United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 22-1070

MARTIN J. WALSH, Secretary of Labor, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITIL SERVICE CORPORATION,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Landya B. McCafferty, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Selya, and Thompson,

Circuit Judges.

Dean A. Romhilt, Senior Attorney, United States Department of 

Labor, with whom Seema Nanda, Solicitor of Labor, Jennifer S. 

Brand, Associate Solicitor, and Rachel Goldberg, Counsel for 

Appellate Litigation, were on brief, for appellant.

William D. Pandolph, with whom Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C.

was on brief, for appellee.

January 11, 2023
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GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Compliance with the Fair Labor 

Standards Act's ("FLSA") overtime pay requirements is critical to 

ensuring worker protections. Before us, Appellant, the Department 

of Labor ("DOL"), seeks overtime compensation under the FLSA for 

hours worked in excess of forty hours per week for two categories 

of employees -- Dispatchers and Controllers -- employed by 

Appellee, Unitil Service Corporation ("Unitil Service"). Unitil 

Service argues that these workers are exempt "administrative" 

employees under federal law and as such are not entitled to 

overtime payments. The district court found that the employees' 

"primary duty" was "directly related" to the general business 

operations of Unitil Service's customers and concluded that the 

employees were "administrative," exempt from the FLSA, and thus 

not entitled to overtime pay. Summary judgment was granted in 

favor of Unitil Service. The DOL filed a timely appeal. For the 

following reasons, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and 

remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

I. Background

Unitil Service is a New Hampshire corporation and 

wholly-owned subsidiary of Unitil Corporation ("Unitil 

Corporation"), a public utility holding company that owns local 

and regional utility companies providing gas and/or electricity to 

approximately 200,000 residential, commercial, and industrial 
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customers in New England. Unitil Corporation and its subsidiaries 

do not own power plants, generate electricity, or produce any 

natural gas themselves. Unitil Service provides "administrative 

and professional services on a centralized basis" to Unitil Service 

subsidiaries ("Distribution Operating Companies" or "DOCs"), 

"including regulatory, financial, accounting, human resources, 

engineering, operations, technology, energy management and 

management services." More specifically, Unitil Service operates, 

monitors, and controls the electrical grid and gas pipelines that 

distribute electricity and gas to the DOCs' end-user customers. 

This includes operating centralized electric and gas control rooms 

staffed by the Electric Distribution Dispatchers ("Dispatchers") 

and Gas Controllers ("Controllers") at issue here. 

a. Duties of Dispatchers

Dispatchers are employed by Unitil Service in a 

centralized work area known as Central Electric Dispatch. 

According to Unitil Service's general position description, their 

duties include: 

Provid[ing] 24/7 monitoring and control of the 

electric transmission and distribution 

systems for all [DOCs]; provid[ing] outage 

management response and reporting for all 

electric [DOCs]; and perform[ing] tasks 

associated with compliance with regulatory 

requirements including but not limited to NERC 

(National Energy Regulatory Commission), MDPU 

(Massachusetts Department of Public 

Utilities), NHPUC (New Hampshire Public 

Utilities Commission) that would include 
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reporting, emergency response, notifications 

and questions regarding the electric systems. 

Monitor[ing] electric [software alarm] 

systems and tak[ing] necessary actions to 

respond to current system conditions. 

In total, approximately 60% of a Dispatcher's time is 

spent "perform[ing] monitoring and control of electric systems and 

emergency response"; 15% in "communications and notifications";

and 25% in "regulatory reporting compliance" and "documentation." 

b. Duties of Controllers

Controllers are employed by Unitil Service in a similar 

capacity but for gas DOCs. Their position description reads: 

This position has primary oversight 

responsib[ility] for the operation and control 

of the Company's gas transmission distribution 

system; and the managing of pipeline and peak 

shaving supplies. The incumbent must ensure 

that the system is operated within the 

constraints of Federal, State and Company 

codes and standards as well tariff constraints 

for the receipt and control of the system 

supply. This position also provides training 

and daily guidance to subordinate Gas 

Controllers and Field Services 

Coordinator[s]. 

As a result, approximately 60% of a Controller's time is spent 

monitoring and controlling gas pipeline systems, supporting 

"processes related to market requirements" for DOCs, and providing 

"general control, confirmation, scheduling, balancing and live gas 

operations"; 30% interpreting, organizing, and executing complex 

assignments, assisting with training and coordination of work for 

subordinate Controllers, estimating personnel needs, scheduling 
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and assigning work, and managing complex projects; and 10% serving 

as "[b]ack up to [the] Field Services Coordinator as needed." 

Generally speaking, both Dispatchers and Controllers

monitor their respective systems for automated alerts or other 

developments and respond accordingly to keep electricity or gas 

flowing safely.1 While they do not actively control the flow of 

electricity or gas, they do determine whether alerts warrant 

responses such as shutting off or re-routing the flow of gas or 

electricity, dispatching service crews, or communicating with 

local authorities and other divisions within the company. Each 

role has a manual that covers standard responses to most 

situations, and each role has supervisors who are available to 

address major issues. Both Dispatchers and Controllers can respond 

independently to some situations and deviate from certain 

procedures, although the extent of their decision-making authority 

and the frequency with which situations require this purported 

exercise of discretion are points of dispute. Both groups reported 

working, on occasion, substantially over forty hours per week. 

II. Procedural History

Following a DOL investigation into the Dispatchers' and 

Controllers' work, the DOL filed suit in the District Court for 

1 We note that we group Dispatchers and Controllers here 

because the nature of their work is similar save for one monitoring 

gas and the other electricity. 
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the District of New Hampshire against Unitil Service alleging 

violation of the FLSA's requirement that employees be paid overtime 

unless they are exempt. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207, 213. Each 

party submitted a motion for summary judgment and the district 

court -- applying the summary judgment standard -- concluded that 

Dispatchers and Controllers are exempt from overtime requirements 

because they are "administrative" employees under the FLSA. U.S. 

Dep't of Lab. v. Unitil Serv. Corp., 573 F. Supp. 3d 566, 580 

(D.N.H. 2021). This appeal followed. 

III. Discussion

On appeal, the DOL argues that Dispatchers and 

Controllers do not satisfy the FLSA's administrative exemption and 

thus are entitled to overtime pay. More specifically, the DOL 

argues that the district court did not properly evaluate the job 

duties of both categories of workers under the second prong of the 

administrative exemption of the FLSA's regulations, discussed 

infra. Rather than relying on and analogizing to the relevant 

regulation's list of functional areas that can be (but are not 

necessarily) administrative, as the district court did, the DOL 

posits that the district court should have instead engaged in a 

"relational" analysis that considers the relationship between the 

job duties of the roles in question and the business purposes of 
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the employer or its customers. We agree,2 acknowledge that our 

circuit's precedent on this issue is limited, commend the district 

court for attempting to parse out our limited jurisprudence, 

clarify the application of the "relational" analysis test, vacate

the grant of summary judgment for Unitil Service, and remand to 

the district court to apply the test we now outline. 

a. Standard of Review

This case comes before us at the summary judgment stage. 

Thus, we review the issues de novo and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmovant -- here, the DOL. Cash v. 

Cycle Craft Co., 508 F.3d 680, 682 (1st Cir. 2007). "Summary 

judgment is appropriate only when the record 'show[s] that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

b. The FLSA

The FLSA requires that covered employers pay certain 

employees an overtime premium "at a rate not less than one and 

one-half times the regular rate at which [they are] employed." 

29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Employees "in a bona fide executive, 

2 The DOL also argues that the district court misapplied the 

third prong of the administrative exemption test. Because an 

employer must satisfy all three prongs to satisfy the 

administrative exemption, and because we vacate on the second 

prong, we need not (and do not) reach these arguments. 
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administrative, or professional capacity[,] . . . as such terms 

are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the 

Secretary," however, are exempt from these provisions, and thus 

not entitled to overtime payment. Id. § 213(a)(1) (emphasis 

added). The Secretary's regulations define those working in an 

"administrative" capacity to include those employees: 

(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis 

pursuant to § 541.600 at a rate of not less 

than $684 per week . . . exclusive of board, 

lodging or other facilities;

(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of 

office or non-manual work directly related to 

the management or general business operations

of the employer or the employer's customers; 

and

(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise

of discretion and independent judgment with 

respect to matters of significance.

29 C.F.R. § 541.200. Thus, to fall under the exemption, each of 

the three prongs must be satisfied and the employer bears the 

burden of establishing each prong. See Reich v. John Alden Life 

Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1997). The DOL has promulgated 

additional regulations defining the terms discussed in the second 

and third prongs, listing relevant factors for consideration, and 

identifying examples of employees who may qualify for the 

exemption. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.201-.203. 

Before us, the parties do not dispute that the first 

prong -- the sufficient compensation requirement -- is met. 

Instead, the dispute turns on whether the remaining two prongs 
- 9 -

were satisfied. Because we vacate on the second prong, we do not 

address the third prong -- the discretion-and-independentjudgment prong.

c. The Second Prong

Whether both classes of employees are administrative 

employees -- and thus exempt from overtime payment -- turns on 

whether their "primary duty is the performance of office or nonmanual work directly related to the management or general business 

operations of the employer or the employer's customers." 

Id. § 541.200 (emphases added). 

The parameters of the administrative exemption are 

articulated in the DOL's regulations. "Primary duty" is defined 

to mean "the principal, main, major or most important duty that 

the employee performs," and generally means that employees spend 

at least 50% of their time performing the duty. Id. § 541.700. 

And "directly related to the management or general business 

operations" "refers to the type of work performed by the employee." 

Id. § 541.201(a). "To meet this requirement, an employee must 

perform work directly related to assisting with the running or 

servicing of the business, as distinguished, for example, from 

working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product in 

a retail or service establishment." Id. (emphasis added). This 

can include "work in functional areas such as tax; finance; 

accounting; budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality control; 
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purchasing; procurement; advertising; marketing; research; safety 

and health; personnel management; human resources; employee 

benefits; labor relations; public relations[;] government 

relations; computer network, internet and database administration; 

legal and regulatory compliance; and similar activities." Id.

§ 541.201(b) (outlining a non-exhaustive list of examples of 

"[w]ork directly related to management or business operations"). 

While our jurisprudence on the second prong is limited, 

we clarify here that the analysis is indeed -- as described by the 

DOL -- a "relational" one. Although often framed as one question, 

it entails two: (1) whether the employee's role relates to "running 

or servicing the business," and if so, (2) what the scope or 

"generality" of the employee's role is. See Bratt v. County of 

Los Angeles, 912 F.2d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The test is 

whether the activities are directly related to management policies

or general business operations. . . . [This] mean[s] 'the running 

of a business, and not merely . . . the day-to-day carrying out of 

its affairs.'"). We explain each question in turn. 

i. Whether the Employee's Role Relates to "Running or 

Servicing the Business"

The first question asks whether the employee's duty is 

related to the goods or services offered for market or whether it 

is related to running the business itself. See Bothell v. Phase 

Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). One useful 
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but non-dispositive distinction that courts have used is the 

distinction between "administrative" staff and "production" 

employees. See John Alden, 126 F.3d at 9-10 (discussing 

"Administrative-Production Dichotomy"); see also 29 C.F.R.

§ 541.201(a) ("To meet this requirement, an employee must perform 

work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing 

of the business, as distinguished, for example, from working on a 

manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or 

service establishment."). 

This administrative-production distinction was the basis 

for the test that our circuit has generally applied: considering 

whether an employee's duties are "ancillary" to the business's 

"principal production activity" or "principal function." See John 

Alden, 126 F.3d at 10; Hines v. State Room, Inc., 665 F.3d 235, 

242 (1st Cir. 2011) (considering whether the employees' duty was 

ancillary to the business's "principal function"); Cash, 508 F.3d 

at 684-86 (not mentioning "ancillary" test but evaluating 

relationship between employee duties and business purposes). John 

Alden provides a clear example. There, we concluded that "the 

activities of the marketing representatives [at issue]

[we]re clearly ancillary to John Alden's principal production

activity -- the creation of insurance policies -- and therefore 

could be considered administrative 'servicing' within the meaning 

of [S]ection 541.205(b)." John Alden, 126 F.3d at 10 (likening
- 12 -

marketing representatives' activities to "'representing the 

company' and 'promoting sales'" -- examples of "exempt 

administrative work"). It should be noted that because the test 

is "relational" and applies to more than just factory production 

or retail, the administrative-production distinction is worth 

employing "only to the extent it clarifies the analysis." Bothell, 

299 F.3d at 1127; see Schaefer v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 358 F.3d 

394, 402-03 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Defining and Delimiting the 

Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside 

Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22141 (April 23, 

2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541). Moreover, while that 

question may be helpful to determining the "principal function" of 

a business to distinguish between, for example, administrative and 

operative roles, there is little principled basis in the text of 

the regulation for differentiating between "'primary' marketplace 

offering[s] and secondary or tertiary" ones. Bothell, 299 F.3d at 

1127. In fact, too much focus on whether something is the 

business's "primary" business purpose, or a myopic framing of that 

purpose, can miss the forest -- whether work is "directly related 

to the management or general business operations of the employer 

or the employer's customers," 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2) -- for the 

trees. 
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ii. The Scope or "Generality" of the Employee's Role

The second question poses a broader inquiry meant to 

ensure that courts do not miss the forest for the trees. While a 

bit more subtle in our case law, it asks, even if an employee's 

work is "ancillary" to the goods or services that constitute the 

business's marketplace offerings, whether the employee is engaged 

in "management or general business operations." Id. (emphasis 

added). 

To satisfy this second, more subtle, aspect of the test, 

an employee's job duties must implicate or include responsibility 

for "general" (i.e., higher-level or more widely applicable) 

aspects of the business's operations. Put another way, the test 

is not satisfied if an employee's duties include only the execution 

of routine, day-to-day operations. Such tasks would not rise to 

the level of "generality" across or within the organization that 

is contemplated by the regulation. For instance, in John Alden, 

we held that the marketing representatives at issue were exempt 

administrative employees because they were responsible for 

"promoting (i.e., increasing, developing, facilitating, and/or 

maintaining) customer sales generally," 126 F.3d at 10 (quoting 

Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 905 (3d Cir. 

1991)), rather than responsible for merely performing routine 

sales tasks, see Bothell, 299 F.3d at 1127 ("John Alden stressed 

that the daily tasks performed . . . , including managing hundreds 
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of agents and developing 'customer sales generally,' were 

consistent with . . . administrative activities in [the 

regulation]."). Cash v. Cycle Craft Co. serves as another example. 

508 F.3d 680. There, the "New Purchases/Customer Relations 

Manager" was responsible for "improving customer service 

generally, by coordinating with various Boston Harley departments" 

and not simply dealing with individual customer service issues. 

Id. at 685-86 (emphasis added). 

Examples from the regulations further illustrate this 

distinction. "Human resources managers who formulate, interpret 

or implement employment policies . . . generally meet the duties 

requirements for the administrative exemption" while "personnel 

clerks who 'screen' applicants to obtain data regarding their 

minimum qualifications and fitness for employment generally do 

not." 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(e). Similarly, while a higher-level 

compliance employee might be considered exempt, "[o]rdinary 

inspection work generally does not meet the duties requirements 

for the administrative exemption." Id. § 541.203(g). And while 

a buyer who evaluated pricing reports or an analyst who prepared

them would likely be considered exempt, "[c]omparison shopping 

performed by an employee of a retail store who merely reports to 

the buyer the prices at a competitor's store does not qualify for 

the administrative exemption." Id. § 541.203(i). Just because an 

employee is on the operational side of the business does not mean 
- 15 -

that his job duties fall on the administrative side of the line. 

To be sure, the requirement of Section 541.200's third prong --

that the employee exercise discretion and independent judgment --

does some work in distinguishing these employees, but the 

generality requirement of the second prong also distinguishes 

them. 

The history of Section 541.200(a)(2) reinforces our 

conclusion that an employee's duties must rise to a level of 

generality beyond responsibility for day-to-day tasks in order to 

satisfy the regulation. For instance, the prior version of 

Section 541.200(a)(2) referred to "management policies" rather 

than "management," suggesting that an exempt employee must play 

more than a purely operational role. See Defining and Delimiting 

the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22137-22138. The DOL clarified 

that the removal of "policies" was not intended to broaden the 

exemption but merely meant to clarify that "exempt administrative 

work includes not only those who participate in the formulation of 

management policies or in the operation of the business as a whole, 

but it 'also includes a wide variety of persons who either carry 

out major assignments in conducting the operations of the business, 

or whose work affects business operations to a substantial degree, 

even though their assignments are tasks related to the operation 

of a particular segment of the business.'" Id. at 22138 (emphases 

added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(2000)). To a certain 
- 16 -

extent, this intersects with the third prong of Section 541.200, 

the exercise-of-discretion-and-independent-judgment prong, but it 

is important that the job duties themselves go beyond mere 

participation in day-to-day operations. 

Two Sixth Circuit cases involving power plant employees 

lend further support. In Schaefer v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 

the court considered whether a nuclear waste disposal technician's 

work was administrative. 358 F.3d at 398-99. The Sixth Circuit

recognized that while day-to-day waste removal is "not part of 

production proper," it is neither "'administrative' [n]or part of 

'servicing the business.'" Id. at 402. As such, in identifying 

the limitations of the administrative-production dichotomy and the 

"principal function" test, the court concluded that the 

technician -- whose role was a limited and highly circumscribed 

one -- was not an administrative employee. See id. at 402-03. 

Further, the court noted that while some removal procedures were 

unique, the scope of the technician's authority was relatively 

circumscribed. See id. at 403. 

Moreover, in Renfro v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., the 

Sixth Circuit considered the case of "planners" responsible for 

"creating plans for maintaining equipment and systems in the 

nuclear [power] plant," 370 F.3d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 2004), and 

managing the work of other skilled employees through those plans, 

see id. at 515. The court acknowledged that the power company's 
- 17 -

principal production activity was "generating electricity" and the 

product it offered was "electricity." See id. at 518. Thus, 

because the planners "creat[ed] plans for maintaining equipment 

and systems in the nuclear plant," their work was "ancillary" to 

the power company's "principal production activity of generating 

electricity." Id. While the Sixth Circuit noted that the planners 

were clearly not production workers, it recognized that "[w]hile 

not precisely 'administrative,' the planners' duties form[ed] the 

type of 'servicing' ('advising the management, planning,' etc.) 

that the FLSA deems administrative work directly related to [the 

power company's] general business operations." Id. 

iii. Dispatchers and Controllers

Having explained how to apply the "relational" analysis 

test, we now turn to the case of Dispatchers and Controllers. As 

an initial matter, we note that areas like the energy sector --

where power is the product, but transmission and certain other 

services are inextricably linked -- and separately incorporated 

services corporations (common in industries like healthcare, 

insurance, and utilities) can create confusion on how to apply the 

second question of the "relational" analysis test. 

Turning to the facts before us, we thus ask whether 

Unitil Service has conclusively shown that the Dispatchers' and 

Controllers' primary duties are "directly related to the 

management or general business operations of" either Unitil 
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Service (the employer) or the DOCs (the employer's customers). 

See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2). If the Dispatchers' and 

Controllers' primary duties relate to Unitil Service's business 

purpose, in that they produce the product or provide the service 

that the company is in business to provide, the second prong is 

not satisfied. Id.; see id. § 541.201(a) ("To meet this 

requirement, an employee must perform work directly related to 

assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as 

distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing 

production line or selling a product in a retail or service 

establishment." (emphasis added)). 

The district court was correct in finding that the 

primary duties of the Dispatchers and Controllers are to provide 

the very services that Unitil Service is in the business of 

providing. Unitil Service's business purpose is to provide 

operational and administrative services to its subsidiaries. The 

primary duties of the Dispatchers and Controllers are to provide 

these various services -- to operate and monitor their respective 

electrical grids and gas pipelines for the DOCs -- and thus are 

the very services that Unitil Service is in business to provide. 

Because the Dispatchers' and Controllers' primary duties relate to 

Unitil Service's business purpose, the second prong of the 

"administrative" exemption is not satisfied. Consequently, the 

only way Unitil Service -- which bears the burden of establishing 
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that an employee falls under the FLSA's "administrative" 

exemption -- can satisfy the second prong is to show that the 

Dispatchers' and Controllers' primary duties are directly related 

to the general business operations of the DOCs (the employer's 

customers). 

To determine whether Unitil Service can satisfy the 

second prong in this regard, we turn to (1) whether the 

Dispatchers' and Controllers' primary duties relate to the 

"running or servicing" of the DOCs, and if so, (2) what the scope 

or "generality" of their role is. See Bratt, 912 F.3d at 1070 

("The test is whether the activities are directly related to 

management policies or general business operations. . . . [This]

mean[s] 'the running of a business, and not merely . . . the dayto-day carrying out of its affairs.'"). 

As previously mentioned, the district court did not 

apply this "relational" analysis. Specifically, rather than 

compare the primary duties of the Dispatchers and Controllers to 

the DOCs' business purposes -- to determine whether their duties 

are directly related to the DOCs' general business operations or 

to the day-to-day operational work related to the DOCs' business

-- the district court looked to a list of the functional areas in 

Section 541.201(b) that can be, but are not necessarily, 

administrative depending on the duties of the employees. Unitil 

Serv. Corp., 573 F. Supp. 3d at 578. The court then concluded 
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that the primary duties performed by the Dispatchers and 

Controllers were analogous to the functional areas of "regulatory 

compliance," "quality control," and "health and safety." Id.; see 

also 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b) (listing examples of the functional 

areas related to "management or general business operations"). 

We conclude, however, that these analogies cannot bear 

the weight that the district court placed upon them. As the DOL 

points out, although the position description for Dispatchers 

includes "tasks associated with compliance with regulatory 

requirements," the record, including the "principal 

accountabilities" section of the job description, does not 

indicate that either Dispatchers or Controllers do anything beyond 

engaging in their daily operational duties "within the limits of 

the applicable Federal, State and Company codes and standards."

The same is true for engaging in work subject to certain compliance 

and safety standards. Further, neither Dispatchers nor 

Controllers play a role in testing or evaluating the DOCs' 

distribution or pipeline systems outside of the day-to-day 

monitoring of these systems. Dispatchers and Controllers do not 

design or plan the systems, nor do they analyze how they work or 

how they can be improved. See Renfro, 370 F.3d at 518 (finding 

that because the "planners" at issue "creat[ed] plans for 

maintaining equipment and systems in the nuclear plant," their 

work was "ancillary" to the power company's "principal production 
- 21 -

activity of generating electricity"). Accordingly, while 

analogizing to the functional areas may be useful in some cases, 

here, these analogies do not address or answer the second 

generality question of the "relational" analysis. 

Moreover, Unitil Service's organizational makeup reveals 

that the company has entirely separate departments for the very 

functional areas outlined above. These include departments for 

"Business Continuity & Compliance" (employing a number of health 

and safety compliance specialists), "Financial Services" 

(employing auditors and lawyers), and "Regulatory Services" 

(employing regulatory analysts). That the Dispatchers' and 

Controllers' duties may, in a limited or superficial way implicate 

health, safety, and quality control tasks, does not mean that this 

was their "primary duty." Further, their duties lack the level of 

generality required by the regulation and the case law to conclude, 

without further inquiry, that they were engaged in "management or 

general business operations" as opposed to routine, day-to-day 

affairs, Bratt, 912 F.3d at 1070, of the DOCs. It is not clear 

that they direct business operations "generally" in the way 

anticipated by the statute and understood by our case law. 

Unitil Service would have us look to two unpublished 

cases on which the district court relied -- Galdo v. PPL Electric

Utilities Corp., No. CV 14-5831, 2016 WL 454416 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 

2016) and Zelenika v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 09 C 2946, 
- 22 -

2012 WL 3005375 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2012). But these cases have 

no role to play in our decision since they employ unpersuasive 

reasoning. Zelenika involved "dispatchers" whose job was to 

"monitor [an electric utility's] power distribution system, 

oversee service to the system, and respond to customer complaints 

and power outages." 2012 WL 3005375, at *2. The court determined 

that the employer satisfied the second prong by analogizing to the 

functional areas in Section 541.201(b) rather than engaging in a 

"relational" analysis between the primary duty of the role and the 

business of the utility. See id. at *13. However, as discussed 

supra, it is not enough to look only at the list of job functions 

under Section 541.201(b). Courts must also consider whether the 

employee's primary duty is contributing to the "running or 

servicing of the business" and, if so, whether their 

responsibilities rise to the level of generality required by the 

rule. Similarly, in determining that "system operators," who 

monitored systems in the utility's transmission department, were 

administrative employees, the Galdo court reasoned that they were 

not production workers because they did not "generate . . . the 

very product or service that the employer's business offers to the 

public." 2016 WL 454416, at *4 (quoting Renfro, 360 F.3d at 517). 

This reasoning, however, improperly reduced the second prong's 

inquiry to the administrative-production dichotomy, rather than 
- 23 -

employ the more flexible "relational" analysis required by the 

regulation. 

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, because the district court did not apply a 

"relational" analysis comparing the business purpose of Unitil 

Service and/or its customers to the primary duty of the Dispatchers 

and Controllers, it was improvident to grant summary judgment to 

Unitil Service. Unitil Service has not demonstrated that the 

Dispatchers' and Controllers' primary duty consists of work 

"directly related to the management or general business 

operations" of its customers such that the employees fall under 

the second prong of 29 C.F.R. § 541.200. We leave it to the trier 

of fact to apply the "relational" analysis required by the second 

prong of the test. At this stage, genuine issues of material fact 

remain unresolved. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the 

district court granting summary judgment to Unitil Service and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No 

costs are awarded.