UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4171

JAMES MICHAEL LEWIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-96-505)

Submitted: August 28, 1997

Decided: September 18, 1997

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Jack H. Lynn, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene

Josey, United States Attorney, Harold W. Gowdy, III, Assistant

United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

James Michael Lewis appeals his conviction entered on his guilty

plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994). Lewis contends that

the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge

from his indictment. In doing so, he asks this court to revisit our decision in United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 1996), upholding

the constitutionality of § 922(g) in the wake of the Supreme Court's

decision in Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which found

that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994), exceeded the Congress's power to

enact legislation under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, Lewis

contends that the Wells decision was in error because it relied on

Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977). Lewis urges that

Lopez must be read as having overruled Scarborough as useful Commerce Clause precedent. Finding no error, we affirm.

This court has rejected the post-Lopez argument that 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause. In Wells, 98 F.3d at 811, we

held that, unlike the Gun-Free School Zone statute at issue in Lopez,

the felon-in-possession statute contains the necessary jurisdictional

element and requires the government to prove a nexus between the

firearm and interstate commerce. Because of this crucial distinction,

the Commerce Clause requires only a "minimal nexus" with interstate

commerce to render the statute constitutional. See id. Contrary to

Lewis's contention, there is nothing in the Lopez decision that would

call into question the applicability of the "minimal nexus" standard to

a statute like § 922(g). See United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387,

390 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, #6D6D 6D# U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W. 3264

(U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-5610). Consequently, even were this

court at liberty to overrule the panel's decision in Wells, which we are

not, see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Director, OWCP, 5 F.3d 777, 779

(4th Cir. 1993), Lewis presents no compelling argument to do so. The

holding in Wells is in accord with all of the other courts of appeals

to consider the issue. See Wells, 98 F.3d at 811 (collecting cases).

Finding no merit to Lewis's sole issue for appeal, we affirm his

conviction. We grant Appellant's motion to dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

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in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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