alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*Release Date: September 30, 2007*

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```
C.5. Average Variable Interest Rates on Farm Loans
Percent
```

| Quarter | Other operating loans1 | Intermediate non-real-estate loans | Long-term real estate loans |
|---------|------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
||
| 7.4     | 7.3                    | 6.9                                |
| 7.7     | 7.7                    | 7.2                                |
| 8.1     | 8.0                    | 7.6                                |
| 8.3     | 8.3                    | 7.8                                |
| 8.7     | 8.7                    | 8.2                                |
| 8.9     | 8.8                    | 8.3                                |
| 9.0     | 8.8                    | 8.3                                |
| 8.9     | 8.8                    | 8.2                                |
| 8.8     | 8.7                    | 8.2                                |
||
| 7.7     | 7.5                    | 7.0                                |
| 8.1     | 7.9                    | 7.3                                |
| 8.4     | 8.2                    | 7.6                                |
| 8.6     | 8.4                    | 7.9                                |
| 9.0     | 8.8                    | 8.2                                |
| 9.1     | 8.9                    | 8.4                                |
| 9.2     | 8.9                    | 8.3                                |
| 9.1     | 8.8                    | 8.3                                |
| 9.1     | 8.8                    | 8.2                                |
||
| 7.4     | 7.7                    | 7.5                                |
| 7.9     | 8.0                    | 7.8                                |
| 8.8     | 8.8                    | 8.5                                |
| 8.9     | 9.0                    | 8.6                                |
| 9.1     | 9.1                    | 8.7                                |
| 9.3     | 9.3                    | 8.8                                |
| 9.4     | 9.4                    | 8.8                                |
| 9.2     | 9.3                    | 8.6                                |
| 9.4     | 9.5                    | 9.3                                |
```
1. Loans used primarily to finance such items as current crop production expenses
and the care and feeding of livestock (including poultry). Return to table
   * State falls only partly within the indicated Reserve District.
   n.a. Not available.
   Source. Federal Reserve Bank quarterly surveys of agricultural credit conditions at
commercial banks.
```

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Statistical releases

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HomeEconomic research and dataAccessibilityContact Us
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 95-50632

(Summary Calendar)

_________________________

ALVIN LEE HARRISON Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE --

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________________________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(A-95-CV-27)

__________________________________________________

August 6, 1996

Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Having reviewed the record on appeal, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal. We find

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that some of Harrison’s claims had no

arguable basis in law. S ee Hicks v. Garner

, 69 F.3d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1995). We further find that,2

upon review de novo, the remainder of Harrison’s claims were properly dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Blackburn v. City of Marshall

, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th

Cir. 1995); Piotrowski v. City of Houston

, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995); LaBounty v. Adler

, 933

F.2d 121 (2nd Cir. 1991). Further, we find t hat t he imposition of sanctions was not an abuse of

discreti o n given t hat Harrison filed this complaint in state court specifically to avoid the district

court’s order that he refrain from filing any more frivolous claims. S ee Mayfield v. Kevenhagen

, 941

F.2d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 1991).
**Exhibit 99.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION UNDERSECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersignedcertifies that this periodic report fully complies with the requirements ofsection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thatinformation contained in this periodic report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of Golf Trust ofAmerica, Inc.

 
| Date: May  14, 2003 |                                                                 |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                |                                                                 |
|                | /s/  W. Bradley Blair, II                                       |   |
|                | W. Bradley  Blair, II*President  and Chief Executive Officer*        |
|                |                                                                 |
| Date: May  14, 2003 |                                                                 |
|                |                                                                 |
|                | /s/  Scott D. Peters                                            |   |
|                | Scott D.  Peters*Senior  Vice President and Chief Financial Officer* |

 

----
(July 31, 2002)

#### In the Matter of Victor Barron, Petitioner, v Nicholas Colabella, as Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Respondent. Charles J. Hynes, Nonparty.

[745 NYS2d 729]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of prohibition and mandamus, inter alia, to prohibit the respondent, Nicholas Colabella, a Justice of the Supreme Court, from enforcing an order dated February 14, 2002, which declared Civil Rights Law § 52 unconstitutional and granted an application for audiovisual coverage of a criminal proceeding entitled *People v Barron,*pending under Kings County Indictment No. 479/02. Alternative application by the petitioner pursuant to CPLR 103 (c), to convert the proceeding to an action for a judgment declaring that Civil Rights Law § 52 is constitutional.

Adjudged that the proceeding is dismissed, on the law, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the application is denied.

The petitioner, Victor Barron, a Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, was charged under Kings County Indictment No. 479/02 with one count of bribe receiving in the second degree *(see*Penal Law § 200.11). The criminal case was assigned to the respondent, Justice Nicholas Colabella. Just before the arraignment on February 8, 2002, the Daily News, *586L.P., and WNBC, a television station owned and operated by the National Broadcasting Company, Inc., applied for permission to photograph, televise, and broadcast the criminal proceedings. In an order dated February 14, 2002, which superseded an order dated February 8, 2002, Justice Colabella declared Civil Rights Law § 52 unconstitutional and granted the application. Civil Rights Law § 52 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person * * * or corporation shall televise, broadcast [or] take motion pictures * * * of proceedings, in which the testimony of witnesses by subpoena or other compulsory process is or may be taken.”

On July 1, 2002, the petitioner, who purportedly intends to plead guilty on August 5, 2002, commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking either a writ of prohibition barring Justice Colabella from enforcing the order dated February 14, 2002, permitting audiovisual coverage, or a writ of mandamus compelling Justice Colabella to comply with Civil Rights Law § 52. Alternatively, the petitioner made an application, pursuant to CPLR 103 (c), to convert the proceeding to an action for a judgment declaring that Civil Rights Law § 52 is constitutional.

The proceeding must be dismissed on the ground that it is time barred by the four-month statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 217 (see *Matter of Holtzman v Marrus,*74 NY2d 865). Furthermore, on the record before the Court, we decline to convert this proceeding to an action for a judgment declaring that Civil Rights Law § 52 is constitutional. Prudenti, P.J., H. Miller, Schmidt and Mastro, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2061 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2061

  To amend the charter of Southeastern University of the District of 
                               Columbia.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 5, 2001

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the charter of Southeastern University of the District of 
                               Columbia.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS TO CHARTER OF SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY REGARDING 
              BOARD OF TRUSTEES.

    (a) In General.--Section 3 of the Act entitled ``An Act for the 
relief of the Southeastern University of the Young Men's Christian 
Association of the District of Columbia'', approved August 19, 1937 (50 
Stat. 697), as amended by section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to 
amend the charter of Southeastern University of the District of 
Columbia'', approved October 10, 1966 (80 Stat. 883), is amended--
            (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``, one-third of 
        whom'' and all that follows and inserting a period; and
            (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``elected for a 
        term'' and inserting ``elected by the board for a term''.
    (b) Treatment of Current Trustees.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a) shall not affect the term of office of any individual 
serving on the Board of Trustees of Southeastern University as of the 
date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 13.2



Certification of Chief Financial Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



(i) the Annual Report on Form 20-F of the Company for the period ended December 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.



Dated: March 23, 2005



/s/    KARL-HENRIK
SUNDSTRÖMKarl Henrik- SundströmExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer




The foregoing
certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into
any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Honorable Marcia S. Krieger

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01763-MSK-CBS

PASTOR MENDIETA GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

RC UTILITY CORPORATION,

Defendant.

ORDER REGARDING CUSTODY OF EXHIBITS AND DEPOSITIONS USED IN

EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND TRIALS

IT IS ORDERED that, as to any exhibits and depositions used during evidentiary

hearings or trials, counsel for the parties shall retrieve the originals of such exhibits and

depositions from the Court following the evidentiary hearing or trial, and shall retain same for 60

days beyond the later of the time to appeal or conclusion of any appellate proceedings. The

Court will retain its copy of the exhibits for the same time period after which the documents will

be destroyed.

DATED this 8th day of July, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

Marcia S. Krieger

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-01763-MSK-CBS Document 3 Filed 07/08/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
Case 1:08-cv-00503-PB   Document 85   Filed 06/29/11   Page 1 of 1
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 904 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 904

Commending the Northport American Legion Post 694 located in Northport, 
   New York, for raising funds for the Marine and Army combat units 
     fighting in the Middle East, enabling them to purchase needed 
                               equipment.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 19, 2007

 Mr. Israel submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Commending the Northport American Legion Post 694 located in Northport, 
   New York, for raising funds for the Marine and Army combat units 
     fighting in the Middle East, enabling them to purchase needed 
                               equipment.

    Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
            (1) commends the Northport American Legion Post 694 located 
        in Northport, New York, for raising more than $75,000 for the 
        Marine and Army combat units fighting in the Middle East, 
        enabling them to purchase welding equipment, ballistic combat 
        goggles, thigh-rig drop pouches, special rifle slings, combat 
        gloves, and other needed equipment; and
            (2) commends other American Legion Posts nationwide that 
        have raised funds for similar purposes.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge William J. Martínez

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01733-WJM-BNB

ESTATE OF ANGEL DEHERRERA, and

SABRINA DEHERRERA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

OPTIONS INC.,

MANUELA TOOKER,

JOANNE HOWELLS, Individually and in her official capacity as director of Options, Inc.

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND REMAND

On July 1, 2011, Defendants removed this action from Denver District Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on Plaintiff’s assertion of a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (ECF No. 1.) No scheduling conference has been held in this case to date.

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Remand. (ECF No. 17.) 

Plaintiff seeks to file a second amended complaint that states no federal claims and,

based on the lack of a federal claim, argues that the Court should remand the case to

state court. Defendant has not opposed the Motion. Because the only federal claim

has been dropped from this case, the Court finds that remand would best serve the

principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See Carnegie-Mellon

University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). 

Case 1:11-cv-01733-WJM-BNB Document 24 Filed 09/28/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
1

 The Court notes that the Motion requests remand to the District Court in El

Paso County, Colorado. However, the Court can only remand an action to the State

court from which it was removed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

2

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Remand is GRANTED. This case is

REMANDED to the District Court in Denver County, Colorado.1

Dated this 28th day of September, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

 

William J. Martínez 

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-01733-WJM-BNB Document 24 Filed 09/28/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
#### Jacob SOLOMON, Appellant, v. Baron de Hirsch MEYER and Milton Weiss, a partnership, t/d/b/a Meyer, Weiss & Rosen, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division A.

July 11, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 31, 1956.

Harry Zukernick, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Brown, Dean & Hill, Miami, for appel-lees.

PER CURIAM.

The trial judge granted a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint against appellees, who were defendants below, in an action by appellant to recover damages for alleged negligence in representing appellant in the purchase of certain assets of a bankrupt business.

A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that, as against a motion to dismiss, the second amended complaint states a cause of action. The defensive matters argued in the brief of ap-pellees may be appropriately presented by answer or , on motion for summary judgment but they cannot be considered on the motion to dismiss the complaint. We do not here pass .upon the ultimate right of recovery. This will depend upon ,the showing to be made by the proof, if any. Our present opinion is limited by the record entirely to the matter of the sufficiency of the pleading.

■ It being our view that the second amended complaint states a cause of action requiring an answer, the order granting the motion to dismiss and judgment entered pursuant thereto is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, HOBSON and THORNAL, JJ., and MORROW, Associate Justice, concur.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Western Pennsylvania Adventure Capital Fund, LLC on Form 10-Q for the period ended
September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, G. Richard Patton, President, Chief Executive Officer of Western Pennsylvania Adventure Capital Fund, LLC certify to the
best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (S) 1350, as adopted pursuant to (S) 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Western Pennsylvania Adventure Capital Fund,
LLC.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                               
|-----------------------------------------------
|/s/ G. Richard Patton                          
|G. Richard Patton                              
|President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
|November 6, 2006                               

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Western Pennsylvania
Adventure Capital Fund, LLC and will retained by Western Pennsylvania Adventure Capital Fund, LLC and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



25
#### The State, ex rel. Bernhardt, *v.*Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

(No. 24391

—Decided April 4, 1934.)

*Mr. J. Edward 8 chens*and *Messrs. Frank & Ream,*for relator.

*Mr. John W. Bricker,*attorney general, and *Mr. R. R. Zurmehly,*for respondent.

It' appearing to the court that on February 14, 1934, a demurrer to the petition herein was sustained for reasons stated in the entry of this court-that date made and that relator herein was granted thirty days to further plead, and it now appearing that no further pleading has been filed within said thirty days, it is therefore ordered that the writ of mandamus prayed for in the petition be, and the same hereby is, denied.

*Writ denied.*

Weygandt, C. J., Allen, Stephenson, Jones, Matthias, Bevis and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.
No. 72-6327.

#### Knox *v.*United States.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### Myers *v.*City of Cincinnati.

(No. 24550

— Decided April 11, 1934.)

*237
      *Messrs. Nichols, Morrill, Wood, Marx & Ginter,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. John D. Ellis,*city solicitor, and *Mr. Francis T. Bartlett,*for defendant in error.

By the Court.

It is contended by plaintiff in error that the ordinance in question is invalid because it violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of Ohio.

Many recent decisions are to the effect that slot vending machines of the general type involved in this case, which in return for coins deposited therein dispense merchandise, accompanied at intervals by a varying number of checks or tokens which may be used either for obtaining additional merchandise or for securing additional amusement by continuing the operation of the machine, are gambling devices. 81 A. L. R., note beginning at page 177; 38 A. L. R., note beginning at page 73; 12 Ruling Case Law, 730. These decisions appear generally to be based on the theory that devices of this kind encourage and stimulate the gambling instinct of receiving something for nothing, or more for less, and are in such contravention of sound public policy as to come within laws relating to gambling and the exhibition of gambling devices; *238However, our sole function is to decide whether the ordinance before us constitutes a valid exercise of police power on the part of the municipal authorities of the city of Cincinnati.

Generally, the power of municipalities to enact and enforce police regulations within their boundaries is only limited by general laws in conflict therewith. Article XVIII, Section 3, Constitution of Ohio; 8 Ohio Jurisprudence, 347 *et seq.;*28 Ohio Jurisprudence, 101.

The constitutional provisions relied upon by plaintiff in error protect the citizen in his right to pursue any lawful business, but they do not prohibit legislation intended to control pursuits which because of their nature have injurious and harmful possibilities. Even if the slot machine involved in this case is manufactured and intended for lawful operation, its potentiality and design is such that it may be easily put to unlawful use. The regulation or prohibition of such a mechanism need not be postponed until such event occurs. This principle is expounded and applied in the following authorities:

*Murphy*v. *California,*225 U. S., 623, 56 L. Ed., 1229, 32 Sup Ct., 697; *City of Burlingame*v. *Thompson,*74 Kan., 393, 86 P., 449, 11 Ann. Cas., 64; *City of Shreveport*v. *Dale,*149 La., 439, 89 So., 408; 6 Ruling Case Law, 220 *et seq.*

The city has the right to determine whether the exhibition, maintenance and operation of slot machines as defined in the ordinance are prejudicial to the public good. 8 Ohio Jurisprudence, 408.

Being of the opinion that the ordinance in question constitutes a valid exercise of police power and that the defendant was properly convicted under it, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Allen, Stephenson, Jones, Matthias, Beyis and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.