Filed 8/5/14 Hager v. County of Los Angeles CA2/3 Opinion following rehearing NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DARREN HAGER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Defendants and Appellants. B238277 consolidated with B239897
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC370326)

APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Victor E. Chavez, Judge. Judgment is affirmed in pa rt and reversed in part. The
order is affirmed. Love & Erskine, Richard A. Love and Beth A. Shenfeld for Plaintiff and Appellant. Hurrell Cantrall, Thomas C. Hurrell a nd Melinda Cantrall for Defendants and Appellants.

_____________ ____________2 In a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit br ought under Labor Co de section 1102.5, subdivision (b) (hereaf ter section 1102.5(b)), 1 the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The plaintiff must s how he engaged in protected activity, his employer subjected him to an adverse employ ment action, and there is a causal link between the two. If the plaintiff meets hi s prima facie burden, the defendant has the burden to prove a legitimate, non-retaliatory e xplanation for its actions. To prevail, the plaintiff has to show that the explana tion is a pretext for the retaliation. ( Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384.)
In Hager v. County of Los Angeles ((Apr. 22, 2010, B208 941) [nonpub. opn.]) ( Hager I ), we held that plaintiff Darren Hager c ould pursue his whistleblower retaliation lawsuit against his employers, defenda nts the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (c ollectively, County). The County appeals from a judgment entered after a substantial ju ry verdict in Hager’s favor. Hager appeals from the postjudgment order denying his request for attorney fees. The County’s principal contentions on ap peal address two errors with respect to the parties’ burdens of proof. The County c ontends Hager did not pr ove that he engaged in a protected activity to establish a prim a facie case of whistleblower retaliation (§ 1102.5(b)) because he did not “disclose information,” as that term has been defined in Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Community College Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.A pp.4th 832, 858-859 ( Mize-Kurzman ). The County also contends the tria l court erred in relying on the Public

1 At the time of the trial, former section 1102.5(b) provided: “An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosi ng information to a government or law enforcement agency, where th e employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation.” Amendments to this subdivision that became effective on January 1, 2014 (Stats . 2013, ch. 781, § 4.1) are not pertinent to our analysis. Subdivision (e) of section 1102.5 provided: “A report made by an employee of a government agency to his or her employer is a disclosure of information to a government or law enforcement agency purs uant to subdivisions (a) and (b).” All further citations to section 1102.5 are to the former version of the statute. All further undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.3 Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Ac t (POBRA) (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.) to exclude the County’s evidence of past conduct not included as a basis to terminate Hager during the administrative proceedings but pr esented in this civil action as additional reasons to support its decision to terminat e Hager. The County also challenges the sufficiency of the evid ence to support the damages award, raises evidentiary errors, and asserts juror misconduct. We initially affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of past conduct and there was no substantial evidence to support the economic damages awarded to Hager. The Coun ty and Hager petitioned for rehearing. The County argued in its petition that we affirm ed the exclusion of evidence
of its undisclosed reasons to terminate Ha ger by improperly relying on Evidence Code section 352 without any support in the record that the trial court engaged in balancing the probative value of this evid ence against the prejudicial impact. Hager argued in his petition that we omitted key facts that his te rmination constituted a “blot on his resume” and significantly impaired his future earni ng capacity, which is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of economic damages. We granted the petitions for rehearing to
address these issues.
We conclude the trial court did not abus e its discretion in ex cluding evidence of undisclosed reasons for terminating Hager. Th e record contains affirmative indications
the trial court considered and understood that the introduction of undisclosed reasons for the decision to terminate Hager was not re levant and was prejudicial. We further
conclude there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s award of economic damages. Accordingly, we reverse that porti on of the judgment, but in all other respects
we affirm. We also affirm the order denying Hager’s motion for attorney fees.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND Hager worked for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) as a deputy sheriff from 1988 to 2003. In 2000, Hager was appointed as the LASD liaison to a federal Drug Enforcement Agen cy (DEA) task force (DEA ta sk force) investigating a large methamphetamine organization in the An telope Valley. The DEA task force was4 formed after Hager brought information to his command staff that a felony suspect was willing to provide the names of several meth amphetamine dealers in the Antelope Valley in exchange for leniency. By all accounts, the DEA taskforce was a success. The informant also gave Hager information that linked the disappearance of a deputy sheriff with the methamphetamine or ganization in the Antelope Valley. While working on the DEA task force, Hager obtained information that led him to believe the missing deputy sheriff had been murdered. Hager accused anothe r deputy of being
involved in the murd er, the cover up, and the illicit methamphetamine trade in the Antelope Valley. It is the disclosure of deputy misconduct that is central to Hager’s
whistleblower retaliation lawsuit.
1. Alleged Disclosure of Deputy Misconduct In June 1998, then off- duty deputy sheriff Jonathan Aujay, an ultra-marathon runner, disappeared while on a long-distance run at the Dev il’s Punchbowl County Park in Antelope Valley. The initial missing pe rson’s investigation c oncluded th at Aujay disappeared or committed suicide. In December 1999, homicide detectiv e Larry Joseph Brande nburg learned from another deputy sheriff that Aujay may have been murdered and that deputy sheriff Richard Engels may have been involved. Brandenburg’s cap tain, Frank Merriman, gave Brandenburg permission to reopen the cold case and investigate Aujay’s disappearance. On March 2, 2000, Brandenburg contacted Hager and asked Hager to speak to his informant about “dirty deputies.” The informant told Ha ger that Engels was involved in narcotics and possibly in the disappearance of Aujay. Hager informed Brandenburg.

a. March 23, 2000 Disclosure of Deputy Misconduct In a March 23, 2000 meeting, then assi stant sheriff Larry Waldie was briefed on the information Hager had obtained regardin g (1) the methamphetamine organization in the Antelope Valley, and (2) Engels’s possi ble involvement in narcotics and Aujay’s disappearance. Based on this information, Wa ldie approved LASD’s participation in the
DEA task force. The DEA task force’s primary mission was to disrupt narcotics trafficking in the Antelope Valley. Hager, as a DEA task force officer, was ordered to5 conduct only the narcotics investigation. Wa ldie specifically orde red Hager and the DEA task force not to investigate deputy sheri ff wrongdoing or Aujay’s disappearance. Any
information the DEA task force learned concer ning deputy sheriff wrongdoing was to be documented and passed on to either the Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB) or the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB), and any information concerning Aujay was to be passed on to the homicide bureau and Brandenburg.
b. Hager’s Daily Reports to Shreves
While a member of the DEA task forc e, Hager reported to lieutenant Ronald Shreves on a daily basis. The DEA task force followed federa l drug enforcement protocol and obtained information from coop erating sources, and as the investigation continued, obtained information through corro borating sources. The DEA task force also filed warrants and federal wiretap applicati ons. The DEA task force made hundreds of

arrests. During the course of the DEA task forc e investigation, Hager asked informants about the missing deputy and received information that Aujay was killed because he discovered a methamphetamine lab while out on a long-distance run. Informants told Hager that Engels was at the methamphetami ne lab when Aujay was killed. Hager’s informants also linked Engels with Tom Hinkle, one of the ta rgets of the DEA task force and a known methamphetamine dealer.

c. Hager’s Summary (September 2000) In September 2000, Shreves requested a meeting with command staff to update them regarding the DEA task force and to info rm them of potential deputy misconduct. Hager prepared a summary that disclosed in formation the DEA task force had received regarding Aujay’s disappearance. The “main” thrust of the meeting was the “potential that Aujay was murdered and a deput y sheriff might be involved.”
d. Hager’s Summary (May 9, 2001)
After the DEA task force arrested Hink le, one of the targeted methamphetamine dealers in the Antelope Valley, Shreves asked Hager to prepare a summary of the
information the DEA task forc e had received regarding Enge ls. The summary revealed6 information linking Engels to Hinkle and to Aujay’s disappearance. Shreves passed this information through the chain of command.
2. Independent Investigation Discredits Hager’ s Disclosure of Deputy Misconduct As ordered, Hager also was disclo sing information to Brandenburg as Brandenburg pursued the homicide investigation. During the course of his investigation, Brandenburg obtained information that Au jay had discovered a methamphetamine lab adjacent to Devil’s Punchbowl County Park while on a long-distance run. Brandenburg was convinced that Engels was involved in an ongoing criminal drug conspiracy, and that Engels and some other uniden tified individuals had murdered Aujay to prevent him from arresting them or exposing their criminal ente rprise. Brandenburg prepared an affidavit for a search warrant to serve on Engels, but his captain would not let him take it to a judge. Brandenburg’s partner testified that their captain did not think the information they had obtained was credible. Brandenbur g’s partner agreed with the captain. Brandenburg went over his captain’s head to present his investig ation results to the command staff. Brandenburg was ta ken off the investigation.

a. Shreves’s Memo In February 2001, Shreves sent a memorandum to his command in which he addressed Brandenburg’s homicid e investigation. Shreves formed the opinion that the
homicide bureau and the command staff were failing to “credibly investigate the disappearance and possible murder of . . . Aujay. ” Shreves also felt that the members of the DEA task force were “being cruelly and u nnecessarily besmirched to a wide audience of department personnel.”
b. Holmes’s Investigation In March 2001, after Shreves submitte d his memo, sergeant Joe Holmes was assigned to investigate the information Br andenburg and Hager reported concerning Aujay’s disappearance. Holmes intervie wed Hager’s initial in formant who admitted during the tape-recorded session with Holmes th at he had lied to Hager. Holmes testified he interviewed 60 people and there was not on e piece of credible evidence linking Engels to drug trafficking in the Antelope Valley or to the murder, death, or disappearance of7 Aujay. Many of the individuals previous ly interviewed by Hager denied making the
statements attributed to th em. Holmes also discovered that many of the reported
statements were not credible . Holmes described the accusations against Engels as a “misinterpretation of informa tion” on a “large scale.” Holmes did not believe that Engels was a suspect in Aujay’s disappearance. He thought Hager was actively inve stigating Aujay’s disappearan ce in violation of direct
orders. Holmes also dismisse d Brandenburg’s conclusions th at Aujay had been murdered and stated that the most likely scenar io was Aujay had co mmitted suicide. At the conclusion of his investigation, Holmes met with command. Both Hager and Shreves were present. Shreves was cri tical of Holmes’s conclusions and believed Holmes had not conducted a comprehensive investigation.
Shreves was ordered to write a memora ndum identifying the deficiencies in Holmes’s investigation. Shreves prepared a 56-page memorandum. Shreves explained in
the memorandum that the DEA task force ha d received information that a deputy sheriff may have been involved with the methamphetamine organi zation, and Aujay may have been murdered by that organi zation. He noted the DEA task force had been “admonished not to conduct follow-up [regarding] alle ged personnel wrongdo ing or the alleged
murder.” Shreves felt the DEA task force was being “criticized for bringing forth uncorroborated information,” but was ordered not to corroborate the information. As Shreves noted, “[t]o do no follow-up and also corroborate informati on is an impossible
task.” In preparing the 56-p age memorandum, Shreves relied on a synopsis Hager prepared. The synopsis cont ained representations regarding the content of federal wiretapped conversations.
3. Hager’s Termination Hager became the subject of an IAB inve stigation. Engels and four other deputy sheriffs filed a complaint against Hager. Shreves’s 56-page memorandum focused the investigation on whether Hager had violated a direct order not to investigate Aujay’s disappearance.8 At the conclusion of the year-long IAB investigation, Hager was charged with conducting a personnel investiga tion and making false statements to his supervisors. The internal affairs investigator believed th at Hager had misrepresented wiretapped conversations to support his th eory that (1) Engels was invo lved in the methamphetamine organization in the Antelope Va lley, and (2) Engels was one of the individuals involved in Aujay’s murder, death, or disappearance. Chief Neal Tyler reviewed the IAB inve stigation and conclu ded the appropriate discipline was termination. Tyler had been given a range of discipline options, which indicated the recommended discipline was su spension for 10 to 15 days. Tyler considered suspension, but he te stified that suspension was not appropriate “for the series of offenses that [he] saw in this in vestigation over the two-year period.” In December 2002, Hager received a letter of intent to discharge. The letter indicated the IAB investigation had esta blished Hager “conducted a personnel investigation regarding Deputy Richard Engels and recklessly accused Deputy Engels of associating with drug dealers and having kn owledge/involvement in the alleged murder of Deputy Jonathan Aujay.” The letter also stated the IAB investigation established Hager made false statements to Shreves “c oncerning information gleaned from Federal wire taps and/or various info rmants, which was used to sup port [his] theory that Deputy Richard Engels was involved in criminal acts with known drug dealers and may have
been involved in the a lleged murder of Deputy Aujay.” LASD held two Skelly 2 hearings addressing these charges in January and July 2003, at which Hage r was represented by counsel. On July 28, 2003, Hager learned he had been terminated. In April 2003, before his second Skelly hearing, Hager filled out an application for disability retirement. Hager suffered neck and back injuries in March 2002 while on duty. His disability retirement wa s granted on September 3, 2003.

2 Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194.9 4. Hager’s Evidence of Retaliation Hager attacked the results of the IAB in vestigation, presenting evidence that he did not conduct an investiga tion into Engels’s wrongdoing or Aujay’s disappearance. Hager also discredited Holmes’s investigatio n, and the IAB investigation because there was no mention of Hager’s work on the DEA ta sk force, and the investigators failed to
interview other members of the DEA task fo rce. Specifically, Hager noted that the
foundation of both the Holmes investigation and the IAB i nvestigation was that Hager’s sources were not credible, but the investig ators completely ignor ed that these same informants had given reliable a nd corroborated information to the DEA task force that led to numerous arrests. Hager also pointed out the inconsistency of being charged with conducting an unauth orized investigation and bein g criticized for conducting an incompetent investigation. With respect to the charge that Hager had falsely reported wiretapped conversations, Hager testified that the inform ation he relayed to Shreves were summaries prepared by others, and not verbatim transcri ptions. Hager had been ordered to pass this information along so other deputy sheriffs could investigate deputy misconduct. When questioned about the false st atements in the summaries, Hager took exception to the internal affairs investigator’s conclusions th at the information Hager relayed to Shreves was false or failed to include exculpatory stat ements. The jury also heard testimony that wiretapped conversations must be interpreted in context because the drug culture has its own language and code.
5. Jury Verdict, Motion for New Trial, Appeal The jury returned a special verdict in Hager’s fa vor, awarding $4 ,506,015 in damages. The award included $2,006,015 in lost earnings ($806,041 in backpay and $1,199,974 in future lost income), and $2, 500,000 in non-econ omic damages. The trial court denied the County’s motion for new trial. Thereafter, the trial court denied Hager’s request for attorney fees. The County timely appeals from the judgment. Hager filed an appeal from the order denying attorney fees. We consolidated the appeals.10 6. Petitions for Rehearing After our original opinion issued, the County filed a petition for rehearing in which it again argued that the trial court erred in excludin g evidence of Hager’s past conduct (motions in limine), and erred in ex cluding Tyler’s testimo ny of his undisclosed reasons for terminating Hager. The County c ontended our conclusion that this evidence was properly excluded un der Evidence Code section 352 was legal error. Hager filed a petition for rehearing in which he contended we omitted key facts that would have supported the jury ’s award of economic damages. We granted the petitions to clarify our opinion on these two issues. Additional facts will be presented with the releva nt issue in the discussion section.
DISCUSSION County’s Appeal
1. Section 1102.5(b) Relying on Mize-Kurzman , supra , 202 Cal.App.4th 832, th e County contends that Hager did not “disclose information” under section 1102.5(b) beca use the LASD already knew that Engels might have been involved in drug tr afficking and in Aujay’s disappearance before Hager disclosed this inform ation. The County c ites to evidence that Brandenburg or other unidentif ied deputy sheriffs, and no t Hager, were the first to disclose Engels’s allege d unlawful conduct. As a preliminary matter, we are concer ned here with whether Hager disclosed
information in March 2000. 3 After that date, the reports to Shreves and up the chain of
command cannot be considered “blo wing the whistle,” as Hager was ordered as part of an

3 In Hager’s brief, he alternatively argues th at he made a disclosure to the DEA that is protected under section 1102.5(b). This a ssertion is not supported by citation to the record, nor does the record reflect any factua l or legal theory that there is a causal connection between Hager’s repo rt to the DEA and retaliation by the LASD. We also reject Hager’s arguments that the County has forfeited the issue, or is estopped from raising the issue because in Hager I the County admitted that Hager made a protected disclosure. An admission in a summary judgm ent motion or separate statement is not binding on the parties in subsequent proceedings. ( Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 746-747.)11 internal personnel matter to report any furthe r information he obtain ed during the course of the DEA task force investigation. Section 1102.5(b) protects an employ ee from retaliation by his employer for making a good faith disclosure of a violation of federal or state law. (§ 1102.5(b); Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist., supra , 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384.) A report made by an employee of a government agency to his employer is a disclosure of information to a government or law enforcement agency purs uant to section 1102.5(b). (§ 1102.5, subd. (e); Colores v. Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1308, 1312-1313.) “This provision reflects the broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistle-blowers to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.” ( Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 77.)

a. Mize-Kurzman
In Mize-Kurzman, supra , 202 Cal.App.4th 832, the court considered whether a jury had been adequately instructed on federal law limits applicable to state whistleblower protection. ( Id. at pp. 844-845.) A special in struction to the jury stated, “[r]eporting publicly known facts is not a disc losure of information” within the meaning of section 1102.5. ( Mize-Kurzman , at p. 845.) Consistent with federal law, the MizeKurzman court held reporting information that already was known to the employer did not constitute a protected disclosure. ( Id . at p. 858.) Citing the Legislature’s choice of the word “disclosing,” and “discloses,” in section 1102.5(b), the court reasoned the plain meaning and dictionary definition of “disclos ure,” is to “ ‘reveal something that was hidden and not known.’ ” ( Mize-Kurzman , at p. 858.) The Mize-Kurzman court supported this interpretati on of “disclosure” by relyi ng on federal and state cases addressing protected disclosures. ( Id. at p. 859.) The County reads Mize-Kurzman, supra , 202 Cal.App.4th 832 as limiting the protections of section 1102.5(b) to the first em ployee who discloses a violation of state or
federal law that had not been previously disclosed by another employee. No such “first report” limitation was discussed in Mize-Kurzman , appears in section 1102.5(b), or is
addressed in the federal and state cases cited and relied on by the Mize-Kurzman court.12 b. Mize-Kurzman Does Not Ad opt a “First Report” Rule
In Mize-Kurzman, supra , 202 Cal.App.4th 832, the plai ntiff made four disclosures
of unlawful conduct to th e alleged wrongdoers. ( Id . at pp. 840-842.) With respect to one of the disclosures of unlawful activity, Mize-K urzman’s supervisor te stified at trial that she already was aware that prog rams receiving state funds c ould not discriminate against students, and with respect to two of the other disclosures, it was disputed at trial whether the community college policie s Mize-Kurzman viewed as unlawful actually violated the law. ( Ibid. ) It was in this factual context th at the court considered whether MizeKurzman made a protected disclosure und er section 1102.5(b). The court never considered whether a second employee who disclosed the same unlawful activity that
Mize-Kurzman disclosed would or would no t have been protected under section 1102.5(b).

c. Section 1102.5(b) Does Not Support a “First Report” Rule The plain language of section 1102 .5(b) also does not limit whistleblower protection only to an employee who disclo ses unlawful conduct that had not been previously disclosed by anothe r employee. The verb “disclose” is not defined in the statute, and the Mize-Kurzman court gave the statutory term its plain and common sense meaning. (See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.) But, words and phrases are construed acco rding to context and approved usage of language. ( California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844.) While we accept the dictionary definition of “disclosure” as used by the court in MizeKurzman, supra , 202 Cal.App.4th 832, the court did no t construe the statutory language
in the context of the statute as a whole. Subdivision (e) of section 1102.5, provid es that a “report,” by an employee of a government agency to his or her employer is a disclosure of information under section 1102.5(b). A report does not necessarily reve al something hidden or unknown. To the

extent Mize-Kurzman has highlighted an inconsistency in the statute, that is, a public employee must merely “report” unlawful condu ct, and other employees must “disclose,” unlawful conduct, it is up to the Legislature to resolve this issue, not this court.13 We also view the “first report” rule the County proposes as contrary to the legislative intent in enacting section 1102.5(b) . Protection only to the first employee to
disclose unlawful acts would defeat the le gislative purpose of protecting workplace whistleblowers, as employees would not come forward to report unlawful conduct for fear that someone else already had done so . The “first report” rule would discourage whistleblowing. Thus, the County’s interpre tation is a disincentive to report unlawful
conduct. We see no such reason to interpret the statute in a manner that would contradict the purpose of the statute.
d. Cases Cited in Mize-Kurzman Do Not Support a “First Report”
Rule
The federal cases cited in Mize-Kurzman, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 832, do not articulate a “first report” rule. Mize-Kurzman cites to federal law for the proposition that the report of information “that was alr eady known did not constitute a protected disclosure.” ( Id. at p. 858.) One of those federal cases is Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management (Fed.Cir. 2001) 263 F.3d 1341 ( Huffman ), 4 which addressed, among other things, the question of whether complaints to a supervisor ab out the supervisor’s conduct constitute a protected disclosure under the fe deral Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U. S.C.) (hereafter, the federal Act). ( Huffman
, supra , at pp. 1344, 1347.) Huffman did not articulate a “first report” rule as between two employees reporting unlawful conduct.
The Huffman court followed its precedent that disclosures to the wrongdoer are not protected because th e wrongdoer already knew of the misconduct. ( Huffman
, supra , 263 F.3d at pp. 1349-1350.) The court also supported its decision by relying on the dictionary definition of “disclosure.” ( Ibid .) The court found “significant” that “Congress in the [federal] WPA did not use a word with a broade r connotation such as ‘report’ or ‘state.’ ” ( Id. at p. 1350.) As the Huffman court noted, the purpose of the

4 Huffman, supra, 263 F.3d 1341, was superseded by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) (Pub.L. No. 112-199 (Nov. 27, 2012) § 101(b)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 1465, 1465-1466).14 federal Act is to encourage disclosures to t hose that are likely to remedy the wrong, and “[t]he wrongdoer is not such a person.” ( Ibid .) On this point, Huffman is not consistent with Calif ornia courts applying section 1102.5(b) when pub lic employees report unlawful conduct. (See, e.g., Jaramillo v. County of Orange (2011) 200 Cal.App.4t h 811, 825-827.) In Jaramillo , the court held that a report of wrongdoing by a public empl oyee to the very person who is engaged in the wrongdoing is covered by the statute. ( Id . at pp. 825-826; see also Gardenhire v. Housing Authority (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 236, 240, 242-243 [housing authority employee who reported to authority commissioners illegal conduct of employee and contractor is covered by the statute].) Although the Mize-Kurzman court cites our decision in Colores v. Board of Trustees, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, as in line with Huffman , in that case we did not address the issue of whether a report to a wr ongdoer is a protected disclosure, or what constitutes a protected disclosure. Rather, we concluded that a public employee is entitled to the protection of s ection 1102.5(b) if she reporte d wrongdoing to her agency and had no need to inform some other gove rnmental agency in order to qualify as a whistleblower. ( Colores v. Board of Trustees, at pp. 1312-1313.) Likewise, Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist.
, supra , 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, also cited by the Mize-Kurzman court, does not discuss what constitutes a protected disclosure, but relies on Colores v. Board of Trustees for the proposition that a state employee discloses information protected unde r section 1102.5(b) wh en she reports the activity to the supervisor in her own agency. ( Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School
Dist. , at pp. 1385-1386.) Cases are “not author ity for propositions ne ither considered nor discussed in the opinion.” ( In re Muszalski (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 500, 504.)
Mize-Kurzman , supra , 202 Cal.App.4th 832, also cite d two federal cases that held reporting publicly known information was not a protected disclosure under the federal Act. ( Id . at p. 8585.) These cases involve an administrative judge’s disclosure in an opinion that a federal agency had incorrectly interpreted federal laws reflected in prior decisions of administrative judges ( Meuwissen v. Department of Interior (Fed.Cir. 2000)15 234 F.3d 9, 12-13), 5 and a disclosure that a federal agency failed to reopen a claim for
retirement benefits after it was revealed to th e agency that it had in correctly interpreted civil service laws ( Francisco v. Office of Personnel Management (Fed.Cir. 2002) 295 F.3d 1310, 1313-1314). In these cases, the agency’s alleged misconduct was publicly known in the erroneous decision of th e administrative judge, and in the agency’s decisions erroneously denying benefits. The report of “publicly known” information or “already known” information is
distinct from a rule in whic h only the first employee to report or disclose unlawful conduct is entitled to protection from whistlebl ower retaliation. Section 1102.5(b) should be given a broad constr uction commensurate with its broad purpose. ( Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. , supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 77.) After the issues were fully briefed, Ha ger brought to the c ourt’s attention that Congress has amended the federal Act to clarify that a disclosure is protected even if the information has been previo usly disclosed. (See ante , fn. 4.) Although instructive, we reach our conclusion based on the plain language of section 1102.5(b). We also reject the County’s interpretati on that the statutory protections of section 1102.5(b) do not apply when the disclosure of information addresses the wrongdoing of a fellow employee. In support of its argum ent, the County relies on an uncodified preamble to the 2003 amendments to secti on 1102.5. (Stats. 2003, ch. 484, § 1; McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 443, 469-470.) The County highlights in the preamble that the protectio n of section 1102.5 applies only to those employees reporting “corporate wrongdoing.” We agree with the conclusion reached in McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco , that section 1102.5(b) protects disclosure of unlawful activity by third partie s such as contractors and employees, and thus by its terms

5 Meuwissen v. Department of Interior
, supra , 234 F.3d at pages 12 through 13 was legislatively overruled by the WP EA to the extent that the court found the appellant did not make a “disclosure” because the administ rative ruling with which he disagreed was already publicly known. (See ante , fn. 4.)16 cannot be interpreted to be limited to unlawful conduct on the part of an employer or other high-ranking official. ( McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco , at pp. 469-472.)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Excluding the County’s Undisclosed Reasons to Justify Hager’s Termination The County contends the trial court co mmitted prejudicial error when it granted Hager’s motions in limine to exclude certai n incidents in Hager’s employment history unrelated to the charged policy violations, and further erred when it barred Tyler from testifying as to the undisclosed reasons for hi s decision to terminate Hager. As shall be discussed, we conclude the trial court’s rulin gs were a proper exercise of discretion, and therefore there was no miscarriage of justice. (Evid. Code, § 354.)

a. Background Facts (1). Motions in Limine The County notified Hager that he was terminated for two policy violations, namely, conducting an unauthorized personnel investigation and fals ely reporting federal wiretapped conversations. Before trial, Hager filed motions in limine to exclude
evidence unrelated to the charged policy violations, incl uding evidence of: (1) “off-duty actions which resulted in IAB, ICIB, or Di strict Attorney inquiries, or civilian complaints, which were not resolved or a basi s for termination” (motion in limine no. 2); (2) Hager’s “relationship with [his form er girlfriend] Liza Mattos” and “any civil complaints or investigations which Liza Ma ttos initiated against plaintiff” (motion in limine no. 4); (3) “evidence of on-duty use of force incidents which [LASD] found to be within policy” (motion in limine no. 5); and (4) the “M andalay Bay Hotel incident” (motion in limine no. 6). (Capitalization om itted.) Hager moved to exclude this evidence on several grounds, including it was inadmi ssible under provisions of POBRA (Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (d)), or under the Eviden ce Code as instances of prior specific conduct (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), impe rmissible character evidence (Evid. Code, §§ 786, 787), or inadmissible hearsay (Evi d. Code, § 1200). Hager also argued the
evidence should be excluded as not relevant (Evid. Code, § 210), and under Evidence17 Code section 352 as the evid ence was unduly prejudicial, collateral, too remote, and required or constituted an undu e consumption of time. During oral argument on motion in limine no . 2, Hager’s counsel argued that the off-duty incidents were “collateral” as Hager “was allegedly terminated for conducting a personnel investigation regarding Deputy Rich ard Engels and then, secondarily, allegedly making a false statement to his supervisor concerning the info rmation gleaned from wiretaps and informants.” Hager’s counsel acknowledged that Tyler testified at his deposition 6 he considered undisclosed reasons for his decision, but under POBRA the Department not only had to “do an investiga tion, but charge and notify [Hager] of intent to impose discipline within on e year.” In response, the County argued POBRA did not apply in a civil action in which it had the burd en of establishing a non-retaliatory reason for its decision to terminate Hager. The tr ial court granted the mo tion without indicating on the record the specific gro unds for exclusion. The tr ial court also granted the remaining motions, referring to its ruling on mo tion in limine no. 2. The trial court, however, stated it would reconsid er the issue during trial. (2). Evidence Code Section 40 2 Hearing (402 Hearing) While Tyler was testifying , the County requested a 402 hearing outside the presence of the jury. Tyler te stified that it was LASD policy to consider an employee’s past performance, disciplinary history, and instances of on- and off-duty conduct when determining the appropriate discipline. Ty ler took into consideration “the past disciplinary history for the thr ee cases that had been founded” and that Hager had been

6 In opposition, the Coun ty cited to Tyler’s depos ition testimony in which he testified: “I believe I informed him that th e offenses that I discovered by reading the investigative file on this case seemed to have factors in common with previous concerns about [Hager’s] performance . . . . [¶] And the factors I was concerned about having to do with judgment and care and caution in doi ng an important, high-stakes job seemed to reoccur in this case, whereas th ey appeared in previous circ umstances in [H ager’s] career involving law enforcement deci sion-making or off-duty conduct. [¶] And because of the connection between the previous situations I was concerned about and the problems in this case, I felt that I had to consider the past performance as well as the current case.”18 placed on performance mentoring status “in a running fashion be tween about 1996 and 2001,” based upon on- and off-duty behavior. Tyler did not specifically id entify the three cases. In 1996, Hager accepted a written reprimand for an incident in which he threatened his former girlfriend. In 2001, his former girlfriend complained that Hager physically assau lted her on or about July 4, 1996. An investigation into the incident concluded the char ge founded, and in October 2002, two months before Hager received the letter of intent to discharge, a five-day suspension was recommended. Tyler signed the disposition sheet recommending the discipline. In November 2002, an internal a ffairs investigation into an incident at the Mandalay Bay Hotel (motion in limine no. 6) , concluded the charge founded and a fiveday suspension was recommended. Tyler si gned the disposition sheet recommending the discipline. Hager did not receive notice of in tent to discipline him for either of these
2002 incidents. On cross-examination, Tyle r conceded Hager had no notice that these undisclosed
reasons were a basis for his termination. Gi ven the lack of notice, Hager’s counsel posed the following question: “And th ere’s no ability of the deputy to respond to these hidden factors that were not disclosed; correct?” Tyler responded, “Well, the opportunity to respond would have occurred in a Skelly hearing.” Hager, however, was not formally advised of Tyler’s undisclose d reasons for his decision to terminate him in order to respond at the Skelly hearing. (See fn. 6, ante .)
The trial court ruled that the “defense is precluded from going into this area.” (3). Motion for New Trial Following the jury’s verdic t, the County moved for a new trial on several grounds, including that the trial court’ s evidentiary rulings on the motions in limine and following Tyler’s testimony at the 402 hearing denied th e jury the opportunity to consider evidence of past conduct that Tyler relied on when he decided to terminate Hager. The trial court
denied the motion. In its motion, the County argued that POBRA did not apply in a civil action and it was entitled to present evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliato ry reason for its decision to19 terminate Hager even though Hager had not b een notified that his termination was based on additional conduct not disclosed during the administrative proceedings. Citing Mays v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 313, 321-322 , the court reasoned that under POBRA (Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (d)), the officer must be notified of the conduct for which discipline may be imposed if he or she wishes “ ‘to defend against possible discipline.’ ” Thus, the trial court conclude d the undisclosed, past conduct “was not relevant to the trial of this action,” and no procedural irregular ity occurred at trial affecting the County’s rights with respect to these rulings.
b. Exclusion of Undisclosed Reas ons for Hager’s Termination
We review the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if there is a clea r showing of abuse of discretion. ( Ceja v. Department of Transportation (2011) 201 Cal.App. 4th 1475, 1480-1481; Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422 , 1431.) “If evidence is excluded on an improper objec tion but the evidence excluded is subject to objection on a different ground, it does not matter that th e reason advanced by counsel or relied upon by the court was wrong. [Citations.] If the exclusion is proper upon any theory of law applicable to the instant case, the exclusion must be sustaine d regardless of the particular considerations which may have motivated the trial court to its decision.” ( Philip Chang
& Sons Associates v. La Casa Novato (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 159, 173; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) A ppeal, § 347, pp. 398-399.)
Even where evidence has been erroneous ly excluded, the judgment or decision shall not be reversed unless the reviewing court concludes the exclusion resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354.) Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The ev idence of Tyler’s undisclosed reasons to terminate Hager, alon g with other past conduct (motions in limine), was not erroneously excluded. (1). Properly Excluded as Not Relevant Although the County argues that the trial court ex cluded this evidence by importing POBRA rights into a civil action, this characterization does not accurately20 reflect the trial court’s discretionary rulings. As a public safety officer, Hager had due process rights ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd.
, supra , 15 Cal.3d at pp. 20 7-208) and rights under POBRA (Gov. Code, § 3301), which in cluded “notice that the public agency, having completed its investig ation into the alleged misc onduct within the statutory period, has decided that it may take disciplin ary action against the officer for specified misconduct.” ( Mays v. City of Los Angeles
, supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 325; Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Tr ansit Development Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App. 4th 940, 949.) The County’s reasons for its decision to terminat e Hager based upon spec ific misconduct had been presented to Hage r in accordance with these rights before his Skelly hearing, which gave him the “right to review the materi al on which the discipline was based.” The undisclosed reasons were vaguely communi cated to Hager’s counsel before the Skelly hearing, but were not provided to hi m in violation of these rights. Given this employment context, in which the County’s discipline decisions affect vested rights and must satisfy certain notice requirements, the trial court exercised its
discretion to exclude evidence of undisclose d reasons for Tyler’s decision to terminate Hager on relevancy grounds, and not based upon a POBRA violation. 7 Even Tyler testified during the 402 hearing that much of the evidence sought to be excluded in the
motions in limine did not factor into his decision to terminate Hager. The County draws a distinction between Hager’s employment rights and its right
to defend this civil action ar ising from Hager’s termination. The County argues that even
if it were later determined that its stated reasons for terminating Hager were untrue, it would not be liable under section 1102.5(b) because the whistleblower statute does not prohibit lying, it prohibits re taliation for engaging in a pr otected activity. This legal principle addresses an employer’s honest belie f in the stated reasons for terminating the

7 In its petition for rehearing, the County cites to the trial court’s ruling on the motion for new trial, stating that the trial cour t specifically held th at evidence of other acts of misconduct was properly excluded under POBRA. The County omits the final sentence of the trial court’s reasoning in wh ich it concludes that the “past conduct in question, therefore, was not relevant to the trial of this action.”21 employee, not the situation in which the em ployer states reasons for its decision to terminate based upon specific mi sconduct, and then adds add itional reasons to justify the termination. (See Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 151, 170-171.) We reject the County’s contention that th e trial court abused its discretion because the evidence of its legitimate and non-reta liatory reasons, whether disclosed or undisclosed, cannot be exclude d as it is a main issue in the case. The trial court’s evidentiary ruling did not preclude th e County from offering into evidence nonretaliatory reasons for terminating Hager ba sed upon the charged po licy violations, only evidence of undisclosed reasons that, on balance, had no probative value. Moreover, none of the cited cases the County relies on to challenge the trial court’s evidentiary rulings presents the unique circumstances of this case or holds the trial court lacks discretion to make evidentiary rulings in a given case to exclude evidence that is not relevant. Many of the cited ca ses reversing evidentiary rulings address the admission of “pattern and pr actice” evidence, so metimes referred to as “me-too” evidence, which was offered to show pretext. (See Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 759-767 [evidence
admissible to show em ployer’s intent]; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109- 116 [evidence admissible to show defendant’s intent]; Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 988- 989, disapproved on other grounds by
Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 6 64 [evidence relevant as “operative facts” of employer’s knowledge of a supervisor’s reputation and complaints from other female employees].) In contrast, evidence of an employee’s conduct unrelated to his termination, is properly excluded under section 352 of the Evidence Code. (See McLain v. Great American Ins. Companies (1989) 208 Cal.App. 3d 1476, 1487.) (2). Properly Excluded under Evidence Code Section 352 The undisclosed reasons for Hager’s term ination also were properly excluded
under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court has discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substan tially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substan tial danger of undue22 prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misl eading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) The prejudicial effect of this evidence was signi ficant. There was a risk the undisclosed reasons that Tyler considered, such as Hager lacked judgment, which justified performance mentoring status in 1996, and that Hager was embro iled in a tumultuous relationship with his former girlfriend, wo uld have been used as improper character
evidence. If admitted into evidence, there was a potential for the jury to use this information to punish Hager b ecause he is a bad person, and not to logically evaluate the misconduct associated with the charged policy vi olations that occurred while Hager was a
member of the DEA task force. The County contends that we cannot a ffirm the exclusion of this evidence on alternate grounds because the trial court did not make an affirmative re cord of its exercise of discretion to facilitate meaningful review. (See Ramona Manor Convalescent Hospital v. Care Enterprises (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1120 , 1137.) We disagree. Although our original opinion did not fully discuss the trial court’s obligation to weigh the probative value of th is evidence against the prej udicial effect, the record
contains affirmative indications the trial c ourt fully understood and executed its duty before exercising its discretion. The trial cour t determined this evidence was not relevant because it was not the basis for the charged policy violations that resulted in Hager’s termination, and by so finding, the admi ssion of this evidence would have been prejudicial, collateral, and an undue consumption of time. Th e record establishes that the
court considered the matter and took time to exer cise its discretion. We do not interpret case law as requiring anything more. Under th e circumstances of this case, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion. The County maintains this conclusion is at odds with Brown v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1529, a decision filed by Division Two of this court. We are not bound by decisions of other Courts of Appeal. Brown is nevertheless distinguishable because the ev identiary ruling at issue in that case was based upon a misunderstanding of the law that led to the exclusion of the reason for the plaintiff’s termination. ( Id . at pp. 1534-1535, 1537- 1538, 1545-1550.) In this case, the rulings on23 the motions in limine, revisited during th e 402 hearing when Tyler revealed the undisclosed reasons for terminating Hager, were based upon an exercise of discretion.
Unlike Brown , the trial court’s evidentiary rulings did not foreclose the County from introducing evidence of the non -retaliatory reasons for its decision to terminate Hager for the charged policy violations. 8

3. Substantial Evidence Support s the Verdict, But the Economic Damages Must Be Reversed for Lack of S ubstantial Evidence The County contends that Hager did not meet his burden to show that the decision to terminate him for falsely reporting wire tapped conversations was a pretext. The County also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the economic damages awarded for past and future earnings becaus e Hager was disabled and could not perform the job of deputy sheriff w ith or without accommodations. We agree on the second contention, as shall be discussed, that portion of the jury’s damages award is not supported by substantial evidence. “When a party contends insufficient eviden ce supports a jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citation.]” ( Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 11 88.) “We must ‘view the ev idence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it th e benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . .’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid .) “ ‘[N]either conflicts in the
evidence nor “ ‘testi mony which is subject to justifia ble suspicion . . . justif[ies] the

8 The County also argues that Hager was permitted to introduce evidence that he was a good deputy sheriff, which included his work on the DEA ta sk force, and his “outstanding” rating by Tyler on his 2000 performance review, while the County was barred from introducing evidence that Hager was a bad deputy sheriff. Hager had the burden to show the stated reasons for his te rmination were a pret ext, and his evidence focused on the period when he worked on the DEA task force. Our review of the trial transcript reveals that the jury heard ample ev idence that Hager was not a competent deputy sheriff while working as a member of the DEA task force, and Hager acted recklessly while a member of th e DEA task force. Additionally , Tyler also testified that he considered suspension, but did not “feel that it was the right level [of discipline] to come in at for the series of o ffenses that [he] saw in this investigation over the two-year period.”24 reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive pr ovince of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or fals ity of the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” ( Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) Therefore, our analysis begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence contradicted or uncontra dicted to support th e verdict in Hager’s
favor.

a. Substantial Evidence Suppo rts the Verdict that Terminating Hager for Falsely Reporting Wiretapped Conv ersations was a Pretext The County asserts there was overwhelming evidence presented at trial that Hager falsely interpreted wiretapped conversations, and no relevant contradictory evidence to show otherwise. In support of this argum ent, the County cites to testimony and evidence of inaccurate transcriptions, while Hager res ponds with a citation to the testimony of a federal agent and member of the DEA task fo rce who explained to the jury the difficulty in translating wiretapped co nversations because criminals often talk in “code.” The County overlooks the testimony that supp orts the verdict in Hager’s favor. (1). Background Facts During trial, the County presented evid ence that in the course of the IAB investigation, LASD discovered Hager had fa lsified certain wiretapped conversations, setting forth several examples where the in formation was inaccurate or exculpatory information had not been reported. 9 The County focuses on two illustrative wiretapped conversations. In the first conversation, Hage r reported that Hinkle, a target of the DEA task force, had responded in the affirmative to the caller’s question that he had “the guy handled,” which appeared to suggest that Hinkle had “man-h andled” someone. The jury
heard that this statement was inaccurate as the caller asked, “ ‘You got me handled?’ ”

9 As we noted in Hager I , this case has a procedural past in federal district court. ( Hager I , supra , B208941, at [pp. 3-4].) In the federa l action, as the County points out in its opening brief, the district court reviewed the wiretapped conversations, and the district court concluded that Hager misrepresented several wiretapped conversations. In Hager I , we addressed this issue, concluding it was one of numerous, factual i ssues that needed to be resolved at trial. ( Id . at [p. 13].)25 Testimony elicited indicated the latter interp retation refers to drugs. The second
conversation also invo lved Hinkle. The caller advised Hinkle that homicide detectives
came to the caller’s house to talk to her. Ha ger reported that the caller “advised Hinkle that she and her mother pretended that she was not home so she could talk to Hinkle first.” Hager’s report omitted allegedly exculp atory statements made by Hinkle in which
he told the caller to talk to the homicide detectives beca use “there ain’t nothing to tell them bad.” The internal affairs investigat or testified that Hinkle’s statement was exculpatory and should have been included in Hager’s report. The internal affairs report detailing the inaccuracies in Hager’s repor ts of the wiretappe d conversations was
admitted into evidence and ch ronicled several other calls from Hinkle’s home phone during a two-month period. Hager explained that he did not listen to transcripts of wiretapped conversations,
but instead looked at summaries called “line sheets” prepar ed by civilians. Line sheets are not verbatim transcriptions. Asked sp ecifically about failing to report Hinkle’s response to the caller in which Hinkle enco uraged the caller to talk to homicide detectives, Hager testified it was not exculpat ory in the sense that it showed Hinkle had nothing to hide. Hager also testified about a wiretapped conversation in his reports to
Shreves between two callers in which Hager reported that one of the callers “sarcastically said that Hinkle could kill a cop. ” When the actual transcript revealed that the caller said, “ ‘Like [Hinkle’s] going to kill a cop,’ with a different connotation than ‘Hinkle could kill a cop.’ ” Hager reiterated that he did not write the synopsis of that call. 10 Hager testified that he accurately reported to Sh reves the wiretap info rmation he received regarding Hinkle. The jury also had an oppo rtunity to review the IAB investigation report, which contained the transcriptions, Hager’s summar y, and the investigator’s analysis.

10 Hager was asked, “Sir, isn’t it true that the actual wiretap states, ‘like Tom’s going to murder a cop’?” The word “murder” does not appear in the investigator’s report. Hager’s response focused on the interchangea ble terms of “murder,” and “kill,” which in his view did not constitute a false report.26 (2). Inconsistencies in LASD’s Stat ed Reason for Terminating Hager
In order to establish the decision to terminate Hager for falsely reporting wiretapped conversation was a pretext, and th e real reason was in retaliation for reporting deputy misconduct, Hager must show “ ‘weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the em ployer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its
action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them “unworthy of credence,” [citation] . . . . [Citati ons.]’ [Citations.]” ( Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1005.) From this evidence, the factfinde r can infer that the employer did not act for the stated non-retaliatory reasons. ( Ibid .) Hager has set forth several such inconsis tencies and implausib ilities to support the jury’s verdict that the stated reason, that is, falsely reporting wi retapped conversations, was unworthy of credence. As part of his wo rk on the DEA task fo rce, Hager obtained summaries and synopses of wiretapped conversations, wh ich he believed set forth
information that he had been or dered to report to Shreves. Hager testified that he did not interpret the wiretapped convers ations, and took exception to the characterization that, as summarized in his reports to Shreves, the information was false or misleading. As described above, the jury could have recogn ized the inherent weakness in the County’s stated reason for terminating Hager, when un der cross-examination, Hager was asked to admit that the summary of a wiretapped conv ersation in which the word “kill” was used instead of “murder,” constituted a false report that justified his termination. Moreover, the jury had an opportunity to examine the IAB investigator’s file, setting forth what he believed were the false reports. The jury might have agreed with Hager, and not the investigator, that the differences between Hager’s report and the IAB investigator’s interpretation of the wiretappe d conversations were not significant, or the use of “code” between the callers was subject to interpreta tion and did not estab lish Hager made false reports. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded this stated reason for Hager’s termination was pretextual.27 b. Substantial Evidence Do es Not Support the Verd ict of Economic Damages Lost actual earnings may be proved with reasonable certainty and are recoverable as an element of special damages. ( Handelman v. Victor Equipment Co. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 902, 906.) The County challenges the jury ve rdict awarding $2,006,015 in lost actual earnings. (1). Background Facts In March 2002, Hager injured his neck an d back while chasing a suspect. He went out on medical disability in April 2002. In April 2003, Hager applied for, and was later granted, medical disability
retirement as a result of his b ack and neck injuries. In hi s application, Hager checked “no,” to the question of whet her he would be willing to ac cept another position he could perform within the County that would not resu lt in a loss of income. Hager explained at trial that as of April 2003, his doctor told him that if he did not have a recommended surgical procedure he could not perform the physical duties of a deputy sheriff. Hager did not undergo surgery, explaining to the ju ry that he would have, but he had no job to return to following th e surgery and there were risks as sociated with the surgery. Hager called as an expert an orthoped ic surgeon who reviewed Hager’s medical
records and obtained information regarding the job classification of a deputy sheriff. The expert opined that Hager could not meet th e requisite job classification to perform the duties of a deputy sheriff as of 2003. The me dical expert testified Hager could undergo a procedure called “disk fusion” to ameliorate or cure Hager’s neck injury. There was no guarantee, however, that Hager would regain complete mob ility in his neck after the surgical procedure. Over objection, Ha ger’s counsel asked the medical expert the following question: “Dr. Kreite nberg, assuming a good result, if you will, on a two-level fusion, did you have an opini on whether or not Deputy Hager could perform at the end of
the four to six months the classifications of a deputy sheriff?” The doctor responded: “With a good result, yes, he could return to arduous work,” as described in the deputy sheriff job classification.28 Hager’s medical expert testified that Hager was not totally disabled from any work. The expert, however, clarified that with two-level disk disease, Hager would have difficulty with the very arduous work of a Class IV deputy sheriff. Hager’s economic expert stated her opinions on his lost earnings were based upon the assumption that he was working as a depu ty sheriff. The economist calculated lost earnings from the date of termination to the date she prepared her report. Her calculations were based on Hager’s rate of pay in effect at the time he last worked. The economist calculated backpay at either $9 52,275 or $915,539, depending upon certain variables with a credit of $127 ,866 for past pension benef its received. Future lost earnings, based upon retirement at age 55, were calculated at either $2,765,243 or $2,562,213, depending upon certain variable s, with a credit of $1,126,343 for past pension benefits received. Adding overtime, the economist calculated Hager’s total loss of earnings at either $3,514,489 or $3,249,35 7, depending upon certain variables. These calculations were offset by the value of pa st and future medica l pension benefits ($1,254,206), leaving a net loss of earnings in the range betw een $2,260,283 and $1,995,151. Hager testified that he applied to “place s” to obtain employment in the fields of private investigation, security management, a nd personal protection. The salary for these positions was in the range of $50,000 to $100,000. Hage r testified that during the interviews, he had to disclose that he was terminated for falsifying affidavits and making false allegations. Hager did not identify the interviews in which the subject came up. Hager also did not further te stify regarding his efforts to obtain employment. He was unable to secure employment in any of these fields. The jury awarde d $2,006,015 in economic damages. (2). Substantial Evidence Does No t Support Backpay Damages Citing Davis v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. Personnel Com. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1122 ( Davis ), the County contends Hager is not entitled to recover backpay ($806,041) because th e evidence presented at trial established that when Hager was terminated he was medically disabled and was unable to perform the duties of a29 deputy sheriff. Our review of the jury ’s award of damages is limited. ( Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1321-1322 & fn. 18.) Given the nature of the issue framed by the Coun ty, we must determine whether the damages award is supported by s ubstantial evidence. ( Id. at p. 1322, fn. 18.)
In Davis , supra , 152 Cal.App.4th 1122, the court concluded that a wrongfully demoted employee was not entitled to recover backpay because he had been placed on nonindustrial disability by his doctor before being demoted and eventually terminated. ( Id . at pp. 1127-1128, 1141.) Upon rescinding the demotion, the employee did not obtain a release from his doctor stating he was able to work in any capacity and, therefore, he was not reinstated. ( Id. at p. 1129.) Thus, the employee did not work and could not work due to his disability, which predated any wr ongful conduct and wa s not work-related. ( Id . at p. 1133.) Invoking traditional causa tion principles, the court concluded the employer could not be held responsible fo r backpay because the employee would have
sustained the loss due to his di sability even in the absence of any wrongful demotion. ( Id. at pp. 1133-1141.)
Like Davis , the County established that Hage r took medical disability leave (unrelated to the charged policy viola tions that led to his termination) before he was terminated. Hager’s medical e xpert testified he was disabled as of 2003 and could not perform the job functions of a deputy sheri ff. Although there was testimony that Hager’s condition might have improved with surgery, Hager did no t undergo surgery and was not “ready, willing, and able” to return to work. Thus, at trial there was no evidence that Hager would have been able to work as a deputy sheriff. Accord ingly, Hager is not entitled to recover backpay beca use he would have sustained the loss due to his disability even if the County had not terminated him. Hager, however, argues that the County’s wrongful conduct in terminating him has “forever destroyed [his] ab ility to secure any replacemen t employment in the field in which he is trained.” Relying on his inability to obtain employment, Hager distinguishes
Davis , a nonindustrial disability, with his, likening his situation to an in dustrial disability.30 We reject this comparison. Hager’s medical disability, that is, inju ry to his neck and back, is unrelated to his terminat ion or damage to his reputation. Hager also relies on SASCO Electric v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 532, to argue that an em ployee is entitled to backpay unless the employer shows the employee is completely una ble to work in any capacity because of his disability. SASCO is inapposite. In SASCO , unlike in Davis , the employer failed to prove that the employee’s work restrictions during her pregnancy could not have been accommodated. ( SASCO , at pp. 543-544.) In this case, like Davis , Hager obtained a
medical leave and did not seek an accomm odation to return to active duty in any capacity. Thus, there was no ev idence in the record that Hager would have worked, nor could he have worked as a deputy sheriff wi th or without accommodations, unless he had surgery and obtained a “good result.” The award of backpay cannot stand. (3). Future Loss of Earnings was Speculative The County contends the jury’s award of future loss of earnings ($1,199,974) is speculative because there is no evidence to show with a re asonable degree of medical certainty that had Hager undergone disk fusi on surgery he could have returned to work and performed the duties of a deputy sheriff. The medical expert testified if Hager underwent disk fusion surgery, “[w]ith a good result . . . he could re turn to arduous work” as a deputy sheriff. 11 The economist’s calculations of fu ture loss of earnings were based upon the assumption that Hager would have re turned to work as a deputy sheriff and worked until he was 55. The economist agreed that if her assumpti on was incorrect, that is, if Hager could not return to work as a depu ty sheriff, her calculations were incorrect. “ ‘Front pay,’ as the term is used in employment litigation, is a measure of damages for loss of future income, as opposed to backpay, which is lost-wages damages through the time of trial.” ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 388.) Front pay is in lieu of re instatement and is an award

11 Hager’s brief states, without citation to th e record, that his medical expert testified “to a reasonable medical certainty that with su rgery, he would likely be restored to full capacity to perform those duties.” Ther e was no such testimony before the jury.31 of the salary and benefits a wrongfully discha rged plaintiff would ha ve earned had he or she been employed after trial. ( Mize-Kurzman , supra , 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 873, fn. 17.) “Front pay is measured by the employee’s pr ojected earnings and benefits over the period of time until he or she is likely to beco me reemployed or likel y to retire, where reemployment is unlikely.” ( Id . at pp. 873-874, fn. 17.) Hager’s economist based her opinion on th e assumption that Hager could return to work as a deputy sheriff, which has no evidentiary support. ( Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117.) Because the economist’s testimony was based on the sala ry Hager would have earned as a deputy sheriff, it was based upon conclusions or a ssumptions not supported by the record and
cannot constitute substa ntial evidence. ( Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 367-368.) Hager, however, contends substantial evid ence supports the jury’s verdict based upon the reputational injury or the “blot on his resume ,” which prevented him from obtaining any employment in re lated fields. This reputationa l injury, or loss of future earning capacity, is distinct from front pay, which is the earnings the employee would
have received from the defendant employer but for his wrongful termination. (See Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment L itigation (The Rutter Gr oup 2013) ¶ 17.228, p. 17-38; Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc. (7th Cir. 1998) 137 F.3d 944, 952 [“ ‘To recover for lost earning capacity, a plaintiff must produce “competent evidence suggesting that his injuries have narrowed the range of econom ic opportunities available to him. . . . [A] plaintiff must show that his injury has caused a diminution in his ability to earn a living.” ’ ”].) Loss of earning power is an element of general damages. (Civ. Code, § 3333.) The evidence does not support the award of damages for loss of future earning capacity. The economist’s calc ulations, which Hager relies on, were based upon what he would have earned as a deputy sheriff, a j ob he can longer perfo rm. Hager’s vague testimony is not sufficient to suggest a diminutio n in his ability to earn a living caused by his reputational injury. The award of front pay cannot stand.32 4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Disc retion in its Evidentiary Rulings The County argues that the trial court committed prej udicial error in admitting
evidence that shifted the fo cus away from the elements of Hager’s whistleblower
retaliation lawsuit toward wh ether Engels actually comm itted criminal acts. This
contention is based on questions presented during trial to Engels, Brandenburg, and a parole officer regarding Aujay’s disappearan ce and the connection between Engels and Hinkle, one of the targets of the DEA task fo rce. Our recitation of the background facts is limited to the evidence up on which timely and specific obj ections were raised in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1595, 1611.)

a. Background Facts The County cites to Engels’s testimony in which he was ques tioned regarding his whereabouts on the date of Aujay’s disappear ance, and his relationship with Hinkle. Defense counsel objected to the line of qu estioning related to Aujay’s disappearance as “inappropriate,” because it suggested Engels had “something to do criminally with the missing Deputy Aujay.” The objection was overruled. With re spect to Engels’s testimony regarding his relations hip with Hinkle, the County raised an objection to a question related to Engels’s response to a radio call from Hinkle’s house reporting an attempted murder. The County also cites to Brandenbur g’s testimony in which he described the
information he received from several sour ces during the course of his homicide investigation. The County raised hearsay objections to questions posed to Brandenburg eliciting the following testimony: (1) another deputy told him that Aujay had been murdered, and the deputy had in formation about Engels, referring to Engels as a “dirty deputy”; (2) a former narcotic s officer told him that a me thamphetamine lab was located adjacent to the area where Aujay’s truck was located; (3) an inmate told him that he overheard people talking about murdering Aujay; and (4) an FBI agen t also had obtained information that Aujay ha d been murdered.33 b. The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Admitting Evidence that Showed Hager had a Reasonable Belief of Deputy Misconduct The County contends the admission of En gels’s testimony was prejudicial because the jury would be more likely to “reward plai ntiff for his belief that Deputy Engels was involved in illicit activity if, in hindsight, the information [wer e] true.” As to the hearsay evidence, the County contends that this evidence sens ationalized the trial resulting in prejudicial error. We conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion. A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1078; Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc.
, supra , 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317.) 12 A judgment will not be reversed by reason of an erroneous admission of evidence unless a miscarriage of justice is shown. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b).) “In civil cases, a miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the reviewing court, after an examination of the entire cause, including th e evidence, is of the opinion that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorab le to the appealing pa rty would have been
reached in the abse nce of the error. [Citation.]” ( Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 692.) As to Engels’s testimony, the trial cour t’s ruling fell well within its discretion. Hager was entitled to the protec tion of section 1102. 5(b) if he had reasonable cause to
believe that the information he disclosed was a violation of the law. Hager’s reasonable belief of Engels’s involvement in Aujay’s disappearance and in the methamphetamine organization in the Antelope Va lley had been discredited by Holmes during the course of

12 In its reply brief, the County cites Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 12-13, for the proposition that our review of the trial court’s rulings on hearsay objec tions is de novo. Wiz Technology is a summary judgment case. In citing this standard of revi ew, the court relied on our case, Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 142. ( Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand , at p. 13.) We noted that the tria l court did not rule on the evidentiary objections, and we stated “we must determine the validity of those objections ourselves since our standard of review is a de novo examination of the order which granted the motion for summary judgment.” ( Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. , at p. 149, fn. 2.)34 his investigation. Holmes testified that there was no credible information from which Hager could have reasonably be lieved Engels had violated th e law. Thus, the evidence elicited from Engels concerning his wherea bouts on the day of Aujay's disappearance cast doubt on Holmes’s investig ation. This evidence was re levant and properly admitted to show Holmes did not thoroughly investigat e Engels to follow up Hager’s information concerning Engels’s involvement in Aujay’s disappearance.
We also conclude that the trial court’ s rulings on the County’s hearsay objections
were not an abuse of discretion. Brandenb urg testified that he received the same information regarding deputy mi sconduct that Hager reported to Shreves. Brandenburg’s testimony was not offered to prove the informa tion was correct, only to show that Hager
had a reasonable belief that En gels had violated the law. Brandenburg’s testimony also cast doubt on Holmes’s conclusion that Hage r’s sources were not credible, and Hager’s reports regarding deputy mi sconduct were reckless.
Even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence, the County has not shown prejudice. Seve ral witnesses testified regarding Hager’s reports to Shreves, which detailed Hager’s information about Engels. The County actually cited to and relied on Brandenburg’s testimony, whic h it asserts was improperly admitted, to show that Brande nburg was the first to report deputy misconduct. Moreover, as to the testimony of the pa role officer, which the County contends was improperly admitted, the County failed to object but thereaf ter cross-examined the witness. The jury heard that the parole officer did not believe the information he rece ived about Engels’s wrongdoing. On this record, ther e was no miscarriage of justice.
5. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denyi ng the Motion for Ne w Trial Based upon
Juror Misconduct The County argues the trial court e rred in denying its motion for new trial premised on juror misconduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) The argument on appeal is twofold. First, the trial court, upon hear ing of misconduct, committed prejudicial error by not following the law. Second, the trial court erred in denying the new trial motion35 because the presumption of prejudice arisi ng from jurors discussing news reports about LASD corruption was not rebutted. We disagree with both arguments.

a. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Prot ecting the Privacy of the Jurors by Requesting Permission to Releas e Their Identifying Information The County contends the trial court erre d when it denied the County’s application for the juror’s personal iden tifying information (addresses and phone numbers) so the County could further investigate whether ju ror misconduct occurred in light of certain news reports. The County ar gued that it was entitled to th e identifying information under Code of Civil Procedure section 237, subdivision (a)(1). Code of Civil Procedure section 237, s ubdivision (a)(1) states: “The names of qualified jurors drawn from the qualified juror list for the superior court shall be made available to the public upon request unle ss the court determines that a compelling interest, as defined in subdiv ision (b), requires that this information should be kept
confidential or its use limited in whole or in part.” Subdivision (b) provides that the petition to the superior court for access to these records shall be “supported by a
declaration that includes facts sufficient to establish good cause for the release of the juror’s personal identifying information.” Th e court is required to set a hearing upon a showing of good cause, unless there is a show ing that establishes “a compelling interest against disclosure.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b).) “A compelli ng interest includes, but is not limited to, protecting jurors from threats or danger of physical harm.” ( Ibid .) If the court does not set the matter for hearing, it must make express findings of either lack of good cause or the presence of a co mpelling interest against disclosure. ( Ibid .) Contrary to the County’s position, it is not entirely clear whether subdivision (b)
of section 237 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies in a civil case. The reference to “personal juror identifying in formation,” as used in subdivision (a)(2), and the use of a
“criminal action” in the first sentence of subdivision (c) suggests that it does not. If subdivision (b) applies, then the trial court’s decision to correspond with the jurors to seek permission to release their identifying information must have been based upon Hager’s counsel’s argument that there was a compelling interest against disclosure.36 While the court made no express findings, ther e is no indication in th e record the County asked for express findings, or the County object ed to the procedure th e trial court invoked to protect the juror’s privacy. While only one juror granted permission to release his identifying information, the jurors had an absolute right not to talk to the County. Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure section 237, there was
no abuse of the court’s inherent discre tion to protect juror privacy. (See Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1091, 1096 [e ntirely apart from Code Civ. Proc., § 237, court has inherent power to protect juro r privacy in civil as well as criminal cases; exercise of that power is reviewed for abus e of discretion].) A litigant seeking juror’s personal identifying information must make “ ‘a sufficient sh owing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, that diligent efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and that further investigati on is necessary to provide the court with adequate informati on to rule on a motion for new trial. . . . [¶] Absent a satisfactory, preliminary showing of possible juror misconduct, the strong public interests in the integrity of our ju ry system and a juror’s ri ght to privacy outweigh the countervailing public interest se rved by disclosure of the ju ror information as a matter of right in each case.’ ” ( Id . at pp. 1093-1094.) The County did not make the requisite preliminary showing in their ex parte application.
b. The Record Reveals No Prej udicial Juror Misconduct During jury deliberations, multiple news sources reported on county-wide inmate abuse in the Los Angeles Co unty jail system. Upon disc harge of the jury, defense
counsel told the court that th e jury “had discussed recent me dia articles on the conduct of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Depart ment during deliberations and felt the Department was corrupt.” As noted above, before moving for new trial, the County asked the court for the juror’s personal identify ing information. In response to the court’s request, only one juror permitted the court to re lease his information. This juror did not submit a declaration to sup port the County’s motion. In its motion for new trial, the County offered another juror’s declaration that stated: “During trial and before the verdic t was reached in this matter, I heard another37 juror mention they hear d the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department was in the news. The juror did not state any additional details regarding the story th ey had heard. In response, one or two other jurors stated that they had also heard recent news stories regarding the Los Angeles Co unty Sheriff’s Department.” 13 An order denying a motion for a new trial is not itself appealable. We review the order as part of the judgment. ( Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 19.) Th e scope of our review from the denial of a new trial on the ground of ju ror misconduct requires an examination of the entire record, including the ev idence, and we independently determine whether an act of misconduct occurred and, if so, whether the act prevented the moving party from having a fair trial. ( Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 803, 818; see also Whitlock v. Foster Wheeler, LLC (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 149, 158.) The County contends that any information obtained about a part y or the case from news reports creates a presump tion of prejudice. In support of its assertion, the County cites cases in which jurors read news article s about the case during trial and prejudged the case ( People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 517-519; Province v. Center for Women’s Health & Family Birth (1993) 20 Cal.App. 4th 1673, 1678-1679, disapproved on other grounds in Heller v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 41), heard news reports that the defendant made “ ‘threats against the guards . . . if he were given the death penalty’ ” ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 993- 994), and were exposed to extraneous information during jury selection in the form of defendant’s statements directed at the prosecutor that the defendant would “ ‘tear hi s head off’ and that he had ‘nothing to lose’ ” ( People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1347). Here, the news reports had nothing to do with the case. The County also cites People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, as support for the proposition that any information about a party leads to a presumption of prejudice. In

13 This portion of the declaration su pporting the motion was admissible. (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).)38 Nesler , a juror overheard damaging information concerning the defendant from a source outside the trial, failed to disclose this info rmation to the court, and during deliberations passed on that informati on to other jurors. ( Id . at pp. 578-579 (lead opn. of George, C.J.).) Unlike here, the information in Nesler was connected to the case. Although the County characterizes the news reports as detailing “corruption” in the LASD, the news reports at issue here focused on the jail system, which had no connection with Hager’s case. This out-of-court information does not appear to be information so prejudicial “that it is inherently and substantia lly likely to have influenced a juror,” or resulted in actual bias against the County. ( People v. Nesler
, supra , 16 Cal.4th at pp. 578-579.) But, even if we were to agree with th e County that a juror who mentioned reading about the LASD, without furthe r elaboration, and “one or two others” had heard news stories, raised a presumption of prejudice, th e presumption was rebutted. “ ‘Some of the factors to be considered when determining whether the presumption is rebutted are the strength of the evidence that misconduct occurred, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, and the probability that actu al prejudice may have ensued.’ ” ( Province v. Center for Women’s Health & Family Birth
, supra , 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1679, citing
Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 417.) In examining the record, we conclude there was no probability actual prejudice resulted from juror misconduct. Evidence of misconduct was not serious. The declarant was uncertain as to the identity of the jurors, there was no i ndication of the nature of the news they had heard, and the declaration lacks specificity re garding the juror’s statements
and the circumstances under wh ich they were made. There also is no indication that these jurors violated the court’s instructions not to “look for any information outside of the court.” Thus, for the foregoing reasons , any juror misconduct was not “of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.” (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).)39 Hager’s Appeal Hager appeals from the trial court’s or der denying his motion for attorney fees
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Code of Civil Pr ocedure section 1021.5 codifies the “private attorney gene ral” doctrine of attorney fees. ( Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1210 .) “ ‘[T]he fundamental objective of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigan ts in such cases.” (G raham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.) The statute authorizes the court to award attorney fees to a successful party in an action th at “has resulted in the enfor cement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the genera l public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforc ement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 .) All of the statutory requirements must be met. ( Satrap v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 72, 80-81.) Because the issues presente d here do not require us to construe the statute, we review the order denying attorney f ees for an abuse of discretion. ( Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 152- 153.) The questions we discuss are whether the court applied the proper legal st andards and, if so, whether the result was within the range of the court’s discretion. ( Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1344.) We presume that the trial court properly applied the law
and acted within its discretion unless affirmatively shown otherwise. ( Collins v. City of Los Angeles
, supra , at p. 153.) As a preliminary matter, Hager appears to contend that the trial court order denying attorney fees without any stated reasons constitutes reversible error because, as a reviewing court, we cannot assess whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard. Hager has offered no legal su pport for this position and ignores the presumption that the court properly applied the law. Moreover, the failure to state reasons for a discretionary decision does no t constitute, by itself, abuse of discretion.40 ( Schwartz v. City of Rosemead (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 547, 555; see also Satrap v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
, supra , 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 81, fn. 2.) To be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must be clear that the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion. Hager next contends this action resulted in enforcement of an important right to be protected from whistleblower retaliation, whic h affects the public and satisfies the first
criterion under Code of Civil Procedure s ection 1021.5, by conferring “a significant benefit . . . on the general public or a large class of persons[.]” There are a number of published appellate cases that have awarded at torney fees to public safety officers who have sued to enforce rights, but we agree with the Co unty that those cases are distinguishable, and the right Hager enforced did not rise to the level of conferring a significant benefit on the public.
In Jaramillo v. County of Orange
, supra , 200 Cal.App.4th 811, attorney fees were awarded because the plaintiff obtained an in junction requiring the County to amend its executive management waiver fo rms to expressly include language that no POBRA rights may be included in the waiver. ( Id . at p. 827.) The injunction did not just benefit the plaintiff, or the executive-level sheriffs w ho will now know that they are not waiving POBRA protections, but it also inured to th e benefit of the County by lessening the probabilities of abuse and corruption in the sheriff’s office. ( Id . at p. 829.)
In Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 414, a sheriff’s association brought an action against the County afte r the County denied certain deputy sheriffs, who were the subject of a criminal investigation, access to employee representatives as required under POBRA. ( Id . at p. 418.) The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees, reasoning that POBRA rights and protections benefit not only public safety officers but th e public at large, transcending the employeremployee relationship. ( Id . at p. 422.) “These principles hold true even where a party enforces an existing right.” ( Ibid .)41 In Otto v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 328, we reversed a trial court order denying attorney fees to a school public safety officer who successfully challenged his em ployer’s refusal to afford him an administrative appeal
from a written memorandum that was critic al of his job performance, which was allegedly a punitive action implicating POBRA. ( Id. at pp. 330-331.) We concluded the issue of what constituted a “punitive action” under POBRA had widesp read implications for law enforcement agencies and their employees across the state, and thus the lawsuit had conferred a significant public benefit by “f urthering the public’s interest in effective law enforcement.” ( Id . at pp. 334-335.) Hager also directs our attention to Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 394, but in that case, like those cited above , Robinson successfully prosecuted POBRA rights that conferred a significant benefit on the general public. Robinson challenged his removal as chief, wh ich resulted in a published case determining that the city’s removal of its police chief from office without notice, a statement of reasons, or an opportunity fo r an administrative appeal violates POBRA (Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (c)). ( Robinson v. City of Chowchilla
, supra , at pp. 387, 395-399.) 14 We do not agree with Hager’s assertion that any action allegi ng a violation of a right, whether under POBRA or the Labor Code , necessarily confers a significant benefit to the public, regardless of the nature of the alleged violations or the underlying circumstances. Unlike the plaintiffs in Jamarillo
, Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn.
, Otto , and
Robinson , whose lawsuits benefited all public safety officers and the public at large, this action only benefited Hager. An action that rectifies illegal private or public conduct, including a suit brought under section 1102.5(b) standing alone , does not establish that

14 Hager also relies on Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal. App.4th 173, and Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, but these cases, unlike Hager’s case, are similar to those cited above and vindicated im portant constitutional ri ghts of due process, freedom of speech, and freedom to petition, wh ich conferred a significant benefit on the general public. ( Bowman , supra , at pp. 179-181; Press , supra , at pp. 318-319.)42 the action conferred a significant benefit on the public. (See Satrap v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co.
, supra , 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 81-82.) In sum, Hager has not met the first criteri on for obtaining an attorney fees award
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hager’s motion.43 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed as to the award of $2,006,015 in damages, and is otherwise affirmed. The order denying the mo tion for attorney fees is affirmed. The parties are to bear th eir own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.
We concur:

CROSKEY, Acting P. J.

KITCHING, J.