Filed 8/31/16 P. v. Campos CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VICTOR HUGO CAMPOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B260079

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA059108)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Bernie 

C. Laforteza, Judge. Affirmed.

Katharine Eileen Greenebaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb, Nathan 

Guttman and Ilana Herscovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant and appellant Victor Hugo Campos (defendant) appeals from his 

conviction of possession for sale and transportation of methamphetamine. He contends 

that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of uncharged 

methamphetamine offenses to prove intent to sell and knowledge of the presence of the 

drug. As defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review or to demonstrate error or 

prejudice, we affirm the judgment. 

BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged in count 1 of an amended information with the sale or

transportation of methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 

11379, subdivision (a), and in count 2 with the possession for sale of methamphetamine, 

in violation of Health and Safety code section 11378. In addition, the amended 

information alleged that defendant had suffered two prior serious or violent felonies as 

defined in the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (b)-(j), 1170.12), as well as 

seven prior convictions resulting in prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code 

section 667.5, and two prior convictions which made him subject to Health and Safety 

Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c).

In a bifurcated trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts as charged, and 

the trial court found true all the allegations of prior convictions. On October 1, 2014, the 

court denied defendant’s motion to strike prior convictions and sentenced him to a total 

of 18 years in prison. The sentence as to count 1 was comprised of the high term of four 

years, doubled under the Three Strikes law, and enhanced by six years due to prior 

narcotics convictions, as well as four years due to the prior prison terms. As to count 2, 

the court imposed the middle term of two years, doubled it to four, and then stayed 

execution of the sentence pursuant to section 654. The court ordered defendant to pay

mandatory fines and fees, and awarded presentence custody credit of 1,120 days, 

consisting of 560 actual days in custody and 560 days of custody credit.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
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Prosecution evidence

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Tim Schank testified both as a percipient 

witness and expert witness in the area of narcotics investigation.

On March 7, 2013, Detective Schank and his partner Detective Keesee were on 

patrol in Lancaster near a house they had been watching for several weeks as part of an 

investigation concerning sales of methamphetamine. Informants had indicated that the 

neighborhood was known for narcotics use and sales. After seeing a 1996 Mercedes 

Benz driven by defendant, who was known to have a prior record of methamphetamine 

sales, the detectives pulled the car over and conducted a lawful search of the interior. 

There, Detective Schank observed metal screws, commonly used to keep interior panels

in place, and several tools, such as pliers and screwdrivers, necessary to remove and 

replace them. The panels looked as though they had been taken apart numerous times, as 

some of the screws appeared worn, with parts of the black coating worn off. The car 

console came out easily and some of the nearby carpet and panels were loose. Though no 

contraband was found, Detective Schank searched defendant’s person and found $1,800

in multiple cash denominations. Detective Schank explained that it was common for 

narcotics sellers to be in possession of multiple denominations, in order to be 

“essentially, . . . kind of like a mobile cash register.”

Two weeks later, Detective Schank and his partner again saw defendant driving 

the same car. Since the registration had expired in 2012, the detectives pulled over 

defendant and asked permission to search the car. Defendant gave his consent and said, 

“I don’t have anything. Feel free to search.” Detective Schank saw the same items inside 

the car as he had two weeks before. When he lifted the carpet and reached under a side

panel, he felt a plastic bag, which he removed and inside saw what appeared to be 

methamphetamine. Detective Schank estimated that it was one ounce, or approximately 

28.3 grams, which would yield between 566 and 1,415 individual uses. Detective Schank 

also observed a clear plastic bag with approximately one-eighth of an ounce of 

methamphetamine, an amount commonly referred to on the street as an “eight ball,”

which appeared to be ready to sell given its packaging. Detective Schank had previously 
4

investigated or arrested hundreds of people for possession of methamphetamine, and 

would typically find between one quarter of a gram to half a gram of the drug in their

possession. The detective also found two cell phones which belonged to defendant.

Detective Schank advised defendant of his Miranda rights and told defendant he 

had found a large quantity of methamphetamine inside his car.

1 First, defendant accused 

Detective Schank of planting the drugs, and then asked who had set him up. Defendant 

said he had been the only person to drive his car in the two weeks since the last search. 

That no one else had access to his car, and that he checked his friends before letting them 

into the car to make sure they did not have anything illegal in their possession. When 

Detective Schank reminded defendant of the search two weeks earlier, and said that 

defendant must have placed the methamphetamine there recently, defendant appeared to 

have an epiphany and said, “Well, it looks like I’m going back to prison for another two 

to three years.” Defendant then asked whether he could “work off” his case, which 

Detective Schank declined.

2 On the drive to the Sheriff’s station, after confirming their 

conversation was not being recorded, defendant told the detective that he would provide 

the names of people who had pounds of methamphetamine and guns, adding, “Call that 

shit sugar and give it back to me. Let me go, and I’ll give you those things.” Detective 

Schank again declined.

During the booking process, Detective Keesee inspected the two recovered cell 

phones and found recent text messages. A message from “Lupita” indicated that she had

just been paid, and after 20 minutes with no response from defendant, she texted: “I 

guess I’ll go make someone else rich.” Detective Schank interpreted this to mean that

she was going to another methamphetamine supplier. A message from “Hit Man” read:

“Hey, my boy. It’s hit man. I got 50. I’m here at black dude house.” A message from 

“Risky” read: “Can you front me something till tomorrow after work?” Defendant 

 

1 See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444-445.

2 Detective Schank explained that “working off his case” meant becoming an 

informant leading to the arrests of others in possession of narcotics of equal or greater 

value than the present case.
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replied, “What do you need?” Risky texted: “Whatever you can do.” When defendant

offered a “40,” Risky replied: “20 just to get me through the day manana.” Detective 

Schank explained that “40” meant $40 worth of drugs, and “20” meant $20 worth, and he

concluded that defendant was using text messaging to conduct narcotic transactions.

After a lab analysis, the packages found in defendant’s car were determined to

contain methamphetamine, and that one weighed 3.5 grams, while the other weighed 25.5 

grams. Detective Schank testified that the street value of 3.5 grams of methamphetamine 

was approximately $140 to $190 in Lancaster, and up to $1,000 in other areas where 

methamphetamine was not so prevalent. Given a hypothetical question mirroring the 

facts in evidence, Detective Schank opined that the person who possessed the 

methamphetamine did so with the intent to sell.

Jailer Sandra Nelson testified to having overheard part of defendant’s telephone 

conversations in the booking cell in which he emphatically told someone to get rid of the 

phone and that there was no case without the phone. Defendant seemed unaware the 

jailer was there, so she immediately left the room and reported what she heard to 

Detective Keesee.

Sergeant Robert Gillis testified that in March 2006, after he pulled over a car for 

speeding and illuminated the interior with his lights, he saw movement in the right front 

passenger seat. The passenger, later identified as defendant, was reaching all over inside 

the car, which made Sergeant Gillis nervous, so he had defendant step out of the car. As 

he did, defendant said, “I’m not going to lie to you,” and admitted that he had 

methamphetamine in his pocket, adding that he had just picked it up and was taking it to 

someone who had given him money. Sergeant Gillis recovered an ounce of the 

methamphetamine and placed defendant under arrest. At that time, one ounce of 

methamphetamine was worth about $1,200.

In June 1999, when Deputy Russell Bailey was assigned to narcotics investigation, 

he conducted a traffic stop of a car in which defendant was the passenger. As Deputy 

Bailey approached the car, he saw defendant making stuffing motions toward the center 

console, so he ordered defendant out of the car, searched the area where defendant had 
6

been sitting, and found a magnetic key holder between the center console and the 

floorboard. Inside the key holder were two baggies containing a powder resembling 

methamphetamine.

Certified records of conviction were admitted into evidence, showing that 

defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine for sale after the 2006 arrest 

and that defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine after the 1999 

arrest. In addition, a certified record of conviction was admitted into evidence, showing 

that defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine for sale in 1995.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence

of other crimes pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) (section 

1101(b)). Section 1101, subdivision (a) prohibits the admission of character evidence 

offered to prove the defendant’s conduct on a specified occasion, but as relevant here, 

subdivision (b) provides: “Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence 

that a person committed a crime . . . when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident 

. . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” Thus, “[e]vidence of other 

crimes is not admissible merely to show criminal propensity, but it may be admitted if 

relevant to show a material fact such as intent. [Citations.] To be admissible, there must 

be some degree of similarity between the charged crime and the other crime, but the 

degree of similarity depends on the purpose for which the evidence was presented.”

(People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 371.)

Here, the evidence regarding defendant’s similar crimes was admitted to show 

intent, as well as knowledge and lack of mistake. “The least degree of similarity is 

needed when, as here, the evidence is offered to prove intent . . . , [as] the recurrence of a 

similar result tends to negate an innocent mental state and tends to establish the presence 

of the normal criminal intent. [Citations.] The determination whether to admit other 

crimes evidence lies within the trial court’s discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Jones, 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 371.) “In prosecutions for drug offenses, evidence of prior drug 
7

use and prior drug convictions is generally admissible under [section 1101(b)], to 

establish that the drugs were possessed for sale rather than for personal use and to prove 

knowledge of the narcotic nature of the drugs. [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2009) 

170 Cal.App.4th 587, 607; see also People v. Pijal (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 682, 691.)

Once the trial court determines that prior conduct is sufficiently similar to the 

charged crimes to be relevant to prove intent, it must then weigh the probative value of 

the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 against its potential to create substantial 

risk of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. (People v. Rogers

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 326.) The “‘“‘ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not 

required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or 

patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ [Citations.]”’” 

(Ibid.)

Defendant contends that the prior cases were not sufficiently similar to the current 

case to be relevant to show intent and knowledge, and he points out dissimilarities in the 

cases. Here, defendant notes, he was the driver with no passengers, he hid the 

methamphetamine under carpeting, and he went to trial rather than plead guilty. 

Defendant adds that in two of the prior cases, he was the passenger, did not attempt to 

hide the methamphetamine until the traffic stop was initiated, and then admitted owning 

the drugs. Defendant concludes that the only similarity between the current and prior 

cases is that he was in a car when he was arrested. From this conclusion, he argues that a 

single broad similarity is not enough to admit the evidence to show intent or knowledge.

Defendant did not object to the evidence on this ground in the trial court.

3

 A 

challenge to the admissibility of evidence is generally not cognizable on appeal in the 

 

3 Defense counsel stipulated to the authenticity of the conviction records, but 

objected to “going into the details of each single one,” and asked “the court to look 

closely to make sure that it meets the requirement factually . . . for [section] 1101(b).” 

The trial court announced that it would exclude one of the three convictions as likely to 

cause an undue consumption of time, but admitted the third conviction after the 

prosecution agreed to submit the certified record of conviction without testimony into the 
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absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground urged on 

appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353.) An objection on one ground does not preserve a challenge 

based upon a different ground. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-435.) 

Section 353 “require[s] sufficient specificity of evidence and legal grounds for the 

opposing party to respond if necessary, for the trial court to determine the question 

intelligently, and for the appellate court to have a record adequate to review for error.”

(People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1171-1172.) As defendant did not comply 

with these requirements, he gave the trial court no opportunity to exercise its discretion 

on the question of similarity, and thus obtained no ruling on the issue for this court to

review.

Contrary to defendant’s argument however, a few dissimilarities do not render a 

prior similar crime irrelevant to the issue of intent or knowledge; indeed, a single “crucial 

point of similarity” may be sufficient to establish the relevance of the prior crime. 

(People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 371.) In concluding that the only similarity 

between the current and prior cases was defendant’s presence in a car when he was 

arrested, defendant overlooks the crucial point of similarity in the current and all three 

prior cases: the possession and transportation of methamphetamine. We conclude that 

such similarity, combined with the fact that defendant intended to sell the 

methamphetamine in two of the prior cases, was relevant and probative on the issue of 

defendant’s knowledge that methamphetamine was hidden in the car and defendant’s 

intent to sell the drug. Defendant has thus not demonstrated that if he had made a 

specific objection on the ground of dissimilarity, the trial court would have acted in an 

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner in overruling that objection. (People v. 

Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 326.)

Moreover, defendant has not demonstrated that admission of the evidence resulted

in a miscarriage of justice. (Evid. Code, § 353.) A miscarriage of justice occurs when it 

appears probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been 

 

details of the arrest. Defense counsel then objected to the evidence under Evidence Code 

section 352 as “unnecessary.”
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reached in the absence of the alleged errors. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 

836; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Under the Watson test, it is defendant’s burden to 

demonstrate prejudice by establishing “a reasonable probability that error affected the 

trial’s result.” (See People v. Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 746.)

Defendant contends that without the prior crimes evidence there was no 

substantial evidence to support his guilt. Although defendant acknowledges his burden to 

demonstrate this point, he fails. We agree with respondent that the other evidence of 

defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Detective Schank knew that defendant had a prior 

record of methamphetamine sales, and had stopped him two weeks before his arrest while 

driving his 1996 Mercedes Benz in a area under surveillance for narcotics activity. At 

that time, tools and other items in defendant’s car led Detective Schank to believe that

drugs had been previously secreted behind the panels and under the carpeting. When 

defendant was stopped the day of his arrest, he admitted that the 1996 Mercedes Benz 

belonged to him and that he exclusively used it. After Detective Schank gave defendant 

Miranda advisements and showed him the methamphetamine found in the car, defendant 

first claimed to have been set up, and then asked to trade information in exchange for the 

return of the methamphetamine without charges. He did not deny his guilt. Detective 

Schank opined that the amount of methamphetamine found in defendant’s car would 

yield between 566 and 1,415 individual uses, far more than personal use. Defendant 

carried cash in multiple denominations, an indicator of drug selling, and text messages on 

defendant’s cell phone also suggested narcotic transactions. After his arrest, defendant 

was overheard in a telephone conversation emphatically telling someone to dispose of the 

phone because without it there was no case against defendant.

An appropriate limiting instruction, combined with strong evidence of guilt apart 

from the uncharged crimes, will eliminate any reasonable probability that defendant 

would have received a more favorable result had the evidence of his prior drug offenses

been excluded. (People v. Ghebretensae (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 741, 755-756.) Such 

was the case here. In addition to hearing the additional overwhelming evidence we have 

summarized, the jury was instructed in relevant part to consider the other crimes evidence 
10

solely for the limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent to 

sell the narcotics in this case or whether he knew of the presence of narcotics. 

(CALCRIM No. 375.) The jury was also told that the other crimes evidence was just one 

factor to consider, not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, that the People were still required 

to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury should “not consider this 

evidence for any other purpose [or] conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a 

bad character or is disposed to commit crime.”

We conclude that any alleged error in the admission of the prior crimes evidence 

was harmless.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

__________________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

__________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT