PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-2194

SOUTHERN APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN STEWARDS; APPALACHIAN 

VOICES; SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

RED RIVER COAL COMPANY, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big 

Stone Gap. James P. Jones, District Judge. (2:17-cv-00028-JPJ-PMS)

Argued: December 8, 2020 Decided: March 30, 2020

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge 

Gregory and Judge Niemeyer concurred.

ARGUED: John Michael Becher, APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN ADVOCATES, 

Lewisburg, West Virginia, for Appellants. Dabney J. Carr, TROUTMAN PEPPER 

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Peter 

Morgan, SIERRA CLUB, Denver, Colorado, for Appellants. Brooks M. Smith, 

TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. 
2

RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

Virginia has promulgated water-quality standards by regulation under the federal 

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“Surface Mining Act”) that are effectively 

the same as the water-quality standards under the federal Clean Water Act. Under the 

Clean Water Act, an operator’s compliance with its issued permit shields it from liability 

for certain violations of those standards. The Surface Mining Act does not include its own 

permit liability shield. This raises the question we must answer: When an operator’s 

conduct is shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act, can the operator still be held

liable under the equivalent Surface Mining Act standards? 

How we answer this question depends on the Surface Mining Act’s saving clause, 

which bars construing the Act in any way that would supersede, amend, modify, or repeal

the Clean Water Act and other laws. See 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). Because here the Surface 

Mining Act’s lack of a permit shield supersedes, amends, or modifies the Clean Water 

Act’s permit shield, we hold that the saving clause prevents liability under the Surface 

Mining Act for conduct that is otherwise shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act. 

So we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Red River Coal Company

on the Surface Mining Act claim.

I. Background

A. The regulatory scheme

The Clean Water Act, the colloquial name of the amended Federal Water Pollution 

Control Act, regulates the issuance of pollutants from “point sources,” generally defined 

as any “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” such as a pipe, into United States 
3

waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); see also § 1251 et seq. The core of the Act prohibits “the 

discharge of any pollutant by any person.” Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cnty. Comm’rs of 

Carroll Cnty., 268 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir. 2001); see § 1311(a). But compliance with a 

Clean Water Act permit issued under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

serves as an exception to this liability. § 1342(k); Piney Run, 268 F.3d at 265.1

 Once 

granted, a permit allows its holder to discharge a limited amount of pollutants. §§ 1311(a), 

1342(a), (c). Compliance with that permit “shall be deemed compliance” with the Clean 

Water Act’s standards (namely, the effluent—wastewater—limitations, § 1311, waterquality-related effluent limitations, § 1312, national standards of performance, § 1316, 

toxic and pretreatment effluent standards, § 1317, and ocean discharge criteria, § 1343).

§ 1342(k); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977)

(such permits provide “finality”).

2

 This liability shield not only covers discharges listed 

1 Given lawyers’—particularly environmental ones—affinity for acronyms, it is no 

surprise that everyone calls these permits “NPDES permits.” Cf. N. Cheyenne Tribe v. 

Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 839 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007). While deviations from acronyms can cause 

confusion, we do our best to speak in plain English so that those lacking subject-matter 

expertise might understand. Cf. D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 

43 (2020). So we will refer to these “NPDES permits” as Clean Water Act permits, though 

we bow to expediency in using the widely recognized “EPA” to refer to the Environmental 

Protection Agency.

2 Plaintiffs note that the Clean Water Act permit-shield provision does not protect 

permit holders from non-compliance with water-quality standards promulgated by states. 

See § 1313 (mandating states to set water-quality standards for each body of water within 

a state). But “water quality standards are not themselves directly enforced by the EPA.” 

Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 1984). Those water-quality 

standards are only enforceable by the EPA if they are affirmatively incorporated within the 

permit. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(k), 1319(a)(3). The same holds for citizen suits, which can 

only be brought to enforce a state-promulgated water-quality standard under § 1313 if the 

(Continued)
4

on this permit but also other discharges “adequately disclosed to the permitting authority.” 

Piney Run, 268 F.3d at 269. Thus, an operator in compliance with its Clean Water Act 

permit is shielded from liability in EPA and citizen-suit enforcement actions. §§ 1319,

1365.

These permits may be issued by the EPA or the states to which the EPA has 

delegated its authority. § 1342(c)(1). The EPA delegated its authority to the 

Commonwealth of Virginia in 1975. 57 Fed. Reg. 43,734 (Sept. 22, 1992); see also J.A. 

43 (approving a sub-delegation to the Virginia Department of Mines, Minerals and Energy, 

Division of Mined Land Reclamation).

Five years after passing the Clean Water Act, Congress passed the Surface Mining 

Act. The Surface Mining Act, among other things, “establish[es] a nationwide program to 

protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining 

operations.” 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a); see also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 

239, 251 (4th Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. E.P.A. v. Nat’l Crushed Stone 

Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980). It does so by allowing states to exclusively regulate surface 

coal mining operations within their borders if they satisfy certain conditions. § 1253(a). 

Virginia satisfied these conditions. 46 Fed. Reg. 61,088 (Dec. 15, 1981). With this 

standard is incorporated within the permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (citizen suits may be 

brought against any person alleged to have violated “an effluent standard or limitation 

under this chapter”); id. § 1365(f)(7) (defining “effluent standard or limitation under this 

chapter”). And “[i]t is clear . . . that if a permit holder discharges pollutants precisely in 

accordance with the terms of its permit, the permit will ‘shield’ its holder from [Clean 

Water Act] liability.” Piney Run, 268 F.3d at 266; see also § 1342(k). So Plaintiffs’ 

argument on this point does not hold water.
5

regulatory authority, Virginia needed to, and did, create a permit system for surface coal 

mining and reclamation operations that, at a minimum, incorporated the Surface Mining 

Act’s anti-pollution performance standards. § 1253(a)(4); see Va. Code Ann. § 45.1-

242(B). Like the Clean Water Act, the Surface Mining Act requires an operator wishing

to “engage in or carry out on lands within a State any surface coal mining operations” to 

“first obtain[] a permit issued by such State.” § 1256(a). But, unlike a Clean Water Act 

permit, compliance with a Surface Mining Act permit does not itself shield its holder from 

liability under the Surface Mining Act.

B. The proceedings below

In August 2017, Plaintiffs Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards, Appalachian 

Voices, and the Sierra Club sued Red River Coal Company, Inc. They alleged that Red 

River had violated the Clean Water Act, the Surface Mining Act, and, in the alternative, 

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (1976). Plaintiffs’

claims stemmed from alleged discharges of pollutants from point sources at Red River’s 

now-inactive North Fox Gap Surface Mine in Virginia. Red River’s activities at the mine 

were governed by a combined Clean Water Act and Surface Mining Act permit issued by 

Virginia.

3

3 Virginia first granted Red River a combined Clean Water Act and Surface Mining 

Act permit in 1992. J.A. 162. This combined permit was renewed in 1997, J.A. 203, 2002, 

J.A. 209, and 2006, J.A. 225. In 2015, Virginia issued a draft renewal permit, S. 

Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. Red River Coal Co., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 481, 487–88 

(W.D. Va. 2019), but the EPA lodged an objection, J.A. 797. And federal regulations bar 

a state from issuing a permit over the EPA’s objection. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(c). The EPA 

never withdrew its objection, but after several months, Virginia renewed the permit 

(Continued)
6

Red River moved for summary judgment on all claims. And the district court 

granted the motion. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 498. 

The district court found the Surface Mining Act claim was barred by that Act’s

saving clause. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 498. That clause 

limits the effect of the Act: Nothing in the Surface Mining Act “shall be construed as 

superseding, amending, modifying, or repealing . . . [the Clean Water Act and] the State 

laws enacted pursuant thereto.” 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).4 The district court held that where 

a Clean Water Act permit precludes liability under the Clean Water Act for certain 

activities, the Surface Mining Act’s saving clause bars imposing Surface Mining Act

liability for the same actions. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 498 

(“[F]inding that Red River complied with the [Clean Water Act] but has violated [the 

anyway. J.A. 233. Regardless of the effect of Virginia’s 2015 renewal, Red River’s 1992 

combined permit remains in force. A state-issued permit may continue past its expiration 

date until the renewed permit’s effective date “if State law allows.” 40 C.F.R. 

§ 122.6(d)(1). And Virginia state law allows that continuation under conditions that both 

parties agree Red River has satisfied. See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-31-70(A). This 

continued combined permit is “fully effective and enforceable.” Id. § 25-31-70(B).

4 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) states:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as superseding, amending, 

modifying, or repealing the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 (30 

U.S.C. 21a), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 

4321-47), or any of the following Acts or with any rule or regulation 

promulgated thereunder, including, but not limited to—

. . . 

(3) The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (79 Stat. 903), as amended, the 

State laws enacted pursuant thereto, or other Federal laws relating to 

preservation of water quality.
7

Surface Mining Act] based on the same discharges would allow [the Surface Mining Act]

to override the [Clean Water Act’s] permit shield and would thus violate [the saving

clause].”). 

Plaintiffs timely appealed only the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

Red River on the Surface Mining Act claim. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 

review the grant of summary judgment de novo, Calloway v. Lokey, 948 F.3d 194, 201 (4th 

Cir. 2020).

II. Discussion

Red River’s combined permit requires it to comply with both the Clean Water Act’s 

standards and the water-quality standards Virginia promulgated under the Surface Mining 

Act. See J.A. 27 (citing Va. Code Ann. § 45.1-242(B) and 4 Va. Admin. Code § 25-130-

773.17(c)). As they apply here, those standards appear to be effectively the same. And

there is no dispute on appeal that Red River cannot be held liable for any violations of the 

Clean Water Act standards because of its compliance with its Clean Water Act permit. But 

Plaintiffs contend that Red River’s activities at the mine have violated the Surface Mining 

Act’s standards and are not covered by the Clean Water Act permit shield. 

We first discuss how the Clean Water Act’s permit shield interacts with the Surface 

Mining Act’s saving clause before addressing Plaintiffs’ counterarguments.

A. The Surface Mining Act’s saving clause

We agree with the district court—and thus the Sixth Circuit in Sierra Club v. ICG 

Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281, 291–92 (6th Cir. 2015)—that liability may not be imposed

under the Surface Mining Act for a specific discharge when the Clean Water Act’s permit 
8

shield bars liability under the Clean Water Act for that same discharge. See S. Appalachian 

Mountain Stewards, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 498. We conclude that although the Clean Water 

Act and the Surface Mining Act substantive water-quality standards are 

“not . . . inconsistent,” id., the saving clause does more than prohibit rules or regulations 

that are “inconsistent” with the Clean Water Act: it prohibits those that more broadly 

“supersed[e], amend[], modify[], or repeal[]” the Clean Water Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a). 

And even if the saving clause only prohibited inconsistencies between the two statutory 

regimes, in this case, there is an inconsistency. Even though the substantive standards may 

not be inconsistent, the scope of liability for violating those standards is.

The ordinary meaning of the terms in the saving clause makes clear that the clause 

does more than prevent inconsistent rules and regulations. See In re Surface Mining Regul.

Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reading the saving clause to broadly prohibit 

the “altering in any fashion” of the Clean Water Act). The term “supersede” means 

“obliterate, set aside, annul, replace, make void, inefficacious or useless, repeal. To set 

aside, render unnecessary, suspend, or stay.” Supersede, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 

1979). “[Black’s Law Dictionary, Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, and 

Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language] indicate that the 

word ‘supersedes’ involves replacing one thing with another, rather than causing 

something to be cancelled or invalidated without replacement.” Bodine v. Cook’s Pest 

Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2016). Likewise, the word “modify” 

means “[t]o alter; to change in incidental or subordinate features; enlarge, extend; amend; 

limit, reduce.” Modify, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1979). The term “amend” has a 
9

similar definition. See Amend, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1979) (“[t]o change, 

correct, revise”).5

Perhaps the Surface Mining Act standards could “replace,” “render unnecessary,” 

“limit,” “change, correct [or] revise” the Clean Water Act’s permit-shield provision 

without being inconsistent with it. For example, if the Surface Mining Act imposed more 

stringent requirements than the Clean Water Act’s corresponding standards, we would not 

say that the Surface Mining Act standards conflict with the Clean Water Act’s standards, 

as it would be impossible for an operator to comply with the Surface Mining Act but not 

the Clean Water Act. But in that situation the Surface Mining Act standards would 

effectively “replace” or “change” the Clean Water Act standards by setting forth the actual 

standard of performance operators must meet. So inconsistency is sufficient, but not 

necessary, for the saving clause to operate. That Virginia’s Surface Mining Act substantive 

standards are consistent with the Clean Water Act does not, by itself, signify that the saving

clause does not apply.6

5 The term “repeal” requires inconsistency but is only one of four verbs in the statute. 

See Repeal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1979) (“abrogation or annulling of a 

previously existing law by the enactment of a subsequent statute which declares that the 

former law shall be revoked and abrogated . . . or which contains provisions so contrary to 

or irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can stand in 

force” as distinguished from “amendment,” which means “alteration in the law already 

existing”).

6 Plaintiffs contend that 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C) and 1370 support their 

argument. But reliance on those statutes is misplaced. “Section 1311(b)(1)(C) allows the 

EPA to issue ‘any more stringent limitation[s]’ if technology-based effluent limitations 

cannot ‘meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance.’” 

Nat. Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 629 (2018). But these more 

(Continued)
10

But even if the saving clause only applies when there is some inconsistency between 

statutes, there is one here, even if not in the substantive provisions. In arguing there is not, 

Plaintiffs focus on the wrong statutory provisions. Although Virginia’s Surface Mining 

Act water-quality standards are not “inconsistent” with the Clean Water Act, see S. 

Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 498, the relevant “inconsistency” 

between the statutes is not the substantive water-quality standards but the existence—or 

lack thereof—of a liability-shielding permit regime. The Clean Water Act provides an 

exemption from liability for discharges if the discharger has a Clean Water Act permit. 

That exemption “conflicts” with the Surface Mining Act’s failure to provide a liability 

shield for the same discharges. That the Surface Mining Act does not have a mechanism 

to protect operators from liability for activities that are otherwise shielded from Clean 

stringent limitations “established pursuant to any State law or regulations” must have been 

promulgated “not later than July 1, 1977.” § 1311(b)(1)(C); see Longview Fibre Co. v. 

Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a total maximum daily load 

established in 1991 cannot fall under § 1311(b) because the section “reference[d] is in the 

context of establishing a ‘Timetable for achievement of objectives’” and “requires 

achievement of the described limitations ‘not later than July 1, 1977’”). The Virginia statelaw standards Plaintiffs reference went into effect after that date. See 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE

25-130-816.41, .42 (effective date Dec. 15, 1981). So § 1311 does not apply to them. 

Reliance on these statutes is unavailing for another reason. Section 1311 permits 

more stringent limitations to be enacted by state law or regulations “under authority 

preserved by section 1370.” § 1311(b)(1)(C). And § 1370 provides that “[e]xcept as 

expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall [] preclude or deny the right 

of any State . . . to adopt or enforce [] any standard or limitation respecting discharges of

pollutants, or [] any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution,” unless the 

state standards are less stringent than the federal standards. But to the extent that the

Surface Mining Act’s saving clause “precludes” Virginia’s right to “adopt or enforce” its 

Surface-Mining-Act-promulgated water-quality standards, the saving clause is not “in 

th[at] chapter” so § 1370’s general rule does not apply. 
11

Water Act liability by a permit effectively “supersede[s],” “modif[ies],” or “amend[s]” the 

permitting regime set forth in the Clean Water Act.

The Supreme Court cases that Plaintiffs cite, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 

(1974), and Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), do not dictate a different 

conclusion. Morton states that “absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the 

contrary,” statutes capable of co-existing should be read to do so. 417 U.S. at 551. 

Plaintiffs argue that Red River could comply with both the Surface Mining Act and the 

Clean Water Act and should be required to do so. But the existence of the saving clause is 

“a clearly expressed congressional intention” that Red River’s permit should protect it from 

liability when it complies with the provisions of that permit. Id. And Myrick considers the 

scope of implied conflict preemption, which implicates federalism concerns not present in 

a case addressing the interaction between two federal regulatory schemes. 514 U.S. at 

287–90.

Plaintiffs cite several statements from the federal Office of Surface Mining 

Reclamation and Enforcement that it claims anticipate enforcement of the Surface Mining 

Act’s performance standards independent of the Clean Water Act’s regulatory regime. But 

those cited statements do not contemplate the issue we face: the effect of the Surface 

Mining Act’s saving clause on operators’ actions that violate the same substantive 

standards promulgated under both the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Act, where 

those actions are allowed by virtue of their Clean Water Act permit. 
12

One statement, however, is worth considering in greater detail. In 1979, the Office 

of Surface Mining promulgated rules to implement the federal Surface Mining Act program 

and addressed its understanding of the saving clause: 

Congress intended that compliance with the [Surface Mining Act] would not 

relieve an operator from compliance with other environmental statutes. 

Congress did not intend that compliance with other environmental statutes 

should relieve operators from compliance with the Surface Mining Act.

The language of Section 702(a) of the [Surface Mining Act], which provides 

that nothing in the Act can be construed as ‘superseding, amending, 

modifying, or repealing’ the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, preserves 

this balance between the statutes. Nowhere in the legislative history is there 

language which indicates that Congress intended this language to reduce the 

performance standards of the Act to meet the requirements of other statutes.

44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,051 (Mar. 13, 1979). The last sentence of this statement makes 

clear the context it addresses: the interaction between substantive performance standards 

promulgated under the various environmental statutes. In that context, complying with 

Regulation A promulgated under the Clean Water Act does not exempt an operator from 

also complying with a substantively different Regulation B under the Surface Mining Act. 

See id. at 15,050 (noting that the saving clause does not prohibit regulations that fill in a 

“regulatory gap” (quoting In re Surface Mining Regul. Litig., 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 

1978))). But that commentary does not address the interaction between the enforcement

provisions of two environmental statutes when the substantive standards under both are the 

same.7

7 Even if the Office of Surface Mining’s interpretation of the saving clause answered 

the question presented, we would not afford it either Chevron or Skidmore deference. The 

language of the saving clause is unambiguous, even if its application is not straightforward 

(Continued)
13

And so we agree with the Sixth Circuit that allowing liability to be imposed under 

the Surface Mining Act for discharges that are exempted by permit from Clean Water Act

liability would “modify” or “supersede” the Clean Water Act’s permit shield in 

contravention of the saving clause. See ICG Hazards, 781 F.3d at 291–92. Plaintiffs may 

disagree with the way Virginia chose to enforce the substantive Clean Water Act and 

Surface Mining Act water-quality standards, but that disagreement does not allow us to 

find liability under the Surface Mining Act for conduct that is shielded by the Clean Water 

Act’s permit shield.

B. Interaction between the Surface Mining Act’s saving clause and 

substantive provisions

Plaintiffs argue that even if the saving clause applies, Supreme Court precedent 

dictates that it cannot be used to override substantive provisions of the Surface Mining Act. 

In doing so, Plaintiffs read United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), and Geier v. 

American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), as establishing both that courts 

should “decline to give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the 

careful regulatory scheme established by federal law,” Locke, 529 U.S. at 106–07, and that 

courts should reject interpretations of saving clauses that “permit[] the law to defeat its 

own objectives” or “destroy itself,” Geier, 529 U.S. at 872 (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 

Cent. Off. Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998)). But this argument misconstrues those 

precedents and over-dramatizes the consequences of adopting Red River’s position.

here, and no one has argued otherwise. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 

837, 842–43 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
14

Both Geier and Locke addressed saving provisions in the context of federal 

preemption, which involves complex questions of federalism not present when discussing 

the interplay between two federal regulatory regimes. In the federalism context, it makes 

sense to interpret saving clauses narrowly, because the consequence of a broad 

interpretation is more federal interference in matters that the states may validly regulate. 

Plaintiffs do not persuasively explain why these cases are relevant in this context despite 

their federalism focus.

But even if those cases espouse principles relevant in this context, both holdings 

were statute-specific and thus are not broadly generalizable. The Locke Court relied on 

principles of statutory interpretation to determine that a federal saving clause located within 

the same chapter as the liability rules for oil spills did not apply to preempt state regulations 

governing a different topic—the operation and design of oil tankers. 529 U.S. at 105–06. 

Likewise, Geier addressed whether traditional principles of conflict preemption continued 

to apply despite a saving clause. In doing so, the Court determined that an interpretation 

of the saving clause there that allowed a conflict not permitted by federal conflictpreemption principles would allow the federal law “to defeat its own objectives” or 

“destroy itself.” 529 U.S. at 872 (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 U.S. at 228). Neither 

case can reasonably be read to hold that a substantive provision of a statute always 

supersedes a saving clause when the two conflict, and neither suggests that result here.

8

8 Both parties also try to marshal Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), 

to support their arguments. Shaw discussed the scope of the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act’s saving clause, which states that its substantive provisions “shall not ‘be 

(Continued)
15

Plaintiffs narrow this argument in their reply brief. There, they contend that saving 

clauses “should be interpreted narrowly to avoid doing damage to the substantive 

provisions of the act.” Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Reply Br. 13. They argue that adopting Red 

River’s interpretation of the saving clause would “fundamentally alter[] two substantive 

provisions of the [Surface Mining Act]: the requirement that all mine operators comply 

with the performance standards (30 U.S.C. § 1265) and the right of citizens to enforce that 

requirement against any operator (30 U.S.C. § 1270).” Id. at 24.

This argument is also flawed. Red River’s interpretation of the saving clause would 

not “defeat” the “objectives” of, “destroy,” or fundamentally alter the Surface Mining Act

for it does not solely regulate water pollution. Rather, it was enacted to more broadly 

“protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining 

operations.” 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a). To implement that broad mandate, the Surface Mining 

Act authorizes the regulation of all aspects of surface coal mining, including resource 

maximization, land restoration, erosion prevention, vegetation protection, waste disposal, 

land stability, and water-pollution prevention. § 1265(b). So the Surface Mining Act’s 

non-hydrologic performance standards continue to apply when they do not supersede, 

amend, modify, or repeal any other statutes listed in the saving clause. This problem only 

construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United 

States.’” Id. at 100–01. The Court considered whether that clause could save a New York 

state law from preemption. Id. In doing so, it determined that “the combination of 

Congress’ enactment of an all-inclusive pre-emption provision and its enumeration of 

narrow, specific exceptions to that provision ma[d]e [them] reluctant to expand § 514(d) 

into a more general saving clause.” Id. at 104. This unique combination of preemption 

and statute-specific concerns makes it difficult for this case to neatly fit within either 

party’s argument.
16

arises for the Surface Mining Act regulations that govern the same areas as the Clean Water 

Act.

Even if the Surface Mining Act was enacted because “Congress recognized that the 

[Clean Water Act] is inadequate to eliminate pollution from inactive mines,” Consolidation 

Coal Co., 604 F.2d at 251, reading the saving clause to prevent Surface Mining Act liability 

for pollutant discharges shielded from Clean Water Act liability by a permit leaves the 

Surface Mining Act with plenty of room to regulate surface coal mining operations without 

being subject to the saving clause. Citizens can still enforce the Surface Mining Act’s rules 

and regulations, and mine operators must still meet the Surface Mining Act’s standards in 

the many other contexts the Act regulates. Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary is an 

exaggerated parade-of-horribles that strays from the rest of the Surface Mining Act’s 

statutory scheme.

* * * 

We are not unsympathetic to concerns about the purity of the water that Virginians

rely on every day. But we must follow the text of the statute that was democratically passed

by Congress. Permitting liability under the Surface Mining Act for pollutant discharges 

that are otherwise exempted from liability under a Clean Water Act permit would 

contravene the text of the saving clause by allowing the Surface Mining Act to “supersede,” 

“modify,” or “amend” the Clean Water Act’s permitting regime. See ICG Hazards, 781 

F.3d at 291. For that reason, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Red River 

on the Surface Mining Act claim is

AFFIRMED.