FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALASKA STOCK, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN HARCOURT

PUBLISHING COMPANY; R.R.

DONNELLEY & SONS COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-36010

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-00061-HRH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

H. Russel Holland, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 27, 2011

Submission Withdrawn June 7, 2012

Resubmitted January 10, 2014

Anchorage, Alaska

Filed March 18, 2014

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain,* Andrew J. Kleinfeld,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kleinfeld

*

Judge Betty B. Fletcher was a member of the panel but passed away

after oral argument. Judge O’Scannlain was drawn to replace her. He has

read the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to the tape of oral

argument held on July 27, 2011.
2 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

SUMMARY**

Copyright

Reversing the district court’s dismissal of a copyright

infringement action, the panel held that copyright registration

of a collective work registers the component works within it.

The panel held that the Register of Copyrights had

authority to prescribe a form and grant certificates extending

registration to individual stock photographs within a

collection where the names of each of the photographers, and

titles for each of the photographs, were not provided on the

registration applications. Agreeing with other Circuits, and

deferring to the Copyright Office’s interpretation of the

Copyright Act, the panel held that where the photographers

had assigned their ownership of their copyrights in their

images to the stock agency, and the stock agency had

registered the collection, both the collection as a whole and

the individual images were registered.

COUNSEL

Maurice Harmon (argued), Harmon & Seidman LLC,

Northampton, Pennsylvania; Christopher Seidman, Autumn

W. Boyd, and Craig F. Wallace, Harmon & Seidman LLC,

Grand Junction, Colorado; Brent R. Cole, Marston & Cole

PC, Anchorage, Alaska, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 3

J. Russell Jackson (argued), Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher

& Flom LLP, New York, New York; Daniel C. Kent, Birch,

Horton, Bittner, and Cherot, Anchorage, Alaska, for

Defendants-Appellees.

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Scott McIntosh and

Melissa N. Patterson (argued), Attorneys, Appellate Staff,

Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.;

David Carson, General Counsel; Robert Kasunic, Deputy

General Counsel, United States Copyright Office,

Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae United States of

America.

OPINION

KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge:

We address whether copyright registration of a collective

work registered the component works within it.

Facts

This case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, so we

assume for purposes of analysis that the facts were as pleaded

in the complaint.

Alaska Stock, a stock photography agency, registered

large numbers of photographs at a time, listing only some of

the authors and not listing titles for each photograph. It

licensed Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company to

use pictures it had registered, for fees based on the number of

publications. Houghton Mifflin and its printer, R.R. Donnelly

& Sons, greatly exceeded the number of publications
4 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

Houghton Mifflin had paid for, so Alaska Stock sued for

injunctive relief, actual and statutory damages, attorneys’

fees, and costs.

Alaska Stock owned the copyrights to all the photographs

at issue, pursuant to assignment by the individual

photographers. It registered the copyrights by registering CD

catalogs and databases of the stock photos, entitled “Alaska

Stock CD catalog 4” and so forth, which contained images of

each of the photographs. For “name of author” on its

application, it listed only three of many, in the form “1) Jeff

Schultz 2) Chris Arend 3) Johnny Johnson & 103 others.”

This form of registration was prescribed by the Register

of Copyrights and was consistent with Copyright Office

procedure for thirty years. The district court nevertheless

dismissed the claims on the ground that the registrations were

defective, because Alaska Stock had not provided the names

of each of the photographers and the titles of each of the

photographs in its registrations. The theory of the dismissal

was that the registrations succeeded only in registering the

catalogs themselves, not the individual photographs within

them, on account of Alaska Stock’s failure to list authors and

titles. The district court held that the statute unambiguously

required titles and authors, so the administrative practice to

the contrary and a statutory savings clause for immaterially

inaccurate information could not save the claims.

We reverse.

We first expand somewhat on the history that led to the

registrations in the form used, and then explain why the

registrations sufficed under the statute.
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 5

Professional photographers make their living in various

ways, sometimes shooting pictures for weddings, sometimes

for advertisements, sometimes “stock.” In “stock

photography,” the photographer usually makes the images

before he has a customer. He then contracts with a stock

agency for the agency to handle copyright registration and

licensing, often for a cash payment up front to the stock

agency and a percentage of whatever the stock agency

collects. Purchasers buy permission from the stock agency to

use particular pictures, usually for a limited number of copies,

with the prices varying from less than a dollar to perhaps a

couple of hundred dollars. The photographer’s income

depends on getting noticed and on volume, since the pictures

are licensed so inexpensively. Stock agencies relieve the

photographers of some of the burden of managing the

commercial end of their business, so that they can focus more

on making images, and they relieve publishers of the burden

of locating photographers and purchasing rights to use the

images they want.

A particularly important task the stock agencies may

perform is at issue here: registering copyrights, to deter

pirating. That is what Alaska Stock did for the many

photographers whose images are affected by this case. 

Alaska Stock registered thirteen automated databases1and

one “CD-ROM collection” of photographs. Alaska Stock’s

photographs are each independently copyrighted, so the

databases and CD-ROM at issue are each a “collective work”

under the Copyright Act. The several databases contained

between 500 and 6,000 individual photographs each. Each

database or CD-ROM contained the work of between 32 and

106 photographers.

 

1

 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (2006) recodified at § 202.3(b)(5).
6 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

The copyright laws and procedures are complex, so photo

stock agencies worked out the registration procedure with the

federal agency in charge. Some stock agencies (such as the

plaintiff in this case) are very small businesses reliant on a

trade association to work out the procedures they should

follow. In 1995, a trade association of stock agencies, Picture

Agency Council of America, Inc., met with the Register of

Copyright (the head of the Copyright Office), her Chief

Examiner, and other Copyright Office staff, to work out how

to register large catalogs of images. The Register agreed that

a stock agency could register both a catalog of images and the

individual photographs in the catalog in one application if the

photographers temporarily transferred their copyrights to the

stock agency for the purposes of registration.

The trade association confirmed this with the Copyright

Office in writing, and advised its member stock agencies. 

Using language suggested by the Copyright Office, Alaska

Stock’s typical pre-2001 agreement with a photographer

includes this language: “I grant Alaska Stock the right to

register for copyright my photographs which appear in this

catalog in the name of Alaska Stock solely for the purpose of

catalog registration. Alaska Stock shall reassign such

copyright to me upon request.” The post-2001 language was

materially similar: “Photographer grants to Alaska Stock,

solely for the purpose of registration, the copyright . . . .”

The Copyright Office provided a letter to the trade

association telling it how stock photo catalogs ought to be

registered. The letter says that listing only three individual

photographers by name, followed by the phrase “and x

[number] others,” and naming the agency as owner of the

copyrights was “acceptable when the accompanying deposit

copies are catalogs consisting of photographs.” A copyright
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 7

examiner would interpret such filings to mean that the claim

being registered would include the catalog and “extend also

to the photographs themselves.” The letter says that a

“registration application submitted for a work created by a

large number of authors is considered acceptable ‘if it names

at least three of those authors followed by a statement such as

“and (number) others.”’” Though the office had a

“preference” for naming all the authors, the Copyright Office

letter says that it is “just that—a preference but not a

requirement.”

Having the written blessing of the federal administrative

agency for its method, Alaska Stock filed its applications in

accord with what the Copyright Office had said was required. 

The registration quoted above is its standard form, and was

adequate under the Copyright Office procedures in effect at

the time to register the individual images. The deposits filed

with the registration applications show innumerable beautiful

images of mountains, glaciers, polar bears, grizzly bears, bald

eagles, dog mushing, and other subjects evoking the North. 

The Copyright Office approved Alaska Stock’s applications

and issued certificates of registration to the company.

Alaska Stock’s contracts with photographers require the

photographers to pay Alaska Stock substantial amounts per

image, and entitle them to 35% to 50% of revenues Alaska

Stock obtains from their images. Alaska Stock sold

Houghton Mifflin limited licenses to copy and distribute

limited numbers of copies of the designated images.

Houghton Mifflin greatly exceeded the license limits. The

complaint alleges that this was a willful and fraudulent

business method, designed to lull licensors into a false

confidence, because having placed a photograph with a stock
8 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

agency, a photographer would assume nothing untoward

when he saw it reproduced in a school textbook.

The United States has filed an amicus brief in support of

Alaska Stock, urging that we reverse. The position of the

United States is that the Copyright Office “has long

interpreted the Copyright Act to permit an application to seek

registration of a collective work and the component works

that the claimant owns, even if the application does not

specify the authors and titles of the component works.” The

government’s brief says that internal guidance for the

copyright examiners has, consistent with this position,

provided that registration of a collective work also registers

independently copyrightable works within the component

work. The Copyright Office takes the position that only the

author of the collective work, not the individual authors of

separate contributions, need be provided in the application. 

The names of three authors followed by a statement “and

[number] others” suffices, as the letter from the Office to the

trade association said. Circulars from the Office say the same

thing. Alaska Stock complied with Copyright Office

procedures. The United States says that this has been the

Copyright Office interpretation “[f]or more than thirty years,

since the Copyright Office started registering works under the

Copyright Act of 1976.” In addition to a deference argument,

the government makes a pragmatic argument, that “[m]any

traditional forms of collective works, such as newspapers and

magazines, can contain hundreds – if not thousands – of

copyrightable works that the claimant owns but did not

author,” and listing them individually would be unduly

burdensome for applicants.
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 9

Analysis

We review de novo.2

One can own a copyright without registering. When a

photographer has fixed an image in a tangible medium of

expression, he owns the copyright, even though he has not

registered it with the Copyright Office.3 Registration is

permissive, not mandatory, and may be made long after the

work comes into existence.4 The owner has various exclusive

rights in the work, regardless of whether it is registered.5 The

photographer may transfer ownership of the copyright in

whole or in part, and any of the exclusive rights of a

copyright owner may be transferred and owned separately.

6

The owner to whom any particular right is transferred is

entitled to all the protection and remedies of a copyright

owner to the extent of the right transferred. It is undisputed

that the limited assignments by the photographers to Alaska

Stock were valid transfers, and that Alaska Stock is the owner

of the copyrights for the purposes relevant to this case.

What this case concerns is registration, not ownership. 

Though an owner has property rights without registration, he

2 Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).

 

3

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).

 

4

 17 U.S.C. § 408(a).

 

5

See 17 U.S.C. § 106.

 

6

 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
10 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

needs to register the copyright to sue for infringement.7

Registration prior to infringement or, if the work is published,

within three months of publication, is necessary for an owner

to obtain statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.8In this case,

the photographers owned the copyrights and assigned

ownership for registration purposes to Alaska Stock, which

did indeed register them.

When a registration application is approved, the Register

“shall register the claim” and issue a certificate of

registration.

9 This certificate is not merely proof that an

application was filed. It is an administrative approval. The

Register makes a determination after examination whether the

statutory requirements for registration are met, and either

grants or refuses a registration certificate depending on that

determination.10If a certificate is refused, the applicant must

be given notice of the reasons, which would enable the

applicant to cure such defects as are alleged in this case.11

The Register granted certificates to Alaska Stock, which she

could only do if after examination she determined that the

legal and formal requirements for registration were met. 

Alaska Stock lost in district court on the theory that its

registration was defective.

 

7

 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).

 

8

 17 U.S.C. § 412.

 

9

 17 U.S.C. § 410(a).

 

10 See id. § 410(a)–(b).

 

11 Id. § 410(b).
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 11

The issue in this case arises because the phrase in the

statute delegating authority to the Register to prescribe the

forms used for registration applications says that the

application “shall include” “the name . . . of the author or

authors” and “the title of the work,” among other things.12

 

12 17 U.S.C. § 409. In relevant part, that subsection provides:

The application for copyright registration shall be made

on a form prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and

shall include—

(1) the name and address of the copyright claimant;

(2) in the case of a work other than an anonymous or

pseudonymous work, the name and nationality or

domicile of the author or authors, and, if one or more of

the authors is dead, the dates of their deaths;

(3) if the work is anonymous or pseudonymous, the

nationality or domicile of the author or authors; . . .

. . .

(5) if the copyright claimant is not the author, a brief

statement of how the claimant obtained ownership of

the copyright;

(6) the title of the work, together with any previous or

alternative titles under which the work can be

identified; . . .

. . .

(9) in the case of a compilation or derivative work, an

identification of any preexisting work or works that it

is based on or incorporates, and a brief, general

statement of the additional material covered by the

copyright claim being registered[.]
12 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

The Register of Copyrights has authority to permit “a single

registration for a group of related works.”13 The issue is

whether the Register could prescribe a form and grant

certificates extending registration to the individual

photographs at issue where the names of each of the

photographers were not provided, and titles for each of the

photographs were not provided, on the applications.

First, names. The statute requires that the application

include “the name and address of the copyright claimant,”14

“the name and nationality or domicile of the author or

authors,”15and if the “claimant is not the author, a brief

statement of how the claimant obtained the ownership of the

copyright.”16 Alaska Stock gave its name and address as the

claimant and a statement of how it came to be the owner.

The issue of names arises from the provision requiring

“the name and nationality or domicile of the author or

authors.”17 Pursuant to the Register of Copyright’s

longstanding procedure, Alaska Stock’s applications gave

three names and said how many other authors there were. 

The Register of Copyrights granted certificates based on these

applications. Addressing this practice, the Associate Register

 

13 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1).

 

14 Id. § 409(1).

15 Id. § 409(2). If the work is anonymous or pseudonymous, only

“nationality or domicile of the author or authors” must be listed. Id.

§ 409(3).

 

16 Id. § 409(5).

 

17 Id. § 409(2).
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 13

for Registration and Recordation of the United States

Copyright Office filed a declaration stating that “[s]ince

1980, the Copyright Office has permitted, as a matter of

practice, copyright registrations of collective works to cover

underlying contributions where the rights in those

contributions belong to the claimant even though the

individual contributors are not named in the registration

form.” She attached a portion of the Copyright Office,

Compendium II: Compendium of Copyright Office Practices

(1984), corroborating her declaration. The Compendium says

“the names of the individual authors of separate contributions

being registered as part of the claim need not be given on the

application.”

Thus there is no question that Alaska Stock provided

names as required by the Register of Copyrights pursuant to

a longstanding administrative practice. And there is no

question that Alaska Stock did not provide names of the

authors of each of the photographs registered.

Second, titles. The statute requires a “title” for the

“work,” but only “an identification of any preexisting work

or works that it is based on or incorporates” for compilations

or derivative works.18

The application for copyright registration

shall be made on a form prescribed by the

Register of Copyrights and shall include . . .

. . .

 

18 17 U.S.C. § 409(6), (9).
14 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

(6) the title of the work, together with any

previous or alternative titles under which the

work can be identified; . . .

. . .

(9) in the case of a compilation or derivative

work, an identification of any preexisting

work or works that it is based on or

incorporates, and a brief, general statement of

the additional material covered by the

copyright claim being registered[.]19

Alaska Stock provided titles for each work it registered, such

as “Alaska Stock CD catalog 4,” and identified the contents

with such phrases as “CD catalog of stock photos.” The

applications did not provide titles for each photograph.

The district court concluded that the Copyright Office

practice could not be reconciled with the statute, as to both

authors and titles, so the registrations were inadequate. 

Houghton Mifflin argues that the statute unambiguously

requires the names of all the authors and titles of all the

constituent works. This tension between at least a superficial

reading of the statutory text and the long standing

administrative practice, remains a serious issue.

For titles, the statutorytext and administrative practice are

easily reconciled. The statute does not say that the

registration application must include a “title” for each

constituent work, just an “identification” of any “preexisting

work or works”—Alaska Stock identified the contents with

 

19 Id.
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 15

such phrases as “CD catalog of stock photos” and with CDs

showing each image, even though it did not give each image

a title.

The requirement that the application must include the

“title of the work” refers to the collective work itself. The

statute expressly requires only “identification,” in the

singular, not titles of preexisting works incorporated, and a

“brief, general statement of the additional material being

covered.”20 The definitions section defines a “collective

work” in the singular, distinguishing it from “contributions”

therein.21 Thus, the statute requires a title for “the work,” in

the singular, which would be the collective work in this case. 

There is no inconsistency between the statutory language and

the Copyright Office procedure, allowing identification of the

“work” without requiring titles for each constituent of the

work.

The same analysis, that the “work” is what needs an

author designated, applies to the authors subsection, even

though unlike the “title” requirement it mentions “authors” in

the plural:

The application for copyright registration

shall be made on a form prescribed by the

Register of Copyrights and shall include . . .

(2) in the case of a work other than an

anonymous or pseudonymous work, the name

and nationality or domicile of the author or

 

20 17 U.S.C. § 409(9).

 

21 17 U.S.C. § 101.
16 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

authors, and, if one or more of the authors is

dead, the dates of their deaths[.]22

This subsection says that the name of the author or authors of

“the work” must be provided, the statute defines a “collective

work” as being a type of “work,”23and here, the author of the

collective work was Alaska Stock. The references to

nationality and domicile have to do with the provisions for

protection of works of foreign origin in another section of the

statute,24 which are immaterial to this case. The “author or

authors” that must be listed in this context are the author or

authors of the collective work itself, and the applications in

this case do name the author of “the work,” Alaska Stock.

Houghton Mifflin argues that because the word “work” is

used to refer to an individual “copyrighted work” elsewhere

in the Copyright Act, it must have that meaning in section

409. This argument arguably shows that the term “work” is

ambiguous, but does not tell us which sense of the word

“work” must be applied in the context of registering

collective works. Moreover, Houghton Mifflin’s

interpretation of section 409 would render another portion of

the Copyright Act superfluous. Section 408(c)(2)(B)requires

single registrations of certain previously published works to

identify each work and “its date of first publication.” This

requirement is redundant if section 409(8), imposing an

identical requirement, applies to constituent works as well as

to collective works. We should not “adopt an interpretation

 

22 17 U.S.C. § 409(2).

 

23 17 U.S.C. § 101.

 

24 17 U.S.C. § 104.
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 17

of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous

another portion of that same law.”25

Additionally, Houghton Mifflin points us to what it sees

as the “purpose” of registration: to create a public record of

“what specific works of intellectual property are registered.” 

It contends that “[v]alidating registrations that intentionally

lack the basic identifying information that Section 409

requires would make that goal unattainable.” This policy

argument suggests that numerous images by “Phillip

Photographer” entitled “Mt. McKinley” would somehow

identify the images more specifically than the images

themselves, which were on the CDs.

The government makes a practical policy argument to the

contrary in its brief, that the expensive and error-prone

tedium of the Copyright Office typing all the names into its

records may explain why the Register of Copyrights was

satisfied to have the names of only three authors for so many

years. The government suggests that the elimination of this

typing, because of electronic registrations, explains why the

Register now is experimenting with new provisions requiring

more information on material included within collective

works.

A 2011 interim rule explicates the administrative history

relating to stock agency registrations. Subsequent to the

registrations at issue in this case, the Copyright Office began

beta testing of new procedures. A 2007 interim regulation

addressed “the Beta test phase of the electronic, online

25 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837

(1988).
18 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

registration system.”26 Then in 2011, the Copyright Office

issued interim regulations for a pilot program for registration

of automated databases and group registrations of

photographs. The Office recited that for many years, “stock

photography agencies have been able to obtain registrations

covering all the photographs added to their databases within

a three-month period when they have obtained copyright

assignments from the photographers.”27 This alludes to the

administrative practice the agency followed with Alaska

Stock. The interim rule, setting out what forms to use, says

that, even as of 2011, “questions remain about the capacity of

the system to accommodate applications listing very large

numbers of authors or titles,” which may affect file size and

transmission speed.28

The regulations in effect when Alaska Stock registered

the catalogs at issue do not add much regarding names and

titles. They do not say one way or the other whether the

names of each of the authors and titles of each of the

contributions have to be listed.

The regulations do make clear the registration status of

separate contributions to collective works. “Registration of

an unpublished ‘collection’ extends to each copyrightable

element in the collection and to the authorship, if any,

involved in selecting and assembling the collection.”29

 

26 72 Fed. Reg. 36,883 (July 6, 2007).

 

27 76 Fed. Reg. 4072, 4073 (Jan. 24, 2011).

 

28 Id. at 4074.

 

29 37 C.F.R § 202.3(b)(3) (2006), recodified at § 202.3(b)(4).
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 19

Where as here, the photographers have assigned their

ownership of their copyrights in their images to the stock

agency, and the stock agency registers the collection, both the

collection as a whole and the individual images are

registered.30

Houghton Mifflin argues that a regulation requiring a

continuation sheet to list titles within a collection shows that

the Register does indeed require listing of all titles.31 This

argument is meritless, because the regulation it depends on

has an effective date of July 6, 2007, subsequent to all the

registrations at issue in this case.32 While the previous

version of the regulation provided for continuation sheets if

applicants needed more space, it does not mandate, as the

new regulation does, identifying titles and authors of the

component works in a collection registered as an automated

database.33

The record reflects that the Register of Copyrights issued

certificates of copyright on each of the registrations at issue. 

The statute saying what must be in an application appears to

be addressed to her: “The application shall be made on a form

prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and shall include

30 See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 2 Nimmer on Copyright

§ 7.16(B)(5)(c) (2013).

 

31 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(3).

 

32 See 72 Fed. Reg. 36,883, 36,886 (July 6, 2007).

33 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(9) (2006); see also 72 Fed. Reg. 36,883,

36,886, 36,888 (July 6, 2007).
20 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

. . . .”34 If an aggrieved party objected to the Register’s long

standing procedure regarding stock photo agency

registrations, petitions to the agency, participation in rule

making, and actions for violations of the Administrative

Procedure Act might have afforded remedies.35

The Register of Copyrights does not perform a mere

clerical function of recording applications. Instead, the

Register makes a judgment after examining an application. 

“When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights

determines” that the requirement of the statute are met, she

registers the claim and issues a certificate, as she did in this

case.36 When she determines that “the claim is invalid” she

refuses registration and provides written notice of the reasons

why.

37 Though the certificate is not binding upon a court, it

is prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright.38 The

regulations provide for an appellate process when registration

is denied.39 Thus, the agency charged with responsibility for

administering the Copyright Act has determined for each of

the applications at issue that it was valid in all respects. Had

the Copyright Office declined Alaska Stock’s applications

and given notice that titles and authors for all the images must

 

34 17 U.S.C. § 409.

 

35 See 17 U.S.C. § 701(e).

 

36 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(a).

 

37 Id. § 410(b).

 

38 Id. § 410(c).

 

39 37 C.F.R. § 202.5.
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 21

be provided, Alaska Stock could have submitted such

applications at that time.

The Fourth Circuit recently confronted the question we

face in this case and adopted the position advocated by

Alaska Stock and the government. Metropolitan Regional

Information Systems, Inc. v. American Home Realty Network,

Inc., addressed whether a real estate listing service had

properly registered the individual photographs of properties

contained within their listings by registering their listings as

a database.40 A competing real estate listing service used

these individual images without permission. The defendants

in that case made the same argument Houghton Mifflin

makes here, namely, that the “failure to identify names of

creators and titles of individual works as required by

17 U.S.C. § 409(2) and (6) limits the registration[s] to the

Database itself and therefore that the registration[s] do[ ] not

extend to the individual elements in the Database.”41 The

Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that “collective

work registrations [are] sufficient to permit an infringement

action on behalf of component works, at least so long as the

registrant owns the rights to the component works as well.”42

We agree.

The Fifth Circuit held similarly in Szabo v. Errison that

a musician who filed a single registration for his collection of

40 Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc.,

722 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2013).

41 Id. at 597 (alteration marks original and internal quotation marks

omitted).

 

42 Id. at 598.
22 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

his “Songs of 1991” succeeded in registering individual songs

within the collection.43Szabo rejected the argument that

because he had not listed titles for each of the songs, he had

not registered the constituent songs, the same argument

Houghton Mifflin makes here. Szabo applies the rule that

“when one copyrights a collection, the copyright extends to

each individual work in the collection even though the names

of each work are not expressly listed in the copyright

registration.”44

A Second Circuit case holds that the registration of a

collective work, Allure magazine, did not register the

copyright in a component work where it did not own the

copyright to the component work and failed to list its author

or title.45 Alaska Stock does own the copyrights to the

components of the collective works. The Second Circuit

clarified in an order denying rehearing in that case that if “all

rights have been transferred to the claimant, then the

constituent work is included in the registration of the

collective work” even if the authors and titles of the

constituent works are not listed.46 The Third Circuit also

43 Szabo v. Errisson, 68 F.3d 940 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other

grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).

 

44 Id. at 943.

45 Morris v. Bus. Concepts, Inc., 259 F.3d 65, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2001), as

clarified on denial of reh’g, 283 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2002), and abrogated

on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. 154.

46 See Morris v. Business Concepts, Inc., 283 F.3d 502, 505 (2d Cir.

2002) (denying rehearing and clarifying previous opinion). The panel

opinion had previously relied on section 409 of the Copyright Act to hold

that a magazine publisher had not registered an article contained in one of

its magazines because the publisher did not include the author and title of
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 23

agrees that registration of a collective work suffices to allow

suit on the individual components,47though not in response

to the specific argument that the statute requires the

individual authors and titles of the component works to be

listed on the registration application for the registration to be

effective.

Nimmer on Copyright agrees as well, explaining that if

the copyright owner of the collective work is not merely a

licensee, but also the copyright owner of the components,

registration of the collective work registers the components.48

Nimmer reasons that the registration of a collective work

should effect registration of the component works, even if the

individual titles are not listed in the registration.49 We

recognize that Houghton Mifflin’s position has prevailed in

the article on its registration application. Morris, 259 F.3d at 71–72. The

order denying rehearing clarified the opinion to say expressly that the

requirement of listing all the names does not apply if the claimant owns

the copyright to the constituent works as well as the collective work it is

registering, as Alaska Stock did at the time it registered them. See Morris,

283 F.3d at 505.

 

47 Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 204, 206 n.2 (3d

Cir. 2005) (“Although the issue is not before us on appeal, we note that

decisions of this Court and others counsel that registration of a collective

work is sufficient to support an action for infringement of the underlying

self-contained parts.”).

48 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 2 Nimmer on Copyright

§ 7.16(B)(5)(c) (2013).

 

49 Id.
24 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

one published and several unpublished district court

decisions,50 but we do not agree with them.

We have held that “[w]hen interpreting the Copyright

Act, we defer to the Copyright Office’s interpretations in the

appropriate circumstances.”51 Here, where the Copyright

Office has announced its interpretation primarily through

“internal agency manuals [and] opinion letters, we defer to

the Copyright Office’s views expressed in such materials only

to the extent that those interpretations have the power to

persuade.”52

50 See Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g

Co.,712 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Muench Photography,

Inc. v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 2013 WL 6185200, at *10–13 (N.D. Cal. Nov.

19, 2013); Bean v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., 2010 WL

3168624, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2010). But see Panoramic Stock

Images, Ltd. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., __F. Supp. 2d__, 2013WL

4047651, at *2–7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2013); Panoramic Stock Images, Ltd.

v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., __F. Supp. 2d__, 2013 WL 4551666, at *7–9

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2013); Masterfile Corp. v. Gale, 2011 WL 4702862,

at *1–2 (D. Utah Oct. 4, 2011).

51

Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 69000,

at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2014); see also Batjac Prods. Inc. v. GoodTimes

Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 1998) (The

Copyright Office’s “interpretations are entitled to judicial deference if

reasonable.”) (quoting Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc., 953 F.2d 469, 473

(9th Cir. 1991)).

52 Inhale, Inc., 2014 WL 69000, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Copyright Office also announced its position by promulgating

copyright forms. Because the forms created by the Copyright Office are

statutorily authorized, it is possible that they qualify for the more

deferential Chevron deference under Mead. See United States v. Mead

Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001); see also Batjac Prods. Inc., 160 F.3d

at 1231 (“The Register’s position is reasonable and consistent with our

review of the contemporaneously used registration forms used under the
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 25

We find the Copyright Office’s interpretation persuasive. 

Thus, we conclude that Alaska Stock successfully registered

the copyright both to its collections and to the individual

images contained therein.53 The statute required

identification of the author and title of the “work,” which was

the collective work, and extended registration to the

component parts if the party registering the collective work

owned the copyright to the component parts, as Alaska Stock

did. The procedure applied for over three decades by the

Register of Copyrights to registration by stock photo agencies

complied with the statutory requirements and did not violate

any clear requirement to list individual authors and titles of

the components within the work. While arguably the statute

could be read otherwise, the Register of Copyrights’ reading

that a collection of stock photos may be registered without

individual titles, and without naming more than three of the

authors and merely designating the number of authors,

pursuant to an assignment in the language Alaska Stock used,

was reasonable and persuasive. Registration by a songwriter

and singer of a CD of his songs registers both the collection

and the individual songs,54and registration by a stock photo

agency of a CD collection of images the copyright to which

the stock agency owns, registers both the collection and the

individual images.

1909 Act. We conclude that it is entitled to deference.”). We need not

decide this question, however, as we conclude that the Copyright Office’s

position is persuasive under less stringent Skidmore deference.

53 We therefore do not reach the question of whether 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)

would have excused Alaska Stock’s “failure” to list the titles and authors

of the individual photographs.

 

54 See Szabo, 68 F.3d at 943–44.
26 ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

Chevron and its progeny generally articulate several

reasons for deferring to administrative interpretation,

including gap filling pursuant to implicit or explicit

delegation to the agency, expertise of the agency in

addressing technical and complex matters, and resolution of

policy debates by “legislators and administrators” rather than

judges.55 While these considerations counsel in favor of

deference in this case, an even stronger reason does as well.

A longstanding administrative interpretation upon which

private actors have relied aids in construction of a statute

precisely because private parties have long relied upon it.56

The Supreme Court said long ago in United States v. Hill that

“[t]his principle has been applied, as a wholesome one, for

the establishment and enforcement of justice, in many cases

in this court, not only between man and man, but between the

government and those who deal with it, and put faith in the

action of its constituted authorities, judicial, executive, and

administrative. . . . A contemporaneous construction, by the

officers upon whom was imposed the duty of executing those

statutes, is entitled to great weight; and since it is not clear

that that construction was erroneous, it ought not now to be

overturned.”57 The Court instructed in modern times that

“[i]n light of . . . substantial reliance interests, the

55 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864

(1984).

56 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and

Statutory Construction § 49:3 (7th ed. 2012).

 

57 120 U.S. 169, 182–83 (1887) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ALASKA STOCK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 27

longstanding administrative construction of [a]statute should

‘not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.’”58

We are not performing a mere verbal, abstract task when

we construe the Copyright Act. We are affecting the fortunes

of people, many of whose fortunes are small. The stock

agencies through their trade association worked out what they

should do to register images with the Register of Copyrights,

the Copyright Office established a clear procedure and the

stock agencies followed it. The Copyright Office has

maintained its procedure for three decades, spanningmultiple

administrations. The livelihoods of photographers and stock

agencies have long been founded on their compliance with

the Register’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. Their

reliance upon a reasonable and longstanding administrative

interpretation should be honored. Denying the fruits of

reliance by citizens on a longstanding administrative practice

reasonably construing a statute is unjust.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

 

58 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457–58 (1978).