* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

(continued...)

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

October 15, 2009

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

In re:

SAMUEL KENNEGTH BEAUMONT,

SR.,

Debtor.

SAMUEL KENNEGTH BEAUMONT,

SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN

AFFAIRS, United States of

America, ex rel.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 09-7006

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D.C. No. 6:08-CV-346-FHS)

Submitted on the briefs:*
*

(...continued)

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

-2-

Richard W. Walden, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Sheldon J. Sperling, United States

Attorney, Cheryl R. Triplett, Assistant United States Attorney, William Kanter,

Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division, and Catherine Y. Hancock, Attorney,

Appellate Staff Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

Defendant-Appellee.

Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge, and

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

We are asked to decide in this case whether the recoupment doctrine

applies to the Department of Veteran Affairs’ (VA) withholding of disability

benefits to plaintiff, Samuel Beaumont, after Mr. Beaumont’s bankruptcy filing

and discharge. After learning of a large inheritance that Mr. Beaumont received

in 2001, the VA determined that it had overpaid his disability benefit by

approximately $18,000 and consequently reduced his monthly benefit payment

in an effort to recoup this amount. Mr. Beaumont filed an adversary proceeding

in his bankruptcy case, arguing that the VA’s reduction of his monthly benefit

violated the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay and discharge injunction

provisions. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 524. The Bankruptcy Court

disagreed, concluding that the VA’s payment obligations and Mr. Beaumont’s
1 Several courts have recognized the VA’s right to recoup a pre-petition

lump sum payment made to a disabled veteran by withholding post-petition

benefits. See, e.g., Newman v. Veterans Admin. (In re Newman), 35 B.R. 97, 99

(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983); Snodgrass v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (In re

Snodgrass), 244 B.R. 353, 355 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000). But Mr. Beaumont

argues, apparently for the first time here, that his case is unique because

according to the VA, he was never entitled to the overpayment, which means the

VA could sue to recover it. Thus, he argues, the VA has an enforceable right

against him, which must be characterized as a “claim” under bankruptcy law. We

reject this proposition, which, if accepted, would appear to render the recoupment

doctrine a nullity in overpayment cases, and would be contrary to our holding in

Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 155, 157

(10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the recoupment doctrine originated to “allow[]

adjudication in one suit of two claims that otherwise had to be brought separately

under the common-law forms of action”). Moreover, in focusing its recoupment

analysis on whether the parties’ countervailing claims arose out of the same

transaction, rather than the significance of terms such as “claim” and “debt” in

the bankruptcy context, the bankruptcy court implicitly rejected this argument,

and we agree with its reasoning.

-3-

obligation to return the overpayment arose from a single transaction and therefore

the VA’s recoupment violated neither the automatic stay nor the discharge

injunction. After losing his appeal in the district court, Mr. Beaumont filed an

appeal with this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

§ 158(d)(1). We agree fully with the bankruptcy court’s well-reasoned opinion of

August 7, 2008, and it would serve no purpose for us to restate its analysis here. 

Accordingly, as we have done on other appropriate occasions, we formally adopt

its decision, attached as an appendix hereto, as our own.1

 See, e.g., Lang v. Lang

(In re Lang), 414 F.3d 1191, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

In Re:

Samuel Kennegth Beaumont, Sr., Case No. 05-72121

Chapter 7

Debtor.

Samuel Kennegth Beaumont, Sr.,

Plaintiff,

v. Adv. No. 07-08023

United States of America, ex rel.,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Defendant.

OPINION

This adversary proceeding came on for trial on April 18, 2008. Appearances were

entered by Richard Walden, attorney for Plaintiff, and Cheryl Triplett, attorney for

Defendant. The trial was continued to June 18, 2008, at which time the parties requested

that this case be submitted to the Court based upon the pleadings, stipulations, and briefs

previously submitted to the Court. The Court took this matter under advisement and now

Dated: August 07, 2008

The following is ORDERED:
2

enters its findings and conclusions in conformity with Rule 7052, Fed. R. Bankr. P., in this

core proceeding.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties have agreed that there are no material facts in dispute, and have

provided the Court with a Statement of Stipulated Facts. The Court adopts these

stipulated facts, and notes Defendant’s statement that it has no personal knowledge of the

facts listed below in paragraph numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6, but does not contest these

statements for purposes of this trial. These stipulated facts are as follows:

A. Stipulated Facts

1. The Plaintiff is a disabled veteran who began receiving disability benefits from the

Defendant in 1993. 

2. The disability benefits were awarded to the Plaintiff pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1521.

3. In 2001, the Plaintiff received a probate distribution from Earl Meadows in the

approximate amount, after applicable taxes, of $285,288.00.

4. Plaintiff used $ 215,000.00 of the above-described probate distribution to purchase

a new residence, including funds necessary to vacate the Meadows’ residence and

render the new residence livable. 

5. The remaining balance of the above described probate distribution (approximately

$ 60,000) was paid to various attorneys in legal fees incurred by Plaintiff during the

probate dispute with Mr. Meadows’ heirs. 

6. The probate dispute is ongoing. 

7. Plaintiff reported his probate distribution on his 2001 income tax returns. 

8. In approximately the Spring of 2005, the Defendant notified Plaintiff that as a result
1

The Court notes that the actual wording of the letter dated June 3, 2005, from

the Department of Veterans Affairs to Mr. Beaumont is that benefits will be withheld

“until the amount you were overpaid is recouped.”

2

The amount of Mr. Beaumont’s initial award in 1993 was $ 1,465.00 per month.

3

of the probate distribution, Plaintiff owed Defendant $ 18,448.00 for the 2001

probate distribution and that Defendant intended to offset this indebtedness by

reducing future disability payments owed to the Plaintiff.1

9. Plaintiff filed bankruptcy on May 18, 2005, and although not listed as a creditor, the

Defendant received actual notice of the filing. 

10. Plaintiff received his discharge on September 23, 2005. 

11. The Defendant continued to offset the indebtedness allegedly owed by Plaintiff

throughout the bankruptcy and continues to do so today. 

12. Plaintiff appealed the Defendant’s decision regarding the alleged indebtedness and

said appeal is still pending. 

13. Since the time of his bankruptcy filing, the Plaintiff has not received any of his

disability benefits from the Defendant. 

14. Most of the $ 18,488.00 allegedly owed by the Plaintiff has been offset by the

Defendant.

B. Additional Findings of Fact

In addition to the stipulated facts, the Court finds these additional facts to be true,

based upon the briefs and supporting documents provided by the parties, including

correspondence between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The Defendant advised Plaintiff

of his initial award of non-service-connected pension in a letter dated August 30, 1993.2
4

That letter stated that Plaintiff’s award was based upon the fact that he had “no countable

income.” He was also instructed to promptly notify the Defendant “[i]f there is any change

in your income . . . [s]ince most changes will affect your monthly rate . . . .” Plaintiff

reported the inheritance income on his 2001 Income Tax Return but that return was not

filed until after he signed it on January 8, 2003. Once the Defendant became aware that

Plaintiff had received the probate distribution, it notified him that his entitlement to benefits

had changed, that he had been overpaid, and that his VA benefits would be withheld until

the overpayment had been recouped. In addition to referring to the $ 18,448.00 as ?the

amount you were overpaid,” the Defendant also referred to it as either an “indebtedness”

or a “debt.” Plaintiff was notified of his right to dispute the determination of the debt or

overpayment, and request a waiver due to hardship. Once the Defendant denied his

request for a waiver of the “indebtedness,” Plaintiff was informed that he would have to pay

this “debt” even if he did not have benefits against which the debt could be offset, and that

he could pay by means of a monthly repayment plan.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff’s action is based upon 11 U.S.C. § 362 regarding the automatic stay and

11 U.S.C. § 524 regarding the discharge injunction. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant’s

withholding of his disability pension was a violation of the automatic stay and the discharge

injunction. Plaintiff further alleges that the amount the Defendant has withheld and

continues to withhold is a “debt” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and is, therefore,

subject to Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing and discharge. Defendant’s position is that the

reduction in Plaintiff’s disability benefits is merely a recoupment of amounts overpaid by

Defendant to Plaintiff, and that such recoupment did not violate the automatic stay nor the
5

discharge injunction. Defendant states that Plaintiff was awarded a non-service connected

pension in 1993, and that the amount of the pension was based upon Plaintiff’s income.

“Recoupment” is an equitable doctrine in bankruptcy that allows one party to a

transaction to withhold funds due another party where the debts arise out of the same

transaction. Conoco, Inc. v. Styler (In re Peterson Distributing, Inc.), 82 F.3d 956, 959

(10th Cir. 1996). In other words, the doctrine “allows a creditor to recover a pre-petition

debt out of payments owed to the debtor post-petition.” City of Fort Collins v. Gonzales (In

re Gonzales), 298 B.R. 771 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (citations omitted). The doctrine is to

be narrowly construed because its effect is to allow one creditor to attain priority over other

creditors. Peterson Distributing, 82 F.3d at 960.

The Defendant argues that it has the right and the duty to pay benefits based upon

its determination of disability as well as upon financial need. It is given that authority

pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1521, and various other statutes regarding the award and payment

of veterans’ pensions and benefits. Section 1521 specifies that a veteran’s pension “shall

be reduced by the amount of the veteran’s annual income.” “Annual income” is defined in

§ 1503 as “all payments of any kind or from any source.” See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.271

(“Payments of any kind from any source shall be counted as income . . . .”) (an

“inheritance” qualifies as non-recurring income). Defendant also cites 38 U.S.C. § 5314

as authority for it to offset overpayments against future benefits. That statute is entitled

“Indebtedness offsets,” and provides that “the Secretary shall . . . deduct the amount of the

indebtedness of any person who has been determined to be indebted to the United States

by virtue of such person’s participation in a benefits program administered by the
6

Secretary.”

Pursuant to federal law regarding veterans pension benefits, Defendant has

determined that the Plaintiff was overpaid pension benefits because he had income that

disqualified him from receiving benefits for some period of time. Plaintiff’s pension was to

be reduced by the amount of any income he received, including an inheritance. Thus,

Defendant argues that Plaintiff owes it monies he received because of an overpayment of

benefits. On the other hand, Plaintiff claims that he is owed pension benefits based upon

his original determination of eligibility in 1993, and that any overpayment he may have

received is simply a debt he owes that is dischargeable in bankruptcy. The issue for this

Court is whether Defendant could properly recoup this overpayment from Plaintiff’s benefits

after Plaintiff filed bankruptcy and continuing after his discharge. If the recoupment

doctrine applies, then there is no “debt” or “claim” here as defined in the Bankruptcy Code,

and Defendant has not violated the automatic stay nor the discharge injunction. Aetna

U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Madigan (In re Madigan), 270 B.R. 749, 754 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.

2001).

The recoupment doctrine depends upon whether Plaintiff’s obligation to repay arose

from the “same transaction” as his claim for pension benefits. See Gonzales, 298 B.R. at

774. This phrase means that “both debts must arise out of a single integrated transaction

so that it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transaction without

also meeting its obligations.” Peterson Distributing, 82 F.3d at 960 (quoting University

Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re University Medical Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1081 (3d Cir. 1992)).

This Court must examine the equities of the case, and determine whether the claims “are
7

so closely intertwined that allowing the debtor to escape its obligation would be inequitable

. . . .” Peterson Distributing, 82 F.3d at 960.

This Court finds that the obligations of both parties did arise from the “same

transaction.” Plaintiff’s claim for and award of pension benefits generated the Defendant’s

obligation to pay those benefits. The Defendant’s obligation to pay benefits was and is

contingent upon Plaintiff’s financial situation, his annual income, and his responsibility to

keep the Defendant informed of his financial situation. Plaintiff’s inheritance had the effect

of reducing the amount of benefits he could receive from the Defendant. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s inheritance was directly related to or intertwined with the amount of benefits

Defendant was obligated to pay to him, and the resulting overpayment of benefits. It is

unlawful for Plaintiff to keep any overpayments so long as the Defendant, through its own

administrative procedures, has properly determined the amount of overpayment and

properly considered Plaintiff’s disagreement with that determination. The Court believes

that it would be inequitable for the Plaintiff to receive his inheritance, continue to receive

benefits as if his income was zero, then be able to discharge in bankruptcy the

overpayments once it was determined that he had been overpaid.

It is not clear from the parties’ briefs or exhibits how the Defendant received notice

regarding Plaintiff’s inheritance. It appears from the record that the determination of

overpayment was not made until 2004 or 2005, several years after the Plaintiff received

the inheritance income and reported it on his income tax return. However, according to the

original terms of his award of benefits, it was Plaintiff’s responsibility to promptly notify the

Defendant following a change in his income or status of dependents. Plaintiff was

specifically instructed to contact the Veteran’s Administration if there was any change in
8

his income “[s]ince most changes will affect your monthly rate . . . .” The earliest it could

be argued that Plaintiff gave notice of his change in income was January 8, 2003, the date

he signed his 2001 Income Tax Return. That is at least one year following the date he

received the monies. The Court finds that the equities in this situation are in favor of the

Defendant. The Court finds, therefore, that the Defendant’s obligation to pay benefits to

Plaintiff and the overpayment that the Plaintiff must repay arise from a single transaction,

and that the Defendant’s recoupment of the overpayment from post-petition benefits did

not violate the automatic stay nor the discharge injunction.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s use of the terms “debt” and “indebtedness” is an

admission that the overpayment is a “debt” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, not

a true recoupment since recoupment does not involve a “debt” or a “claim” as defined by

the Code. See Madigan, 270 B.R. at 754; Adamic, 291 B.R. at 182. The Court does not

find the use of these terms determinative of the issue of recoupment. Defendant uses

several words to refer to the amount of overpayment, including “recoupment.” Although

the Plaintiff is correct that 38 U.S.C. § 5314 requires that the Defendant make a

determination of the amount of “indebtedness,” this statute was not drafted to be part of

the Bankruptcy Code where such words have specific definitions and different implications.

Neither the word “debt,” “indebtedness,” nor “offset” is specifically defined in the definitions

section of this statutory scheme, 38 U.S.C. § 101. The “indebtedness” referred to in

§ 5314 is simply the overpayment made to the veteran that must be repaid. Even the

cases regarding the recoupment doctrine cited by the parties and by this Court refer to the

amount of overpayment as a “debt.” “Equitable recoupment permits one party to a

transaction to withhold funds due the other party, as long as both debts arise from the
9

same transaction.” Adamic, 291 B.R. at 181-82 (quoting In re Healthback, LLC, 226 B.R.

464, 475 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998)) (emphasis added); see also Peterson Distributing, 82

F.3d at 960. It is only a “debt” in the sense that Plaintiff has received something he is not

entitled to and he is therefore obligated to repay it. The terms “debt,” “indebtedness,”

“offset,” “overpayment,” “claim,” “liability,” and “recoupment” are all used in the context of

analyzing the applicability of the recoupment doctrine in a bankruptcy. Therefore, the

Court attaches no particular significance to the use of those terms in § 5314, and certainly

does not regard the use of the terms “debt” and “indebtedness” therein to be an admission

against the Defendant that precludes reliance on the recoupment doctrine.

Plaintiff’s Complaint included a request for a determination that he has fully satisfied

his obligation to the Defendant, and an award of funds paid to the Defendant through the

suspension of Plaintiff’s benefits, which exceed the amount paid to Plaintiff in 2001 only.

These requests are not specifically included in the parties’ Pre-Trial Order. However, to

the extent that Plaintiff is still claiming that benefits were offset in an amount exceeding the

overpayments, it is this Court’s determination that this matter is one that should be decided

by the administrative agency of the Department of Veterans Affairs that has been assigned

to decide the Plaintiff’s appeal of the determination of overpayment. Therefore, the Court

declines to rule on Plaintiff’s claim of overpayment. 

A separate judgment denying Plaintiff’s claims of relief shall be entered in

accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in this Opinion.

###