J-A07014-19

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MODERN MUZZLE LOADING, INC. 

D/B/A KNIGHT RIFLES 

Appellant

v.

THOMAS F. GOWEN & SONS, INC. 

D/B/A/GOWEN & SONS

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1514 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order April 30, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 2017-009549

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2019

Appellant, Modern Muzzle Loading, Inc. d/b/a Night Rifles (Modern 

Muzzle), appeals from an order entered on April 30, 2018 which struck a 

foreign default judgment entered in its favor and against Thomas F. Gowen & 

Sons, Inc. d/b/a Gowen & Sons (TFG). We affirm.

The record reflects the following facts and procedural history. In April 

2016, Modern Muzzle filed an action against TFG in McMinn County, 

Tennessee. Anthony M. Gowen, the president of TFG, was personally served 

with notice of that action by a process server in Pennsylvania on May 5, 2016. 

TFG thereafter did not enter a defense in the Tennessee action and Modern 

Muzzle obtained a default judgment in the amount of $7,447.35 on May 31, 

2016.
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Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4306, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 

Judgments Act (the Act), Modern Muzzle transferred the Tennessee judgment 

to Pennsylvania by filing a copy of the judgment with the office of judicial 

support in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County on November 14, 

2017. Modern Muzzle then filed a writ of execution against TFG and BB&T 

Bank, as garnishee, on November 20, 2017. TFG filed a “Petition to Open a 

Judgment of Default and Amend or Correct the Judgment and Stay Execution 

or Garnishment” (hereafter referred to as “petition”) on January 9, 2018. 

TFG’s petition asked the trial court to vacate the judgment and direct TFG to 

file an answer to the underlying Tennessee action. In support of these 

requests, TFG’s petition averred that Modern Muzzle failed to comply with the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure in serving the original, underlying 

complaint and that Modern Muzzle lacked capacity to enforce a foreign 

judgment in Pennsylvania because it was not registered to conduct business 

within the Commonwealth. 

Modern Muzzle filed a response and brief in opposition to TFG’s petition, 

claiming that TFG had asked the court to open the Tennessee judgment and 

compel the parties to litigate the case on the merits in Pennsylvania, which 

the court lacked authority to do. In response, TFG filed a reply brief asserting 

that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee. TFG also filed a 

preacipe to amend that sought to convert its original petition into a petition to 

strike the Tennessee judgment. In addition, TFG sought to incorporate the 

arguments raised in its reply brief into its original petition.
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The trial court convened oral argument on TFG’s petition on April 23, 

2018. Thereafter, on April 30, 2018, the trial court entered an order striking 

the Tennessee judgment. Modern Muzzle filed a notice of appeal on May 14, 

2018 and a court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

on June 4, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion on July 17, 2018. Among other things, the court explained in its 

opinion that the Tennessee courts lacked jurisdiction over TFG since Modern 

Muzzle failed to effect proper service upon TFG. See Trial Court Opinion, 

7/17/18, at 1 and 6. Because Tennessee lacked jurisdiction over TFG, 

Pennsylvania was not obligated to honor the underlying foreign judgment 

entered in this case. See id.

On June 19, 2018, shortly after the instant appeal was filed, this Court 

issued an order directing Modern Muzzle to show cause why its appeal was 

not subject to quashal. See Superior Court Order, 6/19/18, at 1. Citing 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) and interpretive case law, our order noted that orders 

opening, vacating, or striking off judgments were not appealable as of right. 

See id. In its June 20, 2018 response, Modern Muzzle argued that the 

decisions cited in our show cause order were distinguishable from this case 

and that an order refusing to enforce a foreign judgment is appealable as of 

right. By order entered on July 16, 2018, we discharged our show cause order 

and referred issues concerning the finality and appealability of the trial court’s 

April 30, 2018 to this panel for consideration. See Superior Court Order, 

7/16/18, at 1. The issues are now ripe for review.
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In its brief, Modern Muzzle raises the following issues for our 

consideration.

Is an order refusing to enforce a foreign judgment appealable as 

of right?

[Did the trial court commit an error of law or abuse its discretion 

in striking Modern Muzzle’s Tennessee judgment based upon 

factual and/or legal grounds that were not included in TFG’s 

original petition?]

[Did the trial court commit an error of law by striking Modern 

Muzzle’s Tennessee judgment because Modern Muzzle failed to 

serve TFG pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure?]

[Did the trial court commit an error of law or abuse its discretion 

in striking Modern Muzzle’s Tennessee judgment due to improper 

service where TFG was personally served with a summons and 

affidavit of sworn account and Tennessee law provides that a party 

may commence a lawsuit through a sworn account?]

Modern Muzzle’s Brief at 4 (issues reordered to facilitate discussion).

The first issue we address is whether the April 30, 2018 order from 

which Modern Muzzle appeals constitutes a final, appealable order. The 

appealability of an order implicates the jurisdiction of this Court and raises a 

question of law. See Carmen Enterprises, Inc. v. Murpenter, LLC, 185 

A.3d 380, 388 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied, 201 A.3d 725 (Pa. 2019). 

As such, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. 

Id.

“[I]t is incumbent [upon this Court] to determine, sua sponte when 

necessary, whether [an] appeal is taken from an appealable order.” Kulp v. 

Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). Generally 
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speaking, this Court may assume jurisdiction over appeals taken from final 

orders. See Angelichio v. Myers, 110 A.3d 1046, 1048-1049 (Pa. Super. 

2015). In relevant part, Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure defines a final order as follows:

Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally

(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in subdivisions (d) 

[related to appeals from the Superior Court and Commonwealth 

Court], and (e) [addressing criminal orders] of this rule, an appeal 

may be taken as of right from any final order of an administrative 

agency or lower court.

(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any order that:

(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or

(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or

(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision (c) of 

this rule.

Pa.R.A.P. 341.

Notwithstanding Pa.R.A.P. 341, our appellate rules, in certain 

circumstances, permit appeals from interlocutory orders. As our Supreme 

Court explained:

in addition to an appeal from final orders of the Court[s] of 

Common Pleas, our rules provide the Superior Court with 

jurisdiction in the following situations: interlocutory appeals 

that may be taken as of right, Pa.R.A.P. 311; interlocutory 

appeals that may be taken by permission, Pa.R.A.P. [312]; 

appeals that may be taken from a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P. 

313; and appeals that may be taken from certain distribution 

orders by the Orphans’ Court Division, Pa.R.A.P. 342.
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Commonwealth v. Garcia, 43 A.3d 470, 478 n.7 (Pa. 2012) (internal 

quotations omitted), quoting McCutcheon v. Phila. Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 

349 n.6 (Pa. 2002).

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 holds particular relevance 

in the instant case. It provides that an appeal may be taken as of right from 

an order refusing to open, vacate, or strike off a judgment; appeals from 

orders that open, vacate, or strike off judgments are not appealable. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1). Rule 311(a)(1) states:

Rule 311. Interlocutory Appeals as of Right

(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right and without 

reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:

(1) Affecting judgments. An order refusing to open, 

vacate or strike off a judgment. If orders opening, 

vacating or striking off a judgment are sought in the 

alternative, no appeal may be filed until the court has 

disposed of each claim for relief.

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1).

The parties dispute the appealability of the trial court’s April 30, 2018 

order. To establish that the order was final and appealable, Modern Muzzle 

cites our prior decision in Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Saltzman, 

609 A.2d 817 (Pa. Super. 1992) (Greate Bay) and contends that the trial 

court effectively refused to enforce the Tennessee judgment. See Modern 

Muzzle’s Response to Show Cause Order, 6/20/18, at 4, quoting Greate Bay, 

609 A.2d at 818. More specifically, Modern Muzzle asserts that the court’s 
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refusal to enforce the Tennessee judgment concluded all litigation pertaining 

to the matter in Pennsylvania since no Pennsylvania court had the power or 

authority to entertain the merits of the underlying Tennessee dispute. See 

Greate Bay, 609 A.2d at 818. As such, Modern Muzzle characterizes the trial

court’s order as final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341. TFG maintains that 

the trial court’s order did not terminate the litigation since additional litigation 

was needed to resolve issues surrounding the garnishment of funds in its bank 

account. See TFG’s Brief at 9 and 12-18. Thus, according to TFG, the April 

30, 2018 order – which struck off the Tennessee judgment - was interlocutory 

and unappealable. 

Great Bay addressed the appealability of an order purporting to open a 

foreign default judgment in the context of circumstances quite similar to those 

currently before us. There, Greate Bay, a New Jersey corporation, 

commenced an action in New Jersey against Mark Saltzman, a Philadelphia 

resident, to recover unpaid gambling debts. When Saltzman failed to appear 

and defend against Greate Bay’s claims, a default judgment was entered 

against him. Greate Bay eventually transferred the judgment to the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County pursuant to the Act and obtained a writ 

of execution. Thereafter, the trial court granted Saltzman’s petition to open 

the judgment. After Greate Bay appealed, the court issued an opinion stating 

that its order was not appealable.

In rejecting the trial court’s conclusion, we said:
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A final order is one which terminates the litigation or precludes 

further action in the trial court. In re Adoption of E.J.W., 515 

A.2d 41, 43 (Pa. Super. 1986), citing Peterson v. Philadelphia 

Suburban Transportation Co., 255 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1969); Dash 

v. Wilap Corporation, 495 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. 1985). Whether 

an order is final “cannot necessarily be ascertained from the face 

of a decree alone, nor simply from the technical effect of the 

adjudication. The finality of an order is a judicial conclusion which 

can be reached only after an examination of its ramifications.” 

Pugar v. Greco, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (Pa. 1978); see also Gordon 

v. Gordon, 439 A.2d 683 (Pa. Super. 1981), affirmed, 449 A.2d 

1378 (Pa. 1982). Therefore, how the trial court may characterize 

an order is not controlling, as its finality is determined by its effect. 

In re Adoption of E.J.W., supra.

The trial court's order in the instant case is final. There is no 

further litigation available to the plaintiff-appellant in 

Pennsylvania. When the trial court “opened” the judgment 

which had been transferred to Pennsylvania from New 

Jersey, the effect of its order was to refuse to enforce the 

New Jersey judgment. The Pennsylvania court lacked both 

the power and jurisdiction to open the New Jersey 

judgment and require that the merits of appellant's claim 

be litigated in Pennsylvania. Only a court of competent 

jurisdiction in New Jersey could open the default judgment 

which had been entered in New Jersey. When the 

judgment became final in New Jersey and was thereafter 

filed in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania court could either 

enforce the judgment or refuse to enforce the judgment. 

When the Philadelphia court refused to enforce the 

judgment, its order was appealable. Because the trial 

court's order was final, it was not the same as and did not 

have the effect of an order opening a Pennsylvania 

judgment. The latter is interlocutory and not appealable 

under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1).

Greate Bay, 609 A.2d at 818 (parallel citations omitted).

Although an order opening a domestic Pennsylvania judgment is 

interlocutory and not appealable, we conclude, pursuant to the rationale 

employed in Greate Bay, that the trial court’s order in this case was final. 
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Modern Muzzle’s monetary claims against TFG were reduced to judgment in 

Tennessee and the judgment was transferred to Pennsylvania under the Act. 

When the trial court struck off the judgment, the effect was to refuse 

enforcement. As no Pennsylvania court possessed either the power or 

authority to compel the parties to litigate the merits of the underlying 

Tennessee action in Pennsylvania, the matter came to a conclusion when the 

court refused to enforce the judgment and no further litigation was available 

to Modern Muzzle in Pennsylvania.

We do not agree with TFG’s position that issues surrounding the 

garnishment of funds held in its bank account preclude the exercise of 

appellate jurisdiction under Rule 341. See TFG’s Brief at 16 (trial court’s order 

was not final because it did not dispose of all claims and all parties) and 21 

(“[Modern Muzzle’s] appeal was interlocutory in nature because the issue of 

the garnished funds remained outstanding at the time that [Modern Muzzle] 

filed the within appeal.”). TFG, in its brief, does not dispute that the amount 

of the Tennessee judgment is readily ascertainable from the document but, 

instead, merely attacks the validity of the judgment. Since no further 

litigation was required to determine the extent of TFG’s obligations under the 

Tennessee judgment, the order striking off the judgment was final and 

appealable. See Greate Bay, 609 A.2d at 818.
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We turn now to Modern Muzzle’s challenges alleging that the trial court

erred in striking off the Tennessee judgment against TFG. The following 

principles govern our review of such claims.

An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment 

implicates the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Oswald v. 

WB Public Square Associates, LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 793 (Pa.

Super. 2013). Issues regarding the operation of procedural rules 

of court present us with questions of law. Id. Therefore, “our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Id.

“A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which

operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a 

judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity 

appearing on the face of the record.” Midwest Financial 

Acceptance Corp. v. Lopez, 78 A.3d 614, 622–623 (Pa. Super.

2013). “[A] petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits 

of the allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is 

aimed at defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that 

entitle the petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief.” Oswald, [80 

A.3d at 794]. A fatal defect on the face of the record denies the 

prothonotary the authority to enter judgment. Erie Ins. Co. v. 

Bullard, 839 A.2d 383, 388 (Pa. Super. 2003). When a 

prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that judgment is 

void ab initio. Id. “When deciding if there are fatal defects on 

the face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a 

[default] judgment, a court may only look at what was in the 

record when the judgment was entered.” Cintas Corp. v. Lee's 

Cleaning Services, Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. 1997).

A judgment is void on its face if one or more of three 

jurisdictional elements is found absent: jurisdiction of the 

parties; subject matter jurisdiction; or the power or authority 

to render the particular judgment. The term “jurisdiction” 

relates to the competency of the individual court, 

administrative body, or other tribunal to determine 

controversies of the general class to which a particular case 

belongs. Moreover, it is never too late to attack a judgment 

or decree for want of jurisdiction, as any such judgment or 

decree rendered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the 

subject matter or the person is null and void, and can be 
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attacked by the parties at any time. A petition to strike a 

judgment founded on a jurisdictional deficiency is therefore 

not subject to the same “timeliness” considerations as a 

petition to open the judgment.

Flynn v. Casa Di Bertacchi Corp., 674 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Pa. 

Super. 1996).

Green Acres Rehabilitation and Nursing Center v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 

1261, 1267-1268 (Pa. Super. 2015) (parallel citations omitted) (Green 

Acres).

Lack of personal jurisdiction will not only support an order granting a 

motion to strike a judgment, it also serves as grounds to reject enforcement 

of a foreign judgment. This Court previously said that judgments entered in 

our sister states are

entitled to full faith and credit in Pennsylvania so long as “there 

was jurisdiction by the court which originally awarded the 

judgment, see Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 329 A.2d 483 (Pa. 

1974), and the defendant had an opportunity to appear and 

defend, see Morris Lapidus Associates v. Airportels, Inc., 

361 A.2d 660 (Pa. Super. 1976).” Everson v. Everson, 431 A.2d 

889, 895-896 (Pa. 1981). The courts in Pennsylvania will refuse 

to give full faith and credit to a foreign judgment if it was obtained 

in derogation of a basic, due process right of the defendant. 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958). However, when 

“the court of another state has purported to act on the merits of 

a case, its jurisdiction to do so and the regularity of its proceedings 

are presumptively valid.” Barnes v. Buck, 346 A.2d 778, 782 

(Pa. 1975). The party challenging the validity of the judgment, 

therefore, bears the burden of showing any irregularity in the 

proceedings. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation 

v. Granito, 452 A.2d 889, 891 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982).

Greate Bay, 609 A.2d at 819 (parallel citations omitted), quoting Noetzel v. 

Glasgow, Inc., 487 A.2d 1372, 1375-1376 (Pa. Super. 1985).
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Initially, Modern Muzzle challenges the order granting TFG’s petition to 

strike by asserting that the trial court erred in considering factual issues and 

grounds for relief that were not raised in TFG’s initial filing. Citing Pa.R.C.P. 

206.1(b), Modern Muzzle argues that all grounds for relief asserted in support 

of a petition to strike and/or open a default judgment must be included in a 

single petition. See Modern Muzzle’s Brief at 14, quoting Pa.R.C.P. 206.1(b) 

(“A petition shall specify the relief sought and state the material facts which 

constitute the grounds therefor. All grounds for relief, whether to strike or 

open a default judgment, shall be asserted in a single petition.”) (emphasis 

omitted). Modern Muzzle maintains that the trial court impermissibly “based 

its decision to strike the [Tennessee j]udgment on the additional grounds 

raised in TFG’s [r]eply [materials].” Modern Muzzle’s Brief at 17.

We agree with the trial court that this claim is meritless. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 7/17/18, at 5. TFG’s original petition alleged, among other things,

that there was a conflict between the procedural rules of Pennsylvania and 

Tennessee as to who may serve original process, that Pennsylvania’s rules 

should apply because it had the most significant relationship to the underlying 

dispute, and that, as a result, service of original process should have been 

accomplished by a sheriff and not a process server as occurred in this case. 

See Petition, 1/9/18, at 6. Because service of original process was improper, 

TFG asserted that the Tennessee judgment should be opened because the 

court had no jurisdiction over TFG and lacked power to enter the challenged 
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judgment. See Petition, 1/9/18, at 5 and 7. As we shall explain below, the 

trial court entered a sustainable ruling confined strictly to these grounds. 

Hence, Modern Muzzle is not entitled to relief on its claim that the trial court 

erred or abused its discretion in striking the Tennessee judgment based upon 

legal arguments and factual assertions that were not advanced by TFG in its 

opening petition.1

Modern Muzzle next argues that the trial court committed an error of 

law by striking the Tennessee judgment on grounds that Modern Muzzle failed 

to serve TFG pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. To 

recount, Modern Muzzle commenced this litigation by filing a collection action 

in Tennessee on April 19, 2016. Thereafter, Modern Muzzle retained a process 

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1 We also reject Modern Muzzle’s passing claim that TFG’s original petition 

should be read only as a petition to “open” since it was captioned as such and 

since it expressly asked the trial court to open the Tennessee judgment, which 

the court lacked authority to do. See Greate Bay, 609 A.2d at 818 

(Pennsylvania court lacked power and authority to open judgment entered in 

New Jersey; only court of competent jurisdiction in New Jersey could do so). 

We acknowledge TFG’s procedural misstep but, under the circumstances, shall 

view its initial filing as a petition to strike the judgment. We note, as indicated 

above, that TFG’s opening submission asserted improper service and lack of 

jurisdiction, which constitute cognizable grounds for relief in the context of a 

petition to strike off a judgment transferred from another state. In addition, 

the trial court accepted TFG’s oral request, at the April 23, 2018 hearing, to 

correct the title of its petition from a petition to open to a petition to strike. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 7/17/18, at 2. In view of these circumstances, we 

perceive no error in the trial court’s decision to overlook TFG’s failure to 

caption its initial filing as a petition to strike. See Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 

1272 (“Under the doctrine of substantial compliance, the trial court may 

overlook any procedural defect that does not prejudice a party's rights.”) 

(citation and internal quotation omitted).
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server who served a summons and civil warrant on a TFG officer in 

Pennsylvania on May 5, 2016. Modern Muzzle claims on appeal that because 

it commenced and obtained a judgment in the underlying action in Tennessee, 

it could rely upon Tennessee’s procedural rules to effectuate service of original 

process in Pennsylvania. TFG objected, claiming in its petition that 

Pennsylvania and Tennessee procedural rules were in conflict, that 

Pennsylvania had a more significant relationship to the dispute, and that a 

sheriff needed to serve original process in accordance with Pennsylvania 

procedural law. Without valid original service, TFG maintained that the 

Tennessee court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment. The trial court 

agreed with TFG and struck Modern Muzzle’s Tennessee judgment.

We begin our analysis by reviewing the relevant procedural rules in both 

states. Pursuant to Rule 4.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Court, “[a] summons 

and complaint may be served by any person who is not a party and is not less 

than 18 years of age,” so long as the individual is identified by name and 

address on the return of service. Tn.R.C.P. 4.01(2). When service is to be 

made on a foreign corporation doing business in Tennessee, Rule 4.04(4) 

allows service through the delivery of a copy of the summons and of the 

complaint to an officer or managing agent of the corporation. Tn.R.C.P. 

4.04(4). Lastly, in relevant part, Tennessee permits service upon defendants 

outside the state “by any form of service authorized for service within this 

state pursuant to Rule 4.04,” Tn.R.C.P. 4.05(1)(a), or “in any manner 
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prescribed by the law of the state in which service is effected for an action in 

any of the courts of general jurisdiction in that state.” Tn.R.C.P. 4.05(1)(b). 

In Pennsylvania, with limited exceptions not applicable here, “original process 

shall be served within the Commonwealth only by the sheriff.” Pa.R.C.P. 

400(a) (emphasis added). A conflict emerges from a comparison of the 

procedural rules of Tennessee and Pennsylvania since Tennessee allows 

service of process outside the state by any individual over 18 who is not a 

party to the action while Pennsylvania only permits a sheriff to effect service 

within the Commonwealth.

The parties have not cited, and we have been unable to locate, an 

analogous case considering the validity of a foreign judgment where the 

judgment holder made original service in a manner that complied with a 

procedural rule of the rendering state but which stood in conflict with a 

corresponding rule of Pennsylvania procedure. In the absence of guiding 

precedent that addressed such a conflict, the trial court looked to 

Pennsylvania’s choice of law principles. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/17/18, at 

6. Under Pennsylvania law, a choice of law issue is determined by ascertaining 

which state possesses the greater interest in the application of its law to the 

pending dispute. See, e.g., McDonald v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc., 

116 A.3d 99, 109 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 130 A.3d 1291 (Pa. 

2015). This inquiry turns on the nature and quality each state has with the 

particular issue before the court. See id. Because the contract between 
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Modern Muzzle and TFG was performed in Pennsylvania, the trial court 

concluded that Pennsylvania’s procedural rules should govern the service of 

original process in Pennsylvania. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/17/18, at 6. 

Hence, it found that service of process was invalid.

The trial court did not err in concluding that Pennsylvania’s procedural 

rules should govern the service of process issue in this matter. The United 

States Supreme Court has explained that, “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause 

[of the United States Constitution] does not compel a state to substitute the 

statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter 

concerning which it is competent to legislate.” Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 

U.S. 717, 722 (1988). Moreover, since a state is competent to enact 

provisions relating to judicial procedures, it may apply its own procedural rules 

to cases litigated in its courts. See id. Pennsylvania follows these principles. 

“Whenever Pennsylvania is the chosen forum state for a civil action, our state's 

procedural rules[,] i.e. the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure[,] govern, no 

matter what substantive law our courts must apply in resolving the underlying 

legal issues.” Ferraro v. McCarthy–Pascuzzo, 777 A.2d 1128, 1137 (Pa.

Super. 2001) (citation modified). 

In this case, however, Tennessee was the chosen forum, not 

Pennsylvania. Relying on this fact, Modern Muzzle argues that it was entitled 

to make service pursuant to Tennessee’s procedural rules. See Modern 

Muzzle’s Brief at 21. Modern Muzzle’s contention is undermined, somewhat, 
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by the plain terms of Rule 4.05(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Court. That 

provision permits service upon out-of-state defendants by any method 

permitted within Tennessee or by any manner prescribed by the law of the 

state in which service is to be effected. See supra. Since Tennessee permits 

out-of-state service by means of domestically approved service or by means 

adopted by her sister states, Tennessee has, at best, a diminished interest in 

the method used to achieve service on foreign defendants. For this reason, 

the trial court did not err in holding that Pennsylvania’s procedural rules 

applied and that service was defective in this case. See McDonald, 116 A.3d 

at 107 (explaining that if only one jurisdiction's governmental interests would 

be impaired by the application of the other jurisdiction's law, a court must 

apply the law of the state whose interests would be harmed if its law were not 

applied).

Finally, Modern Muzzle argues that the trial court erred or abused its 

discretion in striking Modern Muzzle’s Tennessee judgment due to improper 

service since a TFG officer was personally served with a summons and affidavit 

of sworn account and Tennessee law provides that a party may commence a 

lawsuit through such a form of service. Because we have concluded that 

service was invalid owing to Modern Muzzle’s use of a process server and not 

a sheriff, we need not consider Modern Muzzle’s final claim.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/19/19