1Donohue filed his initial complaint on November 6, 2008

(document no. 1), and filed an addendum to the complaint on

December 24, 2008 (document no. 6). I accept both documents, in

the aggregate, as the complaint in this matter and consider both

in rendering this Order.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Ronald P. Donohue

v. Civil No. 08-cv-459-PB

Michael J. Ashe, Jr., Sheriff,

Hampden County, Massachusetts, et al.

O R D E R

Before the Court is Ronald P. Donohue’s complaint (document

nos. 1 & 6)1, alleging that, during his incarceration in the

Hampden County House of Corrections (“HCHOC”) in Ludlow,

Massachusetts, defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to

adequate medical care. The matter is before me for preliminary

review to determine, among other things, whether or not the

complaint states any claim upon which relief might be granted. 

See United States District Court District of New Hampshire Local

Rule (“LR”) 4.3(d)(2)(A)(i); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). For the

reasons explained herein, I direct that this matter be

Case 1:08-cv-00459-PB Document 8 Filed 02/19/09 Page 1 of 13
2

transferred to the United States District Court for the District

of Massachusetts for consideration.

Standard of Review

Under this Court’s local rules, when an incarcerated

plaintiff commences an action pro se and in forma pauperis, the

magistrate judge is directed to conduct a preliminary review. LR

4.3(d)(2). In conducting the preliminary review, the Court

construes pro se pleadings liberally, however inartfully pleaded. 

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200

(2007) (following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) to construe pro se

pleadings liberally in favor of the pro se party). “The policy

behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that

if they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the

correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.” See

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (noting that

courts may construe pro se pleadings so as to avoid

inappropriately stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals of

claims); Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). 

All of the factual assertions made by a pro se plaintiff and

inferences reasonably drawn therefrom must be accepted as true. 

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3

See id. This review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair

and meaningful consideration.

Background

Ronald Donohue has been an inmate at the New Hampshire State

Prison since November 14, 2005. Prior to that, he was

incarcerated at the HCHOC. Donohue claims that in April of 2005,

during his stint at the HCHOC, he was hospitalized at the Holyoke

Hospital in Massachusetts for a rapid heartbeat caused by Graves

Disease, a hyperthyroid condition. During his hospitalization,

he also began treatment for hemachromatosis, a blood disease. 

Donohue stayed in the hospital for six days and was then released

to the HCHOC. 

In June of 2005, Donohue was treated for his thyroid

condition, and was started on a daily beta blocker and Coumadin,

a blood thinner. Donohue’s daily medications already included

Claritin for a food allergy, Nortryptilene for depression, and

Flo-Max for an enlarged prostate gland. 

In October of 2005, Donohue gained forty pounds very

rapidly. He also began to bruise easily and suffer from extreme

lower back pain and spasms. Donohue notified a nurse named Sue

at the HCHOC who was not alarmed by his symptoms and took no

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4

action to determine their cause. By November 10, 2005, the pain

in Donohue’s back had increased, he was having difficulty

urinating, and he had stopped having bowel movements. When

Donohue woke up on November 11, 2005, he could not walk. He was

taken, by wheelchair, to the HCHOC medical unit where he saw

Dave, a nurse. Dave, without any testing or examination,

diagnosed the problem as a misalignment in Donohue’s back causing

irritation to the sciatic nerve. Dave gave Donohue an injection

of a muscle relaxer and told him to lie down and elevate his feet

to ease the pain. By later that day, the muscle relaxants ceased

to work at all, and lying down increased Donohue’s pain. 

On November 12, 2005, Donohue was moved to a different unit

within the HCHOC to await a scheduled pick-up by New Hampshire

correctional authorities on November 14, 2005. Donohue’s pain

continued, and he requested medical attention a number of times

while on this unit, but his requests were largely denied. 

Eventually, Donohue was given an injection for pain. The

following day, Donohue was again worse, and the pain medication

had become ineffective. 

Prior to leaving the HCHOC on November 14, 2005, Donohue

requested his medical records, as he had been advised by a worker

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5

in the HCHOC medical records department that his records would be

ready for him to take with him, and that he should be sure that

his records traveled with him so that he would be properly and

immediately treated and given his medication upon his arrival in

New Hampshire. When he requested the records, however, Donohue

was told that they were not available, and that he would have to

leave without them. Donohue also claims that HCHOC officials

failed to otherwise notify the New Hampshire prison officials of

his medical history, condition, or medications. 

The New Hampshire prison officials, unaware of Donohue’s

condition, arrived to transport him in a car too small to allow

Donohue to sit in a position that would minimize his pain. When

Donohue arrived at the New Hampshire State Prison at 7:00 p.m.,

after a grueling three-hour car ride, no wheelchair was available

for him. The medical department wouldn’t admit Donohue to the

infirmary as they had no medical records from the HCHOC. Donohue

was placed in a two-person cell on the second floor that was not

wheelchair accessible. 

When Donohue saw Dr. Brett Mooney at the New Hampshire State

Prison medical department, she immediately recognized that he was

in ill health. His skin was turning green, he was bloated, and

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6

he had bruises on his lower back and groin area. Dr. Mooney had

Donohue taken to the Catholic Medical Center in Manchester, New

Hampshire, where he was found to be suffering from low hemoglobin

and internal bleeding caused by Coumadin, the blood thinner he

had been taking. Donohue’s symptoms had been caused by the

collection of more than a gallon of blood in his lower back and

abdomen, and largely resolved after Donohue received appropriate

medical treatment at Catholic Medical Center and at the New

Hampshire State Prison upon his release from the hospital.

Discussion

I. Personal Jurisdiction

“To hear a case, a court must have personal jurisdiction

over the parties, ‘that is, the power to require the parties to

obey its decrees.’” Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt,

Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002);

(quoting United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 617

(1st Cir. 2001)). “[D]ue process requires only that in order to

subject a defendant to a judgment in personam . . . he have

certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 

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2Generally, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a

defendant must by: (1) authorized by the state long-arm statute,

and (2) compatible with the due process requirements of the

United States Constitution. Harlow v. Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d

7

fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

A court can “exercise authority over a defendant by virtue

of either general or specific [personal] jurisdiction.” See

Mass. Sch. of Law v. ABA, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). 

General jurisdiction exists over a defendant who has maintained

“continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state, even

if that activity is unrelated to the suit. See Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16

(1984); Negron-Torres v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 25

(1st Cir. 2007). Here, Donohue’s allegations, even construed

liberally, contain no facts sufficient to support an inference

that defendants have any “continuous and systematic” contacts

with New Hampshire. Accordingly, I find that this Court does not

have general personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Unlike general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction exists

“where the cause of action arises directly out of, or relates to,

the defendant’s forum-based contacts.” Negron-Torres, 478 F.3d

at 24.2 The First Circuit has established a three-part inquiry

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50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005). This is a singular inquiry as the New

Hampshire long-arm statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510:4, is coextensive with the federal constitutional limits of due process. 

Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 298 F.3d 1, 7 (1st

Cir. 2002) (citing, and analogizing to, Daynard, 290 F.3d at 52).

8

in considering a claim of specific jurisdiction: (1) relatedness;

(2) purposeful availment; and (3) reasonableness. Platten v. HG

Berm. Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 135 (1st Cir. 2006). The

court must make “[a]n affirmative finding on each of the three

elements . . . to support a finding of specific jurisdiction.” 

Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d

284, 288 (1st Cir. 1999). 

To satisfy the relatedness requirement, “the claim

underlying the litigation must directly arise out of, or relate

to, the defendant’s forum-state activities.” Foster-Miller, Inc.

v. Babcock & Wilcox, Can., 46 F.3d 138, 145 (1st Cir. 1995). 

Here, Donohue has not alleged that any of the defendants engaged

in any activity in New Hampshire. Donohue does allege that the

defendants failed to provide him with a copy of his medical

records to present to the New Hampshire prison officials upon his

arrival, but that failure occurred in Massachusetts while Donohue

was still at the HCHOC. All of the acts or omissions alleged to

have been taken by defendants, in relation to this action or

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9

otherwise, occurred in Massachusetts. While Donohue claims that

he suffered in New Hampshire as a result of defendants’ actions

in Massachusetts, the in-state effect of a defendant’s out-ofstate conduct does not itself confer personal jurisdiction. See

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985);

Phillips Exeter, 196 F.3d at 291.

As to the second part of the inquiry into the existence of

personal jurisdiction, “the defendant’s in-state contacts must

represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting

activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and

protections of that state’s laws and making the defendant’s

involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable.” 

Daynard, 290 F.3d at 61. The purposeful availment requirement

inquiry is focused on voluntariness and foreseeability. See N.

Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2005). 

Here, where defendants are not alleged to have engaged in any

activities in New Hampshire, I cannot infer any intent by the

defendants to avail themselves of the privileges of conducting

activities in this State. 

Finally, the Court must determine whether or not the

exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is

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10

reasonable. See Ticketmaster-N.Y. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 209

(1st Cir. 1994). Reasonableness requires the consideration of

five “gestalt factors”: (1) defendant’s burden to appear, (2) the

forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3)

plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective

relief, (4) the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most

effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common

interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social

policies. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. The reasonableness

inquiry operates on a sliding scale that depends on the strength

of the plaintiff’s showing of relatedness and purposeful

availment. See Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1389 (1st Cir.

1995). Where the plaintiff has made a weak showing on

relatedness and purposeful availment, the gestalt factors may tip

the balance against the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See

Nowak v. Tak How Invs., 94 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1996). 

Here, in addition to the fact that plaintiff has not shown

that defendants engaged in actions in the forum state at all, and

has therefore not made a sufficient showing to satisfy the first

two parts of the specific jurisdiction inquiry, the facts

alleged, taken as a whole, do not warrant a finding that

Case 1:08-cv-00459-PB Document 8 Filed 02/19/09 Page 10 of 13
11

exercising personal jurisdiction over these defendants would be

reasonable. It would not be unduly burdensome for Massachusetts

defendants to appear in a New Hampshire case, and New Hampshire

is certainly a more convenient forum for Donohue, who is

incarcerated here. And while this State, like all others, has an

interest in assuring that prisoners are treated with

constitutionally adequate medical care, particularly prisoners

who may be transferred to the New Hampshire Department of

Corrections in poor health due to the lack of proper medical care

elsewhere, I find that the courts of Massachusetts have a

superior interest in adjudicating claims arising out of acts or

omissions in correctional facilities located there. While some

of the reasonableness factors weigh in favor of the exercise of

personal jurisdiction in this matter, taken together, they do

not. I find that the weight of authority, as applied to the

facts of this case, counsel against my exercise of this Court’s

personal jurisdiction over the defendants in this matter.

II. Transfer

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, a civil action that is filed in a

court without jurisdiction to consider the matter may be

transferred to a court where the action could have properly been

Case 1:08-cv-00459-PB Document 8 Filed 02/19/09 Page 11 of 13
328 U.S.C. § 1631 provides:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as 

defined in section 610 of this title or an appeal, 

including a petition for review of administrative 

action, is noticed for or filed with such a court 

and that court finds that there is a want of 

jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the 

interest of justice, transfer such action or 

appeal to any other such court in which the action 

or appeal could have been brought at the time it 

was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal 

shall proceed as if it had been filed in or 

noticed for the court to which it is transferred 

on the date upon which it was actually filed in or 

noticed for the court from which it is 

transferred.

12

brought at the time it was filed.3 See Cimon v. Gaffney, 41 F.3d

1, 7 n.21 (1st Cir. 2005) (supporting the view that § 1631

authorizes transfers to allay any jurisdictional defect after

collecting conflicting authorities on the question of whether §

1631 authorizes transfers to cure a want of personal

jurisdiction, as opposed to a want of subject-matter

jurisdiction). I find that this matter could properly have been

filed in the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts, which possesses personal jurisdiction over the 

Case 1:08-cv-00459-PB Document 8 Filed 02/19/09 Page 12 of 13
13

defendants, and I direct, therefore, that this case be

transferred to the District of Massachusetts for consideration.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: February 19, 2009

cc: Ronald P. Donohue, pro se

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