T h i s Cour t ha s a ddr es s ed t h e i s s u es u n der e ac h c on s t i t u t i on al pr ov i s i on i n depe n den t l y

. T h u s , t h e or der i n g of 1

t he i ssue s d i f

fers sli gh t l y f

ro m t he p arti es’ briefs. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 12, 200 6

TRE NT STA RKS v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 01-02374 P aula S kahan , Judge

No. W2005-02478-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Novem ber 2, 2006

F oll ow ing a

jury tr ia l, the Pe tit ion e r, Tr e nt Sta rk s, wa s c on vic te d of fi rs t de g re e mur de r. Th e State soug ht to impos e the death penalty , but the j ury sentenc ed the Petitioner to life i n prison without the possibili ty

o f p ar o le

. T h e Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s c o n v ic ti o n s w e r e a f f irme d o n d ir e c t a

p p e a l. I n th is appea l from the de nial of post-convic tion relief, the Petitioner a rg ues that (1) his tri al co -c o unsel was inadequate under

the S ix th and Fourtee nth Amendments, (2) his lead trial counsel fa iled to meet and communicate w ith him adequately in violation of the Six th Amendment, (3) his lea d trial counsel didno t a de qu a te ly

a dv ise him

on wh e the r to tes tif

y in v iol a tio n o f the Sixth A me nd me nt, a nd(4 ) h is le a d tria l c ou ns e l di d n ot a de qu a te ly inv e sti g a te his a lib i w itn e ss i n vio latio n o f the Sixth Am e nd me nt. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. 1
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

L a ur e n Pa sle y -Wa

rd , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Tr e nt S tark s.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vidE. Coe ne n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gi b b o n s, District Attorney Gene ral; and A nita Spinetta, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

The Petitioner wa s convicted by a jury of first deg ree murder in the shooting death of Dar rel Smit h. He wa s sentence d to life in prison w ithout the possibili ty of parole

. This c ourt aff irmed the Petitioner’s conviction on direc t appea l. See S tate v. Trent Stark, No. W2002-03078-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22888912 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Dec . 5, 2003). The Tennesse e Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’ s reques t for permission to appeal on May 10, 2004. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-co n v ic ti o nr e li e f

. T h ePe ti ti o n e r was a ppointed post-conviction counse l, who filed an a mended pe tition for post-conviction relief

. At the post-conviction hea ring , the Petitioner testified that he “ wanted to testify ” at tria l but that his attorney

“just said don’t testify period.” The Petitioner said that his attorne y told him t here “wouldn’t ha ve bee n enoug h time” to “ prepa re” him to testify

. The Petitioner said that, when a sked in c ou rt wh e the r h e wo uldwa ive his ri g ht t o te sti fy , he state d th a t he didno t w a nt t o te sti fy be c aus e his at t o rn ey co nvinced him not to. The Petitioner said that his attorney advised him that he wa s “g oing to g et the death penalty ” if the jury believed he was ly ing and h ad “no remorse .” The Petition e r s a id that, i f h e ha d te sti fi e d, the ou tc ome of his tr ia l w ou ld h a ve be e n d if fe re nt b e c aus e he wo uldha ve e xpla ine d to the jury that th e State ’s wi tne sse s we re no t cr e dib le a nd that he w ou ld have me ntioned his alibi witn es s that would confirm he could not have be en at the c rime sce ne at the time of the shooting

.
Th e Pe tit ion e r a lso state d th a t hi s le a d tria l c ou ns e l di d n ot c ommun ic a te wi th h im a d e q uate ly and that his attorney

primarily wo rk ed o n h i s robbery trial and did not discuss the ca pital murder
c a se . T he Pe tit ion e r s ta te d tha t he c ou ld n ot r e c a ll h ow ma ny tim e s h is atto rn e y

vis ite d h im i n jail but that he did not fee l it was sufficient f or a de ath-pe nalty

case

. Wit h reg ard to the a libi witness, the Petitioner stated that he provided his attorne y with the
na me a nda dd re ss of Mr . H oll y wo odHe nd e rs on . T he Pe tit ion e r c la ime d th a t Mr . H e nd e rs on wo uld have te stified that the Petitioner was wa lking f rom his g irlfriend’ s house to his mother’ s house at the time the shooting took plac e. The Petitioner claimed that Mr. H ender son would have te stified that the Pe tit ion e r co uld no t hav e re a c he d h is m oth e r’ s h ou se ne ar the c ri me sc e ne un til a t le a st t we nty min ute s a ft e r the mur de r o ccurr e d. Th e Pe tit ion e r s a id that he didno t kn ow fo r a fa c t th a t hi s attorney failed to investig ate Mr. H ender son’s wher eabouts, but the P et i t i o n er state d that Mr. Hende rson did not testify at his tria l. Thus, the Petitioner assumed that his attorney did not pursue the alibi information. The Petitioner sa id that he ca lled people to try to ge t Holly wood Hende rson to testify at t he post -convic tion hearing but that attempts to locate Mr . Hende rson wer e unsucc essful beca use he w as “r

unning f rom the law.”

Wit h reg ard to h i s ap p ellate c ounsel, the Petitioner testified that she should have raised
a dd iti on a l iss ue s on dir e c t app e a l. Spe c if ic a lly , the Pe tit ion e r state d that he wante d his a ppe llateT h e c o n fes sio n sta te s tha t t h e a c c u se d is t h e P e tit io n e r, T re n t S ta rk s. T h e c o n fes sio n is also sign e d leg ib ly 2
wi t h t h e f

u l l n ame of

T rent S t arks

. H owe v er , i n f i v e pl ac es t h r ou g h ou t t h e con fes s i on , t h e i n i t i al s “ T

. R. ” ar e s i g n ed, wh i ch a r e i n con s i s t en t w i t h t h e Pet i t i on er ’ s i n i t i al s

. O n c r os s

- ex ami n at i on of t h e Pet i t i on er a t t h e pos t

- con v i ct i on h e a rin g , t h e p r o s e c u to r a sk e d the P e tit io n e r if he a lso w e n t b y the na m e “T re n t R o b ins o n ” b e c a u se R o b ins o n w a s h is

m o the r’s m a id e n na m e . T h e P e tit io n e r re p lied tha t he w a s u n a b le to re m e m b e r if he w e n t b y tha t n a m e a t so m e ti m e in the p a st b e c a u se o f his e x te n siv e d ru g us e

. -3- counsel to ra ise the issue of the detec tive’s inconsistent statements from the suppr ession hearing and th e tria l, th e c u r io u s in it ia ls “ T

. R. ” o n th e c o n f e s s io n s tate me n t, th e a d mi s s io n o f th e c o n f e s s io n, 2

a nd the fa c t that “ the re we re tw o ju ro rs c rying du ri ng [his ] tr ia l.” Th e Pe tit ion e r s ta te d th a t app e llate counsel ne ver me t wi t h h i m b efor e filing the appe llate brief to consult with him about potential issues on appea l. The Petitioner alleg ed that the outcome of his appea l would have be en diffe rent beca use the a ppellate c ourt would be a ble to revie w all the issues that he w ished to raise.

The lea d trial counsel a lso testified at the post-conviction hea ring , stating that he visited the Petitioner “a c ouple of times at mos t,” between the initial interview and the prelimi nary hearing. T he lead t ri al counsel testified that he repr esente d the Petitioner for a pproxi mately

two y ear s in the
c apit a l mu rd e r c a se a nda ro bb e ry c a se that w a s b ein g u sed as an a g g ra vatin g fa c tor fo r the fi rs t deg ree murder c harg e.

Th e le a d tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r’ s c o- c ou ns e l pa rt ic ipate d inhis repr esentation. L ead c ounsel stated that he “ d i s cu s s ed t he fa cts,” “ discussed [the] investigation,” and “disc ussed the theories of the c ase.” The lea d trial counsel stated that he did “a whole lot of ta lki ng ” to h is c o- c ou ns e l in pr e pa ri ng fo r the c apit a l mu rd e r c a se a nda lso dis c us se d th e ma tte r w ith the entire capital team of the Public Defe nder’ s Offic e.
The lea d trial counsel testi fi ed t hat he pr esente d a cla im of self-de fense at trial at the Petitioner’s reque st, even thoug h he was leery of doi ng so beca use t he victim was “shot in the bac k of the he ad.” With reg ards to the Petitioner’s alibi w itness inve stigation, lead trial counse l testified that he a nd the c apit a l c a se inv e sti g a tor se arc he d f or Mr . H e nd e rs on to n o a va il b e c a us e the a dd re ss the Petitioner provided wa s a “va cant lot.” L ead trial counsel a lso subpoenaed Mr . Hende rson, but the investig ator was unable to serve the s ubpoena because he could not locate Mr. Hende rson. L ead tr ia l c ou ns e l f

urthe r t e sti fi e d th a t, e ve n if he ha d b e e n a

ble to loc a te Mr

. He nd e rs on , the a lib i de fe ns e was “ totally

inconsistent” with the Petitioner’s sig ned conf ession, which stated that he shot t he victim in self-defe nse.
The lea d trial counsel state d that he advise s any acc used t hat he has the rig ht to testify and that “[n] obody

can ta ke that rig ht away .” F urther, he stated that he w ill provide h i s opinion on whether a def endant should testify

but reminds him that he does not “ha ve to follow it.” L ead trial counsel stated that he per formed a voir dire examination of the Petitioner in ope n court a nd asked the “whole litany ” o f q u es t i o n s about “whe ther or not y ou’re g oing to testify ” and w hether the decision is of “[his] own fre e will.” The lead counsel testified that the Petitioner then answe red that he chose not to testify

on his own behalf. In conclusion, the lea d trial counsel wa s asked whe ther-4-

the outco m e o f the ca se would have been dif fer ent had the Petitioner te stified. L ead trial counsel opined that “[h]e probably would have be en sitting on de ath row.”

Trial co-c ounsel testified that she assisted the lead co-c ounsel in the Petitioner’s ca s e by be ing pr e se nt at th e ini tia l in take , b y dis c us sin g the c a se a t th e mon thl y me e tin g s, a nd by

sit tin g in at trial. Trial co-c ounsel said that she “discuss[ ed] the facts of t he case, the investigation, [and the] trial strateg ies” with lea d counsel. Trial co-counsel testified that the lead c ounsel was ultimately the decision-make r but that he ha d any assistance he nee ded fr om co-c ounsel and the public de fende r capital attorney s

. T ri al l ea d counsel stated that this was cruc ial in preve nting the Petitioner f rom r e c e i v i n g t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y.
The a ppellate c ounsel testified that she notified the Petitioner of the proc ess of dire ct appe al and explained that she c ould raise issues fr om the motion for a new trial, issues of sentenc ing, and issues amounting t o p l ai n er ror. The Petitioner did not respond with any specific contentions or issues he wished to ra ise. The a ppellate c ounsel said that she then prepa red and filed the brief

and sent a c opy

to the Petitioner. The appellate counsel said that she chose to only prese nt one issue on appea l—the suffi ci ency

of the e vidence —beca

use she did not believethe other issues we re me ri toriou s.
Stand ard of Review To sustain a petition for post-c onviction relief, a Petitioner must prove his or he r fa ctual alleg ations by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e at a n evidentiary hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ); Momon v. State, 18 S.W .3d 152, 156 (Tenn. 1999) . Upon re view, this Court will not reweig h or re -eva luate the e vidence below; all questions c oncerning the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the weig ht and value to be g iven their testimony , and the f actua l issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e to be resolved by

the trial j udg e, not the appellate courts. See Mom on, 18 S.W .3d at 156; Henley v. State, 96 0 S. W.2 d 5 72 , 5 78 -7 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . T he tr ial ju dg e ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t ona pe tit ionfo r p os tconviction re lief ar e af

for d ed t h e we i gh t of a jury verdic t and ar e conc lusive on appea l unless the evidenc e preponderates ag ainst those finding s. See Momon, 18 S.W .3d at 156; Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 578.

I. DU E P RO CE SS F ir st, the Pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t hi s tw o a pp oin te d tria l a tto rn e y s d i d n o t a s s i s t him su ff ic ie ntl y to c omp ly wi th R ule 13 of the Rul e s of the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt , the re by de privi ng him of his Fourteenth Amendment rig ht to due proce ss. We conclude that the Petitioner’ s repr esentation was
a de qu a te un de r thedu e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e me nt o f the F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt.

I n Powell v. Alabama , 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the United States Supre me Court held that trial
c ou ns e l mu st b e app oin te d in a c apit a l c a se to c omp ly wi th the F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt’ s d ue pr oc e ss protec t i o n

. I d

. at 7 1; McKeldin v. State, 516 S.W.2d 82, 26 (Tenn. 1974). “T he Constituti on’s g uara ntee of

assistance of counse l cannot be satisfied by mere fo rm al appoint ment.” Ave ry v. Al aba ma , 30 8 U. S. 44 4, 44 6 (1 94 0)

. Ho we ve r, the Sixth A me nd me nt r e qu ir e me nts are sa tis fi e d if counsel a dvocate s in a “zealous and e arne st ” m an n er and actively participates in repr esenting the-5-

acc used. I d

. Fu rt h ermore, the Six th Amendment criteria a re me t so long a s counsel is g iven adequate time and notice to ha ve a g enuine opportunityto prepa re the Petitioner’s ca se. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.

Rule 13 of the Rules of the Te nnessee Supreme Court re quires that the trial court “ appoint two attorney s to repre sent a Petitioner in a c apital ca se. . .

. T h e co u nsel appointed shall be de sig nate d ‘ le a d c ou ns e l’ a nd‘c o- c ou ns e l.’ ” Te nn . Su p. Ct. R. 1 3 § 3( a ). Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court’s qualifications for lead counsel and co-counsel in a death-pena lty trial are set forth in the rule

. See Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 13 § 3(c)- (d).

I n th is c a se , th e Pe tit ion e r w a s n ot d e nie d h is F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt right t o d ue pr oc e ss of la w b e c a us e he wa s a

pp ointed com peten t c ou ns e l to re pr e se nt h im i n h is c apit a l mu rd e r t ri a l. Th e re is n o p ro of in the re c or d whi c h s ho ws that th e app oin te d atto rn e y s w e re no t g ive n a mpl e tim e an d opportunity

to prepa re the Petitioner’s ca se for trial. Further, the r ecor d shows that the trial attorney s advocated ea

rnestly on the Petitioner’s beha lf, including succe ssfully convincing the jury not to impos e the de ath penalty

. Although the trial court did not make spe cific c onclusions of law reg arding the Petitioner’s due proce ss claim, t he record shows no constitutional deficienc y of trial
c ou ns e l.

With re g ardto the Pe tit ion e r’ s a sse rt ionthat th e tw o app oin te d tria l a tto rn e y s d id n ot c omp ly with Rule 13 of the R ules of t he Tennessee Supreme Court, the P etitioner cites no authority , and we
are a wa re of no ne, se tti ng fo rth th a t th e he ig hte ne d s ta nd ard s o f R ule 13 are c on sti tut ion a lly mandated. T he F ourtee nth A m en d m en t g uidelines simplyrequire the appointment of a n attorney to a ca p i t al P etitioner. While the Tennesse e SupremeCourt has put into place he ighte ned
re qu ir e me nts in R ule 13 , in c lud ing the re qu ir e me nts of tw o atto rn e y s th a t me e t c e rt a in s pe c if ic elig ib il it y criteria, the attorne y s need not mee t these string ent standar ds to pass constitutional mus ter. Th e re fo re , w e c on c lud e that the Pe tit ion e r ha s not sho wn by c le ar an d co nv inc ing e vid e nc e that hi s c on vic tio n o ff

e nd e d th e F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt. II. EQU AL P RO TEC TIO N Next, the Petit ioner as s er t s that he wa s denied his Fourteenth Amendme nt rig ht to equal protec tion under the United States Constit ution. Specifica lly , the Petitioner alleg es that his trial coc o u n s e l’ s f

a il u r e to b e in v o lv e d in h is d e f e n s e d e p r iv e d h im o f

h is e q u a l p r o te c ti o n g u ar a n te e

. We
c on c lud e thi s is su e do e s n ot h a ve me ri t.

The Appellant relies on Doug las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 ( 1963), for the proposition that the United States Supreme Court h as found a right to counse l on direct a ppeal unde r the e qual protec tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I d. Whil e the Petitioner ha s acc urate ly stated the
c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nts fo r a pp e llate c ou ns e l, the Pe tit ion e r h a s n ot a lle g e d a ny ina de qu a te perf ormanc e of appellate counsel. There fore , we conclude that the P etitioner has waived this issue by failing to provide the c ourt with fac tual support for the c laim that appell at e co u n s el was not constitutionallysufficie nt. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-30-106( d); Tenn. R. App. P. 10(b).-6-

III . TH E IN EF F EC TIV E A SSIST AN CE OF CO UN SEL Finally , the Petitioner asserts that he r e c e iv e d the ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel as re quired by the Six th A mendment to the United States Constit ution. Specifically , the Petitioner alleg es he was de prived of this rig ht in four way s: (1) the failure of c o-counse l to “actively participate in the defe nse”; (2) the fa ilure to ade quately “mee t with and communicate” with the Petitioner; (3) the failure to “prope rly

advise” the Petitioner in making his decision on whether to testify ; and (4) the failure to “consider , i nvestig ate, a nd prese nt alibi witnesses.” We conc lude that the Petitioner’s
c la ims are wi tho ut m e ri t.

The Six th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and arti cl e I , s ec t ion 9 of the Tenne ssee Constitution guar antee a criminal Petit ioner the r ight to re prese ntation by

counsel. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) ; B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)

. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Tenne ssee Supre me Court have r ecog nized that the rig ht to such repr esentation include s the rig ht to “re asonably eff ective” assistance , that is, within t he rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in c riminal case s. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461; Baxt er, 523 S.W.2d at 936.

A l a wy e r’ s a ssi sta nc e to h is o r h e r c lie nt i s in e ff e c tiv e if the la wy e r’s con du ct “so undermined the proper

functioning of the a dversa rial proc ess that the trial c annot be rel ied on as having produce d a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. This over all standard is c omprised of tw o c omp on e nts : de fi c ie nt p e rf orma nc e by

the Pe tit ion e r ’ s l a w y e r

an d a c tua l pr e jud ic e to the de fe ns e cause d by the def icient performanc e. See id. at 687; Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 461. The Petitioner be ars the burde n of establishing both of these c omponents by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) ; Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461. The Petitioner’s failure to prove e ither defic iency

or pre judice is a suff

icient basis upon which to deny relief on an ineffec tive assistance of counsel c laim. See B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461; Goad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996)

.
Th is t wo -p art

sta nd ardof

me a su ri ng ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l a lso app lie s to c la ims arising out of a g uilty plea. See Hill v. L ockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). The prejudice component is modified such t h at the Petitioner “must show that there is a rea sonable proba bilitythat, but for counsel’s e rror s, he would not ha ve pleade d g uiltyand would have insisted on going to trial.” I d. at 59; see a lso Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.
I n evaluating a

lawy er’ s perf

ormanc e, the r eviewing court u s es an objective standar d of “re asonable ness.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; B urns, 6 S.W .3d at 462. The r eviewing court must be highly

defe rential to counsel’s choice s “and should indulg e a strong presumption that counsel’s c onduct fa lls withi n th e wi d e ra ng e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W. 3 d a t 4 6 2 ; s e e a ls o Str ic k lan d , 4 6 6 U

. S. a t 6 8 9

. T h e c o u r t s h o u ld n o t u s e the benef it of hindsight to second- g u es s t ri al strateg y or to criticize counse l’s tactics, see Hellar d v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) , and counsel’s alleg ed errors should be judg ed in light of all the fa cts and circ umstances a s of the time they wer e made , see Strickland, 466 U .S. at 690; Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.-7-

A trial court’s determination of an i neff ective assistance of

counsel c laim presents a

mix ed qu e sti on of

la w a ndfa c t on app e a l. S e e F ie lds v. Sta te , 4 0 S. W.3 d 450 , 45 8 (Tenn . 2 00 1) . T his Court r eviews the trial court’ s findings of fac t with reg ard to the e ffe ctiveness of counsel unde r a de novo standard, a ccompa nied with a pre sumption t hat those finding s ar e co rre ct unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise . See id. “How ever , a trial c ou rt ’s conc lusions of law—such a s whether

counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient or w hether that defic ien cywas prejudicia l—are revie wed unde r a pur ely de n o v o s ta

n d a r d , w it hn o presumption of cor

rec tness g iven to the trial court’ s conclusions.” I d.
(1 ) L e ad Tr ial Co unse l’ s F ail ur e to M e e t a nd P r ope r ly A dvi se F ir st, the Pe tit ion e r a lle g e s th a t tr ia l c ou ns e l faile d to a de qu a te ly me e t wi th andc ommun ic a te with him. W e concl u d e t h at t he Petitioner did not prove his fa ctual asse rtions by clea r and convincing evidenc e.
The re cord e stablishes that trial counsel performe d an ini tial intake interview , met with the Pe tit ion e r at th e ja il thr ou g ho ut the repr e se ntatio n, a ndc on du c te d th e tr ia l. T he Pe tit ion e r’ s o nly
assertion of deficient performanc e is that lead tria l counsel did not aid him in preparing to testify on his ow n b e ha lf . T he Pe tit ion e r a lle g e s that his le a d tr ia l c ou ns e l di d n ot h a ve “ e no ug h ti me ” to a ssi st the Petitioner sufficie ntly

so that he would be a benef icial wit ness. The S tate point s out that the lead counsel thoug ht that the Petitioner showed combative, ang ry , and ag g ressive tendenc ies which the ju r y l i k e l y w o u l d h a v e s e e n f r o m h i s t e s t i m o n y

. T h e l e a d tr i a l c o u n s e l e xp l a i n e d a t th e po stc on vic ti o n h e ar i n g t h a t , i n h i s o p i n i o n , t h e P e t i t i o n e r s h o u l d n o th a v e t e s t i f

i e da ttr i a l b e c a u s e h is violent de meanor may g ive the jury the impression that he was g uilty and had no remorse

. L ead counsel further e x plained his d ec i s i o n t o advise the Petitioner not to testify by opining that, if the Petitioner had chose n to do so, “[h] e would proba bly be sitting on de ath row.”

The Petitioner has not proven by clea r and convincing evidenc e that the lea d trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e wa s constitutionallydefic ient. I t is clear f rom the record that lead trial c ounsel made a tac tical dec ision to di scoura g e the Petitio n er fr o m t est ify ing be cause he believe d the Petitioner would be a poor

witness. Further, the Petit ioner personally waived his right to testify at trial af ter lead tria l counsel informe d him of his rights during the voir dire proce dure. Thus, we conclude that the Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidenc e that his attorney was inef fec tive by
a d v i s i n g h i mn o tt o t e s t i f

y. (2) Lead Trial Counsel’s Failure t o Consid er, Invest igate, and Pr esent Alibi Witnesses Next, the Petit ioner a lle g es that lea d counsel failed to investigate and pr esent his alibi witness, Holly wood Hende rson. We conclude that this iss u e i s wi t h out merit because counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s not deficient. We also note t hat t he witness did not testify at the post-convic tion h ea ri n g.

Th e re c ord of the p os t- c on vic tio n h e ari ng re fl e c ts that tr ia l c ou ns e l in str

uc te d th e pu bli c defe nder’ s capital c ase i n v est igator to look for the a ddress of H olly wood Hende rson. Further,
c ou ns e l te sti fi e d that he su bp oe na e d Ho lly wo od He nd e rs on bu t that the pr oc e ss s e rv e r f ou ndon ly-8-

a vac ant lot at the addr ess that the Petitioner had pr ovided. Furthermore , lead tria l c ounsel testified at t h e p o s t-conviction hea ring that the alibi defe nse wa s irrec oncilably inconsistent with the Petitioner’s confe ssion that he committed the shooting in self- defe nse. Ther ef o re , even if

trial counsel had been able to loc ate the alibi w itness, the rec ord ref lects that alibi testimony

could have been ha rmful to the Petitioner’s ca se. There fore , we conclude that the Petitioner did not pr esent c lear
a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e that tria l c ou ns e l’ s p e rf orma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt.

I n addition, “[w] hen a pe titioner contends that trial c ounsel failed to discove r, interview , or prese nt witnesses . . . , these witnesses should be presented by the [ post-conviction] petitioner at the
e vid e nti ary

he ari ng .” B la c k v . St a te , 7 94 S.W. 2d75 2, 75 7 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 0)

. I f he fails to do so, he g ener ally

fails to establish ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. I d. The post-conviction court may not spe culate “on the question of

. . . what a witness’s testimony might have been if introduced” at trial. I d.; see a ls o W ad e v. State, 914 S.W .2d 97, 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . Be cause the
a lle g e d a lib i w itn e ss d id n ot t e sti fy a t th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , th e Pe tit ion e r d id n ot d e mon str a te he wa s p re

jud ic e d b y

the wi tne ss’ s f

a ilu re to t e sti fy

a t th e tr ia l.
(3) Trial Co-C ouns el’s Re presentat ion F ina lly , the Pe tit ion e r a lle g e s that he re c e ive d the ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l be c aus e his appointed co-c ounsel did not sufficiently participate i n his case

. We conclude that this i ssue does
no t g a in the Pe tit ion e r r e lie f b e c a us e the qu a lit y of le a d c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n a lon e is constitutionallysufficie nt.

The Petitioner cites no authority , and we are awa re of none, that the Si x th Amendment
re qu ir e s mu lti ple a tto rn e y s f or the re pr e se ntatio n o f a c apit a l Pe tit ion e r t o b e c on sti tut ion a lly sufficie nt. I n this case, the Petitioner r ece i v ed t h e ef fective assistance of counse l by the dilige nt perf ormanc e of his lea d counsel alone. The Petitioner also had the be nefit of ha ving the assistance of an e x perie nced c o-counse l to further aid him dur i n g h is trial. There fore , we c onclude that the Petitioner did not prove by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that he suf fer ed a Sixt h Amendment violation. The rec ord supports t he trial court’s conc lusion that the Petit ioner re ceive d the ef fec tive
a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l.

Conclusion Ba sed on the for eg oing a

uthorities and re asoning , this Court affirms the judg ment of the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE