Interim Decision #2159 

MATTER OF TANG 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-14083327 

Decided by Board July 10, 1972 

Petitioner's alleged adoption by beneficiary in China in 1945 when she was 

approximately 14 years of age has not been established for immigration 

purposes since the provisions of Article 1079 of the Chinese Civil Code 

required that the adoption be in writing, the authenticity of the written 

instrument of adoption presented is at issue, and no credible evidence has 

been presented to support its authenticity. Even if a valid adoption agreement 

had been presented, there is no showing that petitioner, who,following the 

death of her father, continued residing, with her mother, in the same house in 

which she resided prior thereto, ever came under the parental control of the 

beneficiary; lux thee, doubt as to the bona fides of the adoption, raised by the 

fact beneficiary is the blood uncle of petitioner, has not been explained away. 

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Edward E. Merges, Esquire 

4321 Seattle-First National Bank Bldg. 

Seattle, Washington 98104 

The United States citizen petitioner applied for immediate 

relative status for the beneficiary as her adoptive father under 

section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The application was initially approved on November 28, 1966 but the approval 

was subsequently revoked on August 12, 1970. The petitioner 

appealed from that revocation. This Board, in an order dated April 

20, 1971, remanded the case to the District Director in order to 

secure expert testimony as to the authenticity of a Chinese adoption agreement submitted in support of the application. The District 

Director was unable to find an expert and returned 'the file to this 

Board. The appeal will be dismissed. 

The petitioner was born in China on October 10, 1931. According 

to her affidavit dated June 9, 1969, she lived in China in a large 

house with her parents, grandmother, brother and sister, her 

father's brother (the beneficiary.) and her uncle's wife. Her father 

died on September 7, 1945. Upon his deathbed he apparently asked 

his brother to take the children and raise them as his own. 

The petitioner and her younger sister were purportedly adopted 

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Interim Decision #2159 

in mainland China by the beneficiary on September 10, 1945. The 

petitioner was almost 14 years of age at the time. Article 1079 of 

the Civil Code of the Nationalist Republic of China required that 

an adoption be in writing, unless an "infancy adoption" had taken 

place. The term "infancy adoption" relates to an adoption occurring before the child involved had attained the age of seven years. 

Therefore, in the present ease an infancy adoption was not 

possible, and the petitioner must prove her adoption by means of a 

written agreement of adoption. 

The petitioner claims that there was a written agreement of 

adoption in her ease. At first no document was presented. The 

beneficiary, in a statement dated September 26, 1966, stated: "I do 

not have the adoption agreement. It was left in the village." In her 

affidavit the petitioner noted that she was informed by the Service 

that a written adoption agreement would be necessary in her case. 

She stated that she wrote to her adoptive parents, who purportedly sent to the home village in China and secured the writing 

finally submitted. 

The petitioner continued to reside in the same' house after the 

purported adoption. In September of 1948 she went to Hong Kong 

with her mother, sister and brother. Her uncle, the beneficiary, 

accompanied them, but returned to China after one month. The 

petitioner was married in Hong Kong in October of 1948 and came 

to the United States in 1950. The beneficiary remained in China 

until 1952, at which time he moved to Hong Kong. Hence, the 

petitioner resided in the same house as the beneficiary subsequent 

to the claimed adoption only slightly more than three years. 

The District Director adopted the conclusion of the trial attorney, who found the written adoption agreement to be an after-thefact document, prepared and presented as a result of the Service's 

request for written proof. Efforts to establish the age of the paper 

upon which the adoption agreement was written have proven 

unsuccessful. The file contains no corroborating evidence that an 

agreement of adoption had been prepared in September of 1945 

except for the affidavit of a cousin, Tang Yat Chow. Tang Yat 

Chow in his affidavit claimed not only that a writing had been 

executed in 1945 but also in 1954, when the petitioner's brother 

was also purportedly adopted. That is incorrect, however, inasmuch as the beneficiary stated categorically that there was no 

writing prepared in 1954 in the case of the petitioner's brother. 

Consequently, after taking into account all the circumstances 

present in this case, we must agree with the District Director who 

concluded that no credible evidence had been presented to support 

the authenticity of the written instrument of adoption. 

Even if a valid adoption agreement had been presented, we 

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Interim Decision #2159 

would still have to dismiss the prdsent appeal because the petitioner has not shown the existence of a valid subsisting adoption. 

For instance, there is no showing in the present case that the 

petitioner ever came under the parental control of the beneficiary. 

All she did was continue residing in the same house, with her 

mother, that she had been residing in before her father's death. 

See Matter of Chapralis, A-14922517, unreported (BIA, October 24, 

1967), which is referred to 'hi Matter of Yuen, Interim Decision No. 

2130 (BIA, 1972). 

In the Yuen case, we held that the fact that the putative 

adoptive father was an uncle raised doubts as to the bona fides of 

the adoption. We found in that case that the petitioner had failed 

to explain away the doubt. The same reasoning should apply to 

the present case, and we find that the petitioner has likewise 

failed to explain away the doubt present on this score. Also, 

the fact that the petitioner went to Hong Kong with her mother 

three years after the claimed adoption, while the beneficiary 

returned to mainland China after briefly accompanying them to 

Hong Kong, raises the possibility that the adoption, if any, may 

have been mutually terminated in accordance with Article 1080 of 

the Nationalist Civil Code. We find that the petitioner has also 

failed to offer sufficient evidence to explain away the doubt raised 

as to the continuing effect of the adoption. See Matter of Lee, 

Interim Decision No. 2098 (BIA, 1972). 

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude, then, that the District 

Director was correct in holding the petitioner had not borne the 

burden of establishing that the beneficiary is her parent as that 

term is defined in section 101(b)(2) of the Act. Since the beneficiary 

does not qualify as a parent for immigration purposes, he is not 

eligible for preferred status as an immediate relative under section 201(b). The District Director accordingly was correct in revoking the initial approval of the application. The appeal will be 

dismissed and the following order will be entered. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

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