1In addition to William Wrenn, Smith names the following

individuals as defendants to this action: New Hampshire State

Prison (“NHSP”) Warden Richard Gerry, Director of Medical and

Forensic Services for the New Hampshire Department of Corrections

Robert McLeod, NHSP Nurse Coordinator Donna Timulty, NHSP Nurse

Donna Dufresne, and NHSP Nurse Brad Bowden.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Joel L. Smith

v. Civil No. 07-cv-408-SM

William Wrenn, Commissioner,

New Hampshire Department of

Corrections, et al.1

O R D E R

Joel Smith has filed this civil rights action (document no.

1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants

have violated his constitutional rights by denying him adequate

medical care during his confinement at the New Hampshire State

Prison. The matter is presently before the Court for a

preliminary review to determine whether or not the complaint

states any claim upon which relief might be granted, or whether

the complaint should be dismissed. See United States District

Court District of New Hampshire Local Rule (“LR”) 4.3(d)(2); 29

U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring the court to preliminarily screen any

“complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 1 of 22
2Counsel has appeared in this matter, however, the complaint

was originally filed pro se, and will be preliminarily reviewed

according to the standards applied to screening pro se

complaints.

2

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity.”).

Standard of Review2

Under this Court’s local rules, when an incarcerated

plaintiff commences an action pro se and in forma pauperis, the

magistrate judge is directed to conduct a preliminary review. LR

4.3(d)(2). In conducting the preliminary review, the Court

construes pro se pleadings liberally, however inartfully pleaded. 

See Erickson v. Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200

(2007) (following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) to construe pro se

pleadings liberally in favor of the pro se party). “The policy

behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that

if they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the

correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.” See

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (noting that

courts may construe pro se pleadings so as to avoid

inappropriately stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals of

claims); Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). 

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 2 of 22
3Smith is housed at the NHSP pursuant to an agreement

entered into between the corrections departments of Maine and New

Hampshire, pursuant to the New England Interstate Corrections

Compact, codified in New Hampshire at N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 622-

A, which authorizes states to house one another’s inmates

pursuant to mutually acceptable terms delineated by the statute. 

See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 622-A:2, Art. III.

3

All of the factual assertions made by a pro se plaintiff and

inferences reasonably drawn therefrom must be accepted as true. 

See id. This review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair

and meaningful consideration.

Background

Joel Smith is a Maine State inmate currently being housed at

the New Hampshire State Prison (“NHSP”).3 On March 26, 2007, at

3:30 a.m., Smith was awoken by extreme abdominal pain. At 5:00

a.m., when the pain became unbearable, Smith summoned corrections

officers (“C.O.’s”) on his housing unit. The C.O.’s immediately

notified the NHSP infirmary that Smith was having a medical

emergency. Smith was examined by the nurse on duty, who directed

that Smith be transferred to the Catholic Medical Center (“CMC”)

in Manchester. 

At the CMC, Smith was examined, provided with pain

medication and given a CT scan. CMC physician Dr. Selleck

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 3 of 22
4

diagnosed Smith with a large kidney stone. Wanting to try to let

the stone pass on its own, Dr. Selleck prescribed Percoset, a

narcotic, every six hours for pain, and ibuprofen, and said that

he wanted to follow up with Smith in person in a couple of days. 

Smith was then returned to the NHSP.

At the prison, Smith was not provided with the Percoset

prescribed, and was instead given another narcotic painkiller,

Vicodin, which, Smith reports, was not as effective as the

Percoset in managing his pain. Additionally, the prison would

give Smith only three doses of pain medication a day, leaving a

twelve hour gap between 8:00 p.m and 8:00 a.m. when he received

no pain medication. As a result, Smith was kept awake all night

on March 27, 2007 and March 28, 2007, with pain. When, on the

morning of March 29, Smith complained to DOC nurse Donna Dufresne

that he was not receiving pain medication he needed at night,

Dufresne told him that he had received his 8:00 a.m. medication,

that he should leave the line, and that if he persisted in

complaining, she would have him transferred to the prison’s

Special Housing Unit. 

Smith attempted to return to his unit, but collapsed on the

way. When Smith finally made it back to his unit, he told C.O.

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 4 of 22
5

Brown what had happened on the medication line. Brown agreed to

take Smith’s written complaint to the infirmary. Brown returned

twenty minutes later and told Smith that he had tried, but that

he would be unable to assist him. While in his cell, Smith

passed out several more times from uncontrolled pain.

At 11:00 a.m., Smith went to eat lunch. C.O. Lanbrou

noticed that Smith was in extremely bad shape. Another officer

would not let Smith go to work that day, due to the severity of

his condition. Smith returned to his cell and collapsed. When

he regained consciousness, Smith went to find Lanbrou to get

help, and he passed out on his unit in front of Brown, Unit

Manager Lucie Bilodeau, Case Manager Robert McGrath, C.O.

Gauthier, and Lanbrou. Smith was taken to the infirmary in a

wheelchair.

At the infirmary, Nurse Brad Bowden examined Smith, but was

unable to help him. Because Smith was on the floor of the

infirmary vomiting, the NHSP Nursing Coordinator, Donna Timulty,

decided to send Smith back to CMC. 

At the CMC, Smith was given pain medication and an

ultrasound. The ultrasound revealed that the abnormal location

of his kidney was making nonsurgical resolution of the kidney

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 5 of 22
6

stone impossible. The doctor on duty told the transporting

prison officers that he could not, in good conscience, send Smith

back to the NHSP to await surgery, because the NHSP medical staff

was not adequately managing Smith’s pain. Smith was therefore

admitted to the hospital to await surgery.

On March 30, 2007, Smith had surgery. According to Smith’s

description of the procedure, Dr. Selleck pushed the kidney stone

back into the kidney, and placed a stent to keep the stone in

place, and to keep Smith’s “tubes” open. Dr. Selleck advised

Smith that the stent should remain in until Smith followed up

with him in a few days. A catheter was also placed. On March

31, Smith was returned to the NHSP infirmary, to be housed there

until the catheter was removed. 

On April 6, 2007, Smith had still not seen the doctor for

his follow-up visit. When he asked about the appointment, Smith

was told there had been some mix-up, and that he would see the

doctor “sooner than later.” On April 9, Smith was taken to the

Elliot Medical Center in Manchester to see Dr. Selleck. After

examining Smith, Dr. Selleck said the stent would be in place

until it could be surgically removed. Dr. Selleck wanted to 

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 6 of 22
7

perform this procedure within a matter of weeks of that

appointment. 

 Smith was returned to the infirmary on April 9. On April

10, the catheter was removed and Smith was returned to his unit. 

He was told that his antibiotics and pain medication would follow

him to his unit. When, a couple of days later, he had not

received any medication, he returned to the infirmary where he

was told that he would not be receiving his medication.

On April 17, 2007, Smith reported to the 8:00 a.m.

medication line and unsuccessfully tried to obtain pain

medication or other assistance for abdominal pain. The next day,

Smith provided an NHSP nurse with a urine sample which, he

reports, was extremely dark. The nurse told him the urine sample

looked fine, however, and took no further action.

Over the next ten days, Smith’s pain increased, causing him

to lose consciousness a number of times. Smith attempted to get

assistance in the medication line but was sent away. C.O.’s on

Smith’s unit called the infirmary, and again Smith was taken to

the infirmary in a wheelchair. After being examined by a

physician’s assistant, who found that there was blood in Smith’s

urine, Smith was returned to his unit. 

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 7 of 22
8

During the first several weeks of April, Smith stopped being

able to eat for a period of seven days, and lost twenty-five

pounds. On or about April 20, 2007, Smith’s supervisor at the

prison woodshop, Mr. Boudreau, immediately recognized that Smith

was in extreme distress upon seeing him. On Smith’s behalf,

Boudreau contacted both Smith’s doctor’s office and NHSP Warden

Richard Gerry. 

Due to Boudreau’s intervention, Smith got antibiotics, and

his condition began to improve. On April 27, however, Smith’s

pain began to increase again. The NHSP physician’s assistant

told Smith to stop taking his antibiotics, as test results showed

he was not taking the appropriate drug to treat his particular

infection. He was switched from antibiotic to antibiotic in an

unsuccessful effort to get his infection under control. 

Complications and pain from uncontrolled infections lasted over

the following four and a half months.

On May 7, 2007, Smith was given written instructions to stop

taking all of his medication, which he believed meant that his

surgery was imminent, as an order to discontinue medication was

standard procedure for preparing an inmate for surgery that was a

few days off. Seven days later, Smith had still not received

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 8 of 22
9

medication or been taken to the hospital for surgery, and his

condition again began to deteriorate. Smith went to the

infirmary and was given pain medication, but not antibiotics. 

Smith states that although C.O.’s he encountered noticed his

worsening health, no one would intervene on his behalf, as they

were aware Boudreau had been threatened with termination for

contacting Smith’s doctor’s office.

On May 17, 2007, Smith was taken to the CMC for surgery. 

Dr. Selleck told Smith he would try to break up the kidney stone

with the use of a laser. Dr. Selleck was not able to do that,

however, because of the unusual location of his kidney. Instead,

Dr. Selleck replaced the stent with a larger stent, and informed

Smith that more tests would be needed before he could proceed

further. Smith was returned to the prison and to his housing

unit.

Over the next few weeks, Smith fought severe infections and

debilitating pain. Smith states that his dire condition was

obvious to anyone who saw him. After several more weeks, Smith 

was taken to the hospital for a follow-up appointment for tests

that Dr. Selleck had ordered, but that had never been done.

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 9 of 22
10

By mid-July 2007, Smith’s condition had continued to worsen. 

Timulty had threatened to transfer Smith to the Special Housing

Unit if he continued to complain of his ailments, however, so

Smith stopped reporting to sick call for help. Smith states that

he had increased blood in his urine, and his pain became so

severe that he could barely walk. Finally, Boudreau again

contacted the NHSP infirmary on Smith’s behalf. Nurse Bowden

took a urine sample and gave Smith a pass for thirty days of

bedrest, but was unable to take any further action to improve

Smith’s condition or symptoms. 

The urinalysis subsequently showed that Smith’s infections

were out of control, and would require, in addition to the

regimen of antibiotics Smith was already taking, injections of

additional antibiotics every eight hours. None of these

infection-fighting measures was successful. Smith was also given

narcotic pain medication four times a day.

On July 25, 2007, Smith was again told to stop taking all of

his medications. He continued his medications until the supply

he had was gone, on July 27 or 28. 

Approximately ten days later, on August 8, 2007, Smith was

taken back to the hospital where he had laser surgery. He was

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 10 of 22
11

told that the doctors would not immediately know whether or not

the surgery had been successful in breaking up the kidney stone,

and was returned to his unit at the prison. Smith states that he

was in medical distress at the time, and an officer had to escort

him to his cell, or he would not have been able to get there on

his own.

On August 17, 2007, Smith went to the infirmary with

constant pain and symptoms of infection. After he had waited for

an hour, Timulty told Smith to come back the following Monday, as

the infirmary was short-staffed that day. Timulty also said that

the responsibility for Smith’s lack of treatment lay with the

State of Maine, for failing to approve medical tests, causing the

cancellation of appointments. Smith was given medication and

returned to his unit.

On August 20, 2007, Smith, again, was taken to the Elliot

Medical Center for follow-up on tests that had not been done. 

Smith contacted members of his family who called the Maine

Correctional authorities. With the assistance of this outside

help, Smith was able to facilitate communication between Maine

and New Hampshire that finally eased his receipt of necessary

medical tests and treatment.

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 11 of 22
12

On August 24, 2007, Smith’s previously cancelled appointment

for a CT scan to determine whether or not the kidney stone had

been successfully broken up by his most recent surgery, was

rescheduled. At that time, Smith was represcribed the dosage of

Vicodin he had been taking, but it was not effective due to the

severity of Smith’s pain.

On August 30, 2007, Smith was taken to see Dr. Selleck for a

follow-up appointment. Dr. Selleck told Smith that the CT scan

did not reveal the status of Smith’s kidney stone, due to the

abnormal location of Smith’s kidney. Dr. Selleck told Smith that

although ideally he would like to remove the stent, Smith was too

sick to undergo surgery. Dr. Selleck told Smith and the medical

officials at the NSHP that Smith had to return for surgery in a

week, and that in the meantime, he needed to be treated with

antibiotics.

On September 9, 2007, Smith was returned to the hospital for

the final operation on his kidney. Dr. Selleck advised Smith

that the stent had been in so long that it had crusted shut, and

was blocking the release of toxins from Smith’s body. As a

result, the toxins were recirculating into Smith’s system, which 

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 12 of 22
442 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:

Every person who under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 

State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law . . . .

13

was what was causing him to be so ill. The surgery resolved the

condition, and within a few days Smith was greatly improved. 

Discussion

I. Section 1983

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against those who,

acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional

or statutory law. See 42 U.S.C. § 19834; City of Okla. City v.

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829 (1985); Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294

F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002). In order for a defendant to be held

liable under § 1983, his or her conduct must have caused the

alleged constitutional or statutory deprivation. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Soto v. Flores,

103 F.3d 1056, 1061-62 (1st Cir. 1997). Here, Smith claims that

defendants are state actors, and that they violated his federal 

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 13 of 22
14

constitutional right to receive adequate medical care during his

incarceration. Smith’s claim arises, therefore, under § 1983.

II. Access to Adequate Medical Care

The Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates from prison

officials acting with deliberate indifference to their serious

medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831 (1994). 

To assert a viable cause of action for inadequate medical care,

an inmate must first state facts sufficient to allege that he has

a serious medical need for which adequate care has not been

provided. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. The inmate must then

allege that a responsible prison official was aware of the

serious medical need, or of the facts from which such a need

could be inferred, and still failed to provide treatment. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. A serious medical need is one that

involves a substantial risk of serious harm if it is not

adequately treated. Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285

(D.N.H. 2003); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 180 (D.

Mass. 2002) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-47); see also

Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) (defining

a serious medical need as one “that has been diagnosed by a

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 14 of 22
15

physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that

even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.”) (internal citations omitted). 

“[A]dequate medical care” is treatment by qualified medical

personnel who provide services that are of a quality acceptable

when measured by prudent professional standards in the community,

tailored to an inmate’s particular medical needs, and that are

based on medical considerations. United States v. DeCologero,

821 F.2d 39, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1987). This does not mean that an

inmate is entitled to the care of his or her choice, simply that

the care must meet minimal standards of adequacy. Kosilek, 221

F. Supp. 2d at 160-161. Deliberate indifference may be found

where the medical care provided is “so clearly inadequate as to

amount to a refusal to provide essential care.” Torraco v.

Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991). Constraints inherent

in a prison setting may affect the choice of care provided, and

may be relevant to whether or not prison officials provided

inadequate care with a deliberately indifferent mental state. 

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991).

Here, Smith had a kidney stone causing him obvious and

extreme pain, as evidenced by the fact that C.O.’s, as well as a

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 15 of 22
16

civilian DOC employee, were able to easily observe Smith’s

medical distress. While Smith was initially treated for this

condition, and did receive some care for his ongoing pain and

infections, he alleges that the treatment he received was

inadequate to meet his medical needs. Specifically, Smith claims

that his extreme pain, lack of adequate pain medication, and the

inadequate treatment of his severe and persistent infections

resulted in a worsening of his already serious condition and

pain, and the unnecessary complication of his treatment. Smith

lays the blame for the severity of his illness with the prison’s

inattention to his obvious and serious medical needs, and an

unreasonable delay in getting him appropriate medical care. 

I find that for purposes of preliminary review, Smith has

alleged that, while incarcerated at the NHSP, he had serious

medical needs: a kidney stone, extreme pain, and persistent

infections. Further, smith has alleges sufficient facts to

demonstrate that the defendants were clearly aware, or should

have been aware, of these conditions. 

Less clear is whether or not Smith will be able to prove

that prison officials here were deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs. Smith’s narrative indicates that while under the

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 16 of 22
17

care of the NHSP, Smith received several surgeries, was seen a

number of times by NHSP medical staff, and was provided with

testing, medication, and access to both on-site and off-site

care. For purposes of preliminary review, however, I must

construe the allegations in the complaint liberally and in

Smith’s favor. In so doing, I find Smith has alleged the minimum

facts necessary to allege that the severity of his condition and

symptoms was due, at least in part, to inattention to Smith’s

complaints, inadequate care, response, and treatment, and delay

in providing care to Smith by the NHSP defendants. Accordingly,

I find that Smith has sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment

claim for inadequate medical care to allow this action to proceed

against the defendants at this time.

III. Supervisory Liability

“Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on

a respondeat theory, but only on the basis of the supervisor’s

own acts or omissions.” Aponte Matos v. Toledo Davila, 135 F.3d

182, 192 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). A

supervisor must be “either was a primary actor involved in, or a

prime mover behind, the underlying violation.” Camilo-Robles v.

Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1999). There must be “an

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 17 of 22
18

affirmative link, whether through direct participation or through

conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization” to

the violation alleged. Id. at 44.

Defendants Wrenn, Gerry, McLeod, and Timulty each serve a

supervisory function within the DOC. Although there is no

supervisory liability in § 1983 actions based on a respondeat

superior theory of liability, a defendant supervisor can be held

liable based on the defendant’s actual notice of facts sufficient

to render the official responsible for reasonable inquiry into

the complaint. See Feliciano v. Dubois, 846 F. Supp. 1033, 1045

(D. Mass. 1994) (citing Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468 (1st Cir.

1981)). A supervisor also may be held liable for his own acts,

or omissions, if they rise to the level of reckless or callous

indifference to the constitutional rights of others. See FebusRodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 91-92 (1st Cir.

1994). Finally, a supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 if

he or she “formulates a policy or engages in a practice that

leads to a civil rights violation committed by another.” CamiloRobles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998). 

Crediting Smith’s allegations as true, as I must, I find

that defendants Wrenn, Gerry, McLeod, and Timulty each knew of

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 18 of 22
19

plaintiff’s serious medical condition, ongoing pain, and need for

prompt treatment, and nevertheless failed to take any steps to

ensure the requisite care would be provided in a timely fashion. 

These allegations state the minimal facts necessary to allow

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim to proceed against defendants

Wrenn, Gerry, McLeod, and Timulty in their supervisory

capacities. 

IV. Official/Individual Capacity Suits

Smith asserts that he intends to sue the defendants only in

their official capacities. Because each defendant works for the

DOC, a suit against them in their official capacities is a suit

against the DOC, which cannot be held liable for money damages

under § 1983 because of the immunity afforded state agencies

under the Eleventh Amendment. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (absent waiver,

neither a state nor its agencies may be subject to suit in

federal court); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989) (holding that neither a state nor its officials acting

in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983). Yet,

to obtain the prospective injunctive relief plaintiff seeks here,

he must bring this action against defendants in their official

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 19 of 22
20

capacities. See id. at 71 n.10; see also Brandon v. Holt, 469

U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985) (suing an officer in his or her official

capacity is another way of suing the public entity that the

official represents); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60

(1908). 

On the other hand, in order to obtain the monetary relief he

seeks, Smith must pursue his claims against defendants in their

individual capacities. Liberally construing the complaint in

plaintiff’s favor, as I am required to do at this preliminary

stage of review, however, I find that Smith intends to bring this

action against the defendants in both their official and

individual capacities because he seeks both injunctive and

monetary relief. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, and without further comment on

the merits of the claims alleged, I find that Smith has

sufficiently stated the minimum facts necessary to allow this

action to proceed against defendants Wrenn, Gerry, McLeod,

Timulty, Dufresne, and Bowden. I order the complaint (document

no. 1) be served on Defendants. The Clerk’s office is directed

to serve the New Hampshire Office of the Attorney General (“AG”),

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 20 of 22
21

as provided in the Agreement On Acceptance Of Service, copies of

this order and the complaint (document no. 1 & 7). See LR

4.3(d)(2)(C). Within thirty days from receipt of these

materials, the AG will submit to the court an Acceptance of

Service notice specifying those defendants who have authorized

the AG’s office to receive service on their behalf. When the

Acceptance of Service is filed, service will be deemed made on

the last day of the thirty-day period. 

As to those defendants who do not authorize the AG’s office

to receive service on their behalf or whom the AG declines to

represent, the AG shall, within thirty days from receipt of the

aforementioned materials, provide a separate list of the last

known addresses of such defendants. The Clerk’s office is

instructed to complete service on these individuals by sending to

them, by certified mail, return receipt requested, copies of

these same documents. 

Defendants are instructed to answer or otherwise plead

within twenty days of acceptance of service. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(a)(1)(A). 

Plaintiff is instructed that all future pleadings, written

motions, notices, or similar papers shall be served directly on

Case 1:07-cv-00408-SM Document 9 Filed 04/09/08 Page 21 of 22
22

the Defendants by delivering or mailing the materials to them or

their attorneys, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). 

SO ORDERED.

________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: April 9, 2008

cc: Joel L. Smith

Lawrence Vogelman, Esq.

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