J-S31024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GERARD GETER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2585 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0001136-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GERARD GETER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2586 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0002925-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GERARD GETER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2587 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0002951-2017
J-S31024-22

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BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 13, 2022

Appellant Gerard Geter appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

after the trial court found him in violation of his probation. Appellant argues 

that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to state the reasons for 

declining to order a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report. We affirm.

The underlying facts of this case are well known to the parties. See 

Trial Ct. Op., 4/29/22, at 1-6. Briefly, Appellant was found in violation of his 

probation in three separate cases on November 10, 2021. See N.T. Hr’g, 

11/10/21, at 13-15. That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of two-and-a-half years’ incarceration. Id. The trial court did 

not order a PSI report and did not state the reasons for why it declined to do

so. Appellant did not object to the lack of a PSI report at sentencing and did 

not file a post-sentence motion raising that claim.

Appellant subsequently filed timely notices of appeal and a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement1

in which he challenged the trial court’s 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that Appellant’s direct appeal counsel initially submitted a statement 

of intent to file an Anders/Santiago brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). 

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). However, counsel subsequently sought 

leave to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc, explaining that “a postsentence motion for reconsideration of sentence and a merit-based [Rule 

1925(b) statement] should have been filed” in all three cases and arguing

“that preventing a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel would constitute 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S31024-22

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failure to order a PSI report for the first time. The trial court issued a Rule 

1925(a) opinion in which it concluded that Appellant waived his sentencing 

claim by failing to raise the issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.

See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8. However, the trial court also addressed the merits 

of Appellant’s claim, concluded that he was not entitled to relief, and 

requested that this Court issue a decision addressing the merits of the issue 

in the interest of judicial economy.2 See id. at 8-10.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for review:

Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion when it did not comply 

with Pa.R.Crim.P. 702 (a)(2)(a) and Commonwealth v. 

Flowers, 950 A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. 2008) in that it neither 

ordered nor placed on the record the reasons for declining to order 

and review a pre-sentence investigation report when it imposed a 

sentence greater than one year of incarceration, and the record 

offered no effective substitute for a pre-sentence investigation 

report?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Initially, we must address whether Appellant has preserved his

discretionary sentencing claim for review. See Flowers, 950 A.2d at 331 

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good cause shown and extraordinary circumstances” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(2)(i). See Pet. to File Am. Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/24/22, at 2.

2 Specifically, the trial court reasoned that if this Court concluded that 

Appellant waived his sentencing claim, it would “give rise to a claim under the 

[Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, (PCRA)] for ineffective 

assistance of counsel,” which would “require an examination of whether 

Appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to file [] post-sentence motions 

challenging the discretionary aspects of the court’s sentences.” Trial Ct. Op. 

at 7-8. Therefore, the trial court asserted that there was good cause for this 

Court to address Appellant’s underlying sentencing claim in the interest of 

judicial economy. See id.
J-S31024-22

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(holding that a claim that the court erred in failing to order a PSI report 

implicates the discretionary aspects of sentencing). “[C]hallenges to the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of 

right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 991 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted). Before reaching the merits of such claims, we must 

determine: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved 

his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of 

sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a

substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the 

sentencing code. 

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

“To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an 

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. 

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be 

raised for the first time on appeal”).

Here, as noted previously, Appellant did not preserve his instant claim

at the sentencing hearing or raise the issue in a post-sentence motion. 

Therefore, Appellant’s claim is waived. See Malovich, 903 A.2d at 1251. 
J-S31024-22

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Further, we decline the trial court’s invitation to address Appellant’s claim in 

anticipation of a future PCRA petition.3 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 

of sentence without prejudice to Appellant’s right to raise ineffectiveness 

claims in a timely filed PCRA petition.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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3 As noted previously, the trial court has requested that we address the merits 

of Appellant’s sentencing issue in anticipation of a future PCRA claim. See

Trial Ct. Op. at 8. However, “it is not within this Court’s province to offer such 

guidance because any analysis in this regard would amount to nothing more 

than an advisory opinion. This Court may not provide advisory opinions to 

address issues that may arise in future cases.” Commonwealth v. Enix, 192 

A.3d 78, 84 n. 5 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted); see also Sedat, Inc. 

v. Fisher, 617 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. 1992) (stating that “[a]n advisory opinion is one 

which is unnecessary to decide the issue before the court, and . . . the courts 

of this Commonwealth are precluded from issuing such advisory opinions” 

(citations omitted)).

Further, even if Appellant’s direct appeal counsel was deemed ineffective for 

failing to file a post-sentence motion, Appellant did not raise that issue on 

appeal before the trial court, nor did he raise an ineffectiveness claim in his 

brief. 

In any event, absent certain exceptions, ineffectiveness claims are generally 

deferred to PCRA review and are not cognizable on direct appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002), abrogated on other 

grounds, Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021); see also 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563-64 (Pa. 2013) (recognizing 

exceptions to Grant where (1) there are extraordinary circumstances in which 

trial counsel’s “ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to

the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice” 

or (2) “there is good cause shown” and the defendant knowingly and expressly 

waives his entitlement to seek subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and 

sentence). Based on our review of the record, we find no basis to conclude 

that extraordinary circumstances exist in this case, as it is not clear that 

Appellant’s claims are meritorious and entitled to immediate consideration. 

Further, Appellant has not expressly waived his right to subsequent PCRA 

review.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/13/2022