J-S47035- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. ANTHONY FORD Appellant No. 3557 EDA 2013

Appeal from the PCRA Order of November 20 , 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No.: CP

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- CR -0008216-2003

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. ANTHONY FORD Appellant No. 3560 EDA 2013

Appeal from the PCRA Order of November 20 , 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No.: CP

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- CR -0008223-2003

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. ANTHONY FORD Appellant No. 3561 EDA 2013

Appeal from the PCRA Order of November 20 , 2013J-S47035- 14

- 2 - In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No.: CP

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- CR -0002831-2003

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J. MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED AUGUST 13, 2014 Anthony Ford appeals the November 20, 2013 order di smissing his second petition for relief pursuant to the Post- Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, as untimely. We affirm. Because we concur with the PCRA court that Ford’s second PC RA petition was untimely, we need not delve deeply into the factual or procedural history of this case. We merely reiterate the basic history of this case, as summarized by a panel of this Court in Ford’ s appeal of the denial of his first PCRA petition: On March 3, 2005, [Ford] entered several open guilty pleas. . . . [T]he relevant guilty pleas were entered at 8216-03, to the crimes of kidnapping, robbery, and criminal attempt to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI). Those p leas stem from [Ford’s] involvement in the kidnapping, robb ery, sexual assault, and physical assault of three male victims on October 5, 2003. On May 25, 2005, the trial court imposed an ag gravated sentence of eight (8) to sixteen (16) years[’] imprisonm ent for the above referenced offenses. [Ford] did not appeal the judgment of sentence. On February 24, 2006, [Ford], acting pro se , filed a timely PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed and an amended petit ion was filed. Thereafter, following an evidentiary hearin g on August 7, 2006, the PCRA court entered an Order on August 25, 2 006, denying relief.

Commonwealth v. Ford , No. 2623 EDA 2006, slip op. at 1-2 (Pa. Super. Apr. 9, 2007). On April 9, 2007, a panel of this C ourt affirmed the PCRAJ-S47035- 14

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court’s dismissal order. Id. at 1, 12. On September 25, 2007, the

Penns ylvania Supreme Court denied Ford’s petition for all owance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Ford , 932 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 2007) ( per curiam ). On November 5, 2013, Ford filed a second PCRA petit ion, in which Ford argued that, because he was a juvenile at the tim e of the offense and at the time of sentencing, being sentenced as an adult rendered his sentence illegal. On November 21, 2013, the PCRA court dismis sed Ford’s petition without a hearing. 1 On December 18, 2013, Ford filed a notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not order Ford to file a concise sta tement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) , and Ford did not file a statement. Nonetheless, on January 31, 2014, the PC RA court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), in which the court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over Ford’s petition due to its unti meliness. Ford raises two questions for our consideration:

1. Whether the lower court had jurisdiction to adjudicat e [Ford’s] claim of having received an illegal sentence ?

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1 Notably, the PCRA court did not issue notice of its i ntent to dismiss Ford’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Howeve r, it is now well -settled that “where the PCRA petition is untimely, the failur e t o provide [a Rule 907] notice is not reversible error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson , 90 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis , 916 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Pa. Super. 2007)).J-S47035- 14

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2. Whether the lower court erred in not adjudicating [Fo rd’s] claim [that] the sentencing judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction when he imposed an adult sentence for his juvenile case?

Brief for Ford at 5. As in all PCRA cases, particularly those that involve an appellant’s second PCRA petition, we begin with the questions of wh ether the petition was timely filed pursuant to the PCRA’s strict time limi t, and, therefore, whether we have jurisdiction to resolve the substantive claims raised by Ford. It is well-established that the PCRA time limi ts are jurisdictional, and are meant to be both mandatory and applied literall y by the courts to all PCRA petitions, regardless of the potential merit of t he claims asserted. Commonwealth v. Murray , 753 A.2d 201, 202-03 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Leggett , 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011). “[N]o court may properly disregard or alter [these filing re quirements] in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA peti tion that is filed in an untimely ma nner.” Murray , 753 A.2d at 203; see Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor , 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). “[A]ny PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent pe tition, must be filed within one year of the date that the petit ioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final.” Commonwealth v. Breakiron , 781 A.2d 94, 97 (Pa. 2001) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)). “A judgment becomes final for purposes of the PCRA ‘at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the Unit ed States and theJ-S47035- 14

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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.’” Commonwealth v. Wharton , 886 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3)). Ford was sentenced on May 25, 2005. Ford did not fil e post-sentenc e motions or a direct appeal. Ford’s judgment of sentence became final on or about June 25, 2005, at the expiration of the thirt y-day period during which Ford could have filed a direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Thus, to be timely, any PCRA petition must have been filed within one year of that date, on or about June 25, 2006. Id. § 9545(b)(1). Ford filed the instant petition on November 5, 2013, over eight years after his judgment of sentence became final. Consequently, Ford’s petition wa s f acially untimely. Despite such facial untimeliness, a tardy PCRA petition nonetheless will be considered timely if (but only if) the petitioner pleads and proves one of the three exceptions to the one-year time limit enum erated in §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA, which provide: (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with t he presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitu tion or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws o f the United States; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; orJ-S47035- 14

- 6 - (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right tha t was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United Sta tes or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. (2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the clai m could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). Ford does not argue that any of these three exceptio ns apply to his case. Rather, he maintains that his substantive claim, w hich amounts to a challenge to the legality of his sentence, is non-waiva ble and, therefore, not subject to the PCRA’s strict time limit. However, it is well -settled that such claims still must abide by the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. “Though not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be lost should it be raised for the first time in an untim ely PCRA petition for which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving th e court of jurisdiction over the claim.” Commonwealth v. Slotcavage , 939 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy , 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject t o review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limi ts or one of the exceptions thereto.”)). Consequently, Ford has failed to establish either that his petition was timely, or that any of the three exc eptions to the timeliness requirement applies. Order affirmed.J-S47035- 14

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/13/2014