alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IB

Union Calendar No. 259

107TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 84

[Report No. 107–437]

Disapproving the action taken by the President under section 203 of the

Trade Act of 1974 transmitted to the Congress on March 5, 2002.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 7, 2002

Mr. JEFFERSON introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred

to the Committee on Ways and Means

MAY 7, 2002

Reported adversely from the Committee on Ways and Means, committed to

the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

JOINT RESOLUTION

Disapproving the action taken by the President under section

203 of the Trade Act of 1974 transmitted to the Congress on March 5, 2002.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the Congress does not approve the action taken by,

4 or the determination of, the President under section 203
2

•HJ 84 RH

1 of the Trade Act of 1974 transmitted to the Congress on

2 March 5, 2002.

Union Calendar No. 259

107TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 84

[Report No. 107–437]

JOINT RESOLUTION

Disapproving the action taken by the President

under section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974transmitted to the Congress on March 5, 2002.

MAY 7, 2002

Reported adversely, committed to the Committee of the

Whole House on the State of the Union, and orderedto be printed
Exhibit 32.b







CERTIFICATION



I, Larry Bruce, Principal Financial Officer of Blink Logic Inc. (the Company), in compliance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, in connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) on the date hereof, that:



The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Dated: August 14, 2008 |  | /s/Larry Bruce
Larry Bruce
Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer
|---------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-19-00167-CV

DRUE ALLEN HOLLIS, Appellant

V.

PROPATH ASSOCIATES, PLLC,

Appellee

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 352nd District Court

of Tarrant County (352-301866-18)

July 11, 2019

Per Curiam

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the 

appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
# THEA'ITBECNEYGENERAL OF TEXAS AunTIN. TEzxas 78711

March 27, 1973

Honorable John Henry Tatum County Attorney, Angelina County 

### P. 0. BOX582 Lufkin, Texas 75901

Dear Mr. Tatum: Opinion No. H- 21 Re: Whether sentence ofperson convicted offelony may be reduced by time that he has spent in county jail awaiting determination of his appeal.
Inyour request for the opinion ofthis office you state that aman in the county jail was convicted of armed robbery, was sentenced to fourteen years inthe Texas Department of Corrections, and has been in jail for thirty months. His conviction was recently affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because ofthe length oftime he has been injail and because he has apparently reformed andwill make agood citizen, you ask whether adistrict judge has authority to reduce his sentence.

. It is our opinion that the court has nojurisdiction, except for the app:!lcation ofArticle 42.03. Vernon’s Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. l,oenter any order affecting the judgment and sentence. State v. Kiein, 224 S.

### W,2d 250, (Tex. Crim. 1949). Therefore, the district judge may not reduce the overal, sentence to aterm less than fourteen years. On the ot,her hand, Article 42. 03ores provide that thejudge ofthe court mwhich t,hedefendant was convict,ed may, within his discretion, give the defendant credit for time spent mjail. In Ex parte Freeman, 486 S.

### W,2d 556(Tex. Grim. 1972), the court ,_- helo that, under Article 42.03, the trial judge had complete discretion as to credii on a sentence for time spent injail but that. pursuant to N. Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.5711, 23L. Ed. 2d 656, 89S,Ct. 2072 (1969), and Robinson v. Beto, 426 F. 2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970), the defendant is constitutionally entitled to credit for the time from conviction until determination ofhis appeal.
p* 97Honorable John Henry Tatum, page 2 (H-21)

To answer your question specifically, we would state that the district judge has no authority to reduce the defendant’s sentence from fourteen years to some lesser term. He does have discretion, however, to grant credit for pre-trial time ,spent injail between arrest and final conviction. and must give credit for time spent in jail awaiting determination of apx SUMMARY After appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirmation by that court, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to reduce a sentence but does have jurisdiction and discretion to grant credit for time spent injail prior to final conviction and must give credit for time spent injail pending appeal. Very truly yours,

Attorney General of Texas

. APPl$IVED:

DAV:D M. KE-NDALL. Opinion Committee

p. 98
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 05-cr-177-01-SM

Augustin Damian

O R D E R

Defendant Damian’s motion to continue the final pretrial conference and

trial is granted (document 11). Defendant Damian has filed a waiver of speedy

trial. Trial has been rescheduled for the April 2006 trial period. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: March 23, 2006 at 4:30 p.m.

Jury Selection: April 4, 2006 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:05-cr-00177-SM Document 13 Filed 02/01/06 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

February 1 , 2006

cc: James Gleason, Esq.

Robert Kinsella, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00177-SM Document 13 Filed 02/01/06 Page 2 of 2
#### BEAM et al. v. JEROME LUMBER & SUPPLY CO., Inc.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

Sept. 3, 1954.

Sheppard & Woolslair, Fort Myers, for appellants.

Sheppard & Roberts, Fort Myers, for appellee.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice.

J. L. Beam, the owner of a certain lot in Lee County, made a contract with A. *M.*Henderson & Sons to construct three houses thereon for a total consideration of $19,500.00. Appellee (Jerome Lumber & Supply Company, Inc.) furnished material for construction of said houses and says there was due it in November 1951, the last month in which material was furnished, the sum of $777.14. Appellee also alleged that ’on January 22, 1952 it served a cautionary notice on Beam of its intention to claim a lien against appellants. It also filed claim of lien and Bill of Complaint in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Lee County February 6, 1952 and prayed foreclosure thereof against the lands of appellants for the amount of its claim.

Appellants answered the complaint, admitting the contract with the Hendersons, alleging that only $40.15 remained due thereon, but denied that there was unpaid thereon the sum of $777.14. Other allegations of the bill were denied. Testimony was taken and on final hearing the Chancellor entered a final decree for appellee in the sum of $777.14 with interest and costs and ordered sale of the property within 30 days to satisfy the lien. This appeal is .from the final decree.

We think the judgment should be reversed on authority of Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, Fla., 61 So.2d 634, 635. Beam had a contract with the contractor for a specified sum, he was not in privity with the material man (appellee), he paid the contractor as per terms of the contract, and had no notice of intention to claim a lien as provided by Chapter 84, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., until after the buildings were completed and all moneys due to the contractor except $40.15 had been paid. It appears the contractor is unable to furnish the .sworn affidavit required by Section 84.04(3) F.S.A., but appellee failed to establish that “final payment”, under the terms of the contract, was more than the $40.15 remaining due. While the contract is not in evidence, there is no showing of improper payments on it. Compare: Curtis v. McCardel, Fla., 63 So.2d 60; Shaw v. Del-Mar Cabinet *538Co., Fla., 63 So.2d 264. Under such circumstances appellee can claim a lien against the owners’ property for no amount larger than the sum remaining due on the contract at the time the service of notice was made.

It is not amiss to point out that the contract was executed and completed pri- or to Section 84.05(11) F.S., as amended 1953, F.S.A., requiring the owner to withhold twenty per cent of the contract price under the conditions stated, said amendment being in no .way involved in this case.

Reversed.

THOMAS and DREW, JJ., and HER-IN, Associate Justice, concur.
|     |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) | A review of the Servicer’s activities and of its performance under the applicable servicing agreement during the period from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019 has been made under my supervision. |
|     |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (b) | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under the applicable servicing agreement in all material respects throughout the aforementioned period. |

|                                                                                                                           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                           |
| /s/ Ryan M. Hershberger                                                                                                   |
| Ryan M. HershbergerAssistant Treasurer ofFord Motor Credit Company LLC,as Servicer of Ford Credit Auto Lease Trust 2018-B |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Jack Vaughan

v. Civil No. 05-cv-223-JD

Bernice A. Ray Elementary School, et al.

O R D E R

 The Deputy Marshal was unable to serve Superintendent

Greenbaum at the address provided by plaintiff. Plaintiff is

ordered to prepare a new summons with a current address for

Greenbaum. 

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 19, 2005

cc: Jack Vaughan, pro se

Case 1:05-cv-00223-JD Document 9 Filed 10/19/05 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 05-cr-180-PB

Claudia Henry

O R D E R

The defendant, through counsel, has moved to continue the

July 10, 2007 trial in the above case, citing the need for

additional time to complete discovery and prepare a defense or

negotiate a plea agreement. The government does not object to a

continuance of the trial date.

Accordingly, for the above reason and to allow the parties

additional time to properly prepare for trial, the court will

continue the trial from July 10, 2007 to October 10, 2007. In

agreeing to continue the trial, the court finds pursuant to 18

U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8)(A) that for the above-stated reasons, the

ends of justice served in granting a continuance outweigh the

best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 1:05-cr-00180-PB Document 12 Filed 06/29/07 Page 1 of 2
2

The June 28, 2007 final pretrial conference is continued to 

October 2, 2007 at 4:00 p.m. 

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

June 29, 2007

cc: Jeffrey S. Levin, Esq.

Donald Feith, AUSA

United States Probation

United States Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00180-PB Document 12 Filed 06/29/07 Page 2 of 2
Slip Op. 04-110

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

____________________________________

:

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : Court No. 99-03-00178

:

UNITED STATES, :

:

Defendant. :

____________________________________:

[Judgment for plaintiff following appeal.]

Dated: August 26, 2004

Barnes, Richardson & Colburn (Lawrence M. Friedman and Harvey Karlovac), for

plaintiff.

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen, Director, Jeanne E.

Davidson, Deputy Director, Barbara S. Williams, Attorney-in-Charge, International Trade Field

Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (Saul

Davis and Aimee Lee), Karen P. Binder, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, United States Bureau

of Customs and Border Protection, of counsel, for defendant.

JUDGMENT

RESTANI, Chief Judge:

In accordance with the mandate of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued on

August 2, 2004 and as requested by the parties, judgment following appeal shall now enter for

plaintiff as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

1. The United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection shall 
Court No. 99-03-00178 Page 2

reliquidate the entries of DaimlerChrysler Model Year 1993 and 1994 

trucks at issue here to afford duty-free treatment under HTSUS subheading

9802.00.80 to the United States product sheet metal components

of the trucks sent to Mexico for assembly into the trucks as entered.

2. Interest and costs are awarded as provided by law.

 /s/ Jane A. Restani 

Jane A. Restani

Chief Judge

Dated: New York, New York. 

 This 26 day of August, 2004.
**Exhibit31.2**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Lance Thibault, ChiefFinancial Officer, certify that:

1.               I have reviewedthis quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of deCODE genetics, Inc.;

2.               Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.               [Intentionallyomitted*];

4.               [Intentionallyomitted*]; and

5.               [Intentionallyomitted*]
| Dated: August 14, 2006 |   | /s/ LANCE THIBAULT      |
|------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|                   |   | Lance Thibault          |
|                   |   | Chief Financial Officer |
|                   |   |                    |

 

* This paragraph isomitted because there has been no amendment of the matters referred to therein.

----
Law Offices of
Sphen KR, Sine

ATTORNEY AT LAW
23 WEST WEBSTER STREET

Manchester, Now Hampshire 03704

(603) 668-2343
800-666-6623
Fax (603) 626-0408

oe hole
This will confi: t I wil;be handling child’s
claim arising out of .

I will be handling this case on a contingency fee basis. I have given you the
option of paying for legal services on an hourly basis, but you have elected a contingency
fee arrangement, under which you will pay legal fees only in the event of a recovery of a
settlement or verdict.

«

Any settlement or verdict recovered would be subject to a 25% contingency fee of
the gross amount recovered, plus my out-of-pocket disbursements. In determining the
amount of my contingency fee, my out-of-pocket disbursements are deducted after my
fee is calculated. I have also explained that I am only entitled to reimbursement of my
out-of-pocket expenses from any settlement or verdict recovered, and that you will not be
responsible for advancing any of the costs on the case.

In the event that you approve a “structured settlement” (a settlement in which
some or all of the money is paid over a period of years), you agree that we may accept
payment of our fees by either taking the stated percentage of each payment in the
structured settlement or by taking the stated percentage of the “actual cost” of the
structured settlement in a single payment at the time of settlement, or a combination of
both.

Thank you for bringing this matter to me. If the above arrangements meets with
your approval, please sign below where indicated.

Stephen R. Fine

DATED: S. F- APPRO
kx
Exhibit 32.b  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of DataJungle Software Inc. (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:  The Report on Form 10-QSB for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2006 (the Form 10-QSB) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Form 10-QSB.  Dated: November 14, 2006/s/Larry Bruce
Larry Bruce
Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer   The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-QSB pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-B and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
Updated Schedule of Parties to the Employment Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.6(b) 
  
 SCHEDULE OF PARTIES TO THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
  
 Each of the parties identified in the table below is party to an employment agreement with Advanced Medical Optics, Inc. substantially in
the form attached to the Advanced Medical Optics, Inc. Form 10 as Exhibit 10.6(a). Each party’s employment agreement is identical except for such party’s base salary, position, agreement date and prior agreements, each of which is set
forth in the table below. The Agreements of Messrs. Meier and Trenary were amended in October 2004 for the purpose of reflecting their new titles and adjusted salaries. Mr. Post’s Agreement is contingent upon the completion of the proposed
merger between the registrant and VISX, Incorporated. 
  

										
	 EMPLOYEE NAME

	  	BASE
SALARY

	  	 POSITION

	  	 AGREEMENT
DATE

	  	 PRIOR AGREEMENTS


	 Aimee S. Weisner
	  	$	215,000	  	Corporate Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary	  	January 18, 2002	  	Retention Agreement among the Company, Allergan and the Executive dated January 18, 2002
					
	 Jane E. Rady
	  	$	250,000	  	Corporate Vice President, Strategy and Technology	  	April 8, 2002	  	Agreement between Allergan and Executive dated April 8, 2002
					
	 C. Russell Trenary III
	  	$	300,000	  	Corporate Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer	  	April 24, 2002, amended October 1, 2004	  	Agreement between Allergan and Executive dated April 24, 2002
					
	 Richard A. Meier
	  	$	375,900	  	Executive Vice President of Operations and Finance, and Chief Financial Officer	  	April 8, 2002, amended October 1, 2004	  	Agreement between Allergan and Executive dated April 8, 2002
					
	 Douglas H. Post
	  	$	315,000	  	Corporate Vice President and Region President, Americas	  	December 14, 2004 (but effective only upon completion of the VISX merger)	  	Not applicable.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 05-cr-142-01-SM

Donald McMullin

O R D E R

Defendant moved for pretrial release on conditions, having

previously stipulated to detention. A bail violation charge had

previously been leveled and a warrant issued, but, apparently,

neither was served. The parties thought the violation charge

remained outstanding as of the January 31, 2007, hearing on

defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court

dismissed that charge, if it was still pending, on staleness

grounds.

Defendant’s motion for release was denied. Although upon

further consideration it does not appear that the Bail Reform

Act’s rebuttable presumption in favor of detention strictly

applies here, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), still, defendant at this

point has pled and been adjudicated guilty of serious felonies —

possession of firearms and ammunition while being an unlawful

user of drugs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 992(q)(3).

Case 1:05-cr-00142-SM Document 56 Filed 02/02/07 Page 1 of 3
2

A judicial officer “shall” order a person awaiting

imposition of sentence detained, unless the judicial officer

finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not

likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person

or the community if released on bail. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a).

Based upon the record, the proffers made, and argument by

counsel, I cannot find, by clear and convincing evidence, that

defendant does not pose a danger to the community. The record

discloses that defendant was not only in possession of a

substantial quantity of drugs, but also possessed numerous

firearms. The superseding indictment also provides probable

cause to believe that included among the firearms in defendant’s

possession was a machine gun. The investigation that eventually

led to the charges in the indictment, as disclosed in the record,

suggests, as well, that defendant’s personality tends to be

confrontative and anti-social. Drugs, multiple firearms, and a

tendency toward confrontation are a bad mix, posing a genuine

danger to the safety of others and the community at large. In

any event, nothing in the record persuades me, by clear and

convincing evidence, that defendant would not pose a danger to

the safety of others or the community if released.

Case 1:05-cr-00142-SM Document 56 Filed 02/02/07 Page 2 of 3
3

Pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a), defendant

shall remain detained pending sentencing. Should defendant’s

motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty be granted he may, of

course, file another motion for release pending trial to be

resolved under a different standard.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

February 2, 2007

cc: Debra M. Walsh, Esq.

William E. Christie, Esq.

U.S. Probation

U.S. Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00142-SM Document 56 Filed 02/02/07 Page 3 of 3