RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0853-18T2

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

N.W.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

S.M.,

Defendant.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF L.W.-M. 

and M.W., 

Minors.

_____________________________

Submitted May 29, 2019 – Decided June 25, 2019

Before Judges Suter and Geiger.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-0853-18T2

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, 

Docket No. FG-02-0036-18.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, 

of counsel; Christine Olexa Saginor, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jason Wade Rockwell, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Natasha C. Fitzsimmons, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minors (Toya Davis, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant N.W. appeals from the judgment of guardianship terminating 

her parental rights to her children, L.W.-M. (Liam) and M.W. (Maddie).1 The 

children's Law Guardian and the Division of Child Protection and Permanency 

(the Division) urge us to affirm. Our review of the record shows the factual 

findings of the trial judge are supported by substantial credible evidence, 

including his evaluation of witness credibility, and based on those findings, his 

legal conclusions are correct. We therefore affirm the judgment of guardianship.

 

1

 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the parents and the 

children. 
3

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I.

N.W. is the mother of two children. Liam was born in May 2016 and 

Maddie was born in December 2017. Defendant S.M. is the biological father 

of both children. N.W. and S.M. have never been married. 

The Division first became involved with N.W. and S.M. upon receiving 

a referral raising concerns for Liam, then two months old. Police responded to 

N.W.'s residence due to an alleged domestic dispute between N.W. and S.M. 

The responding officers observed a hypodermic syringe sticking out of N.W.'s 

pocket. N.W. admitted to using heroin and cocaine. N.W. was arrested and 

charged with illegal possession of the syringe for use with a controlled 

dangerous substance (CDS). 

The following month, police responded to another domestic dispute 

between N.W. and S.M. Officers observed an old contusion under N.W.'s eye. 

Both N.W. and S.M. told the officers the contusion was caused by a kitchen 

cabinet door and not by physical violence. Two days later, the Division 

implemented a safety protection plan (SPP) that prohibited S.M. from entering 

Liam's residence. Several days later, N.W. tested positive for oxycodone and 

oxymorphone.
4

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The following week, N.W. applied for a domestic violence temporary 

restraining order (TRO) against S.M. based on alleged harassment. S.M. 

informed police that N.W. attempted to run him over with her car. When 

police investigated, S.M. showed officers drug paraphernalia he claimed 

belonged to N.W. S.M. agreed to leave the residence. Two days later, police 

responded to another domestic dispute between N.W. and S.M., during which 

N.W. sustained a contusion on her forehead. S.M. showed the police a video 

of N.W. under the influence of narcotics. S.M. was arrested for assault and 

N.W. obtained a TRO against S.M. Based on this conduct, the Division 

substantiated allegations of abuse and neglect. 

The following day, N.W. was referred by the Division to New Hope 

Foundation (New Hope) to attend a medically monitored inpatient substance 

abuse treatment program based on her Severe Opioid Use Disorder and 

Moderate Anxiolytic Use Disorder. Upon admission to New Hope, N.W. 

tested positive for oxycodone, buprenorphine, alprazolam, norbuprenorphine, 

and oxymorphone.

The Division implemented a revised SPP that required N.W. to be 

supervised during parenting time with Liam. The Division was awarded care 

and supervision of Liam. The trial court ordered N.W. to submit to random 
5

A-0853-18T2

urine screens and participate in all treatment programs recommended by the 

Division. 

N.W. was granted a final restraining order (FRO) against S.M. as a result 

of the August 16, 2016 domestic violence incident. Two days later, N.W. was 

evaluated by a psychiatrist and admitted to using "roxies" two weeks earlier.2 

The psychiatrist recommended N.W. undergo detoxification. The following 

week, N.W. tested positive for benzodiazepines, oxycodone, oxazepam, and 

oxymorphone. 

On September 15, 2016, the trial court ordered the care, custody, and 

supervision of Liam was to remain with the Division, and placed Liam with his 

maternal grandmother due to the ongoing risk to his life, safety, or health. The 

court found Liam's continued residence with N.W. would be contrary to his 

welfare because N.W. required inpatient substance abuse treatment. The court 

allowed N.W. parenting time supervised by the maternal grandmother or the 

Division. The court also ordered N.W. to undergo a psychological evaluation 

and substance abuse treatment, and to submit to random hair, drug, and alcohol 

screenings. 

 

2

 "Roxy" is slang for Roxicodone, an instant release form of oxycodone. 

drugs.com/answers/what-is-a-roxy-306907.html (last visited June 14, 2019).
6

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On October 12, 2016, N.W. was arrested and charged with prowling to 

obtain CDS and failure to turn over CDS to police. She was placed on a 

conditional discharge for one year and fined. She failed to appear at a case 

management review conference the next day, despite receiving notice. The 

Division stated its intention to proceed with a Title 30 proceeding. 

On October 31, 2016, N.W. was admitted into an inpatient treatment 

program at New Hope. N.W. did not attend a compliance review hearing four 

days later. The trial court determined the care, custody, and supervision of 

Liam would remain with the Division due to N.W.'s severe substance abuse 

issues and inpatient treatment. N.W. was successfully discharged from New 

Hope on November 14, 2016, and began residing with her grandmother in 

Brick. Three days later, Division workers met with N.W. and explained the 

services she needed to attend to reunite with Liam. 

From November 18, 2016 to January 27, 2017, the Division could not 

locate N.W. At a February 2, 2017 compliance review hearing, N.W. was 

ordered to meet with a domestic violence liaison and undergo an update 

evaluation. The same day, N.W. was referred to the New Focus Program to 

attend an intensive outpatient substance abuse program based on her severe 

opioid and sedative use disorders, which were in early remission. 
7

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The Division substantiated that, only six days later, N.W. continued to 

abuse opiates and watched Liam unsupervised. Investigation also revealed the 

maternal grandmother's paramour resided in the home contrary to court orders. 

This led to the Division removing Liam from the maternal grandmother's home 

and placing him in an unrelated resource home. Several days later, Liam was 

placed in the care of his paternal grandmother. The next day, N.W. was 

arrested for unpaid parking fines and spent two days in jail. 

On February 24, 2017, N.W. was terminated from her domestic violence 

counseling services for non-compliance and failure to attend. N.W. was also 

terminated from the New Focus substance abuse treatment program for noncompliance and failure to attend. N.W. subsequently requested dismissal of 

the FRO entered against S.M. The Division learned N.W. was residing with 

S.M. at her uncle's residence. 

Despite court orders requiring her to submit urine samples, N.W. refused 

to do so on May 3 and May 10, 2017. At a subsequent compliance review 

hearing, the court reminded N.W. that refusal to submit to random drug 

screens would result in the court drawing a negative inference. Despite that 

warning, N.W. refused to submit urine samples eight more times from May to 

July 2017. She also failed to attend a scheduled substance abuse evaluation. 
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In addition, N.W. did not visit Liam between May 26 and June 22, 2017, 

despite weekly scheduled visits. 

On June 13, 2017, N.W. was terminated from the Center for Evaluation 

and Counseling program for failing to attend appointments and noncompliance. She also failed to attend a compliance review hearing on August 

10, 2017. The trial court drew negative inferences against N.W. for her 

repeated failure to provide drug screen samples. The court also issued a 

permanency order accepting the Division's plan for termination of parental 

rights. 

On September 7, 2017, N.W. overdosed on heroin but was revived by 

S.M. Thirteen days later, the Division filed a complaint for guardianship of 

Liam, citing N.W.'s ongoing substance abuse, history of unstable housing, lack 

of employment, and failure to remediate the issues leading to Liam's removal. 

Despite receiving notice, N.W. failed to attend the October 11, 2017 court 

hearing. The trial court kept all previously ordered requirements in place. On 

November 8, 2017, N.W. again failed to appear for court despite receiving 

notice. 

On December 5, 2017, the Division learned N.W. was thirty-eight weeks 

pregnant and tested positive for opiates and benzodiazepines at a hospital. She 
9

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admitted to hospital staff that she used fifteen to twenty bags of heroin two 

days prior and illegally obtained Suboxone the day before. N.W. also 

disclosed she snorted six Xanax and Percocet pills per day, and used heroin 

continuously during at least the last six months of her pregnancy. At the time, 

N.W. was homeless.

After attempting to leave the hospital to smoke a cigarette and becoming 

combative with staff the following day, N.W. was placed on one-to-one watch. 

Later that evening, she gave birth to Maddie, who was immediately admitted to 

the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit for respiratory distress and narcotic 

withdrawal. N.W. was scheduled to undergo detoxification prior to her release 

from the hospital. 

Two days after her birth, the Division learned Maddie developed 

uncontrolled withdrawal symptoms and also tested positive for 

benzodiazepines. Maddie displayed irritability, tremors, difficulty feeding, 

and weight loss. Three days later, N.W. threatened to overdose. Maddie was 

ultimately discharged from the hospital eight days after her birth. The 

Division then filed an amended guardianship complaint to include Maddie.

On December 24, 2017, N.W. began an inpatient program at Sunrise 

Substance Abuse Treatment Center (Sunrise House). N.W. completed the 
10 A-0853-18T2

Sunrise House thirty-day inpatient program on January 23, 2018. The program 

included attending individual, group, and family sessions. She was referred to 

Spring House, a halfway house facility for women, for follow-up care. She 

entered Spring House the same day. 

After N.W. did not appear at the January 10 or February 7, 2018 

hearings, the court reiterated its prior orders that N.W. attend scheduled 

psychological and bonding evaluations. An April 2018 Spring House progress 

report noted N.W. continued to participate in individual counseling sessions 

and therapeutic groups. She also began attending a twelve-week parenting 

class. The report also noted behavioral infractions, lack of emotional 

regulation, and anger management issues. 

On April 27, 2018, N.W. underwent a psychological evaluation by Frank 

Dyer, Ph.D. In his written report, Dr. Dyer noted N.W. was prescribed 

Remeron, Trileptal, and BuSpar. N.W. also reported taking Neurontin for 

anxiety and restless leg syndrome. Dr. Dyer stated the most significant factor 

affecting N.W.'s parenting capacity was her "severe dependence on drugs, 

primarily opiate medications and heroin." He also noted her use "at various 

times" of "codeine, Xanax, cocaine, and mushrooms, as well as LSD and 

MDMA." 
11 A-0853-18T2

N.W. related her extremely dysfunctional relationship with S.M. to their 

joint drug use and her dependence on him to procure drugs for her. She 

expressed a preference to being homeless with S.M. over living with her aunt 

and uncle, who provided her with a place to live. Dr. Dyer reported N.W. 

"was unable to state when she would be sufficiently prepared to undertake the 

task of parenting her children independently." She admitted her "extremely 

severe problem with substances." She also acknowledged a moderate problem 

with alcohol. 

Dr. Dyer opined N.W. "has a significant antisocial aspect to her 

personality, and her interpersonal relationships are highly conflicted and 

abrasive. She displays a moderate tendency towards self-harm." Testing 

indicated "she suffers from posttraumatic symptoms and depression." She also 

"suffers from anxiety and presents with a degree of emotional instability." Dr. 

Dyer's overall diagnostic impression was N.W. suffered from: Opiate 

Dependence, in early remission; Depressive Disorder, not otherwise specified 

(NOS); Anxiety Disorder, NOS; rule out PTSD; and Personality Disorder, 

NOS with Antisocial and Dependent Features. Dr. Dyer stated N.W. had "just 

begun to address her drug abuse in a serious manner" and "it does not appear 

that she has yet done any real work on achieving a resolution of clinical 
12 A-0853-18T2

problems." He noted N.W. "appears to depend heavily on the children's 

paternal grandmother as a substitute caretaker for them." 

Dr. Dyer opined: 

Based on the case history and on the severity of 

[N.W.'s] drug addiction, emotional problems, and 

extremely dysfunctional relationship problems . . . she 

is quite far from having achieved the level of stability 

that would inspire confidence in her capacity to care 

for her two children without significant risk of harm. 

Additionally placing the children in [N.W.'s] care 

could conceivably increase the likelihood of her 

becoming involved [with S.M.] once again, which 

appears to be a significant trigger for her drug abuse, 

given their codependent history together.

Dr. Dyer further opined:

I do assess [N.W.'s] prognosis for eventually 

overcoming her addiction as fair; however, this would 

necessarily entail continuation of her individual 

psychotherapy, appropriate medication management, 

involvement in Narcotics Anonymous, and developing 

the capacity to avoid legal problems and to avoid 

inappropriate romantic partners. In regard to 

permanency for [Maddie and Liam], I recommend that 

DCPP not consider [N.W.] as a viable candidate for 

custody of them. 

On June 6, 2018, Spring House reported N.W. was making noticeable 

progress in her treatment and had not committed any recent behavioral 

infractions. She continued to participate in group sessions and was actively 

addressing her therapeutic issues. 
13 A-0853-18T2

The two-day guardianship trial took place in June 2018. Division 

worker Kimberly Norman and Dr. Dyer testified on behalf of the Division. 

N.W. testified on her own behalf. The trial court accepted S.M.'s voluntary 

surrender of his parental rights to Liam and Maddie. 

Norman testified N.W. was still residing at Spring House, where she had 

been for the past five months, and had not been given a discharge date. 

Norman stated N.W. had no concrete plan for reunification including where 

she intended to live, employment prospects, or where the children would 

attend school. 

Norman stated the children were doing very well under the care of their 

paternal grandmother, who was prepared to adopt them. All of their needs 

were met and Liam appeared very happy. The paternal grandmother frequently 

took the children to visit N.W.; she believed that would continue if N.W. 

remained sober. Norman opined it was in the children's best interest to 

terminate N.W.'s parental rights to achieve permanency for the children 

through adoption by their paternal grandmother, who provides a safe and 

stable environment for them. 

The trial court found Norman's testimony credible, reasonable, and 

consistent with the exhibits. It noted Norman testified in a calm, direct, and 
14 A-0853-18T2

candid manner. She answered questions without hesitation and maintained eye 

contact with the examiners. Her testimony was based on her personal 

knowledge and her thorough review of the Division's files. 

The parties stipulated to Dr. Dyer's qualifications as an expert in the 

field of psychology. Consistent with his report, Dr. Dyer voiced concerns 

about N.W.'s risk of relapse after discharge from Spring House. He opined 

there was a strong risk N.W. would start using drugs again given her extensive 

substance abuse problems and prior failed attempts at remaining sober when 

not in a controlled environment. He noted the stresses of securing housing, 

maintaining employment, and raising a toddler and an infant. He opined N.W. 

would have a high risk of relapse without the structure, supervision, and group 

support of the halfway house. 

Dr. Dyer's remaining testimony was also consistent with his report. He 

noted N.W.'s personality disorder affected her ability to abide by certain 

restrictions imposed on her. He opined N.W. was "quite far away from making 

an actual start" of addressing her psychological issues. 

Dr. Dyer also testified regarding the "tremendous risk" for future 

"adverse psychological consequences" in "[c]hildren who are exposed to 

domestic violence." He described the differing serious impacts suffered by 
15 A-0853-18T2

boys and girls exposed to domestic violence. Although Dr. Dyer noted Liam's 

positive connection to N.W., he distinguished "attachment" from mere positive 

connection, describing attachment as occurring where the child can confidently 

rely on their caregiver for protection, nurturance, and structure. He concluded 

neither child is securely attached to N.W. 

In stark contrast, Dr. Dyer testified both children were securely attached 

to their paternal grandmother. He described Liam as focused, happy, and 

enthusiastic when under the care of his paternal grandmother. He opined that 

under the circumstances, including placement with the paternal grandmother 

for approximately one year, and N.W.'s limited contact with the children 

during that period, "it is very highly likely that the paternal grandmother . . . is 

[Liam's] central parental love object and attachment figure." He testified there 

is some possibility that if Liam were removed from his paternal grandmother 

he would suffer negative consequences in the form of low self-esteem, lack of 

basic trust, and the incapacity to attach to a new caregiver. If Liam were 

transferred to N.W.'s custody and she became overwhelmed, involved in a 

dysfunctional romantic relationship, or unavailable due to depression or 

substance abuse, disruption of the attachment to his parental grandmother 

would have serious long-term effects. He further opined Maddie would 
16 A-0853-18T2

likewise suffer if removed after gaining the ability to attach to the parental 

grandmother. Dr. Dyer believed it was in the best interests of the children to 

remain under the care of their parental grandmother. 

On cross-examination, Dr. Dyer acknowledged N.W. was receiving 

services at Spring House and reportedly doing well in that environment. He 

noted, however, Spring House is a very structured program that closely 

monitors residents. Dr. Dyer expressed reservations about N.W.'s ability to 

remain sober after leaving the halfway house and living in an environment 

where she would be free to meet with people of her choosing and burdened by 

employment and child care responsibilities. His concerns took into account

N.W.'s long and consistent drug use and relapse after inpatient treatment. 

Dr. Dyer also considered the fact N.W. had only been sober since 

January 2018 and had not previously remained sober for any sustained period 

except while in a controlled environment at an inpatient facility or halfway 

house. He noted N.W. had used drugs consistently since she was fifteen years 

old. Dr. Dyer concluded there was significant potential for relapse. Dr. Dyer 

opined N.W. would have to be sober for two to three years before she could be 

entrusted to care for her children. He explained recovery is longer for longterm addicts.
17 A-0853-18T2

The trial court found Dr. Dyer's testimony credible, believable, and 

reasonable in light of the other evidence, including the exhibits, court records, 

and the testimony of the other witnesses. The court noted Dr. Dyer testified in 

a calm and direct manner, was not evasive, and answered questions without 

hesitation. He maintained direct eye contact with examiners. The court found 

his testimony was consistent with the other evidence and testimony. 

N.W. testified she loved her children and was determined to care for 

them in a safe and secure manner. Although she did not fully engage in the 

services previously offered by the Division, she said she was now fully 

engaged in all recommended services. She expressed an intention to complete 

her substance abuse treatment program and participate in an aftercare program, 

including a Mommy and Me program. She also planned to secure employment 

and safe housing. She stated Spring House would allow her to reside there 

until those goals were met and would continue to provide support even after 

she completed its program.

N.W. testified her abuse of prescription drugs evolved into using heroin 

following Liam's removal in September 2016. She admitted she did not 

receive prenatal care and continued to use heroin and overdosed while 

pregnant with Maddie. She knew caring for a toddler and an infant could be 
18 A-0853-18T2

stressful but was willing to accept the challenge. She understood her children 

were removed because of her drug use and she could not care for her children 

if she continued using drugs. N.W. recognized she was accountable for her 

past behavior and that remaining drug free is a day-to-day process. She 

claimed she was now a different person. On cross-examination, however, 

N.W. acknowledged she relapsed in the past after inpatient treatment and 

follow-up care, including using heroin after relapsing in March 2017. 

N.W. also acknowledged she did not keep in contact with the Division 

and wanted to avoid it. She conceded she had not lived independently or 

soberly for a sustained period except while residing at an inpatient treatment 

facility or a halfway house. N.W. agreed Spring House was very structured. 

She was closely monitored, drug tested, and escorted when she left the 

premises. 

N.W. further acknowledged Liam was in the Division's care and custody 

since August 2016. She understood her children need permanence and 

structure. She recognized she led an unstable life until January 2018, 

including periods when she was unemployed and homeless. 

The trial court found N.W. credible, but considered her biased due to her 

desire to be reunited with her children. The court found N.W. was candid as to 
19 A-0853-18T2

her drug use, homelessness, and the fact she harmed Maddie by using drugs 

while she was pregnant. The court found N.W. sincere in her testimony of her 

commitment to remain drug free. 

The trial court afforded the parties the opportunity to submit proposed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. N.W. argued termination of her 

parental rights was not in the best interest of her children given the positive 

progress she made in her substance abuse treatment and her commitment to 

caring for her children. She contended the children's best interests would be 

served by referring her to a Mommy and Me program, thereby affording time 

to resolve any remaining substance abuse issues. The Law Guardian joined in 

the Division's position that termination was appropriate and any further delay 

in the permanent placement of Liam and Maddie would only exacerbate the 

harm. 

On October 5, 2018, the trial court issued its decision terminating N.W.'s 

parental rights to Liam and Maddie. The trial court concluded the Division 

proved all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing 

evidence. This appeal followed. N.W. raises the following arguments:

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED 

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING 

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 

MATTERS TO THE FACTS. THE RECORD DOES 
20 A-0853-18T2

NOT SUPPORT THOSE VERY PRECISE 

STANDARDS AND THEREFORE TERMINATION 

OF N.W.'S RIGHTS SHOULD BE REVERSED.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

CONCLUDING THAT N.W. HARMED HER 

CHILDREN BY FAILING TO REMEDIATE 

HER PERCEIVED PARENTING DEFICITS IN 

A TIMELY MANNER.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

CONCLUDING THAT N.W. WAS 

UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO ELIMINATE 

ANY PERCEIVED HARM TO HER 

CHILDREN WITHIN THE REQUIRE[D] 

TIME CONSTRAINTS.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

CONCLUDING [THE DIVISION] MET ITS 

LEGAL OBLIGATION TO MAKE 

REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE N.W. 

WITH SERVICES AND TO STRIVE TO 

OVERCOME BARRIERS TO HER 

PARTICIPATION IN THOSE SERVICES.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

CONCLUDING THAT TERMINATION OF 

N.W.'S PARENTAL RIGHTS IS IN THE 

CHILDREN'S BEST INTERESTS. 

II.

We exercise limited review of a decision terminating parental rights. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). In such cases, 

we will generally uphold the trial court's findings, so long as they are supported 
21 A-0853-18T2

by "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." Ibid. (citing N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 108 (2008)). We give substantial 

deference to the family court judge's special expertise and opportunity to 

observe the witnesses firsthand and evaluate their credibility. Id. at 552-53. 

Thus, a termination decision should only be reversed or altered on appeal if the 

trial court's findings were "so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of 

justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) 

(quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). Even where 

a parent alleges "error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying facts and 

the implications to be drawn therefrom," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. 

Super. 172, 189 (App. Div. 1993)), deference must be afforded unless the judge 

"went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." Ibid. (quoting 

C.B. Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 65, 69 (App. 

Div. 1989)). However, we accord no special deference to the Family judge's 

interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established 

facts. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010). 
22 A-0853-18T2

N.W. argues the Division failed to establish the required elements to 

succeed in a termination proceeding. To obtain termination of parental rights, 

the Division must satisfy all four prongs of the following test:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child;

(3) The Division has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

The four prongs of the best interests standard "are not discrete and 

separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive 

standard that identifies a child's best interests." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 

Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123, 145 (2018) (quoting In re Guardianship of 
23 A-0853-18T2

K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999)). Each prong is "extremely fact sensitive and 

require[s] particularized evidence" addressing "the specific circumstances in the 

given case." R.G., 217 N.J. at 554 (quoting M.M., 189 N.J. at 281). The 

Division must prove all four prongs by clear and convincing evidence. Ibid. 

The first prong of the best interest test requires the judge to determine 

whether "the child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to 

be endangered by the parental relationship." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). "Harm, 

in this context, involves the endangerment of the child's health and development 

resulting from the parental relationship." P.P., 180 N.J. at 506 (quoting K.H.O., 

161 N.J. at 348). The analysis does not "concentrate on a single or isolated harm 

or past harm," but rather focuses on "the effect of harms" arising over time. 

K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. Of concern is both actual harm to the children and the 

risk of future harm. See In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999) 

("Courts need not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably impaired by 

parental inattention or neglect."). Further, the harm need not be physical; 

emotional or psychological harm may suffice. In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 

N.J. 32, 43-44 (1992) (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 18 (1992)). 

Maddie was clearly harmed by N.W.'s heroin addiction. As recognized 

by the Court in K.H.O.:
24 A-0853-18T2

[A] child born addicted to drugs and suffering from 

the symptoms of drug withdrawal as a result of her 

mother's substance abuse during pregnancy has been 

harmed by her mother and that harm endangers the 

child's health and development. That determination 

satisfies the first prong of the best interest standard.

[161 N.J. at 349 (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)).]

The trial court found N.W. endangered the health, safety, and 

development of her children and was not presently able to safely care for them. 

Since the Division became involved, N.W. has been arrested and jailed, 

overdosed on drugs while pregnant, remained in a toxic relationship with S.M., 

been homeless for extended periods, remained unemployed, missed numerous 

treatment appointments, avoided contact with the Division, violated the SPP, 

and relapsed after completing an inpatient treatment program. Maddie was 

born addicted to heroin. 

The evidence also demonstrates the potential for future harm. Although 

N.W. made progress by achieving sobriety at Spring House, discharge from 

that program will not occur until she secures employment and suitable 

housing. N.W. never lived independently and soberly for a significant period 

prior to enrolling in Spring House. Placing the children in N.W's care would 

create the risk of the children being removed a second time due to the stress of 

living independently, working, and caring for two young children, which 
25 A-0853-18T2

creates the potential for relapse, inability to maintain a safe and stable 

residence, resumption of her relationship with S.M., and other behaviors 

associated with her antisocial tendencies. The record contains substantial 

support for the trial court's conclusion the Division satisfied prong one.

"The second prong of the statutory standard relates to parental unfitness." 

K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352. It "is aimed at 'determining whether the parent has

cured and overcome the initial harm that endangered the health, safety, or 

welfare of the child, and is able to continue a parental relationship without 

recurrent harm to the child.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.H., 389 

N.J. Super. 576, 617 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348). As 

noted in K.H.O.:

Because a child born drug addicted and suffering from 

withdrawal symptoms has been endangered, and 

because in many cases the parent herself cannot help 

in her child's care or cure, the second element of the 

best interests standard must focus on the measures 

taken by the parent after the child's birth to maintain 

the parent-child relationship and to foster an 

environment leading to normal child development. . . . 

Thus, the second prong may be met by indications of 

parental dereliction and irresponsibility, such as the 

parent's continued or recurrent drug abuse, the 

inability to provide a stable and protective home, the 

withholding of parental attention and care, and the 

diversion of family resources in order to support a 

drug habit, with the resultant neglect and lack of 

nurture for the child.
26 A-0853-18T2

[161 N.J. at 352-53.]

Ultimately, "parental fitness is the key to determining the best interests of the 

child." Id. at 348 (citing In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 

139 (1993)). The Division may satisfy this prong by demonstrating the parent's 

inability or unwillingness to resolve issues that are detrimental to the child. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 592 (App. Div. 

1996). 

Although N.W.'s argument directs our attention to the qualifications of 

Dr. Dyer, we construe it as an attack on the trial court's finding that the Division 

satisfied the second prong of the analysis as it relates to N.W.'s ability to 

overcome the initial harm that endangered the children and prevent its 

reoccurrence. N.W. stipulated to Dr. Dyer's qualifications as an expert in 

psychology. She nevertheless attacks the reliability of Dr. Dyer's opinion 

regarding her potential for relapse. She asserts he lacks professional expertise 

with respect to the intersection of addiction and mental illness and is unfamiliar 

with the American Society of Addiction Medicine. We are unpersuaded by this 

argument. 

"[O]pioid dependence is a chronic relapsing disorder" with no known 

cure. Jacinta O'Shea and Jan Melichar, Opioid Dependence, Nat'l Insts. of 
27 A-0853-18T2

Health, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2907824/ (last visited June 

14, 2019). "[R]elapse is a predictable part of recovery" that "must be 

addressed." Manual for Operation of Adult Drug Courts in New Jersey, at 43 

(July 2002), available at https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/dctman.pdf. 

(Drug Court Manual). Those suffering from substance abuse often "experience 

relapse, and 'repeated treatments become necessary to increase the intervals 

between and diminish' the severity of relapses until abstinence is achieved." 

Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Pub. Health Strategies for Expanding 

Drug Treatment in Cmtys., 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 639 (2005) (quoting Alan I. 

Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease, Issues in Sci. and Tech. 75, 76-77 (Spring 

2001)). Indeed, Drug Court participants, who are subject to "intensive 

supervision, frequent drug testing, and regular court appearances, combined 

with treatment and recovery services," State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 412, 429 (2007) 

(citing Drug Court Manual, at 3-4), commonly relapse despite the threat of 

immediate jail sanctions for a positive drug screen, Drug Court Manual, at 43. 

As a result, Phase III of the Drug Court program focuses upon relapse 

prevention. Id. at 40. 

Opioid use disorder in remission in a controlled environment is a wellrecognized concept and diagnosis. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
28 A-0853-18T2

Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (ICD-9-CM code 304.00 (severe opioid use disorder in 

early remission in a controlled environment)). See also Int'l Classification of 

Diseases and Health Related Problems (ICD-10) (10th rev. 1994), Code F11.21. 

Relapse is common upon release from a controlled environment where access to 

opioids is restricted. For severe relapsing opioid dependence, long-term 

maintenance using an oral opioid agonist such as methadone or buprenorphine 

combined with ongoing counseling and support is preferred. The Merck Manual 

of Diagnosis and Therapy, 3246-47 (2nd ed. 2018). 

As a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Dyer is qualified to diagnose N.W. 

with opioid dependence, in early remission. His conclusion that N.W. faces the 

risk of relapse after exiting a controlled environment is supported by substantial 

credible evidence in the record. The potential for relapse despite treatment and 

aftercare poses a palpable risk N.W. will be unable to overcome or remove the 

harm her addiction and relationship choices present. Her long term, severe 

abuse of drugs, beginning at age fifteen, which escalated to heroin addiction 

while pregnant, from which she is only in the early stages of recovery, makes it 

likely she will encounter difficulties remaining sober when not in a controlled 

environment. The record bespeaks that risk. N.W. previously relapsed after 

completing a twenty-eight-day inpatient program. The record reveals the harm 
29 A-0853-18T2

to the children is likely to continue if N.W. becomes their caretaker. That risk 

will continue into the foreseeable future. Thus, the trial court correctly 

determined the Division satisfied prong two.

To satisfy the third prong, the Division must prove it made "diligent 

efforts to reunite the family." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 354. The analysis 

"contemplates efforts that focus on reunification of the parent with the child and 

assistance to the parent to correct and overcome those circumstances that 

necessitated the placement of the child into foster care." Ibid. "[T]he statutory 

definition of 'diligent efforts' is 'reasonable attempts by an agency authorized by 

the [D]ivision to assist the parents in remedying the circumstances and 

conditions that led to the placement of the child and in reinforcing the family 

structure.'" I.S., 202 N.J. at 176 (quoting DMH, 161 N.J. at 386).

N.W. contends the Division failed to refer her for treatment when 

funding for a program she was attending ran out in November 2017. The 

record shows otherwise. A Division worker promptly provided N.W. with the 

names of three other treatment facilities. Multiple attempts to follow-up from 

November 22, 2017 to January 23, 2018, were unsuccessful. N.W. refused to 

engage with the Division until January 27, 2018. In addition, N.W.'s persistent 
30 A-0853-18T2

failure to complete the services provided by the Division resulted in her 

termination from various programs. 

The Division routinely offered services to N.W. to address her needs. 

By any measure, the Division made reasonable efforts to provide services to 

N.W. to correct the behaviors that led to removal. The record likewise 

demonstrates the Division considered alternatives to termination of parental 

rights, such as kinship legal guardianship, prior to determining termination 

was appropriate. Thus, the trial court correctly determined the Division 

satisfied prong three.

Lastly, the Division must demonstrate "that termination of parental rights 

will not do more harm than good to the child." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 354-55 

(citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4)). However, the Division need not "show[] that 

no harm will befall the child as a result of the severing of biological ties." Id.

at 355. Instead, the issue "is whether, after considering and balancing the two 

relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties 

with her natural parents than from the permanent disruption of her relationship 

with her foster parents." Ibid. To satisfy this prong of the analysis, the Division 

must "offer testimony of a 'well-qualified expert who has had full opportunity 

to make a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation' of the child's 
31 A-0853-18T2

relationship with both the natural parents and the foster parents." N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 442 (App. Div. 2009) 

(quoting M.M., 189 N.J. at 281).

Dr. Dyer determined Liam has a stronger attachment to his paternal 

grandmother than to N.W. and that the paternal grandmother is Liam's "central 

parental love object and attachment figure." Dr. Dyer found Maddie was too 

young to develop a specific attachment to either parent or the paternal 

grandmother. Those findings are unsurprising. Liam was removed from 

N.W.'s care when he was five months old. Maddie was less than a year old at 

trial. She was removed from N.W. a few days after birth and has never lived 

with her. Moreover, N.W.'s participation in supervised visits with her children 

was sporadic with many scheduled visits cancelled due to N.W.'s absence. 

Dr. Dyer concluded Liam "would display a severe short-term reaction of 

the stress and disorientation" if "removed from his paternal grandmother and 

placed with a well-functioning caretaker." He would also "be placed at some 

risk of developing longer-term problems including impaired self-esteem, 

impaired basic trust, and an impaired capacity to attach." If he were "placed 

with a dysfunctional caretaker who suffered from conditions such as 

depression, personality problems, or drug abuse, then there would be a much 
32 A-0853-18T2

greater likelihood of longer-term negative effects due to severing him from his 

present attachment figure." 

Dr. Dyer concluded the children are happy, secure, and enthusiastic with 

their paternal grandmother, who is "totally committed to the welfare of her 

grandchildren." They appear to be thriving in her care. Dr. Dyer 

recommended adoption of both children by the paternal grandmother. The 

record amply supports the determination that termination of N.W.'s parental 

rights will not do more harm than good. The trial court correctly determined 

the Division satisfied prong four.

Any issues raised but not otherwise addressed lack sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.