Filed: September 5, 2013 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1791

(1:10-cv-03183-CCB)

STATE OF MARYLAND, Office of the Attorney General,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor/Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

UNIVERSAL ELECTIONS, INCORPORATED; JULIUS HENSON,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

RHONDA RUSSELL,

Defendant.

O R D E R

The Court further amends its opinion filed July 29, 2013, 

as follows:

On the cover sheet, page 2, attorney information section --

the name “Lindsey Powell” is substituted for the name “Mark R.
2

Freeman” as counsel arguing for Appellees, and the name “Mark R. 

Freeman” is added as counsel on brief for the United States.

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
Filed: August 28, 2013 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1791

(1:10-cv-03183-CCB)

STATE OF MARYLAND, Office of the Attorney General,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor/Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

UNIVERSAL ELECTIONS, INCORPORATED; JULIUS HENSON,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

RHONDA RUSSELL,

Defendant.

O R D E R

Upon the Motion to Publish Opinion filed by the 

Intervenor/Plaintiff – Appellee the United States of America, 

and the responses in support of publication,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Publish is granted.

The Court amends its opinion filed July 29, 2013, as 

follows:
2

On the cover sheet, section 1 -- the status is changed from 

“UNPUBLISHED” to “PUBLISHED.”

On the cover sheet, section 6 -- the status line is changed 

to read “Affirmed by published opinion.” The following sentence 

is added: “Judge Norton wrote the opinion, in which Judge King 

and Judge Agee joined.”

On page 2 -– the reference to the use of unpublished 

opinions as precedent is deleted.

On page 3 -– the heading “PER CURIAM” is deleted and is 

replaced with “NORTON, District Judge.” 

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1791

STATE OF MARYLAND, Office of the Attorney General,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor/Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

UNIVERSAL ELECTIONS, INCORPORATED; JULIUS HENSON,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

RHONDA RUSSELL,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:10-cv-03183-CCB)

Argued: May 15, 2013 Decided: July 29, 2013

Before KING and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and David C. NORTON, 

United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, 

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Norton wrote the opinion, 

in which Judge King and Judge Agee joined.
2

ARGUED: Edward Smith, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF EDWARD SMITH, JR., 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. William D. Gruhn, OFFICE 

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland;

Lindsey Powell, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney 

General, Philip D. Ziperman, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE 

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee State of Maryland. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States 

Attorney, Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Mark B. Stern, Mark R. Freeman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for the United States.
3

NORTON, District Judge: 

Political consultant Julius Henson and his company, 

Universal Elections, Inc., appeal the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the State of Maryland (“the State”) on its 

claim that Henson and Universal Elections violated the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2010) (“the TCPA” or 

“the Act”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 

district court’s decision in all respects. 

I.

Though the district court ably summarized the facts in its 

summary judgment order, we briefly restate them here. Three 

months before the 2010 Maryland gubernatorial election, the 

political campaign of Republican candidate Robert L. Ehrlich, 

Jr. hired Henson and Universal Elections to assist with the 

campaign’s efforts. J.A. 487.1

 

On Election Day, November 2, 2010, Henson and Universal 

Elections employee Rhonda Russell composed and prepared a prerecorded telephone call, also known as a “robocall,” as part of 

their work for the Ehrlich campaign. Id. That pre-recorded 

telephone call (“the election night robocall”) stated, in its 

entirety: 

 1 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed 

by the parties in this appeal.
4

Hello. I’m calling to let everyone know that Governor 

O’Malley and President Obama have been successful. 

Our goals have been met. The polls were correct and 

we took it back. We’re okay. Relax. Everything is 

fine. The only thing left is to watch it on TV 

tonight. Congratulations and thank you. 

J.A. 487-88. The election night robocall neither identified the 

Ehrlich campaign as the sponsor of the message nor included the 

campaign’s phone number. J.A. 488. 

Henson dictated the contents of the election night robocall 

to Russell and directed Russell to omit an authority line that 

would have identified the Ehrlich campaign as the source of the 

message. J.A. 488. Russell recorded the message and uploaded 

it, along with two lists containing the phone numbers for 

Maryland Democratic voters, to the website of a Pennsylvaniabased automatic dialing service called Robodial.org, LLC. Id. 

After sending test messages to Henson and to Ehrlich staffers, 

Russell authorized Robodial.org to deliver the election night 

robocall to the phone numbers included on the uploaded lists. 

Id. Robodial.org sent the election night robocall to more than 

112,000 Maryland Democratic voters through an account maintained 

by Universal Elections. J.A. 487-88. 

Of the roughly 112,000 calls that were placed, 69,497 

voters received the entire message. J.A. 488. Another 16,976 

recipients received part of the message. Id. The remaining 

calls failed or went unanswered. Id. 
5

On November 10, 2010, the State filed a civil lawsuit 

against Henson, Russell, and Universal Elections for violations 

of the TCPA. J.A. 10. Specifically, the State alleged that the 

defendants had violated the Act by failing to identify the 

Ehrlich campaign as the sponsor of the election night robocall. 

J.A. 14.

On December 15, 2010, Henson, Russell, and Universal 

Elections moved to dismiss the State’s complaint. J.A. 16; 

Supp. App. 1-15. In a supplemental motion to dismiss filed on 

December 28, 2010, they argued that the TCPA and its 

implementing regulations were unconstitutional. Supp. App. 45-

51. After defendants asserted a First Amendment defense in 

their supplemental motion to dismiss, the United States 

intervened in this case to defend the constitutionality of the 

TCPA. J.A. 43-45. On May 25, 2011, the district court denied 

defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the TCPA is a 

content-neutral speech regulation that survives intermediate 

constitutional scrutiny, and finding defendants’ other arguments 

unavailing. J.A. 96-108.

On May 11, 2011, shortly before the district court denied 

defendants’ motion to dismiss, Henson, Russell, and Universal 

Elections moved to stay the proceedings pending the resolution 

of related state criminal investigations. J.A. 92-93. The 

district court determined that the motion to stay would not 
6

affect its ruling on the motion to dismiss, and addressed the 

motion to stay after denying the motion to dismiss. J.A. 95, 

148. On July 7, 2011, the court denied the motion to stay, 

noting that:

Other than unfounded attacks on the motives of the 

Attorney General, the defendants have not explained 

why a blanket stay of this action is warranted by the 

existence of a partially parallel criminal indictment 

brought by the State Prosecutor. . . . The motion to 

stay as filed is overbroad and is Denied.

J.A. 148 (emphasis and capitalization in original). 

On March 15, 2012, the State moved for summary judgment. 

Supp. App. 52-75. Defendants did not oppose the State’s motion 

for summary judgment, and the district court granted the 

unopposed motion on May 29, 2012. J.A. 487-94. The court

explained that the record unambiguously supported a finding that 

defendants had violated the TCPA:

Universal Elections, by and through both Russell and 

Henson, drafted and sent a message that failed to 

include the disclosure information required by [the 

TCPA]. As Russell’s testimony makes clear, both she 

and Henson were directly and personally involved in 

the creation of the offending message. . . . [T]he 

documentary evidence in the record and the deposition 

testimony of Russell and Ehrlich staffers establish 

without any doubt that Henson discussed plans to 

suppress the votes of African-American Democrats, 

recorded the plan in the strategy memo sent to the 

Ehrlich campaign, and ultimately dictated and 

authorized the offending message. Thus, both Henson 

and Russell, in addition to Universal Elections, may 

be held jointly and severally liable for any damages 

this court may award under the TCPA. 
7

J.A. 490. The district court entered judgment on behalf of the 

State in the amount of $10,000 against Russell, and in the 

amount of $1,000,000 against Henson and Universal Elections. 

Henson and Universal Elections timely filed a notice of 

appeal on June 22, 2012. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.

II.

We review de novo the constitutionality of a federal 

statute and its implementing regulations, United States v. Sun, 

278 F.3d 302, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2002); the denial of a motion to 

dismiss, Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 

2011); and the grant of an unopposed motion for summary 

judgment, Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011). 

The grant or denial of a request to stay proceedings calls for 

an exercise of the district court’s judgment “to balance the 

various factors relevant to the expeditious and comprehensive 

disposition of the causes of action on the court's docket.” 

United States v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 562 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 

1977). As such, we review the denial of a motion to stay under 

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at 297; Chase Brexton 

Health Servs., Inc. v. Maryland, 411 F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 

2005). 
8

III.

Henson and Universal Elections raise four issues on appeal.2 

Appellants assert that the district court erred by: (1) finding 

that the TCPA is not unconstitutional when applied to political 

robocalls; (2) denying defendants’ motion to dismiss; (3) 

denying defendants’ motion to stay proceedings pending the 

resolution of a related state court criminal case; and (4) 

granting summary judgment in favor of the State. We address 

these arguments in turn.

A.

With regard to the constitutionality of the TCPA, 

appellants appear to argue that § 227(d) “violates the First 

Amendment because it is a content-based burden on political 

speech” that cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Appellants’ Br. 

12 n.6. When evaluating whether a regulation violates the First 

Amendment, “the most exacting scrutiny” is applied to 

regulations “that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential 

burdens upon speech because of its content.” Turner Broad. 

Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). “In contrast, 

regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are 

subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, because in most 

cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain 

 2 Russell does not appeal the district court’s ruling.
9

ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.” Id. (citing 

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 

(1984)). “[L]aws that confer benefits or impose burdens on 

speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in 

most instances content neutral.” Id. at 643.

The TCPA and its implementing regulations require that 

automated, prerecorded messages identify the entity sponsoring 

the phone call and provide that entity’s telephone number. 47 

U.S.C. § 227(d)(1), (3)(A); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(b) (2008). This

identity disclosure requirement applies regardless of the 

content of the message that is relayed to the recipient. 

§ 227(d)’s requirements do not place any greater restriction on 

a particular group of people or form of speech, and do not 

burden appellants – or entities engaging in political speech –

any more than any other person or group placing robocalls. The 

district court properly determined that the TCPA is a contentneutral law to which intermediate scrutiny must be applied. 

A content-neutral law that regulates speech is valid if “it 

furthers an important or substantial governmental interest . . . 

[that] is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and

if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 

freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 

that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 

(1968). “To satisfy this standard, a regulation need not be the 
10

least speech-restrictive means of advancing the Government's 

interests.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 662. Instead, the regulation 

simply cannot “burden substantially more speech than is 

necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.” 

Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 

(1989)). 

There are at least three important government interests 

furthered by the TCPA’s identity disclosure provision: 

protecting residential privacy; promoting disclosure to avoid 

misleading recipients of recorded calls; and promoting effective 

law enforcement. J.A. 104-107. The TCPA protects residential 

privacy – a government interest articulated in the legislative 

history of the Act – by enabling the recipient to contact the 

caller to stop future calls. See S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 1; 47 

U.S.C. § 227(d). Moreover, the Supreme Court has long 

“recognized that ‘[p]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one 

retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the 

tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important 

value.’” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (quoting 

Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)); see also Nat’l Fed’n 

for the Blind v. F.T.C., 420 F.3d 331, 339-40 (4th Cir. 2005)

(“Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind”) (finding that residential privacy 

is “a substantial government interest that the democratic 

process is entitled to protect”). The Act is narrowly tailored 
11

to protect this interest by requiring only that callers identify 

themselves and a phone number at which they can be reached. Cf.

Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind, 420 F.3d at 342-43 (finding that 

caller identification provision of the Federal Trade 

Commission’s Telemarketing Sales Rule is a narrowly tailored, 

minimal restriction that simply allows consumers to “pre-select 

whom they wish to speak to on a particular evening”). 

The Act also promotes disclosure to avoid misleading 

recipients of prerecorded calls. The TCPA’s identity disclosure 

provision obliges callers to state the name of the entity 

responsible for the call. This disclosure allows the recipient 

to better evaluate the content and veracity of the message. See

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 792 

(1988) (“The interest in protecting charities (and the public) 

from fraud is, of course, a sufficiently substantial interest to 

justify a narrowly tailored regulation.”). The TCPA’s 

requirement that robocall sponsors identify themselves is 

narrowly tailored to protect citizens from fraud. Cf. Nat’l 

Fed’n for the Blind, 420 F.3d at 342-43 (upholding as 

constitutional a government regulation requiring telefunders to 

transmit their name and phone number to caller ID services). 

Finally, the TCPA’s identity disclosure provision also 

promotes effective law enforcement by assisting the government 

in detecting violations. See J.A. 91 (affidavit of Federal 
12

Communications Commission enforcement official stating that “the 

two identification requirements for prerecorded messages . . . 

play a central role in allowing called parties to accurately 

report the parties who are responsible for specific violations, 

thereby assisting the Commission in taking enforcement action 

after complaints are received”). Again, the Act’s 

identification provision is narrowly tailored to accomplish the 

goal of assisting law enforcement; the provision places a 

minimal burden on callers to identify themselves and how they 

can be contacted.

The district court correctly identified these three 

important government interests, found that the Act is a contentneutral regulation that furthers important government interests 

unrelated to free expression, and held that the TCPA’s 

restrictions do not burden substantially more speech than is 

necessary to protect those interests. Appellants have failed to 

present a comprehensible argument to the contrary. For these 

reasons, we affirm the district court’s finding that the TCPA’s 

identity disclosure provisions are constitutional. 

B.

To argue that the district court improperly denied their 

motion to dismiss, appellants reiterate the same convoluted 

arguments made in their December 2011 motion to dismiss. Not 
13

surprisingly, these arguments meet with the same amount of 

success that they received in the district court.

Appellants assert that the complaint should have been 

dismissed because it fails to allege that the election night 

robocall was received by any Maryland citizen. This argument 

misses the mark. The complaint alleges that “the prerecorded 

voice message . . . was broadcast to the phone numbers of more 

than 112,000 Maryland residents chosen by Defendants.” Compl. 

¶ 15 (emphasis added). This allegation sufficiently alleges 

that defendants placed the election night robocall to Maryland 

citizens and that Maryland citizens received the call. The TCPA 

does not require state attorneys general to identify particular 

phone call recipients by name. 

Appellants next contend that Congress’ failure to pass “the 

Robocall Privacy Act of 2006, 2007, and 2008” shows that 

Congress has chosen not to regulate political robocalls. 

Appellants’ Br. 20-21. Appellants’ argument is unavailing. The 

fact that Congress has not passed legislation that specifically 

addressed political robocalls does not lessen in any way the 

scope and applicability of the TCPA. The Act’s plain language 

demonstrates that it applies to all prerecorded phone calls, 

including those with a political message. See 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(d)(3) (the restrictions of § 227(d) apply to “all 

artificial or prerecorded telephone messages”). 
14

By referring repeatedly to Maryland agency law, appellants 

also attempt to argue that Henson and Russell cannot be held 

liable under the TCPA. Appellants’ Br. 21-22. However, 

Maryland’s approach to the doctrine of respondeat superior does 

not affect the scope of liability contemplated by the TCPA. 

Additionally, the TCPA’s language makes clear that individuals 

can be sued under the Act. § 227(d) prohibits “any person” from 

violating the authority identification requirements contained in 

the Act, and empowers state attorneys general to bring action 

against “any person” who violates the Act. See also Balt.-Wash. 

Tel. Co. v. Hot Leads Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 736, 745 (D. Md. 

2008) (finding that individuals could be held personally liable 

for TCPA violations); Texas v. Am. Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 

2d 892, 898 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (same); Covington & Burling v. 

Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. 01-cv-4360, 2003 WL 21384825, 

at *6 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2003) (same). 

Appellants also contend that the election night robocall 

cannot violate the TCPA because it was a single phone call 

placed to multiple recipients, not multiple phone calls made to 

the same recipients over time. Appellants’ Br. 22-23. 

Appellants cite no authority in support of this proposition, and 

the TCPA contains no requirement that multiple calls be made to 

the same person. Indeed, § 227(d)(1)(A) prohibits “any 
15

telephone call” that fails to comply with the Act’s technical 

and procedural standards.

Appellants assert that they cannot be liable under the TCPA 

because they did not actually place any of the offending phone 

calls. Appellants’ Br. 23. Rather, they suggest that 

Robodial.org, the autodialing company that placed all the phone 

calls at appellants’ direction, must bear the responsibility for 

violating the Act. Id. As with many of their other arguments, 

appellants cite no authority for the proposition that only the 

autodialer that places the improper calls can be held liable 

under the TCPA. Such a narrow reading would undermine the 

purpose of the Act and would allow the actual violators to 

escape liability. In addition, the language of the Act 

indicates that it is intended to apply to the individuals who

use the autodialing systems that place calls, and not just to 

the autodialing services themselves. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(d)(1) 

(“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make any 

telephone call using any automatic telephone dialing system[] 

that does not comply with the technical and procedural standards 

prescribed under this subsection . . . or to use any . . . 

automatic telephone dialing system in a manner that does not 

comply with the standards.”). Robodial.org’s terms of use 

reinforce this interpretation of the Act, as those terms state 
16

that the “[c]ustomer is responsible for compliance with the 

[TCPA].” J.A. 488. 

Finally, appellants make a cursory argument that the 

complaint should have been dismissed because Robodial.org was 

not joined as a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. 

Appellants’ Br. 24. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) 

provides:

A person who is subject to service of process and 

whose joinder will not deprive the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: 

(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord 

complete relief among existing parties; or

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the 

subject of the action and is so situated that 

disposing of the action in the person's absence may: 

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the 

person's ability to protect the interest; or 

(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial 

risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 

inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 

When a person “who is required to be joined if feasible cannot 

be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and good 

conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties 

or should be dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 

The State’s failure to include Robodial.org as a defendant 

in this case did not affect the district court’s ability to 

adjudicate the claims raised against Henson, Russell, and 

Universal Elections. Robodial.org’s absence from the case 
17

neither impairs its ability to protect its interest nor leaves

the existing parties “subject to a substantial risk of incurring 

double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because 

of the interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B). 

In summary, appellants have failed to demonstrate that 

their motion to dismiss should have been granted. Rather, the 

district court properly evaluated and denied defendants’ motion 

to dismiss. 

C.

Appellants next suggest that the district court erred by 

denying their motion to stay the proceedings pending resolution 

of partially parallel criminal proceedings. This argument also 

fails.

“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the 

power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the 

causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, 

for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 

248, 254 (1936). “Because of the frequency with which civil and 

regulatory laws overlap with criminal laws, American 

jurisprudence contemplates the possibility of simultaneous or 

virtually simultaneous parallel proceedings and the Constitution 

does not mandate the stay of civil proceedings in the face of 

criminal proceedings.” Ashworth v. Albers Med., Inc., 229 

F.R.D. 527, 530 (S.D. W. Va. 2005). Stays generally are not 
18

granted before an indictment has issued. Id. at 531 n.3 (citing 

Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Transworld 

Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Beckham-Easley, No. 01-cv-5530, 2002 

WL 31111766, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2002) (quoting Walsh 

Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 523, 527 

(D.N.J. 1998)); In re Par Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 133 F.R.D. 

12, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 

The district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to stay 

is in keeping with the bulk of judicial authority, which holds 

that stays are generally not granted before indictments have 

issued. The court’s decision to deny the motion to stay was 

particularly appropriate where, as here, the motion was devoid 

of any facts or legal argument. The defendants’ two-page motion 

to stay the proceedings simply stated that they believed that at 

least two grand juries had been convened for which Henson, 

Russell, and Universal Elections were targets and that “[t]he 

use of witnesses who are/may be indicted by government action 

both at that federal and state level triggers substantial Fifth 

Amendment issues.” J.A. 92-93. The motion to stay did not 

identify any particular Fifth Amendment conflict that had 

arisen, or explain how the convening of two grand juries had

jeopardized the constitutionality of the pending civil 

proceedings. The district court wisely chose to delay ruling on 
19

any Fifth Amendment issues until those issues had been properly 

identified and fully briefed. Denial of the motion to stay was 

therefore not an abuse of the court’s discretion. 

D.

Finally, appellants argue that the district court erred by 

granting summary judgment to the State. Defendants did not 

respond to the State’s motion for summary judgment. 

Nevertheless, the district court thoroughly analyzed the motion, 

as it was obligated to do. Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 

599 F.3d 403, 409 n.8 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n considering a 

motion for summary judgment, the district court ‘must review the 

motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it has before 

it whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law.’”) (quoting Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 

F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in original). 

Because appellants did not respond to the State’s summary 

judgment motion, the following facts were uncontroverted: (1) 

Henson and Russell, as political consultants employed by the 

Ehrlich gubernatorial campaign, wrote and recorded the election 

night robocall; (2) the call did not disclose the name or phone 

number of the message’s sponsor; (3) Henson directed Russell to 

omit from the message a line explaining who had authorized the 

message; (4) Russell – perhaps mistakenly – also omitted the 

phone number of the message’s sponsor from the message; (5) 
20

through an account maintained by Universal Elections, Russell 

uploaded the message, along with two lists of Maryland 

Democratic voters, to the website of automatic dialing system 

Robodial.org; (6) Russell then commenced the calls through 

Robodial.org; (7) the election night robocall was delivered to 

approximately 112,000 Democratic voters in Baltimore City and 

Prince George’s County; (8) at least 69,497 call recipients 

received the entire recorded message contained in the election 

night robocall; and (9) at least 16,976 call recipients received 

part of the message. Supp. App. 56, 59-61.

These facts clearly establish that appellants created and 

distributed the election night robocall, which failed to 

identify either the message’s sponsor or a phone number at which 

the sponsor could be reached. This is sufficient to establish 

appellants’ liability under the TCPA, and the district court did 

not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the State. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the rulings of the 

district judge in all respects. 

AFFIRMED