COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker and Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

PRESCOTT LAWRENCE HENRY 

v. Record No. 1205-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MAY 14, 1996 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Richard S. Miller, Judge 

 William R. Light (Killis T. Howard, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 In this appeal from his bench trial conviction by the 

Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg (trial court) for 

possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250, the sole 

issue presented by Prescott Lawrence Henry (appellant) is whether 

the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Finding 

that the evidence was sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 

Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). Guided by that 

familiar principle, the record discloses that on November 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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18, 1994, a warrant to search the premises known as 1817 Bedford 

Avenue, Lynchburg, Virginia was executed by members of that 

city's police department. Upon entering the dining room of the 

house located at that address, the officers discovered four 

persons sitting at a four-sided table. Each person sat at a 

particular side of the table. Appellant sat at one end of the 

table. After the police entered, all four persons were made to 

lie on the floor. 

 Investigator Dance testified that "small white chunks" 

(later determined to be cocaine), razor blades, and a homemade 

smoking device with residue were found on the table. The 

homemade smoking device was within an "arm's length" of appellant 

and "a couple of" plastic bags were found on his person. 

Although cocaine was found on the table, none was found in the 

baggies. When appellant was told that he was under arrest for 

possession of cocaine, he replied: "Yeah, all I was [here] to do 

was smoke cocaine." 

 Appellant concedes that constructive possession may be shown 

by acts, declarations, or conduct of the accused, and that 

appellant was aware of the presence and character of the 

contraband, but argues that the evidence fails to show that the 

cocaine was subject to his dominion and control. 

 While mere proximity to a controlled 

substance is insufficient to establish 

possession, it is a factor to consider when 

determining whether the accused 

constructively possessed drugs. Like Brown, 

the defendant in Eckhart alleged that her 

conviction of possession of marijuana with 
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intent to distribute was based solely on her 

proximity to the drugs. The Supreme Court of 

Virginia, however, found that the evidence 

was sufficient to sustain the defendant's 

conviction based upon constructive possession 

where the defendant, who was holding a baby, 

was seated outside the open door to a baby's 

room which contained marijuana and drug 

paraphernalia that was visible from the 

defendant's position. The court found that 

the trial court "could reasonably conclude 

that she was aware of the contents of the 

room and stationed herself where she could 

exercise dominion and control over the 

marijuana." 

Brown v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 489, 492, 364 S.E.2d 773, 

774-75 (1988) (citations omitted). 

 Here, the evidence disclosed that appellant was more than in 

"mere proximity" to the cocaine. He was present at the table to 

smoke cocaine. The pipe containing cocaine residue necessary to 

complete that intent was within an arm's length of his reach. 

The chunks of cocaine on the table were in plain view. 

Possession need not always be exclusive. Ritter v. Commonwealth, 

210 Va. 732, 741, 173 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1970). The accused may 

share it with one or more persons. Id. The duration of the 

possession is immaterial and need not always be actual 

possession. Id.

 We hold that the trial court could reasonably infer that the 

cocaine was jointly possessed by the four men seated at the table 

and that it was possessed for their exclusive use. We hold that 

the totality of the circumstances disclosed by the evidence is 

sufficient to support the finding that appellant was in 
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constructive possession of the drug named in the indictment and 

that he was aware of its contraband character. 

 The judgment of conviction is therefore affirmed. 

 Affirmed.