alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

ALEAH MEYER, 

Defendant. 

8:23CR112 

ORDER 

 

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Extend Time to File Pretrial 

Motions, (Filing No. 45). The motion is unopposed by the government and the co-defendant. For 

good cause shown, the Court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1) Defendant’s Motion to Extend Time to File Pretrial Motions, (Filing No. 45), is 

granted. 

2) Pretrial motions shall be filed by October 20, 2023. 

3) In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the Court finds that the ends of 

justice will be served by granting this motion and outweigh the interests of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result 

of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today’s date and October 

20, 2023, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the 

requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant this motion would deny 

counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account 

the exercise of due diligence, and the novelty and complexity of the case. The 

failure to grant this motion might result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7)(A) & (B). Failing to timely object to this order as provided under this 

court’s local rules will be deemed a waiver of any right to later claim the time 

should not have been excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. 

 Dated this 20th day of September, 2023. 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Susan M. Bazis 

United States Magistrate Judge 

8:23-cr-00112-RFR-SMB Doc # 46 Filed: 09/20/23 Page 1 of 1 - Page ID # 98
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Gerard Laurendeau

v. Civil No. 05-cv-441-JD

Opinion No. 2006 DNH 139

Sheet Metal Workers

Local 17C-NH Pension Trust

O R D E R

On November 21, 2006, the court denied Gerard Laurendeau’s

motion seeking a judgment to reverse the decision of the Trustees

of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Local 17C-NH Pension Trust suspending

his pension benefits because he is doing disqualifying work. The

court granted the Trust’s motion to affirm that decision “without

prejudice to the plaintiff to seek reinstatement of his pension

benefits from the Trustees if he can prove that he is not

performing disqualifying work.” Counsel for Laurendeau then

wrote to counsel for the Trust asking that a hearing before the

Trustees be scheduled.

The Trust moves to amend the judgment entered in accordance

with that order to preclude Laurendeau from seeking reinstatement

of his pension benefits while he continues to work in his current

position as a Miscellaneous Iron and Maintenance Worker at B. A.

Roy. The Trust contends that the order and judgment can be

misinterpreted as being equivalent to a remand to the Trustees.

Case 1:05-cv-00441-JD Document 28 Filed 12/13/06 Page 1 of 2
2

The court’s order did not remand the case to the Trustees. 

Instead, the court held that the Trustees’ decision in October of

2005, that Laurendeau’s work at B.A. Roy disqualified him from

receiving his pension benefits, was not arbitrary or capricious,

based on the administrative record. If the terms of the Sheet

Metal Workers’ International Local No. 17C-NH Pension Plan would

provide an opportunity for Laurendeau to seek reinstatement,

despite the Trustees’ decision, the final order and judgment in

this case are without prejudice to initiating any such

proceedings. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to alter

or amend judgment (document no. 26) is granted to the extent the

judgment is clarified in this order and is otherwise denied.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

December 13, 2006

cc: John-Mark Turner, Esquire

Vincent A. Wenners, Jr., Esquire

Case 1:05-cv-00441-JD Document 28 Filed 12/13/06 Page 2 of 2
#### Jorge Smith QUINTERO Petitioner-Appellant, v. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT Respondent—Appellee.

No. 03-30353.

Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 4, 2003.

*337Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Petitioner, Jorge Smith Quintero, immigration detainee # 08478-131, appeals the district court’s denial of his 21 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging the right of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to detain him indefinitely in light of the Supreme Court decision in *Zadvydas v. Davis,*533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). Quintero is an excludable alien who is a Cuban national.

In *Zadvydas,*the Supreme Court set up a framework in which a deportable alien could establish the unreasonableness of his continued detention and obtain his release, albeit supervised, in a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. *Id.*at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Qunitero’s argument that *Zadvydas*should apply equally to ex-dudable aliens like himself is foreclosed by this court’s decision in *Rios v. INS,*324 F.3d 296, 296 (5th Cir.2003). Instead, this court’s holding in *Gisbert v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,*988 F.2d 1437, 1440-47 (5th Cir.), *amended by Gisbert v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,*997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.1993), that there are no time limits on the detention of excluded aliens who have been denied entry governs Quintero’s petition. *See Rios,*324 F.3d at 296. The district court did not err in denying the petition.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Opinion issued August 27, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-24-00336-CV

———————————

KENNEDY AMBROISE, Appellant

V.

ME ALPHA II, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1221854

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Kennedy Ambroise filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s 

April 16, 2024 final judgment. Appellant has neither paid the required fees nor 

established indigence for purposes of costs. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145; TEX. R. APP.

P. 5, 20.1; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.207, 51.208, 51.851(b), 51.941(a); 
2

Order, Fees Charged in the Supreme Court, in Civil Cases in the Courts of Appeals, 

and Before the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 

15-9158 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2015). On May 24, 2024, appellant was notified that this 

appeal was subject to dismissal if appellate costs were not paid, or indigence was not 

established, by June 24, 2024. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), (c). Appellant did not 

adequately respond.

Further, appellant has not paid or made arrangements to pay the fee for the 

preparation of the clerk’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b). On June 18, 2024, 

appellant was notified that this appeal was subject to dismissal if appellant did not 

submit written evidence that she had paid or made arrangements to pay the fee for 

the preparation of the clerk’s record by July 18, 2024. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), 

(c). Appellant did not adequately respond. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for nonpayment of all required fees and 

want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 42.3(b), (c), 43.2(f). We dismiss any 

pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Guerra, and Farris.
Exhibit 31.2

                    Certification of Chief Financial Officer
            Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, C.W. Gilluly, Chief Financial Officer, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of AMASYS Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such procedures
to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report are conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business
issuer's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of
the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.


May 17, 2004                               /s/ C.W. Gilluly, Ed.D.
                                           -----------------------------------
                                           C.W. Gilluly, Ed.D. Chief
                                           Financial Officer
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1477

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a refundable credit

to elementary and secondary school teachers for teaching expenses.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 4, 2001

Mr. KIND (for himself and Mr. MCGOVERN) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide

a refundable credit to elementary and secondary school

teachers for teaching expenses.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REFUNDABLE CREDIT FOR TEACHING EX4 PENSES OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY

5 SCHOOL TEACHERS.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subpart C of part IV of sub7 chapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of

8 1986 (relating to refundable credits) is amended by redes9 ignating section 35 as section 36 and by inserting after

10 section 34 the following new section:
2

•HR 1477 IH

1 ‘‘SEC. 35. TEACHING EXPENSES OF ELEMENTARY AND SEC2 ONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS.

3 ‘‘(a) ALLOWANCE OF CREDIT.—In the case of an eli4 gible teacher, there shall be allowed as a credit against

5 the tax imposed by this chapter for such taxable year an

6 amount equal to the qualified teaching expenses which are

7 paid or incurred by the taxpayer during such taxable year.

8 ‘‘(b) MAXIMUM CREDIT.—The credit allowed by sub9 section (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed $500.

10 ‘‘(c) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

11 ‘‘(1) ELIGIBLE TEACHER.—The term ‘eligible

12 teacher’ means an individual who is a kindergarten

13 through grade 12 classroom teacher, instructor,

14 counselor, aide, or principal in an elementary or sec15 ondary school.

16 ‘‘(2) ELIGIBLE TEACHING EXPENSES.—The

17 term ‘eligible teaching expenses’ means expenses for

18 books, supplies, and equipment used by an eligible

19 teacher for instructional purposes.

20 ‘‘(3) ELEMENTARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOL.—

21 The term ‘elementary or secondary school’ means

22 any elementary school or secondary school, as those

23 terms are defined in section 14101 of the Elemen24 tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
3

•HR 1477 IH

1 ‘‘(d) DENIAL OF DOUBLE BENEFIT.—No deduction

2 shall be allowed under this chapter for any expense for

3 which credit is allowed under this section.’’.

4 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

5 (1) Paragraph (2) of section 1324(b) of title

6 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting be7 fore the period ‘‘, or from section 35 of such Code’’.

8 (2) The table of sections for subpart C of part

9 IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of such Code is

10 amended by striking the last item and inserting the

11 following new items:

‘‘Sec. 35. Teaching expenses of elementary and secondary school

teachers.

‘‘Sec. 36. Overpayments of tax.’’.

12 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

13 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after

14 December 31, 2001.

Æ
#### Mario BAYLON, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent.

No. 02-3314.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Feb. 26, 2003.

Before MICHEL, RADER, and SCHALL, Circuit Judges.

*ORDER*

MICHEL, Circuit Judge.

Mario Baylon responds to the issue of whether his petition for review should be dismissed.

Baylon petitions this court for review of a Merit Systems Protection Board decision denying his request for an annuity under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). In the initial decision, the administrative judge determined that Baylon was not entitled to a CSRS annuity because his service was pursuant to an excepted indefinite appointment. *See Rosete v. Office of Personnel Management,*48 F.3d 514 (Fed.Cir.1995) (upholding OPM’s statutory interpretation that indefinite ap*501pointments are excluded from Civil Service Reform Act coverage as reasonable and consistent with the governing statute, 5 U.S.C. § 8347(g)).

Baylon argues in his response that his case differs from *Rósete*because his employment was “converted” into covered service by the 1956 CSRA. Baylon further asserts that Executive Order 10,180 does not apply to foreign nationals employed in their home country. We conclude that these and Baylon’s remaining arguments fall within the holdings of *Rosete*and *Casilang v. Office of Personnel Management,*248 F.3d 1381, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2001).

Baylon’s petition seeks review of issues that were conclusively decided in *Rósete.*This court has denied suggestions for rehearing en banc in *Rósete*and in dozens of other cases that argued that *Rósete*was wrongly decided. Thus, any further attempts to argue the merits of *Rósete*are deemed frivolous and an abuse of the judicial process. Furthermore, if Baylon files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions. *See In re Solerwitz,*848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); *see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,*45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) Baylon’s petition for review is dismissed.

(2) Baylon’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is moot.

(3) Each side shall bear its own costs.

(4) If Baylon files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.
#### NATIONAL ELECTRIC SIGNAL CO. v. CITY OF WACO, TEX.

No. 8262.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 21, 1938.

For former opinion, see 90 F.2d 497.

Jesse R. Stone and Lester B. Clark, both of Houston, Tex., for appellant.

S. J. Brooks, of San Antonio, Tex., and Henry R. Ashton, of New York City, for respondent.

Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

• PER CURIAM.

This is a motion by appellee to recall the mandate heretofore issued and specif*943ically pass upon the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the District Court, which held claims 5 and 6 of Garrett patent, No. 1,743,965, invalid.

The question presented for decision was whether, the patent had been infringed. The defense was on the grounds that the patent was invalid and the patented device was not in use by defendant. The District Court sustained both defenses. It was not necessary for this court to pass upon both defenses. We expressed doubt as to the validity of the patent but put that aside and affirmed the judgment on the second ground. 5 Cir., 90 F.2d 497.

The decision was entered on June 11, 1937. Rehearing was not applied for and the mandate was sent down in due course. The term ended October 2, 1937. The motion to recall the mandate was filed February 21, 1938. Conceding, without so deciding, that we would have the right to recall the mandate after the ending of the term, in the interest of justice, we see no occasion to do so in this case. The motion is denied.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Elena Katz

V .

Timberlane Regional School District

No . 06-fp-14 9

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERI S

Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby

granted, but only for the purpose of waiving the filing fee .

This case has been assigned civil number 06-cv-149-PB .

SO ORDERED .

Date : April 20, 200 6

cc : Elena Katz, pro se

Case 1:06-cv-00149-PB Document 3 Filed 04/20/06 Page 1 of 1
#### Eric Wayne BADGETT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jean HILL, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-35222.

D.C. No. CV-99-00181-HJF.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 13, 2003.*

Decided Jan. 21, 2003.

Before BEEZER, KLEINFELD and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Oregon state prisoner Eric Wayne Badgett appeals the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Badgett’s claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Oregon’s Ballot Measure 11 as unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. *See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,*526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. *6851728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (holding that to comply with the exhaustion doctrine a petitioner must complete “one full round” of the state’s appellate process); *Reese v. Baldwin,*282 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that habeas claims that were not fairly presented to the Oregon courts on direct appeal were procedurally defaulted).

AFFIRMED.1

Judge Kleinfeld concurs in the judgment but would affirm on the merits. *See Alvarado v. Hill,*252 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding that “Measure 11, as applied to [juvenile petitioner], does not violate ... the protection against cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment”).

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. All other issues presented by Badgett in this appeal are beyond the scope of the certificate of appealability ("COA”), and we do not consider them. *See United States v. Christakis,*238 F.3d 1164, 1168 n. 5 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding that because petitioner failed to file motion for broader certification under Circuit Rule 22-1 (d), the appeal was confined to the sole issue within the original COA).
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MA Y 22, 2015

NO. 03

- 13

- 00546

- CV

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas, Appellant

v.

City of Dallas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 53RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFOR E JUSTICES PURYEAR, GO ODWIN, AND FIELD

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on July 11, 2013. Having reviewed

the re cord and the parties’ arguments, the C ourt holds that there was no reversible error in the

trial court’s judgment . Therefore, the C ourt affirms the trial court’s judgment

. A ppellant shall

pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below.
**Exhibit 35.1**

 

ANNUAL SERVICER’S COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE

 

This Compliance Certificate is furnishedpursuant to Section 4.10 of the Sale and Servicing Agreement (the “Agreement”), dated as of December 12, 2018, by andamong Hyundai Auto Receivables Trust 2018-B, Hyundai Capital America, as seller and servicer (the “Servicer”), HyundaiABS Funding, LLC, as depositor, and Citibank, N.A., as indenture trustee and Item 1123 of Regulation AB. The undersigned herebycertifies that:

 

1)          Iam a duly authorized officer of the Servicer.

 

2)          Areview of the activities of the Servicer from December 12, 2018 through December 31, 2018 (the “Relevant Period”) andof the Servicer’s performance under the Agreement during the Relevant Period has been made under my supervision.

 

3)          Basedon such review, the Servicer has, to the best of my knowledge, fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all materialrespects throughout the Relevant Period.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have duly executed this Compliance Certificatethis 15th day of March, 2019.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Steven A. Swan

v. Civil No. 06-cv-404-PB

United States of America

RECUSAL ORDER

The undersigned hereby recuse themselves from presiding over

this case.

SO ORDERED.

January 5, 2007 ______________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

January 5, 2007 ______________________________

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

January 5, 2007 ______________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Steven A. Swan, pro se

William E. Morse, Esq.

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