[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-10655 

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00350-WKW-DAB

DARRELL LAMAR MARSHALL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON, III, 

United States District Judge, in his official capacity, 

MYRON H. THOMPSON, 

United States District Judge, in his official capacity, 

U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 

in their official capacity, 

THE FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTER, 

in their official capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________

(March 4, 2019)

Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 1 of 5 
2

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Darrell Marshall appeals pro se the sua sponte dismissal of his complaint. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Marshall challenges the denial of his motion for the 

magistrate judge to recuse and the treatment of his action as raising constitutional 

claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Marshall also argues that the summary disposition 

of his complaint violated his right to due process. We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Marshall’s 

motion to recuse. Marshall alleged that the magistrate judge was “bias[ed],” but

Marshall failed to file an affidavit stating that the magistrate judge was prejudiced

against him or that the magistrate judge possessed personal knowledge of the case 

that required recusal. See 28 U.S.C. § 144. Marshall’s status as a pro se litigant did 

not excuse him from providing an affidavit in support of his motion. See Albra v. 

Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Marshall also alleged that the 

magistrate judge engaged in “misconduct . . . [by] misconstru[ing] [the] Civil 

Rights Complaint as a Bivens action and recommend[ing] that the case be 

dismissed,” but Marshall’s disagreement with the magistrate judge’s adverse 

Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 2 of 5 
3

rulings did not constitute a valid ground for recusal. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 

F.3d 1270, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004). 

The district court reasonably construed Marshall’s complaint as a Bivens

action. Civil actions against state officers for violating a plaintiff’s federal 

constitutional rights are governed by a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while

Bivens recognizes a cause of action against federal officers for violations of federal 

constitutional rights. Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995). 

Marshall did not allege that any defendant violated his federal constitutional rights 

while acting under color of state law as required to state a claim under section 

1983. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). As the 

district court stated, Bivens offered Marshall his “best hope for relief” because he 

alleged wrongdoing by federal actors. Marshall complained that two federal district 

judges, the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Medical Center, and the 

United States of America conspired to conceal his mental disabilities, 

discriminated against him because of his mental disability, and violated the 

Americans With Disabilities Act.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Marshall’s

complaint as frivolous. When an “action . . . is frivolous,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), by being “without arguable merit either in law or fact,” Napier 

Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 3 of 5 
4

v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 

1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)), the district court must dismiss the action and may do 

so sua sponte before service of process, Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 

1323 (11th Cir. 2001). Marshall’s complaint is frivolous because the district judges 

enjoy absolute judicial immunity, see Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th 

Cir. 2000), and because Bivens does not provide for an action against federal 

agencies like the United States Attorney’s Office and the Federal Medical Center, 

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994), or against the United 

States, McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 608 (11th Cir. 1986), all of which enjoy 

sovereign immunity. Marshall does not challenge the dismissal of his claim under 

the Disabilities Act, so we deem abandoned any argument he could have made

contesting that adverse ruling. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not 

briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned . . . .”).

The district court did not violate Marshall’s right to due process by sua 

sponte dismissing his complaint. “[D]ue process requires, at a minimum, that . . . 

persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process 

must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 

U.S. 371, 377 (1971). The screening procedure under which the district court 

Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 4 of 5 
5

dismissed Marshall’s complaint as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), does 

not violate due process. See Vanderberg, 259 F.3d at 1323. The district court 

reviewed Marshall’s objections to the recommendation of the magistrate judge 

before entering its final order that dismissed the complaint. See Link v. Wabash 

R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) (sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute 

did not “offend[ ] due process” given “the availability of a corrective remedy”). 

And we have reviewed the dismissal of Marshall’s complaint de novo. These 

postdecisional procedures provided Marshall ample “meaningful opportunit[ies] to 

be heard.” See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377.

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Marshall’s complaint. 

Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 5 of 5