alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
| (logo)  PNC

           REAL ESTATE |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|

 

 MIDLANDLOAN SERVICES

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE

of

PNC BANK, NATIONALASSOCIATION

d/b/a MIDLAND LOANSERVICES

 

 

Pursuantto the requirements of the applicable Servicing Agreement for the transactionslisted on Schedule I hereto, the undersigned, Timothy Steward, as Senior VicePresident of Midland Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank, NationalAssociation, hereby certifies, subject to any limitations listed on Schedule Ihereto, as of the date hereof, solely in his capacity as an officer and not inhis individual capacity, as follows:

 

1.      Areview of the Servicer’s activities during the calendar year 2018 (the“Reporting Period”) and of its performance under the Agreement has been madeunder the undersigned officer’s supervision; and

 

2.      To thebest of the undersigned officer’s knowledge, based on such review, the Servicerhas fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respectsthroughout the Reporting Period. except for the following material instance ofnoncompliance with Regulation AB servicing criteria 1122(d)(3)(i)(A), which isapplicable to all transactions serviced on the Enterprise! Loan ManagementSystem (the “Platform”) during the year ended December 31, 2018, as follows:

 

“1122(d)(3)(i) –Reports to investors, including those to be filed with the Commission, aremaintained in accordance with the transaction agreements and applicableCommission requirements. Specifically, such reports: (A) Are prepared inaccordance with timeframes and other terms set forth in the transactionagreements.”

 

 

Dated:March 1, 2019

 

PNCBank, National Association 

d/b/aMidland Loan Services

 

/s/Timothy Steward

TimothySteward

SeniorVice President

 

**Memberof The PNC Financial Services Group**

10851Mastin Boulevard Overland Park, Kansas 66210

800-327-8083

www.pnc.com/midland

 

 

**ScheduleI**

**Bank of America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Inc.**

| **Recipient Role**                                                                          | **Deal Name**                                          | **Series Number** | **Midland Role** |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Depositor                                                                                   | Banc of America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Inc. | Series 2017-C34   | ** **       |
| Master and Special Servicer of the Great Valley Commerce Center  under the UBS 2017-C3 PSA. |
| Depositor                                                                                   | Banc of America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Inc. | BANK 2018-BNK15   | ** **       |
| Master and Special Servicer on the Plaza Frontenac loan under  the MSC 2018-L1 PSA.         |

** **
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 112 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.J.Res.112

                      One Hundred Seventh Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
          the twenty-third day of January, two thousand and two

                            Joint Resolution

 
 Making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 2003, and 
                           for other purposes.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That Public Law 107-229 is 
amended by striking the date specified in section 107(c) and inserting 
in lieu thereof ``October 11, 2002''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
Exhibit (10)(a)

  

  

  

  

  

  

  Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

  

  

  

  

  We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in
    Post-Effective Amendment No. 34 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-170695) and Amendment No. 509 to the 1940 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4
    No. 811-05721), and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) March 13, 2019, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company and (b) April 16, 2019, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln National Variable Annuity
    Account H for the registration of interests in a separate account under individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.

   

  

  /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

  

  

  

  

  

  

  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

  September 6, 2019
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1441

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide an exemption

to States which adopt certain minimum wage laws.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 4, 2001

Mr. DEMINT (for himself, Mr. STENHOLM, and Mr. ARMEY) introduced the

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and the

Workforce

A BILL

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide

an exemption to States which adopt certain minimum

wage laws.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Minimum Wage State

5 Flexibility Act of 2001’’.

6 SEC. 2. STATE MINIMUM WAGE.

7 Section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

8 (29 U.S.C. 206) is amended by adding at the end the fol9 lowing:
2

•HR 1441 IH

1 ‘‘(h)(1) An employer in a State that adopts minimum

2 wage legislation that conforms to the requirement of para3 graph (2) shall not be required to pay its employees at

4 the minimum wage prescribed by subsection (a)(1).

5 ‘‘(2) Paragraph (1) shall apply in a State that adopts

6 minimum wage legislation that—

7 ‘‘(A) sets a rate or rates that are not less than

8 $5.15 an hour; and

9 ‘‘(B) applies that rate or those rates to not

10 fewer than the employees performing work within

11 the State that would otherwise be covered by the

12 minimum wage rate prescribed by subsection

13 (a)(1).’’.

Æ
Exhibit 32.1  SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION  In connection with the quarterly report of StemGen, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2019 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Simon Dawson, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1.The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  Date: December 18, 2019BY: /s/ Simon DawsonSimon DawsonCEO and Chairman of the Board  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

N OTICE OF I NTENT TO D ISMISS FOR W ANT OF J URISDICTION

Appellate case name: J & J Container Manufacturing, Inc. v. Cintas

- R. U.S., L.P.

Appellate case number: 01

- 14

- 00933

- CV

Trial court case number: 1044425

Trial court: Co unty Civil C our t at Law No

. 3 of Harris County

The appellee has represented in its appellate brief that appellant has fully paid and satisfied the judgment in the underlying case and received a Full and Final Release of J udgment and Judgment Lien. W hen a judgment debtor voluntarily satisfies the judgment, the case

becomes moot. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio , 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006); Riner v. Briargrove Park Prop. Owners, Inc. , 858 S.W.2d 370, 370 (Tex. 1993) (citing Highland Church of Christ v. Powell , 640 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1982)). This Court cannot decide a case that becomes moot during the pendency of the litigation, and must dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction. See Heckman v. Williamson Cnty. , 369 S.W.3d 137, 166

– 67 (Tex. 2012).

Accordingly, the Court has directed me to notify you that the Court may dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction unless you file a written response to this notice, providing a detailed explanat ion, citing relevant portions of the record, statutes, rules, and case law to show that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3(a).

The final deadline to file your response is 5:00 p.m., 10 days from the date of this

notice

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3(a). If a meritorious response is not received in the form described above by the deadline, the Court may dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction

without further notice. See id.

Clerk’s signature : /s/ Christopher A. Prine

Date: March 24, 2015
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

CHRISTOPHER LEE KARSTEN, 

Defendant. 

4:23CR3063 

ORDER 

 

Defendant has moved to continue the motion deadline, (Filing No. 58), because 

defense counsel needs additional time to prepare briefing. The motion to continue is 

unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the motion the court finds good cause 

has been shown and the motion to continue should be granted. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1) Defendant’s motion to continue, (Filing No. 58), is granted. 

 

2) Defendant’s motion to dismiss and supporting brief shall be filed on or 

before June 3, 2024. 

3) The Court finds the ends of justice served by granting the motion to continue 

outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, and 

the additional time arising as a result of the granting of the motion, the time 

between today’s date and June 3, 2024 shall be deemed excludable time in 

any computation of time under the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, 

because although counsel have been duly diligent, additional time is 

needed to adequately prepare this case for trial and failing to grant 

additional time might result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(1) & (h)(7). Failing to timely object to this order as provided under 

this court’s local rules will be deemed a waiver of any right to later claim the 

time should not have been excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. 

4:23-cr-03063-JMG-JMD Doc # 59 Filed: 05/22/24 Page 1 of 2 - Page ID # 164
Dated this 22nd day of May, 2024. 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Jacqueline M. DeLuca 

United States Magistrate Judge 

4:23-cr-03063-JMG-JMD Doc # 59 Filed: 05/22/24 Page 2 of 2 - Page ID # 165
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 7
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from AmerUs Life Holdings, Inc.
and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                      <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>            6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                 Jan-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                   JUN-30-1997
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>             2,405,580
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                    0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                      0
<EQUITIES>                          63,008
<MORTGAGE>                         230,368
<REAL-ESTATE>                        4,417
<TOTAL-INVEST>                   2,877,160
<CASH>                               7,752
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                   1,964
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>             138,455
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                   4,450,501
<POLICY-LOSSES>                  1,999,838
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                      0
<POLICY-OTHER>                       5,412
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>               66,004
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                     81,548
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>               86,000
<PREFERRED>                              0
<COMMON>                            23,156
<OTHER-SE>                         511,830
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>     4,450,501
<PREMIUMS>                          41,215
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                 96,856
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                   9,523
<OTHER-INCOME>                       3,000
<BENEFITS>                          83,875
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>         10,973
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                29,029
<INCOME-PRETAX>                     39,954
<INCOME-TAX>                        11,586
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                 29,022
<DISCONTINUED>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                          0
<CHANGES>                                0
<NET-INCOME>                        29,022
<EPS-PRIMARY>                         1.25
<EPS-DILUTED>                            0
<RESERVE-OPEN>                           0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                      0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                        0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                       0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                         0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                          0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                  0
        
          

</TABLE>
#### Murray WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division A.

Oct. 26, 1954.

PER CURIAM

Affirmed.
#### EUMONT v. RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, Inc., et al.

No. 18185.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Dec. 23, 1946.

Henry E. Fallon and John T. Charbonnet, both of New Orleans, for appellant.

Lemle, Moreno & Lemle, of New Orleans, for appellees.

*527PER CURIAM.

This action was brought by Victor Eu-mont against the Railway Express Agency, Inc. and A. M. Posey, in solido, for damages in the amount of $23,000.00 for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The damages claimed are itemized in plaintiff’s petition as follows:

(1) For damages and injuries to his reputation and for the scandal caused— $10,000.00;

(2) For loss of liberty — $2,000.00;

(3) For embarrassment and humiliation —$5,000.00;

(4) For mental suffering and strain— $5,000; and

(5) For legal expenses and fees incurred in defending himself in the Criminal Court — $1,000.00.

There was judgment in the lower court in favor of defendants, and plaintiff moved for and was granted an appeal to this court.

Defendants-appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the amount in dispute is not within the jurisdiction of this court.

Section 10 of Article VII of the Constitution of Louisiana confers upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in civil cases where the amount in dispute exceeds $2,000.00, “Except in suits for damages for physical injuries to, or for the death of a person, or for other damages sustained by such person or his heirs or legal representatives, arising out of the same circumstances * * By Section 29 of the same article of the Constitution the excepted cases are appealable to this court.

However, it is evident that this case does not fall within the exception provided for, and this court does not have jurisdiction of the amount in dispute. In none of the itemized claims are physical injuries involved, and it has been held many times that where damages in excess of $2,000.00 are sought for malicious prosecution, humiliation, mental anguish or the like, an appeal therein' lies only to the Supreme Court. Clarke v. Bandelin, 6 La.App. 564; Liner v. Authement, La.App., 150 So. 72; Duplantis v. Chauvin, La.App., 158 So. 653; Spearman v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 164 La. 677, 114 So. 591. Therefore, for the reasons assigned;

It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that this appeal be, and it is transferred to the Supreme Court of Louisiana to be disposed of according to law; the transfer to be made within sixty days after this judgment becomes final and, if not so made, then the appeal to be dismissed. Appellants are to pay the cost of appeal in this court, other costs to await final determination of the matter.

Appeal transferred to the supreme court.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

AVA SOLOMON,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ALLSTATE INSURANCE IDEMNITY 

POLICY 000000886169059, ALLSTATE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, and ETHAN 

CHAVEZ,

Defendants.

8:23CV207

ORDER

The undersigned’s chambers received four essentially identical e-mails from 

Plaintiff. As the Court previously warned Plaintiff, the Court will not act on any emails 

submitted by Plaintiff and such e-mail submissions will not be made part of the record. 

See Filing No. 40 at 2–3. Pursuant to local rule, “[a] document faxed or e-mailed to the 

clerk or assigned judge is not considered filed without a court order.” NECivR 5.1(c). If 

Plaintiff wishes to request relief from or action by the Court, she may do so by filing a 

proper motion. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Court will not take any action on any 

emails submitted by Plaintiff and the emails will not be made part of the Court’s record.

Dated this 13th day of August, 2024.

BY THE COURT:

Joseph F. Bataillon

Senior United States District Judge

8:23-cv-00207-JFB-PRSE Doc # 48 Filed: 08/13/24 Page 1 of 1 - Page ID # 231
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

ALEAH MEYER, 

Defendant. 

8:23CR112 

ORDER 

 

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Extend Time to File Pretrial 

Motions, (Filing No. 56). The motion is unopposed by the government and the co-defendant. For 

good cause shown, the Court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1) Defendant’s Motion to Extend Time to File Pretrial Motions, (Filing No. 56), is 

granted. 

2) Pretrial motions shall be filed by November 20, 2023. 

3) In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the Court finds that the ends of 

justice will be served by granting this motion and outweigh the interests of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result 

of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between October 20, 2023 and

November 20, 2023, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time 

under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant this motion would 

deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence, and the novelty and complexity of the case. 

The failure to grant this motion might result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B). Failing to timely object to this order as provided under this 

court’s local rules will be deemed a waiver of any right to later claim the time 

should not have been excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. 

 Dated this 23rd day of October, 2023. 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Susan M. Bazis 

United States Magistrate Judge 

8:23-cr-00112-RFR-SMB Doc # 57 Filed: 10/23/23 Page 1 of 1 - Page ID # 121
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

BRYAN LEE, 

Defendant. 

4:22CR3077 

ORDER 

 

Defendant Bryan Lee has moved to continue the pretrial motion deadline and conference 

call (Filing No. 149), because defense counsel and defendant need additional time to prepare any 

pretrial motions. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth in the 

motion, the court finds good cause has been shown and the motion should be granted. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1) Defendant Lee’s motion to continue, (Filing No. 149), is granted. 

2) Pretrial motions and briefs shall be filed on or before June 26, 2024. 

3) The conference call previously scheduled to be held on June 20, 2024, is 

continued. A telephonic conference with counsel will be held before the 

undersigned magistrate judge at 9:30 a.m. on July 1, 2024 to discuss setting any 

pretrial motion hearing needed, a change of plea hearing, or the date of the jury 

trial and deadlines for disclosing experts as required under Rule 16. Counsel for 

all parties shall use the conferencing instructions provided by the court to 

participate in the call. 

4) The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the motion to continue 

outweigh the interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial, and the 

additional time arising as a result of the granting of the motion, the time between 

today’s date and July 1, 2024 shall be deemed excludable time in any computation 

of time under the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, because although counsel 

have been duly diligent, additional time is needed to adequately prepare this case 

for trial and failing to grant additional time might result in a miscarriage of justice. 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) & (h)(7). Failing to timely object to this order as provided 

under this court’s local rules will be deemed a waiver of any right to later claim the 

time should not have been excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. 

 Dated this 10th day of June, 2024. 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Jacqueline M. DeLuca 

United States Magistrate Judge 

4:22-cr-03077-JMG-JMD Doc # 150 Filed: 06/10/24 Page 1 of 1 - Page ID # 723
1I interpret Rule 12 to require a report in all cases in which

the defendant is convicted of first degree murder, regardless of

whether the State seeks the death penalty.

FILED

December 1, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) For Publication

)

Appellee, ) Filed:

)

v. ) Shelby County

)

ANDRE S. BLAND, ) Hon. Arthur T. Bennett, Judge

) 

Appellant. ) No. 02-S-01-9603-CR-00032

SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

I concur, in principle, with Justice Reid’s dissent. I

would, however, increase the pool of similar cases to include all

cases in which a trial judge’s report is required by Supreme Court

Rule 12.1 The majority chose to exclude from the proportionality

review pool all cases in which the State did not seek the death

penalty and all cases in which no capital sentencing hearing was

held. In my view, this exclusion discourages a more meaningful

proportionality analysis.

Defendants are often convicted of first degree murder

after a trial in which the prosecution, for whatever reason, did

not seek the death penalty. The pool defined by the majority would

exclude such cases. However, cases in which the death penalty is

not sought are equally relevant to proportionality as cases in

which the death penalty is sought. Without all first degree murder
2

convictions included in the pool, it would be, in my opinion, quite

difficult to conduct the proportionality review as required by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(Supp. 1996). Thus, because of my

view that the pool of similar cases as described by the majority is

too narrow, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority

opinion. 

I agree with the majority that the evidence is sufficient

to support the jury’s finding of premeditation and torture.

Further, I agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the

jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the

mitigating circumstances. However, like Justice Reid, I would find

the death sentence disproportionate in this case.

____________________________________

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice