J. S50014/14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

FREDDIE BATTLE, ADMINISTRATRIX 

FOR THE ESTATE OF ERIC BATTLE, 

DECEASED,

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

 Appellant :

:

v. :

: No. 1864 WDA 2013

PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., 

MHM CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, INC.

:

:

Appeal from the Order, October 30, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County

Civil Division at No. A.D. No. 552, 20093942

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND ALLEN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2015

Appellant appeals from various orders below which granted summary 

judgment in favor of appellees in appellant’s negligence and breach of 

contract action. Finding no merit in the issues on appeal, we affirm.

Appellant is the administratrix for the Estate of Eric Battle. Tragically, 

Battle died on June 4 or 5, 2005, of untreated diabetes while incarcerated at 

the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI Greene”). Mental health 

issues contributed to Battle’s death as they apparently caused him to refuse 

insulin treatment. Appellees are the general health services provider and 

the mental health services provider, respectively, at SCI Greene.
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On July 30, 2007, appellant commenced her action against appellees 

with the filing of a Writ of Summons. In a subsequently filed complaint, 

appellant raised a breach of contract count and multiple negligence-based 

counts. Ultimately, upon the filing of serial preliminary objections and 

amended complaints, summary judgment was granted in favor of both 

appellees as to all counts of the complaint.

On August 28, 2009, the court sustained appellees’ preliminary 

objections as to the breach of contract claim. In an accompanying opinion of 

the same date, the court explained that appellant’s claim, based upon a 

theory of third party beneficiary, was untenable because the contracts 

between the Department of Corrections and each of the appellees, using 

identical language, contained a clause specifically declaring that the parties 

did not intend to create any third party beneficiary rights.

On June 12, 2012, the trial court entered an order granting summary 

judgment to appellee MHM Correctional Services, Inc., on appellant’s 

negligence claims. In an accompanying memorandum of the same date, the 

court explained that appellant’s negligence claims were all barred by the 

two-year statute of limitations as Battle died no later than June 5, 2005, and 

suit was not commenced until July 30, 2007. The court dismissed 

appellant’s discovery argument by noting that discovery does not toll the 

statute of limitations because death is a definitely established event putting 

survivors on notice to determine the cause of death, citing Pastierik v. 
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Duquesne Light Co., 526 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1987). Finally, the court examined 

the basis for estopping the invocation of the statute of limitations, fraudulent 

concealment. The court found no fraudulent concealment on the part of 

appellee MHM Correctional Services, Inc., and observed that appellant had 

at all times diligently pursued her inquiry into her son’s death.

Finally, on October 30, 2013, the trial court entered an order granting 

summary judgment in favor of appellee Prison Health Services, Inc., as to all 

of appellant’s negligence claims. In an accompanying memorandum of the 

same date, the court again explained that appellant’s negligence claims were 

all barred by the two-year statute of limitations at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). 

After again rejecting discovery as tolling the statute of limitations, the trial 

court systematically examined in detail each instance of alleged fraudulent 

concealment raised by appellant, and gave reasons why none were valid.

We find no error with the trial court’s analysis. After a thorough 

review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the 

well-reasoned opinion and memoranda of the trial court, it is our 

determination that summary judgment was properly granted. The breach of 

contract claim was untenable because the underlying contract specifically 

decreed that the parties did not intend to create third party beneficiaries. 

The negligence claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial 

court’s opinion, filed on August 28, 2009, and its two memoranda, filed 

June 12, 2012 and October 30, 2013, comprehensively discuss and properly 
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analyze the bases for summary judgment. We will adopt them as our own 

and affirm on those bases.

Finally, we review an argument of appellant not fully addressed by the 

trial court. Therein, appellant contends that another clause of the contracts 

between appellees and the Department of Corrections confers third party 

beneficiary status to inmates:

ARTICLE 2

SERVICES

2.1 The PROVIDER shall deliver general health care 

and specialized medical services to inmates 

incarcerated at the FACILITIES.

2.1 The PROVIDER shall deliver mental health 

services to inmates incarcerated at the 

FACILITIES.

Medical Services Agreement (upper); Mental Health Services Agreement 

(lower).

Appellant argues that because appellees cannot fulfill their contracts 

without treating inmates, such factor confers third party beneficiary status 

on appellant’s decedent. We disagree.

Article 25 of both agreements, in identical language, clearly and 

unambiguously declares that it is the intent of the parties not to create third 

party beneficiaries:
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ARTICLE 25

THIRD PARTY RIGHTS

25.1 The only parties to this AGREEMENT are the 

DEPARTMENT and PROVIDER. The parties 

understand that this AGREEMENT does not 

create or intend to confer any rights in or on 

persons or entities not a party to this 

AGREEMENT.

Medical Services Agreement and Mental Health Services Agreement.

The intent of the parties is manifest. Clause 2.1 of each agreement 

merely describes what the basic duties of the provider are. To the extent 

that the clause suggests that third party beneficiary status may be available 

to inmates, Clause 25.1 clearly and unambiguously declares that that is not 

the case.

In support of her position, appellant cites and quotes Scarpitti v. 

Weborg, 609 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1992), a case in which our supreme court 

expanded the rule designating third party beneficiary status:

The current rule in Pennsylvania for 

designation of a party as a third party beneficiary 

was first articulated in the seminal case of Spires v. 

Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 

828 (1950) (plurality opinion). In Spires, we held 

that in order for a third party beneficiary to have 

standing to recover on a contract, both contracting 

parties must have expressed an intention that the 

third party be a beneficiary, and that intention must 

have affirmatively appeared in the contract itself.

. . . .

Accordingly, we hold that a party becomes a 

third party beneficiary only where both parties to the 
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contract express an intention to benefit the third 

party in the contract itself, Spires, supra, unless, 

the circumstances are so compelling that recognition 

of the beneficiary’s right is appropriate to effectuate 

the intention of the parties, and the performance 

satisfies an obligation of the promisee to pay money 

to the beneficiary or the circumstances indicate that 

the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the 

benefit of the promised performance.

Scarpitti, 609 A.2d at 149, 150-151 (emphasis in original).

Appellant argues that the circumstances here are so compelling that 

recognition of third party beneficiary status is appropriate. We find that 

Scarpitti is inapposite in this case.

Scarpitti set out parameters for conferring third party beneficiary 

status where the parties to the underlying agreement failed to explicitly do 

so, but which agreement by its other terms clearly evinced an intention to 

create third party beneficiaries. The instant agreement did not merely fail to 

create third party beneficiaries; rather, the parties explicitly agreed that by 

their agreement they intended to create no third party beneficiaries. In the 

face of such an explicit directive in the underlying contract, it would be 

wholly improper even under Scarpitti to find that the contract actually did 

create third party beneficiaries. We find that appellant does not have third 

party beneficiary status.

Accordingly, having found that the trial court properly entered 

summary judgment against appellant, we will affirm the order below.
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Orders of June 12, 2012 and October 30, 2013, granting summary 

judgment, are affirmed. Order of August 28, 2009, sustaining preliminary 

objections as to the breach of contract claim, is affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/24/2015