United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 4, 2022 

Decided April 8, 2022 

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 20-3398 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SANTIAGO VILLA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:19-CR-00223(1) 

Robert W. Gettleman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

A police officer watching through an observational camera saw Santiago Villa

holding a gun. When other officers approached him, he fled and was arrested. In court, 

Villa waived his right to an attorney, pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and was sentenced to time served—about 22 months—in prison and 

3 years’ supervised release. Villa filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel 

asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967). Villa has filed a response suggesting he wants to challenge the denial of

his motion to suppress, an issue his plea agreement reserved. See CIR. R. 51(b).

Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the potential issues that an 

appeal of this kind might involve. Because the analysis in counsel’s brief appears 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 20-3398 Page 2 

thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel and Villa discuss. 

See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

In assessing the potential issues for appeal, counsel states that she attempted to

consult with Villa, but he “steadfastly refused,” and thus she does not know if he 

wishes to withdraw his guilty plea. Counsel’s brief errs on the side of considering

whether he could seek to withdraw his plea, and she correctly determines that any such 

argument would be frivolous. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Because Villa did not move to withdraw his plea in the district court, we would 

review any attempt to do so only for plain error. United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 

618 (7th Cir. 2013). But such an argument would necessarily fail because the plea 

hearing substantially complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Id. Counsel notes that the court did not inform Villa of his right to counsel. FED. R. CRIM.

P. 11(b)(1)(D). But she properly concludes that this omission is immaterial because Villa 

had already been informed of the right, waived it, and chose to proceed pro se. 

See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 75 (2002). 

Counsel next considers whether the district court erred in accepting that waiver 

of counsel, or by denying Villa’s sudden request, at a sentencing hearing, to retain 

counsel. Villa had a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself if he intelligently made

that choice. United States v. Volpentesta, 727 F.3d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 2013). And the court

appropriately concluded after two colloquies and a competency hearing that Villa’s 

choice was knowing and voluntary. The court, among other things, discussed Villa’s 

history of representing himself, confirmed Villa understood the charges and the risks of 

forgoing a lawyer, and reviewed a doctor’s report about Villa’s competency. It would be 

frivolous to argue that the court erred in accepting Villa’s waiver after this careful 

investigation. See id. at 677–78. And it would be equally pointless to insist that the court

erred by rejecting Villa’s attempt to rescind his knowing waiver and to hire a lawyer 

more than 20 months into the case, on the day he was to be sentenced. See United States 

v. Harrington, 814 F.3d 896, 900–01 (7th Cir. 2016).

Villa’s guilty plea preserved his right to appeal the denial of a motion to 

suppress the evidence from his arrest, but any argument that the district court erred 

would be frivolous. In his response to counsel’s motion to withdraw, Villa argues that

the officers were not justified in stopping him after they saw his gun through the 

camera because, he says, merely possessing a gun is not illegal in Illinois. But, as 

counsel points out, Villa was not only observed carrying a gun, but also fled from 
No. 20-3398 Page 3 

officers when they approached; his “headlong flight” alone provided the officers 

reasonable suspicion to stop him. United States v. Wilson, 963 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)). Although Villa argued in the 

district court that he never fled, he could not overcome the deference we would give to 

the court’s credibility findings in favor of the officers who testified otherwise. 

United States v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Counsel also weighs whether the police department’s failure to preserve the 

recording of Villa holding the gun could persuade this court that the motion to 

suppress should have been successful. But the record does not suggest that this lost 

recording was exculpatory, and Villa did not offer evidence that the police acted in bad 

faith, so this, too, would be a pointless challenge. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 

57–58 (1988); United States v. Holly, 940 F.3d 995, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Counsel next considers, and rejects, possible challenges Villa could make to his 

sentence to time served after spending a bit over 22 months in federal custody. The

district court calculated an offense level of 12, determined Villa’s criminal history 

category was III, and considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 

finding that Villa had a history of gun-related offenses and that his crime posed a threat 

to the community. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Villa’s plea agreement 

suggested he had a criminal history category of II, but the parties agreed that

calculation was preliminary and non-binding. Further review revealed that the

agreement had omitted a point for a juvenile conviction that raised his criminal history 

category to III. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(B). In the end, the court correctly calculated 

that Villa’s guidelines range was 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. It would be frivolous 

to challenge this calculation, or the substantive reasonableness of a sentence to time 

served.

Finally, we agree with counsel that any argument challenging the term or 

conditions of supervised release would be frivolous. Villa’s crime was a Class C felony, 

so three years’ supervision was permitted, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), and this term was

undoubtedly reasonable considering the court’s § 3553(a) findings. See United States v. 

Clark, 906 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2018). The court further tailored the conditions to this 

case, removing a provision requiring Villa find a job when he was already employed, as 

well as a substance-abuse treatment program that the court deemed unnecessary. 

Although the court imposed a condition to which Villa’s stand-by counsel objected

(requiring that Villa undergo evaluation for potential sex-offender treatment), Villa 

expressly consented to that condition before the court imposed it. This waiver would 
No. 20-3398 Page 4 

doom any appellate argument to lift the condition. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 

443, 448 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.