IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0286

Filed June 19, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOSEPH WAYNE HANSON JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Wyatt Peterson, 

Judge.

Joseph Hanson Jr. appeals the denial of his motion to continue. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.

R.E. Breckenridge of Breckenridge Law P.C., Ottumwa, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2024).
2

DANILSON, Senior Judge.

Joseph Hanson Jr. appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled 

substance (methamphetamine) with the intent to deliver, possession of a firearm 

by a felon, possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with the intent to 

deliver, and two counts of failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Hanson argues that the 

district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to continue trial. We 

agree with Hanson and remand for a new trial. 

I. Background Facts & Prior Proceedings

Hanson worked as a confidential informant for the local law enforcement’s 

narcotics task force. On April 22, 2022, an officer pulled Hanson over and 

discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm in Hanson’s vehicle. The 

State filed a trial information charging Hanson with possession with intent to deliver 

methamphetamine, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession with intent to 

deliver marijuana, two counts of tax stamp violation, and possession of a controlled 

substance (diazepam).1 On April 28, defense counsel filed an appearance. 

On May 31, Hanson pled not guilty and demanded a speedy trial. Six days 

later, Hanson filed a “motion to dismiss counsel” requesting a different attorney. 

On June 17, the public defender’s office, which was representing Hanson, 

internally reassigned the case to public defender, Curtis Dial. However, attorney 

Dial was out of the country until July 10. Following a July 11 pretrial conference, 

the district court set trial for July 26. 

1 The State later dismissed the charge for possession of a controlled substance 

(diazepam).
3

Hanson and his trial counsel were first able to communicate about the case

on July 15. The day before trial was to begin, July 25, Hanson filed a motion to 

continue. In the motion, Hanson explained that due to the reassignment of his 

case that he had only met with his current counsel three times, he needed time to 

subpoena a cellular provider to obtain text messages with the narcotics task force, 

and that he was willing to waive his speedy trial rights. The trial judge refused to 

hear the motion on July 25 because the motion was not on the schedule for the 

day, so the motion was heard just prior to the start of the trial the next morning. 

Defense counsel explained that he and Hanson had only been able to work 

on Hanson’s defense for eleven days. Hanson needed the text messages with the 

narcotics task force to mount his defense, they had been unable to obtain them 

without a subpoena, and the charges were quite serious. Counsel also stressed 

that Hanson was willing to waive his speedy trial rights and the unusual delays in 

this case were not Hanson’s fault. 

The court denied the motion noting the speedy trial demand previously filed, 

the fact that Dial was assigned the case on June 17, and that the jurors were 

already arriving at the courthouse. Hanson complained that his counsel was 

unaware that he was working as a confidential informant and was not well versed 

in the unique facts of his case. Hansen also reminded the court that Dial had been 

unavailable because he was out of town and stated, “there is no way I can have a 

fair trial.” Attorney Dial was asked by the court how long the trial would last, and 

Dial stated he did not know, explaining “[w]e were provided a witness—or an 

exhibit list this morning. I haven’t been shown those documents or those exhibits 
4

yet. Nothing has been uploaded to review, so I need time to look at all those 

possible exhibits. I think there were quite a few.”

Hanson then requested to represent himself because he believed counsel 

could not represent him without knowing the facts of the case and his unique 

defense. During the court’s colloquy regarding Hanson’s ability and intention to 

represent himself, Hanson explained that he suffers from ADHD but was not taking 

his prescribed medication because the jail considered it a controlled substance 

and would not permit him to take it. The court ultimately granted Hanson’s request 

to represent himself and appointed Dial as standby counsel for him. 

The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found Hanson guilty on all 

counts. He now appeals, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to 

continue.

II. Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Miller, 480 N.W.2d 894, 895 (Iowa 1992). “A . . . ruling on a motion for 

continuance ‘will not be interfered with on appeal unless it clearly appears that the 

trial court has abused its discretion, and an injustice has resulted therefrom.’” 

State v. Grimme, 338 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Iowa 1983) (citation omitted).

III. Discussion

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.9(2), as effective at the time of trial, 

provided that “[t]he date assigned for trial shall be considered firm. Motions for 

continuance are discouraged. A motion for continuance shall not be granted 
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except upon a showing of good and compelling cause.”2 Hanson poses the critical 

question, “What is ‘good and compelling cause?’” We can inform him that the facts 

and circumstances of this particular case did in fact amount to good and compelling 

cause and the district court abused its discretion when denying the motion to 

continue.

This motion to continue arose following unique events, none of which were 

the fault of Hanson. The public defender’s office internally reassigned his case to 

a new attorney, Dial, but that attorney was out of the country. As a result, Dial did 

not have enough time or opportunity to familiarize himself with the facts of this case 

including Hanson’s unusual defense that he was actually working within his role as 

a confidential informant at the time he was stopped. Moreover, Hanson and his 

counsel needed additional time to issue subpoenas to gather evidence from the 

cell phone he used to communicate about his confidential-informant work. 

Attorney Dial was also only provided the State’s witness and exhibit list the morning 

of the trial and had not yet examined the exhibits. 

Our supreme court has long held that requiring defense counsel to proceed 

to trial where defense counsel has inadequate time to prepare for trial defeats

justice and is an abuse of discretion. State v. French, 35 N.W.2d 1,14 (Iowa 1948) 

(noting two days was not sufficient time). Further, our supreme court has 

observed, “[w]hether in any case enough time has been afforded for consultation, 

investigation for witnesses and preparation of the law and facts depends upon the 

2 Because the underlying events occurred in July 2022, we consider Iowa Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 2.9 as effective at that time. Updated Iowa Rules of Criminal 

Procedure became effective on July 1, 2023, which substantively amended 

rule 2.9. 
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circumstances of the case including the complexity of the factual issues and legal 

principles involved.” Orcutt v. State, 173 N.W.2d 66, 71 (Iowa 1969). We 

acknowledge that two weeks may be ample time for an experienced criminal 

defense attorney such as Dial to prepare for a routine criminal trial depending on 

the seriousness of the charges. However, here the court was informed of the 

limited time counsel and the defendant had to confer and to investigate facts. The 

court was informed that efforts to retrieve some evidence were unsuccessful and 

it would be necessary to use subpoenas to obtain the information. The court was 

also informed that Hanson was willing to waive his right to a speedy trial. 

Furthermore, attorney Dial had not reviewed the State’s witness list or exhibits until 

the morning of the trial and contended they had just been provided to him.3

Given his counsel’s lack of familiarity of the intricacies of the case, Hanson’s 

atypical defense, and due to counsel’s limited time to prepare for trial, Hanson 

stated to the court, “There’s no way I can have a fair trial. This is totally unfair.” 

Shortly later, Hanson became distraught and decided to represent himself. During 

the court’s colloquy with Hanson regarding his decision to represent himself, 

Hanson stated, “he does not know my case, so how is it fair for me to represent 

myself or for him to represent a person he doesn’t know.” We conclude Hanson 

found himself faced with a Hobson’s choice—no tenable choice at all. He was 

forced to choose between proceeding to trial with counsel who was not prepared 

or going it alone and representing himself despite having no knowledge of our rules 

3 The lack of the review of the witness list and exhibit list was not identified as a 

reason needed for a continuance but was a fact provided to the court before the 

trial began. Further the State agreed it had just generated the exhibit list the 

morning of the trial.
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of criminal procedure or evidence. Forcing a defendant into making such a 

decision cannot comport with our notions of justice. 

This decision is all the more untenable when one also considers the fact 

that Hanson was not allowed to take his medication for ADHD while in pretrial 

detention. His counsel noted that Hanson had difficulty focusing when they were 

able to meet to discuss the case, adding an additional impediment to their ability 

to prepare for trial. Yet, even after learning about this added circumstance, the 

district court did not reconsider its decision.

We understand the district court’s concerns about managing the court’s 

schedule. District courts are overworked and require meticulous scheduling to 

accommodate the needs of each case on the court’s docket. Moreover, we 

understand why the district court would disfavor granting a continuance when

jurors were either already present or on their way to the courthouse. Even so, 

when denying the motion would prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial, it 

cannot be denied at least where the defendant stands willing to waive his right to 

speedy trial as here. The motion must be granted to ensure that the defendant 

receives a fair trial.

Still, the State urges us that no harm was done because Hanson cannot 

establish any injustice resulted. See Carter v. Carter, 957 N.W.2d 623, 632 (Iowa 

2021) (recognizing appellate courts will not interfere with a ruling on a motion to 

continue absent a resulting injustice). It reasons that Hanson’s trial would turn out 

the same regardless of whether or not he had more time to prepare. We find such 

a conclusion to be presumptuous. Who knows what evidence the subpoenas of 

the phone records would have turned up if Hanson had the opportunity to serve 
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them. We also decline to speculate how a prepared counsel may have approached 

this case or the arguments to the jury. And the State turns a blind eye to what 

actually happened here. The denial of the motion to continue put Hanson squarely 

between a rock and a hard place. There was no tenable way for him to proceed 

with counsel who was not fully prepared or on his own on the spur of the moment. 

Contrary to the State’s assertion, Hanson has established injustice resulted.

We reverse the district court’s ruling on the motion to continue, vacate 

Hanson’s convictions, and remand for new trial before a different judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.