### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT A ugu st 31 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble C. Ashley

Roy al, United States District Judge f or the Middle District * of Ge org ia, sitting by

desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1155 0

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 02-01131 CV -JEC -1 AN TH ON Y L . E ST ES , Pe tit ion er -Appe llant, ve rs us BRUCE CHAPM AN, Respondent -Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A ug us t 31, 200 4) Before AN DE RSO N and BIRCH , C ircuit Judg es, and ROY AL , District Judge. * AN DE RSO N, Circuit Judge: T his c as e co nc er

ns whe the r a state -c ourt m oti on t o va cate an a lle ge dly voi dO.C.G.A. § 17-10- 6.1(a) (3) ( kidnaping ); § 17-10-6.1,( a)( 4) (r ape) . 1 2 se nte nc e w as “pr ope rl y

f ile d” suc h th at

it tol le d th e lim itatio ns p er iod f or f ili ng federa l habeas petition s set forth in 28 U.S .C. § 2244 (d)(1).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Est es was c on vi ct edin Geor gi a st at e co ur t o f ki dn ap in g a ndot he r of fen se s. He had previousl y

been convicted of rape. Bec ause the kidnapi ng conv iction was E ste s’ se co nd “ se ri ous vio le nt f el ony , ” as de fi ne d inO . C. G . A . § 17 -1 0- 6. 1, the 1 co ur t was requi redto sen te nc e h im to li fe i m pr is on m en t wi th ou t p aro le , O.C.G.A. § 17- 10- 7( b) (2 ). E ste s un suc ce ssf ull y appe al ed and unsuc ce ssf

ull y sou ght state pos tco nvi ct ionr el ie f. I n S ep te m be r 2001 , E ste s f

ile d a“ Mot ionto V ac at e Il le ga lly Im posed Sentence” (her einafter “ m otion to vacate” or “ m otion ”), which w as denied by the trial court, and the Geor gia Court of Appeals af firm ed. Ther eafte r, Estes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federa l court. T he district court rej ected E stes’ feder al habeas petition as unt im ely under § 224 4(d)(1). T his appeal fo llo w ed . T he part ie s a gr ee that whe the r the li m itatio ns p er iod ha d r un t ur ns o n w he the r E ste s’ m oti on t o va cate w as “pr ope rl y f ile d” und er

§ 22 44( d) (2 ). I f the m oti on w as pr ope rl y

f ile d, thi s C ourt sh oul d r ev er se . I f it w as not pr ope rl y f ile d, this Court sh ouldaff

irm . W e re view the district court’ s dism issal de nov o, D rewIn 2001 the Geor g ia leg islature alter ed this law to allow sentenc e modifications 2 within one y ear

or 120 day s of the conc lusion of the direc t appea l proce ss, whicheve r is later. Se e O. C.G .A . § 17 -1 0- 1( f) . T he Ge or g ia Court of Ap pe a ls h a s h e ld t

hat th e ne w p ro vis ion

did not revoke the cour

ts’ ability to vacate void sentenc es at a ny time. Kinsey

v. State, 259 Ga. App. 653, 653, 578 S.E.2d 269, 270 (2003). 3 v. D ep’ t of Corr. , 297 F. 3d 12 78, 1283 (11t h Cir. 2002 ), and we reverse .

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND – M OTIONS TO VA CATE VOID SENTENCES AND “ PROPERLY FILED” HABEAS PETITIONS A. Motion s to Vacate V oid Sentences U nde r the lawope ratin g a t the ti m e of E ste s’ se nte nc ing , G eo rg iac ourts could on ly

m odify a sentence bef

ore the expiration of the sentencing court’s ter m or w ith in 6 0 day s of

the or igi na l se nte nc ing . S ee Re ynol ds v . S tate , 132 G a. App. 89, 91, 207 S . E . 2d 6 30, 632 ( 1974 ); Cr um ble y v. S tate , 261 G a. 610 , 611 , 409 S. E. 2d 51 7, 518 (1991). H owever , “ [w ] here a sentence is void . . . the c ourt m ay resentence the def

endant at any

tim e. ” Cr

um bley , 621 Ga . at 611, 409 S.E .2d at 518 (e m pha sis a dde d) . S ee a lso W ill iam s v. S tate , 217 G a. 686 , 523 S . E . 2d 8 57 2 (1999). Against this legal backdrop , the S tate ar gues that Wright v. State, 277 Ga. 810, 811, 596 S.E .2d 587, 588 (2004 ), bars m otion s to vacate such as E stes’ . See id. (“ Wright is essenti ally seeking to vacate the j udgm ent of conviction for m alice m ur de r. H ow ev er , w e have c onsi ste ntl y he ld tha t a

m oti on t o va cate aj udgm en t w ill not li e in a c ri m ina l c as e. ”) . W e ar e ske pti ca l of the S tate ’ s r ea din g of

Wri ghtFor the same r eason, w e re

ject the State’ s relianc e upon Collins v. S tate, 277 Ga . 3 58 6, 59 1 S. E. 2d

82 0 ( 20 04 ). Th e State re lie s u po n Co lli ns fo r t

he pr op os iti on

that G e or g ia courts lac k jurisdiction to hear a post-term motion to vacate when it alleg es only that a sente nce is voidable rathe r than void. I d. at 587-88, 591 S.E.2d 821-22. The ref ore, the State argues such motions m ay

not be prope rly

filed for purposes of § 2244( d)(2) . We decline to addr ess the import of Colli ns beca

use it was dec ided af

ter the time of E stes’ motion, and the State does not su g g e st that Co lli ns re pr e se nts a fi rm ly e sta bli sh e d a nd re gula rl y fo llo we d r

ule datin gba c k to that time. See Siebert, 334 F .3d at 1025. Quite the c ontrary , the ca ses cited a bove in text reveal that Geor g ia cour

ts have for

many y ear s rec og nized jurisdiction t o enter tain at any

time motions to vacate sentenc es alleg ed to be void, includingcase s in 1999, 2002, and 2003 – time frames which bra cket the 2001 motion involved in this case. Indeed, in this ca se both the state tria l court and the Court of A

ppeals a ddresse d Estes’ alleg ations and ruled on the issue of whe ther the sentenc e wa s void; those courts did not dism iss Estes’ challeng e as a ssertingmere ly that the 4 be ca use the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt r ei te rate d in200 2 and 2 003 that a m oti on t o vacate a void sent ence m ay

be filed at any

tim e. See , e .g. , C urtis v. State, 275 Ga. 57 6, 5 77 -7 8, 5 71 S.E.2d37 6, 3 79 (20 02 ); S hi el ds v. St at e, 27 6 Ga. 6 69 , 67 1, n .6 581 S. E . 2d 5 36, 537 n. 6 ( 2003 ). T hus, r ea din g Wri ght to bar m oti ons to v ac at e voi d se nte nc es w oul d br ing it int o di re ct

c onf lic t w ithve ry

r ec en t c as es , inc lud ing one c as e uponw hic h Wri ght r el ie d. S ee Wri ght , 277 G a. 810 , 811 n. 4, 596 S . E . 2d 587, 588 n. 4 ( ci tin g S hie lds , 276 G a. 669 , 581 S . E . 2d 5 36) . H ow ev er , w e ne ed not de ci de thi s is sue be ca

use Wri ght

w as de ci de d w el l a ft er

E ste s f ile d hi s m oti on; the re fo re any

c hange f ro m the pr ior lawthat i t m ay

have announc ed

w oul d no t ap ply to him . S ee S ie be rt

v. Cam pbe ll, 334 F . 3d 1 018, 102 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) (“ [W ] e co nc lud e that a

r ule gov er nin g f ili ngs m ust be ‘ fi rm ly

e sta bli she d and regularly followed’ before noncom pliance will re nder a petition im properly filed for purpose of AE DP A’ s tollin g provis ion.”). 3sentenc e wa s voidable. B eca use Collins was decided a fter the time of Estes’ motion, and be c a us e the int e rp re tatio n th e State se e ks to p la c e up on Col lin s d oe s n ot r e fl e c t th e fi rm ly established and r egularly

followed rule at that time, any chang e in the law e ffe cted by Colli ns does not apply

to this case. One c laim was bar

red be cause it had alre ady been de cided on the me rits on 4 appea l. The other w as bar red be cause the def

endant ha d “unjustifiabl[y ] fail[ ed]” to raise it on appea l. I d. at 7, 121 S. Ct. at 363 (citing N.Y . Crim. Proc. L aw § 440.10( 2)(a ), 2(c )). 5 B. “ Pr ope rl y

F ile d” H ab ea s P et iti ons In Ar tuz v. Be nnett, 531 U. S. 4, 121 S. Ct. 361 (200 0), the S uprem e Court clarifie d the circum stances under which a m otion is “properly filed” for purposes of § 2244 (d)(2). A rtuz held that a m otion to vacate a sentence w as properly filed ev entho ugh both c la im s inthe m oti on w er e pr oc ed ur al ly barr ed by state law . I d. 4 T he Co urt r ea sone d th at

am oti on i s pr ope rl y

f ile d m er el y

“ w he n it s de liv er

y and ac ce ptanc e ar e in c om

pli an ce w iththe appl ic ab le law s and r ule s go ve rn ing f

ili ngs” – r ule s su cha s “ the f

orm of the doc um en t, the ti m e lim its upo n it s de liv er y , the co urt and o ff

ic e in whic h it

m ust be lod ge d, and the r equis ite f ili ng f ee . ” I d. a t 8, 121 S. Ct . a t 36 4 ( fo otn ote om itt ed ). T he Co urt f urthe r expla ine d th at

“ in c om m on usa ge , the que sti on whe the r anappl ic at ionha s be en‘ pr ope rl y f ile d’ is qui te separate f rom the question whether

the claim s contained in the application are m eritorious and free of procedural bar. ” Id. at 9, 121 S. Ct. at 364. T hus, proper fi lin g is usu al ly

am atte r of

m ee tin g ba sic , f

orm al f ili ng r equir em en ts. H ow ev er , the Co urt sp ec if ic al ly not ed one pot en tia lly

r el ev an t i nst an ce in6

w hic h am oti on i s no t “pr ope rl y f ile d” : whe n am oti on i s f

ile d inac ourt tha t l ac ks j urisdictio n to hear it. Id. ( “ If, for exam ple, an application is erroneously acce pted by the c le rk of ac ourt l ac kin g j ur isd ic tio n . . . it w ill be pe ndi ng, but

not pr ope rl y filed.” ). H ere, Estes and the State argue over whether the trial court had j urisdictio n over Estes’ m otion to vacate. III. DISC USSION T he S tate arg ue s th at

be ca use E ste s f

ile d hi s m oti on o uts ide the te rm of co urt, and b ec au se his se nte nc e w as not voi d, the tr ia l c ourt l ac ke d j ur isd ic tio n to hear the m otion . W e disagree. A s discuss ed above, G eorgia lawm akes clear that a se nte nc ing c ourt ha s j ur isd ic tio n to e xam ine am oti on t o va cate out sid e the se nte nc ing te rm

if it a lle ge s th at

ase nte nc e is v oid . I f the m oti on i s m er ito ri ous, the c ourt w ill gr an t i t; if

the m oti on l ac ks m er it, the c ourt l ose s j ur isd ic tio n be ca use it m ay onl y m odi fy ase nte nc e af

te r the e xpi ratio n of

the se nte nc ing co urt’ s te rm

if the se nte nc e is v oid . S ee , e . g. , Barb er v. S tate , 240 G a. App. 156 , 157, 522 S.E .2d 528, 530 (1999 ) (“ A void j udgm ent is ‘ a m ere nulli ty ,’ and an ind ivi dua l m ay

a tta ck suc h j udgm en t ‘ w he n it

be co m es m at er ia l t o th e int er es t of the parties to consid er it. ’ . . . How ever . . . I f the j udgm ent is not v oid, a trial c ourt ha s no f urthe r subj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n ou tsi de the te rm of c ourt and the pe tit ion m ust be dis m iss ed . ”) . T he G eo rg iaCo urt of Appe al s’ dis posi tio n inthi s c as e7

accorded w ith the case law . It did not s ay the trial court lacked j urisdictio n to hear the m oti on at a ll; it

sa id the tr ia l c ourt l ac ke d j ur isd ic tio n “ to m odi fy E ste s’ se nt en ce.” T hus, w e ag re e w ithE ste s th at thi s c as e is c ontro lle d by D el an cy v. F lor ida De partm ent of Corre ctions, 246 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2001). In D elancy , this court co nsi de re d whe the r a m oti on f ile d be y ond the state ’ s ge ne ra l tw o y ear statut e of lim itatio ns, but

a lle gin g f

ac ts tri gge ri ng an e xc ep tio n to the ge ne ra l r ule , c oul d qua lif y a s “pr ope rl y

f ile d. ” W e he ld tha t e ve n ati m e- barr ed m oti on i s “pr ope rl y filed” if it alleges f

acts that would excuse the tim e bar: Whil e the c la im s r ai se d inhis Ru le 3. 850 m oti on m ay have no m er it, the que sti on f

or pur pose s of thi s a ppe al is w he the r the m oti on i s, within the m eaning of 28 U.S .C. § 2244 (d)(2), “ a properly filed m ot io n fo r st at e p os t-c on vi ct io n” rel ie f un de r th atsec ti on . . . . Be ca use Ru le 3. 850 re qui re s on ly that the m oti on a lle ge that f ac ts “ w er e unkn ow n to the m ovant o r the m ovant’ s atto rn ey and c oul d no t have be ena sc er

ta ine d by the e xe rc ise of

due dil ige nc e” w e fi nd tha t i f De lancy ’ s Rule 3.850 m otion in fact a lleges “ newly discovered ev id en ce,” i t was “pr op erl y fil ed .” Id. at 1331 ; see also Dr ew , 297 F. 3d at 128 5 (“ Pursuant to Delancy , D rew ’ s third 3.850 m otion would have been properly filed despite its unt im eliness if it had al le ge d f ac ts tha t w oul d tr igg er

any of the thr ee e xc ep tio ns s et

f orth i n th e Fl or idaWe ag ree with Estes that Siebert, 334 F.3d 1018, is a lso releva nt to our 5 dispositi on. But it is less directly on point. In Siebert, this Court considered whether an untimely Alabama state post-convic tion petition t olled § 2244(d)( 1). Unde r the lawoperating at the time of Siebert’ s petition, unti meliness did not render petitions improper ly

filed bec ause the Al a bama c ourt s r e ta ine d ju

ri sd ic tio n o ve r t

he m a nd ha d d isc re tio n to g ra

nt t he m un de r c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s. I d. (“ Al a

bama law m a de c le ar . . . that no nc omp lia nc e wi th t he . . . ti me ba

r d id no t di ve st c ourt s o f d isc re tio n to e nte rt a in l ate pe tit ion s sh ou ld t he y c ho os e to d o s o, at le a st i n the a bs e nc e of an a pp ro pr iate ple a din gby

the sta te of a lim itatio ns de fe ns e .” ). Es te s’ mot ion is distinct from Siebert’s in that (1) E stes must make one ve ry specific alleg ation (a void sente nce) for the c ourts to hear

it; and (2) the Ge org ia cour ts have little if any

discretion over

it. (They mus t va c ate if

his se nte nc e is v oid

or dis mis s f or la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n if

it i s v a lid .) B ut h is m o t i o ni s s i m i l ar

i no n e k e y

r e s p e c t : U n t i m e l i n e s s i s n o tana b s o l ut e b ar

t o j ur i s d i c t i o n . ( In Sie be rt , th e Al a

bama Sup re me Court

ha d r e c e ntl y

de c lare d unti me lin e ss a

n a bs olute ba

r t o subject matter jur isdiction over state ha beas pe titions . But that de velopment did not affe ct Siebert bec ause it occ urre d afte r the time of his proc eeding s. See 334 F .3d at 1025-27.)

Estes’ motion contained at least one a ssertion that the Ge org ia Supreme Court ha s 6 e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d

a s s u f f i c i e n tt o a uth o r i z e a c o urt ’ s i n qu i r

y i n t o th e i s s u e o f

v o i d v e l n o n . In Wil liams, 271 Ga. 686, 523 S.E.2d 857, the Geor g ia Supreme Court he ld that the trial court a nd the Court of Appe als could hea r a motion to corr ect a

void sentence which alleg ed that the sentenc ing c ourt failed to c onduct a pr esente nce he aring . I d. at 687-89, 523 S.E.2d 859-60. Estes made the same a lleg ation in his mot ion below. 8 s t a tu t e [ . ]” ) . Es t e s ’ mo t i o nt o v a c a t e i s s i mi l ar i nmat e r i a l r e s p e c t s . Or d i n ar i l y, 5 m otion s to m odify

sentences m

ust be filed within the term of court. But if a m oti on a lle ge s ase nte nc e is v oid , it m ay be f ile d any ti m e. E ste s’ m oti on m ad e nonf ri vol ous al le ga tio ns o f fa ct in as se rt ing that the se nte nc e w as voi d. L ike D el an cy , E ste s a lle ge d f

ac ts t o e xc use the ti m e lim itatio n onm oti ons to v ac at e se nte nc es . 6 The S tate attem

pts to d isting uish Delancy on the groun d that the trial court here lac ked jurisdiction once it determ ined Estes’ sentence w as void. How ever, th e St at e fai ls to ex pl ai n wh y th atdi st in ct io n s ho ul d a lt er t he ou tc om e o f th is cas e.We do not address whe ther we may rec og nize an exception to Delancy for suc h 7 motions when the alleg ations are wholly frivolous on the fa ce of

the motions. Here the State has not argued that the Estes’ motion was frivolous on its face .

We also rejec t the State’s ar gument that the motion to vacate w as not a c ollatera l 8 challeng e and the ref

ore did not fa ll under the tolling pr ovision in § 2244(d)(2). The State cites 9 It argues only

that petition ers should n ot be able to avail them selves of the § 2244 (d )( 2) tol lin g pr ovi sio n by f ili ng p le ad ing s th at

c ourts h av e no j ur isd ic tio n to actup on . H ow ev er , the S tate c onc ed ed a t or al arg um en t tha t G eo rg iac ourts d o have j urisdictio n to determ ine whether they have j urisdictio n. And the state courts here did a ct upo n E ste s’ a lle ga tio ns and c onsi de r w he the r or not the se nte nc e w as in fa ct voi d. T hus, the state c ourts h er e did e xe rc ise that i nit ia l j ur isd ic tio n, did co nsi de r the a lle ga tio ns o f voi dne ss, de ci de d th e se nte nc e w as not voi d, and th ereupo n h el d t ha t t he re was no fur th er jur is di ct io n t o m od ify Estes ’ se nt en ce. The S tate has articulated no principled dist inction betwee n this case and Delancy and no reason why

the failure of

Estes’ m otion shoul d have retroac tively rendere d it im pr ope rl y f ile d. T he m oti on a lle ge d r el ev an t f ac ts and a sse rt ed

that the se nte nc e w as voi d, and i t a lso m et oth er f ili ng r equir em en ts. T he G eo gia c ourts had initi al j urisdictio n to hear it, and it was properly filed. In such a ca se,

7 D el an cy bars the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ro m loo kin g be y ond the f

ac e of am oti on t o as ce rt ai n pr ope r fi lin g. I d. a t 13 30- 31. 8no authority for the pr oposition, and Georg ia law make s clea r that a void sente nce ma

y be set aside in post-convic tion procee dings. See McCranie v. State, 157 Ga. App. 110, 111, 276 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1981) ( “[H]abeas cor pus is not necessar ily

an exclusive or sole re medy wher e, as he re, there is also authority

for a court to impose a va lid sentence if the orig inal sentenc e has be en deter mined to be void as we have f ound in the prec edingdivision.”).

10 III. CONCLUSION Fo r fo rg oin g r ea sons , w e hol d th at E ste s’ m oti on t o va cate w as pr ope rl y filed, and therefore it tolled the lim itations period for filing a feder al habeas pe tit ion . REVERSED AND REMANDED.