alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**
**EXHIBIT 12.2**

CERTIFICATION 

pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) and Rule 15d-14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended 

I, Timothy Rooney, certify that: 

1. I have reviewed thisannual report on Form 20-F of Avita Medical Limited; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The company’sother certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the company and have: 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b) [paragraph omitted in accordance with Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(a)];

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the company’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the periodcovered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. The company’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to thecompany’s auditors and the audit committee of the company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the company’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 
Date: October 31, 2019  
/s/ Timothy Rooney
  Timothy Rooney  Chief Financial Officer**
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 99.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         I, CHARLES H. GUY III, Chief  Executive  Officer of EduLink,  Inc. (the
"Company") do hereby  certify,  in accordance  with 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:

         (1)      The  Quarterly  Report on Form  10-Q/A of the  Company for the
                  period ending September 30, 2003 (the "Periodic Report") fully
                  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2)      The  information  contained  in  the  Periodic  Report  fairly
                  presents,  in all material respects,  the financial  condition
                  and results of operations of the Company.


Dated December 19, 2003                 /s/ CHARLES H. GUY III
                                        -------------------------
                                        CHARLES H. GUY III
                                        Chief Executive Officer
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21

- 7391

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. JERONZA THORNE , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Charlotte

. Max O. Cogburn, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:13

- cr - 00293

- MOC

- 1 ; 3:17

- cv - 00234

- MOC )

Submitted : December 21, 2021 Decided: December 27, 2021

Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges , and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Jeronza Thorn e, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Jeronza Thorne seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion

. 1 We dismiss th is appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. When the United States or its officer or age ncy is a party in a civil case , the notice of appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4 (a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court entered its order on June 29, 2020

. Thorne filed t he notice of appeal on September 16 , 2021

. 2 Because Thorne failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal.
We deny Thorne’s motion to appoint counsel and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED

1 We dismissed Thorne’s previously filed appeal for failure to prosecute. United States v. Thorne , No. 20

- 7065 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 2020) (unpublished order).

2 For the p urpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date Thorne could have delivered the notice to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c) (1) ; Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 , 276 (1988)

.
#### J. S. NOLEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUCCESSION OF L. M. DAVIDSON, C. O. Davidson, Administrator, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5934.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 28, 1939.

Goff & Goff, of Arcadia, for appellant.

Meadors & Gensler, of Homer, for ap-pellee.

HAMITER, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in this court, 190 So. 826, this day decided, the order of executory process issued herein is approved and affirmed. Appellant shall pay the costs of this appeal.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joseph Linyear, Appellant.

[807 NYS2d 651]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rosenzweig, J.), rendered May 11, 2004, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the defendant from entering into evidence a notarized, written statement of a nontestifying third party, who stated that the controlled substance found in the defendant’s car belonged to her and that the defendant did not know it was there. In order for a declaration against penal interest to be admissible at trial, the proponent must establish that: (1) the declarant was unavailable as a witness at trial, (2) when the statement was made the declarant was aware that it was adverse to his or her penal interest, (3) the declarant had competent knowledge of the facts underlying the statement, and (4) “most important, supporting circumstances independent of the statement itself must be present to attest to its trustworthiness and reliability” *(People v Settles,*46 NY2d 154, 167 [1978]; *see People v Brensic,*70 NY2d 9, 15 [1987]). The defendant submitted no evidence and made no offer of proof to establish that the declarant was unavailable *(see People v Brensic, supra; People v Settles, supra; People v Anderson,*153 AD2d 893, 896 [1989]). Moreover, the defendant failed to show supporting circumstances, independent of the statement, that would attest to its trustworthiness and reliability (s*ee People v Brensic, supra; People v Settles, supra).*

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Schmidt, J.P., Mastro, Spolzino and Covello, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Randolph L. Chambers

v. Criminal No. 07-fp-326

NH State Prison, Warden, et al.

O R D E R

Since it is clear that Mr. Chambers seeks immediate relief

and that he qualifies for in forma pauperis status, it is granted

and the case should be assigned. A supplemental order will issue

when his custodial account certificate arrives.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 17, 2007

cc: Randolph L. Chambers, pro se

Case 1:07-cv-00326-JL Document 4 Filed 10/17/07 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 1 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 2 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 3 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 4 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 5 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 6 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 7 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 8 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 9 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 10 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 11 of 12Case 1:06-cv-00286-JD Document 73-5 Filed 09/25/2008 Page 12 of 12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 07-cr-72-01-SM

Osuyuwamen Ojo

O R D E R

Defendant Ojo’s motion to continue the final pretrial conference and trial is

granted (document 8). Trial has been rescheduled for the July 2007 trial

period. Defendant Ojo shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights not later than

May 2, 2007. On the filing of such waiver, his continuance shall be effective. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: June 27, 2007 at 4:00 p.m.

Jury Selection: July 10, 2007 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:07-cr-00072-SM Document 9 Filed 04/25/07 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

April 25, 2007

cc: Bjorn Lange, Esq.

Terry Ollia, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:07-cr-00072-SM Document 9 Filed 04/25/07 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

 v. Civil No. 07-cv-97-SM

Stephen M. Price

O R D E R

I recuse myself from this case as Attorney Wilber Glahn is

on my recusal list. 

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

June 22, 2007

cc: Wendy Kisch, AUSA

Wilbur Glahn, III, Esq.

Case 1:07-cv-00097-DBH Document 5 Filed 06/22/07 Page 1 of 1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Marvin Sowell, Appellant.

[808 NYS2d 46]

*387Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald A. Zweibel, J.), rendered July 17, 2003, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of assault in the second degree (two counts), obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of four years, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. The evidence satisfied the “lawful duty” element of the applicable theory of second-degree assault (Penal Law § 120.05 [3]), the “official function” element of obstructing governmental administration (Penal Law § 195.05) and the “authorized arrest” element of resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30). The police accompanied defendant’s mother to her apartment for the purpose of serving an order of protection against defendant. When told of the order, defendant responded belligerently and, ignoring an officer’s suggestion that he calm down, repeatedly and aggressively sought to push past the officers and confront his mother. This provided probable cause for his arrest, and he violently resisted that lawful arrest, resulting in injuries to officers. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the officers’ lawful duty did not end with their service of the order, since defendant made clear his immediate intention to violate it, and the officers had a lawful duty to protect defendant’s mother from possible harm.

The court properly declined to charge justification, since there was no reasonable view of the evidence warranting such a charge. There is no evidence that defendant believed his use of force was necessary to defend himself against unlawful or excessive police force, or that such a belief was reasonable *(see People v Goetz,*68 NY2d 96 [1986]; *People v Watts, 57*NY2d 299 [1982]).

Nothing in the court’s responses to notes from the deliberat*388ing jury was coercive. To the extent that the court’s instruction to the jury to follow the law made brief reference to a particular unnamed juror, this was prompted by the content of the notes, in which the other jurors complained about this juror’s behavior *(see People v Lussier,*298 AD2d 763, 764-765 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 630 [2003]). The court did not exhort that juror or any other juror to reach a verdict, to accept any particular view of the facts, or to surrender conscientiously held beliefs.

We have considered and rejected defendant’s remaining claims. Concur—Sullivan, J.P., Nardelli, Catterson, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

No. 07-CV-00039-SM

v.

ERIC JAEGER, JERRY A. SHANAHAN,

Defendants.

PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST DEFENDANT JERRY SHANAHAN

The Securities and Exchange Commission having filed a Complaint and Defendant Jerry 

Shanahan (“Defendant”) having entered a general appearance; consented to the Court’s 

jurisdiction over Defendant and the subject matter of this action; consented to entry of this Final 

Judgment without admitting or denying the allegations of the Complaint (except as to 

jurisdiction); waived findings of fact and conclusions of law; and waived any right to appeal 

from this Final Judgment:

I.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant and 

Defendant’s agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or 

participation with them who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or 

otherwise are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating, directly or indirectly, Section 

13(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5)] 

and Rule 13b2-1 promulgated thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240. 13b2-1], by knowingly 

Case 1:07-cv-00039-SM Document 353-2 Filed 02/21/13 Page 1 of 2
2

circumventing or knowingly failing to implement a system of internal accounting controls or 

knowingly falsifying any book, record, or account described in paragraph 2 of Section 13(b)(2) 

of the Exchange Act.

II.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all other claims are 

dismissed.

III.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Court shall retain 

jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of enforcing the terms of this Final Judgment.

IV. 

There being no just reason for delay, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the Clerk is ordered to enter this Final Judgment forthwith and without further notice.

Dated: ______________, _____

____________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

Case 1:07-cv-00039-SM Document 353-2 Filed 02/21/13 Page 2 of 2
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

The undersigned executive officer of MCSi, Inc. (the "Registrant") hereby certifies that the Registrant's Form 10-Q for the three months
ended September 30, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained therein fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of the operations of the Registrant.

|                       |  | /s/IRA H. STANLEYName: Ira H. Stanley
Title: Chief Financial Officer
|---------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date November 13, 2002 |  |                                                                     

---

QuickLinks
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texa s

December 22, 2016

No. 04

- 16

- 00241

- CR

Cody Allen WATERS, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015CR1094 Honorable Raymond Angelini, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

After Appellant’s court

- appointed counsel missed deadlines to file the brief, we abated this appeal and remanded it to the trial court for an abandonment hearing. The trial court held a hearing as ordered ; it filed a supplemental clerk’s record containing findings of fact and conclusions of law . The court reporter filed a supplemental reporter’s record of the hearing

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(b)(3). The trial court found the following:

 A ppellant wishes t o prosecute his appeal

,

 A ppellant ’s court

- appointed counsel Andrea Polunsky did not abandon the appeal,

 Andrea Polunsky’s motion to withdraw was granted, and

 Suzanne Kramer was appointed to represent Appellant in this appeal.

W e REINSTATE the appellate timetable in th is appeal. We ORDER A ppellant’s court

appointed counsel Suzanne Kramer to file A ppellant’s brief with this court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order

.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
court on t his 22nd day of December, 2016

.___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Industrial Communications

and Electronics, Inc., et al.

v. Civil No. 07-cv-00082-JL

Town of Alton

 O R D E R

In light of the intervenors' failure to agree to the

proposed settlement (see document # 65), the intervenors are

ordered to file a memorandum regarding their continued standing

in this matter following such a settlement under applicable law. 

"[A]n intervenor's right to continue a suit in the absence of the

party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon

a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of

Art. III.” Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (ruling

that a citizen lacked standing to continue to pursue an appeal

defending the constitutionality of a state law which the state

itself had abandoned); see also United States v. AVX Corp., 962

F.2d 108, 112-120 (1st Cir. 1992) (ruling that citizens' group,

though permitted to intervene in government's suit against

polluters for cleanup costs under CERCLA, lacked standing to

challenge their consent decree resolving the case). The filing

will be limited to 15 pages, excluding exhibits, and due on or

before March 16, 2010. Responses, if any, subject to same

Case 1:07-cv-00082-JL Document 67 Filed 03/09/10 Page 1 of 2
limitation are due March 23, 2010. Relief from this schedule, if

necessary, should be jointly requested.

SO ORDERED.

 

Joseph N. Laplante

United States District Judge

Dated: March 9, 2010

cc: Steven E. Grill, Esq.

Anthony S. Augeri, Esq.

Katherine Blackall Miller, Esq.

Robert D. Ciandella, Esq.

Robert M. Derosier, Esq.

Paul T. Fitzgerald, Esq.

2

Case 1:07-cv-00082-JL Document 67 Filed 03/09/10 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Kristvn Graham

V.

NH State Prison et al

D

.

DISTR CT OFCN .HRT

FILE D

2D0 8 MAR 2 1 P4-- 0 1

Case No. 01-cv-295-PB

ORDE R

The Plaintiff has recently filed three documents captioned as follows : Ex Parte Motion

for Court Appointed Counsel Due to Transfer to County Facility ; Ex Parte Motion to Extend

Time to Amend Pleadings and Intervene ; and Ex Parte Motion for Relief or in Alternative House

Arrest. Upon a review of the pleading, the court finds there is no basis to submit these

documents on an ex parte basis. Thus, these motions are denied without prejudice . The Plaintiff

may refile and serve these motions in conformance with Fed . R. Civ. P. 5 (d)(1) and LR 1.1 .

SO ORDERED.

Date: March 4 2008

cc: Kristyn Graham, pro se

James Kennedy, Esq.

Case 1:07-cv-00295-PB Document 47 Filed 03/27/08 Page 1 of 1
#### In the Matter of Mikal Ameen, Petitioner, v Donald Selsky, as Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Programs, Respondent.

[807 NYS2d 318]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with possessing a weapon after a nail six inches in length and taped at one end was found in his locker. He was found guilty of the charge following a tier III disciplinary hearing and the determination was affirmed on administrative appeal. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

We confirm. Substantial evidence, consisting of the misbehavior report, hearing testimony and documentary evidence, supports the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Vines v*Goord, 19 AD3d 951, 952 [2005]; *Matter of Sanchez v Goord,*300 AD2d 956 [2002]). The fact that the weapon was found in an area under petitioner’s control supports the inference that it belonged to him *(see Matter of Charles v Selsky,*13 AD3d 861, 862 [2004]; *Matter of Cummings v Goord,*10 AD3d 748, 749 [2004]). Petitioner’s claim that the weapon had been planted by other inmates presented a credibility issue for the hearing officer to resolve *(see Matter of Alston v Goord,*4 AD3d 708, 709 [2004]).

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Spain, Mugglin and Kane, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. 06-cr-208-01-JD

Tyler James, et al

O R D E R

The assented to motion to reschedule jury trial (document no.

59) filed by defendant is granted.

Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights within 10

days. The court finds that the ends of justice served by granting

a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the

defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3131(h)(8)(B)(iv), for the

reasons set forth in the motion.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. 

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

Date: April 23, 2007

cc: James Gleason, Esq.

John Pendelton, Esq.

Ash S. Joshi, Esq.

Gary J. Hill, Esq.

Kenneth P. Glidden, Esq.

Sven D. Wiberg, Esq.

Terry L. Ollila, Esq.

U.S. Marshal

U.S. Probation

Case 1:06-cr-00208-JD Document 60 Filed 04/23/07 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:06-cr-00208-JD Document 60 Filed 04/23/07 Page 2 of 2