Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-378 | August 17, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Derrick D. Armstead

Carlisle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Derrick D. Armstead,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

August 17, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PC-378

Appeal from the Posey Superior 

Court

The Honorable S. Brent Almon, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

65D01-1510-PC-352

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-378 | August 17, 2018 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] Pro-se Appellant-Petitioner Derrick Armstead (“Armstead”) appeals the denial 

of his petition for post-conviction relief, following his convictions of Attempted 

Murder and Battery, and his adjudication as a habitual offender. He presents 

the sole issue of whether he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. 

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts were recited by a panel of this Court on direct appeal, in relevant part,

as follows:

On July 29, 2013, Armstead and Christopher Bradshaw began 

arguing outside at the mobile-home community in which 

Christopher lived. Property manager Tyfney Bennett intervened 

and attempted to settle the dispute between the two. After

Armstead’s girlfriend and Christopher’s wife began to argue, 

Bennett told Christopher’s wife to call the police. Armstead then 

backed off, began walking away and said, “I will f***ing kill you 

all.” Tr. p. 256.

Soon thereafter, Larry Bradshaw, Christopher’s father, arrived at 

the mobile home. Larry worked as a handyman for the property 

and was delivering materials to another trailer. When he arrived, 

Larry was unaware of the prior altercation between Christopher 

and Armstead. Upon exiting his truck, Larry noticed Armstead 

standing nearby and asked him if there was a problem. Armstead 

replied, “F*** yes there is, I am going to cut your f***ing 

throat.” Tr. p. 290. Armstead then removed a folded knife from 

his pocket and approached Larry. Armstead’s girlfriend also 

approached Larry carrying a baseball bat. The two attacked 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-378 | August 17, 2018 Page 3 of 8

Larry, Armstead stabbing him multiple times in the chest, arm, 

and back, and Armstead’s girlfriend striking Larry in the head 

with the baseball bat. Christopher ran to aid his father but was in 

turn stabbed by Armstead in the chest and neck. Armstead 

admitted to stabbing Larry but contends that it was in retaliation 

after Larry poured gasoline on him. Larry testified that he did 

not pour or attempt to pour gasoline on Armstead.

Armstead v. State, No. 65A01-1408-CR-232, slip op. at 1 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 

2015).

[3] On April 11, 2014, a jury found Armstead guilty of Attempted Murder and 

multiple counts of Battery. Armstead was also adjudicated a habitual offender. 

The trial court entered judgments of conviction on Attempted Murder and one 

count of Battery. Armstead received an aggregate sentence of seventy-four 

years (thirty-eight years for Attempted Murder, enhanced by thirty years due to 

Armstead’s habitual offender status, and six years for Battery, to be served 

consecutively).

[4] Armstead appealed, raising issues of prosecutorial misconduct and exclusion of 

evidence. Armstead’s convictions were affirmed. Id. at 5.

[5] On October 1, 2015, Armstead filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On 

August 17, 2017, the post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing, at 

which Armstead’s trial counsel was the sole witness. On January 2, 2018, the 

post-conviction court issued its findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and order 

denying Armstead post-conviction relief. He now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[6] The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing 

the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction 

Rule 1(5); Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). When appealing 

from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of 

one appealing from a negative judgment. Id. On review, we will not reverse the 

judgment of the post-conviction court unless the evidence unerringly and 

unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction 

court. Id. A post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be reversed 

only upon a showing of clear error, that which leaves us with a definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In this review, findings of 

fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous, and no deference is accorded 

to conclusions of law. Id. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the 

weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id.

Effectiveness of Trial Counsel

[7] Armstead contends that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel 

because counsel failed to conduct a “full fact investigation,” Appellant’s Brief at 

8, and failed to call two witnesses supportive of Armstead’s defense of selfdefense: Armstead’s girlfriend, Deneca Finch (“Finch”), and her son Trey 

Bunch (“Bunch”).
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[8] Effectiveness of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). We evaluate Sixth Amendment claims 

of ineffective assistance under the two-part test announced in Strickland. Id. To 

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 

demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Dobbins v. 

State, 721 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. 1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

Deficient performance is that which falls below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Douglas v. State, 663 N.E.2d 

1153, 1154 (Ind. 1996). Prejudice exists when a claimant demonstrates that 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Cook v. State, 675 N.E.2d 687, 692 (Ind. 

1996). The two prongs of the Strickland test are separate and independent 

inquiries. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Thus, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course 

should be followed.” Id.

[9] We “strongly presume” that counsel provided adequate assistance and 

exercised reasonable professional judgment in all significant decisions. McCary 

v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002). Counsel is to be afforded 

considerable discretion in the choice of strategy and tactics. Timberlake v. State, 

753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001). Counsel’s conduct is assessed based upon the 

facts known at the time and not through hindsight. State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 
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1258, 1261 (Ind. 1997). We do not “second-guess” strategic decisions requiring 

reasonable professional judgment even if the strategy in hindsight did not serve 

the defendant’s interests. Id. In sum, trial strategy is not subject to attack 

through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, unless the strategy is so 

deficient or unreasonable as to fall outside the objective standard of 

reasonableness. Autrey v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1998).

[10] Initially, Armstead contends that his trial attorney failed to conduct a 

sufficiently thorough investigation of the relevant facts. Armstead’s trial 

counsel, John Warrum (“Warrum”), was the sole witness at the post-conviction 

hearing. As for his investigative efforts, Warrum testified that he reviewed 

Armstead’s police statements and the body camera footage from the first 

responding officer. Warrum interviewed and deposed potential defense 

witnesses and met with members of Armstead’s family. He estimated that he 

reviewed “five thousand times” a cell phone video made by one of the mobile 

home community residents. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 33.) Armstead does not point to 

relevant evidence that would have surfaced with more diligent efforts on the 

part of trial counsel. He has not shown ineffectiveness in this regard. See 

Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ind. 1998) (observing that the petitioner 

claiming inadequate consultation or investigation bears the burden of showing 

what additional information may have been garnered and how that additional 

information would have aided in the preparation of the case).

[11] Armstead also argues that his trial counsel should have called Finch and Bunch 

as witnesses to support Armstead’s claim of self-defense. Warrum testified that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-378 | August 17, 2018 Page 7 of 8

he deposed Finch but her deposition testimony that she was not wielding a bat 

contradicted the video image of her with a bat. He decided not to call Finch as 

a witness for fear that the jury would find her testimony false and the credibility 

of the defense of self-defense would be undermined. Warrum further testified 

that he had interviewed Bunch, who was too young to drive, and was brought 

to the interview by a relative. Warrum explained that his decision not to call 

Bunch as a witness was based upon his fear that the youthful Bunch could be 

led into providing testimony harmful to Armstead’s defense. In Warrum’s 

view, Bunch could have been questioned about what happened to the knife 

used to stab Larry but never recovered by police. Also, Warrum feared that 

Bunch could “open the door” that “couldn’t be shut,” allowing the jury to hear

about Armstead’s prior conviction for Voluntary Manslaughter. (Tr. Vol. II, 

pg. 36.) 

[12] In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the decision of what 

witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy and appellate courts do not secondguess that decision. Curtis v. State, 905 N.E.2d 410, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 

Here, trial counsel explained that Armstead’s defense was one of self-defense,

but counsel had been placed in a very difficult position in that the trial witnesses 

and physical evidence did not support Armstead’s version of events. In 

addition to video incriminating Armstead, the pour pattern from spilled 

gasoline was near Larry’s truck and not on Armstead’s property as he had 

claimed. However, counsel opined that the first responder’s camera footage in 

which Armstead claimed he was attacked could be helpful to Armstead; the 
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video was admitted into evidence with redactions requested by counsel. The 

jury’s ultimate rejection of the defense of self-defense was not due to 

inadequacy on the part of trial counsel. Trial counsel’s efforts and strategy, 

although they did not ultimately achieve the result desired by Armstead, were 

not so unreasonable as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Badelle 

v. State, 754 N.E.2d 510, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (deciding in relevant part 

that, when trial counsel’s efforts were “more than adequate” to support a 

chosen defense, counsel’s decision not to seek out additional witnesses was a 

judgment call within the wide range of reasonable assistance), trans. denied. 

Conclusion

[13] Armstead was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, 

the post-conviction court properly denied the petition for post-conviction relief.

[14] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.