Filed 3/4/22 P. v. Wright CA2/3

Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DALLAS RAY WRIGHT,

Defendant and Appellant.

B311217

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. MA044175)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Reversed.

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Thomas C. Hsieh and Idan Ivri, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

Appellant Dallas Ray Wright appeals from a postjudgment 

order denying his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition.1 The trial 

court found Wright ineligible for relief as a matter of law because 

he was convicted of attempted murder, not murder, and we 

affirmed its order. Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature 

enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 

775), which amended section 1170.95 to provide relief to eligible 

defendants convicted of attempted murder. Our Supreme Court 

has transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate 

our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill 

775. We agree with the parties that amended section 1170.95 

applies retroactively to Wright. We therefore vacate our previous 

opinion, reverse the trial court’s denial of Wright’s petition, and 

remand for further proceedings. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

1. The attempted murders, conviction, and original appeal

On November 25, 2008, two Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

officers were working undercover at a Lancaster mobile home 

park, investigating graffiti related to the Mid Town Criminals 

(MTC) criminal street gang. Wright drove past and slowed by the 

officers’ vehicle. When they attempted to stop Wright, he led 

them on a five-to-ten minute pursuit. At one point, he appeared 

to be talking on a cellular telephone. The officers followed 

Wright back to an area near an apartment complex, next to the 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.

2 We derive the factual and procedural background in part 

from our unpublished opinion in this case, of which we take 

judicial notice on our own motion. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, 459.) 
3

mobile home park. Wright’s vehicle slowed and Marcos R., an

MTC gang member, emerged from behind some bushes. Wright 

pointed at Marcos and then at the officers. Marcos fired multiple 

shots at the officers, some of which hit their vehicle. Wright and 

Marcos were subsequently apprehended. Wright told detectives 

that he fled because he believed the officers were rival gang 

members. He called Marcos and told him he was being chased. 

Marcos told him, “ ‘I got you’ ” and suggested that Wright drive 

near the apartments. Wright did so, and heard gunshots after he 

drove past Marcos. 

At trial, the court instructed the jury on direct aiding and 

abetting and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 

The jury convicted Wright of the willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated attempted murders of both officers (§§ 664, 187, 

subd. (a)), and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic 

firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)). As to each offense, the jury also found 

true a section 186.22 gang enhancement, and that a principal 

personally used and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), 

(c), (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced Wright to 40 years to life in 

prison. A different panel of this Division affirmed Wright’s 

judgment, with a minor sentence modification, in 2011. (People v. 

Wright (Dec. 1, 2011, B226877) [nonpub. opn.].) 

2. The section 1170.95 petition

On January 26, 2021, Wright filed a section 1170.95 

petition for vacation of his attempted murder convictions and 

resentencing. He appended to his petition a portion of the jury 

instructions in the case and the verdict forms. He also requested 

the appointment of counsel.

On January 28, 2021, the trial court summarily denied the 

petition. Consistent with the law in effect at the time, the court 
4

found Wright was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because 

he had been convicted of attempted murder, an offense to which 

section 1170.95 did not extend. Wright was not present, and was 

not represented by counsel. We affirmed the trial court’s order. 

(People v. Wright (Oct. 18, 2021, B311217) [nonpub. opn.].) 

On October 5, 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill 775,

which took effect on January 1, 2022. (See People v. Montes 

(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1006.) On December 22, 2021, our 

Supreme Court granted Wright’s petition for review and 

transferred the matter to us with directions to vacate our 

decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill 775. 

DISCUSSION

In supplemental briefing, Wright contends, and the People 

concede, that the superior court’s ruling must be reversed and the 

matter remanded for further proceedings in accordance with 

amended section 1170.95. We agree.

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 

Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) limited accomplice liability under 

the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. (People v. Gentile 

(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 

952, 957, 959.) To achieve these goals, Senate Bill 1437 added

section 189, subdivision (e) (limiting application of the felony 

murder rule) and section 188, subdivision (a)(3) (stating that 

“[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or 

her participation in a crime.”)

Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which created 

a procedure whereby persons convicted of murder under a nowinvalid felony-murder or natural and probable consequences 

theory may petition for vacation of their convictions and 
5

resentencing. As originally enacted, section 1170.95’s express 

language encompassed only murder, not attempted murder or 

manslaughter. Accordingly, prior to enactment of Senate Bill 

775, California appellate courts concluded that section 1170.95 

did not extend to convictions for those offenses. (See People v.

Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 993–994.)

Senate Bill 775 amended section 1170.95 to encompass

attempted murder and manslaughter. The statute now provides: 

“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the 

natural and probable consequence doctrine or other theory under 

which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s 

participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a 

petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the 

petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter 

conviction vacated . . . .” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a); see also 

subd. (d)(1); People v. Porter (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 651–652.)

Under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, we assume that,

absent contrary evidence, an amendment reducing punishment

for a crime applies retroactively to all nonfinal judgments. (Id. at

p. 745; People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323; People v.

Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 972–973.) Such is the case

with Senate Bill 775. (People v. Montes, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 1006–1007; People v. Porter, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.) 

For retroactivity purposes, a judgment is not final until the time 

for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court has passed. (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 

264, 306; People v. Garcia, at p. 973.) Wright’s appeal of the 

denial of his section 1170.95 petition was not final when Senate 
6

Bill 775 was enacted and took effect, and therefore the 

amendments apply retroactively to him.

Wright was an accomplice, not the actual shooter. His jury 

was instructed on the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine, as well as on direct aiding and abetting. Pursuant to 

Senate Bill 775, he is no longer categorically excluded from 

section 1170.95 relief. The record before us does not include the 

full set of jury instructions, and the verdict forms do not show, as 

a matter of law, that the jury found Wright personally had the 

intent to kill or personally premeditated and deliberated. 

Therefore, we cannot eliminate the possibility that Wright was 

convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 

(See People v. Montes, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1007–1008.) 

Summary denial of the petition was improper under amended 

section 1170.95. (See People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 971–972; People v. Montes, at pp. 1007–1008.) The matter 

must be remanded for the appointment of counsel (§ 1170.95, 

subd. (b)(3)) and further proceedings in accordance with amended 

section 1170.95. 
7

DISPOSITION

The order denying Wright’s section 1170.95 petition is 

reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings, 

including the appointment of counsel for Wright, consistent with 

section 1170.95 as amended by Senate Bill 775. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.