RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0216-MR

FAITH HORBACH APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CI-005608

BRIANNA M. FORSYTHE

(N/K/A BRIANNA MICHELLE LYDANNE)

AND HANSON A. LYDANNE APPELLEES

OPINION

AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,

AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Faith Horbach appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court’s summary 

dismissal of strict liability and common law negligence claims she asserted against 

the above-captioned appellees stemming from a dog bite incident. For the reasons 

discussed below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 

proceedings.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 21, 2019, Faith Horbach accepted a request through an 

internet application named “Wag!” to walk the appellees’ two dogs, one of which 

was a terrier. Horbach arrived at the appellees’ residence in Jefferson County and 

went into the basement to get the dogs ready. She had walked the terrier on a prior 

occasion without incident. This time, however, as Horbach was getting the terrier 

ready for the walk, it bit her on her right hand without warning. Due to her 

resulting injury, Horbach received treatment on her hand later that day at Baptist

Health Urgent Center. Her wound also required antibiotics and, eventually, 

outpatient surgery in December 2019. 

Horbach thereafter filed suit against the appellees in Jefferson Circuit 

Court. In her complaint, she alleged the appellees were liable for her damages 

stemming from the dog bite incident based on two legal theories: (1) strict 

liability; and (2) negligence.1 Following a period of discovery, the appellees 

moved for summary judgment on grounds that, when their terrier injured Horbach, 

Horbach qualified as the terrier’s “statutory owner” pursuant to KRS2

1 Horbach’s complaint asserted the appellees were liable for “premises liability” negligence, 

“failure to warn of their dog’s violent propensities” negligence, and “gross” negligence.

2 Kentucky Revised Statute.
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258.095(5)(b)2.

3 by virtue of her contracted-for position as their terrier’s 

dogwalker. As a result, pursuant to KRS 258.235(4)4and their understanding of 

this Court’s decision in Jordan v. Lusby, 81 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. App. 2002), the 

appellees argued Horbach was consequently prohibited from suing them for any 

injuries their terrier may have inflicted upon her.

In her response, Horbach disagreed with the appellees’ legal analysis. 

She also asserted that more time for discovery was required to ascertain whether 

the appellees knew or should have known of the terrier’s violent propensities

before the incident. Citing evidence and depositions that discovery had yielded to 

that point in the litigation, she argued in relevant part:

Vet records from Lyndon Animal Clinic show that the 

dog that attacked Faith had suffered from a skin 

condition that the owners did not disclose to Faith for 

which it was prescribed medication. On the day after the 

attack, the owners returned the dog to Lyndon Animal 

Clinic AND reported an “acute mass” on the dog’s right 

ear. Mr. Lydanne denied taking the dog to the vet after 

the attack or knowing of any such problem. On 

September 27, 2019, a few weeks before the bite, the 

dog’s owners took [the terrier] to Lyndon Animal Clinic 

for a “derm exam.” On the day of the attack, the dog was 

prescribed apoquel tablets for the ongoing skin condition. 

In April 2019, the owners sought treatment with the vet 

because the dog “has been licking at the front left paw 

3 KRS 258.095 provides in relevant part: “As used in KRS 258.095 to 258.500, unless the 

context requires otherwise: . . . (5) “Owner,” when applied to the proprietorship of a dog, 

includes: . . . (b) Every person who: . . . 2. Has the dog in his or her care[.]”

4 KRS 258.235(4) provides: “Any owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a 

person, livestock, or other property shall be responsible for that damage.”
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and occasionally limping on the back right leg.” At that 

time, the dog was still prescribed 3.6 mg of apoquel for 

atopy. The Defendant owners have admitted that [the 

terrier] has had multiple prior medical problems, 

including skin allergies and two prior hernias. The 

owners never reported any of these health conditions to 

Faith. These skin problems could have very well caused 

the dog to react in the way it did. The Defendants have 

acknowledged that they have no evidence that Faith did 

anything wrong in connection with this incident.

. . .

Although the parties have exchanged written discovery 

and submitted to depositions, Faith will need to review 

Brian[n]a Lydanne’s social media accounts, which are set 

to private, to review the posts about her dogs and to 

depose other witnesses named in discovery answers who 

have had interactions with the dog. The Defendant 

owners also have stated that [the terrier] has had his nails 

done and has been to a doggy daycare so review of those 

records may provide relevant information. Further, both 

counsels have attempted to obtain records from Wag[!]

without success.

As previously noted, the circuit court granted the appellees’ motion. 

This appeal followed. The circuit court’s reasoning behind its summary 

disposition of Horbach’s claims, as well as other relevant facts, will be discussed in 

the context of our analysis below. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

All of Horbach’s allegations of error in this appeal emanate from the 

summary dismissal of her claims. In weighing her allegations of error:
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“The standard of review on appeal of a summary 

judgment is whether the circuit judge correctly found that 

there were no issues as to any material fact and that the 

moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.” Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Systems, 

Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002). Summary judgment 

is only proper when “it would be impossible for the 

respondent to produce any evidence at the trial 

warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc., v. 

Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 

1991). In Steelvest, the word “‘impossible’ is used in a 

practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Perkins v. 

Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992). In ruling 

on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required 

to construe the record “in a light most favorable to the 

party opposing the motion . . . and all doubts are to be 

resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. A 

party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot rely 

on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the 

movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must present 

affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly 

supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 481.

Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 787, 789-90 (Ky. App. 2012). “Appellate 

review of a summary judgment involves only legal questions and a determination 

of whether a disputed material issue of fact exists. So, we operate under a de novo 

standard of review[.]” Phelps v. Bluegrass Hospitality Mgmt., LLC, 630 S.W.3d 

623, 627 (Ky. 2021) (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Horbach argues the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing her 

strict liability and negligence claims based on the appellees’ proffered legal theory. 

Alternatively, she argues more time for discovery was required, and the circuit 
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court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment prematurely. Before 

discussing Horbach’s arguments in any greater depth, it is necessary to begin our 

analysis with a review of why the circuit court granted the appellees’ motion. In 

the relevant part of its order to that effect, the circuit court began by framing the 

parties’ respective arguments:

Defendants now seek Summary Judgment, arguing that 

Plaintiff was the statutory owner of [the terrier] at the 

time of the incident, and that assumption of the risk is a 

complete defense to the claims asserted. Plaintiff argues 

that she was not the statutory owner of [the terrier] at the 

time of the incident, assumption of the risk is not a 

complete defense in this situation, and summary 

judgment in this case is premature.

Thereafter, the circuit court explained:

Two statutes primarily address the ownership issue 

before the Court. KRS 258.235(4) states that “Any 

owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a 

person . . . shall be responsible for that damage.” 

Providing clarification on the meaning of ‘owner,’ KRS 

258.095(5)(b)(2) states that “Owner, when applied to the 

proprietorship of a dog, includes: (b) Every person who: 

(2) Has the dog in his or her care.” Case law provides 

further guidance on the meaning of ‘owner’ in different 

contexts.

For example, one such case involves a dog 

groomer who was bitten by a dog after she had finished 

grooming it and was carrying it out of the room. Jordan 

v. Lusby, 81 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002). The 

groomer (Jordan) brought suit against Lusby, and 

ultimately the circuit court granted summary judgment in 

favor of Lusby. Id. Jordan appealed, and the Kentucky 

Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit 
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court, holding that a dog groomer is considered an 

‘owner’ under the statutory definition. Id. The rationale 

as to this meaning of ‘owner’ provided was that KRS 

258.095 “was designed to expand liability to those parties 

who keep dogs such as kennel owners, veterinarians, and 

other persons who keep dogs owned by others in their 

care.” Id. at 524. Ultimately, owner “does not simply 

mean a person with a property interest in the dog, for 

reasons of public policy.” Id. Further, the statute 

“operates to insulate the legal owner from liability 

against another ‘owner’ of the dog.” Id. The Court also 

did not see a need to create “a distinction between the 

legal owner or a second party owner[.]” Id.

Other case law supports this interpretation of 

owner. Regarding statutory interpretation, “All statutes 

of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to 

promote their objects and carry out the intent of the 

legislature[.]” Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v. 

Zinsmeister, 367 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Ky. 2012). Here, 

“because the statute [KRS 258.095(5)] is intended to 

expand the class of potentially liable persons, this Court 

must read the statute consistently with that purpose.” Id. 

In its holding, the Court ultimately found that “Aside 

from the actual owner of the dog, the statutory definition 

of owner mostly includes persons into whose care the 

dog may be committed, either directly or indirectly[.]” 

Id. at 569. Pertinent to the current case, “the statute also 

allows for liability when the dog is temporarily in a 

person’s care[.]” Id.

Based upon case law, at the time of the biting 

incident, Plaintiff was the ‘owner’ of the [terrier] under 

the statutory definition found in KRS 258.095(5)(b)(2). 

Plaintiff had accepted Defendants’ request through 

“Wag!” that she would walk [the terrier], and while she 

was getting [the terrier] ready for his walk, he was 

ultimately in her care. This is similar to the dog groomer 

in Jordan, wherein owner goes beyond an individual who 

has a property interest in the dog. Plaintiff was a second 
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party owner while [the terrier] was in her care, and thus 

was a statutory owner at the time of the incident. 

Additionally, per statutory interpretation rules, the statute 

is intended to extend liability, even when a dog is only 

temporarily under someone’s care. Here, [the terrier] 

was temporarily under Plaintiff’s care (at least for the 

time it would take to get him ready, and to walk him), 

therefore Plaintiff’s situation falls under the statute and 

she was the ‘owner.’ Therefore, summary judgment is 

appropriate as to the question of ownership.

Plaintiff also argues that assumption of risk is not a 

complete defense to this situation. In her argument, 

Plaintiff cites to case law involving a discussion of what 

to do regarding assumption of risk in Kentucky. Parker 

v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Ky. [ ] 1967). 

Ultimately, the Court stated that “we are going to abolish 

it.” Id. However, there is case law addressing the 

specific circumstances involved here that is more 

relevant. In the aforementioned Jordan case, the Court 

held that “This Court is persuaded . . . that when Jordan 

accepted the dog for grooming, she assumed the risk of 

being bitten by the dog.” Jordan, [81 S.W.3d] at 524. 

Further, “The profession of dog grooming naturally 

entails a risk of being bitten by a client’s dog, as do other 

professions involving the care of animals[.]” Id. at 525. 

Overall, “Common sense dictates that a person who 

grooms dogs must be deemed to be aware of the risks 

involved in dealing with any dog.” Id. In regard to the 

issue of assumption of risk and whether it is a complete 

defense, in Jordan, the Court also held that someone 

dealing with dogs in such situations “cannot be deemed 

to have unreasonably encountered a risk that is inherent 

in his or her job. Therefore, this type of assumption of 

the risk is not subsumed by comparative fault and, hence 

is a complete defense.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s situation is analogous to that of a 

dog groomer, as a dog walker is a profession that 

involves the care of animals. In walking dogs, there is an 
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inherent risk of being bitten by a dog. As stated above, 

using common sense, Plaintiff is deemed to be aware that 

a risk involved in being around and dealing with dogs is 

that a person may be bitten. Overall, assumption of the 

risk applies here, and Plaintiff did assume the risk when 

she accepted the “Wag!” request to take [the terrier] for a 

walk. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to 

the question of assumption of the risk.

Another argument by Plaintiff is that summary 

judgment is premature. In Kentucky, summary judgment 

“is proper only after the party opposing the motion has 

been given ample opportunity to complete discovery and 

then fails to offer controverting evidence.” Suter v. 

Mazyck, 226 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). In 

essence, “It is not necessary to show that the respondent 

has actually completed discovery, but only that 

respondent has had an opportunity to do so.” Hartford 

Ins. Group v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 579 

S.W.2d 628, 630 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Whether a party 

has had enough time and opportunity “must be 

determined within the context of the individual case” 

with more complex cases requiring more time. Suter, 

[226 S.W.3d] at 842. However, “In the interest of 

judicial efficiency, there is, of course, a limitation on the 

time the parties have to complete discovery[.]” Id. at 

844. For example, in the Jordan case, summary 

judgment was found to be appropriate after a nine (9) 

month discovery period. Jordan, [81 S.W.3d] at 524.

Here, the Complaint was filed on September 30, 

2020. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary 

Judgment on August 27, 2021. Per case law, this time 

frame has provided counsel ample opportunity to conduct 

discovery. In sum, summary judgment is not premature 

at this time.

We now return to Horbach’s appellate arguments, the first of which is 

that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing her strict liability and 
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negligence claims based on the appellees’ proffered legal theory. In part, we 

agree. Horbach asserted two theories of recovery: (1) strict liability and (2) 

negligence. The circuit court’s analysis certainly applies to Horbach’s strict 

liability claim; we adopt it in that respect; and we affirm to that extent. However, 

none of the circuit court’s analysis applied to Horbach’s negligence claim. And 

that is because the statutory interplay that factored prominently into the circuit 

court’s analysis – i.e., the interplay between KRS 258.235(4) and KRS 258.095(5)

– is addressed to the concept of strict liability, not negligence. See Maupin v. 

Tankersley, 540 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Ky. 2018) (explaining these two provisions, 

taken together, mandate that “[a] dog owner is strictly liable for injuries caused 

when his dog attacks a person”); see also id. at 359 (“Without KRS 258.235(4) or 

its predecessor statutes, common law negligence would govern dog bite cases.”). 

Strict liability is not negligence; and one who is not strictly liable is not necessarily 

exempt from negligence – which is a point we have recognized at least twice 

before in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Paige v. McCord, No. 2017-CA000188-MR, 2018 WL 6434518 (Ky. App. Dec. 7, 2018); Cruz v. Henderson, No. 

2021-CA-0983-MR, 2022 WL 2898498 (Ky. App. Jul. 22, 2022) (addressing strict 

liability claims and common law negligence claims separately and under different 

legal standards in the context of dog bite liability).5

5 We cite these unpublished cases for their illustrative value and not as authority, pursuant to 
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Indeed, it would defy common sense to hold that KRS 258.095 – a 

statute designed to “expand liability”6for dog owners – could be interpreted as 

negating liability for dog owners. Rather, the statute in question was simply 

designed to convert part of the liability otherwise contemplated by the common 

law into strict liability. See Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v. Zinsmeister, 367 

S.W.3d 561, 566 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis added) (explaining KRS 258.095 was 

“clearly part of a scheme to displace or abrogate the common law rule on dog-bite 

liability in part to expand liability, presumably to create incentives for various 

actors to take steps to reduce the chances of dog bites”).

As for the “part” of common law that was not abrogated, that much

can be inferred from Jordan. There, the only claim at issue was strict liability, and 

apparently for good reason. At common law, a dog owner is not liable absent 

knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities, i.e., the “one free bite” rule. Dykes v. 

Alexander, 411 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1967), superseded by statute as stated in Maupin 

v. Tankersley, 540 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. 2018). In Jordan, we noted that no evidence 

demonstrated that the offending dog’s primary owner – not the groomer, who was 

statutorily deemed the dog’s secondary owner – had any knowledge of the dog’s 

vicious propensities: 

Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 41(A).

6

Jordan, 81 S.W.3d at 524.
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Jordan does not cite any evidence in the record indicating 

that the dog had actually bitten anyone, nor does she cite 

any evidence in the record indicating that the owner had 

actual knowledge that the dog would bite, beyond a 

statement that the dog “did not like men.” No other 

evidence that the dog had bitten a woman, or in fact any 

other person, is part of the record before us.

Jordan, 81 S.W.3d at 524.

Furthermore, the two cases from our sister states that we relied upon 

in support of our ultimate holding in Jordan – i.e., that assumption of risk negated 

the strict liability claim at issue – both indicated that “assumption of risk” would 

not be a defense to a common law negligence action between a dog’s primary and 

secondary owners. Specifically, in Jordan, 81 S.W.3d at 524, we cited Tschida v. 

Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds in 

Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012), as support:

[Minnesota’s] statute’s language defines “owner” to 

include “any person harboring or keeping a dog.” In that 

case, a veterinarian’s assistant sued the proprietary owner 

of the dog, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that 

the statute excluded the legal owner from liability to a 

second party owner (terms used by the Minnesota court.) 

We believe the Minnesota court’s reasoning is correct 

and adopt it here; the Kentucky statute, in defining 

“owner” as any person who accepts custody of a dog, 

operates to insulate the legal owner from liability against 

another “owner” of the dog. By becoming an “owner” of 

a dog under our statute one is responsible for injuries 

inflicted by the dog to persons or animals. The statute 

does not make a distinction between the legal owner or a 

second party owner; we see no reason to create one here.
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However, with respect to a negligence action between a dog’s primary 

and secondary owners, the Tschida court held:

We interpret the Minnesota dog owners’ liability 

statute to include as an owner a second party who harbors 

or keeps a dog after accepting the delivery of possession 

and control from the legal owner. Where there is no 

negligence by the legal owner, we further interpret the 

statute to exclude liability of the legal owner to the 

second party owner for damages from being attacked or 

injured by the dog. Therefore, we hold that appellants 

are not strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for 

respondent’s injuries resulting from their dog biting her 

while she was performing her job and the dog was in the 

keeping of the veterinarian and respondent, as his 

employee.

Tschida, 462 N.W.2d at 412-13 (emphasis added).

That same conclusion – that a dog’s primary owner could be liable to 

the dog’s secondary owner for common law negligence – was also echoed in 

Nelson v. Hall, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668, 165 Cal.App.3d 709 (1985), which we cited in 

Jordan, 81 S.W.3d at 525, for the following guidance:

Lusby cites a California case, Nelson v. Hall, 165 

Cal.App.3d 709, 211 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1985), wherein a 

veterinarian’s assistant was deemed to have assumed the 

risk of being bitten by a dog during the course of the 

dog’s medical treatment. The California court put it 

simply, “[a] veterinary assistant cannot be deemed to 

have unreasonably encountered a risk that is inherent in 

his or her job. Therefore, this type of assumption of the 

risk is not subsumed by comparative fault and, hence is a 

complete defense.” Nelson at 672. We agree with the 

holding in the California case, and apply it to this case.
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However, with respect to a negligence action between a dog’s primary 

and secondary owners, the Nelson court qualified what it stated on page 672 of its 

opinion:

This does not mean dog owners could never be held 

liable for injuries to veterinarians or their assistants. We 

emphasize that the defense of assumption of the risk 

extends only to the danger which the injured person has 

knowingly assumed, i.e., the danger the dog will bite 

while being treated.

Moreover, if a dog owner purposefully or 

negligently conceals a particular known 

hazard from a veterinarian, he or she would 

not be relieved of liability, for this would 

expose the injured person to an unknown 

risk. (See Lipson v. Superior Court, supra, 

31 Cal.3d at p. 371, 182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644 

P.2d 822.) This question is not before us, 

since defendants are not accused of 

negligence or of knowledge of any particular 

vicious propensities on Amos’ part.

Nelson, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 673, 165 Cal.App.3d at 715, n.4.

From what is set forth above, the following point is obvious and 

inescapable: one part of the common law that has not been abrogated, or 

otherwise converted into strict liability through the interplay between KRS 

258.235(4) and KRS 258.095(5), is the part that involves negligence actions 

between a dog’s primary and secondary owners. In that context, the potential for

liability still exists, but under the auspices of the common law, not strict liability. 

Stated differently, a dog’s secondary owner (i.e., Horbach) may sue the dog’s 
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primary owners (i.e., the appellees) if the primary owners had knowledge of the 

dog’s vicious propensities, failed to warn the secondary owner, and the secondary 

owner is consequently injured. See Dykes, 411 S.W.2d 47.

In sum, the circuit court incorrectly believed a principle that only

applied to Horbach’s strict liability claims also applied to her common law 

negligence claims. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed Horbach’s 

negligence claims on that basis; and in doing so, it erred.

Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the appellees now devote the last 

five pages of their twenty-three-page brief before this Court to the proposition that 

the evidence of record, such as it is, does not support that they acted negligently in 

failing to warn Horbach of any violent propensities their terrier may have had. 

This is a stark contrast to the arguments they presented to the circuit court in their 

seven-page motion for summary judgment and six-page reply memorandum where, 

in the “argument” sections of each filing, their arguments fell under the headings 

“When the Incident Occurred, Plaintiff, Faith Horbach, was the Statutory Owner of 

the Dog at issue”; “Plaintiff’s Assumption of Risk is a Complete Defense to the 

Claims Asserted”; “Plaintiff Voluntarily Accepted the Task of Caring for the Dog 

at Issue”; and “No Portion of Jordan v. Lusby Has Been Overturned.” It further 

conflicts with their stated reason, as set forth in their reply memorandum, for 

opposing Horbach’s request for additional discovery: “[N]one of the remaining 
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discovery mentioned will or can have any bearing on Plaintiff’s status as the dog’s 

statutory owner. Therefore, Plaintiff has had sufficient opportunity for discovery 

and this matter is ripe for summary judgment.”

To be sure, this Court may affirm the circuit court’s judgment if the 

record on appeal discloses any ground on which its judgment could properly have 

been made. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Ashley, 722 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Ky. 1986) 

(citation omitted). However, we lack authority to review issues not raised in or 

decided by the trial court. Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228

(Ky. 1989). Here, we find no indication from the substance of the appellees’ 

circuit court filings, or from the substance of the circuit court’s judgment set forth 

above, that the issue of the appellees’ liability for common law negligence was 

properly argued or addressed below. Furthermore, we find no indication that the 

circuit court premised its decision to curtail further discovery on anything other 

than its misapprehension that the interplay between KRS 258.235(4) and KRS 

258.095(5) precluded common law negligence actions between a dog’s primary 

and secondary owners. Accordingly, we will not alternatively affirm on this point, 

but will instead vacate this aspect of the summary judgment and permit the circuit 

court to fully consider this point on remand. 

As for Horbach’s remaining contention that she was provided 

inadequate time for discovery, our disposition of this case largely moots that 
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question. We note, however, that her stated goal of conducting further discovery 

was to gather evidence of whether and to what degree the appellees had or should 

have had knowledge of the terrier’s alleged vicious propensities – a point that is 

squarely at issue under the applicable law relative to her common law negligence 

claims, and a point that the circuit court roundly ignored in its analysis. On 

remand, and now armed with the applicable law, we have no doubt that the circuit 

court will revisit, and exercise its sound discretion to determine, whether 

Horbach’s request for additional discovery should be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s 

disposition of Horbach’s strict liability claims against the appellees; we vacate its 

dismissal of her common law negligence claims against the appellees; and we 

remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

T. Scott Abell

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Christopher D. Snead

Louisville, Kentucky