J-S84005-16

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DARRYL PALMER,

Appellant No. 3086 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of September 29, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013136-2013

BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED January 12, 2017

Appellant, Darryl Palmer, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on September 29, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County. We affirm.

At the conclusion of a three-day trial on April 11, 2014, a jury found 

Appellant guilty of carrying a firearm on a street or public place in 

Philadelphia (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108) and the trial court found Appellant guilty 

of persons not to use or possess firearms (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105). Thereafter, 

on September 29, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 

punishment of six to 13 years’ incarceration.1

____________________________________________

1 Appellant received five to 10 years’ imprisonment for persons not to 

possess firearms and one to three years for carrying a firearm on the streets 

of Philadelphia.
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Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 28, 2014. On 

March 26, 2015, Appellant timely complied with the trial court’s order to file 

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925. With leave of court, Appellant later supplemented his concise 

statement with filings submitted on March 27, 2015 and November 10, 

2015. This matter is now ripe for consideration.

Appellant raises a single question for our review:

Was not the evidence insufficient to support Appellant’s 

[firearms convictions], where the verdict rests upon unreliable 

evidence, speculation, and conjecture?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant argues on appeal that his convictions rest upon insufficient 

evidence that he possessed a firearm during the incident in question. 

Specifically, Appellant contends that the testimony of Ronald Leach, the 

Commonwealth’s eyewitness to the relevant events, was unbelievable and 

that 911 recordings of Leach’s reports to police constituted unreliable 

hearsay. Appellant therefore reasons that the Commonwealth needed to 

prove constructive possession, which it failed to do since the evidence 

merely showed Appellant in proximity to a firearm that was equally 

accessible to others. These claims are meritless.

Our standard of review for a sufficiency challenge is well settled.

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims 

requires that we evaluate the record “in the light most favorable 

to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all 
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reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). 

“Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when 

it establishes each material element of the crime charged and 

the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Commonwealth v. Brewer, 876 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). Nevertheless, “the Commonwealth need not 

establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.” Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 

2000) (“[T]he facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with the 

defendant's innocence”). Any doubt about the defendant's guilt 

is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. See 

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 

2001).

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. See Brewer, 876 A.2d at 1032. 

Accordingly, “[t]he fact that the evidence establishing a 

defendant's participation in a crime is circumstantial does not 

preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the 

presumption of innocence.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1038–1039 (Pa. Super. 2002)). 

Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the 

fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates 

the respective elements of a defendant's crimes beyond a 

reasonable doubt, the appellant's convictions will be upheld. See 

Brewer, 876 A.2d at 1032.

Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 500 (Pa. Super. 2013) (parallel 

citations and quotation omitted).

We have carefully reviewed the certified record, the submissions of the 

parties, and the opinions of the trial court. Based upon our review, we 

conclude that the trial court has adequately and accurately addressed the 

contentions raised by Appellant and we adopt its sufficiency analysis as our 
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own. In particular, we agree with the trial court’s determination that Leach’s 

testimony, together with the 911 recordings, provided the jury with 

sufficient proof upon which to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

Appellant possessed a firearm on the date in question. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/30/15, at 10-11. Moreover, we decline Appellant’s invitation to 

reconsider the weight and credibility of the evidence adduced by the 

Commonwealth, as our standard of review forbids such an undertaking. 

Accordingly, we direct the parties to include a copy of the trial court June 30, 

2015 opinion with all future filings relating to our disposition of this appeal.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/12/2017