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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

In re TAYLOR ANNE KILLICH. 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Petitioner-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

April 20, 2017 

9:00 a.m. 

v No. 329941 

Washtenaw Circuit Court 

TAYLOR ANNE KILLICH, LC No. 14-000567-DL 

 Respondent-Appellant. 

Before: M.J. KELLY, P.J., and STEPHENS and O’BRIEN, JJ. 

STEPHENS, J. 

 Respondent, minor Taylor Anne Killich, appeals as of right the trial court order 

dismissing a petition against her for poisoning food, drink, medicine, or water supply, MCL 

750.436(2)(a), an offense punishable by imprisonment for fifteen years, a fine of $10,000, or 

both, and denying her motion to waive a previously ordered $100 probation supervision fee. We 

vacate and remand. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner filed a delinquency proceedings petition against respondent for violating MCL 

750.436(2)(a) after an incident on June 5, 2014. On May 6, 2015, respondent pleaded no contest 

before a referee. A probationary order was prepared in which respondent was placed on 

probation for a period of three months. She was ordered to complete 20 hours of community 

service by August 21, 2015, to participate in “the Victim Awareness class,” and submit urine 

screens if requested by her probation officer. Under the proposed order, respondent’s probation 

officer could also impose an additional 20 hours of community service at his or her discretion. 

The court denied respondent’s motion to waive a $100 probation supervision fee. 

At the sentencing hearing before the referee, respondent’s counsel agreed that probation 

was an appropriate remedy, but objected to the $100 probation supervision fee, citing People v 

Juntikka, 310 Mich App 306; 871 NW2d 555 (2015). Counsel’s argument was unsuccessful and 

he requested a review hearing before the trial court. 
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At the September 23, 2015 review hearing, respondent’s counsel asserted that respondent 

completed all probation and community service requirements, but again objected to the $100 

probation supervision fee. Respondent’s counsel argued that the court did not have statutory 

authority under the Juvenile Code to impose a pre-determined flat rate fee and that the Juvenile 

Code only permitted the court to be reimbursed for individualized costs of probation supervision 

services extended to individual juveniles. 

Petitioner argued that three statutory provisions allowed for the imposition of a probation 

supervision fee: 1) MCL 712A.18(1)(b), 2) MCL 712A.18(3), and 3) MCL 712A.18(12). 

Petitioner argued that MCL 712A.18(1)(b) required a juvenile under supervision or probation to 

pay the minimum state costs prescribed by statute and that as a probationer, respondent was at 

least required to pay a statutory minimum of $68. Petitioner also argued that MCL 712A.18(3) 

authorized orders of disposition placing a juvenile in the juvenile’s own home to contain a 

provision for reimbursement by the juvenile to the court for the cost of service. Lastly, petitioner 

argued that MCL 712A.18(12) stated that if a court entered an order of disposition for a juvenile 

offense, the court “shall order” the juvenile to pay a statutory assessment defined under MCL 

780.905, which in respondent’s case was a fee of $130. Petitioner maintains the same on appeal. 

Petitioner also distinguished Juntikka, arguing the probation fee in that case was 

impermissible because it was used to purchase general probation department supplies, whereas in 

the present case the $100 probation supervision fee went directly to the general Washtenaw 

County General Fund. The court called Donna White, a probation supervisor in the juvenile 

court who testified that the probation office charges the same $100 probation supervision fee to 

all juveniles on probation and that the funds go to the county General Fund. The court 

acknowledged that the fee may go to the general fund but affirmed its imposition stating, 

So I do think, because of the mechanism of funding and the allocation it is 

actually a reimbursement, whether or not the fact it goes to the general fund, 

whether or not the fact it is a flat albeit extremely minimal fee compared to the 

true cost; you may be right in that legal analysis. I will leave that to the Court of 

Appeals to direct us as to where we go but at this stage the motion is denied. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 This case involves the interpretation of multiple statutes contained in the Juvenile Code, 

MCL 712A.1 et seq. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo on 

appeal. In re Tiemann, 297 Mich App 250, 257; 823 NW2d 440 (2012). 

III. ISSUE PRESERVATION 

To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be raised before, addressed by, 

and decided by the lower court. In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). 

Respondent filed a challenge to the $100 fee and argued against its imposition at the subsequent 

motion hearing. The court disagreed. Because this issue was raised before, addressed, and 

decided by the trial court, it is preserved for review. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 

We find, as did the trial court, that local units of government share the costs for juvenile 

adjudication and supervision, whether in-home or otherwise within the state. Unlike the adult 

offender, a delinquent juvenile becomes a ward of the state and we will look to the case law and 

statutes addressing penalties, fines, fees, and costs for adjudication of state offenses under the 

Juvenile Code. In Michigan, a court cannot impose penalties or costs in a criminal case unless 

specifically authorized by statute. People v Cunningham, 496 Mich 145, 149-151; 852 NW2d 

118 (2014). As respondent points out, delinquency proceedings under the Juvenile Code are not 

criminal cases. However, when addressing a question implicating the Juvenile Code, this Court 

routinely looks to the adult criminal code and cases that interpret it so long as they are not in 

conflict or duplicative of a Juvenile Code provision. In re McDaniel, 186 Mich App 696, 698-

699; 465 NW2d 51 (1991); see also In re Carey, 241 Mich App 222, 227; 615 NW2d 742 (2000) 

(discussing that juvenile proceedings are not considered adversarial in nature but are still closely 

analogous to the adversary criminal process). 

When looking to the relevant statutory provisions, this Court must interpret statutory 

language reasonably and in context, keeping in mind the purpose of the statute. McCahan v 

Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 739; 822 NW2d 747 (2012). The Legislature is presumed to have 

intended the meaning it plainly expressed. People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 50; 753 NW2d 78 

(2008). If the meaning of statutory language is clear, judicial construction is normally neither 

necessary nor permitted. In re Receivership of 11910 South Francis Rd, 492 Mich 208, 222; 821 

NW2d 503 (2012). 

Petitioner asserts here, as it did in the trial court, that there is statutory authority for 

upholding the fee. Petitioner first contends the $100 probation supervision fee is authorized by 

MCL 712A.18(1)(b). We disagree. MCL 712A.18(1)(b) allows a court to enter an order of 

disposition placing a juvenile under probation or supervision. In pertinent part, MCL 

712A.18(1)(b) specifically states that “[t]he court also shall order, as a condition of probation or 

supervision, that the juvenile shall pay the minimum state cost prescribed by section 18m of this 

chapter.” MCL 712A.18m(a) instructs that 

[i]f a juvenile is within the court’s jurisdiction . . . and is ordered to pay any 

combination of fines, costs, restitution, assessments, or payments arising out of 

the same juvenile proceeding, the court shall order the juvenile to pay costs of not 

less than . . . $68.00, if the juvenile is found to be within the court’s jurisdiction 

for a felony. [MCL 712A.18m(a).] 

MCL 712A.18m(5)(a) defines felony as “a violation of a penal law of this state for which the 

offender may be punished by imprisonment for more than 1 year or an offense expressly 

designated by law to be a felony.” 

 The language of MCL 712A.18(1)(b) is plain, and the intent is clear. It authorizes the 

court to order a juvenile within its jurisdiction to pay the minimum state cost of not less than 

$68.00 for a felony. The offense for which respondent was found guilty, MCL 750.436(2)(a), 

was a felony under MCL 712A.18m(5)(a) because it carried with it a term of imprisonment for 

more than 1 year. Accordingly, respondent must pay the minimum state cost of $68 however, 
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contrary to petitioner’s understanding, MCL 712A.18(1)(b) does not authorize the $100 

probation supervision fee. 

Petitioner next contends that the $100 probation supervision fee is authorized by MCL 

712A.18(12). Again, we disagree. MCL 712A.18(12) states that “[i]f the court enters an order 

of disposition based on an act that is a juvenile offense as defined in section 1 of 1989 PA 196, 

MCL 780.901, the court shall order the juvenile to pay the assessment as provided in that act . . . 

.” MCL 780.901(1)(f) defines “juvenile offense” as “an offense committed by a juvenile under 

the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court or the family division of circuit 

court . . . that if committed by an adult would be a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance 

violation . . . .” Again, respondent stands convicted of an offense that would be an adult felony. 

Thus, the lower court was required to order respondent to pay the assessment provided in MCL 

780.905(3). 

MCL 780.905(3) states: “The court shall order each juvenile for whom the court enters 

an order of disposition for a juvenile offense to pay an assessment of $25.00. The court shall 

order a juvenile to pay only 1 assessment under this subsection per case.” This $25 assessment 

must be used to pay for crime victim’s rights services. MCL 780.905(4). Plainly read, MCL 

712A.18(12) authorizes the payment of a $25.00 assessment by juveniles who have an order of 

disposition entered against them. The statute does not otherwise speak to the $100 probation 

supervision fee.1

 

Lastly, petitioner contends that the $100 probation supervision fee is authorized by MCL 

712A.18(3). MCL 712A.18(3) states as follows: 

 An order of disposition placing a juvenile in the juvenile’s own home 

under subsection (1)(b) may contain a provision for reimbursement by the 

juvenile, parent, guardian, or custodian to the court for the cost of service. If an 

order is entered under this subsection, an amount due shall be determined and 

treated in the same manner provided for an order entered under subsection (2). 

 

1

 Although not dispositive of the issue raised, petitioner incorrectly asserts that the crime 

victim’s rights services assessment imposed on respondent should be $130 under MCL 

780.905(1)(a), instead of $25 under MCL 780.905(3). Neither MCL 780.905(1) nor (2) address 

juvenile dispositions. Indeed, MCL 780.905(2) clearly instructs that a $130 assessment under 

MCL 780.905(1)(a) is applicable to adults in criminal cases, not juvenile dispositions. MCL 

780.905(2) states, “The court shall order a respondent to pay only 1 assessment under subsection 

(1) per criminal case. . . .” (Emphasis added). 

 It is MCL 780.905(3) that addresses juvenile dispositions: “The court shall order each 

juvenile for whom the court enters an order of disposition for a juvenile offense to pay an 

assessment of $25.00. The court shall order a juvenile to pay only 1 assessment under this 

subsection per case.” (Emphasis added.) See People v Earl, 495 Mich 33, 37; 845 NW2d 721 

(2014) (explaining that under the crime victim’s rights assessment, MCL 780.904, a convicted 

felon is assessed $130, those convicted of misdemeanors are assessed $75, and juveniles are 

assessed $25 when the court enters an order of disposition for a juvenile offense). 
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 Respondent contends the $100 probation supervision fee is not authorized by MCL 

712A.18(3) because it is not a “reimbursement” within the purview of the statute because when it 

was imposed on respondent, no expense had been incurred. 

 In relevant part, MCL 712A.18(2) states: 

 An order of disposition placing a juvenile in or committing a juvenile to 

care outside of the juvenile’s own home . . . shall contain a provision for 

reimbursement by the juvenile, parent, guardian, or custodian to the court for the 

cost of care or service. The order shall be reasonable, taking into account both the 

income and resources of the juvenile, parent, guardian, or custodian. The amount 

may be based upon the guidelines and model schedule created under subsection 

(6). . . . 

MCL 712A.18(6) states: 

 The office of the state court administrator, under the supervision and 

direction of the supreme court, shall create guidelines that the court may use in 

determining the ability of the juvenile, parent, guardian, or custodian to pay for 

care and any costs of service ordered under subsection (2) or (3). The guidelines 

shall take into account both the income and resources of the juvenile, parent, 

guardian, or custodian. 

Respondent argues the $100 probation supervision fee falls outside the purview of MCL 

712A.18(3) because the statute only authorizes “reimbursements” and the $100 fee is not a 

reimbursement. The crux of respondent’s contention is that an imposed fee can only be 

classified as a reimbursement if the state has already incurred an expense. We disagree. 

Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its 

plain and ordinary meaning. Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, 492 Mich 503, 

515; 821 NW2d 117 (2012). The word “reimbursement” is not defined in MCL 712A.18 or the 

Juvenile Code.2

 When construing statutory language, the context in which it is placed must be 

considered. Menard, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 302 Mich App 467, 471; 838 NW2d 736 (2013), 

lv den 495 Mich 1000 (2014), citing In re Receivership of 11910 South Francis Rd, 492 Mich 

208, 222; 821 NW2d 503 (2012). 

Again, MCL 712A.18(3) provides that “[a]n order of disposition placing a juvenile in the 

juvenile’s own home under subsection (1)(b) may contain a provision for reimbursement . . . to 

the court for the cost of service . . . .” The statute clearly speaks of providing for reimbursement 

when the order of disposition is issued. That is, the statute provides authority for placing a 

 

2

 The guidelines promulgated under MCL 712A.18(6) provide that “[a] reimbursement order 

should not exceed the actual cost-of-care and/or service. The intent of reimbursement is to 

recover the cost of expenses or services.” SCAO, Guidelines For Court Ordered Reimbursement 

And Procedures For Reimbursement Program Operations (October 1990), p 3. Respondent does 

not argue that the fee imposed on respondent exceeded the state’s actual cost to supervise her. 
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reimbursement provision in the disposition order. In re Brzezinski, 454 Mich 890; 562 NW2d 

785 (1997), supports this reading of the statute. Adopting the dissenting opinion from the 

Michigan Court of Appeals, In re Brzezinski, 214 Mich App 652, 677; 542 NW2d 871 (1995), 

the Supreme Court ruled that MCL 712A.18(2) “provides for the reimbursement order to be 

included in the order that originally places a child under state supervision. Thus, the court must 

order a party to reimburse the state’s expenses before it is aware how much the state will 

ultimately spend on a child . . . .” While the authority granted differs between MCL 712A.18(2) 

and MCL 712A.18(3), § 18(2) uses the imperative “shall” while § 18(3) uses the permissive 

“may,” both have the same timing constraint. 

In sum, the plain language of MCL 712A.18(3) allows a court to impose a reimbursement 

provision before it has incurred any expense. 

Whether the $100 probation supervision fee falls outside the purview of MCL 

712A.18(3) because MCL 712A.18(3) does not authorize flat rate assessments is a different 

question. On this point, we agree because the plain language of the statute indicates the court 

should be reimbursed for “the cost of service.” The use of the definite article signals that the 

statute is speaking about something already in existence, i.e., a cost already incurred. See 

SCAO, Guidelines For Court Ordered Reimbursement And Procedures For Reimbursement 

Program Operations (October 1990), p 3. 

Similarly, People v Juntikka, supra, supports the proposition that imposed probation fees 

must be specific to the cost the state expends on a particular respondent. In Juntikka, an adult 

respondent was sentenced to a five-year probationary term and ordered to pay a $100 probation 

enhancement fee. 310 Mich App at 308. On appeal, the Court considered whether the $100 

probation enhancement fee was authorized by the statute that governs conditions a trial court 

may impose during a term of adult probation, MCL 771.3. Id. at 308-309. The Court held the 

fee was improper because it was not specific to the respondent and was imposed to account for 

general operating costs incurred by the probation department. Id. at 314-315. Although the 

present case involves a juvenile, the same underlying principle is at play. 

White stated that the $100 fee was “standard for any young person going on probation” 

and that the probation department charges the fee to all juveniles on probation, regardless of their 

level of probation. White’s testimony makes clear the $100 fee imposed did not take into 

account differing supervision costs the state may need to expend for different juveniles. 

Therefore, because the fee does not qualify as a reimbursement for “the cost of service” of a 

particular juvenile, it is also not statutorily authorized under MCL 712A.18. 

Respondent was under state supervision for a period of three months. At the motion 

hearing, the trial court reasoned as follows: “I am quite certain that . . . $100.00 from a juvenile 

for the time and costs that it costs the taxpayers to handle their case is noth—[sic] isn’t even one 

ice cube—not even the tip of the iceberg.” The trial court further concluded that the $100 

probation supervision fee was an “extremely minimal fee compared to the true cost” of state 

supervision. While we do not doubt that this conclusion is reasonable, there is no evidence in the 

record of this proceeding to support a finding that the amount imposed in the order is either less 

than or equal to the cost of service. 
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We vacate the $100 probation supervision fee and remand for entry of a corrected order 

of disposition. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien