FOR THE RESPONDENT 		FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT

							DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 

No appearance.				Donald R. Lundberg, Executive Secretary

						Charles M. Kidd, Staff Attorney

						115 West Washington Street, Ste. 1060

						Indianapolis, IN 46204

____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF			) 

						) Case No. 49S00-9205-DI-349

STEVEN J. RADFORD		)

________________________________________________________________________

DISCIPLINARY ACTION 

________________________________________________________________________

August 26, 1998

Per Curiam

	We conclude today that by inducing clients to enter into business transactions as a means to steal their money, by neglecting client matters, and by mismanaging client funds

held in trust, the respondent, Steven J. Radford, committed acts of professional misconduct

that warrant his disbarment.   The opinion that follows sets forth the details of the

respondent’s misconduct and our reasoning underlying the sanction imposed for it.

	The Disciplinary Commission filed a Third Amended Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action on June 28, 1996, upon which was conducted an evidentiary hearing before a hearing officer appointed by this Court. Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 11(b).   His report is now before us for final resolution of this case.   This Court is

the final arbiter of attorney misconduct and sanction.  Matter of Gallo, 619 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. 1993).  Since neither the Commission nor the respondent has petitioned this Court for review

of the hearing officer’s report, we accept and adopt the findings contained therein.   As a

preliminary matter, we note thatthat the respondent’s admission to this state’s bar in 1974

confers with us disciplinary jurisdiction.   Since June 1997, the respondent has been

suspended from the practice of law for failing to comply with continuing legal education

requirements and failing to pay his annual attorney registration fee. 

	Pursuant to Count I, we now find that on July 26, 1990, the respondent borrowed

$4,000 from a client and agreed by promissory note to pay back to the client a total of $5,000

on or before August 14, 1990.  That date passed without  repayment. The client died in

February 1992; the respondent never paid any portion of the loaned amount to her estate. 

We find that the respondent violated Ind.Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(a) by entering into

a business transaction with a client when the transaction was not fully disclosed  in writing

to the client, where the client was not given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of

independent counsel, and where the client did not consent in writing to the personal  business

transaction with her attorney.1 

	Under Count II, we now find that during 1991, the respondent served as co-personal

representative and attorney for a certain estate pending in Marion Superior Court.  The

respondent informed the co-personal representative of a business venture operated by one

of his clients.  The business venture was  involved in oil prospecting in Argentina.  In July 1991, the co-personal representative paid $10,000 to the respondent so that he could invest

the money for her in the business venture. The investment was to mature in July 1992 and

the respondent personally guaranteed repayment of the investment funds.  The co-personal

representative later provided the respondent with an additional $10,000 to invest in the

venture.  The source of that money was the bank account belonging to the estate’s decedent

and her surviving husband.  That investment was secured by a promissory note executed by

the respondent.  The business venture never repaid the funds upon maturation of the

investments and the respondent failed to honor his personal guarantee to repay the money

or his promissory note securing it.  In January of 1992, the co-personal representative gave

the respondent another $20,000 for safekeeping in his attorney trust account.  Her later

demand for return of the money met with no success. 

	We find that the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(a) by entering into the business transaction with his client without providing or ensuring the appropriate safeguards.2  He violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) by his theft of the co-personal representative’s funds and those

drawn on the decedent’s bank account.3   His theft also constitutes conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).4 

	As to Count IV, we now find that on January 28, 1994, the president of a development

company hired the respondent to pursue a civil action against a construction company and

a municipal department of transportation.   The president delivered to the respondent’s office

a package of documents and a retainer check for $500.  A few weeks later, the president,

believing that the respondent had taken no action, demanded return of the documents and

retainer.  The respondent never replied, failed to refund the retainer or to provide an

accounting thereof, and did not return the requested documents.  

	We find that the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(d) by failing to return to his

client the retainer or provide an account for the unearned portion of the retainer upon

termination of representation.5 

	Under Count V, we now find that in 1992 a client hired the respondent to pursue a

personal injury claim pursuant to a referral from UAW legal services.  The respondent signed

a “cooperating attorney agreement” with UAW legal services in which he agreed to accept

28% of any recovery as his fee and to pay $1,100 of any recovery to a certain medical

provider.   The respondent negotiated a $5,000 settlement for his client and deposited the

proceeds into his attorney trust account on December 9, 1994.  On December 29, 1994, the

respondent gave his client a check for $2,244.50, representing his portion of the proceeds,

and retained $2,760 in the trust account.  Thereafter, he failed to pay the medical provider

and failed to remove his earned attorney fee from the trust account.  He also failed to provide

his client with a written settlement statement.  Later, the balance of the respondent’s trust

account fell below an amount sufficient to satisfy the debt to the medical provider.  By April

19, 1995, the account contained only $266.78. 

	By failing to provide his client with a written settlement statement, the respondent

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c).6   By failing to satisfy the debt owed to the medical provider, the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(b).7   By allowing the account in his trust account to fall below an amount necessary to satisfy the obligation to the medical provider, the

respondent converted third-party funds and thus violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b).  

	The hearing officer concluded that the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a),

which provides in relevant part that lawyers shall hold the property of clients that is in the

lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own

property.  We have recognized that, under certain circumstances, a lawyer should be

permitted to leave a nominal portion of earned fees in a client trust account for the protection

an integrity of that account.  Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a); Matter of Lehman, 690 N.E.2d 696, 704 (Ind. 1997); Matter of Blumberg, 695 N.E.2d 114 (Ind. 1998).  The reason for this exclusion from our “anti-commingling” rule is to allow lawyers to satisfy their client trust account’s

minimum balance requirements and/or nominal account maintenance charges.  However, the

amount of earned fees that the respondent left in the client trust account, $1,400, was more

than nominal and there is no indication that he left those funds in the account only for

account maintenance purposes.  We therefore find that by failing to promptly withdraw his earned fees from the trust account, the respondent commingled his funds with client funds

and thus violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a).8 

	Dishonesty and theft permeate the respondent’s actions in this case.    If he was not

stealing his clients’ money through methods of preconceived deceit or unethical trust account

management, he was collecting their money by convincing them to purchase apparently bogus “investments” or to enter other impermissbleimpermissible business transactions with him.  His sole motivation, apparently, was pecuniary gain at the expense of those he ostensibly undertook

to represent.  He failed to appear at hearing of this matter, and therefore we have nothing

before us to mitigate or explain his actions.  Accordingly, for the protection of the public and

the profession, his misconduct warrants removal from practice. 

	It is, therefore, ordered that the respondent, Steven J. Radford, is hereby disbarred. 

Accordingly, the clerk of this Court is directed to remove his name from the Roll of

Attorneys. 

	The clerk of this Court is directed to provide notice of this order in accordance with

Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d) and to provide the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit, the clerk of each of the Federal District Courts in this state, and the clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Court in this state with the last known address of respondent

as reflected in the records of the clerk. 

	Costs of this proceeding are assessed against the respondent.