### IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2013 WY 58

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2013

May 10, 2013

DANIEL B. WALKER,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v

.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff). No. S

- 12

- 0195

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County

The Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A.

Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee:

Gregory A. Phillips, A ttorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General;

Meri V. Geringer, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior

Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Geringer.

B e f o r e K I T E

, C

. J

. , H I L L

, B U R K E

, D A V I S

, J J

. , a n d G O L D E N

, J

. , R e t i r e d

.

N O T I C E : T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f

o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n P a c i f

i c R e p o r t e r T h i r d

. R e a d e r

s

a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f

y t h e C l e r

k o f t h e S u p r

e m e C o u r

t

, S u p r e m e C o u r

t B u i l d i n g , C h e y e n n e , W y o m i n g

8 2 0 0 2

, o f a n y t y p o g r

a p h i c a l o r o t h e r f

o r m a l e r r

o r s s o t h a t c o r r

e c t i o n m a y b e m a d e b e f o r e f i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n i n

t h e p e r m a n e n t v o l u m e

.1

B U R K E

, J u s t i c e

.

[ ¶ 1 ] A p p e l l a n t

, D a n i e l W a l k e r

, c h a l l e n g e s h i s c o n v i c t i o n f

o r f e l o n y s t a l k i n g

, in

violatio n of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 2

- 506(e ) (iv)

. He contends that t he amended information

did not allege facts sufficient to constitute the offense of felony stalking and d i d n o t

adequately inform him of the charges against him

. Appellant also c l a i m s t h a t t h e j u r y was not properly instructed with respect to the intent el ement of the crime

, r e s u l t i n g i n plain error. We find no error in the district court’s decision permitting the S t a t e t o a m e n d

the information and also conclude that Appellant was adequately informed of the charges.

We agree , however, with A ppel l ant ’ s con t e n

t i o n t h a t t h e j u r y w a s n o t p r

o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d

regarding the elements of the crime. A s a result, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I S S U E S

[ ¶ 2 ] A p p e l l a n t p r e s e n t s t

h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s :

1

. D i d t h e t r i a l c o u r

t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n w

h e n i t a l l o w e d t h e

S t a t e t o a m e n d t h e f

e l o n y i n f o r m a t i o n ?

2

. W a s M r

. W a l k e r d e n i e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g

h t t o

a d e q u a t e n o t i c e o f t h e c h a r g

e h e m u s t d e f e n d a g a i n s t

, a s

p r o v i d e d f o r u n d e r t h e f

e d e r a l a n d t h e W

y o m i n g

C o n s t i t u t i o n s

, a n d t

h e W y o m i n g R u l e s o f C r i m i n a l

P r o c e d u r e ?

3

. D i d p l a i n e r r

o r r e s u l t w

h e n t h e t r i a l c o u r

t p r o v i d e d a

c o n f u s i n g a n d m

i s l e a d i n g j u r y i n s t r

u c t i o n w

h i c h

c o m b i n e d t w o o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f s t a l k i n g a n d i n s t r u c t e d

t h e j u r y t h a

t b o t h o f t h o s e e l e m e n t s w e r e m e t u p o n t h e

S t a t e establishing a combination of certain act i o n s b y

Mr. Walker?

T h e S t a t e p h r a s e s t h e i s s u e s i n a s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r m a n n e r

.

F A C T S

[ ¶ 3 ] A p p e l l a n t and the victim, Angel i a Leair, married in 1989 and separated in

September, 2006. The marriage produced two children. In July , 2006, w hile Appellant

and Ms. Leair were still married, Ms. Leair went to a bar with a friend without telling

Appellant. When she returned home, Appellant confronted her about some checks she

had written that night. Appellant became angry and hit her with a checkbook. He then

r etrieved a rifle from the gun cabinet in their bedroom and threatened to commit suicide.2

M s

. L e a i r c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e a n d A p p e l l a n t w a s a r r e s t e d

. C r i m i n a l c h a r g e s w e r e l a t e r f

i l e d

a g a i n s t A p p e l l a n t

, b u t M s

. L e a i r a p p a r e n

t l y c h o s e n o t t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t i o n

a n d t h e S t a t e e v

e n t u a l l y d i s m i s s e d t h e c h a r g

e s

.

[ ¶ 4 ] At Ms. Leair’s request, Appellant moved out of the ir home in September, 2006. A

few weeks later, Ms. Leair obtained a pro tection order against Appellant

, w h i c h r e m a i n e d

in effect until January, 2007

. The order sta ted that Ms. Leair had been the victim of a n

act of domestic abuse as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35

- 21

- 102(a)(iii) a n d p r o v i d e d t h a t

A p p e l l a n t “ s h a l l n o t i n i t i a t e c o n t a c t w i t h [ M s

. L e a i r ] a n y w h e r e e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r indirectly.” (Em

phasis omitted.) In February, 2007

, a f t e r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o r d e r e x p i r e d

, A p p e l l a n t h a d r e g

u l a r c o n t a c t w i t h M s

. L e a i r a t h e r p l a c e o f e m p l o y m e n t o n h i s d e l i v

e r y

route for the United Parcel Service. During one such interaction on F e b r u a r y 1 5

, 2 0 0 7

, Appella n t b e c a m e a n g

r y w i t h M s

. L e a i r a n d c a l l e d h e r e m p l o y e r t o r e

p o r t t h a t s h e h a

d

been having an affair with her boss, an allegation that Ms. Leair denied. A p p e l l a n t ’ s conduct caused a significant delay in Ms. Leair’s advancement from tempo r a r y t o

permanent e mployment

.

[ ¶ 5 ] T w o m o n t h s a f

t e r t h a t i n c i d e n t

, i n April, 2007, Appellant followed Ms. Leair in

h i s v e h i c l e a f t e r s h e p i c k e d u p t h e i r s o n f r o m a f r i e n d ’ s h o u s e

. A

p p e l l a n t o v e r t o o k

M s

. L e a i r o n t h e h i g

h w a y and “slammed on his brakes” in front of her

. Ms. Leai r d r o v e around Appellant and proceeded to the Sheriff’s Department to report the incident.

Appellant was subsequently charged with reckless driving . After pleading guilty, he

received a sentence of thirty days in jail , which was suspended in favor of six m o n t h s o f

unsupervised probation, to be served from April, 2008 to October, 2008. A s a c o n d i t i o n

of probation, Appellant was ordered to have no co ntact with Ms. Leair. Additionally, d u e

to Appellant’s conduct, Ms. Leair obtained a se cond protection orde r , which r e m a i n e d i n

effect until October, 2007

. That protection order w a s l a t e r e x t e n d e d t o A

p r i l

, 2 0 0 8 o n

Ms. Leair’s motion

.

[ ¶ 6 ] I n M a y

, 2 0 0 7

, w

h i l e t h e s e c o n d p r

o t e c t i o n o r

d e r w a s s t i l l i n e f

f e c t , Appellant

entered Ms. Leai r’s home when she was not the re and prayed over her bed. F o u r d a y s later, Appellant left a voicemail on Ms. Leair’s phone. A s a r e s u l t o f t h e s e i n c i d e n t s

, A p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g

e d w i t h

, a n d p l e d g

u i l t y t o

, t w o c o u n t s o f v i o l a t i o n o f a p r o t e c t i o n

order

. Appellant was again sentenced to thirty days in jail , but that sentence was a l s o suspended in lieu of six months of unsupervised probation

.

[ ¶ 7 ] W h i l e A p p e l l a n t w a s o n p r o b a t i o n f

o r h i s r e c k l e s s d r i v i n g c o n v i c t i o n

, h e violated

t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s p r o b a t i o n b y s e n d i n g a t e x t m e s s a g e t o M s

. L e a i r stating that he was

p r a y i n g f o r h e r and asking her to “ask Jesus into your heart

. ” Du r i n g M a r c h

, A p r i l

, a n d

May, 2009

, A

p p e l l a n t r e p e a t e d l y s e n t M s

. L e a i r t e x t m e s s a g e s s t a t i n g t h a t h e w a s p r a y i n g for her and asking for her forgiveness. M s . Leair r e s p o n d e d t o s o m e o f t h e s e m e s s a g e s by asking Appellant to stop praying for her, to stop harassing her, and to leave her alone.3

[ ¶ 8 ] I n J u l y

, 2 0 0 9 , shortly after Ms. Leair was remarried, she and her new husband

e n c o u n t e r e d A p p e l l a n t a t a W a l

- M a r t s t o r e

. A

p p e l l a n t c o n f

r o n t e d M s

. L e a i r a b o u t an

i s s u e r e l a t i n g t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n and then began to yell at Mr. Leair, asking

h i m h o w i t f

e l t t o s t e a l h i s f

a m i l y a n d t e l l i n g h i m t h a t “ h e w a s n ’ t a r e a l m a n

. ” M s

. L e a i r

d i d n o t r e p o r t t h e i n c i d e n

t a t t h e t i m e, but testified at trial that she was “ really scared ” a n d

felt like she could not go anywhere that she might run into Appellant. Several months

l a t e r

, M s

. L e a i r r e c e i v

e d a t e x t m e s s a g

e f r o m A p p e l l a n t a s k i n g f

o r f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t

. After Ms

. Leair respon ded by a s k i n g A p p e l l a n t t o s t o p h a r a s s i n g h e r a n d t o l e a v e h e r alone, Appellant sent a message stating that “In the name of [J]esus [I] rebuke you.”

[ ¶ 9 ] I n O c t o b e r

, 2 0 0 9

, M s

. L e a i r a n d h e r h u s b a n d a g a i n e n c o u n t e r e d A

p p e l l a n t a t W a l

M a r t

. A s s h e a n d h e r h

u s b a nd were leaving the store, Ms. Leair saw Appellant driving

h i s v e h i c l e t o w a r d t h e m

. He began honking his horn and yelling out of his window at

M s

. L e a i r a n d h e r h u s b a n d

. As a result of this incident, Ms. Leair obtained an “ E x p a r t e Stalking Order of Prot ection” o n N o v e m b e r 6

, w h i c h r e m a i n e d i n e f

f e c t “ u n t i l f

u r t h e r

order of the court.” Appellant violated this order on November 29 by calling Ms. Leair ’ s phone a n d l e a v i n g a v o i c e m a i l

. M s

. L e a i r r e p o r t e d t h e i n c i d e n t t o t h e p o l i c e

, a n d

Appellant was arrest ed and charged with a violation of the order. Appellant was r e l e a s e d

from custody on February 25, 2010, o n t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a

t h e w o u l d h a v

e “ n o c o n t a c t

, direct or indirect” with Ms. Leair.

[ ¶ 1 0 ] I n December, 2009, Ms. Leair obtained a “Stalking Order of Protec tion” a g a i n s t

Appellant. T h e o r

d e r s t a t e d t

h a t “ A f t e r h e a r i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e i r

w i t n e s s e s

, t h e C o u r t f

i n d s t h a t t h e R e s p o n d e n t ’ s c o n d u c t c o n s t i t u t e s s t a l k i n g a s d e f

i n e d

by W.S. § 6

- 2

- 506(b) and that an Order of Protection should be en tered.” T h e o r d e r

p r o v i d e d t h a t A

p p e l l a n t “ s h a l l n o t p e r s o n a

l l y

, o r t h r o u g h a n y o t h e r p e r s o n o r m e a n s

, contact, harass, stalk, threaten, intimidate, or otherwise interfere with . . . Angel i a L e a i r

or David Leair.” The order remained in effect until Decem ber, 2010.

[ ¶ 1 1 ] T h r e e m o n t h s l a t e r

, i n M a r c h

, 2 0 1 0

, M s

. L e a i r a n d h e r d a u g h t e r w e r e a t W a l

- Mart

shopping for a cell phone. According to Ms. Leair’s testimony, A p p e l l a n t a p p r o a c h e d

them from behind and said “ [ W ] ow, you m ust be making a lot of money these days. ”

Appellant was standing approximately four feet away from Ms. Leair w h e n h e m a d e t h i s

comment. Ms. Leair immediately left the store with her daughter and repo r t e d t h e

inciden t to the police.

[ ¶ 1 2 ] F o l l o w i n g t h e i n c i d e n t o n M a r c h 2 0

, t h e S t a t e c h a r g e d A p p e l l ant with felony

stalking un der Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 2

- 506 (b) (e)(iv) (LexisNexis 2009)

. T h e i n f o r m a t i o n

alleged that “on or about March 20, 2010,” Appellant, “ w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o h a r a s s a n o t h e r person, engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to hara s s t h a t p e r s o n a n d t h e

defendant committed the offense in violation of a permanent order of protection.” A f t e r a4

j u r y t r i a l

, A

p p e l l a n t w a s f o u n d g u i l t y o f f

e l o n y s t a l k i n g

. O n a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t

, h o w e v e r

, w e overturned Appellant’s conviction because of error in the jury instructions.

W alker v. State , 2012 WY 1, ¶ 1 3 , 267 P.3d 1107, 1112 (Wyo. 2012)

.

[ ¶ 1 3 ] A f t e r t h e c a s e w a s r e m a n d e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r

t

, the State filed a motion to amend

the felony information to specify a range of dates within which Appe l l a n t ’ s c o u r s e o f

conduct was alleged to have occurred. The district court g ranted the motion. A s amended, the information alleged that Appellant

,

o n o r b e t w e e n J

u l y 9

, 2 0 0 6 t h r

o u g h M a r c h 2 0

, 2 0 1 0

, i n

C a m p b e l l C o u n

t y

, W y o m i n g

, d i d w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o h a r a s s

a n o t h e r p e r s o n

, [ A

n g e l i a ] L e a i r

, e n g

a g e [ ] i n a c o u r s e o f

c o n d u c t r e a s o n a

b l y l i k e l y t o h a r a s s t h a t p e r s o n a n d t h e

defendant [’s] c o n d u c t w a s i n v i o l a t i o n o f a p e r m a n e n t o r d e r

o f p r o t e c t i o n i s s u e d i n C a m p b e l l C o u n

t y C i r c u i t C o u r t o n

December 18, 2009 whic h e x p i r e d o n D e c e m

b e r 2 0

, 2 0 1 0 ( S T

2009

- 0050) said offense being Stalking i n v i o l a t i o n o f

Wyoming Statute § 6

- 2

- 506(b)(e)(iv) [.]

( E m p h a s i s i n o r i g

i n a l

. )

[ ¶ 1 4 ] A p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e m o n t

h l a t e r

, t h e S t a t e m o v e d to amend the information for a

s e c o n d t i m e

. T h e s e c o n d a m e n d e d i n f o r m a t i o n p r

o v i d e d t h a

t A p p e l l a n t

,

o n o r b e t w e e n J

u l y 9

, 2 0 0 6 t h r

o u g h M a r c h 2 0

, 2 0 1 0

, i n

C a m p b e l l C o u n

t y

, W y o m i n g

, d i d w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o h a r a s s

a n o t h e r p e r s o n

, [ A

n g e l i a ] L e a i r

, e n g

a g e [ ] in a course of

c o n d u c t r e a s o n a

b l y l i k e l y t o h a r a s s t h a t person and the

defendant ’s c o n d u c t w a s i n v i o l a t i o n o f a t e m p o r a r y

, o r permanent order o f p r o t e c t i o n

, o r c o n d i t i o n s o f p r o b a t i o n o r

bond, issued in C a m

p b e l l C o u

n t y C i r c u i t C o u r

t a s o u t l i n e d i n

the affidavit of probable cause said offense being Stalking in

violation of Wyoming Statute § 6

- 2

- 506(b)(e)(iii) and (iv) [.]

A p p e l l a n t o b j e c t e d t o the State’s motion, claiming t h a t t h e S t a t e “ s h o u l d h a v

e r e q u e s t e d

t h e a m e n d m e n t s i t i s n o w s e e k i n g a t t h e A r r a i g n m e n t a n d b y f

a i l i n g t o d o s o h a s w a i v e d

[its] right to s eek additional amendments.” On the same d a y

, h o w e v e r

, A p p e l l a n t f i l e d a

m otion for a bill of p articulars with respect to the first amended felony information. I n

t h a t m o t i o n

, A

p p e l l a n t c l a i m e d t h a

t t h e f i r s t a m e n d e d i n f

o r m a t i o n “ f

a i l s t o d e s c r i b e w

h a t

co nduct of the Defendant that i s a l l e g e d t o h a v e v i o l a t e d t

h e s t a t u t e s u n d e r w

h i c h h e h a s been charged.” The State responded to Appellant’s motion b y i d e n t i f y i n g t h e d a t e s o f t h e specific acts comprising the alleged “course of conduct” and the dates of the v a r i o u s5

p r o t e c t i o n o r

d e r s e n t e r e d a g

a i n s t A p p e l l a n t

. T h e S t a t e n o t e d t

h a t a l l o f t h e f

a c t s

c o n t a i n e d i n i t s r e s p o n s e h a d b e e n i n c l u d e d i n t h e a m e n d e d a f f i d a v i t o f p r o b a

b l e c a u s e

a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e f

i r s t a m e n d e d i n f

o r m a t i o n a n d h a

d b e e n t e s t i f i e d t o a t t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l

.

[ ¶ 1 5 ] A t a p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g h e l d o n A p r i l 1 1

, 2 0 1 2

, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a d d r e s s e d t

h e S t a t e ’ s

m o t i o n f o r a s e c o n d a m e n d e d f

e l o n y i n f o r m a t i o n a n d A

p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n f

o r a b i l l o f

particulars. After determining that amending the information would n o t c a u s e p r e j u d i c e to Appellant, the district court granted the State’s motion. W i t h r e s p e c t t o A p p e l l a n t ’ s motion for a bill of particulars, Appellant’s counsel acknowledg ed a t t h e p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g

that the State’s response “ essentially takes care of wha t w o u l d b e i n c l u d e d i n a B i l l o f

Particulars.” The district court agreed, stating that “ with the [State’s] response [

, ] t h e

M otion for [ a ] B i l l o f P a r t i c u l a r s i s e s s e n t i a l l y m o o t a n d t h e p u r p o s e [ o f ] a l l o w i n g a defendant to know what the charges are and be i n a p o s i t i o n t o d e f e n d h a s b e e

n adequ a tely responded to by the State[.] ”

[ ¶ 1 6 ] T h e m a t t e r p r o c e e d e d t o t r i a l f o r a s e c o n d t i m e

, a n d a j u r y a g a i n found Appellant

g u i l t y o f f e l o n y s t a l k i n g

. A

p p e l l a n t t i m e l y f

i l e d t h i s a p p e a l

. Additional facts will be set

f o r t h a s n e c e s s a r y i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n b e l o w

.

D I S C U S S I O N

A m e n d m e n t t o F e l o n y I n f o r m a t i o n

[ ¶ 1 7 ] A s n o t e d a b o v

e

, t h i s i s t h e s e c o n d t i m e t h i s c a s e h a s b e e n b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t

. In

order to place the State’s amend ment to the felony information in context , we discuss th e

decision in Walker I in more detail here. In Walker I

, w e n o t e d t

h a t t h e o n l y i n c i d e n t o f

h a r a s s m e n t i d e n t i f

i e d i n t h e c h a r g

i n g d o c u m e n t s w a s A

p p e l l a n t ’ s e

n c o u n t e r w i t h t

h e

victim on March 20, 2010:

T h e F e l o n y I

n f o r m a t i o n m e r e l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e

a p p e l l a n t v i o l a t e d t h e f

e l o n y s t a l k i n g s t a t u t e d u e t o a n

i n c i d e n t o n M a r c h 2 0

, 2 0 1 0

. T h e A f f i d a v i t o f P r o b a b l e C a u s e

elaborated only slightly

– the Wal

- M a r t i n c i d e n t o f M a r c h 2 0

i s d e t a i l e d

, b u

t n o i n f o r m a t i o n i s g i v

e n r e g a r d i n g a d d i t i o n a l

incidents of harass m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a p p e l l a n t d i r e c t e d a

t

his ex

- w i f

e

. T h e o n l y i n d i c a t i o n p r o v i d e d t o t h e a p p e l l a n

t t h a t

this charge stemmed from a course of conduct of harassment,

r a t h e r t h a n s o l e l y t h e M a r c h 2 0 i n c i d e n t

, w a s t h a t a permanent order of protection had b e e n i n p l a c e a t t h e t i m e o f

t h i s i n c i d e n t

. N o i n f

o r m a t i o n w a s p r o v

i d e d

, h o w e v

e r

, a s t o any prior acts of harassment by the appellant.6

I d

. , ¶ 8, 267 P.3d at 1110

- 11

. R a t h e r t h a n i d e n t i f y i n g t h e a l l e g

e d i n c i d e n t s o f h a r a s s m e n t

in the charging documents

, the State sought to e s t a b l i s h a “ c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t ” b y introducing Appellant’s p r i o r a c t s o f h a r a s s m e n t a s u n c h a r g e d m i s c o n d u c t u n d e r W

. R

. E

. 40 4(b). We explained that this approach effectively reduced the State’s burden of proo f

and eliminated one of the necessary elements of the crime:

T h e f i r s t m e n t i o n o f a n y d e t a i l s r e g a r d i n g a c o u r s e o f

c o n d u c t o f h a r a s s m e n t a p p e a r s i n t h e S t a t e ’ s N o t i c e o f I n t e n t

t o I n t r o d u c e W

. R

. E

. 4 0 4 ( b ) E v

i d e n c e

. R

u l e 4 0 4 ( b )

, h o w e v

e r

,

g o v e r n s e v i d e n c e o f “ o t

h e r crimes, wrongs, o r acts,” o f t e n

r e f e r r e d t o a s u

n c h a r g e d m i s c o n d u c t

. I

n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e

, a s i n

all stalking cases, the course of conduct is t h e c r i m i n a l a c t a t

i s s u e ; i t i s n o t u

n c h a r g e d m i s c o n d u c t

. T h e M a r c h 2 0 i n c i d e n t

was just one part of the alleged course of conduct t h a t s h o u l d

h a v e b e e n c h a r g

e d

, a n d t h e a l l e g e d c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t h a d t o

b e p r o v e d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a

b l e d o u b t

. I n s t e a d

, t h e d i s t r i c t

court conducted a Gleason h e a r i n g a n d a d m i t t e d t h e p r i o r

i n c i d e n t s a s u n c h a r g

e d m i s c o n d u c t e v

i d e n c e

. T h e n

, a

t t r i a l

, the dist r i c t c o u r

t r e p e a t e d l y i n s t r

u c t e d t h e j u r y

, v

e r b a l l y a n d

i n w r i t i n g

, t h a t t h e s e a c t s n e e d o n l y b e p r o v e d b y a preponderance of the evidence.

Id. , ¶ 9, 267 P.3d at 1111 (emphasis in original). W e f u r t h e r n o t e d t h a

t t h e c o n f u s i o n a s

to the elements of the c r i m e w a s e c h o e d i n a r e m a r k b y d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d u r i n g c l o s i n g

arguments . Defense counsel stated that “ I h a v e l o s t c o u n t o f h o w m a n y t i m e s t h i s j u r y

w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a l l o f t h o s e i n c i d e n t s i n 2 0 0 6

, 2 0 0 7

, 2 0 0 8

, 2 0 0 9 w e r e o n l y f o r a

lim ited purpose. They can be used by you for t h e p u r p o s e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g c o u r s e o f

conduct, only. One piece of all the elements that the State has to prove. T h i s c a s e i s

about March 20, 2010. ” Id.

, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d at 11 11

- 12 (emphasis in original)

. W e

concluded that

A c t u a l l y

, t h i s c a s e w a s a b o u t t h e o t h e r a c t s a s m

u c h a s i t w a s

a b o u t t h e a c t o f M a r c h 2 0

. I

t w a s n o t e n o u g

h f o r t h e S t a t e t o

p r o v e b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t h a r a s s e d

h i s e x

- w i f

e o n M a r c h 2 0 ; t h e S t a t e h a d t o p r o v e b e y o n d a

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a

t t h e a p p e l l a n t e

n g a g e d i n a c o u r s e o f

c o n d u c t o f h a r a s s m e n t

. T h e j u r y w a s n o t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d

i n t h a t r e g a r d a n d t h i s f a i l u r e w a s p r e

j u d i c i a l t o t h e a

p p e l l a n t

.

I d

. , ¶ 12, 267 P.3d at 1112

. Consequently

, w e r e v e r s e d A p p e l l a n t ’ s c o n v i c t i o n a n d

remanded t o t

h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f

o r a n e w t r i a l

. O n r e m a n d

, t h e S t a t e a m e n d e d t

h e

defective information to s p e c i f y a r a n g e o f d a t e s w i t h i n w

h i c h A p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u r s e o f7

c o n d u c t w a s a l l e g

e d t o h a v e o c c u r r e d

. A s d i s c u s s e d i n f u r t h e r d e t a i l b e l o w

, t h e S t a t e a l s o

submit t e d a n a m e n d e d a f f i d a v i t o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e i d e n t i f y i n g t h e d a t e s o f A

p p e l l a n t ’ s harassing conduct and the nature of those incidents. Against this history of the case

, w e proceed to address Appellant’s first issue.

[ ¶ 1 8 ] A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a b u sed its discretion in allowing the State to

a m e n d t h e f

e l o n y i n f o r m a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e a m e n d e d i n f o r m a t i o n d i d n o t a l l e g

e facts

w h i c h

, i f p r o v

e n

, c o n s t i t u

t e d t h e c r i m e o f f

e l o n y s t a l k i n g

. A

p p e l l a n t presents the issue as

o n e o f s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

. H e contends that the felony stalking statute

u n a m b i g u o u s l y r e q u i r e s a “ c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t ” t o b e i n i t i a t e d s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e e n t r y o f a

c o u r t o r d e r p r o h i b i t i n g h a r a s s m e n t o f t h e v i c t i m

. B a s e d o n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e

s t a t u t e

, A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e a m e n d e d i n f

o r m a t i o n w a s d e f

e c t i v e b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e

a l l e g e d o n l y o n e i n c i d e n t o f h a r a s s m e n t

, o n M a r c h 2 0

, 2 0 1 0

, t h a t v i o l a t e d t

h e p r o t e c t i o n

o r d e r e n t e r e d i n D e c e m

b e r

, 2 0 0 9

. A

p p e l l a n t s t a t e s t h a t h e “ c o m

m i t t e d o n e s i n g

l e a c t ”

and that “a single act does n o t c o n s t i t u t e t h e r e q u i r e d p a t t e r n o f c o n d

u c t c o m p o s e d o f a series of acts” necessary to a felony stalking conv iction.

[ ¶ 1 9 ] T h e S t a t e r e s p o n d s that “ T h e e n t i r e c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t c o m p r i s i n g t h e c r i m e o f

stalking need not violate a single protective order to be a felony

. ” I t contends that “ T h e r e

i s n o q u e s t i o n t h a

t f o r a l m o s t f

o u r y e a r s

, [ A

p p e l l a n t ] i n

t e n t i o n a l l y e n g

a g e d i n a p a t t e r n o f

conduct, or series of acts, that had the purpose and effect of harassing Ms. Leair.” T h e

State claims that Appellant’s interpr etation of the felony stalking statute would “ w i p e t h e

s l a t e c l e a n w i t h e a c h n e w p r o t e c t i o n o r d e r ” b e c a u s e “ a d e f

e n d a n t w o u l d n o t f

a c e a f e l o n y conviction unless he repeatedl y violates the same order.”

[ ¶ 2 0 ] We review a dist rict court’s decision to allow the State to amend a n i n f o r m a t i o n

for abuse of discretion:

W y o m i n g R u l e o f C r i m

i n a l P r o c e d u r e 3 ( e ) g

r a n t s d i s c r e t i o n

t o a t r i a l j u d g

e i n d e c i d i n g w

h e t h e r o r n o t a m o t i o n b r o u g h t

b y t h e S t a

t e t o a m e n d t

h e i n f o r m a t i o n j u s t p r i o r t o t r i a l s h o u l d

b e g r a n t e d

. C o n seque ntly, we review the trial court’ s d e c i s i o n

by applying our abuse of discretion standard. I n d e c i d i n g

whether or not the trial court abused its dis c r e t i o n

, t h i s c o u r t

must “ d e t e r m

i n e w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y

conclude as it did and whet her any facet of its ruli n g w a s arbitrary or capricious.”

Mowery v. State , 2011 WY 38, ¶ 9 , 247 P.3d 866, 868 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting W i l k e n i n g v

. State , 2005 WY 127, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d 680, 687 (Wyo. 2005) )

.

[ ¶ 2 1 ] Appellant’s charge of abuse of discretion is based o n t h e c l a i m t h a t a f

e l o n y8

s t a l k i n g c o n v i c t i o n u n d e r Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 2

- 50 6 (e) (iii) or (iv) requires e a c h a c t o f

h a r a s s m e n t i n a s e r i e s o f a c t s c o m p r i s i n g a “ c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t ” t o b e c o m m i t t e d

subsequent to the issuance of a court order proh ibiting con tact with the victim

. T o t h i s

c laim, we apply our usual rules of statutory interpretation. Our paramount c o n s i d e r a t i o n

is the legislature’ s i n t e n t a s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e p l a i n a n d o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d s u s e d

in the statute. Initially, we determine w hether the statute is clear or ambiguous.

A s t a t u t e i s c l e a r a n d u

n a m b i g u o u s i f i t s w o r d i n g i s s u c h t h a t

r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s a r e a b l e t o a g r e e o n i t s m e a n i n g w i t h

c o n s i s t e n c y a n d p r e d i c t a b i l i t y

. C o n v e r s e l y

, a s t a t u t e i s

a m b i g u o u s i f i t i s f

o u n d t o b e v

a g u e o r u n c e r t a i n a n d s u b

j e c t

t o v a r y i n g i n t e r

p r e t a t i o n s

. I f w e d e t e r m i n e t h a t a s t a t u t e i s

c l e a r a n d u n a m

b i g u o u s

, w e g i v

e e f f e c t t o t h e p l a i n l a n g

u a g e

o f t h e s t a t u t e

.

S p r e e m a n v

. S t a t e , 2012 WY 88 , ¶ 10, 278 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Wyo. 2012)

.

[ ¶ 2 2 ] W e h a v

e p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d t h a t “ L e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s p e c i f i c

reasons for the language employed in Wyo. Stat. § 6

- 2

- 506 is not available.” G a r t o n v

. State , 910 P.2d 1348 , 1355 (Wyo. 1996) . However, other courts have recognized that t h e general intent of stalking statutes is t o i n t e r r u p t t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r e s c a l a t e d v i o l e n c e against the victim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Urrutia

, 6 5 3 A

. 2 d 7 0 6

, 7 0 8 ( P a

. S u p e r

. Ct. 1995) (“Stalking often is a precursor to increased violence and even homicide. L a w

enforc e m e n t o f

f i c i a l s v i e w s t a l k i n g a s a n e a r l y w a r n i n g o f f u t u r e v i o l e n c e a g

a i n s t t h e

victim. I n a n e f f o r t t o p r o t e c t v

i c t i m s

, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s o u g h t t o p r o v i d e e a r l y i n t e r v

e n t i o n

and possible deterrence.”); State v. Lindell

, 828 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2013) (“Undo u b t e d l y

, it was the intent of the legislature to prevent [the] type of long

- t e r m s t a l k i n g t h a t s e r v

e s t o

f r i g h t e n t h e v

i c t i m a n d t h r e a t e

n s t o e s c a l a t e a s t h e s t a l k e r ’ s o b s e s s i o n g r o w s

. ” )

. Wyoming ’s stalking statute pursues the goal of deterrence, in part, b y p r o v i d i n g i n c r e a s e d

penalties for persons who commit the offense of stalking while subject to a n o r d e r o f

protection

. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 2

- 506 , which sets forth the crimes of mi sdemeanor and

felony stalking , provides in relevant part as follows:

§ 6

- 2

- 5 0 6

. S t a l k

i n g ; p e n a l t y

.

. . .

( b ) U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d b y l a w

, a p e r s o n c o m m i

t s t h e

c r i m e o f s t a l k i n g i f

, w i t h i n t e n t t o h a r a s s a n o t

h e r p e r s o n ,

t h e p e r s o n e n g a g e s i n a c o u r s e o

f c o n d u c t r e a s o n a b l y l i k e l y

t o h a r a s s t h a t p e r s o n

, i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o a n y

c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e f

o l l o w i n g :9 ( i ) C o m m u n i c a t i n g

, a n o n y

m o u s l y o r o t

h e r w i s e

, o r

c a u s i n g a c o m m

u n i c a t i o n w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n b y

v e r b a l

, e l e c t r o n i c

, m e c h a n i c a l

, t e l e g r a p h i c

, t e l e p h o n i c

o r w r i t t e n m e a n s i n a m a n n e r t h a t h a r a s s e s ;

( i i ) F o l l o w i n g a p e r s o n

, o t h e r t h a n w i t h i n t h e r e s i d e n c e

o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ;

( i i i ) P l a c i n g a p e r s o n u n d e r s u r v e i l l a n c e b y r e m a i n i n g

p r e s e n t o u t s i d e h i s o r h e r s c h o o l

, p l a c e o f e m p l o y m e n t

,

v e h i c l e

, o t h e r p l a c e o c c u p i e d b y t h e p e r s o n

, o r

r e s i d e n c e o t h e r t h a n t h e r e s i d e n c e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ; o r

( i v ) O t h e r w i s e e n g

a g i n g i n a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t t h a t

h a r a s s e s a n o t h e r p e r s o n

.

. . .

( e ) A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e

d o f s t a l k i n g u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) o f

t h i s s e c t i o n i s g u i l t y o f f e l o n y s t a l k i n g p u n i s h a b l e b

y

i m p r i s o n m e n t f

o r n o t m o r e t

h a n t e n ( 1 0 ) y e a r s , i f :

( i ) T h e a c t o r a c t s l e a d i n g t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n o c c u r r e d

w i t h i n f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s o f a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n u n d e r t

h i s

s u b s e c t i o n

, o r u

n d e r s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n

, o r

u n d e r a s u

b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r l a w o f a n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n ;

( i i ) T h e d e f

e n d a n t c a u s e d s e r i o u s b o d i l y h a r m t o t h e

v i c t i m o r a n o t h e r p e r s o n i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h

c o m m i t t i n g t h e o f

f e n s e o f s t a l k i n g ;

( i i i ) T h e d e f e n d a n t c o m m i t t e d t h e o f f e n s e o f s t a l k i n g

i n v i o l a t i o n o f a n y c o n d i t i o n o f p r o b a t i o n , p a r o l e o r

b a i l ; o r

( i v ) T h e d e f e n d a n t c o m m i

t t e d t h e o f f e n s e o f s t a l k i n g

i n v i o l a t i o n o f a t e m p o r a r y o r p e r m a n e n t o r

d e r o f

p r o t e c t i o n i s s u e d p u r s u a n

t t o W

. S

. 7

- 3

- 5 0 8 o r 7

- 3

- 5 0 9

,

o r p u r s u a n t t o a s u b s t a

n t i a l l y s i m i l a r l a w o f a n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n

.10

( E m p h a s i s a d d e d

. ) A s d e f

i n e d b y t h e statute, a “course of conduct” m eans “ a p a t t e r n o f

c o n d u c t c o m p o s e d o f a s e r i e s o f a c t s o v e r a n y p e r i o d o f t i m e e v

i d e n c i n g a c o n t i n u i t y o f

purpose .” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 2

- 506 (a)(i).

[ ¶ 2 3 ] W e a g r e e w i t h A

p p e l l a n t t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i s c l e a r a n d u n a m

b i g u o u s

. H o wever,

c o n t r a r y t o A

p p e l l a n t ’ s s u g g e s t i o n

, w e f

i n d n o i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e

s t a t u t e t h a t t h e o f f e n s e o f f e l o n y s t a l k i n g u n d e r S e c t i o n 5 0 6 ( e ) ( i i i ) o r ( i v ) r e q u i r e s t h a t a l l

a c t s c o m p r i s i n g a “course of conduct” must occur subsequent to the entry of a n o r d e r prohibiting contact with the victim

. The statute provides no chronological limitation w i t h

respect to the necessary course of cond uct. Rather, the statute p r o v i d e s t h a t a c o u r s e o f

conduct is “a series of acts over any period of time e videncing a continuity of purpose

. ”

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 2

- 506 (a)(i) (emphasis added). In Garton , 910 P.2d 1348

, a d d r e s s i n g a challenge to Section 506(e)(i ii) on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague

, t h i s Court stated that use of the word “any ” evidence d the legislature’s intent to gi v e t h e statute a “broad and comprehensive grasp.”

T h e l a n g u a g e o f W y o

. S t a t

. § 6

- 2

- 5 06(e)(iii)

. . . i s

c l e a r and unambiguous in its provision tha t t h e o f f e n s e i s a felony when “ [ t ] he defendant committed the offe n s e o f

s talking in violation of any condition of probation, p a r o l e o r

bail.” I n addr essing the meaning of the word “any” in M c K a y v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’ y of the United States

, 4 2 1

P.2d 166, 169 (Wyo. 1966), we said, “ [ t ] h e c o m m o n a n d

ordinary und erstanding of the word i s t h a t i t m e a n s a l l o r

every.” We also said, “ [ n ] e c e s s a r i l y i t g i v e s t o t h e l a n g

u a g e employed a broad and comprehensive grasp.” McKay

, 4 2 1

P

. 2 d a t 1 6 9

. T h e c l e a r l a n g

u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e c o n v

e y s t h e legislative intent to give Wyo. St at . § 6

- 2

- 5 0 6 ( e ) ( i i i ) a b r o a d

and comprehensive grasp.

I d

. a t 1 3 5 3

. Similarly, t he definition of a “course of conduct ,” which focuses on a

“continuity of purpose” demonstrated by a series of acts occurring over “ any p e r i o d o f

time,” evide nces the legisl ature’s intent to give broad reach to the statute. I f t h e

l e g i s l a t u r e h a d i n t e n d e d t o l i m i t t h e o f f e n s e o f f e l o n y s t a l k i n g a s s u g g e s t e d b y A p p e l l a n t

, i t could easily have done so. H o w e v e r

, t h e l a n g

u a g e e m p l o y e d b y t h e l e g

i s l a t u r e c o n t a i n s

no time restric tions with respect to the course of conduct requirement

. A c c o r d i n g l y

, w e

find no basis to conclude that a ll of the acts comprising the “ course of conduct ” must b e

commenced after the issuance of a court order prohibiting harassment of the victim.

[ ¶ 2 4 ] T h e “co urse of conduct” necessary for a felony stalking conviction under W y o

. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 2

- 506(e)(iii) or (iv) m a y e n c o m p a s s a c t s o f h a r a s s m e n t o c c u r r i n g p r i o r t o11

t h e i s s u a n c e o f a n o r d e r p r o s c r i b i n g c o n t a c t w i t h t h e v i c t i m

. U n d e r o u r i n t e r

p r e t a t i o n o f

t h e s t a t u t e

, t h e S t a t e w a s n o t r e q u i r e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e v

i o l a t i o n s o f m

u l t i p l e p r o t e c t i o n

o r d e r s i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h t h e c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t

. However , Appellant’s s e p a r a t e violations of the protection orders issued in this case, as well as his violation of t h e

conditions of his probation

, nonetheless constituted acts of harassment r e l e v a n t i n establishing a course of conduct occurring i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e D e c e m

b e r

, 2 0 0 9 p r o t e c t i o n

order. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to am e n d t h e felony information to include incidents of harassment occurring prior to entry of t h a t

order.

N o t i c e o f C h a r g e s

[ ¶ 2 5 ] In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the information did not adequately

a d v i s e h i m o f t h e c h a r g

e s against him because “As expla i n e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s i s s u e

, t h e

c h a r g i n g d o c u m e n t d o e s n o t c o n t a i n t h e c o r r e c t e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e

. ” A

p p e l l a n t

c o m p l a i n s t h a t h e “ w a s m a d e t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t a n y a n d a l l c o n

t a c t w i t h h i s c u r r e n t

, a n d

then later ex

- wife, whether said contact was in violat i o n o f a p r o t e c t i o n o r d e r o r n o t

, which had occurred between 2006 and 2010.” He asserts t h a t t h e r e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t

information to advise him of the charge against him b e c a u s e “ m o s t o f t h e c o n t a c t t h e

State identified [] to show the ‘course of conduct’ di d n o t o c c u r d u r i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a protection or restraining order.”

[ ¶ 2 6 ] W e e m

p l o y a d e n o v o standard of review to the issue of whether a defendant has

r e c e i v e d a d e q u a t e n o t i c e o f t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t h i m

.

A n a c c u s e d h a s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o n o t i c e o f the charges

against him to allow him a fair opportunity to defend against

the charges. United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment;

W y o

. C o n s t

. a r

t

. 1 § 1 0

. S e e a l

s o

, W

. R

. C r

. P

. 3 ; D e r k

s e n v

. S t a t e

, 8 4 5 P

. 2 d 1 3 8 3

, 1 3 8 8

- 8 9 ( W y o

. 1 9 9 3 )

. B e c a u s e t

h e

r i g h t t o n o t i c e o f c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s i s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a

l

m a g n i t u d e a n d t h e d e t e r m

i n a t i o n o n t

h e a d e q u a c y o f t h e

n o t i c e i s a q u e s t i o n o f l a w

, w e r e v i e w t h e i s s u e d e n o v o

. S e e

,

e

. g

. , Pena v. State

, 2 0 0 4 W Y 1 1 5

, ¶ 7

, 9 8 P

. 3 d 8 5 7

, 8 6 2

(Wyo. 2004).

C o u n t s v

. S t a t e , 2 012 WY 70, ¶ 39 , 277 P.3d 94, 106 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting H e y w o o d v

. State , 2009 WY 70, ¶ 4, 208 P.3d 71, 72 (Wyo. 2009)).

[ ¶ 2 7 ] W e h a v

e s t a t e d t h a t a

n i n f o r m a t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s u f f i c i e n t “if it 1 ) c o n t a i n s the elements of the offense charged; 2) fairly inf o r m s a d e f

e n d a n t o f t h e c h a r g

e a g a i n s t

w h i c h h e m

u s t d e f e n d ; a n d 3 ) e n a b l e s a d e f

e n d a n t t o p l e a d a n a c q u i t t a

l o r c o n v i c t i o n i n12

b a r o f f u t u r e p r o s e c u t i o n s f

o r t h e s a m e o f

f e n s e

. ” Hulsy v. State , 2009 WY 81, ¶ 9

, 2 0 9

P.3d 901, 904 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Estrad a

- Sanchez v. State , 2003 WY 4 5

, ¶ 1 3

, 6 6

P.3d 703, 708 (Wyo. 2003) )

. A d e t a i l e d a f f i d a v i t a t t a c h e d t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n m a y

pro vide some of these facts

. Spagner v. State , 2009 WY 12, ¶ 10 , 200 P.3d 793, 799

(Wyo. 2009)

.

[ ¶ 2 8 ] We find no merit in Appellant’s cla i m t h a t h e w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y a d v i s e d o f t h e charges against him. The amended a f f i d a v i t o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e c o n t a i n e d a d e t a i l e d

a c c o u n t o f t h e i n c i d e n t s o f h a r a s s m e n t

, t h e d a t e s o n w h i c h t h o s e i n c i d e n t s o c c u r r e d

, a n d

the various protection orders and con d i t i o n s o f p r o b a t i o n i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e o f t h o s e

i n c i d e n t s

. T h i s i n f

o r m a t i o n w a s a g

a i n p r o v i d e d t o A

p p e l l a n t i n t h e S t a

t e ’ s r e s p o n s e t o

A p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n f

o r a b i l l o f p a r t i c u l a r s

. A t t h e h e a r i n g o n A p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n

, Appellant’s counsel acknowledge d that the State’s response “ e s s e n t i a l l y t a k e s c a r e o f

what would be included in a Bill of Particulars.” Further, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a

t A p p e l l a n t

relies on the a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n d i d n o t c o n t a i n t h e c o r r e c t e l e m e n t s o f t h e crime of felony stalkin g , w e have already rejected th at a r g u m e n t i n o u r d i s c u s s i o n o f

Appellant’s first issue. F i nally

, we find no merit in Appellant’s claim that t h e

i nformation was inadequate because i t a l l e g e d i n c i d e n t s o f h a r a s s m e n t t h a t o c c u r r e d

outside the existence of a protection order or condition of probation. A l l o f t h e i n c i d e n t s alleged in the affidavit of probable cause, and re

- a s s e r t e d i n t h e S t a t e ’ s r e s p o n s e t o Appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars, were used to establish th e “ c o u r s e o f

conduct” necessary for a stalking conviction. A p p e l l a n t s u f f e r e d n o p r e

j u d i c e a s a r e s u l t

o f t h e f a c t t h a t h e w a s r e q u i r e d t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t a l l o f t h e a l l e g

e d i n c i d e n t s o f

harassment, regardless of whether the individual incidents v i o l a t e d a p r

o t e c t i o n o r d e r o r

condition o f probation. W e c o n c l u d e t h a t A p p e l l a n t w a s a d e q u a t e l y a d v

i s e d o f t h e

charges against him.

J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n s

[ ¶ 2 9 ] I n h i s f i n a l i s s u e

, A

p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e j u r y i n s t r

u c t i o n s contained a

c o n f u s i n g

, m i s l e a d i n g

, a n d i n a c c u r a t e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e l a w

. M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y

, h e claims

t h a t J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 1 0 i m

p r o p e r l y j o i n e d t h e “ i n t e n

t t o h a r a s s ” a n d “ c o u r s e o f

conduct” elements of the offense

. B e c a u s e A p p e l l a n t d i d n o t o b

j e c t a t t r i a l

, w e r e v i e w for plain error. W

alker , ¶ 6, 267 P.3d at 1110. Plain err o r e x i s t s w h e n : 1 ) t h e r e c o r d i s

c l e a r a b o u t t h e i n c i d e n

t a l l e g e d a s e r r o r ; 2 ) t

h e r e w a s a t r a n s g

r e s s i o n o f a c l e a r a n d

u n e q u i v o c a l r u l e o f l a w ; a n d 3 ) t

h e p a r t y c l a i m

i n g t h e e r r o r w a s d e n i e d a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t

which materiall y prejudiced him. Id. An er ror in the jury instructions results in prejudice

when “ t h e i n s t r

u c t i o n ‘ c o n f

u s e d o r m i s l e d t h e j u r y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p r o p e r p r i n c i p l e s o f

law.’” Id. (quoting Black v. State , 2002 WY 72, ¶ 6, 46 P.3d 298, 300 (Wyo. 2002)).

[ ¶ 3 0 ] T h e S t a t e c o n c e d e s t h a t t h e first prong of the plain error analysis is satisfied as a

result of the fact that Jury Instruction No. 10 is part of the record. However, the State13

c l a i m s t h a t t h e i n s t r

u c t i o n s d i d n o t v i o l a t e a c l e a r a n d u n e q u i v o c a l r u l e o f l a w

. T h e S t a t e

c o n t e n d s t h a t J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 1 0

, w

h e n r e a d i n c o n

j u n c t i o n w i t h J

u r y I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 5

, w h i c h s e t f o r t h t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e

, a s w e l l a s I n s t r u c t i o n s N o

. 7

, 8

, a

n d 9

, w h i c h

d e f i n e d t h e t e r m s “ i n t e n t

, ” “ h a r a s s

, ” a n d “ c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t

, ” r e s p e c t i v e l y

, a d e q u a

t e l y

informed the jury that it was required to find an “intent to harass” separately from a

course of conduct. F urther , the State claims that “Even if Instruction # 1 0 w a s p o o r l y worded,” Appellant cannot establish prejudice because the State discussed the ind i v i d u a l

e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e d u r i n g c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s

, a n d b e c a u s e t h e e v i d e n c e o f A

p p e l l a n t ’ s guilt was “overwhelming.”

[ ¶ 3 1 ] A s w e n o t e d i n W a l k e r I

, t h e p u r p o s e o f j u r y i n s t r

u c t i o n s is to “ p r o v

i d e t h e j u r y

with a foundational legal understanding to enable a r e a s o n e d a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e f a c t s t o

the law. ” W

alker I , ¶ 10, 267 P.3d at 1111 ( ci ting Miller v. State

, 9 0 4 P

. 2 d 3 4 4

, 3 4 8

(Wyo. 1995) )

. Accordingly, in order to s upport a reliable verdict, “It i s c r u c i a l t h a t t

h e

trial court ‘ correctly state the law an d adequa tely cover the relevant issues. ’ ” Id. (quoting

Olsen v. State , 2003 WY 46, ¶ 134, 67 P.3d 536, 585 (Wyo. 2003) )

. Ultimately, the test

of adequate jury instructions is “‘ w h e t h e r t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s l e a v

e n o d o u b t a s t o t

h e

circumstances under which t he crime can be found to have been committed. ’” B u r n e t t v

. State , 2011 WY 169, ¶ 14 , 267 P.3d 1083, 1087 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting B l o o m f i e l d v

. State , 2010 WY 97, ¶ 15, 234 P.3d 366, 373 (Wyo. 2010)). W i t h t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n

mind, we turn to the relevant in structions in this case.

[ ¶ 3 2 ] I n I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 5

, t

h e j u r y w a s a d v

i s e d o f t h e n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e :

I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 5

The necessary elements of the crime, Stalking, as charged in

t h i s c a s e

, a r e :

1

. O n o r b e t w e e n J

u l y 9

, 2 0 0 6 t

h r o u g h M a r c h 2 0

, 2 0 1 0 ;

2

. I n C a m p b e l l C o u n t y

, W y o m i n g ;

3

. T h e d e f

e n d a n t

, D a n i e l B r i a n W a l k e r ;

4

. W i t h t h e i n

t e n t t o h a r a s s A

n g e l i a L e a i r ;

5

. E n g a g e d i n a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t r e a s o n a b l y l i k e l y t o

h a r a s s A n g e l i a L e a i r ;

6

. T h e D e f

e n d a n t

, D a n i e l B r i a n W a l k e r

, c o m m i t t e d t h e

a c t s s e t f o r t h i n p a r a g

r a p h s 4 a n d 5 i n v

i o l a t i o n o f a14 t e m p o r a r y o r p e r m a n e n t o r d e r o f p r o t e c t i o n o r

c o n d i t i o n s o f p r o b a

t i o n o r b o n d

. 1

I n s t r u c t i o n s N o

. 7

, 8

, a n d 9 t h e n d e f i n e d t h e t e r m s “ i n t e n t

, ” “ h a r a s s

, ” a n d “ c o u r s e o f

c o n d u c t

, ” a s u s e d i n t h e e l e m e n t s i n s t r u c t i o n :

I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 7

T h e i n t e n t w i t h w

h i c h a n a c t w a s d o n e i s a c o n d i t i o n o f

t h e m i n d t h a t i s s e l d o m

, i f e v e r

, c a p a b l e o f d i r e c t a n d p o s i t i v e

p r o o f

. B e c a u s e w e h a v

e n o p o w e r t o d i r e c t l y o b s e r v e t h e

c o n d i t i o n o f a p e r s o n ’ s m i n d

, t h e b e s t w e c a n d o i s i n f e r i t

f r o m t h e e v

i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d

.

T h e j u r y m a y c o n s i d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g

t h e a c t

, t h e d o i n g o f t h e a c t i t s e l f

, t h e m a n n e r i n w

h i c h i t w a s

d o n e a n d t

h e m e a n s u s e d

.

I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 8

“ H a r a s s ” m e a n s t o e

n g a g e i n a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t

, including b u t n o t l i m

i t e d t o v e r b a l t h r e a t s

, w r i t t e n t h r e a t s

, l e w d o r o b s c e n e s t a t e m e n t s o r i m a g e s

, v a n d a l i s m o r

n o n c o n s e n s u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t

, d i r e c t e d a t a s p e c i f i c p e r s o n

o r t h e f a m i l y o f a s p e c i f

i c p e r s o n

, w

h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t k n e w

or should have known would ca u s e a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n t o

s u f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s

, a n d w h i c h d o e s i n f

a c t

seriously alarm the person toward whom it is directed.

I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 9

“ C o u r s e o f c o n d u c t ” m e a n s a p a t t e r n o f c o n d u c t

consisting of a series of acts over any peri o d o f t i m e w h i c h

demonstrates a continuity of purpose.

Finally, Jury Instruction No. 10 provided that an “intent to harass” w a s e s t a b l i s h e d b y a

1 As noted in our discussion of Appellant’s first issue, the State was not required to pro v e t h a t a l l a c t s o f

h a r a s s m e n t o c c

u r r e d i n v i o l a t i o n o f a p r o t e c t i o n o r d e r o r c o n d i t i o n o f p r o b a t i o n o r b o n d i n o r d e r t o

establish the course of conduct element of felony stalking.15

s h o w i n g o f a c o m

b i n a t i o n o f t h e e n

u m e r a t e d e x a m

p l e s o f h a r a s s i n g c o n d u c t :

A c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t r e a s o n a b l y l i k e l y t o h a r a s s a n o t h e r

p e r s o n

, w i

t h t h e i n t e n t t

o h a r a s s t h a t p e r s o n , i n c l u d

e s b u t i s

n o t l i m i t e d t o a n y c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e f

o l l o w i n g :

1

. C o m m u n i c a t i n g

, a n o n y

m o u s l y o r o t

h e r w i s e

, o r

c a u s i n g a c o m m

u n i c a t i o n w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n b y

v e r b a l

, e l e c t r o n i c

, m e c h a n i c a l

, t e l e g r a p h i c

, t e l e p h o n i c

o r w r i t t e n m e a n s i n a m a n n e r t h a t h a r a s s e s ;

2

. F o l l o w i n g a p e r s o n

, o t h e r t h a n w i t h i n t

h e r e s i d e n c e o f

t h e D e f e n d a n t ;

3

. P l a c i n g a p e r s o n u

n d e r s u r v

e i l l a n c e b y r e m a i n i n g

p r e s e n t o u t s i d e h i s o r h e r s c h o o l

, p l a c e o f e m p l o y m e n t

,

v e h i c l e

, o t h e r p l a c e o c c u p i e d b y t h e p e r s o n

, o r

r e s i d e n c e o t h e r t h a

n t h e r e s i d e n c e o f t h e D e f e n d a n t ; o r

4

. O t h e r w i s e e n g

a g i n g i n a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t t h a t

h a r a s s e s t h a t p e r s o n

.

( E m p h a s i s a d d e d

. ) I

n c o n t r a s t t o J

u r y I n s t r u c t i o n N o

. 1 0

, t h e r e l e v

a n t p o r t i o n o f W y o

. S t a t

. A n n

. § 6

- 2

- 5 0 6 ( b ) p r

o v i d e s

( b ) U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e p r o v

i d e d b y l a w

, a p e r s o n c o m m i t s t h e

c r i m e o f s t a l k i n g i

f

, w i t h i n t e n t t o h a r a s s a n o t h e r p e r s o n

, t

h e

p e r s o n e n g

a g e s i n a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t r e a s o n a b l y l i k e l y t o

h a r a s s t h a t p e r s o n

, i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o a n y

c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e f

o l l o w i n g :

. . .

( E m p h a s i s a d d e d

. )

[ ¶ 3 3 ] We agree with Appellant that Jury Instruction No. 10 improperly incorporated the

i n t e n t e l e m e n t o f s t a l k i n g i n t o t h e e x a m p l e s o f h a r a s s m e n t demonstrating a course of

c o n d u c t

. T h e jury instruction wrongly states that intent is established when a course of

c o n d u c t i n c l u d e s t

h e e n u m e r a t e d e x a m

p l e s o f h a r a s s m e n t

. I

n o t h e r w o r d s

, Wyo. Stat.

A n n

. § 6

- 2

- 5 0 6 (

b ) r e q u i r e s t h e j u r y t o f

i n d t h a t A p p e l l a n t e n g a g e d i n a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t

,

w h i c h m a y i n c l u d e t h e e n u m e r a t e d a c t s

, w i t h a n i n t e n t t o h a r a s s

. I n c o n t r a s t

, t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n a l l o w e d t h e j u r y t o f

i n d A p p e l l a n t a c t e d w i t h i n

t e n t t o h a r a s s b e c a u s e h e d i d16

t h e l i s t e d a c t s

. T h i s e f

f e c t i v e l y c r e a t e d t h e p o t e

n t i a l f o r t h e j u r y t o f

i n d A p p e l l a n t g u i l t y

o f s t a l k i n g w i t h o u t i n d e p e n d e n t l y f i n d i n g t h a t h e i n t e

n d e d t o h a r a s s t h e v

i c t i m

. Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that the jury instructions “ c o r r e c t l y s t a t e t h e l a w and adequately cover the relevant issues.” As in W alker I , ¶ 11, 267 P.3d a

t 1 1 1 1

,

“ l o o k i n g a t t h e i n s t r

u c t i o n s a s a w

h o l e

, w e c a n n o t h e l p b u

t f i n d t h a t t h e j u r y m

u s t h a v e been confused with regard to the necessary elements of the crime of stalking .”

[ ¶ 3 4 ] F i n a l l y

, w e f

i n d t h a t the error in the jury instructions caused prejudice to

A p p e l l a n t

. T he State acknowledges that “ t h e d e f e n s e ’ s t h e o r y o f t h e c a s e w a s t h a t

W a l k e r d i d n o t h a v

e t h e r e q u i s i t e i n t e n t t o h a r a s s

, a n d c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s c e n t e r e d a r o u n d

whether the State had met its burden of proving intent. ” Indeed, with respect to the

incident that occurred at Wal

- Mart on March 20, 2010, Appellant testified at trial that he

was shopping for electronics equipment and h a d “ n o i d e a ” t h a

t h e w a s n e a r M s

. L e a i r

. He stated “I was looking at the back of her head. I had no idea that was my e x

- wife.” I n light of Appellant’s testimony supporting th e claim that he d i d n o t h a v e t h e r e q u i s i t e

intent to harass Ms. Leair

, w e d o n o t a g r e e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e o f A p p e l l a n t ’ s g u i l t w a s “overwhelming,” as suggested by the State. More fundamentally, howev er, c o n s i d e r i n g the fact that Jury Instruction No. 10 effectively relieved the State of the obligation t o

prove that Appellant acted with intent, we a r e u n a b l e t o c o n c l u d e t

h a t t h e j u r y

instructions left “no doubt as to the circumstances under which the cr ime can be f o u n d t o

have been committed.” Burnett , ¶ 14 , 267 P.3d at 1087. Rather, we conclude that t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n s l i k e l y “ c o n f

u s e d o r m

i s l e d t h e j u r y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p r o p e r p r i n c i p l e s o f

law.” W alker , ¶ 6, 267 P.3d at 1110. Accordingly, we find that A p p e l l a n t w a s m a t e r i a l l y prejudiced and that A

ppellant has established plain error.

[ ¶ 3 5 ] R e v

e r s e d a n d r e m a n d e d f

o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n

.