Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1511-CR-2009 | September 8, 2016 Page 1 of 22

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jeffrey E. Kimmell

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Richard C. Webster

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Royce Love,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 8, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A03-1511-CR-2009

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable J. Jerome Frese, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D03-1308-FD-653

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1511-CR-2009 | September 8, 2016 Page 2 of 22

[1] Royce Love appeals his convictions for mistreatment of a law enforcement 

animal and resisting law enforcement as class A misdemeanors. Love raises 

two issues, which we revise and restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to 

sustain his convictions.1 We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At around 4:00 a.m. on August 4, 2013, South Bend Police Officers Paul Daley 

and Christopher Deak were on patrol when they observed a white van, which 

was later determined to be driven by Love, drive through a red traffic light. The 

officers began following Love’s van, saw him disregard a stop sign, and turned 

on the police car’s emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop. Love continued to 

drive, and the officers then activated their siren. Love noticed the lights and 

siren but did not stop. His failure to stop required the presence of additional 

officers, who activated their lights and sirens, to join in the pursuit. These 

officers included, among others, Officer Greg Howard, Officer Erik 

Schlegelmilch, Officer Jonathan Gray, and Office Larry Sanchez. Some of the 

officers attempted a “rolling roadblock” by blocking Love’s van with their 

police cars, but Love struck the vehicles and proceeded to lead officers on an 

approximate five minute chase. Transcript at 77. Eventually, the police were 

able to stop Love’s van with Stop Sticks® in an alley near the city’s downtown.2 

 

1 Love was also convicted of an additional count of resisting law enforcement (based on fleeing in a vehicle), 

for which judgment was entered as a class A misdemeanor, but Love does not challenge the conviction. 

2

Stop sticks are a tool used by police to “pop tires of [] suspect vehicles that aren’t stopping for the police.” 

Transcript at 105.
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The officers’ vehicles were equipped with cameras which recorded the pursuit 

and stop. 

[3] A portion of the events that occurred once Love was stopped in the parking 

area near his “mother’s child’s house” was captured on the in-car video 

recorder of Officer Kyle Bilinski. Id. at 233. The video shows that when Love’s 

vehicle was stopped, the officers ordered him to exit the van and he exited the 

vehicle, raised his hands in the air, proceeded to place himself on all fours about 

five seconds after he exited the vehicle, and, after approximately ten additional 

seconds lay face down on the ground. The officers used tasers and deployed a 

police dog to effect his arrest.

[4] On August 5, 2013, the State charged Love with Count I, resisting law 

enforcement (based on fleeing in a vehicle) as a class D felony; Count II, 

mistreatment of a law enforcement animal as a class A misdemeanor; and 

Count III, resisting law enforcement (based on forcibly resisting) as a class A 

misdemeanor.3 

[5] On August 10, 2015, the court held a jury trial at which Love represented 

himself pro se. The court heard testimony from South Bend Police Officers 

Daley, Howard, Schlegelmilch, Gray, and Sanchez. Each officer, with the 

exception of Officer Howard who was not present at the scene of Love’s arrest, 

 

3 The State also charged Love with Count IV, operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class A 

misdemeanor, but the charge was dismissed prior to trial. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1511-CR-2009 | September 8, 2016 Page 4 of 22

testified that Love did not comply with the officers’ commands after he exited 

the van. 

[6] During the direct testimony of Officer Daley, the State introduced State’s 

Exhibit 4A, a DVD recording of the vehicular police pursuit that was recorded 

from Officer Daley’s police car. The court admitted the exhibit without 

objection, and it was played for the jury. Love cross-examined Officer Daley 

and introduced a DVD recording, Defendant’s Exhibit A, from the in-car 

camera of Officer Bilinski of the scene in the alley where Love was eventually 

stopped and arrested by the police. The court admitted the exhibit without 

objection, and it was played for the jury. Love’s exhibit shows that he exited 

the vehicle, raised his hands in the air, proceeded to place himself on all fours 

about five seconds after he exited the vehicle, and, after approximately ten 

additional seconds lay face down on the ground. The video depicts that, shortly 

thereafter, a struggle between the officers and Love ensued in which the officers 

used tasers and deployed a police dog to effect Love’s arrest. 

[7] Officer Daley testified that, as he saw Love exit the vehicle, officers were 

ordering Love to the ground and that Love was “ignoring them and paying 

them no attention whatsoever . . . .” Transcript at 81. He added that, as Love 

“continued to disregard the officers’ commands, a taser was deployed into his 

person to get him to stop walking away.” Id. at 82. Officer Schlegelmilch 

testified that when Love was outside the vehicle he was given “loud verbal 

commands to lay on the ground,” that Love was “completely uncooperative,” 

that Love “would not lay on the ground,” and that he then “deployed [his] 
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taser.” Id. at 116. He stated that after he tased Love, Love snapped the taser 

wire, and that the dog was deployed. Officer Gray stated that Love “was not 

responding to their commands to get on the ground. At that point an officer 

deployed a taser.” Id. at 131. Officer Sanchez, who is a K-9 officer, testified 

that he deployed the dog because “the taser was ineffective,” that he perceived 

Love to be “very agitated and irritated with the police officers on [the] scene,” 

that Love was “not complying with [the] officers,” and that the dog bit Love on 

the forearm. Id. at 145-146. Officer Sanchez stated that after that, Love began 

to squeeze the dog’s upper chest and neck area, that he heard the dog “let out a 

yelp,” and that he struck Love “a couple times in the side of his torso” and 

“knee[d] [Love] in the head” in an effort to free the dog. Id. at 146-147. Officer 

Schlegelmilch also stated that he kicked Love three times to cause Love to 

release the dog, and that the third kick he delivered, which was directed at 

Love’s head, eventually caused Love to release the dog. When Officer Sanchez 

returned to his vehicle he noticed that the dog had a “bite ring” on top of its 

head. Id. at 148. Officer Gray testified he eventually placed Love in handcuffs 

but Love “refused to give his hands,” “he kept his hands tight by his body, and 

it was very difficult to get them out from under him and place him into police 

custody,” and that Love “was kicking his feet.” Id. at 133-134.

[8] Love testified to his version of events. He stated that an officer approached his 

parked vehicle and told him to “get the F out of the car,” that he exited the 

vehicle, put his hands up, and lay face down on the ground. Id. at 234. He 

further testified that he put his hands up to be cuffed, that the officers then 
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deployed a dog on him, that he was then tased and kicked by the officers, that 

the dog bit his arm, and that he tried only to protect himself from the dog. Id. at 

235. 

[9] The jury found Love guilty of Counts I-III as charged. At sentencing, the court 

entered a judgment of conviction on Count I as a class A misdemeanor rather 

than as a class D felony. For each of his class A misdemeanor convictions, 

Love was sentenced to consecutive one year sentences with all of the time 

suspended to supervised probation. 

Discussion

[10] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support Love’s convictions for 

mistreatment of a law enforcement animal and resisting law enforcement as 

class A misdemeanors.4 When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the 

evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. 

Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. Rather, we look to 

the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. 

Id. “We will reverse a conviction, however, if the record does not reveal 

substantial evidence of probative value and there is a reasonable doubt in the 

minds of reasonably prudent persons.” Clark v. State, 695 N.E.2d 999, 1002 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 

 

4 Love also argues that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. However, because we 

conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, we need not address Love’s argument on 

that issue. See Smith v. State, 943 N.E.2d 421, 423 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1511-CR-2009 | September 8, 2016 Page 7 of 22

[11] Additionally, the Indiana Supreme Court has held:

We recognize the rule that we may not weigh the evidence and 

may only review that evidence most favorable to the state to 

determine, on a sufficiency of the evidence question, whether we 

shall affirm or reverse the judgment of the trial court. Such 

appellate duty, of which we take cognizance, in far too many 

cases requires that we probe and sift the evidence. Thus, if as a 

result of our probing and sifting the evidence most favorable to 

the state, we determine that the residue of facts is so devoid of 

evidence of probative value and reasonable inferences adduceable 

therefrom, as to preclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we 

should so declare. A failure to do so is a rejection of our duty as 

an appellate tribunal and tantamount to the enunciation of a rule 

that any evidence no matter how infinitesimal or inferences 

drawn therefrom, whether based on speculation or conjecture, 

would be sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

This we are not inclined to do for to assume such a judicial 

posture, neglecting our appellate responsibility, would reduce the 

appellate process to an exercise in impotent and meaningless 

futility.

Liston v. State, 252 Ind. 502, 511-512, 250 N.E.2d 739, 743-744 (1969).

[12] At the time of the offense, Ind. Code § 35-46-3-11(a) provided that “[a] person 

who knowingly or intentionally . . . strikes, torments, injures, or otherwise 

mistreats a law enforcement animal . . . commits a class A misdemeanor.” 

(Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 158-2013, § 563 (eff. July 1, 2014); and 

Pub L. No. 168-2014, § 86 (eff. July 1, 2014)). To convict Love of mistreatment 

of a law enforcement animal, the State was required to prove that he “did 

knowingly strike or otherwise mistreat a law enforcement animal, to wit: Bacca, 

a police K-9 . . . .” Appellant’s Appendix at 17. At the time of the offense, Ind. 
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Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) provided that a defendant commits resisting law 

enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor when he “knowingly or intentionally . . 

. forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a 

person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution 

of the officer’s duties[.]” (Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 158-2013, § 

509 (eff. July 1, 2014); Pub. L. No. 168-2014, § 80 (eff. July 1, 2014); and Pub. 

L. No. 198-2016, § 673 (eff. July 1, 2016)). To convict Love of resisting law 

enforcement as a class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Love “did knowingly and forcibly resist Officer 

Jonathan Gray, a law enforcement officer, by struggling with Officer Gray 

while he was lawfully engaged in his duties as a law enforcement officer.” Id. 

[13] Love argues that the “violence and force that occurred after the stop was 

gratuitously initiated by the police” and that his subsequent actions were lawful 

“efforts to protect himself from serious injury . . . and cannot form the basis of 

conviction for either Battery to a Law Enforcement Animal or Forcible 

Resistance of a Law Enforcement Officer.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. He contends 

that the video recording shows that he exited the vehicle and placed himself on 

the ground without the need of force by the officers and that his “actions 

toward the police dog were aimed solely at protecting himself from injury.” Id. 

at 7. Love’s position is that law enforcement used excessive force against him 

after he “voluntarily and peacefully surrendered himself.” Id. at 8. He states 

that “there was no need for officers to release a police dog on Mr. Love, 

electrocute him with multiple tasers, or kick him in the head,” and that his 
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convictions for mistreatment of a law enforcement animal and resisting law 

enforcement should be reversed due to the officers’ use of excessive force. Id. 

[14] The State’s position is that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Love’s 

convictions, that Love was noncompliant with the officers’ commands, and that 

his refusal “to obey the officer’s [sic] orders” resulted in the deployment of a 

dog and in Love’s being tased. Appellee’s Brief at 12. It states that Love struck 

the dog, squeezed it, and left a bite ring on the dog’s head, and that, after Love 

was tased and following the dog’s intervention, he refused to give Officer Gray 

his hands by keeping his hands and arms tight to his body before he was 

ultimately handcuffed. Regarding Love’s claim of excessive force, the State 

maintains that he failed to obey the officers’ orders, he was tased twice with no 

effect, when the taser failed the dog was deployed, and that because of Love’s 

resistance law enforcement acted reasonably to apprehend him. 

[15] When addressing claims of excessive force in the context of a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence for resisting law enforcement, the general rule in 

Indiana is that “a private citizen may not use force in resisting a peaceful arrest 

by an individual who he knows, or has reason to know, is a police officer 

performing his duties regardless of whether the arrest in question is lawful or 

unlawful.” Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting 

Casselman v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1310, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)), reh’g denied, 

trans. denied. However, when an officer uses unconstitutionally excessive force 

in effecting an arrest, that officer is no longer lawfully engaged in the execution 

of his or her duty. Id. at 823.
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[16] Claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force in the course of 

an arrest of a free citizen are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and its “reasonableness” standard. Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). Because the Fourth 

Amendment test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or 

mechanical application, its proper application requires careful attention to the 

facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the 

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of 

the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to 

evade arrest by flight. Id. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872. The ‘reasonableness’ of a 

particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer on the scene, “rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id., 109 

S. Ct. at 1872. However, the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force 

case is an objective one; the question is whether the officers’ actions are 

“objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 397, 109 S. 

Ct. at 1872.

[17] The State must present evidence that an officer is lawfully engaged in the 

execution of his duties to support a conviction for resisting law enforcement. 

As touched on above, of particular importance in deciding this matter is what 

Defendant’s Exhibit A, a video recording from the in-car camera of Officer 

Bilinski, depicts and its impact at the appellate stage. The Indiana Supreme 

Court recently discussed the significance of video evidence in Robinson v. State, 
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5 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. 2014). In Robinson, a sheriff’s deputy testified that he 

observed a vehicle “drive off the right side, which was the south side of the 

road, twice,” and that after the second incident he initiated a traffic stop. 5 

N.E.3d at 364. A vehicle camera captured the thirty seconds prior to the stop. 

Id. Joanna Robinson, the driver of the stopped vehicle, was arrested and 

charged with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, possession of 

marijuana, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated as class A misdemeanors 

and operating with a BAC over .08 as a class C misdemeanor. Id. Robinson’s 

counsel moved to suppress the evidence against her, arguing that the deputy 

“did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop because Robinson ‘never 

left her lane of traffic in any form,’” relying on the video taken by the deputy’s 

vehicle camera. Id. The trial court denied Robinson’s motion, stating that it

“reviewed the video on approximately ten occasions and cannot 

conclude from the video that the defendant’s vehicle actually left 

the roadway . . . but it does show the vehicle veering on two 

occasions onto the white fog line.” App. at 33. The trial court 

noted, however, that it was “quite possible that the officer’s 

actual visual observation of the defendant’s vehicle was superior 

to the video camera in his car.” App. at 33. After considering all 

of this evidence, the trial court concluded this case was “perhaps 

a closer call” than [State v. McCaa, 963 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012), which found reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop 

when the defendant drove “slowly and off of the roadway 

twice”], but that “the act of weaving onto the fog line, while not 

itself an illegal act, did give a trained police officer justification to 

stop and inquire further as to the driver’s condition.”

Id.
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[18] On transfer, the parties disputed the significance of the video, in which 

Robinson observed that “the trial court conceded the video ‘did not clearly 

demonstrate that Robinson’s vehicle veered off the roadway . . . but speculated 

that the officer’s observations at the scene were superior to his in-car camera,’” 

and the State cautioned the Court “not to ‘rest [its] determination on minutia of 

an imperfect and rudimentary video.’” Id. at 365. The Court began its 

discussion declaring that “[w]hile technology marches on, the appellate 

standard of review remains constant,” which is to say that appellate courts “do 

not reweigh the evidence.” Id. The Court also observed that it did not believe 

“that the very act of reviewing video evidence constitutes impermissible appellate 

reweighing” and that such evidence is “a necessary part of the record on appeal, 

just like any other type of evidence.” Id. at 366. The Court found that the trial 

judge listened to the deputy at the suppression hearing, as well as other 

witnesses, and saw the video, and in its experience and expertise weighed the 

deputy’s testimony more heavily than the video, and the Court “decline[d] 

Robinson’s invitation to substitute [its] own judgment for that of the trial court 

and rebalance the scales in her favor.” Id. at 367.

[19] The Court instructed that appellate courts may review video evidence like any 

other evidence in the record, but reiterated that they may not reweigh the 

evidence. A question therefore arises regarding the point at which reviewing 

video evidence, as part of our appellate duty to probe and sift the evidence most 

favorable to the State to determine whether substantial evidence of probative 

value exists, becomes impermissible reweighing of evidence. For help 
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answering that question, we find an opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals 

of Texas, Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), 

instructive. 

[20] In Carmouche, the court addressed the issue of whether the defendant consented 

to being searched, in which at trial Texas Ranger Dwayne Williams gave the 

following testimony:

[RANGER WILLIAMS]: So when I walked— I went from there 

and walked up to Mr. Carmouche and asked him if he had any 

narcotics— or I asked him if I could search him. He looked over 

toward the trooper and said— pointed to him and said, “Well, 

he’s already searched me.”

I said, “Do you mind if I search you again?”

He threw his hands up, said, “All right.” Turned around, put his 

hands on the car. I reached around to the crotch area where [the 

informant] told me it was at.

10 S.W. 3d at 326, 331. Carmouche argued on appeal that he made no such 

gesture and did not give consent. Id. at 331.

[21] In evaluating whether Carmouche consented to the search, the court observed 

“that the videotape from the patrol car’s camera does not support the testimony 

of Ranger Williams,” noting that “critical seconds of the tape surrounding the 

time of appellant’s ‘consent’ show a different sequence of events than what 

Williams described at trial.” Id. Specifically, the court noted that Carmouche 

was closely surrounded by four officers while his back was to the car, that a 
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voice told him to turn around and place his hands on the car, that “[o]nly after 

appellant has raised his hands, turned around and faced the car, can Williams

be heard asking, ‘Mind if I pat you down again,’” and that “Williams’ ‘request’ 

to search is made as he is reaching for the crotch area of appellant’s pants.” Id.

at 332. The court also observed that no audible response by Carmouche is 

contained on the tape. Id.

[22] The court noted the applicable standard of review, in which “as a general rule, 

the appellate courts, including this Court, should give almost total deference to 

a trial court’s determination of the historical facts that the record supports 

especially when the trial court’s findings are based on an evaluation of 

credibility and demeanor.” Id. It then stated that, “[i]n the unique 

circumstances of this case, however, we decline to give ‘almost total deference’ 

to the trial court’s implicit findings,” noting that “the nature of the evidence 

presented in the videotape does not pivot ‘on an evaluation of credibility and 

demeanor’” and that, “[r]ather, the videotape presents indisputable visual 

evidence contradicting essential portions of Williams’ testimony.” Id. It ruled 

that “[i]n these narrow circumstances, we cannot blind ourselves to the 

videotape evidence simply because Williams’ testimony may, by itself, be read 

to support the Court of Appeals’ holding” and vacated a judgment of the Court 

of Appeals of Texas that Carmouche consented to the search. Id. at 333. This 

rule has since been stated that courts “give almost total deference to the trial 

court’s factual determinations unless the video recording indisputably 

contradicts the trial court’s findings.” State v. Houghton, 384 S.W.3d 441, 446 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1511-CR-2009 | September 8, 2016 Page 15 of 22

(Tex. App. 2012). See also U.S. v. Maddox, 549 F. App’x. 602 (8th Cir. 2014) 

(noting that the dashboard camera video does not present a clear picture and 

that accordingly it could not determine if the district court “clearly erred in 

crediting Officer Potter’s testimony and finding he had an objectively 

reasonable belief that Maddox violated the Arkansas careless driving statute” 

(citing United States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting that, 

on appeal, witness credibility findings are virtually unreviewable)), cert. denied, 

133 S. Ct. 2369 (2013)); U.S. v. Wiley, 493 F. App’x 481 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting 

that “the video recording fails to contradict the officer’s testimony” and 

“therefore, does not lead to a ‘definite and firm conviction’ that the district 

court erred in its factual finding that the officer first conducted a pat-down 

search for weapons before retrieving the ammunition”).

[23] Turning to Defendant’s Exhibit A, a video recording from the in-car camera of 

Officer Bilinski, we observe that it unambiguously shows that Love exited the 

vehicle, put his hands up, and lay face down on the ground, demonstrating his 

almost immediate compliance with the officers’ requests. At trial, Love’s 

testimony matched what is depicted in the video when he testified that an 

officer approached his parked vehicle and told him to “get the F out of the car,” 

that he exited the vehicle, put his hands up, and lay face down on the ground. 

Transcript at 234. He further testified that he put his hands up to be cuffed, that 

the officers then deployed a dog on him, that he was tased and kicked by the 

officers, that the dog bit his arm, and that he tried only to protect himself from 

the dog. Id. at 235. 
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[24] In stark contrast, Officer Daley testified that, as he saw Love exit the vehicle, 

officers ordered Love to the ground, that Love was “ignoring them and paying 

them no attention whatsoever,” and that because Love “continued to disregard 

the officers’ commands, a taser was deployed into his person to get him to stop 

walking away.” Transcript at 81-82. The video indisputably contradicts Officer 

Daley’s testimony as it clearly shows that Love did not attempt to walk away 

and instead almost immediately lay on the ground. Likewise, Officer 

Schlegelmilch’s testimony that, after ordering Love to the ground, he was 

“completely uncooperative” and “would not lay on the ground” is indisputably 

contradicted by the video. Id. at 116. Officer Gray’s testimony that Love 

would not “get on the ground” and that an officer deployed a taser to gain his 

compliance is also contradicted by the video evidence.5 Id. at 131. 

[25] The video also reveals that prior to the officers’ use of force, Love had not made 

threatening or violent actions towards the officers, but, in effecting the arrest, 

the officers nevertheless tased him twice and deployed a dog who bit him. We 

find that the particular use of force by the officers was not objectively 

reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. See 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S. Ct. at 1872.

 

5 We note that the review of Defendant’s Exhibit A discussed in the dissent supports the conclusion that it 

indisputably contradicts the officers’ testimony. As discussed in the dissent, Love at the rear of the van “gets 

onto the ground” and “places his chin in the palm of his hand as if he is relaxing.” Supra at 21. Thus, the 

dissent acknowledges that it could not identify any forcible resistance in the video, and the officers’ testimony 

that Love would not lay on the ground and attempted to walk away necessitating the deployment of tasers 

and the police dog to stop him does not comport with the video evidence.
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[26] As was the case in Carmouche, under these narrow circumstances we cannot 

blind ourselves to the videotape evidence simply because the officers’ testimony 

may, by itself, support the guilty verdicts. Based upon the record, we cannot 

say that the officers were acting in the lawful performance of their duties or that 

Love was forcibly resisting when they tased Love and deployed the dog, and 

therefore the evidence is insufficient to support Love’s convictions for resisting 

law enforcement and mistreatment of a law enforcement animal. See Shoultz, 

735 N.E.2d at 823-825 (holding that a law enforcement officer who used 

unconstitutionally excessive force was no longer lawfully engaged in the 

execution of his duty and reversing the defendant’s conviction for resisting law 

enforcement). See also Aguirre v. State, 953 N.E.2d 593, 596-597 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2011) (reversing a conviction for forcibly resisting law enforcement where there 

was no evidence that the defendant was violent, threatening, or otherwise 

forcibly resistant towards the officer), trans. denied; Colvin v. State, 916 N.E.2d 

306, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing a conviction for forcibly resisting law 

enforcement where the officers testified that the defendant was not complying 

with the officers’ commands, and observing that “the officers had to use force to 

execute the arrest,” that the State did not present evidence that the defendant 

used force or was violent or threatening towards the officers, and that the 

defendant did not stiffen his arms or otherwise forcibly resist the officers), trans. 

denied. 
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Conclusion

[27] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Love’s convictions for mistreatment of a 

law enforcement animal and resisting law enforcement as class A 

misdemeanors.

[28] Reversed.

Baker, J., concurs.

Pyle, J., dissents with separate opinion.
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I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Royce Love,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellees-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A03-1511-CR-2009

Pyle, Judge dissenting.

[29] If I were presented with the script of the latest Star Wars movie, The Force 

Awakens, before it was released, and asked whether it was a good story, I could 

probably make an independent assessment concluding that it was excellent. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1511-CR-2009 | September 8, 2016 Page 20 of 22

However, I would not be in the best position to make that judgment. Quite 

simply, I did not see the movie. I did not see the mind-blowing special effects; I 

did not see the facial expressions of the actors giving meaning to the story; I did 

not hear the humor, passion, and sorrow that filled the voices of the actors; and 

I did not hear John Williams’s legendary soaring symphony. In fact, my 

limited perspective would impact the accuracy of my conclusion. As a result, if 

you really want to know whether the script is good, you need to go to the 

movie.

[30] Likewise, at the appellate level, my colleagues and I are asked to make 

judgments based upon the reading of a script, a transcript. However, we are 

often not in the best position to make decisions about which witnesses to 

believe or which piece of evidence is most important. This is true because we 

do not attend the movie; we are not present at the trial or hearing. It is 

precisely for this reason that when a defendant challenges his or her conviction 

on appeal, our standard of review consistently warns that we will not reweigh 

the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 

362 (Ind. 2014). 

[31] Jurors are in the best position to make determinations about who and what to 

believe. They get to see the facial expressions of witnesses; they get to hear the 

pain or remorse in the voices of victims, family members, and defendants; they 

get to watch body language; and they get to make judgments based on the 

intonation in a witness’s voice. None of these critical decision making factors 

are reflected in an appellate record. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1511-CR-2009 | September 8, 2016 Page 21 of 22

[32] My able colleagues assert that the record in this case is devoid of evidence and 

reasonable inferences that would support Love’s convictions for mistreatment 

of a law enforcement animal and resisting law enforcement. My colleagues 

believe that the video: (1) shows that Love complied which the officer’s 

instructions; and (2) contradicts the testimony of the officers. I respectfully 

disagree.

[33] After a five-minute chase through the streets of South Bend, the video shows 

Love coming to a stop after pulling into an alley. At gunpoint, the officers 

order him out of the van, onto the ground, and tell Love not to move. (Tr. 81, 

Defendant’s Exhibit A). Instead, Love gets out of the van and starts walking to 

its rear. After reaching the rear of the van, Love then gets onto the ground. He 

does not remain still; Love’s hands are out in front making gestures. Love then 

places his chin in the palm of his hand as if he is relaxing. At this point, the 

officers take action to arrest and gain his compliance. Because the video 

camera became obscured, the video does not show the ensuing altercation. The 

only evidence admitted to determine what occurred next was the testimony of 

witnesses.

[34] In my view, there was ample evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer

beyond a reasonable doubt that Love interfered with a law enforcement animal 

and resisted law enforcement. It is the jury’s role to resolve any real or 

perceived conflicts in the evidence. In fact, this jury was instructed as follows: 

(1) “You are the only judges of the weight of both the physical evidence and the 

testimony – the believability, or “credibility” – of each of the witnesses. . . . [;]” 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1511-CR-2009 | September 8, 2016 Page 22 of 22

(2) “You should try to fit the evidence to the presumption that the defendant is 

innocent. . . . [;]” (3) “Furthermore, you should evaluate the testimony of each 

witness in light of all relevant physical evidence, and the reasonable inferences

drawn from such physical evidence. . . . [;]” (4) “In weighing the evidence to 

determine what or whom you will believe, you should use your own 

knowledge, experience and common sense gained from day to day living. . . . 

[;]” and (5) “You should give the greatest weight to that evidence which 

convinces you most strongly of its truthfulness.” (App. 65) (emphasis added).

[35] Love exercised his right to have the State’s case measured by a jury of his peers. 

He exercised his right to represent himself, testified, and presented evidence. 

(Defendant’s Exhibit A). The State, bearing the burden of proof, presented its 

evidence through witnesses and exhibits. At the conclusion of the trial, the 

jury, properly instructed, considered all of the evidence and decided that the 

State had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Burton v. State, 978 

N.E.2d 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (conviction for resisting law enforcement was 

overturned because excessive force instruction was tendered and refused despite 

video showing clear evidence of abusive police conduct). Because I believe that 

my colleagues are substituting their judgment for that of the jury, I dissent. I 

would affirm the jury’s verdict. Why? Quite simply, I was not at the movie.