Filed 12/19/22 Vincent v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

MARTHA VINCENT et al.,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS 

AT LLOYD’S LONDON,

 Defendant and Respondent.

2d Civ. No. B316786

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2012-

00421417-CU-BC-VTA)

(Ventura County)

Tenants were evicted from landlord’s premises. Landlord

refused to allow them to retrieve their personal property.

Tenants sued landlord, alleging conversion of and negligent 

damage to their personal property. Landlord tendered the 

lawsuit to the insurer, Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (Lloyd’s).

The insurer denied coverage. Tenants obtained a judgment 

against landlord for conversion and negligence. Landlord sued 

the insurer for breach of contract and bad faith. The trial court 

granted the insurer summary judgment on the grounds that the 
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conversion occurred prior to the policy period and was not an 

occurrence covered by the policy.

We agree with the trial court and affirm the summary 

judgment in all respects.

FACTS

Martha Vincent leased her single family residence in 

Westlake Village to Dawn Christie for two years beginning 

January 1, 2009. Christie and her husband intended to operate a 

spa business, Togetherness Productions, LLC on the premises.1

Because the premises was used as a business, Vincent did not 

have liability insurance for the premises. 

Christie soon began falling behind on her rent. As a result, 

Vincent brought an unlawful detainer action that resulted in a 

judgment of possession and damages for unpaid rent in the 

amount of $115,708. Vincent obtained the judgment on April 10, 

2010, but Christie remained in possession until July 27, 2010, 

when the sheriff executed a “lockout” and evicted her.

During the eviction Christie was allowed to take only a few 

personal items with her. Christie requested that she be allowed 

to return to the residence to remove her personal property.

Vincent’s husband, who was managing the property, refused.

The bulk of her personal property, including exercise and spa 

equipment, remained on the premises.

On July 28, 2010, the day after the eviction, Christie spoke 

with Vincent’s attorney about the return of her personal 

property. Vincent’s attorney suggested Christie call back in two 

days “in order to try and hash out the details of how to return 

[her] personal property subject to [Vincent’s] claim that any 

1 We refer to Christie, her husband, and their business

collectively as “Christie.”
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valuable items be held for execution and levy by the sheriff in 

order to be applied to the outstanding money judgment owed by 

[Christie] to [Vincent].”

Christie spoke again with Vincent’s attorney on August 2, 

2010. She again demanded the return of her property. On the 

same day, Christie filed an ex parte motion to compel “emergency 

mediation” to work out terms to get her business equipment, 

office supplies, and other personal property returned.

On August 2, 2010, at 5:35 p.m., Vincent’s insurance broker 

sent an e-mail to the underwriter for Lloyd’s as follows: 

“[T]enants that were conducting business out of home are 

no longer renting at property location. They have been evicted 

and are not physically at location. However, some of their 

personal property is still at house in the control of insured. There 

is a court date this Wednesday to determine what will be done 

with the items still at residence.

“Insured is now trying to rent out property as single family 

private residence. I would like to add Liability ($500,000) and 

Medical ($10,000) coverage to existing policy as soon as possible.” 

Vincent opposed Christie’s ex parte motion on August 4, 

2010, stating that she is willing and able to return all of 

Christie’s personal property except the spa and exercise 

equipment. She also stated she will seek a court order allowing 

her to execute on the equipment to satisfy the judgment against 

Christie. The trial court denied Christie’s ex parte motion on 

August 18, 2010.

Lloyd’s policy providing Vincent with liability coverage 

went into effect on August 3, 2010. 
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The parties could not settle their differences. On December 

3, 2010, Christie filed an action2 against Vincent, the gravamen 

of which was the conversion and negligent damage to her 

personal property.

On January 20, 2011, Vincent tendered Christie’s lawsuit 

to Lloyd’s for defense. Lloyd’s denied coverage. Vincent brought 

the instant action against Lloyd’s for breach of contract under the 

policy and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Ruling in conversion action

In June 2014, the trial court issued a ruling in Christie’s 

conversion action. The court found that Vincent converted 

Christie’s property and negligently damaged the property in 

moving and storing it. The court found the conversion was 

accomplished on July 27, 2010, the day of the lockout.

Ruling in instant case

The trial court found that it is undisputed that the tortious 

acts underlying the conversion litigation arose before Vincent 

applied for and Lloyd’s issued the property damage liability 

policy at issue. Vincent was aware of the underlying dispute 

prior to the effective date of the liability endorsement. Thus, 

Lloyd’s was justified in denying coverage. The court also found 

the conversion was not an occurrence within the meaning of the 

policy.

DISCUSSION

I.

Standard of review

Summary judgment is properly granted only if all papers 

submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact 

2 Christie v. Vincent (Super. Ct. Ventura County, 2010, No. 

56-2010-00386347-CU-BC-VTA) (conversion action).
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and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The court must draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence set forth in the papers 

except where such references are contradicted by 

other inferences or evidence which raise a triable issue of fact.

(Ibid.) In examining the supporting and opposing papers, 

the moving party's affidavits or declarations are strictly 

construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and 

doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be 

resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Szadolci 

v. Hollywood Park Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19.)

The moving party has the initial burden of showing that 

one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established.

(Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)

Where the moving party has carried that burden, the burden 

shifts to the opposing party to show a triable issue of material 

fact. (Ibid.) Our review of the trial court's grant of the motion is 

de novo. (Id. at p. 767.)

II.

Conversion

(a) Policy period

The undisputed evidence is that the conversion occurred 

prior to the effective date of the policy.

Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the 

personal property of another. (Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 

9 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1173.) The trial court found in the 

underlying conversion action that the conversion occurred on 

July 27, 2010, the day of the lockout. Vincent’s husband, who 

was managing the property admitted that on the day of the 

lockout, he did not allow Christie back into the property to pick 
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up her personal property. On July 28, 2010, Vincent’s attorney 

told Christie that Vincent was holding the property so she could 

execute on it to satisfy her judgment for unpaid rent. Vincent 

confirmed in her response to Christie’s ex parte motion that she 

was holding the property to execute on it. The conversion and 

dispute arose prior to the August 3, 2010, effective date of the 

policy.

Vincent argues that both the trial court in the underlying

conversion action and the court in this case determined that the 

date of conversion was August 16, 2010. That is simply not true.

The trial court in the underlying conversion case found “[W]hen 

[Vincent] prevented [Christie] from retrieving their property on 

the day of the lockout (July 27, 2010), and then put them in 

storage, she accomplished a conversion of [Christies’] property.” 

The exercise of dominion over Christie’s property began on July 

27, 2010, when Vincent’s husband refused to let Christie back 

into the house to remove her property.

In the instant case the trial court found: “It is materially 

undisputed that the tortious acts underlying the [conversion 

action] litigation (conversion of tenants’ personal property by 

landlord) arose before [Vincent] applied for and Lloyd’s issued the 

property damage liability policy at issue in this action. It is 

undisputed that [Vincent was] aware of the underlying dispute 

concerning the personal property damages claimed by the tenants 

prior to the effective date of the liability endorsement here.”

Vincent claims that she was lawfully holding Christie’s 

personal property until Christie paid for the storage costs. It is 

true that Vincent demanded storage costs. But the undisputed 

evidence shows that Vincent was holding the property so that she 
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could execute on it to satisfy her judgment against Christie for 

unpaid rent.

Vincent’s reliance on Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co.

(1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 86 (Chu) is misplaced. Owners in a 

condominium complex sued the developer for damages arising 

from construction defects. The developer tendered defense to its 

insurer. Some of the defects were known prior to the effective 

date of the policy. Other defects appeared after the effective date. 

The insurer neither accepted nor denied coverage. The developer 

settled the claims on its own and sued the insurer for bad faith. 

The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer on the 

ground that the defects that appeared after the effective date of 

the policy were simply a manifestation of the faulty construction 

that existed prior to the effective date of the policy. The Court of 

Appeal reversed, holding that each set of distinct defects must be 

analyzed separately.

Vincent argues that like Chu, there is a triable issue of fact 

as to whether the events during the policy period can be 

characterized as necessary extensions of pre-coverage events. 

But here, there is only one event, conversion of Christie’s 

property. It occurred prior to the effective date of the policy. (See 

Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1433 [cause of action 

for conversion accrues when defendant acts in a manner 

inconsistent with the owner’s interest].) Here, unlike Chu, there 

is no arguable basis for distinguishing events that that occurred 

prior to the policy period from events occurring during the policy 

period.

(b) Occurrence

The undisputed evidence shows that Christie’s claim for 

conversion arose prior to the effective date of Lloyd’s policy. In 
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addition, the conversion did not constitute an “occurrence” to 

which the policy applies. The policy defines “occurrence” as “an 

accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 

substantially the same harmful conditions . . . .” An accident is 

““an unexpected, unforeseen or undesigned happening or 

consequence from either a known or unknown cause.”” (Collin v. 

American Empire Ins. Co. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 787, 807.)

Here the undisputed evidence shows that Vincent did not 

accidentally convert Christie’s property. Instead, Vincent 

intentionally retained Christie’s personal property with the 

expectation she could execute on it to satisfy her judgment. That 

does not constitute an occurrence covered by Lloyd’s policy.

III.

Negligence

Vincent contends she was entitled to defense and 

indemnity for Christie’s cause of action for negligence.

Christie’s complaint in the underlying conversion action

alleged that Vincent negligently damaged her property while it 

was in Vincent’s custody. The trial court in the underlying action 

awarded damages against Vincent for negligence.

Vincent raised the argument concerning negligence for the 

first time in her reply brief. We do not consider issues raised for 

the first time in the reply brief. (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. 

Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453.) Moreover, the 

negligence cause of action was subsumed within the conversion 

cause of action. It was simply part of Vincent’s exercise of 

dominion and control over Christie’s personal property.
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DISPOSITION

The summary judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to 

Respondent.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.
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Matthew P. Guasco, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Law Office of David B. Cohen and David B. Cohen for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Vanderford & Ruiz, Ty S. Vanderford and Mark R. Irvine 

for Defendant and Respondent.