alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 885 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                     December 18, 2007.
    Resolved, That the following named Members be, and are hereby, elected to 
the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:
     Committee on Agriculture: Mr. Latta.
     Committee on Energy and Commerce: Mr. Blunt, to rank after Mr. Fossella.
     Committee on Foreign Affairs: Mr. Wittman of Virginia.
     Committee on Science and Technology: Mr. Latta and Mr. Wittman of Virginia.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
#### Braun Farms, Inc., et al., Respondents, v Leonard Goldman, Defendant, and Bruce Goldman, Appellant.

[745 NYS2d 469]

In an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance and for an accounting, the defendant Bruce Goldman appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered June 7, 2001, which, after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against him in the principal sum of $68,157.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

In March 1993 the nonparty corporation, Bella Lane Farms, Inc. (hereinafter BLF), executed installment notes in excess of $400,000 in favor of the plaintiffs in connection with BLF’s purchase of *the*plaintiffs’ business. BLF also executed chattel mortgages against, inter alia, its accounts receivable to secure payment of the notes.

On June 1, 1998, the defendant Leonard Goldman, president *473and sole shareholder of BLF, executed, in his individual and representative capacities, an assignment transferring all of BLF’s outstanding accounts receivable to his son and vice-president of BLF, the appellant, Bruce Goldman. The assignment was purportedly made to the appellant as consideration for a $60,000 loan to BLF, and as compensation for commissions amounting to approximately $38,000 he earned but never received. Further, the assignment to the appellant was not conditioned upon his payment of the debt owed by BLF to the plaintiffs. It is undisputed that BLF was insolvent in May 1998 and ceased operations in June 1998. There was no documentation of the amount that BLF allegedly owed to the appellant.

The plaintiffs subsequently commenced a separate action against BLF and obtained a default judgment against it in the principal sum of $340,849.01. The plaintiffs then commenced this action, inter alia, to set aside the assignment to the appellant as fraudulent. After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the appellant.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, BLF, a defunct corporation, is not a necessary party to this action since the plaintiffs obtained a money judgment against it, and the challenged conveyance was absolute *(see*CPLR 1001 [a]; 1003; *Prometheus Books v Russica Book & Art Shop,*105 AD2d 1138; *Ranno v Ranno,*2 Misc 2d 940).

Further, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination the conveyance to the appellant was fraudulent *(see AMEV Capital Corp. v Kirk,*180 AD2d 775, 776-777; *Century 21 Constr. Corp. v Rabolt,*143 AD2d 873; *Polkowski v Mela,*143 AD2d 260).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit. O’Brien, J.P., H, Miller, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-6779

BEAUMONT GEREAU-BEY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WALLENS RIDGE STATE PRISON; CAPTAIN JANEWAY;

W. R. HEMSLEY; T. PHILLIPS; S. K. YOUNG,

Warden,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District

Judge. (7:05-cv-00605-sgw-mf)

Submitted: November 3, 2006 Decided: November 16, 2006

Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Beaumont Gereau-Bey, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Beaumont Gereau-Bey appeals the district court's order

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. The district court properly

required exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (2000). Because Gereau-Bey did not demonstrate to the

district court that he exhausted his administrative remedies or

that such remedies were not available, the court’s dismissal of the

action was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the

district court’s order, which is modified to reflect that the

dismissal was without prejudice to Gereau-Bey’s right to refile

once he has exhausted his administrative remedies. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 191 (Wednesday, October 1, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 57190]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-23147]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 6381]


Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Beadwork Storytellers, A Visual Language''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236 
of October 19, 1999, as amended, and Delegation of Authority No. 257 of 
April 15, 2003 [68 FR 19875], I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``Beadwork Storytellers, A Visual 
Language,'' imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the 
United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported 
pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owner or custodian. I also 
determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at the 
Cherokee Heritage Center, Tahlequah, OK, from on or about October 11, 
2008, until on or about April 19, 2009, and at possible additional 
exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national 
interest. Public Notice of these Determinations is ordered to be 
published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Carol B. Epstein, Attorney-
Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State 
(telephone: 202/453-8048). The address is U.S. Department of State, SA-
44, 301 4th Street, SW., Room 700, Washington, DC 20547-0001.

    Dated: September 24, 2008.
C. Miller Crouch,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, Department of State.
 [FR Doc. E8-23147 Filed 9-30-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
#### Lori Stadok, Respondent, v Ishay Stadok, Appellant.

[806 NYS2d 419]

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Ross, J.), dated July 12, 2004, which granted the plaintiffs application for an attorney’s fee in the sum of $45,000 and denied his application for an attorney’s fee.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the facts and as an exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof awarding the plaintiff an attorney’s fee in the sum of $45,000 and substituting therefor a provision awarding the plaintiff an attorney’s fee in the sum of $25,000; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of an attorney’s fee *(see Miklos v Miklos,*21 AD3d 353, 354 [2005]; *DeJesus v DeJesus,*264 AD2d 436 [1999]; *Schussler v Schussler,*123 AD2d 618 [1986]). However, given the equities of this case and the parties’ respective financial positions, we find that an attorney’s fee to the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000 is appropriate *(see DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete,*70 NY2d 879, 881 [1987]; *Benzaken v Benzaken,*21 AD3d 391, 392 [2005]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Florio, J.P., Schmidt, Fisher and Dillon, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA JAW 1 i 2ul0 

FILED 

Cr. No. 09-030-01-GZS 

Edward Brown 

GOVERNMENT'S EXHIBIT LIST for SENTENCING HEARING 

TRIAL EXHIBIT NO. DESCRIPTION 

3 Oa-40 Photo graph of rack in master bedroom closet 

3 Oa-41 Photograph of rack in master bedroom closet 

30a-42 Photograph of rack in master bedroom closet 

30a-67 Photograph of shelves in 2d floor hallway 

30a-68 Photograph of shelves in 2d floor hallway 

30a-89 Photograph of firearms and ammunition in master bedroom 

Januarys, 2010 

Respectfully submitted, 

John P. Kacavas 

United States Attome\ 

By: 

Arnold H. Huftalen 

Assistant United States Attorney 

NHBarNo. 1215 

53 Pleasant St., 4th Floor 

Concord, New Hampshire 03301 

(603)225-1552 

FZWeny L. Ollila 

Assistant United States Attorney 

NH Bar No. 560603 

53 Pleasant St., 4th Floor 

Concord, New Hampshire 03301 

(603)225-1552 

Case 1:09-cr-00030-GZS Document 241 Filed 01/11/2010 Page 1 of 2
Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that on January 8, 2010,1 caused this Government's Exhibit List to be filed 

conventionally and sent via electronic mail to attorney Michael lacapino, counsel for Edward 

Brown. 

Arnold H.^Iuftalen 

Assistant U. S. Atomey 

Paqe 2 of 2 

Case 1:09-cr-00030-GZS Document 241 Filed 01/11/2010 Page 2 of 2
#### Philip Mahler, Respondent, v Milta Torres et al., Appellants.

[811 NYS2d 723]

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruditzky, J.), dated March 4, 2005, as upon, in effect, granting that branch of their motion which was to vacate an order of the same court dated December 2, 2004, which, upon their default, granted the plaintiffs motion to vacate the dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3216, granted the plaintiffs motion on the merits and vacated the dismissal of the action.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the plaintiffs motion is denied on the merits, and the action is dismissed.

The compliance conference order dated May 17, 2004, directing the plaintiff to serve and file a note of issue by September 13, 2004, and warning that the failure to comply would result in *670dismissal, had the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 *(see Giannoccoli v One Cent. Park*W. *Assoc.,*15 AD3d 348 [2005]; *Betty v City of New York,*12 AD3d 472 [2004]; *Vinikour v Jamaica Hosp.,*2 AD3d 518 [2003]). The plaintiff failed to comply with this order either by timely serving and filing a note of issue or moving to extend the period for doing so, and the action was properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216 *(see Giannoccoli v One Cent. Park W. Assoc., supra; Werbin v Locicero,*287 AD2d 617 [2001]; *Flomenhaft v Baron,*281 AD2d 389, 390 [2001]).

A case dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216 may be restored only if the plaintiff can demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action *(see Betty v City of New York, supra; Wechsler v First Unum Life Ins. Co.,*295 AD2d 340 [2002]). Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice was meritorious *(see Lichtenstein v Barenbaum,*23 AD3d 440 [2005]; *Levy v Greenberg,*19 AD3d 462 [2005]). Accordingly, his motion to vacate the dismissal of the action should have been denied. Cozier, J.P., Luciano, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. James John COPPAGE, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-50446.

D.C. No. CR-01-01226-AHM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 20, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and T. G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

James John Coppage appeals the 46-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for bank robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and review for clear error the factual findings underlying the sentencing decision. *United States v. Parish,*308 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir.2002). We affirm in part, and dismiss in part.

*762The district court properly granted an upward adjustment of two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(l) for taking money from a financial institution because Cop-page pled guilty to bank robbery. *See United States v. Shaw,*91 F.3d 86, 88-89 (9th Cir.1996) (indicating that an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(l) is appropriate if taking property from a financial institution was an object of the offense).

We do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s discretionary denial of Coppage’s request for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 for over-representation of his criminal history. *See United States v. Webster,*108 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir.1997).

AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports:Boston |New York |Philadelphia |Cleveland |Richmond |AtlantaChicago |St. Louis |Minneapolis |Kansas City |Dallas |San FranciscoDistrict: 4Federal Reserve Bank of: ClevelandFilings received during the week ending February 29, 2020FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment PeriodNONE
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11-3794

Dabush v. The Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A

DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,

on the 25th day of October, two thousand twelve.

PRESENT:

AMALYA L. KEARSE,

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

Circuit Judges.

_______________________________________

Amiel Dabush,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 11-3794

The Guardian Life Insurance Company of 

America,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Amiel Dabush, pro se, Weston, CT.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Daniel J. Krisch, John B. Farley, and Jeffrey F.

Gostyla, Halloran & Sage LLP, Hartford, CT.
2

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of

Connecticut (Thompson, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Amiel Dabush, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on his claim brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment with the view that

“[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine

issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). 

Upon such review, we conclude that Dabush’s appeal is without merit substantially for

the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned order. See Dabush v. The

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 10-cv-67 (D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2011). We have considered

Dabush’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Torres, Appellant.

[806 NYS2d 588]

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (David Stadtmauer, J), rendered December 3, 2002, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of attempted murder in the second degree, -and sentencing him to a term of 20 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Were we to review this claim, we would find that the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence. We further find that *382the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The People disproved defendant’s justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Even assuming, without deciding, that the jury’s verdict acquitting defendant of first-degree attempted murder was not based on such factors as leniency and compromise *(see People v Rayam,*94 NY2d 557 [2000]), but on the jury’s acceptance of defendant’s claim that he did not know that the persons he shot at were police officers, we conclude that the jury still had a rational basis for finding that the shooting was unjustified. In particular, the jury could have discredited other aspects of defendant’s testimony bearing on his justification defense *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]).

Defendant’s challenge to the criteria employed by the court in imposing sentence is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Were we to review this claim, we would find that the record does not establish that defendant’s sentence was based on any improper criteria. We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Williams, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.
Certificate Pursuant to Section 906
 of Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002
 CERTIFICATION OF CEO
 
  In connection with the annual report on Form 10-K/A of Bovie Medical Corporation. (the “Company”) for the period ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned President and Chief Executive Officer certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 
 (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 Date: March 31, 2011
 
 /s/Andrew Makrides
 Andrew Makrides
 President and
 Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

Certificate Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Access Anytime Bancorp, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2003, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof  (the “Report”), I, Norman R. Corzine, ChiefExecutive Officer and Chairman of the Board, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  October 31, 2003 | /s/  Norman R. Corzine                     |   |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------|
|                              | Norman R. Corzine, Chairman  of the Board, |
|                              | Chief Executive Officer                    |
|                              | *(Principal Executive Officer)*            |

 

----
EXHIBIT 21

 

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY

Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation is the parent corporation of 317 subsidiaries which operate "off-price" retail stores in the United States.

Burlington Coat Factory Realty Corp., a Delaware corporation, which buys, sells and otherwise deals in real estate in connection with the Company's business.

Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, which leases the Company's store in Clifton Heights, Pennsylvania to one of the Company's operating subsidiaries.

Monroe G. Milstein, Inc., a New York corporation, which operates a wholesale apparel business.

LC Acquisition Corp., a New York corporation, which owns an interest in a manufacturer of coats.

C.L.B., Inc., a Delaware corporation, through which the Company collects royalties from its subsidiaries for the use of its trade names.

C.F.B., Inc., a Delaware corporation, through which the Company provides financing for its subsidiaries for the acquisition of their merchandise inventory and store fixtures.

C.F.I.C. Corporation, a Delaware corporation, which is an investment holding company.

Burlington Coat Factory Direct Corporation, a New Jersey corporation, formed for direct marketing purposes.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**SEAN SKIBBER,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 748 MAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 20th day of April, 2016, the Petition for All owance of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**