### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Marc h 16 , 200 4 S es sio n IN RE: N ELLIE E LIZ ABE TH C ROWE LL
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court P robate D ivision ) for Davidson County

No. 00P 1427 F rank G. Clem ent, Jr., Judge

No. M2002- 02285-COA-R 3-CV - F iled May 3, 2004

This is a Wil l construction ca se. The de cede nt’s Wil l provided that her estate w ould be distributed to h e r h us ba nd . H ow e ve r, th e hu sb and pr e de c e a se d th e de c e de nt l e avin g no iss ue . T he on ly re ma in in g p r o v is io nin

th e Wi ll p r o v id e d

th a t h e r e s tate w o u ld

b e d is tr ib u te d

to c e rta in

o r p h an’s ho me s if sh e and he r h us ba nd die d at th e same tim e . T he tr ia l c ou rt fo un d it unre a so na

ble to c o n s tr u e th e Wi ll to r e qu ir e s im

u lt an e o u s d e a th an d d is tr ib u te d th e e s tate to th e o r p h an ’ s h o me s
. We hold that the Wil l contains a fa iled condition resulting in i n t es t at e s ucce ssion. W e re verse and rema nd.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Ci r c uitCo ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io no f

th e c o ur t, in w h ic hW. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Mark A. E llmore, J r., Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppel l an t s , J o s eph H. Nic kens, Katherine N

. Mo se r, Ag ne s E . B ake r a

nd Da na A. Ni c ke ns
. J. F ra nk Rud y , Jr. An d W. Gr e g or

y Mil le r, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , fo r t he a pp e lle e s, Th e Or

ph ans ’ Homes Aff

iliated with the Fr ee Will Baptist Church De nomination.
OP IN ION
On Fe bruar

y 5, 1971, Nellie Elizabeth Crowell (Mrs. Crow ell) executed he r Will . Her husband (Mr. Crow ell), whose Will was identical to Mrs. Crowe ll’s, died on August 27, 1998. On June 8, 20 00 , at th e a g e of e ig hty -t wo , M rs . Cr ow e ll d ie d. He r Wi ll w a s a dmi tte d to pr ob a te on No ve mbe r 2 0, 20 00 . H e r Wi ll p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art :
I TEM I : Idirec t that a ll of my just de bts, inc luding funer al and testamentary expenses and expenses of my last illness, be paid by

my Ex ecutor

as soon as c on ve nie nt a ft e r my

de a th. Al l inh e ri tanc e , e state and oth e r l ike ta xes s ha ll b e pa idJo se p h H . N ic k e n s, the b ro the r o f M rs . C ro w e ll, re p la c e d M r. S m ith a s the e x e c u to r o f t h e W ill

. 1
-2- by Exe c uto r a

nd c ha rg e d g e ne ra lly

a g a ins t my

e state wi thou t atte mpt ingto p ro rate the same or

char g e any

part ther eof a g ainst [a] benef iciary named he rein. I TEM I I : Inominate and a ppoint Mr. Wi lliam L

. Smit h, a Public Acc ountant 1 as Executor of this Wil l and direc t that no bond shall be requir ed of him. I TE M I I I : I g ive and be qu e a th to my Hu sb and , Ro be rt

H. Cr ow e ll, a ll a sse ts, bo th r e a l and pe rs on a l and fo r him to have a fr e e ha nd to d o w hate ve r h e wi sh e s w ith any or all there of. I TE M IV: I n th e e ve nt t

hat [I ] an d my

Hu sb and sh ou ld d e c e a se a t th e same time, it is my desire that my Ex ecutor dispose of all asse ts and any residue r emaining in o ur e state be dis tr ibute d to the Or ph ans ho me s ope ra

te d by the F re e Will B a

pti sts Denomination [(Claimants)] in equal amounts to all. I n Wit ness Whereof

, . . . . On J une 11, 2002, the tria l court made a dete rmination as to the identification of the proper heirs and be ne fi c iari e s ( Th e He ir s) of Mr s. Cr ow e ll’ s e state . T he re is n o tr ans c ri pt o f t he pr oc e e din g s, but the parties e ntere d a Statement of Evide nce pur suant to Rule 24(c) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Ap pe llate Pr oc e du

re . T he State me nt o f E vid e nc e pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art : On b ehal f of

th e hei rs o f Nel li e El iz abet h C row ell , M r. Ben net t F. Br atche r, Attorney [,] examined Ms. Pat W hittle, who testified as to her pe rsonal c on ve rs a tio ns wi th t

he de c e de nt o n th e oc c a sio n o f M s. Whittle s[’ ] bir thd ay pa rt y in 1992. Ms. W hittle also read f rom corr oboratingcorr espondenc e she r ece ived fr om P a ul C ro we ll c on c e rn ingthe de c e de nt[’ ]s own p e rs on a l c omm e nts , ma de to Paul Crowell, about the dec edent[’s] W ill and her ultimate wishes c oncer ning the dis po sit ion

of he r p ro pe rt

y . D e c e de nt h a d ma de the state me nts to P a ul C ro we ll duri nghe r atte nd anc e a t th e fu ne ra l of Pa uli ne Cr ow e ll i n 1 99 8. On bo th occa sions[ ,] t he dec edent state d that if her husba nd, [Mr. Crowell] , prede cea sed her, she intended for

her he irs to inherit her e state. . . . On beha lf of the Claimants, [letters were submitt ed] from two of the f our claimants. Eac h of the two c laimants stated that their interpr etation of the Dec endent[’s] W ill to be that Dece dent intended them to be the rec ipients of her estate. . . . B a se d u po n th e ple a din g s, state me nts of c ouns e l, a

nd state me nts of

the wi tne sse s . . . : 1. Un de r T e nn e sse e law, it i s th e c ard ina l r ule in Wi ll c on str

uc tio n to deter mine the intent of the Te stator. 2. Courts will endeavor to avoid intestacy if at all possible. 3. A Will should be construe d as if the De cede nt prepa red a nd executed it on the date of

death. I n a c c or da

nc e wi th t he se pr inc ipl e s[,] th e Court c on c lud e d a s f

oll ow s:-3-

1. Th e L a st Wi ll a

nd Te sta me nt o f [M rs .] Cr ow e ll w a s d uly e xec ute d in acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee law on Fe bruar

y 5, 1971. 2. I TEM I I Iof the Will provided for [Mrs.] Crowell’s estate to be distributed to h e r h us ba nd , [Mr .] Cr ow e ll, ho we ve r [M r. ] Cro we ll p re de c e a se d h is wife. 3. I n the eve nt that [ Mrs.] C rowe ll[ ’]s husband prede cea sed her , I TEM I V of the Will provided for

[Mrs.] Crowell[’] s residuar y estate to be distributed in equal amounts to the [Cl aimants]. The Court found it unreasona ble [to] construe the Wil l in such a wa y as to requir e simultaneous death by [Mrs.] Crowell and he r husband in orde r to conc lude that [Mrs.] Crowell intended to leave he r estate to the [C laimants]. Therefor e, the Tr ial Court found proper construction of I TEM I V of the Will provides for e qual distribution of the e ntire estate to the claimants in this matter since [Mrs.] C rowe ll’s husband had pr edec ease d her.
On Se pte mbe r 1 9, 20 02 [,] c e rt a in h e ir s o f t he Es tate of

[Mr s. ] Cro we ll filed a N otice of A

ppeal r eg ardingthe Court’s dec ision.

Issue Pr esente d
The He irs appea l and pre sent the followingissue, as we perc eive it, for our revie w: Whether the trial c ourt err ed in construingMrs. Crowell’s Will t o provide for distribution of Mrs. Crowell’s r esiduary estate in e qual amounts to the Claimants.
Stand ard of Review
I n a Will construction case, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court has stated that “ ‘[w] hen ther e is no conflict in the evidenc e as to a ny materia l fac t, as in this case, the que stion on appeal is one of law, a nd our scope of re view is de novo with no pre sumption of corre ctness ac company ing the Chance llor’s conc lusions of law.’” In re Estate of Vince nt , 98 S.W .3d 146, 148 (Tenn. 2003) (q u o t i n g Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) ).
Will Cons truct ion
I n Wil l construction, “[t] he ca rdinal rule . . . is the a scer tainment of the intent of the testator. That intent, when known, will be g iven ef fec t unless prohibited by

some rule of

law or public policy .” In re W

alker , 8 4 9 S

. W

. 2 d

7 6 6 , 7 6 8 (T en n
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Cent. S. , 816 S.W .2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991) ). F urther, in Will construction:
the testator’ s intention must be asce rtained from “that which he has written” in the wi ll, and no t fr om wh a t he “m ay be su pp os e d to hav e int e nd e d to do ,” and e xtri ns ic-4-

evidenc e of the condition, situation and surrounding s of the testator himself may be considere d only as aids in the interpre tation of the languag e used by the testator, a

nd “the testator’s intention must ultimately be deter mined from the language o f t he instrument weig hed in the l ight of the testator’ s surrounding s, and no proof , howeve r conclusive in its nature , can be admitted with a vi ew o f s et t ing up a n intention not justified by

the languag e of the writing itself.
Nichols v. Todd , 101 S.W .2d 486, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936) (quoting Sizer’s Pritchar d on Wil ls §§ 384, 387, 388, and 409 (2nd Ed.) ).
I n this case , the pl ain l anguag e of the W ill provides first that Mrs. Crowell’s husband, Mr. Crowe ll , w a s to ta

k e h e r e s tate

. H o w e v e r , M r
. Cr o w e ll p r e d e c e a s e d h is w if e an d le ft no issue resulting in the beque st and devise lapsing

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-105 ( 2001). I tem I V of the Will p ro vid e s that “ [i]n the e ve nt t hat me and

my Hu sb and sh ou ld d e c e a se a t th e same tim e , it is my desire that my

Ex ecutor dis p o s e o f al l assets and any residue r emainingin our estate be dis tr i b ut e d ” to t

he Cla ima nts . U nd e r t

he pla in l angua g e , th is p ro vis ion c ann ot b e e ff

e c tuate d b e c a

us e Mr

. Cr ow e ll pr e de c e a se d Mr s. Cr ow e ll by ne arl y tw o y e ars
. Th e log ic a l re su lt, under t he p la in langua g e , wo uld be a fa ile d c on dit ion un de r a c on dit ion a l Will wi th an int e state dis tr ibutio n o f M rs
. Crowel l’ s e s tate

. H o w e v e r , it is a g e n e r a l r u le o f Wi ll c o n s tr

u c ti o nth a t wh e na

Wi ll h a s b e en executed, “t h er e i s no presumption of an intention to die intestate.” 80 Am. J ur. 2d W ill s § 1037 (2002).
This Court rece ntly

addre ssed the issue of c onditional W ills i n In reEs tate of F ra nk lin , E2000-02687-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 896635 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 9, 2001) ( no perm. app. filed ). I n that case , the Will provided:

I [,] Gloria F ranklin[,] leave [] ever y thing I own incl[] uding f

arm, ve hic[] les . . . to J ess & Terr

y Waltman in case I

die on my

way to & f rom J erse y
. Id . at *1. Ms. Fr anklin did not die on her trip to J erse y
. Id . This court stated:
I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a wi ll i s c on ditio na l or

c ontin g e nt, a

c ourt mus t f ir st deter mine “whe ther the happening of the possibili ty ref err ed to is a condition prec edent to the operation of the will, or whethe r the possibility of the ha ppeningwas only a stateme nt of the motive or induce ment which led to the pr ep ar at ion and execution of the instrument.”
Id

. at * 2 (q u o t i n g Ba

gn all v . B ag na ll , 225 S.W .2d 401, 402 (Tex. 1949)). In answe ring this question, this Court l aid out sever al fa ctors that should be c onsidered: (1 ) t he c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe e xec uti on

of the do c ume nt; (2 ) a

ny state me nts ma de by the de c e de nt f

oll ow ingthe ex ecuti on

of the do c ume nt; (3 ) t

he mann e r i n which the doc um en t wa s kept af ter the time for

the purporte d conting ency hadT h e fin d ing s o f fa c t o c c u rr e d a fter th e c a se w a s re m a n d e d to th e tr ia l c o u rt a fter the fi rs t o p inio n
. In re E sta te 2

o f F ra n k lin , 2001 W L 896635, at * 4- 5. T h i s s ec on d opi n i on was t h e r es u l t of an appe al f

r om t h e t r i al c ou r t a f

t er r ema n d. In re E sta te o

f F ra n k lin , 2 0 0 3 W L 2 2 7 3 4 6 1 8 , at *1

. -5- lapsed; (4) the dec edent’ s educatio n an d k n owledg e of the law; (5) whether any subsequent testame ntary

documents were made ; (6) whe ther the c ontinge ncy bear s a re asonable relation to th e dis position of the dece dent’s prope rty ; (7) whe ther a findi n g of a c onditional will m eans that the dece ased die d intestate; (8) whether eff ectuating the te rms of the will would be inequitable under the circ umstances; and (9) suc h other re levant fa ctors as be ar on the issue at hand.
Id . at 4. In that case , it was undisputed that Ms. Fra nklin “was motivated b y the news of an automobile acc ident to make a w ill. I t is also undisput ed . . . that [Ms

. Fr anklin] told others that she wanted the same dispos ition of her proper ty whether

she died on the trip or

at any other time.” In re Es tate of F

ra nk lin , No. E2003-00926- COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL22734618, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2003) ( no p er m. app. filed ). The trial c ourt also found that Ms. F ranklin had no spe cial 2 education or knowledg e of the law which le d this Court to c onclude that she would have no rea son to think that the langua g e use d about her trip to J erse y

would aff

ect the va lidity

of the Will. Id

. Ba sed upon these f

acts, this Court c oncluded that the languag e used by Ms. Fra nklin in the W ill was no ta c o n d i t i o np r e c e d e n tt o t h e o p e r a t i o no f th e W i l l b u tr a th e r

h e r k n o w l e d g e o f

a r e c e n ttr a ff

ic acc ident in the context of her pendingtrip to J er s ey i n duced he r pre paration and execution of the Wil l. Id . at *3.
I n the pre sent ca se, the stateme nt of evid en ce d o es n o t provide fa cts rele vant to all of the fac tors enumer ated in the Fran k lin c a se but do e s pr ov ide su ff ic ie nt fa c ts to d e te rm ine wh e the r M s. Crowell’s Will i s conditional. Unlike the Fran k lin c a se , the re wa s n o te sti mony fr om M rs . Cr ow e ll that she intended f

or her estate to g o to the Claimants in the event that she and Mr. Crowell did not pass away at t he same time. Rather, there wa s testimony from an a ppare nt disint ere sted witness that on at least two oc casions, Mrs. Crowe ll had said that if Mr. C rowe ll prede cea sed her, she intended for he r estate to be distributed to her heirs. The statement of evidence also includes two letters fr om the Cla ima

nts , w ho , b a se d s ole ly

on the re a din g of Mr s. Cr ow e ll’ s Will, be lie ve d th a t Mr s. Cr ow e ll intended her estate to be distributed to the Claimants. Ba sed upon this evidence , we c annot conc lude that th e c on dit ion

c on ta ine d in

I te m I V o f t

he Will wa s a mot ive or ind uc e me nt fo r Mr s. Cr ow e ll t o make the Will. Rather, the only permissible construc tion is that the conditi on was pre cede nt to the W i l l ’ s o p e r a t i o n
. T h e f

a i l e d c o n d i t i o nr e s u l t s i nM r s
. C r o w e l l ’ s i n t e n t , b a s e d u p o nth e t e s t i m o n y, t h a th e r e s t a t e b e d i s t r i b u t e d

t o h e r h e i r s , b e e f

f e c tu a t e d t h r o u g hi n t e s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n
. A c c o r d i n g l y, on rema nd, the distribution of Mrs. Crowell’s estate sha ll procee d in acc ordanc e with the intestac y provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 31- 2-101 to -110 (2001)

.-6- Conclusion
I n light of the fore g oing, w e re verse the dec ision of the trial court to distribute Mrs. Cr ow e ll’ s e state to t

he Cla ima

nts . Co sts of

thi s a pp e a l are ta xed

to t he Ap pe lle e s, F re e Will Ba ptist Mi nistries, I nc., F ree Wil l Ba ptist Orphanag e, Inc., F ree Wil l Chil dren’ s Home of Al a bama , a nd Ha rv e st F re e Will B a

pti st C hil d Ca

re Min ist ri e s, fo r whic h e xec uti on

may iss ue if nece ssary
.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER, J UDGE