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RANDALL BROWN v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 37056)

DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Mihalakos, Js.

Argued September 18, 2015—officially released December 15, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Mullins, J.)

Patrick Paoletti, with whom, on the brief, were Grayson Colt Holmes and Stephanie M. O’Neil, for the appellant (petitioner).

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, were Tamara Grosso, assistant state’s attorney,

and, on the brief, Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, for

the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J. The petitioner, Randall Brown,

appeals following the judgment of the habeas court

denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas

court erred when it found that his criminal trial counsel,

Robert Meredith, did not render ineffective assistance

of counsel by failing to fully investigate and call two

potential alibi witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the

habeas court.

The following facts, as set forth in the petitioner’s

direct appeal; see State v. Brown, 299 Conn. 640, 11

A.3d 663 (2011); and procedural history are relevant to

our resolution of this appeal. On May 23, 2005, the

petitioner, along with three others, Eddy Hall, Jr., Idris

France, and Chijoke Jackson, attempted to rob the victim, Demarco Mitchell. Id., 644–45. After entering the

victim’s car, ostensibly to purchase crack cocaine,

France pointed a gun at his head. Id., 645. The victim

and France struggled for control of the gun; the victim

then fled. Id. The petitioner chased the victim, who

tripped and fell near the curb of 103–105 Colebrook

Street in Hartford. Id., 646. The petitioner shot the victim in the head and drove away in a car driven by

Jackson. Id.

The petitioner was arrested and charged with felony

murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes

§§ 53a-134 (a) (4) and 53a-8, attempt to commit robbery

in the first degree in violation of General Statutes

§§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134 (a) (4), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (4), carrying a

pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a) and criminal possession of a

firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 (a)

(1). Id., 643. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was

convicted on all seven counts and sentenced to ‘‘a total

effective term of fifty-five years incarceration.’’ Id., 646.

Our Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on direct

appeal. Id., 643. Thereafter, on August 16, 2013, the

petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas

corpus challenging his conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. As relevant to the present

appeal, he claimed that Meredith was ineffective in failing to investigate and present the testimony of Tonya

Horne and Pasquale Sanseverino, which he claimed

would have established an alibi for him at the time of

the murder.1 Following trial, the habeas court denied

the petition. Thereafter, the petitioner sought certification to appeal from the denial of his petition for writ

of habeas corpus, which the habeas court granted. On

appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
improperly found that Meredith was not ineffective in

failing to further investigate and call Horne and Sanseverino as alibi witnesses. Additional facts will be set

forth as necessary.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of

review and the law governing ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. ‘‘The habeas court is afforded broad

discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . Historical facts constitute a recital of

external events and the credibility of their narrators.

. . . Accordingly, [t]he habeas judge, as the trier of

facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses

and the weight to be given to their testimony. . . . The

application of the habeas court’s factual findings to the

pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed

question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary

review.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction,

313 Conn. 360, 375, 98 A.3d 23 (2014), cert. denied sub

nom. Anderson v. Semple, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 1453,

191 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2015).

‘‘[A] criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to

adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.

2d 674 (1984)]. This right arises under the sixth and

fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . . . As enunciated in Strickland v. Washington,

supra, 687, this court has stated: It is axiomatic that the

right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of

counsel. . . . A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of two components: a performance prong

and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong

. . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s

representation was not reasonably competent or within

the range of competence displayed by lawyers with

ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . To

satisfy the prejudice prong, a claimant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. . . . The claim

will succeed only if both prongs are satisfied.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of

Correction, 306 Conn. 664, 677–78, 51 A.3d 948 (2012).

I

We first consider whether the habeas court properly

concluded that Meredith was not ineffective in failing

to investigate Horne further. The petitioner argues that

Horne’s testimony that she went to Action Auto Center

(Action Auto)2 with the petitioner on May 23, 2005,

and then spent the entire night with him would have

accounted for his location at the time of the murder.

He asserts that Meredith and Meredith’s investigator,
Jennifer Lee, should have investigated Horne further

because her testimony could have provided the petitioner with an alibi. The respondent, the Commissioner

of Correction, contends that Meredith’s decision not to

further investigate Horne was reasonable because her

testimony regarding Action Auto would not account for

the petitioner’s location when the murder occurred.

Further, there was a discrepancy between when the

petitioner said he and Horne were at Action Auto and

when Horne said they were there. Finally, the respondent argues that Meredith could have determined that as

the petitioner’s girlfriend, Horne would lack credibility.

We agree with the respondent.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. The petitioner testified at the

habeas trial that from their first meeting, he told Meredith he was not present at the time of the murder, but

rather was at Action Auto with Horne. He maintained

that Horne would confirm this and that his brother

would help Meredith to get in contact with the people

at Action Auto. The petitioner testified that he provided

Meredith with contact information for Horne and his

brother. He did not testify, until asked by his habeas

attorney, that he told Meredith that Horne was with him

the entire time; moreover, he testified in an ambiguous

manner, such that it is unclear whether he told Meredith

that Horne was with him the entire time he was at

Action Auto, or for the rest of the night.3

The petitioner further testified regarding what he did

at Action Auto and for the rest of the night. When

he arrived, it was dark and Action Auto was closed,

although there were still some people present. He

knocked on the door and a man, whom he identified

at the habeas trial as Sanseverino, opened the door for

him. The petitioner purchased an amplifier for his car

and received a receipt.4 He testified that he left the

amplifier at his mother’s house, went to get Chinese

food, and then went to Horne’s house. It was there that

he received a telephone call concerning the Colebrook

Street shooting; he then called his mother, who lived

four or five blocks from Colebrook Street, to make sure

that neither she nor his brother had been hurt.

Meredith testified regarding his conversations with

the petitioner and his investigation into the potential

for an alibi defense based on the testimony of Sanseverino and Horne. He testified that at their first meeting,

the petitioner stated that he had not committed the

crime and he was at Action Auto at 8:55 p.m., the time

at which the police received the 911 call about the

murder. The petitioner further informed Meredith that

the store closed at 9 p.m., and that he was ushered

out of the store quickly because it was closing. The

petitioner told Meredith that both ‘‘Pasquale,’’ whose

last name he did not know, and Horne were with him.

Meredith requested that Lee verify the alibi that the
petitioner was at Action Auto at 9 p.m., went to his

mother’s house, and then spent the night with Horne.

Meredith also testified that Lee interviewed Horne.

Lee testified regarding her interview with Horne,

whom she understood to be the petitioner’s girlfriend.

The interview was by telephone; Horne confirmed that

she was with the petitioner to procure speakers5 at

Action Auto on May 23, 2005. Lee’s notes, which were

submitted into evidence at the habeas trial, indicated

that the petitioner and Horne were at Action Auto at

around sundown, where they met an individual named

Pasquale. They stayed for fifteen to twenty minutes,

then took the amplifier to the petitioner’s mother’s

house. Horne also testified at the habeas trial, but stated

that she did not remember speaking to Lee.6

Meredith testified that following her investigation,

Lee provided him with her notes. On the basis of Lee’s

notes, Meredith decided not to investigate Horne further as an alibi witness; he explained his decision in

his habeas testimony. He noted that according to Lee’s

notes Horne said she and the petitioner arrived atAction

Auto as it was getting dark or about to get dark. Meredith testified: ‘‘[T]hat was a critical piece of information

because what that told me when I put two and two

together is that, at best, Tonya Horne was at Action

Auto at 8:12. That’s inconsistent with the alibi that [the

petitioner] told me because he said he was at Action

Auto at 9. She said she was there for about twenty

minutes when it was just about getting dark. So if you

add that up, give her the benefit of the doubt, then

we’re at 8:12, the sun’s setting,7

she’s at Action Auto

for twenty minutes. That brings us to 8:32.’’ Meredith

maintained that this left the petitioner with ample time

to drive from the Berlin Turnpike, where Action Auto

was located, to the location of the crime by 8:55 p.m.

He then explained his decision not to call Horne as an

alibi witness: ‘‘[I]f anyone did any investigation and she

were to testify at trial and said she was there for about

twenty minutes and upon cross-examination she’s not

gonna be a good alibi witness because the alibi is not—

based on hertestimony,the alibi—based on those notes,

what her anticipated testimony would be, she wouldn’t

be a good alibi witness because essentially she doesn’t

provide the alibi that [the petitioner] was at Action Auto

at the time of the crime, 8:55.’’ Meredith did not recall

whether the notes said that Horne was with the petitioner for the entire night. Meredith also testified that

while the petitioner maintained his claim that he was

at Action Auto, just prior to trial the petitioner told

Meredith he was on Colebrook Street at the time of

the incident.

In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court

found that Meredith ‘‘conducted a reasonable investigation into the information provided by Horne, and adequately explained why he chose not to call her to testify
at trial.’’ The habeas court found that Meredith’s conduct did not constitute deficient performance and that

the petitioner had failed to establish that he was prejudiced by Meredith’s performance. We agree.

‘‘[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim

must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged

conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as

of the time of counsel’s conduct. . . . At the same time,

the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made

all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 306 Conn. 679–80. ‘‘The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the [petitioner’s] own statements or actions.

Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on

informed strategic choices made by the [petitioner] and

on information supplied by the [petitioner]. . . .

[W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to believe

that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless

or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.’’

Id., 681. ‘‘[O]ur habeas corpus jurisprudence reveals

several scenarios in which courts will not second-guess

defense counsel’s decision not to investigate or call

certain witnesses or to investigate potential defenses,

such as when . . . counsel learns of the substance of

the witness’ testimony and determines that calling that

witness is unnecessary or potentially harmful to the

case . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 681–82.

The failure to investigate a potential alibi may provide

grounds for granting a habeas petition, depending on

the potential reliability of the alibi and the reasonableness of counsel’s decision not to investigate it. See id.,

666 (granting petition that claimed failure to investigate

alibi witness), but see Llera v. Commissioner of Correction, 156 Conn. App. 421, 430, 114 A.3d 178 (denying

petition that claimed insufficient investigation of alibi

witness), cert. denied, 317 Conn. 907, 114 A.3d 1222

(2015). ‘‘Defense counsel will be deemed ineffective

only when it is shown that a defendant has informed

his attorney of the existence of the witness and that

the attorney, without a reasonable investigation and

without adequate explanation, failed to call the witness

at trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaines v.

Commissioner of Correction, supra, 681.

In considering the performance prong of Strickland,

the habeas court must focus on the evidence regarding

what Meredith knew when he made the decision, rather

than on what Horne testified to at the habeas trial but

did not testify that she related to Lee or Meredith. See

Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 306

Conn. 679–80 (reasonableness of counsel’s conduct

viewed as of time of counsel’s conduct). The petitioner
claims that Meredith knew or should have known two

ways Horne could have provided the petitioner with an

alibi. First, she could have demonstrated that she and

the petitioner were at Action Auto at the time of the

murder. Second, she could have demonstrated that she

and the petitioner were together for the rest of the

night. We disagree and conclude that the habeas court

properly determined that Meredith’s performance was

not deficient due to his failure to investigate Horne

further.

With respect to the petitioner’s claim that Horne

would have demonstrated that she and the petitioner

were at Action Auto at the time of the murder, the

habeas court credited Meredith’s calculations that there

was sufficient time between when the petitioner and

Horne would have left Action Auto and when the murder occurred for the petitioner to get to the murder

scene. We agree with the habeas court’s factual determination on this issue, especially given that Meredith’s

calculations were premised on the latest possible time

that the petitioner and Horne could have left Action

Auto. Because Horne’s statement to Lee that it was

‘‘getting dark’’ is not a precise time on which to predicate an alibi, it was quite possible that Horne’s testimony would have indicated that they left Action Auto

significantly earlier than the 8:32 p.m. time that Meredith indicated was the latest possible time they could

have left.

We next consider whether Meredith, after concluding

that Horne’s testimony regarding the petitioner’s presence at Action Auto would not provide the alibi the

petitioner had claimed it would, should have investigated further the possibility that Horne could provide

an alibi by testifying that she and the petitioner were

together for the entire night. Even in his habeas testimony, the petitioner focused on Action Auto, and made

only one ambiguous reference regarding being with

Horne the entire time after he was prompted by his

habeas attorney.8 The investigation request written by

Meredith directed Lee to verify the petitioner’s alibi

that he was at Action Auto at 9 p.m. on the night of

the murder; it also briefly noted the petitioner’s statement that he brought the amplifierto his mother’s house

and then spent the night at Horne’s house. According

to Lee’s notes, Horne stated that after leaving Action

Auto, she and the petitioner dropped the amplifier off

at the petitioner’s mother’s house; the notes do not say

whether Horne mentioned anything about being with

him for the rest of the night. According to the petitioner’s habeas testimony, his mother’s house was approximately four orfive blocks from Colebrook Street, where

the murder occurred. Although Meredith could have

investigated further whether Horne could provide an

alibi for the rest of the night, he testified that he was

worried about setting up an alibi that the jury would

easily dismiss. Instead, Meredith chose to focus on the
weaknesses in the state’s case.

We agree with the habeas court that Meredith’s decision to focus on the weaknesses in the state’s case was

a valid trial strategy. In the context in which Horne was

suggested as a witness, and given what Meredith knew

at the time, the habeas court properly determined that

the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Meredith’s performance was deficient. The petitioner has not met his

burden of demonstrating that Meredith’s ‘‘representation was not reasonably competent or within the range

of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 306 Conn. 678.

Even if Meredith’s performance was deficient, however, the petitioner nonetheless has also failed to prove

that he was prejudiced by Meredith’s failure to call

Horne as a witness at the petitioner’s criminal trial. The

petitioner asserts that Horne could have presented a

valuable alternative to the prosecution’s version of the

murder by providing the petitioner with an alibi, and

that this alibi would have been valuable whether the

jury concluded that the petitioner was at Action Auto

or elsewhere with Horne at the time of the murder. The

petitioner contends that the issue of Horne’s potential

bias as the petitioner’s girlfriend was not raised at the

habeas trial and her testimony at the petitioner’s criminal trial would have created a reasonable probability

that the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different. The respondent claims that the inconsistency

between Horne’s statements and the petitioner’s testimony demonstrated how weak her testimony would be,

and that hertestimony could not have made a difference

to the state’s strong case against the petitioner.

To prevail on the prejudice prong of a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the petitioner ‘‘must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.’’ Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S.

694. ‘‘[T]he question is whether there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the [alleged] errors, the fact

finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting

guilt.’’ Id., 695. ‘‘In making this determination, a court

hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the

totality of the evidence before the judge or the jury.

. . . Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on

the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering

the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an

isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion

only weakly supported by the record is more likely to

have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.’’ Id., 695–96. ‘‘This court does not

retry the case or evaluate the credibility of the wit-
nesses. . . . Rather, we must defer to the [trier of

fact’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses

based on its firsthand observation of their conduct,

demeanor and attitude.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, 96

Conn. App. 854, 857, 902 A.2d 701, cert. denied, 280

Conn. 916, 908 A.2d 536 (2006).

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. Horne testified at the habeas

trial that she and the petitioner went to Action Auto to

buy an amplifier, although she could not testify as to

the time. Horne furthertestified that, afterthey dropped

the amplifier off at the petitioner’s mother’s house, they

rode around for a little while, and when they ‘‘got

home,’’ the petitionerreceived a call about the shooting.

As previously stated, Meredith also testified that while

the petitioner maintained his claim that he was at Action

Auto, just prior to trial the petitioner stated to Meredith

that he was on Colebrook Street at the time of the

incident.

The habeas court determined that the petitioner had

failed to meet his burden of establishing that there

was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different had Horne been

called to testify at the petitioner’s criminal trial. On the

basis of our review of the record, we agree with the

habeas court that there was not a reasonable probability

that Horne’s testimony would have altered the outcome

of the trial. Horne’s habeas testimony suggests that she

could have testified that at the time of the murder, she

and the petitioner were riding around together in the

vicinity of Colebrook Street. The petitioner’s contradictory statements regarding whether he was onColebrook

Street create doubt as to the credibility of his claim

regarding Horne’s effectiveness as a witness. In contrast, at the criminal trial the petitioner was identified

by three separate eyewitnesses. In addition, one of the

witnesses, Hall, testified that the petitioner told him

‘‘to say that [the petitioner] wasn’t there the night of

the shooting.’’9

Although two of the eyewitnesses were coconspirators who told conflicting stories, the third was the victim’s half-brother, Devon Roberts. Roberts and Jackson

stated that they saw the petitioner shoot the victim.

Also, Hall testified that the petitioner stood over him

with a gun, then ran toward the victim. Hall then heard

gunshots, but did not see the petitioner shoot the

victim.

The petitioner claims that each eyewitness lacked

credibility. The petitioner notes that Jackson and Hall

presented conflicting testimony regarding a number of

details, including what the petitioner was wearing. He

also claims that Roberts’ testimony lacked credibility

because Roberts informed the police about what he

saw two months after the shooting; he testified at trial
that he fled the scene because he had an outstanding

warrantfor his arrest. This evidence was before the jury.

Although there were weaknesses in the state’s case,

the evidence presented at the habeas trial does not

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for Meredith’s decision not to call Horne as a witness, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. The

habeas court, therefore, properly concluded that the

petitioner had failed to demonstrate that Meredith’s

decision not to interview Horne further or to call her

as a witness at trial constituted ineffective assistance

of counsel.

II

We next consider the petitioner’s claim that he was

prejudiced by Meredith’s failure to call Sanseverino as

a witness.10 The petitioner argues that Sanseverino was

a disinterested witness who could have testified that

the petitioner was at Action Auto at the time of the

murder and who could have bolstered Horne’s credibility. The respondent asserts that the timing issues make

it clear that, even if the jury believed Sanseverino, his

testimony would not provide an alibi for the petitioner.

The following additional facts are relevant to ourresolution of this claim.

Lee testified that she obtained the receipt for the

amplifier the petitioner purchased at Action Auto and

took pictures of what she termed the ‘‘speaker box’’ at

the petitioner’s mother’s house. The petitioner identified the box as the amplifier box, which contained both

speakers and an amplifier. In addition, Lee spoke to

another employee at Action Auto, who confirmed that

Sanseverino frequently sold audio equipment at Action

Auto, although he was not employed there.

Sanseverino testified at the habeas trial regarding his

encounter with the petitioner. He was working at Action

Auto on the Berlin Turnpike in May of 2005. Sanseverino

stated that in May, 2005, Action Auto closed at 6 p.m.

on Sunday; 7 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday;

and 8 p.m. on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, but he

did not know what day of the week it was when the

petitioner came to the store. He saw the petitioner

knocking on the door after the store was closed. He

then sold him an amplifier and gave him a receipt. When

presented with the petitioner’s copy of the receipt, he

identified it as the same, confirming the model number

of the amplifier he sold to the petitioner. Sanseverino

also recalled that after the petitioner bought the amplifier, they went out to the petitioner’s car, where Sanseverino saw a female passenger in the car. He testified

that the process took thirty to forty-five minutes, that

when the petitioner left depended on whether they

closed at 7 p.m. or 8 p.m. that day, and that the petitioner

could have left at 8:30 p.m. or 8:45 p.m. He identified the

receipt as corresponding to the amplifier the petitioner
purchased, and noted it stated the date as May 23, 2005.

The habeas court indicated that May 23, 2005, the

day the murder occurred, was a Monday; it then found

that ‘‘[t]he testimony by Sanseverino regarding the petitioner’s presence at Action Auto . . . approximately

thirty minutes after the store closed at 7 p.m. directly

contradicts the petitioner’s testimony that he arrived

at the store around 9 p.m. and stayed for an hour to

an hour and a half, and does not provide a strong alibi

defense for the petitioner based on the time of the

victim’s murder.’’ It therefore determined that the petitioner had not shown a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceedings would have been different

had Meredith called Sanseverino, and that it need not

determine whether Meredith’s conduct constituted deficient performance. We likewise conclude that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing that he

was prejudiced by Meredith’s performance.

The timing issues cited by the habeas court demonstrate that Sanseverino’s testimony would not have

been any more helpful than Horne’s regarding the petitioner’s presence at Action Auto.11 The habeas court

properly concluded that Sanseverino’s testimony did

not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for

Sanseverino’s absence, the result of the petitioner’s

criminal trial would have been different.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The petitioner also alleged ineffective assistance regarding Meredith’s

failure to call additional witnesses to establish a third party culpability

defense and to conduct further pretrial investigations regarding whether

the petitioner was ever incarcerated with Hall, such that Hall could have

heard inculpatory statements made by the petitioner. He has not pursued

these claims on appeal, and, therefore, they are deemed abandoned. See

Atkinson v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 632, 636 n.5, 9

A.3d 407 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 919, 14 A.3d 1006 (2011).

2 Witnesses and the parties vary regarding whether the name of this store

is Action Auto, Action Audio, Action Auto Center, or Action Auto Sound.

For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to it as Action Auto.

3 The petitioner’s attorney examined him as follows:

‘‘Q. Did you tell him that you were with Tonya Horne?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Did you tell him that you went to Action [Auto]?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Did you tell him that afterwards—that Tonya Horne was with you

the entire time?

‘‘A. Yes.’’

4 The receipt for the amplifier was admitted as an exhibit at the habeas

trial, was signed by Sanseverino and bore the date of May 23, 2005.

5 The petitioner later clarified that the amplifier box contained speakers

and an amplifier; this explains the inconsistency in how the parties referred

to it.

6 As will be discussed in the following colloquy, Horne testified at the

habeas trial regarding the night of the murder, but she said she did not

remember Lee; she testified at the habeas trial that she remembered speaking

to a lawyer as follows:

‘‘Q. Okay. And when [the petitioner] got an attorney, did you ever speak

to the attorney?

‘‘A. Mm-hmm.

‘‘Q. And what did you tell the attorney?

‘‘A. That I was with [the petitioner].

‘‘Q. Okay. Did you explain why that was important?
‘‘A. I didn’t—I don’t remember me explaining it.

‘‘Q. Okay. But you essentially told the attorney that you were with [the

petitioner] when?

‘‘A. The day of the murder.

‘‘Q. Okay. Did you tell the attorney—or do you remember a conversation

about Action Auto?

‘‘A. I’m not for sure.’’

7 Meredith testified that Lee printed out a weather report for the night of

the murder, which stated the time of sunset. He kept a copy of this weather

report, which was submitted into evidence.

8 See footnote 3 of this opinion.

9 Hall testified, outside of the jury’s presence, that this conversation

occurred at ‘‘Walker,’’ i.e., MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution. In

the habeas trial, the petitioner claimed he was not incarcerated at MacDougall-Walker, but at Cheshire Correctional Institution. The records specialist

for the Department of Correction, Michelle Deveau, testified at the habeas

trial that inmates at different institutions may be transported to a central

location prior to court appearances. The habeas court found that Meredith

was not ineffective in failing to further investigate this issue, and the petitioner does not raise it on appeal.

10 The habeas court did not determine whether Meredith’s failure to investigate Sanseverino constituted deficient performance. ‘‘If it is easier to dispose

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice

. . . that course should be followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Smith v. Commissioner of Corrections, 141 Conn. App. 626, 632, 62 A.3d

554, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 947, 67 A.3d 290 (2013).

11 The petitioner also argues that Sanseverino’s testimony could have bolstered Horne’s testimony that the petitioner was with her for the rest of

the night. Although Sanseverino’s testimony could have bolstered Horne’s

testimony about the petitioner being at Action Auto, it would have shed

little light on the veracity of Horne’s testimony regarding what followed.

Even with Sanseverino’s testimony, Horne’s testimony would not have been

sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different result in the

petitioner’s criminal trial.