STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-0373

A23-0621

JayCee Cooper, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

USA Powerlifting, 

Appellant, 

USA Powerlifting Minnesota, 

Respondent on Related Appeal (A23-0373).

Filed March 18, 2024

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Johnson, Judge

Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Frisch, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CV-21-211

Christy L. Hall, Jess Braverman, Sara Jane Baldwin, Gender Justice, St. Paul, Minnesota; 

and

David E. Schlesinger, Riley Palmer, Nichols Kaster, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota; 

and

Matthew A. Frank, Premo Frank P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent and 

cross-appellant JayCee Cooper)

Ansis V. Viksnins, Mark J. Carpenter, Mary Cate S. Cicero, Monroe Moxness Berg P.A., 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant USA Powerlifting and respondent on related appeal 

USA Powerlifting Minnesota)

Charles R. Shreffler, Shreffler Law Ltd., Lakeville, Minnesota; and

Kristine L. Brown (pro hac vice), Shreffler Law Ltd., Denver, Colorado (for amici curiae

83 Female Athletes, Sports Officials, and Parents of Female Athletes)
2

Jason Adkins, Minnesota Catholic Conference, St. Paul, Minnesota (for amicus curiae

Minnesota Catholic Conference)

Stanley N. Zahorsky, Zahorsky Law Firm, Edina, Minnesota; and

William Bock, III (pro hac vice), Kroger, Gardis & Regas, L.L.P., Indianapolis, Indiana 

(for amicus curiae Independent Council on Women’s Sport)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Rachel Bell-Munger, Assistant Attorney General, 

St. Paul, Minnesota (for amicus curiae Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Human 

Rights)

Philip A. Duran, Rainbow Health, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David P. Brown (pro hac vice), Transgender Legal Defense & Education Fund, New York,

New York (for amici curiae Group of Transgender Women Athletes)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin, 

Judge.

SYLLABUS

1. The district court erred by granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment and concluding that defendant is liable to plaintiff on her claims of discrimination 

based on sexual orientation in public accommodations and in business under the Minnesota 

Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.44 (2018), because there are genuine issues 

of material fact as to whether defendant excluded plaintiff from the women’s division of 

its weightlifting competitions because of her transgender status.

2. The district court erred by granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment and concluding that defendant is liable to plaintiff on her claims of discrimination 

based on sexual orientation and sex in business under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, 

Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.44 (2018), because there are genuine issues of material fact as to 
3

whether defendant excluded plaintiff from the women’s division of its weightlifting 

competitions for a legitimate business purpose.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

JayCee Cooper is a transgender athlete. She was not allowed to compete in the 

women’s division of powerlifting competitions sponsored by USA Powerlifting (USAPL). 

Cooper sued, asserting five discrimination claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Cooper’s motion for 

partial summary judgment on three claims, denied her motion with respect to one claim, 

granted a defense motion for summary judgment on one claim, and sua sponte enjoined 

USAPL from doing business in Minnesota. USAPL has appealed, and Cooper has crossappealed.

In USAPL’s consolidated appeals, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material 

fact with respect to Cooper’s claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation (which 

is defined by statute to include transgender status). We also conclude that there are genuine 

issues of material fact with respect to USAPL’s statutory legitimate-business-purpose 

defense to Cooper’s claims of discrimination in business. Accordingly, we reverse the 

district court’s grant of Cooper’s motion for partial summary judgment on three claims and 

its orders for injunctive relief. In Cooper’s cross-appeal, we conclude that there are no 

genuine issues of material fact on Cooper’s claim of aiding and abetting discrimination 

and, accordingly, affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim. 

Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
4

FACTS

USAPL is a nationwide organization that sponsors competitions in powerlifting, a 

strength-based sport in which participants compete in three events: squat, bench press, and 

deadlift. USAPL was organized in 1981 as The American Drug Free Powerlifting 

Association, Inc., and one of its core principles is that its competitors must be drug-free. It 

is a non-profit corporation, with its principal place of business in Alaska. It employs a 

president and six other employees, three of whom work remotely from other states. The 

organization has approximately 18,000 members and relies on local meet directors to 

organize local competitions.

Cooper is a transgender woman who resides in Minnesota. She participated in 

men’s sports before transitioning in her 20s and changing her name in 2015 or 2016, when 

she was approximately 28 years old. She became interested in powerlifting in 

approximately 2018 and became a member of USAPL later that year.

In November 2018, Cooper submitted to USAPL an application for a therapeuticuse exemption (TUE) from USAPL’s drug-free policy. She did so because she wished to 

compete in the women’s division of USAPL competitions in Minnesota in January and 

February of 2019 while taking spironolactone to treat her gender dysphoria. Cooper’s 

application initially was referred to USAPL’s TUE committee, whose members voted to 

approve it. Cooper’s application then was referred to USAPL’s executive committee, 

which determined that Cooper should not be allowed to compete in the women’s division.

The executive committee asked the chairperson of the TUE committee, a medical 

doctor, to communicate the organization’s decision to Cooper. On December 5, 2018, the 
5

committee chairperson sent Cooper an e-mail message, stating: “The TUE committee has 

reviewed your request for spironolactone. That request has been denied. Male-to-female 

transgenders are not allowed to compete as females in our static strength sport as it is a 

direct competitive advantage. This decision has been made at the IPF [International 

Powerlifting Federation] level.” Cooper responded by asking for additional information 

about the decision and the IPF policy. After a few additional messages, the committee 

chairperson explained further by stating, “The fact that transgender male to female 

individuals have gone through male puberty confers an unfair competitive advantage over 

non-transgender females due to increased bone density and muscle mass from pubertal 

exposure to testosterone . . . .”

In January 2021, Cooper commenced this action against USAPL and a defendant 

described as USA Powerlifting Minnesota (USAPL-MN).1

 Her three-count complaint 

asserts multiple causes of action under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. 

Stat. §§ 363A.01-.44 (2018). In count 1, she alleges that USAPL discriminated against her 

based on both sex and sexual orientation in a place of public accommodations. See Minn. 

Stat. § 363A.11, subd. 1(a)(1). In count 2, she alleges that USAPL discriminated against 

her based on both sex and sexual orientation in business. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.17(3). 

1

The parties dispute whether an entity known as USA Powerlifting Minnesota

actually exists. In the district court, USAPL’s attorneys moved for summary judgment on 

the sole claim asserted against USAPL-MN, arguing, in part, that no such entity exists. 

The district court agreed and granted that part of USAPL’s motion. Below we affirm that 

ruling. See infra part III. Nonetheless, the caption of this opinion reflects that USA 

Powerlifting Minnesota is a respondent with respect to Cooper’s related appeal, consistent 

with the appellate rules and this court’s general practice. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01.
6

And in count 3, she alleges that USAPL-MN aided and abetted USAPL’s alleged 

discriminatory acts. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.14(1). Cooper demanded a jury trial and 

requested multiple forms of relief, including a permanent injunction, a civil penalty, 

compensatory damages, treble damages, and punitive damages. See Minn. Stat. 

§§ 363A.29, subds. 3-5, .33, subd. 6.

In essence, Cooper has asserted five claims: (1) discrimination based on sexual 

orientation in a place of public accommodations; (2) discrimination based on sex in a place 

of public accommodations; (3) discrimination based on sexual orientation in business; 

(4) discrimination based on sex in business; and (5) aiding and abetting discrimination. 

Her claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation are, in essence, claims of 

discrimination based on her transgender status or gender identity because, at the time of 

the events that give rise to this case, “sexual orientation” was defined by the MHRA to 

include “having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally 

associated with [one’s] biological maleness or femaleness.” See Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, 

subd. 44 (2018).

The parties engaged in discovery for approximately two years. In November 2022, 

the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Cooper moved for partial summary 

judgment with respect to liability on her first, third, and fifth claims. In support of her 

motion, Cooper submitted voluminous evidence (including deposition transcripts and 

internal USAPL e-mail communications) concerning USAPL’s decision to exclude her 

from competing in the women’s division of its competitions. In her memorandum of law, 

she argued, among other things, that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her 
7

sexual-orientation claims because “there is no factual dispute as to whether an illegitimate 

factor, namely Ms. Cooper’s membership in a protected class, actually motivated 

defendants’ rejection of her application to compete.”

Meanwhile, USAPL also moved for summary judgment on all of Cooper’s claims. 

In support of the motion, USAPL submitted an affidavit of its president, who stated:

The [USAPL] executive committee determined that [Cooper] 

should not be allowed to compete in the women’s division 

because athletes who have gone through puberty as a male 

retain significant strength advantages over those who go 

through puberty as a female and hormone replacement therapy 

does not materially minimize the competitive advantage.

USAPL also submitted expert reports. A post-doctoral researcher in developmental 

biology identified a “non-exhaustive list of sexually dimorphic differences between males 

and females” and stated that “males are, on average, taller with wider shoulders, longer 

limbs and longer digits, . . . have larger and denser muscle mass, reduced fat mass, different 

distributions of muscle and fat and stiffer connective tissues, . . . higher amounts of 

haemoglobin, and larger hearts and lungs.” She also stated, “These physical differences 

underpin functional differences in overall strength, lever proportions, force application, 

upper to lower body strength, and cardiovascular and respiratory function” that “confer 

superior athleticism.” She stated further that, in powerlifting, males have, on average, a 

“35% advantage” in strength over females. Finally, she stated that, if a transgender woman 

engages in 12 months of testosterone-suppression treatment, she would be expected to have 

only a four-percent decrease in muscle mass and strength, which the researcher deemed 

statistically insignificant.
8

Similarly, a lecturer in clinical physiology, with a Ph.D. in sports science, stated, 

“Biological males outperform comparable biological females in powerlifting by at least 

35%” and that the disparity is “almost entirely due to the superior muscle mass and strength 

associated with male physiology compared to female physiology.” He also stated, “There 

is currently no scientific evidence that suppressing testosterone in transgender women 

negates the advantage in muscle mass and strength that biological males, which include 

transgender women, have over females.” He further stated that “competitive fairness 

between males and females cannot be achieved with testosterone suppression” because of 

evidence that “resistance training can mitigate the already small losses in muscle mass and 

strength caused by testosterone suppression.”

In its memorandum in support of its own motion, and in its memorandum in 

opposition to Cooper’s motion, USAPL argued that it did not exclude Cooper from 

competition because of her sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status) but, rather, because 

she had gone through puberty as a male and, thus, had natural “strength advantages” and 

“performance advantages” that gave her an unfair advantage over cisgender women 

athletes in the women’s division.

On February 27, 2023, the district court filed a 46-page order on the parties’

summary-judgment motions. The district court granted Cooper’s motion for partial 

summary judgment with respect to liability on her first, third, and fourth claims. The 

district court concluded that Cooper’s evidence is conclusive proof of discrimination based 

on both sexual orientation and sex. On Cooper’s third and fourth claims, which allege

discrimination in business, the district court granted her motion notwithstanding USAPL’s 
9

statutory defense of a legitimate business purpose. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.17(3). On 

Cooper’s second claim, the district court denied her motion on the ground that genuine 

issues of material fact exist with respect to a statutory exemption for places of public 

accommodations that “restrict[] membership on an athletic team or in a program or event 

to participants of one sex if the restriction is necessary to preserve the unique character of 

the team, program, or event and it would not substantially reduce comparable athletic 

opportunities for the other sex.” See Minn. Stat. § 363A.24, subd. 2. On Cooper’s fifth 

claim, the district court denied her motion and granted USAPL’s summary-judgment 

motion on the ground that USAPL-MN is not an entity or organization with “any separate 

existence or autonomy beyond USAPL.” The district court denied USAPL’s motion with 

respect to Cooper’s first, second, third, and fourth claims.

In its February 27, 2023 summary-judgment order, the district court—on its own 

initiative—also ordered injunctive relief. Specifically, the district court ordered USAPL 

to “cease and desist from all unfair discriminatory practices in public accommodations 

because of sexual orientation” and to submit to the court a proposed policy concerning the 

participation of transgender athletes that complies with the MHRA, as determined by the 

district court. In April 2023, USAPL submitted a proposed policy that would allow a 

transgender woman to compete in USAPL’s women’s division if she declared her gender 

to be female, had conforming government identification, and maintained a testosterone 

level below a certain numerical level. On April 11, 2023, the district court held a hearing 

on USAPL’s proposed policy. The district court ruled from the bench that the proposed 

policy does not comply with the MHRA. The district court orally ruled that USAPL “is 
10

enjoined from holding any events in the state of Minnesota, competitive or otherwise” and 

“is similarly enjoined . . . from selling memberships to identified residents of the state of 

Minnesota” until USAPL submits a proposed policy that complies with the MHRA. 

Although the district court indicated its intention to file a written order providing for 

injunctive relief, it did not do so.

USAPL filed timely notices of appeal from the district court’s February 27, 2023 

written order and its April 11, 2023 oral order. USAPL’s appeals, which have been 

consolidated, challenge the district court’s summary-judgment rulings and grant of 

injunctive relief on Cooper’s first, third, and fourth claims.2

 Cooper filed a notice of related 

appeal to challenge the district court’s grant of USAPL’s summary-judgment motion on 

her fifth claim. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.02, subd. 2. The district court’s denial of 

both summary-judgment motions on Cooper’s second claim is not at issue on appeal.

2

USAPL’s notices of appeal provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction despite the 

absence of a judgment because USAPL seeks relief from “an order which grants . . . an 

injunction.” See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b). We have appellate jurisdiction over the 

district court’s February 27, 2023 order to the extent that the district court granted Cooper’s 

motion because we “may review any order affecting the order from which the appeal is 

taken.” See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. Our appellate jurisdiction does not extend to 

the district court’s February 27, 2023 order to the extent that the district court denied

USAPL’s summary-judgment motion because an order denying summary judgment 

generally is not appealable, see McGowan v. Our Savior’s Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 

830, 832 (Minn. 1995), and because the district court’s denial of USAPL’s motion does 

not support the order for an injunction, which is the original basis of the appeal, see Minn. 

R. Civ. App. P. 103.04; Williams v. National Football League, 794 N.W.2d 391, 394-95 

(Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2011).
11

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err by granting Cooper’s partial-summary-judgment 

motion with respect to her first and third claims, which allege discrimination based on 

sexual orientation?

II. Did the district court err by granting Cooper’s partial-summary-judgment 

motion with respect to her third and fourth claims, which allege discrimination in business

and for which USAPL asserts the statutory defense of a legitimate business purpose?

III. Did the district court err by granting USAPL’s summary-judgment motion 

with respect to Cooper’s fifth claim, which alleges aiding and abetting discrimination?

IV. Did the district court err by ordering injunctive relief?

ANALYSIS

The MHRA protects an individual’s right to an “opportunity to obtain employment, 

housing, and other real estate, and full and equal utilization of public accommodations, 

public services, and educational institutions without . . . discrimination.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 363A.02, subd. 2.

In the context of public accommodations, the MHRA seeks to ensure that persons 

within the state are free from discrimination “because of race, color, creed, religion, 

national origin, sex, sexual orientation, and disability.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.02, 

subd. 1(a)(3). To that end, the act provides, “It is an unfair discriminatory practice . . . to 

deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 

advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, 

color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, or sex 
12

. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 363A.11, subd. 1(a), 1(a)(1). Similarly, “in a trade or business or in 

the provision of a service,” it is “an unfair discriminatory practice” for a person “to 

intentionally refuse to do business with, to refuse to contract with, or to discriminate in the 

basic terms, conditions, or performance of the contract because of a person’s race, national 

origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, or disability, unless the alleged refusal or 

discrimination is because of a legitimate business purpose.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.17, .17(3). 

Furthermore, it is unlawful for any person “intentionally to aid, abet, incite, compel, or 

coerce a person to engage in any of the practices forbidden by” the MHRA. Minn. Stat. 

§ 363A.14(1).

The term “sexual orientation” is defined by the MHRA. Because this case is based 

on events occurring in 2018 and 2019, we apply the then-existing definition of sexual 

orientation, which states, in relevant part:

“Sexual orientation” means having or being perceived 

as having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to 

another person without regard to the sex of that person or 

having or being perceived as having an orientation for such 

attachment, or having or being perceived as having a selfimage or identity not traditionally associated with one’s 

biological maleness or femaleness.

Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 44 (2018) (emphasis added). This definition includes two 

distinct concepts. For purposes of this case, we focus on the latter concept, which we have 

italicized above. We refer to the second concept in this opinion by the term “transgender 

status” while keeping in mind the specific language used in the statutory definition.3

3

During its 2023 session, the legislature amended the definition of sexual orientation 

by deleting the second concept. See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 47, at 1150 
13

The term “sex” is defined in the MHRA in a non-exhaustive way: “‘Sex’ includes, 

but is not limited to, pregnancy, childbirth, and disabilities related to pregnancy or 

childbirth.” Id., subd. 42.

A person may enforce the provisions of the MHRA in a civil action in district court. 

Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1. To establish a defendant’s liability for unlawful 

discrimination under the MHRA, a plaintiff must prove that the person’s “protected 

characteristic actually motivated” the defendant’s decision or action. LaPoint v. Family 

Orthodontics, P.A., 892 N.W.2d 506, 514 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).

We are reviewing a district court decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. 

A district court must grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. A district court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Henry v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 625, 988 N.W.2d 

868, 880 (Minn. 2023). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, 

considering the record as a whole, could find for the nonmoving party. Frieler v. Carlson 

(codified at Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 44 (Supp. 2023)). In the same bill, the legislature 

added a definition of “gender identity,” which states as follows: “‘Gender identity’ means 

a person’s inherent sense of being a man, woman, both, or neither. A person’s gender 

identity may or may not correspond to their assigned sex at birth or to their primary or 

secondary sex characteristics. A person’s gender identity is not necessarily visible to 

others.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 48, at 1150 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, 

subd. 50 (Supp. 2023)). In addition, the legislature made it unlawful to discriminate on the 

basis of gender identity in employment, housing and real property, public accommodations, 

public services, education, and business. See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, §§ 45, 52-

61, 63-71, at 1149-50, 1152-61 (codified at Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.02, .08-.09, .11-.13, .15-

.17 (Supp. 2023)).
14

Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2008). This court applies a de novo standard 

of review to a district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment. Henry, 988 N.W.2d 

at 880.

I. Sexual-Orientation Claims

We first consider USAPL’s argument that the district court erred by granting 

Cooper’s motion for partial summary judgment on her first and third claims, which allege 

discrimination based on sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status) in a place of public 

accommodations and in business. The key question with respect to Cooper’s first and third 

claims is whether her sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status) actually motivated 

USAPL’s decision to exclude her from the women’s division of its competitions. LaPoint, 

892 N.W.2d at 514. USAPL argues that the district court erred on the ground that there 

are genuine issues of material fact. USAPL contends that it excluded Cooper from the 

women’s division of its competition for a non-discriminatory reason: that she has male 

physiology, which gives her “unmitigated strength advantages that would compromise 

principles of fair athletic competition.” USAPL contends that it did not exclude Cooper 

because of her sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status).4

4

USAPL does not admit or concede that it excluded Cooper from the women’s 

division of its competitions because of her sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status). See 

infra at C/D-1, 2, 8. To the contrary, USAPL’s brief clearly states, “USAPL determined 

Ms. Cooper should not compete in the women’s division because of unmitigated strength 

advantages that would compromise principles of fair athletic competition. There is not a 

stitch of evidence in the summary judgment record that USAPL excluded Ms. Cooper from 

the women’s division because of her gender identity.” In addition, USAPL’s brief states, 

“USAPL’s communications to Ms. Cooper consistently stated that exclusion from the

women’s division was not because of her gender identity, but because of the inherent

strength advantages enjoyed by powerlifters who have gone through male puberty,
15

A.

The supreme court repeatedly has stated that summary-judgment motions in MHRA 

cases should be analyzed according to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis if 

there is no direct evidence of discrimination. Henry, 988 N.W.2d at 883; Hansen v. Robert 

Half Int’l, Inc., 813 N.W.2d 906, 918 (Minn. 2012); Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage 

Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2001).

Under this framework, a plaintiff must first make out a prima 

facie case of discrimination. Once established, the burden then 

shifts to the [defendant] to articulate a legitimate and 

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse . . . action. The 

burden then shifts again to the plaintiff to put forward 

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the [defendant’s]

proffered explanation was pretextual.

Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918 (citations omitted); see also Aromashodu v. Swarovski N. Am. 

Ltd., 981 N.W.2d 791, 795-96 (Minn. App. 2022) (applying McDonnell Douglas in MHRA 

public-accommodations case).

The supreme court also has stated that the McDonnell Douglas analysis does not 

apply to a summary-judgment motion if the plaintiff relies on direct evidence of 

discrimination. See Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918; Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542. “Direct 

evidence establishes that . . . discrimination was purposeful, intentional or overt, such as 

where an employer announces he will not consider females for positions.” Hanson v. 

including herself.” USAPL makes other such statements elsewhere in its brief. USAPL 

has consistently maintained that its decision was not motivated by Cooper’s transgender 

status.
16

Department of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 373 (Minn. 2022) (quotations and citations 

omitted) (applying McDonnell Douglas to claim arising under whistleblower act).

B.

In this case, the district court did not apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis because 

the district court deemed Cooper’s evidence to be direct evidence of discrimination based 

on sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status). USAPL contends that the district court erred 

in that reasoning. In response, Cooper contends that the district court correctly 

characterized her evidence as direct evidence, and correctly determined that USAPL is 

liable to her as a matter of law, on the ground that USAPL adopted and enforced “a facially 

discriminatory policy.”

In support of that contention, Cooper cites only one opinion arising under the 

MHRA: Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1979) 

(3M). In 3M, the defendant had a policy that corresponded exactly to a statutory prohibition 

in the MHRA. The defendant, an employer, had adopted an “income maintenance plan” 

by which it paid short-term disability benefits to absent employees unless the absence was 

due to a pregnancy. Id. at 398. The commissioner of human rights sued, alleging that the 

employer’s policy violated an MHRA provision that made it unlawful for “‘an employer 

. . . with respect to all employment related purposes, including receipt of benefits under 

fringe benefit programs, not to treat women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 

disabilities related to pregnancy or childbirth, the same as other persons who are not so 

affected but who are similar in their ability or inability to work.’” Id. (alteration in original) 

(quoting Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2), (5) (Supp. 1977)). In other words, the 
17

employer’s policy did precisely what the MHRA said an employer could not do: deny 

fringe benefits to employees because of pregnancy. In short, the employer’s policy was a 

perfect match for a specific statutory prohibition in the MHRA. The supreme court stated 

that the employer’s plan “obviously violates” the MHRA and described the employer’s 

plan as “per se sex discrimination.” Id. at 398-400. It appears that 3M is the only MHRA 

case in which a defendant has been held to have engaged in per se discrimination.

Unlike 3M, there is no provision in the MHRA that corresponds exactly to USAPL’s 

exclusion of Cooper from the women’s division of its powerlifting competitions. The 

MHRA prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status), but 

it does not expressly and specifically prohibit a place of public accommodations or a 

business from excluding a transgender woman from the women’s division of a strengthbased athletic competition on the ground that she has male physiology, which gives her 

significant competitive advantages over cisgender women. The legislature could amend 

the MHRA to expressly and specifically prohibit such an action, but it has not done so. In 

the absence of such an amendment, USAPL’s exclusion of Cooper from the women’s 

division of its competition is neither per se discrimination, facially discriminatory, nor 

discrimination as a matter of law. USAPL’s action is discrimination based on sexual 

orientation only if a fact-finder finds, as a matter of fact, that Cooper’s transgender status 

actually motivated USAPL’s decision. See LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 514.

That USAPL’s reason for its decision is related to and intertwined with Cooper’s 

transgender status does not make it a discriminatory reason. This point is illustrated by 
18

two supreme court opinions interpreting the MHRA’s prohibitions on discrimination based 

on sex and discrimination based on marital status.

In LaPoint, the plaintiff alleged discrimination based on sex, which is defined by 

the MHRA to include pregnancy. 892 N.W.2d at 508; see also Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, 

subd. 42. After being offered a job, the plaintiff simultaneously accepted the offer and 

informed the employer that she was pregnant. Id. The employer withdrew the job offer 

one or two days later. Id. at 509. After a court trial, the district court entered judgment for 

the defendant based on findings that the defendant was motivated not by the mere fact of 

the plaintiff’s pregnancy but, rather, by the employer’s concern about the likely disruption 

arising from a long maternity leave after the plaintiff gave birth. Id. at 510-11. On appeal, 

the supreme court noted the court of appeals’ statement that the defendant’s reason for its 

decision (the length of the maternity leave) was “very closely related to LaPoint’s 

pregnancy.” Id. at 512 (emphasis added). But the supreme court rejected the plaintiff’s 

argument that the evidence “compel[led] a finding” of discrimination and deferred to the 

district court’s finding that the defendant was not motivated by the plaintiff’s pregnancy. 

Id. at 516-17.5

 The LaPoint opinion demonstrates that a defendant can make a decision 

for a non-discriminatory reason (the length of a maternity leave following a pregnancy) 

that is closely related to a discriminatory reason (pregnancy).

5

The supreme court reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the 

district court to clarify whether it would have made the same finding with a proper 

understanding of the relevance of a discriminatory animus or hostility toward pregnancy. 

LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 517-18.
19

Similarly, in Cybyske v. Independent School District No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256

(Minn. 1984), the plaintiff alleged discrimination based on marital status. Id. at 258. She 

claimed that she was not hired for a job with a school district because her husband was “a 

vocal, controversial advocate” for teachers. Id. at 258-59. On appeal from a grant of 

summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the supreme court reasoned that the defendant 

was motivated not by the plaintiff’s marital status but, rather, by her husband’s “identity 

or situation,” i.e., “who the applicant’s spouse is or what that spouse does.” Id. at 260-61. 

The Cybyske opinion also demonstrates that a defendant can make a decision for a nondiscriminatory reason (a spouse’s outspokenness) that is closely related to a discriminatory 

reason (marital status).6

The LaPoint and Cybyske opinions show that USAPL’s reason for its decision is not 

direct evidence of discrimination based on sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status), even 

though the reason is closely related to Cooper’s protected status. There is evidence that 

USAPL excluded Cooper from the women’s division of its competitions because she 

experienced puberty as a male, which gives her a competitive advantage over cisgender 

women. That reason is related to, but not the same as, Cooper’s protected transgender 

status. Indeed, the distinction between Cooper’s protected status and USAPL’s reason for 

6

The dissenting opinion cites Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979), for 

the general proposition that the MHRA forbids the use of a protected class as a criterion. 

See infra C/D-3. But the “broad” holding in Kraft was narrowed in Cybyske, which drew 

a distinction between marital status itself and a spouse’s “particular political posture.” See 

Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 260-61. After Cybyske, the legislature amended the MHRA’s 

definition of “marital status” to include, in the context of employment, “the identity, 

situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse.” 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 660, § 1, 

at 918 (now codified at Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 24 (2022)).
20

its decision is embedded within the MHRA’s definition of sexual orientation, which 

recognizes that a person’s “self-image or identity” may be different from the person’s 

“biological maleness or femaleness.” See Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 44 (2018). 

Cooper’s evidence is capable of proving unlawful discrimination based on sexual 

orientation (i.e., transgender status) only if a fact-finder finds, as a matter of fact, that 

Cooper’s transgender status (rather than her male physiology) actually motivated USAPL’s 

decision.

Thus, Cooper does not rely on direct evidence of discrimination based on sexual 

orientation (i.e., transgender status).

C.

Because Cooper relies on circumstantial evidence of discrimination based on sexual 

orientation (i.e., transgender status), we apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See 

Henry, 988 N.W.2d at 883; Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 373; Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918; 

Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542.

1.

At the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff must make out a 

prima facie case of discrimination. Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918.

“To establish a prima facie case of public-accommodation discrimination under the 

MHRA, a party must demonstrate that (1) the party is a member of a protected class, (2) 

the place of public accommodation treated the party differently, and (3) the different 

treatment was because of the party’s membership in a protected class.” Aromashodu, 981 

N.W.2d at 796 (citing Monson v. Rochester Athletic Club, 759 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Minn. App. 
21

2009), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2009)). “[T]he evidence needed for a [plaintiff] to shift 

the burden to an alleged discriminator is not onerous.” Id. A plaintiff makes out a prima 

facie case of discrimination if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, would support a finding that the plaintiff has proved the elements of her claim. 

Henry, 988 N.W.2d at 884.

The circumstantial evidence on which Cooper relies, when viewed in a light most 

favorable to her, is sufficient to allow a fact-finder to draw inferences and thereby find that 

USAPL excluded Cooper from its competitions because of her sexual orientation (i.e., 

transgender status). Thus, Cooper has established a prima facie case.

2.

At the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the burden shifts to the 

defendant “to articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse . . . 

action.” Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918.

USAPL contends that it excluded Cooper from the women’s division of its 

competitions for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason: that she has male physiology, 

which would give her an unfair competitive advantage over cisgender women. USAPL 

submitted evidence in support of this argument, including an affidavit of its president, who 

stated that USAPL’s executive committee “determined that [Cooper] should not be allowed 

to compete in the women’s division because athletes who have gone through puberty as a 

male retain significant strength advantages over those who go through puberty as a female 

and hormone replacement therapy does not materially minimize the competitive 

advantage.” The president’s affidavit is corroborated by the reports of experts, who 
22 

described the scientific bases of USAPL’s belief that persons with male physiology have a 

competitive advantage over persons with female physiology in a strength-based athletic 

competition. The president’s affidavit is consistent with the reasons expressed in the email messages that USAPL sent to Cooper in December 2018 and January 2019. 

USAPL has satisfied its burden to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Cooper’s female gender identity co-exists with her male 

physiology. But, for the reasons stated above, her male physiology and her transgender 

status are separate concepts. In essence, USAPL has asserted that its decision was based 

on Cooper’s “biological maleness,” not the fact that she has a gender identity that is 

contrary to or “not traditionally associated with” her biological maleness. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 363A.03, subd. 44 (2018). Furthermore, USAPL’s president stated in his affidavit that a 

transgender woman who transitioned before puberty would not have been excluded from 

the women’s division. He also stated in both his affidavit and his deposition testimony that 

Cooper would have been allowed to compete in the men’s division of USAPL’s 

competitions. A reasonable fact-finder could consider this evidence and find that USAPL 

did not exclude Cooper because of her transgender status.7

7

Cooper contends that, at the time of its decision, USAPL did not know whether she 

had experienced puberty as a male. In its reply brief, USAPL asserts that Cooper’s TUE 

application includes her date of birth and medical records showing the dates of her hormone 

replacement therapy. Those documents indicate that Cooper was 31 years old when she 

joined USAPL and that she had been treated for gender dysphoria within the previous five 

years. The record further reflects that Cooper transitioned in her 20s and that she legally 

changed her name in 2015 or 2016, when she was approximately 28 years old. Cooper 

does not deny that she transitioned after puberty. In any event, Cooper does not contend 

that USAPL did not actually believe that she experienced puberty as a male. A defendant’s 

asserted non-discriminatory reason is not discriminatory simply because it is incorrect, so 
23 

Thus, USAPL has satisfied its burden to produce evidence of a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. 

3. 

At the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the burden shifts back to the 

plaintiff “to put forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the [defendant’s] proffered 

explanation was pretextual.” Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918. In the more typical situation in 

which a defendant has moved for summary judgment, 

the . . . plaintiff must put forth sufficient evidence for the trier 

of fact to infer that the [defendant’s] proffered legitimate 

nondiscriminatory reason is not only pretext but that it is 

pretext for discrimination. In some cases, sufficient evidence 

may consist of only the plaintiff’s prima facie case plus 

evidence that the [defendant’s] proffered reason for its action 

is untrue. In other cases, more may be required. However, at 

all times the . . . plaintiff retains the burden of establishing that 

the defendant’s conduct was based on unlawful discrimination.

Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 546. Because we are reviewing a grant of a plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, the relevant question is whether USAPL’s evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

USAPL excluded Cooper from the women’s division of its competition “because of” her 

sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status), which requires proof that Cooper’s transgender 

status “actually motivated” USAPL’s decision. See LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 513. 

long as it was honestly and sincerely believed. See, e.g., Aromashodu, 981 N.W.2d at 798; 

Schaefer v. Cargill Kitchen Solutions, Inc., No. A16-0154, 2016 WL 6570240, *10 (Minn. 

App. Nov. 7, 2016); see also Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 

1998) (applying federal law and MHRA). 
24

For the reasons stated above, USAPL’s evidence, when viewed in a light most 

favorable to USAPL, is sufficient to allow a fact-finder to find that USAPL excluded 

Cooper from the women’s division of its competition because of her male physiology, not 

because of her sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status).8

 Thus, there are genuine issues 

of material fact on Cooper’s first and third claims, which allege discrimination based on 

sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status).9

8

USAPL does not seek an “exemption” from the MHRA’s prohibition of 

discrimination based on sexual orientation. See infra C/D-6, 7. To the contrary, USAPL 

seeks a trial at which a fact-finder will resolve conflicting evidence and make a factual 

determination as to whether USAPL excluded Cooper from the women’s division of its 

powerlifting competitions because of her sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status).

9

The difference between our conclusion and the district court’s conclusion may be 

explained by several features of the district court’s analysis. The district court set aside 

much of USAPL’s relevant evidence. The district court did not mention the affidavit of 

USAPL’s president and expressly stated that it was not considering USAPL’s expert 

reports. The district court did not recognize that USAPL’s reason for its decision—that 

Cooper has a male physiology—is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. The district 

court also reasoned that USAPL’s “motives” are irrelevant, which is contrary to caselaw 

stating that, to establish a claim of discrimination under the MHRA, a plaintiff must prove 

that his or her protected status “actually motivated” the defendant’s decision. LaPoint, 892 

N.W.2d at 513. To discern USAPL’s reason for its decision, the district court focused on 

a few internal USAPL e-mail messages, some of which were sent after Cooper’s 

ineligibility had been determined. Four times the district court quoted a small part of a 

seven-sentence e-mail message ending in “Full stop,” which was sent by USAPL’s 

president after USAPL had determined that Cooper would be ineligible. The e-mail 

message was written in response to a question from a USAPL staff member about whether 

a different powerlifter (apparently a transgender man) was required to submit to a drug test 

before a competition. USAPL contends that the e-mail message is “a stray remark 

unrelated to the decisional process.” See Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 920 (stating that 

“statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process are insufficient to 

establish a prima facie case” (quotation omitted)).
25

D.

USAPL also argues that the district court erred by not applying Goins v. West 

Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001). In that case, the plaintiff was a transgender woman 

who alleged discrimination based on sexual orientation because her employer did not allow 

her to use the women’s restrooms at her workplace. Id. at 720-23. The supreme court held 

that the plaintiff could not prove her case with direct evidence because “an employer’s 

designation of employee restroom use based on biological gender is not sexual orientation 

discrimination in violation of the MHRA.” Id. at 723. The supreme court also concluded 

that the plaintiff could not prove her case with circumstantial evidence because she failed 

to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 723-25.

In response, Cooper contends that Goins, which concerned a claim of discrimination 

in employment, does not apply to this case, which concerns claims of discrimination in 

public accommodations and in business. Cooper relies on N.H. v. Anoka-Hennepin School 

District No. 11, 950 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. App. 2020), in which we concluded that Goins

does not apply to a claim of discrimination in education. Id. at 560-61. We reasoned in 

N.H. that Goins is not binding in the education context because the issue “actually 

presented and resolved” in Goins was different from the issue presented in N.H. Id. at 561 

(quotation omitted).

Even though Goins concerned a claim of discrimination in employment, its 

reasoning tends to corroborate our conclusion that Cooper does not have direct evidence 
26

of discrimination based on sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status). See supra part I.B.10 

But Goins has less value in informing our analysis of the fact-bound question of whether 

USAPL excluded Cooper from the women’s division of its competitions because of her 

sexual orientation (i.e., transgender status). That question is a question of fact, which must 

be determined based on the evidence in this case. See LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 514.

E.

In sum, because “reasonable persons might draw different legal conclusions from 

the evidence presented,” there is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary 

judgment on Cooper’s claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation (i.e., 

transgender status). See Henry, 988 N.W.2d at 880 (quotation omitted). Thus, the district 

court erred by granting Cooper’s motion for partial summary judgment on her first and 

third claims, which allege discrimination based on sexual orientation in a place of public 

accommodations and in business.

II. Legitimate Business Purpose

We next consider USAPL’s argument that the district court erred by granting 

Cooper’s motion for partial summary judgment on her third and fourth claims, which allege 

discrimination in business. USAPL argues that the district court erred on the ground that 

there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to its statutory defense of a legitimate 

business purpose.

10At the time of Goins, the MHRA defined “sexual orientation” in the same way as 

the 2018 version of the act, which applies to this case. Compare Minn. Stat. § 363.01, 

subd. 41a (2000), with Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 44 (2018).
27

The MHRA provision on which Cooper’s business-discrimination claims are based 

provides as follows:

It is an unfair discriminatory practice for a person 

engaged in a trade or business or in the provision of a service:

. . . .

(3) to intentionally refuse to do business with, to 

refuse to contract with, or to discriminate in the basic terms, 

conditions, or performance of the contract because of a 

person’s race, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, or 

disability, unless the alleged refusal or discrimination is 

because of a legitimate business purpose.

Minn. Stat. § 363A.17(3) (emphasis added). USAPL’s defense to Cooper’s businessdiscrimination claims is based on the last clause of paragraph (3) of section 363A.17, which 

we have italicized above.

The MHRA does not define the phrase “legitimate business purpose.” See Minn. 

Stat. § 363A.03. To our knowledge, the phrase has not been interpreted by the Minnesota 

appellate courts for purposes of section 363A.17(3) of the MHRA. In Sigurdson v. Isanti 

County, 386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1986), the supreme court described the second step of the 

McDonnell Douglas analysis, which requires a defendant to produce evidence of a 

“legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions,” by stating that a district court should 

“look for evidence presented by the [defendant] that its actions were related to some 

legitimate business purpose.” Id. at 720. That statement implies that the phrase “legitimate 

business purpose” is equivalent to the phrase “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.” If 

so, a defendant’s proof of the statutory legitimate-business-purpose defense would allow 

the defendant to avoid liability even if a fact-finder found that the defendant’s decision was 
28

motivated by both the plaintiff’s protected status and a legitimate business purpose. Cf. 

Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., Inc., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623-27 (Minn. 1988)

(holding in employment context that defendant may not avoid liability upon proof of 

“mixed motive” if defendant’s decision was motived in part by plaintiff’s protected status).

The district court reasoned that USAPL has no evidence of a legitimate business 

purpose because USAPL does not have a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its 

decision. But we have concluded above that USAPL’s asserted reason for its decision—

that it excluded Cooper from the women’s division of its competitions because she has 

male physiology, which would give her an unfair competitive advantage over athletes with 

female physiology—is a non-discriminatory reason. See supra part I. For essentially the 

same reasons as are stated above, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether USAPL had a legitimate business purpose for its decision to exclude Cooper 

from the women’s division of its competitions.

Thus, the district court erred by granting Cooper’s motion for partial summary 

judgment on USAPL’s legitimate-business-purpose defense to her third and fourth claims, 

which allege discrimination based on sexual orientation and sex in business.

III. Aiding-and-Abetting Claim

By notice of related appeal, Cooper argues that the district court erred by granting

USAPL’s motion for summary judgment on her fifth claim, in which she alleges that 

USAPL-MN aided and abetted USAPL’s alleged violations of the MHRA.

Cooper’s aiding-and-abetting claim is based on the following provisions of the 

MHRA:
29

It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any person:

(1) intentionally to aid, abet, incite, compel, or 

coerce a person to engage in any of the practices forbidden by 

this chapter;

. . . .

(3) to intentionally obstruct or prevent any person 

from complying with the provisions of this chapter, or any 

order issued thereunder, or to resist, prevent, impede, or 

interfere with the commissioner or any of the commissioner’s 

employees or representatives in the performance of duty under 

this chapter.

Minn. Stat. § 363A.14. “[A] person is liable for aiding and abetting a violation of the 

MHRA when that person knows that another person’s conduct constitutes a violation of 

the MHRA and ‘gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct 

himself.’” Matthews v. Eichorn Motors, Inc., 800 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. App. 2011) 

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b)).

The district court granted USAPL’s motion for summary judgment on Cooper’s 

aiding-and-abetting claim for the following reasons:

USAPL MN is not an organization that had any separate 

existence or autonomy beyond USAPL. In other words, 

USAPL at all times remained responsible for its Minnesota 

actors’ conduct. The Minnesota actors were not acting on 

behalf of an organization separate from USAPL. [The USAPL 

representative in Minnesota] and other persons taking actions 

in Minnesota were not aiding and abetting USAPL’s violations 

of the MHRA because their actions were those of USAPL and 

not of a separate entity. Under these circumstances, aiding and 

abetting liability cannot occur.

Cooper contends in her brief that the district court erred on the ground that “there is 

no reason why an entity such as USAPL MN couldn’t similarly be held responsible for 
30

aiding and abetting discrimination within a larger organization like USAPL, to which it 

belongs.” At oral argument, Cooper asserted that USAPL-MN aided and abetted USAPL 

by voting for an exclusionary policy in mid-2019, after she was excluded from the 

competitions in early 2019.

These arguments fail because Cooper has not shown that the district court erred by 

determining that USAPL-MN is not an “entity” or “organization.” Cooper contends that 

USAPL’s Minnesota representative testified in his deposition about a “state chapter” and 

a “state organization.” But the representative actually testified that there is no such statelevel entity, that “the only formally incorporated organization is USAPL,” and that his role 

was to represent the USAPL members who lived in Minnesota. The Minnesota 

representative’s testimony is consistent with the affidavit of USAPL’s president, who 

stated that “USAPL operates on a national level as one organization, not state by state with 

multiple state organizations” and that USAPL’s “policies and procedures—including the 

policy challenged in this lawsuit—are set at the national level, not on a state-by-state 

basis.”

Cooper has not identified any evidence that contradicts the Minnesota 

representative’s deposition testimony or the president’s affidavit. Accordingly, Cooper has 

not identified a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there is a state-level 

organization known as USAPL-MN, whether some persons acted on behalf of USAPLMN but not on behalf of USAPL, and whether any such persons took action on behalf of 

USAPL-MN to support or encourage the actions of USAPL that are challenged in this case.
31

Thus, the district court did not err by granting USAPL’s motion for summary 

judgment on Cooper’s fifth claim, which alleges aiding and abetting discrimination.

IV. Injunctive Relief

We last address USAPL’s argument that the district court erred by ordering 

injunctive relief. Specifically, USAPL argues that the district court erred by enjoining 

USAPL from excluding transgender female athletes from the women’s division of its 

competitions, by requiring USAPL to submit a proposed new policy, by enjoining USAPL 

from holding competitions or selling memberships in Minnesota, and by making such 

orders before final judgment.

We need not consider or resolve these arguments. We have concluded that the district 

court erred by granting Cooper’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to her 

first, third, and fourth claims. See supra parts I & II. Accordingly, there is no 

determination of liability on any of Cooper’s claims. Thus, there is no legal basis for 

injunctive relief.

DECISION

The district court erred by granting Cooper’s motion for partial summary judgment 

on her first and third claims, which allege discrimination based on sexual orientation in a 

place of public accommodation and in business, because there are genuine issues of 

material fact as to whether USAPL’s decision to exclude Cooper from competing in the 

women’s division of its competitions was motivated by her sexual orientation (i.e., 

transgender status).
32

The district court erred by granting Cooper’s motion for partial summary judgment 

on her third and fourth claims, which allege discrimination based on sexual orientation and 

sex in business, because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether USAPL’s 

decision is justified by a legitimate business purpose.

The district court did not err by granting USAPL’s motion for summary judgment 

on Cooper’s fifth claim, which alleges aiding and abetting discrimination by USAPL-MN, 

because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the non-existence of such an 

entity.

In light of our decision that the district court erred by granting Cooper’s motion for 

partial summary judgment on her first, third, and fourth claims, there is no legal basis for 

injunctive relief. We therefore reverse the district court’s February 27, 2023 and April 11, 

2023 orders for injunctive relief.

We remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
C/D-1

FRISCH, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part)

This matter involves undisputed direct evidence of public-accommodations 

discrimination. Appellant USA Powerlifting (USAPL) admits that it excluded respondent 

JayCee Cooper, a transgender woman, from eligibility to compete in powerlifting 

competitions in the women’s division because of her protected transgender status. 

Minnesota law forbids the use of a protected status as a criterion for such an exclusion. 

There is no statutory exemption or other defense to liability for this form of discrimination 

in public accommodations. Because a reasonable fact-finder could only conclude that 

USAPL violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.44

(2018), the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper on her 

public-accommodations transgender-discrimination claim and enjoined USAPL from 

continuing to engage in illegal discrimination. This is not a close case.

USAPL’s own evidence establishes that it revoked Cooper’s competition eligibility 

because of her transgender status.1

 Contemporaneous with its decision to exclude, USAPL 

informed Cooper that “[m]ale-to-female transgenders are not allowed to compete as 

females in our static strength sport as it is a direct competitive advantage.” This is direct 

evidence of public-accommodations discrimination under the MHRA. Minn. Stat. 

§ 363A.11, subd. 1 (prohibiting denial to any person “the full and equal enjoyment of the 

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public 

accommodation” because of a person’s protected status); Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 

1 Cooper uses the phrase “transgender status” in her brief to this court, and I therefore do 

the same.
C/D-2

717, 722 (Minn. 2001) (acknowledging that direct evidence of discriminatory motive exists 

when a statement or policy is discriminatory on its face); Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 

N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986) (explaining that direct evidence of discriminatory motive 

exists “where an employer announces he will not consider females for positions”). And 

USAPL admits that its policy is to exclude transgender athletes. In its brief to this court, 

USAPL concedes that “the USAPL transgender policy is ‘facially discriminatory’ in the 

most generic sense of the term because it precludes transgender women from competing in 

the women’s division.” (Emphasis added.) USAPL also acknowledges in its brief to this 

court that the following statement from USAPL’s president “simply summarizes the 

policy”: “We do not allow male to female transgender athletes at all. Full stop.” 

(Emphasis added.) It is therefore undisputed that USAPL denied Cooper the full and equal 

enjoyment of its services because of her protected transgender status.2

 

Notwithstanding the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact as to its 

discriminatory action, USAPL argues that summary judgment was improper because it 

presented evidence that it did not intend to discriminate against Cooper because of her 

transgender status and instead intended to exclude Cooper because the “biological 

maleness” of transgender women affords a competitive advantage. This proffered rationale 

does not make its action any less discriminatory under the plain and unambiguous terms of 

the MHRA and our caselaw for three primary reasons. 

2 Because Cooper established her discrimination claim through direct evidence, the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply. That “framework applies 

on summary judgment when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial rather than direct evidence” 

of discrimination. Henry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 988 N.W.2d 868, 883 (Minn. 2023).
C/D-3 

First, the stated rationale is still discriminatory based on transgender status. 

USAPL’s stated rationale cannot be separated from the essence of the protected status of a 

transgender person because, as the legislature expressly recognized, biology is necessarily 

intertwined with a person’s transgender status. Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 44. By 

defining sexual orientation as “having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity 

not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness,” the legislature 

anticipated—and prohibited—the consideration of biology to discriminate against 

transgender people. Id. (emphasis added). 

Second, the stated rationale operates only to segregate people in a protected class 

and exclude them from enjoying USAPL’s services. The supreme court has determined 

that the use of a protected class as a criterion to exclude is forbidden under the MHRA. 

Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979) (holding that anti-nepotism policy 

denying full-time employment to individuals married to persons already employed fulltime by the employer constitutes a discriminatory practice based on marital status within 

the meaning of the MHRA). Cooper’s transgender status was a necessary and 

undisguisable reason for USAPL’s decision to exclude, which is exactly what the MHRA 

outlaws.3

 And USAPL’s assertion that it intended to exclude only a subset of transgender 

people does not make its policy any less discriminatory because the MHRA protects 

3 Although the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply here, the 

result would be the same even if it did because USAPL’s stated rationale is inextricably 

intertwined with Cooper’s transgender status and is therefore not a legitimate and 

nondiscriminatory reason to exclude. See Hansen v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 813 N.W.2d 

906, 918 (Minn. 2012) (identifying burden to “articulate a legitimate and 

nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action). 
C/D-4

Cooper individually from discrimination based on her transgender status. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 363A.11 (deeming it an “unfair discriminatory practice” to “deny any person” full and 

equal enjoyment of public accommodations based on a protected status (emphasis added)); 

cf. Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740-41 (2020) (explaining that 

Title VII protects individuals rather than groups); Henry, 988 N.W.2d at 880 (explaining 

that Minnesota courts look to federal caselaw arising under Title VII in interpreting the 

MHRA). The MHRA and Minnesota caselaw prohibit USAPL from considering 

transgender status at all in a decision to exclude.4

 USAPL readily admitted during oral 

argument that the MHRA would plainly forbid USAPL’s policy if it precluded competition 

by people of a certain race, or national origin, or religion. So, too, does the MHRA prohibit 

a policy of exclusion based on gender identity. The legislature did not establish a hierarchy 

among protected classes. Transgender people are no less protected by the MHRA than any 

other protected class of people. 

Third, USAPL’s stated rationale does not negate liability. Even assuming as true 

that USAPL was motivated in part by what it characterizes as nondiscriminatory factors, 

such an assumption does not shield USAPL from liability because the undisputed evidence 

establishes that USAPL was also motivated by discriminatory factors. That there may be 

4 USAPL’s argument that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether it acted 

with a discriminatory motive is likewise unavailing. A “finding of animus, in the sense of 

dislike or hostility, is not necessary for a forbidden criterion to actually motivate” a 

decision. LaPoint v. Fam. Orthodontics, P.A., 892 N.W.2d 506, 517 (Minn. 2017) 

(quotation omitted). Even so, the record contains evidence of USAPL officials mocking, 

insulting, and dehumanizing both Cooper specifically and transgender people generally. I 

do not repeat this evidence of animus here as it is not necessary to the disposition of the 

legal issues presented to the court.
C/D-5

more than one reason for USAPL’s decision is not a defense to liability when one of those 

reasons is discriminatory; Minnesota has expressly rejected the “mixed motive” doctrine, 

by which a party may avoid liability if it proves that it would have reached the same 

decision notwithstanding a discriminatory basis for its decision. Anderson v. Hunter, 

Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Minn. 1988). That is because “the public 

policy of eradicating discrimination” is frustrated by denying a victim of discrimination 

the remedies afforded by the MHRA. Id. Therefore, even accepting USAPL’s argument 

that it had a claimed nondiscriminatory rationale in excluding Cooper, USAPL is still liable 

because the undisputed evidence shows that USAPL also excluded Cooper from 

competition because she is transgender. LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 514 (emphasizing that a 

plaintiff “proves her case if she establishes that the protected characteristic actually 

motivated” the conduct (quotation omitted)). Summary judgment was proper because the 

undisputed facts establish that USAPL intended to discriminate and did discriminate 

against Cooper based on her protected transgender status. Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.03, 

subd. 44, .11. 

The legislature has not established an exemption in the MHRA for this brand of 

discrimination. The legislature has created other exemptions from liability for publicaccommodations discrimination. Most notably, Minn. Stat. § 363A.24, subd. 2, provides:

The provisions of section 363A.11 relating to sex, do 

not apply to restricting membership on an athletic team or in a 

program or event to participants of one sex if the restriction is 

necessary to preserve the unique character of the team, 

program, or event and it would not substantially reduce 

comparable athletic opportunities for the other sex.
C/D-6

(Emphasis added.) USAPL agrees that this exemption, by its express and unambiguous 

terms, applies only to claims of discrimination based on sex, which is separately defined 

in the MHRA and does not include gender identity. Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 42. The 

exemption does not apply to claims of discrimination based on any other protected class, 

including gender identity, formerly defined in the MHRA as an aspect of sexual orientation. 

Compare Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 44 (2018) (defining sexual orientation), with Minn. 

Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 50 (Supp. 2023) (defining gender identity). 

USAPL argues that the exemption applies to its discriminatory action because its 

decision to exclude Cooper was based only on sex. This argument is belied by USAPL’s 

own admissions and the undisputed evidence establishing that USAPL’s decision to 

exclude Cooper was also based on her transgender status, which is not subject to any 

statutory exemption. Cooper’s sex- and transgender-discrimination claims are not 

mutually exclusive;5 Minnesota law does not prohibit an aggrieved party belonging to more 

than one protected class from asserting multiple claims of discrimination under the MHRA. 

See, e.g., Aromashodu v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd., 981 N.W.2d 791, 796-98 (Minn. App. 

2022) (holding that a Black and Muslim plaintiff had triable issues of fact on claims of 

public-accommodations discrimination based on her race and religion). 

Alternatively, USAPL urges us to recognize an exemption for its discriminatory 

action because requiring the inclusion of transgender women in the women’s powerlifting 

division creates an unfair competitive advantage. It is true that USAPL produced expert 

5 Cooper has also asserted a sex-discrimination claim. That claim is not the subject of this 

appeal and is currently pending before the district court.
C/D-7 

reports supporting this position. But whether a claimed unfair competitive advantage 

should operate as a defense to the provisions relating to public-accommodations 

discrimination under the MHRA is a policy decision for the legislature, not the courts.6

 In 

contrast to the legislature’s adoption of a “legitimate business purpose” defense to business 

discrimination in Minn. Stat. § 363A.17(3), the legislature did not provide for such a 

defense for claims of public-accommodations discrimination. If the legislature had 

intended to allow for such a defense to public-accommodations discrimination, it would 

have said so. It did not. And we cannot graft this defense into the public-accommodations 

provisions of the MHRA because doing so would “encroach upon the right of the 

legislature to enact law by writing into a statute what the legislature did not.” Pfeiffer v. 

Allina Health Sys., 851 N.W.2d 626, 638 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted) (citing 

Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2005)); In re 

Petition of Minn. Power & Light Co., 435 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. App. 1989) (explaining 

that we do not interpret statutes “to include language which is clearly not there”); see also 

Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590-91 (Minn. 2012) (declining to add language to 

6 I appreciate the participation of, information furnished by, and public-policy arguments 

from the amici, who represent parties interested in this matter. But “our task in this case, 

like any other, is not to make legislative policy but to interpret and apply existing statutes.” 

RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 77-78 n.5 (Minn. 2015); Dahlin v. 

Kroening, 796 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn. 2011) (considering competing public-policy 

arguments related to judgment renewals and holding that “policy-related issues are best left 

to the Legislature. When interpreting the statutes, it is our role to rely on what the 

Legislature intended over what may appear to be supported by public policy.”). 
C/D-8

the statute that the legislature did not include); Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 

431, 438 (Minn. 2009) (refusing to rewrite statute).

Given the undisputed direct evidence of discrimination and entry of summary 

judgment in Cooper’s favor, the district court properly enjoined USAPL from continuing 

to violate the MHRA. The district court afforded USAPL ample warning and multiple 

opportunities to amend its policy and practices to comport with the MHRA. When USAPL 

was either unable or unwilling to do so, the district court fulfilled its obligation under Minn. 

Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 6, by ordering appropriate relief that, in this case, enjoined USAPL 

from continuing to conduct business in Minnesota in violation of the MHRA. This action 

is expressly authorized, if not required, by the MHRA once a court determines that a 

defendant has engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice. Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, 

subd. 6; see Minn. Stat. § 363A.29, subd. 3 (directing that where a court finds that a party 

has engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice, the judge shall issue an order that the 

discriminating party “cease and desist from the unfair discriminatory practice” and “take 

such affirmative action” as the court determines “will effectuate the purposes of this 

chapter); see also Minn. Stat. § 363A.04 (directing that the MHRA shall be “construed 

liberally” to accomplish its purposes of eradiating illegal discrimination). 

In sum, the district court properly granted summary judgment in Cooper’s favor on 

her public-accommodations discrimination claim because there is no issue to be tried. To 

prove her claim, Cooper was required to show that USAPL denied her the full and equal 

enjoyment of its services because of her protected transgender status. USAPL concedes 

that it did so. Although USAPL argues that a fact-finder must determine whether its 
C/D-9

discrimination was justified, this defense is not available under the MHRA and thus does 

not present an issue for trial. Cooper was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

on her public-accommodations transgender-discrimination claim based on the undisputed 

material facts. Accordingly, with respect to the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment on Cooper’s public-accommodations discrimination claim, I respectfully dissent 

from the opinion of the court because the undisputed direct evidence establishes that 

USAPL violated the MHRA by intending to exclude and then actually excluding Cooper 

from competition eligibility because she is a transgender person. I would therefore affirm 

the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment and injunctive relief on Cooper’s 

claim for transgender discrimination in public accommodations. I concur with the result 

reached by the court as to the remaining issues.