IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 14, 2017 Session

JEFFREY KING v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2010-C-2083 Cheryl Blackburn, Judge

No. M2016-01224-CCA-R3-PC – Filed June 28, 2017

The Petitioner, Jeffrey King, pleaded guilty to multiple drug and money laundering 

crimes, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years of incarceration to be served at 

100%. The Petitioner attempted to reserve certified questions of law pursuant to 

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether wiretaps used in the 

investigation of the crime were lawful. This court determined that the Petitioner was not 

entitled to relief on the basis of the certified questions and affirmed the judgments on 

appeal. State v. King, 437 S.W.3d 856, 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). In 2015, the 

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the 

ineffective assistance of counsel and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied 

relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined.

Manuel B. Russ, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeffrey King.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant 

Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; Edward S. Ryan and 

Andrea Green, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History

The facts underlying this case encompass numerous charges against the Petitioner 

and his co-defendants for possession and sale of marijuana, money laundering, and 
2

possession of firearms in Davidson, Sumner, and Rutherford counties.

1

The Petitioner 

was represented by different attorneys in each county and pleaded guilty to varying drug 

and money laundering offenses in each county. 

A. Trial

This court summarized the factual and procedural background of the case for each 

of the three counties. We include that which is relevant to this appeal: 

On October 7, 2008, Phillip L. Taylor, state investigator for the 20th 

Judicial District Drug Task Force of Nashville, Davidson County, 

Tennessee, filed in the Criminal Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, an 

Application for Interception of Wire and Electronic Communications for 

the interception of communications through telephone line (615) 517-7591 

“used by Bruce Dady” (“the First Dady Application” and “the First Dady 

Number”). The First Dady Application is 59 pages long and consists of 

271 numbered paragraphs containing the sworn averments of Officer 

Taylor. The identified “concern” of the First Dady Application was “the 

delivery, sale, or possession with intent to sell or deliver, 700 pounds or 

more of any substance containing marijuana, and conspiracy to commit the 

same” (“the Target Crimes”). The First Dady Application identified the 

following individuals as participants in the Target Crimes: Vernon E. 

Lockhart, Bruce A. Dady, the [Petitioner and his co-defendants], . . . 

(collectively, “the Target Subjects”). . . . .

Also on October 7, 2008, Officer Taylor filed in the Criminal Court 

for Davidson County, Tennessee, an Application for Interception of Wire 

and Electronic Communications for the interception of communications 

through telephone line (615) 714-5541 “subscribed to by Cassie T. Roark” 

but “believed to be used primarily by [the Petitioner]” (“the King 

Application”). The King Application is 60 pages long, consists of 275 

numbered paragraphs, and is substantially similar to the First Dady 

Application.

. . .

On October 7, 2008, the Criminal Court for Davidson County, the 

Hon. Mark Fishburn (“the Issuing Court”), granted the First Dady 

Application, the King Application. . . and issued as to each Application an 

 

1 Additional charges in Wilson and Cheatham Counties were dismissed.
3

Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire and Electronic 

Communications, a ten-page document. Each Order contains the following 

findings:

4. There is probable cause to believe that [the Target 

Subjects] have committed, and will continue to commit, the 

offenses of delivery, sale, or possession with intent to sell or 

deliver, 700 pounds or more of any substance containing 

marijuana, and conspiracy to commit same.

. . .

5. There is probable cause to believe that the telephone 

assigned phone number (615) 714-5541, a telephone service 

provided by Verizon Wireless, . . . subscribed to by Cassie T. 

Roark at 1636 Stokley Lane, Old Hickory, Tennessee, 

believed to be used by [the Petitioner], Target Subject, in 

connection with the commission of the above described 

offense [sic].

. . .

6. There is probable cause to believe that the communications 

to be intercepted will concern the telephone numbers 

associated with the Target Subjects, and the dates, times, and 

places for commission of the aforementioned offense when 

the Target Subjects communicate with their coconspirators, 

associates and other participants in the conspiracy, thereby 

identifying the co-conspirators and others as yet unknown. In 

addition, these communications are expected to constitute 

admissible evidence of the above described offense.

7. It has been established adequately that normal investigative 

procedures have been tried and have failed, reasonably appear 

to be unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to 

employ.

. . .

Applications for additional wiretaps and for extensions of the 

wiretaps previously authorized ensued over the period from October 10, 
4

2008 through late March 2009. The Issuing Court granted all of the State’s 

applications, resulting in the electronic surveillance of a total of twentythree telephones. The involved phone numbers were monitored for several 

months for evidence related to the Target Crimes.

In 2009, the [Petitioner and his co-defendants] were indicted in 

several Middle Tennessee counties on multiple charges including drug and 

money-laundering offenses. In the Sumner County and Davidson County 

cases, the [Petitioner and his co-defendants] each filed a motion to suppress

the evidence gleaned from the wiretaps. [The Petitioner] also filed a 

motion to suppress the evidence gleaned from the wiretaps in the 

Rutherford County case. Each of the trial courts held an evidentiary 

hearing and subsequently issued orders denying the [Petitioner’s and his codefendants’] motions.

Thereafter, [the Petitioner] entered conditional guilty plea in 

Rutherford . . . county, as follows:

. . .

Davidson County: One count of conspiracy to sell over three 

hundred pounds of marijuana, a Class A felony, with a 

sentence of forty years in the TDOC; two counts of 

conspiracy to commit money-laundering, a Class B felony, 

with each count carrying a concurrent sentence of twenty 

years’ incarceration; two counts of money-laundering, Class 

B felonies, with each count carrying a concurrent sentence of 

twenty-years’ incarceration; one count of the delivery of over 

seventy pounds of marijuana, a Class B felony, with a 

concurrent sentence of twenty years’ incarceration; one count 

of the delivery of over ten pounds of marijuana, a Class D 

felony, with a concurrent sentence of eight years’

incarceration; one count of the possession with intent to sell 

over ten pounds of marijuana, a Class D felony, with a 

concurrent sentence of eight years’ incarceration; and one 

count of possession with intent to sell over three hundred 

pounds of marijuana, a Class A felony, with a concurrent 

sentence of forty years’ incarceration.

. . .
5

In conjunction with [his] plea, the [Petitioner] reserved the following 

certified questions of law:

In the trial court, the [Petitioner] moved to suppress 

the fruits of electronic surveillance on numerous grounds: (1) 

that the initial wiretap Applications lacked probable cause to 

justify interception in violation of T.C.A. §§ 40-6-304(c) and 

40-6-305, specifically including the Applications’ failure to 

demonstrate the statutorily required nexus between the phone 

to be intercepted and the alleged illegal activity sought to be 

intercepted; (2) that the initial Applications failed to 

demonstrate a constitutionally sufficient requisite necessity 

for the use of electronic surveillance pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-

6-304(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c); (3) that all 

subsequent wiretaps were the fruits of the prior illegal wiretap 

interceptions and therefore, were fruits of the poisonous tree; 

(4) that the notarized but unsigned affidavit requesting a 

second extension of the wiretap for telephone number (615) 

584-6075 was statutorily deficient to support interception; (5) 

that, in addition to being a fruit of the prior illegal 

interceptions, the subsequent interception of telephone (615) 

653-2294 lacked probable cause to justify interception in 

violation of T.C.A. §§ 40-6-304(c) and 40-6-305 because they 

[sic] failed to make a sufficient link between the phone and 

suspected criminal activity or the targets of the investigation; 

(6) that, in addition to being a fruit of the prior illegal 

interceptions, the subsequent interception of telephone (615) 

818-2839 lacked probable cause to justify interception in 

violation of T.C.A. §§ 40-6-304(c) and 40-6-305 because they 

[sic] failed to make a sufficient link between the phone and 

suspected criminal activity or the targets of the investigation; 

(7) that the Applications for extensions of the wiretaps failed 

to articulate a statutorily sanctioned purpose justifying 

continuing interception; (8) that the issuing Court neglected 

its duty as a neutral and detached magistrate and acted as an 

impermissible rubber stamp for law enforcement; and, (9) that 

the Applications contain omissions and material 

misstatements that undercut any showing of requisite 

necessity for the wiretaps.

The [Petitioner] timely appealed from [his] convictions, and this 
6

Court ordered that the appeals from the judgments of conviction entered in 

the Rutherford County, Davidson County, and Sumner County prosecutions 

be consolidated.

King, 437 S.W.3d at 860-64 (footnotes omitted). On appeal, this court determined that 

the Petitioner was not entitled to relief on the basis of the certified questions of law. It 

concluded that several of the questions were not dispositive, limiting review to: whether 

the wiretap applications provided a substantial basis for probable cause in accordance 

with the standard recited at Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-304(c)(4);

2 whether 

the wiretap applications satisfied the requisite necessity requirement found at section 40-

6-304(a)(3); if the wiretap applications contained errors that invalidated the applications’ 

validity; and whether subsequent wiretaps, after the wiretap of the initial phone, were 

“illegal as fruits of the poisonous tree.” Id. 870-86. This court declined to rule on the 

remaining questions, stating “[the Petitioner] fails to explain how, in light of the State’s 

other evidence, [his] convictions must be reversed and [his] cases dismissed were we to 

determine that the Issuing Court erred in granting the Allegedly Invalid Applications.” 

Id. at 888. For this reason, the court deemed not dispositive the Petitioner’s remaining 

certified questions of law. Id. at 886-89. Accordingly, the convictions in each county 

were affirmed. Id. at 889.

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings

 

2

In a footnote, this court clarified that

[a]lthough the first of the issues [in the] [Petitioner’s] certified questions refers specifically only to 

“the statutorily required nexus between the phone to be intercepted and the alleged illegal activity 

sought to be intercepted,” the [Petitioner clarifies] in [his] reply brief that the “heart” of [his]

probable cause challenge is that “[t]he State never conducted consensually monitored and recorded 

calls to any of the target telephones to discuss any target offense or criminal conduct.” That is, the 

[Petitioner] contends that the State failed to satisfy the nexus requirement set forth in subsection 

(c)(4) of the Wiretap Statute, which requires probable cause to believe that the targeted telephone 

is “being used, or [is] about to be used, in connection with the commission of the offense.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-6-304(c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that 

there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense 

will be obtained through the interception.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(c)(2).
7

The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he 

alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas 

were not knowingly and voluntarily entered.

3

 He argued that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to address on appeal the legality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-

304(c)(2). He further argued that he entered his guilty pleas under the impression that his 

nine certified questions would be addressed in turn by the appellate court, would be 

deemed dispositive because of the agreement of the parties, and that a determination in 

his favor on any of the questions would result in his convictions being reversed. The 

post-conviction court appointed an attorney and subsequently held a hearing, during 

which the following evidence was presented: Counsel testified that she worked as a 

criminal defense attorney for fifteen years and had handled hundreds of drug cases 

throughout her career. She stated that she had dealt with eighty to one hundred cases that 

had wiretapping issues and that she had “actively litigated” forty to fifty wiretap cases. 

She testified that she was “very experienced” at the time she represented the Petitioner. 

Counsel recalled that the Petitioner was charged in multiple counties and that she 

represented him in Sumner County and assisted with his representation in the other 

counties (hereinafter “Sumner Counsel”). Sumner Counsel was the Petitioner’s primary 

attorney, and she stated that the Sumner County case “took the lead” over the Rutherford

County and Davidson County cases.

Sumner Counsel testified that she spent a “tremendous” amount of time with the 

Petitioner and had a very good working relationship with him. She was his “primary 

point of contact” for his cases, and the majority of the litigation happened in Sumner 

County where she represented him. Sumner Counsel spoke with the attorneys in the 

Petitioner’s other cases, and they met jointly with the Petitioner on occasion. Sumner 

Counsel described the Petitioner as a “profoundly smart guy” who wanted to be involved 

in his case and participate in his defense. As such, Sumner Counsel had many 

discussions with him about the litigation strategy over the course of an estimated seventyfive meetings. Sumner Counsel arranged for the Petitioner to have access to a computer 

while incarcerated on which he reviewed his discovery file. She felt that the Petitioner 

“trusted [Sumner Counsel’s] judgment,” although she recalled that he had a somewhat 

strained relationship with another of his attorneys. 

Regarding the Petitioner’s direct appeal, Sumner Counsel testified that all of the 

Petitioner’s cases were consolidated and that she wrote the appellate brief and argued the 

case. About the plea negotiations with the State, Sumner Counsel recalled that the State 

made an initial offer that “may have been forty [years] at thirty percent” but that a 

 

3 The Petitioner filed similar petitions for post-conviction relief in Rutherford County and Sumner County. The 

Petitioner appealed the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition filed in Rutherford County, and this court 

affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. See Jeffrey King v. State, M2016-01646-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. 

App., at Nashville, June 28, 2017).
8

certified question was not included in the deal. Lengthy negotiations followed because 

the State insisted that the Petitioner plead guilty in multiple counties, which Sumner 

Counsel felt was unnecessary and excessive. Sumner Counsel also recalled that the State 

made an offer in exchange for the Petitioner’s cooperation as a witness, and the Petitioner 

did not want to cooperate. 

Regarding the certified questions of law in relation to the wiretap issue, Sumner 

Counsel said that this was “incredibly important” to the Petitioner because he felt very 

strongly that the wiretaps were unlawful. The Petitioner understood, and the State 

agreed, that without the wiretap evidence, the State’s case would essentially have to be 

dismissed. As a result, the wiretap issue was also “incredibly important to [Sumner 

Counsel] legally.” She agreed that if the certified questions had not been a part of the

plea deal, the Petitioner would not have accepted the deal. She stated that the “certified 

question[s] were the enticing factor for that plea deal for [the Petitioner].” 

Turning back to her representation of the Petitioner, Sumner Counsel recalled that 

she reviewed with the Petitioner “every bit” of the discovery. Based on the State’s 

evidence, she and the Petitioner “knew collectively that if we went to trial we were in 

trouble.” “[The Petitioner’s] perspective, he knew that if he went to trial he would be 

convicted.” Sumner Counsel had prepared documentation of the Petitioner’s maximum 

potential exposure if he was convicted by a jury, and it was ninety years or more with 

much of the sentence to be served at 100 percent because of school zone enhancements. 

Sumner Counsel stated:

[I]t was very important to [the Petitioner] that the certified 

question[s] be heard. And my advice would have been to him, although I 

thought the [State’s] offer was terrible and I thought it was way too much 

time in the case, . . . we didn’t have a lot of choices, those were our choices. 

. . . . But with the certified question[s] I really felt strongly that he should 

consider the offer. It gave him what he wanted, gave him the opportunity 

to be heard on appeal on these issues, and it gave him some control of his 

future in the sense of a definitive resolution. 

Sumner Counsel stated that she was not a “seller” of plea agreements and believed 

that a case should go to trial if a defendant so desired. She stated that she never pressured 

clients to give up their right to a trial. About the motion to suppress the wiretaps, Sumner 

Counsel felt strongly that the wiretaps were unlawful and that everything that flowed 

from the wiretaps should be suppressed. Sumner Counsel recalled that she reviewed each 

wiretap and made an independent judgment on each one as to whether to file a motion to 

suppress.
9

Turning back to the certified questions of law, Sumner Counsel recalled that she 

was in discussion with the State for four to six weeks about the question. She was “very 

concerned about the trickiness of a certified question” because the appellate court was 

“notorious for finding ways not to hear certified questions,” and she told the Petitioner 

that she had been “a victim” of that occurrence on more than one occasion. As such, 

Sumner Counsel “cautioned” the Petitioner about the “tricky process from a procedural 

perspective.” The State agreed to the submission of a certified question of law, and the 

State allowed Sumner Counsel flexibility as to how to craft the question. The Petitioner 

and Sumner Counsel discussed the certified questions and what issues to include. 

Sumner Counsel “knew” that some of the nine questions were not dispositive, while some 

of the others were. Sumner Counsel explained the risk to the Petitioner that the appellate 

court might find certain ones were not dispositive and would decide not to rule on them 

for this reason. She advised him that there was “an equal chance” that the appellate court 

would go ahead and rule on the questions even if they were not dispositive. She testified, 

however, that the main certified questions were dispositive, and if the appellate court 

ruled in the Petitioner’s favor on those main questions, the case would “disappear” for the 

Petitioner. 

Sumner Counsel acknowledged the complexities involved with a certified question 

of law and stated that, even though she thought the Petitioner was a very intelligent 

person, she knew that the procedural process for review of a certified question was 

difficult to understand. She took plenty of time to discuss the complexities with the 

Petitioner but could not say whether he was able to understand or absorb them. When 

asked if Sumner Counsel thought the Petitioner might have gotten a different impression 

than she had from their discussions, she replied, “It’s possible.” 

About the first certified question, whether “the initial wiretap Applications lacked 

probable cause to justify interception in violation of T.C.A. §§ 40-6-304(c) and 40-6-305, 

specifically including the Applications’ failure to demonstrate the statutorily required 

nexus between the phone to be intercepted and the alleged illegal activity sought to be 

intercepted[,]” Sumner Counsel agreed that the appellate court addressed this question 

but declined to rule on several of the requirements of subsection (c) of the statute based 

on what it deemed Sumner Counsel’s narrowing of the issue to subsection (c)(4) in the 

reply brief. Sumner Counsel disagreed with this, saying that she had focused on one 

prong, (c)(4), in her reply brief because of the State’s argument in its response brief but 

had thoroughly briefed the issue on all subsection (c). She stated that she had no regrets 

about the way she briefed the issue and that she had done so thoroughly but that the 

argument was hurt by the appellate court’s limited analysis. As to this argument, and 

every other aspect of the case, Sumner Counsel told the Petitioner that she could not 

guarantee the outcome at any stage. Sumner Counsel testified that the Petitioner was 

upset after the appellate court issued its opinion finding many of the questions were not 
10

dispositive and declining to rule on the merits of those it deemed not dispositive. The 

Petitioner was upset with Sumner Counsel for taking away his avenue of appeal.

On cross-examination, Sumner Counsel reiterated that the Petitioner was very 

active in his case and asked a lot of questions. Based on his questions, Sumner Counsel 

felt the Petitioner had a good understanding of the case and his right to a jury trial. 

Sumner Counsel believed that the Petitioner understood he was giving up his right to a 

jury trial by deciding to plead guilty with certified questions reserved. She testified that 

he understood that if he proceeded to trial, his risk of conviction was great but that he 

would retain his right to appeal every issue. Sumner Counsel reiterated that she 

explained to the Petitioner the risk of dismissal on the “front end” of the certified 

questions because of a mistake in the “paperwork” but told him that she was confident 

that would not happen because she had successfully pursued certified questions recently 

and had done so successfully on the “paperwork” side of it. She did discuss the “other 

hazards” of a certified question, including the issue of “calling” something dispositive 

when it was not and how the appellate court would decline to rule in that situation. She 

discussed with the Petitioner the risk of putting his case in the “Court of Criminal 

Appeals hands” versus putting it in the hands of a jury and the difference between a 

ninety-plus-year sentence with an automatic right to appeal versus a shorter sentence with 

some risks on appeal because of the certified question. Sumner Counsel gave the 

Petitioner her best forecast as to how each scenario might play out; however, she stated 

that she could not have forecasted that the appellate court would conclude that she had 

narrowed the first issue in her brief and then decline to rule on it; this issue, she felt, was

the “heart” of the case. The appellate briefs drafted by Sumner Counsel were admitted 

into the record as exhibits.

The Petitioner’s Davidson County attorney (hereinafter “Davidson Counsel”) 

testified that he represented the Petitioner on the Davidson County charges. He filed a 

motion to suppress the wiretap evidence by tailoring Sumner Counsel’s motion to the 

facts in Davidson County. He also observed the suppression hearing held in Sumner 

County, argued by Sumner Counsel, where he “learned a lot” about a case such as this 

one involving large amounts of drugs over a long period of time. Davidson Counsel 

testified that he did not make any substantive changes to Sumner Counsel’s motion;

however, he did litigate the motion himself. Davidson Counsel recalled that he did not 

meet with the Petitioner independently from Sumner Counsel and stated that they met 

jointly with the Petitioner three or four times. The Petitioner “made it clear” to Davidson

Counsel that the Petitioner thought Sumner Counsel was more knowledgeable and he was 

more interested in her opinion on the law. Davidson Counsel willingly assumed the role 

of “second fiddle.”

As for the certified questions reserved in the Petitioner’s Davidson County plea, 
11

Davidson Counsel testified that Sumner Counsel offered to draft the certified questions, 

and he accepted her offer. Davidson Counsel recalled attending a meeting with the 

Petitioner and Sumner Counsel about a possible plea deal, and the Petitioner expressed 

that he was not happy with the State’s offer. The Petitioner and Sumner Counsel 

discussed “the pros and cons” of proceeding to trial, and Davidson Counsel offered his 

opinion that, based on his prior dealings in Davidson County Criminal Court, this amount 

of drugs often resulted in the maximum sentence. Davidson Counsel recalled that he 

initiated discussions about a reduction of the plea offer sentence, but the State declined 

and expressed its desire for the Petitioner to turn down the State’s offer and proceed to 

trial. Davidson Counsel agreed that the plea deal encompassing all three counties was a 

“package deal” from the outset and was never going to be anything other than a global 

settlement. Davidson Counsel agreed that he had nothing to do with the certified 

questions or the appellate issues. 

Davidson Counsel agreed that the Petitioner was motivated to enter a guilty plea 

because of the certified questions and that Sumner Counsel felt strongly that if the 

appellate court addressed the certified questions, the Petitioner would be granted relief. 

The Petitioner was otherwise “reluctant” to enter a guilty plea. Davidson Counsel stated 

that Sumner Counsel was confident that the Petitioner would win on appeal but agreed 

that there were “prerequisites” to her confidence. He stated, “The qualifiers were there,” 

pertaining to Sumner Counsel’s predictions of success on appeal.

The Petitioner testified that Sumner Counsel’s testimony regarding their 

relationship was accurate. The Petitioner retained her on the recommendation of another 

attorney that she was the premier wiretap lawyer in the State. The Petitioner agreed that 

Sumner Counsel was very knowledgeable, although his reading of some of the wiretap 

law differed from hers. The Petitioner stated that he was amenable to Sumner Counsel 

being the lead counsel for all the suppression hearings, meaning her legal work was used 

by his other attorneys in the other counties.

Regarding the certified questions, the Petitioner agreed that he had no knowledge 

of the law or procedure surrounding them and was reluctant to take the plea deal because 

he was giving up his right to appeal many issues that were not included in the certified 

questions. The Petitioner acknowledged that he was exposed to lengthy sentences in the 

three counties but that it was more important to him to have his issues heard on appeal. 

Sumner Counsel explained to him that certified questions of law are “particular” in the 

way they are drafted and that it can be difficult to prevail in an appellate court or even 

have them considered. The Petitioner recalled that Sumner Counsel had modeled the 

certified questions for his case from certified questions she had successfully used in 

another case. The Petitioner understood that all of the certified questions would be heard 

and that they were each deemed dispositive by agreement of the Petitioner, the State, and 
12

the trial court. Sumner Counsel did not tell the Petitioner that all of the questions were 

dispositive, but the Petitioner did not know at the time that the appellate court would be 

making an independent conclusion about whether a question was dispositive before 

review on the merits. The Petitioner believed that the “barrier” was getting the State and 

the trial court to agree, not the appellate court. He was not aware that the appellate court 

could “divide” the questions and deem some dispositive and others not. 

The Petitioner testified that he became more knowledgeable on the wiretap law 

and certified question procedure and that he did not agree with the way Sumner Counsel 

framed her argument about the wiretap statute in the appellate brief. The Petitioner 

testified that he did not feel that Davidson Counsel was prepared for the suppression 

hearing because he used Sumner Counsel’s motion and did not do the research himself or 

prepare independently. The Petitioner acknowledged that Sumner Counsel’s appellate 

argument employed federal law and that this was a case of first impression at the state 

level. Regarding the drafting of the certified questions, the Petitioner testified that he was 

present and had input but that the majority of them were drafted by Sumner Counsel.

On cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that he did not knowingly enter his 

guilty plea because he would have chosen to go to trial if he had known that the 

agreement of the parties was not sufficient to guarantee a finding that the questions were 

dispositive and would be considered. He agreed that at the guilty plea submission 

hearing, he was asked if he wished to waive his right to trial and that he affirmed that he 

did. 

The Petitioner’s Rutherford County attorney (hereinafter “Rutherford Counsel”) 

testified that the Petitioner’s charges in Rutherford county were not as serious as the other 

counties. He stated that most of his contact with the other attorneys was with Sumner 

Counsel and that the Petitioner wanted him to follow Sumner Counsel’s lead with regard 

to the wiretap issues. His understanding was that all the defenses in the various counties 

were based on one theory that Sumner Counsel had researched and prepared. Rutherford 

Counsel recalled that in Rutherford County the Petitioner entered a plea to an A or B 

felony with a forty-year sentence to be served at 30 percent. He stated that the Petitioner 

was not happy about the plea or the sentence, but he agreed to enter the plea in order to 

have appellate review of his certified questions of law. Rutherford Counsel agreed that 

Sumner Counsel prepared the certified questions of law and that he made no substantive 

changes. 

The post-conviction court subsequently issued an order, making the following 

findings of facts and conclusions of law:

1. Certified Question
13

[The] Petitioner’s primary complaint is that he was denied the right 

of effective assistance of counsel because his trial and appellate counsel 

‘led [the] Petitioner to believe that each of the nine ‘issues’ enumerated in 

his guilty plea were being properly preserved for appeal and that each 

would be considered by [the appellate court] as nine distinct reasons for 

vacating his convictions and dismissing the indictments against him.’ . . . 

[The] Petitioner . . . conceded that [Sumner Counsel’s] testimony was 

accurate and that she thoroughly discussed his case with him. He explicitly 

testified that [Sumner Counsel] described the ‘tricky’ nature of certified 

questions and that ‘she did not tell me [all issues raised in the certified 

question] were dispositive.’ [The] Petitioner testified that it was his 

‘recollection’ that since the State and trial court agreed to allow the 

certified question that all the issues would be heard.

[The] Petitioner further testified that the only way he would consider 

entering a plea is if the State agreed to a certified question for appeal; 

however, [the] Petitioner’s complaint is that (1) he ‘gave up a lot of issues 

that were not in the certified question that [Sumner Counsel] said not 

dispositive of case’ [sic] and (2) the Court of Criminal Appeals used its 

judicial discretion and only addressed issues within the certified question 

deemed dispositive and cognizable for review. Accordingly, [the] 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 

[Sumner Counsel] or [Davidson Counsel] were ineffective or that he was 

prejudiced by any alleged deficiency.

Moreover, [Sumner Counsel] and [Davidson Counsel] testified that 

[the] Petitioner was not guaranteed success on appeal and was advised that 

not all of the issues raised on appeal were dispositive in nature. [The] 

Petitioner agreed to the accuracy of [Sumner Counsel’s] testimony at the 

evidentiary hearing and this Court credits the testimony of [Sumner 

Counsel]. . . . 

. . .

This Court credits the testimony of [Davidson Counsel] and [Sumner 

Counsel]. The substantial appellate briefing demonstrates that [Sumner 

Counsel] argued all of the issues raised in the certified question. It is the 

appellate court’s prerogative to determine which of those issues are 

dispositive and subject to ruling. For all these reasons, this Court finds that 

[the] Petitioner has failed to establish his burden for post-conviction relief 
14

as to this issue and the petition is denied on this ground.

. . .

3. Arguments Regarding the Legality of T.C.A. § 40-6-304(c)(2)

Post-Conviction Counsel . . . argued that [Sumner Counsel] was ineffective 

because the manner she responded to the State [in appellate briefing] 

waived the issue [of the legality of T.C.A. § 40-6-304(c)(2)]. This Court 

disagrees.

First, [Sumner Counsel] testified that she briefed all of the issues 

raised in the certified question, which is supported by the comprehensive 

filing introduced as an exhibit to the post-conviction hearing. [Sumner 

Counsel] explained that since the State focused its response brief on one 

particular issue, she elected to hone in on that issue in her reply brief; 

however, she did not waive any issues by devoting her allotted number of 

reply brief page [sic] to hone in on countering the State’s arguments. The

Court credits [Sumner Counsel’s] testimony and finds she made a 

reasonable strategic decision. [The] Petitioner has not demonstrated by 

clear and convincing evidence that [Sumner Counsel] was ineffective. The 

Court also notes that [the] Petitioner testified to the accuracy of [Sumner 

Counsel’s] testimony.

Second, as the Court noted from the bench during the evidentiary 

hearing, this Court addressed the Petitioner’s concerns in its June 20, 2011 

Order, which is part of the appellate record. Since the appellate order did 

not address this particular issue raised by [the] Petitioner in the certified 

question, the trial court order stands. The trial court decision was not 

reversed [by the appellate court] and, therefore, remains the law of the case 

despite the fact that [the] Petitioner and [Sumner Counsel] disagree with 

this Court’s interpretation of the Tennessee Wiretapping Act. Accordingly, 

[the] Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing prejudice. [The] 

Petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief is denied as to this claim due 

to [the] Petitioner’s failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that [Sumner Counsel] was ineffective and/or that he was prejudiced by the 

alleged deficiency.

4. Knowing and Voluntary Plea

In this case, [the] Petitioner faced two options: (1) go to trial facing 

significant time and potential consecutive sentencing if convicted (which 
15

both [Sumner Counsel] and [Davidson Counsel] testified they discussed 

with [the] Petitioner would be the likely outcome since the trial court 

determined the wiretap evidence admissible) or (2) accept the State’s offer. 

[The] Petitioner rejected the State’s initial offer and accepted only once 

modified so he would not have to cooperate with the State and would be

able to pursue an appeal on the trial court’s ruling as to the admissibility of 

the [wiretap evidence]. Ultimately, [the] Petitioner chose to accept the 

offer that allowed certainty in sentencing while having the opportunity to 

pursue issues of first impression regarding wiretap surveillance on appeal.

Now that the appeal court affirmed the legality of the wiretaps and 

elected not to address all of the issues [the] Petitioner wished to pursue, 

specifically the non-dispositive issues, [the] Petitioner appears to be 

experiencing “buyer’s remorse.”

The typed guilty plea petition entered in this case is highly 

descriptive and contains handwritten notations by [the] Petitioner with his 

initials on each page. Additionally, the transcript of [the] Petitioner’s guilty 

plea hearing speaks for itself and reflects a comprehensive colloquy. After 

the State read into the record of its proof against [the] Petitioner, [the] 

Petitioner, through counsel, placed modifications to the facts on the record 

before [the] Petitioner accepted as generally true the facts of the underlying 

charges against him.

. . .

Accordingly, a review of the record, including the guilty plea 

transcript, affirmatively demonstrates that the Petitioner’s guilty plea was 

made with an awareness of the consequences, and, as such, the guilty plea 

was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly entered. . . . [The] Petitioner 

has not established his burden by clear and convincing evidence, and his 

petition for post-conviction relief is denied as to all claims raised.

It is from this judgment that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

The Petitioner contends on appeal that the post-conviction court erred when it 

denied his petition because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. It is because of 

the ineffective assistance of counsel that he claims his plea was not knowingly and 

voluntarily entered. He further claims that the post-conviction court should have found 
16

that Sumner Counsel was ineffective in her advice and preparation regarding the certified 

questions of law and that she was ineffective by waiving the Petitioner’s argument on 

direct appeal with regards to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-304(c)(2). The 

State responds that the Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea and that 

Sumner Counsel prepared proper certified questions of law with dispositive issues to 

reserve on appeal and properly advised the Petitioner as to the nature of certified 

questions of law. The State further responds that Sumner Counsel did not waive the 

Petitioner’s argument regarding Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-304(c)(2) on 

appeal. 

In order to obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that his or her 

conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of a constitutional 

right. T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2014). The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual 

allegations in the petition for post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence. 

T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f) (2014). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive 

on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against it. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 

456-57 (Tenn. 2001). Upon review, this Court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the 

evidence below; all questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and 

value to be given their testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be 

resolved by the trial judge, not the appellate courts. Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 156 

(Tenn. 1999); Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997). A post-conviction 

court’s conclusions of law, however, are subject to a purely de novo review by this Court, 

with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457. 

The right of a criminally accused to representation is guaranteed by both the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Tennessee 

Constitution. State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 

S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The 

following two-prong test directs a court’s evaluation of a claim for ineffectiveness:

First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the [petitioner] by the Sixth 

Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s 

errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial 

whose result is reliable. Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it 

cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a 

breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Melson, 772 
17

S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989).

In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must 

determine whether the advice given or services rendered by the attorney are within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 

936. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must show 

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” House 

v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 

(Tenn. 1996)). When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing 

court should judge the attorney’s performance within the context of the case as a whole, 

taking into account all relevant circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. 

Mitchell, 753 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The reviewing court should 

avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight” and “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s 

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s 

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. In doing so, the reviewing court must be 

highly deferential and “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. 

Finally, we note that a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to perfect 

representation, only constitutionally adequate representation. Denton v. State, 945 

S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In other words, “in considering claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘we address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only 

what is constitutionally compelled.’” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting 

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)). Counsel should not be deemed 

to have been ineffective merely because a different procedure or strategy might have 

produced a different result. Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1980). “The fact that a particular strategy or tactic failed or hurt the defense, does 

not, standing alone, establish unreasonable representation. However, deference to 

matters of strategy and tactical choices applies only if the choices are informed ones 

based upon adequate preparation.” House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting Goad, 938 S.W.2d 

at 369).

If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable 

standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by 

demonstrating there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002). This reasonable probability 

must be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694; Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994). The definition of “reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

When ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged in the context of a guilty plea, the 

prejudice analysis
18

focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective 

performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in 

order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 

216-17 (Tenn. 2009).

A. Knowing and Voluntary Plea

The Petitioner claims that his plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered 

because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He stated that after the trial 

court ruled on his motion to suppress, “instead of going to trial, [Sumner Counsel] 

negotiated a plea agreement, where the cases in all three counties would be resolved for a 

sentence of 40 years.” He claims that because Sumner Counsel was lead counsel in the 

cases throughout the various counties, her actions and decisions should be attributed to 

the attorneys in those other counties. The State responds that the evidence presented 

shows that the Petitioner’s plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and that without 

a transcript of the Petitioner’s guilty plea, which the States notes is not included in the 

record, we are to presume the post-conviction’s court findings correct. We agree with the 

State. 

To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969); State v. Mackey, 553 

S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1977). A plea meets constitutional muster when the defendant 

understands both what the plea connotes and its consequences, Blankenship v. State, 858 

S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244), and makes a voluntary 

and intelligent choice from the alternative courses of action available to plead guilty. 

Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tenn. 2003) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 

U.S. 25 (1970)). A petitioner’s testimony at a guilty plea hearing “constitute[s] a 

formidable barrier” in any subsequent collateral proceeding because “[s]olemn 

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 

431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

When determining the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea, the standard 

is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 

courses of action open to the defendant.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 31. A reviewing court can 

look to a number of factors to find a “knowing and intelligent plea,” including “[t]he 

relative intelligence of the petitioner, the degree of his familiarity with criminal 
19

proceedings, the opportunity to confer with competent counsel and the trial court 

regarding the charges faced, and the desire to avoid a greater punishment resulting from a 

jury trial.” Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904. The petitioner must have an understanding 

of the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty, including “the 

sentence that he will be forced to serve as the result of his guilty plea and conviction.”

Id. at 905. A plea is not “voluntary” if it results from ignorance, misunderstanding, 

coercion, inducements, or threats. Id. at 904.

The post-conviction court, in its order, found that Petitioner had affirmed at the 

guilty plea hearing that he was making his own decision to plead guilty, as reflected in 

the “comprehensive colloquy” placed before the post-conviction court. The postconviction court held that the record and plea transcript “affirmatively demonstrates that 

the Petitioner’s guilty plea was made with an awareness of the consequences, and, as 

such, the guilty plea was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly entered.” 

The evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing was that it was the 

Petitioner’s decision to enter a guilty plea and reserve a certified question of law. He was 

not “happy” about the plea, but he chose not to risk a trial where he faced possible 

lengthy sentences. Instead, he elected to accept the State’s offer that greatly reduced his 

sentence while still retaining review of his certified questions of law. Sumner Counsel 

testified that the Petitioner was very engaged in the preparation of his case and in the 

decision whether to go to trial or plead guilty. Rutherford and Davidson Counsels 

affirmed that this was their impression of the discussions they observed. Sumner Counsel 

also stated that she did not like the State’s offer and felt that the State was charging the 

Petitioner excessively. She further testified that she gave her clients the option to 

proceed to trial and did not shy away from trying a case. In this case, however, where the 

Petitioner faced a lengthy sentence approaching 100 years, Sumner Counsel encouraged 

him to enter a plea. Together, Sumner Counsel and the Petitioner weighed the risk of 

taking his case to trial, where he faced a lengthy sentence but retained all his rights of 

appeal, versus entering a guilty plea for a sentence of less than half the potential prison 

time but reduced rights of appeal. The Petitioner affirmed that he was asked at the guilty 

plea hearing whether he understood his right to trial and that he was giving up that right, 

which he stated he did. Based on this evidence, we conclude that the Petitioner’s plea 

was entered knowingly and voluntarily and that Counsel’s representation of the Petitioner 

with regard to his decision was effective. Thus, he is not entitled to relief. 

B. Certified Questions of Law

The Petitioner next claims that Sumner Counsel was ineffective in her preparation 

of the certified questions of law and in her educating the Petitioner on the applicable law. 

The Petitioner claims that Sumner Counsel admitted that she knew that several of the 
20

certified questions were not dispositive but that she also knew that the Petitioner was only 

accepting the plea offer because he wanted his issues heard on appeal. He contends that 

Sumner Counsel “crafted [] certified question[s] that she knew to be ineffective in 

assisting [the Petitioner] to allow that to happen.” The State responds that the evidence 

does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings that Sumner Counsel 

did not guarantee the Petitioner success on appeal and informed the Petitioner in advance 

that his success on appeal depended on the appellate court’s interpretations of the law. 

We agree with the State.

The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner had agreed that Sumner 

Counsel had advised him of the procedural risks of the certified question and that she 

advised that she could not guarantee that the questions would be deemed dispositive by 

the appellate court. The post-conviction court found that Sumner Counsel in no way 

guaranteed him success on appeal and credited Sumner Counsel’s testimony that she had 

adequately advised him of the risks related to the decision to proceed in this manner.

Our review of the evidence shows that the evidence does not preponderate against 

these findings and that Sumner Counsel was not ineffective in her representation of the 

Petitioner regarding the certified questions of law. Sumner Counsel advised the 

Petitioner that there was the possibility that his questions would not be deemed 

dispositive and that this meant there was a risk that his issues would not be heard. 

Sumner Counsel fully understood the importance of the certified questions to the 

Petitioner and spent multiple meetings discussing the option to take his case to trial or 

accept a lesser sentence with the certified questions reserved. Sumner Counsel’s prior 

experience with certified questions on appeal allowed her to advise the Petitioner of the 

risks but also the possibility for success. Sumner Counsel was not ineffective in her 

representation of the Petitioner in this regard. 

The Petitioner points us to several decisions promulgating the standards and 

limitations for certified questions of law to which he claims Sumner Counsel did not 

adhere. State v. Preston stated that it was the appellate court’s determination, not that of 

the trial court and the agreement of the parties, as to whether the certified question was 

dispositive. 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The Petitioner argues that Sumner Counsel 

was aware of this law, however, she failed to caution the Petitioner that the certified 

questions might not be heard. We disagree. The evidence shows that Sumner Counsel 

advised the Petitioner that, although not all questions would be deemed dispositive, she 

chose to include them anyway because it was her experience in the past that the appellate 

court would sometimes overlook whether a question was dispositive and choose to 

review it. This, however, was not “guaranteed” by Sumner Counsel, and the Petitioner 

testified that he was informed of that. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.
21

C. Appellate Argument

The Petitioner lastly contends that Sumner Counsel provided ineffective assistance 

of counsel on appeal when she “waived [the Petitioner’s] primary argument on his direct 

appeal,” that being his argument related to the probable cause requirement found at 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-304(c)(2). He contends that Sumner Counsel 

improperly narrowed his appellate argument to one prong of the statute, (c)(4), in her 

reply brief, causing the appellate court to waive consideration of what he contends was 

his strongest argument. The State responds that Sumner Counsel’s decisions to “use her 

reply brief to hone in on the specific issue the State focused on in its response brief was a 

reasonable strategic decision.” We agree with the State.

The post-conviction court adopted the following findings with respect to this 

argument:

First, [Sumner Counsel] testified that she briefed all of the issues raised in 

the certified question, which is supported by the comprehensive filing 

introduced as an exhibit to the post-conviction hearing. [Sumner Counsel] 

explained that since the State focused its response brief on one particular 

issue, she elected to hone in on that issue in her reply brief; however, she 

did not waive any issues by devoting her allotted number of reply brief 

page [sic] to hone in on countering the State’s arguments. The Court 

credits [Sumner Counsel’s] testimony and finds she made a reasonable 

strategic decision. [The] Petitioner has not demonstrated by clear and 

convincing evidence that [Sumner Counsel] was ineffective. The Court 

also notes that [the] Petitioner testified to the accuracy of [Sumner 

Counsel’s] testimony.

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Sumner 

Counsel provided her original appellate brief and reply brief as exhibits at the hearing and 

testified that she argued all prongs of the statute in her first brief and then, after the State 

responded, she addressed their particular argument in her reply brief. She stated that 

nothing that she did limited or waived her argument as to certain aspects of the statute 

and that she felt the appellate court had incorrectly determined that she had done so. We 

have reviewed the briefs from the direct appeal and have determined that the evidence 

does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s finding that Sumner Counsel 

fully briefed the Petitioner’s argument related to the probable cause requirement found at 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-304(c). Sumner Counsel addressed the 

subsections of the statute in her brief that she felt most strongly aided her argument that 

the wiretaps were unlawful. While this Court’s decision did limit the Petitioner’s 

argument, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that Sumner Counsel was 
22

ineffective in this regard; she made a strategic decision to focus her argument in the reply 

brief that we will not second guess. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we affirm the 

post-conviction court’s judgment. 

________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE