2017 IL App (3d) 150215

Opinion filed August 16, 2017 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2017 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

JAVIER PULIDO, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Will County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-15-0215 

Circuit No. 13-CF-1294 

Honorable 

Amy M. Bertani-Tomczak, 

Judge, Presiding. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Lytton and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Javier Pulido, appeals his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered from a search of his vehicle. We reverse.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of methamphetamine with intent 

to deliver (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1), (a)(2)(F) (West 2012)) after narcotics were found in his 

vehicle on June 11, 2013. 
2 

¶ 4 Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop on the 

basis that he was illegally detained and the vehicle in which he was driving was illegally 

searched. Subsequently, the State filed a motion in limine to admit evidence of a transaction 

between defendant and an undercover Illinois State trooper six days before the traffic stop. 

Although the motions were handled in a different order, for clarity, we discuss the evidence 

adduced from the hearing on the State’s motion in limine first.

¶ 5 I. Motion in limine June 5, 2013, Transaction 

¶ 6 Sergeant Gil Gutierrez, an Illinois state trooper, testified that he was undercover and met 

defendant near the Illinois-Iowa border on June 5, 2013. The purpose of the meeting was to 

purchase methamphetamines from defendant. According to Gutierrez, he received information 

from a confidential informant and was given defendant’s telephone number. 

¶ 7 Gutierrez contacted defendant by telephone and arranged to meet with him. Defendant 

arrived in a 1998 tan Dodge minivan with Washington plates. When Gutierrez first observed 

defendant, the hood of the minivan was up and defendant was standing at the front of the vehicle. 

The two met in person and exchanged greetings. Defendant told Gutierrez to take a small tube of 

methamphetamine located “on the hood” of the minivan. Gutierrez did not see defendant remove 

the tube from any part of the minivan before placing it on the hood of the vehicle. No money was 

exchanged, and Gutierrez left the area with the drugs. Defendant was not detained. 

¶ 8 Gutierrez later provided information of the transaction to Detective Mike Coppolillo but 

could not recall whether he provided Coppolillo with defendant’s name or just the description of 

the vehicle.

¶ 9 Defendant objected to the admission of the June 5, 2013, transaction on the basis that it 

was other-crimes evidence. Defendant argued that the transaction occurred six days before 
3 

defendant’s eventual arrest. The trial court admitted the evidence, acknowledging it was 

prejudicial but finding that its probative value outweighed any prejudice.

¶ 10 II. June 11, 2013, Traffic Stop and Search 

¶ 11 Detective Coppolillo testified that he was assigned to a multi-jurisdictional task force, 

NARCINT. On June 11, 2013, Coppolillo was contacted by Sergeant Gutierrez, who relayed 

information that defendant would be traveling to Illinois with a large quantity of narcotics. 

Coppolillo was told the vehicle was a tan Dodge minivan with a Washington registration. On 

cross-examination, Coppolillo testified that he was mistaken when he said that he had 

information on defendant. Coppolillo only had information on the vehicle description and the 

plates. Coppolillo did not know who was driving the vehicle, where the suspected drugs may 

have been located, or when the suspected narcotics were placed in the vehicle. Coppolillo 

forwarded this information to Trooper Degraff about 30 minutes prior to the traffic stop. 

¶ 12 Degraff testified that he communicated with NARCINT agents on June 11, 2013. Degraff 

met with the agents at a truck stop near I-80. The agents provided Degraff with information 

about a vehicle, its license plate, and the type of drugs suspected to be inside the vehicle. Degraff 

forwarded this information to Illinois state trooper Josh Korando (who was working on I-80) and 

asked him to stop the vehicle. 

¶ 13 Korando testified that around 7 p.m. on June 11, 2013, he was informed by Degraff that a 

tan Dodge minivan with Washington plates was carrying illegal narcotics. Korando did not have 

a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Korando also did not have any information about the driver of 

the vehicle. Korando did not know what type of drugs were potentially involved or where inside 

the vehicle the suspected narcotics were located.
4 

¶ 14 About an hour after receiving this information, Korando initiated a traffic stop of 

defendant’s vehicle for speeding along I-80. Korando testified that he had tested and verified that 

his light detection and ranging device (LIDAR) was working properly at the start of his shift. 

The LIDAR showed that defendant was traveling seven miles per hour above the posted speed 

limit. Korando asked defendant about his travel plans and defendant told Korando that he was 

driving from Washington to New York. Korando asked for and received defendant’s driver’s 

license. According to Korando, defendant was sweating, but he did not observe any furtive 

movements. Korando also did not notice any unusual odors coming from defendant’s vehicle. He

could see inside defendant’s vehicle, but did not observe any contraband. Korando then asked 

defendant to accompany him into his squad car. 

¶ 15 While defendant and Korando spoke inside the squad car, Degraff arrived on the scene 

(about two minutes after the stop was initiated) with his canine, Rico. Degraff testified that he 

had training in canine recognition of narcotics and narcotics interdiction. Degraff had been 

partnered with Rico since February 2012. Rico trained at the Illinois State Police Academy from 

February to May 2012 to detect the odor of narcotics. Rico had participated in about 50 “real 

world” narcotics investigations. Rico is a passive alert dog and will alert by a change in body 

posture and breathing rate. Rico will give a final confirmation by sitting, laying, or standing 

staring. Rico was certified as a narcotics investigation canine in May 2012. The certification was 

valid for one year, but had expired May 2013, right before the June 11, 2013, search. 

¶ 16 According to Degraff, he and Rico trained twice a month for 10 hours each day at 

different locations and diverse environments. Rico had broken his leg in October 2012, and did 

not train again until January 2013. Degraff did not keep records on Rico’s accuracy in the field. 
5 

Degraff stated that Rico had never alerted to a training blank (a room or vehicle that has never 

contained drugs). 

¶ 17 While Korando and defendant were sitting inside Korando’s squad car, Degraff deployed 

Rico and performed a free-air sniff of defendant’s vehicle. Rico alerted on the driver’s side door 

of the vehicle. Degraff interpreted this to mean there was an odor of narcotics. 

¶ 18 As Degraff performed the free-air sniff, Korando ran defendant’s information through 

Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) and determined that defendant had a valid 

driver’s license and no outstanding warrants. Korando then issued a speeding warning to 

defendant for driving seven miles per hour over the speed limit. The warning was not presented 

at the motion to suppress. 

¶ 19 When Rico alerted on defendant’s vehicle, Korando asked defendant if he had illegal 

drugs in his vehicle, and defendant said that he did not. Korando noticed that defendant began 

sweating profusely and his carotid artery pulsed noticeably. Korando asked defendant if he could 

search his vehicle. According to Korando, defendant consented to a search.

¶ 20 A video recording of defendant’s conversation with Korando was admitted into evidence. 

The video appears to malfunction at the time defendant gave his alleged consent to search his 

vehicle. The video does not conclusively show defendant gave consent to search his vehicle.

However, Korando testified that defendant gave him verbal consent. 

¶ 21 Korando then gave Degraff a “thumbs up.” Both Korando and Degraff (who had worked 

together previously) testified that they interpreted a “thumbs up” to mean that the driver had 

consented to the search. Although Degraff never confirmed with Korando that defendant 

consented to the search beyond seeing the “thumbs up,” Degraff began searching the vehicle. 

Korando also assisted in the search. Both troopers searched the inside of the vehicle, as well as 
6 

the engine compartment, but did not find any narcotics. Neither trooper observed anything 

unusual about the engine compartment. The search lasted around 15 minutes. Approximately 27 

minutes and 17 seconds elapsed from the time Korando initiated the stop until the end of the 

search. Throughout the free-air sniff and the search, defendant remained seated inside Korando’s 

squad car.

¶ 22 According to Degraff, when he and Korando completed a search of the vehicle, he 

contacted NARCINT agents and informed them of the search results. Although the officers failed 

to find any narcotics, Degraff believed narcotics could be hidden in the vehicle. According to 

Degraff, a NARCINT agent then made the decision to relocate the vehicle to the Channahon 

police department for a further search.

¶ 23 Coppolillo testified that he was near the scene waiting in his vehicle while Korando and 

Degraff searched defendant’s vehicle. He made the decision to relocate defendant and the 

minivan to the Channahon police department as it had begun raining and due to safety concerns. 

Despite the troopers’ failure to recover any narcotics from the search, defendant and his vehicle 

were transported to the Channahon police department. About 35 minutes elapsed from the time 

defendant was pulled over and the time he arrived at the Channahon police department. 

¶ 24 According to Coppolillo’s police report, Degraff redeployed Rico to search defendant’s 

vehicle at the Channahon police department at 8:44 p.m. Rico alerted at the backseat, and agents 

searched the vehicle. At this time, Coppolillo asked Inspector Tim Wherry and Trooper Diaz to 

interview defendant. 

¶ 25 Wherry testified that he interviewed defendant at the Channahon police department. 

Although defendant said that he understood English, Wherry asked Diaz to translate. The 

officers asked defendant for consent to search the vehicle, and Diaz presented a Spanish side of 
7 

the consent to search form to defendant. Although Coppolillo’s report stated that Rico was 

redeployed at 8:44 p.m., the form shows that defendant signed his consent at 8:50 p.m. 

¶ 26 When the NARCINT agents searched defendant’s vehicle, they found tubes wrapped 

with black tape from the vehicle’s air filter. Inside the tubes was a substance that later tested 

positive for methamphetamines.

¶ 27 After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court found the evidence showed that 

Korando properly stopped defendant for speeding. Degraff arrived at the scene while the stop 

was ongoing, and Rico alerted to narcotics. The trial court noted that Rico’s certification had 

expired, but found that went to the weight of the evidence. The court also found that defendant 

consented to a search of his vehicle on I-80 and Korando notified Degraff of the consent. The 

court noted that no drugs were found during the first search and the vehicle was moved due to 

rain and safety issues. The court found, “I think moving the vehicle is proper under all the 

circumstances.” The court concluded “I am not going to quash the drugs.” However, the court 

quashed defendant’s arrest on I-80 and suppressed statements defendant made as a result of the 

arrest. The written order granted defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress statements, but 

denied defendant’s motion to suppress the seizure of his vehicle and the evidence recovered 

during the search. 

¶ 28 The cause proceeded to a bench trial where the evidence mirrored that adduced during the 

hearings on the motion in limine and motion to suppress. Ultimately, the court found defendant 

guilty, and sentenced defendant to 15 years’ imprisonment. 

¶ 29 ANALYSIS

¶ 30 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in partially denying his motion to 

suppress. Defendant argues that (1) the initial stop for speeding was unlawful, (2) the traffic stop 
8 

was unreasonably prolonged, and (3) the officers lacked probable cause to search his vehicle on 

I-80 and again at the Channahon police department. Upon review, we find that although the 

officers’ testimony establishes that the order to stop defendant on the road was given prior to an 

observed traffic offense, he was speeding at the time he was actually pulled over and his 

detention was, therefore, supported by a lawful traffic stop. We also find that the free-air sniff 

did not unduly prolong the encounter because the dog was already near the scene of the 

orchestrated stop. Finally, we hold that any probable cause the officers might have developed 

during the course of the stop on I-80 dissipated when they failed to find any narcotics or hidden 

compartments during the first hand search of defendant’s vehicle. Therefore, we hold that the 

search should have ended at this point and the officers acted improperly by relocating the vehicle

to the Channahon police department for a second search. 

¶ 31 We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a two-part test. 

People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 230 (2008). The trial court’s factual findings are entitled to 

deference and will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

The ultimate ruling of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists and whether 

suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 32 “[A] traffic stop is analogous to a Terry investigatory stop, and therefore, the 

reasonableness of police conduct during a traffic stop may be judged by reference to Terry’s

‘dual inquiry.’ ” Id. at 238 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 228 (2003)). The two 

prongs of this inquiry are (1) whether the stop was justified at its inception and (2) whether the 

officer’s actions during the course of the stop were reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances that initially justified the stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). 
9 

¶ 33 I. Was the Stop Justified at its Inception? 

¶ 34 Defendant initially contends that the traffic stop was not justified at its inception. Because 

Korando testified that defendant was speeding when he pulled him over, we find the stop lawful. 

¶ 35 Generally, stopping a vehicle based on a suspected violation of the law constitutes a 

seizure, even if the stop is for a brief period of time and for a limited purpose. People v. Jones, 

215 Ill. 2d 261, 270 (2005) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). For a 

traffic stop to comport with the reasonableness requirement of the constitutional guarantees, the 

officers must have at least “ ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ ” that a violation of traffic law 

has occurred. People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20 (quoting Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 227). 

This means that officers must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 

particular person stopped” was violating a traffic law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prado

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting United States 

v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). If reasonable suspicion is lacking, the traffic stop is 

unconstitutional and evidence obtained as a result of the stop is generally inadmissible. See 

People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 227 (2006). 

¶ 36 Here, Korando testified that he had tested and verified that his LIDAR device was 

working properly at the start of his shift. The LIDAR device showed defendant was traveling 

seven miles per hour above the posted speed limit. Defendant, therefore, violated section 11-

601(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-601(b) (West 2012)). Korando’s decision to 

stop defendant’s vehicle was lawful at its inception.

¶ 37 II. Did the Deployment of Rico Unreasonably Prolong the Stop? 

¶ 38 Having found the initial stop of defendant’s vehicle was proper due to the traffic 

violation, we must determine, under the second prong of Terry, whether the officers’ conduct 
10 

impermissibly prolonged the duration of the detention or independently triggered the fourth 

amendment, thereby rendering the seizure unlawful. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 244. Defendant 

contends that the canine sniff impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop along I-80. Because the 

sniff occurred while Korando was still performing the duties related to the initial purpose of the 

stop, we find the sniff did not impermissibly prolong the encounter. 

¶ 39 A suspicionless canine sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not 

independently trigger the fourth amendment, so long as it does not unreasonably prolong the 

duration of the traffic stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005). The duration of a 

traffic stop is analyzed under the totality of the circumstances approach, which considers the 

brevity of the stop and whether the police acted diligently during the stop. People v. Baldwin, 

388 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1032 (2009). 

¶ 40 The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the 

seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, (Caballes, 543 U.S. 

at 407) and attend to related safety concerns (Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 

S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)). Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s 

mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. 

Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are 

outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of 

insurance. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979). 

¶ 41 Here, Korando pulled defendant over for speeding. After obtaining defendant’s 

information, Korando and defendant returned to Korando’s squad car so that Korando could run 

the information through LEADS and write defendant a warning. Before Korando finished 

writing defendant a warning and receiving the confirmation from LEADS, Degraff arrived on the 
11 

scene and conducted the free-air sniff. After Rico alerted on the vehicle, Korando was informed 

by radio that defendant’s LEADS check was clear. A free-air sniff conducted during a lawful 

traffic stop does not violate the fourth amendment, as long as it is done, as it was here, within the 

time reasonably required to complete the mission of the initial traffic stop. Caballes, 543 U.S. at

407. 

¶ 42 III. Did the Officers Have Probable Cause to Search Defendant’s Vehicle?

¶ 43 Having found that the free-air sniff did not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop, we now 

consider whether Rico’s alert constituted probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle. Although 

we find that Rico’s positive alert provided the officers with probable cause to search defendant’s 

vehicle on I-80, we find that such probable cause dissipated after the officers’ initial 15 minute 

hand search of the vehicle did not reveal any evidence of narcotics or any evidence of a hidden 

compartment within the vehicle. Therefore, we hold that the officers improperly transported 

defendant’s vehicle to the Channahon police department for a second search. 

¶ 44 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable 

searches and seizures without a warrant. People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 311 (1994) (citing 

U.S. Const., amend. IV). The “automobile exception” is a recognized exception to the warrant 

requirement. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Contreras, 2014 IL App (1st) 131889, 

¶ 28. Under this exception, a police officer may, during a valid traffic stop, search a vehicle 

without a warrant if probable cause has developed to believe the vehicle contains evidence of 

criminal activity, such as contraband. Id. Generally, stopping an automobile for a minor traffic 

violation does not justify a search of the detainee’s person or vehicle; instead, the officer must 

reasonably believe he is confronting a situation more serious than a routine traffic violation. 

Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 271. The reasonableness of an officer’s conduct must be judged based on his 
12 

responsibility to prevent crime and apprehend criminals. People v. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d 77, 86-87 

(1985). After an officer is in possession of facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe 

that a vehicle contains contraband, the vehicle may be searched without a warrant and the search 

area includes any interior compartment of the vehicle that might reasonably contain the 

contraband. People v. DeLuna, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2002); see also United States v. Ross, 456 

U.S. 798, 806 (1982); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). 

¶ 45 “The probable-cause standard is incapable of [a] precise definition or quantification into 

percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” 

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 

(1983), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). The existence of probable 

cause depends upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest. People v. Love, 199 

Ill. 2d 269, 279 (2002). In reviewing whether probable cause for a search existed, a court 

examines the events leading up to the search or seizure viewed from the standpoint of an 

objectively reasonable law enforcement officer. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 274. 

¶ 46 Although the parties devote a significant portion of their briefs to discussing what 

information the officers had regarding the prior drug transaction and the description of defendant 

and his vehicle, the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress demonstrates 

probable cause existed to search the vehicle along I-80 based on Rico’s positive alert to the 

presence of narcotics in defendant’s vehicle. A positive alert to the presence of narcotics by a 

dog trained in the detection of narcotics is a permissible method of establishing probable cause. 

People v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308, 315-16 (1977). Thus, Rico’s positive alert on the vehicle 

established probable cause to search the vehicle along I-80, unless Rico was shown to be 

unreliable.
13 

¶ 47 Defendant attempts to defeat this probable cause showing by arguing that Rico was not 

sufficiently reliable in the area of narcotics detection. Specifically, defendant alleges that because 

Rico’s certification had expired a month before the time of the sniff, the State was required (and 

failed) to establish Rico’s accuracy and reliability. We disagree.

¶ 48 The United States Supreme Court has articulated the test to determine “if the ‘alert’ of a 

drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle.” Florida v. 

Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 240 (2013). This approach employs a “ ‘flexible, common-sense standard’ 

of probable cause.” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239). In employing this standard, the Harris 

Court noted:

“[E]vidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training 

program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide 

organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, 

a court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s 

alert provides probable cause to search. The same is true, even in the absence of 

formal certification, if the dog has recently and successfully completed a training 

program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.” Id. at 246-47. 

¶ 49 Here, Degraff testified that he had training in canine recognition of narcotics and in 

narcotics interdiction. Degraff and Rico had been partnered since February 2012. Rico trained at 

the Illinois State Police Academy from February through May 2012, to detect the odor of 

narcotics. Rico was certified by the Illinois State Police as a narcotics investigation canine in 

May 2012. The certification alone allows the court to “presume” (id.) that the dog was 

sufficiently reliable and protects against any subsequent holding that the trial court’s 

determination of reliability is manifestly erroneous.
14 

¶ 50 Moreover, even though Rico’s certification had expired at the time of the sniff, the State 

adduced additional evidence from Degraff regarding Rico’s reliability. Although Rico was out of 

service for a three-month period due to a broken leg, Degraff stated that he and Rico otherwise 

trained twice a month for 10 hours each day at different locations in different environments. 

Degraff explained that Rico gives an “unknown response” every third or fourth training day. 

However, each “unknown response” was later explained by either a residual odor or a trainer 

handling narcotics and touching something in the training area. Degraff keeps computer logs of 

the training. Rico participated in about 50 “real world” narcotics investigations. Degraff did not 

keep records on Rico’s accuracy in the field, but Degraff indicated that Rico never alerted to a 

training blank (a room or vehicle that has never contained drugs). Based on the totality of the 

evidence, the State established that Rico was reliable in determining that contraband was or at 

some time had been present in defendant’s car or on his person. 

¶ 51 Having found that Rico was reliable and officers had probable cause to search 

defendant’s vehicle on I-80, we now consider whether the officers had probable cause to 

transport the vehicle to the Channahon police department for a second search. Because the initial 

hand search revealed neither narcotics nor any evidence of a hidden compartment within the 

vehicle, we conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to relocate the vehicle for a second 

search.

¶ 52 The fourth amendment requires that a search not continue longer than necessary to 

effectuate the purposes of an investigative stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) 

(plurality op.). More specifically, an investigative stop must cease once reasonable suspicion or 

probable cause dissipates. See United States v. Watts, 7 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1993); United 

States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993) (unlawful for police to execute search after 
15 

they learn that probable cause no longer exists). Probable cause to search a vehicle does not 

“dissipate” simply because it takes a long time to complete a reasonable and thorough search of 

the vehicle. United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial 

of motion to suppress when there was evidence of hidden compartments in the vehicle and it 

took six hours to locate drugs during examination of the vehicle in the highway patrol garage).

¶ 53 In the present case, Korando and Degraff searched the entire vehicle on I-80 and failed to 

find any contraband. More significantly, the State failed to produce any evidence that Korando or 

Degraff observed any indication that the vehicle may have had a hidden compartment that would 

justify moving the vehicle to the Channahon police department for a second search. The mere 

fact that Degraff believed the vehicle may have contained a hidden compartment is insufficient 

to establish probable cause, as Degraff offered no evidence to support his belief. Terry, 392 U.S. 

at 22 (intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights must be based on more than inarticulate 

hunches). There is also no evidence from the controlled exchange between defendant and 

Gutierrez to suggest that the vehicle contained a hidden compartment. Although the hood of the 

minivan was up and defendant was standing at the front of the vehicle during the controlled 

exchange, Gutierrez never testified that he saw defendant remove the tube of narcotics from the 

vehicle. Thus, when the initial search of the vehicle on I-80 was fruitless, any probable cause 

dissipated and the officers no longer had any authority to continue their search. This conclusion 

remains true even though Coppolillo testified that moving the vehicle was due to weather 

conditions and officer safety. Critically, Coppolillo made this decision after Korando and 

Degraff had completed their initial hand search. 

¶ 54 In reaching this conclusion, we reject the State’s argument that probable cause was not 

necessary to perform the first search or move the vehicle to the Channahon police department for 
16 

a second search. Specifically, the State argues that defendant consented to the search both at the 

scene and again at the Channahon police department. Thus, the State asserts that probable cause 

was unnecessary to justify the search. We discuss each search in turn. 

¶ 55 As to defendant’s consent to search on I-80, it is well settled that an individual may 

consent to a search conducted without a warrant, thereby eliminating the need for probable cause 

and a search warrant. People v. Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d 571, 592 (2003), overruled on other 

grounds by People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513 (2004). However, “[w]hen the police rely 

upon consent as the basis for a warrantless search, they have no more authority than they have 

apparently been given by the voluntary consent of the defendant.” People v. Baltazar, 295 Ill. 

App. 3d 146, 149 (1998). 

¶ 56 The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent is that of “ ‘objective’ 

reasonableness,” which requires consideration of what a “typical reasonable person [would] have 

understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 

248, 251 (1991); see also Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d at 593; People v. Vasquez, 388 Ill. App. 3d 532, 

553 (2009); Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 149-50. The scope of a search is defined by its 

expressed object or purpose. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d at 593. “By 

indicating to the suspect the intended object of the search either directly or by revealing a 

suspicion of specific criminal activity, a police officer not only ‘apprises the suspect that his 

constitutional rights are being impacted, but he also informs the suspect of the reasonable 

parameters of his inquiry.’ ” Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d at 593 (quoting Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 

150). 

¶ 57 In the present case, Korando asked defendant on I-80, “can we search your vehicle to 

make sure there’s nothing in there that’s not supposed to be, there’s nothing illegal?” and 
17 

defendant allegedly replied “yes.” Assuming defendant did in fact respond in the affirmative, the 

reasonable inference is that his consent was limited to a search of his vehicle at the site of the 

stop on I-80. Thus, a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have understood that he 

had authorized Korando to search his entire vehicle while it was stopped on I-80. In other words, 

it is unreasonable to believe that when defendant gave his consent, he also consented to the 

relocation of his vehicle for an even more invasive search. Stated another way, we do not believe 

an Illinois citizen who is pulled over on a highway and subsequently consents to a search of his 

vehicle intends to voluntarily and knowingly consent to have his vehicle removed from the 

highway and relocated to the local police station for a further search once the initial search on the 

highway is completed. The officers’ decision to relocate defendant’s vehicle in the instant case

exceeded the scope of defendant’s alleged consent along I-80. 

¶ 58 As to defendant’s purported consent to search at the Channahon police department, 

“consent is ineffective to justify a search when a search or entry made pursuant to consent 

immediately following an illegal search, involving an improper assertion of authority, is 

inextricably bound up with illegal conduct and cannot be segregated therefrom.” People v. Kelly, 

76 Ill. App. 3d 80, 86 (1979); see also People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 186-87 (2003). The 

officers engaged in impermissible conduct when they seized defendant’s vehicle without 

probable cause and transported it to the Channahon police department for a more prolonged and 

invasive search. It is of no consequence that defendant later “consented” to the second search as 

the second search was inextricably bound with the illegal conduct of the officers. We therefore 

conclude that defendant’s “consent” (being the fruit of an illegal assertion of authority) cannot 

justify a further illegal search. Consequently, the second search pursuant to the traffic stop 
18 

performed by the officers at the Channahon police department lacked probable cause and cannot 

be justified by defendant’s later consent.

¶ 59 In its brief and at oral argument, the State asserted that the probable cause for the 

supplemental search in Channahon was that flowing from the prior money-less drug transaction 

between defendant and undercover officers six days earlier. The proper response to that claimed 

probable cause was to use the ensuing six days either to complete the drug investigation with an 

actual transaction or to apply for a warrant to search defendant’s car. It was not authorization to 

orchestrate a traffic stop to enable a warrantless search.

¶ 60 CONCLUSION

¶ 61 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse defendant’s conviction on the grounds that the trial 

court erred in partially denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Because the conviction cannot 

stand in the absence of any narcotics, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions to 

vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence and for any further proceedings necessary. See 

People v. Surles, 2011 IL App (1st) 100068, ¶ 42. In light of the fact that we are reversing 

defendant’s conviction and sentence, we need not reach the remaining issues on appeal. 

¶ 62 Reversed and remanded with directions.