UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6487

JORGE J. SOLANO-MORETA,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

D. R. STEPHENS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:11-hc-02255-BO)

Submitted: July 25, 2013 Decided: July 29, 2013

Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jorge J. Solano-Moreta, Appellant Pro Se. Christina Ann Kelly, 

BUREAU OF PRISONS, Butner, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jorge J. Solano-Moreta, a federal prisoner, appeals 

the district court’s order entering summary judgment and denying 

relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) 

petition, in which he challenged his loss of twenty-seven days 

of good time credit after a prison disciplinary hearing officer 

concluded that he had threatened to kill a guard.

Solano-Moreta claims that the disciplinary hearing 

officer denied him due process by relying on false incident 

reports. But an inmate’s federal due process rights are not 

violated by the determination of a disciplinary hearing officer 

as long as there is “any evidence in the record that could 

support the conclusion reached by the [officer].” 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985); see

Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 932 (4th Cir. 1990). Because the 

district court was precluded from making independent credibility 

assessments or reweighing the evidence against Solano-Moreta, it 

properly declined Solano-Moreta’s invitation to reevaluate his 

disciplinary hearing on the merits under the guise of ensuring 

that it rendered him due process. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.

Solano-Moreta also claims that the disciplinary 

hearing denied him due process because it was conducted in his 

absence. But an inmate’s right to call witnesses and present 

evidence in his own defense at a disciplinary hearing may be 
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overcome if it is “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or 

correctional goals” to permit him to do so. Brown v. Braxton, 

373 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974)). See also 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(e)(2)

(2013) (permitting inmates to be present at disciplinary 

hearings except when institutional security would be compromised 

by the inmate’s presence); 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(d) (2010) (same); 

Battle v. Barton, 970 F.2d 779, 782-83 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding 

that an inmate may be removed from his disciplinary hearing 

where the removal is logically related to correctional goals).

Here, Solano-Moreta was removed from the hearing 

because he became so disruptive that the hearing officer 

believed that his continued presence would be a threat to the 

safety of the prison staff. Despite Solano-Moreta’s absence, 

the hearing officer reviewed the testimony of each of SolanoMoreta’s profferred witnesses in the presence of the staff 

representative whom Solano-Moreta had requested to assist him. 

We agree with the district court that, on the circumstances of 

this case, Solano-Moreta’s disciplinary hearing comported with 

the Due Process Clause. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-67.*

 * To the extent that Solano-Moreta asserts that the district 

court should have reviewed video footage of the disciplinary 

hearing to ascertain whether he actually became so disruptive as 

to justify his expulsion, we note that there is no evidence in 

(Continued)
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED

 

the record that the hearing actually was recorded or that any 

such recording supports Solano-Moreta’s allegations.