### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 01 17 -C V

______________________________ WAL KER & A SSOC I ATES SURVEYI NG, I NC., Appellant V. REB ECC A A UST I

N D /B /A AUSTI N SURVEYI

NG AND MAPPI

NG, Appe llee
On Appea l from the 123rd Judicial District Court

Panola County , Texas Trial Court No. 2005-412

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Carte r2 O P I N I O N I. F actual and Proc edural History Austin Survey ing a

nd Mapping (Austin) hired three w ork cr ews, on a n hourly basis, from Walker & Associates Surve y ing, I nc., for the purpose of

doing the field work resurve y ing pr operties on which Austin had won bids. No wr itten contrac t was made , and whatever ag ree ment was re ache d was ba sed solely

on verba l discussion. Austin declined to pay

approximately

the last $48,000.00 billed by Walker for the w ork of its c re ws . Wa lke r f

ile d s uit a g a ins t Re be c c a

Au stin, d/b /a

Au sti n Surv e y

ingand Ma pp ing , to
rec over. Austin alleg ed as a defe nse that the work was not c ompetently done and that Walker was thus due nothing. Walker alleg ed that it ag ree d to provide surve y personne l and labore rs, to be supervised solely

by Austin and its mana g ement, and Walker g ave Austin a reduc ed rate price for that rea son. Austin then filed a c ounterc laim seeking to reco v er t h e $55,000.00 that it claimed to have expended in redoingthe work of one team and re working portions of the work f rom the other two teams. The c ase w as tried to the c ourt as a suit on sworn a ccount ba sed on an or al ag ree ment. The trial c ourt’s j u d gm en t awa rded nothing to Walker, but awa rded Austin a rec overy

of $6,094.24, plus $10,035.00 in attorney ’s fees. The $6,094.24 fig ure is the diffe renc e betwe en the amount the trial cour

t foun d t h at W alker

had billed Austin for its work a nd the cost to Austin for redoingthat work. The court e ntere d finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law.Walker also ar g ues that if the court found a violation of the Dec eptive Tra de Prac tices Ac t 1 (DTPA), that claim fails as a matter of l aw, because there is no proof of r epre sentation by Walker that his c rew s wer e competent. Austin a g ree s the trial court made no finding conce rning the DTPA. That is not an issue on appe al. 3 II. Issues Raised on Appeal Wa lk e r f ir s t c o n te n d s th e e v id e n c e is n e it h e r le g a ll y n o r f

a c tu a ll y s u f

f ic ie n t to s u

pport the judgme nt in favor of Austi n. That i ssue concerns the te rms of the c ontrac t, the quality of the wor

k perf ormed by the Walker c rew s, and alleg ed inade quate supe rvision by Austin. I n his ne x t point, Walker argues that no brea ch of contra ct occur red, as a matter o f l aw, beca use there was no e vidence that Walker ag ree d to provide compe tent cre ws. Finally , Walker ar g ues that the c ourt err ed in the damage calc ulation and that the cour t erre d by fa ili ngto a

wa rd a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, be c a

us e Wal ke r a lso pr e va ile d in his c la im. 1 We f ir st a dd re ss the su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to su pp or t the jud g me nt in f

a vo r o f Aus tin on its defensive the ory . III. Legal and F actual Suf fi ciency A. Term s of th e Oral Agr eem ent The ter ms o f an o ral contract must be c lear , cer tain, and def

inite. Gannon v. Bak

er , 830 S.W .2d 706, 709 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1992, writ denied) . A lack of definitene ss in an ag ree ment may

conce rn the time of pe rfor mance , the price to be paid, the wor k to be done, the service to be rende red, or the proper ty to be transf

err ed. Id. ; se e als o Libe rto v . D.F . S tau ffe r B isc uit Co. , 441 F.3d 318, 324 ( 5th Cir. 2006). “The rules reg arding indefiniteness of materia l te rms of aTex. Gulf Coast Land & Oil Co. v. Galveston-Chicago W ell Boring &

Drilling Co. , 3 4 T e x. 2 Civ. App. 33, 77 S.W . 974, 975 (Ga lveston 1903, writ ref ’d). 4 c on tr a c t are ba se d o n th e c on c e pt t hat a pa rt y c ann ot a c c e pt a

n o ff e r s o a s to fo rm

a c on tr a c t un le ss the terms of that contrac t are rea sonably cer tain.” Fo rt W

or th I nd e p. Sc h. Di st. v . Ci ty of F or t W or th , 22 S.W .3d 831, 84 6 (Tex. 2000). “Althoug h Texas courts favor validating contra cts, we ma y not
cre ate a contr act whe re none exis ts.” Knowles v. W right , 2 88 S.W. 3d

13 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Di s t
. ] 2 0 0 9 , p et
. d e n i e d ) (q u o t i n g Lam aja k v . F razin , 230 S.W .3d 786, 793 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.)). Walker ar g ues that there was little or no ag ree ment rea ched about the l evel of competenc e of the wor

kers pr ovided. B oth parties use, in a n eff ort to spe cify the level of

competenc e re quired, lang uag e askingwhether

the judg ment supports a finding that the work wa s not done in a skillful and workmanlike ma

nner, and then Walker fur

ther a rgues that the skillful/workmanlike manne r conc ept is n ot a c on c e pt s y

no ny mou s w iththat a c tua lly

us e d b y the c ourt , w hic h f

ound the pa rt ie s
ma de an o ra l ag re e me nt fo r . . . WAL KE R to pr ov ide on the g ro un d s ur

ve y c re ws to produce comp et en t work for retr ace ment boundary survey s . . . . The information provided . . . c ould not b e used . . . to c omplete the finished surve y s beca use of inc omp le te ne ss, ina c c ur anc e y [sic ], and e rr or s. Although c urre ntly

found in the DTPA, the terminolog y used in counsels’ a

rg uments long p r e d a te s th e s tatute
. T h e s k il lf u l/ w o r kma n li k e c o mb in a ti o na

p p e ar s in s c a tt e r e d c o n tr a c t c ases stretchingas fa

r bac k as 1903. 2I n jury trials, the suffic iency

of the e vidence must be re viewed usingthe def initions and 3 instructions contained in an unobje cted- to jury char g e. Soto v. Sev en Sev entee n HBE Corp. , 52 5 Walke r argue s that beca

use the pa

rties did not discuss the level or standa rd of wor k to be perf ormed, ther e is “a n i m plied war ranty” that the se rvice s will be perf ormed in a “ skillful and
wo rk manli ke mann e r. ” Th e imp lie d w arr anty of g oo d a nd wo rk manli ke mann e r p ro vid e s th a t a service will be perf

ormed in a skillful and wor kmanlike manner
. See Melody Home M fg. Co. v. Barnes , 741 S.W .2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987). A g ood and workmanlike manner is “that quality of work perf ormed by one who ha s the knowledg e, t ra ining, or experience nece ssary

for the suc cessf

ul pr a c tic e of

a tr a de or oc c up a tio n an d pe rf or me d in a man ne r g e ne ra lly c on sid e re d p ro fi c ie nt b y

tho se capa ble of judg ing suc h work.” Id. The trial c ourt found that the ag ree ment require d Walker to pr ovide “on the g round surve y
cr ew s to produce c ompetent work . . . .” The trial c ourt furthe r conc luded that the wor k “wa s not competent wor

k.” Walker a

rg ues that this conclusion has no support in the evide nce. I t appea rs the trial c ourt was using the term “competent” as the e quivalent to the term “ g ood and workmanlike.” As the court did not find the work to be “g ood and wor kmanlike” or

“skillful and wor kmanlike,” that ter

minology is merely

a way o f ex p l ai ning w hat ty pe of w ork would be
c on sid e re d c omp e te nt. Th e re ha s n e ve r b e e n a ny su g g e sti on , eit

he r at tr ia l, by mot ion fo r n e w tri a l,
or any oth e r m e tho d, that a

de te rm inatio n o f w he the r the wo rk wa s n ot c omp e te nt i s an in a pp ro pr ia te
measure to be applied—that the sta ndard w ould not support a judgme nt, or that it was an imprope r definition under the brea ch of contra ct alleg ed. Thus, we revie w the case to determine w hether the 3S.W
. 3 d 2 0 1, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (c iting Larson v. Cook

Consultant

s, Inc. , 6 90 S.W. 2d

56 7, 56 8 ( Te x. 19 85 ); Allen v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. , 380 S.W .2d 604, 609 (Tex. 1964)). 6 judgme nt and finding s made by the cour t are supported by t h e ev i d en ce . Read in lig ht of the require ments set out above, is there evidenc e that would allow t he court to determine that Walker ag ree d to supply

Austin with qualified and compe tent survey cre ws? There is evidence that

C Walker would p ro v i d e cr ews, at a rate of $69.00 pe r hour; Don Austin would be the supervising profe ssional reg istered land sur vey or.

C Rebec ca Austin ex pecte d (base d on conver s ation with Mr. Walker) the c rew s would be competent a

nd able to do the wor

k without constant supervision by Austin.

C The c rew , in ge nera l, should be an extension of the survey or and able to provide labor, c ut lines, look for evide nce of proper ty lines, and do whatever

the job may

require
.

C Wal ke r t e sti fi e d in re sp on se to a qu e sti on a sk ing if he wa s to pr ov ide surv e y c re ws tha t c ou ld produce the work—that he provided survey cre ws that could produc e the wor k, which wa s to b e c omp e te nt. I t is im plicit that for a c rewto p ro d u ce “good and w orkmanlike” results in this field, they must have a c erta in level of tra ining, e x perie nce, and competence . One would not expect an
un tr a ine d d a y

la bo re r to be e qu ipp e d to pro vid e sk ill fu l ser vic e s. Th e re is som e e vid e nc e that A us tin expected the tea

ms to be competent a

nd cap ab l e o f d oing qua lity work without constant, dire ct supervision. Ther e is nothing c o n clus ive to the contra ry . Counsel has direc ted us to no such7

evidenc e. In fac t, Walker hi mself t estified that his cre ws wer e compe tent, that they had bee n doing such work f

or him, that they had perf

ormed the servic es and c ollected the data prope rly , and that he had no proble m with them. Th u s , w e c o n c lu d e th e r e is s u f f ic ie n t e v id e n c e to a ll o w th e c o u rt to d e te r mi n e that the
a g re e me nt i nv olv e d th e pr ov isi on of g oo d a nd wo rk manli ke or c omp e te nt c re ws . F ur the r, e ve n if the p ar t i es do not ag ree on a spec ific standar d, the implied warr anty of g ood workmanship ser ves as a “ g ap-f

iller” or “ defa

ult warra nty ”; it applies unless and until the parties e x press a contra ry intention. Centex H

omes v . Buec her , 95 S.W .3d 266, 273 (Tex. 2002). B. Qua lit y o f the Wo r k P e r for m e d The re maining question is whether the re is suff icient evidenc e that the tea ms actually

failed to perfor m their tasks compete ntly
. A summary of the evidenc e of work poorly done by the Cooper te a m ( and re do ne by

Au sti n) fo llo ws : Cooper' s team: (8 jobs for Austin) Dial
C cut a se arc h line at 6 deg ree s off the c orre ct ang le and e nded up 250 fe et north of the c orre ct northwest cor

ner of the trac t. To do so, he
C took a line down a log g ing r oad, rather than c utting throug h brush to g et a c orre ct line Vice
C ran only

a par t of a we stern boundary line, then cut bac k acr oss the proper ty using a pipeline rig ht-of-w ay , rathe r than c utting brush to match the corr ect line
C fa ile d to fi nd

ri g ht- of wa y mon ument s that

we re no t pr otr

ud ingou t of

the g ro un d, de sp ite having a Te x as DOT pla

n sheet for

a fa rm-to-mar

ket roa d8

W ils on Es tat e C did not complete data c ollection for the sur vey Ga rn e r E sta te
C ignor ed ea st boundary line
C perf

ormed g ener al cr eek me ander inadequately

by having a 200- to 300-f

oot ga p betwee n sh ots
C did not meander

a small branc h of the c ree k corr ectly by g etting no shots of the cre ek
C De sp ite a e ri a l phot og ra ph sh ow ing , an d ve rb a l di re c tio ns fr om Aus tin , r e po rt e d th a t c ou ld no t f ind an o ld f e nc e lin e —w hic h A us tin

la te r d id McPhe rson C cr ew d i d

n o tfi n d s u ff i ci en tt ra v er s e p o i n t s , an d go tn o c e n t er

l i n e s h o t s wh i l e t ra v er s i n g a c ounty ro a d (w hic h is SOP) [Re be c c a Au sti n r e tur

ne d w iththe Coo pe r c re w t o o bta in t ho se s h o ts ] Gr os s &J

am es (c op y

of pr e vio us surv e y , c op y

of City plat and de e d s ke tc he s)
C failed to traverse far enoug h south to locate south boundary line
C failed to locate evidenc e of old fe nce line on that boundary , or C failed to locate evidenc e with sig nificanc e in loc ating the boundary line (despite be ing show n o nt h e o l d s u r v e y) Ba gle yEs tat e (T e xas) (w itha e ri a l ph oto g ra pha nd wo rk ingsk e tc he s)
C failed to traverse the west bounda ry line
C failed to locate the NW and SW corners
C failed to traverse part of nor thern bounda

ry C failed to locate any of the re sidence s on the county road
C (whe n the Austin cre w went ba ck, they found a c oncre te monu m en t at the SW corner, marke d by

red pa inted tree s, a fe nce a nd red painted line on west boundar y , and iron rod at NW corner )
C left 400- to 500-f

oot ga p betwee n shots on cree k on south side
C tr a ve rs e d a c ro ss a pa sture , w he n th e pr op e r t ra ve rs e wo uld

have be e n thro ug h h e a vy br us h and sw a mp9

Bagley Estate (

Louisi ana)
C chose tra

verse line avoiding brush and tre es C took e xtr e me ly

lo n g s id e s h o ts f

r o m m a in p o in ts , i. e . , 1 , 3 0 0 f

e e t ( r e s u lt in g in

an8-foot differ ence when r eshot later)
C ignor ed two quar

ter sec tion corner s marked by fenc e cor ners Ree d (p ro vid e d w ithwo rk ingsk e tc he s, a e ri a l ph oto g ra ph s, c op ie s o f p ro pe rt

y ma ps )
C failed to locate any evidenc e of a

west boundar

y line or SW corner
C ran traver se down lease road and failed to g et any cente r line shots (Austin found old fenc e line down most of west boundar y , and a ve ry

larg e iron monument with witness tree ) Th is i s b oth

le g a lly and fa c tually su ffi c ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s. Walker does not dire ct us to evidenc e that these e rror s did not occur—e ither by this team or the other two teams. He inst ead argues t hat t he teams should not have bee n expected to per form such w ork without the direct super

vision of a license d surveyor, thus sug g esting that the t rue neg lige nce w as that of Austin by

not more closely

supervising his worker s. I n support of that position, he directs us to Walker’s testim ony that in his business, he had people ove rsee ing the cre ws and Judy Key ’s (the bookke eper ) testimony that she had he ard no
com pl aint s a

bo ut t he qu a lity of the ir wo rk . H e a lso e mph a size s a g a in t hat A us tin

ha d e xpre ssl y reje cted his off

er to supervise the work for an additional fe e. The se ar e leg itimate arguments, but the trial cour

t, as the finder

of fa ct, was presente d with this evidenc e and a rg uments and re solved the issue in favor of

Austin. Ultim ately , the questi on the trial cour t had to resolve w as whe ther the w ork
cre ws perf

ormed in a ski l l fu l m anner . We find there is e vidence to support the trial court’ s deter minations.I n deter mining Walker’ s leg al suffic iency issue, we have be en dire cted to ana ly ze “whethe r 4 the evidenc e at tria l would enable r easona b l e an d fair- minded people to re ach the verdic t under revie w.” City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)
. I n making this determination, we c re dit fa vo ra ble e vid e nc e if

a r e a s o n a b l e f a c t- fi nd e r c ou ld, and

dis re g ard c on tr ary e vid e nc e un le ss 10 Walker also ar g ues t hat t he standa rds used to mea sure their

work a re ina ppropriate and ar e standards that should be used only for pr ofessional surve y ors. The que stion decided by the cour t was first, what they

ag ree d to, and sec ond, whether those standar ds we re m et. I n the abse nce of any written ag ree ment, the trial evide nce is ne cessa rily the only source of any

express ag ree ment. There is evidence that Walker re prese nted the cr ews a s competent, that the ag ree ment was for competent worke rs to be provide d, and that Walker f ailed to provide the require d quality of work. I n a re lated ar g ument, Walker conte nds that the standar d used by the tri al co u rt wa s for a
c omp e te nt s ur

ve y or , n ot f

or a c omp e te nt s ur

ve y ing te a m. A g a in, the pr ob le m is that be c a us e thi s is
an ora l ag ree ment, the question initially befor e the c ourt was what that ag ree ment consisted of—a nd the par ties can obviously

contra ct as they

see f it. The standa

rds to be applied to this evidenc e ar e well established. F indings of f act e ntere d in a c a se tr ie d to the c ourt

are of the same force and di gnit y as a jury ' s ans we rs to j ur y qu e sti on s. An de rso n v . Ci ty

of S e v e n P oin ts , 806 S.W .2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). The tria l court' s findings of fac t
are re vie wa

ble fo r le g a l and fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to su pp or t the m by the s a me
s t an d ar d s t h at ar e ap p l i edi nre v i ew i n g t h e l ega l o r fa ct u al s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e e v i d en ce s u

p p o rt i n g a jury ' s answer

to a j ury question. Ortiz v. Jones , 917 S.W .2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catali na v. Blasdel , 881 S.W .2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). 4a reasonable fac t-finder could not
. Id. So lon g a s the e vid e nc e fa lls wi thi n the zon e of re a so na ble disag ree ment, we may

not substit ute our judg ment for that of the fa ct-finde r. Id. at 822. The trie r of fa ct is the sole judg e of the cre dibilit y of the witnesses and the we ight to g ive their testimony
. Id
. a t 81 9. Al tho ug h we c on sid e r the e vid e nc e in a lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the c ha lle nged fi nd ing s, indulgingever

y rea sonable inferenc e that supports them, we may not disreg ard e vidence that allows only one infe renc e. Id. at 822. Us ingthe tr a dit ion a l la

ngua g e , in

our f a c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we c on sid e r an d w e ig h a ll the e vid e nc e , a

nd wi ll se t a sid e the ve rd ic t on ly if the e vid e nc e is s o w e a k o r t he fi nd ingis s o a g a ins t the g reat weig ht and prepondera nce of the evidence that it is clea rly wrongand unjust. Po ol v . F or d Motor Co. , 715 S.W. 2d 62 9, 63 5 (T e x. 19 86 ); Garza v. Alviar , 395 S.W .2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). 11 Walker ar g ues that the findingof fa ct that it ha d ag ree d to provide surve y cre ws to produce competent wor

k for boundary retra ceme nt sur vey s is not supported by the evidenc e. Walker state s that th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot i nd ic a te that th e y dis c us se d or

a g re e d o n th e le ve l or

sta nd ard of wo rk to be per formed b y

the cr ews a

nd that Austin had expressly reje cted Walker ’s offe r to supervise the work for an additional fee
. He argues that althoug h the evidenc e may show that Austin expe cted a p art i c u l ar l e v e l o f c o mp e t e n c e , i td o e s n o ts h o w t h a tt h e y agreed to such. I n a nu ts hel l, W alker

argue s: i t w a s o ur

job to s up ply

a c re w. I t w a s A us tin ’s job to supervise the m and make sur e the wor k they did was u p to the standard de sired. Thus, Walker argues, the e vidence that the cr ews we re not prope rly supervised r equire s our deter mination that no evidenc e supports the verdic t. Walker also argues that Austin w as at fault by not routinely

revie wing the data pr oduced by

the cr ews a

nd that no complaint was made until mont hs later. Thus, Walker posits, the court’s c onclusions that the contra ct re quired the c rew s to produce competent w o rk

— o r alternatively that the work pr oduced by the cr ews wa s not competent—ar e unsupportable a s being based on spe culation and c onjecture
.12

At most, the evidence is in conflict. The trial court had evidenc e from which it could de cide that the work was of poor quality and whether it r esulted from improper wor kmanship by

the cr ew or i n a d e qu a te s u

p e r v is io n f r o m A u s ti n . T h is Co u rt is n o t a f a c t- f in d e r an d ma

y n o t p a ss on the
c r e d ib il it y o f th e w it

n e s s e s o r s u

b s ti tute it s ju d g me n t f

o r th a t o f th e tr ie r

of fa ct. Mar. Ove rseas Cor p. v . E lli s , 9 71 S.W. 2d

40 2, 40 7 ( Te x. 19 98 ); B e l l e f o n t e U n d e rw r i t e r s I n s . C o . v . B ro wn , 704 S.W .2d 742, 744 (Tex. 1986) (finding s of fa ct ar e exclusive province of j ury or t rial court). I t is not within the p rovi nce of

this Court t o interfe re w ith the fac t-finder ’s re solution of conflicts in the evidenc e, or to pa ss on the weig ht or cre dibilit y of the witnesse s’ testimony
. Sw

. Airlines Co. v. Jaege r , 8 67 S.W. 2d

82 4, 83 0– 31 (T e x. Ap p. —El Pa so 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) . Wh e re the re is conflicting evidenc e, the f act- finder’ s verdic t on such matters is g ener ally reg arde d as conc lusive. Ed mu nd s v . S an de rs , 2 S.W. 3d

69 7, 70 3 ( Te x. Ap p. — E l Pa so 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) ; se e Po ol v . F or d Motor Co. , 715 S.W .2d 629, 634 (Tex. 1986). Under these fa cts, we f

ind the evide n ce both f

actua lly and leg ally

sufficie nt to support the
ve rd ic t. I V . Br e a c h o f C o nt r a c t F a il s a s a M a t t e r o f L a w? Walker sepa

rate ly also argues that t h e t ri al co urt could not interpre t the contra ct as one
re q uiring Walker “to provide g round surve y cre ws to provide compe tent work for retra ceme nt bo un da ry surv e y s to save tim e and la bo r” fo r Aus tin . Wa lke r c on te nd s th a t th e re is n o e vid e nc e to13

allow such a

finding and that to construe the par ties’ ag ree ment as including such a c ovenant incorre ctly

interpre ts the contrac t as a matter of law. The evidenc e supporting a conclusion that their oral a g ree ment require d such work is set out
a bo ve , a nd we lik e wi se fi nd

it s uf fi c ie nt i n th is c on te xt. V. Da m ag e s—

Wha t I s P r ope r and H ow M uc h? We have so fa

r conc luded that the evide nce suppor ted the cour

t’s finding that beca

u s e of bre a c h , A u s ti nw a s r e li e v e d f r o m p e r f o r mi n g b y p ay me n t. A t t

h is p o in t, w e c o n s id e r

A u s ti n ’s
rec overy under its counter claim. Austin sought to re cover beca use i t was re quired to re do the work previously d one by

Walker. Austin formulated the claim as see king da mag es base d on Walker’s failure to meet the ter

ms of its contract. The a rg ument under this sec tion that reac hes into the rea lm of the propriety of this ty pe of damag es is found in two para g raphs. In that seg ment, repr oduced in f ull below, Walker ar g ues that Additionally , the contra ct alleg ed by Austin to exis t provides no basis for a n a ff ir ma tive rec ov e ry

by Au sti n o n th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d. Ha d Wa lke r f a ile d to pr o v i d e s e r

v i c e s a s c o n t r a c t e d , A u s t i nw o u l d h a v e a d e f e n s e t o c l a i m f

o r p ay m e nt. Yet, Austin preva iled not only in completely

offse tting the amount owed Walker, but also in a judg ment in its favor ag ainst Walker. Austin’s contention, seeming ly adopted by the trial cour

t is that W alker , by brea ching a contr act to provide survey cre ws fo r t he rate of $69 pe r hour plus mileag e, has caused Austin $55,532.38 in damag es, off set by the $49,438.14 owed Walker. Ye t the trial court did so with no evidenc e that it cost Austin any more than the $69 per

hour plus mileag e ag ree d as Walker’s price
. Moreove r, Austin did not differ entiate be tween c ompleting wor k left incomplete by

Walker’s c r e w s , c orre cting wo rk all e g e dly

pe rf or me d in c or

re c tly , a nd du pli c a tin g wo rk

pr op e rl y do ne . A s to incomplete wor

k, Austin has not been damag ed at a ll. I f add i t i o n al work wa s require d, Austin would have incur red a cost for that work, whether with Walker orCf. Goffney v . Rabson , 56 S.W .3d 186 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) 5 (ca se involving attorney ’s fe es, and a llowing Rabson to re cover for hour ly

fee s billed b y h er new attorney ). I n t h at ca s e, however, he r for mer attorney

(who ha d ag ree d to continge nt fee s) had withdrawn on the day

of trial and the party had to hire a nother fir m on an hourly

basis to repre sent her. Rabson rec overe d damag es as mea sured by the entire amount of the hourly fee char g ed to her
. 14 someone e lse. Since Walker was to be paid on an hour ly basis, had more work be en require d of Walker’ s cre ws, the bala nce ow ed W alker by

Austin would simpl y

have been g reater. No ba sis ex ists for char g ing Walker with any amount other than f

or work done incorre ctly . Since Austin fa i led to seg reg ate his cla imed damag es, the evidenc e is leg ally

and fa ctually

insufficient to support the trial c ourt’s finding s. T h e f i n d i n gs m ad e b y

t h e c o u rt s o u n d

i nco n t ra ct , n o t i n t o r t
. T h er e a re n o fi n d i n gs
c on c e rn ingne g lig e nc e or fr a ud ule nt i nd uc e me nt, or

sim ple fr a ud . T he y are dir e c te d sole ly

a t a
rec overy based on c ontrac t, and then an a war d of attorne y ’s fe es t hat can only be justified base d on a contr act recove ry . Acc ording ly , we lim it our review to the propriety of damag es based on brea ch of c on tr a c t. Specifica lly , A u s ti na ll e g e d th a t a s a r e s u lt o f Wa lk e r ’ s f

a il u r e to p e r f

o r m, A u s ti nw as “ca used to suffe r losses and damag es in e x cess of the ag ree d amount of the ser vices.” There is no evidenc e to support a c ritical par t of this a lleg ation: “dama g es in excess of the a g ree d amount of the service s.” As we have previously stated, there is evidence of the amount that W alker billed, and of the a mou nt t hat A us tin

ult imate ly

pa id t o r e do the wo rk

do ne by Wal ke r. What th ere i s n ot— is evidenc e that Walker ha d ag ree d to do a particular job for a particula r fe e. This is not a situation 5 wher e a tur

n-key job is done, and billed for, but then ha s to be redon e, wi t h d am age s cause d by delay , or by chang ed circumstance s. See Ybarra v. Saldana , 624 S.W .2d 948, 952 (Tex. App.—San15

An ton io 1 98 1, no wr it) ; Mc Kni gh t v . R e nfr o , 371 S.W .2d 740, 745 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1963, writ ref ’d n. r. e .) (whe n an owner , on failure of contra ctor to pe rfor m takes over

job and completes
wo rk him se lf or he rs e lf

, ow ne r may re c ov e r fr om c on tr a c tor e xce ss o f r e a so na ble and ne c e ssa ry c os t of completion over

and above unpaid portion of contr act pr ice)
. The Te x as Supreme Court ha s rec og nized that economic loss may be either

direc t or
c on se qu e nti a l and

su mma ri zed the dis tin c tio n a s f

oll ow s: Direc t economic loss may be said to enc ompass damag e bas ed on ins ufficie nt pr od uc t va lue ; thus , d ir e c t e c on omi c loss may be “ ou t of

po c ke t” the dif

fe re nc e in value be tween w hat is g iven and r ece ived or “ loss of barg ain” the differ ence betwee n the va lue of

wh a t is re c e ive d and its va lue a s re pr e se nte d. Di re c t e c on omi c los s a lso may be me a sure d by c os ts of re pla c e me nt and re pa ir . Co ns e qu e nti a l e c on omi c los s inc lud e s a ll ind ir e c t los s, su c h a s los s of pr of its re su lti ngfr om i na

bil ity to m a ke us e of the de fe c tiv e pr od

uc t. Nob ili ty Ho me s o f Te x ., In c . v . S

hiv e rs , 557 S.W .2d 77, 78 n.1 (Tex. 1977). I n c a se s in vo lvi ngsu c h th ing s a s sa le s o f m a te ri a ls o r i te ms to on e pa rt y wi th e xpe c te d r e sa le of those items to anoth er , co u rt s rec og nize that a potential but lost profit may be re cover able a s dama g e s— and

that th is b e c ome s mo re e nf or c e a ble a s th e a

bil ity to c on c re te ly

me a sure tho se damag es improves. Se e Re tam a M an or Nur sin g Ct rs. , I nc . v . Co le , 582 S.W .2d 196, 202 (Tex. Civ. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 79 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .)
. I n su ch a sit uatio n, a fa c t- fi nd e r m ay

me a sure los t pr o f i t s b y t h e d i f

f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e c o n t r a c t p r i c e an d w h a t i t w o u l d h a v e c o s t t h e c on tr a c tor to perf orm the contra ct in acc ordanc e with the plans and specific ations. De al D e v . Co . v . A ma ril lo Con c re te Con tra c tor

s , 554 S.W .2d 294, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1977, no writ); Fa rri s v . S mi th16

Erectors, Inc

. , 5 16 S.W. 2d 28 1, 28 3– 84 (T e x. Civ . Ap p . — H o u s t o n [1s t D ist .] 19 74 , n o w ri t) ; Carras v. Birge , 211 S.W .2d 998, 1003 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1948, writ ref ’d n. r. e .). I n this case, no s u c h

c oncre te measur ement is possible, beca use as c reated, the ora l ag ree ment was not f o r th e c o mp le ti o no f

jo b s , o r f o r th e p r o v is io no f

s p e c if ie d c o mp le te d

s u r v e y s . T he ag ree ment was mere ly for provision of cre ws on an hourly basis—not for a c ompleted transa ction that could be mea sured. I n the finding s of fa ct, the trial c ourt found that serv i ce s p rovided by Walker “w as not competent wor

k” and Austin “rec eived n o v al u e” f or counte r-de fenda

nt Walker’s “inc ompetent
wo rk .” Ha

vin g fo un d Walk er brea c he d ma te ri a l te rm s o f i ts c on tr a c t, t he pr op e r r e me dy

in t his instance w as to relieve Austin of pay ment for the substanda

rd ser vices provide d. Austin arg ues that it is entit led to the bene fit of t he barg ain. The ty pical st atement of the bene fit-of-the -bar g ain measur e is that it represe nts the d i ff er en ce b etween the value expected fr om the contra ct and the va lue actua lly rec eived by

the nonbre achin g p arty
. Arthur Andersen Co. v. Pe rry Equip. Corp. , 945 S.W .2d 812, 817 (Tex. 1997). Many times parties contrac t for a specific projec t to be complete d for
a sp e c if ie d p ri c e , s o th e va lue e xpe c te d is a c omp le te d p ro

je c t f or the state d p ri c e . H e re , A us tin did not contra ct wit h Walker t o complete a projec t for a stated price, but the contract was to pay Walker $69.00 per hour for the service s provided. The value of the Walker work was not quantified as be ing
w o rt h a s p e c i f i c a m o u n t a s i s d o n e w h e na p art i c u l ar

j o b i s e x p e c t e d

f o r a s e tp r i c e . C o n s e qu e n t l y, there is no evidenc e, ex presse d in specific fig ures, of the value Austin expected to rec eive f rom the17

hourly work done by the W alker worke rs. I nstead of c omparing the value e x pecte d from the c ontrac t with the value actua lly rec eived, here , the trial court c ompare d the unpaid amount cha rg ed by Walker for its servic es (whic h the court found was without any value) with the amount Austin spent to have other surve y

cre ws complete the work a nd g rante d Austin a judg ment for the dif fer ence . An oth e r p os sib le c on tr a c tua l me a sure of dama g e s is th e re a so na ble c os ts n e c e ssa

ry to r e pa ir
or restore the subject of the c ontrac t to its expected or ba rg ained- for c ondition. See D.S.A., Inc . v. Hi lls bo ro In de

p. Sc h. Di st. , 973 S.W. 2d 66 2, 66 3– 64 (T e x. 19 98 ). Th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t A us tin spent $55,000.00 to survey the projec t. Clea

rly , Austin w as require d to expend a siz eable amount to complete this job, whether done by Walker worke rs or other s. Comparing what Austin spent on the re surv e y to t

he a mou nt o f u np a id b ill ingby

Wal ke r d oe s n ot e sta

bli shre a so na

ble c os ts t o “ re pa ir
or re store the subjec t of the contra ct to its expected or barg ained for condition.” Since Walker ne ver barg ained to supply

a par t i cu l ar product for a

desig nated amount which could be c ompare d to the amount spent to “re pair or r estore” the projec t, this m easur e of da mag es is inapplicable. We d o n ot b e lie ve the fa c t th a t Wal ke r b ill e d $ 49 ,0 00 .0 0 f or ho ur ly se rv ic e s, wh ic h A us tin did not pay , and is now re lieved of pa y ing, e stablishes a loss to Austin. The se fa cts and finding s of the trial cour

t excuse Austin from pay ment, b u t d o n o t es t ablish the requisites for an indepe ndent
re c ov e ry fro m W alke r. (I f o ne pa rt y to a c on tr a c t c omm its a

ma te ri a l br e a c h, the oth e r p a rt y is discharg ed or excused from further pe rfor mance [ Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Drive r Pipeline Co., 134 S.W .3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004)].)18

We conclude that beca

use of the nature of the a g ree ment, and of the ty pe of w ork per formed, the d a ma g e s s o u g h t b y A u s ti n ar e n o t a v a il a b le u n d e r th e s e f

a c ts
. A s p le d an d tr ie d , th e r e is no evidenc e of ha

rm t o Au s t i n other than the failure to complete the wor k proper ly . There was no pleadingor proof

of collate ral injuries, or indire ct damag e to Austin beca use of the poor

execution by Walker’s c rew s. Austin was in no worse position than it was bef ore the contra ct was enter ed—Austin had to have the work done , either by providing those servic es by employ ees or contra cting with others. There is no recove ry

available , as a matter of law , under the se fa cts. Austin won its defensive c laim ag ainst Walker. Howe ver, Chapte r 38 does not provide for the re c ov e ry

of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s by a de fe nd ant wh o only de fe nd s ag a ins t a pla int if f’ s c on tr a c t c la im and pre sents no valid contra ct claim of its own. Am. Airlines, Inc. v . Swest, Inc. , 707 S.W .2d 545, 547 (Tex. 1986) (holding defe ndant could not r ecove r attorney ’s fee s under prede cessor to Section 38 .0 01 wh e n d e fe nd ant p re se nts no va lid c on tr a c t c la im o f i ts o wn ); Energen Res. MAQ, I nc. v. Dalbosco , 23 S.W .3d 551, 558 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)
. The judg ment in this case does not refl ec t a rec overy by Austin based on its own contra ct claim, but only

an avoidance of

a cla im based on a w inning de fense . Acc ording ly , Austin is not entitled to rec over attorney ’s fe es in this inst ance .19

We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt of the tr ia l c ourt a s to the ta

ke -n oth ingjud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f Aus tin
a g a ins t Wa lke r’ s c on tr a c t c la ims . T he jud g me nt a wa rd ingAu sti n dam age s o n it s c ounte rc la im i s
reve rsed, a

nd we r ender

a take -nothing judgme nt ag ainst Austin.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: Aug ust 5, 2009 Date D ecide d: Dec ember 11, 2009