NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0388n.06 F iled: July 1, 2008 No. 07-1685 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. GA RY DE WAY

NE WI L L I S, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appea l from th e Uni ted States Dis t ri ct Court for the Wester n District of Michig an

B e fo re : B OG GS, Chi e f Jud g e ; and RY ANand

CO L E, Cir c uit

Judg e s. PER CU RI AM . O n Jan

ua ry 22 , 2 00 7, Willi s p le a de d guil ty to bei ng a fe lon in po sse ssi on of a fi re arm , in viol a tio n of 18 U. S.C. § 922 (g )( 1) , an d pos se ssi on of c ra c k c oc a ine wi th intent to dist ribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1 ). The proba tion officer

who pre pare d Wil lis’s Presentenc e Investig ation Report (“ PSR ”) r ecommend e d a f o u r - le v e l e nh a

n c e me nt pur suant t o U
. S
. S
. G
. § 2 K 2
. 1 ( b ) ( 6 ) f o r p o s s e s s i o no f

a f i r e a r m i n c o n n e c t i o nw i t han o t h e r f e l o n y, n a m e l y, drugtraff icking . This led to a total offe nse leve l of 23 and a g uideline ra ng e for imprisonment of 92 to 115 months. The sentencingcourt ove rruled Willis’s objection to t h e en hance ment and
se nte nc e d Wil lis to 1 04 months of imp ri so nme nt. We a ff

ir m.No. 07-1685

Un ite d St a te s v . Wil lis

- 2 - We reviewthe district court’s f actua l findings f

or cle ar e rror . United States v. Richardson , 510 F.3d 622, 625 ( 6th Cir. 2007). We g ive “due defe renc e to t he district cour t’s application of the g uidelines to the fac ts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). How ever , whether the fac ts found by

the district court “wa rra nt the application of a

particula r guideline provision” is a question of l aw, which we r eview de novo. Richardson , 510 F.3d at 625. U. S.S. G. § 2 K2 .1 (b )( 6) pr ov ide s: I f t he de fe nd ant u se d o r p os se sse d a ny fi re arm or a mmunit ion

in c onne c tio n w ith ano the r f e lony of fe ns e ; or po sse sse d o r tr ans fe rr e d any fi re arm or a mmunit ion wi th kn ow le dg e , inte nt, or

re a so n to be lie ve th at it w ou ld b e us e d o r p os se sse d in c onne c tio n w ithano the r f e lony of fe ns e , in c re a se by

4 le ve ls. Ap pli c a tio n Not e 14 , whi c h disc us se s the me anin g of “ in c onne c tio n w ith ,” state s th a t “ in t he c a se of a drugtr a ff

ic kin g of fe ns e in whic h a

fi re arm is f ound in c los e pr oximi ty

to d ru g s, drug -manufa ctur ing materials, or dr ug para pherna lia[,] . . . application of [the four- level enhanc ement] is warra

nted bec ause the prese nce of the fire arm ha s the p o t ential of fa cilitating another felony offe nse . . .” Fur thermore , our circ uit has adopted the “ fortre s s t h eo ry ,” in interpre ting “ in connec tion with.” United States v. Enne nga , 2 63 F .3 d 4 99 , 5 03 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) . U nd e r the fo rt re ss t he or y , if it rea s o n a b ly a p p e ar s th a t t

h e f ir e ar m i s u s e d to p r o te c t t

h e dr u g s o r o th e r w is e f a c il it a te a drug transac tion then a sufficie nt c onnection is established. Un ite d S tates v . H e nr y , 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6 th C ir . 1 98 9) . In o the r w or ds , “ § 2 K2 .1 a pp lie s ‘ if the firearm h a d s ome e mbo lde nin g ro le in defe ndant’s fe lonious conduct.’” Ennenga , 2 6 3 F. 3 d at 5 0 3 (q u o t i n g United States v. Polanco , 93 F.3d 555, 567 ( 9th Cir. 1996)).No. 07-1685

Un ite d St a te s v . Wil lis

- 3 - Wil lis arg ues that he ke pt the g un for se lf-prote ction beca use the ne ighbor

hood was da ng e ro us and

that he wo uld

have c arr ie d th e gun

e ve n if he ha d n ot b e e n s e lli ngdr ug s. Willi s, ho we ve r, do e s n ot o bje c t to the jud g e ’s fa c tua l fin din g s that: (1 ) bot h the g un and

the dr ug s w e re in the passeng er c ompartment of the c ar; (2) the g un was the ty pe of firea

rm used by people who a re
e ng a g e d in

dr ugde a lin g ; ( 3) the fi re arm wa s lo a de d; a

nd , mos t im

po rt antl y , ( 4) the g un

po te nti a lly
c ou ld b e us e d in the c ours e of a dr ugtr ans a c tio n. Un de r b oth Ap pli c a tio n N ote 14 and the fo rt re ss theory , these fac ts w ere sufficie nt to establish that the gun w as used “ in connec tion with” Wi llis’s drugtraff icking activities. Wil lis also objects to the judge ’s consider ation of fa ctors dis c u s s e d in United States v. Mose s , 289 F.3d 847, 850 ( 6th C i r. 2 002), a c ase that examined “whether a fire arm wa s relate d to a particula r drug offe nse” unde r U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)( 1). Will is argues that bec ause § 2K2.1, unlike § 2D1.1(b)( 1), does not have a burde n shifting pr ovision, the se ntencing judge err ed in re ly ing on the Mo se s fac tors. Most significa ntly , Wil lis arg ues t hat a c ourt ca nnot consider “ the lack of an
acc eptable a lternative r eason f or the pre sence of a f

irea rm” if it has “ not found that the firearm fac ilitated or had the pote ntial to faci l i t at e another felony offe nse.” A

ppellant’s B r. 15. Will is’s
o bjections are unfounded. The judge clea rly understood that the g overnme nt bore the bur den of proof; indeed, he expli citly stated that: “ [T] he burden is on the g overnme nt to show that the gun was used for a drugtraff

icking offe nse. . . . The g overnme nt has the burde n on that, but then y ou can look at the same things you look at under 2D 1.1 as fa r as what fac tors there are .” Our c ircuit has, in sepa

rate case s, fo u n d t h e first three Mo se s fac tors to be re levant to a § 2K2.1 inquiry
. See, e .g. , United States v. Burns , 498 F.3d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that theNo. 07-1685

Un ite d St a te s v . Wil lis

- 4 - pr oximi ty of the fi re arm to t he dr ug s is re le va

nt) ; United States v. Huffman , 461 F .3 d 777 , 7 88 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) (h old ingthat th e ty pe of fi re arm is r e le va nt) ; United States v. Burk e , 345 F.3d 416, 427 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) (h old ingthat w he the r t he fi re arm wa s loa de d is re le va nt)
. Thus , the c ourt

pr op e rl y relied on those sa

me fa ctors in conc luding that the g overnme nt had met its burden. F inally , it was ap p ro p ri at e f

o r t h e c o u rt t o co n s i d er W i l l i s ’s al t ern at i v e ex p l an at i o n fo r p o s s es s i n g t h e gu n . T h o u gh Wil lis did not need to provide an explanation, once he proffere d one, the judg e cle arly could consider
and re je c t it . T hat is , w hil e the g ov e rnme nt b e ars the burd e n o f p ro of , th e ju dge do es no t ha

ve to take the de fenda

nt’s explanation at fac e value, e specia lly when the e x planation was a s dubious as the one Willis tender ed. Willi s’ s se nte nc e wa s w ith in t he Gu ide lin e s. As su c h, it may be afford e d a re bu tta ble presumption of re asonable ness, Rita v . United States , 1 27 S. Ct . 2 45 6, 24 62 (2 00 7) , a nd thi s c ir c uit does so. United States v. Vonne r , 516 F.3d 382, 3 8 9 (6 t h C i r. 2008) ( en banc ). Will is has not demonstrated that the judge failed to c onsider a n y o f t h e rele vant § 3553(a ) fa ctors; nor ha s he de mon strat ed th at the jud g e re lie d o n a ny imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s. F ina lly , th e jud g e c le arl y
c on sid e re d Wil lis ’s argume nt f or a lo wer sen ten ce a

nd e xpla ine d th e ba sis fo r r e je c tin g it. Thus , Willi s’ s se nte nc e is b oth

su bs tanti ve ly

and pr oc e dura lly

re a so na ble , a nd we AF F I RM i t.