FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY MCCOLLOUGH, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 09-35767

v. D.C. No.  1:07-cv-00166-CSO JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER,

LLC, OPINION

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Carolyn S. Ostby, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 29, 2010—Billings, Montana

Filed March 4, 2011

Before: Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice,*

Sidney R. Thomas and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Thomas

*The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice of the United

States Supreme Court (Ret.), sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 294(a). 

3117
COUNSEL

John H. Boyer, Fred Simpson, and Jessie Lundbert, Missoula,

Montana, for the appellant.

John Heenan, Billings, Montana, and Richard Rubin, Santa

Fe, New Mexico, for the appellee.

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3121
OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

Debt collection law firm Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger

(“JRL” or “the law firm”) appeals from the entry of summary

judgment against it under the federal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and from a subsequent jury verdict

awarding damages under the FDCPA, the Montana Unfair

Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), and

state torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. We

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

I

Tim McCollough, a former school custodian, opened a

credit card account with Chemical Bank sometime around

1990. Chemical Bank merged with the Chase Manhattan

Bank (“Chase Manhattan”) in 1996 and continued business

under the Chase Manhattan name. McCollough continued to

make purchases on the account.

McCollough and his wife fell behind on their credit card

bills after he allegedly suffered a brain injury at work and she

underwent surgery. When McCollough made his last payment

on the Chase Manhattan account in 1999, an unpaid balance

of approximately $3,000 remained. In 2000, Chase Manhattan

“charged off” the account on its books.

Collect America, Ltd. (“Collect America”),1 through its

subsidiary, CACV of Colorado, Ltd. (“CACV”), is a purchaser of bad debt portfolios—typically, debts that have been

charged off by the primary lender. CACV purchases the

debts; Collect America attempts collection.

1Collect America is now known as “SquareTwo Financial.” 

3122 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
In 2001, CACV purchased McCollough’s delinquent

account from Chase Manhattan. CACV sued McCollough in

2005 for $3,816.80 in state court to collect the debt. Acting

pro se, McCollough replied that the “statute of limitations is

up.” Two weeks later, CACV dismissed the case. CACV documented service of the complaint and McCollough’s response

in its electronic files.

In 2006, Collect America retained JRL, a law firm specializing in debt collection, to pursue collection of McCollough’s

outstanding debt. Although JRL is a North Dakota law firm,

some of its lawyers are admitted to practice in Montana.

Charles Denby was the JRL attorney who handled the law

firm’s collection cases for Montana. During the period from

January 2007 through July 2008, JRL filed 2,700 collection

lawsuits in Montana. On an average day, JRL filed five lawsuits in the state; on one day, JRL filed 40 lawsuits. JRL attorney Lisa Lauinger testified that approximately 90% of the

collection lawsuits resulted in a default judgment. 

The contract between JRL and Collect America contained

the following disclaimer: “Collect America makes no warranty as to the accuracy or validity of data provided.” In addition, the contract expressly made JRL “responsible to

determine [its] legal and ethical ability to collect these

accounts.” CACV transmitted information about McCollough’s account to JRL using debt collection software. CACV

also sent the law firm the electronic file.

The law firm’s screening procedures flagged a statute of

limitations problem with McCollough’s debt. On January 4,

2007, JRL account manager Grace Lauinger wrote to CACV:

“It appears that the Statute of Limitations has expired on this

file as of August 21, 2005. If you can provide us with an

instrument in writing to extend the Statute of Limitations.”

The next day, JRL recorded in the electronic file that “***

NO DEMAND HAS GONE OUT ON THIS FILE *** THIS

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3123
IS THE COLLECT AMERICA BATCH THAT WE ARE

HAVING PROBLEMS W[ITH].”

On January 23, 2007, CACV responded to JRL attorney

Lisa Lauinger in an email entitled “sol extended” that McCollough had made a $75 partial payment on June 30, 2004, and

inquired: “Do you need any info from me on this one?” Based

on that payment date, the five-year statute of limitations on

the claim against McCollough would not have expired until

2009. See Colo. Nat’l Bank of Denver v. Story, 862 P.2d

1120, 1122 (Mont. 1993) (holding that Montana’s five-year

statute of limitation on an account stated commences running

from the date of the last payment). 

However, the information was incorrect: McCollough had

not made a partial payment on June 30, 2004. Rather, as

reflected in the electronic file, the event that took place on

June 30, 2004, was the return of court costs to CACV for a

collection complaint and summons that CACV had prepared

in 2003. Lisa Lauinger did not respond to CACV’s offer to

provide additional documentation of the event.

On April 17, 2007, JRL filed a collection complaint signed

by JRL attorney Charles Dendy against McCollough in Montana state court. The complaint sought judgment for an

account balance of $3,816.80, interest of $5,536.81, attorney’s fees of $481.68, and court costs of $120.00. 

Dendy later testified that he reviewed the information in the

electronic file before filing suit. At that point, the electronic

file indicated the 2000 charge-off date; a June 30, 2004, entry

indicating the return of court costs; an entry showing that

CACV had previously sued McCollough; and an entry indicating that McCollough had pled a statute of limitations

defense in response. Dendy admitted that he made no inquiry

into whether a partial payment occurred on June 30, 2004.

Instead, he explained: “In this case I relied upon the information that was provided by the client.”

3124 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
On June 13, 2007, McCollough filed a pro se answer to the

complaint, asserting a statute of limitations defense:

FORGIVE MY SPELLING I HAVE A HEAD

INJURY AND WRITING DOSE NOT COME

EASY

(1) THE STACUT OF LIMITACION’S IS UP, I

HAVE NOT HAD ANY DEALINGS WITH ANY

CREDITED CARD IN WELL OVER 81⁄2 YEARS 

(2) I AM DISABLED I GET 736.00 A MONTH

S.S.I. . . . 

(3) WHEN WORKERS COMP STOPED PAYING

I RAN OUT OF MONEY, CHASE WOULD NOT

WORK WITH ME, THEY PASSED IT ON TO

COLLECTOR’S – THEY LIED TO ME, THEY

INSULTED ME, THEY USED BAD LANGUAGE,

THEY CALLED AROUND THE CLOCK, SO I

COULD NOT REST, THEY GOT ME SO WOUND

UP AND CONFUSED THE HEALING OF MY

HEAD INJURY STOPED! THEY WERE HURTING ME, SO I HAD TO STOP DEALING WITH

THEM SO I COULD RECOVER, IM STILL

RECOVERING. THE PAIN THEY COSSED AND

NEW MED BILLS ARE WORTH MORE THEN

THE MONEY THEY WANT.

(4) THIS IS THE THIRED TIME THEY HAVE

BROUGHT ME TO COURT ON THIS ACCOUNT,

. . . WHEN WILL IT STOP DO I HAVE TO SUE

THEM SO I CAN LIVE QUIETLY IN PAIN

One month later, McCollough also telephoned Dendy and

left a message indicating that he would be seeking summary

judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations.

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3125
Dendy noted on July 11, 2007, “[w]e need to get what the

client has for docs on hand.” The following day, Grace Lauinger sent an email to Collect America asking for documentation. Collect America responded: “[b]ecause of the age of the

account, we can’t get any more statements (other than what

has been sent to you).” Dendy continued to prosecute the suit.

On August 6, 2007, CACV informed Grace Lauinger that

McCollough had not made a partial payment on June 30,

2004, as previously stated; rather, the entry on that date “was

actually unused costs by another office, not payment.” Grace

Lauinger testified that she scanned the email into the electronic file to which Dendy had access and that she did not

recall whether she directly conveyed the new information to

Dendy. Dendy testified that he did not learn of this information until later. He continued to prosecute the suit. 

In October 2007, Dendy served on McCollough a list of

twenty-two requests for admission that included the following: 

11. Prior to initiation of this suit, Defendant Tim M.

McCollough has never notified plaintiff or any other

party in interest in this action of any disputes regarding said Chase Manhattan Bank credit card.

. . . .

14. There are no facts upon which Defendant Tim

M. McCollough relies as a basis for defense in this

action.

. . . .

17. Every statement or allegation contained in plaintiff’s Complaint is true and correct.

. . . . 

3126 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
21. Defendant Tim M. McCollough made a payment

on said Chase Manhattan Bank credit card on or

about June 30, 2004 in the amount of $75.00.

The requests for admission did not include an explanation

that, under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a), the

requests would be deemed admitted if McCollough did not

respond within thirty days.

McCollough retained counsel and timely denied all of the

requests. Continuing to prosecute the collection case, Dendy

issued a subpoena to Chase in November 2007 seeking production of the operative records from McCollough’s account.

Chase responded a month later that it had no records of the

account.

On December 7, 2007, Dendy sent to CACV an email

marked “URGENT.” The email read:

An attorney has appeared in this action and has

served discovery requests. . . .

The attorney is one who is anti purchased debt and

who attempts to run up costs in an attempt to secure

a large cost award against plaintiff. . . . 

Please provide me with copies of everything you can

get for documentation as soon as possible. We need

to request everything available from the original

creditor, not just the things that you normally

request, etc. Application, statements, cardmember

agreement, copies of payments, copies of correspondence. Please have the requests expedited if possible.

CACV emailed in response:

For this file we are not able to get any more media.

The retention rate is seven years from [charge-off],

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3127
which was 10/2000. I have sent you all the docs we

have.

CACV also called JRL to explain that the last payment

McCollough had made on the account preceded the 2000

charge-off.

That afternoon, CACV instructed Dendy to dismiss the suit

“asap” because of the “SOL problem.” JRL then moved for

dismissal with prejudice and the state court dismissed the

action.

McCollough sued JRL in federal district court alleging violations of the FDCPA and the MCPA, along with state law

claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court

found that the following facts were established: 

(1) On April 17, 2007, JRL filed a time-barred lawsuit against McCollough.

(2) By August 6, 2007, JRL had information from its

client demonstrating that the lawsuit was timebarred. 

(3) JRL prosecuted the time-barred lawsuit against

McCollough until December 7, 2007. 

The district court granted McCollough partial summary

judgment on his FDCPA claims. 

The case was then tried to a jury over the course of three

days. At trial, lay witnesses Keri Henan and Ken Lucero testified about their experiences being sued by JRL. Michael

Eakin, a consumer law attorney with Montana Legal Services,

testified about the rapid growth of debt-collection lawsuits in

Montana and about JRL’s role in that trend; he also testified

3128 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
that “a vast majority” of JRL’s lawsuits against debtors result

in default judgments because JRL tries its cases without consideration for the pro se status of most of its defendantdebtors. James Patten, a Montana collection lawyer, described

the importance of reasonable pre-suit investigation and testified that it was JRL’s “factory” approach of “mass producing

default judgments,” rather than any mistake, that caused JRL

to prosecute the time-barred debt and pursue unlawful attorney’s fees against McCollough. 

The jury found in favor of McCollough on all remaining

claims and awarded him the $1,000 statutory maximum for

violations of the FDCPA; $250,000 for emotional distress;

and $60,000 in punitive damages.

JRL filed motions for a new trial and amendment of the

judgment to reduce the emotional distress damage award.

When the district court denied these motions, JRL timely

appealed.

II

The district court properly granted summary judgment

against JRL on the FDCPA claims. The FDCPA prohibits

debt collectors from engaging in various abusive and unfair

practices. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292-93 (1995).

The statute was enacted to eliminate abusive debt collection

practices; to ensure that debt collectors who abstain from such

practices are not competitively disadvantaged; and to promote

consistent state action to protect consumers. 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692(e); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer &

Ulrich LPA, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1608-09

(2010). The statute defines a “debt collector” as one who

“regularly collects . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be

owed or due another,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), and covers lawyers who regularly collect debts through litigation, Heintz,

514 U.S. at 293-94.

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3129
A

[1] Although the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, it

excepts from liability those debt collectors who satisfy the

“narrow” bona fide error defense. Reichert v. Nat’l Credit

Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation

omitted). That defense provides that:

A debt collector may not be held liable in any action

brought under [the FDCPA] if the debt collector

shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona

fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). “The bona fide error defense is an affirmative defense, for which the debt collector has the burden of

proof.” Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1006 (citing Fox v. Citicorp.

Credit Servs, Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1514 (9th Cir. 1994)). Thus,

to qualify for the bona fide error defense, the defendant must

prove that (1) it violated the FDCPA unintentionally; (2) the

violation resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) it maintained

procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the violation.

[2] The district court correctly concluded that JRL’s bona

fide error defense failed as a matter of law. JRL argues that

it maintained adequate preventive procedures by utilizing a

system to flag potential statute of limitations problems. However, the procedures that support a valid bona fide error

defense must be “ “reasonably adapted’ to avoid the specific

error at issue.’ ” Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Johnson

v. Riddle, 443 F.3d 723, 729 (10th Cir. 2006)). JRL’s error in

this case was not its failure to catch time-barred cases; indeed,

JRL initially spotted the limitations period problem and sent

a letter to CACV requesting “an instrument in writing to

extend” the limitations period. Instead, JRL erred by relying

without verification on CACV’s representation and by overlooking contrary information in its electronic file. JRL thus

3130 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
presented no evidence of procedures designed to avoid the

specific errors that led to its filing and maintenance of a timebarred collection suit against McCollough. Cf. Jenkins v.

Heintz, 124 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 1997) (debt collectors

maintained “extensive systems” and “elaborate procedures . . .

to avoid collecting unauthorized charges,” and “insist[ed] that

their client[s] verify under oath that each of the charges was

true and correct”).

[3] JRL contends that its reliance on CACV’s representation about a June 30, 2004, partial payment created a question

of fact for the jury on its bona fide error defense. However,

the bona fide error defense “does not protect a debt collector

whose reliance on a creditor’s representation is unreasonable.” Reichert, 531 F. 3d at 1006 (citing Clark v. Capital

Credit & Collection Serv., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir.

2006)). Unwarranted reliance on a client is not a procedure to

avoid error. Indeed, in Reichert, we held that “[t]he fact that

the creditor provided accurate information in the past cannot,

in and of itself, establish that reliance in the present case was

reasonable and act as a substitute for the maintenance of adequate procedures to avoid future mistakes.” 531 F.3d at 1007;

see also Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., Inc., 330 F.3d 991, 996

(7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that one “reasonable preventive

measure[ ]” to avoid mistakes is “an agreement with . . .

creditor-clients that debts are current”); Turner v. J.V.D.B. &

Assocs., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (on

remand from the Seventh Circuit in the above cited case,

determining that an “understanding and/or agreement” that

the client would only furnish reliable information would have

been necessary to showing reasonable reliance).

[4] The undisputed evidence established that JRL’s reliance on CACV’s email was unreasonable as a matter of law.

First, Collect America’s contract with JRL expressly disclaimed “the accuracy or validity of data provided” and

instructed that JRL was “responsible to determine [its] legal

and ethical ability to collect” the account. Second, the elecMCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3131
tronic file confirmed that the event that took place on June 30,

2004, was the return of “unused costs” rather than a partial

payment. Third, the electronic file also indicated that McCollough had asserted a statute of limitations defense to a collection action filed against him in 2005 over the same debt.

Finally, McCollough informed JRL that the debt fell outside

the limitations period both in his answer to JRL’s complaint

and in a phone call.

[5] For these reasons, the district court properly concluded

that JRL’s reliance on its client was unreasonable as a matter

of law. Cf. Hyman v. Tate, 362 F.3d 965, 967-68 (7th Cir.

2004) (reliance was reasonable where debt collector and

creditor-client had “understanding” that client would not forward accounts in bankruptcy; error was made in 0.01% of

cases; and debt collector immediately ceased collection

efforts upon notice from debtor of the mistake); Smith v.

Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1032 (6th Cir. 1992)

(the FDCPA “does not require an independent investigation of

the debt referred for collection” where, for example, the debt

collector’s “referral form, completed and signed by [the

creditor-client], include[d] specific instructions to claim only

amounts legally due and owing”). The district court properly

granted summary judgment on JRL’s bona fide error defense.

B

The district court did not err in granting McCollough’s

motion for summary judgment on his claim that JRL violated

the FDCPA by requesting attorney’s fees in its underlying

state collection complaint.

[6] JRL does not dispute the district court’s determination

that the pursuit of unauthorized attorney’s fees in a collection

suit violates both § 1692f(1) and § 1692e(2) of the FDCPA.

Section 1692f(1) prohibits the use of “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” including

“[t]he collection of any amount (including any interest, fee,

3132 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
charge, or expense . . .) unless such amount is expressly

authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by

law.” See Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1005-07 (violation of

§ 1692f(1) arising from a debt collector’s imposition of an

unlawful charge for attorney’s fees). 

Section 1692e(2) prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive,

or misleading representation or means in connection with the

collection of any debt,” including “[t]he false representation

of . . . (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt;

or (B) any . . . compensation which may be lawfully received

by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.” See Clark,

460 F.3d at 1174-77 (possible violation of § 1692e(2) arising

from misstatement of an account balance); Foster v. DBS Collection Agency, 463 F. Supp. 2d 783, 802 (S.D. Ohio 2006)

(holding debt collectors violated § 1692e(2) by seeking attorney’s fees not permitted by state law); Strange v. Wexler, 796

F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (same). 

JRL argues that the district court erred in two respects.

First, JRL characterizes the district court’s decision as holding

that it violated the FDCPA by requesting attorney’s fees without having proof of its entitlement to those fees at the time it

filed the complaint. In support, JRL cites the Sixth Circuit’s

opinion in Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324,

333 (6th Cir. 2006), which held that no FDCPA violation

occurs when a creditor files a valid debt collection action in

court without having in its possession adequate proof of its

claim. However, in contrast to Harvey, JRL’s collection

action in this case was invalid because JRL presented no

admissible evidence establishing its entitlement to collect the

fees at the time of the summary judgment motion — not at the

time it filed suit.

Second, JRL argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine issue of material fact existed over

whether JRL had a contractual entitlement2 to seek attorney’s

2

JRL does not challenge the district court’s determination that Montana

law did not itself authorize the request for attorney’s fees. 

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3133
fees from McCollough. Before the district court, JRL presented a credit card agreement purportedly belonging to

McCollough. JRL now admits that the agreement was not

McCollough’s and does not contest the district court’s exclusion of the evidence.

JRL contends that it presented evidence that attorney’s fees

are permitted under all cardmember agreements, even if it

was not able to obtain McCollough’s specific agreement. JRL

argues that its failure to produce a cardmember agreement

applicable to McCollough was not fatal, and that the issue

should have gone to the jury for its determination as to

whether McCollough’s agreement contained such a provision.

[7] The district court correctly concluded that JRL failed to

meet its burden to show a genuine issue for trial because it

presented no admissible evidence of a contract authorizing a

fee award. The FDCPA prohibits “[t]he collection of any

amount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the

agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692f(1) (emphasis added). JRL produced no evidence of

express authorization of its fee request from McCollough; the

presentation of generic evidence that all credit cards contain

attorney’s fees provisions was insufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact for the jury. The district court correctly

granted summary judgment on the claim.

C

The district court properly held that JRL’s requests for

admission violated the FDCPA as a matter of law.

1

[8] As a threshold matter, JRL contends that the FDCPA

should not be read to cover discovery procedures such as

requests for admission,3 although JRL concedes that the

3

JRL’s own actions in this case belie its theory. In the very requests for

admission at issue, it stated at the bottom: “This is an attempt to collect

a debt.” 

3134 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
FDCPA covers both the filing of complaints, Donohue v.

Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2010),

and the service of settlement letters during the course of litigation, Heintz, 514 U.S. at 293. Our precedents do not support

such a distinction. Rather, the FDCPA “applies to the litigating activities of lawyers.” Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294. The

Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heintz was twofold. First, the

Court reasoned that lawyers who collect debts through litigation plainly fall within the statutory language defining “ ‘debt

collector[s]’ ” to include those who “ ‘regularly collec[t] or

attemp[t] to collect, directly or indirectly, [consumer] debts

owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.’ ” Id.

(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (alterations in original)). Second, the Court observed that an earlier version of the FDCPA

provided an exemption for lawyers, but that Congress had

since repealed that exemption. See id. at 294-95; Pub. L. No.

95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874, 875 (1977) (exempting

from the definition of the term “debt collector” ”any attorneyat-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the

name of a client”); Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986)

(repealing the exemption); see also 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692a(6)(A)-(F) (listing current exceptions to the definition

of “debt collector,” none of which cover attorneys). 

[9] We have reached similar conclusions in two cases.

First, in the pre-Heintz case of Fox, we held that the FDCPA

applies to attorneys engaged in “purely legal activities” and

thus covers the filing of an application for a writ of garnishment. See 15 F.3d at 1511-12; see also id. at 1512 (“There is

simply no mention of attorneys in the current definition of

‘debt collector’ or its exceptions; nor is there any distinction

drawn between legal and non-legal activities.”). More

recently, in Donohue, we applied Heintz and held that the

FDCPA covers the service upon a debtor of a complaint to

facilitate debt-collection efforts. 592 F.3d at 1031-32. We reasoned in Donohue that “[t]o limit the litigation activities that

may form the basis of FDCPA liability to exclude complaints

. . . would require a nonsensical narrowing of the common

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3135
understanding of the word ‘litigation.’ ” Id. at 1032 (rejecting

a distinction between “lawyers acting in the capacity of debt

collectors and those litigating”). There is no principled distinction to be drawn between these types of litigation activities and written discovery.

Our sister circuits agree. The Fourth Circuit has held that

the FDCPA applies specifically to statements in written discovery documents. See Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485

F.3d 226, 228, 230-32 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the

FDCPA applies to allegedly erroneous statements made by

the defendant law firm in interrogatories and a summary judgment motion during the course of a state court collection suit)

(collecting cases).

JRL asserts that failure to exclude discovery procedures

from FDCPA coverage would hinder attorneys’ ability to litigate cases. Instead, JRL contends that remedies for improper

discovery tactics lie in court rules for civil procedure, and

asserts that if its requests for admission complied with the

applicable state rules, they ought not subject it to liability

under the FDCPA. However, Congress enacted the FDCPA

expressly because prior laws for redressing “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” were “inadequate to

protect consumers.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), (b). The statute preempts state laws “to the extent that those laws are inconsistent

with any provision of [the FDCPA].” 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.

[10] Moreover, policy reasoning provides no authority to

override the clear statutory language of Congress. “[O]ur obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it.” Hubbard

v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703 (1995) (quotation omitted); see Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1622 (finding it unremarkable

that “the FDCPA imposes some constraints on a lawyer’s

advocacy on behalf of a client”); Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 234

(concluding that, by a simple reading of its text, the FDCPA

covers litigation activities, including discovery); Fox, 15 F.3d

at 1512 (“The plain language of the statute unambiguously

3136 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
precludes any continued doctrine of special treatment for

attorneys under the FDCPA.”); see also Heintz, 514 U.S. at

296-97 (allowing for the possibility that the FDCPA may contain some “additional, implicit, exception[s]” to account for

the potential conflicts that may arise in the application of the

FDCPA to litigation activities). In short, the FDCPA does not

exclude from its coverage the service of requests for admission.

2

[11] The district court correctly held that JRL’s service of

false requests for admission violated the FDCPA as a matter

of law. The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using

either “unfair or unconscionable means to collect . . . any

debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, or “any false, deceptive, or misleading . . . means in connection with the collection of any debt,”

id. § 1692e. The FDCPA measures a debt collector’s behavior

according to an objective “least sophisticated debtor” standard. Clark, 460 F.3d at 1171. This standard “ ‘ensure[s] that

the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the

shrewd . . . the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous.’ ”

Id. (quoting Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318-19 (2d

Cir. 1993) (alteration and ellipsis in original)). The FDCPA

imposes strict liability on creditors, including liability “for

violations that are not knowing or intentional.” Reichert, 531

F.3d at 1005.

[12] JRL’s requests for admission asked McCollough to

admit facts that were not true: that he had never disputed the

debt, that he had no defense, that every statement in JRL’s

complaint was true, and that he had actually made a payment

on or about June 30, 2004. JRL had information in its possession that demonstrated the untruthfulness of the requested

admissions. 

[13] The requests for admission did not include an explanation that, under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a), the

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3137
requests would be deemed admitted if McCollough did not

respond within thirty days. Because we consider the debt collector’s conduct from the standpoint of the least sophisticated

debtor, we must conclude that the service of requests for

admission containing false information upon a pro se defendant without an explanation that the requests would be

deemed admitted after thirty days constitutes “unfair or

unconscionable” or “false, deceptive, or misleading” means to

collect a debt. Here, JRL effectively requested that McCollough admit JRL’s entire case against him and concede all

defenses. The least sophisticated debtor cannot be expected to

anticipate that a response within thirty days was required to

prevent the court from deeming the requests admitted. The

district court properly granted summary judgment on this

claim.

D

JRL also challenges the district court’s denial of its motions

for partial summary judgment and judgment as a matter of

law on McCollough’s claims under the MCPA. However,

given our resolution of the FDCPA claims, we need not reach

this issue. The damages McCollough would receive on his

MCPA claims are already available to him through his

FDCPA claims. Like the FDCPA, the MCPA authorizes

actual damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Compare 15

U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), (3) with Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-

133(1), (3). While the MCPA also permits the court in its discretion to award treble damages and any other equitable relief

that it considers proper, id. § 30-14-133(1), the district court

declined to grant McCollough such relief. 

McCollough and amicus curia the State of Montana have

conceded that if the FDCPA claims are upheld, it is not necessary to reach the MCPA issues. If we were to consider the

issues, ours would not be a definitive construction of the statute: that prerogative belongs to the Montana Supreme Court.

See Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939

3138 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
(9th Cir. 2001) (“federal courts are bound by the pronouncements of the state’s highest court on applicable state law” and

“[w]here the state’s highest court has not decided an issue, the

task of the federal courts is to predict how the state high court

would resolve it” (quotation omitted)).

Thus, we need not, and do not, reach the MCPA issues. See

Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2003)

(declining to reach state law issues where verdict could be

sustained on federal grounds).

III

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision

to admit evidence. Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco,

576 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2009). We reverse only if we are

“ ‘convinced firmly that the reviewed decision lies beyond the

pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances.’ ” Id.

(quoting Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.

2000)). “A party seeking reversal for evidentiary error must

show that the error was prejudicial, and that the verdict was

more probably than not affected as a result.” Id. (quotation

omitted).

A

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

the very brief testimony of individual debtors Keri Henan and

Ken Lucero concerning their experiences of being sued by

JRL. JRL argues that the testimony was irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and that it should have been

excluded on that basis. Alternatively, JRL contends that the

probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice and thus that the evidence

should have been excluded under Rule 403.

[14] Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3139
consequence to the determination of the action more probable

or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See

United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc). If evidence is relevant, it is generally admissible under

Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See id. However, relevant evidence must be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of

the issues, or misleading the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403.

[15] The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the testimony of JRL’s conduct in similar cases

was relevant to show intent, absence of mistake, malice, willfulness, and reprehensibility. Pursuant to the FDCPA, McCollough had to prove that JRL’s violations were “intentional” to

obtain the maximum amount of FDCPA statutory damages

and to counter JRL’s bona fide error defense. 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692k(b)(1) (requiring consideration, among other relevant

factors, of “the extent to which such noncompliance was

intentional”); id. at § 1692k(c) (bona fide error defense).

McCollough’s malicious prosecution and abuse of process

claims required proof of malice and willfulness. See Plouffe

v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs., 45 P.3d 10,

14 (Mont. 2002) (malicious prosecution); Hughes v. Lynch,

164 P.3d 913, 919 (Mont. 2007) (abuse of process). Finally,

McCollough’s entitlement to punitive damages depended on

a showing of reprehensibility. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (requiring consideration of whether the defendant’s “conduct involved repeated

actions or was an isolated incident”). In addition, JRL

defended its conduct on the basis that it simply made a series

of mistakes in prosecuting the time-barred lawsuit. Thus, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.

B

JRL contends that the district court abused its discretion in

admitting expert testimony from attorneys Michael Eakin and

3140 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
James Patten regarding JRL’s collection practices in other

cases. However, it failed to preserve this claim for appeal by

failing to object at trial. United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d

861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that filing a motion in

limine is insufficient to preserve an issue for appeal absent a

further objection at trial). Here, JRL filed a motion in limine

challenging admission of the evidence, but the district court

denied JRL’s motion to exclude the experts’ testimony “with

leave to renew any objections at trial” and thus did not issue

an ultimate ruling on the evidence. JRL did not reassert the

objections at trial. JRL thus failed to preserve its objection

under Archdale.

JRL also claims error in the district court’s admission of

Exhibit #106, a list of all the lawsuits JRL had filed in the

State of Montana from January 2007 through July 2008. However, defense counsel opened the door to consideration of this

evidence when he questioned Patten about the number of lawsuits filed during that period. Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Dept., ___ F.3d. ___, No. 07-16640, 2011 WL 13920 at

*11 n.10 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2011) (en banc). A party’s preemptive use of evidence at trial before its introduction by the

opposing party constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge

the admissibility of the evidence on appeal. See Ohler v.

United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757-59 (2000); United States v.

Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1011 (9th Cir. 2006). 

JRL also failed to preserve its claim on appeal that the district court erred in allowing the attorney expert testimony and

the list of cases to be presented at the liability and general

damage portions of the trial, rather than at the punitive damages stage.

IV

The district court did not abuse its “broad discretion” in

formulating the jury instructions. Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.,

845 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1988).

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3141
JRL first argues that the district court abused its discretion

by admitting Exhibit #106 and the testimony of Henan,

Lucero, Eakin, and Patten without instructing the jury to limit

its use of the evidence to the issue of reprehensibility, and to

award punitive damages only for JRL’s conduct toward

McCollough. JRL argues that the admission of the evidence

without proper limiting instructions violated JRL’s due process rights. However, JRL failed to preserve this issue on

appeal because it did not request an instruction limiting the

jury’s use of the evidence at trial. Accordingly, the issue is

waived. See id. (“[I]f an appellant does not request an instruction at trial, the issue is not preserved on appeal.”).

JRL likewise argues that it is entitled to a new trial on the

ground that the district court instructed the jury that it had

previously found JRL’s requests for admission to be “abusive,

unfair, or unconscionable,” rather than by simply stating its

legal conclusion that JRL violated the FDCPA. However, JRL

did not raise this objection at trial. Indeed, JRL conceded that

the instruction correctly summarized the district court’s prior

order and objected only because it disagreed with the court’s

prior order. Thus, this challenge is also waived. See id.

V

The district court did not err in denying JRL’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law on McCollough’s state law malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims.4

“A jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence,

which is evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion,

even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir.

2008) (quotation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the

jury’s findings of liability on both state law claims.

4

JRL also argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for

summary judgment on these issues. However, that decision is not reviewable on appeal. Ortiz v. Jordan, ___ U.S. ___, No. 07-737, 2011 WL

197801 at *2 (2011). 

3142 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
A

To sustain an action for malicious prosecution under Montana law, a plaintiff must establish six separate elements:

(1) a judicial proceeding was commenced and prosecuted against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant was

responsible for instigating, prosecuting or continuing

such proceeding; (3) there was a lack of probable

cause for the defendant’s acts; (4) the defendant was

actuated by malice; (5) the judicial proceeding terminated favorably for the plaintiff; and (6) the plaintiff

suffered damage.

Plouffe, 45 P.3d at 14. JRL contends that McCollough did not

present substantial evidence of elements (3) and (4): lack of

probable cause and malice.

Probable cause exists when a party “reasonably believes in

the existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and

. . . correctly or reasonably believes that under those facts the

claim may be valid under the applicable law.” Hughes, 164

P.3d at 918 (quotation omitted). Probable cause is “determined . . . on the basis of the facts known to the party initiating the legal action.” Plouffe, 45 P.3d at 15.

[16] McCollough presented substantial evidence that JRL

did not reasonably believe in the existence of a June 30, 2004,

partial payment that would have rendered its suit timely.

JRL’s electronic file indicated that the suit was time-barred.

CACV expressly disclaimed the accuracy of the account

information it gave JRL. Lisa Lauinger ignored the offer of

additional “info from me on this one” when she accepted

CACV’s unsupported statement. Grace Lauinger initially

requested supporting documentation from CACV “to extend

the Statute of Limitations,” but did not follow up when none

was submitted. JRL continued to prosecute the collection case

for four months after having been explicitly told by CACV

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3143
that the June 30, 2004, partial payment never occurred. These

facts provide substantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that JRL sued McCollough without reasonably believing in the suit’s timeliness and thus without probable cause.

Substantial evidence also supports the jury’s finding of

malice. The Montana Supreme Court has not yet defined

“malice” in the context of a malicious prosecution action. In

Plouffe, the Montana Supreme Court cited two possible definitions from Montana law. See 45 P.3d at 17. Montana’s punitive damages statute provides:

A defendant is guilty of actual malice if the defendant has knowledge of facts or intentionally disregards facts that create a high probability of injury to

the plaintiff and:

(a) deliberately proceeds to act in conscious or intentional disregard of the high probability of injury to

the plaintiff; or 

(b) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to

the high probability of injury to the plaintiff. 

Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-221(2). Alternatively, Mont. Code

Ann. § 1-1-204(3) defines “malice” as “a wish to vex, annoy,

or injure another person or an intent to do a wrongful act.”

Under either definition, “the plaintiff is not required to prove

the subjective intent of the defendant to establish a prima

facie case for malicious prosecution.” Plouffe, 45 P.3d at 18.

Moreover, a rebuttable presumption of malice arises if the

jury finds an absence of probable cause. Id. at 17-18.

[17] Here, substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding under either definition. McCollough presented evidence

that JRL knew of or intentionally disregarded facts concerning the timeliness of its collection action. JRL’s conduct created a high probability of injury to McCollough, yet JRL

3144 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
deliberately acted in disregard of such injury. See Mont. Code

Ann. § 27-1-221(2). Likewise, the evidence of JRL’s conduct

toward McCollough — as well as the testimony of Henan,

Lucero, Eakin, and Patten — supports an inference that JRL

acted with a “wish to . . . injure another person or an intent

to do a wrongful act.” Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-204(3). Moreover, a rebuttable presumption of malice arose when the jury

found an absence of probable cause. Plouffe, 45 P.3d at 17-18.

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings of both a

lack of probable cause and malice. Accordingly, the district

court properly denied JRL’s motion for judgment as a matter

of law on McCollough’s malicious prosecution claim.

B

To sustain an action for abuse of process under Montana

law, a plaintiff must establish two elements: “(1) an ulterior

purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not

proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Hughes, 164

P.3d at 919 (quotation omitted). Those elements are satisfied

where, as here, evidence indicates that the litigant willfully

filed a lawsuit “with an ulterior purpose of extracting money

from [the opposing party] that he did not owe,” and that the

litigant “had no valid legal claim against [the opposing party]

and knew it, but filed an action . . . nonetheless.” Seipel v.

Olympic Coast Invs., 188 P.3d 1027, 1032 (Mont. 2008).

[18] Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of liability on this claim. McCollough presented evidence that JRL

filed suit to extract money from McCollough that it could not

legally obtain in a collection action and that it filed a baseless

action with knowledge that it had no legal claim. McCollough

presented evidence that JRL filed and pursued a time-barred

lawsuit against him, even though JRL’s own electronic file

indicated that the suit was time-barred. McCollough presented

evidence that JRL continued to prosecute the collection case

for four months after having been explicitly told by CACV

that the June 30, 2004, payment was not grounds for extendMCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3145
ing the statute of limitations. McCollough presented evidence

that JRL sought attorney’s fees without confirming that

McCollough had a contractual fee obligation. The jury could

have inferred from this evidence that JRL’s purpose in filing

the lawsuit was to coerce McCollough to pay awards and fees

to which it and CACV were not entitled. The jury’s abuse of

process verdict was supported by substantial evidence, and

the district court properly denied JRL’s motion for judgment

as a matter of law.

VI

The district court properly denied JRL’s motion for a new

trial or amendment of the judgment based on the jury’s

$250,000 award for actual damages due to emotional distress.

In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion for a new

trial for abuse of discretion, we defer to a jury’s finding of the

appropriate amount of damages unless the award is “grossly

excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or based only on speculation or guesswork.” Del

Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d

1422, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). We “may not

assess the credibility of witnesses in determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict.” Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir.

1999) (citation omitted).

The FDCPA provides for the award of actual damages. See

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1). At trial, McCollough presented evidence of emotional distress through his own testimony and

testimony from a clinical psychologist, Dr. Donna Veraldi,

who examined McCollough in July 2008. At the close of the

evidence, the trial judge issued the following jury instructions

with respect to damages available under the FDCPA:

Actual damages include damages for personal humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish and emotional distress. There is no fixed standard or measure

3146 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
in the case of intangible items such as humiliation,

embarrassment, mental anguish or emotional distress. Mental and emotional suffering and distress

pass under various names such as mental anguish,

nervous shock and the like. It includes all highly

unpleasant mental reactions such as fright or grief,

shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin,

disappointment, worry and nausea. The law does not

set a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental and emotional suffering and distress. Neither is there any requirement that any

witness express an opinion about the amount of compensation that is appropriate for the kind of law.

The law does require, however, that when making an

award for mental and emotional suffering and distress you should exercise calm and reasonable judgment. The compensation must be just and

reasonable.

JRL did not object to either instruction.

JRL argues that the $250,000 award was “clearly not supported by the evidence” and “based on speculation and guesswork.” In support, JRL contends that the evidence “boils

down to [McCollough’s] testimony that he was mad . . . and

had to lie down”; his testimony concerning pre-existing symptoms that had not worsened due to JRL’s conduct; and Dr.

Veraldi’s testimony about the effects she would hypothetically expect of stress on someone with McCollough’s conditions.

[19] However, ample evidence exists in the record to support the jury’s award. See Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc.,

339 F.3d 1020, 1039-41 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding emotional

damages of a similar amount based solely on the plaintiff’s

testimony). Dr. Veraldi described McCollough’s condition

after he suffered a head injury in 1990 and explained that he

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3147
suffered from mixed personality disorder and multiple other

afflictions, including post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Veraldi further testified that the lawsuit was a significant stress

factor in McCollough’s life, and noted that McCollough is

“somebody who is a more vulnerable individual in negotiating

the world,” and thus “more vulnerable to any types of problems.” She explained that the adverse impacts of JRL’s lawsuit may have worsened McCollough’s existing symptoms of

headaches, anxiety, paranoia, and difficulty relating to others.

McCollough testified as to the adverse impact of being

sued by JRL, including the anxiety, stress, and anger that he

felt and the “down time” and severe headaches that he suffered as a result. McCollough testified that the lawsuit JRL

prosecuted against him “definitely” caused him anxiety,

increasing his temper, pain, adrenaline, and conflict with his

wife. McCollough acknowledged his disabling pre-existing

condition but characterized the impact of JRL’s lawsuit on

him as “the straw that broke the camel’s back.” He thought

that the lawsuit was “frivolous” and “an insult,” and that he

was “being shoved around.” We thus must conclude that the

award was not based on speculation and guesswork, but rather

on the jury’s valuation of McCollough’s emotional distress.

Contrary to JRL’s assertions, In re First Alliance Mortgage

Co., 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006), does not compel a different

result. There, the jury improperly arrived at its damage award

by averaging the estimates of the parties’ damage experts. 471

F. 3d at 1002-03. No analogous calculation error is evident on

this record.

JRL also argues that the $250,000 award was based on an

improper desire to punish JRL for its conduct. However, the

jury returned both an emotional distress damages award and

a punitive damages award; no evidence indicates that the jury

improperly blurred the distinction between the two awards. 

3148 MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER
[20] Substantial evidence supports the jury’s emotional

distress damage award. The district court properly denied

JRL’s motion for a new trial or amendment of the judgment.

VII

The district court properly granted summary judgment on

the FDCPA claims. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings or in formulating jury instructions. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER 3149