[Cite as State v. Babock , 2012-Ohio-3627.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsJOSHUA ALEXANDER BABCOCK 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

Case No. 2011CA00286 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 2011CR0723 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 6, 2012 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JOHN D. FERRERO RODNEY A. BACA 

Prosecuting Attorney Schnars, Baca & Infantino, LLC 

Stark County, Ohio 610 Market Avenue North 

 Canton, Ohio 44702 

By: KATHLEEN O. TATARSKY 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Appellate Section 

110 Central Plaza, South – Suite 510 

Canton, Ohio 44702 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 2

Hoffman, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Joshua Alexander Babcock appeals his conviction 

and sentence entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is 

the state of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On May 11, 2011, the victim herein, Monique Crockett, did not report to 

work. Her employer tried to contact her via cell phone, and eventually spoke with 

Appellant, who indicated Crockett was in the hospital due to an accident. On May 12, 

2011, Crockett again did not report to work. Her employer again tried to contact her via 

phone calls and text messages to her cell phone. Crockett’s employer received a 

responsive text on May 13, 2011, indicating she was resigning her position. 

{¶3} Crockett, a twenty-five year-old mother of three small children, recently 

had her children removed from her custody for leaving them unattended. Appellant and 

Crockett had been dating approximately seven months at the time of the incident. 

{¶4} Members of Crockett's family learned she was missing, and heard rumors 

her body was in the trunk of a car driven by Appellant. Crockett's family began looking 

for her, and eventually located the car at the home of Pamela Walker on 14th Street 

N.E., Canton, Ohio. Several police officers responded to the home where the car was 

parked, and knocked on the door. Walker gave the police permission to search her 

home, and Appellant was found inside the home sitting on the couch. Upon noticing the 

police, Appellant ran into a back bedroom. 

{¶5} The officers inquired of Appellant as to Crockett's whereabouts. Appellant 

indicated he did not know where she was, and she wouldn't answer his calls. The 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 3

police called Crockett's cell phone number, and a phone on the couch began to ring. 

The officers asked Appellant if he had the keys to the car, and Appellant indicated he 

did not, Monique had them. Walker then told the police she knew Appellant had the 

keys because she had witnessed him starting the vehicle. 

{¶6} The officers read Appellant his Miranda rights, and asked him what they 

might find in the trunk of the car. Appellant responded, "you know what you'll find in the 

trunk of the car"; followed by an indication Crockett was in the car. Appellant admitted 

to the officers he and Crockett were driving around, got into an argument and she was 

having an asthma attack. He told the officers he pulled over into the Walker driveway, 

and went into the house because he was mad. When he returned, she was dead and 

he put her in the trunk of the car with clothes over her body. Appellant then told the 

officers where the key to the car was located, inside his tennis shoe. 

{¶7} Officer Walker of the Canton Police Department opened the trunk of the 

car, which was stuffed with clothing and a sleeping bag. When he removed some of the 

items, he found Crockett's head. 

{¶8} At the police station, the officers conducted a recorded, videotaped 

interview of Appellant, during which Appellant waived his Miranda rights. Appellant 

admitted he had been dating Crockett for seven months until they were evicted from 

their apartment, and then they were living in the car and in other people's homes. 

{¶9} He told the officers Crockett got off work on Thursday, May 12, 2011, and 

they got into an "altercation," during which Crockett blamed him for losing her children. 

Appellant claimed she was having a panic attack and grabbed him, at which point he 

attempted to administer CPR. Appellant claimed despite his efforts, Crockett died. 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 4

{¶10} Appellant later admitted to putting Crockett in a sleeper hold, which he 

demonstrated to the detectives. Appellant told the officers, 

{¶11} "I put my arm around her neck so her chin shit was right here and her 

throat was right here and I just squeezed but I ain't...I stopped cause she was like, 

Josh, can you please stop so we can talk about this. 

{¶12} "*** 

{¶13} "Yeah. Then I stopped. As soon as I started talking this shit, this spit and 

shit come out her mouth I stopped and she like, and I rolled the window down so she 

can get her air back and we sat there and she was like, Josh, please don't do this, blah, 

blah, blah. We done been through too much. We done through a lot of bad shit 

together it's been straight, a bad road. Everything just fell apart. And then she said 

somethin' and she started talkin' about her mother fuckin' baby dad or whatever and 

then I just snapped. It just hit me again. 

{¶14} "*** 

{¶15} "So I did it again. And this time I was all the way blacked out and I didn't 

stop." 

{¶16} State's Exhibit 21, at 18-19. 

{¶17} Appellant admitted to placing Crockett's body in the trunk after he killed 

her, claiming he was too afraid to call anyone. 

{¶18} The Stark County Coroner later determined the cause of death was 

cervical compression. 

{¶19} On November 18, 2011, the Stark County Grand Jury filed an amended 

indictment charging Appellant with one count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A); 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 5

and one count of gross abuse of a corpse, in violation of R.C. 2927.01(B). Appellant 

entered a plea of not guilty to the charges, stipulated to his competency to stand trial 

and his sanity at the time of the offense. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the 

videotaped statement to the police, which the trial court denied. Appellant also filed a 

motion for appointment of an expert in the area of forensic medicine, asserting the 

autopsy report contains very specific medical information and is inconsistent. The trial 

court denied the motion via Judgment Entry of November 28, 2011. 

{¶20} Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charges. Via 

Judgment Entry of December 29, 2011, the trial court entered the conviction and 

sentenced Appellant to fifteen years in prison on the murder count, twelve months on 

the gross abuse of a corpse count, to be served consecutively for a total of sixteen 

years to life. 

{¶21} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error: 

{¶22} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT THE 

RIGHT TO FUNDS FOR AN EXPERT WITNESS. 

{¶23} “II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS 

RIGHTS WHEN IT FAILED TO PROVIDE JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF 

MANSLAUGHTER, INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND SELF-DEFENSE TO THE 

JURY. 

{¶24} “III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR DURING 

JURY DELIBERATIONS. 

{¶25} “IV. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION 

AND THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.” 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 6

I. 

{¶26} In the first assignment Appellant maintains the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for funds to retain an expert witness. The trial court denied the motion 

finding Appellant failed to demonstrate a particularized need. 

{¶27} The State asserts there is no statutory authority to provide public funds for 

an indigent defendant's expert who is charged with murder. R.C. 2929.024 provides for 

experts in aggravated murder cases, and only when there is a demonstration the expert 

is reasonably necessary. The need must be legitimate and relevant to the case. State 

v. Powell 49 Ohio St.3d 255 (1990); State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164. 

{¶28} The authority to fund defense experts rests within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. 

{¶29} The Ohio Supreme Court has held: "[p]ursuant to Ake, it is appropriate to 

consider three factors in determining whether the provision of an expert witness is 

required: 1) the effect on the defendant's private interest in the accuracy of the trial if the 

requested service is not provided, 2) the burden on the government's interest if the 

service is provided, and 3) the probable value of the additional service and the risk of 

error in the proceedings if the assistance is not provided." State v. Mason, 82 Ohio 

St.3d 144, 149 (1998), citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) 

{¶30} This Court has held "[i]n the absence of a particularized showing of need, 

due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution does not require 

the provision of an expert witness." In re B.L., 2009-Ohio-6341. A defendant must 

provide a trial court with facts to establish a particularized need for expert assistance 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 7

and must demonstrate more than a mere possibility of assistance to receive an expert 

witness at the state's expense. State v. Nichols, 2010-Ohio-2242. Undeveloped 

assertions the proposed assistance would be useful to the defense are patently 

inadequate. Id.

{¶31} On November 28, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant's 

motion for funds for an expert forensic scientist. Appellant requested funds to retain an 

expert in the area of forensic medicine to aid in the defense of Appellant, as counsel for 

Appellant had no training in the field of medicine and did not understand several terms 

in the coroner's report. In addition, Appellant's counsel stated she believed the report 

was inconsistent. 

{¶32} The State claimed Appellant failed to demonstrate a particularized need 

for the expert. 

{¶33} The trial court, via Judgment Entry of November 28, 2011, held: 

{¶34} "In the present action the defendant has failed to show a particularized 

need as to how a forensic expert would assist him. Although counsel for the defendant 

has asserted that there are terms in the coroner's report that she doesn't understand, it 

is unclear what these terms are. Additionally, counsel for the defendant has asserted 

that there are inconsistencies in the medical report; however it is unclear what the 

inconsistencies are. Further, counsel for the defendant has not identified a specific 

forensic expert and has admittedly not spoken with Assistant Coroner Orlino or Dr. 

P.S.S. Murthy regarding their findings despite being given the opportunity to do so." 

{¶35} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion 

because as Appellant demonstrated no particularized need for such an expert. 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 8

Appellant made the request only 26 days prior to trial, and did not name the potential 

expert or explain what testimony could be anticipated. Counsel had not interviewed the 

coroner or the doctor performing the autopsy. Appellant's undeveloped assertions and 

generic statement regarding counsel's failure to understand all the terms in the autopsy 

report and unnamed inconsistencies were insufficient to establish the trial court abused 

its discretion. 

{¶36} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶37} In the second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in 

not providing instructions on the lesser included offenses to the greater charge of 

murder. 

{¶38} An instruction on a lesser included offense is required only where the 

evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime 

charged and a conviction upon the lesser included offense. State v. Robb (2000), 88 

Ohio St.3d 59, 74, 723 N.E.2d 1019 (emphasis added). Thus, if the jury can reasonably 

find the state failed to prove one element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt but that the other elements of the lesser included offense were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt, a charge on the lesser included offense is required. Id.

{¶39} Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether the evidence 

adduced at trial was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction. State v. Morris, Guernsey 

App. No. 03CA29, 2004-Ohio-6988, reversed on other grounds, 109 Ohio St.3d 313, 

847 N .E.2d 1174, 2006-Ohio-2109; State v. Mitts (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 223, 228, 690 

N.E.2d 522. “When reviewing a trial court's jury instructions, the proper standard of 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 9

review for an appellate court is whether the trial court's refusal to give a requested 

instruction constituted an abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances of the 

case.” State v. Sims, Cuyahoga App. No. 85608, 2005-Ohio-5846, ¶ 12, citing State v. 

Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 68, 541 N.E.2d 443. A trial court does not abuse its 

discretion by not giving a jury instruction if the evidence is insufficient to warrant the 

requested instruction. State v. Lessin (l993), 67 Ohio St.3d 487, 494, 620 N.E.2d 72. An 

“abuse of discretion” connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the 

court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore, supra. 

{¶40} Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in failing to instruct 

the jury on the lesser included offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless 

homicide. Appellant was convicted of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), which 

reads: 

{¶41} "(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful 

termination of another's pregnancy." 

{¶42} Involuntary manslaughter is defined at R.C. 2903.04: 

{¶43} "(A) No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful 

termination of another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's committing or 

attempting to commit a felony." 

{¶44} Reckless homicide is set forth at R.C. 2903.041: 

{¶45} "(A) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another or the unlawful 

termination of another's pregnancy." 

{¶46} Upon our review of the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by not giving a jury instruction on the lesser included offenses. Appellant 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 10

admitted to performing a sleeper hold on Crockett, releasing her, then, after she started 

complaining and mentioning her children's father, again performing the hold and cutting 

off her air supply until she died. The coroner testified at trial such a hold would result in 

death after three to four minutes. Appellant would have watched Crockett struggle and 

try to catch her breath, knowing the effect of cutting off her ability to breathe. The 

record clearly supports the jury's finding Appellant purposely intended to cause the 

death of Monique Crockett. We find the self-serving evidence Appellant relies upon 

insufficient to warrant the requested instructions. 

{¶47} Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶48} In the third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court committed 

prejudicial error during jury deliberations. 

{¶49} At trial, the jury indicated it had reached a verdict. The jury then returned 

a verdict of guilty. In polling the jurors individually, Juror No. 10 asked to speak with the 

Judge privately. When Juror No. 10 was asked if this was her individual and collective 

verdict, she answered it was her collective verdict, but was not her independent verdict. 

She also indicated members of the victim's family were staring her down. Earlier in the 

proceedings Juror No. 10 indicated she was uncertain whether her knowledge of the 

defendant would influence her decision despite her earlier indication during voir dire she 

could be fair and impartial. 

{¶50} The trial court then instructed the jury as follows, 

{¶51} “The Court: Juror No. 10, I’m going to ask you the question again and you 

just need to give me an answer. 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 11

{¶52} “With respect to the guilty verdict as it relates to the charge of murder, is 

that your individual verdict and the collective verdict of the jury? 

{¶53} “Juror No. 10: To be honest, it is a collective verdict. It is not my 

independent verdict. 

{¶54} “The Court: Very well. Ladies and Gentlemen, in that case there is no 

verdict. 

{¶55} “And at this point in time I am required by law to read to you a specialized 

instruction. 

{¶56} “In a large proportion of cases absolute certainty can not be attained or 

expected. 

{¶57} “Although the verdict must reflect the verdict of each individual juror and 

not mere acquiescence in the conclusion of other jurors, each question submitted to you 

should be examined with proper regard and deference to the opinions of others. 

{¶58} “It is desirable that the case be decided. You are selected in the same 

manner and from the same source as any future jury would be. 

{¶59} “There is no reason to believe the case will ever be submitted to a jury 

more capable, impartial, or intelligent than this one. 

{¶60} “Likewise, there is no reason to believe that more or clearer evidence will 

be produced by either side. 

{¶61} “It is your duty to decide the case if you can do - - if you can 

conscientiously do so. You should listen to one another’s opinions with a disposition to 

be persuaded. 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 12

{¶62} “Do not hesitate to reexamine your views and change your position if you 

are convinced it is erroneous. 

{¶63} “If there is disagreement, all jurors should reexamine their position given 

that a unanimous verdict has not been reached. 

{¶64} “Jurors for acquittal should consider whether their doubt is reasonable 

considering that it is not shared by others equally honest who have heard the same 

evidence with the same desire to arrive at the truth and under the same oath. 

{¶65} “Likewise, jurors for conviction should ask themselves whether they might 

not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment not concurred in by all other jurors. 

{¶66} “At this time I’m going to return you to the jury deliberation room and ask 

you to further deliberate with respect to these matters. 

{¶67} “Miss Hamilton, could you please return the jurors to the jury deliberation 

room.” 

{¶68} Tr. at 630-633. 

{¶69} Appellant did not object to the instruction as given by the trial court. 

{¶70} The trial court also conducted a colloquy on the record with regard to the 

interaction between Juror No. 10 and the victim's family, and concluded no 

inappropriate conduct had occurred. 

{¶71} The jury returned to deliberations, and eventually reached a verdict of 

guilty on both charges to which Juror No. 10 indicated it was her individual verdict and 

the collective verdict of the jury. Tr. at 661. We find Appellant has not demonstrated 

actual prejudice as a result of the actions of Juror No. 10. 

{¶72} The third assignment of error is overruled. 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 13

IV. 

{¶73} In the fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues his conviction is 

against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, Appellant 

argues he did not intend to cause the death of Monique Crockett. 

{¶74} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry focuses 

primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether the evidence, if believed, 

reasonably could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997–Ohio–52, 678 N.E.2d 541, State v. Jenks, 61 

Ohio St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). The standard of review is whether, after 

viewing the probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jenks, supra. 

{¶75} On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire 

record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the 

witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment 

must be reversed. The discretionary power to grant a new hearing should be exercised 

only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 

judgment.” Thompkins, supra at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App .3d 172, 175, 

485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Because the trier of fact is in a better position to 

observe the witnesses' demeanor and weigh their credibility, the weight of the evidence 

and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 

Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212, (1967), syllabus 1. 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 14

{¶76} R.C. 2901.22 defines purpose, as a "person acts purposely when it is his 

specific intention to cause a certain result" or to engage in conduct of a certain nature 

regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish through that conduct. Persons 

are presumed to have intended the natural, reasonable and probable consequences of 

their voluntary acts. State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72. 

{¶77} The evidence demonstrates Appellant admitted to placing Crockett in a 

sleeper hold. He stated he released her, but upon her complaining and mentioning the 

father of her children, he placed her in the hold again, cutting off her airway, until she 

stopped breathing. The Stark County Coroner testified at trial the hold would not have 

resulted in death until after three to four minutes. 

{¶78} Based upon the evidence presented in the record, we find Appellant's 

conviction for murder is supported by the manifest weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence, and the jury did not lose its way in convicting Appellant of the charges herein. 

{¶79} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By: Hoffman, J. 

Delaney, P.J. and 

Farmer, J. concur 

 s/ William B. Hoffman _________________

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 s/ Sheila G. Farmer __________________

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 

 
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00286 15

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

JOSHUA ALEXANDER BABCOCK : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 2011CA00286 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the Stark 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellant. 

 s/ William B. Hoffman _________________

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 s/ Sheila G. Farmer __________________

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER