In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-20-00140-CR

No. 02-20-00149-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 371st District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 1572638D, 1632168D

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.

Opinion by Justice Birdwell

JAMES CALVIN MASSEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

OPINION

The trial court found that an officer’s frisk of appellant James Calvin Massey was 

not supported by reasonable suspicion. But the court nonetheless concluded that the 

drug evidence should not be suppressed for three reasons.

First, it found that Massey consented to the frisk. But Massey did no more than 

briefly acquiesce to the officer’s command to turn around, and he began a struggle 

almost as soon as the search began. No reasonable trier of fact could find that this 

amounted to consent. The frisk was an illegal search.

Second, the trial court concluded that the taint of any illegality was attenuated 

when Massey committed criminal offenses after the frisk. We hold that Massey’s alleged 

offenses, petty and predictable as they were, do not attenuate the taint of the illegal 

frisk.

Third, the trial court concluded that the officer found the drugs in plain view 

after Massey discarded them during the detention. But the officer violated the Fourth 

Amendment en route to that juncture. The State therefore may not avail itself of the 

plain-view doctrine.

So holding, we reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2018, Massey was indicted for possession of a controlled substance. He 

pleaded guilty and received eight years of deferred adjudication.
3

At around 11 A.M. on February 16, 2020, Officer Richard Lukowsky was 

patrolling the streets of Azle when he observed Massey driving a truck without a 

registration sticker. Officer Lukowsky pursued the truck as it pulled into a gas station. 

Officer Lukowsky was concerned for his safety; he associated that particular gas station 

with drug trafficking because police had made several felony drug arrests there.

Massey was standing at the front door of the closed gas station when Officer 

Lukowsky turned on his police lights and beckoned him over. Officer Lukowsky asked 

Massey if he had any weapons, and Massey said no. Officer Lukowsky requested 

Massey’s driver’s license. Massey gave him permission to retrieve it from the truck. 

Massey told Officer Lukowsky about his job and explained that he had tried to pay for 

a registration sticker but that he did not have enough money. Massey’s hands were 

shaking, and he appeared nervous to Officer Lukowsky, though he was cooperative and 

respectful. It was daylight, and the lot was empty except for the two men. Officer 

Lukowsky saw nothing that would indicate the presence of a weapon.

Still, Officer Lukowsky told Massey to turn around so that Officer Lukowsky 

could pat him down, and Massey turned around and raised his arms slightly. But as 

Officer Lukowsky started patting down his right pocket, Massey slipped his hand into 

his left pocket. Officer Lukowsky grabbed Massey’s left arm and told him not to reach 

for his pocket. Massey strained against Officer Lukowsky’s grip. Massey then ripped 

away from Officer Lukowsky and turned to face him. Officer Lukowsky called for 

backup. When Massey again reached for his pocket, Officer Lukowsky drew his gun. 
4

Massey pulled his keys out of his pocket and dropped them on the ground. Officer 

Lukowsky shouted at him to turn and put his hands behind his back. Massey turned 

but began walking away, saying that if Officer Lukowsky was going to shoot him, he 

should go ahead. Officer Lukowsky drew a taser and screamed at Massey to stop. 

Massey slid behind a metal air compressor and began to fish in his pocket once more, 

obscured from Officer Lukowsky’s view. Officer Lukowsky circled behind him and 

tased him in the back, and Massey crumpled. He was handcuffed and searched, and 

within moments, Officer Lukowsky discovered a small plastic bag of methamphetamine 

on the ground by the air compressor, where Massey had just stood. Before Officer 

Lukowsky tased Massey, there was no methamphetamine on the ground. Massey was 

arrested.

The State moved to adjudicate Massey’s guilt for the 2018 possession charge. It 

was alleged that Massey had breached the terms of his community supervision by 

committing felony drug possession and by failing to report to the probation 

department.

Massey moved to suppress the drug evidence. Among his arguments for 

suppression was his theory that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion 

that Massey was armed and dangerous, as is required to justify a protective frisk. Massey 

contended that because the discovery of the drugs flowed from an illegal frisk and 

Massey’s reaction to that frisk, the drugs should be suppressed as the fruit of the 

poisonous tree.
5

After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied suppression. The court 

reasoned that Massey’s own independent actions, which bordered on a resisting offense, 

disrupted the causative flow from the frisk to the discovery of the methamphetamine, 

and his actions thus attenuated the taint of a potentially illegal frisk. “[W]hether the 

search was legal or illegal,” the trial court concluded, “Mr. Massey did not have the right 

to resist in the manner that is shown on the video, so I’m going to deny the motion to 

suppress on that basis.” After finding that Massey violated the terms of his probation, 

the trial court adjudicated his guilt and sentenced him to five years’ confinement.

Separately, Massey was indicted for possession of a controlled substance. After 

his motion to suppress was denied, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years’ 

confinement to run concurrently with his other sentence. Massey appealed both 

convictions.

Before this court, the State argued for the first time that Massey consented to the 

search when he complied with Officer Lukowsky’s instructions to turn around and 

submit to a protective frisk. On our own motion, we abated the case and remanded it 

for the trial court to prepare written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect 

to consent and the other issues raised on appeal.1

1

See Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“[A]ppellate 

courts should have the trial judge’s findings of fact before disagreeing with that judge’s 

ruling on a motion to suppress.”).
6

The trial court approved the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions 

of law. In them, the trial court found that Officer Lukowsky did not have reasonable 

suspicion to frisk Massey, but that the protective frisk was nonetheless justified by 

Massey’s consent to the search. The trial court further concluded that even if the frisk 

were illegal, the taint from the illegality was attenuated when Massey resisted the search. 

Finally, the trial court concluded that even if the taint were not attenuated, the illegality 

would be immaterial because the drug evidence was not obtained as a result of the frisk, 

but by the discovery of the drugs in plain sight after Massey discarded them.

With the trial court’s findings and conclusions in hand, we now proceed to 

evaluate Massey’s issues on appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress evidence. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); 

Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In reviewing the trial court’s 

decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 

543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ 

credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–

25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, we defer almost totally to the trial court’s rulings 

on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court determined those facts on a 

basis other than evaluating credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact 
7

questions that turn on evaluating credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; 

Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 

S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact 

questions do not turn on the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, we review the trial 

court’s rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 

154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.

Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a suppression 

motion, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. Wiede, 214 

S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial 

court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in 

the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings. Kelly, 204 

S.W.3d at 818–19. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit 

fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id.

at 818.

When the record is silent on the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, or when there 

are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions 

from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that would support the trial 

court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling, supports those findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2008); see Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling 
8

de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also dispositive of 

the legal ruling. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819.

Even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling, we must uphold the 

ruling if it is both supported by the record and correct under any applicable legal theory. 

State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 

S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by 

government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. A defendant 

seeking to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds bears the initial burden 

to produce some evidence that the government conducted a warrantless search or 

seizure that he has standing to contest. State v. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d 621, 623–24 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2019). Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the State to prove 

either that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or, if warrantless, 

was otherwise reasonable. Id. at 624.

III. LEGALITY OF THE DETENTION

Massey does not dispute that Officer Lukowsky was initially justified in detaining 

him for a traffic offense. However, Massey insists that Officer Lukowsky unlawfully 

prolonged the detention beyond what was justified by his initial suspicion. According 

to Massey, Officer Lukowsky engaged in an unlawful fishing expedition for evidence of 

wrongdoing, so the evidence must be suppressed.
9

A detention, as opposed to an arrest, may be justified on less than probable cause 

if a person is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific, articulable 

facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968); Carmouche v. State, 10 

S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An officer conducts a lawful temporary 

detention when he reasonably suspects that an individual is violating the law. Crain v. 

State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the 

circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with 

rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a 

particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Ford, 158 

S.W.3d at 492. This is an objective standard that disregards the detaining officer’s 

subjective intent and looks solely to whether the officer has an objective basis for the 

stop. Id.

The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined 

by the seizure’s mission, which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop 

and attend to related safety concerns. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 

S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the 

traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id., 135 S. Ct. at 

1614. The seizure remains lawful only so long as unrelated inquiries do not measurably 

extend the duration of the stop. Id. at 355, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 

555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009)). Once the original purpose for the stop 
10

is exhausted, police may not unnecessarily prolong the detention solely in hopes of 

finding evidence of some other crime. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 64 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2004). The stop may not be used as a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal 

activity. Id.

“But the Supreme Court has expressly rejected placing any rigid time limitations 

on Terry stops . . . .” Id. “[I]nstead, the issue is ‘whether the police diligently pursued a 

means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, 

during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.’” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985)).

Nothing about the detention here suggests that it was unlawfully prolonged by 

inquiries unrelated to the traffic infraction and public safety. Officer Lukowsky’s 

actions were prompt and tied to the tasks at hand. He approached Massey, explained 

the reason for the detention, asked for Massey’s driver’s license, inquired into the reason 

for the missing registration sticker, and initiated a frisk—all within the first two minutes 

of the stop. See Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (concluding 

that the detention was not illegally prolonged where the officer took similar actions in 

the first five minutes of the stop, at which point additional considerations justified 

further intervention). The next two minutes were spent grappling with Massey, dealing 

with the apparent threat that he posed, and discovering the methamphetamine. See id.

When “police are acting in a swiftly developing situation . . . the court should not indulge 

in unrealistic second-guessing” in determining whether the search was illegally 
11

extended. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S. Ct. at 1575. The entire exchange unfolded in 

four minutes. See Grandberry v. State, No. 02-13-00488-CR, 2014 WL 3029045, at *4 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (“Delays of twenty-six minutes or longer have been found reasonable, 

depending on the balancing of the public interest served by the delay against the 

appellant’s right to be free from arbitrary detentions and intrusions.”). Thus, the 

investigation was not wrongly extended.

IV. LEGALITY OF THE FRISK

Massey next argues that the protective frisk was illegal. Massey contends that 

Officer Lukowsky did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Massey was armed 

and dangerous, and thus the frisk was not defensible under the Fourth Amendment.

The trial court determined that the frisk was not justified by reasonable suspicion. 

This determination is well supported by the record. An officer is justified in engaging 

in a protective frisk if he reasonably suspects that the person who he has lawfully 

detained is presently armed and dangerous. Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2016). “The intrusion must be based on specific articulable facts which, in 

the light of the officer’s experience and general knowledge, together with rational 

inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Id. In this case, 

the only articulable facts available to support a belief that Massey was armed and 

dangerous were that Massey (1) was nervous (2) in an area where there had been drug 

arrests. See Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (deeming 
12

nervousness “not particularly probative” in evaluating reasonable suspicion); see also

O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has 

been ‘careful to maintain’ the ‘narrow scope’ of the pat-down exception.” (quoting 

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343 (1979))). There were no signs of a 

weapon, and Massey was at a safe distance, in broad daylight, without access to his 

vehicle, respectfully complying with the officer, who was the only other person in the 

parking lot—an apparently safe situation until the officer grabbed him and drew him

close, into a frisk that is now alleged to be illegal. Without any articulable facts reflecting 

a hazard to the officer, the initiation of the frisk was unsupported by reasonable 

suspicion.

However, the State maintains that Officer Lukowsky was nonetheless permitted 

to initiate the protective frisk because Massey consented to it. As the trial court found, 

when Officer Lukowsky asked Massey to turn around and submit to a pat-down, 

Massey turned around and raised his arms slightly. According to the State, these 

gestures signified Massey’s consent to the pat-down, as the trial court also found. And 

as to the fact that Massey began resisting the pat-down a moment after it began, the 

State contends that this was simply the withdrawal of his consent. Thus, by the State’s 

account, this fleeting consent is enough to justify the initiation of the frisk.

Under the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted without a warrant is per se 

unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 

exceptions. Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). One of those 
13

exceptions is a search conducted with the person’s voluntary consent. Id. Under Texas 

law, the State must prove voluntary consent by clear and convincing evidence. State v. 

Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The consent must be shown to 

be positive and unequivocal, and there must not be any duress or coercion, actual or 

implied. Id. Consent is not established by showing no more than acquiescence to a 

claim of lawful authority. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 331. The validity of an alleged 

consent to search is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the 

circumstances. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d at 526. “Consent to search is not to be lightly 

inferred.” Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Corea v. State, 52 

S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d).

A person’s consent to a search can be communicated to law enforcement in a 

variety of ways, including by words, actions, or circumstantial evidence showing implied 

consent. Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 458. Thus, Texas courts have held that where law 

enforcement requests consent for a search or otherwise puts the question of consent to 

the detainee in a way that does not indicate compulsion, a person may answer that 

question in the affirmative by a gesture indicating that the search is permitted. For 

instance, in Kendrick v. State, the investigating officer “requested appellant’s permission 

to conduct a pat-down,” and the court of appeals held that when appellant stood up 

and raised his hands in response to this question, he thereby indicated his consent to 

the search. 93 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). 

Likewise, in Todd v. State, the investigating officer asked for permission to search the 
14

appellant’s vehicle. No. 08-03-00443-CR, 2005 WL 1124262, at *5 (Tex. App.—

El Paso May 12, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The defendant “threw 

up his arms in the direction of the vehicle,” and the appellate court upheld the 

determination that his gesture communicated a response of consent. Id. In Salinas v. 

State, the officer requested permission to perform a pat-down, and the court held that 

appellant indicated his consent to the search in part by turning his back and raising his 

hands. No. 13-15-00310-CR, 2016 WL 2747770, at *1, *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg May 5, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In McAllister 

v. State—the case upon which the State principally relies—the driver of a car was 

arrested, and his passenger asked an officer for a ride to his mother’s house. 34 S.W.3d 

346, 349–50 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d). The officer agreed but told the 

passenger he would have to be patted down before he would be allowed to get in the 

patrol car. Id. at 350. In reply, the passenger “raised his hands to about chest level.” 

Id. Because the circumstances left the passenger under “no compulsion” to accept the 

ride or the frisk it entailed, the court held that the passenger’s gesture communicated 

his consent to the search. See id. at 351; see also O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 553 (“[I]f an 

individual volunteers to ride in a police car, he may be subjected to a routine pat-down 

search before being allowed in the car.”).

But where the officer instead couches the issue as a command or directive to 

comply with a search, verbal or nonverbal responses that do not clearly indicate 

consent—rather than mere acquiescence—are seldom deemed manifestations of 
15

consent. For instance, this court rejected a claim of consent to a prolonged detention 

where the officer told the appellee that he would be conducting a dog-sniff search and 

instructed the detainee to start his truck, turn the fan on high, roll up the windows, and 

stay in the vehicle, and the appellee responded “okay” as he complied. State v. Marino, 

No. 2-01-474-CR, 2003 WL 851953, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 6, 2003, pet. 

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We held the officer’s framing of the 

issue as a command rather than a request for consent weighed against a finding of 

consent; “[b]y stating his intentions and instructing appellee on how to cooperate rather 

than requesting permission to prolong the detention for the canine sweep, Officer 

Sheffield indicated to appellee that he had the authority to conduct the canine sweep 

without appellee’s consent.” Id. We concluded that the appellee’s response was nothing 

more than mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. Id.

Likewise, the district court attached weight to the absence of a request for 

consent in United States v. Curtis, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1196 (S.D. Tex. 2020), appeal 

dismissed, No. 20-20570, 2020 WL 9425159 (5th Cir. Nov. 12, 2020). “One thing that 

didn’t happen is obvious—no officer or other personnel on the scene ever asked Curtis 

for permission to enter his home.” Id. “That failure of specific request weighs against 

a finding of voluntary consent here.” Id. In the absence of any request for consent, the 

court held that appellant’s “equivocal” interactions with officers did not demonstrate 

his implied consent to the search. Id.
16

Here, no witness testified that Massey consented to the search, and there were 

no written or verbal indicia of consent. The State’s argument for consent rests solely 

on Massey’s gesture of turning around. But the way that Officer Lukowsky elicited that 

gesture undermines any finding of consent. About two minutes into the detention, 

Officer Lukowsky said to Massey, “You don’t have any weapons on you, do you?” 

Massey replied, “No.” Officer Lukowsky then directed Massey, “Just go ahead and 

turn around, I’m going to pat you down just for my safety.” Massey initially turned 

around and raised his arms slightly. Officer Lukowsky did not request consent to search 

Massey. Rather, he infused the issue with compulsion, directing Massey to turn around 

and comply with a search of his person. The officer’s framing of the issue militates in 

favor of a determination that Massey’s response was merely an acquiescence to an 

assertion of lawful authority.

The State’s case for consent only grows thinner when considering the rest of the 

encounter. As soon as Officer Lukowsky attempted to pat him down, Massey put his 

hand in his pocket and began pulling away. Officer Lukowsky gripped his arm, but 

Massey ripped free, backed away, and continued to defy the officer’s attempts to detain 

and search him until he was tased. Massey’s struggle against the search was so vigorous 

that, on appeal, the State now argues that Massey could and should have been charged 

with a resisting offense. A struggle is not a hallmark of genuine consent to a search.2

2

Indeed, the case for consent was so slight that the State did not even think to 

argue at the suppression hearing that Massey consented to the search. The trial court, 
17

Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, then, a 

rational trier of fact could not conclude by clear and convincing evidence that Massey 

voluntarily consented to the search. See Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 459 n.24. In the absence 

of a warrant or any other exception to the warrant requirement, the search was per se 

illegal. See id. at 458.

V. ATTENUATION

The State argues in the alternative that even if the search was illegal, any taint 

from the illegality was attenuated by Massey’s subsequent criminal conduct. According 

to the State, Massey committed two offenses when he broke from Officer Lukowsky’s 

grip and moved backward: resisting a search and evading detention. See Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. §§ 38.03–.04. The State submits that these intervening offenses vitiate the 

connection between the illegal pat-down and the discovery of the methamphetamine, 

such that the trial court properly denied suppression.

The principal judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations is the 

exclusionary rule, which often requires trial courts to exclude unlawfully seized evidence 

in a criminal trial. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016). “[T]he 

exclusionary rule encompasses both the primary evidence obtained as a direct result of 

in its initial oral findings, did not find that Massey consented to the search. It was only 

when the case reached the appeal stage that the State came up with this ex post facto 

justification. When we abated and remanded the case to the trial court for written 

findings and conclusions, the trial court simply approved the State’s proposed finding 

that Massey consented to the search.
18

an illegal search or seizure and . . . evidence later discovered and found to be derivative 

of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id., 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (internal 

quotation omitted).

Appended to this rule, there are doctrines that “refine the situations in which the 

illegally obtained evidence can be admitted at or excluded from trial.” Day v. State, 614 

S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). One is the attenuation doctrine. Id. Under 

this doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional 

police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening 

circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has 

been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” Strieff, 

579 U.S. at 238, 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (internal quotation omitted).

To determine whether the attenuation doctrine applies, we ask “whether, 

granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence . . . has been come at by 

exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 

purged of the primary taint.” State v. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2015). Neither the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule nor our own statutory 

exclusionary rule, embodied in Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure, requires the suppression of evidence that was not “obtained” as a result of 

some illegality. Id. Depending on how removed the actual attainment of the evidence 

is from the illegality, the ordinary person may not consider that evidence to have been 
19

“obtained” by that illegality. Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2013).

Three factors guide our attenuation analysis. Strieff, 579 U.S. at 239, 136 S. Ct. at 

2061–62. First, we look to the temporal proximity between the unconstitutional 

conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of 

evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Id., 136 S. Ct. at 2062. Second, we 

consider the presence of intervening circumstances. Id., 136 S. Ct. at 2062. Third, we 

examine the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id., 136 S. Ct. at 2062.

The presence or absence of an intervening circumstance dictates which of the 

two remaining factors should carry greater significance:

When police find and seize physical evidence shortly after an illegal stop, 

in the absence of the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant in 

between, that physical evidence should ordinarily be suppressed, even if 

the police misconduct is not highly purposeful or flagrantly abusive of 

Fourth Amendment rights. Under this scenario, temporal proximity is the 

paramount factor. But when an outstanding arrest warrant is discovered 

between the illegal stop and the seizure of physical evidence, the 

importance of the temporal proximity factor decreases. Under this 

scenario, the intervening circumstance is a necessary but never, by itself, 

wholly determinative factor in the attenuation calculation, and the 

purposefulness and/or flagrancy of the police misconduct, vel non, 

becomes of vital importance.

Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 731–32 (quoting State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 306–07 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2012)).

The courts are not of one mind as to whether and when a subsequent criminal 

offense, committed after an illegal seizure or search, will operate as an intervening 
20

circumstance. But the disparity in the decisions appears to have much to do with the 

gravity of the subsequent offense and the degree to which it is an expectable result of 

illegal police action. See State v. Alexander, 595 A.2d 282, 285 (Vt. 1991) (reasoning that 

not all subsequent crimes will act as intervening circumstances, only ones sufficiently 

“serious” to be “distinct”). The more serious and unforeseeable the subsequent offense 

is, the more apt it is to be deemed an intervening circumstance that tends to free the 

resulting evidence from any taint. See United States v. Brodie, 742 F.3d 1058, 1063 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014) (collecting examples). For example, in Matienza v. State, officers attempted 

to detain the appellant on drug charges, and he brandished a gun and pointed it at an 

officer. See 699 S.W.2d 626, 626–27 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, pet. ref’d). The ensuing 

searches revealed cocaine. Id. at 627. The court of appeals rightly upheld the denial of 

the appellant’s motion to suppress this evidence, reasoning that his extreme act served 

as an intervening circumstance that tended to purge the resulting evidence of any taint. 

Id. at 628.

But conversely, if the crime is petty and relatively predictable as a product of an 

unlawful detention or search, the evidence revealed is better viewed as an extended 

derivation of the illegal police action. “Incriminating admissions and attempts to 

dispose of incriminating evidence are common and predictable consequences of illegal 

arrests and searches, and thus to admit such evidence would encourage such Fourth 

Amendment violations in future cases.” LaFave, Crime committed in response to illegal arrest

or search as a fruit, 6 Search & Seizure § 11.4(j) (6th ed.). The supreme courts of Delaware 
21

and New Hampshire have held that milder cases of resisting arrest did not constitute 

intervening circumstances. Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 872–73 (Del. 1999); State v. 

Beauchesne, 868 A.2d 972, 982–83 (N.H. 2005); accord Commonwealth v. Augustus, No. 1603-

15-1, 2016 WL 1002095, at *6–7 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016) (reaching a similar 

conclusion, reasoning that “a non-violent or non-threatening crime” was less apt to be 

deemed an intervening circumstance). Other courts have held that simply running away 

from the detaining officers or attempting to discard evidence will not necessarily 

dissipate the taint. United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 174–75 (4th Cir. 2012); Brodie, 

742 F.3d at 1063; Johnson v. United States, 253 A.3d 1050, 1058 (D.C. 2021) (“Here, 

appellant’s flight, on foot, did not constitute . . . a serious risk to the public safety when 

compared to the cases cited by the government.”); State v. Owens, 992 N.E.2d 939, 942–

43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); Thornton v. State, 214 A.3d 34, 56–57 (Md. 2019).

Massey’s alleged offenses—resisting search and evading detention on foot—fall 

into this latter category. Massey was not violent, he had no weapons, and his alleged 

offenses consisted largely of trying to free himself from the grip of an illegal search. 

Because neither offense marked a severe departure from the common, if regrettable, 

range of responses to an unlawful frisk, they do not constitute intervening 

circumstances.

In the absence of intervening circumstances, the “physical evidence should 

ordinarily be suppressed, even if the police misconduct is not highly purposeful or 

flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights. Under this scenario, temporal 
22

proximity is the paramount factor.” Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 732. Only a minute passed 

between the illegal frisk and the time that Massey was tased. Another minute passed 

between the tasing and the discovery of the methamphetamine.

Because the dominant factor of temporal proximity strongly favors suppression, 

we hold that Massey’s alleged offenses during the detention did not attenuate the taint 

of Officer Lukowsky’s illegal frisk.

VI. PLAIN VIEW

The lack of attenuation for this Fourth Amendment violation also addresses 

another of the State’s arguments against suppression: the State maintains that the 

evidence is admissible because Officer Lukowsky discovered it in plain view.

Three requirements must be met to justify the seizure of an object in plain view: 

(1) law enforcement officials must lawfully be where the object can be plainly viewed; 

(2) the incriminating character of the object in plain view must be immediately apparent 

to the officials; and (3) the officials must have the right to access the object. State v. 

Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In determining whether the officer 

had a right to be where he was, the officer must not have violated the Fourth 

Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. 

Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

As we have determined, Officer Lukowsky violated the Fourth Amendment 

en route to the vantage point where he discovered the methamphetamine. “[I]n light 

of the unjustified pat[-]down, the State cannot invoke the ‘plain view’ doctrine . . . .” 
23

State v. Bishop, No. 13-16-00322-CR, 2017 WL 1089681, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi–Edinburg Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see 

State v. Rodriguez, 529 S.W.3d 81, 90–91 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015), aff’d, 521 S.W.3d 

1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Paulea v. State, 278 S.W.3d 861, 867 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d). We reject the State’s plain-view claim.

VII. HARM

Having found error, we now turn to the question of harm. The admission of 

evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is an error of 

constitutional magnitude. Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d 106, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2001). Because the error is constitutional, Rule 44.2(a) requires us to reverse the 

conviction unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s denial 

of suppression did not contribute to the conviction. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a); Love v. 

State, 543 S.W.3d 835, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In applying the “harmless error” 

test, we ask whether there is a “reasonable possibility” that the error might have 

contributed to the outcome. Love, 543 S.W.3d at 846. If the denial of the motion to 

suppress contributed in some measure to the State’s leverage in the plea-bargaining 

process and may have contributed to the appellant’s decision to relinquish his 

constitutional rights of trial and confrontation, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. Chidyausiku v. 

State, 457 S.W.3d 627, 631–32 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref’d); see Holmes v. 

State, 323 S.W.3d 163, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (op. on reh’g).
24

As to the probation revocation, the State offered no evidence that Massey 

violated the terms of his community supervision aside from the methamphetamine that 

the trial court erroneously declined to suppress. See Pinkston v. State, No. 02-14-00041-

CR, 2015 WL 1262919, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 19, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (concluding that there was harm because “the 

cocaine found on Pinkston during Galbraith’s illegal detention is the only evidence that 

Pinkston possessed cocaine”). As to Massey’s decision to plead guilty to the separate 

possession offense, the State’s victory-in-error at the suppression hearing gave the State 

the ability to offer an essential piece of evidence in a prosecution for possession of a 

controlled substance: the controlled substance itself. See Falero v. State, No. 02-19-

00205-CR, 2020 WL 1949018, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 23, 2020, pet. 

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“If the State’s primary evidence in 

support of Falero’s conviction—the methamphetamine—should have been

suppressed, then Falero would be entitled to a reversal of the trial court’s 

judgment . . . .”). The error had an evident suasive effect on Massey’s decision to plead 

guilty, given that he decided to enter this plea shortly after the denial of his motion to 

suppress. See Wheeler v. State, 573 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019) 

(“Wheeler pleaded guilty only after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, 
25

indicating that the trial court’s denial was a factor in his decision to plead guilty.”), aff’d, 

616 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).3

We therefore cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous 

denial of suppression did not contribute to Massey’s revocation and decision to plead 

guilty. We sustain Massey’s sole point.

VIII. CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgments and remand to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell

Justice

Publish

Delivered: December 9, 2021

3

The State argues that any constitutional error is harmless because, on appeal, 

Massey has failed to challenge the trial court’s finding of true as to the State’s allegation 

that he failed to report to the probation department as required. However, in our 

evaluation of harm, we take into account any and every circumstance apparent in the 

record that logically informs an appellate determination whether beyond a reasonable 

doubt that particular error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. Snowden 

v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). One of those circumstances must 

be that Massey pleaded not true to this allegation, but that the State did not offer any

evidence concerning Massey’s alleged failure to report. Considering the complete lack 

of evidence to establish this ground, Massey’s alleged failure to report does not mitigate

the harm that he suffered due to the erroneous denial of his motion to suppress.