IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-40490

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DANIEL LAUREL,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:16-CR-1263-24

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Daniel Laurel appeals his jury conviction for one count of conspiracy to 

commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and two counts 

of money laundering in violation of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Laurel 

contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing IRS Special 

Agent Jeanette Elizondo to provide conclusory testimony regarding his mental 

state, a required element of the charged offenses. Specifically, he challenges 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 14, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-40490

2

Elizondo’s testimony agreeing that by splitting the total deposit into multiple 

accounts and keeping each deposit under $10,000, the depositors were evading 

or attempting to evade the banks’ reporting requirements. We review a district 

court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, “subject to harmless error 

review.” United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 133 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Elizondo was neither offered nor qualified as an expert, and the record 

belies Laurel’s conclusory suggestion that the agent was “perceived” as an 

expert because she was an IRS agent. Indeed, Elizondo admitted on cross that 

she was not “an expert witness on the law.” Because the challenged testimony 

was based on Elizondo’s personal perception of the facts, common sense 

inferences, and past experience formed from firsthand observation, it is 

properly considered lay opinion testimony. See Ebron, 683 F.3d at 136-38. 

Elizondo did not testify that Laurel made any of the bank deposits at 

issue or that he chose the amounts to be deposited in each account. Thus, the 

challenged testimony was neither a direct comment on Laurel’s mental state 

nor an impermissible legal conclusion as to whether he was guilty of the 

charged offenses. The district court’s admission of the challenged testimony 

was not an abuse of discretion. See Ebron, 683 F.3d at 133.

In any event, any error in admitting the challenged testimony was 

harmless. Coconspirators testified that the illegal drug proceeds were 

deposited into multiple accounts and kept below $10,000 to avoid the banks’ 

reporting requirements, that Laurel knew the cash deposits were illegal drug 

proceeds, and that Laurel knew the deposits had to be kept below $10,000. 

Bank records showing that every deposit was below $10,000—but often at least 

$9,000—strongly corroborated that testimony. And the jury was twice 

instructed to disregard Elizondo’s opinions as to whether Laurel’s conduct 

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satisfied the requisite elements of the charged offenses. Finally, the jury 

acquitted Laurel of conspiracy to structure financial transactions to evade 

reporting requirements. That the jury acquitted on the count most directly 

related to Elizondo’s challenge testimony belies the idea that the agent’s 

testimony was influential. For all these reasons, there is no reasonable 

possibility that the challenged testimony contributed to Laurel’s convictions on 

the laundering counts. See United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 

127 (5th Cir. 2003).

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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