* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### NOV 8 2000 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM DOENZ, individually and as Trustee of the William J. Doenz Real Estate Trust, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHERIDAN COUNTY; SHERIDAN COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendants-Appellees. No. 99-8087 (D.C. No. 98-CV-76) (Wyoming)



### ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, TACHA and EBEL , Circuit Judges.

William Doenz appeals from an order of the DistrictCourt granting summary judgment for defendant. For the reasons se t forth below, we affirm the District Court’s order, albeit on grounds differentfrom those of the District
Court.-2- I This litigation originated in October 1994, when th e Board of County Commissioners of Sheridan County, Wyoming (“Sheridan County”), filed a declaratory judgment action in state court in an attempt to resolve a property dispute among neighbors regarding use of a road. A lthough Mr. Doenz was not part of the dispute, he was brought into the suit b y Sheridan County because he had an easement to use the road. The County then m oved to withdraw from the case and was granted permission to do so. Mr. Doen z prevailed in this first litigation, the court ruling that his easement was valid. Ultimately, however, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the County had no jurisdictional authority to bring the case in the f irst place. Mr. Doenz then filed suit in state court against Sh eridan County under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, alleging that the County had been negligent in bringing him into the declaratory judgment actio n when it had no jurisdictional authority to do so. This negligence, he argued, re sulted in a cloud on the title to his land, which was on the market when the County f iled the lawsuit. Mr. Doenz had located a different piece of property which he wished to purchase. Because of the clouded title on his own land, he lost a wil ling buyer and was unable to sell it. This, in turn, made it impossible for him to a cquire the land he was attempting-3-

to purchase. Mr. Doenz also missed a once-in-a-lif etime opportunity for a low tax rate on the sale of his land and incurred substanti al legal fees. The state court granted summary judgment for Sherid an County on the issue of governmental immunity, concluding the County was immune from liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. However , the court gave Mr. Doenz leave to file a proposed amended complaint th at would lay out any other bases for relief. Mr. Doenz filed an amended compl aint which added a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a takings claim under the F ifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and several claims under the Wyoming co nstitution. The court held that the proposed complaint failed to state claims for which relief could be granted, concluding that the mere filing of a lawsu it by Sheridan County was insufficient to constitute a taking under the Const itution and that Mr. Doenz was therefore not entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, the court suggested to Mr. Doenz that he submit another propo sed amended complaint asserting any claims he might have under Wyoming’s inverse condemnation

statute. Mr. Doenz filed another proposed complaint that contained all the allegations previously rejected by the court and attempted to add an inverse1 The Wyoming Supreme Court later noted that “[i]nste ad of precisely

alleging an inverse condemnation claim, Doenz’s pro posed complaint asserted a slander of title claim along with other claims whic h had already been decided by the district court.” Doenz v. Sheridan County Boar d of County Comm’rs , 949 P.2d 464, 465 (Wyo. 1997). -4- condemnation claim. 1 The court rejected this proposed complaint as wel l, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Mr. Doenz appealed the decision to the Wyoming Supr eme Court. That court held that while Mr. Doenz raised several issu es on appeal, only one of those issues was properly presented: whether the distric t court was right to deny Mr. Doenz’s motion to file the Second Proposed Amended Complaint. The court held that Mr. Doenz did not meet his burden of proving t he trial court abused its discretion in denying yet another motion to amend. The court further noted that “[i]n his appeal to this Court, Doenz has failed t o accurately apply the statute to the facts of this case to establish how the prescribed activities set out in the statute relate to his sit uation. Although he attempts to do so by resorting to arguments alreadydisposed of by the district court, he did not appeal from those ru lings, and we, therefore, will not review them.” Doenz v. Sheridan County Board of County Comm’rs , 949 P.2d 464, 465 (Wyo. 1997). After losing in state court, Mr. Doenz filed this f ederal action, requesting relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the “temporary ta king of private property without due process and just compensation” in violation of the Fifth and-5-

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the Wyoming state constitution. The district court granted summary j udgment to Sheridan County, holding that the County’s lawsuit against Mr. Doenz did not constitute a taking under current takings jurisprudence. Having determ ined the matter on that issue, the court declined to reach Sheridan County’s two o ther arguments for summary judgment: namely, that Mr. Doenz did not have stand ing, and that this action was barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. We review the district court’s grant of summary jud gment de novo. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 53 (1999). We “may affirm the district court on any legal ground supported bythe record.” Wolfgang v. MidAmerica Motorsports, Inc. , 111 F.3d 1515, 1524 (10th Cir. 1995). A cornerstone of the federal court system is res ju dicata. Under this doctrine, “a final judgment on the merits of an act ion precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were orcould have been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). While the federal courts are not bound by state courts’ determinations of federa l law, we are bound to apply the res judicata doctrine to state court proceeding s where the parties have had “a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Whether the parties have had such an opportunity is determined by-6-

examining “whether the state proceedings satisfied ‘the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Proc ess Clause.’” Phelps v. Hamilton , 122 F.3d 1309, 1322 (10th Cir. 1997). As the Sup reme Court has noted, res judicata promotes “the comity between st ate and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system. ” Allen , 449 U.S. at 96. Congress reinforced this state/federal relationship in the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which mandates that federal courts give the same “full faith and credit” to the decisions of a state court as that state’s courts would give to the decision. See Carpenter v. Reed ex rel. Dep’t of Public Safety , 757 F.2d 218, 219 (10th Cir. 1985). In the instant case, each and every claim that Mr. Doenz asserts in the present action has already been ruled upon by the s tate court. Mr. Doenz argued there, as here, that: (1) the filing of Sheridan Co unty’s lawsuit was a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) it was als o a taking under the Wyoming state constitution; and (3) he was accordin gly due just compensation. The state trial court ruled that a lawsuit could no t be a taking under either the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or the Wyoming stat e constitution, and that Mr. Doenz therefore did not state a claim for which rel ief could be granted under 42
U.S.C.2 We note, however, that this case does not require u s to decide whether res

judicata would preclude a litigant from expressly r eserving his takings claim for federal court while pursuing his state remedy in st ate court. Cf. Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm'rs , 142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998) (declining to decide whether a litigant who reserved his takings claim for federal court would be barred by res judicata); Dodd v. Hood River County , 49 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a claimant could under some cir cumstances reserve a takings claim for federal court while engaging in state cou rt litigation of an inverse condemnation claim); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority , 953 F.2d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 1992) (same). Doenz made no effort to reserve his takings claim for federal court litigation, and therefore t hat issue is not properly before us. -7- § 1983. The court twice granted Mr. Doenz leave to file proposed amended complaints in an effort to state a claim. Mr. Doen z could have appealed any of these rulings to the Wyoming Supreme Court. Mr. Doenz thus had a full and fair opportunity to l itigate all his claims in state court. He does not get a third bite at the apple by filing the same case against the same parties alleging the same issues i n federal court. To allow him to do so would contravene a bedrock principle of fe deralism. 2 We hold that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper given that the Mr. Doenz’s case is barred from reli tigation by res judicata. We
AFFIRM

. ENTERED FOR THE COURT Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge