United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3051

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The Branson Label, Inc., a Florida Corporation

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

City of Branson, Missouri; Empire District Electric Co.; HCW Development

Company, LLC; HCW Private Development, LLC; HCW North, LLC

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: February 12, 2015

 Filed: July 17, 2015

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

____________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

The Branson Label, Inc., a Florida corporation ("Florida Branson Label"),

appeals the district court's dismissal of its suit. The district court found that Florida

1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.
Branson Label collusivelymanufactured subject-matter jurisdiction in violation of 28

U.S.C. § 1359. Florida Branson Label argues that the district court erred by adopting

the wrong legal test for determining collusion. Further, it argues that the corporate

acts leading up to the commencement of this action were not done to manufacture

diversity but were motivated by legitimate business purposes. We affirm. 

I. Background

This action and related actions in Missouri state court chronicle the decadelong dispute over ownership of 27 acres of land in Branson, Missouri. Florida

Branson Label claims that it has an unbroken chain of title to this land that can be

traced back to the 1950s. Through a quitclaim deed, the land was passed from the

original owners to Tori, Inc. ("Tori"). Tori was administratively dissolved, and

through various quitclaim transactions, Peter and Darlene Rea acquired the land. In

1992, the Reas quitclaimed the deed to the Branson Label, a Missouri corporation

("Missouri Branson Label") that they owned. Florida Branson Label wasmerged with

Missouri Branson Label, therefore acquiring the ownership interest in the land. Thus,

Florida Branson Label alleges that the City of Branson, Missouri; the Empire District

Electric Company; HCW Development Company, LLC; HCW Private Development,

LLC; and HCW North, LLC (collectively, "Appellees") infringed on its property

rights by breaking ground on its land on May 15, 2004, to develop the Branson

Landing, a mixed-use retail, residential, and entertainment complex.

In addition to Florida Branson Label's claim, Douglass Coverdell also claims

ownership of the disputed land. Coverdell's claim to title arises from Tori's quitclaim

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of the deed to him in 1999. Coverdell's claim of ownership has spurred at least two 2

actions in the Circuit Court of Taney County.3

Marvin Elfant, a businessman living in Florida, has fundedCoverdell'slawsuits

through his businesses Nekome, LLC ("Nekome") and ME Holdings, LLC ("ME

Holdings"). Both Nekome and ME Holdings are Delaware LLCs, but Elfantrunstheir

operations from his home in Florida. Elfant's investment in the Coverdell actions,

however, suffered setbacks in May, June, and August 2013, when Missouri state

courts issued rulings adverse to Coverdell's claim of ownership. 

In the spring of 2013, the Reas entered negotiations with Elfant for Nekome to

buyMissouri Branson Label. On July 18, 2013—after the Coverdell actionssustained

negative decisions fromthe state courts—an oral agreement wasreached for Nekome

to acquire Missouri Branson Label. In a memorandum to Elfant, his tax advisors

described "the acquisition of the stock of [Missouri Branson Label]" as being

"deemed by [Elfant] to be an important element in the legal strategy to realize a

success[] on [his] investment." The Reas did not initially comply with the oral

agreement, and Elfant had to sue the Reas to settle the matter. 

On May 2, 2014, Nekome finally acquired Missouri Branson Label. Only days

before, Elfantsought and received advice fromhis tax advisorsthat merging Missouri

Branson Label into an out-of-state corporation would be sufficient to avoid Missouri

state taxes on any legal award that might come from Missouri Branson Label's claim

Ironically, Coverdell sued the Reas in 2014 alleging that the Reas themselves 2

created his competing claim of title when they quitclaimed the deed to him through

Missouri Branson Label, which he alleged was the mere alter ego of Tori. See

Coverdell v. The Branson Label, Inc., No. 1422-CC00761 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis 2014).

See Empire Dist. Co. v. Douglas Coverdell, No. 03-CV-787034 (Cir. Ct.

3

Taney Cnty. 2013); U.S. Bank v. Coverdell, No. 11-AF-CC00244 (Cir. Ct. Taney

Cnty. 2012).

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to the land. On May 8, 2014, Nekome became the sole member in a newly formed

company, Florida Branson Label. On May 9, Nekome merged Missouri Branson

Label into Florida Branson Label, effectively transferring the former's legal claim of

owning the disputed land to the latter. A few days later on May 14, 2014, Florida

Branson Label filed the instant suit in federal district court asserting diversity

jurisdiction on account of its Florida citizenship and the Appellees' Missouri

citizenships. Since filing suit, Elfant has admitted that the only business activity that

Florida Branson Label conducts includes "directing and overseeing this lawsuit and

a second lawsuit pertaining to the [disputed land] . . . ; conferring with and directing

counsel in connection with the Branson Label Lawsuits; reviewing and revising

pleadings, declarations, and other court papersin connection with the Branson Label

Lawsuits; and funding the Branson Label Lawsuits."

The Appellees moved to dismiss the case for lack ofsubject-matter jurisdiction

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the district court granted the

motion. The court found that Florida Branson Label's corporate maneuvers were done

to manufacture diversity in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1359; further, the court found that

the purported tax purpose for merging the Missouri and Florida Branson Labels was

merely pretextual to obtaining diversity jurisdiction. In coming to this conclusion, the

district court utilized the following six-factor test employed by courts outside of this

circuit:

(1) whether there was nominal or no consideration involved in the

assignment;(2) whether the assignee had any previous connection to the

assigned claim; (3) whether there was a legitimate business reason for

the assignment; (4) whether the timing of the assignment suggestsit was

merely an effort to secure federal diversity jurisdiction; (5) whether the

assignor exercises any control over the conduct of the litigation; and (6)

whether the assignor retains any interest in the action such as receiving

a portion of the assignee's recovery.

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Hytken Family Ltd. v. Schaefer, 431 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699–700 (S.D. Tex. 2006)

(citing Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc. v. NRT Mid–Atl., Inc., 357 F. Supp. 2d 911,

922–23 (E.D. Va. 2005)). After finding that each factor weighed against exercising

subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed the case. 

II. Discussion

Florida Branson Label argues on appeal that the district court's adoption of the

six-factor test was improper because it did not consider the totality of the

circumstances. Further, Florida Branson Label argues that even if the six-factor test

was the proper legal standard, the test weighs in favor of exercising subject-matter

jurisdiction. 

"We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)." Great Rivers Habitat Alliance v. Fed. Emergency

Mgmt. Agency, 615 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted).

First, "[a] court deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) must distinguish between a

'facial attack' and a 'factual attack.'" Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6

(8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th

Cir. 1980)). In a facial attack, "the court merely [needs] to look and see if plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged a basis ofsubject matter jurisdiction." Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511

(citation omitted). Accordingly, "the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings

and the non-moving party receivesthe same protections asit would defending against

a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6)." Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6 (internal

citations omitted). 

Conversely, in a factual attack, "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction [is

challenged] in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings,

such as testimony and affidavits, are considered." Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511

(citation omitted). Thus, the nonmoving party would not enjoy the benefit of the

allegations in its pleadings being accepted as true by the reviewing court. See

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Hastings v. Wilson, 516 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating courts must "accept

all factual allegations in the pleadings as true" for facial attacks). "Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1359, whether an assignment was improperly made to manufacture diversity

jurisdiction is a fact-intensive question . . . ." Nat'l Fitness Holdings, Inc. v. Grand

View Corporate Centre, LLC, 749 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2014). As a result, the

parties in this case substantially developed the record, and the district court

considered evidence outside the scope ofthe pleadings. Thus, we consider Appellees'

challenge under § 1359 to be a factual attack in which the allegations in Florida

Branson Label's complaint will not be assumed to be true. 

Second, we must determine the proper standard of review on appeal of factual

issues. See Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730. "True, we review the ultimate question of

whether diversity jurisdiction exists de novo. But we review the district court'sfactual

findings under the clear-error standard, and whether an assignment passes muster

under § 1359 is a fact question subject to that deferential standard." Nat'l Fitness, 749

F.3d at 1206 (internal citations omitted); see also E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane, LLC,

781 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2015) ("[W]hether diversity jurisdiction was wrongfully

manufactured through assignment, is a question of fact, which we review for clear

error.").4

In Osborn, we adopted the rule that if the challenge to subject-matter 4

jurisdiction is based on "the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced

in the record, the appellate court's review is 'limited to determining whether the

district court's application of the law is correct and . . . whether those facts are indeed

undisputed.'" 918 F.2d at 730 (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th

Cir. 1981)). This rule isinapplicable to § 1359 challenges because whether a plaintiff

collusively manufactured diversity is always a question of fact. E3 Biofuels, 781 F.3d

at 976; Nat'l Fitness, 749 F.3d at 1206. Thus, the district court'sfactual determination

of whether a plaintiff collusively manufactured diversity will be reviewed under a

clear-error standard. 

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A. Factors to Consider in Assignments Challenged Under § 1359

First, we address whether the district court erred using a six-factor test to

determine if a party colluded to manufacture diversity. This court has seldom

analyzed § 1359, and when we have, it was in the materially different context of

estates or injured plaintiffs appointing out-of-state executorsto prosecute tort actions

in federal courts. See, e.g., Rogers v. Bates, 431 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1970); Todd Cnty.,

Minn. v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961); McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227

(8th Cir. 1954). Thus, we seek guidance from persuasive authority. 

Florida Branson Label argues that the correct legal standard should be a

consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, it argues that the district

court'ssix-factortest istoo mechanical. We disagree. The statement of a nonexclusive

and nonexhaustive list of considerations does not preclude consideration of all

circumstances relevant to a legal determination. The mere listing of factors is not as

limiting as some so-called legal tests. Ironically, the very courts that have used the

appellant's favored "totality ofthe circumstances" standard consider many ofthe same

factors used by the district court in this case. See Nat'l Fitness, 749 F.3d at 1205–06;

Yokeno v. Mafnas, 973 F.2d 803, 810 (9th Cir. 1992). In National Fitness, for

example, the Tenth Circuit stated that an analysis of § 1359 turns on "the totality of

the circumstances." 749 F.3d at 1205. Immediately thereafter, the Tenth Circuit

outlined seven factors to consider, including the following: (1) "Did the assignee lack

a prior connection with the matter?"; (2) "Did the assignor select the assignee's

attorney and pay the assignee's litigation expenses?"; (3) "Did the assignor retain

control of the litigation?"; (4) "Did the assignee agree to pay the assignor a portion

of any recovery?"; (5) "Did the assignee provide meaningful consideration for the

assignment?"; (6) "Is the assignment's timing suspicious?"; and (7) "Was the

assignment motivated by a desire to create diversity jurisdiction?" Id. at 1205–06.

These queries do not strike us as an overly mechanical, discretion-limiting test that

fails to consider the totality of the circumstances. Rather, National Fitness seems to

simply list some factual considerations that should not be overlooked when

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determining whether collusion occurred. These factors are the product of controlling

and persuasive precedent of several well-reasoned opinions.5

We need not adopt the Tenth Circuit's precise test and thus leave that question

for another day. When considering "[t]he evidence as a whole," Loegering, 297 F.2d

at 474, we conclude that the district court's analysis sufficiently addressed factors

relevant to a determination of whether an assignment of a legal claim functioned as

part of a scheme to manufacture diversity jurisdiction. While we do not adopt the

Tenth Circuit's precise list of circumstances, we do consider its list to be a helpful

guide to the sorts of facts and circumstances to be considered. Thus, district courts

should consider factors such as the following when determining whether an

assignment of a legal claim is precluded from invoking diversity jurisdiction under

§ 1359: (1) whether the assignee had any previous connection to the assigned claim;

(2) whether the assignee has any assets other than the assigned claim and has any

See id.; see also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 827–28 5

(1969) (considering previous connection of assignee to the action, exchange of

meaningful consideration, and retention of interest by assignor); Land Holdings (St.

Thomas) v. Mega Holdings, 283 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2002) (considering retention

of interest by assignor, underlying motive, and exchange of consideration); Airlines

Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel, 58 F.3d 857, 863–64 (2d Cir. 1995) (considering

timing of assignment, exchange ofmeaningful consideration, and underlyingmotive);

Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1994) (considering timing of assignment, preexisting interest of assignee,

underlying motive, and exchange of meaningful consideration); Yokeno, 973 F.2d at

812 (considering underlying motive and exchange of meaningful consideration);

Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1981)

(considering underlying motive and the exchange of meaningful consideration);

Reinhart Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Excel Directional Techs., LLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1240,

1245 (D. Colo. 2006) (outlining precedent of "totality of circumstances" factors);

Long & Foster, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 922–23 (same). 

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business functions other than pursuing the litigation; (3) whether there was 6

meaningful or merely nominal consideration for the assignment; (4) whether the

timing of the assignment suggests it was primarily executed to secure federal

diversity jurisdiction; (5) whether the assignor retains any control or influence over

the conduct of the litigation or the assignee's attorney; (6) whether the assignor

retains any interest in the outcome of the litigation; (7) whether the assignment was

motivated, at least in part, by a desire to create diversity jurisdiction; and (8) the

extent the party asserting diversity jurisdiction can rebut any claim of collusion by

asserting a legitimate business purpose for the assignment. Because the district court's

analysis closely mirrored this list of considerations, we find no reversible error. 

B. Application of Factors

We now turn to the application of the outlined factors to the instant case.

Florida Branson Label argues that even if the district court articulated the correct

legal standard, it failed to properly administer it. 

"The burden of establishing that a cause of action lies within the limited

jurisdiction of the federal courts is on the party asserting jurisdiction . . . ." Ark. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield v. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A., 551 F.3d 812, 816 (8th

Cir. 2009) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994)). Heightened scrutiny compounds this burden on Florida Branson Label

because its assignment was made between closely related business entities. See

Prudential Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 546 F.2d 469, 475 (2d. Cir. 1976)

("The scrutiny normally applied to transfers or assignments of claims which have the

See Greater Dev. Co. of Conn. v. Amelung, 471 F.2d 338, 339 (1st Cir. 1973)

6

(finding that diversitywas collusivelymanufactured in violation of § 1359 where "the

claim which is the basis of this suit was the only asset transferred, and, as far as the

record shows, the only asset of the new corporation, which apparently has no payroll

and no other activities"); see also Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 70 F.3d 640,

645 (1st Cir. 1995).

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effect of creating diversity must be doubled in the case of assignments between

related or affiliated corporations . . . .").

The First Circuit addressed a similar situation dealing with a merger of a

company into a diverse plaintiff company in Toste Farm. In that case, a company that

was a citizen of Rhode Island brought suit in federal court but later voluntarily

dismissed its case because there was a lack of full diversity of citizenship. 70 F.3d at

641–42. A month later, the Rhode Island company was merged into a New York

company that was created earlier in the year, transferring all of its assets to the new

company. Id. at 642. The New York company then brought suit one month later in

federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction. Id. The First Circuit emphasized that the

merged companies had only one asset of value: their legal claim. Id. at 645.

Additionally, the Rhode Island company transferred a bank account of approximately

$200,000 to the new company, but the court dismissed this asset as a mere "makeweight[]." Id. The newly formed company also admitted that the merger was at least

partly motivated by a desire to enjoy diversity jurisdiction. Id.

Similar to Toste Farm, the record in this case reveals that Missouri and Florida

Branson Labels merged primarily to invoke diversity jurisdiction as proscribed by 

§ 1359. First, Florida Branson Label had no previous connection to the assigned

claim. The lack of such a prior connection causes Florida Branson Label to resemble

an out-of-state executor with no actual interest other than being the vehicle to invoke

diversity jurisdiction. See Loegering, 297 F.2d at 473. Notably, Florida Branson

Label was created only days before the instant action was filed. See Amelung, 471

F.2d at 339 (noting that a diverse plaintiff company was formed and assigned a legal

interest merely four hours before suit was filed). 

Second, neither Missouri nor Florida Branson Labels has any assets other than

the legal claim of ownership to the disputed land. This is more indicative of collusion

than even Toste Farm, in which an additional $200,000 was also transferred in the

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merger between companies, yet the court still deemed it as a "make-weight" in

context. 70 F.3d at 645. Additionally, Elfant admitted that Florida Branson Label's

only business activity is litigating the current and a related action. 

Third, there was no consideration for the assignment. At the time ofthe merger,

Nekome owned both Branson Labels. Nekome merged the two companies without

giving any consideration to Missouri Branson Label. Because this was not an armslength transaction, no consideration was necessary for the merger. Elfant, who

effectively owned Nekome, signed the merger documents on behalf of both Missouri

and Florida Branson Labels. The lack of consideration and an arms-length transaction

between subsidiaries only makesthe possibility of collusion to manufacture diversity

more likely. 

Florida Branson Label argues that the court should broaden its view of the

transaction and take into account the nearly year-long negotiation with the Reas. This

argument has no merit because the consideration given to the Reas to acquire

Missouri Branson Label is outside the scope of the assignment at issue. Florida

Branson Label itself admits that its chain of title comes through Missouri Branson

Label, the company to which the Reas quitclaimed their deed in 1992. Thus, the Reas

are not the applicable "assignor" of the legal interest at issue because they have not

owned any interest in over two decades. Further, the sale of Missouri Branson Label

to Nekome is one transaction removed from Florida Branson Label's acquisition of

the legal interest. Therefore, any consideration given to the Reas for the sale is not

relevant to an analysis of the effective assignment of Missouri Branson Label's legal

interest to Florida Branson Label through their merger. 

Fourth, the timing of the merger in relation to the commencement of the instant

case is suspicious. After Nekome acquired Missouri Branson Label on May 2, 2014,

Florida Branson Label was created on May 8. The Branson Labels were then merged

the next day on May 9, and Florida Branson Label filed this action in federal court

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by May 14. This expedited timing is even more suspicious given that the advice of

Elfant's tax advisors—that he merge Missouri Branson Label into an out-of-state

corporation to avoid Missouri income taxes—did not require that the Branson Labels

be merged in such haste. Missouri Branson Label had no income to be taxed at the

time of Nekome's acquisition; any potential award from the inverse condemnation

litigation would arguably come several months if not several years down the line.

Also, the United States tax code allows several months for a corporation to elect to

become an S-Corporation—another piece of advice from Elfant's advisors—and still

take advantage of the tax advantages of S-Corporation status for that tax year. See 26

U.S.C. § 1362(b). Thus, Florida Branson Label has not met its burden to show that

there was a legitimate business reason for its hasty merger with Missouri Branson

Label; all of the purported tax purposes did not require such expeditious corporate

maneuvers. The only logical explanation that we can see for the hurry was that the

expedited timeline was necessary considering that the ten-year statute of limitations

that applies to Missouri inverse condemnation proceedings wasrapidly approaching.

Because Florida Branson Label alleged in its complaint that Appellees broke ground

on the Branson Landing on May 15, 2004, it had to file its action by May 14, 2014,

to ensure that it was not outside the statute of limitations. See Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 516.010. In other words, it had to merge with Missouri Branson Label as soon as

it did to be able to file its action at all in federal court.7

The fifth and sixth factors do not carry significant weight in this particular case 

because these factors measure the extent that the assignor still controls and benefits

from the litigation. In this case, the assignor—Missouri Branson Label—no longer

exists. We nevertheless consider the indirect control that Nekome and Elfantmaintain

For this factor, we also consider Florida Branson Label's factual contention 7

that its expedited merger was necessary because of the nearly year-long negotiation,

delay, and eventual acquisition of Missouri Branson Label from the Reas. We

appropriately give this contention its proper weight in considering the totality of the

circumstances. 

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over the litigation as part of the totality of the circumstances. Moving to the seventh

factor, Florida Branson Label denies any motivation to invoke diversity jurisdiction.

8

Finally, Florida Branson Label attempts to rebut claims of its collusion to

manufacture diversity by highlighting advice it received from its tax advisors. Elfant

used Nekome to buy Missouri Branson Label because it "was deemed by [Elfant] to

be an important element in the legal strategy to realize a success[] on [his]

investment." Thus, he asked his tax advisors for their "recommendations regarding

whether it would be advisable to reorganize [Missouri Branson Label] outside the

State of Missouri." Considering the presumption of collusion, as well as the other

circumstances that swing in favor of finding collusion, the district court did not err

in finding that the advice of Elfant's tax advisors was a pretextual business purpose

to mask the real intention of manufacturing diversity jurisdiction. Under these

circumstances, we find no error in the district court's dismissal of this tax advice as

a "make-weight."

Florida Branson Label also argues that it merged with Missouri Branson Label

for the legitimate business purpose of administrative convenience. Thus, because

Elfant operated ME Holdings and Nekome fromhis home in Florida, Florida Branson

Label argues it made sense to incorporate the new company in Florida to centralize

the operations of Elfant's corporations. This argument, however, is self-defeating

because both ME Holdings and Nekome are Delaware LLCs. Elfant finds no trouble

running these out-of-state companies from his home in Florida; similarly, running a

Missouri corporation from a headquartersin Florida would have produced no burden

This circumstance applies to admitted motivations. See, e.g., Toste Farms, 70 8

F.3d at 642, 645 (party asserting jurisdiction admitted that merger was partly

motivated by creating diversity jurisdiction). A court's discretion to infer the parties'

real motivation from the totality of the circumstances is a separate analysis.

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whatsoever. Similar to the "administrative convenience" argument that was rejected

in Toste Farm, 70 F.3d at 642, Florida Branson Label's argument has no merit.9

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the relevant circumstances justify the district

court's finding that Florida Branson Label collusively manufactured diversity

jurisdiction for the purpose of bringing the instant action in federal court.

Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

Accordingly, we need not address any of the Appellees' alternative arguments 9

for defeating subject-matter jurisdiction in this case, which largely address the merits

of the case and the legality of Elfant running his businessesfrom his home in Florida. 

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