alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Gassett, Appellant.

[812 NYS2d 3]

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Dominic R. Mas*494saro, J.), rendered June 4, 2004, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts) and endangering the welfare of a child, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s claims regarding his waiver of a jury trial are unpreserved *(see People v Johnson,*51 NY2d 986 [1980]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that defendant made a valid waiver *(see e.g. People v Leon,*290 AD2d 277 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 698 [2002]). Defendant executed his written jury waiver in open court after consultation with counsel, and after being fully advised by the court of the nature and consequences of his waiver. The court’s statement was balanced and neutral, and the record fails to support defendant’s claim that the court persuaded or induced him to waive a jury.

The record establishes that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; *see also Strickland v Washington,*466 US 668 [1984]). Defendant argues that his attorney should have introduced additional evidence concerning an incident that allegedly gave the victim a motive to falsely accuse defendant of sex crimes. Both during and after the trial, defendant challenged his counsel’s effectiveness in this regard, and the relevant facts were developed on the record, which supports the court’s detailed findings on this issue. Counsel explained his reason for not introducing the evidence in question, and we conclude that counsel could have reasonably declined to conduct a cumulative “trial within a trial” of the underlying facts of an incident about which there had already been testimony. In any event, were we to find that a reasonably competent attorney would have concluded otherwise, we would find that counsel’s failure to introduce the cumulative evidence at issue did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or cause him any prejudice *(see People v Caban,*5 NY3d 143, 155-156 [2005]; *People v Hobot,*84 NY2d 1021, 1024 [1995]; *compare People v Turner,*5 NY3d 476 [2005]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Sullivan, Catterson and Malone, JJ.
16

A.11. Characteristics of Bank Loans to Farmers -- All Banks, by Risk Rating, February 6-10, 2006Percent except as notedLoan characteristic All Minimal Low Moderate Acceptable Special Not ratVolume of loans (thousands of dollars) 1,424,592 105,152 240,300 639,335 243,853 82,325 38,39Number of loans 31,597 2,906 5,020 14,278 4,626 1,088 1,4Weighted average maturity (months)1 17.35 17.85 14.49 18.50 17.60 15.69 19.4

Weighted average repricing interval (months)2 6.47 8.78 6.89 6.74 3.88 5.84 10.7

Weighted average risk rating3 2.97 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 n

Weighted average interest rate4 7.98 7.68 8.11 7.89 8.02 8.47 8.2 Standard error5 .07 .19 .14 .19 .18 .21 .2

 Interquartile range6 75th percentile 8.68 8.34 8.66 8.60 8.57 8.68 8.9 25th percentile 7.41 6.75 7.64 7.35 7.41 7.79 7.5 Purpose of loan Feeder livestock 7.96 7.98 8.14 7.72 8.14 9.24 8.2 Other livestock 8.03 7.40 8.29 8.04 8.01 8.34 8.7 Other current operating expenses7 8.14 7.50 8.12 8.13 8.26 8.49 8.0

 Farm machinery and equipment 8.06 8.20 8.48 7.93 8.45 7.69 8.7 Farm real estate 7.68 7.28 7.31 8.13 6.86 n.a. 8. Other8 7.40 8.33 8.30 6.97 7.58 8.48 8.0

Share of total loan volume Features of loan Floating rates 68.05 24.36 56.52 75.52 87.34 62.89 33.4 Under commitment 72.85 49.50 61.17 78.40 86.75 62.90 74. Callable 25.04 29.39 20.84 27.61 13.08 35.93 30. Subject to prepayment penalty 3.06 8.70 .91 4.79 .24 .46 1. Purpose of loan Feeder livestock 7.59 21.03 9.17 6.41 4.78 .38 13. Other livestock 8.71 12.02 8.18 5.78 18.10 .55 13.9 Other current operating expenses7 57.45 46.88 69.30 57.28 47.02 84.09 58. Farm machinery and equipment 6.11 2.17 2.45 10.34 3.10 1.80 4.0 Farm real estate 4.09 7.52 6.04 4.27 2.12 n.a. 2.2 Other8 16.06 10.37 4.87 15.93 24.89 13.17 8.

 Type of collateral Farm real estate 9.88 17.73 10.25 10.72 7.67 4.49 2.5 Other 86.23 81.50 87.44 84.47 87.69 93.48 94.2 For explanation of footnotes, see table A.8. n.a. Not available.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-2749
DALLICE M. ALLEN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus COKER COLLEGE; ANGIE MCKENZIE; DEBRA ORANDER, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 97-1028
DALLICE M. ALLEN, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus COKER COLLEGE; ANGIE MCKENZIE; DEBRA ORANDER, Defendants - Appellants. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-96-1733-4-10BD)2 Submitted: July 24, 1997 Decided: September 24, 1997 Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Dallice M. Allen, Appellant Pro Se. John Wood Francisco, PARKER, POE, ADAMS & BERNSTEIN, Charlotte, North Carolina; Kevin AugustusDunlap, PARKER, POE, ADAMS & BERNSTEIN, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Dallice Allen appeals from the district court's order adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation and denying her motion for a default judgment. Coker College, Angie McKenzie, and Debra Orander cross-appeal from the portion of the district court's order that denies their motion to dismiss the action for insufficient service of process. We dismiss the appeal and the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.We deny as meritless Allen's motion for action against unethical conduct and dismiss the appeal and the cross-appeal as interlocutory. Further, we deny Allen's motions for a transcript and for a stay of discovery pending appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### BEERS v. PETERS et al.

No. 18629.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Nov. 3, 1947.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 1, 1947.

Writ of Certiorari Denied Peb. 16, 1948.

For former opinion, see 29 So.2d 611.

Peter J. Compagno and L. R. Graham, both of New Orleans, for plaintiff and appellant.

Harry R. Hill, of New Orleans, for defendants and appellees.

PER CURIAM.

In our original opinion we adjudicated this case on the faith of a certificate ordering a refund of. rental which had been issued on June 14, 1946, by the Rent Director of the Office of Price Administration. Defendant-appellee filed an application for a rehearing, pending which (on May 20, 1947) the Rent Director modified his order. Because of that fact we granted a rehearing, at which the new order of the Rent Director was presented to the Court. We believe that the ends of justice would be subserved by remanding this cause so that the modified order dated May 20, 1947, might be admitted into evidence and the case adjudged by the lower court on the basis thereof and in accordance therewith.

For the reasons assigned our original decree herein is recalled; the judgment appealed from is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views above expressed. Costs of this appeal are to be borne by defendant-appellee; costs of the lower court are to await final determination of the case. The right is reserved to the parties to apply for a rehearing herein.

Reversed and remanded.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of National Holdings Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2006 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Mark Goldwasser, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, aS adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



                                                 /s/ Mark Goldwasser
                                                 -------------------
                                                 Mark Goldwasser
                                                 Chief Executive Officer
                                                 May 10, 2006
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Gary Dewayne Johnson

v. Case No.: 08-cv-306-SM

Hillsborough County Superior Court, et al

O R D E R

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted,

but pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended, the filing fee must

be paid as follows: the sum of $7.09 is due no later than

September 15, 2008. In addition, 20% of each preceding month’s

income credited to plaintiff’s account to be remitted by the

Northern NH Correctional Facility when the amount in the account

exceeds $10.00 until the sum of $350.00 has been paid. Failure

to pay the fee as ordered will result in dismissal of the action

without prejudice. In all other respects plaintiff’s request for

in forma pauperis has been granted. 

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Justo Arenas

Justo Arenas

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: August 13, 2008

cc: Gary Dewayne Johnson, pro se

 Bonnie S. Reed, Financial Administrator

 Northern NH Correctional Facility, Inmate Accounts

Case 1:08-cv-00306-SM Document 4 Filed 08/13/08 Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02251-CMA-MJW

SHAWN D. ALLEN,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

JUDITH DAWSON,

MATT,

K. WISCHMEIER, 

THE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS BOARD, and

MARY QUINTANA, Case Manager CTCF,

Defendant(s).

MINUTE ORDER 

Entered by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe

It is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motion to Correct Misspelled Name of

Defendant (Docket No. 21) is granted, and the caption and Amended Complaint (Docket

No. 16) are amended to removed “Anne” as defendant Quintana’s middle name.

It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motion to Have Defendants Serve Copy

of Their Motion to Dismiss - Doc # 17 - Upon the Plaintiff (Docket No. 22) is granted. 

The court notes that the Certificate of Service at the end of Docket No. 17 indicates that

a copy of the motion was served upon plaintiff via electronic filing, but the plaintiff is

incarcerated and does not have electronic access. Therefore, attorney Denis K. Lane,

Jr., shall forthwith mail a copy of Docket No. 17 to the plaintiff and file a Certificate of

Mailing.

Date: November 17, 2011 

Case 1:11-cv-02251-CMA-MJW Document 26 Filed 11/17/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2183

To amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to allow public water systems to

avoid filtration requirements, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 14, 2001

Mr. ENGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Energy and Commerce

A BILL

To amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to allow public

water systems to avoid filtration requirements, and for

other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. FILTRATION REQUIREMENTS.

4 Section 1412(b)(7)(C) of title XIV of the Safe Drink5 ing Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300g–1) is amended by adding

6 the following at the end of clause (iii): ‘‘After such 12

7 month period, based on information, technology, or evi8 dence not available prior to the expiration of such 12-

9 month period, any public water system supplied by surface

10 water sources may apply to the State agency for a deter-
2

•HR 2183 IH

1 mination that, under the criteria established under clause

2 (i), the system is not required to use filtration. After no3 tice and opportunity for public comment, but not later

4 than 120 days after receipt of such application, the State

5 shall make such determination and publish notice thereof.

Æ
#### Walter Josh MANN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 45876.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 11, 1972.

*556No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Judge.

This appeal is from an order revoking probation.

On September 30, 1968, appellant entered a plea of guilty before the court to the offense of felony theft and his punishment was assessed at 5 years. The imposition of the sentence was suspended and the appellant was placed on probation subject to certain conditions of probation. On August 31, 1971, the State filed its motion to revoke alleging violations of appellant’s probationary conditions. A hearing on such motion was conducted on November 9, 1971, at the conclusion of which the court revoked probation. Sentence was imposed and notice of appeal was given by the appellant and his court-appointed counsel whose appointment was continued for the purpose of appeal. On November 9, 1971, the appellant filed a pauper’s oath requesting preparation of the appellate record.

The record on appeal was approved on April 11, 1972 and filed in this court on June 22, 1972.

No appellate brief appears to have been filed in the trial court. See Article 40.09 § 9, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.

Our State’s Attorney, taking note of the appellant’s indigency and the condition of the record, has filed his motion to abate the appeal.

So that this indigent appellant will not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal and an adequate appellate review, this appeal will be abated to allow the filing of a brief in the trial court on appellant’s behalf and for such other proceedings as may be conducted in the trial court to provide appellant with the effective aid of counsel on appeal. See Garza v. State, 433 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968), and cases there cited; Martin v. State, 441 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Jackson v. State, 447 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). *Cf.*Steel v. State, 453 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).

The State’s motion to abate the appeal is granted.

It is so ordered.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

V .

Carlos Berrios

Criminal No . 08-mj-101-03-JM

O R D E R

Defendant appeared for a bail revocation hearing pursuant to

18 U .S .C . § 3148 .

Defendant did not dispute that he violated bail by using

marijuana (five times), that he was with a co-defendant or that

he failed to get a job . The government has established that he

committed a crime . Given the number of failed opportunities to

comply with conditions I find that the defendant is unlikely to

abide by any condition or combination of conditions . The

conditions of release are revoked .

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant be detained

pending trial .

The defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney

General or his designated representative for confinement in a

corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from

persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody

Case 1:08-mj-00101-JM Document 39 Filed 03/17/09 Page 1 of 2
pending appeal . The defendant shall be afforded a reasonable

opportunity for private consultation with defense counsel . On

order of a court of the United States or on request of an

attorney for the government, the person in charge of the

corrections facility shall deliver the defendant to the United

States Marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection

with a court proceeding .

SO ORDERED .

March 17, 200 9

cc : Arnold H . Huftalen, AUSA

James W . Dennehy, Esq .

U .S . Marshal

U .S . Probation

2

Case 1:08-mj-00101-JM Document 39 Filed 03/17/09 Page 2 of 2
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00816-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.L., a Child

From the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12-11-21526-CV

Honorable Thomas F. Lee, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 12, 2014

MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; APPEAL DISMISSED

Appellant G.L. and appellant E.A. filed separate notices of appeal from the trial court’s 

Order of Termination and Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship. The order

named G.L. as possessory conservator of the minor child A.M.L., but terminated E.A.’s parental 

rights to the minor child A.M.L. Appellant G.L. filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. We grant 

G.L.’s motion and dismiss the appeal filed by G.L. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). The appeal 

filed by appellant E.A. is retained on this court’s docket. 

PER CURIAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ )

ESTATE OF ESTHER KLIEMAN, et al

. , )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 04

- 1173 (PLF)

)

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, et al

. , )

)

Defendants. )

_________________________________________ )

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the Opinion issued this same day, it is hereby

ORDERED that [Dkt. No. 233] defendants’ motion for reconsi deration of Court’s

December 29, 2006 and April 24, 2008 interlocutory orders on personal jurisdiction is

GRANTED; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that th e PA and the PLO be dismissed from th is case

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2 ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of this Court’s dismissal of the sole

remaining defendants in this case, this case is dismissed with prejudice; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that all currently pending motions in this case are denied

as moot.

SO ORDERED.

/s/

________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

DATE: March 3, 2015 United States District Court
H. Res. 847 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

December 11, 2007. 

Whereas Christmas, a holiday of great significance to Americans and many other cultures and nationalities, is celebrated annually by Christians throughout the United 

States and the world; 

Whereas there are approximately 225,000,000 Christians in 

the United States, making Christianity the religion of 

over three-fourths of the American population; 

Whereas there are approximately 2,000,000,000 Christians 

throughout the world, making Christianity the largest religion in the world and the religion of about one-third of 

the world population; 

Whereas Christians and Christianity have contributed greatly 

to the development of western civilization; 

Whereas the United States, being founded as a constitutional 

republic in the traditions of western civilization, finds 

much in its history that points observers back to its 

Judeo-Christian roots; 

Whereas on December 25 of each calendar year, American 

Christians observe Christmas, the holiday celebrating the 

birth of their savior, Jesus Christ; 

Whereas for Christians, Christmas is celebrated as a recognition of God’s redemption, mercy, and Grace; and 
2 

•HRES 847 EH 

Whereas many Christians and non-Christians throughout the 

United States and the rest of the world, celebrate Christmas as a time to serve others: Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

(1) recognizes the Christian faith as one of the 

great religions of the world; 

(2) expresses continued support for Christians in 

the United States and worldwide; 

(3) acknowledges the international religious and historical importance of Christmas and the Christian faith; 

(4) acknowledges and supports the role played by 

Christians and Christianity in the founding of the 

United States and in the formation of the western civilization; 

(5) rejects bigotry and persecution directed against 

Christians, both in the United States and worldwide; and 

(6) expresses its deepest respect to American Christians and Christians throughout the world. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
#### Bernard B. BROWN, Appellant, v. Wanda MAY, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division A.

Dec. 21, 1954.

Clyde L. Roberts, Lakeland, and Ray Sandstrom, Hollywood, for appellant.

Walter W. Manley, Lakeland, for appel-lee.

MATHEWS, Justice.

In this case the appellee filed a bill of complaint charging that the appellant was the father of a child which she bore out of wedlock. All allegations of the bill of *653complaint were denied by the appellant. The appellee relied mainly on testimony of the former wife of the appellant to substantiate her claim. This testimony, admitted by the Court, was by the former wife when she and the appellant were living together and was with regard to a communication allegedly made to the former wife by the appellant at the time when the marital relationship was in full force and effect between them. They were divorced subsequent to this alleged conversation. At the trial of the cause the appellant strenuously objected to this testimony. The sole question necessary for a determination of this matter is whether or not the admission of such testimony was reversible error.

After the appellant filed his brief in this cause, the appellee filed a brief in which it is admitted that the admission of the testimony was reversible error.

Only on rare occasions will this Court reverse a decree of the Chancellor based solely on the admission of the ap-pellee that reversible error has been committed. In this case the law seems to be well settled that communications between husband and wife made in the course of their marriage relationship and while they are married and living together are privileged and may not be disclosed by one without the consent of the other party. Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154; Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685, 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 273; and Ranee v. Hutchison, 131 Fla. 460, 179 So. 777. In the case of Mercer v. State, supra [40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 157], which is cited in the case of Rance v. Hutchison, supra, this Court said:

> “ * * * Such confidential communications between husband and wife have always been regarded as privileged, and, when attempted to be detailed or divulged by either of the parties to whom the communication has been intrusted, the law not only forbids, and will not permit it to be done, but regards it as a character of testimony that such witnesses are not competent to depose, and upon the same ground that it prohibits the violation by an attorney of the confidence reposed in him by his client, — that of public pol- ‡ Í *tf*

The final decree of the Chancellor be and the same is hereby reversed for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.