THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Kay F. Paschal, Respondent, 

v. 

Leon Lott, the Duly Elected Sheriff of Richland County, 

South Carolina, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2018-000978 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Lexington County 

William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge 

Memorandum Opinion No. 2019-MO-045 

Heard November 21, 2019 – Filed December 18, 2019 

AFFIRMED 

Andrew F. Lindemann, Lindemann, Davis & Hughes, PA, 

of Columbia; and Patrick John Frawley, Davis Frawley, 

LLC, of Lexington, for Petitioner. 
S. Jahue Moore, John Calvin Bradley Jr., and Stanley 

Lamont Myers Sr., Moore Taylor Law Firm, PA, of West 

Columbia, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: Kay Paschal filed this lawsuit against Richland County Sheriff 

Leon Lott alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligence, 

and civil conspiracy. Only the malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims 

were submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Paschal and 

awarded her $1.6 million in actual damages, which the trial court later reduced to 

$300,000, consistent with the monetary cap set by the South Carolina Tort Claims 

Act. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -222 (2005 & Supp. 2019). 

Sheriff Lott appealed the trial court's denial of his directed verdict and judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) motions. In an unpublished opinion issued 

pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, the court of appeals affirmed. Paschal v. Lott, 

Op. No. 2018-UP-080 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 7, 2018). We granted Sheriff Lott's 

petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. We affirm. 

In asking us to reverse the court of appeals, Sheriff Lott raises four issues. The first 

issue concerns the trial court's treatment of section 22-5-110 of the South Carolina 

Code (Supp. 2019). Sheriff Lott argues the trial court improperly allowed the jury 

to interpret the section as it applies to a law enforcement officer's authority to seek 

a warrant outside of his or her jurisdiction. We agree. We find the trial court's failure 

to explain the meaning of section 22-5-110 to the jury permitted the jury to 

improperly interpret the statute and draw its own conclusions as to how the statute 

applied to Lieutenant Heidi Scott's actions in seeking the arrest warrants against 

Paschal in Lexington County. While the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on 

the meaning of the statute amounted to an error of law, see Sparks v. Palmetto 

Hardwood, Inc., 406 S.C. 124, 128, 750 S.E.2d 61, 63 (2013) ("The interpretation 

of a statute is a question of law."), we do not reverse on this basis because we find 

the trial court's erroneous charge had little impact on the jury's verdict. 

In the second issue raised by Sheriff Lott, he argues probable cause existed as a 

matter of law to arrest Paschal for criminal activity related to the purchase of the 

handicapped van, and therefore, the trial court erred in submitting the malicious 
 

 

prosecution claim to the jury.1 See Pallares v. Seinar, 407 S.C. 359, 367, 756 S.E.2d 

128, 132 (2014) ("Whether probable cause exists is ordinarily a jury question, but it 

may be decided as a matter of law when the evidence yields only one conclusion."). 

We disagree probable cause existed as a matter of law in this case. "Probable cause 

in this context . . . turn[s] . . . upon whether the facts within the prosecutor's 

knowledge would lead a reasonable person to believe the plaintiff was guilty of the 

crimes charged." 407 S.C. at 367, 756 S.E.2d at 131 (citation omitted). Reviewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to Paschal, we find the jury heard ample 

evidence from which it could have concluded that facts within Scott's knowledge 

would not have led a reasonable person to believe Paschal was guilty of any criminal 

activity related to the purchase of the handicapped van. Paschal presented evidence 

demonstrating Scott's criminal investigation into the van purchase was incomplete: 

Scott's telephone conversation with Tim Peterson regarding Paschal's involvement 

in the transaction was limited to yes or no questions; Scott did not review the 

documents involved in the transaction before seeking the arrest warrants against 

Paschal; and Scott knew a Lexington County officer investigated the circumstances 

of the transaction and found no probable cause to arrest Paschal for her involvement 

in the purchase of the van. 

Third, Sheriff Lott contends Paschal failed to prove the criminal charges terminated 

in her favor, another element required to maintain her claim for malicious 

prosecution. Sheriff Lott argues Paschal failed to satisfy this element because she 

failed to prove the magistrates court's dismissal of Paschal's charges at the 

preliminary hearing "implied or were consistent with her innocence," which Sheriff 

Lott argues Paschal was required to prove pursuant to this Court's holding in 

McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co., 304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887 (1991). However, in 

McKenney, the narrow issue before this Court was whether a prosecutor's dismissal 

of a criminal charge—as opposed to a judicial dismissal—was sufficient to prove a 

criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff's favor in order for the plaintiff to 

maintain an action for malicious prosecution. 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 887. We 

held a prosecutor's dismissal of a charge is sufficient if the accused can demonstrate 

the charge was dismissed "for reasons which imply or are consistent with 

1

 The elements for a malicious prosecution claim are: "(1) the institution or 

continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of the 

defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in 

instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or 

damage." Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 435, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006) 

(citations omitted). 
innocence." 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 888. Contrary to the position taken by 

Sheriff Lott, this Court has never extended our holding in McKenney to apply "to 

any preliminary dismissal of a criminal charge," Pet'r Br. 32 (emphasis added), 

including preliminary dismissals by magistrates courts. Therefore, Paschal's 

evidence of the dismissal of the charges by the magistrates court was sufficient under 

South Carolina law to prove the criminal proceedings terminated in her favor. See 

Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 265 S.C. 563, 566, 220 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1975) (holding 

a magistrate's dismissal of a disorderly conduct charge was a termination of the 

proceedings in favor of the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action); Mack v. 

Riley, 282 S.C. 100, 102, 316 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he discharge of 

the accused by a magistrate on a preliminary investigation is a sufficient termination 

as will sustain [a malicious prosecution] action." (citing Harrelson v. Johnson, 119 

S.C. 59, 60, 111 S.E. 882, 882-83 (1922), overruled on other grounds by McKenney, 

304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887; Ruff, 265 S.C. at 566, 220 S.E.2d at 651; Jennings v. 

Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S.C. 498, 507-08, 172 S.E. 870, 873-74 (1934))), 

overruled on other grounds by McKenney, 304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887. 

Fourth, with respect to Paschal's abuse of process claim, Sheriff Lott argues there is 

no evidence in the record to support a finding that he or his deputies had an ulterior 

purpose or committed an improper willful act in seeking Paschal's arrest. See 

Pallares, 407 S.C. at 370, 756 S.E.2d at 133 ("The essential elements of abuse of 

process are (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process that 

is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding."). We find Paschal's 

testimony that interactions between Scott and the Wallace children were 

unprofessional, and the other circumstantial evidence surrounding the timing of 

Scott's searches and Paschal's arrest were sufficient for the trial court to submit the 

abuse of process claim to the jury. 

AFFIRMED. 

KITTREDGE, Acting Chief Justice, HEARN, FEW, JAMES, JJ., and Acting 

Justice Stephanie Pendarvis McDonald, concur.