1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-12-00570-CV

____________________

IN RE COMMITMENT OF TIMOTHY RAY BRADSHAW

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court 

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 12-02-02067 CV

________________________________________________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

After a jury found Timothy Ray Bradshaw to be a sexually violent predator, 

the trial court rendered an order of civil commitment establishing the terms that 

govern his civil commitment. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-

.151 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012) (SVP statute). Bradshaw timely filed an appeal, 

raising ten issues that challenge the constitutionality of the SVP statute, the State’s 

use of a prior conviction—later set aside—to establish Bradshaw’s status as a 

repeat sexually violent offender, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jury’s verdict, and whether the trial court and the attorneys 
2

representing the State made improper comments during voir dire that harmed 

Bradshaw by allegedly minimizing the jury’s role in the trial of his case. We 

conclude that all of Bradshaw’s issues are without merit, and we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

The Statute

Under the SVP statute, the State bears the burden of proving that the person 

it seeks to commit for treatment is a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. § 841.062 (West 2010). As defined by the Legislature, a sexually violent 

predator is a person who “(1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers 

from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a 

predatory act of sexual violence.” Id § 841.003(a) (West 2010). The term 

“‘behavioral abnormality’ means a congenital or acquired condition that, by 

affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to 

commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace 

to the health and safety of another person.” Id. § 841.002(2) (West Supp. 2012).

We have explained that “[a] condition which affects either emotional capacity or 

volitional capacity to the extent a person is predisposed to threaten the health and 

safety of others with acts of sexual violence is an abnormality which causes serious 
3

difficulty in behavior control.” In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 

506 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied).

Constitutional Challenge

In issue one, Bradshaw contends that the SVP statute is facially 

unconstitutional and violates his due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, as that statute was interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court in In re 

Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 302-03 (Tex. 2012), cert. denied 133 

S.Ct. 2746 (2013). We considered and rejected the same argument in another SVP 

commitment proceeding, In re Commitment of Anderson. 392 S.W.3d 878, 886 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied). In Anderson, we explained that “[w]e 

do not read the Bohannan opinion as eliminating a statutory requirement, or as 

altering the proof required under the statute to find that a person is a sexually 

violent predator.” Id. For the same reasons that we explained in Anderson, we 

overrule issue one.

Repeat Sexually Violent Offender

In issue two, Bradshaw contends the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support a finding that he is a repeat sexually violent offender because his 1986 

conviction for sexual assault, one of the convictions used to establish his status as a 

repeat sexually violent predator, was set aside in 1990 after he successfully 
4

completed probation. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 20 (West Supp. 

2012). 

Bradshaw’s 1986 conviction is based on a sexual assault that Bradshaw 

committed on August 21, 1984. The evidence in the record shows that in 1986,

Bradshaw was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to eight years in prison, 

but the convicting court then placed him on probation. In 1990, the convicting 

court found that Bradshaw had satisfactorily fulfilled the conditions of his 

probation, terminated Bradshaw’s probation, permitted him to withdraw his plea, 

dismissed the indictment, and the convicting court then set aside Bradshaw’s 1986 

conviction. See id.

Bradshaw argues that using his 1986 conviction to establish his status as a 

repeat sexually violent offender is barred by operation of the judicial clemency 

provision of Article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. When

Bradshaw committed the sexual assault which resulted in his 1986 conviction, the 

Code of Criminal Procedure provided:

In case the defendant has been convicted . . . and the court has 

discharged the defendant hereunder, such court may . . . permit the 

defendant to withdraw his plea, and shall dismiss the . . . indictment 

against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all 

penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense[.] 
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Act of May 27, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 303, § 12, sec. 7, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws

1568, 1591-92 (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 20).

According to Bradshaw, the State cannot use the 1986 sexual assault conviction to 

prove that he is a repeat sexually violent offender because he was released from all 

penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. See id.

Whether Bradshaw’s 1986 conviction can be used to establish that Bradshaw 

is subject to civil commitment proceedings as a repeat sexually violent predator is 

a matter of statutory construction. With respect to defining the prior convictions 

that can be used to establish a person’s status as a sexually violent predator, the 

SVP statute provides: 

A person is a repeat sexually violent offender for the purposes of this 

chapter if the person is convicted of more than one sexually violent 

offense and a sentence is imposed for at least one of the offenses or if:

(1) the person:

(A) is convicted of a sexually violent offense, 

regardless of whether the sentence for the offense was 

ever imposed or whether the sentence was probated and 

the person was subsequently discharged from community 

supervision;

(B) enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for a 

sexually violent offense in return for a grant of deferred 

adjudication;

(C) is adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity of 

a sexually violent offense; or

(D) is adjudicated by a juvenile court as having 

engaged in delinquent conduct constituting a sexually 

violent offense and is committed to the Texas Youth 
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Commission under Section 54.04(d)(3) or (m), Family 

Code; and

(2) after the date on which under Subdivision (1) the person is 

convicted, receives a grant of deferred adjudication, is adjudged not 

guilty by reason of insanity, or is adjudicated by a juvenile court as 

having engaged in delinquent conduct, the person commits a sexually 

violent offense for which the person:

(A) is convicted, but only if the sentence for the 

offense is imposed; or

(B) is adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity. 

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(b) (West 2010).

“When a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts need not resort to rules of 

construction or extrinsic aids to construe it, but should give the statute its common 

meaning.” St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). 

A person is a “repeat sexually violent offender” for purposes of the SVP statute if 

the person is convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and a sentence is 

imposed for at least one of the offenses or if the person “is convicted of a sexually 

violent offense, regardless of . . . whether the sentence was probated and the person 

was subsequently discharged from community supervision[.]” Tex. Health & 

Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(b)(1)(A). 

Bradshaw was convicted of sexual assault in 1986, his sentence was 

probated, and he was later discharged from probation. In 1993, Bradshaw was 

convicted and sentence was imposed because Bradshaw committed an aggravated 

sexual assault. See id. By virtue of his 1986 and 1993 convictions, it appears that 
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Bradshaw meets the definition of a repeat sexually violent offender under the SVP 

statute, but he argues the State cannot use the 1986 offense because he was 

released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense when he 

received judicial clemency in 1990. 

The Texas Supreme Court considered an argument similar to the one 

Bradshaw advances that addressed prior convictions under the 1996 version of the 

Concealed Handgun Act. See Tune v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 23 S.W.3d 358, 

363 (Tex. 2000). In Tune, the statute at issue defined “convicted” as follows:

[A]n adjudication of guilt or an order of deferred adjudication entered 

against a person by a court of competent jurisdiction whether or not:

(A) the imposition of the sentence is subsequently probated and the 

person is discharged from community supervision; or (B) the person is 

pardoned for the offense, unless the pardon is expressly granted for 

subsequent proof of innocence.

Id.; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.171(4) (West 2012).1 Using that 

definition, the Texas Supreme Court read the Concealed Handgun Act, with 

respect to the term “convicted,” to include a person whose conviction was set aside 

 1

In 2009 the Legislature amended this definition of “convicted” to exclude 

an adjudication of guilt or an order of deferred adjudication that has been 

subsequently “vacated, set aside, annulled, invalidated, voided, or sealed under any 

state or federal law.” See Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1146, §§ 6.06, 

11.02, sec. 411.174(4), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 3583, 3624, 3635 (current version at

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.171(4) (West 2012)). No similar change has occurred 

with respect to section 841.003(b) of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
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pursuant to the judicial clemency provision of article 42.12, section 20 of the Code 

of Criminal Procedure. Tune, 23 S.W.3d at 363-64.

The SVP statute and the 1996 version of the Concealed Handgun Act use 

similar language to define a conviction in a way that includes persons who have 

received regular community supervision and are subsequently discharged. Under 

the SVP statute, a person “is convicted . . . regardless of whether the sentence for 

the offense was ever imposed or whether the sentence was probated and the person 

was subsequently discharged from community supervision[;]” under the version of 

the Concealed Handgun Act at issue in Tune, a person is convicted if “an 

adjudication of guilt . . . [is] entered . . . whether or not . . . the imposition of the 

sentence is subsequently probated and the person is discharged from community 

supervision[.]” Compare Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(b)(1)(A),

with Tune, 23 S.W.3d at 363. In Tune, the Supreme Court rejected Tune’s 

argument that he could not be considered to have been “convicted” for purposes of 

the Concealed Handgun Act by operation of the judicial clemency provision in

article 42.12, section 20. Tune, 23 S.W.3d at 364. By using a specific definition 

that included persons who successfully completed community supervision, the

Supreme Court concluded that Tune could not obtain a concealed handgun license

even though the general penalties and disabilities resulting from his prior 
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conviction were discharged when he was discharged from community supervision. 

Id.

Bradshaw argues we should decline to apply the higher court’s reasoning in 

Tune to the SVP statute, and that we should instead apply the reasoning of the 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a case that involved a felon’s conviction for 

the unlawful possession of a firearm. See Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2002). We disagree that Cuellar compels a result different from the 

result reached by applying the Court’s reasoning in Tune. 

In Cuellar, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defendant had been 

released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from his conviction and 

consequently was not a person who had been convicted for purposes of section 

46.04 of the Texas Penal Code. Id. at 820. Under the criminal statute at issue in 

Cuellar, it was an offense for a person who had been convicted of a felony to 

possess a firearm, but the statute did not define “convicted” to have a meaning 

other than its ordinary meaning. Id. at 816, 820; see generally Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. § 46.04 (West 2011). The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the 

Legislature had included two exceptions in article 42.12, and it stated that “[t]he 

Legislature could add other exceptions if it so chooses.” Id. at 820.
10

In the section of the SVP statute addressing prior convictions, the SVP 

statute does not prohibit the use of convictions that are later discharged from 

serving as one of the predicate convictions needed to establish that a person is 

subject to civil commitment proceedings. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 

841.003(b)(1)(A). Section 841.003 of the Health and Safety Code contains an 

exception that allows a conviction discharged after the successful completion of 

probation to be used to establish a person’s status as a repeat sexually violent 

predator. Id. Because the State could use Bradshaw’s 1986 conviction as evidence 

to prove Bradshaw’s status as a repeat sexually violent predator, we conclude that 

Bradshaw’s argument that he did not have more than one prior conviction of a 

sexually violent offense, as required by the SVP statute, is without merit. We 

overrule issue two.

In issue three, Bradshaw contends that the use of his 1986 sexual assault 

conviction violates the ex post facto and retroactive law provisions of the Texas 

Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 16. Because the SVP statute is civil, and it is 

not punitive, the prohibition against ex post facto laws does not apply. In re 

Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 653 (Tex. 2005); In re Commitment of 

Browning, 113 S.W.3d 851, 858-59 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied);

Beasley v. Molett, 95 S.W.3d 590, 608 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). 
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The Texas Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he prohibition against 

retroactive application of laws does not apply to procedural, remedial, or 

jurisdictional statutes, because such statutes typically do not affect a vested right.” 

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Estate of Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544, 548 

(Tex. 2010). The SVP statute includes legislative findings (1) “that a small but 

extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exists and that those 

predators have a behavioral abnormality that is not amenable to traditional mental 

illness treatment modalities and that makes the predators likely to engage in 

repeated predatory acts of sexual violence[;]” (2) “the existing involuntary 

commitment provisions . . . are inadequate to address the risk of repeated predatory 

behavior that sexually violent predators pose to society[;]” (3) “treatment 

modalities for sexually violent predators are different from the traditional treatment 

modalities for persons appropriate for involuntary commitment[;]” and (4) “a civil 

commitment procedure for the long-term supervision and treatment of sexually 

violent predators is necessary and in the interest of the state.” Tex. Health & Safety 

Code Ann. § 841.001 (West 2010). These findings indicate that the SVP statute 

was intended by the Legislature as a remedial statute.
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Also, the application of the SVP statute to Bradshaw does not violate any 

restriction against retroactive laws. Regarding retroactive laws claims, generally, 

the Texas Supreme Court has stated:

[T]he constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws does not 

insulate every vested right from impairment, nor does it give way to 

every reasonable exercise of the Legislature’s police power; it protects 

settled expectations that rules are to govern the play and not simply 

the score, and prevents the abuses of legislative power that arise when 

individuals or groups are singled out for special reward or 

punishment. No bright-line test for unconstitutional retroactivity is 

possible. Rather, in determining whether a statute violates the 

prohibition against retroactive laws in article I, section 17 of the Texas 

Constitution, courts must consider three factors in light of the 

prohibition’s dual objectives: the nature and strength of the public 

interest served by the statute as evidenced by the Legislature’s factual 

findings; the nature of the prior right impaired by the statute; and the 

extent of the impairment. The perceived public advantage of a 

retroactive law is not simply to be balanced against its relatively small 

impact on private interests, or the prohibition would be deprived of 

most of its force. There must be a compelling public interest to 

overcome the heavy presumption against retroactive laws. To be sure, 

courts must be mindful that statutes are not to be set aside lightly.

Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 145–46 (Tex. 2010) 

(footnotes omitted).

The public interest served by the SVP statute includes: “(1) the parens 

patriae power to provide care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional 

disorders to care for themselves; and (2) the police power to protect the community 

from the dangerous tendencies of some who lack volitional control over certain 
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types of dangerous behaviors.” In re Commitment of Rushing, No. 09-11-00268-

CV, 2012 WL 4466421, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 27, 2012, no pet.)

(mem. op.). The right impaired is the right granted by article 42.12, section 20, to 

be free from a disability resulting from the commission of the offense—a right that 

would apply, but for the plain language of the SVP statute. See Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 20. 

Bradshaw claims the SVP statute interferes with his expectation about a 

prior criminal judgment that was set aside, but his expectation is disturbed only if it 

is determined that he is presently experiencing such a serious difficulty in 

controlling his behavior that he is a menace to the health and safety of another. Id.;

see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.002(2), 841.003. We conclude 

there is a compelling public interest in committing for treatment persons like 

Bradshaw who a jury has determined is presently unable to control his sexually 

violent impulses. We conclude the SVP statute does not violate Texas’s

constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws, and we overrule issue three. See 

Tex. Const. art. I, § 16. 

Legal and Factual Sufficiency

Issues four through nine challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Bradshaw is a sexually violent predator.
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In issues four and five, Bradshaw argues the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient because the State failed to link a mental condition to the evidence of 

Bradshaw’s future dangerousness. In issues six and seven, Bradshaw contends 

there is no evidence or insufficient evidence that he has serious difficulty 

controlling his behavior. In issues eight and nine, Bradshaw contends the evidence 

is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that Bradshaw is currently 

a menace to the health and safety of another person and that he is currently likely 

to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. The specific legal challenge 

Bradshaw presents in issue eight contends the State failed to prove his future 

dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under the SVP statute, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

“the person is a sexually violent predator.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 

841.062(a). As defined by the Legislature, a sexually violent predator is a person 

who “(1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral 

abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual 

violence.” Id. § 841.003(a). 

With respect to issues four, six, and eight, Bradshaw failed to raise the 

complaints he has made on appeal when he made an oral motion for directed 

verdict or in his written motion for new trial. During the charge conference 
15

Bradshaw asked the trial court to submit three separate questions asking whether 

Bradshaw is a repeat sexually violent offender, whether he suffers from a 

behavioral abnormality, and whether he is likely to engage in a predatory act of 

sexual violence, but he did not object to the issue submitted on the grounds that he 

asserts in his brief on appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 274. In jury trials, Rule 274 of the 

Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint regarding legal insufficiency be 

raised in the trial court to preserve the complaint for review on appeal. Id. The 

Texas Supreme Court has explained:

No evidence points must be preserved through one of the following 

procedural steps in the trial court: (1) a motion for instructed verdict; 

(2) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (3) an 

objection to the submission of the issue to the jury; (4) a motion to 

disregard the jury’s answer to a vital fact issue; or, (5) a motion for 

new trial.

Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. 1985). 

Bradshaw failed to preserve error regarding the complaints he presents in issues 

four, six, and eight; consequently, these issues are overruled. See Tex. R. App. P. 

33.1. 

Bradshaw’s motion for new trial raised a factual sufficiency issue. “A point 

in a motion for new trial is a prerequisite to . . . [a] complaint of factual 

insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding[.]” Tex. R. Civ. P. 
16

324(b)(2). Bradshaw’s factual insufficiency arguments are preserved for our 

review.

In reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence in SVP 

cases, we must weigh the evidence to determine whether a verdict that is supported 

by legally sufficient evidence nevertheless reflects a risk of injustice that compels 

ordering a new trial. In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 213 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2011, pet. denied). The risk of an injustice arising from the weight of 

the evidence is necessarily slight when the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable 

doubt and the evidence is legally sufficient. Id. Nonetheless, “if in the view of the 

appellate court after weighing the evidence, the risk of an injustice remains too 

great to allow the verdict to stand, the appellate court may grant the defendant a 

new trial.” Id.

Bradshaw contends the opinions expressed by the State’s psychiatrist, Dr. 

Sheri Gaines, were based upon nothing more than Bradshaw’s having committed

two sexual assaults. Dr. Gaines did testify that “the main reason I came to my 

opinion is the facts and data surrounding his sexual offenses[,]” which included a 

rape committed at knifepoint, but she explained that these two offenses were not

the only evidence she considered. 
17

Dr. Gaines described the methodology she used to form her opinions.

Among other things, she reviewed Bradshaw’s records and a report on Bradshaw 

compiled by the Multidisciplinary Team, she interviewed Bradshaw, and she 

reviewed the depositions taken in his case. According to Dr. Gaines, she followed 

a methodology that is consistent with the accepted standards in the field of 

psychiatry and her opinions are based on reliable scientific data. 

Dr. Gaines diagnosed Bradshaw with paraphilia not otherwise specified—

nonconsent type, paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol dependence in remission in a 

controlled environment, marijuana dependence in remission in a controlled 

environment, antisocial personality disorder, and mild mental retardation. She 

explained that her diagnoses were based on criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual. According to Dr. Gaines, a diagnosis of paraphilia concerns an expression 

of sexual deviance through obtaining arousal and having sex with nonconsenting 

partners through threats of violence. Dr. Gaines stated that she was comfortable 

with her diagnosis of paraphilia because Bradshaw exhibited the essential features 

of the diagnosis, including recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual 

urges, or behaviors generally involving the suffering or humiliation of one’s 

partner, and involving non-consenting persons. Dr. Gaines noted that both her 

evaluation of the records and her interview with Bradshaw indicated a long history 
18

of suffering from psychosis, including having chronic delusions and auditory and 

tactile hallucinations. When she interviewed him, Bradshaw was not getting mental 

health treatment, and he was actively psychotic during their interview. According 

to Dr. Gaines, she considered Bradshaw’s psychosis in concluding that he had a 

behavioral abnormality because the records reflected he had offended while

symptomatic from his condition of paranoid schizophrenia. Bradshaw, during his 

interview with Dr. Gaines, acknowledged having, from childhood and adolescence,

several of the criteria that Dr. Gaines explained were applied to a diagnosis for 

conduct disorder, including truancy, enuresis, fighting with weapons, and 

disrespect for authority. Dr. Gaines explained how her diagnosis of Bradshaw’s 

psychiatric disorders influenced her professional opinion that Bradshaw suffers 

from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of 

sexual violence. 

According to Dr. Gaines, Bradshaw’s antisocial personality disorder coupled 

with a paraphilia, sexual deviancy and schizophrenia are together indicative that he 

has a problem controlling his emotional or volitional capacity. Although Dr. 

Gaines noted that Bradshaw’s prison record did not show that he had committed

sexual offenses while in prison, Bradshaw’s sixty-five disciplinary cases while 

incarcerated included fighting, fighting with a weapon, assaulting security, and 
19

assaulting other inmates. Dr. Gaines explained that Bradshaw’s extensive 

disciplinary record showed persistent, repetitive behavior where he continued to 

break the rules even in a controlled environment. Dr. Gaines further noted that 

Bradshaw had committed non-sexual criminal offenses when he was not 

imprisoned. 

Dr. Gaines also explained what she felt were Bradshaw’s risk factors for 

recidivism, and these included his deviant sexuality, mental illness, low intellectual 

functioning, substance abuse, lack of a support system, and his previous use of a 

weapon when he committed a sexual offense. An actuarial test that Bradshaw took 

and that Dr. Gaines relied on in forming her opinions placed him in the lowmoderate category of risk, but, according to Dr. Gaines, the psychologist who 

administered the test also expressed a clinical judgment that Bradshaw has a 

behavioral abnormality. Dr. Gaines testified that it was significant to her opinions 

that Bradshaw had not had sex offender treatment. 

The jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to 

determine ultimate facts, and to resolve conflicts and contradictions in the evidence 

by believing all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. In re Commitment of 

Barbee, 192 S.W.3d 835, 842 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, no pet.). The record 

does not reflect a risk of injustice that compels granting a new trial. See Day, 342 
20

S.W.3d at 213. We hold the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s 

verdict. We overrule issues five, seven, and nine.

Voir Dire

Issue ten complains of statements made by the trial court and the State’s 

attorney during jury selection that Bradshaw argues minimized the jury’s role in 

resolving his case. Bradshaw did not object to the comments when they were made 

during voir dire, and he did not raise a complaint about these same comments in 

his motion for new trial. Bradshaw failed to preserve the complaint he raises in 

issue ten for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. We overrule issue ten, and we 

affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

AFFIRMED.

 ________________________________

 HOLLIS HORTON

 Justice

Submitted on September 19, 2013

Opinion Delivered October 31, 2013

Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.