Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 3, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00098-CR

NO. 14-14-00099-CR

LAJOHN FITZGERALD WILSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 12-13927 & 12-13930

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Lajohn Fitzgerald Wilson appeals the trial court’s revocation of 

his probation for aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2)

(West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). In two issues he contends the evidence is 

insufficient to support the trial court’s revocation. We affirm.1

 

1 Appellant initially appealed to the Ninth Court of Appeals. Pursuant to a docket 
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I. BACKGROUND

Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in exchange 

for ten years’ deferred adjudication probation. The State subsequently filed a 

“Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated Probation” in each case in which the State 

alleged that appellant violated his probation by committing the offense of burglary 

of a habitation. 

At the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke probation, D. M., a thirteenyear-old boy who lived in the burglarized house, testified that he was in his room 

playing a game when he heard a noise that sounded like someone knocking on the 

window with a hammer or crowbar. D. M. grabbed the phone, went into his 

mother’s bedroom closet and called 911. D. M. heard glass break and heard voices 

of more than one person discussing the number of televisions in the house. D. M.

heard the men try to open the locked closet, but did not exit the closet until the 

police arrived. 

When police arrived, appellant and his co-defendant, Jarord Johnson, fled 

from the house. Officers saw Johnson leave the house carrying a pillowcase. Using 

dogs trained to track, officers found appellant hiding under a house, which had a 

raised foundation. Officers located Johnson at his residence, which was across the 

street from the burglarized house.

Martha Washington, D. M.’s mother and the complainant in the burglary 

charge, testified that appellant approached her in front of her house three days 

before the burglary and was in front of her house for approximately twenty 

minutes. Appellant told Washington that he had a message from her ex-boyfriend, 

 

equalization order, this appeal was transferred to this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001

(West, Westlaw through 2013 C.S.). We must decide the case in accordance with the precedent 

of the Ninth Court of Appeals in the event there is a conflict with precedent from this court. See

Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
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Eddie. When Washington arrived home on the day of the burglary she discovered a 

pillowcase in the driveway, which contained several of D. M.’s electronic game 

controllers and a laptop computer.

In a statement to police appellant stated that he went into Washington’s 

house at Johnson’s invitation. Appellant stated he did not know the house belonged 

to Washington, but assumed it was Johnson’s house. Although appellant saw 

Johnson putting items in a pillowcase, he claimed not to have known a burglary 

was taking place. While in the house appellant heard noises coming from the closet 

and opened the door. He saw the “little boy,” and asked whether he had called the 

police. At that time, appellant looked out of the window, saw the patrol car, walked 

outside, heard the police say, “freeze,” and “took off running across the street away 

from the officers.”

At the revocation hearing Johnson testified that he had asked appellant to 

come to his house. When appellant arrived Johnson was in the process of 

burglarizing the complainant’s house. Johnson testified that appellant did not know 

he was burglarizing the house. Johnson testified that he lied to the police at the 

time of the burglary, and testified that appellant did not know about the burglary.

This testimony is contrary to Johnson’s prior written statement in which he 

averred:

On 8-20-13 at approximately 1100 am a subject who I know as BJ (La 

john Wilson) came to my house to help him return an item from 

Walmart. I have known BJ for approximately 2 months and met him 

in county jail. I told BJ to come back later. BJ returned to my house at 

approximately 100 pm and knocked on my bedroom window. BJ told 

me the house across the street was unlocked and to help him do this 

LICK. Lick is street slang for burglary. BJ was wearing a white 

muscle shirt and [black] nike slippers.

When I walked out of my house I observed BJ walk to the back of

5140 Minnie [Washington’s house] which is directly across the street 
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from my house. I walked to the back of 5140 Minnie and BJ was 

already inside the residence. BJ handed me a tan pillow case threw 

[sic] the back window of the residence. I continued standing outside 

the residence holding the pillow case. After several minutes I 

observed the Police pull up in a SUV and an Officer was walking to 

the back of the residence. I dropped the pillow case in the yard and 

took off running west bound beside the drainage ditch. I then doubled 

back and went back to my house at 5121 Minnie. I went in through 

the back door and changed my wet clothes in the laundry room. I went 

into my room and the Police came and got me several minutes later. I 

was placed under arrest and voluntary [sic] came to the Police station 

to speak with Investigator Croak. I told Investigator Croak the truth 

about what happened. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the State proved 

the allegation of burglary by a preponderance of the evidence. Finding that 

appellant violated his probation by committing the offense, the court sentenced 

him to confinement for 50 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice.

II. ANALYSIS

In two issues appellant contends the trial court violated his rights to due 

process and fundamental fairness because the State did not prove that appellant 

committed the offense of burglary of a habitation, and abused its discretion in 

revoking his probation because there was insufficient evidence to support the 

finding that he violated a condition of probation by committing the offense of 

burglary of a habitation. We will address appellant’s issues together.

Our review of the trial court’s order revoking community supervision is 

limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Cardona v. 

State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). When reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support revocation of probation, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the decision to revoke. See Hart v. State, 
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264 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). 

The State’s burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1993). The State satisfies its burden when the greater weight of credible 

evidence before the trial court creates a reasonable belief demonstrating it is more 

probable than not that the defendant has violated a condition of his probation.

Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Staten v. State, 328 

S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). When the State fails to 

meet its burden, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to issue a revocation 

order. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94. In a revocation proceeding, the trial court

is the sole trier of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be 

given to witnesses’ testimony. Mattias v. State, 731 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1987). 

Appellant’s argument rests on his own testimony and that of his codefendant, Johnson. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in crediting the 

police officer’s testimony and Johnson’s prior statement over that of appellant, and 

Johnson’s testimony at the hearing. As the sole trier of facts and credibility of 

witnesses, the trial court was within its discretion in crediting the police officers 

and D. M.’s testimony, especially in light of the fact that their testimony was 

corroborated by Johnson’s first statement made to the police. 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in crediting the 

officers’ testimony over that of appellant and his co-defendant. The record contains 

sufficient evidence for the trial court to have formed a reasonable belief that 

appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by entering the 

complainant’s house with the intent to commit theft. The State met its burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant violated the terms of his 
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probation. See Johnson v. State, 943 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (State meets its burden when the greater weight of the credible 

evidence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a condition of his 

probation as the State alleged).

We overrule appellant’s two issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ John Donovan

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Donovan, and Wise.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).