alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 189 (Monday, September 29, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 56562]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-22767]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Air Force


Air Force Real Property Agency; Exchange of Air Force Real 
Property for Private Land Acquisition

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Authority: Title 10, United States Code, Section 2869(d)(1).
SUMMARY: This Notice identifies excess Federal property under the 
administrative jurisdiction of the United States Air Force that the Air 
Force intends to exchange for land beneficial to the Air Force.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  Ms Diane Bailey, Air Force Real 
Property Agency (AFRPA), 143 Billy Mitchell Blvd., Suite 1, San 
Antonio, TX 78226-1816; telephone (210) 925-3076, (this telephone 
number is not toll-free).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In accordance with 10 U.S.C. Section 
2869(d)(1), the Air Force is publishing this Notice to identify Federal 
real property that the Air Force intends to dispose of in exchange for 
land beneficial to the Air Force.
    Description of the Air Force property: Two non-contiguous sites to 
Dyess Air Force Base, TX (1) a transmitter site (20 acres) (2) middle 
marker site (0.13 acres).
    Property Number:
    Status: Excess.
    Comments: Transmitter site and middle marker site are composed of 
approximately 20.13 acres which are no longer used to support Dyess 
Mission. The proposal is to exchange the 20.13 acres of government land 
at an estimated Fair Market Value or $40,260.00 for 16 acres of 
privately owned land to meet the current airfield criteria for Runway 
Lateral Clearance and Transitional Surface criteria along the bases.
    Privately owned land acquisition:
    Approximately 16 acres estimated Fair Market Value of $48,000 of 
privately owned land adjacent to the Northwest boundary of the base.

Bao-Anh Trinh,
Air Force Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. E8-22767 Filed 9-26-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-05-P
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

WARREN B. RUDMAN U .S . COURTHOUSE

55 PLEASANT STREET

CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE 03301-3941

Office of theClerk Telephone

James R. Starr 603-225-1423

Clerk

September 18, 2008

In re: Civil No. 08-cv-281-JL, Diane Devine Mizusawa v. High Liner Foods (USA),

Incorporated

To: Clerk, Rockingham County Superior Court

Formerly your case #(s) : 08-E-032 2

By Court order, the above case was remanded to your court . We enclose a certified copy

of the order and docket entries.

Counsel/pro se parties are herewith notified by copy of this letter that no pleadings (or

copies of pleadings) filed in our court are being sent to the Superior Court. If there are

outstanding issues which counsel/pro se parties wish the Superior Court to consider, copies of

such pleadings shall be refiled with the Superior Court Clerk.

Orders of remand are not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), except

in certain civil rights cases described in 28 U.S .C. § 1443, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), cl ass actions

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), and ce rtification decisions regarding whether a

federal employee named in a tort action was acting within the scope of employment pursuant to

28 U.S .C. § 2679. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S . 225 (2007).

JAMES R. STARR

CLERK

Enclosures

cc: Ralph Woodman, Jr., Esq.

Amy Celeste Mackin, Esq.

Christopher Cole, Esq.

Karyl Roberts Martin, Esq .

Case 1:08-cv-00281-JL Document 11 Filed 09/18/08 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Westfield Construction

v. Case No. 08-cv-389-PB

 

Butterfield Housing

Ltd. Partnership, et al.

O R D E R

The defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of venue. It

is undisputed in this diversity of citizenship action that all of

the defendants are residents only of the State of Vermont and

that this action could have been brought in that district. 

Therefore, venue will only be proper here if “a substantial part

of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in

New Hampshire. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). A court must look “to

the entire sequence of events underlying the claim” to determine

whether this test has been satisfied. See Uffner v. La Reunion

Francaise, S.A., 244 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir 2001). 

This case involves a payment dispute with a New Hampshire

contractor arising from the construction of affordable housing

projects located in Dover, Vermont. The only fact cited by the

plaintiff contractor to support a finding of venue here is its 

Case 1:08-cv-00389-PB Document 12 Filed 12/01/08 Page 1 of 2
-2-

contention that defendants purposely directed bid requests to

contractors located in this district. Assuming without deciding

that this allegation is sufficient to support a finding of

personal jurisdiction over the defendants, it does not qualify as

a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim” as is required to support a finding of venue. Venue

cannot be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) because the defendants are

not corporations.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of venue (Doc. No. 6) 

is granted.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

December 1, 2008

cc: Robert A. Gensburg, Esq.

John G. MacLachlan, Esq.

Andrew B. Livernois, Esq.

Case 1:08-cv-00389-PB Document 12 Filed 12/01/08 Page 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Statement of Financial Condition for Princeton Mining Company at September 30,
1997 (unaudited) and the Statement of Income for the nine months ended September
30, 1997 (unaudited) and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.

</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1997
<CASH>                                             100
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   100
<PP&E>                                          25,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  25,100
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          321,167
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       300,000
<OTHER-SE>                                    (596,067)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    25,100
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                52,146
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (52,146)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (52,146)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (52,146)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.017)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.017)










</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Benny Nuzzo, Petitioner, v Martin F. Horn, as Commissioner of Department of Correction of the City of New York, Respondent.

[805 NYS2d 836]

*343Determination of respondent Commissioner, dated February 18, 2004, dismissing petitioner from his position as an assistant deputy warden with the Department of Correction, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Lewis Bart Stone, J.], entered October 15, 2004) dismissed, without costs.

Respondent’s findings that petitioner took property from its facility at Rikers Island without proper authorization, provided false entries on his work time sheets and then provided misleading testimony during his official interview are supported by substantial evidence *(see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights,*45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]). There is no basis to disturb the Administrative Law Judge’s credibility findings *(see Matter of Berenhaus v Ward,*70 NY2d 436, 443-444 [1987]), and contrary to petitioner’s claims, the Administrative Law Judge did not draw negative inferences from either petitioner’s failure to testify at the hearing or his failure to call his superior, who indicated that, based on Fifth Amendment grounds, he would not testify.

The penalty of dismissal is not so disproportionate to the offenses petitioner was found to have committed as to shock our sense of fairness *(see Matter of Kelly v Safir,*96 NY2d 32, 38 [2001]).

We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Friedman, Marlow, Sullivan and Malone, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 07-cr-240-02-SM

Peter Loukedes

ORDER

Re: Document No. 29, Assented to MOTION to Continue

sentencing hearing for 90 days

Ruling: Granted, in part. Defendant was indicted on November

7, 2007, arrested on November 15, 2007, obtained two trial

continuances, pled guilty on May 30, 2008, and has obtained one

continuance of the sentencing date. He now seeks another

continuance of ninety days on unspecific grounds. He states

additional time is needed to prepare for sentencing and that he is

participating in a “substance abuse aftercare program and is hoping

the court will allow him to continue in the program.” Seventeen

months between arrest and sentencing in a case resolved by a guilty

plea is too long, and more than 10 months between adjudication of

guilt and sentencing is too long, though such delays have become

somewhat common in this district, generally by agreement between

defense and government counsel. It is probably past time to bring

some better control policies to bear. Continuances in the main

should not require more than sixty days and more than two

continuance requests should warrant close scrutiny. The motion is

granted to the extent a 60 day continuance is allowed. No further

continuance will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances.

 

/s/ Steven J. McAuliffe

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

Date: December 23, 2008

cc: Counsel of Record

Case 1:07-cr-00240-SM Document 30 Filed 12/23/08 Page 1 of 1
| Period | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Total |
|--------|----|----|----|----|-------|
| 1981   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1     |
| 1982   | 2  | 3  | 3  | 3  | 11    |
| 1983   | 1  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 7     |
| 1984   | 3  | 7  | 10 | 12 | 32    |
| 1985   | 12 | 21 | 17 | 18 | 68    |
| 1986   | 14 | 14 | 21 | 16 | 65    |
| 1987   | 22 | 19 | 12 | 16 | 69    |
| 1988   | 11 | 6  | 12 | 7  | 36    |
| 1989   | 5  | 7  | 5  | 5  | 22    |
| 1990   | 3  | 5  | 6  | 3  | 17    |
| 1991   | 2  | 2  | 3  | 1  | 8     |
| 1992   | 1  | 1  | 1  | 4  | 7     |
| 1993   | 1  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 5     |
| 1994   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0     |
| 1995   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0     |
| 1996   | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 2     |
| 1997   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1     |
| 1998   | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1     |
| 1999   | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1     |
| 2000   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0     |
| 2001   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0     |
| 2002   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 2     |
| 2003   | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1     |
| 2004   | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1     |
| 2005   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0     |
| 2006   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | .     |
| 2007   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | .     |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

William Garron

v. Case No. 07-cv-95-PB

Skye Gryphon, LLC

NOTICE OF RULING

Re: Document No. 8, Motion to Remand

Ruling: Defendant confuses the defense of preemption with

the exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule that applies where

federal law completely preempts state law causes of action. See

Guglielmo v. Worldcom, Inc., 2000 DNH 169 (explaining difference

between complete preemption as an exception to the well-pleaded

complaint rule and defense of preemption). None of the cases

defendant cites hold that removal is proper because federal law

completely preempts the state law claim on which the complaint was

based. In any event, I agree with Judge Forester's well-reasoned

opinion in In Re Air Crash at Lexington Kentucky, 486 F. Supp. 2d

640 (E.D.Ky 2007), and the many cases cited therein, that the

Federal Aviation Act does not completely preempt state law claims.

Motion granted. 

Date: July 6, 2007 

cc: Daniel T. Chabot, Esq.

 Garry R. Lane, Esq.

Case 1:07-cv-00095-PB Document 11 Filed 07/06/07 Page 1 of 1
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1813 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1813

 To amend title 10, United States Code, to revise the rules under the 
military Survivor Benefit Plan for termination of an annuity paid to a 
            surviving spouse upon remarriage before age 55.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 10, 2001

 Mr. Moran of Kansas introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 10, United States Code, to revise the rules under the 
military Survivor Benefit Plan for termination of an annuity paid to a 
            surviving spouse upon remarriage before age 55.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REVISION TO SPOUSE ANNUITY TERMINATION PROVISIONS UNDER 
              MILITARY SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN.

    (a) Limitation on Termination of Annuity Upon Remarriage Before Age 
55.--Section 1450(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by adding at the end of paragraph (2) the following: 
        ``However, the annuity of a surviving spouse shall not be 
        terminated if the surviving spouse and the person to whom 
        section 1448 of this title applies were married for a period of 
        not less than 10 years during which that person performed 
        service on active duty or, in the case of a person providing a 
        reserve-component annuity, for not less than 10 years that were 
        credited for purposes of reserve-component retired pay.''; and
            (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``If'' and all that 
        follows through ``remarries'' and inserting ``If an annuity of 
        a surviving spouse or former spouse is terminated under 
        paragraph (2) by reason of remarriage''.
    (b) Applicability to Prior Terminations.--In the case of an annuity 
paid to a surviving spouse under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 
10, United States Code, that was terminated before the date of the 
enactment of this Act by reason of the remarriage of the surviving 
spouse before age 55, the annuity shall be resumed if that annuity 
would not have been so terminated had the provisions of section 
1450(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code, as amended by subsection 
(a)(1), been in effect at the time of such remarriage. Any such annuity 
shall be resumed effective as of the first day of the first month after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and in the amount that would have 
been in effect if the annuity had not been so terminated.
                                 <all>
```
#### William O. NELSON, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Edward HOFFMAN, Dr.; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 02-16464.

D.C. No. CV-00-0985-PMP.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*759Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 18, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN and T. G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William O. Nelson, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to either order or perform follow-up surgery to treat pre-existing injuries. We have jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Barnett v. Centoni,*31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam), and we affirm.

The district court properly found that D’Amico was entitled to qualified immunity because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Nelson, did not show that D’Amico violated Nelson’s constitutional rights by delaying or hindering Nelson’s medical treatment. *See Billington v. Smith,*292 F.3d 1177, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2002); *McGuckin v. Smith,*974 F.2d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir.1992) (holding summary judgment proper where nothing in the record to demonstrates defendants delayed or hindered plaintiffs medical treatment), *overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller,*104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.1997); *see also Jackson v. McIntosh,*90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1996) (concluding that a difference of opinion regarding medical treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference). Although we cannot say, on this record, that there has been a constitutional violation, further delay in surgery or treatment of Nelson’s arm can constitute deliberate indifference if the delay causes harm. *See Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners*766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985).

After weighing the relevant factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deeming Nelson’s failure to timely respond a consent to Hoffman’s summary judgment motion under District of Nevada Local Rule 7-2(d). *See Brydges v. Lewis,*18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). Hoffman’s papers established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and Nelson had been warned of the consequences of failing to respond. *See id.*at 652-53.

We reject Nelson’s unsupported contention that the district court should have treated his untimely motion for an extension of time to oppose summary judgment as a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1808 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1808

To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide housing loan benefits 
      for the purchase of residential cooperative apartment units.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 10, 2001

  Mrs. Maloney of New York (for herself and Mr. Quinn) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide housing loan benefits 
      for the purchase of residential cooperative apartment units.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Veterans Housing Fairness Act of 
2001''.

SEC. 2. RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE HOUSING UNITS.

    (a) Housing Benefits for Cooperative Apartment Units.--Section 
3710(a) of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new paragraph:
            ``(12) To purchase stock or membership in a development, 
        project or structure of a cooperative housing corporation in 
        accordance with subsection (h).''.
    (b) Conditions of Housing Benefits for Cooperative Apartment 
Units.--Section 3710 of such title is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
    ``(h)(1) A loan may not be guaranteed under subsection (a)(12) 
unless the following conditions are met:
            ``(A) The development, project or structure of the 
        cooperative housing corporation complies with such criteria as 
        the Secretary prescribes in regulations.
            ``(B) The dwelling unit, that the purchase of stock or 
        membership in the development, project or structure of the 
        cooperative housing corporation entitles the purchaser to 
        occupy, is a one-family residential unit.
    ``(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term `cooperative 
housing corporation' has the same meaning given such term by section 
216(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
    ``(3) For the purposes of applying the term `value of the property' 
to a loan guaranteed under subsection (a)(12), such term means the 
appraised value of the stock or membership entitling the purchaser to 
the permanent occupancy of the dwelling unit in the development, 
project or structure of the cooperative housing corporation.''.
                                 <all>
```
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2028

To extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric

project in the State of Ohio.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 25, 2001

Mr. NEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Energy and Commerce

A BILL

To extend the deadline for commencement of construction

of a hydroelectric project in the State of Ohio.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FEDERAL ENERGY

4 REGULATORY COMMISSION PROJECT.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the time period

6 specified in section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16

7 U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to the Federal En8 ergy Regulatory Commission project numbered 3218, the

9 Commission shall, upon enactment of this Act, extend the

10 time period during which the licensee is required to com-
2

•HR 2028 IH

1 mence the construction of the project to and including

2 September 24, 2002. Thereafter the Commission shall, at

3 the request of the licensee for the project and after reason4 able notice, in accordance with the good faith, due dili5 gence, and public interest requirements of that section and

6 the Commission’s procedures under that section, extend

7 the time period during which the licensee is required to

8 commence the construction of the project for 2 consecutive

9 2-year periods.

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (a) shall take ef11 fect on September 24, 1999, the date of the previous expi12 ration of the extension issued by the Commission for Fed13 eral Energy Regulatory Commission project numbered

14 3218.

15 (c) REINSTATEMENT OF EXPIRED LICENSE.—If the

16 period required for commencement of construction of the

17 project described in subsection (a) has expired prior to the

18 date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall

19 reinstate the license effective as of the date of its expira20 tion and the first extension authorized under subsection

21 (a) shall take effect on the date of such expiration and

22 shall continue through and including September 24, 2002.

Æ