No. 146 February 28, 2024 279

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

Conrad MOUTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TRI-COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION 

DISTRICT OF OREGON, 

a municipal corporation,

Defendant-Respondent.

Multnomah County Circuit Court

22CV06834; A179342

Jennifer YEAGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Chance MONTGOMERY,

Defendant-Respondent.

Douglas County Circuit Court

22CV05877; A179618

Brandon FLANDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WINCO FOODS, LLC, 

a foreign limited liability company,

Defendant-Respondent.

Multnomah County Circuit Court

22CV11032; A179835

In A179342, Leslie G. Bottomly, Judge; In A179618, 

Robert B. Johnson, Judge; and, In A179835, Jenna R. Plank, 

Judge.

A179342, A179618, and A179835 argued and submitted 

individually December 19, 2023.

In A179342, Willard E. Merkel argued the cause for 

appellant. Also on the briefs was Merkel & Conner, LLC.
280 Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC

In A179342, Michael S. Shin argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was Keith Garza.

In A179342, Sara Kobak and Schwabe Williamson 

& Wyatt, P.C., filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon 

Association of Defense Counsel.

In A179342, Elizabeth C. Savage filed the brief amicus 

curiae for Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

In A179618, Andrew R. Wilson argued the cause for 

appellant. Also on the briefs was Black, Chapman, Petersen 

& Stevens.

In A179618, Casey S. Murdock argued the cause for 

respondent. Also on the brief was Frohnmayer, Deatherage, 

Jamieson, Moore, Armosino & McGovern, P.C.

In A179618, Elizabeth C. Savage filed the brief amicus 

curiae for Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

In A179618, Sara Koback and Schwabe, Williamson 

& Wyatt, P.C., filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon 

Association of Defense Counsel.

In A179835, Apolinar Montero-Sanchez argued the cause 

for appellant. Also on the briefs were Lourdes Sánchez and 

Law Offices of Lourdes Sánchez, P.C.

In A179835, Patricia A. Brockway argued the cause for 

respondent. Also on the brief was Goehler & Associates.

In A179835, Elizabeth C. Savage filed the brief amicus 

curiae for Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

In A179835, Sara Kobak and Schwabe, Williamson 

& Wyatt, P.C., filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon 

Association of Defense Counsel.

Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot,

Judge.

AOYAGI, P. J.

Affirmed.
Cite as 331 Or App 279 (2024) 281
282 Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC

AOYAGI, P. J.

In these three civil cases, consolidated for purposes of 

opinion, each plaintiff filed a negligence action in early 2022 

that the trial court dismissed as time barred. Each plaintiff appeals, arguing that their complaint was timely filed in 

light of temporary legislation enacted early in the COVID-19 

pandemic that extended the statutes of limitations for civil 

actions. Specifically, plaintiffs rely on House Bill (HB) 4212 

(2020), as amended by Senate Bill (SB) 296 (2021) and SB 

813 (2021). See Or Laws 2020, ch 12 (1st Special Session) (HB 

4212), amended by Or Laws 2021, ch 199 (SB 296); Or Laws 

2021, ch 499 (SB 813).1 Each defendant maintains that the 

action against them was properly dismissed. The disputed 

issue is one of statutory construction that requires us to 

determine when the extended statute-of-limitations period 

in HB 4212 ended: December 31, 2021 (the repeal date); 

March 31, 2022 (90 days after the repeal date); or June 30, 

2022 (90 days after the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency). We conclude that the trial courts correctly construed 

HB 4212 as extending the statutes of limitations through 

December 31, 2021, and consequently did not err in dismissing the complaints. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. FACTS

The relevant facts are procedural.

Plaintiff Conrad Mouton alleges that he was injured 

on February 2, 2020, while riding a public bus. On February 

25, 2022, he filed a negligence action against Tri-County 

Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (TriMet). 

TriMet moved to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1)(i), based on 

the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 30.275(9). See 

ORCP 21 A(1)(i) (allowing for dismissal where “the pleading 

shows that the action has not been commenced within the 

1 As temporary legislation, the enrolled versions of HB 4212, SB 296, and 

SB 813 are not permanently codified in the Oregon Revised Statues, although 

sections 7 and 8(2) of HB 4212, as amended by SB 296 and SB 813, are compiled 

as a note after ORS 12.010 in the 2021 edition of the Oregon Revised Statutes. We 

therefore use bill numbers and Oregon Laws citations to refer to the legislation. 

Like the parties, for ease of reference, we use “HB 4212” to refer to HB 4212 as 

amended by SB 296 and SB 813. To avoid any resulting confusion, when we mean 

to refer to the original text of HB 4212, we use limiting language such as “original” or “as originally enacted.”
Cite as 331 Or App 279 (2024) 283

time limited by statute”). The trial court granted the motion, 

concluding that the statute of limitations had expired on 

February 1, 2022. Mouton appeals, assigning error to the 

dismissal of his action.

Plaintiff Jennifer Yeager alleges that she was injured 

in a car accident on January 29, 2020. On February 16, 

2022, she filed a negligence action against defendant Chance 

Montgomery. Montgomery moved for summary judgment 

under ORCP 47, based on the two-year statute of limitations 

in ORS 12.110(1). See ORCP 47 C (providing for summary 

judgment where there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter 

of law). The trial court granted the motion, concluding that 

the statute of limitations had expired on January 28, 2022. 

Yeager appeals, assigning error to the grant of summary 

judgment and resulting dismissal of her action.

Plaintiff Brandon Flanders alleges that he was 

injured on April 30, 2019, while delivering beverages to a 

grocery store for his employer. On March 31, 2022, he filed 

a negligence action against WinCo Foods, LLC (WinCo). 

WinCo moved to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1)(i), based on 

the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1). The 

trial court granted the motion, concluding that the statute of 

limitations, which normally would have expired on April 29, 

2021, had been extended by HB 4212 and expired on 

December 31, 2021. Flanders appeals, assigning error to the 

dismissal of his action.

In all three cases, the trial court construed HB 4212 

as extending the applicable statute of limitations through 

December 31, 2021, and rejected the plaintiff’s argument 

for a longer extension period. In all three appeals, the only 

aspect of the trial court’s decision that is challenged is that 

construction of HB 4212.

II. ANALYSIS

The correct construction of HB 4212 is a question 

of statutory construction, so we review for legal error. Wells 

Fargo Bank v. Clark, 294 Or App 197, 200, 430 P3d 1089 

(2018). We seek to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislature by examining the disputed provision’s text and context, 
284 Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC

as well as any helpful legislative history. State v. Gaines, 

346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Text and context 

“must be given primary weight in the analysis,” because 

only the text “receives the consideration and approval of a 

majority of the members of the legislature,” and “[t]he formal requirements of lawmaking produce the best source 

from which to discern the legislature’s intent.” Id. at 171. 

“If the legislature’s intent remains unclear after examining 

text, context, and legislative history, the court may resort to 

general maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving 

the remaining uncertainty.” Id. at 172.

A. HB 4212

HB 4212 was originally enacted in a special legislative session in June 2020. Or Laws 2020, ch 12 (1st Spec 

Sess). It included a variety of temporary measures to address 

the COVID-19 pandemic, such as allowing public bodies to 

meet by telephone or video conference, allowing courts to 

extend certain time periods and to allow party appearances 

by telephone or video conference, extending the statutes of 

limitations in civil actions, and making it easier to get a 

permit to run an emergency shelter. Id.

The dispute in this case focuses on the portion of 

HB 4212 addressing judicial matters, which consists of sections 6, 7, and 8. Sections 6 and 7 are substantive, while 

section 8 sets a repeal date. Section 6 gave the Chief Justice 

of the Oregon Supreme Court and the presiding judges of 

the circuit courts certain authority regarding extending or 

suspending time periods for court proceedings and allowing 

appearances by telephone or video conference. Id. § 6. Section 

7 extended the statutes of limitations for civil actions, stating, as originally enacted:

“SECTION 7. (1) If the expiration of the time to commence an action or give notice of a claim falls within the 

time in which any declaration of a state of emergency issued 

by the Governor related to COVID-19, and any extension of 

the declaration, is in effect, or within 90 days after the declaration and any extension is no longer in effect, the expiration of the time to commence the action or give notice of the 

claim is extended to a date 90 days after the declaration 

and any extension is no longer in effect.”
Cite as 331 Or App 279 (2024) 285

Id. § 7 (stating further, in subsections (2) and (3), that section 7 applies to any statutory time limitation for commencing a civil cause of action or giving notice of a civil claim, 

but not to criminal actions or most appeals). Finally, section 

8 sets the repeal date for sections 6 and 7, stating, as originally enacted:

“SECTION 8. (1) Sections 6 and 7 of this 2020 special 

session Act are repealed on December 31, 2021.

“(2) The repeal of section 6 of this 2020 special session Act by subsection (1) of this section does not affect the 

release status of a defendant determined under section 6(3) 

of this 2020 special session Act.”

Id. § 8.

There is not much legislative history for HB 4212 as 

originally enacted. Regarding section 7, the legislative history shows only that the legislature recognized the extraordinary nature of extending the statutes of limitations for 

civil actions but felt that it was appropriate in light of the 

COVID-19 pandemic. Video Recording, Joint Committee 

on the First Special Session of 2020, HB 4212, June 25, 

2020, at 1:25:30, available at https://olis.oregonlegislature.

gov (accessed Jan 30, 2023) (statement of Senate President 

Peter Courtney that extending the statutes of limitations 

is “a very dramatic thing in the practice of law”). As for the 

repeal date set in section 8, there is no helpful legislative 

history as to why that specific date was chosen.

During the 2021 regular session, the legislature 

amended original HB 4212 in two ways relevant to these 

appeals. First, in response to a request by the Chief Justice 

of the Oregon Supreme Court, the legislature enacted 

SB 296 (2021), amending section 8 to extend the repeal date 

for section 6 by one year. Video Recording, Senate Committee 

on Veterans’ Affairs and Emergency Preparedness, SB 296, 

Feb 4, 2021, at 00:08:25, available at https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Feb 5, 2024) (statement of Chief Justice 

Martha Walters, asking the legislature to extend section 6’s 

“sunset clause of ** * December 31, 2021,” so that the courts 

would continue to have needed flexibility if the pandemic 

continued beyond December 31, 2021). SB 296 provides that 
286 Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC

“Section 8, chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first special session), is amended to read”:

“[SECTION] 8. (1) Section 6, chapter 12, Oregon Laws 

2020 (first special session), is repealed on December 31, 

2022.

“(2) Section 7, chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first 

special session), is repealed on December 31, 2021.

“(3) The repeal of section 6, chapter 12, Oregon Laws 

2020 (first special session), by subsection (1) of this section 

does not affect the release status of a defendant determined 

under section 6(3), chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first special session).”

Or Laws 2021, ch 199, § 3 (bracketed former language omitted and boldface used to identify new language omitted). 

The legislative history of SB 296 contains no express mention of section 7. However, by amending section 8 in the way 

that it did, the legislature reaffirmed that “[s]ection 7, chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first special session)” is repealed 

on December 31, 2021. Or Laws 2021, ch 199, § 3; see also 

Or Laws 2020, ch 12, § 8(2) (1st Spec Sess), amended by Or 

Laws 2021, ch 199, § 3, compiled as a note after ORS 12.010 

(2021).

Second, in response to a federal district court ruling that section 7 did not apply to civil actions for which the 

applicable statute of limitations had expired before June 30, 

2020 (the effective date of original HB 4212), the legislature enacted SB 813, adding a new subsection (4) that made 

section 7 retroactive to the beginning of the state of emergency. SB 813 provides that “[s]ection 7, chapter 12, Oregon 

Laws 2020 (first special session), is amended” to include the 

following:

“(4) Subsection (1) of this section applies to expiration 

of the time to commence an action or give notice of a claim 

occurring:

“(a) On or after March 8, 2020, and on or before the 

date 90 days after the declaration of a state of emergency 

issued by the Governor on March 8, 2020, and any extension of the declaration, is no longer in effect; or
Cite as 331 Or App 279 (2024) 287

“(b) During the time in which any other declaration 

of a state of emergency issued by the Governor related to 

COVID-19, and any extension of the declaration, is in effect, 

or within 90 days after the declaration and any extension is 

no longer in effect.”

Or Laws 2021, ch 499, § 1 (effective July 14, 2021) (boldface omitted); see also Or Laws 2020, ch 12, § 7, amended 

by Or Laws 2021, ch 499, § 1, compiled as a note after ORS 

12.010 (2021). The legislative history is clear that the purpose of SB 813 was to address the retroactivity issue. See, 

e.g., Video Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary and 

Ballot Measure 110 Implementation, SB 813, Apr 12, 2021, 

at 00:28:15, available at https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov 

(accessed Feb 5, 2024) (statement of Arthur Towers of the 

Oregon Trial Lawyers Association describing purpose of SB 

813 and testifying in favor of the bill).

B. Construction of HB 4212

All three cases before us involve the same legal issue: 

when the extended statute-of-limitations period in section 7

of HB 4212 ended. Defendants TriMet, Montgomery, and 

WinCo maintain—and all three trial courts ruled—that it 

ended on December 31, 2021, the repeal date in section 8. 

Plaintiffs argue that it ended either on March 31, 2022, i.e., 

90 days after the repeal date, or on June 30, 2022, i.e., 90 

days after the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency. In 

their own ways, each plaintiff argues that the legislature 

did not intend the extended statute-of-limitations period 

in section 7 to end on December 31, 2021; that the legislature accidentally enacted an ambiguous provision; and that, 

upon resort to maxims of statutory construction, we should 

construe the statute in plaintiffs’ favor.2

Having considered the text, context, and legislative history of sections 7 and 8 of HB 4212, both as originally enacted and as amended by SB 296 and SB 813, we 

2 In addition to the briefs filed by the parties, the Oregon Trial Lawyers 

Association has filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of each plaintiff (which is 

identical in each case), and the Oregon Association of Defense Counsel has filed 

a brief as amicus curiae in support of each defendant (which is identical in each 

case). Although we do not expressly discuss the arguments made by amici curiae, 

we have considered their arguments in conjunction with the arguments of the 

parties whom they support.
288 Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC

are unpersuaded that the statute is ambiguous. Rather, we 

agree with defendants that the trial courts correctly construed it as extending the statutes of limitations for civil 

actions through December 31, 2021. Essentially, reading 

sections 7 and 8 together, the effect of the legislation was to 

extend the statutes of limitation for civil actions such that, if 

the statute of limitations for an action would have normally 

expired between March 8, 2020, and December 30, 2021, it 

did not expire until December 31, 2021. It follows that each 

of the plaintiff’s actions was time barred. We will explain 

our reasoning.

Section 8 of HB 4212 as originally enacted unequivocally states that section 7 “is repealed on December 31, 

2021.” Or Laws 2020, ch 12, § 8 (1st Spec Sess). HB 4212 as 

amended by SB 296 also unequivocally states that section 

7 “is repealed on December 31, 2021.” Or Laws 2020, ch 12, 

§ 8(2), amended by Or Laws 2021, ch 199, § 3, compiled as 

a note after ORS 12.010 (2021). When an act is repealed, it 

is rescinded or revoked. Drainage Dist. No. 7 v. Bernards, 

89 Or 531, 555, 174 P 1167 (1918) (“The general rule is that 

the repeal of a statute without any reservation takes away 

all remedies given by the repealed statute and defeats all 

actions pending under it at the time of its repeal.”); Newsom 

v. Greenwood, 4 Or 119, 121 (1871) (“[T]he effect of repealing 

a statute is to obliterate the statute repealed as completely 

as if it had never been passed ** *.”); see also Webster’s Third 

New Int’l Dictionary 1924 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining 

“repeal” as “to rescind or revoke (as a sentence or law) from 

operation or effect : ABROGATE, ANNUL”); Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed 2019) (defining “repeal” as “rescind” or 

“[a]brogation of an existing law by legislative act”). Thus, 

the extension of the civil statutes of limitations provided in 

section 7 ended when section 7 was repealed by operation of 

section 8.

Turning to context, HB 4212 as a whole suggests 

that the legislature intentionally set different repeal dates 

for different sections of HB 4212. Some sections were to 

remain in effect only for a few months. See Or Laws 2020, 

ch 12, § 12 (1st Spec Sess) (“Sections 10 and 11 of this 2020 

special session Act are repealed 90 days after the effective 
Cite as 331 Or App 279 (2024) 289

date of this 2020 special session Act.”); id. § 14 (“Section 13 

of this 2020 special session Act is repealed 90 days after 

the effective date of this 2020 special session Act.”). Some 

sections had no repeal date but were limited in duration by 

their nature. See id. § 3 (amending garnishment statute to 

limit garnishing of COVID-19 relief payments). Some sections were to remain in effect until the end of the COVID-19

state of emergency, whenever that might be. See id. § 47 

(“Sections 45 and 46 of this 2020 special session Act are 

repealed on the date on which the declaration of a state of 

emergency issued by the Governor on March 8, 2020, and 

any extension of the declaration, is no longer in effect.”). One 

section was to remain in effect until 30 days after the end 

of the COVID-19 state of emergency, whenever that might 

be. See id. § 2 (“Section 1 of this 2020 special session Act 

is repealed 30 days after the date on which the declaration 

of a state of emergency issued by the Governor on March 

8, 2020, and any extension of the declaration, is no longer 

in effect.”). Several sections—including section 7—were to 

remain in effect until a specified calendar date, with those 

dates varying. See id. § 32 (repealing sections 19, 20, and 27

“on June 30, 2021”); id. § 8(1) (repealing sections 6 and 7 

“on December 31, 2021”); id. § 17 (repealing section 16 “on 

January 2, 2022”).

In two places in HB 4212, the legislature included 

a savings clause to address the effect of a repeal on particular individuals, further evincing intentionality in the repeal 

provisions. See id. § 8(2) (“The repeal of section 6 of this 2020 

special session Act by subsection (1) of this section does not 

affect the release status of a defendant determined under 

section 6(3) of this 2020 special session Act.”); id. § 12a (“The 

repeal of sections 10 and 11 of this 2020 special session Act 

by section 12 of this 2020 special session Act does not affect 

an application for the development of land for an emergency 

shelter that was completed and submitted before the date 

of the repeal.”). If the legislature had wanted to include a 

savings clause for section 7, it knew how to do so.

Nothing in the legislative history of HB 4212, 

SB 296, or SB 813 sheds light on why the legislature chose a 

hard repeal date for section 7, rather than tying its repeal to 
290 Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC

the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency, or why the legislature specifically chose December 31, 2021. It is notable, 

however, that the legislature reaffirmed that decision in July 

2021, when it extended the repeal date for section 6 because 

of the ongoing COVID-19 state of emergency, but kept the 

existing repeal date for section 7. In considering SB 296, the 

legislature had a clear opportunity to revisit the repeal date 

for section 7 if it wished, and nothing in the legislative history of SB 296 suggests that any consideration was given to 

changing section 7’s repeal date. Indeed, because of how section 8 was written in original HB 4212, the legislature had 

to entirely rewrite section 8 in SB 296, including the portion 

addressing the repeal date for section 7, and chose to use the 

same repeal date for section 7 as it had in original HB 4212.

Taken together, the text, context, and legislative 

history of HB 4212 all support the conclusion that sections 

7 and 8, read together, extended the statutes of limitations 

for civil actions through December 31, 2021. We disagree 

with the suggestion that the legislature could not possibly 

have intended the extension to end on December 31, 2021. 

In extending the statutes of limitations for civil actions, the 

legislature was aware that it was doing something extraordinary in response to extraordinary times. By setting a hard 

repeal date of December 31, 2021, the legislature may have 

been balancing the practical realities of the earlypandemic—

such as courts not operating normally, lawyers’ offices not 

operating normally, and the general disruption to people’s 

lives—against the important polices served by statutes of 

limitations.3 See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 US 478, 

487, 100 S Ct 1790, 64 L Ed 2d 440 (1980) (“On many prior 

occasions, we have emphasized the importance of the policies underlying state statutes of limitations. Statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, they 

3 Moreover, even if the legislative history evinced an intent contrary to 

the statutory text—which it does not—that would not overcome the plain text. 

“Legislative history may be used to confirm seemingly plain meaning and even 

to illuminate it; a party also may use legislative history to attempt to convince a 

court that superficially clear language actually is not so plain at all—that is, that 

there is a kind of latent ambiguity in the statute.” State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 

172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). However, “[w]hen the text of a statute is truly capable of 

only one meaning, no weight can be given to legislative history that suggests—or 

even confirms—that legislators intended something different.” Id. at 173.
Cite as 331 Or App 279 (2024) 291

have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered 

judicial system.”); Eastman v. Crary, 131 Or 694, 697, 284 P 

280 (1930) (recognizing as “a clear and accurate statement 

of the law” that statutes of limitations are “a legislative declaration of public policy”).

Plaintiffs argue that HB 4212 is ambiguous and 

urge us to resort to maxims of statutory construction to 

resolve the ambiguity. However, we are unpersuaded that 

the act is ambiguous as to when the extended statute-oflimitations period ended. See State v. S.-Q. K., 292 Or App 

836, 840, 426 P3d 659, adh’d to as modified on recons, 294 

Or App 184, 426 P3d 258, rev den, 364 Or 209 (2018) (statutory text is “ambiguous” if “it is susceptible to at least two 

plausible interpretations”).

We do not discount the possibility that some readers 

of HB 4212 might have been confused as to when the extension period would end. Looking only at section 7, one would 

understand civil statutes of limitations to be extended to 

90 days after the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency. 

See Or Laws 2020, ch 12, § 7 (1st Spec Sess) (extending the 

statutes of limitations “to a date 90 days after the declaration and any extension is no longer in effect”). However, one 

cannot look only at section 7. Section 8 sets a repeal date of 

December 31, 2021. Id. § 8(1); see also Or Laws 2021, ch 199, 

§ 3. The only plausible interpretation of section 8 is that section 7 ceases to have effect after December 31, 2021. That is 

also the only interpretation of HB 4212 that gives effect to 

the whole act. See SAIF v. Ward, 369 Or 384, 398, 506 P3d 

386 (2022) (“As a general rule, when we interpret a statute 

to determine what the legislature intended, we attempt to 

do so in a manner that gives effect to all of the provisions of 

the statute where possible.”).

In hindsight, if the legislature had known with certainty in June 2020 that the COVID-19 state of emergency 

would continue into 2022, it might have phrased section 7 

differently, to avoid any potential confusion. But it did not 

know when the state of emergency would end. Further, the 

legislature drafted the repeal date for section 7 in a manner 

consistent with how it drafted other repeal dates in original HB 4212, essentially following the Office of Legislative 
292 Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC

Counsel’s Bill Drafting Manual. See Legislative Counsel 

Committee, Bill Drafting Manual § 6.1 (2018) (Bill Drafting 

Manual) (stating that “[a] drafter should never place temporary material in the same section as permanent material” 

and providing two options for drafting temporary material, 

one of which is to “creat[e] a separate section that expires 

by its own terms or that is repealed by a specified date” 

(emphasis omitted)).4

Nothing in the text, context, or legislative history 

supports reading HB 4212 to extend the statutes of limitations to March 31, 2022, which is 90 days after the repeal 

date.

5

 Section 7 is either repealed on December 31, 2021, 

or it is not. Nothing links the “90 days” in section 7 to the 

repeal date in section 8. To create that link, plaintiffs argue 

that December 31, 2021, essentially stands in for the last 

day of the state of emergency in section 7. See Or Laws 2020, 

ch 12, § 7 (1st Spec Sess) (extending the statutes of limitations “to a date 90 days after the declaration [of a state of 

emergency issued by the Governor related to COVID-19] and 

any extension is no longer in effect”). However, that reading 

is inconsistent with the statutory text.

As for extending the statutes of limitations to June 30,

2020, as plaintiffs alternatively argue, that construction of 

HB 4212 is supported by the text of section 7, but it would 

require disregarding section 8, which we cannot do. “In the 

construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply 

to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, 

contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or 

to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several 

4 We note that, to use the language of the Bill Drafting Manual, section 7 

seems to be written to “expire[] by its own terms,” while section 8 provides for 

its “repeal[] by a specified date,” whereas the Bill Drafting Manual seems to 

contemplate only one of those end-date mechanisms being used at a time. Bill 

Drafting Manual § 6.1 (providing for the drafting of temporary material in “a 

separate section that expires by its own terms or that is repealed by a specified 

date”). However, the legislature presumably chose that approach because it did 

not know which event would occur first—the expiration of section 7 by its own 

terms (90 days after the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency) or the repeal 

date (December 31, 2021).

5 Ninety days after section 7’s repeal date is March 31, 2022. That date nearly 

coincides with the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency on April 1, 2022, but 

that is happenstance. See Executive Order 22-03 (March 17, 2022) (ending state 

of emergency effective April 1, 2022). 
Cite as 331 Or App 279 (2024) 293

provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to 

be adopted as will give effect to all.” ORS 174.010. To avoid 

that problem, plaintiffs argue that SB 813 replaced section 

7 of original HB 4212 in its entirety and that, as a result, 

the repeal provision in section 8 of original HB 4212 ceased 

to have any effect. Under that view, section 8 of original 

HB 4212 repeals section 7 “of this 2020 special session Act,” 

and section 7 “of this 2020 special session Act” ceased to 

exist when SB 813 was enacted.

That argument is unpersuasive. Article IV, section 

22, of the Oregon Constitution provides that any statutory section that is amended “shall be set forth, and published at full 

length.” The Bill Drafting Manual advises legislative drafters 

that, to comply with Article IV, section 22, a bill amending an 

existing statutory section must “show[] everything that has 

been inserted and deleted as well as what has not changed 

for each section.” Bill Drafting Manual § 13.8. Thus, “[w]hen 

amending an existing statute, the draft [bill] must show every 

difference, except capitalization, between the original version 

and the amended version,” and any “[c]hanges are highlighted 

by bracketing and italicizing deleted material and bolding 

new material.” Id. at § 13.10 (emphasis omitted).

SB 813 was drafted in accordance with the Bill 

Drafting Manual. It identifies “Section 7, chapter 12, Oregon 

Laws 2020 (first special session)” as the existing statute that 

it is amending; sets forth the original language in ordinary 

text to reflect that it is unchanged; and then sets forth new 

subsection 4 in bold text to reflect new material. Or Laws 

2021, ch 499, § 1. The unchanged portion of the statute was 

set forth to comply with Article IV, section 22, not to “reenact” the unchanged text, such that cross-references in the 

original bill would cease to function. Section 7 “of this 2020 

special session Act” did not cease to exist when SB 813 was 

enacted, nor did the enactment of SB 813 turn the internal 

cross-reference to section 7 in section 8 into the legislative 

equivalent of a dead link. See Or Laws, ch 12, § 7, amended 

by Or Laws 2021, ch 499, § 1, compiled as a note after ORS 

12.010 (2021) (compiling section 7, as amended by SB 813).

Because the meaning of HB 4212 is clear upon 

examination of its text, context, and legislative history, we 
294 Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC

have no occasion to reach maxims of statutory construction 

and therefore do not address the parties’ arguments in that 

regard.6 See Gaines, 346 Or at 172 (allowing for resort to 

maxims of statutory construction only when “the legislature’s intent remains unclear after examining text, context, 

and legislative history”); see also, e.g., State v. Vasquez-Rubio, 

323 Or 275, 283, 917 P2d 494 (1996) (“When the legislative 

intent is clear from an inquiry into text and context, or from 

resort to legislative history, * ** it would be inappropriate 

to apply the absurd-result maxim. If we were to do so, we 

would be rewriting a clear statute based solely on our conjecture that the legislature could not have intended a particular result.”).

In sum, extending the statutes of limitations for 

civil actions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic was a legislative policy choice, and deciding the length of the extension 

also was a legislative policy choice. Any number of policy 

choices might have been made. The legislature made the one 

that it did, and, in our view, HB 4212 is unambiguous that 

the extension ended on December 31, 2021.7 It follows that, 

in each case, the trial court correctly concluded that the 

plaintiff’s action was time barred and dismissed the action 

on that basis.

Affirmed.

6 Plaintiffs invoke a number of maxims of statutory construction, including 

the absurd-result maxim, which defendants contend either do not apply or do not 

support plaintiffs’ proposed construction. Given our conclusion that the act is 

unambiguous, we do not discuss the parties’ specific arguments regarding maxims of statutory construction.

7 To be clear, had the COVID-19 state of emergency ended before October 

2021, the extension period would have ended earlier. It ended on December 31, 

2021, because section 7 was repealed before the time that it would have expired 

by its own terms.