[Cite as State v. Dotson, 2018-Ohio-2481.]

Atty. Richard Ferrara, 2077 East Fourth Street, Second Floor, Cleveland, Ohio 44114, 

for Defendant-Appellant and, 

Atty. Paul Gains, Mahoning County Prosecutor and Atty. Ralph M. Rivera, Office 

Mahoning County Prosecutor, 21 W. Boardman Street, 6th Floor, Youngstown, Ohio 

44503, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

 

Dated: 

June 22, 2018 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BRYAN M. DOTSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 16 MA 0105. 

 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 15 CR 613. 

BEFORE: 

Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed in Part. Reversed in Part. Remanded. 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

 

Donofrio, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Bryan Dotson, appeals from a Mahoning County 

Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of receiving stolen property in the form of 

a vehicle and tampering with vehicle identifying numbers, following a jury trial. 

{¶2} On May 22, 2014, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Erik Golias initiated 

a traffic stop of appellant on State Route 46 in Mahoning County, Ohio. Trooper Golias 

initiated the traffic stop due to appellant’s truck not displaying a front-end license plate. 

Appellant was operating a Dodge Ram pickup truck. 

{¶3} Upon approaching appellant’s vehicle, Trooper Golias noticed that the 

truck’s steering column had been “peeled,” meaning that the plastic around the ignition 

had been pulled away from the steering column to access the ignition mechanisms. He 

was then under the suspicion that the truck appellant was operating may have been 

stolen or tampered with. Upon noticing the peeled steering column, he removed 

appellant from the truck, conducted a consensual pat-down, and placed appellant in his 

police cruiser. Trooper Golias then attempted to identify the public vehicle identification 

number (VIN), which is located on the dashboard, but was unable to do so because 

there was black spray paint on the windshield which covered the VIN. Trooper Golias 

also discovered a secondary VIN on the truck inside the door frame that was also 

covered with black spray paint. Eventually, Trooper Golias was able to scrape away 

enough of the spray paint on the windshield to ascertain the public VIN. The public VIN 

indicated that the truck belonged to appellant. 

{¶4} There were several other factors that lead to Trooper Golias’ suspicion 

that the truck appellant was operating was stolen, which lead to a continued search. 

These factors included: a cracked dashboard, missing screws from the dashboard, 

appellant’s apparent level of nervousness, appellant’s overtalkative nature, and 

appellant’s explanation that he changed out the dashboard but the newly installed 

dashboard was damaged. Appellant attempted to explain that he purchased the truck 

inexpensively and had replaced many components including the interior and the 

windshield. Trooper Golias contacted Trooper Skaggs, who was a specialist in stolen 

vehicles, to assist with the investigation. 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

{¶5} Upon Trooper Skaggs’ arrival at the scene, he began to investigate the 

truck. First, he noted that an anonymous tip was reported stating that there was a 

Dodge Ram pickup truck matching the description of the truck appellant was operating 

that was possibly a retagged vehicle. Trooper Skaggs also noted that: the door 

markings identified the truck as a Dodge 1500 series but the chassis was a Dodge 2500 

series; the dashboard itself was a different color than the rest of the interior of the truck; 

and the truck’s engine was missing its body tag. Furthermore, Trooper Skaggs noticed 

that the truck’s VIN indicated that the truck contained a 5.9 liter gas engine but the truck 

had a 5.9 liter turbo Cummins intercooled diesel engine. 

{¶6} At the conclusion of Trooper Skaggs’ inspection, Troopers Golias and 

Skaggs impounded appellant’s truck in order to perform a more thorough investigation. 

But they decided not to arrest appellant at that time. They gave appellant the option of 

transporting the truck to the highway patrol post himself or having the troopers call for a 

tow truck. Appellant opted to drive the truck to the highway patrol post himself. 

Appellant was then free to leave after he left the truck in the troopers’ possession. 

{¶7} The next day, Trooper Skaggs continued his investigation of the vehicle. 

He located the secondary concealed VIN on the truck. The secondary VIN did not 

match the public VIN located on the dashboard. When he ran the secondary VIN 

through the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) and the National Crime 

Information Center (NCIC) databases, he discovered that the secondary VIN was for a 

Dodge 2500 series truck reported as stolen from Cornerstone Motors (Cornerstone) in 

Columbiana, Ohio. Trooper Skaggs also followed up with the public VIN on the 

dashboard and discovered the original owner, Amanda Varney. Varney told him that 

she had sold appellant a maroon Dodge Ram 1500. 

{¶8} Trooper Skaggs also noted that the truck registered as stolen indicated it 

had approximately 141,000 miles on it. Appellant’s odometer at the time he was 

stopped by Trooper Golias read 145,213 miles. But the title of the vehicle when Varney 

sold the truck to appellant indicated that the truck she sold had almost 250,000 miles on 

it. Trooper Skaggs then concluded that the VIN of the vehicle appellant purchased from 

Varney was placed on the stolen vehicle from Cornerstone in order to conceal the fact 

that it was stolen. 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

{¶9} Appellant was then charged and indicted with one count of receiving 

stolen property in the form of a vehicle, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 

2913.51(A), and one count of tampering with vehicle identifying numbers, a fifth-degree 

felony in violation of R.C. 4549.62(A). 

{¶10} Appellant filed a motion to suppress seeking to exclude virtually all 

evidence police obtained in this case. In his supporting memorandum, appellant argued 

that all evidence should be suppressed due to: a lack of reasonable suspicion to 

conduct a traffic stop, a lack of reasonable suspicion to continue appellant’s detention 

and the investigation of the truck, and any and all statements made by appellant were 

obtained prior to appellant being read his Miranda rights. At the suppression hearing, 

Trooper Golias testified that a video tape of appellant’s stop and detention existed. But 

the video had not been produced because it was erased by the Ohio State Highway 

Patrol. 

{¶11} After the suppression hearing, the trial court gave appellant leave to file a 

motion addressing the missing tape. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss on the basis 

that the erased video tape contained potentially exculpatory evidence and should have 

been preserved and disclosed by the prosecution. Appellant requested a hearing with 

the trial court on his motion to dismiss. The trial court overruled both appellant’s motion 

to suppress and motion to dismiss without further hearing. 

{¶12} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Troopers Golias and Skaggs were 

the only witnesses. The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The trial court 

subsequently sentenced appellant to five years of community control, which included six 

months of incarceration on each count to be served consecutively for a total jail 

sentence of one year. The court also ordered appellant to pay restitution of $1,000 to 

Cornerstone and $10,713.38 to Auto Owner’s Insurance, Cornerstone’s insurance 

company. 

{¶13} Appellant timely filed this appeal on July 15, 2016. He now raises ten 

assignments of error. 

{¶14} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS ALL 

EVIDENCE, INCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS, FROM 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL STOP, SEIZURE, AND SEARCH OF 

APPELLANT AND HIS VEHICLE. 

{¶15} Appellant makes several arguments concerning this assignment of error. 

First, appellant argues that he was arrested as a result of his original traffic stop and 

such arrest and subsequent search of the truck was not supported by probable cause. 

Next, appellant argues that he was unconstitutionally seized when Troopers Golias and 

Skaggs prolonged his traffic stop. Finally, appellant argues that the seizure of the truck 

was unconstitutional because it was done so without a warrant or an exception to the 

warrant requirement. 

{¶16} A motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. When 

considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is 

therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness 

credibility. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, 

¶ 8. The appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent and credible evidence. Id. Accepting these facts as true, the 

appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion 

of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.

{¶17} The only witness who testified at the suppression hearing was Trooper 

Golias. He testified that he initiated the traffic stop for failure to display a front license 

plate on an Ohio-registered motor vehicle. (Supp. Tr. 14-15, 33, Exhibit 1). This 

testimony was not contradicted throughout the suppression hearing. As operating a 

motor vehicle without a front license plate is a violation of R.C. 4503.21, sufficient 

reasonable suspicion existed for Trooper Golias to stop appellant. 

{¶18} Next, appellant argues that he was arrested without probable cause when 

Trooper Golias immediately removed him from the truck and placed him in the police 

cruiser. An arrest involves four elements: (1) an intent to arrest; (2) under a real or 

pretended authority; (3) an actual or constructive seizure or detention of a person; and 

(4) the intent is understood by the person arrested. State v. Darrah, 64 Ohio St.2d 22, 

412 N.E.2d 1328 (1980). 

{¶19} Appellant points out the following portion of the suppression hearing 

transcript during Trooper Golias’ cross examination: 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

Q I understand that. I understand that. But that’s what was told to 

you. And at this time, there was a key in the ignition; correct? 

A I don’t recall, but I believe so. 

* * * 

Q Okay. Okay. And I notice that the - - so then you opened the door, 

and you look in the side to see if you see a VIN number; is that what you 

said? 

A No. I said Federal Identification. 

Q Federal Identification number. Okay. Now, up to this point you still 

haven’t asked him his name, have you? 

A No, I have not. 

Q You haven’t asked him for any identification, proof of insurance, 

registration; correct? 

A No. Right now I’m worried about a felony of a stolen vehicle. 

* * *

Q So just by looking at - - so you don’t ask him name, anything about 

him until later on, nine minutes later by your notes; right? 

A I believe that’s when I asked him, after I had the scene secured. 

Q Okay. And as far as you ordered him out of the car; right? 

A Correct. 

Q Okay. And where was he placed at that time? 

A He was taken to the front of my patrol car. 

Q Okay. And he was put in your patrol car?
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Case No. 16 MA 105

A Yes, he was. 

Q He wasn’t free to leave at that time; correct? 

A No, he was not. 

(Supp. Tr. 35-37). 

{¶20} According to this passage, Trooper Golias pulled appellant over, noticed a 

peeled steering column and spray paint on the windshield covering the VIN on the 

dashboard, and then immediately placed appellant in the front seat of his police cruiser. 

The state argues that this was not an arrest but an investigatory detention. 

{¶21} Generally, an investigatory detention is reasonable and, thus, passes 

constitutional muster when the officer performing the investigatory detention has 

reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Warner, 7th Dist. No. 

15 CO 0026, 2016-Ohio-4660 ¶ 33 citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 

(1968). An investigatory detention constitutes a seizure which implicates the Fourth 

Amendment. State v. Walker, 7th Dist. No. 03 MA 0238, 2004-Ohio-5790 ¶ 14 citing 

State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App. 741, 667 N.E.2d 60 (2d Dist.1995). An investigatory 

detention is limited in duration and purpose and can only last as long as it takes for a 

police officer to confirm or dispel his suspicions. Id. quoting Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d at 

748. The actions of a police officer in asking a person to sit in the police car do not 

automatically transform an investigatory detention into a formal arrest. State v. Pickett, 

8th Dist. No. 76295, 2000 WL 1060653 (Aug. 3, 2000). 

{¶22} This Court has addressed investigatory detentions in State v. Coleman, 

7th Dist. No. 06 MA 0041, 2007-Ohio-1573. In that case, Coleman was pulled over for 

speeding and could not produce his license, registration, or proof of insurance. Id. at ¶ 

5. Coleman was then placed in a police squad car while the officer determined 

Coleman’s identity. Id. at ¶ 6. This Court held that the act of relocating a person to a 

police car did not elevate the traffic stop to the level of an arrest. Id. at ¶ 38. This rule 

has also been adopted by the Ninth District. See State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 

585, 596, 657 N.E.2d 591 (9th Dist.1995). 

{¶23} In this case, appellant was lawfully pulled over for failure to display a front 

license plate on an Ohio registered vehicle. (Supp. Tr. 14-15, 33, Exhibit 1). Upon 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

arriving at the truck, Trooper Golias noticed that there was paint over the VIN and that 

the steering column was peeled, which indicated that the truck was stolen. (Supp. Tr. 

15-17). Furthermore, appellant made statements concerning the VIN, which indicated 

to Trooper Golias that appellant knew what he was searching for and where those 

numbers were located. (Supp. Tr. 19-21). Finally, like the defendant in Coleman, 

appellant did not have his driver’s license on him when Trooper Golias initiated the 

traffic stop. (Supp. Tr. 22). Ultimately, when Trooper Golias relocated appellant to his 

squad car, this was an investigatory detention and not a warrantless arrest. 

{¶24} Next, appellant argues that his detention was unreasonably prolonged, 

which ultimately resulted in an unconstitutional seizure. The scope of a detention must 

be carefully tailored to its underlying justification and last no longer than is necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Blackburn, 115 Ohio App. 678, 685 N.E.2d 

1327 (7th Dist.1996). The reasonable and articulable standard applied to a prolonged 

traffic stop encompasses the totality of the circumstances and a court may not evaluate 

each articulated reason for the stop. State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, at paragraph two of the syllabus citing United States v. Arvizu, 

534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). 

{¶25} For the reasons previously set forth, there was sufficient reasonable 

suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion cause 

to expand the scope from that of a minor traffic offense to an investigation into a 

possible stolen vehicle. This would include Trooper Golias requesting another officer’s 

presence who specializes in the investigation of stolen vehicles. Ultimately, appellant’s 

prolonged detention was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 

{¶26} Finally, appellant argues that Troopers Golias and Skaggs did not have a 

warrant to seize his car and there was no valid warrant exception. Appellant cites R.C. 

4549.63(A), which states that law enforcement may seize a vehicle based on probable 

cause to believe that any vehicle identification number has been covered but the 

seizure must be pursuant to a warrant unless the circumstances are within one of the 

warrant exceptions established by the Ohio Supreme Court or the United States 

Supreme Court. The state argues that the automobile exception excused the warrant 

requirement. 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

{¶27} Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a 

vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped automobile based 

on the automobile exception. State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 734 N.E.2d 804 

(2000) citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 

(1999). “The automobile exception allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a 

vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or 

other evidence that is subject to seizure, and exigent circumstances necessitate a 

search or seizure.” State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 367, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992) citing 

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). The 

mobility of automobiles often creates exigent circumstances, and is the traditional 

justification for this exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Id.

citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). 

{¶28} For the reasons previously stated, Trooper Golias’ stop of appellant was 

valid. Also for the reasons previously stated, there was probable cause to believe that 

the truck was stolen due to the peeled steering column, missing screws in the 

dashboard, cracked dashboard, and the concealed identification numbers. The fact that 

appellant was not arrested when Troopers Golias and Skaggs seized the truck does not 

negate the fact that there was sufficient probable cause for the troopers to seize the 

truck. Ultimately, because the contraband at issue was the truck and sufficient probable 

cause to believe it was stolen existed, the troopers’ seizure of the truck was not a 

violation of appellant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure 

as it was pursuant to the automobile exception of the warrant requirement. 

{¶29} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶30} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY 

TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS, AS WELL AS OPINION TESTIMONY 

BY AN OFFICER, FOR WHICH NO EXCEPTION EXISTED UNDER THE 

RULES OF EVIDENCE. 

{¶31} Appellant argues that the opinions and evidence that led the troopers to 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

conclude that the truck was stolen constituted hearsay and should have been excluded 

at trial. Furthermore, appellant argues that the trial court inappropriately allowed 

Trooper Skaggs to testify about his personal opinion that appellant committed a crime. 

{¶32} The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and the 

court’s decision will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion. State ex 

rel. Sartini v. Yost, 96 Ohio St. 3d 37, 2002-Ohio-3317, 770 N.E.2d 584. This includes 

rulings on hearsay. State v. Rupp, 7th Dist. No. 05 MA 0166, 2007-Ohio-1561, ¶ 78. 

Abuse of discretion implies that the court acted in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable manner. State ex rel. Sartini at ¶ 21, citing State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St. 

3d 246, 2002-Ohio-796, 762 N.E.2d 940. 

{¶33} As appellant raise numerous challenges, we will examine each in turn. 

{¶34} First, appellant challenges testimony from Trooper Skaggs regarding the 

condition the truck was in at the time appellant purchased it from Varney. (Trial Tr. 309-

310, 316). Trooper Skaggs testified that the truck was maroon when Varney sold it to 

appellant. (Trial Tr. 309). He further testified that the VIN on the truck indicated that it 

should have had a different engine than the engine that was actually in the truck. (Trial 

Tr. 310). And he testified that a photograph of the truck provided by Varney showed 

that the truck did not have a gap between the headlights and the bumper at the time of 

the sale. (Trial Tr. 316). Appellant objected to the trooper’s testimony as to what 

Varney told him on the basis of hearsay. (Trial Tr. 309, 310, 316). 

{¶35} Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted. Evid.R. 801(C). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible. Evid.R. 802. 

{¶36} Varney told Trooper Skaggs about the physical description of the truck 

when she sold it to appellant. This physical description of the truck when Varney sold it 

to appellant was used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In other words, it was 

used to prove that the truck at the time of the sale was maroon, had a different engine, 

and did not have gap between the headlights and the bumper. Moreover, the state then 

used this hearsay to show that Varney’s truck’s identity was placed on the Cornerstone 

truck in order to conceal the fact that the Cornerstone truck was stolen. 

{¶37} Trooper Skaggs’ testimony about the physical characteristics of the truck 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

when Varney sold the truck to appellant was hearsay. Importantly, the state used this 

hearsay to establish a significant aspect of its case. Without evidence of what the truck 

registered to the public VIN was supposed to look like, the jury would not be able to 

ascertain whether the truck appellant was driving belonged to him or not. Thus, we 

conclude that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony over appellant’s objection. 

{¶38} Second, appellant argues that any reference regarding information 

Trooper Skaggs recovered from the NICB and the NCIC databases was inadmissible 

hearsay. Appellant did not object to these references to the two databases. (Trial Tr. 

294-295, 300). Failure to object to trial testimony waives all but plain error review. 

State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 108. Plain error 

is one in which but for the error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 

State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). 

{¶39} The Twelfth District has held that evidence from a national database is 

admissible as non-hearsay as long as it was admitted for a purpose other than to prove 

the truth of the matter asserted. See State v. Beltran, 12th Dist. No. CA2004-11-015, 

2005-Ohio-4194, ¶ 21-22. Trooper Skaggs testified that he ran the VINs through the 

databases as he was describing the steps he took in his investigation. (Trial Tr. 294-

295, 300). The trooper’s testimony regarding his investigation as a whole, including 

results from the NICB and the NCIC, was meant to show the continuing course of the 

investigation into the truck. Ultimately, the trial court did not commit plain error by 

allowing the testimony concerning these two databases. 

{¶40} Third, appellant challenges Trooper Skaggs’ testimony as to the contents 

of a Columbiana Police Report dated March 10, 2014. (Trial Tr. 304; State’s Ex. 22). 

Trooper Skaggs testified that the police report concerned a vehicle stolen from 

Cornerstone and that the VIN number of the stolen vehicle matched the VIN number 

from the truck at issue. (Trial Tr. 304-305). Appellant did not object. The state 

withdrew Exhibit 22 during the introduction of exhibits noting that “it was not drafted by 

one of the witnesses.” (Trial Tr. 364). 

{¶41} Trooper Skaggs’ testimony as to the information contained in the 

Columbiana Police Report was inadmissible hearsay. The Columbiana Police Report 

was drafted by an officer who did not testify at appellant’s trial and the statements in the 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

report were used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Officer Skaggs’ testimony 

regarding the contents of the report was offered to prove that the VIN located on 

appellant’s truck matched a VIN for a truck reported stolen from Cornerstone. It was 

plain error for the trial court to allow Trooper Skaggs to testify as to the contents of this 

report. 

{¶42} Fourth, appellant challenges Trooper Skaggs’ testimony concerning 

statements made by Chad Zwingler from Cornerstone to him. Specifically, appellant 

challenges the following testimony: 

Q Were you able to ascertain any information regarding the tires on 

this vehicle after speaking with Cornerstone? 

A The information that the Cornerstone Chad Zwingler provided to me 

- - 

Mr. Joltin: Objection. 

The Court: Sustained. 

* * * 

Q Give me a minute. After following up on your investigation with 

Cornerstone, pursuant to your investigation, were you able to determine 

the type of tires that this vehicle had? 

A Yes. And the tires were consistent with what the vehicle had on it at 

the time that they were stolen. 

(Trial Tr. 306). 

{¶43} This testimony is also hearsay as it is based on statements from 

Cornerstone’s representative. Trooper Skaggs never testified that he personally 

investigated or saw the truck stolen from Cornerstone. Any information regarding the 

type of tires on that truck was gained from statements conveyed to him by Zwingler, 

who did not testify. These statements were used to show that the tires on appellant’s 

truck were consistent with the tires on the truck stolen from Cornerstone. Thus, the trial 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

court abused its discretion in allowing Trooper Skaggs’ testimony as to what he learned 

from Cornerstone. 

{¶44} Fifth, appellant challenges Trooper Skaggs’ testimony that an anonymous 

tip was called in regarding a “black semi-gloss primer Dodge Ram pickup truck which 

frequented the Mineral Ridge, Austintown area that was possibly a retagged vehicle 

specifically involving Bryan Dotson.” (Trial Tr. 290). This statement is not hearsay as it 

was offered to show the effect on the listener. Responding to the very next question, 

Trooper Skaggs testified that he relayed that information to Trooper Golias so Trooper 

Golias could keep an eye out for a vehicle matching that description. (Trial Tr. 290). 

{¶45} Finally, appellant argues that it was improper to allow Troopers Skaggs 

and Golias to testify regarding their opinions about whether appellant was guilty of a 

crime. Appellant cites two specific instances where he claims this happened. The first 

instance occurred during Trooper Golias’ testimony where the trooper testified: 

The Federal Identification decal looks like this. You probably will all 

recognize them after you look at your car. It has the full VIN number that’s 

on it. When it’s - - you cannot alter, tamper or destroy that because just 

like a public VIN number, it identifies that vehicle. It cannot be removed. 

It can’t be covered. When it’s covered like this we’ve got to make sure we 

have the true identity of the vehicle. This is the picture of it with the black 

spray paint over it. 

(Trial Tr. 257-258). The second instance was during Trooper Skaggs’ testimony when 

asked what he noticed during his initial investigation. The trooper stated, “I opened the 

door to look at the Federal Identification decal, and it had been partially painted over, in 

violation of the Ohio Revised Code. The dashboard VIN, public VIN.” (Trial Tr. 292). 

{¶46} “If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the 

form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1) 

rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear 

understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact at issue.” State v. 

Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 120 quoting Evid.R. 701. As 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

both of these pieces of testimony from Troopers Skaggs and Golias identify the fact that 

a VIN in the truck was concealed and this was a violation of the Ohio Revised Code, 

which ultimately led to the investigation of the truck at issue being stolen, the elements 

of Evid.R. 701 are satisfied and it was not an abuse of discretion to permit this 

testimony. 

{¶47} Given the substantial amount of inadmissible hearsay that the trial court 

admitted, appellant was denied his right to fair a trial. While the state did introduce 

other admissible evidence that may have proved the elements of receiving stolen 

property, we cannot overlook the potential effect the significant amount of inadmissible 

hearsay likely had on the jury. 

{¶48} We note, however, the inadmissible hearsay evidence did not impact 

appellant’s tampering with vehicle identification numbers conviction. The inadmissible 

hearsay evidence was offered to prove the elements of receiving stolen property. Thus, 

our resolution of this assignment of error only affects appellant’s receiving stolen 

property conviction. 

{¶49} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error has merit in part and 

is sustained in part. 

{¶50} Appellant’s third assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER 

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BY ALLOWING PREJUDICIAL 

HEARSAY STATEMENTS TO OVERWHELM APPELLANT’S TRIAL. 

{¶51} In addition to the arguments raised in his second assignment of error, 

appellant argues Trooper Skaggs’ testimony as to what others told him regarding the 

truck and as to the Columbiana Police Report violated his right to confront the witnesses 

against him. 

{¶52} The Confrontation Clause prohibits the introduction of testimonial 

statements by a non-testifying witness (unless that witness is unavailable to testify and 

the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross examination). State v. Grabe, 7th Dist. 

No. 16 MA 0061, 2017-Ohio-1017, ¶ 20 citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 

124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.3d 177 (2004). 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

{¶53} The question here is whether the statements by Varney and Zwingler to 

the troopers constituted testimonial statements. For Confrontation Clause purposes, a 

testimonial statement includes one made “under circumstances which would lead an 

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for trial.” 

State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834, 2006-Ohio-5482, ¶ 36 quoting 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 

{¶54} In determining whether a statement is testimonial, courts should focus on 

the expectation of the declarant at the time of making the statement; the intent of the 

questioner is relevant only if it could affect a reasonable declarant’s expectations. Id. In 

making the determination if a statement is testimonial, “the ‘primary purpose’ of the 

conversation was to ‘creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’” Ohio v. 

Clark, -- U.S. --, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2180, 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015), quoting Michigan v. 

Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011). Statements are 

non-testimonial when made in the course of a police interrogation under circumstances 

which objectively show that the primary purpose of the statements was to enable police 

assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Id. citing Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 

822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). Statements are testimonial when the 

circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that 

the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish past events potentially relevant to 

later criminal prosecution. Id. citing Hammon. 

{¶55} The statements made by Varney and Zwingler that were admitted at trial 

were testimonial in nature. The conversations Trooper Skaggs had with both of these 

people took place after appellant’s truck was impounded. There was no ongoing 

emergency that Trooper Skaggs was responding to when these conversations took 

place. The statements Trooper Skaggs obtained from these people were meant to 

establish past events that would be potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution. 

{¶56} Thus, the trial court’s admission of Trooper Skaggs’ testimony regarding 

what Varney and Zwingler told him about the trucks violated appellant’s right to confront 

these witness against him. The state should have subpoenaed Varney and Zwingler to 

testify so that appellant could cross-examine them. 

{¶57} Again, we note the inadmissible evidence did not impact appellant’s 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

tampering with vehicle identification numbers conviction. Trooper Skaggs’ testimony 

regarding what Varney and Zwingler told him was offered to prove the elements of 

receiving stolen property. Thus, our resolution of this assignment of error also only 

affects appellant’s receiving stolen property conviction. 

{¶58} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error has merit and is 

sustained. 

{¶59} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states: 

 INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTED APPELLANT’S 

CONVICTIONS. 

{¶60} Appellant argues that the state failed to prove all of the elements of the 

charges it brought against him. 

{¶61} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine 

whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as a 

matter of law to support the verdict. State v. Dickson, 7th Dist. No. 12 CO 50, 2013-

Ohio-5293, ¶ 10 citing State v. Thompkins, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 668 

(1997). Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Id. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient 

to sustain a verdict is a question of law. Id. In reviewing the record for sufficiency, the 

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. citing State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 138, 694 N.E.2d 

916 (1998). 

{¶62} Appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property and tampering with 

vehicle identification numbers. 

{¶63} Receiving stolen property is defined as receiving, retaining, or disposing of 

property of another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property has 

been obtained through commission of a theft offense. R.C. 2913.51(A). If the property 

at issue is a motor vehicle, receiving stolen property is a felony of the fourth degree. 

R.C. 2913.51(C). 

{¶64} Sufficient evidence existed to warrant appellant’s conviction for receiving 

stolen property. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we must 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

consider whether the evidence that the state offered and the trial court admitted, 

whether the trial court admitted the evidence erroneously or not, would have been 

sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Grabe, 7th Dist. No. 16 MA 0061, 2017-

Ohio-1017, ¶ 15, citing State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 

N.E.2d 284, ¶ 17, and Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 35, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 

265 (1988). Thus, in conducting our sufficiency review, we must consider all of the 

evidence offered by the state in this case, including the inadmissible hearsay evidence 

{¶65} The evidence at trial showed that appellant was operating a truck with 

two VINs concealed with black spray paint (Trial Tr. 270), appellant was the one who 

spray painted the truck black (Trial Tr. 252), and the public VIN was different from the 

secondary VIN (Trial Tr. 299-300). Moreover, the evidence indicated that the truck 

Varney sold to appellant was a different color than the truck he was driving (Trial Tr. 

309), did not have a gap between the headlights and bumper (Trial Tr. 316), and had a 

different engine than it did (Trial Tr. 310). And the evidence demonstrated that a police 

report was filed regarding a stolen vehicle with the same VIN that was located on the 

truck appellant was driving. (Trial Tr. 304-305). When construing this evidence in the 

light most favorable to the state, as we are required to do, sufficient evidence existed to 

prove receiving stolen property. 

{¶66} The tampering with vehicle identifying numbers statute provides: “No 

person, with purpose to conceal or destroy the identity of a vehicle part, shall remove, 

deface, cover, alter, or destroy any vehicle identification number or derivative of a 

vehicle identification number on a vehicle or vehicle part.” R.C. 4549.62(A). Appellant 

essentially contends that the state failed to prove the element that he acted “with 

purpose to conceal or destroy the identity of a vehicle.” 

{¶67} Appellant does not contest the fact that the two VINs on the truck were 

concealed with black paint. (Trial Tr. 247, 249). The question is whether sufficient 

evidence showed that appellant acted purposefully to conceal or destroy the identity of 

the truck. Since intent goes to a person’s state of mind, it must be gathered from the 

surrounding facts and circumstances. See In re Washington, 81 Ohio St.3d 337, 340, 

691 N.E.2d 285 (1998), quoting State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d 313 

(1936). 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

{¶68} Trooper Golias testified that appellant was driving a truck with at least two 

VINs concealed with black paint. (Trial Tr. 247, 249). The truck was spray painted 

black by appellant. (Trial Tr. 252). The paint that was covering the VINs was also 

black. (Trial Tr. 247, 249). The two different VINs on the truck being concealed with 

black paint, which appellant admitted using on the truck, was sufficient evidence to 

establish the intent for this offense. 

{¶69} Accordingly, appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶70} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error states: 

 THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DID NOT 

SUPPORT APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS. 

{¶71} Appellant argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. 

{¶72} We have already determined that appellant’s conviction for receiving 

stolen property must be reversed since the jury’s verdict was likely affected by the 

amount of inadmissible hearsay testimony. Therefore, we will only review his conviction 

for tampering with vehicle identifying numbers in this assignment of error. 

{¶73} The claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

concerns whether a jury verdict is supported by “the greater amount of credible 

evidence.” State v. Merritt, 7th Dist. No. 09 JE 26, 2011-Ohio-1468 ¶ 45 citing State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The reviewing court weighs the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences and considers the credibility of the witnesses. 

Thompkins at 387. Although the appellate court acts as the proverbial “thirteenth” juror 

under this standard, it rarely substitutes its own judgment for that of the jury’s. Id. This 

is because the trier of fact is in the best position to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence. Id. citing State v. Higinbotham, 

5th Dist. No. 2005CA00046, 2006-Ohio-635. Only when “it is patently apparent that the 

factfinder lost its way,” should an appellate court overturn a jury verdict. Id. citing State 

v. Woullard, 158 Ohio App.3d 31, 2001-Ohio-3395, 813 N.E.2d 964 (2d Dist.). “No 

judgment resulting from a trial by jury shall be reversed on the weight of the evidence 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

except by the concurrence of all three judges hearing the cause.” State v. Miller, 96 

Ohio St.3d 384, 2002-Ohio-4931, 775 N.E.2d 498, ¶ 36, quoting Ohio Constitution, 

Article IV, Section 3(B)(3). 

{¶74} In addition to the evidence set out above, Trooper Golias testified that 

while he was able to remove the paint from the public VIN on the dashboard in order to 

read it, he did not feel he was able to clean the paint off of the VIN decals in the door 

frame out of fear that he would destroy them. (Trial Tr. 272). The public VIN revealed 

that the truck was registered to appellant. (Trial Tr. 272). Trooper Skaggs testified that 

when he first inspected appellant’s truck, there was a VIN missing in the interior engine 

compartment. (Trial Tr. 322). Furthermore, he testified that the missing VIN in the 

engine compartment in and of itself constituted a concealed identity. (Trial Tr. 322-323). 

He also testified about a secondary concealed VIN that is located on cars whose 

location is not known to the general public and how he received training in locating that 

VIN. (Trial Tr. 324-325). 

{¶75} Appellant’s conviction for tampering with vehicle identifying numbers was 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence demonstrated that 

appellant was operating a truck with two different VINs concealed with black spray paint 

and that appellant had spray-painted the truck black. The evidence does not show that 

the jury clearly lost its way in convicting appellant. 

{¶76} Accordingly, appellant’s fifth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶77} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error states: 

 DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED CONSTITUTIONALLY 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILURE TO OBJECT TO OBVIOUS, 

INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE. 

{¶78} Appellant argues that because his trial counsel failed to object to hearsay 

and confrontation issues concerning evidence pointed out in previous assignments of 

error, his trial counsel was ineffective. 

{¶79} When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s 

assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio St. 3d 150, 2002-

Ohio-350, 761 N.E.2d 18 citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 

80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Furthermore, the defendant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Strickland charges reviewing 

courts to apply a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments and to indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance. Id. 

{¶80} Appellant’s counsel lodged numerous objections to multiple instances of 

hearsay throughout appellant’s trial. (Trial Tr. 306, 309, 310, 316). Thus, counsel was 

aware of, and objected to numerous hearsay issues. Additionally, two of the items 

appellant takes issue with in this appeal that he asserts his counsel should have 

objected to (the reference to the national databases and the troopers’ opinions), we 

have found to be admissible statements. Thus, no objection was warranted. The only 

item counsel failed to object to that this court found to be inadmissible hearsay was 

Trooper Skaggs’ testimony regarding the contents of the Columbiana Police Report. 

The failure to make one hearsay objection in this case does not establish that counsel 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

{¶81} Accordingly, appellant’s sixth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶82} Appellant’s seventh assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT A HEARING ON THE EXPLANATION 

FOR MISSING DASHCAM VIDEO. 

{¶83} Appellant argues the trial court erred in dismissing his motion to dismiss 

without a hearing. Appellant argues that by denying his motion without a hearing, the 

trial court failed to allow him to meet his burden that the tape contained exculpatory 

evidence that was improperly destroyed. 

{¶84} A trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss on the basis that the state 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

failed to disclose to the defense materially exculpatory evidence is subject to a de novo 

standard of review. State v. Whalen, 9th Dist. No. 08CA009317, 2008-Ohio-6739, ¶ 7-

8. 

{¶85} Pursuant to Crim.R. 12(F), “a court may adjudicate a motion based upon * 

* * a hearing, or other appropriate means.” A strict reading of Crim.R. 12(F) states that 

a hearing on pretrial motions is granted at the trial court’s discretion. A hearing is not 

mandatory as appellant argues. 

{¶86} With regard to the videotape potentially containing exculpatory evidence, 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States protects a 

criminal defendant from being convicted of a crime where the state fails to preserve 

materially exculpatory evidence. State v. Tarleton, 7th Dist. No. 02-HA-541, 2003-Ohio3492, ¶ 10 citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 

413 (1984). This also applies to potentially useful evidence the state destroys in bad 

faith. Id. citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 

(1988). Evidence is materially exculpatory if: (1) the evidence possesses an 

exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed and (2) is of 

such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by 

other means. State v. Benton, 136 Ohio App.3d 801, 737 N.E.2d 1046 (6th Dist. 2000) 

citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. The burden is on the defendant to show that the 

evidence is both favorable and material to the defense and that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would have been different had the evidence been 

presented. State v. Whalen, 2008-Ohio-6739 at ¶ 8 citing State v. Davis, 116 Ohio 

St.3d 404, 449, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 338-339. A reasonable probability is a 

probability that is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. State v. 

Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 61, 529 N.E.2d 898, 911 (1988), citing Pennsylvania v. 

Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40. 

{¶87} Appellant argues that the tape only potentially contained useful evidence. 

As such, it is incumbent on appellant to show that the tape’s unavailability was the result 

of bad faith on the part of the state. See Tarleton at ¶ 10. Appellant’s argument is that 

because the trial court denied appellant’s motion without a hearing, appellant was 

unable to ascertain necessary facts to determine if the tape was destroyed in bad faith. 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

{¶88} On August 5, 2015, appellant filed a motion for discovery and to examine 

exculpatory and mitigatory material with the trial court. This motion requested, among 

other things, “[a]ll statements of any kind within the possession of the State, made by 

the Defendant and/or any co-Defendants.” On the same day, appellant filed a motion to 

disclose and made specific requests for exculpatory evidence. The first time appellant 

or his trial counsel learned of the existence of a videotape was on January 28, 2016, the 

date of appellant’s suppression hearing. At that hearing, Trooper Golias testified on 

cross-examination that there was in fact an audiotape or videotape of appellant’s traffic 

stop. (Supp. Tr. 43). Said tape was not provided to the prosecutor’s office. (Supp. Tr. 

43-44). After a brief recess, it was concluded that any recording of appellant’s traffic 

stop was overwritten pursuant to the Ohio State Highway Patrol’s standard retention 

policy. (Supp. Tr. 45). According to the state, this was done because “it was not 

requested by any party to be retained.” (Supp. Tr. 45). The court then granted 

appellant two weeks to prepare a motion regarding the deleted recording. (Supp. Tr. 

46). 

{¶89} Appellant’s original traffic stop occurred on May 22, 2014. (Supp. Tr. 

state’s exhibit 1). Appellant was indicted on July 9, 2015, over 13 months after his 

traffic stop. Appellant filed his discovery requests almost one month after that on 

August 5, 2015. While a hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss may have provided 

more evidence relevant to the tape, it was appellant’s burden to show a reasonable 

probability that the information on the tape would to undermine the confidence of the 

outcome or that the tape was erased due to bad faith. 

{¶90} Appellant’s motion to dismiss alleged no specific facts about what was 

allegedly on the tape that was exculpatory in nature. Appellant’s brief in this appeal is 

also silent on what the tape may have contained that was potentially exculpatory. The 

only thing known for certain from the record is that a tape existed and was erased 

pursuant to the Ohio State Highway Patrol’s retention policy. 

{¶91} Nevertheless, appellant cites two cases where other districts have held 

that when the state breaches its duty to respond in good faith to a defense request to 

preserve evidence, the appropriate remedy is to shift the burden of proof to the state as 

to the exculpatory value of the evidence. See City of Columbus v. Forest, 36 Ohio 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

App.3d 169, 173, 522 N.E.2d 52 (10th Dist.1987) see also State v. Benton, 136 Ohio 

App.3d 801, 805-806, 737 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (6th Dist.2000). But this Court has held 

that Forest and Benton do not apply when the defendant does not file a specific and 

immediate request, where there was no indication that the state acted in bad faith, and 

the value of the tape was only questionable. See Tarleton at ¶ 22. Moreover, this Court 

held that the burden shifting approach set forth in Forest and Benton only applied when 

the state fails to respond in good faith to a defendant’s request to preserve evidence. 

State v. Wolf, 154 Ohio App.3d 293, 2003-Ohio-4885, 797 N.E.2d 109, ¶ 11-15 (7th 

Dist.). Ultimately, because appellant makes no arguments concerning the contents of 

the tape and there is no evidence that the state acted in bad faith when it erased the 

tape, appellant failed to meet his burden that the tape would have had a reasonable 

probability to affect the outcome of his trial. 

{¶92} Accordingly, appellant’s seventh assignment of error is without merit and 

is overruled. 

{¶93} Appellant’s eighth assignment of error states: 

 THE STATE COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT BY 

DELIBERATELY ADMITTING INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE TO 

THE JURY ONLY TO WITHDRAW THAT EVIDENCE ONCE 

INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY TESTIMONY HAD BEEN ELICITED 

REGARDING THE SAME. 

{¶94} Appellant argues that, in two instances, the state committed prosecutorial 

misconduct by eliciting testimony concerning two proposed exhibits only to later 

withdraw those proposed exhibits. 

{¶95} Given our resolution of appellant’s second and third assignments of error, 

appellant’s eighth assignment of error is moot. 

{¶96} Appellant’s ninth assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW IN 

SENTENCING APPELLANT TO CONSECUTIVE JAIL TERMS AS PART 

OF A COMMUNITY CONTROL SANCTION. 
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Case No. 16 MA 105

{¶97} Appellant argues that his sentence was contrary to law in that the trial 

court ordered him to serve two six month jail terms consecutively as part of a 

community control sanction. Furthermore, appellant argues that a jail term of 12 months 

is contrary to law. 

{¶98} The trial court sentenced appellant to five years of community control with 

the Adult Parole Authority. As a condition of community control, the court ordered 

appellant to serve the first six months of each count in jail and for those two jail terms to 

run consecutively. 

{¶99} Because we are reversing appellant’s conviction for receiving stolen 

property, his sentence on that count is necessarily vacated. The only sentence that 

remains, therefore, is appellant’s sentence for tampering with vehicle identifying 

numbers. Thus, there is no issue concerning consecutive sentences. 

{¶100} Accordingly, appellant’s ninth assignment of error is moot. 

{¶101} Appellant’s tenth assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ISSUING A RESTITUTION 

ORDER NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 

{¶102} The trial court ordered two restitution payments. It ordered appellant to 

make restitution to Auto Owner’s Insurance in the amount of $10,713.38 and it ordered 

appellant to make restitution to Cornerstone in the amount of $1,000.00. 

{¶103} The restitution order was necessarily based on the receiving stolen 

property in the form of a vehicle conviction. Because we are reversing that conviction, 

appellant’s tenth assignment of error is now moot. 

{¶104} For the reasons previously stated, appellant’s conviction for tampering 

with vehicle identifying numbers is hereby affirmed. Appellant’s conviction for receiving 

stolen property in the form of a vehicle is reversed, his sentence on that conviction is 

vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to law and 

consistent with this opinion. Additionally, the restitution order is vacated. 

Waite, J., concurs 

Robb, P. J., concurs 
[Cite as State v. Dotson, 2018-Ohio-2481.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, appellant’s first, fourth, 

fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments of error are without merit and are overruled. 

Appellant’s second assignment of error has merit in part and is sustained in part. 

Appellant’s third assignment of error has merit and is sustained. Appellant’s eighth, 

ninth, and tenth assignments of error are moot. It is the final judgment and order of this 

Court that the judgment of the Common Pleas Court, Mahoning County, Ohio, is hereby 

affirmed as to appellant’s tampering with vehicle identifying numbers conviction. It is 

reversed as to appellant’s receiving stolen property in the form of a vehicle conviction, 

his sentence on that conviction is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further 

proceedings according to law and consistent with the opinion herein. The restitution 

order is also vacated. Costs taxed against appellee. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution. 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.