Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1395 | January 29, 2019 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Troy D. Warner

Public Defender’s Office

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert Lee Brady, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 29, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1395

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sanford, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D03-1708-F2-10

Barteau, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1395 | January 29, 2019 Page 2 of 9

Statement of the Case

[1] Appellant Robert Brady, Jr. appeals his conviction of Level 2 felony dealing in

methamphetamine.1 We affirm.

Issue

[2] Brady presents one issue for our review: whether the State presented sufficient 

evidence to support his conviction of dealing in methamphetamine.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 2, 2017, Jermon Gavin contacted his friend, Ron Snyder, about 

obtaining one and one-half pounds of methamphetamine. Snyder called Josh 

Sage, who indicated he could provide the methamphetamine for the price of 

$13,500, to which Snyder added $500 as his fee. Later that same day, Sage and 

his brother, Brady, arrived at Snyder’s house armed with handguns. They hung 

out with Snyder in the basement during which time they smoked some 

methamphetamine provided by Sage.

[4] Before going to Snyder’s house to obtain the drugs, Gavin and his friends Jesus 

Pedraza, Benito Pedraza, and Damon Bethel discussed turning the drug 

purchase into a robbery, and they armed themselves with handguns. On the 

way, they pointed out Snyder’s house to Bethel and then dropped him off 

around the corner. When they arrived at Snyder’s house to purchase the 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1) (2017).
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methamphetamine, Snyder, Sage, and Brady went to the garage to conduct the 

transaction with them.

[5] The men talked in the garage until Jesus asked Snyder for a scale. Snyder went 

to the basement to retrieve a scale and then returned to the garage. Sage and 

Brady produced the drugs as “a team,” and Sage, with Brady standing “right 

next to him,” proceeded to weigh the methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 78, 

76. As the drugs were being weighed, Brady stated, “I told you it’s all there. 

It’s just a little shaky.” Id. at 76.

[6] Suddenly, Bethel appeared in the garage and someone was heard to say, “Don’t 

nobody move. Give me that shit.” Id. at 81. Gun shots were fired, and Snyder 

ran outside the garage to the side of the house to hide his personal stash of 

drugs. Brady ran by Snyder and out to the yard with the bag of 

methamphetamine. Id. at 50. At some point, Brady went to the kitchen to wipe 

down the guns.

[7] As a result of the gunfire, Sage and Bethel were shot, and Bethel died. During 

their investigation, the police found in the yard a gray plastic grocery bag that 

contained two Ziploc baggies of what was later determined to be approximately 

548 grams of methamphetamine. Testing revealed that a red substance found 

on both Ziploc baggies and on the gray grocery bag was Brady’s blood, likely 

from an injury he sustained to his hand.

[8] Based upon this incident, Brady was charged with Count I dealing in 

methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony; Count II attempted dealing in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1395 | January 29, 2019 Page 4 of 9

methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony;2and Count III carrying a handgun 

without a license, a Class A misdemeanor.3 Following a jury trial, Brady was 

found guilty as charged on all counts. At sentencing, the court merged Count II 

into Count I and ordered an aggregate sentence of eighteen and one-half years 

on Counts I and III. Brady now appeals his conviction of dealing in

methamphetamine.

Discussion and Decision

[9] When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction

after a jury verdict, “the appellate posture is markedly deferential to the 

outcome below.” Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016). Upon 

such a review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. Brasher v. State, 746 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Ind. 2001). Instead, we consider 

only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom. Id. If there is probative evidence from which a reasonable 

jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will 

affirm the conviction. Dillard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ind. 2001).

[10] At trial, the State alleged that Brady committed dealing in methamphetamine in 

conjunction with Sage, and the court instructed the jury on accomplice liability.

In order to convict Brady of dealing in methamphetamine as an accomplice, the 

 

2

Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1 (2014), 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1).

3

Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 (2017).
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State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or 

intentionally aided, induced, or caused another person to commit this offense. 

See Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (1977). To obtain a conviction of dealing in 

methamphetamine as charged in this case, the State was required to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Brady (2) possessed with intent to deliver (3) 

at least 10 grams of methamphetamine. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 26; see also

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e).

[11] A person who aids another in committing a crime is just as guilty as the actual 

perpetrator. Lothamer v. State, 44 N.E.3d 819, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. 

denied. An accomplice can be charged as a principal for all acts committed in

the accomplishment of the crime. Smith v. State, 809 N.E.2d 938, 944 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004), trans. denied. It is not necessary that the evidence show the 

accomplice personally participated in the commission of each element of the 

offense. Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Rather, 

mere tangential involvement in the crime can be sufficient to convict a person 

as an accomplice. Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 443, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), 

trans. denied. Further, an accomplice is “criminally responsible for everything 

which follows incidentally in the execution of the common design, as one of its 

natural and probable consequences, even though it was not intended as part of 

the original design or common plan.” Griffin, 16 N.E.3d at 1003. 

[12] There is no bright-line rule in determining accomplice liability; rather, the 

particular facts and circumstances of each case must be considered to determine 

whether a person participated in the offense as an accomplice. Castillo v. State, 
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974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012). In order for an accomplice’s conviction to 

stand:

[T]here must be evidence of his affirmative conduct, either in the 

form of acts or words, from which an inference of a common 

design or purpose to effect the commission of a crime may be 

reasonably drawn. Each participant must knowingly or 

intentionally associate himself with the criminal venture, 

participate in it, and try to make it succeed. That said, the State 

need not show that [he] was a party to a preconceived scheme; it 

must merely demonstrate concerted action or participation in an 

illegal act.

Griffin, 16 N.E.3d at 1003-04 (internal citations omitted).

[13] While a defendant’s presence at the scene or lack of opposition to a crime, 

standing alone, is insufficient to establish accomplice liability, courts may 

consider presence in conjunction with other factors to determine whether one 

acted as an accomplice to a crime. Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726, 736 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014), trans. denied. The four factors relevant to this inquiry are: (1) 

presence at the scene of the crime, (2) companionship with another at the scene 

of the crime, (3) failure to oppose commission of the crime, and (4) course of 

conduct before, during, and after occurrence of the crime. Id. 

(1) Presence at the Scene

[14] The evidence shows that Brady arrived at Snyder’s house with his brother, 

Sage. He remained at the house hanging out and smoking methamphetamine 

with his brother and Snyder and participating in the drug transaction in the 

garage until it was cut short by gunfire.
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(2) Companionship at the Scene

[15] The State presented evidence that Brady arrived at Snyder’s house with his 

brother, Sage, whom Snyder had called to obtain drugs. Brady and Sage were 

both armed with handguns, and they both smoked methamphetamine with 

Snyder in his basement. When Gavin arrived to purchase the drugs, Brady, 

Snyder, and Sage all went to the garage to conduct the transaction. Brady 

remained in the garage talking with everyone, and he and Sage jointly produced 

the drugs for weighing. In a coordinated endeavor, Brady and Sage weighed 

the drugs as Brady assured the men the bags contained the full one and one-half 

pounds of methamphetamine.

(3) Failure to Oppose Commission of the Crime

[16] Not only did Brady not oppose the sale of the methamphetamine, he 

unreservedly participated in the sale in concert with his brother.

(4) Course of Conduct

[17] Brady, armed with a handgun, accompanied his brother to Snyder’s house to 

conduct a drug deal. While there, he smoked methamphetamine and 

collaborated with his brother to weigh the drugs. As gunfire erupted in the 

garage, Brady took the bags of methamphetamine and ran outside to hide them. 

He then wiped down his gun and sought a place to conceal it as well. From this 

evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that Brady was guilty of dealing in 

methamphetamine as an accomplice.
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[18] Brady additionally contends the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction because Snyder’s testimony “regarding the source of the meth is 

incredibly dubious and uncorroborated.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. Brady argues 

that Snyder’s testimony that Sage provided the methamphetamine and that 

Snyder was only a middle man does not make sense. Brady suggests that 

Snyder provided the drugs and that Brady and Sage were Snyder’s security 

men.

[19] Appellate courts may apply the incredible dubiosity rule to impinge upon a 

jury’s function to judge the credibility of a witness only when confronted with 

inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated 

testimony of incredible dubiosity. Whatley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 276, 282 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Application of this rule is rare and is limited to 

cases where a single witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which 

is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of 

circumstantial evidence of guilt. Id. The standard to be applied for this rule is 

whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no 

reasonable person could believe it. Fancher v. State, 918 N.E.2d 16, 22 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009).

[20] At trial Snyder testified unequivocally that he did not provide the 

methamphetamine for this sale and that he did not have the methamphetamine 

at his house at the beginning of the night. He also testified that he contacted 

Sage to get the methamphetamine for Gavin and that Sage quoted him a price 

of $13,500. Upon arriving at the house, Sage produced some 
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methamphetamine that he, Brady, Snyder and others smoked in the basement. 

When Snyder retrieved the scale, Sage first complained that it was not big 

enough and then went on to produce and weigh the methamphetamine. 

Moreover, Snyder’s testimony was corroborated by Gavin. Gavin testified that 

Sage and Brady produced the methamphetamine as a team, that Brady stood 

with Sage while he weighed the drugs, and that Brady assured the men that it 

was all there.

[21] It is within the factfinder’s province to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 

Brasher, 746 N.E.2d at 73. In doing so, the trier of fact is entitled to determine 

which version of the incident to credit. Schmid v. State, 804 N.E.2d 174, 179

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Snyder’s testimony is not so incredibly 

dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. 

Brady’s argument is merely an invitation for this Court to invade the province 

of the trier of fact by reassessing witness credibility. We decline the invitation.

Conclusion

[22] For the reasons stated, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support 

Brady’s conviction of dealing in methamphetamine as an accomplice.

[23] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.