J-A03018-19

____________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: PETITION OF E.M.E.

v.

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE 

AND WESTMORELAND COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL 

HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL 

SERVICES

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 812 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Order May 7, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 5714 of 2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MAY 1, 2019

Appellant, E.M.E., born in August of 1992, appeals from the order 

denying, in part, his petition to expunge his mental health records and restore 

his firearms rights. The trial court granted Appellant relief to possess firearms 

without risk to himself or others pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f) but refused 

to expunge his mental health records. Appellees are the Pennsylvania State 

Police and Westmoreland County Department of Behavioral Health and 

Developmental Services. Upon careful review, we affirm.
J-A03018-19

- 2 -

We summarize the facts of this case as follows: On February 8, 2014, 

pursuant to Section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”),1 50 

P.S. §§ 7101–7503, Appellant was involuntarily committed at Excela Health, 

Westmoreland Regional Hospital, in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. Application 

for Involuntary Emergency Examination and Treatment (“302 Application”), 

2/8/14, at 3; N.T., 3/1/18, at 32, 35. Appellant’s mother related that she had 

been contacted at work by the mother of Appellant’s friend, who advised that

Appellant had threatened to kill himself earlier that evening. 302 Application, 

2/8/14, at 3. Upon returning home, Appellant’s mother found Appellant asleep 

in bed with a firearm. As she removed the firearm, Appellant awoke and 

began destroying items in his bedroom. Id. She ultimately persuaded 

Appellant to go to the hospital voluntarily and drove him there.

Dr. M. Belak evaluated Appellant upon Appellant’s arrival at the hospital 

at 12:34 a.m. on February 8, 2014. Dr. Belak documented that Appellant

____________________________________________

1

 Section 302 of the MHPA provides:

for the involuntary emergency examination and treatment of a 

person not to exceed 120 hours if, upon certification of a physician 

for examination, or upon a warrant issued by a county 

administrator authorizing an examination, an examination 

conducted by a physician within two hours of arrival shows that 

the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency 

treatment. 50 P.S. § 7302(a), (b).

In re J.M.Y., 179 A.3d 1140, 1144 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal 

granted sub nom., In re Petition of J.M.Y., 194 A.3d 121 (Pa. 2018).
J-A03018-19

- 3 -

verbally threatened hospital staff and laughed inappropriately. 302

Application, 2/8/14, at 7. Dr. Belak checked Box A on the form, which 

provides, in pertinent part, that the “patient is severely mentally disabled and 

in need of treatment.” Id. Dr. Belak recommended inpatient psychiatric 

treatment.2 Id. Appellant testified that he was hospitalized for four days. 

N.T., 3/1/18, at 42.

On November 29, 2017, Appellant filed a petition to vacate and expunge 

mental health records pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1)3 and 18 Pa.C.S. § 

6111.1(g)4 (“Petition”) to obtain various relief from the prohibition to possess 

firearms. Following a hearing5 on March 1, 2018, the trial court denied the 

petition to expunge on May 7, 2018, but granted Appellant’s request to 

____________________________________________

2

 “[P]ursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(4), a person who has been involuntarily 

committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under 

sections 302, 303, or 304 of the MHPA is prohibited from possessing, using, 

controlling, selling, transferring, or manufacturing a firearm.” J.M.Y., 179 

A.3d at 1142 n.1.

3 “Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1), the court of common pleas, upon application 

of a person subject to prohibition under [S]ection 6105(c)(4), ‘may grant such 

relief as it deems appropriate if the court determines that the applicant may 

possess a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other person.’” J.M.Y., 

179 A.3d at 1142 n.2.

4 “Section 6111.1(g)(2) provides a means for expungement of records of 

[S]ection 302 involuntary commitment where the evidence was insufficient to 

justify such commitment.” J.M.Y., 179 A.3d at 1142 n.3.

5 Appellant and Mr. Richard Kirk Matson, the Administrator of Westmoreland 

County Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, 

testified at the hearing.
J-A03018-19

- 4 -

possess firearms. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court did 

not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

ISSUE I. Is a diagnosis of mental illness recorded within the 

examining physician’s findings the Sine Qua Non of a valid 302 

involuntary emergency examination and treatment without which 

a 302 must be held to be invalid?

ISSUE II. Is the statutorily required designation of the 

facility essential to a valid 302?

ISSUE III. Is clear and convincing always the standard of 

proof required for evaluating the validity of a section 302 

involuntary emergency examination and treatment when a 

petitioner avers violations of constitutional rights and violations of 

the due process protections and procedural mandates of the 

MHPA?

ISSUE IV. Must the MHPA be strictly enforced?

ISSUE V. Does a petitioner waive averred violations of the 

due process protections and procedural mandates of the 

Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (hereinafter “MHPA”) 

when a petitioner includes a request for expungement based on 

Section 6111.1(g) within a petition for expungement?

Appellant’s Brief6 at 2–3.

“Our well settled standard of review in cases involving a motion for 

expunction is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” J.M.Y., 179 A.3d 

at 1143 (citing In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016, 1022 (Pa. Super. 2013)). Relying 

upon Keyes and Commonwealth v. Smerconish, 112 A.3d 1260 (Pa. 

____________________________________________

6 While Appellant’s brief is more than double the thirty-page guide set forth 

in Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a), counsel has filed a certificate of compliance that the 

word count does not exceed 14,000. Appellant’s Brief at unnumbered 

Appendix 1. Therefore, the brief is compliant with Pa.R.A.P. 2135(d).
J-A03018-19

- 5 -

Super. 2015), the trial court determined that while the Psychological 

Assessment dated May 24, 2017, authored by psychologist Richard W. Pritts 

and presented to the court at the March 1, 2018 hearing, did not state “a 

specific opinion as to [Appellant’s] ability to safely possess a firearm,” the 

psychologist’s cover sheet of his report provided “sufficient language for the 

[c]ourt to make a determination on [the] issue.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/18, 

at 2; N.T., 3/1/18, at 32. The trial court concluded, however, that it did not 

have the authority to expunge an involuntary commitment on that basis. Trial 

Court Opinion, 5/7/18, at 3. The trial court held that it was “more likely than 

not” that the involuntary commitment was appropriate and that the court 

complied with all requirements of the MHPA. The trial court determined that 

the “numerous and general issues raised throughout the petition” were 

“vaguely pled and unsubstantiated.” Id. at 6–7. Thus, the court entered an 

order granting Appellant the ability to possess firearms pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6105(f) but denied expungement of Appellant’s mental health and 

involuntary commitment and treatment records. Order, 5/7/18.

Appellant first asserts that there was no diagnosis of mental illness 

regarding Appellant on the 302 Application, and therefore, the involuntary 

emergency examination, hospitalization, and treatment Appellant underwent

in 2014 violated the requirements of the Pennsylvania MHPA. Appellant’s Brief 
J-A03018-19

- 6 -

at 15–20, 23, 27–28. In support, Appellant cites 50 P.S. §§ 7102, 7103, and 

7301.

7

 Those sections provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 7102. Statement of policy

It is the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to seek to 

assure the availability of adequate treatment to persons who are 

mentally ill, and it is the purpose of this act to establish procedures 

whereby this policy can be effected.

* * *

§ 7103. Scope of act

This act establishes rights and procedures for all involuntary 

treatment of mentally ill persons, whether inpatient or 

outpatient . . . .

* * *

§ 7301. Persons who may be subject to involuntary 

emergency examination and treatment

a) Persons Subject.--Whenever a person is severely mentally 

disabled and in need of immediate treatment, he may be made 

subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment. A 

person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental 

illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and 

discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to 

care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a 

clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.

While the exact nature of Appellant’s first complaint is nebulous, it 

appears he is challenging the validity of his 302 commitment. Appellant cites 

In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017), at length, but to what end is unclear. 

____________________________________________

7

 While these sections will be amended by Act No. 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 690, 

No. 106, effective April 22, 2019, the quoted language of the MHPA is as it 

existed when Appellant was hospitalized.
J-A03018-19

- 7 -

Appellant’s Brief at 22, 35–41. It appears that Appellant contends that when 

evaluating the evidence supporting the 302 commitment in this case, the trial 

court could not look “beyond the four corners of the FINDINGS of the 

examining physician as recorded on page 7 of 7 of the 302 Application.” Id. 

at 41. Appellant suggests that an examination of the 302 Application reveals 

that it lacked a “diagnosis of mental illness reported within the findings of the 

examining physician in the ‘FINDINGS’ section.” Id. at 14. Based on this 

claim, Appellant asserts that the record must be expunged. Id. at 15, 17, 41.

In this case, the record establishes unequivocally that Section 302(a) of 

the MHPA was not violated. “This provision protects critical liberty interests 

and establishes the procedures by which a person may be involuntarily 

detained.” In re A.J.N., 144 A.3d 130, 139 (Pa. Super. 2016). After 

threatening suicide and falling asleep in bed with a firearm, Appellant, 

accompanied by his mother, voluntarily proceeded to the hospital. Within 

sixty-five minutes of his arrival at the hospital, Dr. Belak examined Appellant 

and concluded that Appellant was severely mentally disabled and in need of 

in-patient treatment. 302 Application, 2/8/14, at 7. The trial court stated:

[Appellant] focuses on opinions/legal arguments that the 

302 Application form does not contain a specific medical/mental 

illness diagnosis, that the “FINDINGS” section on the form does 

not verify that the physician read the statements contained in the 

“Describe in detail” section of the form and that merely placing a 

check mark in box A indicating that “The patient is severely 

mentally disabled and in need of treatment. He should be 

admitted to a facility designated by the County Administrator for 

a period of treatment not to exceed 120 hours[]” is insufficient. 
J-A03018-19

- 8 -

Based on those issues and arguments, [Appellant] concludes that 

those deficiencies should result in an invalid commitment.

This [c]ourt concludes that the 302 Application form must 

be taken and viewed in its totality as opposed to analyzing each 

section independently of each other. Page 3 of that form indicates 

that mother of [Appellant] stated that [Appellant] was drinking 

and was threatening to kill himself. His friend’s mother called 

[Appellant’s] mother at her work. She then proceeds home and 

found [Appellant] sleeping on the bed with a gun placed on the 

bed. When she informed him that he needed to go to 

Westmoreland Hospital to get help, she stated that he started 

destroying and breaking items in his room which resulted in her 

calling 911. She further states that [Appellant] stated repeatedly 

that he wanted to kill himself, stating he had nothing to live for.

Page 7 of the Application form actually provides new 

information under the category of Results of Examination. There 

the doctor indicates that “[Appellant] was brought to [the 

hospital] because he threatened to shoot himself. In the 

[hospital] he made verbal threats to staff, attacked staff and 

laughed inappropriately during situation.” The doctor then 

followed the proper requirement by indicating what treatment was 

needed and checked box A as indicated above.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/18, at 3–4. The trial court further noted that 

Appellant proceeded to Westmoreland Hospital voluntarily, and it was only

after the situation in the emergency room disintegrated and Appellant became 

uncooperative that “the proper administrator or delegate approved the proper 

warrant procedure.” Id. at 5; see also N.T., 3/1/18, at 42 (Q. “[W]hen your 

mother took you to the hospital, did your mother take you to the hospital 

against your will, or did you agree to go with your mother? A. I agreed to 

go.”). Thus, the trial court found that sufficient evidence existed to support 

the commitment, and therefore, expungement pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. 
J-A03018-19

- 9 -

§ 6111.1(g)(2) was inappropriate. As our review of the record comports with 

that of the trial court, we agree and find no merit to Appellant’s first issue.

In his second issue, Appellant contends that because Westmoreland 

Regional Hospital was not designated a treatment facility in 2014, there could 

not have been a valid involuntary examination pursuant to the MHPA. 

Appellant’s Brief at 42. The trial court expressly rejected this contention. We 

agree with the trial court’s explanation, as follows:

As stated by the Administrator of the Westmoreland County Office 

of Behavioral Health And Developmental Services, it was testified 

that the administrator brought to the hearing all documents which 

establish, list[,] and/or identify Westmoreland Hospital as having 

been approved and designated by the administrator of 

Westmoreland County Behavioral Health and Developmental 

Services for the purpose of being a treatment facility at which a 

person could be subject to emergency examination and conformity 

with the requirements of Section 7302 of the Mental Health 

Procedures Act and Section 5100.81 (a) of the Pennsylvania Code. 

(Page 20 of transcript). This [c]ourt provided an opportunity to 

all counsel to review said documents. Further, on page 22 of the 

transcript, the witness testifies that he also brought a copy of the 

approved plan which was developed jointly by the County 

administrator [and] the facility director in order to be in 

compliance with the requirements of Section 5100.81(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Code. While specific copies of the newspaper ads or 

other documentation of publications were not produced from 2013 

or 2014, this [c]ourt does not view that as a fatal flaw. Once again 

the [c]ourt provided an opportunity for all counsel to review the 

approved plan document.

Further, even if the facility has not been properly approved, 

nevertheless, as cited by the Pennsylvania State Police, 50 P.S. 

§ 7103 states in pertinent part that “for the purpose of this act, a 

“facility” means any mental health establishment, hospital, clinic, 

institution, center, day care center, base service unit, community 

mental health center, or part thereof, that provides for the 

diagnosis, treatment, care or rehabilitation of mentally ill persons, 

whether as outpatients or inpatients.” Section 105 further states 
J-A03018-19

- 10 -

that a treatment facility only requires approval of a facility by state 

or local authorities if the treatment of an individual is “... funded 

in whole or in part by public moneys....” Pennsylvania State Police 

then notes in its Memorandum that on pages 45 and 45 [sic] of 

the transcript that [Appellant] testified that at the time of his 302 

Commitment he was on his mother’s health insurance and that 

after his hospitalization he recalled paperwork arriving at the 

family home relative to this issue. As such, there is no evidence 

of record in this case that [Appellant’s] involuntary examination, 

or treatment was funded by public monies.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/18, at 5–6. We conclude that Appellant’s argument 

in this regard lacks merit.

Finally, we find that issues III through V are waived. Appellant’s brief 

is vague and nebulous regarding specific claims. In actuality, the brief is a 

hodgepodge of precepts and rhetorical musings, and it lacks specific citation 

to relevant case law in support. For example, in Issue III, Appellant posits 

that “[c]lear and convincing [is] always the standard of proof required for 

evaluating the validity of a section 302 involuntary emergency examination 

and treatment . . . .” Appellant’s Brief at 48. Appellant fails to cite any case 

law to support this averment, but more significantly, fails to connect the 

representation to the instant case. Appellant also suggests that this Court, in 

In re Jacobs, 15 A.3d 509 (Pa. Super. 2011), misquoted In re Hancock, 

719 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Pa. Super. 1998), but the quoted language in the brief 

is a verbatim quotation from Hancock. Appellant’s Brief at 50.

In Issue IV, Appellant opines, “Strict Enforcement of the requirements 

of the MHPA is required.” Appellant’s Brief at 51. Once again, Appellant

presents broad legal concepts without any explanation or connection to the 
J-A03018-19

- 11 -

instant case. Appellant cites multiple pages from A.J.N., 144 A.3d 130, and 

In re Chiumento, 688 A.2d 217 (Pa. Super. 1997), but never suggests or 

explains their applicability to the instant case. Appellant’s Brief at 54–61.

In Issue V, Appellant posits that “violations of constitutional rights and 

the due process protections and procedural mandates of the MHPA” cannot be 

waived. Appellant’s Brief at 63–64. Appellant fails to provide any substance 

or meaningful exposition of the law in support. Our comments in J.C.B. v. 

Pennsylvania State Police, 35 A.3d 792 (Pa. Super. 2012), are particularly 

apt:

As to [the a]ppellant’s constitutionality challenges, we find 

that these issues have been waived by [the appellant because he 

has failed to fully develop them. See Commonwealth v. 

Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that 

undeveloped claims will not be considered on appeal). Although 

in his brief [the a]ppellant repeatedly references and presents 

some discussion regarding his constitutional challenges, such 

references and discussions are general in nature and lack specific 

assailments of the MHPA and the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms 

Act vis á vis the federal and state constitutions. See [the 

a]ppellee Pennsylvania State Police Brief at 8–10 (explaining that 

[the a]ppellant’s constitutional claims consist of “bald assertions” 

that were not adequately raised and preserved with the trial court, 

and that [the a]ppellant has failed to provide “any real explanation

of how the facts of [the a]ppellant’s case violated any specific 

provision of either the state or federal constitution, or even cite to 

how those provisions were applied and reviewed beyond basic 

citation”).

Id. at 797.

Instantly, the trial court held that Appellant’s constitutional claims were 

“vaguely pled and unsubstantiated,” and we agree. Trial Court Opinion, 

5/7/18, at 6–7. Moreover, “[i]t is not the role of this Court to develop an 
J-A03018-19

- 12 -

appellant’s argument where the brief provides mere cursory legal discussion. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 925 (Pa. 2009); In re C.R., 113 

A.3d 328, 336 (Pa. Super. 2015) (This Court will not consider an argument 

where an appellant fails to “otherwise develop the issue.”).

For all of these reasons, we affirm the May 7, 2018 order denying 

expungement of Appellant’s mental health records and granting Appellant’s 

possession of firearms without risk to himself or others pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6105(f).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/1/2019