This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-35130 4 CARNELIAN ALLEN, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 John A. Dean, Jr., District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 John J. Woykovsky, Assistant Attorney General 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 14 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 ZAMORA, Judge. 192 {1} Defendant Carnelian Allen entered into a conditional plea agreement, pleading 1 guilty to possession of a controlled substan ce (methamphetamine), contrary to NMSA 2 1978, Section 30-31-23(E) (2011). Defendant ’s conditional plea agreement included 3 the specific reservation of right to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion 4 to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his person prompted by the police 5 responding to a suspicious person report. We affirm. 6 BACKGROUND 7
{2} At approximately 1:16 a.m. on April 12, 2015, Officer Carlos Martinez (Officer 8 Martinez) of the Farmington Police Department responded to a dispatch call 9 concerning a suspicious male reported to be hiding behind a woode n pallet next to a 10 closed business. Upon arriving at the s cene, Officer Martinez was directed to 11 Defendant’s whereabouts by another individual shining a flashlight at the wooden 12 pallet Defendant was crouche d behind. After locating De fendant, Officer Martinez 13 ordered him out from behind the wooden pallet and directed him to sit on a set of 14 stairs. Defendant complied with this order, and emerged holding only a plastic juice 15 pouch. Officer Martinez testified that at th is point, he was investigating a suspicious 16 person report in addition to a potential vi olation of a county loitering ordinance. 17
{3} Officer Martinez questioned Defendant about his presence outside the building 18 and where he was headed. Defendant explaine d that he was trying to get out of the 193 cold. He further explained that earlier in the day a Sheriff’s deputy took him to a hotel 1 to arrange a room for him, but he had si nce walked away and got lost. During this 2 questioning, Officer Martinez observed thatDefendant was fidgeting with the plastic 3 juice pouch he was holding, he was stammering in his speech, bouncing his legs up 4 and down, and repeatedly looking to the left and right. 5
{4} Defendant’s behavior led Officer Martinez to suspect Defendant might be under 6 the influence of drugs or alcohol. He aske d Defendant if he had been drinking or 7 doing drugs; Defendant responde d in the negative to each question. Officer Martinez 8 then asked Defendant if he could searchhim for drugs, and Defendant consented to 9 being searched. Upon searching Defendant’s person, Officer Martinez found a 10 cigarette box with methamphetamine in Defendant’s pocket. 11
{5} Defendant was charged with posse ssion of a controlled substance 12 (methamphetamine), contrary to S ection 30-31-23(E), and possession of drug 13 paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25. 1(A) (2001). He moved to 14 suppress all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United 15 States Constitution and Article II, Secti on 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. He 16 relied primarily on State v. Bell , 2015-NMCA-028, 345 P.3d 342, to argue that the 17 scope of the stop exceeded constitutional bounds. In response, the State argued that 18 under New Mexico law, Officer Martinez properly questioned Defendant and his 194 suspicions only grew over the duration of th e stop. The State also argued that prior to 1 Officer Martinez’s suspicions being alle viated, Defendant consented to being 2 searched. 3
{6} Following an evidentiary hearing on the mo tion to suppress, the district court 4 concluded that Defendant was under a lawful seizure while Officer Martinez 5 investigated the suspicious person reportand that during questioning, Defendant’s 6 behavior and explan ation as to why he was in the area gave Officer Martinez 7 reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the encounter to include questioning 8 Defendant about drug and alcohol use. Th e district court further concluded that 9 Defendant lawfully consented to be searched, which resulted in Officer Martinez 10 locating the methamphetamine on Defendant’s person. The di strict court subsequently 11 denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. 12
{7} Thereafter, Defendant entered into a conditional plea agreement, pleading guilty 13 to possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a fourth degree felony 14 explicitly reserving the right to appeal th e district court’s denial of his motion to 15 suppress. This appeal followed. 16
{8} On appeal, Defendant argues that pursuan t to Article II Section 10 of the New 17 Mexico Constitution, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 18 because Officer Martinez lacked reasonable suspicion to expand a suspicious person 195 investigation into a drug investigation. S ubsumed into this argument is Defendant’s 1 contention that his consent to be searchedwas tainted by Officer Martinez’s improper 2 expansion of the stop. In response, the St ate argues that Officer Martinez’s questions 3 were reasonably related to the initial reas on for the stop and to observations he made 4 during the stop. The State further conte nds that his questions were supported by 5 reasonable suspicion and therefore lawful. 6 STANDARD OF REVIEW 7
{9} “Appellate review of a motion to suppre ss presents a mixed question of law and 8 fact.” State v. Paananen , 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 357 P. 3d 958 (internal quotation 9 marks and citation omitted). We review “factual matters with deference to the district 10 court’s findings if substantial evidence exists to support them, and [the Court] reviews 11 the district court’s application of the law de novo.” State v. Almanzar , 2014-NMSC12 001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183. “Substantial evidence” is defined as “such relevant evidence 13 as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. 14 Salgado , 1999-NMSC-008, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 691, 974 P.2d 661 (internal quotation 15 marks and citation omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence, and we may not 16 substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder, as long as there is sufficient 17 evidence to support the fact-finder’s conclusion. See State v. Griffin , 1993-NMSC18 071, ¶ 17, 116 N.M. 689, 866 P.2d 1156. The question for us on appeal is whether the 196 district court’s “decision is supported by substantial evidence, not whether the 1 [district] court coul d have reached a different conclusion.” In re Ernesto M., Jr. , 1996- 2 NMCA-039, ¶ 15, 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318. 3 DISCUSSION 4
{10} Article II, Section 10 of the New Me xico Constitution provides that “[t]he 5 people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable 6 searches and seizures[.]” The New Mexi co Constitution provides individuals with 7 broader protection to privacy than does th e Fourth Amendment of the United States 8 Constitution. See State v. Leyva , 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 53, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. 9 Under our interstitial approach, we are not confined by the Fourth Amendment of the 10 United States Constitution law in determining whether the defendant’s rights were 11 violated under the New Mexico Constitution. See id. ¶ 51. Thus, because “Article II, 12 Section 10 is calibrated slightly differentlythan the Fourth Amendment[, i]t is a 13 foundation of both personal privacy and the in tegrity of the criminal justice system, 14 as well as the ultimate re gulator of police conduct.” Id. ¶ 53 (internal quotation marks 15 and citation omitted). 16
{11} In analyzing the constitutionality of police questioning during stops, pursuant 17 to Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexi co Constitution, New Mexico courts employ 18 the two-part test first articulated in State v. Duran , 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 138 N.M. 197 414, 120 P.3d 836, overruled in part by Leyva , 2011-NMSC-009. The two-part test 1 looks at “(1) whether the officer’s action wa s justified at its inception, and (2) whether 2 it was reasonably related in sc ope to the circumstances which justified the interference 3 in the first place.” Leyva , 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and 4 citation omitted). This framework requires “a reasonable justification for the initial 5 stop and that all questions asked during th e stop be reasonably re lated to the reason 6 for the stop or otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion.” Id. ¶ 55. Questioning 7 unrelated to the initial purpose of the stop is proper only if it is otherwise supported 8 by reasonable suspicion, for officer safety, or if the interaction be tween the officer and 9 the individual has become consensual. See id. 10
{12} As we noted earlier, Defendant’s argument focuses only on the expansion of 11 Officer Martinez’s initial investigation. Hedoes not contest the validity or purpose of 12 Officer Martinez’s initial stop itself—investig ation of a suspicious person claim and 13 a possible violation of the county loiteri ng ordinance. Officer Martinez’s questions 14 about drug use or possession werereasonably related in scopeto the suspicious person 15 investigation because of his observations of Defendant’s odd behavior and explanation 16 for being behind a closed business in the middle of the night raised even more 17 questions into who Defendant was and why he was there. Because both prongs of the 188 Durantest have been satisfied and neither are being challenged, we therefore focus 1 our attention on whether the expansion of the stop was justified. 2
{13} In determining whether an officer had proper grounds to expand an 3 investigation beyond the initial purpose of the stop, the officer “must have reasonable 4 and articulable suspicion that other crimin al activity has been or may be afoot.” Leyva , 5 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 59 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We measure 6 reasonable suspicion on an objective st andard based on the totality of the 7 circumstances. See id. “[R]easonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical 8 conception, which requires that officers articulate a reason, beyond a mere hunch, for 9 their belief that an individual has committed a criminal act.” State v. Funderburg , 10 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922 (alteration, internal quotation 11 marks, and citation omitted). “[ The] Court defers to the training and experience of the 12 officer when determining whether particul arized and objective indicia of criminal 13 activity existed.” State v. Olson , 2012-NMSC-035, ¶ 13, 285 P.3d 1066 (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted); Leyva , 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 10. Our Supreme 15 Court has also noted that “[u]nrelated ques tions may also be posed where the stop has 16 ended and a consensual en counter has developed.” Leyva , 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 10. 17
{14} The State argues that the facts in this case mirror those in Duran . Defendant 18 argues that the circumstances surrounding his case do not resemble those in Duran , 191 Defendant failed to provide a record proper citation in support of this 17 characterization. We remind appellate counselit is their responsibility to do so, as we 18 will not undertake that responsibility for them. See Rule 12-318(A)(3) NMRA 19 (declaring that a summary of the facts rele vant to an appellate issue shall contain 20 citations to the record proper). 21 9 as the State suggests. He argues that unlike the defendant in Duran who exhibited 1 suspicious behavior by way of inconsis tent answers and nervousness, Defendant’s 2 own behavior was instead c onsistent with a homeless man merely searching for a 3 warm place to sleep. 1 Therefore, unlike the officer in Duran who possessed reasonable 4 suspicion, Defendant argues that Officer Martinez lacked such reasonable suspicion 5 here. We disagree. 6
{15} Additionally, Defendant relies on Bell , in support of his argument that Officer 7 Martinez’s questions were “well outside the scope of the initial stop.” However, Bell 8 is distinguishable from these facts. In Bell , the officer conducted a traffic stop based 9 on a speeding vehicle. See 2015-NMCA-028, ¶ 3. After explaining the basis of the 10 stop to the defendant, whose hands were shaking, the officer thenproceeded to ask if 11 he had any grenades, rocket launchers , or dead bodies in the vehicle. See id. ¶¶ 4-6. 12 This Court reasoned that this line of que stioning was an impermissible expansion of 13 the scope of the traffic stop. Id. ¶ 17. As we explain below, unlike the officer in Bell , 14 Officer Martinez’s questions were an appropriate expansion of the initial 15 investigation. Therefore, the scope of the stop did not exceed constitutional bounds. 1610 {16} Our review of Officer Martinez’s testimony, along with the video of his lapel 1 camera, supports the district court’s conc lusion that Officer Martinez had reasonable 2 suspicion to expand the stop and inquire into whether Defendant possessed drugs. See 3 State v. Martinez , 2015-NMCA-051, ¶ 15, 348 P.3d 1022 (determining that an 4 appellate court’s review of a video is similar to reviewing any other documentary 5 evidence, and the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to interpret 6 the contents of the video), rev’d on other grounds by2018-NMSC-007, 410 P.3d 186. 7 While communicating with Officer Martinez, Defendant was fidgeting with a 8 seemingly empty juice pouch, his eyes werequickly moving back and forth, his legs 9 were continuously bouncing up and down, and his speech was stammering. This 10 behavior caused Officer Martinez to susp ect Defendant was under the influence of 11 drugs or alcohol. Most notable was Defendant’s implausible explanation about his 12 presence outside a closed business at 1:00 a. m.—that earlier in the day a different law 13 enforcement officer transported him to an unknown hotel to make arrangements for 14 him, but he walked away before the arrangements were made and then he got lost. 15
{17} In considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendant provided a most 16 unusual explanation that created more ques tions than it did provide answers. Like 17 Duran , these circumstances were sufficien t to provide Officer Martinez with 18 reasonable suspicion that other criminal ac tivity, namely public intoxication, drug use, 1911 or drug possession, had been or may be afoot. Therefore, Officer Martinez was 1 justified in expanding the initial scope of his investigation. 2
{18} We conclude that Defendant was under a lawful seizure while Officer Martinez 3 conducted his suspicious person investigation and that during this investigation 4 Defendant’s behavior and e xplanations gave Officer Martinez reasonable suspicion 5 to expand the scope of the i nvestigation. Because we conclude that Officer Martinez 6 lawfully expanded the stop, we likewise conclude that Defendant’s consent was not 7 tainted by such a lawful expansion. 8 CONCLUSION 9
{19} For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of 10 Defendant’s motion to suppress. 11
{20} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 14 WE CONCUR: 15

16 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 17

18 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 19