alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
J

- S27027

- 19

NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHARON MARTIN

Appellant :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1540 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 27 , 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 26

- SA

- 0000089

- 2018

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and COLINS  , J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019

Sharon Martin appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on

September 2 7 , 2018, 1 in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County

following her conviction on two cou nts of 3 P.S. § 459

- 305(a)(3), unlawful

confinement and control of a dog, and one count of 3 P.S. § 459

- 502(a)(1)(ii),

harboring a dangerous dog. Martin was sentenced to pay fines, court costs

and fees. In this timely appeal, Martin raises three issues. However, because

Martin has not provided this Court with a complete record, we are unable to

conduct a meaningful review. Accordingly, we find all issues waived.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Judgment of sentence was dated Sept ember 25, 2018 and docketed in the lower court on September 27, 2018.J

- S27027

- 19

- 2

-

The certified record in this matter contains no notes of testimony from

the bench trial hel d on September 25, 2018. Although the notes were

transcribed, they were not included in the certified record.

Our law is unequivocal that an appellant bears the responsibility

to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary for the reviewing court to perform its duty

. Commonwealth v. B.D.G.

, 959 A.2d 362, 372 (Pa. Super. 2008). Therefore, “we can only repeat the well established pri nciple that ‘our review is limited to

those facts which are contained in the certified record’ and what is not contained in the certified record ‘does not exist for purposes

of our review.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Brown , 161 A.3d 960, 968 (Pa. Super. 2017). 2

Because we have no notes of testimony to review, we must find that all

issues have been waived.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 As a matter of courtesy, counsel was contacted, more than once, by the

Office of the P rothonotary of our Court, was informed of the failure to include the notes of testimony, and was asked to supplement the certified record. However, this has not been done. Nor has this Court been informed of why the notes were not included in the first place; why, in more than two weeks

since counsel was first informed of the lack of notes of testim ony, the certified record has not been supplemented; nor, when the supplement might be expected.J

- S27027

- 19

- 3

-

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/18/2019
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
balance sheet and statements of operations found on pages 3 and 4 of the
Company's Form 10-QSB for the year to date, and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                             243 
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0 
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0 
<INVENTORY>                                          0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   243     
<PP&E>                                               0 
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     406     
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,531
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           125
<OTHER-SE>                                      (4,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       406   
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,260
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (1,260)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Alan F. Beane, et al.

v. Civil No. 06-cv-446-SM

Glenn L. Beane, et al.

O R D E R

In a prior attachment order (Document no. 52), I set forth

an extensive set of facts, the standard for attachments in New

Hampshire and granted part of Glenn Bean’s prior petition, but

denied the portion relating to reimbursement for payments to

HOCO, LLC. The counterclaim plaintiff seeks a second shot at

that apple (Document no. 56). The amount at issue is $11,000.00.

BACKGROUND

The $11,000.00 consists of two $2,000.00 payments to HOCO

and $7,000.00 in attorneys fees in settling claims against Glenn

Beane by HOCO, LLC. The settlement did not resolve the claims in

that suit against either Materials Innovation, Inc. (MMI) or Alan

Beane. Def. Ex. S. Glenn and Alan Beane guaranteed MII’s

obligations under a real estate lease dated June 23, 1994. Def.

Ex. O. 

Case 1:06-cv-00446-SM Document 92 Filed 02/04/08 Page 1 of 3
2

At some point in time, MII turned the space over to Mii

Technologies, LLC (Mii). Apparently, there was no formal

assignment of the lease between MII and Mii and no agreement to

the assignment by HOCO.

In 1997 Mii agreed to pay for the cost of leasing a facility

which MII intended to lease. Def. Ex. D. ¶3.1. MII was

dissolved in 1993. The HOCO settlement by Glenn Beane was in

October of 2004. The HOCO suit sought rent from MII alleging

that it owed $33,087.46 in rent, taxes and fees. Despite his

current position that Mii occupied the building and agreed to pay

the rent, his Motion to Strike Default dated May 5, 2004 contains

a judicial admission that “the corporate defendant”, i.e. MII,

occupied the premises. Def. Ex. O, ¶4.

Neither MII nor Glenn Beane sought to file a third party

claim against Mii in the HOCO case. Thus, Mii had no opportunity

to defend and no notice of suit has been shown. Further, Glenn

Beane stated that he had no valid guarantee for the period in

question. Def. Ex. O, ¶¶3-4. That judicial admission is

binding. His claim that he paid on a guarantee for which he is

entitled to indemnity is not strong. He simply settled a

doubtful claim for nuisance value, no indemnity rights attached.

Case 1:06-cv-00446-SM Document 92 Filed 02/04/08 Page 2 of 3
3

On the $11,000.00 claim Glenn Beane has not shown a

likelihood of success by a “greater than... preponderance of the

evidence...” See Diane Holly Corp. v. Bruno & Stillman Yacht

Co., 559 F. Supp. 559, 561 (D.N.H. 1983). The petition (Document

no. 56) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: February 4, 2008

cc: William S. Gannon, Esq.

W.E. Whittington, Esq.

Case 1:06-cv-00446-SM Document 92 Filed 02/04/08 Page 3 of 3
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 185 (Tuesday, September 23, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 54880]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-22182]



[[Page 54880]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i>11409 and <greek-i>11410]


Florida Disaster Number FL-00035.

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 4.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for the State of Florida (FEMA-1785-DR), dated 08/26/
2008.
    Incident: Tropical Storm Fay.
    Incident Period: 08/18/2008 through 09/12/2008.
    Effective Date: 09/11/2008.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 10/27/2008.
    EIDL Loan Application Deadline Date: 05/26/2009.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the Presidential disaster 
declaration for the State of Florida, dated 08/26/2008 is hereby 
amended to include the following areas as adversely affected by the 
disaster:

Primary Counties: (Physical Damage and Economic Injury Loans):
    Baker, Collier, Glades, Jefferson, Lake, Marion, Nassau, Orange, 
Polk.
Contiguous Counties: (Economic Injury Loans Only):
    Florida: Alachua, Bradford, Citrus, Columbia, Desoto, Hardee, 
Hillsborough, Levy, Madison, Manatee, Miami-Dade, Monroe, Pasco, 
Sumter, Taylor, Union.
    Georgia: Brooks, Camden, Charlton, Clinch, Ware.

    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)

James E. Rivera,
Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. E8-22182 Filed 9-22-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

WILLIE STOKES,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 20 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 30th day of May, 2019

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### Raymond J. VERONDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROTECTION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-16437.

D.C. No. CV-99-05244-MMC.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 14, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Raymond J. Veronda appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection in his employment discrimination action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc.,*170 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir.1999), and we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court’s summary judgment order filed on July 12, 2002.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff ) 

 ) 

v. ) Civil No. 06-cv-203-DBH 

 ) 

JUDITH PUTZEL and ) 

STEPHEN M. PRICE, ) 

 Defendants ) 

O R D E R

After due consideration of the objection/response filed by the defendant Judith Putzel, I 

AFFIRM the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge John H. Rich, III dated June 30, 2008. 

 The government's motion for summary judgment as to the defendant Putzel is GRANTED, with the 

proviso that interest be abated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6404(e)(2) until the date demand for 

repayment was made; the government’s motion for summary judgment as to the defendant Stephen 

Price is DENIED; and the defendant Price’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated this 22nd day of July, 2008 

 /S/D. BROCK HORNBY 

 D. BROCK HORNBY

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 Sitting by Designation 

Case 1:06-cv-00203-DBH Document 29 Filed 07/22/08 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 06-cr-154-01-SM

Timothy Seeley

O R D E R

Defendant Seeley’s motion to continue the final pretrial conference and

trial is granted (document 15). Trial has been rescheduled for the August 

2007 trial period. Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights not later

than April 11, 2007. On the filing of such waiver, his continuance shall be

effective. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: July 30, 2007 at 3:30 p.m.

Jury Selection: August 7, 2007 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:06-cr-00154-SM Document 17 Filed 04/03/07 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

April 3, 2007

cc: Jonathan Saxe, Esq.

Debra Walsh, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:06-cr-00154-SM Document 17 Filed 04/03/07 Page 2 of 2
Opinion issued November 25, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00810-CR

———————————

EX PARTE ROBERT WILLIAM BERLETH

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 5

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 9519158-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Robert William Berleth appeals from the trial court’s order denying his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure.1

 In his application for writ of habeas corpus, Berleth contends 

 1 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072 (West 2005) (providing for appeal 

in felony or misdemeanor case in which applicant seeks relief from order or judgment of 

conviction ordering community supervision).
2

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because he did not receive 

any advice from appointed counsel before his plea, was not properly advised of the 

consequences of his plea, and was improperly advised by the prosecutor and the 

visiting judge that his plea for deferred adjudication, “once completed, would be as 

if it had never happened.” The trial court denied the writ of habeas corpus on 

March 7, 2014. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed on July 22, 

2014. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that the 

relief requested by the applicant is barred by laches under Ex parte Perez, 398 

S.W.3d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The notice of appeal from the March 7, 2014 

order was not filed until September 22, 2014. Appellant did not file a motion for 

extension of time to file his notice of appeal. Further, appellant did not respond to 

a notice of intent to dismiss for want of jurisdiction issued by this Court on 

October 28, 2014.

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.2 provides that in a criminal case, the 

notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the trial court entered an 

appealable order, unless a motion for new trial is filed, in which case a notice of 

appeal must be filed within 90 days. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2. The notice filed by 

Berleth was not timely, and he has therefore failed to invoke this Court’s 

jurisdiction to consider his appeal. See Slayton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 

 
3

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding a timely filed notice of appeal is essential to vest 

the court of appeals with jurisdiction to address the merits of an appeal. 

Accordingly, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Brown.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1237

To designate certain lands in the Valley Forge National Historical Park

as the Valley Forge National Cemetery.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 27, 2001

Mr. HOEFFEL (for himself, Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, Mr. PITTS, Mr.

DOYLE, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. PETERSON of Pennsylvania,

Mr. FATTAH, Mr. TOOMEY, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. HOLDEN, Ms. HART, Mr.

PLATTS, Mr. MASCARA, Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania, Mr. BORSKI, Mr.

MURTHA, Mr. GREENWOOD, Mr. SHERWOOD, and Mr. COYNE) introduced

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Resources, and

in addition to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of

such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To designate certain lands in the Valley Forge National

Historical Park as the Valley Forge National Cemetery.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF LANDS AS VALLEY FORGE

4 NATIONAL CEMETERY.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not more than 200 acres of land

6 located within the Valley Forge National Historical Park

7 on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act
2

•HR 1237 IH

1 are hereby designated as the Valley Forge National Ceme2 tery. Administrative jurisdiction over such lands is hereby

3 transferred to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and such

4 lands shall be administered as a national cemetery in ac5 cordance with chapter 24 of title 38, United States Code

6 (relating to national cemeteries and memorials).

7 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF PARK BOUNDARIES.—Sub8 section (b) of section 2 of the Act entitled ‘‘An Act to

9 authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish the

10 Valley Forge National Historical Park in the Common11 wealth of Pennsylvania, and for other purposes’’ (16

12 U.S.C. 410aa–1) is amended by striking ‘‘map entitled

13 ‘Valley Forge National Historical Park’, dated June 1979,

14 and numbered VF–91,001’’ and inserting ‘‘map entitled

15 ‘Valley Forge National Historical Park’, dated ll, and

16 numbered ll’’.

Æ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 06-cr-71-01/02-SM

Elaine Brown and

Edward Brown

O R D E R

Defendants’ motion to continue trial was granted on September 26, 2006,

at the final pretrial conference (document no. 51). Trial has been rescheduled

for the January 2007 trial period. The defendants shall file waivers of speedy

trial rights not later than October 6, 2006. On the filing of such waiver, their

continuance shall be effective. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant s the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: December 15, 2006 at 1:30 p.m.

Jury Selection: January 9, 2007 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:06-cr-00071-SM Document 56 Filed 09/28/06 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

September 28, 2006

cc: Elaine Brown, pro se

Edward Brown, pro se

William Morse, AUSA

Jean Weld, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:06-cr-00071-SM Document 56 Filed 09/28/06 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 06-cr-63-01-PB

Lolita Dungca

O R D E R

The defendant, through counsel, has moved to continue the

September 6, 2006 trial in the above case, citing the need for

additional time to locate an interpreter to assist with plea

negotiations or trial preparation. The government does not

object to a continuance of the trial date.

Accordingly, in order to allow the parties additional time

to properly prepare for trial, the court will continue the trial

from September 6, 2006 to December 5, 2006. In agreeing to

continue the trial, the court finds pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. §

3161(h)(8)(A) that for the above-stated reasons, the ends of

justice served in granting a continuance outweigh the best

interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 1:06-cr-00063-PB Document 13 Filed 08/31/06 Page 1 of 2
2

The court will hold a final pretrial conference on November

28, 2006 at 3:00 p.m.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

August 31, 2006

cc: Sandra Bloomenthal, Esq.

Donald Feith, AUSA 

United States Probation

United States Marshal

Case 1:06-cr-00063-PB Document 13 Filed 08/31/06 Page 2 of 2
Opinion filed August 3, 2017



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

____ ___ ____ No. 11

- 1 7

- 00 182

- CR

_____ ___ ___ JOSHUA WALTER GOSSON , Appellant

V.
THE S TATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 4 2nd District Court Tayl or County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 27272A

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Joshua Walter Gosson
, Appellant, has filed a n untimely pro se notice of appeal
from a conviction for the offense of possession of methamphetamine

. We dismiss the appeal.
The documents on file in th is case indicate that Appellant’s sentence was imposed on May 1 0 , 201 7 , and that h is notice of appeal was filed in the district2

clerk’s office on June 29
, 201 7

. When the appeal w as filed in this court, we notified Appellant by letter that the notice of appeal appeared to be untimely and that the appeal may be dismissed for want of jurisdiction

. We also noted that the trial court had certified this was a plea

- bargain case and that A ppellant had waived his right to appeal. We requested that Appellant respond to our letter and show grounds to
continue

. Appellant has not filed a response.
P ursuant to T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.2 (a)
, a notice of appeal is due to be filed either (1) within thirty days after the date that sentence is imposed in open court or (2) if the defendant timely files a motion for new trial, within ninety days after the date that sentence is imposed in open court. A notice of appeal must be in writing and
filed with the clerk of the trial court. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(c)(1 ) . The documents on
file in this court re flect that Appellant did not file a motion for new trial and that Appellant’s notice of appeal was file d with the clerk of the trial court fifty days after

sentence w as imposed

. The notice of appeal was, therefore, untimely. Absent a timely filed notice of appeal or the granting of a timely motion for extension of time, we do not have jurisdiction to ent ertain th is appeal. Slaton v.
State , 981 S.W.2d 208 , 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519
, 522

– 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Rodarte v. State , 860 S.W.2d 108 , 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Neither a notice of appeal no r a motion for extension were filed with in
the fifteen

- day period permitted by T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 2 6.3. Moreover, the trial court’s certification reflects that this is a plea

- bargain case and that Appellant ha s no right of appeal. Thus, even if A ppellant had timely perfected an appeal, the appeal would have been prohibited by T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2, which provides that an appellate court must dismiss an appeal without further action when there is no certification showing that the defendant has the right of appea l.3

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State , 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); s ee Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610 , 613

– 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Th i s appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

August 3, 2017 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson
, J., and Bailey, J.