[Cite as State v. Baker, 2016-Ohio-3471.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 15AP-224 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 13CR-1663)

Larry Baker, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 16, 2016 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. 

Gilbert, for appellee. 

On brief: Clark Law Office and Toki M. Clark, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BRUNNER, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Larry Baker, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas entered on February 25, 2015, which sentenced him to a 

two-year term of imprisonment on a single count of burglary following a guilty verdict in a 

trial by jury. Specifically, Baker challenges the authenticity of a video used against him as 

well as the sufficiency and weight of the evidence against him. For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On Monday, September 24, 2012, a pastor with the Rock City Church was in 

the church offices at 950 Michigan Avenue in Columbus, Ohio preparing to deposit the 

collection money obtained on the preceding Sunday. He opened the safe in his office, 

removed packets of checks, other donation receipts from online sources, and an envelope 

of cash. The cash envelope was clearly marked "cash" and had the amount listed on the 

outside, approximately $1200. (Tr. Vol. II at 39.) 
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No. 15AP-224 

{¶ 3} After placing the envelopes on his desk, the pastor left his office briefly to 

use the restroom down the hall from his office. On the way back, he spoke briefly with the 

only other person working in the building that day, the church's youth pastor. In total, he 

was away from his office for approximately five minutes. When he returned to his office 

the cash envelope was gone. 

{¶ 4} Initially believing he had merely misplaced the envelope or misremembered 

ever having it, he investigated by contacting members of the church who took and 

counted the collection in order to confirm that indeed there had been a cash envelope. 

However, after he exhausted those avenues, he contacted Integrated Building Systems 

("IBS") (the landlord from which the church rented the office space) to determine if the 

building had security camera records. IBS did have a security camera system and one of 

the cameras captured activity in the hallway in the area of the route between an outside 

entry door and the doorway of the pastor's office. 

{¶ 5} The pastor contacted the police and either on the day of the theft, 

September 24, 2012, or the day after, a Columbus police officer arrived at the scene and 

reviewed the video with the pastor that had been captured by IBS' system. The pastor fast 

forwarded and rewound through the video with the police officer until they found a 

segment of video that showed some activity. The pastor requested from IBS a copy of the 

video segment showing activity. Employees of IBS made a copy and gave it to the pastor 

who, in turn, delivered it into the hands of the police. 

{¶ 6} The video, which was ultimately introduced into evidence and played at 

trial, is in the record before this Court, and we have reviewed it. It shows a man (whom 

the jury ultimately determined was Baker) entering the building and slowly ambling from 

doorway to doorway looking inside each room. From viewing the video, he is dressed in a 

shirt and tie, has a messenger bag slung across his chest, and appears to be clutching 

some papers. When he enters the pastor's office, there is a longer period in which he is 

not visible than when he looked in any of the other doorways. After this period, he sticks 

his head out and carefully looks both directions up and down the hall before pulling his 

head back into the office. Seconds later, he exits the office with some envelopes or papers 

in his grasp. He pauses briefly to look over his shoulder and then lopes, with soft 
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exaggerated jogging strides, down the hall and out the outer door of the church offices, 

both opening and closing the door slowly. 

{¶ 7} The pastor did not know who the man was, but he said that, despite the fact 

that the church offices are not open to the public or advertised by signs, he had entered 

the church offices once before, approximately three to six months prior to the day of the 

theft. On that occasion, when confronted by staff, he told them he was collecting for some 

charity or organization, gave the church staff a pamphlet, and left. Despite the fact that 

the pastor did not know Baker's identity, by a method not reflected in the record, the 

police came to suspect that Baker was the man shown in the video. Thus, in December 

2012, a Columbus police detective went to speak to Baker. He showed Baker 

photographic stills taken from the video. Baker admitted the photographs looked like him 

but did not admit that they were he and did not admit to having been in the Rock City 

Church offices. Baker related that he goes to a great number of places, to pass out 

resumes and flyers seeking donations for the homeless. 

{¶ 8} A Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Baker on March 26, 2013 for a 

single count of burglary. Apparently because of a service delay, Baker was not arraigned 

until August 1, 2014, when he pled not guilty. On January 26, 2015, a jury trial in the case 

began. The facts related above were introduced into evidence during that trial, and on 

January 29, 2015, the jury found Baker guilty. On February 25, 2015, the trial court 

sentenced Baker to serve two years in prison. 

{¶ 9} Baker now appeals. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 10} Baker presents four assignments of error for review: 

[1.] THE VERDICT OF GUILTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 

LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 

[2.] THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT IS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

[3.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 

GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR ACQUITTAL. 

[4.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EXCLUDE 

MODIFIED VIDEO EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT 

AUTHENTICATED. 
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No. 15AP-224 

For clarity of analysis, we address the assignments of error out of order. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Fourth Assignment of Error–Whether the Trial Court Erred in 

Failing to Exclude the Surveillance Video 

{¶ 11} Baker argues that the surveillance video introduced into evidence against 

him was not properly authenticated, that there was evidence that the time stamp on it 

could have been tampered with, and that it was "whittled down" from a much lengthier 

video. (Baker's Brief at 11.) 

{¶ 12} There is no evidence that the time stamp on the video was or could have 

been tampered with. Indeed, the IBS witness who testified about the security system 

expressly testified that, although the recorder occasionally is off by a few minutes and 

needs to be adjusted, once a video is recorded, the time stamp is part of the video, and 

there is no way, short of "TV show land" style editing to change the date and time. (Tr. 

Vol. II at 145.) 

{¶ 13} While witnesses testified that security cameras record a great deal of footage 

of which this excerpt was only one small part, no witnesses testified that the surrounding 

footage held any relevance at all to this case. The officer who reviewed the video with the 

pastor testified that the two of them were "fast forwarding and rewinding through the 

video to make sure [they] got everything" and "the segment that I - - contained [Baker] on 

it was, maybe, a couple of minutes. No longer than that." (Tr. Vol. II at 153.) In the 

absence of some reason to suspect that other parts of the video were potentially relevant, 

we find no evidence in the record to support that any other portion of the video footage 

available holds any importance as to whether or not the excerpt shown to the jury is 

admissible. 

{¶ 14} Authenticity is a condition precedent to admissibility but can be "satisfied 

by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 

proponent claims." Evid.R. 901(A). In a classic case of photographic authentication, the 

person who took the photographs or videos would testify as to how and when they were 

taken and that they show what they purport to show. See, e.g., State v. Pickens, 141 Ohio 

St.3d 462, 2014-Ohio-5445, ¶ 150. However, in some contexts (including security 

cameras), the Supreme Court of Ohio has embraced the " ' "silent witness" theory. Under 

that theory, the photographic evidence is a "silent witness" which speaks for itself, and is 
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No. 15AP-224 

substantive evidence of what it portrays independent of a sponsoring witness.' " Id., 

quoting Midland Steel Products Co. v. Internatl. Union, United Auto., Aerospace & 

Agriculture Implement Workers, Local 486, 61 Ohio St.3d 121, 129-30 (1991), quoting 

Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 5-6 (1982). In other words, when a witness can testify about 

the reliability of the recording system, including, for example, the positioning of the 

cameras and the method of recording and producing the video, the video will be 

considered properly authenticated in the absence of some countervailing reason to believe 

that the video is defective or has been altered in some respect. Id. at ¶ 151-52. 

{¶ 15} In this case, a representative of IBS testified about the positioning of the 

cameras, how they were activated, how they recorded, and how the excerpt was created 

for the pastor in this case. In addition, a police officer who was present when the excerpt 

was selected by fast forwarding and rewinding in order to ascertain the boundaries of the 

potentially relevant footage, testified briefly about that process. In the absence of 

countervailing evidence or reasons to believe that this video is anything other than what it 

purports to be, the testimony by the IBS witness and the officer was sufficient to establish 

the authenticity of the video recording. 

{¶ 16} Baker's fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

B. First, Second, and Third Assignments of Error–Whether Baker's 

Conviction was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence, 

Whether it was Supported by Sufficient Evidence, and Whether a 

Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal Should Have Been Granted 

{¶ 17} In his first assignment of error, Baker alleges that his convictions were not 

supported by sufficient evidence. Sufficiency is: 

"[A] term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied 

to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether 

the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as 

a matter of law." * * * In essence, sufficiency is a test of 

adequacy. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain 

a verdict is a question of law. 

Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 11, quoting State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997); Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). 

"In reviewing a record for sufficiency, '[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' " State v. 
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No. 15AP-224 

Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, ¶ 47, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 

259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 18} Although Baker's third assignment of error challenges the denial of his 

motion for acquittal, this does not necessitate a separate review because "[a] motion for 

acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the same standard as the one for 

determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient evidence." State v. Tenace, 109 

Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37, citing State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553 

(1995); Thompkins at 386. 

{¶ 19} Baker's second assignment of error challenges the manifest weight of the 

evidence. The Supreme Court has "carefully distinguished the terms 'sufficiency' and 

'weight' * * *, declaring that 'manifest weight' and 'legal sufficiency' are 'both 

quantitatively and qualitatively different.' " Eastley at ¶ 10, quoting Thompkins at 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the greater 

amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one 

side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to 

the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be 

entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their 

minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence 

sustains the issue which is to be established before them. 

Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its 

effect in inducing belief." 

(Emphasis deleted.) Id. at ¶ 12, quoting Thompkins at 387; Black's at 1594. In manifest 

weight analysis, "the appellate court sits as a 'thirteenth juror' and disagrees with the 

jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony." Thompkins at 388, quoting Tibbs v. Fla., 

457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). " 'The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.' " Id.

at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). However, even 

though manifest weight is a different standard from sufficiency, because the evidence 

against Baker in this case was overwhelming and does not come close to failing either 

measure of sufficiency or weight, we find it effective to analyze these assignments of error 

together. 
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No. 15AP-224 

{¶ 20} The Ohio Revised Code defines the offense of burglary, in part, applicable to 

this case as follows: 

(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of 

the following: 

(1) Trespass in an occupied structure * * * when another 

person * * * is present, with purpose to commit in the 

structure * * * any criminal offense. 

R.C. 2911.12(A)(1). 

(C) "Occupied structure" means any * * * building * * * to 

which any of the following applies: 

* * * 

(4) At the time, any person is present * * * in it. 

R.C. 2909.01(C)(4). "Trespass," as used in R.C. 2911.12(A)(1) and as relevant to this case, 

is to "[k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another," "without privilege 

to do so." R.C. 2911.21(A)(1); see also, R.C. 2911.10 (providing that for purposes of R.C. 

2911.11 to R.C. 2911.13 "the element of trespass refers to a violation of section 2911.21 of 

the Revised Code"). 

{¶ 21} Baker argues that his conduct as shown by the evidence does not meet these 

elements because when he entered the building he had no intent to commit a crime and 

could not have known that, only moments before Baker wandered in, the pastor had taken 

money from the safe and left it unattended on his desk while he went to the restroom. 

Baker therefore urges us to find that this was a "theft of opportunity" and not burglary. 

(Baker's Brief at 5.) However, although burglary can be committed by entering an 

occupied structure by force, stealth, or deception with the already-fully-formed purpose to 

commit a criminal offense, Baker fails to note that the crime of burglary occurs upon a 

"trespass" in an occupied structure. R.C. 2911.12(A)(1). "Trespass" is a concept that 

includes more than just the moment when one enters a forbidden area, but also 

knowingly "remain[ing] on the land or premises of another" without privilege to do so. 

R.C. 2911.21(A)(1); R.C. 2911.12(A)(1). Once Baker saw the money, as even his brief does 

not dispute, he formed the intent to steal it, and he remained in the church's office (where 

he had no privilege to be) in order to steal the money and then escape. The video clearly 

reflects that he was stealthy in his exit, peering around corners, exiting with exaggerated 
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No. 15AP-224 

gentle strides, and carefully opening and closing the door to the outside, making his exit 

silent. In short, Baker's readily apparent attempts at stealth helped him to evade the 

hearing of the persons present in the building and to thereby "remain" and "trespass" on 

the premises long enough to steal the money and escape with it. This is burglary. "While 

the term, 'stealth,' is not defined in the Revised Code, this court has defined that term to 

include 'any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or to 

remain within a residence of another without permission.' " State v. McBride, 10th Dist. 

No. 10AP-585, 2011-Ohio-1490, ¶ 23, quoting State v. Lane, 50 Ohio App.2d 41, 47 

(1976); State v. Wallace, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-2, 2008-Ohio-5260, ¶ 43. The video in this 

case and the testimony of the witnesses are sufficient evidence, when viewed " 'in a light 

most favorable to the prosecution, [to have permitted] a[] rational trier of fact [to] have 

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Monroe at 

¶ 47, quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 22} In addition, it could not be clearer from the video exactly what Baker is 

doing when he peers around the corner, eyebrows raised and mouth agape to check for 

potential witnesses, before striding with exaggerated care down the hall to softly open and 

close the door in making his escape. Even his own defense counsel at trial characterized 

Baker's stealthy behavior as "cartoonish." (Tr. Vol. II at 189.) We have no difficulty 

concluding that this conviction is also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, we overrule Baker's first, second, and third assignments of 

error. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 24} Having overruled all four of Baker's assignments of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

TYACK and KLATT, JJ., concur. 

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