alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### HAWKINS v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO. et al.

No. 8139.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 3, 1954.

Rehearing Denied June 25, 1954.

G. F. Thomas, Jr., Natchitoches, for appellant.

W. Peyton Cunningham, Natchitoches, for appellees.

GLADNEY, Judge.

As a result of an automobile collision in Campti, Louisiana, two separate actions were brought and consolidated for trial. After trial the court a quo rejected all demands and the separate plaintiffs have appealed to this court. On May 26, 1954, we decided the appealed companion case captioned Pine v. Edmonds, La.App., 73 So.2d 318.

In the instant case L. O. Hawkins, the appellant herein, alleging he was a guest in the Edmonds vehicle, sued Mrs. Pine and' her liability carrier for damages including personal injuries. Our decree in Pine v. Edmonds disposes of the claims of Hawkins inasmuch as therein we absolved the driver of the Pine automobile of negligence.

Through answer to the appeal, Mrs. .Lucille C. Pine presses her claim in reconvention against L. O. Hawkins for damages inflicted upon her automobile in the collision. The only substantial basis for such a claim is predicated on Hawkins being a participant in a joint venture with the town marshal in the pursuit of the vehicle the marshal hoped to overtake. Hawkins was present only to identify the pursued. The record fails to indicate Hawkins had any right to direct or control the movements of Edmonds.

There can be no joint venture or common enterprise of legal import unless there be a community of interest in the objects or purposes of the undertaking, and an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other in respect thereto. Each party must have some voice and right to be heard in its control or management. 42 C.J. 1179, par. 957, 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 168; Wagner v. Kloster, 188 Iowa 174, 175 N.W. 840; Lawrason v. Richard, 1931, 172 La. 696, 135 So. 29; Lorance v. Smith, 1932, 173 La. 883, 138 So. 871; Kimbro v. Holladay, La.App.1934, 154 So. 369.

*349The «conventional demand, therefore, cannot be sustained on actionable negligence attributive to Hawkins. Clearly the record shows he had no right to control or direct the movements of the driver and owner of the vehicle in which he was riding. The «conventional demand, therefore, must be denied.

The judgment from which appealed is affirmed at appellant’s cost.
#### G. Winston CLARKE, Petitioner, v. Janie M. CLARKE, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

Jan. 18, 1955.

James H. Ruby, Miami Beach, for petitioner.

Miller, Pearson & Miller, Miami, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari granted. The order of reference to which petitioner neither acquiesced or consented, but objected, is quashed on authority of Slatcoff v. Dezen, Fla., 74 So.2d 59.

Petitioner also complains of the chancellor’s denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint. It appearing that the complaint is deficient but amendable, that portion of the order denying the motion to dismiss is quashed with directions to the chancellor to permit such amendment as in his discretion he deems right and proper.

MATHEWS, C. J., and THOMAS, HOBSON, ROBERTS and DREW, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
                        SANCHEZ COMPUTER ASSOCIATES, INC
 
                                   EXHIBIT 11
 
                       COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
 
              Quarter Ended March 31, 1997 and March 31, 1996 

                    (In thousands, except per share data)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                        QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31,
                                                        ----------------------
<S>                                                         <C>        <C>
                                                            1997       1996
                                                           ------     ------
Net Earnings..........................................  $     342  $      19
                                                        ---------  ---------
Average common shares outstanding.....................     10,874      8,407
Average common share equivalents......................        764        866
                                                        ---------  ---------
Average number of common shares and 
common share equivalents outstanding..................     11,638      9,273
                                                        ---------  ---------
Earnings per common share (1).........................  $    0.03  $    0.00
                                                        ---------  ---------
</TABLE>
 

 
(1) Primary and fully diluted income per share are the same for both periods
    presented.
 
                                       12
#### Penny DOUGLAS and Wife v. Tony RUSSO.

No. 2691.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

April *4, 1945.*

C. A. Blanchard, of Donaldsonville, for appellant.

Blum & LeBlanc, of Donaldsonville, for appellee.

FRED G. BENTON, Judge ad hoc.

For the reasons assigned in the consolidated cases of Bea v. Russo and Douglas and Wife v. Russo, La.App., 21 So.2d 530, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the lower Court be and the same is hereby reversed, and judgment is rendered herein in favor of Penny Douglas (or Junion Douglas) for the use and benefit of his minor son, Will Douglas (or Junion Will Douglas), and against Tony Russo in the Sum of $250, and in favor of Mrs. Penny Douglas and against Tony Russo in the sum of $400, with legal interest on both sums from date of judicial demand until paid. The defendant is to pay all costs in both-Courts.
Hurlburt v. Northern NH Correctional Facility, Chaplain et al Doc. 3

Dockets.Justia.com
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 15


         Acknowledgment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
         ---------------------------------------------------------------


Linens 'n Things, Inc.
Clifton, New Jersey

Board of Directors:

Re:     Registration Statements Numbers 333-71903, 333-42874, 333-55803,
        333-62982 and 333-62984 on Form S-8

With respect to the subject registration statements, we acknowledge our
awareness of the use therein of our report dated May 3, 2004, except as to Note
2, which is as of April 19, 2005 related to our review of interim financial
information.

Pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, such report is not
considered a part of a registration statement prepared or certified by an
Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm or a report prepared or certified
by an Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm within the meaning of
sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.





/s/ KPMG LLP

KPMG LLP

New York, New York
April 19, 2005
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1296

To amend chapter 1 of title 9, United States Code, to provide for greater

fairness in the arbitration process relating to motor vehicle franchise

contracts.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 29, 2001

Mrs. BONO (for herself, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. DELAHUNT, Mr. SENSENBRENNER,

Mr. BRADY of Texas, Mr. TERRY, Mr. SHADEGG, Mr. BUYER, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. BALDACCI, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida,

Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. SHIMKUS, Ms. PRYCE of Ohio, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr.

UDALL of New Mexico, Mr. ISAKSON, Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin, Mr.

GALLEGLY, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. PETERSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. CHABOT, Mr.

CHAMBLISS, Mr. GARY G. MILLER of California, Ms. NORTON, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. SHERWOOD, Mr. MICA, and Ms. DELAURO) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend chapter 1 of title 9, United States Code, to provide

for greater fairness in the arbitration process relating

to motor vehicle franchise contracts.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Motor Vehicle Fran5 chise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001’’.
2

•HR 1296 IH

1 SEC. 2. ELECTION OF ARBITRATION.

2 (a) MOTOR VEHICLE FRANCHISE CONTRACTS.—

3 Chapter 1 of title 9, United States Code, is amended by

4 adding at the end the following:

5 ‘‘§ 17. Motor vehicle franchise contracts

6 ‘‘(a) For purposes of this section, the term—

7 ‘‘(1) ‘motor vehicle’ has the meaning given such

8 term under section 30102(6) of title 49; and

9 ‘‘(2) ‘motor vehicle franchise contract’ means a

10 contract under which a motor vehicle manufacturer,

11 importer, or distributor sells motor vehicles to any

12 other person for resale to an ultimate purchaser and

13 authorizes such other person to repair and service

14 the manufacturer’s motor vehicles.

15 ‘‘(b) Whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract

16 provides for the use of arbitration to resolve a controversy

17 arising out of or relating to the contract, arbitration may

18 be used to settle such controversy only if after such con19 troversy arises both parties consent in writing to use arbi20 tration to settle such controversy.

21 ‘‘(c) Whenever arbitration is elected to settle a dis22 pute under a motor vehicle franchise contract, the arbi23 trator shall provide the parties to the contract with a writ24 ten explanation of the factual and legal basis for the

25 award.’’.
3

•HR 1296 IH

1 (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—

2 The table of sections for chapter 1 of title 9, United States

3 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘‘17. Motor vehicle franchise contracts.’’.

4 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

5 The amendments made by section 2 shall apply to

6 contracts entered into, amended, altered, modified, re7 newed, or extended after the date of the enactment of this

8 Act.

Æ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 05-cr-221-01-PB

Thomas Newton

O R D E R

The defendant has moved to continue the April 4, 2006 trial

in the above case. Defendant cites the need for additional time

for his attorney to receive and review medical records from the

V.A. Hospital which may have a bearing on his defense. The

government does not object to a continuance of the trial date.

Accordingly, in order to allow the parties additional time

to properly prepare for trial, the court will continue the trial

from April 4, 2006 to July 6, 2006. In agreeing to continue the

trial, the court finds pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8)(A)

that for the above-stated reasons, the ends of justice served in

granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public

and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 1:05-cr-00221-PB Document 12 Filed 03/17/06 Page 1 of 2
2

The March 23, 2006 final pretrial conference is continue to

June 26, 2006 at 4:30 p.m.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

March 17, 2006

cc: Stephen Cherry, Esq.

Arnold Huftalen, AUSA

United States Probation

United States Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00221-PB Document 12 Filed 03/17/06 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 99.3


                      REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



The Board of Directors
National Education Loan Network, Inc.:


We have examined the accompanying management assertion that National Education
Loan Network, Inc. (the Company) complied with the applicable servicing criteria
set forth in Item 1122 of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation AB
for publicly-issued student loan-backed securities issued on or after January 1,
2006, for which the Company provides services as a master servicer and
administrator (the Platform), except for servicing criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii),
1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(2)(iii), 1122(d)(2)(vi), 1122(d)(4)(ii), 1122(d)(4)(iv),
1122(d)(4)(v), 1122(d)(4)(vi), 1122(d)(4)(vii), 1122(d)(4)(viii),
1122(d)(4)(ix), 1122(d)(4)(x), 1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii),
1122(d)(4)(xiii), and 1122(d)(4)(xiv), for which the Company has determined are
not applicable to the activities the Company performs with respect to the
Platform, as of and for the year ended December 31, 2006. Management is
responsible for the Company's compliance with those servicing criteria. Our
responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion about the
Company's compliance based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with the standards of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included
examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the
servicing criteria specified above and performing such other procedures as we
considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of
less than all of the individual asset-backed transactions and securities that
comprise the Platform, testing of less than all of the servicing activities
related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company processed those
selected transactions and performed those selected activities in compliance with
the servicing criteria. Furthermore, our procedures were limited to the selected
transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during the period
covered by this report. Our procedures were not designed to determine whether
errors may have occurred either prior to or subsequent to our tests that may
have affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company
during the period covered by this report for the selected transactions or any
other transactions. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis
for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the
Company's compliance with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company complied with the
aforementioned servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2006
is fairly stated, in all material respects.


/s/ KPMG LLP


Lincoln, Nebraska
April 2, 2007
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1360 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1360

      To ensure project labor agreements are permitted in certain 
                             circumstances.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 3, 2001

      Mr. George Miller of California (for himself, Mr. King, Mr. 
  Abercrombie, Ms. Lee, Ms. Slaughter, and Mr. Quinn) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and 
                             the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To ensure project labor agreements are permitted in certain 
                             circumstances.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENTS.

    (a) Agreement.--Any person contracting with the Federal Government 
to provide construction services or any person receiving any form of 
Federal financial assistance for a construction project may require 
that every contractor or subcontractor on the construction project 
agree, for a specific project only, to negotiate or become a party to a 
project labor agreement with one or more labor organizations.
    (b) Imposition of Requirement.--The contractor or recipient of 
Federal assistance may choose to include such a requirement under 
subsection (a)--
            (1) if the contractor or recipient has determined that a 
        project labor agreement will advance its procurement interest 
        in cost, efficiency, quality, and the promotion of labor-
        management stability; and
            (2) if no laws applicable to the specific construction 
        project preclude the use of the proposed project labor 
        agreement.

SEC. 2. APPLICATION.

    Any project labor agreement reached pursuant to this Act--
            (1) shall bind all contractors and subcontractors on the 
        construction project through the inclusion of appropriate 
        clauses in all relevant solicitation provisions and contract 
        documents,
            (2) shall allow all contractors and subcontractors wishing 
        to compete for contracts and subcontracts on the project to do 
        so, without discrimination against contractors, subcontractors, 
        or employees based on union or nonunion status; and
            (3) shall comply with all applicable statutes and 
        regulations.

SEC. 3. DEFINITION.

    For purposes of this Act, the term ``project labor agreement'' 
means a prehire collective bargaining agreement in the construction 
industry, establishing the basic terms and conditions of employment for 
the duration of the project, and binding upon all construction 
employers that operate on the project site.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT
32





AMASYS
CORPORATION





CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(SUBSECTIONS
(a) AND (b) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18,


UNITED
STATES CODE)








Pursuant
to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b)
of section 1350, chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the
undersigned officer of Amasys Corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify
with respect to the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period
ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the “Report”), to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge
that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of  1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








October
      20, 2008/s/
      C.W. Gilluly, Ed.D.President
      and Chief Executive Officer
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 16, 2012*

Decided May 22, 2012

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

   

No. 11‐3551

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ALDEGUNDO GONZALEZ‐QURIOZ,

Defendant‐Appellant.                 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 11‐CR‐00072

Barbara B. Crabb,

Judge.

O R D E R

Aldegundo Gonzalez‐Qurioz pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after having

previously been removed, 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court adopted the guidelines

imprisonment range of 30 to 37 months (based on an offense level of 17 and criminal history

category of III) from the presentence investigation report and sentenced Gonzalez‐Qurioz to

30 months. Gonzalez‐Qurioz filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer seeks to

withdraw on the ground that all possible claims are frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967). Gonzalez‐Qurioz has not responded to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
Page 2

We confine our review to the potential issues identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief.

See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973–74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Gonzalez‐Qurioz has told counsel that he does not want his guilty plea set aside, so

counsel properly omits any discussion about the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the

voluntariness of the plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel considers whether Gonzalez‐Qurioz could challenge his sentence but

properly concludes that such a challenge would be frivolous. Counsel cannot identify any

reason to disregard the presumption that a within‐guidelines sentence is reasonable, see Rita

v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Pape, 601 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir.

2010). The district court properly evaluated the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In

imposing a within‐range sentence, the judge acknowledged Gonzalez‐Qurioz’s personal

history and characteristics, see id. § 3553(a)(1)—that he returned to the United States to earn

money so he could better provide for his family, but also that he had illegally reentered

multiple times and had several recent criminal convictions.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 8 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 8

Proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the United 
                                States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 31, 2001

   Mr. Jenkins (for himself, Mr. Duncan, Mr. English, Mr. Rogers of 
  Michigan, Mr. Simmons, Mr. Nethercutt, Mr. Goode, Mr. Largent, Ms. 
  Hart, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Castle, Mrs. Northup, Mr. Schaffer, and Mr. 
Terry) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to 
                     the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
Proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the United 
                                States.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years after the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article--

    ``Section 1. Total expenditures for any fiscal year shall not 
exceed total revenues for that fiscal year, unless three-fifths of the 
whole number of each House of Congress shall provide by law for a 
specific excess of expenditures over revenues by a rollcall vote.
    ``Section 2. The Congress may waive the provisions of this article 
for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in effect. The 
provisions of this article may be waived for any fiscal year in which 
the United States is engaged in military conflict which causes an 
imminent and serious military threat to national security and is so 
declared by a joint resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole 
number of each House, which becomes law.
    ``Section 3. The Congress shall enforce and implement this article 
by appropriate legislation, which may rely on estimates of outlays and 
receipts.
    ``Section 4. Total revenues shall include all receipts of the 
United States Government except those derived from borrowing. Total 
expenditures shall include all outlays of the United States Government 
except for those for repayment of debt principal.
    ``Section 5. This article shall take effect beginning with the 
second fiscal year beginning after its ratification.''.
                                 <all>
```