### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT JACKSON A ssi gne d on Br ie f June 7, 200 5
C. S. O. NOR VEL L, JR. v. D AV ID M ILLS, WAR DEN

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Tip ton County No. 2467 Joseph H. Walk er, Judge

No. W2004-02580-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled Augu st 24, 2005

Petitioner, C.S.O. Norvell, J r., filed a petition for writ of habea s corpus, attacking his conviction for second de g ree murder in the Tipton County Circuit Court. The petition was summarily dismiss ed by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner ha s appealed, ar g uing that his conviction is void because he re ceive d an illega l s en tence . After a thoroug h revie w, we a ffirm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and D A V ID G. H AYES , J J ., joined. C.S.O. Norvell, J r., He nning, T ennesse e, pro s e
. Paul G. Sum me rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vidH. F ind le y , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Eliz abeth T. Rice , District Attorney Gene ral; and James W. Free land, J r., Assi stant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
Ac c or din g to the pe tit ion fo r writ of ha be a s cor pu s, in No ve mbe r 199 2, the Ti pto n Co un ty Gra nd J ury indicted Petitioner for f irst deg ree murder. O n Marc h 8, 1993, pursuant to a ne g otiated plea a g ree ment, Petitioner pled g uiltyto second deg ree murder and was sente nced to se rve sixty(60) y ear s as a Rang e I , standard of fende r, with a 35% [sic] release elig ibilit y status. On September

17, 2004, he filed a pro s e petition for writ of habea s corpus c halleng ing the
va lid ity of his c on vic tio n for se c on d de g re e mur de r. I n the pe tit ion , he a lle g e s tha t th e se nte nc e is ill e g a l a ndvo id b e c aus e it i s “ ou tsi de the statut ory g uid e lin e s” of fi ft e e n to tw e nty -f ive y e ars a t th irty perc ent re lease elig ibilit y status for a Ra ng e I

sentenc e fo r conviction of second de g ree murder, a Class A felony . The full, authorize d t er m o f imprisonment for a Class A felony

is not less than fiftee n y ear s nor more tha n six ty y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-111(b) (1). In its order dismissing the petition wi t h o u tan ev i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g, t h e t ri al co u rt s p ec i fi ca l l y fo u n d t h atp et i t i o n er ’s s entenc e had not expired, the sentenc e was lawful, and the trial court ha d jurisdiction to im pose the sente nce.-2-

Article I , § 15 of the Tenne ssee Constitution guar antee s the rig ht to seek habe as cor pus relief

. Tenne ssee Code Annotated sections 29-21-101 et seq. codifiy the applica ble proc edure s for see king
a writ. W hile there is no statutory time limit in which to file for habea s corpus re lief, Tenne ssee law provides very narr ow g rounds upon which such relief may be g rante d. Tay lor

v . S tate , 995 S.W .2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). A habe as cor pus petition may

be used only

(1) to conte st void judgments which
are fac ially

invalid because the c onvicting c ourt was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defe ndant; or (2) the defe ndant’s sente nce ha s expi red. Arc he r v . S tate , 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993).

Since the off

ense f or which Petitioner wa s convicted oc curr ed prior to July1, 1995, it was
no t r e qu ir e d to ha ve a

on e hu nd re d p e rc e nt s e rv ic e of the se nte nc e wi tho ut a

re le a se e lig ibi lit y

status

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-501(i)( 1) and ( 2).

Th e ne g oti a te d p le a

a g re e me nt r e a c he d b y

Pe tit ion e r andthe St a te a t th e tim e of his
s u b m i s s i o n h e ar i n g i n 1 9 9 3 , p r o v i d e s f o r a “ s t a n d a r d o f f e n d e r ” R a n g e I s e n t e n c e , w i t h a R a n g e II rele ase e ligibility

date of 35%, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501( d), and the leng th of the sentenc e imposed is within R ang e I I I for conviction of t he C lass A felony offe nse of second de g ree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(c )(1)

. I n Hi c k s v . S tate , 945 S.W .2d 706 (Tenn. 1997) , our suprem e co u rt succinc tly stated the
ru lin g of that c a se a s f

oll ow s:
At issue in this post-convic tion case is whe ther a plea ba rg ained Rang e I I

sentenc e is valid when couple d with a Rang e I rele ase e l i gi b i l i t y . We conclude that such a
se nte nc e , w he n impo se d a s a re su lt of a ple a ba rg a in ag re e me nt e nte re d v olu nta ri ly and knowing ly , is valid.

Id . at 706.

T h e p ar t i es i n a c ri m i n al p ro ce ed i n g ar e p re cl u d ed fr o mat t ac k i n g an agr e e d -u p o n ra n ge imp os e d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

wh e re th e sen ten ce is impo se d a s a re su lt o f a

ple a ne g oti a tio n d on e in g ood faith and wher e there are no alleg ations of fr aud or misfe asanc e. Id . at 708. I n concluding , the Hicks court spec ifically held, “[w]e r eiterate today that a knowing and voluntary g uiltyplea waives any irreg ularity

as to offe nder c lassification or r elea se elig ibilit y .” Id . at 709.

I n Mc Con ne ll v . S tate , 12 S.W .3d 795 (Tenn. 2000) , the appe llant pled g uiltyto one count of second d e g r e e mu r d e r

a n d s ix c o u n ts o f

r o b b e r y b y u s e o f a d e a d ly w e ap o n f o r o f f e n s e s w hich
oc c ur re d in Janu ary 19 89

. He did no t ple a d g uil ty un til No ve mbe r 199 0. Pur su a nt to the a g re e me nt, he re ceive d a sente nce of thirty -five y ear s as a Rang e I o ff en der f or sec ond deg ree murder, and a sentenc e of thirty -five y ear s for one conviction of robbe ry by use of a dea dly

wea pon. I n the other five c onvictions for robbe ry by use of a deadly wea pon, he re ceive d a sente nce of ten y ear s for e ach conviction. The c ourt in Mc Con ne ll held that the sent ence for the second de g ree murder and the thi rty -f ive y e ar s e nte nc e fo r r ob be ry wi th a de a dly we apo n w e re ill e g a l a ndvo id s e nte nc e s b e c aus e-3-

they wer e imposed under

the C riminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982, when it was required that sentenc es in such case s be imposed under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989. Mc Con ne ll at 798. Notwithstanding this holdi ng , the court in Mc Con ne ll expli citly stated that “[o] ur dec ision tod a y in n o w a y a lte rs the abil ity

of the State a ndde fe nd a nts to u se of fe nd e r c la ssi fi c a tio n an d r e le a se elig ibilit y as subjects of ple a barg ain negotiations. These elements of plea ba rg aining have be en and still are properly

char acte rized as non-jurisdictional.” Id

. I n Bland v. Dukes , 97 S.W .3d 133 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002), the petitioner in a ha beas c orpus proce eding had pled g uiltyto ag g ravated robbe ry , a C lass B felony , and to vol untary manslaug hter, a Class C felony . Pursuant to a neg otiated plea a g ree ment, he was sente nced to se rve f ifteen y ear s a s a R a n g e I o f

f e n d e r f o r t h e a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y

c o n v i c t i o n , a n d f

i f t e e n y e ar s a s a

R a n g e III pe rs ist e nt o ff

e nd e r f or the vo lun tary

ma ns laug hte r c on vic tio n. On app e a l f ro m th e dis mis sa l of

his habea s corpus pe tition, petit ioner maintaine d that his sentence s were illega l because, (1) conce rning the ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction, the maximum sentenc e for a Rang e I offe nder of a Class B f

elony was twe lve y ear s, and the sente nce imposed upon him wa s fiftee n y ea rs; and (2) conce rning the
vo lun tary ma ns laug hte r c on vic tio n, he didno t ha ve the necess ary pri or c on vic tio ns to p e rm it a sentenc e as a

Rang e I I I , persistent off

ender

. This Court relied upon the de cisions in Hicks and Mc Con ne ll , and af firmed the trial court’s dismiss al of the pe tition for habea s corpus re lief. I n doing so, w e held,

I n the pre sent ca se, the pe titioner neg otiated his ple a ag ree ment using the terms of the 19 89 Ac t an d, th e re fo re , th e mixin g of the le ng th o f i nc arc e ratio n a ndthe re le a se elig ibilit y status is permissible under Hicks . T hu s, the pe tit ion e r’ s ju dg me nt r e fl e c ts a g uiltyplea a nd a hy

brid s en t en ce, which do not contra vene the 1989 Sentencing Act.

Id . at 135-36.

Pursuant to the hol dings of the s upreme court a nd our Court in Hicks , Mc Con ne ll , and Bland , Pe tit ion e r’ s “ Ra ng e I ” sixty -y e ar s e nte nce o f inc arc e ratio n w itha thi rty -f ive pe rc e nt r e le a se elig ibilit y date, whic h was the result of a neg otiated plea ag ree ment, does not c ontrave ne the 1989 Sentencing Act, and is a

valid judgme nt. Thus, Petiti oner is not entitled to relief in this appeal.
CO NC LU SION

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the trial court dism issing the pe tition for writ of habea s corpus re lief.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE