alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
10.3


 


ADDENDUM
2 TO FOUNDERS’ AGREEMENT


 


THIS
ADDENDUM 2 TO FOUNDERS’ AGREEMENT (this “Addendum”), effective as of December 31, 2017 (the “Effective
Date”), is made and entered into by and between Triple-V (1999) Ltd. and A-Labs Finance and Advisory Ltd. (each a “Founder”,
and collectively the “Founders”). Each of the Founders shall sometimes be referred to as a “party”
and collectively, as the “Parties”.


 


WHEREAS,
the Founders hereto entered into a Founders’ Agreement, dated as of the September 1, 2017 (the “Agreement”);
and


 


WHEREAS,
the Parties desire to amend the Agreement, as further set forth herein.


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants hereinafter set forth, the Parties agree as follows:


 


		1.	Capitalized
terms not otherwise defined herein shall bear the meaning ascribed to them in the Agreement.



 


		2.	The
parties agree that the Articles attached to this Addendum as Exhibit A shall be adopted by INX Ltd. and shall replace and
supersede any previous forms agreed upon between the parties.



 


		3.	Section
4.1 of the Founders Agreement, relating to the nomination of Board members, shall be deleted, effective as of the date hereof.



 


		4.	Unless
amended hereby, all provisions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.



 


[THE
REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]


 


Confidential


 






    1


     


    

 


Execution
Copy


 


[Signature
Page to Addendum to Founders’ Agreement]


  


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have executed this Addendum as of the date first written above.


 


	/s/ Shy Datika	 	/s/ Doron Cohen – A-Labs Finance and Advisory Ltd.
	Triple-V
    (1999) Ltd.	 	A-Labs
    Finance and Advisory Ltd.


 


Confidential


 


 


2
#### Robert Carlos et al., Appellants, v Rochester General Hospital, Respondent.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff alleges that, while performing repair work on defendant’s power house building, he was injured when the ladder he was climbing tipped to one side and both he and the ladder fell to the ground. The accident was not witnessed. To recover under section 240 (1) of the Labor Law, plaintiff must demonstrate that he was injured in a fall from an elevated worksite or that he was struck by an object that fell from an elevated worksite *(see, Staples v Town of Amherst,*146 AD2d 292). Whether plaintiff fell while on the ladder or was injured in some other manner is, therefore, a critical factual issue. Because the manner in which the accident occurred is within the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff, partial summary judgment is not appropriate *(see, Parsolano v County of Nassau,*93 AD2d 815; *Bruno v Home Mut. Ins. Co.,*91 AD2d 1169). Plaintiff’s testimonial version should be subjected to cross-examination and his credibility assessed by the fact finder after a trial *(see, Castillo v General Acc. Ins. Co.,*111 AD2d 112, 113; *Krupp v Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,*103 AD2d 252, 262; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3212:19). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Curran, J.— summary judgment.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Green, Balio and Lowery, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7111 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7111

  To amend the National Labor Relations Act to require that lists of 
 employees eligible to vote in organizing elections be provided to the 
                    National Labor Relations Board.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 17, 2022

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. Allen, and Mr. Walberg) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                          Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the National Labor Relations Act to require that lists of 
 employees eligible to vote in organizing elections be provided to the 
                    National Labor Relations Board.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Employee Privacy Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. LISTS OF EMPLOYEES ELIGIBLE TO VOTE IN ELECTIONS.

    Section 9(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 
159(c)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Not earlier 
than 7 days after a final determination by the Board of the appropriate 
bargaining unit, the Board shall acquire from the employer a list of 
all employees eligible to vote in the election to be made available to 
all parties, which shall include the names of the employees, and not 
more than one additional form of personal contact information for the 
employee, (such as a telephone number, an email address, or a mailing 
address) chosen by the employee in writing.''.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE**

**SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q of deCODE genetics, Inc. (the “Registrant”)for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned , KariStefansson, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant,and Lance Thibault, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Registrant,each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that: (1) theReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (2) that the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

 

 
| Dated: May 9, 2008 | /s/ Kari Stefansson            |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
|                    | Kari Stefansson                |
|                    | Chairman, President and  Chief |
|                    | Executive Officer              |
|                    |                           |
|                    |                           |
| Dated: May 9, 2008 | /s/ Lance Thibault             |
|                    | Lance Thibault                 |
|                    | Chief Financial Officer  and   |
|                    | Treasurer                      |

 

----
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Raymond A. Stankunas

v. 06-cv-44-SM

Joseph Statkus, Franklin P. Sylvia, 

Nan McCarthy and Emerald Lake Village District

O R D E R

I herewith approve the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Muirhead dated February 21, 2006 for the reasons set forth therein, no objection

having been filed. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (document

no. 2) is hereby denied without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

April 4 , 2006 _________________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

cc: Raymond A. Stankunas, pro se

Case 1:06-cv-00044-SM Document 8 Filed 04/04/06 Page 1 of 1
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1327

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to prohibit H–2A workers

from bringing law suits against employers except in the State in which

the employer resides or has its principal place of business.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 29, 2001

Mr. WHITFIELD introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to prohibit

H–2A workers from bringing law suits against employers

except in the State in which the employer resides or

has its principal place of business.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON VENUE OF SUITS BROUGHT

4 AGAINST FARMERS BY H–2A WORKERS.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 218(h) of the Immigra6 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1188(h)) is amended

7 by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
2

•HR 1327 IH

1 ‘‘(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an

2 H–2A worker may not bring an action under State or Fed3 eral law arising out of employment authorized under this

4 section against the employer except in the State in which

5 the employer resides or has its principal place of busi6 ness.’’.

7 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

8 subsection (a) applies to actions commenced after the date

9 of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JACARA THOMPSON, on her own behalf 

and on behalf of her minor son J.T.;

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

TODD SCHMADERER, individually, And in 

his official capacity as City of Omaha, 

Nebraska Chief of Police; BRIAN DIMINCO, 

(Shield No. 1988), individually and his 

official capacity as City of Omaha Police 

Officer; OFFICER TYLER BOYER, (Shield 

No. 2458), individually and his official 

capacity as City of Omaha Police Officer; 

OFFICER PHILLIPS, (Shield No. 2452), 

individually and his official capacity as City 

of Omaha Police Officer; and CITY OF 

OMAHA, NEBRASKA, DOUGLAS 

COUNTY,

Defendants.

8:23CV245

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jacara Thompson, a non-prisoner, filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in 

Forma Pauperis. Filing No. 2. Upon review of Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff is financially eligible to proceed in forma pauperis. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis is 

granted, and the Complaint shall be filed without payment of fees. Plaintiff is advised 

that the next step in her case will be for the Court to conduct an initial review of her 

claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2). The Court will conduct this initial review in its normal course of business.

8:23-cv-00245-JFB-PRSE Doc # 5 Filed: 06/09/23 Page 1 of 2 - Page ID # 37
2

Dated this 9th day of June, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

Joseph F. Bataillon

Senior United States District Judge

8:23-cv-00245-JFB-PRSE Doc # 5 Filed: 06/09/23 Page 2 of 2 - Page ID # 38
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-2538
ELLIS TALEU, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND; PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; ROBERT P. FOX, Officer #1545; BENNIE SKIBICKI, Officer #1707, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA94-462-PJM) Submitted: February 28, 1997 Decided: April 3, 1997 Before ERVIN and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Ellis Taleu, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Jay Heyward Creech, Assistant State's Attorney, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Ellis Taleu, Jr., appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment to the Defendants in his civil rights action. The record does not contain a transcript of the July 10, 1995, summary judgment proceedings or oral opinion and order. Appellant has the burden of including in the record on appeal a transcript of all parts of the proceedings material to the issues raised on appeal.Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); 4th Cir. Local R. 10(c). By failing to produce a transcript or to qualify for the production of a transcript at government expense, Appellant has waived review of the issues on appeal which depend upon the transcript to show error. See Powell v. Estelle , 959 F.2d 22, 26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 1025 (1992); Keller v. Prince George's Co. , 827 F.2d 952, 954 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987). We have reviewed the record before the court and find no reversible error. We therefore affirm the district court's order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Thurman GRIGGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

Dec. 15, 1953.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1954.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; W. May Walker, Judge.

Affirmed.
1Exhibit 172 and 173 contain exactly 200 pages. The Clerk

of Court’s required charge is twenty cents per page. Plaintiff

will be supplied copies when his $40.00 is received.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Dennis A. Smith

v. Civil No. 05-cv-374-JD

New Hampshire State Prison, Warden, et al.

O R D E R

 Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of my order denying him a

copy of two exhibits which he filed with his petition.1 In his

motion he said he was indigent, that he gets no prisoner pay, and

that his mother is not in a position to fund copying charges. He

requested copies on credit to be paid for in the future from an

inmate account with no money in it. The court is not permitted

to use government funds to make copies for him nor is it

permitted to extend credit. The motion for reconsideration is

denied. 

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: March 23, 2006

cc: Dennis A. Smith, pro se

Case 1:05-cv-00374-JD Document 18 Filed 03/23/06 Page 1 of 1
Opinion issued October 1, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-19-00900-CV

———————————

MANSOUR SHOJAIE, Appellant

V.

HARRIS COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR-COLLECTOR, Appellee

On Appeal from the 189th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2019-27435

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Mansour Shojaie, has neither established indigence for purposes of 

court costs nor paid or made arrangementsto pay the fee for preparing the clerk’s 

record. SeeTEX. R. CIV. P. 145;TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(a), (b). On February 20, 2020, 

appellant was notified that this appeal was subject to dismissal if appellant did not 
2

submit written evidence that he had paid, or made arrangements to pay the fee for 

preparing the clerk’s record on or before March 23, 2020. After more than six 

months, appellant did not adequately respond.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX.R.APP.

P. 37.3(b), 42.3(b), 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Hightower and Adams.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Robert A. Heghmann,

Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 04-cv-100-SM

Town of Rye, NH, et al.,

Defendants

NOTICE OF RULING

Re: (Document No. 77) Supplement to Motion for an

 Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses

Ruling: Supplement to Motion for Attorneys Fees (document

no. 77) is accepted, the motion for supplemented fees is granted,

without objection. Total fees are awarded against plaintiff in

favor of the moving defendants in the amount of $26,953.00, and

total costs in the amount of $2,028.98. So ordered.

Entered by: Steven J. McAuliffe, Chief Judge

Date: April 11, 2006

cc: Robert A. Heghmann

William C. Saturley, Esq.

Richard Bell, Esq.

Daniel J. Mullen, Esq.

Charles P. Bauer, Esq.

Djamel Hafiani, Esq.

Case 1:04-cv-00100-SM Document 79 Filed 04/11/06 Page 1 of 1
#### BREAUX v. REEVES, Acting Tax Collector.

No. 1435.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

March 4, 1935.

John R. Hunter, of Alexandria, for appellant.

Woosley & Cavanaugh, of Leesville, for ap-pellee.

ELLIOTT, Judge.

In this ease the record shows a motion on the part of plaintiff, appellee, to dismiss the appeal on the ground the record does not disclose that the right claimed has a value exceeding $100.

 The ground stated in the motion is good, but we prefer to ex officio dismiss the appeal on the ground that the only question in controversy is whether Joseph- S. Breaux had timely paid his poll tax for the year 1932. Since that time the Constitution of Louisiana adopted in 1921 has been amended in such a way that the right to vote no longer depends on the payment of a poll tax. Const. 1921, Art. 8, § 2, as amended in 1934. The result is, therefore, there is now no controversy before the court which the court can entertain.

It is therefore ordered that the appeal herein be dismissed at the cost of the appellant.

MOUTON, J., not participating.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

John R. Crooker

v. Civil No. 05-cv-008-JD

Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

O R D E R

John R. Crooker brought a breach of contract action in state

court against his former employer, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (“AB”),

alleging that AB failed to honor its obligations under his

Employment Agreement and his Severance Agreement. AB removed the

case to this court, asserting federal question jurisdiction,

based on preemption of Crooker’s claims by the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and the Labor Management

Act, and diversity jurisdiction. AB then moved to have the case

proceed under Local Rule 9.4, which governs ERISA cases. Crooker

disputed AB’s preemption theory. The court directed AB to file a

motion to dismiss, based on ERISA preemption, and gave Crooker

the options of responding to the motion either by filing an

amended complaint or an objection.

AB filed a motion to dismiss based on ERISA preemption on

October 14, 2005. Crooker responded by filing an amended

complaint on October 28, 2005, in which he alleges two claims,

both under ERISA. Therefore, AB’s motion to dismiss is moot. 

Case 1:05-cv-00008-JD Document 33 Filed 11/17/05 Page 1 of 2
2

Because this case now involves only ERISA claims, it will

proceed under Local Rule 9.4. AB shall file its answer to

Crooker’s current complaint and a copy of the administrative

record within twenty days of the date of this order. LR 9.4(a). 

Thereafter, the case will proceed under Local Rule 9.4 rather

than the standard litigation track. The discovery plan approved

on February 22, 2005, is vacated and will no longer govern

proceedings in this case. See LR 9.4(d).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss

(document no. 27) is terminated as moot.

SO ORDERED.

___

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

November 17, 2005

cc: David A. Garfunkel, Esquire

Andrea K. Johnstone, Esquire

Paul B. Kleinman, Esquire

Shenanne Ruth Tucker, Esquire

Case 1:05-cv-00008-JD Document 33 Filed 11/17/05 Page 2 of 2
#### COTTONPORT BANK v. LEE et al.

No. 2712.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

April 4, 1945.

M. T. Hewes, of New Roads, and Blanche & Wilson, of Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Parker, Seale & Kelton and R. F. Walker, all of Baton Rouge, for appellees.

OTT, Judge.

The issues in this case were stated in our former opinion. La.App., 19 So.2d 656. The case is similar to the case of the same plaintiff against Dunn et al., La.App., 21 So.2d 525, except that in the present case there does not appear to have been filed by the plaintiff a supplemental petition in answer to the exception of vagueness filed by the defendants, setting out the manner in which the plaintiff acquired the notes sued on. .

The principal issue in the case is whether or not the plaintiff Bank has a vendor’s lien on the gas system sequestered in the case. The burden rests'on the plaintiff to show such a lien to support the sequestration against the motion to dissolve the writ. Whether or not plaintiff has such a lien depends on the manner by which it acquired the notes sued on. These notes are made payable to the order of the plaintiff Bank, and the pleadings show that the gas system was sold to the defendants by the Butane Gas & Plumbing Company, but there is nothing in the record to show how the vendor’s lien resulting from the sale in favor of the vendor was transferred to the plaintiff Bank, and how the arrangement among the three parties, the vendor, the vendee and the Bank was consummated, and why the notes were made payable directly to the Bank rather than to the vendor.

Nor does the agreement entered into between the Bank and defendant, William Lee, on August 1, 1942, quoted in our former opinion, explain the transaction by which the Bank acquired the notes on which it now seeks to enforce a vendor’s lien on movables sold by another company to the defendants. We think there should be further proof on this phase of the case before it can be determined whether or not the plaintiff has a vendor’s lien on the property sequestered.

For the reasons above assigned, and for the reasons assigned in the case of Cptton-port Bank v. Dunn et al., supra, our former *528decree is recalled and set aside, and the judgment herein appealed from is annulled and set aside, and it is now ordered that this case be remanded to the district court to be proceeded with according to law and the views herein expressed; cost of the appeal to be paid by defendant, William Lee, and all other cost to await the final termination of the cause.
(July 30, 1990)

#### Anthony Calabrese, an Infant, by His Father and Natural Guardian, Peter Calabrese, Respondent, v Leonard A. Montalbano, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant Montalbano appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Nahman, J.), dated September 1, 1988, which denied his motion to designate a general practitioner as an additional physician on a medical malpractice panel.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

An order denying a motion to designate a specific type of *594practitioner as a panelist on a medical malpractice panel is not appealable as of right pursuant to CPLR 5701 *(see, Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn.,*53 AD2d 169, 174; 7 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 5701.16b). The legislative intent underlying Judiciary Law § 148-a was to provide an expeditious and informal resolution of malpractice litigation. To permit appeals as of right from orders of this kind would thwart the legislative intent *(see, Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., supra).*Furthermore, Judiciary Law § 148-a (8) permits counsel to explore the claimed underlying infirmities of nonbinding panel determinations at the trial of the action. Thus, an appeal from an order denying relief with respect to a medical malpractice panel is permitted only by leave upon a demonstration of good cause shown *(see, Sniedze v South Nassau Community Hosp.,*147 AD2d 630; *Colligan v Sumner,*112 AD2d 265; *Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., supra).*We find that the appellant has failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating "good cause” to warrant granting leave to appeal from the order in question *(see,*Judiciary Law § 148-a [6]; *Ceriello v Brunswick Hosp. Center,*157 AD2d 701, citing *Bernstein v Bodean,*53 NY2d 520, 528-529; *Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., supra).*Bracken, J. P., Kunzeman, Fiber and O’Brien, JJ., concur.