UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4533

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RECO VALARIE CAUTHEN, a/k/a Reco V. Cauthen, a/k/a Rico Valerie Cauthen, 

a/k/a Rico V. Cauthen,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock 

Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (0:15-cr-00324-JFA-1)

Submitted: March 31, 2017 Decided: April 7, 2017

Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William W. Watkins, Sr., WILLIAM W. WATKINS, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Reco Valarie Cauthen pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written agreement, to being a 

felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2) (2012). On appeal, Cauthen’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal but questioning the validity of Cauthen’s guilty plea and the procedural and 

substantive reasonableness of Cauthen’s 120-month sentence. In particular, counsel 

questions whether statements from Cauthen’s proffer were used to enhance his sentence, 

whether Cauthen was improperly sentenced under the “residual clause,” and whether the 

district court properly applied a sentencing enhancement. Cauthen has filed a pro se 

supplemental brief, reasserting that his proffered statements were used to enhance his 

sentence, and contending that counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that the district 

court improperly enhanced his sentence based on his prior convictions, relying on a 

number of recent Supreme Court cases concerning the Armed Career Criminal Act and 

the career offender Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm.

Before accepting a guilty plea, a district court must ensure that the plea is 

knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). Although there were 

minor omissions in the Rule 11 colloquy conducted by the district court, we conclude that 

these omissions did not affect Cauthen’s substantial rights. See United States v. Davila, 

133 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (2013) (providing standard). Moreover, the record reveals that the 
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district court confirmed that Cauthen’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a 

sufficient factual basis.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Martinovich, 810 F.3d 232, 242 (4th Cir. 2016). We first review for procedural error, 

such as improper calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In determining whether the district court properly applied a 

sentencing enhancement, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal 

conclusions de novo.” United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014). 

Absent any procedural error, we examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence 

under “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. Sentences within a properly calculated 

Guidelines range are presumed reasonable, and this “presumption can only be rebutted by 

showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

We conclude that Cauthen’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. The record 

belies Cauthen’s assertion that statements from his proffer were used to support a 

sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Beckles v. United States, 

137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (holding advisory Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenges 

under Due Process Clause), puts to rest Cauthen’s challenge to his sentence based on the 

invalidity of the residual clause. And the district court did not clearly err in enhancing 

Cauthen’s offense level based on his possession of at least three guns. See U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 cmt. n.5. Further, the district court properly 

calculated Cauthen’s offense level, criminal history, and Guideline sentence. The court 
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afforded both parties an adequate opportunity to make arguments about the appropriate 

sentence and allowed Cauthen an opportunity to allocute. Additionally, the court’s 

explanation for its sentence, in which the court addressed several of the § 3553(a) factors, 

was individualized and detailed. Moreover, Cauthen has not overcome the presumption 

of substantive reasonableness accorded his Guideline sentence.

Cauthen also summarily suggests that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

We do not consider ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal “[u]nless an attorney’s 

ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record.” United States v. Faulls, 

821 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 2016). Instead, such claims should be raised—if at all—in a 

motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit sufficient 

development of the record. Id. at 508; United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 

(4th Cir. 2010). Because the record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance 

of counsel, we decline to consider such a claim on direct appeal.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and 

find no meritorious ground for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Cauthen, in writing, of the right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Cauthen requests that a petition 

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may 

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Cauthen. We dispense with oral argument
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED