*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 11, 2009*

Decided May 14, 2009

Before

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐3208

DANIEL S. KONAR,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 07 C 628

John W. Darrah,

Judge.

ORDER

Daniel Konar sued the State of Illinois in federal court after he became unhappy with

the course of a divorce and custody matter.  Konar claims that rulings issued in that state‐

court litigation have violated his constitutional rights.  The district court dismissed the

complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity.  We affirm, but modify the judgment to

reflect a dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Richards v. Kiernan, 461 F.3d 880, 886 (7th

Cir. 2006).  

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐3208 Page 2

The State of Illinois is the only defendant named in Konar’s amended complaint.  His

lawsuit, filed shortly before judgment was entered in his divorce proceeding, accuses the

State of depriving him of custody of his son without due process and engaging in gender

discrimination.  The State’s conduct, according to Konar, violated his rights under the

Constitution as well as Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.  As

relief Konar asked that the district court exercise jurisdiction over his Illinois divorce case,

declare the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act unconstitutional, and award

him $12 million in damages.  The court had earlier dismissed Konar’s first complaint on the

ground that the State was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and at the

State’s urging, the court dismissed the amended complaint on the same basis, this time with

prejudice.  Our review is de novo.  See Vill. of DePue, Illinois v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 537 F.3d

775, 782 (7th Cir. 2008).   

In the district court the State argued that the entire complaint could be dismissed

with prejudice under the Eleventh Amendment, but in this court the State retreats from that

position.  As the State now concedes, Title IX abrogates its Eleventh Amendment immunity,

see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d‐7(a)(1); Cherry v. Univ. of Wis. Sys. Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 554‐55

(7th Cir. 2001), and that immunity, although intact for Konar’s remaining claims, see

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985), would not have allowed dismissal with

prejudice of nonfrivolous claims that might have been litigated in state court, see Feldman v.

Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1999).  But dismissal with prejudice was still correct because

Konar’s complaint is frivolous.  Except for the Title IX claim, the suit is premised on 42

U.S.C. § 1983, yet that statute does not authorize litigation against the states for violations of

the Constitution or federal law, including treaty obligations.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Holton v. Ind. Horse Racing Comm’n, 398 F.3d 928, 929 (7th Cir.

2005); see also Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 827‐28 (7th Cir. 2007).  Thus, a straightforward

application of § 1983 resolves all but the Title IX claim, and the district court should have

refrained from addressing the question of sovereign immunity.  See Vt. Agency of Natural

Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 779‐80 (2000); Holton, 398 F.3d at 929.

Moreover, Konar cannot state a claim under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or

the Vienna Declaration because both are non‐binding declarations that provide no private

rights of action.  See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14‐25, 1993, Vienna

Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc A/ CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993); Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,

U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Sosa v. Alvarez‐Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (explaining

that Universal Declaration is simply a statement of principles and not a treaty or

international agreement that would impose legal obligations); Jochen von Bernstorff, The

Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic

Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 903, 918 (2008) (noting
No. 08‐3208 Page 3

that Vienna Declaration is “non‐binding”).  And to the extent that Konar claims a violation

of Title IX in connection with a court‐ordered parenting class, he does not allege that an

educational institution excluded him from participation, denied him benefits, or subjected

him to sex discrimination within the context of the program itself, as would be necessary to

state a claim under Title IX.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640‐41 (1999); Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp.,

551 F.3d 599, 604‐05 (7th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1018‐

19 (7th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is modified to reflect a dismissal for

failure to state a claim, and we AFFIRM as modified.