1The amended complaint (document no. 19) supercedes all

previous complaints (document nos. 1, 6-7 and 13-15) filed by

Carey. 

2The following NHSP employees are named as defendants:

Gregory Crompton, former Deputy Warden of the NHSP; Kimberly

Lacasse, Classification Supervisor; Richard Manseau,

Classification Department; Robert Thyng, Unit Manager; and Henry

Lemieux, Dentist. The following NCF employees are named as

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

William J. Carey

v. Civil No. 06-cv-479-PB

Wrenn, et al.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pro se plaintiff William J. Carey has filed a complaint,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants have

abridged his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution (document nos. 4, 16

and 17-19).1 Seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary

relief, he brings this action against William L. Wrenn,

Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections

(“NHDOC”), David Sullivan, New Hampshire Superior Court Judge and

several employees of the New Hampshire State Prison (“NHSP”) and

the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility (“NCF”).2

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 1 of 22
defendants: Lawrence Blaisdell, Acting Warden; and Michelle

Watson, Case Manager. 

2

The complaint is before me for preliminary review to

determine whether, among other things, it states a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; U.S.

District Court for the District of New Hampshire Local Rule

(“LR”) 4.3(d)(2). For the reasons stated below, I conclude that

Carey has alleged the following claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment

denial of adequate medical care claim against Lacasse, Manseau

and Watson; and (2) a First and Fourteenth Amendment retaliation

claim against Watson, Blaisdell, Crompton and Wrenn. I recommend

dismissal of all remaining claims.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a pro se complaint, this court must construe

the pleading liberally and in favor of the pro se litigant. See

Ayala Serrano v. Gonzalez, 909 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1990)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). At this

preliminary stage of review, all factual assertions made by the

plaintiff and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom must be

accepted as true. See Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st

Cir. 1996) (stating the “failure to state a claim” standard of

review and explaining that all “well-pleaded factual averments,”

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 2 of 22
3

not bald assertions, must be accepted as true). This review

ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and meaningful

consideration. See Eveland v. Director of CIA, 843 F.2d 46, 49

(1st Cir. 1988). I apply this standard in reviewing Carey’s

complaint.

Factual Background

Crediting the factual allegations in the complaint in the

light most favorable to Carey, the material facts are as follows. 

Carey is currently incarcerated at the NCF, having been

transferred from the NHSP. During the course of his

incarceration at the NHSP and the NCF, prison officials allegedly

subjected him to constitutional deprivations in violation of his

rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. While

incarcerated at the NCF and NHSP, Carey claims, he was denied

adequate medical and dental care and subjected to verbal abuse

and inhumane conditions of confinement. He further alleges that

defendants retaliated against him for filing administrative

grievances, denied him meaningful access to the courts and denied

his request for a prison transfer to the Lakes Region Facility, a

facility with more amenable and safer conditions. Lastly, Carey

alleges during the course of his criminal proceedings, a New

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 3 of 22
4

Hampshire Superior Court judge acted improperly by imposing his

sentence and suggesting to the NHDOC that he complete certain

program requirements as a condition of his parole. He now brings

this action pursuant to Section 1983, alleging that defendants’

acts and omissions rise to the level of constitutional

deprivations.

Discussion

I. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against those who,

acting under color of state law, violate federal law. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981);

Rodriguez-Cirilo v. Garcia, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1997). In

order to be held liable for a violation under Section 1983, a

defendant’s conduct must have been a cause in fact of the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1061-62

(1st Cir. 1997). The premise of Carey’s Section 1983 action is

that prison officials subjected him to the following

constitutional deprivations in violation of his federally

protected rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

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5

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

1. Denial of Adequate Medical Care

Carey alleges that Lacasse, Manseau and Watson transferred

him to another prison facility, thereby causing a five-month

delay in surgery to repair Carey’s umbilical hernia. Defendants’

actions allegedly constitute a denial of adequate medical care

under the Eighth Amendment. 

To state an Eighth Amendment claim premised on inadequate

medical care, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs.” See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97. In order

to be found deliberately indifferent, a prison official “must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Id. Deliberate indifference may be

manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s

needs or by prison personnel “intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the

treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. 

“A ‘serious medical need’ is one ‘that has been diagnosed by

a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 5 of 22
6

that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.’” See Mahan v. Plymouth County House of

Corrections, 64 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting

Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). 

Here, Carey has described a serious medical need by alleging

that he suffered from an umbilical hernia that required surgery. 

He has demonstrated deliberate indifference with respect to the

defendants by alleging that once they had knowledge of his

serious medical need, they nevertheless denied him proper care or

failed to ensure that he received proper care. Despite their

knowledge of Carey’s medical condition and his need for surgery,

defendants transferred him to the NCF, thereby causing a fivemonth delay in surgery. If true, the allegations may demonstrate

that defendants prevented Carey from receiving prompt and

essential medical treatment for a serious condition. See Cotton

v. Hutto, 540 F.2d 412, 415 (8th Cir. 1976) (facts pleaded by

inmate may show deliberate indifference by prison officials with

regard to denial of hernia surgery); Williams v. Sebek, Civil

Action No. 05-1203, 2007 WL 790386 at *5 (W.D. Pa. March 14,

2007) (holding that facts that inmate eventually received surgery

for hernia did not negate Eighth Amendment claim that defendants

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 6 of 22
7

knew or should have known that his medical condition required

surgery and the ten-month delay resulted in inmate suffering pain

and possible permanent injury); Delker v. Maass, 843 F. Supp.

1390, 1395-97 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that although inmate may not

have suffered long-term physical harm from nearly two-year delay

in surgery for inguinal hernia, inmate was injured by delay for

purposes of his Section 1983 action since he experienced some

pain, anxiety and restricted activity). Accordingly, to the

extent Carey alleges that the delay in surgery has caused him

pain, anxiety or degeneration in his condition, I conclude that

he has stated sufficient facts for an Eighth Amendment denial of

adequate medical care claim against Lacasse, Manseau and Watson. 

Because he has failed to allege sufficient predicate facts

against Crompton, Blaisdell and Wrenn, I recommend that the

claims against them be dismissed.

2. Denial of Adequate Dental Care

Construed liberally, the complaint alleges that Lemieux

denied Carey adequate dental care for his broken teeth and

injured jaw. This claim is identical to a denial of adequate

dental care claim alleged in Carey v. Hillsborough County

Department of Corrections, et al., 05-cv-274-PB. As explained

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 7 of 22
8

more fully below, I recommend that the instant clam be dismissed

as duplicative. 

“[A] federal suit may be dismissed ‘for reasons of wise

judicial administration . . . whenever it is duplicative of a

parallel action already pending in another federal court.’” 

Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993)

(quoting Ridge Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram &

Sons, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1210, 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1983)); accord

Adeogba v. Migliaccio, 266 F. Supp. 2d 142, (D.D.C. 2003).

District courts are accorded “a great deal of latitude and

discretion” in determining whether one action is duplicative of

another, but generally an action is duplicative if the “claims,

parties, and available relief do not significantly differ between

the two actions.” Id. (quoting Ridge Gold, 572 F. Supp. at

1213); accord James v. AT & T Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 410, 411

(S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Here, the Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of adequate

dental care is duplicative of the claim raised in Carey’s

parallel action pending before this court (Civil No. 05-cv-274-

PB). In that case, I concluded that Carey stated, among other

claims, an Eighth Amendment claim premised upon the denial of

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 8 of 22
9

adequate dental care against an unnamed HCDOC dentist, who was

later identified as Lemieux. My Report and Recommendation was

approved on December 27, 2005. That claim currently is pending

before this Court. Because the claim, party, and available

relief do not significantly differ between Carey’s earlier action

and this action, I conclude that the instant claim is

duplicative. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of Carey’s Eight

Amendment denial of adequate dental care claim against Lemieux.

3. Verbal Threats

Construed liberally, the complaint alleges that Watson and

Thyng violated Carey’s Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him

to insults and verbal and psychological abuse. On November 22,

2006, Watson and Thyng allegedly called Carey to the guard

station and “proceeded to insult and belittle [him], ordered him

back upstairs to his cell, then immediately called him back down

for more abuse.” 

This conduct, while unprofessional if it is true, does not

state a cognizable claim under Section 1983. It is well

established that “[a]llegations of threats or verbal harassment,

without injury or damage, do not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983.” Ramirez v. Holmes, 921 F. Supp. 204, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 9 of 22
10

See also Shabazz v. Cole, 69 F. Supp. 2d 177, 199 (D. Mass. 1999)

(holding that allegations of threats, verbal harassment or

profanity, without an injury or damage, do not state a claim

under Section 1983) (citations omitted). Given that Carey has

alleged only one isolated incident of verbal abuse and has not

demonstrated any resulting harm, I find that he has failed to

allege an Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, I recommend that

this claim be dismissed in its entirety.

4. Inhumane Conditions of Confinement

Carey alleges that defendants subjected him to inhumane

conditions of confinement, including the denial of a lower bunk

and certain hygiene items, in violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights. 

Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners are entitled to

adequate shelter, including the “minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34

(1994); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981). As

stated previously, to successfully allege an Eighth Amendment

violation, a plaintiff must first plead facts which, if true,

establish that a “sufficiently serious” deprivation occurred. 

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). A plaintiff must

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 10 of 22
11

show that the conditions he was forced to endure were beyond the

bounds of human decency, and that the prison officers

intentionally or recklessly subjected him to those conditions. 

See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“extreme

deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement

claim”); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-301. 

First, Carey alleges that Watson intercepted his request

slip for a lower bunk restriction, which Carey claims was

necessary following his hernia operation. As a result of

Watson’s actions, the NCF Medical Department allegedly never

received Carey request and he was temporarily denied a lower

bunk. Shortly thereafter, the NCF Medical Department discovered

that Carey was assigned to an upper bunk and immediately moved

him to a lower bunk. Carey has not alleged that the temporary

denial of a lower bunk caused him serious pain or harm; nor has

he alleged that the conditions he was forced to endure were

beyond the bounds of human decency. Accordingly, I conclude that

he has not alleged a deprivation sufficiently extreme to

establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim and recommend

dismissal of this claim. 

Second, Carey alleges that defendants forced him to use

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 11 of 22
12

rubber bands as dental floss and provided him with toothpaste

that contained “carcinogenic Sodium Saccahrine.” His conclusory 

complaints do not allege deprivations sufficiently extreme to

establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. Carey alleges no

facts as to the frequency, duration and magnitude of the problems

or any ensuing constitutional harm. See Street v. Fair, 918 F.2d

269, 272 (1st Cir. 1990) (inmate must present sufficient facts to

confirm seriousness of harm). Accordingly, I conclude that he

has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim premised upon

inhumane conditions of confinement and recommend dismissal of

this claim.

B. First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

1. Retaliation

Carey alleges that Watson increased his classification and

required him to complete certain prison programs as a condition

of his parole, all in retaliation for Carey’s filing of

administrative grievances. Carey further alleges that Manseau

subsequently sent him a new classification authorization,

indicating that his C-2 classification had been increased to C-3. 

Lacasse, Crompton, Blaisdell and Wrenn allegedly were responsible

for the actions by subordinate officers Watson and Manseau. 

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13

To prevail on a retaliation claim, an inmate must show: (1)

conduct which led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally

protected; (2) that he suffered some adverse action at the hands

of prison officials; and (3) that his constitutionally protected

conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to

discipline him. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.

2001). It is well-established that prisoners have a First

Amendment right to petition the government for redress of

grievances, and prison officials may not retaliate against

prisoners for exercising that right. See Shabazz, 69 F. Supp. 2d

at 197. See also Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (7th

Cir. 2002) (holding that inmates are entitled under the First

Amendment to file grievances and lawsuits, and officers may not

retaliate against them for exercising that right).

Here, Carey alleges that Watson unjustifiably required him

to complete certain prison programs as a condition of his parole,

all in retaliation for Carey’s filing of administrative

grievances. Carey challenged the requirements imposed by Watson

in an appeal filed with Blaisdell and Wrenn, however, they failed

to remedy the problem. Crompton allegedly intercepted and denied

Carey’s appeal. 

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 13 of 22
14

Carey further alleges that Watson telephoned the NCF

Classification Department and requested that his classification

be increased from C-2 (minimum security) to C-3 (medium

security). At that time, Carey allegedly was four months from

his minimum parole date and had not received a single

disciplinary infraction. Watson’s actions allegedly were taken

in retaliation for Carey’s filing of administrative grievances

and his challenge to the program requirements. Under the

supervision of Lacasse, Manseau subsequently sent a new

classification authorization to Carey, showing that his C-2

classification was crossed out and C-3 hand-written in its place. 

Lacasse, Crompton, Blaisdell and Wrenn allegedly were responsible

for the actions by Watson and Manseau.

Carey alleges that the above retaliatory actions by Watson

were motivated by Carey’s filing of administrative grievances and

therefore were taken against him in reprisal for his exercise of

First Amendment freedoms. Accepting Carey’s allegations as true,

which I must do at this preliminary stage of the proceedings, I

conclude that he has stated a cognizable First and Fourteenth

Amendment retaliation claim against Watson, Blaisdell, Crompton

and Wrenn. Because Carey has failed to allege sufficient

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 14 of 22
15

predicate facts against Lacasse and Manseau, I recommend that the

claims against them be dismissed.

2. Request for Transfer

Construed liberally, the complaint alleges that NCF

officials denied Carey’s request for a transfer from the NCF to

the Lakes Region Facility in Laconia, in violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The Lakes Region

Facility allegedly houses nonviolent offenders and provides

conditions of confinement that are safer and more favorable for

Carey in terms of personal and legal visits. 

“The Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the

conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on

the prisoner.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 423 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir.

2005) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995)). See

also Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (stating that

not every prison action that adversely affects the prisoner

requires due process, such as transfer to a substantially less

agreeable prison). It is well-settled that a prisoner has no

constitutional right to be incarcerated in a particular prison

and that he may be transferred for any reason or for no reason at

all, regardless of differing conditions. See Meachum v. Fano,

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 15 of 22
16

427 U.S. 215, 225-28 (1976). Even a transfer to a more

restrictive facility with more burdensome conditions is within

the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has

authorized the State to impose. Id. at 225 (transfer of an

inmate from one correctional facility to another, without more,

does not violate the inmate’s constitutional rights, even where

conditions in one facility are more disagreeable). Accordingly,

I conclude that defendants’ refusal to transfer Carey to the

Lakes Region Facility, a safer and more favorable facility for

Carey, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

I therefore recommend that his request for transfer be denied. 

3. Denial of Meaningful Access to the Courts

Construed liberally, the complaint alleges that the NHDOC

denied Carey meaningful access to the courts, in violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Specifically, Carey

alleges the NHDOC grievance forms and request slips are not

numbered, thereby allowing prison staff to arbitrarily discard an

inmate’s grievance form or request slip.

“There is a fundamental constitutional right of access to

the courts, founded both in the First Amendment guarantee of

[the] right to petition for redress of grievances, and in the due

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 16 of 22
17

process clause which assures that no person will be denied the

opportunity to present to the courts their claims concerning

violations of fundamental constitutional rights.” McDuffy v.

Koval, 226 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548 (D. Del. 2002) (citations

omitted). The right of access to the courts is strongest in the

context of constitutional claims and other civil rights actions. 

See BreMiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Inst., 898 F. Supp. 572,

582 (N.D. Ohio 1995). To establish a claim for denial of access

to the courts, a plaintiff must show that he was denied access to

the courts and suffered actual injury, such as interference with

his efforts to pursue a claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,

351 (1996). 

Accepting Carey’s allegations as true, I conclude that he

has failed to identify any actual injury that resulted from the

alleged denial of access to the courts. While he claims that the

NHDOC failed to number his grievance forms and request slips, he

has not alleged that his request slips were discarded. Carey has

not alleged any ensuing constitutional harm related to the acts

or omissions by the NHDOC. Nor has he identified any act or

omission by the NHDOC that has frustrated or impeded a specific

legal claim pursued by Carey. In fact, in a request slip dated

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 17 of 22
3To the extent Carey challenges the fact or duration of his

state court confinement, his claims may only be brought in a

habeas corpus petition pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (holding that a

prisoner cannot use a Section 1983 action to challenge the fact

or duration of his confinement). Accordingly, to the extent

Carey challenges the sentence imposed by Sullivan, I recommend

that the claim be dismissed. 

18

February 22, 2007, Carey concedes that he has four actions

pending before this Court and is in the process of “refiling [a]

federal suit against the Merrimack County Attorney’s Office.” 

Since 2005, Carey has filed nine actions with this Court. 

Without demonstrating that the NHDOC prevented him from

participating meaningfully in the legal process, Carey fails to

allege any constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, I recommend

dismissal of this claim in its entirety.

C. Claim against the Hon. David Sullivan

Named as a defendant in this action is the Honorable David 

Sullivan, a New Hampshire Superior Court Judge, for actions taken

in his judicial capacity while presiding over Carey’s criminal

proceedings. Without providing any predicate facts, Carey claims

that Sullivan acted improperly by imposing his sentence and by

suggesting to the NHDOC that Carey complete certain program

requirements as a condition of parole.3 For the reasons stated

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 18 of 22
19

below, Sullivan is not a proper defendant under Section 1983 and

is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Judges are absolutely immune from suits seeking monetary

damages for actions taken in their judicial capacities. See

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). Immunity is overcome only in two

circumstances: 1) where the actions are outside the scope of the

judge’s judicial capacity; or 2) where the actions, though

judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Id. While actions for injunctive relief are not

barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity, Section 1983

precludes such actions against judicial officers “unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001).

Here, Sullivan appears to have been acting in his judicial

capacity and within his jurisdiction by presiding over Carey’s 

criminal proceedings. Carey has not alleged that Sullivan

violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is

unavailable in the state courts. Nor has he alleged facts

supporting the application of any exception to absolute judicial

immunity. I conclude, therefore, that the complaint fails to

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 19 of 22
20

state a Section 1983 claim against Sullivan in his official or

individual capacity and recommend dismissal of the claims against

him. See Roth v. United States, 952 F.2d 611, 613 (1st Cir.

1991) (requiring plaintiff to allege facts regarding each

material element necessary to state an actionable legal claim).

II. Official Capacity Claims

Construed liberally, the complaint seeks declaratory,

injunctive and monetary relief for wrongs committed by the

defendants as state actors in their official capacities. It is

well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state

entities and state agents working in their official capacities

unless the state has expressly waived immunity, which has not

been done by New Hampshire for actions brought under Section

1983. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,

Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (absent waiver, neither a State

nor agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in

federal court); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 71 (1989)(holding that neither a state nor its officials

acting in their official capacities are “persons” under Section

1983). Official capacity suits against officers of an agency are

simply “another way of pleading an action against an entity of

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 20 of 22
21

which an officer is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. To

the extent Carey brings official capacity claims for monetary

relief against the defendants, all of whom are officials or

employees of the NHDOC, NHSP or NCF, I recommend that those

claims be dismissed. 

On the other hand, official capacity actions against state

actors for prospective injunctive relief are not treated as

actions against the state and may be considered under Section

1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123, 159-60 (1908). Thus, Carey is not barred from bringing

claims for prospective injunctive relief against the defendants

in their official capacities.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, I conclude that Carey has

alleged the following claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment denial of

adequate medical care claim against Lacasse, Manseau and Watson;

and (2) a First and Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claim

against Watson, Blaisdell, Crompton and Wrenn. I recommend

dismissal of all remaining claims. 

If this recommendation is approved, the claims as identified

in this report and recommendation, will be considered for all

Case 1:06-cv-00479-PB Document 20 Filed 05/15/07 Page 21 of 22
22

purposes to be the claims raised in the complaint. If the

plaintiff disagrees with the identification of the claims herein,

plaintiff must do so by filing an objection within ten (10) days

of receipt of this report and recommendation, or by properly

moving to amend the complaint. 

Any objections to this report and recommendation must be

filed within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to

file objections within the specified time waives the right to

appeal the district court’s order. See Unauthorized Practice of

Law Committee v. Gordon, 979 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992);

United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986). 

_________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: May 15, 2007

cc: William J. Carey, pro se

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