UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Nicole Corin Christian

v. Civil No. 05-cv-356-JD

Travis W. Anderson, et al.

O R D E R

Nicole Corin Christian, proceeding pro se, alleges claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a state trooper, a bail commissioner,

and various Grafton County officers and employees violated her

constitutional rights when she was arrested following a traffic

stop, taken to the county jail, strip searched, and detained in

October of 2002. Paul Boucher, who served as bail commissioner

in Christian’s case, moves to dismiss the claims against him on

the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity and judicial immunity. 

Travis Anderson, who was the arresting officer, moves to dismiss

the claims against him based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and

argues that new allegations contained in the amended complaint

are barred by the statute of limitations. Both Boucher and

Anderson challenge Christian’s conspiracy claim.

Standard of Review

In considering a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court accepts the facts alleged

in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in

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favor of the plaintiff. Edes v. Verizon Comms., 417 F.3d 133,

137 (1st Cir. 2005). The court must determine whether the

complaint, construed in the proper light, “alleges facts

sufficient to make out a cognizable claim.” Carroll v. Xerox

Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 241 (1st Cir. 2002). “The standard for

granting a motion to dismiss is an exacting one: ‘a complaint

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.’”

McLaughlin v. Boston Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47, 50

(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46

(1957)).

Background

Christian, with her mother as a passenger, was driving

through New Hampshire in early October of 2002 when they were

stopped by New Hampshire State Police Officer Travis Anderson for

exceeding the speed limit. Christian alleges that when she did

not produce a valid operator’s license, Anderson attempted to

physically remove her from the car, which she resisted with her

mother’s assistance. Christian and her mother were charged with

resisting arrest, handcuffed, and transported to the Grafton

County Jail. Once at the jail, Christian was subjected to a

strip search. Paul Boucher was called to serve as bail

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commissioner, and he set her bail at $5,000. 

Boucher previously moved to dismiss the claims against him

on the ground that as bail commissioner he was entitled to

absolute immunity. Christian sought an extension of time to

respond to Boucher’s motion in order to complete discovery

pertaining to the circumstances of Boucher’s resignation of his

office as bail commissioner. The court noted that Christian had

not alleged any claims against Boucher or even alleged any

wrongdoing on his part. The court nevertheless concluded that it

would be appropriate to give Christian an opportunity to file an

amended complaint to state clearly any claim she intended to

bring against Boucher.

On June 5, 2006, Christian filed an amended complaint in

which she added factual allegations, deleted her Sixth Amendment

claim, and identified additional defendants. With respect to

Boucher, Christian now alleges that he was a disqualified bail

commissioner because he had admitted to “a serious felony,” and

that in collusion with Anderson, Boucher set her bail at an

unreasonably high amount. She also added allegations against

Anderson that he sexually molested her during their skirmish in

the course of the traffic stop that led to her arrest.

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1Christian does not specify which defendant or defendants or

which actions by them violated each asserted right.

4

Discussion

Christian alleges that the defendants violated her Fourth,

Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the course of

her arrest and detainment.1 Boucher and Anderson assert that

Christian failed to state a federal claim against either of them

and that the Eleventh Amendment precludes their liability under

state law claims. They contend that Christian failed to state a

conspiracy claim against them. Boucher also contends that he is

protected by quasi-judicial immunity for his actions in his role

as bail commissioner. Anderson argues that Christian’s new

allegations of sexual molestation are time barred.

A. Eleventh Amendment

Boucher’s and Anderson’s Eleventh Amendment defense appears

to be based on a false premise. They assert that because

Christian did not allege any federal claims against them and

because the Eleventh Amendment bars suit on any state claims

against them in their official capacities, Christian’s claims are

barred. Although Christian’s claims are far from clear or

specific, the only claims she alleges are federal claims. In

addition, Anderson and Boucher are sued in their individual, not

official, capacities, making the Eleventh Amendment inapplicable. 

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See Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev’t, 421

F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005). Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment

defense fails in the context it has been raised.

B. Immunity

Boucher contends that as a bail commissioner he is entitled

to quasi-judicial immunity for any actions taken in that

capacity. In support of his motion and to counter Christian’s

challenges to the legitimacy of his office, Boucher filed his

letter of resignation, dated November 13, 2002, and a copy of his

appointment as a justice of peace, dated September 25, 2001. 

Christian acknowledges that Boucher was appointed to serve as a

bail commissioner on August 29, 2001. She argues, however, that

because he had to be a justice of the peace for the bail

commissioner appointment to be effective, he was disqualified

from serving as a justice of the peace, and therefore as bail

commissioner, by his actions that culminated in a term of

probation pursuant to an agreement with the New Hampshire

Attorney General’s Office.

The documents submitted by Boucher and Christian show that

Boucher was appointed bail commissioner on August 29, 2001, which

became effective with his appointment as a justice of the peace

in September of 2001. He did not resign his office until

November 13, 2002. Therefore, Boucher was a duly appointed bail

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2Christian also argues that the court cannot consider

Boucher’s immunity defense in the context of a motion to dismiss

because it requires reference to matters extrinsic to the

complaint. The documents submitted by Boucher come within the

narrow exception that allows the court to consider matters of

public record in deciding a motion to dismiss. See Greene v.

Rhode Island, 398 F.3d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2005). In addition,

Christian appended a copy of Boucher’s appointment as bail

commissioner and a copy of a letter pertaining to his probation.

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commissioner in October of 2002 when he set bail in Christian’s

case.2 His actions that resulted in his resignation on November

13 and the probation referenced in the letter submitted by

Christian did not affect his status as bail commissioner in

October of 2002. Boucher is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity

from claims brought against him for his actions taken in that

capacity. See Briand v. Morin, 2003 WL 540185 at *1 (D.N.H. Feb.

25, 2003); see also Crocker v. Lewiston Police Dep’t, 2001 WL

114977 at *5 (D. Me. Feb. 9, 2001). 

Christian’s claims against Boucher are based on his actions

as bail commissioner, that is, acting as bail commissioner in her

case and setting her bail at $5,000. Therefore, her claims

against Boucher are dismissed.

C. Conspiracy

Boucher and Anderson also contend that Christian failed to

allege a state law conspiracy claim. Because all of Christian’s

claims against Boucher are barred by quasi-judicial immunity,

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this issue is addressed with respect to Anderson only. As noted

above, Christian brings only federal claims in this suit. Her

response on this issue clarifies that she intended to allege a

federal civil rights conspiracy against Anderson. Because

Anderson did not address this claim under the governing law, his

motion is not considered for purposes of the conspiracy claim.

D. Timeliness of the Amendment

Anderson moves to dismiss all claims based on new

allegations in Christian’s amended complaint that he sexually

molested her in the course of her arrest. He contends that any

such claims are time-barred because the three-year statute of

limitations expired on October 7, 2005, and the amended complaint

was not filed until June 5, 2006. Anderson again assumes that

Christian is alleging state law claims against him and that she

has added a claim of sexual molestation. Although Christian has

alleged only federal claims, the same three-year limitation

period applies to claims under § 1983 as to state law claims. 

See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985); N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 508:4.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2) provides that “[a]n

amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original

pleading when . . . the claim or defense asserted in the amended

pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set

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forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” 

Amendments that amplify the factual bases for an existing claim

or state an existing claim with greater particularity relate back

to the original pleading. USX Corp. v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 161,

166-67 (3d Cir. 2004); cf. In re Stone & Webster Inc., 2006 WL

1738348 at *3-*4 (D. Mass. June 23, 2006) (denying relation back

where new allegations concerned entirely new conduct). New

allegations that also add a new legal theory relate back to the

original pleading if the amendment pertains to the same episode

as alleged originally. See Mayle v. Felix, --- U.S. ---, 125 S.

Ct. 2562, 2572 (2005) (discussing Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.

Co., 323 U.S. 574, 58-81 (1945)). 

In this case, Christian amplified her previous description

of the arrest, which alleged that Anderson had assaulted her in

the course of removing her from her car, to include allegations

that he sexually molested her during the same conduct. She has

not alleged a new claim based on the new allegations. Therefore,

her allegations of sexual molestation relate back to the original

complaint.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss

(document no. 35) is granted as to all claims against Boucher and

is otherwise denied.

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As is explained in this order, Christian’s amended complaint

is construed to allege ONLY federal claims, that is violations of

her Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights,

actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If Christian intended to

bring claims under state law, she must move to amend her

complaint to add such a claim or claims. A motion to amend shall

be filed no later than October 20, 2006. The defendants will

then have an opportunity to respond within the time allowed under

the local rules.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

October 5, 2006

cc: Charles P. Bauer, Esquire

Nancy J. Smith, Esquire

Nicole Corin Christian, pro se

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