2017 IL App (1st) 162607

No. 1-16-2607 

September 29, 2017 

SECOND DIVISION

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

HOLLY SHACKELFORD, on behalf of ) 

Herself and all others similarly situated, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY ) 

INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

Of Cook County. 

No. 15 CH 14972 

The Honorable 

Kathleen G. Kennedy, 

Judge Presiding. 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Mason dissented, with opinion.

 OPINION

¶ 1 An arbitrator entered an award in favor of Holly Shackelford on a claim she made against 

Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company. Shackelford filed a complaint in which she 

prayed for entry of judgment on the award plus post-award interest. The circuit court granted 

Allstate's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We hold that 
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Shackelford adequately stated a claim for relief, and therefore, we reverse the circuit court's 

judgment and remand for further proceedings on the complaint. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On October 7, 2012, Raul Cuzco's car collided with Carole McCurdy's car, injuring 

Shackelford, a passenger in McCurdy's car. Shackelford sued Cuzco, but his insurer was 

insolvent. Shackelford sought to recover from McCurdy's insurer, Allstate, under the 

uninsured motorist provision in McCurdy's insurance policy. Shackelford and Allstate 

agreed to arbitrate the claim. The arbitrator entered an award, dated June 30, 2015, 

providing: 

"I, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR ***, AWARD *** Holly Shackelford 

*** $16,000.00[.] 

This is a gross Award. Per the request of Counsel at the June 19, 2015 Hearing, 

all applicable set-offs and liens to be resolved by the Parties and their Attorneys." 

¶ 4 On October 13, 2015, Shackelford filed a complaint in which she alleged that Allstate 

had not paid the award, and she sought a "judgment against Allstate in the amount of her 

individual award, plus interest due" under section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2014)). Shackelford also alleged that "Allstate has 

adopted a pattern and practice of failing to pay interest on awards." She asked the court to 

certify the class of all persons who (1) made a claim against Allstate, (2) received an award 

or a judgment, and (3) did not receive from Allstate statutory interest on the award or 

judgment. Shackelford sought a judgment against Allstate in the amount of unpaid interest 

due to all members of the class.
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¶ 5 The circuit court granted Allstate's motion to dismiss the complaint, but granted 

Shackelford leave to amend. In the amended complaint, Shackelford alleged that after 

October 13, 2015, but before the filing of the amended complaint, Allstate sent her a check 

for $14,000. She changed her prayer for relief, asking for "confirmation of [the arbitrator's] 

award," along with interest on the award. 

¶ 6 Allstate filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint under section 2-615 of the 

Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014). The circuit court dismissed the complaint with 

prejudice. Shackelford now appeals. 

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 We apply familiar rules to review the dismissal of a complaint under section 2-615: 

 "A section 2-615 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)) challenges 

the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on its face. 

[Citation.] Therefore, we review de novo an order granting or denying a section 2-

615 motion. [Citation.] In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, we accept as 

true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 

those facts. [Citation.] We also construe the allegations in the complaint in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. [Citation.] Thus, a cause of action should not 

be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of 

facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery." Marshall v. 

Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). 

¶ 9 Shackelford obtained an arbitrator's award, and in her complaint she sought confirmation 

of the award. We find that she stated a viable claim for entry of a judgment confirming the 
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arbitrator's award. See 710 ILCS 5/11 (West 2014). We note that the Illinois Uniform 

Arbitration Act does not list satisfaction of the award as grounds for the court not to enter a 

judgment on the award. See 710 ILCS 5/12, 5/13 (West 2014). Accordingly, we must 

reverse the judgment dismissing Shackelford's complaint and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 10 The parties on appeal argue primarily about whether Shackelford also stated a claim for 

interest on the award. To assist the circuit court on remand, and in the interest of judicial 

economy, we address the arguments. See Central City Education Association v. Illinois 

Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 524 (1992) (Issues have been raised in 

this case which are likely to reappear on remand, and in the interest of judicial economy the 

court will examine them now). Shackelford sought an award of interest under section 2-1303 

of the Code, which provides: 

 "Judgments recovered in any court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per 

annum from the date of the judgment until satisfied ***. When judgment is 

entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be computed at the above 

rate, from the time when made or rendered to the time of entering judgment upon 

the same, and included in the judgment. Interest shall be computed and charged 

only on the unsatisfied portion of the judgment as it exists from time to time. The 

judgment debtor may by tender of payment of judgment, costs and interest 

accrued to the date of tender, stop the further accrual of interest on such judgment 

notwithstanding the prosecution of an appeal, or other steps to reverse, vacate or 

modify the judgment." 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2014). 
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¶ 11 On the issue of interest on awards, "the case law reveals a fair measure of confusion." 

Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 157 Ill. 2d 282, 

300 (1993). Courts have sometimes referred to section 2-1303 as "the post-judgment interest 

provision" of the Code. Carswell v. Rosewell, 150 Ill. App. 3d 168, 171 (1986). Our 

supreme court noted the inaccuracy of that terminology, and said: 

"To avoid possible confusion over terminology, we have adopted in this opinion 

the term 'judgment interest statute' to generally refer to section 2-1303. This 

provision *** provides for interest to accrue on awards, reports, and verdicts as 

well as judgments. Interest that accrues on reports, awards, and verdicts may be 

viewed as a form of 'prejudgment' interest to distinguish it from the interest that 

accrues on the judgment itself ('post-judgment' interest)." Illinois State Toll, 157 

Ill. 2d at 296 n.1; see also Eclipse Manufacturing Co. v. United States 

Compliance Co., 381 Ill. App. 3d 127, 141 (2007). 

¶ 12 The court in Ryan v. Kontrick, 304 Ill. App. 3d 852, 859 (1999), referred to a plaintiff's 

request for interest on an arbitrator's award as one for "post-award/prejudgment interest," and 

held that section 2-1303 set the appropriate interest rate for the period from the date of entry 

of the award to the date of the judgment confirming the award. 

¶ 13 Here, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of Shackelford for $16,000, but made the 

award subject to "all applicable set-offs and liens to be resolved by the Parties and their 

Attorneys." Allstate argues that the qualification makes the award too indefinite to permit 

the accrual of interest. In general, "[a]n award of interest on a money judgment requires that 

the amount of money owed is certain and that the judgment debtor enjoyed improper use of 
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the money during the period for which interest is to be awarded." Owens v. Stokoe, 170 Ill. 

App. 3d 179, 182 (1988). 

¶ 14 However the weight of authority supports the principle that "[e]ntry of an arbitration 

award on a contract represents a liquidated sum which is within the statute; therefore, it 

accrues interest. [Citations.] However, where a liquidated claim is offset by an unliquidated 

claim arising out of the same general transaction, interest is allowed only on the balance 

due." Recreational Development Co. v. American Construction Co., 749 P.2d 1002, 1004

(Colo. App. 1987). A California court restated the principle: "Ordinarily, where the amount 

of a demand is sufficiently certain to justify the allowance of interest thereon, the existence 

of a set-off, counterclaim, or cross claim which is unliquidated will not prevent the recovery 

of interest on the balance of the demand found due from the time it became due." 

Worthington Corp. v. El Chicote Ranch Properties, 63 Cal. Rptr. 203, 209 (1967), quoting 47 

C.J.S. Interest § 19, at 31 (1946). Another California court explained that "prejudgment 

interest is calculated on the net amount owed and, therefore, the defendant is not required to 

pay interest on the portion of the debt rightfully withheld." (Emphasis in original.) Watson 

Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2016). A Wisconsin court held that "[o]rdinarily, where the amount of a demand is 

sufficiently certain to justify the allowance of interest thereof, the existence of a set-off, 

counterclaim, or cross claim which is unliquidated will not prevent the recovery of interest

on the balance of the demand found due from the time it became due." De Toro v. Di-La-Ch, 

Inc., 142 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Wisc. 1966). Ohio courts follow the same general principle: 

“[w]hile an unliquidated counterclaim does not denude the primary claim of its liquidity, it 
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can reduce the amount upon which the interest is calculated." L.A. Gross & Sons, Inc. v. 

Parisi, 586 N.E.2d 142, 144 (Ohio App. 1990). North Dakota, too: "We hold that a ‘certain’ 

or ‘liquidated’ claim does not become ‘uncertain’ or ‘unliquidated’ by reason of action by a 

defendant to either dispute it or to put forth an unliquidated set-off or counterclaim." Stee v. 

‘L’ Monte Industries, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641, 646 (N.D. 1976). And a Washington court said, 

'[a]n unliquidated counterclaim, even when established, does not affect the right to interest 

prior to judgment on the amount found to be due on a liquidated or determinable claim, since 

the debtor may not defeat the creditor's right to interest on such a claim by setting up an 

unliquidated claim as a setoff." Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equipment Co., 273 P.2d 652, 663 

(Wash. 1954). The Mall Tool court explained that "the amount found to be due on a 

liquidated or determinable claim may be reduced by the amount found to be due on an 

unliquidated counterclaim or setoff, and *** interest will be allowable only on the balance 

remaining after the reduction has been made." Mall Tool, 273 P.2d at 663. See also Knutson 

v. Lasher, 18 N.W.2d 688, 695-96 (Minn. 1945). 

¶ 15 The court in Owens, 170 Ill. App. 3d 179, faced an extraordinary situation in which the 

contested set-offs, amounting to $30,000, justified the debtor's decision not to pay a debt of 

$40,000 pending determination of the set-offs. The Owens court held the amount of the debt 

too indefinite to justify the award of interest prior to determination of the set-offs. We would 

confine the ruling in Owens to the factual situation that justified the failure to pay the 

liquidated debt. Insofar as the language of Owens might lead to the conclusion that any 

possible set-off makes the debt too indefinite to warrant interest, we choose to follow the 

weight of authority and not Owens. 
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¶ 16 We hold that the arbitrator's reference to set-offs does not make the award so indefinite 

that it cannot accrue interest under section 2-1303. In accord with the weight of authority, 

we find that interest accrued only on the amount of the award minus the appropriate set-offs, 

from the date of the award, until Allstate paid Shackelford $14,000. After the date of that 

payment, interest continued to accrue only on any balance remaining unpaid. If the court 

enters a judgment confirming the arbitrator's award, the court should include in the judgment 

the appropriate interest under section 2-1303, and take into account the amount Allstate 

already paid Shackelford when setting the amount of the judgment. 

¶ 17 We express no opinion on the propriety of Shackelford's request for class certification, as 

the parties have not addressed that issue on this appeal. 

¶ 18 CONCLUSION

¶ 19 Shackelford's request in her amended complaint for confirmation of the arbitrator's award 

adequately states a claim for relief, and therefore we reverse the dismissal of the complaint. 

If the circuit court enters a judgment confirming the award, the court should include in the 

judgment post-award prejudgment interest from the date of the award to the date of the 

judgment, with the interest calculated in accord with section 2-1303, taking into account all 

set-offs and the timing and amount of all payments Allstate has made.

¶ 20 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 21 JUSTICE MASON, dissenting.

¶ 22 I respectfully dissent from my colleagues' conclusion that Shackelford's complaint states 

a cause of action against Allstate for failure to pay interest on her arbitration award. 

Shackelford's entitlement to interest on the arbitration award derives from statute. As our 
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supreme court found in Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & 

Trust Co.,

"Under the judgment interest statute [735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2014)], the date 

an award, report or verdict is rendered is the date on which interest begins to 

accrue. If there is a delay between the rendering of the award, report, or verdict 

and entry of judgment thereon, interest shall be assessed from the date the award 

is made and included in the judgment when entered." (Emphasis in original.) 157 

Ill. 2d 282, 301 (1993). 

See also Sunrise Assisted Living v. Banach, 2015 IL App (2d) 140037, ¶¶ 32, 35 ("[A] 

claimant is entitled to section 2-1303 interest if and when the arbitrator's award *** becomes 

an enforceable judgment. *** Without a judgment, Banach was not entitled to additional 

interest under section 2-1303 of the Code." (Emphasis added.)). And under the Uniform 

Arbitration Act, Shackelford was obligated to file an application to confirm her award in 

order to obtain entry of a judgment, which would then include statutory interest. 710 ILCS 

5/14 (West 2014). 

¶ 23 Before her complaint was filed, Shackelford did not file a petition to confirm and enter 

judgment on her arbitration award. Although interest accrued on the award from the date it 

was entered (and I agree with the majority's determination that the existence of a setoff did 

not prevent that accrual), prior to entry of judgment on the award, Shackelford had no 

statutory or contractual right to demand payment of interest from Allstate. Allstate's tender of 

the net award of $14,000 after suit did not prevent the accrual of interest (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 

(West 2014) (further accrual of interest tolled by tender of payment of award, plus costs and 
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interest)), nor did it relieve Shackelford of the obligation to reduce the award to judgment. 

Nothing Allstate did or failed to do after entry of the award could deprive Shackelford of 

interest on the award under the statute. By the same token, Allstate could have, but was not 

obligated, either by contract or statute, to tender the amount of the award plus interest until 

judgment was entered thereon. Thus, because Shackelford did not take the required step of 

petitioning to confirm the award, her complaint failed to state a cause of action against 

Allstate and was properly dismissed. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 

majority's decision to reverse the order of the circuit court of Cook County.