Nos. 94-4033/95-3791

 

Waymon Powell; Claudell Smith, *

Willie Griffin; Hershel Ward; *

Odell Lawson; International *

Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, *

CLC, and Local 5-475, *

*

 Appellants, *

*

 v. *

 *

Georgia-Pacific Corporation, *

*

 Appellee. *

*

* Appeals from the United States

----------------- * District Court for the Western

* District of Arkansas.

*

International Woodworkers of *

America, AFL-CIO, CLC, and Its *

Local 5-475; Roy Matheny, Jr.; *

and Others, *

*

 Appellants, *

*

 v. *

*

Georgia-Pacific Corporation, *

*

 Appellee. *

 

Submitted: June 14, 1996

Filed: July 19, 1996

 
 The HONORABLE CAROL E. JACKSON, United States District

*

Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by 

designation.

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Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and JACKSON,*

District Judge.

 

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiffs filed this appeal from the district court's order

directing the clerk of the court to disburse certain funds from the court's

registry to the Georgia-Pacific Foundation ("disbursement order") in order

to establish a scholarship program approved by the district court in an

earlier order ("scholarship order"). The substance of the plaintiffs'

appeal, however, focuses on the merits of the scholarship order.

Because the order from which the plaintiffs appealed is not a final

one, we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal from it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The district court quite obviously intended the scholarship order to

represent the final disposition of the case and said so. The order

provided a "'clear and unequivocal manifestation by the trial court of its

belief that the decision made ... [was] the end of the case.'" Goodwin v.

United States, 67 F.3d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1995), quoting Fiataruolo v.

United States, 8 F.3d 930, 937 (2d Cir. 1993). In fact, the order

specifically directed the plaintiffs to file a notice of appeal if they so

desired. The disbursement order, from which the plaintiffs appealed, is

merely a "housekeeping" order, and we have repeatedly held that "the mere

retention of jurisdiction for future ministerial orders does not withhold

the finality required to make [a previous] order appealable." United

States v. 1,431.80 Acres of Land, 466 F.2d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 1972) (per

curiam); see also, e.g., Goodwin, 67 F.3d at 151, and Lewis v. United

States Farmers Home Admin., 992 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1993). Because the
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disbursement order is not a final one, the plaintiffs may not appeal from

it. See Sperry Corp. v. City of Minneapolis, 680 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.

1982), quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1020 (2d Cir. 1975), for

the proposition that parties cannot "'appeal from an order which ... merely

permits an expenditure in accordance with the provisions of ... previous

[final] orders.'" 

Georgia Pacific argues that we must dismiss this case for lack of

jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to file a notice of appeal

within thirty days after the court issued the scholarship order. See Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a). We note, however, that the scholarship order was not

accompanied by a judgment entered on a separate document as required by

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. We therefore conclude that this appeal is "premature

because it precedes the filing of a final judgment." Sanders v. Clemco

Industries, 862 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1988). Had the plaintiffs

appealed from the scholarship order, we might find that they had waived the

separate-document requirement. They did not, however, and the

"'separate-document requirement must be applied mechanically in order to

protect a party's right of appeal'" (emphasis in original). Id. at 167,

quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc., 479 U.S. 966, 969

(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

We therefore dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.