Filed 8/19/14 P. v. Coronado CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DENNIS KEVIN CORONADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B248829

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VA122500)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

John A. Torribio and Peter Espinoza, Judges. Affirmed.

Donald L. Stansbarger for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan J. Kline

and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________________
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INTRODUCTION

Dennis Kevin Coronado appeals from a judgment and sentence, following 

his convictions for oral copulation with and committing lewd acts upon a child. 

Appellant contends his convictions should be reversed, as he was denied his right 

to counsel of choice. He argues (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to substitute new trial counsel, which he made on the eve of trial; and (2) that the 

court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. For the reasons stated below, we

affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

In an information filed May 1, 2012 by the Los Angeles County District 

Attorney, appellant was charged with three counts of forcible lewd acts upon a 

child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 1, 3, & 4),1and three counts of oral

copulation/sexual penetration with a child under the age of 10 (§ 288.7, subd. (b);

counts 2, 5, & 6). Appellant pleaded not guilty. 

Appellant was represented by deputy public defender Lizandro Salas at his 

preliminary hearing. Deputy public defender Tammy L. Landeros later became 

appellant’s attorney of record. On November 21, 2012, appellant orally requested 

new counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 

Following a hearing, the court denied the motion. On December 17, 2012, trial 

was set for January 2, 2013. At a later court date, appellant indicated he had 

retained private counsel, but when the public defender contacted private counsel,

she was informed that he had not yet been retained. On the date set for trial, 

January 2, private counsel appeared. Appellant sought to relieve his public 

defender and to substitute private counsel. Private counsel stated he was not ready 

for trial and sought a continuance. The prosecutor objected, based on the age of 

 

1

All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
3

the case, the stress on the victim, the fact that the case had been set for trial, and 

the fact that there had been five prior continuances. The court denied appellant’s

motion, and the matter was trailed for trial the next day. On January 3, 2013, 

private counsel again appeared. The prosecutor and public defender announced 

ready for trial. Appellant was offered and rejected a final plea bargain. Appellant 

again sought to substitute private counsel for his public defender. The court denied

the motion. Appellant made another Marsden motion, which was heard and

denied. 

A jury found appellant guilty of all charges. Appellant’s motion for a new 

trial, based on the court’s denial of his motion to substitute counsel and ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, was heard and denied. Appellant was sentenced to a 

term of 30 years to life in state prison: 10 years each on counts 1, 3, and 4, to run 

consecutively, plus concurrent 15-year-to-life terms on counts 2, 5, and 6. 

Appellant timely noticed an appeal from the judgment of conviction. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Amber first met appellant, a bus driver, in 2006 when she began riding on 

his bus line. Appellant became a friend of Amber’s family, and Amber and her 

husband trusted appellant with their children. Appellant would come over almost 

every weekend: Amber would do appellant’s laundry while he played with her

children. 

Amber’s daughter, E., who was seven years old at the time of trial, testified 

that appellant began molesting her multiple times during the prior year. Appellant 

molested E. at her home, at a laundromat, and at appellant’s house. After E. 

informed her mother Amber, E. was taken to the hospital and police station. At the 

police station, E. spoke with an officer about the molestation. 

 

2 We limit our discussion of the facts to those relevant to the issues on appeal.
4

Appellant presented no defense evidence. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error when it denied 

him “counsel of his choice,” “forcing him to go to trial with unwanted, unprepared, 

and/or incompetent Counsel.” Appellant further contends his convictions should 

be reversed, as defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial. 

A. Right to Counsel of Choice

“The right to the effective assistance of counsel ‘encompasses the right to 

retain counsel of one’s own choosing. [Citations.]’” (People v. Courts (1985) 

37 Cal.3d 784, 789 (Courts), quoting People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 86.) 

“‘A necessary corollary [of the right] is that a defendant must be given a 

reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to 

be heard by counsel would be of little worth. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] In addition, 

counsel, ‘once retained, [must be] given a reasonable time in which to prepare the 

defense.’ [Citation.]” (Courts, supra, at p. 790.) However, “[t]he right to such 

counsel ‘must be carefully weighed against other values of substantial importance, 

such as that seeking to ensure orderly and expeditious judicial administration, with 

a view toward an accommodation reasonable under the facts of the particular 

case.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Byoune (1966) 65 Cal.2d 345, 346.) Accordingly, 

“[a] continuance may be denied if the accused is ‘unjustifiably dilatory’ in 

obtaining counsel, or ‘if he arbitrarily chooses to substitute counsel at the time of 

trial.’” (Courts, supra, at pp. 790-791, quoting People v. Byoune, supra, at pp.

346-347.) For example, where a request for a continuance is made on the eve of 

trial, day of trial or second day of trial, the lateness of the continuance request 

justified a denial, absent compelling circumstances to the contrary. (Courts, at 

p. 792, fn. 4 [citing cases].)
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Here, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motions to substitute 

counsel and to continue the trial, which were made on the eve of trial and the day 

trial commenced, as appellant presented no compelling reason to justify his delay 

in seeking to substitute counsel. Appellant first expressed dissatisfaction with his

appointed counsel on November 21, 2012, but waited until the eve of trial -- six 

weeks later -- to substitute private counsel, who was not prepared to go to trial. 

Appellant provided no explanation for the delay. Moreover, granting the motion to 

substitute counsel would have required -- as appellant concedes on appeal -- a 

continuance of several weeks. The trial court properly considered the adverse 

effect that granting appellant’s motions would have on the orderly and expeditious 

administration of justice, as the prosecution and its witnesses were ready for trial. 

Finally, although appellant’s motions to relieve the public defender were based on 

alleged incompetency of counsel, as detailed below, the record demonstrates no 

incompetence of defense counsel. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying 

appellant’s motions to substitute counsel and to continue the trial.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Appellant next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new 

trial, as his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. He contends (1) that 

defense counsel should have obtained video-recordings from the security cameras 

in the laundromat (where the jury found one incident of molestation occurred), and 

(2) that counsel should have contacted four witnesses who would have provided

evidence supporting a theory that E.’s mother fabricated the sexual assaults on her 

minor child, as the mother was a “bus groupie” who was upset when appellant 

continually rejected her advances. 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant 

must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
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reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) that there is a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would 

have been more favorable to the defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 

466 U.S. 668, 687-688; People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 206-207; People v. 

Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519-520.) When “defense counsel’s reasons for 

conducting the defense case in a particular way are not readily apparent from the 

record, we will not assume inadequacy of representation unless there could have 

been ‘“no conceivable tactical purpose’” for counsel’s actions.” (People v. Earp

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 896.)

Here, appellant has shown neither that defense counsel’s actions fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness, nor that there is a reasonable probability 

that absent counsel’s alleged errors, the result would have been more favorable to 

him. First, although there was some evidence of video surveillance at the 

laundromat, there is no evidence that video-recordings for the specific time, date

and location of the molestation incident actually existed. Appellant provided no 

evidence that they did. Indeed, defense counsel made the tactical decision to argue 

that the prosecution’s failure to present video surveillance from the laundromat 

raised a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt. 

Second, as to the failure to contact witnesses who would have impeached 

E.’s mother, defense counsel asserted that she had interviewed several potential 

defense witnesses, including at least one of the witnesses named by appellant. 

Counsel stated that she decided for tactical reasons not to call the witness, as she 

determined the testimony was “four levels of hearsay, completely inadmissible, 

uncorroborated.” Moreover, E.’s mother did not witness any molestation. She 

merely testified that E. told her about appellant’s actions. It was E. herself who 

testified to all of appellant’s acts, and it was her testimony the jury credited. Thus, 
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there is no reasonable possibility that an attack on the mother’s credibility would 

have resulted in a more favorable outcome for appellant. In sum, appellant has not 

shown ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

denying appellant’s motion for a new trial. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MANELLA, J. 

We concur:

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

EDMON, J.*

________________________________________________________________________

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.