alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-3791

___________

Devon Smith, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Quality Furniture, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: February 2, 2001

 Filed: April 27, 2001

___________

Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Devon Smith appeals following the district court’s1 grant of judgment as a matter

of law to his former employer in his employment-discrimination action. Having

reviewed the record (including the trial transcript) and the parties’ appellate

submissions, we affirm. 

We conclude first that the district court properly dismissed Smith’s claim of
systemic discrimination as not administratively exhausted. See Williams v. Little Rock

Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994) (prior to filing federal lawsuit,

Title VII plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies by filing timely Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission charge and receiving notice of right to sue;

plaintiff will be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies as to allegations that

are like or reasonably related to substance of charge). We further conclude the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s (1) motion for appointed counsel,

see Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998); (2) motion for continuance,

see Myers v. Norfolk Livestock Mkt., Inc., 696 F.2d 555, 557-58 (8th Cir. 1982); (3)

request to subpoena a nonparty’s cellular telephone records, see United States v. Oates,

173 F.3d 651, 658 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 890 (1999); or (4) oral request

during trial to subpoena witnesses, see id.; E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(C)(1). Likewise, we

find no abuse of discretion in the court’s exclusion of certain hearsay testimony. See

Anderson v. Genuine Parts Co., 128 F.3d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir. 1997). 

To the extent that Smith contends the district court erred in granting judgment

as a matter of law to Quality Furniture on his discrimination claim, we reject this

argument as meritless. See Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 1122,

1126-27 (8th Cir. 2000) (direct evidence of discrimination requires showing that actual

motive behind termination was racial animus, and indirect evidence requires showing

that members of other racial groups were treated more favorably); Hawkins v. City of

Farmington, 189 F.3d 695, 700-01 (8th Cir. 1999) (de novo standard of review).

Finally, we deny Smith’s request for appointment of counsel on appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 
A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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#### Louis GILLARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.

June 25, 1954.

John D. Menas, Tampa, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Bart L. Cohen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We have examined and considered the record in this case in the light of briefs filed, and have also reviewed the evidence, pursuant to subparagraph’ (2) of section 924.32, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., to determine if the interests of justice require a new trial, with a result that we find that no reversible error is made to appear and that the evidence does not reveal that the ends of justice require that a new trial be awarded.

Affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, SEBRING, HOBSON, MATHEWS and DREW) JJ., concur.
# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 15-3323

___________________________ John Caldwell lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
v. Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, formerly Deputy Director of Health Services lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee Corizon, Inc. lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant Deborah York, H.S.A., Varner Unit; Robe rt Floss, Doctor, ADC; Ojiugo Iko, Doctor, Corizon Inc. lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

____________ Submitted: August 30, 2016 Filed: September 2, 2016 [Unpublished]

____________ Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

____________PER CURIAM. Arkansas inmate John Caldwell appeals the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Viewing the summary judgment record in a light most favorable to Mr. Caldwell, and drawing all reasonable inferences from it in his favor, seeMurchison v. Rogers , 779 F.3d 882, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2015), we find no basis for overturning the district court’s determination that there were no jury issues on his Eighth Amendment claims, see Allard v. Baldwin , 779 F.3d 768, 771-72 (8th Cir.) (discussing requirements to prevail on Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied , 136 S. Ct. 211 (2015). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

1 The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief J udge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adop ting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Beth Deere, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2-
#### Harold Berger, Appellant, v Water Commissioners of the Town of Waterford, Respondent.

[744 NYS2d 562]

Cardona, P.J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ferradme, J.), entered October 5, 2001 in Saratoga County, which denied plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant from 1977 until his retirement in 1999. Plaintiff contends that during most of his tenure, including that period of time during which he was planning his retirement, defendant had a policy of providing retirees and their surviving spouses with full employer-paid health insurance coverage. One month before the effective date of plaintiffs retirement, he was advised that defendant had changed its policy with respect to future retirees and would be reducing its contribution to plaintiffs postretirement health insurance. Plaintiff commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that defendant breached an implied promise to provide full employer-paid health insurance.

Subsequently, in the course of discovery, plaintiff located a letter, dated March 18, 1977, which he characterizes, together with his acceptance of its terms through his conduct, as creating an express contract entitling him to the fringe benefit he seeks. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for breach of an express contract and to include a request for punitive damages. Supreme Court denied the motion, prompting this appeal.

In general, leave to amend a complaint rests within the trial court’s discretion and should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting from the delay except in situations where the proposed amendment is wholly devoid of merit *(see,*CPLR 3025 [b]; *Spa Realty Assoc. v Springs Assoc.,*256 AD2d 1001, 1002; *Seaman Corp. v Binghamton Sav. Bank,*243 AD2d 1027, 1028). Here, the record supports Supreme Court’s finding that defendant would not be prejudiced by the proposed amendment. We do not agree, however, with the court’s determination that plaintiffs argument concerning the alleged existence of an express contract is so patently meritless as to warrant denial of his motion to amend the complaint *(see, e.g., Gilinsky v Sarbro Realty Corp.,*138 AD2d 823, 824). Accordingly, we find that the motion should have been granted to the extent of permitting the amendment to set forth a claim for *650breach of an express contract. With respect to plaintiffs proposed request for punitive damages, under the circumstances herein, we find no reason to disturb Supreme Court’s denial of that portion of plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint.

Mercure, Spain, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint to add a cause of action for breach of an express contract; motion granted to that extent; and, as so modified, affirmed.
[746 NYS2d 5]

#### In the Matter of Lewis H. Eslinger, an Attorney, Respondent. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner.

First Department,

July 18, 2002

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Raymond Vallejo*of counsel *(Thomas J. Cahill,*attorney), for petitioner.

*Howard Benjamin*of counsel *(Benjamin Brotman & Maltz, LLP),*for respondent.

*213OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Respondent Lewis H. Eslinger was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on April 4, 1956. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.

By an unpublished order dated February 21, 2001 (M-4308), this Court granted the Departmental Disciplinary Committee’s petition, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.4 (d), Judiciary Law § 90 (2) and the doctrine of collateral estoppel, finding respondent guilty of professional misconduct in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (a) (4) and (7), DR 2-106 (a) and DR 9-102 (d) (22 NYCRR 1200.3, 1200.11, 1200.46), and referred the matter to a referee for a hearing solely to consider evidence in mitigation or aggravation, if any, and to recommend an appropriate sanction to be imposed upon respondent. Collateral estoppel was applied to findings rendered by the United States District Court for the Centred District of California dated July 10, 1995 in *Laser-Pacific Media Corp. v Cooper & Dunham.*

A sanction hearing was subsequently held before the Referee who recommended that, in light of the totality of circumstances, including the respondent’s age and unsullied 46 years of practice, respondent be suspended for a period of three years. In its report, the Hearing Panel recommended disaffirming the Referee’s recommendation and recommended respondent’s disbarment, finding that respondent’s acts in submitting false billings constituted “venal conduct.”

The Disciplinary Committee now seeks an order confirming the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendation as to sanction set forth by the Hearing Panel. Respondent cross-moves to deny the Committee’s motion, to disaffirm the Hearing Panel’s report and to suggest a one-year suspension as an appropriate sanction.

In light of the serious nature of respondent’s actions, on the one hand, and his age and his lengthy and unblemished legal career on the other, we conclude that the Committee’s motion, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.4 (d), should be granted to the extent that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately, for a period of five years. The cross motion should be denied in all respects.

Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Buckley, Lerner and Friedman, JJ., concur.

*214Respondent suspended from the practice of law in the State of New York for a period of five years, effective immediately.
#### In the Matter of Keven Plummer, Appellant, v Dana Plummer, Respondent.

[808 NYS2d 414]

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, inter alia, to enforce an order of visitation of the Family Court, Nassau County (Lawrence, J.), dated May 11, 1998, the father appeals from an order of the same court (Robbins, J.), dated January 11, 2005, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Nassau County, for a determination, in the exercise of its discretion, of whether the father should be granted written permission of the court to file a visitation petition.

By order dated July 27, 2004, Nassau County Family Court Judge Richard S. Lawrence prohibited the father from filing, inter alia, any further custody or visitation petitions without obtaining prior written permission of the court *(see Matter of Shreve v Shreve,*229 AD2d 1005 [1996]; *see also Matter of Pignataro v Davis,*8 AD3d 487, 489 [2004]; *Cangro v Cangro,*288 AD2d 417 [2001]). On November 22, 2004, the father filed a petition with the Clerk of the Family Court, seeking written permission to file a new visitation petition and, in effect, annexed a proposed petition which sought to hold the mother in violation of a prior visitation order. The Clerk of the Family Court assigned the petition to a different judge, who ultimately heard the petition and dismissed it, with prejudice, on the ground that the father failed to obtain written permission from Judge Lawrence prior to filing the petition. We reverse and reinstate the petition.

*559The order dated July 27, 2004, did not, by its terms, direct the father to seek prior written permission in any particular fashion, and did not direct the father to submit papers seeking such permission directly to Judge Lawrence *(cf.*22 NYCRR 205.8). The father thus properly sought prior written leave by means of a petition filed with the Clerk of the Family Court *(see*22 NYCRR 205.8, 205.9), and properly, in effect, annexed a proposed visitation petition *(cf. Haller v Lopane,*305 AD2d 370, 372 [2003]; *Perre v Town of Poughkeepsie, 300*AD2d 379 [2002]; *Branch v Abraham & Strauss Dept. Store,*220 AD2d 474, 475 [1995]). Consequently, the Family Court erred in dismissing the petition without first determining whether prior written permission should have been granted.

Thus we remit the matter to the Family Court, Nassau County, for a determination, in the exercise of its discretion, of whether written permission should be granted to the father. Schmidt, J.P., Mastro, Spolzino and Covello, JJ., concur.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

__________________________ 

PATRICIA A. GAVIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2013-5095

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 11-CV-0528, Senior Judge Eric G. Bruggink. 

__________________________ 

ON MOTION

__________________________ 

O R D E R

Patricia A. Gavin moves to reinstate her appeal that 

was dismissed on July 8, 2013 for failure to pay the 

required docketing fee and moves for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

(1) The motion to reinstate is denied. 

Case: 13-5095 Document: 8 Page: 1 Filed: 10/09/2013
GAVIN V. US 2

(2) The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied. 

FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole

 Daniel E. O’Toole

Clerk

s26 

Case: 13-5095 Document: 8 Page: 2 Filed: 10/09/2013
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 5Federal Reserve Bank of: RichmondFilings received during the week ending April 8, 2006FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodBANK OF ROMNEY, THE                                                                                                     * BranchThe Bank of Romney, Romney, West Virginia, proposes to establish a branch at U.S. Route 50 Sunrise Summit, Romney, West Virginia.Newspaper: 04/14/2006Federal Register: Not applicableBANK OF ROMNEY, THE                                                                                                     PremisesThe Bank of Romney, Romney, West Virginia, to increase its investment in bank premises in the amount of $1.7 million.Newspaper: Not applicableFederal Register: Not applicableBANK OF THE COMMONWEALTH                                                                                                * BranchBank of The Commonwealth, Norfolk, Virginia, to establish a branch at 229 West Bute Street, Suite 320, Norfolk, Virginia.Newspaper: 04/11/2006Federal Register: Not applicableGATEWAY BANK & TRUST CO.                                                                                                * BranchGateway Bank & Trust Company, Elizabeth City, North Carolina, proposes to establish a branch at 322 S. Broad Street, Edenton, North Carolina.Newspaper: 04/10/2006Federal Register: Not applicableHOMETOWN BANK                                                                                                           * BranchHomeTown Bank, Roanoke, Virginia, to establish a branch facility to be located at 13400 Booker T. Washington Highway, Moneta, Virginia.Newspaper: 04/20/2006Federal Register: Not applicableROCKINGHAM HERITAGE BANK                                                                                                * 18C
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

CertificatePursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350as Adopted Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofAccess Anytime Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the periodended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ken Huey, Jr., Chief Financial Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1. The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

2. The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  July 31, 2003 | /s/ Ken Huey, Jr.                              |   |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                      | Ken Huey, Jr., Chief Financial Officer,        |
|                      | *(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)* |
|                           |                                                |        |  |

 

----
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 7Federal Reserve Bank of: ChicagoFilings received during the week ending January 24, 2009FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodCITY STATE BANCORPORATION, INC.                                                                                         * 3A1City State Bancorporation, Inc., Central City, Iowa, to become a bank holding company by acquiring 51.3 percent of MSB Corporation, Central City, Iowa, and thereby indirectly control City State Bank, Central City, Iowa.Newspaper: 02/09/2009Federal Register: 02/02/2009INDIANA BANK CORP.                                                                                                      4c812-day Notice - Indiana Bank Corp., Dana, Indiana, proposes to engage de novo in extending credit and servicing loans.Newspaper: Not applicableFederal Register: Not applicable
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02220-RPM-CBS 

CINDY QUINTERO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 

Defendant.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE

THE COURT having reviewed the Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice 

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and being fully advised in the premises, DOES 

HEREBY ORDER that this case is Dismissed with Prejudice, with each party to pay her 

or its own attorney’s fees and costs. 

BY THE COURT:

November 1st , 2011       s/Richard P. Matsch

DATE Richard P. Matsch, Senior District Judge 

Case 1:11-cv-02220-RPM-CBS Document 17 Filed 11/01/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
B.6. Distribution of Agricultural Banks by the Share of Their Total Loans that are Nonperforming

Percent

Less than 20.0 percent

2.0 2.0-4.9 5.0-9.9 10.0-14.9 15.0-19.9 and

Period Total percent percent percent percent percent over

1998...... 100.0 81.7 15.1 2.8 .3 ... .1

1999...... 100.0 84.8 12.6 2.4 .3 .0 ...

2000...... 100.0 85.0 12.8 1.8 .3 ... ...

2001...... 100.0 80.0 17.3 2.5 .1 .0 ...

2002...... 100.0 79.7 17.1 2.8 .2 .1 ...

2003...... 100.0 81.2 15.0 3.3 .4 .1 .0

2004...... 100.0 85.3 12.7 1.7 .2 .1 ...

2005...... 100.0 87.2 10.7 1.9 .2 ... ...

2006...... 100.0 86.8 11.5 1.6 .0 .0 ...

2007...... 100.0 84.0 13.3 2.4 .2 .0 ...

2008...... 100.0 76.1 18.3 4.7 .8 .0 .0

2009...... 100.0 68.4 24.8 5.8 .8 .2 .0

 Q4... 100.0 85.0 12.8 1.8 .3 ... ...

2001: Q1... 100.0 80.3 16.9 2.6 .2 .1 ...

 Q2... 100.0 80.2 16.6 3.0 .2 .1 ...

 Q3... 100.0 78.7 17.8 3.2 .3 ... ...

 Q4... 100.0 80.0 17.3 2.5 .1 .0 ...

2002: Q1... 100.0 76.8 19.3 3.7 .2 .0 ...

 Q2... 100.0 76.8 19.6 3.1 .4 .0 ...

 Q3... 100.0 77.8 18.8 3.2 .2 .0 ...

 Q4... 100.0 79.7 17.1 2.8 .2 .1 ...

2003: Q1... 100.0 75.4 19.9 4.1 .3 .2 .0

 Q2... 100.0 76.2 19.2 4.0 .4 .1 .1

 Q3... 100.0 77.7 18.3 3.6 .3 .1 .0

 Q4... 100.0 81.2 15.0 3.3 .4 .1 .0

2004: Q1... 100.0 79.2 17.2 3.2 .2 .1 .0

 Q2... 100.0 81.3 15.1 3.2 .3 .0 .1

 Q3... 100.0 82.1 15.1 2.4 .2 .1 .0

 Q4... 100.0 85.3 12.7 1.7 .2 .1 ...

2005: Q1... 100.0 84.4 13.3 2.0 .2 .0 ...

 Q2... 100.0 85.7 12.0 2.0 .3 .0 ...

 Q3... 100.0 85.7 12.4 1.8 .1 ... ...

 Q4... 100.0 87.2 10.7 1.9 .2 ... ...

2006: Q1... 100.0 85.6 12.6 1.7 .1 ... ...

 Q2... 100.0 85.8 12.5 1.5 .1 .0 ...

 Q3... 100.0 85.9 12.5 1.5 .0 ... ...

 Q4... 100.0 86.8 11.5 1.6 .0 .0 ...

2007: Q1... 100.0 84.9 12.9 2.0 .1 ... ...

 Q2... 100.0 85.2 12.2 2.5 .1 ... ...

 Q3... 100.0 83.6 14.1 2.1 .0 .0 .0

 Q4... 100.0 84.0 13.3 2.4 .2 .0 ...

2008: Q1... 100.0 81.0 15.5 2.9 .5 .0 .0

 Q2... 100.0 79.2 17.1 3.1 .4 .1 .1

 Q3... 100.0 78.2 17.5 3.5 .6 .1 .1

 Q4... 100.0 76.1 18.3 4.7 .8 .0 .0

2009: Q1... 100.0 69.9 23.6 5.6 .7 .2 .1

 Q2... 100.0 67.9 25.0 5.9 1.0 .1 .0

 Q3... 100.0 67.1 25.5 6.3 1.1 .0 .0

 Q4... 100.0 68.4 24.8 5.8 .8 .2 .0

 Note. Nonperforming loans are loans in nonaccruing status or past due 90 days or more. Renegotiated or restructured

loans in compliance with the modified terms are not included. Agricultural banks are defined in the introduction to section B.

Yearly data are as of December 31. Quarterly data are as of end of quarter.

 ... Not applicable.

26