alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Elizabeth D. LINEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN FAMILY PUBLISHERS; Stephen Francis, CEO; Ed McMahon; Dick Clark; Book Companies; Other Sponsors; Magazine Companies; Deborah M. Young, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-2376.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 6, 2003.

Decided March 13, 2003.

Elizabeth D. Linen, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Elizabeth D. Linen seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying her Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b) motion. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. RApp. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. RApp. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. RApp. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” *Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr.,*434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on October 8, 2002. The notice of appeal was filed on November 18, 2002. Because Linen failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We deny Linen’s motion for default judgment, and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Exhibit
10.34




AMENDMENT
NO. 2 TO




FOREBEARANCE AND WARRANT
MODIFICATION AGREEMENT




THIS AMENDMENT NO. 2, dated as of May
14, 2009 (this “Amendment”), to that certain forbearance and waiver modification
agreement, dated February 25, 2009, as amended by that certain Amendment No 1 to
forbearance and waiver modification agreement, dated May 6,
2009  (collectively, the “Agreement”), by and between NATIONAL HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation(the “Company”), and
BEDFORD OAK PARTNERS,
L.P. (the “Lender “).





W I T N E S S E T
H




WHEREAS, as of the date hereof there is
currently a principal amount of $250,000 due the Lender; and




WHEREAS,
the Company and the Lender wish to amend the Agreement on the terms set forth
herein.




NOW,
THEREFORE, the parties hereto, in consideration of the mutual promises herein
contained and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, hereby agree to amend the Agreement
as follows:




1.           Definitions; References;
Continuation of Agreement.  Unless otherwise specified herein,
each term used herein that is defined in the Agreement shall have the meaning
assigned to such term in the Agreement.  Each reference to “hereof,”
“hereto,” “hereunder,” “herein” and “hereby” and each other similar reference,
and each reference to “this Agreement” and each other similar reference,
contained in the Agreement shall from and after the date hereof refer to the
Agreement as amended hereby.  Except as amended hereby, all terms and
provisions of the Agreement shall continue unmodified and remain in full force
and effect.  Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined
having the meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement.




2.           Amendment.  Section
3 of the Agreement is hereby amended as follows: the date “May 12, 2009” is
hereby deleted and in its place and stead the date “May 22, 2009” is
inserted.




3.           Counterparts.  This
Amendment may be executed in two or more counterparts, all of which when taken
together shall be considered one and the same agreement and shall become
effective when counterparts have been signed by each party and delivered to the
other party, it being understood that both parties need not sign the same
counterpart.  In the event that any signature is delivered by facsimile
transmission or by e-mail delivery of a “.pdf” format data file, such signature
shall create a valid and binding obligation of the party executing (or on whose
behalf such signature is executed) with the same force and effect as if such
facsimile or “.pdf” signature page were an original thereof.





4.           Governing
Law.  This Amendment shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York.




IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be duly
executed on the date first above written.




NATIONAL HOLDINGS
CORPORATION







By:  /S/ MARK
GOLDWASSER


Mark
Goldwasser, CEO








BEDFORD OAKS PARTNERS,
L.P.







By:  /S/ HARVEY
EISEN


Harvey
Eisen, Chairman and Managing Partner
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6317

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BERNARD KING, a/k/a Shaborn,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief 

District Judge. (2:94-cr-00163-RBS-14)

Submitted: May 24, 2012 Decided: May 31, 2012

Before MOTZ and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bernard King, Appellant Pro Se. Laura Pellatiro Tayman, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Bernard King appeals a district court order denying 

his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) 

(2006). We affirm. Because the amendment in question did not 

lower Gore’s Guidelines sentence, we find the district did not 

abuse its discretion denying the motion. United States v. 

Goines, 357 F.3d 469, 478 (4th Cir.2004) (stating standard of 

review). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHEN S. EDWARDS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

BEST BU Y COMPANY OF MINNESOTA,

INC.; BESTBUY.COM, LLC,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 17

- 15642

D.C. No. 2:16

- cv

- 00014

- DKD

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David K. Duncan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **

Submitted October 22, 2018 * * *

Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Stephen S. Edwards appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his diversity action alleging state law tort claims stemming from an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is n ot precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).

* * * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 31 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 15642

alleged sexual assault. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. W e review

de novo. Lopez v. Smith

, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000 ) (en banc)

. We

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Edwards

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were

vicariously liable for their employee’s conduct

. See Pruitt v. Pavelin , 685 P.2d

1347, 1357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) ( Arizona observes the general common law rule

that “an employer is vicariously liable only for the behavior of an employee who

was acting within the scope of his employment” ) ; see also Arizona v. Schallock

,

941 P.2d 1275, 1282

- 84 ( Ariz. 1997) (en banc) ( discussing factors courts evaluate

to determine whether an employee acted within the course and scope of his

employment )

.

We reject as without merit Edwards’s contentions that th e district court was

biased against him.

All pending requests and motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gary Ortiz, Appellant.

[808 NYS2d 668]

*461Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald A. Zweibel, J.), rendered June 23, 2004, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 20 years, unanimously affirmed.

The record establishes that defendant validly waived his right to be present at the hearing and at the commencement of trial. After the court conducted a thorough colloquy in which it informed defendant of his right to be present, strongly recommended that he participate in the proceedings to assist his lawyer, and advised him that the trial would continue in his absence if he refused to come to the courtroom, defendant expressly and unequivocally refused to be present for the proceedings at issue *(see People v Parker,*57 NY2d 136, 141 [1982]; *People v Epps,*37 NY2d 343, 346-347 [1975], *cert denied*423 US 999 [1975]).

The court properly declined to submit robbery in the third degree as a lesser included offense, since there was no reasonable view of the evidence, viewed most favorably to defendant, that he committed the lesser offense but not the greater *(see People v Negron,*91 NY2d 788 [1998]). “The victim was certain that defendant threatened him with a box cutter, and there was no evidence that defendant obtained the victim’s money by ‘us[ing] or threatening] the immediate use’ (Penal Law § 160.00) of any other kind of physical force” *(People v Scott,*5 AD3d 250 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 647 [2004]).

We perceive no basis to disturb the sentence. Concur—Tom, J.P., Marlow, Williams, Sweeny and Malone, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Amendment No. 1 to Annual Report on Form 10-K of CoJax Oil and Gas Corporation, a Virginia corporation (the “Company”), for the year ended December 31, 2020, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jeffrey J. Guzy, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that;  (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.  Date: May 27, 2022By/s/Jeffrey J. GuzyName:Jeffrey J. GuzyTitle:Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Kevin P. Feeley

v. Civil No. 07-cv-402-PB

US Attorney’s Office

 - District of New Hampshire

O R D E R

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted,

but pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended, the filing fee must

be paid as follows: the sum of $4.70 is due no later than January

20, 2008. In addition, 20% of each preceding month’s income

credited to plaintiff’s account to be remitted by the Northern NH

Correctional Facility when the amount in the account exceeds

$10.00 until the sum of $350.00 has been paid. Failure to pay

the fee as ordered will result in dismissal of the action without

prejudice. In all other respects plaintiff’s request for in

forma pauperis has been granted. 

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: December 18, 2007

cc: Kevin P. Feeley, pro se

 Bonnie S. Reed, Financial Administrator

 Northern NH Correctional Facility, Inmate Accounts

Case 1:07-cv-00402-PB Document 7 Filed 12/18/2007 Page 1 of 1

Feeley v. US Attorney's Office-District of New Hampshire Doc. 7

Dockets.Justia.com
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Philip Geary

v. Case No. 07-cv-116-PB

Warden, NH State Prison

O R D E R

Philip Geary seeks permission to appeal my February 14, 2008

ruling that his habeas corpus petition is barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year statute

of limitation for habeas corpus claims. In that ruling, I

determined that the statute of limitation began to run on March

6, 2004, when the time for seeking direct review of his

conviction expired. I also held that the statute of limitation

was not tolled by the filing of his untimely notice of appeal. 

Thus, I determined that Geary lost his right to seek habeas

corpus review in this court because he failed to file his habeas

corpus petition until long after the statute of limitation

expired on March 26, 2005. In reaching this conclusion, I

specifically rejected Geary’s argument that the statute of

Case 1:07-cv-00116-PB Document 28 Filed 07/08/08 Page 1 of 3
-2-

limitation did not begin to run until the state supreme court

disposed of his motion for new trial, a motion that he did not

file until more than a year after his state court conviction

became final. Reasonable jurists would not disagree with the

correctness of these rulings. 

Geary argues for the first time in his motion for a

certificate of appealability that his claims are saved by the

habeas corpus petition he filed in this court on September 7,

2006, Geary v. Warden, Case No. 06-cv-334-PB (Doc. No. 1). This

argument is unavailing because Geary filed the petition well

after the statute of limitation had run. Geary also claims that

he is entitled to equitable tolling because his attorney provided

ineffective assistance in failing to appeal his conviction in

state court. This argument is also without merit. Counsel’s

alleged failure to pursue an appeal in state court did not

prevent Geary from filing a timely habeas corpus petition in this

court. Instead, Geary’s failure to file a timely petition

appears to be based on his mistaken view that the time for filing

a habeas corpus petition was tolled while his untimely motion to

appeal his conviction in state court was pending. Such errors do

not provide a basis for equitable tolling. See Daleney v.

Case 1:07-cv-00116-PB Document 28 Filed 07/08/08 Page 2 of 3
-3-

Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2001). Reasonable jurists

would not disagree with these determinations. 

Geary’s motion for a certificate of appealability (Doc. No.

26) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

July 8, 2008

cc: Philip Geary, pro se

 Thomas E. Bocian, Esq.

Case 1:07-cv-00116-PB Document 28 Filed 07/08/08 Page 3 of 3
B.1. Farm Debt Outstanding at Commercial Banks

Loan volume Percent change from Percent change from

(billions of dollars) previous quarter previous year

Real Non-real- Real Non-real- Real Non-realTotal estate estate Total estate estate Total estate estate

Quarter loans loans loans loans loans loans loans loans loans

1991: Q2... 52.6 18.1 34.5 6.2 3.4 7.7 7.2 5.5 8.1

 Q3... 53.9 18.3 35.6 2.5 1.4 3.1 6.6 5.8 7.1

 Q4... 53.0 18.4 34.6 -1.6 .6 -2.7 5.7 7.0 5.1

1992: Q1... 51.9 18.9 33.0 -2.1 2.7 -4.6 4.9 8.2 3.1

 Q2... 55.1 19.5 35.6 6.2 3.3 7.8 4.9 8.1 3.2

 Q3... 56.2 19.9 36.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 4.2 8.6 1.9

 Q4... 54.5 19.9 34.7 -2.9 -.2 -4.4 2.9 7.8 .2

1993: Q1... 52.8 20.0 32.8 -3.2 .5 -5.3 1.7 5.6 -.5

 Q2... 56.0 20.6 35.4 6.0 3.1 7.8 1.6 5.4 -.6

 Q3... 58.0 20.8 37.1 3.5 1.2 4.9 3.2 4.7 2.4

 Q4... 57.7 20.9 36.8 -.5 .1 -.8 5.8 5.0 6.2

1994: Q1... 56.8 21.2 35.5 -1.5 1.8 -3.4 7.6 6.4 8.3

 Q2... 61.1 21.9 39.2 7.6 3.2 10.2 9.1 6.4 10.7

 Q3... 63.0 22.4 40.6 3.1 2.2 3.6 8.7 7.5 9.3

 Q4... 61.3 22.6 38.7 -2.7 .7 -4.6 6.2 8.2 5.2

1995: Q1... 59.9 22.9 36.9 -2.3 1.6 -4.6 5.4 8.0 3.9

 Q2... 63.5 23.6 40.0 6.1 2.7 8.2 4.0 7.5 2.0

 Q3... 65.3 23.8 41.5 2.9 1.1 3.9 3.7 6.3 2.3

 Q4... 63.7 23.9 39.8 -2.5 .4 -4.1 3.9 5.9 2.8

1996: Q1... 61.7 24.0 37.7 -3.1 .5 -5.3 3.1 4.8 2.0

 Q2... 65.7 24.7 41.0 6.5 2.7 8.9 3.4 4.7 2.7

 Q3... 66.6 24.9 41.6 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.9 4.7 .3

 Q4... 65.5 25.0 40.5 -1.6 .3 -2.8 2.8 4.6 1.8

1997: Q1... 63.8 25.4 38.4 -2.6 1.4 -5.1 3.4 5.5 2.0

 Q2... 69.0 26.2 42.8 8.2 3.3 11.5 5.1 6.2 4.4

 Q3... 71.1 27.0 44.2 3.0 2.9 3.1 6.8 8.1 6.0

 Q4... 71.3 27.1 44.2 .3 .7 .0 8.9 8.5 9.1

1998: Q1... 70.1 27.6 42.4 -1.7 1.8 -3.9 9.8 9.0 10.4

 Q2... 75.0 28.5 46.5 7.1 3.2 9.6 8.6 8.8 8.5

 Q3... 76.3 28.9 47.4 1.7 1.3 1.9 7.2 7.2 7.3

 Q4... 74.7 29.3 45.5 -2.0 1.3 -4.0 4.8 7.8 3.0

1999: Q1... 72.7 29.7 42.9 -2.8 1.7 -5.6 3.7 7.6 1.1

 Q2... 75.8 30.8 45.1 4.4 3.5 5.0 1.1 8.0 -3.1

 Q3... 76.8 31.4 45.5 1.3 1.9 .9 .7 8.6 -4.1

 Q4... 76.0 31.8 44.2 -1.0 1.5 -2.8 1.7 8.8 -2.8

2000: Q1... 71.5 31.4 40.1 -5.9 -1.4 -9.2 -1.6 5.5 -6.5

 Q2... 79.7 33.7 45.9 11.4 7.5 14.4 5.0 9.6 1.9

 Q3... 80.1 33.9 46.2 .6 .5 .6 4.3 8.1 1.6

 Q4... 80.9 34.0 46.9 1.0 .3 1.5 6.4 6.8 6.1

2001: Q1... 79.4 34.3 45.1 -1.9 .8 -3.9 11.0 9.2 12.4

 Q2... 82.9 35.1 47.7 4.4 2.5 5.8 4.0 4.2 3.9

 Q3... 82.5 35.4 47.1 -.4 .8 -1.3 3.0 4.5 2.0

 Q4... 82.2 35.6 46.7 -.3 .4 -.9 1.6 4.6 -.5

2002: Q1... 80.1 36.0 44.1 -2.6 1.2 -5.5 .9 4.9 -2.2

 Q2... 83.7 37.0 46.7 4.4 2.7 5.9 1.0 5.1 -2.1

 Q3... 84.4 37.7 46.7 .9 2.1 -.1 2.3 6.5 -.9

 Q4... 83.9 38.0 45.9 -.6 .6 -1.6 2.0 6.8 -1.7

2003: Q1... 82.0 38.7 43.3 -2.3 1.9 -5.7 2.4 7.5 -1.9

 Q2... 84.5 39.6 44.9 3.1 2.5 3.7 1.1 7.3 -3.9

 Q3... 85.5 40.2 45.4 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.4 6.5 -2.8

 Note. Data are as of end of quarter.

21
14

A.9. Characteristics of Bank Loans to Farmers -- Large Farm Lenders, by Size of Loan, August 4-8, 2Percent except as noted

$1,000 to $10,000 to $25,000 to $50,000 to $100,000 t

Loan characteristic All sizes $9,000 $24,000 $49,000 $99,000 $249,000 

Volume of loans (thousands of dollars) 667,450 31,525 47,362 51,686 78,356 119,97

Number of loans 15,962 8,700 3,221 1,576 1,189 80

Weighted average maturity (months)1 16.31 8.30 9.23 12.05 14.51 22.6

Weighted average repricing interval (months)2 2.46 1.31 1.48 4.15 4.36 3.4

Weighted average risk rating3 3.44 3.34 3.40 3.47 3.33 3.5Weighted average interest rate4 4.73 5.79 5.52 5.34 4.84 4.7 Standard error5 .14 .24 .09 .13 .07 .1

 Interquartile range6

 75th percentile 5.62 6.77 6.35 6.17 5.50 5.3

 25th percentile 3.55 4.76 4.55 4.08 4.06 4.0

 Purpose of loan Feeder livestock 4.36 5.47 5.31 5.73 4.87 3.9

 Other livestock 4.85 5.65 5.84 4.94 4.74 4.8

 Other current operating expenses7 4.85 5.85 5.58 5.41 4.84 4.7

 Farm machinery and equipment 5.58 5.64 6.31 5.55 5.45 4.9

 Farm real estate 5.63 6.38 5.90 5.85 6.05 5.9

 Other8 4.19 5.41 4.96 4.82 4.42 4.4

Share of total loan volume Features of loan Floating rates 87.71 89.39 87.20 83.53 80.34 88.4

 Under commitment 86.15 92.90 92.01 82.67 86.91 83.0

 Callable 14.99 23.22 21.62 21.78 28.29 10.5

 Purpose of loan Feeder livestock 13.84 3.74 7.20 8.68 7.23 5.9

 Other livestock 6.90 3.19 5.02 6.96 8.15 10.8

 Other current operating expenses7 42.15 77.69 68.81 59.21 50.58 39.9

 Farm machinery and equipment 7.58 4.03 3.87 7.83 6.60 14.3

 Farm real estate 5.90 1.18 .73 2.17 5.30 8.5

 Other8 23.62 10.18 14.37 15.15 22.14 20.3

 Type of collateral Farm real estate 9.10 3.12 5.20 6.43 11.46 12.3

 Other 83.71 87.93 85.66 86.12 84.56 83.4

 Note. Most large farm lenders that reported loans to farmers had more than $25 million in farm loans. For explanation of footnotes, see table A.8.
#### Mrs. C. P. HARTLEY v. Dr. J. W. MURPHY.

No. 4352.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Dec. 16, 1932.

Theus, Grisliam, Davis & Leigh, of Monroe, for appellant.

McHenry, Montgomery,. Lamkin & Lamkin, of Monroe, for appellee.

DREW, J.

This is a companion suit to No. 4353, 144 So. 785, this day decided by this court; the two being consolidated for trial and submitted on the same testimony.

Plaintiff sued for personal injuries she received in the accident wherein defendant’s car and the one she was riding in, and driven by her daughter, collided at the intersection of Stubbs avenue and North Sixth street in the city of Monroe.

The lower court rejected her demands, and she has appealed. There is no answer to the appeal; therefore the exception of no cause of action filed in the lower court and overruled is not before us for consideration.

■For the reasons assigned in case No. 4353, this day decided, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.

MeGREGOR, J., dissents.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

CORNELIES STEVENS,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, in their 

Official and Individual Capacities; SCOTT 

FRAKES, in their Official and Individual 

Capacities; DR. DEOL, in their Official and 

Individual Capacities; DR. OGDEN, in their 

Official and Individual Capacities; TERESA 

ROYER, in their Official and Individual 

Capacities; JANET ARAUCO, in their 

Official and Individual Capacities; DR. 

RALITHA JOHNSON, in their Official and 

Individual Capacities; TAGARD BOYD, in 

their Official and Individual Capacities; and 

UNKNOWN DOCTORS, NURSES, STAFF, 

in their Official and Individual Capacities;

Defendants.

8:23CV193

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for case management. The Prison Litigation 

Reform Act requires an imprisoned civil plaintiff to pay the Court’s entire filing fee, either 

at the outset when filing the complaint, or in installments if the Court grants leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529–30 (8th Cir. 1997); 

Jackson v. N.P. Dodge Realty Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Neb. 2001).

On May 31, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to proceed 

IFP and ordered him to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of $15.00 within 30 

days. See Filing No. 12. To date, Plaintiff has not paid the initial partial filing fee or 

asked for an extension of time in which to do so. Accordingly, the Court will require 

8:23-cv-00193-JFB-PRSE Doc # 13 Filed: 07/13/23 Page 1 of 2 - Page ID # 50
2

Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for his failure to pay the 

initial partial filing fee. 

If Plaintiff’s failure to pay by the Court’s deadline was caused by prison officials’ 

failure to adhere to his request to remit payment using funds from his account or other 

circumstances beyond his control, his failure to pay within the time ordered by the Court

will be excused. Absent a sufficient response, the case will be subject to dismissal. 

See Taylor v. Cassady, 570 Fed. App’x. 632 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding district court 

abused its discretion by dismissing case without first taking steps to determine whether 

prisoner-plaintiff’s failure to pay the initial partial filing fee “was caused by circumstances 

beyond his control, such as prison officials’ failure to adhere to his request to remit 

payment using funds from his account”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff will have 30 days to show cause why this case should not be 

dismissed for failure to pay the initial partial filing fee. In the absence of cause shown, 

this case will be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice. 

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to set a pro se case management deadline 

in this case using the following text: August 14, 2023: check for response to show 

cause order. 

Dated this 13th day of July, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

Joseph F. Bataillon

Senior United States District Judge

8:23-cv-00193-JFB-PRSE Doc # 13 Filed: 07/13/23 Page 2 of 2 - Page ID # 51
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