J-S47035-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

ANTHONY FORD 

 Appellant No. 3557 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the PCRA Order of November 20, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0008216-2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

ANTHONY FORD 

 Appellant No. 3560 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the PCRA Order of November 20, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0008223-2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

ANTHONY FORD 

 Appellant No. 3561 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the PCRA Order of November 20, 2013 
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In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0002831-2003 

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED AUGUST 13, 2014 

 Anthony Ford appeals the November 20, 2013 order dismissing his 

second petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, as untimely. We affirm. 

Because we concur with the PCRA court that Ford’s second PCRA 

petition was untimely, we need not delve deeply into the factual or 

procedural history of this case. We merely reiterate the basic history of this 

case, as summarized by a panel of this Court in Ford’s appeal of the denial 

of his first PCRA petition: 

On March 3, 2005, [Ford] entered several open guilty pleas. . . . 

[T]he relevant guilty pleas were entered at 8216-03, to the 

crimes of kidnapping, robbery, and criminal attempt to commit 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI). Those pleas stem 

from [Ford’s] involvement in the kidnapping, robbery, sexual 

assault, and physical assault of three male victims on October 5, 

2003. On May 25, 2005, the trial court imposed an aggravated 

sentence of eight (8) to sixteen (16) years[’] imprisonment for 

the above referenced offenses. [Ford] did not appeal the 

judgment of sentence. 

On February 24, 2006, [Ford], acting pro se, filed a timely PCRA 

petition. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was 

filed. Thereafter, following an evidentiary hearing on August 7, 

2006, the PCRA court entered an Order on August 25, 2006, 

denying relief. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, No. 2623 EDA 2006, slip op. at 1-2 (Pa. Super. 

Apr. 9, 2007). On April 9, 2007, a panel of this Court affirmed the PCRA 
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court’s dismissal order. Id. at 1, 12. On September 25, 2007, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Ford’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 932 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 2007) (per curiam). 

 On November 5, 2013, Ford filed a second PCRA petition, in which 

Ford argued that, because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and 

at the time of sentencing, being sentenced as an adult rendered his sentence 

illegal. On November 21, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed Ford’s petition 

without a hearing.1

 On December 18, 2013, Ford filed a notice of appeal. 

The PCRA court did not order Ford to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Ford did not file 

a statement. Nonetheless, on January 31, 2014, the PCRA court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), in which the court explained that it 

lacked jurisdiction over Ford’s petition due to its untimeliness. 

 Ford raises two questions for our consideration: 

1. Whether the lower court had jurisdiction to adjudicate 

[Ford’s] claim of having received an illegal sentence? 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Notably, the PCRA court did not issue notice of its intent to dismiss 

Ford’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. However, it is now well-settled 

that “where the PCRA petition is untimely, the failure to provide [a Rule 907] 

notice is not reversible error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 5 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 916 A.2d 1206, 1208 

(Pa. Super. 2007)). 
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2. Whether the lower court erred in not adjudicating [Ford’s] 

claim [that] the sentencing judge lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction when he imposed an adult sentence for his 

juvenile case? 

Brief for Ford at 5. 

 As in all PCRA cases, particularly those that involve an appellant’s 

second PCRA petition, we begin with the questions of whether the petition 

was timely filed pursuant to the PCRA’s strict time limit, and, therefore, 

whether we have jurisdiction to resolve the substantive claims raised by 

Ford. It is well-established that the PCRA time limits are jurisdictional, and 

are meant to be both mandatory and applied literally by the courts to all 

PCRA petitions, regardless of the potential merit of the claims asserted. 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 202-03 (Pa. 2000); 

Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011). “[N]o 

court may properly disregard or alter [these filing requirements] in order to 

reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is filed in an 

untimely manner.” Murray, 753 A.2d at 203; see Commonwealth v. 

Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). 

“[A]ny PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must 

be filed within one year of the date that the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final.” Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 97 

(Pa. 2001) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)). “A judgment becomes final for 

purposes of the PCRA ‘at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

review.’” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005) 

(quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3)). 

 Ford was sentenced on May 25, 2005. Ford did not file post-sentence 

motions or a direct appeal. Ford’s judgment of sentence became final on or 

about June 25, 2005, at the expiration of the thirty-day period during which 

Ford could have filed a direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Thus, 

to be timely, any PCRA petition must have been filed within one year of that 

date, on or about June 25, 2006. Id. § 9545(b)(1). Ford filed the instant 

petition on November 5, 2013, over eight years after his judgment of 

sentence became final. Consequently, Ford’s petition was facially untimely. 

 Despite such facial untimeliness, a tardy PCRA petition nonetheless will 

be considered timely if (but only if) the petitioner pleads and proves one of 

the three exceptions to the one-year time limit enumerated in 

§§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA, which provide: 

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of 

the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that 

was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 

or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively. 

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph 

(1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have 

been presented. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). 

 Ford does not argue that any of these three exceptions apply to his 

case. Rather, he maintains that his substantive claim, which amounts to a 

challenge to the legality of his sentence, is non-waivable and, therefore, not 

subject to the PCRA’s strict time limit. However, it is well-settled that such 

claims still must abide by the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. “Though 

not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be 

lost should it be raised for the first time in an untimely PCRA petition for 

which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction 

over the claim.” Commonwealth v. Slotcavage, 939 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 

1999) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the 

PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the 

exceptions thereto.”)). Consequently, Ford has failed to establish either that

his petition was timely, or that any of the three exceptions to the timeliness 

requirement applies. 

 Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/13/2014