IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-23

No. 230A20

Filed 19 March 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: B.T.J.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 18

February 2020 by Judge Charlie Brown in District Court, Rowan County. This matter 

was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 11 February 2021 but 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Jane R. Thompson for petitioner-appellee Rowan County Department of Social 

Services.

McGuireWoods LLP, by Anita Foss, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Parent 

Defender, for respondent-appellant mother.

HUDSON, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her 

parental rights to her minor child B.T.J. (Blake).1 Since we conclude that the trial 

court properly adjudicated at least one ground for termination, we affirm the 

termination order.

 

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading.
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¶ 2 On 25 August 2017, the Rowan County Department of Social Services (DSS) 

filed a juvenile petition alleging that Blake was neglected and dependent. On that 

date, DSS responded to respondent-mother’s hotel room after receiving a report that 

she had overdosed on heroin in Blake’s presence. Eleven days earlier, respondentmother had obtained a domestic violence protective order against Blake’s father 

which also forbade him from having contact with Blake. As a result, neither of Blake’s 

parents could provide care for him. DSS also alleged that Blake’s parents both had 

an “intense and significant” history of substance abuse, which had previously 

necessitated a referral for in-home services on two occasions. DSS obtained nonsecure 

custody of Blake and placed him in foster care. 

¶ 3 On 15 February 2018, the trial court, with the consent of all parties, entered 

an order adjudicating Blake as a neglected and dependent juvenile. Respondentmother was ordered to maintain safe and stable housing, comply with the 

recommendations of her substance abuse and mental health assessments, submit to 

random drug screens, participate in Blake’s treatment if recommended by Blake’s 

therapist, and sign releases of information needed to monitor her treatment progress. 

The order also provided respondent-mother with one hour of supervised visitation per 

week.

¶ 4 On 4 April 2018, respondent-mother was found guilty of a felony drug charge, 

misdemeanor larceny, misdemeanor second-degree trespassing, and misdemeanor 
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child abuse. She was placed on thirty months of supervised probation. On 18 May 

2018, respondent-mother was incarcerated, and she remained so until she entered

inpatient substance abuse treatment on 24 October 2018. After her release from 

treatment on 21 January 2019, she continued to test positive for various controlled 

substances on 4 February 2019, 18 February 2019, 7 June 2019, and 1 July 2019. 

¶ 5 On 29 July 2019, DSS filed a petition seeking to terminate respondentmother’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect and willfully leaving Blake in a 

placement outside the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable 

progress toward correcting the conditions that led to his removal. See N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019). In addition to chronicling respondent-mother’s drug use, DSS 

also alleged that respondent-mother had difficulty maintaining consistent housing, 

employment, and visitation with Blake. 

¶ 6 After a two-day hearing in early November 2019, the trial court entered an 

order on 18 February 2020 which terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights. 

The trial court concluded that DSS had proven both alleged grounds for termination 

and that termination was in Blake’s best interests. Respondent-mother appealed.

2

¶ 7 On appeal, respondent-mother challenges both grounds for termination found 

by the trial court. She argues that in light of the severity of her addiction and the 

 

2 Blake’s father’s parental rights were also terminated in the 18 February 2020 order, 

but he did not appeal the trial court’s order and is therefore not a party to this appeal.
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amount of time she was incarcerated while this case progressed, the trial court failed 

to adequately credit the progress she made in remedying the problems which led to 

Blake’s removal and the neglect adjudication.

¶ 8 When considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the trial court first 

makes an adjudicatory determination based on the alleged grounds for termination.

See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 (2019). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the 

burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or 

more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” In 

re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2017)). “If a trial 

court finds one or more grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a), it then proceeds to the dispositional stage,” id. at 6, at which it “determine[s]

whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 

7B-1110(a) (2019).

¶ 9 We review a trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate parental rights 

“to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 

evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 

392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “Findings of fact not 

challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent evidence and are 

binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019) (citing Koufman v. 
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Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991)). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable 

de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019).

¶ 10 Subsection 7B-1111(a)(1) permits a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights if 

that parent is neglecting their child. A neglected juvenile is one “whose parent, 

guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or 

discipline; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; 

or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment 

injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). 

¶ 11 In some circumstances, the trial court may terminate a parent’s rights based 

on neglect that is currently occurring at the time of the termination hearing. See, e.g., 

In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 599–600 (2020) (“[T]his Court has recognized that the 

neglect ground can support termination . . . if a parent is presently neglecting their 

child by abandonment.”). However, in other instances, the fact that “a child has not 

been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the 

termination hearing” would make “requiring the petitioner in such circumstances to 

show that the child is currently neglected by the parent . . . impossible.” In re N.D.A., 

373 N.C. 71, 80 (2019) (cleaned up). In such situations, “evidence of neglect by a 

parent prior to losing custody of a child—including an adjudication of such neglect—

is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights[,]” but “[t]he 

trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the 
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evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect.” In re Ballard, 

311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984). After weighing this evidence, the trial court may find that

neglect exists as a ground for termination if it concludes the evidence demonstrates 

“a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.” In re R.L.D., 851 S.E.2d 17, 20 (N.C. 

2020) (citation omitted). Thus, even in the absence of current neglect, the trial court 

may adjudicate neglect as a ground for termination based upon its consideration of 

any evidence of past neglect and its determination that there is a likelihood of future 

neglect if the child is returned to the parent’s care. Id. at 20 n.3. 

¶ 12 There were no allegations in this case that respondent-mother was currently 

neglecting Blake at the time of the termination hearing. However, it is undisputed 

that Blake was out of respondent-mother’s custody for an extended period of time and 

that he was previously adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile. Thus, our review 

focuses on whether the trial court correctly determined that there is a likelihood of 

future neglect if Blake is returned to respondent-mother’s care.

¶ 13 When assessing whether there is a likelihood of future neglect, “the district 

court must consider evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period 

of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 

212 (2019) (citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715). “The determinative factors must be 

the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child at the 
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time of the termination proceeding.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 212 (quoting In re 

Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715).

¶ 14 Blake was previously adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile after he witnessed 

respondent-mother overdose on heroin in the hotel room where they were residing 

together, at which time he was in her care. In order to address the underlying causes 

of this adjudication, respondent-mother was ordered to complete a remediation plan 

which required her to participate in treatment for her drug addiction and stabilize 

her living situation. The termination order includes numerous unchallenged findings 

of fact clearly describing the limited progress respondent-mother made on this plan 

which are binding for purposes of appellate review. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407. As 

described below, these binding factual findings reflect that respondent-mother had 

not adequately addressed her issues and at the time of the termination hearing, the 

likelihood of future neglect was “very high,” as the trial court properly determined.

¶ 15 First, the unchallenged findings show that respondent-mother’s substance 

abuse issues continued after Blake entered DSS custody. She was inconsistent in 

engaging in treatment until she entered Black Mountain Substance Abuse Treatment 

Center for inpatient treatment from 24 October 2018 to 21 January 2019. However, 

two weeks after respondent-mother completed this inpatient treatment program, she 

once again tested positive for controlled substances—and continued to do so. She 

tested positive for cocaine and marijuana on 4 February 2019, for buprenorphine 
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without a prescription on 18 February 2019, for marijuana on 7 and 28 June 2019,

for marijuana and alcohol on 1 July 2019, and for alcohol on the first day of the 

termination hearing on 7 November 2019. Thus, while respondent-mother had no 

positive drug screens for approximately four months before the termination hearing 

was held, she had multiple positive screens in the weeks and months prior to that 

period, including soon after her discharge from inpatient drug treatment. Moreover, 

the four-month period of sobriety immediately prior to the termination hearing 

corresponded with respondent-mother’s regular attendance at Rowan Treatment 

Associates, where she was receiving methadone treatment.

¶ 16 The trial court’s unchallenged findings also reflect that respondent-mother’s 

housing situation remained unstable. The trial court found that respondent-mother 

“changed homes several times during the history of this case” and proceeded to list 

more than a half-dozen such changes. By the time of the termination hearing, 

respondent-mother had been living in a one-bedroom trailer with her new husband 

for about two months. This housing situation was unsuitable, however. Respondentmother’s lease for that trailer only permitted three individuals to live there, and her 

stepdaughter was living with her and her husband every other weekend. During 

those times, Blake could not also reside in the trailer without violating the terms of 

the lease. Thus, as the trial court properly determined, respondent-mother’s housing 

at the time of the termination hearing was inadequate.
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¶ 17 The trial court’s unchallenged findings also discuss other areas of concern. 

Respondent-mother was unable to maintain stable employment. She was fired from 

two separate jobs, with one of the firings resulting from her bringing her 

stepdaughter to work on a hot day without permission from her employer. 

Respondent-mother also withheld relevant information from DSS and her treatment 

provider. She did not inform DSS of her employment situation, her marriage, or her 

living situation, including that her stepdaughter stayed in her home on a regular 

basis. Respondent-mother did not sign a release of information for Rowan Treatment 

Associates, and she did not tell her treatment provider about her involvement with 

DSS or that a release was needed.

¶ 18 When the termination hearing occurred, Blake had been in foster care for more 

than twenty-six months. While respondent-mother can point to some signs of progress 

in the months immediately preceding the termination hearing, these were merely her 

first steps toward addressing her issues. Troublingly, respondent-mother had 

relapsed just two weeks after leaving inpatient drug treatment and repeatedly tested 

positive for a variety of controlled substances over a five-month period. At the time of 

the termination hearing, respondent-mother had only been consistent with a 

treatment regimen and gone without a positive drug screen for four months, and she 

had only been in her current housing for two months, which was inadequate. She had 

not established stable employment. The trial court properly determined that 
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respondent-mother’s tenuous, limited progress on the issues that directly led to 

Blake’s prior adjudication was neither enough to rectify these issues nor enough to 

diminish the probability that Blake would likely be neglected again if he returned to 

her care. In In re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645 (2020), we noted that “evidence of changed 

conditions must be considered in light of the history of neglect by the parents and the 

probability of a repetition of neglect,” 375 N.C. at 648 (quoting Smith v. Alleghany 

Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 114 N.C. App. 727, 732 (1994)), and we held that although 

the respondent-father in that case may have made some recent, minimal progress on 

his case plan, “the trial court was within its authority to weigh the evidence and 

determine that these eleventh-hour efforts did not outweigh the evidence of his 

persistent failures to make improvements . . . and to conclude that there was a 

probability of repetition of neglect.” Id. at 654. The same reasoning applies here. 

Taken together, the trial court’s unchallenged findings support its conclusion that 

“[t]he probability of a repetition of neglect of the juvenile if returned to the home or 

care of [respondent-mother] . . . is very high.”

¶ 19 Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly determined that respondentmother’s parental rights could be terminated based on neglect. Because we conclude 

this termination ground is supported, we need not address respondent-mother’s 

arguments as to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the remaining ground found by the trial 

court. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194 (2019) (“[A] finding of only one ground is 
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necessary to support a termination of parental rights . . . .”). We affirm the trial court’s 

order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.