Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

OPINION

No. 04-22-00513-CR, No. 04-22-00514-CR, No. 04-22-00515-CR, No. 04-22-00516-CR, 

No. 04-22-00517-CR, No. 04-22-00518-CR, No. 04-22-00519-CR

The STATE of Texas v. Jaime Francisco FLORES, JR.,

The State of Texas v. Gracie Yvette Lopez, The State of Texas v. Cristal Ann Ramirez, 

The State of Texas v. Martin Eli Perez, The State of Texas v. Rodney Ortiz, 

The State of Texas v. Enrique Cibrian

From the 229th Judicial District Court, Duval County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 19-CRD-43, 21-CRD-07, 21-CRD-12, 21-CRD-93, 

22-CRD-15, 22-CRD-16, 22-CRD-07

Honorable Baldemar Garza, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 30, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED

In seven cases, grand jurors of Duval County indicted Jaime Francisco Flores, Jr., Gracie 

Yvette Lopez, Cristal Ann Ramirez, Martin Eli Perez, Rodney Ortiz, and Enrique Cibrian 

(collectively, Appellees) for third-degree felony smuggling of persons. Appellees moved to quash 

their indictments by challenging the statute on several constitutional grounds. After a hearing, the 

trial court granted the motions. The State appeals all seven cases, which we consolidated for 

briefing and argument. Because we reject Appellees’ constitutional claims, we reverse the trial 

court’s orders and remand the causes for further proceedings.
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BACKGROUND

Texas Penal Code section 20.05(a) prohibits the smuggling of persons by three distinct 

manner and means. Only one—section 20.05(a)(1)(A)—is applicable here. 

In 1999, section 20.05(a)(1)(A) was specifically enacted to target “coyotes” who 

transported noncitizens across the Rio Grande River and through Texas and exposed them to 

dangerous conditions.1 In 2011, the statute was broadened to eliminate the exposure-to-danger 

element and instead make it an enhancement. Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1014, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 

1999. Amended by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 223 (H.B. 260), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2011; Acts 2015, 

84th Leg., ch. 333 (H.B. 11), § 14, eff. Sept. 1, 2015; Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 572 (S.B. 576), 

§ 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2021 (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.05). 

In 2015, as part of House Bill 11, the legislature added a new basis of liability—(a)(2) 

harboring a noncitizen—while limiting (a)(1) liability to those who smuggle persons with “the 

intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit.” Id. (“A person commits an offense if the person, with the 

intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit, knowingly . . . uses a motor vehicle . . . to transport an 

individual with the intent to . . . conceal the individual from a peace officer[.]”). In 2021, the 

legislature eliminated “the intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit” element from (a)(1), instead 

making it an enhancement. Id. (“A person commits an offense if the person knowingly . . . uses a 

motor vehicle . . . to transport an individual with the intent to . . . conceal the individual from a 

peace officer[.]”).

Appellees were each arrested after stops for traffic violations. All were transporting 

suspected noncitizens in their vehicles. All six appellees were charged with violating section 

1 Sen. Eliot Shapleigh Testimony before Senate Criminal Justice Committee (May 12, 1999), 

https://tlcsenate.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view%20id=26&clip%20id=7866 at approx. 11:46 (introduction, 

amendment, and passage of S.B. 1885). 
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20.05(a)(1)(A). Flores,

2 Lopez,3 Ramirez,4 Perez, and Cibrian were indicted under the 2015

version of the statute. Ortiz5 was indicted under the 2021 version.

Appellees moved to quash their indictments by challenging the statute on preemption, 

Fourth Amendment, vagueness, and equal protection grounds. The State responded and the trial 

court held an evidentiary hearing. Appellees argued, essentially:

• Preemption. Enforcement of the statute is preempted by federal law. Regulating human 

smuggling is an area of exclusive federal control. The federal framework is so pervasive 

that it has left no room for the states to supplement it (“field preemption”). Parallel state 

law implicitly conflicts with federal law (“conflict preemption”). Federal and state courts 

have uniformly struck state smuggling statutes as preempted.

• Fourth Amendment. The statute is facially unconstitutional because it “makes a felony 

out of what the Fourth Amendment protects, which is to avoid the police if you want.”

• Vagueness. The statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give ordinary people 

fair notice of the conduct prohibited and it fails to establish guidelines for law enforcement, 

allowing law enforcement (rather than the legislature) to determine what the law is.

• Equal protection. The statute is unconstitutional as applied because it was selectively 

enforced based on the race, ethnicity, and national origin of the transported individuals. 

At the evidentiary hearing on the motions to quash, Appellees clarified that they only challenged

section 20.05(a)(1)(A). They relied on its legislative history and noted that throughout the 

legislative debate, the witnesses “that testified, they only spoke about this migration context. . . . 

That’s how the law is drafted, that’s how it’s been updated, that’s how it’s only ever been talked 

about, one context, transporting migrants, that’s it.” Appellees presented information about 

Operation Lone Star, which was specifically launched to “secure the border and combat the 

smuggling of people and drugs into Texas.” They also argued that in Duval County, the statute is 

2 The Flores indictment alleged transport of “five (5) undocumented aliens from Mexico.”

3 The Lopez indictment alleged transport of “an undocumented immigrant.” 4 The Ramirez indictment alleged transport of specific named individuals.

5 The Perez, Cibrian, and Ortiz indictments in the last four cases simply alleged transport of an “individual.”
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strictly used to prosecute smugglers of individuals from South or Central America or the Caribbean 

who are Hispanic or Black. And, although the statute is not facially an immigration statute, 

Appellees argued the only way it is used is as an immigration statute.

Appellees offered and the trial court admitted, for the limited purposes of the hearing,

6 the 

offense reports from most of the arrests of Appellees. Appellees called a single witness, Sergeant 

Modesto Saavedra with the Criminal Investigation Division of the Duval County Sheriff’s Office. 

He testified, in part, that section 20.05 “is to deal with transport of, uh, migrants.” He explained 

that in every stop in which he has arrested someone under section 20.05, “the subjects identify 

themselves as undocumented aliens.” In all the cases, he considers it an unwritten element of the 

section 20.05(a)(1)(A) offense that there is probable cause to believe the persons transported are 

noncitizens. He stated that circumstance drove the arrests in these cases. Saavedra also testified 

about the various dangers human smugglers pose to the transported noncitizens such as assault, 

ransom, rape, murder, abandonment, and trafficking. He noted that all arrests for human smuggling

have followed stops for traffic violations.

In response to the preemption challenge, the State noted that the statute focuses on the 

transporter. The statute does not target those who transport noncitizens—it targets those who 

transport any passenger with the intent to conceal that passenger from law enforcement. The State 

also argued it uses the smuggling statute to capture conduct related to the “transporting of men, 

women, and children throughout our state for purposes such as forced labor, prostitution, and/or 

other prohibited conduct.” The State argued it needs the smuggling statute because it cannot prove 

trafficking or other crimes because the federal government deports the noncitizens, leaving them 

unavailable to testify. The State noted that although other states’ smuggling statutes have been 

6 When they offered exhibits, Appellees did so with the express caveat—“These are being offered solely for the 

purpose of this hearing and not for any subsequent trial. . . .”
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struck down on preemption grounds, those statutes criminalized conduct directly related to an 

individual’s noncitizen status, and the statute at issue here does not.

In response to the remaining claims, the State argued that the Fourth Amendment challenge 

has no merit because “[e]very stop starts with probable cause.” It further argued the statute is not 

vague because it is clear as to what kind of conduct it criminalizes. In responding to the equal 

protection argument, the State again focused on the fact that the statute only criminalizes the 

conduct of the transporter, not the noncitizens. The goal of the statute, in fact, is to protect the 

individuals being transported from unscrupulous traffickers. Because the noncitizens are often 

deported quickly, there is no way for the State to use them as witnesses against traffickers. The 

State uses the smuggling statute, which requires only proof of transport and concealment, because 

that is how it can protect “not just the citizens of the state, but any individual who is present here 

in our state.”

The trial court granted the motions to quash and set aside the indictments without providing 

a basis for its ruling. The State appeals. In their brief, Appellees focus solely on their preemption 

and Fourth Amendment arguments. Because the trial court could have ruled on any of the four 

constitutional grounds, we address them all.

ANALYSIS

Overall Standard of Review

In reviewing the dismissal of an indictment, we apply a bifurcated standard. State v. KrizanWilson, 354 S.W.3d 808, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We give “almost total deference to a trial 

court’s findings of facts that are supported by the record, as well as mixed questions of law and 

fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness.” Id. “However, the court of appeals applies a de 

novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on 
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credibility determinations.” Id.; see also Estrada v. State, 629 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2021, no pet.) (reviewing trial court’s decision on motion to quash an indictment de novo).

Preemption

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National 

and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.” Arizona v. 

United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012). “From the existence of two sovereigns follows the 

possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes.” Id. at 398–99. “The Supremacy Clause 

provides a clear rule that federal law ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 

every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the 

Contrary notwithstanding.’” Id. at 399 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). “Under this principle, 

Congress has the power to preempt state law.” Id. “There is no doubt that Congress may withdraw 

specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption 

provision.” Id. “State law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances.”

Id. “First, the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within 

its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance.” Id. “The intent 

to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive 

. . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal 

interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state 

laws on the same subject.’” Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 

(1947)). “Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law.” Arizona, 567 

U.S. at 399. “This includes cases where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a 

physical impossibility . . . and those instances where the challenged state law stands as an obstacle 
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to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

There are two cornerstones of preemption jurisprudence. First, “the purpose of Congress is 

the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, in all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in 

which Congress has legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied, we start with 

the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 

Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). The states have traditionally occupied criminal law enforcement; 

they have not traditionally occupied immigration enforcement. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 

806–07 (2020) (noting that while federal law “‘makes a single sovereign responsible for 

maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation’s 

borders,’” criminal law enforcement has been and is “primarily a responsibility of the States”)

(quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401–02).

Specific to preemption in the immigration context, in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 

(1976),7 the United States Supreme Court established three criteria under which state regulation 

affecting noncitizens is preempted: (1) if it regulates immigration—i.e., if it is “essentially a 

determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country”; (2) if the clear and 

manifest purpose of Congress was to completely oust state power in the area of regulation; or (3) 

it is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of Congress. Id. at 355–63. “Preemption is 

a question of law reviewed de novo.” Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. PHI Air Med., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 839, 

846 (Tex. 2020).

7 DeCanas has been superseded on other grounds by the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. See 

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 404–05.
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Application

Appellees moved to quash their indictments on their claim that section 20.05(a)(1)(A) is 

preempted. Both below and in their briefing to this court, they framed this argument as a facial 

challenge. Although at oral argument Appellees referenced this claim as an as-applied challenge, 

the trial court was not squarely asked to address an as-applied preemption claim. Without a fully 

developed record, precedent advises that it would be procedurally inappropriate for this court to 

address the Appellees’ as-applied preemption claim. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has 

recognized, “[a]n ‘as applied’ challenge is brought during or after a trial on the merits, for it is 

only then that the trial judge and reviewing courts have the particular facts and circumstances of 

the case needed to determine whether the statute or law has been applied in an unconstitutional 

manner.” State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Since an asapplied claim “requires a recourse to evidence, it cannot be properly raised by a pretrial motion to 

quash the charging instrument.” Id. This court has also acknowledged that a pretrial motion to 

quash an indictment may be used only for a facial rather than an as-applied challenge to the 

constitutionality of a statute. State v. Rosseau, 398 S.W.3d 769, 779 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2011), aff’d, 396 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In the opinion affirming that decision, the 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that “the record is undeveloped and thus we do not yet 

know what evidence the State will present at trial to support its allegations. In a facial challenge 

to a statute’s constitutionality, we examine the statute as it is written, rather than how it is applied 

in a particular case. Arguments pertaining to an as-applied challenge . . . must be reserved for 

another day.” 396 S.W.3d at 558 n.9 (internal citation omitted).

Here, Appellees introduced evidence at the hearing on the motion to quash with the express 

caveat that evidence was “offered solely for the purpose of this hearing and not for any subsequent 

trial.” And the State declined to present any evidence. As a result, the record is undeveloped and 
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we decline to speculate what evidence the State would present at trial to support its allegations.

Bound as we are by precedent, we decline to address Appellees’ as-applied claims. See id.

And when we examine the statute as written, we cannot find it preempted by federal law.

Appellees argue the statute is field preempted because the federal government makes a single 

sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to penalize the 

transportation of noncitizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii). Section 1324(c) authorizes 

local law enforcement to make arrests for violations of immigration law, but “the federal courts 

maintain exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute for these crimes and interpret the boundaries of the 

federal statute.” Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1263–64 (11th 

Cir. 2012) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1329). That is, state regulation that specifically targets the smuggling 

of noncitizens is preempted because the clear and manifest purpose of Congress was to completely 

oust state power from this area of regulation leaving no room for analogous state crimes. Courts 

generally agree. See id. at 1263–65; United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1286 (11th Cir. 

2012); United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2013); Valle del Sol Inc. v. 

Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1024–26 (9th Cir. 2013); Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, 408 P.3d 445, 452 

(Colo. 2017).

Appellees rely on an order from the Western District of Texas to support their preemption 

argument. Cruz v. Abbott, 177 F. Supp. 3d 992, 998, 1021 (W.D. Tex. 2016), rev’d on other 

grounds, 849 F.3d 594 (5th Cir. 2017).

8 But there, the court analyzed section 20.05(a)(2), not the 

8 Cruz was brought by individuals and groups that provided legal services, food, clothing, and shelter to noncitizens. 

The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court’s injunction on standing grounds, concluding section 20.05(a)(2) required a

level of covertness the plaintiffs lacked and, since they did not face a credible threat of prosecution, they failed to

satisfy the injury-in-fact element for Article III standing. Cruz v. Abbott, 849 F.3d 594, 602 (5th Cir. 2017). Because 

the Western District of Texas’s analysis was a preliminary injunction and not a final ruling on the merits, the Fifth 

Circuit’s reversal means the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims were never—and will never be—reviewed on a fully 

developed record. See id.
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subsection at issue in this case. Because the language of the subsection is different, we find the 

Cruz court’s analysis distinguishable.

Cruz involved Texas Penal Code section 20.05(a)(2), which provides: “A person commits 

an offense if the person knowingly: (2) encourages or induces a person to enter or remain in this 

country in violation of federal law by concealing, harboring, or shielding that person from 

detection.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.05(a)(2). The Cruz court granted a preliminary injunction,

enjoining enforcement of section 20.05(a)(2) on preemption grounds, because 8 U.S.C. § 1324 

occupies the entire field of noncitizen harboring regulation, and Congress left no room for 

additional state regulation. Id. at 1014. But, unlike section 20.05(a)(2), section 20.05(a)(1)(A)—

the only statute at issue in this case—is not directly analogous to any federal statute.

9 Section 

20.05(a)(1)(A) applies to any “person” who transports any “individual” with the intent to conceal 

that individual from the police. Although there is overlap between the federal scheme and some 

applications of section 20.05(a)(1)(A), we do not agree that the clear and manifest purpose of 

Congress was to bar state liability for the smuggling of persons. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357–58. 

Appellees point out that, despite the neutral language of the statute, the clear intent of the 

legislature and the on-the-ground reality show the statute was designed to combat the smuggling

of noncitizens and that is the only way it is actually used. As the Supreme Court has noted, 

however, “Whatever the purpose or purposes of the state law, pre-emption analysis cannot ignore 

the effect of the challenged state action on the pre-empted field.” Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. 

Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992). “The key question is thus at what point the state regulation 

9 Appellees construe Cruz as having enjoined subsection 20.05(a)(1)(A). While some of the language in that opinion 

is broad, we read it more narrowly in light of the fact that the plaintiffs in that case challenged only the harboring 

provision in House Bill 11 and the statutes incorporating it. See Br. for Appellees, Cruz, 177 F. Supp. 3d 992 (W.D. 

Tex. 2016) (No. 5:16–CV–067–DAE) (arguing that federal law preempts state harboring provisions and so preempts 

Texas’s HB 11 § 14 (a)(2) and Texas HB 11 §§ 15(a) and 16(a)(17) “to the extent they incorporate § 14(a)(2)”).
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sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it should be deemed pre-empted under the Act.”

Id.

Although the legislative history of the human smuggling statute shows an intent on the part 

of Texas legislators to prevent noncitizens from remaining in the state, the legislature also 

facilitated the prosecution of criminal traffickers who prey upon vulnerable persons—citizens or 

not—which, as all parties here agree, is a legitimate realm of state criminal law. Federal law 

specifically allows for state laws that target traffickers of noncitizens. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(A), 

(C).10 Appellees’ own witness testified that the State uses the smuggling law to pursue traffickers 

before they can traffic. We hold that despite the state legislative history and Congress’s possible

intent to preempt state criminal statutes that directly criminalize the smuggling of noncitizens, 

Congress did not intend to preempt neutral state smuggling statutes like section 20.05(a)(1)(A).

Nor do we find conflict preemption. Appellees argue the challenged state law stands as an 

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in 

part because the basis of liability and statutory ranges of punishment are different than those in the 

federal statute. The federal statute restricts liability to situations in which the transportation is “in 

furtherance” of the smuggling, but appellees contend the Texas statute “potentially criminalizes 

anyone who gives an undocumented person a ride.” In addition, the federal statute sets out no 

mandatory minimum sentence and a five-year or ten-year maximum (depending on whether the 

10 See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(A) (setting out the authority to permit trafficking victims to stay in the United States to 

facilitate the investigation and prosecution of traffickers); 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(C) (providing federal government 

will develop “materials to assist State and local law enforcement officials in working with Federal law enforcement 

to obtain continued presence for victims of a severe form of trafficking in cases investigated or prosecuted at the State 

or local level” and “distribute the materials” to state and local law enforcement officials); see also 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(15)(T)(i) (authorizing “T Visas” for trafficking victims who have “complied with any reasonable request 

for assistance in the Federal, State, or local investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking. . . .” (emphasis added), 

and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (authorizing “U Visas” for certain crime victims who are “likely to be helpful to. . . 

Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities investigating or prosecuting [certain] criminal activity. . . .”) 

(emphasis added).
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offense was done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain); the current 

Texas statute sets out a two-year minimum sentence and a ten-year or twenty-year maximum

(depending on whether the offense was committed with the intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit).

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (iii), (B)(ii); TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 20.05(a), (b), (b)(1)(C), 12.23, 

12.34. Appellees also argue the state statute usurps power from the federal executive branch, where 

immigration enforcement decisions exclusively reside, and impermissibly delegates to state and 

local law enforcement an initial determination of a person’s noncitizenship status. See DeCanas, 

424 U.S. at 355. Appellees point to the evidence showing that arrests for violations of section 

20.05(a)(1)(A) hinge on whether the passengers appear to be noncitizens. But state actors must 

make these same judgments to make arrests for the federal smuggling offense—an action the 

federal statute expressly permits local law enforcement to do. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c); see, e.g., 

Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding Rhode Island State Trooper’s

detention of motorist for 8 U.S.C. § 1324 violations supported by probable cause); United States 

v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1302 (10th Cir. 1984) (same, Kansas State Trooper); United 

States v. Dimas, 418 F. Supp. 2d 737, 745 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (same, Pennsylvania State Trooper).

Many appellate courts have found these conflict arguments persuasive in striking down 

state smuggling statutes. See Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts., 691 F.3d at 1265–67; Alabama, 691 

F.3d at 1285–86; South Carolina, 720 F.3d at 530–31; Valle del Sol Inc., 732 F.3d at 1025–28; 

Fuentes-Espinoza, 408 P.3d at 452–54. Likewise, they are arguments the Western District of Texas 

agreed with when granting the preliminary injunction to enforcement of section 20.05(a)(2). Cruz, 

177 F. Supp. 3d at 1014–17. That court was persuaded that the subsection involved in that case 

relocated decision-making from federal actors to state actors, imposed inconsistent and greater 

penalties than 8 U.S.C. § 1324, and simultaneously widened 8 U.S.C. § 1324 in certain aspects 

and narrowed it in others. Id.
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While these arguments may be persuasive in the context of a preemption-as-applied 

challenge, we do not find them persuasive in a facial attack. See Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 

1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2016). The federal and Colorado cases addressed state statutes that, on their 

face, applied only to the transportation or harboring of noncitizens, “so every application of the 

statute had the potential to conflict with federal immigration policy.” See id. In contrast, the Texas 

statute applies to any “person” who transports an “individual” with the intent to conceal that 

individual from the police, regardless of the citizenship status of either. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 20.05(a)(1)(A). Although some applications of section 20.05(a)(1)(A) may conflict with the 

federal act’s comprehensive scheme or with the federal government’s discretion over immigrationrelated prosecutions, when the laws are applied to citizens, those concerns simply are not 

implicated. For that reason, we conclude the preemption cases where the statutory language singles 

out the transportation or harboring of noncitizens do not control here. 

Here, Texas exercised its police powers to pass a criminal law that applies equally to those

who smuggle citizens and those who smuggle noncitizens. Just because some applications of those 

laws implicate federal immigration priorities does not mean that the statute conflicts with federal 

law. See Kansas, 140 S. Ct. at 805–06. (“[I]n the vast majority of cases where federal and state 

laws overlap, allowing the States to prosecute is entirely consistent with federal interests.”); 

DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355 (“[T]he Court has never held that every state enactment which in any 

way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this 

constitutional power, whether latent or exercised.”).

In sum, we reject Appellees’ arguments because they apply only to certain applications of 

section 20.05(a)(1)(A). The statute, as written, does not regulate immigration, was not enacted 

contrary to the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to occupy the field, and does not operate 

as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of Congress. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. at 806–07; 
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DeCanas, 424 U.S at 355–63. We therefore conclude the trial court erred to the extent it granted 

the motions to quash based on Appellees’ preemption arguments.

Fourth Amendment

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“A facial challenge is an attack on a statute itself as opposed to a particular application.”

City of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 415 (2015). As a result, to resolve a facial

challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, we focus “on the language of the statute itself rather 

than how it operates in practice.” McGruder v. State, 483 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Because there is no recognized overbreadth doctrine outside 

the limited context of the First Amendment, a defendant who challenges the facial constitutionality 

of a statute beyond that limited First Amendment context has the most difficult challenge to mount 

successfully, since he must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the challenged 

statute would be valid.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “[T]o prevail on a 

facial challenge” the challenger “must establish that the statute always operates unconstitutionally 

in all possible circumstances.” State v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

The United States Supreme Court set out this no-set-of-circumstances standard in United 

States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). See Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 71, 80 n.50 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010). As discussed below, in Patel, the Supreme Court further explained that when 

assessing whether a statute meets the Salerno no-set-of-circumstances standard, it “has considered 

only applications of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct.” Patel, 576

U.S. at 418.

Whether a statute is facially constitutional is a question of law we review de novo. Ex parte 

Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “When the constitutionality of a statute is attacked, 

we usually begin with the presumption that the statute is valid and that the legislature has not acted 
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unreasonably or arbitrarily.” Id. at 14–15. “The burden normally rests upon the person challenging 

the statute to establish its unconstitutionality.” Id at 15.

Application

Appellees set out the basic principle that the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable

seizures to safeguard the right of the people to be secure in their persons. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. 

Ct. 989, 993 (2021). An arrest is the quintessential seizure of the person. Id. at 996. And Appellees 

clarify that they do not challenge their traffic stops; they challenge their arrests—indeed, any 

arrests—under section 20.05(a)(1)(A). Appellees note that, as applied to encounters with law 

enforcement, an individual has the “constitutional right to walk away and not answer any questions 

put to him without such action creating reasonable suspicion in the mind of the officer that criminal 

activity was afoot.” Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). According to 

Appellees, given that an innocent individual has a constitutional right to avoid the police, it follows 

that assisting an innocent person to avoid the police must also be protected by the Fourth 

Amendment. In that circumstance, the person assisting innocent concealment shares the Fourth 

Amendment’s protection.

Relying on Patel, Appellees argue that section 20.05(a)(1)(A) is facially invalid because 

there are no circumstances in which it operates constitutionally. Patel, 576 U.S. at 418. Patel

involved a Los Angeles municipal code provision which allowed police to inspect hotel registry 

information on demand. Id. at 412. Failure to make the records available was punishable as a 

criminal misdemeanor and could subject the hotelier to immediate arrest. Id. at 421. A group of 

motel operators argued the statute was facially unconstitutional because it did not provide the 

operator an opportunity to have a neutral decisionmaker review an officer’s demand to search the 

registry before the operator faced penalties for failing to comply. Id. Los Angeles countered that 

the code provision was not facially unconstitutional because circumstances existed under which it
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would be valid, such as in an emergency or when the inspection was permitted by a warrant. The 

Supreme Court rejected that theory and held that, when applying the Salerno no-set-ofcircumstances standard to a statute authorizing warrantless searches,

the proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is searches that the law actually 

authorizes, not those for which it is irrelevant. If exigency or a warrant justifies an 

officer’s search, the subject of the search must permit it to proceed irrespective of 

whether it is authorized by statute. Statutes authorizing warrantless searches also 

do no work where the subject of a search has consented. Accordingly, the 

constitutional “applications” that petitioner claims prevent facial relief here are 

irrelevant to our analysis because they do not involve actual applications of the 

statute.

Id. at 418–19. Appellees analogize to Patel, asserting that the proper focus of the constitutional 

inquiry here is the seizures that section 20.05(a)(1)(A) authorizes, not those for which it is 

irrelevant. If another statute justifies the seizure, then the subject of the seizure must permit it to 

proceed irrespective of whether it is authorized by section 20.05(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, they 

argue, the constitutional “applications” that could otherwise prevent facial relief here are irrelevant

because they do not involve actual applications of the statute. Appellees argue that all legitimate 

uses of the statute are covered by federal or state statutes:

• 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii) (prohibiting transporting or concealing a person in this 

country without authorization);

• Texas Penal Code § 38.05 (criminalizing harboring or concealing another “with intent to 

hinder the arrest, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for an offense”); and

• Texas Penal Code § 20.05(a)(1)(B) (criminalizing using a means of transport with the 

intent to flee from a person attempting to lawfully arrest or detain the actor).

According to Appellees, the only situation section 20.05(a)(1)(A) separately criminalizes is one in 

which officers do not otherwise have a constitutionally justifiable reason to investigate, i.e., when 

the individual has every right to avoid the police. In essence, they argue, the statute does no 

constitutional work. 
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We find this analogy inapposite. The State’s ability to prosecute under other statutes does 

not mean its ability to prosecute under this statute is irrelevant to the analysis. “In our system, so 

long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined 

by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 

jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978);

see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (“This Court has long 

recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may 

prosecute[] under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.”).

Patel and the authority it relies on address search regimes that permit searches or seizures

without a warrant or probable cause. Patel, 576 U.S. at 416–17. Section 20.05(a)(1)(A) defines a 

crime. Under the actus rea requirement, the defendant must have transported another person. And 

under the mens rea requirement, the defendant must have acted with the specific intent to conceal 

that person from police. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978). Absent 

probable cause to believe both have occurred, no legal seizure is possible. State v. Espinosa, 666 

S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“Probable cause exists under Article 14.01(b) if, when 

the arrest is made, the facts, circumstances, and reasonably trustworthy information known to the 

arresting officer, are sufficient for a prudent person to conclude that an individual committed or 

was committing a criminal offense.”). We agree with the Fifth Circuit that Patel did not “overrule 

the Salerno standard” or otherwise “lower[] the bar for facial Fourth Amendment challenges.” City 

of El Cenizo, Tex. v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 187 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding “plaintiffs must establish 

that every seizure authorized by the ICE-detainer mandate violates the Fourth Amendment”).

Given the lack of an “overbreadth” doctrine outside the limited context of the First 

Amendment, the fact that section 20.05(a)(1)(A) might operate unconstitutionally under some 

conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid. Cf. Ex parte Perry, 483
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S.W.3d 884, 913–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (plurality op.) (excluding conduct covered by other 

statutes when looking at the legitimate sweep of a statute challenged on First Amendment

grounds); Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 20–24 (same).

Further, section 20.05(d) provides, “If conduct constituting an offense under this section 

also constitutes an offense under another section of this code, the actor may be prosecuted under 

either section or under both sections.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.05(d). This indicates the legislature 

wanted this statute to be available as a tool to punish the proscribed conduct, even if other code 

sections also prohibit the same conduct. See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 

(1981) (noting a legislature can lawfully authorize multiple punishments for the same conduct); 

see, e.g., Ritz v. State, 533 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (per curiam) (Newell, J., 

concurring) (“Under the plain text of the [trafficking] statute, the legislature sought to provide as 

much protection for exploited people and children as possible by allowing prosecution for both 

human trafficking and the product of that trafficking.”); Moreno v. State, 413 S.W.3d 119, 131 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (noting legislature clearly expressed intention that a 

defendant may be convicted of both human trafficking based on forced prostitution under section 

20A.02 and compelling prostitution under section 43.05); Ex parte Pool, 71 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. 

App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.) (noting legislature expressly approved multiple punishments for

violating protective orders). An individual transporting a person against the will of that person in 

the trunk of a car, for instance, could be prosecuted as a kidnapper, and, under this statute, as a 

smuggler.11

11 The Patel court rejected the City’s claims that a statute authorizing warrantless searches may still have independent 

force if it imposes a penalty for failing to cooperate in a search conducted under a warrant or in an exigency because 

the “argument gets things backwards.” Patel, 576 U.S. at 419 n.1. “An otherwise facially unconstitutional statute 

cannot be saved from invalidation based solely on the existence of a penalty provision that applies when searches are 

not actually authorized by the statute.” Id. Because we disagree that this is an otherwise facially unconstitutional 

statute, we find section 20.05(d) relevant to the analysis.
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Given that legitimate applications of the statute exist, we disagree that it is facially 

unconstitutional. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; McGruder, 483 S.W.3d at 883; Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 

at 557. The trial court erred to the extent it granted the motions to quash on Appellees’ Fourth 

Amendment claims.

Vagueness12

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“‘The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes,’ . . . is an ‘essential’ of due process, 

required by both ‘ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law.’” Sessions v. Dimaya, 

138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (plurality opinion) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 

595–96 (2015)). “The void-for-vagueness doctrine . . . guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair 

notice’ of the conduct a statute proscribes.” Sessions, 138 S. Ct. at 1212. “And the doctrine guards 

against arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement by insisting that a statute provide standards to 

govern the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges.” Id. “Each ground—a lack of 

fair notice and a lack of standards for law enforcement—provides an independent basis for a facial 

vagueness challenge.” Ex parte Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, 

pet. ref’d). “Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle 

that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that 

statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other 

situations not before the Court.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); Ex parte 

Barton, 662 S.W.3d 876, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Only when a vagueness challenge involves 

12 It appears Appellees have abandoned their vagueness argument on appeal. Because they raised a vagueness 

argument below, the trial court could have quashed the indictments on vagueness grounds. For that reason, and because 

Appellees were not required to file an appellate brief, we are required to review the vagueness argument they raised 

below. Spielbauer v. State, 622 S.W.3d 314, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (an appellee is not required to file a brief 

and an appellee’s failure to file a brief does not relieve the appellate court of its duty to thoroughly review the 

appellant’s claims and any subsidiary issues that might result in upholding the trial court’s judgment) (citing TEX. R.

APP. P. 47.1).
04-22-00513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519-CR

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First Amendment considerations can a criminal law be held facially invalid even though it may 

not be unconstitutional as applied to the defendant’s conduct. State v. Doyal, 589 S.W.3d 136, 144 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Facial challenges to the constitutionality of a criminal statute raise

questions of law, which an appellate court reviews de novo. Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 14. 

Application

In their motions to quash, Appellees alleged the statute lacks specificity because it could 

apply in such situations as “a game of hide and seek, with a monetary prize at stake, involving an 

off-duty police officer as the searcher,” or “a taxi driver picking up a passenger who wants to avoid 

their friend, a police officer.” This case is controlled by Broadrick. 413 U.S. at 610–11. Even if 

the outermost boundaries of the statute “may be imprecise, any such uncertainty has little relevance 

here, where [the captured] conduct falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute’s 

proscriptions[.]” Id. at 608.

Appellees also argue that the statute’s vagueness allows for arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement because it is only enforced in one context—the transport of noncitizens. But the 

statute survives the vagueness challenge because “the statutory language conveys sufficiently 

definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and 

practices.” Ex parte Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). The police 

officers charged with enforcing the statute necessarily must exercise some ordinary level of 

discretion as to what constitutes prohibited conduct, and while the statute is broadly written, it 

establishes minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. See id. It does not appear law 

enforcement or appellate courts have “had trouble making sense” of the statute or that the statute 

is “nearly impossible to apply consistently.” Cf. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 598–99 (“Here, this Court’s 

repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a principled and objective standard out of the 

residual clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy.”).
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The trial court erred to the extent it granted the motions to quash on Appellees’ vagueness 

claims.

Equal Protection13

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

This court recently set out the standards for an equal protection challenge. Ex parte 

Aparicio, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 04-22-00623-CR, 2023 WL 4095939, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio June 21, 2023, pet. filed) (en banc). “Prosecutors retain broad discretion in enforcing both 

the nation’s and a state’s criminal laws.” Roise v. State, 7 S.W.3d 225, 243 (Tex. App.—Austin 

1999, pet. ref’d) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). “Thus, if the prosecutor 

has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision 

whether to prosecute and what charge to file generally rests entirely within his or her discretion.”

Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Because of this discretion, there is a presumption that a prosecutor has acted within his 

or her duties and in good faith. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). Nonetheless,

prosecutorial discretion is not absolute and is subject to constitutional constraints, including equal 

protection principles. See id.; Roise, 7 S.W.3d at 243.

“A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is ‘directed so 

exclusively against a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that 

the system of prosecution amounts to ‘a practical denial’ of equal protection of the law.”

Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464–65 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)). 

Accordingly, a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute “may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard 

such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Oyler 

13 Again, although Appellees did not argue equal protection in their responsive brief, for the reasons described in the 

footnote above, we review the equal protection arguments they raised below.
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v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). “The requirements for a selective-prosecution claim draw on 

‘ordinary equal protection standards.’” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 

608). 

“Because we presume that a prosecution for the violation of a criminal law is undertaken 

in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory fashion, the burden falls on the defendant to establish a 

prima facie case of selective prosecution.” Robles v. State, 585 S.W.3d 591, 597 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). The defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutorial 

policy “‘had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.’”

Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608). To establish a discriminatory effect 

in a case based on an arbitrary classification, the defendant must show similarly situated 

individuals of a different classification were not prosecuted for the same conduct. Id. To 

demonstrate that the prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, the defendant must 

show that the government’s selection of the defendant for prosecution was based on an 

impermissible consideration, such as race, religion, or desire to prevent the exercise of 

constitutional rights. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610. Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case of 

selective prosecution in violation of equal protection rights, the burden shifts to the State to justify 

the discriminatory treatment. Ex parte Quintana, 346 S.W.3d 681, 685 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, 

pet. ref’d).

“A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, 

but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by 

the Constitution.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463. Because it has no bearing on the determination of 

actual guilt, “it is an issue for the court to decide, not an issue for the jury.” Galvan v. State, 988 

S.W.2d 291, 295 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d). 
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Application

Appellees argued below that the Texas human smuggling law violates equal protection 

because law enforcement and prosecutors selectively apply it, in “incidents involving foreign 

nationals who are overwhelmingly Hispanic and/or Black,” but not where the smuggled persons 

are citizens, or another race. “In the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal 

rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” 

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991). But a litigant may rest a claim to relief on the legal 

rights or interests of third parties provided “three important criteria are satisfied.” Id. at 410–11. 

“The litigant must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ thus giving him or her a ‘sufficiently concrete 

interest’ in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third 

party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own 

interests.” Id. (internal citations omitted, quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112–16 (1976)).

Appellees argued below that strict scrutiny governed their claims. Even if we assume that 

Appellees have standing to bring this challenge on behalf of the transported individuals,14 strict 

scrutiny does not apply. The Supreme Court has stated, “Undocumented aliens cannot be treated 

as a suspect class[.]” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982); see Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 

F.3d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 2011). We agree with the Western District of Texas, which applied a rationalbasis review to an equal protection challenge to the 2015 version of section 20.05(a)(2), which 

directly targets the smuggling of noncitizens. Cruz, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 1019 (“[L]egislation such 

as [section 20.05(a)(2)], ‘that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental 

rights must be upheld against an equal protection attack when the legislative means are rationally 

14 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (“As a general matter—and assuredly 

in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case—[a person] unlawfully in this country has no 

constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.”).
04-22-00513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519-CR

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related to a legitimate governmental purpose.’”) (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331

(1981)). Such laws carry a “presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear 

showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 331–32. The Cruz court wrote:

In this case, despite being likely preempted by federal law, [section 20.05(a)(2) and 

the statutes incorporating it] are rationally related to their stated purpose of 

“strengthen[ing] the State’s border security measures and help[ing to] stem the 

rising tide of human smuggling and human trafficking in Texas” by targeting “folks 

that are engaging in smuggling for financial gain.” Because of the substantial 

deference afforded to governmental actions in a rational basis review, the Court 

finds that these purposes are both rational and legitimate, and that Plaintiffs have 

failed to state a violation of their equal protection rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 

have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for their equal 

protection claim.

Cruz, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 1019–20 (internal citation omitted). The same can be said for section

20.05(a)(1)(A)—the statute and its enforcement are rationally related to the legislature’s stated 

purpose of “strengthening the State’s border security measures and helping stem the rising tide of 

human smuggling and human trafficking in Texas.” The trial court erred to the extent it granted 

the motions to quash on Appellees’ equal protection claims.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s orders quashing the indictments, reinstate the original 

indictments, and remand the cases to the trial court for further proceedings on the original 

indictments.

Beth Watkins, Justice

PUBLISH