alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**BOVIE
MEDICAL CORPORATION**
 
 EXHIBIT
32.2
 
 Certification
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
  In
connection with the amended Annual Report of Bovie Medical Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Charles Peabody,
Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 USC §1350 as adopted pursuant
to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that (1) the Annual Report
fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the annual report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.
  
 
  Date:
February 14, 2005
  
 
 
 /s/
      Charles PeabodyChief
      Financial Officer,
 
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01955-LTB

ROBERT J. FREEMAN,

Applicant,

v.

ARISTEDES ZAVARAS, and

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,

Respondents.

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Babcock, Senior Judge

Applicant has submitted a Notice of Appeal. Applicant previously was allowed to proceed in forma

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 in this court in this action. The court has examined the file and has

determined that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal must be denied. Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(3)

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court finds that this appeal is not taken in good faith

because applicant has not shown the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts

in support of the issues raised on appeal. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied because this appeal is not

taken in good faith.

DATED at Denver, Colorado this 4th day of January, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

 s/Lewis T. Babcock 

SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Case 1:11-cv-01955-LTB Document 24 Filed 01/04/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
<Page>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                    PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vita Food Products, Inc. (the
"Company"), on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2004, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
the undersigned, in the capacity and on the date indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) the Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: May 14, 2004                                /s/ Stephen D. Rubin
                                               ------------------------
                                                    Stephen D. Rubin,
                                                        President
                                              (Principal Executive Officer)

                                       19
IV 

House Calendar No. 172 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 876 

[Report No. 110–495] 

Waiving a requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII with respect to 

consideration of certain resolutions reported from the Committee on Rules. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 17, 2007 

Mr. WELCH of Vermont, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following 

resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 

RESOLUTION 

Waiving a requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII with 

respect to consideration of certain resolutions reported 

from the Committee on Rules. 

1 Resolved, That the requirement of clause 6(a) of rule 

2 XIII for a two-thirds vote to consider a report from the 

3 Committee on Rules on the same day it is presented to 

4 the House is waived with respect to any resolution re5 ported on or before the legislative day of December 19, 

6 2007, providing for consideration or disposition of any of 

7 the following measures: 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•HRES 876 RH 

1 (1) A bill relating to the Children’s Health In2 surance Program, or an amendment thereto. 

3 (2) A bill relating to Medicare, or an amend4 ment thereto. 

5 (3) A bill relating to the alternative minimum 

6 tax, or an amendment thereto. 

7 (4) A joint resolution making further con8 tinuing appropriations for the fiscal year 2008, or 

9 an amendment thereto. 

10 (5) The bill (H.R. 2764) making appropriations 

11 for the Department of State, foreign operations, and 

12 related programs for the fiscal year ending Sep13 tember 30, 2008, and for other purposes, or an 

14 amendment thereto. 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS

bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
House Calendar No. 172 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 876 

[Report No. 110

–495] 

RESOLUTION 

Waiving a requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII 

tions reported from the Committee on Rules. with respect to consideration of certain resoluDECEMBER 17, 2007 

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel 

Criminal Action No. 11-cr-00362-WYD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1. DALE JOHNSON,

2. DONALD BEVERLY,

3. RONALD BENJAMIN,

4. JIMMY HUTCHINSON,

5. VINCENT JACKSON,

6. JERROLD MINNEY, and

7. SCOTT GOLDBERG,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Government’s Unopposed Motion for

Protective Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) filed September 9, 2013. Having

reviewed the motion and being otherwise advised in the premises, I find that good and

sufficient cause supports the same. It is therefore

ORDERED that the Government’s Unopposed Motion for Protective Order

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) (ECF No. 249) is GRANTED. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Special Agent’s personnel records at issue shall

only be used in defending this case; that such records may be disclosed only to the

Defendants and their attorneys; that if copies are made, the Defendants’ attorneys shall

maintain custody of such copies, and shall not reproduce or disseminate them; and that
2

any material provided pursuant to this Order shall be returned to the Government at the

completion of the case. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that in the event defense counsel seeks to introduce such

materials for impeachment or for other purposes at any proceeding, or seeks to make

reference to the contents of the materials in a pleading, that counsel first seek leave of

Court through an in camera submission prior to doing so as to allow the Government

adequate time to respond.

Dated: September 9, 2013

BY THE COURT:

s/ Wiley Y. Daniel 

Wiley Y. Daniel

Senior United States District Judge
#### CARRUTHERS v. HOLLOWAY et al.

No. 6714.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Jan. 31, 1944.

Russell E. Gahagan, of Natchitoches, for appellants.

Turner B. Morgan, of Shreveport, and Henry W. Bethard, Jr., of Coushatta, for appellee.

HARDY, Judge.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages resulting from an automobile collision alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant.

The facts show that on September 26, 1941, plaintiff was driving a 1941 model Buick Sedan north on Plighway No. 71, about 4 miles north of Coushatta, traveling at a moderate rate of speed on the east side of the highway; that upon topping a hill he observed a mule-drawn wagon some 100 yards or more ahead of his car on the same side of the road and proceeding in the same direction; that he also observed a truck approaching from the south, which truck was about to cross a bridge at the foot of the hill. According to plaintiff’s allegations, the wagon was very near the approach to the bridge, and plaintiff, immediately concluding that it was impossible to pass the wagon and clear the approaching truck, began to slow the speed of his car by gradually applying his brakes and actually brought his car to a stop behind the wagon. At or about the time plaintiff was engaged in bringing his car to a stop, defendant drove his automobile into the rear of plaintiff’s car, causing the damage complained of. Plaintiff alleges that the collision was caused entirely by the negligence of defendant and specified several grounds of negligence.

After trial there was judgment by the lower court in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $602, representing damages to plaintiff’s car, as established by the evidence on trial of the case.

Examination of the record and briefs discloses that there is but one question before this court, i. e., whether or not plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Counsel for defendant in his brief makes the statement that defendant does not deny his negligence in running into the rear of plaintiff’s car, but takes the position that plaintiff is barred from recovery because of his own negligence in stopping his car suddenly and without any previous warning to defendant of his intention to stop.

The question raised by the defense was conclusively disposed of in the written opinion of the special Judge, who heard the trial, when he stated that the evidence did not bear out defendant’s contention, and that the testimony of the plaintiff and of the driver of the wagon team established the fact that plaintiff did give sufficient warning which should have been heeded by defendant.

*747We find that the record amply substantiates the conclusion reached by the trial judge. On the particular point the evidence preponderates clearly in favor of plaintiff.

This being so, the results of our examination confirming the conclusion reached by the trial judge, accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, at appellant’s cost.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 11
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                           SIX MONTHS ENDED
                                                                JUNE 30
                                                         ---------------------
                                                            1997       1996
                                                         ---------- ----------
<S>                                                      <C>        <C>
Diluted net income per share:
  Net income............................................ $5,174,000 $  (28,000)
  Average number of shares outstanding..................  7,570,000  3,623,132
  Net effect of dilutive stock options-based on treasury
   stock method using average market price..............    282,328          0
                                                         ---------- ----------
    Total average shares................................  7,852,328  3,623,132
    Diluted net income per share........................ $     0.66 $    (0.01)
                                                         ========== ==========
</TABLE>
Case 1:11-cv-01733-WJM-BNB Document 5 Filed 07/01/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
Case 1:11-cv-01733-WJM-BNB Document 5 Filed 07/01/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 3
Case 1:11-cv-01733-WJM-BNB Document 5 Filed 07/01/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Action No. 11-cr-355-MSK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1. WAUNITA WEINGART,

2. JOHN PHILLIP GALLEGOS,

3. ALOIS CRAIG WEINGART,

Defendants.

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT WAUNITA WEINGART’S MOTION

FOR GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE (DOC. 100)

The United States of America, by and through United States Attorney John F. Walsh

and Assistant United States Attorney Linda Kaufman, responds to Defendant Waunita

Weingart’s Motion for Government to Provide Notice of Rule 404(b) Evidence (Doc. 100)

as follows:

1.The defendant has previously requested notice of evidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), and the government has been ordered to

provide written notice to the defendant no later than twenty-one days before trial unless for

good cause shown, the Court permits less notice in accordance with that rule. Discovery

Conference Memorandum and Order (Doc. 15 at 4, 8). Identical orders were entered in the

co-defendant’s cases. (Doc. 16 at 4, 8; Doc. 32 at 4, 8). The government intends to comply

with those orders.

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 106 filed 07/23/12 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 3
2. Despite its caption, the defendant’s motion also includes a request for pretrial notice of evidence the government seeks to use in its case-in-chief, for impeachment,

or as possible rebuttal pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 609. That rule, unlike Rule 404(b), does not

require pretrial notice of such evidence, and the defendant has cited no authority requiring

the requested notice.

WHEREFORE, the government respectfully requests that this Court deny the

defendant’s motion.

Respectfully submitted this 23 day of July, 2012. rd

JOHN F. WALSH

United States Attorney

By: s/ Linda Kaufman 

Linda Kaufman

Assistant United States Attorney

1225 Seventeenth Street, Suite 700

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 454-0100

Facsimile: (303) 454-0404

E-mail: Linda.Kaufman@usdoj.gov

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 106 filed 07/23/12 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 23rd day of July, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSETO DEFENDANT WAUNITAWEINGART’S MOTION FOR

GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE (DOC. 100) with the

Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to

the following e-mail addresses:

Martin Adam Stuart 

Email: martinstuartlaw@solucian.com

William Lewis Taylor 

Email: wltaylorpc@gmail.com

Ms. Paula M. Ray

E-mail: paulamray@earthlink.net

 

By: s/ Solange Reigel 

SOLANGE REIGEL

Legal Assistant to AUSA Linda Kaufman

United States Attorney’s Office

1225 - 17 Street, Suite 700 th

Denver, CO 80202

Telephone: (303) 454-0244

Fax: (303) 454-0402

E-mail: solange.reigel@usdoj.gov

 

Case No. 1:11-cr-00355-MSK Document 106 filed 07/23/12 USDC Colorado pg 3 of 3
#### WINN v. CITY OF COCOA (2 cases).

Supreme Court of Florida.

January Term 1954.

Dismissed without opinion.
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of Cosmo Communications Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter
Horak, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Cosmo Communications Corporation. and will be retained by Cosmo Communications
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.





:
              /S/ Peter HorakPeter
      Horak
                Chief
      Executive Officer
                (Principal
      Executive Officer)
                
                Date:
      July 6, 2009
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2


                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Laura A. Camisa, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Calton, Inc.;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

     4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

     (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
     disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
     ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
     consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
     entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
     prepared;

     (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
     procedures presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
     of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period
     covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
     control over financing reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
     recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case
     of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely
     to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
     reporting; and

     5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

     (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
     operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are
     reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
     process, summarize and report financial information; and

     (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
     employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
     controls.


Date:   February 24, 2006

/s/ Laura A. Camisa
-------------------
Chief Financial Officer & Treasurer
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2



              SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of CDSI Holdings Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, J.
Bryant Kirkland III, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



August 14, 2006                          /s/ J. Bryant Kirkland III
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                             J. Bryant Kirkland III
                                             Vice President and Chief Financial
                                             Officer
#### In the Matter of Mitchell Kalwasinski, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[810 NYS2d 224]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Chemung County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with engaging in the unauthorized exchange of property and providing unauthorized legal assistance after correction officers found another inmate’s legal papers in his cell. Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty of the unauthorized exchange of property charge. The determination was affirmed on administrative appeal, and this CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

We confirm. The misbehavior report, together with the testimony of its author and petitioner’s admission that he possessed another inmate’s papers, constitute substantial evidence supporting the determination finding him guilty of engaging in the unauthorized exchange of property. Petitioner’s claim that the exchange was authorized because the papers were delivered to him by a correction officer presented a credibility issue for the hearing officer to resolve *(see Matter of McAllister v Goord,*6 AD3d 829, 830 [2004]). Moreover, we find no merit to *1051petitioner’s contention that the misbehavior report violated 7 NYCRR 251-3.1, as it contained the *necessary*specificity to apprise petitioner of the charges so as to enable him to prepare an adequate defense *(see Matter of London v Selsky,*247 AD2d 675 [1998]). We similarly are unpersuaded by petitioner’s argument that the matter at hand should not have been designated for disposition via a tier III disciplinary hearing as such a hearing was appropriate for the rule violations at issue *(see*7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [14] [vi]; [26] [vii]). We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions, to the extent they are properly before us, and find them to be unavailing.

Crew III, J.P., Peters, Carpinello, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.