STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

FILED 

In Re: T.H., A.H., and J.H. February 18, 2014 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

No. 13-0951 (Raleigh County 11-JA-138 through 11-JA-140) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Father filed this appeal by his counsel, Timothy P. Lupardus. His appeal arises 

from the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, which terminated his parental rights to his children by 

order entered on August 15, 2013. The guardian ad litem for the children, Neil V. Boden, filed a 

response in support of the circuit court’s order. The Department of Health and Human Resources 

(“DHHR”), by its attorney Angela Alexander Walters, also filed a response in support of the 

circuit court’s order. Petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by admitting drug screen results 

into evidence; proceeding to termination when petitioner’s improvement period had been 

extended; terminating his parental rights when he is not a physical or emotional threat to the 

children, can obtain employment, obtain a suitable residence, and refrain from drug use around 

the children; and terminating his parental rights where a reasonable, less drastic alternative was 

available for the children’s placement. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

In June of 2011, the DHHR filed a petition initiating the instant case. The petition alleged 

that the youngest child, T.H., tested positive for cocaine at birth and that petitioner disclosed to 

Child Protective Services (“CPS”) that he used marijuana about three weeks earlier. At the 

adjudicatory hearing in September of 2011, petitioner stipulated to neglecting his children due to 

illegal drug use. The circuit court adjudicated the children as abused and neglected. The DHHR 

granted petitioner’s motion for an improvement period and granted the DHHR’s motion for 

petitioner to undergo frequent and random drug screens. 

As the case proceeded, a review hearing in December of 2011 revealed that neither parent 

had been participating in their drug screens or going to outpatient drug treatment. The circuit 

court ordered the DHHR to schedule inpatient drug treatment for both parents.1 The circuit court 

extended petitioner’s improvement period in the summer of 2012 and again in December of 

2012, which pushed its expiration to March of 2013. In the spring of 2013, the DHHR filed a 

1 During the course of the proceedings below, the children’s mother voluntarily relinquished her 

parental rights. 

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motion to terminate petitioner’s parental rights, asserting that petitioner tested positive for drugs 

in March, refused services, and failed to make improvements. 

In August of 2013 at a dispositional hearing, evidence presented demonstrated that 

petitioner last participated in services in April and had not had a negative drug screen since 

February, which was also when he had his most recent visit with his children. A worker from the 

Day Report Center also testified that petitioner missed over forty drug screens. In its 

dispositional order, the circuit court found that petitioner failed to complete the terms of his 

improvement period and show that he would be able to complete rehabilitation within a 

reasonable time. Accordingly, the circuit court denied petitioner’s motion for a dispositional 

improvement period and terminated his parental rights. From this order, petitioner now appeals. 

This Court has previously established the following standard of review: 

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply 

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

In his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by admitting 

drug screen results into evidence over his objection concerning their authenticity and foundation. 

Our review of the record indicates no error by the circuit court in admitting this evidence. Rule 

803(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides an exception to hearsay for those 

documents that are records of regularly conducted business activity, which include memoranda, 

reports, or data compilations. The dispositional hearing transcript provides that the evidence 

petitioner contests was part of the DHHR’s July of 2013 court summary, which was signed and 

dated by the assigned DHHR worker. In light of these circumstances, the DHHR court summary 

satisfies Rule 803(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and was not improperly admitted. 

Second, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by proceeding to terminate his 

parental rights when his improvement period had been extended and no motion to terminate his 

improvement period had been filed. Our review of the record indicates no error by the circuit 

court in this regard. The record provides that on March 1, 2013, the circuit court held a review 

hearing on petitioner’s improvement period, during which the circuit court was advised that 

petitioner’s improvement period was scheduled to expire the next day, March 2. The circuit court 

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was also advised that although petitioner completed inpatient drug rehabilitation, he was having 

problems with the DHHR. The record reveals that such issues included petitioner’s lack of 

contact with his CPS worker and his continuous use of drugs despite completing inpatient drug 

treatment. At the March 1, 2013, hearing, the DHHR moved to “continue on status quo,” which 

the circuit court granted. The next hearing was scheduled for May 31. At no time did the circuit 

court further extend petitioner’s improvement period beyond March 2. Accordingly, we find no 

error with the circuit court’s procession to hearing evidence and arguments with regard to 

termination after finding that petitioner’s improvement period had expired. 

Third, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by terminating his parental rights 

because he is not a physical or emotional threat to his children. Petitioner further asserts that he 

testified that he could obtain employment and suitable housing, and could refrain from drug use 

around the children. We find no error by the circuit court in this regard. Under West Virginia 

Code § 49-6-5(b)(3), circumstances that warrant finding no reasonable likelihood that conditions 

of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected include circumstances in which the subject 

parent has not responded to, or followed through with, rehabilitative efforts designed to reduce or 

prevent abuse and neglect. Such circumstances warrant terminating parental rights under West 

Virginia Code § 49-6-5(a)(6). The record reflects that petitioner failed to participate in over forty 

required drug screens, failed to engage in services for several months before the dispositional 

hearing, and had not visited with his children for several months before the dispositional hearing. 

Moreover, the record reflects that, despite participating in inpatient rehabilitation, petitioner 

tested positive for THC, cocaine, and oxycodone just days after his improvement period expired. 

Lastly, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by terminating his parental rights 

where a reasonable, less drastic alternative was available for placement. Petitioner asserts that his 

grandmother passed a home study and was available for the children’s placement through a 

guardianship. We find no error in the circuit court’s decision to terminate petitioner’s parental 

rights. “‘Although parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal in 

cases involving abuse and neglect, as in all family law matters, must be the health and welfare of 

the children.’ Syl. Pt. 3, In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996).” Syl. Pt. 2, In re 

Timber M., 231 W.Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013). We also bear in mind the following: 

Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the statutory 

provision covering the disposition of neglected children, W.Va.Code, 49-6-5 

(1977) may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive 

alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under 

W.Va.Code, 49-6-5(b) (1977) that conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected. 

Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). From our review of the record, it 

is clear that the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s findings and conclusions 

that there was no reasonable likelihood to believe that conditions of abuse and neglect could be 

substantially corrected in the near future, and that termination was necessary for the children’s 

welfare. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-6-5(a)(6), circuit courts are directed to terminate 

parental rights upon such findings. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

ISSUED: February 18, 2014 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Brent D. Benjamin 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

Affirmed. 

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