In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16-2892

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT E. FOX,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:15-cr-00025 — Jane E. Magnus-Stinson, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2017 — DECIDED DECEMBER 22, 2017

____________________

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Robert Fox was convicted of two 

Hobbs Act robberies. Because he used a firearm to commit the 

robberies, he was subject to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)’s mandatory 

sentencing add-on and was sentenced to 435 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he principally argues that he is entitled to 

a new trial because the district court denied him his right to 

be represented by counsel of his choice. We affirm his conviction. The district court was well within its discretion to deny 
2 No. 16-2892

Fox’s morning-of-trial motion for a continuance when there 

was no indication Fox was particularly close to retaining new

counsel.

Fox also raises three other arguments. He admits that the 

first two, which challenge parts of his conviction, are foreclosed by controlling precedent. He simply wishes to preserve 

them for Supreme Court review. But the government concedes that Fox is correct on his final argument, agreeing that 

he is entitled to resentencing in light of Dean v. United States, 

137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017). We agree. Dean permits district courts 

to take into account the sentencing add-on when fashioning a 

just sentence for the predicate robberies, so the district court 

may impose a less severe sentence on remand. Therefore, we 

vacate Fox’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. Background

Fox was charged with robbing a White Castle restaurant 

and a Speedway gas station in southern Indiana. He was indicted in federal court under the Hobbs Act in January 2015 

and appointed counsel on account of his indigence. Fox had 

some conflict with his appointed counsel and twice wrote to 

the district judge—in July and September of 2015—requesting 

new counsel. But at his November 3 competency hearing, Fox 

did not object to continued representation by appointed counsel and made no representations that he or his family were

attempting to retain private counsel. Indeed, his appointed 

counsel told the court that Fox wanted to resolve the case but 

wanted more time to prepare. The district court set trial to 

begin on February 16, 2016.

At the final pre-trial conference on January 20, 2016, Fox 

requested a continuance and claimed that his family was 
No. 16-2892 3

speaking with potential new representation. The district 

judge noted that she expected a superseding indictment to be 

returned and was inclined to grant a continuance, but she also 

warned that Fox’s case had been pending for a long time, so if 

he planned to retain new counsel, “that needs to happen.” Yet 

five days later, at the initial hearing on the superseding indictment (which was almost entirely unchanged from the original), Fox reversed himself and indicated that he wanted to 

proceed on February 16 after all. As such, he declined to exercise his right to have 30 days between the date of the superseding indictment and trial.

On the morning trial was to begin, Fox changed his position again. He requested a continuance, arguing that his family was attempting to retain private counsel. The district judge 

held a short hearing on the request. Fox’s uncle testified that 

the family had talked to an attorney and was “in the process 

of trying to get the money,” but didn’t “have it right now.” He 

also said that Fox’s family had been unaware that trial was to 

start that morning, even though it had been scheduled since 

early November. Fox’s appointed counsel testified that he had 

spoken to the private attorney and that the latter had no plans 

to make an appearance in the case. The district judge denied 

the motion for a continuance, concluding that: (1) Fox had 

changed his position several times, indicating a desire to proceed less than a month before trial; (2) there was no indication 

that the private attorney would actually make an appearance; 

and (3) the lawyers were prepared to proceed and the court 

had summoned witnesses and jurors to be ready for trial that 

morning. 

Fox proceeded to trial and the jury convicted him of both 

robberies and the accompanying counts of using a firearm in 
4 No. 16-2892

connection with crimes of violence.1 He was sentenced to 435 

months’ imprisonment due to the mandatory consecutive sentences for using a firearm in connection with the robberies. See

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Fox timely appealed his conviction and 

sentence.

II. Analysis

A. Denial of Motion for a Continuance

Generally “[w]e will reverse the district court’s denial of a 

motion for a continuance only for an abuse of discretion and 

upon a showing of actual prejudice.” United States v. Shields, 

789 F.3d 733, 748 (7th Cir. 2015). Yet the denial of the right to 

be represented by counsel of the defendant’s choice, assuming 

the defendant can afford such counsel, is a structural error 

warranting reversal irrespective of prejudice. United States v. 

Sellers, 645 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, district 

courts still “have broad discretion to grant or deny a continuance to substitute new counsel.” Id. We will reverse only if the 

district judge’s denial of the motion amounted to “an unreasoning or arbitrary insistence on expeditiousness in the face 

of a justifiable request for delay.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2001)).

Our decisions in Sellers and United States v. Sinclair, 770 

F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 2014), are particularly relevant. The facts in 

Sellers are strange but instructive. The defendant retained an 

attorney, but for some reason that attorney never filed an appearance and instead designated a “secondary counsel” to 

represent the defendant. That counsel missed several filing 

 1 The court declared a mistrial on the fifth count, which charged Fox 

with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
No. 16-2892 5

deadlines and improperly relied on a schedule issued by the 

magistrate judge that assumed the district judge would grant 

a continuance. Despite secondary counsel’s several representations to the court that the defendant’s actual counsel of 

choice would file an appearance soon, it never happened. So 

on the Friday before trial, the defendant told the district court 

that he wished to fire secondary counsel and was in contact 

with two additional attorneys, one of whom he planned to 

hire. The court said it was unlikely to grant a continuance, so 

the defendant reluctantly agreed to continue with secondary 

counsel. Yet on the morning of trial, the defendant appeared 

with the secondary counsel and his new counsel of choice. The 

new counsel said he’d file an appearance only if the court 

granted a continuance to give him time to prepare, but the 

court denied the request on the ground that it had already 

made several attempts to accommodate the situation and the 

promises of original counsel of choice to appear had not come 

to fruition. The defendant proceeded with secondary counsel 

“under protest” and was convicted.

We held that the district court unreasonably denied the defendant the right to be represented by his counsel of choice. 

We determined that the district court had failed to inquire of 

either counsel “how long substitute counsel would need to 

prepare adequately for trial,” which “evidence[d] a failure to 

actually balance the right of choice of counsel against the 

needs of fairness, and suggest[ed] that the district court unreasonably viewed any delay as unacceptable.” Sellers, 645 

F.3d at 837. We also found it troubling that the district court 

might have denied the motion in part because it was annoyed 

with the secondary counsel’s failure to meet filing deadlines, 

or possibly annoyed by eleventh-hour continuance motions 
6 No. 16-2892

more generally. Id. at 838. In the end, “legitimate considerations must be balanced against the reasons in support of the 

motion for a continuance to accommodate new counsel.” Id.

at 838–39. Failure to perform that balancing warranted reversal.

Contrast those facts with Sinclair. There, six days before 

the trial was to begin, the defendant sent a letter to the district 

court seeking a continuance because his family was planning 

to retain a private attorney with their tax refund money. The 

judge held a hearing the day before trial, and the defendant 

reiterated that as soon as the refund money came through, his 

family would retain the new attorney. The defendant also 

stated vague complaints about the federal defender who had 

represented him in his suppression hearing. The judge denied 

the continuance request, pointing out that (1) it was made at 

the last minute and no reason was given for the delay; (2) jurors and witnesses had already been summoned for trial; and 

(3) the retention of the new attorney was still quite uncertain.

We affirmed the denial of the continuance motion. Particularly, we observed that the defendant’s family’s plans to hire 

substitute counsel were “at best preliminary and highly contingent.” Sinclair, 770 F.3d at 1155. Given that uncertainty, 

“[t]he preferred lawyer’s failure to appear in support of a defendant’s continuance motion is a significant factor weighing 

against granting a continuance.” Id. at 1156. We also noted 

that the district judge properly considered the inconvenience 

to jurors and witnesses, which constitute “real costs for real 

people (not to mention the sunk public resources).” Id. at 1155. 

In short, the judge’s decision was “neither unreasoned nor arbitrary.” Id. at 1156.
No. 16-2892 7

Our case bears little resemblance to the situation in Sellers, 

but is quite similar to Sinclair. Like the defendant in Sinclair, 

Fox sought a continuance very near the trial date, had no reason to wait that long, and had an uncertain plan to retain new 

counsel. Indeed, Fox waited longer than the Sinclair defendant to make his motion, and his plan to hire an attorney was 

even more speculative than was Sinclair’s. Fox’s uncle didn’t 

specify when the family would have the money together to 

retain new counsel, the new counsel didn’t appear before the 

court, and there was no guarantee that the new counsel would 

take the case even if the money did materialize. Moreover, like 

the district judge in Sinclair, the judge here properly recognized that granting a continuance on the morning of trial 

would impose costs on jurors, witnesses, and the court.

To be sure, Fox had previously sought new counsel several 

times in the months leading up to trial. These requests, however, were always followed by waffling. Fox changed his 

mind several times about whether he wanted new counsel, 

and when he was warned at the final pre-trial hearing to hire 

new counsel as quickly as possible, he decided a few days 

later to proceed with the original trial date anyway. The judge 

heard no more on the subject of new counsel until the morning of trial, so she was entitled to treat the motion as if it were 

an eleventh-hour request. In effect, that’s what it was. Sinclair 

counsels that such a request is properly denied when the plan 

to hire new counsel is too speculative and no new counsel actually appears before the court. 

In Sellers, on the other hand, the defendant sought a continuance for the same reason several times in the weeks leading up to trial, that reason was legitimate, and the defendant 
8 No. 16-2892

showed up the morning of trial with his newly retained counsel. The court denied the motion for a continuance even 

though it knew that the defendant’s original choice of counsel 

had been frustrated, his secondary counsel had performed 

poorly, and new counsel was present and ready to take the 

case. All of those factors counseled in favor of granting a continuance. None exists in this case.

We conclude that the district court was well within its discretion to deny Fox’s last-minute motion for a continuance. 

The judge properly weighed the reasons for and against 

granting relief and reasonably concluded that a continuance 

was not warranted. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the motion. Fox is not entitled to a new trial.

B. Issues Raised for Preservation

Fox raises two arguments that he admits are foreclosed by 

controlling precedent, but seeks to preserve them for Supreme Court review. First, he argues that the indictment in 

this case was insufficient because it did not refer to the 25-year 

mandatory add-on sentence for a second or subsequent conviction for using a firearm in a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i). Our decision in United States v. Cardena, 842 

F.3d 959, 1000 (7th Cir. 2016), is conclusive on that point. We 

observed there that the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244–47 (1998), 

“held that recidivism is not an ‘element’ of an offense, and so 

it need not be found by a jury.” Because the recidivism addon is not an element of the predicate offense, it did not have 

to be included in the indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) 

(“The indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and 
No. 16-2892 9

definite written statement of the essential facts constituting 

the offense charged ....”).2

Second, Fox argues that Hobbs Act robberies are not 

“crimes of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). We held 

otherwise earlier this year in United States v. Anglin, 846 F.3d 

954, 965 (7th Cir. 2017), vacated on other grounds by 138 S. Ct. 

126 (2017). Our sister circuits which have confronted the question agree. United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 292 (6th Cir. 

2017); United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 140–44 (2d Cir. 2016); 

In re St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016); United States 

v. Howard, 650 F. App’x 466, 468 (9th Cir. 2016). We reaffirm 

today that Hobbs Act robberies are crimes of violence under 

Section 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, we affirm Fox’s conviction.

C. Sentencing

Although we decline to disturb Fox’s conviction, we conclude that a remand for resentencing is appropriate in light of 

 

2 We recognize, as we have before, that “there is some tension between 

[Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2251 (2013)] and Almendarez-Torres,” but 

that tension is “for the Supreme Court to resolve.” See United States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2016). Alleyne held that any fact that 

increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an “element” of a crime 

rather than a “sentencing factor,” and therefore must be found by a jury. 

Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. And even before Alleyne, we had suggested that 

Almendarez-Torres is “vulnerable to being overruled.” See United States v. 

Elliott, 703 F.3d 378, 381 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Browning, 436 

F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2006). So Almendarez-Torres may be on its last legs. 

See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring 

in the judgment) (“Almendarez-Torres ... has been eroded by this Court's 

subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court 

now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”). But “the 

continued authority of Almendarez-Torres is not for us to decide.” Browning, 436 F.3d at 782.
10 No. 16-2892

Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017). The parties agree 

on this point. Dean abrogated prior Seventh Circuit precedent 

that required district courts to “determine the proper sentence 

for the [predicate offenses] entirely independently of the section 924(c)(1) add-on.” United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 

437 (7th Cir. 2007). In other words, before Dean, district courts 

had to sentence defendants for predicate offenses as if the significant add-on sentence did not exist. Now, in fashioning a 

just sentence, the court may take into account the mandatory 

384-month add-on to Fox’s sentence for the two robberies. Because this may result in a less severe sentence, we vacate Fox’s 

sentence and remand the case for resentencing.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fox’s motion for 

a continuance to find new counsel on the morning of trial. 

Therefore, we AFFIRM his conviction. However, we VACATE 

Fox’s sentence and REMAND this case for resentencing in 

light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dean.