### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 1, 200 5
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA CK T. TRA NS OU
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty No. 02-359 Roy B. Mor gan, Jr., Judge

No. W2004-01475-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jun e 30, 2005

The de fendant, Mack T. Transou, st ands convicted of rape and sexual battery , for which he re ceive d
an ef fe ct i v e s i x t ee n -y ea r s en t en ce

. Aggr i ev ed o f h i s co n v i ct i o n s an d s en t en ce , t h e d ef en d an tb ri n gs the instant appea l challeng ing the trial court’ s denial of his moti on to suppress DNA e vidence and the impositi on of his sentenc e in violation of his rig ht to trial by jury . Following our re view upon the re cord, w e af

firm the def

endant’ s convictions and sente nce.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt s o f theCi r c uit Co ur t a r e Affir m e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL a ndJ.C. M C LIN , J J ., joined.
Mike Mosier, Jackson, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Mack T. Tr ansou.
Paul G. S u m m er s , At t o rn eyGe n er al & R ep o rt er ; R en ee W

. T u rn er , As s i s t an tAt t o rn ey General; Jerry Woodall, Dist rict Attorney Gene ral; and Jody

Pickens, Assistant D istrict A ttorney Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

B e c aus e thede fe nd a nt d oe s n ot atta c k th e su ff ic ie nc y of thee vid e nc e to s up po rt his two convictions, we w ill only summarize those fac ts r elevant to the issue whether the DNA e vidence collecte d from the de fendant should have been suppressed. The defendant was pre viouslyconvicted of being a habitual motor off ender and beg an serving his inca rce rative se ntence for that offe nse on Se pte mbe r 7 , 1 99 9. As pa rt of theint ake pr oc e ss in 199 9, theinc omi ng inm a te s r e c e ive d p hy sic a ls and had blood sa mples drawn to test for , inte r a lia , communicable dise ases. The incoming inmate s all r e c e iv e d s e v e r a l f

o r ms , o n e o f w h ic h w a s a c o n s e n t f o r m to a ll o w a T e n n e s s e e D e p artment of Correc tion (TDOC) ag ent to draw a blood sample. As indicated on the form, the inmate s had a right to refuse to consent. I f an inmate ref used to sign the form, the TDO C wo u l d conduct a n administrative hea

ring on the matter. Acc ording to the defe ndant, the usual re sult of this proceedingT he defendan t su bm i t t ed bl oo d s amp l es o n t hr ee di f fer ent occas i ons

. T he f

i r s t bl oo d s amp l e wa s gi ven 1
i n 1999 , as out l i ned a bo ve. In 200 0 t he defendan t s ubmi t t ed a s econd bl oo d s amp l e a t t he com mencemen t of an
u n r el at ed s en t en ce a s pa r t of t h e i n t ak e pr oce s s a t t h e s ame pe n al i n s t i t u t i on w h er e h e s u bmi t t ed a bl ood s ampl e i n 1999. H o wever, a D N A pro f

i l e generat ed f

rom t he second b l o o d s am p l e was not ent ered i nt o t he C O D IS d at ab ase bec ause t he def en dan t ’ s D N A pr of

i l e h ad bee n e n t er ed i n 1999. As di s cu s s ed i n f ra , t h e def

en dan t g av e a t h i r d bl ood s ampl e i n 2002 whe n po l i ce i dent i f

i ed hi m as a s us pect f or t he i ns t ant cri mes af t er t he defendan t ’ s 199 9- gen er at ed D N A prof i l e mat che d the D N A p ro fil e e x tra p o la te d fro m the vic tim ’s ra p e kit.

I t i s t he po l i cy of

t hi s cour t t o re f

r ai n f r om r ef er r i ng t o vi ct i ms of

s exu al cr i mes by na me. 2

D uri ng t he p o l i ce i nt errogat i o n, only t he i nt ervi ewing o f f i cer and t he d efend ant were present , and t he 3
i nt ervi ew wa s nei t her vi d eo

- t ap ed nor aud i o

- reco rded

. A t t he co ncl usi o n o f th e s up p res si o n heari ng, t he t ri al co urt specif i cal l y accred i t ed t he o f

f i cer’ s t est i m o ny t hat the d efend ant ref used t o si gn a w ai ver f

o rm and m ake a st at em ent but d i d s i gn t he 2 0 0 2 co nsent fo rm all o wi ng t he p o l i ce t o c o l l ect a b l o o d sam p l e f rom hi m

. Furt herm o re, af t er not i ng t he

cour t ’ s fam i l i ari t y wi t h t he defendan t ’ s s i gn at ur e a nd comp ar i ng t he s i gn at ur e on t he 20 02 cons ent form t o known

exam p l ars of t he d efend ant ’ s si gnat ure, t he t ri al co urt fo und t hat t he si gnat ure on t he co nsent fo rm wa s i nd eed t he (c o n tinu e d ...)
-2- wo uldbe that th e de fe nd a nt w ou ld b e ta xed the c os t of the he ari ng , wou ld los e se nte nc ing c re dit s, and would neve rtheless be forc ed to provide a blood sample.

When the defe ndant was pr esente d with the consent form on September 7, 1999, he signe d the form on t h e l i ne indicating that he conse nted to providing the blood sample. The defe ndant left blank a

second sig nature line indicating he refused to consent, and he sig ned the f orm on a no the r l ineind ic a tin g that he ha d re a d the e nti re fo rm a nd un de rs too d the c on te nts of thefo rm

. Sub se qu e ntl y , a

TD OC a g e nt dre w a sa mpl e of the de fe nd a nt’ s blo od , a nd the re su lti ng DN A p ro fi le g ener ated f

rom that blood sample was pla ced in the Combined DN A Ind ex S y s t em (CODI S), a data ba se c on ta ini ng theDN A p ro fi le s o f c on vic te d o ff e nd e rs

. 1

OnMa rc h 1 7, 20 02 , th e de fe nd a nt e nte re d th e be dr oo m of C.T ., a 62 -y e ar- old 2

wo ma n li vin g in a

bo ard ing ho us e in Jac ks on , Te nn e sse e

. Th e de fe nd a nt v a g ina lly ra pe d th e vic tim and performed or al sex on her. After she re ported the r ape to police , investigating of fice rs broug ht the victim to a hospital where medical profe ssionals pe rformed a rape -kit examination on her. The
e x a m i n a t i o n r e c o v e r e d a s e m e n s a m p l e , f

r o mw h i c h T e n n e s s e e B u r e au o f In v e s t i g a t i o n ( T B I) fore nsic ana ly s ts ex trapolate d a DNAprofile. This prof ile was then e ntere d into CODI S, and the databa se matche d the def endant’ s DNA prof

ile to that of the victim’s assailant.
Subsequently , police office rs arr ested the defe ndant on May 15, 2002, and the defe ndant was he ld overnig ht until a police office r interview ed him the following morning . The office r testified that he interviewe d the defe ndant to le arn more a bout the defe ndant’s involvement in t he ins t a n t c r i m e a n d a l s o t o o b t a i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s D N A f

o r g e n e r a t i n g a D N A p r o f i l e

. Th is DNA pr ofile wou l d t h en be compare d with the defe ndant’s 1999 prof ile and the victim’s perpe trator’ s profile, ther eby confirming that the def

endant wa s indeed the pe rpetrator. During the interview, the defe ndant refused to sign a waiver of hi s constitutional rig hts and make a stateme nt about the instant crime. H e did, howeve r, sig n a conse nt form allowing the police to collec t a blood sample fr om him. There afte r, t he poli ce transported the defe ndant t o a familyprac tice ce nter whe re 3(

. . . con t i n u ed) 3
d e fen d a n t’s sign a tur e , d e sp ite th e d e fen d a n t’s ass e rtio n s to the c o n tra ry.
-3- his blo odwa s dr a wn , a ndtheblo odsa mpl e wa s th e n tr a ns po rt e d to theTB I c ri me la b f or a na ly sis

. The re sulting DNA profile confirme d that the defe ndant’s DNA profile matched the profile of the victim’s perpe trator.

Pre-tria l, the defe ndant moved to suppress this e v id e n c e , a n d f o ll o w in g an evide ntiary hearing, the trial court de nied the motion. Specifica lly , the trial court found that the statute r equiring that inmate s allow collec tion of blood samples for DN A profiling was not applica ble to the def

endant when the T DOC ag ent collec ted his blood on September 7, 1999, bec ause the s t at u t e wa s not eff ective w hen the de fendant committed the crime for wh i ch he w as then be ing inc arc erated. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 40- 35 -3 21 (d )( 1) (2 00 3) (r e qu iring that “ a pe rs on c on vic te d o f any

fe lon y of fe ns e commi t t ed o n o r after July 1, 1998” shall be r equire d “to provide a biologica l specimen for

the purpose of DNA analy sis”). Howeve r, the court found that the September 7, 1999 blood sample was not collected in c ontrave ntion of the defe ndant’s ri gh ts because the de fendant consented to the proce dure. Spec ifically , the court found that t h e TDO C ag ents explained the consent f orm to the defendant and that he had an opportunity to refuse to consent and did not do so. Moreove r, the defe ndant explained his reasons f or conse nting to the proce dure. Noting the de fendant’s extensive criminal history

and familiaritywith the TDOC sy stem, the court found that the defe ndant conse nted to theSe pte mbe r 7 , 1 99 9 b loo d c oll e c tio n a ft e r b e ing a dv ise d a ndha vin g a n o pp ortun ity to r e fu se t o c o n s e n t

. T h e c o u rtf

u rt h e r f o u n d t h a tt h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s M a y 1 6 , 2 0 0 2 c o n s e n tw a s a l s o v o l u n t ar i l y, knowing ly , and intellige ntly made. In so fi n ding, the court found the defe ndant’s testimony incre di b l e but acc redited the testimonyof the off icer who witnessed the de fendant sign the 2002
c on se nt f orm.

I n the instant appea l, the defe ndant challeng es the trial court’s admission of his DNA
e vid e nc e on theba sis that th e e vid e nc e wa s c oll e c te d inc on tr a ve ntion of his c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts
a g a ins t un re a so na

ble searc he s a ndse izur e s a ndhis se nte nc e a s b e ing imp os e d invio latio n o f h is rig ht to trial by

jury . Ba sed on the following anal y s i s , we a ffirm the lowe r court’s admission of evidenc e and the defe ndant’s sente nce. Suppression of DNA E vidence

The de fendant arg ues that the trial c ourt err oneously ad m i t t ed the DNA pr ofiles g e ne rate d f

ro m hi s il le g a lly obta ine d b loo d s a mpl e s. Spe c if ic a lly , th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t hi s blood samples wer e collec ted in violation of his rights ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures and that this evidenc e was the sole basis for his c onvictions. The defe ndant aver s that the collec tion of b lo o d s a mp le s a n d s u b s e q u e n t a n a ly s is is a s e ar c h a n d s e iz u r e th a t f a ll s w ith in th e p u rview of F ou rth A me nd me nt p ro te c tio n a ndthat th e de fe nd a nt’ s b loo d s a mpl e wa s c o l l e c t e d w ith ou t pr ob able
c aus e , in div idu a lize d s us pic ion , o r i n f urthe ranc e of

a ny “ sp e c ia l ne e ds ,” thu s vio lat in g his constitutional protection. The defe ndant also contends that his c onsent to both of these sea rche s and seizures was inef

fec tual beca

use his consent to the 1999 blood collec tion was made unde r dure ss and-4-

threat of disciplinary

action if he ref

used to consent and beca

use his 2002 consent was made afte r being detained for 12 hours without c ounsel, under duress by threats to obtain a warr ant for the blood collection if the de fendant refuse d to consent. In response , the state c ounters, inte r a lia , that the de fe nd a nt kno wi ng ly , in te lli g e ntl y , a ndvo lun tari ly c on se nte d to bo th b loo d c oll e c tio ns

. A trial court’s finding s of fact m ade in relation to a suppression hearing a re binding upon this court unless the evidenc e contained in the re cord pr ep o n d er at es ag ainst them. State v. Ro ss , 4 9 S. W.3 d 8 33 , 8 39 (Ten n. 20 01 ). Mo re ov e r, thetria l c ou rt , a s th e trie r o f f a c t, i s a bleto assess the c redibility

of the witnesses, determine the weig ht and value to beaff orded the evidenc e, and re s o l v e anyconflicts in the evide nce. State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) . On
app e a l th e pr e va ili ng pa

rty is e nti tle d to thestr on g e st l e g iti mate vie w o f th e e vid e nc e a nda ll
rea sonable infe renc es dra wn there from. State v. Hick s , 55 S.W .3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 20 0 1 ). T he de fe nd a nt, a s th e no np re va ili ng pa rty , ha s the bu rd e n of e sta bli sh ing that th e e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in t he re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst the finding s of fa ct made by the trial court. Br

az ie l v . S tate , 529 S. W

. 2 d 5 01, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975) . Howeve r, this court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law

. State v. Simpson , 968 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998) . We review de novo the application of the law to the trial court’s findings of fac t. State v. Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000).

“Ac cording to both the Fourth Ame ndment and [A]rti cle I , § 7 of the Te nn es s ee Constit u t i o n , ‘a w arr antless sea rch or seizure is presumed unr easona ble, and e vidence discovere d
as a r esult there of i s subject t o suppression unl ess t he S tate demonstrates that the sea rch or seizure
was c onducted pur suant to one of the nar rowly define d exceptions to the warr ant re quirement.’” See State v. Randolph , 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d 330, 334 (Tenn. 2002) . It is well settled that a sea rch c onducted pursuant to a volunt ary

consent is an e x ception to the wa rrant require ment. State v. Bartram , 925 S

. W

. 2 d 2 2 7 , 2 3 0 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Sc hn e c k lot h v . B us tam on te , 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. C t. 2041 (1973))

. “[T] o pass constitutional muster, consent to sea rch mu s t b e u nequivoca l, specific, intelligently g iven, and uncontaminated by duress or coe rcion.” Sta te v . B ro wn , 836 S.W .2d 530, 54 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . The qu e sti on wh e the r the app e llant v olu nta ri ly c on se nte d to these arc h is a question of fa ct which focuse s upon the totality of the c ircumstance s. Sc hn e c k lot h , 412 U.S. at 248- 49. T h e fo l l o wi n g factors areused to eva luate the voluntariness of the c onsent: (1) whe ther the defe ndant is in custody ; (2) the leng th of detention prior to the giving of consent; (3) the pre sence of coe rcive police proc edure s; (4) the defe ndant’s awa rene ss of the rig ht to ref

use to consent; (5) the def e n d an t’ s a g e , e du c ati o n , an d in te ll ig ence ; (6) whe ther the de fendant understands his constitutional rig hts; (7) the extent of the def endant’ s prior experienc e with law e nforc ement; and ( 8) whe ther the defe ndant was injure d, intox icated, or in ill health. See, e .g., State v. Carter , 16 S.W .3d 762, 769 (Tenn. 2000) . Moreove r, the state must show “mor e than ac q u iesce nce to a claim of law ful authority .” Bumper v . North C arolina , 391 U.S. 543, 549, 88 S. C t. 1788 (1968). T h e b u rd en of proof r ests upon the state to show, by a p re p o nderance of the evidenc e, that the c onsent to a
war rantless sea

rch w as g iven fre ely

and voluntarily

. Id. at 548.-5- I n the instant case , we hold that the evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s de termination that the def endant’ s 1999 and 2002 conse nts were valid. The trial c ourt found that the def

endant c onsented to provide a bl ood sample i n 1999 afte r being advised of the proce dure and his rig ht to consent or re fuse:

As to the issue dea ling with the biolog ica l specimen that wa s taken wh ile thi s D e fe nd a nt w a s intheTe nn e sse e State Pe nit e nti ary , I no te t wo or threethings. It was very clea r that the individuals, as Mr. Tr a ns ou a ls o tes tif

ie d to , a rebr ou g ht i n a

g ro up . It mi g ht b e 10 , it might be 20 or s o m ew h ere in betwee n, and they are advised of the pr oc e du re . T he pr oc e du reun de r w hic h M r. Tr a ns ou wa s ta ke n in dealt with this statute requiring DNA analy sis, but it’s ve ry clea r fr om thec on se nt f

orms, 2A a nd2B , le t’ s tal k a bo ut 2 A f ir st, that it

wa s a consent for

DNA analy sis. It does st ate – set forth the statute and the conseque nces of

not giving it and the require ment of the law to g ive it, bu t it a lso c le arl y

ha s th e pr ov isi on fo r the de fe nd a nt t o r efus e to part i cipate in the testing proc ess, eve n though the re may be conseque nces, as the De fendant testified to. But the prior witnesses te sti fi e d th a t th is i s e xpla ine d, inc lud ing theri g ht t o r efus e and thi s Def endant did – as he ’s testified, this is his signature. He did sign the form on S ep tember the 7th of ‘99 g iving c onsent to take the biologica l specimen. He had a c hanceto refuse . The only thing that
c oncern s th e co urt is it’ s b e ing take n u nd e r the c ir c ums ta nc e s a s if that st a tut e re qu ir e d it . I no te that a s a

sim ila r s itu ati on on thi s Aug ust the 9th of 2000[si c]. Ag ain, t he same type form, consent for DNA analy sis, same type [sic] circ umstances, a gai n the Def endant g iven an opportunityt o ref use it but didn’t. He has his own
e xp l a n a t i o n a s t o w h y

h e d i d n ’ tr e f

u s e i ta n d t h a t ’ s t h a th e w o u ld suffe r conse quence s if he didn’t, but he i s well ex perie nced in the TDOC sy stem, in the way i t o p er ates. He eve n testified he kne w wh e n th e la w [r e qu ir in g a b iol og ic a l sp e c ime n f or DN A ana ly sis ] took effe ct. I fi n d t hat he f ree ly , voluntarily

and intellige ntly

knew what he was doing at the time he sig ned the f orm g iving c onsent for that specimen on both those oc casions, after be ing g iven the opportunity

to refuse

. The de fendant challeng es these f indings by

arg uing that h e s igne d his 1999 consent form unde r duress. At his suppression hea ring , the def

endant testified that he was a wa re t hat there could be
ne g a tiv e c on se qu e nc e s if he c ho se to re fu se to c on se nt to the blo od c oll e c tio n, a ndthe re fo rehe did
no t ha ve a n a c tua l c ho ic e re g ard ing wheth er to submi t to thepr oc e du re . H ow e ve r, TD OC a g e nts informed the de fendant of the blood co l l ection process and e x plained the c onsent form to the defe ndant. The c onsent fo rm itself indicates that only those who have been c onvicted of a felony offe nse on or a fter July 1, 1998 are require d to pr ovide a biologica l spe cimen for DNA analy sis. The-6-

form also c ontains th re e s i gn ature lines. A signature on one line indicates that the unde rsig ned consents to the blood collec tion; a signature on a second line indicates that the under signe d ref uses to consent to the blood collec tion; a signature on a third line indicates that the unde rsig ned has r ead and understands the contents of the form. The de fendant’s two signatures re flec t that he conse nted to the blood collection and that he had re ad the e ntire form and under stood its cont en t s. Thus, he was pr o v i d ed with an opportunityto refuse to consent and did not do so. Any threat of future disciplinary

action that the defe ndant believed would befa ll him if he ref used to c onsent to the blood collection did not equate to eliminating his rig ht to refuse

. See B rown, 836 S.W .2d at 547 (sig nature
on a c on se nt f orm that re fe re nc e d th e de fe nd a nt’ s rig ht t o r e fu se va lid a te d th e re su lti ng se arc h) ; c f. Bumper , 3 91 U. S. at 55 0, 88 S. Ct . at 17 92 (h old ing that a de fe nd a nt’ s c on se nt to se arc h w a s in va lid wh e n th e de fe nd a nt c on se nte d a ft e r p oli c e c la ime d to ha ve a wa rr a nt t o sea

rc h the de fe nd a nt’ s h ome beca use the police action conve y ed that the de fendant had “no right to re sist the searc h”).

Furthermore , we f

ind that the rec ord does not pre ponderate against the trial court’s fi nd ing that th e de fe nd a nt’ s c on se nt t o a llo w po lic e to c oll e c t his blo od in 20 02 wa s v a lid , a s w e ll. At thesu pp re ssi on he ari ng , th e de fe nd a nt c la ime d th a t hedidno t si g n th e 20 02 c on se nt f orm. Howeve r, the intervie wing police officer testified that he witnesse d the def endant sig n this form, and the trial court specifica lly acc redited his testimony

and discre dited the def

endant’ s testimony

. See Odom , 928 S.W .2d at 23 (trial c ourt is in the best position t o assess the c redibility of the witnesse s). Furthermore , afte r noting the court’s familiarity with the defe ndant’s sig nature and compa ring the signature on the c onsent form to known e x emplars of the def endant’ s signature, the tria l court found that the sig nature on the conse nt form was indeed the defe ndant’s sig nature . Acc ording ly , the court found tha t th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s c o n s e n t w a s v o lu n ta r il y a n d in te ll ig e n tl y ma d e

. T h e e v id e n c e in the
re co rd d o es n o tp re p o n d er at e a gai n s tt h i s fi n d i n g.

Th us , exam ini ng the tot a lit y of the c ir c ums ta nc e s, we ho ld that th e re c or d s up po rt s the finding that the def

endant knowing ly , intelligently , and voluntarily consente d to both blood sample collec tions.
Violation of Right to J ury Trial

The de fendant n ext challeng es his sentenc e on the ba sis that the trial court
e rr on e ou sly

app lie d e nh ancem e nt f

a c tor s to his se nte nc e in v iol a tio n o f h is c on sti tut ion a l rig ht t o trial by jury

. Specifica lly , the defe ndant contends that pursuant to Blakely v. W ashington , 5 42 U. S. __, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), s ev er al o f t he enhanceme nt fac tors requirea jury finding of applicabili t y

. Howeve r, our Te nnessee Supreme Court has r ece ntly held that notwithstanding the United S tates S upreme Court’s holding in Bl ake ly , the Tenne ssee se ntencing structure does not run afoul of the Six th Amendment. State v. Gome z , __ S.W. 3d

__ , No . M 20 02 -0 12 09 -S C- R11 -C D, sli p op. at 27 (Te nn. Apr

. 1 5, 2005), petitions for r eh’g de nied , (May 2005). Ac cording ly , the de fe nd a nt’ s a lle g a tio n o f e rr or la c ks me ri t.

I n conclusion, none of

the def endant’ s alleg ations merit relief , and ther ef

o re , the defe ndant’s convic tions and sentenceare aff irmed.-7- ___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE