Filed 5/15/23 In re C.A. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re C.A., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GABRIEL P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B323951

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP06341E, 

F)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Reversed with 

directions.

Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳

Gabriel P. (father) appeals from an order terminating his 

reunification services as to his two children. Father raises two 

contentions on appeal. First, the juvenile court erred in finding 

that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services (DCFS) provided reasonable reunification services to 

him. Second, DCFS conducted an inadequate inquiry into the 

children’s Indian ancestry, under the Indian Child Welfare Act 

(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law. 

Because we find that DCFS failed to provide reasonable 

reunification services to father, we reverse the order. 

BACKGROUND

I. The petitions and adjudication

The family consists of mother, father, C.A. (born September 

2020), and K.P. (born September 2021). Mother and father were

never married. Father is C.A.’s alleged father and K.P.’s 

presumed father.

Mother and father’s history of domestic violence brought 

the family to DCFS’s attention. That history included an 

incident in November 2020 during which father assaulted mother 

and brandished a pocketknife at her while she was holding C.A. 

Father was arrested as a result of that incident.
3

In December 2020, DCFS filed a petition as to C.A. under 

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300 alleging that the 

parents’ domestic violence placed C.A. at risk of serious physical 

harm, damage, and danger (§ 300, subd. (a); count a-1) and 

mother failed to protect C.A. from father’s violence (§ 300, subd. 

(b); count b-1).2 At the detention hearing, the court noted that

father and mother were living together when C.A. was born and 

father was present for C.A.’s birth, but he had not signed the 

birth certificate. The court thus said that father would likely 

qualify as a presumed father but nonetheless deferred paternity 

findings. The court detained C.A. from father and mother, 

ordered monitored visits with father, and released C.A. to home 

of mother.3

When K.P. was thereafter born in September 2021, DCFS 

filed a separate petition as to him and an amended petition as to 

C.A. Both petitions were based on mother and father’s history of 

domestic violence and alleged a new incident occurring in May 

2021 during which father held an ice pick to mother’s stomach 

while she was holding C.A. and was pregnant with K.P. The 

juvenile court later sustained allegations in those petitions

against father and mother.

The juvenile court held the adjudication hearing on October 

15, 2021. The juvenile court found that father was K.P.’s 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code. 

2 Mother’s four older children were also subjects of the 

petition, but they are not subjects of this appeal.

3 Both children were later removed from mother’s home.
4

presumed father, ordered reunification services for mother and 

father, and ordered monitored visits for father. Father was 

ordered to submit to weekly drug tests, to take a 52-week 

domestic violence program, and to take anger management and 

parenting classes. The six-month review hearing was scheduled 

for April 19, 2022, but continued to June 2, 2022.

II. History of contact between DCFS and father

Throughout the proceedings, father was generally 

unresponsive to social workers. Early in the proceedings and 

before reunification services had been ordered, father did not 

respond to phone calls. On February 16, 2021, for example, a 

social worker left a voicemail for father and emailed him 

instructions about DNA testing, but father did not respond to the 

voicemail and the email message was “undeliverable.” Father did 

not respond to another email sent on February 23, 2021. 

However, mother told the social worker that father was 

incarcerated. According to an inmate locator search, father was 

released on March 5, 2021, and the social worker unsuccessfully 

tried to call father at phone numbers paternal grandmother had 

provided. Then, on March 23, 2021, paternal grandmother 

reported that father was serving a three-month sentence.

On June 16, 2021, father did not answer another call from 

the social worker. In August 2021, father called the social worker 

from a number different than ones he had previously provided

and asked for information about DNA testing. When the social 

worker asked about father’s programs, he said he would let her 

know. A social worker visited father at paternal grandmother’s 

house on October 5, 2021. Father said he wanted to visit C.A., 

but he did not want to pursue DNA testing to establish that he 

was C.A.’s biological father because he did not have 
5

identification. Father also agreed to random drug tests, and 

although the social worker said she would send instructions to 

his cell phone, it is unclear if she did so.

During most of the reunification period, which began on 

October 15, 2021, social workers had no contact with father. On 

February 18, 2022, mother told a social worker that father was 

incarcerated, but she did not know his release date. On March 

29, 2022, mother told the social worker that father had been 

transferred from federal prison to a jail in downtown Los 

Angeles.

On April 13, 2022, just before the six-month reunification 

period was to end, the social worker called the jail facility where 

father was incarcerated to ask if he had been able to take classes 

there, but the social worker was told to call another day. The 

social worker called back the next two days but was unable to 

speak to anyone at the facility because the phone was 

disconnected between call transfers and the person in charge was 

unavailable to provide information. The social worker left 

messages for father on a number that had been provided in 

January and February 2022 but the calls were not returned. The 

social worker learned that father had been released from jail on 

April 21, 2022. But father did not respond to calls the social 

worker made to him on April 29 and May 4, 2022.

III. Termination of reunification services

The section 322.21, subdivision (e), review hearing was 

continued from April 19 to June 1 and 2, 2022. At the hearing, 

father asked the court to find that DCFS had not provided 

reasonable services, pointing out that, per the title XX’s, the 

social worker had contact with father on October 5, 2021, and 
6

then provided no further services until April 2022, when the 

social worker made a few phone calls.

Over father’s objection, the court terminated father’s 

reunification services but continued mother’s services. In 

terminating father’s services, the court said it relied on the 

history of the case, DCFS’s efforts to reach out to father, and 

father’s failure to follow up with DCFS. The court also noted that 

father had been in and out of facilities, had not visited the 

children, and had made no efforts to communicate with DCFS.

Because mother’s reunification services were not 

terminated, a section 366.26 hearing was not scheduled. 

IV. ICWA 

Throughout the proceedings, mother and father 

consistently denied Indian ancestry. The court found C.A. and 

K.P. were not Indian children.

DISCUSSION

I. Reunification services

Father’s primary contention is that DCFS did not provide 

reasonable reunification services to him, and therefore the 

juvenile court erred by terminating services. As we now explain, 

we agree.

Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the court is 

required to provide reunification services whenever a child is 

removed from parental custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The purpose 

of such services is to eliminate the conditions leading to loss of 

custody and to facilitate parent-child reunification, thus 

furthering the goal of preserving families, whenever possible. (In 

re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.)
7

Where, as here, the case involves children under the age of 

three when removed from parental custody, reunification services 

are presumptively limited to six months and generally shall not 

exceed 12 months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) If the child cannot 

be safely returned home, the court shall terminate the parent’s 

reunification services and set a hearing to terminate parental 

rights unless the court finds either that the child is likely to be 

returned home by the 18-month hearing, or that “reasonable 

services have not been provided to the parent.” (§ 366.21, 

subd. (g)(1).) A reasonable services finding shall be made by clear 

and convincing evidence. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(4).)

We review a reasonable services finding for substantial 

evidence based on that clear and convincing standard. (In re 

M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 14, disapproved on another ground 

by Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 631, fn. 8.) 

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the court’s 

reasonable services finding, we review the record in the light 

most favorable to the finding and draw all reasonable inferences 

from the evidence to support it. (M.F. at p. 14.) We do not 

reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, and the 

burden is on the appellant to show that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the court’s findings. (Ibid.)

To support a finding that reasonable services were offered 

or provided, the record should show that DCFS identified the 

problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed 

to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with 

the parent during the reunification period, and made reasonable 

efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proved 

difficult. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 

691.) The standard whether services were reasonable considers 
8

the circumstances at issue and not those existing in an ideal 

world. (Id. at p. 692.)

Moreover, a parent’s incarceration does not disqualify that 

parent from receiving services. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 

60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1011–1012.) Exerting reasonable efforts for 

an incarcerated parent includes maintaining reasonable contact 

with the parent, assisting the parent with accessing services by 

determining the availability of services at the institution, 

notifying the institution that the incarcerated parent needs

reunification services, and exploring whether housing changes 

are possible to facilitate provision of services. (Id. at pp. 1012–

1013.) 

Here, the court ordered father to have reunification 

services beginning October 15, 2021, so the six-month

reunification period ran until April 15, 2022, although the review 

hearing was not held until June 1 and 2, 2022. From October 15, 

2021 until April 15, 2022, the record shows that DCFS made just 

three attempts to contact father, on April 13, 14, and 15, 2022. 

Those attempts occurred within a week of the originally 

scheduled six-month review hearing and therefore were belated 

at best. Otherwise, the record does not show that DCFS provided 

any services to father or tried to connect him with any programs. 

These efforts were untimely and unreasonable. (See, e.g., T.J. v. 

Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1242–1248 [delay in 

providing services was unreasonable], disapproved on another 

ground by Michael G. v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 631, fn. 8.)

DCFS concedes that these efforts were “not ideal” and “late 

to start.” Nonetheless, DCFS argues that they were reasonable

when placed in historical context. DCFS thus asserts that the 
9

social worker made more than just three attempts in April 2022 

to contact father, stating that a social worker also left voice 

messages for father in January and February 2022 to which he 

never responded. The record does not support that assertion. 

Instead, the record shows that the social worker left messages for 

father in April 2022 at a number “which was provided to [DCFS] 

in late January and mid February of 2022.” Thus, DCFS had 

contact information for father in January and February 2022 but 

did not use it until months later. 

DCFS also argues that it made additional efforts to provide 

services to father after April 15, 2022, and before the continued 

review hearing in June 2022. Those efforts consisted of two 

phone calls, one on April 29 and the second on May 4, 2022. 

Those phone calls also were untimely and, even assuming that 

the social worker had been able to contact father, he could not 

have been provided services in a timely fashion. 

DCFS also points out that father was in and out of custody 

during the reunification period and failed to keep it advised of his 

address. However, incarcerated parents are entitled to 

reunification services in the absence of a finding of detriment to 

the children. (See generally § 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) DCFS cannot 

simply conclude that “father is in prison; he knows what the 

requirements of his case plan are; he was imprisoned before any 

referrals were made; he says no services are available to him; and 

being unaware of any resources to assist the incarcerated parent 

with reunification, [DCFS] need not take any action to facilitate 

the reunification process.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1013.)

Also, the record shows that DCFS knew where father was 

incarcerated. On February 18, 2022, mother told DCFS that 
10

father was in federal prison. She then told DCFS, on March 29, 

2022, that father had been transferred from federal prison to a 

downtown jail. Therefore, DCFS was aware of father’s 

whereabouts but apparently did nothing with that information. 

In any event, DCFS has resources to locate incarcerated parents; 

yet, the record does not show that it availed itself of them in a 

timely manner.

To be sure, the entirety of the record, including events 

preceding the reunification period, suggests that father did not

respond to DCFS’s minimal efforts to contact him. Even so, we 

cannot agree with DCFS’s characterization of father’s behavior as 

deliberately evasive. Rather, it is unclear whether father had a 

reliable phone number. And while father can certainly be faulted 

for failing to remain out of custody, his incarceration can hardly 

be characterized as a deliberate attempt to avoid DCFS. Indeed, 

father told a social worker in October 2021 that he wanted to see 

C.A. and would drug test. The record therefore does not show he 

was unamenable to receiving services or refused services

outright. (See, e.g., In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323, 330 

[father never placed in position where refusal possible because 

services were never offered]; see In re T.J. v. Superior Court, 

supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1240–1241 [social worker’s doubt 

about outcome of services does not excuse failure to provide 

them].) Indeed, DCFS did not try to help father obtain services, 

much less maintain reasonable contact with him during the 

service plan. (See generally Kevin R. v. Superior Court, supra, 

191 Cal.App.4th at p. 691.) 

II. Alleged father status

DCFS next argues that any failure on its part to provide

father with reasonable reunification services is of no moment 
11

because he was only C.A.’s alleged father and, as such, not 

entitled to reunification services. Therefore, DCFS asserts that 

the order should be affirmed as to C.A.

A father’s rights and the extent to which he may 

participate in dependency proceedings depend on his status as a 

biological, alleged or presumed father. (In re H.R. (2016) 245 

Cal.App.4th 1277, 1283.) A presumed father ranks highest, as he 

has received the child into his home and openly held out the child 

as his natural child, thereby demonstrating a full commitment to 

parental responsibilities, emotional, financial, and otherwise.

(Ibid.; In re Jovanni B. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1482, 1488.) In

contrast, a biological father has established paternity but has not 

established presumed father status. (In re H.R., at p. 1283.) An 

alleged father may be the child’s father but has not established 

biological paternity. (Ibid.) Only presumed fathers are entitled 

to appointed counsel and, absent a detriment finding, 

reunification services. (Ibid.)

Although Gabriel P. was only C.A.’s alleged father, the 

court treated him as a biological or presumed father by ordering 

reunification services be provided to him. The court also said at 

the detention hearing that because father lived with mother 

when C.A. was born and was at her birth, father likely would 

qualify as a presumed father. Under these circumstances, and

because we are reversing termination of reunification services as 

to K.P., we reverse the order as to C.A. as well.

III. ICWA

Father also contends that DCFS did not comply with its 

duty of initial inquiry under ICWA and related state law because 

it did not ask extended family members about the children’s 

possible Indian ancestry. However, after this appeal was filed, 
12

the juvenile court, on February 14, 2023, ordered DCFS to 

interview or attempt to interview extended family members 

about whether the children may be Indian children, to document 

those efforts, and to submit a report about the results to the 

juvenile court.4 This order accordingly renders father’s appeal as 

to the ICWA findings moot.5 (See generally In re D.P. (2023) 14 

Cal.5th 266.)

4 We grant DCFS’s request for judicial notice of the February 

14, 2023 minute order. (Evid. Code, § 452.)

5 Because the appeal as to this issue is moot, we deny 

DCFS’s partial motion to dismiss the appeal. 
13

DISPOSITION

The order terminating Gabriel P.’s reunification services is 

reversed with directions to reinstate services.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

BENKE, J.*

*

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.