1

This defendant, sued under the fictitious name of “Jane

Doe,” has not been properly served. Though Hall purported to

serve her by publication, the court ruled that method of service

defective by way of a prior order, then denied Hall’s motion to

reconsider. Because Doe has not been timely served, the court

dismisses any claims against her. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Daniel E. Hall

v. Civil No. 08-cv-101-JL

Opinion No. 2009 DNH 015

Kent A. Brooks et al.

O R D E R

Daniel Hall, proceeding pro se, has sued a number of parties

for their participation in selling a parcel of commercial

property in which he held an option to purchase, to wit:

• his own attorney, and the attorney’s law firm;

• his own real estate broker, and the broker’s agency;

• the title company that handled the closing;

• an employee of that agency who, Hall alleges, acted as the

buyer’s “inside man” during the transaction, and a company 

controlled by that employee;

• the buyer and a number of companies he controls;

• a person who, Hall alleges, was falsely portrayed as the 

buyer’s broker;

• a person who financed the buyer’s acquisition of the 

parcel;

• a New Hampshire state judge;1

 and

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 1 of 25
2After some of the motions to dismiss had been filed, Hall

successfully moved to amend his original complaint, but only to

correct certain typographical errors. The court has therefore

treated all of the motions to dismiss as directed at the

allegations of the amended complaint, which differ from those of

the original complaint only in the correction of the typos. 

3Both this corporation and its principal, Thomas J. Fini,

have been named as defendants. For simplicity’s sake, they are

referred to collectively as “Fini.”

2

• the chairman of the New Hampshire Real Estate Commission.

Together with various state-law claims, Hall has alleged

violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (“RICO”).

The defendants have filed motions to dismiss this action on

a number of grounds. For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’

motions to dismiss are granted.

I. Background

While Hall’s amended complaint is prolix, its relevant

allegations are simple.2 Hall and his then-business partner,

Lewis Fortin, held a lease on the parcel, located on Second

Street in Manchester, New Hampshire, where their automobile

repair business was located. The lease gave Hall and Fortin the

option to purchase the property.

To locate a buyer for this interest, Hall and Fortin engaged

a real estate broker, defendant Fini Real Estate Group, Inc.3, in

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 2 of 25
4

Both Cleary and Wadleigh, Starr and Peters are named as

defendants. For simplicity’s sake, they are referred to

collectively as “Cleary.” 

5Both Horgos and his company, Horgos Enterprises, have been

named as defendants. For simplicity’s sake, they are referred to

collectively as “Horgos.”

3

January 2001. They were introduced to Fini through defendant

Charles Cleary, an attorney at the New Hampshire law firm of

Wadleigh, Starr and Peters, PLLC, who had represented them in

other matters.4 Hall and Fortin signed an exclusive listing

agreement, obligating them to pay Fini a five percent commission

upon sale of the parcel to a purchaser introduced to it during

the term of the agreement and, in turn, obligating Fini “to pay

any other brokers involved in the transaction.”

Fini hired defendant James Horgos as a real estate

salesperson in December 2001.5 Hall alleges that this marked the

beginning of a “scheme” by defendant Kent Brooks, who owns used

car retailing and wholesale businesses that have also been named

as defendants here, “to purchase inventory of used vehicles and

the property” (capitalization corrected). Brooks did ultimately

buy the property, including Hall’s and Fortin’s interest, in a

transaction that closed on October 15, 2002.

According to Hall, Brooks promised Horgos future employment

at Brooks’s businesses, and related benefits, in exchange for his

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 3 of 25
6Brooks has sued Vineyard Investment Group; a related

entity, Vineyard Financial Services, LLC; and their principals,

Carol DeCola and Richard Bielagus. For simplicity’s sake, these

defendants are referred to simply as “Vineyard.”

4

agreement to “infiltrate” Fini, i.e., ensure that it served

Brooks’s interests, rather than Hall’s and Fortin’s, in the

eventual sale of the property. Hall alleges that Brooks

similarly “infiltrated” defendant Vineyard Investment Group, LLC,

the title company that eventually handled the closing, by

promising its principals “benefits of the profits of closing the

loan [and] future mortgage loans on the property.”6

 Hall further

alleges that, around this time, Brooks also convinced defendant

William Fenton, who also sells cars for a living, to lend Brooks

money to buy the property in an arrangement for what Hall calls

“a silent second mortage.” Thus, Hall claims, Brooks, Vineyard,

and Fenton were all joined in a “conspiracy” against him to

accomplish Brooks’s acquisition of the property.

Hall alleges that, in furtherance of this scheme, Horgos

worked as Brooks’s “inside man,” funneling him information on

Hall’s and Fortin’s position, including the terms of their

agreement with their broker, Fini. This tactic, Hall says, was

used to “drive down the price of the property,” though he alleges

no facts to support this theory, i.e., that the price was

actually lowered as a result of negotiations.

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 4 of 25
5

Hall also claims that, to conceal Horgos’s role--and to

accomplish another integral part of the scheme discussed more

fully infra--Brooks had to convince the sellers that “he was

represented by a legitimate broker.” To accomplish this, Brooks

allegedly forged a letter of intent to Horgos, bearing the

letterhead of “Five Star Realty” and the signature of defendant

Richard DeCola in his capacity as “Broker, Five Star Realty.” 

The letter stated that DeCola, who was the broker for Brooks, saw

the fair market value of the property as between $550,000 and

$600,000 and that “Brooks is prepared to enter into a Purchase

and Sales Agreement immediately if you are agreeable to a price

within that range,” subject to certain specified conditions. 

Within thirty days of the letter of intent, Hall and Fortin

entered into a purchase and sales agreement (“P&S”), prepared on

Brooks’s behalf, to sell their interest in the property to him

for $650,000. The P&S recited the parties’ understanding that

“Five Star Realty Agency represents buyer, Kent A. Brooks in this

transaction” (capitalization corrected). Fini subsequently

issued a “broker invoice” for a “net commission” of $12,500,

i.e., five percent of the $650,000 sale price, less $20,000 that

Brooks had placed in escrow with it. According to the amended

complaint, the invoice stated that Fini “would be responsible to

pay the 50% co-broke [sic] fee to 5-Star Realty.” 

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 5 of 25
6

Less than two weeks before the closing, Brooks, on behalf of

an entity he had created to take title to the property, defendant

1953 Realty Group, LLC, gave a mortgage in the property to

Fenton. This mortgage was fraudulent, Hall charges, because it

was unknown not only to him and Fortin, but to Centrix Bank and

Trust, which was unaware of it when loaning Brooks $520,000

toward his purchase of the property. In fact, Hall alleges,

Brooks falsely stated in executing the mortgage with Centrix that

he held lien-free title to the property. The mortgage with

Fenton, though, did expressly state that it was subordinate to

the mortgage with Centrix.

Hall also alleges that on the day of the closing Brooks,

Horgos, Vineyard, Fini, and Cleary--who had been providing legal

representation to Hall and Fortin in the transaction--“knowingly

failed to disclose, omitted and concealed” from Hall, Fortin, and

others that DeCola “would be gifting a commission (to which he

had no right to [sic]) to Brooks” (capitalization corrected). 

Prior to the closing, however, Brooks received a copy of the

Department of Housing and Urban Development settlement statement,

reciting a contract sales price of $633,750--that is, the

original $650,000 set forth in the P&S less DeCola’s $16,250

commission, which was itself half of the $32,500 due Fini and

paid to it by Hall and Fortin at the closing per the listing

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 6 of 25
7

Hall also alleges that Vineyard subsequently gave Brooks

another loan, secured by a mortgage on property he and his wife

owned in Bedford, New Hampshire, and that this transaction was

fraudulent in various respects--though not as to him, because he

was not a party to any aspect of it.

7

agreement. Hall also alleges that, with Cleary’s assistance, he

discussed the settlement statement with Brooks and Vineyard to

ensure its “bottom line numbers matched Hall’s calculated bottom

line numbers” (capitalization corrected). Apparently they did,

because the closing proceeded, with Hall receiving $209,642.

Several months later, around February 2003, Brooks gave a

mortgage in the property to Vineyard, and began employing Horgos

at one of his businesses, defendant Millennium Auto Sales, Inc. 

These actions, Hall alleges, were consideration for Vineyard’s

and Horgos’s role in Brooks’s scheme to acquire the property.7

Then, on March 19, 2004, Hall filed a complaint against Fini

with the Real Estate Commission, charging that he had violated

the New Hampshire Real Estate Practice Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

(“RSA”) § 331-A, by acting for both sides in the transaction,

directing payment of a commission to DeCola, making various

misrepresentations and non-disclosures, misplacing the deposit

money, and otherwise breaching its fiduciary duty to Hall. Hall

alleges that, in response, Brooks coerced Fortin into withholding

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 7 of 25
8

testimony from the Commission by threatening to stop purchasing

automobile parts and servicing from him.

The Commission rejected Hall’s complaint, notifying him that

“[f]rom the information furnished . . . it does not appear that a

case of unlawful, dishonest, fraudulent conduct or any prohibited

act contained in RSA 331-A . . . on the part of [Fini] has been

established.” The Commission also denied Hall’s later request

that it reconsider this decision. Hall charges that Fini--joined

by Brooks, Horgos, Vineyard, Fenton, and DeCola--achieved these

results by (1) bribing the chairman of the Real Estate

Commission, defendant Arthur Slattery, (2) causing Horgos and

Fini to withhold information from the Commission, (3) suborning

perjury from Horgos, and (4) otherwise providing false

information. Hall appealed the Commission’s decision to the New

Hampshire Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case, see

Appeal of Hall, No. 2005-0024 (N.H. Apr. 27, 2005) (citing N.H.

Supr. Ct. R. 10(1)), then declined to reconsider that decision. 

Hall subsequently commenced this action on March 18, 2008.

II. Applicable legal standard

In their motions to dismiss, the defendants argue, among

other things, that Hall has failed to state a claim under RICO. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim, a plaintiff must

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 8 of 25
9

set forth “[f]actual allegations [that are] enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption

that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if

doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1965 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted). This showing

“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Id. at 1964-65. That is so even though Hall’s pro se amended

complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (applying

Twombly standard to pro se complaint); see also, e.g., Giarratano

v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (same).

The bar is even higher in cases like this, “where fraud lies

at the core of the action.” Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443

(1st Cir. 1985). That triggers the elevated pleading standard,

under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that

“the circumstances constituting fraud . . . be stated with

particularity,” i.e., that the plaintiff “specify the time,

place, and content of the alleged false or fraudulent

representations.” United States ex rel. Karvelas v. MelroseWakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 232 (1st Cir. 2004). This

heightened standard applies to claims of RICO violations

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 9 of 25
10

predicated on alleged acts of mail and wire fraud, like Hall’s. 

See, e.g., Cordero-Hernandez v. Hernandez-Ballesteros, 449 F.3d

240, 244 (1st Cir. 2006); Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp.,

942 F.2d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 1991); New Eng. Data Servs., Inc. v.

Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir. 1987).

Defendants Slattery and Fini also move to dismiss the claims

against them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

This places the burden on Hall to show that subject-matter

jurisdiction in fact exists but, in satisfying this burden, he

receives the benefit of treating all of the well-pleaded facts in

the amended complaint as true. See Federacion de Maestros de

P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 20

(1st Cir. 2005). 

III. Analysis

As an initial matter, Slattery and Fini are incorrect that

Hall’s claims against them are barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine as a result of the ultimate outcome of his complaint to

the Real Estate Commission. The doctrine, as refined by the

Supreme Court in ExxonMobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), applies only to “cases brought by

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 10 of 25
8

The court of appeals has held that the New Hampshire

Supreme Court’s refusal to hear an appeal creates a “state-court

judgment” for purposes of applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

because it results in a decision reviewable by certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court. Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d

33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1999). And the view of “state-court

judgment” in this context has only become broader in light of

Exxon Mobil. Federacion de Maestros, 410 F.3d at 27-28. The

state supreme court’s refusal to hear Hall’s appeal from the Real

Estate Commission’s dismissal of his complaint, then, amounts to

a “state-court judgment” under Rooker-Feldman. 

11

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of

those judgments.” Id. at 284 (emphasis added). The doctrine

thus protects the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, by way

of certiorari, over appeals from state courts. Id. at 291. 

Though it is hard to identify what Hall’s claimed injury

from the Real Estate Commission proceedings is, it is easier to

identify what it is not: an injury “caused by” the outcome of

those proceedings in the sense that the outcome itself violated

Hall’s rights.8 See McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 392

(6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 41 (2007). “Instead,

[Hall] asserts independent claims that those [decisions] were

procured by certain [d]efendants through fraud,

misrepresentation, or other improper means.” Id. As the Sixth

Circuit reasoned in McCormick, those kinds of claims do not

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 11 of 25
12

implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they do not require

this court to conduct de facto appellate review of the

Commission’s decisions, but to assess the legality of the

defendants’ actions. Id. at 393-95; see also Bolden v. City of

Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1145 (10th Cir. 2006); Davani v. Va. Dep’t

of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir. 2006); Hoblock v. Albany

County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005).

It is true that, as Slattery and Fini argue, this court

could not rule in Hall’s favor on his claims against them without

“revisit[ing] Hall’s allegations that were rejected at the

[Commission] . . . and determin[ing] that the [Commission] should

not have ruled” as it did. These concerns are no longer

sufficient to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. They were

sufficient under some pre-Exxon Mobil authority, see, e.g.,

Rosenfeld v. Egy, 346 F.3d 11, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2003), but the

Supreme Court has since explained that Rooker-Feldman does not

apply “[i]f a federal plaintiff presents some independent claim,

albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has

reached in a case to which he was a party.” Exxon Mobil, 544

U.S. at 293 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). It is the

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, not RookerFeldman, that prevent a federal court from revisiting claims

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 12 of 25
9

For the same reason, the court need not reach Slattery’s

judicial immunity argument.

13

adjudicated by a state court. See id.; Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.

459, 466 (2006).

While the Real Estate Commission’s dismissal of Hall’s

complaint against Fini would appear to preclude Hall’s claims

against Fini here, see, e.g., Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774,

777-78 (2003), Fini has not made any res judicata argument. 

Though the court could nevertheless take up the defense sua

sponte, see Banco Santander de P.R. v. Lopez-Stubbe (In re

Colonial Mtg. Bankers Corp.), 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003),

there is no reason to do so, because Fini and the other

defendants are correct that Hall has failed to state a RICO claim

against them.9

Even “[t]o have standing in a civil RICO claim, [Hall] must

show ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the

injurious conduct alleged’”--namely, “that the defendant[s’]

specified acts of racketeering were the proximate cause of [his]

injuries.” George Lussier Enters., Inc. v. Subaru of New Eng.,

Inc., 393 F.3d 36, 51 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Holmes v. Sec.

Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)); see also 18

U.S.C. § 1964(c). Hall’s amended complaint, even when liberally

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 13 of 25
14

construed, fails to allege any injury at all, let alone one

proximately caused by the alleged predicate acts of racketeering.

Hall claims to have been harmed by (1) losing profits on the

sale of the property “through slanted or rigged negotiations,”

and (2) not receiving the “honest services” of Fini, Vineyard,

Cleary, and the Real Estate Commission. These claims proceed

from Hall’s charge that Brooks bribed (or, in certain cases,

duped) some of the other defendants, like Horgos, Fini, Vineyard,

and Slattery, to ensure that the deal for the property resolved

in favor of Brooks at the expense of Hall and Fortin, and, after

that had been accomplished, to keep the defendants’ wrongdoing

hidden from scrutiny. Putting aside whether Hall has alleged

facts sufficient to support such a serious charge, he has failed

to allege facts sufficient to show that these acts, even if they

occurred, injured him.

The only facts set forth in the amended complaint that could

even theoretically support Hall’s claim that the negotiations

were “slanted” or “rigged” against him are his account of

Horgos’s role, i.e., that he used his position in Fini’s agency

to provide Brooks with “inside information” on Hall’s and

Fortin’s negotiating position. There are at least two problems

with Hall’s “inside man,” theory, however.

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 14 of 25
15

First, Hall has not alleged any of the particulars of

Horgos’s communications with Brooks on this subject, e.g., their

time, place, or content. Hall is bound to do so, as discussed

supra, because those communications, which he repeatedly

describes as integral to the claimed “scheme to defraud,” are

part of “the circumstances constituting fraud” in this case. See

Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1223 (1st Cir. 1996). 

By failing to allege Horgos’s transmissions of inside information

to Brooks with particularity, Hall has violated both the letter

and spirit of Rule 9(b), which exists in part “to protect

defendants whose reputation may be harmed by meritless claims of

fraud.” Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 226 (quotation marks omitted); see

also Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th

Cir. 1999) (observing that Rule 9(b) “assure[s] that the charge

of fraud is responsible and supported, rather than defamatory and

extortionate”). 

Second, even if Hall had adequately alleged that Horgos was

feeding Brooks inside information, the amended complaint sets

forth no facts suggesting that these actions caused Hall any

harm. Brooks purchased the property for $650,000, some $50,000

more than his broker, DeCola--who, despite Hall’s curious belief

to the contrary, undoubtedly was Brooks’s broker, as discussed

infra--had indicated the property was worth. Hall alleges

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 15 of 25
16

nothing to suggest that the property could have fetched more,

such as the course of the parties’ negotiations or other offers

he and Fortin received for the property either before or after

they accepted Brooks’s. Furthermore, Hall’s “inside man” theory

relies heavily on Horgos’s allegedly disclosing the terms of

Hall’s and Fortin’s agreement with Fini, but Hall does not

coherently explain how knowing those terms--which are simply the

standard provisions of any exclusive listing agreement--would

have given Brooks any advantage in the negotiations. Hall’s

allegations of harm from Horgos’s actions, then, are not “enough

to raise [his] right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65; see also Miranda v. Ponce

Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a RICO

claim is not stated “simply by asserting an inequity attributable

to a defendant’s conduct”).

And Hall’s “inside man” theory is his only claim of injury

that makes even the slightest bit of sense. Hall’s primary

theory--what he describes as “the ‘HOOK’ of the fraud” against

him--relies on the references to DeCola’s brokerage as “Five Star

Realty” in the letter of intent, the P&S, and other materials

circulated in connection with the transaction, when the name of

DeCola’s business is actually “5 Star Realty,” i.e., with the

number expressed as a numeral rather than a word. This “fraud,”

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 16 of 25
10Hall calls the letter of intent “the FORGERY,” alleging

that it was not created by DeCola, but by Brooks and Horgos. But

even if Brooks and Horgos did “forge” the letter without DeCola’s

permission, that does not change the fact that DeCola, though “5

Star Realty,” was acting as Brooks’s broker in the transaction.

17

Hall explains, allowed Brooks to “portray that he was represented

by an actual broker in the transaction,” when in fact, through

Horgos, Brooks had Fini doing his bidding.

Needless to say, DeCola was “an actual broker” for Brooks

who was identified as such, by that name, in the letter of

intent--even if that document also happened to spell the name of

his business with a “Five” rather than a “5.”10 So it is pure

fantasy to say that Brooks “pretended” that DeCola was

representing him in the deal, because he was, but, in any event,

Hall has not sufficiently alleged any harm from what he believes

was Horgos’s secret representation of Brooks, as just discussed. 

Nor does Hall explain how DeCola’s allegedly masquerading as

Brooks’s broker somehow concealed Horgos’s allegedly working for

Brooks, as Hall charges; it strains logic to assume that, if

Brooks had not identified any broker who was working for him,

Hall would have realized that Horgos must have been. Indeed,

parties to real estate deals regularly proceed without brokers,

such that doing so would be highly unlikely to arouse suspicion.

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 17 of 25
18

Hall also claims that identifying DeCola’s business as “Five

Star” rather than “5 Star” in the deal documents somehow

disentitled him to a commission, making everyone who worked on

the deal a participant in a fraud. Even allowing for Hall’s lack

of legal training and experience, that claim is absurd. First,

what matters in contracts is not whether the names of the parties

are properly spelled, but whether they accurately reflect the

parties’ understanding. See, e.g., 27 Richard A. Lord, Williston

on Contracts § 70:93 (4th ed. 1993). The parties understood,

from both the letter of intent and the P&S, that an agency called

“Five Star Realty” was representing Brooks in the transaction,

regardless of how that name was spelled. Indeed, even if the

spelling of the name were somehow relevant, Hall alleges that, in

the fall of 2002, Fini issued an invoice noting its obligation

“to pay the 50% co-broke [sic] fee to 5-Star Realty” (emphasis

added), so Brooks’s broker had been identified by its properly

spelled name before the deal closed anyway.

Second, assuming that the proper spelling of the name did

have some effect on DeCola’s right to the commission, there was

still no harm to Hall, because, under his and Fortin’s agreement

with Fini, that commission was paid out of Fini’s commission. As

discussed supra, Hall has not sufficiently alleged any theory

disentitling Fini to its commission: the property was sold to a

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 18 of 25
11Hall also appears to be barred from asserting any such

theory here as a result of the res judicata or collateral

estoppel effect of the Real Estate Commission proceedings, as

mentioned supra.

12This includes Hall’s suggestion that DeCola was ineligible

for the commission because he allowed his broker’s license to

lapse “in the period between March, 2002 until October 2002.”

19

buyer, Brooks, who had been introduced to it during the term of

Fini’s listing agreement.11

Just as that agreement obligated Hall and Fortin to pay the

commission to Fini, it likewise obligated Fini to pay half of it

over to DeCola as another “broker[] involved in the transaction,”

which is precisely what happened. It is simply not the case, as

Hall appears to believe, that Fini would have been required to

“refund” half of the commission to Hall and Fortin if DeCola were

not eligible for it because he was not really Brooks’s broker,

the name of his agency was spelled wrong, or for any other

reason;12 Fini simply would have kept all of the commission for

itself, as the listing agreement provides. Hall did not suffer

any injury from DeCola’s receipt of a commission on the sale (or,

for that matter, from statements that funds were placed on escrow

with or paid to “Five Star Realty” and the like).

Nor did Hall suffer any injury from DeCola’s gifting the

commission to Brooks. Again, Hall and Fortin were obligated to

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 19 of 25
13Hall describes, as “[t]he crux of [his] complaint,” the

the defendants’ actions “foreclosed any further negotiations for

the $16,250.” As just discussed, it was the listing agreement

Hall and Fortin signed--rather than anything any of the

defendants did--that required them to pay the commission to Fini,

and Fini to pay half of it to DeCola. And if DeCola were not

entitled to half of it, Fini would have been entitled to all of

it. Hall does not explain, and certainly does not allege any

facts tending to suggest, why Fini would nevertheless have agreed

to refund some of its commission to Hall and Fortin. This

speculative theory does not state a claim for relief. See Bell

Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65; Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318

F.3d 113, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2003) (ruling that plaintiff failed to

allege causation for RICO claim based on “inherently speculative”

assumptions about how third parties would have acted but for the

alleged racketeering activity).

20

pay a commission to Fini, who in turn was obligated to pay half

of that commission to DeCola, and that is what happened. What

DeCola did with his share of the commission afterwards made not

the slightest bit of difference to Hall. In fact, what DeCola

did do with the money--giving it to Brooks to reduce his down

payment--appears to have helped the deal to close when it

otherwise might not have, based on representations that Hall

makes in his objections to the motions to dismiss. This worked

to Hall’s benefit, at least in the absence of allegations, as

noted supra, that a deal more favorable to him and Fortin was in

the offing.13

That is the fundamental problem with Hall’s lawsuit: it

accuses a number of parties of racketeering, fraud, conspiracy,

and other malfeasance for their assistance in helping him

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 20 of 25
21

complete a deal that he agreed to make and that, by all

indications, was the most favorable one available to him. So

Hall’s claim that he was deprived of the “honest services” of

Fini, Vineyard, and Cleary, even if true, does not assert any

injury. Assuming, dubitante, that those parties were secretly

working for Brooks, he was trying to achieve the same objective

Hall and Fortin were, namely, his purchase of the property from

them. Especially puzzling is Hall’s reliance on alleged conduct,

e.g., Brooks’s enlisting the help of his relative “Jane Doe” to

evict a subtenant from the property, or receiving a “secret

second mortgage” loan from Fenton, that, while perhaps less than

honest, had no effect whatsoever on Hall--other than the

beneficial one of helping the deal he had struck to close. Cf.

Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 191 (1st Cir. 1996) 

(observing that plaintiffs could not show causation for RICO

claim arising from defendant’s refusal to do business after they

stopped paying bribes because “if there had been no bribes,

[there is] no reason to think that plaintiffs would have gotten

any [of defendant’s] business at all.”)

Indeed, aside from the insufficient allegations of Horgos’s

role, Hall has set forth no facts suggesting that any of the

defendants had any influence on his decision to agree to sell his

and Fortin’s interest in the property to Brooks for $650,000.

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 21 of 25
14Hall suggests that these acts “concealed” earlier

fraudulent conduct but, assuming there were any, Hall could not

have been harmed by the defendants’ concealing conduct that did

not harm him any more than he was harmed by the conduct itself. 

The most significant example is the defendants’ alleged

malfeasance in the proceedings before the Real Estate Commission

on Hall’s complaint against Fini: since Hall has not adequately

alleged that Fini’s actions harmed him, he likewise could not

have been harmed by the Commission’s decision that Fini’s actions

were not illegal. 

22

That omission is significant because the vast majority of the

acts alleged in the amended complaint occurred after Hall and

Fortin had signed the P&S agreeing to do just that. See Efron v.

Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2000)

(observing that plaintiff who invested in a “partnership before

any of the alleged predicate acts occurred, and thus without

reliance on any misrepresentations” could not state a RICO claim

arising out of the loss of his investment for lack of causation). 

Given that the deal closed on those essential terms, there is no

way any of this post-agreement conduct could have harmed Hall--it

only helped him to sell his interest in the property for more

than $200,000, as he agreed to do.14 Hall has therefore failed

to state a RICO claim against the defendants. See, e.g., Sanchez

v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 806 (2007); George Lussier Enters., 393 F.3d at 51-52;

Camelio v. Am. Fed’n, 137 F.3d 666, 670-71 (1st Cir. 1998).

Case 1:08-cv-00101-JL Document 130 Filed 02/11/09 Page 22 of 25
23

These RICO claims provide the only basis for subject-matter

jurisdiction in this court. There is no diversity jurisdiction,

because this is not a suit between “citizens of different

states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Hall is a citizen of New

Hampshire, as are all but one of the defendants. Contrary to

Hall’s fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrine, then, the

fact that one of the defendants is not a New Hampshire citizens

cannot support diversity jurisdiction: the plaintiff cannot be a

citizen of the same state as any defendant. See Strawbridge v.

Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). This court therefore has only

supplemental jurisdiction over Hall’s state-law claims, which it

declines to exercise. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

In ruling on the motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, this court has, as it must, accepted all of the factual

allegations in Hall’s amended complaint as true. In so doing,

the court in no way suggests that any of these very serious

allegations--including racketeering, secret deals, kickbacks,

perjury, and bribery of a state official--have any basis in fact. 

Indeed, what Hall appears to have done is to use unrelated and

innocuous dealings among various defendants (e.g., Horgos’s going

to work for Brooks several months after the deal, Vineyard’s

making a mortgage loan to Brooks on an different parcel,

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24

Slattery’s holding reciprocal easements with Vineyard’s owners on

different parcels) as the jumping-off point for a far-ranging and

inherently implausible conspiracy theory in which everyone else

who participated in the deal were secretly aligned against him. 

The basic rules of this court do not allow lawsuits premised on

such fanciful speculation, even by parties appearing without

counsel, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), and provide for serious

sanctions when they are violated, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). 

Hall should consider himself warned.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motions to

dismiss (documents no. 30, 35, 44, 63, 68, 87) are granted on the

basis that Hall has failed to allege the necessary injury to

support his RICO claims. The court does not reach any of the

other arguments presented by the motions. Slattery’s motion to

dismiss (document no. 24) is denied, but he is nevertheless

dismissed from the case as a result of Hall’s failure to state a

RICO claim. Defendant Jane Doe is dismissed from the case as not

timely served. The court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Hall’s state-law claims. The clerk shall enter

judgment accordingly and close the case.

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25

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Joseph N. Laplante

United States District Judge

Dated: February 11, 2009

cc: Daniel E. Hall, pro se

Michael J. Connolly, Esq.

John-Claude Sakellarios, Esq.

Ralph Suozzo, Esq.

John F. Bielagus, Esq.

David I. Bailinson, Esq.

Nancy J. Smith, Esq.

John G. Cronin, Esq.

Christopher P. Mulligan, Esq.

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