[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Toran, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3564.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3564

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. TORAN, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Toran, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3564.]

Criminal law—Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution—Warrantless 

searches—Inventory searches—Government’s failure to submit copy of 

written inventory-search procedure into evidence in support of warrantless 

inventory search does not render search per se unreasonable—Lawenforcement officer’s testimony attributing inventory-search policy to lawenforcement agency that conducted inventory search, explaining when 

policy must be followed, and explaining whether policy was followed, 

combined with body-camera footage documenting search, is sufficient 

evidence to establish existence of such procedure, that officer who 

conducted search acted in accordance with policy, and that search was 

reasonable, and therefore lawful, under Fourth Amendment—Court of 

appeals’ judgment reversed and convictions reinstated.

(No. 2022-1203—Submitted June 28, 2023—Decided October 4, 2023.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,

No. C-210431, 2022-Ohio-2796.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

__________________

KENNEDY, C.J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the First District Court 

of Appeals, we consider whether a deputy sheriff’s testimony and body-camera 

footage was sufficient evidence to support a finding that a warrantless inventory 

search of a vehicle was reasonable, and therefore lawful, under the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

{¶ 2} The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches

and seizures. Typically, the government must obtain a warrant before performing 

a search, but there are exceptions to this rule. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 

357-358, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.E.2d 576 (1967). One exception is when law 

enforcement performs an inventory search of an automobile. Illinois v. Lafayette, 

462 U.S. 640, 643, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983). For that exception to 

apply, the law-enforcement agency must have adopted before the search a 

standardized procedure for inventory searches. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 

428 U.S. 364, 372, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). Such procedures are 

put into place to carry out certain community-caretaking functions, such as

protecting citizens’ property, protecting law enforcement against claims for damage

to property, and ensuring officer safety. Id. at 368-369; Colorado v. Bertine, 479 

U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). When law-enforcement 

officers comply with these procedures in good faith, a warrantless inventory search 

is reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Bertine at 374; see 

Opperman at 376.

{¶ 3} Appellee, Jamie Toran, was driving under a suspended driver’s 

license when Hamilton County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Singleton pulled him over. 

Deputy Singleton subsequently impounded the truck that Toran was driving and 

performed an inventory search that revealed a handgun in the truck’s right door 

panel. Toran moved to suppress the evidence of the gun on Fourth Amendment 
January Term, 2023

3

grounds. At the suppression hearing, the state did not submit into evidence a 

written copy of the sheriff’s office’s inventory-search procedures. Instead, Deputy 

Singleton testified about the policy, although not at length. The trial court denied 

Toran’s motion to suppress, and Toran later pled no contest to felony charges 

stemming from the search. The trial court found him guilty of the offenses and 

sentenced him to five years of community control. The First District reversed

Toran’s convictions and the trial court’s decision on Toran’s suppression motion, 

2022-Ohio-2796, ¶ 31, and the state appealed to this court.

{¶ 4} We hold that the government’s failure to submit a copy of written 

inventory-search procedures into evidence in support of a warrantless inventory 

search does not render the search per se unreasonable. We further hold that a lawenforcement officer’s testimony that attributes an inventory-search policy to the 

law-enforcement agency that conducted the inventory search, explains when the 

policy must be followed, and explains whether the policy was followed, combined 

with body-camera footage documenting the inventory search, is sufficient evidence 

to establish the existence of such procedures, that the officer who conducted the 

search acted in accordance with the policy, and that the search was reasonable, and 

therefore lawful, under the Fourth Amendment.

{¶ 5} We therefore reverse the judgment of the First District and reinstate 

Toran’s convictions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 6} In 2019, Deputy Singleton was on patrol when he stopped a truck for 

improperly displaying a temporary license plate in violation of R.C. 4503.21. 

Toran was the driver of the truck. After obtaining Toran’s personal information, 

Deputy Singleton learned that Toran’s license had been suspended since 2016. 

Driving under a suspended driver’s license is a violation of R.C. 4510.111(A).

{¶ 7} Although the truck was legally parked following the stop, Deputy 

Singleton determined that it would need to be towed and impounded under the 
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sheriff’s office’s policy because Toran had a suspended driver’s license. Deputy 

Singleton then conducted an inventory search of the truck. Deputy Singleton’s 

body-camera footage captured him stating at the beginning of the search that he 

was going to have the vehicle towed and would conduct an inventory search of the 

vehicle. During the search, Deputy Singleton discovered a loaded handgun in the 

truck’s right door panel.

{¶ 8} Upon discovering the gun, Deputy Singleton halted the search and

placed Toran under arrest, securing him in the back seat of the deputy’s cruiser. 

Deputy Singleton then secured the gun by removing the ammunition from it, 

placing the gun into a folder and the ammunition into a clear bag, and then 

consolidating the folder and the clear bag into a bag marked “Evidence/Property.” 

He then resumed the search, finding Toran’s prescription medication. He secured 

the medication by placing it into a folder in the trunk of his cruiser. And after

finishing the search, he also placed the evidence bag containing the gun and the 

ammunition into the trunk of his cruiser.

{¶ 9} Toran was later indicted on one count each of fourth-degree-felony 

carrying concealed weapons, fourth-degree-felony improperly handling firearms in 

a motor vehicle, and third-degree-felony having weapons while under disability.

{¶ 10} Toran moved to suppress the evidence of the gun on the grounds that 

Deputy Singleton’s search of the truck violated his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 

Constitution. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Singleton testified about the stop 

and the search. He explained what happened after he determined the truck was 

going to be impounded:

Due to the stop and [Toran’s] status, what our policy is, an 

inventory search of that vehicle was conducted, any damage, 

anything. I have been doing this occupation, road patrol, just short 
January Term, 2023

5

of 20 years. I am systematic about how we do the tows because, if 

there is damage all over the car, valuables can be in the car, and 

officers need to be accountable.

{¶ 11} During the hearing, Deputy Singleton’s body-camera footage was 

admitted into evidence without objection. The trial court viewed the footage, up to 

the point of Toran’s arrest, in chambers. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court 

determined that the “[s]heriff’s department, by policy, indicated the deputy’s duty 

was to conduct an inventory search, which was done.” The court denied Toran’s 

motion to suppress, and Toran later pled no contest to all the counts in the 

indictment. The trial court found him guilty of the offenses and sentenced him to 

five years of community control.

{¶ 12} Toran appealed his convictions to the First District. He argued that 

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because, in his view, the 

traffic stop was unlawful and, relevant here, the warrantless search of the truck was 

not a proper inventory search under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 

14, 2022-Ohio-2796 at ¶ 13, 22, although he did not set forth a separate argument 

under the Ohio Constitution. Toran did not challenge Deputy Singleton’s decision 

to impound the truck. The court of appeals held that the traffic stop was lawful, id.

at ¶ 21, but that the search “was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” 

because the state’s evidence was “insufficient to demonstrate that the inventory 

search of the vehicle was made in accordance with standardized procedures of the 

sheriff’s department,” id. at ¶ 30. The court reversed Toran’s convictions and the 

trial court’s judgment denying his motion to suppress. Id. at ¶ 31.

{¶ 13} The state appealed, and we accepted jurisdiction to consider a single

proposition of law:
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6

Where the stop and impoundment of a vehicle is lawful, the 

subsequent inventory search of the vehicle in accordance with 

Sheriff Department procedures is not rendered constitutionally 

unreasonable by the State’s failure to introduce actual written policy 

into evidence or the deputy’s failure to testify as to specific details 

of the policy at the suppression hearing.

See 168 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2022-Ohio-4380, 199 N.E.3d 546.

II. Standard of Review

{¶ 14} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a 

mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings 

of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. See State v. Fanning, 

1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). But the appellate court must decide 

the legal questions independently, without deference to the trial court’s decision. 

Burnside at ¶ 8.

III. Law and Analysis

A. The Fourth Amendment and Inventory Searches

{¶ 15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 

the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

{¶ 16} Reasonableness, therefore, is paramount in determining whether a 

search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. And “except in certain carefully 
January Term, 2023

7

defined classes of cases, a search of private property without consent is 

‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” Camara 

v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528-529, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 

930 (1967).

{¶ 17} One exception to the warrant requirement is the reasonable inventory 

search of a vehicle. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 

1000. The reasoning behind this exception comes from the “community caretaking 

functions” that law-enforcement officers often engage in when dealing with

vehicles. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706

(1973). Inventory searches function “to protect an owner’s property while it is in

the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized 

property, and to guard the police from danger.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372, 107 S.Ct. 

738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739. Deference is afforded to such “police caretaking procedures 

designed to secure and protect vehicles and their contents within police custody.” 

Id. But such deference does not give law-enforcement officers free reign; rather, 

inventory searches must be conducted in good faith and not for the sole purpose of 

investigation. See id. at 372, 374.

{¶ 18} The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 

U.S. 643, 655, 660, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Based on the federal 

caselaw discussed above, we have determined that warrantless inventory searches 

are lawful if they are conducted “in good faith and in accordance with reasonable 

standardized procedure(s) or established routine,” State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio 

St.3d 403, 604 N.E.2d 743 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus. Regarding the 

process of evaluating a law-enforcement officer’s good faith, the United States 

Supreme Court has said:
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

“[O]ur good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively 

ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer 

would have known that the search was illegal” in light of “all of the 

circumstances.” [United States v.] Leon, 468 U.S. [897,] 922, n. 23, 

104 S.Ct. 3405[, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)]. These circumstances 

frequently include a particular officer’s knowledge and experience, 

but that does not make the test any more subjective than the one for 

probable cause, which looks to an officer’s knowledge and 

experience, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700, 116 

S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), but not his subjective intent, 

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 

L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145-146, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 

(2009).

B. Deputy Singleton’s Inventory Search Was Conducted in Accordance with 

Reasonable Standardized Procedure

{¶ 19} To decide whether Deputy Singleton’s inventory search of the truck 

was conducted “in accordance with reasonable standardized procedure[] or 

established routine,” Hathman at paragraph one of the syllabus, we must first 

determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that a standardized 

procedure or routine existed regarding the inventory search.

{¶ 20} As an initial matter, we conclude that the state was not required to 

submit the inventory-search policy in writing as evidence to establish the existence 

of such a policy. Numerous state and federal courts across the country have agreed 

with this conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 20 N.Y.3d 122, 127, 980 N.E.2d 

937 (2012); People v. Gipson, 203 Ill.2d 298, 306, 786 N.E.2d 540 (2003); State v. 

Huisman, 544 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1996); United States v. Tackett, 486 F.3d 
January Term, 2023

9

230, 233 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 872-873 (8th 

Cir.1994); United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1002 (3d Cir.1988). When other 

evidence such as officer testimony is available, the reasonableness of an inventory 

search does not hinge on whether a written policy was submitted as evidence. We 

therefore hold that the government’s failure to submit a written inventory-search 

policy as evidence does not per se mean that the challenged inventory search was 

unreasonable. However, prosecutors should be mindful that submitting a written 

policy as evidence would certainly assist judges in determining the reasonableness 

of an inventory search.

{¶ 21} The issue then becomes whether Deputy Singleton’s testimony and

body-camera footage was sufficient to establish the existence of an inventorysearch policy at the sheriff’s office. When discussing the search at the suppression 

hearing, Deputy Singleton stated:

Due to the stop and [Toran’s] status, what our policy is, an 

inventory search of that vehicle was conducted, any damage, 

anything. I have been doing this occupation, road patrol, just short 

of 20 years. I am systematic about how we do the tows because, if 

there is damage all over the car, valuables can be in the car, and 

officers need to be accountable.

{¶ 22} This testimony was sufficient to establish the existence of an 

inventory-search policy at the sheriff’s office. Contrary to Toran’s assertion, the 

issue before this court is not whether Deputy Singleton’s decision to impound the 

truck was reasonable. Indeed, that issue is not what the proposition of law before 

this court is predicated on, and regardless, it “was not raised in any way in the 

[c]ourt of [a]ppeals and was not considered or decided by that court,” State v. Price, 

60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph two of the syllabus. The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10

issue here is whether Deputy Singleton established that the Hamilton County 

Sheriff’s Office has an inventory-search policy, explained when that policy must 

be followed, and showed whether it was followed in this case.

{¶ 23} Deputy Singleton explained the reasons for the policy—to require

surveying for damage to property and keeping track of valuables found in the 

vehicle. These are some of the community-caretaking functions that inventorysearch policies are designed to facilitate. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372, 107 S.Ct. 

738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739. Deputy Singleton’s safekeeping of Toran’s medication found 

in the search is a prime example of these functions. And the fact that a handgun 

was discovered during the search further supports the notion that inventory searches 

guard law enforcement from danger. See id.

{¶ 24} Further, Deputy Singleton provided testimony regarding the 

circumstances in which inventory searches are appropriate in Hamilton County—

namely, when it is discovered during a vehicle stop that the driver has a suspended 

license, which requires the vehicle to be towed and impounded. Because Toran had 

been driving under a suspended license, Deputy Singleton ordered the truck to be 

towed and impounded and performed an inventory search. In doing so, Deputy 

Singleton acted in accordance with the policy of the sheriff’s office.

{¶ 25} Therefore, Deputy Singleton’s testimony was sufficient to establish

both the existence of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office’s inventory-search 

policy and that he acted in accordance with the policy.

C. Deputy Singleton’s Inventory Search Was Conducted in Good Faith

{¶ 26} We are also convinced that Deputy Singleton acted in good faith in 

conducting the inventory search and that the search was not conducted for the sole 

purpose of investigation. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372, 374, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 

L.Ed.2d 739. As discussed above, the sheriff’s office had a policy to perform 

inventory searches under the circumstances presented. Deputy Singleton’s 

discovering that Toran was driving under a suspended license justified his decision 
January Term, 2023

11

to have the truck towed. Following that decision, and pursuant to the sheriff’s 

office’s policy, Deputy Singleton performed an inventory search. Even after he 

found the gun and arrested Toran, he continued the search, which allowed him to 

find and inventory Toran’s medication before the truck was impounded, showing 

adherence to the policy’s purpose. In addition, his testimony indicated that he had 

nearly 20 years of experience and was systematic about the impoundment process. 

His knowledge, experience, and actual use of a systematic process showed that he 

was well trained in the area of vehicle searches and that the inventory search was 

not conducted for the sole purpose of investigation. Therefore, he acted in good 

faith.

{¶ 27} Deputy Singleton’s testimony established the existence of an

inventory-search policy at the sheriff’s office. Both the testimony and body-camera 

footage proved that he acted in accordance with that policy and in good faith. For 

those reasons, we hold that his warrantless inventory search of the truck was 

reasonable, and therefore lawful, under the Fourth Amendment.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 28} “The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the 

general standard of ‘unreasonableness’ as a guide in determining whether searches 

and seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant 

is not required.” Cady, 413 U.S. at 448, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. Since 

Cady was decided, courts have striven to ascertain under what circumstances a 

warrantless inventory search is reasonable. Caselaw paves our path in such

determinations, requiring us to ask whether the law-enforcement agency had 

standardized inventory-search procedures, whether the inventory search was 

conducted in accordance with these standardized procedures, and whether, if the 

officer complied with the procedures, he did so in good faith. See Hathman, 65 

Ohio St.3d at 407-408, 604 N.E.2d 743.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12

{¶ 29} While prosecutors facing inventory-search challenges might be wise 

to introduce written inventory-search policies into evidence and to routinely ask 

complete questions regarding the procedures, a written policy is not a constitutional 

requirement to establish the reasonableness of an inventory search. Testimony that

establishes the existence of an inventory-search policy, explains when the policy is 

to be followed, and explains whether the policy was followed, combined with bodycamera footage documenting the inventory search, may be sufficient evidence to 

support a finding that a warrantless inventory search was reasonable, and therefore 

lawful, under the Fourth Amendment. And here, we conclude that Deputy 

Singleton’s inventory search was lawful.

{¶ 30} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the First District Court of 

Appeals and reinstate Toran’s convictions.

Judgment reversed

and convictions reinstated.

DEWINE, DONNELLY, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

GALLAGHER, J., concurs, with an opinion.

STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

FISCHER, J.

RONALD C. LEWIS, J., of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

DETERS, J.

__________________

GALLAGHER, J., concurring.

{¶ 31} I fully concur in the majority opinion, but I write separately to 

emphasize that no reviewing court could have addressed the question whether the 

warrantless inventory search of the vehicle that appellee, Jamie Toran, had been 

driving was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution because the impoundment of the vehicle was itself unlawful based on 
January Term, 2023

13

the state’s failure to enter the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office’s policy on 

impoundment into the trial-court record. This question implicates broader 

procedural concerns. The record contains scant evidence of any departmental 

impoundment policy, because Toran failed to challenge the policy as a basis to 

suppress evidence either in his motion to suppress or at the hearing on that motion. 

Under Crim.R. 12(H) and 47, he waived any such argument pertaining to that 

policy at the trial-court level. See United States v. Concepcion-Guliam, 62 F.4th 

26, 31 (1st Cir.2023) (defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims were waived and 

could not be reasserted on appeal); see also United States v. Pierre, 486 Fed.Appx. 

59, 66 (11th Cir.2012).

{¶ 32} The argument portion of Toran’s motion to suppress was limited to 

two paragraphs, the first of which generically cited the Ohio Constitution and the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The second 

paragraph presented a boilerplate argument that the stop of the vehicle must have 

been pretextual because, in Toran’s view, he had “properly displayed th[e] 

temporary plate.” No legal authority in support of that proposition was ever 

presented to the trial court. During his opening statement at the suppression 

hearing, defense counsel reiterated Toran’s position: “This is a warrantless search. 

[The state] has to prove the search was lawful. There was no search warrant to 

search [Toran’s] vehicle. There is no exception to the search warrant requirement

that would allow the officer to lawfully search the vehicle * * * Toran was driving.” 

(Emphasis added.) The state thereafter focused on proving that the inventorysearch exception to the warrant requirement applied, based on Toran’s framing of 

the Fourth Amendment issue. This should have ended any potential for appellate 

review on the impoundment-policy issue. See State v. Wintermeyer, 158 Ohio St.3d 

513, 2019-Ohio-5156, 145 N.E.3d 278, ¶ 8.

{¶ 33} Despite the limited framing of the issues within the motion to 

suppress, the First District Court of Appeals reviewed the reasonableness of the 
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14

inventory search conducted by the deputy sheriff under constitutional standards. 

The First District never addressed the impoundment-policy issue. That issue was 

articulated for the first time in Toran’s appellate briefing. The lawfulness of the 

decision to impound the vehicle, however, was not an issue that could have been 

raised for the first time by Toran in his direct appeal to the First District, much less 

as a basis to affirm the appellate court’s decision.

{¶ 34} Toran’s belated argument pertaining to the legality of the deputy’s 

decision to impound the vehicle, a decision that then triggered the need for the 

inventory search, represents a broader trend of parties presenting new arguments 

during the appellate process by looking first to any federal constitutional question 

before considering Ohio’s procedural rules, thus eroding the traditional rule that an 

issue should not be decided on constitutional grounds unless doing so is necessary. 

See State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 9 (“It 

is well settled that this court will not reach constitutional issues unless absolutely 

necessary”), citing In re Miller, 63 Ohio St.3d 99, 110, 585 N.E.2d 396 (1992), and 

Hall China Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 50 Ohio St.2d 206, 210, 364 N.E.2d 852 

(1977); see also State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98, 122, 1 N.E. 439 (1885). Not all 

challenges implicating a constitutional question need be analyzed or discussed 

through that lens. The answer to the question regarding the lack of evidence 

concerning the impoundment policy is simple: Toran failed to raise the issue in the 

trial court with the specificity and citations to authority required by Crim.R. 12(H) 

and 47. Under Crim.R. 12(H), Toran waived any challenges to the legality of the 

deputy’s decision to impound the vehicle he had been driving, and he is not 

permitted to cite any deficiencies in the state’s presentation of evidence, which 

depended on that waiver, for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Mock, 11th 

Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-066, 2013-Ohio-874, ¶ 9 (because the defendant failed to 

advance arguments in a suppression motion filed in the trial court, the state lacked 

notice of the arguments and an opportunity to present its case on the issues 
January Term, 2023

15

pertaining to the arguments; the issues were waived and the trial court could not 

make any findings of fact on the waived issues, because there was no evidence 

introduced on them at the suppression hearing); State v. Walker, 2017-Ohio-9255, 

103 N.E.3d 325, ¶ 28-29 (1st Dist.) (following Mock); see also State v. Harrison, 

166 Ohio St.3d 479, 2021-Ohio-4465, 187 N.E.3d 510, ¶ 16 (lead opinion) (failure 

to raise an argument in the trial court precluded the opposition from developing a 

record that could be reviewed on appeal).

{¶ 35} Accepting Toran’s argument here would send the wrong message to 

litigants and courts in Ohio that courts of review may find error and redefine the 

scope of black-letter law concerning decisions never made by the trial courts and 

on evidentiary foundations never timely tested. Permitting parties to partake in this 

form of gamesmanship would serve no legitimate purpose. See Wintermeyer, 158 

Ohio St.3d 513, 2019-Ohio-5156, 145 N.E.3d 278, at ¶ 24. Ohio courts would be 

faced with the prospect that regardless of the argument actually presented by a 

defendant at the trial-court level, the state would be required to anticipate and 

disprove every claim that could have been asserted by the defendant in order to 

preserve the defendant’s conviction as the issues morph throughout the appellate 

process. And Ohio law does not require this form of preemptive advocacy. Id. at 

¶ 19, quoting State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 500, 668 N.E.2d 489 (1996) 

(“when a defendant makes stipulations or narrows the issues to be decided at a 

suppression hearing, the prosecution need not ‘prove the validity of every aspect of 

the search’ ”). Our adversarial system is designed around the premise that the 

parties “ ‘are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to 

relief.’ ” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 

L.Ed.2d 399 (2008), quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386, 124 

S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 

the judgment). This system does not depend on an opposing party’s prediction and 

preemption of potential arguments that might be belatedly raised. The Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure precluded Toran from challenging the legality of the deputy’s 

decision to impound the vehicle in his direct appeal, and as a result, that cannot be 

an independent basis to affirm the appellate court’s decision.

{¶ 36} Crim.R. 47 unambiguously requires any pretrial motion to “state 

with particularity the grounds upon which it is made” and the relief sought and to 

be supported by “a memorandum containing citations of authority” and, if 

applicable, an affidavit. “By requiring the defendant to state with particularity the 

legal and factual issues to be resolved, the prosecutor and court are placed on notice 

of those issues to be heard and decided by the court and, by omission, those issues 

which are otherwise being waived.” State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 636 

N.E.2d 319 (1994) (collecting cases); State v. F.O.E. Aerie 2295, Port Clinton, 38 

Ohio St.3d 53, 54-55, 526 N.E.2d 66 (1988) (failure to comply with Crim.R. 47 

results in waiver of the argument). As a result, “before the state is put to [its] burden 

[on a suppression issue], the defendant must assert the grounds upon which he 

intends to challenge the validity of the search.” Wintermeyer at ¶ 18, citing Xenia 

v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988), and State v. Codeluppi, 139 

Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 10. Toran made no attempt to 

provide any specificity within his suppression motion. The burden never shifted to 

the state to introduce a foundation for the invocation of the Hamilton County 

Sheriff's Office’s impoundment policy.

{¶ 37} Arguably, the state abandoned any claim that Toran waived the 

argument by not advancing a waiver argument in his appeal, see, e.g., State v. 

Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857, ¶ 77, but the state 

was never provided with the opportunity to advance a waiver argument with respect 

to the impoundment-policy questions. The trial court agreed with the state’s 

arguments, and Toran did not raise the issue of any lack of evidence pertaining to 

the impoundment policy until his appeal to the First District. Because the First 

District implicitly rejected any argument pertaining to the legality of the 
January Term, 2023

17

impoundment and presumed the validity of the decision to impound the vehicle as 

the underlying basis to reach the inventory-search question, the state bore no burden 

to address Toran’s waiver of the issue.

{¶ 38} Notwithstanding Toran’s waiver, even if the procedural rules are 

discarded in favor of addressing the merits of his argument, the record is sufficient 

to demonstrate the existence of an impoundment policy at the sheriff’s office and 

the particular criteria underlying the deputy’s decision to impound the vehicle.

{¶ 39} According to the transcript of the suppression hearing, Hamilton 

County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Singleton articulated the basis of his decision for 

having the vehicle towed: he was following procedures under “the policy” applying 

to a situation in which the sole occupant, who was not under arrest, could not be 

left with the vehicle following the issuance of a citation because he did not have a 

valid driver’s license. As Deputy Singleton clarified on defense counsel’s 

prompting, before the inventory search was conducted, “there was no arrest.” 

Deputy Singleton then provided the criteria justifying his decision to impound the 

vehicle, which necessitated the inventory search: “When someone hasn’t had a 

driver’s license for three years with multiple suspensions and the record indicated 

he had been pulled over by another agency, pulled over in the same vehicle, that 

vehicle is going to be towed due to that status.” He then said, “I have a procedure 

that I follow. It is in the policy, and I am going to follow my policy.” (Emphasis 

added.) Toran’s counsel conceded the existence of that policy: “I understand you 

have a policy.” And counsel then attempted to explore the outer limits of that policy 

in the remainder of his cross-examination of the deputy, suggesting that an officer 

may release a vehicle to another person who is present when the traffic stop ends.

{¶ 40} In other words, when the deputy made the decision to impound the 

vehicle, Toran was not under arrest. He was free to leave at that point, but because 

he was not licensed to drive and had been the only occupant of the vehicle, the 

vehicle was going to be impounded to prevent him from operating it after the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18

deputies departed the scene. Although that decision and the criteria under which it 

was made may be challenged based on the totality of the evidence, Toran never 

questioned the existence of a policy in the trial court, and the evidence was 

determined by the trial court to be sufficient to justify the decision to implicate the 

inventory-search policy. The questions surrounding the decision to impound the 

vehicle turn on Toran’s failure to adhere to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. See

Crim.R. 12(H) and 47. They do not require analysis under the Ohio or federal 

Constitutions.

{¶ 41} Therein lies the danger of permitting parties to shirk procedural rules 

in favor of raising new constitutional arguments for the first time on appeal. The 

scant evidence of the departmental impoundment policy was a direct result of 

Toran’s failure to state with specificity the basis of his motion to suppress. He then 

failed to timely challenge the legality of the impoundment, and his counsel elicited 

statements from the deputy justifying the deputy’s decision to impound the vehicle 

based on the criteria under the policy that a vehicle may not be left with the sole 

occupant of the vehicle when he or she has no valid driver’s license.

{¶ 42} Courts of review should not resort to broad discussions of 

constitutional requirements to resolve cases in which the parties have failed to 

comply with the procedural rules at the most basic levels. If we were to affirm the 

judgment of the First District relying on the lack of a record regarding the 

impoundment policy, this court would be sending a message that defendants no 

longer need to abide by the Rules of Criminal Procedure governing motions to 

suppress and that constitutional questions may be resolved in the defendant’s favor 

despite his or her failure to trigger the state’s requirement to build a record in the 

trial court. With this in mind, I concur in the majority opinion and join this court’s 

judgment.

________________
January Term, 2023

19

STEWART, J., dissenting.

{¶ 43} This case involves questions about whether the impoundment and 

search of a vehicle were legal. The law in this area is straightforward:

(1) The impoundment must be legal in order for the inventory search to be legal,

(2) both the impoundment and the inventory search must follow established policy 

and procedure, and

(3) the burden of proof is on the state to show that the impoundment and the search 

were valid.

{¶ 44} Here, appellant, the state of Ohio, failed to carry that burden. The 

state failed to show that (1) the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office had a policy in 

place for determining when and how to impound and then conduct an inventory 

search of a vehicle and (2) whether that policy was followed here. The majority 

opinion glosses over many conflicting facts and ignores others to create an 

expansive conception of an inventory search that transforms the search from a 

narrow exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution into a discretionary investigatory tool with no 

boundaries or standards for its use. In sum, the majority concludes that an arresting 

officer’s testimony that he followed “our policy” (assuming “our policy” means the 

policy of his law-enforcement agency)—and that testimony alone—is legally 

sufficient to establish that the officer’s agency had a policy on the impounding and 

searching of vehicles and that the officer followed that policy. This is not, however, 

what the law requires.

{¶ 45} In reaching its conclusion, the majority not only ignores the burden 

of proof placed on the state to establish the applicability of an exception to the 

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, but it also bypasses any analysis of the 

arresting deputy sheriff’s decision to impound the vehicle in the first place. 

Because the majority erodes the protections of the warrant requirement in favor of 
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20

an expansive conception of the inventory-search exception that swallows the 

general rule, I dissent.

{¶ 46} Warrantless searches and seizures “are per se unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 

L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); see also State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 

850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 98. And those “exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be 

narrowly construed.” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 

L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Consequently, the 

state has the burden of demonstrating that a challenged warrantless search falls 

within one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 

Amendment. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 

(1951), citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 

153 (1948).1

{¶ 47} The warrantless search at issue in this case is an inventory search of 

the truck that appellee, Jamie Toran, was driving when Hamilton County Sheriff’s 

Deputy Kevin Singleton pulled him over. An inventory search is “the search of 

property sc and detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable 

items (such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of 

loss or damage.” (Emphasis added.) Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811, 

116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), fn. 1. Before a court reaches the issue of 

the legality of an inventory search, it must determine that the impoundment of the 

vehicle prompting the inventory search was legal. See United States v. Williams, 

936 F.2d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.1991) (“If a search is to be upheld under the 

1. Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution contains language that is nearly identical to that of 

the Fourth Amendment, “and we have interpreted it as affording at least the same protection as the 

Fourth Amendment.” State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 13, 

citing State v. Hoffman, 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 11.
January Term, 2023

21

inventory search doctrine, * * * the police must first have the authority to impound 

the vehicle and must then follow the procedures outlined in the policy”); State v.

Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 29 (“testimony about 

the police procedure for conducting the inventory is insufficient to establish the 

reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment if the impoundment of 

the vehicle is not itself lawful”). Here, the state asserts that “[b]ecause the 

impoundment of Toran’s vehicle was proper, the search was proper.” But the 

state’s assertion that impounding the vehicle was lawful does not make it so.

The state did not show that the decision to impound the vehicle was lawful

{¶ 48} Following the hearing on Toran’s motion to suppress the evidence 

of the handgun found in his truck, the trial court stated from the bench that the 

impoundment of the vehicle was proper because it could not be released to Toran 

since he did not have a valid driver’s license. Toran challenged the legality of the 

impoundment in his direct appeal to the First District Court of Appeals. Although 

the court of appeals did not reach the underlying issue whether the decision to 

impound the vehicle was lawful, it nonetheless reached the correct conclusion that 

Deputy Singleton’s search of the vehicle was not justified under the inventorysearch exception because the state did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the 

search was in accordance with standardized procedures of the sheriff’s department. 

See 2022-Ohio-2796, ¶ 30-31.

{¶ 49} The majority avoids analyzing the deputy’s decision to impound the 

vehicle. It states as its grounds for doing so that Toran forfeited the issue by not 

raising it in the court of appeals and that it “is not what the proposition of law before 

this court is predicated on.” Majority opinion, ¶ 22. The concurrence also decries 

the analysis regarding the impoundment on the ground that Toran waived the issue. 

The majority and the concurrence are wrong on those points. Toran did raise this 

issue in both the trial court and the court of appeals. Although he combined his 
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22

arguments challenging Deputy Singleton’s decision to impound the vehicle and the 

propriety of the concomitant inventory search, he argued that Deputy Singleton was 

not justified in impounding the vehicle. And while the proposition of law we 

accepted for review is written on the flawed assumption that Deputy Singleton’s 

decision to impound the vehicle was lawful, the state argues in its brief that the 

impoundment was lawful under R.C. 4513.61.2 Despite the concurrence’s apparent 

frustration with what one might deem ineffective assistance of counsel, there is no 

evidence of gamesmanship in the record before us, as the concurring opinion 

suggests. In each of the courts below, Toran raised issues concerning the vehicle 

stop, the impoundment, and the search. His theory of the Fourth Amendment 

violation has not changed: the stop was pretextual, and the impoundment and 

therefore any ensuing search were unlawful. Toran also correctly notes that in order 

to determine that an inventory search was permissible, the impoundment of the 

vehicle must have been lawful. The state bears the burden to demonstrate that its 

challenged conduct falls within the inventory-search exception to the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant requirement. And it is the act of impounding the vehicle 

that gives rise to the need for, and the justification of, an inventory search. Thus, 

the threshold inquiry when determining the lawfulness of an inventory search is 

whether the impoundment of the vehicle was proper. See Leak at ¶ 29; see also 

United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630, 634 (6th Cir.2020) (“A vehicle is lawfully 

seized and, thus, subject to an inventory search if it is lawfully impounded”); United 

States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir.1996) (“Both the decision to take the 

car into custody and the concomitant inventory search must meet the strictures of 

the Fourth Amendment”). If the evidence of such an impoundment policy is 

“scant,” concurring opinion, ¶ 31, as the concurring opinion suggests, then the 

blame for any deficiency in the record lies with the state.

2. As discussed below, the state’s reliance on this statute is misplaced.
January Term, 2023

23

{¶ 50} It is well established that in the interests of public safety and as part 

of their community-caretaking functions, law-enforcement officers have the 

authority to seize vehicles and remove them from the streets. South Dakota v. 

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-369, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976). 

Officers may impound a vehicle if the decision to do so is based on standardized 

criteria and is not solely a basis to search for evidence of other criminal activity. 

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); 

Duguay at 351, quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 

L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (“ ‘[S]tandardized criteria or established routine must regulate’ 

inventory searches. * * * Among those criteria which must be standardized are the 

circumstances in which a car may be impounded’ ” [brackets added in Duguay]);

United States v. Young, 751 Fed.Appx. 381, 388, (4th Cir.2018), fn. 3 (“a police 

officer’s initial decision to tow and impound a vehicle—the necessary predicate for 

an inventory search—also must be governed by standardized criteria”).

{¶ 51} Courts have recognized that the decision to impound a vehicle is 

valid when the decision is in line with a departmental policy or a statute and is 

based on the totality of the circumstances rather than being based solely on the 

officer’s discretion. Compare State v. Calvin, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-15-17, 2015-

Ohio-4801, ¶ 23 (decision to impound was lawful when it was pursuant to a written 

policy and took into account that the vehicle was located on a busy highway at 

approximately 1:20 a.m. and it was unclear whether or when another driver could 

retrieve the vehicle) with State v. Myrick, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21287, 2006-

Ohio-580, ¶ 23 (decision to impound was unlawful when the officer failed to 

produce or articulate any impoundment policy and testified only that impoundment

decision was solely in an officer’s discretion). In Myrick, the defendant was 

arrested for trespassing at a nightclub, and at the time of the arrest, his car was 

legally parked in the common parking lot where the nightclub and other businesses 

were located. Id. at ¶ 2-3, 26. Upon being placed in the arresting officer’s police 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

24

cruiser, Myrick asked an acquaintance who was nearby to call Myrick’s wife and 

to drive his car home. Id. at ¶ 3. The officer refused to allow Myrick’s acquaintance 

to take possession of the car and impounded and searched the car, finding a 

handgun. Id. at ¶ 3-4.

{¶ 52} Similarly, in this case, the state failed to produce any evidence of a 

departmental impoundment policy—written or otherwise—and Deputy Singleton 

failed to articulate the criteria for impoundment under any such policy. Instead, the 

deputy spoke of a general, sweeping policy: “There is not going to be a time in my 

entire career [that] you are going to find that I let a vehicle go. That’s not the policy 

of the Department and not my policy as an officer.” Assuming arguendo that such 

a departmental policy actually exists, it is overbroad. Deputy Singleton’s testimony 

in no way indicates what criteria or factors he or other law-enforcement officers in 

his department are supposed to consider when deciding whether to impound a 

vehicle, such as the location and safety of the vehicle, whether another driver is 

available to drive the vehicle, or other factual circumstances. In fact, the deputy 

testified that he would not release the vehicle “regardless of who showed up to get 

[it], including the registered owner. That was not going to change [his] conduct 

and [his] procedure.” This purported policy leaves the decision whether to impound 

a vehicle completely within the discretion of an individual officer and does not take 

into account the unique factual circumstances of each vehicle stop, let alone what 

the law actually requires. This runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.

{¶ 53} The facts in the record before us cannot sustain any conclusion other 

than that the impoundment of the vehicle was unlawful. The vehicle was legally 

parked on a residential street, in line with other vehicles, so there was no concern 

that the vehicle was impeding traffic or was located on a busy highway. Toran’s 

driving with a suspended license was not an arrestable offense. Upon being 

stopped, Toran immediately informed Deputy Singleton that Toran’s mother was 

the owner of the vehicle and lived nearby. Toran even attempted to call his mother 
January Term, 2023

25

to have her retrieve the vehicle, but Deputy Singleton said she did not need to come, 

because he was only issuing a ticket. However, since Toran had already informed 

Deputy Singleton that he did not have a license, the deputy knew Toran was not 

authorized to drive the vehicle, and there are no facts demonstrating why Toran’s 

mother could not retrieve the vehicle. Toran’s mother appeared at the scene 

anyway, arriving shortly after the vehicle had been searched and Toran arrested for 

having the gun but before Deputy Singleton had called for a tow truck or started 

the process of physically removing the vehicle. She offered Deputy Singleton 

evidence of her valid registration and proof of insurance, which he declined to 

review. In short, there was no lawful basis for Deputy Singleton to impound the 

vehicle, and therefore there was no lawful reason for him to search the vehicle.

{¶ 54} The record shows that Deputy Singleton also made conflicting 

statements about when and why he impounded the vehicle. He testified that he 

made the decision to impound the vehicle based on Toran’s “driving status” and 

that he would never have released the vehicle to its owner. But his body-camera 

footage shows that he informed Toran’s mother that the car was being impounded 

because it was connected to a felony arrest. He made a similar statement to Toran, 

telling him that the vehicle was being towed because of Toran’s “driving status.” 

But Deputy Singleton also told Toran that if he were not making an arrest, he could 

release the vehicle to the vehicle’s owner “but not when [he] t[ook] a gun out of it.”

{¶ 55} The problem with this sequence of events is that in order for the 

search to have been lawful, the deputy had to have made the decision to impound 

the vehicle, as authorized by statute or departmental policy, before he searched it 

and found the gun that gave rise to the felony charge. He was not permitted under 

the Fourth Amendment to unlawfully search the vehicle and then use any evidence 

he found during the search as a basis to impound the vehicle. The majority opines 

that the impoundment and the search were legal based on the combination of the 

deputy’s testimony and his body-camera footage. But the exchange detailed above 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

26

conflicts with Deputy Singleton’s testimony that he impounded the vehicle based 

on Toran’s suspended license and completely undermines the deputy’s decision to 

impound, let alone search, the vehicle.

{¶ 56} In an attempt to bolster Deputy Singleton’s decision to impound the 

vehicle, the state contends that R.C. 4513.61 applies to this case. This argument is 

a nonstarter.

{¶ 57} R.C. 4513.61(A)(1) through (2) states:

The sheriff of a county * * * may order into storage any 

motor vehicle, including an abandoned junk motor vehicle as 

defined in [R.C. 4513.63], that * * * [h]as come into the possession 

of the sheriff * * * as a result of the performance of the sheriff’s 

* * * duties * * * or * * * [h]as been left on a public street or other 

property open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel, or upon 

or within the right-of-way of any road or highway, for forty-eight 

hours or longer without notification to the sheriff * * * of the 

reasons for leaving the motor vehicle in such place. However, when 

such a motor vehicle constitutes an obstruction to traffic it may be 

ordered into storage immediately * * *.

{¶ 58} Under any view of the facts here, this statute does not apply. The 

vehicle Toran had been driving was not in Deputy Singleton’s possession as a result 

of the performance of his duties—as discussed above, Toran’s mother owned the 

vehicle, could legally operate it, and was at the scene before it was impounded and 

the deputy provided conflicting reasons as to why it was being impounded. See

Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, at ¶ 26 (finding no 

reason to impound a vehicle when the driver had been present and was duly licensed 

and able to drive the vehicle and there was no reason to believe the vehicle would 
January Term, 2023

27

be left unattended). And it is undisputed that the vehicle was not left on the street 

for 48 hours or longer. Further, the record shows—and the state does not dispute—

that the vehicle was not obstructing traffic; it was parked on the side of the road 

like other vehicles. Deputy Singleton offered no statute, ordinance, or policy of the 

sheriff’s department evincing a community-caretaking rationale for impounding 

and subsequently searching the vehicle. Compare Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio 

St.3d 67, 2007-Ohio-1103, 862 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 12-16 (upholding the impoundment 

of a vehicle when the defendant could not have lawfully driven the vehicle away, 

the vehicle could not safely have been allowed to remain on Interstate 71, and the 

impounding officer had authority to have the vehicle towed pursuant to the Revised 

Code and a city ordinance).

{¶ 59} Additionally, there was no basis for the impoundment of the vehicle 

in the local law. Toran was stopped (at approximately 800 Adams Street in 

Hamilton County) in the Village of Lincoln Heights. See State v. Marshall, 2022-

Ohio-3795, 199 N.E.3d 665, ¶ 16 (noting that a court may take judicial notice of 

geographic facts not subject to reasonable dispute). Lincoln Heights has passed 

ordinances authorizing police to remove vehicles that are illegally parked or are 

obstructing traffic, and Lincoln Heights allows for a court to order the 

immobilization and impoundment of a vehicle involved in a driving-under-asuspended-license offense. See Lincoln Heights Code of Ordinances 71.18(A), 

76.03, and 76.09(B). Lincoln Heights does not, however, have an ordinance 

specifically permitting police impoundment of a vehicle based on the driver’s status 

of having a suspended license. Therefore, there is no local ordinance or state statute 

that authorized the impoundment here.

{¶ 60} Because the state has not shown that the impoundment of the vehicle 

was lawful in this case, it cannot show that the deputy’s search of the vehicle fell 

within the inventory-search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement. See Leak at ¶ 29. Therefore, the deputy’s search of the vehicle 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

28

violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.

The state did not show that the search was conducted in accordance with a valid 

inventory-search policy

{¶ 61} Even if Deputy Singleton’s decision to impound the vehicle was 

valid, an analysis similar to that for the impoundment applies to the inventory 

search—namely, was the inventory search conducted pursuant to a valid policy (or 

statute), and was that policy actually followed? See State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d

105, 110-111, 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999) (police officers followed a detailed written 

policy that specified where officers could and could not search and when an 

inventory report was required). Similarly, the state has the burden of demonstrating 

the lawfulness of the inventory search. See State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d 403, 

408, 604 N.E.2d 743 (1992) (concluding that the opening of a closed container 

during an inventory search was unlawful, because the state did not meet its burden 

of establishing the existence of a standardized policy or practice governing the 

opening of such containers).

{¶ 62} When discussing the impoundment and the inventory search at the 

suppression hearing, Deputy Singleton stated:

Due to the stop and the status [of Toran’s suspended license], 

what our policy is, an inventory search of that vehicle was 

conducted, any damage, anything. I have been doing this 

occupation, road patrol, just short of 20 years. I am systematic about 

how we do the tows because, if there is damage all over the car, 

valuables can be in the car, and officers need to be accountable.

{¶ 63} The majority concludes that Deputy Singleton’s testimony “was 

sufficient to establish both the existence of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office’s 
January Term, 2023

29

inventory-search policy and that he acted in accordance with the policy.” Majority 

opinion at ¶ 25. But the deputy’s testimony tells us nothing about the substance of

any policy of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, nor does it demonstrate that he 

followed any such policy.3 Deputy Singleton testified that he followed a policy in 

deciding to impound and search the vehicle. But his testimony does not 

demonstrate whose policy he followed, the details or criteria of that policy, and how 

his actions complied with the policy. Officer testimony must outline the lawenforcement agency’s standardized inventory-search policy and specifically 

describe how the decision to search adhered to the policy. See State v. Smith, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-200352, 2021-Ohio-2654, ¶ 35-40 (upholding trial court’s

determination that an inventory search was unlawful when officer failed to testify

to the details of the policy, such as whether closed containers found in the vehicle

could be opened and searched); State v. Beasley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180152,

2019-Ohio-3936, ¶ 14 (finding that an inventory search was unlawful when an

officer testified about a general policy that the contents of vehicles searched must

be cataloged to ensure the contents are protected and returned).

{¶ 64} Similarly, the body-camera footage does not prove the existence of

any inventory-search policy at the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, nor does it

show that Deputy Singleton followed such a policy. For example, there is no

footage of Deputy Singleton completing an inventory-search form, physically

producing a handbook or written policy for his review, or discussing any such

policy with his partner at the scene. The majority’s reliance on the body-camera

3. Inventory-search policies typically contain a provision requiring the officer conducting the search 

to list or catalog the items in the vehicle and any damage to the vehicle—for the very reasons Deputy 

Singleton stated in his testimony. See Mesa at 112, fn. 4 (policy required that every item removed

from a vehicle be listed on a report); State v. Beasley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180152, 2019-Ohio3936, ¶ 14 (noting that officer conducting the search did not appear to adhere to generic inventory 

policy and failed to write down items removed from the vehicle). The record in this case contains 

no evidence of any inventory catalog or list regarding the search of the vehicle.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

30

footage makes little sense here, because the footage does not answer any Fourth

Amendment questions in this case.

{¶ 65} Without having offered more, the state has failed to carry its burden 

to prove that the inventory search in this case was lawful, and I would affirm the 

judgment of the First District based on the facts presented. To be clear, I agree with 

the majority that the state is not always required to produce a written policy to 

justify the impoundment of a vehicle and a concomitant inventory search (though, 

obviously, producing such a policy could alleviate the need for a court to consider 

this precise issue and would provide clarity to law-enforcement officers). But the 

Fourth Amendment requires more than general, personalized and unsupported 

officer testimony that a departmental or agency policy exists and the officer 

followed it. See Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d at 404-405, 604 N.E.2d 743 (finding 

officer’s general testimony about departmental policy on how to properly conduct 

an inventory search insufficient to support search of closed containers found in 

vehicle); Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, at ¶ 37. This 

is not an onerous burden for the state to carry. So while there may be evidence 

showing that the decision to impound the vehicle in this case was made pursuant to 

departmental policy, if that evidence exists, it is not in the record. Without knowing 

the requirements of the policy the deputy referred to in his testimony, just like the 

court of appeals, this court is unable to determine whether he acted pursuant to the 

policy.

{¶ 66} The majority skips past the rigorous standards of the Fourth 

Amendment to determine that the ends here justify the means. The majority states 

that one purpose of the inventory-search exception is to safeguard officers from 

danger and that the fact that a gun was found (and thus secured) during the search 

means the search was appropriate. The majority is right that one purpose of 

inventory searches is to safeguard officers, but the majority also knows better than 

to declare that finding the weapon makes the search lawful. That analysis puts the 
January Term, 2023

31

cart before the horse and glosses over the serious deficiencies related to the search 

in this case, all to the detriment of the safeguards that the Fourth Amendment 

enshrines. It is the Fourth Amendment that “gives concrete expression to a right of 

the people which ‘is basic to a free society.’ ” Camara v. Mun. Court of San 

Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), quoting Wolf 

v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). Because the 

majority concludes that the inventory search here was lawful, I dissent, and I would 

affirm the decision of the First District Court of Appeals.

BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

________________

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. 

Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Brian A. Smith Law Firm, L.L.C., and Brian A. Smith, for appellee.

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Christine Y. 

Jones, Director, Appellate Division; Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public 

Defender, and Jonathan Sidney and Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public 

Defenders; and Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 

Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance or dismissal for amici curiae 

Hamilton County Public Defender, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Office 

of the Ohio Public Defender.

________________________