J-S56032-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JULIE TRYBOSKI, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY,

Appellee No. 124 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

Civil Division at No.: 2011-4909

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 

09, 2015

Appellant, Julie Tryboski, appeals pro se from the order of the court of 

common pleas granting the motion for summary judgment of Appellee, The 

Pennsylvania State University, and dismissing her amended complaint with 

prejudice. We affirm.

We take the following background from this Court’s April 1, 2013 

memorandum opinion:

In August 1995, Appellant was accepted into a doctoral 

program with the Communications Arts and Sciences 

Department of Penn State. By 2000, Appellant began work on 

her dissertation. Professor J. Michael Hogan served as 

Appellant’s graduate advisor and chair of her dissertation 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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committee. Under the program rules, a student who did not 

complete his or her dissertation within six years of passing 

required comprehensive examinations must retake the 

examinations to remain viable in the program. Appellant did not 

complete her dissertation by her deadline of October 8, 2005, 

having only turned in a first draft that month.

Arrangements were made for Appellant to retake her 

comprehensive examinations on February 1, 2006. Additionally, 

Appellant sought a retroactive two-year medical withdrawal, 

which she hoped would effectively extend the deadline for 

completion of her dissertation. On February 17, 2006, Graduate 

School Associate Dean Mark Wardell advised Appellant that the 

six-year deadline was not contingent on registration, and a 

medical withdrawal would not affect her need to retake her 

comprehensive examinations. It was subsequently approved for 

Appellant to retake her comprehensive examination in the fall of 

2006.

In May and June 2006, Appellant sent e-mails to Professor 

Hogan detailing her dissatisfaction with the decision and 

advancing various criticisms of his performance as her advisor. 

On June 5, 2006, Professor Hogan resigned as Appellant’s 

advisor, and from her dissertation committee, citing a lack of 

collegiality. Appellant was promptly notified of Professor 

Hogan’s resignation and advised that a replacement advisor 

needed to be found. Unknown to Appellant at the time, two 

other committee members resigned on June 6, 2006, and the 

remaining member resigned on July 25, 2006. Neither 

Appellant’s own efforts, nor efforts made on her behalf by the 

Department and the University administration, succeeded in 

securing a replacement advisor. Consequently, on August 4, 

2006, Communications Arts and Sciences Department Head, 

Professor James P. Dillard sent a letter to Appellant, informing 

her that her “program of study in Communications Arts and 

Sciences has reached its end as of August 1, 2006.” (Appellant’s 

Amended Complaint, 2/21/12, Appendix K).

Appellant did not make a timely request for a departmental 

appeal of her dismissal. However, on January 31, 2007, 

Appellant filed a discrimination complaint with the Pennsylvania 

Human Relations Commission. On November 12, 2009, the 

Commission dismissed Appellant’s complaint. On November 4, 

2011, Appellant filed a pro se complaint with the Court of 
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Common Pleas of Centre County, alleging sexual discrimination 

under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). On 

December 21, 2011 Penn State filed preliminary objections. The 

trial court sustained Penn State’s preliminary objections on 

February 2, 2012, and permitted Appellant leave to file an 

amended complaint within 20 days.

Appellant timely filed her pro se amended complaint on 

February 21, 2012. On March 9, 2012, Penn State filed renewed 

preliminary objections raising various issues, including a 

demurrer alleging Appellant failed to state a prima facie case of 

gender discrimination. On June 5, 2012, the trial court 

sustained Penn State’s preliminary objection in the nature of a 

demurrer and dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice. 

On June 14, 2012, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, 

which the trial court denied on June 19, 2012. Appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal on July 5, 2012. 

(Tryboski v. Penn State Univ., No. 124 MDA 2015, unpublished 

memorandum, at *1-*4 (Pa. Super. filed April 1, 2013)) (footnotes omitted; 

parentheses added).

As further detailed by the trial court in its December 16, 2014 opinion:

On April 1, 2013, the Superior Court reversed and 

remanded, indicating that the trial court had erroneously 

determined that [Appellant] had failed to plead sufficient facts to 

show that she is qualified for the position and failed to plead 

sufficient facts to show she was discharged under circumstances 

that gave rise to an inference of discrimination. . . .

On February 6, 2014, [Appellee] filed its Answer and on 

February 24, 2014, [Appellant] filed a Reply. On September 30, 

2014, [Appellee] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along 

with a statement of material facts and relevant documents. 

[Appellant] filed a brief in opposition to summary judgment on 

November 11, 2014 along with relevant documents. [Appellee] 

thereafter submitted a reply brief. A hearing was held December 

1, 2014.

(Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/14, at 2).
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On December 16, 2014, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion for 

summary judgment based on its finding that “Professor Hogan’s stated 

reasons for resigning were not a pretext for gender discrimination.” (Id. at 

11). The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. Appellant 

timely appealed.1

Appellant raises one issue for our review: 

1. Did the trial court error [sic] in granting [Appellee’s] 

Motion for Summary Judgment because the court improperly 

held that [Appellant’s] evidence failed to establish that genuine 

issues of material fact remain as to whether [Appellee’s] averred 

reasons for discharging her were pretextual because the court

improperly weighed conflicting evidence and failed to draw all 

inferences in the light most favorable to [Appellant]?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 2).2

____________________________________________

1 Appellant filed a timely statement of errors on appeal on February 11, 

2015 pursuant to the court’s order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court filed 

a Rule 1925(a) opinion in which it relied on the reasons stated in its 

December 16, 2014 opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

2 As a preliminary matter, we observe that Appellant’s brief is forty-one 

meandering pages long, and does not contain a certification that it is not in 

excess of 14,000 words, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 2135. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 1-41); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

2135(a)(1), (d). Additionally, the argument section of the brief is flawed. 

First, other than a citation to one binding United States Supreme Court case, 

the argument section of the brief only cites law from the Commonwealth 

Court and lower federal courts. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 11-40). However, 

we can consider this authority as persuasive, even if not binding. See

Cresci Const. Serv., Inc. v. Martin, 64 A.3d 254, 256 n.3, 258 n.7 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (Decisions of Commonwealth Court and lower federal courts 

not binding, but provide persuasive authority and guidance). Also, the vast 

majority of this section contains a self-serving, tortuous recitation of the 

underlying facts of this case, rather than pertinent discussion, in violation of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our standard and scope of review of a court’s order granting a motion 

for summary judgment is well-settled:

A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only 

where it is established that the court committed an error of law 

or abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review 

is plenary.

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary 

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the 

summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that 

where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment 

may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears the burden 

of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or 

answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a 

non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue 

essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof 

establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a 

matter of law. Lastly, we will review the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved 

against the moving party.

Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 562-63 (Pa. Super. 2014) (case 

citation omitted).

Established for Title VII cases, where, as here, direct 

evidence of discriminatory treatment is lacking, is “an allocation 

of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of 

proof” according to which a court may assess a plaintiff’s indirect 

evidence of discrimination. This Title VII burden-shifting 

framework as developed in McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),] is a three-part one. First, the 

plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case 

of discrimination. The burden on the plaintiff of presenting a 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Rule 2119(a). (See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-40); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a). However, although Appellant fails to clearly explain her argument, 

we will consider it on the merits to the extent possible.
J-S56032-15

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prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is minimal. If the 

plaintiff cannot meet this minimal burden, the employer is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

If the plaintiff does establish a prima facie case, a 

presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden of 

production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment 

decision. . . . If the employer articulates a legitimate business 

explanation, then the presumption of discriminatory intent 

created by the employee’s prima facie case is rebutted and the 

presumption simply drops out of the picture.

If the employer satisfies its burden of production, the third 

and final part of the McDonnell Douglas framework gives the 

plaintiff the opportunity to show that the legitimate reasons 

proffered by the employer were pretexts for what, in reality, was 

a discriminatory motivation. In the pretext discrimination case, 

the employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually 

motivated its behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting 

paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional 

discrimination always rests with the plaintiff.

Kroptavich v. Penn. Power and Light Co., 795 A.2d 1048, 1055 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (citations omitted; some quotation marks omitted).3

Here, Appellant seeks to hold Appellee liable for terminating her 

because its stated reasons for doing so were inconsistent, and resulted from 

the alleged discriminatory actions of her advisor, its employee, Professor 

Hogan. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 15). Specifically, she states that “[she] 

has offered evidence supporting the fact that the demise of her PhD 

____________________________________________

3 As stated previously, a panel of this Court found that Appellant stated a 

prima facie case. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 2). The only prong at issue in this 

appeal is the third prong, i.e., whether the trial court properly found that 

Appellant failed to establish pretext. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 12).
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aspirations was a fait accompli once Prof. Hogan’s animus infected the 

process. (There are, thus, issues of fact as to ‘cat’s paw’ liability sufficient to 

avoid summary judgment[.] . . .).” (Id. at 16). Appellant’s claim does not 

merit relief.

In Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011), the United States 

Supreme Court held that, under the cat’s paw theory, “[i]f a supervisor 

performs an act motivated by [discriminatory] animus that is intended by 

the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a 

proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is 

liable . . . .” Staub, supra at 422 (footnote and emphasis omitted).

However, as aptly discussed by the trial court in this case, Appellant 

failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Professor 

Hogan acted with discriminatory intent when he resigned, much less about if 

he intended her termination. Specifically, the trial court observed:

[Appellant] did not raise a material issue by casting 

substantial doubt on Professor Hogan’s proffered reasons for 

resigning or by coming forward with sufficient evidence from 

which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that an illegitimate 

factor more likely than not was a motivating or determinative 

cause of his decision to do so. [Appellant] argues that Professor 

Hogan relied on “ingrained sex stereotypes, particularly the ones 

that anger and assertiveness are unacceptable in women” when 

he decided to resign as her advisor after receiving her email on 

June 5, 2006. In support of her argument, [Appellant] 

presented emails wherein Professor Hogan and Dr. Dillard 

referred to the June 5, 2006 email as “combative” and 

“aggressive.” Additionally, discovery revealed emails wherein 

Professor Hogan writes critically of [Appellant]. For example, on 

October 5, 2005, Professor Hogan sent an email to Dr. Dillard 

wherein he said that “the decision NOT to take a forceful stand 
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and terminate [Appellant] back in November of 2005 is coming 

back to haunt us.” Similarly, on April 13, 2004, Professor Hogan 

stated in another email to administration that “if [Appellant’s] 

past behavior is any indication, she’ll try to blame us [for her 

situation].” Despite the fact that it is clear Professor Hogan did 

not have a great deal of respect for [Appellant] leading up to his 

resignation, the [c]ourt cannot find any evidence in the record 

that his feelings toward [Appellant] were a result of gender 

discrimination. The evidence shows that Professor Hogan 

eventually resigned due to his long history with [Appellant], 

including her failure to adhere to his expectations of graduate 

students. For example, [Appellant’s] draft dissertation arrived to 

Professor Hogan on October 5, 2005─three days before her 

deadline─though she had sent him the same draft by email two 

weeks earlier. Professor Hogan does not accept dissertations by 

email and thus did not consider the emailed draft a submission. 

He therefore did not have sufficient time to review her draft, 

suggest edits to her, and allow her to revise it before the rest of 

her committee reviewed it by the deadline.

[Appellant] also presented comparator evidence. Professor 

Hogan told another female student, Corinne Weisberger, that he 

treated seeking one’s request to view comprehensive exam 

scores as an “adversarial action.” In an email in June 2002, 

Professor Hogan also told Corinne Weisberger that he was 

“becoming increasingly concerned. about [her] apparent 

obsession with these perceived past injustices” in reference to 

the student’s desire to see her scores on her comprehensive 

exams. While the correspondence between Professor Hogan and 

Corinne Weisberger was tense─like much of [Appellant’s] 

correspondence with Professor Hogan─the [c]ourt finds no 

evidence of pretext in it. [Appellant] additionally presented 

evidence regarding a male student, George Elder, who spoke out 

publically against the [d]epartment but was not terminated. 

Notably, Mr. Elder had a different advisor and committee 

members, with the exception of Professor Johnstone. Upon 

consideration of all of [Appellant’s] evidence, the [c]ourt finds 

that Professor Hogan’s proffered reasons for his resignation─the 

eventual demise of their working relationship─to be credible. 

[Appellant] argues that she was continually penalized with a 

difficult dissertation, a hostile adviser, and persistent poor 

health. These arguments cut against her theory that Professor 

Hogan resigned because she failed to adhere to sex stereotypes, 

but instead bolster Professor Hogan’s stated reasons for 
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resigning. [Appellant] failed to “cast substantial doubt” on 

Professor Hogan’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 

resigning from her committee. In other words, the [c]ourt finds 

that Professor Hogan’s stated reasons for resigning were not a 

pretext for gender discrimination. . . .

(Trial Ct. Op., at 10-11) (citation omitted). 

After our independent review of the record, we agree with the trial 

court that Appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact regarding whether Professor Hogan’s stated reasons 

for resigning were merely a pretext for gender discrimination. See Krauss, 

supra at 562-63; Kroptavich, supra at 1055.

Appellant’s amended complaint alleges, in pertinent part, that, “Prof. 

Hogan, in making his decision to resign, and in citing a ‘lack of collegiality,’ 

illegally relied on deeply ingrained sex stereotypes, particularly the ones that 

anger and assertiveness are unacceptable in women,” and that “[his] 

interest in collegiality was . . . a pretext to cover his discriminatory animus 

toward [Appellant].” (Amended Complaint, 2/21/12, at 5 ¶ 33, 16 ¶ 76). 

However, none of the numerous exhibits in the certified record support her 

allegation. 

For example, at her deposition, when repeatedly asked if she had any 

evidence that Professor Hogan “relied on the deeply ingrained stereotypes” 

alleged in her complaint, Appellant consistently replied in the negative. 

(N.T. Appellant’s Deposition, 3/28/14, at 125, 127; see id. at 126). She 

also admitted that she did not have any evidence that Professor Hogan 
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treated the female students whom he advised differently than the males. 

(See id. at 128-29). Further, in spite of her allegation that Professor Hogan 

used “lack of collegiality” as a pretext, she admitted that the June 5, 2006 

email she sent to him was angry and confrontational. (Amended Complaint, 

2/21/12, at 5 ¶ 33; see id. at 16 ¶ 76; N.T. Appellant’s Deposition, at 128). 

Finally, although Appellant asserts that her entire doctoral committee 

resigned at the urging of Professor Hogan, she admitted at her deposition 

that she does not have any evidence of that. (See N.T. Appellant’s 

Deposition, at 133-37).

Indeed, a review of the email communications between Appellant and 

Professor Hogan reveal a history of an antagonistic relationship between the 

two that certainly could be characterized as lacking collegiality, but do not 

even suggest discrimination. (See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Appendix F, 

Email Exchange Between Appellant and Professor Hogan, 5/30/06-6/05/06); 

id. at Appendix S, Email Exchange Between Appellant and Professor Hogan, 

2/26/04-2/27/04; Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix 7, 

Documents Provided in Discovery, Exhibit G1, Email Exchange Between 

Appellant and Professor Hogan, 2/07/02-2/11/02; id. at Exhibit G3, Email 

Exchange Between Appellant and Professor Hogan, 8/23/02-8/24/02; id. at 

Exhibit H1, at unnumbered pages 3-6, Email Exchange Between Appellant 

and Professor Hogan, 9/23/04-9/24/04; id. at Exhibit I6, Email Exchange 

Between Appellant and Professor Hogan, 11/28/05-12/05/05). 
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Also, we also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

characterization of the comparator evidence. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 11; see 

also Amended Complaint, Appendix I, Letter from Dr. George H. Elder to 

Trial Court, 12/29/11; id. at Appendix J, Samples of Elder’s Editorials and 

Controversies at Penn State; id. at Appendix P, Email from Corinne 

Weisgerber to Appellant, 8/24/07, at 1). The email sent from Corinne 

Weisgerber to Appellant claimed that she and Professor Hogan had a 

contentious relationship, but did not contain any allegation of gender 

discrimination. (See id. at Appendix P, Email from Corinne Weisgerber to 

Appellant, 8/24/07, at 1). Dr. Elder is a male who had a different advisor 

than Appellant and spoke against the school. (See id. at Appendix I, Letter 

from Dr. George H. Elder to Trial Court, 12/29/11; id. at Appendix J, 

Samples of Elder’s Editorials and Controversies at Penn State). 

In short, Appellee discontinued Appellant’s doctoral program for her 

failure to meet its requirements. Appellant did not provide one piece of 

evidence that would link her termination to her speculation that Professor 

Hogan resigned, persuaded other committee members to resign, and 

rendered her somehow unable to meet the requirements of the doctoral 

program on the basis of gender bias. Therefore, the trial court properly 

found that Appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that there is a 

genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Professor Hogan’s stated 
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reason for resigning as her advisor was pretext for discrimination.4 See 

Kroptavich, supra at 1055. 

Hence, after our own independent review, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law when it granted 

Appellee’s motion for summary judgment where it is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. See Krauss, supra at 562-63. Appellant’s issue lacks 

merit.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/9/2015

____________________________________________

4 Although Appellant baldly accuses many members of Appellee’s faculty of 

not acting in her best interest and conspiring against her, she does not 

allege that their actions were premised on their own gender discrimination. 

(See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-40).