UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Margaret Patrisso

v. Case No. 08-cv-482-PB

Opinion No. 2010 DNH 002

School Administrative Unit #59- 

Winnisquam Regional School District

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Margaret Patrisso has sued School Administrative Unit #59-

Winnisquam Regional School District (“Winnisquam”) for damages

resulting from alleged sexual, physical, emotional, and mental

abuse by its employee, Walter Garland, that allegedly occurred

while she was a student at Winnisquam between 1978 and 1982. 

Winnisquam argues in a motion to dismiss that Patrisso’s claims

are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. I deny

Winnisquam’s motion for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

Patrisso enrolled as a freshman at Winnisquam in the fall of

1978, when she was fourteen years old. (Compl., Doc. No. 1,

¶ 8.) Garland, a Biology and Ecology teacher at Winnisquam,

allegedly began to “sexually, emotionally, and mentally” abuse

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Patrisso shortly thereafter. (Id. ¶ 7, 9.) The alleged abuse 1

started with flirtation, but “quickly progressed” to kissing,

fondling of Patrisso’s breasts, masturbation, oral sex, and

vaginal sexual intercourse. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) These acts of

alleged abuse took place in Garland’s car while it was parked on

the Winnisquam campus and during rides to and from school, as

well as in Garland’s classroom, in Garland’s office, and in other

rooms of the Winnisquam science wing, often during school hours. 

(Id. ¶ 11.) The alleged abuse “continued unabated” until 1982. 

(Id. ¶ 12.) 

In the fall of 2008, another former Winnisquam student

contacted Patrisso, and informed her that she too had been abused

by Garland in the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Id. ¶ 13.) Upon

further investigation, Patrisso also learned that a Winnisquam

student had allegedly reported to administrators in the late

1970s or early 1980s that he/she had observed Garland having

sexual contact with a female student, but that the administration

did nothing in response. (Id. ¶ 14.) Patrisso has sued

 Patrisso’s complaint does not specify whether she was 1

enrolled in one of Garland’s classes, though it does assert that

Garland used his “position of trust and authority, arising solely

and directly from his position as an employee of [Winnisquam]” to

facilitate the abuse. (Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶ 9.)

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Winnisquam on the basis of the information that she acquired in

the fall of 2008, alleging that, despite Winnisquam’s actual or

constructive knowledge that Garland was sexually abusing its

minor students, it failed to protect those students (Count I),

failed to warn its students that Garland posed a safety risk

(Count II), failed to exercise reasonable care in the hiring,

training, supervision and retention of its employees (Count III),

caused Patrisso to suffer severe mental and emotional harm and

distress and bodily injury (Count IV), breached the fiduciary

duty that it owed to its students (Count V), and is vicariously

liable for Garland’s conduct (Count VI). (See id. ¶¶ 24-59.) 

Winnisquam alleges in a motion to dismiss that Patrisso’s

claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, New

Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (“RSA”) § 508:4-g. (See

Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 12);

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-g (2009). In response, Patrisso

invokes New Hampshire’s “discovery rule” and argues that she

could not have reasonably discovered that her injury was caused

by the negligent acts or omissions of Winnisquam until she

learned in the fall of 2008 that another student had complained

to Winnisquam administrators about Garland’s conduct. (See Pl.’s

Mem. of Law in Supp. of Objection to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc.

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No. 14-2, at 1-2.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the

plaintiff must make factual allegations sufficient to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim meets this threshold

of plausibility where “the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In

deciding such a motion, the court must “accept the plaintiff’s

well-pleaded facts as true, viewing factual allegations in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Rederford v. U.S.

Airways, Inc., No. 09-1005, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 27258, *9 (1st

Cir. Dec. 14, 2009). Dismissal is appropriate only “if it

clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the

plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.” Nathan P. v. W.

Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted). The court’s task “is not to decide whether

the plaintiff ultimately will prevail but, rather, whether he is

entitled to undertake discovery in furtherance of the pleaded

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claim.” Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 13 (1st

Cir. 2004).

III. ANALYSIS

New Hampshire RSA § 508:4-g, which governs “Actions Based on

Sexual Assault and Related Offenses,” provides:

A person, alleging to have been subjected to any

offense under RSA 632-A or an offense under RSA 639:2,

who was under 18 years of age when the alleged offense

occurred, may commence a personal action based on the

incident within the later of:

I. Twelve years of the person’s eighteenth birthday; or

II. Three years of the time the plaintiff discovers,

or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have

discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to

the act or omission complained of.

§ 508:4-g. Patrisso argues that her claim is saved by the

discovery rule set forth in Section II.2

 The relevant statute of limitations that applied when 2

Patrisso was allegedly abused provided that a plaintiff had six

years from the time that her cause of action accrued to file a

claim. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4 (1983) (pre-1986

statute); Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 252 (1995). That

statute was also subject to a common law court rule under which a

cause of action did not accrue “until the plaintiff discover[ed]

or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have

discovered both the fact of his injury and the cause thereof.” 

Conrad, 140 N.H. at 252. Thus, under that statute, Patrisso

would have had six years from the time that she discovered both

her injury and the cause of her injury to file her claim. This

court has held that the six-year statute of limitations applies

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Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins

to run “when the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of

reasonable diligence should have discovered not only that he has

been injured but also that his injury may have been caused by the

defendant’s conduct.” McLean v. Gaudet, 769 F. Supp. 30, 30

(D.N.H. 1990) (citing Rowe v. John Deere, 130 N.H. 18, 21

(1987)). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that this is a

two-pronged rule 

requiring both prongs to be satisfied before the

statute of limitations begins to run. First, a

plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known

that it has been injured; and second, a plaintiff must

know or reasonably should have known that its injury

was proximately caused by conduct of the defendant. 

Big League Entm’t, Inc. v. Brox Indus., 149 N.H. 480, 485 (2003). 

There is no dispute in this case that Patrisso knew of her

injury long before 2008, when she claims that the statute of

in similar actions arising prior to July 1, 1986 where the

plaintiff did not discover the causal relationship between her

injury and the defendant’s conduct at the time that she was

allegedly abused. See Michaud v. McAnaney, 2007 DNH 118, 4-9. 

However, I need not decide whether Patrisso’s claims are subject

to the pre-1986 statute of limitations because Patrisso bases her

argument that her claim is saved by the discovery rule on facts

that she allegedly discovered less than three years before she

filed her complaint. If this assertion is correct, her claim

would be timely under either the pre-1986 statute or § 508:4-g. 

(See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Objection to Def.’s Mot. to

Dismiss, Doc. No. 14-2, at 1.) 

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limitations began to run. Thus, the only real issue is whether

she also knew or reasonably should have known of Winnisquam’s

causal role in her injury more than three years before she filed

her complaint. Winnisquam contends that a reasonable person in

Patrisso’s position would have conducted an investigation and

discovered Winnisquam’s alleged role in the sexual abuse soon

after she turned 18, but the applicability of the discovery rule

is not something that I can resolve at the present time. 

Although a statute of limitations issue may sometimes be resolved

through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court can grant a motion to

dismiss on limitations grounds only when the pleader’s

allegations leave no doubt that an asserted claim is timebarred.” Archdiocese of San Salvador v. FM Int’l, LLC, 2006 DNH

22, 8 (quoting Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de

Melicio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)). In this case, the

applicability of the discovery rule presents a question of fact

that cannot be resolved through a motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, I am in no position to grant Winnisquam the relief

it seeks. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, I deny Winnisquam’s motion

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to dismiss (Doc. No. 12).

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

January 5, 2010

cc: Peter Hutchins, Esq.

Cyrus F. Rilee, III, Esq.

John F. Teague, Esq.

Edward Kaplan, Esq.

William Pandolph, Esq.

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