the intent to remain with the child in Portugal. Appellant also sent 

several disparaging letters to respondent's family and friends, expressing 

his intention to permanently remove the child from respondent and to live 

in Portugal. When respondent discovered that appellant had taken their 

child to Portugal, she filed several motions in the district court seeking the 

return of the child. Appellant initially refused to return the child, and 

when respondent travelled to Portugal in an attempt to visit with the 

child, appellant would not permit her see the child. Eventually appellant 

returned the child to Nevada. The district court held a hearing on 

respondent's multiple motions, and issued an order awarding primary 

physical custody to respondent, setting supervised visitation for appellant, 

and awarding respondent attorney fees. This appeal followed. 

This court has held that "[parents] are free to agree to child 

custody arrangements and those agreements are enforceable if they are 

not unconscionable, illegal, or in violation of public policy." Rivero v. 

Rivero,125 Nev. 410, 429, 216 P.3d 213, 227 (2009). A written post-decree 

agreement between two parents setting a visitation arrangement over the 

course of several months is an enforceable agreement. Id. A provision 

stating that at the end of the specified period, the visitation arrangement 

will return to the original arrangement outlined in the divorce decree is 

also enforceable.' See id. Settlement agreements in divorce cases are in 

'Appellant argues that the August 2008 stipulation and order is the 

controlling document governing custody because it is a final order entitled 

to preclusive effect under Rennels v. Rennels,127 Nev. , 257 P.3d 396 

(2011). We disagree. Rennelsconcerns stipulated visitation of 

nonparents, id. at , 257 P.3d at 397, and appellant's reliance on 

Rennelsfor the proposition that the August 2008 stipulation granted 

continued on next page . . . 

2 
the nature of contract law, and subject to de novo review by the supreme 

court. See Mack v. Estate of Mack, 125 Nev. 80, 95, 206 P.3d 98, 108 

(2009). 

Here, the district court concluded that the parties entered into 

a series of post-decree agreements modifying visitation and custody. The 

district court concluded that the most recent agreement was the October 

2008 addendum, which provided that at the end of the period specified in 

the addendum, the visitation arrangement would return to the original 

arrangement set forth in the 2007 divorce decree. On our de novo review, 

we agree with the district court's interpretation. 2Id. The 2007 decree 

provided that custody and visitation could be modified by written 

agreement. The August 2008 stipulation left that provision in place. 

Thus, we conclude that the October 2008 addendum was an effective 

modification under the express terms of the divorce decree. We note that 

the October 2008 addendum specifically references the "original" custody 

arrangement outlined in the divorce decree, and does not reference the 

August 2008 stipulation. As no further addendum or stipulation was 

reached, we conclude that the parents shared joint physical and joint legal 

. . . continued 

rights that were unaltered by the subsequent October 2008 addendum is 

misplaced. 

2The district court also concluded that if there was an ambiguity as 

to whether the visitation arrangement would return to the original 2007 

divorce decree arrangement or the modified 2008 stipulation arrangement, 

that ambiguity would be resolved against appellant as the drafter of the 

addendum. 

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custody pursuant to the 2007 divorce decree, negating the provisions of the 

August 2008 stipulation that permitted appellant to relocate the child. 

Thus, we agree with the district court's conclusion that appellant could not 

relocate the child outside of Nevada in 2011, and consequently violated 

respondent's custodial rights by wrongfully removing the child from 

Nevada to Portugal. NRS 125.510(2); Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 618, 

199 P.3d 1246, 1249 (2005) (holding that a parent sharing joint physical 

custody must seek relocation through NRS 125.510(2)). Thus, we affirm 

the district court's order compelling the minor child's return to Nevada. 

Appellant next argues that even if the district court order 

requiring the child's return was proper, the district court abused its 

discretion by awarding primary physical custody to respondent and 

limiting appellant to supervised visitation. We disagree. The district 

court found, and the record supports, that appellant took the minor child 

to Portugal without informing respondent of his intentions. The district 

court found that the letters appellant sent to respondent's family and 

friends evidenced an intent to deprive appellant of a relationship with the 

parties' child. Additionally, appellant failed to return the child to Nevada 

despite several orders to do so, and the district court found that appellant 

hid the child from respondent when respondent attempted to visit her in 

Portugal. Consequently, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district 

court's determination that circumstances had materially changed and that 

supervised visitation was in the best interest of the minor child under 

Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 161 P.3d 239 (2007), and Truax v. Truax, 

110 Nev. 437, 874 P.2d 10 (1994). See NRS 125.480(4)(c), (1). 

Additionally, appellant argues that the district court 

erroneously awarded attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) for 

4 
maintaining an unreasonable claim. We note that attorney fees have not 

actually been awarded, and the issue is not properly before this court. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3 

/31AA14.4.9t1 , J. 

Hardesty 

Cherry 

cc: Hon. Bridget Robb Peck, District Judge 

Shawn B. Meador, Settlement Judge 

Richard F. Cornell 

Silverman, Decaria & Kattelman, Chtd. 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

3We have considered appellant's remaining arguments and conclude 

that none warrant reversal. 

We have determined that this fast track appeal should be submitted 

for decision on the fast track appeal statement and response without oral 

argument. See NRAP 34(f)(1). 

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