NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-2641

___________

CHRIS ANN JAYE,

Appellant

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY;

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL IONE K. CURVA, in her Official Capacity; 

THE HON. PETER A. BUCHSBAUM, individually and in his 

Official Capacity as Judge of the Law Division of Hunterdon County; 

THE HON. YOLANDA CICCONE, individually and in her 

Official Capacity of Assignment Judge Law Judge of the 

Superior Court of Hunterdon, Somerset and Warren; 

THE HON. MARY C. JACOBSON, in her Official Capacity as 

Assignment Judge and Presiding Judge in the Law Division of the 

Superior Court of Mercer County; 

HON. PATRICK MCMANIMON, in his Official Capacity as 

Special Civil Part Judge of the Superior Court of Mercer County; 

CHRISTOPHER KOOS, in his Official Capacity as Civil Division Team Leader

for the Superior Court of Mercer County; 

JUDITH IRIZZARI, in her Official Capacity as 

Civil Division Manager for the Superior Court of Mercer County; 

CAROLINE RECORD, individually and in her Official Capacity as 

NJ Supreme Court's Secretary for the Office of Attorney Ethics;

JOHN DOES 1-25 (FICTITIOUS NAMES), individually and 

in their official capacities as State actors, 

including but not limited to the NJ Judgment Processing Service Defendants

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-07471)

District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

____________________________________
2

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

August 15, 2017

Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 22, 2017)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Chris Ann Jaye, proceeding pro se, appeals from orders of the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing her civil rights action and her 

post-judgment motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 

Jaye filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil 

Rights Act, which she later amended in response to an order directing her to comply with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), alleging that various New Jersey state court judges, 

state court staff, and the New Jersey Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 

violated her rights in connection with several state court cases. Those cases involve an 

ongoing dispute between Jaye and her condominium association regarding unpaid 

condominium fees. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court dismissed 

the second amended complaint, determining that it still failed to comply with the 

requirements of Rule 8(a) and that, in any event, Jaye’s claims were subject to dismissal 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
3

District Court’s order also “terminated” various other motions that Jaye had filed in the 

case, including motions to stay the state court proceedings. Jaye timely appealed. She 

also filed a “Motion to Vacate,” which the District Court denied. Jaye filed another 

notice of appeal.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the dismissal of 

the complaint is de novo. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); cf.

Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(exercising plenary review over district court’s invocation of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine). We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s order denying Jaye’s 

motion for reconsideration. See Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011). 

We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 773 

F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985). 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a District Court of jurisdiction to review, 

in some circumstances, a state court adjudication.1 See Turner, 449 F.3d at 547. In 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), the 

Supreme Court emphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding 

that it “is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” It is 

difficult to fully determine the status of all of Jaye’s state court cases, as she has filed 

 

1 The doctrine is derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
4

several different lawsuits concerning her condominium fees. But at least some of her 

claims seek relief for injuries caused by judgments that were entered against her before 

she commenced the underlying action. To the extent that is the case, the District Court 

correctly determined that those claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See

Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 

2010) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower federal courts of 

jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments). 

To the extent, however, that Jaye’s claims stem from rulings in matters that are 

ongoing in state court, those claims are not barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Nevertheless, they are subject to dismissal on other grounds.2 In particular, the New 

Jersey Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General are immune from suit for money 

damages under the Eleventh Amendment. See Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. 

Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment ... has been 

interpreted to render states—and, by extension, state agencies and departments and 

officials when the state is the real party in interest—generally immune from suit by 

 

2

Jaye sought to stay any ongoing state court proceedings, but the District Court properly 

denied this request. The Anti-Injunction Act provides that “[a] court of the United States 

may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly 

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect 

or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. These exceptions do not apply here. 

Only the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception is even remotely relevant to this 

action and, as we have explained, it applies only when the state court proceedings “so 

interfere with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously 

impair the federal court’s flexibility to decide that case.” 1975 Salaried Ret. Plan for 

Eligible Emps. of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 408 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The circumstances of this case do not meet this 

standard.
5

private parties in federal court.”); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 

465 U.S. 89, 119-20 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars state law claims 

against state officials in federal court). In addition, the named judges (and members of 

their staff and court personnel) are immune from suit to the extent they were sued in their 

individual and official capacities. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) 

(judges immune from suit unless they act in complete absence of jurisdiction); Gallas v. 

Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000) (court personnel entitled to 

quasi-judicial immunity for alleged acts pursuant to judge’s instructions). Jaye did not 

set forth information which might suggest that the judges in her cases acted in the 

absence of all jurisdiction. Nor did she set forth information which might show that court 

personnel acted contrary to judicial instruction. Rather, Jaye appears to be merely 

dissatisfied with the judicial rulings against her. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 

303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has 

absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”). 

The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Jaye’s “Motion to 

Vacate.” That motion, which the District Court treated as seeking relief under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), alleged that the defendants’ motion to dismiss 

mischaracterized the finality of her state court judgments, misinterpreted her claims as 

arising out of those judgments, and misapplied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rather 

than identify instances of fraud or misconduct, however, these allegations challenge the 

substance of the Defendants’ arguments. See Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 

(3d Cir. 1983) (to prevail under Rule 60(b)(3) the moving party must establish that the 
6

adverse party engaged in fraud or other misconduct, and that this misconduct prevented 

the moving party from fully and fairly presenting her case). Indeed, Jaye’s “Motion to 

Vacate” essentially sought to relitigate issues the District Court had already decided. But 

Rule 60(b) relief is available “only in cases evidencing extraordinary circumstances” and 

is not a substitute for an appeal. Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999).

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3

 

3

Jaye’s motion to expand the record and the Appellees’ motion for leave to file a 

supplemental appendix are granted. But we deny Jaye’s motion to strike Appellees’ brief 

and their motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix, as well as her opposition to 

the Appellees’ submission of a supplemental appendix. We also deny Jaye’s motion for 

judicial notice, her motion to summarily set aside, her motion to summarily remand, and 

her letter titled “Still Waiting on Reason for Basis for Delay.” To the extent that Jaye’s 

letter captioned “Judge Shipp is Unfit to Act as a Federal Judge” seeks his 

disqualification, relief is denied. We also deny Jaye’s “Emergent Injunctive Relief to 

Stay All Federal Cases and Motion to Transfer Case and Appeal to a Neutral Venue” and 

her “Motion for Emergent Change of Venue.”