07-03-0259-CV
OCTOBER 29, 2004
DAVIE HARRISON
NORTHWEST TEXAS HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, ET AL.

Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.

	Appellant Davie Harrison, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,challenges the trial court's order dismissing his claim for alleged negligence and breach ofduty in medical services provided by Northwest Texas Health Care, System, et al. Presenting three issues, Harrison contends the trial court abused its discretion indismissing his claim.  We affirm.

	Citing sections 671.001 and 672.009 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, (1)Harrison filed a notice of intent to file a claim against Northwest Texas Health Care System,et al. pursuant to former article 4590i of the Medical Liability Act within 60 days of the dateof his notice.  The notice is dated March 17, 2003, and bears a Potter County District Clerkfile-stamp of April 4, 2003.  It is designated in the clerk's record as "Plaintiff's OriginalPetition."  By the notice, Harrison did not seek any relief against Northwest Texas HealthCare System, et al.  On May 12, 2003, the trial court signed a dismissal order citing, amongother reasons, that Harrison's realistic chance of ultimate success was slight and thereforefrivolous.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §14.003(b)(1) (Vernon 2002).

	By his three issues, Harrison contends the trial court erred in dismissing his claim(1) as frivolous (2) pursuant to section 14.003(b)(1) and (3) pursuant to Rule 165a of theTexas Rules of Civil Procedure.  Considering the first two issues together, we disagree.

	As noted above, by his handwritten document Harrison stated it was only a noticeof claim which he "intend[ed] to file" sixty days after March 17, 2003.  Moreover, sections671.001 and 672.009 have no relevance to the matters asserted in his notice of claim. Harrison did not allege his damages were within the jurisdictional limits of the court and didnot make a demand for judgment or other relief as required by Rule 47 of the Texas Rulesof Civil Procedure.  Harrison's status as a pro se litigant did not excuse the failure to complywith the rules of procedure.  See Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1998, no pet.).  As presented in his notice of claim, Harrison's realistic chance ofultimate success was slight, and his filing did not comply with Rule 47.  Thus, we overruleissues one and two.  Our disposition of Harrison's first and second issues pretermitsconsideration of his third.

	Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

						Don H. Reavis

						    Justice

1. Section 671.001 is entitled "Standard Used in Determining Death," and section672.009 is entitled "Use of Information and Records; Confidentiality."

	In conformity with the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court, we willnot rule on the motion to withdraw until we have independently examined the record.Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.).  If this courtdetermines the appeal has merit, we will remand it to the trial court for appointment of newcounsel.  See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).  

	Appellate review of a revocation order is limited to determining whether the trial courtabused its discretion.  Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984);Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). The trial court abuses itsdiscretion in revoking community supervision if the State fails to meet its burden of proof. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493-94.  

	In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of theevidence that appellant violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in themotion to revoke.  Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993);  Becker v.State, 33 S.W.3d 64, 66 (Tex.App.-El Paso, 2000, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trierof the facts. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). A defendant's pleaof true to an alleged violation, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation. Mosesv. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). 

	In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, we view theevidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.  Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d419, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).  Carillo's pleas of true to four alleged violations of theconditions of his community supervision in the underlying trial court Cause No. B12324-9603 and to five alleged violations in trial court Cause No. B12323-9603, and the respectivestipulations of evidence, support the court's judgments.  There is nothing in the record tosuggest that he was incompetent or that his pleas and stipulations were not madeknowingly, voluntarily or intelligently. The record contains some evidence in mitigation ofsome of his violations, but when, as here, more than one violation is alleged, proof of anyone of them is sufficient to support revocation.  Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926(Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Gobell v. State, 528 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975); McCollumv. State, 784 S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd).

 	Our review convinces us that appellate counsel conducted a diligent andconscientious review of the record. We have also made an independent examination of theentire record to determine whether there are any arguable grounds which might support theappeal.  See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.  We agree it presents no meritorious grounds forreview. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Carillo's communitysupervision. We grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the judgments of the trialcourt.

							James T. Campbell

							        Justice

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