alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Rowland Dewitt PUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cal A TERHUNE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-15426.

D.C. No. CV-00-06882-REC.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 13, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Rowland Dewitt Pugh, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation, a First Amendment violation, and denial of access to the courts. Pugh also appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo dismissals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *See Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000). We affirm.

Pugh’s first amended complaint alleged that a letter he sent to his brother through the prison mail system was returned by the United States Postal Service in retaliation for grievances Pugh had filed at an unspecified time. The district court properly dismissed this claim because Pugh failed to allege facts demonstrating a link between his grievances and the returned mail. *See Pratt v. Rowland,*65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that prisoner must establish link between exercise of constitutional rights and allegedly retaliatory action).

The district court properly dismissed Pugh’s claim that the prison interfered with his mail because Pugh’s allegations were vague and conclusory. *See Pena v. Gardner,*976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir.1992).

Pugh’s claim that the prison did not process his grievance lacks merit because according to documents attached to Pugh’s motion to vacate judgment, Pugh’s grievance was not filed because it was untimely. *See Lewis v. Casey,*518 U.S. 343, 351-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) *352(requiring prisoner to demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim has been frustrated or impaired).

Because Pugh failed to demonstrate any basis for relief from judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to reconsider. *See School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc.,*5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993).

We deny Pugh’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal. *See Wood v. Housewright,*900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America,

Government

v. Criminal No. 08-cr-34-1-SM

Mark Williams,

Defendant

ORDER FOR PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL

EXAMINATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 4241

The defendant’s assented-to motion for examination to

determine mental competency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241

(document no. 16) is granted. The court hereby orders that a

psychiatric or psychological examination of Defendant Mark

Williams be conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological

report be filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of

18 U.S.C. § 4247(b), (c).

Defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney

General for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days for placement

in a suitable facility where an examination of the defendant’s

mental condition can be conducted, or if appropriate, counsel for

the parties may seek to agree on an outpatient examination and an

appropriate examiner, and advise the court of such agreement.

Case 1:08-cr-00034-SM Document 19 Filed 08/26/08 Page 1 of 2
2

A hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(c) and scheduling of

defendant’s trial will be deferred until completion of that

examination, and submission of a report to the court.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

August 26, 2008

cc: Terry L. Ollila, Esq.

Thomas F. McCue, Esq.

U.S. Marshal

U.S. Probation

Case 1:08-cr-00034-SM Document 19 Filed 08/26/08 Page 2 of 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SYLVESTER GOULD, § 

§ No. 457, 2018

Defendant Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court of the 

§ State of Delaware 

v. §

§ Cr. ID No. 1607021540 (N) 

STATE OF DELAWARE, §

§

Plaintiff Below, §

Appellee. §

Submitted: December 21, 2018

Decided: January 3, 2019

O R D E R

On December 3, 2018, the Clerk issued a notice, by certified mail, directing 

the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for the 

appellant’s failure to file the opening brief. The appellant received the notice to 

show cause on December 10, 2018 but did not respond to it, and he has not filed the 

opening brief. Accordingly, dismissal of the appeal is deemed to be unopposed.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rules 3(b)(2) 

and 29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIALOFFICER PURSUANT to 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES —OXLEYACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of EF Johnson Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the quarter ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jana Ahlfinger Bell,Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.                       The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and

 

2.                       The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in theReport.

 
|   | /S/ Jana Ahlfinger Bell |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Jana Ahlfinger Bell     |
|   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

May 6, 2009

 

*Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.*

 

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Daniel Santiago RAMIREZ, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 01-50595.

D.C. No. CR-01-18-DOC.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 10, 2003.

Decided March 6, 2003.

*326Before B. FLETCHER and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges, and BURY, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable David C. Bury, District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Santiago Ramirez (“Ramirez”) argues that his motion to suppress should have been granted by the district court because he was under arrest when removed from his vehicle, was not subject to an investigatory *Terry*stop, and that this arrest was not supported by probable cause.

There is no need to determine whether the police conducted a *Terry*stop or made an arrest because there was probable cause to arrest Ramirez at the time he was stopped. *See United States v. Harvey,*3 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir.1993) (performing *Terry*analysis unnecessary where ample probable cause exists).

Probable cause exists when police officers have “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense,’ ” *United States v. Del Vizo,*918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting *United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez,*856 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir.1988)), and “must exist from facts and circumstances known to the officers *at the moment of arrest.*” *Delgadillo-Velasquez,*856 F.2d at 1298 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of the police officers involved in the investigation, even if some of the information known to other officers is not communicated to the arresting officer. *United States v. Butler,*74 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.1996).

Ramirez was the driver of the bank robbery getaway vehicle that had been reliably identified by two eyewitnesses. The vehicle had distinctive features that lent further credibility to the eyewitnesses’ identification of the vehicle as the getaway car. When these facts are considered in conjunction with the short time frame between the bank robbery and the stop, and the close proximity of the stop to the bank, there was reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to believe that Ramirez was connected to the bank robbery. Therefore, there was probable cause to arrest Ramirez. *See Rohde v. City of Roseburg,*137 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir.1998) (finding probable cause to arrest driver of a stolen vehicle because reasonable to conclude that driver is either the thief himself or is aware of the theft).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**Exhibit 99.5**

** **

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Robert C. Hill, certify that:

 

1             Ihave reviewed this annual report on Form 40-F of Emerald Health Therapeutics, Inc.;

 

2.            Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect tothe period covered by this report;

 

3.            Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

 

4.            Theissuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the issuer and have:

 

(a)          Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)          [omitted];

 

(c)          Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and

 

(d)          Disclosedin this report any change in the issuer’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period coveredby the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the issuer’s internal controlover financial reporting; and

 

5.            Theissuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of the issuer’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):

 

(a)          Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting whichare reasonably likely to adversely affect the issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and

 

(b)          Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer’sinternal control over financial reporting.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

USA

v. Civil No. 06-cv-013-JM

Amy McPherson, et al.

ORDER

Re: Document No. 4, Motion/Letter to Appoint Counsel

Ruling: Denied. There is no constitutional or statutory

right to free legal representation in a civil case. Bemis v.

Kelley, 857 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1988). An indigent litigant

must demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist to justify

appointment of counsel. DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23;

Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986)(per curiam). 

Being incarcerated and indigent are insufficient in and of

themselves. 

James R. Muirhead

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Date: January 31, 2006

cc: John J. Farley, Esq.

 Amy McPherson, pro se

 

 

Case 1:06-cv-00013-PB Document 5 Filed 01/31/2006 Page 1 of 1

USA v. McPherson et al Doc. 5

Dockets.Justia.com
183 La. 53

#### Ernestine THOMAS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 33163.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 4, 1935.

On Rehearing July 1, 1935.

J. N. Brittingham, Jr., J. I. McCain, and Herman L. Midlo, all of New Orleans, for relator. '

Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps & Dunbar and Louis B. Claverie, all of New Orleans, for respondent.

ROGERS, Justice..

Edith Thomas was insured for a total of $806 on three industrial life insurance policies issued by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. She died in New Orleans on August 2, 1932, and her daughter Ernestine Thomas was duly recognized as her sole heir and, as such, put in possession of her estate by a judgment of the civil district court for the parish of Orleans. Thereafter, Ernestine Thomas brought this suit against the insurance company for the recovery of the full amount called for by the policies. The civil district court, in which the suit was filed, gave plaintiff a judgment for the full amount sued for. The Court of Appeal, on defendant’s exception to that effect, held that plaintiff was without any right of action and dismissed her suit. The case is before us on a writ of review issued at plaintiff’s instance.

The legal questions involved in the case are identical with those we considered and disposed of in the cases of Succession of Watson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 162 So. 790, and Crump v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 162 So. 800, decided by us this day.

For the reasons assigned in those cases, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is annulled and the judgment of the civil district court is reinstated and made the final judgment of this court. Defendant is to pay all costs of suit

*800On Rehearing.

BRUNOT, Justice.

The issues in this case are identical with those presented in the case of Julia Crump, Widow of Wilson Miles v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (La. Sup.) 162 So. 800, this day finally decided.

These issues were considered and disposed of by the court in Succession of Frank Watson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (La. Sup.) 162 So. 790, and Julia Crump, Widow, v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (La. Sup.) 162 So. 800, finally decided this day.

The original opinion and decree herein are therefore reinstated and made the final judgment of the court.

HIGGINS, J., recused.
1 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont 

_________________ 

NO. 09-15-00021-CV 

_________________ 

IN RE BEVERLY ELAINE JONES 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Original Proceeding 

________________________________________________________________________ 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 Beverly Elaine Jones filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging she 

was illegally confined for punitive contempt pursuant to an order of the 75th 

District Court of Liberty County, Texas, in trial cause number CV71726 because 

she had not been provided with adequate notice of the manner in which she 

violated the trial court’s 2013 community supervision order and the trial court 

failed to hold a hearing within the time required by law. We set a bond for Jones’s 

temporary release and requested a response from the real party in interest. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 52.8(b)(1), (3). The Office of the Attorney General of Texas (OAG) 

filed a response that concedes error. 
2 

On May 28, 2013, the trial court signed a judgment of contempt and 

commitment order, suspended the commitment, and placed Jones on community 

supervision. The OAG filed a motion to revoke community supervision for failure 

to timely pay current child support and medical support. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 157.214 (West 2014) (authorizing Title IV-D agency to file a motion to revoke 

community supervision). The trial court ordered the clerk to issue an arrest 

warrant. See id. § 157.215 (authorizing arrest by warrant). Jones was booked into 

the Liberty County Jail on December 20, 2014. 

Due process requires the trial court to hold a revocation hearing soon after 

the obligor is arrested. In re Alexander, 243 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding). Section 157.216 of the Texas Family Code sets 

forth the time frame for holding a revocation in an enforcement case and provides 

that the hearing “may not be held later than the seventh working day after the date 

the respondent is arrested.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 157.216(b) (West 2014). It is 

undisputed that no hearing was held within seven working days of the date that 

Jones was arrested. Jones was deprived of her liberty without due process of law 

because she did not receive a hearing before the time expired for conducting a 

hearing on the motion to revoke community supervision. See id.; see also In re 

Roznosky, No. 02-11-00128-CV, 2011 WL 1743682, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort 
3 

Worth May 4, 2011, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.) (granting habeas 

relief to person held in custody without a revocation hearing for more than seven 

working days). 

We grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, order that Beverly Elaine 

Jones be discharged from custody under the warrant issued in trial cause number 

CV71726, and order that she be released from the bond posted to secure her 

temporary release pursuant to this Court’s order of January 16, 2015. 

PETITION GRANTED. 

 

 PER CURIAM 

Submitted on February 4, 2015 

Opinion Delivered February 19, 2015 

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
EXHIBIT 99.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER  Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

The undersigned executive officer of MCSi, Inc. (the "Registrant") hereby certifies that the Registrant's Form 10-Q for the three months
ended June 30, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained therein fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

| |  | /s/IRA H. STANLEYName: Ira H. Stanley
Title: Chief Financial Officer
| |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:
August 13, 2002

---

QuickLinks
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

USA

v. Civil No. 06-cv-251-JD

Laurie S. Chown

O R D E R

On October 6, 2006, an Order was issued in this case stating that a return of service or a

motion to extend time to effect service be filed by November 6, 2006, or the case would be

dismissed without prejudice.

In that no filing to this effect has been made, the case against Laurie S. Chown is herewith

ordered dismissed without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

November 16, 2006

cc: Thomas P. Cole, Esq.

/s/ Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:06-cv-00251-JD Document 7 Filed 11/16/06 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of FIRSTFED AMERICA BANCORP,
INC. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), we, Robert F. Stoico, Chief Executive Officer, and Edward A. Hjerpe
III, Chief Financial Officer, certify to the best of our knowledge and belief,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13
                  (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by
                  the Report.

                                      /s/ Robert F. Stoico
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      Robert F. Stoico
                                      Chairman of the Board, President and
                                      Chief Executive Officer
                                      February 12, 2004

                                      /s/ Edward A. Hjerpe, III
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      Edward A. Hjerpe, III
                                      Executive Vice President, Chief Operating
                                      Officer and Chief Financial Officer
                                      February 12, 2004

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to FIRSTFED AMERICA BANCORP, INC. and will be retained by FIRSTFED
AMERICA BANCORP, INC. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.