht her to do that, g oing on to say that the Defenda nt had spanke d her a

nd made he r do that to him, that s h e h ad not told her fathe r bec ause the Def endant ha d said that he would kill R icky if she told, that the incident had oc curr ed in the De fenda nt's living room, and that the pater nal g randmother was in the house when it ha ppened. I n addition, he testified that V.J . had said that she had told he r mother previously , but that he r mother had said to just keep he r mouth shut about it. Ricky

said that althoug h V.J . said that her g ran d fa t h er ha d made he r do that more tha n
on c e , s he ne ith e r g a ve any de ta ils a bo ut a ny oth e r s uc h in c ide nt, ho w many tim e s h e wo uld take his penis from he r mouth and re inse rt i t wh en t h ese inc idents occur red, nor her f eeling s about the incidents. I t was mentioned that Ricky ' s mother also spoke with the c hild at that time reg ardingthe incident, but the testimony did not revea l the content of that discussion.5

Th e sh e ri ff

wa s im me diate ly

c a lle d a nd an a pp oin tme nt w a s ma de fo r V .J
. to sp e a k to
someone at the Northea st Te x as Child Advoc acy Center (CAC) within da y s afte r V.J.'s re velation of the oc curr ence of the sexual assault. Dy kes, the c hild forensic inter viewer with the CAC, did an extensive interview of ove r an hour and elicited substantial details from V.J
. conce rning the conduc t be tw e e n V .J. and

the De fe nd ant. B
. Rulin g on Ob jec tion to Hearsay The De fenda

nt had bee n g iven prior notice of the intention of the State to ca ll Dy kes t o testify as the outcr

y witness. At a hea

ring outside the prese nce of the jury , the Def

endant a rg ued that the

" fi rs t pe rs on " to w ho m V .J. mad e a st ateme nt a bo ut t he of fe ns e wa s h e r f

a the r, no t D y

ke s. Hi s argument was that since there can only be one outc ry

witness, Dy

kes could not testify

about information re lated to her by V.J . Duringthe hea

ring , both Dy

kes and Ricky

wer e q u es t i o n ed on
v o i r d i r e t o p r o v i d e a

s u m m ar y o f t h e s u b s t an c e o f

t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h V
. J. A f t er t h e h ea ri n g, t h e t ri al co u rt o v erru l edDe fe n d an t 's o b j ec t i o nan d

al l o we d Dy k es 's te sti mony a s th e ou tc ry

wi tne ss. C
. Stand ard of Review "When r eviewinga trial c ourt' s ruling on the admi ssion of evidenc e, an a ppellate c ourt app li es an abus e of d is cret io n s tan dard of r evi ew. " Cas e yv . S tate , 2 15 S.W. 3d

87 0, 87 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); ac c or

d Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tate , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on
re h' g ). " A tr ia l c ourt ' s de te rm inatio n that an o utc ry state me nt i s a dmi ssi ble un de r a rt ic le 38 .0 72 is6

revi ewedfor

an ab us e of d is cret io n. " Nin o v . S tate , 2 2 3 S
. W.3d 749, 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h D ist .] 20 07 , n o p e t.) ; see Ga rc ia v . S tate , 792 S.W .2d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). "' [A] tr ial cou rthas bro ad d is cret io n i n d ete rm in in g' th e pro per o ut cry wi tn ess ." Vi lla nu e v a v . S tate , 209 S
. W
. 3 d 2 3 9 , 2 4 7 (T ex . Ap p . —W ac o 2 0 0 6 , n o p et
. ) ( qu o t i n g Ga rc ia , 792 S.W .2d at 92). Howeve r, althoug h a trial court has broad discretion in deter mining the person who ca n be an outcr y witness, that discretion is not unfetter ed. The statute, which pre scribes a narr ow exception to the hear say

rule, de fines the identity

of the outcr

y witness as being the "f

irst pe rson . . . to whom th e chi ldmad e a st ate men t ab ou t t he o ffen se. " T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt
. 38 .0 72 . T he re is no exception to allow the second pe rson to whom the child speaks a bout such an incide nt, whether or not that second pe rson ca n elicit more de tails than the first. Plainly , Ricky

testified that V.J. had told him "who" did this thing (the Def endant) , "w here " it occurr ed (in the living room of the c hild's paterna l gr andpar ent), a nd "what" o cc u rr ed (s he wa s forc ed to per form fe llatio). I n a journa listi c sense , the only rema ining question (" when" ) re mained
unanswe red throug hout the trial. Althoug h many more de tails were elicited through the skilled questioning of

the traine d interviewe r t han by the child's fathe r, t hose details wer e not related to the

" fi rs t pe rs on " pr e sc ri be d b y the statut e to q

ua lif y a s th e ou tc ry

wi tne ss. Ac c or din g ly , t here was erro r i n h avi ng perm it ted th e hear say tes ti mo ny

of D y kes , t he fo rensic interviewe r.7

D
. Har m Ana lys is We do not rever se a r

uling ba sed on nonconstitutional error that does not aff

ect " substantial ri ghts ." See T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2( b). I f, afte r examining the rec ord as a w hole, we de termine that
an y erro r h ads l i gh to r n o ef fe ct o nt h e j u ry , t h en we wi l l n o to v er tu rn t h e t ri al co u rt 's ru l i n g. Mo ra le s v . S tate , 3 2 S
. W
. 3 d

8 6 2 , 8 6 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g J oh ns on v . S

tate , 967 S.W .2d 41 0, 41 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 )) . A n e rr or af fect s a su bs tanti a l r ig ht whe n th e e rr or ha s a substantial and injurious effe ct or influenc e on the jury ' s verdict. Kin g v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Ru sse ll v . S tate , 1 13 S.W. 3d 53 0, 54 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 3, pe t.
re f' d) . T he " pr e se nc e of

ov e rw he lmi nge vid e nc e of g uil t pla y s a de te rm inativ e ro le " in t his ana ly sis
. Mo til la v . S

tate , 7 8 S
. W
. 3 d 3 5 2 , 3 5 6 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Ha rri s v . S tate , 790 S.W .2d 568, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). I f we have " a g rave doubt" that the r esult w as fr ee fr o m the substantial influence of t he error, then we must reve rse. Bu rn e tt v . S tate , 8 8 S. W. 3 d

6 3 3 , 6 3 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2002). The court has explained that " g rave doubt" means that "in the judge ' s mind, the matter is so evenly balanc ed that he fee ls himself in virtual equipoise as to the har mlessness of the
erro r." Id
. at 6 3 7

– 3 8 (c i t i n g O'Neal v. McAninc h , 513 U.S. 432, 433–36 (1995)). Thus, " in case s of grav e do ub t as to harm les sn ess th e pet it io ner m us t w in ." Bu rn e tt , 88 S.W .3d at 638. I n e sse nc e , th e fa c t th a t D y ke s w a s n ot t

he pr op e r o utc ry wi tne ss ( wh e re by sh e wo uld

fa ll i nto the categ ory

of witnesses permitted to te stify under the outcry -witness exception to the hea rsay rule), her testimony beca

me inadmissible a s hear say . There fore , in this ca se, we will completely disreg ard8

her e ntire testi m o n y t o d et ermine what other e vidence there was to urg e the jury to vote for a conviction. First, we have the testimony of Ricky , V.J .' s fathe r, which is se t out above. Whil e his outcry te sti mony wa s nei the r as de ta ile d nor a s exte ns ive a s tha t of the fo re ns ic int e rv ie we r, the ba sic fa c ts of the a ssa ult are se t out. Second, ther e wa s the testimony of Shane Jackson, the licensed counselor to whom V.J . was taken f or trea tment of her psycholog ical condition af ter the a ssault was di scover ed. There wa s no g ener al hea

rsay objection t o the t estimony of t his witness, which was admissible. See T EX . R. E V ID . 803(4). The testimony

of Jackson tracke d much of that g iven by the fore nsic interviewe r and provided a

bout as much deta il. Consequently , almost the sam e i n fo rm at ion contained in the t e s t i m o n y o f

D yk e s , t h e p u t a t i v e o u t c r y w i t n e s s , w a s r e p e a t e d

i nJ a c k s o n ' s t e s t i m o n y. Third, there was the te stimony of V.J. herself. Althoug h her te stimony was unc erta in in many respe cts and a lthough he r t es t i m o n y co ntradicte d some of the thing s which Jackson had said (a s might be e x pecte d with an ei gh t y ea r o ld on the witness stand), she w as def initely clea r in her testimony that her g randf

ather , the Def

endant, had compelled her to take his penis into her mouth. Consequently , even if one totally disreg ards any testimony

g iven by Dy kes, over whelming evidenc e of guilt remains. Howeve r, we examine not only the other e vidence prese nted, we also revie w t he entire rec ord of the trial. In doing so, we consider the nature of the evidenc e supporting the verdic t, the char acte rThe sole mention by the State of Dy kes' s testimony

was, " You hea

rd her say it to her fathe r, 3 y ou hear d her sa

y it four day s later to the CAC interview er, a fore nsic interviewe r." 9 of the e rror , and how the errone ously -admitted evidence might have be en conside red in c onnection with other evidence in the case
. Mo til la , 78 S.W .3d at 357–58. We take into acc ount the source and the nature of the e rror , the extent of emphasis place d upon it by t h e S t at e, i t s p robable collater al imp lic a tio ns , th e we ig ht a jur or wo uld pr ob a bly pla c e on the e rr or , and

wh e the r d e c lari ngit h arm le ss would be likely

to encour ag e the State to re peat the sa me mistake with impunity
. Ha rri s v . S tate , 79 0 S. W.2 d 5 68 , 5 87 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 89 ); Fi sc he r v . S

tate , 2 3 5 S. W. 3 d

4 7 0 , 4 7 5 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). F o r t h e m o s tp art , t h e t e s t i m o n y p r o f f e r e d b y D yk e s w a s r e d

u n d a n t o f o t h e r t e s t i m o n y, pa rt ic ula rl y the te sti mony

of Jac ks on , th e c hil d' s c ouns e lor . T he re fe re nc e ma de by the State to Dy kes' s testimony

on closing argument was slig ht. On the other hand, t h e De fenda

nt's c losing 3 argument relied quite a

bit on this testimony , pointing out that V.J
. beg an the interview w ith Dy kes by making four se parate denials of the Def endant' s conduct four

times before final l y re l at ing that Pe tr ie ha d c omp e lle d h e r t o p ut h is p e nis in h e r m ou th. I t wo uld a pp e ar t hat on c los ingargume nt, then, the De fenda

nt used Dy

kes' s testimony

more e ffe ctively

to buttress his case than the State used it to convict him. I n short, Dy kes' s testimony

was not so compelling , so unique, or so per suasive that it p lay e d a

sig nif ic ant r ole in th e tr ial . The State , w hic h o ff e re d it , p la c e d li ttl e e mph a sis on its importance during argument. Acc ording ly , its influenc e on the jurors wa s relatively minimal, given10

the weig ht of the entire case , and it is highly unlikely that the jurors unduly

relied upon it in voting for a conviction. Under this analy sis, we entertain no g rave doubts that the result at which the j ury arr ived was fre e fr om the substantial influence of the e rror . Th is b e ingthe c a se , w e fi nd that th e e rr or

of a llo wi ngDy

ke s to te sti fy

a s th e ou tc ry

wi tne ss was ha rmless. This point of error is rejec ted. II
. CL AI M OF IN EF F EC TIV E A SSIST AN CE OF CO UN SEL The De fenda

nt next claims that he wa s provided ineffe ctive assistance of counse l, thereby deprivinghim of his constitut ional rig ht to the same. Th e sta nd ard of te sti ng c la ims of ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l is s e t out in Strickland v. W ashington , 4 6 6 U
. S
. 6 6 8 ( 1 9 8 4 )
. T o p r e v a i l o nt h i s c l a i m , ana p p e l l an tm u s tp r o v e b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e (1) that his counsel' s repr esentation fell below an objec tive standard of reasonable ness and (2) that the def icient per formanc e pre

judiced the de fense
. Id. a t 68 9; Rosales
v . S tat e , 4 S.W .3d 228, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To meet thi s burden, the appellant must prove that the attorne y ' s repr esentation fell below the standard of preva iling prof

essional norms and that the re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity tha t, b ut f or the a tto rn e y ' s de fi c ie nc y , the re su lt of the tr ia l w ou ld have be en diffe rent. T

o n g v . S t ate , 25 S.W. 3d

70 7, 71 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Un de r t his standard, a

claimant must prove that counsel' s repr esentation so undermined the prope r func tioning11

of t h e a dv e r s ar i a l p r o c e s s t h a tt h e t r i a l c an n o tb e r e l i e d o na s h a v i n g p r o d

u c e d a j u s tr e su lt. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 686. The Def endant cites sever al examples w hich took place dur ing tr ial which, he a lleg es, whe n take n in the c umu lativ e , p ro ve that he did no t r e c e ive e ff

e c tiv e c ouns e l. T he se e xamp le s a re : (1) Some witnesses (Ricky , the f o rensic interviewe r, the lice nsed prof essional counselor, a

nd V.J .' s mother) a ll testified t o one deg ree or anothe r that they believed V. J
. t o b e t el l i n g t h e t ru t h i nh er al l ega t i o n s aga i n s tt h e D e f e n d an tb u tDe fe n d an t 's c ouns e l ma de no ob

je c tio n; (2) That whe n a drawing made by V.J
. during her c ounseling session portray ed the De fe nd ant i n ja il b e ingdep ri ve d o f t e le vis ion ri g hts , th e ri g ht t o c omm un ic a te wi t h an y o n e, et c. , wa s p re s en t ed , t h e on l y o b j ec t i o n l o d ged b y t h e De fe n d an t 's counsel to its introduc tion was that no proof ha d been a dduced f or it to fall within the bu sin e ss r e c or ds e xce pti on wh e n a pr op e r ob je c tio n wo uld have be e n to ob je c t to its introduction as beingunduly prejudicia l to the Defe ndant; and (3) Def

endant' s counsel either di d not object to the t estimony of De fenda

nt's wife and daug hter that De fenda nt had been prone to violence toward his wife and his nowdece ased son in times past or, when he lodg ed objec tions which were sustained, he failed to re quest that the jury be instructed to disre g ard that evidence
. Texas appellate courts begin any such analy sis by presuming that the appe llant's tria l counsel perf ormed c ompetently
. Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W. 3d

80 8, 81 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). We a lso presume th a t c o u n s e l' s d e c is io n s w e r e r e a s o n a b ly p r o f e s s io n a l a n d w e r e mo ti v a te d

b y s o u n d tr ial strateg y . J

ac k so n v . S tate , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). I n the abse nce of direc t
e vid e nc e of

c ouns e l' s r e a so ns fo r t

he c ha lle ng e d c on du c t, an a pp e llate c ourt wi ll a ssume a str a te g ic motivation for the conduc t if any can be imag ined. Ga rc ia v . S tate , 5 7 S. W.3 d 4 36 , 4 40 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Ma lle tt v . S

tate , 65 S.W .3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We will not conclude that12

the cha lleng ed conduc t constitutes deficient pe rfor mance unless the conduct was so outrag eous that
no competent attorney

would have e ng ag ed in it. Ga rc ia , 57 S.W .3d at 440. The best kind of rec ord for this kind of re view is one produc ed o n a hea ring on a motion for new trial or a he aringon an application for writ of habe as cor pus. Sm ith v . S

tate , 968 S.W .2d 490, 494 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.). That strateg y was not involved her e. Th e De fe nd ant h a s f

a ile d to e sta

bli shthat he su ff

e re d th e ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: J uly 15, 2008 Date D ecide d: Aug ust 6, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh