Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 

JOHN A. WALDROP, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

v. Record No. 970160 January 9, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the statutory 

requirement that an election candidate report all campaign 

"contributions" applies to money received by the candidate after 

the election to defray legal expenses associated with a recount 

proceeding. 

 I 

 John A. Waldrop, Jr., was charged in the Circuit Court of 

Henrico County with three counts of perjury resulting from his 

failure to disclose three payments he received from supporters in 

connection with his 1991 election to the Board of Supervisors of 

Henrico County (the Board). A jury acquitted Waldrop on one 

charge, convicted him on the other two, and imposed two $2,500 

fines, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. The 

Court of Appeals, in an opinion rendered December 17, 1996, 

affirmed the judgment, Waldrop v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 614, 

478 S.E.2d 723 (1996), and we awarded Waldrop this appeal. 

 II 

 The relevant facts are undisputed. On November 5, 1991, 

Waldrop was re-elected to his fifth term on the Board. Due to 

Waldrop's slight margin of victory, however, his opponent 

instituted a recount proceeding pursuant to former Code §§ 24.1-
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249 and -250 (now Code §§ 24.2-800 through -802). The recount 

proceeding was conducted in December 1991. 

 Waldrop retained Edward E. Willey, Jr., an attorney-at-law, 

to represent him in the recount proceeding.1

 According to 

Waldrop, Willey advised him that monies received to defray 

expenses pertaining to the recount were not campaign 

contributions and, therefore, were not required to be reported 

under the campaign finance disclosure requirements of the former 

Fair Elections Practices Act, former Code §§ 24.1-251 et seq. 

(the Act).2

 Waldrop received from Kenny Graham a check for $1,000, dated 

December 2, 1991, and payable to the "John Waldrop Defense Fund." 

 Graham testified that the money was given to Waldrop to defray 

his legal expenses related to the recount. Willey had asked 

Graham for the money and told Graham how to make out the check. 

Graham did not consider the check to be a "campaign 

contribution." 

 On December 13, 1991, Waldrop received from E. Carlton 

Wilton, Sr., a $500 check, payable to "John Waldrop." Wilton 

testified that, after the campaign, the money had been solicited, 

by someone other than Waldrop, for attorney's fees. 

 Acting upon Willey's advice, Waldrop deposited the two 

 

 1At the time of Waldrop's trial, Willey was deceased. 

 2In 1993, the Act was recodified in Title 24.2. 1993 Va. 

Acts ch. 641. 
- 3 - 

checks in a personal checking account he maintained jointly with 

his wife. Waldrop was using this bank account, rather than a 

separate account, as his "defense fund." 

 Willey's legal fees for representing Waldrop in the recount 

proceeding were $10,000. On November 24, 1991, pursuant to 

Willey's request, Waldrop paid Willey $1,000 in cash. Waldrop 

reimbursed himself therefor by keeping the $1,000 he had received 

from Graham. Using the money he had received from Wilton, 

Waldrop made other cash payments to Willey for out-of-pocket 

expenses. On December 24, 1991, Waldrop gave Willey a check for 

$9,000 and received a receipt from Willey showing that Waldrop 

had paid $10,000 for professional services rendered. 

 On January 15, 1992, Waldrop filed his campaign finance 

disclosure form for the period November 26 through December 31, 

1991, as required by the Act (the Report). The Report, in 

Schedule A, required Waldrop to list all "contributions" over 

$100. By his signature on the Report, Waldrop affirmed that, 

"[u]nder penalty of perjury," he had examined the Report and 

that, "to the best of [his] knowledge and belief, it [was] true, 

correct and complete." Waldrop did not list the checks received 

from Graham and Wilton. 

 III 

 Waldrop contends that the requirement that a candidate 

report all campaign contributions does not include a requirement 

that he report contributions related to a recount proceeding. 
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Conversely, the Attorney General contends that Waldrop was 

required to report all contributions, including those received 

relating to the recount. 

 The present case is governed by the law in effect in 1991. 

In 1991, the Act required a candidate to file periodic reports 

disclosing "all contributions and expenditures, except the 

payment of a filing fee." Former Code §§ 24.1-257.2(C) and -258 

(now Code §§ 24.2-916 and -914). The Act, however, did not 

expressly define the term "contribution." 

 In pertinent part, former Code § 24.1-255 (now Code § 24.2-

907) provided that it was unlawful for a candidate to fail to 

report "every . . . collection" of "money, services, or other 

things of value over $100 in relation to his candidacy." The 

Act, however, expressly referred to "campaign contributions." 

Former Code §§ 24.1-251 and -252 (now Code §§ 24.2-900 and -903) 

(emphasis added). The Act also provided for the disposition of 

contributions that were in excess of the amount necessary to 

defray a candidate's "campaign expenditures." Former Code 

§ 24.1-258.1 (now Code § 24.2-921) (emphasis added). 

 In 1993, the Act was recodified as the Campaign Finance 

Disclosure Act, Code §§ 24.2-900 et seq. (the Recodified Act). 

The Recodified Act defines the term "contribution," in pertinent 

part, as "money and services of any amount, and any other thing 

of value over $100, given . . . to a candidate . . . for the 

purpose of influencing the outcome of an election." Code § 24.2-
- 5 - 

901 (emphasis added).3

 Generally, there is a presumption that a recodified statute 

does not make substantive changes in the former statute unless a 

contrary intent plainly appears in the recodified statute. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Major, 239 Va. 375, 378, 389 S.E.2d 307, 

309 (1990); Chapman v. Richardson, 123 Va. 388, 391, 96 S.E. 776, 

777 (1918). In the present case, nothing in the Recodified Act 

suggests an intent to make substantive changes in the Act. To 

the contrary, we are told that "[t]he goal of [the] 

recodification is a clearer, more easily understood set of 

election laws and the elimination of ambiguities in the present 

law rather than substantive changes in the law." Report of the 

Virginia Code Commission on The Recodification of Title 24.1 of 

the Code of Virginia (1993). 

 Analyzing the Act in the light of the Recodified Act, we 

cannot say that Waldrop was required to report the Graham and 

Wilton checks which Waldrop received to defray the expenses of 

the recount proceeding. When those checks were delivered, the 

election had been held and the campaign had been concluded. 

Clearly, therefore, those contributions could not have 

"influenc[ed] the outcome of [the] election." 

 At the very least, the Act was unclear and ambiguous with 

respect to whether recount contributions had to be reported. 

 

 3Interestingly, this emphasized language is also found in 

the Act. Former Code § 24.1-255(C). 
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When a penal statute4

 is unclear, the statute must be strictly 

construed against the Commonwealth and in favor of an accused's 

liberty, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of any 

reasonable doubt concerning the statute's construction. Harward

v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 365, 330 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1985); 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 298, 300-01, 295 S.E.2d 890, 892 

(1982). Indeed, before the accused can be punished, "`his case 

must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute.'" Harward, 

229 Va. at 365, 330 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting United States v. 

Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1890)). Additionally, in a perjury 

prosecution, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt not only that the statements made under oath by 

the accused were false, but also that he knew they were false 

when made. Holz v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 876, 880, 263 S.E.2d 

426, 428 (1980); Rothfuss v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 461, 466, 94 

S.E.2d 532, 535 (1956). 

 IV 

 In view of the foregoing principles of law, we hold that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove that Waldrop wilfully and knowingly 

committed perjury. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of 

the Court of Appeals, annul the convictions, and dismiss the 

indictments. 

 

 4Former Code § 24.1-279 (now Code § 24.2-1016) provided, in 

pertinent part, that "[a]ny wilfully false, fraudulent, or 

misleading statement or entry made by any person in any statement 

or account under oath required by [Title 24.1], shall constitute 

the crime of perjury." 
- 7 - 

Reversed and dismissed.