alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT to 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES –OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of EF Johnson Technologies, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Michael E. Jalbert, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.                       The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and

 

2.                       The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in theReport.

 

 
| ** ** | **/S/  Michael E. Jalbert**    |
|------------|--------------------------------|
|       | Michael E. Jalbert             |
|       | Chief Executive Officer        |
|       | (Principal Executive  Officer) |

 

**July 30, 2008**

 

*A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained bythe Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.*

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ECHELON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION FOR THE PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                      JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                        SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                   24,000
<SECURITIES>                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                            48,800
<ALLOWANCES>                                  0
<INVENTORY>                               1,100
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         75,500
<PP&E>                                  301,900
<DEPRECIATION>                           25,200
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                          560,100
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                    59,300
<BONDS>                                 152,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0
<PREFERRED>                                   0
<COMMON>                                    100
<OTHER-SE>                              221,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>            560,100
<SALES>                                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         34,600
<CGS>                                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            18,800
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          7,200
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        5,100
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           3,500
<INCOME-TAX>                              (800)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       4,300
<DISCONTINUED>                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0
<CHANGES>                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                              4,300
<EPS-BASIC>                               .64
<EPS-DILUTED>                               .64


</TABLE>
#### Bobby Joe CARTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 44983.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 7, 1972.

*484John Cutler, Houston, for appellant.

Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., James C. Brough, Calvin Botley and James A. Moseley, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ODOM, Judge.

This appeal is taken from a conviction for the offense of unlawfully carrying a prohibited weapon in a place where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed. Punishment was assessed by the court at two years.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his plea of “autrefois acquit”.

In the case at bar, we do not have before us the transcription of the court reporter’s notes of the prior proceedings, upon which this claim is based. The record does contain the indictment and judgment from the prior proceeding as well as some excerpts from the testimony of the appellant and two witnesses.

These excerpts show that: (1) on August 23, 1970, appellant entered the Blue Flame Lounge in Houston with a pistol in his possession; (2) Freeman Smith had approached appellant in the lounge and told him that he wanted to see appellant “outside about something he had said about his son”; (3) Freeman Smith then departed; (4) appellant pulled his pistol and immediately followed Smith; (5) that witnesses inside the lounge heard a gunshot; (6) appellant was indicted for the murder of Smith; and (7) a jury acquitted appellant of the murder charge.

In support of his contention, appellant relies on Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (19 — ). His reliance is misplaced. In *Ashe,*the accused had been acquitted of committing the armed robbery of one of six poker players. The court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented a second trial for the robbery of another player in that game. The court reasoned that the sole issue in dispute in the first trial was whether the accused was one of the robbers. The issue of identity having been resolved by the jury against the state, the state was es-topped from relitigating that issue at the second trial.

In the instant case, the identity of appellant and his possession of the pistol in the lounge were not in issue in the first trial. Therefore, these issues were not determined adversely to the state’s position in the case at bar. Cf. Hutchings v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 466 S.W.2d 584 (Onion, P. J., concurring).

That appellant possessed the pistol in question on premises licensed to sell intoxicating beverages, and apparently used that pistol to shoot another, from which incident a murder indictment resulted, does not constitute identical offenses but rather separate and distinct offenses. Benard v. State, 481 S.W.2d 427; McMillan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 468 S.W.2d 444.

There being no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
175 La. 29

#### Mrs. Henry C. SCHINDLER v. Mr. Henry C. SCHINDLER.

No. 30949.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 23, 1932.

Paul W. Maloney, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Joseph Lautenschlaeger, of New Orleans, for appellee.

O’NIELL, C. J.

The plaintiff has appealed from a judgment rejecting her demand for a separation from hed and board on the ground of cruel treatment. She testified to one instance of cruelty on the part of her husband, but he denied the charge. There was no other testimony offered by either of the'parties. The judge who heard their testimony found the facts to be in favor of the defendant; and, having read the testimony, we have come to the same conclusion.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Michael COHEN, Executor Estate of Evelyn Donnerstag, Deceased, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Kathleen CONNELL, State Controller, Defendant—Appellee.

No. 02-16248.

D.C. No. CV-01-01587-EJG/JFM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 14, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California resident Michael Cohen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging that the California State Controller’s enforcement of California’s estate tax violates his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo questions of Eleventh Amendment immunity, *Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Maryland,*179 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. *3631999), and we vacate the district court’s order and remand.

The district court erred by dismissing the entire action under the Eleventh Amendment. At least some of Cohen’s claims appear to seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against a state official for alleged violation of federal law, and thereby fall under the *Ex Parte Young,*209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. *See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin,*223 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (9th Cir.2000) (finding no Eleventh Amendment bar to an Indian Tribe’s federal action against state officials seeking a declaratory judgment that certain California sales and use taxes violate federal law); *Goldberg v. Ellett (In re Ellett),*254 F.3d 1135, 1143-44 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an action to prohibit a state official from violating federal bankruptcy law by collecting the taxes at issue).

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

October 5, 2005 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM GLENN ROGERS

Automatic Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

No. 38939 Robert W. Wedemeyer, Judge

No. M2002-01798-SC-DDT-DD - Filed February 17, 2006

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the conclusion of the majority that Rogers’ convictions should be affirmed. As to the

sentence of death, however, I respectfully dissent. I continue to adhere to my view that the

comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to

shield defendants from the arbitrary and disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. See State

v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 323-325 (Tenn. 2005)(Birch, J., concurring and dissenting), and cases cited

therein. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the

imposition of the death penalty in this case.

___________________________________ 

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR.
#### RICHMOND v. NEWSON.

No. 6832.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 29, 1945.

See, also, 17 So.2d 635.

Robert L. Richmond, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Robert J. Newson, of Shreveport, for appellee.

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

This case is on appeal taken by plaintiff from judgment sustaining exceptions of no cause and no right of action and a plea of res judicata filed by the defendant, Robert J. Newson. The case is one of several between the same parties, the first of which was filed by defendant Newson on rent account coupling therewith a writ of provisional seizure under which some law books and other chattels were seized, ultimately sold under fi. fa. and purchased by- Newson. Subsequent suits filed by Richmond, including this one, seek to have decreed null and void said writs, the seizures thereunder, the sale made under the fi. fa., and to recover the property sold together with large amounts in damages.

The exceptions and plea are in whole or part based upon the record and final judgment of the First District Court, Caddo Parish, in suits Nos. 85028 and 85657 on the docket thereof between these same parties, the former being an appeal de novo from the City Court of the City of Shreveport, and numbered 43298 on the docket thereof. When trial was had of the exceptions and plea the exceptor offered and filed in evidence the entire record in said two cases and the minute entries in No. 85657, but the offerings are not incorporated in the transcript now before us. This being true, the record is incomplete and will have to be returned to the Clerk of the lower court for completion by attaching or incorporating therein said two *590records and the minute entries in suit No. 85657. Without these records, etc., this court is not in a position to pass on the questions involved in the appeal.

For the reasons herein given, it is ordered that the record in the present case be returned to the Clerk of Court of the First Judicial District, Parish of Caddo, for completion in the respects above mentioned; and that this be done and the completed record returned to this court within ten days from date of the rendition of this order.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
APPLICABLE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
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<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   62,503
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                82,558
<PP&E>                                       1,875,918
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,158,459)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 831,629
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          123,485
<BONDS>                                        309,120
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,271
<OTHER-SE>                                     254,640
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   831,629
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                64,513
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   73,682
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (41)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,225
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (14,262)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,001
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (19,027)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (19,027)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.15)
        

</TABLE>
#### SHAFER v. TOWN OF MADISONVILLE et al.

No. 860.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Dec. 8, 1931.

For original opinion, see 18 La. App. 146, 136 So. 774.

H. W. Robinson, of New Orleans, and B. & M. Purser, of Amite, for appellant.

Devaille H. Theard, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee Susquehanna, Inc.

Morgan & Simmons, of Covington, for ap-pellee Town of Madisonville.

PER CURIAM.

The application for rehearing calls our attention to the fact that the judgment allows interest from the date of injury instead of from the date of judicial demand: .It is therefore ordered that our former decree be amended by allowing interest from judicial demand, and as amended same is made final, and the application for rehearing is refused.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

* * 

* National Pasteurized Egg, LLC * 

* * 

* v. * Civil No. 07-103-JL 

* * 

* L. John Davidson * 

* * 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NOTICE OF APPEAL

 Notice is hereby given that L. John Davidson, defendant in the above named case, hereby 

appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit from the Final Judgment and 

from an Order Denying his Motion to Alter Judgment entered in this action on 3/2/12. 

 Respectfully Submitted, 

 L. John Davidson, 

 By his Attorney, 

 LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BOWNES, P.C. 

Dated: March 30, 2012 /S/ David H. Bownes, Esq.

 David H. Bownes, Esq. 

 NH Bar No.: 277 

 20 Canal Street 

 Laconia, NH 03246 

 (603) 524-4330 

 office@dhblaw.net

CERTIFICATION

 I hereby certify that on this 30th day of March, 2012, that a copy of the foregoing Notice 

of Appeal has been forwarded to Peter Callaghan, Esq., Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, 

LLP, via ECF. 

 /S/ David H. Bownes

 David H. Bownes, Esq. 

Case 1:07-cv-00103-JL Document 162 Filed 03/30/12 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001023298
<NAME> AVENUE ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         280,709
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  283,469
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    917,558
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,481,736
<PP&E>                                          61,843
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,313,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,090,390
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        45,890
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,176,720
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,313,000
<SALES>                                        248,935
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               248,935
<CGS>                                          136,065
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,128,910
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (879,975)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,059)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (88,034)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (881,034)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.19)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.19)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Eagle Broadband, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form  10-Q  for the  quarter  ending  November  30,  2003 as  filed  with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard
R.  Royall,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


(1) The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d),
as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  June 1, 2004


/S/Richard R. Royall
Richard R. Royall,
Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Michael C. Dillon

Jennifer Kresge

v. Civil No. 07-cv-70-SM

Select Portfolio 

Servicing, et al.

O R D E R

Defendants move to compel responses to requests for

production of documents and for answers to interrogatories

(Document no. 49).

As to each request for production, plaintiffs assert that

they have produced everything responsive and, as to many, they

continue to search for more. The motion, as it relates to the

requests, is denied as the court can not order produced that

which either does not exist or which, despite a diligent search,

has not been found.

Plaintiffs are ordered to provide answers to interrogatories

forthwith to the extent they have not been provided. The

privileged log is to be produced within ten (10) working days. 

Case 1:07-cv-00070-JL Document 56 Filed 01/09/08 Page 1 of 2
2

Waiver of objections to interrogatories will only be considered

upon further motion.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: January 9, 2008

cc: Walter L. Maroney, Esq.

Dorothy A. Davis, Esq.

William P. Breen, Esq.

Edmund J. Boutin, Esq.

Steven A. Clark, Esq.

Case 1:07-cv-00070-JL Document 56 Filed 01/09/08 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v.

Gary Sydavong

Criminal No. 07-cr-09-01-JD

O R D E R

The assented to motion to reschedule jury trial (document no.

18) filed by defendant is granted.

Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights within 10

days. The court finds that the ends of justice served by granting

a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the

defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3131(h)(8)(B)(iv), for the

reasons set forth in the motion.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Joseph A. DiClerico

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

Date: May 1, 2007

cc: Donald Kennedy, Esq.

Jennifer Davis, Esq.

U.S. Marshal

U.S. Probation

Case 1:07-cr-00009-JD Document 19 Filed 05/01/07 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

V .

Francis Ndemi Mwangi

Case No . 07-cr-133-01-SM

ORDER

Defendant Mwangi's motion to continue the final pretrial conference an d

trial is granted (document 10) . Trial has been rescheduled for the December

2007 trial period. Defendant Mwangi shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights

not later than September 4, 2007 . On the filing of such waiver, his continuance

shall be effective .

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S .C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances.

Final Pretrial Conference : November 26, 2007 at 3 :00 p .m.

Jury Selection : December 4, 2007 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:07-cr-00133-SM Document 11 Filed 08/23/07 Page 1 of 2
SO ORDERED .

August 23, 2007

cc : Paul Garrity, Esq.

Arnold Huftalen, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

teven J/McAuliffe

Chief Judge

2

Case 1:07-cr-00133-SM Document 11 Filed 08/23/07 Page 2 of 2