alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02280-WYD

RANDLE S. CRABILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon consideration of the Stipulation for Equal

Access to Justice Act Attorney's Fees filed on June 20, 2013. The Stipulation states

that the parties, through counsel, have agreed to an award of attorney fees to Plaintiff

under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount of $4,000.00.

After a careful review of the file and the Stipulation, it is

ORDERED that the Stipulation for Equal Access to Justice Act Attorney's Fees

(ECF No. 24) is APPROVED. In accordance therewith, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees in the total amount of

$4,000.00 under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Payment shall be made to Plaintiff

directly, care of his attorney, at:

Michael W. Seckar, Esquire

402 W. 12th Street

Pueblo, CO 81003

Case 1:11-cv-02280-WYD Document 25 Filed 06/20/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
-2-

Dated: June 20, 2013.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Wiley Y. Daniel 

Wiley Y. Daniel,

Senior United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02280-WYD Document 25 Filed 06/20/13 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2094

To amend the Act of March 3, 1931 (known as the Davis-Bacon Act)

to increase the contract amount specified in the Act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 7, 2001

Mr. BALLENGER (for himself and Mr. COBLE) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce

A BILL

To amend the Act of March 3, 1931 (known as the DavisBacon Act) to increase the contract amount specified

in the Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Davis-Bacon Mod5 ernization Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. INCREASE IN CONTRACT AMOUNT.

7 Subsection (a) of the first section of the Act of March

8 3, 1931 (known as the Davis-Bacon Act) is amended by

9 striking ‘‘$2,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$100,000’’.

Æ
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

---------------------

No. 01-31402

Summary Calendar

---------------------

EDWARD DIXON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

JOE L. SMITH,

Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

THE REVELATION CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC.; ET AL.,

Defendants - Intervenor Defendants

THE REVELATION CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant - Intervenor Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(98-CV-863-A)

November 21, 2002

Before JOLLY, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Edward Dixon and Joe L. Smith appeal the district court’s

judgment, following a bench trial, in favor of The Revelation

Corporation of America, Inc. (“RCA”), dismissing their claims for
2

attorneys’ fees and for detrimental reliance on RCA’s alleged

promises of employment.

With respect to their claims for attorneys’ fees, the

appellants argue that the district court’s written findings of fact

and conclusions of law are inconsistent with the court’s oral

statements, following completion of the bench trial, that the

appellants had a viable claim for attorneys’ fees. The district

court’s oral statements were not formal findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The court made clear that it was “just kind of

sharing” its thoughts with counsel. After sharing those thoughts,

the district court took the matter under advisement. Upon further

study, the district court found, in writing, that the legal

services rendered by the appellants were performed on behalf of the

National Baptist Convention of America, Inc. (“NBCA”), rather than

on behalf of RCA. That finding of fact is not clearly erroneous.

The district court observed further that there was no evidence that

NBCA ever approved the appellants’ attorneys’ fee invoices or

submitted them to RCA for reimbursement. Accordingly, the district

court did not err by concluding that the appellants were not owed

any attorneys’ fees by RCA.

Furthermore, the district court did not commit reversible

error in concluding that the appellants failed to prove that any

offer of employment was ever made to them by RCA or by any

authorized person on behalf of RCA. Therefore, the district court
3

did not err by dismissing the appellants’ claims for detrimental

reliance.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, essentially

for the reasons stated by the district court in its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law. Dixon v. The Revelation Corporation

of America, Inc., et al., Civ. Action No. 98-863-A (M.D. La., Nov.

9, 2001).

A F F I R M E D.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND THE CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE
SHEET AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH SEPTEMBER 1997 10Q.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,483,640
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  589,763
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,073,403
<PP&E>                                      18,573,637
<DEPRECIATION>                                (71,001)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              20,576,039
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,144,804
<BONDS>                                      2,013,710
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    19,972,124
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,554,599)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                20,576,039
<SALES>                                        625,201
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               625,201
<CGS>                                          447,438
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  447,438
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                177,763
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (44,441)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            133,322
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   133,322
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

USA

v . Civil No. 08-mc-88-JD

Peter R. Maggio

ORDE R

I herewith approve the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Muirhead dated January 14, 2009, recommending that it the taxpayer, Peter R .

Maggio, be ordered to obey the summons and that he be ordered to appear on

March 2, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. at 1000 Elm Street, Manchester, NH at 10:00 a .m.

before Diane Saylor, to give testimony and produce all books and records in his

possession or control required and called for by the terms of the summons of

August 7, 2008 . It is further recommended that the government be awarded its

costs.

SO ORDERED.

February 3, 2009 /s/Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

cc: Michael T. McCormack, ausa

Peter R. Maggio

Case 1:08-mc-00088-JD Document 5 Filed 02/03/09 Page 1 of 1
#### Johnny LOPEZ, Appellant, v. ROYAL INDEMNITY CO., Appellee.

No. 15070.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

June 28, 1972.

Tinsman & Houser, Inc., Robert D. Sohn, San Antonio, for appellant.

Loyd E. Bingham, Jr., House, Mercer, House & Brock, San Antonio, for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by appellant from a take-nothing summary judgment granted Royal Indemnity Company in appellant’s suit against Harold Ushery and Royal Indemnity Company to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage sustained in an automobile collision.1 Summary judgment was granted Royal Indemnity Company upon the trial court’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, appellant had not given written notice as soon as practicable after the accident.

The summary judgment makes reference to the fact that the suit is brought against two defendants; however, there is no disposition made of appellant’s claim against Harold Ushery, nor is there an order of severance in the record before us. Therefore, we do not have the power to review the partial summary judgment granted in this cause. See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, 159 Tex. 550, 324 S.W.2d 200 (1959); Travelers Insurance Company v. Appell, 471 S.W.2d 886 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1971, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

1

. At the time of the accident, Harold Ushery carried liability insurance with Dealers National Insurance Company. Dealers National Insurance Company was placed in receivership before a settlement was consummated with Lopez, and he, therefore, seeks recovery from Royal Indemnity Company under the uninsured motorist’s coverage of his own policy.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                          82,390
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,910,268
<ALLOWANCES>                                 3,300,556
<INVENTORY>                                  5,834,828
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,826,022
<PP&E>                                       6,648,652
<DEPRECIATION>                                 463,538
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,085,216
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,644,132
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        23,660
<OTHER-SE>                                     230,560
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,085,216
<SALES>                                     13,770,728
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            13,770,728
<CGS>                                       11,616,449
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,617,863
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                91,978
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             406,681
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,962,243)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,962,243)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,962,243)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.73)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.73)
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

The Mark W. Knight Revocable Trust,

Jennifer Knight, Trustee

v. Civil No. 08-cv-354-JM

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,

 d/b/a/ MetLife Investors USA Insurance

Company, and The New England Agency

an Office of MetLife

O R D E R

A flurry of motions have resulted from the court’s

inadvertent premature ruling on plaintiff’s motion to amend its

complaint.

Background

Plaintiff filed a motion to amend complaint as a matter of

right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) on September 23, 2008. (Doc.

no. 10.) Although the docket correctly shows that defendant had

until October 10, 2008 to file an objection, the motion was sent

to me on September 24, 2008 for ruling with the notation, “No

answer/responsive pleading has been filed yet by defendants.” I

did not look at the docket for dates and assumed that the time to

object had passed. Sending me the motion was inadvertent and

premature. Defendant had a right to respond. My ruling of

Case 1:08-cv-00354-JM Document 21 Filed 10/03/08 Page 1 of 2
2

September 24, 2008 granting the motion to amend is withdrawn. 

The parties may rely on their memoranda filed on the motion to

reconsider (Doc. no. 16) and/or file memoranda within ten days on

the motion to amend (Doc. no. 10).

The motion to remand (Doc. no. 13) is denied without

prejudice as premature. The motion to strike (Doc. no. 17) the

amended complaint (Doc. no. 11) is granted. The motion for

reconsideration (Doc. no. 16) is granted, in that I will decide

Doc. no. 10 on the merits after defendant has a chance to

respond.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 3, 2008

cc: David S.V. Shirley

 Edmund J. Waters, Jr.

 James J. Ciapciak

 

Case 1:08-cv-00354-JM Document 21 Filed 10/03/08 Page 2 of 2
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION UNDERSECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned certifies that thisperiodic report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained inthis periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of Golf Trust of America, Inc.

 
| Date:  May 11, 2004 |                                                 |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
|                     |                                                 |
|                     | /s/  W. Bradley Blair, II                       |   |
|                     | W. Bradley  Blair, II                                |
|                     | *President and Chief Executive Officer*              |
|                     |                                                 |
|                     |                                                 |
| Date:  May 11, 2004 |                                                 |
|                     |                                                 |
|                     | /s/  Scott D. Peters                            |   |
|                     | Scott D.  Peters                                     |
|                     | *Senior Vice President and Chief Financial  Officer* |
|                          |                                                      |  |  |

 

----
#### Paul R. Patera, Appellant, v Joan M. Patera, Respondent.

[745 NYS2d 722]

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk *571County (Blydenburgh, J.), entered November 20, 2000, as directed him to pay the defendant maintenance in the sum of $200 per week for 11 years.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

It is well settled that the amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the trial court’s sound discretion *(see Kahn v Kahn,*221 AD2d 320, 321; *Feldman v Feldman,*194 AD2d 207, 217; *Sperling v Sperling,*165 AD2d 338, 341). Under the circumstances presented here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in fashioning its maintenance award *(see Castiglione v Castiglione,*259 AD2d 582, 583; *Morrissey v Morrissey,*259 AD2d 472). O’Brien, J.P., Krausman, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 1, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STEVEN FISHMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-5035

(D.C. Nos. 4:12-CV-00607-CVE-TLW

and 4:07-CR-00195-CVE-4)

(N.D. Okla.)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

A federal jury convicted Steven Fishman of two conspiracy charges based

on his role in a long-running scheme to unload worthless bonds on unwitting

investors. After this court affirmed the conviction and sentence, see United States

v. Fishman, 645 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2011), Mr. Fishman filed a habeas petition

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking relief on a number of grounds. The district court

rejected each of Mr. Fishman’s arguments in a detailed 48-page order and then

proceeded to reject his request for a certificate of appealability in a separate

order. It’s this request Mr. Fishman now asks us to revisit. But we may grant a

*

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
COA only if “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

was correct.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c). And so much we cannot say in this case. All the arguments Mr.

Fishman seeks to present to this court are premised on the notion that the

government lacked Article III standing to pursue the case against him. But, as the

district court noted when denying Mr. Fishman’s initial COA request, even

viewing his lengthy § 2255 petition with liberality this argument was not among

the many fairly presented there. And a district court cannot be debatably wrong

on issues that are not fairly presented to or decided by it. See, e.g., Sanders v.

Miller, 555 F. App’x 750, 751 (10th Cir. 2014) (declining to indulge a COA

request premised on an argument “never raised . . . before the district court”); see

also United States v. Scruggs, 691 F.3d 660, 667 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding “no

reason why a § 2255 movant hoping to raise a jurisdictional challenge to his

conviction on collateral review should be excused from including the claim in his

§ 2255 motion”).

Mr. Fishman’s request for a COA and his motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis are denied. This appeal is dismissed. Mr. Fishman is reminded of

his obligation to pay the filing fee in full.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Neil M. Gorsuch

Circuit Judge

- 2 -
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 870 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 870

  Congratulating the 200th Anniversary of the University of Maryland 
                          School of Medicine.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 12, 2007

Mr. Cummings submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                  the Committee on Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Congratulating the 200th Anniversary of the University of Maryland 
                          School of Medicine.

Whereas the Baltimore campus of the University of Maryland was founded in 1807;
Whereas the School of Medicine was established in 1807, which makes it the first 
        public and the fifth oldest medical school in the United States and the 
        first to institute a residency training program in 1823;
Whereas the School of Medicine is the founding school at the University of 
        Maryland and is an integral part of the 11-campus University System of 
        Maryland;
Whereas at the University of Maryland in Baltimore, the School of Medicine 
        serves as the foundation for a large academic health center that 
        combines medical education, biomedical research, patient care, and 
        community service;
Whereas the University of Maryland School of Medicine is dedicated to providing 
        excellence in biomedical education, basic and clinical research, quality 
        patient care, and service to improve the health of the citizens of 
        Maryland and beyond;
Whereas the School of Medicine is committed to the education and training of 
        M.D., Ph.D., graduate, physical therapy, rehabilitation science, and 
        medical research technology students;
Whereas the University of Maryland School of Medicine has played a crucial role 
        in helping to meet Maryland's health care needs and continues to recruit 
        and develop faculty to serve as exemplary role models for students;
Whereas in 1823, the medical school became the first teaching hospital in the 
        Nation with the construction of the Baltimore Infirmary; and
Whereas the University of Maryland School of Medicine has a legacy that has 
        established a tradition of academic excellence, outstanding patient 
        care, and ground-breaking research: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the United States House of Representatives--
            (1) congratulates the 200th Anniversary of the University 
        of Maryland School of Medicine;
            (2) recognizes the achievements of the University of 
        Maryland, Baltimore, and the School of Medicine in training 
        local, State, and world leaders; and
            (3) recognizes the achievements of the University of 
        Maryland School of Medicine for outstanding work in the 
        community.
                                 <all>
```
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 2Federal Reserve Bank of: New YorkFilings received during the week ending May 5, 2007FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodBANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA, S.A.                                                                                   * 3A1