Filed 2/28/24 Alcaraz v. Steadfast Ins. Co. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

HECTOR ALCARAZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

STEADFAST INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Defendant and Respondent.

B324365

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 21STCV39169)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, William Fahey, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with directions.

Downtown L.A. Law Group, Igor Fradkin, Daniel Ezizi; 

Joseph Socher for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cozen O’Connor, Maria Cousineau and Angel Marti for 

Defendant and Respondent.
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Plaintiff and appellant Hector Alcaraz was injured in a car 

accident with an underinsured driver. He presented a claim to 

his insurer, defendant and respondent Steadfast Insurance 

Company (Steadfast). After unsuccessful attempts to settle,

Alcaraz demanded arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Alcaraz 

$532,220. Steadfast paid the arbitration award in full.

Alcaraz then filed the underlying action alleging Steadfast

breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 

unreasonably withholding policy benefits. He appeals from a 

judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained 

Steadfast’s demurrer without leave to amend. Alcaraz contends 

the trial court erred in accepting Steadfast’s arguments, 

including that the complaint failed to state a claim because there 

was a genuine dispute regarding the amount owed on the claim. 

We agree that the complaint was sufficient to withstand the 

demurrer. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of dismissal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

In October 2021, Alcaraz filed the underlying complaint 

against Steadfast alleging two causes of action: breach of contract 

1 We draw our facts from the allegations in Alcaraz’s 

complaint. Consistent with the standard of review, we assume 

the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations and do not

assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of 

law. (People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology 

Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 532 (Discovery 

Radiology Physicians).)
3

and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2

Alcaraz’s insurance policy with Steadfast provided up to 

$1 million in coverage for bodily injury due to a collision with an 

underinsured driver. This policy was in effect in August 2017 

when an underinsured driver failed to stop at a stop sign and 

collided with Alcaraz’s vehicle. As a result of the accident,

Alcaraz suffered a “left shoulder curved acromion, mild 

supraspinatus tendinosis and disc protrusions in the cervical 

spine.” To treat his injuries, he required neck injections, anterior 

cervical discectomy surgery, and disk replacement surgery. In

January 2019, Alcaraz settled with the underinsured driver’s 

insurance company for the third party policy limit of $15,000.

In March 2019, Alcaraz submitted an underinsured 

motorist demand to Steadfast for his remaining policy limit

amount of $985,000. The demand had an expiration date of April 

15, 2019, but Steadfast did not respond until May 1, 2019, when 

it counteroffered with $7,000. Alcaraz immediately rejected 

Steadfast’s offer and again demanded $985,000, with a response 

due May 6, 2019. This demand “again did not elicit any response 

from [Steadfast].” The complaint alleges that “on or about May 

31, 2019, after [Steadfast] made an unreasonably low and 

unjustifiable settlement offer,” Alcaraz demanded arbitration.

On July 2, 2019, Alcaraz again demanded the $985,000

policy limit, with a deadline of July 26, 2019. Steadfast 

responded on August 9, 2019, with an offer of $151,000. Alcaraz 

rejected the offer and, on January 20, 2020, sent another policy 

limit demand with a deadline of February 7, 2020.

2 Alcaraz does not challenge the trial court’s ruling on his 

breach of contract claim.
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In May 2020, Steadfast made a Code of Civil Procedure 

section 998 (section 998) offer to settle for $403,000. Alcaraz 

rejected the offer. On December 1, 2020, Steadfast lowered its 

offer to $250,000. Alcaraz responded on December 2, 2020, with 

a section 998 offer of $549,000, inclusive of his costs. The parties 

did not settle and proceeded to arbitration.

Following a hearing, the arbitrator issued an award in 

favor of Alcaraz for $547,200. Once the $15,000 third party 

settlement was credited, the total award due from Steadfast was

$532,200, not including Alcaraz’s costs. With costs, the amount 

Steadfast owed exceeded Alcaraz’s section 998 offer.

According to the complaint, at all relevant times, Alcaraz 

provided Steadfast information sufficient to establish that (1) the 

underinsured driver was 100 percent at fault for causing the 

accident; (2) Alcaraz’s injuries were serious and permanent;

(3) his medical expenses already exceeded $285,000, and he 

would require further treatment; and (4) he had a claim for past 

and future pain and suffering. Steadfast also had information 

regarding Alcaraz’s specific injuries and the medical treatment 

he required.

The complaint alleges Steadfast breached the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to make a 

“prompt, careful, and reasonable assessment of his injuries and 

damages” caused by the accident; disregarding the evidence in 

support of Alcaraz’s claim; making unreasonably low settlement 

offers; failing to promptly respond to his settlement offers; and 

engaging in “delay tactics” by not responding to Alcaraz’s calls 

and correspondence. The complaint further asserts Steadfast 

was obligated to “obtain medical records, reports and bills to 

fairly evaluate the nature and extent of Mr. Alcaraz’s injuries,”
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and to have Alcaraz “objectively examined by a doctor of 

[Steadfast’s] choice, if necessary, to assist it in making a good 

faith, objective, and fair determination of the nature and extent 

of his accident-related injuries and damages . . . .”

In July 2022, Steadfast demurred to Alcaraz’s complaint. 

It asserted Alcaraz could not state a cause of action for breach of 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because it 

paid the arbitration award in full and was permitted to arbitrate

under the Insurance Code. Steadfast further argued Alcaraz’s 

claim failed because there was a genuine dispute regarding the 

policy benefits owed. The trial court sustained Steadfast’s 

demurrer without leave to amend and issued a judgment of 

dismissal. Alcaraz timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Alcaraz argues he sufficiently alleged a cause of 

action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. Steadfast counters there was a genuine dispute between 

the parties as to the value of the underinsured motorist claim,

thus Alcaraz’s bad faith claim fails as a matter of law. Steadfast 

also contends Alcaraz did not state a valid claim because it paid 

the arbitration award in full; Alcaraz did not claim breach of any 

specific contract provision; submitting to arbitration cannot be 

bad faith; and Alcaraz failed to adequately allege causation 

because only his unreasonable demands rendered the arbitration 

necessary. We agree with Alcaraz that the complaint states a 

valid cause of action.

I. Standard of Review

“ ‘ “On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order 

sustaining a demurrer, the standard of review is de novo: we 

exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint 
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states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citation.] First, we 

give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a 

whole and its parts in their context. Next, we treat the demurrer 

as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. Then we 

determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to 

constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] [¶] We do not, however, 

assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of 

law. [Citation.]” ’ ” (Discovery Radiology Physicians, supra, 94 

Cal.App.5th at p. 532.)

II. The Complaint Sufficiently Alleges Breach of the 

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

A. Applicable legal principles

“ ‘The law implies in every contract, including insurance 

policies, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. “The implied 

promise requires each contracting party to refrain from doing 

anything to injure the right of the other to receive the 

agreement’s benefits. To fulfill its implied obligation, an insurer 

must give at least as much consideration to the interests of the 

insured as it gives to its own interests.” ’ ” (Maslo v. Ameriprise 

Auto & Home Ins. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 626, 633 (Maslo),

quoting Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720 

(Wilson).)

“An insurer that unreasonably delays, or fails to pay, 

benefits due under the policy may be held liable in tort for breach 

of the implied covenant. [Citation.] The withholding of benefits 

due under the policy may constitute a breach of contract even if 

the conduct was reasonable, but liability in tort arises only if the 

conduct was unreasonable, that is, without proper cause.” 

(Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile 

Club (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 831, 837 (Rappaport-Scott).) “[T]he 
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reasonableness of the insurer’s decisions and actions must be 

evaluated as of the time that they were made; the evaluation 

cannot fairly be made in the light of subsequent events . . . .” 

(Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn v. Associated Internat. 

Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 347.)

In addition, “[w]hile an insurance company has no 

obligation under the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing to pay every claim its insured makes, the insurer cannot 

deny the claim ‘without fully investigating the grounds for its 

denial.’ [Citation.] To protect its insured’s contractual interest in 

security and peace of mind, ‘it is essential that an insurer fully 

inquire into possible bases that might support the insured’s 

claim’ before denying it. [Citation.] By the same token, denial of 

a claim on a basis unfounded in the facts known to the insurer, or 

contradicted by those facts, may be deemed unreasonable. ‘A 

trier of fact may find that an insurer acted unreasonably if the 

insurer ignores evidence available to it which supports the claim. 

The insurer may not just focus on those facts which justify denial 

of the claim.’ [Citations.]” (Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 720–

721.)

“An insurer’s good or bad faith must be evaluated in light of 

the totality of the circumstances surrounding its actions.” 

(Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 723.)

B. The complaint sufficiently pleads bad faith

The complaint’s allegations that Steadfast unreasonably 

failed to investigate his insurance claim, and unreasonably 

delayed payment of policy benefits, are sufficient to state a cause 

of action.

According to the complaint, at all relevant times Steadfast 

knew: Alcaraz was in an accident with an underinsured driver 
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who was 100 percent at fault; because of the accident, Alcaraz

suffered injuries requiring injections and surgery; Alcaraz

incurred more than $285,000 in medical expenses; and Alcaraz 

would require further treatment.

The complaint further alleges that Steadfast ignored this 

information and failed to conduct any investigation necessary to 

make a reasonable assessment of his claim. Taking the 

complaint’s allegations as true, Steadfast made its initial $7,000 

settlement offer without first obtaining Alcaraz’s medical records 

or otherwise attempting to evaluate the nature of Alcaraz’s 

injuries. As a result, the $7,000 offer lacked a factual basis and 

was substantially less than Alcaraz’s already incurred medical 

expenses of $285,000. These allegations would support a finding

that Steadfast unreasonably failed to conduct a “prompt, careful,

and reasonable assessment of [Alcaraz’s] injuries and damages”

as alleged in the complaint. “[D]enial of a claim on a basis 

unfounded in the facts known to the insurer, or contradicted by 

those facts, may be deemed unreasonable.” (Wilson, supra, 42

Cal.4th at p. 721; Brehm v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2008) 166 

Cal.App.4th 1225, 1239–1240 (Brehm).) Where, as is alleged 

here, an insurer ignores medical evidence in its possession and 

reaches its decision about the amount owed without contacting 

the insured’s doctors, having its medical expert review the 

evidence, or arranging for the insured to be evaluated by an 

objective physician, an insurer’s delay in paying a claim may be 

unreasonable. (Wilson, at p. 721.)

Likewise, the complaint also alleges Steadfast engaged in 

other conduct that unreasonably delayed the payment of benefits. 

According to the complaint, Steadfast did not respond to Alcaraz’s 

calls and correspondence, thus failing to engage in settlement 
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discussions in good faith. It did not make a settlement offer 

sufficient to cover Alcaraz’s already-incurred medical expenses 

until a year after Alcaraz demanded arbitration and 14 months 

after he made his initial claim. (Rappaport-Scott, supra, 146 

Cal.App.4th at p. 837 [insurer must not “unreasonably” delay 

payment]; Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 718–720 [two-year 

delay from demand letter with documentation to payment of full 

policy limit could be found unreasonable by jury].)

The allegations of Steadfast’s inadequate investigation, its 

disregard of evidence regarding Alcaraz’s injuries and alreadyincurred medical expenses, its settlement offers that were 

unreasonably low in light of the information available to it, and 

the related delay in payment of policy benefits, were sufficient to 

state a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing.

C. Genuine dispute

We reject Steadfast’s assertion that Alcaraz’s claim fails as 

a matter of law because the complaint establishes a genuine 

dispute regarding the amount owed.

Under the genuine dispute rule, “ ‘an insurer denying or 

delaying the payment of policy benefits due to the existence of a 

genuine dispute with its insured as to the existence of coverage 

liability or the amount of the insured’s coverage claim is not 

liable in bad faith even though it might be liable for breach of 

contract.’ [Citation.]” (Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 723.) 

However, “[t]he genuine dispute rule does not relieve an insurer 

from its obligation to thoroughly and fairly investigate, process 

and evaluate the insured’s claim. A genuine dispute exists only 

where the insurer’s position is maintained in good faith and on 

reasonable grounds.” (Ibid.)
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As detailed above, the complaint alleges Steadfast failed to 

appropriately and timely investigate, process, and evaluate 

Alcaraz’s claim, such that Steadfast’s initial counteroffers were 

not made in good faith. These allegations prevent the conclusion 

that the genuine dispute rule forecloses Steadfast’s bad faith 

liability as a matter of law.

Two cases are instructive. In Rappaport-Scott, a panel of 

this court concluded an arbitration award that is substantially 

lower than the insured’s claimed damages may demonstrate the 

existence of a “genuine dispute.” (Rappaport-Scott, supra, 146 

Cal.App.4th at p. 839.) The insured in Rappaport-Scott asserted 

the insurer breached the implied covenant by making only low 

settlement offers that unreasonably failed to resolve her claim. 

(Id. at pp. 837, 839.) The court held “the vast difference between 

the $346,732.34 in losses claimed by Rappaport-Scott and the 

$63,000 in actual losses as determined by the arbitrator 

demonstrates, as a matter of law, that a genuine dispute existed 

as to the amount payable on the claim.” (Id. at p. 839, italics 

omitted.)

In Maslo, the complaint’s allegations led to a different 

result. In Maslo, there was also a substantial difference between 

the insured’s demand and the arbitrator’s eventual award. 

(Maslo, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 636.) However, the 

complaint alleged the insurer “failed to comply with its common 

law and statutory obligations to thoroughly and fairly 

investigate, process, and evaluate [the] appellant’s claim.” (Ibid.) 

The complaint asserted that although the insurer had 

information establishing that an uninsured motorist was solely at 

fault, as well as information documenting the nature and costs of 

medical treatment the appellant had received, it did not 
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interview the appellant’s treating physicians or conduct its own 

investigation into his injuries. The complaint further alleged the 

insurer did not respond in good faith to the appellant’s settlement 

demand, did not provide a reason for withholding payment, 

refused an offer to participate in mediation, and made no 

settlement offer. (Ibid.)

The Maslo court thus rejected the insurer’s reliance on the 

genuine dispute rule, explaining “there can be no genuine dispute 

in the absence of a thorough and fair investigation.” (Maslo, 

supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 637.) The court further 

distinguished Rappaport-Scott, since the insurer in that case 

“fairly investigated, processed and evaluated the insured’s claim,” 

made a settlement offer, and participated in mediation prior to 

arbitration. (Ibid.)

Here, as in Maslo, and unlike in Rappaport-Scott, the

complaint alleges Steadfast did not conduct a thorough and fair

investigation. While in Rappaport-Scott the insured’s bad faith 

claim appeared to be based exclusively on the insurer’s alleged 

failure to make a reasonable settlement offer, here, as in Maslo, 

the complaint alleges Steadfast’s failure to meaningfully 

investigate or fairly handle Alcaraz’s claim demonstrated its bad 

faith.

Maynard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Company (C.D.Cal. 2007) 499 F.Supp.2d 1154, is inapposite. In 

Maynard, the federal district court granted summary judgment 

in the insurer’s favor. The insured did not attempt to refute the 

insurer’s argument based on Rappaport-Scott that the difference 

between the damages claimed and the arbitrator’s award was 

evidence of a genuine dispute that was fatal to the insured’s bad 

faith claim. (Id. at p. 1161.) With the benefit of evidence 
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proffered in connection with the summary judgment motion, the 

court further concluded the insured could not dispute that there 

was a “reasonable and legitimate basis” for the insurer to 

question the insured’s claim. (Id. at pp. 1165, 1162–1164.)

In contrast, we consider only whether Alcaraz’s allegations 

were sufficient to state a cause of action. The complaint alleges

Steadfast breached the implied covenant in ways other than 

failing to make a reasonable settlement offer. It further alleges 

Steadfast’s settlement position was not maintained in good faith 

or on reasonable grounds. (Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 723.)

At this preliminary stage of the proceedings, the genuine dispute 

rule does not defeat Alcaraz’s bad faith claim as a matter of law.

D. The complaint sufficiently alleges causation

Steadfast additionally argues the complaint fails to

sufficiently allege its conduct caused Alcaraz’s damages. It 

asserts arbitration was necessary because of Alcaraz’s

unreasonable demands for the full policy limit, and not because 

Steadfast made an unreasonable settlement offer or failed to 

adequately investigate the claim.

That Alcaraz may have made unreasonable settlement 

demands does not establish as a matter of law that Steadfast was 

not to blame for the delay in the payment of policy benefits. 

Steadfast’s contention ignores the complaint’s allegations, which, 

at this stage, must be accepted as true. An insufficient 

investigation, and therefore a baseless counteroffer or refusal to 

settle, may be the legal cause of damages in a bad faith action. 

(Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 721; Brehm, supra, 166

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1232, 1240.)

Further, the complaint alleges Steadfast made its 

counteroffer of $7,000 without a good faith basis. Even after 
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Alcaraz requested arbitration, it took Steadfast a year to offer a 

sum large enough to account for his past medical expenses alone.

When Alcaraz made a section 998 offer that was only $2,000 more 

than the arbitrator’s eventual award, Steadfast did not accept it 

or make a counteroffer even approaching that amount. The 

complaint alleges that Steadfast engaged in a pattern of 

unreasonable conduct and did not participate in meaningful 

settlement discussions. It does not allege that Alcaraz would not 

have accepted anything less than the policy limit. Instead, the 

complaint alleges that “at all relevant times, [Alcaraz] was 

amenable to, and expressly indicated a willingness to reach an 

amicable settlement of his underinsured motorist claim[s] for an 

amount within the policy limits.”

The Maslo court considered and rejected a similar 

causation argument. The insurance company argued that its 

failure to investigate the claim could not be the legal cause of the 

insured’s damages because the complaint did not allege the 

insured would have settled for less than his initial, high demand, 

thus “arbitration was inevitable.” (Maslo, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 639.) The Maslo court reasoned it was not the insured’s 

initial demand that made arbitration inevitable, rather it was the 

insurance company’s refusal to investigate the claim and that it

offered nothing. (Ibid.) We find this reasoning persuasive. 

While Steadfast made several settlement offers, the complaint 

adequately alleges they were unreasonably low because Steadfast

made them without conducting any investigation, it already knew 

Alcaraz had incurred over $285,000 in medical expenses, and it 

also had information indicating the other driver was at fault. 

The complaint sufficiently alleges causation.
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E. Neither Steadfast’s payment of the arbitration 

award nor Alcaraz’s failure to allege breach of a 

specific contract provision precludes his claim

Finally, we reject Steadfast’s arguments that its prompt 

payment of the arbitration award eliminated any potential 

liability for bad faith and that Alcaraz was required to plead that 

Steadfast breached a specific contractual provision to state a 

cause of action for breach of the implied covenant.

It is well established that an insured may maintain a cause 

of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

even when the insurer has paid all benefits due under the policy. 

(Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 720–721 [bad faith action based 

on delay in payment and insufficient evaluation of claim after 

insurer ultimately paid full policy limit]; Maslo, supra, 227

Cal.App.4th at pp. 634, 638 [bad faith action after insurer paid 

arbitration award]; Brehm, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1232, 

1241–1242 [same]; Hightower v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1995) 38 

Cal.App.4th 853, 857, 861–862 (Hightower) [same].)

Steadfast fails to recognize this precedent and asserts that

because it promptly paid the arbitration award, it never withheld 

benefits, so it cannot have acted in bad faith. For this 

proposition, it vaguely cites “the policy” and Insurance Code 

sections “11580.2” and “11580.26.”

3

3 Steadfast appears to implicitly rely on Insurance Code 

section 11580.2, subdivision (f), which provides that “[t]he policy 

or an endorsement added thereto shall provide that the 

determination as to whether the insured shall be legally entitled 

to recover damages, and if so entitled, the amount thereof, shall 

be made by agreement . . . .” It also appears that Steadfast relies 

on Insurance Code section 11580.26, subdivision (b), which
15

As we understand its argument, Steadfast contends these 

provisions establish it cannot be held liable for bad faith because 

it was not required to pay Alcaraz any policy benefits until either 

the parties agreed as to the amount owed, or the arbitrator 

issued an award. Yet, this argument ignores the insurer’s duty to 

act in good faith in responding to its insured’s claim before it 

ultimately pays a claim. (See, e.g., Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 

pp. 720–721, 723; Rappaport-Scott, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 837.)

Moreover, several courts have rejected Steadfast’s

argument that an insurer’s right to arbitrate extinguishes its 

duty to respond in good faith to the insured’s claim. (Maslo, 

supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 638–639; Brehm, supra, 166 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1244; Hightower, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 862–863 [Insurance Code section 11580.26].) For example, in 

Brehm, the court held that the insurer’s contractual right to 

arbitrate did not relieve it from its duty to interact with its 

insured in good faith. The court reasoned there was an “implied 

obligation to honestly assess Brehm’s claim and to make a 

reasonable effort to resolve any dispute with him as to the 

amount of his damages before invoking that right [to 

arbitration].” (Brehm, at p. 1242.) The court also held that 

Insurance Code section 11580.26, subdivision (b), which states 

that no cause of action can be brought against either the insurer 

or insured for demanding arbitration, did not “immunize” the 

insurer from tort liability for its handling of a claim. (Id. at 

p. 1243.) Citing Hightower, the court held that an insurer could 

states: “No cause of action shall exist against either an insured or 

insurer from exercising the right to request arbitration of a claim 

under this section or Section 11580.2.”
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not use its right to pursue arbitration as a means to 

“ ‘ “stonewall” ’ ” or “ ‘shield . . . dilatory conduct.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 1244, citing Hightower, at p. 863.) We find the Brehm court’s 

reasoning equally applicable here.

Steadfast also summarily asserts, without citation to any

legal authority or explanation, that the complaint fails to state a 

claim because Alcaraz does not allege it breached a specific 

contract term. This contention lacks merit. The covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing is implied in every insurance contract.

(Maslo, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 633.) Thus, the breach of an 

express contract term is not required to maintain an action for 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

(Brehm, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1235–1236.)
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is reversed. The case is 

remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate its order 

sustaining the demurrer in its entirety and to enter a new order 

overruling the demurrer to the breach of the covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing cause of action. Alcaraz shall recover his 

appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.