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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

JHONNATTAN E. PAREDES, : No. 1743 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, May 29, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0011767-2011,

CP-51-CR-0011768-2011, CP-51-CR-0011769-2011,

CP-51-CR-0013063-3011, CP-51-CR-0013064-2011

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2016

Jhonnattan E. Paredes appeals from the order filed in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which dismissed, without a hearing, 

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Because we agree with the PCRA court that 

appellant’s facially untimely petition failed to establish a statutory exception 

to the one-year jurisdictional time limit for filing a petition under the PCRA, 

we affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the following:

On December 27, 2011, [appellant] appeared 

before this court to enter a negotiated guilty plea to 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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five counts of robbery.[1] The court conducted an 

extensive colloquy before [appellant] accepted a plea 

deal of 6-12 years of incarceration. [Appellant] 

stated that he was satisfied with counsel and that 

the only promise made to him was a negotiated 

sentence of 6-12 years of incarceration. On 

January 26, 2012, this court imposed the negotiated 

sentence. On May 28, 2013, [appellant] filed a 

pro se PCRA petition, more than a year after his 

judgment of sentence became final. Then on 

November 5, 2014, PCRA counsel filed an amended 

petition, which asserted an exception to the time bar 

because of the discovery of new evidence: that on 

July 5, 2012, then Governor Tom Corbett signed 

SB 100, Act 122, which prohibited pre-release.

PCRA court opinion, 12/23/15 at 1-2.

Appellant raises two issues for our review:

I. Whether the court erred in denying the 

[a]ppellant’s PCRA petition without an 

evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the 

amended PCRA petition regarding trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness.

II. Whether the court erred in not granting relief 

on the PCRA petition alleging counsel was 

ineffective.

Appellant’s brief at 8.

All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be 

filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes 

final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A judgment becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
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expiration of the time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the PCRA’s time restriction is 

constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. 

2004). In addition, our supreme court has instructed that the timeliness of 

a PCRA petition is jurisdictional. If a PCRA petition is untimely, a court lacks 

jurisdiction over the petition. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 

120-121 (Pa.Super. 2014) (courts do not have jurisdiction over an untimely 

PCRA); see also Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120 (Pa. 2005).

Here, the trial court sentenced appellant on January 26, 2012. 

Appellant failed to file a direct appeal to this court, and consequently, 

appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on February 27, 2012, 

30 days after imposition of sentence and the time for filing a direct appeal 

expired.2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903; Commonwealth 

v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 763 (Pa.Super. 2013). Therefore, appellant’s 

petition, filed May 28, 2013, is facially untimely. As a result, the PCRA court 

lacked jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition, unless appellant alleged 

and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the time bar, as set forth in 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

 

2 We note that the 30th day after the trial court sentenced appellant was 

February 25, 2012, but February 25, 2012, was a Saturday. See

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (requiring that when the last day of a statutory period 

falls on Saturday or Sunday, such day shall be omitted from the time 

computation).
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Those three narrow exceptions to the one-year time bar are: when 

the government has interfered with the appellant’s ability to present the 

claim, when the appellant has recently discovered facts upon which his PCRA 

claim is predicated, or when either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the 

United States Supreme Court has recognized a new constitutional right and 

made that right retroactive. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii); 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa.Super. 2012). 

The appellant bears the burden of pleading and proving the applicability of 

any exception. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). If an appellant fails to invoke a 

valid exception to the PCRA time bar, this court may not review the petition. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

Here, in his brief on appeal before this court, appellant does not 

identify which exception to the PCRA time bar he alleges applies. Rather, he 

baldly asserts, “[a]ppellant now files this instant PCRA petition pursuant to 

the exception to the timeliness requirement.” (Appellant’s brief at 21.) He 

then sets forth the following in an effort to circumvent the time bar:

Governor Tom Corbett passed SB 100, 

Act 122, which prohibited pre-release. This Bill was 

signed into law on July 5, 2012. Appellant did not 

learn of this until April 2013 when he had a 

conversation with his counselor as to when his 

minimum date was up. His attorney never advised 

him that the law had been changed. He filed the 

instant PCRA as soon as he learned of the change in 

law.

Id.
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Appellant has entirely failed to carry his burden of pleading and 

proving that an exception to the time bar applies. Not only has he failed to 

identify which narrow exception or exceptions he claims would apply, he has 

entirely failed to set forth any legal support for his claim that his 

untimeliness should be excused because he learned of a change in the law 

and filed his amended PCRA petition as soon as he gained knowledge of that 

change. We suspect appellant has failed to do so because no legal support 

exists for that proposition. We note, however, that to the extent that 

appellant contends his learning of a change in the law constitutes a recently 

discovered fact, our supreme court, in Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 

980, 986-987 (Pa. 2011), expressly cautioned against confusing the 

concepts of “fact” and “law” and rejected the notion that a law can be 

considered a newly discovered fact capable of invoking the protections 

afforded by the PCRA’s after-discovered facts exception.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/20/2016