[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-11772

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00082-MCR-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN P. LOTHAMER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(November 26, 2018)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

John Lothamer pled guilty to distribution and attempted production of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2252A(a)(2). For these 

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offenses, the district court sentenced him to 180 months of imprisonment followed 

by a life term of supervised release. Lothamer appeals, arguing that the life term of 

supervised release is substantively unreasonable, given his personal history, lack of 

a criminal record or physical contact with any minor, and low risk of recidivism. 

After careful review, we affirm. 

We typically review the reasonableness of the district court’s sentence of 

supervised release for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 

1087 (11th Cir. 2003). Both parties here, however, say that plain-error review 

applies because Lothamer did not address or object to the life term at sentencing. 

See United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1238 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that 

we generally review arguments raised for the first time on appeal for plain error). 

Yet they do not cite any published case in which we have applied plain-error review 

to an appeal of the reasonableness of a term of supervised release. And in any case, 

we need not resolve whether plain-error review applies here because Lothamer 

cannot prevail even under our ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard. 

In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we ensure that the sentence is both 

free from any significant procedural error and “substantively reasonable in light of 

the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Trailer, 

827 F.3d 933, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2016). Lothamer does not argue that the court 

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procedurally erred in sentencing him, and we see no error in that regard, so we 

consider only the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

In general, the district court must impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not 

greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). When including a term of supervised release, the court must determine 

the length of the term based on the purposes of deterrence, protection of the public, 

and rehabilitation, but not retribution. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c); see id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–

(D). The court must also consider, among other factors, the nature and 

circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and 

any relevant policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id.

§ 3553(a)(1), (5). The weight to be given each § 3553(a) factor is within the district 

court’s sound discretion. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 

2013). 

“The party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the sentence 

is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial 

deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 

1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). Ordinarily, “we will reverse a sentence as substantively 

unreasonable only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the 

[d]istrict [c]ourt committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors by 

arriving at a sentence outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts 

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of the case.” United States v. Alberts, 859 F.3d 979, 985 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation 

marks omitted).

Here, Lothamer has not met his burden of showing that the district court 

abused its discretion by imposing a life time of supervised release. First, the 

governing statute authorized a life term. For sex offenses, including distribution and 

attempted production of child pornography, a district court must impose a term of 

supervised release of at least five years, and it may impose a term up to life. 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(k). Additionally, as we noted in United States v. Pugh, Congress 

enacted § 3583(k) with the intent “to impose life terms of supervised release on sex 

offenders.” 515 F.3d 1179, 1199 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, the court’s decision is consistent with § 3583(k). 

Second, the district court’s decision is also consistent with the guidelines. The 

Sentencing Commission has issued a policy statement recommending life terms of 

supervised release for sex offenses. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2) (“If the instant offense 

of conviction is a sex offense, . . . the statutory maximum term of supervised release 

is recommended.”). Lothamer does not dispute that his convictions qualify as “sex 

offense[s]” within the meaning of this policy statement. The court was required to 

consider this policy statement in imposing the term of supervised release, see 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5), which further supports the reasonableness of the district court’s 

decision to impose a life term. 

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Third, the district court’s imposition of a life term of supervised release is 

supported by the other § 3553(a) factors and the particular facts of Lothamer’s case. 

Lothamer argues that a life term is too harsh in light of his general history and 

characteristics—including his veteran status, steady employment history, balanced 

family life, and lack of criminal record—as well as the relatively minor nature of the 

offenses, his lack of physical contact with minors, and his low risk of recidivism. 

But the district court reasonably balanced these mitigating factors against 

other factors supporting a serious term of supervised release, and we will not secondguess the court’s weighing decisions. In particular, the court cited his repeated 

requests that a purported minor produce and send him pornographic images, his 

illicit chats with two real minors, his “daddy rules” that demonstrated experience in 

such a role, and his distribution of pornographic images to minors for the purpose of 

having them produce similar images. This evidence, according to the court, reflected 

a “pattern of activity” of Lothamer “grooming minors” on the internet and 

“control[ing] children for [his] own sexual pleasure.” The court was entitled to 

weigh these factors more heavily and to conclude, consistent with what the 

guidelines recommend, that a serious term of supervised release was necessary to 

deter others, to protect the public, and to promote rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D), 3583(k). 

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Finally, we note that Lothamer’s life term of supervised release “can be 

shortened in the future by the district court.” Trailer, 827 F.3d at 937. As we noted 

in Trailer, in upholding a life term of supervised release for failure to register as a 

sex offender, a defendant can both petition the district court “for modification of the 

conditions of supervised release” and “also seek early termination of his supervised 

release after he has served at least one year of the term.” Id. at 937–38 (citing 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)). If the district court denies such a motion, he may seek appellate 

review of that decision. Id. at 938. 

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision to impose a life term 

of supervised release for Lothamer’s child-pornography convictions. 

AFFIRMED.

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