1283-84 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying Arizona law to conclude that a party to a 

settlement agreement could still be deemed the prevailing party for the 

purposes of recovering attorney fees pursuant to a statute); Khavarian 

Enters., Inc. v. Commline, Inc., 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657, 665 (Ct. App. 2013) 

("It is not unlawful for a plaintiff who filed a voluntary dismissal but 

received a net monetary recovery through settlement to be found to be a 

prevailing party."). Additionally, under federal law a party to a settlement 

can be a prevailing party. See generally Buck hannon Bd. & Care Home, 

Inc. v. W Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) 

(explaining that "settlement agreements enforced through a consent 

decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorney's fees" pursuant to 

a statute that authorizes awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party). 

Thus, we conclude that a party to a compromise settlement can be a 

prevailing party under NRS 18.010(2)(a). See Albios v. Horizon Cmtys., 

Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 417, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006) (stating that we review 

issues of statutory interpretation de novo). 

Under 18,010(2)(a), the district court may make an allowance 

of attorney's fees to a prevailing party . . [w]hen the prevailing party has 

not recovered more than $20,000." Furthermore, "a money judgment is a 

prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees under [NRS 18.010(2)(a)]." 1 

1-Santa Margarita argues that based upon Smith v. Crown Financial 

Services, Tulelake cannot recover attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a) 

because it did not receive a money judgment at trial. See Smith v. Crown 

Fin. Servs. of Am., 111 Nev. 277, 280, 890 P.2d 769, 771 (1995) (stating 

that "a party may recover attorney fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(a) only 

if that party received a money judgment at trial" (emphasis added)). We, 

however, view our addition of "at trial" in Crown Financial Services to our 

rule from Woods, 107 Nev. at 427, 812 P.2d 1299, as dicta. See St. James 

continued on next page . . . 

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Woods v. Label Inv. Corp., 107 Nev. 419, 427, 812 P.2d 1293, 1299 (1991), 

overruled on other grounds by Hanneman v. Downer, 110 Nev. 167, 180 

n.8, 871 P.2d 279, 287 n.8 (1994). Here, the offer of judgment awarded 

Tulelake $20,000 and resulted in a money judgment in Tulelake's favor. 2 

Thus, we conclude that Tulelake is potentially capable of receiving 

attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a). 3Accordingly, we remand for the 

district court to determine: (1) whether Tulelake was the prevailing party, 

(2) if so, whether to award Tulelake attorney fees, see 18.010(2)(a) ("[T]he 

. continued 

Village, Inc. v. Cunningham, 125 Nev. 211, 216, 210 P.3d 190, 193 (2009) 

("Dictum is not controlling."). 

2Santa Margarita also contends that Tulelake cannot obtain 

attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a) because a "judgment" was not 

entered. Both NRCP 68(d) and NRS 17.115(2)(a) allow for dismissal of the 

settled claim, instead of a judgment being entered, if the party that owes 

money under the settlement requests dismissal and pays the offer amount 

within a reasonable amount of time. Santa Margarita points out that it 

requested dismissal and paid the offer amount within a reasonable 

amount of time. We conclude, however, that the offer of judgment, as 

evidenced by thefl parties' email exchange in the record, expressly 

prohibited Santa Margarita from moving for dismissal. See Ringle v. 

Bruton, 120 Nev. 82, 93, 86 P.3d 1032, 1039 (2004) ("When contract 

language is ambiguous and incomplete. . . extrinsic evidence may be 

admitted to determine the parties' intent, explain ambiguities, and supply 

omissions."). Thus, pursuant to the offer of judgment, Tulelake was 

entitled to have a money judgment entered against Santa Margarita, 

which satisfies the prerequisite to an attorney fees award. Consequently, 

we conclude that this argument by Santa Margarita fails. 

3We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude 

that they are without merit. 

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court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party . . 

(emphasis added)), and (3) if so, how much. 4Consequently, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this order. 

, J. 

Saitta 

Gibbons 

J. 

J. 

cc: Hon. Leon Aberasturi, District Judge 

Laurie A. Yott, Settlement Judge 

Law Office of James Shields Beasley 

Law Offices of Roderic A. Carucci 

Wayne A. Pederson, P.C. 

Lyon County Clerk 

4We recognize that the district court found that Tulelake incurred 

$33,865.00 in attorney fees in order to avoid remand if this court 

determined that a party to a compromise settlement could be a prevailing 

party. With this in mind, we still conclude that remand is appropriate 

because fees from this appeal may be warranted, or the district court could 

exercise its discretion in another way. 

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