UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4480

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

HUMBERTO LONGORIA MORENO,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Martin K. 

Reidinger, District Judge. (2:10-cr-00014-MR-6)

Submitted: July 10, 2013 Decided: July 25, 2013

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Denzil H. Forrester, DENZIL H. FORRESTER, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States 

Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A federal jury convicted Humberto Longoria Moreno of

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and money laundering, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). The 

district court sentenced Moreno to a total of 151 months of 

imprisonment and he now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. 

On appeal, Moreno first argues that the district court 

erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for 

violation of the Speedy Trial Act. “We ‘review de novo the

district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act.’” 

United States v. Rodriguez-Amaya, 521 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 

2008) (quoting United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 272 (4th 

Cir. 2005)). The Speedy Trial Act provides that:

[i]n any case in which a plea of not guilty is 

entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an 

information or indictment with the commission of an 

offense shall commence within seventy days from the 

filing date (and making public) of the information or 

indictment, or from the date the defendant has 

appeared before a judicial officer in the court in 

which such charge is pending, whichever date last 

occurs. 

18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(c)(1) (West Supp. 2013). However, periods of 

delay are excludable from this calculation if they result from 

the court’s granting of a defendant’s motion for a continuance, 

provided that the court grants the motion “on the basis that the 

ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 
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interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 

U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2013). 

Here, Moreno was indicted in North Carolina, but was 

arrested in Texas in September 2010 and initially appeared in a 

district court in that state. His initial appearance in the 

district court in North Carolina occurred on March 14, 2011, and 

his trial, prior to his motion for a continuance, was set for 

the May 2011 court term. We conclude that the district court 

did not err in concluding that Moreno’s initial appearance 

“before a judicial officer in the court in which such charge 

[was] pending” was on March 14, 2011, when he appeared before 

the court in North Carolina. See United States v. Wilkerson, 

170 F.3d 1040, 1041-42 (11th Cir. 1999) (date for Speedy Trial 

Act commences upon initial appearance in court where charges are 

pending, and not in court from which the case is transferred). 

As the delay between the initial trial date and the ultimate 

date of trial is excludable under the Act because it was due to 

the district court’s granting of Moreno’s motion for a 

continuance in the interests of justice, Moreno’s rights under 

the Speedy Trial Act were not violated.

Moreno next argues that the Government violated its 

obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by 

failing to tender to the defense all the memoranda of interviews 

conducted by federal agents with Moreno’s coconspirators. “In 
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Brady, the Supreme Court announced that the Due Process Clause 

requires the government to disclose ‘evidence favorable to an 

accused upon request . . . where the evidence is material either 

to guilt or to punishment.’” United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 

608, 619 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). 

In order to establish a Brady violation, Moreno must 

demonstrate that the evidence at issue is favorable to him, 

either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; the evidence was 

suppressed by the Government; and that he was prejudiced by that 

suppression. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). 

Favorable evidence is material if the defendant can demonstrate 

that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 

been disclosed, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different. Caro, 597 F.3d at 619. We have thoroughly reviewed 

the record and conclude that Moreno has failed to demonstrate 

that the Government failed to comply with its obligations under 

Brady. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED