UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Markem-Imaje Corporation

 v. Civil No. 07-cv-00006-PB 

Opinion No. 2012 DNH 136

Zipher Ltd. &

Videojet Technologies, Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Markem-Imaje Corporation (“Markem”), a manufacturer of 

thermal transfer printers, seeks a declaratory judgment that a 

series of patents held by Zipher Ltd. and Videojet Technologies, 

Inc. (collectively “Zipher”) are invalid, unenforceable, and 

have not been infringed by Markem or its customers. For the 

reasons detailed below, I determine that the broad functional 

claim language in Zipher’s patents fails to satisfy the 

definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 2. On that basis, 

I grant Markem’s motion for summary judgment, and declare the 

challenged patent claims invalid.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Overview1

This dispute involves the tape drive systems used in

industrial thermal transfer printers. Product manufacturers use

these printers to rapidly print unique information onto

individual labels or packaging material. For example, a potato

chip manufacturer might use a thermal transfer printer to stamp

expiration dates onto a roll of flat potato chip packages before

separating the roll into individual bags and filling the bags

with potato chips.

The act of thermal transfer printing consists of pressing a

print head against an inked tape that contacts the printing

medium (the potato chip bag) and using the print head to

selectively heat the tape, thereby transferring the desired ink

pattern to the printing medium (e.g., “BEST IF USED BY

08.29.2012”). The basic principle is similar to that of a

typewriter or dot matrix printer, except that the print head 

 

1 The descriptions of thermal transfer printers, prior art, and 

the patents are drawn from my prior orders in this litigation. 

See Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd., No. 10-cv-112-PB, 2011 WL 

5837087 (D.N.H. Nov. 21, 2011); Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher 

Ltd., No. 07-cv-06-PB, 2008 WL 4116666 (D.N.H. Aug. 28, 2008)

(Doc. No. 92).

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uses heat rather than the force of the impact to transfer the 

ink from the ribbon to the printing medium.

The printer may be required to operate in intermittent mode

or continuous mode, depending on how the production line is set

up in a particular factory. In intermittent mode, the printing

medium is advanced into position and remains stationary during

the printing process. In continuous mode, the printing medium

advances through the printer at a constant rate throughout the

printing process; as the printing medium moves forward, the

printing head moves with it. Once the current sheet has been

printed, the printing head then rapidly returns to its home

position and the printing ribbon briefly rewinds so that the

printing head is lined up with the boundary between the used and

unused sections of ribbon.

As with any industrial application, reliability is 

extremely important in a thermal transfer printer. Some of the 

failures that can interrupt the operation of such a printer 

include excessive tape tension (which can cause the tape to 

break, forcing the operator to halt the production line to 

respool the tape), insufficient tape tension (which can 

interfere with the printer’s ability to position the tape 

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properly), wastage of unused tape (which forces the operator to 

replace the tape spools more frequently), and mechanical 

failures caused by wear and tear on the tape drive system.

Accordingly, tape drives must be designed to maintain tape 

tension within an acceptable range.

For two reasons, simply rotating each spool the same number

of degrees for each printing cycle will not produce consistent

tape tension. First, even in perfect conditions, rotating a

given spool by a given number of degrees will result in a

different length of ribbon advance depending on the diameter of

ribbon on the spool. For example, a one-degree rotation of a

spool 100 mm in diameter will result in about 0.9 mm of ribbon

advance, whereas a one-degree rotation of a spool 50 mm in

diameter will result in only about 0.4 mm of ribbon advance. 

Thus, the rotation of each spool must be adjusted according to

the amount of ribbon remaining on the spool. Second, real-world

conditions can interfere with the ideal mathematical 

relationship between spool diameter, spool rotation, and ribbon 

advance. For example, ribbon may stretch unevenly over time, 

causing unpredicted slack to develop. Additionally, if the 

ribbon breaks, operators may take actions (such as taping two 

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sections of ribbon together or tying off the ribbon) that make 

it even more difficult to measure how much ribbon remains on 

each spool.

B. Prior Art

The most common form of prior art relies upon a single 

motor to drive the take-up spool (the spool onto which used 

ribbon is taken up), with tension control provided by some form 

of “slipping clutch” arrangement on the supply spool (the spool 

from which fresh ribbon is drawn). As the take-up motor pulls 

more ribbon from the supply spool, the slipping clutch provides 

a resistive force that maintains an appropriate level of tension 

in the ribbon. The slipping clutch becomes less reliable, 

however, as it wears out over time. Additionally, a slipping 

clutch system’s reliance on friction for tension control limits 

the acceleration, deceleration, and maximum speed capability of 

the ribbon transport system.

Other prior art uses two motors, with one motor driving the

ribbon in a tape-transport direction and the other functioning

solely for tension control, not ribbon advance. For example,

U.S. Patent No. 5,366,303 (filed May 11, 1993) (“Barrus”)

discloses a printer that employs a take-up motor and a supply

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motor. Barrus, however, is a “pull-drag” device in that only 

the take-up motor provides rotational torque in the direction of

ribbon transport; the supply motor merely provides a variable

drag on the other motor.

C. The Patents

At issue in this case are U.S. Patent No. 7,150,572 (“the 

‘572 Patent”) and four patents that are continuations of the 

‘572 Patent: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,682,094 (“the ‘094 Patent”), 

7,722,268 (“the ‘268 Patent”), 7,748,917 (“the ‘917 Patent”), 

and 7,753,605 (“the ‘605 Patent”). Although the claims of the

continuation patents differ from the ‘572 Patent, each patent’s 

specification is necessarily the same as the one filed with the 

‘572 Patent. The patents disclose a tape drive intended for use 

in a thermal transfer printer. 

The tape drive described in the common specification 

consists of two spools of tape, each mounted on a spool support. 

The exemplary embodiment energizes both motors to drive the 

spools in a tape transport direction, drives the spools to add 

or subtract appropriate lengths of ribbon for tension control 

purposes, uses the operation of the motors to measure tape

tension without making physical contact with the tape, and

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switches easily between continuous and intermittent operation.

For purposes of the analysis that follows, claim 1 of the 

‘572 Patent is representative. It is directed to “[a] tape 

drive comprising” the following four elements:

[1] two motors, at least one of which is a stepper 

motor;

[2] two tape spool supports on which spools of tape 

are mounted, each spool being driveable by a 

respective one of said motors;

[3] a controller adapted to control energization of 

said two motors such that tape is transported in at 

least one direction between spools of tape mounted on 

the spool supports;

[4] wherein the controller energizes both said motors

to drive the spools in a tape transport direction, and 

said controller calculates a length of tape to be 

added to or subtracted from tape extending between 

said spools in order to maintain tension in said tape 

between predetermined limit values and controls said 

motors to drive the spools to add or subtract the 

calculated length of tape to or from the tape 

extending between said spools.

’572 Patent, Doc. No. 151-4 at 35 (emphases added). The dispute 

in this case centers on the active verb clauses in the fourth 

element that describe the functional capabilities of the 

controller. Zipher concedes that such language constitutes 

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“functional claiming.”2 Although I focus on the fourth element 

of claim 1 of the ‘572 Patent, each of the challenged claims in 

the five patents contains similar functional language describing 

a controller’s capabilities. 

D. Prior Litigation

In a series of prior orders, I construed the terms “drive” 

and “spools” as they were used in the ‘572 patent. See Markem

Corp. v. Zipher, Ltd., No. 07-cv-06-PB, 2009 WL 2855011 (D.N.H. 

Sept. 1, 2009) (Doc. No. 117); Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher 

Ltd., No. 07-cv-06-PB, 2008 WL 4116666 (D.N.H. Aug. 28, 2008)

(Doc. No. 92). I construed “drive” to mean “rotates” and 

“spools” to mean “more than one spool.” Based on these rulings, 

I held that Markem’s printer did not literally infringe the ‘572 

Patent. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated my rulings and 

held that “‘drive’ is properly construed to mean the application 

of torque to the spools, whether the torque causes rotation or 

resists it.” Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd., 657 F.3d 1293, 

1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

 

2 In an argument that I do not reach, Markem alternatively 

contends that the active verb clauses constitute method-step 

language, rendering the claims invalid under IPXL Holdings, LLC 

v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005), as 

impermissible method/apparatus hybrid claims. 

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After my rulings, Zipher obtained the four continuation 

patents enumerated above. In a separately filed action that was 

consolidated with the instant action in December 2011,

3 I agreed 

with Zipher that various claims in the continuation patents that 

used the terms “controller” or “monitor” should not be construed 

as “means-plus-function claims” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. 

Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd., No. 10-cv-112-PB, 2011 WL 

5837087 (D.N.H. Nov. 21, 2011). I also resolved disagreements 

about the construction of three claim terms. I held that the 

phrase “correction amount of tape to be added to or subtracted 

from tape extending between the tape spools” requires neither a 

calculated amount of tape nor a linear length of tape, and that 

the correction amount is designed to restore tension to an 

acceptable level but need not necessarily do so; that 

“controlling the operation of said two motors” means 

“controlling the motors to rotate or hold their respective spool 

of tape against rotation”; and that the phrase “parameter 

indicative of”, as used in “parameter indicative of tension” and 

“parameter indicative of the [spool] diameter,” includes both 

 

3 To date, I have also consolidated with this action, for 

pretrial purposes only, Videojet Tech. Ltd. v. Markem-Imaje

Corp., No. 12-cv-34-PB.

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direct and indirect methods of monitoring tension or diameter.

On March 30, 2012, Markem moved for summary judgment, 

contending that Zipher’s patents are invalid on the grounds of 

indefiniteness. Zipher responded in an objection filed on May 

31. To assist in my consideration of the issues at hand, I 

conducted an oral argument on July 30, at which time I allowed

each party to clarify their respective positions. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A summary judgment motion should be granted when the record 

reveals “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). Where a party argues that a patent claim is 

invalid for indefiniteness, the issue ordinarily is amenable to

resolution on summary judgment because “claim indefiniteness is 

a legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of 

its duty as the construer of patent claims.” Datamize, LLC v. 

Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(quoting Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 

161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

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The definiteness requirement arises out of paragraph 2 of 

35 U.S.C. § 112, which commands that the specification of a 

patent conclude by “particularly pointing out and distinctly 

claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 

invention.” This requirement is satisfied only by claims that

“clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before in 

the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future 

enterprise.” United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 

228, 236 (1942). Because a patent’s claims delineate the bounds 

of the invention, a claim is invalid for indefiniteness if “it 

does not reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of its 

scope.” IPXL Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 

1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

Each of a patent’s claims enjoys a presumption of validity, 

and clear and convincing evidence must be shown to invalidate a 

patent. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 

131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). Where claim construction is 

necessary to resolve an indefiniteness challenge, general 

principles of claim construction apply, and claims should not be 

found indefinite unless “reasonable efforts at claim 

construction prove futile.” Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1347-48. 

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III. ANALYSIS

In its motion for summary judgment, Markem argues that the 

claims are indefinite because they use impermissibly functional 

language at the point of novelty. Although I reject Markem’s 

categorical approach to functional claiming, I conclude that in 

the specific factual circumstances of this case, the functional 

language at issue renders the claims indefinite because one of 

ordinary skill in the art would not apprehend what additional 

structure is implied by the functional language. 

A. Categorical Indefiniteness Argument Based on Halliburton

Markem first contends that the patent claims asserted by 

Zipher are invalid for indefiniteness because, in contravention 

to the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in Halliburton Oil Well 

Cementing Co. v. Walker, they use “conveniently functional 

language at the exact point of novelty.” 329 U.S. 1, 8 (1946).

Under Markem’s per se approach, Halliburton establishes a twopart test, where a claim is automatically invalid if it (1) uses 

functional language (i.e., language that defines a structure “by 

what it does rather than by what it is,” In re Swinehart, 439 

F.2d 210, 212 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), (2) to distinguish the claimed 

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invention from the prior art. Zipher’s central response is that

Halliburton is no longer good law, having been overturned by 

Congress’s passage of the 1952 Patent Act. I agree with Zipher 

insofar as the categorical prohibition suggested by Markem is 

not borne out by recent case law. I disagree, however, that 

this ends the inquiry. Because functional claiming may violate 

generally applicable patent law standards, its usage must be 

closely scrutinized. Zipher’s patents do not withstand that 

scrutiny. I begin my analysis with a discussion of the genesis

of Halliburton and its remaining vitality. 

Eight years prior to Halliburton, in a case where it 

invalidated a patent claim disclosing a lamp filament, the 

Supreme Court stated that functional claiming can render a 

patent claim invalid “when the inventor is painstaking when he 

recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently 

functional language at the exact point of novelty.” General 

Electric Co. (“GE”) v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 

371 (1938). Elaborating on the potential vice of functional 

claiming, the Court in GE explained that although “[a] limited 

use of terms of effect or result, which accurately define the 

essential qualities of a product to one skilled in the art, may 

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in some instances be permissible and even desirable, [] a 

characteristic essential to novelty may not be distinguished 

from the old art solely by its tendency to remedy the problems 

in the art met by the patent.” Id. at 371-72.

Adverting to the GE decision and its derogation of the use 

of “conveniently functional language at the exact point of 

novelty,” the Court in Halliburton invalidated a patent claim on 

the basis that it was a combination of old ingredients whose 

novel aspect was described in purely functional terms. 329 U.S. 

at 8-9. In the Court’s view, the claim impermissibly described 

the “most crucial element” of the apparatus –- in whole, a 

structure for measuring oil well depth –- “in terms of what it 

will do rather than in terms of its own physical characteristics 

or its arrangement in the new combination apparatus.” Id. at 9. 

The Court explained that the danger of using functional language 

to distinguish a claimed invention from the prior art inhered in

an inventor’s ability to use ambiguous language to claim more 

than what he had actually invented: 

[T]here may be many other devices beyond our present 

information or indeed our imagination which will 

perform that function and yet fit these claims. . . . 

Had [the inventor] accurately described the machine he 

claims to have invented, he would have had no such 

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broad rights to bar the use of all devices now or 

hereafter known which could [accomplish the function]. 

. . . [A] patentee cannot obtain greater coverage by 

failing to describe his invention than by describing 

it as the statute commands.

Id. at 12-13.

Apparently displeased by the decision in Halliburton, 

Congress enacted portions of the 1952 Patent Act as a response 

to the Court’s prohibition on functional claiming. See In re 

Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Congress 

enacted paragraph six . . . to statutorily overrule [the

Halliburton] holding”). Section 112, paragraph 6 of the Act 

explicitly authorizes what is termed “means-plus-function”

claiming: “An element in a claim for a combination may be 

expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function 

without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support 

thereof . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. In exchange for the 

convenience of means-plus-function claiming, however, the Act 

restricts the patentee to “the corresponding structure, 

material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents 

thereof.” Id. 

In a prior order in this case I determined, at Zipher’s 

urging, that the patent claims at issue are not means-plusCase 1:07-cv-00006-PB Document 169 Filed 08/09/12 Page 15 of 28
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function claims. Markem-Imaje, 2011 WL 5837087. I was 

persuaded, in large part by extrinsic evidence denoting 

established definitions for the disputed terms “controller” and 

“monitor,” that one of ordinary skill in the art would 

understand those terms as “known physical apparatuses” rather 

than as “‘nonce words’ or ‘verbal constructs’ that are simply 

substitutes for the term ‘means for,’” id. at *4-5 (quoting 

Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1356 

(Fed. Cir. 2006)). I also accepted Zipher’s representations 

that the two terms connote sufficient structure to perform the 

functions recited. Def.’s Brief at 7, 9, Doc. No. 47 of No. 10-

cv-112-PB. In light of the evidence presented and the 

presumption against means-plus-function claiming that arises 

when a claim avoids using the term “means,” I concluded that the 

restrictions of section 112, paragraph 6 do not apply.

Markem argues that where, as here, a patentee does not 

avail itself of the “safe harbor” of section 112, paragraph 6, 

the bright-line rule of Halliburton continues to govern and bars 

a patentee from functional claiming at the point of novelty. I 

am unpersuaded by Markem’s categorical approach, however, 

because it is inconsistent with Federal Circuit precedent, which 

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plainly sanctions functional claiming, whether or not at the 

point of novelty, outside of the framework of a means-plusfunction claim. E.g., Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. (“MEC”)

v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(“Functional language may also be employed to limit the claims 

without using the means-plus-function format.”); Swinehart, 439 

F.2d at 212-13 (“[A]ny concern over the use of functional 

language at the so-called ‘point of novelty’ . . . . is not only 

irrelevant, it is misplaced . . . . We are convinced that there 

is no support, either in the actual holdings of prior cases or 

in the statute, for the proposition, put forward here, that 

‘functional’ language, in and of itself, renders a claim 

improper.”); see, e.g., Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I 

LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Swinehart

with approval); Haberman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 236 F. App’x 592, 

596 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (patentee is “permitted to use 

functional language to limit the claims”); K-2 Corp. v. Salomon 

SA, 191 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (analyzing functional 

language in patent claim as an additional limitation).4

 

4 In asserting the continuing vitality of Halliburton, Markem 

cites no recent federal case law as precedent, relying instead 

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Instead, the Federal Circuit has adopted a more nuanced

approach. See M-I, 514 F.3d at 1255; Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 

212-13. The appropriate inquiry is directed to the traditional 

patent formalities: because “there is nothing intrinsically 

wrong with” functional claiming, a court should invalidate a 

patent with functional language only if it fails to satisfy the 

established, generally applicable requirements set out in 

section 112 and elsewhere. See Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 212. 

That said, as the Supreme Court recognized in Halliburton and 

GE, there are particular dangers implicated when an inventor 

 

on the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 

(“Board”) in Ex Parte Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1207, 1217 

(B.P.A.I. 2008). I place little weight on that opinion largely 

for the same three reasons expressed by the district court in 

American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Laser Peripherals, LLC, 712 F. 

Supp. 2d 885, 910 (D. Minn. 2010). That court explained: (1) 

in Miyazaki, the Board expressly limited its holding to claim 

construction before the Board; (2) the Board linked its concerns 

about functional language to the traditional requirements of 

section 112; and (3) Board opinions are not binding on federal 

courts. 712 F. Supp. 2d at 910. As an addendum to the first 

reason, I would also add that the Board in Miyazaki expressly 

stated that it had chosen to adopt a “lower threshold standard 

of ambiguity for indefiniteness for claims during prosecution” 

as compared to the threshold for claims subject to court review 

after issuance. 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1212. I also place no weight 

on the Board’s subsequent decision in Ex Parte Rodriguez, 92 

U.S.P.Q.2d 1395, 1408-11 (B.P.A.I. 2009), which unquestionably 

accepted Miyazaki as governing law.

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describes his invention in functional terms. A leading treatise 

succinctly lists three problems that tend to arise:

First, functionality may present a problem of 

definiteness under the second paragraph of Section 112 

because it fails to provide a clear indication of what 

subject matter is within the claim. Second, 

functionality may present a problem of inadequate 

disclosure under the first paragraph of Section 112. 

Functional terms tend to be very broad in scope and 

the specification may not provide an enabling 

disclosure commensurate in scope. Finally, 

functionality may present a problem of novelty and 

nonobviousness: “the mere recitation of a newly 

discovered function or property, inherently possessed 

by things in the prior art does not cause a claim 

drawn to those things to distinguish over the prior 

art.

Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 8.04[3] (2010) (footnotes 

omitted). 

In this case, Markem has made clear in its briefing and at 

oral argument that its challenge is predicated only on the 

putative indefiniteness of the patent claims at issue. See

Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 1, Doc. No. 151-1. Stripped 

of any categorical rule existing by dint of Halliburton,

Markem’s functionality argument links the functional language in

Zipher’s claims to the traditional concern of definiteness

encapsulated in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. My analysis of that 

argument is guided by the many Federal Circuit decisions on 

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indefiniteness and by its admonition in M-I that “[w]hen a claim 

limitation is defined in purely functional terms, the task of 

determining whether that limitation is sufficiently definite is 

a difficult one that is highly dependent on context[.]” 514 

F.3d at 1255.

B. Specific Indefiniteness Argument

Although Markem’s brief is not a paragon of clarity, I 

understand its more specific indefiniteness argument to be as 

follows.5 The claims in Zipher’s patents recite a variety of 

“generic components” that have long been “ubiquitous in tape

drives,” including “controllers.” Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Summ. 

J. at 30, Doc. No. 151-1. Although a generic controller has 

inherent functionality, it requires additional structure –-

i.e., additional programming, hardware, circuitry, etc. -- to be 

able to perform the particular functions detailed in the claims.

The patents, however, do not claim any particular programming

 

5 Zipher’s counsel complained at oral argument that Markem had 

not raised a general indefiniteness argument untethered from a 

per se rule predicated on Halliburton. My review of Markem’s 

brief (Doc. No. 151-1), specifically pages 30-34, satisfies me 

that Markem did assert a more nuanced, fact-specific 

indefiniteness argument, and that Zipher had fair notice that 

the issue was in play. The argument I describe in the text is 

drawn directly from Markem’s brief and fairly characterizes 

Markem’s contentions.

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for the controllers, but instead “broadly claim[] all 

controllers that operate in the ways claimed, even if they do so 

using very different technology than that described in the 

patent specifications.” Id. at 34. As such, the argument 

concludes, Zipher’s claims are invalid for indefiniteness 

because they fail to specify the scope of the subject-matter 

embraced by the claims.

As a general principle, when functional language in an 

apparatus patent acts as an additional claim limitation to 

describe a capability of a structural component, it will either 

describe a capability that is inherent in an already disclosed 

structural component, or it will describe a capability that is 

not inherent and that therefore implies some additional 

unidentified structure that is required to perform the claimed

function. The first type of claiming is problematic if the 

functional claim language is at the point of novelty because 

“[w]here all structural elements of a claim exist in a prior art 

product, and that prior art product is capable of satisfying all 

functional or intended use limitations, the claimed invention is 

nothing more than an unpatentable new use for an old product.”

Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 653 

Case 1:07-cv-00006-PB Document 169 Filed 08/09/12 Page 21 of 28
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(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Reyna, J., dissenting); see also Swinehart, 

439 F.2d at 213. The second type of claiming, whether or not it 

is at the point of novelty, can present a problem if the claimed 

function can be performed through various structural means and a 

person skilled in the art cannot determine the structures that 

are encompassed by the claim. See, e.g., M-I, 514 F.3d at 1254. 

The functional claiming at issue here is of the latter variety. 

Zipher’s patents all require controllers that perform a 

variety of functions, including energizing motors to transport 

tape, calculating a correction amount of tape, and operating the 

motors to maintain tape tension at an acceptable level. As 

Zipher now concedes, however, a controller is not inherently 

capable of performing these functions without special 

programming.6 See Tr. of July 30, 2012 Hr’g at 131, Doc. No. 

168. Thus, a person skilled in the art must be able to discern 

what additional structures are encompassed by the functions 

 

6 This concession represents a change in position by Zipher. In 

its brief arguing that the functional claim language was not 

means-plus-function claiming, Zipher contended that a controller 

was capable of performing the claimed functions without 

additional structure. Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Claim Construction 

Br. at 7, Doc. No. 47 of No. 10-cv-112-PB (“‘Controller’ 

Sufficient to Perform Recited Functions”). 

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claimed. Here, however, Zipher does not argue that its 

functional claim terms connote specific structure. Instead, its 

position is that the functional terms encompass all means by 

which the functions can be performed. In other words, the 

purely functional claim language broadly and impermissibly 

“cover[s] any means which anyone may ever discover of producing 

the result.” In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 263 (C.C.P.A.

1963). Indeed, Zipher’s counsel admitted as much during the 

claim construction hearing when he acknowledged that the term 

“controller” was a “deliberately chosen broad term[]” that was 

intended to cover every controller capable of performing the 

recited functions, no matter the algorithm used in the software 

enabling that functionality. Tr. of June 16, 2011 Markman Hr’g 

at 68-69, Doc. No. 68 of No. 10-cv-112-PB. It is clear, 

therefore, that one of ordinary skill in the art, confronted by 

the unbounded functional claiming at issue, would not apprehend 

what additional structure was being claimed to enable the 

controller to accomplish the recited functions. Therefore, the 

claims are invalid for indefiniteness under section 112, 

paragraph 2, for “fail[ing] ‘to provide a clear-cut indication 

of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim.’” 

Case 1:07-cv-00006-PB Document 169 Filed 08/09/12 Page 23 of 28
24

M-I, 514 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 212-13).

Zipher might argue that I should attempt to save its claims 

by construing them as means-plus-function claims and limiting

their scope to the structures disclosed in the specification. 

That course is inappropriate for two reasons. First, Zipher 

carefully pled its patent claims to avoid such treatment by 

refraining from using “means” language. Second, Zipher 

zealously resisted means-plus-function treatment in this 

litigation, contending until recently that the recitation of a 

controller was sufficient structure to perform the recited 

functions. 

Nonetheless, belated application of section 112, paragraph 

6 would not save Zipher’s claims because the specification does 

not disclose structures sufficient to perform the functions at 

issue. Instructive on this point is the line of Federal Circuit 

cases addressing claims that recite a general-purpose computer 

as the means for performing a function that requires special 

programming. In such cases, the Federal Circuit has made clear 

that a patent’s specification must disclose the algorithm that 

enables the computer to perform the claimed function because the 

algorithm serves as the “defining structure [that] render[s] the 

Case 1:07-cv-00006-PB Document 169 Filed 08/09/12 Page 24 of 28
25

bounds of the claim understandable to one of ordinary skill in 

the art.” AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 

F.3d 1236, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A patent that fails to 

disclose the limiting algorithm –- for example, a patent that 

only discloses the existence of software or a general-purpose 

computer -- is invalid for indefiniteness under section 112, 

paragraph 2. See, e.g., In re Katz Interactive Call Processing

Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Finisar 

Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). 

As Zipher now concedes, a controller, just like a generalpurpose computer, can be programmed to perform various functions 

that are not inherent to its structure. Under a section 112, 

paragraph 6 analysis, a means-plus-function claim that recites a 

programmable controller capable of performing special functions 

must be accompanied by an adequate disclosure in the patent 

specification of the algorithm that enables the claimed 

functions. That algorithm need not be in any particular form, 

so long as it is expressed “in any understandable terms 

including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow 

chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient 

Case 1:07-cv-00006-PB Document 169 Filed 08/09/12 Page 25 of 28
26

structure.” Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340 (internal citation 

omitted).

Means-plus-function treatment could not operate to save the 

claims at issue because the common specification fails to

disclose sufficient algorithmic structure to describe the 

controller’s functions. At the hearing, I questioned Zipher’s 

counsel on whether and where the common specification disclosed 

an algorithm. I was directed to various portions of the 

specification that show the following: a circuit diagram 

illustrating the connections of a controller to other 

components; a description of the circuit diagram; references to 

one known set of conventional control algorithms and an 

explanation of what those algorithms might allow; and a 

description of how hardware can be configured to allow for a 

calculation of spool diameter. Tr. of July 30, 2012 Hr’g at 

133-38, Doc. No. 168. I have reviewed these sections of the 

specification, and conclude that they do not set out the 

necessary algorithms that would enable a controller to perform 

the claimed functions. Therefore, Zipher’s claims would remain 

invalid for indefiniteness even if I applied the limiting 

mechanism of section 112, paragraph 6.

Case 1:07-cv-00006-PB Document 169 Filed 08/09/12 Page 26 of 28
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IV. CONCLUSION

I am, of course, cognizant of the presumption of validity 

that accompanies a patent, and I am aware of the need for clear 

and convincing evidence to overcome that presumption. In this 

case, Markem has overcome that burden and established that 

Zipher’s functional claiming “fail[s] ‘to provide a clear-cut 

indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the 

claim.’” M-I, 514 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 

212-13). 

For the foregoing reasons, I grant Markem’s motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. No. 151). The asserted claims are 

invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 for 

failing to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the 

subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 

Specifically, claim 1 of the ‘572 Patent, claims 2, 18, and 31 

of the ‘094 Patent, claims 1 and 33 of the ‘268 Patent, claims 1 

and 3 of the ‘917 Patent, and claims 1, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 

18 of the ‘605 Patent are invalid. The clerk is directed to 

enter judgment accordingly and to close the case.

Case 1:07-cv-00006-PB Document 169 Filed 08/09/12 Page 27 of 28
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SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

August 9, 2012

cc: Christopher H.M. Carter, Esq.

Kurt L. Glitzenstein, Esq.

Christopher R. Dillon, Esq.

Daniel Miville Deschenes, Esq.

Michael C. Lynn, Esq.

J. Michael Jakes, Esq.

Joyce Craig, Esq.

Kara F. Stoll, Esq.

Bryan K. Gould, Esq.

David J. Shulock, Esq.

Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Esq.

Garth D. Baer, Esq.

Michael V. O’Shaughnessy, Esq.

Philip R. Braley, Esq.

Case 1:07-cv-00006-PB Document 169 Filed 08/09/12 Page 28 of 28