In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 01-2307 & 01-2791

Lyne Brunt, David Wadinski

and John Wittenberg,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Cross-Appellees,

v.

Service Employees International Union

and Dan Iverson,

Defendants-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 00-C-317--Lynn Adelman, Judge.

Argued January 16, 2002--Decided March 21, 2002

 Before Bauer, Rovner and Williams, Circuit

Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. Appellants Lyne

Brunt, David Wadinski and John Wittenberg

filed suit against Service Employees

International Union and Union President

Dan Iverson, complaining of violations of

the Labor Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and state law

because Iverson terminated Appellants’

employment when they refused to support

Iverson’s re-election as union president.

The district court granted the Union’s

Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss the case and

denied Appellants’ motion for leave to

amend their complaint. The district court

also denied the Union’s motion for Rule

11 sanctions against Appellants’ counsel.

Both parties now appeal the district

court’s rulings. For the following

reasons, we affirm the decisions of the

district court.

BACKGROUND

 Brunt, Wadinski and Wittenberg were

full-time members of the Union. They were

also employed by the Union as union

representatives and their

responsibilities included settling and

arbitrating grievances, negotiating labor
agreements and representing the Union in

organization campaigns. In addition, in

late 1997, Brunt was promoted to

assistant to the union president. In this

capacity, her additional duties included

assisting other union representatives in

bargaining, as well as overseeing

troubled facilities. Brunt, Wadinski and

Wittenberg each paid their union dues and

as a result, they were entitled to the

full benefits of union protection

regarding the terms and conditions of

their employment.

 In the spring of 1998, Union President

Dan Iverson ran for re-election. Iverson

told union members that anyone who ran

against him in the presidential election

would be fired. Wadinski ran against

Iverson in the election. Wittenberg

refused to support Iverson and instead,

openly supported Wadinski. Iverson asked

Brunt for her support, but she refused.

Instead, Brunt informed Iverson that she

intended to remain "neutral" in the

election. Iverson responded that Brunt’s

"neutral" stance was a dangerous position

that could have "possible repercussions"

for her future career.

 In May of 1998, the union membership reelected Iverson as Union President.

Wadinski and Wittenberg were discharged

at Iverson’s direction on June 29, 1998

because they had challenged him in the

presidential election. Brunt was

discharged on August 21, 1998 because of

her decision to remain neutral in the

election. Appellants’ request for a

grievance hearing from the Union was

denied.

 On March 2, 2000, Brunt filed a

complaint in federal court, charging the

Union and Iverson with violating Title I

of LMRDA. The complaint asserted that

Brunt was terminated from her position as

an appointed union representative for

exercising her rights to free speech and

that this discipline resulted in the

termination of her rights and status as a

union member. In June, Brunt amended her

complaint, adding Wadinski and Wittenberg

as plaintiffs.

 On April 18, 2001, the district court

granted the Union’s Rule 12(c) motion to

dismiss Appellants’ complaint. The court

found that the instant case was

indistinguishable from Finnegan v. Leu,
456 U.S. 431 (1982), in which the United

States Supreme Court held that LMRDA does

not restrict the power of a union

president to hire his or her own staff.

The district court also denied

Appellants’ motion for leave to amend

their complaint to add an additional

LMRDA violation.

 On April 30, 2001, the Union moved for

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs

incurred in defending this litigation on

the grounds that the Appellants’ claims

were not warranted by either existing law

or a non-frivolous argument for the

extension of existing law. The district

court denied the motion. This appeal and

cross-appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal of Appellants’ Complaint

 Appellants first argue that the district

court erred in granting the Union’s Rule

12(c) motion to dismiss the complaint on

the grounds that Finnegan barred their

claim. Under Rule 12(c), a party can move

for judgment on the pleadings after the

filing of both the complaint and answer.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court will grant

a Rule 12(c) motion only when it appears

beyond a doubt that the plaintiff cannot

prove any facts to support a claim for

relief and the moving party demonstrates

that there are no material issues of fact

to be resolved. N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor

Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163

F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). We review

a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(c)

motion de novo. Id.

 Title 1, section 101(a)(2) of LMRDA

grants union members the rights of

freedom of speech and assembly, including

the right to "express any views,

arguments or opinions." 29 U.S.C. sec.

411(a)(2). In addition, section 609

provides that a union and its officers

may not fine, suspend, expel or otherwise

discipline any union members for

exercising such rights to free speech and

assembly. 29 U.S.C. sec. 529. Appellants

claim that they were subject to unlawful

discipline under these provisions when

Iverson ordered their termination.

 In Finnegan v. Leu, the United States

Supreme Court examined the language of

LMRDA and held that sections 101 and 609
"[do] not restrict freedom of an elected

union leader to choose a staff whose

views are compatible with his own."

Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441. The Court

noted that nothing in the language of

LMRDA or the legislative history suggests

that it was intended to address the issue

of union patronage; rather, LMRDA’s

objective was "to ensure that unions

would be democratically governed and

responsive to the will of the union

membership." Id. The Court concluded that

"the ability of an elected union

president to select his own

administrators is an integral part of

ensuring a union administration’s

responsiveness to the mandate of the

union election." Id.

 In Hodge v. Local Union 695, 707 F.2d

961 (7th Cir. 1983), we reviewed a LMRDA

claim and reiterated the Supreme Court’s

holding in Finnegan. The claimant in

Hodge asserted that she was wrongfully

dismissed from her union employment when

she failed to openly support the union’s

new administration. The district court

dismissed her claim and we affirmed. In

so doing, we determined that the union

leadership discharged her because her

views were incompatible with the new

administration’s policy and Finnegan

plainly allows union leadership to act on

such a conviction. Id. at 964. Further,

we noted that the Finnegan holding

applies even where the union employee

simply remained neutral, rather than

openly campaigning against a new union

administration. Id.

 In the instant case, Appellants argue

that their rights under LMRDA were

violated when they were discharged from

their positions for their refusal to

support Iverson in the union elections.

We agree with the district court that

this case falls squarely within the

mandates of Finnegan and Hodge. As

president of the Union, Iverson could

legally terminate Appellants’ employment

for their failure to support his reelection. As we stated in Hodge, even if

Brunt did not openly oppose Iverson’s

campaign, Iverson was still within the

legal boundaries when he discharged her

for refusing to support him. Finnegan

makes clear that when union membership

has elected a leader, that leader has a

right to select his own employees.

Accordingly, the district court properly
dismissed Appellants’ complaint.

 Nevertheless, Appellants assert that

their case is distinguishable from

Finnegan and Hodge because when Iverson

terminated their employment, their status

as union members was terminated as well.

They argue that because Finnegan only

permits the Union to affect or terminate

their employment, not their membership

status as a whole, they were improperly

disciplined under section 609 and their

complaint sets forth a valid cause of

action. This argument is unpersuasive.

 Appellants are correct in their

assertion that section 609 prohibits any

discipline or retaliation that affects a

union member’s rights or status, but any

effect Iverson’s actions had on

Appellants’ status as union members was

merely incidental and does not fall

within the scope of prohibited activity

in section 609. As Union President,

Iverson had the right to remove

Appellants from their positions in

hisadministration and that right is not

affected by the fact that Appellants’

union memberships were also terminated.

Discharge from union employment does not

violate LMRDA even if it has an indirect

effect on union membership rights.

Finnegan, 435 U.S. at 440-41. Appellants

lost their union membership only because

it was wholly contingent on their union

employment, not because Iverson or the

Union terminated their membership status.

The district court properly held that

Iverson is not liable for any incidental

consequences of his legal acts.

B. Leave to Amend the Complaint

 Appellants also argue that the district

court erred when it denied their motion

for leave to amend their complaint. They

insist that leave was necessary in the

interest of justice because the

additional claim stated a new, valid

theory of liability that would have

precluded dismissal of the complaint. We

disagree.

 Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend

a pleading shall be freely given when

justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

However, this right is not absolute and

is appropriately denied when, among other

reasons, the amendment would be futile.

Wilson v. Am. Trans Air, Inc., 874 F.2d
386, 392 (1989). Moreover, the decision

to grant or deny a motion to file an

amended pleading is a matter purely

within the sound discretion of the

district court. J.D. Marshall Int’l Inc.

v. Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 819 (7th

Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a district

court’s denial of a Rule 15(c) motion

will be overturned on appeal only if it

is shown that the district court abused

its discretion by refusing to grant the

leave without any justifying reason. Id.

 Appellants moved to amend their

complaint to add factual allegations and

assert a violation of section 102 of

Title I of LMRDA. This section permits

any union member to sue for relief if he

or she was discharged as part of a

purposeful and deliberate attempt to

suppress dissent within the union. See,

e.g., Stroud v. Senese, 832 F.Supp. 1206,

1213 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Appellants argue

that they have set forth a valid

retaliatory cause of action because the

Union discharged them in order to

intimidate other union members and stifle

any dissent.

 We find Appellants’ argument that the

amended complaint asserts a new theory of

liability to be without merit.

Appellants’ proposed amendment merely

adds several factual allegations to their

central claim that they were terminated

for not supporting Iverson’s re-election.

We agree with the district court that

even with these additional factual

allegations, the complaint fails to

support a claim under section 102. The

amended complaint added allegations that

Iverson made various ultimatums regarding

the Appellants’ refusal to support his

re-election; however, these additions do

not amount to a showing of a pattern of

stifling dissent within the union. In

fact, these ultimatums were precisely

what the Finnegan holding grants Iverson

the right to do, i.e., fire any employees

on the basis of their disloyalty to him.

Nothing in LMRDA subjects him to

liability for such ultimatums. Because

Appellants’ amended complaint would not

survive a motion to dismiss, the

amendment would be futile and the

district court was well within its

discretion in refusing to grant leave to

amend.

C. Sanctions
 Finally, the Union argues on crossappeal that the district court erred in

refusing to impose Rule 11 sanctions

against Appellants. The Union insists

that because Appellants’ complaint

contradicts existing case law, they

failed to set forth a non-frivolous

argument and sanctions are warranted. We

review the district court’s decision to

impose Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of

discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax

Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).

 Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to

ensure that any papers filed with the

court are well-grounded in fact, legally

tenable, and not interposed for any

improper purpose. Id. at 392. The rule is

principally designed to prevent baseless

filings. Id. Sanctions will be imposed if

counsel files a complaint with improper

motives or without adequate

investigation. Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l

Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989).

Even "objectively frivolous filings

support but do not compel an inference of

unreasonable investigation." Id. at 933.

 We agree with the district court that

the circumstances in this case do not

warrant sanctions. Although Appellants’

claims were barred by existing Supreme

Court and Seventh Circuit case law, it

does not follow that sanctions must be

imposed. Appellants did attempt to

distinguish their case from Finnegan and

Hodge, and we defer to the district

court’s finding that Appellants’

complaint was not so frivolous that Rule

11 sanctions are warranted.

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the

judgment of the district court.