alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 10944 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
JACKIE EUGENE CLAYTON , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 7:16

- CR

- 15

- 1

Before REAVLEY, GRAVES, and HO , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
The attorney appointed to represent Jackie Eugene Clayton has moved
for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Clayton h a s not filed a respon se. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 21, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-10944 Document: 00514480605 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/21/2018No. 17

- 10944

2 appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the
APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 17-10944 Document: 00514480605 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/21/2018
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 05-cr-147-01-PB

Keith Scott

O R D E R

The defendant has moved to continue the January 4, 2006

trial in the above case. Defendant cites the need for additional

time to complete discovery and prepare a defense. The government

does not object to a continuance of the trial date.

Accordingly, for the above reasons and to allow the parties

additional time to properly prepare for trial, the court will

continue the trial from January 4, 2006 to April 4, 2006. In

agreeing to continue the trial, the court finds pursuant to 18

U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8)(A) that for the above-stated reasons, the

ends of justice served in granting a continuance outweigh the

best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 1:05-cr-00147-PB Document 17 Filed 12/14/05 Page 1 of 2
2

The December 19, 2005 final pretrial conference is continued

until March 21, 2006 at 3:30 p.m.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

December 13, 2005

cc: Jonathan Saxe, Esq.

Donald Feith, Esq.

United States Probation

United States Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00147-PB Document 17 Filed 12/14/05 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 05-cr-136-01-SM

Carlos M. Nunez

O R D E R

Defendant Nunez’s motion to continue the final pretrial conference and

trial is granted (document 10). Trial has been rescheduled for the December 

2005 trial period. Defendant Nunez shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights not

later than September 29, 2005. On the filing of such waiver, his continuance

shall be effective. No further continuances without good cause.

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: November 28, 2005 at 3:00 p.m.

Jury Selection: December 6, 2005 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:05-cr-00136-SM Document 11 Filed 09/22/05 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

September 22, 2005

cc: Joseph Caulfield, Esq.

Robert Kinsella, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00136-SM Document 11 Filed 09/22/05 Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

BOBBY MEAD and KARRIE MEAD

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 

a Delaware corporation; and ART BECKER 

TRANSPORTATION, LLC

Defendants.

Case No. 8:23-cv-00170

PROTECTIVE ORDER CONCERNING 

LOCOMOTIVE VIDEOS

Upon consideration of the parties’ stipulated motion for Protective Order, (Filing No. 39), 

the Court enters the following Protective Order governing the disclosure of confidential Discovery 

Material by a Producing Party to a Receiving Party in this Action.

The videos from the subject locomotives in this case shall be protected by this order and 

shall not be disclosed, produced, or disseminated to anyone who is not involved in this case by the 

parties or their attorneys.

The parties shall not allow these videos to be disseminated by any means. The parties shall 

not allow these videos to be disseminated over the internet, disseminated to any news media, or 

disseminated through any electronic media outlet or media platform. The locomotive videos shall 

not be filed with the Court except under seal via the Court’s CCEF e-filing system. The parties, as 

well as any agents or representatives of those parties, may provide the video to their representative 

employees, experts, consultants, or witnesses on the condition that such persons will be advised of 

and provided a copy of this Protective Order. The acceptance of the subject video or a copy of the 

same by any employee, expert consultant, or witness, as well as any agents or representatives of 

8:23-cv-00170-JFB-SMB Doc # 40 Filed: 12/05/23 Page 1 of 2 - Page ID # 145
-2-

those parties, constitutes their agreement and consent to be bound by all the provisions of this 

Protective Order.

The termination of this action shall not relieve any person to whom the video has been 

disclosed from the obligations of this Protective Order, though any party may seek an order from 

the Court modifying or lifting this Protective Order. At the conclusion of this case, the locomotive 

videos shall be returned to the party producing it or the parties may elect to destroy the locomotive 

videos. Under no circumstances may the locomotive videos be used outside the case for any 

reason.

DATED this 5th day of December, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Susan M. Bazis

United States Magistrate Judge

8:23-cv-00170-JFB-SMB Doc # 40 Filed: 12/05/23 Page 2 of 2 - Page ID # 146
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 96-30079 Summary Calendar

__________________ DREW MICHAEL PIZZO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus JEFFERSON PARISH SHERIFF'S OFFICE ET AL., Defendants,
JUDITH RICE; J. EDDY; K. DAVIS; K. GORMAN; HOWARD LAVIN; HARRY LEE, Sheriff, incorrectly designated as the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 93-CV-4173 E
- - - - - - - - - - July 15, 1996 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHE’ and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Drew Michael Pizzo, Louisiana inmate #131376, appeals the dismissal of his civil rights suit. We GRANT Pizzo's motion for leave to submit supplemental authorities of law and to correct aNo. 96-30079 -2- factual error in one of his appellate issues. We DENY his motion
to supplement the record with an exhibit which was not presented to the district court. Pizzo argues the merits of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. We affirm the district court's dismissal on an alternate ground. See Bickford v. International Speedway Corp. , 654 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981). From our careful review of the record and the appellate arguments, we conclude that Pizzo's claims against the defendants had prescribed before the district court's initial dismissal in 1991. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston , 51 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995). Pizzo's argument concerning the denial of his request for a transcript of the teleconference hearing is without merit. Pizzo argues that the district court erred by denying his motions for appointment of counsel. We detect no abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't , 811 F.2d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 1986). We DENY Pizzo's request for the appointment of appellate counsel. See Ulmer v. Chancellor , 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). AFFIRMED.
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: September 11, 2014 517913 

________________________________

In the Matter of JAMES R. 

MOORE,

Appellant,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF 

PAROLE,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: August 4, 2014

Before: Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, McCarthy, Garry and Rose, JJ.

__________

James R. Moore, Coxsackie, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M.

Treasure of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Elliott III,

J.), entered October 16, 2013 in Greene County, which dismissed

petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR

article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole

denying petitioner's request for parole release.

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to

challenge a July 2012 determination of the Board of Parole that

denied his request for parole release. The Attorney General has

advised this Court that petitioner reappeared before the Board in

July 2014 and was again denied parole release. Thus, the appeal

is now moot (see Matter of Jackson v New York State Div. of

Parole, 116 AD3d 1308, 1308 [2014]). Petitioner urges us to

treat this matter as a habeas corpus proceeding and nevertheless

reach the merits, but "the denial of parole may not be challenged
-2- 517913 

by way of a writ of habeas corpus" (People ex rel. Borrell v New

York State Bd. of Parole, 85 AD3d 1515, 1515-1516 [2011], lv

denied 17 NY3d 718 [2011]). To the extent that petitioner

additionally attacks the legality of his sentence, his failure to

name as respondent the "person having custody of" him renders any

request for a writ of habeas corpus procedurally defective (CPLR

7004 [b]; see Matter of Wisniewski v Michalski, 114 AD3d 1188,

1190 [2014]; People ex rel. Backus v Broome County Dept. of

Social Servs., 240 AD2d 786, 787 [1997]; see also Executive Law

§ 259-b [1]).

Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, McCarthy, Garry and Rose, JJ.,

concur.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without

costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION OF****CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER UNDER SECTION 906****OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1350**

In connection with Annual Report on Form 10-K of New Fortress Energy LLC (the “Company”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Christopher S. Guinta, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge: 
|  | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date:  | March 26, 2019 |   | By:    | /s/ Christopher S. Guinta     |
|--------|----------------|--------|--------|-------------------------------|
|   |           |   |   | Christopher S. Guinta         |
|   |           |   |   | Chief Financial Officer       |
|   |           |   |   | (Principal Financial Officer) |
Exhibit 32.01



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Cleartronic, Inc. (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009 of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                 |  |    |  |                                                            
|---------------- |  | -- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------
|                 |  |    |  |                                                            
|January 12, 2010 |  |    |  |                                                            
|                 |  |    |  | /s/ Larry Reid                                             
|                 |  | By |  | Larry Reid                                                 
|                 |  |    |  | Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer
*

District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

 

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-20958

ROOSEVELT COLLINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC., ET AL,

Defendants,

SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC., doing business as

Delaware Holding Smith International, Inc.,

 Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-97-CV-1515)

October 29, 1999

Before JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and PRADO*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:*

The court has carefully considered this appeal in light

of the briefs, oral arguments of counsel, and pertinent portions of

the record. We find no error in any of the trial court rulings

appealed by Smith. 
2

In particular, the court did not err in finding that

Collins had filed his application for long-term disability benefits

in a timely manner, particularly in light of the “reasonably

possible” language of the plan. Additionally, the district court

carefully reviewed the evidence concerning Smith’s claim-handlers’

understanding of when Mr. Collins could have filed his claim, as

well as Mr. Glass’s behavior, and had ample evidence to justify a

finding that Mr. Collins filed his application as soon as

reasonably possible.

Nor did the court abuse its discretion in holding that

the pre-trial order precluded Smith from arguing that Collins was

not a participant or beneficiary under the Plan. District courts

are encouraged to construe their pre-trial orders without fear of

reversal, and appellate courts are hesitant to interfere with the

trial court’s discretion in this area. See Flannery v. Carroll,

676 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir. 1982). The district court reached its

decision after it had considered the need to avoid undue surprise

and to sharpen the trial controversy, and this Court is not in a

position to disturb the trial court’s choice.

As for whether the case should be remanded to the plan

administrator, we carefully considered the arguments pertaining to

both Schadler v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.

1998), and Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 1999 WL 680319

(5th Cir. 1999), and being mindful of the specific situation in

this case, we find that the trial court was correct in not

remanding the case to the plan administrator. Smith did not
3

seasonably raise its Vega arguments; rather, it attempted to try

the coverage issue at trial. In addition, Smith had sufficient

opportunity in which to examine the application administratively --

sixteen months, in fact. Therefore, this Court declines to remand

the case to the plan administrator for further consideration of the

merits of the application.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
#### Kaselicska *v.*Pittsburg Railways Company, Appellant.

*Negligence*— "Stop, *look and listen”*— Street *raihoays.*

In an action against a street railway company to recover damages for personal injuries by being struck by a car at a crossing, the case is for the jury where there is testimony that the street was dark, that the curtains of the car- were down, that there was no headlight, that the car could not be seen at the point where it was the plaintiff’s duty to look, and that it could not be heard because of the noise of trains and mills in the immediate vicinity; and-this is the case, although the weight of the testimony was that the plaintiff stepped in front of a moving car which he saw or could have seen by the exercise of reasonable care.

Argued Nov. 1, 1907.

Appeal, No. 104, Oct. T., 1907, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 1, Allegheny Co., June T., 1903, No. 485, on verdict for plaintiff in case of John Kaselicska v. Pittsburg Railways Company.

Before Pell, Brown, Mesteezat, Potter, Elkin and Stewart, JJ.

Affirmed.

*44Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries.

Before Macearlane, J.

Yerdict and judgment for plaintiff for $5,347. Defendant appealed.

*Error assigned*was in refusing binding instructions for defendant.

*Clarence Burleigh,*with him *James C. Cray*and *'WilUam A. Challener,*for appellant.

*Body P. Marshall,*with him *Thomas M. Marshall, J. D. Ilern*and *W. H. Leahy,*for appellee.

January 6, 1908 :

Per Curiam,

On the decisive question in this case the weight of the testimony was undoubtedly with the -defendant and the more reasonable conclusion from a fair consideration of it is that the plaintiff stepped in front of a moving car which he saw or could have seen by the exercise of the reasonable care which the law exacts of one about to cross the tracks of a street railway. But there was testimony that the street was dark and that the curtains of the car were down; that there was no headlight and the car could not be seen at the point where it was the plaintiff’s duty to look, and that it could not be heard because of the noise of trains and mills in the immediate vicinity. This testimony carried the case to the jury. The rule stated in Carroll v. Penna. Railroad Co., 12 W. N. C. 348, is from its nature applicable only to clear cases where there is no reasonable doubt of the facts or the inferences to be drawn from them: Doyle v. Traction Co., 214 Pa. 382.

The judgment is affirmed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RENE ORLANDO ALVARADO 

MORALES, AKA Rene Alvarado, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-72008 

Agency No. A072-293-181 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 16, 2018

**

Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 

Rene Orlando Alvarado Morales, a native and citizen of El Salvador, 

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying 

his motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 

U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 19 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-72008 

and we review de novo questions of law. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 

(9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alvarado Morales’ motion 

to reopen as untimely, where he did not timely file the motion and failed to 

demonstrate the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing 

deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from 

timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as the 

petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

The record does not support Alvarado Morales’ contention that the BIA 

failed to adequately explain its decision not to reopen sua sponte. See Najmabadi v. 

Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (agency need not write an exegesis on 

every contention); Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(petitioner did not overcome the presumption that the BIA did review the record).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Alvarado Morales’ remaining contentions 

regarding the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte. 

See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his court has 

jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying sua sponte reopening for the limited 
3 16-72008 

purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or constitutional 

error.”).

In light of our disposition, we do not reach Alvarado Morales’ remaining 

contentions regarding the alleged ineffectiveness of prior counsel or compliance

with the requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). See

Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are 

not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

PVP-Salem Associates, L.P.

v. Civil No. 04-cv-386-JD

Parlex Corporation

PROCEDURAL ORDER

PVP-Salem Associates, a self-described “New Jersey limited

partnership,” Am. Compl. ¶ 1, has filed this action in this court

asserting state-law claims against Parlex Corporation, a

Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business

also in that state. PVP-Salem’s amended complaint invokes this

court’s diversity jurisdiction, asserting that this action is

“between citizens of different States.” Id. ¶ 3. For purposes

of diversity jurisdiction, however, a limited partnership is not

a “citizen” of the state of its formation, but “of each state or

foreign country of which any of its partners is a citizen.” 

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 569

(2004) (citing Carden v. Arcoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 192-95

(1990)). This court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter,

then, only if none of PVP-Salem’s general or limited partners is,

like Parlex, also a citizen of Massachusetts. Carden, 494 U.S.

at 195-96. Furthermore, this court has the responsibility to

ensure its own subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. E.g.,

Case 1:04-cv-00386-JD Document 26 Filed 02/10/06 Page 1 of 2
2

Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 410 (1st Cir. 2005). 

The amended complaint contains no allegations as to the

citizenship of any of the partners of PVP-Salem. Accordingly, as

the party bearing the burden of showing subject-matter

jurisdiction, see, e.g., Garcia Perez v. Santaella, 364 F.3d 348,

351 (1st Cir. 2004), PVP-Salem shall file a second amended

complaint setting forth the citizenship of each of its general

and limited partners for that purpose by February 28, 2006. If

PVP-Salem fails to do so, this case will be dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the amended complaint. 

SO ORDERED.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

February 10, 2006

cc: Anthony S. Augeri, Esquire

R. David DePuy, Esquire

Edward A. Haffer, Esquire

Edward D. Kutchin, Esquire

Kerry R. Northup, Esquire

Case 1:04-cv-00386-JD Document 26 Filed 02/10/06 Page 2 of 2