This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0351

Joseph Bergeron, petitioner, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

Tom Roy, 

Commissioner of Corrections, 

Respondent.

Filed August 22, 2016

Affirmed

Johnson, Judge

Washington County District Court

File No. 82-CV-15-4911

Joseph Bergeron, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Cody M. Zustiak, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, 

Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

In 1989, Joseph Bergeron was convicted of first-degree murder and received a 

mandatory life sentence. In 2011, the commissioner of corrections released him from 

prison, with conditions. In 2014, the commissioner returned him to prison after it was 
2

determined that he had violated conditions of his release. Bergeron petitioned for a writ of 

habeas corpus, arguing that he is unlawfully confined on the ground that his sentence 

expired in 2013. The district court dismissed Bergeron’s petition. We affirm.

FACTS

In September 1988, Bergeron burglarized a man’s home and stabbed him with a 

knife eight times, causing him to bleed to death. A grand jury indicted him on

(1) premeditated first-degree murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(1) (1988), and 

(2) first-degree murder while committing burglary, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(3) 

(1988). In April 1989, a Hennepin County jury found Bergeron guilty on count 2. The 

district court imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment on count 2 and dismissed 

count 1. See Minn. Stat. § 609.185. The supreme court affirmed Bergeron’s conviction. 

State v. Bergeron, 452 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1990).

“The commissioner of corrections may parole any person sentenced to confinement 

in any state correctional facility for adults under the control of the commissioner of 

corrections . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 243.05, subd. 1 (2014). A person serving a life sentence 

for committing a first-degree murder while committing burglary in 1988, without having a 

prior felony conviction, may be paroled only after “having served 20 years, less the 

diminution that would have been allowed for good conduct had the sentence been for 20

years.” Minn. Stat. § 243.05, subd. 1(a) (1988). An inmate serving a term of years for a 

crime committed in 1988 would be entitled to “diminish the term of sentence one day for 

each two days during which the inmate has not violated any facility rule or discipline.” 

Minn. Stat. § 243.18 (1988). Thus, a person imprisoned for having committed first-degree 
3

murder while committing burglary in 1988, without having a prior felony conviction, is 

eligible for parole after 13 and one-third years.

In addition, “The commissioner of corrections may, under rules promulgated by the 

commissioner, give supervised release to an inmate serving a mandatory life sentence 

under section 609.185, . . . clause (3) . . . after the inmate has served the minimum term of 

imprisonment specified in subdivision 4.” Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 5 (2014).1 The 

minimum term of imprisonment specified in subdivision 4 in 1988 was 17 years. Minn. 

Stat. § 244.05, subd. 4 (1988). Thus, a person imprisoned for having committed firstdegree murder while committing burglary in 1988 is eligible for supervised release after 

17 years.

In February 2011, the commissioner of corrections released Bergeron from prison 

and placed him on intensive supervised release. The standard conditions of Bergeron’s 

release required him to, among other things, not consume alcoholic beverages and not 

commit any additional crimes. 

In October 2014, a Bloomington police officer arrested Bergeron for driving while 

impaired (DWI). Bergeron submitted to a urine test, which revealed an alcohol 

concentration of 0.129. The state charged Bergeron with three criminal offenses: DWI, 

obstruction of legal process, and fleeing a peace officer. 

 

1This statute was declared unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile in Jackson v. 

State, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2016 WL 4126394, *5-8 (Minn. Aug. 3, 2016). Because Bergeron 

was not a juvenile at the time of his offense, Jackson does not apply.
4

The commissioner of corrections detained Bergeron pending an administrative 

hearing. At a hearing in the Hennepin County jail, a department of corrections hearing

officer found that Bergeron violated a condition of his release by using alcohol and found 

that there was probable cause to believe that Bergeron violated a condition of his release 

by committing a crime. The hearing officer determined that Bergeron should be returned 

to a correctional facility pending a final disposition with respect to the violation. It appears 

from the record that Bergeron was returned to the correctional facility in Lino Lakes at that 

time. In December 2014, Bergeron appeared before the commissioner and an advisory 

panel for a dispositional hearing. In a letter dated January 2, 2015, the commissioner 

informed Bergeron that he would remain confined at Lino Lakes because he had violated 

a condition of his parole. 

In October 2015, Bergeron petitioned the Washington County District Court for a 

writ of habeas corpus. Bergeron argued in his petition that he is unlawfully confined 

because his sentence expired in September 2013. He asserted that his sentence expired in 

September 2013 because he committed his offense in September 1988 and his sentence is 

for 25 years. The commissioner opposed Bergeron’s petition. 

In January 2016, the district court dismissed the petition. The district court rejected 

Bergeron’s argument that his sentence expired after 25 years, stating that his “life sentence 

is still in effect and he remains under the control of the Commissioner of Corrections” and 

that “the Commissioner of Corrections had the authority to rescind his parole upon 

violation of the conditions of release.” Bergeron appeals. 
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D E C I S I O N

Bergeron, appearing pro se, argues that the district court erred by dismissing his 

habeas petition. 

The privilege of filing a writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed by the state constitution. 

Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The legislature has fulfilled that guarantee by enacting a statute 

that provides a habeas remedy. See Minn. Stat. §§ 589.01-.35 (2014). The relevant chapter 

begins by stating:

A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty, 

except persons committed or detained by virtue of the final 

judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal 

jurisdiction, or by virtue of an execution issued upon the 

judgment, may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief 

from imprisonment or restraint. 

Minn. Stat. § 589.01. A prisoner may use a habeas petition to obtain judicial review of a 

decision of the commissioner of corrections that implements a sentence. State v. Schnagl, 

859 N.W.2d 297, 301-03 (Minn. 2015). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving 

that his detention is unlawful. State ex rel. Adams v. Rigg, 252 Minn. 283, 285, 89 N.W.2d 

898, 901 (1958); Bedell v. Roy, 853 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied

(Minn. Oct. 28, 2014).

In this case, Bergeron contends that the commissioner is unlawfully confining him 

because his sentence expired 25 years after the date of his offense. Bergeron relies on a 

statute that provides that a person serving a life sentence for premeditated first-degree 

murder, without having a prior felony conviction, may not be paroled “without having 

served 25 years, less the diminution which would have been allowed for good conduct had 
6

the sentence been for 25 years.” See Minn. Stat. § 243.05, subd. 1(b) (1988). Bergeron 

essentially contends that, in light of this statute, his sentence is, as a matter of law, a 

sentence that expires after 25 years.

Bergeron misreads the statute. Section 243.05, subdivision 1(b), does not provide 

that, as a matter of law, a person convicted of premeditated first-degree murder may not be 

imprisoned for more than 25 years. Likewise, section 243.05, subdivision 1(a), does not 

provide that, as a matter of law, a person convicted of first-degree murder while committing 

burglary may not be imprisoned for more than 20 years. The statute that set forth the 

offense of which Bergeron was convicted plainly states that a person who is “guilty of 

murder in the first degree . . . shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.185 (1988). Consistent with the mandatory nature of section 609.185, the Hennepin 

County District Court filed a warrant of commitment that imposed a life sentence on 

Bergeron. Contrary to Bergeron’s argument, subdivisions 1(a) and 1(b) of section 243.05 

merely establish the minimum amounts of time that must be served in imprisonment before 

an inmate may be eligible for parole by the commissioner of corrections. But an inmate 

who has been paroled after the minimum amount of time has not discharged his sentence. 

Another subdivision of section 243.05 refutes Bergeron’s argument: 

Upon being paroled and released, an inmate is and 

remains in the legal custody and under the control of the 

commissioner, subject at any time to be returned to a facility 

of the department of corrections established by law for the 

confinement or treatment of convicted persons and the parole 

rescinded by the commissioner.
7

Minn. Stat. § 243.05, subd. 1(d) (2014). Thus, Bergeron is not unlawfully confined by the 

commissioner of corrections.

In sum, the district court did not err by dismissing Bergeron’s petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus.

Affirmed.