RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0098-17T1

IN RE REGISTRANT R.J.

_________________________

Argued July 16, 2018 – Decided August 3, 2018

Before Judges Whipple and Suter.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. ML05-18-0014. 

Michael C. Woyce argued the cause for 

appellant R.J. (Murphy & Woyce, attorneys; 

Michael C. Woyce, on the brief).

Kimberly Savino French, Assistant Prosecutor 

argued the cause for respondent State of New 

Jersey (Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Kimberly Savino French, 

of counsel and on the brief).

Law Offices of Jeffrey S. Mandel, LLC, 

attorneys for amicus curiae Association of 

Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey 

(Jeffrey S. Mandel, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Appellant R.J. appeals from the trial court's June 26, 2017 

order denying his application to be removed from community 

supervision for life (CSL) under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c). 

On December 8, 2016, R.J. moved for removal from Megan's Law 

Registration and CSL. R.J. has a lengthy, serious criminal 

history. At age eighteen, he was convicted of robbery and 

sentenced to a youth correctional facility. He was subsequently 

arrested for terroristic threats, sexual assault, and drug related

offenses.

By 1980, R.J. moved on to kidnapping, rape, sodomy, and 

lewdness after he lured several women to his home under the guise 

of being a model photographer. Once they were at his home, he 

prevented them from leaving and forced them to perform sexual 

acts, including sodomy. He was sentenced to twelve years in prison

on the sodomy charge, with the lesser charges running concurrently. 

That same year, he was also sentenced in New York for sodomy.

On February 5, 1999, R.J. was convicted of second-degree 

sexual assault by force/coercion, stemming from a 1997 arrest. 

Similar to his 1980 offense, R.J. lured a victim to his 

"photography studio" and forced her to perform sexual acts. He 

was sentenced to a four year prison term, and was also subject to 

the special sentence of CSL, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. He was released 

on October 4, 2001. 
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On December 8, 2016, R.J. moved to: terminate registration 

as a sex offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f); terminate community 

notification, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f); and be removed from CSL, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c). He withdrew his first two requests, leaving 

only removal from parole supervision for life. On March 1, 2017, 

the court held a hearing on the motion. Dr. R.1 was the sole 

witness presented.

At the beginning of the hearing, the trial judge mentioned 

he remembered Dr. R. from a prior, unrelated matter. Dr. R. 

testified about his evaluation of R.J. and ultimately opined R.J.

should be released from CSL because he posed a low threat to the 

safety of others if released. 

The trial judge denied R.J.'s motion on June 14, 2017, and 

issued a written decision. In pertinent part, the opinion stated:

Dr. [R.] last testified before this [c]ourt 

in Hunterdon County on May 6, 2015, as a 

defense expert in forensic and clinical 

psychology in a termination of parental rights 

case. Similar to the extant matter, Dr. 

[R.'s] opinion rests upon factual 

underpinnings which often lack verification, 

fail to include relevant information, and/or 

assign greater or lesser probative value than 

warranted by the facts. Based upon the 

[c]ourt's observations of Dr. [R.'s] demeanor 

during the course of his testimony, including 

his persistent, "no risk/low risk" mantra, 

despite [R.J.'s] extensive violent and 

 

1 We use initials to identify the expert for reasons that are 

apparent below.
4 A-0098-17T1

deceptive criminal history, the [c]ourt finds 

him to be a marginally credible witness. 

The judge thoroughly detailed his additional reasoning for 

rejecting Dr. R.'s testimony in its twenty-nine page opinion. This 

appeal followed.

R.J. raises the following issues on appeal:

POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY 

RELIED ON TESTIMONY IN AN UNRELATED MATTER TWO 

YEARS PRIOR IN A SEPARATE COUNTY IN MAKING 

CREDIBILITY FINDINGS OF THE EXPERT DENYING 

R.J. DUE PROCESS. 

POINT II: REGISTRANT MET THE FIRST CRITERIA 

FOR RELEASE FROM COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR 

LIFE, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(C) AS HE HAS NOT BEEN 

CONVICTED OF A CRIME SINCE HIS LAST RELEASE 

FROM CUSTODY, A PERIOD GREATER THAN FIFTEEN 

YEARS. 

POINT III: THE SECOND CRITERIA FOR REMOVAL 

REQUIRES R.J. TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 

EVIDENCE THAT HE IS NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT 

TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS IF RELEASED FROM 

SUPERVISION. 

POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 

TERMINATING R.J.'S COMMUNITY SUPERVISION AS 

REQUIRED BY N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(C) WHERE R.J. 

PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT 

HE WAS NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE 

SAFETY OF OTHERS IF RELEASED FROM SUPERVISION. 

The amicus curiae2 raises the following issue on appeal:

WHILE JUDGES CAN MINIMIZE OR REJECT EXPERT 

TESTIMONY FOR VARIOUS REASONS, IT IS PLAIN 

 

2 By order of January 11, 2018, we granted the motion of the 

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey to appear 

as amicus curiae and file a brief, but not participate in oral 

argument.
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ERROR TO MAKE CREDIBILITY FINDINGS BASED IN 

PART ON A WITNESS' TESTIMONY FROM AN UNRELATED 

PRIOR PROCEEDING. 

At the outset, we note the judge's reference to Dr. R.'s

prior testimony in an unrelated matter two year's prior invites

such questions of impropriety and partiality that we are compelled 

to vacate and remand to a different judge.

We recognize the judge, in his written decision, fully 

summarized the expert's testimony, including the actuarial risk 

assessments, the psychosexual evaluation, and detailed the crossexamination of Dr. R., which rigorously challenged Dr. R.'s

findings. However, applying a plain error standard to consider 

whether an error is "clearly capable of producing an unjust 

result," Rule 2:10-2, we cannot ignore the taint associated with 

the apparent predetermination of a witness's credibility based on

testimony from a prior proceeding beyond the record.

Put simply, it was unfair to R.J. for the judge to comment 

upon impressions of Dr. R.'s credibility from a previous case 

because it demonstrated inherent bias, even as an aside, when

rejecting Dr. R.'s current assessment of R.J. The judge's prior 

assessment was not based on something either party knew about or

which they could have become aware because the prior case was a 

Family Division matter with a closed record. Moreover, since the 
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doctor was the only witness to testify in R.J.'s case, the error 

clearly had the capacity to produce an unjust result.

Vacated and remanded to a different judge for a new hearing 

consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.