In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-3415 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

EDWARD WOODFORK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 2:18-cr-20060 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 22, 2021 — DECIDED JUNE 4, 2021

____________________ 

Before WOOD, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In 2018, a state police officer sought 

and obtained a warrant to search Defendant Edward Woodfork’s home based on the officer’s orchestration of several controlled-buy drug transactions involving Woodfork. Upon executing the warrant, officers discovered methamphetamine 

and a firearm at Woodfork’s suspected residence. Based on 

this evidence, a federal grand jury indicted Woodfork for
2 No. 20-3415

possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and 

possession of a firearm by a felon. 

Woodfork maintains that the officer made material misstatements or omissions in seeking the warrant in violation of 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and that probable cause 

to issue the search warrant was lacking in the first instance. 

Accordingly, Woodfork moved the district court to quash the 

search warrant and to suppress the resulting evidence. When 

the district court denied the motion, Woodfork pled guilty to 

both charges but preserved his ability to appeal the district 

court’s denial of his suppression motion. 

For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of the motion to quash and to suppress. 

I. Background

The government’s prosecution of Woodfork arose out of 

an investigation by the Vermillion (County) Metropolitan Enforcement Group (“VMEG”). As part of the investigation, 

Danville Police Officer Scott Crawley sought a warrant from 

a county judge to search the residence that officers believed to 

be Woodfork’s home at 1220 North Franklin Street in Danville, Illinois. Crawley did not submit an affidavit in support 

of the search warrant request; instead, he testified under oath,

live before the judge. The court recorded the testimony. 

During his testimony, Crawley identified Edward Woodfork as the target of the requested search warrant. He testified 

that Woodfork had sold 1.6 grams of crystal methamphetamine in a controlled buy to a confidential source earlier that 
No. 20-3415 3 

day.1 Prior to the transaction, officers searched the source for 

currency and contraband and provided the source with $110 

of official advanced funds to buy the methamphetamine from 

Woodfork. Officers surveilled the transaction, and the source 

wore a wire that recorded the transaction. Officers also 

searched the source after the transaction. Crawley reported 

that he had relied on the confidential source “multiple times” 

in the past and that the source was “reliable.” 

Crawley also testified that the officers intended to set up a 

second controlled buy on the day of the hearing. For this 

transaction, a second reliable confidential source contacted 

Woodfork to buy crystal methamphetamine. The source attempted to set up the controlled buy with Woodfork away 

from 1220 North Franklin Street so that officers could stop 

Woodfork in his car before he arrived at the agreed-upon location for the controlled buy. This “buy bust” maneuver was 

stymied, however, by Woodfork’s insistence that the source 

come to Woodfork’s home for the transaction. Because the 

source feared retaliation, he did not want the transaction to 

take place at Woodfork’s home. In describing this attempt at 

a controlled buy, Crawley first testified that Woodfork directed the source to come to “Franklin and English” for the 

sale, and Crawley testified that law enforcement understood

1 As we have previously recognized: 

The controlled buy is a familiar law enforcement tool. In a typical 

case, officers enlist a confidential informant to buy drugs from a 

suspected dealer. To protect against informant deception, officers 

search the informant before and after the buy and frequently wire 

him so that they can listen in on the transaction.

United States v. Bacon, 991 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2021). 
4 No. 20-3415

this intersection to mean Woodfork’s residence at 1220 North 

Franklin Street. Later in the hearing, the court questioned 

Crawley further about where the transaction was supposed to 

take place, and Crawley confirmed Woodfork was directing 

the buyer to his home at 1220 North Franklin Street. 

Crawley further testified that he had “done” three “past 

buys” from Woodfork within the last year using the same confidential informants. Those three controlled buys were also 

“wired buys.” 

Based on this testimony, the judge issued a search warrant 

for Woodfork’s home at 1220 North Franklin Street. Upon executing the warrant, officers discovered methamphetamine 

and a firearm. The government presented this evidence to a 

federal grand jury, which indicted Woodfork for possession 

of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm by a felon. Woodfork moved to quash the 

search warrant and in the alternative to suppress the evidence 

discovered through the warrant-authorized search of his 

home. He argued that he was entitled to a Franks hearing and 

suppression of the evidence from the search because he 

claimed that Crawley had misled the warrant-issuing judge 

regarding the identification of his home as the place to be 

searched and by omitting details about the confidential 

sources’ criminal histories. 

The district court found that Woodfork was not entitled to 

a Franks hearing. First, he “failed to show Crawley made false 

statements about his address knowingly, intentionally, or 

with reckless disregard for the truth.” See Franks, 438 U.S. at 

155–56. In addition, the district court found that Woodfork 

failed to show that “the alleged false statement [about his address] was essential to the establishment of probable cause, 
No. 20-3415 5 

because even without the statement, Crawley’s testimony 

provided the issuing judge with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed [to search 1220 North 

Franklin Street].” The district court further found that “the 

omission of information about the sources’ backgrounds, 

criminal histories, or motives does not change the probable 

cause determination.” Finally, the district court held that regardless of probable cause, the good-faith exception announced in United States v. Leon would apply. See 468 U.S. 897 

(1984). 

When the district court denied his motion, Woodfork conditionally pled guilty, preserving his ability to challenge the 

suppression ruling. The district court sentenced Woodfork to 

two concurrent 120-month sentences and five years’ supervised release. 

II. Discussion

On appeal, Woodfork argues that the district court should 

have held a Franks hearing to investigate the veracity of Officer Crawley’s testimony in support of the search warrant. 

Woodfork contends that Crawley made two material omissions or misstatements during his testimony before the 

county judge that render the search warrant invalid. First, he 

argues Crawley recklessly or intentionally omitted the confidential sources’ criminal histories and other details about 

their credibility.2 Second, he asserts that Crawley “invented” 

the street corner (“Franklin and English”) where the controlled buy was supposed to take place, so that it was a 

2 In the proceedings below, the government admitted that “the second 

confidential source does have a criminal history that was not discussed in 

Agent Crawley’s testimony.”
6 No. 20-3415

material misstatement to suggest that 1220 North Franklin 

Street was the location where drugs were likely to be found. 

Woodfork also maintains that the district court erred in applying Leon’s good-faith exception, because, he claims that

Crawley acted in bad faith. For these reasons, Woodfork seeks 

to suppress the evidence discovered at 1220 North Franklin 

Street. 

In reviewing a motion to suppress, we review the district 

court’s “legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for 

clear error. Similarly, we review the denial of a Franks hearing 

for clear error, but any legal determinations that factored into 

the ruling are reviewed de novo.” United States v. Hancock, 844 

F.3d 702, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. 

Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014)). We give “‘great deference’ to the conclusion of the judge who initially issued the 

warrant,” upholding it “so long as ‘there is substantial evidence in the record’ that supports the state judge’s decision.” 

United States v. Leonard, 884 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2008); 

United States v. Curry, 538 F.3d 718, 729 (7th Cir. 2008)).

A. Entitlement to a Franks Hearing 

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall 

issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

“Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant exists if there 

is ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found in a particular place.’” Bacon, 991 F.3d at 839–40 

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “The ability 

of the neutral and detached magistrate to determine probable 

cause depends on the accuracy of the information the police 

submit.” United States v. Clark, 935 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 

2019). “‘A search warrant is not valid if the police obtain it by 
No. 20-3415 7 

deliberately or recklessly presenting false, material information,’ or by omitting material information from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013)). 

“To obtain a Franks hearing, the defendant must make a 

‘substantial preliminary showing’ of (1) a material falsity or 

omission that would alter the probable cause determination, 

and (2) a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth.” Glover, 

755 F.3d at 820 (citing McMurtrey, 704 F.3d at 508); see also 

United States v. Bell, 925 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when he ‘makes 

a substantial preliminary showing that the police procured a 

warrant to search his property with intentional or reckless 

misrepresentations in the warrant affidavit and such statements were necessary to a finding of probable cause.’”) (quoting United States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, 531 (7th Cir. 2018)). 

“Franks hearings are ‘rarely held’ because ‘[t]hese elements 

are hard to prove.’” United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395, 402 

(7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788, 

790 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

1. Material Falsity or Omission 

Here, Crawley’s omission of the confidential sources’ 

criminal histories was not “necessary to a finding of probable 

cause.” Bell, 925 F.3d at 372. “Our cases do not hold that a 

Franks hearing is required every time some substantial adverse information about an informant’s credibility is omitted 

from a probable cause affidavit.” Clark, 935 F.3d at 565 (citing 

Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709). In seeking to establish probable 

cause for the search warrant in his testimony before the judge, 

Crawley did not simply rely on a tip from a confidential informant who chose to provide information to the police after
8 No. 20-3415

an unverified drug transaction. Instead, Crawley relied on information he had gathered through an investigation involving four separate controlled-buy transactions with confidential informants, which law enforcement had orchestrated and 

surveilled. See United States v. Glenn, 966 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 

2020) (“Given the audio and video evidence of the controlled 

buy, the informant’s reliability and motivations are not material to the existence of probable cause.”); United States v. Fifer, 

863 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The officer who submitted 

the affidavit credibly reported that he and another officer had 

recently overseen two controlled buys[.]”). 

This case is distinguishable from cases in which probable 

cause depended on the credibility of the source of a single

confidential or anonymous tip. See, e.g., Glover, 755 F.3d at 

814–15, 820 (“[T]he omitted credibility information was 

clearly material” because probable cause depended on a tip 

from a gang-affiliated confidential informant with minimal 

corroboration or detail.); United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 

867 (7th Cir. 2002) (government conceded lack of probable 

cause in warrant affidavit where the affidavit was based on a 

tip from a single source). Importantly, Crawley (and the issuing judge) were not simply relying on the uncorroborated 

word of the confidential sources; law enforcement officers arranged and witnessed the controlled-buy transactions 

through the wire recordings and surveillance. Indeed, “[w]e 

have held that ‘a controlled buy, when executed properly,’ is 

generally ‘a reliable indicator as to the presence of illegal drug 

activity.’” Bacon, 991 F.3d at 837 (quoting United States v. Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2006)). Here, Officer Crawley 

had direct knowledge of the controlled buys.
No. 20-3415 9 

Moreover, Crawley appeared in person to testify before 

the judge. Unlike the consideration of a written affidavit, the 

judge had the ability to ask Crawley questions regarding the 

confidential sources’ backgrounds and criminal histories. We 

trust that warrant-issuing judges are aware that the individuals upon whom law enforcement relies to make drug purchases through controlled buys are likely to have criminal histories, and it is not a stretch to assume that the judge here 

knew that a confidential source buying methamphetamine

likely had some criminal history. Cf. Molina ex rel. Molina v. 

Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ourts are aware 

that informants are frequently facing charges and hoping for 

deals.”). Given Crawley’s live testimony, the judge could have 

probed this issue further had he thought it necessary. As the 

district court aptly pointed out, “[i]f [the issuing judge] had 

thought the confidential sources’ criminal history or motivations were relevant to his determination of probable cause, he 

could have asked Crawley to explain.” 

Thus, we agree with the district court that the “omission 

of information about the sources’ backgrounds, criminal histories, or motives does not change the probable cause determination.” See also United States v. Sims, 551 F.3d 640, 645 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (omission of confidential source’s arrest record was 

not material to the probable cause determination). While “we 

think the[] omissions” of information about the sources’ credibility are “unfortunate,” those omissions “do not negate 

probable cause” on these facts. See Glenn, 966 F.3d at 661. 

2. Deliberate or Reckless Disregard for the Truth 

Even if Woodfork was able to establish that Crawley made 

some material omission during the probable cause hearing, 

Woodfork has failed to make the necessary “substantial 
10 No. 20-3415

preliminary showing” that Crawley intentionally or recklessly misled the warrant-issuing judge. Bell, 925 F.3d at 372.

“To secure a Franks hearing, a defendant must put forth ‘an 

offer of proof’ that is ‘more than conclusory’ and gestures toward more than negligent mistakes.” United States v. Daniels, 

906 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Franks, 

438 U.S. at 171). “What is needed is ‘direct evidence of the affiant’s state of mind’ or else ‘circumstantial evidence’ of ‘a 

subjective intent to deceive.’” Id. (quoting Glover, 755 F.3d at 

820). To make the necessary preliminary showing, “the evidence must show that the officer submitting the complaint 

perjured himself or acted recklessly because he seriously 

doubted or had obvious reason to doubt the truth of the allegations.” United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 

2009) (citing United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 

2000); United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir.

1984)). 

Here, Woodfork has made no such showing. First, Woodfork’s frustration that Crawley did not testify about the confidential sources’ criminal histories does not show that Crawley 

omitted that information to intentionally mislead the judge. 

At most, Crawley was negligent in failing to testify about the 

sources’ criminal histories, but “negligence does not justify a 

Franks hearing.” United States v. Slizewski, 809 F.3d 382, 385 

(7th Cir. 2016). And as we explained above, the issuing judge 

could have asked questions about the sources’ criminal histories had he thought it necessary. Given that the issuing judge 

was apparently satisfied by Crawley’s testimony that his 

sources were reliable, Crawley’s omission of additional details does not suggest that he recklessly or intentionally 

sought to deceive the judge. Labelling Crawley’s omission of 

the criminal histories as “deceptive” does not make it so. See 
No. 20-3415 11 

Johnson, 580 F.3d at 671 (“Conclusory, self-serving statements 

are not enough to obtain a Franks hearing.”). As the district 

court found, “[a]ny failure on Crawley’s part to elaborate 

about the confidential sources’ reliability was not an intentional or reckless omission.”

Second, Woodfork has similarly failed to put forth evidence of any intent to mislead the judge regarding the location of the place to be searched. Woodfork points to Crawley’s 

reference to “Franklin and English” as evidence that Crawley 

intended to mislead the judge. But that interpretation is inconsistent with the record, which shows that Crawley explained that law enforcement understood “Franklin and English” to refer to Woodfork’s home at 1220 North Franklin 

Street, which is located just one tenth of a mile from the Franklin and English intersection. The judge did ask clarifying 

questions about the intended location of the drug transaction, 

indicating that the judge was not in fact misled. The issuing 

judge could have asked more questions about this issue, but 

the judge’s apparent satisfaction with Crawley’s responses 

and failure to probe Crawley’s testimony any further does not 

support the conclusion that Crawley intended to mislead the 

judge. Accordingly, Woodfork has presented no facts to support a preliminary showing that Crawley recklessly, let alone

deliberately, disregarded the truth of the location to be 

searched. See Kienast, 907 F.3d at 531. There is simply no suggestion in the record that Crawley had “obvious reason to 

doubt the truth” of his testimony before the issuing judge. 

Johnson, 580 F.3d at 670. 

We are also mindful that Crawley appeared in person to 

testify before the county judge, who questioned and evaluated Crawley’s credibility himself. Cf. United States v. Sutton, 
12 No. 20-3415

742 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Finally, the CI personally 

appeared and presented his affidavit to the county judge, allowing the judge to evaluate his knowledge and credibility.”); 

Sims, 551 F.3d at 644 (live testimony in a probable cause hearing “allow[s] the judge to evaluate the informant’s 

knowledge, demeanor, and sincerity.”). Submitting to the 

court’s questioning under oath and answering all of the 

court’s questions does not suggest that Crawley intended to 

omit details or mislead that judge. Indeed, nothing in the transcript suggests that Crawley responded evasively or did not 

provide complete responses to the questions posed by the 

judge.3 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not 

clearly err in denying Woodfork a Franks hearing. 

B. Good-faith Exception 

The district court held that even if there was insufficient 

probable cause to issue the search warrant, Leon’s good-faith

exception exempts the evidence recovered in the search from 

suppression. Woodfork argues this was error and contends 

that the testimony in support of the search warrant was so 

lacking that it demonstrates a lack of good faith by Crawley

3 Woodfork argues that Crawley’s use of verbal pauses like “um” indicates

that Crawley was lying. That may be true in some circumstances, but not 

here. Reviewing the transcript of the probable cause hearing in its entirety, 

Crawley also paused before giving his own name, indicating that he, like 

most people, does not always speak in perfectly formulated complete sentences. But we do not doubt that Crawley was telling the truth when he

gave his name on the record. The transcript also reflects several verbal 

pauses by the judge. These verbal pauses may indicate a fastidious court 

reporter, but they do not indicate deception by Crawley under these circumstances. 
No. 20-3415 13 

such that the good-faith exception should not apply. See Leon, 

468 U.S. at 923. 

At the outset, we note that “we need not decide whether 

the state judge who issued the warrant had a basis for finding 

probable cause,” if we find that the search survives a motion 

to suppress under the good-faith exception of Leon. United 

States v. Thompson, 801 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–23); see also United States v. 

Clark, 668 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Leon’s good-faith exception to the warrant requirement 

provides that “the fruits of a search based on an invalid warrant may be admitted if the officers who executed the search 

relied upon the warrant in good faith.” United States v. Yarber, 

915 F.3d 1103, 1106 (7th Cir. 2019). “And an officer’s decision 

to obtain a warrant creates a presumption that the officer 

acted in good faith.” Id. Suppression, however, “remains an 

appropriate remedy if the officer misled the issuing judge 

with knowingly false information or reckless disregard of the 

truth.” United States v. Grisanti, 943 F.3d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 

2019). “The presumption of good faith ... can be rebutted if 

the defendant shows that ‘(1) the judge issuing the warrant 

abandoned his detached and neutral role; (2) the officer was 

dishonest or reckless in preparing the affidavit; or (3) the warrant was so lacking in probable cause that the officer’s belief 

in its existence was entirely unreasonable.’” United States v. 

Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States 

v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 2008)). “Overcoming the 

presumption of good faith is no small feat, as an officer cannot 

ordinarily be expected to question a judge’s probable cause 

determination.” United States v. Adams, 934 F.3d 720, 726–27 
14 No. 20-3415

(7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 824 (2020) (quoting 

United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019)). 

Here, Woodfork has not pointed to any evidence that the 

investigating officers, or Crawley in particular, acted in bad 

faith. Woodfork complains of Crawley’s (and the department’s) search warrant practices, but aside from criticizing 

the lack of detail in Crawley’s testimony, Woodfork has not 

overcome Leon’s good-faith exception.4 “An officer’s decision 

to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence that he or she was 

acting in good faith.” United States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 

1124 (7th Cir. 2011). If an officer “obtained a search warrant, 

the defendant shoulders the burden of satisfying one of the 

Leon exceptions.” Id. Woodfork has not met that burden. 

There is no evidence that the issuing-judge abandoned his detached and neutral role. See Mitten, 592 F.3d at 771. There is 

no evidence that the officer was reckless or dishonest in his 

live testimony before the judge. See id. And, the warrant certainly was not so lacking in probable cause that it was unreasonable for Crawley to rely on it. See id.; Yarber, 915 F.3d at 

1107 (warrant was not “so deficient in establishing probable 

cause as to preclude reasonable, good-faith reliance on it by 

4 Indeed, Woodfork’s counsel wastes time in footnote 6 of his opening 

brief criticizing the prosecutors and the federal courts generally for relying 

on “thin” affidavits. This accusation is unhelpful to our consideration of 

the facts of this case. Though counsel is correct that we have grown “weary 

of thin affidavits that suffer from the same omissions which [have] provoked our criticism in the past,” Thompson, 801 F.3d at 848, this case is not 

about an affidavit where probable cause rested on omitted information. 

Counsel would do well to focus on the facts of the present appeal. Counsel’s quibbling with the government over his citation to literary works in 

his reply brief is similarly unhelpful and unproductive. 
No. 20-3415 15 

the police”); Fifer, 863 F.3d at 765 (the defendant “offer[ed] no 

evidence that any of [the representations in the search warrant affidavit] are false—much less that they’re reckless distortions or outright lies.”). Indeed, it was based on several 

properly executed controlled buys. See Bacon, 991 F.3d at 837. 

Woodfork relies on Owens v. United States, in which we 

found the search warrant affidavit to be “[s]o inadequate ... 

that the search cannot be saved by United States v. Leon.” 387 

F.3d 607, 608 (7th Cir. 2004). That case is easily distinguishable. In Owens, the only evidence presented in the “barebones”

affidavit was an allegation that an informant had bought “a 

quantity of crack” from the defendant three months prior. Id.

The transaction was not a controlled buy, and there was no 

information about the quantity of purchased drugs. Accordingly, we reasoned that “there would be no basis for thinking 

either that the premises were a crack house or that the money 

received in the sale would still be on the premises.” Id. Moreover, the information in the affidavit was stale and officers 

had not updated it since officers received the tip three months 

prior. Here, by contrast, Crawley described multiple controlled buys involving Woodfork, including a surveilled controlled buy occurring earlier that day. He described the orchestration of the most recent controlled buy in detail, including the quantity of drugs sold and the officers’ procedures for 

that controlled buy. And, Crawley testified live before the 

judge, so the court could assess his credibility and freely ask 

him questions about the controlled buys that Crawley described. 

Woodfork also relies on Thompson, 801 F.3d 845, but there, 

we held that the good-faith exception did apply. Though we 

expressed concern over the lack of detail contained within the 
16 No. 20-3415

search warrant affidavit, we held that “we need not decide 

whether the state judge who issued the warrant had a basis 

for finding probable cause, since the search of [the defendant’s] residence survives a motion to suppress under the 

good-faith exception.” Id. at 848. 

III. Conclusion 

The district court did not clearly err in denying Woodfork’s request for a Franks hearing and properly denied

Woodfork’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the judgment

of the district court is

AFFIRMED.