NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0552n.06 Case Nos. 07- 1466 and 07-2113 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT K ARL WI NG O, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

BEF OR E: BA TC HELD ER , D AU G HTREY and M OORE, C ir c uitJudg e s. ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Circ uit Jud ge. Petitioner Karl Wingo ( “Wingo” ) see ks
re v e r s a l o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s d e n i a l o f h i s m o t i o n f o r r e l i e f u n d e r 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 2 25 5, a ndof his
mo ti o nf o r b o n d p e n d in g th e a

p p e a l o f th e d e n ia l o f

th a t m o ti o n . N e it

he r c la im h a s me r it
. We
a ff ir m. I. F ind ingthat he ha d b e e n d e nie d c ouns e l at a cri ti cal sta g e of the c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s — namely , during his debrief ing se ssions with t he g overnme nt as part of his e n t er i n g into a plea ag ree ment — the district court orig inally g rante d Wingo’s § 2255 motion on November 27, 2006, and vac ated his convic tion for par ticipating in a continuing c riminal enterpr ise (“CCE”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006). W ingo v. United States , No. 04-71558, 2006 WL 3446255 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2006). The g overnme nt moved for rec onsideration, arg uing that the rec ord did not supportSee Ka s t i ga r v. Uni t ed St at es , 40 6 U
. S. 44 1 (19 7 2 ). 1 2 Wingo’s claim. The district court g rante d the motion, held another e videntiary hear ing, a

nd in an Aug ust 29, 2007, opinion, held that even if W i ng o was de nied counse l at a cr itical stag e, and specific ally

at the point when Wingo signe d the “ Kastigar ” le tte r g ra

nti nghim

immun ity

in 1 exchang e for his ple ading g uilty and cooper ating with the g overnme nt, the g overnme nt had shown that he wa s not prejudiced by the denial. W

ingo v. United States , No. 04-71558, 2007 WL2480731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug . 29, 2007). The c ourt held that Wingo wa s theref ore not e ntitled to relief, and reinstated the CCE conviction. The district court gra nted a c ertificate of a

ppeala bility (“COA” ) on the sole question of whe ther Wingo’ s Six th Amendment rig ht to effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel was vio la te d w he n h is tri a l c ouns e l wa s a bs e nt duri ng de br ie fi ng se ssi on s w ithg ov e rnme nt a g e nts . T his appea l followed. I neff ective- assistance -of- counsel c laims present mi x ed questions of law and fa ct, which we revie w de novo. Mallet v. United States , 3 3 4 F. 3 d 4 9 1 , 4 9 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ). I n t h i s ap p ea l , W i n go claims that his counsel fa iled to expl ain the limited ext ent of the immunity g rante d to Wi ng o by

the Kastigar letter, did not attend the de briefing s, and “provide d err oneous advic e about the se ntence Wingo would be e x posed to if convicte d at trial, resulting in Wing o’s reje ction of a plea offe r made during the debr iefing s,” and in the g overnme nt’s using a g ainst him at trial the information that Wing o h a d p ro vid e d d

ur ingthe de br ie fi ng s. We t ur n f ir st t o Win g o’ s c la im th at his c ouns e l f a ile d to e xpla in t

he sc op e of

the po ssi ble pe na lti e s f

or the of fe ns e s w ithwh ic h Wing o w a s c ha rg e d. Wing o h a s atte mpt e d to c ou c h th is c la im as prejudice he suffer ed bec ause his counse l was not prese nt during the debr iefing s. Our re view of his § 2255 motion and of the re cord, how ever , satisfies us that he ne ver pr esente d this claim to the3

district court. We there fore ag ree with the g overnme nt that it is not included within the COA. Fur thermore , even if

we c ould interpret the COAto include this claim, i t is abundantly clea r fr om the re cord that the claim is baseless. Prior to the debriefing s, Wi ng o signe d at least two
a c kn ow le dg me nts that he und e rs too d th e min imum a nd ma ximumpe na lti e s f

or the of fe ns e s w ith wh ic h h e wa s c ha

rg e d. Th e ple a a g re e me nt t hat he re je c te d — bu t w hic h h e no w c la ims he wo uld have a cce pted had he been correc tly advised of the pos sible penalties — include d that information. Wing o is no t e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is c la im. I t is undisputed that Wingo’s counsel was not phy sically prese nt at the Kastigar

d eb ri ef i n gs Wingo attende d. Wingo claims that these se ssions were a critica l stag e of the proce eding s, and the absenc e of his c o u n s e l at t h e s e s e s s io n s d e n ie d

h im h is Si xth

A me n dme n t r ig h t t o e f f e c ti ve assistance of counse l. This, he argues, wa s a pe r se violation of his Si x th Amendment rig hts. See Un ite d S tat es v . Cr on ic , 4 66 U. S. 6 48 , 6 59 (1 98 3) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt wa s initi a lly pe rs ua de d b y

thi s argument, and in its November 2006 opinion, vacated the CCE conviction. Howe ver in re instating that conviction in Aug ust 2007, the court esse ntially presumed Strickland v. W ashington ’s f

ir st prong , the def

icient per formanc e of c ounsel. W ingo , 2 00 7 WL 24 80 73 1 at *3 ; se e ge ne ra lly Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Movingdirec tly to the prejudice prong , the cour t found none, c oncluding that the g overnme nt had demonstrate d that it had obtained t h e i d entity of Michae l Z ajac from indepe ndent source s, W ingo , 2007 WL 2480731 at *4, and that Z ajac was the only witness whose testimony had play ed a sig nificant role in the case ag ainst Wi ng o, id. at *3, n. 5. The court further conclude d that the rec ord did not support Wingo’s claim that the g overnme nt had used Wing o’s statements to per suade Z ajac to testify ag ainst Wi ng o. Id. at *4. B eca use the4

court ha d found in its 2006 opinion that these wer e Wingo’ s only claims of pre

judice that had a

ny substance, the court found that Wi ng o had fa iled to demonstrate pr ejudice. We will assume for purpose s of this appea l that Wi ng o’s first debr iefing— the session at which Wingo sig ned the Kastigar letter — wa s a cr itical stag e of the proce eding s, such that the total absenc e of c ounsel would require u s t o p re s u m e pre judice. Se e Cro nic , 466 U.S. at 659. The evidenc e, howe ver, r efute s any claim of total abse nce of counsel at that deb ri ef

i n g. The re cord contains some evide nce that Stephen Glass, Wingo’s attorney at the time of the intial debrie fing , had revie wed the Kastigar

letter with W ingo pr ior to the debrie fing
. W ingo , 2006 WL 3446255 at *3 (re counting that Glass testified as to this being his usua l pr actice and that AUS A W aterstreet confirme d

th a t t h is h a d b e e nd o n e )
. M o r e im

p o rta n tl y , th e r e c o r d

d e mo n s tr a te s th a t d

u r in g th at initial debriefingon Fe bruar y 13, 1992, Wingo s poke with Glass by telephone, a

nd Glass advised him to sign the cooper ation ag ree ment. Id. a t *4 ; see W right v. Van Patten , 128 S.Ct . 743, 746-747 (2008) ( putting off

a direct dispositi on of t he is sue of “the merits of t elephone prac tice,” but holding that the lower

courts’ f indings that counsel’s presenc e by telephone w as not defic ient perf ormanc e was not an unr easona

ble application of fede ral law ). Th e fa c ts of thi s c a se do no t su pp or t Win g o’ s Cro nic claim. And once Wingo — with the advice of counse l — had sig ned the K a s t i g ar le tte r a nd a g re e d to c oo pe ra

te wi th t he g ov e rnme nt, the debrie fing s cea sed to be adver sarial proce eding s where Wingo’s rig hts were in dang er of being “irre trievably lost” if not safeguarde d by the pre sence of counse l. See V an v. Jone

s 475 F.3d 292, 29 8 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7)
. Wing o mus t the re fo re de mon str a te that his c ouns e l’ s pe rf or manc e wa s no t on ly defic ient, but resulted in ac tual prejudice . We have c are fully revie wed the r ecor d, and conclude that for the r easons e x plained by the district court, Wingo c annot ca rry that burden.5 II. Wingo also cha lleng es, pr o s e , the district c ourt’s denying him bond while his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion was pending . This is a claim without merit. T h e t es t fo r granting bond duringthe pendenc y of a § 2255 was set forth in Aronson v. May , 85 S.Ct . 3 (1 96 4) , whi c h w e int e rp re te d in D o t s o n v . Cl ark , 9 0 0 F.2d 77 ( 6th Cir. 1990). I t require s that (1) the § 2255 motion prese nt substantial questions (principal amongthem a showing that challeng ing the sentenc e in the district court wa s inadequate or inef fec tive), and ( 2) there exis ts “some circ umstance making t h is a p p li c a tion exceptional and deser

ving of specia l treatment in the intere sts of justice.” Aronson , 85 S.Ct . at 5; Dotson , 9 0 0 F. 2 d

at 7 9 (q u o t i n g Aronson ). As we sa id in Dotson , “[t] here will be few occasions wher e a pr isoner will meet this standard. Mo re ov e r, it i s dou

btf ul that the dis tr ic t cou

rt or a c ir c uit jud g e wi ll issu e the c e rt if ic a te of pr ob a ble
c a us e fo r an app e a l r e qu ir e d f or a pp e a ls b y state ha be a s p e tit ion e rs in F e de ra l Ru le of Ap pe llate Procedur e 22(b) unless the claim re flec ts cl ear merit.” Id. Her e, ther e wa s no cer tificate of
a pp e a la bil ity iss ue d on this g ro un d. B ut e ve n if the re ha d b e e n, our a

na ly sis of the c la ims ra ise d in Wingo’s § 2255 motion forec loses our finding that either the reme dy in the sentenc ing c ourt was ina de qu a te or

that th is c a se pr e se nts e xce pti on a l c ir c ums tanc e s. III . For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.G l ass , who was not a m em b er of t he M i chi gan st at e b ar when he represent ed W i ngo , was di sbarred b y t he 1 Flori d a Sup rem e C o urt t wo y ears l at er. 6 KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circuit Judge, di ssenting. After his indictment on various drug -re lated charg es and w ithout having e ntere d into a plea a g ree ment with the g overnme nt, Karl W i n go p ar t i ci p at edi ns ev er al s es s i o n s d u r i n g wh i ch h e w ai v edh i s Fi ft h Am en dm en tp ri v i l ege ag ainst self-incr imination and debrief ed the g overnme nt on the details of the crimes with which he had been charg ed. I t is unclea r how much W ingo had s poken with his counsel, S tephen Gla ss, up to this poi nt, but it appears that they met on only

one occ asion and spoke a lmost ex clusively by telephone, a s Glass’s pra ctice w as base d in Florida. Al t h o u g h Iexpress no opinion on whether 1 Gl a ss w a s “to ta lly a

bs e nt” fr om Wing o’ s initi a l deb ri e fi ng se ssi on , dur ing wh ic h Wing o spo ke wi th Glass by telephone, it is undisputed that Glass was totally absent fr om the four subseque nt debrief ing
se ssi on s. B e c a

us e I be lie ve that the se de br ie fi ng se ssi on s we re a “ c ri tic a l sta g e ” of the pr oc e e din g s, Iwould presume that Wi ng o was pr ej u d iced by his counsel’s abse nce a

nd there fore was de prived of hi s Six th Amendment right t o the assistance of counse l pursuant to Un ite d S tates v . Cr on ic , 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Claims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel g ener ally are revie wed under t he we ll-established test set forth in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which re quires the pe titioner to s ho w that th e c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e wa s b oth

de fi c ie nt a

nd pr e jud ic ia l to the de fe ns e . “ I t is we ll settled,” howe ver, “ that a co m p lete abse nce of counsel at a cr itical stag e of a criminal proc eeding is a pe r seSix th Amendment violation warr anting reve rsal of a conviction, a sentenc e, or both, as applicable , without analy sis for prejudice or harmless e rror .” Van v. J ones , 475 F.3d 292, 311- 12 (6th Cir. 2007). In C

ro nic , de c ide d th e same da y a s Strickland , “the Supre me Court held that an7

a p p e a ls c o u rt mu s t r e v e r s e a c r im in a l d e f e n d an t’ s c o n v ic ti o n ‘ w it

h o u t an y s p e c if

ic s h owing of prejudice to defe ndant when co u nsel was e ither totally absent, or pr evente d from assisting the
acc used during a critica l sta g e of the proc eeding .’” Mitchell v. M ason , 325 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Cro nic , 466 U.S. at 659 n.25). Ther ef o re , wh i le the Strickland test “provides g uidance for r esolving virtually all ineffe ctive assist ance of counse l claims, there a re ‘ a fe w situations in which prejudice may be presumed,’” including the absenc e of counsel during a cr itical stag e of the proce eding s. Id
. (q u o t i n g W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)). The Sup re m e C o u rt has not laid out “a c omprehe nsive and fina l one-line de finition of ‘cr itical stag e.’” Van , 475 F.3d at 312. Most rece ntly , the Court stated that a c ritical stag e is “a step of a criminal proce eding
. . . that h[ol ds] s ignif icant conse quence s for the a ccuse d.” Bell v. Cone , 5 3 5 U
. S. 6 8 5 , 696 (2002). A cr it ic a l s ta g e is o n e a t wh ic h “ [a ]v a il a b le d e f e n s e s ma y b e [] irretr ievably

lost,” Hamilton v. Alabama , 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961), and “whe re rig hts are pr eser ved or lost,” W

hite v. Mary land , 373 U.S. 5 9 , 6 0 (1 9 6 3). The Court ha s emphasized that the de te rm inatio n r e qu ir e s “ an a na ly sis ‘whe the r p ote nti al subs tanti a l pr e jud ic e to d e fe nd ant’ s r ig hts inhere d in the . . . confr ontation and the ability of counsel to he lp a void that prejudice .’” Coleman v. Alabama , 3 9 9 U. S
. 1 , 9 (1 9 7 0 ) ( al t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. W ade , 3 88 U. S. 218, 227 (1967)) . We also should consider whe ther the stag e is adve rsar i al in nature so that “ the
acc used re quired a id in coping w ith lega l problems or assistance in meeting his adversa ry .” United Sta te s v . A sh , 413 U.S. 300, 313 (1973). A var iety of post-indictment, pretr ial proce edi n gs h av e been f ound to be “c ritical stag es.” See, e .g. , Michigan v. J ackson , 4 75 U.S
. 625, 62 9- 30 (1 98 6) (n oti ngtha t, a ft e r a rr a ig nme nt, “g overnme nt effor

ts to elicit information from t he ac cused, inc luding inter rog ation, repr esent8

‘cr itical stag es’ at which the Six th Amendment applies” ), overruled on othe r grounds , Montejo v. Louisi ana , - -- U. S. -

-- , 1 29 S. Ct . 2 07 9, 20 85 (2 00 9) ; King v. Bobby , 433 F.3 d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (“ Plea neg otiations, guilty plea he aring s, an d s en t en cing hear ings a re a ll ‘critical stag es’ at which the r ight to counse l attache s.”). B eca use g overnme nt debrief

ings ma y hold significa

nt
c on se qu e nc e s f

or the a c c us e d w ithre sp e c t to wa ive r o f his or he r F if th A me ndme nt r ig ht a g a ins t self-inc rimination, neg otiation of a plea ag ree ment, and sente ncing , Ibelieve that post-indictment de br ie fi ng s are a

c ri tic a l st a g e fo r p ur

po se s o f t he Sixth A me ndme nt. I n Este llev . S

mi th , th e Su

p r e me Co u rt e mp h a s iz e d th e im p o rta n c e o f c o u n s e l when a de fe nd ant c on sid e rs wa ivi nghis or he r F if th A me ndme nt r ig ht a g a ins t se lf -i nc ri min a tio n: “ B e c a

us e ‘[a ] l ay m anm ay n o tb e aw ar e o f

t h e p r e c i s e s c o p e , t h e nu an c e s , an d t h e b o u n d ar i e s o f

h i s F i f th Amendment privil eg e,’ the asser tion of that rig ht ‘often de pends upon leg al advi[c]e from someone wh o is tr a ine d a

nd sk ill e d in

the su bje c t matte r. ’” 45 1 U .S. 47 1, 471 (198 1) (f ir st a lte ratio n in
o ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Ma ne

ss v . M e y e rs , 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975))
. The Court c oncluded that consent to a ps y c hiatr ic int e rv ie w w a s a c ri tic a l sta g e in pr e tr ia l pro c e e din g s suc h that th e de fe nd ant’ s Sixth Am e ndme nt ri ght to c ouns e l w a s v iol a te d w he n th e de fe nd ant w a s n ot g ive n a n o pp or tun ity to consult with his counsel befor e p articipating in a psychiatric examination. Although the
re pe rc us sio ns of a ps y c hiatr ic e xami natio n may be dif fe re nt f ro m th os e of

de br ie fi ngse ssi on s, bo th involve the def

endant’ s decision to waive c erta in Fifth Amen d me nt rights, a

nd in both circumstance s “a de fenda

nt should not be force d to resolve such an important issue without ‘the guiding ha nd of counsel.’” Id
. (q u o t i n g Powell v. Alabama , 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). As i d e fr o m t h e wa i v er o f t h e Fi ft h Am en dm en t ri gh taga i n s ts el f- i n cr i m i n at i o n , d eb ri ef i n gs ho ld t he po te nti a l for pr e

jud ic e to the a c c us e d whi c h may be a vo ide d w iththe a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l.9

I n United States v. Ming He , 94 F.3d 782 (2d C ir. 1996), t he S econd Circuit discussed at length the imp o rta n t r o le o f c o u n s e l a t d e b r ie f in g s in c o n s id e r in g w h e th e r a d e f e n d an t w a s e n ti tl e d to ha ve counsel pre sent during debrie fing sessions held afte r the d ef en d ant had, with the assistance of counsel, plea ded guilty

and si gn ed a co o p eration letter. Althoug h the cour t did not reac h the underlying Six t h Am en d m ent i ssue, the cour t used its supervisory

power s to conclude “ that
coo p e r a tingwitnesses ar e entitled to have counsel pre sent at debr iefing s, unless they expli citly waive such assistance .” Id . at 79 3. Re je c ti ng the g ov e rnme nt’ s a rgume nt t hat “ a de br ie fi ngse ssi on

is a minor event a

nd that defe nse counse l would of nec essity be limited to giving advice principally about
ma tte rs of fa c t,” the c ourt dis c us se d sev e ra l way s in whic h co un se l’ s ass ist anc e may be c ru c ia l at a debrie fing session. Id . at 789
. “ F ir st, a lawy e r ca n e xpla in t

he g ov e rnme nt’ s q

ue sti on s w hil e a lso keepingher c lient calm,” pr eventingthe def endant f rom “blurt[ing] out unthinki ng answe rs.” Id
. “Second, a

lawy er can keep the client focuse d on the fa ct that while he is see king the assistance and protec tion of the g overnme nt, that entity does not sh ar e the def

endant’ s interests eve n afte r the execution of a coope ration ag ree ment.” Id . at 790
. Con tr ary to t he g ov e rnme nt’ s argume nt i n th is
c a se , the c ourt no te d that a deb ri e fi ngis a n a dv e rs ari a l pr oc e e din g , b e c a us e “ the de fe nd ant’ s r ig hts have not be en fully

adjudicate d.” Id
. “Third, in this setting, a defe nse attorne y

might help r esolve po te nti a l di sa g re e me nts be tw e e n th e g ov e rnme nt a nd th e de fe nd a

nt i n c lari fy

inghis ans we rs to
ensure they

are complete a

nd acc urate .” Id . Four

th, “def ense c ounsel ca

n serve as a potential witness at sentenc ing to t h e fa ct that her c lient fully perf ormed the pr omise he made to the g overnme nt.” Id
. Finally , the court noted that the outcome of the debr iefingsessions would impact whether the g overnme nt made a motion for a downwar d d ep ar t u re u n d er § 5K 1.1 of the United10

States SentencingGuidelines, “a motion that has a critica l eff ect on the amount of time def endant will serve in prison”: Mo st s ig nif

ic antl y , th e re fu sa l by

the g ov e rnme nt t o ma

ke su c h a mot ion

is o rd ina ri ly unrevie wabl e. T h e specia l nature of a § 5K1.1 motion demonstrates that the g overnme nt d ebrie fing interview is cr ucial to a c ooperating witness. To se nd a de fe nd ant i nto thi s p e ri lou s se tti ngwi tho ut h is atto rn e y is, we thi nk , in c on sis te nt w ith the fa ir administration of justice. Id
. All of these r easons make clea r t hat Wingo’s de briefingsessions were adver sarial in natur e and also were stag es at which aspects of Wingo’s F ifth Amendment rig ht ag ainst self-incr imination
wer e “ir retrie vably

lo st.” Hamilton , 3 6 8 U. S
. at 5 3
. M o re o v er , t h e c o n s eq u en ce s t h at t h e d eb ri ef i n gs held for Wing o wer e in many respe cts more substantial than those fac ed by the def endant in Ming He beca use, unl ike M ing He, W ingo had not y et enter ed into a plea ag ree ment when he debrie fed. There fore , not only

was his sentenc e depe ndent upon t h e d e b r ie f in g s, but the debrief

ings w ere cruc ial to the plea ne g otiations. Cf. Ki ng , 4 3 3 F. 3 d at 4 9 0 (n o t i n g t h at p l ean ego t i at i o n s ar e acr i t i ca l s t age of c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s)
. B a se d on the se de br ie fi ng s, the g ov e rnme nt w ou ld d e te rm ine the te rm s of the plea

ag ree ment and whe ther the g overnme nt would be willing to ente r into a plea ag ree ment at all. The im portanc e of the debr iefing s is ex emplified by the fa ct that, af

ter the de briefing s broke down, Wingo did not rea ch a ple a deal wi t h the g overnme nt and the ca se proc eede d to trial. The
mere fac t that Wi ng o had sig ned the Kastigar letter doe s not me an t h at the g overnme nt was no longe r his adver sary , and the de briefing s surely held sig nificant c onsequenc es for Wingo. Irec og nize that, i n p ra ct i ce, some defe nse counse l may not attend debr iefingsessions
s u bsequent to the first session and that there may be benef its to the cooper ation proce ss if a defe ndant is able to mee t w ith the g overnme nt w ithout his counsel prese nt. As at any other stag e ofT he p re- A E D P A vers i o n of R ul e 2 2 of t he Fe d eral R ul es of A p p el l at e P roce d ure r ef erred t o t he 2 r equi r ement f

or a “ cer t i f

i cat e of probabl e c aus e, ” but t he cur r ent r ul e u s es t he t er m “ cer t i f i cat e of appeal abi l i t y . ” Fe d
. R
. A p p . P
. 22 (b)(1). 11 criminal proc eeding s, howeve r, a de fenda nt may aff irmatively waive his or her rig ht to have c ounsel prese nt during the debr iefingsessions, as long as this waiver i s m ade voluntarily , knowing ly , and intelligently
. S

e e Es te lle , 4 5 1 U.S. at 471 n.16. I n some ca ses, counse l may deter mine that the debrie fing s would proce ed more smoothly without counsel prese nt, and in such ca ses counse l may advise the de fenda

nt to waive his rig ht to have counse l present at the debrie fing s. Here , there is no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t W i n g o m a d e an y kn o w i n g an d i n t e l l i g e n t w a i v e r o f c o u n s e l
. I t h e r e fo re wo uld conclude that Wingo’s S ix th Amendment rights were viol ated by his counsel’s fa ilure to attend the
va st m a jor ity of his de br ie fi ngse ssi on s. Reg ardingWingo’s sepa

rate appea l of the district c ourt’s denial of bond pending appea l, I
wo uld c on c lud e that we have no jur isd ic tio n ov e r t his a pp e a l be c a

us e no c e rt if

ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity was issued in that appea l. Although de nial of bond pendinghabea s review is appea lable under

the collater al-o rder

doctrine, Do tso n v . Cl

ar k , 9 00 F .2 d 7 7, 78 (6 th C ir . 1 99 0) , w e have he ld “ that a
cer tificate of probable cause is a prer equisite to a ppealing the denial of a bail moti o n i n a h abea s 2 proce eding ,” Lee v. J

abe , 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993). The district c ourt specif ically denied
a ce rtificate of appe alability on the issue of the denial of bond, and, in re sponse to Wingo’s notice of appe al of the denial of

bond, this court ref

used to expand the ce rtificate of appe alability bey ond the one issue c ertified by

the district court. The ref ore, unde r Lee , I would conclude that we do not have jur isdiction over Wingo’s a ppeal of the district court’s de nial of bond.