The State of TexasAppellee/s



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

August 6, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00470

- CR

David A. MEDRANO

, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee

From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015CR4205

Honorable Melisa Skinner, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

David A. Medrano entered into a plea bargain with the State, pursuant to which he pleaded nolo contendere to a felony offense. As part of his plea bargain, Medrano signed a separate “Waiver of Appeal” that states:

I understand that upon my plea of guilty or nolo contendere, where the punishment does not exceed that recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by me, my right to appeal will be limited to only: (1) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (2) other matters on which the trial court gives me permission to appeal. I understand that I have this limited right to appeal. However, as part of my plea bargain agreement in this case, I knowingly and voluntarily waive my right to appeal under (1) and (2) in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation, provided that the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed our agreement.

The trial court imposed sentence in accordance with the agreement and signed a

certificat e stating this “is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal” and “the defendant has waived the right of appeal.” See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2). Medrano timely filed a notice of appeal. The clerk’s record, which includes the trial cou rt’s rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and a written plea bargain agreement, has been filed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d). This court must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the recor d.” Id

.The clerk’s record establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. Ordinarily, “[i]n a plea bargain case ... a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.”

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2). However, when a defendant waives this limited right to appeal, the defendant may app eal only if the trial court later gives its express permission. See Willis v. State

, 121 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Monreal v. State , 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A notation on the judgment indicates the trial court denied Medra no permission to appeal. The trial court’s certification therefore appears to accurately reflect that this is a plea bargain case, Medrano does not have a right to appeal, and he waived any limited right to appeal.

See Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that court of appeals should review clerk’s record to determine whether trial court’s certification is accurate).

Medrano is hereby given notice that this appeal will be dismissed pursuant to rule 25.2(d)

of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless the trial court’s written consent to appeal and an amended certification showing that Medrano has the right to appeal are made part of the appellate record by August 27, 2015

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); Daniels v. State , 110 S .W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, order), disp. on merits, No. 04

- 03

- 00176

- CR, 2003 WL 21508347 (July 2, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).

We order all appellate deadlines suspended until further order of the court. We further

orde r the clerk of this court to serve copies of this order on the attorneys of record and the court
reporter.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 6th day of August, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court