NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 12a1110n.06
No. 11-6496
UNI TED STATES COURT OF A PPEAL S FOR THE SI XTH CI RCUI T
FRANCI S ROY, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE; TENNESSEE BO ARD OF MEDI CALEXAMI NERS; DAVI D HASSEL L ; NEAL BECKF ORD, MD; DENNI S HI GDON, MD ; CHARL ES WHI TE, MD, boar d members both individually

and in their off

icial ca pacity , Def endants-A

ppellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE MI DDL E DI STRI CT OF TENNESSEE

Be fore : MARTI

N and WHI TE, Circuit J udg es; ECONOMUS, District J udg e. *

PER CURI AM. Fr ancis Roy , M.D., a pro se Tenne ssee resident, ap p ea l s a d i strict court judgme nt dismi ssing his civil rig hts action filed pursua nt to 42 U.S.C . § 1983. I n J uly 2007, the Tenne ssee Boa rd of Medica l Ex aminers revoke d Roy ’s medical license, deter mining that he had “pre scribed add i cti ve narc otics or other controlled drug s to twenty -eig ht patients without proper documentation and without appropr iate clinical indications.” Roy v. Tenn. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs , 310 S.W .3d 360, 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Roy challeng ed the revoc ation i n the state trial court; the court aff irmed the Boa

rd’s decision. The Tenne ssee Court of Appea ls af fi rm ed the trial court’s decision and the Tenne ssee Supreme Court denied Roy permissio n t o appea l.

The Honora

ble Peter C. Economus, United States Senior District J udg e for the Norther n * District of Ohio, sitting by desig nation.No. 11-6496 - 2 - Roy then filed the instant action ag ainst the State of Tenne ssee; the Boa rd; Boa rd members Charles Whit e, Dennis Hig don, and Nea l Be ckfor d; and David Hassell, who provided testimony at Roy ’s revoc ation hear ing, in their individual and officia l c apac ities. Roy asser ted that the Boa

rd’s actions violated his due proce ss rig hts; the Boa rd violated sever al Tenne ssee laws, which constituted “neg lige nce per se”; and the appellee s committed defa mation by posting the revoc ation of his license

on the Boa

rd’s we bsite. Roy

reque sted damag es, re instatement of his medica l license, re moval of

err oneous information from the Boa rd’s website, and for the court to rule that the Boa rd’s decision

was une nforc eable

. The S tate of Tennessee , the B oard, a nd the B oard me mbers filed a joi nt motion to dismiss the complaint for Roy ’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be g rante d. Hassell also filed

a motion to dismiss

. Roy filed a response to eac h motion to dismiss , acknow ledg ing that his claims
ag ainst the State of Tenne ssee and the Boa rd wer e barr ed by sovere ign immunit y , but asser ting that he stated a claim for relief ag ainst the indivi du al d efe ndants. A mag istrate judge rec ommended dismiss ing the claims ag ainst the State of Tenne ssee and the Boa rd based upon Roy ’s conce ssion. The mag istrate judge further conclude d that the motions to dismiss should be g rante d with respe ct
to the civil rig hts claims and that the fede ral court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Roy ’s state-la w claims of ne g lige nce a

nd defa mation. Having not rec eived any objections from Roy reg arding the mag istrate judge ’s

rec ommendation, the district court adopted the mag istrat e j u d ge’ s repor t, g rante d the motions to dismiss , dismiss ed Roy ’s fede ral claims with prejudice , and dismiss ed his state-law claims without prejudice

. Approxim ately one wee k later, Roy filed objections to the mag istrate judge ’s repor t. The district court revie wed de novo the mag istrate judge ’s repor t, Roy ’s objections, and the rec ord. The

co u rt d eter

mined that nothing in Roy ’s objections would chang e its prior order of dismiss al

. On
appea l, Roy asser

ts that the district court failed to consider his obje ctions to the mag istrate judge ’s
repor t and that his complaint stated valid claims for relief

.No. 11-6496 - 3 - Roy ’s claim that the district court failed to consider his objections to the mag istrate judge ’s
repor t lacks merit. I n its order aff irming the dismiss al, the district court explained that it considere d Roy ’s late objections, but that t h ey did not aff ect the court’s prior order of dismiss al. Moreove r, Roy ’s failure to file his objections waived his appea l. See Vanwinkle v. United States , 645 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The mag istrate judge ’s repor t was sent to Roy on October 18, 2011, and he h ad s ev en t ee n d ay s, or unt il November 4, 2011, in which to file hi s objections. See Fe d. R. Civ. P. 6(d) and 72(b)( 2). He submitt ed his objections on November 9, 2011, claiming that he did not rec eive the repor t until October 27, 2011, beca use he only chec ks his post office box ever y
one to two wee ks. Roy ’s failure to chec k his mail reg ularly is not an excusable re ason for failing
to file t imely objections. See Jamison v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs, Inc. , 2 7 9 F. Ap p’x 723, 726 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that waiver could not be overlooke d for plaintiff’s failure to timely object
to mag istrate judge ’s repor t beca use she only chec ked her post office box tw i ce ea ch month). Fur ther, this is not a case wher e “fa ilure to permit appellate revie w would work a miscarr iag e of justice,” United States v. Sullivan , 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), beca use Roy ’s claims wer e proper ly d i s m i s s ed

. S ee Lambert v. Hartman , 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008)(noting that a district cour t’s dismiss al of a

complaint for f

ailure to state a claim is r eviewe d de n o v o ). T h e S tate of Tenne ssee and the Board were proper ly dismiss ed upon ag ree ment by the
p arties. Hassell was proper ly dismiss ed beca use “[i] t is well-settled that witnesses are g ra n t ed absolute immunit y from suit for al l t estimony provided in judicial proce eding s.” Spurlock v. Satterfield , 167 F.3d 995, 1001 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The claims asser ted ag ainst the Boa rd members in their officia l capa cities wer e proper ly dismiss ed as barr ed by the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine, which prec ludes fede ral revie w of a case that has alre ady been litigated in a state court. See E xx o n Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005); Dist. of Colum b i a Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 482–83 (1983); Rooke r v. Fidelity Trust Co ., 263 U.S. 413, 414–17 (1923). Specifica lly , we have enfor ced t h e doctrine in challeng es to occupationalNo. 11-6496 - 4 - licensing proce dures like those raised by Roy

. See Raymond v. Moye r , 501 F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2007)(c halleng ing denial of law license) ; McD onald v. Lawhorn , 9 8 F. Ap p ’x 358, 359 (6th Cir. 2004) (cha lleng ing denial of permit to operate taxi ). The claims asser ted ag ainst the Boa

rd members in their individual capa cities wer e also proper ly dismiss ed on the basis that the Boa rd members wer e entitled to q

u a s i-judicial immunit y for actions taken during Roy ’s revoc ation proce eding s. See W atts

v. Burkhart , 978 F.2d 269, 275–76 (6th Cir. 1992)

. Finally , the district c ourt proper ly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Roy ’s state-law claims of neg lige nce and defa mation in the absenc e of a viable fede ral claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (3); W ee Care Child Ctr., Inc. v. Lumpkin , 680 F.3d 841, 849 ( 6th Cir. 2012). The judg ment of the district cour t is affirmed.