### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON SE PT E MB E R 2 0, 200 4 S es sio n RONALD HUGH PARCHMAN v. BRENDA PARCHMAN
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Madison Coun ty

No. 58411 Joe C. M orris, Chancellor

No. W2003-01204-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 17, 2004

This case involves the validity of a final divorce decr ee enter ed by the trial court whic h incorporated a n a g re e me nt r e a c he d b y

the pa rt ie s r e g ard ing a lim on y a nd pr op e rty div isi on
. Th e wi fesu bs e qu e ntl y filed a motion for a

new tria l, or in the alternative to a lter and amend the judg ment, alleg ing that the final divorce decr ee w as i nvalid. The wife allege d that, at t he ti me she e ntere d into the ag ree ment with her husband, she was not mentally competent. The trial court de nied t h e wife ’s motion. On app e a l, the wi fe a lle g e s th a t th e tria l c ou rt erred in d e nying he r p os t- tr ia l mo tio n, a s w e ll a s in its division of marital property and aw ard of

alimony in the final dec ree . For

the re asons contained he re in, we a ff

ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d and Rem anded
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R
. F ARMER , J ., joined.
M. Scott S mith, L ouis W . Ringg er, Jr., J ackson, TN , for Appe llant
L loy d R. Tatum, Hender son, TN, for A ppellee
OP IN ION
F ac ts and P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound
We beg in by noting that we are presente d only with the technic al re cord and two depositions filed post-trial for

revie w. Ronald Hug h Parchma n (“H usband”) appar ently marrie d Br enda P ar c h m a n ( “ W i f

e ” ) i n 1 9 6 2 , a n d t h e c o u p l e d i v o r c e d a ts o m e p o i n ti n 1 9 7 3 o r 1 9 7 4

. In approximately

1975 or 1976, Husband and Wife remar ried. Two da

ug hter s we re born of the marria g e. One daug hter died during the marria g e, and the other daug hter is no long er a minor.B ot h deposi t i ons wer e t ake n a f t er t he t r i al i n t hi s mat t er bel ow. T he depo s i t i on of D r
. Cap er t on was t ake n 1

on Fe br u ar y 12, 2003, a n d t h e depos i t i on of Cha r l es Car y w as t ak en on Fe br u ar y 19, 2003.

-2- On M arc h 30, 2001, Husband filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorc e in the Chanc ery Court of Madison County , Tenne ssee, a lleg ing ir rec oncilable diff

ere nces. Wife f

iled an answ er to the complaint and included he r counte r-c omplaint for divorce for irr econc ilable d i ff er ence s and inappropriate marital conduct. On September 17, 2002, the parties met at the office of Wife’s lawy er to n e g oti a te a

pr op e rty a nda lim on y

se ttl e me nt. On Se pte mbe r 18 , 20 02 , the la te Chanc e llo r Joe C. Morris enter ed a final divorce decr ee incorporating the ag ree ment rea ched by the p ar t i es o n the pr e vio us day . T he de c re e pr ov ide d f or the dis tr ibu tio n of the mari ta l pr op e rty be tw e e n the pa rt ie s, instructed Husba nd to pay Wife $48,630.50, and aw arde d Wife periodic a limonyin the amount of $50.00 per month pay able until Wife dies, rema rries, or rea ches sixty -five ( 65) y ear s of ag e.
On Octobe r 18, 2002, Wife fil ed a Motion for New Tria l or in the Alternative Motion to Alt er or Amend Judgment with the chanc ery court. Wife alleg ed that whe n she ente red into the a g ree ment on September 17, 2002, she di d not clea rly understand w hat she wa s signing and her attorney at the time pr essure d her into a cce pting the ag ree ment. Wife stated that when she acc epted the a g ree ment sh e wa s suffering f

rom sever e depr ession related to the death of her da ug hter a nd the impending divor c e
. Wi f

e r e lay e d to th e trial c o u r t h o w th is p r e v e n te d h e r f r o m u n d e r s tan d in g w h a t she was ag ree ing to a nd from making an inf o rm ed , rational de cision. I n support of her motion, W ife submitt ed a le tter written to her prese nt attorney

by Dr. Rebe cca

Capert o n (“D r. Capterton”), a clinical psy cholog ist who treated Wife during the divorce

. The letter indicates that Wife visited Dr. Caperton’ s office on October 14, 2002, and explained to Dr. Cape rton that she had sig ned pape rs under pr essure and without fully understanding their m eaning

. Dr. Cape rton was of the opinion that “her depre ssi o n wa s s o s ever e at the time she became divorce d that she wa s incapa ble of making clea r, compe tent, well thoug ht out decisions reg arding her be st interest.”
On Fe b ru ar y

2 3 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e c h an ce l l o r h el d a h ea ri n g o n W i fe ’s m o t i o n
. At t h e h ea ri n g, Wife’s counsel submitted the deposition testimonyof Dr. Ca pert on while Husband’ s counsel submitt ed the de position t estimony of Charle s Cary

(“Mr

. Cary ”), W ife’s attorney at t he time of the neg otiations. The chanc ellor’s order indicates that he took took both depositi ons under a dvisement 1 befor e issuing an order

on April 11, 2003, denying Wife’ s motion. Following the cha ncellor’ s ruling on he r m o ti o n , Wife filed an a ppeal to this Court presenting the following issues for our r eview:
I

. Whether the trial c ourt erred i n d en y i ng the Appellant’ s Motion for a Ne w Trial or in the Al te rn a tiv e Mo tio n to Al te r o r A me ndtheJudg me nt; I I

. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in a war ding alimony without considering the criteria in sec tion 36 -5 -1 01 (d )( 1) of

theTe nn e sse e Cod e ; I I I

. Wh e th e r th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in ap p r o v in g th e p r o p e r ty s e tt le me n t w ith o u t c o n s ide ring the criteria in section 36-4- 121(c) of the Te nnessee Code; andT he f i nal de cree d i d not co nt ai n a s um m ary of t he evi d ence p res ent ed d uri ng the p roce ed i ngs b el o w. I f no 2
t rans cri p t o f

the evidence was m ad e, “t he ap p el l ant shal l p repa re a st at em ent o f the evidence o r p roce ed i ngs f rom t he b e st a v a ilab le m e a n s, inc lud ing the a p p e llan t’s re c o llec tio n .” T e n n . R . A p p . P . 2 4 (c ) (2 0 0 3 ). -3- I V. Whether the Appe llant is entitl ed to h er at t o rney ’s fe es incurr ed during the divorce pr oc e e din g s a ndon app e a l.
I n ad d i t i on to the issues raised by Wife, Husband pre sents the following issues for our r eview a s we ll:
V. Whether the re cord pr esente d to this C ourt on appe al pre cludes this Court from considering w h e t h e r t h e tr i a l c o u r t e rr e d i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n a n d a l i m o n y; and VI

. Whether t h e Appe llee is entitled to attorney ’s fe es pursua nt to section 27-1-122 of the Tenne ssee Code due to the Appellant’s f iling of a frivolous appe al.
For the re asons containe d here in, we af firm the trial court’s decisions in this matter a nd rema nd for further action consistent with this opinion.

Alim ony and P roperty Distribution
Gen eral ly we re vie w f

ind ing s o f f

a c t by thetr ia l c ou rt

re la te d to a wa

rd s o f a lim on y

in div or c e c a se s “ de novo upon the re co rd of the trial court, ac companied by a pre sumption of the corr ectne ss of the finding , unless the pre ponderance of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3( d) (2 00 3) ; see also Crabtree v. Crabtree , 1 6 S. W.3 d 3 56 , 3 60 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d 220, 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). We revie w the trial c ourt’s conc lusions of law de novo g iving no pr esumption of corr ectne ss to those f indings. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

. I n revie wing the fac tual finding s made by the trial cour

t, we ar e constrained to considering “those fa cts established by the evidence in the trial court and se t forth in the re cord.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13( c) (2003). I n revie wing the final divorce decr ee, w e note that the c hance llor specific ally states that, i n a dd iti on to the ple a din g s, he e nte rt a ine d the te sti mon y of wi tne sse s in op e n c ou rt

to r e a c h h is decision. Reg arding the trial court’s ruling s related t o alimony and property division, t he Appe llant

2 has submitted only

the technic al re cord f

or our r eview and failed to submit a transc ri pt of the evidenc e pre sented to the c ourt below.
The Te nnessee Rules of Appella t e P ro ce dure pla ce the responsibilityprimarily with the app e llant t o e ns ur e that a

pr op e r r e c or d, inc lud ing a tr a ns c ri pt o f the e vid e nc e , is fi le d inthi s Co urt. T e n n
. R

. A p p
. P

. 2 4 ( 2 0 0 3) ; see also McDonald v. Onoh , 772 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 89 ). “ Th is co urt ca nn ot re vie w the fa c ts de novo wi tho ut an a pp e llate re c or d c on ta ini ng the fa c ts, and there fore , we must a ssume that the rec ord, had it be en prese rved, would have contained sufficie nt evidenc e to support the trial court’s fac tual finding s.” Sh e rro d v . W ix , 849 S.W .2d 780,-4-

78 3 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 93 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Th re ad gil l v . Th re ad

gil l , 740 S.W .2d 419, 4 2 6 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 7 ) ( ci t i n g J.C. Bradford & Co. v. Martin Constr. C o. , 576 S.W .2d 586, 587 (Tenn. 1979) ). W e agr ee w ith the Appellee that the rec ord pre sented on a ppeal pr events us fr om revie wing the t rial court’s decisions reg arding alimony and property division. There fore , we a ffirm thetria l c ou rt ’s de c isi on s r e g ard ing the se ma tte rs
. Appellan t’s P ost-Trial Mot ion The sole justification put forth by Wife in he r post-trial motion wa s her mental state at the time she enter ed into the divorce decr ee. Yet, i n her brief, W ife arg ues t hat an abuse of discretion exis ts in the chanc ery

court’s initial dec ision reg arding the award of alimony and prope rty

settlement which, acc ording to Wife, taints the subsequent decision to de ny a motion for a new trial or to alter or ame nd a judg ment. Wife also points out t hat a letter was sent to Husba nd’s counse l in Febr uary of 2002 by

her tre ating phy sician notify ing H usband of Wife’s de licate menta l state. Dr. Cape rton beg an se ei n g W i fe as a patient on September 6, 2001, shortly afte r Husband filed for divorce , and spoke with Wife five other times, w ith the last visit occurring on October 11, 2002. Wife’s attorney

at the time re fer

red he r to Dr. Cape rton to disc u s s her de pression. Dr. Caperton state d that she g leane d from their conver sations that Wife suffe red from depre ssion related to her daug hter’s de ath and the br eakup of her m ar ri age
. Du ring their visit on October 11, 2002, Wif e re late d to Dr . Ca

pe rt on that sh e ha d sig ne d the a g re e me nt on Se pte mbe r 17 , 20 02 , wi tho ut f ull y understanding w h at s h e was doing . Dr. Cape rton stated that, in Octobe r of 2002, Wife’s me ntal condition was “hor

rible” and that she would have advised a g ainst Wi fe making any major dec isions during this period of time. Orig inally , Dr. Caperton admitted she wa s skeptical of Wife’ s story , but she stated that a fter spe aking with Wi fe’ s attorney she came to believe Wife’ s version of e vents. Conversely , Mr. Cary ’s deposition testimonyreve aled a differ ent set of circ umstances on the day Wife signe d the ag ree ment. Mr. Cary beg an re prese nting W ife in t his matter in May of 2002, and he w as pre sent during the neg otiations o n S ep t ember 17, 2002. Acc ording to Mr. Cary , the me e tin g la ste d s e ve n h ou rs a ndhe de sc ri be d Wif e ’s de me a no r a s f

oll ow s:
A. We started off

in this confere nce r oom on the sec ond floor of my building with Ms. Ann Turner Moore, her c lient Mr. Parchma n, my sel f, and Ms. Parc hman. They wer e on one side of the table and we we re on theother. We stay ed up her e seve ral h o u rs and went throug h a schedule of all of their marital pr operty and asse ts and g ot them at least tog ether

to ag ree upon the values. The n later, w hen we wer en’t g e tt in g a n y w h e r e , w e s e p ar a te d a n d M s
. M o o r e s tay e d up here with her c lient, and Ms. Parchma n and I went down to my office

. T h e n t h e a t t o r n e y s w o u l d s h u t t l e b a c k a n d f o r t h b e t w e e n t h e r oo ms and bring the proposals ba ck and f orth. Q. During y our discussions with Ms. P arc hman did y ou find her t o b e r a t i o n a l o r

i rr a t i o n a l t h a td a y?-5- A. Ontheday

that th e div or c e wa s se tt le d, sh e wa s th e c a lme st and the most rational that I had eve r obser ved her

. Q. Do y ou have an opinion as to whether or not she understood things that y ou we re d i s cussing with her a nd the nature of the settlement that was ultimately rea ched in the c ase? A. Yes. She understood completely . She participated in various offe rs. Ther e were certain things that she wanted that I told her she was not g oing to g et, such a s attorney fee s. She said she wa nted the case definitely

to be over

that day . She wanted to b e sure that she maintained her

home, that that was the most im portant thing to her. We went throug h sever al, s ever al drafts, at least, I ’d say , a minimum of four and proba

bly more p ro p o s al s . She was a dvised as to all of those. When the ca se wa s finally settled and the decr ee w as pre pare d in my officethat day

and both attorne y s and the clients signed it, she said that she wished she ’d come here first, that she was satisfied. She hu g g e d m e . Sh e hu g g e d my se c re tary wh o d id the wo rk , a ndtol d every body how thankful she w as that it was over

. T h e decision a s to w hether to g rant a motion for new trial or a motion to alter or amend a judgme nt rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Esstman v. Boyd , 605 S

. W .2d 237, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). We will af firm a tria l court’s d enial of a motion for a new trial unless the party seeking the motion is able to show an abuse of di scre tion on the part of the trial court. Sm ith
v . S mi th , N o. E2 00 3- 02 87 7- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 4 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 69 0, a t *4 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . O c t. 25, 2004). Likewise, we must also affirm a trial court’ s denial of a

mot i o n t o al t er or ame nd a judgme nt unless the movant is able to demonstrate an abuse of di scre tion by the trial court. Sto v all v. Clarke , 1 13 S.W. 3d71 5, 72 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) . “ A t ri a l c ou rt abu ses it s disc re tio n o nly wh e n it ‘applies an incorre ct leg al standar d, or re ache s a dec ision whi ch i s ag ainst logic or re asoning that cause s an injustice to the party complaining .’” Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (q u o t i n g State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999) ).
Th e Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Proc e du re g ov e rn ing mot ion s for a ne w t ri a l a ndmot ion s to alter or amend a judgme nt do not provide specific g rounds for g ranting such motions. See Te nn . R. Civ. P . 59.02 (2003); Te nn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 (2003). This Court has indicated that gr anting Rule 59 motions m ay

be appr opriate: (1) whe n th e co ntrolling law chang es bef ore a judgme nt becomes final, (2) when pre viouslyunavailable evidenc e bec omes ava ilable, (3) when, for su i ge ne ris re a so ns , a jud g me nt s ho uldbe a me nd e d to corr ect a clea r er ror of law or to pre vent injustice. Bradley v . McLeod , 9 8 4 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 9 , 9 3 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Helton v. ACS Group , 964 F.Supp. 1175, 1182 (E.D. Te nn. 1997)), ov e rru le d on othe r grou nd s by Ha rri s v. C

he rn , 33 S.W .3d 74 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; s e e a l s o V a c c a r e l l a v
. V

a c c a re lla , 4 9 S.W .3d 307, 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).-6-

“The y should not, however, be g rante d if they ar e s implyseeking to relitigate matters that ha ve alre ady been adjudicated.” Bradley , 9 8 4 S

. W

. 2 d at9 3 3 (c i t i n g W indsor v. A Fed. Ex ecutive Agenc y , 614 F.Supp. 1255, 1264 (M.D. Te nn. 1983)).
This case does not involve a c hang e in law during the pendenc y of t he proc eeding s below, nor c an we s ay that a cle ar e rror of law e x ists in t he chancellor’ s final dec ree beca use we have an inadequate re cord w ith which to make this determina tion. L ikewise, we cannot say that Wife’s motion in cludes ne wly

discovere d evidenc e re g arding her me ntal state. I n her brief, Wife, in an attempt to thwart the a

rg ument by

Husband that she knowingly and will ingly signe d the ag ree ment of September

17, 2002, points to a letter sent by her psy cholog ist to Husband’s counsel in F ebrua ry of 2002. This letter advised Husband’s counsel t hat W ife’s mental state was que stionable. This does no t c on sti tut e ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e be c aus e , lik e Hu sb a nd , Wif e wa s a lso a wa

reof the se fa c ts at the time she e ntere d into the ag ree ment. Yet, Wife neve r ra ised this iss ue with the trial c ourt at the time the court approve d the ag ree ment and incor porate d it into the final dec ree . “The moving pa rty mus t de mon str a te that th e ne w e vid e nc e wa s not kno wn prior to or du ri ng the tria l a ndthat it could not have be en asc erta ined by the exercise of re asonable diligenc e.” Col lin s v . G re e ne Cou nty Bank , 916 S.W .2d 941, 945 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). F or the same rea son, we c annot say that the trial court’s r efusa l to allow a new trial or to alter or ame nd the judg ment amounts to a manifest injustice. We also note that the tri al court was able to intera ct with Wife and view he r deme anor during the proce eding s below, wherea s we a re le ft with review ing a

partial, c old rec ord. Se e Az bil l v . A zb ill , 66 1 S. W.2 d 6 82 , 6 87 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 3) ; Mize v. Skeen , 468 S.W .2d 733, 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971). F or these r easons, wecannot f ind that the trial court a

bused i ts discretion in deny ing Wife’ s motion.
Attor ney’s F ees On appe al, both parties ha ve re quested that this Court a war d them their re spective attorney ’s fee s. Wi fe r equests that thi s Court awar d her attorney ’s fe es incurr ed incident to the divorc e, inc lud ing tho se lit ig a tio n e xpe ns e s in c ur re d a s a re sult of th is appea l. “ [A]tt orne y ’s fe e s a re on ly awa rded if provided for by contra ct, s tatute, or a recog nized g round of equity .” Austin Powder Co. v. Thompson , No. 03A01-9607- CV-00229, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXI S 805, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 1 6 , 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Thomas , 585 S.W .2d 606, 607 (Tenn. 1979) ). I n divorce case s the rec overy of attorne y ’s fe es is permitted by statute, which provide s that a spouse s ee k ing e nforc ement of an alimony or custody

awa rd may be g rante d attorney ’s fe es. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103( c) ( 2003).
I n this case, howe ver, Wife is not seeking to enforc e the p ro v i sions in the divorce de cre e. I nstead, she is see king to ha ve the e ntire dec ree declare d v o i d

. T h e decision of whe ther to aw ard attorney ’s fe es on appe al re sts solelywithin the discretion of this Court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5- 10 3( c ) ( 20 03 ); see also Arche r v. Arche r , 90 7 S.W. 2d 41 2, 41 9 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) . We are a lso m i n d fu l o f t h e f

o l l o wi n g: Our supre me co urt has def ined the fa ctors that should be a pplied wh e n c on sid e ri ng a

re qu e st f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in c ur

redon app e a l.-7- These fac tors include the ability of the reque sting party t o p ay the acc rued f ees, the reque sting party ’s succ ess in the appe al, whethe r the reque sting pa

rty soug ht the appea l in good f aith, and any

other equitable f

actor that need beconsidere d.
Du lin v . D uli n , No. W2001-02969-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXI S 628, at *26–27 (T en n. C t

. Ap p
. S ep t

. 3 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Fo lk v . F olk , 357 S.W .2d 828, 8 2 9 (Tenn. 1962) ). I n light of the natur e of Wif e ’s app e a l r e g ard ing the fi na l de c re e , a s we ll a s ou r dis po sit ionof Wif e ’s oth e r i ssu e s, we de c lin e Wif

e ’s re qu e st f

or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
Husband ha s asked this Court to awar d him attorney ’s fe es pursua nt t o s ection 27-1- 122 wh ic h p ro vid e s:

When it appear s to any

revie wing court that the appe al from any court of record was frivolous or t aken solely for de lay , the court may , either upon motion of a pa

rty or of its own motion, awar d just damag es ag ainst the appellant, which may include but need not be limited to, costs, interest on the judg ment, and expenses incur red by the appe llee as a r esult of the appe al.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 7- 1- 12 2 ( 20 03 ). “ An app e a l is de e me d f ri vo lou s if it i s d e vo id o f m e ri t or if it has no reas o n able chanceof succ ess.” W ake fie ld v . Lo ng mi re , 5 4 S. W.3 d 3 00 , 3 04 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Bursack v . W ilson , 98 2 S.W. 2d 34 1, 34 5 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) ; Indus. Dev . Bd. of Cit y of Tullahoma v. Hancoc k , 901 S.W .2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)) . “Thus, an a ppeal in which the revie wing court’s ability to a ddress the issues raised is unde rmined by the appe llant’s failure to provide an ad eq u ate recor d is deemed f rivolous because it has no re asonable chanc e of succe eding .” Y

oung v. Barrow , 130 S.W. 3d 59 , (T e nn . Ct. App . 200 3) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Brooks v. U

nited Unif. Co. , 682 S.W .2d 913, 915 (Tenn. 1984) . Acc ording ly , we de em this appea l to be frivolous. We rema nd this case to the chanc ery court for a dete rmination of appr opriate le g al e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d b y Hu sb a ndin d e fe nd ing thi s a pp e a l.
Conclusion
For the foreg oing rea sons, we affirm the decision of the c hance ry court a nd rema nd for fu rthe r a c tio n co ns is ten t withthi s o pin ion . Co sts of thi s a pp e a l areta xeda g a ins t th e Ap pe lla nt, B r e n d a P ar c h m a n , a n d h e r

s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE