alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           8,711
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,046
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                14,874
<PP&E>                                          21,965
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  61,890
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           32,765
<BONDS>                                         32,980
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            74
<OTHER-SE>                                    (11,480)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    61,890
<SALES>                                          2,929
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                54,976
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   44,009
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                40,443
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,576
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,967
<INCOME-TAX>                                       374
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,593
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,593
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.26
        

</TABLE>
B.5. Net Charge-offs of Real Estate Farm Loans Held by Insured Commercial Banks
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
                                                                                                              
                                  Estimated volume                 Share of outstanding real estate farm loans
                               (millions of dollars)                                (percent)
                      ________________________________________     ___________________________________________

Year                  Total     Q1       Q2       Q3       Q4      Total      Q1        Q2        Q3       Q4
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
                                                                                                              
1994......    |          10       1        1        3        6      .048      .003      .003     .013     .026
1995......    |          12       0        3        6        4      .055     -.001      .011     .027     .016
1996......    |           7       0        1        2        4      .031      .000      .003     .009     .017
1997......    |          16      -1        0        3       14      .064     -.003     -.001     .010     .054
1998......    |           6      -1        3        0        5      .022     -.004      .009     .000     .016
1999......    |          15       0        3        5        7      .051     -.001      .011     .015     .022
2000......    |          12     -12        3        8       14      .037     -.037      .009     .022     .040
2001......    |          42      10        9        5       17      .123      .030      .027     .014     .049
2002......    |          35       8        6        5       16      .097      .022      .017     .014     .041
2003......    |          32       4        6        8       14      .082      .010      .015     .021     .034
2004......    |          18       1        5        2       10      .044      .003      .012     .005     .021
2005......    |        n.a.       2     n.a.     n.a.     n.a.      n.a.      .005      n.a.     n.a.     n.a.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
   Note. Components might not sum to totals because of rounding. Quarterly data are as of end of quarter.
   n.a. Not available.

25
#### Neil H. Melnick, Appellants, v Ronald Parlato et al., Defendants, and Stuart Cohen, Respondent.

[745 NYS2d 68]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for architectural malpractice, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered November 30, 2000, as, upon granting that branch of the motion of the defendant Stuart Cohen pursuant to CPLR 4401 which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him at the close of the plaintiffs’ case, is in favor of that defendant and against them dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The only claim that was tried was the plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleging architectural negligence against the defendant, Stuart Cohen. It is undisputed that no contract existed between Cohen and the plaintiffs for design and supervision services with respect to the construction of the plaintiffs’ patio. Therefore, to establish the meritorious nature of that cause of action, the burden was on the plaintiffs to establish that the functional equivalent of privity of contract arose between themselves and Cohen as a result of Cohen’s actions *(see Ossining Union Free School Dist. v Anderson LaRocca Anderson,*73 NY2d 417). Under the three-part test articulated in Ossining, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the functional equivalent of contractual privity existed between themselves and Cohen. The plaintiffs failed to show that (1) Cohen was aware that his architectural sketch of the patio would be used for a particular purpose, (2) they relied upon Cohen’s sketch, and (3) the existence of some conduct by Cohen “linking” him to the plaintiffs and “evincing” his understanding of that reliance *(Ossining, supra*at 425). Consequently, the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case of architectural malpractice against Cohen, and the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

In light of our determination, the parties’ remaining contentions need not be addressed. Florio, J.P., O’Brien, Krausman and Luciano, JJ., concur.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50548

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PEDRO DE LA ROSA-VARGAS

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(01-CR-27)

 

October 9, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pedro De La Rosa-Vargas, federal prisoner # 15075-180, appeals

the district court’s denial of his motion for modification of his

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He argues that

Amendment 632 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines should be

applied retroactively to reduce his offense level under U.S.S.G.
1 See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), comment. (n. 1(B)(ii)) (Nov. 2001). 

2 See United States v. Lopez, 26 F.3d 512, 515 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1994).

2

§ 2L1.2. Amendment 632 is not listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c), p.s.

and, therefore, it is not retroactive. Further, under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2, as amended, De La Rosa-Vargas’ offense level would have

remained the same because his prior conviction for burglary of a

habitation is considered a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) and its application notes.1 Because Amendment 632

is not retroactive, the district court lacked authority to modify

De La Rosa-Vargas’ sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).2

AFFIRMED.
O rder filed August 31 , 2016



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

________ _ _ No. 11

- 1 6

- 00 203

- C V

__________ IN THE INTEREST OF J.R. AND I.R

. , CHILD REN

On Appeal from the 326 th District Court

Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 8126

- CX

O R D E R In this accelerated parental

- termination appeal, the mo ther filed a pro se notice of appeal and an affidavit of indigence in the district clerk’s office on July 25, 2016

. The mother has filed in this court a motion for court

- appointed counsel

. We abate the appeal.
The record in this case indicate s that the trial court determined that the mo ther was indigent and entitled to court

- appointed counsel

. Sometime after counsel was appoi nted, the trial court found that the mother had “discharged that attorney” and
that the mother was “not entitled to a se cond court

- appointed attorney.” Consequently, the mother represented herself at trial.2

Pursuant to T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 20.1(a)(3), “a par ent determined by the trial court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the duration of the suit and any subsequent appeal .” Moreover, the appointment of an attorney ad litem to represent an indigent parent is mandatory in a suit filed by a go vernmental entity seeking termination of the parent

- child relationship. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 107.013 (a) (West ____). We note that the Texas Supreme Court has recently determined that
the c ourts “ have a duty to see that withdrawal of counsel will not result in foreseeable prejudice to the client ” in a parental termination case

. In re P.M. , No. 15

- 0171, 2016 WL 1274748, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016)

. The court stressed the importance of
counsel for the parents in such cases when it stated, “ If a court of appeals allows an attorney to withdraw, it must provide for the appointment of new counsel to pursue a petition for review. ” Id. The court also indicated that this court should abate an appeal and refer the case to the trial court for the appointment of new counsel when new counsel is necessary

. Id. at *3 n.13 Accordingly, w e abate this appeal and direct the trial court to appoint counsel
for the mo ther on or before September 12 , 2016

. Immediately thereafter, t he district
clerk shall file a supplemental clerk’s record in this court containing any order entered by the trial court with respect to the appointment of counsel for the mother

. At that time, the appeal will be reinstated. The mo ther’s appellate brief will be due
to be filed in this co urt twenty days after reinstatement. 1 The appeal is abated.

August 31 , 2016 PER CURIAM Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson , J. , and Bailey, J.

1 We note that this appeal is accelerated, and so far as reasonably possible, this court must ensure that the appeal is brought to final disposition within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal was filed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 28.4; T EX

. R. J UD

. A DMIN

. 6.2(a).
#### Salessia Gray, Appellant, v Macy’s East, Inc., Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[807 NYS2d 374]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Emily Jane Goodman, J.), entered September 29, 2004, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendant’s motion *476for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs causes of action for false imprisonment, assault and battery, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs causes of action for false imprisonment, assault and battery, which arose out of the termination of her employment with defendant and ensuing escort from defendant’s premises by its security guards, were properly dismissed as barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (§§ 11, 29 [6]). Defendant showed, prima facie, that the reason for the nearby presence of the security guards at the time of plaintiffs termination was plaintiffs threats of violence against her supervisor and volatile reaction to her suspension a few days earlier, and that the guards escorted plaintiff out of the building because of a similarly volatile reaction to her termination. In opposition, plaintiff adduced no evidence tending to show that the actions of the security guards in removing plaintiff from the premises reflected an intentional or deliberate act by defendant directed at causing harm to plaintiff. Accordingly, no basis exists for removing plaintiffs claims from the ambit of the Workers’ Compensation Law *(see Crespi v Ihrig,*99 AD2d 717 [1984], *affd*63 NY2d 716 [1984]; *McKay v Ciani,*280 AD2d 808, 809-810 [2001], *Iv denied*96 NY2d 713 [2001]). In any event, plaintiffs deposition testimony shows that while she may have been embarrassed when escorted out of the building, she was never confined, battered or offensively touched, and had no reason to fear that such was imminent. Concur— Buckley, P.J., Tom, Sullivan, Nardelli and McGuire, JJ.
#### In re Long.

(No. 24868

— Decided June 20, 1934.)

*Mr. Tim Long, in propria persona.*

*Mr. J. Virgil Gory, Mr. Paul W. Walter*and *Mr. W. T. Kinder,*for defendant in error.

*442It is ordered and adjudged that said petition in error be, and the same is hereby, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Petition in error*dismissed.

Weygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Jones, Matthias, Zimmerman and Wilkin, JJ., concur.

Bevis, J., not participating.
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of West Coast Bancorp (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),  the undersigned certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of   section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                        
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly   presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of   operations of the Company.

|/s/ ROBERT D. SZNEWAJS                |  | /s/ ANDERS GILTVEDT                                  | 
|------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------- | 
|                                      |  |                                                      | 
|President and Chief Executive Officer |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer | 
|March 3, 2005                         |  | March 3, 2005                                        |
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF LARSCOM INCORPORATED FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED
MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           50832
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     9079
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      11079
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 73853
<PP&E>                                           14126
<DEPRECIATION>                                    8932
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   79257
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            12392
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           181
<OTHER-SE>                                       66425
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     79257
<SALES>                                          16410
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 16410
<CGS>                                             7394
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     7396
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (432)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   2052
<INCOME-TAX>                                       718
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               1334
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      1334
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.07
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Petitioner**

**v.**

**JARVIS PAYTON,**

**Respondent :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 544 EAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 17th day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allo wance of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**
#### Abram Sabo, as Shareholder of Candero Realty Corp., Appellant, v Alan B. Brill, P.C., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[808 NYS2d 194]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered November 8, 2004, which granted defendant First Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the *421complaint against it; and order, same court and Justice, entered November 9, 2004, which granted defendant Brill’s motion to dismiss the complaint against it, based on documentary evidence and failure to state a cause of action, and denied plaintiffs cross motion for leave to amend the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with separate bills of costs.

Where a title insurer or its agent contracts to prepare an abstract, its liability for damages resulting from negligent performance or errors in or omissions from the prepared abstract, in the absence of fraud or collusion, extends solely to the person who contracted for such services *(Calamari v Grace,*98 AD2d 74 [1983]). There was no evidence of fraud, collusion or other special circumstances here.

Plaintiff also failed to plead—sufficient to defeat a dismissal motion—factual allegations of legal malpractice, e.g., that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary, reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession, and that such breach of duty was the cause of plaintiffs actual damages *(see McCoy v Feinman,*99 NY2d 295, 301-302 [2002]). There was no evidence or taint of fraud apparent from the Consent of Shareholders and Directors sworn to by the client, which normally would have required further investigation.

“Although permission to amend should ordinarily be freely granted (CPLR 3025 [b]), the movant must make some evidentiary showing that the proposed amendment has arguable merit” *(Helene-Harrisson Corp. v Moneyline Networks,*6 AD3d 151 [2004]). Here, the proposed fraud claim was duplicative of the legal malpractice claim since it was not based on an allegation of independent, intentionally tortious content *(see LaBrake v Enzien,*167 AD2d 709 [1990]). The proposed claim against the title abstractor based on a theory that plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary must also fail in the absence of a showing of fraud or collusion *(see Calamari,*98 AD2d at 80).

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them without merit. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Marlow, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02291-REB-MJW

VERNE JAY MERRELL,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

DAVID ALLRED, D.O. FCC Health Services, and

PATRICIA MITCHELL, Program Mgt [sic] Officer, Health Services,

in their individual and professional capacities,

Defendant(s).

MINUTE ORDER 

Entered by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe

It is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Docket No. 45) is

denied. A report and recommendation on the pending motions will be issued in due

course on the papers already submitted.

Date: April 18, 2012

Case 1:11-cv-02291-REB-MJW Document 47 Filed 04/18/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 09-cr-07-PB

Carlos Santiago, Jr.

O R D E R

The defendant, through counsel, has moved to continue the

trial scheduled for March 3, 2009, citing the need for additional

time to complete discovery and prepare a defense. The government

does not object to a continuance of the trial date.

Accordingly, for the above reasons and to allow the parties

additional time to properly prepare for trial, the court will

continue the trial from March 3, 2009 to June 2, 2009. In

agreeing to continue the trial, the court finds pursuant to 18

U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8)(A) that for the above-stated reasons, the

ends of justice served in granting a continuance outweigh the

best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 1:09-cr-00007-PB Document 9 Filed 02/13/09 Page 1 of 2
2

The February 25, 2009 final pretrial conference is continued

to May 20, 2009 at 2:30 p.m. 

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

February 13, 2009

cc: Adam Bernstein, Esq.

Terry Ollila, Esq.

United States Probation

United States Marshal

Case 1:09-cr-00007-PB Document 9 Filed 02/13/09 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Adam Nagle

v. Case No. 08-cv-432-SM

FNU Jorgenson, et al.

O R D E R

After due consideration of the objection filed, I herewith approve the Report

and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Muirhead dated December 18, 2008, for

the reasons as set forth therein. The following claims will proceed against Gerry,

Jorgenson and the four unnamed corrections officers in their individual capacities:

 (1) Eighth Amendment claims alleging use of excessive force;

 (2) First Amendment retaliation claims alleging denial of the right to petition

the government for redress of grievances; and

(3) related state law claims alleging intentional infliction of emotions distress.

All remaining claims are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

January 5, 2009 _________________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

cc: Adam Nagle, pro se

Case 1:08-cv-00432-SM Document 12 Filed 01/05/09 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Alexander R. Kores

v. 06-fp-352

NH State Prison

O R D E R

Petitioner’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (document

no. 3) is granted. 

This file has been assigned civil number 06-cv-352-SM. 

SO ORDERED.

___________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 11, 2006

cc: Alexander R. Kores, pro se

Case 1:06-cv-00352-SM Document 4-1 Filed 10/04/06 Page 1 of 1