UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4292

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO DEON WALKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior 

District Judge. (4:08-cr-00079-RGD-FBS-1)

Submitted: February 25, 2010 Decided: April 16, 2010

Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard E. Gardiner, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert 

Edward Bradenham, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport 

News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Antonio Deon Walker appeals from the 360-month 

sentence imposed following his jury conviction on one count of 

conspiracy to obstruct, delay, and affect interstate commerce by 

robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 

(2006) (“Count 1”), one count of obstructing, delaying, and 

affecting interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1951(a) (“Count 2”), and one count of possession of a 

firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006) (“Count 3”). Walker’s counsel 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal, but questioning whether the district court abused its 

discretion in not permitting Walker’s counsel to inquire whether 

a Government witness expected favorable consideration at 

sentencing in an unrelated state prosecution. Walker filed a 

pro se supplemental brief, arguing that the Government failed to 

prove that the alleged robbery affected interstate commerce and 

questioning the credibility of the witnesses. The Government 

has not filed a brief. Finding no error, we affirm. 

“[E]xposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is 

a proper and important function of the constitutionally 

protected right of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
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475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, the district court has “wide latitude insofar as the 

Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on 

such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other 

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 

witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only 

marginally relevant.” Id. at 679. Thus, we review the district 

court’s limitations on cross-examination for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th 

Cir. 2002). “The critical question . . . is whether the 

defendant is allowed an opportunity to examine a witness[’] 

subjective understanding of his bargain with the government, for 

it is this understanding which is of probative value on the 

issue of bias.” United States v. Ambers, 85 F.3d 173, 176 (4th 

Cir. 1996).

We find that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in preventing Walker’s counsel from questioning the 

Government witness about the details of an unrelated state 

murder investigation. The record clearly demonstrates that 

counsel was given the opportunity to fully question the witness 

about his deal to cooperate with the Government for favorable 

consideration as a consequence of his testimony against Walker 

in the present case. Allowing counsel to delve further into the 
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details of the witness’ cooperation in the state murder 

investigation for favorable consideration at a possible state 

sentencing would have served no real purpose, as counsel had 

already established that the witness sought favorable treatment 

for his cooperation both in the prosecution against Walker and 

in the unrelated state investigation. 

In his pro se supplemental brief, Walker argues that 

the Government failed to prove that the alleged robbery affected 

interstate commerce and questions the credibility of the 

witnesses implicating him in the robbery. A jury’s verdict 

“must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the 

view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” 

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). The court 

“may not weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the 

witnesses [because] [t]hose functions are reserved for the 

jury.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 

1997) (internal citation omitted). 

A conviction under the Hobbs Act requires the 

government to prove “(1) the underlying robbery or extortion 

crime, and (2) an effect on interstate commerce.” United 

States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 353 (4th Cir. 2003). However, 

“the impact on commerce [may be] small, and it may be shown by 

proof of probabilities without evidence that any particular 
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commercial movements were affected.” United States v. Brantley, 

777 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1985). The interstate commerce 

requirement has been broadly interpreted and courts have found 

it “satisfied even where the effect on interstate commerce is 

indirect, minimal and less than certain,” although the effect 

must be “reasonably probable.” United States v. Buffey, 899 

F.2d 1402, 1404 (4th Cir. 1990). Moreover, we have held that 

“[d]rug dealing . . . is an inherently economic enterprise that 

affects interstate commerce. For this reason, the robbery of a 

drug dealer has been found to be the kind of act which satisfies 

the ‘affecting commerce’ element of the Hobbs Act.” Williams, 

342 F.3d at 355 (internal citation omitted). 

We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Government, is sufficient to sustain a 

conviction under the Hobbs Act. The victim, the co-conspirator, 

and a witness all testified that Walker was involved in the 

robbery. Moreover, the victim admitted that he was a known 

crack dealer, which Walker’s co-conspirator confirmed, and that 

he earned at least some of the cash stolen by selling crack 

cocaine. Accordingly, we find that the jury’s verdict is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 
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We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Walker, in writing, of his right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Walker requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Walker. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED