PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 20-2633

___________

ANGEL ARGUETA ANARIBA,

Appellant

v.

DIRECTOR HUDSON COUNTY

CORRECTIONAL CENTER

_________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-19-cv-09135)

District Judge: Honorable John M. Vazquez

_________________________________

Argued April 21, 2021

Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, Circuit Judges, and NOREIKA*, District Judge.

(Opinion Filed: November 3, 2021)

*

 The Honorable Maryellen Noreika, United States District Judge for the District of 

Delaware, sitting by designation. 
2

Elyssa N. Williams [ARGUED]

The Bronx Defenders

360 E. 161st Street

Bronx, NY 10451

Counsel for Appellant

Victor M. Mercado-Santana [ARGUED]

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Appellee

___________

OPINION OF THE COURT

___________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

Angel Argueta Anariba, a native and citizen of 

Honduras, has been detained in the custody of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) since December 2014. Over 

the course of his now approximately 82-month ICE detention, 

Argueta has been transferred at least 15 times to 6 different 

facilities in 4 different states.

In March 2019, Argueta filed the underlying petition for 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 

seeking relief from continued detention. At the time of his 
3

filing, Argueta was detained at the Hudson County 

Correctional Facility in Kearny, New Jersey. The District 

Court denied Argueta’s petition without prejudice, reasoning 

that the statutory scheme under which Argueta was detained 

subjected him to a mandatory detention period and thus 

rendered him ineligible for the immediate release requested. 

Over six months later, in April 2020, Argueta – who in the 

interim had been transferred to a detention facility outside of 

New Jersey – filed a motion in the District Court to reopen his

§ 2241 petition. The District Court denied Argueta’s motion 

in July 2020. Finding that Argueta’s motion raised new claims, 

the District Court construed his filing as a new habeas petition 

over which it lacked jurisdiction to consider for reasons 

stemming from ICE’s transfer of Argueta to a detention facility 

outside of its territorial jurisdiction. Argueta appeals. For the 

reasons set forth below, we will reverse the District Court’s 

order and remand for further proceedings. 

I.

A.

Argueta entered the United States in 1998, at the age of 

20. Settling in Washington, D.C., Argueta became involved in 

his community, started a family, and was employed in 

construction and carpentry. In 2007, Argueta got into an 

altercation with a former employer over the late payment of 

wages. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated assault 

under D.C. Code § 22-404.01 and sentenced to 96 months’ 

imprisonment. In December 2014, Argueta was released early 
4

for good behavior, having served all but approximately two 

years of his sentence. He was transferred directly into ICE 

custody.

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

immediately thereafter initiated removal proceedings under 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (removal due to being present 

without admission or parole) and 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (removal due to conviction of a crime 

involving moral turpitude). Argueta admitted inadmissibility 

under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and applied for asylum, withholding 

of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) rejected 

Argueta’s claims, in part on the ground that Argueta’s 

conviction for aggravated assault “constituted an aggravated 

felony crime of violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).” 

J.A. 24, ¶ 34. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 

affirmed. 

In October 2015, Argueta filed a petition for review and 

a motion to stay removal in the Second Circuit. The Second 

Circuit remanded Argueta’s case to the BIA following the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 

1204 (2018) (holding that § 16(b) as incorporated into the 

Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutionally 

vague). The BIA reopened Argueta’s removal proceedings and 

remanded the case to the IJ. In March 2019, the IJ denied 

Argueta’s petition for relief. The BIA affirmed on August 23, 

2019, and Argueta again petitioned the Second Circuit for 

review. It granted Argueta a stay of removal in June 2020; his 
5

petition for review remains pending. See Argueta Anariba v. 

Att’y Gen. (No. 19-2862).

B.

In December 2015, approximately twelve months into 

his ICE custody, Argueta requested a bond hearing pursuant to 

Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 

judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018). The IJ determined 

that Argueta’s detention fell under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and thus he 

did not have jurisdiction to hold a bond hearing. Argueta 

subsequently filed a habeas petition in the Southern District of 

New York. Finding that Argueta’s detention was instead 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, the District Court granted 

Argueta’s petition and directed the IJ to hold a bond hearing. 

See Argueta Anariba v. Shanahan, 190 F. Supp. 3d 344, 345 

(S.D.N.Y. 2016). 

By October 2016, Argueta’s bond hearing still had not 

occurred. The District Court again ordered the IJ to conduct a 

bond hearing, which he did but applied the incorrect legal 

standard. This resulted in the District Court remanding the 

case for clarification, and, in August 2017, approximately 20 

months into Argueta’s ICE detention, the IJ denied Argueta 

bond “based on a finding of dangerousness to the community 

and flight risk.” J.A. 27, ¶ 47. 

In March 2019, Argueta – well into his 51st month of 

ICE detention, and approximately 19 months following his 

August 2017 bond hearing – filed the underlying habeas 
6

petition in the District of New Jersey. At the time of filing, 

Argueta was detained at the Hudson County Correctional 

Facility in Kearny, New Jersey. Argueta’s petition centered on 

allegations that his continued detention without a bond hearing 

violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The sole 

relief that Argueta sought was his immediate release from 

detention. 

On October 1, 2019, the District Court dismissed 

Argueta’s petition without prejudice. Concluding that the 

statutory scheme under which Argueta was being held had 

switched from § 1226 to § 1231 on August 23, 2019 (i.e., when 

the BIA affirmed the IJ’s post-Dimaya denial of Argueta’s 

petition, thus making his removal order administratively final), 

the District Court found that Argueta was subject to § 1231’s 

mandatory 90-day detention period and thus ineligible for the 

relief he sought. In doing so, it signaled that Argueta could file 

a motion to reopen should there be a change in the statutory 

scheme governing his detention. Yet it also hinted that 

Argueta’s claims would continue to fall short for at least the 

“presumptively reasonable” six-month detention period 

following the lapse of § 1231’s 90-day window. J.A. 10 n.3 

(citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and GuerreroSanchez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 

2018)). On the same day as the District Court’s decision, the 

Government transferred Argueta to a facility outside of New 

Jersey. 
7

C.

In April 2020, Argueta – then detained at an ICE facility 

in Louisiana – filed a motion to reopen the habeas proceedings 

in the District of New Jersey.1 Pointing to the District Court’s 

decision as “expressly permitt[ing] [him] to seek reopening if 

his detention continued” beyond both § 1231’s 90-day period 

and the “presumptively reasonable” six-month period, Argueta 

claimed that reopening was “required” at this point to address 

the alleged constitutional impermissibility of his continued 

detention. Pet’r’s Mot. to Reopen Pet. for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus, ECF No. 17 (“Mot. to Reopen”) 2-3 (internal 

quotations omitted). He further argued that the COVID-19 

outbreak, coupled with his medical conditions, amplified the 

urgency and necessity of his immediate release. While the 

motion was pending, the Second Circuit granted a stay of 

removal; Argueta informed the District Court accordingly. 

The Government opposed Argueta’s motion. 

According to the Government, the motion raised two new 

habeas claims that were not otherwise included in his original 

petition: “1) that his conditions of confinement during the 

COVID-19 pandemic violate his constitutional rights and 

1

 Argueta’s motion to reopen, as well as related docket entries 

(including the Government’s opposition brief), do not appear 

in the record on appeal. However, we may take judicial notice 

of the District Court’s docket. See Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 

F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We may take judicial notice 

of the contents of another [c]ourt’s docket.”). 
8

warrant[] immediate release; and 2) that his detention under 

§ 1231(a)(6) has exceeded six months under Zadvydas and 

Guerrero-Sanchez and warrants immediate release.” Opp. to 

Pet’r’s Mot. to Reopen 1, 11. The Government urged the 

District Court to find that the immediate custodian rule 

pursuant to Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2014),

foreclosed the District Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction 

over these new claims, as the Government no longer was 

detaining Argueta in New Jersey. Relatedly, it reasoned that 

any change in the statutory scheme governing Argueta’s 

detention occurred not only after the District Court closed the 

matter but also after he was removed from New Jersey, and any 

suggestion that the District Court “retained jurisdiction as if 

this matter had never been adjudicated to its conclusion” was

baseless. Id. at 11. Furthermore, if the District Court were to 

find it had jurisdiction, the Government stated that it should 

transfer the case to the Western District of Louisiana, which 

the Government deemed to be the “appropriate venue” given 

Argueta’s then-detention at the Catahoula Correctional Center

in Harrisonburg, Louisiana. Id. at 16. 

On July 13, 2020, the District Court denied Argueta’s 

motion to reopen. Agreeing with the Government that his

“case was closed when the matter became ripe for reconsideration,” the District Court viewed Argueta’s discussion

pursuant to Zadvydas as a new claim over which it lacked 

jurisdiction. J.A. 3. Additionally, it construed Argueta’s 

COVID-19 argument as a “new filing,” which “should be 

adjudicated in the jurisdiction where he is currently housed” –
9

i.e., the Western District of Louisiana. Id. (citing Padilla, 542 

U.S. at 442-43 (“[F]or core habeas petitions challenging 

present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one 

district: the district of confinement.”)). Argueta timely 

appeals. 

D.

As a final matter before considering the merits of 

Argueta’s appeal, we look to the nature and circumstances of 

his ICE detention. At the time of briefing, Argueta claimed 

that the Government had transferred him at least 14 times to 5 

different facilities in 4 different states. At oral argument, 

Argueta’s counsel indicated that, since the last filing in this 

case, ICE had once again transferred Argueta – this time from 

Catahoula Correctional Center in Harrisonburg, Louisiana to a 

facility in Pine Prairie, Louisiana. Over the course of his ICE 

detention, amounting to approximately 82 months, this totals 

to the Government having transferred Argueta at least 15 times 

to 6 different facilities in 4 different states. As far as we are 

aware, Argueta remains detained in Louisiana within the

territorial jurisdiction of the Western District of Louisiana. 

And, since being transferred outside of New Jersey, Argueta 

has not filed for habeas relief in any other jurisdiction. 
10

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction over Argueta’s 

habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Whether it

retains jurisdiction to entertain Argueta’s motion to reopen is 

at issue on appeal. Our jurisdiction to consider Argueta’s

appeal of the District Court’s denial of his motion to reopen 

arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Focusing on the substance of the filing over its form or 

label, we construe Argueta’s “motion to reopen” as we would 

a Rule 60(b)(6) motion.2 Cf. Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 

201, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e are free to recharacterize the 

motion to amend to match the substance of the relief 

requested.”); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 

460, 463 (3d Cir. 1989) (in deciding how to treat a motion, our 

inquiry stems “from its substance and not from its form”); 

Turner v. Evers, 726 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1984) (analyzing a 

motion based on its “function . . . not its caption”); 12 James 

Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.64 (3d ed.). 

We typically review a district court’s dismissal of a 

motion to reopen under Rule 60(b)(6) for abuse of discretion. 

See Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 725 (3d Cir. 2004). 

However, we review questions of law de novo. Id.; cf. Wiest v. 

2

 While both parties recommend that we consider Argueta’s 

motion to reopen his § 2241 petition as we would a Rule 60(b) 

motion, neither points us to a specific subsection of Rule 60(b). 

However, the only plausible basis for Argueta’s motion is 

subsection (b)(6), so we will view it as such.
11

Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen a district 

court predicates its denial of reconsideration on an issue of law, 

our review is plenary[.]”). Our de novo review extends to 

“question[s] regarding the legal status of the 60(b) motion.” 

Pridgen, 380 F.3d at 725; see also Williams v. Chatman, 510 

F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (in considering a Rule 60(b) 

motion, “[w]e review de novo questions concerning 

jurisdiction”). 

III.

We must determine whether it was proper for the 

District Court to deny Argueta’s 60(b)(6) motion. From a high 

altitude, our review centers on the effect that the Government’s 

transfer of Argueta out of New Jersey had on the District 

Court’s jurisdiction over his case. But, panning in, our inquiry 

settles on two related, yet independent, threshold issues that 

concern the legal status of Argueta’s motion: First, did the 

District Court err in finding that his motion raised new claims 

such that it amounted to a new habeas petition? Second, to the 

extent that Argueta’s motion is not a new habeas petition in 

disguise, did the Government’s transfer of Argueta out of New 

Jersey following the District Court’s denial of his habeas

petition without prejudice divest it of jurisdiction? Answering 

the former in the affirmative and the latter in the negative, we 

hold that the District Court was mistaken in its conclusion that 

it lacked jurisdiction. Argueta did not raise new claims in his 

motion to reopen, and it therefore should not be construed as 

anything but a true Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Additionally, 

Argueta’s transfer out of New Jersey did not strip the District 
12

Court of jurisdiction. Based on the following analysis, we will 

reverse the District Court’s ruling and remand for further 

proceedings.

A.

We first look to whether the District Court erred in 

finding that Argueta’s motion, to the extent that it includes new 

claims, amounted to a new habeas petition. The District Court 

suggested that Argueta raised two new claims in his motion: 

First, his “right to a bond hearing under Zadvydas,” and, 

second, his “COVID-19-related concerns.” J.A. 3. As to the 

Zadvydas argument, it adopted the Government’s position that 

since the underlying change in Argueta’s statutory detention 

occurred after it denied his petition without prejudice, it should 

be viewed as a new claim. J.A. 3-4 (noting that “the case was 

closed when the matter became ripe for re-consideration”) 

(citing Opp. to Pet’r’s Mot. to Reopen 15-16). As to Argueta’s 

COVID-19 argument, the District Court simply construed it as 

a “new filing,” without providing further reasoning.3 J.A. 3. 

Because these reasons alone do not warrant the conversion of 

an ICE detainee’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion into a new habeas 

petition, we hold that the District Court’s reading of Argueta’s 

motion as a new habeas petition was in error. 

1.

3

 While not a part of the District Court’s reasoning, we note 

that Argueta filed his § 2241 petition almost an entire year prior 

to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
13

As an initial matter, we note that the Court has yet to 

consider the circumstances in which an ICE detainee’s Rule 

60(b)(6) motion, filed following a district court’s denial of a 

§ 2241 petition seeking relief from continued detention, may 

amount to a new habeas filing. It is widely recognized that 

petitioners seeking habeas relief under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

or § 2255 may seek relief from final judgment pursuant to Rule 

60(b), without the Rule 60(b) motion necessarily being 

construed as a new, or successive, habeas petition. See 

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005) (noting, in its 

analysis of Rule 60(b) in the context of a habeas case arising 

under § 2254, that “Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role 

to play in habeas cases”); see also Wilson v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of 

Corr., 782 F.3d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2015) (addressing Rule 60(b) 

in the context of a habeas case arising under § 2254); United 

States v. Arrington, 763 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(indicating that at least six Courts of Appeals, including the 

D.C. Circuit, have recognized Gonzalez in the context of cases 

arising under § 2255). Less well-established is the relationship 

between a Rule 60(b) motion and § 2241, particularly in the 

context of an ICE detainee seeking habeas relief from 

continued detention pursuant to § 2241. Yet, for the purposes 

of this appeal, our task is to define exactly that. Given the 

novelty of this narrow issue, and the lack of precedent 

definitively on point, we begin our inquiry by looking to how 

we have considered Rule 60(b) motions in the broader habeas 

context. 
14

The Supreme Court in Gonzalez held that a Rule 60(b) 

motion in the § 2254 context should be construed as a new 

habeas petition when it “seeks vindication” of a “claim,” i.e., 

when the Rule 60(b) motion advances “an asserted federal 

basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” 

545 U.S. at 530-31. This may occur, for example, when the 

Rule 60(b) motion “seeks to add a new ground for relief” or 

“attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on 

the merits.”4 Id. at 532 (emphasis omitted). The underlying 

4 As to the latter, the Gonzalez Court noted that “[t]he term ‘on 

the merits’ has multiple usages.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 

n.4. But here, it refers to “a determination that there exist or 

do not exist grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus 

relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and (d).” Id. So, “[w]hen a 

movant asserts one of those grounds (or asserts that a previous 

ruling regarding one of those grounds was in error) he is 

making a habeas corpus claim. He is not doing so when he 

merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits 

determination was in error – for example, a denial for such 

reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-oflimitations bar.” Id. 

We have previously applied this principle in the § 2253(c) 

context. In Bracey, the Court held that § 2253(c)’s certificate 

of appealability requirement extended to a § 2254 petitioner’s 

appeal of a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, in which the 

petitioner had requested the district court to reconsider its 

dismissal of his habeas petition on procedural grounds. Bracey 

v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274, 281-83 (3d Cir. 

2021). In reaching this conclusion, we recognized that 

“Gonzalez used ‘the merits’ to distinguish a ‘true Rule 60(b) 
15

rationale being that allowing such a “claim” to proceed by way 

of Rule 60(b) would create inconsistencies with the 

gatekeeping mechanism of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which, as relevant 

here, imposes limitations on a § 2254 petitioner’s ability to 

bring “second or successive” habeas petitions. Id. at 529-31; 

see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). What this means is that Gonzalez

restricts a petitioner from filing a “second or successive” 

habeas petition disguised as Rule 60(b) motion in order to 

bypass AEDPA’s gatekeeping mechanism. See Bracey v. 

Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 

2021). On the flip side, “[w]hen no ‘claim’ is presented, there 

is no basis for contending that the Rule 60(b) motion should be 

treated like a habeas corpus application,” because there is little 

risk that a petitioner is harnessing Rule 60(b) to circumvent 

AEDPA’s gatekeeping mechanism. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531, 

533.

In contrast, a habeas petition pursuant to § 2241 – like 

Argueta’s – is not subject to AEDPA’s gatekeeping 

mechanism. Zayas v. I.N.S., 311 F.3d 247, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(“The statutory text [of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)] does not in terms 

govern petitions under § 2241.”); see also Holland v. Warden 

Canaan USP, 998 F.3d 70, 74-75 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[Section]

2241 has no gatekeeping provision[.]”); Queen v. Miner, 530 

motion’ attacking a procedural defect from a disguised 

successive habeas petition attacking the substantive resolution 

of a habeas claim[.]” Id. at 282 (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 

531-32). The same reasoning applies here. 
16

F.3d 253, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (same). 

However, petitions under § 2241 are still subject to the 

predecessor of AEDPA’s gatekeeping mechanism: the abuse 

of the writ doctrine. Zayas, 311 F.3d at 257. The abuse of the 

writ doctrine, which “refers to a complex and evolving body of 

equitable principles informed and controlled by historical 

usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions,” 

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991), generally 

prohibits a petitioner under § 2241 from “rais[ing] new claims 

that could have been resolved in a previous action,” Queen, 530 

F.3d at 255; see also McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 496-98 (adopting 

a “cause and prejudice standard” under which to analyze 

whether a petition is barred under the abuse the writ doctrine). 

When considering the abuse of the writ doctrine in the context 

of a § 2241 proceeding, we do not consider it in a vacuum 

entirely distinct from the principles underlying AEDPA. 

Zayas, 311 F.3d at 257 (“[E]ven with respect to abuse of the 

writ scenarios not governed in terms by AEDPA, its provisions 

‘certainly inform [judicial] consideration.’”) (quoting 

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998)). Rather, our 

application of the doctrine “should be expected to yield a 

resolution in harmony with AEDPA.” Id.

With this expectation of harmony in mind, it follows 

that the underlying principle in Gonzalez – that a § 2254 

petitioner cannot use Rule 60(b) to sidestep an application of 

AEDPA’s gatekeeping mechanism – likewise resonates in the 

§ 2241 context, at least to the extent that a § 2241 petitioner 

cannot use Rule 60(b)(6) to sidestep an application of the abuse 
17

of the writ doctrine. For our limited purpose here, it need not 

matter that AEDPA imposes “sharply narrow[er]” limitations 

on “second or successive” petitions. 2 Randy Hertz & James 

S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 

28.3 (7th ed.). Instead, what is relevant is that both AEDPA’s 

gatekeeping mechanism and the abuse of the writ doctrine 

place limitations, whatever they may be, on a petitioner’s filing 

of a successive habeas petition. And a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, 

if it in substance constitutes a successive habeas petition, could 

conflict with these limitations. 

Therefore, turning back to Gonzalez for guidance, we 

look to its holding to clarify when a Rule 60(b)(6) motion 

amounts to a new, or successive, habeas petition in the context 

of an ICE detainee seeking relief from continued detention 

pursuant to § 2241. We hold that an ICE detainee’s Rule 

60(b)(6) motion amounts to a new habeas petition if it “seeks 

vindication” of a “claim,” i.e., when the Rule 60(b)(6) motion 

advances “an asserted federal basis for relief” from the 

continued detention. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530-31. Likewise, 

we adopt Gonzalez’s reasoning that such a “claim” may occur 

when the Rule 60(b)(6) motion “seeks to add a new ground for 

relief” or “attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a 

claim on the merits.” Id. (emphasis omitted). And if an ICE 

detainee’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion does not advance a “claim,” 

then “there is no basis for contending that [it] should be treated 

like a habeas corpus application.” Id. 
18

2.

The District Court, without citing to any authority, 

found that Argueta’s motion raised two new claims: 1) his 

“right to a bond hearing under Zadvydas,” and, 2) his “COVID19-related concerns.” J.A. 3. Thus, for the purposes of its 

jurisdictional inquiry, it treated Argueta’s motion as it would a 

new habeas petition. This was in error. 

Applying our adoption of Gonzalez to the § 2241 

context, Argueta’s Rule 60(b) motion cannot be construed as a 

new habeas petition because it does not “seek[] vindication” of 

a “claim.” Cf. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530-31. First, as to 

whether Argueta’s motion includes new grounds for relief, the 

answer is no. Argueta’s COVID-19 discussion is not a new 

ground for relief, it is merely a recital of reasons for why the 

District Court should find that there are “extraordinary 

circumstances” that favor it reopening his § 2241 petition. 

Mot. to Reopen 8-13 (“[E]xtraordinary circumstances exist 

requiring release because Mr. Argueta’s asthma, emphysema, 

PTSD and mental health concerns put him at heightened 

vulnerability of severe illness or death if infected by COVID19 while in immigration detention.”); Reply Br. 5 (“Petitioner 

offered the information about his medical conditions to support 

the argument that his prolonged detention was unconstitutional 

and immediate release continued to be the proper remedy.”). 

This is the exact type of “extraordinary circumstance” that 

petitioners are free to raise on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See 

Bracey, 986 F.3d at 284 (“A court may grant equitable relief 

under Rule 60(b)(6) ‘in extraordinary circumstances where, 
19

without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would 

occur.’”) (quoting Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 

2014)). 

Nevertheless, the Government urges us to consider 

Argueta’s COVID-19 discussion as a new claim because it was 

not raised in his § 2241 petition. Appellant’s Br. 12 (“[T]he 

claims Appellant seeks to raise here were not raised in his 

habeas petition because they were not ripe at that time. And 

Appellant’s COVID-related claims arose in March 2020 when 

the COVID-19 pandemic began in the United States.”). But 

the very nature of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion requires a 

consideration of “other reason[s] that justif[y] relief,” which 

may include those that were not “raised” in the underlying 

petition because they do not come to light until after the final 

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Viewing a novel 

discussion or argument made in a Rule 60(b)(6) motion as a 

new claim would essentially read Rule 60(b)(6) out of 

existence. Therefore, this reasoning alone does not merit a 

conclusion that Argueta’s COVID-19 discussion constitutes a 

new claim. 

Likewise, Argueta’s Zadvydas argument is not a new 

ground for relief. The District Court is correct that the 

underlying change in Argueta’s statutory detention occurred 

after it denied his petition without prejudice such that this 

argument was not “ripe” at the time it reviewed the § 2241 

petition. However, Argueta offers this discussion simply as 

another “reason” in support of his effort to obtain relief from 

final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). Mot. to Reopen 3, 5-7. 
20

Again, this argument alone does not support a conclusion that 

a Rule 60(b)(6) motion amounts to a new claim. 

Finally, Argueta’s motion does not “attack[] the federal 

court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.” Cf. 

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530-32 (emphasis omitted). The District 

Court denied Argueta’s petition, in sum, on a threshold 

determination that he was ineligible for immediate release due 

to the change in the statutory scheme governing his detention. 

See, e.g., J.A. 2 (“[T]he Court determined that Petitioner’s 

period of detention was not unconstitutional under 

Zadvydas[.]”). It did not address the merits of why the 

circumstances of his continued detention violated his right to 

due process under the Fifth Amendment and warranted 

immediate release. Argueta’s motion does not challenge the 

correctness of the District Court’s determination. Rather, as 

relevant to this point, Argueta merely asserts that the 

subsequent change in the statutory scheme governing his 

detention justifies the District Court reopening his § 2241 

petition and reaching more than a threshold determination as 

to reopening his habeas proceeding. Mot. to Reopen 3 (“Mr. 

Argueta moves to reopen the § 2241 habeas corpus petition as 

there is no constitutionally permissible basis for his continued 

detention.”); cf. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.4 (A Rule 60(b) 

movant “is not [making a habeas claim] when he merely asserts 

that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination 

was in error – for example, a denial for such reasons as failure 

to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar.”). 
21

Given that Argueta’s motion does not advance a 

“claim,” “there is no basis for contending that [it] should be 

treated like a habeas corpus application.” Id. at 531, 533. We 

do not clip the wings of Argueta’s motion: we view it as proper 

Rule 60(b) motion, that does not raise new habeas claims. The 

District Court erred in finding otherwise. To be sure, this is 

not to say that Argueta’s COVID-19 or Zadvydas arguments 

amount to the “extraordinary circumstances” that warrant a 

court to grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion on the merits – we make 

no determination of that here. Instead, we narrowly hold that 

the arguments Argueta raises in his motion fit within the 

parameters of what constitutes a proper Rule 60(b)(6) motion, 

and it should be treated as such. 

B.

We are next tasked with determining whether the 

District Court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction over 

Argueta’s motion. Viewing his motion as a new habeas 

petition, the District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction 

to entertain the filing due to Argueta’s transfer out of its 

territorial jurisdiction. It did not consider its jurisdiction to the 

extent that his motion did not amount to a new habeas petition. 

But, as addressed in the previous section, Argueta’s motion 

constitutes a proper Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and does not amount 

to a new habeas petition. Therefore, the District Court should 

have considered the effect of an ICE detainee’s transfer on a 

district court’s jurisdiction at the Rule 60(b) stage – not the 

§ 2241 filing stage. This error is fatal to the District Court’s 

analysis. Based on the following, we hold that the District 
22

Court retained jurisdiction over Argueta’s case despite his 

transfer outside of its territorial jurisdiction. 

1.

We recognize “[w]henever a § 2241 habeas petitioner 

seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the 

United States, he should name his warden as respondent and 

file the petition in the district of confinement.” Rumsfeld v. 

Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004); Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg 

USP, 868 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2017); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2242 and 2243. This is aptly called the “immediate custodian 

rule.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435. The logic of this rule rests in 

an understanding that “the warden . . . has day-to-day control 

over the prisoner and who can produce the actual body.” Yi v. 

Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 507 (3d Cir. 1994); see Wales v. 

Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885) (recognizing that governing 

body of habeas law “contemplate[s] a proceeding against some 

person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, 

with the power to produce the body of such party before the 

court or judge”) (emphasis added). “This rule . . . serves the 

important purpose of preventing forum shopping by habeas 

petitioners.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447. As the Padilla Court 

acknowledged: 

Without [this rule], a prisoner 

could name a high-level 

supervisory official as respondent 

and then sue that person wherever 

he is amenable to long-arm 
23

jurisdiction. The result would be 

rampant forum shopping, district 

courts with overlapping 

jurisdiction, and the very 

inconvenience, expense, and 

embarrassment Congress sought to 

avoid when it added the 

jurisdictional limitation 137 years 

ago.

Id.

For cases arising under § 2241, a district court evaluates 

its jurisdiction at least in part based on a proper application of 

the immediate custodian rule. United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 

263, 273-74 (4th Cir. 2008). “[S]election of the proper

respondent is critical to the question of jurisdiction because, 

‘[i]n habeas challenges to present physical confinement, . . . the 

district of confinement is synonymous with the district court 

that has territorial jurisdiction over the proper respondent.’” 

Id. at 273 (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 444). So if a § 2241 

petitioner does not adhere to the immediate custodian rule, then 

the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 

But what happens to a district court’s jurisdiction when 

the § 2241 petitioner, who has adhered to the immediate 

custodian rule, is transferred out of the court’s territorial 

jurisdiction after the proper filing of the petition? The 

Supreme Court addressed this question in Padilla: “[w]hen the 

Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files 
24

a petition naming her immediate custodian, the District Court 

retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent 

within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the 

prisoner’s release.” 542 U.S. at 441 (reaffirming its holding in 

Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 306-07 (1944)). The Supreme 

Court in Endo articulated that 

[the] objective [of habeas relief]

may be in no way impaired or 

defeated by the removal of the 

prisoner from the territorial 

jurisdiction of the District Court. 

That end may be served and the 

decree of the court made effective 

if a respondent who has custody of 

the prisoner is within reach of the 

court’s process even though the 

prisoner has been removed from 

the district since the suit was 

begun.

Endo, 323 U.S. at 307.5

5

 The applicability of Endo in the Rule 60(b) context also 

conforms with how a court evaluates petitioner transfers in the 

Rule 23(a) context. See Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 477 

n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that the court retains 

jurisdiction over a habeas petition despite the petitioner’s 

transfer when there was no application for transfer pursuant to 

Rule 23(a)); Meck v. Commanding Officer, Valley Forge Gen. 
25

Our precedent likewise reflects an adherence to the 

general rule articulated in Endo, that the government’s postfiling transfer of a § 2241 petitioner out of the court’s territorial 

jurisdiction does not strip the court of jurisdiction over the 

petition. In Ex parte Catanzaro, 138 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1943)

cert. denied 321 U.S. 793 (1944) – which was decided prior to 

Endo – the Court noted its skepticism at the belief that “passing 

about of the body of a prisoner from one custodian to another 

after a writ of habeas corpus has been applied for can defeat 

the jurisdiction of the Court to grant or refuse the writ on the 

merits of the application.” 138 F.2d at 101. The Court made 

clear that “where one has become subject to the jurisdiction of 

a court, the jurisdiction continues in all proceedings arising 

out of the litigation such as appeals and writs of error.” Id. 

(emphasis added). In the decades since Catanzaro and Endo, 

we have continuously applied this rule when reviewing similar 

jurisdictional inquiries. See, e.g., McGee v. Martinez, 490 F. 

App’x 505, 506 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that the post-filing

transfer of a § 2241 petitioner from a facility in Pennsylvania 

Hosp., 452 F.2d 758, 761 n.11 (3d Cir. 1971) (recognizing that 

“it is not clear that a suitable respondent with custody remained 

in this jurisdiction” but noting that “Rule 23 of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure makes it clear that the transfer of 

petitioner to another’s custody may not be a means of 

depriving the court of jurisdiction once it has attached”); see 

also Griffin v. Ebbert, 751 F.3d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 2014) 

(“Jurisdiction attached on that initial filing for habeas corpus 

relief, and it was not destroyed by the transfer of petitioner and 

accompanying custodial change.”) (internal citation omitted).
26

to one in Miami did not divest the district court of jurisdiction 

over the habeas petition, nor did it divest the Court of 

jurisdiction over the appeal); Brown v. Yates, 154 F. App’x 

319, 320 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that our Court retained 

jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal of the district court’s 

dismissal of his habeas petition despite his post-filing transfer 

from a facility in Pennsylvania to one in Kentucky); cf. 

Caballero v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 550, 558 (D.N.J. 

2001) (finding that the post-filing transfer of a petitioner out of 

state while his habeas petition was pending had “no effect” on 

the court’s jurisdiction).

2.

When Argueta filed the § 2241 petition in March 2019, 

he was detained in New Jersey, at the Hudson County 

Correctional Facility in Kearny. He named Ronald P. 

Edwards, in his official capacity as Director of the Hudson 

County Correctional Facility, as a respondent, and he filed the 

petition in his district of confinement, the District of New 

Jersey. There is no dispute, be it about an application of the 

immediate custodian rule or otherwise, that the District Court 

acquired jurisdiction over Argueta’s § 2241 petition.

The Government transferred Argueta out of New Jersey 

on October 1, 2019 – the same day that the District Court 

denied his petition without prejudice. Applying the Supreme 

Court’s holding in Endo that “when the Government moves a 

habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her 

immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction,” 
27

our analysis is straightforward: the District Court retained 

jurisdiction following Argueta’s transfer out of New Jersey 

because it already had acquired jurisdiction over Argueta’s 

properly filed habeas petition that named his then-immediate 

custodian, the director of the Hudson County Correctional 

Facility. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441 (reaffirming Endo’s 

“important but limited” holding concerning the post-filing 

transfer of a § 2241 petitioner); Endo, 323 U.S. at 307. This 

conclusion conforms with our long-held belief that “passing 

about of the body of a prisoner from one custodian to another 

after a writ of habeas corpus has been applied” does not defeat 

the jurisdiction of the Court to consider the merits of the habeas 

petition. Catanzaro, 138 F.2d at 101.

While our analysis need not go further, we address the 

Government’s arguments in turn.

The Government’s position rests heavily on the same 

faulty reasoning of the District Court, namely that Argueta’s 

motion constitutes a new habeas petition. Accordingly, the 

Government suggests that Endo is distinguishable because, 

unlike the petitioner in Endo who “was transferred while her 

direct appeal was pending in the court of appeals,” Argueta 

“had no open habeas petition pending in New Jersey at the time 

his new claims arose.” Appellant’s Br. 13. It may be true that 

if Argueta’s motion amounted to a new habeas petition, then 

the Court would lack jurisdiction pursuant to an application of 

the immediate custodian rule at the time that these new claims 

arose (i.e., in April 2020). See, e.g., Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441 

(noting the inapplicability of Endo where the petitioner was 
28

transferred out of the territorial jurisdiction of the court prior 

to the filing of the habeas petition). But that is not the question 

at issue here.

6

 

Similarly, the Government contends that “[i]f the Court 

adopts [Argueta’s] position that a closed habeas petition should 

be reopened to raise new claims that arose in another 

jurisdiction under another custodian, there would be an 

opportunity for forum shopping.” Appellant’s Br. 14. The 

Government suggests that this gamesmanship not only 

undermines the immediate custodian rule, but it also would 

allow a petitioner the “choice to pursue a habeas claim in their 

current jurisdiction or pursue those claims in another 

jurisdiction.” Id. at 15. Again, this forum-shopping argument 

is relevant to the scope and purpose of the immediate custodian 

rule, and may have a role to play in Argueta’s case if his motion 

in fact amounted to a new habeas petition. See, e.g., Padilla, 

542 U.S. at 447 (noting that the immediate custodian rule 

prevents “a prisoner . . . nam[ing] a high-level supervisory 

official as respondent and then su[ing] that person wherever he 

is amenable to long-arm jurisdiction. The result . . . be[ing] 

rampant forum shopping, district courts with overlapping 

6

 Applying Padilla, the District Court construed Argueta’s 

motion as a “new filing” that failed to satisfy the immediate 

custodian rule because he was not detained in New Jersey at 

the time of its filing. J.A. 3 (“[F]or core habeas petitions 

challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in 

only one district: the district of confinement.”) (quoting 

Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442-43). 
29

jurisdiction, and the very inconvenience, expense, and 

embarrassment Congress sought to avoid when it added the 

jurisdictional limitation 137 years ago.”). But the Government 

misses the point – Argueta’s motion does not amount to a new 

habeas petition, and the forum-shopping concerns articulated 

do not have the vigor in the context of a Rule 60(b) motion. 

In actuality, the Rule 60(b) context raises new forumshopping concerns, not on the part of the petitioner but instead 

the Government. Should Endo not apply in the Rule 60(b) 

context, then the Government – as Argueta correctly notes –

“would effectively be permitted to forum shop if the sudden 

transfer of a detainee resulted in the loss of jurisdiction over a 

prolonged detention habeas.” Appellant’s Br. 30. In other 

words, the Government could willingly transfer an ICE 

detainee seeking habeas relief from continued detention to a 

jurisdiction that is more amenable to the Government’s 

position, or the Government could transfer an ICE detainee for 

the purpose of intentionally introducing complicated 

jurisdictional defects to delay the merits review of already 

lengthy § 2241 claims. Taken to an extreme, the Government 

could transfer a petitioner with such consistency as to evade a 

district court ever even obtaining jurisdiction over a 

petitioner’s § 2241 claims. 

These forum-shopping concerns intensify when the 

§ 2241 petitioner is an ICE detainee. According to Argueta, 

the Government has “broad authority to move ICE detainees,” 

which occurs “often . . . without notice.” Appellant’s Br. 30 

n.3. The frequency and circumstances surrounding such 
30

transfers can have negative repercussions on ICE detainees, 

particularly those seeking federal habeas relief. See, e.g., id.

(indicating that the Government “often repeatedly” moves ICE 

detainees to “remote locations far from counsel or their 

community” without informing counsel of the transfer or 

updating the “ICE detainee locator”). As noted, the 

Government has transferred Argueta at least 15 times to 6 

different facilities in 4 different states. When continuous 

transfer permeates the reality of ICE detention, it suggests that 

the Government has the machinery already in place to permit 

extensive forum shopping. Allowing a district court to retain 

jurisdiction for all post-filing proceedings, including a Rule 

60(b) motion, despite a detainee’s transfer out of the territorial 

jurisdiction of the district court in which the § 2241 petition 

was filed, would minimize incentives for Government abuse of 

the already turbulent ICE transfer process. See Catanzaro, 138 

F.2d at 101 (“[W]here one has become subject to the 

jurisdiction of a court, the jurisdiction continues in all 

proceedings arising out of the litigation such as appeals and 

writs of error.”) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Tulane University 

Law School Immigration Rights Clinic, No End in Sight: 

Prolonged and Punitive Immigration Detention in Louisiana

(2021) (discussing “shadow wins” – voluntary administrative 

releases of ICE detainees petitioning for habeas relief made 

prior to a habeas court’s merits determination – and suggesting 

that these “wins” may allow the Government “to avoid 

negative court decisions that make formal rulings regarding

prolonged, indefinite and punitive detention”) 
31

* * * * *

In sum, it was in error for the District Court to hold that 

it lacked jurisdiction over Argueta’s habeas petition despite his 

transfer out of its territorial jurisdiction. An ICE detainee’s 

Rule 60(b)(6) motion should be treated as a true Rule 60(b) 

motion, and not a successive habeas petition, unless it “seeks

vindication” of a “claim.” As Argueta’s motion neither raised 

new grounds for relief nor attacked the District Court’s prior 

ruling on the merits, the District Court erred in construing 

Argueta’s motion as a new habeas petition. Given that his 

motion did not amount to a new habeas petition, the District 

Court’s determination as to the effect of his transfer on its 

jurisdiction was fatally flawed. Rather, after a district court 

acquires jurisdiction over an ICE detainee’s § 2241 petition for 

relief from continued detention, the Government’s transfer of 

the detainee outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction does 

not strip that court of jurisdiction to entertain a true Rule 60(b) 

motion filed subsequent to the transfer. 

Therefore, we reverse the District Court’s decision and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, to 

include, should it be necessary, addressing whether it “may 

direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has 

legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release,” Padilla, 

542 U.S. at 441, or transfer Argueta’s § 2241 proceedings to 

another court’s jurisdiction. 
32

C.

Argueta urges us to reach the merits of his motion to 

reopen, suggesting that our evaluation of the motion’s 

substance should hinge on whether his prolonged detention 

qualifies as an “extraordinary circumstance.”7 

7

 Argueta seemingly weaves into his analysis an argument that 

we should also evaluate whether the prolonged detention claim 

forming the basis of his underlying § 2241 petition warrants 

relief. While his prolonged detention claim might merit relief 

in some circumstances, we lack appellate jurisdiction to make 

this determination. Argueta has not appealed the District 

Court’s October 2019 denial of his § 2241 petition. Rather, 

pursuant to the notice of appeal filed August 10, 2020, he 

confines the scope of our review to the District Court’s denial 

of his motion to reopen – which, again, we are construing as a 

Rule 60(b)(6) motion. As relevant here, an appeal limited to 

review of a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion does 

not subsume review of the appellant’s underlying habeas 

petition. See Browder v. Dir. Dep’t of Corrs., 434 U.S. 257, 

263 n.7 (1978) (“[A]n appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief 

does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.”); 

Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 405-06 (3d Cir. 2015); see also 

Wenger v. O’Brien, 221 F.3d 1340, 2000 WL 874844, at *1 

(7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (applying 

Browder when the appellant’s underlying habeas petition 

arises pursuant to § 2241). Therefore, we reserve any judgment 

on the merits of Argueta’s § 2241 petition and leave it to the 

District Court on remand to consider, if necessary, whether his 

prolonged detention claim warrants relief. 
33

The District Court denied Argueta’s motion to reopen 

on threshold issues without performing the requisite 

substantive analysis pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). Because we 

lack a decision from the District Court on whether the merits 

of Argueta’s motion warrant relief – and because “[t]he grant 

or denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is an equitable matter left, 

in the first instance, to the discretion of a district court” – we 

leave it to the District Court on remand to discuss in the first 

instance whether Argueta satisfies the requisite standard under 

Rule 60(b)(6). Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 2014);

accord Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 149 

(3d Cir. 2016) (“As a general rule, ‘a federal appellate court 

does not consider an issue not passed upon below.’”) (quoting

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)); PDK Laby’s, 

Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., 

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (reiterating 

“the cardinal principle of judicial restraint – if it is not 

necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more”). 

IV.

For these reasons, we will reverse the order of the 

District Court denying Argueta’s motion to reopen and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.