IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1656

Filed September 18, 2024

H.D. SUPPLY MANAGEMENT, INC. and NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Petitioners-Appellees,

vs.

KENNETH E. SMITH,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

An injured employee appeals an interlocutory district court order staying

enforcement of a workers’ compensation award pending judicial review under Iowa 

Code section 17A.19(5) (2023) and refusing to enter judgment on the award under 

section 86.42. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Nate Willems of Rush & Nicholson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Kathryn L. Hartnett of Prentiss Grant, LLC, Omaha, Nebraska, for 

appellees.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal, the parties ask us to decide whether the district 

court correctly granted a stay of a workers’ compensation award pending

completion of a judicial-review proceeding that is now complete. And they want to 

know if the court properly refused to enter judgment on that award, which has now 

been reversed and remanded to the workers’ compensation commissioner. But 

because the judicial-review proceeding has ended and the workers’ compensation 

award has been reversed and remanded, this interlocutory appeal is moot. Any 

ruling would not affect either party. And this appeal does not satisfy the publicimportance exception to mootness because deciding it would provide little 

additional guidance on the law governing stays and enforcement of workers’ 

compensation awards during judicial-review proceedings. So we abide by our duty 

to refrain from answering moot questions and dismiss this appeal.

I.

In March 2023, the workers’ compensation commissioner awarded Kenneth

Smith benefits for an injury while working at H.D. Supply Management, Inc. The 

commissioner found that Smith suffered an unscheduled work-related injury to his 

shoulder and arm under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(v) (2023) and that he was 

permanently and totally disabled. And so, the commissioner awarded Smith 

benefits of $487.87 to be paid weekly, beginning from the date of the injury. It also 

awarded penalty benefits of $19,000 because H.D. Supply and its insurer, New 

Hampshire Insurance Company, unreasonably denied Smith’s claim for benefits.

1

 

1 The insurer, New Hampshire Insurance, is also a party to this proceeding. But 

for readability we will refer to both collectively as H.D. Supply.
3

And it ordered H.D. Supply to reimburse Smith for his medical expenses and 

mileage, the cost of the independent medical evaluation, and the costs of the 

arbitration proceeding and hearing transcript.

H.D. Supply petitioned for judicial review of the commissioner’s award. Its 

two-page petition contained little explanation of its grounds for review aside from 

conclusory claims that the award was not supported by substantial evidence; was 

based on an irrational, illogical or wholly unjustifiable interpretation and application 

of law; and was otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 

discretion. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f), (l), (m), (n).

Thirty-three days later, Smith applied for entry of judgment on the award 

under Iowa Code section 86.42.

2

 He argued that he was entitled to judgment 

because H.D. Supply did not post a bond within thirty days of filing its petition for 

judicial review to stay the award under Iowa Code section 86.26(2). See Iowa 

Code § 86.42 (authorizing judgment on presentment of “file-stamped copy of an 

order or decision of the commissioner . . . which has not had execution or 

enforcement stayed as provided in section 17A.19, subsection 5, or section 86.26, 

subsection 2”); id. § 86.26(2) (staying “execution or enforcement of a decision or 

order of the workers’ compensation commissioner if the party seeking judicial 

review posts a bond securing any compensation awarded pursuant to the decision 

or order with the district court within thirty days of filing the petition”). Smith 

2 Effective July 1, 2023—after Smith filed his motion—section 86.42 was 

transferred to section 10A.330 without making any changes to its text as part of a 

government reorganization statute. See 2023 Iowa Acts, ch. 19, § 1477(1)(ab). 

The rest of chapter 86 was also transferred chapter 10A. See id. § 1477(1). To 

be consistent with the citations used by the district court and the parties on appeal, 

we continue to use the citations in effect at the time Smith filed his motion.
4

calculated the amount of weekly total disability benefits and interest that H.D. 

Supply still owed under the award as of the date of his application for entry of 

judgment. He also added in the penalty benefits and medical and litigation 

expenses he was awarded. He thus requested entry of judgment against H.D. 

Supply “in the total amount of $77,942.08 with interest continuing to accrue on 

unpaid permanent total disability benefits at 2.15%.”

About three hours later, H.D. Supply moved to stay enforcement of the 

award under Iowa Code sections 86.26(2) or 17A.19(5). H.D. Supply conceded

that it was three days late in posting bond under section 86.26(2), but asked for 

permission to do so “[i]n the interest of: judicial economy, having this case be heard 

by this Court on the merits, justice, and equity.” Alternatively, H.D. Supply argued 

that a stay was appropriate under section 17A.19(5) because it was likely to prevail 

on the merits, it would suffer irreparable injury if Smith could not repay the award 

if the award is reversed after being paid, Smith would not be substantially harmed 

by delayed payment, and there is significant public interest in deciding the proper 

statutory interpretation.

The district court eventually heard argument on the dueling requests. But 

it did not receive any testimony or other evidence. Nor did it have the 

administrative record before the workers’ compensation commissioner—that 

record was not filed by the commissioner until several months after the court ruled. 

See generally id. § 17A.19(6) (requiring the agency to “transmit to the reviewing 

court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of any contested case 

which may be the subject of the petition” for judicial review).
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In September 2023, the court granted H.D Supply’s motion to stay the 

award during the judicial-review proceeding under section 17A.19(5) and denied 

Smith’s application to enter judgment on the award. The court reasoned:

In this case, there is a likelihood that the Petitioner will prevail on the 

appeal. Furthermore, the Petitioner would suffer irreparable harm if 

the judgment were to be entered at this juncture because they would 

likely be unable to recuperate the award payment if they prevailed 

on appeal. The Respondent will also not be prejudiced in a stay 

because he would not have received judgment if the bond was 

posted and the Petitioners appear solvent and capable of paying an 

award at the appeal’s conclusion. As such, the Court concludes that 

a stay under Iowa Code section 17A.19(5) is supported.

Smith then sought interlocutory review of the district court order. The 

supreme court granted his application and transferred the case to our court. In his 

appeal, Smith makes two main arguments that the district court abused its 

discretion in granting the stay. First, he argues that the court made its findings—

especially on irreparable harm—without having any evidence on which to base 

them and thus improperly “listened to a mere allegation from an employer and 

adopted it.” Second, he argues the court did not follow the governing precedent 

on considering stays pending judicial review of workers’ compensation awards: 

Grinnell College v. Osborn, 751 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 2008).

In most interlocutory appeals, proceedings in the district court would have 

stopped while this appellate process plays out. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.104(2) (“An 

order granting an appeal under this rule will stay further proceedings in the court 

below . . . .”). But here, the supreme court ordered that the district court could 

continue its “proceedings related to the petition for judicial review” so long as it did 

“not rule on any issues directly related to its” order granting the stay and denying 
6

entry of judgment. And so, the district court proceedings on the merits of H.D. 

Supply’s judicial-review petition continued on. 

In April 2024, the district court ruled on the merits of H.D. Supply’s petition. 

The court first held that Smith’s arm injury and shoulder injury were both workrelated—rejecting H.D. Supply’s argument that the arm was “not injured due to the 

work injury, but as an incidental result of [Smith’s] shoulder surgery.” But the court 

still reversed and remanded the award back to the workers’ compensation 

commissioner because the commissioner had awarded compensation for an 

unscheduled injury rather than as separate scheduled injuries. The court reasoned 

that Smith’s injuries “are parallel to those in” a supreme court case decided a few 

weeks before its ruling, which held that arm and shoulder injuries should be 

compensated separately as scheduled injuries rather than as an unscheduled 

injury. See Bridgestone Americas, Inc. v. Anderson, 4 N.W.3d 676, 683 (Iowa 

2024). So the court concluded that “[t]he commissioner should consider Smith’s 

injuries consistent with the Iowa Supreme Court’s Bridgestone decision.” 

Neither party appealed that district court order. And according to Smith’s 

statement to us, which H.D. Supply does not dispute, as of August 2024, his case 

was still pending before the commissioner after the parties submitted additional 

briefing about “Smith’s entitlement to permanent benefits consistent with 

Bridgestone.”

We asked the parties for supplemental briefing to address the effect on this 

interlocutory appeal of the district court’s ruling reversing and remanding the 

award. Both parties urged that it has no effect and this appeal is not moot. Smith 

also contends that even if it is moot, we should decide it under the public-
7

importance exception to mootness because whether injured workers should be 

paid “benefits which are not contested or disputed” during judicial-review 

proceedings “is a matter of public importance” and “likely to recur unless this Court 

requires a workers’ compensation carrier to pay the injured workers the benefits 

which they have not contested on appeal.”

II.

“Courts exist to decide cases, not academic questions of law.” Riley Drive 

Ent. I, Inc. v. Reynolds, 970 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up). So as a 

matter of “judicial restraint,” we generally “do not decide cases when the underlying 

controversy is moot.” Grinnell, 751 N.W.2d at 398 (cleaned up). A dispute is moot 

when our decision would have no “force or effect in the underlying controversy.” 

Id. (cleaned up). And a case can become moot while pending on appeal if 

“because of changed circumstances,” our “decision will no longer matter.” Homan 

v. Branstad, 864 N.W.2d 321, 328 (Iowa 2015). So we “may consider matters 

technically outside the district court record in determining a question of mootness.” 

Riley Drive, 970 N.W.2d at 296. 

Even when neither party contests mootness, “[i]t is our duty on our own

motion to refrain from determining moot questions” unless the case fits within an

exception to mootness. Homan, 864 N.W.2d at 328 (cleaned up). One such 

exception is the public-importance exception. See Riley Drive, 970 N.W.2d at 298. 

In deciding whether to apply the public-importance exception, we consider: “(1) the 

private or public nature of the issue; (2) the desirability of an authoritative 

adjudication to guide public officials in their future conduct; (3) the likelihood of the 
8

reccurrence of the issue; and (4) the likelihood the issue will recur yet evade 

appellate review.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Grinnell, 751 N.W.2d at 399.

This interlocutory appeal is moot. Nothing we might decide could affect

anything because the judicial-review proceeding appealed from is already over and 

the award sought to be enforced has been reversed. Cf. Grinnell, 751 N.W.2d at 

399 (holding that appeal of entry of judgment on workers’ compensation award 

and denial of stay pending judicial review was moot after the judicial review 

proceeding concluded with affirmance of the award). Suppose we agreed with 

Smith that the district court should not have stayed the workers’ compensation 

award while the judicial-review proceeding was pending and reversed that ruling.

What relief would that give Smith? None. Even without any decision by our court, 

the stay already has no continuing effect because it only operated while the 

judicial-review proceeding was pending, and that proceeding has ended. And the

stay prevented enforcement of an award that no longer exists now that the district 

court has reversed and remanded that award.

For the same reason, even if we were to hold that the district court should 

have entered judgment on that award back in September 2023, the court could not 

do so now. The award has been reversed and remanded. Smith’s claims are now 

pending before the workers’ compensation commissioner. And the district court 

lacks authority under section 86.42 to enforce a commissioner’s award that no 

longer exists. Accord Iowa Code § 10A.330 (2024).

Smith contends that “[t]his case still presents a justiciable controversy,” 

explaining “[t]he gist is the fact that aspects of the original agency decision which 

were not appealed by [H.D. Supply] result in monetary payments to [Smith], and 
9

[H.D. Supply has] paid [Smith] nothing.” And so, he argues for various alternative 

amounts that he believes he is still owed regardless of how the commissioner 

resolves the remaining disputes between the parties in a new award. But Smith 

misunderstands the issues that are before us in this appeal: dueling requests to 

stay or enforce a specific award that no longer exists. The district court’s ruling on 

the judicial-review petition reversed and remanded the entire award back to the 

commissioner—the decretal language in its judgment (“IT IS THEREFORE 

ORDERED that [the] worker[s’] compensation commissioner’s decision is 

REVERSED AND REMANDED”) does not carve out any part of the award that 

was not reversed and remanded.

And whatever the merits of Smith’s argument that he should be able to 

request entry of judgment for some portion of the award that was not disputed by 

H.D. Supply in its petition for judicial review, that is not the judgment that he 

requested in the district court. He sought entry of judgment for the total amount 

he calculated as being owed under the commissioner’s award on the date of his 

application. And even if the award had not been reversed, he could not seek a 

different judgment for the first time on appeal from our court.3

Smith also argues that we should still decide this appeal under the publicimportance exception to mootness. But the issue he suggests would warrant 

application of that exception—whether injured workers should be paid at least 

some “benefits which are not contested or disputed” during a judicial-review 

proceeding contesting other benefits—is not before us in this appeal. And while 

3 We have also considered H.D. Supply’s single paragraph of argument that the 

appeal is not moot. It does not offer any other points that merit further discussion.
10

the issues he does properly raise in his original briefing may reoccur and evade 

appellate review, deciding them would provide little new guidance on any important 

issue. The supreme court has already exercised its discretion to give guidance on 

stays of workers’ compensation awards under the public-importance exception to 

mootness in a similar case. See Grinnell, 751 N.W.2d at 399–404. Smith’s 

argument on appeal is mainly that the district court failed to properly follow that 

case, especially the supreme court’s admonitions that “the applicant for a stay 

during judicial review has the burden to establish the prerequisites for a stay and 

must submit evidence to the district court concerning all relevant statutory factors

at a hearing” and that the court must “decide the request based on the evidence 

submitted by the parties.” Id. at 403. We could thus decide this appeal without 

plowing new ground. And doing so would not give any significant guidance on 

these issues that would warrant an exception to mootness.4

Because this appeal is moot and the public-importance exception does not 

apply, we refrain from deciding its purely academic questions and dismiss it. Our 

dismissal does not disturb the district court’s ruling on the petition for judicial review 

nor the case pending before the workers’ compensation commissioner.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

4 Before we could get to the merits, we would also have to address whether Smith 

preserved error in the district court even though he never cited Grinnell nor argued 

that there was an insufficient evidentiary record—in his written resistance, at the 

hearing, or in a reconsideration motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 

after the ruling granting the stay. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 

(Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must 

ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide 

them on appeal.”).