1In addition to the State of New Hampshire, Lemay names the

following defendants to this action: New Hampshire Governor John

Lynch, Strafford County, Strafford County Commission Chairman

George Maglaras, and Strafford County Commission Vice Chairman

Paul Dumont.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Steven P. Lemay

v. Civil No. 08-cv-195-SM

State of New Hampshire, et al.1

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court for preliminary review is pro se and in

forma pauperis plaintiff Steven Lemay’s complaint (document no.

1) seeking the overturning of his civil commitment as well as

money damages from defendants. For the reasons stated herein, I

recommend this action be dismissed.

Standard of Review

Under this Court’s local rules, when a plaintiff commences

an action pro se and in forma pauperis, the magistrate judge is

directed to conduct a preliminary review. United States District

Court District of New Hampshire Local Rule (“LR”) 4.3(d)(1)(B). 

In conducting the preliminary review, the Court construes pro se

Case 1:08-cv-00195-SM Document 3 Filed 10/16/08 Page 1 of 8
2Lemay alleges that the Rochester Fire Department, in

putting out the fire, caused significant and unnecessary damage

2

pleadings liberally, however inartfully pleaded. See Erickson v.

Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (following

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) to construe pro se pleadings

generously in favor of the pro se party). “The policy behind

affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if

they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the correct

cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.” See Castro v.

United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (noting that courts may

construe pro se pleadings so as to avoid inappropriately

stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals of claims); Ahmed v.

Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). All of the

factual assertions made by a pro se plaintiff and inferences

reasonably drawn therefrom must be accepted as true. See id.

This review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and

meaningful consideration.

Background

Steven Lemay was charged with arson on August 6, 2006 by the

Rochester Police Department. The charges stemmed from a fire in

Lemay’s living room.2 After spending a year in the Strafford

Case 1:08-cv-00195-SM Document 3 Filed 10/16/08 Page 2 of 8
to the interior and exterior of his home. Lemay, however, has

not named the Rochester Fire Department or any of its employees

as defendants to this action and, as these facts do not appear to

be relevant to any of the defendants listed or claims alleged, I

will not consider those allegations further in connection with

this matter.

3

County House of Correction (“SCHC”) pretrial, the Strafford

County Superior Court Judge dismissed the arson charge. Lemay

contends here that the case was dismissed because he is innocent

of the offense charged, and not because he was deemed incompetent

to stand trial.

During Lemay’s pretrial incarceration, the State

successfully sought to have Lemay civilly committed for a fiveyear period by the Strafford County Probate Court. In that

proceeding, the State presented testimony from Dr. Breiholtz, who

testified to Lemay’s mental status, although he had not

personally examined Lemay. Dr. Breiholtz instead testified from

information obtained from Lemay’s medical records. The providers

cited in the records were not made available for Lemay’s attorney

to cross-examine at the hearing.

Lemay alleges that while he was at the SCHC, he suffered

numerous abuses. Specifically, he alleges that he was peppersprayed several times, and that some kind of hot sauce was placed

in his food, causing acid reflux disease, and causing him to have

Case 1:08-cv-00195-SM Document 3 Filed 10/16/08 Page 3 of 8
4

to be held in the SCHC medical department for four months. Lemay

alleges he was so ill during this time he was unable to shower

for a period of sixty days.

Discussion

I. Overturning the State Probate Court Civil Commitment

Lemay requests that this Court overturn the commitment order

of the Strafford County Probate Court. The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine precludes a federal district court from reviewing a

final judgment of a state court. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.

459, 463 (2006) (under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district

courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over

final state-court judgments); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416

(1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only in limited

circumstances, to cases where “the losing party in state court

filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended,

complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and

seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Galibois v.

Fisher, 174 Fed. Appx. 579, 580 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Lance,

546 U.S. at 464-65 and Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.,

544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). Rooker-Feldman forecloses federal

Case 1:08-cv-00195-SM Document 3 Filed 10/16/08 Page 4 of 8
5

court jurisdiction over claims that are inextricably intertwined

with the claims adjudicated in a state court proceeding. See

Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 39-40 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2000); Wang

v. N.H. Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir.

1995). “A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the

state court claims ‘if the federal claim succeeds only to the

extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before

it.’” Sheehan, 207 F.3d at 40 (quoting Hill v. Town of Conway,

193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1999)).

Once a state court issues a final judgment, a federal

district court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision even if

the state court judgment is patently wrong or was entered

following patently unconstitutional proceedings. See Feldman,

460 U.S. at 486. Thus, a litigant may not seek to reverse a

final state court judgment simply by recasting his complaint in

the form of a civil rights action. See Fortune v. Mulherrin, 533

F.2d 21, 22 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d

750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993). 

The proper recourse for a litigant in the state courts who

is unhappy with the decisions of those courts is to pursue his

appeal through the state appellate process, and then to the

Case 1:08-cv-00195-SM Document 3 Filed 10/16/08 Page 5 of 8
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United States Supreme Court. In other words, a party is barred

from seeking appellate review of a state court decision in the

federal district court. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 464; Johnson v.

De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); see also Wang, 55 F.3d

at 703. 

Here, Lemay seeks an order of this Court overturning the

findings and decisions of the Strafford County Probate Court on

the basis that the commitment hearing violated his right of

confrontation, and that the decision was made without sufficient

evidence. To decide these issues in Lemay’s favor, this Court

would have to invalidate the holding of the State court. In

essence, Lemay has appealed the State court’s holding here, and

this Court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over such a

claim. Accordingly, I recommend that the claim seeking the

reversal of Lemay’s civil commitment be dismissed.

II. Claims Against Strafford County

Lemay claims that he was subjected to inhumane treatment at

the SCHC. Specifically, Lemay states he was pepper-sprayed

several times and that “some kind of hot sauce” was put in his

food, causing the destruction of his stomach valve and causing

acid reflux disease requiring extensive medical attemtion. As to

Case 1:08-cv-00195-SM Document 3 Filed 10/16/08 Page 6 of 8
7

the pepper spraying, Lemay doesn’t give specifics about who

sprayed him, under what circumstances, and how he was injured by

being pepper sprayed. As to the hot sauce Lemay believes was

placed in his food, he fails to state who put the sauce into his

food or any other specifics about the placing of sauce in his

food, and how the presence of hot sauce caused the significant

harm alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, I find that the

complaint submitted contains insufficient factual allegations to

give rise to a finding that defendants, members of the Strafford

County Commission, committed any constitutional violation against

Lemay. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of these charges.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, I recommend dismissal of this

action in its entirety. Any objections to this report and

recommendation must be filed within ten (10) days of receipt of

this notice. Failure to file objections within the specified

time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See

Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Gordon, 979 F.2d 11, 13-14 

Case 1:08-cv-00195-SM Document 3 Filed 10/16/08 Page 7 of 8
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(1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6

(1st Cir. 1986). 

_________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 16, 2008

cc: Steven P. Lemay, pro se

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