61512 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

49 CFR Part 232 

[Docket No. FRA–2006–26175, Notice No. 

4] 

RIN 2130–AB84 

Electronically Controlled Pneumatic 

Brake Systems 

AGENCY: Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing revisions to 

the regulations governing freight power 

brakes and equipment by adding a new 

subpart addressing electronically 

controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake 

systems. The revisions are designed to 

provide for and encourage the safe 

implementation and use of ECP brake 

system technologies. These revisions 

contains specific requirements relating 

to design, interoperability, training, 

inspection, testing, handling defective 

equipment, and periodic maintenance 

related to ECP brake systems. The final 

rule also identifies provisions of the 

existing regulations and statutes where 

FRA is proposing to provide flexibility 

to facilitate the voluntary adoption of 

this advanced brake system technology. 

DATES: This final rule is effective 

December 15, 2008. Petitions for 

reconsideration must be received on or 

before December 15, 2008. Petitions 

received after that date will be 

considered to the extent possible 

without incurring additional expenses 

or delays. The incorporation by 

reference of certain publications listed 

in the rule is approved by the Director 

of the Federal Register as of December 

15, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: Petitions for 

reconsideration: Any petitions for 

reconsideration related to Docket No. 

FRA–2006–26175, may be submitted by 

any of the following methods: 

• Web site: The Federal eRulemaking 

Portal, http://www.regulations.gov. 

Follow the Web site’s online 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Room W12–140 on 

the Ground level of the West Building, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m. Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Instructions: All submissions must 

include the agency name and docket 

number or Regulatory Identification 

Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Note 

that all petitions received will be posted 

without change to http:// 

www.regulations.gov including any 

personal information. Please see the 

Privacy Act heading in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document for Privacy Act 

information related to any submitted 

petitions, comments, or materials. 

Docket: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or 

comments received, go to http:// 

www.regulations.gov or to Room W12– 

140 on the Ground level of the West 

Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m. Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

James Wilson, Office of Safety 

Assurance and Compliance, Motive 

Power and Equipment Division, RRS– 

14, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad 

Administration, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 

(telephone 202–493–6259); or Jason 

Schlosberg, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal 

Railroad Administration, 1200 New 

Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 

20590 (telephone 202–493–6032). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

Since the inception of automatic air 

brakes by George Westinghouse in the 

1870s, brake signal propagation has 

been limited by the nature of air and the 

speed of sound. Other adjustments have 

sought to alleviate this deficiency, but 

have left the basic system unaltered. As 

early as 1990, the Association of 

American Railroads (AAR) began 

investigating more advanced braking 

concepts for freight railroads, including 

ECP brake systems, which promise to 

radically improve brake propagation by 

using electrical transmissions of the 

braking signal through the train while 

still using air pressure in the brake 

cylinder to apply the force of the brake 

shoe against the wheel. During the past 

15 years, ECP brake technology has 

progressed rapidly and has been field 

tested and used on trains operating in 

revenue service by various railroads. 

FRA has been an active and consistent 

advocate of ECP brake system 

implementation. In 1997, FRA 

participated in an AAR initiative to 

develop ECP brake standards and in 

1999, FRA funded, through 

Transportation Technology Center, Inc., 

a Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality 

Analysis (FMECA) of ECP brake systems 

based on the AAR standards. FRA also 

took part in programs to develop and 

enhance advanced components for ECP 

brake systems. 

To further assess the benefits and 

costs of ECP brakes for the U.S. rail 

freight industry, FRA contracted Booz 

Allen Hamilton (BAH) in 2005 to 

conduct a study. BAH engaged an expert 

panel consisting of principle 

stakeholders in ECP brake technology 

conversion to participate in the study. 

The expert panel made various 

conclusions relating to technological 

standards, safety, and efficiency. In 

addition, the final BAH report provided 

a comprehensive analysis and 

comparison of ECP and conventional air 

brake systems. On August 17, 2006, FRA 

announced in a press release its 

intention to issue a notice of proposed 

rulemaking to revise the federal brake 

safety standards to encourage railroads 

to invest in and deploy ECP brake 

technology. In the press release, FRA 

encouraged railroads to submit ECP 

brake implementation plans before the 

proposed rule changes were completed. 

In a petition dated November 15, 

2006, and filed November 21, 2006, two 

railroads—the BNSF Railway Company 

(BNSF) and the Norfolk Southern 

Corporation (NS)—jointly requested that 

FRA waive various sections in parts 229 

and 232 as it relates to those railroads’ 

operation of ECP brake pilot trains. See 

Docket No. FRA–2006–26435. FRA held 

a public fact-finding hearing on this 

matter on January 16, 2007, featuring 

testimony from representatives of the 

petitioners, air brake manufacturers, and 

labor unions and granted a conditional 

waiver on March 21, 2007. See id. 

On September 4, 2007, FRA published 

a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) containing proposed revisions 

to the power brake regulation. See 72 FR 

50820. In the NPRM, FRA proposed 

revisions to the regulations governing 

freight power brakes and equipment by 

adding a new subpart addressing ECP 

brake systems. The proposed revisions 

were designed to provide for and 

encourage the safe implementation and 

use of ECP brake system technologies. 

The proposed revisions contained 

specific requirements relating to design, 

interoperability, training, inspection, 

testing, handling defective equipment, 

and periodic maintenance related to 

ECP brake systems. The proposed rule 

also identified provisions of the existing 

regulations and statutes where FRA 

believed flexibility to facilitate the 

introduction of this advanced brake 

system technology was necessary. 

Following publication of the NPRM in 

the Federal Register, FRA held a public 


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hearing in Washington, DC on October 

4, 2007, and a public hearing in 

conjunction with a public technical 

roundtable in the Chicago, IL area on 

October 19, 2007. The purpose of the 

hearings was to receive oral comments 

regarding the specific provisions 

contained in the proposed rule and to 

receive evidence and to develop 

findings to determine whether FRA 

should invoke its discretionary 

authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to 

provide a limited exemption from 

§ 20303 for freight trains and freight cars 

operating with ECP brake systems. 

Section 20303 requires operators to 

transport rail vehicles with defective or 

insecure equipment ‘‘from the place at 

which the defect or insecurity was first 

discovered to the nearest available place 

at which the repairs can be made’’ to 

avoid incurring civil penalties related to 

such movement. 

The hearings were attended by 

numerous railroads, organizations 

representing railroads, labor 

organizations, and brake manufacturers. 

Although the comment period officially 

closed November 5, 2007, FRA 

continued to receive comments on the 

NPRM into January 2008. FRA received 

substantial oral and written testimony at 

the hearings and written comments to 

the NPRM from the following 

organizations, railroads, and brake 

manufacturers, listed in alphabetical 

order: 

• American Association for Justice 

(AAJ). 

• Association of American Railroads 

(AAR). 

• Brotherhood of Locomotive 

Engineers and Trainmen (BLET). 

• Brotherhood Railway Carmen 

Division, TransportationCommunications International Union 

(BRC). 

• General Electric Transportation and 

General Rail Services (collectively, GE). 

• New York Airbrake (NYAB). 

• Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS). 

• Transport Workers Union of 

America, AFL–CIO (TWU). 

• Union Pacific Railroad Company 

(UP). 

• United Transportation Union 

(UTU). 

• Wabtec Railway Electronics 

(Wabtec). 

UTU supports and incorporates by 

reference the comments submitted by 

BLET, TCU, TWU, and its other labor 

representatives. 

FRA carefully considered all the 

information, data and proposals 

submitted in relation to Docket No. 

FRA–2006–26175 when developing this 

final rule. In addition to the preceding 

information, FRA’s knowledge and 

experience with enforcing the existing 

power brake regulations were also relied 

upon when developing this final rule. 

FRA will address and summarize all 

comments in the section-by-section 

analysis below and elsewhere as 

appropriate or necessary. 

Based on the oral and written 

comments submitted at the hearing and 

in the docket to this proceeding, FRA 

makes the following findings: (1) Safety 

is not compromised by allowing a train 

operating with ECP brakes and having a 

minimal number of ineffective or 

inoperative defective brakes to travel to 

its destination, not to exceed 3,500 

miles, without any additional 

intermediate brake inspections; (2) the 

safety hazards caused by placing cars 

equipped with ECP brakes into a train 

with an incompatible brake system are 

no different than the hazards caused by 

placing a car equipped with 

conventional brakes with ineffective or 

inoperative brakes into a train operated 

with conventional brakes; (3) safety is 

not compromised by allowing a train 

operated with ECP brakes with at least 

85 percent effective and operative 

brakes to haul a car with defective nonbrake safety appliances to the nearest or 

nearest forward repair location; and (4) 

requiring strict compliance with the 

movement for repair provision 

contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 would 

constitute a significant disincentive to 

the implementation and use of ECP 

brake technologies. Based on these 

findings, FRA has elected to utilize its 

discretionary authority provided under 

49 U.S.C. 20306 to provide a limited 

exemption for freight trains and freight 

cars operating with ECP brake systems 

from the requirements contained in 49 

U.S.C. 20303. 

Subsequent to the close of the 

comment period in this proceeding, 

AAR modified two of its existing ECP 

brake standards, S–4200 and S–4210, 

and continued to develop standards 

regarding hardware and software 

configuration management issues for 

ECP brake systems. AAR sought 

comments from its members concerning 

a proposed standard S–4270 addressing 

the configuration management issues. 

As FRA is interested in incorporating by 

reference the most current standards 

into the final rule, FRA reopened the 

comment period on April 18, 2008, for 

an additional fifteen (15) days for the 

limited purpose of receiving comments 

on revised standards S–4200 and S– 

4210 and newly developed draft S– 

4270. FRA continues to believe that 

reopening the comment period was the 

most efficient method of ensuring that 

the most current industry standards 

were included in this final rule. 

The NPRM and this subsequent notice 

indicated that FRA intended to include 

S–4270 in the final rule if it was 

finalized by AAR with sufficient time 

for inclusion and if its final version 

remained substantially similar to the 

draft standard reference in the notice 

reopening the comment periods. 

Ultimately, AAR adopted S–4270 

without any changes. 

II. Conventional Brake Operations 

While the basic operational concept of 

the automatic air brake system, 

originally conceived by George 

Westinghouse in the 1870s, remains the 

same, it has seen continuous 

improvement in practice. An air 

compressor in the locomotive charges a 

main reservoir to about 140 pounds per 

square inch (psi). With controls located 

in the locomotive, the locomotive 

engineer uses the main reservoir to 

charge the brake pipe—a 11⁄4 inch 

diameter pipe—that runs the length of 

the train and is connected between cars 

with hoses. The brake pipe’s 

compressed air—used as the 

communication medium to signal brake 

operations and the power source for 

braking action—then charges each car’s 

two-compartment reservoir to a pressure 

of 90 psi. Braking occurs through a 

reduction of air pressure in the brake 

pipe, which signals the valves on each 

car to direct compressed air from the 

reservoir on each car to its respective 

brake cylinder for an application of 

brakes. When air pressure is supplied to 

the brake cylinder—which is connected 

to a series of rods and levers that apply 

and release the brakes—the resulting 

force presses the brake shoes against the 

wheel, retarding the car’s speed. 

While brake applications were 

initially directed by George 

Westinghouse’s triple valve, modern 

applications use a control valve, which 

directs air from the brake pipe into the 

air reservoir when air pressure is rising 

in the brake pipe in order to charge the 

auxiliary and emergency reservoir and 

be ready for a brake application. To 

perform a brake application, the 

locomotive automatic brake valve 

reduces air pressure in the brake pipe by 

exhausting air, causing the car’s control 

valve to direct air from the auxiliary 

reservoir into the brake cylinder. The 

increase in air pressure to the brake 

cylinder is approximately 21⁄2 times the 

drop in brake pipe pressure. A 26 psi 

reduction in brake pipe pressure is 

equal to a full service brake application 

on a fully charged brake pipe, and 

should result in a brake cylinder 

pressure adequate to achieve a full 

service braking effort (brake force). 

While the control valve is directing air 


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into the brake cylinder, or holding air in 

the brake cylinder, it is unable to 

recharge the auxiliary reservoir on each 

car. The engineer can apply the brakes 

in increments, of a few psi at a time, go 

directly to a full service application, or 

initiate an emergency application of the 

brakes. 

Unlike a brake application, the 

incremental release of brakes on a 

typical freight train operating in direct 

release cannot be accomplished. Brakes 

can only be fully released, called a 

direct release, and only with the brakes 

released can the auxiliary reservoirs 

then begin to recharge. Brake 

applications are possible, but are more 

complicated, from undercharged brake 

pipe and air reservoirs. Recharging takes 

more time for a longer train, because the 

air has to be sent down the length of the 

train’s brake pipe—which can be up to 

a mile and a half. In addition, on 

extremely long trains, it is often difficult 

to fully charge the brake pipe due to 

small air leaks throughout the brake 

pipe and cold weather. 

Brake pipe pressure can be measured 

by an end-of-train (EOT) device, which 

is pneumatically connected to the rear 

of a train equipped with conventional 

pneumatic brakes and sends signals 

(EOT Beacon) via radio indicating the 

brake pipe pressure to the lead 

locomotive. Current Federal regulations 

specify the design and performance 

standards for both one-way and twoway EOT devices. See Part 232, subpart 

E. Both EOT device designs comprise of 

a rear unit pneumatically connected to 

the rear of the train’s last car that 

transmits an EOT Beacon to a an EOT 

Head End Unit—a device located in the 

cab of the lead locomotive displaying 

the brake pipe pressure of the rear car 

to the locomotive engineer. The twoway EOT device also has the capability 

to transmit an electronic signal from the 

locomotive to the rear end unit to 

initiate an emergency brake application 

by venting brake pipe pressure to 

atmosphere at the rear end unit. 

An emergency brake application can 

be initiated in several ways. The 

locomotive engineer can initiate the 

application by moving the brake handle 

to the emergency position, which 

depletes brake pipe pressure to zero at 

a faster rate than the service application 

by exhausting brake pipe air pressure at 

the locomotive. Emergency brake 

applications can also be initiated by 

opening the conductor’s valve, located 

in the cab of the locomotive, or by a 

break-in-two, where the train separates 

between cars and the brake pipe hoses 

separate, thereby venting brake pipe 

pressure to zero. While performing an 

emergency brake application from the 

locomotive, a locomotive engineer can 

also use the two-way EOT device to 

initiate an emergency brake application 

at the rear of the train. This permits the 

emergency application to be 

simultaneously initiated from both the 

front and rear of the trains and ensures 

that the brakes on the cars at the rear of 

the train apply in the event a brake pipe 

blockage occurs. 

III. ECP Brake Operations 

As early as 1990, AAR began 

investigating a more advanced braking 

concept for freight railroads, the ECP 

brake system. The ECP brake system 

radically improves the operation of the 

automatic air brake by using electrical 

transmissions to signal the application 

and release of brakes on each car in a 

train while still using compressed air to 

supply the air reservoirs on each car, 

which will be used to pressurize the 

brake cylinders to apply the force of the 

brake shoes against the wheels. ECP 

brakes also greatly simplify the brake 

system by eliminating multiple 

pneumatic valves used by conventional 

brakes and replacing them with printed 

circuit boards, each with a 

microprocessor, one electrically 

activated application valve, and one 

electrically activated release valve, with 

feedback on brake cylinder pressure for 

uniform control. 

ECP brake technology requires 

equipping locomotives and cars with 

special valves and electronic equipment 

that are unique to the operation of ECP 

brakes. While this system still requires 

a brake pipe to supply compressed air 

from the locomotive to each car’s 

reservoir in a train, there are currently 

two known methods to send the 

electronic signal for ECP brake 

operations from the locomotive to each 

car in the train. These methods include 

using a hard wire electrical cable 

running the length of the train or a 

radio-based technology requiring a 

transmitter and a receiver installed on 

the cars and locomotives. At this time, 

it appears that the railroad industry has 

chosen to use a cable-based system for 

ECP brake operation. 

ECP brake systems still employ the 

automatic air brake system’s basic 

concept where the locomotive supplies 

compressed air to each car’s reservoir 

via the conventional brake pipe. Each 

car’s brake valve reacts to a signal to 

apply the brakes by directing 

compressed air from the car’s reservoir 

to the brake cylinder or to release the 

brakes by releasing air from the brake 

cylinder. The similarities between the 

conventional pneumatic and ECP brake 

systems end here. Instead of utilizing 

reductions and increases of the brake 

pipe pressure to convey application and 

release signals to each car in the train, 

ECP brake technology uses electronic 

signals, resulting in an almost 

instantaneous application and release of 

brakes on each car in the entire train. 

Since the brake pipe pressure no longer 

serves as the communication medium in 

ECP braked trains, the brake pipe is 

constantly being supplied or charged 

with compressed air from the 

locomotive regardless of whether the 

brakes are applied or released. In 

addition, ECP brake-equipped trains 

offer graduated release, where a partial 

brake release command provides a 

partial, proportional brake release. 

The basic ECP brake system is 

controlled from the Head End Unit 

(HEU) and each car is equipped with a 

Car Control Device (CCD), an electronic 

control device that replaces the function 

of the conventional pneumatic control 

valve. The CCD acknowledges and 

interprets the electronic signals from the 

HEU and controls the car’s service and 

emergency braking functions. The CCD 

controls charging the car’s air reservoir 

and also has diagnostic capabilities to 

send a warning signal to the locomotive 

in the event any component fails to 

appropriately respond to a braking 

command. Each CCD has a unique 

electronic address located in the Car ID 

Module, which is keyed to a car’s 

reporting mark and number. 

Each car connects to the locomotive 

via special connectors and junction 

boxes. More specifically, an ECP brakeequipped train’s train line cable—a twoconductor electric cable (#8 A–WG and 

a shield)—connects the locomotive and 

cars and carries train line power to 

operate all CCDs and the ECP brake 

system’s end-of-train (ECP–EOT) device 

and communicates network signals via 

the power voltage. A Power Supply 

Controller (PSC)—mounted within the 

locomotive and providing 230 VDC of 

electricity—interfaces with the train line 

cable’s communication network, 

provides power to all connected CCDs 

and ECP–EOT devices, and controls the 

train line power supply as commanded 

by the HEU. Under the AAR standards, 

a single power supply shall be capable 

of supplying power to an ECP brakeequipped train consisting of at least 160 

CCDs and an ECP–EOT device. 

Under the existing regulations, the 

conventional pneumatic brake system’s 

EOT device can lose communication for 

16 minutes and 30 seconds before the 

locomotive engineer is alerted. See 49 

CFR 232.407(g). After the message is 

displayed, the engineer must restrict the 

speed of the train to 30 mph or stop the 

train if a defined heavy grade is 

involved. Per the regulations, railroads 


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must calibrate each conventional twoway EOT device every 365 days and 

incur additional maintenance and cost 

expenses while replacing its batteries. 

By contrast, an ECP–EOT device 

uniquely monitors both brake pipe 

pressure and operating voltages and 

sends an EOT Beacon every second from 

its rear unit to its HEU on the 

controlling locomotive. The HEU will 

initiate a full service brake application 

should brake pipe pressure fall below 50 

psi or initiate an emergency brake 

application should a communication 

loss occur for five consecutive seconds 

or if there is a break in the train line 

electrical cable. An ECP–EOT device 

does not require calibration and its 

battery, only a back-up for the 

computer, is charged by the train line 

cable and is much lighter in weight than 

the conventional EOT device battery. 

Physically the last network node in the 

train, the ECP–EOT device also contains 

an electronic train line cable circuit—a 

50 ohm resistor in series with 0.47 

micro-farad capacitor—and must be 

connected to the network and transmit 

status messages to the HEU before the 

train line cable can be initially powered. 

ECP brake systems have the great 

advantage of real-time monitoring of the 

brake system’s health. In normal 

operation, the HEU transmits a message/ 

status down the train line cable to each 

car. If an individual car’s brakes do not 

respond properly to the HEU’s brake 

command, or if air pressures are not 

within the specified limits for operation, 

a message indicating the problem and 

the applicable car number is sent back 

to the HEU, which in turn notifies the 

locomotive engineer of the problem. The 

ECP brake system can identify various 

faults, including, but not limited to: low 

brake pipe pressure; low reservoir 

pressure; low train line cable voltage; 

low battery charge; incorrect brake 

cylinder pressure; and offline or 

inoperative CCDs. 

Emergency or full service brake 

applications automatically occur when 

the ECP brake system’s software detects 

certain faults. For instance, if the HEU 

detects that the percentage of operative 

brakes falls below 85 percent, a full 

service brake application will 

automatically occur. In addition, the 

brakes will automatically apply when 

the following occurs: (1) Two CCD’s or 

the ECP–EOT report a ‘‘Critical Loss’’ 

within 5 seconds; (2) the train line cable 

indicates low voltage with less than 90 

percent operative brakes; (3) the ECP– 

EOT reports a low battery charge; (4) the 

train moves during set-up; (5) the train 

line cable becomes disconnected; or (6) 

the train exceeds 20 mph in Switch 

Mode. Under the AAR standards, the 

ECP brake system shall also have a 

pneumatic back-up system on each car 

for an emergency brake application in 

the event of a vented brake pipe or a 

train separation. These features preserve 

and exceed the fail safe features of 

conventional pneumatic brake systems. 

IV. Interoperability 

Due to control methodology 

differences, ECP brake systems are not 

functionally compatible with 

conventional pneumatic air brake 

systems. For instance, while 

conventional pneumatic air brake 

systems command a brake application 

by reducing the air pressure in the brake 

pipe, ECP brake systems command a 

brake application through a digital 

communications link transmitted on the 

electrical train line cable. 

Manufacturers have developed 

application strategies to address issues 

relating to car and locomotive fleet 

interchangeability. In particular, they 

have proposed three major schemes of 

ECP brake design: stand-alone systems 

using only ECP brakes; overlay (dual 

mode) systems capable of operating in 

either conventional or ECP brake mode; 

and emulation systems, also capable of 

operating in either conventional or ECP 

brake mode. 

Since cars with stand-alone ECP brake 

systems do not include a fully 

pneumatic brake control valve, they are 

incompatible with conventionally 

braked cars and must be operated in 

train sets depending solely upon ECP 

brakes. Cars using stand-alone ECP 

brake systems cannot intermix in the 

same train with cars using conventional 

pneumatic brakes unless (1) the train 

uses ECP brakes and those cars using 

conventional pneumatic brakes are 

transported as cars with inoperative 

brakes or (2) the train uses conventional 

pneumatic brakes and the cars using 

ECP brakes are transported as cars with 

inoperative brakes. While the standalone ECP brake system is the least 

expensive alternative of the three design 

types, its incompatibility with 

conventional pneumatic brake systems 

requires train segregation, potentially 

posing significant operational problems 

until the entire car fleet is converted to 

ECP brakes. 

Overlay configurations—cars 

equipped with both ECP CCDs and 

conventional pneumatic control valve 

portions—allow cars to operate with 

either ECP or conventional pneumatic 

brakes. To operate in ECP brake mode, 

compatible ECP equipment must be 

installed on the locomotive as well as 

on the freight car. While an overlay 

system’s dual mode capability provides 

significant flexibility, railroad operators 

must purchase, install, and maintain 

equipment to support both types of 

brake systems for as long as dual mode 

capability is required. 

Emulation configurations use a CCD 

capable of operating in either ECP or 

conventional mode without requiring 

conventional pneumatic controls. One 

manufacturer has provided an 

emulation ECP brake valve that 

monitors both the digital 

communications cable and the brake 

pipe for a brake command. If an 

electrical signal is present, the ECP 

brake valve operates in ECP brake mode. 

If the electrical brake command signal is 

not present, then the valve will monitor 

the changes in the brake pipe pressure 

like a conventional pneumatic control 

valve and the CCD will use a software 

program to emulate the function and 

response of a conventional pneumatic 

valve. An emulation ECP brake system 

can be operated in any train with any 

mix of emulation ECP and conventional 

brake systems. In a mixed train, the 

emulation ECP brake system will 

monitor the brake pipe for pressure 

changes and set up brake cylinder 

pressure like a conventional pneumatic 

valve. 

In the NPRM, FRA did not propose 

any rules uniquely regulating trains or 

cars equipped with emulation ECP 

brake systems, but sought comments on 

whether or how it should regulate such 

systems differently than what was 

proposed. According to NYAB and 

Wabtec (collectively, the brake 

manufacturers), the current AAR 

standards do not require a pneumatic 

emulation mode, and this function 

should not be subject to FRA regulation. 

In the event future releases of the S– 

4200 specifications add pneumatic 

emulation as a requirement, the brake 

manufacturers suggest that the need for 

FRA regulation can be addressed at that 

time. FRA concurs and the final rule 

does not include regulations uniquely 

affecting emulation ECP brake systems. 

Manufacturers have also addressed 

ECP brake compatibility with 

locomotives equipped with 

conventional pneumatic brakes, which 

must be equipped with an HEU unit to 

operate the brakes on cars equipped 

with ECP brakes. For instance, one 

manufacturer has developed a portable 

unit that will allow a locomotive lacking 

an ECP brake HEU to operate a train 

equipped with ECP brakes by converting 

the air pressure changes in the brake 

pipe to digital command signals that are 

transmitted to the freight cars through 

the electrical train line cable. The 

locomotive engineer operates the brakes 

with the conventional automatic brake 

valve in the control cab. The brakes, 


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however, will respond instantaneously 

and provide all of the benefits of an ECP 

brake system. While FRA recognizes 

that the technology for such a portable 

unit is in development and may provide 

a possible solution to the technological 

transition, it is not addressed or 

authorized by this final rule and the 

incorporated AAR standards. 

V. Advantages of ECP Brakes Over 

Conventional Pneumatic Brakes 

ECP brake technology overcomes 

many of the physical limitations 

inherent in conventional pneumatic 

brake technology. Field testing of AAR 

compliant ECP brake systems over the 

past decade has not revealed any 

indication of a catastrophic event that 

could be caused by an ECP brake system 

malfunctioning. With a high level of 

confidence, the ECP brake stake holders 

support the implementation of ECP 

brake systems on the Nation’s railroads. 

FRA concludes that the advantages of 

ECP brake technology will significantly 

improve the safety and the performance 

of train operations. Examples of such 

benefits include better train handling 

through simultaneous brake 

applications, continuous brake pipe 

charging, and graduated brake 

operation. Derailments are expected to 

decline significantly. ECP brake benefits 

also include electronic train 

management, improved performance, 

and real time diagnostics of the train’s 

brake system. 

A. Simultaneous Brake Application 

The conventional pneumatic brake 

system uses compressed air as the 

source for braking power and as the 

medium for communicating brake 

application and release commands and 

communicates the brake commands by 

changing brake pipe pressure through 

the use of the locomotive’s automatic 

brake valve. These commands begin at 

the front of the train and propagate to 

the rear of the train at the speed of the 

air pressure moving from car to car. This 

slow propagation of the brake command 

contributes to uneven braking, excessive 

in-train and run-in forces, train 

handling challenges, longer stopping 

distances, safety risks of prematurely 

depleting air brake reservoirs, and a 

corresponding low brake rate until all 

cars in the train receive and fully 

respond to the brake command. FRA 

recognizes that the slow application and 

release of brakes in a train, causes 

excessive in-train forces, which have the 

potential to cause derailments when 

they occur in curves, cross-overs, or 

when heavier cars are placed at the rear 

of the train or after empty cars. When 

the brakes on the rear of the train release 

much more slowly than the brakes on 

the front of the train, the potential for 

a ‘‘string-line’’ derailment—where the 

train stretches out until one or more 

wheels are lifted off the inside rail of a 

curve—increases. 

The ECP brake system reduces these 

problems by enabling cars to brake 

simultaneously at the command of an 

electronic signal. The electronic signal’s 

speed ensures an instantaneous, 

simultaneous, and even activation of 

each car’s brake valves, significantly 

reducing braking distances—40 to 60 

percent for the longest trains—and 

minimizing the consequences of 

collisions or derailments by reducing 

the collision speed and slowing the nonderailed portion of the train. 

B. Continuous Brake Pipe Charging 

Propagating a brake command signal 

through the reduction or increase of air 

pressure in the brake pipe represents a 

significant limitation of conventional 

pneumatic brakes. The same brake pipe 

air used to propagate brake commands 

also charges reservoirs on each freight 

car. As a result, the brake pipe must be 

fully charged to restore full braking 

capacity to depleted reservoirs. Partially 

depleted air from the brake pipe, which 

occurs during the initial stage of 

braking, prohibits repeat applications of 

brakes until the brake pipe can be 

recharged. A brake pipe can only be 

recharged once the brakes have been 

fully released. This characteristic of 

conventional pneumatic brakes 

contributes to the risk of run-away 

trains caused by prematurely depleted 

brake pipe pressure, particularly on 

steep grades. 

The ECP brake system reduces this 

risk by continuously charging the brake 

pipe. Since ECP brakes do not use the 

brake pipe as a brake command 

medium, the brake pipe is constantly 

being charged, allowing the locomotive 

engineer to operate the brake system 

more aggressively. With ECP brake 

systems, it is unnecessary to apply hand 

brakes on steep grades to recharge the 

brake pipe after the train stops on the 

grade. 

C. Graduated Brake Application and 

Release 

The conventional pneumatic brake 

system’s inability to operate freight 

trains in graduated release has long 

hampered train operations and has 

increased fuel consumption. The 

conventional pneumatic brake system 

can only operate in direct release, 

preventing locomotive engineers from 

reducing the braking effort without 

completely releasing and resetting the 

brakes. In other words, after a direct 

release brake application with a 

conventional pneumatic brake system, 

braking effort can be increased but not 

decreased without fully releasing the 

brakes. In many cases, direct release 

leads to unnecessary train stops or 

insufficient initial brake applications. 

ECP brake systems overcome this 

deficiency by operating in graduated 

release, which enables the operator to 

reduce braking effort to a lower level 

after making a brake application without 

fully releasing the brakes. As a result, 

the operator can accurately adjust the 

braking level as each situation requires, 

eliminating the stops required to 

recharge and reset the brakes after 

excessive brake applications and prior 

to negotiating hills and valleys. 

D. Train Management 

The use of a train line cable allows 

real-time self-diagnostic functions to be 

incorporated in the brake system. The 

initial check of brake system conditions 

on each car and continuous monitoring 

of each car’s braking functions provides 

immediate communication to the 

locomotive engineer of certain brake 

failures. The continuous monitoring of 

each car’s braking functions and realtime diagnostics of the train’s brake 

system is a significant advantage to the 

locomotive engineer for the operation of 

the train. These technical benefits also 

justify elimination of some of the 

currently required physical inspections 

of the train’s brake system and support 

regulatory change to operate cars with 

non-functioning brakes out of the initial 

terminal. When the ECP brake system 

diagnostics detect a serious problem, 

including when the brake pipe pressure 

falls below 50 psi, the ECP brake system 

will automatically command a penalty 

brake application. ECP brake systems 

also eliminate the conventional 

pneumatic brake system’s inability to 

apply all brakes in the train when there 

is a blockage in the brake pipe, which 

is handled through the use of a two-way 

EOT telemetry device not required by 

all trains. This failure will not affect 

brake applications in ECP brake 

systems, because each car is provided a 

braking command through a train line 

cable, not solely through the reduction 

of brake pipe pressure, which would not 

be propagated through the consist if the 

brake pipe is blocked. Therefore, ECP 

brake systems incorporate features that 

make them inherently safer than 

conventional pneumatic brakes. Using 

sensor-based technology to maintain a 

continuous feedback loop on train 

condition for the crew and any 

centralized monitoring, the electrical 

communication cable network can also 

serve as a platform for the gradual 


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addition of other train performance 

monitoring and management controls, 

including distributed power locomotive 

control, hand brake on/off detection 

system, automatic activation and release 

of hand brakes, hot bearing detection, 

and truck oscillation and vibration. 

These and other train management 

features will increase the reliability and 

overall safety of train operations. 

E. Improved Performance 

Ultimately, ECP brake technology also 

provides improved performance, which 

will contribute to safer train operations 

and significant cost savings over time. 

Since trains operated with ECP brakes 

can operate in graduated release, instead 

of direct release, fuel will not be wasted 

while pulling trains against a heavy 

brake application. Further, because all 

of the cars’ ECP brakes release 

simultaneously, fuel will not be wasted 

on initial start-ups and power-ups after 

a brake release. 

Operations utilizing ECP brake 

systems also promise increased average 

train speeds and decreased trip times. 

ECP brake systems allow the locomotive 

engineer to modulate the brake 

applications in territories with 

descending grades, thus increasing 

overall trip average speeds and reaching 

destinations sooner. While the slow 

release of the rear cars’ brakes on 

conventional pneumatic braked trains 

cause drag, the brakes on ECP brakeequipped trains release simultaneously, 

improving start-up and acceleration 

times. Further, due to their shorter 

stopping distances, trains equipped 

solely with ECP brake systems may 

potentially permit higher train speeds 

within existing signal spacing, which 

will increase average system velocity, or 

permit use of shorter ‘‘blocks’’ between 

signals, facilitating greater system 

capacity. 

The instantaneous application and 

release of ECP brakes will result in more 

uniform braking, thus improving wheel 

wear and increasing brake shoe life. In 

a conventional pneumatically braked 

train, the brake pipe gradient and slower 

response time causes the first third of 

the train’s cars to provide the majority 

of the braking action, thus applying 

additional pressure and heat on those 

cars’ wheels. Since ECP brake systems 

provide instantaneous braking on all 

cars, such pressure will be more 

uniformly distributed along the train, 

thus eliminating the uneven braking 

force on the wheels of those leading 

cars. The ECP brake system also selfmonitors each car’s brake cylinder 

pressure and maintains the prescribed 

pressure, thus reducing the potential for 

creating shelling and flat spots on 

wheels. 

Due to minimized wheel defects, and 

their accompanying vibrations, freight 

cars and brake components will enjoy 

increased life. Further, instantaneous 

braking will also prevent draft gear 

assemblies from receiving the constant 

pressure caused by trains equipped with 

conventional pneumatic brake systems 

and will reduce lading damage by 

eliminating slack action and in-train 

forces caused by uneven braking. ECP 

brake systems will also reduce the 

number of brake parts and rubber 

diaphragms required by conventional 

pneumatic brake systems. 

VI. Standards, Approval, and Testing 

During the past 18 years, FRA has 

monitored the progression of ECP brake 

technology and has observed field 

testing on various revenue trains, both 

freight and passenger. In 1997, FRA 

participated in an AAR initiative to 

develop ECP brake standards and in 

1999, FRA funded, through the 

Transportation Technology Center, Inc., 

a FMECA of the ECP brake system based 

on AAR’s Standards and Recommended 

Practices, S–4200 Series. FRA also 

participated in programs to develop and 

enhance advanced components for ECP 

brake systems. After all of these efforts, 

FRA has determined that the AAR S– 

4200 Series of standards are appropriate 

substantively and legally for 

incorporation by reference in this rule 

and that the AAR Air Brake Systems 

Committee is an appropriate vehicle to 

rely upon in the implementation of ECP 

brake technology for this rule. FRA 

acknowledges that ECP brakes are an 

attractive, viable, and enabling 

technology with the potential to 

substantially improve the operational 

efficiency of trains and that by 

complying with AAR Standard S–4200, 

ECP braked trains offer significant safety 

and efficiency benefits in freight train 

handling, car maintenance, fuel savings, 

network capacity, self-monitoring, and 

fail-safe operation. 

AAR administers the existing industry 

ECP brake standards through its Air 

Brake Systems Committee—consisting 

of representatives from the major 

railroads, brake manufacturers, and 

FRA—which requires demonstrated 

proof of compatibility, safety, and 

reliability of air brake systems to receive 

AAR approval. FRA is satisfied that the 

existing AAR S–4200 Series 

specifications, AAR approval 

procedures, and continuing oversight by 

the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee 

will best ensure the safety and 

reliability of ECP brake systems. An ECP 

brake monitoring system complying 

with AAR Standard S–4200 Series 

increases safety by communicating 

information on the location and 

quantity of defective equipment and by 

providing for the safe movement of 

equipment over longer distances and 

periods of time. 

A. AAR Standards and Approval 

Process 

In order to assure the safety and the 

interoperability of ECP brake system 

designs, AAR developed the S–4200 

Series of standards. The first five 

standards (S–4200, S–4210, S–4220, S– 

4230, and S–4250)—issued in 1999 and 

updated in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 

2007—specify the functional, 

operational, and interface requirements 

for cable-based ECP brake systems. AAR 

issued two additional standards in 

January 2007, specifying ECP brake 

equipment approval procedures (S– 

4240) and interoperability testing 

requirements (S–4260). In April 2008, 

AAR issued a standard for hardware and 

software configuration management 

plans (S–4270). At this time, AAR has 

not completed specifications for radiobased ECP brakes, which it considers 

technically immature and unsuitable. 

The purposes of the standards are to 

ensure that AAR-approved electronic 

brake systems are interoperable between 

different manufacturers and meet high 

standards of safety and reliability. The 

analysis of the S–4200 Series of 

standards indicates that the 

performance specifications for the cablebased ECP brake concept are complete. 

The AAR Manual of Standards and 

Recommended Practices (MSRP) 

contain the following standards for 

cable-based ECP brake systems: 

• S–4200, ECP Cable-Based Brake 

Systems—Performance requirements; 

• S–4210, ECP Cable-Based Brake 

System Cable, Connectors, and 

Junctions Boxes—Performance 

Specifications; 

• S–4220, ECP Cable-Based Brake DC 

Power Supply—Performance 

Specification; 

• S–4230, Intratrain Communication 

Specification for Cable-Based Freight 

Train Control System; 

• S–4240, ECP Brake Equipment— 

Approval Procedure; 

• S–4250, Performance Requirements 

for ITC Controlled Cable-Based 

Distributed Power Systems; 

• S–4260, ECP Brake and Wire 

Distributed Power Interoperability Test 

Procedures; and 

• S–4270, ECP Brake System 

Configuration Management. 

Standard S–4200 ensures that the 

functionality and performance of freight 

ECP brake systems are uniform and 


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consistent among equipment from 

different manufacturers, that cars 

equipped with AAR-approved ECP 

brake systems from different 

manufacturers are interoperable, and 

that AAR-approved electronic brake 

systems meet a high standard of safety 

and reliability. This standard defines 

ECP brake system elements, specifies 

their functionality in different 

implementation schemes—such as 

stand-alone, overlays, and emulators— 

and sets the requirements for all system 

functions. It covers all primary 

functions of ECP brakes, including 

graduated brake application and 

releases, continuous reservoir charging, 

adjustment of braking level to car load, 

continuous fault detection, equipment 

status monitoring, and pneumatic 

backup. It also specifies requirements 

for all modes of train operation and 

provides an extensive description of 

fault response and recovery functions 

for all possible faults of the system 

components. The standard also 

establishes environmental requirements 

for the designed systems, in-service 

testing, and rigorous approval 

procedures for the certification process 

of new ECP brake equipment. 

Other standards in the AAR S–4200 

Series contain requirements for critical 

ECP brake system components and 

communication protocols. Standard S– 

4210 contains the performance 

specifications and qualification test 

procedures for ECP brake system cables, 

connectors, and end-of-car junction 

boxes. The required testing verifies that 

the designed components have high 

reliability, will withstand harsh 

environmental conditions, and will 

have at least an 8-year operating life. 

Standard S–4220 contains 

performance specifications for the DC 

power supply system through the hardwired train line cable for ECP brake 

controllers and other electronic freight 

car components. Since a DC power 

supply conductor will also send 

communication control commands 

between a locomotive and its attached 

cars, the standard requires reliable 

separation and absence of interference 

between the DC power supply and the 

communication circuits. 

Standard S–4230 contains the 

requirements related to intra-train 

communication systems on freight 

equipment used in revenue interchange 

service. The standard facilitates 

interoperability between freight cars and 

locomotives without limiting the 

proprietary design approaches used by 

individual suppliers. The 

communication protocol was developed 

for control of ECP brakes and multiple 

remote units, including distributed 

power locomotives, and for safety 

reporting of various car and locomotive 

components. 

Standard S–4250 contains the 

methodology and communication flow 

requirements for controlling the 

operation of multiple locomotives in a 

freight consist through the intra-train 

communication network that is shared 

with ECP brake system. The locomotive 

control through the intra-train 

communication line is an alternative 

method of locomotive control, which 

was not available before the 

introduction of ECP brake system 

technology. The controlled locomotives 

can either trail a lead locomotive or be 

distributed (i.e., separated by cars) in a 

train. The standard establishes protocols 

for different types of locomotive 

controls through the intra-train line 

cable, depending on the location of the 

consist’s multiple locomotives. While 

the current means of controlling 

‘‘distributed power’’ is performed 

through radio control—which is 

susceptible to a loss of communication 

and is not ‘‘fail safe’’ in operation— 

locomotives operated with ECP brake 

systems can be relied upon to function 

as commanded in real time and 

automatically apply the brakes in the 

event of a communication loss. 

Standard S–4260 contains the test 

procedures that must be completed by 

ECP brake manufacturers to establish 

interoperability baselines among ECP 

brake and wire distributed power (WDP) 

systems in compliance with the S–4200 

standards series. The test procedures 

validate the functional interoperability 

of ECP brake and WDP systems 

developed by different manufacturers. 

Standard S–4270 defines the 

procedures for managing the software 

and hardware configuration for AARapproved ECP brake systems. 

The AAR approval process and the 

work of the Air Brake Systems 

Committee has been the primary 

method of ensuring the safety and 

reliability of railroad brake systems and 

components for decades. Through its 

participation on the Air Brake Systems 

Committee, FRA can monitor any safety 

or reliability issues that may develop 

with ECP brake systems. In the event of 

a serious safety issue with a supplier’s 

ECP brake system, FRA can 

appropriately respond by invoking its 

authority to intervene with additional 

rulemaking or an emergency order. FRA 

does not expect to use this authority, 

because the AAR Air Brake Systems 

Committee already has the authority to 

rescind AAR approval for brake systems 

that do not perform safely or reliably. 

Standard S–4240 contains the 

acceptance procedure for seeking AAR 

approval of ECP brake equipment. The 

standard requires a manufacturer to 

apply for approval by submitting certain 

information under Administrative 

Standard S–060. Following review and 

approval of the initial application data 

and test plan by the AAR Air Brake 

Systems Committee, a manufacturer 

maintains the burden of establishing 

compliance with Standards S–4200, S– 

4210, S–4220, S–4230, S–4250, S–4260, 

and S–4270 to obtain conditional 

approval. 

For laboratory testing, an AAR 

representative will select 150 CCDs from 

a lot of 200 and will select HEUs, train 

power supplying units (TPSs), and ECP– 

EOTs from lots of four each. The testing 

will be performed on a 150-car test rack 

configured in accordance with AAR 

specifications. The manufacturer will 

provide for AAR evaluation of the test 

results, which shall include a 

requirements traceability and 

compliance matrix for each AAR 

standard and all necessary test reports, 

and then conduct interoperability 

laboratory testing between new ECP 

brake equipment and AAR-approved 

ECP brake equipment in accordance 

with standard S–4260. 

Upon satisfactory completion of the 

aforementioned laboratory tests, AAR 

will consider conditional approval for 

field testing of ECP brake equipment. If 

conditional approval is granted, 150 

ECP brake CCDs shall be selected from 

a production lot of 200 test-approved 

CCDs, and 100 of those selected, plus at 

least two ECP brake-equipped 

locomotives and one ECP–EOT device, 

must be placed in railroad service for 24 

months. Under conditional approval, at 

least 1,000 cars must be allotted for use. 

Within those 24 months, all in-service 

tests must be conducted. After those 24 

months, the Air Brake Systems 

Committee continues to monitor the 

product for reliability and safety 

concerns. If a problem with any brake 

component is discovered, the 

Committee will discuss the issue and 

may either demand further tests or 

withdraw AAR approval. 

Full AAR approval shall be provided 

after 4 years if during that time a 

manufacturer furnishes AAR at 

specified intervals various service 

reports, which must include accurate 

ECP brake equipment malfunction 

records. FRA agrees with AAR’s 

assessment that 4 years are needed to 

collect a history of reliable data with 

minimum failures. In addition, the 

manufacturer must provide to AAR a 

semiannual report containing any repair 

material for the test ECP brake 

equipment. Under the standard, AAR 

reserves the right to withdraw 


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conditional test approval if it 

determines that safety is impaired, 

reliability degrades, or incompatibility 

of ECP brake operation develops, and 

may require any additional testing or 

performance evaluations it deems 

necessary. Standard S–4240 also 

contains specific procedures that must 

be followed when a manufacturer 

intends to change certain ECP brake 

equipment physical characteristics, 

software, or electronics. 

FRA supports this effort as a timely 

measure for AAR to strengthen the 

regulatory package for ECP brake 

systems. Overall, FRA considers AAR 

approval a valuable step to ensure the 

reliability and safety of ECP brake 

systems and a minimum requirement for 

initial application of ECP brake systems 

on the Nation’s railroads. However, FRA 

fully intends to monitor the application 

and safety of ECP and may, at its 

discretion, require additional safety 

analysis to be performed to confirm the 

safety of ECP brake systems installed 

and operating in revenue service. FRA 

reserves the right to witness the AAR 

approval testing of the product. 

B. FMECA 

AAR Standard S–4200 Series was 

developed to support the design of a 

safer, more reliable ECP braking system 

when compared with conventional air 

brakes. Once the standard was created, 

the railroad industry identified the need 

to perform a safety and reliability 

assessment of an ECP brake system built 

in accordance with this standard. Since 

actual S–4200 Series compliant ECP 

brake systems did not yet exist, the 

industry decided to conduct a FMECA 

for a hypothetical ECP brake system that 

satisfied all the requirements of the 

standard. At FRA’s insistence, the 

FMECA on AAR Standard S–4200 was 

performed in 1999 by DEL Engineering 

with participation of AAR, FRA and a 

number of experts with significant 

experience in the development and 

application of ECP brake systems. 

The FMECA team began the analysis 

by identifying all major ECP brake 

system components and their intended 

functions. The analysis examined each 

component and function and identified 

associated failure modes and effects. 

The failure modes were analyzed to 

determine severity, frequency of 

occurrence, and effectiveness of 

detection. The FMECA team created a 

numeric ranking criterion and 

determined and prioritized the level of 

risk posed by each failure mode. Highrisk failure modes were identified and 

appropriate mitigation strategies were 

developed to decrease the risk. 

The FMECA team analyzed the failure 

modes of all ECP brake components, 

including: CCDs with the battery; HEUs 

on the head locomotive; ECP–EOT 

devices; train line cables, 

communication and power supplies; 

power supply controllers; head end line 

terminators; car ID modules; locomotive 

ID modules; and operative brakes. The 

analysis included different types of ECP 

brake systems, including stand alone, 

overlay (dual mode), and emulator and 

all system functional requirements and 

operating modes, including 

Initialization, Switch, Run, and Cut-out. 

The FMECA failure log contained about 

1,500 failure modes. For each high-risk 

failure mode, the FMECA team 

identified action items and offered 

recommendations on how to mitigate 

the consequences of component failures 

or system functional failures. The team 

primarily examined single-point failures 

but also identified and evaluated some 

cases of combined failures that had 

significant safety consequences. 

The FMECA results confirmed that 

the ECP brake concept offers the 

potential for improved performance, 

reliability, and safety over that of 

conventional pneumatic brake systems. 

The FMECA concluded that no failure 

mode of an AAR-compliant ECP brake 

system exists that can cause a 

catastrophic accident due to singlepoint failure of the system itself. The 

AAR standards, as written, eliminate or 

mitigate critical outcomes of singlepoint failure of ECP brake systems. 

The FMECA team encouraged 

manufacturers to pursue ECP brake 

technology, because the potential safety 

and efficiency benefits will far outweigh 

any disadvantages. If designed and 

maintained properly, ECP brakes will be 

substantially safer and more reliable 

than the conventional pneumatic brake 

system they are intended to replace. 

AAR and the brake manufacturers 

indicated that they were completely 

satisfied that ECP brake systems are 

significantly safer than conventional 

pneumatic systems. They accepted the 

results of the FMECA and concluded 

that no modifications were necessary to 

the AAR standards related to ECP brake 

systems. 

VII. Market Maturity and 

Implementation 

The U.S. market for ECP brake 

systems is mature enough to begin 

implementation of ECP brake 

technology. The equipment 

manufacturers have made a significant 

investment in the technology and have 

completed the preliminary design work 

and field testing of ECP brakes. For 

instance, they have provided technical 

solutions for different ECP brake 

implementation strategies, enabling 

non-ECP and ECP brake-equipped cars 

to run in combined trains and, in some 

cases, allowing ECP brake-equipped 

freight cars to run in ECP brake mode 

using locomotives with conventional 

pneumatic brake systems. In addition, 

they are ready to supply fully 

operational stand-alone ECP brake 

systems, overlays, and emulators for the 

U.S. market, easing the industry’s 

migration process. A commitment by 

the railroad industry to change over to 

ECP brakes is necessary to inspire 

additional technological initiatives by 

the manufacturers. 

ECP brake systems from the main U.S. 

manufacturers—all in different stages of 

AAR approval and testing in revenue 

service—have been built with the 

intention of complying with the AAR S– 

4200 Series of standards, proven safe 

through field testing, designed using 

fail-safe principles, and accommodated 

the industry’s need for different 

implementation schemes. The AAR S– 

4200 Series standards are intended to 

assure the necessary level of safety, 

reliability, interoperability, and 

ultimately the applicability of this 

equipment in the U.S. market. The 

equipment of existing ECP brake 

manufacturers incorporates the 

conventional pneumatic emergency 

brake system as a backup in case of 

failure of the ECP brake control. In most 

cases, ECP brake systems will support 

enhanced safety even if the electronics 

fail, because continuous recharging of 

the brake pipe will ensure availability of 

an emergency application. Therefore, 

the ECP brake system reduces the risk 

caused by depleted air in the case of an 

emergency. There is no instance or 

record of a malfunctioning ECP brake 

system that resulted in a catastrophic or 

critical event. 

To assess the benefits and costs of 

ECP brakes for the U.S. rail freight 

industry, FRA contracted with BAH in 

2005 to conduct a study. An ECP brake 

expert panel of principal stakeholders in 

the conversion of the U.S. freight car 

fleet to ECP brake technology, including 

suppliers, railroads, private car owners, 

AAR, and FRA was assembled to 

participate in the study. The expert 

panel supported the conclusion that the 

AAR standards are sufficient for the ECP 

brake system designer to achieve a 

system safety level adequate for a safetycritical system. In particular, an AARcompliant system, while providing a 

significant increase in safety and 

efficiency, does not introduce extra risks 

associated with single-point failure of 

the ECP system itself. 


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The final BAH report provided a 

comprehensive analysis and comparison 

of ECP and conventional air brake 

systems. BAH acknowledged that while 

trains with ECP brake systems have 

been operated in North America, South 

Africa, and Australia, U.S. 

implementation has been stalled due to 

the absence of an acceptable 

implementation plan for conversion and 

hard data to support a sound economic 

analysis, limited interoperability with 

traditionally braked trains, and 

insufficient capital investment required 

for conversion. It concluded that 

although the barriers to implementation 

are formidable, ECP brake systems are 

economically and technically ripe for 

adoption and should be implemented in 

phases. BAH suggests that 

implementing ECP brakes on 2,800 

locomotives and 80,000 cars in the 

Powder River Basin (PRB) would cost 

the industry approximately $432 

million. However, according to BAH, 

the annual $157 million in anticipated 

benefits—resulting from saved fuel, 

improved wheel and brake shoe life, 

and a reduction in necessary brake 

inspections—will allow railroads to 

recover those costs in less than three 

years. To justify the investment, the 

BAH report says, conversion must be 

focused first on the high-mileage, unittrain-type services that would most 

benefit from its use. 

FRA acknowledges that BAH’s fuel 

cost estimates are underestimated due to 

subsequently rising prices. It is notable 

that BAH did not attempt to quantify 

potential savings relating to capacity 

increases or emissions decreases due to 

the difficulty in arriving at acceptable 

values. Accordingly, the report’s 

estimated internal rate of return should 

be viewed as conservative. 

VIII. Related Proceeding 

In a petition dated November 15, 

2006, and filed November 21, 2006, 

BNSF and NS jointly requested that 

FRA waive various sections in parts 229 

and 232 as it relates to those railroads’ 

operation of ECP brake pilot trains. See 

Docket No. FRA–2006–26435. The FRA 

Safety Board held a fact-finding hearing 

on this matter on January 16, 2007, 

featuring testimony from representatives 

of the petitioners, air brake 

manufacturers, and labor unions. On 

March 21, 2007, the Safety Board 

granted the petitioners’ request, in part, 

subject to various conditions designed 

to ensure that ECP brake equipped 

trains subject to the waiver will be as 

safe as trains equipped with 

conventional brakes and operated under 

the existing rules. See id. 

IX. Legal Impediments and Proposed 

Relief 

ECP brake operation provides for 

continuous electronic monitoring of the 

condition of air brake system 

components and brake pipe pressure, 

potentially limiting the need for certain 

physical brake inspections currently 

required under part 232. Accordingly, 

this final rule modifies, relaxes, and 

removes certain requirements, including 

intermediate terminal inspections 

(§§ 232.207, 232.209, and 232.211), 

single-car air brake tests (§ 232.305), and 

the required percent of operable brakes 

at initial terminal departure 

(§ 232.103(d)), as they apply to trains 

operating in ECP brake mode. The rail 

industry’s implementation of ECP 

brakes is frustrated by such inapplicable 

and inefficient statutory and regulatory 

requirements. Without a large-scale 

proliferation and implementation of 

ECP brake technologies, the industry 

will not be able to enjoy economies of 

scale and to overcome the industry-wide 

limits caused by interoperability 

problems. FRA seeks to improve market 

efficiency by providing reliable and 

suitable standards and procedures that 

will support investments in ECP brake 

technology. 

The current statutory and regulatory 

requirements, however—including 

those concerning brake inspections and 

the operation of trains with defective 

equipment—may reduce or eliminate 

incentives for railroads to implement 

new ECP brake technology and take 

advantage of its operational and safety 

benefits. For example, 49 U.S.C. 20303 

presents an obstacle to cost-saving, safe, 

and efficient long hauls promised by 

ECP brakes. To avoid incurring civil 

penalties, operators are required under 

49 U.S.C. 20303 to transport rail 

vehicles with defective or insecure 

equipment ‘‘from the place at which the 

defect or insecurity was first discovered 

to the nearest available place at which 

the repairs can be made.’’ 

The design and operation of ECP 

brakes renders strict application of the 

existing statutory movement for repair 

provision unnecessary as it will reduce 

efficiencies and may actually reduce the 

safety of such operations. When the 

defective equipment is an ECP brake, 

stopping for immediate repairs is not 

necessary. If more than 15 percent of the 

train’s AAR approved ECP brakes 

become inoperable, the train 

automatically stops. It should be noted 

that a train with 85 percent operative 

ECP brakes will still have shorter 

stopping distances than a train 

equipped with conventional pneumatic 

brakes that are 100 percent operative. 

Considering the technology’s 

continuous self-monitoring and constant 

communication with the engineer, it is 

highly unlikely that a train equipped 

with ECP brakes will ever reach such a 

level of inoperability. Further, FRA 

continues to believe that a freight train 

operated with ECP brakes may travel 

non-stop to its destination, not to 

exceed 3,500 miles, without 

intermediate brake inspections, because 

foundation brake rigging and brake 

shoes will safely operate this distance 

and redundant intermediate brake 

inspections within that distance do not 

increase ECP brake system safety. As an 

added benefit, the increased mileage 

allowance would provide for coast-tocoast travel. In the related proceeding, 

Docket No. FRA–2006–26435, FRA’s 

Safety Board granted the request of 

BNSF and NS to allow the non-stop 

movement of an ECP brake operated 

train to its destination, each not to 

exceed 3,500 miles. 

Nevertheless, 49 U.S.C. 20303 

requires trains with defective safety 

appliances, including brakes, to travel to 

the nearest location where the necessary 

repairs can be made. If the nearest 

available location is in a direction other 

than that in which the train is traveling, 

the train with defective equipment may 

be required to switch the defective car 

out of the train and add it to another 

train traveling in the direction of the 

nearest repair location, referred to as a 

‘‘backhaul.’’ ECP brake implementation 

has been complicated by the ECP brakes 

system’s technological incompatibility 

with conventional pneumatic brake 

systems. To switch a car equipped with 

ECP brakes into a technologically 

incompatible train operating with 

conventional pneumatic brakes will 

create additional safety concerns for that 

train. 

The potential risks involved in 

combining cars with incompatible 

braking systems coupled with the 

hazards normally associated in 

switching cars in the field, outweigh the 

potential harm of keeping the defective 

car in its existing ECP braked train and 

traveling to a repair location that is 

significantly further away. In 

circumstances where the defective 

safety appliance is a non-brake defect, it 

will often be safer and is certainly more 

efficient to allow ECP brake-equipped 

trains with non-brake defective 

equipment to travel to the nearest 

forward repair station. Moreover, due to 

the ability of ECP brake systems to 

continuously monitor the brakes on 

each car in a train and to provide 

specific information to the locomotive 

engineer regarding the location of any 

car with inoperative brakes and the 


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design of such systems to prohibit 

operation with less than 85 percent 

operative brakes in certain situations, 

the need to immediately set-out and 

handle cars with defective brakes for 

repair is unnecessary. There is also no 

safety need to require a railroad to incur 

the expense and delay involved with 

cutting the defective car out of the train 

or to run the safety risk of doing so. 

Currently, freight cars with defective 

mechanical conditions are permitted to 

be hauled long distances for repair. See 

49 CFR 215.9. In light of the 

technological advances provided by ECP 

brake systems, it appears logical and 

necessary to permit more flexibility in 

moving equipment with defective 

brakes when equipped with ECP brakes 

and hauled in a train operating in ECP 

brake mode. However, the language of 

49 U.S.C. 20303 prevents FRA from 

providing this flexibility. 

When drafting the proposed rule in 

this proceeding, FRA recognized that 

the aforementioned statutory 

requirements governing conventional 

pneumatic braked trains may offset the 

increased safety and efficiency benefits 

afforded by ECP brakes, thus 

eliminating the incentives for rail 

operators to implement ECP brake 

technologies. To encourage 

implementation without hindering 

safety, FRA proposed to invoke its 

discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. 

20306 to exempt ECP brake-equipped 

trains from the specific statutory 

requirements contained in 49 U.S.C. 

20303. The requirements for moving 

defective equipment were created over a 

century ago, during the infancy of 

pneumatic brakes and before all cars 

were equipped with power brakes. With 

many more reasons to stop train 

operation along tracks with frequent 

repair shops and exponentially more 

employees, the legislative drafters of 

that time could not have envisioned the 

type of safer and more efficient 

technologies available today. 

Recognizing the importance of 

upgrading rail technologies, Congress in 

1980 passed the Rock Island Railroad 

Transition and Employee Assistance Act 

(the ‘‘Rock Island Act’’), which, inter 

alia, provides statutory relief for the 

implementation of new technologies. 

More specifically, when certain 

statutory requirements preclude the 

development or implementation of more 

efficient railroad transportation 

equipment or other transportation 

innovations, the applicable section of 

the Rock Island Act, currently codified 

at 49 U.S.C. 20306, provides the 

Secretary of Transportation with the 

authority to grant an exemption to those 

requirements based on evidence 

received and findings developed at a 

hearing. 

According to Senate Report No. 96– 

614, ‘‘This section fosters rail 

technological improvements by giving 

the Federal Railroad Administration 

discretionary authority to grant 

exemptions from the Safety Appliance 

Acts’ mandatory requirements when 

those requirements preclude the 

development or implementation of new 

rail technology.’’ Senate Comm. on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

S. Rep. No. 96–614, at 8–9 (Mar. 4, 

1980) (emphases added). The House 

version of the bill includes no similar 

provision, but the Conference substitute 

adds that the authority granted FRA in 

this section must be exercised after a 

hearing, absent an agreement between 

labor representatives and the developers 

or operators of the new equipment or 

technology. Joint Explanatory Statement 

of the Committee of Conference, H. 

Conf. Rep. No. 96–1041, § 117, at 30 

(May 20, 1980). 

Under 49 CFR 1.49(v), the Federal 

Railroad Administrator is delegated 

authority to carry out the functions 

vested in the Secretary by the Rock 

Island Act. Under this authority, FRA 

held two public oral hearings in 

Washington, DC on October 4, 2007, and 

near Chicago, IL, on October 19, 2007, 

to receive evidence and develop 

findings to determine whether FRA 

should invoke 49 U.S.C. 20306. While 

FRA solicited any information that 

would bear on this decision, it also 

asked a series of questions in the NPRM 

and at the hearing designed to invoke 

discussion and gather information 

regarding the safety of moving defective 

equipment as proposed and to 

determine whether existing statutory 

provisions impede the implementation 

of the technology. 

At the hearing, the labor unions 

commented on the limitations of the 

ECP brake system’s self-monitoring 

capabilities. According to the labor 

unions, since the technology cannot 

monitor a variety of brake defects, it 

should not be relied upon to allow a 

train to operate 3,500 miles without any 

intermediate brake inspections. On the 

other hand, the railroads support the 

increase in the allowable distance of 

3,500 miles between brake inspections, 

believing the safety level of trains 

operating with ECP brakes that distance 

should equal or exceed the safety level 

of trains operating with conventional 

brakes over 1,000 miles. For the same 

reasons, some railroads even suggested 

that ECP brake operated trains be 

allowed to move 5,000 miles between 

Class I brake inspections. 

The labor unions and railroads agree 

that a conventional freight car with the 

brakes cut out is no different than an 

ECP brake-equipped car with the brakes 

cut out and that switching a defective 

ECP brake-equipped car into a 

conventionally braked train will not 

increase current safety concerns. 

However, the railroads and the labor 

unions disagree when the defect is a 

non-brake safety appliance on a car 

equipped with ECP brakes. According to 

the labor unions, if a non-brake defect 

requires the car to be set out, there is no 

difference between a train operated with 

conventional brakes and a train 

operated with ECP brakes; the car 

should be set out for repair on site or 

moved under special circumstances to 

the nearest repair point. The railroads 

believe that such cars should be left in 

the train operated with ECP brakes for 

forward movement to a location where 

ECP brake repairs can be made instead 

of being switched out and hauled in a 

different direction. Any switching, says 

the railroads, causes the switching and 

pick-up crews more risk exposure. 

The labor unions assert that the 

regulations proposed in this proceeding 

provide sufficient incentives for the 

implementation of ECP brake systems 

and that the restrictions within 49 

U.S.C. 20303 do not provide a 

disincentive for such implementation. 

The railroads, on the other hand, assert 

that strict application of 49 U.S.C. 20303 

provides a disincentive for the 

implementation and use of ECP brake 

technologies. According to the railroads, 

they are required under section 20303 to 

handle cars with defective equipment 

more times than necessary, resulting in 

lost time and revenue. The resulting 

undue and unreasonable financial 

burden and significantly negative 

financial impact on rail operations, say 

the railroads, provides no relief from the 

added expense of equipping rail cars 

with ECP brakes and is a strong 

disincentive for ECP brake system 

implementation. The railroads claim 

that eliminating the requirements under 

49 U.S.C. 20303 would provide a 

necessary and significant economic 

incentive to the widespread adoption of 

ECP braking technology in the U.S. 

Based on the comments and 

information submitted at those hearings, 

FRA has decided to invoke its 

discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. 

20306 to exempt application of 49 

U.S.C. 20303 as it applies to the 

operation of ECP brake operated freight 

trains and freight cars. FRA believes that 

application of section 20303 will clearly 

provide a disincentive towards the 

implementation of ECP brake systems, a 


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technology that promises safer operation 

of trains throughout the U.S. 

FRA is confident that this initiative is 

consistent with improving railroad 

safety. As further discussed below, 

through oversight of present train 

operations, including extended haul 

operations, FRA has observed that 

properly inspected trains can proceed 

for extended distances without loss of 

braking effort due to wear or damage to 

foundation brake rigging. FRA further 

notes that hauling of cars with defective 

safety appliances to the next forward 

point where repairs can be 

accomplished poses virtually no 

incremental risk to employees, 

particularly if defects have been 

identified and communicated to the 

crew of the train. In the great majority 

of cases, damaged or insecure safety 

appliances pose a risk only during 

switching operations, not during line 

haul movements. Indeed, back hauling 

of safety appliances introduces 

additional risk, as the car is first 

removed from one road train and then 

added to another for the reverse 

movement. 

X. Additional Issues 

A. Part 229 

In the ECP brake waiver proceeding, 

Docket No. FRA–2006–26435, BNSF 

and NS sought relief from various 

provisions of parts 229 and 232. In 

relation to part 229, BNSF and NS 

sought relief from the requirements 

relating to daily locomotive inspections 

and electronic record keeping. FRA 

sought comments and information 

whether this final rule should include 

any exceptions to part 229 for 

operations using ECP brake systems. 

No commenting party supported or 

suggested any exceptions to part 229. 

On the contrary, UTU and BLET agreed 

with the FRA’s proposal not to modify 

part 229 in this rulemaking. According 

to BLET, there is no basis for relief from 

the daily inspection or recordkeeping 

requirements of Part 229. FRA continues 

to believe that there is insufficient 

information available to consider any 

exceptions to part 229 for operations 

using ECP brake systems. Thus, under 

this rulemaking, part 229 remains 

unaffected. 

In its comments, Wabtec lists a 

number of minimum requirements that 

it proposes should be added to existing 

event recorder parameters, applicable to 

the lead locomotive when in ECP brake 

operation. BLET filed a supplemental 

response in which it responded to this 

particular filing, stating that it ‘‘cannot 

serve as a basis for FRA requirements 

pertaining to event recording of ECP 

data because of [an] omission [relating 

to the ‘ECP train brake source’ 

parameter described in UP’s 

comments].’’ The scope of this 

proceeding does not include 

information relating to event recorder 

data. The NPRM did not discuss or seek 

comments on this issue. Accordingly, 

FRA will not include in this final rule 

any modifications to the regulations 

governing event recorders, since many 

parties interested in event recorders 

would not have been put on notice that 

the issue was being raised. FRA believes 

that these issues would best be resolved 

in a separate proceeding concerning part 

229. 

B. Dynamic Brake Requirements 

At the public hearing conducted in 

relation to the waiver proceeding, BNSF 

requested relief from some of the 

dynamic brake requirements contained 

in 49 CFR part 232. On this issue, FRA 

only received comments from BLET, 

which indicated that relief relating to 

dynamic brake requirement is not 

necessary as it applies to ECP brake 

systems. According to BLET, it would 

be unwise and unsafe to further erode 

braking capacity by diluting the existing 

dynamic brake requirements. 

FRA remains unsure of what specific 

relief BNSF requested regarding 

dynamic brakes. Section 232.109 

provides for the continued operation of 

a locomotive found with inoperative 

dynamic brakes for a period of up to 30 

calendar days. It appears that railroads 

will continue to require locomotive 

engineers to rely on extended range 

dynamic brakes where they sufficiently 

control the braking effort without 

introducing excessive buff forces. 

Locomotive engineers will need to know 

what level of braking effort is available, 

particularly in extreme cases operating 

over territory with significantly 

descending grades. Otherwise, an 

engineer may lose control of the train 

due to brake fade when the speed 

precludes a timely application of the 

automatic brake due to insufficient 

dynamic brake capacity. FRA recognizes 

that this scenario is much less likely to 

occur with availability of ECP braking, 

but that does not mean it could not 

occur. FRA continues to believe that 

more flexibility in this area is not 

necessary and declines to make any 

such modifications in this final rule. 

C. Single Car Air Brake Test Approval 

Procedures and Single Car Air Brake 

Tests 

The NPRM included a provision 

requiring the submission and approval 

of single car air brake test procedures for 

cars with ECP brake systems in 

accordance with the special approval 

procedures in § 232.17. FRA also 

reserved the right to modify § 232.17 to 

make clear the applicability of proposed 

subpart G, including, but not limited to, 

adding cross-references. 

Section 232.305(a) provides that a 

single car air brake test may be 

performed partially in accordance with 

‘‘Section 4.0, ‘Special Tests,’ of the 

Association of American Railroads 

Standard S–486–01, ‘Code of Air Brake 

System Tests for Freight Equipment,’ 

contained in the AAR Manual of 

Standards and Recommended Practices, 

Section E (January 1, 2001).’’ That 

standard has since been amended and 

FRA has approved the use of the new 

Standard S–486–04 as the procedure to 

use when performing a single car air 

brake test. Accordingly, FRA proposed 

to amend § 232.305(a) by replacing the 

directly preceding quoted text with the 

following: ‘‘Section 4.0, ‘Special Tests,’ 

of the Association of American 

Railroads Standard S–486–04, ‘Code of 

Air Brake System Tests for Freight 

Equipment,’ contained in the AAR 

Manual of Standards and 

Recommended Practices, Section E 

(January 1, 2004).’’ 

BLET submitted comments 

supporting FRA’s proposed 

amendments to sections 232.17 and 

232.305(a). No other comments were 

filed on these issues. Consequently, the 

final rule amends §§ 232.17 and 

232.305(a). 

D. Train Handling Information 

Section 232.111 requires railroads to 

adopt and comply with written 

procedures ensuring that railroad train 

crews receiving trains are provided 

accurate information concerning each 

train’s condition. The continuous 

monitoring capabilities of ECP brake 

systems provide information regarding 

the location of equipment with 

inoperative or cut out brakes. BLET 

commented that none of the information 

provided by the ECP brake system 

appears to satisfy the requirements of 

232.111(b) and that it agrees with FRA 

that there is no reason for excepting any 

portion of or provision contained in 

§ 232.111. 

FRA continues to see no reason to 

excepting any portion of or provision 

contained in § 232.111. FRA continues 

to believe that, if anything, ECP brake 

systems’ continuous monitoring 

capabilities will assist railroads in 

complying with the train handling 

information rules in § 232.111 by 

monitoring defects and potentially 

allowing for the manual input of defects 

not monitored electronically and then 


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electronically providing such 

information to subsequent train crews. 

E. Piston Travel Limits 

For cars equipped with 81⁄2-inch or 

10-inch diameter brake cylinders 

receiving either a Class I brake test or a 

periodic inspection while on a shop or 

repair track, §§ 232.205(c)(5) and 

232.303(c) currently limit piston travel 

to 7 to 9 inches. An industry-wide 

waiver currently in effect, however, 

permits piston travel limits to range 

from 6 to 9 inches on these types of 

cylinders. In the NPRM, FRA proposed 

the incorporation of that waiver into the 

rules by amending §§ 232.205(c)(5) and 

232.303(c) accordingly. 

BLET, Wabtec, and NYAB concur 

with FRA’s proposal to incorporate the 

current, industry-wide waiver 

permitting piston travel limits to range 

from 6 to 9 inches by amending sections 

232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c). Similarly, 

AAR states that there is no reason to 

refrain from incorporating the industrywide waiver in the regulations. 

Consequently, this final rule amends 

sections 232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c) by 

revising the piston travel range limit of 

7 to 9 inches to a range limit of 6 to 9 

inches. 

F. Extended Haul Trains 

Section 232.213(a)(6) requires 

inbound inspections for extended haul 

trains and states that, ‘‘After April 1, 

2007, the inbound inspection described 

in this paragraph shall not be required 

unless FRA provides notification to the 

industry extending the requirement to 

perform inbound inspections on 

extended haul trains.’’ Section 

232.213(a)(7) requires railroads to 

maintain a record of all defective, 

inoperative, or ineffective brakes and all 

conditions not in compliance with parts 

215 and 231 discovered during train 

movement. In addition, that section says 

that, ‘‘After April 1, 2007, the records 

described in this paragraph need not be 

maintained unless FRA provides the 

notification required in paragraph (a)(6) 

of this section extending the 

requirement to conduct inbound 

inspections on extended haul trains.’’ 

In the NPRM, FRA proposed to amend 

Part 232 by deleting §§ 232.213(a)(6) 

and (a)(7) from the regulations. These 

regulations ‘‘sunsetted’’ on April 1, 

2007, without further FRA action. Since 

this proposal remains uncontested and 

the ‘‘sunsetted’’ provisions serve no 

purpose by remaining in the CFR, the 

final rule deletes § 232.213(a)(6) and 

(a)(7). 

G. Part 238 

Amtrak informally expressed interest 

in potentially using ECP brake system 

technology for its Auto Train that runs 

from Lorton, Virginia to Sanford, 

Florida. Amtrak previously employed 

overlay ECP braking on that train, and 

presumably would benefit from some 

additional flexibility with respect to the 

conduct of intermediate inspections. 

However, since FRA does not currently 

have sufficient information regarding 

the use of ECP brake systems on 

passenger trains and passenger 

equipment, FRA did not propose any 

amendment to 49 CFR part 238. FRA 

continues to believe that the functions 

of freight and passenger trains and cars, 

evidenced by the varied rules applicable 

to each, are too disparate to provide a 

one-size-fits-all solution for ECP brake 

integration and use. 

In the NPRM, FRA stated that it may 

consider Part 238’s applicability to ECP 

brake systems in another rulemaking or 

in other proceedings and would 

consider requests for waivers relating to 

the regulation of freight trains and 

freight cars equipped with ECP brake 

systems for passenger trains on a caseby-case basis. BLET agrees that the issue 

of ECP brakes and Part 238 should be 

addressed in a separate rulemaking. For 

this reason, BLET does not believe that 

it is appropriate for FRA to regulate ECP 

brakes on passenger trains via the 

waiver process or on a case-by-case 

basis. 

FRA continues to believe that any 

regulations affecting the implementation 

and use of ECP brake systems on 

passenger trains are better left for a 

separate rulemaking proceeding relating 

to Part 238. FRA will also consider 

requests for waivers for such 

implementation and use on passenger 

trains. Although BLET expresses its 

opinion that a rulemaking would be a 

better venue for permitting the 

implementation and use of ECP brake 

systems on passenger trains, it provides 

no reasons why it would not be prudent 

to allow for the use of waivers to 

achieve similar goals. 

XI. Section-by-Section Analysis 

49 CFR Part 232 

Unless otherwise noted, all section 

references below refer to sections in title 

49 of the Code of Federal Regulations 

(CFR). FRA sought comments on all 

proposals made in the NPRM to this 

proceeding. 

Subpart A—General 

This subpart contains amendments to 

the definitions listed in subpart A of 

part 232. 

Section 232.5 Definitions 

In the NPRM, FRA proposed the 

amendment of section 232.5 by adding 

an extensive set of definitions to 

introduce the regulatory relief and 

regulations applicable to ECP brake 

systems. FRA worded these definitions 

to mirror, to the extent possible, the 

definitions provided in existing AAR 

standards. FRA intends these 

definitions to clarify the meaning of 

important terms that are used in the text 

of the proposed rule. The definitions are 

carefully worded in an attempt to 

minimize the potential for 

misinterpretation of the rule. Some of 

the definitions introduce new concepts 

or new technologies. 

These new definitions acknowledge 

the two general types of ECP brake 

systems—dual mode and stand-alone. 

The definition of a dual mode ECP brake 

system, which means a brake system 

that can work either as a conventional 

pneumatic brake system or an ECP brake 

system, intends to cover both an overlay 

ECP brake system and an ECP brake 

system equipped with an emulator CCD. 

The definition of CCD is intended to 

describe an important and necessary 

part of ECP brake system technology. 

FRA did not receive any comments on 

the proposed definitions. Consequently, 

except for reasons set forth below, the 

final rule retains the definitions as 

proposed. 

Subpart G—Electronically Controlled 

Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems 

FRA is adding a new subpart G to part 

232. The new subpart contains various 

design and operational requirements 

that provide both regulatory relief and 

regulatory modification to allow 

implementation of ECP brake systems 

on the Nation’s railroads and to ensure 

the safety of such operations. 

Section 232.601 Scope 

This section contains a formal 

statement of the final rule’s purpose and 

scope. The final rule contains specific 

requirements relating to the operation of 

freight trains and freight cars equipped 

with ECP brake systems and operating 

in ECP brake mode. The final rule also 

provides specific exceptions from 

various requirements contained in part 

232 for ECP brake-equipped freight 

trains and freight cars. 

Section 232.602 Applicability 

As a general matter, this section 

makes clear that these rules apply to all 

railroads that operate freight trains or 

freight cars equipped with ECP brakes 

on track which is part of the general 

railroad system of transportation. The 

final rule applies to freight trains 


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operating in ECP brake mode, freight 

cars equipped with ECP brake systems, 

and conventionally braked freight trains 

and freight cars when operated in 

conjunction with ECP brake equipment. 

The regulatory relief provided in the 

final rule and the need to ensure the 

safe operation of trains and vehicles 

equipped with this advanced 

technology requires that exception of 

certain existing part 232 provisions be 

afforded. Many of the provisions that 

the final rule excepts either apply 

awkwardly or should otherwise not 

apply to ECP brake systems due to the 

new technology’s design or additional 

safety benefits. Similarly, the addition 

of various requirements directly related 

to ECP brake systems is necessary to 

ensure that the equipment is properly 

designed, inspected, tested, maintained, 

and safe to operate. 

To fulfill these goals and to avoid an 

excess of confusing cross-references, 

this final rule excepts specific 

provisions and an entire subpart of part 

232 from application to ECP brake 

systems. Each section of subpart G 

contains specific exceptions from 

various provisions contained in other 

portions of part 232 or contain 

appropriately rewritten provisions 

directly applicable to ECP brake 

systems. Those portions and sections of 

part 232 not specifically excepted by 

this final rule remain applicable to ECP 

brake-equipped freight trains and freight 

cars. 

Section 232.603 Design, 

Interoperability, and Configuration 

Management Requirements 

In order to ensure the safety and 

interoperability of ECP brake systems, 

this section incorporates by reference 

the existing AAR standards and 

approval procedures for ECP brake 

systems. The AAR, its member 

railroads, and various brake 

manufacturers have invested 

considerable time and effort in 

developing the identified industry 

standards addressing the design, 

performance, and interoperability of 

ECP brake systems. FRA has reviewed 

the industry standards it intended to 

incorporate by reference in this final 

rule and has determined that the 

standards effectively address and ensure 

the safe and proper operation of the 

brake system technology. As noted 

previously in this preamble, FRA 

funded a FMECA, which validated the 

safety and applicability of AAR’s ECP 

brake system standards for freight 

railroads. 

FRA believes that compliance with 

the AAR standards identified in 

paragraph (a) will ensure the safety and 

efficiency of freight trains and freight 

cars equipped with ECP brakes. 

Implementation of ECP braking systems 

complying with these standards will 

bring benefits and efficiencies 

encompassing train handling, car 

maintenance, fuel savings, network 

capacity, self-monitoring, fail-safe 

operation, accurate and instantaneous 

brake commands throughout the train, 

and continuous, real-time selfdiagnostics. Paragraph (a) requires all 

manufacturers to meet existing AAR 

standards when developing and 

installing ECP brake systems. 

Paragraph (a) incorporates the most 

recent AAR standards related to ECP 

brake systems. FRA recognizes that ECP 

brake systems are a growing technology 

and realizes that the existing AAR 

standards may need to change as the 

technology advances. Accordingly, this 

final rule includes two methods by 

which the incorporated industry 

standards may be changed. Paragraph 

(a) permits the submission of an 

alternate standard under the special 

approval procedures contained in 

§ 232.17. In addition, paragraph (f) 

permits the AAR or other authorized 

representative of the railroad industry to 

seek modification of the approved 

industry standards through the 

modification procedures contained in 

§ 232.307. Only the party that initially 

submits a standard approved by FRA 

pursuant to paragraph (a) may 

subsequently seek modification of that 

standard under paragraph (f). For 

instance, only AAR may seek 

modification of its own AAR S–4200 

Series Standards already incorporated 

by reference into this final rule. If 

another authorized representative of the 

railroad industry submits an alternative 

standard under paragraph (a) and 

pursuant to § 232.17, then only that 

representative may seek modification of 

their alternate standard under paragraph 

(f). 

The modification procedures in 

§ 232.307 were developed to permit 

modification of the other incorporated 

AAR standards and FRA believes that 

the procedures are equally applicable to 

the regulations contained in this final 

rule. The industry has successfully 

utilized both these methods to change or 

modify industry standards incorporated 

in part 232 and FRA believes it is 

appropriate and necessary to provide 

this latitude for the standards related to 

ECP brake systems and components. 

BLET filed comments supporting 

§ 232.603(a) and (f) to utilize the 

alternate standards of § 232.17 and the 

modification procedures of § 232.307, 

respectively. GE requests that an 

exception be granted to certain standalone ECP brake systems in 

§ 232.603(a)(1)–(6). We will address 

GE’s comments below when providing 

analysis of § 232.603(e). 

FRA recognizes that while most of the 

S–4200 Series apply technical standards 

concerning the mechanical attributes 

and capabilities of ECP brake systems, 

S–4240 and S–4270 delegate additional 

responsibilities to those manufacturing, 

implementing, and using ECP brakes 

and have been the subject of various 

comments filed in this proceeding. 

Thus, FRA believes they require further 

discussion. 

FRA has reviewed the approval 

procedures contained in AAR Standard 

S–4240 and believes that they provide 

an appropriate review process to ensure 

the safe and proper operation of ECP 

brake systems. FRA believes that AAR is 

in the best position to approve those 

ECP brake systems that will be used by 

its member railroads and, over time, 

other non-member railroads 

interchanging traffic on the general rail 

system. FRA does not intend this 

section to necessarily preclude the 

introduction and acceptance of 

alterative standards subsequently 

approved in accordance with the rules. 

FRA recognizes, however, that 

enforcement of S–4240 against the 

railroads would be difficult without 

additional regulatory language. 

Accordingly, paragraph (b) requires that 

all ECP brake systems developed under 

the AAR standards incorporated by 

reference in paragraph (a) receive 

conditional or final approval under 

AAR Standard S–4240 prior to use and 

that they maintain such approval while 

in use. In this paragraph, FRA prohibits 

the use of ECP brake systems developed 

under the AAR standards incorporated 

in paragraph (a) that do not receive 

conditional or final AAR approval or 

that cease to comply with the 

incorporated AAR standards relating to 

ECP brake systems. 

BLET filed comments stating that it 

does not oppose paragraph (b). 

However, BLET believes that FRA’s 

Railroad Safety Board should review 

petitions for conditional approval via 

the waiver process. FRA does not 

believe this level of scrutiny is 

necessary at this time. Under 232.103(l), 

all conventional brake systems must 

comply with AAR Standard S–469–47. 

Compliance with this standard is 

determined by the AAR brake 

committee, subject to FRA technical 

oversight. There are no more specific 

FRA requirements for these systems. For 

similar reasons, FRA is incorporating 

into the final rule the appropriate ECP 

brake standards. FRA has successfully 

relied on AAR for approving 


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conventional brake standards and there 

is nothing suggesting why FRA should 

perform a materially different approval 

process oversight role for the ECP brake 

standards. For the purposes of this 

rulemaking, FRA has closely reviewed 

and scrutinized the ECP brake design 

standards adopted by AAR. FRA also 

funded and participated in a FMECA 

analysis of the S–4200 series standards. 

We feel confident relying on AAR’s 

approval process. Just like FRA enforces 

Standard S–469–47 after a system is 

introduced into service, FRA will 

equally enforce the S–4200 series 

standards on trains in service with ECP 

brake systems. 

In paragraph (a), FRA also requires 

that all ECP brake systems meet the 

configuration management requirements 

contained in an industry recognized, 

FRA approved standard such as AAR 

Standard S–4270. FRA believes that 

configuration management of ECP brake 

system hardware and software 

components is an absolute requirement 

to ensure the interchangeability, 

interoperability, compatibility and 

continued proper and safe operation of 

ECP brake systems. Compatibility of 

ECP hardware and software will have a 

direct affect on the safety and reliability 

of ECP brake systems running on the 

Nation’s railroads. 

In the NPRM, FRA cautioned that the 

limited configuration management plan 

requirements in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of 

AAR Standard S–4240 may not have 

been sufficiently robust to adequately 

control ECP brake system components. 

The more recently developed AAR 

Standard S–4270 eliminates this 

shortcoming by adequately addressing 

issues relating to configuration 

management, including a sufficient set 

of requirements that properly allocate 

the responsible party and necessary 

procedures to be followed by this party 

to assure proper management of ECP 

brake system software and hardware 

configurations. 

The AAR approval process and Air 

Brake Systems Committee requires 

various procedures to ensure the 

interoperability and interchangeability 

of AAR-approved ECP brake systems 

and their components. These same 

requirements and procedures have been 

used for many years to successfully 

manage the configuration of 

conventional pneumatic AAR approved 

air brake valves. Therefore, FRA 

believes that responsibility for the 

configuration management of AARapproved brake systems and their 

components should continue to reside 

with AAR and its Air Brake Systems 

Committee. 

As discussed above, FRA has 

reviewed and approved AAR Standard 

S–4270 and has determined that the 

standard should be incorporated by 

reference into this final rule. In a notice 

issued on April 18, 2008, FRA sought 

comments and concerns on AAR 

Standard S–4270, which at that time 

was in draft form, and indicated that it 

would consider inclusion of the final 

draft if it was timely adopted with no 

substantial changes. 73 FR 21092, 94 

(Apr. 18, 2008). AAR adopted and 

implemented Standard S–4270 on April 

30, 2008, without any changes from the 

draft referenced in FRA’s public notice 

dated April 18, 2008, and placed in the 

docket to this proceeding on April 21, 

2008. 

Since the NPRM was issued prior to 

the development of an acceptable 

configuration management plan 

standard, paragraph (c) as proposed 

included language delineating 

minimum requirements for acceptance 

of a subsequently submitted 

configuration management plan 

standard. Since paragraph (a) 

incorporates by reference AAR Standard 

S–4270 and provides for the submission 

of alternative standards under § 232.17, 

the extraneous text of proposed 

paragraph (c) has been removed from 

the final rule. However, FRA continues 

to believe that alternative configuration 

management plans must maintain the 

same minimum standards. More 

specifically, to receive approval in 

accordance with § 232.17, a 

configuration management plan must be 

structured in accordance with accepted 

configuration management standards 

and define all of the purposes, 

procedures, organizational 

responsibilities, and tools to be used for 

ECP brake system hardware and 

software configuration management 

including: The purpose and scope of the 

application; control activities to be 

performed; responsibilities and 

authorities for accomplishing the 

activities; implementation schedules; 

tools and resources for executing the 

plan; and periodic updating of the plan 

to maintain currency. 

In the NPRM, FRA suggested that any 

submitted alternate configuration 

management plan be structured in 

accordance with accepted configuration 

management standards such as IEEE Std 

28–1990, IEEE Standard for Software 

Configuration Management Plans, 

American National Standards Institute, 

1990; or IEEE Std 1042–1987, IEEE 

Guide to Software Configuration 

Management, American National 

Standards Institute, 1987. The brake 

manufacturers, however, argue that 

these IEEE standards are not considered 

appropriate or necessary for achieving 

adequate configuration management 

control for ECP brake systems. Despite 

their promise to recommend 

alternatives, nothing on this issue was 

subsequently filed. 

The NPRM’s references to the various 

aforementioned IEEE standards were 

provided for use by the railroads in the 

event that AAR did not develop its own 

configuration management standard. As 

previously mentioned, AAR issued a 

configuration management standard, S– 

4270, subsequent to the initial comment 

period in this proceeding. FRA 

understands the brake manufacturers to 

mean that some items specified in the 

IEEE standards may not be applicable 

because they are superseded by the 

more restrictive standards and processes 

developed by the brake manufacturers. 

While FRA concedes that this may be 

true, it does not speak to the overall 

applicability of the IEEE standards to 

any alternate configuration management 

plan that might be submitted by any 

other party. FRA expects all 

configuration management plans to be 

tailored to the requirements of accepted 

IEEE standards or a more restrictive, 

proprietary, or industry-specific 

standard has been developed and 

implemented. FRA believes AAR 

Standard S–4270 complies with the 

latter expectation. 

FRA continues to believe that any 

ECP brake configuration management 

plan should consider issues beyond 

initial approval. For instance, use of 

improper or out-of-date software 

versions for microprocessor controlled 

systems has been an issue in a variety 

of industries. Therefore, FRA continues 

to caution that any alternate 

configuration management plan should 

be sufficiently robust to adequately 

control ECP brake system components, 

especially as more manufacturers apply 

for AAR approval of ECP brake systems. 

Further, safety or reliability issues may 

dictate that hardware or software 

configurations be changed once ECP 

brake systems are put in service on a 

large scale in the U.S. FRA continues to 

encourage AAR, railroads, and 

manufacturers to ensure their ability to 

continually monitor and respond to 

hardware and software issues affecting 

ECP brake systems after initial approval. 

FRA continues to believe that AAR is 

capable of setting appropriate 

configuration management standards 

and related approval procedures and 

FRA intends to rely on AAR to monitor 

ECP brake component approval, 

configuration and compatibility for 

systems designed and approved under 

its standards incorporated herein. 

However, FRA, in its federal oversight 


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61526 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

role, will continue to monitor the 

activities of the Air Brake Systems 

Committee and the AAR ECP brake 

approval process to ensure that any 

safety or reliability issues that may 

emerge are addressed promptly and 

comprehensively. FRA will also issue 

additional configuration management 

requirements for the operation of ECP 

brake systems if, in the sole opinion of 

the FRA, the oversight of the AAR and 

the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee 

proves inadequate for the continued safe 

operation of ECP brake systems. In this 

case, FRA may take a variety of 

approaches including requiring 

railroads and car owners to develop 

their own configuration management 

plans for monitoring ECP brake system 

interchangeability, interoperability and 

compatibility. 

In relation to the issue of ECP brake 

system configuration management 

plans, FRA received comments from 

BLET at the public hearing and written 

comments in response to FRA’s notice 

seeking comment on AAR Standard S– 

4270. At the hearing, BLET stated that 

configuration management plans must 

conform to the requirements of part 236, 

subpart H. According to BLET, ‘‘There 

is a strong likelihood that the majority 

of the routes over which ECP will be 

deployed also will see the 

implementation of positive train control 

(‘PTC’). Given the manner in which PTC 

will enforce speeds and authorities, the 

ECP head-end unit and its associated 

appurtenances will become a core 

element of the PTC system.’’ In its 

written comments, BLET added, ‘‘We 

continue to believe that—to the extent 

ECP-equipped trains operate on routes 

where PTC has been or will be 

installed—the ECP technology is a 

processor-based train control system. 

Braking algorithms for speed and 

authority enforcement for ECP-equipped 

trains will differ significantly from those 

utilized for conventionally-braked 

trains.’’ 

FRA understands BLET’s contention 

to be that, if an ECP brake system ‘‘is 

considered a core element of PTC 

system’’ or ‘‘is considered a train control 

system,’’ then it must comply with the 

configuration management requirements 

contained in Part 236, Subpart H, 

905(b)(4). While FRA acknowledges the 

importance of configuration 

management, it does not agree that ECP 

brake systems must conform to the 

requirements of part 236, subpart H. 

Although ECP brakes may have a 

significant impact on the safety case 

prepared under subpart H of part 236 for 

train control systems, FRA does not 

consider the brake system, standing 

alone, to constitute a train control 

system. 

The current implementation of ECP 

brake technology and processor based 

train control technology are two 

independent industry initiatives. FRA 

recognizes the potential for the future 

use of both technologies onboard a 

single locomotive and FRA looks 

forward to such integration. Of course, 

operations that contemplate using both 

PTC and ECP brakes in a common 

operation must include the ECP brake 

system as an integral part of the Product 

Safety Plan for the train control system. 

While the ECP brake system itself is not 

subject to subpart H of part 236, ECP 

brakes may not be utilized with 

processor based train control systems 

until the impact on their use has been 

included in the required analysis of the 

train control system under subpart H of 

part 236 and that analysis has been 

approved by FRA. Given the superior 

characteristics of ECP brake systems, 

and assuming straightforward 

integration with new train control 

systems, the use of ECP braking should 

be helpful in the formulation of 

persuasive safety case documents. 

FRA acknowledges BLET’s concern 

that ‘‘AAR’s proposed S–4270 Standard 

is materially inferior to the other S–4200 

standards,’’ and their strong 

recommendation to FRA to insist on 

‘‘(1) the use of identified, scientificallyproven configuration management 

plans, and (2) the delineation of ‘bright 

line’ triggers governing the urgency with 

which hardware and/or software 

changes must be made.’’ FRA further 

acknowledges BLET’s concern regarding 

‘‘[delegation] to AAR’s Air Brake System 

Committee oversight of [ECP brake] 

product approval, implementation, and 

operations.’’ 

In the NPRM, FRA recommended the 

use of acceptable IEEE software 

configuration management standards 

such as IEEE–828 and IEEE–1042 for the 

development of ECP brake system 

configuration management plans. 72 FR 

50820, 50831 (Sept. 4, 2007). As BLET 

notes, neither of these standards are 

referenced in the proposed AAR S–4270 

standard, and the proposed standard 

passes the responsibility to develop and 

maintain the configuration management 

plan for the ECP brake product to the 

manufacturers. FRA, however, does not 

believe that such actions are 

inconsistent with either IEEE–828 or 

IEEE–1042, since both standards 

provide for and encourage tailoring 

appropriate to individual products and 

the system developers’ operational 

needs. For example, IEEE–828 makes 

the following provisions: 

This standard permits significant flexibility 

in preparing an SCM Plan. A successful Plan 

reflects its project environment. It should be 

written in terms familiar to its users and 

should be consistent with the development 

and procurement processes of the project. To 

conform to the requirements set forth in other 

applicable standards or to accommodate local 

practices, a Plan may be tailored upward, to 

add information, or tailored to use a specified 

format. The Plan may also be tailored 

downward, omitting information required by 

this standard, when specific standard 

requirements are identified as not applicable 

to this project. * * * The information may be 

presented in the Plan in any sequence or 

presentation style deemed suitable for the 

Plans users. 

Similarly, IEEE–1042 states: 

The application (and thus the planning) of 

SCM is very sensitive to the context of the 

project and the organization being served. If 

SCM is applied as a corporate policy, it must 

not be done blindly, but rather should be 

done in such a way that the details of a 

particular SCM application are reexamined 

for each project (or phase for very large 

projects). It must take into consideration the 

size, complexity, and criticality of the 

software system being managed, and the 

number of individuals, amount of personnel 

turnover, and organizational form and 

structure that have to interface during the life 

of the software system being managed. 

The AAR S–4720 standard, particularly 

in § 3.3.2, outlines the main 

requirements to the ECP brake system 

configuration management plan that are 

common to the requirements of the IEEE 

and other standards referenced in the 

NPRM. Section 3.3.2 additionally 

requires that ‘‘the manufacturer shall 

maintain a readily retrievable record of 

all software and hardware changes and 

make that record available to the AAR 

and FRA at any time.’’ In any event, the 

NPRM merely stated that FRA expected 

any configuration management plan to 

conform to an accepted standard; the 

IEEE standards referenced were simply 

provided as acceptable examples. 

FRA would also like to address 

BLET’s concern regarding the 

‘‘delineation of ‘triggers’ governing the 

urgency of the software/hardware 

changes implementation.’’ FRA has 

reviewed industry practice regarding 

software changes and has determined 

that the levels contained in AAR 

Standard S–4270 are consistent with the 

IEEE 1044 and 1044.1. These standards 

differentiate the urgency of software and 

hardware implementation schedules in 

order to assure gradual implementation 

without significantly affecting 

operations. FRA considers the use of the 

three levels of software and hardware 

implementation strategy given in § 3.6 

of S–4270 as reasonable and practically 

justified. 


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To further assure and enforce 

compliance of the ECP brake 

manufacturers’ configuration 

management plans with the final rule 

and appropriate standards, FRA makes 

vendor and railroad compliance with S– 

4270 a regulatory mandate subject to 

regulatory oversight in paragraph (c) of 

this section in the final rule. AAR 

Standard S–4270 places the 

responsibility for configuration 

management on the brake 

manufacturers. Paragraph (c) of this 

section, however, requires the railroads 

implementing and using ECP brake 

technology to ensure that the brake 

manufacturers’ configuration 

management plans comply with the 

existing applicable standards. FRA 

believes that the users of rail 

technologies are ultimately responsible 

for their safe use. 

Paragraph (c) also provides for 

regulatory oversight of configuration 

management plans, which could 

include a review of the manufacturer’s 

commitment and adherence to the 

general requirements of accepted or 

scientifically proven configuration 

management plans. Based on the 

allowances for customization of the 

configuration management standards to 

support a specific vendor’s mode of 

operation, and the inclusion of FRA 

regulatory oversight to ensure that 

vendor’s standards are appropriate, FRA 

considers the content of S–4270 

standard sufficient to be incorporated by 

reference in this final rule. 

Paragraph (d), of this section excepts 

a freight car or freight train equipped 

with ECP brakes from certain existing 

provisions contained in part 232. FRA 

recognizes that part 232 requires 

compliance with other AAR standards 

not applicable to ECP brake systems. For 

instance, section 232.103(l) requires 

compliance with AAR Standard S–469– 

47 (‘‘Performance Specification for 

Freight Brakes’’), which specifies a 

train’s air brakes must respond to the 

decrease and increase of brake pipe 

pressure. However, ECP brake systems 

respond to an electronic signal, not 

brake pipe pressure, rendering S–469– 

47 inapplicable to ECP brake systems. 

Accordingly, paragraph (d) excepts ECP 

brake systems from the requirements of 

AAR Standard S–469–47. 

In addition, GE requests that an 

exception be granted to certain standalone ECP brake systems to the AAR 

standards referenced in § 232.603(a)(1)– 

(6), where a suitable justification is 

provided. To this end, GE supplied 

proposed language to be inserted in a 

new paragraph of the final rule. While 

FRA agrees that the rules should 

provide for alternative standards, such 

flexibility is already provided in the 

introductory text to paragraph (a) of this 

section. If GE or any other potential 

brake manufacturer seeks to enter the 

marketplace with ECP brakes relying on 

standards other than AAR’s, then it may 

submit alternative standards for FRA 

approval pursuant to § 232.17. 

Accordingly, a new paragraph providing 

for exception from the incorporated 

AAR standards under suitable 

justification is unnecessary. 

Moreover, paragraph (e), provides 

further flexibility for the introduction of 

new technologies by providing for the 

possible exceptions from the 

requirements of subpart F of this part. 

BLET objects to exempting railroad 

operators from the requirements of 

subpart F. According to BLET, the prerevenue service acceptance testing plan 

requirements set forth in subpart F 

provide data and other information that 

is necessary in order to safely regulate 

the technology. BLET also asserts that 

‘‘FRA does not propose that an 

exception be granted if testing or 

demonstration is conducted pursuant to 

an AAR standard that has been 

incorporated by reference after being 

subject to public review and comment. 

Rather, FRA proposes a lower 

requirement, that the testing/ 

demonstration standard only be FRArecognized.’’ (Emphasis removed.) 

Subpart F of part 232 contains general 

requirements for introducing new brake 

system technologies. More specifically, 

it requires a pre-revenue acceptance 

testing plan. As FRA views existing ECP 

brake system technology to be a fully 

mature and well-tested technology, FRA 

disagrees with BLET on this issue and 

does not believe the provisions 

contained in subpart F are applicable to 

this existing technology. When subpart 

F was originally added to part 232, ECP 

brake technology was just beginning to 

gain prominence. Since that time, 

experience with the technology is far 

more developed and the technology is 

being used on many different trains 

around the world. Moreover, FRA 

believes that requiring ECP brake 

systems to initially and continually 

comply with a FRA approved standard 

and to be approved in accordance with 

AAR’s approval procedures prior to 

being placed in service obviates the 

need for existing ECP brake system 

technology to comply with the 

requirements under subpart F. 

Accordingly, paragraph (d)(2) provides 

for an exception from the requirements 

contained in subpart F freight trains and 

freight cars equipped with existing ECP 

brake system technology that has been 

conditionally or finally approved by 

AAR in accordance with its approval 

procedures prior to the effective date of 

the final rule in this proceeding. FRA 

has limited the exception to ECP brake 

system technologies approved by AAR 

as of the effective date of a final rule to 

provide an incentive to the industry to 

move the introduction of the technology 

along in a timely fashion. 

In anticipation of future ECP brake 

technologies not currently contemplated 

within the scope of the incorporated 

AAR standards or not approved by AAR 

prior to the effective date of a final rule 

in this proceeding, paragraph (e) 

provides a procedure for introducing 

such technologies without going 

through the pre-revenue testing 

procedures contained in subpart F. 

Paragraph (e) permits a party interested 

in using new ECP brake system 

technologies or using an ECP brake 

system technology not approved by 

AAR prior to the effective date of the 

final rule in this matter to file a written 

request with the FRA seeking an 

exception from subpart F. FRA would 

expect any such request to include a 

comprehensive narrative statement and 

any evidence or facts justifying the 

exception of the new ECP brake 

technology from the testing and 

demonstration requirements of subpart 

F. The material should fully explain the 

testing or demonstration that will be 

conducted pursuant to an FRArecognized industry standard and 

ensure that FRA is able to monitor such 

testing or demonstration. FRA’s 

Associate Administrator may revoke the 

exception in writing for any reason after 

providing an opportunity for the 

affected party or parties to respond. 

GE supports the adoption of proposed 

§ 232.603(e), but recommends that ‘‘FRA 

clarify that ‘new technology’ does not 

include functionally equivalent 

replacement components, consistent 

with past practice.’’ To this end, GE 

suggests adding a ‘‘new technology’’ 

definition to part 232, clarifying this 

interpretation in the preamble to the 

final rule, or including some additional 

clarifying language to paragraph (e), 

indicating that in lieu of an FRA 

recognized industry standard, testing or 

demonstration of new technologies 

should be performed in an environment 

with a safety equivalent to that in 

paragraph (a). 

Subpart F, as indicated in § 232.501, 

already addresses the issue of new 

technology. FRA intends subpart F to 

continue to apply to the introduction of 

new ECP brake technologies. However, 

as previously mentioned, the purpose of 

paragraph (e) is to provide a more 

liberal alternative to subpart F for the 

demonstration and testing of new ECP 

brake technologies subject to the 


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discretion of the Associate 

Administrator on a case-by-case basis. 

GE’s suggestion that the final rule 

include language requiring some type of 

adherence to an FRA approved ECP 

brake design standard misses the mark, 

since demonstration and testing may 

occur before any determination on 

design standards. Chronologically 

speaking, new ECP brake technologies 

can be tested and demonstrated under 

paragraph (e) ‘‘right out of the box.’’ 

Then, if the testing or demonstration 

results in an ECP brake technology 

worthy of use in revenue service, the 

manufacturer of that technology may 

need to apply for FRA approval of that 

technology’s new design standard under 

paragraph (a) or (f). It appears that GE 

may have mixed apples (testing and 

demonstration) with oranges 

(subsequently seeking FRA approval or 

new alternative design standards). 

During the testing and demonstration 

phase, design standards may not even 

be contemplated. 

Section 232.605 Training 

Requirements 

The general training requirements for 

railroad and contractor employees 

performing the inspection, testing, and 

maintenance on brake systems under 

this part are contained in § 232.203. 

Paragraph (a) of this section makes clear 

that all of the training requirements 

contained in § 232.203 are applicable to 

ECP brake system operations and 

requires that all railroads operating ECP 

brake-equipped trains update their 

training, qualification, and designation 

programs to include provisions for these 

operations. Accordingly, FRA expects 

that railroad and contract personnel 

responsible for performing brake system 

inspections, tests, and maintenance on 

ECP brake systems be trained, tested, 

and designated in accordance with the 

requirements contained in § 232.203 on 

the ECP brake systems they will be 

required to inspect, test, and maintain. 

Section 232.203(c) contains general 

requirements or elements which must 

be part of any training and qualification 

plan adopted by a railroad or contractor. 

FRA continues to believe that the 

elements contained in this section are 

specific enough to ensure high-quality 

training and broad enough to permit a 

railroad or contractor to adopt a training 

plan that is best suited to its particular 

operation. FRA continues to believe that 

the required training must provide 

employees with the necessary 

knowledge, skills, and abilities to 

perform the tasks required for the 

various types of brake systems the 

individual employee will be required to 

inspect, test, or maintain. Since FRA 

expects only a limited number of 

employees will be involved initially 

with ECP brake operations, a railroad or 

contractor may tailor its training 

programs only for those individuals 

involved with ECP brake systems, based 

on the tasks that employee will be 

required to perform on those specific 

systems. 

Section 232.203(e) contains 

recordkeeping requirements, the 

cornerstone for training requirements 

accountability. FRA continues to believe 

that such records should be kept for 

employees inspecting, testing, and 

maintaining ECP brake-equipped freight 

cars and freight trains. Such 

documentation will allow FRA to judge 

the effectiveness of the training 

provided and will provide FRA with the 

ability to independently assess whether 

the training provided to a specific 

individual adequately addresses the 

skills and knowledge required to 

perform the tasks that the person is 

deemed qualified to perform. Moreover, 

requiring these records will deter 

railroads and contractors from 

circumventing the training requirements 

and discourage them from attempting to 

utilize insufficiently trained personnel 

to perform the inspections and tests 

required by this rule. The required 

records may be maintained either 

electronically or on paper in the same 

manner as required under section 

232.203. 

Paragraph (a) of this section also 

requires ECP brake operations to comply 

with § 232.203(f), which requires that 

each railroad or contractor adopt and 

comply with a plan to periodically 

assess the effectiveness of its training 

program. To ensure that affected 

employees receive timely, effective 

training relating to ECP brake 

technology, UTU encourages FRA to 

audit the training functions that are 

required under § 232.605. BLET agrees 

with UTU that FRA should reserve the 

right to audit such training programs 

and also proposes that training 

programs should be submitted to FRA 

for approval. AAR argues that the 

regulations should not require FRA 

approval of railroad training programs, 

since it would delay any changes that 

railroads might want to make. 

FRA currently performs audits on the 

training provided to railroad employees 

and contractors under § 232.203. These 

audits examine the course content, 

learning objectives, testing methods, 

refresher training, and methods for 

ensuring the effectiveness of the 

training. FRA intends to continue to 

audit these training programs, including 

those for transportation and mechanical 

employees working with ECP brake 

operations. FRA does not require 

submission of training programs relating 

to conventional brake operations for 

FRA approval and does not see a need 

to require a submission of training 

programs relating to ECP brake 

operations. Accordingly, paragraph (a) 

extends this requirement to employees 

and contractors utilizing ECP brake 

operations. 

In addition, FRA continues to believe 

that railroads and contractors should 

periodically assess the effectiveness of 

their training programs that would 

include an assessment of the training 

related to ECP brake systems. FRA 

continues to believe that periodic 

assessments may be conducted through 

a number of different means and each 

railroad or contractor may have a need 

to conduct the assessment in a different 

manner. By referencing the 

requirements contained in § 232.203, 

paragraph (a) requires that a railroad or 

contractor institute a plan to 

periodically assess its training program 

regarding ECP brake systems and 

permits the use of efficiency tests or 

periodic review of employee 

performance as methods for conducting 

such review. While FRA continues to 

believe that many railroads are capable 

of assessing the quality of the training 

their employees receive by conducting 

periodic supervisory spot checks or 

efficiency tests of their employees’ 

performance, FRA also believes that on 

larger railroads the periodic assessment 

of a training program should involve all 

segments of the workforce involved in 

the training. 

Paragraph (b) of this section requires 

each railroad to appropriately amend or 

modify its operating rules to include 

safe train handling procedures when 

utilizing ECP braking systems. The 

developed operating rules should 

address the equipment and territory 

operated by the railroad. FRA insists 

that training on proper train handling 

procedures is essential to ensuring that 

locomotive engineers can properly 

handle their trains with or without ECP 

braking systems. FRA also continues to 

believe that it should not specify the 

specific knowledge, skill, and ability 

criteria that a railroad must adopt into 

its locomotive engineer training 

program. Given the considerable 

differences among railroads, FRA 

believes that each railroad is in the best 

position to determine what these criteria 

should be and what training is 

necessary to provide that knowledge, 

skill, and ability to its employees 

operating ECP brake-equipped trains. 

However, to ensure that the railroads 

and contractors provide and complete 

training, paragraph (c) of this section 


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requires each to adopt and comply with 

such criteria and training procedures 

and to incorporate them into its 

locomotive engineer certification 

program required by 49 CFR part 240. In 

the final rule, the text of paragraph (c) 

has been modified from the proposed 

text for clarification purposes. 

Section 232.607 Inspection and 

Testing Requirements 

Except for transfer trains, the existing 

part 232 regulations require that each 

train operating with conventional brake 

systems receive a Class I brake test at its 

initial terminal and when certain events 

occur en route, a Class IA brake test 

every 1,000 miles, and Class III brake 

tests when the train consist continuity 

is interrupted. When operating as an 

extended haul train, the existing 

regulations require that a Class I brake 

test be performed at the train’s initial 

terminal and at the train’s 1,500-mile 

location, if operating further than 1,500 

miles. In addition, under certain 

circumstances, cars and solid blocks of 

cars are required to receive either a 

Class I or a Class II brake test when they 

are added to a train. Each of these 

inspections is expensive and timeconsuming. 

An ECP brake system’s selfmonitoring capabilities, fail-safe 

operation, and enhanced safety and 

performance provide railroads the 

ability to reduce the number of physical 

inspections on a train. In a letter dated 

January 26, 2007, filed in the related 

ECP brake waiver proceeding, BNSF and 

NS assert that ‘‘[t]his performance-based 

technology supercedes [sic] the need for 

a scheduled inspection based on the 

amount of mileage that can be 

accumulated within the boundaries of 

the U.S. rail system.’’ Docket No. FRA– 

2006–26435. Similarly, in the same 

docket, two ECP brake manufacturers, 

NYAB and Wabtec, state that when an 

ECP brake system enters ‘‘Run’’ mode, it 

provides diagnostics, continuous 

monitoring, and fault reporting to the 

locomotive display. According to the 

manufacturers, ECP brakes provide to 

the locomotive monitoring and feedback 

of the most important brake data and 

‘‘while it is not economically practical 

to monitor for all potential brake system 

failures, the increased level of 

monitoring and data reporting should 

allow safely extending the distance 

between inspection points, coupled 

with revised railroad procedures.’’ 

Letter dated January 29, 2007, in Docket 

No. FRA–2006–26435. 

FRA is convinced that if a train is 

properly and thoroughly inspected, with 

all of the defective conditions being 

eliminated, then the train is capable of 

traveling distances much greater than 

1,000 miles between brake inspections. 

FRA’s experience with extended haul 

trains over the last four years has 

established that trains with 

conventional pneumatic brake systems 

that are inspected by highly qualified 

individuals can safely operate up to 

1,500 miles between brake inspections. 

FRA is not aware of any significant 

incident or derailment related to a brake 

or mechanical component failure on an 

extended haul train. Accordingly, in 

paragraph (h) of this section, FRA 

excepts trains operating exclusively in 

ECP brake mode from the Class IA and 

Class II brake inspections currently 

required under §§ 232.207 and 232.209. 

Paragraph (h) also excepts such trains 

from en route Class I inspections 

required under § 232.205(a) and (b). 

Various comments were submitted 

relating to these exceptions of en route 

brake inspections. Since the exceptions 

in paragraph (h) substantially relate to 

the other paragraphs of section 232.607, 

we will discuss them as appropriate 

below. 

Paragraph (a) requires continued 

compliance with § 232.205(c)—which 

describes the tasks and requirements of 

a Class I brake test—for an ECP brakeequipped train at its initial terminal. To 

offset safety concerns regarding the 

exceptions to intermediate inspections, 

FRA requires that Class I brake tests 

performed at initial terminals on ECP 

brake-operated freight trains be 

performed by a qualified mechanical 

inspector (QMI). FRA continues to 

believe that a Class I brake test 

performed on a train at its initial 

terminal needs to be as in-depth and 

comprehensive as possible and, thus, 

should be performed by an individual 

possessing the knowledge not only to 

identify and detect a defective condition 

in all of the brake equipment required 

to be inspected, but also to recognize the 

interrelated workings of the equipment 

and the ability to trouble-shoot and 

repair the equipment. Similarly, FRA 

will require that all of the mechanical 

inspections required to be performed on 

a train at its initial terminal be 

conducted by an inspector designated 

pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11 in order to 

ensure that all mechanical components 

are in proper condition prior to the 

train’s departure. 

FRA believes that the regulatory relief 

provided by paragraph (h) of this 

section is justified by the increased level 

of safety provided by ECP brake 

technologies and the requirement under 

paragraph (a) that a Class I brake test of 

car equipped with ECP brakes be 

performed by a QMI at its initial 

terminal. The exceptions provided in 

paragraph (h), in conjunction with the 

requirements of paragraph (a), would 

allow most trains equipped and 

operated with ECP brakes to travel to 

their destinations without stopping for 

any required intermediate inspections. 

The regulatory relief provided by this 

elimination of intermediate brake tests 

will significantly reduce operating and 

train delay costs. 

In its comments, UP argues that it is 

not necessary to utilize a QMI to 

perform a Class I brake inspection for 

movements up to 3,500 miles. UP 

instead proposes that a qualified person 

(QP) perform Class 1 inspections for 

movements up to 3,500 miles and that 

a QMI be required to perform 

inspections for longer movements. UP 

also notes that some trains operated 

with ECP brakes may originate at a point 

where a QMI is not present and where 

train crews containing a QP may 

perform the inspections. AAR also 

objects to the requirement in paragraph 

(a) that Class I inspections on ECP brake 

operated trains be performed by a QMI. 

AAR asserts that the QMI requirement is 

more stringent than the existing 

inspection requirements for trains 

equipped with conventional brakes. 

According to AAR, since a QMI is not 

present at all initial terminals, requiring 

a QMI to perform Class I brake 

inspections would discourage railroads 

from implementing ECP brake systems. 

BRC supports paragraph (a), stating 

that a QMI will help ensure the proper 

condition of ECP brake systems prior to 

departure. According to BRC, the 

leeway requested by AAR and the 

carriers to designate any person as 

qualified is premature and should not 

be considered until data can be 

provided showing that inspections by a 

QMI are unnecessary. BLET 

wholeheartedly concurs that each Class 

I brake test at an initial terminal should 

be performed by a QMI. According to 

BLET, the industry’s objection is 

without merit and its two-standard 

proposal will produce an oversight 

nightmare. 

FRA agrees that, at this time, a twotiered approach requiring a QMI for 

only some Class I inspections of ECP 

brake operations would result in 

significant monitoring and enforcement 

difficulties. In any event, as discussed 

in more detail below, the final rule will 

only allow freight trains and freight cars 

operated with ECP brakes to operate to 

their destination, not to exceed 3,500 

miles, or up to 3,500 miles for unit or 

cycle trains, before receiving an 

additional Class I brake inspection. 

Accordingly, there will be no ‘‘longer 

movements’’ between Class I brake 


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61530 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

inspections that would allow for such a 

two-tiered approach. 

FRA also believes that the railroads’ 

concerns relating to QMIs are without 

merit. FRA is not mandating the 

railroads to operate with ECP brake 

systems. Thus, if the railroads opt to 

implement such systems, they will need 

to adjust their operations accordingly. 

FRA already requires that a QMI 

perform Class I brake inspections on 

extended haul operations, which are 

limited to 1,500 miles between such 

inspections. By more than doubling the 

allowable distance, FRA insists that 

there is an even greater need to require 

that a QMI perform the Class I brake 

tests on operations traveling further 

than the currently allowed distances. 

Moreover, the railroads’ concerns are 

further mitigated by the reduction of the 

number of Class I brake inspections 

required en route. Since a QMI is 

required for extended haul operations at 

only 1,500 miles, it is unclear why AAR 

asserts that requiring the use of a QMI 

for ECP brake operations at 3,500 miles 

would be more stringent. 

In light of the significant benefits 

provided by the extension of allowable 

distance between Class I inspections to 

3,500 miles, FRA does not believe that 

requiring a QMI to perform a Class I 

brake test on for an ECP brake operation 

would discourage implementation of 

this technology. The railroads have had 

little difficulty in ensuring QMI 

placement at facilities where Class I 

inspections are required on extended 

haul trains. Since the number of Class 

I inspections for an ECP brake operation 

will be less than those for a 

conventional brake operation in 

extended haul status, FRA does not 

foresee this requirement becoming 

sufficiently burdensome to effectively 

discourage the implementation of ECP 

brake system technology. 

In paragraph (b), FRA permits a train 

operating in ECP brake mode to travel 

up to 3,500 miles or to its destination, 

whichever is less, without any 

additional brake inspections. FRA 

believes that 3,500 miles allows 

virtually all ECP brake operated trains to 

travel to their respective destinations 

and provides for coast-to-coast travel. 

FRA also bases this mileage amount on 

the fact that foundation brake rigging 

and brake shoes will safety operate this 

distance and redundant intermediate 

inspections will not necessarily increase 

ECP brake system safety. Because many 

unit or cycle trains operate in a 

continuous loop with multiple loading 

and unloading locations, FRA has not 

included the destination of the train as 

a limiting factor for them. FRA is 

specifically making this distinction in 

order to prevent misinterpretation of the 

final rule as it relates to unit or cycle 

trains. As these trains may have 

multiple destinations, a strict 

application of destination could result 

in Class I brake tests being performed 

more frequently than intended by this 

final rule. Thus, in paragraph (b)(2), 

FRA treats unit and cycle trains 

differently by only requiring them to 

receive Class I brake inspections by 

qualified mechanical inspectors at least 

once every 3,500 miles. To be clear, 

under the final rule, no freight car or 

freight train equipped with ECP brakes 

would be allowed to travel more than 

3,500 miles without receiving an 

additional Class I brake inspection by a 

qualified mechanical inspector. 

UTU encourages FRA to continue to 

consistently regulate the need for 

mechanical inspections and repairs. 

UTU asserts that the self-monitoring 

feature of ECP brake equipment will 

have no effect on monitoring the 

mechanical functions of the freight car 

involved. According to UTU, ECP brake 

equipment will not monitor the 

condition of draft gear, brake shoes and 

hangers, coupling devices, safety 

appliances and grab irons, sill steps, 

springs, hopper doors, and the 

multitude of items a normal mechanical 

inspection is designed to check. UTU 

also asserts that a well trained and 

qualified mechanical inspector must not 

be removed from the safety equation 

because of advanced brake equipment 

that is only designed to improve the 

braking functions. 

BLET agrees, asserting that 

continuous monitoring capability is not 

quite as robust as FRA claims. 

According to AAR Standard S–4260, 

§ 3.5.4.2, ‘‘CCDs with a low or missing 

battery are counted as inoperable, but 

may not be displayed as inoperable 

until the total inoperable reaches less 

than 90% with trainline power OFF, or 

less than 85% with trainline power ON, 

at which time a penalty brake 

application will be commanded.’’ 

TWU similarly argues that ECP 

braking does not have capabilities to 

perform the safety critical inspections 

indicated in FRA Technical Bulletin 

MP&E 98–59. In contrast, says TWU, 

ECP brake systems, as designed today, 

while having the ability to monitor 

certain aspects of the braking system, 

are not designed or equipped to monitor 

or detect defects on most equipment of 

a train braking system, in particular the 

complex brake rigging systems on the 

various types of equipment. According 

to TWU, 122 of the potential 127 brakerelated defects (96%) are not detectable 

by ECP brake monitoring, making clear 

that the advantages of real-time 

monitoring are both overstated and 

misleading. BRC asserts that the ECP 

brake system technology cannot detect 

65 defects. Moreover, TWU states that 

FRA accident data indicates that the 

highest percentage of accidents are 

caused by brake-related mechanical 

defects not monitored by ECP brake 

systems. 

TWU further asserts that, in addition 

to a serious decrease in the level of 

safety based on brake system 

considerations, the reduction in 

inspection frequency will seriously 

decrease the level of safety as it relates 

to other mechanical systems and 

components. ‘‘There should be no 

question that reducing the number of 

inspections will reduce opportunities to 

detect defective equipment. The 

reduction in frequency of inspections 

will also reduce opportunities for 

detecting bent, broken, loose, or missing 

safety appliances.’’ TWU points out that 

FRA previously noted that ‘‘railroads 

have not conducted the excellent initial 

terminal inspections that were 

contemplated in 1982, when FRA 

extended the 500-mile inspection 

interval to 1,000 miles.’’ (Citing 66 FR 

4113 (Jan. 17, 2001)). TWU also claims 

that from January 2005 to July 2007, 

FRA accident data includes 24 

derailments, 2 collisions, and 3 other 

type of accidents resulting from 

mechanical defects, including 

‘‘Tiedowns, doors, etc.’’ TWU asserts 

that a comprehensive mechanical 

inspection is critically important, citing 

FRA Technical Bulletin MP&E 98–57, 

which states, ‘‘In order to conduct a 

proper Freight Car Safety Standards 

inspection, both sides of a car must be 

inspected.’’ 

AAR counters by questioning the 

significance of the brake rigging issue. 

According to AAR, from 1990 to 2006, 

‘‘the industry averaged five mainline 

accidents attributable to brake rigging 

down and dragging,’’ identified by FRA 

cause code E07C. In addition, says AAR, 

U.S. railroads have 2,415 dragging 

equipment detectors placed across the 

country, which provide immediate radio 

feedback to train crews. 

FRA understands the concerns 

relating to the ECP brake system’s selfmonitoring limitations. FRA 

acknowledges that the ECP brake system 

developed under the applicable AAR 

design standards does not monitor a 

number of brake components. However, 

FRA believes that the labor unions’ 

concerns, while relevant, do not take 

into account a number of factors. By 

requiring a QMI to perform a Class I 

brake inspection at initial terminal on 

an ECP brake operated freight train, FRA 

expects a reduction in all en route brake 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61531 

defects. While performing a Class I 

brake inspection every 1,000 miles 

would provide more opportunities to 

detect defective equipment, FRA 

believes that such detection is limited to 

only obvious en route defects and that 

an inspection by a QMI at initial 

terminal will significantly reduce those 

defects. Based on its experience with 

extended haul operations, FRA feels 

that a good, quality inspection 

conducted by a QMI at the initial 

terminal will ensure that the items not 

monitored by the ECP brake system 

computer will safely travel a distance of 

3,500 miles. 

For instance, in FRA’s experience, en 

route Class IA brake inspections 

performed subsequent to Class I brake 

inspections performed at initial 

terminals by QPs have significantly 

higher defect ratios than those found at 

en route Class I brake inspections 

performed on extended haul operations 

that received an earlier Class I brake 

inspection performed by a QMI. As 

indicated in Technical Bulletin MP&E 

07–01, issued on April 3, 2007, in 

addition to the numerous regular 

inspections of extended haul operations, 

FRA performed several formal weeklong audits at various locations to 

determine the railroads’ compliance 

with the regulations and whether the 

quality of the inspections and tests 

would justify allowing the inbound 

inspections and record-keeping 

requirements to sunset in April of 2007. 

Most of the non-compliance identified 

during the audits included the railroads’ 

inability to create, maintain, and 

produce the required records of defects 

found during the inbound inspections. 

It was also noted that the railroads 

occasionally failed to perform the 

necessary inspections on cars picked-up 

or set-out of extended haul trains on 

certain corridors. Actual defective 

conditions found at inbound 

inspections were minimal. 

FRA further believes that any 

remaining concerns relating to en route 

defects are offset by the ECP brake 

system’s other significant safety 

benefits, including increased train 

control, a reduction of in-train forces, 

shorter stopping distances, and its selfmonitoring capabilities. Moreover, 

while some commenters provided data 

on what portion of brake parts remain 

unmonitored by the ECP brake system, 

they did not establish the relationship 

between those parts and the quantity 

and significance of defects found and 

derailments caused. FRA continues to 

believe that the ECP brake system 

monitors the more crucial aspects of the 

brake system. 

FRA believes that TWU’s references to 

freight car inspection standards and 

guidance are misplaced. Although 

freight car defects may be incidentally 

detected during a Class I brake 

inspection, part 232 does not govern 

such issues. Freight car defects should 

still be found when cars are added to a 

train en route and when they are 

otherwise required to receive a freight 

car inspection under part 215. 

FRA also continues to believe that 

ECP brake system self-monitoring is 

sufficiently robust. BLET’s citation of 

§ 3.5.4.2 of AAR Standard S–4260 is 

misplaced. Section 3.5.4.2 sets the limit 

for the number of CCDs that report a low 

or missing battery. This does not 

reference or mean inoperable CCDs. All 

CCDs may remain operable when 

reporting low or missing batteries. The 

ECP brake system is powered by the 

train line and § 3.5.4.2 only indicates 

that a back-up battery is necessary to 

cover for a temporary loss of power. 

Accordingly, to have a battery 

malfunction is not critical to train brake 

system operation. The purpose of the 

limitation in § 3.5.4.2 is to eliminate the 

possibility of train line power 

disappearing when back-up battery 

power is unavailable. 

FRA recognizes and appreciates the 

use of additional wayside detection 

equipment, which AAR claims should 

reduce concerns relating to brake rigging 

malfunctions. However, FRA has not 

had an opportunity to review that 

equipment with respect to key attributes 

such as network coverage, sensitivity, 

and availability, and does not require 

use of that equipment. Accordingly, 

FRA does not feel comfortable relying 

on such unreviewed technology, which 

can be removed or modified at any time. 

However, FRA does recognize that the 

combination of on-board and wayside 

monitoring does provide an additional 

layer of safety for all train operations 

and that the use of such technologies 

may offer opportunities for further 

liberalization of visual inspections 

requirements in the future, given proper 

safeguards. 

UP believes that the allowable 

distance between brake inspections 

using ECP brake technology should be 

extended to 5,000 miles, instead of the 

3,500 miles proposed by the FRA, in 

order to provide a significant incentive 

for the railroad industry to implement 

ECP braking in high-mileage services. 

For example, says UP, an intermodal 

train with ECP braking could be 

operated round-trip between Chicago 

and any of the west coast ports within 

such a 5,000 mile limit. According to 

UP, a 5,000 mile limit for ECP brake 

operated trains between Class I brake 

inspections with no intermediate 

inspections would enable the operation 

of sets of intermodal equipment in very 

high-mileage, high-utilization, rapid 

turnaround service. 

To support its request, UP points to 

the success of a previous operation. In 

April 2004, UP operated a round-trip 

test train 4,400 miles at a maximum 

speed of 74 MPH between Chicago and 

East Los Angeles. Based on that test’s 

findings, UP and CSX jointly operated 

one pair of high-speed trailer on flat car 

(‘‘TOFC’’) trains for UPS between 

Kearney, New Jersey and East Los 

Angeles, California, a trip that took 59 

hours. While there was some economic 

penalty involved in this dedication of 

equipment, UP says that it proved that 

locomotives and cars could be selected, 

maintained and operated in high-speed, 

high-mileage transcontinental freight 

service. In addition to the Class I 

inspections performed at Kearney and 

East Los Angeles, three Class 1A 

inspections occurred en route. UP 

asserts that a 3,500 mile limit would 

have been extremely valid and useful. 

According to UP, the elimination of 3 

intermediate brake inspections of 40 

minutes each could have potentially 

reduced overall one-way transit time by 

120 minutes or 2 hours. An ECP brake 

operated train resulting in the same 

running time as a conventional brake 

operated train would require a lower 

operating speed and would have 

reduced fuel consumption and exhaust 

emissions. 

AAR also supports a higher limit of 

5,000 miles between Class I inspections, 

asserting that it would be more 

consistent with FRA’s objective in this 

proceeding to facilitate conversion to 

ECP brake technology and provide 

regulatory relief without adversely 

affecting safety. According to AAR, a 

5,000 mile limit would facilitate the 

efficient operation of intermodal trains 

in high-mileage, rapid turn-around 

service. AAR claims that there is no 

technical justification for setting the 

limit at 3,500 miles instead of 5,000 

miles given the capability of ECP 

systems to monitor the critical functions 

of the air brakes. 

BRC supports paragraph (b), stating 

that the proposed distance of 3,500 

miles is ‘‘more than generous.’’ 

According to BRC, AAR and the carriers 

have not provided real evidence that the 

safety benefits offered by ECP brake 

technologies will offset any of the 

numerous safety risks that the 

technologies cannot detect over long 

distances. BRC asserts that without such 

data, the railroads’ request for a 5,000 

mile allowable distance between Class I 


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61532 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

brake inspections should not be 

considered at this time. 

After consideration of all the 

comments provided and based upon 

existing information available to the 

agency, FRA is not convinced that the 

allowable distance for ECP brake 

operations should exceed 3,500 miles 

between Class I brake inspections. FRA 

believes that an extension of the 

allowable distance to 3,500 miles is 

justified by the increased safety 

promised by ECP brake technology and 

provides a suitable incentive for 

railroads to implement and use ECP 

brake technology. While FRA supports 

the railroads’ interest in operational and 

fuel efficiency, FRA believes the 

extension to 3,500 miles provides such 

efficiency. Moreover, based on its 

experience and the lack of safety data 

supporting a 5,000 mile allowable 

distance between Class I brake 

inspections for ECP brake operations, 

FRA does not feel comfortable further 

extending the allowable distance limit 

at this time. The only example provided 

by UP was a 4,400 mile joint operation 

with CSX that received three Class 1A 

brake inspections while en route. 

Although such demonstrations, with 

proper documentation, are helpful, 

acquisition of further experience will be 

needed to achieve confidence in less 

restricted longer hauls. 

AAR and UP also commented on FRA 

concerns relating to brake shoe wear. 

AAR claims that brake shoe wear should 

not be a concern in ECP brake 

operations moving with up to 5,000 

miles between brake inspections. 

According to AAR, ECP brakes reduce 

brake shoe wear and the AAR 

condemning thickness of 3/8’’ provides 

an ample safety margin over a 5,000 

mile run. UP stated that it would 

consider establishing its own minimum 

brake shoe criteria to properly configure 

the train for the entire round trip. 

FRA appreciates UP’s offer to 

consider establishing its own minimum 

brake shoe criteria for trips involving 

more than 3,500 miles between Class I 

inspections. However, FRA cannot rely 

on that voluntary offer, which would 

apply only to one railroad and could be 

withdrawn at any time. In any event, 

FRA continues to find cars with brake 

shoes that are well past the brake shoe 

replacement condemning limits for 

trains equipped with conventional 

brakes. On some trains not permitted to 

travel beyond 1,500 miles between Class 

I brake inspections, brake shoes have 

been found worn into the backing plate. 

Accordingly, FRA does not feel 

comfortable at this time permitting 

trains to operate more than 3,500 miles 

between comprehensive brake 

inspections until more data can be 

obtained to support such an initiative. 

Currently, no extended haul train is 

permitted to travel more than 1,500 

miles without receiving another 

comprehensive brake inspection. For 

trains equipped with ECP brakes, FRA 

more than doubles the currently 

allowed distance to 3,500 miles. FRA 

acknowledges that in the related 

proceeding, Docket No. FRA–2006– 

26435, the Safety Board provided for the 

movement of trains equipped with ECP 

brakes up to 3,500 miles. During the 

pendency of this rulemaking, FRA 

closely monitored those trains’ 

operations and collected information on 

the equipment operated in those trains. 

FRA reserved the right to make 

appropriate modifications in the final 

rule based on any further data then 

available. Since cars equipped with ECP 

brakes have only operated for a limited 

time since the recent issuance of the 

waiver under Docket FRA–2006–26435 

and are not typical of those in the 

general fleet with respect to the age of 

components, FRA has not received any 

data convincing it to modify the rule as 

proposed in the NPRM. Accordingly, 

paragraph (b) provides for a train 

operated with ECP brakes to travel to its 

destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, 

between brake inspections. 

FRA acknowledges, however, that 

notwithstanding the proposed 

allowance of a train equipped and 

operated with ECP brakes to travel up to 

3,500 miles without an additional brake 

inspection, instances exist where certain 

trains would require the performance of 

a Class I brake inspection en route. For 

instance, the regulations governing 

operations utilizing conventional brake 

systems require that certain tests be 

performed when a car is off a source of 

compressed air for more than 4 hours. 

FRA acknowledges that an ECP brakeequipped train’s on board diagnostics 

reduce concerns relating to cars 

remaining off air for extended periods of 

time. Accordingly, in this proceeding’s 

NPRM, FRA proposed to extend the 

allowable off-air period to 24 hours. For 

the purposes of organizational clarity, 

the final rule includes the off-air 

requirement in paragraph (b). 

BLET opposes the 24-hour off-air 

limitation. According to BLET, the 

allowable off-air period should remain 

at 4 hours and the Class I brake 

inspections required on ECP brake 

operated trains after an off-air period 

exceeding 4 hours should be performed 

by a QMI, not a qualified person. 

AAR, UP, NYAB, and Wabtec all 

assert that the allowable off-air period 

should be extended to 120 hours (five 

days). According to UP, providing for a 

120 hour off-air period will be 

especially relevant for equipment such 

as grain hoppers and coal cars in unit 

train operations serving grain elevators 

or electrical generating plants, where 

intact train sets may be parked for 

several days awaiting either loading or 

unloading. UP further asserts that the 

self-diagnostic capability of ECP braking 

systems, with results displayed in the 

locomotive cab upon powering-up the 

ECP train line cable, will enable this to 

occur without compromising safety. 

Moreover, being off-air for up to 120 

hours should not result in any 

measurable or visually identifiable 

deterioration of the non-ECP brake 

components in the braking system. The 

ECP brake manufacturers see no 

technical or safety issues with extending 

the allowable off-air period to 120 hours 

and state that, when the ECP brake 

system initializes, self testing will verify 

the car is ready for service, including 

the battery charge status. 

FRA believes that an expansion of the 

time allowed off-air for ECP brake 

operations is justified based on the 

capabilities of ECP brake systems or the 

combination of those capabilities and 

protection against vandalism. 

Accordingly, FRA will require under 

paragraph (b) that an en route Class I 

brake inspection be performed by a 

qualified person if a train operating in 

ECP brake mode is off air for more than 

24 hours. However, if such a train is 

located within an ‘‘extended-off-air 

facility,’’ as more fully described below, 

the time limit is extended to 80 hours. 

FRA continues to believe that dangers, 

although reduced, remain when an ECP 

brake-equipped train remains off air for 

too long. Thus, the final rule retains the 

proposed off-air time limit of 24 hours 

since cars moving in service generally 

have a dwell time of 24 hours or less 

and this limit provides sufficient 

flexibility while allowing the industry 

to move equipment without impacting 

timely inspections and maintaining an 

acceptable level of safety. 

In light of the comments filed in this 

proceeding and upon further internal 

deliberation, FRA believes that 

extending the off air requirement to 80 

hours for trains left in extended-off-air 

facilities effectively ensures the safe 

operation of ECP brake systems while 

providing suitable flexibility for certain 

operations. FRA recognizes that 

additional flexibility may be reasonable 

when a freight train or freight car 

operated with ECP brakes is left at a 

protected location controlled by the 

shipper or consignee and not accessible 

to the railroad or potential vandals. For 

instance, a train or car equipped with 

ECP brakes may be dropped off at a 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61533 

consignee’s plant on one morning and 

will be inaccessible to the railroad for 

several days, such as over the weekend 

or a holiday. 

Since railroads may not be able to 

pick up the equipment from the 

extended-off-air facility immediately 

when it opens, FRA believes that some 

additional operational flexibility should 

be provided during this time. FRA also 

recognizes that providing a limited 

number of hours after the opening of the 

facility on a given day may result in 

enforcement issues when attempting to 

determine the actual number of hours 

the train may have been off air or in the 

facility. 

Accordingly, the final rule provides 

for the retrieval of the equipment up 

until the close of business on the fourth 

day it is at the facility. Assuming the 

extended-off-air facility maintains an 8- 

hour work day, this would provide a 

time span of up to 80 hours in that 

facility. For instance, FRA believes that 

the 80-hour time differential between 

the facility opening on Friday morning 

and closing on the directly subsequent 

Monday provides suitable flexibility for 

such operations. 

From a safety standpoint, FRA 

believes that an 80-hour off-air 

limitation is justified if the train is left 

in an extended-off-air facility. FRA 

previously expressed its belief that in 

certain circumstances the length of time 

that equipment is removed from a 

source of compressed air can impact the 

integrity and operation of the brake 

system on a vehicle or train. 

Particularly, FRA indicated that the 

potential for vandalism may be high due 

to the location where equipment is left 

standing. See 66 FR 4122 (Jan. 17, 2001). 

While a train remains off air for any 

period of time, it may be unattended, 

providing an opportunity for vandalism. 

FRA continues to believe that the 

potential for vandalism is one of various 

factors justifying an off-air limitation. 

If steps are taken to substantially 

reduce the potential for vandalism, 

however, FRA believes additional 

flexibility is justified. Thus, if a freight 

train or freight car operated with ECP 

brakes is at an extended-off-air facility 

and is not accessible to the carrier or 

potential vandals, FRA believes an 80- 

hour off-air limitation is warranted. For 

the purposes of this final rule, an 

extended-off-air facility is a private 

location controlled and access-restricted 

by a sole shipper or consignee. The 

location must be suitably designed to 

effectively and significantly reduce the 

possibility of vandalism. For instance, a 

suitably fenced-in power plant with 

sufficient entry-prohibitive security 

would suffice. 

Also for the purposes of this final 

rule, the times the equipment enters and 

departs the extended-off-air facility 

shall presumptively be when the off-air 

time period begins and ends, 

respectively. Otherwise, enforcement 

would be difficult, since FRA would be 

unable to ascertain when a train or car 

went off and on air within the restricted 

area. This presumption, however, may 

be rebutted with evidence showing 

when the equipment actually went off 

air and when it was reconnected to an 

air source. 

For trains operating in ECP brake 

mode and off air for more than 24 hours, 

the Class I brake inspection may be 

performed by a qualified person. FRA 

acknowledges that while a qualified 

mechanical inspector must be stationed 

at each route’s initial terminal, it is not 

reasonable or feasible at this time to 

require one at each location a train 

operating in ECP brake mode is off air 

for more than 24 hours, because many 

of those locations will be unpredictable. 

Requiring a qualified mechanical 

inspector at each point a train is off air 

for more than 24 hours would likely 

result in a significant disincentive for a 

railroad to equip its trains with ECP 

brake systems. 

FRA also intends for these 

requirements to apply to trains 

operating in ECP brake mode, located at 

their initial terminals, and off air for 

more than 24 hours without the train 

consist being changed. In other words, 

under paragraph (b), if a qualified 

mechanical inspector performs a Class I 

brake test on a train operating in ECP 

brake mode at the train’s initial terminal 

and that train then goes off air for more 

than 24 hours before departing from the 

initial terminal, another Class I brake 

test must be performed prior to 

departure. However, FRA believes that 

requiring a qualified mechanical 

inspector at an initial terminal to 

perform a Class I brake test twice on the 

same train with unmodified consist 

would be unnecessary and possibly too 

onerous. FRA does not expect this 

situation to occur often, since trains 

rarely sit off air for more than 24 hours 

after receiving a Class I brake test. The 

train will not have traveled at all, but if 

the same train spent 24 hours off air 

after traveling 500 miles, a Class I brake 

test by a qualified person would suffice. 

Thus, the second Class I brake test may 

be performed by a qualified person. 

While FRA recognizes that additional 

experience with ECP brakes may show 

that brake tests are no longer needed 

after being off air, FRA does not believe 

the evidence suffices to prove that 

proposition today. FRA’s intent in 

providing these narrow expansions of 

the existing 4 hour rule is not to alter 

the tenet that equipment should be 

retested when it is removed from a 

source of compressed air for any lengthy 

period of time. The 24 and 80 hour offair requirements apply to any ECP brake 

operated train, regardless of whether it 

is a unit or cycle train, and replace the 

4 hour off-air requirement under 

§ 232.205(a), which is excepted under 

paragraph (h), as previously indicated. 

The 24 hour allowance gives railroads 

the flexibility to perform switching 

operations while ECP brake-equipped 

trains are en route and provide 

flexibility to efficiently move cars from 

one ECP brake-equipped train to another 

when necessary, yet retain the concept 

that such cars or trains be retested when 

left disconnected from a source of 

compressed air for longer periods of 

time. The 24 and 80 hour time frames 

are also consistent with the general 

dwell time that cars experience while en 

route and while in extended-off-air 

facilities. FRA further believes that a 

limitation on the amount of time that 

such equipment may be off air is 

necessary for ensuring that such 

equipment is inspected in a timely and 

predictable manner. If no time limit 

were imposed or if too much time was 

permitted, an ECP brake-equipped car 

could lawfully sit for days or weeks at 

various locations while en route to its 

destination and be switched in and out 

of numerous trains without ever being 

reinspected. Such an approach would 

drastically reduce the number of times 

that the brake systems on such 

equipment would ever be given a visual 

inspection from what is currently 

required and, in FRA’s view, would 

seriously degrade the safety of the trains 

operating with such equipment in their 

consists. 

Furthermore, if an ECP brakeequipped train was allowed to be off-air 

for an excessive amount of time, it 

would be virtually impossible for FRA 

to ensure that equipment is being 

properly retested as it would be 

extremely difficult for FRA to determine 

how long a particular piece of 

equipment was disconnected from a 

source of compressed air. In order to 

make such a determination, FRA would 

have to maintain observation of the 

equipment for days at a time. 

Consequently, a 24-hour limit on the 

amount of time equipment can be 

disconnected from a source of 

compressed air as it maintains current 

levels of safety and provides an 

enforceable and verifiable time limit 

that FRA believes provides the railroads 

some additional benefit over what is 

currently required both in terms of 


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61534 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

operational efficiency and cost savings. 

An FRA inspector could monitor a 24 

hour off-air period by merely returning 

to the same accessible location the very 

next day. FRA believes that a limited 

extension to 80 hours off air at 

extended-off-air locations provides for 

further flexibility where the safe 

custodianship of the equipment is 

ensured and where the amount of off-air 

hours can be easily determined. 

In paragraph (c), the final rule retains 

the proposed requirement that a Class I 

brake test be performed by a qualified 

person on each ECP brake-equipped car 

added en route to a train operating in 

ECP brake mode. However, FRA 

believes that this requirement may not 

be necessary if other safety precautions 

are taken. Thus, the final rule will not 

require a Class I brake test on such cars 

when being added to a train operating 

in ECP brake mode if the car had 

previously received a timely and proper 

Class I brake test by a QMI, the train 

crew is provided documentation of that 

test, the car has not been off air for more 

than what is allowed under the final 

rule, and a proper visual inspection is 

performed prior to use or departure. 

Accordingly, if an ECP brakeequipped car has received a Class I 

brake test by a qualified mechanical 

inspector within the last 3,500 miles, 

documentation of that test is provided 

to the train crew, the car has not been 

off air for more than the amount of time 

allowed by this final rule, and a proper 

visual inspection is conducted when the 

car is added to the train, FRA believes 

that it would be unnecessary to require 

an additional Class I brake test when 

that car is added to an en route train 

operating in ECP brake mode. However, 

to account for those cars that have not 

received a Class I brake test by a 

qualified mechanical inspector within 

the last 3,500 miles and that will be 

added to a train operating in ECP brake 

mode, paragraph (c) requires a new 

Class I brake test under those 

circumstances. Paragraph (c) is 

necessary in light of paragraph (h) 

excepting compliance with section 

232.205(b). Unless a car operating in 

ECP brake mode is off air for more than 

the allowable time frame under this 

final rule, it would not require a Class 

I brake test when it is added to a new 

train, since the rules contemplate that 

the car would have already received a 

Class I brake test within the previous 

3,500 miles or at its initial terminal. The 

documentation would be required to 

ensure that a Class I brake test by a 

qualified mechanical inspector will be 

performed every 3,500 miles. Under 

paragraph (c), any ECP brake-equipped 

car being added to a train operating in 

ECP brake mode would require a Class 

I brake test when the car has been off 

air for more than the allowable amount 

of time for the same reasons stated 

above concerning paragraph (c). 

FRA believes that a visual inspection 

of the car’s brake components is a 

suitable replacement for an additional 

Class I brake test when the car or cars 

added in these circumstances have 

received a Class I brake test by a 

qualified mechanical inspector within 

the last 3,500 miles. The visual 

inspection required by paragraph (c) 

could be performed while the car is off 

air and in conjunction with the 

mechanical inspection required under 

part 215 whenever a car is added to a 

train. Thus, FRA believes that the visual 

inspection required by paragraph (c) 

does not impose any significant burden 

on the railroads as they are already 

required to visually inspect the 

mechanical components on any car 

added to a train under part 215. FRA 

also acknowledges that the brake 

systems on cars not equipped with ECP 

brakes would be inoperative after being 

added to a train operating in ECP brake 

mode. To ensure the safe operation of 

such equipment and trains, paragraph 

(c)(2) of the final rule requires that cars 

equipped solely with conventional 

brake systems and placed into trains 

operating in ECP brake mode also be 

given a visual inspection to ensure their 

safe operation and to ensure compliance 

with § 232.15 when added to the train. 

In the event that a car would be 

required to receive a Class I brake test 

when added to an en route train, the 

final rule requires that the Class I brake 

test be performed by a qualified person 

for the same reasons stated in the above 

analysis. To be clear, although any car 

added to a train en route may receive a 

Class I inspection by a qualified person, 

the entire train’s travel distance is 

limited to its destination or the distance 

remaining until the train or any 

individual car picked up en route has 

traveled 3,500 miles since its last Class 

I brake inspection performed by a 

qualified mechanical inspector, 

whichever is less. A Class I brake 

inspection by a qualified person does 

not reset the mileage clock for the entire 

train. 

FRA also sought comments on the 

application of a Class III brake test to an 

ECP brake system. NS expressed its 

concern that the specifications outlined 

under § 232.211(c) cannot be met. 

According to NS, that section relates to 

the increase and decrease of brake pipe 

pressure as indicated by a rear end 

gauge or electronic telemetry device. 

ECP braking systems provide for the 

constant charge of the brake pipe and 

this rear end value will not reflect the 

air pressure differential currently 

experienced with conventional braking 

systems. NS asserts that since those 

brake reductions will be made 

electronically rather than pneumatically 

from the locomotive, the end of train 

device will not display a change in 

brake pipe pressure to indicate a brake 

application. 

A freight train operating with 

conventional brakes receives a Class III 

brake test at the location where its 

configuration is changed in order to 

ensure the integrity of the train line. 

Basically, a Class III brake test ensures 

that the train brake pipe is properly 

delivering air to the rear of the train. 

Upon further review and consideration 

of the comments, FRA recognizes that 

for an ECP brake system, a traditional 

Class III test may not be completely 

applicable. 

Accordingly, paragraph (d) requires a 

Class III brake test for ECP brake 

operated trains with certain 

modifications. Paragraph (d)(1) includes 

the locations and events that require the 

performance of a Class III brake test on 

an ECP brake operated train. 

Accordingly, § 232.211(a) is being 

excepted under paragraph (h). 

Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that the 

Class III brake test requirements relating 

to using EOT devices to observe brake 

pipe pressure changes at the rear of the 

train is not practical with ECP brake 

operations. The diagnostic capabilities 

of ECP brake systems will identify 

defective brake conditions on all of the 

train’s cars, including the rear car. 

Under the applicable AAR standards, 

this information should automatically 

appear on the ECP brake system 

monitor. 

Paragraph (e) includes requirements 

relating to the sequential initialization 

of ECP brake operated trains. The 

applicable AAR standards—as defined 

in § 4.2.3 and its subsections in AAR 

Standard S–4200 and in § 5.2 of AAR 

Standard S–4230—provide procedures 

for the initialization of the ECP brake 

system. The standards provide for the 

ECP brake system’s initialization to 

occur by car either randomly or 

sequentially. FRA believes that the 

sequential initialization of an ECP brake 

system provides the train crew with the 

exact placement of the cars in the train, 

which can help satisfy the consist 

comparison requirements also under 

this paragraph. An electronic version of 

the train consist displayed on the 

locomotive cab’s ECP brake system 

monitor can also help during 

emergencies and when identifying the 

exact location of cars with brake 

problems. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61535 

Due to the possibility of an ECP brake 

system not recognizing the inclusion of 

cars not equipped with ECP brake 

systems, paragraph (e) requires the train 

crew compare the total number of cars 

indicated by the train consist 

documentation with the total number of 

cars identified by the ECP brake system. 

Under the existing regulations, tests 

and inspections include brake pipe 

service reductions and designate 

specific psi specifications. In the NPRM, 

FRA indicated that modifications to the 

brake pipe reduction standard are 

appropriate to reflect the technological 

differences between ECP brakes and 

conventional pneumatic brakes. Brake 

pipe pressure in ECP brake-equipped 

trains remains important, since these 

trains still employ a pneumatic 

emergency brake application for safety 

back-up purposes and rely on the 

pneumatic parts when used in an 

overlay system. Accordingly, for trains 

equipped with ECP brake systems, FRA 

proposed to replace the existing brake 

pipe service reductions and increases 

with an alternative requirement for an 

electronic signal that provides an 

equivalent application or release of the 

brakes. FRA indicated that any 

alternative test procedures must 

include, at a minimum, either the 

electronic equivalent to each existing 

test’s brake pipe reduction requirements 

or the equivalent of a full service brake 

pipe reduction initiated by an electronic 

signal. 

FRA sought comments on this 

proposal, including the appropriate type 

of alternative test. In light of how the 

brake pipe’s use in an ECP brake train 

will be limited to charging brake air 

reservoirs, FRA sought comments on 

how the existing regulatory brake pipe 

leakage limits should be modified, if at 

all, for ECP brakes and whether changes 

in the leakage requirements will affect 

the pneumatic backup capability of the 

ECP brake system. In addition, FRA 

indicated that comments should address 

the need to include the specific 

electronic reduction that is to be made 

on ECP equipped trains during the 

required brake tests and what type of 

electronic signals would be suitable 

equivalents to the currently mandated 

20-psi and 15-psi brake reductions. 

NS asserts that compliance with the 

brake pipe service reduction 

requirements cannot be met with ECP 

brake operations. For instance, NS notes 

that § 232.211(c) relates to the increase 

and decrease of brake pipe pressure as 

indicated by a rear end gauge or 

electronic telemetry device. According 

to NS, ECP braking systems provide for 

the constant charge of brake pipe and 

this rear end valve will not reflect the 

air pressure differential currently 

experienced with conventional braking. 

Since those brake reductions will be 

made electronically rather than 

pneumatically from the locomotive, NS 

says that the ECP EOT device will not 

display a change in brake pipe pressure 

to indicate a brake application. 

On the other hand, BLET believes that 

there is a need to include both the 

specific electronic reduction that is to 

be made on ECP brake-equipped trains 

during the required brake tests and a 

determination of what type of electronic 

signals would be suitable equivalents to 

20-psi and 15-psi brake reductions 

mandated in part 232. BLET believes 

that the appropriate alternative would 

be one that correlates a particular psi 

reduction with its digital percentage 

equivalent. According to BLET, 

assuming that the train brake command 

scale is relatively linear, a 20 psi 

reduction represents approximately 77 

percent of a full service reduction and 

a 15 psi reduction represents 

approximately 58 percent of a full 

service reduction. Regarding brake pipe 

leakage, BLET urges FRA to retain 

current regulatory limits, since overlay 

and emulator systems permit 

conventional pneumatic operations. 

Furthermore, AAR Standard S–4200, 

§ 3.8, states that a ‘‘pneumatic backup 

(PB) system shall be required on each 

car to apply emergency brake cylinder 

pressure in the event of a vented brake 

pipe.’’ Establishing different brake pipe 

leakage limits, says BLET, is a 

prescription for confusion and 

unnecessary risk. 

AAR supports retaining the existing 

brake pipe leakage limits. NYAB and 

Wabtec also commented, suggesting 

that, in order to maintain the same 

functionality as with conventional 

brakes, an ECP train brake command 

should be applied in the range of 80 to 

85 percent to address both the 15 and 

20 psi reduction. According to the brake 

manufacturers, the brake pipe 

continuity can be verified by a 

procedure that requires watching the 

end of train brake pipe pressure as 

reported to the locomotive. 

FRA believes that an electronic or 

digital equivalent of the current brake 

pipe reduction test should apply during 

a Class I brake test on ECP brake 

operations. Since the brake 

manufacturers are in the best position to 

determine that equivalent metric, FRA 

will rely on the percentages proposed by 

NYAB and Wabtec. Accordingly, 

paragraph (f)(1) will remain as proposed 

with the understanding that the 

electronic equivalents of 80 percent and 

85 percent ECP train brake command 

shall replace the 15 and 20 psi 

reductions, respectively, when 

conducting brake tests on ECP brake 

systems. 

Further recognizing the disparity 

between the requirements of part 232 

and the reality of ECP brake technology, 

paragraph (f) addresses piston travel 

requirements as they apply to ECP brake 

operations. Paragraph (f) modifies 

certain regulatory requirements related 

to piston travel limits and adjustments 

during applicable brake inspections 

under part 232. For instance, under 

§ 232.205(c)(5) a person performing a 

Class I brake test must ensure that 

piston travel be adjusted to specific 

distances. Although FRA believes that 

ECP brake operations require specific 

piston travel limits, FRA recognizes that 

the piston travel limits contained in 

§ 232.205(c)(5) may not be fully 

applicable to ECP brake systems. Since 

the ECP brake system precisely 

measures and maintains the amount of 

brake cylinder pressure for each 

specified brake application, piston 

travel tolerances for ECP brakes may not 

require the level of specificity as those 

for conventional pneumatic brake 

operations. Further, FRA acknowledges 

that a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ requirement for 

ECP brake system piston travel may not 

be ideal or applicable. AAR and BLET 

support paragraph (f)(1). BLET believes 

that paragraph (f) adequately addresses 

the subject of nominal piston travel and 

AAR believes that manufacturers should 

be permitted to establish alternative 

minimum piston travel ranges. 

Accordingly, paragraph (f) provides 

flexibility for the piston travel limits in 

§ 232.205(c)(5) as they apply to ECP 

brake systems. While FRA limited this 

flexibility in the proposed rule to 

minimum piston travel limits, the final 

rule provides this flexibility to all piston 

travel limits in part 232 as applicable to 

ECP brake operations. FRA anticipates 

that recommended piston travel limits 

for each ECP brake system will be 

determined by the car’s design, weight, 

and engineered brake ratio. 

The final rule requires that such 

limits be stenciled or marked on the car 

or badge plate in the same fashion FRA 

requires for systems and equipment 

subject to § 232.103(g). FRA believes 

that requiring the affixation of a legible 

decal, stencil, or sticker or the 

equipping of a badge plate displaying 

the permissible brake cylinder pistol 

travel ranges will effectively 

communicate the acceptable ranges to 

train crew members and will ensure the 

proper operation of a car’s brakes after 

being inspected. FRA believes that this 

information is essential in order for a 

person to properly perform the required 

brake inspections. Ultimately, all 


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61536 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

modifications provided under paragraph 

(f) apply to part 232 as it relates to ECP 

brake operations. 

In the preamble to the NPRM, FRA 

anticipated that placing a car equipped 

with conventional pneumatic brakes 

into an ECP brake-equipped train may 

be awkward at best, requiring use of an 

electrical ‘‘run around cable’’ and 

manual inputs into the locomotive 

control system. In a letter dated 

February 5, 2007, which is part of the 

docket to this proceeding, AAR 

provided a list of recommended 

‘‘enhancements and modifications’’ to 

Part 232 to facilitate the use of ECP 

brakes. In that communication, the AAR 

stated that railroads ‘‘do not plan to 

commingle non-ECP equipment in 

stand-alone ECP trains.’’ However, FRA 

expressed its belief that foreseeable— 

though rare—circumstances should be 

considered in this rulemaking to the 

extent possible. Accordingly, FRA 

sought comments and information on 

what requirements may be necessary to 

safely allow the addition of cars 

equipped with conventional pneumatic 

brakes into a train equipped with ECP 

brakes, including, but not limited to, the 

placement and securement of cables 

along cars equipped with conventional 

pneumatic brakes to preserve their 

continuity between non-consecutive 

cars equipped with ECP brakes and the 

appropriate placement in the consist of 

cars equipped with conventional 

pneumatic brakes. 

AAR asserts that the railroads can 

wrap ECP brake cables around the 

conventionally braked cars. BLET urges 

FRA to adopt a standard similar to that 

set forth in § 229.89(a), which requires 

that jumpers and cable connections 

between locomotives shall be located 

and guarded to provide sufficient 

vertical clearance. 

In response to the comments 

provided, FRA has added paragraph (g) 

to ensure the safe handling of train line 

cables for the same reasons § 229.89 

addresses jumpers and cables. 

Considering the unique logistical and 

operational issues relating to train line 

cables—including their placement 

between and throughout cars and the 

potential need to somehow bypass cars 

equipped with only conventional 

brakes—FRA has added additional 

requirements. For instance, the final 

rule intends to ensure that the train line 

cable does not drag, catch, or snag and 

does not interfere with any human or 

train movements. Paragraph (g) also 

provides the same electrical related 

protections provided under § 229.89(a). 

Section 232.609 Handling of Defective 

Equipment With ECP Brake Systems 

In § 232.609, FRA modifies certain 

part 232 requirements as they apply to 

freight cars and freight trains equipped 

with ECP brake systems and hauling 

defective equipment. In particular, for 

such trains and cars, paragraph (k) 

excepts certain existing requirements 

and paragraphs (a) through (j) provide 

alternative requirements. 

Under § 232.15 and 49 U.S.C. 20303, 

railroads may be immune to civil 

penalty liability if a car or train with 

certain inoperative or defective 

equipment is hauled under certain 

conditions. Section 232.15(a) contains 

various parameters that must exist in 

order for a railroad to be deemed to be 

hauling a piece of equipment with 

defective brakes for repairs without civil 

penalty liability. The vast majority of 

the requirements contained in 

§ 232.15(a) are a codification of the 

existing statutory requirements 

contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 and are 

based on the voluminous case law 

interpreting those provisions. The 

statutory provisions require hauling 

defective equipment only to the nearest 

place where necessary repairs can be 

made and require 100 percent operative 

brakes from any location where such 

repairs can be effectuated. Thus, 

because many locations where trains are 

initiated with any frequency are also 

locations where brake system repairs 

can be effectuated, the statutory 

provisions essentially require 100 

percent operative brakes from a train’s 

initial terminal. FRA continues to 

believe that the proposed requirements 

relating to the movement of equipment 

with defective ECP brakes are generally 

consistent with the statutory 

requirements, ensure the safe and 

proper movement of defective 

equipment, and clarify the duties 

imposed on a railroad when moving 

such equipment. 

As indicated above, in light of the 

increased safety levels produced by ECP 

brake systems, FRA has decided to use 

its discretionary authority under 49 

U.S.C. 20306 to provide an exception 

from the rigid statutory provisions and 

modify the regulations governing the 

movement of defective equipment 

concomitant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Under 

certain circumstances, the statute and 

related regulations provide immunity 

from civil penalty when a train with 

defective equipment is hauled to the 

nearest location where the necessary 

repairs can be made, regardless of 

direction. Since a train equipped with 

an ECP brake system and operating in 

ECP brake mode with a minimum 

percentage of cars with defective ECP 

brakes is capable of traveling safely for 

long distances, the final rule permits the 

operation of such a train and any cars 

with defective ECP brakes to its 

destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, 

for repair without incurring a civil 

penalty. 

While FRA believes that a train 

operating in ECP brake mode with some 

ineffective or inoperative ECP brakes 

may continue to travel safely, concerns 

remain if such a train includes cars with 

defective non-brake or conventional 

pneumatic brake equipment. ECP brake 

systems do not monitor that equipment 

and do not otherwise reduce the danger 

of traveling with such defects. FRA is 

cognizant of the need for logistical 

flexibility to efficiently accomplish 

repairs during the transition from 

conventional pneumatic to ECP brake 

operations. Furthermore, requiring strict 

adherence to the statutory requirements 

related to moving defective equipment 

ignores the safety features provided by 

ECP brake system technology and could 

potentially stifle the industry’s ability 

and desire to implement the technology. 

The final rule invokes this statutory and 

regulatory relief in paragraph (k) of this 

document, by excepting application of 

§§ 232.15(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), 

(a)(8), and 232.103(d)–(e) as applied to 

ECP brake operated trains. 

Under § 232.103(d), no train may 

depart a location where a Class I brake 

test is required to be performed on the 

entire train with any inoperative or 

ineffective brakes. FRA recognizes that 

some trains operated with ECP brakes 

may need to include cars equipped with 

conventional brakes, especially while a 

fleet makes the transition to ECP brake 

technology. Under such and similar 

circumstances, FRA believes that some 

leeway needs to be provided for trains 

operating in ECP brake mode. To 

provide for such flexibility, and in light 

of ECP brake operations’ higher levels of 

safety, including shorter stopping 

distances and constant real-time 

monitoring of the brake system, FRA 

believes that a train operated with ECP 

brakes may depart its initial terminal 

with less than 100% operative brakes. 

However, FRA also acknowledges that 

allowing a car to depart an initial 

terminal with inoperative or ineffective 

brakes may permit such equipment to 

move indefinitely without receiving the 

proper repairs. For this and other 

reasons noted below, FRA believes there 

needs to be a limit on the types and 

number of cars that may depart in a 

train operating in ECP brake mode from 

a location where the train is required to 

receive a Class I brake test. 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61537 

Per paragraph (k), a train operating in 

ECP brake mode is excepted from 

§ 232.103(d), which requires that onehundred percent of the brakes on a train 

shall be effective and operative prior to 

use or departure from any location 

where a Class I brake test is required to 

be performed on the train pursuant to 

§ 232.205. For ECP brake-equipped 

trains, this requirement is replaced by 

the ninety-five percent effective and 

operative brake requirement contained 

in paragraph (a). FRA believes that this 

provides flexibility from the rules 

governing conventional pneumatic 

braking systems while rendering a 

sufficient brake failure buffer between 

departing an initial terminal with 

ninety-five percent effective and 

operative brakes and experiencing a 

penalty stop upon reaching eighty-five 

percent effective and operative brakes, 

as required under paragraph (d) of the 

final rule. 

The one-hundred percent effective 

and operative brake requirement 

contained in § 232.103(d) is based on 

FRA’s long-standing interpretation and 

application of AAR’s inspection and 

testing standards as they existed in 1958 

as well as the statutory provisions 

related to the use of power brakes and 

the movement of equipment with 

defective safety appliances. See 66 FR 

4104, 4124, 4128 (Jan. 7, 2001). 

However, the design, operation, and 

safety benefits derived from the use of 

ECP brake systems dictate a need to 

modify this long-standing requirement. 

Under the AAR standards, if at any time 

the ECP brakes on a train become less 

than eighty-five percent operative, the 

train will automatically stop via a 

computer induced penalty brake 

application. In addition, it has been 

determined that a train with eighty-five 

percent operative ECP brakes will still 

have better stopping distances than a 

conventional pneumatic braked train 

with one-hundred percent operative 

brakes. Moreover, ECP brake system 

technology provides the ability to 

continuously monitor the real-time 

status of the braking system on each car 

in a train. This allows a locomotive 

engineer to always know the exact 

status of his train’s braking system. In 

light of this increased level of safety, 

FRA believes that a partial reduction in 

the percentage of operative brakes is 

justified. Accordingly, for ECP brake 

operations, FRA hereby modifies the 

requirement to 95 percent effective and 

operative brakes, which it believes 

strikes a balance between the current 

regulation and the need to allow for intransit failures that could compromise 

the operation of the train or otherwise 

automatically shut it down when it 

reaches 85 percent effective or operative 

brakes. 

Under paragraph (a), a train can only 

leave its initial terminal if a Class I 

brake test is performed by a qualified 

mechanical inspector and all ECP 

braked cars that are known to have 

arrived at the location with ineffective 

or inoperative brakes are repaired or 

handled accordingly. The final rule 

intends to ensure that at least 95 percent 

of the cars equipped with ECP brakes 

have effective and operative brakes prior 

to departure from an initial terminal and 

that cars are repaired in a timely 

fashion. The purpose of the 95 percent 

threshold is to prevent the delay or 

disassembly of a train for the removal or 

repair of a very small percentage of cars 

that are discovered to be defective for 

the first time while the railroad is 

conducting its in-depth inspections 

required at a train’s initial terminal. The 

95 percent requirement also 

acknowledges that some initial 

terminals may not initially have the 

capabilities of repairing ineffective or 

inoperative ECP braking systems. 

Accordingly, paragraph (b) allows for 

the movement of cars with such defects 

known to exist upon arrival at its 

destination to be moved only to the 

nearest forward location where repairs 

may be performed and restricts the car 

from being loaded or unloaded while 

being so moved. However, to ensure the 

safe operation of trains operating in ECP 

brake mode, operators are reminded 

that, under the final rule, the inclusion 

of such defective cars cannot make the 

train have less than ninety-five percent 

effective or operative brakes. 

TWU asserts that the widely 

recognized cornerstone of train brake 

system safety is a comprehensive train 

brake inspection and test at the initial 

terminal, which requires 100 percent 

effective brakes. According to TWU, 

there is no valid basis for extending 

inspection intervals to 3,500 miles and 

permitting trains to operate out of an 

initial terminal without 100 percent 

effective brakes. BLET is also strongly 

opposed to paragraph (a). According to 

BLET, AAR Standard S–4260, § 3.5.4.2, 

indicates that the exact status is not 

always known. Thus, says BLET, a HEU 

display of 95 percent operable brakes 

may not reflect all the brakes in the train 

that are inoperable, meaning that the 

locomotive engineer does not always 

know the exact status of the braking 

system. FRA notes that BLET’s concern 

was based on a misunderstanding of 

ECP brake system design, as discussed 

previously during the analysis of 

§ 232.607(b). 

UTU contends that the overall braking 

capacity of each freight car has not 

changed with the introduction of ECP 

brake technology. According to UTU, 

when the number of operable brakes on 

an ECP brake-equipped train is reduced 

by 5 percent, the train has lost 5 percent 

of its total braking capacity. Thus, says 

UTU, an ECP brake operated train with 

only 95 percent operative brakes is less 

safe than a conventional brake operated 

train with 100 percent operable brakes. 

UTU also asserts that the issue of 

allowing ECP brake-equipped trains ‘‘to 

operate in and out of terminals, from 

one Class IA brake test to another with 

only 95 percent of the brakes operable 

is also a significant degradation to 

safety.’’ If these trains depart an initial 

terminal, says UTU, an additional brake 

failure en route may occur in potentially 

unsafe territory and not in a yard’s 

controlled environment. 

On the contrary, UP believes that 

FRA’s proposed limitation to not allow 

less than 95 percent effective ECP 

brakes per train is too restrictive. The 

current regulations allow a 

conventionally braked train to depart 

after a Class I brake inspection with 100 

percent operative brakes, with a 

cumulative failure of up to 15 percent 

of the brakes, equivalent to operating a 

train with 85 percent operative brakes. 

Therefore, says UP, there is no logical 

reason to establish a more stringent 

requirement on an ECP braked train. 

AAR agrees, adding that FRA has 

determined that a train can safely 

operate with 85 percent operative brakes 

and that an ECP brake operated train 

with fewer than 85% operative brakes 

will engage in a penalty brake 

application. According to AAR, no 

adverse safety consequences would flow 

from such an event. Since the train will 

automatically engage in a penalty brake 

application when it reaches that 85 

percent threshold, the railroads assert 

the minimum amount of effective or 

operative brakes at departure should be 

a business or operational decision by 

the railroad. 

BRC supports paragraph (a) and 

objects to the railroads’ proposal, 

arguing that an 85 percent operating 

rule ‘‘goes against all the claims of 

operating efficiency, convenience, and 

incentive for the railroad industry to 

employ ECP brakes.’’ According to BRC, 

this is especially a concern for ECP 

equipped trains traveling long distances 

without intermediate inspections. If 

these trains are allowed to leave the 

initial terminal at 85 percent operating 

capacity, the likelihood that these trains 

will have to stop and make repairs or set 

outs at intermediate locations 

significantly increases. UTU adds that, 


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if these trains depart an initial terminal, 

an additional brake failure en route may 

occur in potentially unsafe territory and 

not in a yard’s controlled environment. 

FRA is not persuaded that it should 

modify paragraph (a) from that proposed 

in the NPRM. The purpose of paragraph 

(a) is to provide operators flexibility in 

an environment of technological change. 

Although FRA understands TWU’s and 

UTU’s concerns about ensuring 100 

percent effective and operative brakes 

on trains departing from initial 

terminals, FRA believes that the ECP 

brake system’s self-monitoring system 

and significant increase in braking 

capabilities provides a level of comfort 

to maintain such flexibility without 

compromising safety. That comfort level 

is also increased by requiring only 

limited movement of that train for the 

purpose of repair. 

UTU also seems to misunderstand 

paragraph (a) when it asserts that the 

issue of allowing ECP brake-equipped 

trains ‘‘to operate in and out of 

terminals, from one Class IA brake test 

to another with only 95% of the brakes 

operable is also a significant 

degradation to safety.’’ The final rule 

does not require Class IA brake tests on 

trains operated with ECP brakes. In any 

event, paragraph (b), further discussed 

below, requires that each car equipped 

with ECP brakes, and known to have 

arrived at a location of a train’s initial 

terminal or at a location where a Class 

I brake test is required, shall not depart 

that location with ineffective or 

inoperative brakes in a train operating 

in ECP brake mode, except when that 

initial terminal does not have facilities 

capable of repairing defective ECP 

brakes. Paragraph (b), however, also 

requires the entire train to stop at the 

nearest forward repair location, causing 

further delays. Thus, FRA expects 

paragraph (b) to provide an incentive for 

the operator to repair the defective 

brakes or set out those cars at the initial 

terminal. For these reasons, FRA 

expects the railroads to quickly ensure 

that all initial terminals and locations 

where Class I brake tests are otherwise 

performed are fully equipped with ECP 

brake repair facilities and that most 

repairs would be made at those 

locations so that trains will depart with 

100 percent effective and operative ECP 

brakes. 

FRA intends that the only exceptions 

are ECP brake-equipped cars whose 

brake defects were found after arrival at 

the initial terminal and conventional 

brake-equipped cars. For instance, if 

defects to a car’s ECP brake system were 

found during a pre-departure Class I 

brake inspection, the ECP brake 

operated train may depart and travel to 

destination. While paragraph (a) and (b) 

imply this as a possibility, paragraph (e) 

makes it clear. 

FRA believes that the railroads 

misinterpret the existing regulations 

under subpart C and this final rule’s 

paragraph (a) as they relate to the 

minimum number of effective and 

operative brakes on a train departing 

from its initial terminal. Under 

§§ 232.103(d) and (f), trains operated 

with conventional brakes cannot move 

with any ineffective or inoperative 

brakes except under the safe harbor 

provisions provided under § 232.15. 

Even moving with the immunities 

afforded under § 232.15, however, 

§ 232.103(e) absolutely prevents such 

trains from moving if the level of 

operative or effective brakes reaches 85 

percent. Accordingly, FRA is not 

increasing the 85 percent limitation up 

to 95 percent, but is decreasing the 100 

percent limitation to 95 percent. 

In any event, FRA believes that the 95 

percent limitation at initial terminals 

provides sufficient flexibility for the 

implementation of new technology and 

does not feel comfortable further 

reducing that amount at this time. While 

the railroads contend that the buffer 

between departure and the ECP brake 

system’s potential penalty brake 

application (i.e., an automatic and 

immediate emergency or full brake 

application made by the ECP brake 

system in accordance with the current 

AAR standards) at 85 percent should be 

a market or operational decision since it 

is much safer than conventional brake 

operations at that level, FRA believes 

that the railroads fail to appreciate the 

aforementioned reasons for the 95 

percent limitation and the effects no 

limitation may have. By further 

reducing or eliminating the limitation, 

the potential for an automatic 

application of the brakes at 85 percent 

effective and operative brakes increases. 

In such an event, the stopped train may 

delay other trains, potentially causing a 

serious domino effect of non-movement. 

Safety concerns also remain. FRA is 

certainly sensitive to UTU’s concern 

that such an event may occur in unsafe 

territory, putting the train and its crew 

at risk. Accordingly, FRA does not think 

it reasonable to allow an ECP brake 

operated train to depart its initial 

terminal with as little as 85 percent 

effective and operative brakes. 

Paragraph (b)(4) also requires that a 

car with ineffective or inoperative ECP 

brakes be tagged in accordance with 

§ 232.15(b). FRA believes that 

§ 232.15(b) should equally apply to 

trains operating in ECP brake mode and 

should be a prerequisite for the 

movement from the initial terminal of 

any car with defective brakes. Section 

232.15(b) contains the specific 

requirements regarding the tagging of 

equipment found with defective brake 

components and recognizes that the 

industry may attempt to develop some 

type of automated tracking system 

capable of retaining the information 

required by that section and tracking 

defective equipment electronically. 

Thus, paragraph (b)(4), through 

§ 232.15(b), proposes to permit the use 

of an automated tracking system in lieu 

of directly tagging the equipment if the 

automated system is approved for use 

by FRA. FRA continues to believe that 

these provisions are necessary to ensure 

the agency’s ability to monitor such 

systems and potentially prohibit the use 

of the system if it is found deficient. The 

proposed rule makes clear that, by 

ensuring application of § 232.15(b) to 

ECP brake systems, an automated 

tracking system approved for use by 

FRA would be capable of being 

reviewed and monitored by FRA at any 

time. This paragraph also notifies the 

railroads that FRA reserves the right to 

prohibit the use of a previously 

approved automated tracking system if 

FRA subsequently finds it to be 

insecure, inaccessible, or inadequate. 

Such a determination would have to be 

in writing and include the basis for 

taking such action. 

Paragraph (c) permits, with certain 

limitations, trains operating in ECP 

brake mode to move cars equipped with 

conventional pneumatic brakes. If a 

freight car equipped with only 

conventional pneumatic brakes would 

have effective and operable brakes in a 

train equipped with a ‘‘stand-alone’’ 

conventional pneumatic brake system, 

the final rule permits a freight train 

operating in ECP brake mode to move 

such a car. If a car has defective 

conventional pneumatic brakes—which 

would be ineffective or inoperative in a 

train with a ‘‘stand-alone’’ conventional 

pneumatic brake system—the final rule 

permits its movement by a freight train 

operating in ECP brake mode, but only 

if the movement is made in accordance 

with § 232.15. By referring to § 232.15, 

paragraph (c) intends to, amongst other 

things, include the exceptions 

delineated in paragraph (k) and limit the 

movement of such cars to the nearest 

location where repairs can be made. 

Paragraph (c) also reminds regulated 

parties to comply with the tagging 

requirements of § 232.15(b) for the same 

reasons as paragraph (b). FRA notes that 

the inclusion of cars with defective or 

non-defective conventional pneumatic 

brakes into a train operating in ECP 

brake mode shall not cause the train to 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61539 

have less than ninety-five percent 

effective and operative brakes in 

accordance with paragraph (a). FRA 

believes that permitting a limited 

inclusion of cars equipped with 

conventional pneumatic brakes will 

provide some flexibility as operators 

transition their fleets from conventional 

pneumatic to ECP brake systems while 

ensuring a satisfactory level of safety. 

BLET believes that § 232.15(e) should 

apply with respect to placement of cars 

equipped with conventional brakes in 

trains operated with ECP brakes. As 

previously stated, FRA expects that, 

except for the sections and paragraphs 

specifically excepted and the limitations 

modified by the final rule, subpart C 

continues to be fully applicable and 

enforceable for trains and cars equipped 

with ECP brakes. Since the final rule 

does not except or modify § 232.15(e), 

FRA intends its continued application 

and enforcement. While the final rule 

may remind the regulated parties that 

certain specific existing paragraphs in 

subpart C continue to apply (e.g., 

paragraphs (b)(4) and (c) referencing 

§ 232.15(b)), this does not imply that 

sections and paragraphs not referenced 

do not apply. References to more 

specific paragraphs may exist for the 

purposes of clarity. FRA recognizes that 

mixing technology may confuse 

application of the existing law. For 

instance, while it may be clear to most 

how § 232.15 may apply to 

conventionally braked cars even in 

trains operated with ECP brakes, FRA 

foresees confusion when applying 

§ 232.15 to ECP braked cars in trains 

operated with conventional brakes. 

Thus, the final rule includes specific 

paragraph references when regulating 

the latter under paragraph (g). 

Once an ECP brake system detects 

that the train has less than eighty-five 

percent operative brakes, AAR standard 

S–4200 requires an automatic and 

immediate full service brake 

application. Paragraph (d) mirrors S– 

4200 by requiring a train operating in 

ECP brake mode to cease moving once 

less than eighty-five percent of the 

train’s cars have effective and operative 

brakes. In other words, under paragraph 

(d), no train shall move with more than 

fifteen percent of its brakes being 

defective or otherwise inoperative or 

ineffective until certain conditions are 

met. Recognizing, however, that 

foundation brake rigging defects may 

not be detected by the electronic system, 

and that calculation of the percentage 

may require an accurate manual entry of 

the total cars in the train by the train 

crew, FRA proposes paragraph (d) to 

continually ensure the safe operation of 

trains operating in ECP brake mode with 

ineffective or inoperative brakes. 

Although there is no explicit statutory 

limit regarding the number of cars with 

inoperative brake equipment that may 

be hauled in a train, the fifteen percent 

limitation is a longstanding industry 

and agency interpretation of the 

hauling-for-repair provision currently 

codified at 49 U.S.C. 20303, and has 

withstood the test of time. This 

interpretation is extrapolated from 

another statutory requirement which 

permits a railroad to use a train only if 

‘‘at least 50 percent of the vehicles in 

the train are equipped with power or 

train brakes and the engineer is using 

the power or train brakes on those 

vehicles and on all other vehicles 

equipped with them that are associated 

with those vehicles in a train.’’ 49 

U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally 

enacted in 1903, section 20302, also 

granted the Interstate Commerce 

Commission (ICC) the authority to 

increase this percentage, and in 1910 

the ICC issued an order increasing the 

minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 

49 CFR 232.103(e), which codifies the 

ICC order. FRA believes that if the rule 

is read in its entirety, there should be no 

confusion as to the movement of 

defective equipment, and that this 

provision merely sets an outside limit 

on the percentage of cars that may be 

hauled in any train with inoperative 

brakes. Consequently, FRA will 

continue to require that equipment with 

inoperative air brakes make up no more 

than 15 percent of any train. 

FRA acknowledges that § 232.103(e) 

already prevents a train’s movement ‘‘if 

less than 85 percent of the cars in that 

train have effective and operative 

brakes.’’ However, FRA has also stated 

that § 232.103(e) ‘‘contains a clear and 

absolute prohibition on train movement 

if more than 15 percent of the cars in a 

train have their brakes cut out or have 

otherwise inoperative brakes.’’ Because 

ECP brake systems are designed to 

automatically stop the train whenever 

and wherever the brake system has less 

than 15 percent operative brakes, FRA 

recognizes that some flexibility is 

needed to ensure that such trains are not 

stranded on the main track. To provide 

flexibility in those rare instances where 

a train experiences a penalty brake 

application as a result of having less 

than 85 percent operative brakes, 

paragraph (d) includes requirements to 

ensure the safe movement of such 

trains. FRA recognizes the need for 

some trains operating in ECP brake 

mode to continue to an appropriate 

repair facility or nearest siding after 

experiencing a penalty brake 

application. Since ECP brake 

implementation is in its infant stages, 

FRA acknowledges that a railroad may 

not initially have a significant number 

of repair facilities beyond the initial 

terminals of ECP equipped cars. 

Accordingly, paragraph (d) permits 

limited movement of such trains for 

repair or consist modification purposes. 

In any event, in light of the Class I 

inspection required under § 232.607, the 

minimum number of ineffective or 

inoperative brakes allowed under 

§ 232.609, and an ECP brake system’s 

continuous monitoring and diagnostics 

functions, FRA believes that trains 

operating in ECP brake mode will rarely, 

if ever, reach fifteen percent inoperative 

or ineffective brakes. However, FRA 

believes that paragraph (d)—in an 

abundance of caution and in 

anticipation of such a possibility 

occurring—will ensure safe and efficient 

operations. In order to move a train 

operating in ECP brake mode that 

experiences a penalty brake application 

due to having less than 85 percent 

effective and operative brakes, 

paragraph (d) requires the train crew to 

perform a visual inspection of the entire 

train, ensure the safe operation of the 

train, and determine that it is safe to 

move the train. 

Under the current regulations, visual 

inspections are generally performed 

when moving defective equipment since 

a ‘‘qualified person’’ must determine 

that the car is safe to move. It is FRA’s 

understanding that most, if not all, 

railroads require a crew member to 

make a visual inspection of a car when 

a problem occurs en route. A proper 

visual inspection ensures that the brakes 

are cut out on a faulty car and 

eliminates the possibility of dragging or 

stuck brakes. A dragging or loose part or 

piece of equipment can find its way 

under a wheel, causing a derailment. A 

brake that will not release—due to bent 

or fouled brake rigging or a problematic 

control valve—will cause the wheel to 

slide. A sliding wheel will not properly 

traverse a switch or cross-over, setting 

up a potential derailment. A sliding 

wheel may also cause a severe flat spot 

to occur on the wheel, which can also 

lead to a derailment and stress on the 

rail. By requiring that the train crew 

ensure the safe operation of the train 

and determine that it is safe to move the 

train, FRA intends to make clear that it 

is the railroad’s responsibility, through 

its crew, to do whatever is necessary to 

ensure safe train operation under the 

flexibility provided by paragraph (d). 

Any deviation from the requirements 

under paragraph (d) while moving a 

train with less than eighty-five percent 


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61540 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

effective brakes would pose a significant 

safety hazard and violate the rule. 

In addition, under paragraph (d), the 

train’s subsequent movement must be 

made in a restricted ECP brake Switch 

Mode to the nearest or nearest forward 

location where necessary repairs or 

changes to the consist can be made. 

Under AAR Standard S–4200 § 4.2.6.2.2, 

the speed of an ECP brake-equipped 

train in Switch Mode shall not exceed 

20 mph. The purpose of the 20 mph 

limitation, among Switch Mode’s other 

restrictions, is to ensure the safe 

movement of the train with less than 

ideal brake operations while allowing 

the train to operate to a location where 

defective braking systems can be 

repaired or where cars can be added or 

removed from the train so that it will 

have at least eighty-five percent 

effective and operative brakes. 

BLET notes that paragraph (d)(4), as 

proposed in the NPRM, appeared to 

prohibit a railroad from opting to move 

an ECP brake operated train with less 

than 85% operative brakes in Switch 

Mode to the nearest rearward repair 

location. If FRA intended to prohibit a 

backhaul, BLET expressed interest in 

FRA’s rationale. The proposed rule 

provided for the movement of defective 

equipment to the ‘‘nearest forward’’ 

repair location and did not intend to 

prohibit a backhaul of equipment when 

appropriate. The purpose of FRA 

invoking its discretionary authority 

under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to partially 

except application of 49 U.S.C. 20303 to 

ECP brake operations was to remove a 

disincentive towards ECP brake 

implementation by providing 

operational flexibility when hauling 

defective equipment for the purposes of 

repair. FRA intends to allow the 

railroads to move defective equipment 

to the first suitable location for repairs 

in either direction it so chooses. 

Accordingly, FRA has clarified the final 

rule to provide for such movement to 

the ‘‘nearest or nearest forward repair 

location.’’ Paragraph (e) permits trains 

operating in ECP brake mode with 

defective ECP brakes to be used or 

hauled without civil penalty liability 

under part 232 to its destination, not to 

exceed 3,500 miles. Such defects must 

be found for the first time during a Class 

I brake test or en route. As previously 

mentioned, FRA believes that a train 

operating in ECP brake mode can safely 

continue to its destination with some 

ineffective or inoperative brakes. 

Accordingly, paragraph (e) proposes 

that all such trains be permitted to 

travel to its destination, not to exceed 

3,500 miles, without incurring civil 

penalty liability in relation to the use of 

those brakes. Paragraph (e) also 

proposes that this civil penalty 

immunity be extended to such trains 

with ECP brake defects found at the 

initial terminal. If such defects are 

found after a train is put together in 

preparation for its next departure, it 

may be overly burdensome to require 

that the train be taken apart for repair. 

If a brake repair may be performed 

without taking the train apart, FRA 

acknowledges that the repair may cause 

undue delay. If the ECP brake defect is 

found at the location where a Class I 

inspection is performed, FRA believes 

that such burdens and delays may be 

avoided in light of the increased safety 

afforded by ECP brake systems. 

FRA believes that this flexibility 

needs to be afforded differently to 

defects that are known to exist upon a 

car’s arrival at its destination or at a 

location where a Class I brake test will 

be required on the train than to defects 

found for the first time at the location 

where a Class I brake test is performed. 

If a freight car equipped with an ECP 

brake system is known to have arrived 

with ineffective or inoperative brakes at 

the location of a train’s initial terminal 

or at a location where a Class I brake test 

is required under § 232.607(b), that car 

is subject to the limitations in paragraph 

(b), not paragraph (e). Paragraph (b) 

intends to ensure that known defects are 

repaired before continued use and to 

prevent trains operating in ECP brake 

mode from traveling indefinitely 

without repairing their defective ECP 

brakes. On the other hand, by retaining 

paragraph (e) as proposed, FRA 

recognizes the burden placed on 

operators to comply with such a rule 

when it discovers the defect when it is 

in the process of putting a train together 

or after a train is already put together 

and inspected. Paragraph (e) recognizes 

that burden by treating the train 

similarly to a train that detects a 

defective ECP brake while it is en route. 

Paragraph (f) provides limited 

flexibility for trains operating in ECP 

brake mode with a non-brake safety 

appliance defect on a car equipped with 

ECP brakes. To enjoy such flexibility 

under paragraph (f), the car may only be 

used or hauled to the nearest or nearest 

forward location for repairs. As noted 

above, in light of the increased safety 

levels afforded by ECP brake system 

technologies, the final rule allows trains 

operating in ECP brake mode with 

defective ECP brakes to travel to its 

destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles. 

FRA does not believe it prudent to 

provide the same level of flexibility to 

cars operating in ECP brake-equipped 

trains with non-brake safety appliance 

defects, since an ECP brake system’s 

increased safety level does not reduce 

the dangers of such defects. However, 

FRA does believe that flexibility should 

be afforded to permit the direct hauling 

of such equipment to the nearest or 

nearest forward repair location. To 

require the hauling of ECP brake 

equipment to the nearest location where 

necessary repairs can be effectuated, 

rather than allowing such to the nearest 

forward location, could create 

unnecessary safety hazards. As there 

initially will only be a limited number 

of ECP brake-equipped trains in 

operation at any given time, the ability 

to switch cars from one ECP train to 

another, merely for the purposes of 

getting the car to a closer repair facility, 

will be severely limited. Rather than 

requiring cars equipped with ECP 

brakes to be hauled in non-ECP braked 

trains, where their brakes will be 

inoperative, FRA believes it is safer to 

permit the car to continue in the train 

equipped with ECP brakes to the next 

forward location where the necessary 

non-brake safety appliance repairs can 

be made. 

In the event trains must include cars 

equipped with brake systems not 

compatible with the train’s brake 

system, the final rule includes 

requirements to ensure the safe 

operation of such trains. Paragraph (g) 

allows a train operating with a 

conventional pneumatic brake systemregardless of whether it is a train with 

‘‘stand-alone’’ conventional pneumatic 

brakes or an ECP brake-equipped train 

operating in conventional pneumatic 

brake mode—to include cars with standalone ECP brake systems. To maintain 

an acceptable level of safety, however, 

paragraph (g) requires that such trains 

must have at least 95 percent effective 

and operative brakes at the conclusion 

of a Class I brake test, inclusive of all 

cars regardless of braking systems. 

Further, to meet the same level of safety 

intended by 49 CFR 232.103(d), 

paragraph (g) also requires that the train 

have 100 percent effective and operative 

conventional pneumatic brakes at the 

Class I brake test site when operating in 

conventional pneumatic mode. 

Accordingly, paragraph (g) allows 

trains equipped with a conventional 

pneumatic brake system—or with ECP 

brake systems and operating in 

conventional pneumatic brake mode—to 

operate with freight cars equipped with 

stand-alone ECP brake systems under 

limited circumstances. Under paragraph 

(g), any such train not in compliance 

with those circumstances shall not be 

operated. The purpose of these 

limitations is to ensure the safe 

operation of such trains that contain 

cars with incompatible stand-alone ECP 

brake systems. FRA understands that 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61541 

some trains operating with conventional 

pneumatic brakes may need to carry 

cars with incompatible stand-alone ECP 

brake systems, especially when the 

implementation of ECP brake system 

technology is in its infant stages. For 

instance, FRA anticipates that a need 

may arise to move a new ECP brakeequipped car in a train operating with 

conventional pneumatic brakes from the 

car manufacturer’s facility or a repair 

shop to a location where the railroad 

operates trains equipped with ECP 

brakes. FRA also anticipates that a dual 

mode ECP brake system operating in 

ECP brake mode may incur a 

malfunction—such as a broken train 

line cable or locomotive controller— 

forcing the operator to switch the train’s 

operation to conventional pneumatic 

brake mode. As long as the train’s total 

number of cars with ineffective or 

inoperative brakes does not fall below 

the threshold percentage contained in 

paragraph (g)—via reference to 

paragraph (d)—FRA believes that the 

train may safely include cars with 

incompatible stand-alone ECP brake 

systems. 

Paragraph (g) includes requirements 

for the subject train and each of its 

stand-alone ECP brake-equipped cars. 

For such a train to operate, it must 

comply with the minimum percentage 

of operative brakes required by 

paragraph (h) when at an initial 

terminal—which will be discussed 

below—or paragraph (d) when en route 

for the same reasons discussed in 

paragraph (d). Under paragraph (g), a 

stand-alone ECP brake-equipped car in 

a train operating with conventional 

pneumatic brakes can only be moved for 

delivery to a railroad receiving the 

equipment or to a location where the car 

may be added to a train operating in 

ECP brake mode. Otherwise, the 

movement of the car is restricted to the 

nearest available location where 

necessary repairs can be effectuated. In 

addition, such cars must be tagged in 

accordance with § 232.15(b) for the 

same reasons as stated for the analysis 

of paragraph (b) and placed in the train 

in accordance with § 232.15(e). Section 

232.15(e) contains the requirements 

regarding the placement of cars in a 

train that have inoperative brakes. The 

requirements contained in that 

paragraph are consistent with the 

current industry practice and are part of 

almost every major railroad’s operating 

rules. By incorporating § 232.15(e) by 

reference, paragraph (g) prohibits the 

placing of a vehicle with inoperative 

brakes at the rear of the train and the 

consecutive placing of more than two 

vehicles with inoperative brakes, as test 

track demonstrations have indicated 

that when three consecutive cars in a 

train operating with conventional 

pneumatic brakes have their brakes cutout, it is not always possible to obtain 

an emergency brake application on 

trailing cars. To remain consistent with 

existing industry practice, paragraph (g), 

by referencing § 232.15(e), requires that 

such equipment shall not be placed in 

a train if it has more than two 

consecutive individual control valves 

cut out or if the brakes controlled by the 

valve are inoperative. 

NS is concerned that § 232.609 does 

not adequately allow for the handling of 

defective equipment with ECP brake 

systems. NS notes that 

§ 232.609(g)(2)(iii) requires compliance 

with § 232.15(e)(2), which states that 

‘‘no more than two freight cars with 

either inoperative brakes or not 

equipped with power brakes shall be 

consecutively placed in the train.’’ Due 

to the efficiencies gained in stopping 

and the drastically reduced slack action, 

says NS, for ECP trains this should be 

increased to ‘‘no more than five freight 

cars with defective air brakes to being 

cut out electronically.’’ NS supports that 

no more than five cars that are 

electronically cut out shall be placed 

consecutively within the train, two of 

which may be pneumatically cut out. 

ECP brake-equipped cars that have the 

brakes electronically cut out, says NS, 

will retain the same rapid venting of 

brake pipe in order to produce a 

pneumatic emergency with no adverse 

effects on the braking system. NYAB 

and Wabtec make the same proposal. 

FRA sees the merit in the proposal of 

NS, NYAB, and Wabtec and continues 

to believe that § 232.15(e)(1) should 

apply to the placement of cars equipped 

with ECP brakes in trains operated with 

ECP brakes, since it is always dangerous 

when the last car in the train is without 

braking capacity. FRA also continues to 

believe that no more than two 

consecutive cars should be placed in a 

train with their brakes pneumatically 

cut out, since the train’s pneumatic 

brake application should remain 

available in emergency situations, 

especially in trains operating with ECP 

overlay systems. FRA recognizes that a 

train operated with ECP brakes may 

safely initiate an emergency brake 

application with up to five ECP brakeequipped cars electronically cut out via 

the car’s CCD. Pneumatically cut out 

brakes will increase the length of the 

brake pipe, which may slow the rapid 

venting of brake pipe pressure to the 

point where an emergency brake 

application cannot be made. However, 

all effective and operative ECP brakes 

should be able to apply in an ECP brake 

operated train, since the train line cable 

continues to carry the emergency 

transmission with equal strength and 

speed throughout the entire train. 

Accordingly, any increase in 

consecutive cars equipped with ECP 

brakes with ineffective or inoperative 

brakes may only affect train handling, 

not train line braking communications. 

FRA recognizes that a railroad may be 

more familiar with each territory it 

traverses and may be in a better position 

to determine how many consecutive 

cars with electronically cut out brakes 

may be allowed without causing safety 

issues. However, in the interests of 

public safety, and in light of the 

comments made by the brake 

manufacturers and railroads, FRA 

believes that the performance 

characteristics of the ECP brake system 

will safely allow for up to five 

consecutive cars to be electronically cut 

out in a train. 

FRA further recognizes that a one-toone CCD-to-car ratio does not exist for 

all cars. Intermodal cars, for example, 

have more platforms than CCDs and 

control valves. Accordingly, for the 

same reasons provided above, the final 

rule prevents more than five 

consecutive platforms with 

electronically cut out brakes on 

intermodal trains. Thus, to ensure 

sufficient train handling safety, the final 

rule also requires that the sets of 

consecutive cars with electronically cut 

out brakes be sufficiently spaced. FRA 

expects the number of cars with 

operative brakes buffering between 

these sets to differ depending upon a 

variety of factors including, but not 

limited to, the length of the train, the 

weight of the train and certain cars, the 

types of cars, and the territory. The 

sufficiency of buffer cars, therefore, 

must be determined by each railroad 

and enforced by FRA on a case-by-case 

basis. 

Paragraph (h) includes additional 

requirements for freight trains equipped 

and operating with conventional 

pneumatic brakes when departing an 

initial terminal with stand-alone ECP 

brake-equipped freight cars. On such 

trains, paragraph (h) allows the train to 

depart its initial terminal with at least 

ninety-five percent effective and 

operative brakes and up to five percent 

of the cars to be equipped with ECP 

brakes. However, each car equipped 

with conventional pneumatic brake 

systems must have effective and 

operative brakes and each car equipped 

with dual mode ECP brake systems must 

operate in conventional pneumatic 

brake mode and have effective and 

operative conventional pneumatic 

brakes. The five percent of cars with 


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potentially defective brakes may only be 

cars equipped with stand-alone ECP 

brake systems. 

Paragraph (i) provides for the 

electronic tagging of defective ECP brake 

equipment when being moved in a train 

operating in ECP brake mode. FRA 

recognizes that § 232.15(b) already 

provides requirements for electronic 

tagging of defective equipment. 

However, in view of the ECP brake 

system’s unique characteristics, it is not 

entirely clear how § 232.15(b) would 

appropriately apply to electronic 

records developed, retained, and 

maintained by ECP brake systems. 

Accordingly, paragraph (i) contains the 

criteria necessary to determine whether 

an ECP brake system complies with 

§ 232.15(b). 

In the NPRM, FRA stated that, in 

order for an ECP brake system to 

provide electronic tagging of equipment 

with defective safety appliances, the 

ECP brake system must provide 

appropriate, constant, and accurate 

information to the crew via a display in 

the cab of the lead locomotive, and 

ensure that the information is securely 

stored and is accessible to FRA and 

appropriate operating and inspection 

personnel. To ensure the integrity of 

electronic tagging, FRA asserted, the 

ECP brake system must securely store 

the information. FRA sought comments 

on how secure a system must be. 

BLET and AAR responded to this 

proposal with concerns relating to the 

secure storage of information 

requirement. According to BLET, any 

resolution of electronic recordkeeping 

issues should consider the solutions 

provided by the RSAC Locomotive 

Safety Standards Working Group. AAR 

does not believe it likely that an 

employee would seek to override the 

ECP software. In any event, AAR points 

out that since there is no information 

security requirement for paper records, 

there is no reason to require information 

security for electronic records. FRA 

agrees with BLET and AAR on this issue 

and has not included the information 

security requirement in the final rule. 

However, the remainder of the proposal 

has been retained in the final rule. FRA 

continues to believe that the electronic 

tag information must be accessible for 

safety and oversight purposes. 

Paragraph (i) makes clear that an 

automated tracking system approved for 

use by FRA must be capable of being 

reviewed and monitored by FRA at any 

time. The information should also be 

accessible to subsequent train crews that 

require notification of defects. 

In the NPRM, FRA acknowledged that 

some railroads may also desire to use 

the ECP brake system to electronically 

tag defective non-ECP brake equipment. 

FRA anticipates that such electronic 

tagging would have to be manually 

entered into the system, since safety 

appliances are not monitored by the 

ECP brake system. FRA sought 

comments on whether the rule should 

include provisions allowing for the 

manual input of non-ECP brake defects 

into ECP brake systems for electronic 

tagging purposes. FRA also sought 

comments on what requirements and 

allowances should be made in 

consideration of that interest, including 

means to associate or merge ECP brake 

system information with information 

not monitored electronically by the ECP 

brake system. No comments were 

received on this issue. Accordingly, 

FRA has not provided for such 

electronic tagging capabilities in the 

final rule. This does not mean that a 

railroad is prevented from bringing an 

electronic tagging program to FRA for its 

approval under § 232.15(b) when it 

pertains to non-ECP brake defects and 

utilizes the ECP brake technology to 

electronically tag and track such 

equipment. 

In the NPRM, FRA acknowledged that 

locomotive engineers may be distracted 

or subjected to information overload by 

multiple monitors or displays in the 

locomotive cab, thus potentially 

endangering the safe operation of the 

train. FRA sought comments and 

information on this issue. In Wabtec’s 

and NYAB’s experience, the additional 

display has not been an issue with the 

operators. In the event that an 

additional display is added, say the 

brake manufacturers, the information 

displayed is minimal and straight 

forward. In the case where ECP brake 

system information is integrated into the 

existing displays, ECP information 

replaces air brake information. BLET 

states that Appendix E to Part 236 

addresses the issue of human-machine 

interface design where positive train 

control technology is implemented. 

Otherwise, says BLET, this issue is not 

ripe for resolution in the final rule. AAR 

agrees, stating that information overload 

caused by multiple monitors or displays 

in the locomotive cab is better suited for 

a separate proceeding. In light of the 

comments, the final rule does not 

include any requirements relating to 

ECP brake system monitors and 

displays. 

Paragraph (j) requires that the 

railroads adopt and comply with written 

procedures governing the movement of 

defective equipment. The procedures 

must comply with the related regulatory 

requirements, including those in the 

final rule. FRA expects each railroad to 

develop appropriate procedures 

regarding its handling and repair of 

defective equipment containing ECP 

brake systems or hauled in trains 

operating in ECP brake mode. FRA 

acknowledges that many railroads may 

already have such procedures in place. 

FRA believes that the establishment of 

these procedures is the most effective 

means by which to minimize the 

possibility of future accidents caused by 

the movement of defective equipment 

on cars and trains equipped with ECP 

brake systems or operating in ECP brake 

mode. Given the introduction of new 

technology and its partial 

incompatibility with existing systems, 

FRA believes the need for adoption and 

compliance with such procedures is 

critical for continued safety in the rail 

industry. 

BLET suggests that the procedures 

governed by paragraph (j) should be 

filed with, rather than merely be made 

available to, FRA. FRA has placed the 

burden on the railroads to be custodians 

of the information referenced in 

paragraph (j)(1). FRA only needs access 

to the information in certain situations 

and does not require ownership or 

custodianship. Accordingly, FRA sees 

no need to expend its resources on 

receiving and maintaining such files. 

In contrast, however, the information 

required in paragraph (j)(2) must be 

filed with FRA for continual 

enforcement purposes. FRA cannot be 

expected to enforce its rules relating to 

the handling of defective equipment 

without this information instantly and 

continually available. To ensure 

compliance with the requirements 

concerning the performance of ECP 

brake system repairs, paragraph (j)(2) 

requires railroads to submit to FRA, 

prior to operating ECP brake systems in 

revenue service, a list identifying 

locations where such repairs may be 

made. FRA believes that the list should 

encompass a sufficient number of 

locations to ensure that Class I brake 

tests are performed at appropriate 

intervals and that trains equipped with 

ECP brake systems do not travel further 

than their destination or 3,500 miles 

without being inspected and repaired at 

Class I brake test locations and repair 

facilities. If a railroad adds or removes 

any repair facility from its system, 

paragraph (j)(2) requires that the 

railroad amend or modify that list by 

timely notifying FRA of those changes at 

least 15 days in advance. 

Paragraph (k) explicitly excepts other 

portions of part 232 as they apply to 

ECP brake systems. For instance, 

paragraph (k) excepts application of 

§ 232.15(a)(2) and (a)(5) through (a)(7), 

which generally require that equipment 

with defective safety appliances be 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61543 

repaired at the location where they are 

first discovered to be defective or that 

they be moved only to the nearest 

available location where necessary 

repairs can be performed. As noted 

above, FRA believes that freight cars 

equipped with ECP brakes and freight 

trains operating in ECP brake mode 

need to be provided some flexibility in 

being handled for repair and when 

moving equipment with defective safety 

appliances. The provisions contained in 

§ 232.15(a), if applied, would frequently 

frustrate the purpose of FRA’s proposal 

and ignore the safety advances provided 

by ECP braking systems. 

Paragraph (k) also excepts 

§ 232.15(a)(8), which prohibits the 

movement of a defective car or 

locomotive in a train required to receive 

a Class I brake test at that location. As 

discussed in detail above, paragraph (a) 

allows a train operated with ECP brakes 

to leave its initial terminal with only 

ninety-five percent operative brakes 

after a Class I brake test. By doing so, 

paragraph (a) implicitly excepts trains 

operating in ECP brake mode from 

§ 232.103(d), which prohibits a train 

from departing from its initial terminal 

with any inoperative or ineffective 

brakes. Nevertheless, paragraph (k) 

intends to clearly and explicitly except 

§ 232.103(d). An explicit exception in 

this rule does not imply that there are 

no independent and implicit exceptions 

elsewhere. Finally, § 232.103(e) 

‘‘contains a clear and absolute 

prohibition on train movement if more 

than 15 percent of the cars in a train 

have their brakes cut out or have 

otherwise inoperative brakes,’’ thus 

preventing a train’s movement ‘‘if less 

than 85 percent of the cars in that train 

have effective and operative brakes.’’ 

Due to relief proposed by this section, 

however, the strict limits imposed by 

§ 232.103(e) would no longer be 

applicable to trains regulated under 

these proposed rules. Accordingly, 

paragraph (k) excepts § 232.103(e). 

BLET does not support 232.609(k) and 

does not believe that FRA should invoke 

its discretionary authority under 49 

U.S.C. § 20306 to exempt railroads from 

the requirements of 20303. As noted 

above in the discussion contained in 

Section IX of this document, FRA has 

considered BLET’s concerns and has 

decided to invoke its discretionary 

authority. 

Section 232.611 Periodic Maintenance 

FRA intends that all unexcepted and 

unmodified rules under part 232 apply 

to ECP brake operations. For the 

purposes of further clarity, however, 

paragraph (a) of § 232.611 reminds the 

operators of equipment with ECP brake 

systems to comply with the 

maintenance requirements contained in 

§ 232.303(b) through (d), which require 

the performance of certain tests and 

inspections whenever a car is on a shop 

or repair track. FRA continues to believe 

that a repair or shop track provides an 

ideal setting for railroads to conduct an 

individualized inspection on a car’s 

brake system to ensure its proper 

operation. FRA also continues to believe 

that such inspections are necessary to 

reduce the potential of overlooking cars 

with excessive piston travel during the 

performance of ordinary brake 

inspections. If any problems are 

detected at that location, the personnel 

needed to make any necessary 

corrections are already present. 

Furthermore, performing these 

inspections at this time ensures proper 

operation of the cars’ brakes and 

eliminates the potential of having to cut 

cars out of an assembled train and, thus, 

should reduce inspection times and 

make for more efficient operations. 

FRA continues to believe that 

§ 232.303(b) and (c) should apply to all 

operations, including those with ECP 

brake systems. Section 232.303(b) 

requires testing of each car on a shop or 

repair track to determine that its air 

brakes apply and remain applied until 

a release is initiated. If the brakes fail to 

apply or to remain applied until a 

release is initiated, the car must be 

repaired and retested. Section 

§ 232.303(c) requires piston travel to be 

inspected and, if necessary, adjusted. 

FRA intends for this to be accomplished 

in accordance with the stencil or badge 

plate on cars equipped with ECP brakes 

in accordance with § 232.607(f)(2). 

FRA also continues to believe that 

§ 232.303(d) should apply to all 

operations, including those with ECP 

brake systems. Section 232.303(d) lists 

brake system components requiring 

inspection prior to releasing a car from 

a shop or repair track. This section 

requires inspection of a car’s hand 

brakes, angle cocks to ensure proper 

positioning to allow maximum air flow, 

and brake indicators, if equipped, to 

ensure their accuracy and proper 

operation. A periodic inspection is an 

ideal time for the railroad to inspect 

these items while imposing the least 

burden on the railroad’s inspection and 

repair forces. 

In addition to requiring continued 

compliance with § 232.303(b) through 

(d), paragraph (a) requires further 

inspection of freight cars equipped with 

ECP brake systems prior to release from 

a shop or repair track. These additional 

requirements afford the inspector the 

opportunity to look at each car more 

thoroughly and take into consideration 

an ECP brake system’s unique 

characteristics. For instance, while 

§ 232.303(d) requires inspectors to 

ensure that brake pipes are securely 

clamped, paragraph (a) provides the 

equivalent for ECP brake systems by 

requiring the secured clamping of ECP 

brake system wires. Accordingly, 

paragraph (a) requires inspectors to 

check the ECP brake system’s wiring 

and brackets, electrical connections, 

electrical grounds, and any car mounted 

ECP brake system component. During 

such inspections, inspectors must look 

for problems such as frayed wiring, 

loose or damaged brackets, and wires 

that have become loose due to a fallen 

bracket. FRA believes that a missing 

bracket may be overlooked during a 

regular train yard inspection or Class I 

brake test and the final rule requires 

shop or repair track inspections of such 

ECP brake related components to ensure 

their safe operation. 

Paragraph (a)(3) as proposed required 

the testing of the train line cable’s 

electrical grounds and impedance. 

NYAB and Wabtec asserted that 

paragraph (a)(3) as proposed should be 

removed entirely. According to these 

brake manufacturers, train line integrity 

tests, which should be performed 

subsequent to repairs or replacement of 

the ECP brake-equipped train line or as 

part of a single car air brake test, do not 

require impedance testing, since they 

can be performed via resistance and 

grounds tests using commonly available 

measurements tools. AAR concurs with 

the brake manufacturers’ submission, 

asserting that an impedance test is 

unnecessary. One of the labor 

representatives disagrees with the 

manufacturers, urging FRA to retain 

impedance testing of train line cables in 

the final rule. 

FRA believes that the main purpose of 

cable impedance testing is checking the 

integrity of the train line electrical cable 

to assure that there is no electrical 

shortage between the wires and 

electrical current leakage through the 

ground connections. Since the current 

leakage testing of train line cable is a 

routine single car air brake test 

procedure and the ECP brake system 

continuously monitors the integrity of 

the train line cable, the additional 

impedance testing of train line cable 

wires is redundant and therefore 

unnecessary. FRA also believes that 

independently testing for grounds (i.e., 

check for the legitimate presence of 

cable shield connections to the car 

frame) is not necessary since paragraph 

(a)(2) already requires that a single car 

air brake test include a review and 

repair of the ECP brake system electrical 

connections. FRA continues to believe 


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that the brake manufacturers are in the 

best position to determine the level of 

testing that can be integrated into a 

single car air brake test. Accordingly, 

the proposal that periodic testing 

include electrical impedance and 

grounds testing is not being included in 

the final rule. 

Paragraph (b) requires railroads to 

submit periodic single car air brake test 

procedures to FRA for approval and 

paragraph (c) requires railroads to 

comply with such submitted and 

approved procedures whenever they 

perform a single car air brake test. FRA 

must be given an opportunity to review 

and comment on any revision of the 

procedures by which these tests are 

performed to ensure that there is no 

degradation in safety resulting from any 

such modification and to ensure 

consistency in how the tests are 

performed. FRA notes that the review 

and approval required by paragraph (b) 

are necessary to prevent railroads from 

making unilateral changes to the test 

procedures. Paragraph (b) requires the 

industry to follow the special approval 

process contained in § 232.17 in order to 

initially submit the procedures to FRA 

for approval. 

Paragraph (c) requires the 

performance of a single car air brake test 

on a car equipped with ECP brakes upon 

the occurrence of most of the events 

identified in § 232.305. Except for the 

exceptions provided herein, FRA 

continues to believe that § 232.305 

adequately covers the parameters and 

timeliness of single car air brake tests. 

Paragraph (f), however, excepts 

application to a car equipped with 

stand-alone ECP brakes of 

§ 232.305(b)(2), which requires a car 

that is on a shop or repair track to 

receive a single car air brake test if one 

has not been performed on the car 

within the previous 12 months. FRA 

believes that since the car’s CCD 

performs a self-diagnostic of the brake 

system each time the car is initialized 

and used in a train, there is no need to 

perform a single car air brake test on a 

car that has not received such a test 

within the last 12 months. 

FRA acknowledges that railroads may 

retrofit ECP brake systems on existing 

cars equipped with conventional 

pneumatic brake systems. While 

§ 232.305(e) requires a single car air 

brake test on each new or rebuilt car 

prior to placing or using it in revenue 

service, it is unclear whether this rule 

applies to cars retrofitted with ECP 

brake systems. Accordingly, to ensure 

the proper and safe operation of cars 

with newly installed ECP brake systems, 

paragraph (d) requires the performance 

of a single car air brake test prior to 

placing the car in revenue service. FRA 

believes that it is essential for retrofitted 

cars to receive this test prior to 

returning to revenue service in order to 

ensure the proper operation of the 

vehicle’s new brake system. Since this 

is a requirement when installing a new 

brake system, the cost of this 

requirement is minimal and merely 

incorporates the industry’s current 

practices. 

FRA acknowledges that, after 

receiving approval of the single car air 

brake test standard from FRA in 

accordance with paragraph (b), a 

railroad or an industry representative 

may—through its experience— 

subsequently determine better 

procedures applicable to single car air 

brake tests of cars equipped with ECP 

brake systems. Accordingly, FRA 

recognizes that the industry may find it 

necessary to modify the single car air 

brake test procedures from time to time. 

Section 232.307 provides regulatory 

procedures for those seeking 

modification of an approved single car 

air brake test procedure. Paragraph (b) 

extends the application of § 232.307 to 

single car air brake test procedures for 

cars equipped with ECP brake systems. 

FRA believes that § 232.307 provides 

the industry with a quick and efficient 

procedure to seek modification of an 

incorporated or approved testing 

procedure and provides both FRA and 

other interested parties an opportunity 

to review potential changes prior to 

their becoming effective. The process 

under § 232.307 permits the industry to 

modify the single car air brake test 

procedures and permits those 

modifications to become effective 75 

days from the date that FRA publishes 

the requested modification in the 

Federal Register, if no objection to the 

requested modification is raised by 

either FRA or any other interested party. 

The process allows FRA and other 

interested parties 60 days to review and 

raise objections to any proposed 

modification requested by the industry 

and submitted to FRA. FRA believes the 

process established in § 232.307 will 

meet the needs of AAR and the industry 

to expeditiously modify the single car 

air brake test procedures required by 

and approved under paragraph (b). 

FRA continues to believe that, for the 

process to work at optimum efficiency, 

AAR and the industry would be best 

served if they ensure that there is open 

communication regarding any 

modifications with both FRA and the 

representatives of affected employees 

prior to requesting any modification of 

the procedures. This will ensure that 

interested parties are fully informed of 

any potential modification and their 

concerns are addressed or allayed before 

a request for modification is submitted 

to FRA. This information and dialogue 

will eliminate the potential for 

objections being submitted when the 

requested modification is officially 

sought. 

As previously noted, for ECP brakeequipped freight cars, the final rule 

contemplates replacing application of 

the single car air brake test in 

§ 232.305(a) with a new single car air 

brake test submitted and approved 

under § 232.611(b). To make this clear, 

paragraph (f) excepts application of 

§ 232.305(a) as it applies to all cars 

equipped with ECP brakes, regardless of 

whether they are dual mode or standalone. To preserve the requirement of 

using a qualified person to perform 

single car air brake tests on cars 

equipped with ECP brakes, however, the 

final rule includes appropriate language 

in paragraphs (c) and (d). 

FRA acknowledges that the selfmonitoring capabilities of ECP brake 

systems may eliminate the need to 

perform single car air brake tests on a 

time-specific basis. Accordingly, 

paragraph (f) also excepts 

§ 232.305(b)(2) as it applies to single car 

air brake tests for cars with stand-alone 

ECP brake systems. Since cars with dual 

mode ECP brake systems include all of 

the components of a conventional 

pneumatic brake system and may be 

operated in conventional pneumatic 

brake mode at any time, paragraph (f) 

does not intend to provide those cars 

relief from section 232.305(b)(2). 

BLET asserts that there should be no 

exception from § 232.305(b)(2). 

According to BLET, the FMECA 

recommends the continuation of 

periodic single car testing to assure 

power brake functionality. UP states 

that it disagrees with the FRA proposal 

to require a single car air brake test 

whenever an ECP braked car is shopped 

for a non-braking defect. Under current 

AAR rules, says UP, a conventionally 

braked freight car is only subject to a 

single car air brake test when the 

braking system itself is service or 

repaired, or if 5 years have passed since 

the last such test or if 8 years had passed 

since the equipment was built. 

UP apparently misunderstands the 

existing rule and the proposed rule. In 

addition to the requirements under 

§ 232.305(c) and (d) that cars must be 

tested every 5 or 8 years, § 232.305(b)(2) 

requires a single air brake test when the 

car is found on a repair track ‘‘for any 

reason’’ and it has not received a single 

car air brake test within the previous 12- 

month period. Since this rule was 

enacted, it has always applied to all 

freight cars. The single car air brake test 


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is critical to ensuring the safe and 

proper operation of the brake equipment 

on the Nation’s fleet of freight cars. 

When FRA issued § 232.305(b)(2), the 

single car air brake test was the sole 

method by which air brake equipment 

on freight cars is periodically tested to 

identify potential problems before they 

result in a brake becoming inoperative. 

It will now also apply to dual mode ECP 

brake-equipped freight cars. 

However, stand-alone ECP brakeequipped freight cars will be exempt 

from § 232.305(b)(2) pursuant to 

paragraph (f). Accordingly, each standalone ECP brake-equipped car will not 

require a single car air brake test each 

time it is on a repair track. FRA believes 

that a reduction in the frequency of 

single car air brake tests is justified for 

stand-alone ECP brake-equipped cars in 

light of the ECP brake system’s selfmonitoring capabilities. However, the 

final rule maintains most of the 

requirements under § 232.305. FRA 

agrees with BLET and the FMECA that 

such periodic testing should continue 

and FRA continues to believe that 

insufficient information exists at this 

time to completely eliminate the need to 

conduct periodic single car air brake 

tests on ECP brake-equipped cars. 

Section 232.305(f) was initially 

enacted to allow the continued 

operation of cars already in service that 

had received a single car air brake test 

before a more formal standard was 

adopted by the 2001 final power brake 

rule. While paragraph (f) of § 232.611 as 

proposed also excepted the application 

of § 232.305(f), FRA believes that 

§ 232.305(f) should actually be removed 

from the rules in its entirety, since it no 

longer applies to any car, regardless of 

its brake system technology. 

Accordingly, § 232.305(f) is hereby 

deleted. 

With the need for the submission and 

adoption of a new single car air brake 

test for ECP brake systems, FRA 

recognizes that the same flexibility 

initially afforded by § 232.305(f) may be 

necessary to allow for the continued 

operation of ECP brake-equipped cars 

currently in service under the existing 

waivers. New paragraph (g) intends to 

provide for such flexibility by 

considering the last single car air brake 

test performed on any ECP brakeequipped car prior to June 15, 2009, 

pursuant to the then existing standards, 

to be considered the last single car air 

brake test for that car. Accordingly, each 

such car would not require an 

additional single car air brake test in 

accordance with § 232.305(e) and 

232.611(d). 

Under paragraph (b), no car should be 

in service if it has not received a single 

car air brake test under a procedural 

standard submitted to and approved by 

FRA. Since no such standard has yet 

been submitted and approved, all trains 

under the existing waiver would be 

required to be taken out of service upon 

the publication of this rule. To avoid 

this unintended consequence and to 

provide flexibility for ECP brakeequipped cars already in service, 

paragraph (g) provides more time for the 

submission and approval of a single car 

air brake test standard submitted 

pursuant to paragraph (b) and § 232.17. 

FRA understands that AAR has 

formed a group, which includes AAR 

Brake Committee members, the ECP 

brake manufacturers, and FRA, for the 

purpose of developing single car air 

brake test procedures for freight cars 

equipped with ECP brakes. FRA expects 

these procedures will become part of the 

AAR Standards and Recommended 

Practices once they are developed and 

adopted by the AAR. Accordingly, for 

the same reasons FRA implemented 

§ 232.305(f) (2001), the date that all cars 

equipped with ECP brakes will receive 

a single car air brake test under the 

existing standard prior to June 15, 2009, 

shall be considered the date for the last 

single car air brake test for that car. 

Section 232.613 End-of-Train Devices 

Current FRA regulations specify 

design and performance standards for 

one-way and two-way EOT telemetry 

devices, which, at a minimum, have the 

capability of determining rear-of-train 

brake pipe pressure and of transmitting 

this information by radio to a receiving 

unit in the controlling locomotive. Most 

EOT units in service are battery 

operated and also incorporate a rear end 

marker required under 49 CFR part 221. 

Optional features include transmission 

of information regarding rear end 

motion and battery status. Most units 

operate on the same ultra high 

frequency (UHF), but each rear unit has 

a discrete identification code which 

must be recognized by the HEU before 

the message is acknowledged. The more 

modern two-way EOT device, in 

addition to the features of the one-way 

EOT device, has the ability of activating 

the emergency air valve at the rear of the 

train upon receiving an emergency 

brake application command from the 

HEU. This is a desirable feature in event 

of a blockage in the brake pipe that 

would prevent the pneumatic 

transmission of the emergency brake 

application throughout the entire train. 

Provisions governing the use of oneway EOT telemetry devices were 

initially incorporated into the power 

brake regulations in 1986. Pursuant to 

the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review 

Act, Public Law 102–365 (Sept. 3, 1992), 

which amends the Federal Rail Safety 

Act (FRSA) of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 421, 431 

et seq.), FRA held rulemakings to amend 

the power brake regulations, including 

those concerning one-way and two-way 

EOTs. 62 FR 278 (Jan. 2, 1997); 66 FR 

4104 (Jan. 17, 2001). The resulting 

regulations, contained in subpart E of 

part 232, specify the requirements 

related to the performance, operation, 

and testing of EOT devices for 

conventional pneumatic braking. 

The new ECP–EOT devices—which 

must comply with AAR standards such 

as S–4200 and S–4220—will provide 

many of the same functions that 

conventional two-way EOT devices use 

on trains with conventional pneumatic 

brakes. In addition to serving as the 

final node on the ECP brake system’s 

train line cable termination circuit and 

as the system’s ‘‘heart beat’’ monitoring 

and confirming train, brake pipe, power 

supply line, and digital communications 

cable continuity, the ECP–EOT device 

transmits to the HEU a status message 

that includes the brake pipe pressure, 

the train line cable’s voltage, and the 

ECP–EOT device’s battery power level. 

Since the ECP–EOT device—unlike a 

conventional EOT device—will 

communicate with the HEU exclusively 

through the digital communications 

cable and not via a radio signal, it does 

not need to perform the function of 

venting the brake pipe to atmospheric 

pressure to engage an emergency brake 

application. However, ECP–EOT devices 

do verify the integrity of the train line 

cable and provide a means of 

monitoring the brake pipe pressure and 

gradient, providing the basis for an 

automatic- rather than engineercommanded-response if the system is 

not adequately charged. In the case of 

ECP brakes, the brake pipe becomes a 

redundant- rather than primary-path for 

sending emergency brake application 

commands. Under certain 

communication break downs between 

the ECP–EOT device, the HEU, and any 

number of CCDs, the system will selfinitiate an emergency brake application. 

FRA acknowledges that ECP–EOT 

devices, with their additional and 

changed features, may not comply with 

the rules under subpart E. Accordingly, 

paragraph (d) excepts trains operating in 

ECP brake mode from having to comply 

with subpart E of part 232 and the 

remainder of section 232.613 provides 

alternative requirements. Paragraph (a) 

provides for the minimum requirements 

under which an ECP–EOT device must 

operate. Paragraph (b) requires that each 

ECP brake operated includes a properly 

connected ECP–EOT device that 


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61546 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

comports with the requirements under 

paragraph (a). 

AAR and NS noted that, similarly to 

trains operating with conventional air 

brake systems, a train operated with 

ECP brakes may include a locomotive as 

the train’s rear vehicle performing the 

same function as an EOT device. 

According to AAR, a locomotive at the 

rear of a train can perform all the 

functions performed by an EOT device. 

BLET concurs with AAR and NS and 

proposes that § 232.613(c) be redrafted 

to permit the use of a locomotive in lieu 

of an ECP–EOT device. FRA agrees 

because a locomotive equipped with 

ECP brakes functions the same as an 

ECP–EOT device. They both provide the 

same feedback loop between the HEU 

and end of the train. Accordingly, 

paragraph (c) provides for a locomotive 

equipped with ECP brakes to be used in 

lieu of an ECP–EOT device in a train 

operated with ECP brakes. 

NYAB and Wabtec state that a 

conventional EOT unit is subject to 

annual calibration to address issues 

relating to its radio and BP pressure 

transducer. However, since an ECP–EOT 

device does not require a radio and the 

ECP brake system continuously 

monitors the brake pipe pressure 

transducer, the brake manufacturers 

contend, it does not require annual 

calibration. 

FRA agrees with the brake 

manufacturers’ comments regarding 

annual ECP–EOT device calibration. 

Unlike conventional EOT units, ECP– 

EOT devices do not require radios. 

Annual calibration of the brake pipe 

pressure transducer is not necessary in 

light of the ECP brake system’s brake 

pipe pressure readings at each 

individual ECP brake operated car and 

ability to confirm train line integrity. 

Accordingly, the final rule does not 

require annual calibration and testing. 

XII. Regulatory Impact and Notices 

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

This final rule has been evaluated in 

accordance with existing policies and 

procedures, and determined to be 

significant under both Executive Order 

12866 and DOT policies and procedures 

(44 FR 11034; Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has 

prepared and placed in Docket No. 

FRA–2006–26175 a Regulatory Analysis 

addressing the economic impact of this 

final rule. Document inspection and 

copying facilities are available at the 

DOT Central Docket Management 

Facility located in Room W12–140 on 

the Ground level of the West Building, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. Access to the 

docket may also be obtained 

electronically through the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Photocopies may 

also be obtained by submitting a written 

request to the FRA Docket Clerk at 

Office of Chief Counsel, Stop 10, 

Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

For purposes of analysis, FRA has 

assumed that this final rule will support 

business decisions by Class I railroads 

to convert unit train service, such as 

coal and intermodal, to ECP brake 

operations over a 10-year period. This 

type of service is characterized by 

intensive utilization of assets and is 

reasonably discrete in terms of 

operational requirements. Although 

carload service is dispersed over the 

national rail network, unit train service 

tends to be concentrated in certain 

corridors. Locomotives are or could be 

dedicated to this service (e.g., as in the 

extensive use of high traction 

alternating current (AC) locomotives in 

coal service). FRA believes that, as costs 

and benefits are validated and the 

technology’s market enjoys economies 

of scale, additional markets will benefit 

from ECP brake technology. 

The benefits of voluntarily 

implementing and using ECP brakes 

under this rule substantially exceed the 

costs. If the industry were to implement 

ECP brakes to the extent estimated in 

this final rule, it would cost it 

approximately $1.7 billion (discounted 

at 7%). The largest portion of these 

voluntary costs, $1.2 billion, would be 

the cost to convert freight cars to ECP 

brakes and the remaining costs relate to 

locomotive conversion and training. The 

total benefits of the final rule would 

total approximately $9.7 billion 

(discounted at 7%), if ECP brakes are 

adopted as estimated. Of those benefits, 

the $1 billion in regulatory relief and 

the $1.2 billion in fuel savings together 

exceed the costs. The remaining benefits 

include accident risk reduction, 

environmental cleanup savings, track 

out-of-service time reduction, wheel 

replacement savings, and network 

velocity improvements. The expected 

benefits of ECP braking technology 

appear to justify the investment, 

provided that the conversion is focused 

first on the high-mileage, unit and unitlike train services that would most 

benefit from its use. 

As presented in the following tables, 

FRA estimates that the present value 

(PV), discounted at 7 percent of the total 

20-year benefits and costs which the 

industry would be expected to incur if 

it elected to comply with the alternative 

requirements contained in this rule is 

$9.7 billion and $1.7 billion, 

respectively: 

TOTAL 20-YEAR BENEFITS AND DISCOUNTED BENEFITS

[At 3% and 7%] 

Benefits 3% Discount 7% Discount 

Highway-Rail Accident Risk Reduction ........................................................................... $25,802,114 $17,897,484 $11,513,191 

Rail Equipment Accident Risk Reduction ........................................................................ 286,687,494 198,859,081 127,923,151 

Environmental Cleanup Savings ..................................................................................... 113,296,427 78,587,395 50,554,127 

Track Out-of-Service Time for Accidents ........................................................................ 10,825,104,763 7,508,769,780 4,830,282,231 

Regulatory Relief ............................................................................................................. 2,283,662,829 1,586,425,219 1,022,855,259 

Fuel Savings .................................................................................................................... 2,745,000,000 1,904,052,986 1,224,849,552 

Wheel Replacement Savings .......................................................................................... 1,601,250,000 1,110,697,575 714,495,572 

Network Velocity Improvement of 1 mph ........................................................................ 2,500,000,000 2,101,494,145 1,698,459,555 

Total Benefits ............................................................................................................ 20,380,803,627 14,506,783,665 9,680,932,638 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61547 

TOTAL 20-YEAR COSTS AND DISCOUNTED COSTS

[at 3% and 7%] 

Costs 3% Discount 7% Discount 

Freight Car Costs ............................................................................................................ $1,746,326,400 $1,467,957,882 $1,186,425,904 

Locomotive Costs ............................................................................................................ 582,624,000 489,752,370 395,825,320 

Employee Training ........................................................................................................... 231,470,835 165,421,968 111,016,540 

Total Costs ............................................................................................................... 2,560,421,235 2,123,132,221 1,693,267,763 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and 

Executive Order 13272 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 

U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and Executive Order 

13272 require a review of proposed and 

final rules to assess their impact on 

small entities. FRA has prepared and 

placed in Docket No. FRA–2006–26175 

an Analysis of Impact on Small Entities 

(AISE) that assesses the small entity 

impact of this rule. Document 

inspection and copying facilities are 

available at the Department of 

Transportation Central Docket 

Management Facility located in Room 

W12–140 on the Ground level of the 

West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 

SE., Washington, DC 20590. Docket 

material is also available on the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Photocopies may 

also be obtained by submitting a written 

request to the FRA Docket Clerk at 

Office of Chief Counsel, Stop 10, 

Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

‘‘Small entity’’ is defined in 5 U.S.C. 

601 as a small business concern that is 

independently owned and operated, and 

is not dominant in its field of operation. 

The U.S. Small Business Administration 

(SBA) has authority to regulate issues 

related to small businesses, and 

stipulates in its size standards that a 

‘‘small entity’’ in the railroad industry is 

a railroad business ‘‘line-haul 

operation’’ that has fewer than 1,500 

employees and a ‘‘switching and 

terminal’’ establishment with fewer than 

500 employees. SBA’s ‘‘size standards’’ 

may be altered by Federal agencies, in 

consultation with SBA and in 

conjunction with public comment. 

Pursuant to that authority FRA has 

published a final statement of agency 

policy that formally establishes ‘‘small 

entities’’ as being railroads that meet the 

line-haulage revenue requirements of a 

Class III railroad. See 68 FR 24891 (May 

9, 2003). Currently, the revenue 

requirements are $20 million or less in 

annual operating revenue. The $20 

million limit is based on the Surface 

Transportation Board’s threshold of a 

Class III railroad carrier, which is 

adjusted by applying the railroad 

revenue deflator adjustment (49 CFR 

part 1201). The same dollar limit on 

revenues is established to determine 

whether a railroad, shipper, or 

contractor is a small entity. FRA uses 

this alternative definition of ‘‘small 

entity’’ for this rulemaking. 

For this rulemaking, there are 

approximately 523 small railroads that 

could potentially receive regulatory 

relief. However, railroads are not 

mandated to convert to ECP brake 

technology. Regulatory relief provides 

an incentive for most long-haul services 

to convert. Smaller railroads do not 

operate over 1,000 miles or 1,500 miles 

and would not benefit economically by 

converting to this technology. Hence, 

FRA does not expect this regulation to 

impact any small railroads. 

The small entity segment of the 

railroad industry faces little in the way 

of intramodal competition. Small 

railroads generally serve as ‘‘feeders’’ to 

the larger railroads, collecting carloads 

in smaller numbers and at lower 

densities than would be economical for 

the larger railroads. Smaller railroads 

that carry unit and unit-like 

commodities often operate the train 

with the locomotives and cars without 

ownership of the equipment. They 

transport those cars over relatively short 

distances and then turn them over to the 

larger systems, which transport them 

relatively long distances to their 

ultimate destination, or for handoff back 

to a smaller railroad for final delivery. 

Although there are situations in which 

the relative interests of large and small 

railroads may not always coincide, the 

relationships between the large and 

small entity segments of the railroad 

industry are more supportive and codependent than competitive. 

It is also extremely rare for small 

railroads to compete with each other. As 

mentioned above, small railroads 

generally serve smaller, lower density 

markets and customers. They exist, and 

often thrive, doing business in markets 

where there is not enough traffic to 

attract the larger carriers that are 

designed to handle large volumes over 

distance at a profit. As there is usually 

not enough traffic to attract service by 

a large carrier, there is also not enough 

traffic to sustain more than one smaller 

carrier. There are also significant 

barriers to entry in the railroad industry, 

including the need to own rights-ofway, build track, purchase fleets. Thus, 

even to the extent that the rule may 

have an economic impact, it should 

have no impact on the intramodal 

competitive position of small railroads. 

The AISE developed in connection 

with this final rule concludes that this 

final rule will only likely impact four 

Class I railroads that voluntarily choose 

to implement ECP brakes in their 

operations and therefore should not 

have any economic impact on small 

entities. Smaller railroads that carry unit 

and unit-like commodities often operate 

and transport trains owned by other 

parties over relatively short distances 

and turn them over to larger systems 

that, in turn, transport those trains 

relatively long distances to their 

ultimate destination or to another small 

railroad for final delivery. FRA 

recognizes that small entities may, in 

some cases, be involved in specific 

route segments for trains that originate 

or terminate on a Class I railroad. In 

these cases, the cars involved are more 

likely to be owned or provided by 

shippers or a Class I railroad. Mutual 

support arrangements and shared power 

practices are likely to ensure that the 

smaller railroad will not require trains 

equipped with ECP brakes for this 

service. Further, FRA anticipates that 

train operations using ECP brakes will 

be limited to long hauls of commodities 

such as intermodal, coal, ore, nonmetallic minerals, motor vehicle parts, 

and grain for many years. Since small 

railroads do not handle such 

commodities, they will not likely 

receive large blocks of cars equipped 

with ECP brakes from Class I railroads. 

Since FRA does not expect small 

railroads to convert to ECP brake 

technology within the period of the 

analysis, this final rule is not 

anticipated to affect any small entities. 

Thus, FRA certifies that this final rule 

is not expected to have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities under the 


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61548 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

Regulatory Flexibility Act or Executive 

Order 13272. 

C. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The information collection 

requirements in this final rule have been 

submitted for approval to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) under 

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 

44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. The sections that 

contain the new information collection 

requirements and the estimated time to 

fulfill each requirement are as follows: 

CFR section Respondent universe Total annual 

responses 

Average time per 

response 

Total annual burden 

hours 

229.27—Annual tests ..................................... 30,000 locomotives .... 30,000 tests ............... 15 minutes ................. 7,500 hours. 

232.3—Applicability—Export, industrial, & 

other cars not owned by railroads-identification.

559 railroads .............. 8 cards ....................... 10 minutes ................. 1 hour. 

232.7—Waivers .............................................. 559 railroads .............. 20 petitions ................ 40 hours ..................... 800 hours. 

232.11—Penalties—Knowingly falsifying a 

record/report.

559 railroads .............. 1 falsified recd/rpt ...... 10 minutes ................. .17 hour. 

232.15—Movement of Defective Equipment: 

—Tags ............................................. 1,620,000 cars ........... 128,400 tags .............. 2.5 minutes ................ 5,350 hours. 

—Written Notification ....................... 1,620,000 cars ........... 25,000 notices ........... 3 minutes ................... 1,250 hours. 

232.17—Special Approval Procedure: 

—Petitions for special approval of 

safety-critical revision.

559 railroads .............. 4 petitions .................. 100 hours ................... 400 hours. 

—Petitions for special approval of 

pre-revenue service acceptance 

plan.

559 railroads .............. 2 petitions .................. 100 hours ................... 200 hours. 

—Service of petitions ....................... 559 railroads .............. 4 petitions .................. 40 hours ..................... 160 hours. 

—Statement of interest .................... Public/railroads .......... 14 statements ............ 8 hours ....................... 112 hours. 

—Comment ...................................... Public/railroads .......... 13 comments ............. 4 hours ....................... 52 hours. 

232.103—Gen’l requirements—all train brake 

systems.

114,000 cars .............. 70,000 stickers ........... 10 minutes ................. 11,667 hours. 

232.105—Gen’l requirements for locomotives—Inspection.30,000 locomotives .... 30,000 forms .............. 5 minutes ................... 2,500 hours. 

232.107—Air source requirements and cold 

weather operations—Monitoring Plan 

(Subsequent Years).

10 new railroads ........ 1 plan ......................... 40 hours ..................... 40 hours. 

—Amendments to Plan .................... 50 railroads/plans ...... 10 amendments ......... 20 hours ..................... 200 hours. 

—Recordkeeping ............................. 50 railroads/plans ...... 1,150 records ............. 20 hours ..................... 23,000 hours. 

232.109—Dynamic brake requirements—status.559 railroads .............. 1,656,000 records ...... 4 minutes ................... 110,400 hours. 

—Inoperative dynamic brakes ......... 30,000 locomotives .... 6,358 records ............. 4 minutes ................... 424 hours. 

—Tag bearing words ‘‘inoperative 

dynamic brakes’’.

30,000 locomotives .... 6,358 tags .................. 30 seconds ................ 53 hours. 

—Deactivated dynamic brakes 

(Sub. Yrs.).

8,000 locomotives ...... 10 stencilings ............. 5 minutes ................... 1 hour. 

—Operating rules (Subsequent 

Years).

5 new railroads .......... 5 op. rules .................. 4 hours ....................... 20 hours. 

—Amendments ................................ 559 railroads .............. 15 amendments ......... 1 hour ......................... 15 hours. 

—Requests to increase 5 mph overspeed restriction.559 railroads .............. 5 requests .................. 30 min/20 hrs. ............ 103 hours. 

—Knowledge criteria—locomotive 

engineers—Sub Yrs.

5 new railroads .......... 5 amendments ........... 16 hours ..................... 80 hours. 

232.111—Train information handling ............. 5 new railroads .......... 5 procedures .............. 40 hours ..................... 200 hours. 

—Sub. Yrs.—Amendments .............. 100 railroads .............. 100 amendments ....... 20 hours ..................... 2,000 hours. 

—Report requirements to train crew 559 railroads .............. 2,112,000 reports ....... 10 minutes ................. 352,000 hours.

232.203—Training requirements—Tr. Prog.: 

—Sub Yr .......................................... 15 railroads ................ 5 programs ................. 100 hours ................... 500 hours. 

—Amendments to written program .. 559 railroads .............. 559 amendments ....... 8 hours ....................... 4,472 hours. 

—Training records ........................... 559 railroads .............. 67,000 records ........... 8 minutes ................... 8,933 hours. 

—Training notifications .................... 559 railroads .............. 67,000 notific ............. 3 minutes ................... 3,350 hours. 

—Audit program ............................... 559 railroads .............. 1 plan/559 cop ........... 40 hours/1 min ........... 49 hours. 

—Amendments to validation/assessment program.559 railroads .............. 50 amendments ......... 20 hours ..................... 1,000 hours. 

232.205—Class 1 brake test—Notifications/ 

Records.

559 railroads .............. 1,646,000 records ...... 45 seconds ................ 20,575 hours. 

232.207—Class 1A brake tests—Subsequent 

Years.

559 railroads .............. 5 des. Lists ................ 1 hour ......................... 5 hours. 

—Notification .................................... 559 railroads .............. 5 amendments ........... 1 hour ......................... 5 hours. 

232.209—Class II brake tests—intermediate 

inspection.

559 railroads .............. 1,597,400 commun .... 3 seconds .................. 1,331 hours. 

232.213—Extended haul trains ...................... 83,000 long dist. 

movements.

100 letters .................. 15 minutes ................. 25 hours. 

—Record of all defective/inoperative 

brakes.

N/A ............................. N/A ............................. N/A ............................. N/A. 

232.303—Gen’l requirements—single car 

test.

1,600,000 frgt. cars .... 5,600 tags .................. 5 minutes ................... 467 hours. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61549 

CFR section Respondent universe Total annual 

responses 

Average time per 

response 

Total annual burden 

hours 

—Last repair track brake test/single 

car test.

1,600,000 frgt. cars .... 320,000 stncl ............. 5 minutes ................... 26,667 hours. 

232.305—Single Car tests ............................. 1,600,000 frgt. cars .... 320,00 tests/records .. 45 minutes ................. 240,000 hours. 

232.307—Modification of Single Car Air 

Brake Test Procedures (Old Rqmnt)—Req.

AAR ............................ 1 req. + 3 copies ....... 4 hrs. + 5 min ............ 4 hours. 

—Affirmation Statement on Mod. 

Req. to Employee Representatives.

AAR ............................ 1 statement + 4 copies.30 min. + 5 min ......... 1 hour. 

—Comments on Modification Request.Public/Int. Parties ....... 2 comments ............... 60 minutes ................. 2 hours. 

232.309—Repair track brake test .................. 640 shops .................. 5,000 tests ................. 30 minutes ................. 2,500 hours. 

232.403—Unique Code .................................. 245 railroads .............. 12 requests ................ 5 minutes ................... 1 hour. 

232.407—Operations requiring 2-way EOTs 245 railroads .............. 50,000 comm ............. 30 seconds ................ 417 hours. 

232.409—Insp. and Testing of EOTs ............ 245 railroads .............. 447,500 comm ........... 30 seconds ................ 3,729 hours. 

—Telemetry Equipment—Testing 

and Calibration.

245 railroads .............. 32,708 mar. units ....... 1 minute ..................... 545 hours. 

232.503—Process to introduce new brake 

technology.

559 railroads .............. 1 letter ........................ 1 hour ......................... 1 hour. 

—Special approval ........................... 559 railroads .............. 1 request .................... 3 hours ....................... 3 hours. 

232.505—Pre-revenue svc accept. test 

plan—Sub Yr.

559 railroads .............. 1 procedure ................ 160 hours ................... 160 hours. 

—Amendments ................................ 559 railroads .............. 1 procedure ................ 40 hours ..................... 40 hours. 

—Design description ........................ 559 railroads .............. 1 petition .................... 67 hours ..................... 67 hours. 

—Report to FRA Assoc. Admin. for 

Safety.

559 railroads .............. 1 report ...................... 13 hours ..................... 13 hours. 

—Brake system technology testing 559 railroads .............. 5 descriptions ............. 40 hours ..................... 200 hours. 

232.603—Configuration Management—New 

Requirements.

—Configuration Management Plan 

Submitted to FRA.

4 railroads .................. 1 plan ......................... 160 hours ................... 160 hours. 

—Subsequent Years ........................ 4 railroads .................. 1 plan ......................... 60 hours ..................... 60 hours. 

—Modification of Standards ............ 4 railroads .................. 1 request + 2 copies .. 8 hours + 5 min ......... 8 hours. 

—Affirmative statement + statement 

copies re: modification request.

4 railroads .................. 4 statements + 24 

copies.

1 hour + 5 min ........... 6 hours. 

—Comments on requested modification.Public/Int. Parties ....... 4 comments ............... 2 hours ....................... 8 hours. 

232.605—ECP Brakes: Training—New Requirements.4 railroads .................. 4 programs ................. 100 hours ................... 400 hours. 

—Adopt/Developing an ECP Training Prog.—Yr. One.4 railroads .................. 2 programs ................. 100 hours ................... 200 hours. 

—Subsequent Years.

—ECP Brakes Training of Employees—Yr. One.4 railroads .................. 6,409 tr. Empl ............ 8 hrs/24 hrs ................ 105,512 hours. 

—ECP Brakes Training of Employees—Sub. Yrs.4 railroads .................. 6,409 tr. Empl ............ 1 hour/8 hours ........... 30,264 hours. 

—ECP Training Records—Yr. One 4 railroads .................. 6,409 records ............. 8 minutes ................... 855 hours. 

—ECP Training Records—Subsequent Years.4 railroads .................. 6,409 records ............. 4 minutes ................... 428 hours. 

—Assessment of ECP Training Plan 4 railroads .................. 4 plans ....................... 40 hours ..................... 160 hours. 

—Adopt Operating Rules for ECP 

Brakes.

4 railroads .................. 4 Op. Rules ................ 24 hours ..................... 96 hours. 

—Loco. Engineers—ECP Brakes 

Systems: Criteria For Certification.

4 railroads .................. 4 amended Programs 40 hours ..................... 160 hours. 

232.607—ECP Inspection and Testing—New 

Requirements: 

—Initial Terminal—Inspections and 

Notification of Class I Brake Tests.

4 railroads .................. 10,000 insp. + 10,000 

notific.

90 min. + 45 sec ........ 15,125 hours. 

—Cars added or removed en 

route—Class I Br. Test.

4 railroads .................. 1,000 insp. + 500 

notific.

60 min. + 45 sec ........ 1,006 hours. 

—Non-ECP cars added to ECP 

Trains—Inspections and Tags for 

Defective Cars.

200 Cars .................... 200 insp. + 400 tags/ 

rcds.

5 min. + 2.5 min ........ 34 hours. 

232.609—Handling of Defective Equipment 

with ECP Brake Systems—New Requirements: 

—Freight Car w/defective conventional brakes moved in train operating in ECP brake mode.25 Cars ...................... 50 tags ....................... 2.5 minutes ................ 2 hours. 

—Inspections/Tagging for ECP 

Train moving w/less than 85 percent operative/effective brakes.

20 Cars ...................... 20 Insp. + 40 tags/ 

records.

5 min. + 2.5 min ........ 3 hours. 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES3
61550 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

CFR section Respondent universe Total annual 

responses 

Average time per 

response 

Total annual burden 

hours 

232.609—Freight Car with ECP brake system found with defective non-brake safety 

appliance—Tagging.

75 Cars ...................... 150 tags ..................... 2.5 minutes ................ 6 hours. 

—Conventional Train with standalone ECP brake equipped 

cars—Tagging.

500 Cars .................... 1,000 tags .................. 2.5 minutes ................ 42 hours. 

—Procedures for handling ECP 

brake system repairs and designation of repair locations.

4 railroads .................. 4 procedures .............. 24 hours ..................... 96 hours. 

—List of repair locations .................. 4 railroads .................. 4 lists .......................... 8 hours ....................... 32 hours. 

—Notification to FRA Safety Administrator regarding change to repair 

location list.

4 railroads .................. 1 notification ............... 1 hour ......................... 1 hour. 

232.611—Periodic Maintenance—New Requirements: 

—Inspections before being released 

from repair Shop.

500 fr. Cars ................ 500 insp. & records ... 10 minutes ................. 83 hours. 

—Procedures for ECP Single Car 

Tests.

1 Railroad Rep ........... 1 procedure + 2 copies.24 hours + 5 min ....... 24 hours. 

—Single Car Air Brake Tests— 

Records.

2,500 fr. Cars ............. 2,500 tests/rcd ........... 45 minutes ................. 1,875 hours. 

—Modification of Single Car Test 

Standards.

1 Railroad Rep ........... 1 mod. Proc ............... 40 hours ..................... 40 hours. 

All estimates include the time for 

reviewing instructions; searching 

existing data sources; gathering or 

maintaining the needed data; and 

reviewing the information. For 

information or a copy of the paperwork 

package submitted to OMB, contact Mr. 

Robert Brogan, Information Clearance 

Officer, at 202–493–6292, or contact Ms. 

Nakia Jackson at 202–493–6073; or via 

e-mail at robert.brogan@dot.gov or 

nakia.jackson@dot.gov. 

OMB is required to make a decision 

concerning the collection of information 

requirements contained in this final rule 

between 30 and 60 days after 

publication of this document in the 

Federal Register. Therefore, a comment 

to OMB is best assured of having its full 

effect if OMB receives it within 30 days 

of publication. Comments to OMB may 

be sent by mail to: The Office of 

Management and Budget, 725 17th St., 

NW., Washington, DC 20503, attn: FRA 

Desk Officer. Comments may also be 

sent to OMB at the following address: 

oira_submissions@omb.eop.gov. 

FRA is not authorized to impose a 

penalty on persons for violating 

information collection requirements 

which do not display a current OMB 

control number, if required. FRA 

intends to obtain current OMB control 

numbers for any new information 

collection requirements resulting from 

this rulemaking action prior to the 

effective date of this final rule. The 

OMB control number, when assigned, 

will be announced by separate notice in 

the Federal Register. 

D. Federalism Implications 

Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism’’ 

(64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), requires 

FRA to develop an accountable process 

to ensure ‘‘meaningful and timely input 

by State and local officials in the 

development of regulatory policies that 

have federalism implications.’’ ‘‘Policies 

that have federalism implications’’ are 

defined in the Executive Order to 

include regulations that have 

‘‘substantial direct effects on the States, 

on the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government.’’ Under Executive 

Order 13132, the agency may not issue 

a regulation with Federalism 

implications that imposes substantial 

direct compliance costs and that is not 

required by statute, unless the Federal 

government provides the funds 

necessary to pay the direct compliance 

costs incurred by State and local 

governments, or the agency consults 

with State and local government 

officials early in the process of 

developing the proposed regulation. 

Where a regulation has Federalism 

implications and preempts State law, 

the agency seeks to consult with State 

and local officials in the process of 

developing the regulation. 

In the NPRM, FRA stated that this 

proposed rule has preemptive effect. 

Subject to a limited exception for 

essentially local safety or security 

hazards, FRA stated that its 

requirements will establish a uniform 

Federal safety standard that must be 

met, and state requirements covering the 

same subject are displaced, whether 

those standards are in the form of state 

statutes, regulations, local ordinances, 

or other forms of state law, including 

state common law. Section 20106 of 

Title 49 of the United States Code, FRA 

said, provides that all regulations 

prescribed by the Secretary related to 

railroad safety preempt any State law, 

regulation, or order covering the same 

subject matter, except a provision 

necessary to eliminate or reduce an 

essentially local safety hazard that is not 

incompatible with a Federal law, 

regulation, or order and that does not 

unreasonably burden interstate 

commerce. This is consistent with past 

practice at FRA and within the 

Department of Transportation. In 

particular, the notice of proposed 

rulemaking did not change the 

preemption provision of part 232; this 

final rule amends the preemption 

provision, § 232.13, to conform to the 

recent clarifying amendments to 49 

U.S.C. 20106. 

AAJ filed comments expressing its 

belief that FRA should revise the 

‘‘Federalism Implications’’ section of 

the preamble to reflect Congress’s 

intention that federal rail safety 

regulations do not preempt an 

individual’s right to pursue a state tort 

law claim against a railroad company. 

According to AAJ, section 1528 of the 

‘‘Implementing Recommendation of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007’’ (the 9/ 

11 Act) clarifies that 49 U.S.C. 20106 

does not preempt State law causes of 

action. AAR disagrees, stating that, by 

its plain language, section 1528 ‘‘is 

intended solely to reject a preemption 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61551 

defense where the defendant has 

violated the federal standard of care 

embodied in a federal regulation or a 

plan created pursuant to a federal 

regulation.’’ According to AAR, section 

1528 does not eliminate preemption of 

common law claims, but reaffirms that 

state law is preempted whenever the 

Secretaries of Transportation and 

Homeland Security issue a regulation or 

order covering the applicable subject 

matter, unless the local safety or 

security hazard exception applies. 

Normal State negligence standards 

apply where there is no Federal action 

covering the subject matter. In Section 

1528 of Public Law 110–53, Congress 

clarified the availability of State law 

causes of action under section 20106 

where there is Federal action covering 

the subject matter. As amended, 49 

U.S.C. 20106 provides that issuance of 

these regulations preempts any State 

law, regulation, or order covering the 

same subject matter, except an 

additional or more stringent law, 

regulation, or order that is necessary to 

eliminate or reduce an essentially local 

railroad safety or railroad security 

hazard; that is not incompatible with a 

law, regulation, or order of the United 

States Government; and that does not 

unreasonably burden interstate 

commerce. Section 20106 permits State 

tort actions arising from events or 

activities occurring on or after January 

18, 2002, for the following: (a) A 

violation of the Federal standard of care 

established by regulation or order issued 

by the Secretary of Transportation (with 

respect to railroad safety, such as these 

regulations) or the Secretary of 

Homeland Security (with respect to 

railroad security); (b) a party’s violation 

of, or failure to comply with, its own 

plan, rule, or standard that it created 

pursuant to a regulation or order issued 

by either of the two Secretaries; and (c) 

a party’s violation of a State standard 

that is necessary to eliminate or reduce 

an essentially local safety or security 

hazard, is not incompatible with a law, 

regulation, or order of the United States 

Government, and does not unreasonably 

burden interstate commerce. Nothing in 

Section 20106 creates a Federal cause of 

action on behalf of an injured party or 

confers Federal question jurisdiction for 

such State law causes of action. 

While this recent amendment has 

altered the preemptive reach of Section 

20106, it is important to note that there 

are limits to this exception allowing 

state tort actions under this statute. For 

example, Congress provided an 

exception only for an action in State 

court seeking damages for personal 

injury, death, or property damage. The 

statute does not provide for the recovery 

of punitive damages in the permitted 

common law tort actions. In addition, 

the statute permits actions for violation 

of an internal plan, rule, or standard 

only when such internal plan, rule, or 

standard is created pursuant to a 

Federal regulation or order issued by 

DOT or DHS. While parties are 

encouraged to go beyond the minimum 

regulatory standard in establishing 

internal safety and security standards, 

such standards that exceed the 

requirements of Federal regulation or 

order are not created pursuant to 

Federal regulation or order. 

Accordingly, there is no clear 

authorization of a common law tort 

action alleging a violation of those 

aspects of such an internal plan, rule, or 

standard related to the subject matter of 

this regulation that exceed the 

minimum required by the Federal 

regulation or order. 

FRA has analyzed this final rule in 

accordance with the principles and 

criteria contained in Executive Order 

13132. This final rule will not have a 

substantial effect on the States, on the 

relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among various levels of 

government. FRA concludes that this 

final rule will not impose any direct 

compliance costs on State and local 

governments and has no federalism 

implications, other than the preemption 

of state laws covering the subject matter 

of this final rule, which occurs by 

operation of law under 49 U.S.C. 20106 

whenever FRA issues a rule or order. 

Elements of the final rule dealing with 

safety appliances affect an area of safety 

that has been pervasively regulated at 

the Federal level for over a century. 

Accordingly, the final rule amendments 

in that area will involve no impacts on 

Federal relationships. 

E. Environmental Impact 

FRA has evaluated this final rule in 

accordance with its ‘‘Procedures for 

Considering Environmental Impacts’’ 

(FRA’s Procedures) (64 FR 28545, May 

26, 1999) as required by the National 

Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 

4321 et seq.), other environmental 

statutes, Executive Orders, and related 

regulatory requirements. FRA has 

determined that this final rule is not a 

major FRA action (requiring the 

preparation of an environmental impact 

statement or environmental assessment) 

because it is categorically excluded from 

detailed environmental review pursuant 

to section 4(c)(20) of FRA’s Procedures. 

See 64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Section 

4(c)(20) reads as follows: (c) Actions 

categorically excluded. Certain classes 

of FRA actions have been determined to 

be categorically excluded from the 

requirements of these Procedures as 

they do not individually or 

cumulatively have a significant effect on 

the human environment. * * * The 

following classes of FRA actions are 

categorically excluded: * * * (20) 

Promulgation of railroad safety rules 

and policy statements that do not result 

in significantly increased emissions or 

air or water pollutants or noise or 

increased traffic congestion in any mode 

of transportation. 

In accordance with section 4(c) and 

(e) of FRA’s Procedures, the agency has 

further concluded that no extraordinary 

circumstances exist with respect to this 

regulation that might trigger the need for 

a more detailed environmental review. 

As a result, FRA finds that this final rule 

is not a major Federal action 

significantly affecting the quality of the 

human environment. 

F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 

1995 

Pursuant to Section 201 of the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

(Pub. L. 104–4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each 

Federal agency ‘‘shall, unless otherwise 

prohibited by law, assess the effects of 

Federal regulatory actions on State, 

local, and tribal governments, and the 

private sector (other than to the extent 

that such regulations incorporate 

requirements specifically set forth in 

law).’’ Section 202 of the Act (2 U.S.C. 

1532) further requires that ‘‘before 

promulgating any general notice of 

proposed rulemaking that is likely to 

result in the promulgation of any rule 

that includes any Federal mandate that 

may result in expenditure by State, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$132,000,000 or more in any 1 year, and 

before promulgating any final rule for 

which a general notice of proposed 

rulemaking was published, the agency 

shall prepare a written statement’’ 

detailing the effect on State, local, and 

tribal governments and the private 

sector. This final rule may result in the 

expenditure, in the aggregate, of 

$132,000,000 or more in any one year. 

However, those expenses are not 

mandated and would only be incurred 

by the private sector if it wishes to take 

advantage of the regulatory relief 

provided by this final rule. Although the 

preparation of such a statement is not 

required, the analytical requirements 

under Executive Order 12866 are similar 

to the analytical requirements under the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

and, thus, the same analysis complies 

with both analytical requirements. 


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61552 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

G. Energy Impact 

Executive Order 13211 requires 

Federal agencies to prepare a Statement 

of Energy Effects for any ‘‘significant 

energy action.’’ 66 FR 28355 ( May 22, 

2001). Under the Executive Order, a 

‘‘significant energy action’’ is defined as 

any action by an agency (normally 

published in the Federal Register) that 

promulgates or is expected to lead to the 

promulgation of a final rule or 

regulation, including notices of inquiry, 

advance notices of proposed 

rulemaking, and notices of proposed 

rulemaking: (1)(i) That is a significant 

regulatory action under Executive Order 

12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is 

likely to have a significant adverse effect 

on the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy; or (2) that is designated by the 

Administrator of the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs as a 

significant energy action. FRA has 

evaluated this final rule in accordance 

with Executive Order 13211. FRA has 

determined that this final rule is not 

likely to have a significant adverse effect 

on the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy. Consequently, FRA has 

determined that this regulatory action is 

not a ‘‘significant energy action’’ within 

the meaning of Executive Order 13211. 

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 232 

Electronically controlled pneumatic 

brakes, Incorporation by reference, 

Penalties, Railroad power brakes, 

Railroad safety, Two-way end-of-train 

devices. 

The Rule 

■ In consideration of the foregoing, FRA 

amends chapter II, subtitle B of title 49, 

Code of Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 232—BRAKE SYSTEM SAFETY 

STANDARDS FOR FREIGHT AND 

OTHER NON-PASSENGER TRAINS 

AND EQUIPMENT; END OF TRAIN 

DEVICES 

■ 1. The authority citation for Part 232 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20107, 

20133, 20141, 20301–20303, 20306, 21301– 

21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 

CFR 1.49. 

■ 2. Section 232.5 is amended by adding 

definitions car control device (CCD), 

dual mode ECP brake system, ECP, ECP 

brake mode, ECP brake system, ECP– 

EOT device, emulator CCD, overlay ECP 

brake system, stand-alone CCD, standalone ECP brake system, switch mode, 

and train line cable; by revising the 

definition train, unit or train, cycle and 

adding the definition yard limits as 

follows in alphabetical order: 

§ 232.5 Definitions. 

* * * * * 

Car control device (CCD) means an 

electronic control device that replaces 

the function of the conventional 

pneumatic service and emergency 

portions of a car’s air brake control 

valve during electronic braking and 

provides for electronically controlled 

service and emergency brake 

applications. 

Dual mode ECP brake system means 

an ECP brake system that is equipped 

with either an emulator CCD or an 

overlay ECP brake system on each car 

which can be operated in either ECP 

brake mode or conventional pneumatic 

brake mode. 

ECP means ‘‘electronically controlled 

pneumatic’’ when applied to a brake or 

brakes. 

ECP brake mode means operating a 

car or an entire train using an ECP brake 

system. 

ECP brake system means a train 

power braking system actuated by 

compressed air and controlled by 

electronic signals from the locomotive 

or an ECP–EOT to the cars in the consist 

for service and emergency applications 

in which the brake pipe is used to 

provide a constant supply of 

compressed air to the reservoirs on each 

car but does not convey braking signals 

to the car. ECP brake systems include 

dual mode and stand-alone ECP brake 

systems. 

ECP–EOT device means an end-oftrain device for an ECP brake system 

that is physically the last network node 

in the train, pneumatically and 

electrically connected at the end of the 

train to the train line cable operating 

with an ECP brake system. 

* * * * * 

Emulator CCD means a CCD that is 

capable of optionally emulating the 

function of the pneumatic control valve 

while in a conventionally braked train. 

* * * * * 

Overlay ECP brake system means a 

brake system that has both conventional 

pneumatic brake valves and ECP brake 

components, making it capable of 

operating as either a conventional 

pneumatic brake system or an ECP brake 

system. This brake system can operate 

in either a conventionally braked train 

using the conventional pneumatic 

control valve or in an ECP braked train 

using the ECP brake system’s CCD. 

* * * * * 

Stand-alone CCD means a CCD that 

can operate properly only in a train 

operating in ECP brake mode and 

cannot operate in a conventional 

pneumatically braked train. 

Stand-alone ECP brake system means 

a brake system equipped with a CCD 

that can only operate the brakes on the 

car in ECP brake mode. 

* * * * * 

Switch Mode means a mode of 

operation of the ECP brake system that 

allows operation of that train at 20 miles 

per hour or less when the train’s ECP– 

EOT device is not communicating with 

the lead locomotive’s HEU, the train is 

separated during road switching 

operations, or the ECP brake system has 

stopped the train because the percentage 

of operative brakes fell below 85%. 

Many of the ECP brake system’s fault 

detection/response procedures are 

suspended during Switch Mode. 

* * * * * 

Train line cable is a two-conductor 

electric wire spanning the train and 

carrying both electrical power to operate 

all CCDs and ECP–EOT devices and 

communications network signals. 

Train, unit or train, cycle means a 

train that, except for the changing of 

locomotive power or for the removal or 

replacement of defective equipment, 

remains coupled as a consist and 

operates in a continuous loop or 

continuous loops without destination. 

* * * * * 

Yard limits means a system of tracks, 

not including main tracks and sidings, 

used for classifying cars, making-up and 

inspecting trains, or storing cars and 

equipment. 

* * * * * 

■ 3. Section 232.13 is amended by 

revising paragraph (a) to read as follows: 

§ 232.13 Preemptive effect. 

(a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of 

the regulations in this part preempts any 

State law, rule, regulation, order or 

standard covering the same subject 

matter, except for a provision necessary 

to eliminate or reduce a local safety 

hazard if that provision is not 

incompatible with this part and does 

not impose an undue burden on 

interstate commerce. Nothing in this 

paragraph shall be construed to preempt 

an action under State law seeking 

damages for personal injury, death, or 

property damage alleging that a party 

has failed to comply with the Federal 

standard of care established by this part, 

has failed to comply with its own plan, 

rule, or standard that it created pursuant 

to this part, or has failed to comply with 

a State law, regulation, or order that is 

not incompatible with the first sentence 

of this paragraph. 

* * * * * 

■ 4. Section 232.17 is amended by 

revising paragraphs (a) and (b) to read 

as follows: 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 201 / Thursday, October 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 61553 

§ 232.17 Special approval procedure. 

(a) General. The following procedures 

govern consideration and action upon 

requests for special approval of a plan 

under § 232.15(g); an alternative 

standard under § 232.305, § 232.603, or 

a single car test procedure under 

§ 232.611; and pre-revenue service 

acceptance testing plans under subpart 

F of this part. 

(b) Petitions for special approval of an 

alternative standard or test procedure. 

Each petition for special approval of a 

plan under § 232.15(g); an alternative 

standard under § 232.305 or § 232.603; 

or a single car test procedure under 

§ 232.611 shall contain: 

(1) The name, title, address, and 

telephone number of the primary person 

to be contacted with regard to review of 

the petition; 

(2) The plan, alternative standard, or 

test procedure proposed, in detail, to be 

submitted for or to meet the particular 

requirement of this part; 

(3) Appropriate data or analysis, or 

both, for FRA to consider in 

determining whether the plan, 

alternative standard, or test procedure, 

will be consistent with the guidance 

under § 232.15(f), if applicable, and will 

provide at least an equivalent level of 

safety or otherwise meet the 

requirements contained in this part; and 

(4) A statement affirming that the 

railroad has served a copy of the 

petition on designated representatives of 

its employees, together with a list of the 

names and addresses of the persons 

served. 

* * * * * 

■ 5. Section 232.103 is amended by 

revising paragraph (f) to read as follows: 

§ 232.103 General requirements for all 

train brake systems. 

* * * * * 

(f) Each car in a train shall have its air 

brakes in effective operating condition 

unless the car is being moved for repairs 

in accordance with §§ 232.15 and 

232.609. The air brakes on a car are not 

in effective operating condition if its 

brakes are cut-out or otherwise 

inoperative or if the piston travel 

exceeds: 

(1) 10 1/2 inches for cars equipped 

with nominal 12-inch stroke brake 

cylinders; or 

(2) The piston travel limits indicated 

on the stencil, sticker, or badge plate for 

the brake cylinder with which the car is 

equipped. 

* * * * * 

■ 6. Section 232.205 is amended by 

revising the first two sentences of 

paragraph (c)(5) to read as follows: 

§ 232.205 Class I brake test-initial terminal 

inspection. 

* * * * * 

(c) * * * 

(5) For cars equipped with 81⁄2-inch or 

10-inch diameter brake cylinders, piston 

travel shall be within 6 to 9 inches. If 

piston travel is found to be less than 6 

inches or more than 9 inches, it must be 

adjusted to nominally 71⁄2 inches. * * * 

* * * * * 

§ 232.213 [Amended] 

■ 7. Section 232.213 is amended by 

removing paragraphs (a)(6) and (a)(7) 

and redsignating paragraphs (a)(8) and 

(a)(9) as (a)(6) and (a)(7) respectively. 

■ 8. Section 232.303 is amended by 

revising the first three sentences of 

paragraph (c) to read as follows: 

§ 232.303 General requirements. 

* * * * * 

(c) A car on a shop or repair track 

shall have its piston travel inspected. 

For cars equipped with 81⁄2-inch or 10- 

inch diameter brake cylinders, piston 

travel shall be within 6 to 9 inches. If 

piston travel is found to be less than 6 

inches or more than 9 inches, it must be 

adjusted to nominally 71⁄2 inches. * * * 

* * * * * 

■ 9. Section 232.305 is amended by 

revising the first sentence of paragraph 

(a) and removing paragraph (f); the 

revision reads as follows: 

§ 232.305 Single car air brake tests. 

(a) Single car air brake tests shall be 

performed by a qualified person in 

accordance with either Section 3.0, 

‘‘Tests-Standard Freight Brake 

Equipment,’’ and Section 4.0, ‘‘Special 

Tests,’’ of the Association of American 

Railroads Standard S–486–04, ‘‘Code of 

Air Brake System Tests for Freight 

Equipment,’’ contained in the AAR 

Manual of Standards and 

Recommended Practices, Section E 

(January 1, 2004); an alternative 

procedure approved by FRA pursuant to 

§ 232.17; or a modified procedure 

approved in accordance with the 

provisions contained in § 232.307. 

* * * 

* * * * * 

■ 10. Part 232 is amended by adding a 

new subpart G to read as follows: 

Subpart G—Electronically Controlled 

Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems 

Sec. 

232.601 Scope. 

232.602 Applicability. 

232.603 Design, interoperability, and 

configuration management requirements. 

232.605 Training requirements. 

232.607 Inspection and testing 

requirements. 

232.609 Handling of defective equipment 

with ECP brake systems. 

232.611 Periodic maintenance. 

232.613 End-of-train devices. 

§ 232.601 Scope. 

This subpart contains specific 

requirements applicable to freight trains 

and freight cars equipped with ECP 

brake systems. This subpart also 

contains specific exceptions from 

various requirements contained in this 

part for freight trains and freight cars 

equipped with ECP brake systems. 

§ 232.602 Applicability. 

This subpart applies to all railroads 

that operate a freight car or freight train 

governed by this part and equipped 

with an ECP brake system. Unless 

specifically excepted or modified in this 

section, all of the other requirements 

contained in this part are applicable to 

a freight car or freight train equipped 

with an ECP brake system. 

§ 232.603 Design, interoperability, and 

configuration management requirements. 

(a) General. A freight car or freight 

train equipped with an ECP brake 

system shall, at a minimum, meet the 

Association of American Railroads 

(AAR) standards contained in the AAR 

Manual of Standards and Recommended 

Practices related to ECP brake systems 

listed below; an alternate standard 

approved by FRA pursuant to § 232.17; 

or a modified standard approved in 

accordance with the provisions 

contained in paragraph (f) of this 

section. The incorporation by reference 

of the AAR standards identified in this 

section was approved by the Director of 

the Federal Register in accordance with 

5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

Copies of the incorporated documents 

may be obtained from the Association of 

American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW., 

Washington, DC 20001, 202–639–2100, 

www.aar.org. You may inspect a copy at 

the Federal Railroad Administration, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC, 202–493–6300 or at 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, 

or go to: http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. The applicable 

standards, which are incorporated into 

this regulation by reference, include the 

following: 

(1) AAR S–4200, ‘‘Electronically 

Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) CableBased Brake Systems—Performance 

Requirements,’’ (Adopted 1999; 

Revised: 2002, 2004, 2008); 


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(2) AAR S–4210, ‘‘ECP Cable-Based 

Brake System Cable, Connectors, and 

Junction Boxes—Performance 

Specifications,’’ (Adopted: 1999; 

Revised 2002, 2007); 

(3) AAR S–4220, ‘‘ECP Cable-Based 

Brake DC Power Supply—Performance 

Specification,’’ Version 2.0 (Adopted: 

1999; Revised: 2002); 

(4) AAR S–4230, ‘‘Intratrain 

Communication (ITC) Specification for 

Cable-Based Freight Train Control 

System,’’ Version 3.0 (Adopted: 1999; 

Revised: 2002, 2004); 

(5) AAR S–4240, ‘‘ECP Brake 

Equipment—Approval Procedure’’ 

(Adopted: 2007); 

(6) AAR S–4250, ‘‘Performance 

Requirements for ITC Controlled CableBased Distributed Power Systems,’’ 

Version 2.0 (Adopted: 2003; Revised: 

2004); 

(7) AAR S–4260, ‘‘ECP Brake and 

Wire Distributed Power Interoperability 

Test Procedures’’ (Adopted: 2007); and 

(8) AAR S–4270, ‘‘ECP Brake System 

Configuration Management’’ (Adopted: 

2008). 

(b) Approval. A freight train or freight 

car equipped with an ECP brake system 

and equipment covered by the AAR 

standards incorporated by reference in 

this section shall not be used without 

conditional or final approval by AAR in 

accordance with AAR Standard S–4240, 

‘‘ECP Brake Equipment—Approval 

Procedures’’ (2007). 

(c) Configuration management. A 

railroad operating a freight train or 

freight car equipped with ECP brake 

systems shall adopt and comply with 

the configuration management plan 

developed in accordance with the AAR 

standards incorporated by reference in 

this section. FRA reserves the right to 

audit a manufacturer’s configuration 

management plan at any time. 

(d) Exceptions. (1) A freight car or 

freight train equipped with a standalone ECP brake system shall be 

excepted from the requirement in 

§ 232.103(l) referencing AAR Standard 

S–469–47, ‘‘Performance Specification 

for Freight Brakes.’’ 

(2) The provisions addressing the 

introduction of new brake system 

technology contained in subpart F of 

this part are not applicable to a freight 

car or freight train equipped with an 

ECP brake system approved by AAR in 

accordance with paragraph (b) of this 

section, conditionally or otherwise, as of 

the effective date of this rule. 

(e) New technology. Upon written 

request supported by suitable 

justification and submitted pursuant to 

the special approval procedures in 

§ 232.17, the Associate Administrator 

may except from the requirements of 

subpart F of this part the testing of new 

ECP brake technology, demonstration of 

new ECP brake technology, or both, 

where testing or demonstration, or both, 

will be conducted pursuant to an FRArecognized industry standard and FRA 

is invited to monitor the testing or 

demonstration, or both. 

(f) Modification of standards. The 

AAR or other authorized representative 

of the railroad industry may seek 

modification of the industry standards 

identified in or approved pursuant to 

paragraph (a) of this section. The 

request for modification will be handled 

and shall be submitted in accordance 

with the modification procedures 

contained in § 232.307. 

§ 232.605 Training requirements. 

(a) Inspection, testing and 

maintenance. A railroad that operates a 

freight car or freight train equipped with 

an ECP brake system and each 

contractor that performs inspection, 

testing, or maintenance on a freight car 

or freight train equipped with an ECP 

brake system shall adopt and comply 

with a training, qualification, and 

designation program for its employees 

that perform inspection, testing or 

maintenance of ECP brake systems. The 

training program required by this 

section shall meet the requirements in 

§§ 232.203(a), (b), (e), and (f). 

(b) Operating rules. A railroad 

operating a freight train or freight car 

equipped with an ECP brake system 

shall amend its operating rules to 

govern safe train handling procedures 

related to ECP brake systems and 

equipment under all operating 

conditions and shall tailor its operating 

rules to the specific equipment and 

territory of the railroad. 

(c) Locomotive engineers. A railroad 

operating a freight car or freight train 

equipped with an ECP brake system 

shall adopt and use in its training 

program under part 240 specific 

knowledge, skill, and ability criteria to 

ensure that its locomotive engineers are 

fully trained with the operating rules 

governing safe train handling 

procedures related to ECP brake systems 

and equipment under all operating 

conditions and tailored to the specific 

equipment and territory of the railroad. 

§ 232.607 Inspection and testing 

requirements. 

(a) Trains at initial terminal. A freight 

train operating in ECP brake mode shall 

receive the following inspections at its 

point of origin (initial terminal): 

(1) A Class I brake test as described in 

§ 232.205(c) by a qualified mechanical 

inspector (QMI); and 

(2) A pre-departure inspection 

pursuant to part 215 of this chapter by 

an inspector designated under § 215.11 

of this chapter. 

(b) Trains en route. (1) Except for a 

unit or cycle train, a train operating in 

ECP brake mode shall not operate a 

distance that exceeds its destination or 

3,500 miles, whichever is less, unless 

inspections meeting the requirements of 

paragraph (a) of this section are 

performed on the train. 

(2) A unit or cycle train operating in 

ECP brake mode shall receive the 

inspections required in paragraph (a) of 

this section at least every 3,500 miles. 

(3) The greatest distance that any car 

in a train has traveled since receiving a 

Class I brake test by a qualified 

mechanical inspector will determine the 

distance that the train has traveled. 

(4) A freight train operating in ECP 

brake mode shall receive a Class I brake 

test as described in § 232.205(c) by a 

qualified person at a location where the 

train is off air for a period of more than: 

(i) 24 hours, or 

(ii) 80 hours, if the train remains 

inaccessible to the railroad and in an 

extended-off-air facility. For the purpose 

of this section, an extended-off-air 

facility means a location controlled by 

a sole shipper or consignee which 

restricts access to the train and provides 

sufficient security to deter vandalism. 

(c) Cars added en route. (1) Each 

freight car equipped with an ECP brake 

system that is added to a freight train 

operating in ECP brake mode shall 

receive a Class I brake test as described 

in § 232.205(c) by a qualified person, 

unless all of the following are met: 

(i) The car has received a Class I brake 

test by a qualified mechanical inspector 

within the last 3,500 miles; 

(ii) Information identified in 

§ 232.205(e) relating to the performance 

of the previously received Class I brake 

test is provided to the train crew; 

(iii) The car has not been off air for 

more than 24 hours or for more than 80 

hours, if that train remains in an 

extended-off-air facility; and 

(iv) A visual inspection of the car’s 

brake systems is conducted to ensure 

that the brake equipment is intact and 

properly secured. This may be 

accomplished as part of the inspection 

required under § 215.13 of this chapter 

and may be conducted while the car is 

off air. 

(2) Each car and each solid block of 

cars not equipped with an ECP brake 

system that is added to a train operating 

in ECP brake mode shall receive a visual 

inspection to ensure it is properly 

placed in the train and safe to operate 

and shall be moved and tagged in 


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accordance with the provisions 

contained in § 232.15. 

(d) Class III brake test (1) A Class III 

brake test shall be performed on a 

freight train operating in ECP brake 

mode by a qualified person, as defined 

in § 232.5, to test the train’s brake 

system whenever the continuity of the 

brake pipe or electrical connection is 

broken or interrupted. 

(2) In lieu of observing the brake pipe 

changes at the rear of a freight train with 

the end-of-train telemetry device 

referred to in §§ 232.211(c) and (d), the 

operator shall verify that the brakes 

applied and released on the rear car of 

the freight train by observing the ECP 

brake system’s display in the locomotive 

cab. 

(e) Initialization. (1) A freight train 

operating in ECP brake mode shall be 

initialized as described in paragraph 

(e)(2) whenever the following occurs: 

(i) Class I brake test. 

(ii) Class III brake test. 

(iii) Whenever the ECP brake system 

is powered on. 

(2) Initialization shall, at a minimum: 

(i) initialize the ECP brake system 

pursuant to AAR Series Standard S– 

4200; and 

(ii) be performed in the sequential 

order of the vehicles in the train. 

(3) Whenever an ECP brake system is 

initialized pursuant to this paragraph, 

the train crew must ensure that the total 

number of cars indicated by the ECP 

brake system is the same as the total 

number of cars indicated on the train 

consist. 

(f) Modifications to existing brake 

inspections. (1) In lieu of the specific 

brake pipe service reductions and 

increases required in this part, an 

electronic signal that provides an 

equivalent application and release of the 

brakes shall be utilized when 

conducting any required inspection or 

test on a freight car or freight train 

equipped with an ECP brake system and 

operating in ECP brake mode. 

(2) In lieu of the specific piston travel 

ranges contained in this part, the piston 

travel on freight cars equipped with ECP 

brake systems shall be within the piston 

travel limits stenciled or marked on the 

car or badge plate consistent with the 

manufacturers recommended limits, if 

so stenciled or marked. 

(g) ECP brake system train line cable. 

Each ECP brake system train line cable 

shall: 

(1) be located and guarded to provide 

sufficient vertical clearance; 

(2) not cause any tripping hazards; 

(3) not hang with one end free 

whenever the equipment is used in a 

train movement; 

(4) not be positioned to interfere with 

the use of any safety appliance; or 

(5) not have any of the following 

conditions: 

(i) Badly chafed or broken insulation. 

(ii) Broken plugs, receptacles or 

terminals. 

(iii) Broken or protruding strands of 

wire. 

(h) Exceptions. A freight car or a 

freight train shall be exempt from the 

requirements contained in §§ 232.205(a) 

and (b), 232.207, 232.209, and 

232.211(a) when it is equipped with an 

ECP brake system and operating in ECP 

brake mode. 

§ 232.609 Handling of defective equipment 

with ECP brake systems. 

(a) Ninety-five percent of the cars in 

a train operating in ECP brake mode 

shall have effective and operative brakes 

prior to use or departure from the train’s 

initial terminal or any location where a 

Class I brake test is required to be 

performed on the entire train by a 

qualified mechanical inspector pursuant 

to § 232.607. 

(b) A freight car equipped with an 

ECP brake system that is known to have 

arrived with ineffective or inoperative 

brakes at initial terminal of the next 

train which the car is to be included or 

at a location where a Class I brake test 

is required under §§ 232.607(b)(1) 

through (b)(3) shall not depart that 

location with ineffective or inoperative 

brakes in a train operating in ECP brake 

mode unless: 

(1) The location does not have the 

ability to conduct the necessary repairs; 

(2) The car is hauled only for the 

purpose of repair to the nearest forward 

location where the necessary repairs can 

be performed consistent with the 

guidance contained in § 232.15(f); 

(3) The car is not being placed for 

loading or unloading while being moved 

for repair unless unloading is necessary 

for the safe repair of the car; and 

(4) The car is properly tagged in 

accordance with § 232.15(b). 

(c) A freight car equipped with only 

conventional pneumatic brakes shall not 

move in a freight train operating in ECP 

brake mode unless it would otherwise 

have effective and operative brakes if it 

were part of a conventional pneumatic 

brake-equipped train or could be moved 

from the location in defective condition 

under the provisions contained in, and 

tagged in accordance with, § 232.15. 

(d) A freight train operating in ECP 

brake mode shall not move if less than 

85 percent of the cars in the train have 

operative and effective brakes. However, 

after experiencing a penalty stop for 

having less than 85 percent operative 

and effective brakes, a freight train 

operating in ECP brake mode may be 

moved if all of the following are met: 

(1) The train is visually inspected; 

(2) Appropriate measures are taken to 

ensure that the train is safely operated 

to the location where necessary repairs 

or changes to the consist can be made; 

(3) A qualified person determines that 

it is safe to move the train; and 

(4) The train is moved in ECP brake 

Switch Mode to the nearest or nearest 

forward location where necessary 

repairs or changes to the consist can be 

made. 

(e) A freight car or locomotive 

equipped with an ECP brake system that 

is found with inoperative or ineffective 

brakes for the first time during the 

performance of a Class I brake test or 

while en route may be used or hauled 

without civil penalty liability under this 

part to its destination, not to exceed 

3,500 miles; provided, all applicable 

provisions of this section are met and 

the defective car or locomotive is hauled 

in a train operating in ECP brake mode. 

(f) A freight car equipped with an ECP 

brake system that is part of a train 

operating in ECP brake mode: 

(1) that is found with a defective nonbrake safety appliance may be used or 

hauled without civil penalty under this 

part to the nearest or nearest forward 

location where the necessary repairs can 

be performed consistent with the 

guidelines contained in § 232.15(f). 

(2) that is found with an ineffective or 

inoperative brake shall be hauled in 

accordance with the following: 

(i) § 232.15(e)(1). 

(ii) No more than two freight cars with 

brakes pneumatically cut out or five 

freight cars or five units in a multi-unit 

articulated piece of equipment with 

brakes electronically cut out shall be 

consecutively placed in the same train. 

(g) A train operating with 

conventional pneumatic brakes shall not 

operate with freight cars equipped with 

stand-alone ECP brake systems unless: 

(1) The train has at least the minimum 

percentage of operative brakes required 

by paragraph (h) of this section when at 

an initial terminal or paragraph (d) of 

this section when en route; and 

(2) The stand-alone ECP brakeequipped cars are: 

(i) Moved for the purpose of delivery 

to a railroad receiving the equipment or 

to a location for placement in a train 

operating in ECP brake mode or being 

moved for repair to the nearest available 

location where the necessary repairs can 

be made in accordance with 

§§ 232.15(a)(7) and (f); 

(ii) Tagged in accordance with 

§ 232.15(b); and 

(iii) Placed in the train in accordance 

with § 232.15(e). 

(h) A train equipped and operated 

with conventional pneumatic brakes 


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1A penalty may be assessed against an individual 

only for a willful violation. Generally when two or 

more violations of these regulations are discovered 

with respect to a single unit of equipment that is 

placed or continued in service by a railroad, the 

appropriate penalties set forth above are aggregated 

may depart an initial terminal with 

freight cars that are equipped with 

stand-alone ECP brake systems provided 

all of the following are met: 

(1) The train has 100 percent effective 

and operative brakes on all cars 

equipped with conventional pneumatic 

brake systems; 

(2) The train has at least 95 percent 

effective and operative brakes when 

including the freight cars equipped with 

stand-alone ECP brake systems; and 

(3) The requirements contained in 

paragraph (g) of this section are met. 

(i) Tagging of defective equipment. A 

freight car equipped with an ECP brake 

system that is found with ineffective or 

inoperative brakes will be considered 

electronically tagged under 

§ 232.15(b)(1) and (b)(5) if the car is 

used or hauled in a train operating in 

ECP brake mode and the ECP brake 

system meets the following: 

(1) The ECP brake system is able to 

display information in the cab of the 

lead locomotive regarding the location 

and identification of the car with 

defective brakes; 

(2) The information is stored or 

downloaded and is accessible to FRA 

and appropriate operating and 

inspection personnel; and 

(3) An electronic or written record of 

the stored or downloaded information is 

retained and maintained in accordance 

with § 232.15(b)(3). 

(j) Procedures for handling ECP brake 

system repairs and designation of repair 

locations. (1) Each railroad operating 

freight cars equipped with ECP brake 

systems shall adopt and comply with 

specific procedures developed in 

accordance with the requirements 

related to the movement of defective 

equipment contained in this subpart. 

These procedures shall be made 

available to FRA upon request. 

(2) Each railroad operating freight 

trains in ECP brake mode shall submit 

to FRA’s Associate Administrator for 

Safety a list of locations on its system 

where ECP brake system repairs will be 

performed. A railroad shall notify FRA’s 

Associate Administrator for Safety in 

writing 30 days prior to any change in 

the locations designated for such 

repairs. A sufficient number of locations 

shall be identified to ensure compliance 

with the requirements related to the 

handling of defective equipment 

contained in this part. 

(k) Exceptions: All freight cars and 

trains that are specifically identified, 

operated, and handled in accordance 

with this section are excepted from the 

movement of defective equipment 

requirements contained in 

§ 232.15(a)(2), (a)(5) through (a)(8), and 

232.103(d) and (e). 

§ 232.611 Periodic maintenance. 

(a) In addition to the maintenance 

requirements contained in § 232.303(b) 

through (d), a freight car equipped with 

an ECP brake system shall be inspected 

and repaired before being released from 

a shop or repair track to ensure the 

proper and safe condition of the 

following: 

(1) ECP brake system wiring and 

brackets; 

(2) ECP brake system electrical 

connections; and 

(3) Car mounted ECP brake system 

components. 

(b) Single car air brake test 

procedures. Prior to placing a freight car 

equipped with an ECP brake system into 

revenue service, a railroad or a duly 

authorized representative of the railroad 

industry shall submit a procedure for 

conducting periodic single car air brake 

tests to FRA for its approval pursuant to 

§ 232.17. 

(c) Except as provided in § 232.303(e), 

a single car air brake test conducted in 

accordance with the procedure 

submitted and approved in accordance 

with paragraph (b) of this section shall 

be performed by a qualified person on 

a freight car equipped with an ECP 

brake system whenever any of the 

events identified in § 232.305 occur, 

except for those paragraphs identified in 

paragraph (f) of this section. 

(d) A single car air brake test 

conducted in accordance with the 

procedure submitted and approved in 

accordance with paragraph (b) of this 

section shall be performed by a 

qualified person on each freight car 

retrofitted with a newly installed ECP 

brake system prior to placing or using 

the car in revenue service. 

(e) Modification of single car test 

standard. A railroad or a duly 

authorized representative of the railroad 

industry may seek modification of the 

single car test standard approved in 

accordance with paragraph (b) of this 

section. The request for modification 

will be handled and shall be submitted 

in accordance with the modification 

procedures contained in § 232.307. 

(f) Exceptions. A freight car equipped 

with a stand-alone or dual mode ECP 

brake system is excepted from the single 

car air brake test procedures contained 

in § 232.305(a). A freight car equipped 

with a stand-alone ECP brake system is 

excepted from the single car test 

requirements contained in 

§ 232.305(b)(2). 

(g) For purposes of paragraphs (c) and 

(d) of this section, if a single car air 

brake test is conducted on a car prior to 

June 15, 2009, pursuant to the then 

existing AAR standards, it shall be 

considered the last single car air brake 

test for that car, if necessary. 

§ 232.613 End-of-train devices. 

(a) An ECP–EOT device shall, at a 

minimum, serve as the final node on the 

ECP brake circuit, provide a cable 

terminal circuit, and monitor, confirm, 

and report train, brake pipe, and train 

line cable continuity, cable voltage, 

brake pipe pressure, and the status of 

the ECP–EOT device battery charge. The 

ECP–EOT device shall transmit a status 

message (EOT Beacon) at least once per 

second, contain a means of 

communicating with the HEU, and be 

equipped with a brake pipe pressure 

transducer and a battery that charges 

from the train line cable. 

(b) A railroad shall not move or use 

a freight train equipped with an ECP 

brake system unless that train is 

equipped with a functioning ECP–EOT 

device designed and operated in 

accordance with this subpart. The ECP– 

EOT device must be properly connected 

to the network and to the train line 

cable at the rear of the train. 

(c) A locomotive equipped with ECP 

brakes can be used in lieu of an ECP– 

EOT device, provided it is capable of 

performing all of the functions of a 

functioning ECP–EOT device. 

(d) Exception. A freight train 

operating in ECP brake mode is 

excepted from the end-of-train device 

requirements contained in subpart E of 

this part, provided that it is equipped 

with an ECP–EOT device complying 

with this section. 

■ 11. Appendix A to part 232 is 

amended by revising footnote 1 and by 

adding an entry for subpart G to the end 

of the table to read as follows: 

Appendix A to Part 232—Schedule of 

Civil Penalties 1


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up to a maximum of $11,000 per day. An exception 

to this rule is the $15,000 penalty for willful 

violation of § 232.503 (failure to get FRA approval 

before introducing new technology) with respect to 

a single unit of equipment; if the unit has additional 

violative conditions, the penalty may routinely be 

aggregated to $15,000. Although the penalties listed 

for failure to perform the brake inspections and 

tests under § 232.205 through § 232.209 may be 

assessed for each train that is not properly 

inspected, failure to perform any of the inspections 

and tests required under those sections will be 

treated as a violation separate and distinct from, 

and in addition to, any substantive violative 

conditions found on the equipment contained in 

the train consist. Moreover, the Administrator 

reserves the right to assess a penalty of up to 

$27,000 for any violation where circumstances 

warrant. See 49 CFR part 209, appendix A. 

Section Violation Willful 

violation 

* * * * * * * 

Subpart G—Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems 

232.603 Design, interoperability, and configuration management requirements: 

(a) Failure to meet minimum standards ................................................................................................................... 7,500 11,000 

(b) Using ECP brake equipment without approval ................................................................................................... 7,500 11,000 

(c) Failure to adopt and comply with a proper configuration management plan ..................................................... 7,500 11,000 

232.605 Training Requirements: 

(a) Failure to adopt and comply with a proper training, qualification, and designation program for employees 

that perform inspection, testing or maintenance .................................................................................................. (1) (1) 

(b) Failure to amend operating rules ........................................................................................................................ 12,500 16,000 

(c) Failure to adopt and comply with proper training criteria for locomotive engineers ........................................... 12,500 16,000 

232.607 Inspection and testing requirements: 

(a)(1), (b), (c)(1) Complete or partial failure to perform inspection .......................................................................... (1) (1) 

(a)(2) Complete or partial failure to perform pre-departure inspection .................................................................... 7,500 11,000 

(c)(1)(iv), (c)(2) Failure to perform visual inspection on a car added en route ........................................................ 4,500 6,500 

(d) Failure to perform inspection .............................................................................................................................. (1) (1) 

(e)(1), (2) Failure to properly initialize the train ........................................................................................................ 7,500 11,000 

(e)(3) Failure to ensure identical consist and system information ........................................................................... 7,500 11,000 

(f)(1) Failure to apply a proper brake pipe service reduction .................................................................................. (1) (1) 

(f)(2) Failure to properly adhere to the proper piston travel ranges ........................................................................ (1) (1) 

(g)(1)–(4) Improperly located and guarded cable .................................................................................................... 7,500 11,000 

(g)(5) Condition of cable and connections ............................................................................................................... 7,500 11,000 

232.609 Handling of defective equipment with ECP brake systems: 

(a) Failure to have proper percentage of operative brakes from Class I brake test ............................................... (1) (1) 

(b) Failure to prevent a car known to arrive with defective brakes to depart location where a Class I brake test 

is required ............................................................................................................................................................. 7,500 11,000 

(c) Improper movement of a car equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes .................................................... 7,500 11,000 

(d) Operating with less than 85 percent operative brakes ....................................................................................... (1) (1) 

(f)(2)(i) Improper placement of defective conventional brake equipment ................................................................ (1) (1) 

(f)(2)(ii) Improper placement of defective ECP brake equipment ............................................................................ 7,500 11,000 

(g) Improper movement of defective stand-alone ECP brake equipment in a train operating with conventional 

pneumatic brakes .................................................................................................................................................. (1) (1) 

(h) Improper movement from initial terminal of stand-alone ECP brake equipment in a conventional brake operated train ............................................................................................................................................................... (1) (1) 

(i) Failure to tag equipment ...................................................................................................................................... (1) (1) 

(j)(1) Failure to adopt and comply with procedures for the movement of defective equipment .............................. 7,500 11,000 

(j)(2) Failure to submit list of ECP brake system repair locations ........................................................................... 7,500 11,000 

232.611 Periodic maintenance: 

(a) Failure to ensure the proper and safe condition of car ...................................................................................... 7,500 11,000 

(b)–(d) Failure to perform test .................................................................................................................................. 7,500 11,000 

232.613 End-of-train devices: 

(a) Failure to meet design standards for ECP–EOT devices .................................................................................. 7,500 11,000 

(b) Moving with an improper or improperly connected ECP–EOT device ............................................................... 9,500 13,000 

Failure to observe any condition for 

movement of defective equipment set forth in 

§ 232.15(a) will deprive the railroad of the 

benefit of the movement-for-repair provision 

and make the railroad and any responsible 

individuals liable for penalty under the 

particular regulatory section(s) concerning 

the substantive defect(s) present on the 

equipment at the time of movement. 

Failure to provide any of the records or 

plans required by this part pursuant to 

§ 232.19 will be considered a failure to 

maintain or develop the record or plan and 

will make the railroad liable for penalty 

under the particular regulatory section(s) 

concerning the retention or creation of the 

document involved. 

Failure to properly perform any of the 

inspections specifically referenced in 

§ 232.209, § 232.213, § 232.217, and subpart 

G may be assessed under each section of this 

part or this chapter, or both, that contains the 

requirements for performing the referenced 

inspection. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 

19, 2008. 

Joseph H. Boardman, 

Federal Railroad Administrator. 

[FR Doc. E8–22549 Filed 10–15–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 


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