### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00551- CR

Rue l Hi ll, App e lla nt
v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 4 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 67143 5, HO NORAB LE MIK E DENTON, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
The trial court found appellant Ruel Hill g uilty of assa ult with family

violence. See T e x . P e n . C o d e A n n . § 2 2
. 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( W e s t S u p p . 2 0 0 5 )
. T h e c o u rta s s e s s e d p u n i s h m e n ta t1 8 0 d a ys in j a il a nd a $3 00 0 f ine , b ut s us pe nd ed im po si tio n o f s e nte nc e and pla c e d H ill on

c omm un ity supervision. Hi ll contends that the evide nce is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to sustain the conviction and that he was de nied his constitutional rig ht to a jury trial. Finding no reve rsible er ror, we will af

firm the convic tion. The State’s only

witness was Austin police office r L arr y Gordon. He testified that he wa s dispatched to a c onvenienc e store at about 1:00 a.m. When he a rrived, he found Hill and a
woman name d J amie Ward s t an d i n g outside the store. Ward wa s cry ing a nd hy sterica l, and “she
se e me d f e arf ul a s w e ll. ” Go rd on

te sti fi e d th a t Ward

tol d h im:2

Hill wa s a live in boy friend and they had a child toge ther and th ey h ad a v erba l argument beca

use she wa

nted to leave the house a nd he wa s very

violen t and she believed that he would hurt her if she left. And she also advised that she le ft but he kept the baby

and he g rabbe d her a

nd shook her and she ca lled the police at the convenie nt store because she had to leave her baby there . And she wa

nted to g et her belong ings a

nd her c hild from the re sidence
. Gordon testified that, using his f lashlight, he examined War d’s arm wher e she said Hill ha d g rabbe d he r. He sa i d t h a t h e s aw b r u i s e s o n h e r t r i c e p s t h a t w e r e m o r e p r o n o u n c e d t h an t h e y a pp e a r i n photogr aphs t ak en at t h e scene a nd introduced in e vidence . Gordon said that the br uises he saw “would be c onsistent with the complaint of pain” by any rea sonable person, but he ac knowledg ed that Ward told him t hat she did not experience pain.

Gordon de scribed H ill’s d em eanor at the sce ne as a

ng ry and ag g ressive. H e interrupted G ordon’s que stioning of Ward, sa y ing, “[W ]hy are y ou saying that to the police, I didn’t hurt y ou Ididn’t do any

thing.” Hill “was constantly looking at her and very verba l with ey e conta ct in h e r d ir e c tio n. ” Th e of

fi c e r sa id that War d “w a s v e ry de fe ns ive on c e sh e tho ug ht t hat [Hi ll] w ou ld probably be ar rested.” War d te sti fi e d f

or the de fe ns e . She sa id that sh e and Hi ll h a d a rgue d b e c a

us e Hi ll d id not want her

to take their c hild with h er wh en s h e l ef t the house, a

nd that she ca lled the police beca use she wa

nted help g etting the child out of t he house. She testified t hat Hill did not gra b her
arm or c ause he r any pain. She added that she and H ill “were making up” whe n Gordon a rrived at the conve nience store, but that the off icer “wa s ag g ressive towa

rds Ruel of course bec ause I said that he had a knife, whic h he did not.”3 When there is a c halleng e to the suff iciency of the e vidence to sustain a crim i n al conviction, the question prese nted is w hether a rational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (l e g a l su ff

ic ie nc y ); Gr iff in v . S tat e , 614 S.W .2d 155, 158-59 (T ex . C ri m. App. 1981) (leg al
su ff ic ie nc y ); Zun iga v . S

tat e , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (fa ctual suf fi cienc y ). I n a le g a l su ff ic ie nc y re vie w, a ll the e vid e nc e is re vie we d in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t, and it is assumed that the trier of fac t resolved c onflicts in the testimony , weig hed the e vidence , and drew rea sonable inferenc es i n a manner t hat s upports the ver dict. Gr iff in , 614 S.W .2d at 159 (c iting Jack son , 4 4 3 U
. S
. a t 3 1 8

- 1 9 )
. In a f a c tu a l s u f f i c i e n c y r e v i e w , a l l t h e e v i d e n c e i s c o n s i d e r e d e qu a l l y, including the testimony of defe nse witnesses and the exis tence of alter native hy potheses. Orona v. Sta te , 8 36 S.W. 2d 31 9, 32 1 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 92 , no pe t.) . A lth ou g h d ue de fe re nc e sti ll mus t be a c c or de d th e fa c t- fi nd e r’ s d e te rm inatio ns , p art ic ula rl y tho s e c o n c e rn ingthe we ig ht a nd c re dib ili ty of the e vid e nc e , th e re vie wi ngc ourt may dis a g re e wi th the r e su lt i n o rd e r t o p re ve nt a manif e st injusti ce. J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The evide nce w ill be deemed fac tually insufficient to sustain the convic t i o n if the proof of g uilt is too weak or

the contra

ry evidenc e is too strong to suppor t a finding of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. Zuniga , 144 S.W .3d
a t 48 4- 85 ; see J

ohnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11. Hill c ontends that the State failed to pr ove that he cause d bodily inju ry t o W ard. “B odily injury ” mea

ns phy sical pain, illness, or any impairment of p h y s i ca l condition. Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 1.07(a) (8) (West Supp. 2005). This definition is purposefully broad a nd encompa sses
ev en re l at i v el y

m i n o r p h y s i ca l co n t ac t s o l o n g as i t co n s t i tu t es m o re t h an m er e of fe n s i v e t o u ch i n g.4

L a n e v . Stat e , 763 S.W .2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). I t is not necessar y that the alleg ed vic ti m t e s ti f

y th a t s h e e xp e r ie n c e d

p a in ; t h e tr ie r o f f a c t m ay dr aw r e a s o n a

b le in f e r e n c e s f r o m the evidenc e, including an infe renc e that the victim suff ere d pain as a result of her injuries. Bolton v. Sta te , 6 19 S.W. 2d

16 6, 16 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ) ( e vid e nc e of c ut s uf fi c ie nt t o s ho w b od ily in jur y ); Ar zaga v . S tat e , 8 6 S. W. 3 d 7 6 7 , 7 7 8 ( T e x. A p p . — E l Pa s o 2 0 0 2 , n o p e t. ) ( s w e ll in g and br uis ingof lip s su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w b od ily

inj ur y ); Go od in v . S tat e , 7 5 0 S. W. 2 d 8 5 7 , 8 59 (Te x. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref ’d) (bruises and muscle strain suffic ient to show bodily injury). Ward told Office r Gordon at the s ce n e t h at Hill gr abbed he r ar m and shook her. Gordon testified that he saw bruises on Ward’s arm that wer e consistent with this desc ription of the alleg ed assa

ult, and he wa s of the opinion that any person suffering such bruisi ng would experience pa in. Al tho ug h War d lat e r t old the of fi c e r t hat H ill did

no t hu rt he r a nd te sti fi e d at tr ia l th a t he did
no t e ve n g ra

b h e r, the tr ia l c ourt

wa s in the be st po sit ion to jud g e the c re dib ili ty of the se state me nts in light of the circumstances under which they wer e made. Apply ing the appropr iate standa rds of
re vie w, we ho ld t

hat th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly su ffi cie nt t o s up po rt a fi nd ingof

g uil t bey ond a re asonable doubt. Point s of er ror one and two ar e over

ruled. I n his remaining points of error , Hill contends that he was de nied his constitutional rig ht to a jury trial and that the trial court e rre d by overr uling his motion for newtrial on that g round. S p e c i f i c a l l y , H i l l a s s e rt s t h a ta c o n s t i tu t i o n a l e r

r o r o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e h e n e v e r

kn o w i n g l y, intelligently , or voluntarily waived his rig ht to a jury trial. Se e Ro ble s v . S tat e , 577 S.W .2d 699, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (waive r of c onstitut ional rig ht must be voluntarily and knowing ly

made)
.5 The cler k’s rec ord does not c ontain the written jury waiver require d by

statute. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 1 .1 3( a ) ( Wes t 20 05 ). A w ri tte n w a ive r i s n ot c on sti tu ti on ally require d. J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 7 2 S
. W
. 3 d 3 4 6 , 3 4 8 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Ex pa rteSa db e rry , 864 S. W. 2 d

5 4 1 , 5 4 3 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) )
. T h e r e p o rte r ’ s r e c o r d is a ls o s il e n t i nth is r e g ard. The judg ment of convic tion, however , rec ites that Hill wa ived trial by jury
. This rec itation is bi nding in the absence of direc t proof of its fa lsity
. Id
. at 3 4 9 (c i t i n g Br e az e alev . S tat e , 683 S.W .2d 446, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on re h’g )).

At the hea

ring on his moti on for new t rial, Hil l testified that his trial counsel ne ver d i s c u s s e d w i t h h i m w h e t h e r

h e s h o u l d

i n v o k e o r w a i v e h i s r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l
. H i l l s a i d , “ I a l w a ys thought it was a

jury , even the day

of the trial I saw some people sitti ng there and I thought it was the jury , Ihave ne ver been in a situation like that befor e.” H ill testi fied that he never told his l awy er that he wa

nte d a be nc h tr ia l and

that he ne ve r w a ive d h is j ur y ri g ht i n c ourt
. Hill’s trial counsel testified that he and H ill dis cussed Hill’s rig ht to a jury trial and the re la tiv e me ri ts o f a

jur y tr ia l and a be nc h tr ia l. C ouns e l a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he ha d d if fi c ult y communicating with Hill “beca use he ne ver rea lly wanted to ta lk a bout w hat to do with the case , he only wanted to g et excited and scr eam a bout the injusti ce of

him being c harg ed.” B ut counsel wa s
cer tain that appellant u n d er stood his right to trial by jury and deliber ately

chose to wa ive it. He te sti fi e d, “ Ikn owhe un de rs too d h is o pti on s and he se le c te d th e op tio n of g oin g to the Judg e be c a us e he spec ifically

told me he was not worried a bout ge tting convic ted. He did not believe he could g et convicted a

nd he knew

that was the quic kest route possible.”6 We reviewthe denial of

a motion for new

trial for an abuse of

discretion. Charles

v . S t a te , 146 S.W. 3d

20 4, 20 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ). We v ie w the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the c ourt’s ruling and pre sume that all rea sonable finding s that could have been ma de ag ainst the losing pa

rty wer e made
. Id . A trial cour t abuses its discretion in deny ing a motion for new tria l only

when no r easona

ble view of

the re cord c ould support the trial court’ s ruling. Id
. I n denying H ill’s moti on for ne w trial, the co u rt expressly stated that it found trial
co u n s el ’s t es t i m o n y

t o b e c re d i b l e. T h at t es t i m o n y , v i ew ed i n t h e l i gh t m o s tfa v o rab l e t o t h e r u l i n g, supports the conc lusion that Hi l l k n ew and under stood his right to trial by jury , and that he knowing ly and voluntarily waived it. On this re cord, there is no direc t pr oof that the judg ment rec ital is f a lse and the tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n by ov e rr uli ng the mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l. P oin ts of er ror thre e and f

our ar e over

ruled. The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Apr il 13, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh