J. S07031/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COLIN J. MOSHER :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

ROSSANA QUATTROCCHI, : No. 173 EDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Decree, December 8, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Family Division at No. A06-10-60566-DQYR

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 16, 2018

Rossana Quattrocchi (“Wife”) appeals pro se from the December 8, 

2016 divorce decree entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks 

County. For the following reasons, we dismiss Wife’s appeal.

The trial court provided the following relevant procedural history:

On January 4, 2017, [Wife] filed a Notice of Appeal 

with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania from the 

Divorce Decree of the Court of Common Pleas and 

Equitable Distribution Order entered on December 8, 

2016 as well as this Court’s Order of the same date 

denying and dismissing her Petition to Enforce the 

Marital Agreement. . . . 

[Wife] filed a Concise Statement on January 30, 

2017, consisting of thirty-three enumerated 

paragraphs which were anything but concise, and a 

“Supplemental Concise Statement” on February 3, 

2017, consisting of thirty-three (33) enumerated 

single-spaced paragraphs which were essentially 

redundant recitations of the issues and matters that 
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[Wife] had already addressed or included in her 

Concise Statement. [Wife] did not file separate 

statements for each Order from which she was 

appealing.

Trial court opinion, 3/6/17 at 1.

As noted by the trial court, Wife’s “concise” statement fails to comply 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). This court has long recognized that “Rule 1925 is a 

crucial component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court 

to identify and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” 

Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 

880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006). “The 

Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant 

intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for 

the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). However, the filing of a timely 

Rule 1925(b) statement alone “does not automatically equate with issue 

preservation.” Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.Super. 2007), 

affirmed, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009). In Tucker, we explained that:

this Court has held that when appellants raise an 

outrageous number of issues in their 

1925(b) statement, the appellants have deliberately 

circumvented the meaning and purpose of 

Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively 

precluded appellate review of the issues [they] now 

seek to raise. We have further noted that such 

voluminous statements do not identify the issues 

appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because 

the briefing limitations contained in 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) make[] the raising of so many 

issues impossible. Further, this type of extravagant 

1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible for 
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the trial court to provide a comprehensive analysis of 

the issues.

Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in 

original). Thus, “the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently 

concise and coherent such that the trial court judge may be able to 

identify the issues to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not 

suggest the existence of bad faith.” Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 

206, 210 (Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis added), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 

1048 (Pa. 2008); see also Kanter, 866 A.2d at 401 (finding issues in 

Rule 1925(b) statements waived where the court determined that 

“outrageous” number of issues was deliberate attempt to circumvent 

purpose of Rule 1925).

Here, we cannot conclude that Wife’s five-page, 33-issue statement 

and subsequent six-page, 33-issue supplemental concise statement were so 

concise and coherent that the trial court was able to conduct a meaningful 

review of all the issues she sought to raise. (See Wife’s Concise Statement; 

Supplemental Concise Statement.) Accordingly, Wife waives all issues on 

appeal for circumventing the meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) so as to 

preclude meaningful judicial review.

Alternatively, even if Wife had complied with Rule 1925(b), we could 

nonetheless dismiss this appeal because her brief entirely fails to adhere to 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is well settled that parties 

to an appeal are required to submit briefs in conformity, in all material 
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respects, with the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, as 

nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials 

filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the 

appellant.” In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-1212 (Pa.Super. 2010), 

appeal denied, 20 A.3d 489 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). We will not 

advocate or act as counsel for an appellant who has not substantially 

complied with our rules. Bombar v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93 

(Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). “This Court may quash or dismiss an 

appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the requirements set forth in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Ullman, 995 A.2d at 1211 

(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Instantly, Wife’s 72-page pro se brief falls well below the standards 

delineated in our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, Wife’s entire 

brief is comprised of prose in which she includes ad hominem attacks 

against Colin Mosher (“Husband”), the trial court, and Husband’s attorney.1 

 

1 For example, Wife avers that Husband’s attorney engaged in unethical 

conduct by hiring a private investigator during the course of the litigation of 

the divorce case. (Wife’s brief at 20.) Wife also alleged that Husband, 

Husband’s counsel, the trial judge, and other trial court personnel drank 

excessively. (Wife’s reply brief at 2.) Wife further attempted to compare 

Husband to United States Attorney General Jeff Sessions in an unflattering 

manner. (Wife’s brief at 28.) Finally, Wife also attached a photograph of 

her cat as an exhibit to the brief in an attempt to establish that she owned a 

certain type of office chair which appears in the background. (Id. at 67; 

see also exhibit to Wife’s brief.)
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Wife also fails to include any citation to relevant authority in the 

argument,2 nor does she develop any analysis of the issues raised. We 

further note that Wife’s brief lacks the necessary citations to the record in 

violation of Rule 2119(b), and fails to provide this court with references to 

the record, in violation of Rule 2119(c). In her certificate of compliance, 

Wife certified that the word count of her brief is 16,400 words—2,400 words 

in excess of the 14,000 word maximum pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2135. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1).

Based on the foregoing, we find all of Wife’s issues waived. 

Accordingly, we dismiss Wife’s appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

 

2 We do note that Wife includes citations to Koon v. United States, 518 

U.S. 81 (1996), and United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 

1984). Both cases are cited to discuss the standard of review in this case, 

and thus do not develop the argument. Moreover, McConney is not binding 

authority on this court, nor is it relevant, as there is no issue involving a

federal question. See, e.g., Chiropractic Nutritional Associates, Inc. v. 

Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 669 A.2d 975, 980 (Pa.Super. 1995) 

(“Although the decisions of the federal courts lower than the United States 

Supreme Court are not binding on Pennsylvania courts, they do have a 

persuasive authority with regard to federal questions.” (emphasis 

added)).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/16/18