1Elena Katz has filed this action on her own behalf and on

behalf of hundreds of John and Jane Doe plaintiffs who she

defines as “[m]others, [f]athers and [c]hildren who were students

in special educational program in Defendant Timberline [sic]

Regalia [sic] School District under the NH Dept of Education, and

who had a diagnosis of [j]uvenile [d]iabetes and NVLD, a disorder

within an autistic spectrum, whose parents advocated for their

special education needs within Timberline [sic] School District

and NH Department of Education.” Parties to a lawsuit cannot be

represented by anyone other than themselves or a member of the

bar. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also Local Rules of the United

States District Court for the District of New Hampshire (“LR”)

83.2(d) (“Persons who are not members of the bar . . . will be

allowed to appear before this court only on their own behalf”) 

and LR 83.6(b) (“Pro se parties must appear personally . . . . A

pro se party may not authorize another person who is not a member

of the bar of this court to appear on his or her behalf.”). Pro

se litigants cannot “fairly and adequately protect the interests

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Elena Katz, et al.

v. Civil No. 07-cv-383-PB

New Hampshire Department of

Health and Human Services,

Division of Children, Youth,

and Families, et al.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Elena Katz has filed a complaint in this Court, seeking

relief from claimed violations of her rights arising out of state

and federal law (document no. 1 & 7).1 The matter is before me

Case 1:07-cv-00383-PB Document 11 Filed 12/06/07 Page 1 of 5
of the class,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). See

Avery v. Powell, 695 F. Supp. 632, 643 (D.N.H. 1988) (denying pro

se plaintiff’s motion for class certification because of his

incompetence to represent the class); see also Young v. Wall,

2005 WL 1366742 *1 (D.R.I. May 24, 2005) (discussing requirements

for certifying a plaintiff class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) in

the context of a pro se complaint and finding such a complaint to

be inadequate). Accordingly, I will not consider any of the John

or Jane Doe plaintiffs, or their interests, to be part of this

action. 

2

for preliminary review to determine, among other things, whether

the plaintiff has stated any claim upon which relief might be

granted. See United States District Court for the District of

New Hampshire Local Rule (“LR”) 4.3(d)(1)(B). For the reasons

stated herein, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed.

Standard of Review

Under this Court’s local rules, when a plaintiff commences

an action pro se and in forma pauperis, the magistrate judge is

directed to conduct a preliminary review. LR 4.3(d)(1). In

conducting the preliminary review, the Court construes pro se

pleadings liberally, however inartfully pleaded. See Erickson v.

Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (following

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) to construe pro se pleadings

liberally in favor of the pro se party). “The policy behind

affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if

Case 1:07-cv-00383-PB Document 11 Filed 12/06/07 Page 2 of 5
3

they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the correct

cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.” See Castro v.

United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (noting that courts may

construe pro se pleadings so as to avoid inappropriately

stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals of claims); Ahmed v.

Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). All of the

factual assertions made by a pro se plaintiff and inferences

reasonably drawn therefrom must be accepted as true. See id.

This review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and

meaningful consideration.

Discussion

Katz has alleged generally that she believes that the

actions taken by the defendants in connection with previous state

court litigation concerning her daughter violated plaintiff’s

constitutional rights and rights under state law. Katz asserts

that the defendants acted in conspiracy with one another and

individually, but she has not alleged any specific facts as to

which defendant engaged in what actions, and how those actions

affected her rights. 

In filing a civil rights complaint, a "claim must at least

set forth minimal facts, not subjective characterizations, as to

Case 1:07-cv-00383-PB Document 11 Filed 12/06/07 Page 3 of 5
4

who did what to whom and why." Guglielmo v. Cunningham, 811 F.

Supp. 31, 35 (D.N.H. 1993) (quoting Dewey v. Univ. of N.H., 694

F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983));

accord Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Even

pro se litigants must do more than make mere conclusory

statements regarding constitutional claims.") (internal citations

omitted). Katz has failed to state any facts that could be

generously construed to enable her to clear even the low hurdle

for pro se pleadings. I therefore recommend that her asserted §

1983 claims be dismissed.

Katz also has alleged a number of claims based on state tort

law. A federal district court may exercise its supplemental

jurisdiction over such claims if they arise out of the same facts

and circumstances as properly asserted federal claims. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a). However, a district court may decline to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction where it dismisses all of the claims

over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

Here, where I recommend dismissal of all of the federal claims

over which this Court has original federal question jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, I decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the claims based on state law.

Case 1:07-cv-00383-PB Document 11 Filed 12/06/07 Page 4 of 5
5

Because I find that Katz’s allegations do no more than state

conclusory claims without specific factual assertions to support

them, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed. Any

objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within

ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to file

objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal

the district court’s order. See Unauthorized Practice of Law

Comm. v. Gordon, 979 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992);

United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986). 

_________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: December 6, 2007

cc: Elena Katz, pro se

Case 1:07-cv-00383-PB Document 11 Filed 12/06/07 Page 5 of 5