Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1512-CR-2260 | June 29, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Megan Shipley

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Eldridge,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 29, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1512-CR-2260

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Barbara Crawford, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G09-1411-F6-51834

Baker, Judge.
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[1] Michael Eldridge appeals his convictions for Residential Entry,1 a Level 6 

felony, and Resisting Law Enforcement,2 a class A misdemeanor. He argues 

that the trial court erroneously admitted a 911 call into evidence. Eldridge also 

seeks review of a fine that is listed on his sentencing order, even though the trial 

court found him indigent as to fines and costs. Finding no error in the 

admission of the 911 call, but finding that the sentencing order needs 

clarification, we affirm and remand. 

Facts

[2] At around 1:00 a.m. on November 14, 2014, Indianapolis Police Officers Dane 

Elkins and Bryan Zotz received a report of a burglary in progress at 3050 

Central Avenue. The report described the suspect as a Black male in a black 

hoodie. Riding in the same marked police car, both officers arrived at the scene 

in less than one minute. 

[3] When the officers arrived at the location of the reported burglary, they noticed 

that there were broken windows and that some lights were on inside the 

residence. They also noticed a man standing inside the door of the house. This 

man, later identified as Eldridge, matched the description of the suspect from 

the report. Because this particular area of Central Avenue is lined with street 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5. 

2

Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a). 
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lights, the officers were able to get good glimpses of Eldridge’s face. As the 

officers emerged from their police car, Eldridge exited the house and began 

running toward the back of the house. At this point, Officer Elkins drew his 

weapon, repeatedly ordered Eldridge to show his hands, and ran after him. 

Officer Zotz, meanwhile, ran across to the other side of the house. The three 

men went back and forth behind the house several times, as Eldridge kept 

changing his path of direction to evade the officers. When the officers

eventually caught up to Eldridge and handcuffed him, they noticed that he had 

blood on his hands and body. They checked Eldridge for injuries and saw that 

he had a cut on the right side of his back. They then called an ambulance.

[4] When the officers questioned him, Eldridge stated that he had been at the 

residence to see a woman. He insisted that he needed to get inside the house, 

even though the occupants had prevented him from doing so. Afterward, 

Officers Elkins and Zotz spoke with the people inside the house, but neither 

officer recalls speaking to anyone that had called the police. 

[5] On November 26, 2014, the State charged Eldridge with Level 6 felony 

residential entry and class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. 

Eldridge’s jury trial was held in October 2015. At trial, Eldridge objected to the 

admission of the 911 call that alerted the police. The trial court admitted this 

evidence and played the recording in the courtroom. 

[6] The caller in the recording gives his name as Damascus Cheatham, and

describes the ongoing events to the operator. However, some details of the 
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recording indicate that Cheatham did not actually see the attempted entry as it 

was occurring; at one point, when the operator asks for more details, Cheatham 

responds that he does not know and explains that he is inside the bedroom with 

his cousin and two little girls. Later on, Cheatham can be heard relaying the 

sequence of events from an unidentified male who was also in the house. At 

trial, Officers Elkins and Zotz testified that they did not speak to a man named 

Damascus Cheatham inside the house after they had arrested Eldridge. 

[7] The jury found Eldridge guilty on both charges. The trial court sentenced 

Eldridge to concurrent terms of 545 days for Count 1, with 365 days suspended 

to probation, and to 365 days for Count 2, with 315 days suspended to 

probation. The trial court also ordered Eldridge to complete alcohol 

evaluations and treatment while on probation. Although the trial court found 

Eldridge indigent as to fines and costs, the sentencing order nevertheless lists a 

user fee of $250 for alcohol and drug programs. Eldridge now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of the 911 Call

[8] Eldridge’s first argument is that the trial court erred by admitting the 911 call 

into evidence. Eldridge contends that the call is hearsay evidence that does not 

fit into an exception to the hearsay rule. He also argues in the alternative that 

the 911 call was not authenticated and should have been excluded for that 

reason.
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[9] A trial court errs by admitting evidence if its decision flies against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if a misinterpretation of law 

has occurred. E.g., Teague v. State, 978 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted, and it is inadmissible unless it falls under an exception. Ind. R. Evid. 

801(c). The exclusion of hearsay is meant to prevent the introduction of 

unreliable evidence that cannot be tested through cross-examination. Truax v. 

State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

[10] A statement that qualifies as an excited utterance is admissible as an exception 

to the hearsay rule. Indiana Evidence Rule 803(2) defines an excited utterance 

as a “statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the 

declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” In this regard, we 

turn to Teague, where this Court held that the statements of a 911 caller who did 

not have personal knowledge of the underlying incident could be admissible if 

the caller was merely repeating the statements of a victim to the 911 operator. 

978 N.E.2d at 1188. In other words, there is no requirement that a declarant 

have personal knowledge of the underlying event or condition being reported. 

Id. at 1188 (“Here, [the declarant] did not have personal knowledge of the 

underlying incident [that the victim] described, but she did have personal 

knowledge of, and was responding to, the startling event or condition that came 

to her home in the middle of the night in the person of a bloodied [victim] 

screaming for help.”). 
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[11] We hold that the statements made in Cheatham’s call qualify as an excited 

utterance. The trial court could reasonably believe that the declarant, 

Cheatham, was still under the stress of experiencing an attempted residential 

burglary and that he was, therefore, unlikely to make a deliberate falsification to 

the 911 operator. And just as the declarant in Teague relayed messages between 

the 911 operator and the victim, Cheatham relayed messages between the 

unidentified male and the operator in this case. Furthermore, the temporal 

proximity in this instance between the call and the officers’ arrival at the scene

increases the likelihood that Cheatham was still in an excited condition of 

experiencing an entry into his house, even if he did not witness it firsthand. 

This 911 call bears “sufficient indicia of reliability, the hallmark of all hearsay 

exceptions.” Id. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision to admit the 911 

call into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

3

 

[12] Lastly, we address Eldridge’s argument that the 911 call was not properly 

authenticated. Because Eldridge did not base any of his objections at trial on 

the ground of improper authentication, he must demonstrate that there was 

fundamental error. Purifoy v. State, 821 N.E.2d, 409, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 

Fundamental error “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation 

of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the 

resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Wilson v. State, 

 

3 As we find the 911 call admissible as an excited utterance, we need not and will not address Eldridge’s 

argument regarding the present sense impression exception. 
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931 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We note that, even if the trial 

court’s admission of the 911 call into evidence was error, it was harmless. An 

error is harmless if there is “substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying 

the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence 

contributed to the conviction.” Teague, 978 N.E.2d at 1189. Officers Elkins 

and Zotz themselves witnessed Eldridge attempting to break into the residence 

at 3050 Central Avenue. The officers got good glimpses of Eldridge’s face as he 

ran away from the house toward the backyard. As the alleged error was 

harmless, it was a far cry from fundamental. Therefore, we decline to reverse 

the trial court based on Eldridge’s authentication argument. 

II. The Alcohol and Drug Program User Fee

[13] Eldridge next argues that the trial court should vacate the $250 fine that is listed 

on his sentencing order. We remand this issue to the trial court for clarification. 

[14] In-court pronouncements prevail over subsequent contradictory language. Stott 

v. State, 822 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Thus, cases in which incourt pronouncements vary from the written record should be remanded to the 

trial court for correction. 

[15] At Eldridge’s sentencing hearing, the trial judge found that Eldridge was 

indigent as to fines and costs. Moreover, one section of Eldridge’s sentencing 

order states that Eldridge is indigent for “court costs, fines, and probation fees”; 

however, the Court Costs and Fees section of the order also lists an 
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“Alcohol/Drug Services Prgrm User Fee” in the amount of $250. Given this 

discrepancy, we remand this issue back to the trial court to clarify its order.

[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded. 

May, J., and Brown, J., concur.