UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6102

DEAN JACKSON KINDER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JAMES RUBENSTEIN, Commissioner; PAT MIRANDY, Warden; DANIEL 

KIMBLE, Unit Manager,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:15-cv-00050-FPS-JES)

Submitted: April 19, 2016 Decided: April 22, 2016

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dean Jackson Kinder, Appellant Pro Se. William E. Murray, 

ANSPACH MEEKS ELLENBERGER LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Dean Kinder appeals the district court’s judgment adopting 

the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss his 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (2012) action for failure to state a claim. On appeal, 

we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal 

brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

Kinder first argues that the district court erred in 

declining to sanction Defendants for “perjury” committed by 

Defendants’ counsel in a memorandum in support of Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. The apparent misrepresentation by 

Defendants’ counsel was regrettable and potentially warranting 

of admonishment if made in bad faith. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(b)(2), (3), (c); In re Bees, 562 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 

2009) (distinguishing between counsel’s inadvertent mistake and 

statement in bad faith). However, Kinder’s request for 

sanctions was procedurally improper, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(c)(2), and the statement caused Kinder no prejudice, given 

that the magistrate judge independently investigated and 

corrected it. Under the circumstances presented, we find no 

abuse of discretion in the court’s decision not to sua sponte 

issue a show cause order to address this isolated statement. 

See Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 151 (4th 
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Cir. 2002) (discussing sua sponte sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 11(c)(3)); Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 277 

(4th Cir. 2006) (standard of review).

Next, Kinder challenges the district court’s repeated 

denials of his motions for appointed counsel and discovery. We 

conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Kinder discovery during the pleading stage of the proceedings or 

in declining to appoint counsel, as Kinder’s articulate 

pleadings demonstrated his ability to present his claims. See

Kolon Indus. Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 160, 

172 (4th Cir.) (standard of review for discovery matters), cert. 

denied, 135 S. Ct. 437 (2014); Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 

966 (4th Cir. 1987) (standard of review for denial of counsel); 

Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984) (addressing 

factors relevant to appointment of counsel in civil cases), 

abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 

490 U.S. 296 (1989). Finally, while Kinder challenges the 

district court’s factual recitation regarding grievances he 

filed, we find no reversible error in its summary of Kinder’s 

complaint and attached grievance forms. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED