UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5129

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL QUINN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00442-JFM-1)

Submitted: June 29, 2012 Decided: July 10, 2012

Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gary A. Ticknor, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Michael Quinn appeals his convictions following a jury 

trial for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), and possessing materials to 

manufacture controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 843 (2006). On appeal, Quinn challenges several evidentiary

rulings made by the district court. This court reviews 

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004). Applying this 

standard, we affirm.

Quinn first contends that the Government did not 

provide notice of certain evidence it offered at trial. A 

review of the record leads us to conclude that Quinn had 

adequate notice of the evidence presented by the Government.

Quinn next argues that Fed. R. Crim. P. 404(b) 

prohibited the introduction of portions of the trial evidence. 

Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of a “crime, wrong, or other act” 

as proof of a person’s character when it is used “to show that 

on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 

character.” Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion that allows for 

the introduction of all evidence “except that which proves only 

criminal disposition.” United States v. Sanchez, 188 F.3d 192, 

195 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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We find no merit in Quinn’s argument that Rule 404(b) 

was violated. A search of Quinn that occurred prior to his 

arrest on the charges of which he was ultimately convicted and 

testimony of his subsequent admission that he had possessed a 

handgun during that earlier search were relevant to Quinn’s 

state of mind and intent to unlawfully possess weaponry. See, 

e.g., United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (noting that in cases where unlawful possession is at 

issue, evidence of previous possession can be relevant to 

knowledge and intent of crime charged). We thus conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting 

such evidence. We also conclude that admission of a letter 

found in Quinn’s possession during the execution of a search

warrant was relevant to show Quinn’s possession and knowledge of 

the contraband at issue and was not overly prejudicial. See

United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 262 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(testimony of son that he delivered drugs for his father was not 

overly prejudicial). Finally, we conclude that reference to

Quinn’s fugitive status was not an abuse of discretion because 

“evidence of flight is admissible to prove guilty conscience.” 

United States v. Peoples, 748 F.2d 934, 936 (4th Cir. 1984); 

United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2006) (“the jury 

unquestionably was entitled to draw the reasonable inference 

that Moye fled because he knew he was prohibited under federal 
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law from possessing firearms.”); United States v. Obi, 239 F.3d 

662, 665 (4th Cir. 2001). 

Quinn next argues that the district court erred in 

allowing the Government to introduce evidence of his gang 

membership and inquire into other "bad acts" during crossexamination. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 

evidence to which Quinn objects because Quinn’s gang affiliation 

was relevant to his motive for possessing a weapon and his 

involvement in drug transactions.

Quinn lastly challenges the district court’s denial of 

his motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant. 

A decision not to require disclosure of an informant is within 

the discretion of the district court. United States v. Gray, 47 

F.3d 1359, 1363-64 (4th Cir. 1995). “Under the abuse of 

discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its judgment 

for that of the district court; rather, [it] must determine 

whether the [district] court’s exercise of discretion, 

considering the law and facts, was arbitrary or capricious.” 

United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir. 1995). 

Here, the informant was not a participant in the crimes Quinn 

was charged with. Thus, his identity or testimony was not 

necessary for Quinn’s defense, and we will not disturb the 
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district court’s conclusion that the identity should be kept 

confidential.

Accordingly, we affirm Quinn’s convictions and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED