J-A08027-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA, 

Appellant

v.

WILLIE A. WILLIAMS, 

Appellee

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 71 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order November 29, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0009535-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 1, 2018

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting Willie A. Williams’ 

post-sentence motion in arrest of judgment and vacating his convictions on

two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver 

(PWID), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and one count of criminal conspiracy, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 903.1 After our review, we affirm.

The facts of this case are as follows: 

On August 31, 2015, Police Officer [Dierta] Cuffie and other 

members of the Narcotics Field Unit set up a narcotics surveillance

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1 Williams was also convicted of knowing and intelligent possession of a 

controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) (ungraded misdemeanor) and 

tampering with evidence, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910. The court denied the motion 

in arrest of judgment with respect to those convictions.
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at 6742 North 18th Street [in Philadelphia], due to numerous 

complaints of drug sales at that address. The house was 

registered to Daniel Simons. A confidential informant (“CI”) was 

provided with pre-recorded buy money, and knocked on the 

door[,] which was opened by Mr. Simons. The CI spoke with Mr. 

Simons, who then made a phone call. Thereafter, a Neon 

automobile approached, an unknown black male exited the 

vehicle, and went inside the property. The CI returned and turned 

over to the officers one purple packet of crack cocaine. The Neon 

and unknown black male were not stopped or seen [again]. 

Appellee Mr. Williams was not seen at all during this incident. On 

September 1, 2015, the surveillance operation was again made 

on that property. The CI went to the house. Simons was outside, 

and spoke with the CI, who gave Simons the pre-recorded buy 

money. Simons made a phone call, and shortly thereafter, a Buick 

automobile appeared and parked in front of the house. Appellee 

Williams then exited the house, entered the Buick, exited the 

Buick, then re-entered the property, along with Simons and the 

CI. The CI returned and turned over crack cocaine. The Buick 

was not stopped or seen again. On September 2, 2015, police 

again set up the surveillance operation. The CI went to the house, 

knocked on the door, and was admitted by Mr. Simons. The CI

returned with two purple packets of crack cocaine. Appellee 

Williams again was not present. Later on September 2, 2015, 

police executed a search warrant for the property. During the 

execution of the warrant, Police Officer Weaver, who was in the 

back of the property, observed white Styrofoam particles falling

from the side of the air conditioning unit in the second floor rear 

window of the property. Appellee Williams was arrested along 

with the other people in the home, but was not found to be in 

possession of either drugs or money. In the room where he was 

arrested, which is the room where the police officer observed 

Styrofoam falling from the window, police recovered one packet 

containing 16 purple packets of crack cocaine near a window air 

conditioner unit, two clear baggies of powder cocaine on a dresser, 

$20 in pre-recorded buy money from under a mattress, $256 in 

cash, a yellow probation card, with Williams’ name, and Williams’ 

ID card, listing his address as 7205 North 21st Street. Simons was 

arrested in the middle bedroom, and recovered from him was 

$4.00, a door key and a letter listing his address as the house 

being searched, 6742 North 18th Street. No cell phones were 

recovered. 
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/17, at 1-3. 

Following a bench trial before the Honorable Tracy Brandeis-Roman, 

Williams was convicted of two counts of PWID, one count of conspiracy, one 

count of knowing and intelligent possession of a controlled substance, and one 

count of tampering with evidence. The court sentenced Williams to 111⁄2 to 

23 months’ incarceration on the tampering with evidence conviction, with 

immediate parole, and one year of probation for each of the remaining four 

convictions, to run consecutively. 

Williams filed a post-sentence motion claiming that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain his two PWID convictions and his conspiracy conviction. 

The court granted Williams’ motion and vacated those convictions. The 

Commonwealth filed this timely appeal, raising the following issues for our 

review:

1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant’s 

convictions for possessing a controlled substance with intent 

to deliver, where defendant was arrested in a room with 

numerous packets of crack cocaine and hundreds of dollars 

in cash, including pre-recorded buy money? 

2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant’s 

conviction for criminal conspiracy, where defendant aided 

his conspirator in selling three packets and one chunk of 

crack cocaine to a confidential informant?

Appellant’s Brief, at 1.

The standard of review for the trial court as it passes upon a 

motion in arrest of judgment, is limited to a determination of the 

absence or presence of that quantum of evidence necessary to 

establish the elements of the crime. The trial court is required to 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
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Commonwealth, as verdict winner, and may not alter the verdict 

based on a redetermination of credibility or a re-evaluation of the 

evidence. Before granting an arrest of judgment, the trial court 

must find the evidence supporting the verdict to be so weak and 

inconclusive that a jury of reasonable persons would not have 

been satisfied as to the accused’s guilt. . . . It [is] not the function 

of the trial court, in reviewing post-trial motions, to reweigh the 

evidence presented at trial.

Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 611 A.2d 301, 303-04 (Pa. Super. 1992) 

(citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Marquez, 980 A.2d 145, 

148 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). Further, “[t]he Commonwealth’s burden 

may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the 

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the factfinder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be 

drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 

141 A.3d 523, 525 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 

42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012)).

In his motion, Williams claimed the Commonwealth did not prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt “that he either possessed the narcotics with intent 

to deliver, actually sold or delivered narcotics, or was part of a conspiracy to 

sell or deliver narcotics.” Post-Sentence Motion, 11/23/16, at ¶ 6. Williams 

argued: 

[He] was never seen on the first day of the narcotics surveillance. 

He was seen on the second day but he was never seen interacting 

with the CI in any direct manner. He was not seen on the third 

day prior to the execution of the search warrant. Instead, Mr. 

Simons was seen all three days. In fact, Mr. Simons was the only 

one seen interacting with the CI. Mr. Simons is seen answering 

the door to the home on two occasions and on the third occasion 

he is seen already outside and accepts money from the CI. Mr. 
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Simons is the one who owns the house [about which] police 

received complaints of narcotics sales and those complaints 

specifically mention a Daniel Simons. The Commonwealth 

likewise failed to present sufficient evidence that [Williams] was 

involved in a criminal conspiracy to sell or deliver narcotics. 

[Williams] is never seen interacting with either Mr. Simons or the 

CI on any of the days. 

Id. at ¶ 8. Williams further claimed that the Commonwealth did not argue, 

or present expert testimony to establish, that the circumstances of the arrest 

or narcotics recovery indicated possession with intent to deliver. Id. at ¶ 7. 

Finally, Williams contended that the Commonwealth likewise failed to present 

evidence of criminal conspiracy, stating that he was never seen on day one or 

day three of the surveillance, and was “never seen interacting with either Mr. 

Simons or the CI on any of the days.” Id. at ¶ 9. 

The Commonwealth would argue seeing [Williams] on one day 

enter the house with the CI and Mr. Simons, his presence in this 

house where drugs are sold, his identification with the money and 

his arrest near where the drugs were recovered is enough. 

However, on cross-examination, this evidence [i]s admitted to be 

perhaps incorrect. The Officer could not know who else 

might have been in the house on any given date and 

admitted [Williams] never directly interacted with the CI 

or Mr. Simons. She admitted there were other individuals 

in the home, potentially in the same room as [Williams] 

during the search, that were not arrested. She admitted 

that the identification might not have been with the money.

Given these admissions on cross-examination, the Commonwealth

has not shown that [Williams] was part of a drug selling 

conspiracy. 

Id. (emphasis added).

The Controlled Substances Act defines PWID as follows:

(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the 

Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
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 * * * *

(30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, 

or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 

substance by a person not registered under this act, or a 

practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State 

board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent 

to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.

35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(30). A person is guilty of conspiracy with another 

person or persons to commit a crime if, with the intent of promoting or 

facilitating its commission, he: 

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or 

more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime 

or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or 

commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903. 

The Commonwealth maintains that the evidence presented at trial 

established that Williams “helped his co-conspirator Daniel Simons sell crack 

cocaine to a confidential informant.” Appellant’s Brief, at 8. The 

Commonwealth also argues that Williams “was arrested in a room containing 

numerous packets of crack cocaine and hundreds of dollars in cash, including 

$20 of pre-recorded buy money” and therefore the evidence was sufficient to 

convict him of PWID and criminal conspiracy. Id. 

Even viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

Commonwealth did not prove constructive possession. See Commonwealth 

v. Macolino, 469 A.2d 132, 134 (Pa. 1983) (constructive possession is “the 
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ability to exercise a conscious dominion over the illegal substance: the power 

to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control.”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 480 A.2d 1035, 1045 (Pa. Super. 1984) (“where 

more than one person has equal access to where drugs are stored, presence 

alone in conjunction with such access will not prove conscious dominion over 

the contraband.”). “Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set 

of facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than not.” 

Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. 1986). Where more 

than one person has equal access, the Commonwealth must present evidence 

showing either defendant’s participation in the drug-related activity, or 

evidence connecting defendant to the specific room or area where the 

contraband was kept. Commonwealth v. Bricker, 882 A.2d 1008 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). Our review of the record indicates that the Commonwealth 

presented neither.

The Commonwealth presented no evidence that Williams engaged in a 

drug transaction with the CI, and no evidence that Williams ever interacted 

with Simons or the CI at any time during the surveillance or execution of the 

search warrant. N.T. Trial, supra at 28. Further, Officer Cuffie acknowledged 

that no drugs or money were found in Williams’ possession at the time of 

arrest. Id. at 36. 

As noted above, Officer Cuffie testified that at the time of the search

“there could have been someone else in the room [with Williams]. There 

w[ere] other people in the house.” N.T. Trial, supra at 31. Officer Cuffie 
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stated there were a couple of women in the house. Id. at 32. Williams did 

not reside in that house with Simons. The only thing connecting Williams to 

the room where the drugs and money were found was his identification, which, 

on cross-examination, Officer Cuffie acknowledged might not have been with 

the money found in the room, but may have been somewhere “in the room.” 

Id. at 36. Further, the parties stipulated that there was no paperwork 

indicating that Williams was associated with the address under surveillance. 

Id. at 27. Finally, Officer Cuffie acknowledged that paraphernalia was found 

in the same room where Williams was arrested, supporting the inference that 

Williams was a user, and not a seller. Id. at 37. In light of the fact there 

were two other individuals present with equal access, and the inconclusive 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth, we conclude that the inference of 

constructive possession is not appropriate here. 

We are satisfied that the court did not engage in a reevaluation of the 

evidence or a redetermination of credibility. Bigelow, supra. In fact, at the 

hearing on post-sentence motions, the trial court stated the following on the 

record: “I thought I heard something that I didn’t hear. When I read the 

[notes of testimony], I realized that I thought there was something else that 

was said and it wasn’t, so I apologize to both of you.” N.T. Hearing on PostSentence Motion, 11/29/16, at 6-7. 

In conclusion, we find that the record, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, reveals that the Commonwealth failed to establish 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams possessed controlled substances with 
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the intent to deliver or that he conspired with Simons to do so. The “web of 

circumstantial evidence” is simply too fragmented to support the convictions. 

Marquez, supra at 150. We conclude, therefore, that there was simply 

insufficient evidence to establish that Williams was guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt of PWID and conspiracy. We affirm the trial court’s order granting 

Williams’ post-sentence motion in arrest of judgment. 

Order affirmed.

Judge Panella joins this Memorandum.

Judge Strassburger files a Dissenting Memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/1/18