# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 23 , 2022 *

Decided June 27 , 2022

Before

D IANE S. SYKES
, C hief Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER
, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2702

LAVALL T. LEE
, Plaintiff -Appellant ,

v

.

ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, et al.
, Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin

.

No. 19-C-614

William C. Griesbach , Judge

.

O R D E R
Lavall Lee sued a jail’s nurse and others over a half

- day delay in receiving an

exam to treat stomach pain and rectal problems when he was a pretrial detainee

. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants because Lee did not supply evidence suggesting that the defendants knew that faster care was required

. Because

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 21-2702 Page 2

Lee provided no basis for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the treatment he received violated the applicable constitutional norms, w e affirm.
In reviewing the entry of summary judgment, w e describe Lee’s medical care based on the record in the light most favorable to Lee. See Lockett v. Bonson , 937 F.3d 1016, 1022 (7th Cir. 2019). Lee experienced gastrointestinal troubles during his pretrial detention at the Milwaukee County Jail. H e focuses on the 24

- hour period beginning o n August 23, 2018, when he complained of stomach pain and blood in his stool. A nurse practitioner examined Lee and scheduled a follow

- up appointment for the afternoon of the next day. ( Medical records show that Brittany Wysocki, a nurse , also examined Lee

on August 23. C iting inconsistent time

- stamp s on the records, Lee dispu tes that the records correctly reflect that Wysocki treated him that day. )
The next morning, Lee wanted immediate treatment . He told a correctional officer that he felt severe stomach pain during a bowel movem ent, saw significant blood in his toilet, and may have fainted. The officer described the situation to the prison’s health unit and asked that Lee be “prioritized .” After she received the officer’s call
, Wysocki assessed that Lee’s symptoms were not an emergency and decided that he could wait for his appointment that afternoon. Dissat isfied, Lee asked to see other correctional officers on duty , and they check ed on him . (T he record does not reflect what they did or saw .) A nurse prac titioner examined Lee at his scheduled appointment that afternoon

. The practitioner referred Lee to an outside specialist for an appointment ; the practitioner set the appointment for two weeks later

.
T he outside specialist performed a colonoscopy and endoscopy , and tes t ed for a bacteria l infection . Lee tested positive for the infection and received medication that resolved it . He was also diagnosed with reddening of the rectum , inflammation of the

s mall intestine , and second

- degree inte rnal hemorrhoids. The outside specialist prescribed further medication and dietary changes.

Lee responded by su ing Wysocki, her employer ( Armor Correctional Health Services , the jail’s health care provider ) , and Milwaukee County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Wysocki i gnored his serious medical needs, in violation of his constitutional rights, by not arranging immediate care after the correctional officer reported his symptoms to her on the morning of August 24 . In addition, Lee asserted that Armor and Milwaukee County each enforced unconstitutional policies: Armor allow s medical staff to assess an inmate’s condition based only on an officer’s description , and the county prevent s officers from declaring medical emergenciesNo. 21-2702 Page 3

themselves. Lee also asked the district judge to recruit him counsel . The judge d enie d th e requests for counsel , fin d ing that Lee could litigate his case himself

. The parties cross

- mo ved for summary judgment , and the judge ruled in favor of the defendants

. The defendants argued that Wysocki reasonably let Lee wait for his scheduled appointment and that he suffered no injury from the short delay

. The parties disputed whether Wysocki had , along with the nurse practitioner , examined Lee on August 23 . ( In raising this dispute, Lee insist ed that the defendants had falsified time records .) When granting the defendants ’ motion, the judge reasoned that no evidence suggest ed that Lee’s gastrointestinal issues would have resolved differently had Wysocki arrang ed for earlier care on August 24. He also ruled that Lee did not show any injury from the policies that he alleged. Finally, the judge concluded t hat Lee had not substantiated his assertion that the defendants falsified medical records

. On appeal, Lee contends that the judge wrongly entered summary judg ment and should have credited his assertion that Wysocki never treated him on August 23

. But even if we credit that assertion, his claim fails . (T he parties cite Eighth Amendment

case s, but the Fourteenth Amendment applies here because Lee was a pretrial detainee at the time of these events. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson , 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015); Miranda v. Cty. of Lake , 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018).) T o stave off summary judgment, Lee had to supply evidence from whic h a jury could find that Wysock i “acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when considering the consequence s ” of declining to a dvance Lee’s appointment by a few hours and that her decision was "objectively unreasonable.” James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2020). But he has not. First, Lee does not dispute that , when the officer c alled her on the morning of August 24, Wysocki knew that a nurse practitioner had seen him the day before for the same symptoms and that he was

s et for another exam th at afternoon

. Second, Lee has not furnished evidence suggesting that a patient’s painful bowel movement, bloody stools , and possible fai nting mean that

se vere harm will likely occur before a scheduled medical appointment just hours away

. Finally , at the afternoon exam, th e nurse practitioner scheduled Lee for a specialist ’s

care two weeks later , and Lee does not contend that a wait of two weeks was unreasonable ; thus the half

- day delay attributed to Wysocki could not be unreasonable either.

Lee responds that , b y August 24
, his need for immediate attention for his symptoms was obvious because officers beyond the one who called Wysocki came to assist him. But Lee offers no evidence that Wysocki knew what these additional officers were told or saw . T heir involvement thus does not render Wysocki culpable.No. 21-2702 Page 4

That brings us to Lee’s claim that Armor and Milwaukee County maintained unconstitutional medical policies. But , as just explained , Lee has not shown that the half

- day delay in his appointment caused a constitutional injury . Therefore
, ne ither Armor’s policy (of allowing medical staff to rely on an officer’s report on an inmate’s condition ) or the county’s policy (of not allowing officers to declare medical emergencies) caused a violation of Lee’s rights

. See Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc ., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021).
Finally, Lee argues that the judge abused his discretion by denying his requests to recruit counsel. The judge, however, reasonabl y evaluat ed the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote , 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In consider ing Lee’s ability to litigate the case himself, the judge not ed that Lee “demonstrated competence” in the litigation by communicating well and recall ing past events with specificity

. Moreover, Lee has not shown , as he must, that he was p rejudiced by the denial

. S ee id . at 659. He speculates that it i s “ not inconceivable” that counsel could have helped create “genuine issues of facts for trial,” but he offered no specific reason to think that “counsel

... might have turned up evidence that would have affected the outcome of the case.” Tidwell v. Hicks , 791 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2015).

AFFIRMED