[Cite as State v. Hammock, 2018-Ohio-3914.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 18CA27 

 : 

BRUCE HAMMOCK : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court 

of Common Pleas, Case No. 15-CR0858D 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN 

 PART, AND REMANDED FOR 

 RESENTENCING 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: September 26, 2018 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: 

 

GARY BISHOP BRUCE A. HAMMOCK, PRO SE 

RICHLAND CO. PROSECUTOR Inmate No. 682-596 

JOSEPH C. SNYDER Trumbull Correctional Institution 

38 South Park St. P.O. Box 901 

Mansfield, OH 44902 Leavittsburg, OH 44430 

 
Richland County, Case No. 18CA27 2 

Delaney, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Bruce Hammock appeals from the March 15, 2018 judgment 

entry of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas overruling his motion for 

resentencing. Appellee is the state of Ohio. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} A statement of the facts underlying appellant’s criminal convictions is not 

necessary to our resolution of this appeal. In 2015, appellant was charged by indictment 

with cocaine possession with a firearm specification, having weapons while under 

disability with a forfeiture specification, fleeing and eluding with a firearm specification, 

two counts of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, carrying a concealed 

weapon, and OVI. 

{¶3} On February 8, 2016, appellant entered pleas of guilty. On April 11, 2016, 

the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate prison term of 4 years in addition to a 

term of community control. Appellant was advised he was subject to 5 years of mandatory 

post-release control. 

{¶4} On July 8, 2016, we denied appellant’s motion for delayed appeal in Case 

No. 16-CA-37. Appellant’s motion for reconsideration was overruled and his appeal to 

the Ohio Supreme Court was declined. State v. Hammock, 147 Ohio St.3d 1438, 2016-

Ohio-7677, 63 N.E.3d 157. 

{¶5} On December 4, 2017, appellant filed a “Motion for Resentencing” in the 

trial court and made the following arguments: 1) the sentencing entry was not a final 

appealable order because the trial court failed to impose a separate sentence on each 

individual offense; 2) the trial court erred in ordering the community-control sanction to be 
Richland County, Case No. 18CA27 3 

served consecutively to the prison term; and 3) post-release control was not properly 

imposed. 

{¶6} The trial court overruled the motion on March 15, 2018, finding the motion 

was an untimely petition for post-conviction relief. 

{¶7} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s judgment entry overruling his 

motion for resentencing. 

{¶8} Appellant raises four assignments of error: 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶9} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY SENTENCING 

HAMMOCK TO COMMUNITY CONTROL ON A MATTER THAT THE GENERAL 

ASSEMBLY HAS CLEARLY DECLARED TO BE A NONPROBATIONABLE OFFENSE.” 

{¶10} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO IMPOSE A [SEPARATE] 

SENTENCE ON EACH INDIVIDUAL OFFENSE, THERE HAS BEEN A JUDGMENT 

WHICH IS NOT A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER FROM WHICH HAMMOCK COULD 

NOT FILE A DIRECT APPEAL (SIC THROUGHOUT).” 

{¶11} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING HAMMOCK’S 

COMMUNITY CONTROL SANCTION TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVE TO HIS 

PRISON TERM.” 

{¶12} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT PROPERLY NOTIFYING 

HAMMOCK OF POST-RELEASE CONTROL, AND THE DETAILS OF POST-RELEASE 

CONTROL AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING POST-RELEASE CONTROL.” 
Richland County, Case No. 18CA27 4 

ANALYSIS 

{¶13} We will address appellant’s assignments of error out of order. 

IV. 

{¶14} We begin with appellant’s fourth assignment of error: he argues the trial 

court failed to properly advise him of the consequences of violating post-release control. 

We agree. 

{¶15} The caption of a pro se pleading does not define the nature of the pleading. 

State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997). Thus, if the pleading 

meets the definition of a petition for post-conviction relief, it must be treated as such, 

regardless of the manner in which appellant actually presents the motion to the court. 

State v. Green, 5th Dist. Knox No. 15–CA–13, 2015–Ohio–4441, ¶ 13. A motion meets 

the definition of a motion for post-conviction relief set forth in R.C. 2953.21(A)(1), despite 

the caption or manner in which a defendant presents a motion to the court, if it is (1) filed 

subsequent to direct appeal; (2) claims a denial of constitutional rights; (3) seeks to render 

the judgment void; and (4) asks for vacation of the judgment and sentence. Reynolds, 

supra, 79 Ohio St.3d at 160. 

{¶16} We find the trial court erred in treating appellant’s motion for resentencing 

as a petition for post-conviction relief as to this claim. A claim that an appellant was not 

properly informed of post-release control is based solely on state statutory requirements 

and is not a constitutional claim. State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 14-CA-18, 2014-

Ohio-4657, ¶ 17. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that where a trial court did 

not properly impose post-release control, the sentence is void, and principles of res 

judicata do not preclude appellate review. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010–
Richland County, Case No. 18CA27 5 

Ohio–6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 30. The sentence may be reviewed at any time, on direct 

appeal or by collateral attack. Id. The trial court therefore erred in converting this portion 

of appellant's motion to vacate a void sentence into a petition for post-conviction relief. 

Smith, supra, 2014-Ohio-4657 at ¶ 17. 

{¶17} Although the sentencing entry recites that appellant was informed of postrelease control, the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the trial court failed 

to inform appellant of the consequences of violating post-release control. A trial court may 

correct its omission to inform a defendant about post-release control sanctions by 

complying with R.C. 2929.191 and issuing a corrected sentence. State v. Alexander, 5th 

Dist. Stark No. 13–CA–151, 2014–Ohio–2351, ¶ 21. 

{¶18} However, in cases where no corrected entry is necessary, only a hearing is 

required. Id. Because the trial court did not verbally inform appellant of mandatory postrelease control sanctions at sentencing, his fourth assignment of error is sustained, and 

appellant is entitled to a new limited sentencing hearing during which the court will explain 

the mandatory period of post-release control included in his sentence, including the 

consequences of violating post-release control. Smith, supra, 2014-Ohio-4657, ¶ 25. 

{¶19} This matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of holding 

a sentencing hearing to address appellant in regard to his post-release control sanction. 

Smith, supra, 2014-Ohio-4657 at ¶ 26. 

III. 

{¶20} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in 

sentencing him to a term of community control to be served consecutive to his prison 
Richland County, Case No. 18CA27 6 

term. We disagree because appellant’s community-control sanction does not include a 

term in a CBCF. 

{¶21} We recently noted in State v. Weber, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-36, 2018-

Ohio-3174, our authority on this issue is at odds with decisions from other Courts of 

Appeal, specifically the Eighth and Twelfth Districts.1 We certified a conflict to the Ohio 

Supreme Court in State v. Hitchcock, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 16-CA-41, 2017-Ohio-8255, 

motion to certify allowed, 152 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2018-Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 877, and the 

Court stayed briefing pending a decision in State v. Paige, ––– Ohio St.3d ––––, 2018-

Ohio-813.2 The Paige decision has now been announced although Hitchcock remains 

pending. The split in authority will be further discussed infra. 

{¶22} In Weber, we found this issue is not res judicata because it presents a split 

of authority among the Courts of Appeal and is presently pending before the Ohio 

Supreme Court. State v. Weber, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-36, 2018-Ohio-3174, ¶ 19. 

Because this appeal raises the issue of the trial court's statutory authority to sentence 

appellant in a certain way, we find the sentence is not res judicata. Id. We further found 

 

1 State v. Anderson, 2016-Ohio-7044, 62 N.E.3d 229, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) [“Because there is 

no statutory authority for the imposition of community control sanctions to be served 

consecutive to, or following the completion of, a prison or jail term or other sentence of 

imprisonment, the trial court was without authority to impose the same.”]; State v. Ervin, 

12th Dist. No. CA2016-04-079, 2017-Ohio-1491, 89 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 23 [“Moreover, because 

there is no statutory authority for the imposition of community control sanctions to be 

served consecutive to, or following the completion of, a prison or jail term or other 

sentence of imprisonment, the trial court was without authority to impose the same. The 

community control sanctions are therefore void and must be vacated.”] 

2 The following issue of law was certified for review and final resolution: “Whether a trial 

court may impose a term of residential or nonresidential community control sanctions on 

one felony count, to be served consecutively to a term of imprisonment imposed on 

another count.” 
Richland County, Case No. 18CA27 7 

that in accord with Paige, supra the trial court did not have statutory authority to order, as 

part of the original sentence, appellant's placement into a CBCF as part of her communitycontrol sanction after her completion of the separate prison term. Id. at ¶ 28. 

{¶23} In the instant case, we have reviewed the “Community Control Sanctions” 

portion of the trial court’s Sentencing Entry of April 13, 2016. We note appellant’s 

community-control sanction does not require him to complete a term in a CBCF. We 

therefore find the trial court had authority to order him to complete a term of community 

control after completion of his prison term. See, Weber, supra, 2018-Ohio-3174, ¶ 29. 

{¶24} Appellant’s third assignment of error is therefore overruled. 

II. 

{¶25} Next, appellant argues the trial court erred in imposing a “lump sentence” 

upon Counts II through VII. We disagree on the basis of res judicata. 

{¶26} This argument could have been raised on direct appeal and is barred by res 

judicata. State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 14-CA-18, 2014-Ohio-4657, ¶ 19, citing 

State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967); see also, State v. Houston, 73 

Ohio St.3d 346, 347, 652 N.E.2d 1018 (1995), citing Perry, supra. “A defendant who fails 

on direct appeal to challenge the sentence imposed on him for an offense is barred by 

res judicata from appealing that sentence * * *.” State v. Lindsay, 5th Dist. Richland No. 

16CA39, 2017–Ohio–595, ¶ 30. 

{¶27} Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion on the basis of 

res judicata. “Otherwise, appeals could be filed indefinitely.” State v. Henley, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 26604, 2015–Ohio–4113, ¶ 11; State v. Isa, 2nd Dist. Champaign No. 

2015-CA-44, 2016-Ohio-4980, ¶ 9 [res judicata prevents appellant from raising sentence-
Richland County, Case No. 18CA27 8 

packaging issue now, as it could have been previously litigated and raised in prior appeal]; 

See also, State v. Selmon, 5th Dist. Richland No. 15 CA 83, 2016–Ohio–723; State v. 

Lynch, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2017-0040, 2017-Ohio-8642. 

{¶28} The remand for resentencing upon appellant’s fourth assignment of error 

does not entitle him to resentencing on all offenses. When a defendant fails to appeal 

the sentence for a certain offense, he cannot take advantage of an error in the sentence 

for an entirely separate offense to gain a second opportunity to appeal upon resentencing. 

State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 19. To hold 

otherwise would essentially abrogate the doctrine of res judicata for multicount sentences 

and precludes finality in sentencing. Id. Accordingly, a defendant who fails on direct 

appeal to challenge the sentence imposed on him for an offense is barred by res judicata 

from appealing that sentence following a remand for resentencing on other offenses. Id. 

I. 

{¶29} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in 

sentencing him to a term of community control on a “nonprobationable offense.” We 

disagree because appellant raises this argument for the first time on appeal. 

{¶30} Appellant failed to present this argument to the trial court and raises it for 

the first time on appeal. He has therefore waived review of this issue. State v. Churchill, 

5th Dist. Delaware No. 17 CAA 10 0068, 2018-Ohio-1031, ¶ 19, citing State v. Green, 5th 

Dist. Stark No. 2011 CA 00127, 2011–Ohio–5611, ¶ 28–29; see also, State v. Lane, 5th 

Dist. Licking No. 98 CA 75, 1998 WL 918257, *2, citing State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 

112, 364 N.E.2d 1364 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus [appellate court need not 
Richland County, Case No. 18CA27 9 

consider error which party could have called to trial court's attention when such error could 

have been avoided or corrected by trial court]. 

{¶31} Appellant’s first assignment of error is therefore overruled. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶32} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is sustained and the remaining 

assignments of error are overruled. This matter is remanded to the trial court for the 

limited purpose of holding a sentencing hearing to address appellant in regard to his postrelease control sanction. State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 14-CA-18, 2014-Ohio4657, ¶ 26. 

By: Delaney, J., 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Hoffman, J., concur.