Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1410-CR-480 | August 11, 2015 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Darren Bedwell 

Marion County Public Defender 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Richard C. Webster 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Shayne Thompson, 

Appellant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee

August 11, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A05-1410-CR-480 

Appeal from the Marion County 

Superior Court Criminal Division 1 

Cause No. 49G01-1309-MR-063580 

 No. 49G01-1406-FA-029370 

The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber, 

Judge 

Friedlander, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1410-CR-480 | August 11, 2015 Page 2 of 8

[1] Shayne Thompson appeals the calculation of credit time in conjunction with his 

sentencing for one count of murder, one count of robbery as a class A felony, 

and one count of robbery as a class B felony. 

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions. 

[3] On October 24, 2011, Thompson committed acts that eventually led to his 

conviction of robbery as a class C felony. He was sentenced to two years, 

suspended, and placed on home detention. He was also placed on 365 days 

probation. His probation was revoked on January 11, 2013. He was later 

released to parole on July 12, 2013. While on parole, on September 19, 2013, 

Thompson and several accomplices forced their way into a residence in 

Indianapolis and robbed a family at gunpoint. Less than a week later, on 

September 25, 2013, Thompson and an accomplice robbed a BP store at 

gunpoint. During the robbery, Thompson shot and killed a store clerk. 

[4] Based upon Thompson’s subsequent arrest on the murder charge, the parole 

department issued a parole warrant on October 2, 2013. On November 20, 

2013, “the warrant was lifted and voided due to the amount of time the 

defendant had already served on this case and his pending maximum release 

date (per legislative order).” Appellant’s Appendix at 301. A supervisor at the 

parole department indicated that “they were aware [Thompson] was in the 

Marion County Jail, and this case was monitored by parole until [Thompson] 

reached his maximum expiration date.” Id. The supervisor further indicated 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1410-CR-480 | August 11, 2015 Page 3 of 8

that Thompson “was released from parole for this case on 01/10/2014, due to 

[Thompson] reaching his maximum expiration date.” Id.

[5] Two separate criminal cases were filed against him as a result of the events of 

September 19 and September 25. The State and Thompson eventually entered 

into a single plea agreement resolving both cases. As a result of the September 

19 incident, which we shall refer to as the confinement case, Thompson pled 

guilty to burglary as a class A felony, robbery as a class B felony, and five 

counts of criminal confinement, all as class B felonies. As a result of the 

September 25 incident, which we shall refer to as the murder case, Thompson 

pled guilty to murder and two counts of robbery, one as a class A felony and 

one as a class B felony. According to the terms of the agreement, the sentences 

for each case would run consecutively, and Thompson’s aggregate sentence 

would be between 65 and 110 years. Thompson agreed to waive his right to 

appellate review of the appropriateness of the sentence, and the State agreed 

that Thompson would not be required to register as a sex offender. 

[6] On September 26, 2014, following a hearing, the trial court sentenced 

Thompson to fifty-five years for the murder conviction and ten years for the 

class B-felony robbery conviction. The court ordered that those sentences were 

run consecutively to each other and concurrently with a four-sentence for 

robbery as a class A felony. With respect to the confinement case, Thomas was 

sentenced to thirty years for the burglary conviction, which was to run 

concurrently with a four-sentence for the class B-felony robbery conviction. He 

received fifteen-sentences for each of the four B-felony criminal confinement 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1410-CR-480 | August 11, 2015 Page 4 of 8

convictions, with those sentences to run concurrently with each other and 

consecutively to the sentence for the burglary conviction. Finally, the aggregate 

sentence for the confinement case was ordered to run consecutively to the 

aggregate sentence for the murder case, for a total aggregate sentence of 110 

years. 

[7] Finally, and germane to the issue presented on appeal, the parties agree that 

Thompson was incarcerated for 367 days between his arrest in the murder case 

and the time he was sentenced. The State argued, and the trial court ultimately 

agreed, that Thompson was not entitled to credit time for 101 of those days 

because he was serving a sentence for his parole violation between October 2, 

2013 (when the parole department filed the warrant) and January 10, 2014 

(when the parole warrant was lifted because Thompson had already “reached 

his maximum expiration date”). Id. at 301. 

[8] Thompson challenges the award of credit time.1 When considering challenges 

to the award of credit time, we review the trial court’s factual determinations 

 

1

 We reject the State’s assertion that Thompson cannot appeal this alleged error because he 

invited it. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Thompson should not get credit for 

“his DOC sentence”, i.e., the time “he was serving [on] a parole violation sentence”. 

Transcript at 96. When asked for a response, Thompson’s stated: “That is a correct statement 

based on the law as we understand it.” Id. It is debatable whether Thompson "invited" the 

error within the meaning of the invited error doctrine. Even if it was argued as a traditional 

example of waiver for failing to object, the argument would not prevail. See Groves v. State,

823 N.E.2d 1229, 1231–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[g]enerally, a failure to object to error in a 

proceeding, and thus preserve an issue on appeal, results in waiver. However, a court may remedy 

an unpreserved error when it determines the trial court committed fundamental error. An improper 

sentence constitutes fundamental error and cannot be ignored on review”). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1410-CR-480 | August 11, 2015 Page 5 of 8

for an abuse of discretion. Harding v. State, 27 N.E.3d 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 

On the other hand, legal conclusions based, as here, upon the interpretation of a 

statute are reviewed de novo. See Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind. 

2010) (“we review de novo matters of statutory interpretation because they 

present pure questions of law”). On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of 

showing that the trial court erred in calculating credit time. Gardner v. State, 678 

N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 

[9] Thompson contends the trial court erred in denying him credit time for time 

spent on pretrial confinement. It appears the trial court determined that 

Thompson was not entitled to credit time for the period of his confinement 

spanning from October 2 through January 10. It further appears that the trial 

court accepted the State’s argument that Thompson was not qualified to receive 

credit time because during that time he was serving a sentence for violating his 

parole. See fn. 1 infra. 

[10] We begin by considering the statutory scheme devised by our Legislature 

relating to credit time for parole violations. Pursuant to Ind. Code Ann. § 35-

50-6-1(a) (West, Westlaw current with all 2015 First Regular Session of the 

119th General Assembly legislation), “when a person imprisoned for a felony 

completes the person’s fixed term of imprisonment, less the credit time the 

 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1410-CR-480 | August 11, 2015 Page 6 of 8

person has earned with respect to that term, the person shall be ... (1) released 

on parole for not more than twenty-four (24) months, as determined by the 

parole board[.]” As reflected in this provision, parole is administered and 

determined by the parole board, and not the court. See Mott v. State, 273 Ind. 

216, 221, 402 N.E.2d 986, 989 (1980) (“[t]he Indiana parole board of the 

Department of Corrections has exclusive power to parole prisoners, under our 

statutes”). I.C. § 35-50-6-7 (West, Westlaw current with all 2015 First Regular 

Session of the 119th General Assembly legislation) does provide that credit time 

may be denied for a person who is jailed on new charges stemming from acts 

committed while on parole. Pursuant to this provision, a parolee who “has 

been charged with a new crime may be immediately assigned to Class III and 

may have all earned credit time suspended pending disposition of the 

allegation” by the DOC or the county detention facility. I.C. § 35-50-6-7(a). 

The statute further provides that in the event the parolee is found not guilty of 

the alleged misconduct following a hearing, the credit time must be restored. 

We reiterate, however, that this is a decision committed to the parole board and 

the Department of Correction. See I.C. § 35-50-6-7; see also Propes v. State, 587 

N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind. 1992) (“the manner in which a sentence is served once 

the prisoner has been committed to the Department of Correction is a matter of 

discretion of that department together with the parole board and the clemency 

commission and their interactions with the Governor”), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 

1226. It appears from the record before us that these steps were not undertaken 

and Thompson’s parole was never revoked. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1410-CR-480 | August 11, 2015 Page 7 of 8

[11] Based upon Thompson’s arrest for the murder charge, the parole department 

issued a parole warrant on October 2, 2013. Approximately a month and a half 

later, that warrant “was lifted and voided due to the amount of time [he] had 

already served ... and his pending maximum release date.” Appellant’s Appendix

at 301. Although the parole department was aware that he was in the Marion 

County Jail and continued to monitor the case, Thompson’s parole was never 

revoked. In fact, Thompson was released from parole on January 10, 2014, 

because he had “[reached] his maximum expiration date.” Id. Importantly, 

neither the parole department nor the DOC held a hearing to determine, for 

purposes of revoking parole, whether Thompson was guilty of the charges for 

which he was arrested on October 2, 2013. Further, neither the parole board 

nor the DOC undertook the steps necessary to assign him to Class III and/or 

suspend his credit time. Therefore, it cannot be said that Thompson’s 

incarceration during that time was attributable to his parole having been 

revoked, or indeed any official change in his parole status at all. This means 

that during this period Thompson remained in Class I credit time. Thus, any 

loss of credit time during that period could only have been premised upon the 

fact of the allegation that he violated parole. Under these circumstances, we 

can find no authority for denying credit time on this basis. 

[12] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in depriving Thompson of 

101 days credit time in the murder case for the time he was incarcerated 

between October 2, 2013 and January 10, 2014. We remand with instructions 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1410-CR-480 | August 11, 2015 Page 8 of 8

to correct the sentencing order to reflect that Thompson is entitled to receive an 

additional 101 days credit time against the present sentence. 

[13] Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.

Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.