# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O



## . 15-0171

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# I N T H E 

# I N T E R E S T O F 

# P

. M

. , A 

# C H IL D

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## S E C O N D 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## P ER CURIAM

Section 107.013 (a ) of the Texas Family Code provides that “[i] n a suit filed by a 1



## g overnme ntal entity

. . . in which termination of t he parent-c hild relationship . .

. is reque sted, the

court shall appoint an attorney ad litem to repr esent the interests of

. . . an indige nt pare nt

. . . .” The

i s s u e befor e us is whether this rig ht to appointed counsel extends to proce eding s in this Cou rt , including the filing of a petition for revie w. We hold that it does and direc t the trial court to appoint

counsel for

petitioner (he reina fter, “ mother”)

.
T h e proce eding s in this case have been extensive. There have been two trials and t wo

appea ls, the clerk’s record is over 1,100 pag es, and the re p o rter’ s rec ord i s thirty -six volumes. To fully explain the circ ums t an ce s an d issues involved in the case , we attach the court of appea ls’

memorandum opinions. For prese nt purposes, we briefly descr ibe the proce dural backg round of the

case and then f

ocus on the involvement a nd withdrawa l of counsel.

A l l s t a t u t o r y r e f

e r e n c e s a r e t o t h e T e x a s F a m i l y C o d e u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e n o t e d

. 1

## The case beg an in 2011, when the Depa rtment of Family and Protecti v e S er vices sued to
terminate mother’s rela tionship with her then five-y ear -old daug hter beca use of mother’s alleg ed use

o f m ethampheta

mine and abuse by the child’s fathe r. After a bench trial, the court order ed
termination, finding that mother had endang ere d her daug hter and that termination was in the child’s

best interest. The court of appea ls conclude d that mother had been improperly denied a jury and

2



## reve rsed a

nd rema nded for a new tria l. I n the sec ond trial, the jury found, as the c ourt had be fore , 3



## that mother had endang ere d her daug hter and that termination of the pare ntal rela tionship was in the

child’s best intere st. On a sec ond appea l, the court of a ppeals a ffirme d. 4


## Attorney s appointed by the trial court repr esente d mother throu gh b o t h trials and appea ls,

befor e the attorney in the s econd appea l moved t o withdraw. The court of appeals abated t he case

and refer red the motion to the t rial court for a hear ing to deter

mine whether there was good cause

for withdrawa l and whether new counsel should be appointed. Mother and the lawy er both told the

trial court that they did not want their rela tionship to continue. Wit hout g iving a re ason, the trial

court rec ommended that the lawy er be allowed to withdraw. The trial court’s only finding s wer e that

mother rema ined indige nt and still wish ed t o p u rsue her appea l. Ba sed on the trial court’s

rec ommendation and the rec ord of the hear ing, the court of appea ls g rante d the motion to withdraw

with an opinion explaining that the lawy er “expressed displeasure with h e r c o n ti n u e d r e p rese ntation”

S e e T E X

. F A M

. C O D E § 1 6 1

. 0 0 1 ( 1 ) ( D ) , ( E ) , ( 2 )

. 2

I n r e P

. L

. G

. M

. , N o

. 0 2

- 1 3

- 0 0 1 8 1

- C V , 2 0 1 3 W L 5 9 6 7 0 3 7 , a t * 5 ( T e x
. A p p

. — F o r t W o r t h N o v
. 7 , 2 0 1 3 , n o 3 p e t

. ) ( m e m

. o p

. ) [ A p p e n d i x A ]

.

I n r e P

. M

. , N o

. 0 2

- 1 4

- 0 0 2 0 5

- C V , 2 0 1 4 W L 8 0 9 7 0 6 4 , a t * 3 4 ( T e x
. A p p

. — F o r t W o r t h D e c

. 3 1 , 2 0 1 4 ) ( m e m

. 4

o p

. ) [ A p p e n d i x B ]

. 

### 2

## of mother. Neither the trial cour t nor the cour

t of appe als appea

rs to ha ve considere d whether new
counsel should be appointed. Mother moved the court of appea ls for appointment of counsel, but the

court of a ppeals simply

transfe rre d that motion to t his Court.

I n this Court, mother’s counsel moved for an extension of time to file a pe tition for revie w
but rea sserted her motion to withdraw, stating that she was “unable to eff ectively communicate with
[m other] to such a deg ree that further repr esenta tion

. . . is not possible,” and adding that mother had “expressed on the rec ord her desire” t h at the repr esenta tion not continue. Mother rea sserted her

motion for appointment of new counsel. We abate d the case to consider the issue of mother’s rig ht

to counsel. Section 107.013(a) (1) state s:
I n a suit filed by a g overnme ntal entity

. . . in w hich termination of the pa rent-c hild rela t i o n s h ip or the appointment of a conser vator for a child is reque sted, the court shall appoint an attorney ad litem to repr esent the interests of

. . . an indige nt pare nt of the c hild who responds in opposition to t he ter mination or appointment . . . .

Section 107.013(e) adds t hat “[ a] pare nt who t he court has determined i s indige nt fo r p u rp oses of

this sec tion is presumed to r emain indige nt f or the duration of the suit and any subsequent appea l”

absent c hang ed cir cumstance s. Section 107.016(2) provide s that appointed counse l

continues to serve in that capa city until the earliest of: (A) the date the suit affe cting the par ent-c hild relationship is dism issed; (B ) the date all appea ls in rela tion to any final order terminating pare ntal rig hts are e x hausted or w aived; or (C) the date the attorney is relieve d of the attorney ’s duties or repla ced by another attorney afte r a finding of g ood cause is rende red by the court on the rec ord.

3

## Tog ether , these provisions establish the rig ht of an indige nt pare nt to appointed counsel in the trial

court a nd court of a

ppeals.

We have not addre ssed wh et h er a ri g ht to counsel on appea l includes a rig ht to counsel to bring a petition for review i n t h i s C o u rt

. But we have indicated g ener ally , in other contexts, that

exhaustion of appea ls includes revie w soug ht in this Court. A few statutes appea r to take the same 5



## view. We see no rea son to depar t from that view here

. To the contra ry , the rig ht to counsel is as 6


## important in pe titioni ng this Court for revie w, and in our considering the issues, as in a ppealing to
the cour t of appe als.

Acc ording ly , we hold that the rig ht to counsel under Section 107.013(a) (1) throug h the

exhaustion of appea ls under Section 107.016(2)( B) includes all proce eding s in this Court, including

E

. g

. , T e x

. B e e f C a t t l e C o

. v

. G r e e n , 9 2 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 0 3 , 2 0 8 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t “ a n u n d e r l y i n g c i v i l s u i t 5 h a s n o t t e r m i n a t e d i n f

a v o r o f a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n p l a i n t i f f u n t i l t h e a p p e a l s p r o c e s s f o r t h a t u n d e r l y i n g s u i t h a s b e e n
e x h a u s t e d ” ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) , a n d c i t i n g R E S T A T E M E N T ( S E C O N D ) O F T O R T S § 6 7 4 c m t

. j ( 1 9 7 7 ) ( “ I f a n a p p e a l i s t a k e n , t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a r e n o t t e r m i n a t e d u n t i l t h e f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e a p p e a l a n d o f a n y f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s t h a t i t m a y
e n t a i l

. ” ) ) ; A p e x T

o w i n g C o

. v

. T

o l i n , 4 1 S

. W

. 3 d 1 1 8 , 1 1 9 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( “ W h e n a n a t t o r n e y c o m m i t s m a l p r a c t i c e i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o r d e f

e n s e o f a c l a i m t h a t r e s u l t s i n l i t i g a t i o n , t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o n a m a l p r a c t i c e c l a i m a g a i n s t t h a t
a t t o r n e y i s t o l l e d u n t i l a l l a p p e a l s o n t h e u n d e r l y i n g c l a i m a r e e x h a u s t e d o r t h e l i t i g a t i o n i s o t h e r w i s e f i n a l l y c o n c l u d e d

. ” ) ; U n d e r k o f l e r v

. V a n a s e k , 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 3 4 3 , 3 4 5

– 4 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( c i t i n g A p e x T o w i n g , 4 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 1 2 1 ) ; I n r e L o n g , 9 8 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 2 3 , 6 2 6 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 9 ) ( p e r c u r i a m ) ( a n i n j u n c t i o n s u p e r s e d e d b y t h e d i s t r i c t c l e r k a u t o m a t i c a l l y , b y f i l i n g a n o t i c e
o f a p p e a l , w a s n o t e n f

o r c e a b l e b y c o n t e m p t u n t i l a l l a p p e a l s r e l a t e d t o t h e j u d g m e n t w e r e e x h a u s t e d , i n c l u d i n g t h e d e n i a l
o f a n a p p l i c a t i o n f

o r w r i t o f e r r o r b r o u g h t b y t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g c o n t e m p t s a n c t i o n s )

.
E

. g

. , T E X

. B U S

. O R G

. C O D E § 8

. 1 0 2 ( c ) ( “ A g o v e r n i n g p e r s o n , f o r m e r g o v e r n i n g p e r s o n , o r d e l e g a t e i s 6

c o n s i d e r e d t o h a v e b e e n f o u n d l i a b l e i n r e l a t i o n t o a c l a i m , i s s u e , o r m a t t e r o n l y i f t h e l i a b i l i t y i s e s t a b l i s h e d b y a n o r d e r , i n c l u d i n g a j u d g m e n t o r d e c r e e o f a c o u r t , a n d a l l a p p e a l s o f t h e o r d e r a r e e x h a u s t e d o r f o r e c l o s e d b y l a w
. ” ) ; T E X

. F A M

. C O D E § 5 1

. 0 9 5 ( c ) ( “ A n e l e c t r o n i c r e c o r d i n g o f a c h i l d ’ s s t a t e m e n t

. . . s h a l l b e p r e s e r v e d u n t i l a l l j u v e n i l e o r c r i m i n a l

m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o a n y c o n d u c t r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e s t a t e m e n t a r e f i n a l , i n c l u d i n g t h e e x h a u s t i o n o f a l l a p p e a l s , o r b a r r e d f r o m p r o s e c u t i o n

. ” ) ; s e e a l s o T E X

. C IV

. P R A C

. & R E M

. C O D E § 3 4

. 0 7 4 ( c ) ( “ [ A p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y ’ s a c t i o n a g a i n s t a s u r e t y ]

m u s t b e b r o u g h t o n o r b e f o r e 1 8 0 d a y s a f

t e r t h e d a t e a l l a p p e a l s a r e e x h a u s t e d i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g a c t i o n

. ” ) ; T E X

. E D U C

. C O D E § 5 1

. 9 0 9 ( b ) ( “ I n t h i s s e c t i o n , a p e r s o n i s f i n a l l y c o n v i c t e d i f t h e c o n v i c t i o n h a s n o t b e e n r e v e r s e d o n a p p e a l a n d

a l l a p p e a l s , i f a n y , h a v e b e e n e x h a u s t e d

. ” )

. B u t s e e T E X

. C O D E C R IM

. P R O C

. a r t

. 1

. 0 5 1 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( “ A n e l i g i b l e i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o h a v e t h e t r i a l c o u r t a p p o i n t a n a t t o r n e y t o r e p r e s e n t h i m i n t h e f o l l o w i n g a p p e l l a t e a n d p o s t c o n v i c t i o n h a b e a s c o r p u s m a t t e r s :

. . . ( 2 ) a n a p p e a l t o t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s i f

t h e a p p e a l i s m a d e d i r e c t l y f r o m t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r i f a p e t i t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w h a s b e e n g r a n t e d

. . . . ” )

.



### 4

## the filing of a petition for revie w. Once appointed by the trial court, counsel should be permitted to

withdraw only for g ood caus e and on appropr iate terms and conditions. Mere dissatisfaction of 7 8



## counsel or client with eac h other is not g ood cause

. Nor is counsel’s belief that the cl i en t h as no

g rounds to seek further revie w from the court of appea ls’ decision. Counsel’s obliga tion to the client

may still be satisfied by filing an appellate brief meeting the standards set in Anders v. Calif ornia , 9



## and its prog eny

. I n light of our holding, howeve r, an Anders motion to withdraw brought in the 1 0



## court of appea ls, in the absence of additional g rounds for withdrawa l, may be pre mature. Courts

1 1



## have a duty to see that withdrawa l of counsel will not result in fore seea ble prejudice to the client. 1 2



## I f a court of appea ls allows an at t o rney to withdraw, it must provide for the appointment of new

S e e T E X

. R

. C IV

. P

. 1 0

. 7

T E X

. R

. A P P

. P

. 6

. 5

. 8

3 8 6 U

. S

. 7 3 8 ( 1 9 6 7 )

. 9

I n r e D

. A

. S

. , 9 7 3 S

. W

. 2 d 2 9 6 , 2 9 7 , 2 9 9 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 8 ) ; s e e a l s o K e l l y v

. S t a t e , 4 3 6 S

. W

. 3 d 3 1 3 , 3 1 8

– 2 0 ( T e x
. 10 C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( s e t t i n g f o r t h d u t i e s o f c o u n s e l ) ; I n r e S c h u l m a n , 2 5 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 0 3 , 4 0 6 n

. 9 ( T e x
. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 8 ) ; S t a f f o r d v

. S t a t e , 8 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 0 3 , 5 1 0 n

. 3 ( T e x
. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 1 )

. I n D

. A

. S

. , t h e C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t A n d e r s p r o c e d u r e s p r o t e c t j u v e n i l e s ’ s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o c o u n s e l o n a p p e a l i n d e l i n q u e n c y c a s e s a n d s o h e l d t h a t t h o s e p r o c e d u r e s
a p p l y i n j u v e n i l e c a s e s

. “ A n d e r s s t r i k e s a n i m p o r t a n t b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t ’ s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o
c o u n s e l o n a p p e a l a n d c o u n s e l ’ s o b l i g a t i o n n o t t o p r o s e c u t e f r i v o l o u s a p p e a l s

. ” I

n r e D

. A

. S

. , 9 7 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 2 9 7

. T h e
s a m e i s t r u e f

o r i n d i g e n t p a r e n t s i n p a r e n t a l r i g h t s t e r m i n a t i o n c a s e s

.
I n c r i m i n a l a p p e a l s i n T e x a s , t h e r e a r e t w o p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e s w h e n a n A n d e r s b r i e f i s f i l e d , b o t h o f w h i c h 11 i n v o l v e e v e n t u a l l y g r a n t i n g t h e o r i g i n a l a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l ’ s m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w
. “ E i t h e r t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o n f i r m s t h a t t h e r e a r e n o n o n
- f

r i v o l o u s g r o u n d s f

o r a p p e a l , t h u s e x t i n g u i s h i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a p p e l l a t e
c o u n s e l , a n d g r a n t s t h e m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w , o r t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e a r e p l a u s i b l e g r o u n d s f o r a p p e a l , i n
w h i c h c a s e t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s t i l l g r a n t s t h e m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w , b u t r e m a n d s t h e c a u s e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r a p p o i n t m e n t
o f n e w a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l

. ” K e l l y , 4 3 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 1 8 n

. 1 6 ( c i t i n g M e z a v

. S t a t e , 2 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 8 4 , 6 8 9 ( T e x
. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 6 ) )

.
S e e V

i l l e g a s v

. C a r t e r , 7 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 6 2 4 , 6 2 6 ( T e x
. 1 9 8 6 ) ( t r i a l c o u r t a l l o w e d a n a t t o r n e y t o w i t h d r a w t w o 12 d a y s b e f o r e t r i a l a n d r e f

u s e d t o a l l o w a c o n t i n u a n c e )

. 

### 5

## counsel to pursue a petition for revie w. I n this Court, ap p o i n t ed co u nsel’s obliga tions can be 1 3 

## satisfied by

filing a petition for re view that satisfies the sta ndards f or an Anders brief. 1 4



## Whil e an appellate court may be equipped to rule on a motion to withdraw in many instances,

it may decide instead, as the court of appea ls did in this case with a motion unrela ted to any Anders
claim, to ref

er t h e m o t i o n to the trial court for evidenc e and a hear ing. An appellate court must ordinarily ref er the matter of a

ppointment of replac ement counse l to the trial court. 1 5



## Her e, the rec ord indicates that counsel’s motion to withdraw, and mother’s motion for new counsel, wer e not based on mere dissatisfaction with eac h other. We conclude that the trial court in making its rec ommendation, and the court o f ap p eals in acc epting that rec ommendation, did not
abuse their discretion by allowing counsel to withdraw. Acc ording ly , we g rant counsel’s motion to
withdraw and mother’s motion for appointment of co u nsel. We direc t the trial court to appoint

A c o u r t m a y a b a t e t h e a p p e a l t o r e f e r t h e c a s e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r a p p o i n t m e n t o f

n e w c o u n s e l , a p r o c e d u r e 13 t h a t p a r a l l e l s t h e p r o c e d u r e r e q u i r e d i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s w h e n n e w c o u n s e l i s n e c e s s a r y
. S e e K e l l y , 4 3 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 1 8 n

. 1 6 ; S t a f f o r d , 8 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 5 1 1 ( “ t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s t h e n m u s t a b a t e t h e a p p e a l a n d r e m a n d t h e c a s e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h
o r d e r s t o a p p o i n t o t h e r c o u n s e l ” t o p r e s e n t g r o u n d f o r a p p e a l )

.
A n d e r s , 3 8 6 U

. S

. a t 7 4 4

– 4 5 ; s e e H i g h v

. S t a t e , 5 7 3 S

. W

. 2 d 8 0 7 , 8 1 2

– 1 3 ( T e x
. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 7 8 )

. I n c r i m i n a l 14

a p p e a l s , t h e r e v i e w i n g c o u r t m u s t c o n d u c t a n i n d e p e n d e n t e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e r e c o r d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r c o u n s e l i s
c o r r e c t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e a p p e a l i s f r i v o l o u s

. S e e S t a

f f o r d , 8 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 5 1 1

. P e t i t i o n s f o r r e v i e w o r d i n a r i l y c o m e t o t h i s C o u r t w i t h o u t t h e u n d e r l y i n g r e c o r d , b u t o f t e n w i t h a n a p p e n d i x i n c o r p o r a t i n g n u m e r o u s e x h i b i t s f r o m t h e r e c o r d

. S e e T E X

. R

. A P P

. P

. 5 3

. 2 ( k )

. C o u n s e l s h o u l d p r o v i d e r e c o r d c i t a t i o n s , a n d , i n a p r o p e r c a s e , m a y c h o o s e t o a s k t h a t t h e
r e c o r d b e f

o r w a r d e d f

r o m t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

. S e e T E X

. R

. A P P

. P

. 5 4

. 1 ( “ W i t h o r w i t h o u t g r a n t i n g t h e p e t i t i o n f o r
r e v i e w , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t m a y r e q u e s t t h a t t h e r e c o r d f r o m t h e c o u r t o f

a p p e a l s b e f

i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k o f

t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t

. ” )

.
I n c r i m i n a l c a s e s , w h e n n e w c o u n s e l i s r e q u i r e d , c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s w o u l d a b a t e t h e a p p e a l a n d d i r e c t t h e t r i a l

15

c o u r t t o a p p o i n t n e w c o u n s e l

. S e e M e z a , 2 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 6 8 8 ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f a n a b a t e m e n t i n a c a s e i n v o l v i n g b o t h a m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w a n d a m o t i o n t o s u b s t i t u t e n e w c o u n s e l , “ e s p e c i a l l y g i v e n [ t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e ’ s ] e l a b o r a t e m e c h a n i s m f o r m a k i n g c o u r t a p p o i n t m e n t s f o r i n d i g e n t c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t s ” )

. 

### 6

## counsel to repr esent mother i n t his Court and to repor t the appointment to the Court within thirty day s. The ca se re mains abate d until further orde r.

Opinion delivere d: April 1, 2016

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