IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francis G. Landmesser, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Office of Luzerne County : No. 310 C.D. 2019

District Attorney : Submitted: June 7, 2019

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PER CURIAM FILED: August 14, 2019

Francis G. Landmesser (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the November 

15, 2018 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (trial court) that 

denied Appellant’s Petition for Review of the Decision of the Attorney for the 

Commonwealth (Petition for Review), which sought review of the Luzerne County 

District Attorney’s Office’s (District Attorney) denial of Appellant’s private 

criminal complaints charging his neighbors and various local authorities with 

criminal conduct. Upon review, we affirm.

On May 29, 2018, Appellant filed nine private criminal complaints

seeking redress from perceived wrongs visited upon him by his neighbors and 

various local government officials in relation to a zoning dispute involving his 

property. See Luzerne County Private Criminal Complaints 129-18 through 137-18. 

The District Attorney denied all the private criminal complaints, citing an office

policy of not becoming involved in zoning disputes as the reason for the denials. See

Letter from District Attorney to Appellant dated August 27, 2018. 
2

On September 19, 2018, Appellant filed his Petition for Review1 with 

the trial court. The trial court conducted a hearing on the Petition for Review on 

November 7, 2018. On November 15, 2018, the trial court issued an Order and 

Memorandum denying the Petition for Review (Trial Court Decision). On 

December 3, 2018, Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal.

2

On appeal, Appellant alleges the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying his Petition for Review of the District Attorney’s denial of his private 

criminal complaints. See generally Appellant’s Brief.3 We disagree.

 

1 Appellant submitted only one of the nine denied private criminal complaints for review 

with his Petition for Review.

2 Appellant originally filed this appeal in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which 

transferred the matter to this Court. See Superior Court Order dated January 22, 2019; see also 42 

Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(4)(i) (granting the Commonwealth Court exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from 

final orders of courts of common pleas from civil and criminal matters involving local government 

matters and employees).

3 Appellant styled his questions presented on appeal as follows:

Question 1. Was the District Attorney[’s] Office[’s] decision to 

disapprove of the complaints arbitrary and capricious?

Question 2. Did the District Attorney[’s] Office personnel comply 

with agency’s [sic] mission statement?

Question 3. Was the Appellant afforded his rights established by our 

[c]ountry’s and Commonwealth’s forefathers and [the] Nanticoke 

City Charter?

Question 4. Did the [trial court] consider animus/bias displayed 

against Appellant and [his] wife?

Question 5. Did the [trial court] consider crimes committed by all 

perpetrators?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.
3

Regarding private criminal complaints, Pennsylvania’s Rules of 

Criminal Procedure state, in relevant part:

(A) When the affiant [of a criminal complaint] is not a law 

enforcement officer, the complaint shall be submitted to 

an attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall approve or 

disapprove it without unreasonable delay.

(B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:

(1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall 

indicate this decision on the complaint form and 

transmit it to the issuing authority;

(2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall 

state the reasons on the complaint form and return 

it to the affiant. Thereafter, the affiant may 

petition the court of common pleas for review of 

the decision.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(A) & (B). Thus, the prosecution of a private criminal complaint 

is initially subject to approval by the district attorney of the county in which the 

complaint is sought to be brought. In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 211-12 (Pa. Super. 

2005). Further, as the Superior Court has explained: 

The district attorney is permitted to exercise sound 

discretion to refrain from proceeding in a criminal case 

whenever he, in good faith, thinks that the prosecution 

would not serve the best interests of the state. This 

decision not to prosecute may be implemented by the 

district attorney’s refusal to approve the private criminal 

complaint at the outset.

Id. at 212.
4

In reviewing a district attorney’s decision on a private criminal 

complaint, the Superior Court has explained the following:

It is well-settled that, if the Commonwealth disapproves a 

private criminal complaint, the complainant can petition 

the Court of Common Pleas for review, and the trial court 

must first correctly identify the nature of the reasons given 

by the district attorney for denying the complaint. “Where 

the district attorney’s denial [of a private criminal 

complaint] is based on a legal evaluation of the evidence, 

the trial court undertakes a de novo review of the matter.”

[However,] [w]hen the district attorney disapproves 

a private criminal complaint on wholly policy 

considerations, or on a hybrid of legal and policy 

considerations, the trial court’s standard of review of 

the district attorney’s decision is abuse of discretion. 

This deferential standard recognizes the limitations 

on judicial power to interfere with the district 

attorney’s discretion in these kinds of decisions. . . . 

Thereafter, the appellate court will review the trial 

court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, in keeping 

with the settled principles of appellate review of 

discretionary matters. . . .

* * *

The private criminal complainant has the burden to 

prove the district attorney abused his discretion, and 

that burden is a heavy one. In the Rule 506 petition 

for review, the private criminal complainant must 

demonstrate the district attorney’s decision 

amounted to bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality. 

The complainant must do more than merely assert the 

district attorney’s decision is flawed in these regards. 

The complainant must show the facts of the case lead 

only to the conclusion that the district attorney’s 

decision was patently discriminatory, arbitrary or 

pretextual, and therefore, not in the public interest. In 
5

the absence of such evidence, the trial court cannot 

presume to supervise the district attorney’s exercise 

of prosecutorial discretion, and should leave the 

district attorney’s decision undisturbed.

In re Private Criminal Complaints of Rafferty, 969 A.2d 578, 581-82 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (citations and footnote omitted).

In this case, the District Attorney disapproved Appellant’s private 

criminal complaints based on the District Attorney’s policy not to become involved 

in zoning disputes. Because this denial was based on a pure policy consideration, 

the trial court’s review of the District Attorney’s decision was for an abuse of 

discretion. See Rafferty, 969 A.2d at 581. Therefore, Appellant was required at the

hearing before the trial court to demonstrate that the District Attorney’s “decision 

was patently discriminatory, arbitrary or pretextual, and therefore, not in the public 

interest.” Id. at 582. However, as the trial court explained, “[Appellant] presented 

no evidence whatsoever to establish that an abuse of discretion was committed by 

the [] District Attorney in disapproving the nine private criminal complaints he 

filed.” Trial Court Decision at 3 (pagination supplied). Further, Appellant’s 

rambling appellate brief, to the extent it raises discernable arguments,4fails to direct 

this Court’s review to evidence of record that satisfies Appellant’s heavy burden to 

prove the District Attorney’s alleged abuse of discretion amounted to bad faith, fraud 

 

4 We acknowledge the District Attorney’s argument that Appellant’s brief is so rambling 

and incoherent as to preclude meaningful review. See District Attorney’s Brief at 6-8. We further 

acknowledge that a party’s failure to adequately develop a claim can waive the claim for review. 

See Berner v. Montour Twp., 120 A.3d 433, 437 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (ruling that a party’s 

failure to sufficiently develop an issue in a brief constitutes waiver of the issue); see also Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a). We further acknowledge that, while we may be willing to liberally construe a pro se

litigant’s filings, pro se status neither confers special benefits on Appellant nor excuses 

shortcomings in his brief. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

However, given the obvious nature of Appellant’s pro se challenge and our disposition thereon, 

we decline to find waiver in this instance.
6

or unconstitutionality. See generally Appellant’s Brief. As a result, we are 

constrained to conclude that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the District 

Attorney improperly disapproved of Appellant’s private criminal complaints or that 

the trial court abused its discretion in affirming the District Attorney’s disapprovals.

Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court Decision.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francis G. Landmesser, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Office of Luzerne County : No. 310 C.D. 2019

District Attorney :

PER CURIAM

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 14th day of August, 2019, the November 15, 2018 

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Francis G. Landmesser’s Motion to Expedite is DISMISSED

as MOOT.