1Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

‘ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 98-10172

Summary Calendar

_______________________

LUCIAN R. HENDERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ABILENE REGIONAL MHMR CENTER,

WILLIAM V. LIVINGSTON, and

ROSCOE C. HOLLIDAY

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(1:97-CV-55)

_________________________________________________________________

September 25, 1998

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Appellant Henderson claims that his termination from

employment at the Abilene Regional MHMR Center was illegally

motivated by discrimination. He appeals the district court’s grant

of summary judgment in favor of Appellees and the denial of his

motion for judgment as a matter of law (treated below as a motion

for summary judgment). Because we agree that Henderson has not 
2

adduced specific facts sufficient to support a finding of

discrimination, we affirm.

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment in an

employment discrimination case. See Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus.,

Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Henderson was a 40-year-old black male when his

employment at the Center was terminated in June 1995. He was

replaced by a younger white female. His complaint in this suit

alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. In addition, his pro se complaint and

subsequent briefs make general references to age and sex, although

these were not mentioned in the charge of discrimination he filed

with the E.E.O.C.; nor does his complaint mention the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act.

Nevertheless, the procedural framework necessary to

determine this case would be the same for race, sex, or age

discrimination. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989,

992 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Under any of these allegations,

Henderson, as the plaintiff, has failed to prove facts sufficient

to meet his burden under the three-step McDonnell Douglas-Burdine

framework. 

Under that framework, the plaintiff must first make out

a prima facie case of discrimination. See Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 992.

Then the defendant may rebut the resulting inference of

discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the discharge. Id. at 992-93. Finally, the plaintiff
 

2Henderson contends that the felony was an after-the-fact

rationalization for his termination because it was not explicitly

given as a reason until the grievance hearing held two months after

his termination. Although not enumerated at the time, the felony

and failure to disclose it were apparently known to the executive

director when he made the final decision (App. Record at 157-8).

Such questions, however, go to credibility, which is irrelevant in

determining the employer’s fulfillment of its second-step burden.

See Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 958 (“The employer need only articulate

a lawful reason, regardless of what its persuasiveness may or may

not be.”).

3

must prove not only that “the employer’s reasons were not the true

reason for the employment decision,” but also that “unlawful

discrimination was.” Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. 

The Center has met its second-step burden of articulating

legitimate reasons for the termination. The letter notifying

Henderson of his imminent termination, and his subsequent meeting

with the executive director, focused primarily on the intimidating

statements Henderson made to a witness in a legally-required client

abuse investigation. In addition, the executive director’s

affidavit states that his determination to fire Henderson was also

motivated by the nearly simultaneous discovery that Henderson had

been convicted of a felony before he came to work for the Center

and had failed to disclose this on his employment application.2 

Henderson has not adduced facts to show that these

reasons are pretexts for prohibited discrimination. He contends

that the proffered reasons are pretextual by disputing the facts

underlying the original allegation of his interference in the

client abuse investigation and by arguing that the felony was not

officially invoked as a justification until after he was fired.

Even if these arguments were sufficient to show pretext, Henderson
4

provides insufficient facts to prove that the pretext masks

unlawful discrimination.

At bottom, Henderson’s claims of race or age

discrimination are sorely lacking in any of the “specific facts”

that are necessary to avoid summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).

Apart from broad statistics about the makeup of the Center’s small

staff and inadmissible evidence of statements by an employee not

involved in the termination decision, Henderson has provided only

conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions of subjective

belief, which “are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant’s burden.”

Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,1429 (5th Cir.

1996) (en banc). Henderson has not met his burden of producing

evidence sufficient “to allow a jury to infer that the actual

reason for the discharge was discriminatory.” Rhodes, 75 F.3d at

994. Thus, defendants’ summary judgment motion must succeed, and

Henderson’s must fail. 

Henderson also presents a smorgasbord of purported abuses

of discretion or errors by the district court (e.g., “Prejudicial

supervision of this case,” “Consideration of inadmissible

evidence,” “Failing to provide Pro Se Litigant, revisions of The

Local Rules”). We have examined each of these contentions and find

no abuse of discretion or reversible error. 

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.