NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ALAN SINGER, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JONATHAN PALMER, aka JONATHAN JAMES PALMER, and 

MONDEX CORPORATION, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0707

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015CV201804044

The Honorable Charles W. Gurtler, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Alan Singer, Fort Mohave

Plaintiff/Appellant

The Mullan Law Firm, P.C., Bullhead City

By Anthony Joseph Mullan, Jr.

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

FILED 10-24-2019
SINGER v. PALMER/MONDEX

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Chief Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Alan Singer appeals from the superior court’s order granting

the motion to dismiss in favor of Jonathan Palmer (“Palmer”) and Mondex 

Corporation (“Mondex”) for lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of service 

of process. For the reasons that follow we affirm in part and reverse and 

remand in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 This appeal arises out of a contract between Mondex 

(incorporated in Ontario, Canada) and Judith Rottmann, on her own behalf, 

and on behalf of Mercury Terrain & Maison Inc. (“Mercury”) (incorporated 

in Quebec, Canada). The parties’ contract noted that Mondex had

information concerning assets that Mercury may be entitled to receive. 

Mondex agreed “to help recover these [a]ssets situated in the Province of 

Quebec, and possibly elsewhere, which were expropriated or otherwise 

misappropriated.”

¶3 Singer, an Arizona resident and Mercury’s consultant, was 

not originally a party to the contract. Instead, Singer signed the contract as 

a witness and the contract provided that he would act on behalf of

Rottmann “in the case of her incapacity.” Singer alleges that Mercury and 

Rottmann assigned their right to monetary damages against Mondex and 

Palmer to him, although the record is devoid of any proof of the 

assignment.

¶4 In March 2018, Singer filed a lawsuit against Mondex, Alan 

Singer v. Mondex Corporation, 1 CA-CV18-0346, 2019 WL 1961576 (Ariz. App. 

May 2, 2019) (mem. decision) (“Mondex I”), alleging the same tort and 

 

1 A more detailed rendition of the facts is included in our 

memorandum decision issued in Alan Singer v. Mondex Corporation, 1 CACV18-0346, 2019 WL 1961576 (Ariz. App. May 2, 2019) (mem. decision).
SINGER v. PALMER/MONDEX

Decision of the Court

3

contract theories he now alleges against Palmer and Mondex.

2 The superior 

court dismissed the action against Mondex for lack of personal jurisdiction

under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2). We affirmed the 

superior court’s dismissal in Mondex I because “Singer did not provide the 

superior court with enough facts to support Arizona’s exercise of specific 

jurisdiction over a Canadian corporation that contracted with another 

Canadian corporation and its owner to locate assets in Canada.” 1 CA-CV 

18-0346, at *3, ¶ 13. We held personal jurisdiction was lacking against 

Mondex. Id. at *4, ¶ 17.

¶5 Less than four months after the superior court’s adverse

decision in Mondex I, Singer filed this nearly identical lawsuit against 

Mondex, but this time including Palmer in his capacity as the “founder, 

former president, and the decision maker of Mondex.” Singer had become 

aware that Palmer was in the state giving a presentation at Scottsdale 

Community College located within the reservation of the Salt River PimaMaricopa Indian Community (“Tribe”). Singer then employed a private 

process server, certified under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, to 

serve process on Palmer and Mondex. As planned, Palmer was served 

individually and purportedly on behalf of Mondex while on tribal land.

¶6 Palmer and Mondex subsequently filed a motion to dismiss 

for lack of service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction under Rules

12(b)(2), (b)(5), and 4(g). The superior court granted the same. From this 

judgment Singer timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review a superior court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for 

abuse of discretion, but review questions of law de novo. Dressler v. 

Morrison, 212 Ariz. 279, 281, ¶ 11 (2006).

I. Issue Preclusion and Personal Jurisdiction over Mondex3

¶8 It is undisputed that in Mondex I, the lawsuit against 

defendant Mondex was dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction. See 

 

2 Singer now also alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (“FDCPA”) against Palmer and Mondex. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-

1692p.

3 Although the claims against Palmer seem to arise out of Palmer’s

conduct in his capacity as a representative of Mondex, and personal 
SINGER v. PALMER/MONDEX

Decision of the Court

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CA-CV 18-0346, at *4, ¶ 17. A review of the record in that case shows that 

Singer and Mondex submitted affidavits and argued the issue of whether 

Mondex, a Canadian entity, had sufficient minimum contacts with the State 

of Arizona so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

¶9 Singer appealed the superior court’s determination that the 

minimum contacts requirement was not satisfied in Mondex I, and we 

affirmed. We denied Singer’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, and 

his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court is currently pending

consideration. The question is whether Singer may relitigate the same 

issue, although previously decided against him, against the same defendant 

simply by filing this new action.

¶10 Even though the instant lawsuit differs from the first in that 

Palmer is now also a named defendant and a violation of the FDCPA is 

alleged, insofar as the issue of personal jurisdiction against defendant 

Mondex is concerned, the action is improper. As this court has recognized, 

“a subsequent action by and against the same parties on the same cause in 

the same court is barred . . . .” Tash v. Saunders, 153 Ariz. 322, 325 (App. 

1987) (quoting 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments, § 500 (1969)). “When an 

appropriate opportunity to be heard has been afforded to all interested 

parties, neither jurisdictional nor other questions can be relitigated by 

them.” Tash, 153 Ariz. at 326; see Moore Drug Co. v. Schaneman, 10 Ariz. App. 

587, 589 (1969). Accordingly, we will not revisit the issue of personal 

jurisdiction against Mondex. We affirm the court’s order dismissing all 

claims against Mondex.

II. Service of Process on Palmer, a Non-Indian, on a Reservation Within 

the State of Arizona

¶11 Singer argues that when a non-Indian defendant is served on 

a reservation within the State and the subject matter concerns offreservation activities, service of process in compliance with the Arizona 

Rules of Civil Procedure is valid. We agree.

¶12 A reservation is “subject to [a state’s territorial] jurisdiction, 

so that process may run there, however the Indians themselves may be 

exempt from that jurisdiction.” Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, 147 

 

jurisdiction over Palmer may be in question, this issue is not before us and 

we decline to address it.
SINGER v. PALMER/MONDEX

Decision of the Court

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(1880). For example, “service of process by the sheriff on a non-Indian 

within that part of the reservation within Arizona is valid,” but that same 

service of process is invalid when the defendant is Indian and on his or her 

tribe’s reservation. State v. Zaman, 194 Ariz. 442, 443, ¶¶ 2, 4 (1999). In 

Arizona, methods of service on Indian reservations, other than by the 

sheriff, are also authorized under Rule 4, including service by certified 

private process servers. Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 160 Ariz. 251, 259 (1989).

¶13 In this case, Palmer is a non-Indian and was served by a 

private process server certified under Rule 4. Relying on Zaman, the 

superior court found that service of process was insufficient because service 

on the Tribe’s reservation must be executed by the sheriff or a person that 

is certified under the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Salt River PimaMaricopa Community Court. But the argument that service of process 

upon a non-Indian while on tribal lands must comport with that tribe’s

rules of civil procedure was directly rejected in Zaman.

4 194 Ariz. at 444, 

¶ 14. That court reasoned that “[p]roceedings in the Superior Court of 

Arizona are governed by the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. 

Zaman’s only pertinent requirement is that, when serving process on a nonIndian within tribal lands, the process server must be certified under the 

Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Nor does Zaman vest the power to 

serve process under these circumstances exclusively upon the sheriff. Id. at 

443, ¶ 4; see also id. at 445, ¶ 19 (Jones, J., concurring) (“It is not necessary in 

every case that civil litigants employ the county sheriff to serve process on 

non-Indians on tribal lands . . . . The Rules provide alternative means

. . . .”).

¶14 Because Singer employed a private process server certified 

under Rule 4(e) to serve process on Palmer, a non-Indian, the service of 

process on the Tribe’s reservation was valid. See Zaman, 194 Ariz. at 444, 

¶ 14; see also Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1990).

Accordingly, the superior court erred when it found that Singer’s service of 

process on Palmer was insufficient, and we reverse that portion of the 

dismissal order.

 

4 We decline Singer’s request that we take judicial notice of the Rules 

of Civil Procedure for the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Community Court

because, although relevant to a lawsuit in tribal court, they are not pertinent 

to the analysis in this superior court matter. See Zaman, 194 Ariz. at 444, 

¶ 14.
SINGER v. PALMER/MONDEX

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III. Failure to Timely Object

¶15 Singer also argues that Palmer and Mondex conceded to 

personal jurisdiction by failing to make a timely, more precise, and specific 

objection on the issue of the validity of service of process on tribal lands. 

Because we hold that service of process on Palmer was valid and Singer is 

precluded from relitigating the issue of personal jurisdiction against 

Mondex, we need not decide this issue.

IV. Attorneys’ Fees

¶16 Palmer and Mondex request attorneys’ fees pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-341.01(A) and 12-349(A). In 

the exercise of our discretion, we grant Mondex alone its reasonable 

attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1) because Singer brought this 

subsequent action against Mondex without substantial justification, after 

the issue had been litigated, and while it is pending review by the Arizona 

Supreme Court. As a prevailing party, Mondex is entitled to its taxable 

costs on compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, and reverse and 

remand in part for proceedings consistent with this decision.