IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DAVID STAMBAUGH, 

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

DONALD BUTLER, acting in his capacity as Director of the 

Arizona Department of Agriculture; ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF 

AGRICULTURE, an agency of the State of Arizona; SUZETTE TAYLOR, 

acting in her capacity as State Brand Clerk at the Arizona Department of 

Agriculture; STATE OF ARIZONA; and EUREKA SPRINGS CATTLE 

CO., LLC, an Arizona limited liability company and real party in interest, 

Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0817

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV 2012-017523

The Honorable John Christian Rea, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Salmon Lewis & Weldon, PLC, Phoenix

By Paul R. Orme, Mark A. McGinnis, R. Jeffrey Heilman

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Aaron Thompson

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Donald Butler, Suzette Taylor, Arizona Dept. 

of Agriculture and State of Arizona 
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined, and to which Judge Kenton D. 

Jones dissented.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 David Stambaugh appeals the superior court’s ruling 

upholding the recording by Defendants Donald Butler, Suzette Taylor, the 

Arizona Department of Agriculture (Department) and the State of Arizona

(collectively, Defendants) of the Eureka Springs Cattle Co. livestock brand. 

The Eureka Springs brand is identical to Stambaugh’s brand, but placed in 

a different location on the animal. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Stambaugh is the owner in Arizona of the bar seven brand1

applied to the left hip of his cattle. Eureka Springs owns the bar seven 

brand in California applied to the left rib of its cattle. Eureka Springs 

wanted to move its cattle from California to Arizona without rebranding its 

herd.2 Therefore, Eureka Springs applied to the Department to use the bar 

seven brand in Arizona on the left rib. 

¶3 According to the record, the Department in the past has 

approved requests to record brands that are identical to other recorded 

brands, as long as the new application specifies that the brand will be 

placed on a different location of the animal (i.e., left or right ribs, hip or 

shoulder). When it received Eureka Springs’ brand application, the 

Department researched potential conflicts and noted Stambaugh’s existing

bar seven brand. Even though the Eureka Springs brand is identical to 

Stambaugh’s, the Department decided to accept Eureka Springs’ brand for 

recording because its brand would be placed on a different location; 

Stambaugh’s on the left hip of a cow and Eureka Springs’ on the left rib.

 

1 The appearance of the bar seven brand resembles -7. Stambaugh’s 

cattle are located in Eastern Pinal County.

2 After its brand was recorded, Eureka Springs moved its cattle into

Western Graham County.
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Opinion of the Court

3

The Department also noted the Eureka Springs brand was not so similar to 

any other brand on the left rib that the brand could be converted or cattle 

could be misidentified. The Department then publicly advertised Eureka 

Springs’ request to record its brand. 

¶4 After learning of the Eureka Springs application, Stambaugh 

filed a protest. The Department denied Stambaugh’s protest and issued a 

certificate to Eureka Springs signifying its approval and recording of the 

bar seven brand applied on the left ribs of cattle.

¶5 Stambaugh then filed suit challenging the Department’s 

recording of Eureka Springs’ bar seven brand, and the parties moved for 

summary judgment. The superior court granted the Defendants’ motion in 

part, explaining that “A.R.S. § 3-1261 and related statutes give the 

[Department] and its employees discretion, as a matter of law, to consider 

the location of a brand on an animal in determining whether two brands 

are of the same design or figure.” The superior court remanded the matter 

to the Department to conduct a hearing on the brand and the protest. 

Stambaugh timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes 

(A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.1 (West 2016).3

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 

summary judgment was granted. Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12 

(2003). We also review issues of statutory construction de novo. Short v. 

Dewald, 226 Ariz. 88, 93-94, ¶ 26 (App. 2010). “If a statute’s language is clear 

and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other methods of 

statutory interpretation.” Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268 (1994).

“However, if more than one plausible interpretation of a statute exists, we 

typically employ tools of statutory interpretation.” Haag v. Steinle, 227 Ariz. 

212, 214, ¶ 9 (App. 2011). Such tools include “the statute’s context, its 

language, subject matter and historical background, its effects and 

consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” Id. In addition, when “the 

legislature has not spoken definitively to the issue at hand, ‘considerable 

weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a 

statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.’” Ariz. Water Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Water Res., 208 Ariz. 147, 155, ¶ 30 (2004) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 

 

3 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Opinion of the Court

4

Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). The Department’s 

interpretation is not infallible, however, and courts remain the final 

authority in an issue of statutory construction. U.S. Parking Sys. v. City of 

Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211 (App. 1989).

I. Arizona Livestock Branding Statutes

¶7 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 3-1261:

A. Every person owning range livestock in this state shall 

adopt and record a brand[.]

B. No two brands of the same design or figure shall be 

adopted or recorded, but the associate director may, in his 

discretion, reject and refuse to record a brand or mark similar 

to or conflicting with a previously adopted and recorded 

brand or mark. 

. . . 

G. It is unlawful to apply a recorded brand in any location on 

an animal except as specified on the brand registration 

certificate. The application of a brand in any other location is 

the equivalent of the use of an unrecorded brand. 

¶8 The Arizona legislature has given the Department “general 

supervision over the livestock interests of the state, [including] protect[ing]

the livestock industry from theft.” A.R.S. § 3-1203.A. Livestock brands help 

prevent theft by identifying the owners of livestock. See A.R.S. §§ 3-1267.B 

(“The appearance upon an animal of the recorded brand of the owner as 

shown by the record shall be received in the courts of this state as prima 

facie evidence that the animal bearing the brand is the property of the 

owner of the recorded brand . . . .”); -1371.1 (“The question of ownership 

may be raised . . . [if] [t]he livestock is not branded as required by this 

chapter.”). 

¶9 The recording of a brand “shall consist of depicting a facsimile 

of the brand adopted . . . [and] the place upon the livestock or other animals 

where the brand is proposed to be used.” A.R.S. § 3-1262.A. When the 

Department approves and records a brand, it issues a registration 

certificate, see A.R.S. § 3-1266, which specifies where the brand must be 

applied on the animal. The Department is also authorized to issue brand 

books, A.R.S. § 3-1268, which identify recorded brands and note where they 

are to be applied to their owners’ livestock. 
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Opinion of the Court

5

¶10 To protect brands and the function they serve, the legislature 

has criminalized misconduct related to brand usage. For example, it is a 

crime to brand “livestock with an unrecorded, cancelled, suspended or 

forfeited brand[,]” A.R.S. § 3-1269.A, to brand livestock “with a brand other 

than the recorded brand of the owner,” A.R.S. § 3-1304, or to apply a 

recorded brand in a location other than that specified on the brand 

registration certificate, A.R.S. § 3-1261.G.

II. Analysis

¶11 The narrow issue the superior court decided is whether the 

Arizona livestock branding statutes grant the Department discretion to 

consider the location a brand is to be applied on an animal when deciding 

if a proposed brand is of the “same design or figure” as another under 

A.R.S. § 3-1261.B. Stambaugh contends that “[A.R.S.] § 3-1261.B is a plain 

and unambiguous directive from the Arizona Legislature that prohibits the 

[Department] from recording duplicate brands with the ‘same design or 

figure,’” regardless of where on an animal a brand is to be applied. In 

contrast, the Department asserts that, “[g]iven A.R.S. § 3-1261(G), it is at the 

very least unclear whether the Legislature intended to allow the 

Department to consider a brand’s location in determining whether the 

brand consists of the ‘same’ design or figure as an existing brand[.]” We 

agree with the Department that the statute is ambiguous. 

¶12 In discerning the meaning and significance of the term “same 

design or figure” in A.R.S. § 3-1261.B, we cannot disregard the repeated 

references in A.R.S. § 3-1261 and surrounding statutes to the significance of 

the location at which a brand is approved for placement on the owner’s

livestock. Although Stambaugh argues the first clause of A.R.S. § 3-1261.B

(“No two brands of the same design or figure shall be adopted or 

recorded”) establishes the sole basis on which the Department is to decide 

whether to approve a brand, other statutes in the same chapter and article

distinguish brands based on their location on livestock. As recited above, 

subpart G of the same statute provides that “application of a brand in any 

other location is the equivalent of the use of an unrecorded brand.” A.R.S. 

§ 3-1261.G. Subsection G’s reference to an “unrecorded brand” indicates 

that an owner’s choice of where a brand will be placed on the animal is part 

of the brand that the Department ultimately accepts and records.

¶13 Other statutes in the same chapter and article relating to 

branding also undercut Stambaugh’s contention that we must read the first 

clause of A.R.S. § 3-1261.B in isolation. For example, A.R.S § 3-1262.A 

requires that the record of a brand must contain a designation of where the 
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

brand is to be placed on livestock. Under A.R.S. § 3-1267.B, a brand must 

be applied to its recorded location to constitute prima facie evidence of 

ownership of the livestock. Sections 3-1262.A, -1267.B and -1261.G mandate 

that the designated location at which an owner applies a brand is a legally 

enforceable requirement that, along with the design and figure of the brand, 

combine to create the brand that the Department may accept for recording.4 

Additionally, the second clause of A.R.S. § 3-1261.B (“the associate director 

may, in his discretion, reject and refuse to record a brand or mark similar to 

or conflicting with a previously adopted and recorded brand”) expressly 

grants the Department discretion in determining whether a proposed brand 

conflicts with one already recorded. When read in context to achieve a

consistent interpretation, these statutes make clear that the Department 

may consider a brand’s location when determining if duplicate brands are 

“of the same design or figure.”

¶14 Our interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the 

Arizona livestock branding statutes. The purpose of livestock branding is 

to identify ownership of livestock and thereby help prevent their theft. See 

A.R.S. §§ 3-1267.B, -1203.A. Therefore, the statutes do not allow the 

Department to approve conflicting brands of the “same design or figure”

because such brands would not then identify livestock ownership and 

prevent theft. It follows, then, that the Department has discretion to accept 

and record a brand that is similar to another already approved brand, as 

long as the new brand can identify livestock ownership and prevent theft.

See Hoyle v. Super. Ct., 161 Ariz. 224, 227 (App. 1989) (“What a statute 

necessarily implies is as much a part of the statute as what the statute 

specifically expresses.”). A brand that is similar to another can be rendered 

distinctive if it is required to be applied in a different location than the other. 

Therefore, the purpose of the statutes is achieved if the Department can 

consider location when determining whether a proposed brand is of the 

same “design or figure” as a brand already recorded. 

 

4 Brand location must also be designated on numerous documents 

incidental to the administration of brands. For instance, location is 

designated on brand applications and brand certificates, advertisements of 

proposed brands, bills of sale for brands, brand lease forms, and 

instruments of distribution if the brand is part of decedent’s estate.

Livestock self-inspection certificates also identify the brand’s location. See 

Arizona Administrative Code R3-2-702.C.1.g.
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Opinion of the Court

7

¶15 Furthermore, evidence in the record indicates that the 

Department has long interpreted the branding statutes to allow it to 

consider the location at which brands are to be applied when it determines 

whether a proposed brand is of the same design or figure as a recorded 

brand.

5 “In circumstances like these, in which the legislature has not 

spoken definitively to the issue at hand, ‘considerable weight should be 

accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme 

it is entrusted to administer.’” Ariz. Water Co., 208 Ariz. at 155, ¶ 30 (quoting 

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844). This is particularly true when, as here, 

the Department’s construction of the statute is “long continued,” see City of

Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. 290, 296 (1964); Long v. Dick, 87 Ariz. 25, 

28-29 (1959); and when a contrary outcome would upset settled 

understandings, see Dupnick v. MacDougall, 136 Ariz. 39, 44 (1983) (“Where 

there has been such a background of acquiescence in the meaning of a law 

unless manifestly erroneous, we will not disturb it.”); Bohannan v. Corp.

Comm’n, 82 Ariz. 299, 382 (1957) (“Uniform acquiescence of meaning, if it is 

not manifestly erroneous, will not be disturbed, at least in cases of doubt, 

for injustices are likely to result after a long period of time during which 

many rights will necessarily have been acquired.”); Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. 

v. State, 184 Ariz. 533, 535 (App. 1995) (“[I]f an executive office that 

administers a statute interprets it a certain way and acquiesces in that 

meaning for many years, the appellate courts will not disturb that 

interpretation unless it is manifestly erroneous.”). Deposition testimony 

and brand books in the record demonstrate that, for many decades, the 

Department has exercised discretion to approve duplicate brands as long 

as they are required to be applied in different locations, and we accord 

considerable weight to that construction of the statutes. Based on the record 

before us, to now invalidate the manner in which the Department has 

 

5 Contrary to the dissent’s contention, the statute’s ambiguity is not 

created by longstanding “misapplication” by the Department. The 

ambiguity exists by virtue of the language of A.R.S. § 3-1261 and related 

statutes, read in context with each other. Accordingly, we must look, inter 

alia, to the Department’s longstanding construction of the statutes. To do 

otherwise might render invalid hundreds of brands the Department 

accepted for recording over the past several decades based on their owners’ 

promises to apply the brands in different locations than prior similar 

recorded brands were to be applied. 
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Opinion of the Court

8

construed the statutes over many decades would cause havoc with untold 

numbers of recorded brands.6 

¶16 Stambaugh argues that A.R.S. § 3-1261.G has no bearing on 

subsection B because the provisions are not codependent and do not 

reference each other, and because A.R.S. § 3-1262.A is “simply a procedural 

directive.” We interpret a statute’s various provisions in context with each 

other to achieve a consistent interpretation. Koss Corp. v. Am. Express Co., 

233 Ariz. 74, 79, ¶ 12 (App. 2013). Thus, although subsections A and G do 

not expressly reference each other, we must construe them together to 

achieve consistency. See id. Construed in that manner, A.R.S. § 3-1261.G 

bears on subsection B by suggesting that a brand’s location is a 

distinguishing component of a recorded brand. 

¶17 Our interpretation also does not “render[] the first and 

primary phrase of [A.R.S. § 3-1261.B] meaningless and nonoperational,” as 

Stambaugh asserts. Read as a whole, the statutes prohibit the Department 

from approving brands of the same design or figure because such brands 

do not identify livestock ownership and prevent theft. See A.R.S. 

§§ 3-1261.B; -1267.B; -1203.A. Two identical brands applied at the same 

location on an animal are “of the same design or figure,” and are prohibited 

because they cannot identify ownership or prevent theft. Id. But the 

converse also is true: the Department’s longstanding practice of accepting 

similar brands that are applied in different locations on their owners’

livestock serves the statutes’ purpose of identifying ownership and 

preventing theft.

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

judgment.

J O N E S, Judge, dissenting:

¶19 The unambiguous language of a statute is not made 

ambiguous simply by virtue of its longstanding misapplication. In Arizona, 

persons owning range livestock are required to adopt and record a brand 

with the Arizona Department of Agriculture (the Department), which they 

 

6 Brand books from as early as 1908 list brands accepted for recording 

that are similar in appearance but approved for application at different 

locations on their owners’ livestock. 
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Jones, J., Dissenting

9

may then affix to their livestock to provide evidence of ownership. A.R.S. 

§§ 3-1261(A), -1267(B), -1371(1), (4). Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) 

§ 3-1261(B) unequivocally states, “[n]o two brands of the same design or 

figure shall be adopted or recorded.” 

¶20 Here, the parties agree the bar seven brands issued by the 

Department to both Stambaugh and Eureka Springs are identical; Eureka 

Springs argues, however, its placement of the brand on the left rib rather 

than the left hip of its livestock makes the brand different in “design or 

figure” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 3-1261(B). The fact that other 

portions of A.R.S. § 3-1261 regulate the location of a brand does not modify 

the unambiguously plain and ordinary language of A.R.S. § 3-1261(B). See

SFPP, L.P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 210 Ariz. 151, 155, ¶ 19 (App. 2005) 

(“When a term is undefined by the legislature, we strive to apply the plain 

and ordinary meaning of the words used unless a contrary intent is 

expressed by the legislature.”) (citing State v. Hoggatt, 199 Ariz. 440, 443, 

¶ 8 (App. 2001)). We look to an established, widely respected dictionary to 

deduce a word’s plain and ordinary meaning. See Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Pima 

Cnty., 178 Ariz. 215, 219 (App. 1994) (citing State v. Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 470 

(1983)). The phrase “design or figure” excludes consideration of placement; 

both “design” and “figure” are defined to include only a pattern, shape, or 

pictorial representation. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the 

English Language 491, 656 (5th ed. 2011) (defining “design” as “a drawing 

or sketch,” “[a] graphic representation,” or “[a]n ornamental pattern”; and 

defining “figure” as “[a] written or printed symbol representing something 

other than a letter,” “[a] pictorial or sculptural representation,” or “[a]n 

illustration printed from an engraved plate or block”).

¶21 Those statutes regulating placement of the brand are not 

rendered meaningless by the exclusion of a brand’s location from the

analysis of whether two brands are “of the same design or figure.” The 

requirement that a particular brand be placed in a specific location provides 

an additional measure of protection to the owner of the livestock by 

requiring, first, the application of a particular, unique design previously 

approved by and recorded with the Department, and second, that the 

particular, unique design be applied to the animal in a specific location.7 

 

7 For this reason, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that its 

interpretation furthers the purpose of Arizona’s livestock branding statutes 

— “to identify ownership of livestock and thereby help prevent their theft.” 

See supra ¶ 14. The majority merges two separate and meaningful 
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Jones, J., Dissenting

10

The dual requirements also assist anyone seeking to identify the owner of 

livestock by directing him to a specific location for the evidence of 

ownership. 

¶22 Additionally, although the Department is granted some 

discretion in determining whether brands are “of the same design or 

figure,” that discretion has been narrowly defined by the legislature. 

Specifically, the Department may exercise its discretion only to “reject and 

refuse to record a brand or mark similar to or conflicting with a previously 

adopted and recorded brand or mark.” A.R.S. § 3-1261(B). This limited 

discretion does not allow the Department to accept and record identical 

brands simply because they are to be placed in different locations. Instead, 

it only allows the Department to be more restrictive than otherwise stated, 

and reject brands that are not even necessarily “the same,” but merely

“similar.” 

¶23 The Department is not afforded deference where its 

implementation of legislative directives contravenes their clear language. 

See Ariz. Water Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 208 Ariz. 147, 155, ¶ 31 (2004)

(noting judicial deference is granted to an administrative agency’s 

interpretation of a statute where the “statutory language is . . . not 

dispositive”); Kobold v. Aetna Life Ins., 239 Ariz. 259, 262, ¶9 (App. 2016) 

(noting an agency’s interpretation is granted deference only if “the statute 

is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” and “the agency’s 

interpretation is reasonable”) (first quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); then citing United States v. Mead 

Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)); Dewitt v. Magma Copper Co., 16 Ariz. App. 

305, 308 (1972) (holding a “prior [administrative] construction is not 

determinative [where] the statutes contain a sufficiently clear statement of 

legislative intent”). Indeed, “our deference to tradition cannot blind us to 

the fact” that, now that the Department’s practice has been challenged, it 

does not conform to the statute. Colonial Life, 184 Ariz. at 535; see also Golder 

v. Dep’t of Revenue, State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 123 Ariz. 260, 264 (1979) (“No 

case law exists, nor any logic which would support the perpetuation of 

faulty administrative proceedings merely for the sake of uniformity.”). 

Because the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we must apply 

it as written. Tobel v. State, Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 189 Ariz. 168, 174 (App. 

 

components of livestock identification — the unique brand and its specific 

location — and then ultimately disregards the requirement that the brands 

be unique to the owners, leaving only the location of the brand to fulfill the 

statutes’ purpose.
STAMBAUGH v. BUTLER et al.

Jones, J., Dissenting

11

1997) (quoting Chaparral Dev. v. RMED Int’l, Inc., 170 Ariz. 309, 311 (App. 

1991)). The Department’s contrary interpretation of an unambiguous 

statute, while long-held, is manifestly erroneous. 

¶24 Under the plain and unambiguous language of A.R.S. 

§ 3-1261(B), the Department did not have discretion to approve Eureka 

Springs’ brand — the bar seven — because its “design or figure” is identical 

to Stambaugh’s previously recorded bar seven brand. I have no doubt that 

both the Department and the cattle growers are capable of distinguishing 

between a cow with a bar seven branded on its left hip and a cow with a 

bar seven branded on its left rib. But that is not the question presented here. 

The language of the statute simply does not permit the Department to issue 

the identical bar seven brand to two entities. And while everyone but 

Stambaugh may be comfortable with a course of practice at odds with the 

language of the statute, it is solely within the purview of the legislature, 

rather than the courts, to correct the discord between the language of the 

statute and its longstanding, but inappropriate, application. 

¶25 The Department has violated the clear and unambiguous 

language of A.R.S. § 3-1261(B) by approving Eureka Springs’ application 

for a bar seven brand identical to that previously approved and recorded 

for Stambaugh’s use. I would reverse the order of the superior court and 

direct the entry of judgment in favor of Stambaugh.