In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16‐3595

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RONALD JOHNSON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 CR 290 — Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 16, 2017 — DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2017

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.  Defendant Ronald Johnson entered a

conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of heroin

with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), reserving the

right to appeal the denials of his motions to suppress the

evidence found in his condominium. Johnson now challenges

those denials. We affirm.
2 No. 16‐3595

I.  BACKGROUND

A. Search Warrant Affidavit

On April 12, 2011, Agent Paul Matuszczak of the Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, applied for a

search warrant for Johnson’s condominium located at 728 W.

Jackson Blvd., Unit #310, in Chicago, Illinois (the “Jackson

residence” or “condo”). The search warrant affidavit, which

also incorporated by reference an affidavit submitted in

support of the search of informant Loren Coleman’s residence,

included the following information.

On March 30, 2011, a grand jury returned an indictment

charging Coleman with two counts of being a felon in posses‐

sion of a firearm, 21 U.S.C. § 922(g), and two counts of posses‐

sion of heroin with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

On that same day, the district court issued a warrant for

Coleman’s arrest.

On April 12, 2011, ATF agents executed the warrant at

Coleman’s residence, located in Chicago, Illinois. During a

protective sweep, the agents observed a tannish substance on

a bedroom dresser that appeared to be heroin. The agents

asked for permission to search the apartment, but Coleman

refused. After reading Coleman his Miranda rights, the agents

asked about the substance; Coleman responded that it was

heroin for his personal use, that he used heroin the previous

night, and that he expected to suffer from withdrawal within

two hours.

Afterthe agents escorted Colemanout ofthe apartment and

placed him in a law enforcement vehicle, they interviewed his
No. 16‐3595 3

wife, Charisse Coleman, at the residence. According to

Charisse, Coleman kept a gun in the bedroom. She said thatthe

last time she saw Coleman use the gun was on December 31,

2010, when she observed him shoot a round out of the resi‐

dence’s window.According to Charisse,Johnson and Coleman

had been selling heroin for the past 20 years. She told agents

that Johnson was the leader of a crew of five to six other heroin

dealers, who were all members of the Gangster Disciples. She

said that, over the past year, Coleman would acquire heroin

from Johnson and resell it. She stated that, up until a few

months prior, Johnson and Coleman would bag heroin at her

residence and that she had occasionally passed through the

room where they were completing this task. She recalled

seeing Johnson and Coleman in her residence with heroin,

guns, and money in October or November 2010. She said that

she overheard several phone conversations between Coleman

and Johnson in 2011 that involved code words for heroin deals.

She stated that a few months prior Coleman told her that he

and Johnson began bagging the heroin at Johnson’s new

residence located in Greektown, a neighborhood in Chicago;

AgentMatuszczak testifiedthatthe condo isdirectly across the

highway from the Chicago neighborhood known as

“Greektown.” Charisse ultimately consented to the search of

the residence.

The agents then re‐approached Coleman and told him they

would transport him to the hospital before he got sick. Cole‐

man then said, unprompted, “That shit up there ain’t

[Charisse’s], let’s work out adeal.”Agents respondedthatthey

could not make him a deal. The agents read Coleman his

Miranda rights again and provided him a waiver form, which
4 No. 16‐3595

he signed. Coleman then told the agents that he had two guns

and 100 grams of heroin inside the residence. The agents again

asked Coleman for consent to search; he agreed. Coleman was

then transported to the hospital.

Despite receiving consentfrom both ColemanandCharisse,

agents obtained and executed a search warrant for Coleman’s

residence where they found a variety of drug paraphernalia,

two guns, and approximately 168 grams of heroin.

At some point, Coleman was again advised of and had

waived his Miranda rights before being interviewed by agents.

During the interview, Coleman stated that he bought 150‐200

grams of heroin per week from Johnson and that Johnson

provided most of the heroin he sold. He purchased drugs at

Johnson’s condo, which he told the agents was unit #310 at the

Jackson residence. He would pay Johnson $13,000 for 200

grams of heroin, but, frequently, would pay Johnson a portion

of the $13,000 up front and pay the remaining balance after he

sold the drugs. He stated that he bought 200 grams of heroin

from Johnson at his condo on April 10, 2011, for which he paid

him $6,500 and promised to pay the remaining $6,500 after he

sold the heroin. Agents showed Coleman a driver’s license

photo ofJohnson, and Coleman indicatedthatthe person in the

photo was the same person who he bought heroin from on a

weekly basis.

The agents performed a search on a law enforcement

database for Johnson’s and Coleman’s prior convictions.

According to the search, Coleman had three convictions for

manufacturing and delivering a controlled substance. He also

had convictions for passing a forged check, possession of a
No. 16‐3595 5

controlled substance, and aggravated unlawful discharge of a

firearm in a vehicle. The search for Johnson’s criminal history

revealed that he had a state conviction in 2002 for manufactur‐

ing and delivering a controlled substance.

Agents also performed a search on two other databases,

Westlaw and Accurint, for more information on Johnson. The

databases revealed that the registered owner of unit #310 was

Francine Johnson. The Accurint database listed Ronald

Johnson as a person “associated” with this address. Agent

Matuszczak indicated in the affidavit that, based on his

experience, a person associated with this address could mean

several things, including that the person listed the address on

a utility bill, credit card application, or a library card.

Agents also inquiredaboutJohnson withthe ChicagoPolice

Department who informed the agents that it was running an

ongoing money laundering investigation involving Johnson.

Based on their investigation, CPD officers concluded that

Francine was Johnson’s sister, but she did not actually live at

the address. CPD officers also followed Johnson to and from

the condo on several occasions, including twice on Febru‐

ary 25, 2011. According to CPD records, Johnson received a

parking ticket outside the residence in December 2010.

Agent Matuszczak testified that individuals who possess

150‐200 grams of heroin are distributing drugs, and drug

dealers often keepdrugs, money,records, and weapons attheir

residences. Based on this information, he concluded that there

was probable cause to believe contraband relating to criminal

conduct would be found in the Jackson residence.
6 No. 16‐3595

B. Johnson’s Arrest

On April 12, 2011, ATF agents obtained and executed a

search warrant for Johnson’s condo.1 During the search, the

agents seized approximately 4.8 kilograms of heroin, approxi‐

mately $155,000 in cash, a digital scale, plastic baggies, and

other items used to repackage and sell drugs. In a post‐arrest

interview, Johnson admitted owning the drugs and money

found in the condo.

C. Procedural History

On May 11, 2011, Johnson was indicted on one count of

possession of heroin with intentto distribute. On June 23, 2011,

Johnson moved to quash the search warrant and suppress the

evidence, claiming that the government lacked probable cause

to support the issuance of the search warrant. He claimed,

among other things, that the search warrant affidavit did not

contain sufficient information about Coleman and Charisse’s

credibility and reliability.

OnSeptember 20, 2011,thedistrict courtdeniedthe motion,

finding that the search warrant was supported by probable

cause and that, even if the search warrant was not supported

by probable cause, the agents relied on the warrant in good

faith.

Johnson then moved to reconsider, reiterating the same

arguments in his initial motion. The district court continued

the motion because Johnson’s counsel withdrew due to a

1

   The search warrant for the Coleman and Johnson’s residences were both

issued by Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Gilbert.
No. 16‐3595 7

conflict. With new counsel, Johnson filed a supplemental

motion to suppress and requested an evidentiary hearing

under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

On June 27, 2012, the district court denied the motions and

the requestfor a Franks hearing.The courtfoundthatJohnson’s

arguments supporting his request for a Franks hearing were

either factually inaccurate or based on omissions that were

immaterial.

On May 22, 2013,Johnson pleaded guilty pursuantto a plea

agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his

motions to suppress. He was sentenced to 121 months’

imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II.  DISCUSSION

Johnson contends thatthedistrict court erredindenyinghis

motions to suppress andhis requestfor a Franks hearing.When

reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the

district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings

for clear error. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir.

2014).We review a district court’s denial of a Franks hearing for

clear error, but any legal determinations that factored into its

ruling are reviewed de novo. United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603,

606 (7th Cir. 2000).

Johnson argues that the district court erred in denying his

suppression motion because the search warrant affidavit was

not supported by probable cause. “A search warrant affidavit

establishes probable cause when it sets forth facts sufficient to

induce a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search

thereof will uncover evidence of a crime.” United States v.
8 No. 16‐3595

Gregory, 795 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

Where, as here, an affidavit is the only evidence presented in

support of a search warrant, the validity of the warrant

depends solely on the strength of the affidavit. United States v.

Carson, 582 F.3d 827, 831–32 (7th Cir. 2009).

Where the affidavit is supported by information from an

informant, we employ a totality‐of‐the‐circumstances inquiry

to determine whether that information establishes probable

cause for the search. Gregory, 795 F.3d at 741. This inquiry

encompasses several factors, including: “the level of detail, the

extent offirsthandobservation,thedegree of corroboration,the

time between the events reported and the warrant application,

and whether the informant appeared or testified before the

magistrate.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816. No one factor is

dispositive; a deficiency in one factor may be compensated by

a stronger showing in others. United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754,

756 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). We give “great

deference” to the issuing judge’s conclusion that there is

probable cause. United States v. Robinson, 724 F.3d 878, 884 (7th

Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

The known facts and circumstances here support a finding

of probable cause. Coleman’s description of the activities at

Johnson’s condo was detailed and based on firsthand

knowledge. He specified that he purchased 150‐200 grams of

heroin from Johnson on a weekly basis. He described to agents

the manner in which he paid for the heroin and how much it

cost. He told agents the location where he purchased the

heroin, and he specified the unit number of the condo. He told

agents that his most recent purchase of 200 grams of heroin at
No. 16‐3595 9

Johnson’s condo was on April 10, 2011, merely two days before

agents obtained and executed a search warrant at the condo.

Moreover, Coleman’s statements were corroborated by

Charisse’s account of previously observing Johnson and

Coleman’s drug‐dealing activities and knowing about their

long‐term relationship. Charisse described to agents how she

saw Coleman and Johnson bag heroin at her residence. She

also told agents that Coleman told her that they recently

switched to bagging heroin at Johnson’s new residence in

Greektown, which is across the highway from where Johnson’s

condo was located. She provided information regarding the

extent of Johnson and Coleman’s relationship, such as being in

the same gang and dealing heroin for the past 20 years.

The affidavit included other corroborating information as

well, although with limited significance. The Accurint search

showed that Johnson was “associated” with the Jackson

residence. Agent Matuszczak explained that “associated”

means that the person listed the address on a utility bill or

library card. Agents also learned more about Johnson’s

association with the condo unit from CPD officers who were

investigatinghimformoney laundering.Although the parking

ticket outside the condominium building also has very limited

significance, it is one of several pieces of evidence that show

Johnson’s association with the location. While, as Johnson

argues, none of these facts directly indicate that Johnson

distributed heroin at the condo, they do further support the

reliability of Coleman’s statements thatit was Johnson’s condo.

Johnson takes issue with the fact that Coleman was an

untested, newly arrested informant who used heroin the night
10 No. 16‐3595

before and had impending symptoms of heroin withdrawal.

But this narrow view of the evidence is contrary to ourtotality‐

of‐the‐circumstances inquiry. Despite being a newly arrested

informant, whose statements we take with a “greater dose of

skepticism,” United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366, 370–71 (7th

Cir. 2005), Coleman’s admissions that he purchased and dealt

drugs were statements against his penal interest and thus “a

weighty factor in establishing probable cause even if the

statements have not been proven reliable[,]” United States v.

Lake, 500 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007). It was clear that, even at

his own expense, his primary motivation was to protect

Charisse from criminal liability, giving him a “strong

incentive” toprovide accurate information to the agents.Olson,

408 F.3d at 371 (citation omitted). Indeed, the affidavit noted

that Coleman was cooperating in hopes of receiving

consideration on criminal charges.Moreover,the recent nature

of Coleman’s latest heroin transaction at Johnson’s condo gave

agents further reason to rely on his statements. See Lake, 500

F.3d at 633 (citation omitted).

Additionally, Johnson supplies further reason to find

Coleman reliable and credible. In Johnson’s attempts to

discount the fact that Coleman was able to identify a driver’s

license photo of him, he argues that this fact is unhelpful

because “agents knew that the Colemans and Mr. Johnson

were friends who had known each other for a long time ... .”

Indeed,the affidavitmade this long‐term relationshipapparent

when it provided Charisse’s statements that Coleman and

Johnson had been in the same gang and sold heroin forthe past

20 years.
No. 16‐3595 11

We have considered Johnson’s other arguments on the

probable‐cause issue, but none merit discussion.2 Because the

search warrant affidavit was supported by probable cause, the

district court properly denied Johnson’s motions to suppress.

Finally, Johnson’s argument that the district erred when it

denied his request for a Franks hearing is equally without

merit. The first alleged omission is immaterial, the second

alleged omission is not even an omission, and the third alleged

omission is not an omission because the alleged contradictory

statement did not present itself until May 2011, after the

warrant was issued. The district court properly determined

that Johnson’s allegations about omissions in the search

warrant affidavit did not amount to the “substantial

preliminary showing” required to obtain a Franks hearing. 438

U.S. at 170. We find no error.

III.  CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

2

   Johnson also challenges the district court’s determination that the good‐

faith exception would apply as an alternative ground for denying his

motions to suppress. See United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.

2008) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984)). Because we hold

that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and thus not

unconstitutional, we need not address this argument.