- 495 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

Eric J. Vyhlidal, appellant, v. 

Nessa A. Vyhlidal, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 28, 2022. No. S-21-736.

1. Divorce: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a divorce 

decree presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate 

court reaches a conclusion independent of the determination reached by 

the court below.

2. Contempt: Appeal and Error. In a civil contempt proceeding where 

a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, 

an appellate court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) 

the trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) the 

trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and (3) the trial 

court’s determinations of whether a party is in contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

3. Divorce: Property Settlement Agreements: Final Orders. A decree is 

a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution becomes final, its meaning, including a settlement agreement incorporated therein, is determined as a matter of law from the four corners of the decree itself.

4. Divorce: Property Settlement Agreements: Parent and Child: 

Judgments. A judgment including both a settlement agreement and a 

parenting plan is construed as an integrated judgment.

5. Divorce: Judgments: Intent. The meaning of a decree must be determined from all parts thereof, read in its entirety, and must be construed 

as a whole so as to give effect to every word and part, if possible, and 

bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and 

reasonable interpretation.

6. ____: ____: ____. Effect must be given to every part of a decree, including such effect and consequences that follow the necessary legal implication of its terms, although not expressed.

7. Child Custody. A determination of legal custody is a mandatory and 

indispensable part of a parenting plan pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-2929 (Reissue 2016).

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

06/03/2022 09:10 AM CDT
- 496 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

8. ____. Under the Parenting Act, joint legal custody involves mutual 

authority and responsibility of the parents while legal custody does not.

9. Child Custody: Words and Phrases. The definitions in the Parenting 

Act of “legal custody” and “joint legal custody” are terms of art having 

clear and unambiguous meaning.

10. ____: ____. In the absence of an explicit contrary definition in a parenting plan, the term “joint legal custody” must be construed according to 

its statutory definition in the Parenting Act.

11. Child Custody. In a child custody case, the decision of where a child 

will reside is a fundamental decision affecting the child’s welfare.

12. ____. In a child custody case, the decision of where a child will attend 

school is a fundamental decision.

13. Courts. A maxim sanctioned by centuries of experience is that ignorance of the law is no excuse.

14. Courts: Presumptions. Everyone is presumed to know the law.

15. Contempt: Words and Phrases. Willful disobedience is an essential 

element of contempt; “willful” means the violation was committed 

intentionally, with knowledge that the act violated the court order.

16. Contempt: Proof: Presumptions. Outside of statutory procedures 

imposing a different standard or an evidentiary presumption, the complainant must prove all elements of contempt by clear and convincing evidence.

17. Courts: Appeal and Error. A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.

18. Contempt. Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and 

enforce the rights of private parties to a suit when a party fails to comply with a court order made for the benefit of the opposing party.

19. Contempt: Sentences. A civil sanction is coercive and remedial; the 

contemnors carry the keys of their jail cells in their own pockets, 

because the sentence is conditioned upon continued noncompliance and 

is subject to mitigation through compliance.

20. Contempt: Costs: Attorney Fees. Costs, including reasonable attorney 

fees, can be awarded in a contempt proceeding when there has been a 

finding of contempt.

Appeal from the District Court for Garfield County: Mark 

D. Kozisek, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Loralea L. Frank and Nathan P. Husak, of Bruner, Frank, 

Schumacher & Husak, L.L.C., for appellant.
- 497 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

Michele J. Romero and Vikki S. Stamm, of Stamm, Romero 

& Associates, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

An integrated marital dissolution decree, settlement agreement, and parenting plan granted joint legal and physical 

custody of a minor child to Eric J. Vyhlidal and Nessa A. 

Vyhlidal. Over Eric’s objection and without obtaining a modification of the decree, Nessa moved the child to another school 

in a distant town. The district court declined Eric’s request for 

a contempt citation. On appeal, we reversed the denial and 

remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing. 1

After issuing the citation and holding an evidentiary hearing on remand, the court below found no violation or willfulness. Eric again appeals. We conclude that the district court 

erred in its interpretation of the decree and its assessment of 

Nessa’s actions. We reverse the order and remand the cause 

with directions and for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

II. BACKGROUND

Our background section consists of four parts. We begin by 

reciting pertinent conclusions from our first opinion. Second, 

we summarize the essential facts elicited at the evidentiary 

hearing. We then recall specific provisions of the integrated 

decree. Finally, we summarize the district court’s decision 

and reasoning.

1. Prior Appeal

In the parties’ prior appeal, we determined that the district court abused its discretion in denying Eric’s motion for 

1 See Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal, 309 Neb. 376, 960 N.W.2d 309 (2021).
- 498 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

an order to show cause. 2 After citing the definition in the 

Parenting Act 3 of “[j]oint legal custody,” 4 we stated:

Here, the parenting plan, developed by the parties and 

approved by the court, clearly indicates that the parties 

were to share joint legal custody of the minor child, and 

neither party was granted exclusive final decisionmaking 

authority. As a result, it is undisputed that the parties 

share mutual authority for making fundamental decisions 

regarding the minor child’s welfare, including choices 

regarding education, such as where the minor child will 

attend school. 5

We also noted that we had classified the decision of where a 

child will attend school as a fundamental decision. 6

We concluded that the denial of Eric’s motion for an order 

to show cause was an abuse of discretion that unfairly deprived 

Eric of his rights as a joint legal custodian of the minor child. 

We stated: “Whether Nessa’s unilateral decision to change the 

child’s school is a willful violation of the decree . . . is a matter to be considered at an evidentiary hearing where Eric can 

offer evidence to demonstrate both that a violation of the court 

order occurred and that the violation was willful.” 7 Thus, we 

reversed, and remanded for further proceedings.

2. Evidentiary Hearing

After spreading our mandate, the district court set the matter for a hearing. It ordered Nessa to show cause why she 

should not be held in contempt of court for willful violation of 

the decree.

2 See id.

3 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-2920 to 43-2943 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 

2020).

4 See § 43-2922(11).

5 Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal, supra note 1, 309 Neb. at 382, 960 N.W.2d at 314.

6 See id.

7 Id. at 383, 960 N.W.2d at 314.
- 499 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

After the hearing, the court characterized the facts as “simple 

and relatively undisputed.” In late June 2020, Nessa informed 

Eric that she intended to move the child’s residence and change 

the child’s school. Eric objected. Nessa proceeded with moving and enrolling the child in a new school. She moved from 

Burwell, Nebraska, to Springfield, Nebraska, on August 8. She 

moved the child there on August 12. Two days later, she then 

enrolled the child in the Springfield school. Nessa admitted 

that she did so without Eric’s permission.

The parties attended mediation. Nessa testified that she 

“submitted paperwork for Central Mediation” in June 2020. 

The parties’ mediation session occurred, using video conferencing, on September 14. They failed to reach an agreement.

At the hearing, Nessa argued that she complied with the parenting plan. Her position rested on two facts: She notified Eric 

that she planned to change the child’s residence prior to doing 

so and attempted to reach an agreement through mediation.

3. Integrated Decree, Settlement 

Agreement, and Parenting Plan

A June 2018 decree dissolved the parties’ marriage. The 

decree awarded them “joint legal and physical custody” of 

their child, born in 2013. The decree further ordered the 

parties to abide by the terms of their mediated parenting 

plan that was attached to a marital settlement agreement. The 

marital settlement agreement stated that the parties agreed to 

“share legal and joint physical custody . . . as outlined in the 

Parenting Plan.”

The settlement agreement contained an integration clause. 

Paragraph 12 stated, in pertinent part, that it “constitute[d] a 

complete agreement and any and all other agreements, whether 

written or oral, which precede the date as set forth below are 

hereinafter superseded and are null and void.”

The parenting plan contained several provisions directly 

applicable to this appeal, which focuses on legal custody. 

Those provisions are as follows:
- 500 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

B. CUSTODY/RESIDENCE: The parents agree to 

Joint Legal Custody (decision-making).

. . . .

K. DECISION MAKING: The parents will discuss 

matters concerning the child, such as health and medical, 

school related problems and decisions, and any behavioral 

or disciplinary issues that could impact both households.

. . . .

P. CHANGE OF CHILD’S RESIDENCE: Both parents shall provide notification to the other if s/he plans 

to change the residence of the child. Neither parent may 

move the child outside of the [S]tate of Nebraska without 

permission of the Court. If intending to move that parent 

must first:

•Make written application to the Court at least 45 day

in advance, including the proposed changes to the parenting time schedule and costs of transportation[;]

•Give notice of the application and hearing to the othe

parent; and,

•Establish that the move is in the best interest o

the child.

. . . .

R. REMEDIATION: The parents agree that should a 

future dispute arise concerning their child or this agreement which they are unable to resolve, they will first 

attempt to mediate a solution through mediation prior to 

filing legal action.

S. ATTORNEY REVIEW: We both acknowledge that 

this parenting plan accurately reflects our agreements 

reached on May 16, 2018 and represent we each have had 

ample opportunity to discuss this parenting plan with our 

attorneys. Each parent certifies they understand the terms 

contained herein.

In this appeal, the parties dispute the nature of their legal 

custody of their child—particularly, decisionmaking regarding 

the child’s school and residence. Physical custody, parenting 
- 501 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

time, and the change of a parent’s residence are largely irrele

vant here.

But for the sake of completeness, we quote the parenting 

plan provisions directly bearing on physical custody, parenting time, and parent’s residence, as follows:

B. CUSTODY/RESIDENCE: . . . .

They also agree that Mom and Dad will have Joint 

Physical Custody.

C. REGULAR TIME-SHARING:

[The child] will be with Mom during the school year, 

except for one night each week from after school until 

8 p.m. Dad will give Mom 2 weeks’ notice of what night 

he will exercise that parenting time.

The parents agree to alternate weekends, with Dad 

having [the child] two weekends in a row from Friday 

at 6 p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m., then Mom having [the 

child] the third weekend. On the Sundays when Mom 

works at night, Dad will have [the child] until he drops 

him off for school on Monday morning. The parents shall 

follow a 2 weekend with dad/1 weekend with mom rotation. This weekend rotation shall resume the first Friday 

after school resumes with dad commencing the weekend 

rotation annually.

The parents agree that they will work together to adjust 

[the child’s] schedule if their time with [the child] interferes with the work schedule.

Neither parent may make plans for the child during the 

other parent’s parenting time without talking with that 

parent in advance and obtaining that parent’s consent.

. . . .

O. CHANGE OF PARENT’S RESIDENCE: In the 

event that one of the parents plan to change his/her 

residence, that parent shall notify the other parent of 

such change of residence. If one of the parents is living 

or moving to an undisclosed location because of safety 

concerns, the address or return address shall only include 

the county and state.
- 502 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

4. District Court’s Decision and Rationale

The district court entered an order finding that Nessa did 

not violate the parenting plan. It therefore vacated the order to 

show cause.

The court’s rationale relied upon its interpretation of the 

decree, which focused on the parenting plan. The court reasoned: “One must look to the Parenting Plan itself and not 

statutory definitions or labels . . . . For it is the violation of the 

Parenting Plan at issue, not the violation of a statute or legal 

definition found in a statute.”

The district court further stated: “[T]he parties did not 

define ‘joint legal custody’ in the same manner as the Court. 

The parties chose the words, ‘Joint Legal Custody (decisionmaking)’. They then chose to describe ‘Decision Making’ 

as parents discussing matters concerning [the child] such as 

school related decisions.”

The parties’ description of “joint legal custody,” the court 

reasoned, required discussion between the parties and was 

silent on mutual authority and the parties’ responsibility for 

making mutual fundamental decisions regarding the child’s 

welfare. The court, essentially adopting Nessa’s argument, 

determined that Eric failed to establish Nessa violated the parenting plan—reasoning that Nessa told Eric she was moving, 

that they discussed the move, and that they attempted to mediate a solution.

The district court, for the sake of completeness, discussed 

the willful aspect of contempt. The court determined that the 

violation had to be committed with subjective knowledge and 

that Nessa did not willfully violate the parenting plan.

Eric filed a timely appeal, which we moved to our docket. 8

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Eric assigns that the court abused its discretion by failing 

to hold Nessa in contempt for three reasons: (1) The court’s 

interpretation of the parenting plan was erroneous, (2) the 

8 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
- 503 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

court failed to find Nessa violated the parenting plan, and (3) 

the court abused its discretion by not finding Nessa’s violation 

was willful.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] The meaning of a divorce decree presents a question 

of law, in connection with which an appellate court reaches 

a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the 

court below. 9

[2] In a civil contempt proceeding where a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, an appellate 

court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) the 

trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) 

the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, 

and (3) the trial court’s determinations of whether a party is in 

contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. 10

V. ANALYSIS

Eric contends that the district court abused its discretion 

when it failed to hold Nessa in contempt for moving and 

enrolling the child into a new school despite his having joint 

legal custody and objecting to the change. We start by determining what the decree required. Then, we apply that interpretation to the violations asserted by Eric in determining whether 

Nessa violated the decree and, if so, whether the violation 

was willful.

1. Interpretation of Decree

[3-6] Rules for interpreting a decree are well known. 

A decree is a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution 

becomes final, its meaning, including a settlement agreement 

incorporated therein, is determined as a matter of law from the 

9 Johnson v. Johnson, 308 Neb. 623, 956 N.W.2d 261 (2021).

10 Becher v. Becher, ante p. 1, 970 N.W.2d 472 (2022).
- 504 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

four corners of the decree itself. 11 To the extent that we have 

not said so directly, we iterate that the same principle applies 

to a decree which includes both a settlement agreement and a 

parenting plan—it is construed as an integrated judgment. The 

meaning of a decree must be determined from all parts thereof, 

read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as 

to give effect to every word and part, if possible, and bring 

all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair 

and reasonable interpretation. 12 Effect must be given to every 

part thereof, including such effect and consequences that follow the necessary legal implication of its terms, although not 

expressed. 13 Because the parties attached a parenting plan to 

their marital settlement agreement which the court incorporated 

into the decree, we consider the documents together in determining the meaning of the decree.

[7] The contents that must be included in a parenting plan 

are set forth in statute. 14 Pertinent to this appeal, a parenting 

plan shall include a determination regarding legal custody of 

the child. 15 In other words, a determination of legal custody 

is a mandatory and indispensable part of a parenting plan 

pursuant to § 43-2929. 16 Legal custody focuses entirely on 

decisionmaking authority. 17

The Parenting Act defines the terms “legal custody” and 

“joint legal custody,” and those terms have the same definitions 

for purposes of domestic relations actions. 18 “Legal custody 

11 Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 9.

12 Id.

13 Bayne v. Bayne, 302 Neb. 858, 925 N.W.2d 687 (2019).

14 See § 43-2929.

15 § 43-2929(1)(b)(i).

16 See id.

17 See State on behalf of Kaaden S. v. Jeffery T., 303 Neb. 933, 932 N.W.2d 

692 (2019).

18 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-347 (Reissue 2016) and 43-2922.
- 505 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

means the authority and responsibility for making fundamental decisions regarding the child’s welfare, including choices 

regarding education and health.” 19 On the other hand, “[j]oint 

legal custody means mutual authority and responsibility of 

the parents for making mutual fundamental decisions regarding the child’s welfare, including choices regarding education 

and health.” 20

[8] The difference between the two concepts is obvious. 

Under the Parenting Act, joint legal custody involves “mutual

authority and responsibility of the parents” 21 while legal custody does not. 22

[9,10] The definition of “joint legal custody” contained in 

the Parenting Act provides a baseline for what the term means 

within the context of child custody. In contract cases, we have 

said, “‘Trade terms, legal terms of art, numbers, common words 

of accepted usage and terms of a similar nature should be interpreted in accord with their specialized or accepted usage unless 

such an interpretation would produce irrational results or the 

contract documents are internally inconsistent.’” 23 In probate 

matters, we have applied a similar rule: Generally, a term of 

art used in reference to a devise or other testamentary disposition or provision has a technical but clear meaning. 24 We now 

hold that the definitions in the Parenting Act of “legal custody” 

and “joint legal custody” are terms of art having clear and 

unambiguous meaning. In the absence of an explicit contrary 

definition in a parenting plan, the term “joint legal custody” 

must be construed according to its statutory definition in the 

Parenting Act.

19 § 43-2922(13). See, also, § 42-347(6).

20 § 43-2922(11). See, also, § 42-347(4).

21 § 43-2922(11) (emphasis supplied).

22 § 43-2922(11) and (13).

23 Kalkowski v. Nebraska Nat. Trails Museum Found., 290 Neb. 798, 804-05, 

862 N.W.2d 294, 301 (2015).

24 In re Estate of Hannan, 246 Neb. 828, 523 N.W.2d 672 (1994).
- 506 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

With that understanding, we turn to the integrated decree 

here. The decree awarded the parties “joint legal and physical 

custody” of their child. The marital settlement agreement stated 

that the parties agreed to “share legal and joint physical custody . . . as outlined in the Parenting Plan.” The parenting plan 

stated that the parties agreed to “Joint Legal Custody (decisionmaking).” None of those documents specifically defined “joint 

legal custody.”

Reading the document as a whole, mutuality runs throughout. Time-sharing provisions provide that “[t]he parents agree 

that they will work together to adjust [the child’s] schedule if 

their time with [the child] interferes with the work schedule” 

and that “[n]either parent may make plans for the child during 

the other parent’s parenting time without talking with that parent in advance and obtaining that parent’s consent.” The paragraph on summer break requires the parties to “work together 

to develop a schedule for the summer.” Temporary changes can 

be made to the plan “as long as they both agree to it”; permanent changes can be initiated “by mutual, written agreement of 

the parents.” Finally, the remediation provision states that if the 

parties are unable to resolve a dispute concerning the child or 

the parenting plan, “they will first attempt to mediate a solution 

through mediation prior to filing legal action.”

Narrowing our focus to particular provisions of the parenting plan, we start with the paragraph entitled “Decision 

Making.” That paragraph stated that the parties “will discuss 

matters concerning the child, such as health and medical, 

school related problems and decisions, and any behavioral or 

disciplinary issues that could impact both households.” But 

that paragraph does not remove the mutuality element and 

does not confer final decisionmaking authority on either party. 

In other words, there is nothing in that paragraph inconsistent 

with the statutory definition of “joint legal custody.” Reading 

the decree in that fashion effectively reads the words “joint 

legal custody” out of the parenting plan—a reading which 
- 507 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

would violate the principle that effect should be given to all 

words and phrases in the judgment.

[11,12] Under the decree at issue, changes in the child’s residence or school enrollment are matters governed by the provision for joint legal custody. In a child custody case, the decision 

of where a child will reside is a fundamental decision affecting 

the child’s welfare. If the decision could be made unilaterally, 

that would need to be clearly articulated in the plan. It was not. 

Likewise, the decision of where a child will attend school is a 

fundamental decision. 25 Nothing in the decree or incorporated 

plan provides that this decision can be made by one parent. As 

a fundamental decision and in accordance with the meaning of 

joint legal custody, it required mutual agreement.

The district court erred in determining what the parenting 

plan required. The court’s reasoning that the parties need only 

discuss matters because the arrangement was “silent on mutual 

authority” is contrary to the meaning of “joint legal custody.” And as we noted above, neither the parenting plan nor 

the decree conferred final decisionmaking authority on either 

party. We conclude the district court erred in interpreting the 

plan to require discussion only.

[13,14] Nor are we persuaded that there is anything unfair 

or unreasonable in holding the parties to the terms of art they 

chose in their parenting plan. A maxim sanctioned by centuries of experience is that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 26

Everyone is presumed to know the law. 27 Both maxims apply 

to Nessa, particularly in light of paragraph S of the parenting 

plan, where the parties “represent[ed]” they “each [had] had 

ample opportunity to discuss this parenting plan with [their] 

attorneys” and “certifie[d] they underst[ood] the terms contained” therein.

25 See Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal, supra note 1.

26 See State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Holscher, 193 Neb. 729, 230 

N.W.2d 75 (1975).

27 Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
- 508 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

2. Contempt

Having established the meaning of the decree as a matter 

of law, we move to the district court’s determinations pertaining to the contempt proceeding before it. Under our three-part 

standard of review, we review the district court’s resolution of 

issues of law de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and 

its determinations of whether a party is in contempt and of the 

sanction to be imposed for an abuse of discretion.

(a) Violation of Parenting Plan

Having settled that joint legal custody required mutual 

decisionmaking, whether Nessa violated the parenting plan is 

easily answered. Nessa complied in part by discussing with 

Eric her plan to move the child’s residence to a distant town 

and enroll him in a different school district and by attempting to mediate a solution. But Nessa knew that Eric opposed 

those actions and that there was not mutual agreement, and 

she moved the child to the other town and enrolled him in the 

other school anyway. The “Remediation” provision of the plan 

hints at the next step when parties cannot agree: “filing legal 

action.” The district court’s erroneous interpretation of the 

parenting plan’s requirements led it to find that Eric failed to 

establish a violation of the parenting plan by Nessa. In doing 

so, the court abused its discretion.

(b) Willfulness of Violation

[15,16] To be in contempt, Nessa’s violation of the parenting plan had to be willful. Willful disobedience is an essential 

element of contempt; “willful” means the violation was committed intentionally, with knowledge that the act violated the 

court order. 28 Outside of statutory procedures imposing a different standard or an evidentiary presumption, the complainant 

must prove all elements of contempt by clear and convincing evidence. 29

28 Becher v. Becher, supra note 10.

29 Id.
- 509 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

Eric proved willfulness by clear and convincing evidence. 

The evidence established that he informed Nessa of his objection to moving the child’s residence and school. While Nessa 

claims that she believed the parenting plan required discussion 

only, our first opinion demonstrated that any such subjective 

belief was erroneous. While Nessa did not move the child until 

after the district court denied Eric’s motion for an order to 

show cause and motion for writ of assistance, she did not seek 

modification or other relief through the court.

[17] We conclude the district court abused its discretion 

when it found that Nessa was not in contempt. A district court 

by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error 

of law. 30

(c) Remedial Relief and Coercive Sanctions

[18-20] Because Nessa willfully violated the decree, coercive 

and remedial sanctions are appropriate. Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit when a party fails to comply with a court 

order made for the benefit of the opposing party. 31 A civil sanction is coercive and remedial; the contemnors carry the keys 

of their jail cells in their own pockets, because the sentence is 

conditioned upon continued noncompliance and is subject to 

mitigation through compliance. 32 Moreover, costs, including 

reasonable attorney fees, can be awarded in a contempt proceeding when there has been a finding of contempt. 33

Here, Eric is entitled to obtain Nessa’s compliance with the 

decree. This requires the immediate return of the child to 

Burwell and that school district. Eric is also entitled to his 

reasonable attorney fees. Nothing in this opinion should be 

30 Stone Land & Livestock Co. v. HBE, 309 Neb. 970, 962 N.W.2d 903 

(2021).

31 Becher v. Becher, supra note 10.

32 Id.

33 Id.
- 510 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

311 Nebraska Reports

VYHLIDAL v. VYHLIDAL

Cite as 311 Neb. 495

construed to preclude the district court on remand from considering modification of the decree, whether upon the complaint 

of either party 34 or as part of a contempt proceeding. 35

VI. CONCLUSION

We reverse the order of the district court, which declined to 

find that Nessa violated the decree or that she did so willfully. 

We remand the cause with directions to find Nessa in willful 

contempt, to order the child’s immediate return to Burwell residency and school enrollment, to award Eric reasonable attorney 

fees, to craft such coercive sanctions as may be appropriate to 

achieve Nessa’s compliance with the decree, and for further 

proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

34 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364(6) (Cum. Supp. 2020).

35 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364.15 (Reissue 2016).