No. 80-385 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

vs. 

WILLIAM F. WILLIAMS, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Jefferson 

Honorable Frank Blair, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Cecil Woodgate, Deputy County Attorney, Boulder, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Small, Hatch & Doubek, Helena, Montana 

Filed: AUG G - 

Submitted on briefs: June 12, 1981 

Decided: August 6, 1981 

p. &"ic 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

The State of Montana (State) appeals from an order of 

the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Jefferson 

County, granting defendant's motion for a new trial. 

Linda Tittleton and Debra Cunningham reported that 

their house in Basin, Montana, had been broken into during 

the late evening of November 9, 1979. Items reported missing 

included a stereo tape player, stereo tapes, a small black 

and white television, $85 in cash and $18 worth of food 

stamps. The defendant was subsequently charged with burglary 

and felony the£ t in connection with this incident. 

Defendant was brought to trial on the charges in August 

1980. Prior to trial, the District Court granted defendant's 

motion in limine excluding evidence of: (I-) defendant' s 

prior criminal record; (2) defendant's use of or familiarity 

with marijuana; and (3) defendant's marital problems. 

Trial was held on August 27, 28, 1980. The prosecution's 

main witness was a Jerry Wilk, a friend of both of the victims 

and the defendant. Wilk had been charged with other thefts 

in Jefferson County and as a part of a plea negotiation on 

such charges, agreed to assist the prosecution by testifying 

against the defendant. Wilk testified that he was at the 

defendant's house after the alleged burglary and saw some 

of the stolen goods. He also testified that the defendant 

told him how the break-in of the Tittleton/Cunningham residence 

had occurred. 

Tittleton and Cunningham testified that they had been 

friends of the defendant and that he had visited their house 

several times. The two women also testified that they had 

been with the defendant at a bar in Boulder, Montana, on the 
night of the break-in, but that the defendant had left 

early. 

Additional testimony was given by police officers and 

also by a Suzanne Campbell. Ms. Campbell testified that the 

defendant sold her a tape player and tapes which turned out 

to be items taken from the Tittleton/Cunningham residence. 

Following trial, the jury returned a verdict finding 

the defendant guilty of burglary and felony theft. Sentencing 

was set for September 3, 1980. About ten minutes before the 

sentencing hearing, the defendant gave the State a copy of a 

motion for new trial, supported by a brief. 

The motion for a new trial stated four grounds. The 

first was numerous violations by the State of the motion in 

limine. Secondly, defendant alleged that Debra Cunningham 

had perjured herself when she falsely said she had never 

been arrested for shoplifting. Third, defendant argued that 

the prosecuting attorney had violated his attorney-client 

relationship when he attempted to impeach the testimony of 

the defendant's wife. The fourth and final basis for a new 

trial was that the State had violated the defendant's fifth 

amendment right to remain silent when the prosecuting attorney 

pointed a finger at him during trial and indirectly challenged 

him to deny the charges against him. 

Minutes after the State had received a copy of the defendant's motion on September 3, 1980, the motion was argued 

before the court. The State objected that it had not received reasonable notice in advance of the motion, and it 

asked for a chance to brief its side. The District Court 

denied the State's request for time to brief the motion. 

Several hours after argument on defendant's motion, the 

District Court granted the defendant a new trial. No reasons 

were given specifying the basis for the District Court's 
decision. The District Court file contains a minute entry 

which reads: 

"On motion of the defendant filed herein, and by 

express agreement, heard this 3rd day of September, 

1980 argued by counsel for the State and the defendant and good cause being shown it is ordered 

that the Motion of the defendant to set aside the 

verdict and grant a new trial is hereby granted." 

The State's single issue on appeal is that the District 

Court erred in granting a new trial when the county attorney 

had not been given advance notice of the motion and an 

opportunity to brief the question. 

Defendant contends on appeal that the District Court 

erred in failing to set aside the jury verdict as being 

based on insufficient evidence. 

Section 46-16-702, MCA, establishes the procedural 

guidelines for granting a defendant a new trial. This 

provision states: 

"(1) Following a verdict or finding of guilty, 

the court may grant the defendant a new trial if 

required in the interest of justice. 

" (2) The motion for a new trial must be in writing and must specify the grounds therefor. It 

must be filed by the defendant within 30 days 

following a verdict or finding of guilty. Reasonable notice -- of the motion must -- be served - on 

the state. 

" (3) On hearing the motion for a new trial, if 

justified by law and the weight of the evidence, 

the court may: 

" (a) deny the motion; 

" (b) grant a new trial; or 

" (c) modify or change the verdict or finding by 

finding the defendant guilty of a lesser included 

offense or finding the defendant not guilty." 

(Emphasis added. ) 
Here the State had no effective notice of defendant's 

motion and no opportunity for reply. The District Court 

granted the motion on the same day that the State was served. 

Such action clearly denied the State "reasonable notice" as 

required by section 46-16-702, MCA. 

Additionally, this Court is concerned with the manner 

in which the District Court granted the defendant's motion. 

In neither the District Court's order granting the motion, 

nor in the minute entry of the court file, are grounds for 

granting the motion specified. As previously noted, the 

governing statute regarding motions for new trial, section 

46-16-702, MCA, requires only that the moving party specifically state its grounds for such motion. This statute does 

not require that the District Court expressly state its 

reasons for taking whatever action it deems appropriate 

regarding such motions. 

However, in civil proceedings, the trial court must, 

when granting a motion for a new trial, ". . . specify the 

grounds therefor with sufficient particularity as to apprise 

the parties and the appellate court of the rationale underlying the ruling . . ." Rule 59(f), M.R.Civ.P. The purposes 

behind this rule are to narrow the issues on appeal and to 

obviate the need to read an entire record to determine the 

District Court's rationale for issuing its decision. Such 

considerations are equally necessary regarding appeals from 

criminal cases. Therefore, this Court holds that the mandates 

of Rule 59(f), M.R.Civ.P., are applicable to motions for new 

trial made pursuant to section 46-16-702, MCA. erea after, 
the District Court must set forth its reasons in deciding 

such motions. 

The defendant here contends that the District Court 

should have granted a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding 

the jury verdict because of insufficient evidence. This 

matter will have to be presented to the District Court after 

giving reasonable notice to the State. 

The order of the District Court is reversed and this 

case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with 

this decision. 

We concur: 

6' 

Justices /