An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-274

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 16 December 2014

KAREN H. WHITE,

Plaintiff

v. Pasquotank County

No. 09-CVD-770

RICHARD McMULLEN WHITE,

Defendant.

Appeal by Plaintiff from judgments entered 22 February 2011

by Judge Robert P. Trivette and 17 September 2013 by Judge C. 

Christopher Bean in Pasquotank County District Court. Heard in 

the Court of Appeals 10 September 2014.

The Twiford Law Firm, P.C., by Edward A. O’Neal, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Pritchett & Burch, PLLC, by Lloyd C. Smith, Jr., Lloyd C. 

Smith, III, and Jonathan E. Huddleston, for DefendantAppellee.

DILLON, Judge.

Karen H. White (“Wife”) appeals from the trial court’s 

declaratory judgment barring her claim for equitable 

distribution of real property acquired by Richard McMullen White 

(“Husband”) in his own name during the marriage based on the 
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terms of an antenuptial agreement. She also appeals from the 

final consent judgment awarding alimony, attorney’s fees, and 

equitable distribution. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

Husband and Wife were married in 1983 and three children 

were born of the marriage. Shortly before their marriage, the 

parties signed an antenuptial agreement (the “Antenuptial”) 

which addressed their rights to certain property owned by either 

party.

At the time of their nuptials, Husband owned real estate 

associated with his used car business; Plaintiff owned personal 

property but not any real estate. During the marriage, Husband

acquired several rental properties titled in his name. Also 

during the marriage, Husband and Wife purchased their marital 

home, which was titled in both of their names.

In 2009, the parties separated. Wife filed this action

raising claims for child custody and support, post separation 

support and alimony, equitable distribution, and attorney’s 

fees. Husband filed his answer admitting that the marital home 

was “marital property” but pleaded that the Antenuptial was a 

bar to equitable distribution with respect to property he owned 

in his individual name.
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In 2010, Wife filed a motion for declaratory judgment to 

determine the rights and obligations of the parties under the 

Antenuptial. Husband filed a motion for partial summary 

judgment requesting the trial court to decree that the terms of 

the Antenuptial operated as a bar to Wife’s claim for equitable 

distribution of the real estate titled to him.

In 2011, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court 

entered a declaratory judgment (the “Declaratory Judgment”)

stating that the Antenuptial was unambiguous and that it barred 

Wife’s claim for equitable distribution of Husband’s real 

estate.

In 2013, the trial court entered a consent order (the 

“Consent Order”) which resolved the remaining claims of the 

Wife. The Consent Order stated that Wife’s claims for equitable 

distribution of Husband’s real estate had been adjudicated by 

the Declaratory Judgment and that Wife had not waived her right 

to appeal the Declaratory Judgment.

On 2 October 2013, Wife filed appeal from the Declaratory 

Judgment and the Consent Judgment.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Wife contends that the trial court erred in 

finding that the Antenuptial was unambiguous in creating a 
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waiver of her marital interest in real property acquired by 

Husband during the marriage. She concludes that this property 

should be classified as marital property and subject to 

equitable distribution. Husband counters that Wife waived any 

challenge to the Consent Judgment; that her entire appeal should 

be dismissed because she has attempted to manipulate the rules 

of procedure to appeal from an interlocutory order; and that the

Declaratory Judgment and Consent Judgment should be, otherwise,

affirmed.

A. Waiver/Dismissal

Husband contends that Wife waived her right to appeal from

the Consent Judgment which set the final terms of equitable 

distribution by failing to raise any argument in her brief 

challenging this judgment. Wife concedes in her reply brief 

that she has abandoned her appeal of the claims adjudicated by 

the Consent Judgment. Accordingly, any appeal from the 

adjudication of those claims has been waived. However, Wife’s 

failure to present an argument regarding the Consent Judgment 

does not waive her right to appeal from the Declaratory Judgment 

adjudicating her equitable distribution claim regarding the real 

estate acquired by Husband in his name during the marriage.
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Husband also argues that Wife’s appeal from the Declaratory 

Judgment should be dismissed, contending that she has attempted 

to manipulate the rules of procedure by signing the Consent 

Judgment so that her appeal from the Declaratory Judgment would 

not be interlocutory. Specifically, Husband argues that the 

Consent Judgment “specifically acknowledged the right to 

reinstate a claim if the appeal was successful” in contradiction 

to our holding in Hill ex Rel Hill v. West, 177 N.C. App. 132, 

627 S.E.2d 662 (2006).

We believe that our holding in Hill is distinguishable from 

the present case and, therefore, overrule Husband’s argument 

that Wife’s appeal should be dismissed. We recently noted that 

“[t]his Court has . . . repeatedly limited Hill to the specific, 

unusual facts present in that case.” Tong v. Dunn, ___ N.C. 

App. ___, ___, 752 S.E.2d 669, 674 (2013) (citing Curl v. Am. 

Multimedia, Inc., 187 N.C. App. 649, 654, 654 S.E.2d 76, 80 

(2007); Goodman v. Holmes & McLaurin Attorneys at Law, 192 N.C. 

App. 467, 472, 665 S.E.2d 526, 530 (2008); and Duval v. OM 

Hospitality, LLC, 186 N.C. App. 390, 651 S.E.2d 261 (2007)). In 

Hill, the plaintiffs raised a number of claims against a number 

of parties. 177 N.C. App. at 133, 627 S.E.2d at 663. The trial 

court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs with 
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respect to some of the claims. Id. This Court dismissed the 

plaintiff’s appeal from a partial summary judgment order as 

interlocutory, and noted that additionally the plaintiffs had 

failed to include a statement of the grounds for appellate 

review in violation of the appellate rules of procedure. Id. at 

133, 627 S.E.2d at 663. On remand to the trial court, the 

plaintiffs attempted to effect an immediate appeal from the 

partial summary judgment order by voluntarily dismissing their 

remaining claims in a rather unique manner. Id. at 135, 627 

S.E.2d at 664. Specifically, the plaintiffs dismissed their 

remaining claims in the form of a consent judgment entered by 

the trial court whereby the plaintiffs’ remaining claims were 

dismissed. Id. at 134-35, 627 S.E.2d at 663-64. However, the 

consent judgment allowed the plaintiffs to resurrect these 

dismissed claims in the event the plaintiffs won their appeal 

regarding the other claims, even if the appeal was not resolved 

in one year, thereby circumventing the requirements of N.C. R. 

Civ. P. 41. Id. We dismissed the appeal as having been taken 

from an interlocutory order, stating that the “manipulat[ion of] 

the Rules of Civil Procedure in an attempt to appeal the []

summary judgment that otherwise would not be appealable” did not
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convert the partial summary judgment order into an appealable 

final judgment. Id. at 135, 627 S.E.2d at 664.

In the present case, however, the Consent Judgment does not 

contain any language that attempts to manipulate N.C. R. Civ. P. 

41 through the inclusion of a statement that claims could be 

reinstated at any time without regard to the one-year 

limitation. This judgment simply states that it is a final 

judgment on the equitable distribution claim “pending” a 

successful appeal by Wife challenging the trial court’s 

Declaratory Judgment regarding the Antenuptial, which could 

operate to reinstate the claim for equitable distribution with 

respect to Husband’s real estate. Therefore, Hill is not 

controlling and Defendant’s argument is overruled.

B. Antenuptial Agreement

Wife argues that the trial court erred in finding that 

there were no ambiguities in the Antenuptial and concluding that 

it barred equitable distribution of the property acquired by one 

of the parties during their marriage. We disagree.

“Declaratory judgment affords the appropriate procedure to 

alleviat[e] uncertainty in the interpretation of written 

instruments and to clarify litigation associated with an actual 

controversy.” McCabe v. Dawkins, 97 N.C. App. 447, 449, 388 
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S.E.2d 571, 572 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 326 

N.C. 597, 393 S.E.2d 880 (1990). Under the Uniform Declaratory 

Judgment Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-253 et seq., “the court’s 

findings of fact are conclusive if supported by any competent 

evidence; and a judgment supported by such findings will be 

affirmed, even though there is evidence which might sustain 

findings to the contrary[.]” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Allison, 51 N.C. App. 654, 657, 277 S.E.2d 473, 475, disc. 

review denied, 303 N.C. 315, 281 S.E.2d 652 (1981). Thus, 

“[t]he function of our review is, then, to determine whether the 

record contains competent evidence to support the findings[] and 

whether the findings support the conclusions.” Id. The trial 

court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. Cross v. 

Capital Transaction Grp., Inc., 191 N.C. App. 115, 117, 661 

S.E.2d 778, 780 (2008) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 

363 N.C. 124, 672 S.E.2d 687 (2009).

Two people who are contemplating marriage may enter into a 

valid contract before marriage with respect to the property and 

property rights of either or both after marriage. Stewart v. 

Stewart, 222 N.C. 387, 391, 23 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1942). We have 

further explained that “[t]he term ‘antenuptial agreement’ or 

‘marriage settlement’ is often applied to such agreements” and 
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that “a valid antenuptial agreement may serve as a plea in bar 

to the equitable distribution of property acquired during the 

marriage[,]” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(d). Prevatte 

v. Prevatte, 104 N.C. App. 777, 780-81, 411 S.E.2d 386, 388

(1991). In other words, even though the right to equitable 

distribution is a statutory property right, that “right may be 

waived by a complete property settlement which contains a 

general release of spousal property rights.” Id. at 781, 411 

S.E.2d at 388. Husband pleaded as a bar to equitable

distribution of his real estate the terms of the Antenuptial. 

Therefore, the issue before us is whether the Antenuptial 

operated as a bar to Wife’s claim for equitable distribution of 

the real estate owned solely in Husband’s name.

Principles of construction applicable to contracts, 

generally, are applicable to premarital agreements. Stewart v. 

Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 236, 240, 541 S.E.2d 209, 212 (2000). 

“The heart of a contract is the intention of the parties[,]” and 

“[t]his intention is to be gathered from the entire instrument, 

viewing it from its four corners.” Jones v. Palace Realty Co., 

226 N.C. 303, 305, 37 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1946). “The contract 

must be construed as a whole, and a paragraph or excerpt must be 

interpreted in context with the rest of the agreement.” 
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Security Nat'l Bank v. Educators Mut. Life Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 

86, 93, 143 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1965) (citations omitted). “When 

the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, 

construction of the agreement is a matter of law for the court 

and the court cannot look beyond the terms of the contract to 

determine the intentions of the parties.” Stovall v. Stovall, 

205 N.C. App. 405, 410, 698 S.E.2d 680, 684 (2010). “If the 

words employed are capable of more than one meaning, the meaning 

to be given is that which it is apparent the parties intended 

them to have.” Jones, 226 N.C. at 305, 37 S.E.2d at 907

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

Section I of the Antenuptial is at the heart of the 

parties’ arguments, which states

[a]ny property, either real or personal, 

acquired by either prospective spouse, 

before or after their marriage, shall be the 

separate property of the party owning or 

obtaining the property, and the other party 

shall make no claim or demand on the 

separate property or on the heirs, 

executors, or administrators of the owner’s 

estate, for that separate property.

(Emphasis added.) Wife argues that the phrase “after their 

marriage” in this paragraph is ambiguous, as it could mean (1) 

after the marriage ended by divorce (excluding property acquired 

during marriage and giving Plaintiff a right to equitable 
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distribution in Defendant’s real property) or (2) after date of 

marriage (including property acquired during marriage and 

excluding Plaintiff’s right to equitable distribution of

Defendant’s real property). Plaintiff reasons that because of 

this ambiguity, we should look to her trial and deposition 

testimony along with other parts of the agreement to determine 

the intent of the parties and that their intent was not to waive 

equitable distribution of their property acquired by either 

party during the marriage. Plaintiff concedes, however, that 

“before . . . marriage” means before the parties were married. 

Therefore, we must determine the parties intention in regards to 

the phrase “after marriage[.]”

We believe that the trial court correctly interpreted the 

Antenuptial to apply to property acquired by either party during 

the marriage. Looking to the “four corners” of the document, we 

note that in a preamble to the rest of the terms of the 

agreement, the Antenuptial states:

The parties stipulate and recite that:

1. Prospective Husband and Prospective Wife 

intend to be married.

2. Prospective Husband and Prospective Wife 

are legal owners of real and personal 

property located in the State of North 

Carolina.
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3. Prospective Husband and Prospective Wife 

desire to retain all property that they 

presently own, whether real or personal, as 

separate property, after solemnization of 

their marriage.

4. That parties wish to set forth other 

provisions relative to the manner in which 

they will conduct themselves after marriage

and relate the business context in which 

they will operate as man and wife.

(Emphasis added). The parties’ intent, as stated in the 

preamble is that the agreement govern their conduct, including 

the ownership of property, “after solemnization of the 

marriage[,]” “after the marriage[,]” and “as man and wife.” 

Paragraph 3 of the Preamble makes it clear that Section I’s 

“before . . . marriage” refers to property owned before 

“solemnization of their marriage[.]” We believe that it is 

equally clear from paragraph 4 of the Preamble that “after 

marriage” means while operating “as man and wife” or “after 

solemnization of their marriage[.]”

1

Wife contends that an antenuptial agreement must expressly 

mention “equitable distribution” in order to operate as a waiver 

 

1 An antenuptial agreement can be invalidated if it is the 

product of undue influence, duress, coercion, or fraud, and if 

there is a lack of full disclosure between the parties as to 

their respective financial status. Howell v. Landry, 96 N.C. 

App. 516, 525, 386 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1989). Plaintiff raised 

none of these contractual defenses on appeal.
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of this right. In Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 354 S.E.2d 

228 (1987), our Supreme Court held two identical releases for 

the husband and wife in a separation agreement operated as a bar 

to equitable distribution: “any and all other rights arising out 

of the marriage relation in and to any and all property now 

owned by the [“Wife,” or “Husband”] or which may be hereafter 

acquired by [her or him] and further does hereby release the 

right to administer upon [her or his] estate.” Id. at 288, 295,

254 S.E.2d at 231, 234-35. The agreement did not contain the 

phrase “equitable distribution.” Id. However, the Court 

analyzed the intent of the parties based on the specific terms 

of the agreement and determined that they intended a waiver of 

equitable distribution. Id. In the present case, by entering 

into the Antenuptial, the parties agreed that any property 

acquired and owned by either of them would be the separate 

property of the owner. Accordingly, Wife’s argument is 

overruled.

III. Conclusion

The unambiguous language of the Antenuptial stated that 

real or personal property acquired by either party before or 

after marriage was separate property, and this language 

supported the trial court’s findings and conclusion that the 
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Antenuptial operated as a waiver of equitable distribution of 

such property in the Declaratory Judgment. As we affirm the 

Declaratory Judgment, we also affirm the conclusions based on 

that Declaratory Judgment in the Consent Judgment.

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are

AFFIRMED.

Judge HUNTER, Robert C. and Judge ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).