NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARVIN G. HOLLIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

RISENHOOVER, Nurse Practitioner; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-16489 

D.C. No. 5:17-cv-00326-BLF 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2022**

Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Marvin G. Hollis appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C § 1983 action alleging deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo, Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020), 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 22 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-16489 

and we affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hollis failed 

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were 

deliberately indifferent in treating his chronic pain and mental health issues. See 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (holding deliberate indifference is a 

“high legal standard” requiring a defendant be aware of and disregard an excessive 

risk to an inmate’s health; medical malpractice, negligence, and difference of 

opinion concerning the course of treatment do not amount to deliberate 

indifference).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for 

recusal. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting 

forth standard of review and objective test to determine if recusal is required).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for 

leave to amend his complaint. See Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t 

of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of review 

and explaining denial of leave to amend is warranted if amendment “would cause 

prejudice to the opposing party . . . or creates undue delay”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion to 

compel discovery because Hollis failed to establish that denial would result in 

actual and substantial prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th 
3 20-16489 

Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court’s 

“decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing 

that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the 

complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for 

appointment of counsel because Hollis failed to demonstrate “exceptional 

circumstances” warranting appointment. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 

(9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” 

requirement for appointment of counsel).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for 

appointment of an expert because such appointment was not necessary for the 

court to make its determination. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term 

Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of 

review for appointment of an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for 

judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

689 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review).

We reject as meritless Hollis’s contentions that the district court failed to 

liberally construe his pro se pleadings, was biased against him, and improperly 

denied him subpoena forms.
4 20-16489 

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.