### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 7, 200 5 S es sio n
LIND A D IAN E STU TZ v. D AV ID LA RR Y S TUT Z
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 02 D 587 W. Ne il Th om as, Jud ge

No. E2004-01399-COA- R3-CV - F ILED AUGU ST 23, 2005

This case involves a divorce and the va lidityof a po s tnuptial ag ree ment. Mr. and Ms. Stutz wer e marrie d more than twe nty y ear s. During most of t he marriag e, they wanted to have c hildren but wer e un su c c e ssf

ul. Whe n a

c hil d b e c a me a va ila

ble fo r ad op tio n, Ms. Stu tz w a s e la te d a nda g g re ssi ve in her a ctions to secu re t h e adoption of the c hild, but Mr. St utz was opposed to the adoption of the child. Over the course of sever al weeks, Ms. Stutz attempted to cha ng e Mr. Stutz’s mi nd reg arding the a do pti on . F ina lly , sh e sug g e ste d th a t in e xch a ng e fo r h is c on se nt t o th e a do pti on , th e y wo uld
en t eri n t o an agr ee m en t d i v i d i n g t h e m ar i t al es t at e an d i n t h e e v en tM r. S t u t z wa s u n h ap p y b ei n g a fathe r they

would divorce and follow the a g ree ment previously determined. The result was a leng thy postnuptial ag ree ment, which among other thing s, divide d t h e m ar i t al estate g iving most of the marital prope rty

to Mr. Stutz

. Wit hin a fe w y ear s of the sig ning of the postnuptial ag ree ment and the adoption, Ms. Stutz fi l ed fo r divorce . The trial c ourt upheld the va lidityof the postnuptial ag ree ment with the exception of a section which attempted to wa ive and/or sig nificantly limit Mr. Stutz ’s child support obligation. The trial court also g rante d a divorce to the parties upon Mr. Stutz ’s motion without conducting an evide ntiary hearing. Ms. Stutz appeals. We hold that the postnuptial
a g re e me nt i s in va lida s it

is c on tr ary

to p ub lic po lic y . We fu rthe r h oldthat the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in g ranting a divorc e to the parties in the absenc e of a stipulation t o or proof

of gro u n d s for divorc e. Acc ording ly , we r ever se the trial c ourt’s dec ision and remand this ca se for a trial on the division of the mari ta l e state , a lim on y , d ivo rc e , a nda ny re ma ini ng iss ue s.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d, C aus e Rem anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which D.M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., and G A RY R. W ADE , Sp.J ., joined.

Ph il li p C. L a w r e n c e , Ch a tt a n o o g a , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e A p p e ll a n t, L in d a

D ia n e Stu tz

. Glenna M. Rame r, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee and Sarah Y. Sheppear d, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, for the Appellee , David L arry

Stutz

.-2- OP IN ION

I.

L ind a Di a ne Stu tz a ndDa vidL arry Stu tz we re marrie d o n D e c e mbe r 1 8, 19 82 . A t th e tim e of the mar riag e, Ms. Stutz , ag e 26, was working for a fre ight company and taking colleg e cla sses at nig ht. L a te r, sh e be g a n w or kin g fo r the Te nn e sse e Va lle y Au tho ri ty . M r. Stu tz, a g e 34 , h a d r e c e ntl y sta rt e d a me c ha nic a l c on tr a c tin g bu sin e ss. Ne ith e r pa rt y ha d a ny sig nif

ic a nt a sse ts or inc ome . M s. Stutz testified that Mr. Stutz was not dra wing any income fr om the new c ompany and that her

salary pa id the ir liv ing e xpe ns e s f

or a nu mbe r o f y e ars

. Du ri ng the e arl y y e ars of thi s mar ri a g e , M r. Stu tz
wo rk e d lo ng ho ur s a way

fr om the ho me a t the ne w c omp a ny in or de r to make it a su c c e ss. Ms. Stu tz
was wor king f ull-time and g oing to sc hool at night to a dvance her car eer

. I n short, much time was devoted by

the parties to their respe ctive ca ree rs. Mr. Stutz was an astute businessman and ove r the y ear s, the company

he starte d, Valley

Mecha nical, I nc., bec ame ve ry profita b l e. As the pa

rties pr os pe re d f

ina nc ia lly , th e y

be g a n to tr a ve l e xten siv e ly a nd a c qu ir e a sse ts. I n a dd iti on to the ir ho me in Ch a tt a n o o g a , th e y p u r c h a s e d a b e a c h f r o n t v a c a ti o n h o me in F lo r id a , lo ts o n Wa tt s B ar lake, a bo a t, j e t skis, dia mon d r ing s, oth e r j e we lr y , a ndse ve ra l mi nk c oa ts.

At the tim e of

tr ia l, M s. S tutz wa s a

pr og ra mme r a na ly st f

or TV A, e arn ing app ro xima te ly $50,000 per y ear and Mr. Stutz operated Valley Mecha nical, I nc, ea rning $1,082,552.00 in 1996, and $782,502.00 in 1995. The Stutz s had an adjusted g ross income in 1997 of appr ox imately $905,000 ba se d o n M s. Stu tz’ s sa lary a t T VA , Mr

. Stu tz’ s e arn ing s f ro m V a lle y

Me c ha nic a l, Inc ., div ide nd s, interest, re al estate income, and othe r sourc es. During this marriag e, Mr. a nd Ms. Stut z, byvirtue of the ir pe rs e ve ra nc e and hard wo rk , a c hie ve d g re a t f ina nc ia l su c c e ss anda ma sse d a ma ri ta l e state worth in excess of $11,000,000.
The pa rties wante d children, but we re una ble to conce ive a c hild. Ms. Stut z testi fied that she had under g one thr ee d i ff er ent surg ical proc edure s in an attempt to become preg nant. She furthe r te sti fi e d tha t both pa

rt ie s und e rw e nt te sti ng a nd so ug ht he lp fr om t wo dif fe re nt f e rt ili ty sp e c ia lis ts. Ms. Stut z resear ched the possibili ty of in vitro f

e r t i l i z a t i o n , w h i c h t h e y a t t e m p t e d , u n s u c c e s s f u l l y, fo r a sho rt pe ri od of tim e

. Mr . Stutz tes tif ie d tha t he wa s c omp le te ly su pp ortiv e of

the ma ny a tte mpt s to h a ve a fa mil y a nd that he, too , de sir e d to hav e c hil dr e n. At the a g e of

41 , M s. Stu tz un de rw e nt a complete hy sterec tomy . After Ms. Stutz’s hy sterec tomy in 1997, the parties c ease d discussing the p o s s i b i l i t y o f

h a v i n g a f a m i l y.

Howeve r, this chang ed on F ebrua ry 27, 1998, when Ms. Stutz learned of a woman who wa s preg nant and wa nted to surre nder he r child for adoption. Ms. Stutz wa s very enthusiastic about the prospec tive adoption, but was unable to discuss it wit h M r. S t u t z beca use he w as in Europe on a business trip. O n Marc h 2, 1998, Ms. Stut z contacted L ane A very , a Chattanoog a attorne y with the law firm of

Gea rhiser, Pete rs, L ockaby

& T allent, who had pe rformed leg al work f or Mr. Stutz ’s business for many

y ear s. Ms. St utz asked Mr. Avery if any one in the law firm handled adoptions and
was re fer red to a nother a ttorney

within the same law f

irm, Terry

Cavett. Ms. Stutz testified that she-3-

and Ms. Cavett had multiple telephone conver sations over the ne x t few day s about the process of an adoption.

Whe n M r

. Stu tz r e tu r n e d f r o m E u r o p e o n M ar c h 9 , 1 9 9 8 , M s

. Stu tz to ldhim of the prospec tive adoption. Ms. Stut z was disappointed to le arn that Mr. Stutz was not supportive of the idea of the adoption. Ms. Stutz beg an try ing to c onvince Mr. Stutz to a g ree to the adoption, but he
c on tin ue d to re sis t th e ide a . D e sp ite Mr . Stutz’ s opp os iti on , on Mar c h 11, 19 98 , M r. a ndMs. Stu tz
we nt t o th e a do pti on a g e nc y ha nd li ng the a do pti on a ndwe re int e rv ie we d. Mr . Stutz c on tin ue d to disag ree with the idea of

the adoption and a dvised the adoption ag ency that he believe d he wa s too ol d a n d t h a t h i s h e a l t h w a s t o o p o o r t o b e c o m e a p ar e n t

. M e a n w h i l e , M s

. S t u t z c o nti nu e d to communicate with Ms. Cavett almost daily reg arding her prog ress with locating the birth fathe r and handling the leg al aspe cts of the a doption.

On Friday , Marc h 13, 1998, the couple spe nt t h e weekend at their Florida vacation home. Following that trip, Mr. Stutz still had not cha ng ed his mind ab o u t t h e ad option and rema ined adama ntly

opposed to the i dea. On M onday , Marc h 16, 1998, Mr. Stutz contac ted Ms. Stutz about
a n o pp ortun ity

fo r a bu sin e ss tr ip in Pue rt o Ric o wi th so me frie nd s b e g inn ing Ma rc h 1 8, 19 98 . M s. Stutz tes ti fi ed th a t sh e a g re e d to g o, bu t th a t be fo re le a vin g Cha tta no og a sh e c on ta c te d b othMs. Ca ve tt a ndthe a do pti on a g e nc y to i nf or m th e m of

he r p la n to be ou t of

tow n f or se ve ra l day s.

Du ri n g t h e t ri p t o P u er t o R i co , M s

. S t u t z t es t i fi ed t h at s h e c al l ed b o t h M s

. C av et tan d P eggy L owe, the direc tor of clinica l service s at Be thany Christian Services, e very morning and eve ry evening for a n update on the ba by who was due on Marc h 20, 1998. The pa rties t alked about the adoption on sever al occ asions while in Puerto Rico. Mr. Stutz continued to ar g ue ag ainst the
a do pti on c iti ng his a g e , h is p oo r h e a lth , th e str e ss c a us e d b y his job , the lim itatio ns the c hil d w ou ld pla c e on the ir

abil ity to t ra ve l, a ndthe fi nan cia l res pons ibi lit ie s th e c hil d w ou ld i mpo se on the m. Ms. Stu tz, c on c lud ing that Mr . Stutz’ s o pp os iti on wa s p ri mari ly ba se d o n f

ina nc ia l c on c e rn s, proposed a

solution - the parties would enter into an agr eeme nt for the division of t heir assets in the event of a divorc e in exchang e for Mr. Stutz ag ree ing to the adoption. Ms. Stutz testified that she
su g g e ste d a n ag re e me nt fo r a fa ir a nd e qu ita ble pr op e rt y div isi on pu rs ua nt to w hic h, oth e r tha n c hil d
su pp ort, M r. Stu tz w ou ld h a ve no oth e r fi na nc ia l obli g a tio n to Ms. Stutz o r t o th e c hil d. Ms. Stu tz also testified that her

proposal wa s for the a g ree ment to last one y ear and that, if within that one y ear pe ri odMr . Stutz “ ha te d” be ing a pa re nt, he c ou ld wa lk a way , ob ta in a div or c e a ndthe a sse ts w ou ld be alr eady

divided per the ag ree ment. Mr. Stutz testified that Ms. Stutz set all the parame ters for the
a g r e e m e n ta n d t h a ts h e w a s o n l y i n t e r e s t e d i n r e c e i v i n g t h e m ar t i a l r e s i d e n c e , h e r f u r s , h e r j e w e l r y, the Wat ts B ar L ake lot s, a c ar a ndon e mil lio n d oll ars . M r. Stu tz a g re e d to thi s p ro po sa l. A t th e tim e Ms. Stut z made this proposal she had not see n a fina ncial stateme nt of the parties’ net worth. Acc ording to Mr. Stutz , upon their re turn from Puerto Rico, Ms. Stutz contac ted M r. Avery and asked him to beg in drafting the postnuptial ag ree ment. Ms. Stut z denies contac ting Mr. A very and denies e ver discussing the postnuptial a g ree ment with him except on the morning the ag ree ment was signe d. Mr. Avery

had no rec ollection as t o whether he consulted with Mr. or Ms. Stutz reg arding the dra fting of the postnupt ial ag ree ment althoug h Mr. Stutz ’s pag er numbe r wa s on Mr. Avery ’s handwritten notes.-4-

Th e ba by g ir l, w ho m th e pa

rt ie s in te nd e d to a do pt a ndwh om the y had a g re e d to na me L aShawn Da nielle Stutz , was born on Mar ch 20, 1998 while the pa rties wer e in Puerto Rico. When Mr. and Ms. Stutz returne d home on Marc h 23, 1998, they went to B ethany

Christian Services to see the baby . Ms. Stutz bonded with L aShawn imm ediately upon the baby being place d in her arms. The first visit with L aShawn laste d approximately two hours. Ms. Stutz testified as follows re g arding their first visit with L aShawn:

Mr. L awr ence : J ust tell the Court what happene d, then, on the

23 . You’re there at Be thany Christian rd Se rvi c e s a ndthe y

br ing L a Sha wn in. Just describe what ha

ppens on that occ asion.

Ms. Stutz : I had alre ady felt like Shawnee was mine, but

when they put her in my arms, all 15 y ear s of dis app oin tme nt w a s g on e . Sh e wa s mi ne jus t as much a s if I

had just g iven bi rt h to that baby . We b o n d ed instantly and she w as every thing I

had eve r hoped f

or in a c hild.

An d D a vidwas th ere, a ndI ha d a sk e d h im i f he wa nted to hold her, a nd he s aid he wa s nervous a nd afr aid he would h u rt her, a nd I said, “The y ’re a lot toughe r than y ou think,” and he he ld her. An d it was the fa milyI had drea med of m ywhole mar riag e and it wa s c omi ng to pass ri g ht the re . Sh e pu t he r l itt le ha ndaro un d o ne of

his fingers andhe jus t
seeme d so tender towa

rd her

. I mean, I knew t h a th e w o u l d l o v e h e r , i f h e d i d n ’ ta l r e a d y. He just seeme d to melt right ther e.
On M ar c h 2 4 , 1 9 9 8 , a p r e li mi n ar y h o me s tu d y w a s c o n d u c te d b y th e a d o p ti o n a g e n c y and Mr . a ndMs. Stu tz w e re pr e se nt i n the h om e and partic ipate d. Ms. Stu tz c on tin ue d to vis it w ith L aShawn on Ma

rch 25 , and on Mar ch 27 , spending three to four hours with the c hild on each

th th

occa sion. On Marc h 29, 1998, Mr. and Ms. Stutz signe d the application for adoption with Be thany Christian Services.

Whil e the Stutzs wer e pursuing the adoption and repre sented by Terry Cavett, L ane A very wa s d ra ft ing the po stn up tia l a g re e me nt. L a ne Av e ry ha d re pr e se nte d Mr

. Stu tz’ s bu sin e ss i nte re sts since 1983, a nd done som e estate planning for the parties. Mr. Ave ry was a lso a social ac quaintance of the pa rties, had visited their F lorida home on more than one occasion, and had ac companied the m on a plea sure trip to San F ranc isco. Fr om billi ng rec ords of the law firm, i t appea rs that leg al work on the postnuptial ag ree ment beg an on March 24, 1998. When asked w ho he wa s repr esenting in the-5-

d r a f t i n g o f t h e p o s t n u p t i a l a g r e e m e n t , M r

. A v e r y r e s p o n d e d t h a th e d i d n o tr e p r e s e n te i t h e r p ar t y, but that he m ere ly draf

ted t he parties’ agr eeme nt. Howeve r, a le tter wa s introduced into evidenc e from Mr. Ave ry

to Mr. Stutz dated Ma rc h 3 0 , 1 9 98, which outlined Tenne ssee law reg arding postnuptial ag ree ments and m ade refe renc es to their discussions reg arding limit ations on Mr. Stutz ’s
c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n. Mr . Stutz t e sti fi e d th a t he didno t see k in de pe nd e nt l e g a l a dv ic e be c a us e he knew he could rely on Mr. Avery

. When asked whether he consult ed with M s. Stut z reg arding thi s a g re e me nt, Mr . A ve ry te sti fi e d a s f

oll ow s:

Mr

. L a wr e nc e : Do y ou ha ve a ny mem ory of s peak ing wi th L ind a Stu tz a bo ut this a g re e me nt prior to i ts being draf

ted?

Mr

. Av e ry : I ha ve no pa rtic ula r me mory of sp e akin g wi th either Linda Stut z or Da vid Stut z concerning t h i s agreement during its prepar ation. Howeve r, I

mus t h av e spoken to one or the oth e r o f the m.

M r

. L a w r e n c e : I s th e re a nyc orre sp on de nc e in y ou r fi le

addres s ed to L inda Stutz g iving he r a p r o p o s e d d r a f

t o f th is M ar it a l Pr o p e r ty and Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt t o r e vie w a nde dit ?

Mr . A ve ry : I ha ve se e n no sp e c if ic le tte r a dd re sse d to Mr s. Stu tz

.
Mr. L awr ence : I nsofar as y our billing re cords a re c oncerned, I understand y our testimony to be that y ou can find no specific ref

ere nce to the g ener ation of thi s d oc ume nt?

Mr. Avery : I rec all no specific ref ere nce to the g ener ation of the do c ume nt.

Pat Murchison, Mr. Stutz ’s ac countant for many y ear s, testified that he wa s contac ted by Mr. Avery who aske d him to meet with Mr. Stut z to prepare an “a cc urate financ ial statement.” Mr

. Av e ry str e sse d th e imp orta nc e of fu ll d isc los ur e . H e fu rthe r t e sti fi e d th a t he didme e t with Mr . Stutz
a n d t h a tt h e y p u tt h e f

i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n tt o g e t h e r a n d t h e n f

o r w ar d e d i tt o M r

. A v e r y.
Acc ording to Ms. St utz, t here h ad been no me ntion of the ag ree ment by either pa rty since their re turn from Puerto Rico a nd she had not pursue d the idea. H oweve r, on either Marc h 30 or

thM s

. St u t z i s r ef er r i n g t o t h e Apr i l 2, 1998, c ou r t d at e wher ei n t h e par t i es w er e t o a cc ept t h e s u r r en der of 1
La Sha wn and recei ve p hy si cal cust o d y of her.
-6- 31 , Mr. Stutz came home and prese nted Ms. Stutz with a postnupt ial ag ree ment. As to when she st
rec eived the postnuptial ag ree ment for the f irst time, Ms. S tutz testified:

Ms. Stutz : I believe i t wa s t h e f o l l o wi n g M o n d ay or Tuesday night. We hadn’ t talked about anything a

bout it. W e had ta lked about L a Sha wn

. I kn e w the c ou rt da te

. I had tol d 1 him wh e n the c ou rt

da te wa s. We h a d a ll this stuff lined out. I

had tak en off f

rom work. I
me a n, e ve ry

thi ng wa s se t.

And he c ame in fr om work one e veni n g and just threw this ag ree ment down on the couc h, and he sa id, “This is the ag ree ment.”

A n d I - - “ W h a t ?”

An d h e sa id, “ This i s th e a g re e me nt. Th is i s all y ou’re g etting from m e. You’re not ge tting anything e lse. I

sug g est y ou rea d it.” So I did.

Ms. Stut z further testified tha t she was shocked t o see the financ ial disclosure a nd how much money they had. She said she was aware they had a high standa rd of living , but was surprise d to see what they wer e worth. Ms. St utz t estified that while s he had signe d tax returns in the past she had never revie wed them prior to signing and that she had alway s trusted her husband t o handle their financ es a ndne ve r f

e lt the ne e d to a sk

qu e sti on s. Whe n a sk e d o n d ir e c t e xami na tio n a bo ut h e r r e a c tio n to the ag ree ment prese nted to her by Mr. S tutz , she t estified that it was nothing like the ag ree ment she ha d s ug g e ste d to him in Pue rt o Ric o. F urthe r, sh e te sti fi e d tha t with re sp e c t to the pa rt s sh e c ou ld
un de rs ta nd , s he kn e w the do c ume nt wa s g ivi ng Mr

. Stu tz th e bu lk o f the mari ta l e state . O n A pr il 1, 19 98 , M s. Stu tz a tte mpt e d to c on ta c t a la wy e r t o r e vie w the a g re e me nt, bu t w a s u ns uc c e ssf ul.

On t h e morning of April 2, 1998, the birth mother was to appe ar be fore the trial court and
surre nder he r par ental rig hts to the baby . Mr. and Ms. Stutz wer e to a ppear later tha t same morning to a c c e p t th e s u rr e n d e r , r e c e iv e g u ar d ia n s h ip a n d p h y s ic a l c u s to d y o f th e c h il d

. B e f

o r e ap p ear ing in cour t , h o we v er , Mr. and Ms. Stutz went to the law of fice of L ane A very

for the pur

pose of sig nin g the po stn up tia l a g re e me nt. Ms. Stu tz te sti fi e d th a t on the way to M r. Av e ry ’s of

fi c e sh e tol d Mr. Stutz that she had be en unable to talk to a lawy er a n d asked tha t they postpone the sig ning of the ag ree ment until she could consult with lega l counsel. Acc ording to Ms. Stutz, M r. Stutz said, “No. Tha t kid is n o t c o mi n g in my h o u s e u n le s s th is is s ig n e d to d a y

. ” M s

. Stu tz te s ti f ie d to the following reg arding her e motional state upon arriving at Mr. Avery ’s offic e:-7- M r

. L a w r e n c e : So y ou a rr ive d a t th e - - y ou ha d thi s

conver sation with D avid in the car on the way to L a ne Av e ry ’s of

fi c e , c or re c t?

Ms. Stu tz: Uh -huh. Ye s. We dr ov e a nd that wa s p re tty

much it. I

mean, a fter he said n o, I ’m not po stp on ing it, thi s k id i s n ot c omi ng int o th is house, I knew I had to sig n or I

would never see my baby ag ain.

Mr . L a wr e nc e : Ho w d id y ou fe e l a bo ut tha t.

M s

. Stu tz : I w a s s ic k

. I w a s ju s t

- - I r e me mb e r f e e ling
rea lly light-he aded and - - just the emotion of the adoption would have been one thin g . I
was terrif ied the birth mother would not show; she mig ht chang e her

mind at the last minute,
so me thi ng . I hadne ve r b e e n th is c los e to being a mother. I

had neve r bee n any wher e ne ar. An d Sh a wn e e wa s li te ra lly a n ho ur or so a way fr om m e be ing he r mothe r, he r b e ing my l i t t l e ba b y , I h ad o ri gi n al l y t h o u gh t , u s b ei n g a f a m i l y.

. . . .
Mr

. L a wr e nc e : I wa nt to fo c us , tho ug h, on wh a t c a us e d y ou to

sign this ag ree m en t that y ou knew to be unfair.

Ms. Stut z: I

had held Shawne e. She had my heart in he r hand. I was her mother as much a s any mother is t o t h eir child. Had David be en holding a knife to he r throat, I would have not felt any differ ently . I

would have ne ver se en that baby ag ain. I know that. He w as not g oing to postpone. That ’s - - that wa s de fi nit e . I

wa s a t th e c ro ssr oa ds

. I c ou ld
e ith e r s ig n th is d oc ument, bring my c hil d home, or re fuse to s ign a nd never see he r ag ain.-8-

On ce t h eyar ri v ed at M r. Av er y ’s o ff i ce , M r. an d M s

. S t u t z we re es co rt ed t o a r o o mt o re ad an d s i gn the postnuptial ag ree ment. Present in the room with them we re Mr . Avery , Mr. Murchison, a ttorney J err e Mosley , and two women w ho wer e witnesses to the Stutzs’ signature s. Mr. Murchison testified that Mr. Avery

was c lear ly

in char g e of the meeting and that he asked both Mr . and Ms. Stutz to rea d
e a c h p a g e of

the a g re e me nt a nde xec ute the do c ume nt. B e fo re the a g re e me nt w a s si g ne d, Ms. Stu tz
a sk e d th a t th e fo llo wi ng se nte nc e be a dd e d, “ I n th e e ve nt o f d ivo rc e , M rs . Stutz s ha ll be e nti tle d to sole custody

of any adopted c hild. ” The postnuptial ag ree ment consists of 14 pag es plus Ex hibit A, which is a description of the
mari ta l a sse ts w ith the ir

va lue s. Th e po stn up tia l a g re e me nt p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art :

M AR ITA L P RO P ER TY AND SETTL EMENT AGR EEMENT

THI S MARI TAL PRO PE RT Y A N D SE T T L EMENT AGREEMENT, made this 2 day of April, 1998, by

and betwe en nd DA VI D L . STU TZ , a resident of Florida (her einaf ter re fer red to a s

“ M r

. Stutz ”), a nd LIN DA D. STU TZ , a r e s i d e n to f

H a m i l t o n C o u n t y, Tenne ssee ( here inafter

ref err ed to as “ Mrs. Stutz ”),

W IT N E S E T H:
THAT WHEREAS, Mr. and Mrs. Stutz are husband a nd wife, be ing lawfully marrie d on Dec ember

18, 1982; and

. . . .
WHE REA S, M r. a ndMr s. Stut z no w, thr ou g h th e e xec uti on of thi s Ma ri ta l Pr op e rt y a nd Se ttl e me nt Ag re e me nt (“ Ag re e me nt” ), de sir e to (i) mutually attempt to pr eser ve their marria g e and promote harmony in their marital and f

amily rela tionships, and (ii) solemniz e in writing the ir un de rs ta nd ing a nd a g re e me nt wh ic h wa s re a c he d in a n e ff ort to
rec oncile all of the ir disputes an d disag ree ments, the parties
a c kn ow le dg ing that thi s Ag re e me nt a c c ur a te ly de fi ne s a ndse ts f

orth the re spective rights of ea ch of them in and to their respe ctive properties and all jointlyheld prope rty in the event of

any subsequent divorce during the term he reof ; and

. . . . WHEREAS, t he parties consider t h em s elves to be c apable of providing their own support by virtue of their curr ent estates and by virtue of their

m an age ment and employ ment skills, ex perie nce a nd education; and-9- . . . . NO W, T H E RE F O RE , in c o n s id e r a ti o n o f th e p r e mi s e s a n d mu tual
covenan t s and conditions here inafter set forth, the pa

rties ag ree as fo llo ws :

1. P ay m e nt

. I n c on sid e ratio n of Mr s. Stu tz’ s a g re e me nts a s se t f orth here in, and other g ood and valuable consider ation, Mr. Stutz ag ree s t o p a y t o M r s

. S t u t z t h e s u mo f $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0

. 0 0 w i t h i n f

i f t e e n ( 1 5 ) d a ys of the da te of thi s Ag re e me nt. Suc h amo un t ma y be pa id t o M rs . Stutz by a ndthr ou g h a

de po sit by Mr

. Stu tz of su c h a mou nt (w hic h d e po sit
ma y c o n s ti tu te a

c o n trib u ti o n o f

in

- k in d a s s e ts ) in to a n a ccount
e s ta b li s h e d in th e n a me o f

M r s

. Stu tz

.

. . . .
2. F inan cial Disclosure; M arital P roperty

.

. . . . (c ) .

. . Mr s. Stu tz e xpre ssl y a c kn ow le dg e s th a t du ri ng e a c h o f the la st three cale ndar y ear s Mr. Stutz has re ce ived as W-2 compensation fr o mh i s b u s i n es s o rga n i z at i o n s am o u n t s n o t l es s t h an t h e f o l l o wi n g: (i) for 1996, $ 1 , 0 8 2 , 552.00, (ii) for 1995, $782,502.00, a nd (iii) for 1994, $192,263.00, all of which compensation has be en re flec ted on the c or re sp on din g fede ra l in c ome ta x re turns , F or m 10 40 . With respe ct to the 1997 calendar y ear , Mrs. Stutz expressly acknow ledg es that Mr . Stutz r e c e ive d a s W -2 c omp e ns a tio n f ro m hi s b us ine ss org anizations amounts not l ess than $620,000.00. I n addition to the W-2 c omp e ns a tio n w hic h M r. Stu tz r e c eiv es ea c h y e ar, Mr s. Stu tz
rec og nizes and acknow ledg es that Mr. Stutz rec eives a substantial amount o f r e n ta l i n c o me e a c h y e ar , a ll o f w h ic h is a ls o r e f

le c te d on the cor responding fede ral income tax returns, Form 1040.

. . . .
4. Te r m of P r ope r ty Se tt le m e nt Ag r e e m e nt

. T h e sp e c if ic pr ov isi on s o f P ara g ra

ph s 5 , 6 , 7 , a nd 8 of thi s Ag re e me nt sha ll o nly
app ly in the e ve nt the pa

rt ie s shou ld se pa

rate or oth e rw ise te rm inate the ir marria g e a t a ny tim e du ri ng the pe ri odbe g inn ing a s o f the da te here of and e nding a s of the date which is n i n etee n (19) y ear s following the date he reof (her einaf ter the “ Term” ) . . . .

5. Ef fect of Separation or Ter m ination of Marriage by Divorc e

. I n th e e v e n to f

t h e p ar t i e s ’ m ar i t a l s e p ar a t i o n d u r i n g t h e T e r m , o r if-10- the marriage b etween the parties is during the Term terminated by divorce , annulment or by any means other than t he death of one of the pa rt ie s, e a c h o f the pa

rt ie s a g re e a s f

oll ow s: (a ) E a c h p art y

he re by wa ive s, qu itc la ims , r e le a se s a ndre lin qu ish e s a ll ri g hts to c la im tem po ra

ry or pe rm a ne nt a lim on y , s up po rt , s e pa rate
m a i n t e n a n c e , p a ym e n to f e x p e n s e s o r

d e b t s , p a ym e n to f

a t t o r n e ys fe e s, be ne fi ts an d an y int e re st in the Se pa rate Pr op e rt y

of the oth e r t o the fullest extent permitted unde r the laws of the State of Tenne ssee or the jurisdiction g overning the enforce ment of this Ag ree ment. . .

. . . .
6. Distribution an d/or Division of Marital P roperty . I n the eve nt
o f t h e p ar t i es ’ m ar i t al s ep ar at i o n d u ri n g t h e T er m , o r i f t h e m ar ri age betwee n the p ar t i es i s during the Term terminated by divorce , a nn ulm e nt or by a ny me a ns oth e r tha n the de a th of on e of the pa rt ie s, ea ch o f t h e p ar t i es agr ee s t h at t h e p ar t i es ’ M ar i t al P ro p er t y , i n cl u d i n g, but not lim ited to the property ref lected on Ex hibit A attached he reto, sh a ll b e dis tr ibu te d to a nddiv ide d b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s a s f oll ow s: (a) Pro p er ty ti tl ed i n Mr
. S tu tz ’s Na me

. All pr operty titled in the sole name of

Mr. Stutz , including, but not limit ed to, (i) a ll shares of sto c k in Va lle y

Me c ha nic a l, Inc ., (i i) a ll o the r o wn e rs hip int e re sts in those other misce llaneous business org anizations and entiti es owne d by Mr . Stutz, inc lud ing , a ll b us ine ss e nti tie s o wn e d b y Mr . Stutz i n his indivi dual name a s now described on co l l ec t ive Exhi bit A, and (ii i ) al l rea l estate de scribed on c ollective Exhibi t A owned by Mr. Stutz in his individual name, sha ll be reta ined by and dee med owned
so le ly by Mr . Stutz. Mr s. Stu tz he re by sp eci fi c a lly

wa ive s, quitclaims, relea ses and r eli nquishes any and all rig hts, tit le and interest that she ma y

have, or claim to ha ve, in any such property , and Mrs. Stutz further ag ree s that she is not entitled to rece ive any value
or c omp e ns a tio n w ith re g ardto, or in e xch a ng e fo r, a ny su c h r ig hts , title and int er es t that she may have or have ha d at any

time in such p r o p e r t y. (b) Pro p er ty T i tl ed i n Mr s . S tu tz ’s Na me

. All property titled in the sole name of

Mrs. Stutz shall be re tained by an d d ee med owned
so le ly by Mr s. Stu tz. M r. Stu tz he re by he re by sp e c if ic a lly wa ive s, quit claims, rele ases a nd relinquishes any and all rig hts, tit le and interest that he ma y have, or claim to ha ve, in a ny such prope rty , and Mr. Stutz further

ag ree s that he is not entitled to r ece ive any value or-11- compensa tion with reg ard to a ny such rig hts, tit le and inter est that he
m a y h a v e o r

h a v e h a d a ta n y t i m e i n s u c h p r o p e r t y. (c) Real Estate . A s r e fl e c te d o n E xhibi t A , th e pa rt ie s c ur re ntl y jointly own (i) a house, pe rsonal prope rty and re al prope rty

located at 1803 Glenn Oa

ks Place, Chattanooga , Tenne ssee, ( ii) a house, persona l property

and re al prope rty

located at 8 7 5 9 Hig hway C38, Se a g ro ve , F lorida , a nd (i ii) tw o un imp ro ve d lake lot s loc a te d in Wat ts Ba r Estate on the Tenne ss ee R iver. Except as other wise provided here in, Mrs. Stut z shall be entitled to the rea l e state and f urniture a nd her personal prope rty

at 1803 Glenn Oa

ks Place (or

the home then occupie d by

the parti es as their principa l residenc e) a nd the two (2) Watts B ar E s tate lo ts

. I n a n y a n d a ll e v e n ts , M r

. Stu tz s h a ll be
e nti tle d to sole own e rs hip of the pe rs on a l pr op e rt y

a ndre a l e state located in Sea g rove, F lorida ( ev en if serving as their principal
re s i d en ce ). M r. S t u t z s h al l b e r es p o n s i b l e f o r t h e m o n t h l y

m o rt gage pay ments attributable to all such re al estate

. (d) Automobiles. Mr s. Stut z shall be entitled to the Chevrolet Corvette, or any succe ssor automobile then driven principally by her. Mr. Stutz ag ree s to continue to provide Mrs. Stutz , for suc h time as she is persona lly

able to drive, with the use of a n automobile, of such type, m ak e and model, as Mr. Stut z shall, i n g ood faith, dee m to be appropriate. . . .

. . . .

7. Annu al P aym ents to M rs. Stutz

. (a)

. . . Mr. Stutz ag ree s to pay to Mrs. Stut z the following: (i) the sum of $100,000.00 per

y ear during the period of any such sepa ration, not to exceed a ma x imum period of ten (10) y ear s, or (ii) t h e sum of $100,000.00 per y ear for a term not to exceed a ma x imum of 10 y ear s from the date of a ny

divorce

. (b) Th e ob lig a tio n o f M r. Stu tz to make a ny a nn ua l pay me nts here under sha ll imm ediately terminate and expire upon the earlier of t h e fo l l o wi n g ev en t s : (i ) t h e de at h o f Mr s

. S t u t z , o r (i i ) t h e r em ar ri age of Mrs. Stutz

. . . . (c ) M r. Stu tz’ s p a y me nt o bli g a tio ns pu rs ua nt t o th is Pa ra g ra ph 7 s ha ll not at any

time ever

exceed a total cumulative payment of One Milli on Dollars ($1,000,000.00)

. . .-12- (d ) T his $1 00 ,0 00 .00 p e r y e ar a mou nt p a y able pu rs ua nt t o th is Para g ra ph 7 sha ll be pa id in e qu a l c on se c uti ve mon thl y ins ta llm e nts of $8,333.33, pay able on or befor e the 10 day

of ea ch month, and th

s u c h p a ym e n t s s h a l l b e d e e m e d t o c o n s t i t u t e r e h ab i l i t a t i v e a l i m o n y, d e d u c ti b le to M r

. Stu tz a n d in c lu d e d a s in c o me to M r s

. Stu tz

. (e) Mrs. Stutz shall no t b e en titled to any additional pay ments or
a mou nts , e xce pt a s o the rw ise s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e d in thi s A g re e me nt, it b e ing e xpre ssl y

un de rs too d a nda c kn ow le dg e d that Mrs. Stu tz here by specific ally waives, quitcla ims, release s and re linquishes any and all rig hts she may

have to c laim any

temporary o r permanent
a lim on y , s up po rt , s e pa

rate ma int ena nc e , o the r tha n th e a mou nts specific ally

set forth in this Parag raph 7.

8. Health Insu rance

. . . . (a ) M r. Stu tz sh all pro vid e he a lth ins ur a nc e c ov e ra g e fo r ( i) Mr s. Stu tz un til su c h ti me a s sh e sh a ll r e a c h a g e 65 , a nd (ii) the pa rt ie s’ children, if a ny , until such child or children rea ches a g e eig hteen ( 18) y ear s or g raduates from hig h school, whiche ver is later

. . . . (b) Ea ch party

will pay 1⁄2 of any medical, de ntal, orthodontic, optical
or oth e r m e dic a l or

he a lth re la te d e xpe ns e s of Mr s. Stu tz or

a ny c hil d which ar e not cove red by any available insurance

. . . .

. . . .
13. Acknow ledgm ent by P artie s; Repre sentation by Coun sel

. . . F urthe r, bo th p art ie s h e re by wa ive a ny

po te nti a l con fl ic t of

int e re st that the law firm of Gearhiser , Peters, L ockaby & Tallent, PL L C, may have in th e p reparation of this Ag ree ment and her eby rele ase a nd waive a ny claim they

have or could assert ag ainst such firm by rea son of per ceive d or alleg ed joint repre sen t at ion of the parties. Mr. and Mrs. Stutz acknow ledg e that they hav e furnished c omplete and
acc urate information to eac h other re g arding their asse ts and that Ge arh ise r, Pe te rs , L oc ka

by & Ta lle nt, PLL C, h a s b e e n r e qu e ste d to reduc e to writing their prior ag ree ment and understanding with reg ard to their property and its disposit ion in the event of the ir dea th, divorce
or separ ation. Both parties repr esent that they have not s o u ght ind ivi du a l a dv ic e fr om Ge arh ise r, Pe te rs , L oc ka by & Ta lle nt, PLL C, that would be ad v erse to the other pa rty ’s rig hts and that Gea

rhiser, Pe ters, L ockab y

& Ta lle nt, PLL C, h a s e nc ou ra g e d b othpa rt ie s to ha ve ind e pe nd e nt l e g a l c ou nsel re vie w this Ag re e me nt o n th e ir respe ctive beha ves

. Both parties ac knowledg e that they have ha d the-13- op po rtun ity

to r e ta in s e pa

rate c ou ns e l to a dv ise the m r e la tiv e to the ir ri g ht a ndob lig a tio ns un de r this Ag re e me nt. Mr s. Stu tz sp e c if ic a lly
a nde xpre ssl y

re pr e se nts that sh e ha s h a d h e r l e g a l c ou ns e l r e vie w this Ag ree ment, and that both she a nd her legal co u n s el ag ree that the terms of this Ag ree ment are valid, binding a nd enfor cea ble.

. . . .
22. Child Sup port

.

. . . . (c) While th e p ar ti e s u n d e r s ta n d th a t M r s

. Stu tz ma y n o t le g a ll y

be entitled or permitted to forg ive or re lease Mr. S t u t z from any such ch i l d s u p p o rt o b l i gat i o n s u n d er ap p l i ca b l e T en n es s ee l aw (a l t h o u gh she acknow ledg es that she would immediately do so if Tenne ssee law
a llo we d) , it

is the pa rt ie s e x pres s in tent

a ndde sir e that Mr s. Stu tz pursuant to the terms the reof here by expressly assumes any

and all of Mr

. Stu tz’ s c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio ns , if

a ny , w hic h may

a t a ny tim e exceed a total of $ 2 , 1 0 0.00 per month. I n consideration of (i) Mr. S t utz’s agr eeme nts as set forth in this Ag ree ment, (ii) Mr. Stutz ’s ag ree ment to adopt a child or children, (iii) the $100,000.00 payment to Mrs. Stut z described in Para gra ph 1 above, a nd (iv) such othe r g ood and valua

ble consid er ation, Mrs. Stutz here by expressly

and
vo lunt ari ly

a ssu me s, a ndis p e rs on a lly a ndind ivi du a lly

re sp on sib le fo r, a ny a nd a ll su c h c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio ns of Mr

. Stu tz with
re sp e c t to a ny

a do pte d c hil d o r c hil dr e n w hic h may a t a ny tim e be in excess of the c umulative amoun t o f $ 2 , 1 00.00 per month. I f in the fu tur e Mr s. Stu tz ma y la wf ull y wa ive or re le a se Mr

. Stu tz f ro m c hil d
s u p p o rt o bligations in ex cess of $2,100.00 per month, the terms of thi s Ag re e me nt sh a ll a t that ti me be imm e diate ly c on str ue d to pe rm it and ef fec t such waive r and r elea se. (d) Mrs. Stutz agr ees to indemnify and hold Mr . Stutz harmless fr om a ny a nd a ll lia bil ity fo r an y c la ims , suit s, ob lig a tio ns , o r atto rn e y fe e s, which may arise out of or from her failure to a ssume and take responsibilityfor (i) all child support obligations in ex cess of a total of $2 ,1 00 .0 0 p e r m on th, a nd(i i) to t ime ly sa tis fy all su c h c hil d support obligations in ex cess of a total of $2,100.00 pe r month.

. . . . (f ) I f a ndto the e xten t th a t Mr . Stutz s ha ll at a ny tim e be re qu ir e d to pay any amounts in ex cess of

the total amount o f $ 2 ,100.00 per
mon t h as ch ild support for any child or childre n of the pa rties, any
s u ch ch i l d s u p p o rt o b l i gat i o n s h al l fi rs tb e s at i s fi ed fr o man d t h ro u gh-14- the amounts otherwise being paid to Mrs. Stutz pursuant to Para g raph 7 above, and t he amount pay able to Mrs. Stutz pursuant to P ara g raph 7 above sha ll be reduc ed by such child support payments. . . .

. . . .
I n addition, the foll owing was handwritten at the end of the postnuptial ag ree ment and initialed by bot h p ar t i es: “I n the eve nt of divorce , Mrs. Stutz shall be entitled to sole custody of any adopted child.”

I n summary , the following is a l i s t of the asse ts, their division provided by the postnuptial
a g re e me nt a ndthe ir

va lue s a s se t f

orth i n E xhibi t A of

the po stn up tia l a g re e me nt:

As se t Mr . Stutz Ms. Stu tz Valley Mecha nical, I nc. stock $4,000,000 Valley Mecha nical of Te nnessee , I nc. stock 300,000 Metal Products, I nc. stock 300,000 Superior I nsulation Co., I nc. stock 0 Valley Precision Mac hine, I nc. stock 100,000 Fa ntasea Enterprises, LL C interest 29,500 Valley Specialties intere st 0 Quality Pipe & Supply , I nc. stock 0 Har bor Doc ks Seafood & Br ewe ry , LL C 100,000 DL S Gener al Contractor s, I nc. 0 Rossvil le, Geor g ia re al prope rty 1,200,000 Rome, Georg ia re al prope rty 350,000 Seag rove, F lorida commer cial re al estate 649,000 Seag rove, F lorida re sidential rea l estate 89,500 Watts Bar Esta te lots 190,000 Everg ree n Manag ement Ac count 1,300,047 Valley Mecha nical re tirement plan 98,000 TVA Retire ment Plan 25,000 Au tom ob ile 0 Marital Residenc e 240,000 Florida Residence 1,300,000 1313 Bloc ker L ane, E ast Ridge (re al estate ) 180,000 Cedar V illage Apts. (re al estate ) 400,000

Total 10,396,047 455,000T h is to ta l v a lue d o e s n o t in c lud e h o u se h o ld fu rn ish ing s a t e ithe r the F lo rid a o r T e n n e sse e re sid e n c e , t h e b o a t, 2 jet s ki s, jewel ry , f

urs , cl o t hi ng or o t her personal p rop ert y

. M s. S t ut z has f o ur f urs w hi ch co st a tot al o f $ 8 9 , 0 0 0

. M r. St u t z t es t i f

i ed t h at h e al s o ow n s a f u r c oat , t h ou g h h e di d n ot t es t i f y a s t o i t s va l u e. M r

. St u t z t es t i f i ed h e pu r ch as ed a $ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 rin g fo r M s. S tutz a n d a $ 1 5 6 ,0 0 0 rin g fo r h im se lf.

T hese percentages do not i ncl ud e t he val ue o f a car f o r M s. Stut z, her heal t h i nsur ance o r med i cal co st s, t he 3 $ 1 0 0 ,00 0 .00 p aya b l e to M s. S t utz w i t hin 1 5 d ays o f t he ex ec uti o n of t he d o cu m en t , o r t he $ 1 ,00 0 ,00 0 p aya b l e to M s. S t utz o ve r a p erio d o f

1 0 years.
-15- Total value of

the marital e state: $10,851,047 2

Perce ntag e of the marital estate 95.81% 4.19% 3

I n addition to the postnupti al ag ree ment executed by the parties, a sec ond d o cu m ent was also executed a t the office of Mr. Ave ry on the morning of Apr i l 2 , 1 9 9 8

. At torney J err e Mosley testified that on t he evening of April 1, 1998, he rece ived a phone call from Pat Murchison asking him to a pp e ar the ne xt mornin g a t 7: 00 a .m. a t Mr . A ve ry ’s of fi c e

. Mr

. Mo sle y

te sti fi e d th a t he did not know the purpose of

his attendanc e at the me eting and had ne ver me t Mr. or Ms. S tutz . When he arrive d in Mr . Ave ry ’s of fi c e c on fe re nc e ro om, he sa w a l e tte r l y ing on the c on fe re nc e ro om t able
a dd re sse d to him . M r. Mo sle y te sti fi e d th a t he ha d n ot d ra ft e d th e le tte r. Mr . Stutz i ns ist e d in his te sti mon y that Ms . Stutz h a d d ra ft e d th e le tte r a ndthat he ha d n o r e sp on sib ili ty fo r the le tte r. Ms. Stutz testified that she did not prepa re the letter, that she had never seen the letter prior to arriving at Mr. Ave ry ’s offic e, and that she had never met Mr. M osley prior to April 2

. Mr. Mosley testified nd that he made some chang es himself to the letter, and wa s absent fr om the meeting approximately 30 minutes and then re turned to Mr. Avery ’s office with the corr ecte d letter. The final copy of the letter
wa s a s f oll ow s:
DAVID & L I NDA STUTZ

CHATTANO OGA, TEN NESSEE
April 2, 1998

Mr. J err e Mosley Dunca n, Mosley

& War ren 701 Marke t Street, Suite 1000 Chattanoog a, Te nnessee 37402

D e ar M r

. M o s l e y:

I t is ou r requ est tha t y ou be the c us tod ia n o f t wo pa c ka g e s g ive n to y ou by Mr

. L a ne Av e ry on the mornin g of Ap ri l 2, 19 98 . Y ou are to ho ld the se pa c ka g e s u nti l su c h ti me a s a F in al Ord e r o f A do pti on is enter ed at which time y ou will in all events relea se pac kag e 1 to Mr. Stutz and pac kag e 2 to Ms. Stutz . I f prior t o the entry of the F inal-16- Or de r o f A do pti on , th e a do pti on is no t c on su mmate d th ro ug h n o f a ult of Da vid Stut z, y ou are authorized and directed to rele ase packa g e 1 to Mr. Stutz and pac kag e 2 to Mrs. Stutz . The de term i n ation of whether or not David Stutz is at fault in terminating the adoption pr oc e ss s ha ll b e de te rm ine d b y B e thanyChrist ia n Se rv ic e s w ho se d et er m i n at i o n s h al l b e c o n cl u s i v e a n d b i n d i n g.
Notwithst an d i ng the fore g oing, if L inda Stutz instit utes divorce proce eding s befor e the adoption is finaliz ed, y ou are authorized and dir e c te d to rel e a se pa c ka g e 1 to Mr . Stutz a ndpa c ka g e 2 to Mr s. Stu t z . I f Da vid Stut z ins titutes divorce proc eeding s befor e the
a do pti on pr oc e ss i s fin a lize d, y ou are dir e c te d to sh re d th e c on te nts of bo th p a c ka g e s. Signed this 2 day

of April, 1998. nd
_____/s/ W itness____ ____/s/ David Stut z____

____/s/ W itness_____ ____/s/ L inda Stutz

____

I mmediately

following the execution of t he two documents at Mr. Avery ’s offic e, Mr. a nd Ms. Stut z went to court to acc ept leg al g uardia nship of L aShawn and then went to B ethany Christian Service s to take phy sical custody of L aShawn.

Th roughout this lit igation, Mr. Stut z has admitted that he would neve r have ag ree d to the
a do pti on of thi s c hil d w ith ou t Ms . Stutz s ig nin g the po stn up tia l a g re e me nt. Mr . Stutz t e sti fi e d at a d ep o s i t i o n , wh i ch wa s re ad i n t o ev i d en ce at t h e h ea ri n g, t o t h e f o l l o wi n g:

Mr. L awr ence : Would y ou say that the adoption of L aShawn

be c a me c on dit ion e d

u p o nthe e xec uti on of

thi s agr eement, that were it not for the execution of th is a g re e me nt y ou we re n’ t g oin g to participa te in L aShawn’ s adoption?

Mr . Stutz: Th a t’ s c or re c t.

M r

. L a w r e n c e : D idy o u ma k e th a t kn o w n to L in d a

Stu tz ?

Mr. Stutz : I ’m sure I did.-17-

As pe r the po stn up tia l a g re e me nt, and in con sid e ratio n f or sa id a g re e me nt, Mr . Stutz fo rw ard e d to Ms. Stu tz $1 00 ,0 00 wi thi n f if te e n ( 15 ) d a y s o f s ig nin g the a g re e me nt.

The a doption pr o cee ded and a final orde r of a doption was enter ed on Mar ch 15, 1999. On May 12, 1999, Mr. M osley forwa rded both packa g es t o Mr. Avery with a letter stating that both Mr.
a ndMs. Stu tz ha d r e qu e ste d th e ir re sp e c tiv e pa c ka g e be se nt t o h im.
Despite his initial opposit ion to the a doption, Mr. Stutz testified at trial that he now be lieves L a Sha wn i s, “th e gre a te st thin g that e ve r h app e ne d to me . Sh e ’s the lov e of my lif e .” I t is abundantly

clea r that L aShawn is loved by both her pa

rents.

Nea rly three y ear s after

the adoption was f

inal, on Marc h 14, 2002, Ms. Stut z filed for divorce alleg ing ir

rec oncilable diff

ere nces a nd inappropriate mari t al conduc t. I n his answer , Mr. Stu tz a dmi tte d th a t ir

re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s e xiste d, bu t de nie d that he wa s g uil ty of ina pp ro pr ia te marital conduc t. On Fe bruary 24 and 26, 2003, the tria l court condu ct ed a h ea ri ng reg arding the
va lid ity of the po stn up tia l ag re e me nt. F ina l ar g ume nts we re he ardon Ap ri l 25 , 2 00 3, a ndthe c a se was t ak e n u n d e r

a d v is e me n t. Su b s e q u e n tl y o n Ju n e 2 , 2 0 0 3 , th e tria l c o u r t i s s u e d a n o r d er, upholding the validity of the postnuptial a g ree ment, but f inding para g raph 22, th e provision reg arding child support, to be void and unenf orce able. T h e t ri al court entere d an orde r on Jul y 2, 2003, decla

ring that Mr. and Ms. Stutz wer e divorc ed pursua nt to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 129(b), following a hearing on a

motion filed by

Mr. Stutz reque sting that the pa rties be divorc ed. The order
rese rved f or further he aring all other issues not pre viouslyaddre ssed. On May 13, 2004, an orde r was e ntere d on issues of chi l d support and par enting . On May 27, 2004, an orde r wa s entere d reg arding summer vacation and parenting time. Ms. Stutz filed a notice of appea l on J une 3, 2004
r e g a r d i n g t h e or d er u p h o l d i n g t h e va l i d i t y o f t h e po s t n u p t i al agr ee m en t an d t h e or d er gra n t i n g a divorce . On J une 10, 2004, Mr. S tutz filed a motion to alter or amend a nd/or for a

new tria l reg arding various matter s including c hild support, attorney ’s fe es, and c ounseling for the child. Mr. Stutz filed a notice of

appea l on J une 11, 2004, appe aling the final judg ment of May 13, 2004. On Aug ust 30, 2004, the trial court entere d an orde r deny ing Mr. Stutz ’s motion to alter or ame nd stating tha t upon the fi lin g of t he no ti ce of app e a l by Ms. Stu tz, the tr ia l c ou rt wa s d e pr ive d o f j ur isd ic tio n to determine the motion to alter or ame nd.

II.

Ms. Stu tz r a ise s tw o iss ue s on app e a l wh ic h w e re state : ( 1) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in holding that the postnuptial a g ree ment was va lid and, (2) whe ther the tria l court er red in de cre eing a divorc e to the parties absent proof of fault or stipulation byboth parties.

III

. Th e pa rt ie s in thi s a

pp e a l are we ll- re pr e se nte d b y c ou ns e l a ndpr e se nt c omp e lli ng arg ume nts in support of their positions

. M s

. S t u t z ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in holding the postnuptial-18-

ag ree ment valid. She asserts that the postnuptial ag ree ment violates public policy beca use part of the consider ation fo r t h e postnuptial ag ree ment was Mr. Stutz’s ag ree ment to adopt the child. Fu rt h er , s h e a rgu es t h at t h e p o s t n u p t i al agr ee m en twa s i n v al i d b ec au s e i twa s o b t ai n ed t h ro u gh duress and undue influence and is unc onscionable due to its gross inequity . Also, Ms. St utz arg ues that the trial court erre d in decr eeing a divorc e betwee n the parties without an e videntiary hearing
or sti pu la tio n b y

bo th p art ie s.
Mr. Stutz counter s that the postnuptial ag ree ment does not violate public policy in that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 109 reg arding illega l pay ments in conn ection with pl ace ment of a c hild for adoption does not apply

to the situation before the court. H e asserts that he was not compe nsating
so me on e fo r s ur

re nd e ri ng a child b ut, rathe r, wa s e nte ri ng int o a n a g re e me nt s o th a t a thi rdpa rt y c ou ld su rr e nd e r a c hil d to Ms. Stu tz. Mr

. Stu tz su bmi ts tha t th e a g re e me nt s a tis fi e s th e re qu ir e me nts of Bratton v. Bratton , 136 S.W .3d 595 (Tenn. 2004)

. Finally , Mr. Stutz arg ues that the divorc e decr ee w as prope rly

enter ed base d upon Mr. Stutz ’s admission of g rounds for divor ce.

I V.

This is a non-jury case and, accor dingly , our review is de novo upon the r ecor d of the trial court with o u t a n y

p r e s u mp ti o n o f

c o rr e c tn e s s a tt a c h in g to th e tria l c o u r t’ s c o n c lu s io n s o f la w. Cam pb e ll v . Flor ida Ste e l Co rp
. , 9 1 9 S. W. 2 d 2 6 , 3 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 ) a n d T e n n

. R. A p p

. P. 1 3 ( d )

. We must, however, pr esume the tria l court’s fa ctual finding to be cor rec t absent evide nce pr eponder ating to the contra

ry

. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993)

.

V.
As a g ener al rule, postnuptial ag ree ments are valid in Tennesse e. Bratton v. Bratton , 136 S.W. 3d59 5, 59 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) . Po stn up tia l ag re e me nts se e k to det e rm ine the ri g hts of e a c h s po us e in the ot her’ s property , spousal support, and re lated issues in the eve nt of dea th or divorce

. Black’ s Law Dictionary 11 67 (6 e d. 19 90 ). Pos tnu pti a l a g re e me nts are g e ne ra lly tr e a te d in the sa me th

manner as ante nuptial and re conciliation ag ree ments. Postnupt ial ag ree ments should be interpre ted and e nforc ed as a ny other c ontrac t . Bratton at 599. As such, they must be supported by adequate consider ation. Id. Gene rally , consideration for a contr act may

be either a bene fit to the promisor or a de triment to, o r an o b l igation upon, the promisee . See B rown Oi l Co. v. Johnson , 6 89 S.W. 2d14 9, 15 1 ( Te nn . 1 98 5) . M arria g e its e lf is sufficie nt consideration for a prenuptial a g ree ment. Se e Sp ur loc k v . B ro wn , 9 1 T e n n

. 2 4 1 , 1 8 S. W. 86 8, 87 1 ( 18 92 ); Sa nd

e rs v . San de rs , 4 0 T e n n

. A p p

. 2 0 , 2 8 8 S. W. 2 d 4 7 3 , 4 7 7 (1955). Reconc iliation in t he fa ce of an i m p en d i n g separ ation or divorce may be ade quate c onsideration. See, e .g., Gilley v. G illey , 7 78 S.W. 2d86 2, 86 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 198 9) . H ow e ve r, the marria g e its e lf cannot a ct as suff

icient consider ation for a postnuptial ag ree ment beca use past consideration ca nnot-19-

support a cur

rent promise. Se e S. M. W ill iam so n & Co. v . R ag sd

ale , 170 Tenn. 439, 95 S.W.2d 922, 92 4 ( 19 36 ). Th e re mus t be c on sid e ratio n f low ing to b othpa

rt ie s a s p art

of a po stn up tia l a g re e me nt. Bratton at 600.

Be cause of the c onfidential re lationship which exi sts be tween husba nd and wife , postnuptial ag ree ments are subjected to c lose scrutiny by the courts to ensure that they are fair and equitable. See, e.g., Peirce v. Pe irce , 9 94 P.2 d 1 93 (U tah 2 00 0) ; In re Estate of Gab , 364 N.W.2d 924 (S.D. 1985); In re Estate of Harber , 104 Ariz. 79, 44 9 P.2d 7 ( 19 69 ); see also 41 C.J .S. Hu sb an d & W ife 87 (1 99 1) (“S in ce a hu sb a nda ndwi fe do no t de a l a t arm ’s le ng th, a fi du c iary du ty of the hig he st deg ree is imposed in transactions betwe en them.”) . The Bratton Court stated:

Whil e it is lawful and not a g ainst public policy for husba nd and wife to enter into such contra cts, y et they are not de aling with eac h other
a s st ra ng e rs a t arm ’s le ng th. Th e re la tio ns hip of hu sb a nda ndwi fe is
on e of sp e c ia l c on fi de nc e a ndtrus t, r e qu ir ing the utm os t g oo d f a ith and fr ankness in their deal i n gs wi t h eac h other. . . . Tr ansac tions of this chara cter

are scrutinized by the courts with g reat car e, to the end t h at no unjust advantag e may be obtained by

one over the other by
me a ns of a ny op pr e ssi on , de c e pti on , or fr a ud . Courts o f e qu ity wi ll relieve ag ainst any

unjust advantag e proc ured by any such mea ns, and less evidenc e is requir ed in such cases to establish the fr aud, oppression, or de ception than if the parties had been dealing at arm’s leng th as strang ers. . . .

Bratton at 6 0 1 (q u o t i n g In re Estate of Gab, 364 N.W.2d 924 (S.D. 1985)

. As with any

other c ontrac t, a postnuptial ag ree ment must be made for a lawful purpose and must not be contra

ry to the public policy

of the state. Sa nd

e rs v . San de rs , 288 S.W .2d 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), Ho me Be ne fic ial As so c iat ion v . W

hit e , 17 7 S.W. 2d 54 5, 54 6 (T e nn

. 19 44 ). With reg ard to public policy our Supreme Court ha s stated that, “[t] he public policy of the State is to be found in its Const itution, i ts laws, its judi cial dec isions and the applicable rules o f co m m o n law. Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Lawson, 229 S.W . 741 (Tenn. 1921) , Home B eneficial Association v. W hit e , 177 S.W .2d 545, 546 (Tenn. 1944)

.

The me a n in g o f

th e p h r a s e ‘ p u b li c p o li c y ’ is v a g u e a n d v ar iable; courts have not defined it, and the re is no fixed rule to deter m i ne wh a t c on tr a c ts a

re re pugnant to i t. T he pr inc ipl e that c on tr a c ts i n contra vention of publ ic pol icy are not enforc eable should be applied with caution and only

in case s plainly

with i n t h e re asons on which that do c tr ine re sts . It is on ly be c a us e of the do min a nt p ub lic int e re st that one who, like responde nt, ha s had the benef it of perf ormanc e by the other pa

rty will be permitted to avoid his own promise.-20- I n determining whe ther this contra ct is void a s being in violation of public policy

it is proper to consider

the situation of the parties at the tim e the c on tr a c t w a s ma de a nd th e purp os e s o f the c on tr a c t. Lip pm an v . B oa ls , 79 Te nn . 4 89 ; Sa nd e rs v . San de rs , 40 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W .2d 473, 57 A.L .R.2d 932.
Hoyt v. H oyt , 372 S.W .2d 300, 302-303 (Te nn. 1963).

We must now determine whether the agr eeme nt enter ed int o by Mr. and Ms. Stutz meets the require ments for a

valid and enfor cea

ble postnuptial a g ree ment. I t is clea r fr om the evidenc e cited above that the postnuptial ag ree ment in this case constitutes a contract whe reby Ms. Stut z ex chang es her promise to sur

rende r her equitable share of the marital estate in r eturn for Mr. Stutz’s ag ree ment to enter into an a doption to which he is opposed. I n this reg ard, w e have noted Ms. Stutz ’s testimony that Mr . Stutz state d to he r “ Th a t ki d is no t c omi ng to m y ho us e un le ss [the po stn up tia l a g re e me nt] is signed toda y .” We ha ve further noted Mr. Stutz ’s own testimony that the adoption of L aShawn
was c ontinge nt upon the execution of the postnuptial ag ree ment and that abse nt execution of the ag ree ment he wa s not going to participate in the child’s adoption

I t is we ll se ttled in our state that the best interest of the child is the para mount consideration i n an ad o p t i o n p ro ce ed i n g. So ne t v . U nk no wn F ath e r o f J .D .H . ( So ne t) , 7 97 S.W. 2d1, 5 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1990). I t is assumed that persons see king to a dopt a child ar e motivated by the desire to love
a ndc are fo r the c hil d - mot ivatio ns that are na tu ra lly c on sis te nt w ith the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st. Howeve r, the b e s t in te r e s t o f th e c h il d is ig n o r e d a n d th e a d o p ti o n p r o c e s s is s u b v e r te d w hen a p r o s p e c ti ve a d o p ti v e p ar e n t w h o is o th e r w is e a d a ma n tl y o p p o s e d to a d o p ti o n , a s w a s M r

. Stu tz , e nte rs int o a n a g re e me nt t o e ff e c t a n a do pti on fo r the so le re a so n th a t he wi ll re a lize fi na nc ia l g a in if he doe s so. Monetary

enric hment should not be the motivating fa ctor for a conse nt to an adoption.

Mr. Stutz ’s motivation for entering into the p o s t nuptial ag ree ment and the a doption was financ ial. He barg ained his consent to the adoption for a larg er sha re of the marital e state in the eve nt of a div or c e

. An a do pti on sh ou ld n ot b e vie we d a s a bu sin e ss o pp ortun ity

by a n a do pti ve pa

re nt. No r c a n w e c o n d o n e M s

. S t u t z ’ s a c t i o n s i n e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e p o s t n u p t i a l a g r e e m e n t

. Al tho ug h in some sense he r entra nce into the a g ree ment may appea r to be less o b

j ec t i o n able in that she was willing to sac rifice materia l goods f or the opportunity

to raise a nd nurture the child, she too place d the child’s needs second to he r own. She wanted a child and did not hesitate to re sort to ag g ressive financ ial manipulation to ge t what she wa nted without reg ard f or the fac t that she was bringing the child into a family

in w hich the father wa s at the time strong ly resistant to the child being a part of t h at fa m i l y

. W e fi n d t h e agr ee m en t ar ri v ed at b y t h es e p ar t i es t o b e b o t h cy n i ca l an d s el f- s er v i n g. We further

find that it ex posed an a dopted child to the u n re as o n ab l e risk of be ing pla ced in a n e nv ir on me nt tha t w a s n ot i n th a t c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st. We d o n ot c on te st the a sse rt ion that bo th pare nts have c ome to love the adopte d child in this case ; however , as noted a bove, in determining whether a contr act violates public policy we consider the situation of t he parties when the contrac t was made

. Sa nd

e rs v . San de rs , 288 S.W .2d 473, 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955). Our L eg islature has expressed the public policy of the State re g arding pay ments involved in the surre nder of a child for-21-

adoption by

making it a C lass C felony to sell or surrender a child to another pe rson for mone y or anything of

value a nd to rec eive suc h child for such pay ment of money or thing of value. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1-109. While we a g ree with Mr. Stut z t h at t his statute is not di rec tly applicable to the fac ts of this case, we do believe that it evide nces the public policy of this State that a conse nt for a
surre nder or a consent to adopt i s not to be bartere d or sol d and that an adoptive pare nt should not profit financ ially

from an a doption. W e ca nnot approve of and e nforc e an a g ree ment in which a spouse in eff

ect se lls his or her conse nt to an adoption in exchang e for a gre ater share of a ma

rital estate in the e vent of a

divorce . Acc ording ly , we f ind that the postnuptial ag ree ment at issue to be i n v a l i d a n d u n e n f

o r c e ab l e a s a g a i n s tp u b l i c p o l i c y.

V I.

The ne x t issue we addr ess is whether the trial court erre d in gr anting a divorc e to the parties based upon Mr . Stutz ’s “Motion to Grant Divorce ” in w hich he admitted that he had bee n g uiltyof conduct that would e ntitle Ms. S tutz to a divorce and reque sted the trial court to declar e the pa rties divorce d. The trial c ourt, without hearing any evidenc e, g rante d a divorc e to both parties pur suant to T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 9( b) up on the mot ion a nd ov e r the ob je c tio n of Ms. Stu tz. M s. Stu tz arg ues that Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-129 require s either a stipulation to, or proof of, g rounds bef ore a divorc e may

be aw arde d and that there was neither i n this case

. Mr. S tutz arg ues t hat his motion to gr ant the divorc e wa s an admission of fault on his part, and that admission, co u p l ed wi t h the t e s t i m o n y h e ar d b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t o n t h e i s s u e o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e p o s t n u p t i a l a g r e e m e nt, wa s a sufficie nt basis for the g ranting of the divorc e. Mr. Stutz also asserts t h at M s. Stut z’s notice of
ap p e a l w a s n o t ti me ly f

il e d s in c e it c a me mo r e th a n 3 0 d a y s a f te r th e o r d e r g r a n ti n g th e d iv o r c e

. We ag ree with Ms. St utz t hat there should have be en an e videntiar y h ea ri ng befor e the divorc e wa s g rante d. Be cause there was ne ither a stipulation to nor proof as to g rounds for divorce , the trial court had no authority

under Te nn. Code. Ann. § 36-4- 129 to gr ant a divorc e to the parties. We further hold that the i ssue of marital fault was not litigated during the hea ring on the postnuptial ag ree ment and that the notice of appe al was timely filed as to this issue.

Ms. Stut z ini tiated this action by filing a complaint for divorce in which she a lleg ed that Mr. Stu tz w a s g uil ty

of ina pp ro pr ia te mari ta l con du c t and tha t the pa rt ie s hadir

re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s. Mr . Stutz a dmi tte d th a t th e re we re ir re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s, bu t he de nie d th a t he ha d b e e n g uil ty of ina pp ro pr ia te ma

ri ta l c on du c t. T e nn .Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 9 p ro vid e s: (a) I n all actions for divorce f rom the bonds of matrimony or leg al
se pa ratio n th e pa

rt ie s may sti pu la te a s to g ro un ds a nd /or de fe ns e s. (b) The court may , upon stipulation t o or proof of any g round for divorce pursuant to §36-4-101, gr ant a divorce to the party who was less at fault or, if either or both pa rties are entitled t o a d i v o rce, de c lare the pa

rt ie s to b e div or c e d, rathe r tha n a wa rd ing a div or c e to either pa rty alone.-22-

A stipulation is an ag ree ment betwee n counsel with re spect to business bef ore the court. Sta te
v . F or d , 725 S.W .2d 689, 691 (Tenn. Ct. App.1986). It is entered into mutually and voluntarily

by the parties. Ove rstreet v. Shoney’s, I nc., 4 S.W .3d 694, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). It is clear that Mr. and Ms. Stutz did not enter into any ag ree ment reg arding g rounds fo r divorce . Mr. Stutz ’s state me nt in his mot ion that he ad mit te d tha t he ha d be e n g uil ty of c on du c t so as to ent itl e Ms. Stu tz to a div or c e is n ot a sti pu la tio n b e c a us e it i s n ot a n a g re e me nt b e tw e e n c ou ns e l. It is no t e nte re d in to mutually by the parties. We do not deem this statement to be proof of g rounds as c ontemplated by the statute. We have car efully rea d the record in this case and do not find that the issue of g rounds for divor ce wa s l itigate d by the parties in the hearing r eg arding the validity of the postnuptial
a g re e me nt. Th e div or c e wa s g ra nte d w ith ou t a sti pu la tio n a ndwi tho ut a ny te sti mon y . T his c ou rt

in Hyne man v. Hy neman, 152 S.W .3d 549 (Tenn.Ct. App. 2003) held that absent a mutual stipul ation ag ree d upon by the parties, pursuant to T enn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 4-114 and 36- 4-129, the trial c ourt must conduct a he aring prior to entering a final dec ree of divorce . There fore , an evide ntiary hearing
was re quired in this case befor e the g ranting of the divorc e.
We further hold that Ms. Stutz ’s notice of appea l was timely filed. The or der g ranting the divorce was e ntere d on J uly 2, 2003, and spec ifically

rese rved for further hearing all other issues not prev i o u s l y

addre ssed. I ssues of child support and pa renting wer e re solved in an orde r ente red on May 13, 2004. Ms. Stut z’s notice of appe al was f iled on J un e 3 , 2 0 0 4

. T h is notice of appe al was timely beca use it was filed w ithin 30 day s of t he entry of t he final order in this cause. The J uly 2, 2003 ord er gr anting the divorce adjudicate d few er tha n all the claims of the pa rties and wa s not appea lable pursua nt to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54. There is no exception in Tenn. R. Civ. P . 54 for or ders g ra nti ng divor c e s. Ac c or din g ly the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on g ranti ng the div or c e to the pa rt ie s is
re v er s ed an d t h i s ca u s e i s re m an d ed fo r a n ev i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g.

V II.

For the fore g oing rea sons, w e re verse the dec ision of the trial court a nd rema nd for a trial on the division o f t h e marital estate, alimony , divorce , any other re maining issues, a nd for f urther pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith thi s o pin ion . T he c os ts o n a pp e a l are ta xedto Mr . Stutz an d his s ur e ty for whic h execution may

issue, if nec essary

.

____________________________________ SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE