[Cite as Strasburg v. Strasburg, 2010-Ohio-3672.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

AUGLAIZE COUNTY 

 

CINDRA K. STRASBURG, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-10-12 

 v. 

RONALD STRASBURG, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court 

Domestic Relations Division 

Trial Court No. 2009 DR 0059 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: August 9, 2010 

 

APPEARANCES: 

James A. Roeder for Appellant 

William E. Huber for Appellee 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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ROGERS, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Ronald Strasburg, appeals the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Auglaize County, Domestic Relations Division, 

granting Plaintiff-Appellee’s, Cindra Strasburg, complaint for divorce. On appeal, 

Ronald argues that the trial court erred in finding that certain farmland was marital 

property; in failing to deduct ordinary and reasonable expenses from the gross 

receipts of his business income; and, in calculating his spousal support obligation 

despite Cindra’s failure to provide her expenses. Based upon the following, we 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶2} In June 1970, Ronald and Cindra married. In April 2009, Cindra 

filed a complaint for divorce. All children born of the marriage had emancipated 

as of the filing. 

{¶3} In October 2009, Ronald was deposed and stated that he was selfemployed selling insurance and investments; that his accountant designed a setup 

for his business whereby income he generated through his self-employment was 

issued to him personally by an IRS 1099 form; that the 1099 form from his 

personal return was “crossed” to his Subchapter S Corporation, Legacy; that 

Legacy recognized the income and the operating expenses; that he was the sole 

shareholder, director, and decision maker of Legacy; that Legacy had not issued 

him a paycheck in two years because “business has been down”; that, accordingly, 
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he had not received a W-2 in 2007 or 2008; and, that Legacy currently had no 

assets and had a negative equity. 

{¶4} Ronald continued that he, his brother Thomas, and his sister Carol, 

were each the beneficiaries of an undivided one-third interest in farmland from his 

father’s estate; that all three beneficiaries executed a quitclaim deed transferring 

the farmland to Cindra in December 2005; that the farmland was solely in 

Cindra’s name, with no conditions or restrictions of ownership; that, also in 2005, 

he and Cindra mortgaged the farmland and used the proceeds to pay off an 

outstanding farm credit loan balance from his father’s estate; that the money he 

paid to his father’s estate was the same amount he owed his father from a previous 

loan in 1983 when he started his business; that Cindra signed the $35,000 

mortgage, but not the note; that she signed the mortgage because her name was on 

the deed for the farmland; and, that he rented the farmland to his brother and 

placed the proceeds into Legacy’s account. 

{¶5} In December 2009, the trial court held a final hearing, at which the 

following testimony was heard. 

{¶6} Cindra testified that she was currently collecting unemployment of 

$122 per week after being laid off from the public library; that she was paying 

$144.99 per month for COBRA health care insurance; that she was paying for 

several charge cards with an aggregate balance of approximately $25,000, 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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groceries, and gasoline; that she was currently supporting herself, except that 

some of her friends were “feeding” her; that she was still residing in the marital 

residence, for which Ronald was paying virtually all of the expenses, but that she 

would be vacating in forty-five days; that she did not know where she would be 

moving until she received her divorce settlement because she had no money; that 

she owned approximately one hundred fifty Longaberger baskets; that she had 

sold some of the baskets for approximately $15 to $20, but that there was really no 

market for them; that she had worked for nearly the entire thirty-nine year 

marriage; that she had a high school degree and had attended two quarters of 

college, but did not complete a degree; that Ronald had a bachelor’s degree; that 

the parties enjoyed a very good standard of living throughout the marriage; that 

Ronald had titled the farmland in her name; that the farmland came from his 

family; and, that, even though she held title to the farmland, Ronald managed it, 

and his brother and son-in-law farmed it. 

{¶7} Ronald testified that, in 2004, his father died and he inherited onethird of his $939,844 estate; that, in 2005, he, his brother, and his sister deeded the 

farmland inherited from the estate via quitclaim to Cindra; that he put the farmland 

into Cindra’s name because he was concerned about the risk that he would be 

sued; that he believed he and Cindra had a conversation concerning that risk and 

believed that she knew this was why the property was titled in her name; that he 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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did not believe he ever relinquished ownership, control, or dominion over the 

farmland; that he never intended to waive his rights to the property; that neither he 

nor Cindra had improved the farmland or exerted control over the farming; that the 

farmland was never entirely titled in his name, but was owned equally by him, his 

brother, and his sister as heirs to the estate; that he leased the farmland to his 

brother to grow crops in 2007, 2008, and 2009 for $11,532, $11,856, and $11,856, 

respectively; that the parties filed taxes jointly in 2007, 2008, and, 2009, so both 

paid taxes on the rental income; that, in 2007, Cindra earned $13,207 in income; 

and, that, after calculations, depreciation, and payments to banks, he incurred a 

loss of $2,329. 

{¶8} Ronald further testified that his consulting business was called 

Strasburg Consulting; that Strasburg Consulting was organized as a sole 

proprietorship; that he earned his income from commissions paid to him by 

insurance companies for the policies he sold; that his gross income in operating 

Strasburg Consulting in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, was, respectively, 

$161,568, $112,478, $77,168, $88,868, and $138,386; that his business expenses 

in operating Strasburg Consulting, consisting of paid commissions and fees, in 

2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, were, respectively, $161,568, $112,478, 

$77,168, $88,868, and $138,386; that, since approximately 1996, all of the money 

he earned through Strasburg Consulting was transferred to Legacy, the pass-
Case No. 2-10-12 

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through operating entity Subchapter S corporation for which he was the sole 

shareholder; that his accountant organized his sole proprietorship and corporation 

in this manner for tax advantage purposes; that, in past years, he had paid himself 

a salary from Legacy, but had not taken a salary for three years because there was 

not enough money; that he paid his personal bills by taking money out of Legacy 

and listing them as loans from Legacy to the sole shareholder; that Legacy paid his 

office rent, payroll, insurance, taxes, utilities, advertising, and all the other costs of 

running a financial planning business; that Legacy had only one employee besides 

himself, a secretary whom Legacy paid $22,000 per year; and, that Legacy 

reimbursed him for mileage and other business-related expenses that he paid outof-pocket. The individual tax returns submitted by both Ronald and Cindra 

reflected that the income or loss for Legacy in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, 

was, respectively, $16,617, - $5,061, -$9,712, $6,796, and $31,866.1

{¶9} James Siefring, Ronald’s CPA, testified that he prepared the 

Strasburgs’ tax returns for 2003 through 2008; that Ronald operated his business 

through Legacy; that Ronald passed his income over to Legacy as its income; that 

this was the manner in which he recommended the Strasburgs handle their income 

 

1

 Ronald’s written closing argument submitted to the trial court claims that the tax forms establish Ronald’s 

income in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 was, respectively, $64,285, $11,760, $7,423, $13,207; however, 

Ronald and Cindra filed jointly, and Ronald testified at the hearing that the $13,207 represented Cindra’s 

W-2 wages and that he had not received a W-2 in several years. 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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because it benefitted them financially and was permitted by the tax code; and, that 

Legacy’s expenses were “legitimate.” (Hearing Tr., p. 74). 

{¶10} In January 2010, the parties submitted to the trial court written 

closing arguments. Cindra asserted that, regarding spousal support, this was a 

long-term marriage; that Ronald had a much higher earning ability and had been 

the primary source of income for the parties during the marriage; that she had 

recently undergone heart surgery, which affected her ability to obtain health 

insurance because it was a pre-existing condition; that the parties enjoyed a high 

standard of living throughout the marriage; that the average annual sum of 

commissions earned by Ronald from 2003 to 2007 was $115,693. Regarding the 

farmland, Cindra asserted that the property was never transferred to Ronald, but 

was purchased and granted to Cindra via quitclaim deed in December 2005; that a 

mortgage of $136,650 on the farmland was executed by both Ronald and Cindra; 

and, that the proceeds of the mortgage were used to pay off a marital debt—the 

loan extended to Ronald by his father to equalize the estate with his sister. 

{¶11} Ronald asserted in closing that Cindra’s request for spousal support 

should be denied, as she did not assert her request until the day of the hearing; that 

Cindra wrongfully characterized his income as his gross income without taking 

into consideration his business expenses; that Cindra’s health conditions would not 

prevent her from performing office work; that the value of Cindra’s basket 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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collection should be credited against any support obligation; and, that Cindra was 

likely receiving support from a boyfriend. Next, Ronald argued that Cindra was 

not entitled to the farmland as marital property because he inherited the property 

as a one-third undivided interest of his father’s estate; that, because the property 

was an inheritance, it was his traceable separate property; that the farmland had 

not been comingled because he had no donative intent to gift the property to 

Cindra, but merely put it in her name to protect his assets in case he was sued; that 

there was no relinquishment of ownership, dominion, or control of the farmland; 

that the joint mortgaging of the farmland did not necessarily transmute the 

property into marital property pursuant to Welsh-Pojman v. Pojman, 3d Dist. No. 

3-03-12, 2003-Ohio-6708; that the titling of the property in Cindra’s name was not 

conclusive as to whether the property was marital or separate; and, that, as the 

property was his separate property, the $82,650 passive appreciation of the 

property was also his separate property pursuant to Middendorf v. Middendorf

(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 397. 

{¶12} Thereafter, the trial court entered the Divorce Decree. The trial 

court found that Cindra was the owner of the 97.5 acre parcel of real estate in 

Auglaize County (the “farmland”) via a quitclaim deed recorded on December 13, 

2005; that the value of the property was $380,250; that Ronald had never owned 

the farmland; that the farmland was a one-third undivided interest in the estate of 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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Ronald’s deceased father, which he never took ownership of, but conveyed via 

quitclaim deed to Cindra, giving her full ownership of the farmland; that Ronald 

then used marital assets in mortgaging the farmland to put money into his business 

and pay his siblings for the share of their deceased father’s estate to which they 

were entitled; that, when Ronald transferred the one-third undivided interest in 

three parcels of real estate into full ownership in one parcel of real estate, the 

property was no longer identifiable as separate property and became marital 

property; that the parties treated the farmland as marital property as they both 

entered into a mortgage on the property and cash rent earned from the farmland 

was used as marital income; and, that, in making its finding that the farmland was 

marital property, the trial court considered R.C. 3105.171. 

{¶13} Regarding Ronald’s income, the trial court found that the average 

gross annual income deposited into Legacy was $115,693.60, and that the same 

amount was Ronald’s potential gross income. The trial court reasoned that: 

[Ronald] is self employed selling investments and insurance. * * 

* All sales made by [Ronald] result in a Federal Form 1099 

being issued to him personally. He then turns this income over 

to a Subchapter S corporation known as Legacy Planning, inc. 

[Ronald] is the sole shareholder, sole officer and sole decision 

maker with regard to Legacy Planning, inc. Legacy Planning, 

inc. then had expenses by way of “Commissions and Fees” * * * 

that exactly match its income. [Ronald] testified that he takes 

“draws” from Legacy as needed but earns no income from 

Legacy. There was no testimony from any source as to what 

“Commissions and Fees” consist of. * * * It appears that both 

marital and business obligations were paid from the accounts of 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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Legacy, inc., although no specific bank account records were 

presented to the Court for review. * * * [Ronald] was paying 

much, if not all of the expenses to service both business and 

family debt out of the income deposited by [Ronald] into the 

accounts of Legacy, inc. The average gross income of [Ronald] 

deposited into Legacy, inc. accounts as shown on [Cindra’s] 

exhibits 9 – 13 is $115,693.60 

(Jan. 2010 Decree of Divorce, p. 3). 

{¶14} Regarding spousal support, the trial court stated that it had 

considered all factors in R.C. 3105.18 including that Ronald was more educated 

than Cindra and had a much higher earning potential; that Cindra had recently 

undergone open-heart surgery leaving her with vocal difficulties; and, that the 

marriage was thirty nine and one-half years in duration. Consequently, the trial 

court concluded that Ronald should pay Cindra $3,200 per month for one hundred 

and eighteen months. 

{¶15} It is from this judgment that Ronald appeals, presenting the 

following assignments of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION BY CONCLUDING THE INHERITED 

FARMLAND HAD BECOME UNIDENTIFIABLE AS THE 

SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE DEFENDANT AND HAD 

BECOME MARITAL PROPERTY. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION BY FAILING TO DEDUCT THE ORDINARY 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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AND REASONABLE EXPENSES FROM THE GROSS 

RECEIPTS OF THE DEFENDANT’S BUSINESS INCOME. 

Assignment of Error No. III 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT CALCULATED DEFENDANT’S 

SPOUSAL SUPPORT OBLIGATION WHEN THE 

PLAINTIFF’S EXPENSES WERE NOT PROVIDED. 

{¶16} Due to the nature of Ronald’s arguments, we elect to address his 

second and third assignments of error together. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Ronald argues that the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion in concluding that the farmland was not his 

separate property, but had become marital property. Specifically, Ronald argues 

that he presented evidence from his father’s estate’s final accounting, a certificate 

of transfer, and the quitclaim deed to Cindra, sufficient to demonstrate that this 

property was traceable to his inheritance; that the state of the property never 

changed; that Cindra was listed on the mortgage of the farmland, but not the note; 

that the record is devoid of any indication that he made an inter-vivos gift of the 

farmland to Cindra; and, that, consequently, the farmland was his traceable, 

separate property. 

{¶18} “In determining whether the trial court has appropriately categorized 

property as separate or marital, the standard of review is whether the classification 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Eggeman v. Eggeman, 3d Dist. 

No. 2-04-06, 2004-Ohio-6050, ¶14, citing Henderson v. Henderson, 3d Dist. No. 

10-01-17, 2002-Ohio-2720, ¶28. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will not 

be reversed if the decision is supported by some competent, credible evidence. 

Eggeman, 2004-Ohio-6050, at ¶14, citing DeWitt v. DeWitt, 3d Dist. No. 9-02-42, 

2003-Ohio-851, ¶10. In determining whether competent, credible evidence exists, 

“[a] reviewing court should be guided by a presumption that the findings of a trial 

court are correct, since the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and 

observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use those observations 

in weighing the credibility of the testimony.” Barkley v. Barkley (1997), 119 Ohio 

App.3d 155, 159, citing In re Jane Doe I (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 135. 

{¶19} In a divorce proceeding, a trial court must classify property as either 

marital or separate and then award each spouse his or her separate assets. R.C. 

3105.171(B),(D). Marital property includes “all real and personal property that 

currently is owned by either or both of the spouses * * * and that was acquired by 

either or both of the spouses during the marriage.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i). 

R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a) describes separate property, stating, in pertinent part: 

“Separate property” means all real and personal property and 

any interest in real or personal property that is found by the 

court to be any of the following:

* * * 

(i) An inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent 

during the course of the marriage;
Case No. 2-10-12 

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* * 

(vii) Any gift of any real or personal property or of an interest in 

real or personal property that is made after the date of the 

marriage and that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to 

have been given to only one spouse.

{¶20} In addition, “[t]he commingling of separate property with other 

property of any type does not destroy the identity of the separate property as 

separate property, except when the separate property is not traceable.” R.C. 

3105.171(A)(6)(b). Therefore, traceability is the main issue in determining 

whether separate property has become marital property due to commingling. 

Earnest v. Earnest, 151 Ohio App.3d 682, 2003-Ohio-704, ¶38, citing Peck v. 

Peck (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734. Additionally, R.C. 3105.171(H) provides 

that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the holding of title to property 

by one spouse individually or by both spouses in a form of co-ownership does not 

determine whether the property is marital property or separate property.”2

 

However, “title can be some evidence of the parties’ intent as to the nature of the 

asset being marital or separate.” Gallo v. Gallo, 11th Dist. No. 2000-L-208, 2002-

Ohio-2815, ¶25. Finally, “the party seeking to establish an asset as separate 

property * * * has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to 

trace the asset to separate property.” Id. 

 

2

 This author wishes to emphasize that, despite R.C. 3105.171(H) and some courts’ holdings, longestablished case law holds that a formally executed deed in the correct form is presumed valid and may not 

be set aside except upon the challenger’s demonstration of fraud, undue influence, or lack of capacity by 

clear and convincing evidence. See Neville v. Neville, 3d Dist. No. 9-08-37, 2009-Ohio-3817, ¶¶36-42 

(Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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{¶21} In Neighbarger v. Neighbarger, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-651, 2006-

Ohio-796, the Tenth Appellate District examined a situation where a husband 

transferred farmland via quitclaim deed to his wife shortly prior to their marriage. 

As the husband acquired the farmland prior to the marriage, it was his separate 

property that would normally not be subject to equitable distribution. The 

husband claimed that, upon the parties’ divorce, the farmland was his traceable 

separate property because he had not intended to make a gift to the wife by 

transferring the property to her, but that his motive was to shield the farmland 

pending criminal charges and possible civil judgments against him. The Tenth 

District rejected the husband’s argument, finding that, “[t]here is no question that 

[husband] intended, in 1990 [when he transferred the property to wife], to create a 

legal barrier between himself and the property. His stated objective was to shelter 

his assets from any financial risk arising from the criminal charges against him. If 

the outcome of the criminal trial had been different, he most certainly would have 

argued that he had no assets to satisfy whatever financial liability might have 

arisen * * * [.] Having made that choice for his own benefit in 1990, to the 

detriment of his children and creditors, we will not allow appellant to turn his 

deliberate action into a legal fiction for his own benefit again. He intended to 

transfer the property and, as evidenced by the quitclaim deed, he did transfer the 

property.” Neighbarger, 2006-Ohio-796, at ¶25. 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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{¶22} Initially, we emphasize that, as Ronald is the party seeking to 

establish that the farmland is his separate property, he bears the burden of 

demonstrating its traceability by a preponderance of the evidence. See Earnest, 

supra. Ronald testified that, in 2004, during the marriage, he inherited farmland 

from his father’s estate, and that he conveyed the property to Cindra via quitclaim 

deed because he was concerned about the risk that he would be sued. We find the 

situation sub judice to be analogous to Neighbarger, supra. Similar to 

Neighbarger, we note that Ronald transferred his inherited farmland via quitclaim 

deed immediately upon his inheritance, and that, had Ronald been sued, he 

doubtlessly would have argued that the farmland was Cindra’s sole property, and 

was not an asset subject to any ensuing financial liability. Although the farmland 

at issue in Neighbarger was transferred to the wife prior to the marriage, and thus, 

was the wife’s separate property upon divorce, we nevertheless find the reasoning 

to be persuasive. Here, the farmland was transferred to Cindra during the 

marriage via quitclaim deed, but the trial court found the property to be marital

property. Regardless of Ronald’s testimony that he did not intend to relinquish 

ownership or waive his rights to the property, the fact remains that Ronald deeded 

the farmland to Cindra solely via quitclaim deed, and did not retain any reserved 

rights or joint rights to the property. Thus, Ronald’s testimony about his motives 

for the transfer was wholly inconsistent with his actions in making the transfer. 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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As Ronald’s testimony established that he relinquished all legal rights to the 

farmland upon its transfer to Cindra, we cannot find that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the farmland was not Ronald’s separate property.3

{¶23} Accordingly, we overrule Ronald’s first assignment of error. 

Assignments of Error Nos. II and III 

{¶24} In his second assignment of error, Ronald argues that the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion in failing to deduct the ordinary and reasonable 

expenses from the gross receipts of his business income. Specifically, Ronald 

contends that the trial court calculated his spousal support obligation to Cindra 

based upon a potential income of $115,693.60, which he claims did not account 

for any of his ordinary and reasonable business expenses demonstrated by his tax 

returns, and that “one cannot dispute that a business does have expenses.” In his 

third assignment of error, Ronald argues that the trial court erred and abused its 

discretion in calculating Cindra’s spousal support obligation without any evidence 

of her expenses. We disagree with both of Ronald’s arguments. 

{¶25} We review a trial court’s determination of spousal support under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Siekfer v. Siekfer, 3d Dist. No. 12-06-04, 2006-Ohio5154, ¶15, citing Heitzman v. Heitzman, 3d Dist. No. 3-05-11, 2005-Ohio-4622, 

¶3. An abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it 

 

3

 We note that Cindra did not cross-appeal the issue of determination that the real estate was marital 

property, or argue that the real estate was her separate property. 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” 

Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. When applying the abuse 

of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment 

for that of the trial court. Id. 

{¶26} R.C. 3105.18 governs the trial court’s award of spousal support and 

requires the court to consider fourteen factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) 

when determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, and 

when determining the nature, amount, terms of payment, and duration of the 

support. Schalk v. Schalk, 3d Dist. No. 13-07-13, 2008-Ohio-829, ¶28, citing Lee 

v. Lee, 3d Dist. No. 17-01-05, 2001-Ohio-2245. The factors are as follows: 

(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but 

not limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, 

or distributed under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code; 

(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties; 

(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional 

conditions of the parties; 

(d) The retirement benefits of the parties; 

(e) The duration of the marriage; 

(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, 

because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the 

marriage, to seek employment outside the home; 

(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the 

marriage; 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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(h) The relative extent of education of the parties; 

(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including 

but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties; 

(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, 

or earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited 

to, any party’s contribution to the acquisition of a professional 

degree of the other party; 

(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is 

seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job 

experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain 

appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or 

job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought; 

(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of 

spousal support; 

(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that 

resulted from that party’s marital responsibilities; 

(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be 

relevant and equitable. 

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(n). 

{¶27} Although the trial court must consider all of these factors, it is not 

required to specifically enumerate all of the factors. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 3d 

Dist. No. 15-08-08, 2008-Ohio-6754, ¶31, citing Schalk, 2008-Ohio-829, at ¶28. 

However, the trial court must “make specific findings in order ‘to enable a 

reviewing court to determine the reasonableness of its order to grant or deny a 

request for spousal support and that the relevant factors within R.C. 3105.18 were 
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considered.’” Malloy v. Malloy, 3d Dist. No. 8-08-15, 2009-Ohio-1918, ¶11, 

citing Hendricks, 2008-Ohio-6754, at ¶31. 

{¶28} In determining the income of the parties, courts have particularly 

scrutinized situations where a spouse is the sole shareholder of his corporation, 

and, accordingly, has “unlimited control over the distribution of the corporation’s 

profits and assets.” Burkart v. Burkart, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1169, 2007-Ohio3992, ¶22, citing Bowen v. Thomas (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 196, 201. Courts 

have found a need to “‘pay particular attention to the possibility that a spouse who 

is the sole shareholder of a business is engaged in “creative accounting” designed 

to cloak net income.’” Burkart, 2007-Ohio-3992, at ¶22, quoting Offenberg v. 

Offenberg, 8th Dist No. 78885, 2003-Ohio-269, ¶30, quoting Corrigan v. 

Corrigan, 8th Dist. No. 74088, 1999 WL 304523. 

{¶29} Here, Ronald presented testimony that his financial consulting 

business, Strasburg Consulting, was a sole proprietorship; that his entire income 

earned from Strasburg Consulting was transferred to Legacy, a pass-through 

operating entity Subchapter S corporation; that he had followed this procedure 

since approximately 1996 for tax advantage purposes; that he was the sole 

shareholder of Legacy; that he was the sole officer, director, and decision-maker of 

Legacy; that his gross income in operating Strasburg Consulting in 2003, 2004, 

2005, 2006, and 2007, was, respectively, $161,568, $112,478, $77,168, $88,868, 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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and $138,386; that his business expenses in operating Strasburg Consulting, 

consisting of paid commissions and fees, in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, 

were, respectively, $161,568, $112,478, $77,168, $88,868, and $138,386; that he 

paid his personal bills by taking money out of Legacy and listing the withdrawals 

as loans from Legacy to the sole shareholder; that Legacy reimbursed him for 

business-related expenses that he paid out-of-pocket; and, that Legacy’s business 

expenses were “legitimate” expenses that included licenses and permits, dues and 

subscriptions, and staff meeting expenses. 

{¶30} We cannot find, based on the evidence Ronald presented at the 

hearing, that the trial court abused its discretion in imputing an income to him 

calculated by averaging the gross income of Strasburg Consulting from 2003 

through 2007. Although Ronald testified that his entire gross income from 

Strasburg Consulting was deducted as a “paid commissions and fees” expense 

when it was passed to Legacy, as reflected on his tax forms, neither he nor his 

accountant could testify as to what specific amount of business expenses either 

Strasburg Consulting or the pass through entity, Legacy, had incurred. Further, we 

do not disagree with Ronald’s argument that a business doubtlessly has expenses; 

however, Ronald failed to present evidence to the trial court’s satisfaction 

demonstrating the ordinary and reasonable expenses he incurred in operating his 

business. As such, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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declining to consider an unidentified amount of expenses when it calculated 

Ronald’s income. 

{¶31} Next, we turn to Ronald’s argument that the trial court erred in 

ordering him to pay Cindra spousal support when she did not provide evidence of 

her expenses. 

{¶32} Testimony was heard at the hearing that Cindra’s sole source of 

income was unemployment of $122 per week; that she was paying $144.99 per 

month for health insurance; that she was paying on several charge cards with a 

balance of approximately $25,000; and, that she was paying for groceries and 

gasoline. Additionally, testimony was heard that, at the time of the hearing, 

Cindra was still living in the marital residence for which Ronald was paying the 

expenses, but that she was required to vacate within forty-five days; and, that 

Cindra did not know where she would be moving until she received her divorce 

settlement. Based upon the foregoing, we cannot find that the trial court had 

insufficient evidence of Cindra’s expenses, assets, and liabilities to award her 

spousal support. The trial court had specific evidence about Cindra’s income, 

health insurance costs, and credit card costs. Further, we cannot see how Cindra 

could have presented more specific evidence of her living costs in light of the fact 

that she was required to vacate the marital residence soon after the hearing, and 

did not yet know where she would be moving. 
Case No. 2-10-12 

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{¶33} Accordingly, we overrule Ronald’s second and third assignments of 

error. 

{¶34} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

SHAW and PRESTON, J.J., concur. 

/jlr