Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jeffrey E. Stratman

Aurora, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine Modesitt Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Steusloff,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

69A01-1603-CR-591

Appeal from the Ripley Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sharp, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

69C01-1407-FC-27

69C01-1203-FC-10

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] In this consolidated appeal, Michael Steusloff (“Steusloff”) appeals his sentence 

for Class C felony failure to register as a sex offender1in one cause and the 

revocation of his probation in another cause. Steusloff argues that his six-year 

sentence is inappropriate and that the trial court abused its discretion by 

ordering him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence. 

Concluding that Steusloff has failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate

and finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm his sentence and the revocation of 

his probation.

[2] We affirm. 

Issues

1. Whether Steusloff’s sentence is inappropriate.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Steusloff to 

serve his previously suspended sentence. 

Facts

[3] In March 2012, the State charged Steusloff in cause number 69C01-1203-FC010 (“FC-010”), with Class C felony failure to register as a sex offender and 

alleged that he was an habitual offender. In February 2013, Steusloff pled 

guilty, was convicted of Class D felony failure to register as a sex offender, and 

the State dismissed the habitual offender allegation. Under that cause, Steusloff 

 

1

IND. CODE § 11-8-8-17. 
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was sentenced to three (3) years, with six (6) months executed in the Indiana 

Department of Correction, and two-and-a-half (2 1⁄2) years suspended to 

probation. 

[4] On June 19, 2014, the State filed a Petition for Probation Violation, alleging 

that Steusloff: (1) moved and failed to report his new address; (2) failed to pay 

probation fees; and (3) failed to pay drug testing fees. The State subsequently 

amended its petition and alleged that Steusloff had been charged with Class C 

felony failure to register as a sex offender under cause number 69C01-1407-FC027 (“FC-027.”) 

[5] On January 19, 2016, Steusloff entered an open guilty plea to his Class C failure 

to register as a sex offender in FC-027. He also admitted that he had violated 

the terms of his probation in FC-010. Thereafter, the trial court held a 

combined sentencing and probation revocation hearing. During this hearing, 

the trial court found Steusloff’s extensive criminal history, the nature and 

circumstance of the crime, and the fact that Steusloff was on probation at the 

time he committed the new offense to be aggravating factors. The court noted 

that Steusloff’s criminal history included Class C felony sexual misconduct with 

a minor and two prior convictions for failure to register as a sex offender. The 

trial court, however, found Steusloff’s failure to comply with sex offender 

registry rules the most compelling aggravating factor.

[6] Although the trial court noted Steusloff’s improved conduct while incarcerated 

and his guilty plea without a plea agreement as mitigating factors, it determined
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that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Thereafter, the 

trial court imposed a six (6) year executed sentence for Steusloff’s Class C 

felony failure to register as a sex offender in cause number FC-027. In cause 

FC-010, the trial court revoked Steusloff’s probation and ordered him to serve 

the remaining five hundred ninety-four (594) days of his previously suspended 

sentence. The trial court ordered the FC-010 and FC-027 sentences to be served 

consecutively in the Department of Correction. Steusloff now appeals.

Decision 

[7] Steusloff argues that: (1) his sentence in FC-027 is inappropriate; and (2) the 

trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his 

previously suspended sentence in FC-010. We discuss each of his arguments in 

turn.

1. Inappropriate Sentence

[8] Steusloff first argues that his six-year sentence for his Class C felony failure to 

register as a sex offender in cause FC-027 is inappropriate.2 He requests this 

Court to “review and correct his sentence, and for all other relief just and 

proper in the premises.” (Steusloff’s Br. 11).

 

2

Steusloff also attempts to challenge whether his previously imposed sentence from his probation revocation 

in cause FC-010 is inappropriate. We note, however, that Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is not the correct

standard when reviewing a sentence imposed for a probation violation. See Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 

188 (Ind. 2007).
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[9] This Court may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). The 

defendant has the burden of proving that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress 

v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The principal role of Rule 7(B) 

review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding 

principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing 

statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Whether a sentence is inappropriate 

ultimately turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, 

the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a 

given case.” Id. at 1224. 

[10] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that 

the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. 

At the time of Steusloff’s offense, a Class C felony failure to register as a sex 

offender carried a sentencing range of two (2) to eight (8) years, with an 

advisory sentence of four (4) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6. 

[11] As to the nature of Steusloff’s offense, the record reveals that Steusloff, who 

was required to register as a sex offender, moved to Kansas, some seven 

hundred miles away from his home address, without notifying his probation 

officer. Once in Kansas, Steusloff still did not register as required. Steusloff’s 

offense was made worse by the fact that he was on probation for the same 

crime. Steusloff attempts to downplay the nature of his offense by claiming that
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he was “not sure he was still required to register . . . and that he had a lot on his 

mind . . . [making] it difficult to track the date his registry requirement ended.” 

(Steusloff’s Br. 8). Based on his prior encounters with the sex offender registry 

requirements, we are not persuaded by this argument. Steusloff further argues 

that given the nature of his offense, there is no evidence indicating that any 

victim was harmed. We disagree. As explained by the trial court, “[t]he 

purpose of the sex offender registry is to put the community on notice of an 

individual living or working in their area that has been convicted of a restorable 

sex offense. Essentially, the registry is used as a tool to enhance the safety of a 

community.” (Tr. 42-43). 

[12] Turning to Steusloff’s character, we see from the record that Steusloff has a 

criminal history including the following convictions: seven Class A 

misdemeanor convictions for conversion, driving while suspended, possession 

of marijuana and paraphernalia; two Class B misdemeanor convictions for 

reckless driving and reckless possession of paraphernalia; three Class C felony 

convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor, failure to register as a sex 

offender, and forgery; one Class D felony conviction for failure to register as a 

sex offender; and an Ohio felony theft conviction. Steusloff also has eight 

probation violations.

[13] Steusloff contends that his character should be viewed favorably because his 

attitude has changed since his initial hearing and because he pled guilty. The 

trial court considered Steusloff’s character as a mitigating factor during 

sentencing, noting that Steusloff had “been a model prisoner . . . and ha[d] been 
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able to maintain a good status even while being housed with individuals that 

the jail would determine to be problematic.” (Tr. 43). In regard to his guilty 

plea, he argues that he “received little, if any, benefit of his plea of guilty and 

admission to the probation violation” because the trial court “did not seem to 

place significant weight on this [mitigating] factor.” (Steusloff’s Br. 10). The 

trial court, however, factored Steusloff’s guilty plea as a mitigating factor during 

its sentencing. We will not review the trial court’s determinations regarding the 

weight applied to these mitigators. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 

2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

[14] Steusloff has not persuaded us that his six-year sentence for Class C felony 

failure to register as a sex offender is inappropriate. We, therefore, affirm the 

trial court’s sentence. 

2. Abuse of Discretion 

[15] Steusloff admits that he violated the terms of his probation by committing a

new crime, and he does not challenge the revocation of his probation. Instead, 

he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve all 

594 days of his previously suspended sentence upon the revocation of his 

probation. 

[16] Once a trial court has determined that a condition of probation has been 

violated, the trial court may impose one of the following: 

(1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying 

or enlarging the conditions;
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(2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than 

one (1) year beyond the original probationary period; 

(3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that “[o]nce a 

trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than 

incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to 

proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not afforded to 

trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges 

might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. We review 

a trial court’s probation revocation for an abuse of discretion. Sanders v. State, 

825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances before the court or when the court misinterprets the 

law. Id.

[17] There is ample basis for the trial court’s decision to order Steusloff to serve his 

previously suspended sentence. Steusloff violated probation based on his 

failure to register as a sex offender, the same offense for which he was on 

probation. Furthermore, the record reveals that Steusloff has an extensive 

criminal history, including sexual misconduct with a minor, and, now, three 

convictions for failing to register as a sex offender. Additionally, Steusloff has 

accumulated eight prior probation violations during the course of his criminal 

history. In fact, during its sentencing hearing, the trial court found Steusloff’s 
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continued disregard for the rules of the sex offender registry compelling in 

ordering him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence. We are not 

convinced by Steusloff’s argument that the court abused its discretion by 

ordering him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence. As 

such, we affirm the trial court’s order that Steusloff serve his previously 

suspended sentence.

[18] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Riley, J., concur.