The jury also assesse d two $10,000 fines and one $100,000 fine. The trial court e ntere d 1 a jud g me nt i n a c c or da

nc e wi th t he jur y ’s de te rm inatio ns , p ro vid ingthat the thr e e ja il te rm s w ou ld r u nc o n c u r r e n t l y b u tw o u l d

b e s t a c k e d

o np u n i s h m e n ta s s e s s e d

i na c a u s e f r o m G i l l e s p i e C o u n t y. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 389 -CR NO. 03-07-00390- CR

Be r t E dwar d Cr abt r e e , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LLANO COUNTY , 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NOS . 5756 & 5757, H ONO RAB LE GUILF ORD L. JO NES III , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt B e rt Cr a btr e e wa s c ha

rg e d w ithon e c ount o f p osses si on of c e rt a in chemic als with the intent to manufac ture methamphetamine and one count of possession of betwee n four a

nd two-hundre d g rams of me thamphetamine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.115(d), ( f) ( West 2003), .124 (West Supp. 2 0 0 8). In a sepa rate indictment, appellant
was c harg ed with possession of more tha n four- hu n dred g rams of me thamphetamine. Se e id
. § 4 8 1
. 1 1 5 (f

). Ap p el l an tp l edgu i l t y

t o al l t h re e c h ar ges wi t h o u ta pl eaagr ee m en tas t o s en t en ci n g, and chose to have a

jury assess his punishment. The jury sentenc ed him to ten and fifte en y ear s for the tw o c ha

rg e s in the fi rs t ind ic tme nt and fi ft y y e ars on the se c on d in dic tme nt. We affir m the trial 1 court’s judg ments of conviction.2 F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound On M ay 18, 2005, law enforce ment office rs ex ecute d a sea rch w arr ant at the 1,600-
acr e ra nch (“ Crabtre e Ranc h”) at which appe llant resided a nd in which appe llant had a joint
owner ship interest along wit h his mother and siblings, unc overingevidenc e implicating appellant i n t h e m an u fa cture of methampheta mine. As a re sult, appellant pled g uilty to two counts of po sse ssi on

of me tha mph e tamin e and

on e c ount o f po sses sio n o f c he mic a ls w ithint e nt t o manufa cture , leavingthe issue of punishment for a jury ’s deter

mination. Be fore appellant’ s g uilty

pleas a nd in a sepa

rate civil proce eding , the State broug ht
a fo rf e iture a c tio n a g a ins t th e ow ne rs of Cr a btr e e Ranc h, inc lud ing

a pp e lla nt, his mo th er, and

his
s i b l i n gs , alleg ing that the ranc h was be ing use d or intended to be used to commit a felony under chapte r 481 of the he alth and saf ety code. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . Ann. art s. 59 .0 1( 2) (B )( i) (We st Sup p. 20 08 ) ( de fi nin g c on tr a ba nd ), .0 2( a ) ( Wes t 2 00 6) (“ Pr op e rt y that is c on tr a

ba nd is s ub je c t to seizure and f

orfe iture under

this chapter.” ). To pre vent the for feiture of the fa mily ’s ra nch,
a pp e lla nt’ s mo the r p a id a

n und is clo sed a

mou nt t o th e State a s p art

of a se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt. Subsequently , appellant voluntar ily deede d his interest in the Crabtre e Ranc h to his mot her. Duringthe punishment phase of his criminal trial, appe llant sought to introduce testimony from his mother refer encing the S tate’s origina l petition from the forf eiture a ction broug ht ag ainst the Crabtre es. Appe llant soug ht to use her testimony to show that he wa s remorse ful for the trouble he ha d cause d and money he had cost his family . Appellant ar g ued that the f orfe iture wa s rele vant, and thus his mother’s testimony reg ardingthe forf

eiture w as re levant and should be admitted to show his remorse. The State argued t h at any mention of the for feiture would be irrele vant and pr ejudicial. After hear ing arguments from both side s and re viewing case law, the tria lAp pe lla nt c la ims that he ha s a

n “abs ol ut e ri g ht t o p re se nt m iti g a tio n e vid e nc e pr ior to 2 receiving punishment for the c ause,” citing Is sa v . S tate , 8 26 S.W. 2d

15 9, 16 1 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1992). Appe llant’s relianc e on Is sa is mispl ace d. Issa pr ov ide s th a t a c ri min a l de fe nd ant i s entitled to a punishment hear ing at which he must be g iven “the oppor tunity to present e vidence ,” whether immediately

following his conviction or af t er en t ry of g uilt in a defer

red- adjudication proce eding
. Id
. Issa does not hold that a defe ndant has the rig ht to present any and all evide nce at the re quired punishment hea ring
. Se e id .; se e als o Elli

so n v. Sta te , 2 01 S.W. 3d

71 4, 72 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt he re pr ov ide d a pp e lla nt w itha punis hme nt h e ari ngand

a llo we d h im t o prese nt what it determined w as re levant evide nce r eg ardingmitigation.
3 court rule d that appellant, not his mother, would have to be the one to testify about hi s remorse , and that if he te stifie d r e g ard inghis re mor se , h e wo uld be a llo we d at mo st t o s pe a k in g e ne ra l te rm s about t he f

o r f e it u r e . T h e c o u rt b ar

r e d a p p e ll an t’ s mo th e r ’ s te s ti mo n y r e g ar d in g th e f

o r f e it u re p r o c e e d i n g a l t o g e t h e r

o nt h e g r o u n d s t h a tt h e l i k e l y p r e j u d i c i a l e f

f e c to f th a ts p e c i f

i c t e s t i m o n y, sy mpathy toward the family , outweig hed its probative va lue. See Tex. R. Evi d. 403.
Ana lys is Ap pe ll an tar g u e s o na

p p e a l t h a t

t h e t r i a l c o u rte r

r e d i nr e f u s i n g t o a dm i tc e rt a in evidenc e of the forf

eiture pr o ce ed ing thr oug h his mother’s testimony . The trial c ourt held that evidenc e re lated to the for feiture could only be admitted throug h appellant’ s testimony . Appellant
argue s th a t th e e vid e nc e , w hic h w ou ld h a ve sh ow n th a t he l os t hi s in te re st i n th e ra nc h a nd that hi s family expended considera ble sums in settling the forf eiture, w as evide nce “ that he alr eady suffe red
some p u n i s h m en t ” and wa s thus releva nt to the jury ’s deter

mination of what it should assess as fu rt h er p u n i s h m en t
. He co n t en d s t h at b y b arri n g ev i d e n c e o f t h e f o rf ei tu re o t h er

t h an t h ro u gh appellant’ s own t estimony reg arding his remorse , the trial cour t limi ted his constitutional right not to testify and his rig ht to present evide nce on his be half. 24 We r eview a

trial court’ s ruling on the admissibili ty of evide nce unde r an a

buse of discretion standa

rd. Ro dr igu e

z v . S tate , 2 03 S.W. 3d

83 7, 84 1 ( Tex . Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). We w ill uphold the trial court’s decision as long as it falls within the z one of r easona ble disag ree ment. Id. We may not reve rse the c ourt’s dec ision solely beca use we disag ree with it. Id. The question to be deter

mined in a sentenc ing he aringis not whether the de fenda nt is guilty of some off

ense—that question has alre ady been answe red in the aff irmative. Instead, the purp o s e o f a p u n is h me n t h e ar in g is to a ll o w th e f a c t- f in d e r to d e te r

mi n e w h a t w ould be an appropr i at e punishment for the offe nse. See id. a t 84 2; Ro ge rs v . S tate , 991 S.W .2d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). One foc us of the sente ncing h ea ri n g i s the defe ndant’s per sonal responsibility and mora l blameworthiness for the offe nse. Se e Mi lle r-El v . S tate , 782 S.W .2d 892, 896-97 (Te x . Crim. App. 1990).

The code of criminal proc edure provides that in the punishment hea ring , “evide nce
may be of fe re d b y the stat e and

the de fe nd ant a s to any matte r t he c ourt de e ms r e le va

nt t o sentenc ing.” Tex. Code Crim. P ro c. An n . ar t . 37.07, § 3(a) (1) ( West S upp. 2008). Howe ver, the code of criminal proc edure does not d ef i ne what evidence is releva nt to sentencing
. Ro ge rs , 99 1 S. W.2 d at 26 5; Miller-El , 782 S.W .2d at 896. Whether evidenc e is rele vant is left to the trial court, whic h has broa d discretion in making that deter mination. See R odriguez , 203 S.W .3d at 842- 43. The c o u rt o f cr iminal appeals ha s held that, subject to the limits i mposed by article 37.07, evidenc e of the c ircumstance s of the off ense or the def endant himself should be a dmissibl e. Mi lle rEl , 782 S.W .2d at 896. I n deter mining re levanc e in a se ntencingcontext, the rules of evide nce a re helpf u l guide s. Rodriguez , 203 S.W .3d at 842-43 (disc ussing r ule 403’s bala

ncing of pre

judicial
e ff e c t a g a ins t pr ob a tiv e va lue ); El lis on v . S tate , 201 S. W
. 3 d 714, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)5

(d isc u s s i n g

r u l e 4 0 1 ’ s de fi nit ion

of “ re le va nt” e vid e nc e and

ho ldi ngthat in

de te rm ini nga dmi ssi bil ity of punishment evidenc e, “a trial judg e must operate within the bounds of” r ules 401, 402, and 403). Ev ide nc e is r e le va

nt i f i t ha s a

“ te nd e nc y

to m a ke the e xiste nc e of

any fa c t th a t is of c on se qu e nc e to the deter mination of the ac tion more p ro b ab l e or less probable than it would be w ithout the
e vid e nc e .” Te x. R. E vid . 4 01 . Re le va nt e vid e nc e , h ow e ve r, may be e xclu de d und e r r

ule 40 3 “ if

its pr ob a tiv e va lue is s ub sta

nti a lly ou tw e ig he d by the da

ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e ” or c on fu sio n. Te x. R. Evid. 403. And, in sentencing , beca use there are no “distinct ‘fa ct[s] . . . of conse quence ’” to be decide d, deter

mining what evidenc e should be admitted “is not a question of log ical re levanc e, but of policy .” Miller-El , 782 S.W .3d at 896 (quoting Tex. R. Evi d. 401).

Her e, bef ore making its dete rmination on the issue, the trial cour t expl ained: [T]he re are tw o f

a c tor s th a t must b e e xiste nt b e fo re the fo rf e iture e ve nt c ou ld be re levant to a showingof r em o rs e. One is . . . an expression [ of re morse] by the defe ndant. T h e ca s e law, I think, is clear that ther e’s no e x ception to [the] hear say rule to re count it throug h another person. The sec ond is it could only be re levant to the extent the forf eiture w orked a pa rtial , quo te , p un ish me nt, un qu ote , o n th e de fe nd ant. Ithi nk the State ’s e xac tly ri g ht t hat to the e xten t th a t it imp a c te d o the r p e op le , a lth ou g h .
. . Ic an s e e so me potential rele vance there , I can also see a prejudice outweig hing the probative va lue.
After hear ing argument, the court made its deter mination reg arding the admis sion of the for feiture evidenc e: The De fenda nt’s g oing to have t o te s ti fy about it and express remor se himself. And I think all he ca n t al k ab out at most is t hat there is a forf eiture pr ovision, and that he did

have an in te re st i n la

nd fo rf e ite d a s a re su lt.
Idon’t see how

y o u ca n go any

further than that. And I

think that cures the prejudice in terms of evokingsy mpathy fo r the re st of the family . The re st of the family can’ t come into it.6

. . . N o w i t ’ s a l r e a dy i ne v i d e n c e t h a th i s p r o b l e m s h a v e c o s t[ t h e m o t h e r ] m o n e y. He c an say

g ener ically , that t h at is a basis of r emorse, if that’s his testimony . I ’m g oing to let him talk about, in a very g ener ic way . . . that he has lost an inter est in the proper ty
. . . . We need to mask it. I don’t want to g et into the details [that] his mother or oth e r f a mil y me mbe rs pa id f

or it, and he de e de d it

to t he m.

. . . I f he w ere to testify about re morse b as ed upon the f orfe iture loss to him, I would allow that much.

Re g ard inga

pp e lla nt’ s mo the r’ s te sti mony a bo ut a pp e lla nt’ s re mor se , the tr ia l c ourt ru le d e xplic itl y that su c h te sti mony

wo uld be “ he ars ay

and sp e c ulatio n” and

re fu se d to a llo w i t. The trial c ourt did not a

buse its discr etion in refusingto allow evidenc e re g ardingthe forf eiture pr ocee ding a

nd its impact on appellant’ s family
. I t would have showe d only the ef fec t of the e nti re ly

se pa rate c ivi l pro c e e din g on oth e r pe op le , a matte r that wa s ir re le va nt t o th e a pp ro pr iate
se nte nc e to b e a sse sse d a g a ins t a pp e lla nt, and se rv e d o nly

to i nv ok e sy

mpathy fo r a

pp e lla nt’ s f a mil y that might be tr ansfe rre d to appellant himself. T h e consequence s of appe llant’s offe nse ar e not
nece ssarily rele vant to his sentencing —evidenc e of c onsequenc es may be re levant if they

touch on his responsibility

and blamew orthiness for the offe nse. See id. at 896-97. As far as showing appellant’ s remor s e and that the f orfe iture worke d a par

tial punishment on appellant, the trial c ourt stated that appellant would be allowed to testify on his own behalf reg arding his remorse and to testify in g ener al t erms about the forfe iture proc eedingand how7

h e c a m e t o l o s e h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e rt y. In d e c i d i n g t o e x c l u d e a p p e l l an t ’ s m o t h e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y, the tr ia l c ourt c on sid e re d c a se law ho ldi ng that on ly a de fe nd ant, no t a

thi rd pa rt y , ma y te sti fy a s to that defe ndant’s re morse. See, e .g. , Swa llo w v . S tate , 829 S.W .2d 223, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“Te stimony

as to contrition or re mors e ca n only come f rom the ac cused, a

nd when of

fer ed by wi tne sse s oth e r tha

n the a c c us e d h ims e lf

, is ina dmi ssi ble .” ); Tho ma s v . S tate , 638 S.W .2d 481, 483- 84 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 82 ) ( “ te sti mony of thi rd pe rs on s that an a c c us e d ha s e xpre sse d c on tr iti on is not ‘leg ally

admissible’ evidenc e in mitig ation when offe red by an acc used”)
. This case law der ives from the he arsa

y rule, see Thomas , 6 3 8 S
. W
. 2 d at 4 8 4 (c i t i n g De Ru ssev . S tate , 579 S.W .2d 224, 233 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 79 ); Me nd oz a v . S tate , 522 S.W .2d 898, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)), which g ener ally excludes out of court stateme nts offer ed to prove t h e t ru t h o f t he matter asser ted, see Te x. R. Ev id. 80 1( d) , 80 2. He re , the te sti mony of fe re d b y a pp e lla nt’ s mo the r r e g ard inghis re mor se and the c ircumstance s of how he g ave up his r ights to the proper ty following his mother’s settlement
o f t h e S t a t e ’ s f

o r f e i tu r e p r o c e e d i n g w o u l d

b e , a s t h e t r i a l c o u rtr

u l e d , i n a dm i s s i b l e h e ar s ay. Fur ther, the trial court discussed at leng th a nd subsequently found that the e vidence ’s likely prejudicia l effe ct in the form of sy mpathy for a ppellant’s fa

mily members due to the hardships and expenses they

have suf fer ed bec ause of

appellant outwe ighe d its probative value. See Te x. R. Evid. 403. The forfeiture proce eding was a distinct procee ding f

rom the cr iminal trial, and appe llant
c e de d h is r ig hts to t

he fa mil y ’s ra nc h after his mot he r s e ttl e d th e fo rf

e iture a c tio n. Th os e fa c ts support the trial cour

t’s conclusion that the proc eedinghad little releva nce in this c riminal case and its decision that any slight relevanc e of the evidenc e would likely be outweig hed by

its prejudicial eff ect a nd the possible confusion it might ca use in the jurors’ minds. See id.8 On this recor d, the trial cour t’s ref u s al t o allow appe llant’s mother’s testimony relating to the f

o rf eiture f ell within the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment. Se e Ma rti n v . S tate , 173 S.W .3d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial c ourt did not act without ref ere nce to guidingrules or pr inciples or in an a rbitrar y or unre asonable manner . We ov er ru le appe llant’s point of err or. Conclusion

Be cause we ove rrule a

ppellant’s point of er

ror, we aff

irm the judg ments of
c on vic tio n o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: August 28, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh