J-S38027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.R., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: Z.R., MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2903 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered October 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-JV-0001370-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2023

Z.R., a minor, appeals from the dispositional order entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Juvenile Division, following her 

adjudication of delinquency for aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, and 

robbery.

1

 Z.R. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After careful 

review, we affirm.

Z.R.’s charges stem from an incident that occurred on the SEPTA subway

between a group of teenage girls and group of teenage boys. On November 

17, 2021, the boys – all approximately 15 years old – were waiting at the 

subway platform when they were spotted by a group of at least four girls, 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) (aggravated assault); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903 

(conspiracy); 18 Pa.C.S.S.A. § 3701(a) (robbery).
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including Z.R.

2

 One of the girls shouted, “that’s them,” in reference to what 

occurred the day before.3 The boys moved to the other side of the platform 

to avoid confrontation, and the girls followed them. One of the girls grabbed 

a boy’s backpack, but he managed to get away. The subway arrived, and the 

groups went into separate cars, and the subway departed.

Surveillance video then showed that the girls moved to the boys’ car. 

They walked to where the boys were sitting, placed their coats and bookbags

on empty seats, confronted the boys, and then and began punching the boys 

in the head. One of the girls stood on an adjacent seat and kicked the boys 

in the head. Z.R. was among the girls attacking the boys. The boys tried to 

cover their heads, but none fought back. When one of the boy’s glasses fell, 

one of the assailants took them and broke them. Another teenage girl, C.L., 

witnessed the attack and tried to stop the assailants from beating up the boys. 

The assailants then turned their ire on C.L. One assailant pushed C.L. 

against the subway door and slammed C.L.’s head into the window. When 

C.L. went down, the assailant and another girl repeatedly kicked C.L. in the 

head and beat her with a shoe. A third assailant – not Z.R. – demanded that 

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2

 The boys were E.T., R.T., Y.J., and R.H.

3 The day before, on November 16, the two groups got into a verbal altercation

while on the subway. The boys testified that they were called Asian slurs. At 

one point, Z.R. poured her drink on one of the boys; the boy threw the cup 

back at her as she left the train. A cellphone video partially captured the 

scene. The boys were laughing. The events of November 16 are largely 

irrelevant except to explain the impetus for the next day’s altercation.
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C.L. give them her AirPods and went through C.L.’s pockets. Z.R. was not one 

of C.L.’s primary attackers. Initially, Z.R. stayed out of the fray, but then she 

moved toward C.L. The surveillance video shows her shoving a bystander

aside. The whole incident lasted only a couple of minutes, essentially the time 

between subway stops. When the subway doors opened again, the assailants

left the train, stepping over C.L., who was still on the ground. As Z.R. exited 

the car, she kicked back to strike C.L.

One of the boys had bruises on his face, a clump of his hair was pulled 

out, and his hearing was fuzzy. C.L. had to go to the hospital. She had a 

bruised lip, a black eye, and was given a neck brace.

Two days after the attack, Z.R. was arrested. After several months of 

preliminary proceedings, the juvenile court adjudicated Z.R. delinquent on 

July 21, 2022. Disposition was deferred for several more months, until 

October 27, 2022, when she was placed on probation.4

Z.R. timely filed this appeal and presents the following two issues for 

our review:

1. Was not the evidence insufficient to sustain a finding that 

Z.R. committed the offense of aggravated assault as a 

felony of the first degree against complainants E.T., R.T., 

and Y.J., where they did not suffer serious bodily injury 

and the prosecution failed to prove that either Z.R. or 

her co-conspirators agreed to or attempted to cause 

serious bodily injury?

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4 Evidently, Z.R. was also adjudicated dependent under the Juvenile Act and 

was placed at St. Joseph’s Group Home. See T.C.O. at 2 (unpaginated).
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2. Was not the evidence insufficient to sustain a finding that 

Z.R. committed aggravated assault or robbery against 

the complainant C.L., and the prosecution failed to prove 

that she entered into a conspiracy to do so?

Z.R.’s Brief at 3.

We begin by observing our standard of review when evaluating

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adjudication of delinquency:

When a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute 

a crime if committed by an adult, the Commonwealth must 

establish the elements of the crime by proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt. [...].

In determining whether the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, 

the test to be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and drawing 

all reasonable inferences therefrom, there 

is sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime 

charged. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.

The facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with a 

defendant's innocence. Questions of doubt are for the 

hearing judge, unless the evidence is so weak that, as a 

matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the 

combined circumstances established by the Commonwealth.

Interest of D.J.B., 230 A.3d 379, 388 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting In re A.V., 

48 A.3d, 1251, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2012)) (further citations omitted).

As an appellate court, we must review the entire 

record...and all evidence actually received[.] [T]he trier of 

fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. Because evidentiary sufficiency is 

a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.
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D.J.B., 230 A.3d at 387 (quoting In re C.R., 113 A.3d 328, 333-34 (Pa. 

Super. 2015)) (further citations omitted).

Z.R.’s first appellate issue pertains to the attack on the boys. Z.R. does 

not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that she conspired to attack 

them. See Z.R.’s Brief at 22. Instead, she presents a two-fold argument: 

first, the assault did not rise to the level of aggravated assault; second, even 

if her co-conspirators committed aggravated assault, that act was beyond the 

scope of the conspiracy.

Regarding Z.R.’s aggravated assault challenge, a juvenile may be 

adjudicated delinquent if she “(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 

another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a). “Serious bodily injury” is defined as “[b]odily injury 

which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent 

disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 

member or organ.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 (Definitions).5 Aggravated 

assault also exists when it can be proven that the assailant attempted to 

cause serious bodily injury. “[A]n ‘attempt’ is found where an “accused who 

possess the required, specific intent acts in a manner which constitutes a 

substantial step toward perpetrating a serious bodily injury upon another.” 

Commonwealth v. Fortune, 68 A.3d 980, 984 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

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5 By contrast, “bodily injury” is the “[i]mpairment of physical condition or 

substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
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omitted). “An intent ordinarily must be proven through circumstantial 

evidence and inferred from acts, conduct or attendant circumstances.” Id. 

(citation omitted).

Z.R. argues that the boys did not suffer serious bodily injuries, and thus 

she could not be held liable for aggravated assault. At most, Z.R. argues, she 

committed simple assault. Id. at 12-13. Here, the boys suffered bumps and 

bruises, and one had a clump of his hair pulled out. Whether these injuries 

meet the definition of “serious bodily injury” is irrelevant. The juvenile court

found Z.R. liable for the attempt to cause serious bodily injury:

The evidence in this instant case overwhelming[ly] suggests

that the co-conspirators acted in a manner which

constituted a substantial or significant step toward 

perpetrating serious bodily injury upon another. The 

circumstances of the specific intent surrounding this incident 

are clear. Four girls surrounded the boys who were sitting 

on the subway. Together they continually beat and kicked 

three of the boys. These victims were not fighting back but 

the girls continued to beat them viciously and brutally. [...] 

They attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the 

victims, did cause injuries to the victims and their actions 

demonstrated their extreme indifference to the value of 

human life.

Trial Court Opinion, dated 1/20/23 (T.C.O.), at 7 (unpaginated) (emphasis 

added).

Under the applicable standard of review, we must view the evidence in 

a light most favorable to the Commonwealth and draw all reasonable 

inferences therefrom. D.J.B., 203 A.3d at 388. Importantly, the facts and 

circumstances need not be incompatible with the defendant’s innocence. Id.
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When reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the evidence is sufficient for a finding of aggravated assault.

The girls followed the boys into the subway car; they took off their bookbags 

and coats to prepare for the assault; and then they repeatedly punched and 

kicked the boys in the head. The boys did not defend themselves other than 

trying to cover their bodies. Although Z.R. does not appear to be the primary 

assailant, she nevertheless participated in the attack. The juvenile court could 

have found Z.R. committed only simple assault but did not. Given our

standard review, we discern no error. 

Regarding Z.R.’s conspiracy challenge, “[a] person is guilty of 

conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent 

of promoting or facilitating its commission [s]he: (1) agrees with such other 

person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct 

which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such 

crime; or (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or 

commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such 

crime.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a).

In order to prove the existence of a criminal conspiracy, the 

Commonwealth must demonstrate that the juvenile: “(1) entered an 

agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or persons, 

(2) shared a criminal intent and, (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of 

the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 409-10 (Pa. 

2018) (citations omitted). Once the conspiracy is established beyond a 
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reasonable doubt, a conspirator can be convicted of both the conspiracy and 

the substantive offense that served as the illicit objective of the conspiracy.” 

Chambers, 188 A.3d at 410.

The juvenile court articulated its conspiracy determination as follows:

There is overwhelming evidence that a conspiracy existed. 

Z.R. was present with the group of girls at the subway 

platform when the boys arrived. The girls shouted “that’s 

them” indicating that they were waiting for the boys. Once 

the boys entered the train, Z.R., along with three girls,

entered the car where the boys were sitting. They 

immediately walked up to the boys. The video from SEPTA 

clearly shows that the girls removed their coats and bags 

and placed them on unoccupied seats on the train. The four 

girls then proceeded to brutally attack [the boys,] E.T., R.T., 

and Y.J.

T.C.O. at 6 (unpaginated)

Z.R. admits she conspired to assault the boys but argues that she cannot 

be found delinquent because she did not conspire to commit aggravated

assault. Z.R.’s argument fails by its own terms. Our Supreme Court has 

explained:

Where the existence of a conspiracy is established, the law 

imposes upon a conspirator full responsibility for the natural 

and probable consequences of acts committed by his fellow 

conspirator or conspirators if such acts are done in 

pursuance of the common design or purpose of the 

conspiracy. Such responsibility attaches even though such 

conspirator was not physically present when the acts were 

committed by his fellow conspirator or conspirators [...].

See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 1192 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted).
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Assuming Z.R. and the other girls only conspired to commit simple 

assault – and setting aside the fact that Z.R. also physically attacked the boys 

– Z.R. would still be responsible for her co-conspirators’ actions. If we assume 

that “the common design or purpose of the conspiracy” was to commit simple 

assault, then the actions committed by Z.R.’s co-conspirators – the 

aggravated assault of the boys – are the “natural and probable consequences 

of acts...done in pursuance of the common design or purpose of the 

conspiracy.” See Fisher, 80 A.3d at 1192. As such, Z.R. was equally 

responsible for her co-conspirators’ aggravated assault of the boys.

For these reasons, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the 

juvenile court to find Z.R. delinquent of aggravated assault and conspiracy. 

Z.R.’s first appellate issue merits no relief.

Z.R.’s second appellate issue pertains to the attack on C.L., for which 

the juvenile court found her delinquent of conspiracy, aggravated assault, and 

robbery. Recall that when C.L. interceded on the boys’ behalf, two of the girls 

attacked C.L. During the attack, a third girl demanded C.L.’s AirPods, and 

when C.L. went down, the same girl went through C.L.’s pockets.

On appeal, Z.R. argues that she cannot be held responsible, because 

the co-conspirators’ assault and robbery of C.L was beyond the scope of the 

conspiracy. She argues further that she could not be responsible under the 

accomplice theory, because she took no steps to solicit or aid the other girls’ 

assault and robbery of C.L. As a preliminary matter, we note that Z.R. does 

not challenge the finding that C.L. was assaulted and robbed; Z.R. only 
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challenges whether she is responsible as a co-conspirator or otherwise 

culpable under the accomplice theory.

Again, for the conspiracy charge, the Commonwealth had to prove that 

Z.R. (1) entered an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with 

another person or persons, (2) shared a criminal intent and, (3) an overt act 

was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Chambers, 188 A.3d at 409-10 

(citations omitted). Moreover, Z.R. would also be responsible for the “natural 

and probable consequences” of acts taken in furtherance of the original 

conspiracy. See Fisher, 80 A.3d at 1192. Our Supreme Court recognized the 

difficulty of finding a conspiracy in situations like this. “Fights involving 

multiple participants, particularly those in which a person interjects herself 

into a brawl after it has commenced, present unique challenges for 

determining whether a conspiracy existed.” Chambers, 188 A.3d at 411. 

It is apparent that the group of girls, at least initially, did not conspire 

to attack C.L. Only when C.L. interceded on behalf of the boys did the girls

turn their attention toward her. At that point, C.L. was assaulted and robbed. 

We must resolve whether there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s finding that Z.R.: 1) entered an agreement to aid in the assault and 

robbery; 2) that she shared in the criminal intent; and 3) she took an overt 

act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Chambers.

When reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, we 

conclude there was sufficient evidence to hold Z.R. accountable. The 
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surveillance video initially shows Z.R. was away from the other girls during 

their attack on C.L. Indeed, Z.R. cites this point in the video to argue that 

she tried to stop the attack, as evidenced by the fact that she can be seen 

pulling one of the other girls away. This argument is plausible, except that 

Z.R. then moved closer to C.L. so she could aid another assailant.

6

 When Z.R. 

reached C.L., the footage shows a bystander was poised to intercede on C.L.’s 

behalf. Z.R. shoved that bystander back while the assault and robbery 

transpired. Additionally, Z.R. kicked C.L. as she exited the subway.7 Thus, 

we may infer that Z.R. agreed to aid the robbery and assault of C.L., that she 

shared in the criminal intent, if only briefly, and that she took steps in 

furtherance of the attack and robbery. The juvenile court did not err when it 

held Z.R. responsible as a co-conspirator in the assault and robbery of the 

C.L.8 Z.R.’s second appellate issue merits no relief.

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6 We reiterate that the facts and circumstances need not be incompatible with 

Z.R.’s innocence. See D.J.B., 230 A.3d at 387. Perhaps Z.R. did not initially 

agree to attack C.L. But after a while, Z.R. decided to participate rather than 

staying out of it. In any event, we note that it is the role of the juvenile court 

– not this Court – to weigh the evidence. See id.

7 Contrary to Z.R.’s characterization, the footage does not indicate that Z.R. 

merely tripped over C.L., but that Z.R. actively kicked her.

8 Even if we agreed with Z.R.’s position – that she was not a co-conspirator in 

the attack on C.L. – we would still conclude that Z.R. was accountable under 

the accomplice theory. “A person is legally accountable for the conduct of 

another person when: (3) [s]he is an accomplice of such other person in the 

commission of the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(b)(3). “A person is an 

accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the 

intent or promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, [s]he: (ii) 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Order affirmed.

Date: 12/19/2023

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aids or agrees to attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing 

it.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(c)(1)(ii). We disagree with Z.R.’s contention that she 

took no steps to facilitate the assault and robbery of C.L. As noted above, 

Z.R. shoved a bystander out of the way to ensure that the other girls in her 

group could attack C.L. unencumbered.