UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Jai Taal

v. Case No. 05-cv-82-PB

Hannaford Bros. Co.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Jai Taal alleges that her former employer,

Hannaford Bros. Co. (“Hannaford”), engaged in acts of racial

discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hannaford moves

for summary judgment, arguing that Taal’s claims are either

barred by the applicable statute of limitations or there is no

evidence to support them. Taal objects and has filed her own

motion for summary judgment. Because I agree with Hannaford, I

grant its motion and deny Taal’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Taal, an African-American woman, was employed at a grocery

store owned by Hannaford from 1995 to 2002. Compl. ¶ 1. Taal

claims that during the course of her employment, Hannaford 

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discriminated against her on the basis of race by paying her on a

different wage scale than other employees, not giving her costof-living adjustments, not giving her any training or career

development opportunities, not nominating her to any committees

(such as the “Culture Committee”), and giving her an unfair work

load. Id. ¶¶ 4-8. She also claims that she was subjected to a

hostile work environment. In one instance, a co-worker allegedly

placed a stuffed monkey at Taal’s workstation and, after she

complained, the department manager allegedly replaced the stuffed

animal with a picture of herself dressed as a member of the Ku

Klux Klan. Id. ¶ 2. Finally, Taal claims that an assistant

manager retaliated against her by giving negative references to

potential employers. Id. ¶ 9. Taal resigned from her position

with Hannaford in March 2002.

Taal filed her complaint with this court on March 15, 2005,

after the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission (NHHRC) made a

finding of no probable cause and the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter. I dismissed

Taal’s Title VII claims because they were not timely filed. See

Order dated July 8, 2005 (Doc. No. 20). Hannaford now moves for

summary judgment on her § 1981 claims.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I construe

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 

Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2001). 

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial

responsibility of . . . identifying those portions of [the

record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden

shifts to the adverse party to “produce evidence on which a

reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof burden,

could base a verdict for it; if that party cannot produce such

evidence, the motion must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol

Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir. 1996). The “adverse

party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the

adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response . . .

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must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Evidence that is

“merely colorable, or is not significantly probative” is

insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249 (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Disparate Treatment

I analyze Taal’s disparate treatment claims by using the

familiar burden-shifting framework first established in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must

establish a prima facie case, which in turn gives rise

to an inference of discrimination. The employer then

must state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its decision. If the employer can state such a reason,

the inference of discrimination disappears and the

plaintiff is required to show that the employer’s

stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 212 (1st Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted). “The ultimate question in every employment

discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is

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whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional

discrimination.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).

1. Pay discrimination

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in

terms of pay, Taal must show that: (1) she is a member of a

protected class; (2) she performed her job in keeping with her

employer’s expectations; and (3) she was paid less than similarly

situated employees who held the same position. See Rathbun v.

Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 77 (1st Cir. 2004); Begovic v. Water

Pik Techs., Inc., 2005 DNH 59, 2005 WL 768595, at *7 (D.N.H.

April 6, 2005). Taal alleges that she “and other African

American employees [were] on a different wage scale and job

description” and “made substantially less than other white

employees, who performed the same if not less duties.” Compl. ¶

4. She also alleges that she “was never eligible” for the

company’s cost-of-living raises. Id. ¶ 7. 

Taal attempts to support her claims of disparate pay with a

copy of her wage record, which shows that between December 15,

1995 and May 1, 1999, her hourly wage increased from $4.50 to

$7.65. Pl. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8. Hannaford has provided further

Case 1:05-cv-00082-PB Document 53 Filed 01/19/06 Page 5 of 11
 Because Hannaford uses different wage scales for full-time 1

and part-time employees, a full-time employee holding the same

position as Taal may have received a higher hourly wage. 

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documentation to show that as of May 2001, Taal was paid $8.45

per hour. Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G to Toner Aff. This pay rate

was consistent with the company’s pay scale for part-time

employees at that store location. Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, Part

4. 

Despite the fact that her pay rate increased periodically

throughout the course of her employment, Taal contends that other

employees doing the same work made more than she did. Pl. Mot.

Summ. J. at 5. However, she does not cite any specific examples

of similarly situated employees who held the same position and

received a higher wage. Even assuming that Taal could establish

a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Hannaford explains

that any apparent wage discrepancies were due to the fact that

the employees who were paid more either held different positions

or worked full-time.1 Toner Aff. ¶ 10. 

Where, as here, the plaintiff in a disparate treatment

race discrimination case offers comparative evidence in

[her] quest to raise an inference of racial

discrimination, [she] must provide a suitable

provenance for the evidence by showing that others

similarly situated to [her] in all relevant respects

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were treated differently by the employer.

 

Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1999). 

Taal’s attempt to compare herself with employees who do not

closely resemble her in all relevant aspects is insufficient to

meet her burden of showing that any wage discrepancies were the

result of racial animus. Thus, Hannaford is entitled to summary

judgment on Taal’s pay discrimination claim.

2. Failure to promote

To prove her failure-to-promote claim, Taal must show that:

(1) she is a member of a protected class who (2) was qualified

for an open position for which she applied, but (3) was rejected

(4) in favor of someone possessing similar qualifications. See

Rathbun, 361 F.3d at 71. Taal concedes that she never applied

for a promotion, but she claims that this was because Hannaford

did not advertise openings for higher positions. Pl. Obj. to

Mot. Summ. J. at 3. Nonetheless, she has not presented any

evidence that she was denied a position in favor of someone who

was similarly qualified. Thus, she has not met her minimal

burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment. 

Likewise, to the extent that Taal claims she was treated

differently from similarly situated employees in other respects,

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including training and career development, her bare allegations

do not suffice to establish a prima facie case of disparate

treatment. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6. 

3. Retaliation

In her complaint, Taal alleged that an assistant manager

retaliated against her by giving negative references to potential

employers. Compl. ¶ 9. Although Hannaford did not address this

claim directly in its motion, Hannaford sought summary judgment

on all of Taal’s § 1981 claims. Hannaford’s summary judgment

materials reveal that the assistant manager remembers receiving a

call from a potential employer and she directed the caller to

contact Hannaford’s headquarters in Scarborough, Maine, because

she could not provide a reference at the store level. Def. Mem.

of Law in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, Part 1, at 5. Taal has

not provided any evidence to contradict Hannaford’s version of

this incident. Thus, I propose to grant summary judgment unless,

within 10 days, Taal files supplemental material that comports

with Rule 56 and demonstrates that a genuine factual dispute

exists as to this claim. See Fed. R. Civ P. 56. 

Case 1:05-cv-00082-PB Document 53 Filed 01/19/06 Page 8 of 11
 The “beans” comment allegedly derives from an incident in 2

which Texaco’s senior management referred to African-American

employees as black jelly beans.

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B. Hostile work environment

To prove her hostile work environment claim, Taal must show

“that she was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment that

materially altered the conditions of her employment.” Noviello

v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92 (1st Cir. 2005). A § 1981

claim of hostile work environment is subject to the four-year

statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Jones v. R.R.

Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382-83 (2004). Thus, Taal’s

claim is time-barred if it is based solely on incidents that

occurred more than four years before she filed her complaint on

March 15, 2005. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 117 (2002).

On January 9, 2001, Taal sent a letter to Hannaford’s

Executive Vice President that described incidents in which coworkers allegedly placed a stuffed monkey at her workstation and

referred to her as the “Black sheep” and the “Beans”. A Human 2

Resource Specialist investigated the incidents and, after

receiving conflicting stories from other Hannaford employees,

Case 1:05-cv-00082-PB Document 53 Filed 01/19/06 Page 9 of 11
 According to the NHHRC’s investigation, the incident in 3

which a co-worker allegedly dressed as a Ku Klux Klansman

occurred in February 2001. Taal’s Complaint does not mention any

other specific incidents of harassment that occurred after she

sent the January 2001 letter.

 Taal’s request for summary judgment on the basis that 4

Hannaford has not complied with discovery deadlines is denied

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deemed the matter inconclusive. Pl. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 5. In

April 2001, Taal sent a letter to Hannaford’s Director of Human

Resources stating that she disagreed with some of the conclusions

from the investigation. Pl. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 7. She also

stated, however, that “the harassment has stopped and, I now work

in an acceptable environment.” Id. The letter concluded: “To

sum it up I am pleased that you ensured that I work in a harassfree [sic] environment.” Id. 

Although Taal argues that Hannaford engaged in a “consistent

continuous violation,” she has not presented any evidence of

harassing incidents that occurred after March 15, 2001. Pl. 3

Obj. to Mot. Summ. J. at 4. As a result, her hostile work

environment claim is time-barred. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Taal’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 31) is denied.4

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because these issues have been addressed in the court’s orders on

the parties’ motions to compel discovery. Her request for oral

argument (Doc. No. 48) is also denied because it will not assist

in the resolution of the pending motions. See LR 7.1(d). 

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Hannaford’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 38) is granted

except as to Taal’s retaliation claim, on which I will grant

summary judgment if Taal does not provide, within 10 days,

supplemental material that demonstrates that a genuine factual

dispute exists as to this claim.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

January 19, 2006

cc: Jai Taal, pro se

William B. Pribis, Esq.

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