17-669 (L) 

Federal Trade Commission v. Rensin 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a 

summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is 

governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local 

Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this 

Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic 

database (with the notation “Summary Order”). A party citing a summary 

order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 26th day of June, two thousand and nineteen. 

Present: 

 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 

PETER W. HALL, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

 Circuit Judges.

Federal Trade Commission, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

Joseph K. Rensin, 

 Defendant-Appellant,

Bluehippo Funding, LLC, Bluehippo Capital, LLC, 

 

 Defendants. 

 

For Appellant: JEFFREY J. MOLINARO, Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, 

PL, Miami, FL (Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III, on the brief, Joseph 

A. DiRuzzo, III, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, FL) 

17-669-cv (L) 

17-1587-cv (CON) 
2 

For Appellee: IMAD D. ABYAD, (Theodore (Jack) Metzler, attorney, 

Michele Arington, attorney, on the brief), Assistant 

General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, 

DC 

 

 Appeals from March 6 and March 28, 2017 orders of the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court’s orders are VACATED. 

 Joseph Rensin appeals from two orders entered by the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.). The March 6, 2017 order 

determined that the automatic bankruptcy stay imposed by Rensin’s Chapter 7 

bankruptcy did not apply to efforts to enforce the district court’s orders under the 

“governmental unit” exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and that the district court was, 

therefore, not barred from deciding whether to hold Rensin in contempt. The March 

28, 2017 order holds Rensin in contempt for his failure to comply with a final 

judgment of the district court imposing compensatory contempt sanctions in the 

amount of $13,400,627.60. The two appeals were consolidated for disposition by order 

of this Court dated January 16, 2019. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

issues and arguments on appeal. 

Rensin challenges the district court’s determination with respect to the 

automatic stay, asserting that the contempt proceedings constitute the enforcement 

of a money judgment and therefore fall outside of the “governmental unit” exception 

to the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). As a result, Rensin asserts, the 
3 

contempt order is void because it violates the automatic bankruptcy stay, and in the 

alternative, violates a temporary stay issued by our court on March 27, 2017. 

We conclude that the district court’s order of March 6, 2017, finding that the 

automatic bankruptcy does not apply to the contempt proceeding, is final and 

therefore reviewable. The only issue in this case is whether the district court’s 

disposition of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) attempt to pursue a contempt 

order, holding Rensin in coercive incarceration until he pays the $13.4 million 

judgment, amounts to the “enforcement of a . . . money judgment” and therefore falls 

outside of the governmental unit exception and violates the automatic stay.1 We 

conclude that it does. See SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[While] 

the governmental unit exception of § 362(b)(4) permits the entry of a money judgment 

against a debtor . . . anything beyond the mere entry of a money judgment against a 

debtor is prohibited by the automatic stay.”). 

The “governmental unit” exception to the automatic stay provides: 

The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . does 

not operate as a stay . . . of the commencement or continuation of an 

action or proceeding by a governmental unit . . . to enforce such 

governmental unit’s or organization’s police and regulatory power, 

including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, 

obtained in an action or proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce 

such governmental unit’s or organization’s police or regulatory power[.] 

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). Here, the purpose in seeking the entry of the contempt order 

 

1 We note that the FTC requested that the district court stay enforcement of coercive incarceration 

until after Rensin’s bankruptcy proceedings had completed. That stay would make no difference in 

our analysis. The issue in this case is whether the district court could, without violating the automatic 

stay, enter the contempt order in the first place, regardless of whether it then stayed enforcement of 

that order. 
4 

was simply to enforce a money judgment that had already been entered against 

Rensin. 

We have noted that “[w]e did not intend in Brennan to impose a one-factor 

timing test whereby . . . orders entered (or with continuing force) post-judgment are 

always subject to the stay,” but we have also said that “the timing of the order’s entry 

constitutes a crucial factor in our analysis.” SEC v. Miller, 808 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 

2015). Here, not only was the FTC’s request for a contempt order filed after entry of 

judgment, it also had no other purpose than to enforce the money judgment against 

Rensin. Although it is clear the FTC filed its request for an order of contempt before 

Rensin filed his bankruptcy petition, once the automatic stay was in place, the district 

court was prohibited from disposing of that request while Rensin’s bankruptcy 

remained pending. For that reason, the district court’s conclusion that it could, and 

indeed did, decide the contempt issue under the governmental unit exception was 

erroneous because the contempt proceeding was an attempt to enforce the money 

judgment. 

In disposing of the appeals as we have, we express no view as to the FTC’s 

ability to collect the $13.4 million judgment against Rensin after the conclusion of his 

bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the district court’s orders are VACATED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court