* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determ ined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED November 2, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50002 Summary Calendar ALAN E. DOOP, Individually, and as Next Friend of Marissa R. Doop, Justin Doop, and Wyatt A. Doop; CINDY LOU DOOP, Individually, and as Next Friend of Marissa R. Doop, Justin Doop, and Wyatt A. Doop, Pl aint iffs-Appellants,

versus THOMAS CHAPMAN, Etc.; ET AL., Defendants, THOMAS CHAPMAN, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services; ELLEN DECKINGA, Individually, and in her Official Capacity; KIM GIBBONS, Individually, and in her Official Capacity; GAIL BLACKWELL, Individually, and in her Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

----------------------------------------------------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Texas USDC No. 1:03-CV-802

------------------------------------------------------------------ Before DeMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *R. 47.5.4. -2-

Alan and Cindy Lou Doop, individually and as next friends of their mino r children, Wyatt, Justin, and Marissa, appeal the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of their claims against Thomas Chapman, the direct or of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (TDPRS), and TDPRS employees Ellen Deckinga, Kim Gibbons, and Gail Blackwell, individually and in their of ficial capacities. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunit y as to the Doops’s federal constitutional claims and t o state statutory and common-law of ficial immunit y wit h respect to their claims based on state tort law. The district court also concluded th at the claims based on the Texas Constitution were not cognizable claims under Texas law. On appeal, the Doops argue only that the defendants’ actions (1) violated the children’s Fourth Amendment rights, (2) vio lat ed Mr. and Mrs. Doops’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right of family int egrity, (3) vio lat ed the Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process; (4) and constituted various state torts. Alt hough the Doops also alleged violations of the Texas Constitution and the Texas Family Code in the district court, they do not brief t he district court’s conclusion th at Texas law provides no right of action fo r such vio lat io ns. Thus, these claims are deemed abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). In examining claims of qualified immunit y, we lo ok to (1) whether the facts, taken in the light

mo st f avorable to the pl aint iff, show that the state actors violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether, if a constitutional vio lat io n is made out on the facts alleged, the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the violation. See Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Keenan v. Tejeda , 290 F.3d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 2002).-3-

Wit h respect to the Fo urth Amendment claims, we conclude that the Doops fail to satisfy eit her prong. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable t o th e Doops, we cannot say th at the of ficials vio lat ed the children’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of seizure. There was evidence regarding whether Marissa had been abused. Although the invest igation may have been flawed, at the time, there was sufficient evidence to justify removing the children pending an invest igation of the abuse allegations. Further, given the state of the law in 2001, the application of the Fo urth Amendment to child welfare of ficials in this context had not been clearly established. See Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Reg. Servs

. , 299 F.3d 395, 411 (5th Cir. 2002)

. Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, we conclude th at there

was no vio lat io n. The summary judgment evidence does not establish that the state actors engaged in the ty pe of egr egious, conscience-shocking conduct necessary to establish a substantive due process vio lat io n. See McClendon v. City of Columbia , 305 F.3d 314, 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). In addition, we have not clearly defined the nebulous right to family int egr it y in this particular context. See Kiser v. Garrett , 67 F.3d 1166, 1173 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fourteenth Amendment proce dural due process claims fail. The Doops fail to demonstrate how the post-seizure court proceedings were constitutionally inadequate. Given our conclusion th at the officials’ actions were reasonable, the district court correctly concluded th at the defendants were immune from l iabilit y fo r the state l aw claims under both the statutory immunit y conferred by the Texas Family Cod e and the Texas com mo n-law doctrine of of ficial immunit y. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.