[Cite as Ream v. Graffiti Foods, Ltd., 2017-Ohio-7190.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Steven Ream, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

v. : No. 17AP-179 

 (C.P.C. No. 16CVH11-11342) 

Graffiti Foods, Ltd. et al., : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on August 10, 2017 

 

On Brief: Marshall and Forman LLC, Edward R. Forman, 

John S. Marshall and Samuel M. Schlein, for appellant. 

Argued: Edward R. Forman. 

On Brief: The Behal Law Group LLC, Robert J. Behal and 

Gilbert J. Gradisar, for appellees Argued: Robert J. Behal. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

TYACK, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Steven Ream is appealing from the dismissal of his defamation suit against 

Graffiti Foods, Ltd. and Philip E. Griesinger. He assigns a single error for our 

consideration: 

IN DISMISSING A DEFAMATION CLAIM, THE COURT OF 

COMMON PLEAS ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE 

TENDENCY OF THE FALSE STATEMENTS TO INJURE 

THEIR TARGET IN HIS OR HER TRADE, OCCUPATION, 

OR PROFESSION. 

{¶ 2} Our standard of review for a decision and entry granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 

motion to dismiss is de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 81, 2004-
No. 17AP-179 2 

Ohio-4362, ¶ 5. We accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint. Mitchell v. 

Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). Dismissal may be ordered only if it 

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. 

O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus. 

{¶ 3} Ream was a chef employed with Graffiti Foods, Ltd. until he was fired 

through the actions of Philip Griesinger, the CEO of Graffiti Foods, Ltd. Griesinger is 

alleged to have accompanied the firing with an email sent to persons in the food service 

industry. Ream viewed the email as being defamatory. A common pleas judge did not 

view the email as defamatory and dismissed the lawsuit filed on Ream's behalf. 

{¶ 4} The email is set forth in the complaint which initiated the lawsuit. The 

email reads: 

Effective immediately Chef Steve Ream is no longer 

employed at Graffiti Foods. 

Chef Stephanie Van Den Berg who has worked on projects 

for us over the past year will be working with our Food 

Scientist, Melissa Shimp. 

At Graffiti Foods, one thing that we take very seriously and 

hold great pride in is the high standards and expectations 

we have for the behavior and conduct of all our employees, 

especially anyone in a leadership capacity. When it comes 

to establishing a culture of excellence and positioning 

ourselves to best meet our valued customers, partners, and 

suppliers we believe that our expectations in this area can 

never be high enough. 

Due to these standards, we have had to make a difficult 

decision to part ways with one of our team members. We 

want to ensure you that this decision (as well as past 

personnel decisions) are grounded in the philosophy and 

belief in excellence. We need to have the very best people 

who adhere and fit with our culture of high standards and 

personal accountability. We value you as a partner and 

look forward to continuing to meet your needs while 

rewarding your continued trust in us. 

All inquiries and any questions should come directly to me, 

Phil Griesinger. All of my information is below. 
No. 17AP-179 3 

Regards, Phil. 

(Compl. at ¶ 23.) 

{¶ 5} "Defamation is a false publication that injures a person's reputation, 

exposes him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace; or affects him 

adversely in his trade or business." Sweitzer v. Outlet Communications, Inc., 133 Ohio 

App.3d 102, 108 (10th Dist.1999). In order to establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff 

must show that: (1) the defendant made a false statement of fact; (2) the statement was 

defamatory; (3) the statement was published; (4) the plaintiff suffered injury as a 

proximate result of the publication; and, (5) the defendant acted with the requisite degree 

of fault in publishing the statement. Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 

366, 2012-Ohio-4193, ¶ 77. 

{¶ 6} Here, Ream was not a public figure, so this case does not involve the legal 

issue of actual malice. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) 

(a public official could not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his 

official conduct unless he proved actual malice, that the statement was made with 

knowledge that was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false); Curtis Publishing 

Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-65 (1967)(extending Sullivan rule to public figures in 

addition to public officials) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). Instead, the standard 

is whether the email included any false statements which harmed Ream by affecting him 

adversely in his trade, business, or profession. Jackson v. Columbus, 117 Ohio St.3d 328, 

2008-Ohio-1041, ¶ 9. A lost employment opportunity would constitute actual injury. 

Woods v. Capital Univ., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-166, 2009-Ohio-5672, ¶ 40. If the email 

included statements which were false and harmful, malice or ill-will would be inferred, at 

least at the pleading stage of a lawsuit. The complaint in defamation alleged that the 

statements in the email were false and that Ream was actually fired for asking for a raise 

and for reasons related to workers' compensation. 

{¶ 7} Unlike the trial court judge, we find that the statements could be construed 

as defamatory. Ream was accused of being fired for failing to conduct himself within the 

expected standards for behavior, conduct, and accountability. Although the allegations in 

the email are not specific, they could be construed as alleging that Ream was a bad 
No. 17AP-179 4 

employee at least—guilty of egregious misconduct at worst. His misconduct was 

presented as so bad that he had to be fired. The allegations could be construed as 

harming Ream in any efforts he would make in trying to get another job in the food 

service industry. Whether anyone who received the email believed its allegations is not 

known at this stage of the proceedings. 

{¶ 8} We are not, at this point in the proceedings, dealing with actual facts. The 

motion to dismiss was not converted to a motion for summary judgment. The trial court 

was bound by the allegations within the four corners of the complaint. The email was 

phrased in such a way as to imply, without stating how, that Ream so failed to meet 

Graffiti's high standards and expectations for behavior, conduct, and personal 

accountability that he had to be immediately terminated. (Compl. at ¶ 26.) 

{¶ 9} Counsel for Griesinger and Graffiti Foods, Ltd. argues that the email was 

merely an expression of opinion. In fact, the statement was far more than opinion or fair 

comment on his performance. The statement alleged that chef Ream had engaged in 

conduct bad enough that it necessitated his firing. His being fired was an admitted fact. 

The reason was not stated but made no mention of issues related to a request for a raise or 

workers' compensation. The email strongly implied that chef Ream had engaged in 

misconduct and "effective immediately" was "no longer employed at Graffiti Foods." 

(Compl. at ¶ 23.) Thus, Ream was no longer employed because he was not one of "the 

very best people who adhere and fit with our culture of high standards and personal 

accountability." Id. Those allegations state a claim for defamation. 

{¶ 10} The sole assignment of error is sustained. The dismissal of the lawsuit is 

vacated and the case is remanded to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for 

further appropriate proceedings. 

Judgment reversed and case remanded 

for further proceedings. 

BRUNNER and HORTON, JJ., concur.