alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         395,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,573,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                    50,000
<INVENTORY>                                    502,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,015,000
<PP&E>                                       1,487,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 679,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,907,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,318,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     8,319,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (6,799,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,907,000
<SALES>                                      5,678,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,678,000
<CGS>                                        3,733,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,496,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              26,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,581,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,581,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.47)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.47)
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, W. BradleyBlair, II, certify that:

1.             I have reviewed this QuarterlyReport on Form 10-Q of Golf Trust of America, Inc;

2.             Based on my knowledge, this reportdoes not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state amaterial fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

3.             Based on my knowledge, thefinancial statements, and other financial information included in this report,fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;

4.             The registrant’s other certifyingofficer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)           Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

(b)           Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

(c)           Disclosed in this report any changein the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and

5.             The registrant’s other certifyingofficer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions):

(a)           All significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and

(b)           Any fraud, whether or not material,that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
| May 15, 2007 |     | /s/ W. BRADLEY BLAIR, II  |
|--------------|----------|---------------------------|
|         |     | W. Bradley Blair, II      |
|         | * * | *Chief Executive Officer* |

 

1

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Donald James LAWSON, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-35207.

D.C. Nos. CV-01-00201-WFN, CR-97-00154-WFN.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 13, 2003.*

Decided Jan. 21, 2003.

Before BEEZER, KLEINFELD and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellant’s request for oral argument is denied.

*684MEMORANDUM**

Donald James Lawson appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging the 120-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, we review de novo, *United States v. Chacon-Palomares,*208 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

Lawson contends that *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) applies retroactively and renders his sentence unconstitutional. This contention is unpersuasive. First, because *Apprendi*does not apply retroactively to cases on initial collateral review. *United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes,*282 F.3d 664, 671 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 48, 154 L.Ed.2d 243 (2002). Second, Lawson’s sentence is below the 20-year statutory maximum for an unspecified amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), so *Apprendi*would not reduce his sentence. *See United States v. Garcia-Guizar,*227 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 984, 121 S.Ct. 1629, 149 L.Ed.2d 490. (2001).1

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. Lawson also contends that the AEDPA made federal habeas petitions a critical stage of the legal process, entitling him to appointed counsel at the district court hearing. This issue was not certified for appeal and we decline to address it.- 9th Cir. R. 22-1. Lawson's request for counsel in the instant appeal is denied.
214 La. 361

#### WENDLING v. AUCOIN.

No. 38659.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 8, 1948.

Frank H. Langridge, of Gretna, for defendant and appellant.

Connor, Durham & Clarke and Bert W. Clarke, all of New Orleans, for appellee.

HAMITER, Justice.

The defendant is appealing from a judgment in favor of his wife, the plaintiff herein, decreeing a separation from bed and board on the ground of cruel treatment, granting to her the custody of their minor child, and condemning him to pay alimony in the sum of $56 per month.

Appellant urges here only an insufficiency of the evidence in proof of the wife’s charge of his excessive and extreme cruelty towards her.

While the record does not disclose the commission of any physical violence by defendant on his wife, it does contain evidence of certain conduct, occurring during plaintiff’s period of pregnancy and causing her (a person of highly nervous temperament) to endure repeated hysterical spells, which amounted to mental abuse and harassment. This included an attempt to physically carry plaintiff from th'eir home to a tourist court against her will, the making of unreasonable demands and the using of what is termed brutal force with reference to their sexual relations, and his constant criticism of her in the handling of family funds and in the performance of household duties.

Defendant, of course, denied any cruel treatment towards his wife; his denial, however, was qualified somewhat as follows: “Q. You heard her testify that you mistreated her in your marital relations. Is that true? A. No, I guess she took it the wrong way. I didn’t do it intentionally if I did.”

If defendant actually committed during plaintiff’s period of pregnancy the above enumerated acts, it must be held that he was guilty of the cruel treatment which justifies a judgment of separation from bed and board. For as was said in Moore v. Moore, 192 La. 289, 187 So. 670, 671:

> “Cruel treatment, under the jurisprudence of this state, is not confined to physical mistreatment, abuse, or injury, but can, likewise, result from mental harassment alone arising from conduct that is the ‘very *820refinement of cruelty/ without either force or blows. * * * ”

Whether or not the evidence adduced preponderately shows the unreasonable conduct attributed to defendant is a question that addresses itself to the weight to be afforded the testimony of the witnesses. Sampognaro v. Sampognaro, 211 La. 105, 29 So.2d 581. The district judge resolved this question in favor of plaintiff. We can not say that he manifestly erred in so ruling; he had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified and could weigh better their conflicting testimony than can we from the transcript containing it.

The judgment is affirmed.

O’NIELL, C. J., dissents.
#### Maria T. Miller, Appellant, v Baayork Almadovar et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. Joseph L. Miller et al., Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

[744 NYS2d 716]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cammer, J.), entered July 11, 2001, which, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint upon finding that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the notice of appeal is deemed an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted *(see*CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the complaint is reinstated.

Following jury selection in this personal injury action, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, asked the plaintiff for an offer of proof on the issue of whether she had sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s request for a short continuance to allow her to produce a medical witness, and then dismissed the complaint upon finding that the offer of proof she was able to make was insufficient. Reversal is warranted since the Supreme Court improperly dismissed the complaint, sua sponte, and without granting the plaintiff the short continuance she requested. In so doing, the Supreme Court deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to properly address the issue of whether or not she sustained a serious injury, “rendering meaningful appellate review of the propriety of the court’s determination on the merits impossible” *(Sena v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*198 AD2d 345, 346; *see Balogh v H.R.B. Caterers,*88 AD2d 136).

In light of this determination, we need not reach the plaintiff’s remaining contention. Santucci, J.P., Florio, Goldstein and Townes, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT
      32.2




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
      connection with the annual report on Form 10-K of Value Line, Inc. (the
“Company”), for the period ended April 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Mitchell E. Appel,
      Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
      1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





1)
            the
                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
                and





2)
            the
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.








Date:
      July 28, 2006


By: 
      /s/ Mitchell E. Appel


Mitchell
      E. Appel


Chief
      Financial Officer
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 3Federal Reserve Bank of: PhiladelphiaFilings received during the week ending June 15, 2013FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodDELANCO, MHC                                                                                                            * SLHC Formation
IV 

House Calendar No. 176 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 894 

[Report No. 110–499] 

Providing for consideration of the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 3996) 

to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend certain expiring 

provisions, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 19, 2007 

Ms. SLAUGHTER, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

RESOLUTION 

Providing for consideration of the Senate amendment to the 

bill (H.R. 3996) to amend the Internal Revenue Code 

of 1986 to extend certain expiring provisions, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it 

2 shall be in order to take from the Speaker’s table the bill 

3 (H.R. 3996) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 

4 to extend certain expiring provisions, and for other pur5 poses, with the Senate amendment thereto, and to con6 sider in the House, without intervention of any point of 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with BILLS
2 

•HRES 894 RH 

1 order, a motion offered by the chairman of the Committee 

2 on Ways and Means or his designee that the House concur 

3 in the Senate amendment. The Senate amendment and the 

4 motion shall be considered as read. The motion shall be 

5 debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by 

6 the chairman and ranking minority member of the Com7 mittee on Ways and Means. The previous question shall 

8 be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption 

9 without intervening motion. 

10 SEC. 2. During consideration of the motion to concur 

11 pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation 

12 of the previous question, the Chair may postpone further 

13 consideration of the motion to such time as may be des14 ignated by the Speaker. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with BILLS

hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with BILLS
House Calendar No. 176 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 894 

[Report No. 110

–499] 

RESOLUTION 

Providing for consideration of the Senate amendpiring provisions, and for other purposes. nal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend certain ex- ment to the bill (H.R. 3996) to amend the InterDECEMBER 19, 2007 

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with BILLS
---

B.9. Number of Agricultural Bank Failures Year
                  Q1
                  Q2
                  Q3
                  Q4
                  Total1988
          11
          6
          12
          7
          361989
          5
          7
          5
          5
          221990
          3
          5
          6
          3
          171991
          2
          2
          3
          1
          81992
          1
          1
          1
          4
          71993
          1
          2
          2
          0
          51994
          0
          0
          0
          0
          01995
          0
          0
          0
          0
          01996
          0
          2
          0
          0
          21997
          0
          0
          0
          1
          11998
          0
          0
          1
          0
          11999
          0
          1
          0
          0
          12000
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02001
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02002
          1
          0
          0
          1
          22003
          0
          1
          0
          0
          12004
          0
          1
          0
          0
          12005
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02006
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02007
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02008
          1
          0
          0
          2
          32009
          2
          n.a.
          n.a.
          n.a.
          n.a. Note. Data exclude banks assisted to prevent failure.
Industrial banks and mutual savings banks also are
excluded.  Agricultural banks are defined in the
introduction to section B.
   n.a. Not available.


Statistical releases

---

Home Economic research and data  Accessibility Contact Us  Last update: July 02, 2009
---

B.9. Number of Agricultural Bank Failures Year
                  Q1
                  Q2
                  Q3
                  Q4
                  Total1988
          11
          6
          12
          7
          361989
          5
          7
          5
          5
          221990
          3
          5
          6
          3
          171991
          2
          2
          3
          1
          81992
          1
          1
          1
          4
          71993
          1
          2
          2
          0
          51994
          0
          0
          0
          0
          01995
          0
          0
          0
          0
          01996
          0
          2
          0
          0
          21997
          0
          0
          0
          1
          11998
          0
          0
          1
          0
          11999
          0
          1
          0
          0
          12000
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02001
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02002
          1
          0
          0
          1
          22003
          0
          1
          0
          0
          12004
          0
          1
          0
          0
          12005
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02006
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02007
          0
          0
          0
          0
          02008
          1
          0
          0
          2
          32009
          2
          3
          n.a.
          n.a.
          n.a. Note. Data exclude banks assisted to prevent failure.
Industrial banks and mutual savings banks also are
excluded.  Agricultural banks are defined in the
introduction to section B.
   n.a. Not available.


Statistical releases

---

Home Economic research and data  Accessibility Contact Us  Last update: September 15, 2009
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 12-2957

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellee

v.

Anthony Donnelle Brown

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

____________

 Submitted: February 11, 2013

Filed: February 22, 2013

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SMITH, ARNOLD, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Anthony Brown admitted that by twice driving after his license was cancelled

(a misdemeanor under Minnesota law), he violated the terms of his supervised release

that were imposed as part of his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm,

see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The parties agreed that Mr. Brown's infractions

constituted a Grade C violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(3), and, given Mr. Brown's
criminal history, the guidelines recommended a range of 8 to 14 months'

incarceration, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. After the district court sentenced him to 1

6 months in prison, Mr. Brown appealed, arguing that his sentence is substantively

unreasonable because it is "greater than necessary" to fulfill the sentencing goals set

out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

We use the same "deferential abuse-of-discretion standard" to review the

substantive reasonableness of sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised

release as we do when considering the substantive reasonableness of an initial

sentence. See United States v. Merrival, 521 F.3d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 2008). We

likewise give the same presumption ofreasonablenessto a revocation sentence within

the range recommended by U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 that we give to an initial sentence that

falls within the applicable guideline range. See, e.g., United States v. Petreikis,

551 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, where a district court imposes an

initial sentence below the advisory guideline range, we have held that "it is nearly

inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still

further," see United States v. Lazarski, 560 F.3d 731, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2009), and we

see no reason to apply a different principle to a sentence below a range recommended

by § 7B1.4, such as Mr. Brown's. In imposing sentence, moreover, the district court

here noted that it was "taking into account all of the circumstances," including

Mr. Brown's "track" record on supervised release, which was "not good." From these

statements and the record as a whole, we conclude that the court properly considered

the § 3553(a) sentencing goals as directed to do when imposing a sentence from a

violation of supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). See United States v.

Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (8th Cir. 2008). Because Mr. Brown has given us

no reason to believe that his below-guidelines sentence was "greater than necessary"

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District 1

of Minnesota.

-2-
to fulfill the appropriate sentencing goals set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we discern

no error here.

Affirmed.

______________________________

-3-