Filed 5/30/13

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re NADIA G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 B243392

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARIA R.,

Defendant;

NADIA G.,

Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK82104)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Elizabeth Kim, Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Patti L. Dikes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Welfare and Institutions Code section 3911authorizes the juvenile court to 

terminate its jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent in foster care who is between the 

ages of 18 and 21, but only in three narrowly defined circumstances and only after the 

county welfare department has submitted a report containing recommendations and 

verifying it has provided the nonminor with certain information, documents, and services. 

(§ 391, subds. (b)-(e).) The juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over Nadia G. (id., 

subd. (c)(1)(B)) and she appeals. We hold that the record supports the court‟s findings 

that Nadia was not participating in a transitional independent living case plan (ibid.), one 

of the grounds for terminating jurisdiction. (§§ 366.32, subd. (a), 303, subd. (a), 391, 

subd. (c).) However, although ordered by the court to comply with the requirements of 

section 391, the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to 

file a section 391 report, with the result jurisdiction may not be terminated yet. (§ 391, 

subds. (b) & (e).) Accordingly, as it was premature, we reverse the order terminating 

jurisdiction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The dependency

The juvenile court declared Nadia a dependent in 2010 when she was 17 years old 

because her mother was unwilling and unable to provide parental care and supervision 

and her father had long ago left the family. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (g).) Nadia qualifies for 

special education, but has a history of truancy beginning when she was 14 years old. 

Hence, she has no high school credits. She started drinking alcohol at age 12. She was 

defiant and belligerent. Nadia had an infant and was pregnant with her second child 

when she was removed from her mother‟s care. She gave custody of her first born to her 

mother. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless 

otherwise noted.
3

The juvenile court ordered the Department, among other things, to enroll Nadia in 

counseling; to refer her to trauma-focused cognitive behavior therapy, a parenting 

program, and a substance abuse program, and to report on the status of her schooling. 

2. Nadia’s dependency has been marked by instability and inconsistency 

interspersed with short periods of cooperation.

Throughout this dependency, Nadia would comply with the juvenile court‟s 

requirements, the Department‟s programs, and house rules for a time and then run away 

from her foster placement and return to her old behaviors. In her first placement, Nadia 

was rebellious and disrespectful and she refused to attend school. Her first foster parent 

wanted Nadia removed because of her misbehavior. Instead, Nadia ran away in 

September 2010, just months after the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction.

Although placement proved difficult because Nadia was pregnant, the Department 

next found her a bed at a home for girls. Nadia had difficulty adjusting to the group 

home‟s rules, and within the first month she had run away twice and was involved in a 

physical altercation with another resident. Eventually, Nadia settled into the group home 

and began attending school and participating in many of her programs. Nadia‟s second 

child was born in November 2010. 

Only two months later, however, Nadia returned from an overnight visit with her 

mother a day late and intoxicated and had to be prompted several times to wake up to 

tend to her infant. When she failed to pick up her infant from a visit with the child‟s 

father, the Department detained the baby. After the baby‟s detention, Nadia began 

skipping school and staying in bed until late morning. She would go out in the evenings 

and on weekends, returning only to sleep or spend the day. She was arrested five months 

after the baby was born for assaulting and threatening staff at the group home. Upon her 

release from jail in early April 2011, she told her social worker she did not want the 

Department to find her another placement. Instead, she opted to stay with an unnamed 

friend and so the Department did not know her whereabouts for over a month. 

Nadia finally contacted the Department from the Los Angeles Police Department‟s 

77th Precinct in May 2011 to announce she had been arrested for battery. By then, she 
4

was 18 years old and did not wish to return to her mother‟s home, preferring to reunify 

with her baby. Nadia‟s mother did not want to continue with reunification. 

3. The Department recommends terminating dependency jurisdiction.

In May 2011, the Department notified the juvenile court that Nadia had once again 

gone missing. The Department requested a progress review hearing be scheduled in 

August 2011 to assess Nadia‟s compliance with the court-ordered child welfare services, 

and the Department recommended, if she was not complying, that the juvenile court 

terminate jurisdiction.

In August 2011, the Department reported that Nadia was living with a “non 

extended family member,” although the placement was at risk because the foster 

mother‟s son had a criminal record. Apart from housing, Nadia was trying to make 

positive changes. She appeared to be “very motivated,” and as before, “appear[ed] to be 

serious about re-directing her life.” She started attending school where she was “very 

motivated” to get her General Education Diploma (GED). In the social worker‟s view, 

Nadia was doing her best to follow her program and to keep up with her appointments 

and responsibilities so that she could reunify with her baby.

Nadia‟s motivation was apparently short lived as a month later, in September 

2011, she ran away and her whereabouts were unknown for four months. The record 

contains no further indication of Nadia‟s participation in her court-ordered child welfare 

services.

During this four-month interval, in November 2011, the social worker reached 

Nadia by telephone. She was staying with a friend but refused to reveal her whereabouts. 

She admitted she was drinking and declared she had lost all motivation when she lost 

custody of her baby. She had worked for a few days and was looking for somewhere to 

live. The social worker warned Nadia that her case could not remain open if she was not 

compliant with school and other court-ordered services. Nadia understood. 

Nadia‟s whereabouts were still unknown when the Department filed its next status 

review report recommending termination of juvenile court jurisdiction. 
5

4. The juvenile court announces its intention to terminate jurisdiction and orders 

the Department to prepare Nadia for emancipation.

Nadia did not appear at the scheduled hearing in December 2011. Her attorney 

relayed Nadia‟s wish that jurisdiction continue. Nadia wanted services and wanted to be 

placed in suitable housing. Finding emancipation to be the appropriate goal for Nadia, 

the juvenile court ordered the Department to file the most current transitional independent 

living case plan (TILP) if it continued to recommend terminating jurisdiction. The court 

announced its intention to terminate jurisdiction if Nadia showed little cooperation in her 

services and did not keep the Department informed of her whereabouts and ordered the 

Department “to conform with [the] requirements in WIC [section] 391.” (Italics added.) 

At the end of December 2011 Nadia asked her social worker to come get her. 

Then, she changed her mind and asked to be given housing after the new year. The 

Department made several attempts to find suitable housing for Nadia and finally placed 

her in a group home in January 2012. Nadia participated in creating her TILP in early 

January 2012. 

That same month, the juvenile court ordered the Department to “assess Nadia 

ASAP for AB12 [section 391] eligibility and programs . . . .”

In February 2012, before her transition meeting was held, Nadia was removed

from her group home, as it was only a 30-day shelter. Preferring to stay with a friend 

instead of a shelter, Nadia vanished for two months. She finally contacted her social 

worker in April 2012 to report that she and her boyfriend were renting a room but she 

again refused to provide an address and had no working cell phone. She stated she would 

agree to close her case. Nadia did not appear at her re-scheduled transition conference at 

the end of April 2012 and did not contact her social worker. 

Nadia finally appeared for a transition conference in May 2012. By this time, she 

was three months pregnant. She and her boyfriend were living at his parents‟ house 

where they planned to remain until they could afford a place of their own. Informed of 

the services and requirements under section 391, Nadia stated she would like to continue 

with services until she turned 21. Recognizing what she would have to do to maintain 
6

dependency jurisdiction, Nadia stated she was stable and was committed to re-enrolling 

in school and to remaining in her current home. She agreed to undergo mental health 

treatment and to keep in regular contact with her social worker. Under the heading 

“recommendation” in the status review report, the Department requested the court order 

Nadia to remain a dependent of the court. 

In June 2012, the juvenile court asked the Department why it wanted to keep the 

case open as Nadia had not been in school in months, was not working, and was not 

living in approved housing. The Department replied it was simply trying to set Nadia on 

the right path in advance of closing her case. Nadia was trying to address her problems 

but claimed her individualized education plan made it difficult to enroll in school.

At the June 20, 2012 contested hearing, the court summarized Nadia‟s case: she 

was 19 years old; she held her own educational rights; the Department had not approved 

her residence as a Supervised Independent Living Placement;2and Nadia had only 

enrolled in school the week before the hearing. The court observed that the Department 

was working harder than Nadia to provide services and maintain jurisdiction over her. 

Counsel for the Department replied that for the past two months Nadia had been 

communicating with her social worker and so the Department recommended keeping the 

case open. 

The juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction. It explained that Nadia had not 

participated in the services that the Department provided. Indeed, she refused services. 

Although Nadia represented she was willing to participate in some services, the court 

noted Nadia‟s difficulty following through with her promises. Nadia appealed and the 

Department did not file a brief.

 

2

“ „Supervised independent living placement‟ means, on and after January 1, 2012, 

an independent supervised setting, as specified in a nonminor dependent‟s transitional 

independent living case plan, in which the youth is living independently, pursuant to 

Section 472(c)(2) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 672(c)(2)).” (§ 11400, 

subd. (w).)
7

DISCUSSION

1. Section 391

The Legislature enacted section 391 in 2000 “in response to concerns that 

dependent children who had reached the age of 18 were being removed from the 

dependency system before they had adequate skills or resources to support themselves, 

and evidence that 45 percent of these young persons became homeless within a year after 

leaving the foster care system. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading 

analysis of Assem. Bill No. 686 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 29, 2000.) The 

Youth Law Center, which sponsored the legislation, posited that „[h]omelessness is not 

merely a housing issue, but is related to poor education, lack of a support system, 

estrangement from family, lack of marketable skills, poor employment prospects and lack 

of community linkages. Emancipation of foster youth before they are ready to live 

independently creates significant costs-both to the youth and to the state.‟ (Ibid.)” (In re 

Holly H. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1330-1331.) In 2009, the Legislature rewrote 

section 391 to conform to federal law so as to maximize federal financial participation 

and extend transitional foster care services for youth between the ages of 18 and 21. 

(Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Aug. 30, 2010, p. 1.)

For nonminor dependents who have permanent plans of long-term foster care, “the 

court may continue jurisdiction of the nonminor as a nonminor dependent of the juvenile 

court or may dismiss dependency jurisdiction pursuant to Section 391.” (§§ 366.32, 

subd. (a), italics added, 303; In re Tamika C. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1160; see 

also Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.), 

supra, at p. 8 [juvenile court is authorized to terminate jurisdiction over nonminors 

between ages 18 and 21].)

Section 391 expresses the legislative preference for retaining jurisdiction and so 

the statute authorizes the termination of jurisdiction in only three specific circumstances: 

the court finds (1) “[t]hat the nonminor does not wish to remain subject to dependency 

jurisdiction;” (2) “[t]hat the nonminor is not participating in a reasonable and 
8

appropriate transitional independent living case plan;” or (3) “[t]he court finds after 

reasonable and documented efforts [that] the nonminor cannot be located.” (§ 391, 

subds. (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B) & (d)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.555(d)(2)(A)(i)-(iii), 

italics added.) 

Even if the juvenile court terminates its dependency jurisdiction however, it 

“retain[s] general jurisdiction over the youth pursuant to Section 303. If the court has 

dismissed dependency jurisdiction, the nonminor, who has not attained 21 years of age, 

may subsequently file a petition pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 388 to have 

dependency jurisdiction resumed and the court may vacate its previous order dismissing 

dependency jurisdiction over the nonminor dependent.” (§ 366.32, subd. (c).)

Jurisdiction is maintained if there is “ „existing and reasonably foreseeable future 

harm to the welfare of the child.‟ [Citation.]” (In re Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1333.) The principal question to be addressed when deciding whether to terminate 

jurisdiction over a child in long-term foster care is the best interest of the child. (In re 

Tamika C., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.) “[T]he decision to retain or terminate 

jurisdiction remains within the sound discretion of the juvenile court.” (In re Holly H., 

supra, at p. 1333.)

2. The evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Nadia was not 

participating in a reasonable and appropriate TILP (§ 391, subd. (c)(1)(B)) but 

termination of jurisdiction was premature because the mandates of section 391 were not 

followed.

a. Nadia was not participating in her TILP.

Nadia contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court‟s 

finding she was not participating in her TILP, the second of the three bases for 

terminating jurisdiction. She reasons that the court found that she was not complying 
9

with services, whereas subdivision (c)(1)(B) of section 391 requires the court to find that 

she was not participating in a reasonable and appropriate TILP.

3

 

Section 391, subdivision (c)(1)(B) authorizes the juvenile court to terminate 

dependency jurisdiction if it finds “[t]hat the nonminor is not participating in a reasonable 

and appropriate [TILP].” The TILP describes the “collaborative efforts between the 

nonminor and the social worker . . . and the supportive services” provided to ensure 

meaningful transition to independent living. (§ 11400, subd. (y).) The TILP is the 

roadmap for the nonminor‟s transition to self-sufficiency.

The record here demonstrates that Nadia was not participating in her TILP. 

Entered into on January 9, 2012, Nadia‟s TILP required her, among other things, to 

(1) keep pushing to attend school on a daily basis with the goal of finishing high school; 

(2) try to be trustworthy and choose the right friends; (3) follow the programs necessary 

to obtain her green card; and (4) look for a job. The juvenile court stated it did not 

believe Nadia‟s claim that she had been trying to register in school or to participate in a 

program geared to obtaining her GED. The court observed that Nadia had suddenly 

enrolled in school just a week before the termination hearing and the court openly 

disbelieved Nadia‟s explanation for the delay. The court was entitled to question Nadia‟s 

veracity in light of her pattern of truancy, lying to her social workers, and running away. 

For the same reason, the court was understandably skeptical of Nadia‟s pledge, on the eve 

of the termination hearing, to comply with her TILP so as to remain a dependent. The 

 

3

“ „Transitional independent living case plan‟ means, on or after January 1, 2012, 

the nonminor dependent‟s case plan, updated every six months, that describes the goals 

and objectives of how the nonminor will make progress in the transition to living 

independently and assume incremental responsibility for adult decisionmaking, the 

collaborative efforts between the nonminor and the social worker, probation officer, or 

Indian tribal placing entity and the supportive services as described in the transitional 

independent living plan (TILP) to ensure active and meaningful participation in one or 

more of the eligibility criteria described in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive, of subdivision 

(b) of Section 11403, the nonminor‟s appropriate supervised placement setting, and the 

nonminor‟s permanent plan for transition to living independently, which includes 

maintaining or obtaining permanent connections to caring and committed adults, as set 

forth in paragraph (16) of subdivision (f) of Section 16501.1.” (§ 11400, subd. (y).)
10

court‟s credibility determinations are not subject to reweighing on appeal. (In re 

Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52.) As for the remainder of Nadia‟s TILP, the 

Department was not in a position to determine whether Nadia was choosing the right 

friends as she made it a practice of hiding her whereabouts from the social workers, 

which thwarted their efforts to assess her choices. The Department, not Nadia, was 

attempting to obtain a green card for her, and although she claimed to be working, the 

information about that is almost nonexistent. Indeed, even Nadia agreed her case should 

be closed just two months before jurisdiction was terminated. The maintenance of 

jurisdiction for Nadia cannot realistically be expected to prevent any future harm to her 

where she has repeatedly rejected nearly all efforts of assistance from the Department and 

where the Department is working harder than she to maintain dependency jurisdiction. 

In this respect, this case is not unlike the facts of In re Holly H., supra, 104 

Cal.App.4th 1324. There, the appellate court noted “[a]lthough one may reasonably 

conclude that these facts demonstrate a continued need for assistance, Holly has 

repeatedly refused to take advantage of services that have been offered to her. She failed 

to appear for an evaluation that might have allowed her to receive income from SSI; she 

failed to report for a job that the department helped to secure for her; and as just noted

she left her group home when she began receiving a very small, limited-term income as 

the result of her father‟s death. Holly‟s continued participation in the juvenile 

dependency system cannot reasonably be expected to prevent any future harm when she 

has effectively rejected nearly all offers of assistance from the department.” (Id. at 

p. 1337, fns. omitted.) 

The record here also supports the court‟s finding that Nadia refused to take 

advantage of child welfare services the Department offered, which services were 

designed to aid Nadia in meeting the promises she made in her TILP. Nadia flouted the 

Department‟s plans for her and the extraordinary efforts the social workers have made to 

meet her needs and assure that she was cared for. Nowhere does the record indicate she 

is in therapy or a substance abuse program and she has prevented the Department from 

assessing her residence. After December 2011, when the juvenile court announced its 
11

intention to emancipate Nadia, she disappeared; avoided the Department‟s efforts to 

communicate with her; refused to apprise her social workers of her whereabouts; declined 

the Department‟s attempts to locate housing for her; and skipped out of scheduled 

transition meetings. This recalcitrant truant‟s refusal to avail herself of the services the 

Department provided in an attempt to aid her transition to emancipation simply bolsters 

the court‟s conclusion she was not participating in her TILP and undermines any 

argument that continued jurisdiction could prevent future harm to her. (See In re Holly 

H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1333, 1337.) This record supports the juvenile court‟s 

finding Nadia was not participating in a reasonable and appropriate TILP. (§ 391, 

subd. (c)(1)(B).)

b. The termination order was premature because the Department never obeyed 

the juvenile court’s order to comply with the mandates of section 391.

Notwithstanding our conclusion above, termination of dependency jurisdiction 

was premature. The principal question for the juvenile court under section 391 is the best 

interest of the child. (In re Tamika C., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.) Toward that 

end, at any hearing at which the juvenile court is considering terminating its jurisdiction, 

the Department “shall” “[s]ubmit a report describing whether it is in the nonminor‟s best 

interests to remain under the court‟s dependency jurisdiction, which includes a 

recommended transitional independent living case plan” and “the facts supporting the 

conclusion reached.” (§ 391, subd. (b)(2), italics added; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

5.555(c)(1)(A).) 

The Department must also file a report verifying it has provided the youth with a 

checklist of information, documents, and services designed to aid the nonminor in 

transitioning to emancipation. (§ 391, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.555(c); In re 

Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333.) Subdivision (e) requires the Department to 

provide the nonminor among other things, with (1) written information about the 

nonminor‟s dependency, family history, how to get access to his or her file, notification 

that the nonminor is granted preference for student assistant or internship positions with 

state agencies; (2) numerous documents, including a social security card, birth certificate, 
12

health and education summary, state identification card, letters in compliance with state 

and federal financial aid documentation requirements, proof of citizenship or legal 

residence, advance healthcare directive form; and (3) assistance in obtaining employment 

or other financial support, referrals to housing, assistance in applying to school, and the 

like.4 (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.555(c).) 

 

4

Subdivision (e) of section 391 includes in its list of information, documents, and 

services to be provided to the youth, among other things, “(1) Written information 

concerning the nonminor‟s dependency case . . . his or her family history and placement 

history, any photographs of the nonminor or his or her family . . . directions on how to 

access the documents the nonminor is entitled to inspect under Section 827, and the date 

on which the jurisdiction of the juvenile court would be terminated. [¶] (2) The 

following documents; [¶] (A) Social security card. [¶] (B) Certified copy of his or her 

birth certificate. [¶] (C) Health and education summary . . . . [¶] (D) Driver‟s 

license . . . or identification card . . . . [¶] (E) A letter prepared by the county welfare 

department [including among other things a statement that the nonminor was a foster 

youth in compliance with state and federal financial aid documentation requirements]. 

[¶] . . . [¶] (F) If applicable, the death certificate of the parent or parents. [¶] (G) If 

applicable, proof of the nonminor‟s citizenship or legal residence. [¶] (H) An advance 

healthcare directive form. [¶] (I) The Judicial Council form that the nonminor would use 

to file a petition pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 388 to resume dependency 

jurisdiction. [¶] (J) The written 90-day transition plan prepared pursuant to Section 

16501.1. [¶] (3) Assistance in completing an application for Medi-Cal or assistance in 

obtaining other health insurance. [¶] (4) Referrals to transitional housing if available, or 

assistance in securing other housing. (5) Assistance in obtaining employment or other 

financial support. [¶] (6) Assistance in applying for admission to college or to a 

vocational training program or other educational institution and in obtaining financial aid, 

where appropriate. [¶] (7) Assistance in maintaining relationships with individuals who 

are important to a nonminor who has been in out-of-home placement for six months or 

longer from the date the nonminor entered foster care, based on the nonminor‟s best 

interests. [¶] (8) For nonminors between 18 and 21 years of age, assistance in accessing 

the Independent Living Aftercare Program in the nonminor's county of residence, and, 

upon the nonminor‟s request, assistance in completing a voluntary reentry agreement for 

care and placement pursuant to subdivision (z) of Section 11400 and in filing a petition 

pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 388 to resume dependency jurisdiction. [¶] 

(9) Written information notifying the child that current or former dependent children who 

are or have been in foster care are granted a preference for student assistant or internship 

positions with state agencies pursuant to Section 18220 of the Government Code.”
13

If the Department has not met the section 391 requirements, the juvenile court is 

forbidden to terminate its jurisdiction. Subdivision (e) of section 391 states: “The court 

shall not terminate dependency jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent . . . until . . . the 

[D]epartment has submitted a report verifying that the following information, documents, 

and services have been provided to the nonminor, or in the case of a nonminor who, after 

reasonable efforts by the county welfare department, cannot be located, verifying the 

efforts made to make the following available to the nonminor.” (Italics added; Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 5.555(d)(2)(E)(i); see In re Tamika C., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.)5

Based on the section 391 report prepared by the county welfare department and on 

the entire file, the juvenile court must, if it decides to terminate jurisdiction, make a series 

of findings on the record. Principally, the court is directed to determine “[w]hether 

remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction is in the nonminor‟s bests interests” and state 

on the record the “facts in support of the finding made.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

5.555(d)(1)(B); In re Tamika C., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.) Additionally, the 

court must find that the nonminor had the opportunity to confer with counsel; whether the 

nonminor understands the potential benefits of remaining in foster care under juvenile 

court jurisdiction; and the right to reenter foster care. (§ 391, subd. (c)(1)(B)(2); 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.555(d) & (d)(1).) 

Here, despite the juvenile court‟s announcement, six months before the 

termination hearing, that it planned to emancipate Nadia, and the court‟s clear and 

repeated orders to the Department to comply with section 391, the Department did not do 

so. The status report it did file recommending maintenance of jurisdiction, merely stated 

that, with no accompanying facts or analysis. The Department filed no section 391 report 

describing whether it was in Nadia‟s best interests to remain under the court‟s 

dependency jurisdiction (§ 391, subd. (b)(2)), with “the facts supporting the conclusion 

 

5

The California Rules of Court allow the juvenile court to determine, if the 

nonminor was not provided with the section 391, subdivision (e) information, documents, 

and services, whether jurisdiction should be continued to ensure that all information, 

documents, and services are provided. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.555(d)(1)(J).)
14

reached” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.555(c)(1)(A)). Despite its representations that it 

wanted to set Nadia on the road to independence, the Department never indicated that it 

had provided Nadia with the information, documents, and services listed in section 391, 

subdivision (e). In short, the record contains no section 391 report.

It is unclear why the juvenile court allowed the Department to flout the court‟s 

valid orders. However, the failure of the Department to file its section 391 report 

deprived the court of the facts it needed to make the myriad findings required by both 

section 391 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.555 -- including the pivotal best interest 

determination -- and to exercise its discretion. Section 391 also precludes termination of 

jurisdiction here because the Department did not verify that it had given Nadia the 

information, documents, and services listed in subdivision (e), even if the reason for this 

omission was the Department‟s inclination to maintain the dependency and Nadia‟s 

pattern of intermittently vanishing and avoiding her social workers, and her persistent 

refusal to avail herself of the transition services the Department did make available. The 

juvenile court was held hostage to the Department‟s disobedience and Nadia‟s defiance. 

By failing to provide the court with the report section 391 mandates, which report the 

court had repeatedly ordered, the Department has blocked termination of this 

dependency. (§ 391, subd. (e); In re Tamika C., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.) 

Therefore, although the record supports the finding under section 391, subdivision 

(c)(1)(B) so as to justify terminating dependency jurisdiction over Nadia, the order was 

premature and must be reversed so that the Department can file the necessary reports and 

the court can make the required findings. (§ 391; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.555.)
15

DISPOSITION

The order terminating jurisdiction is reversed. The matter is remanded to the 

juvenile court with directions to order the Department to comply with section 391, and 

thereafter, the court shall conduct further proceedings consistent with the views expressed 

herein.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

KLEIN, P. J.

KITCHING, J.