alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Dwayne A. Reddick

v. Civil No. 06-cv-8-SM

Hillsborough County Department

of Corrections, et al

O R D E R

I herewith approve the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Muirhead dated April 27, 2006, no objection having been filed. The case is

hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

May 22, 2006 _________________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

cc: Dwayne A. Reddick, pro se

Case 1:06-cv-00008-SM Document 7 Filed 05/22/06 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 06-cr-208-04-JD

Tyler James

O R D E R

The assented to motion to reschedule jury trial (document no.

88) filed by defendant is granted.

Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights within 10

days. The court finds that the ends of justice served by granting

a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the

defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3131(h)(8)(B)(iv), for the

reasons set forth in the motion.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. 

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

Date: August 10, 2007

cc: James Gleason, Esq.

Terry Ollila, AUSA

U.S. Marshal

U.S. Probation

Case 1:06-cr-00208-JD Document 63 Filed 08/10/07 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Michael Leon Hammell

V .

Lakes Region FacilitV, Warden

No . 06-fp-17 6

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERI S

Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby

granted, but only for the purpose of waiving the filing fee .

This case has been assigned civil number 06-cv-176-SM .

SO ORDERED .

R . Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judg e

Date : May 15, 200 6

cc : Michael Leon Hammell, pro se

Case 1:06-cv-00176-SM Document 3 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 1 of 1
#### STATE of Missouri ex rel. D. A. S., a minor, by N. C. S., Next Friend, Relator, v. The Honorable George P. ADAMS, Judge of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Missouri, Juvenile Division, at Montgomery City, Missouri, Respondent.

No. 34376.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District.

Sept. 12, 1972.

McQuie & Deiter, Montgomery City, for relator.

James G. Gregory, Montgomery City, for respondent.

WEIER, Judge.

By prohibition, relator, a minor under the age of seventeen years, by next friend, seeks to restrain entertainment by the juvenile court of Montgomery County of jurisdiction in a juvenile proceeding, wherein the juvenile officer alleges the child is in need of care and treatment because of the commission of an act of burglary and stealing in Montgomery County. It is an admitted fact that the child is a resident of Gasconade County. He was not apprehended in Montgomery County, but was served with summons in Gasconade County to respond to the petition.

The sole issue before us is the determination of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court of Montgomery County to proceed against the non-resident juvenile by reason *443of an alleged violation of state law in that county.

The section of the Juvenile Code which resolves this issue is Section 211.031, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., which reads in part:

> “Except as otherwise provided herein, the juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:

> “(1) Involving any child who may be within the county who is alleged to be in need of care and treatment because:

> * 3⁄8 * * * 3⁄8

> “(d) The child is alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance;

> 5⁄8 5⁄8 5⁄8 5⁄8 5⁄8 3⁄8 *yy*

Under the plain terms of this statute, “exclusive original jurisdiction” is placed in the juvenile court of the county where the child “may be.” We have previously interpreted this to mean that the presence of a child outside the territorial jurisdiction of a juvenile court precludes that court from adjudicating his status. In the Matter of Shaw (De Marinis v. Smith), Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 380, 382 [1,2]. As pointed out therein, the court’s jurisdiction is in personam and is confined to its territorial jurisdiction. This may not be enlarged to include constructive domicile by reason of the mother residing within the county where the proceeding is instituted, as in *Shaw,*nor by constructive presence in the county where a criminal act was committed, as presented here. As declared in *Shaw,*territorial jurisdiction is realistic. It is the purpose of the juvenile code to facilitate the care and treatment of a child. “Logically this can best be done by the juvenile court of the county where the child is located.” In the Matter of Shaw (De Marinis v. Smith), supra, Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d, 380, 384.

The preliminary writ heretofore issued is made absolute.

BRADY, C. J., and DOWD, SMITH and SIMEONE, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Michael DeAngelis

v. Civil No. 06-cv-376-PB

New Hampshire State Prison, et al.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that the motion (Document No. 54) be denied

without a hearing. The plaintiff is regularly supplied with

toilet paper, he was given a roll shortly after he requested it

and two days later he purchased two more rolls from the canteen,

all as shown by documentary evidence by defendant. Plaintiff’s

conclusory motion is unsupported by a single allegation.

Any objections to this report and recommendation must be

filed within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to

file objections within the specified time waives the right to

appeal the district court’s order. See Unauthorized Practice of

Law Comm. v. Gordon, 979 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1992);

United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986). 

_________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: August 22, 2007

Case 1:06-cv-00376-JL Document 62 Filed 08/22/07 Page 1 of 2
2

cc: Michael DeAngelis, pro se

Andrew B. Livernois, Esq.

Case 1:06-cv-00376-JL Document 62 Filed 08/22/07 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Carlos Lope z

v . Case No. 06-fp-305

Sommersworth Police Department, et al .

O R D E R

Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted,

but pursuant to 28 U .S .C . § 1915, as amended, the filing fee must

be paid as follows : the sum of $68 .77 is due no later than

September 23, 2006 . In addition, 20% of each preceding month's

income credited to plaintiff's account to be remitted by Fort

Dix, FCI when the amount in the account exceeds $10 .00 until the

sum of $350 .00 has been paid . Failure to pay the fee as ordered

will result in dismissal of the action without prejudice . In all

other respects plaintiff's request for in forma pauperis has been

granted .

This case has been assigned number 06-cv-305-PB .

SO ORDERED .

/s/ Paul Barbadoro

Paul Barbador o

United States District Judge

Date : August 22, 200 6

cc : Carlos Lopez, pro s e

Bonnie S . Reed, Financial Administrator

Fort Dix, FCI, Inmate Accounts

Case 1:06-cv-00305-PB Document 3 Filed 08/22/2006 Page 1 of 1
#### MAUCK v. UNITED STATES.

No. 8519.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 10, 1938.

James W. Bell, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Peirson M. Hall, U. S. Atty., and Francis C. Whelan, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Los Angeles, Cal. (H. C. Veit, Chief Atty., U. S. Veterans’ Administration, of West Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel) for the United States.

Before, DENMAN, STEPHENS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.

DENMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action brought by the United States against W. M. Mauck, administrator of the estate of one August H. Eberhardt.

The estate of Eberhardt, who died intestate on February 29, 1920, consists of $934.-11. Eberhardt was a member of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, at Sawtelle, Cal., from November, 1916, until the day of his death. The government asserts a right to his estate under the provision of 24 U.S.C.A. § 136, that the admission of a veteran into the National Home shall constitute a binding contract between the veteran and the board of managers of the home to the effect that all property of the veteran dying without heirs, next of kin, or legatees, shall become the property of the Board for the use of the post fund of the home, “and that all personal property of said applicant shall, upon his death, while a member, at once pass to and vest in said Board of Managers, subject to be reclaimed by any legatee or person entitled to take the same by inheritance at any time within five years after the death of such member.”

The case was tried without a jury. There is no bill of exceptions; consequently the court’s findings cannot be challenged. They recite the execution by the decedent of a written contract embodying the requirements of the statute; his admission to *746the home in 1916, in reliance upon that contract ; his death intestate. It was found that he was not without heirs, but that no heir reclaimed or sought to reclaim the estate within the five years specified in the contract and in the statute.

Since the argument on this appeal, the Supreme Court has decided the identical question here presented. In United States v. Stevens, 58 S.Ct. 388, 82 L.Ed. -, decided January 17, 1938, the veteran’s contract under 24 U.S.C.A. § 136 was held binding as against heirs who did not claim his estate within five years after the veteran’s death as required in the statute. It was pointed out in the Stevens Case that the statute requiring the contract did not operate, to invade the reserved powers of the state over the course of intestate descent and distribution, inasmuch as the law of the veteran’s domicile, Massachusetts, permitted and enforced contracts directing the distribution of the promisor’s property after his death.

Such is also the law in California. Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 331, 41 P. 1089, 50 Am.St.Rep. 43; Booth v. Oakland Bank, 122 Cal. 19, 54 P. 370; Treadway v. Board of Directors, 14 Cal.App. 75, 85, 86, 111 P. 111, hearing by Supreme Court denied; Monsen v. Monsen, 174 Cal. 97, 99, 162 P. 90; cf. Cal.Civ.Code, § 1624, subd. 6; Levi v. Murrell, 9 Cir., 63 F.2d 670,671.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                              JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                            1,000
<SECURITIES>                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCES>                                          0
<INVENTORY>                                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  1,000
<PP&E>                                        3,540,000<F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                                        0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                3,541,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         3,540,000<F2>
<BONDS>                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                           0
<COMMON>                                              1
<OTHER-SE>                                          999<F3>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  3,541,000
<SALES>                                               0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                      0
<CGS>                                                 0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                    0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       0
<INCOME-TAX>                                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   0
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0
<CHANGES>                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                          0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         0
        
<FN>
<F1> Amount consists of $3,540,000 in deferred costs related to initial public
     offering
<F2> Amount consists of $3,540,000 due to an affiliate of Brookdale Living 
     Communities, Inc.
<F3> Amount represents additional paid-in capital on common stock
</FN>
                                  


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM EAGLE
WIRELESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S BALANCE SHEET AND STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE
PERIOD ENDED NOVEMBER 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND ACCOMPANYING NOTES.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                             3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   AUG-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                        NOV-30-1999
<CASH>                                    1,105
<SECURITIES>                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                               340
<ALLOWANCES>                                  0
<INVENTORY>                               2,335
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                          4,214
<PP&E>                                      926
<DEPRECIATION>                              366
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           11,397
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                     2,290
<BONDS>                                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0
<PREFERRED>                                   0
<COMMON>                                     14
<OTHER-SE>                                8,985
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             11,397
<SALES>                                     656
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            907
<CGS>                                       251
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               251
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            534
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              85
<INCOME-TAX>                                 17
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          68
<DISCONTINUED>                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0
<CHANGES>                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                                 68
<EPS-BASIC>                                0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                              0.01


</TABLE>
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-22-00170-CR

MUHAMMAD FAIZAN ANSARI,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 372nd District Court

of Tarrant County (1629392R)

August 31, 2023

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was no error in the trial court’s judgments. It is ordered that the judgments of the 

trial court are affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Lee Gabriel

 Justice Lee Gabriel
Exhibit (10)(a)

    

    

    

    

    

    

    Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

    

    

    

    

    We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in Post-Effective Amendment No. 26 to the 1933 Act
      Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-170529) and Amendment No. 687 to the 1940 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 811-08517), and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) March 13, 2019, with respect to the consolidated financial
      statements of The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company and (b) April 16, 2019, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln Life Variable Annuity Account N for the registration of interests in a separate account under
      individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.

    

    

    /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

    

    

    

    

    

    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

    August 22, 2019
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 184 (Monday, September 22, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 54655]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-22104]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 6310]


Announcement of a Meeting of the International Telecommunication 
Advisory Committee

SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the International 
Telecommunication Advisory Committee (ITAC) to prepare for the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Council Meeting.
    The ITAC will meet on October 8, 2008, from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m., at 
1120 20th Street, NW., 10th floor, Washington, DC 20036. The purpose of 
the meeting is to prepare advice for the U.S. government on the annual 
ITU Council Meeting, which will be held from November 12-21, 2008 at 
ITU headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.
    This meeting is open to the public as seating capacity allows. The 
public will have an opportunity to provide comments at this meeting. 
People desiring further information on these meeting may contact the 
Secretariat at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#711b181d1d021e1f10153102051005145f161e07"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="fe949792928d91909f9abe8d8a9f8a9bd0999188">[email protected]</span></a> or 202-647-5872.

    Dated: September 15, 2008.
Richard C. Beaird,
International Communications & Information Policy, Department of State.
[FR Doc. E8-22104 Filed 9-19-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-07-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### YOUNG v. GETER.

No. 5864.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

March 31, 1939.

R. É. Gahagan, of Natchitoches, for appellant.

*831John G. Gibbs, of Natchitoches, for ap-pellee.

DREW, Judge.

The minute record of the court in this case discloses that a plea of abandonment by plaintiff of his claim was sustained by the lower court, and plaintiff’s suit was dismissed. No judgment was signed. Plaintiff has perfected an appeal to this court.

 If a judgment had been signed in the case, it would have been a final judgment, since it dismissed plaintiff’s suit, and an appeal from same would have been plaintiff’s remedy, but no judgment is final until it is signed.

In this court appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The motion is good and will have to be sustained.

It therefore follows that the appeal in this case is dismissed at appellant’s cost.
EXHIBIT
32.1



CERTIFICATION

Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906

Of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers
of Rand Capital Corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:



The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2020 (the “Form 10-Q”) of the Company fully complies
with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form
10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Dated:
    May 11, 2020 | /s/
Allen F. Grum                                               
|----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------
|                        | Allen
    F. Grum, President 
    (Chief Executive Officer)     
|                        |                                                                 
|Dated:
    May 11, 2020 | /s/
    Daniel P. Penberthy                                     
|                        | Daniel
    P. Penberthy, Treasurer
    (Chief Financial Officer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 05-cr-196-01-SM

Tamieka Lamos

O R D E R

Defendant Lamos’ motion to continue the final pretrial conference and trial

is granted (document 20). Trial has been rescheduled for the April 2006 trial

period. Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights not later than

February 3, 2006. On the filing of such waiver, her continuance shall be

effective. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference or Change of Plea: March 20, 2006 at 11:30

a.m.

Jury Selection: April 4, 2006 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:05-cr-00196-SM Document 21 Filed 01/25/06 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

January 25, 2006

cc: Jeffrey Levin, Esq.

Alfred Rubega, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00196-SM Document 21 Filed 01/25/06 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc.

v. Civil No. 06-cv-100-JD

HemCon, Inc.

O R D E R

Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. moves, in limine, to

preclude HemCon, Inc. from introducing evidence related to its

non-infringement defenses. In response, HemCon agrees not to

introduce evidence, statements, arguments or testimony to show

that HemCon’s products do not infringe the asserted claims of the

‘245 patent. HemCon notes that some evidence about its products

and manufacturing processes may be relevant to show obviousness. 

HemCon also reserves the right to introduce evidence of

noninfringement if Marine Polymer “opens the door,” for

impeachment, and for any other purpose the court may allow.

In addition, HemCon asserts that its “counterclaims for

noninfringement of claims 1 -5, 8, 9, 13-16, 18, 19, 21 and 22

remain unresolved.” HemCon states that it reserves the right to

present “to the Court any and all admissible evidence,

statements, arguments, or testimony related thereto or stemming

therefrom.”

Case 1:06-cv-00100-JD Document 285 Filed 04/06/10 Page 1 of 3
With respect to evidence that will be presented to the jury,

it appears that the parties agree that noninfringement is not an

issue and that evidence pertaining to whether HemCon’s products

infringe the asserted claims of the ‘245 patent is not

admissible.

To the extent HemCon raises counterclaims for

noninfringement in its opposition to Marine Polymer’s motion to

preclude certain evidence, that issue cannot be resolved in this

context. The court notes, however, that HemCon did not include

counterclaims for noninfringement in its final pretrial statement

or its “Roadmap of the Case.”

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Marine Polymer’s motion to

preclude noninfringement evidence (document no. 266) is granted

to the extent that evidence of noninfringement is not relevant. 

The admissibility of evidence that may relate to noninfringement

but

2

Case 1:06-cv-00100-JD Document 285 Filed 04/06/10 Page 2 of 3
is offered to support HemCon’s invalidity defenses must be

assessed in the trial context.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

April 6, 2010

cc: Julie M. Baher, Esquire

Garet K. Galster, Esquire

Daniel R. Johnson, Esquire

Heather E. Krans, Esquire

Joseph A. Kromholz, Esquire

Lynda Q. Nguyen, Esquire

Brian M. Poissant, Esquire

Daniel D. Ryan, Esquire

Ognian V. Shentov, Esquire

Jonathan M. Shirley, Esquire

Daniel E. Will, Esquire

Leigh S. Willey, Esquire

3

Case 1:06-cv-00100-JD Document 285 Filed 04/06/10 Page 3 of 3