alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NARENDRA PRASAD,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,

 Respondent.

No. 08-71664

Agency No. A078-652-077

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 13, 2010** 

Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Narendra Prasad, a native and citizen of Fiji, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 

FILED

SEP 30 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-71664

8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d

889, 894 (9th Cir. 2003), we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Prasad’s motion to reopen

because it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s May 12, 2005, order

dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Prasad failed to

demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see

Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is

prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner

acts with due diligence”); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th

Cir. 2007). 

In light of our disposition, we do not reach Prasad’s remaining contentions.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### Michael R. SHEMONSKY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-1169.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

DECIDED: Feb. 26, 2003.

*478Before MICHEL, RADER, and SCHALL, Circuit Judges.

*ORDER*

MICHEL, Circuit Judge.

The court considers whether Michael R. Shemonsky’s appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Shemonsky filed a “Complaint — Writ of Error” in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania naming that court as the defendant, 02-1410. He founded his complaint on civil rights laws and RICO, and named certain Constitutional amendments. On October 28, 2002, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The district court concluded that the complaint, in essence, was an attempt to relitigate a 2000 district court decision, which itself was an attempt to reopen a 10-year old case. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Shemonsky’s complaint and dismissed. Shemonsky directed his appeal to this court.

We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. The only statutory provision that could provide a basis for this court’s jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2), which grants this court jurisdiction to review decisions of district courts that are based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), the so-called Little Tucker Act. However, Shemonsky did not allege jurisdiction under § 1346(a)(2) and that provision does not encompass suits against courts for “wrong” decisions. *See generally United States v. Mitchell,*463 U.S. 206, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983).

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we decline to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 because we conclude it is not in the interest of justice (when an appeal is filed in a court that finds it lacks jurisdiction, that court may transfer to the appropriate court “if it is in the interest of justice”). We note that the district court found Shemonsky’s complaint to be “frivolous and harassing.” We agree. Further, the district court took notice of the following statement of the Third Circuit in its previous appeal:

> The instant appeal is the result of yet another notice of appeal filed by Shemonsky in response to an order entered by the District Court on September 28, 2000, which merely advised Shemonsky that the case was closed as of January 23, 1993. (Dkt.#23). As this appeal presents no substantial questions, see I.O.P. 10.6, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. We note that we have no qualms with an order that seeks to discourage the filing of additional motions in a case which has been closed for over seven years.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The appeal is dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1502 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1502

   To clarify the citizenship eligibility for certain members of the 
       Tohono O'odham Nation of Arizona, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 4, 2001

Mr. Pallone (for himself and Mr. Pastor) introduced the following bill; 
            which was referred to the Committee on Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To clarify the citizenship eligibility for certain members of the 
       Tohono O'odham Nation of Arizona, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELIGIBILITY FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP; PASS AND REPASS 
              OF BORDERS.

    (a) Applications for Citizenship Granted.--For a period of 3 years 
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, any member of the 
Tohono O'odham Nation of Arizona residing on the lands of the Tohono 
O'odham Nation of Arizona in Arizona or Mexico may apply for United 
States citizenship. Such application shall be made to the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service and, upon receipt of the application, 
citizenship shall be granted to the applicant.
    (b) Pass and Repass of Borders.--Notwithstanding the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, all members of the Tohono O'odham Nation of 
Arizona shall be entitled to pass and repass freely the borders of the 
United States.
                                 <all>
```
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2009-7096 

ERNEST L. BELL, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Ernest L. Bell, of Lake Charles, Louisiana, pro se. 

Scott A. MacGriff, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. With 

him on the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, 

Director, and Brian M. Simkin, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were Michael J. 

Timinski, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and Christa A. Childers, Staff Attorney, Office 

of the General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

 

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

Chief Judge William P. Greene, Jr. 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

2009-7096 

ERNEST L. BELL, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

 Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 07-1398, Chief 

Judge William P. Greene, Jr. 

 __________________________ 

DECIDED: November 4, 2009 

 __________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, MAYER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Ernest L. Bell appeals the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims that he abandoned his claim for an earlier effective date for his total 

disability based upon individual unemployability rating. Bell v. Shinseki, No. 07-1398 

(Ct. Vet. App. Jan. 30, 2009). We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

Our authority to review a decision of the Veterans Court is limited. We may 

review such a decision only to the extent that it pertains to the validity of “a rule of law or 

of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination 
2009-7096 2

as to a factual matter),” or “to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the 

extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. §§ 7292(a), 7292(c). Absent 

a constitutional issue, we do not otherwise have jurisdiction to review either “a challenge 

to a factual determination” or “a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts 

of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2). 

Bell does not assert that the Veterans Court misinterpreted a statute or regulation 

or that his case presents constitutional issues. Rather, he challenges the court’s 

application of the jurisprudential rule of abandonment to the facts in his case. We lack 

jurisdiction to consider this challenge. See Andre v. Principi, 301 F.3d 1354, 1362-63 

(Fed. Cir. 2002).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Misc. No. 06-024-PB

)

MICHAEL CASWELL, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

PROPOSED ORDER

I herewith approve in substance the Report and

Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Muirhead dated June 19, 2006

with the following modification. It is ordered that Michael

Caswell obey the underlying summons and appear on September 5,

2006 at 9:00 a.m. at 195 Commerce Way, Suite B, Portsmouth, New

Hampshire, before Revenue Officer Stephen Jerome, to give

testimony and produce all books and records in his possession or

control required and called for by the terms of the summons dated

June 2, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:___________________ ___________________________

Paul J. Barbadoro

U.S. District Court Judge

cc: Gretchen Leah Witt, AUSA

Michael Caswell, pro se

Case 1:06-cv-00358-PB Document 7 Filed 08/04/06 Page 1 of 1
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1688

To direct the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund to oppose any new

loan by the International Monetary Fund to any country that is acting

to restrict oil production to the detriment of the United States economy,

except in emergency circumstances.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 2, 2001

Mr. SAXTON (for himself, Mr. DELAY, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr.

SCHAFFER, Mr. ROHRABACHER, Mr. PITTS, and Mr. PAUL) introduced

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the

United States Executive Director at the International

Monetary Fund to oppose any new loan by the International Monetary Fund to any country that is acting

to restrict oil production to the detriment of the United

States economy, except in emergency circumstances.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 1688 IH

1 SECTION 1. OPPOSITION BY THE UNITED STATES TO ANY

2 NEW LOAN BY THE IMF TO ANY COUNTRY

3 ACTING TO RESTRICT OIL PRODUCTION TO

4 THE DETRIMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

5 ECONOMY; EXCEPTION.

6 Title XV of the International Financial Institutions

7 Act (22 U.S.C. (XV 262o—262o–2) is amended by adding

8 at the end the following:

9 ‘‘SEC. 1504. OPPOSITION BY THE UNITED STATES TO ANY

10 NEW LOAN BY THE IMF TO ANY COUNTRY

11 ACTING TO RESTRICT OIL PRODUCTION TO

12 THE DETRIMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

13 ECONOMY; EXCEPTION.

14 ‘‘The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the

15 United States Executive Director at the Fund to use the

16 voice, vote, and influence of the United States to oppose

17 any new loan by the Fund to any country which the Sec18 retary of Energy determines is a member of the Organiza19 tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries and is acting to

20 restrict oil production to the detriment of the United

21 States economy, or is acting in concert with that organiza22 tion to do so, unless the provision of the loan is necessary

23 to address a systemic risk to the international financial

24 system.’’.

Æ
United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 11-1034

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

Defendant - Appellant

MANDATE

Entered: April 25, 2012

In accordance with the judgment of February 29, 2012, and pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 41(a), this constitutes the formal mandate of this Court. 

By the Court:

/s/ Margaret Carter, Clerk

cc: 

Seth R. Aframe

Peter Anthony Biagetti

Bret A. Cohen

Catherine A. Fiske

Peter M. Flynn

Donald G. Frankel

Lisa Elizabeth Jones

Bradford T. McLane

Andrew N. Nathanson

Robert Harris Oakley

Jeffrey R. Porter

Laura J. Rowley

Ruthann Sherman

Colin Grant Van Dyke

Case: 11-1034 Document: 00116366982 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/25/2012 Entry ID: 5635939 Case 1:06-cv-00354-PB Document 172 Filed 04/26/12 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

USCOC of New Hampshire RSA #2, Inc.

v. Civil No. 05-cv-266-JM

City of Franklin, New Hampshire

O R D E R

 Counsel moves to permit fifteen unidentified “abutters and

near neighbors” to plaintiff’s proposed wireless facility to

intervene in this case. Plaintiff objects. 

Background

Plaintiff instituted suit against the City of Franklin due

to its planning board’s denial of plaintiff’s cell tower

application. Defendant based its decision in part upon (1) the

alleged dangerous conditions of such construction in this area,

(2) the damaging effect that this tower will impose on the

aesthetic nature of the surrounding community and (3) the

diminution of value which the tower will allegedly create to

local residences. The purported intervenors allege that the

plaintiff’s proposed project represents a danger to their health

and safety and that it will diminish their property values. 

Discussion

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) requires that a party seeking to

Case 1:05-cv-00266-JM Document 13 Filed 10/06/05 Page 1 of 2
2

intervene to show that “the applicant’s interest is (not)

adequately represented by existing parties.” The burden is upon

the applicant to demonstrate the inadequacy. Public Service Co.

of New Hampshire v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 207 (1st Cir. 1998). 

There must be a tangible basis to support the claimed inadequacy

and that showing is greater when intervenors seeks to defend a

decision of a governmental entity. Id. The First Circuit

requires that the intervenor rebut the presumption that the

government will adequately represent the interests of its

citizens. Id. 

In this instance the interests advocated by the applicants

match two of the purported bases of Franklin’s decision. The

allegations that the fifteen anonymous applicants care more about

these bases than Franklin and that lack of financial resources

will limit Franklin’s vigor simply do not rebut the presumption. 

The motion (document no. 8) is denied. 

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 6, 2005

cc: Steven E. Grill, Esq.

 Paul T. Fitzgerald, Esq.

 Geoffrey J. Ransom, Esq.

Case 1:05-cv-00266-JM Document 13 Filed 10/06/05 Page 2 of 2
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1291 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 1291

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 20, 2001

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To amend title 38, United States Code, to increase the amount of 
    educational benefits for veterans under the Montgomery GI Bill.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``21st Century Montgomery GI Bill 
Enhancement Act''.

SEC. 2. INCREASE IN RATES OF BASIC EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE UNDER 
              MONTGOMERY GI BILL.

    (a) In General.--(1) Section 3015(a)(1) of title 38, United States 
Code, is amended to read as follows:
            ``(1) for an approved program of education pursued on a 
        full-time basis, at the monthly rate of--
                    ``(A) for months occurring during fiscal year 2002, 
                $800,
                    ``(B) for months occurring during fiscal year 2003, 
                $950,
                    ``(C) for months occurring during fiscal year 2004, 
                $1,100, and
                    ``(D) for months occurring during a subsequent 
                fiscal year, the amount for months occurring during the 
                previous fiscal year increased under subsection (h); 
                or''.
    (2) Section 3015(b)(1) of such title is amended to read as follows:
            ``(1) for an approved program of education pursued on a 
        full-time basis, at the monthly rate of--
                    ``(A) for months occurring during fiscal year 2002, 
                $650,
                    ``(B) for months occurring during fiscal year 2003, 
                $772,
                    ``(C) for months occurring during fiscal year 2004, 
                $894, and
                    ``(D) for months occurring during a subsequent 
                fiscal year, the amount for months occurring during the 
                previous fiscal year increased under subsection (h); 
                or''.
    (b) CPI Adjustment.--No adjustment in rates of educational 
assistance shall be made under section 3015(h) of title 38, United 
States Code, for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 19, 2001.

            Attest:

                                                 JEFF TRANDAHL,

                                                                 Clerk.

                            By Martha C. Morrison,

                                                          Deputy Clerk.
```
FIRST AMENDMENT

                             TO

     SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS


      THIS AMENDMENT made and entered into this 8th day   of
July,  1999,  by  and between AEI Fund Management,  Inc.,  a
Minnesota corporation, ("Purchaser") and Marie Callender Pie
Shops, Inc., ("Seller");

     WITNESSETH, that:

      WHEREAS,  on  the  2nd day of June, 1999  the  parties
hereto  executed  a Sale and Purchase Agreement  and  Escrow
Instructions  (Agreement  ") for  those  certain  properties
located as follows:

1.   Gresham #247             Farris Road, Gresham, OR

2.   Henderson #245           Warm Springs Road, Henderson, NV

3.   Amarillo #261            4111 Wolfin Avenue, Amarillo, TX

(collectively "the Properties"); and

      WHEREAS, AEI and Borrower have agreed to amend certain
terms  and  conditions  of  said  Agreement  as  hereinafter
provided;

      NOW, THEREFORE, for One Dollar ($1.00) and other  good
and  valuable  consideration, receipt  of  which  is  hereby
acknowledged,  it is hereby agreed between  the  parties  as
follows:

1.    The  ten (10) business days referred to in  the  first
line  of   Paragraph 5.4 beginning is deleted  and  replaced
with twenty (20) business days.

2.    The thirty (30) business days referred to in the third
line  of  Paragraph 5.1 is deleted and replaced with  forty-
five (45) business days.


      EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH ABOVE all other terms
and   conditions  of  said  Lease  Documents  shall   remain
unchanged and in full force and effect.


                       AEI FUND MANAGEMENT, INC.


                       By:/s/ Mark E Larson
                              Mark E. Larson
                              Its: Chief Financial Officer




                         MARIE CALLENDER PIE SHOPS, INC.

                         By: /s/ Stephen Jennings

                              Its: Chief Financial Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 07-cr-53-01-SM

Timothy McComas-Lowe

O R D E R

Defendant McComas-Lowe’s motion to continue the final pretrial

conference and trial is granted (document 7). Trial has been rescheduled for

the June 2007 trial period. Defendant McComas-Lowe shall file a waiver of

speedy trial rights not later than March 27, 2006. On the filing of such waiver,

his continuance shall be effective. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: May 23, 2007 at 4:30 p.m.

Jury Selection: June 5, 2007 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:07-cr-00053-SM Document 8 Filed 03/20/07 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

March 20, 2007

cc: Jeffrey Levin, Esq.

Peter Papps, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:07-cr-00053-SM Document 8 Filed 03/20/07 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Joseph Vaillancourt

also known as

Bryan Bernard

v. Civil No. 06-cv-438-JD

NH Department of Corrections, et al

O R D E R

After due consideration of the objections filed, I herewith approve the Report

and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Muirhead dated March 29, 2007, for the

reasons stated therein.

SO ORDERED.

April 23, 2007 /s/Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. 

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

cc: Joseph Vaillancourt, pro se

Nancy J. Smith, Esq.

Nancy Sue Tierney, Esq.

Case 1:06-cv-00438-JD Document 151 Filed 04/23/07 Page 1 of 1
#### J. C. BELLAH, Petitioner, v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HEREFORD, Respondent.

No. B-3375.

Supreme Court of Texas.

July 26, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 1972.

Kolander, Templeton & Hamilton, R. C. Hamilton, Amarillo, for petitioner.

Witherspoon, Aikin, Thomas & Langley, D. Wesley Gulley, Hereford, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner attacked the validity of a trustee’s sale under a deed of trust covering multiple tracts of land. The alleged ground of invalidity was that the sale of the tracts en masse resulted in a grossly inadequate selling price. An adverse judgment was affirmed by the court of civil appeals. 478 S.W.2d 636. Petitioner’s only point here relates to three of the tracts which he purchased under the Veterans Land Program. He argues that he was without power to mortgage his beneficial interest in these three tracts, and that their sale was void for this reason. This was not pleaded by him, however, nor did he submit any evidence concerning these tracts other than an affidavit which was stricken by the trial court as untimely filed, and of which action there is no complaint. See Womack v. Allstate Insurance Company, 156 Tex. 467, 296 S.W.2d 233 (1956); Blankenship v. Citizens State Bank, Slaton, 457 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Civ.App.1970, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Traweek v. Radio Brady, Inc., 441 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.Civ.App.1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

For these reasons, we do not pass upon the question of whether petitioner’s beneficial interest in the three tracts in question under the contracts of purchase and sale with the Veterans Land Board was subject to the voluntary lien which he created.

The application for writ of error is refused, no reversible error.