## In t he Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 23

- 00061

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.E., P.E., AND Q.S. AKA Q.S., JR., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 307th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021

- 1 088

- DR

B efore Stevens , C.J., van Cleef and Rambin , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION The Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her children, Allie , Porcha, a nd Quincy
. 1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding that (1) she knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well

- being, (2 ) she engag ed in conduct or knowingly placed the child ren with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well

- being, (3) she failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions ne ce ssary to obtain the children’s return, as described in Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code, and (4) termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. See T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2) (Supp .)
. On appeal, Mother argues that the evi dence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that there were statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights and that doing so was in the children’s best intere s t s. We con c lude that the evidence presented at trial s upported the trial court’s findings. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to Allie , Porcha, and Quincy. I. A Statutory Ground for Termination of Mo t h er ’s Paren t al Rights is Supported by Legally and Factu ally Sufficient E vidence A. Standard of Review “The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions.” In re E.J.Z. , 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2 018 , no pe t .) (quoting

1 We use pseudonyms t o p ro te ct th e identity of the children. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 9.8.3

Holick v. Smith , 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). “Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning ‘the care, custody, and control of their children.’” Id. (quoting T roxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality o p.) )
. “ Because the termination of parental rights implicate s fundamental int erests, a higher standard of proof

— clear and convincing evidence

— is required at trial.” Id. (quoting In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). “ This Court is
. . . required to ‘ engage i n a n exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to support the termination of parental rights. ’ ” Id. (quoting In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d at 500). “[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are stri ctly constru e d in favor o f th e parent.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re S.K.A. , 236 S.W.3d 87 5, 900 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick , 685 S.W.2d at 20 ) ).

“ In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must fin d , by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termin ation and that termination is in the child[ren]’s best interest.” Id. (citing T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 161.001; In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex
. 2012)). “ ‘Cl ear and convincing evidence’ is that

‘ deg ree of proof that will produce in the mind of the tr ier of fact a fir m belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” Id. (quoting T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 101.007 ) ( c iting In re J .O.A. , 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009) )
. “This standard of proof necessarily affects our rev iew of the evidence.” Id. “In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evi dence in the light m ost favorable to the findings to determine w hether t h e fac t
- finder reasonably could have formed a f irm belief or conviction that the grounds for termin ation were proven .” In re L.E.S. , 471 S.W.3d 915, 9204

(Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (pe r curiam) ; I

n r e J.L.B. , 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. A p p.
— Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). “We assume the trial cou rt, acting as fact

- finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a
reas onable fact

- finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that t h e fact

- f i nd er could have reasonably disbelieved or t he credibility of which reasonably could be doubted.” Id
. (citing In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d at 573). “In our review of factual sufficiency , we give due consideration to evidence the trial court could h a ve reaso n ab ly found to be clear and convincing.” I d
. ( citing In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 105 , 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). “We consider only that evidence the fact

- finder reasonably could hav e found to be clear and convincing and determine ‘ “ whether the e vidence i s
suc h that a fact[

- ]finder could reasonabl y fo rm a firm belief or conviction about the truth of th e

. . . allegatio ns. ” ’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting In re C .H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)) ) ; see In re J .F
. C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex. 2002). “If, in light of the entir e re cord, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact [

- ] fi nder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact [

- ] fin der could not reasonably hav e for med a f i rm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id
. (q uoting In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266). “‘[I]n maki ng this determina tion,’ we must undertake ‘ “ an exacting review of the entire record wi th a healthy regard for the cons titut io n al interests at stake. ” ’” Id. (quoting In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex
. 20 14) ). “We als o recognize that the trial court, as the fact

- finder, is the sole arbiter of a witnes s’ demeanor and credibili ty, and it may believe all, part, or no ne of a wi tn e ss’ testimony.” In re A.M. , No. 06

- 18

-5

000 12

- CV, 2018 WL 3077784, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana J une 22, 2018, pet . denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d at 109). “Desp ite the profound constitu tional interests at stake in a proceedi ng to term in a te parental rights, ‘ “ the rights of nat u ral parents are not absolute; protection of the child i s paramount. ” ’” In re L.E.S. , 471 S. W.3d at 920 (quoting In re A.V. , 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) ). “A child’s emotional and physical interests must not be sacr ificed merely to preserve parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re C.A.J. , 459 S.W.3d 175, 1 79 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2015, no pet.) ). B. The Evidence at T ria l Jaqueline Ibarra, a conservatorship specialist wi th the Department, testified that she
rece ived a r eport on June 20, 2021 , that Mother had left her child ren at home alone. At that time, Allie was five years old , Porcha was two years old , and Q uincy was five mon ths old. According to Ibarra, there were also report s that Mother habitually paid t hirte en - and fourteen

- yea r - o lds to watch the children, u sed alcohol and cocaine, underfed Quincy, and lived in a roach

- infested home. Ibarra w ent to Mother’s home to investigate the complaints and found Allie and Quincy alone. 2 Because she could not ent e r the hom e without an adult pre sent , Ibarra called the Gladewater Police Department for assistance. Ibarra testified that the respon di ng officer found Quincy in his blanket in a very hot ro om an d brought him o utside to her. Ibarra said Qunicy
s melled of fe ce s and urine and was “very, very s lim
. ” S he stated that she could “feel all his little bones. He didn’t have any muscle mass.” Even at five months , Quincy only weighed nine

2 Porcha was staying with a fa mily friend on that date
.6

pound s an d twelve ounces and was diagnosed with malnutritio n and “insufficient prot ein .” Allie ’ s face and feet were dirty , an d she was hungry. According to Ibarra, the officer said the re were roach es and in sects throughout the home. Ibarra and the officer were still present when Mother arrived home and began y elling. Ibarra test ifie d, “[Mother] s tate d that she had gone out t o a conc ert in Tyler, and that she had paid a tee nag er to go watch the ki ds. So, the fact that the kids were left alone was not her fault. ” Further conversations with Mother revealed that the concert occurre d th e n ight b efor e and that she had spent th e n ight with a boyfriend, overslept, and was just returning to th e house a round 7:00 p.m. Mother was arrested , and the Gladewater Police Department determined that the conditions of the home were too unsanitary t o al lo w the child r en to remain th ere . Kemetri a Hill, a caseworker with the Depa rtm ent , testified that Mother w as given a family service plan and obtained monitored return of the children on December 1, 2022, after compl eting all the tasks spell ed out by the pl a n. Howev er, Mot her’s conduct began to concer n the De partment soon after the monitore d return and eventua lly led to the Department’s decision to seek termination of her parental rights. According to Hill, Mother mi ssed four visits i n Janua ry 202 3 a nd b eca me hard to reach
. Hill testified that M oth er refused to answer the door ev en when H ill saw her car parked outside and could hear the children in the home. Hill said Mother cancel ed a Department visit with the chi ldren on April 14 an d “ [did not ] co me to t he door” during hom e visits on Apr il 8, 22, and 29 , which made Hill feel that Mother “ was hiding something
. ” This resulted in the Department issuing a new family service plan requiring Mother to atten d coun seling and complet e a “Pa rents7

as Teac hers ” class
. Altho ugh Mother s tarted counsel ing, she did n ot c omplete it because she was arrested for crimin al trespass and a violation of community supervision. Hill said Mother spent “[a] couple of weeks” in jail durin g May 2023 and miss ed visits aft er he r r elea se when Hill told M other that her visits would b e su pervised b y the Department. As a result, the children had not seen Mother for three months before trial. When asked how the children r esponded t o the missed visits, Hill s aid that Al lie “really [ did not ] care” and did n ot resp ond when Hill asked he r about Mother
. As for the visits Hill had observed with Mother, she testified that Mother “would be on her phone or she would keep [the children] occu pied with her pho ne” for the “majo rity of the time ” and wo uld sometimes le a ve the vis its early. Kennet h Michael Reine, II, the laboratory manager and custodian of records for Quest Diagno stics, testified that Mother’s August 25, 2021, drug test was posit ive for
me thamphetami ne and that Mother also tested positiv e for methamphe t amine and cocaine on A pril 7 , 2022. Hill testified that Mother failed to submit to the Department’s requested drug tests i n (1) September, O ctober, and November 2021 ; (2) Mar ch , June, and Octob er 2022 ; a nd (3) January and April 202 3
. Acc ording to H ill , Allie told her counselor th at, during the monitored return, “her mother and dad were y elling and arguing and she cover [ed] her ears,” but the man she referred to a s

“ dad” was not her fath er and was un known to the Depar tmen t . Allie a lso tol d the counse lor that Mother showed her an d Porcha “the blood gang sign
. ” Allie demonstrated “gang signs” for t he
counse lor and told her that the s ign s meant “mission, b lood[,] and dr ugs.” All ie ’s foste r mothe r8

also testifie d that she witnessed the gang s igns when A llie ’s counse lor video chatt ed with her , and Porcha’s foster mother said Porcha “thre w up the blood sign” when she “was on ly three.” Mother was properly ser ved bu t fa iled to ap pear for trial. Hill told the trial court that she had seen Mother exiting th e courtroom on the day of tri al and asked her where she was going. Moth er indicated she wo uld be back , but she did not show up for trial, which ind icated to Hill that Mothe r was indi fferent to what happe ned during the termination hearing. Hil l testi fied that the children could not be saf ely returned to Mother and that doing so
wo uld en danger the children’s p hysical or emotional health
. As a result, Hill testified that term ination of Mother’ s parental ri ghts was in the children’s best inte rest s. She ka Howard, a supervisor for the Court A ppointed Special Advocat es (CASA) program, testifi ed that CASA was satisfied wi th the children’s placements and that she also bel ieved it was i n the chi l dren’s best interests to terminate Moth er’s parental righ ts . Af ter hearing th is testimony, the trial court terminate d M other’s parental rights
. C. Sufficient Evidence Suppor ts the Ground E Finding By her first issue, Mother ass ert s that the e vidence is le gally and fac tually insufficient to support the trial c ourt ’s find ings under g r ounds D, E, and O. “ Only one predicate fi nding under Sect ion 161.001[b](1) is necessary to su pport a judgment of termination when there is also a f inding that term ination is i n the child[r en]’s best int erest.” Id. at 923 (quoting In r e O.R.F
. , 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.

— Te xarkana 2013, pet. de nied) ). Even so, when the trial court’s findings under g rounds D or E are challenged on appeal, due proc ess demands t hat we revi ew t he evi dence s upporti ng the findings under at least one of tho se grou nds. See In re N.G. , 577 S.W.3d9

230, 237 (Tex. 20 19) (per c uriam) (“We hold that due process and d ue course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court detail its a nalysis for an app eal of ter minatio n of parental rights under [S]ection 1 61. 00 1(b)( 1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code.”). This is becau se termina tion of parental rights under these grounds may implicate the parent’s parental rights to other chil dren. Id. at 234; see T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 1 61 .001(b)(1)(M) (Supp.) (providing as a gro un d for termination of parental rights that the p arent “h ad his or her parent

- child relationship terminate d with respect to another child based on a finding that the p arent’s condu ct was in viola tio n o f Parag raph (D ) or (E)”). Ground E permits the term i nat io n of a parent’s pa rental rights “if the court f inds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the phy sical or emot ional well

- bein g o f t he chil d[ren]. ” T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 161.001(b)(1 ) (E)
.

“ ‘ [ E ] ndanger ’ mea ns more than a threat of meta physical inj ury or pot ential ill effects of a less

than

- ideal family environment
. . . .” In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 803. “‘ [ E ] ndanger’ means t o expose to l oss or injury; to jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t o f Hu m . Serv s. v. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 198 7); In re L.E.S. , 471 S.W.3d at 923; In re N.S.G. , 235 S.W.3d 358, 367 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2007, no pet.). “It is n ot necessary that the condu ct be directed at the child[ren] or that the child[ren] actu ally s uffer i njury.” I n re L.E.S. , 471 S.W.3d at 92 3. Under g round “(E) , it is su fficient that the child[ren]’s well

- bei ng is jeopardized or exposed to loss or injury .” Id. (citing Boyd , 727 S .W .2d at 533; I n r e N .S.G. , 235 S.W.3d at 367). “Further, te rmin at ion u n der [ g round ] (E) must be based on more t han a single act or omission
. Instead, a ‘voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.’” Id. (quoting Pe r ez v.10

Tex. De p’t of Protective & Regul
. Servs. , 148 S.W.3d 4 27, 43 6 (Te x. App.

— El Paso 2004, no pet.) ); see Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G. , 235 S.W.3d at 366

– 67. Grou nd E “refers only t o the parent’s conduct, as ev idenced not only by the p arent ’s acts, but also by the parent’s omissions or failures to act.” In re S.K. , 198 S. W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.

— Dall as 2006, pet. denied); see In re N.S.G. , 235 S.W.3d at 366

– 67. T he endangering
con d uc t may also occur “either be fore or after the child[r en]’s removal by t he Department.” In re Z.J. , No. 02

- 19

- 001 18

- CV, 201 9 WL 6 20525 2, at *1 1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wo rth Nov. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam
. & Protecti v e Servs. , 312 S.W.3d 608, 6 16

– 17 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st D ist.] 2009, p et. denied)). “‘Because it exposes the ch ild [ren] to the po ssibi lity that t he parent may be impaired or imprisoned, illegal drug use may support termination under’ Groun d E.” In re H.M.J
. , No. 06

- 18

- 00009

- CV, 2018 WL 3028980, at *5 (Tex. Ap p . — Texarkana June 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In r e A.L. , No
. 0 6

- 14

- 00050

- CV, 2 014 WL 5204888, at * 7 (Tex. A pp.
— Texarkana Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ). “Drug use and its effect on a parent’s life and his [or her] abili ty to parent may establish an endangering cou rse of con duct.” Id. (quotin g In re J.L.B. , 34 9 S.W.3 d 83 6, 848 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2011, no pet.) ); see In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 n.4 (Tex. 200 9); In r e S.N. , 272 S.W.3d 45, 52 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2008, n o p et.) (“ Evi dence of illegal drug use or alcohol a buse by a parent is oft en cited as co nduc t which wil l support an affirmative finding that th e p arent has engaged in a course of conduct which has t he effect of endangering the child [ren]
. ”). In our analysis un der g round E, we may also consider a parent’s

“ failure to complete relevan t require ment s of [ a ] family service plan. ” In re U.H.R. , No. 07

- 18

-11

00318

- CV, 2019 WL 8187 4, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Jan. 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op. ) ; In re Z.J. , 2019 WL 620525 2, a t *11
. Her e, clear and convi ncing evidence supporte d the trial court’ s conclusi on t ha t Mot her engag ed in an endangering course of conduct. The e v idence showed that Mother attended a
concer t and left her young child , Al lie , and her baby, Quincy , ei ther home alone or overnight i n the c are of a teenager
. Instead of returnin g home the foll ow ing m orning, Mother overslept and did not return unti l 7 :00 p.m. As a result, the Department found Allie an d Quincy dirty and hungry in a home that the Gladewater Polic e Depar tme nt determined w as bug infested and unfit t o allow the childr en to remai n. Qu incy was so m alnourished that it was clear that Mother ha d
u nderfed him for a signi ficant amount of time , whi ch affected his physical heal th
. After obtaining a monitored return of the children, Mother stopped cooperating with the Depar tment. The evi de nce s howed sh e had taught Allie and Porcha gang signs and f a iled to comply with her family service plan by re fus ing to drug test or answer the door for Department home visits . Mot her was jailed for weeks, exposing the children to temporary loss of a par en t,
an d missed several visits with the children after her r el e ase. She also fail ed to comply with the prov ision o f her family service p lan that required her to complete couns eling. On the day of tri al, Mother showed up to court but left b efore the t rial s tarte d. Mo st importantly, Mother tested positive for m et h amphetamine two mon ths after the Department f

iled it s petition on June 21, 2021 , and tested positive for methamph etamin e an d cocaine in Ap ril 2022. “A parent’s failure to remain drug

- free w hile u nder the Depa rtment’s supervision will support a finding of endangering conduct under [ g round] (E) even if there is no12

direct evidenc e that the parent’s drug use actually in jured the child [ren] .” In re H.M.J. , 2018 WL 3028980, at *5 (quoting I n re J .A.W
. , No. 02

- 08

- 215

- CV, 2009 WL 579287, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth M a r. 5, 2009, n o pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) ). From the above

- recited ev idence, we conclude that the record firmly e st a blished tha t Mother engaged in a cour se of conduct t hat endangere d th e child ren’s physical and emotional well

- bei ng. A s a result, we find that legally and factually sufficient ev idence supported the trial
cou rt’s finding under g round E. Since there w as sufficient evidence supporting the t rial court’s fin ding under g r ound E , we need not review its findings under g r ounds D a nd O
. See J.T. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam
. & Protective Ser vs. , No. 03

- 21

- 00070

- CV, 2021 WL 2672055, at *9 (Tex. App.

— Austin June 30, 2 0 21, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re M.F
. , No. 14

- 19

- 00964

- CV, 2020 WL 283 2166 , at *8 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] M ay 28, 202 0, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We overrule Mother’s first point of error. II. Sufficie nt Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Best - In t erest F inding Next, Mother argue s that the evidence is legally and fac tu ally in suffi cient to support the trial cou rt’s findi ng that termina tion of her parental rights was in the ch ildren ’s best interests. Beca use we disagree , we overrule Mother’ s last p oi n t of error. A. Standard of Review

“ There is a strong presumption t hat ke eping a child with a parent is in the chil d’s best i nterest.” In r e J.A.S., Jr. , No. 13

- 12

- 00612

- CV, 2013 W L 782692, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Cor pus Christi

– Edinburg Feb. 28, 2013, pet. denied) (me m. op.) (citing In re R.R. , 2 09 S.W .3d 112, 11613

(Tex. 2 006) (pe r c uriam )). “Termination ‘ “ can never be justified with out the mo st so lid and substantial reasons. ” ’” In re N.L .D. , 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (quot ing Wiley v. Spra tla n , 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (T ex. 197 6)). In determinin g th e b e s t inte rests of the child [ren] , courts consider the followi ng Holley facto rs: (1) the desires of the child [ren] , (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child [ren] now and in the future, (3) the emotional an d physical danger to the child [ren] now a nd i n the f uture , (4) t he parental abilities of the individuals seeking custod y, (5) the prog rams ava ilable to assist these individual s, (6) the plans for the child [ren] by these i ndividuals, (7) the stability of the home, (8 ) the acts or omissions of the pare n t that may indic ate the existing parent

- child relationship is not a proper one , and (9) any e xcuse fo r the acts or omissions of the pa rent. Id. at 8 19 (citing Ho lley v. Ada ms , 544 S.W.2d 367, 3 72 (Tex. 1976)) ; s ee In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex
. 2012) ; se e also T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 263.307(b). The Department is n ot require d t o present proof of each Holley factor. In re M.C
. , 482 S.W.3d 675, 688 (Tex. A pp.
— Texarka na 2016, pet. denied) (citing In re C. H
. , 89 S.W.3d at 27 ). “When consideri ng t h e chil d[r en]’s best int erest[ s], we may take into account that a parent is unable to provide adequate care for [her] child[ren], lacks parenting skills, or exercise s poor judg ment.” Id. (citing In re C.A.J. , 1 22 S .W.3d 888, 893 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2003 , no pe t.) ). “Parental drug a buse, which reflects poor judgment, is also a factor tha t may be considered when determining the child[re n]’s best interest[s].” Id. ( citing In r e M.R. , 243 S.W.3d 807, 820 (Tex. A pp.
— Fort W orth 2007, no pet.)). “ The par ent’ s . . . past per formance as a parent [is] relevant in determining the child[ren ]’s be st i nterest[s].” Id. (citing In re C.H. , 8914

S.W.3 d at 28). Further, we may con sider evide nce used to support the grounds for termi nat i on of parental rights in the be st
- i n t erest analysis
. In re C.H. , 89 S. W.3d at 28. B. Analysis of the Holley Factors As fo r th e first Holley factor, there was no direct evi dence of Allie ’ s and Porcha’s wi shes, and Quincy was too young to express his desire s. Hill said that Allie had a go od r e l ation ship with M other but that Mother was not bonded with the children, althou gh she car ed for them
. Hill testified that Allie was pl aced with James Williams and h is wife, Brenetta, and Hill and Brenet ta both testifie d that A llie was strongly bonded to t h e Wil liams family. P orcha was placed with her foster family, Z ach an d Ti ffany Gilmore, had an exceptional bond with them, and called them
m om and d ad
. Quincy was pl aced wit h h is paternal gra ndmoth er. The evid ence showed that a ll the children were thri v i ng in their placement s and received adequate educa tion al , de ntal, and medical care . In light of the eviden ce, including that Mother h ad not visited with the c hil dr en for three months before t rial, we find that the first Holley factor weighs in favor of t e rmina ting her parenta l rights to the children. Se e In r e K. O. , 488 S.W.3d 829, 842 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2016, pet. denied). As f or the second and third f act or s, the young children’s emot ional and physical nee ds were great, but Mother presented an e m o tiona l and physical d anger to the child ren. Allie was
a tten ding counseling after having been found dirty, hungry, and alone in Mother ’s care
. Porcha

“ [was no t] wal ki ng,” was not potty trained, and “was delayed in he r speech ” but had “caught up” in the G i lmore s ’ care . Quincy was originally mal nouris hed and “had to attend occupational therapy ” but was well cared for by his paternal grand mother. Hill testifi ed that M o ther’s drug15

use and c onduct leading to jail time would prevent her from parenting ap prop r i ately and c ould expose the ch ildr en to trauma. She also testified that the Department had no informa tion to suggest th at Mother had inc ome or could provide a stable home. See In re Z.M. , 456 S.W.3d a t 689 (“A parent who lacks stability, income, and a h o m e is unable to provide for a chil d’s emotional and physical needs.” (quoting In re J.T.G. , No. 14

- 10

- 00972

- CV, 2012 WL 171012, at *17 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [1 4th Dis t. ] Jan. 19, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.)) )
. We find that the second and third Holley fact o r s fav or t erminating M other’ s pa rental rights. As to the fourth , seventh, and eighth Holley factors , “ [e]vidence of past miscon duct or negle ct can be used t o measure a parent’s future conduct. ” Id. (quoting In re I.R.K.

- N. , No. 10

- 13

- 00455

- CV, 201 4 WL 2 069 28 1, at *7 (T ex. Ap p.
— W aco May 15, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Will iams v. Williams , 150 S. W.3d 436, 451 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2004, pet. denied); Ra y v. Burns , 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Te x. App.

— Waco 1992, no writ) (“Past is often prologue.”)). Th e evi de nce showed that M othe r lacked parental ability . In addition to her actions that caused the init ial removal of the children, Mother cont inued to use dr ug s during the pendency of the case a nd missed visitation s with the children
. When she did vi sit, s he w a s often on t he pho ne. There was also evidence showing that Mother’s visits did not benefit the c hil dren. Brenetta testified that Allie was unaffected b y M other’s missed visits , Tiffany t estified that Porcha would have “regression in her speech and p otty training” and would not sleep after visits, and Quincy was “very emotional” “ [d]ue to the trauma” aft er his visits. Mother ha d also tau g ht Allie and Porcha gang signs, demonstrating that the parent

- child relationship with them was inappropriate
. W e fi nd tha t th e fourth, seventh, and eight h Holley factors weigh aga inst Mother.16

As for the fifth factor, the Department showed that Mother ha d in itially completed all of her family service plan , but Hill said “[Mother w as not ] able to implement what she le arne d .” According to Hill, after the monitored return, Allie said that Mother an d an unknown man would argue and yell in her presence
. Mo ther also failed to complete required individua l counseling and a “ Parents as Teachers ” class that was necessar y to o bt ain the children’s return. Accordingly, this fa ctor weigh s against M oth er. As for the plans for the children, Mother faile d to appear fo r trial and did not indicate what her plans w ere. Hill said that the Department planned on keeping the childr en w i t h th e ir
c urrent placements. Brenetta testified that her fam ily would be willing to provide a “stable, loving, fore ver home” f

or Allie
. T iffany testified that her fami ly loved Porcha a nd was willing to adopt her. Quincy’s grandmother also t e stifi ed th a t Quinc y, two years old by the time of trial, was doing well and that she was willing to ad opt him. The sixth H olley fact or weigh s in fav or of terminating Mother’s par ental rights. A s for the remaining factor, the only exc u se fo r Mot her’s actions w a s of f e red b y H ill in rel ation to Mother’s missed drug tests. Hill said that Mother claimed she did not have gas mo ney or transportation, but Hill “would go get her and tak e her to drug tes t.” As a result, Hill believe d Moth er’s f

ailure to test on several occ a s ions s how ed a “clear intent to avoid the drug testing procedu res when she refused to test.” There was no excuse for Mother’s positive d rug tests. Consequently, we f

ind that the ninth Hol ley factor weigh s a ga inst Mot he r. Considering the Holley factors, a nd in ligh t of all of the evidence, the trial court cou ld have reasonably formed a firm belie f or conviction that termination of Mother’s pa rental rights17

was in the child ren’s best intere sts. Therefore, we co nclu de tha t th e evidence was sufficient to sup p ort t he be st
- interest finding and overrule Mother’s las t point of error. III. Conclusion W e affirm the tri al court’s judgment.

Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice Dat e Submitted: Nove mber 17, 2023 Date D ec ided : Nov ember 27 , 2023