alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Susan BAKER, individually and as surviving mother of Sarah Baker, deceased; Jesse Bishop, individually, Plaintiffs—Appellants, v. SAN CARLOS IRRIGATION PROJECT DISTRICT, an agency/subsidiary of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a division of the Department of Interior, United States Federal Government, Defendant—Appellee.

No. 02-15086.

D.C. No. CV-00-02380-SRB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 13, 2003.

Decided Feb. 21, 2003.

Before NOONAN, THOMAS and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM*

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss their negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for lack of sub*304ject matter jurisdiction. The facts and proceedings are familiar to the parties.

A determination of whether the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applies is reviewed de novo. *See McGraw v. United States,*281 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir.2002), *amended by*298 F.3d 754 (9th Cir.2002). The court’s factual findings relevant to its determination of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed for clear error. *See United States v. Peninsula Communications, Inc.,*287 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir.2002). All uncontroverted factual assertions regarding jurisdiction are taken as true, while all contested assertions must be construed in favor of the plaintiff. *See McGraw,*281 F.3d at 1001.

To consider whether the action taken by the San Carlos Irrigation Project District — or not taken, as is the case here — is a matter of choice, the court must look to the regulations governing Native American electric power utilities, 25 C.F.R. Part 175 §§ 175.1 to 175.62 (1997). These regulations state that a utility shall “[cjonstruct and operate facilities in accordance with accepted industry practice.” 25 C.F.R. § 175.24(b). Although “accepted industry practice” is not defined in the regulations, § 175.24(b) places a specific, mandatory obligation on the government. The definition of accepted industry practice can be easily ascertained by the district court.

Plaintiffs have submitted an affidavit from engineer Robert E. Witter that the accepted industry practice requires “plac[ing] warning markers at the site of any aircraft strike.” The government, which bears the burden of proof that the discretionary function applies, has neither disputed this affidavit nor offered any evidence at all. As all uncontroverted factual assertions regarding jurisdiction must be taken as true, the district court must assume, on the current record, that accepted industry practice is as plaintiffs maintain. The application of the discretionary function exception at this stage is unwarranted.

As the government failed to meet its burden under 12(b)(1), the district court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction was erroneous. The grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss is REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

Carlos Morales, et al.

v. NH Civil No. 05-ds-114-JD

PR Civil No. 04-1760

Puerto Rico Department

of Education, et al.

O R D E R

Counsel for the defendants, Kristine Burgos Santiago,

Federal Litigation Division, Department of Justice, filed a

motion to inform the court of her annual leave, which includes a

week in April, the month of July, and a week in November. She

asks the court not to schedule hearings or conferences during the

time that she plans to be on leave and to grant her an automatic

extension of fifteen days to respond to any motion that is filed

during her six weeks of leave. 

The court declines to conform its schedule to accommodate

counsel’s vacation plans. The court expects counsel to make

arrangements for coverage by another attorney in order to comply

with the defendants’ obligations and the court’s deadlines,

orders, and proceedings. The defendants have delayed this case

by failing to comply with other court deadlines and orders and

further delay is not justified or appropriate. 

The defendants have also filed a motion for leave to file

the transcript of the administrative hearing in Spanish. The

defendants represent that the translation would be filed as soon

Case 1:05-ds-00114-JD Document 26 Filed 03/31/06 Page 1 of 2
2

as it is ready. The defendants have not indicated when the

English translation would be filed. Filing the transcript in

Spanish will do nothing to advance the case or to meet the

defendants’ obligations stated in the order issued on November

21, 2005.

 “It is well settled that federal litigation in Puerto Rico

must be conducted in English.” Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family

Dep’t, 377 F.3d 81, 88 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also D.P.R.R. 10(b). The defendants were ordered

to produce the transcript in December of 2005. Three months

later the defendants still are not prepared to comply with the

order, and default has been entered against them. Therefore, the

motion is denied. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion seeking

scheduling accommodations (document no. 24) and motion to file a

document in Spanish (document no. 22) are denied.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

 (Sitting by designation.)

March 31, 2006

cc: Jose E. Cespedes-Sabater, Esquire

Alfredo Fernandez-Martinez

Kristine Burgos Santiago, Esquire

USDC-PR, Clerk

Case 1:05-ds-00114-JD Document 26 Filed 03/31/06 Page 2 of 2
184 La. 172

#### MILNER v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. et al.

No. 33713.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 6, 1936.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1936.

P. M. Milner, of New Orleans, in pro. per.

St. Clair Adams & Son, of New Orleans, for respondents.

BRUNOT, Justice.

On the application of relator, this court issued a writ of certiorari, coupled with a stay order, and it ordered the trial judge and both defendants to show cause on December 2, 1935, why the relief prayed for by relator should not be granted. The orders of this court have been complied with, and the case is now submitted to us for review. . • ■

The real issue presented to us is whether or not, after exceptions filed by the defendants in the trial court have been overruled, the defendants must file their answers to the suit within two days thereafter, or the trial judge may, in his discretion, grant the defendants further time to file additional exceptions or pleas. The relator relies’upon section 9 of article IX of the Rules of the Civil District Court for the parish of Orleans. We quote the section:

> “Section 9. When an exception is overruled or referred to the merits the defendant shall file his answer before the opening of the Court within two days, or judgment by default may be taken unless, for good reasons shown, the, Judge may grant a longer delay.”

In this case no application was made to the judge to grant a longer delay within which to answer the suit, but, on the application of defendants, a delay of twelve days was granted to them within which time to file additional pleas. The granting of suelva delay to file further pleas was in violation of the quoted section of the court’s rules, and justified the relator’s application to this court for the exercise of its supervisory powers. Under the quoted section of the court’s rules, it is discretionary with the judge to grant additional time, for good reasons shown, within which to answer a suit after exceptions have been filed, heard, and overruled, or referred to the merits, but he has no discretion thereafter to grant applicants therefor additional time for any other purpose.

A number of incidental issues have been presented in the application and the returns filed in the record, but the decision is not dependent upon any of them, and we therefore dismiss them without comment.

For the reasons assigned, the writ issued by this court is perpetua’ted, the trial judge is prohibited from trying the defendants’ exceptions and rule which are complained of in relator’s application, and the relator’s prayer for a mandamus compelling him to fix a reasonable time within which the defendants may answer the relator’s suit is granted. The cost of these proceedings are to be paid by respondents Maryland Casualty Company and E. F. Nine, Jr.

O’NIELL, C. J., and ODOM, J., dissent.
#### Mrs. Louise A. GUILBEAU, Wife of Jos. A. Sibille, v. HIGHWAY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS et al.

No. 2493.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

March 24, 1943.

Davidson & Davidson, of Lafayette, for appellant.

H. L. Guilbeau and Pavy & Pavy, all of Opelousas, for appellees.

LE BLANC, Judge.

For the reasons stated in the opinion .this day handed down in the suit of Joseph A. Sibille v. Highway Insurance Underwriters, La.App., 12 So.2d 625, it is ordered that the judgment appealed from herein be, and the same is now hereby, reversed, avoided and set aside, and it is further ordered that there be judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, Mrs. Joseph A. Sibille, dismissing her suit and rej ecting her demands at her costs.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

JAMES SLOMAN, on behalf of himself and 

all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

PRESSTEK, INC., EDWARD J. MARINO 

and MOOSA E. MOOSA,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:06-cv-377-JL

PLAINTIFF’S CONSENTED TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL 

OF SETTLEMENT AND OF PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER

Plaintiff, with the consent of Defendants, moves that the Court grant preliminary 

approval to the settlement agreed to by the parties and enter the proposed Order of Preliminary 

Approval (hereafter “Proposed Order”), submitted as Exhibit A to the Stipulation of Settlement.

Plaintiff further moves that a hearing on final approval of the settlement pursuant to Rule 

23 be scheduled on a date convenient to the court during the week of July 20, 2009, or such other 

date near thereto as is convenient to the Court. See ¶ 8 of the Proposed Order.

Plaintiff further moves that the deadline for class members to request exclusion, as 

provided in ¶ 6 of the Proposed Order, be no later than 14 days prior to the date for the final 

approval hearing.

Finally, Plaintiff moves that the deadline for Class Members to submit Proof of Claim 

forms, as provided in paragraph 11 of the Proposed Order be 150 days from the date of the 

Proposed Order.

Case 1:06-cv-00377-JL Document 85 Filed 03/11/2009 Page 1 of 2
Dated: March 10, 2009 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mark L. Mallory .

Mark L. Mallory (Bar No. 1599)

mark@malloryandfriedman.com

MALLORY & FRIEDMAN, PLLC

8 Green Street

Concord, NH 03301

(603) 228-2277

Thomas G. Shapiro, Pro hac vice

tshapiro@shulaw.com

SHAPIRO HABER & URMY LLP

53 State Street

Boston, MA 02109

(617) 439-3939

Attorneys for Lead Plaintiff

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that this document(s) filed through the ECF system will be sent 

electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) 

on March 11, 2009.

/s/ Mark L. Mallory 

Mark L. Mallory

Case 1:06-cv-00377-JL Document 85 Filed 03/11/2009 Page 2 of 2
33

C.2. Expected Farm Loan Volume for the Next Quarter, Compared with a Year EarlierPercent

Purpose of loan

Total Feeder cattle Dairy Crop storage Operating 

Quarter Lower Same Higher Lower Same Higher Lower Same Higher Lower Same Higher Lower Same Hig

Seventh (Chicago) Federal Reserve District (IL*, IN*, IA, MI*, WI*)

2002: Q1... 19 54 27 25 68 7 20 72 8 27 67 6 11 49 

 Q2... 18 63 19 32 64 3 20 73 7 28 65 6 12 60  Q3... 23 54 23 32 64 3 26 67 7 25 69 6 16 49  Q4... 19 58 23 21 70 9 20 74 6 23 73 4 14 50 2003: Q1... 23 53 24 19 73 8 24 71 5 26 72 2 14 46  Q2... 18 65 18 17 78 6 19 75 6 23 71 5 9 63  Q3... 17 61 22 22 65 13 17 78 5 21 71 8 11 60  Q4... 15 58 27 31 59 10 13 80 7 17 76 8 11 54 2004: Q1... 13 56 31 20 71 10 15 73 12 11 71 18 16 50 

Eleventh (Dallas) Federal Reserve District (LA*, NM*, TX)

2002: Q1... 29 55 16 25 65 10 18 75 7 18 77 5 25 59 

 Q2... 29 60 11 37 58 5 20 74 6 20 74 6 23 58  Q3... 24 63 13 30 60 10 20 73 7 16 76 9 21 58  Q4... 22 66 12 26 58 15 19 75 6 18 76 6 20 64 2003: Q1... 20 67 13 22 69 10 14 84 3 11 85 4 16 67  Q2... 16 66 18 17 70 13 16 79 6 19 75 6 15 69  Q3... 17 72 12 16 65 19 14 81 6 12 85 3 11 76  Q4... 18 68 14 22 62 16 18 80 3 14 84 2 10 76 2004: Q1... 12 70 19 13 75 12 11 78 6 11 81 3 11 71 

Fifth (Richmond) Federal Reserve District (MD, NC, SC, VA, WV*)

2002: Q1... 19 70 11 16 76 8 20 72 8 18 79 4 21 69 

 Q2... 31 62 8 27 73 0 23 77 0 29 67 4 33 63  Q3... 30 57 13 22 78 0 22 78 0 21 63 16 33 59  Q4... 27 53 20 15 69 15 21 71 7 40 53 7 30 50 2003: Q1... 29 53 18 13 75 13 19 75 6 17 67 17 23 55  Q2... 25 60 15 24 71 6 31 63 6 6 78 17 19 71  Q3... 14 71 14 7 80 13 33 60 7 11 74 16 10 81  Q4... 21 74 5 12 82 6 17 78 6 15 75 10 14 82 2004: Q1... 10 81 10 17 61 22 24 71 6 23 68 9 12 76  * State falls only partly within the indicated Reserve District. Source. Federal Reserve Bank quarterly surveys of agricultural credit conditions at commercial banks.
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Sanchez Computer Associates, Inc. (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each ofthe undersigned officers, certifies, based on such officer’s knowledge,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/  FRANK R. SANCHEZ                            |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Frank R. SanchezChief Executive Officer  May 15, 2003 |
|                                                  |
|                                                  |
| /s/  TODD A. PITTMAN                             |   |
| Todd A. PittmanChief Financial Officer  May 15, 2003  |

 

----
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 07-cr-45-PB

John Douglas

O R D E R

The defendant, through counsel, has moved to continue the

trial scheduled for November 4, 2008, citing the need for

additional time to finalize a negotiated plea agreement. The

government does not object to a continuance of the trial date.

Accordingly, for the above reason and to allow the parties

additional time to properly prepare for trial, the court will

continue the trial from November 4, 2008 to January 6, 2009. In

agreeing to continue the trial, the court finds pursuant to 18

U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8)(A) that for the above-stated reasons, the

ends of justice served in granting a continuance outweigh the

best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 1:07-cr-00045-PB Document 174 Filed 10/30/08 Page 1 of 2
2

No further continuances.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

October 30, 2008

cc: Glenn Geiger, Esq.

Peter Papps, Esq.

United States Probation

United States Marshal

Case 1:07-cr-00045-PB Document 174 Filed 10/30/08 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Debbie Glaude

v. Case No. 07-cv-137-PB

Jeffrey Glaude

O R D E R

I herewith approve the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Muirhead dated October 11, 2007, no objection having been filed.

SO ORDERED.

December 10, 2007 /s/ Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

cc: Debbie Glaude, Pro se.

Case 1:07-cv-00137-PB Document 4 Filed 12/10/07 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM TRANSCRYPT
INT'L INC.'S CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATED
BALANCE SHEETS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          14,026
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,004
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      3,806
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                22,114
<PP&E>                                           6,975
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,962
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  28,036
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,141
<BONDS>                                          2,850
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            93
<OTHER-SE>                                      22,726
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    28,036
<SALES>                                          3,512
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,512
<CGS>                                            1,272
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,272
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,147
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (99)<F1>
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    169
<INCOME-TAX>                                        27
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       142
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .02
<FN>
<F1>INTEREST EXPENSE IS NET OF $125 INTEREST INCOME AND $49 OF INTEREST EXPENSE.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Michael Ledger

v. Case No. 06-cv-411-SM

Ryan LeVierge, et al.

NOTICE OF RULING

Re: (Document No. 44) Defendant’s Motion for

Reconsideration of Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment

Ruling: Denied. Defendants do not point to now-uncontested

material facts entitling them to judgment, but merely argue that

plaintiff's expert witnesses can be successfully exposed as

having gotten it wrong. Perhaps. Perhaps not. The jury will

decide what the facts are, and, as the record stands, there is a

genuine dispute as to material facts, one being whether plaintiff

suffered his injury as a result of a car accident or an

unwarranted application of physical force at the jail. 

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

January 13, 2009

cc: Michael J. Sheehan, Esq.

Elizabeth L. Hurley, Esq.

John A. Curran, Esq.

Case 1:06-cv-00411-SM Document 46 Filed 01/13/09 Page 1 of 1
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EXHIBIT 35.1



SERVICER
COMPLIANCE STATEMENT



Re: Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC, in its
capacity as Servicer (the “Servicer”) under the Amended and Restated Servicing Agreement, dated as of March 1,
2009, among Daimler Trust, as Titling Trust, Daimler Title Co., as Collateral Agent, and Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA
LLC, as Lender and as Servicer (the “Servicing Agreement”), and under the 2018-B Servicing Supplement, dated as
of November 1, 2018, among the same parties (the “Servicing Supplement”) for the period from November 20, 2018,
to December 31, 2018 (the “Reporting Period”)



I, Brian T. Stevens, certify that:



|(a) |  | A review of the Servicer’s activities during the Reporting Period and of its
performance under the Servicing Agreement and the Servicing Supplement has been made under my supervision.                                  
|--- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
|(b) |  | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all
of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement and the Servicing Supplement in all material respects throughout the Reporting
Period.



Dated: March 25, 2019



| | /s/ Brian T. Stevens                
| | ------------------------------------
| | Name: Brian T. Stevens              
| | Title: Vice President and Controller