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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

__________________________________________ 

) 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF ) 

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, ) 

LOCAL 812, et al., ) 

 ) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 09-1191 (ESH) 

 ) 

BROADCASTING BOARD OF ) 

GOVERNORS, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

__________________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on renewed cross-motions for summary judgment brought 

by defendant Broadcasting Board of Governors and plaintiff Verla Wiley, proceeding pro se, on 

plaintiffs’ claims under the Freedom of Information Act. The Court previously granted 

defendant’s motion in part and denied both plaintiffs’ cross-motions in part but ordered 

defendant to file supplementary declarations. See May 18, 2010 Order at 1-2; see also Am. Fed. 

of Gov’t Employees, Local 812 v. Broad. Bd. of Gov’rs (“AFGE”), No. 09-CV-1191, 2010 WL 

1976747 (D.D.C. May 18, 2010). After defendant filed numerous declarations and renewed its 

summary judgment motion, Wiley opposed defendant’s motion and renewed her own summary 

judgment motion. Having reviewed the filings by defendant and Wiley, the Court will grant 

defendant’s renewed motion except as to the declaration by Carol Durika, and it will deny 

Wiley’s renewed cross-motion in all other respects. 

First, the additional declaration by Michael Lawrence complies with the Court’s 

instruction that defendant file “a declaration stating that it has correctly searched [Lawrence’s] 
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email account . . . (including sent mail) for the search terms identified in his [previously 

submitted] declaration . . . .” AFGE, 2010 WL 1976747, at *14. (See Def.’s Renewed Mot. for 

Summ. J. (“Def.’s 2nd SJ Mot.”), Ex. C.) Lawrence states that his initial email search took place 

via remote network access while he was overseas, and that he found no responsive documents at 

that time. (Id. ¶ 3.) However, in response to the Court’s May 18 Order, he again searched his 

email directly from his office computer on May 25, and this search produced several responsive 

documents which have been produced to Wiley in redacted form. (Id. ¶ 4; Def.’s 2nd SJ Mot. at 

2 n.2; see id., Ex. M.) This declaration resolves the Court’s prior concern “about ‘the sufficiency 

of the agency’s identification or retrieval procedure’ with respect to [his] files.” AFGE, 2010 

WL 1976747, at *14 (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 370 (D.C. Cir. 

1980)). 

Second, six declarations by Angela Puryear, Timi Kenealy, Maryellen Righi, Donna 

Grace, Kataryna Lyson (formerly Kataryna Baldwin), and Paul Kollmer-Dorsey comply with the 

Court’s instruction that defendant file declarations stating that it has “searched the paper files of 

[agency officials] Baldwin, [Carol] Booker, Grace, Kenealy, [George] Moore, and Righi . . . .” 

AFGE, 2010 WL 1976747, at *14. In response to the Court’s May 18 Order, Righi, Grace, and 

Lyson searched their own paper files and Puryear searched those of George Moore; responsive 

documents were found only among Moore’s paper files.1

 (See Def.’s 2nd SJ Mot., Exs. B, E-G.) 

In addition, the declarations of Kenealy and Kollmer-Dorsey clarify that the paper files of 

Kenealy and Booker had already been reviewed during defendant’s initial search, and no 

responsive documents were found. (See id., Exs. D & H.) These six declarations sufficiently 

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 Some of the responsive documents found in Moore’s files are duplicative of those 

previously located and disclosed. (See Def.’s 2nd SJ Mot. at 2 n.1.) Other responsive 

documents were not produced because they were issued by another government office. (See id.) 

Wiley does not dispute the non-production of these particular documents. 
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address the Court’s prior concern that defendant’s initial declarations stated only that it had 

searched the “electronic files” of Baldwin, Booker, Grace, Kenealy, Moore, and Righi. AFGE, 

2010 WL 1976747, at *14. 

Third, declarations by Royster Martin, Piero Ciancio, and Mark Filipek satisfy the 

Court’s instruction that defendant file declarations stating that it has “searched the records of the 

Building Security Council (or those of its members) for documents responsive to the FOIA 

request.” AFGE, 2010 WL 1976747, at *14. These three declarants searched the records of the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service pertaining to defendant’s 

building, as well as the computer and paper files of defendant’s last Safety Officer, who retired 

in 2008. (See Def.’s 2nd SJ Mot., Exs. I-K.) No responsive documents were found related to the 

Building Security Council or the decision to restrict unescorted retiree access to defendant’s 

building. (See id.) These three declarations sufficiently address the Court’s earlier concern that 

“there [was] no evidence that those records were ever searched” during defendant’s initial 

search. AFGE, 2010 WL 1976747, at *14. 

Fourth, the Court originally denied summary judgment with respect to the email of 

former agency official George Moore because no signature appeared on the December 11, 2009 

declaration submitted by Carol Durika, an agency information technology specialist, about the 

unavailability of Moore’s email. See AFGE, 2010 WL 1976747, at *8, *14. The Court 

concluded that “Durika’s declaration, if signed, would be sufficient to establish that Moore’s 

email was not available for review.” Id. Defendant has now submitted a signed version of 

Durika’s declaration. However, Wiley requests that defendant certify the signature on the 

document because the signed declaration continues to state that the declaration was executed on 

December 11, 2009, and yet it is formatted and paginated differently from the unsigned version 
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that accompanied defendant’s original motion for summary judgment. (See Wiley’s Request for 

Certification of Carol Durika Decl. at 1-2.) Wiley correctly contends that “[i]f the declaration 

was retyped (using the exact language) for Durika’s signature” in response to the Court’s prior 

ruling, “the date upon which the declaration was executed should be the official date shown on 

the newly submitted declaration.” (Id. at 2.) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

therefore denied as to the adequacy of its search of Moore’s email. 

Wiley also raises a number of other issues in response to defendant’s submissions. 

However, many of these issues are not properly before the Court. The Court’s prior order 

granted defendant’s motion in all respects except for the four issues discussed above, each of 

which pertained only to the adequacy of the agency’s search. See May 18, 2010 Order at 1-2. 

Thus, Wiley cannot repeat arguments on issues that have already been resolved in defendant’s 

favor, such as the propriety of its invocation of certain FOIA exemptions. (See Wiley’s 

Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. at 15-19.) Moreover, to the extent that her renewed motion for 

summary judgment is also a motion for “reconsideration” of the Court’s prior ruling (see id. at 

4), Wiley has failed to meet her burden under both the standard for reconsideration of final 

orders and the standard for reconsideration of interlocutory orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 

(permitting motions for relief from “[f]inal” judgments and orders on grounds of (1) mistake or 

excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence, (3) fraud, (4) void judgment, (5) satisfied or 

invalid judgment, or (6) other reasons “justif[ying] relief”); Sieverding v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 466 F. 

Supp. 2d 224, 227 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing Rule 60(b) standard); see also Rogers v. Mabus, 

699 F. Supp. 2d 73, 76 (D.D.C. 2010) (discussing “as justice requires” standard for 

reconsideration of interlocutory decision). 
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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s renewed motion for summary judgment is granted 

in all respects except for the adequacy of its search of George Moore’s email; the parties’ crossmotions motion are held in abeyance as to this issue, but Wiley’s renewed motion for summary 

judgment is denied in all other respects. On or before August 30, 2010, defendant must file 

either (1) a representation by counsel that the signed version of Carol Durika’s declaration was in 

fact executed on the date listed on the document, December 11, 2009, or (2) a declaration signed 

by Durika that lists the actual date of the signing of the document. Upon such a filing, the Court 

shall enter summary judgment on behalf of defendant. 

 

 /s/ 

 ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE 

 United States District Judge 

DATE: August 19, 2010