IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

No. 81978 FILED 

MAY 12 2022 

ELIZABETH A. BPOWN 

CLERK

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S/U

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PREM- COURT 

DEPUTY CLERK 

No. 82245 

1No. 83726 

ALI SHAHROKHI, 

Appellant, 

VS. 

KIZZY J. S. BURROW A/K/A KIZZY 

BURROW, 

Res • ondent. 

ALI SHAHROKHI, 

Appellant, 

KIZZY BURROW, 

Res • ondent. 

ALI SHAHROKHI, 

Appellant, 

VS. 

KIZZY BURROW, 

Res • ondent. 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE (DOCKET NOS. 81978, 82245, AND 83726) 

AND DISMISSING APPEAL IN PART (DOCKET NO. 83726) 

These appeals challenge several orders in a custody dispute. 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Linda Marie Bell, Chief 

Judge, Mathew Harter, Judge, and Dawn Throne, Judge.' 

Appellant Ali Shahrokhi and respondent Kizzy Burrow never 

married and have one minor child together. Sometime after their 

relationship ended, Kizzy obtained a temporary restraining order against 

Ali and the parties filed competing complaints for child custody. After an 

evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded Kizzy sole legal and physical 

'We have determined that Docket No. 83726, which is subject to the 

child custody fast track rule, should be submitted for decision on the fast 

track briefs and the appellate record, without any further briefing or oral 

argument. See NRAP 3E(g)(1). 

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custody of the minor child, permitted her to relocate with the minor child to 

Oregon, and awarded her attorney fees and costs. Ali now challenges these 

orders, and several others, on various grounds. 

As a preliminary matter, Ali makes several constitutional 

arguments, all of which lack merit upon de novo review. See Jackson v. 

State, 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012) (holding that this court 

applies de novo review to constitutional issues). First, Ali's constitutional 

challenge to NRS 125C.0035 fails because he and Kizzy have equal 

fundamental rights to care for their child, leaving the best interest of the 

child as the sole consideration to decide custody. See Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 

Nev. 695, 704, 120 P.3d 812, 818 (2005) (holding that "[i]n a custody dispute 

between two fit parents, the fundamental constitutional right to the care 

and custody of the children is equar; therefore, "the dispute in such cases 

can be resolved best, if not solely, by applying the best interests of the child 

standard"). 

Ali also argues that the district court deprived him of his 

constitutional procedural due process rights by failing to provide him with 

adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding certain motions. 

"Due process is satisfied by giving [the] parties 'a meaningful opportunity 

to present their case."' J.D. Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Ina Grp., 126 Nev. 366, 

376, 240 P.3d 1033, 1040 (2010) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 

349 (1976)); see also Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 

(2007) C[P]rocedural due process 'requires notice and an opportunity to be 

heard."' (quoting Maiola v. State, 120 Nev. 671, 675, 99 P.3d 227, 229 

(2004))). The record shows that Ali was served with the motions, which 

included information regarding any related hearings, and he either 

submitted a written opposition, appeared at the scheduled hearing, or failed 

2 

ii 
to request a hearing pursuant to local rule. Therefore, Ali's due process 

claims fail because in all alleged instances, Ali was provided both "notice 

and an opportunity to be heard" with respect to the issues before the court.2 

Callie, 123 Nev. at 183, 160 P.3d at 879. We now turn to Ali's challenges to 

specific court orders. 

Docket No. 81978 

In Docket No. 81978, Ali challenges the denial of his request to 

disqualify the presiding judge, two district court orders finding he 

committed domestic violence, and the order granting Kizzy sole legal and 

physical custody and permitting her to relocate to Oregon. 

Motion to disqualify 

Ali challenges Chief Judge Linda Bell's denial of his motion to 

disqualify Judge Mathew Harter, arguing that Judge Harter displayed bias 

, which would "cause a reasonable person to question the judge's 

impartiality." Towbin Dodge, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 

251, 260, 112 P.3d 1063, 1069 (2005); see also NCJC Rule 2.11(A) ("A judge 

2We note there is no right to a jury trial in family court proceedings. 

See In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 132 Nev. 209, 215, 371 P.3d 995, 999-

1000 (2016) (holding that there is no right to a jury trial for termination of 

parental right proceedings and explaining the policy rationale for why 

having juries decide family division cases is improper); Barelli v. Barelli, 

113 Nev. 873, 879, 944 P.2d 246, 249 (1997) (affirming the district court's 

conclusion that there is no right to a jury trial in divorce proceedings 

because there is no such right in domestic proceedings). 

We have considered Ali's remaining constitutional arguments and 

determine that they do not warrant reversal. See Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 

579, 588-89, 188 P.3d 1112, 1118-19 (2008) (explaining that this court "will 

not decide constitutional questions unless necessary" to resolve the issues 

on appeal). And the record belies Ali's arguments that the district court 

ignored his pretrial objections or that it improperly deemed him a vexatious 

litigant. 

3 
shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned."). Most of Ali's arguments fail 

because they are based on rulings and official actions in the child custody 

proceedings,3 see Matter of Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 

1275 (1988) C[R]ulings and actions of a judge during the course of official 

judicial proceedings do not establish legally cognizable grounds for 

disqualification."), none of which displayed "a deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible," Kirksey v. State, 

112 Nev. 980, 1007, 923 P.2d 1102, 1119 (1996) (quoting Liteky v. United 

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Nor do we agree that Ali's pending civil 

rights action against the judge in federal court required disqualification.4 

See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 

644, 649, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (1997) (holding that a party "should not be 

permitted to create a situation involving a judge and then claim that the 

judge" should be removed due to the events the party created). Because Ali 

3We further note that the record does not support many of Ali's 

allegations, including allegations of ex parte communications between 

Judge Harter, Kizzy, and her counsel, allegations that the district court 

marshals threatened him with violence, or allegations that Judge Harter 

gave legal advice to the parties or counsel throughout the proceedings. 

4AEs campaign-contribution disqualification arguments lack merit 

because he does not allege that Kizzy's counsel's contributions to Judge 

Harter exceeded statutory limits and this court has held that "a 

contribution to a presiding judge by a party or an attorney does not 

ordinarily constitute grounds for disqualification." City of Las Vegas 

Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 

640, 644, 5 P.3d 1059, 1062 (2000); see also Ivey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, 129 Nev. 154, 162, 299 P.3d 354, 359 (2013) (Campaign 

contributions made within statutory limits cannot constitute grounds for 

disqualification of a judge under Nevada law.") 

4 
failed to show that Judge Harter exhibited extreme bias that would "permit 

manipulation of the court and significantly impede the judicial process," 

which is required to overcome the presumption that a judge is personally 

unbiased, Millen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1245, 1254-55, 

148 P.3d 694, 701 (2006) (quoting Hecht, 113 Nev. at 635-36, 940 P.2d at 

128-29), we conclude that the chief judge did not abuse her discretion in 

refusing to disqualify Judge Harter, see Ivey, 129 Nev. at 162, 299 P.3d at 

359 (reviewing the denial of a motion to disqualify for an abuse of 

discretion). 

Domestic violence findings 

Ali next challenges the district court's domestic violence 

findings on various grounds. We reject any argument the proceedings were 

criminal or in excess of the court's jurisdiction. While the district court's 

order refers to criminal law to define relevant terms, see, e.g., NRS 33.018 

(defining acts which constitute domestic violence), it makes clear that the 

court's domestic violence findings were pursuant to NRS 125C.0035(5) to 

determine if that statute's best-interest presumption applied in this case.5 

5Because the district court's domestic violence findings were made 

pursuant to NRS 125C.0035(5) and not NRS Chapter 33, we decline to 

consider Ali's arguments that the district court proceedings deprived him of 

the additional constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants. 

We also decline to consider any argument that Kizzy's complaint did not put 

Ali on notice of domestic violence allegations because the argument is not 

cogent and Ali fails to support it with citation to relevant authority. See 

Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 

1288 n.38 (2006) (noting that this court need not consider claims 

unsupported by cogent argument or relevant authority). We further note 

that the district court is required by statute to consider whether a parent 

seeking custody of a minor child has committed acts of domestic violence, 

see NRS 125C.0035(4)(k) (providing that whether a parent seeking physical 

5 
See NRS 125C.0035(5) (creating a rebuttable presumption that physical 

custody is not in the child's best interest where the district court has found 

that a parent committed "acts of domestic violence against the child, a 

parent of the child or any other person residing with the chile); NRS 

3.223(1)(a) (providing that family courts have exclusive jurisdiction in any 

proceeding brought pursuant to NRS Chapter 125C); Landreth v. Malik, 

127 Nev. 175, 186-88, 251 P.3d 163, 170-71 (2011) (concluding that family 

court judges "ha[ve] the same constitutional power and authority as any 

[other] district court judge" such that they have jurisdiction to resolve issues 

beyond those listed in NRS 3.223). And the record supports the district 

coures application of NRS 125C.0035(5)s best-interest rebuttable 

presumption, as it provides substantial evidence that Ali engaged in 

multiple acts of domestic violence against Kizzy, including threats to hit her 

and burn her clothing, harassing her, and intiniating that he knows where 

she lives.6Considering this evidence, which the district court deemed 

credible, combined with Ali's failure to meaningfully rebut the statutory 

presumption,7we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

custody of a minor child has committed acts of domestic violence is a 

relevant factor in determining the best interest of the child), and neither 

domestic violence nor child custody are among those areas of the law upon 

which the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure imposes heightened pleading 

standards, see generally NRCP 9. 

6This includes evidence from Kizzy's prior TPO action, testimony from 

Kizzy, an interview with the minor child, and numerous text message and 

Our Family Wizard messages between the parties. 

7The record reveals that Ali presented no evidence during the 

domestic violence phase of the district court's evidentiary hearing. We are 

not persuaded by Ali's arguments that he was not afforded adequate notice 

or an opportunity to respond to Kizzy's domestic violence allegations, as he 

6 
discretion by applying NRS 125C.0035s presumption to find that giving Ali 

physical custody would not be in the child's best interest. See Castle v. 

Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 102-03, 86 P.3d 1042, 1045-46 (2004) (explaining 

that the district court analyzes NRS 125C.0035(5)s rebuttable presumption 

based on a totality of the evidence and further holding that "we will not 

reweigh the credibility of witnesses on appear). 

Custody and relocation 

We next reject Ali's argument that the district court erred when 

it applied the factors set forth in Druchman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 473, 

327 P.3d 511, 515 (201.4), in granting Kizzy's relocation request. See Stacco 

v. Valley Hosp., 123 Nev. 526, 530, 170 P.3d 503, 505-06 (2007) (recognizing 

that this court reviews whether a district court applied the correct legal 

standard de novo). We disagree that the district court's stipulated order 

granting Kizzy temporary sole physical custody constituted an order 

awarding physical custody such that the district court had to apply the NRS 

125C.007 relocation factors instead.8 See Druckman, 130 Nev. at 473, 327 

P.3d at 514 (explaining that, in the absence of a court order awarding a 

was present at numerous court hearings during which the court, parties, 

and counsel discussed the need for an evidentiary hearing specifically 

regarding those allegations and because Ali elected to conduct that hearing 

on the first day set for trial on Kizzy's custody and relocation requests. Cf. 

Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) C[A] party 

will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself 

induced . . . (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962))). 

8NRS 125C.007(1) explains that the factors set forth in that statute 

apply to all petitions to relocate brought pursuant to NRS 125C.006 or 

125C.0065; those latter statutes apply to petitions for relocation only where 

there is a prior court order establishing either primary or joint physical 

custody. 

7 
parent physical custody, the predecessor statute to NRS 125C.006 does not 

apply). 

Our review of the record also supports the district court's 

findings regarding the Druckman factors. The record shows that Kizzy 

demonstrated good-faith reasons for the move to Oregon, including her 

relationship with her fiance and her desire to escape Ali's obsessive 

behavior. See id. at 473, 327 P.3d at 515 (requiring a parent to demonstrate 

a good faith basis for relocation before the district court may consider the 

motion); see also Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 1260-61, 885 P.2d 563, 568-

69 (1994) (explaining that the best interest of the child must be considered 

in conjunction with the well-being of the custodial parent and recognizing 

that "Mlle custodial parent's right to pursue another relationship is 

integrally connected to the health and well-being of the custodial parent"). 

And the record also supports the district court's detailed findings regarding 

the Schwartz9 factors, see Druckman, 130 Nev. at 473, 327 P.3d at 515, and 

the factors set forth in NRS 125C.0035. Because the district court's findings 

regarding the parties inability to cooperate to meet the chilcUs needs; 

"which parent is more likely to allow the child to have . . . a continuing 

relationship with the noncustodial parent; the chilcr s "physical, 

developmental and emotional neede; and Ali's acts of domestic violence 

against Kizzy are supported by substantial evidence, we conclude that the 

district court's decision to award Kizzy sole physical custody was not an 

abuse of discretion.1° See NRS 125C.0035; see Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 

9Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 382-83, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 

(1991). 

1°We decline to address Ali's remaining arguments in this regard 

because they are either irrelevant or unsupported by the record. And we 

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1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (reviewing a child custody order for an 

abuse of discretion); see also Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 

239, 242 (2007) (explaining that this court "will not set aside the district 

court's factual findings [in child custody determinations] if they are 

supported by substantial evidence). 

We reject Ali's contention that the district court violated SCR 

251, which generally requires child custody issues be resolved within six 

months of a responsive pleading. Indeed, the rule allows extensions of time 

for "[e]xtraordinary cases that present unforeseeable circumstancee so long 

as the district court enters "specific findings of fact regarding the 

circumstances that justify the extension of time." SCR 251. Here, the 

record supports the district court's finding that Ali was the primary cause 

of the delay in resolving the parties competing custody requests: Ali delayed 

proceedings on multiple occasions, including by filing numerous writ 

petitions, several requests to continue trial, multiple failed motions to 

disqualify the presiding judge, as well as additional delays due to Ali's 

wavering agreement to participate in child custody and psychological 

evaluations.11Thus, the invited error doctrine bars Ali's argument 

need not address Ali's arguments regarding termination of parental rights, 

given that the district court's order does not terminate Ali's parental rights. 

11Indeed, in the span of several months, Ali refused to participate in 

any counseling, then agreed to participate in counseling (and sought a trial 

continuance to do so) but failed to pay the retainer fee necessary to begin 

counseling, then later renewed his opposition to counseling. Given Ali's 

representations that he would participate in a psychological evaluation, we 

decline to consider his appellate arguments regarding the district court's 

authority to order him to do so. See Pearson, 110 Nev. at 297, 871 P.2d at 

345 (explaining that "a party will not be heard to cornplain on appeal of 

error which he himself induced or provoked the court . . . to commie). 

9 

4 --1"••:;'-ti. 
regarding the delay and we conclude the district court complied with SCR 

251. See Pearson, 110 Nev. at 297, 871 P.2d at 345 ("The doctrine of 'invited 

error embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on 

appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the 

opposite party to commit." (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 713 

(1962))). 

Docket No. 82245 

In Docket No. 82245, Ali challenges the order requiring him to 

pay Kizzy's attorney fees and costs. We review for an abuse of discretion, 

see Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 82, 319 P.3d 606, 616 

(2014), and conclude that the district court was authorized to award Kizzy 

her "reasonable attorney fees . . . and other costs of the proceedine as the 

prevailing party. See NRS 125C.250 (authorizing an award of attorney fees 

to the prevailing party in a child custody matter). We also reject Ali's 

contention that the district court improperly evaluated the parties' 

disparity in income when considering the issue, as the district coures order 

makes clear that it considered the information provided in• both Ali's and 

Kizzy's most recent financial disclosure forms when making its decision.12 

See Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 623-24, 119 P.3d 727, 730 (2005) 

(requiring the district court to "consider the disparity in income of the 

parties when awarding feee in a family law case). 

Docket No. 83726 

In Docket No. 83726, Ali challenges several post-judgment 

orders. As to some of those orders, our review pursuant to NRAP 3(g) 

reveals a jurisdictional defect. Specifically, some of the orders designated 

12We have considered Ali's remaining arguments regarding the 

district court's fee award and determine that they lack merit. 

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, 
in Ali's notices of appeal are not substantively appealable. See NRAP 3A(b). 

This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when authorized by 

statute or court rule. Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 209, 

678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1984). No statute or court rule provides for an appeal 

from an order denying a request to transfer a matter to a different district 

court department, an order denying a post-judgment motion to dismiss 

(including a post-judgment anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss), an order 

denying a motion for sanctions pursuant to NRCP 11, or an order denying 

a "Demand for Bill of Particulars and Cause of Accusation U.S. Constitution 

6th Amendment."13Because these are not appealable orders, we dismiss 

the appeal in part as to those orders. 

Ali argues that the district court abused its discretion when it 

denied his motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to NRCP 60(b). See 

Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654, 656, 428 P.3d 255, 257 (2018) 

(reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion for relief from judgment 

pursuant to NRCP 60(b) for an abuse of discretion). We disagree. As the 

district court correctly observed, the evidence forming the basis of ALi's 

motion was available to him before trial and Ali failed to prove that the 

information was fraudulently concealed from the district court. See NRCP 

60(b)(2)-(3) (authorizing relief from a final judgment due to "newly 

discovered evidence that, without reasonable diligence, could not have been 

discovered in time to move for a new triar or "fraud[,] misrepresentation, 

or misconduct by an opposing party"). The district court also did not abuse 

1-3This court previously dismissed Ali's appeal from two of these orders 

because they were not substantively appealable. See Shahrokhi v. Burrow, 

2021 WL 5028911, No. 83662 (Nev. Oct. 28, 2021) (Order Dismissing 

Appeal). 

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its discretion when it found Ali failed to prove the district court's order was 

void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see NRCP 60(b)(4), and Ali did 

not demonstrate "any other reason [to] justif[y the] relief requested, NRCP 

60(b)(6). We further conclude that A1is newly discovered evidence 

regarding Donald Pearson's interest in a legal business enterprise in 

Oregon is collateral to the final judgment, which addressed issues of 

custody, relocation, and child support; therefore, this information did not 

justify relief from the judgment pursuant to NRCP 60(b). As to Ali's 

argument that the district court abused its discretion in striking his 

supplement to his Rule 60 motion, we decline to consider this argument 

because he failed to support it with any cogent argument or relevant 

authority. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 

130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (noting that this court need not consider 

claims unsupported by cogent argument or relevant authority). 

Lastly, as to Ali's challenges to the orders denying his motions 

for costs related to the writ petition before this court in Docket No. 82803, 

we conclude that the district court did not err because neither NRS 18.060 

nor NRAP 39 allow an award of costs to a prevailing party in an original 

proceeding for writ relief." See NRS 18.060 (providing this court with 

14This court rejected Ali's nearly identical request for costs pursuant 

to NRAP 39 for this same reason. See Shahrokhi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, Docket No. 82803 (Order, July 16, 2021). 

Although we affirm the district court's denial of costs pursuant to 

NRS 18.060 for a different reason, Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 267, 

277 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2012), we also agree with its conclusion that Ali was 

not entitled to costs under the statute because this court's writ of 

mandamus in Docket No. 82803 neither granted him a new trial nor did it 

modify the underlying judgment. 

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Par aguirre 

discretion to award costs of an appeal "[w]here a. new trial is ordered [or] a 

judgment is modified"); NRAP 39 (providing for an award of costs to a 

prevailing party in a civil appeal); Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 264, 350 P.3d 

1139, 1141 (2015) (explaining that this court reviews a party's eligibility for 

an award of costs pursuant to statute de novo). And although Ali urges that 

he was entitled to costs pursuant to NRS 18.020(4), we decline to consider 

this argument because he failed to raise it before the district court. See Old 

Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) 

(providing that an argument not raised in the district court is "waived and 

will not be considered on appear). For the foregoing reasons, we 

ORDER the appeal in Docket No. 83726 DISMISSED IN PART 

and the judgments of the district court AFFIRMED.15 

cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, Chief Judge 

Hon. Mathew Harter, District Judge 

Hon. Dawn Throne, District Judge 

Ali Shahrokhi 

Kizzy Burrow 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

15The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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