NO. 95-425 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1996 

FARMERS ALLIfiATCE MUTITAL INSUR&TCE: 

COMP.LVY, a Kansas Insurance corporation, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

KRISTI HOLEW, Personal Representative 

of the Estate of Gary Lee Leonard, Deceased, 

Defendant and Respondent 

CERTIFZED QUESTION FROM: 

The United States District Court for the District 

of Montana, Billings Division, The Honorable Jack 

D. Shanstrom presiding 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Robert Savage; Habedank, Cumming, Best & Savage, 

Sidney, Montana (argued for Farmers Alliance) 

For Respondent: 

Donald D. Sommerfeld; Towe, Ball, Enright, 

Mackey & Sommerfeld, Billings, Montana (argued for 

Kristi Holeman, Personal Representative) 

For Amicus: 

Peter F. Habein; Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, 

Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana (argued for 

Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company) 

Susan P. Eoy, Garlington, Lohn &Robinson, Missouia, 

Montana (argued for Alliance of American Insurers) 

Gene R. Jarussi; Jarussi &Bishop, Billings, Montana 

(argued for Montana Trial Lawyers Association) 

..-:,..* ** .- # , ... 9 r"" '@*,& ;- ‘f <;q ./ ? Heard: May 20, 1996 

sf-: . , :~. .LA Akd Submitted: June 25, 1926 

~~~id~d: aeptamber 12, 
Justice W. VJilliam Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court 

The United States District Court for the District of Montana, 

. - - Bliiings Division, bas zertified the folLowing question to this 

Court pursuant to Rule 44, M.R.Appp.F. We answer the certified 

question "no." 

The certified question is: 

Section 33-23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of 

the uninsured motorist coverage available under a policy 

of motor vehicle liability insurance. Does Section 33- 

23 -203, MCA, prohibit the stacking of the medical payment 

coverage and the -insuredmotorist coverage available 

under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance where 

a premium is charged for coverage of each motor vehicle 

listed within that policy? 

In the insurance policy at issue, a premium is 

charged on each motor vehicle listed within the policy 

for medical payment co*Jerage and a premium is charged on 

each motor vehicle listed within the policy for 

-insurance coverage. The premium for the 

-insured motorist coverage is included as part of the 

premium for the uninsured motorist coverage. 

In its Order Certifying Question to the Supreme Court of 

Montana, the District Court submitted a statement of agreed facts 

The facts that this Court finds dispositive of the question are as 

follows : 

4. That, at approximately 0450 hours, on November 

9, 1991, a vehicle insured by the Plaintiff under the 

policy issued to Wade and Diana Brown, namely a 1971 Ford 

pickup with VIN FlOGKL66406, being driven by Lori Watson, 

in which Scott Hankel and Gary Lee Leonard were 

passengers, was involved in a one-vehicle accident in 

Jefferson County, Montana, on Interstate 90 at milepost 

233.4, 15.6 miles west of Whitehall, Montana. 

5. Subsequent thereto, at approximately 0510 hours, 

at [sic] 1983 Ford pickup truck, V1N 1FTHF26LSDPA15458, 

owned by Darrel. M. Storey and driven by Darrel Maynard 

Storey, Jr., was traveling east on Interstate 90 when the 

driver lost control of the vehicle as he attempted to 
slow for the accident scene and went into a sideskid. 

The Storey vehicle struck the right roar corner of the 

trailer attached ts the subject 1971 Ford pickup, VIN 

F30GRL66406. Such contact pushed the trailer into the 

ditch and onto its Left side. The Storey vehicle then 

rapidly rotated. Mr. Leonard's coat became entangled on 

the bitch of the Storey pickup which caw-sed Mr. Leonard 

to be dragged under the Storey vehicle until after it 

went backwards into the ditch on the south side of the 

road. 1. Leonard died as a result of the injuries 

sustained. 

6. The Storey vehicle was insured by State Farm 

Auto Insurance Company under Pnli.cy PJo 1.3E 522.2-495-225 

add State Farm subsequently paid out its policy limits 

under the liability portion of its policy limits in the 

amount of $25,000. 

7. Prior to signing a Release, the Estate of Gary 

Lee Leonard made demand upon Plaintiff for the uninsured 

(underinsured) motorist coverage and auto medical payment 

coverage provided for in the Business Auto Policy of Wade 

and Diana Brown. 

8. Plaintiff has refused to make any payments of 

uninsured (underinsured! motorist coverage and auto 

medical payment coverage to the heirs and/or Estate of 

Gary Lee Leonard, deceased. 

Answering the question certified by the United States District 

Court requires this Court to construe § 33-23-203, MCA. In 

construing a statute, "the office of the judge is simply to 

ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained 

therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has 

been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. The rules of statutory 

construction require the language to be construed according to its 

plain meaning. Stratemeyer v. L~ncoln County (Flont . 1996) , 915 

P.2d 175, 178, 53 St.Rep. 245, 250 (citing Clarke v. Massey (19951, 

271 Mont. 412, 416, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088). If the language is clear 

and unambiguous, then no further interpretation is required; we 

will resort to legislative history only if the intent cannot be 
determined fromthe plain wording of the statute. Clarke, 847 F.id 

at 1088. Where the intention of the legislature can be determined 

from che piain meaning of the words used in a statute, the courts 

may not go further and apply other rneans of interpretation. 

Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088 (citing Tongue River Glec. Coop. v. 

Montana Power Co. (1981), 191 Mont. 511, 515, 636 P.2d 862, 864). 

The question certified is a narrow one. We are asked only trj 

determine whether § 33-.23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of 

woptional" coverages--here, the medical payments and underinsurance 

coverages. We do not consider whether the terms of the insurance 

contract prohibit stacking. Rather, our analysis is confined to an 

interpretation of § 33-23-203, MCA. Accordingly, this Court's 

recent decision in Chilberg v. Rose (1995) , 273 Mont . 414, 903 P. 2d 

1377, is not controlling in this case as Chilberq is a multiple 

policy case and does not interpret § 33-23-203, MCA. In addition, 

we note that Sayers 'J. Safeco Ins. Co. of America i1981), 192 Mont. 

336, 628 P.2d 659, cited with approval in Chilberq, is contrary to 

§ 33-23-203, MCA, as Savers approved the stacking of uninsured 

motorist coverage under a single policy. Thus, under § 33-23-203, 

MCA, Savers is no longer good law because under the terms of S 33- 

23-203, MCA, stacking of uninsured motorist coverage for multiple 

vehicles lnsured under a single policy is expressly prohibited 

unless the policy specifically provides otherwise. Section 33-23- 

203, MCA, provides: 

(1) Unless a motor vehicle liab~lity policy 

specifically provides otherwise, the limits of insurance 

coverage available under any such policy, including the 

limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage, 

4 
nmst be determined as follows, regardless of the number 

of motor vehicles insured under the policy: . ' (a) the l~rnlt of insurance coverage available for 

any one accident is the Limit specified for the motor 

vehicle involved in the accident; 

(bj if no motor vehicle insured under the policy is 

involved in the scciclent, the limitof insurance coverage 

available for any one accidest is the highest limit of 

coverage specified for any one motor vehicle insured 

under the policy; and 

(c) the limits of coverage specified for each motor 

vehicle insured under the policy may not be added 

together to determine the limit of insurance coverage 

available under the policy for any one accident. 

(2) A motor vehicle liability policy may also 

provide for other reasonable limitations, exclusions, or 

reductions of coverage which are designed to prevent 

duplicate payments for the same element of loss. 

From the language of the statute, it is clear that "stacking" is 

not allowed "unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically 

provides otherwise." It is equally clear that the "anti-stacking" 

provisions of the statute apply to a "motor vehicle liability 

policy" (MVLP) . The term MVLP is defined in § 33-23-204(2), MCA, 

as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance against 

liability now or hereafter required under Title 61, chapter 6, 

parts 1 and 3. " (Emphasis added. ) 

The dissenters argue that 9: 33-23-204(2), MCA, refers to 

required "policiesti rather than required "co~erages.'~ It makes no 

sense, however, to discuss "policies" in a vacuum. A policy of 

insurance is nothing more than the coverages which are provided 

within the policy. In 9: 33-23-204(2), MCA, the legislature was 

obviously correlating the anti-stacking stiitutes with the fact that 

policies with specific types of coverage are required by Title 61, 

chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. In particular, the per person, per 

vehicle and property damage coverages mandated by § 61-6-103(2), 

5 
FICA. 

In interpreting 33-23-204(2), IKA, three points are 

apparent; it is directed at insurance against iiabiiity. Secondly, 

it is directed at insurance coverage which is "required" by law: 

and finally, it is concerned with liability icsuraace which is not 

only required, but is required by both part 1 and part 3. There 

are only three variatirjl?~ of insurance coverage whiilh meet the 

above criteria; that is, liability coverage which is required by 

both the MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Liability Act. Those three 

coverages are the per person, per vehicle and property damage 

coverages which are required by S 61-6-103(2), MCA, and which are 

incorporated into the Motor Vehicle Liability Act by § 61-6-301, 

MCA. Unlilce the third-party coverage mandated by MVSRA and the 

Motor Vehicle Liability Act, underinsurance and medical payment do 

not qualify as insurance against liability. Rather, underinsurance 

and medical pay coverage are designed to protect the first party 

insured. Furthermore, there is nothing in MIJSRA, the Motor Vehicle 

Liability Act or Title 33, chapter 23, MCA, which would "require" 

underinsurance and medical pay coverage. To the contrary, the 

MVSRh specifically excludes coverages which are in excess of the 

required per person, per vehicle and property damage coverage. 

The MVSRA, § 61-6-103(8), provides as follows: 

Any policy which grants the coverage required for a 

motor vehicle liability policy may also grant any lawful 

coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage 

specified for a motor vehicle liability policy, and the 

excess or additional coverage is not subject to the 

provisions of thls part, With respect to a policy which 

grants the excess or addlti~nal coverage, the term "motor 

vehicle liability policy" applies only to that part of 
the coverage which is required by this section. 

As Justice Erdrnann's dissent points cut, the above pro-,?ision 

specifically refers to coverage which is required "by this 

secticlr." Although '*this section" refers to the MVSRA, the Motor 

Vehicle Liability Act has also incorporated those same "c~verage'~ 

requirements; $25,000 because of bodily injury to any one person, 

$50,000 for bodily injury in any one accident* and $10,000 fcr 

property damage. There is nothing in the Motor Vehicle Liability 

Act which would suggest that the liability coverage requirements 

incorporated from MVSRA are any broader than those required under 

MVSRA. Since MVSRA specifically does not require any excess or 

additional coverage such as underinsurance, it is reasonable to 

conclude that the Motor Vehicle Liability Act likewise treats 

medical pay coverage and underinsurance as in 'IexcessN or in 

addition to the coverages which are specifically required by both 

Acts in question. Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. 

As medical payment coverage and underinsured motorist coverage 

are "excess or additional coverage" which are not required under 

either the MVSRA or the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, we determine 

that these coverages are not part of the MVLP under § 33-23-204 !2), 

MCA . Accordingly, the prohibition against stacking required 

coverages in § 33-23-203, MCA, does not apply to underinsurance and 

medical payment coverage. 

This Court has recognized that "Montana has no statutory 

insurance requirement concerning underinsured motorists." Grier v. 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. !1931), 248 Mont. 457, 455-59, 812 P.2d 
347, 349. While coverage in excess of the minimum amounts mandated 

by 51-6-103(2), MC<A, and additional coverages such as 

comprehensive, underinsured, medical payments, or towing may be 

purchased by the insured, the mandate of Title 61, chapter 6, part 

I, MCA, and the term MTiLP apply only to the third-party liability 

coverage required by § 61-5-10312) (b), MCA. 

Section 33-23-201, MCA, requires thak the insurer offer f isstparty, uninsured motorist coverage in the same amounts as required 

for third-party coverage under § 61-6-103, MCA. The distinction 

between the uninsured motorist coverage and the third-party 

coverage is that by rejecting the uninsured coverage the insured 

may waive the first-party uninsured coverage benefitting himself, 

but he cannot waive the minimum liability coverages benefitting the 

third-party. Importantly, however, in the absence of the insured 

affirmatively rejecting the coverage, the policy is issued with the 

uninsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, under Montana's 

statutory scheme the minimum third-party liability coverages under 

§ 61-6-103 (2) (b) , MCA, and the minimum f irst-party, uninsured 

motorist coverage under § 33-23-201. MCA, are required coverages. 

Section 33-23-203, MCA, initially references the MVLP and 

coverage available under such a MVLP policy and continues: 

"including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist 

coverage." This latter inclusion of uninsured motorist coverage 

was necessary because uninsured motorist coverage is not required 

as part of the MVLP. Uninsured motorist coverage is, nonetheless, 

a coverage which is required by s 33-23-201, MCA, subject to 
rejection by the insured. Accordirigly, we determine that the 

"anci-stac1ci~g'"provision of S 31-23-203, MCA, applies onllr to 

tnose coverages required under the MVLP or B 33-23-201, MCA. 

E'arnrers Aiiianee argues tha.t the "available coverageii language 

in S 33-23-203, MCA, is broader than the required coverages and 

that the statute includes underinsurance coverage. We reject this 

argument. The only insurance coverags a~ailable under both part 1 

and part 3, as the MVLP has been restrictively defined by the 

legislature, is the minimum third-party coverage required by § 61- 

6-103 (2) (b) , MCA. This definition of "available coverage" follows 

because the term MVLP does not encompass any other "excess1' or 

additional coverage. Section 61-6-103(8), MCA. The limits of 

coverage available under any such policy must refer to the required 

third-party minimum coverages, required under both parts 1 and 3 of 

Title 61, chapter 6. Furthermore, "uninsured motor vehicle" is 

defined in § 33-23-201, MCA, which provides that "[aln uninsured 

motor vehicle is a land motor vehicle, the ownership, the 

maintenance, or the use of which is not insured or bonded for 

bodily injury liability at the time of the accident." This 

definition does not include "underinsured motor vehicle" within its 

terms. 

Although Farmers Alliance asserts that this Court's opinion in 

Grier holds that underinsured coverage is part of the uninsured 

motor vehicle coverage, we determine that is distinguishable. 

Our holdings in were based upon an interpretation of the 

policy language and are not controlling as a matter of statutory 
construction. In e, we stated tikt "under these circumstances, 

the "underinsured" coverage is part of the uninsured motor vehicle 

coverage." Our hoidins, hwdever, was prefaced with the caveat 

Itunder these circumstances. " We recognized that the *'unique 

fashion" of the Grier policy was determinative. We noted that "the 

insurance policy in this case 1- is set up in a unique 

fashion. , . the "underinsured" motorist provision is part of the 

section on uninsured motorist coverage. . . there is no separate 

policy section providing for underinsured motor vehicle coverage." 

, 812 P.2d at 349. In addition, we noted that "the 

declarations page makes no mention whatsoever of underinsured motor 

vehicle coverage. " Grier 812 P.2d at 349. Most importantly, we 

were interpreting the language of the Grier policy--not the 

statute. Here, however, our conclusion is based on § 33-23-203, 

MCA. Further, unlike the policy at issue in Grier, the instant 

policy sets forth the underinsurance coverage on the declarations 

page. We determine that Grier is not determinative on this issue 

as it interpreted the insurance contract, not 5 33-23-203, MCA. 

The legislature has mandated that motor vehicle liability 

policies provide two types of coverage: coverage for injury to 

third-parties, Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3, and first party 

coverage for uninsured motorists, § 33-23-201, MCA. Likewise, the 

legislature has provided that, absent contractual language to the 

contrary, such required coverages cannot be "stacked" when numerous 

vehicles are insured under one policy. Section 33-23-203, MCA. 

The question of whether excess or additional coverages, such as 
uiidericsurance coverage, can be stacked was left as a matter of 

pclicy interpret-"; aLAon. 

-Accordingly, we answer tine certified question in the negative. 

Section 33-23-203, MCA, does not prohibit the stacking of the 

medical pa-pent cosrerage and the -insured motorist coverage 

available under a poliq of motor vehicle liability insurance where 

a premium is charged for coverage of each motor vehicle listed 

within that policy. 

We concur: 

Justices 
jrrstioe Cames C. Nelson specially concurs, 

I - Co?-. ,..-dr in oar agswer co t-?e certified qfiestion. In doing 

so, I aiso agree with Justice Gray that tne statutes at issue are 

neitkLer a rtodel of clar-2~ nor do they track well. ~f zn-fb\'-- ri LiiCt, 

that is an understatenl~ent. As demonstrate6 by the Court's opinion 

and by the dissents, reasonable interpretations lead to 

diametrically opposed results. Whether one interpretation is more 

"absurd" rhan the sther is aore a funccion of perception than it is 

logic. 

One thing, however, is obvious: if the legislature wanted to 

prohibit the stacking of underinsured and med-pay coverage, it 

could have simply said so in S 33-23-203, MCA. It had no trouble 

sa-ying that with respect to uninsured coverage. It could have used 

an equally simple, clear and unambiguous approach to underinsured 

and med-pay coverage, The fact is it did not, and we are, thus, 

left with the task of trying to make sense out of a mishmash of 

overlapping statutes, adopted and amended at different times and, 

with one possible exception, absent any clear unifying rationale. 

That possible exception is, as our opinion points out, where 

the legislature has explicitiy or implicitly mandated third-party 

or first-party coverage, it has clearly prohibited stacking, absent 

agreement between the insurer and the insured. Where, on the other 

hand, it has not statutorily mandated coverage in one fashion or 

another, the legislature has not clearly prohibited stacking. 

Finally, ; note that; if in discharging our task of statutory 

interpretation, the majority has erred on the side of the insured, 

L 2 
. . thzri, c:Jr OFLnion is at least consistent with this Cocrt's 

histcrical approac!? in numerous other J~sura~ce cases wherein we 

have enforced Montana's strong pu.biic policy favoring co:reraTe 

where either the pollcy 1.apguage or rhe Law was not clear. See 

-, k%~hrai?d -J. Xat. Farmers Union (13951, 272 'ilo~t. 1, 6, 998 P.26 

122C, 1223; Wellcome v. Home Ins. Co. (1993i, 257 Monc. 354, 358, 

849 P.2d 19C. 192-93: Head. v. Central Reserve Life (1993), 256 

Kont. 188, 200, 845 P.2d 735, 742. 
Justice Charles 4. Erdman~ dissentica. 

I respoctfvlly dissanr, 

Iritialiy, it is impcrcarr to note that in ics dlscxssi.cn of 

i+- ?he certified qdesticil, ~~~c majoricy has cmitted Agrsed Facz Nr;. 3 

ccntained in the Order Certifying Questior, wnich provides: 

* That on or about Kay 31, 1931, riaintiff issued co Wade 

and Diana Brown, the named insured and pareets of Scotr 

Hankel, a policy of auto insurance, a true, correct, and 

complete copy of which is marked "Exhibit A" attached 

hereto and incorporated herein by rl- -Terence. 

Thus, al~hough the certified question from xhe Federal 

District Court is somewhat narrow, it is also clear that bctn the 

parties and the Federal District Ccurt contemplated that this Cncrt 

address the certified question with reference to and in the context 

of the provisions of rhe specific insurance policy in this case. 

While resolution of the certified question requires an analysis of 

;he language of S 33-23-203, MCA, such an analysis should not be in 

a vacuum separate and apart from the policy involved in the case. 

After narrowing an already narrow certified question, the 

majority embarks on a strained statutory construction analysis to 

reach its ultimate result. The majority correctly sezs forth the 

rsles apon which this Courc relies when construing a stacute. If 

the statutory langcage is clear and unambiguous, then ro furrher 

interpretation is required. C13rke .J; Massep :I9351 , 271 Kant. 

412, 416, 857 P.2d 1.085, 1088. Where the intention of the 

Segislatsre can be drrermined frcx the plaifi meaning of the words 

ased in a scatuce, -,he ccurEs r~ay not go fzrtker and apply ariy 
other mears of interpretatior. Clar~e, e97 P.2d at 1CEE (srcinc 

-. - -. 511; 515, 636 2~2a 352, 664;. under this fra??ewcukj I woci~ nsid 

of underinsured votorise and medical payment coverages 

Unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically 

provides :herwise, fhe limits of insurance coverage 

available ~nder any such policy, including the Limits of 

Liability under ani~sured motsrist coverage, nuat be 

determined as foliows, regardless of the number of xotor 

vehi.cles insnred under the policy: 

(a) the limit cf insuranze coverage available for 

any one accideric is the limit specified for rhe motor 

vehicle involved in the accident; .... 

(cj the limits of coverage specified for each motor 

vehicle insured under the policy may no: be added 

together eo determine the limit of insurance coverage 

available under the policy far any one accident. 

The majority cpinior focuses on che term "motor vehicle 

liability policy" (MVLF) as ic is used ir S; 33-23-233(li, PSCA 

As noted by the msjority, MVL? is deficed in 5 33-23-234(2), MCA, 

as any policy required under Title 61, Chapter 6, Parts 1 & 3. 

- he majority opini~n igr'cres the refererice to Part 3 and improperly 

- ~t 1s important to understand the different pur~oses of 

, 33-23-204 i2!, PICA. Part 1 is the Motor Vehicle SafetyResponsibility Act iMWRAj which was enacted to require that 

. . ar:vers wno nave had an accidenn involving a w.otor vekiicle, =r 
drivers who have an outstanding unsatisfied judgment a~gainst inem 

L~nanckal F 2 rsspcnsihlii, pr-- - ~ - LY . ,~r of flnagc~a; responsibility 

v, Stare Farm W~tual Auto ins. Co. ;196Rj, i5i Piocc. ii7? 443 P.2d 

Section 61-6-103, MCA, defines WVLP for purpcses of the bIVSRA 

and yrcvrdes, rr pertznent part, as foilows: 

(1) A "motor vehicle liability policy", as the term is 

used in this part, Eeans an owner's or operator's policy 

of liability ins~lrance, certified as provided in 61-6-133 

or 61-6-134 as croof of financial responsibility and 

issued, exceot - as otherwise provided - in 61-5-134, bv an 

insurance carrier duly axthorized to transact business in 

this state, to or for the benefit of the person named 

therein as insured. 

(2! Tne owner's po:.icy of liability insurance must : 

.... 

:bi insure the person named therein and any other 

person, ;;s insured, uzi.ng ar,y motor vehicle cr zocor 

vehicles with the express or implied permission sf the 

named insured, against loss from the liability inposed by 

law for damages arisi~g cut of the ownership, 

xaintenance, or use cf the motor vehicle or motor 

-~ehicles within the C'nited States of Axerica or che 

Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of 

i~zerest and costs, with respect to sach sotor vehicle, 

as fclicws: 

(i) $25,060 because of bodily i~jury to or ;path of 

one person in any one accident and subject to said " dsit 

for one person; 

iiij $50,036 because of bodily injury to or dearh 

of twc or Rore persons in any Dne a-ccident; and 

(iii) $10,000 because of injury to or destruciion 

of property cf others in any one accidect. 

:8) ArLy pclicy which grants the coveraqe required 

for a motor vehicle liability policy nay alsa grant any 

iawfxl coverage in excess of or in additicn to the - - coverage specified for a motor -.&iicle Liability policy, 

and rko excess or addicic~al coverage is noc subject to 

the ~rovisions of chis part. Nitk respect to a poiicy 

which grants the excess or addirional coverage, the ; ~erm 
"motor vehicle ?izbZ' ilzry policy" ap~l~ies cnly tc tkat 

pzrt the Co""-eI-.-- . . ,a,e \qh$ch 5s rcquirea r-rr this sect$sn, 

:E-.phasis added. j 

'rho rfiajority rei.les or: s:~bsfctiicii (8) to coccluae that sir!:^ 

ucderinsured motorist a~d medical payment coverages are not 

included in saksecticn i2! (bi, tk-ey are not part of an ?4VL>~rder 

33-23-203 (I;, MCA. - , i the majority was only construing 

5 61-6-103, MCP., they wosld be ccrrect in their i.r.ter;recazion. 

However, in the present case the Fecieral Giscrict Court has 

requested our interpretaticc of § 33-23-203, MCA. When several 

statutes apply to a given sitnarion, this Cocrt's '-i J~; is t? adopt 

a construction that will qive - effect to all. Section ;-2-L01, NCA; 

-- See also Schuman v. Besrrom (1Y85), 214 Mcnt. 410, 693 P.26 536. 

The aefinition of NVLP in S 61-6-103!13, MCA, applied by tne 

majority to g 33-23-203, MCA, is restricted by its own terms to 

Part 1 of Chapter 6 and to only those pclicies certified under 

SS. 61-6-133 or -i34, MCA, for individuals who are required zo 

provide proof of financial responsibi.lity.' § 01-6-131, YCA. 

The Language of S 61-5-:03 (8: , A, reas~nakly constraed, means 

The cajority relies on S 1-2-107, M3A, as authcriry to apply 

the definition of IWLP in the MVSRA in Title 61 to rhe 

+ slcii +--I<: lng statute in Title 33. Secti2;r i-2-1Q7, MCA, prcviees, , . however, that the defirrclon of a phrase in cne part of the co5e 

may be applied to the same phrase - iq - ansther uerceu7 A - wkLert. i 

ccntrary intention plaizly appears," Here, the plair language of 

5 6;-5-133 (i), MCA, restzict-s the defi~itton of WJLP "as tl?e tern 

is used in :his part" ard then cnLy for policies certifie" under 

S§ 61-5-133, -4, -- XCA. -C A %. w3.cld be difficult to enyw~isicn z 

clearer expression of legislative ictenz. The 1,egislzture inten6ed 

that the defifiitlon of MVLP in S 51-6-103(1), MCA, be restricted to 

the MVSEA. 
that the strict require~orrs of the MVSRA apply to the 1iabil;ty 

cs~~crzg~ rea;ired by scbser--icn (2) (b:, but not t- the adjitic-al L 

-, ~r excess cs:-eraqes avziLaE;li; in a x;n_:c;r ertified f,zr z~ :'>,- ,a? 

+.".: GL "" .,ey, 18,' 

-? , in~s cons~ruction :s further supported by reviewing Fart 3 sf 

Chapter 5 which contains the mandatory liability limizs far all 

Montana dri~~ers. As noted, S 33-23-204 (2: , MCA, defines KVLF as 

any policy required uncer Title 61, Chapcer 5, Parts 1 & 3. 

Policies can be lssued under either Par- 1 or Part 3 and the two 

parts are independent. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Xoyle i13531, 

202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 920. 

Part 3 of Chapter 6 references and incorporates only the 

liability limits ccctaiced in S 61-6-103, FICA, and the remaining 

provisio~s of the MVSRA are not incorporated into Part 3. If, 

-herefore, a policy is issaed under Part 3, it '- r-' ,at subjecr +~- Lu 

L . . _he prcnlslons of Part I. -- See Boldr, 443 P.23 at 35-36; 

Tra~sanerica, 655 P.2d at e22-23. ?he facts incll~ied with the 

certified question do not reflect that the policy was issued under 

Zart 1, and it is apparerit frcn the policy Lrself that it was 

issued under Par: 3. I therefore believe the majority's conciusion 

that the definitioc of MVLP in the MVSBA apclies in its entirety tc 

' Fclicies issuec under the ?4VSnnA (Part 1: contain a cumber of 

restricti.orrs not fcun5 in joiizies issued ucder the mandatcry 

liakility provisions (Part 3). For instance, ~nder the NVSRA the 

liability of tne insurer is absolute afser an accident occurs and 

there are restrictions as cc cancellation and increasing premiums. 

& § 61-5-103(6)- (71, MCA. 
g 33-23-203? PICA, is in error and ignores the refsrecce rc Part 3 

only to policies issued under the MVSRA: 

Other policies not affected. (1; This pr:, :&art 1; 

shall not be held to apply tc or affecr. poiicies f -. a,~torr.obile insarance a~ga~irst ~1abilit-y which rtay now or 

hereafter be repire5 by a2y ccher Law cr' LI1:is srate 

.... 

'iere .the policy was issaed u:ider Parc 3 ar,d the rescricti-,-e 

definitiofi of MVLF in Part I clearly was cot ictecded ro apply to 

policies issued under the part repiri-g mandatory liability limits 

for a11 drivers. 

- Even if an TMVLP ander 5 33-23-263, KCA, was as limited as chc 

majcrity holds, the clear language of S 32-23-2833, KC?., still leads 

. . to the conciusion char the szacite ~rohibics SSaCKIrig of 

underinsured mccorist and medicai pay coverages. ectisn 

33-23-203 (13, MCA, provides that stacking is prohibited f~r 

insurance coverage "available under any such [KJL?] policy." 

:Znphasis aicied.: The Legislarcre dic! r?ot grohibis stacking for 

in~urar~ce caverage "required" by the policy, whicil according to cke 

-. r2aJ or: 'ty is ocly the iiaciii~,y lizitc fo~rd in 5 5I-0--lC3:2, I, " ~3 ) 

P2A, t-at rat, ~r3hibited sca~king for -_.oi;erages "availablev 

under the colicy. 

Under tne plain ianjliage of D 33-22-263, MCA, stackkg cf b.oci- 

.. - mea;ca~ payaent and undericsured mctorist ccvsraqes is prohibited 
. .- since both were "available' under the policy. wnere the languaue 

G . , -- a stat-;te is ;;lair,, l~r.avpm7 i.-il.l-U~, el..-7, and .---'--- , L. ~r~e furcti-,r: cf 

~ - Eke c0c-Z is sln~iy to ascertain and Secisr? :what is in ?.errns cr 

s LI,U~t3n~e ~, I- c~ntained -i . - , -.--3'- 3.2 , 5s i~serc h;is I- ~dez.. --vs 

omitted or orrit what has been inserted. Secitisn 1-2-Xi, NCA. 

Xeese v. Iieese ii381), 136 Mont. 1a1, E37 P.2d ii63. 

Further, :he =ajority1s conclusion thac an XVLF policy, as it 

is used in § 33-23-203, MCA, is limiied to the $25,000/$50,090,' 

$10,000 requirements of § 61-6-163 (2: (b), MCA, is simply not 

consisterc with the other language of § 33-23-203, XCA. Becrion 

33-23-203 (1) , MCA, provides that stacking is prohibited for 

insurance coverage "available under any su-oh LMVLP; policy 

includinq limirs cE liabiii" Ly under uninsured mctorist coverage." 

(Emphasis added.) Znzer ~he ma?orityls interpretation, an MVL? 

ii~cluder; only the found in S 61-6-1C3(2~ (b), 

MCA. Clea--I ,ly, uninsured rnc:orisr coverage is not repired by that 

provision, b~: is specifically recognized by the Legislature 2s 

being available ur.der an MVLF. 

Lr, an effort to av~id this clear statctory language, tne 

xajority coccLudes chat ucinsured coverage is required ccverage. 

cnics-cred c-xjeraqe, La ch~ dearee it is required, is not recuirei d 

kv Fart I of Chapter 6, Title 61, MCA, but rather by 5 33-23-20? - I 

MCA.' The language ir S 61-5-?.03i8iC MCA, relied upon by the 

Ir? Yemp 7.r. Allstate 1~s. CC. (1975), 193 Mcnt. 526, 531, 6CI 

P.2d 20, 25, this Cc~Jrt, in a stacking case predating 5 33-23-203, 

MCA, neld that: 'vru;oncana's urinsured motorist statute is coc 
. , 3ajorit-y, cirarly states thar when a pci:c); 9r;;ncs cc7~eracre in 

e----c iiir~r mF the c=uerz.ge i-q?aired by 22 :,?VLP, term ~~VLP vapplies 

. . c~Ly cs thzic cf ,he co~j-ra~f- ,I Is rt.q,jire+ , 

sectl37. L' , zdjej,: sirice ..i.-'7s-.-1: u A. .,_c_c. c.ul,_ qe 1s not 

required by 5 6i-6-103, MCA, che najority's Logic breaks dcwn. 

Finally, the phrase "inciuding the ].inits of liability under 

uni~sured motor-isr co-reraqe" in S 33-23-233, C also de~onstrates 

that the ieoislature inter.ded that the stacking prohibition apply 

to coverages other than those required by 5 6i-6-i03 !,2 1 (b'j , MCA, 

an6 uninsured motorist coverase. ?he rerm "including" is rct a 

limii;izg ce-m, but instead is used as an illiistratii~e device. A 

cumber of courts have neld that the term "includir,g" used ir, 

similar contexts is not all-inclusive. i?h;llps Dodge Corp. v. 

National Labor Relations Bd. (lY41), 313 U.S. 177, 51 S. Ct. 845, 

85 1. Ed. 1271; Federai 'and Bank of Sc, Pa~i v. Bismarck iumber 

Cic. i13411, 314 Z.S. 95, 62 S. Ct. 1 86, 1,. Ed. 65; Schab v. 

Ariyoshi [Eaw. I977), 564 P.26 135; Ccfinert y v. Mecrcpclitan Disc. 

Comm'n ;Mass. 1986), 495 N.E.2d 84C; Cumberland Reclamatior, v. 

Secretarq. Dep't of interior (6cn Cfr. I991), 925 "2d 161. SEf: 

also 2A C. Sands, Sutkerland Statutorv Ccnstruition S 47.23 at 114 

(4th ee. 19ec: . 

zandatory, 1~ the sense that the insured has the right tc -~-je,-+ -- , -- :r -, wricin~ si;c?: ccverage in pollcies issiled in Nontana." he 

~ajoric~'~ holding in chis rase tha.t uni~sured mstorist coverage is 

ri.quire6 col-erage is in dil-ect conflict with cur holding in m. 
. . Tnis Court's prior cleclsion; irr this area are ad-itredly 

ccnf;~i~cr , ., a ar.3 ~23j~rity ad& zr, c-zfasigr, by ~istir.j216;~-~13c2 ., 

sev-rai s;ses that clear>; apply tr tkis slt~~ation. v!,~ -.A- 7.<ii ,.. 4 <,?-; -LC.: k-7 

atte-rprs -,o 3isripqd-s? :?is -as; --rnm :"?'--- . . , , L,~ A,cl _ -7 , 1i:at :.~~~~~~LCie r"I;itci,a; 

Insurance Co. 5, 248 P%ont. 457, 2 2 3'7, on tile basis 

that LC we interpreted rhe policy, while re we are 

- restri.ct;?d tc intsrpreticg the statute. As noted earlier, i. 

beii.eve the ::ajorizy has ixproperiy r,arroweci rhe issue presented by 

the Federal District Cocrt fo exclude acy copsideration of the 

policy language. By referencing the policy ~rovisions in the 

certified question and by attaching a copy of the policy to tie 

certified question, both the Federal Distrlct Conrc and the parties 

intended tnar we consider the provisicns of the poljcy in 

responding to the questicc. 

ifi m, the underinscred mc-,orist coverage was par-; c,f cr!e 

pel-icy secti.i;~ cn u~insured motorist coverage and there was no 

separace policy section for underinsured coverage. We ilsc noted 

chat the declarations page made no mention of anderinsured 

coverage. We conc1.uded that ~inder those circuxstances, the 

unaeri~sur.ed caverzge was part cf tile uninsured ccverage. In this 

case, icwevor, :he u~derinsured coverage is also UZVT .r)f the 

. . uninsured e-veraoe - orovisioc and tiers is no separat:e sezcicn i~ 

tee policy for underinsured ccverage. While the declaration page 

does reference -~r~derinsi;red ccverage, it s~ecifies that there is fio 

, , separate premiun for underinsured coverage as it is lccluded in the 
aninsured co-verage premium, which was the racicnale relied upon in 

- crier, 

T!:erefrc: arder the raci.cn2;e 0: -, C.~E ~~rL~eri~~;~:~

co~.~eiage 1 ' i~ -1,- ~o;icy irL a;r_yicn i.: ~lphr!~ czirt_ ,;f i-5" ii~~lls7;l.~~ & . - - 

coxjerage and stacking is specifically prchibited bv S 33-23-iC3, 

DICA . 

The majority 3150 distinguishes chis Court's recenr decision 

in Cnilberg V. Rose i1995;, 273 Nont. 414, 903 F.2d 1377, on the 

grounds tna: Chilberq was a xuitiple poiicy case and did nor 

intersret S 33-23-203, IvTCA. In Chilberq there were zultiole 

policies since rhe same insurance company issued separate policies 

for each vehicle rather than insaring all ~he vehicles i one 

palicy, as was done in this :as". The decision in Chilbnrg was not 

dependent on the fact that multiple policies were involved, bat 

rather on izne fact that Ck:xiberg, iike Leonard in tnis case, was a 

strznger to ths inscra~ce pclicies, no~ being the na:ned insured or 

a fanily merber. Having never paid any ~remiuas or! rhe policies, 

nor having any knowledge the policies even existed prior co the 

accidect, this Ccurt riled that Chiiberq shodld r'ot be able zc 

stack the separate underinsured coverage limits, ChiIberc, c"j3 

P.Zd at L38C. ~ik,~ chi1be-< q, Leocard had nc "reasonable 

, , expectation" of covezags and, under tk eattir:aie cf Chilberc, n:s 

estate should not be allowed to stack underinsured coverage. 

T n summary, the majority's strained and :restrictisre 

consrracrisn of MVLhs used in S 33-23-203, ?4CA, is contrary tc 
c. the clear language cr ine statute and dces ncr take into acccnnt 

- -; csfitext in :he szatlte .?.;is "A?rittfn. Tnjfr the_ -aj-ri--r 

, , . , - - :, the zrly stac;k~cg rrc;i-i;,ite.5 3gc-e~ 9 -2.- 3 ?4Clj 1.s 

fax- rple liab5>4-. -. , ~. . Lie; i~rn~ts far poi;cies . iss~j~ei under --- iLr- MT,7SX.EA f 0;- 

"ha3 drivers" an6 unirisured motorist coverage. Since sta-cking has 

-, n-;-x,-e:- been appiieci to ;:ability cc-jera~es," the only type cf 

coverage in Monrana for which sracking is prchibired is ncw 

cninsurea motorist coverage. The plain language of the statute is 

simply not that narrow. 

The practical result of tne majority's decisisn is absurd. 

Since the majority opinion recognizes che prohibition against che 

stacking crf ~ninsured coverage limits, if Leonard had been struck 

and killed by a driver with no liability insurance a, all, stacking 

wozld not be allowed and ~he xaxin~m his esrate could have 

. recovered under rhe poiicy would be $SC,OOC. under ;he aajority's 

interpretation, however, since the driver who strack Leonard had 

the r~ini~urn iimics, the vehicles ucder the policy can be stacked 

and Leonard's estate is entitled to $350,0CO. Statutes should be 

read and eonstr~ied so as tc avoid absurd resul-rs if a reascnable 

constructign can avoid it. Christenot v. State (I995j, 272 

- ' See Ailstate Lnsurapce ConpaiLy v. Skor;pa (1533) , 13 Norit. . , Fed. Rep. 355, which addressed the issue of stackicg -iability- ., - pc;licies and concluded that tnls _oar: 5~s lsariy reccgrizc;d a -, . ,-, distirrc:isn betweerr i;abL~.lty cc7.rerage and re rnotcri.sc 

csverage cizing Jacobson -J. Implement Dealers W2t. Ins. Co. ; 1982; , . . 196 Mont. 542, 644 P.2d 908, and Cnaffee v. Lynited States Fid. & -. -dar. Co. '19'793, 191 Nonc. 1, i9i F.8d i102. 
Mcnc . 395, 9C1 T 2.5 541 8 - Darby S~ar, Lzd. v. Cepartment of Reven*~e 

- - (1195), 3, 376, ,G5 p~zd. 11:~ 

T would therefor? ans:~Jer certified quesh~c oresegred ic 

this . . Tcart in ~1.- affirrxarL\-o aid ksid L^," 3,;.~2;2C3i 'J-" I l-ni 

prohibits the stacki~g cf medical payment coverage and uncierir.sured 

mctcrist coverage 
Justice Kar1.a PI. Gray, dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion. While I 

think the Court does a relatively creditable job of attsmpting to 

mesh statxtes which simply do not track well, I: am uzabie to join 

in its analysis. 

Plainly stated, the question before us is whether the antistacking provision contai~~eci in 5 33-23-2C3(i!, XCA, is limited to 

liability coverages required by law or applies to all coverages 

contained in a vehicle insurance policy. The Court concludes that 

the statute prohibits only the stacking of required liability 

coverages, as the Court creatively defines such coverages. It is 

my view that, while the statute is not a model of clarity, the 

legislature's intent to more broadly prohibit stacking is apparent 

therein, On that basis, I would answer the certified question in 

the affirmative. 

The Court begins with the "motor vehicle liability policy" 

(MVLP) language contained in § 33-23-203, MCA, and looks first to 

5 33-23-204, MCA, for a definition of that term; that detinition is 

stated as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance 

against liability now or hereafter required under Title 51, chapter 

6; parts i and 3.'! 1 agree that chis appears co be a rational 

starting point. 

Moreover, I generally agree with the Court's interpretation 

that the definition of MVLP contained in § 33-23-204, MCA, 

addresses the third-party per person, per vehicle and property 

damage liability coverages required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 

1 and 3. Finally, I agree that the first-party med pay and 
underinsuraace coverages at issue in this case are not liability 

coverages within the definitional parameters of W7LE contained in 

S 33-23-204, MCA. 

Tnat saic?, it is important to recall that our resolutiori of 

the certified question before us turns on the proper interpretation 

of 5 33-23-203, MCA, rather than § 33-23-204, MCA. In my view, it 

is the Court's attempt to force feed the S 33-23-204, MCA, 

definition of MVLP into § 33-23-203(1), MCA, that results in a 

legally flawed and logically inconsistent analysis which disregards 

the actual language used by the legislature in 5 33-23-203 (I), MCA. 

Inserting the 5 33-23-204, MCA, definition of MVLP into § 33- 

23-203(1), MCA, produces the following rough reading of the first 

pertinent portion of that statute: "the limits of liability 

coverage required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3 . . . 

cannot be stacked." The problem I have with such a reading is that 

the legislature did not use language even approximating such a 

reading; it clearly used different words, and words clearly at odds 

with the Court's interpretation, in 5 33-23-203(1), MCA. What the 

legislature said is that the iimits of "insurance coverage 

available" cannot be stacked. It is my view that, if the 

legislature had intended to limit the anti-staclcing provision to 

"liability coverage required by law," it could and would have done 

so. It did not. 

A more reasonable interpretation of 5 33-23-203(1), MCA, is 

that the legislature intended precisely what it said: to prohibit 

stacking of any and all "insurance coverage available" in an 

automobiie insurance poiicy, inciuding the med pay and 
underfnsiirznce coverages a:: issue here. in tila:: regard, 1 ccjnclude 

that neither the definition contained in § 33-23-204, MCA; nor that 

contained in 61-6-103, MCA, is logically transferable to the 

t, 1 in; ,, s of insurance coverage availablei' language contaiaed in 

B 33-23-203;l), MCA. Therefore, while the geaeral ruie contained 

in § 1-2-107, MCA, is that definitions contained in one part of the 

?~?ontana Code Annotated are applicable to the saw? wor4 or phrase 

wherever it occurs, I would apply the exception to that rule also 

contained in 5 1-2-107, MCA, and conclude in this case that "a 

contrary intention plainly appears" with regard to inserting 

definitions of MVLP into § 33-23-203(1), MCA. 

This conclusion is further buttressed by the remaining--and, 

in my view, largest--barrier to the Court's interpretation of § 33- 

23-203 (I), MCA. The critical portion of the statute reads "the 

limits of insurance coverage available under any such policy, 

including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist 

coverage. . . . " With the Court's definition of "such policy" 

inserted, the statute reads "the limits of coverage required under 

Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3 [the $25,000/$50,000/$10,000 

amounts of third-party liability coverage! including the limits of 

liability under uninsured motorist coverage." 

Whether or not one agrees with the Court's creative 

interpretation that uninsured motorLst coverage is actually 

reauired by § 33-23-201, MCA, and 1 do not, an inconsistency 

results on the face of § 33-23-203(1), MCA, when both the Court's 

definitron of MVLP and the "includingn clause are considered. It 

is ciear that notblng ~n 'i'ltie 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3, 
requires uninsured motorist coverage; the Court's own anaiy-'- % biP 

makes that clear in pointing out that the ii 33-23-204, E4CA/Title 61 

required coverages are third-party per person, per vehicle and 

Froperty damage liability ccverage. it 5s equally clear that the 

"including" clause refers back to what preceded it in the statute-- 

"such policy"--defined by the Court as tile § 33-23-204, MCA, 

definitior sf MVL9. The "inciudingN clause simply cannot broaden, 

by any rule of logic, grammar or law of which I am aware, the 

statutory definition of MVLP which the Court has inserted into the 

statute. 

For these reasons, it is my view that the Court's analysis is 

flawed. A more reasonable reading of § 33 -23-203 (1) , MCA, requires 

a conclusion that the legislature intended to prohibit the stacking 

of all coverages contained in an automobile insurance policy 

insuring more than one vehicle. I invite the legislature to 

revisit the statutes addressed in this case by both the Court and 

the dissenting opinions with an eye toward clarifying statutes 

which simply do not mesh well under any analysis. 

I dissent.