alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Amendment to Severance Agreement




 Exhibit 10.23 
  
 ALTERA CORPORATION 
 AMENDMENT TO SEVERANCE AGREEMENT 
 FOR JOHN DAANE 
  
 Effective May 12, 2004, Section 3 of the Severance Agreement entered into between Altera Corporation and John Daane on November 30, 2000, is
hereby amended and replaced in its entirety as follows: 
  
 3.
Severance Package. In the event Executive is entitled to the Severance Package pursuant to Section 2, above, it shall be payable within thirty days of Executive’s termination. The Severance Package shall consist of (i) payment equivalent
to two year’s of Executive’s then-current base salary, and (ii) one year of accelerated stock vesting, which applies to all Executive’s restricted stock and option grants. Executive shall have one (1) year from the date of termination
to exercise any stock options for which vesting is accelerated pursuant to subsection (ii). 
  
 All other terms and conditions of the Severance Agreement remain unchanged. 
  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Amendment on the respective dates set forth below. 
  

							
	 JOHN DAANE
	 	 ALTERA CORPORATION

			
	 /s/ John Daane

	 	 By:
	 	 /s/ William E. Terry


	 	 	 	 	 	 	 William E. Terry

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Chairman, Compensation Committee

				
	 Date:
	 	 ______________
	 	 Date:
	 	 ______________
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JOSE LUIS LORENZONA JR.,

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Respondent.

8:23CV166

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On June 16, 2023, the Court advised Petitioner Jose Luis Lorenzona, Jr. that it 

would construe the document at Filing No. 1 as a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 if he did not voluntarily withdraw his petition within 30 days and directed 

Petitioner to file an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus if he decided to allow this 

action to proceed as one brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and to pay the filing fee 

or submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Filing No. 3. Furthermore, the 

Court advised Petitioner that if he failed to respond to the Court’s June 16, 2023,

Memorandum and Order or file an amended petition within 30 days and pay the filing fee 

or submit a request to proceed IFP, then this matter would be dismissed without prejudice 

and without further notice. To date, Petitioner has not paid the filing fee, submitted a 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis, filed an amended petition, or taken any other action 

in this matter, and the time in which to do so has passed. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: This case is dismissed without prejudice 

because Petitioner failed to prosecute it and failed to comply with this Court’s orders. No 

certificate of appealability has been or will be issued. The Court will enter judgment by a 

separate document.

8:23-cv-00166-JFB-PRSE Doc # 4 Filed: 08/22/23 Page 1 of 2 - Page ID # 9
2

Dated this 22nd day of August, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

Joseph F. Bataillon

Senior United States District Judge

8:23-cv-00166-JFB-PRSE Doc # 4 Filed: 08/22/23 Page 2 of 2 - Page ID # 10
**
**Exhibit 31**

**Certifications**

I,Richard Simpson, certify that: 

1.    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Kand all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-C6 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”); 

2.    Based on myknowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3.    Based on my knowledge, all of thedistribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports; 

4.    Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s) required in this report under Item 1123 of RegulationAB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and 

5.    All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their relatedattestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described insuch reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above,I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wells Fargo Bank, National Association; Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association; Park Bridge Lender Services LLC; U.S. BankNational Association; CoreLogic Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc.; National Tax Search, LLC; KeyBank National Association; LNR Partners, LLC; Pentalpha Surveillance LLC; Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC; Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC; andBerkeley Point Capital LLC, dba Newmark Knight Frank. 

Date:    March 29, 2019 

 

 

/s/ Richard Simpson

Richard Simpson

President, CitigroupCommercial Mortgage Securities Inc.

(senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)

 

 
CGCMT 2018-C6Certifications (2018) 

**
#### PARIDY v. CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.*

No. 6212.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Nov. 12, 1937.

Leroy E. Miller, of East St. Louis, 111., for appellant.

Chas. M. Fryer and Alfred C. Aurich, both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before EVANS and SPARKS, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.

*

Writ of certiorari denied 58 S.Ct. 758, 82 IxEd. —

PER CURIAM.

This action sought to establish a constructive trust against property and funds in possession of appellee as a result of fraud. The District Court made findings of fact, stated its conclusions of law, and dismissed the complaint for failure of proof of its essential allegations, and this appeal is from that ruling.

The same case was here in 1931 on appeal from a decree dismissing appellant’s bill of "complaint. We reversed that ruling and remanded the cause with instructions to hear the evidence. Paridy v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (C.C.A.) 48 F.(2d) 166. The material allegations of the complaint are set forth in that opinion. Our instructions were complied with, and the District Court found adversely to appellant.

The questions relied upon for reversal involve only matters of fact. The findings are all supported by substantial evidence and we have no authority to disturb them. The conclusions of law are supported by the findings, and the decree must stand affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Patricia Ricciardi

v. Case No. 06-cv-112-PB

MBNA America Bank, et al.

O R D E R

Re: Document Nos. 5, 11 Motions to Dismiss 

Ruling: Plaintiff has filed what appears to be a form

complaint asserting causes of action that in some cases are

frivolous and in other cases are purely conclusory. In response to

defendants’ well supported motions to dismiss, plaintiff has stated

only that she opposes the motions and that “Plaintiff further

states that material facts have not been submitted and are still in

question and, as a Rule of Law, Motion for Dismissal is improper.”

This response does not come close to being a meaningful answer to

the arguments that the defendants raise in opposition to the

complaints. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (document nos. 5 and 11)

are granted.

/s/ Paul Barbadoro

Paul Barbadoro

District Judge

Date: June 14, 2006

cc: Patricia Ricciardi, pro se

 Adam Olsham, Esq.

 William Saturley, Esq.

 Richard Bell, Esq.

Case 1:06-cv-00112-PB Document 13 Filed 06/14/06 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 06-cr-117-01-SM

Steven Huard

O R D E R

Defendant Huard’s motion to continue the final pretrial conference and trial is granted 

(document 22). Trial has been rescheduled for the October 2006 trial period. Defendant Huard 

shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights not later than August 3, 2006. On the filing of such

waiver, his continuance shall be effective. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the

best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in

that failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time

necessary for effective preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: September 25, 2006 at 2:30 p.m.

Jury Selection: October 3, 2006 at 9:30 a.m.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

July 26, 2006

cc: Thomas McCue, Esq.

Terry Ollila, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:06-cr-00117-SM Document 23 Filed 07/26/06 Page 1 of 1
#### BRAAI et ux. v. INDEPENDENT CAB OPERATOR’S ASS’N et al.

No. 18039.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Nov. 6, 1944.

For former opinion, see 18 So.2d 43.

Robert J. Pitard and M. C. Scharff, both of New Orleans, for appellants.

Williams & Wolfson, A. Melville Wolf-son, and Beryl E. Wolfson, all of New Orleans, for appellees.

L. V. Landry, of New Orleans, for Charity Hospital of Louisiana, intervenor and appellee.

WESTERFIELD, Judge.

We granted a rehearing in this case in order to reconsider the amount awarded plaintiffs as damages for physical injuries and consequent suffering.

Counsel for defendants-appellants have directed our attention to a number of authorities which, it is contended, would justify a considerable decrease in the judgment. On the other hand, opposing counsel have cited some authorities, the effect of which, they believe, warrants an increase in the quantum. They also have called our attention to the fact that there has been a decrease in the purchasing power of money, in consequence of which “a sum of money that was fair compensation in value for given injuries when -money was dear and its purchasing power was great will not suffice when money is cheap and its purchasing power is small * * American Jurisprudence, Volume 15, Page 621.

Without attempting to analyze these authorities or to reconcile their differences, which is always a difficult task for, ás we have frequently said, uniformity in awards for physical injuries and suffering is hardly to be attained, we have reached the conclusion that a small reduction should be made.

Mr. and Mrs. Braai obtained a judgment below awarding each of them $3,000 which, on appeal to this court, was affirmed. Upon reconsideration we have concluded to reduce each of these amounts by the sum of $500.

It is, therefore, ordered that our former decree be amended accordingly and that the plaintiffs pay the cost of this appeal.

Our original decree amended and reinstated.
#### Painter's Estate.

Argued Oct. 23, 1907.

Appeal, No. 116, Oct. T., 1906, by Thomas Painter et ah, from decree of O. O. Butler Co., ordering sale of real estate in Estate of George *W.*Painter, deceased.

Before Mitchell, O. J., Fell, Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin and Stewart, JJ.

Reversed.

Petition to sell real estate. For the facts see Painter v. Painter, ante, p. 82.

January 20, 1908 :

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Mestrezat,

This was an application in the court below by J. L. M. Hal-*99stead, administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. of George W. Painter, deceased, for an order to sell the testator’s real estate so as to carry into effect the provisions of his will, which directs that on the death of his widow the real estate shall be sold and the proceeds divided between his two daughters. It is claimed by the petitioner that under the provisions of the will there was an equitable conversion of the real estate into personalty, and that being personal property, it is distributable as such. The court granted the order prayed for.

Subsequently, Milton 13. Painter, one of the heirs-at-law of George W. Painter, deceased,- presented his petition to the court, denying the conversion of the real estate and the authority of the administrator to make sale of it, and prayed the court to set aside and revoke the order of sale theretofore granted. This was refused, and Milton B. Painter has appealed.

In an opinion handed down herewith in the case of Thomas Painter et al. v. Peter Painter, ante, p. 82, we have held that the will of George W. Painter did not create a conversion of his real estate, and that upon the death of his widow, who had a life estate therein, it went to his heirs-at-law, and was not personalty and to be distributed as such. It therefore follows that the application made in the court below by the administrator for an order to sell the real estate should have been denied, and that the order of the court directing a sale was error.

The court should have granted appellant’s petition, and set aside and revoked the order to the administrator for the sale of the real estate.

The decree of the court below refusing to set aside and revoke its former order directing the sale of the real estate of George "W. Painter, deceased, is now reversed, and the decree of the court granting the order of sale is set aside and revoked at the costs of the appellee.
Exhibit 32
                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection with the Quarterly Report of AEI Income  &  Growth
Fund  XXII Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") on Form 10-QSB
for  the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities
and  Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  the
undersigned, Robert P. Johnson, President of AEI Fund  Management
XXI,  Inc., the Managing General Partner of the Partnership,  and
Patrick  W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer of AEI Fund Management
XXI,  Inc., each certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as  adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The  Report  fully  complies with the  requirements  of
          Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act
          of 1934; and

     2.   The   information  contained  in  the   Report   fairly
          presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Partnership.


                          /s/ Robert P Johnson
                              Robert P. Johnson, President
                              AEI Fund Management XXI, Inc.
                              Managing General Partner
                              August 10, 2004



                          /s/ Patrick W Keene
                              Patrick W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer
                              AEI Fund Management XXI, Inc.
                              Managing General Partner
                              August 10, 2004
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 06-cr-071-02-SM

Edward L. Brown

O R D E R

Defendant, Edward L. Brown, has filed a “motion for notice

to appeal.” The motion is construed as one seeking to enlarge

the time in which to appeal. This court is without jurisdiction

to grant that relief as the motion is filed well beyond forty

(40) days after the entry of judgment in the criminal case. See

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4); United States v. Rapoport, 159 F.3d 1

(1st Cir. 1998). Defendant already filed a direct appeal in this

case, which appeal was dismissed by the United States Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit due to defendant’s failure to

prosecute it.

The motion (document no. 229) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

February 4, 2008

cc: William E. Morse, Esq.

Edward L. Brown, pro se

U.S. Probation

U.S. Marshal

Case 1:06-cr-00071-SM Document 230 Filed 02/04/08 Page 1 of 1
#### SPEICH v. CROMLEY.

No. 6555.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Jan. 14, 1938.

Richard Henry Klein, of Sunbury, Pa., for appellant.

Miller Alanson Johnson, of Lewisburg, Pa., and Donald M. Johnson, of Scranton, Pa., for appellee.

Before BUFFINGTON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and DICKINSON, District Judge.

DICKINSON, District Judge.

There is a helpful classification of facts into evidentiary and ultimate facts. This is a negligence case. Negligence is an ultimate fact finding. A main difficulty in reviewing the trial of such cases is that the evidentiary facts are so many that the discussion of them becomes almost interminable.

Counsel for the defendant below has summarized the points of his argument on appeal into four. This summary we will follow.

I. “There was No Proof of Defendant’s ' Negligence.”

The choice of the word “proof” instead of the word “evidence” was doubtless advisedly made and is significant. The choice indicates that, in the view of counsel, the jury was wrong in the ultimate finding of negligence. There is not, nor could there be, any denial of there being evidence from which negligence was found. The many pages of the paper books devoted to the discussion of the evidence argues that there was evidence to discuss. The weight of it was for the jury. Without quoting the evidence before the jury, there was evidence of negligence warranting the finding.

II. “The Evidence Showed the Deceased was Guilty of Contributory Negligence.”

 This was likewise an inferred fact to be found by the jury. There is no pretense that the court should have found the deceased to have been guilty of negligence. The trial judge affirmed the defendant’s sixth point. He refused, and properly so, to include a part of it which was nothing more than the argument of counsel.

III. “There was no Competent Evidence of Plaintiff’s Damages.”

The deceased was a carpenter whose earned wages were 50 cents per hour. There was evidence, and the fact was not-in real controversy, that he received at least as much as $26 a week. The plaintiffs were his widow and -six minor children. He contributed to their support by providig food, clothing, rent, and giving to his wife for incidentals $5 per week in cash. He had an expectation of life of nearly 18 years.

There was evidence from which the money loss of the plaintiffs could be found.

*544IV. “The Verdict was Excessive.”

The charge of the court was emphatically an impartial one. There is in this respect no fault found with it. On the motion for a new trial the court reduced the verdict. We have therefore not merely the finding of the jury but that of the trial judge. There would be no justification for an interference with the judgment on this ground.

The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1145 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1145

  To amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to 
assure that the full amount deposited in the Abandoned Mine Reclamation 
  Fund is spent for the purposes for which that Fund was established.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 21, 2001

  Mr. English (for himself, Mr. Sherwood, Ms. Hart, and Mr. Kucinich) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                               Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to 
assure that the full amount deposited in the Abandoned Mine Reclamation 
  Fund is spent for the purposes for which that Fund was established.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FROM ABANDONED MINE RECLAMATION FUND.

    Section 401(d) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977 (30 U.S.C. 1231(d)) is amended to read as follows:
    ``(d) Moneys in the fund shall be available for the purposes of 
this title without further appropriation and without fiscal year 
limitation.''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1

                          ARCHSTONE COMMUNITIES TRUST
               COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

                         (Dollar amounts in thousands)

                                  (Unaudited)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                      Six Months Ended June 30,                   Twelve Months Ended December 31,
                                     ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         2000          1999          1999         1998        1997(1)        1996          1995
                                     ------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------
<S>                                  <C>             <C>           <C>           <C>          <C>             <C>         <C>
Earnings from operations............. $ 90,079       $ 82,421      $169,339      $134,571     $ 24,686        $ 94,089    $ 81,696
Add:
     Interest expense................   71,527         56,041       121,494        83,350       61,153          35,288      19,584
                                      --------       --------      --------      --------     --------        --------    --------
Earnings as adjusted................. $161,606       $138,462      $290,833      $217,921     $ 85,839        $129,377    $101,280
                                      ========       ========      ========      ========     ========        ========    ========
Fixed charges:
     Interest expense................ $ 71,527       $ 56,041       121,494      $ 83,350     $ 61,153        $ 35,288    $ 19,584
     Capitalized interest............   13,032         17,739        31,912        29,942       17,606          16,941      11,741
                                      --------       --------      --------      --------     --------        --------    --------
         Total fixed charges......... $ 84,559       $ 73,780      $153,406      $113,292     $ 78,759        $ 52,229    $ 31,325
                                      ========       ========      ========      ========     ========        ========    ========
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges...      1.9            1.9           1.9           1.9          1.1             2.5         3.2
                                      ========       ========      ========      ========     ========        ========    ========
</TABLE>

(1)  Earnings from operations for 1997 includes a one-time,  non-cash charge
     of $71.7 million associated with costs incurred in acquiring the management
     companies from an affiliate.  Excluding this charge,  the ratio of earnings
     to fixed charges for the year ended December 31, 1997 would be 2.0.