COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Senior Judge Hodges Argued at Richmond, Virginia

KATHY H. CATLETT v. Record No. 3031-03-2 LARRY D. CATLETT MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III LARRY D. CATLETT AUGUST 24, 2004 v. Record No. 3057-03-2 KATHY H. CATLETT

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY Margaret A. Englisby, Judge pro tempore Bradley D. Wein for Kathy H. Catlett. Elizabeth C. Mooz (Larry D. Ca tlett; Larry D. Ca tlett & Associates, on briefs), for Larry D. Catlett.
Kathy H. Catlett and Larry D. Catlett appeal a final decree of divorce entered after four years of protracted and contentious litigation. The trial court granted a divorce on the grounds of a one-year separation, distributed one half of the marital estate to each party, but did not award spousal support or reserve it for th e future. The wife presents ten questions in her appeal, and the husband raises four in his. The issues raised in his separate appeal are the same as those raised by his cross-appeal. The parties married in January 1995. It wa s the second marriage for both. They had no children during this marriage, buttheir children by prior marri ages lived with them. The

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opini on is not designated for publication.- 2 - husband moved out of the marital bedroom in the summer of 1999, and filed for divorce November 4, 1999 alleging cruelty and desertion. The wife filed a cross-bill asserting constructive desertion. Both pa rties remained in the marita l residence until July 30, 2000. The husband was an attorney who practiced in Chesterfield County, and all the judges in that circuit recused themselves. Despite pr oblems scheduling with the judge designate, the parties reached an in itial settlement of pendente lite issues with reasonable dispatch. To facilitate the proceedings, the parties agreed to designate a judge pro tempore . See Code § 17.1-110. That judge presided over the balance of the proceedings. Upon her designation in July 2000, the judge pro tempore entered an agreed order that approved the pendente lite agreement. That order directed the wife to leave the marital residence and the husband to pay pendente lite support of $1,350 per month. It set the equitable distribution hearing for October 200 0, though the parties late r agreed to continue that hearing to January 2001 and then to July 2001. The r ecord reflects active and continuous discovery throughout that year. In May 2001, the wife’s attorney asked the husband’s attorney to accommodate the wife by consenting to a continuance of the July hearing because it conflicted with her mandatory job training. The husband’s attorney acquiesced in the request, bu t shortly after obtaining the continuance, the wife discharg ed her original atto rney and retained a new attorney, who represented her for the balance of the trial procee dings. Her appellate coun sel did not participate in the trial. The trial court rescheduled the equitable distribution hearing for October 2, 2001. Shortly before that date, the wife again move d for a continuance asse rting she did not have adequate discovery data. She also moved to co mpel discovery and for an alternate evaluation- 3 - date. At that time, the husband moved to exclude expert testimony by the wife because she had not designated any expert witnesses. In view of the various motions indicating di scovery problems, the trial court entered a scheduling order that continued the hearing to January 8, 2002 and fixed November 28, 2001 as the discovery completion date. Despite the order, the wife filed a motion to compel discovery on the discovery completion date. The wife acknow ledged she had not complied with the requests for discovery of her experts but maintained the husband already knew wh at her experts would say. Two days before the January hearing, the wi fe’s attorney delayed the hearing because she had incorrectly calendared the hearing and had cr eated a conflict in the district court on the correct date. The two days reserved for hearing evidence we re not sufficient. The proceedings were continued to February 21 but sti ll not completed. Illness forced rescheduling from April to July. When testimony was completed July 31, it had consumed six full days. The parties then filed extensive memoranda comprising 265 pages of the record. The trial judge filed a timely, comprehensive, and meticulous letteropinion January 8, 2003. Though carefully resolving most of the factual issues presente d, the trial judge still had to order submission of supplementary data. She required updated balances for several financial accounts because the data presente d was incomplete. The trial j udge rendered a supplemental letter opinion February 10, 2003 fixing the account balances as of the date of separation. A troublesome issue plagued the proceedi ngs after the January 8, 2003 opinion and continued to delay resolution of equitable distribution. The tr ial court had not received any evidence valuing the marital jewelry. The wife did not comply with discovery and refused to make the jewelry available for appraisal by the hu sband’s expert. In the opinion letter, the trial court threatened monetary sanctions if the wife pe rsisted in her refusal. Her supplemental letter- 4 - opinion February 10 noted the wife still had not complied and threatened a sanction of $100 per day. The trial court never imposed monetary sanctions, but the failure to comply forced an additional hearing on June 17, 2003 solely to value the jewelry. Even then, the wife moved for a continuance, a reconsideration of the earlier ruli ngs, and a reappraisal of all assets. When the wife’s expert testified, she had only appraised eight of the twenty -one items requiring appraisal. In the supplemental letter opinion dated the day after the hearing, th e trial court adopted the values presented by the hus band’s appraiser, awarded the husband $2,000 for attorney’s fees incurred for the additional hearing, and directedcounsel to prepare orders incorporating the decisions made beginning January 8, 2003. Th e final order was entered October 31, 2003. The husband filed nineteen objections to the final order. The wife filed twenty-six objections. Her last three are handwritten, but two were illegible. The wife states ten questions in her brief. They reference the objections appended to the final decree when designating the place where she preserved the issues in the record. Unfortunately, the list of objections does not indicate where the wi fe raised and argued the issues at trial. The majority of the objections to th e order redundantly argue th e trial court erred by not accepting her version of the facts. Her questions on appeal assert the trial court erred in striking the evidence from her expert witnesses; in cl assifying, valuing, and divi ding certain assets and debts; in failing to award appr eciation on her contribution to the husband’s separate property; and in being biased against her. Appellant’s opening brief “shall contain . . . [a ] statement of the questions presented with a clear and exact reference to the page(s) of the transcript, written statement, record, or appendix where each question was preserved in the trial co urt.” Rule 5A:20(c). “Questions ‘unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellate co nsideration.’” Kane v.- 5 - Szymczak , 41 Va. App. 365, 370, 585 S.E.2d 349, 352 (2003) (quoting Buchanan v. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992)). See Rule 5A:20(e). It is not the function of the appellate court “to comb thr ough the record of [seven days of testimony] in order to ferret-out for ourselves th e validity of these claims.” Fitzgerald v. Bass , 6 Va. App. 38, 56 n.7, 366 S.E.2d 615, 625 n.7 (1988) ( en banc ). In order to be considered preserved on appeal, objections to a trial court’s rulings must be stated with specificity. Rule 5A:18; Lee v. Lee , 12 Va. App. 512, 515, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1991) ( en banc ). The wife did not establish a trial record th at permitted compliance with the appellate rules. Instead of summarily dismissing much of the appeal, we address th e substantive issues in this case. The ultimate resolution of the e quitable distribution issu es was so dependent upon each of the many mesne decisions made by the trial court that we elect to conclude this lengthy, bitter contest definitively. “At some point we must ‘ring the curtain down.’” Bowers v. Bowers , 4 Va. App. 610, 617-18, 359 S.E.2d 546, 550 (1987) (cit ation omitted). In addition, we must address the issues the husband presents. He cont ends the trial court erred in finding he intended to make a gift of a one-half interest in the marita l residence; in setting th e date of separation; in awarding the wife $5,000 from his retirement fu nd; and in failing to rule on a motion to reconsider the classifi cation of two debts. First, the wife contends the trial court e rred in striking the te stimony of her jewelry appraiser and her forensic accountant. The hus band filed a request for designation of expert witnesses early in the discovery process. When the wife had not designated any experts, the husband moved to exclude her expert testimony. The trial court conti nued the hearing from October 2001 and fixed a discovery completion date to eliminate all disc overy problems. The wife still failed to provide the requested info rmation, and the husband again moved for sanctions.- 6 - The trial court ordered the wife to delive r her jewelry for appraisal by the husband’s expert. At the January 2002 hearings, the wife named an appraiser but never provided information about her qualifications or her an ticipated testimony. The recalcitrance forced postponement from January to June. While the wife blamed her default on the husband’s failure to comply with her discovery requests, she neve r transformed her accusati ons into a justiciable issue for the trial court. As of the hearing July 29, 2002, the wife had not complied with discovery. She presented a different appraiser th an she had designated, and that witness only appraised eight of the twenty-one pieces in question. The appraiser based her op inion on the auction market rather than fair market value, which she conceded was not the proper standard to use in an equitable distribution case. The appraisal was dated Ja nuary 2002 and indicated a preliminary evaluation existed by October 3, 2001. The wife did not prov ide it to the husband until ten days before the second stage of heari ngs in February 2002. The trial court ultimately excluded the eviden ce because the wife had failed to comply with discovery. The wife concedes the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. After trial counsel replaced the wife’s original counsel, the trial court permitted the wife more than a year to develop her expert testimony. It patiently allowed abundant time for the wife to develop her evidence and withheld sanctions. De spite that, the wife never honored the discovery request, and when she finally pres ented her evidence, it only appraised a part of the jewelry and employed an inappropriate method. The wife offe red repeated excuses that suggested diligence, but the record reflects obdurate failure to comply that needlessly and adversely affected the orderly and efficient adjudication of the case. The trial court pr operly exercised its discretion in striking the wife’s evidence of the value of the jewelry. Bowers , 4 Va. App. at 618, 359 S.E.2d at 551.- 7 - The wife presented a second expert witness, Gerald Schultz, a forensic accountant. The trial court permitted him to testify before ruling on the husband’s motion to exclude for failure to designate. The witness classified and valued various assets and debts. Cross-examination revealed that the wife had provided the witne ss incomplete data. For example, the wife’s retirement account data did not include her contributions for ov er three years and lacked her employer’s contributions altogether. Similarly, th e witness incorrectly designated a Jeep vehicle as a marital asset because the wife failed to inform him it was leased not owned. When the problem became apparent, the trial court granted the wife’s request to permit her expert to recalculate his results. However, she never ac ted on the opportunity to submit conclusions based on corrected data. The wife’s primary excuse for not designating th at expert was her assertion that her delay did not prejudice nor surprise the husband. She claimed she could not identify the expert until April because the husband failed to give her re quired documents in a timely manner. The trial court heard the complete testimony of the accounta nt before deciding whether the wife’s excuses justified non-compliance with discovery. The witness did not appraise assets. He or ganized and compiled the maze of financial documents produced by the parties. His testimon y would only have assisted the trial judge in discerning the facts that the documents themselv es proved. Much of his testimony repeated the wife’s explanations and characte rizations of the data. Those e xplanations and characterizations were fully presented by the wife during her testimony. The admission of expert testimony and the appropriate sanction for abuse of discovery are within the sound discretion of the tr ial court. Virginia Power v. Dungee , 258 Va. 235, 258, 520 S.E.2d 164, 177 (1999); Walsh v. Bennett , 260 Va. 171, 175, 530 S.E.2d 904, 907 (2000); Woodbury v. Courtney , 239 Va. 651, 654, 391 S.E.2d 293, 295 (1990). The trial court did not- 8 - abuse its discretion when it ultimately reject ed the testimony. Hi s evidence essentially summarized the documents and reiterated the expl anations given by the wife. Her excuses for not complying with discovery orde rs did not justify her default. Next, the wife contends a resi dence, designated the Krossrid ge property, was her separate property. She purchased the house during the marriag e and before the date the court fixed as the date of separation. She did not move into it until after the tria l court approved the parties’ pendente lite agreement and ordered her out of the marital residence. The house was presumed to be a marital asset, and the wife bore the burden of rebutting that presumption. Fowlkes v. Fowlkes , 42 Va. App. 1, 6-7, 590 S.E.2d 53, 55 (2003). The wife maintains the property was separate be cause she proved her father paid for it. Her evidence consisted of a single comment that her father paid for the house. She made the comment obliquely when explaining credit cardcharges. The trial court found the evidence insufficient but permitted the wife an opportunity to supplement her evidence. When the wife chose not to present further evidence, the trial c ourt treated her objection to the classification as waived. The wife argues that Huger v. Huger , 16 Va. App. 785, 433 S.E.2d 255 (1993), required the trial court to accept her ev idence as sufficient proof because the husband did not rebut the wife’s testimony. However, Hugerdoes not eliminate the requi rement that the evidence presented be found credible and of sufficient wei ght to rebut the presumption. The wife never introduced any financial records related to the purchase. Th e only evidence was her comment when explaining charges to purchase a rug for the house. Given the opportunity to present additional evidence to support he r claim, she did not do so. It was the trial court’s prerogative to dete rmine the weight and value of any evidence presented to it. “As the trial court heard evidence ore tenus , these factual findings will not be- 9 - disturbed unless plainly wr ong or without evidential s upport.” Bchara v. Bchara , 38 Va. App. 302, 309, 563 S.E.2d 398, 402 (2002). The trial court wa s not required to accept the modicum of evidence presented especially when a real estate purchase normally would generate precise documentation. See Anderson v. Anderson , 29 Va. App. 673, 688, 514 S.E.2d 369, 377 (1999). The wife’s evidence did not rebut the presumption as a matter of law. Next, the wife contends the trial court erred in valuing the marital residence. The trial court fixed the date for evaluation on the date it found the parties separated, July 30, 2000. It valued the residence at $453,000 based on the a ssessed value for the year 2000. The wife contends both the date the trial court us ed and the value it assigned are erroneous. On September 13, 2001, the wife moved for analternative evaluation date, but her pleading offered no reason for doing so, suggested no da te to use, and listed no assets to which it would apply. Though the wife argues in her brie f the court should have used the hearing date, January 8, 2002, as the evaluation date, Code § 20 -107.3(A), a search of th e record reveals the issue of selecting that date was never properly raised, presented to the trial court, and preserved for appeal. After the trial court announced its valuati on, the wife filed an objection to which she attached copies of county real estate records. Her counsel maintained the records showed comparable sales of properties in the neighborhoo d of the marital home. The trial court properly refused to consider the attachments as eviden ce. Statements of counsel are not evidence, Bateman v. Commonwealth , 183 Va. 253, 256-57, 32 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1944); Goin v. Commonwealth , 182 Va. 307, 310, 28 S.E.2d 631, 632 (1944), and may not form the basis upon which the trial court can base its decision. Similarly, after the trial court rendered its final supplemental decision July 20, 2003, and shortly before the trial court memorialized al l decisions by final order entered October 31, 2003,- 10 - the wife moved to reappraise the marital residence. Apparently for the first time, she claimed the values established by the court were outdated. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding to enter a final order. The untimely motion for a reappraisal w ould have negated four years of litigation at its culmination a nd commenced the dispute from the beginning. The wife also objects to the value assigned to the marital home. The trial court heard conflicting opinions presented by th e real estate appraisers. Th e husband’s appraiser valued the marital residence at $400,000 as of 1995 and $440,000 as of November 2000. The wife’s appraiser valued the residence at $569,000 as of August 2000. Neither party provided an appraisal as of July 30, 2000, the valuation date se lected by the trial court. The lack of timely appraisals was partly caused by continued postpon ement of the equitable distribution hearing in July and October 2000. The trial court properly fi xed the valuation as of July 30, 2000. The trial court was only presented with appraisals for that year. It had to work with the data made available. “The trial court has discreti on to resolve conflic ting expert testimony to determine an asset’s value.” Howell v. Howell , 31 Va. App. 332, 341, 523 S.E.2d 514, 519 (2000). It may “choose among conflicting assessments of value as long as its finding is supported by the evidence.” McDavid v. McDavid , 19 Va. App. 406, 413, 451 S.E.2d 713, 718 (1994). “The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Howell , 31 Va. App. at 341, 523 S.E.2d at 519. As carefully explained in her letter opinion of January 8, 2003, the tria l judge interpolated the divergent appraisal data presented by incorporating the tax assessment for 2000 taxes to arrive at a value of $453,000. The court resolved th e conflicts in the eviden ce and fixed a value. While tax assessment values are normally not used to determine fair market value of real estate, evidence established that Chesterfield County asse ssments were accurate evaluations. The trial- 11 - court did not abuse its discretion in accepting th at evidence and in relying on that data to determine value. Next, the wife contends the trial court erred in classifying marital debt , in valuing it as of the date of separation, and in allocating the debt equally. In her brief, she maintains the husband wasted assets and received reimbursement for certain debts during July 2000. That argument varies from the objection stated to the final d ecree. There, she objected that the trial court classified the debts without documentation of th e source of the debts and included credit card debt that accrued during the month of separati on to purchase a BMW “solely for the purpose of establishing an inflated balance to be offset against any award.” The wife has not pointed to a specific place in the record where the trial court erred in classifying a debt, and we do not find it from our review of the recor d. The wife testified generally about the credit card charges, but her testimony amounted to commentary on credit card statements. She did not substantiate her r ecollections and characteri zations of the various transactions or her general complaints of wast e. The husband’s testimony disputed her testimony explaining the charges and the application of reimbursements. Credible evidence supported both claims, but the documentation did not definitely support either claim. “Fashi oning an equitable distribution award lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge[,] and that award wi ll not be set aside unle ss it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it .” Srinivasan v. Srinivasan , 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). When there is a confli ct in the evidence, the trial court must resolve the factual dispute. The record does not i ndicate the trial judge abused he r discretion in classifying and distributing the debt. Next, both parties appeal portions of the classification of the Advest Investment Account. The trial court ruled that this individual retirement account was the husband’s separate property- 12 - but that the wife had contributed $5,000 of her separate property to it. The wife maintains she was entitled to $12,582.20 in accrued appreciation. The husband maintains the evidence did not support the finding that the wife contributed $5,000 of her separate funds to his IRA. The wife testified that the hus band needed to make a payment to his law firm to fund his 1994 retirement contribution. He asked her for a lo an of her separate funds because he did not have sufficient funds to make the retirement contribution that was due by April 15, 1995. She wrote a check, number 1502, for $5,000, drawn on her separate funds at First Union Bank, and payable to their joint account at NationsBank. She testified th e check funded a payment to the husband’s law firm, which made the retirement contribution for the tax year 1994. First Union Bank check number 1502 was not introduced. NationsBank check number 5022 was introduced. The wife wrote it for $13,320.50, payable to the husband’s law firm, and dated April 13, 1995. The bank statement reflects the account lacked sufficient funds to honor the ch eck when it was posted on April 13, 1995. The husband testified that after the bank notified him of the insufficiency, he deposited funds to cover the delinquency that he had received from his law firm in repayment of a loan. The bank statement reflected a deposit of $5,071.40 posted Friday, April 14, 1995. It also showed a deposit of $5,000 posted the following Monday. The First Union Bank statement showed that check 1502 was debited against the wife ’s separate account April 18, 1995. The husband maintains the documents prove as a matter of law that the wife never contributed separate funds to his individual retirement account. He argues check 1502 for $5,000 was not deposited to their joint account until April 17, 1995, which was after check 5022 for the retirement contribution cleared. When separate property is c ontributed to marital property and is retraceable, and not a gift, the separate property reta ins its original classification. Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d); Watts v.- 13 - Watts , 40 Va. App. 685, 701, 581 S.E.2d 224, 232 (2003). Ne ither side presented definitive proof of their claim. The documentary eviden ce was not complete, and a key document, check 1502 for $5,000, was not introduced. The bank statements that were admitted documented the transactions of the financial institutions as they accepted and cleared item s, but the statements did not fully define the complete details of all the financ ial actions involved. The evidence showed that a check was drawn on the wife’s separate account for $5,000 about the time a check was written on their jo int account to fund the husband’s retirement account. The evidence showed the joint account had insufficient funds when the check to the firm was posted. The parties supplemented the documentary evidence with their explanations, which were in conflict though each was supporte d in some respects by the documents they stressed. The ultimate characterization of the banking transactions restedon the testimony of the parties about very detailed banking transactions. Their individual recoll ections supported their respective positions. While the trial court found the wife had pr oved her separate contribution, it also found that she failed to prove any appreciation in its value. The evidence permitted both decisions. The evidence of appreciation was the wife’s general estimate unsupported by documentation or expert testimony. Her evidence amounted to her impression that the value had increased by nearly $13,000. It did not provide a sufficient ba sis to determine with any degree of certainty that her contribution increased by the amount she asserted. Anderson , 29 Va. App. at 685-87, 514 S.E.2d at 376. Cf. Moran v. Moran , 29 Va. App. 408, 416-17, 512 S.E.2d 834, 838 (1999) (error not to consider passive income from husband’s separate property contributed pre-marriage to his pension plan where his expe rt testified to the amount of pa ssive income the property could have earned).- 14 - The fact finder, who heard the evidence ore tenus , must resolve the conflicts. We will not set aside the determination unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; Howell , 31 Va. App. at 341, 523 S.E.2d at 519. Given the evidence presented, we conclude credible evidence supported the wife’s contention that she contributed $5,000 separate property to the husband’s retirement account. We further conclude the evidence did not support her claim of appreciation. Next, the wife contends the trial court erre d in classifying her First Union CAP account as marital property. That account, which wife ow ned before the marriage, combined the features of a brokerage account and a checking account. She claimed that she deposited $11,000 that represented separate funds from a delinquent ch ild support payment and that she made several loans of the funds to the husband that he neve r repaid. However, the wife’s documentary evidence did not trace any separate property thro ugh the account and did not substantiate her claim that she lent funds to the husband. The ev idence did establish that over the course of the marriage the parties commingled funds in the account. “Property which is initially separate may become marital property either by express agreement, or by the manner in which it is maintained.” McDavid , 19 Va. App. at 410-11, 451 S.E.2d at 716. When a party fails to segregate se parate property during th e marriage, and instead commingles it, the property must be classifiedas marital property subject to equitable distribution. Smoot v. Smoot , 233 Va. 435, 441, 357 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1987) (superceded by statute on other grounds). The evidence showed the parties commingled their funds in the account and permitted the trial court to find the remaining balance of $6,183.40 was marital property. Next, the wife contends her engagement ri ng was her separate property because it was acquired before the marriage. Other than stat ements by the wife’s trial counsel, no evidence- 15 - indicated the ring was a pre-marital gift or when the wife acquired it. Statements of counsel are not evidence. Bateman , 183 Va. at 256-57, 32 S.E.2d at 136; Goin , 182 Va. at 310, 28 S.E.2d at 632. They may not form the basis upon which the tr ial court based its deci sion. The record fails to support the wife’s contention; indeed, it shows that she designated all th e jewelry as a marital asset in one of her exhibits. Next, the wife contends the trial court erre d in classifying the Traveler’s Life and Annuity IRA and the American Funds IRA as th e husband’s separate property. However, her own evidence corroborated the trial court’s ruling and no evidence refuted it. The wife’s evidence acknowledged that the Du Pont Savings and Inve stment Account was the husband’s separate property. The husband testif ied that he rolled the DuPont account into a Solomon Smith Barney IRA and later used that to fund the purchase of the Traveler’s IRA. That explanation corresponded to the wi fe’s evidence. Nothing indicatedthat marital funds went into this account or that any increase in the acc ount was due to either party’s efforts. Similarly, the wife’s evidence supported the finding that the American Funds IRA was separate property. Her exhi bits assign it a premarital va lue of $44,139.53. The fund’s advisor testified that no contributions were made to the account after 1993, two years before the marriage. No evidence showed that contributions were made to th is account during the marriage. “Classification of property as marital or separa te is a factual issue that is determined by whether the property was acquired before or during marriage. Pr operty acquired before marriage is separate unless it is transmuted; property acqui red during marriage is presumed to be marital.” Gamer v. Gamer , 16 Va. App. 335, 345, 429 S.E.2d 618, 625 (1993). The trial court did not err in classifying the two accounts as the husband’s separate property. Next, the wife argues the trial court erred invaluing her Lexus automobile. She first contends the trial court used an improper valuat ion date, but she did notpreserve any objection- 16 - to the evaluation date used for the automobile. She also contends her evidence established the correct value. Both parties relied on valuations obtained from the Kelly Bluebook web site. The wife used a 63,000 mileage figure and obtained a value of $15,695. The correct mileage was 48,000 miles. The husband used a figure of 45,000 mile s and obtained a retail value of $20,615 and a trade-in value of $13,690. The trial court selected the average of those two values submitted by the husband, $17,172.50. The trial court may not base its valuations on mere guesswork, but the parties have the burden to provi de the court with sufficient evidence from which it can value their property. Bosserman v. Bosserman , 9 Va. App. 1, 5, 384 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1989). We cannot say that the trial cour t erred in resolving the conflicting evidence before it. Next, the wife contends the trial court erre d in valuing the life in surance policy and her fur coat. She raises these complaints for the first time on appeal, and we will not consider an argument raised for the first time on app eal. Rule 5A:18; Ohree v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 299, 307-08, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). If the issue was raised before the trial court, we will not search the record for where the objection was made and argued. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. at 56, 415 S.E.2d at 239. Finally, the wife maintains the trial judge wa s biased. As support for this charge, she reiterates the adverse rulings that comprise her appeal. The wife did not pr esent this issue to the trial court. More importantly, nothin g in the record suggests its validity. The husband raised four issues in his appeal. He contends the trial court erred in finding he made a gift of a one-half interest in the ma rital home; in finding the parties separated July 30, 2000; and in not ruling on his motion to reconsider classification of two debt s. His appeal of the award to his wife of $5,000 from his Adve st Investment account has been addressed.- 17 - Before their marriage, each party owned a hous e. When they married, they planned to sell both houses and to purchase a new residence. The wife’s house sold quickly, and she moved into the husband’s home at 3860 Re eds Landing Circle. When hi s house did not sell quickly, the parties agreed to retain it but to redecorate it so that it would be their “new” marital home. The wife testified that the husband told he r he wanted the house to be theirs. The husband conveyed the wife a half interest in his residence. He testified that he granted her the property pursuant to an ag reement that she would pay him the $90,000 she received from the sale of her house. He tran sferred title without rece iving the $90,000 that he claims was the actual consideration. He stated that he did not inte nd a gift. He paid no recording taxes on the transaction. The husband argues that Utsch v. Utsch , 266 Va. 124, 128, 581 S.E.2d 507, 508 (2003), mandates a finding that the transf er was not a gift. In Utsch , the husband retitled his separate property jointly as tenants by the entirety. He executed a deed labeled “deed of gift,” which recited a consideration of “love and affection” and which referred to the precise statute that exempted deeds of gifts from recording taxes. The Supreme Court held the deed of gift was unambiguous proof by clear and convincing evidence of donative intent. Parol evidence was not admissible to refute the gift. Id. at 129, 581 S.E.2d at 509. In this case, the deed was not labeled as a deedof gift but as “Pursuant to Virginia Code Section 58.1-806.” That code section imposes a reduced recording tax of 50 cents on partition deeds or deeds pursuant to a decree of divorce or separate maintenance. Neither provision applied to the transfer, and the clerk’s receipt on the deed showed that no recording tax was paid. While the deed recited consider ation “of Ten Dollars ($10.00), cas h in hand and other valuable consideration, paid by the grantee,” it also ackno wledged receipt of the consideration. The- 18 - husband acknowledged the consideration was never paid, and the record indicates that the consideration he would have received was less than the value of the interest he conveyed. Unlike the deed of gift in Utsch , the deed in this case was drafted by the husband, an attorney, and was ambiguous. It di d not establish the lack of donativ e intent as a matter of law, and parol evidence was necessary to interpret it. Th e testimony of the parties amounted to characterizations of antebellum transactions ente red when expectations for their marriage were sanguine. Other than the deed, which was ambi guous, no documentary evidence supported the conflicting testimony of the parties. In order to prove an interspousal gift, the wife must prove the husband’s donative intent and the nature and extent of th at intent. Lightburn v. Lightburn , 22 Va. App. 612, 616-17, 472 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1996); Theismann v. Theismann , 22 Va. App. 557, 565-66, 471 S.E.2d 809, 813, aff'd , 23 Va. App. 697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996) ( en banc ). The conflicting testimony permitted the trial court’s factual finding. Next, the husband maintains the parties separated July 31, 1999, the date he alleged the wife deserted the marriage by forcing him to move to a separate bedroom. He stresses that the wife acknowledged in her answer and cross-bill th at they had separate bedrooms as of August 2, 1999. He notes the parties entered a pendente lite agreement February 15, 2000 that required her to move from the marital home and the wife had purchased her own house by March 2000. The wife always maintained that the parties and their blended families continued to live together in the marital home though the parties had separate bedrooms. She testified that familial relations continued as they ha d in the past, and as they ha d when the two had physically separated earlier during the marriage. She argue s the separation did not occur until she actually moved out of the house.- 19 - Whether and when the parties “‘lived separa te and apart without cohabitation’ is a fact-based inquiry, requiring ex amination of all the circumstances before the court.” Bchara , 38 Va. App. at 310, 563 S.E.2d at 402 (referring to C ode § 20-91(A)(9)(a)). The Supreme Court noted, “‘“matrimonial cohabitation” consists of mo re than sexual relations. It also imports the continuing condition of living togeth er and carrying out the mutual re sponsibilities of the marital relationship.’” Schweider v. Schweider , 243 Va. 245, 248, 415 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1992) (quoting Petachenko v. Petachenko , 232 Va. 296, 299, 350 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1986)). This issue was thoroughly litigated, and the trial court heard the conflicting evidence about their relationship. It found the parties did not separate until it approved the pendente lite agreement and ordered the wife to leave. The husband relied on the maintenance of separate bedrooms and his filing for divorce. The wife countered with evid ence that the parties maintained a familial relationship. Because the evidence supported both contentions, see Bchara, 38 Va. App. at 310, 563 S.E.2d at 402, we cannot say the trial court erred in reaching the decision that it reached. Finally, the husband contends the trial court failed to rule on factual issues he raised in his motion for reconsideration. That moti on was filed June 4, 2003 and addressed the classification of debts made January 8, 2003. The motion asserts the trial court failed to rule whether the husband’s American Express account and debts owed to The Wallpaper Place were marital debts. The husband originally introduced American E xpress statements as part of an exhibit covering several separate charge accounts all of wh ich he broadly characteri zed as marital debts. He also presented numerous receipts for purchas es he and the wife made at a store, The Wallpaper Place. His testimony categorized the various charges as his separate debt, her separate debt, or their marital debt. In its letter opinion January 8, 2003, the trial court made- 20 - detailed findings of which of the many obligations incurred by the parties were marital debts. The husband’s American Express debt and The Wallpaper Place debt were not listed. The opinion did not attempt to enumerate its negativ e findings. The opinion ma de clear findings as to which obligations were marital debt. At no point during the period th e trial court called for supplemental submissions and issued additional ru lings to complete the evaluation of marital debts did either party assert thatthe omission of those two debts wa s a failure to act rather than a ruling against the husband. A motion to reconsider is addressed to the s ound discretion of the trial court. Morris v. Morris , 3 Va. App. 303, 307, 349 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1986). The husband’s motion moved the trial court to revisit evidence and rulings made months before on relative ly minor details. It asserted for the first time the husband’s c ontention that the failure to state the debts were marital was a failure to rule rather than an adve rse ruling. Code § 8.01-678(2) provides: When it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reach ed, no judgment shall be arrested or reversed . . . [f]or any other defect, imperfection, or omission in the record, or for any error committed on the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in de nying that portion of the motion to reconsider. In conclusion, the trial court exercised its discretion appropriate ly, applied the law correctly, and made findings supported by the evidence. The record reflects it considered all the evidence and decreed an e quitable and just result. Code § 8.01-678. Smoot , 233 Va. at 443, 357 S.E.2d at 732, held: Unless it appears from the record that the chancellor has abused his discretion, that he has not consider ed or has misapplied one of the statutory mandates, or that th e evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying his re solution of the conflict in the equities, the chancellor’s equitabl e distribution award will not be reversed on appeal.- 21 - We will not disturb on appeal a ruling where the r ecord and the evidence indicate the parties had a fair trial. Accord ingly, we affirm. Affirmed.