1In addition to Knox, Gadson has named the Oak Leaf Trust

and James Colburn, the Blueberry Hill Mobile Home Park onsite

manager, as defendants to this action.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Frederick Gadson

v. Civil No. 08-cv-103-PB

Peter Knox, Trustee, Castle Trust, et al.1

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Frederick Gadson’s complaint (document

no. 1) seeking relief for a violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42

U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. (“FHA”). Because Gadson is pro se and

filed this complaint in forma pauperis, the matter is before me

for preliminary review to determine whether or not the complaint

states any claim upon which relief might be granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A; United States District Court District of New

Hampshire Local Rule (“LR”) 4.3(d)(1). For the reasons stated

herein, I direct, in an Order issued simultaneously with this

Report and Recommendation, that the claim alleging discriminatory

failure to provide services against the defendants be served, and

recommend that the remainder of the claims in the complaint be

dismissed. 

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Standard of Review

Under this Court’s local rules, when a plaintiff commences

an action pro se and in forma pauperis, the magistrate judge is

directed to conduct a preliminary review. LR 4.3(d)(1)(B). In

conducting the preliminary review, the Court construes pro se

pleadings liberally, however inartfully pleaded. See Erickson v.

Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (following

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) to construe pro se pleadings

liberally in favor of the pro se party). “The policy behind

affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if

they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the correct

cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.” See Castro v.

United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (noting that courts may

construe pro se pleadings so as to avoid inappropriately

stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals of claims); Ahmed v.

Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). All of the

factual assertions made by a pro se plaintiff and inferences

reasonably drawn therefrom must be accepted as true. See id.

This review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and

meaningful consideration.

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3

Background

Although the complaint in this matter fails to present a

clear chronology of relevant events, construing the facts alleged

generously, I find as follows for purposes of preliminary review. 

Frederick Gadson, who is African-American, lives in the Blueberry

Hill Mobile Home Park (“BH Park”) in Charlestown, New Hampshire. 

He has lived there for eleven years. Plaintiff alleges that,

beginning in February of 1998, he has been the victim of racially

discriminatory housing practices by members of the management and

ownership of BH Park.

On February 11, 1998, Gadson was informed by BH Park

management that he could not light fires on the BH Park grounds

for any reason. Plaintiff noted that no other BH Park residents

were told that they could not light fires within the park. 

Plaintiff had previously been advised by the BH Park Manager that

if it had been known before he moved in that Gadson was AfricanAmerican, he would not have been able to purchase a mobile home

there and he attributes the restriction on his ability to light

fires to racially motivated animus. 

In August of 1999, James Colburn became the park manager and

tried to evict plaintiff on three occasions between August 13,

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2It is not clear what role Oak Leaf Trust plays in the

management of BH Park but, for purposes of preliminary review, I

will presume that Oak Leaf Trust is in some position of authority

over the tenants of the BH Park and that the Oak Leaf Trust has

the ability to engage in activities that would impact the use of

BH Park by its tenants.

4

1999 and February 19, 2000. Colburn also denied housing to

members of plaintiff’s family by telling them that no mobile

homes were available to rent at BH Park because they were selling

the mobile homes. However, contemporaneously with that

assertion, Colburn offered a white person a rental unit on two

separate occasions and has also rented to his own family members

who are, presumably, white.

Shari Edmonds, the Office Manager for Oak Leaf Trust2, made

several allegations against plaintiff that, Gadson alleges, were

motivated by racial animus on her part. Specifically, Edmonds

stated that: (1) plaintiff was “the only person who sees himself

as a person of color and will go out of his way to make sure

everyone knows it,” (2) plaintiff could have been evicted because

his grandchildren shot pellets and shot windows out of other

tenants’ mobile homes, (3) plaintiff stole an awning from another

mobile home and put it onto his property, (4) plaintiff had no

burn permit to burn stumps out of the ground on his lot, and (5) 

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5

plaintiff had a freezer on his lot that did not lock even though

Edmonds told plaintiff to lock the freezer. 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that in December 2005, he

requested that his telephone lines be reburied as they had to be

dug up and repaired due to damage done by both BH Park management

and other BH Park tenants. Plaintiff alleges that he has not

been provided with that service, although such services are

offered to other tenants of BH Park who are white.

Plaintiff states that he filed a complaint of racial

discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and

Urban Development on June 16, 2006. That agency denied the

complaint, making a finding of “No Reasonable Cause.” On

November 8, 2006, plaintiff field a motion for reconsideration

with the Fair Housing Enforcement and Equal Opportunity Office,

which was denied on March 22, 2007. Plaintiff now appeals the

denial of his complaint. 

Discussion

I. Fair Housing Act

The FHA is intended “to provide within constitutional

limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” 42

U.S.C. § 3601. The FHA “forbids racial discrimination in respect

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to the sale or rental of a dwelling.” Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S.

280, 282 (2003). The FHA makes it unlawful: 

(a) [t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making 

of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate 

for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make 

unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 

because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 

status, or national origin.

 (b) [t]o discriminate against any person in the 

terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental 

of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or 

facilities in connection therewith, because of 

race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 

national origin.

(c) [t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be 

made, printed, or published any notice, statement, 

or advertisement, with respect to the sale or 

rental of a dwelling that indicates any 

preference, limitation, or discrimination based on 

race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 

status, or national origin, or an intention to 

make any such preference, limitation, or 

discrimination.

(d) [t]o represent to any person because of race, 

color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, 

or national origin that any dwelling is not 

available for inspection, sale, or rental when 

such dwelling is in fact so available.

. . .

42 U.S.C. § 3604. 

II. Standing

Gadson claims that his rights have been violated because his

family members, African-Americans, were denied the ability to

rent at the BH Park under the pretense that no rental units were

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7

available when, in fact, they were available and were offered to

white renters. Section 3604 of the FHA prohibits a landlord from

refusing to rent to a person on the basis of his race, or from

misrepresenting the availability of a rental property in order to

keep a member of a certain race from renting that property. 

Here, Gadson has not alleged that he himself was denied rental

property or that the defendants represented to him that any

rental property was unavailable. To the extent plaintiff alleges

such activity on the part of defendants, he asserts that it was,

in fact, relatives of his, rather than plaintiff himself, that

were the damaged parties. 

In all stages of federal judicial proceedings, the parties

must have a personal stake in the outcome of the action. Spencer

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (internal citations omitted). 

This means that Gadson’s complaint must allege some injury to

himself that could be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 

Id. A suit is moot if it fails to present a live case or

controversy. Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir.

2003). The Supreme Court has held that claims brought under the

FHA are to be judged under a liberal standing requirement, and

that an FHA plaintiff need not allege that they were actually a

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8

victim of discrimination, but only that they suffered the

“Article III minima of injury in fact.” Havens Realty Corp. v.

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 3722 (1982). Gadson has not presented any

facts demonstrating that he was personally affected or injured by

those actions, only that they were generally against the law. I

find, therefore, that Gadson has presented neither a live case or

controversy nor any injury in fact for this Court to resolve or

redress regarding any claims relating to the denial of rental

opportunities to his relatives. I therefore recommend that these

claims be dismissed.

III. Statements of Sherri Edmonds

As stated above, the FHA prohibits “any statement . . . that

indicates . . . an intention to make [a] preference, limitation,

or discrimination” on the basis of race or other protected

category. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Edmonds’ statements, standing

alone, can constitute evidence of a discriminatory intent on the

part of the speaker. However, Gadson does not allege any

discriminatorily motivated adverse action was taken by Edmonds

against him. Therefore, Gadson has not stated any claim against

Edmonds under the FHA.

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3Section 3613(a)(B) provides for an exclusion from the

limitations period for time during which an administrative

proceeding was pending with respect to a discriminatory housing

claim raised in the FHA Suit. While Gadson filed an

administrative complaint, he did not do so until 2006. The

limitations period that applies to the attempted eviction claims

expired, at the latest, in February of 2002.

9

IV. Attempted Eviction Claims

Gadson claims that Colburn, the onsite manager of BH Park,

sought to evict Gadson three times in 1999. Gadson claims that

Colburn was motivated by a desire to deny housing to AfricanAmericans. A claim under the FHA is timely if it occurs within

the limitations period or is alleged to be a continuing violation

fo the FHA that extends into the limitations period. The FHA

contains a two-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. §

3613(a)(1)(A). This action was not filed until 2008,

approximately eight and a half years after the alleged 1999

attempts to evict Gadson.3 Accordingly, I find that the claims

alleging discriminatory attempts to evict Gadson are untimely and

I recommend they be dismissed on that basis.

V. Claims Regarding Telephone Line Maintenance

Section 3604(b) of the FHA prohibits discrimination “against

any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or

rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or

Case 1:08-cv-00103-PB Document 4 Filed 08/14/08 Page 9 of 13
10

facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color,

religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Gadson

alleges that the proper maintenance of buried telephone lines at

the BH Park is a service provided by defendant owners and

managers of the park. Gadson claims that he was denied

maintenance of his buried telephone lines because he is AfricanAmerican. He attributes the lack of services to racially

motivated animus based on comments made by defendants as well as

Gadson’s belief that telephone line maintenance is performed for

white tenants of BH Park. Accordingly, I find that Gadson has

alleged the minimum facts necessary to state a claim under the

FHA against defendants. I will, therefore, direct that this

claim proceed against defendants in an Order issued

simultaneously with this Report and Recommendation.

VI. Out-of-State Defendants

Gadson has sued three separate defendants, James Colburn,

the onsite manager at BH Park, Castle Trust Trustee Peter Knox,

and the Oak Leaf Trust. Knox and the Oak Leaf Trust are located

in Massachusetts. For purposes of preliminary review, I find

that the Massachusetts defendants, as owners or managers of the

BH Park located in New Hampshire, have sufficient contacts with

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4Nothing in this finding prevents defendants from raising a

defense based on this Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction if

such a defense is appropriate under the circumstances of this

case.

11

New Hampshire to subject them to the jurisdiction of this Court. 

See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of Unemp. Comp. & Placement,

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (finding due process allows service 

against an out-of-state defendant with certain minimum contacts

with the forum state).4

VII. Motion for Court-Appointed Counsel

Gadson has filed a motion seeking court-appointed counsel

(document no. 3). Section 3613(b) authorizes this Court to

appoint counsel, but does not require such an appointment. 

Gadson alleges that he has contacted private attorneys but that

he has not been able to find legal representation on his own. 

There is no absolute constitutional right to free legal

representation in a civil case. Bemis v. Kelley, 857 F.2d 14, 15

(1st Cir. 1988). Rather, appointment of counsel in a civil case

is left to the discretion of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

42 U.S.C. § 3613(b). An indigent litigant must demonstrate that

exceptional circumstances exist to justify appointment of

counsel, such that without counsel the litigant most likely would

be unable to obtain due process of the law. DesRosiers v. Moran,

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12

949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1991); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d

1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam). In the case at hand, Gadson

has failed to establish the existence of such circumstances. 

Gadson’s motion for a court-appointed attorney is therefore

denied without prejudice to refiling in the future should

circumstances warrant.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that all of the

claims, except the claim alleging the racially motivated denial

of telephone line maintenance services against defendants, be

dismissed. In an Order issued simultaneously with this Report

and Recommendation, I direct service of that claim against the

three named defendants. 

The motion for a court-appointed attorney (document no. 3),

is denied.

Any objections to this report and recommendation must be

filed within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to

file objections within the specified time waives the right to

appeal the district court’s order. See Unauthorized Practice of 

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Law Comm. v. Gordon, 979 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992);

United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986). 

/s/ Justo Arenas

Justo Arenas

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: August 14, 2008

cc: Frederick Gadson, pro se

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