THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

William C. (Billy) Sellers, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2021-000910 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Edgefield County 

Eugene C. Griffith Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 28188 

Heard March 30, 2023 – Filed January 17, 2024 

AFFIRMED 

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of 

Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney 

General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy 

Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Senior 

Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, of 

Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard III, of 

Lexington, all for Respondent. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUSTICE FEW: The court of appeals affirmed Billy Sellers' conviction for murder 

arising from the brutal killing of Johnny Hydrick. We granted Sellers' petition for a 

writ of certiorari to address two questions. First, did the trial court's jury instruction 

defining malice in part as "the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause 

or excuse" shift the burden of proof to Sellers to provide justification or excuse for 

his wrongful acts, or was that portion of the instruction otherwise contrary to law. 

Second, did the State present evidence to support the trial court instructing the jury 

as to Sellers' criminal liability under the doctrine of "the hand of one is the hand of 

all." We affirm the court of appeals. 

I. Background 

Johnny Hydrick—disabled from a car accident—was widely known in his 

hometown of Trenton, South Carolina, to keep large supplies of Oxycodone on hand 

to alleviate the pain associated with his disability. Hydrick often illegally sold 

Oxycodone to others, including Sellers. At trial, the State presented strong evidence 

Sellers personally murdered Hydrick in his home on October 10, 2014, during the 

course of burglarizing his home and robbing him of Oxycodone, guns, and cash. A 

pathologist testified the cause of death was "multiple blunt-force injuries" to the head 

"due to a beating." While the State's primary theory was Sellers personally beat 

Hydrick to death,1 the State presented the alternative theory Sellers was guilty under 

the doctrine the hand of one is the hand of all because he and a man named "Gee" 

agreed to carry out the burglary and robbery, during the course of which Gee beat 

Hydrick to death or did so jointly with Sellers. 

The jury convicted Sellers of murder. Because Sellers had a prior conviction from 

Florida for burglary of a dwelling while armed with a deadly weapon, "an offense 

that would be classified as a most serious offense" under subsection 17-25-45(C)(1) 

of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2023), the trial court was required to sentence 

him to life in prison without the possibility of parole pursuant to subsection 17-25-

45(A)(1) (2014). The court of appeals' opinion affirming the conviction is 

unpublished. State v. Sellers, Op. No. 2021-UP-254 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 7, 

2021). 

1 Because the strength of the State's evidence that Sellers personally beat Hydrick to 

death is not an issue on appeal, we do not discuss most of that evidence. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

II. Malice Jury Instruction 

Sellers contends that, by including the language "the intentional doing of a wrongful 

act without just cause or excuse" in the definition of malice in its jury charge, the 

trial court violated his due process rights by shifting the burden to him to prove he 

acted with just cause or excuse. We begin our discussion of Sellers' burden-shifting 

argument by pointing out the trial court gave the jury a thorough and complete 

instruction on the State's burden of proving "all of the elements, each of them, 

beyond a reasonable doubt." Among multiple specific references in its jury charge 

to the State's burden of proof, the trial court instructed the jury that "to sustain a 

conviction for murder the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the 

defendant killed another person with malice . . . ." The trial court then defined 

malice "as hatred, ill will, hostility toward another person. It is the intentional doing 

of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse . . . ." 

Under the State's clearly-articulated burden of proof and the trial court's definition 

of malice, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sellers 

acted "without just cause or excuse." Thus, we find the trial court's jury instruction 

on malice could not have been reasonably interpreted by the jury as shifting the 

burden of proof to Sellers. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 99 S. Ct. 

2450, 2456, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 47 (1979) (analyzing whether a jury instruction violated 

the Due Process Clause because of improper burden shifting as whether "a 

reasonable jury could well have interpreted" the instruction to relieve the State of its 

burden of proof); see also State v. Bell, 305 S.C. 11, 19, 406 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1991) 

(holding a jury instruction defining malice as "the doing of a wrongful act 

intentionally and without just cause or excuse" was not "an unconstitutional burdenshifting" instruction). 

Sellers also argues the malice instruction was "needlessly confusing" and violated 

"this Court's modern pattern of disapproving of jury instructions on how the jury 

should interpret certain evidence." On this point, the court of appeals stated, 

We understand Sellers' argument that a reasonable jury 

could apply the phrase equating malice with "intentional 

doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" in 

problematic ways. We are not sure what the challenged 

phrase adds to a malice charge and can see the wisdom in 

not charging it. We are also not sure how a wrongful act 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

can be said to be done with malice if all that is proven is 

that the act was done with intent . . . . Nor are we sure how 

an intentional act that is justified or excusable by law 

could be a crime. 

Sellers, Op. No. 2021-UP-254, at 2-3. 

Instructing a jury on any point of law is difficult, but it can be particularly so on the 

principle of malice. In some cases, such as where there is evidence the defendant 

acted in self-defense, it is true the State must prove the defendant acted without just 

cause or excuse. See State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011) 

(holding "when a defendant claims self-defense, the State is required to disprove the 

elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt"). Here, however, there was no 

evidence of self-defense or any other legal justification for the killing of Hydrick. 

The only question in this case was whether it was Sellers who committed the crime. 

Thus, like the court of appeals, we question what the phrase "without just cause or 

excuse" added to the jury's understanding of the legal principle of malice. While we 

caution our trial courts to carefully consider whether to include any phrase in a jury 

instruction, however, we do not believe the phrase "without just cause or excuse" in 

this case could have caused the jury to be confused, nor could have improperly 

guided the jury on how to interpret specific evidence. We find no error. 

In his brief to the court of appeals, Sellers argued for the first time the trial court did 

not connect the phrase "the intentional doing of a wrongful act" to an act that 

proximately caused Hydrick's death. He argued the jury instruction could thus lead 

the jury to conclude the State proved malice merely by showing Sellers engaged in 

the "wrongful act" of buying or selling drugs, burglarizing Hydrick's home, or 

robbing Hydrick, unless Sellers showed "just cause or excuse" for those acts. "There 

was," counsel wrote in his brief to this Court, "a variety of . . . unlawful or wrongful 

acts that this jury instruction impermissibly called upon [Sellers] to show 'just cause 

or excuse' for . . . ." At oral argument before this Court, Sellers argued for the first 

time—in connection with the hand of one is the hand of all—the instruction 

permitted the jury to find the State proved Sellers' malice merely by showing another 

person committed one of these wrongful acts. 

Neither of these arguments is preserved for appellate review, however, as neither 

argument was presented to the trial court. See State v. Field, 429 S.C. 578, 582, 840 

S.E.2d 548, 550 (2020) ("As we have repeatedly held, 'A party need not use the exact 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that the argument 

has been presented on that ground. A party may not argue one ground at trial and 

an alternate ground on appeal.'" (quoting State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 

S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003))). 

III. The Hand of One is the Hand of All Jury Charge 

Ordinarily, the State convicts a defendant of a crime by proving that he personally 

committed the criminal act. As discussed above, the State's primary theory in this 

case was Sellers committed the murder by personally beating Hydrick to death. 

Under the doctrine we refer to in South Carolina as "the hand of one is the hand of 

all," the State proves the defendant guilty by proving he had a mutual plan or 

agreement with another person to commit one crime, and during the course of 

committing that initial crime, the other person committed a second crime they had 

not agreed to commit. State v. Harry, 420 S.C. 290, 299, 803 S.E.2d 272, 276 

(2017); see also Butler v. State, 435 S.C. 96, 97-98, 866 S.E.2d 347, 348 (2021) 

("Under the theory the 'hand of one is the hand of all,' when two people join together 

to commit a crime, and during the commission of that crime one of the two commits 

another crime, both may be criminally liable for the unplanned crime if it was a 

natural and probable consequence of their common plan to commit the initial 

crime."). In this case, the State's alternative theory was that Sellers and Gee mutually 

planned to burglarize Hydrick's home and rob him of Oxycodone, guns, or cash, and 

while the two of them were carrying out those initial crimes, either Gee beat Hydrick 

to death or the two of them mutually beat Hydrick to death. 

In most cases in which the State attempts to convict a defendant of murder under the 

hand of one doctrine, the factual scenario involves a gunshot, not a beating. In such 

a typical case, two or more people agreed to commit the initial crime, and during the 

course of that crime a person who is not the defendant shot and killed a victim. This 

typical scenario is that one of them—not both of them—fired the shot that killed the 

victim. In cases where the evidence is clear the other person—not the defendant— 

fired the fatal shot, the hand of one doctrine clearly applies and the trial court will 

instruct the jury on the doctrine without hesitation. In many cases, however, the 

evidence is not clear as to one of three points: (1) whether there was a mutual plan 

or agreement, (2) whether the person who might have fired the fatal shot was part of 

that plan or agreement, or (3) whether the other person in the plan or agreement is 

the person who fired the fatal shot. If the evidence is unclear as to any one of these 
 

 

 

points, it can be quite difficult for the trial court to determine whether to instruct the 

jury on the hand of one doctrine. 

As to the first point, the trial court must determine whether there is any evidence the 

defendant had a mutual plan or agreement with another person to commit an initial 

crime. In Harry, for example, the propriety of the hand of one jury instruction 

depended on whether the State presented evidence the defendant agreed with the 

others in his group to use illegal force if that force became necessary to retrieve his 

television. Compare 420 S.C. at 300, 803 S.E.2d at 277 (majority concluding "the 

evidence yielded a reasonable series of inferences . . . that Petitioner devised a plan 

to retrieve, by force if necessary, his television from Victim" and, "The State 

therefore presented sufficient evidence that Petitioner was engaged in a scheme to 

commit an illegal act, the result of which was Victim's shooting death"), with 420 

S.C. at 301, 803 S.E.2d at 278 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (concluding "the record 

contains no evidence of an illegal plan"). 

As to the second point, the trial court must determine whether there is any evidence 

the other person who might have fired the fatal shot was a person included in the 

mutual plan or agreement to commit the initial crime. In State v. Washington, 431 

S.C. 394, 848 S.E.2d 779 (2020), for example, there was evidence another person— 

Kinloch—joined together with the defendant to harass and assault Manigault (the 

initial crime), and there was evidence another person—not the defendant—fired the 

shot that killed Manigault. 431 S.C. at 406-07, 848 S.E.2d at 785-86. But there was 

no evidence Kinloch fired the shot, 431 S.C. at 409, 848 S.E.2d at 787, and there 

was no evidence the other person who might have fired the shot was part of the 

agreement to commit the initial crime, 431 S.C. at 407, 848 S.E.2d at 786. This 

Court found the hand of one jury instruction should not have been given because 

"there was no evidence Kinloch shot Manigault," 431 S.C. at 409, 848 S.E.2d at 787, 

and "Kinloch is the only possible person who could fall into the category of 

Petitioner's accomplice," 431 S.C. at 407, 848 S.E.2d at 786. 

The third point requires the trial court to determine whether there is evidence the 

defendant fired the fatal shot and evidence the person with whom the defendant had 

a mutual plan or agreement is the person who fired the fatal shot. In Barber v. State, 

393 S.C. 232, 712 S.E.2d 436 (2011), for example, three witnesses testified the 

defendant shot two victims, killing one. 393 S.C. at 234-35, 712 S.E.2d at 438. 

However, the trial court also instructed the jury it may find the defendant guilty on 

the alternative "hand of one" theory that one of his co-defendants was the gunman. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

393 S.C. at 235, 712 S.E.2d at 438. The defendant argued on appeal there was no 

evidence a co-defendant was the person who fired the fatal shot, and thus the trial 

court erred by charging the hand of one theory. See 393 S.C. at 237, 712 S.E.2d at 

439 (stating "the question is whether there is any evidence that another coconspirator was the shooter"). 

Barber is the classic example of this third type of case because there was evidence 

the defendant fired the shot, but the question was whether there was also evidence 

the other person fired the shot. This is the scenario in which we said the "alternate 

theory of liability may only be charged when the evidence is equivocal on some 

integral fact." 393 S.C. at 236, 712 S.E.2d at 439. In other words, Barber requires 

the trial court to determine whether—in addition to evidence the defendant fired the 

shot—there is any evidence the person with whom he agreed to commit the initial 

crime fired the shot. By stating the evidence must be "equivocal," we simply meant 

the evidence must support both alternative theories as to which person was the 

shooter. If all the evidence indicates the defendant was the only shooter, the hand 

of one theory must not be charged. 

This case is unlike Harry, Washington, and Barber because determining whether it 

was proper to charge the hand of one doctrine here requires addressing all three 

points—whether there was evidence (1) Sellers mutually agreed with Gee to 

burglarize Hydrick's home and rob him, (2) Gee participated with Sellers in the 

burglary and the robbery, and (3) Gee administered a fatal blow to Hydrick during 

the beating. 

We turn, therefore, to the testimony and evidence the State introduced at trial, and 

begin with the testimony of several inmates Sellers met while incarcerated at the 

Edgefield County jail awaiting trial. Dennis Amerson testified he did not know 

Sellers before meeting him during "rec" time when they were let out of their cells 

for one hour a day. Sellers told Amerson he and two of his friends were "scrapping 

metal" across the street from Hydrick's house earlier on the day the murder occurred. 

Sellers told Amerson he tied up the victim and beat him, and that some pills and 

other items were stolen from the victim. As to the stolen items, Sellers told Amerson 

"they had got [sic] rid of them." 

Phillip Griffin testified he and Sellers were cellmates beginning with Griffin's arrest 

on November 21, 2014, and Sellers started talking about the charges against him. At 

first, Griffin testified, Sellers denied he committed the crime. As they continued 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

talking, however, "His story would change a little bit and he kind of started putting 

himself involved in the case." Griffin testified Sellers' story "got to the point to 

where he told me that he actually went out there to commit a robbery," and then "him 

and a friend . . . drove down Highway 19 to go to the guy's house and they was [sic] 

going to pull a lick and rob him." Griffin then explained "pull a lick" meant, "They 

were going to rob him or steal." Sellers told Griffin he knew Hydrick "just got his 

prescriptions filled and [Sellers] was gonna [sic] go get his pills. If he had any 

money, [Sellers] wanted it too." Griffin then summarized what Sellers told him, 

They were in his van and they drove down 19 and went 

close to his house, like an abandoned lot about a hundred, 

a hundred and fifty yards away from where Johnny lived 

and that's where they parked and they went to his house. 

They parked there. They went to his house and they taped 

him up and was asking him where the pills were and they 

were pistol-whipping him until he told them where the 

pills were. 

When asked whom Sellers said he was with, Griffin testified Sellers said "a guy 

named Gee." 

Wesley Brown testified he and Sellers were cellmates after Brown was arrested in 

January 2015. Sellers initially told Brown he had an alibi. Brown testified that after 

he told Sellers the supposed alibi witness was a close friend of Brown's, "I guess he 

lightened up a little bit, like he felt like he could trust me a little more." As they 

continued to talk, Sellers described committing the crime with "some other person" 

he did not name. Sellers told Brown, "We did it with a .38." Brown also testified 

Sellers told him that sometime after Hydrick's murder "a guy named Gee" was using 

Sellers' phone and "while he was using [Sellers'] phone, he was putting text messages 

or something in his phone, I mean, I guess to make it look like [Sellers] did it." 

The State called Jeremy Hembree, an investigator with the Aiken Department of 

Public Safety, who testified he performed a "phone extraction" to download all the 

data from Sellers' phone on November 6, 2014, one week after the Edgefield County 

Sheriff's Department arrested Sellers for Hydrick's murder. Investigator Hembree 

testified Sellers' phone records showed multiple calls the evening of the murder to a 

contact in Sellers' phone named Gee. Investigator Hembree testified, however, that 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

when he did another phone extraction of Sellers' phone just before trial, the "Gee" 

contact had been deleted, along with all calls and text messages to and from Gee. 

We find this evidence supports the trial court's decision to charge the hand of one 

doctrine to the jury. First, Sellers' statement to Griffin was specific that he and Gee 

agreed to jointly enter Hydrick's home for the purpose of robbing him. This 

statement is supported by the fact Sellers made phone calls to Gee just before the 

crime and deleted Gee's contact information from his phone after he was arrested. 

Second, Sellers' statement to Griffin was specific that he and Gee jointly tied up 

Hydrick and pistol-whipped him to accomplish the robbery. This statement is 

further supported by Sellers' telling Brown "we" did it with a .38 caliber pistol and 

his telling Amerson "they" had gotten rid of the items stolen from Hydrick. Thus, 

there is evidence Gee was part of Sellers' criminal plan. 

Finally, as to the third point, unlike in Barber and other cases, the State was not 

required to offer evidence Gee killed Hydrick instead of Sellers doing so. Rather, 

the evidence they jointly beat Hydrick supports the State's position that either one or 

both of them could have administered the fatal blow or blows. Therefore, the Barber 

idea of "equivocal" evidence—which we applied in Barber because the shooting 

must have been done by one but not both of the co-defendants—is not applicable 

here. In addition, Sellers told Griffin that when Sellers left Hydrick's home, Hydrick 

was still alive. This statement clearly supports an inference it was Gee who delivered 

the final or fatal blows to Hydrick after Sellers left the crime scene. 

Thus, if the jury believed Griffin's testimony about what Sellers told him, or if it 

believed Amerson's and Brown's testimony, then it could find Sellers guilty based 

on Gee's actions beating Hydrick during the burglary and robbery the two of them 

agreed to commit without speculating and without having to rely on finding evidence 

to be not credible. See Washington, 431 S.C. at 411, 848 S.E.2d at 788 (reversing 

because the hand of one charge "invited the jury to speculate"); 431 S.C. at 409, 848 

S.E.2d at 787 (holding "an alternate theory of liability may not be charged to a jury 

'merely on the theory the jury may believe some of the evidence and disbelieve other 

evidence'" (quoting Barber, 393 S.C. at 236, 712 S.E.2d at 438)). 

IV. Conclusion 
 

 

Because the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury on the State's burden of proof, 

the phrase "intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" did not 

shift the State's burden of proof or confuse the jury. Because the State presented 

evidence Sellers agreed with Gee to commit the burglary and robbery and evidence 

both Sellers and Gee beat Hydrick during the course of the two initial crimes, the 

hand of one jury instruction was supported by the evidence. 

AFFIRMED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Stephanie P. 

McDonald, concur.