1It is the Court’s understanding, based on the

representations made by plaintiffs’ counsel at the evidentiary

hearing, that defendant received in-hand notice of the hearing on

January 3, 2007. Defendant has neither objected to this motion

nor requested a continuance of this hearing.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Timothy M. Francis &

Tammy A. Francis

v. Civil No. 06-cv-480-JM

Lindon L. Pulley

O R D E R

Plaintiffs Timothy and Tammy Francis (hereinafter,

collectively, “plaintiffs” or “the Francises” and individually,

“Timothy” and “Tammy”) sought a preliminary injunction enjoining

the defendant, Lindon Pulley (hereinafter “Pulley” or

“defendant”), from transferring any real estate or real property

in the defendant’s possession, or in which the defendant has an

interest. An evidentiary hearing was held on plaintiffs’ motion

on January 5, 2007. Defendant did not appear at the hearing.1

After the hearing, I issued an order granting plaintiffs’ motion

and enjoining the defendant from selling, or transferring any

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 1 of 22
2

interest he may have, directly or indirectly, in real property or

real estate, including defendant’s real estate holdings in White

River Junction, Vermont. This Order supplements and clarifies

the extent of my previous order granting the preliminary

injunction.

Background

In 1999, Pulley approached his daughter Tammy, stating that

he was aware of an investment opportunity that Tammy and Timothy,

her husband of two months, could benefit from financially. 

Pulley proposed to the Francises that they put up the money to

buy a restaurant equipment business from Pulley’s thengirlfriend, Marilyn Tobin (“Tobin”). Pulley had previously owned

a restaurant equipment business, but the business failed and

Pulley had to file for bankruptcy protection. Accordingly,

Pulley had experience in the restaurant equipment business, but

did not have sufficient cash or credit to purchase Tobin’s

business himself.

Relying on Pulley’s assertions that this was a great

opportunity for them to make a great deal of money, the Francises

agreed to give Pulley the money to purchase Tobin’s business,

called Pots & Pans, Etc. (hereinafter “P&P”). Pulley purchased

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 2 of 22
3

P&P for $8,000. At the time of this transaction, Tammy had a

tenth grade education and was employed in a bakery. Timothy had

a high school education and was employed as a phone technician. 

Although neither Tammy nor Timothy had any experience in

business, Tammy testified that she had an excellent relationship

with her father and that she trusted him and his experience in

business. 

Pulley told the Francises that he would take care of

everything related to the operation of the business. Pulley

maintained all of the financial documents, including checks and

bank statements, ran the business, and paid himself out of the

business account. This all occurred with the plaintiffs’

consent. The business itself remained in Tammy’s and Timothy’s

names. Other than ownership, Tammy and Timothy were not involved

in the business at all. The plaintiffs never received any cash

disbursements, although Pulley reported that the business was

doing fine, that it would eventually make the Francises a lot of

money, and that Pulley would make sure the Francises were taken

care of financially. 

Occasionally, Pulley would present the plaintiffs with

documents to sign related to the business. Tammy stated that

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4

Pulley would always bring paperwork to the Francis’ Massachusetts

home to be signed, and that Pulley always rushed through these

transactions. Pulley would tell plaintiffs not to worry about

the contents of the paperwork, that everything was fine, and did

not generally give plaintiffs an opportunity to review the

paperwork. Despite this, plaintiffs routinely signed the

paperwork because they trusted Pulley and did not feel they had

any reason to question his behavior.

In January of 2000, plaintiffs, on Pulley’s advice, bought

the building, referred to in the pleadings as the “Agway

Building,” that housed P&P in White River Junction, Vermont for

$12,500. In May of 2002, the plaintiffs, through Pulley,

purchased the property that the Agway Building sat on (the “Agway

property”) for $136,677. It appears that the money for this

purchase came from the business accounts owned by plaintiffs and

controlled by Pulley. The purchase of the Agway property was

made through a company called South Main Street Properties

(“SMS”), which appears to have been created by Pulley. In

December of 2002, as an agent of SMS, Pulley conveyed the Agway

property to Tammy and Timothy individually. 

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5

In November of 2002, again on Pulley’s advice, plaintiffs

purchased a commercial warehouse adjacent to the Agway Building,

the Freight Warehouse (“Freight Building”) for $80,000. Again,

Pulley contributed no money to the transaction.

In June of 2004, plaintiffs, at the direction of Pulley,

sold P&P and the Agway Building and Agway property to R&K Snaith,

LLC (“Snaith”) for a total of $375,000. Timothy and Tammy were

given a promissory note from Snaith for $150,000 plus interest

(the “Snaith Note”) that was due on July 15, 2006. The Snaith

Note was secured by the mortgage on the Agway Building. Pulley

controlled all of the money paid pursuant to the Snaith Note. 

The plaintiffs never received any money from the transaction or

from payments made on the Snaith Note. In October of 2005,

Pulley had Tammy and Timothy assign the Snaith Note to Pulley for

no consideration.

Although a settlement statement produced for the sale of

P&P, the Agway Building, and the Agway property shows that

$15,000 was given to plaintiffs, plaintiffs never received any

payment or proceeds from the sale. Instead, the money was

received by Pulley as the plaintiffs’ agent. Further, a 2004

Chevy Silverado that had been owned by P&P was excluded from the

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 5 of 22
6

sale and retained by Pulley for his own use without any

recompense to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim that the

total profit from the sale of P&P, the Agway Building and the

Agway property was $225,823, of which the plaintiffs received

nothing. Pulley is also alleged to have applied $72,989.01 of

the proceeds of the sale of P&P and the Agway Building and

property to a like-kind exchange transaction from which the

plaintiffs received no benefit. 

In October of 2004, at Pulley’s direction, plaintiffs

purchased another commercial warehouse in White River Junction,

the Steel Warehouse (“Steel Building”) from Earl Heath for

$225,000. Simultaneously with that purchase, as plaintiffs’

agent, Pulley entered into leasehold agreements with three

different businesses for space in the Steel Building. The leases

generated monthly rent of more than $2200. Again, the Francises

never saw any proceeds from the sale or any of the rent money. 

On one occasion, one of the tenants damaged the exterior of

the Steel Building. The tenant entered into a settlement

agreement with Pulley that assigned the right to the claim to the

plaintiffs as the owners of the Steel Building. The damage claim 

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 6 of 22
2The record is unclear as to precisely why this amount was

less than the amount of the Execusuite Note and paid later than

July of 2005. There is reference in the complaint to a dispute

over personal property left in the Freight Building by Pulley

after the sale to Execusuite which was not resolved until

September 13, 2005. It appears this dispute may have delayed

payment on and reduced the value of the Execusuite Note.

7

was settled by Pulley for $4,500. Pulley did not have the damage

repaired and applied the funds instead to his own use.

In December of 2004, at Pulley’s direction, Tammy and

Timothy sold the Freight Building to a company named Execusuite,

for $200,000. The Francises did not receive any proceeds from

this sale. Plaintiffs took a promissory note from Execusuite for

the sale in the amount of $75,000 (the “Execusuite Note”). The

terms of the Execusuite Note called for Execusuite to make one

balloon payment on July 15, 2005 of all of the principal and

accrued interest. In September of 2005, Execusuite issued a

check for $73,971.24 to the plaintiffs.2 Pulley converted the

funds for his own use and the plaintiffs received nothing.

In October of 2005, Pulley convinced the plaintiffs to sign

the Steel building title over to Pulley for one dollar. Tammy

testified that she was willing to sign the building ownership to

Pulley because she had become concerned about her tax liability

for the building. Pulley represented to Tammy that upon

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 7 of 22
8

assigning the building title to him, plaintiffs would be free and

clear from any responsibility for the building, its mortgage, or

the taxes on the building. Plaintiffs later discovered, however,

that while Pulley had taken ownership of the building, he had not

assumed the mortgage or the tax liability, both of which remained

with the plaintiffs.

According to the documents entered into evidence at the

hearing, see Ex. 2, when Pulley obtained ownership of the

building, he filed a Vermont property tax return certifying that

the transfer was without consideration. Later, Pulley sought to

amend that document to indicate that the fair market value of the

Steel Building, $310,000, was paid as consideration, in order to

minimize capital gains taxes that would be owed on a subsequent

sale of the Steel Building. Pulley then had a promissory note

drafted in the amount of $243,824.41 for the plaintiffs’ benefit

(the “Pulley Note”), ostensibly to secure Pulley’s financial

obligation to the plaintiffs. 

On December 15, 2005, Pulley had an attorney draft a gift

letter stating that Tammy and Timothy were each gifting Pulley

$12,000, for a total of $24,000, of the principal owed. On

December 31, 2005, Pulley had the gift letter amended to forgive

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 8 of 22
9

$22,000 instead of $24,000, so that no gift tax return had to be

filed. 

In June of 2006, Pulley had an accountant draft a gift tax

return for the plaintiffs’ to sign, gifting Pulley $158,100 each,

for a total of $316,200. This would have forgiven the entire

amount due to plaintiffs under the Pulley Note. Pulley presented

the plaintiffs with the gift documents to sign and insisted that

they be immediately executed. At this point, however, Tammy had

become suspicious of her father’s actions, and decided to have

the gift tax returns examined by her own accountant prior to

signing them. Once Tammy obtained the advice of an accountant,

she understood that she and Timothy were being asked to gift

their entire interest in the Steel Building, which at that time

constituted the entirety of the returns on the business

investments they had made, to her father’s benefit without any

consideration at all. Further, she would retain liability for

the mortgage and taxes on the Steel Building. Tammy also learned

that all of the business tax returns filed since 2000 had been

filed in the plaintiffs’ names, and that accordingly, plaintiffs

had paid in excess of $21,000 more in taxes over those years than

they otherwise would have owed, without receiving any benefit

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 9 of 22
10

from the business. Upon learning these facts, plaintiffs did not

sign the gift tax return documents. Accordingly, Pulley, it

appears, is still bound by the terms of the Pulley Note, which is

secured by Pulley’s interest in the Steel Building. 

Pulley continued to badger the plaintiffs to sign the

documents and ultimately, Tammy lied to Pulley, telling him the

documents were signed in order to stop the badgering. At the

point when he believed the gift tax returns had been signed,

Pulley’s demeanor toward the plaintiffs became hostile. 

In the meantime, in September of 2005, a friend of Tammy’s

offered to sell Tammy a minivan for $9000. Tammy and Timothy

were having financial trouble as Tammy had stopped working

outside of the home in 2004 in order to care for the Francises’

two small children. The Francises had only one vehicle and no

reliable transportation for Tammy to use. Due to the plaintiffs’

financial difficulties, Pulley offered to register the van in his

own name, use the business account to pay for the van, and also

to register and insure it, with the business account money, in

his own name. The plaintiffs accepted that offer and obtained

the van on those terms. During the course of the following year,

Tammy loaned the van to her father on several occasions. On the

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 10 of 22
11

last of these occasions, Pulley took the van on a trip to Canada. 

While in Canada, at about the same time he believed that the

final gift transaction was transpiring between himself and the

plaintiffs, Pulley learned that Tammy had requested copies of tax

returns and bank statements relating to the business and property

transactions that the plaintiffs had invested in. Pulley became

enraged and refused to return the minivan. Since that time, the

plaintiffs have been without a second vehicle.

The plaintiffs have learned that Pulley is seeking to sell

the Steel Building. According to the plaintiffs, they had

learned that the Steel Building was under agreement for sale at

the time that the property was attached pursuant to this Court’s

temporary restraining order enjoining such transfer.

 Standard of Review

Preliminary injunctive relief is available to protect the

movant from irreparable harm, so that the movant may obtain a

meaningful resolution of the dispute after full adjudication of

the matter. Such a situation arises when some harm from the

challenged conduct could not be adequately redressed with

traditional legal or equitable remedies following a trial. See

Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 18

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 11 of 22
12

(1st Cir. 1996) (finding irreparable harm where legal remedies

are inadequate); see also Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d

645, 653 (3rd Cir. 1994) (“Mere injuries, however substantial, in

terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the

absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate

compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a

later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily

against a claim of irreparable harm.”). Absent irreparable harm,

there is no need for a preliminary injunction.

Alleging a mere possibility that a defendant might not be

able to ultimately satisfy a judgment because, at the time such

judgment is entered, he may not have assets is not sufficient to

demonstrate irreparable injury for preliminary injunction

purposes. See Micro Signal Research, Inc. v. Otus, 417 F.3d 28,

31 (1st Cir. 2005). However, “where there is a strong indication

that the defendant may dissipate or conceal assets,” preliminary

injunctive relief may be warranted. Id.

The purpose of preventing irreparable harm is to enable the

court to render a meaningful disposition on the underlying

dispute. See CMM Cable Rep. v. Ocean Coast Props., 48 F.3d 618,

620 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining the purpose of enjoining certain

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 12 of 22
13

conduct as being to “preserve the ‘status quo’ . . . to permit

the court, upon full adjudication of the case’s merits, more

effectively to remedy discerned wrongs.”); see also Becton v.

Thomas, 48 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (“‘The purpose

of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable

injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a

meaningful decision on the merits.’”) (quoting Stenberg v. Cheker

Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978)). The court’s focus,

therefore, must always be on the underlying merits of the case,

and what needs to be done to ensure that the dispute can be

meaningfully resolved.

A preliminary injunction cannot issue unless the moving

party satisfies four factors which establish its need for such

relief. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zavas, 445 F.3d 13,

17-18 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing the requisite showing to obtain

a preliminary injunction); see also Ross-Simons, 102 F.3d at 18-

19 (explaining the burden of proof for a preliminary injunction). 

Those factors are: “(1) the likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) the potential for irreparable harm [to the movant] if the

injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions,

i.e., the hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 13 of 22
3As the plaintiffs live in Massachusetts and the defendant

lives in New Hampshire and the amount in controversy in this

14

with the hardship to the movant if no injunction issues; and (4)

the effect (if any) of the court’s ruling on the public

interest.” Esso Standard, 445 F.3d at 18. If the plaintiff is

not able to show a likelihood of success on the merits, the

remaining factors “become matters of idle curiosity,” id. at 18,

insufficient to carry the weight of this extraordinary relief on

their own. See id. (the “sine qua non of this four-part inquiry

is likelihood of success on the merits”) (internal quotation

omitted). Yet, “the predicted harm and the likelihood of success

on the merits must be juxtaposed and weighed in tandem.” RossSimons, 102 F.3d at 19. A “strong showing of likely success on

the merits reduces, but does not eliminate, the showing of

irreparable harm that plaintiffs must make to obtain preliminary

injunctive relief.” Biogen Idec MA Inc. v. Trs. of Columbia

Univ. in N.Y. 332 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (D. Mass. 2004).

Discussion

The Four Preliminary Injunction Factors

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The plaintiffs have stated seven claims based upon state

tort law3 upon which they assert relief might be granted: (1)

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 14 of 22
action exceeds $75,000, this is a diversity action that is within

this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Accordingly, the claims alleged arise in New Hampshire tort law.

15

deceit/misrepresentation, (2) breach of fiduciary duties, (3)

undue influence, (4) constructive trust for unjust enrichment,

(5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

(6) conversion, and (7) improper accounting. Because I find that

the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on at least one of these

claims, constructive trust for unjust enrichment, I will not

address the merits of the other claims at this time.

Under New Hampshire law, “[n]o rigid requirements exist for

imposing a constructive trust.” In re Estate of Cass, 143 N.H.

57, 60, 719 A.2d 595, 598 (1998). Rather,

[a] constructive trust may be imposed when clear 

and convincing evidence shows that a confidential 

relationship existed between two people, that one 

of them transferred property to the other, and that 

the person receiving the property would be unjustly 

enriched by retaining the property, regardless of 

whether the person obtained the property honestly.

Id. A “family relationship in which one person justifiably

believes that the other will act in his or her interest” is a

confidential relationship. In re Estate of McIntosh, 146 N.H.

474, 479, 773 A.2d 649, 653 (2001), citing Cass, 143 N.H. at 60. 

Unjust enrichment occurs when a person obtains the title to

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 15 of 22
16

property by “fraud, duress, or undue influence” or through

violation of a fiduciary duty owed to the grantor. Cass, 143

N.H. at 60. 

Whether or not undue influence exists is a factual decision

based on the court’s consideration of the relationship between

the parties and all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the

incident or transaction in question. Id. at 61. To that end,

the court examines the relationship itself, the physical and

mental condition of the party claiming to have been unduly

influenced, the reasonableness and nature of the disposition, and

the personalities of the parties. Id.

The plaintiffs have submitted evidence of a constructive

trust claim. A confidential relationship existed between Pulley

and the Francises. Pulley is Tammy’s father and Tammy testified

that the two were very close, spoke at least once a day prior to

all of these allegations, and that she trusted him implicitly. 

Because Timothy was Tammy’s husband at the time of this

transaction in question, I find that Timothy too was in a

confidential relationship with Pulley. Further, there was a

transfer of property. Plaintiffs transferred ownership of the 

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 16 of 22
17

Steel Building to Pulley in exchange for a dollar and a

promissory note. 

 To claim a constructive trust with unjust enrichment,

plaintiffs must demonstrate that Pulley would be unjustly

enriched by retaining the property. Id. Plaintiffs can

demonstrate unjust enrichment if they can show that Pulley

obtained the title to the Steel Building by fraud, duress or

undue influence. Id.

To show that the title was obtained by undue influence, the

plaintiffs must demonstrate circumstances from which the Court

can conclude that either the influence exerted over the

plaintiffs must amount to force or coercion that alters the

plaintiffs’ will, and must be more than the influence of

affection. Id. On the other hand, if Pulley was acting as a

fiduciary agent of the plaintiffs, Pulley has the burden of

proving an absence of undue influence. Id. Here, while it

appeared that Pulley may have used threatening behavior later in

the relationship, there is no evidence that Pulley forced or

coerced the plaintiffs to transfer title in the Steel Building to

him, or to sign the gift tax returns forgiving the Pulley Note. 

In fact, the complaint specifically indicates that Pulley’s

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 17 of 22
18

hostility occurred after he thought the gift tax return was

signed. 

While the evidence presented at the hearing indicates that

the influence over the plaintiffs’ business decisions was based

on the affection and trust shared between a father and a

daughter, it was also clear at the hearing that, by placing

himself in a position of exclusive control of the business,

including its finances and accounting, that Pulley acted in a

fiduciary capacity and had a duty to act in the financial

interest of the plaintiffs. As such, the onus was on Pulley to

demonstrate that there was no undue influence at work in

effecting the transfer of the Steel Building. Because Pulley did

not appear at the hearing, no such evidence was presented on his

behalf. Accordingly, I find that the plaintiffs sufficiently

alleged undue influence to have demonstrated that they are likely

to be able to prove that a constructive trust existed, and that

Pulley was unjustly enriched as a result. Therefore, I find that

the plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the

merits of at least one claim in their complaint.

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19

2. Irreparable Harm

The Supreme Court has held that, ordinarily, injunctive

relief interfering with a debtor’s use of his own property cannot

be granted to a non-judgment creditor seeking money damages. 

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,

527 U.S. 308, 321 (1999). The Court in Grupo Mexicano, however,

also noted that this rule might not apply where a creditor holds

or asserts an “equitable lien” on the defendant’s property. Id.

at 326. 

Here, plaintiffs have demonstrated that they hold a

promissory note executed by Pulley in consideration of their

conveyance of the Steel Building to Pulley, and that the note is

secured by the Steel Building. Further, they have alleged that

Pulley is attempting to sell the Steel Building for his own

benefit. Accordingly, it is arguable that the reasoning of Grupo

Mexicano might not apply in this situation, as plaintiffs have

demonstrated the minimum facts necessary to show that they hold

an equitable interest in the property that is the subject of the

motion for injunctive relief. See Charlesbank Equity Fund II v.

Blinds To Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding

that under Grupo Mexicano, a District Court has “no authority to

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4Further, the Fourth Circuit has recently held that when

“both monetary damages and equitable relief are sought . . ., the

controlling authority is not Grupo but Deckert v. Independence

Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).” Rahman v. Oncology Assocs.

P.C., 198 F.3d 489, 492 (4th Cir. 1999). The Rahman Court also

found that application of the holding in Grupo Mexicano is

properly limited to actions solely at law. Id. at 496. Here,

plaintiffs seek both compensatory and injunctive relief. 

Accordingly, I find that preliminary injunctive relief is

appropriate on that basis.

20

issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners from

disposing of their assets pending adjudication of respondents’

contract claim for money damages where no preexisting lien or

equitable interest [has] been claimed” and finding that “it is at

least arguable that the existence of a security interest . . . is

a salient distinction.” (emphasis added)).4 

Here, plaintiffs argue that, at a minimum, they hold an

equitable interest in the Steel Building, or any assets that may

derive from the sale of that building. Therefore, the plaintiffs

can demonstrate irreparable harm to their interests if Pulley is

not enjoined from disposing of or otherwise transferring the

Steel Building or the proceeds from its sale. 

While the plaintiffs also argue that they are owed money

from business transactions from which they should have benefitted

financially, they have not undertaken to demonstrate any 

Case 1:06-cv-00480-PB Document 9 Filed 01/10/07 Page 20 of 22
21

equitable interest in that money. Accordingly, I cannot find

that it is the proper subject of a preliminary injunction. 

3. The Balance of Relevant Impositions 

Pulley did not appear at the hearing on this matter. 

Accordingly, no evidence is before the Court regarding any

hardship or imposition that would accrue to Pulley if this

injunction issues. The plaintiffs have demonstrated that their

efforts to pursue a remedy against Pulley for unjustly enriching

himself by disposing of a building in which they hold an

equitable interest would be significantly impinged if this

injunction fails to issue. Accordingly, I find that this factor

weighs in favor of issuing the injunction.

4. The Effect of the Court’s Ruling on the Public Interest

 While this is a private dispute concerning private property,

the public is always interested in this Court protecting the

rights of the litigants to appropriate remedies if those

litigants can present legally sufficient evidence that they are

entitled to relief. Accordingly, I find that the issuance of

this Order comports with the public interest in obtaining fair

remedies to legal disputes.

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22

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, I reaffirm my issuance of a

preliminary injunction in this matter, under the terms previously

set forth in my Order granting plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive

relief (document no. 6) to the extent that it seeks to enjoin

defendant from selling, or transferring any interest he may have,

directly or indirectly, in the Steel Building as identified

herein, or disposing of any proceeds Pulley may have received 

from the sale of the Steel Building in White River Junction,

Vermont.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: January 10, 2007

cc: Michael G. Furlong, Esq.

John J. LaRivee, Esq.

Lindon L. Pulley, pro se

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