1In addition to Steiner, Dacey names the following

defendants to this action: James J. Tenn, Esq., GMAC Bank General

Counsel, Mary Fran Rich, Merrimack Valley Federal Credit Union,

Merrimack Valley Federal Credit Union President/CEO Peter J.

Matthews, Jr., Cinda Lea D’Amante, and Market Street Settlement

Group President/CEO Michael Massey. In the narrative of her

complaint, Dacey refers to other individuals as “unnamed

defendants” or “as yet unnamed defendants.” These individuals

include Marital Master Leonard S. Green, New Hampshire Superior

Court Judges Barry and Mangones, and Amherst Police Officer

Patrick Webster. I construe Dacey’s statement that these

individuals are “as yet unnamed,” as a concession that those

individuals are not presently named defendants in this action,

and that she does not intend for those individuals to be served

with this action at this time.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Veronica Hanke Dacey

v. Civil No. 08-cv-212-PB

R. James Steiner, Esq., et al.1

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Before the court is Veronica Hanke Dacey’s complaint

(document no. 1). Dacey is seeking relief under various federal

criminal and civil rights statutes. Dacey alleges that

defendants have conspired against her, denied her civil rights,

defrauded her, and stolen her property and identity, in engaging

in activities concerning a real estate transaction related to her

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2

divorce. Because Dacey is proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, the matter is before me for preliminary review to

determine, among other things, whether or not she has stated any

claim upon which relief might be granted. See United States

District Court District of New Hampshire Local Rule (“LR”)

4.3(d)(1)(B). 

For the reasons discussed herein, I find that Dacey has

failed to state any claim upon which relief might be granted. 

Accordingly, I recommend that this action be dismissed.

Standard of Review

Under this Court’s local rules, when a plaintiff commences

an action pro se and in forma pauperis, the magistrate judge is

directed to conduct a preliminary review. LR 4.3(d)(1)(B). In

conducting the preliminary review, the Court construes pro se

pleadings liberally, however inartfully pleaded. See Erickson v.

Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (following

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) to construe pro se pleadings

generously in favor of the pro se party). “The policy behind

affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if

they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the correct

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3

cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.” See Castro v.

United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (noting that courts may

construe pro se pleadings so as to avoid inappropriately

stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals of claims); Ahmed v.

Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). All of the

factual assertions made by a pro se plaintiff and inferences

reasonably drawn therefrom must be accepted as true. See id.

This review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and

meaningful consideration.

Background

In December of 2006, pursuant to an Order of the New

Hampshire Superior Court in Dacey’s divorce case, Dacey’s

interest in her home was transferred to her former husband, and

she was paid her share of the equity in the home. The home

transferred to Mr. Dacey’s sole ownership via a quitclaim deed

signed by a private attorney, James Tenn. At the request of Mr.

Dacey’s counsel, James Steiner, Tenn was appointed by the

Superior Court to be a “commissioner” for that particular sale,

with the power to sign the deed and effect the transfer of

ownership. Plaintiff neither consented to nor authorized the 

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4

transfer of property, or the representation of her interests in

the sale by Attorney Tenn. 

Subsequent to the transfer of property, plaintiff went to

her ex-husband’s home, which had formerly been her home as well,

and refused to leave. Mr. Dacey contacted the police to request

that plaintiff be removed from the property. Amherst Police

Officer Patrick Webster responded to the house and advised

plaintiff that she had to leave, and that she would be arrested

if she returned to the house.

Plaintiff alleges that the entire process of transferring

the house without her signature or consent was the result of a

conspiracy among the defendants to deprive her of her civil

rights and property rights, to steal her identity, and,

ultimately, to punish her with arrest. Plaintiff claims that she

is homeless and lives “in hiding” for fear that, if found, she

will be arrested and incarcerated by defendants.

Discussion

I. Claims Arising out of Alleged Criminal Wrongdoing

Dacey asserts claims based on her assertion that the

defendants have committed crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

241, 242, 1014 and 1344. These are criminal statutes and do not

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provide for a private cause of action. See Rodi v. Ventetuolo,

941 F.2d 22, 29 n.8 (1st Cir. 1991); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d

1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.

Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 138 (4th Cir. 1987); Murphy v. Maine, No.

CV-06-62-B-W, 2006 WL 2514012, *3 n.5 (D. Me. 2006); Milgrom v.

Burstein, 374 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528-29 (E.D. Ky. 2005). To the

extent that Dacey relies on these criminal statutes as a basis

for civil claims, I recommend dismissal of those claims.

II. Claims Alleging Discrimination

Dacey grounds several of her claims on federal statutes that

give rise to a cause of action for racial discrimination in

making contracts or in the sale of real property. See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981 & 1982. Dacey, however, has not alleged that she has

suffered from racial discrimination, or any other class-based

invidiously discriminatory animus. The absence of any allegation

of discrimination is fatal to her claims under these statutes. 

See Delaunay v. Collins, 97 Fed. Appx. 229, 233 (10th Cir. 2004);

Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 739 n.1 (1st Cir.

1980); Shipley v. Orndoff, 491 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (D. Del.

2007); Rivera Diaz v. P.R. Tel. Co., 724 F. Supp. 1069, 1073

(D.P.R. 1989) (“The absence of an allegation of racial

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discrimination is fatal to a cause of action brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1981.”). Accordingly, I recommend that the claims

brought pursuant to §§ 1981 and 1982 be dismissed. 

III. Claim Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of

federal rights effected under color of state law. See Am. Mfrs.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (finding

that in order to state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs “must

establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged

deprivation was committed under color of state law”). Dacey has

named private actors as defendants to this action. While Dacey

complains of actions taken by some state actors, she specifically

concedes that those individuals are not named as defendants to

this action. I find, therefore, that the defendants are all

private actors acting in their private capacity, and therefore

cannot be sued under § 1983. 

It is worth noting that one defendant to this action, James

Tenn, sits in a different position than the other defendants, as

the claim Dacey brings against Tenn alleges that he acted as a

court-appointed commissioner, and thus should be considered to be

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a state actor in this matter. The First Circuit has previously

decided, however, that a private litigant’s use of the state

courts to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional settlement

agreement did not constitute state action that could support a

civil rights claim. See Miles v. Funk, 259 Fed. Appx. 335, 337

(1st Cir. 2008). Under Miles, by acting as a court-appointed

commissioner, Tenn’s action in signing the deed transferring her

property to her ex-husband, did not constitute state action

subjecting him to suit under § 1983. Accordingly, I recommend

dismissal of the § 1983 claim from this action.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that this action be

dismissed in its entirety, as Dacey has failed to state any claim

upon which relief might be granted. See LR 4.3(d)(1)(B)(i). 

Any objections to this report and recommendation must be

filed within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to

file objections within the specified time waives the right to

appeal the district court’s order. See Unauthorized Practice of 

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Law Comm. v. Gordon, 979 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992);

United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986). 

_________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 7, 2008 

cc: Veronica Hanke Dacey, pro se

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