PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 20-2270

______________

THAMOTHARAM PILLAI THAYALAN,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA,

Respondent

____________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A203-596-281)

Immigration Judge: Pallavi S. Shirole

____________

Argued: January 29, 2021

Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and PORTER,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: May 10, 2021)

____________
2

Brian J. Slipakoff [Argued]

Duane Morris LLP

30 South 17th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Petitioner Thamotharam Pillai Thayalan

Anthony C. Payne

Jennifer A. Bowen [Argued]

Raya Jarawan

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent Attorney General

of the United States of America

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Thamotharam Pillai Thayalan is a native and citizen of 

Sri Lanka. On July 10, 2019, he was apprehended in California

after illegally entering the United States. The Department of 

Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and 

Thayalan sought relief from removal in the form of asylum and

withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality 

Act (“INA”).
3

Thayalan testified that in 2007, when he was about sixteen years old, he was kidnapped and blindfolded by members 

of the Sri Lankan army and taken to an army camp. While he 

was detained, soldiers hit his head against a wall and punched 

him in the stomach. He claims that this mistreatment constitutes past persecution, entitling him to a presumption of a wellfounded fear of future persecution. Thayalan also claims a 

well-founded fear of future persecution based on two incidents 

in 2019, when members of the Eelam People’s Democratic 

Party (“EPDP”) of Sri Lanka tried to extort money from him.

Thayalan maintains that he was targeted for extortion because 

of the EPDP’s false belief that he financially supported a rival 

political party.

The agency credited Thayalan’s testimony, but ordered 

his removal to Sri Lanka. The agency determined that (1) the 

Sri Lankan army’s mistreatment of Thayalan did not rise to the 

level of persecution, and (2) the EPDP members targeted 

Thayalan for extortion because they wanted his money, not 

because of disapproval of any political opinion. As a result,

Thayalan failed to meet his burden of showing past persecution 

or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a 

ground protected by the INA and thus was ineligible for both

asylum and withholding of removal.

Thayalan petitions for review of the order of removal.

He contends that the agency’s past-persecution determination 

contravenes this Court’s precedents and that substantial evidence does not support the agency’s determination about what 

motivated the EPDP’s extortion efforts. We disagree with 

Thayalan on both counts, so we will deny the petition.
4

I

A

Thayalan was apprehended near the United States–

Mexico border after making an illegal entry. Thayalan

expressed to an asylum officer a fear of returning to Sri Lanka.

The asylum officer found that Thayalan had demonstrated a 

credible fear of persecution. In proceedings before an immigration judge (“IJ”), Thayalan conceded the Department of 

Homeland Security’s charges of removability and applied for

asylum and withholding of removal.

B

Thayalan testified in support of his application. He told 

the IJ that in 2007, when he was about sixteen years old, he and 

other ethnic Tamils were kidnapped and blindfolded by members of the Sri Lankan army after a bomb went off during the 

Sri Lankan Civil War. He was taken to an army camp, where 

men tied his arms together, hit his head against a wall, and 

punched him in the stomach. He was released after two hours, 

and while he did not seek medical help, he did experience 

swelling on his head and pain in his stomach for three days.

Thayalan also testified about two incidents that 

occurred in March and April 2019, when members of the EPDP 

tried to extort him. Thayalan received a phone call from “the 

EPDP people” telling him that he “had to pay them money.” 

A.R. 115. The EPDP told Thayalan that since he gave money 

to the Tamil National Alliance (“TNA”), a different political 

party, he also had to give money to the EPDP. The TNA was 

the ruling party in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, where 

Thayalan resided. Before hanging up the phone, the EPDP told 
5

Thayalan, “you know if you don’t pay us money what will happen.” A.R. 125. Thayalan knew of a bar owner who the EPDP

shot and killed after he failed to comply with a demand for 

money.

Thayalan refused to make the demanded payment, and 

a few days after the phone call, EPDP members came to his 

store. They threatened to shoot Thayalan if he did not pay them 

a specified sum of money within three days. Rather than remit 

payment, Thayalan fled to Colombo, a city in a different part 

of Sri Lanka, for two weeks. The EPDP members came back 

to Thayalan’s store after he fled, but did not search for him in 

Colombo.

Asked during his hearing if the EPDP was “asking you 

for money because you were a business owner,” Thayalan 

replied that the EPDP asked him for money “[b]ecause I was 

doing business, and also they were falsely accusing me that I’m 

working for TNA, and I’m paying TNA the money.” A.R. 130.

Thayalan also testified that the EPDP wanted “revenge” on him 

“[b]ecause I’m a businessman, I work along with other Tamil 

groups and help the Tamil people.” A.R. 115–16.

C

The IJ found that Thayalan “testified credibly and . . .

sufficiently corroborated his claim.” A.R. 57. But the IJ nevertheless denied Thayalan’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ determined that the harm Thayalan 

experienced from the 2007 detention and beating did not 

amount to persecution. As for the 2019 incidents, the IJ found

that Thayalan did not show the requisite connection between 

the extortion attempts and a protected ground, because the 

EPDP members were motivated to extort Thayalan by a desire 
6

for money and not by any imputed pro-TNA political opinion.

In the IJ’s view, “the members of the EPDP seem[ed] to be 

targeting [Thayalan] because they believed he was able to pay

another organization and, therefore, should also pay the 

EPDP.” A.R. 60. And even if the EPDP members did harm 

Thayalan on account of a protected ground, the IJ concluded 

that he had not established a reasonable possibility that they 

would harm him in the future. The IJ also determined that, if

Thayalan were removed, it would be reasonable for him to

relocate within Sri Lanka to prevent any future harm at the 

hands of the EPDP. Thayalan thus failed to establish eligibility 

for asylum or withholding of removal. Accordingly, the IJ 

denied Thayalan’s application and ordered his removal.

D

Thayalan appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(“BIA”), which upheld the IJ’s decision.

The BIA agreed with the IJ that the harm done to 

Thayalan in 2007 did not amount to persecution. Turning to the 

2019 extortion attempts, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that the EPDP members who threatened Thayalan “were 

motivated to extort [him] because he was a business owner 

who [sic] they perceived to have the financial means to contribute to the EPDP.” A.R. 4 (citing A.R. 60–61). The BIA 

noted that the EPDP members never demanded that Thayalan 

stop supporting the TNA or insisted that he change his political 

opinions or support EPDP candidates. As a result, any proTNA opinion that the EPDP may have imputed to Thayalan 

was, at most, an “incidental, tangential, or superficial reason[]

for the extortion and threats by the EPDP members.” A.R. 4. 

The BIA also concluded that Thayalan failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the EPDP would persecute him upon his 
7

return to Sri Lanka or that he could not relocate within Sri 

Lanka to avoid any future harm. After agreeing with the IJ that 

Thayalan was ineligible for asylum, the BIA likewise adopted

the IJ’s determination that Thayalan could not meet the higher 

standard for withholding of removal.

This timely petition for review followed.

II

We have jurisdiction over this petition for review of a 

final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where, as 

here, “the ‘BIA’s opinion directly states that the BIA is deferring to the IJ, or invokes specific aspects of the IJ’s analysis 

and factfinding in support of the BIA’s conclusions,’ we 

review both decisions.” Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 289 

(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 

259, 270 (3d Cir. 2012)). 

We review challenges to the agency’s factual findings 

under the familiar substantial-evidence standard. See Romero 

v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 2020). Under our

“highly deferential” review, “[t]he agency’s ‘findings of fact

are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 

compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 

140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). “If a reasonable fact finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record, then the finding is 

supported by substantial evidence.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 

228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).

“Whether an asylum applicant has demonstrated past 

persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution is a 

factual determination reviewed under the substantial evidence 
8

standard.”1 Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 2005).

An agency determination about whether an asylum applicant 

has established the requisite nexus between the persecution he 

has suffered or will suffer and his protected characteristic is 

also reviewed for substantial evidence. See INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1, 483–84 (1992); GonzalezPosadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 686 (3d Cir. 2015). We 

will not, however, defer to a factual finding that is “based on a 

1 We suggested last year that, where “[n]either party disputes 

the facts underlying [a petitioner’s] past-persecution claim,” 

we “review the BIA’s application of our past-persecution 

standard to those facts de novo.” Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 

952 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2020). In Herrera-Reyes, we 

applied de novo review to the question of whether the BIA 

misapprehended the legal methodology we have prescribed for 

assessing persecution. 952 F.3d at 108–09. We concluded that 

it was legal error for the agency to examine incidents of alleged 

past persecution in isolation from each other rather than 

cumulatively and to restrict qualifying harm to that inflicted on 

the petitioner herself, excluding harm to family members or 

close associates. See id. at 108–11. In contrast, where the 

agency does not misapprehend applicable law, we apply the 

substantial-evidence standard to an agency determination that 

an alien did not suffer harm rising to the level of persecution 

even where the underlying facts about how an alien was 

mistreated are undisputed. See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 

F.3d 184, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2007); Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 

F.3d 733, 738–40 (3d Cir. 2005); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 

221, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 

F.3d 477, 483, 492–95 (3d Cir. 2001). We do so because the 

question of whether a particular fact pattern rises to the level 

of persecution is largely fact-driven.
9

misunderstanding of the law.” Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 135, 

141 (3d Cir. 2020).

III

To be eligible for asylum, an alien must demonstrate

that he is unable or unwilling to return to his home country 

“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 

on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see id. § 1158(b); Sunuwar v. Att’y Gen., 

989 F.3d 239, 244 n.2 (3d Cir. 2021). An alien can establish 

eligibility for asylum based on past persecution if he shows “(i) 

that he was targeted for mistreatment ‘on account of one of the 

statutorily-protected grounds,’ (ii) that the ‘incident, or incidents’ of mistreatment ‘rise to the level of persecution,’ and 

(iii) that the persecution was ‘committed by the government or 

forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.’” Doe, 956 F.3d at 141–42 (quoting Abdulrahman v. 

Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003)). “A showing of 

past persecution gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of a 

well-founded fear of future persecution.” Toure v. Att’y Gen., 

443 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(b)(1)). An alien who has not suffered past persecution 

can establish eligibility for asylum by showing a “reasonable 

possibility” of future persecution on account of a protected 

ground. Doe, 956 F.3d at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 175 (3d Cir. 

2003)). Persecution is on account of a protected ground only if

that ground “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

To be granted withholding of removal under the INA, 

an alien bears the heavier burden of proving that he would
10

more likely than not be persecuted on account of race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion if returned to the proposed country of removal. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 684. 

An alien who establishes past persecution is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he would more likely than not be persecuted if removed. See Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 

(3d Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)). Because withholding of removal requires a showing of a greater-than-fiftypercent chance of persecution rather than just a reasonable possibility, “an applicant who cannot meet the standard for asylum 

will necessarily be unable to meet the standard for withholding 

of removal.” Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 348–

49 (3d Cir. 2008). As with asylum, persecution is not on 

account of a protected ground unless that ground is at least 

“one central reason” why the applicant was or will be targeted.

Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 684–85 & n.6.

This case requires us to resolve two questions. First, did 

the agency err in determining that the Sri Lankan army’s mistreatment of Thayalan does not rise to the level of 

persecution?2 Second, does the record compel rejection of the

agency’s conclusion that the EPDP did not target Thayalan on 

account of a protected ground?

We answer each question in the negative. As a result,

Thayalan’s asylum and withholding-of-removal claims fail,

2 If we concluded that Thayalan was subjected to persecution, 

a remand to the agency would be appropriate for a determination of whether the presumption of a well-founded fear of 

future persecution could be rebutted. See Herrera-Reyes, 952 

F.3d at 112 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)).
11

and we need not address the agency’s alternative grounds for 

denying Thayalan relief from removal.

A

We consider first whether the 2007 detention and beating rises to the level of persecution. We emphasize at the outset

of our analysis that the Sri Lankan army’s treatment of 

Thayalan was deeply troubling. But the fact that an alien has 

been treated deplorably by his government does not necessarily 

mean that he has suffered persecution. “Persecution” is “an 

extreme concept.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 

1993) (Alito, J.). “While it includes ‘threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they 

constitute a threat to life or freedom,’ . . . it ‘does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or 

even unlawful or unconstitutional.’” Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 

F.3d 733, 739 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240).

Though a single incident may be extreme enough to constitute 

persecution, a past-persecution claim will usually be stronger 

where government actors “were engaged in a ‘program or campaign to drive away or subjugate’” the applicant. Voci, 409 

F.3d at 614 (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240 

n.10).

The BIA concluded that, although Thayalan was only 

sixteen years old at the time of the incident, the harm he suffered “does not rise to the level of persecution.” A.R. 3–4. It

emphasized that Thayalan did not seek medical care for his 

injuries. And it cited three of our past decisions in support of 

its conclusion: Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 223, 234–35 

(3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.), Kibinda v. Attorney General, 477 

F.3d 113, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2007), and Doe, 956 F.3d at 143.
12

The agency’s reliance on Chen and Kibinda was proper, but its 

discussion of Doe borders on error.

In Chen, the petitioner was informed by Chinese officials that his fiancée’s child would have to be aborted. 381 F.3d 

at 223. When those officials came to the petitioner’s home 

looking for his fiancée, the petitioner refused to disclose her 

whereabouts. Id. The officials began hitting him with sticks, 

and the petitioner fought back with a plumbing tool. Id. The 

petitioner’s parents intervened to end the scuffle. Id. The officials left, warning the petitioner that he would be arrested if his 

fiancée “did not report for an abortion in three days.” Id. We 

concluded that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution 

because his “scuffle with the local officials does not appear to 

have been serious” and the petitioner “never alleged that this 

altercation resulted in any injuries that required medical treatment.” Id. at 235.

In Kibinda, the petitioner, a member of the Angolan 

army, was detained for five days for violating a curfew order. 

477 F.3d at 117. At one point during his detention, a guard 

threw a heavy object that struck the petitioner’s jawbone, causing a laceration that required seven stiches. Id. We held that the 

petitioner’s “detention by the Angolan army and the attendant 

circumstances of that detention simply do not rise to the level 

of persecution as we have defined it” because the mistreatment, 

“as offensive as it may be, was far from unusual or extreme.” 

Id. at 119. We explained that “the injury [the petitioner] suffered . . . , though it left a scar, was certainly not severe, requiring as it did only a few stitches.” Id. While agreeing with the 

agency’s conclusion that the conduct did not amount to persecution, we also cautioned that we were not “suggest[ing] that 

the severity of an injury should be measured in stitches.” Id. at 

120. But because the petitioner “provided no other objective 
13

evidence to demonstrate that the single injury he suffered was 

severe enough to constitute persecution under our stringent 

standard,” we upheld the agency’s decision. Id. 

These cases support the BIA’s decision here because 

they show that physical abuse, even in the context of detention, 

may not rise to the level of past persecution, especially in the 

absence of concrete and menacing threats of violence or death. 

An alien who can show an “escalating pattern of mistreatment” 

will tend to have a stronger past-persecution claim. HerreraReyes v. Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 112 (3d Cir. 2020); accord 

Gjetani v. Barr, 968 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Persecution . . . has the quality of a sustained, systematic effort to target an individual on the basis of a protected ground.” (emphasis 

omitted)). Thayalan has not shown such a pattern here. Instead, 

the mistreatment he faced was a true one-off. There is no indication that Thayalan was threatened or that the Sri Lankan 

army pursued him after his release. And, like the petitioner in 

Kibinda, he has not produced evidence to show that he suffered 

any severe or protracted injury (whether or not of a physical 

nature) that would further support his past-persecution claim.

In fact, his detention was far shorter than the five-day detention 

the petitioner suffered in Kibinda. For these reasons, considering the totality of the circumstances, we uphold as supported 

by substantial evidence the agency’s finding that Thayalan has 

not suffered past persecution.

While we leave undisturbed the BIA’s ultimate disposition of this case, we pause to comment on its treatment of our 

decision in Doe. The BIA cited Doe for the proposition that 

“isolated incidents of beatings that do not result in serious 

injury do not rise to the level of persecution.” A.R. 4 (citing 

Doe, 956 F.3d at 143). That was a poor paraphrasing of Doe’s 

quotation of our decision in Voci. It is true that in Voci, we 
14

suggested that “isolated incidents that do not result in serious 

injury do not rise to the level of persecution.” 409 F.3d at 615. 

But the BIA treated this as a hard-and-fast rule. It is not. We 

explained in Doe that “[n]either Chen nor Kibinda foreclosed 

the possibility that outrageous conduct, even if limited to a single event without physical harm, could rise to the level of persecution.” Doe, 956 F.3d at 145 n.5; see id. at 145 (“We have 

never held that persecution requires more than one incident. 

Rather, we have left open the possibility that a single incident, 

if sufficiently egregious, may constitute persecution.”). In fact, 

we held in Doe that the BIA “committed legal error by finding 

that a single beating without severe physical injury” is never

persecution.3 Id. at 146.

Thayalan contends that Doe “refutes [the] very foundations” of the BIA’s decision in this case. Pet’r Br. 13. But a 

comparison of the facts of Doe to the facts here reveals otherwise. The petitioner in Doe was a man born and raised in 

Ghana, where he had a secret homosexual relationship with 

another man. Doe, 956 F.3d at 139. He knew that being gay in 

Ghana was considered unacceptable, so he refrained from 

speaking to his family about his sexual orientation. Id. One 

morning in January 2016, the petitioner’s father “unexpectedly 

entered [his] bedroom at the break of dawn and discovered him 

having sex with his partner.” Id. His father began shouting that 

3 In Blanco v. Attorney General, 967 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2020), 

which we decided a few weeks after the BIA’s decision in this 

case, we reiterated that the lack of physical harm from an attack

“is not dispositive in establishing past persecution” where an 

applicant also experienced concrete and menacing threats. Id. 

at 312. “[E]valuating past persecution is not as simple as 

comparing the severity of each injury.” Id.
15

his son was having sex with a man and called on others to witness the petitioner’s conduct. Id. The petitioner’s father 

accused his son of bringing shame to their family and promised

that he would face punishment for his homosexuality. Id.

Upon hearing the petitioner’s conflict with his father, “a 

crowd of neighbors gathered at [the petitioner’s] house, forming a violent mob.” Id. “Together with his father, the mob 

began to beat the two young men with stones, wooden sticks, 

and iron rods, and dragged them into a courtyard.” Id. Some in 

the mob wanted to report the petitioner and his partner to the 

police, “but others began to argue over how best to punish 

them: death by burning or beheading.” Id. The petitioner was 

then doused with kerosene, while members of the crowd called 

for him to be set on fire. Id. Someone in the mob brandished a 

sword. Id. “Fearing that his life was in danger, [the petitioner]

managed to escape and ran naked, hurt and bleeding to a 

friend’s house about ten minutes away.” Id. He “told his friend 

about the attack and about his sexual relationship with his partner.” Id. His friend became worried that they could both be 

killed if it were discovered that the petitioner was hiding at his 

house. Id. Too frightened to call the police or seek medical 

care, the petitioner fled to Togo. Id. But he feared being 

attacked there, too. Id. So with a friend’s help, he retrieved his 

passport from his home and flew to Ecuador, eventually entering the United States without valid documents. Id. at 139–40. 

After arriving in the United States, the petitioner “heard that 

his father has publicly disowned him for being gay, that he is 

still looking for him, and that he intends to kill him if he finds 

him.” Id.

The BIA determined that the petitioner’s beating did not 

rise to the level of persecution because it was a single, isolated 

incident that did not cause serious physical injury. Id. at 145. 
16

We rejected its determination. Id. “In addition to having his life 

credibly threatened by accompanying acts of violent intimidation,” we explained, the petitioner “suffered actual physical 

harm from the beating, not to mention the emotional suffering 

he has endured.” Id. The petitioner’s own father encouraged a 

violent mob to attack him, and the situation progressed to the 

point that “[a]ll that was left for the mob to do was to cut off 

his head or set him on fire.” Id. at 144. 

The facts here are markedly different—Thayalan did 

not suffer physical mistreatment or threats that, considered

cumulatively, compel the conclusion that he suffered persecution. Unlike Doe, there is no evidence in this record that 

Thayalan’s oppressors continued to pursue him even after he 

was physically attacked. And it appears that Thayalan did not 

seek medical care because he did not feel that he needed it, not 

because he was unable to do so. Cf. Doe, 956 F.3d at 146 (noting that the petitioner “did not seek medical care because he 

feared for his well-being” rather than because he “did not 

require medical treatment” (emphasis and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). The agency may consider whether a physical 

beating caused enough harm to require medical care in 

assessing a claim of past persecution so long as it does not give 

that consideration dispositive weight. See Chen, 381 F.3d at 

235 (concluding that a petitioner’s mistreatment “does not 

appear to have been serious” in part because he did not suffer 

“any injuries that required medical treatment”); Jarbough v. 

Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding a finding of no past persecution where the petitioner “suffered bruising” from an attack but “did not go to a doctor” because “his 

injuries did not ‘require immediate medical intervention’”);

Voci, 409 F.3d at 614 (concluding that the fact that a beating 

required an “extended hospitalization” weighed in favor of a 
17

finding of past persecution); Doe, 956 F.3d at 145 (noting that 

this Court does not “condition[] a finding of past persecution 

on whether the victim required medical attention or on whether 

he was too hurt to escape his aggressors”).

In short, Thayalan “has provided no other objective 

evidence to demonstrate that the single injury he suffered was 

severe enough to constitute persecution under our stringent 

standard.” Kibinda, 477 F.3d at 120. And he has given no 

explanation for his decision to remain in Sri Lanka for over a 

decade after his detention and beating, which further undermines his claim of past persecution. See Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 

399 (explaining that when “an alien has endured a threat or 

assault but has nevertheless chosen to stay in his home country 

for a period of time,” that “choice to stay tends to weaken [a] 

claim of persecution”). We thus uphold the agency’s determination that the harm Thayalan suffered does not amount to past 

persecution. Thayalan’s attempt to establish eligibility for asylum based on his mistreatment by the Sri Lankan army fails.

B

We now turn to the agency’s nexus finding with respect 

to the 2019 extortion attempts. Thayalan does not contend that 

these incidents constitute past persecution. Rather, he argues

that they give rise to a reasonable possibility that he would be 

persecuted on account of an imputed pro-TNA political opin-
18

ion if he were removed to Sri Lanka.

4 The agency disagreed. It 

ruled that the EPDP’s extortion efforts were not, as Thayalan 

contends, centrally motivated by an imputed pro-TNA political 

opinion, and thus do not give rise to a reasonable possibility of 

future persecution on account of a protected ground. We conclude that this finding is supported by substantial evidence.

As we previously noted, the INA requires that an applicant for asylum and withholding of removal demonstrate that 

his protected characteristic “was or will be at least one central 

reason” for his persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); see Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 684–85 & n.6 (holding that the “one central reason” standard applies in the context 

of withholding of removal). “For a protected characteristic to 

qualify as ‘one central reason’, it must be an essential or principal reason for the persecution.” Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d 

at 685. As a result, neither asylum nor withholding of removal 

may be granted “when the characteristic at issue ‘played only 

an incidental, tangential, or superficial role in persecution.’” 

Id. (quoting Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 130 (3d 

Cir. 2009)). The characteristic “must be both a but-for cause of 

[the] persecution and it must play more than a minor role that 

is neither incidental nor tangential to another reason for the 

harm or a means to a non-protected end.” Matter of A-B-, 28 I. 

4 An alien may establish eligibility for asylum by showing that 

he was targeted because of a political opinion that was 

attributed to him, but that he did not actually hold. See Singh v. 

Gonzales, 406 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2005). In determining 

whether an alien was persecuted on account of an imputed 

political opinion, “we focus on whether the persecutor has 

attributed a political view to the victim and acted on that attribution.” Id.
19

& N. Dec. 199, 211 (A.G. 2021). A persecutor may “have more 

than one central motivation for his or her actions.” 

Ndayshimiye, 557 F.3d at 129.

Thayalan contends that “the persecutors’ own statements” reveal that “the EPDP targeted [him] because of his 

purported support for the TNA.” Pet’r Br. 19. Thayalan first 

testified that he was targeted by the EPDP because he was “a 

businessman.” A.R. 116. But later in his testimony, he stated

that the EPDP members who sought to extort him “falsely 

accus[ed]” him of “working for TNA” and “paying TNA the 

money.” A.R. 130. It is this latter piece of testimony that 

Thayalan now relies on in attacking the agency’s nexus finding.

The BIA credited this testimony, but concluded that 

Thayalan still failed to meet his burden of establishing nexus. 

“While this evidence demonstrates that the EPDP members 

believed [Thayalan] provided support for the TNA,” the BIA 

reasoned, “it does not establish that [his] . . . imputed political

opinion was a characteristic the EPDP members sought to 

overcome.” A.R. 4 (citing Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec.

40, 44 & n.2 (B.I.A. 2017), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 27 

I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019)). The BIA explained that the 

EPDP members never demanded that Thayalan “stop supporting the TNA” or “change his political opinion and support” 

EPDP candidates, and that Thayalan had not “presented any 

evidence that [the] EPDP members have any particular animus 

toward . . . supporters of the TNA.” A.R. 4. Defending the 

BIA’s decision, the government argues that the false accusations made by the EPDP members do not render unreasonable 

the agency’s view that they “targeted [Thayalan] due to . . . 

their perception that, as a business owner, he had the means to 

pay their extortion demands.” Resp’t Br. 18.
20

The applicable standard of review places a heavy

burden on Thayalan. “[T]o obtain judicial reversal of the BIA’s

determination” that the EPDP did not target him on account of 

a protected ground, “he must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could 

fail to find” the nexus requirement satisfied. Elias-Zacarias, 

502 U.S. at 483–84. It is “[q]uite beside the point” that the record may be adequate to support the conclusion that at least one 

central reason for the efforts to extort Thayalan was an imputed 

political opinion. Id. at 481 n.1. The substantial-evidence 

standard does not permit this Court to re-weigh evidence or to 

substitute its own factual determinations for those of the 

agency. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 

359 (3d Cir. 2011). We are to decide only whether a reasonable 

factfinder could agree with the agency’s determination—that 

is, whether the agency’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Dia, 353 F.3d at 247–49; Gonzalez-Posadas, 

781 F.3d at 688 (explaining that even when “there is more than 

one way to view the record,” this Court is “required to uphold 

the decision of the [agency]” if there is substantial evidence to 

support it).

Thayalan’s challenge to the nexus finding fails because 

the record provides ample support for the agency’s view that 

the EPDP did not target Thayalan principally because of an 

imputed political opinion. The BIA properly relied on the fact

that the EPDP members never tried to get Thayalan to stop supporting—financially or otherwise—any other political party or 

political viewpoint to support its conclusion that any imputed 

pro-TNA political opinion was, at most, of minor interest to the 

EPDP. And while the EPDP members did mention Thayalan’s 

alleged financial support for the TNA during their first extortion attempt, the agency took the reasonable view that the 
21

EPDP members inferred from that support only that Thayalan 

had the wherewithal to fund the EPDP in addition to the TNA. 

Considering the strength of the BIA’s reasoning and the 

entirety of the record, we cannot conclude that any reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to find that an imputed proTNA political opinion was a central reason for the EPDP’s 

decision to target Thayalan for extortion. The agency’s conclusion that getting Thayalan’s money was the EPDP’s only central motivation for its criminal behavior is therefore supported 

by substantial evidence. As this Court has held before, an alien 

targeted out of a simple desire for money has not experienced

persecution on account of a ground protected by the INA. See

Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 686; Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 

F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 2007). Thayalan has not shown that his

mistreatment by the EPDP gives rise to a reasonable possibility 

of future persecution based on an imputed political opinion.

* * *

To sum up, we uphold as supported by substantial evidence the agency’s findings that (1) the 2007 detention and 

beating by the Sri Lankan army did not rise to the level of past 

persecution, and (2) the 2019 extortion attempts by the EPDP 

were not motivated by an imputed political opinion.

5 Thayalan 

5 We also disagree with Thayalan that the IJ erred by failing to 

analyze whether there is a “pattern or practice of persecution 

against ethnic Tamils.” Pet’r Br. 23. Thayalan did not make a 

pattern-or-practice argument to the IJ, and the BIA declined to 

consider an “issue . . . raised for the first time on appeal.” A.R. 

5. Yet Thayalan now contends that the IJ should have conducted a pattern-or-practice analysis even though he failed to 

raise the issue. The applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii), provides in relevant part:
22

[An IJ] shall not require [an] applicant to provide 

evidence that there is a reasonable possibility he 

or she would be singled out individually for persecution if . . . [t]he applicant establishes that 

there is a pattern or practice in his or her country 

. . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly 

situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 

social group, or political opinion. 

We do not think that this regulation required the IJ to specifically analyze in her decision whether Thayalan established a 

pattern or practice of persecution, or that the BIA was required 

to entertain an argument that could have been raised before the 

IJ. See Ye v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding 

that where an applicant “did not argue before the IJ that, independent of his claims of past persecution, he had a wellfounded fear of future persecution because there was a pattern 

or practice of persecuting Christians in China,” the “BIA did 

not err in concluding that the argument was not exhausted”). 

Thayalan relies on Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 

2006), where the Seventh Circuit held that 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii) “governs not only the proofs at the hearing 

but also an IJ’s process of reasoning, and it must be followed 

whether or not an alien draws it to the agency’s attention.” Id. 

at 452. But even assuming the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation 

of the regulation is correct, see Vakeesan v. Holder, 343 F. 

App’x 117, 127 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (disagreeing with Banks), it does not follow that an alien need not 

preserve the argument that he is eligible for asylum even if he 

cannot show that he would be singled out for persecution. See 
23

is thus not eligible for asylum. And because he is not eligible 

for asylum, he is “unable to meet the [higher] standard for withholding of removal.” Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 348–49. We

therefore uphold the agency’s denial of both forms of relief 

from removal.

Banks, 453 F.3d at 453 (noting that the applicant, by claiming 

asylum based on the Liberian government’s mistreatment of its 

enemies, preserved the pattern-or-practice issue); AguilarMejia v. Holder, 616 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2010) (“In Banks, 

. . . we still required the applicant to preserve the issue.”).

Thayalan did not claim asylum based on “systematic, pervasive, or organized” persecution of Tamils by the Sri Lankan 

government; he claimed asylum based on a single detention 

and beating in 2007 and two extortion attempts more than a 

decade later. Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 687 & n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 

530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005)). As the BIA acknowledged, Thayalan 

“testified generally on cross-examination that Tamils are 

attacked in Sri Lanka.” A.R. 5. But Thayalan’s asylum claim 

was based on a fear of being singled out individually for persecution, not a fear of pervasive attacks on Tamils. Cf. 

Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 630–31, 637 (3d Cir. 

2006). In these circumstances, we will not fault the IJ for failing to include a pattern-or-practice analysis in her decision or 

the BIA for deeming the issue unpreserved and declining to 

remand the case. See Prabhudial v. Holder, 780 F.3d 553, 555 

(2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“[T]he BIA may refuse to consider 

an issue that could have been, but was not, raised before an 

IJ.”).
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IV

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 

review. The stay of removal this Court previously granted is 

vacated.