UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Joseph M. LeDoux

v. Civil No. 06-cv-268-PB

Superintendent, Rockingham County

House of Corrections, et al.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pro se plaintiff Joseph M. LeDoux has filed a complaint and

amendment thereto, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that

defendants have abridged his rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (document

nos. 1 and 6). Seeking injunctive and monetary relief, he brings

this action against the Rockingham County House of Corrections

(“RCHOC”) and the following RCHOC employees: Superintendent

Albert Wright; Major Blomeke; Captain Steven Church; Sergeant

Horne; corrections officers Valencia, Sparks, Haywood and

Trainor; and an unnamed corrections officer.

The complaint is before me for preliminary review to

determine whether, among other things, it states a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; U.S.

District Court for the District of New Hampshire Local Rule

(“LR”) 4.3(d)(2). 

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For the reasons stated below, I find that LeDoux has alleged

the following claims: (1) First and Fourteenth Amendment denial

of access to the courts claims against Wright, Blomeke and

Church; (2) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against

Haywood, Trainor, Horne, Wright, Blomeke and Church; and (3)

First and Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claims against

Haywood, Trainor, Wright and an unnamed corrections officer. I

recommend dismissal of all remaining claims.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a pro se complaint, this Court must construe

the pleading liberally and in favor of the pro se litigant. See

Ayala Serrano v. Gonzalez, 909 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1990)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). At this

preliminary stage of review, all factual assertions made by the

plaintiff and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom must be

accepted as true. See Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st

Cir. 1996)(stating the “failure to state a claim” standard of

review and explaining that all “well-pleaded factual averments,”

not bald assertions, must be accepted as true). This review

ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and meaningful

consideration. See Eveland v. Director of CIA, 843 F.2d 46, 49

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1LeDoux further alleges that under RCHOC policy “legal

materials must be relevant to present incarceration at this

facility”, however, this allegation is unclear and unsupported by

facts.

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(1st Cir. 1988). I apply this standard in reviewing LeDoux’

complaint.

Background

LeDoux is currently confined as a pretrial detainee at the

RCHOC. During his confinement, LeDoux claims, defendants have

abridged his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him

adequate access to the law library and its resources, subjecting

him to discipline without due process and retaliating against him

for filing administrative grievances.

Access to Law Library 

In Counts 1-2 and 6 of the complaint, LeDoux alleges that

Wright, Blomeke and Church have denied him adequate access to the

RCHOC law library and its resources. He further alleges that the

library resources available at the RCHOC are incomplete, obsolete

and poorly maintained. Because the law library is devoid of any

state or federal reporters, LeDoux claims, his efforts to obtain

copies of decisions are extremely burdensome and time-consuming. 

In support of his claims, he alleges that the following RCHOC law

library policies are unconstitutional1:

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• inmate requests are honored in the order in which

they are received;

• the opportunity to access the law library and use

legal reference materials depends on staff

availability and order of the request; 

• an officer escorts each inmate to the location

where legal materials are shelved and remains with

the inmate;

• RCHOC law library policy fails to address state

and federal decisions and on-line services; and

• the RCHOC law library is “a closet filled with

outdated books” with no supplies, such as,

typewriters, staplers or a copy machine.

According to LeDoux, defendants’ actions in denying him

adequate access to the library, combined with RCHOC policies

limiting his use of the library, have interfered with his ability

to research, defend and prosecute his civil and criminal actions. 

Specifically, LeDoux alleges that Wright, Blomeke and Church

denied him adequate access to the law library in July 2006,

thereby interfering with his ability to prepare for a habeas

corpus hearing and causing the habeas petition to be dismissed. 

Wright allegedly has failed to adjudicate LeDoux’ grievances

pertaining to the deprivations.

Disciplinary Proceedings

In Counts 3-5 of the complaint, LeDoux alleges that

defendants subjected him to discipline without due process and

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retaliated against him for filing administrative grievances. On

May 20, 2006, Haywood and Trainor filed a false disciplinary

report, charging LeDoux with tampering with a security device. 

The disciplinary report allegedly was filed against LeDoux in

retaliation for his prosecution of administrative grievances. On

May 22, 2006, an unnamed corrections officer filed a second

disciplinary report, charging LeDoux with possessing contraband

(a cigarette). While LeDoux was in the process of moving into a

cell, the officer allegedly found a cigarette in the common area

of the cell. Although the officer was unable to determine who

possessed the cigarette, he nevertheless wrote up an incident

report and charged LeDoux with possession of contraband.

On May 23, 2006, LeDoux received a “Disciplinary Board

Hearing Notice”, charging him with (1) tampering with a security

device and (2) possession of contraband (a cigarette). On May

24, 2006, LeDoux requested Wright to provide him with additional

information pertaining to the charges and an opportunity to

present testimony from two witnesses, all of which he deemed

necessary to present a defense. One witness allegedly intended

to testify to committing the offense of tampering with the

security device. The other witness allegedly intended to testify

to ownership of the cigarette. That evening, over his objections

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that he was denied discovery, LeDoux was called to a disciplinary

hearing commenced by Horne, Valencia and Sparks. During the

hearing, Horne denied having receiving LeDoux’ request for

discovery. Horne then explained that LeDoux was guilty until

proven innocent and proceeded with the hearing despite the

Disciplinary Board’s (“Board”) failure to produce the security

device in question.

LeDoux was found guilty on both charges and sanctioned to

twenty days of “privilege restriction lock-up or isolation” in

which he was stripped of all privileges, including visits,

reading material, television and newspapers. While the complaint

is unclear, LeDoux appears to allege that he never received a

written statement specifying the reasons for the disciplinary

action taken against him and the sanctions imposed. He filed a

notice of appeal with Wright and also requested the Board to

issue a stay. Horne denied LeDoux’ request for a stay and

allegedly knew that the sanctions would be served before the

appeal could be reviewed. Wright subsequently review the appeal

and overturned the contraband charge but upheld the security

device charge. LeDoux further claims that Wright failed to

provide him with written notice of the ruling. 

On June 7, 2006, LeDoux was served with a second

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“Disciplinary Board Hearing Notice”, charging him with (1)

disorderly conduct: threats and (2) disobeying an order from a

room-mate. That day, he was placed in the “privilege restricted

block” for the above disciplinary infractions. He was further

notified that a hearing would commence on or before June 11,

2006. On June 8, 2006, LeDoux requested additional information

pertaining to the charges and an opportunity to cross-examine the

charging officers, all of which he deemed necessary to present a

defense. A disciplinary hearing allegedly was never held. 

Despite this fact and LeDoux’ objections to the denial of a

hearing, Wright, Blomeke and Church confined him in disciplinary

segregation and denied him certain privileges for one month,

including outdoor recreation, television and out-of-cell time. 

LeDoux broadly alleges that the disciplinary charges imposed

adversely affect his good time credit.

Discussion

I. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against those who,

acting under color of state law, violate federal law. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981);

accord Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). In order to be

held liable for a violation under Section 1983, a defendant’s

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conduct must have been a cause in fact of the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1061-62

(1st Cir. 1997). The premise of LeDoux’ Section 1983 action is

that defendants subjected him to the following constitutional

deprivations in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. 

A. Access to the Courts

LeDoux alleges that defendants have abridged his First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him adequate access to the

RCHOC law library and denying him adequate library resources.

“It is undisputed that inmates have a fundamental

constitutional right of access to the courts.” Carter v. Fair,

786 F.3d 433, 435 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 828 (1977)). This right of access “requires prison

authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of

meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law

libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the

law.” Id. See also Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir.

2000). Prisons “are not required to provide comprehensive legal

representation for inmates”; rather, prisons “must provide enough

assistance so as to “‘protect[ ] the ability of an inmate to

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prepare a petition or complaint.’” Carter, 786 F.2d at 435

(citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828)).

 To establish a claim that this right of access has been

denied, an inmate must allege that he suffered actual injury. 

See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). “Because Bounds

did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library

or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual

injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or

legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” 

Id. at 351. Rather, he must demonstrate that the alleged

shortcomings in the law library or legal assistance program

“hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. (“He might

show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for

failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of

deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he

could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably

actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but

was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was

unable even to file a complaint.”). 

A prison regulation or policy may interfere with the right

of access to the courts if the challenged regulation or policy

bears a rational relation to legitimate penological interests. 

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See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003); Lewis, 518

U.S. at 361; Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23, 30-31 (1st Cir.

2003) cert. denied 540 U.S. 1109 (2004). Thus, even if an inmate

is able to establish that the challenged regulation or policy

actually impeded his access to the courts with respect to a

specific claim, he is not entitled to relief if the regulation or

policy satisfies this requirement.

In this action, LeDoux alleges that Wright, Blomeke and

Church denied him adequate access to the RCHOC law library and

denied him adequate library resources. According to LeDoux, the

library resources are incomplete, obsolete and poorly maintained. 

Because the library is devoid of any state and federal reporters,

LeDoux’ efforts to obtain copies of decisions are extremely

burdensome and time-consuming. He further alleges that RCHOC

policies impede his ability to use the library. For example, his

access to the library and his ability to use legal materials is

contingent upon staff availability. In addition, RCHOC policy

requires corrections officers to escort inmates while they use

the library and conduct legal research.

According to LeDoux, the above deprivations and policies

have interfered with his ability to research, defend and/or

prosecute his civil and criminal actions. Specifically, he

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alleges that on June 13, 2006, he filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. Weeks before the hearing on the petition, Wright

and Church allegedly denied LeDoux adequate access to the law

library, thereby preventing him from preparing for his hearing. 

In a series of inmate request slips filed in July 2006 and

reviewed by Wright and Church, LeDoux requested copies of case

law in order to prepare for his hearing and complained that he

was denied certain cases and provided with incorrect cases. The

record further reveals that Blomeke allegedly caused certain

delays in LeDoux’s receipt of research materials and case law. 

Allegedly as a result of defendants’ actions, Ledoux’ habeas

corpus petition was dismissed. He has provided a copy of the New

Hampshire Superior Court (Rockingham County) order dismissing his

petition on July 28, 2006. Accepting the allegations as true, I

conclude that LeDoux has alleged First and Fourteenth Amendment

denial of access to the courts claims against Wright, Blomeke and

Church.

B. Procedural Due Process

LeDoux alleges that while he was confined at the RCHOC as a

pretrial detainee, defendants abridged his Fourteenth Amendment

rights by subjecting him to discipline without due process.

A pretrial detainee has a Fourteenth Amendment 

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right to be free from punishment prior to 

conviction. While a pretrial detainee may be 

disciplined for a specific institutional infraction 

committed during the period of his detention, the 

discipline imposed must be roughly proportionate to 

the gravity of the infraction. An arbitrary, or 

disproportionate sanction, or one that furthers no 

legitimate penological objective, constitutes 

punishment (and, thus, is proscribed by the 

Fourteenth Amendment).

Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Bell

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 538-9 (1979) and Collazo-Leon v.

U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995)). 

Accordingly, I find that LeDoux’ complaints pertaining to the

denial of due process arise under the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. Disciplinary Segregation

Ordinarily, when a prisoner is subjected to disciplinary

sanction, he must prove that the sanction itself was so atypical

of the normal incidents of prison life, and imposed such a

hardship, that he was entitled to due process in order for the

sanction to be constitutionally effected. Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Sandin, however, only applies to

convicted inmates who might expect a certain amount of punishment

as typical of the normal incidents of prison life. Pretrial

detainees, to the contrary, have a constitutionally-protected

liberty interest in avoiding any punishment. Surprenant, 424

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F.3d at 17. 

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974), the Supreme

Court identified the due process requirements associated with

prison disciplinary hearings. Those requirements include written

notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours in advance of

the hearing, the ability to call witnesses and present evidence,

and that the hearing be presided over by an impartial

decisionmaker. Id. at 566, 570-71; Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 16. 

It follows that “a pretrial detainee who is placed in

disciplinary segregation as punishment has a right to a due

process hearing” and the protections guaranteed by Wolff. See

Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, LeDoux alleges a Fourteenth Amendment due process

violation arising from the false charges filed by Haywood,

Trainor and an unnamed corrections officer and the subsequent

disciplinary hearing commenced by Horne, Valencia and Sparks. 

During the disciplinary hearing, LeDoux allegedly was denied the

opportunity to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence

in his defense. He was found guilty on both charges and

subjected to sanctions and disciplinary segregation. LeDoux

further alleges that he never received a written statement

specifying the reasons for the disciplinary action taken against

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him and the sanctions imposed. LeDoux filed an appeal with

Wright, who overturned the contraband charge and upheld the

security device charge. Wright allegedly failed to provide

LeDoux with notice of his ruling.

LeDoux’ pretrial status entitled him to due process

protections during his hearing and prior to the imposition of

sanctions and punitive segregation. Accordingly, I find that he

has alleged sufficient facts to state Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process claims against Haywood, Trainor, Horne and

Wright. Because LeDoux has failed to allege sufficient predicate

facts against Valencia and Sparks, I recommend that the claims

against them be dismissed.

LeDoux alleges that he was further denied due process when 

disciplinary charges were filed against him on June 7, 2006, and

he was placed in disciplinary segregation without first being

afforded a hearing. Despite the fact that LeDoux was denied a

hearing, Wright, Blomeke and Church confined him in disciplinary

segregation for approximately one month and denied him certain

privileges. As mentioned above, LeDoux’ pretrial status entitled

him to a due process hearing and due process protections prior to

the imposition of sanctions and punitive segregation. 

Accordingly, I find that he has alleged sufficient facts to state

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a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against

Wright, Blomeke and Church.

 C. Retaliation

LeDoux alleges that defendants abridged his First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unwarranted

disciplinary actions in retaliation for filing administrative

grievances. Construed liberally, the complaint alleges

retaliation claims against Haywood, Trainor, Wright and an

unnamed corrections officer.

“[I]t is well established that prison officials must provide

inmates access to the courts, and prison officials may not harass

or retaliate against an inmate for exercising his right of access

to the courts.” Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1404 (10th Cir.

1996)(internal citations omitted). To prevail on a retaliation

claim, an inmate must show: (1) conduct which led to the alleged

retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) that he suffered

some adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3)

that his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or

motivating factor in the decision to discipline him. See Rauser

v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).

Here, LeDoux alleges that on May 20, 2006, Haywood and

Trainor filed false disciplinary reports against him in

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2If LeDoux wishes to pursue his claims against the unnamed

corrections officer, he will have to obtain the defendant’s full

name in discovery and appropriately move to amend the complaint. 

To this end, upon service of this action on the named defendants,

LeDoux can serve the named defendants with interrogatories to

obtain the full name of the presently unidentified defendant

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a) which states in pertinent part:

Without leave of court or written stipulation, 

any party may serve upon any other party 

written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in 

number including all discrete subparts, to be 

answered by the party served or, if the party 

served is a public or private corporation or a 

partnership or association or governmental 

agency, by an officer or agent, who shall 

furnish such information as is available to 

the party.

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retaliation for his prosecution of administrative grievances. He

further alleges that on May 22, 2006, an unnamed corrections

officer filed a false disciplinary report against him in

retaliation for his prosecution of administrative grievances. 

Construed liberally, the complaint alleges that Wright was aware

of and condoned the actions of the subordinate officers. To the

extent the disciplinary charges were filed in reprisal for

LeDoux’ exercise of First Amendment freedoms, he may establish a

retaliation claim. For purposes of preliminary review, I

conclude that he has stated cognizable First and Fourteenth

Amendment retaliation claims against Haywood, Trainor, Wright and

the unnamed corrections officer2. 

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LeDoux is further instructed to forward a summons to this Court

with the unidentified defendant’s proper name.

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II. Municipal and Supervisory Liability

Construed liberally, the complaint names the RCHOC, a

municipal entity, as a defendant in this action. Municipalities

and local government entities are “persons” within the meaning of

Section 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. A municipal entity

cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a theory of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability; rather the

municipality itself must proximately cause the constitutional

injury, through promulgation or tacit approval of a policy or

custom. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 

To state a viable Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege in

substance that the challenged municipal custom or policy was the

“moving force” behind the constitutional violations. See Board

of the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); McCabe

v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., 77 F.3d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 1996)

(citations omitted). Supervisors similarly can be held liable

only on the basis of their own acts or omissions, amounting to

reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of

others. See Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 209 (1st Cir.

1990).

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In this action, if LeDoux intends to pursue claims against

RCHOC, he must, at a minimum, allege that his constitutional

deprivations were the product of a municipal custom or policy. 

Liberally construing the complaint, I conclude that the wrongful

conduct ascribed to the RCHOC was the product of an

unconstitutional municipal custom or policy. The alleged

deprivations stem from RCHOC policy governing the treatment of

pretrial detainees and their access to the RCHOC law library. 

Construed liberally, the complaint suggests that RCHOC was the

“moving force” behind the acts or omissions allegedly taken by

certain corrections officers. Accordingly, I conclude that the

complaint states a viable claim premised upon municipal liability

against the RCHOC.

Construed liberally, the complaint also names Wright in his

official capacity as Superintendent of the RCHOC. Official

capacity suits against officers of an agency are simply “another

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. See also Brandon v.

Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)(suits against parties in their

official capacities treated as suits against the municipality). 

While Wright’s conduct may not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference, his acts or omissions may amount to reckless or

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callous indifference to LeDoux’ constitutional rights. As an

employee of the RCHOC, Wright had knowledge of the municipal

policy that allegedly caused the underlying deprivations. 

Because I find municipal liability as to the RCHOC, I extend that

reasoning to Wright and conclude that the official capacity

claims against him are cognizable for purposes of preliminary

review.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, I conclude that LeDoux has

alleged the following claims: (1) First and Fourteenth Amendment

denial of access to the courts claims against Wright, Blomeke and

Church; (2) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against

Haywood, Trainor, Horne, Wright, Blomeke and Church; and (3)

First and Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claims against

Haywood, Trainor, Wright and an unnamed corrections officer. I

recommend dismissal of all remaining claims.

If this recommendation is approved, the claims as identified

in this report and recommendation, will be considered for all

purposes to be the claims raised in the complaint. If the

plaintiff disagrees with the identification of the claims herein,

plaintiff must do so by filing an objection within ten (10) days

of receipt of this report and recommendation, or by properly

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moving to amend the complaint. 

Any further objections to this report and recommendation

must be filed within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. 

Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the

right to appeal the district court’s order. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1); Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Gordon, 979

F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Valencia-Copete,

792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986).

________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: November 30, 2006

cc: Joseph M. LeDoux, pro se

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