alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Shawndalaya II., Alleged to be a Neglected Child. Commissioner of Social Services of Clinton County, Respondent; Jamella II., Appellant.

[807 NYS2d 214]

Spain, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Clinton County (Lawliss, J.), entered February 2, 2005, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, to adjudicate respondent’s child to be neglected.

Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10 alleging that respondent neglected her daughter. After a fact-finding hearing where two witnesses testified for petitioner and respondent was not present but was represented by her attorney, Family Court found that the child was chronically absent from school, that respondent suffered from mental illness and that respondent had exposed her child to violent and dangerous conduct. The court concluded that the child was neglected and ordered placement with petitioner for one year. Respondent appeals.

Respondent’s counsel has requested to be relieved of her assignment on the basis that no nonfrivolous issues exist that can be raised on appeal. As our review of the record and the brief submitted by respondent’s counsel reveals possible nonfrivolous issues, we disagree. The neglect adjudication was not based on an admission by respondent, but was premised on Family Court’s determination that petitioner’s witnesses were credible and on the evidence taken at the hearing, the sufficiency of which respondent’s attorney disputed at the close of proof *(see Matter of Darin J. v Tylena S.,*298 AD2d 630, 632 [2002]; *Matter of Bishop v Livingston,*288 AD2d 703, 704-705 [2001]; *Matter of Andrew MM.,*267 AD2d 515, 515-516 [1999]; *cf. Matter of Patricia O.,*279 AD2d 895, 895 [2001]). Further, among other things, petitioner was served with the neglect petition while hospitalized in a mental health facility. Accordingly, the application of respondent’s counsel to be relieved of her assignment is granted and new counsel will be assigned to address any nonfrivolous issues which the record may disclose.

Crew III, J.P., Peters and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that *939the decision is withheld, application to be relieved of assignment granted and new counsel to be assigned.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

Wlnfteb $tateg ~ourt of §ppeaIg

for tbe jfeberaI ~frcuft

BAYER CROPSCIENCE AG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DOW AGROSCIENCES LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

2013-1002

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Delaware in case no. 10-CV-1045, Judge Renee

Marie Bumb.

ON MOTION

ORDER

Bayer CropScience AG moves to reform the caption to

indicate that Dow Agrosciences LLC is an appellee.

Upon consideration thereof,

IT Is ORDERED THAT:

Case: 13-1002 Document: 20 Page: 1 Filed: 10/25/2012
BAYER CROPSCIENCE AG v. DOW AGROSCIENCES LLC 2

The motion is granted. The revised official caption is

reflected above.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Jan Horbaly

Jan Horbaly

Clerk

s25

Case: 13-1002 Document: 20 Page: 2 Filed: 10/25/2012
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

CARRIE MONROE

,

Appellant,

v.

UDAY SHAH

,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 20

- 00213

- CV

Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 5

of Dallas County, Texas 1

(TC# CC20

- 03109

- E )

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the appeal should be

dismissed for want of prosecution. We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. We

further order Appellant pay all costs of this appeal, and this decision be certified below for

observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2020.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

1 We hear this case on transfer from the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 41.3.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

John Edward Schomaker

v. Case No. 07-cv-164-PB

United States of America,

Arnold H. Huftalen,

John/Jane Doe(s)

O R D E R

In an accompanying order (Opinion No. 2008 DNH 100), I

granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 29). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental

Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 34),

Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 45), and Plaintiff’s

Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Doc. No. 62) are denied as moot.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 48) is

denied as moot for the reasons specified in footnotes 2 and 5 on

pages 2 and 15 of the above-mentioned order. Plaintiff’s Motion

to Maintain Arnold Huftalen as a Defendant (Doc. No. 53) is

denied as moot because the above-mentioned order folded

plaintiff’s state law claims against Arnold Huftalen into

Case 1:07-cv-00164-PB Document 64 Filed 05/13/08 Page 1 of 2
-2-

plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claims against the

United States.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

May 13, 2008

cc: John Edward Schomaker, pro se

Evan J. Roth, Esq.

Case 1:07-cv-00164-PB Document 64 Filed 05/13/08 Page 2 of 2
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 July 30, 2013

s0722

Order 

Clerk

July 30, 2013

146720 & (80)(81)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 146720

COA: 306057

Oakland CC: 2011-236030-FC

COREY LAMONT FENDERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion to expand the record on appeal is DENIED. The 

application for leave to appeal the December 27, 2012 judgment of the Court of Appeals 

is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions 

presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to remand is DENIED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Todd M. Horstkotte

v. Civil No. 08-cv-61-JL

NH Department of Corrections, Commissioner et al

O R D E R

I herewith approve the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Muirhead dated 5/5/08, no objection having been filed.

SO ORDERED.

June 10, 2008 /s/ Joseph N. Laplante

Joseph N. Laplante

United States District Judge

cc: Todd M. Horstkotte, Pro se

Deborah B. Weissbard, Esq.

Case 1:08-cv-00061-JL Document 24 Filed 06/10/08 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Randy S. Campney

v. Civil No. 06-cv-297-JD

Superintendent, Bare Hill

Correctional Facility

Procedural Order

On August 26, 2008, the court denied the Superintendent’s

motion for summary judgment without prejudice, because the

question of procedural default could not be resolved while Randy

Campney’s motion for a new trial was pending in state court. The

Superintendent has filed a status report that Campney’s motion

for a new trial was denied by the Grafton County Superior Court

on November 3, 2008, along with a copy of the decision. 

Campney shall file a status report in this case, on or

before December 10, 2008, providing notice as to whether he filed

an appeal from the November 3, 2008, decision of the Grafton

County Superior Court.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

November 17, 2008

cc: Randy S. Campney, Sr., pro se

Stephen D. Fuller, Esquire

Susan P. McGinnis, Esquire

Case 1:06-cv-00297-JD Document 73 Filed 11/17/08 Page 1 of 1
DATAMEG CORP. ANNOUNCES CAS INTERFACE PERFORMANCE WITH CONVENTIONAL 56K MODEM

WASHINGTON DC, Dec. 19 - DataMEG Corp. (OTC BB: DTMG) announced today that the
Company demonstrated the ability of their Communications Acceleration System
(CAS) to interface with conventional 56k modems; increasing data transmission
speeds up to 128k.

Andrew Benson, President DataMEG Corp. stated, "We have demonstrated the
ability to interface our CAS technology between two peripheral devices that
are outfitted with conventional 56k modems. The demonstration consisted of a
56k modem transmission over a standard telephone line, of a Windows Media
video file accompanied with audio, through our CAS prototype. A PC utilizing a
conventional 56k modem received the files. The demonstrations produced
verifiable transmission rates ranging from 80k to 128k. We can improve on
these transmission speeds."

Mr. Benson continued, "These demonstrations are part of our on-going efforts
to expand and improve CAS. Our ability to interface with conventional modems,
in addition to the benefits of CAS as a stand-alone system with megabit per
second transmission rates, is clear indication that CAS is a Communications
Acceleration System."

DataMEG Corp., currently headquartered in Washington DC, is an
engineering/technology firm focused on Internet and telecommunications
technology solutions. DataMEG Corp. is developing proprietary technology, its
Communications Acceleration System, (CAS), which allows for the transfer of
information over POTS, DSL and other information transmission networks.

Except for the historical information contained herein, this press release
contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 21E of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended that involve a number of risks
and uncertainties. These forward-looking statements may be identified by
reference to a future period by use of forward-looking terminology such as
"expect", "anticipate", "could", "may" and other words of similar nature.
There are certain important factors and risks that could cause results to
differ materially from those anticipated by the statements herein. Such
factors and risks include the successful completion of the CAS technology
development, and the business conditions and growth in related areas of
telecommunications, wireless and digital transmission arenas and in the
economy in general. Competitive factors include the rapid pace of alternative
technology advancements and the Company's ability to gain market acceptance of
its evolving product. Other risks, including the outcome of pending adverse
claims to the Company and it's subsidiary's technology that have been and may
be detailed from time to time in the filings of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Neither DataMEG Corp. or its subsidiary undertake any obligation
to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new
information, future events or otherwise.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Ivan Falcon, Appellant, v Warden of Rikers Island Correctional Facility et al., Respondents.

[807 NYS2d 299]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John A. Barone, J.), entered on or about January 21, 2005, which denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, unanimously dismissed, without costs.

Petitioner’s challenge to the hearing determination has been rendered moot by the final parole revocation determination *(People ex rel. Johnson v New York State Div. of Parole,*270 *501AD2d 137 [2000]; *People ex rel. McCummings v DeAngelo,*259 AD2d 794 [1999], *lv denied*93 NY2d 810 [1999]). Concur— Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Nardelli, Sweeny and McGuire, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Felix Rivera, Appellant, v Robert Dennison, as Chair of the New York State Board of Parole, Respondent.

[805 NYS2d 861]

*857Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lamont, J.), entered May 11, 2005 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner’s request for parole release.

Petitioner was convicted in 1993 of attempted murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and was sentenced, respectively, to consecutive prison terms of 8 to 24 years and 2 to 6 years. In 1995, he was convicted of attempted escape in the first degree and sentenced to a prison term of IV2 to 3 years, to run consecutive to the other two sentences. In February 2003, he made his first appearance before the Board of Parole and his request for parole release was denied. At his second appearance in August 2004, the Board again denied his request and ordered him held for an additional 24 months. Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the Board’s decision and, following service of respondent’s answer, Supreme Court dismissed the petition. This appeal ensued.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the transcript of the parole hearing reveals that the Board took into consideration the appropriate statutory factors in making its decision, including the serious nature of his crimes, as well as his good disciplinary record, program accomplishments and postrelease plans *(see*Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]; *Matter of Vasquez v State of N.Y. Exec. Dept., Div. of Parole,*20 AD3d 668, 669 [2005]; *Matter of Morel v Travis,*18 AD3d 930, 931 [2005]). Although the Board ultimately concluded that the serious nature of petitioner’s crimes outweighed the other factors, it was not required to accord each factor equal weight *(see Matter of Carter v Dennison,*19 AD3d 974, 975 [2005]). Moreover, there is nothing in the record to substantiate petitioner’s assertion that the Board’s decision was premised on an executive policy to deny parole to violent felons *(see Matter of Salahuddin v Travis,*17 AD3d 760 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 707 [2005]). In sum, petitioner has not made a showing that the Board’s decision exhibits “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” *(Matter of Silmon v Travis,*95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting *Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole,*50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]). Inasmuch as his remaining contentions have been reviewed and found to be without merit, there is no basis for disturbing the Board’s decision.

Spain, J.P., Mugglin, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
**EXHIBIT        21**

**THE        DRESS BARN, INC.**

**SUBSIDIARIES        OF THE REGISTRANT**

|                                               |   |                          |
|----------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|
|                                               |   |                          |
|                                               |   | **State                  of** |
| **Subsidiary**                                     |   | **Incorporation**             |
|                                               |   |                          |
| Dress                  Barn Credit Management, LLC |   | Virginia                      |
|                                               |   |                          |
| Dunnigan                  Realty, LLC              |   | Delaware                      |
|                                               |   |                          |
| D.B.X.,                  Inc.                      |   | New                  York     |
|                                               |   |                          |
| D.B.R.,                  Inc.                      |   | Delaware                      |
|                                               |   |                          |
| Maurices                  Incorporated             |   | Delaware                      |

----
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1821

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reestablish the marketing

aspects of farmers’ cooperatives in relation to adding value to a farmer’s

product by feeding it to animals and selling the animals and to grant

a declaratory judgment remedy relating to the status and classification

of farmers’ cooperatives.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 10, 2001

Mr. THUNE (for himself and Mrs. EMERSON) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reestablish

the marketing aspects of farmers’ cooperatives in relation

to adding value to a farmer’s product by feeding it

to animals and selling the animals and to grant a declaratory judgment remedy relating to the status and classification of farmers’ cooperatives.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. COOPERATIVE MARKETING INCLUDES VALUE4 ADDED PROCESSING THROUGH ANIMALS.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1388 of the Internal Rev6 enue Code of 1986 (relating to definitions and special
2

•HR 1821 IH

1 rules) is amended by adding at the end the following new

2 subsection:

3 ‘‘(k) COOPERATIVE MARKETING INCLUDES VALUE4 ADDED PROCESSING THROUGH ANIMALS.—For purposes

5 of section 521 and this subchapter, the term ‘marketing

6 the products of members and other producers’ includes

7 feeding the products of members and other producers to

8 cattle, hogs, fish, chickens, or other animals and selling

9 the animals (or animal products) which were fed such feed

10 products.’’

11 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

12 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after

13 the date of the enactment of this Act.

14 SEC. 2. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REMEDY RELATING TO

15 STATUS AND CLASSIFICATION OF FARMERS’

16 COOPERATIVES.

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 7428(a)

18 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to creation

19 of remedy) is amended by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end of sub20 paragraph (B), and by inserting after subparagraph (C)

21 the following new subparagraph:

22 ‘‘(D) with respect to the initial qualifica23 tion or continuing qualification of an organiza24 tion as a cooperative described in section
3

•HR 1821 IH

1 521(b) which is exempt from tax under section

2 521(a), or’’.

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

4 this section shall apply with respect to pleadings filed with

5 the United States Tax Court, the district court of the

6 United States for the District of Columbia, or the United

7 States Court of Federal Claims after the date of enact8 ment of this Act but only with respect to determinations

9 (or requests for determinations) made after January 1,

10 2001.

Æ
JUDGMENT

Court of Appeals 

 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-14-00203-CR

RICHARD CHARLES RIETTE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 183rd District Court of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 1395252).

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on February 

25, 2014. After submitting the case on the appellate record and the arguments properly 

raised by the parties, the Court holds that the trial court’s judgment contains no reversible 

error. Accordingly, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered January 22, 2015.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Brown. Opinion delivered by Justice Higley.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER to 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES –OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of EF Johnson Technologies, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2009 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Jana Ahlfinger Bell, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.                       The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and

 

2.                       The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed inthe Report.

 

 
| ** ** | **/S/ Jana Ahlfinger Bell** |
|------------|-----------------------------|
|       | Jana Ahlfinger Bell         |
|       | Chief Financial Officer     |

 

**November 12,2009**

 

*Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.*

 

----
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Elizabeth Ryan

v. Civil No. 08-cv-17-PB

Commissioner, United States

Social Security Administration

O R D E R

 I apologize to the parties if I did not clearly state my

views concerning the medical evidence in the record supporting

the claimant’s contention that she was disabled as of the last

date that she was eligible for an award of DIB. In the August

21, 2008 Order, I outlined the extensive medical and lay evidence

in the record supporting Ryan’s claim that she was disabled at a

point when she would have been eligible for social security

disability benefits (“DIB”). I also noted that, to reach the

conclusion that Ryan was not disabled as of her date last

insured, the ALJ “had to discount expert medical evidence in the

record that supported Ryan’s claim, and disregard lay testimony

that ran counter to his decision.” In my view, the evidence in

the record supporting Ryan’s claim that she was disabled as of 

Case 1:08-cv-00017-PB Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 1 of 3
-2-

her date last insured is not merely ambiguous; it is strong

enough that I would have awarded her benefits if I were in the

ALJ’s position.

The Commissioner also misreads my Order when he suggests

that it requires a medical advisor whenever there is substantial

evidence in the record to support a determination that the

claimant is presently disabled and a dispute arises concerning

onset date. As I thought I explained, it is the existence of

substantial medical and lay evidence in the record to support the

view that the claimant was disabled as of her date last insured

that makes a medical advisor necessary in this case. Finally, it

is erroneous to suggest that I based my ruling on Grebenick v.

Chater, 121 F.3d 1193 (8th Cir. 1997). Although I cited the

case, it is from another circuit and is not controlling. I based

my Order on my own reading of the plain language of Social

Security Ruling 83-20 and the evidence in the record that

concerned Ryan’s claim. 

The Commissioner based his argument that SSR 83-20 was

inapplicable in this case solely on the contention that the

ruling did not apply because the ALJ never made a finding of

disability. My ruling focused on the argument that the

Commissioner presented and explained why it was wrong. Nothing

Case 1:08-cv-00017-PB Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 2 of 3
-3-

the Commissioner says in the current motion has caused me to

reconsider that determination. 

The motion to amend judgment (Doc. No. 13) is denied. 

 SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

September 19, 20018

cc: Seth Aframe, Esq.

Raymond Kelly, Esq.

Case 1:08-cv-00017-PB Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 3 of 3