[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2022-Ohio-3579.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

GUDONAVON J. TAYLOR

Defendant-Appellant

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Appellate Case Nos. 29422 and 29423

Trial Court Case No. 2008-CR-1087

(Criminal Appeal from

Common Pleas Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 7th day of October, 2022.

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

 

GUDONAVON J. TAYLOR, Inmate No. A627-232, Trumbull Correctional Institution, P.O. 

Box 901, Leavittsburg, Ohio 44430

Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se

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DONOVAN, J.
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Gudonavon J. Taylor appeals pro se from a judgment 

of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his motion for leave to 

file a delayed motion for a new trial and his motion to vacate a void conviction. Taylor 

filed timely notices of appeal on March 15, 2022.1

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} We previously set forth the history of the case in State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 28276, 2019-Ohio-4485, and repeat it herein in pertinent part:

In 2010, a jury found Taylor guilty of three counts of murder, two 

counts of felonious assault, one count of discharging a firearm on or near a 

prohibited premises, and several firearm specifications. Following a bench 

trial, the trial court also found Taylor guilty of having weapons while under 

disability. After Taylor's conviction, the trial court merged several of the 

offenses and thereafter imposed a prison term of 15 years to life for murder, 

eight years for felonious assault, ten years for discharging a firearm on or 

near a prohibited premises, five years for having weapons while under 

disability, and three years for all of the firearm specifications. The trial court 

ordered all of the sentences to be served consecutively for a total, 

aggregate term of 41 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole.

Taylor filed a direct appeal from his conviction, and this court affirmed 

the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

1 Taylor separately appealed the trial court’s decision overruling his motion for leave to 

file a delayed motion for a new trial and his motion to vacate a void conviction, respectively 

Montgomery C.A. Nos. 29422 and 29423. We have consolidated the appeals. 
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No. 23990, 2013-Ohio-186 (“Taylor I”). This court later allowed Taylor to 

reopen his appeal, and he raised five additional assignments of error. After 

considering the new assignments of error, we again affirmed the trial court's 

judgment. See State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23990, 2014-Ohio3647 (“Taylor II”).

Three years later, in 2017, Taylor filed a pro se “motion to vacate 

unlawful sentence.” In support of that motion, Taylor argued that his 

sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment. The trial court overruled the motion, and Taylor 

appealed. On appeal, we found no error in the trial court's decision 

overruling the motion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State 

v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27879, 2018-Ohio-4628 (“Taylor III”).

While Taylor III was pending, Taylor filed a pro se “motion to correct 

allied offenses.” The trial court, however, denied the motion on grounds 

that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the matter due to the pending appeal in 

Taylor III. Taylor then filed a timely notice of appeal from that decision. In 

April 2019, we affirmed the trial court's decision denying Taylor's motion on 

jurisdictional grounds, and also found that the allied offense argument 

raised in the motion was barred by res judicata. See State v. Taylor, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 28166, 2019-Ohio-1376 (“Taylor IV”).

While Taylor IV was pending, Taylor filed a pro se “motion for 

resentencing.” In that motion, Taylor claimed that he was entitled to a 
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resentencing because his sentence was rendered void as a result of the 

trial court advising him that he would be subject to a single, five-yearmandatory term of post-release control. According to Taylor, the trial court 

should have instead notified him of the distinct term of post-release control 

that applied to each of his offenses. The trial court disagreed and 

overruled Taylor's motion upon finding that it had properly notified Taylor of 

his post-release control obligation. Taylor appealed, and we affirmed the 

judgment of the trial court holding that the trial court did not err in overruling 

his motion for resentencing because his sentence was not rendered void as 

a result of the trial court failing to notify appellant of the applicable term of 

post-release control for each of his offenses. See State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 28276, 2019-Ohio-4485, ¶ 11-12. (“Taylor V”). Rather,

we held that the trial court properly advised appellant of the single, longest 

term of post-release control that applied. Id. 

Motion for Leave to File a Delayed Motion for New Trial

{¶ 3} On January 26, 2022, Taylor filed a “Motion for Leave to File a Delayed 

Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Criminal Rule 33(B).” In his motion, Taylor argued that 

he should be granted a new trial for the following reasons: 1) the prosecutor committed 

plain error by knowingly using perjured testimony to convict him; 2) the prosecutor 

committed plain error by impermissibly suggested to the jury that in order for it to find 

Taylor not guilty, it would have to disbelieve the State’s witness and evidence; and 3) the 

trial court committed plain error by incorrectly instructing the jury that Taylor had the 
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burden of proof with respect to his alibi defense. Taylor also argued that he had been

unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for new trial within the 14 days required 

pursuant to Crim.R. 33(B) because he did not have access to the trial transcript until two 

months after the verdict was rendered, and “the only way [Taylor] could have discovered 

the misconduct by [the] Prosecutor and the error of law occurring at trial was if he had 

access to the transcript.” Motion for Leave, p. 1. Taylor also argued that his youth at 

the time of the trial should excuse his failure to file a timely motion for new trial.

{¶ 4} On February 24, 2022, the trial court overruled Taylor’s motion for leave to 

file a delayed motion for a new trial, finding that he had failed to establish that he had 

been unavoidably prevented from filing a timely motion for new trial because of the 

allegedly missing trial transcript. The trial court also noted that Taylor’s motion for leave 

was filed “not only outside of the 14 days required under Crim.R. 33(B), but comes over 

11 years after the jury rendered its guilty verdicts on March 30, 2010.” With respect to 

the arguments advanced in Taylor’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that they all 

lacked merit and were barred by res judicata. 

Motion to Vacate Void Conviction 

{¶ 5} On February 18, 2022, Taylor filed a “Motion to Vacate Void Conviction.” In 

the motion to vacate, Taylor contended that the trial court had lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the majority of the charges for which he was indicted because the juvenile 

court found probable cause that he had committed the two counts of murder charged in 

the original complaint, but the juvenile court failed to bind over the remaining counts for 

which Taylor had been indicted. In its decision overruling Taylor’s motion to vacate a 
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void a conviction, the trial court distinguished the main case relied upon by Taylor, State 

v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, __ N.E.3d __, finding that the common 

pleas court had had proper jurisdiction over all of the offenses for which Taylor was 

indicted and later convicted. The trial court also found that Taylor’s argument in his 

motion to vacate a void sentence was barred by res judicata and also barred as an 

untimely petition for post-conviction release.

{¶ 6} It is from these judgments that Taylor now appeals.

{¶ 7} Taylor’s first assignment of error is as follows:

APPELLANT’S STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 

WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS INDICTED AND CONVICTED ON 

CHARGES THAT WERE NEVER TRANSFERRED FROM THE JUVENILE 

COURT TO THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY COURT OF COMMON 

PLEAS.

{¶ 8} Taylor contends that the trial court did not properly bind his case over and/or 

that the general division of the common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to sentence 

him after he was found guilty by a jury on multiple counts and in a bench trial on one 

count. In support of his argument, Taylor relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision 

in Smith, which was decided on February 2, 2022. 

{¶ 9} Smith held that “[a] finding of probable cause is a jurisdictional prerequisite 

under R.C. 2152.12 to transferring a child to adult court for prosecution of an act charged.” 

Id. at ¶ 44. Smith further concluded that “[i]n the absence of a juvenile court's finding 

probable cause or making a finding that the child is unamenable to care or rehabilitation 
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within the juvenile system, no adult court has jurisdiction over acts that were charged in 

but not bound over by the juvenile court.” Id.

{¶ 10} In our view, Smith is clearly distinguishable from Taylor’s case. In Smith, 

the juvenile court found probable cause on two counts of aggravated robbery and one 

count of grand theft; however, with respect to the remaining charges in the complaint the 

court did not find probable cause and specifically stated the same. Id. at ¶ 9-10. 

Thereafter, the juvenile court conducted an amenability hearing and concluded that Smith 

was not amenable to the juvenile system, and it transferred his case to the general 

division for his prosecution as an adult for the acts for which the juvenile court had found 

probable cause. Id. at ¶ 10-11. After the case was transferred to the adult court, the 

State obtained a grand-jury indictment against Smith on eight counts that were identical 

to those that had been alleged in the original juvenile complaint, including those for which 

the juvenile court had found no probable cause and including firearm specifications on 

the aggravated-burglary counts and the grand-theft and theft counts. Id. at ¶ 12.

{¶ 11} Based upon actions taken by the State, Smith held “the General Division of 

the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 

Counts 4, 6, 7, and 8 and the firearm specifications because the juvenile court found that 

the acts related to those counts and specifications were not supported by probable cause 

and thus the juvenile court could not have made an amenability determination with regard 

to those acts.” Id. at ¶ 43. 

{¶ 12} Smith is distinguishable from this case. Taylor, who was 17 years old at 

the time, was charged by complaint in the juvenile court for two counts of murder, with a 
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firearm specification on count two. After the court heard testimony at the probable cause 

hearing, it found probable cause on the two murder counts and the firearm specification. 

After this finding of probable cause, Taylor was indicted on April 7, 2008, for three counts 

of murder, two counts of felonious assault, and one count of having weapons while under 

disability; each of the six counts carried a firearm specification. On April 18, 2008, Taylor 

was indicted for an additional count of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited 

premises, with a firearm specification.

{¶ 13} In our view, since Taylor was bound over by the juvenile court after it had 

found probable cause for the two murder counts and the firearm specification (the only 

charges in the complaint before the juvenile court), Taylor’s case does not involve the 

jurisdictional defects identified in Smith. Additionally, the general division of the common 

pleas court did have jurisdiction over Taylor after his case was transferred pursuant to 

R.C. 2151.23(H), which expressly provides:

The court to which the case is transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant 

to that section has jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer to hear and 

determine the case in the same manner as if the case originally had been 

commenced in that court, subject to section 2152.121 of the Revised Code, 

including, but not limited to, jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty or another 

plea authorized by Criminal Rule 11 or another section of the Revised Code 

and jurisdiction to accept a verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction 

pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure against the child for the 

commission of the offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case for 
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criminal prosecution, whether the conviction is for the same degree or a 

lesser degree of the offense charged, for the commission of a lesserincluded offense, or for the commission of another offense that is different 

from the offense charged.

{¶ 14} As noted by the trial court, this section has remained substantially the same 

since at least 2006 when 2007 Ohio S.B. 10 went into effect. Therefore, the version of 

this statute in effect when Taylor was charged, bound over, and found guilty by the 

Common Pleas Court was the same as it is today. Furthermore, nothing in Smith

changed or modified this statute. All of Taylor’s convictions were either for the offense 

for which he was transferred, or the commission of the offenses for which he was charged 

after his transfer, such as the weapons under disability or discharge of a firearm at or 

near a prohibited premises. All of these offenses occurred on the same day as the 

murder on December 7, 2007, and involved the same firearm as the murder.

{¶ 15} In general, “[a] new judicial ruling may be applied only to cases that are 

pending on the announcement date, and the new judicial ruling may not be applied 

retroactively to a conviction that has become final, that is, where the accused has 

exhausted all of his appellate remedies.” State v. Greathouse, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

24935, 2012-Ohio-2414, ¶ 6, citing Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-6592, 819 

N.E.2d 687; State v. Smith, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27294, 2017-Ohio-2684, ¶ 11. In 

Taylor’s case, it is undisputed that his convictions became final on March 11, 2015, after 

we affirmed his conviction in Taylor II, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined further 

review. See Taylor II, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23990, 2014-Ohio-3647, appeal not 
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accepted for review, State v. Taylor, 141 Ohio St.3d 1490, 26 N.E.3d 824, 2015-Ohio842. 

{¶ 16} Accordingly, Taylor’s convictions had been final for approximately seven 

years when he filed his motion to vacate a void conviction on February 18, 2022. 

Nevertheless, and without providing any support for his argument, Taylor argues that the 

Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, issued in February 2022, should be retroactively 

applied to render his convictions void. However, as previously stated, new judicial 

rulings may only be applied to cases that are pending on the announcement date, and 

the new judicial ruling may not be applied retroactively to a conviction that has become 

final because the accused has exhausted all of his appellate remedies. Greathouse at 

¶ 6. Because Taylor’s convictions became final in 2015, he cannot avail himself of the 

Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Smith, which was decided in 2022. 

{¶ 17} Taylor’s first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 18} Taylor’s second assignment of error states:

THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND 

DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GURANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT[S] OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION WHEN THE STATE KNOWINGLY USED FALSE 

EVIDENCE TO OBTAIN HIS CONVICTION.

{¶ 19} Taylor argues that the testimony of Louise Tamlyn, a State’s witness at trial, 

was completely unreliable because she perjured herself when she identified Taylor as the 

perpetrator of the shooting. Taylor also contends that the State was aware that Tamlyn 
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was lying but still permitted her to testify. 

{¶ 20} Upon review, we agree with the trial court and conclude that issues raised 

by Taylor regarding Tamlyn’s testimony in his motion for leave to file a delayed motion for 

new trial were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as he could have raised those issues

in his direct appeal and raised similar issues in other post-convictions motions. See State 

v. Videen, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27479, 2017-Ohio-8608, ¶ 20, citing State v. Russell, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1149, 2005-Ohio-4063, ¶ 6-7 (finding res judicata barred 

appellant from raising issues in his motion for new trial that could have been raised in his 

direct appeal). Significantly, the record establishes that Taylor did raise arguments 

relating to the prosecutor’s remarks during trial about Tamlyn’s credibility in his reopened 

appeal. See Taylor II at ¶ 35-51. In the reopened appeal, Taylor also made arguments 

relating to the credibility of witnesses in general, as well as a manifest weight argument.

Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it held that Taylor’s arguments were 

barred by res judicata.

{¶ 21} Because they are interrelated, Taylor’s third and fourth assignments of error 

will be discussed together as follows:

THE ADULT COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF 

APPELLANT BY PLACING ON HIM THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE 

DEFENSE OF ALIBI BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THEREBY, 

VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

THE ADULT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND DENIED 
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APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND DUE 

PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION[S] WHEN IT DENIED HIS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

A DELAYED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

{¶ 22} In his third assignment, Taylor argues that the trial court erred when it 

improperly instructed the jury by suggesting that Taylor had the burden of proving his alibi 

defense beyond a reasonable doubt. In his fourth assignment, Taylor argues that the 

trial court erred when it found that his motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new 

trial was untimely. As previously stated, Taylor was found guilty of the offenses by a jury 

on March 10, 2010. Taylor did not file his motion for leave to file a delayed motion for 

new trial until January 26, 2022, over 11 years beyond the 14-day time limitation for filing 

a motion for new trial.

{¶ 23} Crim.R. 33(B) states as follows:

(B) Motion for New Trial; Form, Time. Application for a new trial shall be 

made by motion which, except for the cause of newly discovered evidence, 

shall be filed within fourteen days after the verdict was rendered, or the 

decision of the court where a trial by jury has been waived, unless it is made 

to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably 

prevented from filing his motion for a new trial, in which case the motion 

shall be filed within seven days from the order of the court finding that the 

defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing such motion within the 

time provided herein.
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{¶ 24} Regarding a hearing on a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, 

this Court has noted:

* * * We have held that a defendant is entitled to such a hearing if he 

submits “documents that on their face support his claim that he was 

unavoidably prevented from timely discovering the evidence” at issue. 

State v. York, [2d Dist. Greene No. 1999-CA-54, 2000 WL 192433 (Feb. 18, 

2000)], citing State v. Wright (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 827, 828 * * * (finding 

affidavits sufficient to warrant a hearing on whether the defendant was 

unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which his request 

for a new trial relied). Notably, the documents at issue in York and Wright 

were affidavits from prosecution witnesses recanting their trial testimony 

against the defendant.

State v. McConnell, 170 Ohio App.3d 800, 2007-Ohio-1181, 869 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 19 (2d 

Dist.).

{¶ 25} In order to file a motion for new trial after the expiration of the time periods 

specified in Crim.R. 33(B), a defendant must first seek leave of the trial court to file a 

delayed motion. State v. Lanier, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009-CA-84, 2010-Ohio-2921, ¶ 15, 

citing State v. Warwick, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2001-CA-33, 2002 WL 1585663, *2 (July 

19, 2002); State v. Parker, 178 Ohio App.3d 574, 2008-Ohio-5178, 899 N.E.2d 183, ¶ 16 

(2d Dist.). “To obtain leave, defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing 

evidence that he or she was unavoidably prevented from timely filing the motion for a new 

trial or discovering the new evidence within the time period provided by Crim.R. 33(B).” 
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(Citations omitted.) Warwick at *2. “A defendant is entitled to a hearing on a motion for 

leave to seek a new trial if he submits documents that on their face support his claim of 

being unavoidably prevented from meeting Crim.R. 33’s time requirement.” State v. 

Hiler, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27364, 2017-Ohio-7636, ¶ 12, citing Lanier at ¶ 16.

{¶ 26} “ ‘[A] party is unavoidably prevented from filing a motion for new trial if the 

party had no knowledge of the existence of the ground supporting the motion for new trial 

and could not have learned of the existence of that ground within the time prescribed for 

filing the motion for new trial in the exercise of reasonable diligence.’ ” Parker at ¶ 16, 

quoting State v. Walden, 19 Ohio App.3d 141, 145-146, 483 N.E.2d 859 (10th Dist.1984). 

“[A] defendant fails to demonstrate that he or she was unavoidably prevented from 

discovering new evidence when he would have discovered that information earlier had 

he or she exercised due diligence and some effort.” State v. Lenoir, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 26846, 2016-Ohio-4981, ¶ 24, citing State v. Metcalf, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26101, 

2015-Ohio-3507, ¶ 11.

{¶ 27} Normally, “[w]e review a trial court's ruling on a Crim.R. 33 motion for an 

abuse of discretion.” State v. Thompson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25016, 2012-Ohio4862, ¶ 7. “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, 

arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citation omitted.) AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place 

Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 

(1990).

{¶ 28} The evidence on which Taylor relied in support of his motion for leave to file 

a delayed motion for new trial consisted of the following: 1) the trial testimony of Tamlyn, 
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which Taylor alleges was perjured; 2) the prosecutor’s remarks in opening statements 

and closing arguments regarding Tamlyn’s testimony; and 3) the trial court’s instruction 

to the jury regarding Taylor’s alibi defense. Here, Taylor contends that he was 

unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for leave within 14 days because it took him 

over two months to obtain a copy of the trial transcript. We have already addressed this 

issue in State v. Hutchinson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17852, 2000 WL 262650 (Mar. 10, 

2000). In Hutchinson, we held that obtaining a copy of a transcript before filing a motion 

for a new trial is not sufficient proof to show any petitioner was unavoidably prevented 

from filing a timely motion for a new trial. Id. We also stated:

Although Hutchinson said he was indigent and was not entitled to free 

transcripts of the proceedings until his direct appeal was filed, he was in the 

same position as any other indigent defendant. For that matter, 

Hutchinson was in the same position as any convicted defendant. Due to 

the short time limits for filing motions for new trial, the transcript of the trial 

proceedings is typically unavailable, even to litigants who can pay. 

Furthermore, the transcript is not needed...[and as] a final point, we note 

that both the trial court and the litigants ought to be familiar with the 

evidence in a case which has just been heard. 

Id. at *7.

{¶ 29} Here, the record establishes that Taylor was present during the entirety of 

his jury trial, so he was aware of the statements made by all parties, including the 

witnesses and the prosecuting attorneys, and of the trial court’s jury instructions. 
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Furthermore, the record establishes that he and his trial counsel were provided a copy of 

the jury instructions prior to their being read to the jury, and the version of the alibi 

instruction given by the trial court was requested by Taylor and given without objection. 

See 2 Ohio Jury Instructions CR 421.03.2 We also note that any issues regarding the 

jury instructions could have been argued by Taylor in his direct appeal from his 

convictions, but were not, and are therefore barred by res judicata. 

{¶ 30} Finally, Taylor’s “juvenile status” at the time of his trial cannot form the basis 

for an excuse from filing a timely motion for leave to file a motion for new trial pursuant to 

Crim.R. 33(B). 

{¶ 31} In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err when it held 

that Taylor’s motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial was untimely, and that 

he failed to establish that he was unavoidably prevented filing said motion in a timely 

manner.

{¶ 32} Taylor’s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

{¶ 33} All of Taylor’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed. 

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“1. The defendant claims that he was at some other place at the time the offense 

occurred. This is known as an alibi. The word ‘alibi’ means elsewhere or a different 

place. If the evidence fails to establish that the defendant was elsewhere, such failure 

does not create an inference that the defendant was present at the time when and at the 

place where an offense may have been committed. If, after a consideration of the 

evidence of alibi along with all the evidence, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant was present at the time in question, you must return a verdict of 

not guilty.”
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EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr.

Andrew T. French

Gudonavon J. Taylor

Hon. Robert G. Hanseman

Hon. William H. Wolff, Jr., Visiting Judge