J. S30018/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

ALLEN SPEARMAN, : No. 848 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, February 24, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0005428-2008

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., AND JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2016

Allen Spearman appeals from the order of February 24, 2015, denying 

his PCRA1 petition. After careful review, we affirm.

In a prior memorandum, affirming appellant’s judgment of sentence on 

direct appeal, this court summarized the history of this case as follows:

Appellant was arrested for sexual crimes 

committed against his biological daughter, B.S. On 

May 15, 2009, represented by counsel, Appellant 

proceeded to a bench trial at which then 

sixteen-year-old B.S. testified on direct examination 

extensively regarding the years of sexual abuse 

perpetrated upon her by her father, Appellant. N.T. 

5/15/09 at 6-42. Specifically, B.S. testified in detail 

regarding Appellant repeatedly raping her and then 

financially rewarding her thereafter. N.T. 5/15/09 at 

6-42. At the conclusion of the direct examination of 

B.S., trial counsel requested a short recess, and 

Appellant then indicated his desire to plead guilty. 

 

1

Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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N.T. 5/15/09 at 44. The Court Crier stated, “Judge, 

this is going to be an open plea,” and the certified 

docket entry indicates “Guilty Plea-Non-Negotiated.” 

N.T. 5/15/09 at 44. Appellant then presented the 

trial court with a written guilty plea colloquy and the 

trial court conducted an oral guilty plea colloquy. 

N.T. 5/15/09 at 44-48. During the guilty plea 

colloquy, the trial court indicated, inter alia, that 

Appellant could appeal if the trial court imposed an 

illegal sentence and, following Appellant’s plea of 

guilty to the charges indicated supra,[2] the trial 

court orally ordered a presentence investigation, as 

well as a Megan’s law evaluation. N.T. 5/15/09 at 

46-49. Appellant remained on bail pending 

sentencing; however, the trial court kept the “stay 

away order in effect.” N.T. 5/15/09 at 46-48.

On October 2, 2009, a presentence 

investigation report was filed, and represented by 

new counsel, on October 9, 2009, Appellant filed a 

presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In 

the motion, Appellant averred (1) his guilty plea was 

a “product of duress and was therefore not a 

knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his trial 

rights;” (2) he is “innocent of all charges in this 

matter and believes he has a viable defense to the 

allegations against him in this case;” and (3) the 

“Commonwealth will not be substantially prejudiced 

if [Appellant] is permitted to withdraw his guilty 

plea[.]”

Following a brief hearing, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s presentence motion on the basis that, 

inter alia, the Commonwealth would be 

substantially prejudiced by Appellant’s withdrawal of 

his guilty plea.

 

2 Appellant pled guilty to the charges of aggravated indecent assault, 

unlawful restraint, endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, 

indecent assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, sexual assault, 

statutory sexual assault and incest. In exchange for his plea, the 

Commonwealth withdrew additional charges of rape, involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), and false imprisonment. 
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Commonwealth v. Spearman, No. 1823 EDA 2010, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed October 18, 2011).

On January 21, 2010, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, 

which was denied on April 23, 2010, following an evidentiary hearing.3 That 

same date, the trial court imposed sentences of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment 

for aggravated indecent assault, and 2 to 4 years for unlawful restraint, run 

consecutively for an aggregate of 7 to 14 years’ imprisonment. No further 

penalty was imposed for the remaining charges. Appellant was also 

determined to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) for Megan’s Law 

purposes.

Post-sentence motions were denied, and on October 18, 2011, this 

court affirmed the judgment of sentence. We determined that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s pre-sentence motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea where the trial court found that appellant’s assertion 

of innocence was not sincere, but rather was an attempt to manipulate and 

delay the entire judicial process. Id. at 14. In addition, we agreed that the 

Commonwealth would have been substantially prejudiced by appellant’s 

pre-sentence withdrawal of his guilty plea where the minor victim had 

already testified and she and her mother had moved to Florida. Id. at 

15-16.

 

3 The basis for appellant’s reconsideration motion is discussed at length in 

this court’s prior memorandum at pages 3 through 8. It is not germane to 

the instant appeal.
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Appellant also argued on appeal that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea 

because the Commonwealth failed to make an agreed-upon sentencing 

recommendation of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment, and because he entered 

into a negotiated plea agreement, the terms of which the sentencing court 

failed to abide. We found these claims waived for failure to raise them in the 

court below. Id. at 16-21. Although appellant filed a timely post-sentence 

motion, he never averred therein that his guilty plea was involuntary due to 

his understanding that the Commonwealth was going to recommend an 

aggregate sentence of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 19. Nor did 

appellant allege that he had entered into a negotiated plea agreement and 

should be permitted to withdraw his plea since the trial court failed to abide 

by the terms of that agreement. Id. at 20. As these claims were being 

raised for the first time on appeal, we found them to be waived.

Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, which was denied on April 4, 2012. This timely, counseled 

PCRA petition was filed on March 12, 2013. Following an evidentiary hearing 

held on January 23, 2015, the PCRA court entered an order on February 24, 

2015, denying appellant relief.4 A timely notice of appeal was filed on 

March 23, 2015. On March 26, 2015, appellant was ordered to file a concise 

 

4 The judge who presided over appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing, the 

Honorable Harold M. Kane, has since retired. The Honorable Susan I. 

Schulman heard appellant’s PCRA petition.
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statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); appellant timely complied on April 15, 2015, and on 

June 12, 2015, the PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:

1. Is [appellant] eligible for Post-Conviction Relief 

under Commonwealth v. Hopkins?

2. Did Plea Counsel [Max] Kramer[, Esq.] render 

ineffective assistance by failing to inform 

Petitioner that he would have to make an 

admission of guilt and attend sex offender 

courses in order to qualify for parole?

3. Did the PCRA court err by concluding that Plea 

Counsel Kramer and Sentencing Counsel 

[Mariana] Rossman[, Esq.] did not render 

ineffective assistance?

4. Did the PCRA court err by denying a hearing on 

issues 16(a), 16(c), 16(e), 16(g), and 16(l) in 

the March 13, 2013 Counseled [PCRA] Petition 

and issues 13(a), 13(b)(ii), 13(b)(iii), 13(e), 

and 13(f)(i) of the AMENDED PETITION FOR 

RELIEF UNDER THE [PCRA] AND ANSWER TO 

COMMONWEALTH’S MOTION TO DISMISS?

Appellant’s brief at 7 (capitalization in original).

Initially, we note our standard of review:

Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of 

a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the 

PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Ceo, 812 A.2d 1263, 1265 

(Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Great 

deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA 

court, and these findings will not be disturbed unless 

they have no support in the certified record. 
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Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 

(Pa.Super. 2001) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa.Super. 2003) 

(en banc), appeal denied, 839 A.2d 352 (Pa. 2003).

In his first issue, appellant claims that his 5 to 10-year mandatory 

minimum sentence for aggravated indecent assault was illegal under 

Alleyne v. United States, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 

(2013) (holding that facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences 

must be submitted to the jury and must be found beyond a reasonable 

doubt).5 Appellant received a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence under 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718 (“Sentences for offenses against infant persons”). In 

Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Pa.Super. 2014), affirmed, 

A.3d , 2016 WL 3388530 (Pa. June 20, 2016), this court determined that 

Section 9718 was facially void.6 However, recently our supreme court 

 

5 Appellant raised this issue for the first time in his brief on appeal. This is 

of no consequence as we recognize that “[i]ssues relating to the legality of 

sentence cannot be waived and are cognizable under the PCRA.” 

Commonwealth v. Hockenberry, 689 A.2d 283, 288 (Pa.Super. 1997), 

appeal denied, 695 A.2d 784 (Pa. 1997). See also Commonwealth v. 

Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 90 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 

121 A.3d 496 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351 (Pa. 

2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 860 (2005).

6 Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015), upon which 

appellant relies, struck down a different mandatory sentencing statute, 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317 (setting forth a mandatory minimum sentence of 

two years’ total confinement if delivery of, or possession with intent to 

deliver, a controlled substance occurs within 1,000 feet of a school, college, 

or playground).
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decided that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases pending on 

collateral review. Commonwealth v. Washington, A.3d , 2016 WL 

3909088 (Pa. July 19, 2016). See also Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 

A.3d 1058 (Pa.Super. 2015) (declining to give Alleyne retroactive effect to 

cases on timely collateral review when the defendant’s judgment of sentence 

was finalized before Alleyne was decided).

We now turn to appellant’s second and third issues, alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

To prevail on a claim alleging counsel’s 

ineffectiveness under the PCRA, Appellant must 

demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s course of conduct 

was without a reasonable basis designed to 

effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) that he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness, i.e. there is 

a reasonable probability that but for the act or 

omission in question the outcome of the proceeding 

would have been different. Commonwealth v. 

Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999); 

Commonwealth v. Douglas, 537 Pa. 588, 645 

A.2d 226, 230 (1994).

Commonwealth v. Bracey, 795 A.2d 935, 942 (Pa. 2001).

It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to 

effective counsel extends to the plea process, as well 

as during trial. However, “[a]llegations of 

ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the 

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an 

involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant 

enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether 

counsel’s advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”
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Commonwealth v. Allen, 833 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal 

denied, 860 A.2d 488 (Pa. 2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Hickman, 

799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

Appellant alleges that plea counsel, Attorney Kramer, was ineffective 

for not informing him that in order to qualify for parole, he will have to 

complete mandated sex offender treatment, which will include admitting his 

crimes and attending classes. (Appellant’s brief at 22.) Appellant claims 

that Attorney Kramer’s failure to inform him of this important consequence 

of his plea rendered his plea invalid. (Id.) We disagree.7

“[A] defendant’s lack of knowledge of collateral consequences of the 

entry of a guilty plea does not undermine the validity of the plea, and 

counsel is therefore not constitutionally ineffective for failure to advise a 

defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.” Commonwealth 

v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 350 (Pa. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. 

Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93 (Pa. 1989). See also Commonwealth v. 

Stark, 698 A.2d 1327, 1332 (Pa. 1997) (a defendant’s eligibility for parole is 

a “collateral consequence” of his guilty plea); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (PCRA 

 

7 The Commonwealth argues that this claim is waived for failure to raise it in 

appellant’s PCRA petition. (Commonwealth’s brief at 15.) See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) (“a claim not 

raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). 

However, the record reflects that appellant was permitted to address the 

issue during the evidentiary hearing. (Notes of testimony, 1/23/15 at 9-11.) 

In addition, the PCRA court addressed the issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

(PCRA court opinion, 6/12/15 at 22.) 
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does not provide relief from collateral consequences of a criminal 

conviction). Therefore, Attorney Kramer was not ineffective for failing to 

inform appellant that he would be required to complete sex offender 

counseling in order to be eligible for parole.

In his third issue on appeal, appellant claims that both plea counsel, 

Attorney Kramer, and sentencing counsel, Attorney Rossman, were 

ineffective for not enforcing the terms of the negotiated plea bargain. As 

discussed above, appellant argues that his understanding was that he would 

receive a sentence of 5 years’ incarceration. Appellant contends that this 

was not an open plea as to sentencing. The record belies appellant’s 

assertions in this regard.

Although it was in the context of a waiver analysis, this court’s 

previous discussion of the plea and sentencing proceedings on direct appeal 

is instructive:

In the case sub judice, at the point when 

Appellant decided to plead guilty, the Court Crier 

announced, “Judge, this is going to be an open 

plea[,]” N.T. 5/15/09 at 44, and the guilty plea 

colloquy continued in such a manner without 

objection by Appellant. At the sentencing hearing, 

the sentencing court asked for the sentencing 

guidelines, and the prosecutor informed the 

sentencing court of Appellant’s prior record score, 

offense gravity score, and the sentencing guidelines 

based thereon. N.T. 4/23/10 at 38-39. The 

prosecutor also informed the sentencing court that 

“there’s also one mandatory minimum required in 

this case, and that is for the charge of aggravated 

indecent assault. It requires a minimum of five to 

ten years.” N.T. 4/23/10 at 39. Appellant did not 
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object to the exchange between the sentencing court 

and prosecutor. N.T. 4/23/10 at 39. Appellant’s 

counsel requested the sentencing court impose the 

mandatory minimum, and no other sentence; 

however, in response, the prosecutor argued the 

“defendant . . . deserves an aggravated sentence.” 

N.T. 4/23/10 at 41. Appellant did not object and, 

specifically, did not inform the sentencing court that 

the prosecutor had agreed to recommend a sentence 

of five years to ten years in prison. The sentencing 

court imposed sentence, and again, Appellant did not 

object. N.T. 4/23/10 at 43.

After the sentencing hearing, Appellant filed a 

timely post-sentence motion; however, Appellant 

never averred therein that his guilty plea was 

involuntary due to his understanding the 

Commonwealth was going to recommend an 

aggregate sentence of five years to ten years in 

prison. In fact, with regard to withdrawing his guilty 

plea, Appellant merely requested in his 

post-sentence motion that the trial court “[p]ermit 

him to withdraw his guilty plea for the reasons cited 

in the motions filed by Defendant on October 9, 

2009, and January 21, 2010 (which are incorporated 

herein by reference as though set forth in full and 

attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A’)[.]” Neither 

Appellant’s October 9, 2009 presentence motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea nor his January 21, 2010 

motion for reconsideration mention that the 

Commonwealth failed to fulfill its promise to make a 

sentencing recommendation in exchange for 

Appellant pleading guilty.

Spearman, No. 1823 EDA 2010 at 18-19.

Appellant testified at the January 23, 2015 PCRA hearing that 

Attorney Kramer told him the plea offer was for the 5-year mandatory 

minimum. (Notes of testimony, 1/23/15 at 13, 16-17.) It was appellant’s 

understanding that it would be a flat 5-year sentence. (Id. at 17.) 
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Appellant’s testimony was contradicted by Attorney Kramer, who testified 

that it was an open plea and that he explained to appellant that he could 

receive a sentence greater than the 5 to 10-year mandatory minimum. (Id.

at 40, 45.) Attorney Kramer told appellant that by entering the guilty plea, 

he would serve at least 5 years’ imprisonment, but that in exchange for his 

plea, the Commonwealth agreed to drop the charges of rape and IDSI, which 

carried ten-year mandatory minimum sentences. (Id. at 37-39.) 

Attorney Kramer testified that he never guaranteed appellant any particular 

sentence. (Id. at 45.)

Similarly, Attorney Rossman testified that from her recollection, it was 

not a negotiated plea. (Id. at 54-55.) Attorney Rossman testified that if the 

parties had negotiated a sentence, she would have raised the issue with the 

sentencing court. (Id. at 59.) Appellant never complained to 

Attorney Rossman that there was a negotiated sentence. (Id. at 34-35, 60.)

The PCRA court, after hearing all the testimony and reviewing the 

record, clearly found appellant’s testimony on the issue to be not credible. 

(PCRA court opinion, 6/12/15 at 14.) The PCRA court concluded that neither 

Attorney Kramer nor anyone else ever informed appellant that he was 

entering a negotiated plea for a sentence of 5 years’ incarceration. (Id. at 

15.) The PCRA court’s determination in this regard is amply supported by 

the record and will not be disturbed on appeal. This claim lacks arguable 
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merit where appellant failed to establish that, in fact, there was a negotiated 

plea agreement.

Finally, appellant complains that the PCRA court limited the evidentiary 

hearing to the issue of whether appellant was told he was going to receive a 

negotiated sentence of 5 years’ incarceration. (Appellant’s brief at 30.) 

Appellant argues that there were several other issues of arguable merit he 

wanted to explore, including Attorney Rossman’s alleged failure to challenge 

the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”) report, and 

Attorney Kramer’s deficient pre-trial investigation and lack of preparedness 

for trial. (Id. at 31-34.)

Simply stated, appellant’s assertion that the PCRA court limited the 

scope of the hearing is incorrect. Prior to taking testimony, the parties 

engaged in the following pertinent discussion:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL WILLIAM BICKERTON, ESQ.]: 

Actually, there may have been another issue, if 

Mr. Spearman -- that he did want to address today. 

If he could put that on the record, Your Honor? 

Because I thought that we were limited today as to 

what you’re going to allow for the evidentiary 

hearing, that you issued a ruling to it would only be 

one issue. I do know that Mr. Spearman still would 

like to raise a couple other issues.

THE COURT: Correct me if I’m wrong -- I mean, 

perhaps you are correct and I’m not -- was there -- I 

don’t honestly recall if I ordered a limited evidentiary 

hearing today. Do you recall, Mr. Ritterman?

[ADA SAMUEL RITTERMAN, ESQ.]: My thought was 

that the only issue was on the plea agreement. But I 

can’t 100 percent represent to the Court that the 
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Court had said it couldn’t on anything else. But I 

just don’t--

THE COURT: I don’t have notes to that effect. I 

don’t generally do that. If I grant an evidentiary 

hearing, I grant an evidentiary hearing. We are all 

here to address any and all issues. So, 

Mr. Bickerton, what is the other issue that you think 

needs to be addressed today?

Notes of testimony, 1/23/15 at 7-8.8

Even if the PCRA court had originally limited the scope of the hearing 

to whether appellant believed he would receive a more lenient sentence, 

clearly, at the hearing of January 23, 2015, the PCRA court indicated its 

intent to permit appellant to address “any and all issues.” (Notes of 

 

8 On March 3, 2016, appellant filed an application to supplement the original 

record. Appellant attached a letter from ADA Ritterman to the PCRA court 

dated January 23, 2015, which states,

Your Honor inquired today whether you had granted 

a limited evidentiary hearing or a hearing without 

limits on the issues. I answered that I thought the 

hearing was limited but I did not have a perfect 

recollection. I have subsequently looked at my file 

markings, and I see that at the listing of January 31, 

2014, I had noted that a hearing was granted on the 

limited ground of whether [appellant] believed he 

would get a more lenient sentence. I hope this 

helps, and I apologize that I did not have this 

notation with me at the hearing.

Motion to supplement record under Pa.R.A.P. 1926(B)(1), 3/3/16 at 4. 

Appellant also attaches a “State Custody Video Hearing Confirmation,” dated 

November 12, 2014, setting aside only one hour for appellant’s January 23, 

2015 PCRA hearing. (Id. at 5.) According to appellant, this further supports 

his position that the hearing was limited in scope. We will grant appellant’s 

application to supplement the original record with these documents; 

however, they do not change the analysis for the reasons discussed infra.
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testimony, 1/23/15 at 8.) There is no indication that appellant was limited 

to one issue. In fact, appellant did explore other issues during the hearing, 

including Attorney Kramer’s pre-trial preparation. In his reply brief, 

appellant complains that the one hour allotted for the hearing was 

insufficient. (Appellant’s reply brief at 4 n.1.) However, there is nothing to 

support appellant’s assertion that one hour was inadequate to address the 

issues he wished to present. In fact, the prison official indicated that 

although the allotted time was almost up, he was willing to “postpone as 

long as I can.” (Notes of testimony, 1/23/15 at 49.)9 The court stated that 

they had one more witness and did not expect to be much longer. (Id.)

The only issues appellant identifies that he was purportedly unable to 

address during the PCRA hearing are 1) Attorney Kramer’s lack of 

preparation for trial; and 2) Attorney Rossman’s failure to challenge the 

SOAB report and appellant’s SVP classification. (Appellant’s brief at 30-34.) 

In fact, appellant did explore the issue of Attorney Kramer’s pre-trial 

preparation, including appellant’s allegation that he failed to hire an 

investigator or interview witnesses. (Notes of testimony, 1/23/15 at 19, 

41-42, 62-64.) Attorney Kramer testified that appellant never requested an 

investigator and there were no witnesses to interview. (Id. at 41, 62-64.) 

After the victim’s detailed and credible testimony, appellant accepted 

 

9 Appellant participated via video-conferencing from SCI Rockview.
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Attorney Kramer’s advice that it was in his best interest to enter a plea. 

(Id. at 42.)

Furthermore, the sentencing transcript indicates that 

Attorney Rossman did submit an expert report on appellant’s behalf, finding 

that appellant did not meet the statutory criteria for SVP status. (Notes of 

testimony, 4/23/10 at 37-38.) Therefore, appellant’s assertion that 

Attorney Rossman was ineffective for failing to challenge the SOAB’s findings 

is belied by the record. In addition, appellant cannot challenge his SVP 

status on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Masker, 34 A.3d 841 

(Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 846 (Pa. 2012) (a 

challenge to the classification of the defendant as an SVP is not a challenge 

to the conviction or sentence, and therefore is not cognizable under the 

PCRA). Because the registration requirements of Megan’s Law10 are 

collateral consequences of appellant’s conviction and are not considered part 

of his sentence, appellant’s challenge to SVP classification, even framed as a 

trial counsel ineffectiveness claim, falls outside the ambit of the PCRA. 

Masker.

Having determined that appellant’s issues on appeal are without merit 

and do not warrant relief, we will affirm the order of the PCRA court denying 

his petition.

 

10 Now called the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14, 9799.15.
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Appellant’s motion to supplement the record is granted. Order 

affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/23/2016