alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Sandra GUTIERREZ-ALEMAN, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 00-50574.

D.C. No. CR-99-03631-MJL.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 8, 2002.*

Decided Jan. 9, 2003.

*247Before HUG, BRUNETTI and O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Sandra Gutierrez-Aleman appeals her conviction and sentence under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 for importation of marijuana. Gutierrez-Aleman first argues the district court erred in denying her request to withdraw her guilty plea because it was entered without knowledge of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Gutierrez-Aleman also contends the district court committed error by refusing to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege type and quantity of controlled substance as an element of the charge. We affirm the district court on both counts.

Gutierrez-Aleman’s first argument fails because *Apprendi*is not implicated where the defendant is sentenced below the prescribed statutory maximum. *See id.*at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. *See also United States v. Carranza,*289 F.3d 634, 643 (9th Cir.2002). Under 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(3), Gutierrez-Aleman was subject to a statutory maximum of twenty years imprisonment. She received a twenty-four month sentence. Accordingly, *Apprendi*does not provide a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e).

Gutierrez-Aleman also argues that the district court should have dismissed the indictment because the government failed to allege quantity and type of controlled substance. First, the government explicitly alleged quantity and type of drug in the indictment. Further, the drug sentencing statutes at issue in this case have been held to be facially constitutional. *See United States v. Mendoza-Paz,*286 F.3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir.2002) (rejecting constitutional challenge to § 960); *United States v. Valera-Rivera,*279 F.3d 1174, 1175 n. 1 (9th Cir.2002) (rejecting constitutional challenge to § 952). Finally, to the extent Gutierrrez-Aleman argues the district court erred by failing to require proof of means rea as to type and quantity of controlled substance, this argument is foreclosed by our decision in *United States v. Carranza,*289 F.3d 634, 643-44 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that government need not prove drug type or knowledge of drug *248quantity). The district court is therefore affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Monte C. HOISINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs—Appellants, and Abraham Dean, Plaintiff, v. Mark SELING, et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 02-35915.

D.C. No. CV-01-05228-RJB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 14, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

This appeal from the district court’s order denying appellant’s motion for preliminary injunction comes to us for review under Ninth Circuit Rule 3-3. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm.

We express no view on the merits of the complaint. Our sole inquiry is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief. *See Gregorio T. v. Wilson,*59 F.3d 1002, 1004-OS (9th Cir.1995). The record before us shows that the court did not rely on an erroneous legal premise or abuse its discretion in concluding that appellant had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or the threat of imminent irreparable harm and in denying preliminary injunctive relief. *See id.*The court’s factual findings and application of legal standards are not clearly erroneous. *See id.*Accordingly, the court’s order denying the preliminary injunction is affirmed. All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

December 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
132291 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 132291 COA: 262328 Wayne CC: 04-012023-01 JOHNATHAN LARAWN ROUNDTREE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 3, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

t1218 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 29, 2006

Clerk
#### Michael J. McKINNEY, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. J. PETERS, Lieutenant, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-55691.

D.C. No. CV-97-07448-AHM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 7, 2003.*

Decided Feb. 11, 2003.

Before D.W. NELSON, WARDLAW and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

*285MEMORANDUM **

Michael McKinney (“McKinney”) filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 alleging that his civil rights were violated when Peters, a corrections lieutenant at the California Men’s Colony in San Luis Obispo, failed to grant his request for a cell transfer despite an allegedly imminent threat of attack by his cellmate. The cellmate later attacked McKinney. Peters moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied this motion; Peters brings an interlocutory appeal challenging that denial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, and we affirm.

We review de novo “the district court’s determination on summary judgment that [Peters] cannot invoke qualified immunity as a bar to civil litigation.” *Martinez v. City of Oxnard,*270 F.3d 852, 855 (9th Cir.2001). In evaluating whether Peters is entitled to qualified immunity, we must accept as true the facts as McKinney alleges they exist, looking only to his complaint. *Saucier v. Katz,*533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); *Martinez,*270 F.3d at 855.

We must answer “this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” *Saucier,*533 U.S. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting *Siegert v. Gilley,*500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991)). Then, “if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” *Id.*at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

Two years before the attack on McKinney, the Supreme Court held that “[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” *Farmer v. Brennan,*511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

McKinney’s complaint and the attached exhibits allege (1) an objectively substantial risk of serious harm (2) of which Peters was subjectively aware but chose to disregard. *See Id.*at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970; *Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer,*301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir.2002). Moreover, assuming the facts alleged as true, McKinney’s right to a cell transfer was clearly established in this case, and “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation [Peters] confronted.” *Saucier,*533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 99.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         I, MICHAEL ROSENFELD,  Primary Financial Officer of EduLink,  Inc. (the
"Company") do hereby  certify,  in accordance  with 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:

              (1)     The  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the
                      period ending  September 30, 2003 (the "Periodic  Report")
                      fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
                      15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
                      and

              (2)     The  information  contained in the Periodic  Report fairly
                      presents,   in  all  material   respects,   the  financial
                      condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated November 14, 2003                   /s/
                                          ------------------------------
                                          Michael Rosenfeld
                                          Primary Financial Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

J. Krist Schell

v. Civil No. 06-cv-425-JM

Thomas W. Kent

O R D E R

By order of April 6, 2009, counsel was instructed to refile

the attorney’s fees submission to reflect only fraud-related fees

since that is the only count on which the jury found a right to

the fees. Counsel filed an amended motion (document no. 109) and

detailed billing records. Defendant has not objected to the

resubmission.

After reviewing the filings, I find the rates charged are

reasonable, the activities billed for were necessary to the fraud

count, and the time spent reasonable. The request for $73,219.10

is granted.

SO ORDERED. Final judgment may be entered.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:06-cv-00425-JM Document 111 Filed 05/11/09 Page 1 of 2
2

Date: May 11, 2009

cc: David A. Strock, Esq.

 Melinda J. Caterine, Esq.

 K. William Clauson, Esq.

Case 1:06-cv-00425-JM Document 111 Filed 05/11/09 Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 99.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         I, MICHAEL ROSENFELD, Chief Executive Officer of EduLink, Inc. (the
"Company") do hereby certify, in accordance with 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:


         (1)      The Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the
                  period ending March 31, 2003 (the "Periodic Report") fully
                  complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly
                  presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
                  and results of operations of the Company.


Dated May 19, 2003                                 /S/ Michael Rosenfeld
                                                   -----------------------
                                                   MICHAEL ROSENFELD
                                                    Chief Executive Officer
H. R. 1583

One Hundred Seventh Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the third day of January, two thousand and one

An Act

To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located at 121

West Spring Street in New Albany, Indiana, as the ‘‘Lee H. Hamilton Federal

Building and United States Courthouse’’.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

The Federal building and United States courthouse located

at 121 West Spring Street in New Albany, Indiana, shall be known

and designated as the ‘‘Lee H. Hamilton Federal Building and

United States Courthouse’’.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper,

or other record of the United States to the Federal building and

United States courthouse referred to in section 1 shall be deemed

to be a reference to the ‘‘Lee H. Hamilton Federal Building and

United States Courthouse’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Larriante J. Sumbry 

 v. Civil No. 05-cv-112-SM 

Cecil Davis 

O R D E R

On May 3, 2005, the court issued an order granting the 

plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, and directing 

the Indiana Department of Corrections to remit a percentage of 

income in plaintiff's account to the court until the sum of 

$250.00 was paid, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (doc. no. 6). 

In fact, the filing fee for this case is $5.00. The court's 

order of May 3, 2005 (doc. no. 6) is therefore vacated.

This case was filed in 2005, and the court received 

plaintiff's first installment of 22 cents on April 8, 2011. The 

court grants plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis 

(doc. no. 3), and accepts the 22 cents paid. No further payment 

is required. 

SO ORDERED. 

__________________________

Landya McCafferty 

United States Magistrate Judge 

April 15, 2011 

cc: Larriante J. Sumbry, pro se

Bonnie S. Reed, Financial Administrator

Indiana Department of Corrections, Inmate Accounts

Case 1:05-cv-00112-SM Document 17 Filed 04/15/11 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:06-cv-00337-SM   Document 24   Filed 06/17/08   Page 1 of 1
29

B.9. Number of Agricultural Bank Failures

Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total

1981...... 1 0 0 0 1

1982...... 2 3 3 3 11

1983...... 1 1 2 3 7

1984...... 3 7 10 12 32

1985...... 12 21 17 18 68

1986...... 14 14 21 16 65

1987...... 22 19 12 16 69

1988...... 11 6 12 7 36

1989...... 5 7 5 5 22

1990...... 3 5 6 3 17

1991...... 2 2 3 1 8

1992...... 1 1 1 4 7

1993...... 1 2 2 0 5

1994...... 0 0 0 0 0

1995...... 0 0 0 0 0

1996...... 0 2 0 0 2

1997...... 0 0 0 1 1

1998...... 0 0 1 0 1

1999...... 0 1 0 0 1

2000...... 0 0 0 0 0

2001...... 0 0 0 0 0

2002...... 1 0 0 n.a. n.a.

 Note. Data exclude banks assisted to prevent failure. Industrial banks and

mutual savings banks also are excluded. Agricultural banks are defined in

the introduction to section B.

 n.a. Not available.
Exhibit (10)(a)

    

    

    

    

    

    

    Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

    

    

    

    

    We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in
      Post-Effective Amendment No. 20 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-175691) and Amendment No. 509 to the 1940 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 811-09763),
      and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) April 1, 2019, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln Life & Annuity
      Company of New York and (b) April 16, 2019, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln New York Account N For Variable Annuities for the registration of interests in a separate account under individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.

    

    

                 /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

    

    

    

    

    

    

    

    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

    August 22, 2019
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-20735

ISMENIA R. DAVID,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DAVE & BUSTER’S Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-98-CV-3403

-------------------- July 11, 2000

Before POLITZ, JONES & STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Ismenia R. David appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Dave & Buster’s. Her appeal is limited to her claim

that Dave & Buster’s violated section 510 of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140, by firing

her to prevent her from exercising rights under Dave & Buster’s

ERISA plan. The parties join issue over whether back pay is an

equit able remedy available under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(29 U.S.C. §

1132(a)(3)) or whether it is a form of extracontr actual or

compensatory relief of the sort we have previously held to beNo. 99-20735 -2-

una vailable in ERISA cases. S ee Corcoran v. United HealthCare,

Inc. , 965 F.2d 1321, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1992); Medina v. Anthem Life

Ins. Co.
, 983 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1993); Rogers v. Hartford Life

and Acc. Ins. Co. , 167 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 1999). B ut see
Schwartz v. Gregori , 45 F.3d 1017 (6 th Cir. 1995).

We pretermit the issue. David has waived any challenge to the

district cour t’s conclusion that she was not entitled to plan

benefits by failing to appeal the district court’s summary-judgment

determination that she ha d a preexisting condition which was not

covered by Dave & Bus ter’s’s ERISA plan. Dave & Buster’s could

not, as a matter of law, have int erfered with a benefit to which

David had no entitlement. S ee Perdue v. Burger King Corp.
, 7 F.3d

1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1993); s ee also Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co.
, 200

F.3d 1337, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2000).

AFFIRMED ON ALTERNATE GROUNDS

.
Exhibit 35.1



Servicer Compliance Statement of AmeriCredit Financial Services,
Inc.





This Annual Statement as to Compliance
is delivered to you pursuant to Section 4.10 (a) of the Sale and Servicing Agreement dated as of October 3, 2018 (the “Agreement”)
and Item 1123 of Regulation AB, executed in connection with the formation of AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-3 (the
“Trust”), the issuance of the Notes by the Trust and the closing of the transactions and the execution and delivery
of the various documents by AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (the “Servicer”) and AFS SenSub Corp. in connection
therewith. The capitalized terms used herein shall have the same meanings as in the Agreement.



The undersigned certifies
that I am the Executive Vice President, Corporate Controller and Chief Accounting Officer of the Servicer. I further certify as
follows:



| | 1. | I have conducted, or caused to be conducted under my supervision, a review of the Servicer during
the preceding period from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019, and its performance under the Agreement.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, following such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations
under the Agreement throughout such period, and, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no default in the fulfillment of any
such obligation.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. |                                         | 
|------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------- | 
|                                     |                                         | 
|By:                                  | /s/ Connie Coffey                       | 
|                                     | Connie Coffey                           | 
|                                     | Executive Vice President, Corporate     | 
|                                     | Controller and Chief Accounting Officer |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mark R. Mandeville

v. Civil No. 05-cv-92-JD

Merrimack County Department of Corrections, Superintendent, et al .

ORDE R

On September 26, 2006, Magistrate Judge James R . Muirhead ordered plaintiff to provide

the Court with a current address for Steven Mayo within 20 days or the Court would be required to

dismiss this defendant without prejudice . As no response to this Court order has been filed, it is

herewith ordered that defendant Steven Mayo is dismissed without prejudice .

SO ORDERED.

October 19, 2006

cc: Michael Sheehan, Esq.

John Curran, Esq.

W. Kirk Abbott, Jr., Esq.

Charles Bauer, Esq .

Lisa Lee, Esq .

Ralph Suozzo, Esq.

/s/ Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:05-cv-00092-JD Document 52 Filed 10/19/06 Page 1 of 1
#### In re HOTEL MARTIN CO. OF UTICA. FIRST CITIZENS BANK & TRUST CO. OF UTICA v. MARTIN et al.

No. 209.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Feb. 11, 1938.

Miller, Hubbell & Evans, of Utica, N. Y. (Arthur L. Evans, of Utica, N. Y., of counsel), for appellant.

Mauriee Supiro, of Utica, N. Y., for appellee.

Before MANTON, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The Hotel Martin Company of Utica is in reorganization proceedings, pursuant to section 77B, Bankr.Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 207, and still under the jurisdiction of the court. Mr. Martin, its president, was appointed trustee for the debtor. Neither he nor his property became subject to the jurisdiction of the court. He borrowed moneys from the appellant and gave second mortgage bonds of the debtor as collateral. A judgment has been recovered against Mr. Martin in the New York state court, and the appellant has been restrained by the court below from selling the bonds in satisfaction of the judgment.

The court was without jurisdiction or power to grant the injunction of restraint.

The debtor relies on Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 55 S. Ct. 595, 79 L.Ed. 1110, in support of the order, but there the property restrained from sale was the property of the debtor and the principle of that case is inapplicable. No sufficient reason is advanced why the sale or disposition of the appellee’s bonds would in any wise interfere or affect the reorganization of the debtor as proposed.

Order reversed.