### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d O n- Br ie fs to the W es te rnS ec tio n of the Co urt of

A ppe al s on M ar ch 30, 200 7
CU MM INS S TAT ION, LLC v. A LLISON BA TEY

A Dire ct A ppeal f

rom the Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 04C-3435 The Honorable Ham ilton Gayden, Jud ge

No. M2005- 2508-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on May 4, 2007

Th is c a se ari se s fr om a de fa ult jud g me nt en te re d ag a ins t App e lla nt fo r fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th an Or der to Compel. Appellant a ppeals. We affirm and rema nd for de termination of dama g es for fr ivo lou s a

pp e a l.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uitCo ur t A ffirm e d and Rem anded

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opi nion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Al lis on B a te y Pr o Se

S a m u e l F

. M i l l e r

o f N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e f

o r A p p e l l e e , C u m m i n s S t a t i o n , LLC

OP IN ION

On F e br ua ry 9, 20 00 , A lli so n B a te y

(“Def end ant, ” or

“ Ap pe lla nt” ) e nte re d in to a

L e a se Ag ree ment with Cumm ins St ation, L .L .C. (“Cummins,” “Plaintiff,” or “ Appellee ”), u n der w hich L ease Ms. Batey l ea s ed n o n -r esidential prope rty from Cummins for use as a beauty salon. On October 7, 2004, Cummi ns filed a de tainer w arr ant ac tion in the Ge nera l Sessions C ourt of Davidson County . On Octobe r 26, 2004, the g ener al sessions court g rante d Ms. Batey a continuance to seek counsel. When Ms. Batey failed to ap p ea r at t he re schedule d hear ing, a defa ult judgment wa s enter ed ag ainst her on Nove mber 15, 2004.

On Novembe r 17, 2004, Ms. Batey appea led the d ef

au l t j u dg ment to the Circuit Court at Davidson County . On or ab o u t t h at s am e day , Ms. Batey was g iven notice that it was he r

“ re sp on sib ili ty

to t a ke the ne c e ssa

ry ste ps to h a ve thi s c a se se t on the do c ke t w ith in 45 d ay s o f i ts
arr ival in Circuit Court.” When Ms. Batey failed to file a

motion to set the m atter, Cumm ins moved for e ntry of final judg ment on J anuar y 13, 200 5

. On J anuary 18, 2005, Ms. Batey

filed a

“ Me mor and

um i n O pp os iti on

to M oti on

to E nte r F ina l Judg me nt, ” a lon g wi th t he Af fi davit of Ms.-2-

Batey ’s counse l, L arr

y L . Crain, in support there of. In his Affidavit, Mr. Crain asser ts that neither h e , n o r M s

. B a t e y, r e c e i v e d “ w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e r u l e r e qu i r i n g t h a tt h i s c a s e b e s e tw i t h i n4 5 d a ys o f t h e ap p ea l

. . . . ” O nt h e s am e d ay , M s

. Ba t ey a l s o fi l eda “ M o t i o nt o S et ” t h e m at t er fo r h ea ri n g. On J anuar y 24, 2005, Cummi ns filed a r esponse in opposition to Ms. Bate y ’s motion to set. The trial court he ld a hear ing on the motion to enter final judg ment and, by Orde r of F ebrua

ry 3, 2005, denied the motion with the fol l o wi n g conditions: “(1) that this case be set for trial as expeditiously

as possible; and (2) that the de fenda nt pay as s an ct i o n s t h e sum of $150.00 in attorney ’s fe es to the plaintiff within five day s of J anuar y 28, 2005.”

On F ebru ary 1, 2005 , Cummi ns fi le d a mot ion to a me nd its De ta ine r Wa

rr ant t o r e qu e st additional damag es. L eave was g rante d and the Ame nded De tainer Warr ant was f iled on Marc h 28, 2005. The Ame nded W ar ra n t reque sts damag es in the amount of $30,224.27 plus attorne y ’s fe es and costs. On F ebrua

ry 4, 2005, an “Ag ree d Orde r Setting D ate f or Tria l” was f

iled, which Or der set a he aringdate of

April 20, 2005.

On F e b r u a r y 1 , 2 0 0 5 , C u

mm i n s s e nt

i nte rr og a tor ie s and

re qu e sts fo r p ro du c tio n o f d oc ume nts to Ms. Bate y . When Ms. Bate y failed to re spond within the prescr ibed time, Cummi ns filed a

“ Mo tio n to Com

pe l and De mand fo r A tto rn e y ’s F e e s” on

Ma rc h 2 8, 20 05 . O n M arc h 2 4, 20 05 , M s. Batey ’s counse l f

iled a motion to withdraw, which motion wa s g rante d on April 29, 2005. On Mar ch 28, 2005, Ms. Batey

moved t h e co u rt for a continuance postponing he r deposition, which wa s orig inally schedule d for Ma

rch 28, 2005. O n April 6, 2005, the t rial court enter ed an “Ag ree d Orde r ReschedulingDate for Trial,” which Orde r set the m atter for hearing on J une 7, 2005. On Apr il 22, 2005, the trial cour

t hear d Cummi ns’s motion to compel and g rante d same by Orde r o f April 28, 20 05 . T his Or de r r e a ds , in re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
1. Def endant/Appe lla n t Allison Batey (“D efe ndant”) is compelled and re quired to provide c omplete and thoroug h answe rs to the discovery reque sts served upon he r counse l on or about F ebrua ry 1, 2005.

2. Def endant’ s responses to Plaintiff’s discovery are due fifte en (15) day s from the date of e ntry of this order.

3. Def endant sha ll pay

to Plainti ff the a

mount of $270.00 for Plaintiff’s attorney ’s fe es re sulting fr om t h e draf ting a nd filing of Pla int if f’ s Mo tio n to Com

pe l and De mand

fo r A tto rn e y ’s fe e s a

nd its attorney ’s attempts to resolve this discover y dispute.
On May 19, 2005, Cummi ns filed a “ Motion for Entry of Def ault J udg ment,” which Motion
re a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
1. Def endant has not c omplied w ith this Court’s ordert o co m pel enter ed on Apr il 28, 2005. Pursuant to Tenn. R

. Civ. P . 37.02,-3- Plaintiff is entitl ed to entry of a defa ult judgment ag ainst Defe ndant beca use she ha s failed to comply with this order.

2. I n th e alter

nativ e , D e fe nd ant h a s n ot a ns we re d o r o the rw ise
re sp on de d to Pla int if

f’ s amend e d d e ta ine r w arr ant f ile d w iththi s Court on March 28, 2005. Pursua nt to Tenn. R. Civ. P

. 12.01 and 55.02, Plaintiff is enti tled to a def ault judgme nt ag ainst Defe ndant beca use she ha s not tim ely

filed an a nswer or otherwise r esponded.

This Motion was hear d by the trial cour

t on J une 3, 20 05. On J une 7, 2005, the c ourt enter ed an

“ Or de r G ra

nti ngMo tio n f

or En tr y of De fa ult Judg me nt, ” wh ic h Or de r g ra nts the mot ion

fo r d e fa ult jud g me nt a

nd or de rs Ms. B a te y

to p ay $3 8, 27 8. 91 to C umm ins

. On J uly 7, 2005, Ms. Bat ey fi l ed a “Motion t o Set Aside Def ault J udg ment Ruling.” A n Amen d ed M o t i o n t o Set Aside Def ault J udg ment was filed on July 19, 2005. On J uly

29, 2005, Cummi ns filed a r esponse to Ms. B atey ’s motion to set aside the de fault judg ment. The trial c ourt held a he aringon the amende d motion on August 5, 2005. On Au g ust 11, 2005, the trial court
e nte re d a n “O rder Den y ingin P art and Gr anti ngin P art

De fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to Se t A sid e De fa ult J udg ment Ruling Enter ed on J une 7, 2005,” wherein the trial court de nied Ms. Batey ’s re quest to set asi d e t h e defa

ult judgment and g rante d Ms. Batey ’s re quest to set aside the a mount of damag es “pendinga hea

ri n g on the exact amount of damag es.” B y Ag ree d Orde r of August 9, 2005, the damag es hea

ring was set f

or September

26, 2005. On September

26, 2005, Ms. Batey

serve d Cummi ns with a “Countersuit” in the amount of te n mi lli on do lla

rs ($ 10 ,0 00 ,0 00 .0 0)

. B y Or de r of Se pte mbe r 30, 20 05 , the tr ia l court de nie d M s. Batey ’s motion to filed her counter -cla im. The damag es hea ring proce eded on Septe mber 26, 2006. We note that there is no transcript nor st atement of the evidenc e adduc ed at this hea ring . By Orde r of Oc tober 3, 2005, the tria l court entered an “Order Setting Amount of De fault Judgment,” whic h Or de r a wa rd s Cummi ns fi ft e e n th ou sand do lla rs ($ 15 ,0 00 .0 0) in d a ma g e s.

Ms. Batey

appea ls and raise s one the followingissue for r eview a s stated in her br ief:

To be re lieved of the financ ial obligation ordere d by t h e C hance ry Court since the:

1. Ap pe lle e br ok e int o th e Ap pe lla nt’ s b us ine ss. 2. Ap pe lle e did

no t ho no r t

he Ap pe lla

nt’ s p ri va c y

a s a te na nt. 3. Appellee constantly operated in br eac h of contra ct w i t h the Ap pe lla nt. We perc eive Ms. B atey ’s issue to be whe ther the tria l court er re d in enteringa def

ault judgme nt ag ainst Ms. Bate y

for f ailure to c omply

with the Orde r t o Compel. Cummi ns raises the a dditional-4-

issue of whe ther this ap p ea l i s frivolous and, a s such, whethe r Cummins i s entitled to recove r the costs of def

ending same.
Rul e 37 .0 2 o f t

he Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Civi l Proc e dure pr ov ide s tha t a tria l cou rt fa c e d w ith a par ty who fails to obe y an order to pr ovide discovery may rende r a judgme nt by defa ult ag ainst the d i s o b e d i e n tp art y. S ee Yea rwo od , J ohns on, Sta nto n & Crab tre e , I nc . v . Fo xla nd D e v e lop ment V e ntur e , 8 28 S.W. 2d

41 2 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 99 1) . T he Rul e state s:
If a d e p o n e n t ; p art y; a no f

f i c e r , d i r e c t o r , o r m an a g i n g a g e n to f a p art y; or, a pe rson desig nated unde r Rule 30.02(6) or 31.01 t o testify

on b e h a l f o f a p art y f

a i l s t o o b e y ano r d e r

t o p r o v i d e o r

p e r m i td i s c o v e r

y, inc lud ingan o rd e r m a de un der Ru le 37 .0 1 o r R ule 35 , o r i f a

pa rt y fails to obey

an orde r entered under Rule 26.06, t he cour t in which the action is pending may make such order s in reg ard to the failure a s are j u s t , an d am o n g o t h er s t h e f

o l l o wi n g:

* * *

(C) An orde r striking out plea dings or parts ther eof, or

staying f urther proce eding s until t h e order is obey ed, or dismissing the a ction or pr oceedi ngor

any pa rt the re of , o r r e nd e ri nga

jud g me nt b y

de fa ult
a g a i n s tt h e d i s o b e d i e n tp art y;
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02. Although this sanc tion is ex treme, it is appropr iate “w here there has been a cle ar r ecor d of delay or contumac ious conduct.” In re Beckm an , 78 B.R. 516, 518 (M.D.Tenn.1987). The decision to g ra nt or de ny a de fa

ult jud g me nt a s a sa

nc tio n lie s w ith in t

he so un d d isc re tio n o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Rule 55.02 of the Te nnesse e R u l es of Ci vil Procedure provides that a c ourt may , for g ood
cause shown, set aside a defa ul t judgme nt in accor dance with Rule 60.02. Rule 60.02 of the Tennes s ee Rules of Civil P roce dure se ts forth the cr iteria the c ourt should consider in dec iding
w h e t h e r t o s e ta s i d e s u c h a

j u d g m e n t

. T h e R

u l e s t a t e s i ni t s e n t i r e t y:
Rule 60.02 Mistake s; I nadver tence ; Ex cusable Neg lect; Fr aud, etc

. O n mo ti o n an d u

p o n s u c h te r

ms a s ar e ju s t, th e c o u rt ma y relieve a party or the pa rty ' s leg al re prese ntative from a final judg ment, order or p r o c e e d in g f

o r th e f o ll o w in g r e a s o n s : ( 1 ) mi s ta k e , in a d v e rte n ce, surprise or

exc u s ab l e neg lect; (2) f raud ( whether

here tofore denominated in t ri nsic or extrinsic), misrepre sentation, or other misconduct of an a dverse p ar t y ; (3) the judg ment is void; (4) the-5- judgme n t h as been satisfied, rele ased or discharg ed, or a

prior jud g me nt u

po n w hic h it

is b a se d h a s b e e n r e ve rs e d o r o the rw ise
vacated, or it is no longe r equitable that a judg ment should have prospec tive application; or (5) any other re ason justify ing relief from t h e oper ation of the judgme nt. T he motion shall be made within a
rea son ab l e t ime, and for

rea sons (1) and ( 2) not more than one y ear afte r the judg ment, o rd er or proce edingwas e ntere d or take n. A mot io n u n d e r th is Ru le 6 0

. 0 2 d o e s n o t a f f e c t th e f in a lity of a judgme nt or suspend its o p er at i o n, but the court may enter an orde r suspending the oper ation of t he judgment upon such t erms as to bond and notice a s to it s hall seem prope r pendingthe hea ring of such motion. This rule doe s not limit the power of a c ourt to enterta in an independe nt action to relieve a par ty from a judg ment, order or pr oc e e din g , o r t o set a sid e a jud g me nt fo r fr a ud up on the c ourt . Wr its of er ror c oram nobis, bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
re vie w a re a bo lis he d, and

the pr oc e dure fo r o btai ni ngre lie f f ro m a judgme nt shal l be by

motion as prescr ibed in these rule s or by an independe nt action.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.

The func tion of Rule 60.02 is “to strike a pr oper ba lance betwee n the competingprinciples
o f f in a li ty an d ju s tic e.” J

er k i ns v. McKinn ey , 533 S.W .2d 275, 280 (Tenn.1976) . Rule 60.02 operates as “a

n esca pe valve from possible ine quity that might other wise ar ise from the unr elenting imposit ion of the principle of finality imbedded in our proce dural rule s.” Tho mpson v . Fi re man's Fun d Ins. C

o. , 798 S.W .2d 235, 238 (Tenn.1990) . Howeve r, “[b]ecause of the ‘princ iple of finality ,’ the ‘e scape valve’ should not be easily opened.” Banks v. Dem ent Con str. Co. , 817 S.W .2d 16, 18 (T en n

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Toney v . Mueller Co. , 810 S.W .2d 145, 146 (Te n n

. 1 9 9 1 )). The dispositi on of motions under Rule 60.02 is best left t o the discre tion of the lower c ourt, and such de cisions are
reve rsed only

if they constitute an abuse of that discre tion. Spru ce v . Spru ce , 2 S.W .3d 192, 194 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Underwood v. Zurich In s. Co. , 854 S.W .2d 94 (Tenn.1993) ).

To set aside a judgme nt under Rule 60.02, the bur den is upon the movant to prove that she is entitled to relief

, and there must be proof of the basis on which r elief is soug ht. See Brum low v.. Brum low , 7 29 S.W. 2d

10 3, 10 6 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 98 6) ; Jeff erson v. P

n eu m o Servs. Corp. , 699 S.W .2d 181, 186 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985). Amotion for relief from a judgme nt pur suant to Rule 60.02
a dd re sse s th e so un d d isc re tio n o f t he tr ia l ju dg e . A c c or din g ly , th e sc op e of re vie w o n a pp e a l is limit ed to w hether the trial judge abused he r discre tion. See Ton ey v. M ueller Co. , 810 S.W .2d 145 (T e nn .1 99 1) ; Trav is v

. Ci ty of Mur fre esb or o , 686 S.W .2d 68, 70 (Tenn.1985)

. The Te nnessee Supreme Court recently addre ssed t he abuse of discre tion standard in Doe 1
e x r e l. D oe 1 v. Roman Ca tho lic Dioc ese of Na shv ill e , 154 S.W .3d 22 (Tenn.2005) . I n that Opinion, the Court states that “[a] trial court abuse s its dis cre tion when it applies an incorr ect leg al standar d-6-

or re ache s a dec ision which is ag ainst logic or re asoning and which c auses an i njustice to the complaining party .” Id . at 42.

The rec ord in this ca se is reple te with evidenc e to support the trial c ourt’s dete rmination that Ms. Batey failed to c ooperate with discovery eff orts made by Cummi ns. Ms. B atey ’s pattern of delay beg an i n t he g ener al sessions court with her declining to appea

r at the r esche duled hea

ring in that court. Upon he r appe al t o the C ircuit Court, Ms. Bate y failed to set the matter for hear ing a s require d by the local r

ules. Ms. Batey

was then or dere d to pay

$150.00 in sanctions and to set the m atter a s so on a s p os sib le . T he re a ft e r, Ms. B a te y re fu se d to c oo pera te wi th C umm ins ’s dis c ov e ry e ff or ts, forc ing Cumm ins to file a motion to compel, which motion was g rante d by Orde r of Apr il 22, 2005. Th is O rd e r g ra

nte d M s. B a te y

an a dd iti on a l f

if te e n d ay s in

wh ic h to com

ply wi th dis c ov e ry

re qu e sts and, ag ain, Ms. Batey

was san ct i o ned–this time in the amount of $270.00. Despite these chanc es t o c o mp l y , M s

. B a t e y

s t i l l f a i l e d t o an s w e r

d i s c o v e r y o r t o f i l e an an s w e r t o t h e d e t a i n e r w ar r a n t

. In fac t, the rec ord re veals that it was Ms. B atey ’s re fusal to re spond to discovery that led to her attorney fili ng a mot ion to w ith dr aw. On

Marc h 2 4, 20 05 , M r. Cr a in, the n atto rn e y fo r M s. B a te y , s e nt a le tte r t o Cummi ns ’s a tto rn e y , w hic h le tte r r e a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art :
Af te r m e e tin g wi th M s. B a te y y e ste rd ay

to d isc us s h e r a

ns we rs to y our written discovery , I lear ned that she w as not in a position at that time to respond. B ased on our ear lier conve rsation, I

am left with no alternative but to file the enc losed Mo t i o n to Wi thdraw a s her counsel....

Fr om this corresponde nce, it appe ars that Ms. B atey k n ew that she wa s require d to answer the discovery and y et, despite this knowle dg e, she continually ref used to c omply

. As stated above , the trial court' s decision re fusing to se t a side the defa ult judg ment can only be overturne d upon a finding of abuse of discre tion. Under Roman Ca tho lic Dioc ese of Na shv ill e , 154 S.W .3d at 42, a tria l court abuses its discre tion in one of two way s. Id . First, the trial court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorre ct leg al standar d. Id . Her e, the c ourt used the defa ult judg ment as a sa

nction allowable unde r Te nn . R. Civ . P. 37 .0 2. F ur the r, the c ourt

did no t a pp ly an in c orr e c t le g a l st and ard in r e fu sin g to g ra nt r e lie f u nd e r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 60 .0 2. Se c on d, the tr ia l c ourt a bu se s it s d isc re tio n if

it r e a c he s a d e c i s i o nw h i c h i s a g a i n s t l o g i c o r r e a s o n i n g an d

w h i c h c a u s e s ani n j u s t i c e t o t h e c o mp l a i n i n g p a rt y. Roman Ca tho lic

Dioc ese of Na shv ill e , 154 S.W .3d at 42. Her e, the trial cour t's de cision was log ical and re as o n ab le. The tria l court base d its decision to uphold the default judg ment on Ms. Batey ’s deliberate re fusal to comply with discovery

require ments, even a fter a dditional tim e for providing the discover

y response s was g rante d. There fore , the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in either g ranting the motion for def ault judgme nt or in ref

using to set a side same.

We n ote that Ms. B a te y

do e s n ot r a ise an is su e c on c e rn ingthe awa rd of $1 5, 00 0. 00 in t

his
case . Howeve r, as noted a bove, we have no transcr ipt or st atement of the evidence a dduced a t the hear ing on da

mag es. When revie wing a ca se on appea l, the appellate courts rely upon the re cord, which sets for

th the fac ts established as evide nce in the tr ial court. Sta te De p't of Chil dr e n's S e rv s. v . O we ns , 129 S.W .3d 50, 56 (Tenn.2004) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(c) ). I n this case , the re cord-7-

of wha t tr an s p ir e d in th e tr ia l c o u rt is li mi te d d u e to th e la c k o f a tr a

n s c r ip t o r s tate me n t of the evidenc e. The rec ord on appe al in this case is, there for e, conf ined to what is ref

err ed to as the te c h n ic a l r e c o r d. P r o se litigants ar e entitled to fa ir and e qual treatment, but they are not excused from complying w ith the applicable substantive a nd proce dural law

. Pa e hle r v. U nio n Pl ant e rs N at. Bank , 971 S.W .2d 393, 396 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997). There fore , in the absenc e of a transcr ipt or statement of the e vidence , we must conc lusive l y p re sume that eve ry fac t admissible under the pleading s was found or should ha ve been found in f

avor of Appellee

. Le e k v

. P owe ll , 884 S.W .2d 11 9 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 99 6) ; Lyon v. Ly on , 765 S.W .2d 75 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988). Co n s eq u entl y , we conclude that the awa

rd of damage s i n this case wa s supported by the evidenc e adduc ed at the hear ing on sa

me.
As noted above , Cummi ns asks this Court for a finding of fr ivolous appeal a nd for a n awa rd of costs and f

ees ba sed upon that finding . I t is well settl ed t h at “[ s ] u ccessful litigants should not have to be ar the expense and vex ation of groundless a ppeals.” Da v is v

. Gulf Ins ura nc eGr oup , 546 S.W .2d 583, 586 (Tenn.1977)

.
F ro m ou r r e vie w of th e re c or d in

thi s c a se , w e c on c lud e that App e lla nt h a d n o r e a so na

ble ch ance of succ ess on the appe al, and it appe ars, f rom the history

of the c ase, that this i s another ins tanc e by the Ap pe lla

nt to de lay the ine vit a

ble

. Ac c or din g ly , we fi nd that th is i s a

fr ivo lou s a

pp e a l, and Appe llee is entitled to damag es incurr ed by virtue there of.

Acc ording ly , the orde r of the tr ial court is af firmed, an d t h i s case is remande d to the trial
c ourt fo r a de te rm inatio n b y

the tr ia l c ourt

of dama g e s to be a sse sse d a g a ins t th e Ap pe lla nt. Cos ts
o f t h e a p p e a l ar e a s s e s s e d

a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l an t , A l l i s o nB a t e y, an d h e r s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. F RA NK CRA WF OR D, P RE S I DI NG J UDG E, W.S.