IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1833

Filed April 7, 2019

CHRISTOPHER HANS GRANSTRA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

SHEA BRIANNE DRIESEN,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for O’Brien County, Charles Borth, 

District Judge.

A father appeals a decree establishing paternity, custody, visitation, and 

child support. AFFIRMED.

Matthew G. Sease of Kemp & Sease, Des Moines, for appellant.

Jenny L. Winterfeld of Winterfeld Law, P.L.C., Sioux Center, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

Christopher Granstra and Shea Driesen are the unmarried parents of a 

child, born in 2017. Following trial on Granstra’s petition to establish paternity, 

custody, and visitation, the district court granted Driesen physical care of the child. 

The court reasoned:

[Driesen] has been the primary caretaker for [the child] her entire life. 

She has also been the primary caretaker of her older son . . . . [The 

child] and [the older half-sibling] are only separated in age by

approximately four years. They have a strong bond with each other. 

The record establishes that under [Driesen’s] care, these children 

are both well-adjusted and appropriately developed children. The 

successful caregiving by one parent in the past is a strong predictor 

that future care of the child will be of the same quality. While 

[Driesen] had some instances of poor judgment following her 

separation from [Granstra], she seems to have again stabilized after 

a short bout with immaturity. Even during her issues, she never did

anything which would put either of the children in danger. Along with 

[Granstra], the court is concerned about [Driesen’s] living 

arrangement due to the fact that the home in which she is residing

has been foreclosed upon. No execution has yet been filed, 

however, nor has any sheriff’s sale been scheduled. [Driesen’s 

boyfriend] testified that he is actively seeking new employment and 

working to obtain mortgage assistance in order to remain in the 

home. In the unfortunate event they must find alternative living 

arrangements, nothing in the record indicates they would absolutely 

be unable to do so. In the meantime, this is the home that [the child] 

has known for the past several months. As shown by photographic 

evidence in the record, the home is well-maintained.

On appeal, Granstra contends the court should have granted him physical 

care of the child. In his view, (A) he “offers more stability than [Driesen]”; (B) he 

“will better promote a healthy relationship between [Driesen] and all family 

members”; (C) “Driesen does not make decisions based upon the best interests of 

[the child]”; (D) “[Driesen’s] relationship with [her boyfriend] was not given 

appropriate weight”; and (E) the “court gave too much weight to [the child’s] 

relationship with” her older half-sibling. Driesen seeks appellate attorney fees.
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I. Physical Care

Our analysis of who should have physical care is the same whether the 

parents are married or unmarried. Lambert v. Everist, 418 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 

1988). Specifically, we apply the factors set forth in our chapter on dissolutions of 

marriage. Id.; see Iowa Code §§ 598.41(3), 600B.40(2) (2018). Our review is de 

novo. See McKee v. Dicus, 785 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).

A. Stability. Granstra argues the court “gave undue weight [to Driesen’s] 

purported history as primary caregiver” and did not consider that he “provides more 

stability.” See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(a) (considering “[w]hether each parent 

would be a suitable custodian for the child”), (d) (considering “[w]hether both 

parents have actively cared for the child before and since the separation”). He 

points to his ownership of a home in which the child was born, his steady 

employment, and the availability of extended family support “within the area.” He 

asserts Driesen, in contrast, was at imminent risk of losing the home she shared 

with her boyfriend, had “several jobs,” and moved constantly.

Granstra did indeed have more stable housing than Driesen. He purchased 

an acreage with a five-bedroom home while he was involved with Driesen, and he 

remained in the home after his breakup with her. Driesen, on the other hand, lived 

with a new boyfriend whose home was the subject of a foreclosure decree. 

However, the house had yet to be sold at a sheriff’s sale and Driesen remained on 

the property at the time of trial. Driesen’s boyfriend testified he was told “the 

foreclosure [was] actually on hold” and he might get “a mortgage modification.” 

Granstra also had a steady job that paid well. But Driesen’s job history was 

not as checkered as Granstra made out. She worked at two nursing homes as a 
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certified nurse’s assistant. Later she provided in-home daycare for her children 

and others. 

As for Driesen’s moves, they were not as numerous as Granstra suggested. 

When the child was eight months old, Granstra kicked Driesen out of his home. 

Driesen moved to her mother’s home with the child and her three-and-a-half year 

old son from another relationship. She stayed with her mother for four or five 

months before moving in with her boyfriend of two months.

On this record, we conclude Driesen’s life was not so unstable as to 

preclude her from exercising physical care of the child. Granstra conceded as 

much when he expressed a willingness to have Driesen provide daycare for the 

child during his twelve-hour workdays. 

B. Promoting Relationship with Other Parent and Family Members. 

Granstra argues he would do better than Driesen at supporting the child’s 

relationship with the other parent. See id. § 598.41(3)(e) (considering “[w]hether 

each parent can support the other parent’s relationship with the child”). Both 

parents had room to improve on this score. At the same time, both acknowledged 

the importance of the other parent in the child’s life and largely cooperated with 

exchanges of the child. Driesen, as temporary caretaker, adjusted visitation to 

accommodate Granstra’s work schedule. These adjustments boded well for the 

child’s well-being.

As for Granstra’s relationship with other family members, there is no 

question he kept the lines of communication open with the child’s maternal 

grandmother. Indeed, at one point, the maternal grandmother spoke more to 

Granstra than Driesen, expressing concern about Driesen’s alcohol consumption
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and romances and the potential effect on her children. In time, the grandmother 

repaired her relationship with Driesen, communicated with her on a daily basis, 

and visited the children approximately twice a week. She acknowledged Driesen 

is a good mother. Driesen’s sister also acknowledged that “[t]hings have gotten 

better,” despite Driesen’s poor choices in the past.

C. Best Interests of Child. Granstra argues Driesen did not act in the child’s 

best interests. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(o). He points to her alcohol usage 

and romantic relationships, in addition to her moves, which we have already 

addressed.

Driesen’s post-separation behaviors give us pause. As noted, both her 

mother and sister expressed concern about the extent of her alcohol use and her 

serial romantic associations. Driesen attempted to dispel their concerns but, in our 

view, her trial testimony confirmed reasons for uneasiness. That said, even 

Granstra admitted Driesen was a good mother—so good that he was willing to 

entrust the child’s care to her for twelve hours a day. And Granstra conceded 

Driesen served as the child’s primary caretaker throughout the child’s life. 

D. Driesen’s Relationship with her Boyfriend. Granstra takes issue with the 

fact that Driesen moved in with her new boyfriend “[a]fter only two (2) months of 

knowing him and less than five (5) months after” her separation from him. He 

points to the boyfriend’s criminal history and his financial circumstances.

The boyfriend did indeed have a history of theft and escape dating back to 

2004. Nonetheless, Driesen stated she had no concerns for the safety of her 

children. The child’s maternal grandmother also acknowledged the boyfriend 

“actually interact[ed] with [the children] pretty well.” Although there was some 
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question as to whether the boyfriend was committed to a long-term relationship 

with Driesen, our record contains scant evidence he posed a threat to the child. 

E. Half-sibling Relationship. Granstra contends the district court placed too 

much weight on the child’s relationship with her half-sibling. See In re Marriage of 

Orte, 389 N.W.2d 373, 374 (Iowa 1986). We disagree. Witnesses uniformly 

testified to the close relationship between the children. Driesen’s boyfriend noted 

they were “inseparable,” and even Granstra acknowledged they “get along good.” 

We conclude the district court acted equitably in granting Driesen rather 

than Granstra physical care of the child. Although Driesen showed signs of 

immaturity, the district court appropriately weighed those signs against her history 

of primary and appropriate caretaking. We affirm the court’s decree.

II. Appellate Attorney Fees

Driesen seeks an award of $5500 in appellate attorney fees. We conclude 

Granstra has the financial ability to pay a portion of her attorney fee bill. See In re 

Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). He earned more 

than $90,000 annually, whereas Driesen earned approximately $15,000. And 

Driesen prevailed. Accordingly, we order Granstra to pay $3000 toward that 

obligation.

AFFIRMED.