PRESENT: All the Justices 

PAUL G. BEETON 

v. Record No. 011225 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 March 1, 2002 

DENNIS BEETON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

CO-EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF 

MARGARET R. BEETON, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY 

William L. Wellons, Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the chancellor erred in 

his determination of the ownership of certain intangible 

personal property. 

 Paul G. Beeton, Dennis J. Beeton, and Mary E. Watson are 

three of the four children of Margaret R. Beeton (Mrs. Beeton), 

who died in January 1998. In 1985, Mrs. Beeton had executed a 

will directing that her property be divided into three equal 

shares and distributed to Paul, Dennis, and Mary. In her will, 

Mrs. Beeton also expressly disinherited her fourth child and 

appointed Paul, Dennis, and Mary as co-executors of her estate. 

 The property at issue in this appeal includes two United 

States Treasury Bills, in the amounts of $250,000 and 

$1,000,000, formerly owned by Mrs. Beeton. On the date of her 

death, Paul was the designated "payable on death" (P.O.D.) 

beneficiary of both Treasury Bills. Also at issue in this 

appeal is the ownership of a certificate of deposit in the 

approximate amount of $200,000, which Mrs. Beeton purchased in 
1996 at Community National Bank (the Community National CD). At 

the time of this purchase, Mrs. Beeton designated Paul as the 

P.O.D. beneficiary. However, in March 1997, Paul had the 

Community National CD reissued payable to "Margaret S. Beeton or 

Paul S. Beeton W/S," which purported to establish them as joint 

owners with right of survivorship. 

 After Mrs. Beeton's death, Dennis and Mary (collectively, 

the executors) filed a bill of complaint asking that Paul be 

required to return to the estate certain assets, including the 

Community National CD and the $250,000 and $1,000,000 Treasury 

Bills. In their bill of complaint, the executors alleged that 

Mrs. Beeton "lacked the mental capacity to understand and 

appreciate" the transactions that designated Paul as the P.O.D. 

beneficiary on the two Treasury Bills and as joint owner of the 

Community National CD. The executors further alleged that the 

disputed transactions were void based on Paul's fraud and the 

undue influence he exerted over Mrs. Beeton. 

 At trial, the chancellor heard evidence that in 1988, Paul 

resigned from his employment as a schoolteacher, and began 

residing with Mrs. Beeton and depending on her for financial 

support. During this time, Paul performed various tasks for his 

mother, including maintaining her home and raising tobacco on 

her farm. 

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 In 1994, Paul and Mrs. Beeton became estranged due to 

Paul's violent behavior caused by his abuse of alcohol. Paul 

and Mrs. Beeton reconciled about one year later and Mrs. Beeton 

purchased a residence for Paul near her home. After their 

reconciliation and until her death, Paul continued to maintain 

his mother's home and to assist her with her personal needs. 

 Mrs. Beeton had two accounts in which she held Treasury 

Bills. One account contained three Treasury Bills, each in the 

amount of $250,000, which were payable on her death to Paul, 

Dennis, and Mary, respectively. In a second account (the 

separate account), Mrs. Beeton held three other Treasury Bills, 

one in the amount of $200,000, and the Treasury Bills of 

$250,000 and $1,000,000 at issue in this appeal. The Treasury 

Bills in the separate account were held solely in Mrs. Beeton's 

name and originally had no P.O.D. designations. 

 In December 1997, Mrs. Beeton, then 80 years old, began to 

rely on Paul as her primary caretaker because her health was 

failing. Until that time, Mrs. Beeton had administered her 

financial accounts without assistance from Paul. However, when 

the three $250,000 Treasury Bills bearing the P.O.D. 

designations and the $200,000 Treasury Bill in the separate 

account were due for renewal, Mrs. Beeton requested Paul's help 

in renewing them. The Treasury Bills of $250,000 and $1,000,000 

in the separate account were not due for renewal at this time. 

3
 Paul testified that at his mother's direction, he completed 

by telephone an automated renewal procedure for the Treasury 

Bills that were due to expire. Paul also stated that he and 

Mrs. Beeton "ran across a bill that did not have a POD on it. 

She told me that she would like to place a POD on it." Mrs. 

Beeton asked Paul to obtain a Transaction Request Form for this 

purpose from the United States Department of the Treasury. 

 Paul stated that he thought that his mother was referring 

only to the $200,000 Treasury Bill in the separate account, and 

that he was unaware that there was more than one Treasury Bill 

in that account. Paul completed the Transaction Request Form at 

Mrs. Beeton's direction, writing in the account number and Mrs. 

Beeton's name, and designating the account in the name of 

"Margaret S. Beeton POD Paul G. Beeton." 

 After Mrs. Beeton signed the completed form in Paul's 

presence, he took the form to an officer of Crestar Bank in 

South Boston who guaranteed Mrs. Beeton's signature. According 

to Paul, only after Mrs. Beeton's death did he learn that the 

form designated him as the P.O.D. beneficiary of an account that 

contained three Treasury Bills. 

 When questioned further about his conversation with his 

mother concerning the addition of a P.O.D. designation, Paul 

testified, "At that time she indicated that she wanted to put a 

POD on the account." However, when questioned why Mrs. Beeton 

4
wanted to make the P.O.D. designation, Paul also stated, "From 

her conversation she just indicated to me considering the way 

things are going I would like to place a POD on that bill." 

 Paul also testified that when Mrs. Beeton instructed him to 

list himself as the P.O.D. beneficiary on the Transaction 

Request Form, she commented to Paul, "[T]hat's a lot of 

responsibility." Paul stated that his mother's comment did not 

have any meaning to him at the time because he thought that she 

was referring only to the Treasury Bill of $200,000. Paul 

described himself as "flabbergasted and shocked" when he 

discovered that he was also the P.O.D. beneficiary of the two 

additional Treasury Bills in the separate account. 

 In the final decree, the chancellor found that Mrs. Beeton 

was competent at the time of the disputed transactions, and that 

"such transactions were not the product of the fraudulent 

actions or undue influence of Paul upon [Mrs. Beeton]." 

However, the chancellor awarded judgment in favor of the 

executors on the $250,000 and $1,000,000 Treasury Bills. 

 The decree stated that there was no evidence showing that 

Mrs. Beeton intended to make Paul the beneficiary of the 

$250,000 and $1,000,000 Treasury Bills. The chancellor held 

that the evidence regarding the separate account showed that 

Mrs. Beeton only intended to make Paul the P.O.D. beneficiary of 

the $200,000 Treasury Bill in that account. Citing Massie v. 

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Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922), the chancellor 

ruled that Paul was bound by his testimony that before his 

mother's death, he thought that her intent was to have the added 

P.O.D. designation apply only to the $200,000 Treasury Bill. 

 The chancellor also held that Paul was the owner of the 

Community National CD. The decree stated that the 1997 

certificate executed by Paul was null and void because, at that 

time, Paul lacked any ownership interest in the certificate 

purchased by Mrs. Beeton in 1996. The decree further provided 

that the 1996 certificate designating Paul as the P.O.D. 

beneficiary remained in effect. 

 Paul appeals from the portion of the chancellor's decree 

awarding the $250,000 and $1,000,000 Treasury Bills to Mrs. 

Beeton's estate. The executors assign cross-error to the part 

of the chancellor's decree awarding to Paul the Community 

National CD. 

 Paul argues that the Transaction Request Form signed by 

Mrs. Beeton was prima facie evidence of her intent and that the 

executors failed to carry their burden of proving a contrary 

intent. He asserts that absent a showing of fraud, undue 

influence, mistake, or incompetence, Mrs. Beeton's intent, as 

evidenced by the form of the account on the date of her death, 

is controlling. Paul further contends that the Massie doctrine 

does not apply to his testimony about his impression of his 

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mother's intent because her unexpressed intent was beyond the 

realm of his personal knowledge. Paul thus contends that the 

two Treasury Bills at issue belong to him as the P.O.D. 

beneficiary of the separate account. 

 In response, the executors argue that the evidence 

supported the chancellor's decision regarding the two Treasury 

Bills. The executors assert that Paul was bound by his 

testimony under Massie, and that his testimony established that 

Mrs. Beeton intended to make Paul the P.O.D. beneficiary of only 

the $200,000 Treasury Bill, not of the entire contents of the 

separate account. The executors contend that the chancellor 

appropriately considered this evidence in determining that Mrs. 

Beeton's actual intent was contrary to the form of the account. 

We disagree with the executors' arguments. 

 Our standard of review is well established. As trier of 

fact, the chancellor evaluated the testimony and the credibility 

of the witnesses. Johnson v. Cauley, 262 Va. 40, 44, 546 S.E.2d 

681, 684 (2001); Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 

Va. 106, 120, 501 S.E.2d 148, 156 (1998). Thus, we will not set 

aside his findings on appeal unless they are plainly wrong or 

without evidentiary support. Nelson v. Davis, 262 Va. 230, 234, 

546 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2001); Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va. 296, 302, 

541 S.E.2d 556, 560 (2001). 

7
 The record shows that the separate account containing the 

two disputed Treasury Bills was a "Treasury Direct" account 

established by Mrs. Beeton with the United States Department of 

the Treasury. We treat this particular account as an "account" 

within the meaning of Code § 6.1-125.1(1) under the law of this 

case as presented by the parties.1

 Under Title 6.1 of the Code, a determination of the 

ownership of a P.O.D. account, in which there was a sole 

original payee and one P.O.D. payee, is made with reference to 

the date of death of the original payee. See Code § 6.1-

125.5(B)(2); Jampol v. Farmer, 259 Va. 53, 58, 524 S.E.2d 436, 

439 (2000). One who challenges the intent expressed in the form 

of a P.O.D. account as it existed on the date of death of an 

original payee has the burden of proving a contrary intent. See

id. at 59, 524 S.E.2d at 439. 

 1

 The parties presented this case at trial and on appeal 

under the statutory framework of Title 6.1 of the Code, and 

neither the parties nor the trial court considered provisions of 

federal law relating to the ownership of a Treasury Direct 

account or of securities held in such an account. See, e.g., 31 

C.F.R. § 357.22(c) (2001). Therefore, the provisions of Title 

6.1 have become the law of the case. We also note that the facts 

presented here are unlike those considered in Bennett v. First & 

Merchs. Nat'l. Bank, 233 Va. 355, 360, 355 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 

(1987). There, we held that a certain Treasury Bill was not an 

"account" within the meaning of Code § 6.1-125.1, because the 

Bill was purchased by a bank as the agent of a depositor and was 

an obligation owed to the bank, not to the depositor of the 

bank. Thus, unlike the present case, the depositor's contract of 

deposit in Bennett was solely with the bank and did not invovle 

a contractual relationship with the Department of Treasury. Id. 

8
 We therefore address the particular burden of proof that 

must be met to overcome the intent expressed by the form of an 

account. In cases involving joint accounts and P.O.D. accounts 

with more than one original payee, Code § 6.1-125.5 requires 

that a party challenging the form of such an account after the 

death of one of its owners prove a contrary intent by clear and 

convincing evidence. However, neither Code § 6.1-125.5 nor any 

other statute addresses the level of proof required to overcome 

the form of a P.O.D. account having only one original payee, 

such as the separate account established by Mrs. Beeton. 

 In the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, we 

perceive no basis for assigning a lesser burden of proof when a 

P.O.D. account has only one original payee, as opposed to an 

account in which there are multiple payees. Thus, we conclude 

that the burden of proof required to overcome the intent 

expressed by the form of a P.O.D. account having a sole original 

payee is also that of clear and convincing evidence.2

 

2

Our conclusion is consistent with decisions in prior cases 

in which we have held that persons challenging the validity of 

certain written instruments have the burden of overcoming the 

express contents of those instruments by clear and convincing 

evidence. See, e.g., Knewstep v. Jackson, 259 Va. 263, 269-70, 

523 S.E.2d 505, 508-09 (2000); Ayers v. Mosby, 256 Va. 228, 233-

34, 504 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (1998); Gifford v. Dennis, 230 Va. 

193, 197-98, 335 S.E.2d 371, 373 (1985); Carter v. Carter, 223 

Va. 505, 509, 291 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1982). 

9
 In the present case, therefore, the executors had the 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. 

Beeton had a contrary intent regarding ownership of the separate 

account than that expressed by the form of the account on the 

date of her death. We conclude that, as a matter of law, the 

executors failed to meet this evidentiary burden. 

 Paul's testimony regarding his conversation with Mrs. 

Beeton, in which he interchangeably used the words "account" and 

"bill" in describing Mrs. Beeton's instructions concerning the 

P.O.D. designation, does not clearly and convincingly establish 

Mrs. Beeton's intent to place a P.O.D. designation only on the 

$200,000 Treasury Bill. At best, this testimony is equivocal 

regarding whether Mrs. Beeton intended to make Paul the P.O.D. 

beneficiary of the entire separate account or of only the 

$200,000 Treasury Bill. 

 We also conclude that the chancellor erred in applying the 

doctrine of Massie v. Firmstone to Paul's testimony that he 

thought his mother was referring only to the $200,000 Treasury 

Bill when she executed the Transaction Request Form. The Massie

doctrine is limited to sworn statements of fact within a 

litigant's own personal knowledge and is based on the premise 

that a litigant should not be permitted to ask a court to make 

findings that contradict the litigant's own sworn statements 

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regarding such facts. Henderson v. Henderson, 255 Va. 122, 126-

27, 495 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1998). 

 The Massie doctrine does not apply to a litigant's 

statement of opinion. See Braden v. Isabell K. Horsley Real 

Estate, Ltd., 245 Va. 11, 16-17, 425 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1993); 

Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 55, 419 S.E.2d 

627, 629-30 (1992); Charlton v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 235 

Va. 485, 489, 369 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1988). Paul's testimony at 

issue was a statement of opinion concerning Mrs. Beeton's inner 

motivation, rather than a statement of fact within his personal 

knowledge. See id. Thus, this testimony was not binding 

evidence of Mrs. Beeton's intent. Because the executors failed 

to establish their claim of a contrary intent by clear and 

convincing evidence, we hold that the chancellor erred in 

awarding judgment for the executors on the two disputed Treasury 

Bills. 

 We next consider the executors' assignment of cross-error 

that the chancellor erred in holding that Paul was the owner of 

the Community National CD. The executors agree with the 

chancellor's determination that the 1997 certificate was null 

and void because Paul lacked any ownership interest in the 

account at the time he attempted to change its form. However, 

the executors argue that the 1996 certificate became invalid 

when Paul obtained the new certificate in March 1997 and, thus, 

11
that the assets held in that account did not pass to Paul in a 

non-testamentary manner and belong to the estate. We disagree 

with the executors' arguments. 

 Initially, we agree that the 1997 certificate was null and 

void. A certificate of deposit is an "account," as defined by 

Code § 6.1-125.1(1). Only a "party" to an account may give a 

written order to a financial institution to change the form of 

the account or vary the terms of payment under that account. 

Code § 6.1-125.6. 

 As the P.O.D. payee of the account established by the 

Community National CD in 1996, Paul could qualify as a "party" 

to that account only after it became payable to him by reason of 

his surviving Mrs. Beeton, the original payee of the account. 

Code § 6.1-125.1(7). Therefore, in March 1997, when Mrs. Beeton 

was still alive, the account established by the 1996 certificate 

still belonged solely to her as the original payee of the 

account, and Paul did not have the legal right to effect a 

change in the form of that account. See Code §§ 6.1-125.3(B) 

and –125.6. 

 Because Paul's actions in March 1997 were null and void, 

the Community National CD issued in 1996, which designated Paul 

as the P.O.D. beneficiary, remained in effect at Mrs. Beeton's 

death. Thus, we conclude that the chancellor did not err in 

awarding the assets held in that account to Paul. 

12
 For these reasons, we will affirm that portion of the 

chancellor's decree awarding to Paul the assets in the account 

established by the Community National CD. We will reverse that 

portion of the decree concerning the two disputed Treasury Bills 

and remand the case to the chancellor for entry of final 

judgment in favor of Paul in the amount of those Bills and the 

interest accrued on them. 

Affirmed in part and final judgment,

 reversed in part and remanded.

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