In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-22-00261-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 352nd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 352-291883-17

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker

ALLSTATE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant

V.

CHRISTINE HILL, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After Appellee Christine Hill obtained a judgment against Appellant Allstate

County Mutual Insurance Company (Allstate), she applied for and obtained a turnover 

order and the appointment of a receiver to satisfy that judgment. On appeal, Allstate 

asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the receiver ex parte 

pursuant to the turnover order and by awarding a receivership fee of $15,000. We will 

affirm, because Allstate’s appeal of the turnover order and the appointment of the 

receiver were untimely, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding the receiver’s fees.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following a motor vehicle accident, Hill sued Allstate to recover under her 

uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) policy. After a jury trial, the trial court 

signed its final judgment on March 24, 2020. The judgment awarded Hill $30,000 in 

UIM benefits; court costs; $42,668.75 in attorney’s fees; and post-judgment interest. 

Allstate appealed the award of attorney’s fees. We affirmed the judgment, see Allstate 

Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hill, No. 02-20-00174-CV, 2021 WL 2978746, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 15, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Allstate I), and mandate issued on 

October 8, 2021.1 

1Allstate’s counsel alleged that she was not notified of the Allstate I mandate

until the receiver emailed her on December 17; however, the clerk of this court

delivered it via email to each parties’ counsel on October 8, 2021. Further, Allstate’s 
3

On November 19, 2021, Hill filed her Application for Ex Parte Turnover 

Relief and Appointment of Receiver, alleging that she had yet to receive payment 

from Allstate to satisfy the judgment. In support of her application, Hill offered the 

affidavit of Caleb Moore, the proposed receiver, in which he attested that he had 

performed a post-judgment asset investigation and described Allstate’s nonexempt 

property. On December 16, 2021, the trial court signed its Order Requiring Turnover

and Appointing Receiver2, which appointed Moore as the receiver. 

That same day, Moore emailed Allstate’s counsel informing her of his

appointment and his intention to collect the judgment. In response to this email, 

Allstate alleged that it had sent Hill’s counsel a $30,000 check on March 27, 2020, 

which it claimed was an attempt to pay the policy-benefits portion of the final 

judgment. According to Allstate, this check expired without being cashed, so it sent a

replacement check on April 16, 2021.3 Ultimately, on January 4, 2022—less than a 

counsel conceded that she was aware of our July 15, 2021 opinion in Allstate I before

mandate issued. 

2Specifically, the trial court ordered Allstate and third-parties in possession of 

Allstate property “to immediately turnover” all relevant documents and property to 

Moore and enjoined Allstate from transferring, encumbering, or concealing its nonexempt property. 

3Though there is some indication in the record that these checks were written 

or printed by Allstate, it is unclear if either check was actually sent to Hill or her 

counsel. Hill and her counsel denied ever receiving these checks or being notified 

that they had been sent.
4

month after the trial court’s order for turnover and appointment of receiver—Allstate 

paid Hill the full amount of the judgment, $109,382.02. 

On April 13, 2022, Moore filed his receiver’s report and fee application stating 

that the full judgment amount had been collected from Allstate, and he requested a 

receiver’s fee of $27,345—25% of the collected amount. 

On April 14, 2022, the trial court approved Moore’s report and awarded him 

the requested 25% fee. That same day, Allstate sent a letter to the trial court stating

that it would be filing an objection to Moore’s appointment and the fee award.

4

 In 

response to this letter, the trial court vacated its April 14 fee award and set a hearing

on Moore’s report and fee application for May 26. At the hearing, the trial court 

heard evidence by way of Moore’s affidavit, in which he attested that:

• He had extensive experience as a receiver;

• It was customary for a receiver to be awarded 25% of the judgment as a 

reasonable fee for his services;

• At the time of his appointment, Allstate had not paid the underlying judgment;

• He had performed fourteen hours of work as receiver in this case;

4This letter is the first record evidence showing any intention on Allstate’s part 

to formally object to the order for turnover and appointing Moore as receiver, despite 

Allstate’s acknowledgment that it had received notice of the order soon after it was 

entered on December 16. Still, Allstate did not file its objection to Moore’s 

appointment until the night of May 25—more than five months after his appointment 

and less than fifteen hours in advance of the hearing to approve Moore’s final report 

and fees. 
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• All of this work was done while he was on vacation and during the holiday

season and consisted of numerous communications and negotiations with the 

parties, reviewing documents, and filing his oath and bond;

• He obtained full payment of the $109,382 judgment—that had gone unpaid for

nearly two years—in nineteen days, which he characterized as “an extraordinary 

result,” given that it typically takes at least thirty days for insurance companies 

to pay judgments to him as a receiver and that it occurred during the holidays. 

Allstate proffered no evidence at the hearing.

After the hearing, the trial court entered its Order Approving Receiver’s Fee in 

which it again approved Moore’s report but awarded him a reduced fee of $15,000. 

In this order, the trial court found that “25% of the amount collected” was the usual 

and customary fee paid to post-judgment receivers in Tarrant County. But, 

considering the evidence in light of the Bergeron factors, it found that the reduced fee 

was reasonable. See Bergeron v. Session, 561 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1977, 

writ ref’d n.r.e.). 

Allstate filed its notice of appeal on July 7, 2022, seeking to appeal both the 

Order Requiring Turnover and Appointing Receiver and the Order Approving 

Receiver’s Fee. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s ruling of a turnover order, an order appointing a 

receiver, and an order approving a receiver’s fee for abuse of discretion. Beaumont 

Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Wells v. Poindexter, No. 14-13-

00982-CV, 2014 WL 4202527, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 2014, 
6

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Beaumont Bank, 806 S.W.2d at 226); Moyer v. Moyer, 

183 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). A trial court abuses its 

discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles—that is, if its

act is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. 

Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). 

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Allstate raises two issues: whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by (1) entering its Order Requiring Turnover and Appointing Receiver and 

(2) awarding a receivership fee of $15,000.

A. ORDER REQUIRING TURNOVER AND APPOINTING RECEIVER

Allstate first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the 

Order Requiring Turnover and Appointing Receiver on December 16, 2021.

Allstate’s main contention is that no grounds or evidence existed to support the 

turnover order or to necessitate the appointment of a receiver. But we must dismiss

Allstate’s appeal as it relates to this order because it was not timely filed.

A turnover order that serves as a mandatory injunction is a final, appealable 

judgment. Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 

540 S.W.3d 577, 586–87 (Tex. 2018); Burns v. Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C., 

909 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). This is true even when the turnover 

order also appoints a receiver. Abira Med. Lab’ys, LLC v. St. Jude Med. SC, Inc., No. 14-

17-00849-CV, 2018 WL 3911084, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 16, 
7

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Bahar v. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 330 S.W.3d 379, 386–87 

(Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (holding that the appellant failed to timely 

appeal from the final turnover order, which also appointed a receiver); see also Wilkins 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 58 S.W.3d 176, 179–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2001, no pet.) (holding that a motion for new trial filed more than twenty days after 

the trial court signed a turnover order that also appointed a receiver extended

appellate deadlines because the order was final, not interlocutory). Notices of appeal

from final judgments “must be filed within 30 days after the judgment is signed.”

Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. The time for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional in the 

appellate courts and we must dismiss the appeal absent a timely-filed notice of appeal. 

In re K.L.V., 109 S.W. 3d 61, 67 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (citing 

Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). 

The turnover order here was a final, appealable order because it served as a 

mandatory injunction by requiring Allstate and third parties to turnover relevant assets 

and enjoined Allstate from transferring, encumbering, or concealing non-exempt 

property. See Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Dallas, 810 S.W.2d 738, 

739–40 (Tex. 1991) (holding that a turnover order was a mandatory injunction and, 

therefore, final and appealable where it ordered, among other things, the judgment 

debtor to turnover paychecks to the receiver), abrogated on other grounds by In re 

Sheshtawy, 154 S.W.3d 114, 124–25 (Tex. 2004). The trial court signed the order on 

December 16, 2021. But Allstate did not file its notice of appeal of this order until
8

July 7, 2022. Given that more than 200 days passed between the signing of the 

turnover order and the filing of Allstate’s notice of appeal, it was untimely, and we do 

not have jurisdiction to consider it. See Burns, 909 S.W.2d at 506.

For these reasons, we dismiss Allstate’s appeal so far as it pertains to the trial 

court’s Order Requiring Turnover and Appointing Receiver.

B. ORDER APPROVING RECEIVER’S FEE

Allstate next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding

$15,000 in receivership fees because the receiver “sought a windfall rather than a 

reasonable fee.” According to Allstate, Moore’s fee was not reasonable because he 

only sent “a couple of emails” and Allstate’s payment of the judgment was spurred 

not by these emails but rather Allstate learning of the issuance of mandate in Allstate I. 

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the receivership 

fees.

The turnover statute provides a trial court with the discretion to “appoint a 

receiver with the authority to take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and 

pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 

§ 31.002(b)(3). “The judgment creditor is entitled to recover reasonable costs.” Id. 

§ 31.002(e). “A receiver’s fees are considered court costs, and thus a trial court may 

award reasonable receiver’s fees.” Vaccaro v. Raymond James & Assocs., 655 S.W.3d 485, 

490 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.). Whether a receiver’s fee is reasonable is 
9

determined by the value of his services. Bergeron, 561 S.W.2d at 554. We consider six 

factors in determining this value: 

(1) the nature, extent and value of the administered estate; (2) the complexity 

and difficulty of the work; (3) the time spent; (4) the knowledge, experience, 

labor, and skill required of, or devoted by the receiver; (5) the diligence and 

thoroughness displayed; and (6) the results accomplished.

Id. at 554–55.

Here, the value of the judgment was $109,382.02, and the only evidence before 

the trial court was that this amount remained unpaid for approximately twenty

months before Moore was appointed receiver. This included two months of 

nonpayment even after mandate issued from our judgment affirming the award of 

attorney’s fees in Allstate I. Moore attested that he was an experienced receiver who 

performed fourteen hours of work on this case, most of which occurred while he was 

on vacation during the holidays. This work consisted mainly of communications with 

the parties but also included document review and the filing of his oath and bond. 

And Moore’s work resulted in the expeditious and full payment of the judgment 

within three weeks of his appointment.

Additionally, even though the trial court initially awarded Moore a fee of 25% 

of the judgment ($27,345), it withdrew this award upon Allstate’s objection. After the 

hearing, the trial court reduced the award to $15,000 (or about 14% of the 

judgment)—despite finding that 25% was the customary receivership fee in Tarrant 

County. See Evans v. Frost Nat’l Bank, No. 05-12-01491-CV, 2015 WL 4736543, at *5 
10

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming award of receiver’s 

fee on the basis that the trial court determined the reasonable fee after holding an 

evidentiary hearing).

Taking this evidence and record together, we cannot conclude that the trial 

court acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in awarding $15,000 in receiver’s fees to 

Moore. See Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we dismiss Allstate’s appeal as to the trial court’s Order Requiring 

Turnover and Appointing Receiver and affirm the trial court’s Order Approving 

Receiver’s Fees.

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker

Justice

Delivered: April 27, 2023