alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DAVID BOYD KERR,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

No. 98-7352

RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director of

the Virginia Department of

Corrections,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge.

(CA-98-160-2)

Submitted: March 30, 1999

Decided: April 29, 1999

Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

David Boyd Kerr, Appellant Pro Se. William W. Muse, Assistant

Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

David Boyd Kerr, a Virginia inmate, appeals the district court's

order denying relief on his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We dismiss the appeal.

In his petition, Kerr claimed that two disciplinary convictions that

resulted in the loss of good time credits violated the Due Process

Clause. The Supreme Court of Virginia previously had, without discussion, denied Kerr's state habeas corpus challenges to the convictions as "frivolous." The magistrate judge recommended that the

district court defer to the state court decisions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(d) (West Supp. 1999) and deny relief. Over Kerr's objections,

the district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge

and denied the petition.

Because each of the Virginia court's decisions is devoid of any reasoning supporting the conclusion that Kerr's habeas corpus petitions

were frivolous, it is impossible to say whether deference to those

decisions under § 2254(d) was correct. However, after carefully

reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that Kerr was afforded

all the process due him in connection with both disciplinary proceedings. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974). In each case,

he received notice of the charge against him, a statement of the reasons for the unfavorable decision, and the opportunity to call witnesses in his defense.

We accordingly deny a certificate of appealabilty and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

 2
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-16-0000832

15-OCT-2018

07:55 AM
<PAGE>   1

AMERUS LIFE HOLDINGS, INC.
EXHIBIT 11 - STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                      Nine Months Ended                   Three Months Ended
                                      September 30, 1998                  September 30, 1998
                                   ----------------------------     ---------------------------------
                                             Number     Per                     Number         Per
                                    Net        of      Share         Net         of           Share
                                   Income    Shares    Amount       Income      Shares        Amount
                                   ------    ------    ------       ------      ------      ---------
                                              (in thousands, except per share amounts)
<S>                                <C>       <C>      <C>          <C>         <C>         <C>     
Basis EPS
   Net Income                      $49,482   34,393   $   1.44     $ 6,862       33,726     $   0.20 
                                                                                                     
Effect of dilutive                                                                                   
   securities                                                                                        
       Option                         --        220      (0.01)       --            145         --   
       Warrants                       --         82       --          --             80         --   
       Stock appreciation rights      --       --         --          --           --           --   
                                   -------   ------   --------     -------       ------     -------- 
Diluted EPS                        $49,482   34,695   $   1.43     $ 6,862       33,951     $   0.20 
                                   =======   ======   ========     =======       ======     ======== 

</TABLE>
Summary of Non-Employee Director Compensation, effective April 28, 2005



 Exhibit 10.14 
  
 Journal Communications, Inc. 
 Summary of Non-Employee Director Compensation 
 Effective Date: April 28, 2005 
  

					
	 Cash Compensation
	  	 	 	 
	 Annual Retainer Fee
	  	$	30,000	 
	 Meeting Fees:
	  	 	 	 
	 (Per Meeting)
	  	$	1,500	 
	 (Teleconference Meeting)
	  	$	750	 
		
	 Committee Retainers
	  	 	 	 
	 Compensation Committee Chair
	  	$	7,500	 
	 Human Resources Committee Chair
	  	$	5,000	 
	 Lead Director/Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Chair
	  	$	10,000	 
	 Audit Committee Chair
	  	$	7,500	 
		
	 Equity Compensation
	  	 	 	 
	 Annual Share Grant (at Annual Meeting of Shareholders)
	  	 	3,000 shares 	(1)



	(1)	Full value unrestricted grant of Class B-2 Common Stock of Journal Communications, Inc.
EX-35 (d)
(logo) WELLS FARGO

Corporate Trust Services
MAC N2702-011
9062 Old Annapolis Road
Columbia, MD 21045
410 884-2000
410 715-2380 Fax

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

March 13, 2007

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.

RE: Annual Statement As To Compliance for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-7

Per Section 9.11 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, dated as of 5/1/2006,
the undersigned Officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (Master Servicer), hereby
certifies the following for the 2006 calendar year or portion thereof:

(A)     a review of such party's activities during the preceding calendar year
        or portion thereof and of such party's performance under this Agreement,
        or such other applicable agreement in the case of an Additional
        Servicer, has been made under such officer's supervision,

(B)     to the best of such officer's knowledge, based on such review, such
        party has fulfilled all its obligations under this Agreement, or such
        other applicable agreement in the case of an Additional Servicer, in
        all material respects throughout such year or portion thereof, or, if
        there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligation in any material
        respect, specifying each such failure known to such officer and the
        nature and status thereof and

(C)     in the case of the Master Servicer, to the best of such officer's
        knowledge, each Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under its
        Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout such year, or,
        if there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligation in any
        material respect specifying each such failure known to such officer and
        the nature and status thereof.

Certified By:
/s/ Reid Denny
Reid Denny, Vice President

Certified By:
/s/ Gordon Johnson
Gordon Johnson, Assistant Secretary
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED May 20, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-30959 Summary Calendar

HELEN RHEAMS, on behalf of Walter James Rheams; TAMMY RHEAMS; ALISHA MONIQUE THOMAS, on behalf of Jamilah Monet Rheams, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus VICTOR MARLER, ETC.; ET AL., Defendants, VICTOR MARLER, Officer; UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.; JASON POE; LARRY JONES, Special Agent; WILLIE GRAVES; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 00-CV-912

-------------------- Before GARWOOD, WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Appellants appeal from a judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994).No. 02-30959 -2- They assign error to the district court’s determination that Walter Rheams’s pending criminal proceedings mandated that the suit be dismissed or, alternatively, stayed until resolution of the criminal proceedings . Rheams’s death during the pendency of this appeal, however, necessarily brings a premature end to his criminal proceedings. See United States v. Estate of Parsons , 314 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2002). We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court dismissing the suit and remand the case for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Statement of Financial Condition for Princeton Mining Company at March 31, 
1998 (unaudited) and the Statement of Income for the three months ended March 
31, 1998 (unaudited) and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such 
financial statements.

</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                              42
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    42
<PP&E>                                          25,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  25,042
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           12,800
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       956,334
<OTHER-SE>                                    (944,092)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    25,042
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,496
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (2,496)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (2,496)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (2,496)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.00)
        









</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

BYRON CALDERON,

Appellant,

§

§

§

No. 08-13-00361-CV

Appeal from the

384th District Court

v.

YP ADVERTISING, L.P., 

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2013DCV0539)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the Appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal and 

concludes the motion should be granted and the appeal should be dismissed. We therefore 

dismiss the appeal. We further order costs of the appeal are taxed against the party incurring 

same, and this decision be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 23RD DAY OF MAY, 2014.

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
194 La. 1099

#### STATE ex rel. PEREZ, Dist. Atty., v. MERAUX, Judge. In re PEREZ, Dist. Atty.

No. 35778.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 17, 1940.

L. H. Perez and Rudolph M. McBride, both of New Orleans, for relator.

Richard A. Dowling, of New Orleans, for respondent.

FOURNET, Justice.

Upon application of the District 'Attorney for the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, we issued a rule to the judge of said district to show cause why writs of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition should not issue in order to review his (district judge’s) ruling refusing to re-cuse himself on the trial of a motion to annul and set aside the proceedings of the Plaquemines Parish Jury Commission an'd to quash the general venire lists selected by them, as well as the grand and petit jury venires.

In response to the rule the district judge filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that all the matters presented by the application, including the writs prayed for, have become moot questions, in that, since the issuance of the rule, by order of this court dated April 3, 1940, he (district judge) has been temporarily relieved of his official duties by the Honorable Paul Debaillon, one of the judges of the Fifteenth Judicial District of Louisiana.

The relator, in a pleading subsequently filed, has joined the respondent judge in asking that the matter be dismissed for the reason that the issues therein raised have become moot, thus leaving nothing before us for consideration.

For the foregoing reason it is ordered that the rule herein issued is dissolved and the writs applied for are refused.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. FABIAN DAVID MONGE, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-10367D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00863-RCCCRP-1
MEMORANDUM *

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. FRANK STEVE LOPEZ, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-10370D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00863-RCCCRP-5

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Raner C. Collins, Chief District Judge, Presiding 

# FILED
MAR 19 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.Page 2 of 3 Submitted March 9, 2015 **

San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE, M. SMITH, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 1. Defendants Fabian Monge and Frank Lopez contend federal prosecutors violated the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, by failing to produce the Sierra Vista Police Department’s recording of Belen Ro mero’s interview. We need not resolve that issue because we conclude that, even if we credit defendants’ argument, any violation that occurred was harmless. Romero’s testimony had no impact on the case against Lopez, whom she did not even mention. Her testimony equally clearly had no effect on the first three counts of which Monge was convicted, as those convictions rested primarily on the testimony of Monge’s other drivers. As to count four (which charged Monge with possession with intent to distribute on the day Romero was arrested with 272 pounds of marijuana), independent evidence of Monge’s guilt—including the marijuana in the car, the route Romero drove, and other drivers’ testimony that Romero worked for Monge—is strong enough to sustain the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. CardenasMendoza , 579 F.3d 1024, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 2009).

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).Page 3 of 3 2. Defendants also argue that the jury should have been instructed that it could draw an adverse inference from the government’s failure to record a witness interview. The district court properly re jected defendants’ proposed instruction as having no legal basis, and instead allowe d defendants to argue for an adverse inference in closing arguments. Defendant s cite no authority on appeal that calls into question the district court’s ruling. 3. Nothing in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument warranted a mistrial. The prosecutor’s allegations about the twin defendants and about reputation evidence had nothing to do with Monge and Lopez. None of the prosecutor’s comments about the defense’s case or the defense attorneys were impermissibly inflammatory. The prosecution’s statemen t that witness Michael Kreyling “didn’t lie” did not amount to a personal assura nce of Kreyling’s credibility but instead was a segue between a summary of Kreyling’s testimony and the evidence corroborating it. 4. Appellant Monge’s motion for rese ntencing is more appropriately directed to the district court in the first instance. We therefore DENY the motion without prejudice. AFFIRMED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL,

Petitioner

v.

WILLIAM J. HIGGINS, JR.

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 2504 Disciplinary Docket No. 3

No. 110 DB 2018

Attorney Registration No. 84428

(Bedford County)

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 10 th day of July , 2018, upon consideration of the Verified

Statement of Resignation, William J. Higgins, Jr.

, is disbarred on consent from the Bar

of this Commonwealth, see Pa.R.D.E. 215, and he shall comply with the p rovisions of

Pa.R.D.e. 217. Re spondent shall pay costs to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to

Pa.R.D.E. 208(g).
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

March 26, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 132601 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 132601 

 COA: 272703 

Macomb CC: 2005-001137-FH,

SHANNON BRIAN BURTON, 2005-001138-FH 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 9, 2006 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d0319 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

March 26, 2007 

 Clerk
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Bonnie Mink

v. Case No. 05-cv-408-PB

East Coast Lumber

O R D E R

Re: Document No. 10, Motion to Remand to State Court

Ruling: The defendant, as the removing party, bears the

burden of demonstrating that the amount in controversy requirement

has been satisfied. Kivikovski v. Smart Professional Photocopying

Corporation, 2001DNH043. Defendant’s references to a disputed

telephone conversation concerning settlement and a nonspecific

statement that an award of attorney’s fees will satisfy the

jurisdictional amount are not sufficient to meet this burden.

Motion granted. 

/s/ Paul Barbadoro

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

Date: December 26, 2005

cc: Brian Stern, Esq.

 Edwinna Vanderzanden, Esq.

Case 1:05-cv-00408-PB Document 15 Filed 12/26/05 Page 1 of 1
#### SECURITY BANKING CO. v. MADDOX et al.

No. 5508.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Jan. 3, 1938.

Joel L. Fletclier, of Colfax, for- appellants.

Hawthorn, Stafford & Pitts, of Alexandria, for appellee.

DREW, Judge.

Plaintiff had executory process issue on a real estate mortgage against defendants. The property was advertised for sale to take place on March 13, 1937. ' On March 3d prior to the sale date, defendants filed a *petition*alleging many irregularities in the issuance of the writ of execution, which are not necessary to enumerate here, and prayed for a temporary restraining order and finally for an injunction against the sale. A rule nisi issued, made returnable on March 9th. On that date the lower court sustained an exception of no cause or right of action filed by plaintiffs in execution and dismissed the petition for a restraining order and injunction. From this judgment, defendants prosecute this, a devolutive, appeal. No suspensive appeal was prayed for or granted. On the day advertised for the sale, the property was sold by the sheriff of Grant parish and the funds derived therefrom distributed.'

In this court appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The motion will have to be sustained and the appeal dismissed.

In the case of Miller v. People’s Homestead & Savings Association, 161 So. 656, 657, we passed upon this identical question. The facts in that case and the one at bar are identical in most respects. In that opinion we said:

> “But, conceding that plaintiff did not mistake his remedy, his position now is -beyond relief. He appealed devolutively from the judgment dismissing his suit in toto. This action did not prevent sale of his property. It was sold as advertised. The questions propounded by his application for injunction are now moot. A sale under such circumstances is none the less valid. No judgment now could disturb the status of things resulting from the sale.

Citizens’ Bank of Columbia v. Bellamy Lumber Company (Wheel & Company, Intervenor), 140 La. 497, 73 So. 308; Ouachita National Bank v. Shell Beach Const. Company, 154 La. 709, 98 So. 160; T. Hofman-Olsen, Inc., v. Northern Lumber Company, 160 La. 839, 107 So. 593.”

The appeal herein is therefore dismissed, at plaintiff’s cost.