IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PAMELA FORD

, :

: Plaintiff, : C.A. No. K19C

- 12

- 030 JJC

: In and for Kent County

v. :

: SEDGWICK CLAIMS : MANAGEMENT SERVICES

, : INC., and LOWE’S HOME : CENTERS, INC.

, :

Defendant s

. :

OPINION AND ORDER

Submitted: April 7 , 2020 Decided: May 20 , 2020

Defendant

s ’ Motion for Summary Judgment

– GRANTED

John S. Spadaro, Esquire, John Sheeha n Spadaro, LLC, Smyrna, Delaware

, Attorney for Plaintiff

. David C. Malatesta, Esquire, Kent & McBride, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants

.

Clark, J.2

Defendants Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. and Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc. (hereinafter collectively “Sedgwick”) seek summary judgment in this

insurance bad faith suit

. Sedgwick argues that P laintiff Pamela Ford’s suit should

be dismissed because it violates the rule against claim splitting. Ms. Ford had previously filed a suit seeking unpaid bills , int erest, and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Huffman v. C.C. Oliphant & Son, Inc.

. 1 She settled that claim one year after she

filed it. Approximately three weeks later

, she filed this bad faith action. Because

Ms. Ford’s Huffman claim and bad faith claim inv olve the same nucleus of facts and

the same transaction , the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents her from pursuing

her bad faith claim

. As a result, Sedgwick’s motion for summary judgment must be

GRANTED

.

Procedural Background and Facts of Record The facts are those of record, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Ford,

the non

- movant. Ms. Ford suffered a work

- related injury on May 26, 2015 at
Lowe’s . Sedgwick ’s role re levant to this action included the processing and
payment of medica l expen ses related to her injur y. On April 11, 2017, Ms. Ford filed a petition seeking outstanding medical expenses from Sedgwick . On September 26, 2017, the parties settled that claim. In the agreement, Sedgwick accepted responsibility for the medi cal expense s

. Notwithstanding the settlement

, Sedgwick did not pay them for more than two years.

Over the first year following the settlement, Ms. Ford’s attorney contacted Sedgwick three times seeking payment

. Her attorney first wrote Sedgwick on November 24, 2017, requesting payment verification. 2 Her attorney sent another

1 432 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1981).
2 Def. Mot., Ex. 1, at 3.3

letter on December 5, 2017, again r equesting payment verification. 3 On March 27, 2018, Ms. Ford’ s attorn ey sent Sedgwick a third letter. It con firmed Sedgwick ’s
agreement to pay

. 4
Approx imately one year after the September 2017 settlement

, however, Sedgwick had still not paid Ms. Ford’s bills . At that point, on September 13, 2018, Ms. Ford’s attorney sent Sedgwick a Huffman demand pursuant to 19 Del. C. §§
2357, 1103, and 1113. 5 Following Se dgwick’s failure to pay within t hirty days of

the demand , Ms. Ford filed suit in Superi or Court on October 17, 2018

. In her complaint

, she sought her medical expenses, interest due on those bills , attorneys’
fees, and costs. 6

A full year l ater, Sedgwick had still not paid the benefits . The parties then

settled the claims in her Huffman suit and on N ove mber 21, 2019, Ms. Ford signed

the release. 7 The court then dismissed that case with prejudice on December 6,

2019. 8 Approximately three week s later, Ms. Ford filed the current suit. In it

, she

claims that because Sedgwick failed to pay the medica l expenses claimed in the Huffman action

, it acted in bad faith. 9 Specifically, the new suit focus es on an alleged lack of reasonable justification for Sedgwick’s “prolonged and repeated

failure” to pay the same medical expenses that were at issue in the Huffman claim. After Ms. Ford filed the second complaint, Sedgwick moved to dismiss it pursuant to Superi or Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Because the parties referenced matters outside the pleadings, the Court converted the motion to one for summary judgment.

3 Id. at 4.
4 Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 6.
6 Id. at 1.
7 Def. Mot., Ex. 2, at 1.
8 Def. Mot., Ex. 3, at 1.
9 Pl. Compl., ¶¶ 9

– 19.4 Parties’ Arguments Sedgwick argue s that Ms. Ford’s failure to raise the bad faith claim in her first suit precludes her fr om raising it in her second pursuant to the rule against claim splitting

. Namely, Sedgwick argues that she could have

— and should have

— raised any bad faith claims in the first action. Sedgwick argues that both the Huffman and

bad faith claims arise out of the same transaction . This, in turn it argues, triggers the

rule against claim splitting . Finally, Sedgwick argues that because there was no jurisdictional or other impediment to raising the bad faith claim in the first suit , it is

barred

. In response, Ms. Ford argues that the first action, a Huffman suit, and the present action do not arise out of the same transaction. Instead, she argues that for transactional purposes, a Huffman suit arises directly out of the ini tial workplace injury . On the other hand , she argues that a b ad faith claim arises out of subsequent

claim s handling by the insurer. Given this difference , she argues that they are separate and distinct actions and need not be included in the same suit. In so arguing

, she relies primarily upon the Superior Court decision in Kelley v. ILC Dover, Inc. 10

and the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Pierce v. International Insurance Co

. 11

She also argues that public policy weighs against requiring a bad faith action to be

included in a Huffman action. She asserts that to do so would inappropriately limit an insured’s ability to pursue bad faith claims.

Conversion to Motion for Summary Judgment Sedgwick originally filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Superior Court

Civil Rule 12(b)(6). W hen the Court examines a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[t]he complaint generally defines the universe of facts that the trial court may consider

10 787 A.2d 751 (Del. Super. Mar. 16, 2001) aff’d , 784 A.2d 1080 (Del. 2001).
11 671 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1996).5

....” 12 With only lim ited exceptions, if the Court looks outside the facts alleged in the complaint, it must not consider them or it must convert the motion into one for summary judgment

. 13 If the Court converts the motion, it must provide the parties a
reasonable opportunity to expand the record. 14

In its motion to dismiss , Sedgwick included documents as exhibits that Ms.

Ford had not incorporated in the complaint. They include d (1) Ms. Ford’s 2018 Huffman complaint and its accompanying exhibits, (2) the signed November 21, 2019 release settling the 2018 litigation , and (3) the December 6, 2019 stipulated

order of dismissal that followed the release of the Huffman claim

. Ms. Ford

referenced the same documents in her response to Sedgwick’s motion to dismiss. At oral argumen t, both parties also referred to them

. The Court recognizes that it could arguably take judicial notice of the pleadings filed in the prior Huffman action for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes . Nevertheless, when the parties inc luded the release as an

exhibit

, they expanded the re cord beyond the complaint

. M s. Ford’s claim narrowly focuses on Sedgwick’s alleged bad faith when it failed to pay the medical bills at issue in the Huffman action

. U nder the circumstances, and in light of the expansion of the record, the Court converted Sedgwick’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. At that point,

the Court notifi ed the parties on March 5, 2020, and granted them leave until April

12 In re General Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig. , 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006)

. 13 Id.
14 Id. See also Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b) (providing “[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56”).6

7, 2020 to supplement the record. 15 Both parties filed supplemental arg uments; neither supplemented the evidentiary record

.

Standard of Review

Given the conversion

, the Court must apply the well

- settled standard for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine

issue of material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 16
The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non

- moving
party. 17 The burden of proof is initially on the moving party. 18 However, if the
movant meets his or her initial burden, then the burden shifts to the non

- moving party to demonstrate the existence of material issues of fact. 19 The non

- movant ’ s evidence of material facts in dispute must be sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law and to support the verdict of a reasonable jury. 20

Claim Splitting and the Doctrine of Claim P r eclusion

The rule against claim splitting is a subset of the doctrine of claim preclusion. 21 Delaware applies the transactional approach

. 22 This approach

considers a second lawsuit precluded if it arises from the same transaction as a

15 See Appriva S'holder Litig. Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc.

, 937 A.2d 1275, 1288 (Del. 2007) (recognizing “that the Superior Court must give the parties at least ten days’ notice of its intent to convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment”).
16 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Moore v. Size more , 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
17 Brozaka v. Olson , 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
18 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e); Moore , 405 A.2d at 680 (Del. 1979).
19 Moore
, 405 A.2d at 681 (citing Hurtt v. Goleburn , 330 A.2d 134 (Del. 1974)).
20 Lum v. Anders on , 2004 WL 772074, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 10, 2004).
21 Kossol v. Ashton Condominium Ass’n, Inc. , 637 A.2d 827, 1994 WL 10861, at *2 (Del. 1994)

. (TABLE) (citing Maldonado v. Flynn , 417 A.2d 378, 382

– 83 (Del. Ch. May 29, 1980) )

. The majority of existing case law examining this issue refers to the doctrine of res judicata . The contemporary reference refers to claim preclusion . The latter provides a better reference to examine claim splitting.
22 LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp. , 970 A.2d 185, 193 (Del. 2009)

.7

previous adjudication

. 23 Two claims that come from a common nucleus of facts

arise from the same transaction. 24 If the plaintiff knows or could have known those
common facts at the time of the first action, then the doctrine of claim preclusion

bars the claim in the second action

. 25 Under the transactional approach, resolving the first suit may bar a claim in the second

, even if the plaintiff pursues a different substantive theory of recovery than in the first

. 26

This rule rests on the belief that it is fairer to require a plaintiff to present all

his or her theories of re covery regarding one transaction in one suit. Thi s prevents overlapp ing or repetitive actions at different times. 27 Accordingly, “where a plaintiff has had a ‘full, free and untrammeled opportunity to present [ his or her] facts,’ but

has [not, he or she] will ordinarily be precluded by the doctrine of [c laim preclusion] from subsequently pressing [the] omitted claim in a subsequent action.” 28

T o bar a plaintiff’s second claim under the transactional approach, a defendant

must establish two elements . First, the same transaction must form the basis for the prior and subsequent actions

. 29 Second, the plaintiff must have not raised a claim in
the first action that he or she should have, in fairness, raised. 30 If the defend ant
establishes these two elements , then the claim is barred unless th e plaintiff

demonstrate s a legal impediment to bringing the claim in the first instance. 31

23 Id.
24 Id. at 193.
25 Id. (c itation omitted).
26 Kossol , 1994 WL 10861, at *2 (citations omitted).
27 Maldonado , 417 A.2d at 382.
28 Id. (citing Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Co. , 172 A. 260, 262 (Del. Super. Apr. 16, 1934 ))

. 29 Id.
30 Kossol , 1994 WL 10861, at *2 (citing Coca Cola , 172 A. at 262 ).
31 Maldonado , 417 A.2d at 382; Kossol , 1994 WL 10861, at *2 (citing Maldonado , 417 A.2d at 383

– 84).8 Both Claims Involved the Same Transaction

In LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp

. , the Delawa re Supreme Court recogni zed three factors applicable to the first element of the two

- part inquiry :
whether the two claims arose from the same trans action. These three factors are (1)

whether the facts relate in time, space, origin, or motivation, (2) whether they form
a convenient trial unit, and (3) whether treating t he claims as a unit meets the parties’ expectations

, business understanding , or usage. 32

Fir st , Ms. Ford’s Huffman and bad faith claims relate in time, space, origin,

and motivation. They center on S edgwick ’s handling of the same claim

. Moreover,

the time

- frames applicable to the two claims align exactly

. Namely, after waiting a full year for Sedgwick to pay the bills, Ms. Ford filed her first suit on October 17,

2018. Her Huffman suit then remained active for more than a year, until early

December 2 019 . The Court dismis sed it after settlement. Ms. Ford filed her second

sui t three weeks later

. As with the first suit

, t he second suit focuses on Sedg wick’s

failure to pay the same bills during the identical time

- period at issue i n the first suit. 33
Accordingly, t he time relevant to the Huffman claim and the bad f aith claim is

identical in time and space . Likewise, the claims’ origins are related. They both stem from Sedgwick’s allegedly improper claims handling. Finally, and most telling

, Ms. Ford ’s bad faith complaint alleges no additional bad faith after the

settlement of the same claims addressed in t he Huffman action.

As to motivation , both suits attack Sedgwick’s claims handling and seek, at least in part, to impose a penalty

. The Huffman a ction sought a remedy for failure
to pay approximately $26,000 in medical expenses after a thirty

- day demand period expired. In that action, Ms. Ford so ught the statutory penalty for Sed gwick’s failure

to pay

– attorneys’ fees . Likewise, the bad faith ac tion

, though a different theory of

32 LaPoint , 970 A.2d at 193 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2) (1982)).
33 Pl. Compl. ¶ 13.9

recovery, seeks to punish Sedgwick for not paying the same benefits. Specifically, Ms. Ford’s second suit alleges a bad faith breach of contract based upon the “defendants’ handling of Ms. Ford’s claims for workers’ compensation benefits.” 34 In doing so, it seeks both “compensatory and punitive damages.” 35 Both suits have substantially similar motivations in that they both seek penalti es because Sedgwick wrongfully withheld the same benefits

. As to the second LaP oin t factor , Ms. Ford’s Huffman and bad faith claim s
would have formed a convenient trial unit

. She arg ues that they would not because they have different state of mind requirements. S he correctly emphasizes that in a Huffman suit, the insurer’s state of mi nd is irrelevant. 36 In contras t, in a bad faith
claim, the fact finder must evaluate the insurer’s sta te of mind to determine if it was

reckless or worse

. 37 Based on these state of mind difference s , Ms. Ford argues that filing Huffman actions and bad faith claims together would result in unnecessary work, expense, and confusion. Namely, she argues that combining them would require more extensive discovery, trial preparation, and a complicated explanation

to the jury

. In this regard, Ms. Ford’s argument is not persuasive. Many, if not most

, actions include claims with different theories of recovery and different state of mind requirements. Coupling a claim that has no state of mind requir ement with one that

does is an ordinary thing in civil practice. Rather than adopt Ms. Ford’s suggested approach focusing narrowly on states of mind

, the Court must consider the overall

34 Pl Compl. ¶ 1

. 35 Id.
36 See Huff

man , 432 A.2d at 1209 (explaining that an employer or insurer’s good faith belief that an employee is not entitle d to compensation is irrelevant under the applicable statute because only the Board can make such a determinat ion and payment should continue until any such determination is made).
37 See Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes , 523 A.2d 518, 529 (Del. 1987) (summarizing the states of mind justifying punitive damages). See also Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. , 653 A.2d 254, 264 (Del. 1995) (applying the punitive damages state of mind framework in the insurance context).10

evidentia ry overlap between the two claims. 38 Namely, it must consider the degree

that witnesses or proofs in a secon d action would tend to overlap with the first. 39
Where the two substantially overlap, the second action is more likely precluded. 40
Here, there is significant, if not complete, overlap between the two claims.

The two year s between the 2017 s ettleme nt agreement and the 2019 Huffman suit’s

settlement is the relevant claims handling period for both claims. The identical claims adjuster and medical providers testimony would be necessary to prove both claims, including (1) the presentation of bills, (2) settlement of the IAB claim, (3)
the terms of the settlement, (4) Ms. Ford’s demand for payment thereafter, and (5) Sedgwick’s failure to pay despite demand. As a result, there is a substantial overlap in witnesses and proof between the two claims.

Con sidering the third LaPoint factor

— whether treating the Huffman suit and bad faith claim as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage

-- turns on many of the same undisputed facts. Claims handling is claim handling and parties generally understand it to be so

. In a lawsuit, parties typically assert all relevant claims available against an opposing party. 41

E xceptions apply, such as where individual obligations create successive obligations that may require separate actions. 42 Even where successive obligations arise

between the same parties, the doctrine of claim preclusion may still require the

38 Restatement (Se cond) of Judgments § 24 , cmt. b.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 18 (permitting “a party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross

- claim, or third

- party claim, [to] join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims as the part y has against an opposing party”).
42 Restatement ( S eco nd) of Judgmen ts § 24 , cmt. d. (providing an example of separate successive actions , such as where “ there is an undertaking, for which the whole consideration has been previously given, to make a series of payments of money . . . the obligation to make each payment is c onsidered separate from the others and judgment can be obtained on any one or a number of them without affecting the right to maintain an action on the others”).11

plaintiff to raise the claims in the same suit

. 43 This case does not require the more complicated analysis required in su ch cases. Rather, it involves one distinct claims handling period as opposed to successive ones.
In this decision, the C ourt recognizes that evaluating bad faith in c laims handling often require s a cumulative evaluation of an insurer’s conduct . B ad conduct may not tip the threshold to qualify as bad faith until a certain point in the

process. Furth ermore, the Court recognizes that given the length of some workers ’ compensation claims , a claim may run smoothly for a time and then generate a later dispute between the parties.
Here, however, the entire relevant universe of facts for both claims fe ll within

the same clearly defined time

. If M s. Ford wanted to sue Sedgwick for bad faith for its conduct during this time, she (1) should have raised it in her first complaint, or (2) sought to amend the first complaint to include it before settling the first action.

B ased upon the LaPoint factors

, Ms. Ford’s 2018 Huffman suit and bad faith claim

arise out of the same transaction.

Fai rnes s in Includin g It in the First Suit Before applying claim preclusion in this instance, the Court must also

examine the second element in the inquiry: whether Ms. Ford

, should have in
fairness, included her bad faith claim in the first suit. 44 Here, she should have for

the same reasons discussed in the Court’s LaPoint factors analysis

. Namely, s he d id

not settle the first suit until a full year after filing it. This gave her sufficient time to fully litigate any claims related to Sedgwick’s then two

- year withholdi ng of

43 Id. (describing the concept of successive or simultaneous acts of a defendant within the general rule of claim splitting).
44 Kossol , 1994 WL 10861, at *212

benefits. 45 This period also permitted her sufficient time to move to amend the first complaint. Permitting Ms. Ford to proceed with her b ad f aith claim now would provide overlap ping and repetitive prosecutions . The rule against claim splitting

avo ids those ills. 46 As a result, Ms. Ford failed to assert a bad faith claim that she

should have in fairness asserted in her 2018 Huffman suit.

No Impediment to Having Joined the Two Claims Finally, Sedgwick has established that (1) the same transaction form s the basis for Ms. Ford’s prior and present suit, and (2) in fairness, she should have asserted

her bad faith claim in the first suit. Accordingly

, Ms. Ford’s bad faith claim survi ves only if there was an impediment to the presentation of her claim in th e prior action.
Here, she identifies no such impediment ; nor has the Court found one. Pursuant to

19 Del. C. § 1113(a), Ms. Ford filed her 2018 Huffman suit in Superior Court. 47 As

with her Huffman suit, the Superior Court had jurisdiction to addres s her bad faith

claim so there was no jurisdictional impediment

. Likewise, n o statutory or common

law prohibition prevented her from including the claim in her first suit.

Ms. Ford asks th e Court to bypass the LaPoint factors in its analysis because

she claims that , as a matter of law, Huffman suit s and bad faith claim s arise out of
separate t ransactions

. Although she does not couch her argument in terms of a legal impediment to combining the c laims, her argument is best resolved in that manner.

S he bases her argument on the Superior Court’s decision in Kelley v. ILC
Dover, Inc

. , 48 and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Pierce v. International

45 Id. at *3 (explaining that “[a] fundamental tenet of the adversarial process is the opportunity of both parties to fully litigate the claims implicated in their dispute”).
46 Maldonado , 417 A.2d at 382.
47 19 Del. C. § 1113(a) (providing that “[a] civil action to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction”).
48 787 A.2d 751 (Del. Super. Mar. 16, 2001).13

Insurance Co

. 49 Ms. Ford claims these decisions collectively provide that a bad

faith claim need not be included in any Huffman suit

. According to her

, the Kelley

decision recognizes that Huffman suits are intended to “pry loose” unpaid workers’ compensation benefits. 50 B ecause a Huffman claim seek s unpaid benefits due

because of a workplace accident

, she argues that a Huffman claim arises f rom the accident rather than subsequent claims handling

. S he further emphasizes that the

Pierce decision recognizes that bad f aith claims arise from claims handling that

occurred after the workplace accident

. 51 That, she asserts, makes the two claims different and the later not subject to preclusion. In this regard, she argues that her

two claims arose out of separate transactions as a matter of law

. N either the Kelley nor the Pierce decision support Ms. Ford’s arguments

. In fact, together the y illustrate why there was no impediment to including the two

claims in the first suit. First, n othing in the Kelley decision provides that Huffman

suits deri ve , as a matter of law

, from the original accident. Rather, it addressed claims handling and th e demand necessary to trigger the Superior Court remedy

. 52
Otherwise, the Kelley decision mentions nothing

, in terms of transactional matters,

about the basis for a Huffman suit. To the contrary, the Kelley decision impliedly recognizes that a Huffman claim arises from the employer or insurer’s failure to pay benefits upon demand

. 53 Failure to pay benefits is a function of claims handling . It

is not an event that can be considered one in the same as the or iginal workplace injury

.

49 671 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1996).
50 See Pl. Resp. at 4

– 5 (quoting Kelley to show that Sections 2357 and 1113(a) “include claims based on unpaid workers’ compensation benefits”).
51 Pierce
, 671 A.2d at 1365.
52 Kelley , 787 A.2d at 753

– 54

. 53 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).14

Likewise, the Supreme Court’s Pierce decision further demonstrates that the

claims are more similar than dissimilar. Namely, in Pierce
, the plaintiff filed a bad

faith claim after an employer delayed paying disability benefits for eleven

- month s. 54
The plaintiff appealed the Superior Court ’s dismissal of his claim on the basis that workers’ compensation exclusivity bar red the plaintiff from filing his bad faith claim in Superior Court. 55 In that decision , the Superior Court found the original work injury to subsume the bad faith claim

. In reversing the Superior Court ’s decision , the Delaware Supreme Court h eld that exclusivity did not bar the plaintiff’s claim . It recognized that bad faith adjustment centers on conduct aft er the workplace accident. 56 The Court also recognized the distinct temporal difference between a workplace accident and subsequent claims handling related to the accident

. 57
Accordingly, a Huffman action arises only after there is a failure to pay

benefits and a demand . Similarly

, a bad faith action arise s only after there is a bad

faith delay or failure to pay benefits

. Both focus upon claims handling. Under the

circumstances of this case, these two claims should have been included in the same

suit. Finally, the Court need not address Ms. Ford’s public policy argu ment

re garding an improper chilling effect on bad faith litigation. The Court’s role in this instance is not to address public policy . Rather, it is to apply well

- recognized
concept s of civil procedure. A lthough Ms. Ford’s claim is barred under the

circu mstances of this case, the Court does not hold that a bad faith claim can never separately follow a Huffman action

. To do so would ignore the possibility that bad

54 Pierce
, 671 A.2d at 1362.
55 Id. at 1363.
56 Id. at 1365.
57 Id.15

faith could follow the resolution of a Huffman suit. Under the circumstances of this

ca se, however , there was a complete overlap of relevant insurer conduct between the

two claims. Ms. Ford should have

, in fairness

, included her bad faith claim in the

first suit.

Conclusion When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Ford, and recognizing that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the same transaction forms the basis for both the 2018 litigation and the present action

,

summar y judgment on behalf of Defendant Se dgwick Claims Management Servic es, Inc., and Lowe’s Home Centers Inc., must be GRANTED

. IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Jeffrey J Clark Judge