PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 19

- 1835

_____________

NELIDA BEATRIZ CABEDA,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

_______________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the United States Department of Justice Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA A042

- 791

- 483) Immigration Judge: John P. Ellington

____________

_ __
Argued January 1 4 , 2020

Before: JORDAN , GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Filed : August 1 8 , 2020 )

_______________2 Thomas M. Griffin [ARGUED]
Surin & Griffin
718 Arch Street

, S ui te 701N Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counse l for Petitioner

William P. Barr Andrew J. Oliveira [ARGUED] Gregory A. Pennington, Jr. United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878

Be n Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Counsel for Respondent

_____ _ _ ________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge

.

W e d e a l t o d a y w i t h a n o t h e r a p p e a r a n c e o f w h a t i s kn o w n a s t h e “ c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h ” t o d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r

a n d h o w a c o n v i c t i o n under s t a t e l a w w i l l h a v e c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e c o n v i c t e d c r i m i n a l u n d e r f e d e r a l l a w

. W e m u s t a p p l y i t n o w i n a n i m m i g r a t i o n c a s e , b u t

, i n w h a t e v e r c o n t e x t i t

s u r f a c e s , i t ’ s a f

a i r b e t t h a t t h i s f

o r m a l i s t i c f

r a m e w o r k m a y

r e s u l t i n s o m e c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e a n d h a r d

- t o

-

j u s t i f y o u t c o m e

. A n d s o i t d o e s h e r e

.

A r g e n t i n e c i t i z e n N e l i d a B e a t r i z C a b e d a , a w o m a n i n h e r t h i r t i e s , w a s c o n v i c t e d i n P e n n s y l v a n i a s t a t e c o u r t o f

h a v i n g i n v o l u n t a r y d e v i a t e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h a t e e n a g e b o y

. T h a t c o n v i c t i o n u l t i m a t e l y l e d i m m i g r a t i o n a u t h o r i t i e s3 t o f i n d h e r r e m o v a b l e f

o r h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d what they
concluded is a state

- law offense qualif y i n g as a n “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e “sexual abuse of a minor,” id. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Cabeda h a s

p e t i t i o n e d f

o r r e v i e w o f t h a t d e c i s i o n , argu i n g tha t

, not w ithstanding her actual, admitted sexual abuse of a minor,

she cannot be r e move d on that basis

. T h a t i s s o , s h e s a y s , because the Penn s ylvania statute under whic h she was
convicted could conceivably be violated by conduct that falls

short of satisfy i n g a l l t h e e l e m e n t s o f the federal l y d e f i n e d

c r i m e o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r

.

Regrettably, s h e i s r i g h t

. T h e c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h

m a n d a t e s o u r a c c e d e n c e t o Cabeda’s d e m a n d t h a t w e ig nore what she actually did and focus instead on what someone
else

, i n a h y p o t h e t i c a l w o r l d

, could have done

. T h a t ’ s t h e

a n a l y t i c a l b o x t h e c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h p u t s u s i n

. T h u s , e v e n

t h o u g h i t i s i n d i s p u t a b l e o n t h i s r e c o r d

– a n d

, i n f a c t

, n o o n e d o e s d i s p u t e

– t h a t C a b e d a r e p e a t e d l y h a d s e x w i t h a m i n o r ,

w h e n w e a s s e s s h e r c o n v i c t i o n a l o n g s i d e t h e p e r t i n e n t f e d e r a l

s t a t u t e s , t h e c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h b l i n d s u s t o the f a c t s a n d

c o m p e l s u s to hold that the crime of which she was convicted
d o e s n o t a m o u n t t o the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of
a minor.” I t i s a s u r

p a s s i n g l y s t r a n g e r e s u l t b u t r e q u i r e d b y controlling l a w

.

I. BACKGR OUND

Cabeda is a citizen of Argentina who entered the
United States in 1991 as a la wful perman ent resident. M a n y

y e a r s l a t e r , a s a l l u d e d t o a b o v e , s h e r e p e a t e d l y e n g a g e d i n

v a g i n a l a n d o r a l s e x w i t h a 1 5

- y e a r

- o l d b o y

. S h e w a s 3 4

y e a r s o l d a t t h e t i m e a n d w e l l a w a r e o f t h e b o y ’ s a g e

. The4 encounters occurred over a period of s everal weeks and

eventu ally came to light after the c hild’s mother fo und tex t

messages o f a sexual nature on his phone a n d t o ok her concerns to the police.

Once confronted, Cabeda confessed and pled guilty in Pennsylvania state court t o one count of Involuntar y Deviate

Sexu al I ntercourse

, in vi olation o f 18 Pa. C o ns. Stat. § 3123(a)(7). S h e w a s s e n t e n c e d t o f o u r t o e i g h t y e a r s ’

i m p r i s o n m e n t

. H e r crime dr e w the attention of f e d e r a l authorities, and, a f

t e r s e r v i n g t h e m i n i m u m r e q u i r e d t e r m o f

h e r s e n t e n c e , C a b e d a w a s r e l e a s e d i n t o t h e c u s t o d y o f

I m m i g r a t i o n a n d C u s t o m s E n f o r c e m e n t a g e n t s i n J u l y o f

2 0 1 8

. S h e w a s s e r v e d w i t h a N o t i c e t o A p p e a r c h a r g i n g h e r

w i t h r e m o v a b i l i t y o n t w o g r o u n d s : f i r s t

, t h a t s h e h a d

c o m m i t t e d t h e a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n y o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r ;

a n d s e c o n d

, t h a t s h e h a d c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e o f c h i l d a b u s e

. Cabeda appe ared b e f

o r e a n I m m i g r a t i o n J u d g e ( “ I J ” ) and denied the charges.

A fter the heari ng, she f

ile d a motion to terminate t h e i m m i g r a t i o n proceedings

, a r g u i n g tha t her P e n n s y l v a n i a

conv i c tion did n o t qu alify as e i t h e r se xual abuse of a minor or

child abuse. The I J denied the motion

. H e conc l ud e d that
Cabeda ’s statute of co nviction categorically qualified as the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes

of federal i mmigration law

. T h e analysis p r o c e e d e d i n t w o

s t e p s

. F i r s t

, t he I J l o o k e d t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of “sexual abuse ”

s e t f o r t h i n 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8)

, a n a p p r o a c h p r e v i o u s l y endors ed by the B o a r d o f I m m i g r a t i o n A p p e a l s ( “ B I A ” ) in I n

r e Rodr ig uez

- Rodri

guez , 22 I

. & N

. Dec. 991 (BIA 1999)

. The I J n e x t r e f

e r r e d t o t h e S u

p r e m e C o u r t ’ s o b s e r v a t i o n i n Esquivel

- Quintana v. Sess ions , 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017)

, that

,5 “ in the context of statutory rape offenses that cri minalize
sexual inter cou r se bas ed s ol ely on th e age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be young e r th an 16. ” I d

. a t 1 5 6 8

. T h u s , since Cabeda’s crime of conviction l i k e w i s e r e q u i r e s

t h a t t h e v i c t i m b e s o m e o n e “l e ss tha n 16 y ears of age,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3123(a)(7)

, t h e I J r u l e d t h a t C a b e d a ’ s c r i m e quali f i e d as sexual abuse of a minor. A n d

, s i n c e s e x ua l a b u s e

o f a m i n o r i s o n e v a r i e t y o f c h i l d a b u s e , t he IJ a l s o rul ed that

Cabe da h a d c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e o f c h i l d a b u s e a n d w a s

t h e r e f o r e r e m o v a b l e o n t h a t g r o u n d t o o

.

Cabe da appealed t h e I J ’ s d e c i s i o n t o t h e B I A . She argued that the I J h a d erre d in t wo wa ys

– first, by failing to

ap p ly what she c l a i m s i s a new generic definition o f sexua l
abus e of a minor p r e s c r i b e d b y Esquivel

- Qui ntana , a nd second, by concluding that her crime of conviction was a categorical match for the federal generic crime o f sex ual

abuse of a minor. 1 T he B IA agreed th at the IJ h a d erred by

1 C a beda addi t i onally asserted befo re the B IA that h er crime of con viction did not qualify as a “cr ime of child abuse,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)

. The BIA rej ected her

arg um en t and affirmed th e IJ on that count as w ell

. She ha s

not raised that argu m ent in her petition to us

, p erhaps b ecaus e

a c onviction for se x ual abuse o f a min o r is an aggr avated felony and prevents her from appl ying for c an c ellation of

remov a l

, whereas a conv iction for child abuse

, wh ich is not

an ag gra vated felony

, leaves o pen th e possibility of that relief

. S ee Sa lmora n v. Att ’

y Gen.

, 909 F. 3 d 73, 83 (3d Ci r. 2018) ( stating that a rem ovable alien may a pply for c ancellation of
removal i f cr im e of conviction is not an aggravate d felo n y).

The crime of c hild a buse is not listed in t he I mmigration and6 fail i ng to use Es quivel

- Qu intana ’ s “new” d e f i n i t i o n o f sexual
abuse of a m i nor . But i t concluded that the Pennsylvania

statutes a t p l a y i n t h e c o m p a r i s o n o f s t a t e a n d f e d e r a l l a w a r e

ne v erthe less a categorical m atch to th a t new definition

, e v e n

t h o u g h t h e B I A n e v e r s p e c i f i e d what it believed th a t n ew defin ition to be

. I t a c c o r d i n g l y u p h e l d t h e I J ’ s r

u l i n g t h a t
C a b e d a w a s r e m o v a b l e a s a n a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n

.

C a b e d a n o w p e t i t i o n s f

o r r e v i e w

.

II. DIS CU SSIO N 2

T h e I m m i g r a t i o n a n d N a t i o n a l i t y A c t d e s i g n a t e s

c e r t a i n c r i m e s a s “ a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n [ i e s

. ] ” 8 U

. S

. C

.

National ity Act sectio n l a y ing ou t t he exclusive li st o f

aggra vate d felonies ; it is instead found in a separate section of

th at statute listing domestic violence grounds for

remo va bi lity. See 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (prov i ding list of

a g grav ated f

elonies ); id

. § 1 227 ( a) ( 2) ( A ) ( ii i)

, (E) ( i) ( identi fying c rime of child abuse )

. I n any eve nt, Cabeda ’ s

c hild abuse conviction remains a s a n indepen d ent ground for

remo val

.

2 The BIA ha d jurisd iction p urs uant t o 8 C.F .R. § 1003 .1(b). W e h av e juri sdi ction under 8 U.S.C

. § 1252(a).

We r e vi e w the BIA’s le gal c onclus ions de novo. Par t yka v

. Att’ y Gen. , 41 7 F .3d 40 8, 4 11 (3d Ci r. 200 5 ). “ [ F ] ind ings of

fact are conclus ive unl ess any rea s o n ab le a djudicat or would

be c o m pelled to conclude to the c o ntrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b )( 4)(B ).7 § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 )

. I f a n a l i e n c o m m i t s s u c h a c r i m e w h i l e

p r e s e n t i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , h e o r s h e b e c o m e s s ub j e c t t o

r e m o v a l f r o m t h i s c o u n t r y

. I

d . § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)

. T h e I J

a n d B I A b o t h d e t e r m i n e d t h a t C a b e d a h a d c o m m i t t e d t h e

a g g r a v a t e d f

e l o n y o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r

– a n

u n d e r s t a n d a b l e c o n c l u s i o n , g i v e n h e r a d m i t t e d a n d r e p e a t e d

s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r

. B u t C a b e d a ’ s c o n d u c t i s i r r e l e v a n t ; i t ’ s h e r c o n v i c t i o n t h a t c o u n t s

. S u p r e m e C o u r t p r e c e d e n t t e l l s

u s w e a r e n o t t o “ look

... to the facts of the parti cular

... case , but instead to w hether the sta te statute defining the cri me of
conviction categori cally fits withi n the generic federal

d e finition of a corresponding aggravate d felony. ” Moncr i effe

v. Holder , 5 69 U.S. 184, 19 0 (2013) (i nternal quotation mark s and ci tation omitted).

I n t h i s c a s e t h a t m e a n s w e a r e r e q u i r e d t o d e c i d e

w h e t h e r t h e p e r t i n e n t P e n n s y l v a n i a s t a t u t e s d e f i n i n g a n d

c r i m i n a l i z i n g i n v o l u n t a r y d e v i a t e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e a r e a

c a t e g o r i c a l m a t c h t o t h e f e d e r a l g e n e r i c c r i m e o f s e x u a l a b u s e

o f a m i n o r

. T he offens es p r o s c r i b e d b y t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e s

“ mu st b e view ed in th e a bstract, ” to see whether t h e y “ share [ ]
the nature o f the fede ral offense that serves as a point of comparis o n. ” Id

. T h u s , “ a state of fense is a categorical match with a generic f

e deral o f fense only if a convic tion of

t he st ate offens e necessar i ly involved facts equating to the generic federal offense .” I d . (inter nal quotation marks,

alt erations

, o m i s s i o n , an d citatio n omitted).

A. The Generic Feder a l Offense of Sexual

Abuse of a Minor

The term “sexual abuse of a mino r , ” 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 ) ( A )

, is n ot define d i n t h e I m m i g r a t i o n a n d8 N a t i o n a l i t y A c t ( “ I N A ” )

. See Restrepo v. At t ’ y Gen

. , 617
F.3d 7 8 7

, 79 2 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 1 0 ) (n oting t hat t h e INA “contains

no de finition of this phrase” ). T h e I N A d o e s d e f i n e o t h e r

a g g r a v a t e d f

e l o n i e s b y e x p r e s s l y c r o s s

- r e f e r e n c i n g v a r i o u s

c r i m i n a l s t a t

u t e s

. S e e

, e

. g

. , 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 ) ( B ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t 2 1 U

. S

. C

. § 8 0 2 p r o v i d e s t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f “ i l l i c i t

t r a f f i c k i n g i n a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ” ) ; i d

. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 ) ( C ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 9 2 1 p r o v i d e s t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f “ i l l i c i t

t r a f f i c k i n g i n f

i r e a r m s o r destructiv e d e v i c e s ” ) ; i d

. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 ) ( D ) ( m a k i n g “ l a u n d e r i n g o f m o n e t a r y i n s t r u m e n t s [

, ] ” a t l e a s t p a s t a m o n e t a r y t h r e s h o l d a n d a s d e f i n e d i n 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 9 5 6

, a n a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n y )

. B u t n o

s u c h c r o s s

- r e f

e r e n c e i s p r o v i d e d t o g i v e p r e c i s e c o n t e n t t o t h e

t e r m “ s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r

. ” T h a t

, o f c o u r s e , l e a d s t o

s o m e u n c e r t a i n t y i n d i s c e r n i n g t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h a t g e n e r i c f e d e r a l c r i m e

.

The BIA dealt with th i s unce rtainty in i t s en banc

d e c i s i o n i n I

n r e Rodriguez

- Rodri

guez , 2 2 I

. & N

. D e c

. 9 9 1 ( B I A 1 9 9 9 )

, by tur ning to 18 U.S .C

. § 3509(a)(8), “ a code

section re lating to the rights of child victims a nd witnesses in

federal c riminal cases .” Restre po, 617 F.3 d at 79 6

. S ection

3 509(a)(8) defines sexual abuse to i nclud e “the employmen t,

use, pers uasion

, induceme n t, enticement, or c oe rcion of a child to engage in , o r assist another person to engage in,

s exually explicit conduct or the rape, molestatio n, prostitu tion, or o th er form of sexual exploitation of children,

or i ncest with child re n.” 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 3 509 (a)(8)

. L a t e r ,

a pp l y i n g t h e i n t e r

p r e t i v e a p pr o a c h s e t f

o r t h i n t h e S u

p re m e C o u r t ’ s l a n d m a r k d e c i s i o n i n Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

, w e d e f e r r e d t o a n d a d o p t e d t h e B I A ’ s a n a l y s i s i n o u r o p i n i o n i n Restrepo v. Attorney Gen e r a l

. W e r e a s o n e d t h a t t h e a b s e n c e9 o f a d e f i n i t i o n i n t h e s t a t

u t e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f
“sexual abuse of a minor” is no t clear and unambiguou s

. R e s t r e p o , 6 1 7 F

. 3 d a t 7 9 5

- 9 7

. W e n o t e d “ that the BIA ’ s definition of sexu a l abus e of a minor [ i n Rodrigu ez

Rodri guez ] is a rea sonable on e and th at it [ w a s t h e r e f o r e ]

a p p ropria te to exerci se Chevron deference. ” I d

. at 796.

A c c o r d i n g l y , i n o u r C i r c u i t a n d f o r p u r p o s e s o f a p p l y i n g t h e

c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a n i m m i g r a t i o n c a s e , a n

a n a l y s i s o f the generic crime of “sexual abu se o f a minor”

d e p e n d s u p o n 18 U.S.C

. § 3509(a)(8) for guida nce. D e s p i t e

t h a t

, a t C a b e d a ’ s u r g i n g , t h e B I A r u l e d t h a t t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c i s i o n i n Esquivel

- Qu intana e f f e c t i v e l y o v e r r u l e d

R e s t r e p o a n d a l t e r e d t h a t p r i o r a p p r o a c h

. T h a t w a s e r r o r

.

In Esquive l

- Quinta na , the Supr eme C ourt c o n s i d e r e d

t h e i m m i g r a t i o n r a m i f

i c a t i o n s o f a c o n v i c t i o n u n d e r a C a l i f o r n i a l a w d e f

i n i n g statutory rape t o i n c l u d e “ sexual
interco urse with a minor who is more than three ye ars

you nger than the perpetrator,” 1 37 S. Ct. a t 1567 ( q u o t i n g Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c) )

. M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e q u e s t i o n

w a s “ whether a conviction under a state statute [ t h u s ] criminalizing consensual se xual intercourse between a 21

- year

- old and a 17

- year

- ol d qualifies as sexual abuse o f a

minor under the INA. ” I d

. T h e C o u r t b e g a n b y r e i t e r a t i n g

t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h

, s a y i n g t h a t t h e

p e r t i n e n t s e c t i o n o f t h e I N A “ ma kes aliens rem ovable based
on the nature of thei r convictions, not ba sed on their actual

conduct. ” I

d

. ( c i t i n g 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ( “ Any
alien who i s convicted of an aggravated felo ny at any time
after admission is deportab le. ” ) )

. T h e C o u r t t h e n f o c u s e d o n

t h e p r e c i s e q u e s t i o n b e f

o r e i t

.10 N o t i n g a g a i n t h e para met ers o f t h e C a l i f o r n i a s t a t u t o r y

r a p e s t a t u t e a n d C a l i f

o r n i a ’ s d e f

i n i t i o n o f a “ m i n o r ” a s

a n y o n e u n d e r 1 8

, the C o u r t o b s e r v e d t h a t “ the co nduct
criminal ized under this provision would be, at a minimum,

c o nsensual sexua l inter course between a victim who i s a lmost 18 and a perpetrator who ju st tur ned 21. ” I d

. a t 1 5 6 8

. T h e

c a t e g o r i c a l a n a l y s i s r e q u i r e d t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e b e h a v i o r a t i s s u e w a s t h e l e a s t c u l p a b l e t h a t could b e

p r o s e c u t e d u n d e r t h e s t a t u t e , s o c o n s e n s u a l s e x b e t w e e n o n e

p a r t n e r a d a y s h y o f e i g h t e e n a n d a n o t h e r o n h i s o r h e r 2 1 s t

b i r t h d a y w a s t h e f

r a m e o f r e f

e r e n c e t h e C o u r t a s s u m e d f o r j u d g i n g w h e t h e r t h e o f

f e n s e o f c o n v i c t i o n constitute d sexual
abuse of a minor u nder the INA

.

B e c a u s e t h e I N A d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a d e f i n i t i o n o f

“ s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r , ” t h e C o u r t t u r n e d t o “ th e normal

tools o f statutory in terpretation [

, ] ” b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e w o r d s

o f t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f

. I d

. a t 1 5 6 9

. S i n c e C o n g r e s s a d d e d s e x u a l

a b u s e o f a m i n o r t o t h e I N A i n 1 9 9 6 a s a n a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n y

t r i g g e r i n g r e m o v a l

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t l o o k e d t o a t h e n

c u r r e n t d i c t i o n a r y f

o r a d e f i n i t i o n o f w h a t c o n s t i t

u t e s “ s e x u a l

a b u s e , ” s a y i n g the ord inary meaning of t h o s e w o r d s “ included

‘ the engaging in s exual contact with a p e rson who is bel ow a

sp ecified age or who is incapab le of giving consent because of age o r men tal or physical incapaci ty. ’ ” I d

. ( q u o t i n g Merria m

- Webster ’ s Dictionary of Law 454 (1996) )

. B e c a u s e

t h e I N A r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e abuse be “of a minor,” the C o u r t
d e c i d e d t h e s t a t

u t o r y f o c u s i s “ on age, rather than me nta l or physical incapacity. ” I

d

.

T u r n i n g t o t h e p a r t i e s ’ a r g u m e n t s , t h e C o u r t s a i d t h a t

t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a n t e d a f e d e r a l l a w d e f

i n i t i o n o f “ s e x u a l

a b u s e o f a m i n o r ” r e q u i r i n g o n l y that b e h a v i o r “ (1) is illegal,11 (2) inv olves sexual activi ty, and (3) is di rec ted at a person younger than 18 years old.” I d

. ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

. B u t

, t h e C o u r t o b s e r v e d

, t h a t “ tur ns the categorica l approach on its head by definin g the generic federal offense of sexual abuse

o f a minor as w hat ever is illegal und er the particular la w of
the State where the defendant was convicted. ” I d

. a t 1 5 7 0

. T h a t e f f e c t i v e l y m e a n s “ there is no ‘ generic ’ definiti on at
all. ” I d

.

I n s t e a d o f a c c e p t i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s u n r e s t r i c t e d

w h a t e v e r

- a

- s t a t e

- o u t l a w s ap proach t o d e f i n i n g t h e t e r m , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a g r e e d w i t h t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s m u c h n a r r o w e r f o c u s o n t h e a g e o f c o n s e n t t h a t i s c u s t o m a r y i n m a n y

s t a t u t o r y r a p e l a w s acros s t h e c o u n t r y

. I t w a s n o t e w o r t h y , t h e C o u r t d e c i d e d

, t h a t t h e w o r d “ a g g r a v a t e d ” p r e c e d e s t h e w o r d

“ f e l o n y ” i n t h e I N A ’ s l i s t i n g o f “ s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r ” a s

a d e p o r t a b l e c r i m e , a n d t h a t t h e c r i m e i s l i s t e d i n t h e s a m e

s ub p a r a g r a p h o f t h e s t a t u t e a s m u r d e r a n d r a p e , t w o o f t h e

m o s t h e i n o u s c r i m e s

. “ The structure of the I NA therefore

sugg ests that sexual abuse of a m inor en com passes only especially egregious felonies

. ” I d

. U l t i m a t e l y , a f

t e r l o o k i n g

a t o t h e r c o n t e x t

u a l c l u e s i n t h e I N A a n d s u r v e y i n g s e v e r a l

s t a t e s ’ p o l i c y c h o i c e s o n t h e a g e o f c o n s e n t f o r s e x u a l

a c t i v i t y , t h e C o u r t s a i d

, “ the gener al consensus from s tate

cr imi nal codes points to the same generic definition as

dictionari es and federal law: Where sexual intercou rse is
abusive solely becaus e of the ages of the participants , the victim must be younger than 16

. ” I d

. a t 1 5 7 2

.

T h a t e n d e d t h e m a t t e r

. T h e C o u r t d i d n o t h a v e t o g i v e

a f u l l d e f i n i t i o n o f w h a t c o n s t i t

u t e s s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r ,

a n d i t d i d n o t d o s o

. I n f a c t

, i t e x p r e s s l y r e s i s t e d a t t e m p t s t o

p u s h i t p a s t t h e l i m i t s o f w h a t w a s r e q u i r e d t o answ e r t h e12 s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n b e f

o r e i t

. T h e r e w a s n o n e e d t o c o n s i d e r C h e v r o n d e f

e r e n c e o r a n y o t h e r i s s u e t h a t m i g h t b e a r m o r e b r o a d l y o n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e t e r m “ s e x u a l a b u s e o f a

m i n o r , ” “ because the statute, read in context, unambiguous ly

foreclose [ d ] the [ B I A ] ’ s int erpr etation [

, ] ” w h i c h h a d t r e a t e d

t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s c r i m e a s a n a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n y

. I d

. A l l t h a t

m a t t e r e d w a s t h at t h e “ petitioner was not convicted of an aggravated fel ony and [ w as ] not, on that basis, removable. ”

I d

. a t 1 5 6 8

.

W h i l e t h e r e i s a l o t t o l e a r n f r o m t h e S u

p r e m e C o u r t ’ s E s q u i v e l

- Q u i n t a n a d e c i s i o n , t h e p r i m a r y t a k e

- a w a y f o r t h e

p r e s e n t ma t t e r i s t h a t t h e C o u r t v e r y d e l i b e r a t e l y r u l e d

n a r r o w l y

. I t d i d n o t p u r p o r t t o e s t a b l i s h a f

u l l d e f i n i t i o n o f

“ s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r , ” a n d i t d i d n o t

, i n e i t h e r p u r p o s e o r

e f f e c t

, u n d e r m i n e o u r e x i s t i n g p r e c e d e n t i n R e s t r e p o i n a w a y

t h a t w o u l d p e r m i t u s t o i g nor e t h a t p r e c e d e n t

. O n e m a y s e n s e

s o m e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t he s t a t u t o r y i n t e r

p r e t a t i o n u n d e r t a k e n i n R e s t r e

p o a n d t h e a n a l y ti c a l a p p r o a c h e m p l o y e d i n E s q u i v e l

- Q u i n t a n a

. M o s t n o t a b l y , o u r o p i n i o n i n R e s t r e p o

w a s p r e m i s e d h e a v i l y o n t h e b r o a d a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f C h e v r o n d e f e r e n c e t o t h e B I A ’ s e x p e r t i s e , s e e R e s t r e p o , 6 1 7 F

. 3 d a t
7 9 3 ( a s s e r t i n g t h a t “ Congress may have i ntended for the BIA

t o utilize its exper tise to def ine the phrase ” s e x u a l a b u s e o f a

m i n o r )

, w h i l e E

s q u i v e l

- Q u i n t a n a r e l i e d o n o r d i n a r y t o o l s o f

s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d d e c l i n e d t o r e s o r t t o C h e v r o n d e f e r e n c e i n a n s w e r i n g t h e s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n c o n f

r o n t e d

, s e e E s q u i v e l

- Q u i n t a n a , 1 3 7 S

. C t

. a t 1 5 7 2 ( s t a t i n g t h a t “ the

s ta tute, r ead in context, unamb iguously foreclo ses the [ B I A ] ’ s interp reta t i on ” a n d t h u s C h e v r o n d i d n o t a p p l y )

. B u t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t C

h e v r o n d e f

e r e n c e i s u n n e c e s s a r y i n o n e

s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e d o e s n o t “ s u f f i c i e n t l y u n d e r c u t t h e d e c i s i o n a l b a s i s ” o f R e s t r e p o t o a l l o w u s t o s a y t h a t i t s “ r u l e13 n o l o n g e r h a s a n y v i t a l i t y [

. ] ” W es t v. Ke ve , 721 F.2d 9 1, 93 (3d Ci r. 1983) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

. 3 I n s h o r t

, w e a r e s t i l l b o u n d

b y R e s t r e p o

. Es quivel

- Quinta na h a s n o t c h a n g e d t h a t

. 4

3 T h a t i s t r

u e e v e n th o u g h t he S u p r e m e C o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n i n a n o t h e r r e c e n t c a s e , K i s o r v

. W i l k i e , 1 3 9 S

. C t

. 2 4 0 0 ( 2 0 1 9 )

, c a s t s d o ub t o n t h e k i n d o f b r o a d l y d e f e r e n t i a l

a p p r o a c h t a k e n i n R e s t r e

p o

. S e e i d

. a t 2 4 1 5 ( c o n s i d e r i n g t h e

q u e s t i o n o f w h a t j u d i c i a l d e f e r e n c e i s o w e d t o a n a g e n c y ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i t s o w n r e g u l a t i o n s

– s o

- c a l l e d A u e r d e f e r e n c e

– a n d d e c i d i n g t h a t “ Auer

... gives agencies their due, while al so a llowing

– inde ed, obligating

– courts to

pe rform their reviewing and restraining f uncti on s ” )

.

4 I n the a ccompanyi ng o pinion concurring in part, o ur

co l league Jud ge Kr ause says that the ten sion between Esquivel

- Quintana and Restrepo is “irreconcilable [. ]” ( Con c ur. Op. at 4 .) That is because, in her view , “ [ i]n multiple respects, the statutory analy sis of Esquive l

- Qui ntana is entirely inconsistent wi th that of Restrepo .” ( Concur. Op.

at 4 .) She thus concludes that “ Esquivel

- Quintana has so

un de rm ined [ Restrepo ’s] analysis that ... Restrepo is no longer good l a w.” ( Con cur. Op. a t 4

- 5.) That is where we part comp any

. As already acknowledged , it is t rue that Esquivel

Quintana and Re strepo undertook the ta sk of statut ory int erpretation on diff

er en t metho dologic al track s. Our
dec ision in Restrepo was written a t a time when defe rence to agency dec ision making o ft en pro ceeded as a matter of

course , while the Supreme Court ’ s de cision in Esquivel

Quintana re flects what may be see n as a more searchi ng a nd nuanced app roach

. But shifti ng interpretive methodo logies

ar e not usually view ed as carrying the force of s tare deci sis , at
least not when the decisi ons empl oying them do not purport14 to o verrule past prec edent

. W e h ave noted tha t th e Supreme

Court “ ty pic ally avoid s me thodological stare decisis [,] ” Am.

Far m Bureau F

ed’n v. U.S. E.P. A. , 792 F.3d 281, 3 07 n.8 (3d

Cir . 2015)

, while observing that “ f ederal courts do not treat interpretive meth odology as a traditional form of ‘law [.] ’ ” Id

. ( quoting Evan J. C riddle & Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis

, 1 02 Geo. L.J. 1573 , 1576 (2014) ). Se e also Philip P. Frickey, Interpre tive

- Regime Change , 38 Loy. L

. A. L

. R ev

. 1971, 1976 (2005) (noting that the Suprem e Court ’ s method ological s tatements “ ar e not binding on the Supreme Court or even on lower cou rts ” )

. W e certainly agree that cases li ke Esq uivel

- Quintana and Kisor provide an analy tical appr o ach we ou ght to follow now, but
that does not mean the sub stanti ve conclusions r eache d in

earlier c as es have all been overruled.

If E s q uiv e l

- Quintana did what our c oll e ague claim s for

i t

– that is, if it meant that our prior precedential deci sions

were all being overruled to the extent they gave broad
Chevron defer ence to the BIA ’s int erpretation of immi gr at ion

st atu tes

– we think there w ould have been more to signal so dramatic a step t h an the mere ob serv ation t hat , in the particu lar case then before it

, th e Supre me Court saw Chev ron as having no application

. See E squivel

- Quintana v.

S essions , 137 S. Ct. a t 1572 ( “ We have no need to resol ve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives p riority in this

ca se because the statute, read in context, unambiguousl y forecloses the Board's interpretation. Therefore, neither the rule of lenity n or Chevron applies

. ” )

. So we are no t pers uaded that R es trepo has been

overr ul ed by E

s quivel

- Quin tana

. That is not “ tur n[ ing]

vertical s tare decisis on its head

, ” as our coll eague says.15 I n d e e d

, we have al r e a d y t a k e n the pos i tion

, a t l e a s t
i m p l i c i t l y , that Es quivel

- Quinta na s p e a k s t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f

s t a t u t o r y r a p e , n o t m o r e b r o a d l y t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e

g e n e r i c o f

f e n s e o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r

. 5 See Mon dragon

Gonzalez v

. Att o r n e

y G e n e r a l

, 88 4 F.3d 155 , 160 (3d Cir.

20 18 ) (n oti n g that E

squivel

- Quint ana clarified the meaning of “the generic offense of statu tor y rape”). 6 A n d o t h e r c i r c u i t s

( Concur. Op. at 1 9 .) It is giving necessary respect to our
existin g precedent, even w he n we ou rselves m ight be inclined

to dec i d e things d iffer ently now

.

5 In fact, o n t h e topic of statuto ry rape, the op inion has

the even narrow er focus of t he age of conse n t

. See Esq uivel

Quintana

, 137 S. Ct. at 1 57 2

- 73 ( “ We hold that in the context

of s ta t u tory rape off

e nses focused s o lely on the age of t he

pa rticipant s , the generic fed e ral def inition of ‘ se xual a buse o f

a minor ’ under § 1101(a )(43)(A) req u ires t he a ge of t he

vic tim to be less than 16. ” )

.

6 It is notab le that nowhere in Mondragon

- Gonzal ez d id we suggest

, much less embrace

, the view that Esquiv el

Quinta n a enacte d a sweep i ng change that wil l affect all

ma tters in whic h we and the BIA h ave bee n called upon to interpret a statute . In fact, even though Mondragon

- Gonzalez

p resented the questi on o f whether to d e fer to the BIA ’ s defin ition of the crim e of chil d a buse, we simp ly s tated that

“ Esqui vel

- Quintana ha [d] no application

... at a ll. ” Mondrago n

- Gonzalez

, 884 F.3d at 160

. T hat pron ouncement

appears i ncom patible with the k ind of sea change i n ou r jurisprud en c e th at our concurring colleague says has

occurred

.16 a p p a r e n t l y a g r e e

. See A ceve do v. Barr

, 94 3 F.3d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding tha t Esq uivel

- Qu intana “ did not fo reclose
the BIA’s u se of [ § 3 509 ( a)(8)] i n other instances ” and thus prior circuit decisio ns to grant de fer enc e to that approach

were still b inding) ; Correa

- D iaz v. Se ssions

, 8 81 F.3d 523, 527 (7th Cir. 2018 ) (noting that th e Supreme Court “ decli ned

to rul e more broadly o n t he g e ne ric fe d eral def in ition ” and

decided only “ one precise question: the definition of ‘ min or ’ under § 1101 ( a)(43)(A) in the cont ext of s tatu tory rape of fe nses focused solely on the age of the participan t s ”)

. P u r s u a n t t o R e s t r e

p o , t h e n , w e w i l l c o n t i n u e t o d e f e r t o t h e B I A ’ s u s e o f 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 3 5 0 9 ( a ) ( 8 ) a s t h e p r i m a r y g u i d e t o d e f i n i n g t h e g e n e r i c f

e d e r a l c r i m e o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r

.

T h a t

, h o w e v e r , d o e s n o t e n d o u r t a s k

. S e c t i o n 3 5 0 9 ( a ) ( 8 ) d o e s n o t s p e c i f y a m e n s r e a r e q u i r e m e n t

, a n d w e

c a n n o t d e f

e r t o a n u l l i t y , s o w e m u s t l o o k e l s e w h e r e t o d i s c e r n t h e m e n s r e a r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e g e n e r i c f e d e r a l

c r i m e

. F o l l o w i n g t h e a n a l y t i c a l p a t t e r n l a i d o u t i n E squivel

Quintana

, w e t h u s “ consider the s t ructure of the INA, t he

inheren t egregious natu re of an a ggr avated felony , and closely

- related statutes

. ” A c e v e d o , 9 4 3 F

. 3 d a t 6 2 4

. T h o s e

s i g n p o s t s a l l l e a d u s t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t s e x u a l a b u s e o f a

m i n o r i s a c r i m e that r e q u i r e s , a t a m i n i m u m , a kn o w i n g s t a t e

o f m i n d

.

F i r s t

, “ [ t ] he structure of the INA

... sug gests that

sexua l abuse of a minor enc ompasses only especiall y

e gregiou s felonies. ” E

s q u i v e l

- Q u i n t a n a , 1 3 7 S

. C t

. a t 1 5 7 0

. A g a i n , “ the INA lists sexual abuse of a minor in the same subparagraph as ‘ murder ’ and ‘ rape , ’ ” a n d t h e “ [ s ] u r r o u n d i n g17 p r o v i s i o n s ” o f t h e l a w , l i s t i n g e x t r e m e l y s e r i o u s o f f e n s e s ,

“ g u i d e o u r i n t e r

p r e t a t i o n [

. ] ” I

d

. “ When conside ring th e mens

rea required fo r a crime to serve as ‘ sexual abuse of a minor, ’

th e court must keep i n mind this categoriza tion. ” A c e v e d o , 9 4 3 F

. 3 d a t 6 2 4

. T h e S u

p r e m e C o u r t ’ s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t s e x u a l

a b u s e o f a m i n o r i s a n “ e s p e c i a l l y e g r e g i o u s f e l o n [ y ] ”

i n d i c a t e s t h a t a m e n s r e a o f l o w e r c u l p a b i l i t y s u c h a s

r e c k l e s s n e s s w i l l n o t s u f f i c e a s a n e l e m e n t o f t h e g e n e r i c

c r i m e

.

S e c o n d

, t h e t e r m “ a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n y ” i t s e l f i m p l i e s a

c e r t a i n “ i n h e r e n t s e r i o u s n e s s [

. ] ” I d

. A f t e r a l l

, a c o n v i c t i o n f o r s u c h a n o f

f e n s e “ car ries signifi cant immigrati on

c onsequences , i n cluding providing a basis for the removal

from t he United States of a l awfully present immigrant

, or, as in th is case , dis qualifying a removable immigrant alien from discretionary relief f

rom remova l. ” R a n g e l

- P e r e z v

. L y n c h

, 8 1 6 F

. 3 d 5 9 1

, 6 0 1

- 0 2 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 6 ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

. A n

a g g r a v a t e d f

e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n , t h e n , “ mu st be f or conduct t hat Cong ress h as d et ermined w arr a nts such significant and

seri o us treatment. ” I

d

. a t 6 0 2

. A n d t h a t t o o s i g n a l s t h a t a kn o w i n g m e n s r e a i s a r e q u i r e m e n t

.

T h i r d a n d f

i n a l l y , o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a c l o s e l y r e l a t e d

s t a t u t e , 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 2 4 3

, c o n f i r m s t h a t

, t o p r o v e s e x u a l

a b u s e o f a m i n o r , t h e p r o s e c u t i o n m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e

p e r p e t r a t o r a c t e d kn o w i n g l y

. S e c t i o n 2 2 4 3

, t i t l e d “ [ s ] e x u a l

a b u s e o f a m i n o r o r w a r d [

, ] ” i s a h e l p f u l a n a l o g t o s e c t i o n 3 5 0 9 ( a ) ( 8 )

. T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r e a c h e d f o r i t w h e n

c l a r i f y i n g a d i f

f e r e n t p a r t o f t h e d e f

i n i t i o n o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f

a m i n o r

. S

e e E s q u i v e l

- Q u i n t a n a , 1 3 7 S

. C t

. a t 1 5 7 0

- 7 1 ( t u r n i n g t o 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 2 4 3 t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a g e o f c o n s e n t
f o r t h e g e n e r i c f

e d e r a l d e f

i n i t i o n o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r )

.18 O t h e r c o u r t s , t o o , h a v e l o o k e d t o i t w h e n d e f i n i n g t h e m e n s

r e a f o r s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r

. S e e

, e

. g

. , A c e v e d

o , 9 4 3 F

. 3 d

a t 6 2 4 ( i m p o r t i n g m e n s r e a f r o m 1 8 U

. S

. C § 2 2 4 3 ) ; R a n g e l

P e r e z , 8 1 6 F

. 3 d a t 6 0 4 ( s a m e )

. S e c t i o n 2 2 4 3 a c t u a l l y i n c o r p o r a t e s two distin ct men s rea r e q u i r e m e n t s

. First, i t requi res k n o w i n g c o n d u c t a s t o the sexu al a ct i n q u e s t i o n

. 1 8

U

. S

. C

. § 2243(a)

. 7 Second, it e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t n o k n o w l e d g e

a t a l l i s r e q u i r e d w ith r espect to t h e v i c t i m ’ s age ; i n t h a t

r e s p e c t

, i t i s a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y s t a t u t e

. I d

. § 22 43(d)(1 ). We
hold that t he gener ic federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor
includes at least the first of t h o se mens rea requirements; we have no cause today to address whether it also includes the
second. 8

7 Our concurrin g colleague claim s that turning to §

2243 for guidance whil e declining t o overrule Restrepo lacks “logical coherence.” ( C oncur. Op. at 3 1.) But Restre po itself

acknowle dg ed that Rodrigue z

- Rodriguez only tr eat ed section 3509(a) (8) as a “ g u i de” and not “a s a restrictive or limiting
defini tion[.]” Restrepo

, 6 1 7 F

. 3d a t 796 n. 1 0. It is thus

consistent to both continue to adhere to binding preceden t
callin g for us to defer to t he BIA’s relia nce on § 3509(a)(8)

, and , a t the same ti me, to tur n t o other statut o ry aids when § 350 9(a)(8) f

ails t o p rovide the necessary gu idance.

8 W ith respect to the mens rea regarding the age of the victim, the Fifth Circuit has held that a stat e st atute requiring only recklessness is a categorical mat ch for the generic
federal o ffense of sexual a bu se of a minor

. United States v.

Rivas , 836 F.3d 514, 515 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing
Contreras v. Holder , 754 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2014)). As j ust noted, however, there is no need for us to reach th at issue.19 I n s u m m a r y , s e c t i o n 3 5 0 9 ( a ) ( 8 ) c o n t i n u e s t o p r o v i d e

t h e c o n t o u r s o f t h e s ub s t a n c e o f t h e o f f e n s e , b u t s e c t i o n 2 2 4 3

s e t s f o r t h the n e c e s s a r y m e n t a l s t a t e

. W i t h t h e g e n e r i c c r i m e

t h u s sufficiently o u t l i n e d

, w e t u r n n e x t t o t h e r e l e v a n t

P e n n s y l v a n i a s t a t

u t e s t o s e e w h e t h e r , b y c o m p a r i s o n , t h e l e a s t

c u l p a b l e c o n d

u c t f o r w h i c h a c o n v i c t i o n c o u l d b e h a d u n d e r

t h e m w o u l d l i k e w i s e f

i t t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e g e n e r i c c r i m e

.

B. P e n n s y l v a n i a I n v o l u n t a r y D e v i a t e S e x u a l

I n t e r c o u r s e

T he n e c e s s a r y c o m p a r i s o n q u i c k l y s h o w s t h a t C a b e d a i s c o r r e c t i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e r e i s n o c a t e g o r i c a l m a t c h

b e t w e e n t h e P e n n s y l v a n i a s t a t u t e s a n d t h e g e n e r i c f e d e r a l

o f f e n s e o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r

. T h e c r i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e i s f o u n d i n t h e m e n s r e a r e q u i r e m e n t s

– the state offense c a n b e

c o m m i t t e d r e c k l e s s l y , w h e r e a s t h e f e d e r a l g e n e r i c c r i m e

r e q u i r e s a kn o w i n g m e n t a l s t a t e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s e x u a l

con duct

.

C a b e d a ’ s o f

f e n s e o f c o n v i c t i o n i s 18 P a. C ons. S tat. § 312 3(a)(7)

, u n d e r w h i c h

, a “ person c om mits a felony of the
first degr ee wh en the per s on engages in deviat e sexual

int ercours e with a c omplainant

... who i s l ess t han 16 years of age and the per son is four or more year older tha n the compl ai n a nt a nd the compla inant and person are n ot married

t o ea ch ot her.” T h e t e r m “ d e v i a t e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e ” i s i n

t u r n d e f i n e d i n 18 P a. Cons. Stat. § 310 1 a s “ [ s ] exual

i n te r cours e per os or per anus between human bei ngs and any

f orm of sexual intercourse wi t h an animal. T he ter m also includes penet r ation, howev er s light , of th e genitals or anus of

an other p erson with a foreign object f or any purpose other20 than good faith me d ical, hygienic or law enforcement proced ure s. ”

N o t a b l y a b s e n t f

r o m e i t h e r o f t h o s e s t a t u t o r y

p r o v i s i o n s i s a n y m e n s r e a r e q u i r e m e n t

. T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a

c r i m i n a l c o d e h a s a g a p

- f i l l i n g p r o v i s i o n , 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(c)

, f

o r j u s t s u c h a c i r c u m s t a n c e : “ W hen the culpabil ity

sufficient to establish a material element of an offen se is no t

pre scribed by law, such element is establ ished if a person a cts
int ent ionally, knowingly or reckless l y with respect ther eto.”

18 Pa . Cons. Stat. § 302( c)

. Thus, the P e nn s ylvan ia code

a l l o w s f o r p r o s e c u t i o n u n d e r s e c t i o n 3123(a )(7) o n t h e b a s i s

o f b e h a v i o r t h a t i s o n l y r e c k l e s s

. 9

9 S e ction 302 is not divisible in a way that would mak e the modified categorical approach appropri ate. Although § 30 2(c) lists thr ee types of mens rea in the disju nctive, Pennsylvani a author ity suggests that they are altern ate means
rather than ele ments. Se e Mathis v. Unite d States , 136 S. Ct

. 2243, 2253 n. 3 (2016) (noting that alternate “ mental states are interchangeable means of satisfying a single mens rea

element ” ). Section 302(c) itsel f re fers to “the culpability

sufficient to establish a mat er ial elem e nt of an offense [

, ] ” and it provide s alternative m ental states for determining whether
“such element is established [

. ] ” Thus, the statute itself

distin guishes between the elements of an offe nse and the alternative means, li sted therein, of sati sf ying tho s e elements.

Pen n sylvania case law t oo appear s to t reat the § 302(c) mental states as alternative means of satisfying a single statutory
element

. See, e.g.

, C ommonwealth v. Gallagher , 924 A.2 d 636, 637 (Pa. 2007) (noting in prosecution for child l uring

th a t § 302(c) impos e s a “duty to prove that [defendan t] acted intentionally, knowingly, or at least recklessly”);21 T h a t c o n c l u s i o n i s c o n f i r m e d b y P e n n s y l v a n i a

c a s e l a w , w h i c h s h o w s that o t h e r , closely related

, s tatutes ca n be violated rec kles sly. F o r e x a m p l e , s ectio n 3125 o f t h e s a m e

c r i m i n a l c o d e t i t l e prohi bit s “p enetration, ho wever sligh t, o f the geni t als or anus of a co mplainant with a part of the

perso n ’ s body for any purpose oth er tha n go od faith medical, hygienic o r law enforcement pro c edures” where, a mo n g oth er possible circumstances, “the person has sub s ta ntially impaired the co mpl a in ant ’ s power to appraise or control his
or her co nduct b y administeri ng or emp loying, without the

kno w le dge of the complainant, dr ugs , intoxicants or ot he r

m eans for the p ur

p ose o f preventing resistance[.]” 18 Pa.

Cons. Stat. § 3125(a). T h e p r o h i b i t i o n s e t f o r t h i n t h a t d a t e

r a p e s t a t u t e c o n t a i n s n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l w o r d i n g t o t h e s t a t u t e C a b e d a v i o l a t e d

, a n d Pennsylvania co urts h ave s a i d that “ the

minim um m ens rea for thes e offenses is r eckle ssness.”

Comm onwealth v. Cosby

, 2 2 4 A

. 3 d 3 7 2

, 4 1 9 ( P a

. S u p e r

. C t

. 2019) ; a c c o r d C

o m m onwealth v. Torsilie ri

, N o

. 2300 EDA

2018

, 2019 WL 3854450, at *5 (P a. Super. Ct. A u g. 16,

Commonwealth v. Mayfield , 832 A.2d 418, 427 (Pa . 2003) (noting in prosecutio n fo r sexual assault that § 302(c) “require[s] the Commonw ea lth to p r ove at least

rec k lessness”) . We h a ve als o suggest ed as much. See Aguilar v. Att’y Gen. , 663 F.3d 692, 695 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that sexual assault in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat

. § 3124.1 constitutes an INA “crime of violence” aggr av ated
fel o ny even though i t can be committed recklessly unde r § 302(c)

, and noting that “the trial judge instructed the jury that they must find ‘that the defendant acted knowingly or at

least reck less ly regarding [the complainant’s] nonconsent’”).22 2019)

. T h e m e n s r e a cat chall p rovision i n section 3 0 2 ( c ) i s

t h e u n d e r p i n n i n g f o r t h o s e d e c i s i o n s

.

Similar ly, sectio n 3126 (a) pr ohi b i ts “ indecen t

contact [

, ] ” w ith in d ec ent con tact defined in se cti on 3101 as “[ a]ny touching o f the sexual or other i ntimate part s of the person for t he purpose of arousing or grat ifyin g sexual desi r e , in any per son.” A gain, Pennsylvan ia courts have conclud ed

t h at t h e c r i m e t h u s d e f i n e d ca n b e commi tte d recklessly

, based on sec tio n 302(c). See Torsilieri

, 2019 WL 3854 4 50, at
*5 (explaining that t h e d efault mens rea of recklessn ess appl i e s ) ; Com m o n w e a l t

h v . Carte r , 4 1 8 A

. 2 d 5 3 7

, 54 0

- 4 1 ( P a

. S u p e r

. C t

. 1980) ( s a m e )

.

T h a t m e a n s t h a t t h e P e n n s y l v a n i a s t a t u t e s a r e

c a t e g o r i c a l l y b r o a d e r t h a n t h e f e d e r a l g e n e r i c c r i m e o f s e x u a l

a b u s e o f a m i n o r , s i n c e t h e f e d e r a l o f f e n s e m u s t b e c o m m i t t e d

kn o w i n g l y , b u t t h e P e n n s y l v a n i a c r i m e s c a n b e c o m m i t t e d

rec kles sly

. N o w , o n e m i g h t b e f o r g i v e n f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t

, a s a

m a t t e r o f c o m m o n s e n s e , it is s c a r c e l y c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t o n e

c o u l d

, a s a f

a c t u a l m a t t e r , r e c k l e s s l y c o m m i t t h e c r i m e t h a t

P e n n s y l v a n i a c a l l s i n v o l u n t a r y d e v i a t e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e

. 10

T h a t i m p r o b a b i l i t y , o n e m i g h t f u r t h e r t h i n k

, s h o u l d m e a n t h a t

t h e P e n n s y l v a n i a s t a t

u t e a c t u a l l y i s a c a t e g o r i c a l m a t c h f o r t h e

g e n e r i c c r i m e o f s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m i n o r , b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o

r e a l i s t i c probability t h a t P e n n s y l v a n i a c o u l d o r w o u l d e n f o r c e i t s s t a t u t e i n a w a y t h a t w o u l d s w e e p i n r e c k l e s s c o n d u c t

. F o l l o w i n g t h a t r e a s o n i n g w o u l d a l l o w f o r a m o r e s e n s i b l e

10 And y et, g iven t he breadth of t h e statutory langua ge prohibiting penetra ti on “ however slight

, ” reckless violation of

t he law is not as absurd as it might seem at first glance. See

i nfra at n.1 2

.23 r e s u l t h e r e , t h e s e m a n t i c s t r i c t u r e s o f t h e c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h

n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g

. U n f

o r t u n a t e l y , t h a t a n a l y t i c a l r o u t e i s a l s o b a r r e d b y b i n d i n g p r e c e d e n t

.

I t i s t r u e t h e S u

p r e m e C o u r t h a s s t a t e d t h a t

, a t l e a s t

u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h

“ requires a r eal isti c probab ility, not a theoretical po ssibility,

that the State would ap pl y its statute t o cond uct that falls outside the generic defin ition of a crime. ” G onza les v.

D u enas

- Alva rez , 549 U.S. 183, 193 (20 07)

. A n d i t i s f u r t h e r

t r u e t h a t

, i n o t h e r c i r c u i t s , C a b e d a ’ s a r g u m e n t s m a y w e l l h a v e fai l ed b e c a u s e o f t h e i m p r o b a b i l i t y o f a p p l y i n g a s t a t u t e li ke

P e n n s y l v a n i a ’ s t o p r o s e c u t e r e c k l e s s c o n d u c t

. See United

Stat e s v. Castillo

- Rivera

, 853 F.3 d 218 , 223 (5t h Cir. 20 17) ( e n b a n c ) (“There is no exception t o the a c tual c ase

requ ir ement articu lat ed in Duenas

- Alvare z where a court

conc lu des a state s t atute is broade r o n its face. ” )

.

“ Our Court’s precedent, however, take s [ a n ]
alter native approach. ” S

a lmoran v. Att ’

y Gen

. , 909 F.3d 73, 81 (3d Cir. 2018)

. W e h a v e h e l d t h a t “ w here th e elements o f

the c rime of conviction are not the s ame as the elements of

th e generic federal offense

... the realistic probability i n q u i r y

... i s simply not mea nt to apply.” I d

. ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n

m a r k s a n d c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. S o , o n c e w e c o n c l u d e t h a t th e

t extual bread th of a statute is more e xpansive tha n th e f ederal

gener i c cr i me b e c a u s e t h e m e n s r e a e l e m e n t s a r e d i f f e r e n t

, a petitioner need not show that there is a realis tic chanc e that

the statute w i ll a ctually b e applied in an over l y b road man ner

. S e e Zhi Fei Li a o v. A t t '

y Gen. , 91 0 F.3d 714, 723 (3d Cir

. 2018) ( n o t i n g t h a t “ i t i s u n n e c e s s a r y t o c o n d u c t a r e a l i s t i c

p r o b a b i l i t y i n q u i r y ” w h e n “ t h e e l e m e n t s o f [ t h e s t a t e ]

c o n v i c t i o n

... [ d o ] n o t m a t c h t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e g e n e r i c24 f e d e r a l o f f e n s e ” ) ; Singh v. Att ’

y Gen. , 83 9 F

. 3 d 273, 286 n

. 1 0 (3d Cir. 2016) ( n o t i n g t h a t t h e r e a l i s t i c p r o b a b i l i t y i n q u i r y d o e s n o t a p p l y w h e n “ the elements of the cr ime of convic tion
are not th e sa me as the eleme nts of th e generic federal

offense ” )

.

T h u s , t h e m i s m a t c h b e t w e e n t h e m e n s r e a o f t h e f e d e r a l g e n e r i c c r i m e a n d t h e P e n n s y l v a n i a i n v o l u n t a r y d e v i a t e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e s t a t u t e l e a d s i n e v i t a b l y t o t h e

c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e y a r e n o t a c a t e g o r i c a l m a t c h

. W e a r e l e f t

w i t h n o o p t i o n , t h e n , b u t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t C a b e d a ’ s m u l t i p l e statutory r a p e s o f a 1 5

- y e a r

- o l d b o y d o n o t q u a l i f y a s s e x u a l

a b u s e o f a m i n o r w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e I N A

. W h a t a

w o r l d

.

C. T h e D i s s e n t ’ s A n a l y t i c a l P a t h I s U n a v a i l a b l e

T h e d i s s e n t

, u n d e r s t a n d a b l y , s e e k s t o a v o i d t h i s r e s u l t

, b u t w e c a n n o t e n d o r s e t h e l e g a l r e a s o n i n g i t u s e s a l o n g t h e

w a y

. Our di sse n ting coll eag u e seeks to retroactively reframe

the Salmoran li ne of cases as applying only when ther e is a

“ clea r difference between the statute of conviction and the federal g eneric offense[

. ] ” (Diss enting Op. at 3.) Thus, in h is view, the realis tic pro b ability i nquiry i s f o r e c l o s e d o n l y w h e n the petitioner “ definit ively demons tra te[s] a difference ”
between th em. (Dissenting Op. at 5.) I n c l o s e c a s e s , t h e n ,

a n d o n l y i n c l o s e c a s e s , w i l l t h e i n q u i r y a p p l y

. But nowhere

in Salmo ran is there any indica tion that we were laying down

a mere tie

- breaking rule. Instead, as alre ady noted, what w e said was t h a t “ w here th e elements o f the crime of conviction

are not the s ame as the elements of th e g e neric federal offense

... the realistic probability i n q u i r y

... i s si mply not mea nt to apply.” S a lmoran

, 909 F.3d at 81 ; s e e a l s o Z h i F e i L i a o , 9 1 025 F

. 3 d a t 7 2 3 ( h o l d i n g t h a t “ the BIA erred in conducting a

‘ realist ic probability ’ inquiry where the elements of petitioner’s controlled substance conv iction under Pennsylvan ia s tate law did not match the elements of the generic federal offense ” )

. In line with th at holding, we engage in an o rdinary statutory interpretation analysis of the

statute of conviction. An d once we complete that analysis,

we co mpare our resu lt to the fed eral gen e ric offense. We do

not then take into account how d ifficult the statutory

in terpretation question was in determining whether the
realistic

- probability inquiry applies. 11 T e m p t i n g a s i t i s , t h e n , w e c a n n o t a c c e p t o u r d i s s e n t i n g col league ’ s re adin g of
Sal m oran

.

But even if t h e d i s s e n t w e r e c o r r e c t t h a t S a l m o r a n

r e q u i r e s a “ c l e a r d i f

f e r e n c e ” b e t w e e n the e l e m e n t s o f t h e s t a t e

s t a t u t e a n d t h e f

e d e r a l g e n e r i c o f

f e n s e , s u c h a d i f

f e r e n c e i s

p r e s e n t h e r e

. Ou r dissenting colleag ue believes that Pennsy lvan ia ’ s Inv o luntary Deviate S exual Intercourse statu t e requires “ a mens re a of knowledge , if not intent

. ” ( Diss entin g Op. at 6 .) He bases t hat conclusion on two premises: first,

that a mens r ea o f reckl essness would produce absurd results which the legis latu re could n ot possibly have intended ; and second, that it is a mistake to rely o n the default culpab ility requirem ents of § 302(c).

11 Nor are we persuaded by the dissent ’ s approach of

first lookin g for pros e cutions and then concluding, after finding non e, t hat the realistic

- pro bability inquiry does not apply

. That is pr ecisely ba ckwards. W e onl y look through judicial records for prosec utio ns af ter we determine w hether

th e realistic

- probability an al ys i s app l ies.26 As to the first premise, it is putting the car t before t he horse to start with the absurdity doc trine a nd then work

back w a rd s from t here to i nterpret the text so as to avoid a preconceived absurd result. Instead, we first interpret the

statute according to its text and only then analyze whether
that text lead s to an absurd result

. To do otherwise l ead s t o a distortion i n s t a t

u t o r y i n t e r

p r e t a t i o n a s w e strain to avoid the

pre

- identifie d absurd result. That risk is amply demo nstrated by the free

- form a n d purposive approach the dissent takes to

arrive at a pref

e rred statutory interpretation

. Regardle ss of any intuitions we may have abo ut whether Pennsylvania ’ s involuntary deviate sexual intercourse s t a t u t e o u g h t t o be

v i e w e d a s a s u f

f i c i e n t m a tch with the p r o v i s i o n s o f federal

l a w d e f i n i n g t h e generic offense, o ur discomfort w i t h t h e

o u t c o m e i n t h i s c a s e d o e s n ’ t a l l o w u s t o r e w r i t e o u r o w n

p r e c e d e n t o r P e n n s y l v a n i a l a w

. 12

12 The dis s en t ’ s p ur posive an alysis fails ev en on its

own terms. The disse nt c laims that t he Pennsylvania Supreme Court has articulated one possible purpose of § 3123(a)(7) as “ to p rotect minors younger than 16 years of age from older tee nage and a d ult sexual aggre s sors. ”
Commonweal th v. Albert , 7 58 A.2d 1149, 115 4 (Pa. 2000)

. But t he language relied up on by our di ss enting colleague is
from the court’s analysis of hypothetical reasons off ered by the government in respon se t o a rationa l

- basis ch a llenge to

the st a tute. The court ’s recognition of a legitimate state
interest sufficient to withstand rational

- basis scrutiny says nothing about what mens rea would suffice to accomplish the

statute ’s purpose. I n fact , the court specifically no ted that

t h ere wa s no statu t ory purpose define d anywhere. Se e id

. at
1152 ( “ At the outse t, we note that neither the legislative provision [] at issue here nor the accompanying legislative27 As to the second premise

– that § 302(c) is inapplicable in this context

– our dissenting colleague cite s no

au t hority for that proposition

, save a couple of opinion s declining to ap p ly it in a n unrelated context. 13 A n d , as

history

... disclose any official statement by the legislature regardi ng the rat i onale or policy m otivating [its]

en actment. ”). Mor eove r, i t is not for us to make Pennsylvania ’ s p olicy choice in setting the level of culpable

mens re a for sexual offenses. A s already noted, it seems strange to imagi ne how t he devi ate s exua l i ntercou rse statute
could be violated recklessl y ( see supra n. 10 and accompanying text )

, but suppose an adult w ere to aggressively and inappropri ately touch a child

, and that

conduct re sult ed in the penetration “ howe ver slight ” req uired

for a violation of § § 302(c), 3 101, and 312 3(a) ( 7)

. In such a
sit uation , p enaliz ing reckless conduct is not on its face

abs urd

. The dissent ’ s example of a parent feeding her child is plainly inapposite. Such an innocent action car ries no culpable mens re a whats oever and th us is not s ubject t o

cr imin a l p enalty.

13 Our dissentin g col l eag ue cites C ommonwealth v.

Hart , 28 A.3d 8 98 ( P a. 2011), as an example of a Pennsy lvania court engaging in broader statutory interpretation “ rather than merely applying § 302(c). ” But at
issu e in Hart w a s an interpre tiv e dispute over actu s reus, not

men s rea

– specif

ically, over “ whether the mere off e r of an

automobile ride to a child constitutes an attempt to ‘ lure ’ the
child. ” Id . at 900. In concluding that an offer for a ride must

be acco m panied by “ other enticem ent or inducement, ” id . at28 900, 909, the court unsu rprisingly saw little need to enga g e with section 302(c). N o one argu es that section 302(c) will

answer every relevant question a criminal statute might raise.

What matters f

or ou r purposes is whether it an s wers the
relevant question we mus t answer

– nam ely, the minimum

mens rea for w hic h a defendant could be convicted. I t does

. A nd the answer it gives is different from

– and broader than

– the mens rea for the federal generic of fense.

Nor is the dissen t ’ s reliance on Common wealth v.

Ludwi g , 874 A.2d 62 3 (Pa. 2005) , persuasive

. Ther e, t he state supreme court recognized t hat where a criminal statute

“ does not explicitly provide for an applica ble mens rea , the General Assembly has provided a default culpa bil i ty provision in Se ction 302(c) . . . that is to be applied

. ” Id. at 630 (emph asi s added). True, in applying section 302, the

court state d that the mens rea default does not apply where a
contrary mens rea “ is . . . prescribed by law. ” I d. (quoting 1 8

P a . C.S.A. § 302(c))

. But it did s o only because the relevant offense, third

- de gre e murder, had a “ consistent[] ” and “ well

settled ” mens rea (malice) at common law. Id. at 630

– 31.

T here is no such common

- law tradition for i nvol untary
dev i ate sexual in ter c ourse with a minor

. Finally, the dissent c ites to a lone concurrence by one ju sti c e that was joined by none of the ot her six ju stices on the

bench. See Commonwealth v. Moran , 104 A.3d 1136, 1 151

- 52 (Pa. 2014) (Todd, J., concurr ing). The justices in t he

m ajority reiterated their “ repeate d[] h[o]ld[ing ] [that] § 302 provides the def

aul t level of culpability where a crimi nal

statute does not includ e an express mens rea

. ” Id. at 1149 (majority op.) (citing Gallagher , 924 A.2d at 6 39; Ludwig

, 874 A.2d at 630 ; and Mayfield , 832 A.2d at 427). Even the29 already discussed, Pennsylvania courts have applied § 302(c )

t o closely related statut ory language. 14 So w hi le it is true th at the text of Pennsylvania ’ s Involuntary Deviat e Se xual

Intercourse sta tute does not itse lf contain a mens rea, the c lear guidance from the courts is that we should apply the gap

filling provisions of § 302(c). 15 T here is nothing unusual

two justices in dissent were in ful l a g reement on th at point.

See id. at 1154 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).

14 S ee supra pp. 17

- 18.

15 P e n n s y l v a n i a c o u r t s h a v e r e p e a t e d l y e m p h a s i z e d t h e b r o a d applic abi l i ty o f § 3 0 2 ( c ) t o t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h ’ s

c r i m i n a l l a w s

. The sta te supreme court has relied on it, for

instance , in expl aining that even for a criminal statute that lacks any mention of mens rea, the legislature ’ s intent as to

mens rea is no t unclear. Se e C o m monwealth v. Mayf

ield , 832
A.2d 418, 427 (Pa. 2003) (assessi ng 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3 1 24.2

– a provision neighbor ing § 3 123(a)(7)

– that criminalizes

institutional sexual assault and importing a mens rea of recklessness). I n d e e d

, o n c e a n i n t e r p r e t i n g c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s

t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t o f

f e n s e was not int ended “ to be a strict liability cri me ” the court “ need . . . do[] noth ing more than advert to § 302(c) and require the Commonwealth to prove at

least recklessness. ” Id. ; see also C ommonwealt h v. Gallagher , 9 2 4 A.2d 636, 638 (P a. 2007) ( “ As a rule , in . .

. instances [wh ere the statute does not express a mens

rea requirement ], Section 302(c) of the Crimes Code prescribes the default culpability requirement . . . . ” (emphasis added)); Commonwea l th v. Parmar

, 71 0 A .2d 1083, 1088

– 8 9 (Pa. 1998) ( “ The bribery st atute does not have an explicit30 a bo ut supplementi ng the text of a specific provision with a

cross

- referenc e to a generally applicable statu t ory provi sion

d e s p i t e t h e u n f

o r t u n a t e r e s u l t i t l e a d s t o w h e n m a d e a

c o m p o n e n t o f t h e c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o a c h t o analyzing C a b e d a ’ s

c o n v i c t i o n

.

S o , w h i l e w e a r e i n c o m p l e t e a c c o r d w i t h o u r

c o l l e a g u e ’ s d e s i r e t o m i t i g a t e t h e w o r k i n g s o f t h e c a t e g o r i c a l

a p p r o a c h

, w e c a n n o t t a k e t h e a n a l y t i c a l p a t h h e s u g g e s t s

. I n

t h e e n d

, w e a r e l e f

t t o s h a k e o u r h e a d s a t t h e p a t h w e a r e o n

. B u t

, h a v i n g f

o l l o w e d t h a t p a t h a s r e q u i r e d

, w e c o n c l u d e t h a t

t h e r e i s n o t a c a t e g o r i c a l m a t c h b e t w e e n C a b e d a ’ s s t a t u t e o f

c o n v i c t i o n a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g g e n e r i c f e d e r a l c r i m e

.

men s rea requirement on its face, but it is subject to the culpability requirements of Section 302 . . . . Th[ose] culpability req uirements . . . ap ply to all crimes in the Cr i me s Code, like bri bery, [as well as] those outs ide the Crimes Code

. . . . ” ). T he Pennsylvania code itself bears out § 302(c) ’ s broad application. As the state supreme court explained in

Parmar , see 710 A.2d at 1089, although the legisl a ture
crafte d exc e p tions to section 302(c)'s genera l rule, those
except ions apply only to "summary o ffenses" and those for which "a leg islative purpose to impose absolute ability . . . plainly appears [

. ] " 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 305(a)(1)

– (2). Neither o f

those ex c eptions, ho we ver , applies here. W e a r e t h u s bound to apply § 30 2(c).31 III. C ONCLUSION

For t he foregoing rea sons, we wil l g r a n t t h e petition for review, vacate th e BIA’s decision, a nd remand for fu rther proceedings consiste nt with this opinio n

. 16

16 N othing in our decision today m eans that Cabeda is

en titled to cancellat ion of remov al

, if and whe n she appli es for it. Our h olding simply me ans tha t she is no t subject t o th e

au t o m atic depo r t a tio n that results fr om a convic tion f or an aggravat e d fel ony.1 G REENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge , concurring in part

, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment.

At the outset, I join the majority’s well

- reasoned analysis with respect to the three conclusions in Section II.A : (1) Esquivel

- Quintana did not provide a new federal generic
definition of a crime of sexual abuse of a minor ; (2) we continue to defer to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) as the primary guide to defining the generic offense ; and (3) the mens rea of
the federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor is “ knowing conduct as to the sexual act in question .” 1 Maj. Op. at 1 8

.
I also share my colleagues’ frustration with the depths of the mental gymnastics that the categorical approach
manufactures and the counterintuitive results it often produces ; however, here the proper application of the categorical approach does not result in such a head

- scratching outcome.

Initially, w here I part with my colleagues is in their

reliance on Salmoran v. Attorney General to excuse Cabeda from demonstrating that there is “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” 909 F.3d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2 018) (Greenaway, J.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). T heir analysis in Section

II.B leads to the challenging interpretation tha t a defendant could be culpable for recklessly “engag [ ing ] in deviate sexual

1 Because I fin d that Esquivel

- Quintana did not provide a new federal generic definition of a crime of sexual abuse of a minor, I respectfully decline to join J UDGE K RAUSE ’s

concurrence.2 intercourse ” with a minor

, whatever t hat actually entails

. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3123(a).

In contrast, my view is that t he categorical approach
does not require us to go down th at rabbit hole

. I therefore reach the opposite result, that Cabeda was convicted of an aggravated felony consisting of the sexual abuse of a minor. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Accordingly, I would deny the petition for review for lack of ju risdiction. 2

In explaining how I reach this conclusion , I will first
situate Salmoran within th e context of this Court’s treatment
of the realistic probability requirement

. Then I will offer t wo reasons why Cabeda is not excused from demonstrating a realistic probability that Pennsylvania courts would apply a mens rea of recklessness to the sexual act under Cabeda’s

statute of conviction , 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3123(a)(7)

. Namely, this case is distinguishable from Salmoran and other cases
where we found it unnecessary to engage in a realistic probability inquiry

, and that the majority’s i nterpretation of § 3123(a)(7) is flawed , or, at best, inconclusive and does not

render the realistic probability requirement moot. Because I
find that Cabeda cannot meet that additional burden (of proving a realistic probability) , her crime is a match for the

2 This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), but we lack jurisdiction to review an order to remove an alien who commits an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). However, this Court may retain jurisd iction to address the prerequisite of
“whether an alien was convicted of a non

- reviewable aggravated felony.” Stubbs v. Att’y Gen. , 452 F.3d 251, 253 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).3 federal generic offense and aggravated felony of sexual abuse

of a minor.

I. The Categorical Approach and the Rea listic

Probability Requirement

As the majority explains, the categorical approach requires us to determine if the material elements of the federal generic offense match those of the state statute of conviction. Maj. Op. at 6

– 7 (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder , 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013))

. W here the petitioner claims that an element of a statute encompasse s more conduct than the federal crime

, the petitioner must have some practical basis for his or her
argument. Moncrieffe , 569 U.S. at 191; Gonzales v. Duenas

Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007); Lewin v. Att’y Gen. , 885 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2018)

. In other words, the petitioner’s interpretation of the statute cannot be based on “legal imagination

. ” Duenas

-

Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193

.

However, this Court ha s clarified that where th e petitioner has already demonstrated a clear difference between

th e statute of conviction and the federal generic offense

, the realistic probability requirement is su perfluous

. Salmoran , 909
F.3d at 82. Indeed, we have found that the statute of conviction “plainly encompasses more conduct than its federal counterpart” based on a comparison of the plain text s of the

statute and the federal generic crime

, e.g. , id. ; Singh v. Att’y

Gen. , 839 F.3d 273, 285

– 86 (3d Cir. 2016); cf. Jean

- Louis v. Att’y Gen. , 582 F. 3d 462

, 481 (3d Cir. 2009)

, and where the
state court ha s definitively articulated an interpretation of the

statute that sweeps in more culpable conduct than that contemplated by the federal offense

, e.g. , Zhi Fei L i ao v. Att’y

Gen. , 910 F.3d 714, 723

– 24 (3d Cir. 2018)

. Having supported the argument with statutory text or state

- court interpretations4 of the law in these cases

, we determined it was unnecessary for the petitioner to further demonstrate a realistic probability

th at th e state court s would interpret the statute in the petitioner’s favor ; n othing was left to “ legal imagination” in

these cases. Duenas

-

Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193.

II. The Realistic Probability Inquiry Applies

In my view, t he outcome

- determinative question in this

case i s whether Cabeda should be required to demonstrate a

r ealistic probability that the Pennsylvania court s would require only recklessness as to the act of deviate sexual intercourse
under § 3123(a)(7). 3 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3101 (defining deviate sexual intercourse as “[s]exual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. The term also includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of another person with a foreign obje ct for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures.”). For the following reasons,
I conclude , unlike my colleagues in the majority, that Cabeda must make that showing.

3 The majority correctly points to two mens rea requirements in the federal generic offense of sexual abuse of

minor. Maj. Op. at 1 8

. The second, strict liability with respect to the victim’s age, is not the subject of debate here. Subsequent references to the mens rea at issue will refer only to the culpable mental state as to the conduct of deviate sexual

intercourse as defined unde r § 3127(a)(7) and § 3101.5 A. The Present Case is Distinguishable from Our

Pre cedent
, s o Cabeda is not Excused from Demonstrating

a Realistic Probability

The lack of a clear difference between the mens rea as to the conduct under § 3123(a)(7) and the federal generic
crime ’s mens rea of knowledge distinguishes this case from

those i n the Salmoran line of cases

. As such, this is not a case
“where the elements of the crime of conviction are not the same as the elements of the generic federal offense.” Salmoran , 909
F.3d at 81

.

Cabeda’s statute of conviction does not reference any mens rea, so there is no textua l hook for differentiation . Nor have I or any of my colleagues found a n occasion where the Pennsylvania courts have definitive ly spoken to the mens rea of the sexual act under § 3123(a)(7)

. T his case therefore falls
outside of those in which we have found it unnecessary to inquire a bout the realistic probability that the state would interpret the law in the petitioner’s favor

. Because we are left

without sufficient “guidance as to how the statute applies,” Zhi

Fei Liao , 910 F.3d at 7 2 3

, I would require Cabeda to

demonstrate that there is a re alistic probability that the Pennsylvania courts would find reckless conduct culpa bl e

.

B. We Must Engage in a Realistic Probability Inquiry

Because the Majority’s Statutory Interpretation Does Not Definitively Demonstrate a Difference Between the Statute

of Conviction and the Federal Generic Offense

In an attempt to avoid this uncertainty , the majority

presses to apply a gap

- filling provi sion . Thi s leads my colleagues to th e uncomfortable presumption that one could be
convicted for recklessly committing the act of deviate sexual6 intercourse. Maj. Op. at 1 9

– 20

. The majority then rel ies on this awkward reading of the statute to differentiate § 3123(a)(7) from the federal generic offense.

Unfortunately, neither the c urious conclusion at which my colleagues arrive nor their path in reaching it alleviate s the
concern that the statutory interpretation they embrace is

flawed

. The approach I embrace demonstrates that Pennsylvania courts would more likely apply at least a mens

rea of knowledge , if not intent. At the very least, th is competing approach shows that the majority’s interpretation is
far from definitive . Left without sufficient guidance to

construe the statute confidently , we cannot forego the application of the realistic probability test.

1. The Majority Fails to Fully Consider Pennsylvania’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation

The majority would apply 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(c)

, the default culpability provision, to insert a “recklessness”

mens rea as to the conduct. While the majority stops there, Pennsylvania courts have a more involved approach to statutory interpretation. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court describes, “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of

statutes is to ascerta in and effectuate the intention of the
General Assembly.” Com monwealth v. Hart , 28 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2011) (citing 1 Pa. C ons. S tat

. § 1921(a) )

. Importantly, “ [ c ] oncomitant with these considerations,

the Statutory Construction Act also sets forth certain presumptions regarding the General Assembly ’ s enactment of

statutes which are to be applied when attempting to ascertain

its legislative intent. ” Id

. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has noted that, “[i] n particular, when interpreting a statutory

p rovision we must presume that the legislature [] does not7 intend a result that is unreasonable, absurd, or impossible of execution, 1 Pa. C ons

. S tat

. § 1922(1). ” Id

. Indeed, Pennsylvania courts have refrained from a strict application of § 302(c)

. See, e.g. , id. at 909

– 10 (choosing to ascertain a mens rea as to the act of “luring a child into a motor vehicle” from the language of the statute with guidance from the Statutory Construction Act, rather than merely apply ing § 302(c));

Com monwealth v. Lud

wig , 874 A.2d 623, 630 ( Pa. 2005) (declining to apply § 302(c) where “[t]he law is clear and well

settled regarding the mens rea for third degree murder”); see also Com monwealth v. Moran , 104 A.3d 1136, 1151

– 52 (Pa. 2014) (Todd, J., concurring) (“ Neither the plain language
of Section 302, nor our prior caselaw, requires the automatic application of Section 302 ’ s default culpability requirements

in every situation where a criminal statute does not expressly

state a requisite level of culpability for the conduct it seeks to penalize.

. . . Rather, Section 302 has a narrower application: it applies only where the ‘ culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law. ’ ” ( quoting 18 Pa

. Cons. Stat. § 302 )).

After applying Pennsylvania’s approach to interpreting its own law, it is clear that a mens rea of recklessne s s does not
comport with the legislature’s intent and would produce

unreasonable results

. We therefore should not apply the default culpability provision in § 302 to supply a mens rea in § 3123(a)(7). Instead, we should find that the sexual act under § 3123(a)(7) requires a mens rea of at least knowledge.

Although the Pennsylvania legislature did not enact a specific statement of legislative intent , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted that § 3123(a)(7) serves a legitimate

state interest in “ protecting children from sexual predators”

a nd “assuring that a significantly older individual cann ot take8 advantage of a young child's complete lack of knowledge, inexperience or poor judgment.” Com monwealth v. Albert

, 758 A.2d 1149, 1153 ( Pa. 2000 ) (“ We agree with
the Commonwealth that the subject legislation serves a legitimate state interest, i.e., to protect minors younger than 16

years of age from older teenage and adult sexual aggressors. Such an interest recognizes that older, more mature individuals

are in a position that would allow them to take advantage of the immaturity and p oor judgment of very young minors.”) ; see also Commonwealth v. Bruner , 527 A.2d 575, 576 (Pa. 1987) (“As to the necessity and purpose of the involuntary deviate sexual intercourse statute, the Commonwealth . . . does have a strong interest in . . . protecting minors from being sexually abused by adults.”). It is clear that a mens rea of at least knowledge , if not intent, complies with § 3123(a)(7)’s legislative purpose. 4

Faced with these statements by the Pennsylv ania Supreme Court, it is difficult to square the intent to punish sexual predators, sexual abusers , and older individuals who take advantage of children with a reading of the statute that

would find reckless sexual acts c ulpable . § 3123(a) (7)

. 5

4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s definition of the sexual act under § 3123(a)(7) as “oral and anal sex” also supports a mens rea of knowledge or intent. See Commonwealth v. Kelley , 801 A.2d 551, 555 (Pa. 2002); cf.
Commonwealt h v. Hitchcock , 565 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Pa. 1989) (describing involuntary deviate sexual intercourse as “ forcible
sexual penetration of a person by another”).

5 Several other circuits have also interpreted similar state statutes to require knowledge or intent. See, e.g.

, Acevedo9 Reading recklessness into the mens rea is also in tension with
how Pennsylvania courts have so far interpreted the required mental state for committing deviate sexual intercours e

. Indeed, to my knowledge, the y have never found a defendant culpable for any thing less than what appears to be knowing
conduct

. See, e.g.

, Commonwealth v. Elia , 83 A.3d 254, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) ( finding evidence that victim perform ing

oral sex on defendant after previously engaging in other sexual

acts was sufficient for conviction under § 3123(a)(7) );

v. Barr , 943 F.3d 619, 626

– 27 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming BIA’s decision to use § 3509 as the generic offense and finding New

York convic tion for attempted oral or anal sexual conduct with person under the age of fifteen constituted sexual abuse of a minor); Correa

- Diaz v. Sessions , 881 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2018) (continuing to apply § 3509 as a guide and concluding a

conviction for atte mpted sexual misconduct with a minor constituted sexual abuse of a minor); Bedolla

- Zarate v.

Sessions , 892 F.3d 1137, 1141

– 42 (10th Cir. 2018) (applying § 3509 as a guide for concluding Wyoming conviction for
sexual contact with minor constitutes sexual ab use of a minor);

Contreras v. Holder , 754 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2014) (comparing Virginia statute of conviction for “carnal knowledge of child between thirteen and fifteen years of age” to § 3509 to find conviction qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor); cf. Garcia

- Urbano v. Sessions , 890 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2018) (applying Esquivel

- Quintana ’s age requirement to find Minnesota conviction for sexual conduct with person under sixteen years of age qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor); Bahar v. Ashcroft

, 264 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (relying on the BIA’s decision in Rodriguez to find conviction for taking “indecent liberties” with a child under sixteen years of age constitutes sexual abuse of a minor).10 Commonwealth v. Mawhinney , 915 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Super

. Ct. 2006), appeal denied 932 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 2007) (finding multiple acts of anal and oral sex sufficient evidence for § 3123(a)(7) conviction) ; Commonwealth v. Castelh un , 889 A.2d 1228, 1232

– 33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) ( same ) ; s ee also

Com monwealth v. Williams , 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (describing involuntary deviate sexual intercourse as a “general intent crime[]”)

. The majority’s attenuated reading only drive s needless uncertainty into a consistently

- applied

statute. 6 Cf. 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1922(2) (advising that courts

6 As indication that the Pennsylvania courts w ould apply a recklessness mens rea to § 3123(a)(7), the majority relies on three Pennsylvania cases interpreting two similar statutes in which the courts applied the default culpability provision. But these cases are plainly inapposite; not one speaks to the mens rea of the sexual act, only to the mens rea of other elements that are not present under § 3123(a)(7). Commonwealth v. Cosby , 224 A.3d 372, 419

– 20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (applying recklessness to whether the defendant has the “complainant’s consen t,” knows that “the complainant is unaware that the penetration is occurring,” or “has substantially impaired the complainant’s power to appraise or control his or her conduct”); Commonwealth v. Torsilieri , No. 2300 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3854450, at *5 (Pa. Su per. Ct. Aug. 16, 2019) (not precedential) (same); Commonwealth v. Carter

, 418 A.2d 537, 540

- 41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (applying § 302(c) to find there was sufficient evidence showing “ a substantial risk that [the victim] was of such mental infirmity as to render her incapable of consent ”).11 should presume that the legislature “ intends the entire statute

to be effective and certain ”)

.
Importantly, reading recklessness into the mens rea of the sexual act under § 3123(a)(7) plainly violates Pennsylvania’s tenet that courts must presume that the legislature “does not intend a result that is absurd

, impossible

of execution

, or unreasonable

. ” 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1922(1) ;

see also United States v. Schneider , 14 F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1994) (“ It is the obligation of the court to construe a statute to avoid absurd results, if alternative interpretations are available
and consistent with the legislative purpose.”). Certainly, the Pennsylvania General Assembly did not intend to make a
mother or father criminally liable for “penetrat [ing] ” the ir baby’s mouth, “however slight,” with a hot spoon

, while holding the baby and cooking dinner

. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §

3101.

2. The Competing Interpretations Present the Precise Challenge in Duenas

-

Alv arez

Clearly

, I have failed to convince my colleagues that knowledge or intent is the appropriate mens rea. So, I humbly proffer that my approach is at least as reasonable as that of the majority

. If we accept th ere are two equally good ways to interpret the mens rea under § 3123(a)(7) , then the majority’s conclusion that Pennsylvania would apply recklessness to the
statute is far from definitive and cannot be relied up on to show

a clear difference between the state statute and the federal generic offense.

This case therefo re falls under the same circumstances

as in Duenas

-

Alvarez. I n Duenas

-

Alvarez , the petitioner posit ed an interpretation of state law, which had been neither12 con firmed nor denied by the state courts

. 549 U.S. at 190

– 93.
Faced with two possible interpretations, the Supreme Court
erred on the side of what was realistically probable. Id. at 193. So, too, must this Court.

Instead, the majority favors a theorical possibility and
therefore unnecessarily risk s superseding the state’s authority as the primary interpreter of its own laws. S ee Pinho v. Gonzales , 432 F.3d 193, 212 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he authority

of state courts to determine state

- law question s is clear: ‘[C]omity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to decisions of state courts on issues of state law. That practice reflects our understanding that the decisions of state courts are definitive pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns.’” (citati ons omitted)). In rejecting the realistic probability inquiry, the majority regrettably ignores the Supreme Court’s admonition to avoid “legal imagin[ing s ]

. ”

Duenas

- Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193.

Unrestricted by Salmoran , and for the reasons supplied above, I would require Cabeda to show a realistic probability that the Pennsylvania courts would apply a mens rea of

recklessness to the act of deviate sexual intercourse. 7

7 The depths of the disagreements between myself and my colleagues in analyzing Pennsylvania cases is further evidence that we should tread lightly in interpreting § 3123(a)(7) . So, rather than “put[] the cart before the horse,” Maj. Op. at 2 6

, this a pplication of Salmoran ’s realistic probability requirement draws from the Supreme Court’s own cautionary approach

.13 III. Cabeda Cannot Meet the Realistic Probability

Requirement

“To show that realistic probability, an offender . . . may show that the statute was so applied in [the petitioner’s] own

case. . . . or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which [the petitioner] argues.” Duenas

- Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193. W e have not found a Pennsylvania case that has applied a mens rea of recklessness to the conduct criminalized under § 3123(a)(7)

, so Cabeda could not have met the realistic probability requirement here

.

***

I would therefore find Cabeda’s statute of conviction a categorical match to the federal generic offense of an aggravated felony consisting of sexual abuse of a minor. Having found Cabeda was convicted of an aggravated felony
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), I would deny the petition for lack of jurisdiction , which would preclude Cabeda from applying for cancellation of removal.1 KRAUSE, Circuit Judge

, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

.

I join J UDGE J ORDAN ’s excellent opinion (the Majority ) in

its three major respects

. First, the generic definition of “sexual abuse of a minor,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), includes a mens rea of knowledge with respect to the proscribed sexual conduct. Second, Cabeda’s Pennsylvania offense requires a mens rea of only recklessness as to that conduct

. T hird, under our case law, that is the end of the matter: Where the elements of

a state offense differ from and are broader than those of the generic federal offense, there is no categorical match regardless whether the petitioner can show a “realistic pro bability” that the state will prosecute the offense in an overbroad way. 1

Salmoran v. Att’y Gen. , 909 F.3d 73, 81 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted)

. Based on these three conclusions, I agree that

— although the result is counterintuitive if not bizarre

— Ca beda’s crime of conviction does not fit within the generic federal offense of “sexual abuse of a minor,” and she can neither be removed nor denied cancellation of removal on that basis.

I write separately because I reach the first of those conclusions by a different path. The Majority rejects the argument

that Esquivel

- Quintana v. Sessions , 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), requires us to revisit Restrepo v. Attorney General , 617 F.3d 7 8 7 (3d Cir. 2010), which

, in interpreting “sexual abuse of a

1 That is, I join in full not only J UDGE J ORDAN ’s analysis of

the contents of Pennsylvania law, Maj. Op. 19

– 22 , but also his application of our holdings in the Salmoran line of cases, id. at

22

– 24 , and his rejection of the alternative lines of reasoning offered in dissent by J UDGE G REENAWAY

, id. at 24

– 30

.2 minor

, ” deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA)

decision in In re Rodriguez

- Rodriguez , 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (BIA 1999) (en banc)

. Its reasoning is that Esquivel

- Quintana

reach es no further than its context

— f ixing the age of consent for statutory rape offense s based solely on the participants’

age s

— and gives us no basis to depart from Restrepo

. Yet once the Majority turns to defining the generic federal offense, it does not rely on Restrepo

, Rodriguez

- Rodrigu ez , or even 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), the statutory provision on which those decisions were based. Instead, its analysis turns on 18 U.S.C. § 2243

— a distinct provision that both Restrepo and Rodriguez

Rodriguez rejected as an interpretive guide

— as well as statutory and contextual clues that those decisions discounted or ignored. So i n the end, the Majority looks beyond Restrepo andfinds a knowledge requirement by adopting the interpretive approach of Esquivel

- Quintana

.

I would reach that result more directly by holding that Esquivel

- Quintana abrogates the bases on which Restrepo rested. Under the approach set out in Esquivel

- Quintana

, before deeming a provision ambiguous under Chevron

, courts must engage
in vigorous te xtual and contextual statutory analysi s tailored to
the precise interpretive question presented. That approach is impossible to square with Restrepo , which ignored or discounted sources of statutory meaning on which Esquivel

- Quintana relied

, assessed ambiguity at the broadest level , and required deference to Rodriguez

- Rodriguez for all future interpretive questions involving § 1101(a)(43)(A)

. Restrepo is a

r elic of a n era when deference was far more reflexive and automatic than it is today and

, after Esquivel

- Quintana

, we can no longer follow Restrepo in uncritically relying on Rodriguez

Rodriguez or § 3509(a)(8 )

.3 I tackle these issues in three steps. I fi rst highlight the fundamental inconsistencies between Esquivel

- Quintana and Restrepo , which reveal that the latter decision ’s assessment of ambiguity was erroneous. I then explore the case law on Rodriguez

- Rodriguez after Esquivel

- Quintana to show why I

view the issue as unsettled. Finally, I explain why the conclusion that § 1101(a)(43)(A) requires knowledge

— with which I wholeheartedly agree

— flows not from Restrepo or Rodriguez

Rodriguez , but from Esquivel

- Quintana

.

I.

Th e Majority ably summarizes the contours of Esquivel

Quintana ’s holding. I agree Esquivel

- Quintana resolved only one aspect of the generic federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor”: the meaning of “minor” “in the context of statutory rape offenses th at criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants.” 137 S. Ct. at 1568. The Court

did not set down a n all

- encompassing definition of “sexual

abuse of a minor” ; in fact

, it expressly reserved interpretive questions not before i t. See , e.g. , id. at 1572

. So I join the Majority in rejecting the argument, which the BIA endorsed, 2

2 The BIA “agree[d] with [C abeda]” about the contents of the new definition and cited the pages of Cabeda’s brief layingout that definition. A.R. 4. As those pages reveal, the definition Cabeda put forward, and that the BIA accepted, was “the engaging in sexual contact with a per son who is below a specified age or who is incapable of giving consent because of age4 that Esquivel

- Quintana created a new, comprehensive generic federal definition to be applied in future cases. So far, so easy.

What is not so easy, though, is the distinct question whether Esquivel

- Quintana ’s analysis

— the sources and evidence the

Court considered and the order in which the Court considered

them

— undermines Restrepo ’s analysis of § 1101(a)(43)(A) or its choice to defer to the BIA’s interpretation in Rodriguez

- Rodriguez

. The Majority acknowledges that more complicated question, observing that there is “some tensi on between ” Restrepo and Esquivel

- Quintana

. Maj. Op. 12 ; accord id. at 13

n.4

. I see that tension as irreconcilable

. I n multiple respects, the statutory analysis of Esquivel

- Quintana is entirely inconsistent with that of Restrepo . Indeed, Esquivel

- Quintana has

or mental or physical incapacity .” A.R. 15 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1569).

But the idea that the quoted language established a new generic definition borders on the fatuous. That language, which

came from Merriam

- Webster’s Dictionary of Law

, see Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1569, was just one of many pieces of evidence the Court considered en route to deciding the age of consent for a subset of statutory rape offenses. See

id. at 1568

– 72. Nothing in the Court’s opinion even hints at an

endorsement of that la nguage as a definitive encapsulation ofthe generic federal definition. Nor, contrary to Cabeda’s argument, is there any evidence to suggest that by quoting the phrase “sexual contact” as part of the dictionary definition, the Court meant to silently adop t the definition of that phrase from 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3).5 so undermined that analysis that I believe Restrepo is no longer good law

.

Under the first step of Chevron

, we may “defer to [an] agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute only if the text of the statute is unclear and we cannot discern congressional intent by utilizing various tools of statutory construction.” Quinteros v. Att’y Gen. , 945 F.3d 772, 784 ( 3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But Restrepo putthe cart before the horse, signaling that deference was appropriate before engag ing in statutory interpretation. What’s

more, Restrepo ’s eventual statutory analysis cannot wi thstand scrutiny after Esquivel

- Quintana , which demanded a much more targeted approach and which took a contrary position on essentially all the sources of statutory meaning Restrepo considered. Viewed through the lens of Esquivel

- Quintana

, Restrepo erred in concluding that § 1101(a)(43)(A) was across

the

- board ambiguous under Chevron

.

A.

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Esquivel

- Quintana

cannot be gleaned only from reading the Court’s opinion. As

it came to the Court

, Esquivel

- Quintana was very much a case

about Chevron deference in general and about the wisdom of deferring to the BIA’s reliance on a procedural statute like § 3509(a)(8) in particular. 3 See, e.g. , Brief for the Petitioner at

35

– 48, Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. 1562 (No. 16

- 54), 2016

3 As noted by the Majority , § 3509 deals with the rights of child victims and witnesses in federal criminal proceedings.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3509. It does not criminalize any conduct.6 WL 7384847; Brief for the Respondent at 36

– 55, Esquivel

Quintana , 137 S. Ct. 1562 (No. 16

- 54), 2017 WL 345128; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 17

– 23, Esquivel

- Quintana

, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (No. 16

- 54), 2017 WL 632460. Yet for all the space it

commanded in the briefing, Chevron ended up relegated to a short paragraph at the tail end of the Court’s opinion. A fter reviewing the text along with dictionary definitions, statutor y context, related federal statutes, and analogous state laws, the

Court found “no need” to resort to Chevron deference at all “because the statute, read in context , unambiguously foreclose [d] the [BIA]’s interpretation.” Esquivel

- Quintana

, 137 S. Ct. at 1572. In other words, when faced with a question about the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor,” the Court treated

Chevron as a canon of last resort, to be used if

— but only if

— the Court could not dispel ambiguity through a robust application of all the tools in its statutory toolkit. See also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis , 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (noting that “ Chevron leaves the stage” where the “ court , employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” can discern the meaning of the contested provision (citations omitted)).

Not so with Restrepo

. In analyzing “sexual abuse of a minor,” we first noted that, unlike other aggravated felonies listed

i n the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) , § 1101(a)(43)(A)

contain s neither cross

- references to other statutory provisions nor explanatory parentheticals about the nature of the offense. Restrepo , 617 F.3d at 792. Then

— before looking to any other

text ual or contextual clues

— we suggested that “Congress ha[d] explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” “intend[ing] for the BIA to utilize its expertise to define the phrase.” Id. at 793 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

Inc.

, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). And

— once again without7 further statutory analysis

— we concluded that because § 1101(a)(43)(A) lacks an express definition and cross

- references, its “precise definition

. . . is most assuredly not clear and unambiguous.” 4 Id.

Put plainly , in Restrepo we waved the white flag of ambiguity far too readily

, and without performing the rigorous analysis Esquivel

- Quintana demands. But that is not Restrepo ’s only flaw.

B.

Esquivel

- Quintana also clarified that in assessing ambiguity u nder step one of Chevron , courts must define the interpretive question narrowly

. Said differently, courts must ask not whether a statute is ambiguous in general , but whether it is ambiguous as to the specific legal issue in the case. That, too, is impossible to square with Restrepo , which approached the issue of ambiguity practically in the abstract.

In analyzing the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor,” the

Court in Esquivel

- Quintana did not trouble itself with whether

4 We revealed we were jumping the gun on ambiguity in other ways, too. Among Restrepo ’s brief statutory analysis isa footnote discussing the legislative history, which we understood to suggest Congress had intended § 1101(a)(43)(A) to be read “expansive[ly].” 617 F.3d at 795 n.6. We considered that reading consistent “ with the structure of § 1101(a)(43)(A)”

— but also “with the BIA’s interpretation” of the phrase. Id. Accordingly, it appears Rodriguez

- Rodriguez colored what should have been an independent analysis of s tatutory meaning at step one of Chevron

.8 every element of the federal generic offense was clear from the

text. Instead, it limited its interpretive task to the specific category of crimes it faced: “statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants.” Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1568. Because it did so, the Court could assess § 1101(a)(43)(A) through an appropriately tailored lens and conclude that the generic age of consent, at least where the statutory rape offense is based only on age (rather than, say, a relationship of trust between the adult and the minor), is sixteen

. Id. at 1569

– 72. T hat narrow focus allowed the Court to avoid the broader dispute about whether it was appropriate to defer to a BIA interpretat ion based on a procedural statute like § 3509. See id. at 1572.

Since Esquivel

- Quintana , the Court has reaffirmed its endorsement of this approach. Take Pereira v. Sessions , 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) , a case involving the INA’s “stop

- time rule,” which if triggered ends a noncitizen’s period of continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal. Id.

at 2109. As in Esquivel

- Quintana , in Pereira the issue of

Chevron deference was hotl y contested and commanded substantial space in the briefing

. See Brief for Petitioner at 24

– 55,

Pereira , 138 S. Ct. 2105 (No. 17

- 459), 2018 WL 1083742; Brief for the Respondent at 21

– 52, Pereira , 138 S. Ct. 2105 (No. 17

- 459), 2018 WL 1557067; Reply Brief for Petitioner at

3

– 23, Pereira , 138 S. Ct. 2105 (No. 17

- 459), 2018 WL

1792078. Yet in its opinion, the Court criticized the parties for approaching the interpretive question too “broadly.” Pereira

, 138 S. Ct. at 2113 . Rather than asking whether “all ‘i tems listed’ in [8 U.S.C.] § 1229(a)(1)” must be included for a document to qualify as a “notice to appear” triggering the stop

time rule, the Court narrowed the question presented to the one9 item missing from Pereira’s notice : “the date and time of [the] removal proceedings.” Id. O nce it had sufficiently “narrowe[d] [the] question” presented, the Court found it “need not resort

to Chevron deference” at all. Id. Instead, after reviewing the statutory text, neighboring provi sions, and “common sense,”

id. at 2114

– 16, it concluded the stop

- time provision “ha[d] supplied a clear and unambiguous answer to the interpretive question at hand ,” id. at 2113 (emphasis added)

. Once again, therefore, the Court made clear that statutory ambiguity

— without which deference to an agency is inappropriate

— must be assessed through the lens of the precise dispute

. See also Nielsen v. Preap , 139 S. Ct. 954, 963

– 65 (2019) ( resolving an interpretive dispute related to an INA provision governing the apprehension and detention of noncitizens based on a close analysis of the text and without citing Chevron

, even though

the parties had sharply litigated the deference issue ) ; SAS Inst.

Inc. v. Iancu , 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (declining to address the parties’ Chevron arguments because, “after applyingtraditional tools of interpretation” to the specific question presented, the Court was “left with no uncertainty that could warr ant deference”) ; Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States , 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) ( similar ) ; Sturgeon v. Frost , 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1080 n.3 (2019) ( similar )

.

Now consider Restrepo

. The specific question presented was a narrow one: whether inappropriate contac t with a minor’s sensitive areas “through her clothing” qualified as sexual

abuse. See 617 F.3d at 800. But you woul d hardly know it from reading the opinion because the first time we grappled with that specific issue occurred well over halfway in, id. at
799

— and long after we had deemed § 1101(a)(43)(A) ambiguous, see id. at 793, 795

. Instead, we analyzed the statute at10 the highest level of generality, focus ing on the lack of cross

references and explanatory parentheticals

, id. at 792

– 93, andon general clues drawn from surrounding provisions and contemporaneous legislation, id. at 793

– 95. It is no surprise that such a general review of the statute “le[ft] u s in a state of interpretive uncertainty,” id. at 795: Without the benefit of decisions like Esquivel

- Quintana and Pereira , we hadn’t defined

the precise question we were meant to answer.

We have, since Restrepo , gotten it right, stating that we

must as sess the ambiguity of a statute “with respect to the specific issue of law in the case.” Da Silva v. Att’y Gen. , 948 F.3d 629, 634 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) ; accord , e.g. , S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. , 894 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir. 2018) ( Chevron step one requires courts to narrow in on “the precise question at issue” (citation omitted)). Had we followed that path in Restrepo , we may or may not have found ambiguity over

whether “sexual abuse of a minor” encompasses “inappropriate touching of a mi nor through the clothing,” 617 F.3d at 799

— but we would not have concluded that § 1101(a)(43)(A) was ambiguous across the board , and consequently we could not

have purported to require “ defin[ing] sexual abuse of a minor by reference to § 3509(a)” in all f uture cases, id. at 796. After Esquivel

- Quintana , we must revisit that misstep.

C.

Finally, and apart from those issues about the timing and framing of the ambiguity inquiry, Esquivel

- Quintana has revealed that Restrepo ’s statutory analysis was deeply fla wed. In

five respects, we either misinterpreted or ignored key clues about § 1101(a)(43)’s meaning.11 First

, Restrepo discounted a longstanding “rule of statutory construction”: that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc. , 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994) (citation omitted). Congress add ed “ s exual abuse of a minor”to the INA’s list of aggravated felonies in 1996. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,

Pub

. L. No. 104

- 208, div. C, § 321(a) (1) , 110 Stat. 3009, 3009

- 627 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)). As part of the same omnibus legislation, Congress also amended the code provision criminalizing sexual abuse of a minor. Amber Hagerman Child Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104

- 208,

div. A, tit. I, § 121, subsec. 7(c), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009

- 31 (codi fied at 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)). So Restrepo invoked the same

act canon, urging us to interpret “sexual abuse of a minor” under § 1101(a)(43)(A) in line with § 2243. See Restrepo

, 617 F.3d at 793. But we rejected that canon as “inapplicable”

to omnibus le gislation, concluding

—without citing any precedent for this proposition

— that terms used “in separate and distinct statutes” were not subject to the rule. Id. at 793

– 94.

Esquivel

- Quintana took a contrary approach. There, the Court leaned heavily on § 2243, which it described as “[a] closely related federal statute” providing valuable “evidence [of] the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor.”

137 S. Ct. at 1570. It did so not just because § 2243 “contains the only definition of that ph rase in the United States Code,” but also because Congress had amended § 2243 “in the same

omnibus law that added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA.”

Id. As the Court explained, the temporal proximity between revisions to § 1101(a)(43)(A) and § 2243 “pr ovide[s] stron[g] suppor[t]” for the argument that the two should be interpreted12 consistently. See id. (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, t h e conflict could hardly be more evident : Restrepo held inapplicable a canon of statutory construction that Esquivel

- Quintana employed in interpreting the same provision

.

Second

, Restrepo also neglected another longstanding

canon: noscitur a sociis , under which “a word is known by the company it keeps.” Y

ates v. United States

, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015). Here, the words are “sexual abuse of a minor,” and the company they keep is sinister indeed : “murder” and “rape.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Invoking noscitur a sociis

, Restrepo argued that the severi ty of murder and rape should inform our interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor. See Restrepo , 617 F.3d at 794. We rejected that argument as inconsistent with “the broader context of the legislation at issue,” id.

, which

— looking beyond § 1101(a)(43)(A) to unrelated parts of

the INA

— we characterized as an effort “to expand both the protections afforded to minors and the penalties applicable to aliens who commit crimes against minors.” Id. (More on that in a moment.) W e otherwise did not explore how the phrase’s proximity to murder and rape should affect our analysis.

Once again, Esquivel

- Quintana revealed the error in our thinking. The Court emphasized that “the INA lists sexual abuse of a minor in the same subparagraph as ‘murder’ and

‘ rape,’” which are “among the most heinous crimes it defines as aggravated felonies.” Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1570 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)). For the Court, the noscitur a sociis canon was highly useful because it reve aled “that

sexual abuse of a minor encompasses only especially egregious felonies.” Id. (emphasis added). That insight is not just13 missing from Restrepo

— it is directly contrary to how Restrepo

characterized § 1101(a)(43)(A).

Third

, Restrepo ignored another valuable cont extual clue about the contours of § 1101(a)(43)(A). Restrepo emphasized that when Congress added sexual abuse of a minor to the list of aggravated felonies, “it simultaneously amended the INA to classify crimes of domestic violence, stalking, child abuse,child neglect, and child abandonment as grounds for deportab ility.” 617 F.3d at 794. We took that to mean that “Congress intended to implement comprehensive protections for minor victims that were expansive in nature.” Id. at 795 n.6. That “expansive” reading was critical to our analysis, as it supported

our co nclusion that it “would be counterintuitive” to adopt an interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A) that excluded certain state

offenses. See id. at 795.

Restrepo ’s expansive reading is nowhere to be found in Esquivel

- Quintana

. In fact, after a thorough review o f the statutory text and context, the Court concluded the opposite. Section 1101(a)(43)(A) , the Court emphasized, is “an ‘aggravated’ offense,” meaning “one made worse or more serious by [the]

circumstances.” Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1570 (intern al quotation marks and citation omitted). And unlike the broader grounds for removal discussed in Restrepo , sexual abuse of a minor is an aggravated felony carrying the additional, and severe , sanction of ineligibility for cancellation of

removal. That s ignal was a key reason the Court concluded that § 1101(a)(43)(A) “encompasses only especially egregious felonies,” id.

, but unfortunately it is one we missed in Restrepo

.

Fourth

, Restrepo misunderstood the role state criminal offenses should play in the analysis of a federal generic offense14 like § 1101(a)(43)(A). Restrepo was convicted of a New Jersey statute criminalizing “an act of sexual contact,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14

- 3(a), which in clude s intentional touching of intimate areas “ through clothing ,” id. § 2C:14

- 1(d)

. But § 2243 ’s

actus reus is a “sexual act,” 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), which is defined as intentional touching “ not through the clothing ,” id. § 2246(2)(D). In Restrepo , we si gnaled our concern that relying on § 2243 would exclude the New Jersey offense from the generic federal definition, something we felt would conflict

with the “expansive” reading discussed above. See 617 F.3d

at 794

– 95 nn.6 & 7. So instead we turned to § 3509, whose

definition includes intentional touching “ through clothing,” 8 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(9)(A)

. See Restrepo , 617 F.3d at 799

– 800.

Esquivel

- Quintana reveals we were wrong to let the state

crime drive our interpretation of the generic federal offense

. Indeed, t he government tried something similar in Esquivel

Quintana : Faced with a state statute criminalizing consensual

sex between 21

- and a 17

- year

- old, 137 S. Ct. at 1567, it offered up a definition broad enough to capture the statute

, namely that sexual abuse covers sexual activity “directed at a person younger than 18.” Id. at 1569 (citation omitted). But

the Court criticized the government for “turn[ ing ] the categorical approach on its head by defining the generic federal offense of sexual abus e of a minor as whatever is illegal underthe particular law of the State where the defendant was convicted.” Id. at 1570. Under that conception of the categorical approach, the Court explained, “there is no ‘generic’ definition

at all.” Id.

Further, although the Court ultimately “ look [ ed ] to state criminal codes for additional evidence,” it did so only after developing15 an independent view on the meaning of § 1101(a)(43)(A) and

, just as critical, only after a comprehensive cross

- jurisdictional

survey. Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1571

– 72; see id. at 1573 app. That survey allowed the Court to confirm its understanding of the statute’s meaning by reference to a majority of jurisdictions

— even though its c onclusion excluded over a dozen states’ laws from the generic definition, id. at 1576 app. Although we referred to a few states’ laws in Restrepo

, 617 F.3d at 795 n.7 (Pennsylvania and Delaware); see id. at 799 n.16 (citing, but not analyzing , sexual

- abu se

- of

- a

- minor analogs from five states and the District of Columbia ), we stopped far short of the cross

- jurisdictional analysis used in Esquivel

- Quintana

.

We are not alone in having misunderstood the import and

role of state crimes in analyzing a generic federal offense

. See,

e.g. , Bedolla

- Zarate v. Sessions , 892 F.3d 1137, 1141 n.4 (10th Cir. 2018) ( noting that Esquivel

- Quintana abrogated circuit precedent on looking to state criminal statutes). But after Esquivel

- Quintana , we should not hesi tate to ask whether we inappropriately “turn[ed] the categorical approach on its head,” 137 S. Ct. at 1570, in crafting § 1101(a)(43)(A) to capture the

offense before us.

Fifth

, Restrepo unnecessarily painted itself into a corner. Restrepo portrayed an interpretive dilemma in which it would

have to choose either § 2243 or § 3509 as the definitive lodestar

for “sexual abuse of a minor.” C hoosing § 2243, we concluded, would exclude too man y state offenses from the generic federal definition. Restrepo , 617 F.3d at 795. So instead we chose § 3509(a)

— and purported to do so for all future cases involving § 1101(a)(43)(A). See id. at 796.16 But Esquivel

- Quintana has shown that to be a false choice. There, although the Court relied heavily on § 2243, it did so only because it judged § 2243 to be a sensible guide for the problem it was facing. And it made clear it was not adopting § 2243 “as

. . . the complete or exclusive definition ” of § 1101(a)(43)(A). Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1571. If

we had had the benefit of Esquivel

- Quintana ’s gui dance, we

would have understood that our choice between the two sources of statutory meaning was neither as absolute nor as consequential as we made it seem.

D.

Although the Majority recognizes that “ Esquivel

- Quintana

reflects

. . . a more searching and nu anced approach” than the

one we took in Restrepo

, Maj. Op. 13 n.4 , it attributes those

differences to “shifting interpretive methodologies [that] are not usually viewed as carrying the force of stare decisis.” Id. I disagree in four respects.

First , I cannot help but note the irony in embracing this proposition when the delta between my and my collea gue s ’ views

comes down to “ interpretive methodologies ” on both sides

. If all that were binding on us were Restrepo ’s substantive holding

— namely

, that a statute criminalizing the “intentional touching

. . . , either directly or through clothing,” of a mino r’s sensitive areas “for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor” qualifies as “sexual abuse of a minor” under § 1101(a)(43)(A), see 617 F.3d at 800 & n.18 (citation omitted)

— we would be in complete alignment about how to resolve this appeal

. It is only

what Restrepo had to say about its interpretive method

— i.e., that in analyzing “sexual abuse of a minor,” we would “refer[]17 to § 3509(a)” as “a guide,” id. at 796 n.10 (citation o mitted)

— that is at issue between us. In essence, the Majority dismisses Esquivel

- Quintana ’s contributions as merely providing interpretive guidance but declines to apply the same lens to Restrepo

. But “what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for

th e gander,” Heffernan v. City of Paterson , 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016), and there is no reason why our own prior views on interpretive methods

— especially views that are inconsistent with current doctrine

, see Maj. Op. 13 n.4

—would continue to demand adherence when the Supreme Court’s more

recent views would not.

Second

, the rule on which the Majority relies is, in my view,

far narrower than as described

. My colleague s assert, for instance, that “the Supreme Court ‘typicall y avoids methodological stare decisis, ’ ” Maj. Op. 14 n.4 (quoting Am. Farm Bureau

Fed’n v. U.S. EPA , 792 F.3d 281, 307 n.8 (3d Cir. 2015)) , and to be sure, some Justices have suggested that statements in [the Court’s] opinions about

. . . generally applica ble interpretive methods, like the proper weight to afford historical practice in constitutional cases or legislative history in statutory cases,” are not entitled to the “full force” of stare decisis, e.g. , Kisor v.

Wilkie , 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2444 (2019) (G orsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). But that principle addresses only the extent to which “future Justices” are bound by methodology in the Supreme Court’s prior decisions

— that is, it addresses only

“ horizontal ” stare decisis. Id. at 2444. And that distinction is critical: Whatever might be said of how the Court chooses to treat “its own precedents,” “[b]y contrast, vertical stare decisisis absolute, as it must be in a hierarchical system with ‘one supreme Court.’” Ramos v. Lou isiana

, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1416 n.518 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added and omitted) (citation omitted).

Nor have we held that, as a C ourt of A ppeals, we are free to discard the Supreme Court’s instructions on “interpretive

methodol ogy” as not a “form of ‘law’” that binds us, Maj. Op. 14 n.4 (quoting Am. Farm Bureau , 792 F.3d at 307 n.8). What my colleague s omit in discussing American Farm Bureau is that there, although we outlined an academic debate

about so

- called methodological s tare decisis, we concluded wehad “no occasion to explore further the contours of th[at] debate.” 792 F.3d at 307 n.8. Instead, we applied the interpretive method called for by precedent. See id. The Majority has apparently opted to embrace one side of that debate, but we as a Court did not do so in American Farm Bureau or any other

decision of which I am aware

.

Indeed, t he “sea change in our jurisprudence,” Maj. Op. 15

n.6 , if anything, would be if the C ourts of A ppeals were suddenly free t o discard as nonbinding the Supreme Court’s instructions on “interpretive methodologies ,” id. at 13 n.4 (citation omitted)

— for instance, that we may defer to an agency’sinterpretation only if the statute “is ambiguous” and the interpretation “reasonable,” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.

Brand X Internet Servs. , 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005), or that we may apply the rule of lenity “only

. . . after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction,” United States v.

Shabani , 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994). Wha t are those if not “interpretive methodologies” addressing how to understand civil and

criminal enactments ?

— and yet we follow them just as we follow all other binding statements from the High Court, see, e.g. , Mejia

- Castanon v. Att’y Gen. , 931 F.3d 224, 23 2

– 33 (3d Cir.19 2019) ( Chevron ); United States v. Barbosa , 271 F.3d 438, 455 (3d Cir. 2001) (lenity).

Third

, perhaps search ing for a limiting principle, the Majority suggests we can ignore methodological guidance from the Supreme Court “when the decisions employing [such guidance] do not purport to overrule past precedent.” Maj. Op. 13

– 14 n.4

. Yet it is unclear exactly what “past precedent” the Esquivel

- Quintana Cou rt was supposed to note it was overruling. After all, Esquivel

- Quintana was the Court’s first occasion to address § 1101(a)(43)(A). And surely the Majority does not
mean to suggest that the Supreme Court, to guarantee that its dictates will be followed, must canvas the case law of this Circuit and every other C ourt of A ppeals and identify each possible point of abrogation. That suggestion would all but erase the very concept of abrogation, restricting changes in c ircuitlaw to those occasions when our decisions are expressly overruled. But that has never been our practice. To the contrary, “[a] panel of this Court may reevaluate the holding of a priorpanel which conflicts with intervening Supreme Court precedent ,” even if only “impliedly.” In re Krebs , 527 F.3d 82, 83

– 84 (3d Cir. 2008)

. H ere, however, the Majority turns vertical

stare decisis on its head

, elevating a concededly outmoded panel decision over a contrary and more recent statement from the Supreme C ourt.

Fourth , the fundamental inconsistencies between Esquivel

Quintana and Restrepo cannot be swept aside as if they were purely “ methodological,” Maj. Op. 13 n.4

. As discussed in detail above, see supra 10

– 16

, Esquivel

- Quintana has revealed Restrepo t o be flawed not only in its methodology, but also in its substantive conclusions about § 1101(a)(43)(A)’s context20 and meaning , particularly the expansive reading of the statute

on which Restrepo (and Rodriguez

- Rodriguez ) so heavily depended. Those substantive conflicts fall beyond the methodological

- stare

- decisis argument , whatever its merits, and go unaddressed by my esteemed colleagues

.

* * *

In brief, a close look at Esquivel

- Quintana reveals that Restrepo found ambiguity in § 1 101(a)(43)(A) too quickly, toogenerally, and by ignoring or misinterpreting valuable evidence of statutory meaning. And as a result, Restrepo erroneously suggested that under Chevron step one, it would always be appropriate to refer to the BIA’s interpre tation in Rodriguez

Rodriguez

. 5

5 Because in my view § 1101(a)(43)(A) unambiguously requires a mens rea of knowledge with respect to the proscribed sexual conduct, I take no position on whether the BIA’s view

in Rodriguez

- Rodriguez is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” Egan v. Del. River Port Auth. , 851 F.3d 263, 271 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted), either in terms of the statute’s text or its “design and structure . . . as a whole,” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA

, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (citation omitted).

I note, though, that Rodriguez

- Rodriguez suffers from several of the flaws that Esquivel

- Quintana has revealed in Restrepo . Like Restrepo

, Rodriguez

- Rodriguez hinged on an “expansi[ve]” view of § 1101(a)( 43)(A), see 22 I. & N. Dec. at 994, one that ignored multiple pieces of evidence “suggest[ing] that sexual abuse of a minor encompasses only especially21 As a result , I cannot agree this is simply a matter of “ Chevron deference [’s] [being] unnecessary in one specific instance” and not in another, Maj. Op. 12

. The Court’s analysis in Esquivel

- Quintana not only implicate s , but directly undermine s , everything we said and did in Restrepo

. That is more than enough to “‘undercut the decisional basis’ of Restrepo ,” id. at

12

– 13 (quoting West v. Keve , 721 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1983)), and accordingly we are not bound b y that decision’s suggestion that we must uncritically defer to § 3509(a)(8) in all case s involving § 1101(a)(43)(A).

egregious felonies,” Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1570. And, again like Restrepo

, Rodriguez

- Rodriguez seems to have

reverse

- engineered the generic federal definition to fit the state offense, see 22 I. & N. Dec. at 995

– 96, thereby “turn[ing] the categorical approach on its head,” Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at 1570. Although it is possible that Rodriguez

- Rodrig uez ’s

bottom

- line conclusion, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 993, that “sexual abuse of a minor” encompasses non

- contact indecent exposure offenses was correct, future panels of this Court faced with genuine ambiguity may have to decide whether Rodriguez

- Rodriguez off

ers up a reasonable interpretation. If so , they will

also have to confront the fact that Rodriguez

- Rodriguez looked to § 3509(a)(8) only as a “guide,” id. at 996, and only in one specific context. Cf., e.g.

, Amos v. Lynch , 790 F.3d 512, 520 (4th Cir. 201 5) (holding that Rodriguez

- Rodriguez is not entitled to deference “[b]eyond [its] limited holding” on indecent exposure offenses).22 II.

My learned colleague s view the idea that Restrepo ’s deference to Rodriguez

- Rodriguez survives Esquivel

- Quintana as something of a fait accompli, which we and other C ourts of

A ppeals have already decided. In my view, neither we nor, with one exception, any other circuit has reached that conclusion , and in fact most of our sister circuits’ case law suggests

we must revisit Restrepo in light of Esquivel

- Quintana

.

A.

Relying on Mondragon

- Gonzalez v. Attorney General

, 884 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2018), the Majority infers, as a general matter, that “we have already taken the position

. . . that Esquivel

- Quintana speaks speci fically to the question of statutory rape, not more broadly to the definition of the generic offense

of sexual abuse of a minor.” Maj. Op. 15

. I do not believe Mondragon

- Gonzalez sweeps so broadly; indeed, that case did

not involve the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor”

at all.

In Mondragon

- Gonzalez , the issue was whether the petitioner’s Pennsylvania conviction of unlawful contact with a

minor constituted a “crime of child abuse” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 884 F.3d at 157. After Esquivel

- Quintana

came down, the petitioner argued that “a child for purposes

of

. . . the term ‘crime of child abuse’ means some one under the age of 16,” and not (as the BIA had concluded ) anyone under eighteen

. See id. at 160

. In rejecting that argument, we emphasized Esquivel

- Quintana ’s limits, noting that the Court had addressed only the “sexual abuse of a minor” aggravated felony provision. Id. Unsurprisingly , we concluded that “ Esquivel

- Quintana has no a pplication

. . . at all,” id.

, in a case23 turning on the meaning of the word “child” in the statutory phrase “crime of child abuse

. ” There is little that is “notable,” Maj. Op. 15 n.6 , in that decision; to the contrary, the surprise

would have been if a panel addressing an entirely unrelated INA provision had launched into an unnecessary analysis of

whether Esquivel

- Quintana had abrogated unrelated precedent.

Because n othing in Mondragon

- Gonzalez addressed the effect of Esquivel

- Quintana ’s reasoning on Re strepo ’s statutory analysis

, t hat issue remains open in our Circuit

.

B.

To the extent we may draw wisdom from our sister circuits, they generally favor revisiting Restrepo ’s deference to Rodriguez

- Rodriguez in the aftermath of Esquivel

- Quintana

.

Many of th ose circuits reject outright the notion that Rodriguez

- Rodriguez is entitled to deference. Several reached that

conclusion before Esquivel

- Quintana

. S ee Estrada

- Espinoza v. Mukasey , 546 F.3d 1147, 1157

– 58 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that Rodriguez

- Rodriguez , which looked to § 3509(a)(8) only as a “guide” and which did not identify defined elements of the generic federal offense, did not set down a definitive interpretation entitled to Chevron defer ence)

, overruled on other grounds by United States v. Aguila

- Montes de

Oca , 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ; Amos v. Lynch

, 790 F.3d 512, 519

– 20 (4th Cir. 2015) (following Estrada

- Espinoza ); Rangel

- Perez v. Lynch , 816 F.3d 591, 598

– 601 (10th

Cir. 20 16) (same)

, abrogated in other part by Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. 1562 ; see also Contreras v. Holder , 754 F.3d 286, 292

– 93 (5th Cir. 2014) (suggesting that Rodriguez

-24 Rodriguez ’s definition may “not [be] a reasonable one”)

. A nother has implicitly joined the fold since

. S ee Garcia

- Urbano v. Sessions , 890 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting that the BIA has “interpreted the phrase [‘sexual abuse of a minor’] through case

- by

- case adjudication,” not a definitive interpretation). I n the Fourth, Fif

th, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, therefore, there is simply no Restrepo analog for those courts

to re consider after Esquivel

- Quintana

.

And in the few circuits with a Restrepo analog

— the Second, see Mugalli v. Ashcroft , 258 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2001 ), Sixth, see Esquivel

- Quintana v. Lynch , 810 F.3d 1019, 1026

– 27 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d in part , 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), and Seventh, see Velasco

- Giron v. Holder , 773 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014)

— t he reaction to Esquivel

- Quintana has been anything but uni form. To be sure, in Correa

- Diaz v. Sessions

, 881 F.3d 523 (7th Cir . 2018)

, the court adhered to pre

- Esquivel

- Quintana precedent deferring to Rodriguez

- Rodriguez

, reasoning that the Supreme Court’s decision made Chevron deference inappropriate only “as to [the] one precise question” presented there

. Id. at 527

– 28. So the Seventh Circuit, at least, is firmly in the Majority’s camp.

The same cannot be said , though , for the Second Circuit.

In Acevedo v. Barr , 943 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2019), the court noted that although Esquivel

- Quintana “avoided any issue of

Chevron deference with respect to

. . . § 3509(a)(8)” as to the issue before it, “it also did not foreclose th e BIA’s use of that statute in other instances,” and thus circuit precedent deferring

to Rodriguez

- Rodriguez “survives Esquivel

- Quintana .” Id. at
623. That is fair

, as far as it goes

. But Acevedo then sidestepped § 3509(a)(8) altogether and instead perf ormed a wide

-25ranging analysis of “the structure of the INA, the inherent egregious nature of an aggravated felony, and closely

- related statutes, ” id. at 624

— including § 2243, which Esquivel

- Quintana

had cited and which Rodriguez

- Rodriguez had rejected. In essence, ongoing deference to Rodriguez

- Rodriguez was more honored in the breach than in the observance.

The Sixth Circuit’s view is yet unclear. But in Keeley v.

Whitaker , 910 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2018), a case involving the nearby aggravated felony of “rape,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A),

the court showed both sensitivity to the need for rigorous statutory analysis and reluctance to give unwarranted deference to

the BIA. It r ejected the BIA’s interpretation that “rape” includes digital penetration, reasoning that the BIA had given short shrift to statutory language in order to sweep more state
laws into the aggravated felony category. See Keeley , 910 F.3d

at 883

– 84. That criticism echoe d Esquivel

- Quintana ’s caution that the government cannot “turn[] the categorical approach on its head by defining the generic federal offense

. . . as whateveris illegal under the particular law of the State where the defendant was convict ed,” 137 S. Ct. at 1570. And, as in Esquivel

Quintana

, Keeley found “no need” to resort to Chevron deference after fully exhausting the tools of statutory construction.

910 F.3d at 885

– 86 (citation omitted). So a lthough Rodriguez

Rodriguez ’s vitality in the Sixth Circuit is uncertain

, Keeley arguably laid the groundwork for independent statutory interpretation beyond § 3509(a)(8).

To review: The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Correa

- Diaz

, to date, remains an outlier. Of the three C ourts of A ppeals to

ha ve followed Restrepo ’s path before Esquivel

- Quintana , one has stayed the course; another has swept § 3509(a)(8) to the26 side; and the third has yet to return to the issue but has signaled a muscular view of courts’ responsibility to engage in statutory

inte rpretation before deferring to the BIA. And in five other circuits, Rodriguez

- Rodriguez commands no deference at all. That is the conclusion compelled by Esquivel

- Quintana in this

context and the position we should adopt today.

III.

To follow the course the Court has charted, we must assess § 1101(a)(43)(A) through the lens of “the least of the acts criminalized by the state statute

. ” Esquivel

- Quintana , 137 S. Ct. at

1568. The Majority does so by focusing on the fact that involuntary deviate sexu al intercourse under Pennsylvania law has

a minimum mens rea of recklessness as to the proscribed sexual conduct. 6 18 Pa. C.S.A. § § 3101, 3123(a)(7); see i d.

6 Although I take no issue with this approach, I note another feature of the Pennsylvania offense: that it can be committed

b y “penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of another person with a foreign object for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101 ; see id. § 3123(a) . That feature sets Pennsylvani a law apart from that of other states, almost all of which define such inappropriate sexual contact in terms of a specific “intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade a person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of a person.” E.g.

, Alaska

Stat. § 26.05.890( h )(5) (B) ; accord Ala. Code § 13A

- 6

- 60(3); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13

- 1419(D)(1) (a) ; Ark. Code Ann. § 5

- 14

- 101( 11); Cal. Penal Code § 288(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18

- 6

- 403(2)(c); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a

- 65(3); Del. Code Ann.

tit. 11, § 1356(4); D.C. Code § 22

- 3001(9); Fla. Stat. § 827.071(1)(h); Ga. Code Ann. § 16

- 6

- 4(a)(1); Haw. Rev.27 Stat. § 712

- 1210; Idaho Code § 18

- 1507(1)(c); 720 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/11

- 0.1; Ind. Code § 35

- 42

- 4

- 3(b); Iowa Code § 709.8(1); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21

- 5506(a) (1) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.010(7); La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81(A); Me. Stat. tit. 17

- A, § 251(1)(C)(3); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3

- 301(d)(1)(v); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145c(1)(g); Miss. Code Ann. § 97

- 5

- 23(1); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.010(6); Mont. Code

Ann. § 45

- 5

- 701(9); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28

- 318(5); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.520 (4)

– (5) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632

- A:1(IV); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14

- 1(d); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(3); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14

- 202.1(a) (1) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1

- 20

- 02(5); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.01(B ); Okla. Stat. tit. 44, § 920(F)(1)(c); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.305(6); 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11

- 37

- 1(7); S.C. Code Ann. § 16

- 3

- 655(C); S.D. Codified Laws § 22

- 22

- 7.1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39

- 15

- 501( 13 ); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.01(2); Utah C ode Ann. § 76

- 5

- 404.1(2); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 2602(a)(1); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2

- 67.10(6); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.010(2); W. Va. Code § 61

- 8B

- 1(6); Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5) (a) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 2

- 301(a)(vii)(A); see 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101 (defining “[i ]ndecent

contact” as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person”); id. § 3126(a)(8) (criminalizing indecent contact by certain defendants with a “complainant

. . . less than 16 years of age”); see also 9 Guam Code Ann. § 25.10(a)(8); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1699(d). And m any of our sister circuits, interpreting § 1101(a)(43)(A) or similarly worded sentencing enhancements, have concluded that “sexual

abuse , co nsistent with its common meaning, connotes the use or treatment of so as to injure, hurt, or damage for the purpose28 § 302(c). I t concludes, quite rightly, that the generic federal offense of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires knowledge as to
the sexual conduct. Under our precedent, this facial difference in the elements of the state and generic federal offenses

of sexual or libidinal gratification.” E.g.

, United States v. Mateen , 806 F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).

I therefore w ould approach this case by asking two questions: (i) whether “sexual abuse of a minor,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), in the context of a statute criminalizing de

minimis penetration with a foreign object, requires a n intent to humiliate, harass, degrade

, or arouse or gratify the libidinal desire of any person; and, if so, (ii) whether Pennsylvania’s

carveout for “good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures

, ” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101, is sufficiently broad or instead leaves less culpable conduct subject to prosecution, cf.,

e.g. , Alaska Code § 11.81.900(b)(61)(B) (excluding from the definition of “sexual contact” acts “that may reasonably be

construed to be norma l caretaker responsibilities for a child” or

that are “performed for the purpose of administering a recognized and lawful form of treatment that is reasonably adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the person being

treated ”); Ariz. Rev. Stat . § 13

- 140 1 (A) (3)(b) (excluding from the definition of “sexual contact” any “ direct or indirect touching or manipulating during caretaking responsibilities, or interactions with a minor or vulnerable adult that an objective, reasonable person would recogni ze as normal and reasonable under the circumstances ”). Still, I join the Majority in analyzing the Pennsylvania statute through the lens of the more general mens rea requirement and leave for another day the question of any libidinal

- gratification

- or

- degr adation requirement.29 “leave[s] nothing to the ‘legal imagi nation,’” Zhi Fei Liao v. Att’y Gen. , 910 F.3d 714, 724 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas

-

Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)), and, because

the state offense sweeps in less culpable conduct than the generic federal offense , our categorical approach analysis is at an

end. Again, I agree in all respects. See supra 1 & n.1.

We part company on the basis for concluding that § 1101(a)(43)(A) contains a knowledge requirement, a conclusion my esteemed colleague s view as consistent with ongoing fealty to Restrepo

. Although this approach mirrors the Second

Circuit’s in Acevedo , I find it unconvincing. In my view, that conclusion is more consistent with the open

- ended statutory

construction that Esquivel

- Quintana demands than it is with

the reflexive deference that Restrepo calls for.

The key analytical move in Acevedo is that § 3509(a)(8)

“does not

. . . provide guidance as to the mens rea a defendant must possess.” 943 F.3d at 623

– 2 4; accord Maj. Op. 16 (“Section 3509(a)(8) does not specify a mens rea requirement, and we cannot defer to a nullity

. . . .”) ; id. at 19 (asserting that § 3509(a)(8) addre sses “the contours of the substance of the offense” but not “the necessary mental state”) ; id. at 18 n.7 (again asserting that “§ 3509(a)(8) fails to provide the necessary guidance”)

. There are two things to note about that analytical move. First, it recognizes what many of our sister circuits have acknowledged: that Rodriguez

- Rodriguez did not adopt § 3509(a)(8) “as a definitive standard or definition ” in interpreting “sexual abuse of a minor” in all cases. Amos

, 790 F.3d at 519

– 20 (quotin g Rodriguez

- Rodriguez , 22 I. & N.

Dec. at 996); see Rangel

- Perez

, 816 F.3d at 601 (holding that § 3509(a)(8) is not “the exclusive touchstone for defining the30 INA’s generic ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ [offense]”). Rather, § 3509(a)(8) is merely “a guide,” Rodriguez

- Rodriguez , 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996, and not a comprehensive one. At very least, therefore, Restre

p o ’s statement that “we will define sexual abuse of a minor by reference to § 3509(a),” 617 F.3d at 796, is not as absolute as it may seem , and ther e may be times when § 3509(a)(8) offers limited guidance or no guidance at all

. See

id. at 796 n.10 (recognizing that § 3509 is only “a guide” (citation omitted)).

Second, Acevedo ’s analytical mov e begs the question

whether the lack of language on mens rea in § 3509(a)(8) reflects open

- ended silence on the required mental state

— rather than, say, an indication that the definition has no required mental state. Answering that question is ultimately a matter of statutory interpretation, 7 b ut Acevedo assume s it away. I n my view, the reason it does so is plain: “Given the inherent seriousness of an aggravated felony and the harsh immigration consequences that come from that categorization”

— not to mention other indications of statutory meani ng, including the “closely related” provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2243

— it is simply

untenable that a ny mens rea less than knowledge could form part of the generic federal definition. Acevedo , 943 F.3d at

7 It might, for instance, depend on the extent to which “‘mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent’ [can] be read ‘as dispensing with it,’” United

States v. Elonis , 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) ( citatio n omitted )

— an issue further complicated by whether § 3509(a)

counts as a “criminal enactment” and whether recklessness can be read into such an enactment, see id. at 2012 (reserving this question).31 624. And because § 3509(a)(8) does not require knowledge, it

is cast aside as not “provid[ing] guidance.” Id. at 623. That approach may allow for avoiding an impression of revisiting a prior panel decision in light of intervening precedent, but it

does so at the cost of lo gical coherence.

To be clear, I take no issue with the Majority’s statutoryanalysis, which cogently explains why “sexual abuse of a minor , ” read in context, unambiguously embodies a knowledge requirement. But I would ground that analysis in an acknowledg ment that at least here, deferring to Rodriguez

- Rodriguez is inappropriate and, to the extent Restrepo suggests otherwise , it is no longer good law.

IV.

For now , Restrepo limps on

. Yet there may come a day when the conflict between § 3509(a)(8) and other sources of statutory meaning is less easily avoided. Should that day come, I would recognize that § 3509(a)(8) is but one of many

sources we must consider in analyzing, using all th e tools of statutory construction at our disposal, whether a particular aspect of § 1101(a)(43)(A) is ambiguous

.