J-S42025-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

REJEANA MARIA SILLA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1541 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0013554-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: JANUARY 10, 2023

Appellant, ReJeana Maria Silla, appeals pro se from the order entered 

on October 22, 2021, which dismissed her petition filed under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On February 18, 2014, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to 

possessing instruments of crime, disorderly conduct, prostitution, and 

possessing a controlled substance.

1

 That day, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to serve the negotiated term of nine months of probation. N.T. 

Guilty Plea and Sentencing Hearing, 2/18/14, at 7-8. Appellant did not file a 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 907(a), 5503(a)(3), 5902(a)(1), and 35 P.S.

§ 780-113(a)(16), respectively.
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direct appeal from her judgment of sentence and she completed her sentence 

of probation on November 17, 2014. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/28/22, at 3.

On November 21, 2019, Appellant filed a PCRA petition. Within the 

petition, Appellant sought to withdraw her February 18, 2014 guilty plea 

because, she claimed, she was forced to plead guilty and the arresting officer 

later told her that he was “told to lie.” See Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 

11/21/19, at 3-7.

Since this was Appellant’s first petition for post-conviction collateral 

relief, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent her in the proceedings. 

However, on January 30, 2020, appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw 

as counsel and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 

Super. 1988) (en banc). 

On February 5, 2021, the PCRA court granted counsel leave to withdraw 

and issued Appellant notice that it intended to dismiss her petition in 20 days 

without holding a hearing. PCRA Court Order, 2/5/21, at 1; see also

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). As the PCRA court later explained, it granted counsel 

leave to withdraw and issued the 20-day notice because Appellant was no 

longer serving a sentence of probation for her convictions and Appellant filed 

her petition outside of the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 4/28/22, at 2-3. 
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Appellant filed a response to the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss 

on March 3, 2021. Nevertheless, the PCRA court finally dismissed Appellant’s 

petition on October 22, 2021. PCRA Court Order, 10/22/21, at 1. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant contends

that the PCRA court erred in construing her petition under the PCRA. 

According to Appellant, the PCRA does not encompass her claims and, 

therefore, the requirements of the PCRA do not apply to her petition. 

Appellant's contention fails and the PCRA court properly dismissed her

petition.

We “review an order granting or denying PCRA relief to determine 

whether the PCRA court's decision is supported by evidence of record and 

whether its decision is free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 

A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. 2003).

The PCRA “provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes 

they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain 

collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. As the statute declares, the PCRA “is 

the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other 

common law and statutory remedies . . . including habeas corpus and coram 

nobis.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. 

1997). Thus, under the plain terms of the PCRA, “if the underlying substantive 

claim is one that could potentially be remedied under the PCRA, that claim is 

exclusive to the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (emphasis in original).
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Within Appellant's petition, Appellant requested to withdraw her plea, 

as her plea was coerced and the arresting officer informed her that he was 

“told to lie.” See Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 11/21/19, at 3-7. However, the 

PCRA undoubtedly encompasses Appellant's claims, as the claims concern 

“matters affecting [Appellant's] conviction [or] sentence.” Commonwealth 

v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007), quoting Coady v. Vaughn, 770 

A.2d 287, 293 (Pa. 2001) (Castille, J., concurring); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9542 (“[the PCRA] provides for an action by which persons convicted of 

crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain 

collateral relief”).

Appellant's claims thus fall under the rubric of the PCRA and, since the 

PCRA encompasses Appellant's claims, Appellant “can only find relief under 

the PCRA's strictures.” Pagan, 864 A.2d at 1233; see also Commonwealth 

v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[petitioner's legality of 

sentence] claim is cognizable under the PCRA. . . . [Thus, petitioner's] ‘motion 

to correct illegal sentence’ is a PCRA petition and cannot be considered under 

any other common law remedy”).

To be eligible for relief under the PCRA:

the petitioner must be “currently serving a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i). As soon as [her] sentence is 

completed, the petitioner becomes ineligible for relief, 

regardless of whether [she] was serving [her] sentence when 

[she] filed the petition. In addition, this [C]ourt determined 

in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 703 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super.

1997), that the PCRA precludes relief for those petitioners 
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whose sentences have expired, regardless of the collateral 

consequences of their sentence. Id. at 716 (citations 

omitted).

Commonwealth v. Hart, 911 A.2d 939, 941–942 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some

citations omitted).2

On February 18, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve nine 

months of probation. Appellant's sentence was effective immediately, and she

completed her sentence of probation on November 17, 2014. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 4/28/22, at 3. Appellant has thus completed serving her sentence 

on the crimes for which she seeks relief.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 9543 of the PCRA, Appellant cannot now 

obtain collateral relief on her underlying convictions or sentence, as her

sentence is complete. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, 832 A.2d 1141, 

1143 (Pa. Super. 2003) (affirming dismissal of PCRA petition because 

petitioner completed serving the sentence on the crime for which he sought 

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2

In relevant part, Section 9543 of the PCRA declares:

(a) General rule.--To be eligible for relief under [the PCRA], the 

petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence all of the following:

(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under 

the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time relief is 

granted:

(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation 

or parole for the crime[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i).
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relief); Commonwealth v. Fields, 197 A.3d 1217, 1222 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(en banc) (plurality) (“section 9543 requires that a petitioner be serving a 

sentence of incarceration at the time relief is granted; if they are not, they 

are ineligible for post-conviction relief”) (emphasis omitted). Given that 

Appellant can no longer obtain relief because she is not currently serving a 

sentence, dismissal of Appellant's PCRA petition was proper, and we may not 

consider the merits of Appellant's claims on appeal.

3

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/10/2023 

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3 We further note that dismissal was also proper because Appellant filed her 

petition outside of the PCRA’s one-year time-bar and she did not plead a valid 

statutory exception to the time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Thus, since 

Appellant's PCRA petition is manifestly untimely and Appellant did not plead 

any of the statutory exceptions to the one-year time-bar, our “courts are 

without jurisdiction to offer [Appellant] any form of relief.” Commonwealth 

v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011).