ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT			ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Patricia Caress McMath				Jeffrey A. Modisett

Appellate Public Defender				Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

							Priscilla J. Fossum

							Deputy Attorney General

							Indianapolis, Indiana

In The

INDIANA SUPREME COURT

ERIC TAYLOR,					)	

		Defendant-Appellant,		)			

							)

		v.					)	49S00-9710-CR-00525

							)					 STATE OF INDIANA,				)

		Plaintiff-Appellee.			)

                          ________________________________________________  

APPEAL FROM MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Ruth D. Reichard, Judge

Cause No. 49G02-9601-CF-016753

                        _________________________________________________

On Direct Appeal

JulyJuly 9, 1998[add date]

DICKSON, J.

	The defendant, Eric Taylor, appeals his conviction for the murder1 of Mattie Smith (“Smith”).  In this direct appeal, he raises a single issue:  whether the trial court

erroneously admitted hearsay evidence in violation of his right to confront witnesses.

	At trial, the State sought to introduce the statements Smith made to her mother, her

mother’s boyfriend, and a police officer, after she had been stabbed.  The evidence at trial

showed that Smith had dated the defendant in the past but had broken up with him a few

weeks prior to the murder.  Smith was living in her mother’s home on the day of the

murder when Smith’s mother, Ruth Peterson (“Peterson”), was awakened at

approximately 5:00 a.m. by the sound of screaming or “hollering.”  Record at 198, 235.  

When Peterson went into the stairway, she saw Smith bleeding around her neck or chest. 

While Peterson and her boyfriend, Tommy Coach (“Coach”), tried to stop the bleeding,

Smith identified the defendant as the man who stabbed her in the neck.  When Officer

Thomas Shaffer arrived at the scene, he was directed to where Smith was awaiting

medical attention.  He testified that she “appeared very scared,” and that she also

identified the defendant as the person who stabbed her.  Record at 260.  When this

evidence was offered at trial, the defendant timely objected, but the court overruled the

objections and allowed Smith’s statements be presented to the jury.

	On appeal, the defendant contends that these statements were inadmissible

hearsay.  While he claims that this violates his right to confront witnesses, he also

concedes that this right is not violated if the evidence fits within an established hearsay

exception.  At trial the statements were admitted under the excited utterance exception to

the hearsay rule.  The defendant argues that the statements do not fall within this

exception because there is no indication of the time between the stabbing and her

statements and because there was no evidence that Smith was still under the stress of excitement.

	We review claims of erroneous evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, 

Yamobi v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ind. 1996), and only reverse “where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.”  Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997).  Hearsay is admissible under the excited utterance rule when the statement relates “to a startling event or condition while the

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” 

Ind.Evidence Rule 803(2).  The amount of time that has passed between the event and the

statement is not dispositive.  Yamobi, 672 N.E.2d at 1346.  The issue is “whether the declarant was still under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event when the

statement was made.”  Id. 

	Here there were facts and circumstances to suggest that Smith was still under the

stress of excitement.  The testimony established that Smith screamed or “hollered” for

help and that, immediately after doing so, told both Peterson and Coach that the

defendant stabbed her.  Officer Shaffer testified that she appeared to be very scared when

she identified the defendant as her attacker.  Additionally, evidence presented at a hearing

on the admissibility of the statements showed that there was relatively little blood in the

area of the stabbing, thus indicating that the victim spent little time between the stabbing

and seeking help.  We decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding

that Smith was still under the stress of excitement when she made those statements.

	The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

	SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, SELBY, and BOEHM, JJ., concur.