United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 23, 2022*

Decided June 27, 2022 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2702 

LAVALL T. LEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH 

SERVICES, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 19-C-614 

William C. Griesbach, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Lavall Lee sued a jail’s nurse and others over a half-day delay in receiving an 

exam to treat stomach pain and rectal problems when he was a pretrial detainee. The 

district court entered summary judgment for the defendants because Lee did not supply 

evidence suggesting that the defendants knew that faster care was required. Because 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 21-2702 Page 2 

Lee provided no basis for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the treatment he 

received violated the applicable constitutional norms, we affirm.

In reviewing the entry of summary judgment, we describe Lee’s medical care 

based on the record in the light most favorable to Lee. See Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 

1016, 1022 (7th Cir. 2019). Lee experienced gastrointestinal troubles during his pretrial 

detention at the Milwaukee County Jail. He focuses on the 24-hour period beginning on 

August 23, 2018, when he complained of stomach pain and blood in his stool. A nurse 

practitioner examined Lee and scheduled a follow-up appointment for the afternoon of 

the next day. (Medical records show that Brittany Wysocki, a nurse, also examined Lee 

on August 23. Citing inconsistent time-stamps on the records, Lee disputes that the 

records correctly reflect that Wysocki treated him that day.) 

The next morning, Lee wanted immediate treatment. He told a correctional 

officer that he felt severe stomach pain during a bowel movement, saw significant blood 

in his toilet, and may have fainted. The officer described the situation to the prison’s 

health unit and asked that Lee be “prioritized.” After she received the officer’s call, 

Wysocki assessed that Lee’s symptoms were not an emergency and decided that he 

could wait for his appointment that afternoon. Dissatisfied, Lee asked to see other 

correctional officers on duty, and they checked on him. (The record does not reflect 

what they did or saw.) A nurse practitioner examined Lee at his scheduled appointment 

that afternoon. The practitioner referred Lee to an outside specialist for an appointment; 

the practitioner set the appointment for two weeks later. 

The outside specialist performed a colonoscopy and endoscopy, and tested for a 

bacterial infection. Lee tested positive for the infection and received medication that

resolved it. He was also diagnosed with reddening of the rectum, inflammation of the

small intestine, and second-degree internal hemorrhoids. The outside specialist 

prescribed further medication and dietary changes.

Lee responded by suing Wysocki, her employer (Armor Correctional Health 

Services, the jail’s health care provider), and Milwaukee County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

He alleged that Wysocki ignored his serious medical needs, in violation of his 

constitutional rights, by not arranging immediate care after the correctional officer 

reported his symptoms to her on the morning of August 24. In addition, Lee asserted

that Armor and Milwaukee County each enforced unconstitutional policies: Armor

allows medical staff to assess an inmate’s condition based only on an officer’s 

description, and the county prevents officers from declaring medical emergencies 
No. 21-2702 Page 3 

themselves. Lee also asked the district judge to recruit him counsel. The judge denied 

the requests for counsel, finding that Lee could litigate his case himself. 

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the judge ruled in favor of 

the defendants. The defendants argued that Wysocki reasonably let Lee wait for his

scheduled appointment and that he suffered no injury from the short delay. The parties 

disputed whether Wysocki had, along with the nurse practitioner, examined Lee on 

August 23. (In raising this dispute, Lee insisted that the defendants had falsified time 

records.) When granting the defendants’ motion, the judge reasoned that no evidence 

suggested that Lee’s gastrointestinal issues would have resolved differently had 

Wysocki arranged for earlier care on August 24. He also ruled that Lee did not show

any injury from the policies that he alleged. Finally, the judge concluded that Lee had 

not substantiated his assertion that the defendants falsified medical records. 

On appeal, Lee contends that the judge wrongly entered summary judgment and 

should have credited his assertion that Wysocki never treated him on August 23. But

even if we credit that assertion, his claim fails. (The parties cite Eighth Amendment 

cases, but the Fourteenth Amendment applies here because Lee was a pretrial detainee 

at the time of these events. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015); Miranda 

v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018).) To stave off summary judgment, Lee 

had to supply evidence from which a jury could find that Wysocki “acted purposefully, 

knowingly, or recklessly when considering the consequences” of declining to advance

Lee’s appointment by a few hours and that her decision was "objectively unreasonable.” 

James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2020). But he has not. First, Lee does not dispute 

that, when the officer called her on the morning of August 24, Wysocki knew that a 

nurse practitioner had seen him the day before for the same symptoms and that he was 

set for another exam that afternoon. Second, Lee has not furnished evidence suggesting 

that a patient’s painful bowel movement, bloody stools, and possible fainting mean that

severe harm will likely occur before a scheduled medical appointment just hours away. 

Finally, at the afternoon exam, the nurse practitioner scheduled Lee for a specialist’s

care two weeks later, and Lee does not contend that a wait of two weeks was 

unreasonable; thus the half-day delay attributed to Wysocki could not be unreasonable

either. 

Lee responds that, by August 24, his need for immediate attention for his

symptoms was obvious because officers beyond the one who called Wysocki came to 

assist him. But Lee offers no evidence that Wysocki knew what these additional officers

were told or saw. Their involvement thus does not render Wysocki culpable.
No. 21-2702 Page 4 

That brings us to Lee’s claim that Armor and Milwaukee County maintained 

unconstitutional medical policies. But, as just explained, Lee has not shown that the 

half-day delay in his appointment caused a constitutional injury. Therefore, neither 

Armor’s policy (of allowing medical staff to rely on an officer’s report on an inmate’s 

condition) or the county’s policy (of not allowing officers to declare medical 

emergencies) caused a violation of Lee’s rights. See Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 

18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Finally, Lee argues that the judge abused his discretion by denying his requests 

to recruit counsel. The judge, however, reasonably evaluated the factors discussed in 

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In considering Lee’s ability to 

litigate the case himself, the judge noted that Lee “demonstrated competence” in the 

litigation by communicating well and recalling past events with specificity. Moreover, 

Lee has not shown, as he must, that he was prejudiced by the denial. See id. at 659. He 

speculates that it is “not inconceivable” that counsel could have helped create “genuine 

issues of facts for trial,” but he offered no specific reason to think that “counsel ... might 

have turned up evidence that would have affected the outcome of the case.” Tidwell v. 

Hicks, 791 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2015). 

AFFIRMED