COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Elder, Beal es and Senior Judge Annunziata

KEISHA D. CARR MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0351-10-4 PER CURIAM AUGUST 10, 2010 FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Charles J. Maxfield, Judge (Harold N. Ward, Jr.; The Ward Law Office, P.C. , on brief), for appellant. (David P. Bobzien, County Atto rney; Peter D. Andreoli, Jr., Deputy County Attorney; Deborah C. Lair d, Assistant County Attorney; Suzanne Gwen Hruby, Guardian ad litem for the minor children, on brief), for appellee.

Keisha Carr (mother) appeals the trial court’ s order terminating her parental rights to her two children and approving fo ster care plans with goals of adoption for the children. Mother argues

that the trial court er red by (1) approving a foster care plan with a goal of adoption, as opposed to return to parent/relative, for D.F.; (2) approving a foster care plan with a goal of adoption, as opposed to return to parent/rel ative, for K.C.; (3) terminating her parental rights to D.F.; and (4) terminating her pare ntal rights to K.C. 1 Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 We refer to the children by their initials.- 2 - BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of

Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). K.C. was born in January 2000, and D.F. was born in November 2000. From their birth until 2002, the children lived with their mother a nd their father, Davon Fields. They lived in shelters, hotels, and with friends of their parents. They were dirty, hungry, and left unattended for long periods of time. Linda Saifi, the paternal gra ndmother, began to care for the children. In April 2003, the Fairfax County Juvenile and Domest ic Relations District Court (the JDR court) found that the children were in need of services and tempor arily transferred custody to the Fairfax County Department of Family Services (the Department). 2 In May 2003, the JD R court transferred custody of the children to Saifi. The Department provided protective supervision. Saifi and mother were ordered to cooperate with the Department, obtain psychological evaluations and parent-child assessments, and obtain a home study. In December 2006, mother filed a motion for a home study. On May 21, 2007, the JDR court found that the children’s placement with Saifi was unacceptable be cause Child Protective Services (CPS) was investigating Saifi. The JDR court transferred custody to mother with a thirty-day transition period. On June 5, 2007, the Department filed an emergency motion seeking to transfer the childre n’s custody back to the Department. On June 7, 2007, the JDR

court found that mother was homeless and Saifi was unable to care for the children. The JDR court transferred custody of the children to the Department. At the next hearing in August 2007,

2 Fields was incarcerated when the children firs t came into foster ca re and died in July 2009.- 3 - the Department filed foster care plans with a goal of return home a nd a concurrent goal of placement with relatives. Mother and Saifi were ordered to obtain psychological evaluations, parent capacity evaluations, and alcohol and drug services evalua tions. They also were ordered to follow any treatment recommendations and cooperate with the Department. Several review hearings were conducted over the next year and a half until the Department filed petitions to terminate parental rights and submitted foster care plans with goals of adoption. On October 1, 2009, the JDR court terminated mother’s parental rights and approved the foster care plans with the goals of adoption. Mother and Saifi appealed to the trial

court. On January 26, 2010, after a two-day trial, the trial court terminated mother’s parental rights and approved the foster care plans with the goals of adop tion. The trial court found that Saifi was not a viable relative placement for the children. Mother timely noted her appeal. 3

ANALYSIS Issues 1 and 2 – Goals of foster care plans Mother argues that the trial court erred in approving the foster car e plans with goals of adoption, as opposed to goals of return home or re lative placement. Mother contends the trial

court should have considered th e homes of the patern al grandmother and maternal grandmother, both of whom indicated that they woul d be willing to care for the children. “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support

it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citations omitted).

3 Saifi also appealed the trial court’s ruling. See Saifi v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. , No. 0736-10-4 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010).- 4 - Before terminating a parent’s rights, “the court shall give a consideration to granting custody to relatives of the child, including grandparents.” Code § 16.1-283(A). The “Department has a duty to produce sufficient evid ence so that the court may properly determine whether there are relatives willing and suitable to take custody of the child, and to consider such relatives in comparison to other placement options.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 131, 409 S.E.2d at

465. The Department spoke with numerous relatives regarding placement of the children. The maternal grandmother, Denise Carr (Carr), indi cated that she would be interested in having custody of the children, but she ne ver filed petitions for custody. The Department met with Carr and her live-in boyfriend and e xplained the process. The De partment was concerned about Carr’s boyfriend and required that he complete a psychosexual risk assessment in addition to the evaluations that the Depa rtment usually requires. 4 Carr and her boyfriend did not follow through with the Department’s requests. A home study was conducted on Carr’s home in Maryland, where mother was living. The home study concl uded that Carr’s home was not an appropriate placement. Furthermore, Carr testified at trial about her interest in helping mother raise the children. She testified that they could liv e with her. She also testifie d that she did not know that the children had special needs and that she had not seen them since 2007. The trial court received sufficient evidence to evaluate Carr as a possible placement for

the children. See Hawthorne v. Smyth Cnty Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 33 Va. App. 130, 139, 531 S.E.2d 639, 644 (2000) (although the Department did not investigate a re lative, the relative testified at trial, so “the trial court was presented with evidence for its consideration as to the

4 Mother alleged that he made inappropriate sexual advances towa rd her at one time.- 5 - suitability” of placing the child with a relative before it ordered termination of the parent’s rights). The trial court also received evidence rega rding Saifi as a possible placement for the children. Saifi’s home was not a suitable placement for the children. The children had lived with Saifi for years, but had to be removed fr om her home because it wa s dirty and cluttered. Saifi struggled with hoarding. Her home had not passed inspection, and she faced eviction on

several occasions. 5 In addition, Saifi had a history of violence. CPS had investigated her home on several occasions. Her own children had been placed in fo ster care. Saifi was charged with voluntary manslaughter after stabbing her husband to death. In June 2007, D.F. broke her arm when Saifi grabbed and pulled her. Saifi also had physical disabilities and coul d not keep up with the children. The children have special needs, and Saifi could not provide th em with the structure an d consistency that they

needed. The trial court found that Saifi was not going to be able to meet the children’s needs. The trial court stated, “I think the [children’s] n eeds are going to get much greater shortly, and her [Saifi’s] ability to take care of the child ren to date has been marginal at best.” The Department also investigated other rela tives, including Saifi’s sister and two other great aunts. None of them was inte rested in custody of the children. Contrary to mother’s argume nt, the Department presented ev idence of its investigation of

the children’s relatives. The trial court considered placement with relatives, especially Saifi, but

found that it was in the children’s best interests no t to be placed with relatives. The trial court did not err in approving the foster ca re plans with the goals of adoption.

5 By the time of the trial, Saifi’s home passed inspection.- 6 - Issues 3 and 4 – Termina tion of parental rights Mother argues that the trial court erred in te rminating her parental ri ghts to K.C. and D.F. She contends (1) she remedied the conditions wh ich required the continuation of foster care, (2) the Department failed to prove that termination was in the children’s best interests, and (3) the Department failed to prove that it provided appropriate services to mother. When considering termination of parental ri ghts, “the paramount c onsideration of a trial

court is the child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. A court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). [S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that cr eated the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated fa ilure of the parent to make reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,” subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he has been offered rehabilitation services. Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 271, 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (2005) (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow , 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003)). Mother had a history of being unable to main tain stable housing. When the children were born and in her care, mother was living in shelters , hotels, and friends’ homes. Over the years, she had been evicted from several apartments for failure to pay rent. At the time of the trial, mother testified that she now had housing for the children because she was living with her- 7 - mother and her mother’s boyfriend. Howeve r, when a home study was conducted at her mother’s home, the home was found unsuitable. Mother testified that she would need another month or two to obtain housing of her own. Mother also failed to maintain stable employ ment while the children were in foster care. She testified that she quit a full time job at A dvance Auto Parts so that she could spend more time with her children. However, the frequency of her visits did not increase. She said that she had a part-time job at Food Lion, but did not prov ide proof of employment to the Department. Therefore, at the time of the hearing, mother still did not have stable housing and had not provided proof of stable employment. While the children were in foster care, mo ther failed to attend all of the scheduled visitations with her children and their therapists. She lived in Maryland, and the children lived in Virginia. The Department spoke with mother’s employer and arranged a day off for her so that she could visit with her children, but mother continued to miss vi sits, which upset the children. Mother told the Department that she had unreliable transportation. The Department offered to pick up mother from a metro station in Virg inia and transport her to the children. The Department also offered to give her gas cards. One of the children’s therapists sent $50 to

mother so that she could visit with the childre n. Despite the Department’s efforts, mother consistently missed visitations. The Department even offered to help mother move to Virginia and help pay for moving expenses, but she refused the offer. The Department made additional efforts to assist mother, but to no avail. The Department suggested that mother write letters to the children, but mother did not do so. The Department required mother to participate in evaluations. Mother took eleven months to complete a three-month alcohol and drug serv ice program. Although mother completed the psychological evaluation and the parent-child ev aluation, she frequently cancelled appointments- 8 - and the Department had to reschedule appoint ments. Mother did not follow up with the

recommended individual thera py or parenting classes. “‘Reasonable and appropriate’ efforts can only be judged with reference to the circumstances of a particular case. Thus, a c ourt must determine what constitutes reasonable and appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Ferguson v. Stafford Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. , 14 Va. App. 333, 338, 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992). Here, the evidence proved that the Department made reasonable and appropriate efforts to provide services to mother. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in te rminating mother’s parental rights. Mother did not recognize her own limitations and refused to acknowledge th at the children had special needs. When the children were very young, she gave them to Saifi. The trial court stated that mother “passed [her] responsibility on to the chil dren’s grandmother.” The trial court explained: And the law is pretty clear that if you want to do that, when she [Saifi] made the mistake she made, you have got twelve months to do it, and here we are at thirty months and you are in here today saying, I am close to an apartment. This is just not good enough for these children. Mother had been unable to meet these childre n’s needs since they were born. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a m eaningful period serve as good i ndicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery , 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte , 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). At the time of the trial, the children were in foster care for approximately thirty months. They were doing well and receiving the necessary services. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capa ble of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).- 9 - The trial court did not err in terminating mo ther’s parental rights to K.C. and D.F.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ru ling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.