### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE O ct obe r 28, 200 4 S es sio n DON SMI TH FORD, LI NCOLN-ME RCURY, INC. v. DOUG BO LI NGER, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Gr eene C ounty No. 02CV201 Ben K . Wexler , Judge

No. E2003-02764-COA- R3-CV - F ILED MARCH 29, 2005

Don Smith Ford, Lincoln-Mer cury , I nc. sued D oug Boling er ba sed upon theorie s of negligent misrepre sentation, brea ch of c ontrac t and violatio n s o f the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act (“the TCP A” ). Th e plaint if

f a ve rr e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt f a ile d to dis c los e su bs ta nti a l body da ma g e to h is vehicle, w hich vehicle the def endant tra ded to the plainti ff in connec tion with his purcha se fr om the plaintiff of a

new F ord Ex plorer. T he def endant de nied the plaintiff’ s alleg ations and filed athirdpart y co m p l ai nt ag ainst previous owne rs of the ve hicle, Ga ry Hoese , dba Ga

ry ’s Used Car s (“H oese” ) and Ea st Gate Motors, Inc. (“ East Gate ”). The defe ndant’s third-pa rty complaint is based upon alleg ed common law violations and upon the theory that Hoese an d E as t Gate violate d the TCPA in failing to disclose the c ondition of the vehicle’ s titl e. T h e trial court f ound that the defe ndant was liable to the plaintiff for neg lige ntly misrepre senting the condition of the ve hicle and awa rded it dama g es in the amount of $17,085. I n addition, the trial court dismissed the def endant’ s third-party

claims ag ainst Hoese and East Gate and, without stating the basis of its action, awa rded attorney ’s fee s to the m, a s well as to the plaintiff. The defe ndant appe als, arg uing, inte r a lia , that the tria l c o u r t e rr e d in f

in d in g h im li ab le f

o r n e g li g e n t mi s r e p r e s e n tati o n ; th a t th e tria l c o u rt err ed in failing to hold Hoese a nd East Gate liable to t h e defe ndant; and that the tria l court’s a war ds of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s w a s imp ro pe r. We v a c a te the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fe e a wa rd s to the plaint if

f, Ho e se , a ndEa st Gate pe nd ing fu rthe r p ro c e e din g s in the tr ia l c ou rt . T he ba la nc e of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ju dgment is aff irmed. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Va c at e d in P ar t a nd A ffirm e d in P ar t; Ca se Re m ande d wit h Ins tr uc ti ons
C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.
Mark D. E dmonds, J onesboroug h, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Doug Boling er.
E. Ronald Che s n u t, Gr e e n e v il le, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, D on Smit h For d, L incoln-Mer cury , I nc.T he st atem en t co ntains o t he r q ue st i o ns that are n o t m aterial t o t he i ssue s b efo re u s. 1
-2- Thomas L . Kilday

and De borah F . Roberts, Gre eneville, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, G ary

Hoese , db a Ga ry ’s Us e d Ca

rs
. J erry W. L aug hlin, Gree neville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, E ast Gate Motors, I nc. OP IN ION
I.
On Novembe r 3, 1996, B rooks Excavating & Construc tion (“B rooks ” ) p u r c h a s ed a ne w 1997 For d E x p l o re r (“the vehicle ”) f rom Ted Russell For d in Knox ville. Sometim e af ter the pur chase , the vehicle was wre cked, sustaining damag e to the exterior of the ve hicle. Signif icantly , the top of the vehicle was pa

rtially remove d at the site of the w rec k in order to extract an occupant who wa s trappe d inside.
B ro ok s late r s oldthe ve hic le in its wr e c ke d co nd iti on to Ho e se
. B ro ok s’ orig ina l c e rt if ic a te of tit le wa s a ssi g ne d to Ho e se on Ma rc h 2 2, 19 99 . Witho ut m akin g a ny re pa ir s to the ve hic le , H oe se sold it t o East Gate two wee ks later, a g ain assig ning the orig inal certificate of title. East Gate ha d the vehicl e r e p a ir e d , a n d o n M a y 1 2 , 2 0 0 0 , s o ldth e v e h ic le to th e d e f e n d a n t f o r $ 1 8 , 6 2 0

. O n ce a g a in, the orig ina l c e rt if

ic a te of tit le wa s a ssi g ne d, thi s ti me fr om E a st G a te to the de fe nd a nt.
At the time of t he sale, East Gate g ave the defe ndant a “B uy ers Guide ,” which indicated that the vehicle was be ing sold “ as is” with no war ranty . The B uy ers Guide , signe d by East Gate ’s ow ne r, Ma x Cox, st a te s a s f oll ow s:
Vehicle has had damag e to front spoiler, rt. spindle[,] top was cut a nd lif ted up t o r e mov e pa sse ng e r – c ar w a s d ri va

ble [sic ] an d n o p art s we re str a ig hte d [si c ] – ve hic le wa s c omp le tly [sic ] re pa int e d –

/s/ Max L . Cox
The sale to the defe ndant was c onsummated on May 12, 2000. At that time, the defe ndant sig ned the B uy ers Guide , acknow ledg ing his re ceipt of same. L ater , on J une 26, 2000, a new certificate of title was issued by

the state, indicating that the vehicle was a “r ebuilt vehicle.” The c ertificate was not mailed to the defe ndant; it appare ntly was mailed to a

lienor. On September

22, 2001, the def

endant pur chase d a new 2001 For d Ex p l o re r fr o m the plaintiff. The de fendant traded in the vehicle , for whic h the plaintiff g ave him a tr ade- in allowance of $11,500. At the time of the sa le, the def endant e x ecute d a damag e dis closure statement, which a sk e d th e fo llo wi ng qu e sti on s of the de fe nd a nt: 1-3- Has this vehicle be en dama g ed by collision or other oc cure nce [sic] to the extent that damag es excee d 25% of its value at the time of the c o ll is io n o r

o th e r o c c u r e n c e [s ic ]?

* * *
Has this vehicle be en re constructe d? (Numbering in origina l omitt ed). In response to these t wo q u es t i ons, the defe ndant che cked the “No” box . The defe n d ant sig ned the da mag e disclosure statement, dec laring that “the a bove inf orma tio n is trueto the be st o f m y kn ow le dg e .” Th e de fe nd a nt d id n ot s up ply the plaint if

f w ith a copy of the B uy ers Guide which he ha d rec eived f rom East Gate, nor did he inform the plaintiff of the da mag e to the vehic le or the r epair s that East Gate had undertaken.
Whe n th e plaint if

f r e c e ive d th e c e rt if

ic a te of tit le on the ve hic le , it dis c ov e re d, fo r the fi rs t tim e , th a t th e ve hic le ha d be e n la be le d a “ re bu ilt ve hic le .” B e c aus e the va lue of a ve hic le wh os e tit le is so branded is sig nificantly less than without the brand, the plaintiff contac ted the def endant a nd reque sted that he a g ree to rescind the sa le and r epurc hase the vehicle f ro m the plaintiff. The defe ndant initiallyindicated to the plaintiff that he would re purcha se the vehicle, but he later ref used to do so.
O n M ar c h 1 5 , 2 0 0 2 , th e p lain ti f f f il e d s u it a g a in s t th e d e f

e n d a n t b a s e d u p o n theories of misrepre sentation, brea ch of c ontrac t , an d v i o lations of the TCPA. The def endant a nswere d the complaint on J une 27, 2002, g ener ally denying a ll o f t he plaintiff’ s alleg ations. I n addition, the defe ndant fi l ed a t h ird-party complaint ag ainst Hoese and East Gate , alleg ing that the two parties we re a wa re the ve hic le wa s c on sid e re d a re bu ilt ve hic le a nd y et had fai le d to dis c los e thi s inf o r mati o n to th e d e f

e n d a n t. T h is f

a il u r e to d is c lo s e , a c c o r d in g to th e d e f e n d a n t, v io late d the c omm on la w andthe TCP A. Ea st G a te a ns we re d th e thi rd -p arty c omp la int , as did H oe se ; bo th denied leg al culpability

. Hoese also filed a counter claim for attorney ’s fe es, base d upon the TCPA.
The c ase pr ocee ded to a be nch trial. The court took the case under advisement and then later filed its opinion. W ith respec t to Hoese, the trial court found that he sold the vehic le in its wrecke d condition to East Gate; that Hoe se neve r discussed the ve hicle with t he defenda nt; and that the new certificate of

title indicating that the vehicle had been rebuilt was issued by the state more than a y ear a ft e r the Ho e se/E a st G a te tr a ns a c tio n. Th e c ou rt fo un d th a t H oe se “ ha d n o w a y to kn ow in Ap ri l 1999, that the State of Tennessee , in its C ertificate of Title date d May 12, 2000, was g oing to show or list this vehicle a s a re built vehicle.” The court then dismissed the cla im ag ainst Hoese.
As to East Gate , th e t ri al co u rt found that the ne w ce rtificate of title was issued to the defe ndant 44 day s after

East Gate sold the vehicle to the def endant. As w ith Hoese, the c ourt opined that East Gate did not know how the ve hicle would be c lassified, title-wise, after it s oldthe ve hic le to the defe ndant. The c ourt furthe r found that East Gate had g iven the def endant a Buy ers Guide , sh ow ing the da ma g e to the ve hic le . T he c ou rt dis mis se d th e c la im a g a ins t E a st G a te a s w e ll.-4-

Finally , with respec t to the plaintiff, t he court found t hat the def endant did not provide the plaint if f w ith the B uy e rs Gu ide , nor did he te ll the plaint if f that Eas t Ga te ha d f

urnis he d h im w ith a B u y er s Gu i d e w h en h e p u rc h as ed t h e v eh i cl e. T h e c o u rt we n to n t o s t at e t h e f o l l o wi n g: [The defe ndant] was asked [in the damag e disclosure statement], has the vehicle been rec onstructed? His answe r was “no.” He must have kn own a ft e r r e c e ivi ng the B uy e rs Gu ide fr om [E a st G a te ] that th is vehicle ha d been rec onstructed, any way the State of Te nnessee listed it as being a re built vehicle.
The c ourt then held that the pl aintiff was entitled to damag es in the amount of $11,500, r epre senting the amount allowed on the trade -in of t he vehicle; $4,050 in parking fee s; and floor plan inter est of $1,535. The co u rt al s o awa rded attorney ’s fe es to the plaintiff a nd eac h of the two c ounterde fe nd a nts

. Following the filing of the c ourt’s opinion, the plaintiff, Hoe se, and East Gate all submitt ed motions and affi d av i t s fo r attorne y ’s fe es. On Oc tober 10, 2003, the tria l court ente red its final judg me nt, inc or

po ratin g the fi nd ing s f

ro m it s e arl ie r- fi le d o pin ion , a ndg ranti ng a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in the following amounts: $4,708.75 to the pl aintiff; $2,711.75 to Hoese ; and $2,642.50 to East Gate.
F ro m th is j ud g me nt, the de fe nd a nt a pp e a ls.
II.
W e re v i ew this non-jury

case de novo u p o n th e r e c o r d o f th e p r o c e e d in g s b e lo w ; b u t the rec ord come s to us with a presumption of corr ectne ss that we must honor “unless the pre ponderance of th e e v id e n c e is o th e r w is e
. ” T e n n
. R. A p p
. P. 1 3 ( d )

. T h e tria l c o u r t’ s c o n c lu s io n s of law, howeve r, are acc orded no such presumption. Cam pbell v. F lorida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (T e nn . 1 99 6) ; Pre sle

y v . Be nne tt , 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993)

. III

. Th e de fe nd a nt r a ise s th e fo llo wi ng fi ve iss ue s o n a pp e a l:
1. Did the trial court err i n h o l d i n g the def endant liable to the plaintiff for ne g lige nt or rec kless misrepre sentation?
2. Did the trial court err in holding the def endant l i ab l e t o the plaint if f f or br e a c h o f c on tr a c t?
3. I f the de fendant is found to be liable to the pl ai n t i ff , should the t ri al court have re duced the amount of the judg ment awa rded to the plaint if f f or its failu re to m iti g a te da ma g e s?-5- 4. I f the de fendant is li able to the plaintiff for f ailing to discove r the condition of the title, t h en d id the trial court e rr in failing to find Hoese and Ea st Gate liable for failing to disclose the condition of the title to the defendant under the TCPA?
5. Did the trial court err in a war ding attorney ’s fee s to the plaintiff, Hoese and Ea st Gate without specif ically finding a violati on of the TCPA?
I V.
A.
The de fendant first contends that the trial court erre d in holding him liable to the plaintiff on the basis of ne g lige nt or rec kless misrepre sentation. We disag ree
. I n order to preva il o n a cla im of neg lige nt misreprese ntation, a plaintiff must establish the fo l l o wi n g: (1) the de fendant supplied information to the plaintiff; (2) the

inf orma tio n w a s f

a lse ; ( 3) the de fe nd a nt didno t e xer c ise re a so na ble car e in obtaining or commun i cating the information; and ( 4) the plaintiff justifiably

relied on the information.
Atkin s v. Kirkpatrick , 823 S.W .2d 547, 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ( citation omitted).
Th e a lle g e d n e g lig e nt m isr e pr e se ntatio ns in th e in stan t c a se re la te to the fi rs t a ndfi fth questions asked of the defe ndant in the damag e disclosurestatement. The first question asked the d e f e n d a n t w h e th e r

th e v e h ic le h a d b e e n d a ma g e db y c o ll is io n o r

o th e r w is e “ to th e e xte n t th at damag es exceed [ ed] 25% of its value at the time of the collision.” The f

ifth question asked the de fe nd a nt w he the r the ve hic le ha d b e e n r e c on str uc te d. Th e de fe ndant answe re d “ no ” to b oth questions. Whi le there is no evidenc e that the defendant was awa re that the state ha d brande d the ve hic le a “ re bu ilt ve hic le ” un til he wa s so inf orme d by the plaint if

f – a s th e ne w c e rt if

ic a te of tit le appar ently

went dire ctly

from the state to the cre dit company financ ing the defe ndant’s ca r l oan – there is no doubt that the defendant was aw are of the prior damag e to t h e v eh i cl e and the repairs made to the ve hicle by

East Gate

. We turn f ir st t o th e a lle g e d mis re pr e se nta tio n of the de fe nd a nt in a ns we ri ng “ no ” to the fi rs t question on the damag e disclosure statement. Whil e the trial court did not ref er to the de fendant’s response to this question in f inding the def

endant liable to the pla intiff, the parties have a ddresse d it on appeal, ne cessitating ou r re v i ew of this question and the defe ndant’s answ er. A s we ha ve pr e vio us ly

state d, the de fe nd a nt w a s u nd ou bte dly a wa re that th e ve hic le ha d u nd e rg on e fair ly signific ant re pairs. Howe ver, the re is no evide nce that the defe ndant knew or , i n t h e ex erc ise ofW hi l e t he defendan t cl ai ms h e i nf ormed t he s al es man wi t h w hom he wa s wo r ki ng o f t he dam age t o t he veh i cl e, 2 h e a lso a c k n o w le d g e d tha t, a s o f t h e trial o f t h is m a tter , t h e sa le sm a n w a s d e c e a s e d ; th e re fo re , t h e re w a s n o o n e to c o rr o b o ra te the d e fen d a n t’s t e stim o n y o n this m a tter

. B e c a u se th e tr ia l c o u rt fo u n d the d e fen d a n t l ia b le to the p la intiff
o n the b a sis o f ne g lige n t m isre p re se n ta tio n , the trial c o u rt o b v io u sly d id no t l e n d a n y c re d e n c e to this te stim o n y. See Bow m an v . Bowm an , 8 3 6 S .W .2 d 5 6 3 , 5 6 7 ( T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) (h o ld ing tha t witn e ss c re d ib ili ty i s a m a tter sing u la rly wi t hi n t he p rovince of

t he t ri al co urt ).

-6- rea sonab l e ca re , s h ould have known that the damag es caused by the wre ck excee ded 25% of the value of the vehicle

. We hold that the evidence preponde rate s ag ainst a finding that the def endant ma de a ne g lig e nt m isr e pr e se ntatio n to the pl ain ti ff when h e re sp on de d inthe ne g a tiv e to this question. Turning to the alleg ed misrepre sentation embodied in the defe ndant’s re sponse to the sec ond question, howeve r, we rea ch a d i ff er en t conclusion. The de fendant knew, base d upon the B uy ers Gu ide he re c e ive d f

ro m E a st G a te , that the ve hic le ha d su staine d the fo llo wi ng da ma g e : da ma g e to the front spoiler and rig ht spindle; damag e to the roof of th e v eh i cl e, as i t had bee n cut away and lifte d u p i n o rd er t o extract an oc cupant; and damag e to the paint, as the entire ve hicle had be en repainted. I n spite of this knowledg e, the de fendant did not pr ovide the plaintiff with a copy of the B uy e rs Gu ide , n or

did he inf orm the plaint if

f of the e xten t of

the da ma g e to the ve hic le prior to h is purcha se of it. The defenda nt claims that he understood the word “ rec onstructed” to mean “totale d”

2 and that, as the vehicle, in his judgme nt, had not been totale d, he wa s corr ect in re sponding that the vehicle ha d not been r econstruc ted. Howe ver, in our vie w, a r easona ble per son possessed of the same knowle dg e as the defe ndant with respe ct to the damag e and re pairs to the vehic le would have re sp on de d to the qu e sti on inv olv ing the ve hic le ’s re c on str uc tio n b y div ulg ing the inf

orma tio n inhis po sse ssi on rathe r tha n b y simply re spon ding “ no ” to the qu e sti on . We be lie ve the de fe nd a nt d id su pp ly fa lse inf orma tio n to the plaint if

f wi th his un qu a lif

ie d “ no ” a ns we r; that he didno t e xer c ise re a so na ble c are in r e la y ing thi s in fo rm a tio n; and that th e plaint if

f relie d o n th is i nf

orma tio n to its detriment. See Atk ins , 82 3 S.W. 2d a t 55 2. As su c h, we fi nd that the e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding that the defendant is liable t o the pl aintiff on the basis of neg lige nt m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e c o n d o f t h e t w o q u e s t i o n s
. A c c o r d i n g l y, we a ffirm the tria l court’s a war d to the pl aintiff of $11,500 in damag es, $4,050 i n parking fee s, and $1 ,5 35 in f

loo r p la n in te re st.
B.
The de fendant next asserts that the trial court erre d in finding him liable to the plaintiff on the ba sis of

a br e a c h o f c on tr a c t th e ory . In li g ht o f o ur pr e vio us ho ldi ng , w e fi ndit u nn e c e ssa ry to discuss this is sue in detail. The trial court did not addre ss the t heory of bre ach of contra ct, nor do we.
C.-7-

Next, the defendant arg ues that, in the eve nt he is found to be liable to the plaintiff, the trial court e rre d in f

ailing to r educe the amount of damag es awa rded to the plaintiff due to the plaintiff’s failu re to mit ig a te

. Ou r tho ro ug h re vie w of the re c or d do e s no t sh ow that th e de fe nd a nt r a ise d th is issue in the trial court. It is well-settled that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be r aised for the first time on appea l. Sim pson v. Fron tier Cm ty. Credit Union , 810 S.W .2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991). We will not discuss thi s issue further

. D.
Th e de fe nd a nt n e xt co nte nd s th a t, i f h e is f ou nd to be lia

ble to the plaint if

f w ithre sp e c t to his response to the “ rec onstructed” question, then the trial court err ed in fa iling to find Hoe se and East Gate equally

liable to the def

endant f or their f ailure to disclose the condition of the title.
With re sp e c t to Ho e se , he so ld the ve hic le in i ts wrecke d condition to East Gate on A pril 5, 1999. Over

thirteen months later, the defe ndant purcha sed the repaired ve hicle fr om East Gate, and the following month, on J une 26, 2000, the ne w ce rtificate of title was issued, indicating that the ve hic le ha d b e e n r e bu ilt . A s th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d, Ho e se c ou ld n ot p os sib ly ha ve kn ow n a t the tim e he so ld the ve hic le that a t so me po int in the fu tur e the state of

Te nn e sse e wo uldbr a ndthe ve hic le as re built. Furthermor e, Hoe se cannot be liable for a failure to communicate the condit i o n of the vehicle w hen it was in the same obvious damag ed condition when he sold it as it had been whe n he rec eived it. Ther e is no err or in the trial court’s ruling as to Hoese

. L ike wi se , th e tr ia l c ou rt

didno t e rr

in f ind ing that E a st Gate ha d no liabil ity to the de fe nd a nt. Ea st G a te so ld the ve hic le to the de fe nd a nt “ a s is ” wi th n o w arr a nty a nd wi th fu ll disc los ur e of a ll damag e to an d repairs of the ve hicle. Like Hoese , East Gate did not know, at the time it sold t he vehicle to the de fendant, that the vehicle would be branded as rebuilt by the state of T ennesse e one mon th l a te r. We f

indthat E a st Gate ma de a ll of the app ro priate dis c los ur e s to the de fe nd a nt a s to the da ma g e to the ve hic le a ndthe re pa ir s u nd e rt ake n by it an d tha t Eas t Ga te c a nn ot be he ld l ia ble for f ailing to disclose the condition of the title when the ne w title was not in its possession when the ve hic le wa s so ld t o th e de fe nd a nt.
E. Finally , the def

endant a sserts that t h e t ri al court erre d in awar ding attorney ’s fe es to the plaintiff, Hoese , and Ea st Gate, a s the court did not specific ally find that the def

endant violated the TCPA. The TCPA provides that, once a trial court finds the Act has been violated, t he court may awa rd the plaintiff “ rea sonable attorney ’s fe es and c osts.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47- 18-109(e )( 1) (2001). Further, if the t rial court finds that an action broug ht under the TCPA “is frivolous, without leg al or fac tual merit, or broug ht for the pur pose of ha rassment,” the court may

awa rd attorne y ’s fe es and costs to the party

burdene d by

the institut ion of the action. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(e )(2)

. I n the instant case , the def endant is cor

rec t that, while the trial court a war ded attorney ’s fe es to the plaint if

f, Ho e se a ndEa st G a te , th e c ou rt ne ve r a rt ic ulate d th e ba sis fo r suc h an a wa rd

. I n f a c t,-8-

the trial court focused on “neg lige nt misre prese ntation.” The trial court’s silenc e with re spect to the TCPA requires that we rema nd this c ase for a dete rmination on this is sue. I f, on re mand, the trial court finds that the awa

rd of attorney ’s fee s to the plaintiff is based upon a violation of the TCPA, and that the a war ds of fees t o Hoese and East Gate is pursuant to the TCPA and pre mised upon the de fe nd a nt’ s c ou nte rc la im b e ing “ frivo lou s, wi tho ut l e g a l or fa c tua l merit, or br ou g ht fo r the pu rp os e of ha ra ssm e nt, ” the n w e fi nd that th e a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to e a c h o f the thr e e pa rt ie s sh ou ld stand. I f, o n t h e o t her hand, the awa rd of f ees is base d upon a common law the ory of neg lige nt misrepre sentation, we f

ind that the awa

rd of a ll attorney ’s fe es i s improper a nd must be reve rsed. See P ul lma n S ta nd

a r d , I nc . v . Ab e

x Co r p. , 6 9 3 S.W .2d 336, 338 (Tenn. 1985) (holding that “attorne y s’ fe es are not r ecove rable in the absenc e of a statute or contra ct spec ifically providing for such re covery , or a r ecog nized gr ound of equity ”). Since we ca nnot determine w hether the fe e awa rds wer e based on a violation of the TCPA or, rathe r, on the ba sis of common law violations, a r e m a n d f o r t h e tri a l c o u r tt o s t a t e t h e b a s i s o f t h e a w ar d i s n e c e s s ary.
As to the award of attorney ’s fe es to East Gate, the def endant a rg ues that such a n awa

rd wa s imp ro pe r i n a ny

e ve nt, a s Ea st G a te didno t sp e c if ic a lly re qu e st an a wa

rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. I n h is third-party

complaint, the def

enda n t al l ege d that East Gate violated the TCPA. As we ha ve pr e vio us ly state d, the Ac t pe rm its a tr ia l c ou rt

to a wa rda tto rn e y ’s fe e s a ndc os ts t o th e pa rty a g a ins t whom a TCPA action is broug ht, if the ac tion is found to be “f ri v o l o u s , without lega l or fac tual merit, or broug ht for the pur pose of ha

rassment.” We theref

ore c onclude that the d efendant “w as e f f e c ti v e ly p u t o n n o ti c e ” tha t East Gate w a s e n ti tl e d to “ a ll r e li e f au th o r iz e d u n d e r

th e [T CP A ], including attorney ’s fe es and c osts.” See Kill ingsw orth v. Ted Russ ell Ford, In c. , 104 S.W .3d 530, 53 4 (T e nn . Ct. A pp . 2 00 2) . A c on se qu e nc e of a su it under the TCPA that is “frivolous, without leg al or fa c tua l me ri t, o r b ro ug ht f or the pu rp os e of ha

ra ssm e nt” is a po ssi ble imp os iti on of fe e s a g a ins t t h e p ar t y as s er t i n g s u ch cl ai m
. W e f i n d E as tGa t e’ s fa i l u re t o re q u es tat t o rn ey ’s fe es i n i t s p l ea d i n gs is not fatal to its re covery of them, in the event the trial court finds that the awa rd wa s made pursua nt to the TCPA.
V.
B y way of a se pa rate iss ue , Ho e se re qu e sts tha t w e a wa rdhim his a tto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a

pp e a l. We hold that Hoese is entitled to c ollect the fee s associate d with de fending this appeal, if, an d o nly if , the trial court determines on r emand that the a war d of attorne y ’s fe es t o Hoese at the trial c ourt le ve l wa s b a s e d u p o n t h e T C P A

. I n t h a te v e n t , w e d i r e c tt h e tr i a l c o u r tt o a s c e r t a i n a r e a s on a ble a mou nt o f atto rn e y ’s fe e s to a wa rdto H oe se fo r this app e a l.

V I.
The a war d of fe es to the plaintiff, Hoe se, and Ea st Ga t e i s v ac ated pending f urther pr oc e e din g s in the tr ia l c ou rt . In a ll o the r r e sp e c ts, the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt i s a ff ir me d. Th is c a se is remande d to the trial court fo r fu rt her pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion and for the collection of c osts assessed below, a ll pursuant to applicable la w. Costs on appea l are taxed to the appellant, Doug Boling er.-9- _______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE