16-1855 

Ramirez-Gonzalez v. Sessions 

BIA 

Verrillo, IJ 

A206 629 325 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

3rd 4 day of October, two thousand seventeen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 DENNIS JACOBS,

8 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 SAN HUMBERTO RAMIREZ-GONZALEZ, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 16-1855 

17 NAC 

18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Gregory Osakwe, Hartford, CT. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy 

26 Assistant Attorney General, Carl H. 

27 McIntyre, Assistant Director, 

28 Justin R. Markel, Senior Litigation 

29 Counsel, Office of Immigration 

30 Litigation, United States 

31 Department of Justice, Washington, 

32 DC. 
2

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner San Humberto Ramirez-Gonzalez, a native and 

6 citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of a May 18, 2016, decision 

7 of the BIA affirming a September 22, 2015, decision of an 

8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ramirez-Gonzalez’s 

application for asylum and withholding of removal.1 9 In re San 

10 Humberto Ramirez-Gonzalez, No. A206 629 325 (B.I.A. May 18, 

11 2016), aff’g No. A206 629 325 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Sept. 22, 

12 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

13 facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

15 the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 

16 Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The 

17 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 

18 § 1252(b)(4); Gjolaj v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration 

19 Servs., 468 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 

1 Ramirez-Gonzalez does not challenge the denial of relief 

under the Convention Against Torture. Norton v. Sam’s Club, 

145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently 

argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will 

not be addressed on appeal.”). 
3

1 To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of 

2 removal based on membership in a particular social group, the 

3 applicant must establish both that the group is legally 

4 cognizable, see Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 

5 2014), and that the applicant has suffered past persecution or 

6 has demonstrated a well-founded fear or likelihood of future 

7 persecution on account of her membership in that group, see

8 Rodas Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010), i.e., 

9 that the membership in the group is “at least one central reason 

10 for persecuting the applicant,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 

11 A particular social group is cognizable if it refers to “a 

12 discrete class of persons” and “the relevant society perceives, 

13 considers, or recognizes the group as a distinct social group.” 

14 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 210, 217 (BIA 2014); see 

15 Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195 (according deference to the BIA’s 

16 construction of “particular social group”). 

17 The agency reasonably determined that Ramirez-Gonzalez was 

18 targeted by gang members for recruitment, and not because of 

19 his membership in any particular social group. 

20 Ramirez-Gonzalez testified that the gang members chased and 

21 beat him because they wanted him to join their organization. 

22 He presented no evidence that the gang members targeted him 
4

1 because of his proposed particular social group, “young males 

2 with discernible ability to earn money. The agency’s 

3 determination that Ramirez-Gonzalez failed to establish past 

4 persecution on account of a protected ground was supported by 

5 substantial evidence. Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196-97 (whether 

6 persecution occurs “on account of” a protected ground “depends 

7 on the views and motives of the persecutor” (internal quotation 

8 marks omitted)). Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73-74 

9 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting proposed social group where “harm 

10 visited upon members of a group is attributable to the 

11 incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to 

12 persecution”). 

13 Nor is the additional group that Ramirez-Gonzalez 

14 proposes—“young Guatemalan men who face gang violence”—legally 

15 cognizable. The U.S. State Department report he relies on 

16 indicates that gang violence is widespread in Guatemala. Any 

17 group premised on facing such violence lacks particularity. 

18 See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (BIA 2014) 

19 (particular social group cannot be “amorphous, overbroad, 

20 diffuse, or subjective”). Individuals targeted for gang 

21 recruitment “make up a potentially large and diffuse segment 

22 of society.” Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (BIA 
5

1 2008). And a particular social group cannot be defined solely 

2 by the harm its members have suffered. Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d 

3 at 73 (“[A] social group cannot be defined exclusively by the 

4 fact that its members have been subjected to harm.” (internal 

5 quotation marks omitted)). 

6 Nor did the agency err in holding that Ramirez-Gonzalez did 

7 not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution on 

8 account of a protected ground. Ramirez-Gonzalez has failed 

9 to establish any protected ground for which he might be 

10 persecuted in the future. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 

11 Because Ramirez-Gonzalez has not met his burden of proof 

12 for his asylum claim, he has not met the higher standard required 

13 to succeed on his claim for withholding of removal. See Paul 

14 v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). 

15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

16 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

17 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

18 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

19 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

20 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

21 

22 
6

1 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

2 34.1(b). 

3 FOR THE COURT: 

4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk