alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism

On September 23, 2001, by Executive Order 13224, I declared a national emergency with respect to persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706).  I took this action to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the terrorist attacks in New York, in Pennsylvania, and against the Pentagon committed on September 11, 2001, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks against United States nationals or the United States.  Because the actions of these persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States, the national emergency declared on September 23, 2001, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond September 23, 2008.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for  1 year the national emergency with respect to persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.

                    This notice shall be published in the                     *Federal Register*                    and transmitted to the Congress.                

[FR Doc. E8-22248

Billing code 3195-01-P
186 La. 1101

#### DESSALLES v. TICHENOR.

No. 34249.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 29, 1937.

S. J. Parlongue, of New Orleans, for appellant.

H. M. Ansley, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee.

FOURNET, Justice.

This case is before us for consideration on the motion of the defendant and appel-lee to dismiss the appeal. The case was originally appealed from the district court to the Court of Appeal and by it transferred to this court, under the provisions of Act No. 19 of 1912, on a motion to dismiss filed by mover.

The basis of the motion here is that neither the appellant nor his attorney of record, before the transfer was made from the court of appeal to this court, made oath that the appeal was not taken for the purpose of delay, as required by Act No. 56 of 1904.

Counsel for mover filed no brief in support of the motion, as required by rule 8 of the rules of this court, but alleged in the motion:

> “That Act 19 of 1912, purporting to amend Act 56 of 1904, did not have the effect of repealing the provision of Act 56 of 1904, quoted in Article 8 of this motion for the reason that the title to Act 19 of 1912 conclusively shows that Act 56 of 1904 was only amended 'by authorizing the Supreme Court to transfer to the Court of Appeal any case that may (be) erroneously transferred to the Supreme Court by the Courts of Appeal, etc.’

> “That the body of Act 19 of 1912, especially section one thereof is broader than the title thereof and if it purports to go further than authorized by the title, said Act is unconstitutional, null and void, violates the constitution of Louisiana especially Article 3, Section 16 .of the Constitution of 1921; that said Act also conflicts with Article 29 (sic) of said constitution.”

The title of Act No. 19 of 1912 reads as follows:

> “An Act *to amend and re-enact Act No. 56 of the Acts of 1904,*entitled ‘An Act Relative to the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal and to authorize either Court to transfer to the other the record in any case where the appeal was brought up through mistake in the jurisdiction, instead of dismissing the appeal,’ by authorizing the Supreme Court to transfer to the Court of Appeal any case that may be erroneously transferred to the Supreme Court by the Courts of Appeal, to' be there proceeded with as if it had never been transferred to the Supreme Court.” (Italics ours.)

Thus it may be seen that the purpose and object of the act was not only to amend but *re-enact*Act No. 56 of 1904, and, consequently, was not limited to merely amending the act. The Legislature, therefore, did *898not violate any of the constitutional requirements by leaving out that portion of Act No. 56 of 1904 requiring that the appellant or his attorney of record, before transferring a case from one court to another, make oath that the appeal was not taken for the purpose of delay.

We, therefore, conclude that the act is constitutional and supersedes Act No. 56 of 1904.

For the reasons assigned, the motion 1⁄8 dismiss the appeal is denied, at mover’s cost.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-18-00677- CR

Kase y Schaf

ler, Appellant
v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 6 O F TRAVIS CO UNTY NO. C-1 -CR- 17- 2038 61, TH E H ONO RAB LE B RANDY M UELLER, JUDGE P RESIDING

O R D E R A N D M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
P ER CURIAM

Appe l l an t Kasey Schafle r seeks to appea l her judgme nt of conviction for misdemeanor dr iving while intoxicated. SeeTex. P enal Code § 49.04( a), ( d). The cler k’s re cord, howeve r, does not contain the require d trial court cer tification of appellant’ s rig ht of appea l, see Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a) (2) (mandating trial court to enter cer tification of defe ndant’s rig ht of appea l “ea ch time it enter s a judgment of guilt or ot her appea lable order”) , (d) (requiring rec ord t o include trial court’s cer

tification), and the district cler k has informed this Court that a cer tificatio n ca n n o t b e produce d beca

use no such doc ument has bee n filed with the cle rk. T h is appea l is there fore abate d and the trial court is direc ted to prepa re and file it s
cer tification of appellant’s rig ht of appeal as require d by the Tex as Rules of Appellate Procedur e.See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a) (2), 44.4. A supplemental cler k’s rec ord containing the tri al co u rt ’s
cer tification shall be filed with this Court no later than J anuar y 9, 2019. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 34.5(c) (2). I t is so ordered on this the 10th day of De cembe r, 2018.

Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Goodwin, and B ourland Abated a nd Remanded Filed: De cembe r 10, 2018 Do Not Publish

2
1

This minute order is issued pursuant to the express authority of the Honorable Robert E. 

Blackburn, United States District Judge for the District of Colorado.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Criminal Case No. 11-cr-00354-REB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1. KEVIN BARRY MCAULEY,

a/k/a Michael Gabriel Hoverty,

a/k/a Keith Christopher Morony,

a/k/a Kevin Loughrin,

a/k/a Steven Maloney,

a/k/a Patrick Roche,

Defendant.

MINUTE ORDER1

A Notice of Disposition was filed on September 19, 2011. A Change of Plea Hearing

is set for October 6, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. Counsel for the parties shall deliver or e-mail

a courtesy copy of all change of plea documents separately to Judge Blackburn’s

chambers AND to the Probation Department not later than 48 hours before the

Change of Plea Hearing date. See D.C.COLO.LCrR 11.1C. If the documents are not

timely submitted, the hearing will be vacated. There will be no exceptions to this policy.

On the date of the hearing, counsel shall then bring with them an original and one (1) copy

of the plea agreement and the statement in advance. See D.C.COLO.LCrR 11.1F.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal for the District of

Colorado shall assist the court in securing the appearance of the defendant at the Change

of Plea Hearing.

Dated: September 19, 2011
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of BPZResources, Inc. (the “Company”) for the quarter ended June 30, 2008as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Edward G. Caminos, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,pursuant to and solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to thebest of my knowledge and belief, that:

 

(1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| */s/ Edward G. Caminos* | * * |
|-------------------------|----------|
| Edward G. Caminos       |
| Chief Financial Officer |
| August 11, 2008    |

 

----
Exhibit 13.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson (publ) (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | the Annual Report on Form 20-F of the Company for the period ended December 31, 2016 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated April 26, 2017



/s/ Börje EkholmBörje Ekholm
President and Chief Executive Officer


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, and is
not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general
incorporation language in such filing.
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 9Federal Reserve Bank of: MinneapolisFilings received during the week ending February 29, 2020FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodFIRST PREMIER BANK                                                                                                      * BranchFirst Premier Bank, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, to establish a branch facility to be located at 202 NW 2nd Street, Madison, South Dakota.Newspaper: Not availableFederal Register: Not applicable
Case 1:08-cv-00367-JM Document 14 Filed 08/04/09 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 10.3


                     AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

     This Amendment No. 2 to Employment Agreement (this "Amendment") is made and
entered into as of January 1, 2004, by and between Werner Co., a Pennsylvania
corporation (the "Company"), and Dennis G. Heiner ("Executive").

     WHEREAS, the Company and Executive desire to enter into this Amendment to
certain terms of the Amended Employment Agreement dated as of May 31, 2000 (the
"Agreement").

     NOW THEREFORE, the Company and Executive agree as follows:

     1. PLACE AND TERM OF EMPLOYMENT

     Section 2 of the Agreement shall be amended by deleting such section in its
entirety and replacing it with the following:

     Executive's Period of Employment shall commence on June 15, 1999 unless the
parties mutually agree upon an earlier date (the date on which Executive
actually starts working for the Company pursuant hereto is referred to herein as
"Commencement Date"). Subject to Section 8 hereunder, the term of this Agreement
shall be through December 31, 2006. This Employment Agreement shall be
automatically renewed for successive one (1) year periods thereafter unless
either party gives notice otherwise within 12 months, but not less than 6 months
prior to an expiration.

     2. REMAINING PROVISIONS.

     All provisions of the Agreement not otherwise amended by this Amendment
shall remain in full force and effect.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment has been duly executed as of the day and
year first above written.

                                       WERNER CO., a Pennsylvania
                                       Corporation



                                       By:      /s/ Eric J. Werner
                                                ------------------------------
                                       Name:    Eric J. Werner
                                       Title:   Vice President, Secretary &
                                                General Counsel


                                       EXECUTIVE



                                       /s/ Dennis G. Heiner
                                       ---------------------------------------
                                       Dennis G. Heiner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge John L. Kane

Civil Action No. 11-cv-2240-AP

DOLORES E. TAFOYA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

ORDER

Kane, J.

The Stipulated Motion Regarding Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, (doc.

#23), filed April 26, 2012, is GRANTED. In consideration thereof, it is

ORDERED that the Defendant pay to Plaintiff, through counsel, attorney fees in the

amount of $6,400.00.

Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 26th day of April, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

S/John L. Kane

JOHN L. KANE, SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 1:11-cv-02240-JLK Document 24 Filed 04/26/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 190 (Tuesday, September 30, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56864-56865]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-22923]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management


California Desert District Advisory Council; Meeting

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given, in accordance with Public Laws 92-463 
and 94-579, that the California Desert District Advisory Council to the 
Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, will 
participate in a field tour of BLM-administered public lands on Friday, 
November 14, 2008 from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., and meet in formal session on 
Saturday, November 15 from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. at the Heritage Inn and 
Suites, 1050 N. Norma, Ridgecrest, CA.
    The Council and interested members of the public will depart for 
the field tour at 8 a.m. from the lobby of the Heritage Inn and Suites. 
The public is welcome to participate in the tour but should plan on 
providing their own transportation, lunch, and beverage. A four-wheel 
drive vehicle is strongly recommended for the field tour.
    Agenda topics for the formal session on Saturday will include 
updates by Council members and reports from the BLM District Manager 
and five field office managers. Additional agenda topics are being 
developed. Once finalized, the field tour and meeting agendas will be 
published in a news release prior to the meeting and posted on the BLM 
California state Web site at http://www.blm.gov/ca/news/rac.html.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: All California Desert District Advisory 
Council meetings are open to the public. Public comment for items not 
on the agenda will be scheduled at the beginning of the meeting 
Saturday morning. Time for public comment may be made available by the 
Council Chairman during the presentation of various agenda items, and 
is scheduled at the end of the meeting for topics not on the agenda.
    While the Saturday meeting is tentatively scheduled from 8 a.m. to 
4 p.m., the meeting could conclude prior to 4 p.m. should the Council 
conclude its presentations and discussions. Therefore, members of the

[[Page 56865]]

public interested in a particular agenda item or discussion should 
schedule their arrival accordingly.
    Written comments may be filed in advance of the meeting for the 
California Desert District Advisory Council, c/o Bureau of Land 
Management, External Affairs, 22835 Calle San Juan de Los Lagos, Moreno 
Valley, California 92553. Written comments also are accepted at the 
time of the meeting and, if copies are provided to the recorder, will 
be incorporated into the minutes.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Briery, BLM California Desert 
District External Affairs, (951) 697-5220.

    Dated: September 17, 2008.
Steven J. Borchard,
District Manager.
[FR Doc. E8-22923 Filed 9-29-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-40-P
EXHIBIT 99

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Media Sciences International, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2003, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),the undersigned officers of the Company hereby certify, pursuant to and forpurposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

| (1) |  | the Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange         Act of 1934; and                                |  |
|-----|--|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| (2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,  the financial         condition and results of operations of the Company. |  |

Dated:  May 7, 2003

/s/ Michael W. Levin                            Michael W. LevinChief Executive Officer

Dated:  May 7, 2003

/s/ Duncan Huyler                            Duncan HuylerVice President of Operations

Dated:  May 7, 2003

/s/ Denise Hawkins                            Denise HawkinsVice President and Controller
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 7753** 

HASSAN HARVEY , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria
. Claude M. Hilton , Senior District Judge. ( 1:16

- cv - 01442

- CMH

- MSN )

Submitted : March 14, 2017 Decided: March 17, 2017

Before FLOYD and HARRIS , Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Hassan Harvey, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Hassan Harvey seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petiti on. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (A) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional righ t.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debat able, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Harvey has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certi ficate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately3 presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the dec isional process.
DISMISSED
#### Michael Brancato, Respondent, v Dee and Dee Purchasing, Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

[745 NYS2d 564]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Dee and Dee Purchasing, Inc., doing business as Dee and Dee Stores, Inc., and Robert J. Dweck and Albert Dweck, doing business as Dee and Dee Stores appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barron, J.), dated May 17, 2001, as denied their cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the cross motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the defendants Dee and Dee Purchasing, Inc., doing business as Dee and Dee Stores, Inc., and Robert J. Dweck and Albert Dweck, doing business as Dee and Dee Stores, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.

The Supreme Court improperly denied the cross motion of *519the defendants Dee and Dee Purchasing, Inc., doing business as Dee and Dee Stores, Inc., and Robert J. Dweck and Albert Dweck, doing business as Dee and Dee Stores (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Dee and Dee defendants) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employee, even when the employee’s actions are intentional, if the actions were done while the employee was acting within the scope of his employment *(see Riviello v Waldron, 47*NY2d 297, 302). However, there is no vicarious liability on the part of the employer for torts committed by the employee solely for personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the employer’s business *(see Riviello v Waldron,*supra;*Vega v Northland Mktg. Corp.,*289 AD2d 565).

Here, the plaintiff, a police officer, was injured when he was struck by the defendant Edward Mora, an employee of the Dee and Dee defendants. Mora’s actions in striking the plaintiff were not incidental to the furtherance of the Dee and Dee defendants’ business interests and fell outside the scope of Mora’s employment. Moreover, Mora’s intentional conduct could not have reasonably been expected by his employer *(see Vega v Northland Mktg. Corp., supra).*

The Supreme Court similarly should have dismissed the plaintiffs claim that the Dee and Dee defendants negligently hired Mora. A necessary element of a cause of action for negligent hiring is that “the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury” *(Kenneth R. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,*229 AD2d 159, 161). In this case, there is no evidence that the defendants had any such knowledge. Goldstein, J.P., McGinity, Adams and Townes, JJ., concur.