alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.a  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of DataJungle Software Inc. (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:  The Report on Form 10-QSB for the three and six months ended June 30, 2006 (the Form 10-QSB) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Form 10-QSB.  Dated: August 14, 2006/s/Edward Munden
Edward Munden
President & Chief Executive Officer   The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-QSB pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-B and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1409

_____________________________

ROBERT E. STAHR,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—Original Jurisdiction.

November 15, 2018

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2004). 

RAY, KELSEY, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Robert E. Stahr, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 01-51144 Summary Calendar

LINDA FUENTES, Parent and Next Friend of Pablo Anastasio Llamas and Celia Llamas,

Minors and Celia Llamas,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

REEVES COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Texas

(P-00-CV-19)

September 23, 2002

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The plaintiffs, Linda Fuentes, parent and next friend of Pablo

Anastasio Llamas and Celia Llamas, minor s, and Celia Llamas, are

the surviving minor children (represented by their mother as next2

friend), and the surviving parent of Pablo Llamas-Espino (Llamas)

who was an inmate at the Reeves County Detention Center (RCDC)

between 1997 and 1999. Llamas died of a heart attack which he

s ustained while incarcerated in his jail cell and the plainti ffs

brought suit against Reeves County, Texas, asserting that medical

personnel on duty at the jail facility were delib erately

indifferent to his medical needs. Reeves County moved for a

summary judgment and the district judge granted the motion and

entered a final judgment that plaintiffs take nothing. Plaintiffs

timely appeal to this Court.

We have carefully reviewed the briefs, the reco rd excerpts,

and relevant portions of the record itself. For the reasons stated

by the district judge in his order granting defendant’s motion for

summary judgment filed November 1, 20 01, we affirm the final

judgment that t he plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant are

dismissed with prejudice.

AFFIRMED

.
Summary of Compensation Arrangement btw Agilent and Adrian T Dillon



 Exhibit 10.49 
  
 Summary of Compensation Arrangement between Agilent and Adrian T. Dillon 
  
 Adrian T. Dillon is Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President,
Finance and Administration. For the fiscal year 2005, his compensation arrangement is: (1) an annual base salary of $650,000; (2) a short-term target bonus of 70 percent of base salary; and (3) 51,000 shares available under the long-term performance
program and a stock option grant for 80,000 shares. As Chief Financial Officer of Agilent, Mr. Dillon is required to attain an investment level in Agilent’s stock equal to three times annual salary, including direct ownership of at least 15,000
shares of Agilent common stock. This stock ownership level must be attained by the later of five years from election or the end of fiscal year 2007. Mr. Dillon’s employment is at-will.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ROBERT HARRIS,

Defendant.

4:23CR3057

ORDER

Defendant has moved to continue the trial, (Filing No. 30), because 

Defendant and defense counsel need additional time to fully review the 

discovery. The motion to continue is unopposed. Based on the showing set forth 

in the motion, the court finds the motion should be granted. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED:

1) Defendant’s motion to continue, (Filing No. 30), is granted.

2) The trial of this case is set to commence before the Honorable John 

M. Gerrard, Senior United States District Judge, in in Courtroom 1, 

United States Courthouse, Lincoln, Nebraska at 9:00 a.m. on 

February 26, 2024, or as soon thereafter as the case may be called, 

for a duration of four (4) trial days. Jury selection will be held at 

commencement of trial.

3) Expert witness disclosures as required under Rule 16 must be 

served on or before February 16, 2024.

4) The ends of justice served by granting the motion to continue 

outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy 

trial, and the additional time arising as a result of the granting of the 

motion, the time between today’s date and February 26, 2024 shall 

be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the 

requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, because although counsel 

have been duly diligent, additional time is needed to adequately 

prepare this case for trial and failing to grant additional time might 

4:23-cr-03057-JMG-CRZ Doc # 31 Filed: 11/21/23 Page 1 of 2 - Page ID # 54
result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) & (h)(7). 

Failing to timely object to this order as provided under this court’s 

local rules will be deemed a waiver of any right to later claim the time 

should not have been excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.

Dated this 21st day of November, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Cheryl R. Zwart

United States Magistrate Judge

4:23-cr-03057-JMG-CRZ Doc # 31 Filed: 11/21/23 Page 2 of 2 - Page ID # 55
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<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                            55,935
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                           37,789
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                             37,913
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<TOTAL-INVEST>                                 114,817
<CASH>                                          14,639
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                               3,933
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                           6,825
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 180,669
<POLICY-LOSSES>                                 52,529
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                             38,631
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                                0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                  4,872
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        38,318
<OTHER-SE>                                      41,262
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   180,669
<PREMIUMS>                                      45,885
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                              4,494
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                               1,936
<OTHER-INCOME>                                     339
<BENEFITS>                                      28,529
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                          0
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                            20,506
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,619
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,296
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,311
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,311
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.58
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.58
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                  55,371
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                  0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                   0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                     0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                 52,529
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

William Alexander Parks

v. Case No. 04-cv-445-PB

Carol A. Tatarinowicz, et al.

NOTICE OF RULING

Re: Document No. 33, Plaintiff’s Memorandum 

in Opposition to State of New Hampshire’s 

Motion to Dismiss

Ruling: I treat plaintiff’s late objection to the state’s

motion to dismiss as a motion to reconsider my April 12, 2005 order

granting the motion to dismiss. The motion to reconsider does not

provide good grounds to reconsider my prior order. Motion denied.

Entered by: Paul Barbadoro, District Judge

Date: June 24, 2005

cc: William Alexander Parks, pro se

Karla J. Black, Esq.

Donald Gardner, Esq.

Lawrence Gormley, Esq.

Daniel J. Mullen, Esq.

Kenneth D. Murphy, Esq.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-1597

JIHBIN HWANG,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CITY OF GREENBELT; ERNEST JOHNSON; GREENBRIER

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION; JOHN DOE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA99-3825-PJM)

Submitted: August 30, 2000 Decided: September 6, 2000

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jihbin Hwang, Appellant Pro Se. Daniel Karp, Michelle Lee Seidleck,

ALLEN, JOHNSON, ALEXANDER & KARP, Baltimore, Maryland; Rhonda Lee

Weaver, Upper Marlboro, Maryland; William John Hickey, Thomas

Collier Mugavero, MONTEDONICO, HAMILTON & ALTMAN, Chevy Chase,

Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
1 We have considered only Hwang’s 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West

Supp. 1999) claim because that is the only issue Hwang raised in

his informal brief. See 4th Circuit Local Rule 34(b).

2 Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

April 27, 2000, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on April 28, 2000. Pursuant to Rules

58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the

date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as

the effective date of the district court’s decision. Wilson v.

Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

Jihbin Hwang appeals the district court’s order denying relief

on his civil complaint.1 We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Hwang v.

City of Greenbelt, No. CA-99-3825-PJM (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2000).2 We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
178 La. 925

#### TRASCHER v. DUCOTE.

No. 31732.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 2, 1934.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1934.

Jose A. Morales and Henry J. Rhodes, both of New Orleans (Richard A. Dowling, of New Orleans, of counsel), for appellant.

Harold J. Moore, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee.

BRUNOT, Justice.

The litigants were married on October 25, 1919. They have two minor sons and some community property. The suit is for a separation from bed and board. The suit is based upon alleged threats and acts of cruelty, on the part of the defendant toward the plaintiff, of such a character as to render their living together insupportable.

The plaintiff’s prayer is for the temporary custody of the minor children, for alimony, for an injunction restraining the disposal of the community property, and restraining the defendant from molesting her, and, finally, for a judgment decreeing a separation from bed and board, and perpetuating the injunction.

The answer admits the marriage, the birth, age, and sex of the children and the existence of a community of acquSts and gains, but categorically denies all other allegations of the petition.

This appeal is from a judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s suit.

The case presents only questions of fact, which the litigants seek to establish or disprove by oral testimony alone. We have read the testimony and we find conflicts therein which cannot be reconciled, but the plaintiff is the complainant and the burden is upon her to prove the allegations of her petition by a reasonable preponderance of the credible testimony. We use the word credible advisedly, because the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, is better able to determine their credibility than an appellate court with nothing before it but the typed record.

It is the rule that where oral testimony, alone, is relied upon, the trial judge’s conclusions of fact must be given great weight, and his rulings thereon will not be disturbed unless there be manifest error.

For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellant’s cost.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

HYPERTHERM, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN TORCH TIP COMPANY,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:05-CV-373-JD

The Honorable Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

STIPULATED ORDER

It is HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

For the patent trial scheduled to begin before this Court on February 18, 2009, in the 

presence of the jury or jury panel, either directly or indirectly, and at any time during the jury 

selection and trial: 

1) Neither party may reference or seek to introduce evidence relating to the fact that 

motions in limine were filed or granted;

2) Neither party may reference discovery rulings of the Court;

3) Neither party may assert claims or defenses that have not been plead, or offer 

evidence, testimony, statements, opinions or arguments to support any unpleaded claims or 

defenses, or claims or defenses that have been dismissed, although this paragraph is not intended 

to preclude a party’s ability to offer evidence, testimony, statements, opinions, or arguments on 

those claims and defenses at issue at trial; 

4) Neither party may seek to introduce expert opinion testimony not disclosed in 

their respective experts’ reports;

Case 1:05-cv-00373-JD Document 518 Filed 03/04/09 Page 1 of 2
-2-

5) ATTC, ATTC’s counsel, and ATTC’s witnesses may not seek to introduce any 

evidence, testimony, statement, opinion or argument to support any claim or defense that the 

‘510 and ‘923 Patents are invalid, since this Court has granted summary judgment in 

Hypertherm’s favor of no patent invalidity with respect to the ‘510 and ‘923 Patents (Docket No. 

279), although this paragraph is not intended to preclude a party’s ability to offer evidence, 

testimony, statements, opinions, or arguments on any other claims and defenses at issue at trial; 

and 

6) ATTC, ATTC’s counsel, and ATTC’s witnesses may not seek to introduce any 

opinions of counsel not previously disclosed by ATTC with respect to its “advice of counsel” 

defense for Hypertherm’s charge of willfulness. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: ____________________, 2009 

United States District Judge

March 4, 2009 /s/ Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. cc: Counsel of Record

Case 1:05-cv-00373-JD Document 518 Filed 03/04/09 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Tanja Gavrilovic

v. Civil No. 05-cv-428-SM

Worldwide Language Resources, Inc.

ORDER

Re: Document No. 20, Motion For Reconsideration

Ruling: Denied. In my view the Report and Recommendation is

not based on a manifest error of law and it is properly based

upon the “Fortune Affidavit” (which is now further confirmed by

the “Prince Affidavit”). A party cannot produce what it does not

have. Further, Mr. Meyers’ Affidavit does not establish

compliance with New Hampshire practice or Rule 7.1(c). 

James R. Muirhead

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Date: May 16, 2006

cc: Thomas J. Donovan, Esq.

 Robert E. McDaniel, Esq.

 Jeffrey A. Meyers, Esq.

 Alexander J. Walker, Esq.

Case 1:05-cv-00428-PB Document 24 Filed 05/16/06 Page 1 of 1
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<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                           36,249
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 179,947
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<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                             40,475
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                                0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                  3,702
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   179,947
<PREMIUMS>                                      36,177
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<OTHER-INCOME>                                   1,208
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<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                            16,680
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</TABLE>
**Exhibit 32.01**

 

**Officer Certification**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Public Service Company of Colorado(PSCo) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended Sept. 30, 2009, as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (Form 10-Q),each of the undersigned officers of PSCo certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that, to such officer’s knowledge:

 

(1)          The Form 10-Qfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          The informationcontained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of PSCo as of the dates and forthe periods expressed in the Form 10-Q.

 

Date: Nov. 2, 2009

 
|   | /s/  TIM E. TAYLOR                          |
|--------|---------------------------------------------|
|   | Tim E. Taylor                               |
|   | President and Chief  Executive Officer      |
|   |                                        |
|   | /s/ DAVID M. SPARBY                         |
|   | David M. Sparby                             |
|   | Vice President and Chief  Financial Officer |

 

The foregoing certificationis being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is notbeing filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906, orother document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting thesignature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of thiswritten statement required by Section 906, has been provided to PSCo andwill be retained by PSCo and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

----