D A 0 9

- 0 1 0 0

I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U

R T O F T H E S T

A T E O F M O N T

A N A

2 0 0 9 M T 3 3 3

S C O T T S L A U S O N

,

P l a i n t i f f

, A p p e l l a n t a n d C r o s s

- A p p e l l e e

,

v

.

M A R O Z Z O P L U

M B I N G A N D H E A T

I N G

, L L C

,

D e f e n d a n t

, A p p e l l e e a n d C r o s s

- A p p e l l a n t

.

A P P E A L F R O M : District Court of the Nin e teenth Judicial District,

I n a n d F o r t h e C o u

n t y o f L i n c o l n

, C a u s e N o

. D V 0 8

- 0 4 6

H o n o r a b l e C

. B

. M c N e i l

, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e

C O U N S E L O F R E C O R D :

F o r A p p e l l a n t :

A m y N

. G u t h

, A t t o r

n e y a t L a w

, L i

b b y

, M o n t a n a

F o r A p p e l l e e :

H e a t h e r M c D o u g a l l

, A t t o r n e y a t L a w

, T r o y

, M o n t a n a

S u b m i t t e d o n B r i e f

s : S e p t e m b e r 1 6

, 2 0 0 9

D e c i d e d : O c t o b e r 1 3

, 2 0 0 9

F i l e d :

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C l e r k October 14 20092

J u s t i c e J a m e s C

. N e l s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t

.

¶ 1 Scott Slauson appeals, and Marozzo Heating and Plumbing, LLC ( “ Marozzo ” )

c r o s s

- a p p e a l s

, f

r o m t h e o r d e r o f t h e N i n e t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t

, L i n c o l n C o u n t y

,

g r a n t i n g i n p a r t a

n d d e n y i n g i n p a r t t h e p a r t i e s ’ s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n s

. W e a f f i r m

.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Referring to the diagram below, t his case concerns a prescriptive easement over

Tract B (Slauson’s north property) in favor of Tract A (Marozzo’s property). Slauson

a l s o o w n s T r a c t C ( S l a u s o n ’ s s o u t h p r o p e r t y )

. T h e s e p r o p e r t i e s a r e s i t u a t e d a l o n g U

. S

.

H i g h w a y 2 o n t

h e s o u t h e a s t e r n o u t s k i r t s o f L i b b y

, M o n t a n a

.



## A

B

C3

¶ 3 The prescriptive easement over Tract B was established prior to M a r o z z o ’ s

a c q u i s i t i o n o f T r a c t A

. B e f o r e M a r o z z o

, T r a c t A w a s o w n e d b y N e i l B e r t e l s e n a n d

P h y l l i s A

. B e r t e lsen as trustees of the Bertelsen Family Trust (“Bertelsen”)

. I n 1987,

Bertelsen leased the property to Amerigas ( w h i c h w a s m a n a g

e d b y N e i l B e r t e l s e n ’ s

s o n

- i n

- l a w )

. D u r i n g i t s l e a s e

, A m e r i g a s c o n s t r u c t e d o r p l a c e d a n u m

b e r o f i m p r o v e m e n t s

o n T r a c t B

, i n c l u d i n g f

i x t u r e s a n d a d r i v

e w a y / p a r k i n g l o t

. I

n a d d i t i o n

, B e r t e l s e n i n s t a l l e d

s o m e l a n d s c a p i n g ( r a i l r o a d t i e s

, s h r u b s

, a n d w a s h e d r o c k

) o n T r a c t B i n t h e m

i d

- 1 9 9 0 s

.

A m e r i g a s l e a s e d T r a c t A f r o m J u n e 1 9 8 7 t o A

u g u s t 2 0 0 7

, w

h e n i t t e r m i n a t e d t h e l e a s e

a n d v a c a t e d t h e p r e m i s e s

. B e r t e l s e n then sold Tract A to Marozzo in December 200 7

.

¶ 4 M e a n w

h i l e

, S l a u s o n p u r c h a s e d T r a c t C i n O c t o b e r 2 0 0 2

. W h i l e r e s e a r c h i n g t h e

p u r c h a s e o f t h i s p r o p e r t y

, h e n o t i c e d t h a t the land constituting Tract B was not part of

B e r t e l s e n ’ s p r o p e r t y

. R a t h e r

, i t b e l o n g

e d t o A l m a E d w a r d s

, w

h o o w n e d a l a r g

e t r a c t o f

l a n d o n t h e opposite side of Highway 2. Apparently, Tract B had been split off from

E d w a r d s ’ l a r g

e r t r a c t w

h e n t h e h i g

h w a y w a s c o n s t r

u c t e d

. E d w a r d s

, h o w e v

e r

, w a s n o t

a w a r e t h a t s h e o w

n e d T r a c t B

. M o r e o v

e r

, t h e p r o p e r t y h a

d n e v e r b e e n s e p a r a t e l y

i d e n t i f i e d b y d e e d a n d w a s n o t o n t h e L i n c o l n C o u n t y t a x r o l e s

. T o a v o i d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

o f a p r o p e r

t y t a x l i a b i l i t y

, E d w a r d s transfer red Tract B to Slauson in July 2003.

¶ 5 S l a u s o n t h e n h a d T r a c t B s u r v e y e d

. T h e s u r v

e y s h o w e d t h a t A m e r i g a s w a s u s i n g

T r a c t B f o r i t s c u s t o m e r s t o a c c e s s t h e A m e r i g a s o f f i c e a n d t o p a r k

. I

n a d d i t i o n

, t

h e

s u r v e y s h o w e d t h a t s e v

e r a l o f t h e i m

p r o v e m e n t s w

h i c h A m e r i g a s h a d c o n s t r u c t e d

,

i n c l u d i n g a p o r t i o n o f t w o c h ain

- l i n k f e n c e s a n d a “ c o n

t r o l b o x u n i t ” p r o t e c t e d b y t h r e e

c o n c r e t e p o s t s

, w e r e e n c r o a c h i n g o n T r a c t B

.4

¶ 6 S l a u s o n c o n t a c t e d t h e M o n t a n a D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n

, w h i c h d i s c h a r g

e d

i t s e a s e m e n t o v

e r T r a c t B

, a n d h e c o n t a c t e d t h e L i n c o l n C o u n

t y C l e r k and R ecorder ’ s

O f f i c e

, w h i c h p l a c e d t h e p r o p e r t y b a c k o n t h e t a x r o l e s

. H e t h e n a p p r o a c h e d A m e r i g a s

a n d B e r t e l s e n a

n d o f f e r e d t o l e a s e T r a c t B t o B e r t e l s e n

. B e r t e l s e n

, h o w e v e r

, c l a i m e d a

r i g h t t o c o n t i n u e u s i n g t h e p r

o p e r t y

.

¶ 7 S l a u s o n t

h u s f i l e d s u i t i n D e c e m

b e r 2 0 0 4 a g

a i n s t B e r t e l s e n ( b u t n o t A m e r i g a s ) t o

e n f o r c e h i s p r o p e r

t y r i g h t s a n d r e c o v

e r c o m p e n s a t i o n a n d d a m a g

e s

. B e r t e l s e n r e s p o n d e d

t h a t h e h a d a c q

u i r e d T r a c t B t h r o u g

h a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n or that he had acquired a

prescriptive easement allowing Amerigas to use Tract B

. The District Court agreed with

B e r t e l s e n ’ s l a t t e r t

h e o r y

. I n i t s N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 5 F i n d i n g s o f F a c t

, C o n c l u s i o n s o f L a w

,

a n d J u d g m e n t

, t h e c o u r

t c o n c l u d e d that “Bertelsen and Amerigas have used [Tract B] in

an open, notorious, exclusive, adve rse, continuous, and uninterrupted manner since 1987”

and, thus

, that “[t]he Bertelsens and its lessee, Amerigas, have established a prescriptive

easement to maintain the improvements and to transact Amerigas’s business ” o n T r a c t B

.

T h e c o u r t r

u l e d t h a t t h e e a s e m e n t w a s l i m

i t e d i n s c o p e t o t

h e u s e s ( i n g

r e s s

, e g r e s s

, a n d

c u s t o m e r p a r k i n g

) a n d e n c r o a c h m e n t s w h i c h e x i s t e d a s o f D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4

, but that

Bertelsen and Amerigas w e r e e n t i t l e d “ t o m a i n t a i n t h e p r o p e r t y ( s n o w p l o w i n g

, e t c

. ) a s

n e c e s s a r y t o f

a c i l i t a t e t h e u s e s w

h i c h t h e y h a v

e a c q u i r e d t

h e r i g h t h e r e i n t o c o n t i n

u e

. ”

¶ 8 T h i s C o u r t a f

f i r m e d i n Slauson v. Bertelsen Family Trust , 2006 MT 314, ¶ 23, 335

Mont. 43, 151 P.3d 866

. W e c o n c l u d e d t h a t “ B e r t e l s e n

. . . e s t a b l i s h e d t

h e e l e m e n t s

n e c e s s a r y t o a c q u i r e a p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t o f [ T r a c t B ] , including that the use was open

a n d n o t o r i o u s a n d a d v

e r s e

. ” Slauson , ¶ 1 9. We thus “ a f f i r m [ e d ] t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s5

determination that Bertelsen has established a prescriptive easement to use Slauson’s

property for an access and parking lot, and agree[d] with the District Court’s

p r o n o u n c e m e n t t h a t t h e e a s e m e n t i s l i m i t e d t o t h e s e e x i s t i n g u s e s

. ” Slauson , ¶ 23.

¶ 9 A s n o t e d

, B e r t e l s e n s o l d T r a c t A t o M a r o z z o i n D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 7

. S h o r

t l y

t h e r e a f t e r

, a d i s p u t e a r

o s e b e t w e e n S l a

u s o n a n d M a r o z z o c o n c e r n i n g t h e u s e o f T r a c t B

.

S l a u s o n u l t i m a t e l y c o m m e n c e d t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n a g a i n s t M a r o z z o in February 200 8

,

asserting that Marozzo had trespassed on and used Slauson’s property “in ways not

authorized by law,” including piling snow and placing equipment in such a manner as to

interfere with Slauson ’ s e n j o y m e n t o f h i s p r o p e r t y

. M a r o z z o c o u n

t e r s u e d f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e

w i t h t h e s c o p e o f t h e e a s e m e n t

. M a r o z z o c l a i m e d t h a

t i t h a d a l e g

a l r i g h t t o u s e T r a c t B

,

t h a t i t w a s e n t i t l e d t o u s e t h e p r o p e r t y in the same manner as Amerigas and Bertelsen had

used it , and that it had not exceeded the e a s e m e n t ’ s s c o p e

. M a r o z z o a l s o a s s e r t e d a c l a i m

f o r c o n v e r s i o n

, a l l e g

i n g t h a t S l a

u s o n h a d w r o n g f u l l y r e m o v

e d l a n d s c a p i n g t i m

b e r s a n d

rock from Tract B. Marozzo requested costs and attorney’s fees.

¶ 1 0 T h e p a r t i e s f

i l e d c r o s s

- m o t i o n s f

o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t

. R e l y i n g o n L e i c h t f u s s v

.

D a b n e y , 2005 MT 271, 329 Mont. 129, 122 P.3d 1220, Slauson argued that the

p r e s c r i p t i v

e e a s e m e n t h a d b e e n c r e a t e d t h r o u g h A m e r i g a s ’ s u s e o f T r a c t B

, t h a t A m e r i g a s

h a d b e e n a l e s s e e o f T r a c t A

, a n d t h a t a n e a s e m e n t c r e a t e d i n f

a v o r o f a n e s t a t e l e s s t h a n a

f ee simple (such as a lease) terminates when that e state ends. The District Court,

however, concluded that the “identical legal is s u e s ” a n d t h e f i n a l j u d g m e n t s r e n d e r e d i n

S l a u s o n were dispositive here. The court then reasoned that M a r o z z o w a s “ i n p r i v

i t y ”

w i t h B e r t e l s e n a n d t h a

t t h e e a s e m e n t o v

e r T r a c t B h a d p a s s e d t o M a r o z z o w i t h t h e s a l e o f6

T r a c t A

. T h e c o u r t a w a r d e d M a r o z z o $ 4 1 8

. 6 0 f o r t h e l a n d s c a p i n g S l a u s o n h a d r e m o v e d

f r o m T r a c t B

, awarded Slauson $430.00 for the costs of removing snow piled by Marozzo

on Slauson’s property south of the area subject to the easement

, but denied Marozzo’s

request for costs and a t

t o r n e y ’ s f e e s

.

ISSUES

¶ 1 1 Slauson presents the following issue on appeal: Did the easement over Tract B

survive the extinguishment of Amerigas’s leasehold? In addition

, he asserts, essentially

a s a n a f t e r t h o u g h t a t t h e e n d o f h i s o p e n i n g b r i e f

, t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t “ e r r e d i n

o r d e r i n g S l a u s o n t o p a y d a m a g e s t o M a r o z z o f

o r r e m o v a l o f p e r s o n a l p r

o p e r t y a b a

n d o n e d

b y A m e r i g

a s

. ” H o w e v e r

, h e p r e s e n t s n o a r g u m e n t

, w i t h c i t a t i o n t o a u t h o r i t y

, i n s u p p o r

t

o f t h i s a s s e r t i o n

, a n d w e t h e r e f o r e w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r i t

. See Marx v. Belgr ade Volunteer

Firefighters Relief Assn. , 2008 MT 410, ¶¶ 12

- 13, 347 Mont. 256, 198 P.3d 247.

¶ 1 2 Marozzo presents the following cross

- appeal issue: Should Marozzo be awarded

attorney’s fees? In addition, Marozzo asserts in its Summary of the Argument that

“M arozzo is not responsible for the cost of removing the snow piles since it is within the

e s t a b l i s h e d s c o p e o f t h e e a s e m e n t

. ” Y e t

, S l a u s o n f i l e d a n a f

f i d a v i t ( w i t h a t t a c h e d

d o c u m e n t a

t i o n ) i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e d t h a

t M a r o z z o p l a c e d t h e s n o w

p i l e s o u t s i d e t h e a r e a s u b j e c t t o t h e e a s e m e n t

, t h a t t

h e s n o w p i l e s p r e v

e n t e d a c c e s s

b e t w e e n S l a

u s o n ’ s n o r

t h a n d s o u t h p r o p e r t i e s ( T r a c t s B a n d C

, r e s p e c t i v e l y )

, a n d t h a

t i t

c o s t h i m $ 4 3 0

. 0 0 t o r e m o v e t h e s n o w

. A

n d a s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t n o t e d

, M a r o z z o d i d n o t

r e f u t e t h i s a m o u n t o r t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e p i l e s

. L i k e w i s e o n a p p e a l

, M a r o z z o u

t t e r l y f a i l s

to show t h a

t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s a n a l y s i s w a s i n e r r o r

. M a r o z z o a s s e r t s t h a t t h e e a s e m e n t7

“included snow piling

, ” b u t M a r o z z o d o e s n o t a d d r e s s t h e f

a c t t h a t t h e p i l e s w e r e p l a c e d

o u t s i d e t h e a r e a s u b

j e c t t o t h e e a s e m e n t

. M a r o z z o s i m p l y offers the rather flippant

observation that “Slauson could have let the snow piles melt rather than intentionally

i n c u r r i n g c o s t s

. ” T h u s

, M a r o z z o h a v i n g f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t a n a p p r o p r i a t e a r g

u m e n t i n

s u p p o r t o f its position , we will not consider this matter any further

. Marx

, ¶

¶ 1 2

- 1 3

.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 1 3 W e r e v

i e w d e n o v

o a d i s t r i c t c o u r t ’ s r

u l i n g o n a m o t i o n f

o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t

,

a p p l y i n g t h e c r i t e r i a s e t f o r t h i n M

. R

. C i v

. P . 56. Arnold v. Yellowstone Mountain Club

,

LLC, 2004 MT 284, ¶ 1 2

, 3 2 3 M o n t

. 2 9 5

, 1 0 0 P

. 3 d 1 3 7

. S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t “ s h a l l b e

r e n d e r e d f

o r t h w i t h i f t h e p l e a d i n g s

, d e p o s i t i o n s

, a n s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s

, a n d

a d m i s s i o n s o n f

i l e

, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a f

f i d a v i t s

, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

l a w

. ” M

. R

. C i v

. P

. 5 6 ( c )

. W h e r e t h e m a t e r i a l f

a c t s a r e u n d i s p u t e d

, t h e c o u r t m u s t

s i m p l y i d e n t i f

y t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w

, a

p p l y i t t o t

h e u n c o n t r

o v e r t e d f a c t s

, a n d d e t e r m

i n e

w h o p r e v a i l s

. See Corporate Air v. Edwards Jet Center

, 2 0 0 8 M T 2 8 3

, ¶ 2 8

, 3 4 5 M o n t

.

3 3 6

, 1 9 0 P

. 3 d 1 1 1 1

.

D I S C U S S I O N

¶ 1 4 I s s u e 1

. D i

d t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t o v e

r T r a c t B s u r v i v e t

h e e x t i n g u i s h m e n t

of Amer igas’s leasehold?

¶ 1 5 Slauson contends t h a t t h e e a s e m e n t o v

e r T r a c t B c e a s e d t o e x i s t w h e n A m e r i g

a s ’ s

l e a s e o f T r a c t A e n d e d

. H e a r g u e s t h a t A m e r i g

a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e q

u i s i t e e l e m e n t s o f a

p r e s c r i p t i v

e u s e a n d t h a

t a p r e s c r i p t i v

e e a s e m e n t e s t a b l i s h e d b y a l e s s e e t e r m i n a t e s a t t h e8

e n d o f t h e l e a s e h o l d

. H e a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e e a s e m e n t e s t a b l i s h e d b y A m e r i g a s w a s i n

g r o s s a n d t h a

t a n e a s e m e n t i n g

r o s s t e r m i n a t e s w i t h t h e e state that benefitted from it.

¶ 1 6 A d d r e s s i n g S l a u s o n ’ s s e c o n d p o i n t f i r s t

, w e d o n o t a g

r e e t h a t t h e e a s e m e n t w a s i n

g r o s s

. An easement

—

which is a nonpossessory interest in land that gives a person the

right to use the land of another for a specific purpose

— may be “appurtenant” or “in

g r o s s

. ” Taylor v. Montana Power Co.

, 2 0 0 2 M T 2 4 7

, ¶ 1 1

, 3 1 2 M o n t

. 1 3 4

, 5 8 P

. 3 d 1 6 2 ;

Blazer v. Wall

, 2 0 0 8 M T 1 4 5

, ¶ 2 4

, 3 4 3 M o n t

. 1 7 3

, 1 8 3 P

. 3 d 8 4

. A n e a s e m e n t

a p p u r t e n a n t i s o n e t h a t b e n e f

i t s a p a r t i c u l a r p a r c e l o f l a n d

, i

. e

. , i t s e r v e s t h e o w n e r o f t h a t

l a n d a n d p a s s e s w i t h t h e t i t l e t o t h a t l a n d

. T h e b e n e f

i t e d p a r c e l i s k

n o w n a s t h e d o m

i n a n t

t e n e m e n t o r e s t a t e

, a n d t h e b u r d e n e d p a r c e l i s t e r m e d t h e s e r v i e n t t e n e m e n t o r e s t a t e

.

Blazer

, ¶ 2 4

. A

n e a s e m e n t i n g

r o s s

, b y c o n t r a s t

, b e

n e f i t s t h e h o l d e r o f t h e e a s e m e n t

p e r s o n a l l y

, i

. e

. , n o t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s o r h e r o w n e r s h i p o r u s e o f a p a r t i c u l a r p a r c e l

o f l a n d

. T h u s

, w i t h a

n e a s e m e n t i n g

r o s s

, n o d o m

i n a n t t e n e m e n t e x i s t s a n d t h e e a s e m e n t

r i g h t d o e s n o t p a s s w i t h t h e t i t l e t o a n y l a n d

. Blazer , ¶ 24.

¶ 1 7 A s w e r e c e n t l y e x p l a i n e d i n B r o a d

w a t e r D e v e l

o p m e n t

, L L C v

. N

e l s o n

, 2 0 0 9 M T

3 1 7

, 3 5 2 M o n t

. 4 0 1

,

_ _

_ P

. 3 d

_ _ _ , w e d e t e r m

i n e w h e t h e r a n e x

p r e s s l y c r e a t e d e a s e ment

is appurtenant or in gross based on a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s ( e

. g

. , § § 7 0

- 1 7

- 1 0 1

a n d

- 102, MCA) and “ t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s a s a s c e r t a i n e d f r o m t h e l a

n g u a g e o f t h e

i n s t r u m e n t a n d a i d e d

, i f n e c e s s a r y

, b y t h e s i t u a t i o n o f t h e p r

o p e r t i e s i n v

o l v e d

, t h e

o b j e c t i v e c i r c u m s t a n c e s e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e o f e x e c u t i o n

, a n d t h e p u r p o s e t o b e

accomplished by the easement

. ” Broadwater Development

, ¶ 3 4

. H e r e

, b e c a u s e w e a r e

c o n s i d e r i n g a p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t

, a s o p p o s e d t o a n e x p r e s s e a s e m e n t

, t

h e r e i s n o9

i n s t r u m e n t t o e x a m

i n e

, a n d w e m

u s t l o o k i n s t e a d t o t h e s i t u a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s

i n v o l v e d

, t h e p u r

p o s e t o b e a c c o m

p l i s h e d b y t h e e a s e m e n t

, a n d t h e n a t u r e o f t h e

e n j o y m e n t b y w

h i c h i t w a s a c q u i r e d

. See § 70

- 17

- 1 0 6

, M C A ( “ T h e e x t e n t o f a s e r v i t u d e

i s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e t e r m s o f t h e g r a n t o r the nature of the enjoyment by which it was

acquired

. ” ( e m

p h a s i s a d d e d ) ) ; c

f

. L e i c h t f u s s

, ¶ 4 2 ( b e c a

u s e t h e e a s e m e n t a t i s s u e h a d

b e e n c r e a t e d b y p r e s c r i p t i v e u s e

, t h e r e w e r e n o w r i t t e n t e r m s f r o m w h i c h w e c o u l d

d i s c e r n t h e parties’ intent; thus, our inquiry focused on “the expectations the

c i r c u m s t a n c e s s h o u l d r e a s o n a b l y h a v e e n g e n d e r e d i n t h e p a r

t i e s ” )

. T h e f

a c t t h a t t h e

e a s e m e n t b e n e f

i t s t h e o w n e r o f a p a r t i c u l a r t r a c t

, a d d s t o t h e e n j o y m e n t o f a n o t h e r p a r c e l

,

o r i s o f n o v

a l u e u n l e s s u s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h p a r t i c u l a r l a n d s u g g e s t s a p p u r t e n a

n c e

.

B r o a d w a t e r D e v e l o p m e n t

, ¶ 3 4

. F u r

t h e r m o r e

, w e b e g

i n w i t h t h e p r e s u m

p t i o n t h a t t h e

e a s e m e n t i s a p p u r t e

n a n t

. Broadwater Development , ¶ 34.

¶ 1 8 H e r e

, t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o i n d i c a t e t h a t A m e r i g a s o r B e r t e l s e n c o n t e m p l a t e d t h a

t

t h e i r u s e o f T r a c t B w a s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e i r u s e o f T r a c t A

. T o t h e c o n t r a r y

, t h e r e c o r d

r e f l e c t s t h a t they used Tract B in connection with Tract A. In fact, the purpose of the

easement was to facilitate Amerigas’s business operations on Tract A , and this use is the

manner by which the easement was established

. N o t a b l y

, “ t h e r i g h t o f t r a n s a c t i n g

b u s i n e s s u p o n l a

n d ” i s s t a t u

t o r i l y r e c o g

n i z e d a s a t y

p e o f e a s e m e n t a p p u r t e

n a n t

, s e e

§ 7 0

- 1 7

- 1 0 1 ( 6 )

, M C A

, b u t i s n o t l i s t e d a s a t y p e o f e a s e m e n t i n g

r o s s

, see § 7 0

- 1 7

- 1 0 2

,

M C A

. T h e r e a l s o i s n o t h i n g t o i n d i c a t e t h a t A m e r i g a s o r B e r t e l s e n e x p e c t e d t o r e t a i n a

p e r s o n a l

, n o n p o s s e s s o r y i n t e r e s t i n T r a c t B r a t h e r t h a n h a v e t h e e a s e m e n t p a s s w i t h t h e

t i t l e t o T r a c t A

. A l l o f t h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e e a s e m e n t i s a p p u r t e n a n t

.10

¶ 1 9 S l a u s o n ’ s c i t a t i o n s t o R a s m u s s e n v

. F o w l e r , 245 Mont. 308, 800 P.2d 1053 (1990),

in support of his “in gros s ” t h e o r y a r e u n a v a i l i n g

. F o r o n e t h i n g

, t h e R a s m u s s e n Court

did not hold that “[a] lessee is not entitled to an easement appurtenant” or that “[a]

prescriptive easement created for the benefit of an interest less than fee simple is not

a p p u r t e n a n t

. ” T h e C o u r

t d i d o b s e r v

e t h a t R a s m

u s s e n

, w h o h e l d a n a g r i c u l t u r a l l e a s e o n

2 0 0 a c r e s o f s t a t e l a n d

, c o u l d n o t h a v e a n e a s e m e n t a p p u r t e

n a n t t o t h e s t a t e l a

n d o v e r

F o w l e r ’ s l a n d

. R a s m u s s e n

, 2 4 5 M o n t

. a t 3 1 3

, 8 0 0 P

. 2 d a t 1 0 5 6

. B u t t h e C o u r t c i t e d n o

a u t h o r i t y i n s u p p o r

t o f t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n

, a

n d t h i s p o r

t i o n o f t h e o p i n i o n w a s a r g u a b l y

d i c t u m i n a n y e v

e n t

, g i v e n t h a t t h e C o u r

t h a d a l r e a d y h e l d t h a

t a p u b l i c e a s e m e n t e x i s t e d

t o a c c e s s t h e s t a t e l a n d

, s e e R a s m u s s e n

, 2 4 5 M o n t

. a t 3 1 2

, 8 0 0 P

. 2 d a t 1 0 5 6

. M o r e o v

e r

,

t h e f a c t s a n d h o l d i n g o f Leichtfuss

— w h e r e w e c o n c l u d e d t

h a t a p r e s c r i p t i v

e e a s e m e n t i n

f a v o r o f a l i f

e e s t a t e m a y s u r v

i v e t h e e x t i n g

u i s h m e n t o f t h e l i f

e e s t a t e a n d p a s s t o a

s u b s e q u e n

t p u r c h a s e r o f t h a t l a

n d

, see Leichtfuss , ¶¶ 37

- 45

— directly contradict Slauso n ’ s

a s s e r t i o n t h a t a p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t c r e a t e d f

o r t h e b e n e f

i t o f a n i n t e r e s t l e s s t h a n f e e

s i m p l e c a n n o t b e a p p u r t e

n a n t

. W e c o n c l u d e t

h a t t h e p r e s c r i p t i v

e e a s e m e n t o v

e r T r a c t B

i s a p p u r t e n a

n t

.

¶ 2 0 T h e r e i s n o q u e s t i o n t h a t t h i s e a s e m e n t p a s s e d t o M a r o z z o i f i t w a s a t t a c h e d t o

T r a c t A a t t h e t i m e o f t h e B e r t e l s e n

- Marozzo sale

. See Burleson v. Kinsey Cartwright

,

2000 MT 278, ¶ 1 6

, 3 0 2 M o n t

. 1 4 1

, 1 3 P

. 3 d 3 8 4 ( “ A t r a n s f e r o f r e a l p r o p e r t y p a s s e s a l l

e a s e m e n t s a t t a c h e d t o i t

. S e c t i o n 7 0

- 2 0

- 3 0 8

, M C A

. T h u s

, t he valid conveyance of real

p r o p e r t y c o n v e y s a l l e a s e m e n t s t h a t a t t a c h t o t h e p r o p e r t y

. ” ) ; accord Leichtfuss

, ¶ 2 9 ; s e e

a l s o J o n W

. B r

u c e & J a m e s W

. E l y

, J

r

. , T h e L a w o f E a s e m e n t s a n d L i c e n s e

s i n L a n d11

§ 9:1, 9

- 4 (2009) (hereinafter “ Bruce & Ely ” ) (“Appurte nant easements acquired by

p r e s c r i p t i o n a r e

, o f c o u r s e

, t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h t h e d o m

i n a n t e s t a t e

. ” )

. T h e q u e s t i o n r a i s e d

b y S l a u s o n

, r a t

h e r

, i s w h e t h e r t h e e a s e m e n t e x i s t e d w h e n Bertelsen sold Tract A to

Marozzo. More specifically: Did the termination of Am erigas’s lease concomitantly

extinguish the easement?

¶ 2 1 W e a d d r e s s e d a s i m i l a r i s s u e i n L e i c h t

f u s s

, w h e r e t h e q

u e s t i o n w a s w

h e t h e r a

p r e s c r i p t i v

e u s e e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e o w n e r s o f a l i f

e e s t a t e t e r m

i n a t e d w h e n t h e l i f

e e s t a t e

ended. The general rule, we note d, is that “an easement burdening or benefitting an

e s t a t e l e s s t h a n a f

e e s i m p l e e n d s w

h e n t h a t e s t a t e e x

p i r e s

. ” Leichtfuss

, ¶ 3 7 ( e m p h a s i s

o m i t t e d ) ; s e e a l

s o Bruce & Ely, § 2:9, 2

- 24 to 2

- 2 5

, § 1 0 : 1 5

, 1 0

- 3 2

. W e o b s e r v e d t h a t

t h i s p r i n c i p l e m a k e s s e n s e w h e r e t h e s e r v i e n t

tenement is held in less than fee simple, as

“ a p e r s o n c a

n c o n v e y n o m o r e o r g

r e a t e r t i t l e t

h a n h e h o l d s

. I

n o t h e r w o r d s

, a l i f

e t e n a n t

o r a l e s s e e g e n e r a l l y c a n n o t i m p o s e u p o n h i s l a n d a b u r d e n t h a t p a s s e s t o t h e

r e m a i n d e r m a n o r t h e r e versioner.” Leichtfuss

, ¶ 3 8 ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

. B u

t w h e r e ( a s

h e r e ) t h e dominant t e n e m e n t i s h e l d i n l e s s t h a n f e e s i m p l e

, w e c o n c l u d e d t h a

t “ r i g i d

a p p l i c a t i o n o f a r

u l e t h a t p r e v

e n t s t h e b e n e

f i t of an easement from running to a

remainderman or reversio n e r i s u n s o u n d

. ” Leichtfuss

, ¶ 4 1

. W h e t h e r a p r e s c r i p t i v

e

e a s e m e n t e s t a b l i s h e d b y a l i f e t e n a n t o r a l e s s e e c o n t i n u e s t o e x i s t a f t e r t h e l i f e e s t a t e o r

l e a s e h o l d e n d s d e p e n d s o n w h a t t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d r e a s o n a b l y h a v e e x p e c t e d d u r i n g t h e

p r e s c r i p t i v

e p e r i o d

. See Leichtfuss , ¶¶ 4 2

- 44.

¶ 2 2 Applying this rule here , Marozzo offers a brief argument that Bertelsen, Amerigas,

and Edwards did not expect the easement over Tract B t o t e r m i n a t e w i t h A m e r i g

a s ’ s12

l e a s e o f T r a c t A

. H o w e v e r

, t h i s a p p r o a c h p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e e a s e m e n t w a s h e l d by an

estate less than a fee simple

, and Marozzo’s primary argument is not that the easement

was held by Amerigas, Bertelsen ’ s l e s s e e

, b u t r a t h e r t h a t i t w a s h e l d b y B e r t e l s e n

, t h e f e e

s i m p l e o w n e r o f T r a c t A

, a n d a s s u c h t h a t i t p a s s e d w i t h t h e s a l e o f T r a c t A

. S l a u s o n

, o n

t h e o t h e r h a

n d

, i n s i s t s t h a t t

h e e a s e m e n t w a s e s t a b l i s h e d b y a n d f o r A m e r i g

a s ; a f t e r a l l

,

A m e r i g a s l e a s e d T r a c t A d u r i n g t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e p e r i o d

, A m e r i g a s o p e r a t e d a b u s i n e s s on

that property

, A m e r i g a s ’ s c u s t o m e r s u s e d T r a c t B f o r a c c e s s a n d p a r k i n g

, a n d A m e r i g a s

c o n s t r u c t e d e n c r

o a c h m e n t s o n T r a c t B i n connection with its use of Tract A

. S lauson

thus maintains that the easement did not survive the extinguishment of Amerigas’s lease.

We conclude, however, that Slau son’s argument is foreclosed b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s

d e c i s i o n i n t h e p r i o r l a w s u i t

, w h i c h w e a f

f i r m e d i n S l a u s o n

, a

n d t h a t L e i c h t

f u s s

,

therefore, is distinguishable and does not control the outcome of this case.

¶ 2 3 As Marozzo points out, Slauson chose in the prior lawsuit to sue Bertelsen, not

Amerigas. The District Court ruled in November 2005 that “[t]he Defendants”

— i.e.,

Bertelsen Family Trust, Neil Bertelsen and Phyllis A. Bertelsen, trustees

— e s t a b l i s h e d a

p r e s c r i p t i v

e e a s e m e n t t o u s e T r a c t B

. G r a n t e d

, i n r e a c h i n g t h i s c o n c l u s i o n

, t h e c o u r t

c i t e d v a r i o u s u s e s o f T r a c t B b y A m e r i g a s a n d i m p l i c i t l y a s s u m e d t h a t t h e s e u s e s i n u r e d

to the benefit of Bertelsen

— a q u e s t i o n a b l e a s s u m

p t i o n

, g i v e n t h e l o n g s t a n d i n g l e g a l

p r i n c i p l e s discussed in Leichtfuss

. But Slaus on did not contest this aspect of the c o u r t ’ s

d e c i s i o n ; a n d w

h i l e h e s e e m s t o d o s o n o w

, h e n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n c e d e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

that the present case is “controlled” by the court’s November 2005 decision, and he

likewise asserts on appeal that he a n d M a r o z z o a r e “ b o u n d ” b y t h a t d e c i s i o n

.13

¶ 2 4 T h u s

, S l a u s o n i n s t e a d s e e k s t o l i m i t t h e e a s e m e n t r e c o g

n i z e d b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

i n f a v o r o f B e r t e l s e n

. H e contends that the easement was “ fo r the benefit of [ Bertelsen’s ]

lessee” and not for the benefit of Berte lsen’s successors

, as if to suggest that Bertelsen’s

easement contained a durational limitation. Yet, while t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n s e t s

f o r t h l i m i t a t i o n s o n t h e u

t i l i z a t i o n o f t h e e a s e m e n t

, i t d o e s n o t s e t f o r t h a l i m i t a t i o n o n t

h e

d u r a t i o n o f t h e e a s e m e n t

. M o r e o v e r

, t h e r e c o r

d r e f l e c t s t h a t B e r t e l s e n u s e d T r a c t B a l o n g

w i t h A m e r i g

a s ( e

. g

. , h e i n s t a l l e d s o m e l a n d s c a p i n g o n T r a c t B i n t h e m i d

- 1 9 9 0 s ) a n d t h a t

B e r t e l s e n i n t e n d e d t h e u s e s o f T r a c t B w h i c h o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e p e r i o d t o

c o n t i n u e i n d e f i n i t e l y

. For these reasons, w e do not agree with Slauson that the

termination of Amerigas’s lease extinguish ed Bertelsen’s easement

.

¶ 2 5 I n s u m

, b a s e d o n t h e f a c t s a n d p r i o r c o u r t d e c i s i o n s h e r e

, B e r t e l s e n h e l d a

p e r p e t u a l e a s e m e n t a p p u r t e

n a n t o v e r T r a c t B f

o r t h e b e n e f i t o f T r a c t A

. T h e e a s e m e n t

p a s s e d t o M a r o z z o w i t h t h e s a l e o f T r a c t A

, b u t i t r e m a i n s l i m i t e d t o t h e prescriptive uses

which were established in the prior lawsuit and recited in t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s N o v e m b e r

2 0 0 5 j u d g m e n t

. T h e m a t e r i a l f a c t s b e i n g u n d i s p u t e d

, a n d M a r o z z o h a v i n g s h o w n t h a t i t

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law concerning the easement’s validity , we hold that

the District Court did not err in granting in part Marozzo’s motion for summary judgment

and denying in part Slauson’s motion for summary judgment.

¶ 2 6 Issue 2. S

h o u l d M a r o z z o b e a w a r d

e d a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s ?

¶ 2 7 Marozzo asserts that it is entitled to a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s “ b e c a u s e t h i s s u i t w a s f i l e d

w i t h b o t h p a r t i e s a g

r e e i n g t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a applied and the scope of the

e a s e m e n t w a s c o n s i d e r e d l i t i g a t e d i n t h e p r e v

i o u s c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g

. ” M a r o z z o f u r t h e r14

asserts that it is entitled to attorney’s fees “due to Slauson’s interference with the scope of

the easement.” As Slauson quite correctly points out, ho wever, “[i]n the United States,

the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from

t h e l o s e r

. ” A l

y e s k a P i p e l i n e S e r v i c e C o

. v

. W i l d e r n e s s S o c i e t y , 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95

S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (1975). This is in fact the longstanding rule in Montana, often referred

to as the “American Rule,” and we have held that “absent statutory or contractual

a u t h o r i t y

, a t

t o r n e y ’ s f e e s w i l l n o t b e a w a r d e d t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n a l a w s u i t

. ” Erker

v. Kester

, 1 9 9 9 M T 2 3 1

, ¶ 4 3

, 2 9 6 M o n t

. 1 2 3

, 9 8 8 P

. 2 d 1 2 2 1 ; a c c o r d S t a n l e y v

. L e m i r e

,

2006 MT 304, ¶ 72, 334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643 . We have recognized an equitable

exception to this rule under which “a district court may award attorney’s fees to make an

injured party whole under its e q u i t y p o w e r s

. ” Erker , ¶ 4 4. This exception, however,

applies only in “rare” and “isolated” instances

— i n p a r t i c u l a r

, o n l y w h e r e t h e a c t i o n i n t o

w h i c h t h e p r e v

a i l i n g p a r t y h a s b e e n f

o r c e d i s u t t e r l y w i t h o u

t m e r i t o r f

r i v o l o u s

, a n d o n l y

i n c a s e s w i t h p a r t i c u l a r

l y l i m i t e d f

a c t s

. Erker , ¶ 4 4 ; G o o d o v e r v

. L i n d e

y ’ s I n c

. , 2 5 5

M o n t

. 4 3 0

, 4 4 6

- 4 7

, 8 4 3 P

. 2 d 7 6 5

, 7 7 4

- 7 6 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; J a c o b s e n v

. A l l

s t a t e I n s

. C o

. , 2 0 0 9 M T

248, ¶ 21, 351 Mont. 464,

___ P.3d ___.

¶ 2 8 Marozzo intimates that this is one of those rare and isolated instances in which an

equitable award of attorney’s fees should be granted ; however, we are not persuaded that

Slauson’s claims against Marozzo were utterly without merit or frivolous. Alternatively,

Marozzo contends that it is entitled to atto rney’s fee s u n d e r § 7 0

- 1 7

- 1 1 2 ( 5 )

, M C A

, w h i c h

s t a t e s t h a t i f a l e g

a l a c t i o n i s b r o u g

h t t o e n f o r c e r i g h t s r e l a t i n g t o a c a n a l o r d i t c h

easement

, t h e p r e v

a i l i n g p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s

. Y e t

, M a r o z z o d i d15

not bring this action to enforce an easem ent for a canal or ditch. And while Marozzo

argues that th e

statute “should also include interfer e n c e w i t h p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t s ” l i k e

t h e o n e a t i s s u e h e r e

, t h i s i s a n a r g u m e n t t o b e m a d e t o t h e L e g i s l a t u r e

. T h i s C o u r t m a y

not rewrite the statute to su it Marozzo. Section 1

- 2

- 1 0 1

, M C A ( “ I n t h e c o n s t r

u c t i o n o f a

s t a t u t e

, t h e o f f i c e o f t h e j u d g

e i s s i m p l y t o a s c e r t a i n a n d d e c l a r e w h a t i s i n t e r m s o r i n

s u b s t a n c e c o n

t a i n e d t h e r e i n

, n o t t o i n s e r t w

h a t h a s b e e n o m

i t t e d o r t o o m

i t w h a t h a s b e e n

inserted.”). We accordingly conclude that Marozzo has not demonstrated that it is

entitled to a

t t o r n e y ’ s f

e e s

.

CONCLUSION

¶ 2 9 The District Court d e t e r m i n e d t h a t B e r t e l s e n ’ s p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t p a s s e d t o

M a r o z z o w i t h t

h e s a l e o f T r a c t A

. T h e c o u r t t h e n a w a r d e d M a r o z z o $ 4 1 8

. 6 0 f o r t h e

l a n d s c a p i n g S l a u s o n h a

d r e m o v e d f r o m T r a c t B

, a w a r d e d S l a u s o n $ 4 3 0

. 0 0 f o r t h e c o s t s

of removing snow piled by Marozzo on Slauson’s property south of the area subject to

t h e e a s e m e n t

, a n d d e

n i e d M a r o z z o ’ s r e q

u e s t f o r c o s t s a n d a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s

. T h e p a r t i e s

h a v e n o t s h o w

n e r r o r i n any of these rulings

.

¶ 3 0 A f f i r m e d

.

/ S / J A M E S C

. N E L S O N

W e C o n c u r :

/ S / M I K E M c G R A T H

/ S / W

. W I L L I

A M L E A P H A R T

/ S / P A T R I C I A O

. C O T T E R

/ S / J I M R I C E16