J-S25037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROBERT LELLOCK 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 658 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013778-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROBERT LELLOCK 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 660 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003936-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 29, 2022

Appellant, Robert Lellock, appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his 

resentencing for multiple counts of endangering the welfare of children 
J-S25037-22

- 2 -

(“EWOC”), corruption of minors, and related offenses.

1

 We affirm. 

Appellant worked as a school police officer in Pittsburgh. During the 

course of his employment, he sexually abused multiple boys. The trial court 

opinion set forth the remaining procedural history of this appeal as follows: 

On July 29, 2013, a jury found [Appellant] guilty [of 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) and multiple 

counts of EWOC, corruption of minors, and indecent assault 

at two different docket numbers]. The [court] sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of 32-64 

years and found him to be a sexually violent predator. 

Judgment of sentence was affirmed on appeal, but the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case for 

resentencing, finding that the imposition of a mandatory 

sentence was illegal. [The trial court] resentenced 

[Appellant] to the same sentence, without the mandatory 

sentence, on July 21, 2016. This sentence was affirmed on 

August 16, 2017. 

In 2017, appointed counsel filed an amended PCRA petition 

and in 2018 the Commonwealth conceded a sentencing 

issue on two counts of [EWOC]. On January 2[8], 2019, 

just before retiring, [the trial jurist] granted a resentencing 

hearing on the EWOC [convictions] and denied the rest of 

the PCRA.[2] The case was reassigned to [the current jurist]. 

Next, counsel for Appellant filed a motion to reconsider, and 

Appellant filed a pro se motion for a Grazier[3] hearing. 

[The PCRA court] granted both motions and ordered 

Appellant to refile a PCRA [petition] and raise all issues 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4304(a) and 6301(a)(1), respectively. 

2 Regarding the need for resentencing, the court determined that two (2) 

counts of EWOC at docket No. 13778 of 2012 were improperly graded as thirddegree felonies. Instead, these counts should have been graded as firstdegree misdemeanors. (See N.T. Resentencing Hearing, 5/4/21, at 2-3; 

Order Granting PCRA Relief in Part, filed 1/28/19, at 1). 

3 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81 (1998). 
J-S25037-22

- 3 -

therein. Appellant complied and the Commonwealth 

answered. [The PCRA court] reviewed the record, issued a 

notice of intent to dismiss the non-sentencing related 

issues, and scheduled a [resentencing] hearing. Appellant 

filed motions to amend and to stay, which [the PCRA court] 

granted. On [August 26], 2020, Appellant filed an amended 

PCRA [petition]. The Commonwealth responded that claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel at claims 1-8 and 10-12

were without merit, and claim 13 of cumulative prejudice 

was also meritless. Claim 9 is a time credit issue wherein 

the Commonwealth believes [Appellant] is entitled to three 

additional days. Appellant had been given credit from 

9/12/12-12/18/12, but had not been released from custody 

until 12/21/12. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/28/21, at 2-3) (some capitalization omitted). 

The court conducted Appellant’s resentencing hearing on May 4, 2021. 

At that time, the court resentenced Appellant to terms of one (1) to two (2) 

years’ imprisonment for each of the EWOC convictions that the PCRA court 

identified as improperly graded. The court ordered these sentences to run 

consecutive to the sentences for Appellant’s remaining convictions, which 

resulted in an aggregate prison term of twenty-seven (27) to fifty-four (54)

years. The court also provided Appellant with credit for all time served. On 

May 7, 2021, the court dismissed Appellant’s remaining PCRA claims. 

Appellant filed a pro se post-sentence motion on May 17, 2021.

4

 In it, 

Appellant argued that his sentence “was manifestly excessive, unreasonable 

____________________________________________

4 Although the post-sentence motion was not docketed until May 17, 2021, 

the motion included a copy of a “cash slip” indicating that Appellant provided 

the motion to prison officials for mailing on May 5, 2021. Giving Appellant the 

benefit of the “prisoner mailbox rule,” we deem the filing timely. See 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S25037-22

- 4 -

and [an] abuse of discretion where the court imposed ... 27-54 years ... of total 

confinement on a 45-year-old man.” (Post-Sentence Motion, filed 5/17/21, at 

3). Before the court ruled on the post-sentence motion, Appellant filed a pro 

se notice of appeal on June 1, 2021.

5, 6 Appellant voluntarily filed a pro se

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on 

June 28, 2021. 

Appellant now raises two issues for our review: 

The sentencing court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced Appellant to a manifestly excessive and 

unreasonable period of twenty-seven to fifty-four years of 

incarceration. 

____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 

616 Pa. 625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (explaining pro se prisoner’s document is 

deemed filed on date he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing). 

5 More specifically, Appellant filed separate pro se notices of appeal at each 

underlying docket number from the May 4, 2021 judgments of sentence. 

Appellant also filed separate pro se notices of appeal at each underlying docket 

number from the order denying PCRA relief. This Court docketed the appeals 

related to the denial of PCRA relief at 657 and 659 WDA 2021. This Court 

subsequently consolidated each set of appeals sua sponte. 

6 The filing of Appellant’s post-sentence motion tolled the thirty-day appeal 

period. See Pa.R.A.P. 720(A). Perhaps unaware of the tolling, Appellant filed 

the instant notices of appeal before the entry of an order denying the postsentence motion. The trial court acknowledged this procedural history in its 

opinion. (See Trial Court Opinion at 3). Thereafter, the trial court’s opinion 

considered the claim raised in the post-sentence motion and concluded that 

Appellant was not entitled to relief. (See id. at 7). Under these 

circumstances, we will treat Appellant’s premature notices of appeal as having 

been filed after the trial court’s opinion, which effectively serves as the order 

denying the post-sentence motion. See Commonwealth v. Ratushny, 17 

A.3d 1269, 1271 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2011) (treating appellant’s premature notice 

of appeal as having been filed after entry of order denying post-sentence 

motions, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 905). 
J-S25037-22

- 5 -

The sentencing court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced Appellant to separate sentences for counts ten 

(10) and eleven (11) and counts thirteen (13) and fifteen 

(15) from [docket No. 13778 of 2012], counts ten and 

eleven should have merged and thirteen and fifteen should 

have merged for sentencing purposes. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

In his first issue, Appellant claims that his aggregate sentence of twentyseven (27) to fifty-four (54) years’ imprisonment is “so disproportionate as to 

implicate the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” (Id.

at 6). Specifically, Appellant argues that his sentence was manifestly 

excessive and unreasonable considering that his prior record score was zero

and he will be on supervision for the rest of his life due to the relevant sex 

offender registration requirements. Appellant insists that a sentencing court 

commits an error of law when “a sentence overlooks[s] pertinent facts.” (Id.

at 5). Appellant also notes that “no criminal activity of any kind was alleged 

in the thirteen years after the allegations that brought Appellant to trial.” (Id.

at 10). As presented, Appellant’s issue implicates the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 876 A.2d 408, 411 (Pa.Super.

2005) (stating claim that sentence is manifestly excessive constitutes

challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence). 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an 

appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 

1013 (Pa.Super. 2003). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary 
J-S25037-22

- 6 -

sentencing issue:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant 

must also invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by, inter alia, including in 

his brief a separate concise statement demonstrating that there is a 

substantial question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the 

Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 425-26, 812 

A.2d 617, 621-22 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The determination of what 

constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” 

Anderson, supra at 1018. A substantial question exists “only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; 

or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 741 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa.Super. 1999) 

(en banc), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 755, 790 A.2d 1013 (2001). “An appellant 

must articulate the reasons the sentencing court’s actions violated the 
J-S25037-22

- 7 -

sentencing code,” and this Court will not accept bald assertions of sentencing 

errors. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

A claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive might raise a substantial 

question if the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the 

way the sentence imposed violates a specific provision of the Sentencing Code 

or the norms underlying the sentencing process. Mouzon, supra at 435, 812 

A.2d at 627. A Rule 2119(f) statement does not raise a substantial question 

if it “does not set forth the specific provision of the Sentencing Code or the 

fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process that the trial court 

violated in imposing the sentence.” Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 

188, 202 (Pa.Super. 2007). “An allegation that the sentencing court failed to 

consider certain mitigating factors generally does not ... raise a substantial 

question.” Moury, supra at 171. See also Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 

A.3d 327, 335-36 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 689, 29 A.3d 796 

(2011) (stating bald assertion that sentencing court gave inadequate 

consideration to certain mitigating factors does not raise substantial question). 

Instantly, Appellant’s assertion that the court gave inadequate 

consideration to his age, prior record score, or the collateral consequences of 

his convictions does not raise a substantial question. See Moury, supra. To 

the extent Appellant’s argument might be interpreted as a challenge to the 

court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for certain counts, this also fails 

to raise a substantial question. See id. at 171-72 (explaining court has 
J-S25037-22

- 8 -

discretion to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently; imposition of 

consecutive sentences may raise substantial question in only most extreme 

circumstances, such as where aggregate sentence is unduly harsh considering

nature of crimes and length of imprisonment). Therefore, we decline to 

disturb the judgment of sentence on the grounds alleged. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues the court should have merged the 

counts of EWOC and corruption of minors for the conduct related to his first 

victim, and it also should have merged the counts of EWOC and corruption of 

minors for the conduct related to his second victim. Appellant emphasizes

that one act of inappropriate sexual contact formed the basis for all counts 

related to each victim. Appellant concludes that his sentence is illegal, and 

this Court must vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. 

We disagree. 

Whether crimes merge for sentencing purposes implicates the legality 

of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043 (Pa.Super. 

2013). Merger of sentences is governed generally by the Sentencing Code, 

which provides: 

§ 9765. Merger of sentences

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the 

crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the 

statutory elements of one offense are included in the 

statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes 

merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the 

defendant only on the higher graded offense. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765. “[T]he language of the legislature is clear. The only 
J-S25037-22

- 9 -

way two crimes merge for sentencing is if all elements of the lesser offense 

are included within the greater offense.” Commonwealth v. Coppedge, 984

A.2d 562, 564 (Pa.Super. 2009) (emphasis in original). 

The Crimes Code defines the offense of EWOC as follows:

§ 4304. Endangering welfare of children

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A parent, guardian or other person supervising the 

welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that 

employs or supervises such a person, commits an offense if 

he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating 

a duty of care, protection or support. 

(2) A person commits an offense if the person, in an 

official capacity, prevents or interferes with the making of a 

report of suspected child abuse under 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 

(relating to child protective services). 

(3) As used in this subsection, the term “person 

supervising the welfare of a child” means a person other 

than a parent or guardian that provides care, education, 

training or control of a child. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a). 

The Crimes Code defines the offense of corruption of minors as follows:

§ 6301. Corruption of minors

(a) Offense defined.—

(1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, 

being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act 

corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less 

than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or 

encourages any such minor in the commission of any crime, 

or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor in 

violating his or her parole or any order of the court, commits 

a misdemeanor of the first degree. 
J-S25037-22

- 10 -

(ii) Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and 

upwards, by any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 

31 (relating to sexual offenses) corrupts or tends to corrupt 

the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or who 

aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the 

commission of an offense under Chapter 31 commits a 

felony of the third degree. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a). 

Instantly, an examination of the statutory elements at issue reveals that 

the offense of EWOC includes a violation of “a duty of care, protection or 

support,” which does not appear in the offense of corruption of minors. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1). Compare 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301. Likewise, the offense 

of corruption of minors includes an element requiring an act that “corrupts or 

tends to corrupt the morals of any minor,” and such element is not included 

in the offense of EWOC. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i). Compare 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 4304. Thus, EWOC and corruption of minors contain different statutory 

elements and do not merge for sentencing purposes. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9765; Coppedge, supra. Consequently, Appellant is not entitled to relief on 

his challenge to the legality of the sentence. See Tanner, supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
J-S25037-22

- 11 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/2022