An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-807

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 4 February 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

A.G. Durham County

No. 07 J 23

Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 2 April 2013 

by Judge Brian C. Wilks in Durham County District Court. Heard 

in the Court of Appeals 13 January 2014.

Robin K. Martinek for petitioner-appellee Durham County 

Department of Social Services.

Duncan B. McCormick for respondent-appellant mother.

Derrick J. Hensley for guardian ad litem.

HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.

Respondent appeals from an order that ceased reunification 

efforts with her minor child, A.G. (“Andy”) and placed him in 

the legal and physical custody of a former foster parent. We 

affirm.

Background
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On 25 January 2007, the Durham County Department of Social 

Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that Andy and two 

siblings were neglected juveniles. DSS assumed non-secure 

custody of the children that same day. After a hearing in April 

and May of 2007, the trial court entered an order that 

adjudicated Andy and his siblings neglected and dependent 

juveniles and continued them in the legal and physical custody 

of DSS. The court found that respondent’s mental health 

conditions interfered with her judgment and impaired her ability 

to care for and protect her children. To remedy the conditions 

that led to or contributed to the removal of the children from 

her custody, the trial court directed respondent to obtain a 

full psychological evaluation, including an assessment for 

medication, and that she receive recommended treatment.

For several months, respondent worked with DSS to correct 

the conditions that led to the removal of Andy and his siblings 

from her home. The trial court rewarded respondent’s efforts

when, by order dated 7 April 2010, it returned Andy and his 

siblings to her custody. However, on 12 May 2010, DSS filed 

another petition alleging Andy and his siblings were neglected 

juveniles, and again took non-secure custody of the children.

After a hearing on 1 December 2010, the trial court entered an 
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order on 6 January 2011 adjudicating Andy and two of his 

siblings neglected juveniles. The court found that respondent 

was unable to manage her frustrations with her children, which 

resulted in her use of inappropriate discipline with the 

children. Nevertheless, the court returned Andy and his 

siblings to respondent’s custody pursuant to a court-ordered 

protection plan, which specifically included no physical 

punishment.

After his return home, significant conflict developed 

between Andy and respondent, resulting in his placement in a 

rapid response placement provided by DSS to address his 

aggressive behavior and language towards respondent. Andy 

returned home on 14 June 2011, but on 4 July 2011 respondent 

called the police after an altercation with Andy. Andy was 

charged with simple assault, and while being taken to a 

relative’s home to spend the night he disclosed suicidal 

ideation. Andy was transported to the emergency room, and 

admitted to UNC Hospital the next day. On 12 July 2011, Andy 

was released from the hospital with the agreement that he not 

return to respondent’s home. Respondent agreed to place Andy 

with a former foster parent. 
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Andy continued to live with his former foster parent for 

the next several months and had biweekly supervised visitation 

with respondent and his siblings. After a hearing on 13 

December 2012, the trial court entered an order changing the 

permanent plan for Andy to custody with the foster parent and 

granting legal and physical custody of Andy to the foster 

parent. The court further found that Andy’s reunification with 

respondent was not a viable option, and reunification efforts 

should therefore cease. Respondent appeals. 

Discussion

We first address respondent’s argument that the trial court 

erred in making finding of fact number fifteen, which states:

The Mother continues to believe that she has 

never done anything to harm the child or 

contribute to the child being out of the 

home. She does not believe the child has 

suffered trauma.

We review this finding of fact to determine whether it is 

supported by competent evidence in the record. In re P.O., 207 

N.C. App. 35, 41, 698 S.E.2d 525, 530 (2010). 

In the 2011 order adjudicating Andy neglected, the trial 

court found that respondent “never denied that she used physical 

punishment to discipline the children[, and] contends her 

children have never been hurt and that her actions were 
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exaggerated and embellished by others.” Respondent continued to 

blame others for Andy’s behavioral problems at the permanency 

planning hearing, where she asserted that his current problems 

were caused by people telling him that if he were not in her 

custody he could become a United States citizen. Additionally, 

when specifically asked if she thought she had done anything to 

contribute to the trauma Andy has experienced, she replied that 

“things did happen” and “things did affect him,” but stated that 

she did not “think that the things that happen[ed] in the past” 

were the cause of Andy’s current behavioral problems. 

Respondent’s testimony reveals that she has not accepted that 

her inappropriate discipline of Andy and failure to provide 

proper care for Andy contributed to his removal from her home, 

and were an underlying cause of the trauma he continues to 

suffer. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.

Respondent also argues the trial court erred in ordering 

that DSS cease providing her with efforts to reunify her with 

Andy. Respondent contends that the trial court’s findings of 

fact regarding her visitation with Andy and participation in 

therapy do not support its conclusion. Respondent further 

argues that the court erred in concluding that reunification was 
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inconsistent with Andy’s health, safety, and need for a 

permanent home within a reasonable time. We disagree.

A trial court may order that

reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for 

placement of the juvenile shall not be 

required or shall cease if the court makes 

written findings of fact that:

(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or 

would be inconsistent with the 

juvenile’s health, safety, and need for 

a safe, permanent home within a 

reasonable period of time[.]

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2013). “This Court reviews an 

order that ceases reunification efforts to determine whether the 

trial court made appropriate findings, whether the findings are 

based upon credible evidence, whether the findings of fact 

support the trial court’s conclusions, and whether the trial 

court abused its discretion with respect to disposition.” In re 

C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007).

Here, the trial court found:

6. [Andy] continues to receive therapy with 

Mary Sue Cherney. He continues to make 

progress in therapy learning to understand 

mature, interpersonal relationships and 

reciprocity. [Andy] has started taking 

[medication] as recommended by Dr. Chevy 

from the Center for Child and Family Health 

to address depressive symptoms and make 

[him] more receptive to therapy. Since 

being on the medication, his behavior has 

leveled out and he is sleeping a lot better.
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7. [Andy] visits with [respondent] and his 

siblings every other Thursday, supervised by 

Durham DSS at the Genesis Home from 4 pm to 

5 pm. The interaction between [Andy] and 

[respondent] has not changed much since the 

last hearing. There continues to be minimal 

communication between the two. [Andy] 

indicates that the visits are not for him to 

visit with his mother but to spend time with 

his sisters.

. . . .

9. [Andy] continues to do well in [the 

foster parent’s] home. She is providing a 

safe and nurturing environment for [Andy] 

and ensuring that all of his basic needs are 

being met.

. . . .

12. [Respondent] meets with Karla Siu, 

Family Therapist, once every three weeks and 

has missed one appointment since the last 

court date. This session was rescheduled. 

[Andy] has not been a part of these 

sessions. It is unknown when family therapy 

that will incorporate [Andy] will begin. 

Ms. Siu feels that family therapy would be 

more damaging than helpful at this time and 

there is a need to get to know [respondent] 

before engaging [Andy]. While [respondent] 

is keeping her appointments, she has not 

been very engaged in the sessions. She has 

indicated that she does not trust Karla Siu 

and is frustrated with the system. 

[Respondent’s] therapy is anticipated to 

take approximately one year of weekly 

therapy. It is predicted that [respondent] 

will be ready for family therapy after she 

makes positive progress in two of her 

outlined goals for two straight months. It 

is unknown when this will happen.
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13. [Andy] is not ready for family therapy 

at this time, but he is working with Mary 

Sue Cherney towards preparing for family 

therapy.

. . . .

16. [Respondent] has been consistent with 

visitation, but there continues to be 

problematic communication. [Respondent] was

informed that [Andy] was placed on 

medication. She continues to indicate that 

she does not want [Andy] on medication.

Respondent does not challenge these findings, and they are thus 

binding on appeal. In re I.T.P-L., 194 N.C. App. 453, 462, 670 

S.E.2d 282, 287 (2008), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 581, 681 

S.E.2d 783 (2009).

We agree with respondent that the trial court’s findings 

support her contention that she has been diligent in attending 

her visitation with Andy and her therapy sessions. However, 

diligent attendance is insufficient in this instance. 

Respondent and Andy have been involved with DSS since 2007, and 

have been under the court’s supervision pursuant to an 

adjudication of neglect entered in January of 2011. Andy made 

progress in his therapy due in part to prescribed medication, 

which respondent does not want Andy to take. Nonetheless, it is 

still unclear when he will be ready to engage in family therapy 

with respondent, a pre-cursor to any reunification between the 
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two. Over the two years prior to the entry of the permanency 

planning order at issue, respondent made negligible progress in 

her therapy sessions and it is unknown when she will achieve 

sufficient progress to begin family therapy with Andy. 

Additionally, as discussed above, respondent continues to 

believe that she has never harmed Andy or contributed to his 

removal from her home.

Given respondent’s lack of progress in her own therapy and 

opposition to medication that is assisting Andy’s therapy, we 

hold the trial court’s findings of fact show that reunification 

efforts would be futile or inconsistent with Andy’s health, 

safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable 

period of time. We conclude that respondent has not shown the 

trial court abused its discretion in directing that 

reunification efforts cease, and overrule this argument.

Similarly, we overrule respondent’s argument that the trial 

court abused its discretion by changing the permanent plan for 

Andy to custody with the former foster parent and awarding her 

custody of Andy. The purpose of a permanency planning hearing 

is to “develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the 

juvenile within a reasonable period of time.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
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7B-907(a) (2011).

1 “This Court's review of a permanency planning 

order is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the 

record to support the findings and whether the findings support 

the conclusions of law.” In re P.O., 207 N.C. App. at 41, 698 

S.E.2d at 530. “We review a trial court’s determination as to 

the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion.” In 

re D.S.A., 181 N.C. App. 715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007).

The trial court’s conclusion to set the permanent plan for 

Andy as custody with the former foster parent, and award her 

custody of Andy is fully supported by its findings detailing the 

uncertainty as to when family therapy could commence and 

respondent’s failure to: (1) make progress with her therapy; (2) 

acknowledge her role in contributing to the harm and trauma Andy 

suffered over the years; and (3) improve her communication and 

relationship with Andy during visitation. Based upon these 

findings, and her demonstrated opposition to Andy’s use of 

medication to complement his mental health therapy, we cannot 

say the trial court abused its discretion in setting the 

 

1 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907 has since been repealed and replaced 

by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1. See 2013 Sess. Laws 129, §§ 25-

26. However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1 is only applicable to 

“actions filed or pending on or after” 1 October 2013. 2013 

Sess. Laws 129, § 41. Here, the trial court entered the order 

from which respondent appeals on 2 April 2013. Thus, we apply 

section 7B-907.
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permanent plan for Andy and awarding custody of Andy to the 

former foster parent pursuant to that plan. Accordingly, we 

overrule this argument.

Conclusion

After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s order. 

AFFIRMED.

Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur. 

Report per Rule 30(e).