UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DONALD PARKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-1051

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.

(CA-93-2734-2-1AJ)

Submitted: December 19, 1996

Decided: January 3, 1997

Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,

Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Anne Margaret Miles, SUGGS & KELLY, LAWYERS, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Preston Strom, Jr., United States

Attorney, Wistar D. Stuckey, Assistant United States Attorney, Arthur

J. Fried, General Counsel, Randolph W. Gaines, Acting Principal

Deputy General Counsel, A. George Lowe, Acting Associate General

Counsel, Douglas Cohen, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Donald Parker filed a claim with the Social Security Administration in May and June 1990 for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits, alleging disability commencing

March 8, 1990, as a result of seizures, severe headaches, and mental

impairment. After denial of his claim initially and on reconsideration,

Parker requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ). The ALJ concluded that Parker was not disabled, finding that

although he had a severe seizure disorder well-controlled by medication, a low intelligence quotient score, and could not return to past relevant work, he also had the residual functional capacity to perform

light work. The ALJ limited the type of light work Parker could perform by requiring that the work be an unskilled, entry level, routine,

and repetitive job that did not expose him to dangerous or hazardous

conditions or to highly stressful situations. The Appeals Council

denied Parker's request for review. The ALJ's decision then became

the Secretary's final decision.

Parker filed a complaint in the district court challenging the final

decision of the Secretary. The magistrate judge recommended affirming the Secretary's denial of benefits. After conducting a de novo

review of the record, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's

recommendation and affirmed the Secretary's decision. This appeal

followed.

We review the Secretary's final decision to determine whether it is

supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was

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applied. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 1996); D'Accardi v.

Chater, 96 F.3d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1996); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d

1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Parker claims that substantial evidence

does not support the ALJ's findings because the ALJ failed to give

proper weight to the opinions of two doctors and failed to adequately

consider the combined effects of Parker's impairments. However, the

ALJ gave specific reasons for the determination, and we will not disturb it. Hammond v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1985). The

ALJ made a thorough evaluation of the evidence, and we conclude

that the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence and

was based on the correct legal standards.

Parker also challenges the ALJ's finding that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of jobs. Parker has raised this issue for the first time on appeal. Generally, we

will not consider an issue which was not raised at the administrative

or district court level. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 469 n.12

(1983); Artrip v. Califano, 569 F.2d 1298, 1300 n.5 (4th Cir. 1978).

Parker failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting

consideration of this issue; thus, the issue is not properly before us.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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