1Seven thousand nine hundred and twenty-five dollars

($7,925.00) in United States currency was also seized from Phan

at the time the money orders were seized. That money is not the

subject of this action. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States

v. Civil No. 05-cv-429-JM

Five Thousand Eight Hundred

Dollars ($5,800.00) in United

States Postal Service Money

Orders, seized from Khoi Phan

O R D E R

This action, brought by the United States under 18 U.S.C. §

981, concerns the forfeiture of five thousand eight hundred

dollars ($5,800.00) in United States Postal Service money orders

seized from Khoi Phan.1 Phan has not contested the forfeiture. 

The claimant in this case, Peter Hoang, asserts an ownership

interest in the money orders. The United States has moved for

summary judgment (document no. 8). Hoang objects (document no.

9). For the reasons stated herein, I grant the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment.

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 1 of 11
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Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A genuine issue is one “that properly can be resolved

only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved

in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A material fact is one “that might affect

the outcome of the suit.” Id. at 248.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court

construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant. See Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st

Cir. 2001). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the

initial responsibility of . . . identifying those portions of

[the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden,

the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “produce evidence on which

a reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof burden,

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 2 of 11
3

could base a verdict for it; if that party cannot produce such

evidence, the motion must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol

Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). Neither conclusory

allegations, improbable inferences, nor unsupported speculation

are sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Carroll v. Xerox

Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236-37 (1st Cir. 2002).

Background

On May 27, 2005, the United States Postal Inspectors’ office

was advised of a package that had been received at the Plaistow,

New Hampshire post office in an open and damaged condition. The

package, addressed to Khoi Phan at a nail salon in Plaistow, was

from a Peter Hoang in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The package

contained $5,800.00 worth of money orders and $7,925.00 in United

States currency. The cash and money orders were in envelopes

that were inserted inside a magazine. No letter, note, or

receipts were found in the package. The postal inspectors

inspecting the package were suspicious, based on their experience

and knowledge of the characteristics of illicit money

transactions, that the money was for use in illegal activity. 

Further, based on the denominations of the money orders, the

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 3 of 11
231 U.S.C. § 5324 prohibits the structuring of transactions

in a manner designed to evade reporting requirements or to cause

or attempt to cause, a financial institution to fail to fulfill

its reporting requirements. The United States Postal Service is

a qualifying financial institution under 31 U.S.C. §

5312(a)(2)(V). A financial institution issuing a money order in

the amount of $3,000.00 or more must obtain documentation of the

purchaser’s identity and require the purchaser to complete

certain paperwork in order to fulfill its reporting requirements. 

31 U.S.C. § 5325. In this case, money orders were obtained from

two separate post offices in Philadelphia on the same day, in

amounts totaling $2,900.00 at each post office. Based on these

facts, the inspectors suspected illegal structuring of the money

order purchase.

4

inspectors believed that the purchase of the money orders had

been “structured,” or made in such a way as to purposely evade

identification and paperwork requirements.2 This furthered the

inspectors’ suspicions regarding potentially illegal transactions

involving the money in the package. 

In furtherance of their investigation, the inspectors

delivered the package to Phan at his place of business. Phan

produced identification and signed for the package. At that

point, Phan was advised that the individuals delivering the

package were federal agents. The package was seized and Phan

spoke with the agents outside of the store. Phan subsequently

gave his consent to the agents to search the package.

Prior to the search of the package, Phan told the agents

that the package contained money from Hoang, who had sent it as a

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 4 of 11
5

loan to Phan for use in Phan’s business. Phan stated that he did

not have any documentation regarding the loan. When Phan was

advised that the investigators were suspicious that the purchase

of the money orders had been structured, Phan disclaimed all

ownership of or interest in the money. Phan stated he had not

received money from Hoang in the past and did not want to get

into any trouble that might interfere with his pending United

States citizenship application. 

After the money was seized and this action commenced, Hoang

filed claim to ownership of the money. Hoang’s claim concedes

that the money was an unsecured loan to Phan for use in his

business. Hoang rests his claim of ownership on the assertion

that the money was never actually delivered to Phan’s physical

custody, and that therefore ownership of the money never

transferred from Hoang to Phan, and therefore, Hoang retained

ownership of the money at all times. 

Discussion

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment alleging that Hoang

cannot establish that he has standing to challenge the forfeiture

of the money orders in question. See United States v. 1998 BMW

“I” Convertible, 235 F.3d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 2000). “It is well

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 5 of 11
6

established that a party seeking to challenge a forfeiture of

property must first demonstrate an ownership or possessory

interest in the seized property in order to have standing to

contest the forfeiture.” United States v. One-Sixth Share of

James J. Bulger in All Present & Future Proceeds of Mass Millions

Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003). 

Standing in forfeiture cases has both constitutional and

statutory aspects. Id. at 40. To maintain constitutional

standing under Article III, a claimant must first demonstrate an

ownership or possessory interest in the seized property. Id. at

41. The federal forfeiture statute defines who may intervene in

a civil forfeiture action as a claimant and, therefore, who has

standing to bring a claim for the property that is the subject of

the forfeiture action. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 983. 

Here, claimant asserts that he is an innocent owner of the

questioned property, and that therefore, under 18 U.S.C. §

983(d)(1), he has standing to contest the forfeiture. To do so,

Hoang must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he

is an “innocent owner” of the property. Being such an owner: 

(A) means a person with an ownership interest in the 

specific property sought to be forfeited, including a 

leasehold, lien, mortgage, recorded security interest, 

or valid assignment of an ownership interest; and

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 6 of 11
3I make no comment on whether or not Hoang could maintain an

action against Phan to recoup the amount of money allegedly

loaned to Phan by my finding that Hoang, as an unsecured

creditor, had no ownership interest in the actual money orders

seized.

7

(B) does not include --

(i) a person with only a general unsecured 

interest in, or claim against, the property or 

estate of another;

(ii) a bailee unless the bailor is identified and 

the bailee shows a colorable legitimate interest in 

the property seized; or

(iii) a nominee who exercises no dominion or 

control over the property.

18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6) (emphasis added). Under this statutory

definition of an owner, the holder of an unsecured interest lacks

standing to state a claim for the forfeited money. Here, Hoang

concedes that the money was sent as an unsecured loan. 

Accordingly, if in fact Hoang loaned the money to Phan, Hoang is 

simply an unsecured creditor without standing to claim an

interest in the specific property seized from Phan.3

Hoang argues that while he intended to make an unsecured

loan to Phan, he never did so, because Phan never took possession

of the money that Hoang sent. Hoang claims that he therefore 

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 7 of 11
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retained an ownership interest in the money as though it had

never been sent. As evidence in support of his argument, Hoang

claims that the plaintiff did not provide evidence that the

package to Phan was signed for by Phan and did not provide

evidence that, even if signed for, Phan understood what he was

signing.

Hoang first argues that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate

that the package was delivered to Phan. “[T]he law presumes

delivery of a properly addressed piece of mail.” Matos v. United

States, 380 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.P.R. 2005); Broad. Music, Inc.

v. Rindge Land Corp., No. Civ. 93-470-JD, 1995 WL 136940 (D.N.H.

Mar. 27, 1995) (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Producciones Padosa,

Inc., 835 F.2d 950, 952 n.2 (1st Cir. 1987) and Rosenthal v.

Walker, 111 U.S. 185 (1884)). While this presumption is

rebuttable, once the plaintiffs have offered evidence of mailing

the documents in question the burden shifts to the defendants to

produce evidence of nondelivery. Broad. Music, 1995 WL 136940 at

*7. 

Here, the plaintiff’s motion included an affidavit from one

of the postal inspectors who participated in the delivery and 

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 8 of 11
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seizure of the package, Sean Dever, who averred that Phan signed

for the package after positively identifying himself as the

intended recipient of the package. Claimant’s objection to the

motion for summary judgment cited to the failure of the plaintiff

to include a copy of Phan’s signature acknowledging receipt of

the package as evidence that no such signature existed. While

Hoang’s bald assertion would not suffice to counter the sworn

affidavit of Dever in any event, the plaintiff, in response to

Hoang’s objection, filed a copy of the label of the package in

question signed by Phan. There is no genuine issue as to whether

or not Phan signed for the package. Accordingly, I find that the

package was delivered to Phan and that any interest Hoang may

have held in the property prior to delivery had therefore ceased

to exist after Phan signed for it. At the point of signature,

the package became Phan’s property. The inspectors seized the

package only after that point. 

Hoang next argues that if Phan did sign for the package,

Phan’s limited grasp of English may have interfered with his

ability to understand that signing for a package meant taking

possession of it. The argument is without merit. Phan runs a 

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 9 of 11
10

business in the United States, was able to conduct a basic

conversation with the postal inspectors at his store regarding

the package, and was aware that the package was sent to him from

Hoang, and he knew without opening it what it contained. Hoang

has not demonstrated that Phan’s limitations in the English

language in any way impacted his knowledge of the effect of his

action in signing a package presented to him for delivery. For

that matter, Hoang has not raised any support for his argument

that a failure to understand the legal effect of his signature

would nullify Phan’s actual possession of the package. Raising

the spectre of language difficulties is precisely the sort of

unsupported speculation that cannot defeat a summary judgment

motion. See Carroll, 294 F.3d at 237 (citing Medina-Munoz v.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (the

nonmovant’s allegations asserting a factual dispute that would

defeat summary judgment “cannot be conjectural.”)) 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, I find that Hoang has no

ownership interest in the property in question, and therefore he 

Case 1:05-cv-00429-JM Document 13 Filed 12/28/06 Page 10 of 11
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does not have standing to challenge the seizure and I therefore

grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (document no. 8).

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: December 28, 2006

cc: Peter Hoang, pro se

Robert J. Rabuck, AUSA

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