### N THE COURT OF CRI MI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 2, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MIC HAE L N AS H

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-03621 Otis Higgs, Jud ge

No. W2004-03005-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Septem ber 6, 2005

The De fendant, Michael Nash, was convicted by a jury of one c ount of ag g ravated robbe ry . After a hea ring, t h e t ri al court sentence d him as a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender to twelve y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. I n this appeal a s of rig ht, the Def endant c halleng es the sufficiency of the

e v id e n c e a n d c o n te n d s th a t h e s h o u ldh a v e b e e n s e n te n c e d a s a Rang e I
, stand ar d o f

f e n d e r

. We aff irm the Def

endant’ s conviction. We reve rse the or der of the trial court sentencing the Def endant as a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender . We remand this matter f or a ne w sentenc ing he aring

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d in Par t; Re verse d in P art; Rem anded

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE a ndJ.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Tony Br ayton, Assistant P ublic Def ender , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Michael Na sh.

Paul G . S um mer s, Attorne y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Da vidH. F ind le y , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wi ll iam L

. G ib b o n s , D is tric t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; a n d T o m H o o v e r , A s s is tan t D is tric t A tt o r n ey Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

Tamro L ewis testified that on the evening of Friday , October 19, 2001, she wa s working at L auder dale Liquors in Shelby County , Tenne ssee. The liquor store wa s config ured suc h that the ar ea
c on ta ini ng the liq uo r andthe c a sh re g ist e rs wa s se pa rate d b y bu lle tpr oo f glas s fro m the lob by in which the c ustomers arrived. The e mploy ees w orked be hind the g lass. A s i n gl e closed door separ ated the two a

rea s. Normally , a customer would enter the lobby , tell an employ ee w hat he or she wa nted, and then pay

for the item through a draw er betwee n the l obby and the e mploy ee a

rea

. The liquor bottle would then be pla ced in a “chute ” and delivere d to the customer. Customers we re
no t allo w e d i n t h e ar e a

i n w h i c h t h e e m p l o y e e s w o rk e d

. A c c o r d i n g t o M s

. L e w i s , t h e s t o r e a lso-2-

cashe d chec ks. For this purpose, there was a cash box kept i n the dra wer of a f ile cabine t in an are a behind the display

shelves.

Ms. L ewis testified that, on the night in question, a bla ck man e ntere d the store a nd purcha sed a lar g e bottle of Moet champa g ne for about $83. Ms. L ewis di d not rec og nize the man and stated that he wa s not one of her reg ular c ustomers. About twenty minutes later, the ma n re t urned and wanted to exchang e the bottle of Moe t for seve ral less e x pensive bottles. Ms. L ewis ca lled her employ er and soug ht permission to make the exchang e. Upon g etting approva l, Ms. L ewis and he r
co-w orker

beg an putting the less expensive bottles of champa g ne into a box in preparation for the

e xch a ng e . Wh e n th e bo x wa s re a dy , the y wa ite d for the lob by to cl e ar of a dd iti on a l cus tom e rs . M s. L ewis’s c o-worke r, John Harmon, then opene d the door be tween the lobby and the e mploy ee a

rea in order to pa ss the box to the customer wanting the exchang e. Ms. L ewis identified this customer

a t tria l a s th e De fe nd a nt.

Ms. L e wi s s tat ed th at, i ns te a d o f t akin g thebo x, the De fe nd a nt p ull e d o ut a g un a ndc a me throug h the door into the employ ee a rea . A sec ond man f

o l l o wed him i n. The De fenda nt approa ched Ms. L ewis and asked her where “the box ” was. Ms. L ewis realized that the Def endant

was see king the cash box from which the business c ashed c hecks. Ms. L ewis stated that the exis tence of “the box ” wa s common knowledg e among reg ular customers. She also stated that, at times, it was in plain view from the lobby are a.

The De fendant pulled open the dra wer s of the filing cabine t kept in the bac k are a and f ound the box. The second man then came t o the Defenda nt and took the gun. The se cond man r eturne d to the are a whe re Mr . Harmon was located and some a ltercation occur red. The two men then lef t the store a nd Ms. L ewis ca lled the police.

Ms. L ewis explained that, afte r t he robbery
, she viewe d some photog raphs c ompiled by the police but was not a

bl e t o i d en t i fy from the photog raphs the ma n who had pulled the g un and retrie ved the c ash box. However, she was c erta in at trial that the De fendant was that man.

Ms. L ewis also expl ai n ed t hat the store ha d a video c amer a for security purposes. She identified a video tape that was made during the t ime of t he robbery . This tape wa s play ed for the jury . Ms. L ewis ac knowledg ed that sh e n ev er sa w a c lear view of the robber ’s fa ce on the video tape.

Michae l Dicker son testified that, on the eve ning of October 19, 2001, he wa s a customer at L auder dale Liquors. Whil e he was there, he notice d another man who wa s placing an unusual orde r of “diff ere nt liqueurs.” Mr. Dic kerson identifie d the Def endant at trial as this other customer. Mr. Dicker son left the store be fore the robbe ry occur red.

J o h n H ar m o n t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h e w a s w o rk i n g a t L a u d e r d a l e L i q u o r s o n t h e n i g h t o f t h e r o b b e r y. At about 7:30 that evening , he stated, a customer came in and wanted a lar g e bottle of c hampag ne. Mr. Harmon sold him a bott le of Moet for $82. About two hours later , the customer r eturne d and-3-

stated that he ha d “boug ht the wrong thing.” The c ustomer, w h o m Mr. Harmon identified at trial as the De fendant, wanted to e x chang e the sing le bottle for multiple less expensive bottles of champa g ne. Mr. Harmon and Ms. L ewis then collecte d numerous bottles o f l es s ex pensive champa g ne. Mr. Ha

rmon stated that all of the chea per bottles made up two box es.

Mr. Harmon passed one of t he box es t o the Defenda nt throug h the door be tween the lobby and the e mploy ee a

rea . The De fendant took this box out to his c ar and then returne d for the se cond box . Mr. Harmon testified that, as he started to pass t he second box throug h the door, the D efe ndant “pulled a g un up and said I ’m coming in.” Mr. Harmon described t he gun as an automatic, “a 9 or either a .380.”

Upon being fac ed with the g un, Mr. Harmon dropped th e s ec o n d case of champag ne and stepped ba ck. The Def

endant a pproac hed the f

ront of the re g ister and told Mr. Ha rmon to g et down on the floor. Mr. H armon then sa w a se cond man come into the store behind the Def endant. The Def endant a sked whe re “ the box” was

. M r. Ha rm on assumed the De fendant was re fer ring to the cash box. The Def

endant then handed his g un to the second man and told that person to make sure Mr. Harmon did not move. The Def endant we nt to the back are a of the store and r eturne d with the cash box. The Def

endant ha d also retrie ved the unloaded handg un that was ke pt in the back a rea of the store. The second ma n took the money out of one of the cash r eg isters and the two men then lef t the store. Mr. Harmon stated that the robbe ry lasted three to four minutes. He a lso stated that the robbery made him “sc are d.”

Mr. Harmon testified that he had ne ver se en the De fendant before . He wa s able to identify the Def endant’ s photogr aph on Nove mber 2, 2001, fr om a line-up showe d to him bythe police.

Mike DeA ng elis testified that he is the owne r of L auder dale Liquors. He ex plained that the chec k c a s h in g a s p e c t o f h is b u s in e s s is h e a v ie s t o n p a y d a y s , a n d th a t h e w o u ld e xp e c t to have $50,000 to $60,000 dollars at the s tore for that purpose on a Friday

. Most of that money was ke pt in a floor safe to w hich only he had acc ess. Some of the cash was kept in a cash box to which the employ ees ha d acc ess.

Mr. DeA ng elis had worke d in the store on the day of the rob b er y b u t l eft at about 4:30 or 5:0 0 th a t a ft e rn oo n. He he ard abo ut the ro bb e ry a bo ut te n min ute s a ft e r i t ha pp e ne d. Mr . D e An g e lis perf ormed a n audit afte r the robbery and determined that about $22,000 was missing as we ll as the pistol he kept at the store.

During cross-e x amination, Mr. DeA ng elis asserte d that he thoug ht either Ms. L ewis or Mr. Harmon was involved with the robbe ry . He f urther stated that, t o his knowledg e, the police had not pursued that p o ssibili ty . Mr. DeA ng elis confirme d that he had spoke n with Ms. L ewis over the phone that nig ht, but the conver sation was l i m i t ed to a discussion about a discount on a ca se of

c ha mpa g ne . M r. De An g e lis state d th a t a n e xch a ng e of on e bo ttl e of c ha mpa g ne fo r o the rs wo uld have be en “a

problem” and contra

ry to store policy . He a lso stated that opening the door be tween the lobby and the e mploy ee a

rea was a brea ch of his sec urity

proce dures.-4-

Memphis Poli ce Ser g eant James Howell testified that he investigat ed t h e robbery of L aud e rd a le L iqu or s. Du ri ng his inv e sti g a tio n, the De fe nd a nt’ s na me wa s de ve lop e d as a s us pe c t. Ac co rd i ng ly , Sgt. Howe ll developed photog raphic line-ups to show Ms. L ewis and Mr . Harmon. Ms. L ewis wa s not ab l e t o p ro v ide a positive identification on the basis of these line- ups. Mr. Ha rm on , h ow e ve r, did po sit ive ly ide nti fy the De fe nd a nt’ s ph oto g ra ph fr om on e of the lin e -u ps

. Sg t. Howell testified that he showed Mr. Harmon a tot al of three line-ups, onl y one of w hich containe d a photog raph of

the Def endant.

Sgt. Howe ll also state d that crime scene office rs had obtained some partial f inge rprints from the liquor store, but none of these wer e matched to the Def endant. Sg t. Howell furthe r stated that he had r eviewe d the video tape of the robbe ry but could not positively identify any one’s f

ace from the tape.

Th e De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d a nde xpla ine d th at he re me mbe re d the 19 th o f O c tob e r b e c a us e his birthday was “ coming up that Sunday .” He spent the day making arr ang ements to g et his car fix ed

a ndwa s o n L e Cle a ve s andWal ke r s tr e e t a t hi s c ou sin ’s ho us e g e tti ng his c ar r e pa ir e d d uring the tim e of the robbe ry

. The De fendant acknowle dg ed that he ha d been pr eviously convicted of

a felony drug char g e, a bank r o b b e r y

a n d a g u n o f f e n s e

. T h e D e f

e n d a n t m a in tain e d
, h o w e v e r , th a t h e “ d idn o t r o b th at liquor store.”

After considering the above proof, t h e j u ry convicted the Def endant of the ag g ravated robbery of John Harmon by

use of a handg un and plac ing the victim in fear.

AN AL YSI S I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence I n h is f ir st i ssu e , th e De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is n ot s uf fi c ie nt t o s usta in h is

c on vic tio n. Te nn e sse e Rul e of Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re 13 (e ) p re sc ri bes th at “[ f]i nd ing s o f g uil t in

c ri min a l a c tio ns wh e the r b y the tr ia l cou rt or jury sh a ll b e se t a sid e if

the e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o support the finding s by

the trier of

fac t of g uilt bey ond a rea sonable doubt.” A convicte d criminal defe ndant who cha ll eng es the suff iciency of the e vidence on appea l bear s the burden of de mon st rat in g why

the e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the ve rd ic t, b e c a us e a

ve rd ic t of

g uil t destroy s the presumption of i nnocenc e and imposes a presumption of guilt. See S tate v. Evans, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W .3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). This Court must reje ct a c onvicted criminal defendant’s

c ha lle ng e to th e su ffi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e if, a ft e r c on sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e in a lig ht m os t favor able to the pr osecution, we d et ermine that any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. See J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Ha ll, 8 S.W .3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999)

.
On app e a l, the State is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l egit im ate vi e w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll

rea sonable and leg itimate inf ere nces which may be draw n there from. See Carr uthers, 35 S.W.3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W .3d at 599. A guilty verdic t by the trier of

fac t acc redits the testimony of the State’sC r i mi nal defendan t s cl as s i f i ed as “ R ang e I ” of

fender s ar e s ubj ect t o s hor t er s ent enc es t han t hos e c l as s i f i ed as 1

“Ra nge II ” o f

fend ers

. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 2 (a), (b).

-5- wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s all c on fl ic ts in the e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the pr os e c uti on ’s the ory . See State

v. Bl an d, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997) . Questions about the cr edibilityof witnesses, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, as well as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t, and this Court will not re- weig h or re -eva luate the e vidence . See Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d at 236; Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 659. Nor w ill thi s Court su b s t i t u t e it s own infer ence s drawn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those dr awn by the trier of

fac t. See Evans, 108 S.W

. 3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.

Ag g ravated robbe ry

is defined a s the “intentional or knowing thef t o f p roperty

from the person of another by violence or p u t t i n g t h e person in fea r,” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 401(a)
, “[a]ccomplished with a dea dly we ap o n

. . . . ” I d. § 39-13-402( a)( 1). I n this case, the pr oof established that the De fendant, using a handg un, g ained e ntranc e into the em p loy ee a rea of L auder dale Liquors and took the business’s c ash box. The Defendant took possession of the money afte r ac costing J ohn Harmon with the gun and ordering him onto the floor. M r. Ha rmon testified that he wa s scar ed during the robbe ry

. Two ey ewitnesses to the robbery identified the Def endant at trial as the pe rpetrator. One of these e y ewitnesses a lso identified the Def endant a s the perpe trator f

r o m a p h o to g raphic line-up about t w o w e e k s a f

t e r t h e r o b b e r y.
This proof is suf

ficient to support the Def

endant’ s conviction. The De fendant challeng es the

cre dibilit y

of t he ey ewitnesses, but such determinations are left t o the j ury and will not be sec ondg uessed by t h i s Court. The De fendant’s contention that the evide nce is not suffic ient is without merit. We aff

irm the Def

endant’ s conviction.

II. Se nt e nc ing T h e D e f e n d a n t a l s o ar g u e s t h a tt h e tr i a l c o u r te rr e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g h i mt o b e a R a n g e II,

m u l t i p l e o f

f e n d e r a n d t h e r e f

o r e s u b j e c tt o a l o n g e r s e n t e n c e t h a n i f

h e w e r e s e n t e n c e d a s a

R a n g e I, standard of

fende r. The S tate responds that the Def endant ha s waived this issue by not raising the 1 issue at the sente ncing hearing and by failing to raise it i n his motion for new t rial. I n his Amended Mo tio n f or Ne w T ri a l, the De fe nd a nt re qu e ste d a ne w t ri a l onthe ba sis that, amon g oth e r thin g s, “[t] he Court er

red in sentencing Def

endant to 12 y ear s @ 35% conse cutive to Def endant’ s fede ral sentenc e.” T he State ar g ues that th e De fe n d an t “only objected to the imposition of consec utive sentenc ing, w here the trial court ran t h e[D ]e f e n d an t’ s s entenc e conse cutive to his fede ral sente nces.” We disag ree . The stateme nt of the issue, although not succinc t, was suffic ient to preserve the issue of the leng th of the De fendant’s sentenc e as well as the trial court’s determination that it was to be

se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly . I f the De fe nd a nt ha d inte nd e d to c ha lle ng e on ly the c on se c uti ve natur e of his sentenc e, the r efe renc e to i ts leng th was unnecessa ry

. Acc ording ly
, we will addre ss on its m erits the Def endant’ s issue reg arding the leng th of his sentence

.Indee d
, t he Stat e’ s A m end ed N o t i ce o f Int ent t o See k E nhanced P uni shment p rovides t hat t he D efend a n t’s 2

1 9 9 2 c o n v ic tio n is a C la ss B felo n y.

T h e Se n t en ci n g Act pr ov i des t h at t h e pr es um p t i ve s en t en ce for a Cl as s B f el on y , a bs en t e n h an ce men t or 3

m i t i gat i ng f act o rs , i s t he m i ni m um i n t he ap p l i cab l e range. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 (c).

-6- Th e Cr imi na l Se nte nc ing Re fo rm Ac t of 19 89 de fi ne s a

“ mul tip le of

fe nd e r” a s a def endant who ha s rec eived: (1 ) A min imu m of tw o (2 ) b ut n ot m or e than f ou r ( 4) prior

fe lon y c on vic tio ns wi thi n the c on vic tio n c la ss, a hig he r c la ss, or wi thi n the ne xt t wo (2 ) low e r fe lon y c la sse s, wher e applica

ble; or (2 ) O ne (1 ) C la ss Aprior

fe lon y c on vic tio n if

the de fe nd a nt’ s con vic tio n off e ns e is

a C l a s s A o r

B f e l o n y. (b) In determining the number of prior c onvictions a defe ndant has re ceive d: (1) “ Prior conviction” mean s a co nviction for an of fense occur

ring prior to the commission of the offe nse for which the de fendant is being se ntence d[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-106. “A defe ndant who is found by the court bey ond a re asonable doubt to b e a mul tip le of

fe nd e r s ha ll r e c e ive a se nte nc e wi thi n Ran g e I I .” I d. § 4 0- 35 -1 06 (c ). Ou r s up re me court ha s held that, within this contex t, “‘prior conviction’ means a convic tion that has been adjudicate d prior to the commission of the more rec ent offe nse for which sente nce is to be imposed.” State v. Blouve tt, 904 S.W .2d 111, 113 (Tenn. 1995) (empha sis added).

Th e De fe nd a nt c omm itt e d th e ins ta nt c ri me on Oc tob e r 1 9, 20 01

. Ag g ra vate d ro bb e ry is a Class B felony

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402( b). The De fendant was convic ted of a fede ral felony drug char g e in 1 9 9 2. Howeve r, there is no proof in the re cord that the Def endant’ s 1992 conviction is a Class A fe lony

. Thus, the Def endant c annot be c l as s i fi ed as a multiple offe nder 2

su bje c t to a

Ra ng e I I se nte nc e on the ba sis of thi s si ng le prior c on vic tio n. Th e De fe nd a nt w a s a lso convicted of

fede ral c harg es in 2003. Howe ver, the se convic tions were a djudicated after theinstant crime w as committed and ther efor e do not satisfy the def inition of “prior convic tions.” Thus, they cannot be used to classify

the Def endant a s a multiple offende r. Ac cording ly
, the proof in the r ecor d is insufficient to sustain the trial court’ s d et ermination that the De fendant is a multi ple offe nder subject to Rang e I I

sentenc ing f

or the purpose s of the instant conviction. Ther efor e, we must modi fy the Def endant’ s sentenc e by desig nating him to be a standa rd off ender subject to a Rang e I

sentenc e fo r t h e p u rp o s es o f t h e a ggra v at ed ro b b er y co n v i ct i o n i n t h i s ca s e. S ee i d

. § 4 0 -3 5 -1 0 5

. T h e R an ge I sentenc e for

a Class B f

elony is eig ht to twelve y ear s. See id. § 40-35-112( a)( 2).

At the time the Def

endant’ s s en t encing hearing w as held, the tria l court, prose cutor a nd d e f e n s e c o u n s e l w e r e in a g r e e me n t th a t th e U n it e d St a te s Su p r e me Co u r t c a s e o f B la k e ly v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (20 04), prohibited the a pplication of enhanceme nt fac tors to the Def endant’ s sentence for the instant c rime, other tha n prior convic tions. Thus, no proof was submitt ed as to whe ther the D efe n d an t ’s sentenc e could be proper ly incre ased be y ond the presumptive sente nce. The Tennessee Supreme Court has since determined that Blakely does not 3 apply to Tennesse e’s se ntencing scheme

. See State v. Gomez, 163 S.W .3d 632, 661 (Tenn. 2005)

.-7-

Thus, the Def

endant’ s sentence may

be incr ease d bey ond the pre sumptive se n t en ce of eig ht y ear s to a ma ximum

of tw e lve y e ars up on the pr op e r ap pli c a tio n of en ha nc e me nt an d mi tig a tin g fa c tor s. S ee T en n

. C ode Ann. § 40- 35-210(e ). I n order for the trial court to dete rmine whe ther a ny enhanc ement (or

mitigating ) fa ctors should be a ppli ed and the Def

endant’ s presumptive sentenc e i n c r e a s e d
, a

s e c o n d s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g i s n e c e s s ar y.

Acc ording ly , we modify

the Def endant’ s sentence insofar a s chang ing his de signation from a Rang e I I , multipl e off

ender to a Rang e I , standard of

fende r as to the instant offense of ag g ravated robbery . We remand this matter f or a new sentenc ing hearing for the prese ntation of proof a s to any enhance m en t and mitigating f actor s that may

be applica

ble, and the tr

ial court’s analy sis thereof. The trial court shall there upon enter an ame nded judg ment setting f orth the De fendant’s revised sentenc e.

CO NC LU SION We affirm t h e De fendant’s conviction of a g g ravated robbe ry . We reve rse the trial court’s determination that the Defenda nt be sente nced a s a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender and we modify

the Def endant’ s sentence so as to desig nate his sentenc ing c lassification as a Rang e I , standard of

fende r. We remand this matter f

or a ne w sentenc ing he aring consistent with this opi nion.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE