SECOND DI VI SI ON M ERCI ER, C. J. , M ILLER, P. J. , and HODGES, J.

N O T IC E : M o tions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be phy s ic a lly r

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Januar y 24, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 23A 16 7 5
. CLA R K v

. TH E STA TE.
M I L L E R , Presid ing J u d ge. Fo llo w ing a j u ry trial, Shaw n Clark w as c o nv ic ted o f c hild mo lestatio n and
p u blic ind ec enc y. Clark a p p eals f o llo w ing his c o nv ic tio ns and s entenc e and the d enial

o f his mo tio n f

o r new trial, claiming t hat the ev id enc e w as insu f f ic ient to su p p o rt his

c hild m o lestatio n c o nv ic tio n and t hat the trial c o urt p lainly erred in instr u c t i n g t h e j u ry and in a llo w ing c ertain exp ert tes t i m o ny. We d isagree and theref o re af f irm Clark ’ s c o nv ic t io ns and sentenc e and the d enial o f his mo t io n f

o r new trial. V iew ed in the light mo st f av o rable to the v erd ic ts, 1 the ev id e nc e at trial sho w ed that o n D ec ember 2 , 2 01 8, Clark w as an inmate in the H enry Co u nty J a il when his

1 See Pa tch v. S ta te , 337 Ga. A p p . 233, 235 (1 ) (7 86 SE2d 882) (201 6 )

.girlf

riend V enessa Park er and their three- year- o ld dau ghter A

. P. visited him. The

v isitati o n a r e a c o nsists o f tw o sid es, o ne f o r inmates and o ne f

o r v isito r s, w hic h

c o ntain three bo o t hs w ith sto o ls, c o u nters, and t elep ho nes and w hic h a re sep arated f ro m the o ther s id e by trans p a r e n t p l exiglass. T he sto o ls in ad j o ining bo o ths are ap p ro ximately tw o f

eet ap art f r o m eac h other, and an ind iv id ual in one bo o th c an see into the o ther bo o ths. D u ring the v isit, Clark sp o k e w ith A

. P. bef o re telling Park er that he wanted to

see her p riv ate parts. Park er p u lled d o w n her p ants and p u t her p riv ate p arts up to the
p lexiglass f

o r Clark to see. 2 Park er attemp t e d t o b lo c k A

. P. f ro m s eeing her p riv a t e p arts by p lac ing her j a c k e t o ver her lap

. Clark p u lled his p e nis o u t of his pants, p lac ed lu bric ant o n it, and mastu rbated , o c c asio nally stand ing u p w h i l e he d id s o . A

. P. initially w and ered aro u nd the v isitatio n a r e a and the o ther bo o ths w hile Clark w as

m a stu rbating, bu t at one p o int A

. P. was stand ing behind Park er’ s bo oth in C l a r k ’ s

“ clear v iew ” and w a s f

ac ing Clark w hile he mastu r b ated

. Priso n g u a r d s saw Clark
mastu rbating a nd sto p p ed the v isit. Clark su bsequ ently to ld the gu a r d s that “ if it

2 Park er p led gu ilty to p u blic ind e c enc y based o n the inc id ent. 2w asn’ t on c amera, no t hing hap p ened

. ” The j u ry observ ed bo th a v id e o rec o rd ing and

p ho to grap hs o f

the v isit at trial. A t trial, law enf

orc ement o f

f ic ers f amiliar with the visitatio n area testif ied that b a s ed on the resp ec tiv e v antage p o ints o f Clark and A

. P. , the t wo c o u ld hav e se e n

eac h o t her while Clark was mastu rbating. H o w e v er, Park er testif ied that A

. P. d id no t see Clark mastu r bating bec au se she w as no t p aying attentio n to him. Clark w a s c harged w ith c hild mo lestati o n (OCGA § 1 6

- 6

- 4 (a)) and p u blic ind ec enc y (OCGA § 1 6- 6- 8), and the j u ry f ou nd him gu ilty o n bo th c o u nts. The trial

c o u rt sentenc ed Clark to 20 years, w ith the f irst 1 0 years t o be serv ed in c o nf inement

a n d the remaind er o n p ro batio n. Clark f iled a m o t io n f

o r new trial, w hic h the trial

c o u rt d enied af

ter a hearing. This ap p eal f ollo w ed

. 1
. Clark argu es that the ev id enc e w as insu f f ic ient t o c o n v i c t him o f c hild

mo lestatio n f

or t w o r e a s o n s . First, Clark argu e s t hat he w a s no t aro u sed d u e to the
p resenc e o f A. P. bu t d u e to the p resenc e o f Park er, and a natu ral r ead ing o f OCGA § 1 6

- 6- 4 (a) ind ic ates t hat the State mu st p ro v e that the d ef e nd ant aro u sed himself d u e
to t he c hild ’ s p resenc e. Sec ond , he a rgu es that the ev id enc e d id no t sho w that Clark
mastu rbated “ in the p resenc e o f ” A. P

. b ec au se there w as a signif ic ant p hysic al barrier

3betw een him and the c hild , the c hild ’ s v iew o f him w as blo c ked by the bar r i er and

Park er, and there w as no testimo ny that the c hild saw his p enis. W e rej ec t Clark ’ s interp retatio n o f the c hild mo lestatio n statu te a nd c o nc lu d e that the e v id enc e

au tho riz ed the j ury to f

ind that he mastu rbated in A

. P. ’ s p r e senc e . W hen a def

end ant c hallenges the su f

f ic ienc y o f the e vid enc e su p p o rting his c riminal co nv ic tio n, the relev a nt qu estio n is w heth er , a f ter v iew ing the ev id enc e in the light mo st f av o rable to the p ro sec u tio n, a ny ratio nal trier o f f ac t c ou ld hav e fo u nd the essential e lements o f the c rime beyo nd
a reaso nable d o u b t . I t is the f u nc tio n of the j u ry, no t the r ev iew ing c o u rt, to reso lv e c onf

lic ts in the testimo ny, to w eigh t he ev id enc e, and to d raw reaso nable inf

erenc es f ro m the ev id enc e. A s l o n g as there is s o m e c o mp etent ev id enc e, ev en tho u gh c o ntrad ic ted , t o su p p o rt eac h f ac t nec essary to mak e o u t the [S]tate’ s c ase, the j ury’ s v erd ic t w ill be
u p held

. (Citatio ns, p u nc tu atio n, and emp h a sis omitted

. ) Tho ma s v . Sta te , 324 Ga. A p p . 26 (7 48 SE2d 509 ) (201 3). A re a d ing o f the c hild m o lestatio n statu te and an e xaminatio n o f the relev ant

c ase law establishes that the d ef end ant need no t be aro u sed d u e to t he p resenc e o f the

c hild to su s tain a c onv ic t io n u nd er the statu te. A t the tim e o f C l ark ’ s c ond u c t in

4201 8, 3 OCGA § 1 6- 6- 4 (a) (1 ) p ro v id ed that “ [a] p erso n c o mmits t he o f f ense o f c hild

mo lestat i o n w hen su c h perso n . . . [d ]o es any immo ral o r ind ec ent a c t to or in the
p resenc e o f or w ith a ny c hild u nd er the age o f 1 6 y ears w ith the intent to ar o u s e o r satisf y t he sexu al d esires o f either the c hild o r the p erso n[. ]” 4 T hu s, t o c o nv ic t Clark

o f c hild mo lestatio n, the State need ed to p r o v e t h e f o llo wing elements:

“ ( 1) c o mmissio n o f an immo ral o r ind ec ent ac t ; (2) to or in the p resenc e o f o r w ith any

c hild u nd er the age o f 1 6 ; ( 3) w ith the intent to aro u se o r satisf y the sexu al desires o f either t he c hild o r t he p erp etrato r. ” Ga b le v . S t a te , 222 Ga. A pp . 7 6 8, 7 6 9

- 7 7 0 (1 ) (47 6 SE2d 6 6) (1 9 9 6 ). Und er o u r w ell- established ru les o f statu t o ry c o nstru c tio n, w e p resu m e that the General Assembly meant w hat it said a nd s aid w hat it m eant. To that end , w e mu st af

f o rd the statu to ry text its p lain and o rd inary meaning, w e mu st v iew the statu to ry text i n the c o ntext in w hic h it ap p ears, and w e m u s t read the statu to ry text in its mo st natu ral a nd
reaso nable w a

y, as an o rd inary sp eak er o f the English langu age w o uld

.

3 “ [I ]t has lo ng been the law in t his state that, in general, a c r ime i s t o b e c o nstru ed and p u nished ac c o rd ing to the pro v isio ns o f the law existing at the time o f its c o mmissio n. ” Flemi

n g v. S t a te , 27 1 Ga. 587 , 59 0 (523 SE2d 31 5) (1 9 9 9 ).

4 T he statu te was amend ed in 2022 to c hange the p h r a se “ any immo ral o r ind ec ent ac t” to “ an immo ral o r ind ec ent ac t. ” See Ga. L. 2022, p
. 1 04, § 1

. 5(Citatio n and p u nc t u atio n o mitted

. ) S co tt v . S ta te , 29 9 G a . 56 8, 57 1 ( 2) (7 88 SE2d

46 8) (201 6 ). Fu rther, w e mu s t “ interp r et the statu te a s a w ho le, striv ing to mak e all its p arts harmo niz e and t o giv e a sensible and intelligent ef f ec t t o e a c h p art, and to

av o id c o nstru c tio ns that m a k e s o me langu age mere su rp lu sage. ” (Citatio ns and
p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) S ta te v . Fre e A t L a s t Ba i l Bo n d s , 285 Ga. A p p . 7 34, 7 37 (6 47 SE2d 402) (2007 ). The c hild mo lestatio n statu te simp ly ref ers t o “the sexu al d esires o f either the

c hild o r the p erso n” and p ro vid es no ind ic atio n that the d ef end ant mu s t be aro u sed d u e to the c hild ’ s p resenc e . I nd eed , that the statu te c o v ers t h e c o m missio n o f an immo ral o r ind ec ent ac t “ in the p resenc e o f” a c hi l d s h o w s t h a t the c hild d o es no t need to be a mo tiv ating fac t o r fo r t h e imp ro p er ac t. Bind ing p rec ed ent ap p lying the
statu te also sho w s that the d e f end ant need no t be aro u sed d u e to the c hild ’ s p resenc e. Sp ec if ic ally, this Co u rt has held that a hu sband and w if e who engaged in a n “ op en and intentio nal ac t o f sexu a l interc ou rse” with eac h o t her in the p resenc e o f fiv e c hild ren

c o u ld be co nv ic ted o f c hild mo lestatio n. Gri ms ley v . S t

a te , 233 Ga. A p p . 7 81 , 7 84- 7 85 (1 ) ( 5 0 5 SE2d 5 22) ( 1 9 9 8). This Co u rt has also held that a d ef end ant c o u ld be

c o nv ic ted o f c hild mo lestatio n w hen he mastu rbated and w atc hed p o rno grap hy w hile

6a child w as mo ving aro u nd the ho u se and w hen he w as aw are that t he c hild c o u ld see

him. Jo rda n v . S ta te , 31 7 Ga. Ap p . 1 6 0, 1 63- 1 6 4 (1 ) (b) ( 730 SE2d 7 23) (201 2); see also B ro wn v . S ta te , 324 Ga. A p p . 7 1 8, 7 20- 7 21 (1 ) (7 5 1 SE2d 51 7 ) (201 3) (t h e c h i l d

mo lestatio n statu te “ requ ires only that the d ef e nd a n t hav e ac ted w ith the intent to

aro u se his sexu al d esires” ). C l a r k ’s co n c ern t hat the c hild mo lestatio n statu te c o u ld be ap p l i e d t o i n n o cu o u s

c o nd u c t is ad d ressed by o ther e lements o f t he statu te. Signif ic antly, the statu te o nly
ap p lies to “ immo ral o r ind ec ent” ac ts, and w e hav e generally held that the d ef end ant

mu st be aw are of the c hild ’s presenc e d u ring the ac t. See Ra i n e y v . S ta te , 26 1 Ga. A p p . 888, 89 0 (1 ) (584 SE2d 1 3) ( 2003) (ev id enc e su p p o rted c hild mo lestatio n co nv ic tio n bec au se “the j u ry w as au tho r iz ed to c o nc lu d e that [the d ef end ant] w as aw are o f the

v ic tim’ s p resenc e and t hat he so u ght to exp o se himself to her f o r the p u rp o s e o f satisf ying his o w n sexu a l d esires” ). “ I mmo ral o r ind e c e n t a c ts c o nstitu ting c hild

mo lestatio n ref

er to ac ts generally v iew e d as mo rally ind e lic ate o r i m p ro p er o r

o f f e n s i v e, and w hic h o f

f end a gainst the p u blic ’ s s ense o f pro p riety. ” (Citatio n an d
p u nc tu atio n o mitted .) Wo rmley v . S ta te , 255 G a . Ap p . 3 4 7 , 3 4 8 ( 5 6 5 SE2d 530) (2002). Clark relies u p o n this Co u rt’ s p rio r rej e c ti o n o f the hyp o thetic al argu m ent that

7“ t ak ing a p ic tu r e o f a p o t ted p lant might be an ac t o f c hild mo lestatio n if there is

su f fic ient ev id e nc e t o sho w t hat the p ho to grap her ac ted w ith sexu al intent. ” See Ri ce

v . S t a te , 357 Ga. A p p . 87 3, 87 6

- 87 7 (1 ) (b) (852 SE2d 57 9 ) (2020). H o w ev er, in Ri ce this Co u r t simp ly ad d ressed t h e i s s u e of w hether t he ac t o f tak ing p ho to grap hs o f

c hild ren w ho w ere c lo thed and sleep ing w as “ immo ral a nd ind ec ent” — no t the issu e

o f w hat the d ef

end ant mu st be aro u sed by. See id

. Thu s, w e r ej ec t Clark ’ s argu ment that u nd er the c hild mo lestatio n statu te the d ef end ant’ s aro u sal mu st alw ays be d u e
to the p resenc e o f

the c hild

. W e also disagree w ith Clark ’ s assertio n t ha t bec au s e mastu rbating in p u blic

w here c hild ren might see is c o v ered by t he p u blic ind ec e nc y s tatu te, the ru le o f lenity
requ ires that a p erp etrato r who has engaged in su c h c o nd u c t be p u nished fo r the lesser

o f f ense o f p u b lic ind ec e nc y. [T]he ru le o f lenity f

ind s i t s r o o t s in t he vagu e ness d o ctrine, w hic h requ ires f a ir w arning as to w hat c o nd uc t is p ro sc ribed

. M ore sp ec if ic a lly, the ru le o f

lenity ensu res that if and w hen an a mbigu ity exists in o ne o r mo re s t a t u tes, s u c h that the law exac ts v arying degrees o f p u nishment f o r the same o f

f e nse, the ambigu ity w ill b e reso lv ed in f av o r o f a d ef

end ant,
w ho w ill then rec eiv e the lesser p u nishment. Of c o u r se, if it is d etermined af

ter ap p lying the t rad itio nal c ano ns o f c o nstru c tio n that the relev ant statu to ry t ext i s u nambigu o u s, t hen the ru le o f lenity will no t

8ap p ly. T he f u nd amental inqu iry w hen mak ing that a s s e s s m e n t i s w hether the id entic a l c o nd u c t w o u ld su pp o rt a c o nv ic tio n u nd er e i ther o f tw o c rimes w ith d if

f ering p enalties. (Citatio n o mitted

. ) Ko ro ma v . S ta te , 350 Ga. Ap p . 530, 531 (2) (827 SE2d 9 03) (201 9 ).

“ P u t ano ther w a

y, t he o p erativ e qu estio n is w hether [Clark ’ s] c o nd u c t, as c harged ,
su bj ec ted him to pro sec u tio n and sentenc ing und er bo th statu t es. ” ( Citatio n and
p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) Id

. ; see also Ba n t a v. Sta te , 281 Ga. 6 15, 61 8 (2) (6 42 SE2d 51 ) (2007 ) (“ [T]hat a single ac t m a y, as a f ac tu al matter, v io late mo re than o ne p enal
statu te d o es no t imp lic ate the ru le o f lenity. ”). OCGA § 1 6

- 6

- 8 (a) (2) p ro v id es that “a p erso n c o m mits the o f f ense o f p u blic ind ec enc y w hen he o r s he p erf o rms” c ertain ac ts “ in a p u blic p lac e,” inc lu d ing “ [a] lew d exp o s u r e o f t h e s e x u a l o r g a ns[. ]” Clark w as c harged w ith c hild mo lestatio n based

o n him mastu rbating in A

. P. ’ s presenc e, w hile he w as c harged w ith p u blic ind ec enc y based o n him lew d ly exp o sing his p enis at the jail, a p u blic p lac e. The o f f ense o f c hild

mo lestatio n requ ired p ro o f o f ad d itio nal f a c ts w hic h p ublic ind ec enc y did no t : that the

v ic tim be u nd er the age o f 1 6 and that Clark so u ght t o aro u se his ow n s exu al d esires. See Ko ro ma , s u p ra, 350 Ga. A p p . at 532- 533 ( 2). A nd the o f f ense o f p u blic ind ec enc y

re q u i red p ro o f of an a d d itio nal f ac t whic h child m o lestatio n d id no t: t hat the ac t be

9p erf

o rmed in a p u blic plac e. “ B ec a u se d if f erent f ac ts w er e requ ired t o pro v e these

o f f enses, the ru le o f lenity d o es no t ap p ly. ” Qu a wea y v . Sta te , 27 4 Ga. Ap p . 6 57 , 6 58 (6 1 8 SE2d 7 07 ) (2005). W e c o nc lu d e that the ev id enc e au t ho riz ed the j u ry to f ind that Clark
mast u r b a ted “ in the p resenc e o f ” A

. P. “ [T]his Co u rt has mad e c lear that the
p resenc e element o f child mo lestat i o n is satisf ied where the ac c used and the v ic tim

w ere in c lo se p hysic al p r o x i m ity (su c h as in the same ro om o r o n the same p iec e o f f u rnitu re) and the d ef

end ant w as aw are o f th e c h i l d ’ s p resenc e at the time he

c o mmitted the immo ral or ind ec ent ac t a t issu e. ” Pro phi tt v . S ta te , 336 Ga. Ap p . 26 2, 26 5 (7 84 SE2d 1 0 3) (201 6 ) (p hysic al p rec ed ent o nly); see id

. at 26 8 (“ [F]o r an

ac c used and v ic tim t o be to gether, they mu st b e in the same lo c atio n — i. e. , they mu st be i n c l o s e eno u gh p hysic al p ro ximity that they eac h w ou ld at least hav e the

o p p o rtu nity to o bserv e the o ther — r e g a rd less o f whether the c hild ac tu ally d o es

o bserv e the d ef

end ant’ s c o nd u c t. ” ). H ere, Clark and A

. P. w ere w ithin three f eet o f

eac h o t her in the same v isitatio n area sep arated o nly b y transp arent p lexiglass, and they were v isible to eac h o ther while Clark mastu rbated

. This ev id e nc e w as su f f ic ient f o r a j u ry to c o nc lu d e that Clark m astu r bated in the pre senc e o f A

. P. See Jo rda n ,

10su p ra, 31 7 G a . A p p . at 1 6 3- 1 6 4 (1 ) (b) (ev id enc e su p p o rted t he def end ant’ s c hild

mo lestatio n c o nv ic t io n bec au se he mastu rbated and w atc hed p o rno grap hy w hile the

c hild w as mo v ing aro u nd the ho u se and he w as aw are that t he c hild c o u l d s ee him). Co mp a re Pro

phi tt , su pra, 336 Ga. A p p . at 26 2- 26 3, 26 8 (c o nd u c t d id no t o c c u r in the

c hil d ’ s p r e senc e, w here the d ef end ant po sitio ned himself sev en to eight f eet

u nd erneath a ho use and mastu rbated w hile o bserv ing the c hild sho w er thro u gh a ho le in the bathro o m f

lo o r that w as o ne inc h lo ng and one- half inc h wid e, and it w o u ld hav e been p hysic ally imp o s sible f o r the c hild to see the d ef end ant); S elfe v . S ta te , 29 0 Ga. A p p . 857 , 859

- 86 1 (1 ) (6 60 SE2d 7 27 ) (2008) ( c o nd u c t o c c u rring o v er a w ebc am d o es

no t c o nstitu te c hild mo lestatio n b e c au s e it d o es no t o c c u r in the c hild ’ s p resenc e), d isap p ro v ed o f

o n o ther gro u nd s, Go rdo n v . S ta te , 334 G a. A p p . 633, 637 (7 80 SE2d
37 6 ) (201 5). M o reo v er, the State w as no t requ ired to p ro v e t h at A

. P. ac tu ally saw Clark
mastu rbating. “ [T]he m ere e xp o su re o f sexu al o rgans t o a c hild is su f fic ient ev id enc e

o f child m o lestatio n, and neither p hysic al c o ntac t with the c hild no r the c hild ’ s ac tu al sight o f the sexu al o rgans is requ ired

. ” (Citatio n o m itted

. ) C l emen s v . S ta t

e , 31 8 Ga. A p p . 1 6, 20 (3) (7 33 SE2d 6 7 ) (201 2). All t hat is requ ired u nd er the c hild mo lestatio n

11s t a t u t e is that the immo ral o r ind ec ent ac t o cc u r in the c hild ’ s p resenc e. Ja cks o n v .

S ta te , 344 Ga. Ap p. 6 1 8, 620 (1 ) (81 0 SE2d 6 7 20 (201 8). I n this c ase, t here w as amp le

ev id enc e — inc lu ding the v id eo rec o rd ing and p ho t ograp hs o f the inc id ent sho w ing that Clark and A

. P. w e re in c lo se p hysic al p ro ximity and that Clark w as aw are o f A

. P. ’ s p resenc e— f

r o m w hic h the j u ry c o uld find that Cla r k m a s t u rbated in A

. P. ’ s p resenc e. See id

. (u p ho ld ing c hild mo lestatio n c o nv ic tio n bec au s e t here w as ev id enc e f ro m w hic h t he j u ry co u ld inf er that the d ef

end ant mastu rbated in the c hild ’ s p resenc e); Kla u s en v . S ta t e , 29 4 Ga. A p p . 46 3, 46 4- 46 5 (1 ) (6 6 9 SE 2 d 4 6 0 ) (2008) (ev id enc e su pp o r t e d child m o lestatio n c o nv ic tio n bec a u se the d ef end ant mastu rbated

w hile a c hild was on a so f

a w ith him, ev en tho u gh the c hild “ m ay no t hav e been f u lly

aw are o f w hat w as o c c u rring” ). A c c o rd ingly, w e c o nc lu d e that the ev id e nc e w a s su f fic ient to su p p o rt Clark ’ s

c o nv ic tio n f

o r c hild mo lestatio n. 2. N e xt, Clark a rgu es that the trial c o u rt p lainly erred by instru c ting t he j u ry as f o llo w s: “ The requ irement that an ac t o f c hild mo lestati o n b e co m mitted in the c hild ’ s p resenc e is met when the ac cu sed is aw are o f the c hild ’ s p r esenc e. The c hild need no t

see the ac c u sed ’ s s ex o rgan o r ev en be aw a re o f the a c c u sed ’ s p resenc e a t the time o f

12the ind ec ent ac t f o r th e j u r y to f

ind the c hild is in the a c c u sed ’ s p resenc e. ” Clark
asserts that u nd er Pro

phi t t , su p ra, 336 Ga. A p p . 26 2, a d ef end ant’ s mere aw areness o f the c hild ’ s p resenc e i s n o t s u f f ic ient to p ro v e the p resenc e e lement o f c hild

m o lestatio n and that the instru c tio n allo w ed the j ury to c o nv ic t him o f c h i l d

mo lestatio n regard less o f what c au sed his aro u sal. W e c onc lu de that the trial c o u rt d id

no t p lainly err in giv ing this instru c tio n. This Co urt rev iew s a c hallenged j u ry instru c tio n f o r p lain erro r w here, as here, the d ef e nd ant d id n o t o b j e ct to it at trial. S t a te v . K elly , 29 0 Ga. 29 , 31

- 32 (1 ) (7 1 8 SE2d 232) (201 1 ); OCGA § 1 7

- 8- 58 (b). A n ap p ellant seek ing to establish p lain erro r

mu st mak e f

o u r sho w ings: First, there mu st be an erro r o r d ef ec t — so me so rt o f

d ev iatio n f

ro m a legal ru le — that has no t been intentio nally relinqu ished o r aband o ned , i. e. , a f f irmativ ely waiv ed , by the a p p ellant. Sec o nd , the legal erro r mu st be c lear o r o bv io u s, rather than s u bj ec t to reaso nable d isp u te. Third , the
erro r mu st hav e af

f e c ted the ap p e llant’ s su bstantial rights, w hic h in the
o rd inary c ase means he mu st d emo nstrate that it af f e c ted the o u tc o m e o f the trial c o urt p ro c e ed ings. Fo u rth and finally, if the abo v e three p ro ngs are satisf

ied , the ap p ellate c o u rt has the d isc retio n to r emed y the
erro r — disc retio n w hic h o u ght to be e xerc ised o nly if t he e rro r serio u sly af f ec ts the f airness, integrity o r p u blic r ep u tatio n o f j u d ic ial pro c eed ings.

13(Citatio n, p u nc tu atio n, and e mp hasi s o m i t t e d

. ) Kelly , su p ra, 29 0 Ga. a t 33 (2) (a).

“ Satisf ying all f o u r p ro ngs o f this stand ard is d if f ic ult, as it sho u ld be. ” (Citatio n and
p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) I d

. W e c o nc lu d e that the trial c o u rt d id no t c o mmit c l e ar o r o bv io u s erro r in instru c ting the ju ry here. Signif ic antly, the p rinc i p l e s c o ntained in the c hallenged instru c tio n c o nstitu ted a c o rrec t statement o f t he law

. A s disc ussed abo v e in D iv isio n 1 , an ac t o f c hild mo lestatio n may oc c ur in the c hild ’ s p r e senc e w hen the d ef end ant is aw are o f the c hild ’ s p r esenc e; the c hild d o e s no t need to ac t ually see the d ef end ant’ s ge n i t a l s ; and the d ef end ant d o es no t need to be aro u sed by the c hild ’ s p resenc e. B ec au se the t rial co u rt c o rrec t ly instru c ted the j u ry o n the elements o f c hild

mo lestatio n, Clark c anno t establish t hat the trial c o u rt c o m mitted p lain erro r. See Pye

v . S t a te . 322 Ga. A p p . 125, 1 28- 1 29 (2) (7 42 SE2d 7 7 0) (201 3) (d ef end ant co u ld no t establish p lain erro r in the trial c o u rt’ s j u ry instru ctio n bec au se t he instru c t io n w as a

c o rrec t statement o f the law ).
3. Clark f urther argu es t hat the trial c o u rt p lainly erred by allo w ing Inv estigato r Greg Patterso n o f the H enry Co u nty Sherif f ’s O f f i c e t o testif

y as a legal exp ert and
exp lain c hild mo lestatio n and pu blic ind ec enc y f o r the j u ry. Sp ec if

ic ally, Clark asserts

14t hat Patterso n w as imp ro perly allo w ed to testif y that (a) in his inv estigatio ns, b o t h ind iv id u als w ho had to u c hed a c hild and tho se who had no t w ere c harged w ith c hild

mo lestatio n, and (b) he had inv estigated c ases “ as c hild mo lestatio n” w here a su sp ec t sho w e d p o rno grap hy to a c hil d and mastu rbated in the c hild ’ s p resenc e, bu t he had

c ited p eo p le w ho had u rinated in the w oo d s f o r p u blic ind ec enc y. W e c o nc lu d e that the trial c o u rt d id no t p lainly err in allo wing the c hallenged testimo ny. Ou r rev iew o f t his issu e is limited to p lain erro r bec au s e Clark d id no t o bj ec t to Patterso n’ s t estimo ny at trial. See OCGA § 24- 1

- 1 03 ( a) (1 ), (d ) ; Wa ts on v. S ta te , 303 Ga. 7 5 8, 7 6 1 (2) (c ) (81 4 SE2d 39 6 ) (201 8). H ere, t he trial c o u r t d id n o t c o mmit clear o r o bv io us erro r in allo w ing the
test i m o n y. A ltho u gh “ an exp ert witness may no t testif y as t o his o p inio n regard ing

u ltimate legal c onc lu sio ns,” (Citatio n o m i t t e d

. ) Fi rema n’ s Fu n d In s. C

o . v . Ho lder C o n s tr. Gro u

p , 36 2 Ga. A p p . 36 7 , 37 4 (1 ) (b) (86 8 SE2d 485) ( 2022), Patterso n d id no t testif y that Clark ’ s c o nd u c t c onstitu ted c hild mo lestatio n o r p u blic ind ec enc y bu t instead merely exp lained what o f f e nses c ertain d e f

end a nts had been c harged w ith in his inv estigatio ns.

15Ev en if Patterso n imp r o p e r l y o p i ned o n w hat co nd u c t c o nstitu tes c hild

mo lestatio n o r p u blic ind ec enc y, any erro r in allo w ing his testimo ny d id no t af f ec t the j u ry’ s v erd ic ts. W hen the State ask ed Patterso n if a perso n’ s aro u sal need ed to be

c au sed by a c hild in o r d er to be c harged w ith child mo lestatio n, Clark o bj ec ted o n the basis that Patterso n c o u ld no t giv e a legal o p inio n, and the t r ial c o u rt s u stained the

o bj ec tio n and to ld the j u r y that it w ou ld tak e the law t he c o urt p ro v id e d

. B ef o re d eliberatio ns began, the c ou rt reaf f irmed to the j u ry that t he c o u rt w as r e sp o nsible f o r instru c ting it o n the law

. The c o u rt also instru c t ed the ju ry that it w as no t requ ired to

ac c e p t t he testimo ny o f any w i t n e s s e s, “ exp ert o r o therw ise. ” T hu s, the j u ry w as

aw are that it s ho u ld f

o llo w the law giv en by the c o u rt and that it d id no t hav e to ac c ep t Patterso n’ s testimo ny. See, e. g. , Mi ke v . S ta te , 358 Ga. A p p . 1 1 3, 1 1 8 ( 3) (b) (853 SE2d
887 ) (2021 ) (trial c o u rt lessened the prej u d ic ial imp a c t o f c ertain ev id enc e by instru c ting the j u r y to co nsid e r the ev id enc e f o r o nly the limited p u rp o se o f p ro v ing intent o r the absenc e o f mistak e or ac c id ent). Fu rther, the p o t ential i m p l i c a t i o n o f Patterso n’ s testimo ny — that a d ef end ant need no t to u c h a c hild in o rd e r to c o mmit

c hild mo lestatio n — was c o r rec t, as w e exp lained in D iv isio n 1
. A nd there w as amp le

ev id enc e, inc lu d ing the v id e o rec o r d ing and p ho t ograp hs o f the inc id ent, that Clark

16c o mmitted c hild mo lestatio n and p u blic ind ec enc y. See Ga tes v . S t a te , 29 8 Ga. 324,
328 (3) (7 81 SE2d 7 7 2) (201 6 ) (the d ef end ant co u ld no t establish that any e rro r in the ad missio n o f e v id e nc e lik ely af fec ted the o u t c o m e o f his trial, in light o f the

o v e rw helming ev id enc e o f his gu ilt). Ac c o rd ingly, the trial c o u rt d id no t p lainly err in allo w ing Patterso n’ s testimo ny. 4. Finally, Clark ar g u es that the cu m u lativ e ef fec t o f the erro rs asserted in D iv isio ns 2 and 3 requ ires a n e w t r i a l

. Ho wev er, giv en o u r co nc lu sio n that the trial

c o u rt d id no t c o mmit a ny p lain erro r, this argu ment lac ks merit. See Hea de v . S ta te , 31 2 Ga. 1 9 , 29 (5) (86 0 SE2d 509 ) ( 2021 ) (d ef end ant’ s cu m u lativ e erro r argu ment f ailed w hen there w ere no erro r s to c u mu late). A c c o rd ingly, w e af

f irm Clark ’ s c o nv ic tio ns and sentenc e and the d enial o f his

mo tio n f o r new trial. Ju dgmen t a

ffi rmed. Merci

er, C. J. , a n d Ho dges

, J. , c o n cu r .

17