United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20-1950

JOHN DOE, by his Mother and Next Friend, JANE DOE; B.B., by his 

Mother and Next Friend, JANE BLOGGS,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

HOPKINTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Defendant, Appellee,

CAROL CAVANAUGH, in her individual capacity and official 

capacity as Superintendent of the Hopkinton Public Schools; EVAN 

BISHOP, in his individual capacity and official capacity as 

Principal of Hopkinton High School,

Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Selya, and Barron,

Circuit Judges.

Alexandra H. Deal and Jeffrey P. Wiesner, with whom Jennifer 

McKinnon, Paik, Brewington & Deal LLP, and Wiesner McKinnon LLP

were on brief, for appellants.

William G. Creeley, Seth B. Orkand, and Robinson & Cole LLP

on brief for Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, amicus 

curiae.

Sophia Cope and Naomi Gilens on brief for Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, amicus curiae.

Elizabeth F. Toner and Joshua R. Coleman, with whom Murphy, 

Lamere & Murphy, P.C. was on brief, for appellees.

Maura Healey, Attorney General, Abrisham Eshghi, Douglas 

Martland, and Joshua Olszewski-Jubelirer, Assistant Attorneys 

General, on brief for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, amicus 

curiae.

Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., John Foskett, and Valerio, 

Dominello, & Hillman LLC on brief for National School Boards 

Association, Maine School Boards Association, Massachusetts 

Association of School Committees, New Hampshire School Boards 

Association, and Rhode Island Association of School Committees, 

amici curiae.

Patience Crozier and Bennett Klein on brief for GLBTQ Legal 

Advocates & Defenders and Anti-Defamation League, amici curiae.

Ruth A. Bourquin, Rachel E. Davidson, Rebecca R. Krumholz, 

and Matthew R. Segal on brief for the American Civil Liberties 

Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae.

Nicolas Y. Riley and Institute for Constitutional Advocacy & 

Protection on brief for Professor Daniel B. Rice, amicus curiae.

November 19, 2021
- 3 -

LYNCH, Circuit Judge. After an investigation, Hopkinton 

High School ("School"), a part of the Hopkinton Public Schools,

found that eight students on the school hockey team, including 

plaintiffs/appellants John Doe and Ben Bloggs, had bullied their 

fellow hockey team member Robert Roe.1 The School disciplined all 

eight students involved in the bullying. Doe was suspended for 

three days, and Bloggs was suspended for five days. 

Of the disciplined students, Doe and Bloggs chose to sue 

in federal court challenging the constitutionality of their 

discipline. They argued that they were exercising their First 

Amendment rights and that the causal connection between their 

conduct and the admitted bullying was insufficient. They further 

argued that the "emotional harm" prong of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, 

§ 37O is unconstitutional. They also argued that the punishment 

violated state law, specifically their student speech rights 

guaranteed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 82. 

On cross motions for summary judgment, the parties 

agreed to proceed on a case stated basis. The district court 

rejected Doe's and Bloggs's claims and entered judgment in favor 

of Hopkinton Public Schools on all counts. See Doe v. Hopkinton 

Pub. Schs., 490 F. Supp. 3d 448, 470 (D. Mass. 2020). 

1 John Doe, Ben Bloggs, Robert Roe, and other references 

to students are pseudonyms agreed to by the parties. The district 

court granted the plaintiffs permission to proceed pseudonymously. 
- 4 -

We affirm.

I.

We describe the relevant facts supported by the record. 

At the time of the disciplinary investigation, plaintiffs Doe and 

Bloggs were tenth-grade students at the School. Roe was a ninthgrade student. Doe, Bloggs, and Roe were members of the School's 

hockey team during the 2018-2019 season. 

A. Facts

On February 4, 2019, Roe's father filed a bullying 

complaint alleging that another high school student and member of 

the hockey team, Student 1, had been bullying Roe. The written 

complaint was filed on the School's standard bullying complaint 

form. The complaint stated that Roe had observed Student 1 videorecording him without his consent on multiple occasions and that 

those video recordings had been circulated amongst other students. 

The complaint further stated that Roe's parents had previously 

reported Student 1 to the high school hockey coach in December 2018 

for taking photos of Roe in the locker room without his consent. 

Despite the prior complaint in December 2018, Student 1 had 

continued to take photos and videos of Roe without his permission. 

The complaint also listed three other members of the hockey team 

as witnesses but not Doe or Bloggs. 

With the complaint, Roe's parents contemporaneously 

emailed School administrators, providing more specific information 
- 5 -

about the bullying but acknowledging that they did not have 

complete information. They stated that Student 1 had been videorecording and photographing Roe without his permission. The 

bullying was furthered by the fact that these video recordings and 

photographs were circulated in a group chat. They stated that 

this bullying had created a hostile environment for Roe and had 

impacted his personal rights and well-being. Roe's parents 

reported that they believed other students on the team were 

involved in bullying Roe and that other team members were part of

the group chat engaged in the bullying. Roe's parents filed the 

bullying complaint on the Monday after a weekend incident during 

which Student 1 had filmed Roe without his consent on the hockey 

team bus. Roe's parents also referenced the December 2018 

complaint to the hockey coach and their understanding that this 

conduct was not an isolated event but a pattern of repeated 

bullying. Roe's parents asked that Roe be moved out of the physics 

class in which two of the bullies were present. 

Upon receipt of the bullying complaint, the School 

promptly investigated the allegations as it was obligated to under

the Hopkinton School Committee Policy on Bullying Prevention & 

Intervention ("Hopkinton Bullying Policy"). Massachusetts state 

law requires the School to have a bullying policy, and the 

Hopkinton Bullying Policy uses nearly the same definition of 

"Bullying" as that in the Massachusetts anti-bullying statute. 
- 6 -

See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, §§ 37H & 37O. The Hopkinton Bullying 

Policy is available on the School's website and is distributed in 

the Student Handbook, which must be signed by students' parents or 

guardians every school year. The Hopkinton Bullying Policy defines 

"Bullying" as:2

the repeated use by one or more students or by 

a member of a school staff of a written,

verbal, or electronic expression, or a 

physical act or gesture, or any combination 

thereof, directed at a target that:

• causes physical or emotional harm to the 

target or damage to the target's 

property;

• places the target in reasonable fear of 

harm to him/herself, or of damage to 

his/her property;

2 Massachusetts state law defines "Bullying" as:

the repeated use by one or more students or by 

a member of a school staff including, but not 

limited to, an educator, administrator, school 

nurse, cafeteria worker, custodian, bus 

driver, athletic coach, advisor to an 

extracurricular activity or paraprofessional 

of a written, verbal or electronic expression 

or a physical act or gesture or any 

combination thereof, directed at a victim 

that: (i) causes physical or emotional harm to 

the victim or damage to the victim's property; 

(ii) places the victim in reasonable fear of 

harm to himself or of damage to his property; 

(iii) creates a hostile environment at school 

for the victim; (iv) infringes on the rights 

of the victim at school; or (v) materially and 

substantially disrupts the education process 

or the orderly operation of a school. For the 

purposes of this section, bullying shall 

include cyber-bullying. 

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O.
- 7 -

• creates a hostile environment at school 

for the target;

• infringes on the rights of the target at 

school; or

• materially and substantially disrupts 

the education process or the orderly 

operation of a school. 

Pursuant to the Hopkinton Bullying Policy, Josh Hanna and Justin 

Pominville, assistant principals at the School, conducted the 

investigation into the bullying.3 

The investigation covered the various means of bullying, 

including Roe's own reports of exclusion and feeling bullied, the 

surreptitious audio- and video-recording and photographing of Roe, 

the unauthorized sharing of photographs of Roe and his family, the 

isolating of Roe, and the group communications between the members 

of the hockey team bullying Roe. Hanna and Pominville met with 

Roe's parents and Roe. They interviewed ten other members of the 

hockey team, starting with those initially named in the bullying 

complaint. Hanna and Pominville also met with law enforcement. 

The School's athletic director interviewed the hockey coach. 

We recount the general course of the investigation and 

relevant factual findings made by Hanna and Pominville in the 

School's Bullying Investigation Report ("Bullying Report").

3 Doe and Bloggs do not allege bias on the part of Hanna 

and Pominville. Neither Hanna nor Pominville was listed as a 

defendant in Doe's and Bloggs's lawsuits.
- 8 -

During his interview, Roe stated that he was actively 

excluded at hockey team spaghetti dinners and on the team bus. He 

reported that other team members whispered about him and looked at 

him. He stated that as a result, he became aware of the existence 

of the Snapchat group, which was discussed in front of him. Roe 

told the investigators that the bullying included sneaking photos 

and videos of him without his permission and sharing those photos 

and videos of him in the group. He reported that he felt alone on 

the hockey team bus and at hockey team events. Roe named four 

students whose bullying had been evident to him: Student 1, 

Student 3, Student 5, and Student 6. Roe reported that Student 1 

had attempted to get him to say "I am gay" and "dick" while audioand video-recording him. 

Hanna interviewed Student 2, one of the students listed 

as a witness in the bullying complaint. Student 2 stated that 

there was a Snapchat group composed of members of the hockey team.4 

Student 2 gave his phone to Hanna to view. Upon viewing, Hanna 

4 Snapchat is a social media application, which allows 

users to share and edit photos, videos, and messages. Snapchat 

servers automatically delete group photos, videos, and messages 

after 24 hours. See When Does Snapchat Delete Snaps and Chats?, 

Snapchat.com, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/article/whenare-snaps-chats-deleted (last visited Sept. 10, 2021). Snapchat 

users can take active steps to save a photo, video, or message at 

any point. If a user saves a group photo, video, or message, it 

remains available to all members of the Snapchat group. See id. 
- 9 -

saw videos, photos, and messages, not yet deleted, communicated by 

and among the Snapchat group members, including Doe and Bloggs. 

Hanna and Pominville viewed and preserved the photos, 

videos, and messages in the Snapchat group that had been saved or 

not yet deleted. Hanna learned from those messages that eight 

members of the Hopkinton hockey team were members of the group: 

Student 1, Student 2, Student 3, Student 4, Student 5, Student 6, 

Doe, and Bloggs. The members of the group confirmed as true Roe's 

statement that he had been excluded from the Snapchat group. The 

group was named "Geoff Da Man."5 Bloggs told the investigators 

that the Snapchat group had been created in December 2018. The 

group continued until it was broken up when the discipline was 

imposed. The School maintains that the group would have continued 

absent that discipline. The Snapchat postings were composed not 

only of messages from members of the group but also videos and 

photos of Roe taken without his consent, dating back to at least 

January 19, 2019, and circulated among the members. 

The preserved Snapchat messages included demeaning and 

expletive-laced comments regarding Roe's appearance, voice, 

intimate anatomy, parents, and grandmother. Doe and Bloggs each 

received these ongoing exchanges and responded to them. They each 

5 The Snapchat group was named after a tenth student, 

Student 10, who was also excluded from the group. Roe, Student 

10, and the eight members of the Snapchat group shared a locker 

room together. 
- 10 -

joined in these exchanges and sent derogatory messages about Roe

in response to photos and messages from other students. For 

instance, in one exchange, Bloggs initiated a series of group 

messages about Roe's family members:

Bloggs: "Was [Roe]'s grandma in the third 

row" 

Student 2: "They tied her to the hood" 

Bloggs: "With bungee cords?"

. . . 

Bloggs: "Are [Roe]'s parents ugly too [o]r

did he just get bad genes" 

In response, Student 3 found photos of Roe's parents and shared 

those photos with the Snapchat group. Bloggs then responded to 

the photos:

Bloggs: "A family of absolute beauties" 

Student 5 also posted a different photo of Roe that had been 

surreptitiously taken without his consent. In response to that 

photo, Doe and Bloggs both messaged the group:

Doe: "[Student 5] and [Roe] were made on the 

same day[.] [Student 5] was the starting 

product and [Roe] is what it turned into[,]

kinda like a game of telephone in 1st grade" 

Bloggs: "[Roe]'s leather shampoo makes up for 

the looks though" 

Bloggs, in addition, disclosed to the group without Roe's 

authorization one of Roe's online usernames. 

On February 8, 2019, Hanna and Pominville concluded 

their investigation and forwarded the nine-page Bullying Report to 

the School's principal and the school district's superintendent. 
- 11 -

Hanna and Pominville considered the interviews, the screenshots 

and videos from the Snapchat group, and the written complaint 

submitted by Roe's father in arriving at their findings. The 

Bullying Report included summaries from interviews with ten 

individuals: the eight members of the Snapchat group, Roe, and the 

hockey coach.6 In addition to the facts described earlier, the 

Bullying Report made additional specific findings. Student 1 

stated, "we pick on [Roe]," and Student 2 stated that Roe was 

"targeted." Student 5 stated that the intent was to "laugh[] at 

[Roe]" and apologized for his conduct. 

The Bullying Report concluded, based on the 

investigation and Doe's and Bloggs's interviews, that they were 

aware of, joined, participated in, and encouraged the bullying. 

When asked if he had a sense that the students' conduct was not 

appropriate, Doe responded, "Yes, I said something but not to the 

point to end it." He also stated that he understood the conduct 

was harassment. 

Bloggs acknowledged that Roe was shy "so some people 

take pictures and make fun of him." On February 4, 2019, after he 

was interviewed, Bloggs sent an email to the hockey coach 

6 Hanna and Pominville also interviewed Student 10 and 

another witness, but the summaries of these two interviews were 

not included in the Bullying Report. 
- 12 -

apologizing for his conduct and stated, "I should have taken more 

of a serious role in preventing anything else from happening." 

The Bullying Report found that each of the eight students

"was an active participant in the SnapChat group" and that the 

"[s]tudents admitted that [Roe] was excluded from Snapchat." The 

Bullying Report detailed other activities by group members when it

stated:

4. The SnapChat group included:

a. Photos of [Roe] taken without his 

consent

b. Videos of [Roe] taken and posted 

without his consent

c. Photos of [Roe's] parents with 

disparaging comments on their appearance

d. Disparaging comments regarding 

[Roe's] appearance, voice, and anatomy

e. Attempts to get [Roe] to say 

inappropriate statements and record him 

doing this 

The Bullying Report noted that the students admitted to "taking 

videos and photos while on bus rides to away hockey games and while 

at team gatherings." 

The Bullying Report concluded that "[t]here was a 

preponderance of the evidence showing that the 8 students bullied 

and harassed [Roe]" as defined by the Hopkinton Bullying Policy. 

The Bullying Report found that "[t]he conduct caused emotional 

harm to [Roe], created a hostile environment for him during schoolsponsored events and activities and infringed on his rights at 

school" in violation of the first, third, and fourth prongs of the 
- 13 -

Hopkinton Bullying Policy and section 37O. The School suspended 

all eight members of the Snapchat group from the hockey team for 

the remainder of the 2018-2019 season. 

On February 12, 2019, School principal Evan Bishop held 

individualized suspension hearings for each of the eight students, 

including Doe and Bloggs. The students' parents were invited to 

the disciplinary hearings. These individualized hearings 

constituted each "student's opportunity to provide [his] side of 

the story and to dispute the allegations." 

After the individual hearings, Bishop found that Doe 

"made a disparaging comment regarding [Roe's] appearance." He 

identified "[r]eports of additional videos and photos taken of 

[Roe] throughout the season that have not been retained" on 

Snapchat. He issued Doe a three-day suspension after the findings. 

Bishop found that Bloggs participated in "[p]osting 

photos of [Roe] without his consent," "[p]osting comments of 

[Roe's] parents with disparaging comments on their appearance," 

and "posting of disparaging comments regarding [Roe's]

appearance." Bishop also identified "[r]eports of additional 

videos and photos taken of [Roe] throughout the season that have 

not been retained" on Snapchat. He issued Bloggs a five-day 

suspension.7 

7 Given the short length of the suspensions, the 

disciplinary process ended with principal Bishop, and there was no 
- 14 -

After the bullying, Roe obtained counseling from the 

School's student therapeutic academy resource team, declined to 

try out for the lacrosse team in the spring, and entered formal 

mental health treatment. At the end of the 2018-2019 academic 

year, Roe left the School to attend school in Quebec, Canada. 

B. Procedural History

On August 16, 2019, Doe, by and through his mother Jane 

Doe, filed an amended complaint in federal court alleging Hopkinton 

Public Schools and its administrators violated his rights to free 

speech and association under state and federal law. Doe also 

requested a declaration that the "emotional harm" prongs of 

Hopkinton's Bullying Policy and the enabling Massachusetts antibullying statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, §§ 37H & 37O, are 

unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. On September 19, 2019, 

Bloggs, by and through his mother Jane Bloggs, filed a complaint 

in federal court alleging similar causes of action. On February 

5, 2020, the district court consolidated Doe's case with Bloggs's 

case. 

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. On 

June 29, 2020, during the summary judgment hearing, the parties 

agreed to proceed on a case stated basis. Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 

appeal to the School's superintendent, who did not play a role in 

the disciplinary process. Nonetheless, superintendent Carol 

Cavanaugh was named as a defendant in her individual and official 

capacities in Doe's and Bloggs's complaints.
- 15 -

453. In a case stated decision "the parties waive trial and 

present the case to the court on the undisputed facts in the pretrial record." TLT Constr. Corp. v. RI, Inc., 484 F.3d 130, 135 

n.6 (1st Cir. 2007). "The court is then entitled to 'engage in a 

certain amount of factfinding, including the drawing of 

inferences.'" Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union Loc.

14 v. Int'l Paper Co., 64 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1995)). On 

September 22, 2020, the court issued its Findings of Fact and 

Rulings of Law. 

The court found that the factual conclusions in the

Bullying Report were well-supported in the record. Doe, 490 F. 

Supp. 3d at 456. As to the argument that the imposition of the 

discipline violated the First Amendment rights of Doe and Bloggs, 

the court ruled in favor of Hopkinton Public Schools on Doe's and 

Bloggs's challenges. It held that the School's discipline under 

its bullying policy and Massachusetts state law did not violate 

Doe's and Bloggs's First Amendment rights to speech and/or

association. The court reviewed the Supreme Court's decision in 

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 

(1969), and its holding that speech "may be regulated only if it 

would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere with 

the right of others." Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 457 (quoting Saxe v. 

State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001)). 

The court found that:
- 16 -

the Students' messages did not take place in 

isolation; the students in "Geoff da Man" were 

engaging in bullying. A reasonable official 

could have found that Roe did suffer from the 

speech and actions of the members of the 

hockey team, coordinated through the Snapchat 

group. This "repeated" conduct and speech "by 

one or more students" was "directed" at Roe, 

causing him "emotional . . . harm." Mass. 

Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O. A reasonable 

official could have found this bullying was 

"severe or pervasive." Norris, 969 F.3d at 29 

n.18. This bullying therefore constituted an 

infringement of Roe's rights and is not 

protected by Tinker whether or not it caused 

a substantial disruption. Id. at 29.

Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 461. The court found that "[a] reasonable 

official could have found Doe and Bloggs to be participants in 

group bullying that invaded Roe's rights." Id. at 465. 

Doe and Bloggs contended that there was a lack of 

causality between their actions and the bullying and that they 

were thus being subjected to "guilt by association." See NAACP v. 

Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-19 (1982); see also

Humanitarian L. Project v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 463 F. Supp. 2d 

1049, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2006). The district court rejected those 

arguments, reasoning that "th[o]se precedents do not require 

school officials to ignore the group context in which Doe's and 

Bloggs' comments were made" and finding Doe and Bloggs "did not 

merely 'associate' in the Snapchat but were active -- albeit minor 

-- participants in the group targeting of Roe." Doe, 490 F. Supp. 

3d at 463. The court cited to similar cases in which federal 
- 17 -

courts had rejected the lack of causality argument. Id. at 463-

64; see Taylor v. Metuchen Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 18-cv-1842, 2019 

WL 1418124, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2019); Shen v. Albany Unified 

Sch. Dist., Nos. 3:17-cv-02478, 3:17-cv-02767, 3:17-cv-03418, 

3:17-cv-03657, 2017 WL 5890089, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017).

After discussing those cases, the court made further 

findings:

A reasonable official could conclude that both 

Doe and Bloggs made derogatory comments about 

Roe in the group conversation. That official 

could easily find that Bloggs' comment about 

the "game of telephone," amidst a litany of 

insults against Roe's appearance, was not 

innocuous. Snapchat Screenshots PO000036. 

Doe's messages speak for themselves. Id. at 

PO000034-36. Thus an official could find that 

by posting these comments -- even if they were 

themselves minor relative to the surrounding 

nastiness -- Doe and Bloggs had signaled their 

approval and encouragement of the bullying by 

the other hockey teams members. Their 

punishment would not have been constitutional 

under the First Amendment if they were merely 

members of the Snapchat group, cf. Shen, 2017 

WL 5890089, at *9-10, but by actively 

encouraging the group bullying, they could be 

permissibly disciplined for its results.

This conclusion is consistent with the 

causality analysis in Norris. In Norris, 

"[t]he defendants do not assert that A.M. 

directly participated in the bullying of 

Student 1 at school, or that she was 

responsible for the video or any of the rumors 

being circulated about Student 1." 969 F.3d 

at 31. Here, Doe and Bloggs were participants 

in the bullying. This Court is persuaded by 

Shen that the proper inquiry is whether the 

group caused an invasion of Roe's rights and 

whether Doe and Bloggs participated in the 
- 18 -

group by encouraging its behavior. 2017 WL 

5890089, at *9-10. A reasonable official 

could have found these facts, and these 

reasons align with the schools' explanations 

at the time. See Doe Suspension, Bloggs 

Suspension.

Lastly, the Massachusetts law contemplates 

discipline of collective action. Section 37O 

defines bullying as action "by one or more 

students . . . directed at a victim" that cause 

the listed harms. Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 71, 

§ 37O. If the isolated conduct of each 

student in the group had to individually meet 

all the elements of "bullying," the words "or 

more" in the statute would be read out. 

Children often bully as a group. The children 

who stand on the sidewalk and cheer as one of 

their friends shakes down a smaller student 

for his lunch money may not be as culpable, 

but they are not entirely blameless. 

Similarly, the "Geoff Da Man" group's conduct 

as a whole was directed at Roe, and 

Massachusetts law allows School officials to 

consider Doe and Bloggs as members of that 

group.

Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 464-65. 

The court also ruled that the "emotional harm" prong of 

section 37O and the Hopkinton Bullying Policy is neither overbroad 

nor vague. Id. at 465-69. Lastly, the court ruled that Hopkinton 

Public Schools did not violate Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 82. Id.

at 470.

Doe and Bloggs timely appealed.8

8 We acknowledge the amici curiae for their submissions in 

this matter. The following amici submitted briefs in support of

Doe and Bloggs: the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 

and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The following amici 

submitted briefs in support of Hopkinton Public Schools: the 
- 19 -

II.

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court's legal conclusions de 

novo. See United Paperworkers, 64 F.3d at 32. In a case stated 

decision, "the parties waive trial and present the case to the 

court on the undisputed facts in the pre-trial record." TLT 

Constr. Corp., 484 F.3d at 135 n.6. We review the district court's 

factual findings and inferences for clear error. United 

Paperworkers, 64 F.3d at 31.

B. The School Did Not Violate Doe's and Bloggs's First Amendment 

Rights.

To prevail on a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, Doe and Bloggs bear the burden of showing that (1) they 

were engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) they were 

subjected to adverse actions by the School, and (3) the protected 

conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse 

actions. See D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 

43 (1st Cir. 2012). The parties do not dispute that the second 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the National School Boards 

Association, Maine School Boards Association, Massachusetts 

Association of School Committees, New Hampshire School Boards 

Association, and Rhode Island Association of School Committees; 

and GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders and the Anti-Defamation 

League. The following amici submitted briefs in support of neither 

party: Daniel B. Rice and the American Civil Liberties Union of 

Massachusetts.
- 20 -

and third requirements have been satisfied. We thus focus our 

analysis on the first requirement. 

Doe and Bloggs contend that the School violated their 

First Amendment rights to speech and association by punishing them 

for what they call their "private messages" that they sent to their 

friends over the Snapchat platform. They primarily argue that the 

court's finding that there was a causal relationship between their 

participation in the group and each of the three reasons given by 

the school for imposition of the discipline was clear error. 

1. The School's Decisions Regarding Student Speech and 

Bullying Are Entitled to Deference.

The School's findings that Doe and Bloggs violated 

school policy and the Massachusetts anti-bullying statute are

entitled to deference if they are reasonable.9 The Supreme Court 

9 The amicus brief submitted by the American Civil 

Liberties Union ("ACLU") of Massachusetts argues that the district 

court's textual reading of the Massachusetts anti-bullying statute 

was erroneous. The ACLU argues that the district court erroneously 

read the statute expansively to encompass a theory of group 

bullying. Doe and Bloggs thus could not be disciplined under the 

statute as a matter of law based on the district court's factual 

findings. 

We do not address this argument because Doe and Bloggs 

did not plead that the School exceeded its authority under the 

Massachusetts anti-bullying statute, nor did they raise this 

argument on appeal. We do not consider an argument raised by 

amicus curiae where the "argument was not raised by the parties or 

passed on by the lower court[]." FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 

Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4 (2013); see Weaver's Cove Energy, 

LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458, 467 (1st 

Cir. 2009). The ACLU also does not argue that the School could 

not act beyond the authority of the Massachusetts anti-bullying 

statute as long as it did not violate the constitutional 
- 21 -

has long held that schools have a special interest in regulating 

speech that "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 

disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Tinker, 393 U.S. 

at 513. "Courts generally defer to school administrators' 

decisions regarding student speech so long as their judgment is 

reasonable." Norris ex rel. A.M. v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 

969 F.3d 12, 30 (1st Cir. 2020); see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 

393, 403 (2007) ("Tinker held that student expression may not be 

suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it 

will 'materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline 

of the school.'" (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513)); Hazelwood 

Sch. Dist. v. Khulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. 

Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The 

determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in 

school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school 

board."); Norris, 969 F.3d at 29 n.18 ("[S]chool administrators 

must be permitted to exercise discretion in determining when 

certain speech crosses the line from merely offensive to more 

severe or pervasive bullying or harassment."). 

At the time of the imposition of the discipline, the 

School provided three justifications for Doe's and Bloggs's 

suspensions and does not vary from those justifications in this 

protections of the First Amendment.
- 22 -

litigation. Cf. Norris, 969 F.3d at 25-26 (requiring school 

administrators to adhere to rationale provided at time of 

discipline in litigation defending discipline). The School 

determined that Doe's and Bloggs's "conduct [1] caused emotional 

harm to [Roe], [2] created a hostile environment for him during 

school-sponsored events and activities and [3] infringed on his 

rights at school." 

Tinker holds that schools have a special interest in 

regulating speech that involves the "invasion of the rights of 

others." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. The Supreme Court made clear 

in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. ex rel. Levy that schools 

have a significant interest in regulating "serious or severe 

bullying or harassment" that invades the rights of others.10 141 

S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2021). This pedagogical interest remains even 

in off-campus circumstances.11 In Mahanoy Area School District, 

10 The amicus brief submitted by the GLBTQ Legal Advocates 

& Defenders and the Anti-Defamation League cites to social science 

research showing that bullying is an extensive and pervasive 

problem amongst adolescents. The Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention has concluded that a considerable number of youth are 

bullied. See Gladden et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & 

Prevention, Bullying Surveillance Among Youths: Uniform 

Definitions for Public Health and Recommended Data Elements (1st 

ed. 2014). National surveys estimate that anywhere from 11% to 

28% of adolescents are victims of bullying. Id. at 5.

11 There is no merit to Doe and Bloggs's argument that their 

speech is not subject to punishment because it did not occur on 

campus. In Mahanoy Area School District, the Supreme Court 

rejected the Third Circuit's on-campus/off-campus speech 

distinction. 141 S. Ct. at 2045. Instead, the Supreme Court held 

that "[t]he school's regulatory interests remain significant in 
- 23 -

B.L. was disciplined for off-campus Snapchat posts, which were not 

directed at any individual. The Supreme Court found that the 

speech was more accurately characterized as "criticism of the rules 

of a community of which B.L. forms a part," id. at 2046, and that 

it did not satisfy the "substantial disruption" prong of Tinker,

id. at 2047-48. A general statement of discontent is vastly and 

qualitatively different from bullying that targets and invades the 

rights of an individual student. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 

S. Ct. at 2045; Norris, 969 F.3d at 29 ("[B]ullying is the type of 

conduct that implicates the governmental interest in protecting 

against the invasion of the rights of others, as described in 

Tinker.").

2. Doe's and Bloggs's Speech and Conduct Are Not Protected 

by the First Amendment.

Doe and Bloggs contend that their speech and conduct 

were protected by the First Amendment and could not be disciplined 

some off-campus circumstances. . . . These include serious or 

severe bullying or harassment targeting particular 

individuals. . . ." Id.

Further, the School found that Doe's and Bloggs's speech 

and conduct occurred both on campus and off campus and took place 

during school-affiliated events. The district court agreed and 

did not clearly err in this factual determination. Doe, 490 F. 

Supp. 3d at 463. The students admitted to taking videos and photos 

while in the locker room, on bus rides to school hockey games, and 

at team gatherings. Doe's and Bloggs's speech and conduct were thus 

unlike B.L.'s Snapchat message that was posted on her own time outside 

of school at a convenience store. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 

S. Ct. at 2043. 
- 24 -

by the School. They argue that they were punished solely for 

sending messages over Snapchat and participating in the Snapchat 

group -- and that they engaged in no offending conduct directed 

towards Roe. 

For the School to discipline Doe's and Bloggs's speech, 

there must be a causal connection between their speech and the 

bullying that invaded Roe's rights. Norris, 969 F.3d at 28, 31.12 

Doe and Bloggs do not dispute that other group members directly 

bullied Roe, such as by taking nonconsensual photos and videos of 

him, attempting to get him to say inappropriate statements on 

camera, and isolating him from the hockey team. They do not 

dispute that this bullying could be regulated consistent with the 

First Amendment. They challenge only whether their conduct 

reasonably could be viewed as a ground for treating them as active 

participants in such regulable conduct. As such, the relevant 

question is whether the School reasonably concluded that Doe's and 

Bloggs's messages and active participation in the group were 

12 The causal connection concerns from Norris are not 

present in Doe's and Bloggs's situations. In Norris, the 

plaintiff, student A.M., posted a sticky note, which read "THERE'S 

A RAPIST IN OUR SCHOOL AND YOU KNOW WHO IT IS;" it was not widely 

distributed or viewed by members of the school community. Norris, 

969 F.3d at 14-15. The note was in the girls' bathroom for a few 

minutes and seen by two students. Id. at 32. Here, the School 

reasonably concluded that Doe's and Bloggs's messages were viewed 

by the members of the Snapchat group, who were all active 

participants in the group. In Norris, the sticky note contained 

several ambiguities. Included among those ambiguities was the 

"rapist" and whether the "rapist" was even a student. Id.
- 25 -

causally connected to the direct bullying because they encouraged

other group members to continue bullying Roe.

As the district court stated: "Children often bully as 

a group. The children who stand on the sidewalk and cheer as one 

of their friends shakes down a smaller student for his lunch money 

may not be as culpable, but they are not entirely blameless." Doe, 

490 F. Supp. 3d at 464-65; see e.g., Taylor, 2019 WL 1418124, at 

*6 (dismissing First Amendment claim where student had been 

punished for encouraging his friend to publish a caricature of 

another student on a social media website); Shen, 2017 WL 5890089, 

at *9 (upholding school discipline against students that "liked" 

or expressed approval of derogatory and racist Instagram posts

that targeted specific students).13

Here, the School and the district court both concluded 

as a matter of fact that Doe's and Bloggs's speech and Snapchat 

participation were causally connected to the other members' 

bullying of Roe. That conclusion was reasonable, and we see no 

clear error.

13 The amicus brief submitted by the National School Boards 

Association, Maine School Boards Association, Massachusetts 

Association of School Committees, New Hampshire School Boards 

Association, and Rhode Island Association of School Committees 

cites to social science research finding that "bullying is a 'group 

process', and many researchers and policymakers share the belief 

that interventions against bullying should be targeted at the peergroup level rather than at individual bullies and victims." 

Salmivalli, Bullying and the Peer Group: A Review, 15 Aggression 

& Violent Behavior 112, 117 (2010) (citations omitted).
- 26 -

Doe and Bloggs both made derogatory comments about Roe 

in the Snapchat group conversation. Doe stated, "[Student 5] and 

[Roe] were made on the same day[.] [Student 5] was the starting 

product and [Roe] is what it turned into kinda like a game of 

telephone in 1st grade." Bloggs initiated an exchange about Roe's 

family that led another student to post photos of Roe's parents. 

Bloggs then made numerous derogatory comments about Roe's family 

members and his appearance, including "Are [Roe]'s parents ugly 

too [o]r did he just get bad genes" and "[Roe]'s leather shampoo 

makes up for [his] looks though." Bloggs also sent a photo of 

another student to the Snapchat group and shared with the group 

one of Roe's online usernames without his consent. 

Importantly, as the district court noted, Doe's and 

Bloggs's messages demeaning Roe's appearance and family -- and 

their continuous, active participation in the Snapchat group --

"did not take place in isolation." Doe and Bloggs both admitted 

that they were aware that members of the group were bullying Roe.

They were aware that members of the group were taking nonconsensual 

photos and videos of Roe and circulating them in the group. The 

Snapchat group was formed in December 2018 and continued to exist 

until at least the date of the investigation in early February 

2019, months after Roe's parents filed their initial complaint 

with the hockey coach that Student 1 had taken photos and videos 

of Roe in the locker room without his consent. Doe and Bloggs
- 27 -

nonetheless continued to send demeaning messages about Roe and his 

family. They were participants in an extensive back-and-forth 

between the eight students that included numerous derogatory 

comments and nonconsensual photos and videos. The students in the 

Snapchat group continued to bully Roe during this time, until at 

least February 2, 2019, when Student 1 again attempted to videorecord Roe on the hockey team bus without his consent and replayed 

a video of Roe on his phone in front of him -- two days before 

Roe's parents filed their bullying complaint. 

The School reasonably concluded that Doe's and Bloggs's 

messages and participation in the group fostered an environment 

that emboldened the bullies and encouraged others in the invasion 

of Roe's rights. The evidence shows that they were well aware of 

the effects of that conduct on Roe. The School reasonably 

concluded that this speech and conduct itself constituted, 

contributed to, and encouraged the bullying.

To be sure, there may be circumstances in which 

encouragement is so minimal or ambiguous, the chain of 

communication so attenuated, or knowledge of direct bullying so 

lacking, that a school's punishment of certain speech would be 

unreasonable. See Shen, 2017 WL 5890089, at *10 (finding certain 

students' participation in online group containing racist content 

not sufficiently active to warrant punishment). The speech and 

conduct of the defendants in this case, though, actively and 
- 28 -

extensively encouraged bullying and fostered an atmosphere where 

bullying was accepted. Consequently, it does not present those 

concerns and, thus, we have no occasion to explore those limits.

Doe and Bloggs point to a finding by the district court 

that "[t]here is no evidence in the record of any non-speech 

conduct by Bloggs or Doe directed at Roe, except for their failure 

to intervene when other students mistreated him, which is certainly 

insufficient alone to constitute bullying." Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d 

at 461. But this reliance is misplaced because speech that 

actively encourages such direct or face-to-face bullying conduct 

is not constitutionally protected. Doe and Bloggs ignore the 

district court's further conclusion that "an official could find 

that by posting these comments -- even if they were themselves 

minor relative to the surrounding nastiness -- Doe and Bloggs had 

signaled their approval and encouragement of the bullying by the 

other hockey teams members." Id. at 464. The record supports the 

School's finding that Doe and Bloggs were participants in 

encouraging the group and its bullying of Roe, and that bullying 

went beyond speech and included activities such as taking 

nonconsensual photos and videos of Roe, attempting to get him to 

say inappropriate statements on camera, and isolating him from the 

hockey team. The district court did not clearly err in finding 

that Doe and Bloggs, through their active participation in the 
- 29 -

Snapchat group, encouraged the bullying that -- they do not dispute 

-- others engaged in that went beyond speech. 

We reject Doe and Bloggs's argument that their speech, 

though offensive, did not rise to the level of invading the rights 

of others and thus could not be disciplined under Tinker and the

Massachusetts anti-bullying statute. Doe and Bloggs were not 

punished because Roe was offended by the content of their messages. 

As Doe and Bloggs themselves point out, Roe never saw the Snapchat 

messages from them. Doe and Bloggs were punished because the

School reasonably found that their speech and participation in the 

Snapchat group actively encouraged the repeated bullying that 

occurred throughout the 2018-2019 season.

We also reject Doe and Bloggs's argument that they did 

not intend or expect their messages to be viewed by Roe because 

they expected the messages to be deleted. But there is no intent 

requirement under Tinker. The test under Tinker is objective, 

focusing on the reasonableness of the school's response, not the 

intent of the student. See Norris, 969 F.3d at 25; Shen, 2017 WL 

5890089, at *10.

In light of the evidence in the record, the district 

court did not clearly err in finding that "Doe and Bloggs had 

signaled their approval and encouragement of the bullying by the 
- 30 -

other hockey teams members." Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 464.14 Speech 

or conduct that actively and pervasively encourages bullying by 

others or fosters an environment in which bullying is acceptable 

and actually occurs -- as in this case -- is not protected under 

the First Amendment. 

C. Doe's and Bloggs's Facial Overbreadth and Vagueness 

Challenges to the "Emotional Harm" Prong of the School Policy 

and Massachusetts Statute Are Moot.

Doe and Bloggs in addition seek declarations that the 

"emotional harm" prong of the Hopkinton Bullying Policy and section 

37O are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. They contend that 

these provisions have "chilled" their speech because they are open 

to expansive and potentially arbitrary enforcement.

Under "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute 

is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of 

protected speech." United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 

(2008). The doctrine rests on the notion that "the threat of 

enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from engaging in 

constitutionally protected speech," a chilling effect that 

inhibits the free exchange of ideas. Id. The void-for-vagueness 

doctrine, by contrast, is derived from the Due Process Clause of 

14 The district court also correctly rejected Doe and 

Bloggs's argument that their punishments violated their First 

Amendment rights to free association. Doe and Bloggs were not 

punished for associating with other members of the hockey team. 

The School punished Doe and Bloggs for their conduct. They were

active members of the Snapchat group and encouraged the bullying. 
- 31 -

the Fifth Amendment and is concerned with circumstances in which 

a law is so vague that it does not provide fair notice of what 

conduct it prohibits and creates a risk of arbitrary enforcement. 

See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). 

Courts have long recognized that when a vague law implicates First 

Amendment interests, the injuries can be similar to and overlapping 

with those in overbreadth claims, but the analysis takes place 

under distinct tests. See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 

U.S. 1, 20 (2010); Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman 

Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982); see also Wright & Miller, 

13A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3531.9.4 (3d ed. 2021).

Doe's and Bloggs's claims as to facial overbreadth and 

vagueness seek prospective relief, and they have presented no 

argument that these claims are integrally intertwined with their 

discipline claims.15 That being so, the facial overbreadth and 

15 The facial overbreadth and vagueness claims, as pleaded 

and argued, seek only prospective relief in the form of a 

declaration of rights and injunctive relief against future

enforcement of the "emotional harm" prong. Doe's and Bloggs's 

First Amendment Tinker claims, by contrast, request injunctive 

relief to remove the discipline from their records. The district 

court understood the claims as we do. 

To the extent Doe and Bloggs challenge either the 

Hopkinton Bullying Policy or section 37O insofar as they relate to 

removing the past discipline from their records, those arguments 

are waived. See United States v. Rodrigues, 850 F.3d 1, 13 n.6 

(1st Cir. 2017).
- 32 -

vagueness claims as to the "emotional harm" prong of the Hopkinton 

Bullying Policy and section 37O are moot.

"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute 

may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on 

the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally 

to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 

458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982). First Amendment overbreadth challenges 

are an exception to that general rule against third-party standing. 

See Osediacz v. City of Cranston, 414 F.3d 136, 140-41 (1st Cir. 

2005); see also United States v. Smith, 945 F.3d 729, 736 (2d Cir. 

2019). "Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute 

not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but 

because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's 

very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain 

from constitutionally protected speech or expression." 

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 

Even so, the overbreadth doctrine does not dispose of 

the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate Article III 

constitutional standing. Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 141; see Serv. 

Emps. Int'l Union, Local 3 v. Mun. of Mt. Lebanon, 446 F.3d 419, 

423 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[L]itigants [asserting a First Amendment 

overbreadth challenge], of course, must still meet the 

constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact because their own 

constitutionally unprotected interests will be adversely affected 
- 33 -

by application of the statute." (first citing Note, Standing to 

Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 424 (1974); 

and then citing Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 

853, 860 n.33 (1991))). Nor does the void-for-vagueness doctrine 

excuse a plaintiff from establishing the constitutional 

requirement of injury-in-fact as to their own interests.16 See

Holder, 561 U.S. at 20 ("A plaintiff who engages in some conduct 

that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the 

law as applied to the conduct of others." (quoting Vill. of Hoffman

Ests., 455 U.S. at 495) (quotation omitted)). To establish Article 

III standing, a plaintiff must show: "(i) that he suffered an 

injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or 

imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; 

and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial 

relief." TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021).

16 In addition, we note that Doe and Bloggs do not challenge 

the third or fourth prongs that cover conduct that "creates a 

hostile environment at school for the target" or "infringes on the 

rights of the target at school." Hopkinton Bullying Policy; see

Mass. Gen. L. ch. 71 § 37O. The School determined that the conduct 

for which discipline was imposed independently satisfied each of 

the three prongs of the School policy and the Massachusetts 

statute. Even assuming Doe and Bloggs could challenge their past 

discipline by challenging the "emotional harm" prong as overbroad 

and vague, the result would be the invalidation of the "emotional 

harm" prong of the Hopkinton Bullying Policy and section 37O. Doe 

and Bloggs would receive no relief from their injury because the 

School had two separate and independent grounds for finding that 

they engaged in bullying. See Signs for Jesus v. Town of Pembroke, 

N.H., 977 F.3d 93, 100-01 (1st Cir. 2020).
- 34 -

The plaintiff must thus show "whether the risk that the Policy 

will have a chilling effect on the speech of others is a sufficient 

injury to the plaintiff to meet the first prong of the 

constitutional test for standing." Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 142 

(emphasis in original). "[A] chill on speech sometimes may be a 

cognizable injury," but "in order to have standing, the plaintiff 

must be within the class of persons potentially chilled." Id.

Having graduated -- and thus no longer subject to the 

Hopkinton Bullying Policy or section 37O -- Doe and Bloggs do not 

fall within the "class of persons potentially chilled." See Powell

v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) ("[A] case is moot when the 

issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome.").

An exception to the mootness doctrine exists for cases 

that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Murphy v. 

Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). But this exception applies only 

when: "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to 

be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) 

there [i]s a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party

w[ill] be subjected to the same action again." Id. (quoting 

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)) (emphasis added). 

Doe and Bloggs fail to satisfy the second prong of the 

exception. They are no longer students at the School, and there 

is no reasonable expectation that they will be subject to the same 
- 35 -

discipline again under the challenged policy and statute. See

Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th 

Cir. 2009) ("[T]here is no reasonable expectation that [plaintiff] 

will be subjected, post-graduation, to [the challenged policy]."); 

Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 

211, 217 (3d Cir. 2003); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 

228 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000).

D. The School Did Not Violate Doe's and Bloggs's Rights Under 

the Massachusetts Student Speech Statute.

Doe and Bloggs further contend that the School violated 

their rights under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 82, which provides in 

relevant part: "The right of students to freedom of expression in 

the public schools of the commonwealth shall not be abridged, 

provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder 

within the school." They argue that the statute protects the free 

speech rights of students limited only by the requirement that the 

speech be nondisruptive. Doe and Bloggs argue that they thus 

cannot be punished for speech that invaded the rights of another 

but was not found to "cause any disruption or disorder within the 

school."17 

17 The district court correctly held that the School may 

not rely on the "substantial disruption" prong of Tinker to justify 

its actions. Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 460. In Norris, we held 

that the school "must rely only on the reasons originally provided 

to A.M. for her suspension" and "may not rely on post hoc 

rationalizations for the speech restrictions." Norris, 969 F.3d 

at 25-26. Here, the Bullying Report found that Doe's and Bloggs's 
- 36 -

Doe and Bloggs ask us to interpret section 82 in a manner 

that directly conflicts with the plain text of the later-enacted 

Massachusetts anti-bullying statute. When Massachusetts enacted 

the anti-bullying statute in 2010, it adopted the language from 

Tinker, and the plain text of the statute permits discipline based 

on "Bullying" that "infringes on the rights of the victim at 

school." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 71, § 37O(a). If Doe and Bloggs's 

interpretation of section 82 were correct, entire paragraphs of 

section 37O would conflict directly with section 82. We do not so 

interpret section 82. See Town of Hadley v. Town of Amherst, 360 

N.E.2d 623, 626 (Mass. 1977).

Doe and Bloggs's sole response is that the anti-bullying 

statute states that it does not "supersede or replace existing 

rights or remedies." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 71, § 37O(i). But 

subsection 37O(i) is not plausibly read to limit school discipline 

of bullying to the constraints provided for in section 82, as that 

would render much of the anti-bullying statute meaningless. Given 

the anti-bullying statute's focus on victims of bullying and the 

responsibilities of school administrators in addressing bullying, 

the more natural reading of subsection 37O(i) is that insofar as 

"conduct caused emotional harm to [Roe], created a hostile 

environment for him during school-sponsored events and activities 

and infringed on his rights at school." The School may rely only 

on these justifications for rationalizing the speech restrictions. 

See id.
- 37 -

bullying covered by section 37O was already actionable under 

Massachusetts law, it remains so.

We do not adopt Doe and Bloggs's reading of section 82. 

The School did not violate either section 82 or Tinker in 

suspending Doe and Bloggs for their speech and conduct.

III.

Affirmed.