T his c aus e w as tr ie d w ith Ca use N o. 5292 i n the tr ia l c ourt. I n Ca use N o. 5292, the jur

y c onv ic te d a

ppel la nt of pos se ss ion 1 of c ocaine in th e a

m ou nt o f one gram or m ore bu t less than four gram s. A pp ellant pleaded true to an enh ancem ent allega tion in that ca use , a nd the jur y a ss es se d his punis hm ent

at tw ent y y ea rs c onf ine m ent . A

ppel la nt ha s f ile d a s epa rate a ppea l – Ca

use N o. 11- 08- 00091-C R – f

rom his c onv ic tion in th at c au se , a nd the c onv ic tion is a f

f irm ed this s am e day

in a se par at e opinion. T he tri al c ourt orde re d tha

t t he se nte nce in this c aus e run c oncur re ntly w ith the s ent enc e in C aus e No. 5292. Opinion filed July16 , 2 009



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

___________ 

### No. 1 1- 08 -0 00 92 -CR

____ ____ __ GAR Y S HAWN DIX ON, Ap pellant

V.
STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee

On App eal from the 50th Distric t Court Baylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 5297

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Th e jur y c on vic te d G ary

Sha wn Di xon of po sse ssi on of c oc a ine in the a mou nt of fo ur g ra ms or more but less than two hundred g rams. Appellant plea ded true to an enha nceme nt alleg ation, and the jur y a sse sse d p un ish me nt at ni ne ty y e ars c on fi ne me nt. We a ff ir m. 1 Introduction Appellant does not challeng e the suff iciency of the e vidence to support his conviction. He challenge s the leg ality

of the wa

rra ntless searc h that led to the seizure of the coca ine. Appellant2

contends that Sey

mour Police Off

icer J ohn H. Wi l k erson Jr. discovere d the coc aine a s a re sult of tr e sp a ssi ngon to his pr op e rt y . Ap pe lla

nt argue s that, be c a

us e of the tr e sp a ss, the se arc h w a s il le g a l. Th e State c on te nd s th a t app e lla nt g a ve c on se nt to Of

fi c e r Wilke rs on to en te r his ba c ky ard and tha t, there fore , the discover

y o f t he coc aine did not re sult from an illeg al sea rch. A ppellant ra ised the consent issue in a mot ion to suppress and at the hea ring on his moti on to suppress. The tria l court denied appellant’ s motion. The consent issue was hotly contested at trial, and the trial court instructed the jury on the i ssue pursuant to Article 38.23(a) of the Code of Criminal Proce dure. See T EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN . art. 38.23(a ) (Ve rnon 2005). Appellant also raised the consent issue in a motion for new tr ial and motion in arre st of judgme nt, which the trial c ourt also denied. Issues on Appe al Appellant pre sents three points of e rror for revie w. I n his f irst point, he asser

ts that the trial court e rre d in overrulinghis motion to suppr ess beca use the State fa iled to prove c onsent by clea r and convinc ing e vid en ce
. I n his second point, he asse rts that the trial cour t misst ated the State’ s burden of proof on the consent issue in its instructions to the j ury and that, ther efor e, the tria l court

err ed in over

ruling his objections to the instructions. I n his t h i rd p oint, he contends that the tria l

c ourt e rr e d in ov e rr uli nghis mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l a

nd mot ion in a rr e st o f j ud g me nt. De nia l of Ap pe lla nt’ s M oti on to S up pr ess A tri al co u rt ’s denial of a motion to s uppress is re viewed f or an a buse of discr etion. Ba le nti nev . S

tate , 7 1 S.W.3 d 7 63 , 7 68 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). At a he ari ngon

a mot ion to suppress, the tria l c ourt is the sole judg e of the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s and the we ight to be g iven their testimony

. Ga rza v . S tate , 213 S.W .3d 338, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court may choose to be lieve or disbelieve a ny or all of a witness’s testimony

. Id. ; Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 85 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). I n r e vie wi nga tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g on

a mot ion to s up pr e ss, an a

pp e llate court must view the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the r uling. Sta te v . Ke lly , 204 S.W .3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). W e m u s t give g reat defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s finding s of historical fa cts as long as the re cord suppor ts the findings. T

o r r es v
. S t a te , 1 8 2 S

. W

. 3d 899, 902 (T e x. Cr im

. App. 20 05 ); Gu zm an v . S tate , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When, as here , a trial court makes expli cit fac t finding s, the appellate court deter mines whether

the evidenc e, wh e n v ie we d in

the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g , s up po rt s th os e fact fi nd ing s.3

Ke lly , 204 S.W .3d at 818. We also g ive def ere nce to the tr ial court’s rulings on mix ed questions of law and f act whe n those ruling s turn on an eva l u at i o n o f cre dibilit y and deme anor. Guzman , 955 S.W .2d at 89. Where suc h ruling s do not turn on an ev al u at i o n o f credibility and deme anor, w e revie w t h e trial court’ s actions de novo. Id. ; Da v ila v . S tate , 4 S. W. 3 d

8 4 4 , 8 4 7

- 4 8 ( T e x. App.—Eastland 1999, no pe t.). I n deter mining whe ther a

trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is supported by the

rec ord, we g ener ally

only consider e vidence adduce d at the suppre ssion hearingbeca use the trial court’s r uling wa s based on it rather than e vidence prese nt ed later at trial. Ra c ha l v . S

tate , 917 S.W .2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). However , wher e, as in this cause , the suppression issue has bee n consensua lly

re- litigated by

the par ties during the trial on the mer its, we may also consider rele vant trial evide nce in our revie w. Id. There fore , in review ing the trial court’ s rul ing on appellant’ s motion t o suppress, we will consider the e vidence adduce d at t h e s u p p re s sion hearing and re levant trial e vidence

. Offic er Wilkerson and a

ppellant testified at the suppr ession hear ing. O ffice r Wilkerson and Charles Ly

nch provide d testimony

at trial that wa s rele vant to a deter mination of the consent issue. The re cord shows that, on J une 14, 2006, at about 4:05 a.m., appe llant placed a 911 call. Appe llant repor ted that J ohn Mitchell had attempted t o ru n over Ly nch with a ve hicle in appe llant’s y ard. Ap pe lla nt l ive d at 40 1 Ea st Rei man Stre e t in Se y mou r. Of fi c e r Wilke rs on wa s disp a tc he d to the c a ll. When O ffice r Wil kerson arr ived at appellant’ s house, appellant and Ly nch we re on the front porc h. Ap pe lla nt a nd L y nc h h a d b e e n d

ri nk ingbe e r a ll n ig ht a

nd we re int oxica ted . App e lla nt t old Of fi c e r Wi lke rs on

tha t, a bo ut f if te e n o r t we nty min ute s e arl ie r, Mit c he ll h a d d ri vena ve hic le int o the y ard a nd had atte m p t ed t o strike Ly nch with it. Office r Wilkerson did not find any phy sical evidenc e at the sc ene, suc h as tire tra cks, to s u p p o rt appellant’ s claim as to what ha d occur red. Offic er Wilkerson then we nt to talk with Mitchell, who lived a block or two awa y from appe llant’s house. Off

icer Wil kerson testified that Mitche ll’s story conflicte d with a ppellant’s story

. Ba sed on his inv e sti g a tio n, Of

fi c e r M itc he ll d e te rm ine d th a t he did no t have pr ob a ble c a us e to arr e st M itc he ll. Offic er Wilkerson re turned to appellant’s house and informed a ppellant that he did not have

su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e or

pr ob a ble c a us e to a rr e st M itc he ll a

nd that, t he re fo re , h e wa s n ot g oin g to a rr e st Mit c he ll. Of

fi c e r Wi lke rs on

te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt be lie ve d Mit c he ll wo uld c ome ba c k to his ho us e4

and ca use m ore problems. Acc ording to Office r Wilkerson’s testimony , he advise d appellant that he could hide in a

ppellant’s backy ar d , i f appellant wa nted him to do so, and wait to see whe ther Mitchell returne d and did something else. Of fice r Wilkerson expl ained to appe llant that, if he we re to see Mitchell commit an off ense, he could then ar

rest Mitchell. Offic er Wilkerson testified that appellant responded, “That’s cool.” Offic er W ilkerson s aid t hat appe llant ga ve him consent to be in h is b a c ky ard

and that Ly nc h h e ard a pp e lla nt g ive him

c on se nt. Offic er Wilkerson moved his patrol c ar out o f s i gh t and then hid in appe llant’s backyard. Offic er Wilkerson testified that a ppellant saw him “g oing a round the ba ck.” A

ppellant’s house was

on a cor ner lot, and O ff

i ce r W i l k er s o n positioned himself in the backy ard in a location wher e he could see activity

on East Reiman Stree t an d t h e st ree t goingby the side of a

ppellant’s house. Offic er Wilkerson testified that he was a bout twenty -five or thirty fee t away

from the ba ck of

a pp e lla nt’ s h ou se. Af

te r O ff ic e r Wi lke rs on

ha d b e e n in

the ba c ky a

rd fo r a bo ut f if te e n mi nu te s, appellant c ame out of the back door of the house. A

ppellant walke d to a bar

becue pit that was in the backyard, ope ned the lid of the barbecue pit, and took something out of the pit. Offic er Wilkerson shined his flashlight on a

ppellant and obse rved a

small bag containing what he believed to be c rac k

coca ine in appe l l an t ’s hand. Of fice r Wilkerson asked a

ppellant to come to him but appellant ra n back into the house . Offic er Wilkerson cha sed appe llant throug h the house, a nd they both e x ited the house throug h the front door . Appell ant jumped off the front porc h and sustained a n ankle injury when he landed. Appe llant was ly ing stomach-down, with his hands under neath him, just in front of the porc h. Ultimately , appellant r emoved his hands f rom underne ath him, a

nd Offic er Wilkerson place d him in handcuffs. O ffice r Wilkerson rolled appe llant over onto his side to s ee if appe llant had any wea

pons. At that time, Office r Wilkerson discovere d the bagthat appellant ha d retrie ved fr om t he ba rb e c ue pit . A

pp e lla nt h a d b e e n ly

ingon the ba g b efore Of

fi c e r Wi lke rs on

ro lle d h im over. Te sting of the substance in the ba g reve aled that it we ighe d 4.43 g rams and c ontained coc aine. At the suppression hear ing, appellant testified that he made the 911 call and report ed that Mit c he ll h a d a lmo st r

un ov e r L y nc h in his y ard

. Ap pe lla

nt sa id that Of

fi c e r Wilk e rs on c a me to h is ho us e and

sp ok e wi th L

y nc h a nd him . App e lla

nt a lso sa id that Of

fi c e r Wi lke rs on

late r r e tur

ne d to his ho us e , to ld him that he ha d spo ke n w ithMit c he ll, and tol d h im that he c ou ld n ot a rr e st M itc he ll. Acc ording to appellant, Officer Wil kerson sa id that “he wa s g oing to ke ep a c lose ey e on both of us.”5

Appellant testified that Offic er W ilkerson di d not ask for permission to hide i n his backyard a nd that he did not g ive per

mission t o Offic er Wilkerson to be in his backyard. At tr ia l, L y nc h te sti fi e d th a t O ff

ic e r Wi lke rs on

did no t ask a pp e lla nt fo r pe rm iss ion to g o in to the bac ky ard a

nd stake out the pre mises. L y nch said that nothing wa s said about the bac ky ard but that O ff ic e r Wi lke rs on

sa id t hat he wa s g oin g to ke e p a c los e watc h to se e if Mit c he ll c a me ba c k to appellant’ s house. At the suppression hear ing, the State had the burde n to prove voluntary consent by

clea r and

co n v i n cing evidenc e. J

oh ns on v . S

tate , 2 2 6 S. W. 3 d

4 3 9 , 4 4 3 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p
. 2 0 0 7 )

. T h e trial

c ourt fo un d th a t O ff

ic e r Wi lke rs on

ob ta ine d v olu

ntary and int e lli g e nt c on se nt f ro m a pp e lla nt t o
rema in on his property

to watch f

or Mi tchell. Off

icer Wil kerson’ s testimony

supports a finding that

a pp e ll ant gave himc on se nt t o b e in t he ba c ky ard

fo r t he purp os e of

watc hin g fo r M itc he ll. Ap p el l an t ’s an d

L y n ch ’s t es t i m o n y

co n fl i ct edwi t h Of

fi ce r W i l k er s o n ’s t es timon y . As t h e s o l e j u d ge of t he credibility of t he witnesses, the t rial court was free to believe Office r Wilkerson’s testimony and to disbelieve a

ppellant’s and L

y nch’s testimony

. Ga rza , 2 13 S.W. 3d a t 34 6; Ro ss , 32 S.W .3d at 855. Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the trial court’s ruling , we hold that the State met it s b u

r d en of pr oving by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that appe llant voluntarily consente d to O ff ic e r Wi lke rs on

e nte ri ngand

re ma ini ngin h is b a c ky ard . T he re fo re , th e tr ia l cou rt did no t a bu se its discretion in denying a

ppellant’s motion to suppress. We overrule appellant’ s first point of err or. Jury I nstruction on Consent Issue The trial c ourt instructed the jury that, befor e i t c ould consider Of fice r Wilkerson’s testimony

c on c e rn ingthe arr e st o f a pp e lla nt a nd the se izur e of the c oc a ine inc ide nt to the arr e st, it “ mus t f ir st fi nd be y on d a re a so na

ble do ub t that [Of

fi c e r] Wilk e rs on ha d c on se nt o r b e lie ve d h e ha d c on se nt t o
re ma in o n th e pr e mis e s o f [ap pe lla nt], and if [it did ] n ot s o f

ind be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, [i t] mu st disreg ard suc h testimony and evide nce.” The trial c ourt g ave this instruction under Article 38.23(a ) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure , which is the Texas exclusionary rule. I n h i s s ec o n d point of

err or, appe llant contends that the trial court’s instruction imprope rly stated that the State’s burde n of proof on the conse nt issue was “bey ond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant arg ues t hat the State had the burde n to prove c onsent by “cle ar a nd convincingevidenc e” and that the tria l court should have i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y a c c o r d i n g l y.6

As stated above , at a suppre ssion h ea ri n g, t h e State must prove c onsent by clea r and convincingevidenc e. Johnson , 226 S.W .3d at 443. Howe ver, if the consent iss u e i s tried and

su bmi tte d to th e ju ry , the St a te ha s th e burd e n to pr ov e c on se nt b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. Lalan de v . S

tate , 67 6 S.W. 2d 11 5, 11 8 n .5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 84 ); J oh ns on v . S

tate , 885 S.W .2d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.). Theref ore, in this cause , the trial cour t’s instructions to the jury on the consent issue included the pr oper bur den of pr oof. We overr ule appe llant’s second point of err or. Denial of Appellant’s Motion for New T rial Appellant conte nds in his thi rd point of err or that the trial court err ed in overrulinghis moti on fo r ne w tr ia l and mot ion in arr e st of jud g me nt. I n the se mot ion s, a pp e lla nt a sse rt e d that th e S tate failed to prove consent by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. We have held that, at the suppr essi on hear ing, the State met i t s burden of proving by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that appe llant voluntarily

consente d to Office r Wilkerson enteringand re maining in his bac ky ard. There fore , the tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in de nying a

pp e lla nt’ s motio n f

or ne w tri a l and

mot ion in a rr e st o f j ud g me nt. We overrule appellant’ s third point of error

. This Court’s Ruling We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.

T E R RY M c C A LL

JUSTI CE

J uly 16, 2009 Do not publish. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.