Interim Decision #2795 

MATTER OF GORDON 

In Section 212(c) Proceedings 

A.-31446671 

Decided by Board June 6, 1980 

(1) In its elementary form, an application for a section 212(c) waiver concerns a present 

application for readmission to the United States following a temporary absence or an 

advance waiver in contemplation of a future absence. 

(2) Although it was an accepted principle that an alien might obtain a section 212(c) 

waiver in the course of deportation proceedings with retroactive effect to cure a past 

illegal reentry, the benefit is now held to be available in a deportation proceeding to 

nullify deportability due to a criminal conviction in the case of an alien who had the 

requisite period of lawful permanent domicile even if there has not been a reentry. 

Matter of Grouulos, 16 I&N Dec. 726 (BIA 1979), reaffirmed. 

(3) Where the Service invited an application for a section 212(c) waiver, not as part of a 

deportation or an exclusion proceeding, and not in contemplation of the alien's 

departure from the United States and return (ie., la a vacuum"), the procedure is 

held to be unfair and unreasonable inasmuch as the letter of invitation threatened 

deportation proceedings within 30 days, and the applicant was not made aware of her 

burden of proof. 

(4) Where an unfair procedure induced the filing of a section 212(c) application "in a 

vacuum," the resulting adverse discretionary determination by the District Director 

is set aside, and proceedings terminated. 

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: On BEHALF OF SERVICE 

Joseph M. Tapper, Esquire Jim Tom Haynes 

410 Asylum Street, Room 424 Appellate Trial Attorney 

Hartford, Connecticut 06103 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Maguire, and Farb, Board Members. Concurring 

Opinion, Appleman, Board Member 

The applicant has appealed from a decision of the District Director, 

dated August 16, 1979, denying her application for advance permission 

to return to an unrelinquished domicile pursuant to section 212(c) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). She contends 

that a letter of instruction from the District Director, received just 

after her conviction, improperly induced her to file the application 

prematurely, to her detriment. The order of the District Director will 

389 
Interim Decision #2795 

be set aside, and the proceedings will be terminated. 

The applicant is a 22-year-old native and citizen of the United 

Kingdom who was admitted to the United States as a lawful 

permanent resident on June 27, 1971. The record indicates that she has 

not departed from the United States since that entry. 

On August 25, 1978, the applicant was convicted of obtaining 

property by false pretenses and sentenced to jail for a period of 1 year. 

After 4 months of that sentence had been served, it was suspended and 

she was placed on probation for a period of 2 years. On October 18, 

1978, she was convicted of conspiracy, criminal impersonation, forgery, 

and larceny:This time she was sentenced to GO days in jail for each 

offense, the sentences to be served concurrently. 

As a result of these convictions, the District Director decided that 

the applicant might be deportable under section 241 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 

1251. instead of starting deportation proceedings against her, however, he sent the following letter to her. 

It has been determined you may be deportable under section 241 of the Immigration 

and Nationality Aat because you were convicted of a violation or violations of law_ 

Recent court decisions and subsequent changes in Service policy now allow you to 

apply for advance permission to return to an unrelinquished domicile in the United 

States. An application is enclosed for that purpose, the fee for which is $50.00. 

Please read and follow carefully the instructions on the reverse of the form. Your 

application can be adjudicated even though you haven't actually departed from the 

United States. Your application will be reviewed and if you are found eligible for the 

waiver, no further action will be taken in your case. 

The application must be filed within thirty days of receipt of this letter. 

In response to the District Director's letter, the applicant, not then 

represented, filed the subject application for a waiver of excludability 

under section 212(c) of the Act on April 11, 1979. 

The District Director denied the application, however, because of the 

applicant's criminal record and the absence of any showing of 

rehabilitation. The District Director also noted that the applicant had 

not submitted supporting documentation to persuade him to exercise 

his discretionary authority favorably. 

On appeal, the applicant contends that the District Director should 

not have invited an application for a waiver under section 212(e) in 

advance of deportation or exclusion proceedings in the circumstances 

of this case. She argues, therefore, that the District Director's adverse 

decision should be set aside. We agree. 

Section 212(c) provides that aliens lawfully admitted for permanent 

residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not 

under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful 

unrelinquished domicile of 7 consecutive years, may be admitted in the 

discretion of the Attorney General without regard to certain specified 

grounds for exclusion of section 212. 

390 
Interim Decision #2795 

In its elementary form, an application for a section 212(c) waiver 

concerns a present application for readmission to the United States 

following a temporary absence. An alien may also seek an advance 

waiver, in contemplation of a future absence. The first type is essentially forced, since the alternative if the application is not granted will 

be exclusion; the second is essentially voluntary. 

Recently, a new dimension to the section 212(c) waiver was added. 

Although it had been an accepted principle that an alien might obtain 

the waiver in the course of deportation proceedings with retroactive 

effect to cure a past illegal reentry, the benefit was now held to be 

available in a deportation proceeding to nullify deportability due to a 

criminal conviction in the case of an alien who had the requisite period 

of lawful permanent domicile even if there had not been a reentry_ 

Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2 Cir. 1976); Matter of Granaclos,16 I&N 

Dec. 726 (BIA 1979). As in exclusion, the application in these circumstances is essentially forced. 

As an outgrowth of the Francis-type section 212(c) application, the 

Service appears to have engaged in a program to encourage resident 

aliens with criminal records which render them technically deportable, while not under deportation proceedings, to file applications for 

section 212(c) waivers by means of the formal procedure referred to 

above as an application for "advance" waiver. Such an application is 

essentially voluntary on its face. 

In the present case, the letter that the District Director sent to the 

applicant declares that she may be deportable because of her criminal 

record, that nonetheless she may be able to obtain relief from deportation, and that she must apply for the relief within 30 days. This last 

statement strongly implies that deportation proceedings will follow if 

the suggested form of relief is not sought and that the applicant will 

only have one chance to apply for it. Moreover, since the Service official 

who examined her immigration file solicited a 212(c) application instead of instituting deportation proceedings, it is likely that the applicant did not realize that she would have to satisfy him that she 

deserved the waiver. Indeed, she did not submit any supporting documentation with her application. Consequently, the 212(c) waiver application was decided on the basis of an undeveloped record, and the 

applicant was left with a formal determination in her file that she had 

applied for such relief and had been unable to establish that she 

deserved it. 

We find that this procedure is unfair and unreasonable. In Matter of 

Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978), we noted, at 588: 

Confined aliens and those who have recently committed criminal acts will have a more 

difficult task in showing that discretionary relief should be exercised in their behalf 

than aliens who have committed the same offenses in the more distant past. 

391 
Interim Decision #2795 

Common sense and prudence suggest that a recently convicted alien 

should prefer to let a considerable time elapse before offering to 

demonstrate rehabilitation. 

The application herein was filed improvidently. Its filing was induced unfairly. The applicant desires not to have added to her future 

burdens the record of this discretionary determination that she is 

undeserving. Her request is reasonable. We will set aside the denial 

order. 

ORDER' The decision of the District Director is set aside, and the 

proceedings are terminated. 

CONCURRING OPINION: Irving A. Appleman, Board Member 

I concur in the decision of the majority, but believe the majority 

statement that the Service "procedure is unfair and unreasonable" 

needs elaboration. 

This case involves an "in a vacuum" application under section 212(c) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). The application was made neither as part of a deportation or exclusion proceeding, 

nor in advance of a departure from the United States in order to 

facilitate a return as a matter of convenience. Matter of WW, 12 I&N 

Dec. 736 (BIA 19(i5). It was made by a lawful permanent resident, of the 

United States. The logical question presents itself—why was it made 

at all? So far as the record before us is concerned, the applicant has no 

need for "relief" at this time. If, as, and when an Order to Show Cause 

in deportation proceedings issues, and she becomes the subject of a 

proper adjudication, in the manner prescribed by law, that she is 

deportable and hence here illegally, she may then make an application 

for section 212(c) relief pursuant to Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2 Cir. 

1976); Matter of Silva, Interim Decision 2532 (BIA 1976). 

At the same time, it must be recognized that a District Director has 

every right, in fact, a duty, to exercise his prosecutive judgment 

whether or not to institute a deportation proceeding against an alien 

who appears to be illegally in the United States. If, in screening the file 

of, and possibly after consultation with, such an alien, it appears to 

him that a deportation proceeding would surely result in a grant of 

section 212(c) relief under Francis, supra, it would be pointless to 

institute an expensive, vexatious, and needless deportation proceeding. 

In such a case, I see nothing improper in his noting the record to this 

effect, and in declining to issue an Order to Show Cause. This is not a 

"grant" of section 212(c) relief. It differs, for example, from suspension 

of deportation, which by statute, requires the institution of deportation proceedings and results in the creation of a new record of lawful 

admission. GORDON already has a record of lawful admission. In 

392 
Interim Decision #2795 

other cases where the District Director grants relief to a deportable 

alien prior to a hearing, such as voluntary departure (section 244, 8 

U.S.C. 1254), adjustment of status• (section 245, 8 U.S.C. 1255), registry 

(section 249, R U.S.C. 1259), etc., his action is authorized by statute or 

regulation. No such regulation exists here, nor is there need for one. 

On the other hand, if the District Director, after appropriate screening, decides the alien may not warrant section 212(c) relief, then it is 

his prerogative to issue an Order to Show Cause in deportation 

proceedings. There the alien may contest, with all the safeguards of 

the due process hearing accorded her by statute, the unproved assumption that she is deportable. Once found deportable, she may seek any 

relief for which she is eligible. 

In contrast, in this case, the District Director entertained an application based on an implied finding of deportability, without proper 

hearing and possibly without awareness on the part of the alien of the 

right guaranteed her by statute to contest such a finding. Her "application" was then formally denied in a nonadversary proceeding, with a 

recitation of adverse factors. These findings are a part of her file and 

can easily result in prejudice in any further proceedings. Her appeal to 

this Board was based on an inadequate record and is duplicative, since 

the entire process will be repeated in the subsequent deportation 

proceeding. If there is to be no subsequent deportation proceeding, this 

entire exercise is pointless, and she should have been left alone to enjoy 

her lawful permanent status in the first place. 

It perhaps exceeds the range of this decision to set forth what should 

have occurred. Nevertheless, as a minimum, any notice sent to an alien 

as a preliminary to the possible issuance of an Order to Show Cause 

and as a result of initial screening for eligibility for section 212(c) 

relief should advise that while she "may" be deportable, it may not be 

necessary to institute proceedings in view of her 7 years or more of 

lawful permanent residence; that to assist in a determination whether 

or not to institute a proceeding an interview would be desirable; that 

she could have counsel or a representative present if she wished; that 

her appearance is entirely voluntary; that this would be merely a 

preliminary interview and that she would be given full opportunity 

before any final decision was rendered, to contest her deportability at a 

hearing, and to make formal application for any relief for which she 

might qualify (including section 212(c)). The notice could advise of 

appropriate evidence which would assist the District Director in his 

determination whether or not to institute proceedings. The notice 

could be sent only if it appeared the likelihood of getting the relief was 

high, or if it was impossible to make any judgment from the existing 

record. A recent and serious crime, with an obvious failure of 

rehabilitation and an absence of countervailing equities, such as close 

393 
Interim Decision #2795 

family ties, might dictate a negative posture and the immediate issuance of an Order to Show Cause. 

Such a procedure would serve the objectives of both the Service and 

the alien—the former in that it would result in a determination to 

leave the alien in her present lawful status and to close the file, and the 

latter in that she would either have her case put to rest, or could fully 

and properly, in the manner provided by law, contest the issues before 

an immigration judge. And as a felicitous result, a double review would 

be eliminated in the event of an appeal. 

Since the procedure in this case was totally defective, I agree it 

should be declared a nullity, and have concurred in the majority 

decision. The proceedings, in my opinion, are subject to renewal only in 

de novo proceedings which conform substantially to the foregoing. 

394