COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ROBERT LYNN SINK 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0225-98-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 DECEMBER 15, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

Clifford R. Weckstein, Judge 

 Randy V. Cargill (Magee, Foster, Goldstein & 

Sayers, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Robert L. Sink was convicted in a bench trial of driving 

after having been declared an habitual offender as a subsequent 

offense in violation of Code § 46.2-357. Sink contends that 

because he was a Florida resident and possessed a valid Florida 

driver's license, the evidence was insufficient to convict him. 

Because obtaining a Florida operator's license did not restore 

Sink's privilege to drive in Virginia, we find the evidence 

sufficient to sustain the conviction and affirm the trial court's 

ruling. 

BACKGROUND

 On September 2, 1975, Sink was adjudicated an habitual 

offender and was barred from operating a motor vehicle on the 

highways of the Commonwealth for ten years and "until permitted 

to do so by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction." In 
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1978 and again in 1987, Sink was convicted of driving after 

having been declared an habitual offender. 

 In December 1995, Sink moved to Florida, where he obtained a 

driver's license. According to Sink, he first obtained a 

Virginia license but two days later the Virginia division of 

motor vehicles informed him that it was invalid. Sink testified 

that he surrendered his Virginia license to the Florida division 

of motor vehicles, attended an alcohol safety program, and 

satisfactorily completed a psychiatric evaluation that indicated 

he was capable of driving. Sink testified that after he obtained 

a Florida license he believed he was authorized to drive in 

Virginia. He explained that, after completing all licensing 

requirements imposed by Florida, he understood that the Florida 

division of motor vehicles had informed Virginia of his status as 

a licensed driver. He concedes that his privilege to drive had 

not been restored by a Virginia court pursuant to Code 

§ 46.2-356. 

 In 1997, when Sink traveled to Roanoke, a Roanoke city 

police officer stopped Sink and charged him with driving after 

having been declared an habitual offender. Sink was convicted of 

a second or subsequent offense of driving after having been 

declared an habitual offender and appeals that conviction. 

 The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to convict 

Sink of driving after having been adjudged an habitual offender 

where the undisputed evidence proved that Sink was a Florida 
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resident, had obtained a valid Florida operator's license, and 

more than ten years had elapsed since Sink had been adjudged an 

habitual offender. 

ANALYSIS

 Whether Sink was guilty of violating the order declaring him 

an habitual offender and prohibiting him from driving requires 

reconciliation of the habitual offender statutes and the statute 

exempting nonresidents from the requirement of obtaining a 

Virginia license to drive in Virginia. Resolution of this issue 

depends upon the interpretation of Code §§ 46.2-356, 46.2-357 and 

46.2-307. Although the trial court's findings of historical fact 

are binding on appeal unless plainly wrong, we review the trial 

court's statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo. 

See Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 193, 503 S.E.2d 

233, 235-36 (1998). 

 Code § 46.2-357 defines the felony of driving after having 

been adjudicated an habitual offender: "It shall be unlawful for 

any person to drive any motor vehicle . . . on the highways of 

this Commonwealth while the revocation of the person's driving 

privilege remains in effect." Code § 46.2-356 provides the 

period during which an habitual offender may not be relicensed: 

"No license to drive . . . shall be issued to an habitual 

offender (i) for a period of ten years from the date of any final 

order . . . finding the person to be an habitual offender and 

(ii) until the privilege of the person to drive . . . has been 
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restored by an order of a court entered in a proceeding as 

provided in this article." 

 Code § 46.2-307 states: "A nonresident over the age of 

sixteen years who has been duly licensed as a driver under a law 

requiring the licensing of drivers in his home state or country 

. . . shall be permitted, without a Virginia license, to drive a 

motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth." Sink argues 

that while Code §§ 46.2-356 and 46.2-357 appear to forbid him 

from driving, Code § 46.2-307 specifically authorizes him to 

drive in Virginia. 

 Sink argues that the statute authorizing a nonresident 

licensee to drive in Virginia is clear and admits of no 

exception. He contends the two statutes are not in conflict and 

that the habitual offender statute does not apply to a 

nonresident licensee authorized to drive pursuant to Code 

§ 46.2-307. The principles governing statutory interpretation 

are well established: 

 "`[T]he primary objective of statutory 

construction is to ascertain and give effect 

to legislative intent.'" In interpreting 

statutes, "courts should give the fullest 

possible effect to the legislative intent 

embodied in the entire statutory enactment." 

 To do so, "[t]wo statutes which are closely 

interrelated must be read and construed 

together and effect given to all their 

provisions." Potentially conflicting 

statutes should be harmonized to give force 

and effect to each. 

Zamani v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 59, 63, 492 S.E.2d 854, 856 

(1997) (citations omitted). Applying these principles of 
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statutory construction, we hold that Code § 46.2-307 does not 

authorize a nonresident licensee to drive in Virginia in direct 

violation of an habitual offender order. 

 The habitual offender statutes, particularly the statute 

defining the felony of driving after having been declared an 

habitual offender, Code § 46.2-357, and the statute authorizing a 

nonresident licensee to drive in Virginia, Code § 46.2-307, are 

not in conflict. They address different areas of concern. The 

latter applies to licensure; the former applies to revoking a 

person's privilege to drive in Virginia regardless of licensure 

and irrespective of whether the person is a resident or 

nonresident. The habitual offender statute expressly applies to 

both "resident[s] or nonresident[s]." Code § 46.2-351. Code 

§ 46.2-300 prohibits driving without a license. A resident or 

nonresident who possesses a valid license is not in violation of 

Code § 46.2-300. However, if the person's privilege to drive in 

Virginia has been revoked upon having been declared an habitual 

offender, the privilege can be restored only by a court of 

competent jurisdiction pursuant to Code §§ 46.2-358 through 

46.2-361. Obtaining or possessing a valid out-of-state 

operator's license does not restore an habitual offender's 

privilege to drive in Virginia. Thus, although Florida may 

legitimately issue Sink a Florida driver's license, its action 

does not affect Sink's status as an habitual offender in Virginia 

because Florida has no authority to declare that Sink is not an 
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habitual offender in Virginia. In accordance with the plain 

language of Code § 46.2-361, only a Virginia court may restore an 

habitual offender's privilege to drive, and neither the Virginia 

nor the Florida division of motor vehicles has authority to do 

so. 

 Code § 46.2-307, which concerns a nonresident's license to 

drive, has no bearing on habitual offenders or on the definition 

of the felony of driving after having been declared an habitual 

offender. Code § 46.2-307 does not address the privilege of an 

habitual offender to drive in Virginia. Neither the explicit 

language nor the logical implications of the statute authorizes 

other states to restore an habitual offender's privilege to drive 

after a Virginia court has revoked it. 

 Therefore, because Sink had not had his privilege to drive 

in Virginia restored, he continued to be an habitual offender and 

the fact that he possessed a valid Florida operator's license did 

not restore his privilege to drive in Virginia. Accordingly, we 

affirm the trial court's conviction. 

 Affirmed.