Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,*

 Hassell, 

Keenan, and Koontz, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

DAVID K. SLOAN, ET AL. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 962264 September 12, 1997 

MILTON F. JOHNSON, ET AL. 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Charles H. Duff, Judge Designate 

 In this appeal, we consider whether owners of certain 

lots in a subdivision may enforce express covenants that run 

with the land. 

 Arlington Investment Corporation conveyed approximately 

25 acres of land to Jonathan R. Hagan in 1932. From this 

grant, Hagan created a subdivision known as "Forest Park 

Addition to Waycroft" by plat of subdivision. 

 By deed dated July 11, 1934, Hagan and his wife 

conveyed part of Lot 13 and all of Lot 14 in the subdivision 

to J. Frederick Abel and his wife as joint tenants. The 

deed contained this express language: 

 "This conveyance is made subject to the following 

conditions and restrictions which shall remain in 

force until July 1, 1943, and shall then be 

automatically renewed for a period of ten years 

and shall be automatically renewed every ten years 

thereafter: 

. . . . 

 4. Not more than one residence shall be 

erected upon this lot, the cost of which shall be 

not less than $4,000.00." 

 Alberta C. Abel, "the unremarried widow of J. Frederick 

 

 *Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and 

decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 

retirement on July 1, 1997. 
Abel," conveyed this property to Alberta C. Abel and Selina 

A. Taylor, trustees of the Alberta C. Abel Trust. This 

conveyance was made subject to "the restrictions and 

conditions contained in the deed forming the chain of title 

to [the] property." 

 Hagan conveyed Lot 11 in the subdivision to Joseph L. 

Gaddy in 1936. That deed contained the same restriction 

included in the Hagans' deed to Abel. Gaddy and his wife 

conveyed their property to James T. and Eva J. Newman by 

deed which stated that the conveyance was made subject to 

the restrictions and limitations of record. The Newmans 

conveyed their property to Jack H. and Thelma A. Foster who 

subsequently conveyed the property, by deed, to David K. and 

Robyn D. Sloan. These deeds contain provisions that each 

conveyance was made subject to the restrictions and 

conditions contained in the deeds forming the chain of title 

to the property. 

 Jonathan Hagan conveyed Lot 12 and part of Lot 13 in 

the subdivision to Cameron R. and Catherine V. Dye in 1934. 

 This property is located between the property owned by the 

trustees of the Abel Trust and the Sloans' property. The 

deed also contained a restriction which stated that "[n]ot 

more than one residence shall be erected upon this lot, the 

cost of which shall be not less than $4,000.00." 

 Cameron Dye, who survived his wife, died testate, and 

Milton F. and Sharon A. Johnson inherited the property. The 

Johnsons filed a plan to subdivide their lot with the zoning 
administrator of Arlington County. The plan of subdivision, 

which was approved by the zoning administrator, permits the 

Johnsons to construct a second house on their lot. 

 David and Robyn Sloan, Alberta and Selina Abel Taylor, 

trustees, and others, filed their bill of complaint seeking 

to enforce the restrictive covenants against Milton F. 

Johnson, Sharon A. Johnson, and Potomac Custom Builders, 

Inc., and to prohibit them from constructing a second 

residence on the Johnson property. Potomac Custom Builders, 

Inc., was dismissed from the proceeding, and at the 

conclusion of a bench trial, the chancellor held that the 

covenant was unenforceable "because a general scheme or plan 

of development applicable to Forest Park Addition to 

Waycroft does not exist which gives other lot owners 

reciprocal rights of enforcement of the restriction." David 

and Robin Sloan and Alberta and Selina Abel Taylor, 

Trustees, sought and were awarded an appeal. (Hereinafter, 

the Sloans and the Trustees will be referred to as the 

complainants and Milton F. and Sharon A. Johnson will be 

referred to as the defendants.) 

 The complainants contend that the chancellor erred by 

failing to enforce the express covenants which run with 

their land. The defendants assert that the complainants are 

not entitled to enforce the covenants because the 

complainants' evidence failed to establish a general scheme 

or plan of development imposed on lots in the subdivision. 

 Covenants, express or implied, which restrict the free 
use of land are not favored and must be strictly construed. 

Mid-State Equipment Co. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 140, 225 

S.E.2d 877, 884 (1976). We will, however, enforce such 

covenants when applicable, but the person claiming the 

benefit of the restrictions must prove that the covenants 

are applicable to the acts of which he complains. Id., 

accord Friedberg v. Building Committee, 218 Va. 659, 665, 

239 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1977); Riordan v. Hale, 215 Va. 638, 

641, 212 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1975); Stevenson v. Spivey, 132 Va. 

115, 119-20, 110 S.E. 367, 368 (1922). 

 We have recognized two separate and distinct types of 

restrictive covenants: the common law doctrine of covenants 

running with the land and restrictive covenants in equity 

known as equitable easements and equitable servitudes. MidState Equipment Co., 217 Va. at 140, 225 S.E.2d at 884; 

Duvall v. Ford Leasing, 220 Va. 36, 43, 255 S.E.2d 470, 473-

74 (1979); Renn v. Whitehurst, 181 Va. 360, 366-67, 25 

S.E.2d 276, 279 (1943); Springer v. Gaddy, 172 Va. 533, 541, 

S.E.2d 355, 358 (1939). 

 We have, on numerous occasions, thoroughly discussed 

the doctrine of restrictive covenants in equity. For 

example, in Mid-State Equipment Company, we stated: "[t]he 

doctrine of restrictive covenants in equity, distinct from 

the common law doctrine of covenants running with the land, 

establishes rights and obligations known as equitable 

easements and equitable servitudes." 217 Va. at 140, 225 

S.E.2d at 884; accord Minner v. City of Lynchburg, 204 Va. 
180, 187, 129 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1963); Cheatham v. Taylor, 

148 Va. 26, 37, 138 S.E. 545, 548 (1927). The doctrine is 

that 

 "when, on a transfer of land, there is a covenant 

or even an informal contract or understanding that 

certain restrictions in the use of the land 

conveyed shall be observed, the restrictions will 

be enforced by equity, at the suit of the party or 

parties intended to be benefited thereby, against 

any subsequent owner of the land except a 

purchaser for value without notice of the 

agreement. The principal purposes of such 

agreements are to regulate the style and costs of 

buildings to be erected on a tract that is being 

sold in parcels for building lots, to restrict 

their location to certain distances from the 

street, and to prevent buildings in a locality 

from being put up or used for any other than 

residential purposes. . . . The equity which is 

enforced prevents a third person, who has actual 

or constructive notice, from violating the 

equitable rights of another. 

. . . . 

 And where a common grantor develops land for 

sale in lots and pursues a course of conduct which 

indicates an intention to execute a general scheme 

or plan of improvement for the benefit of himself 

and the purchasers of the various lots, and by 

numerous conveyances incorporates in the deeds 

substantially uniform restrictions, conditions and 

covenants against the use of the property, the 

grantees acquire by implication the equitable 

right, sometimes referred to as an implied 

reciprocal negative easement, to enforce similar 

restrictions against the residential lot or lots 

retained by the grantor or subsequently sold 

without the restrictions to a purchaser with 

actual or constructive notice of the restrictions 

and covenants." 

Mid-State Equipment Co., 217 Va. at 140-41, 225 S.E.2d at 

884 (citations omitted); accord Woodward v. Morgan, 252 Va. 

135, 138, 475 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996); Burns v. Winchester 

Hospital, 225 Va. 545, 548-49, 303 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1983). 
 The defendants argue that the trial court, relying upon 

Burns, was correct in deciding that the complainants "failed 

to prove the existence of a general scheme or plan of 

development which imposed a restriction on the number of 

houses." However, in Burns, we considered whether 

residential owners could prevent a hospital from 

constructing a multi-level parking garage in their 

subdivision when the residential owners conceded that "no 

language in their deeds or those of the hospital [gave] them 

the explicit right to enforce restrictions contained in the 

hospital's deeds." 225 Va. at 548, 303 S.E.2d at 910. 

 Having conceded their inability to enforce the 

restrictive covenants under the common law doctrine of 

covenants running with the land, the residential owners in 

Burns went on to argue that there was an equitable servitude 

based upon a general scheme of development restricting the 

subdivision to residential use, which prohibited the 

hospital's multi-level parking garage. The trial court held 

"there was no general scheme of development in the 

subdivision," id. at 549, 303 S.E.2d at 911, and we affirmed 

that holding. 

 Here, however, the complainants have not conceded their 

inability to enforce the restriction in dispute under the 

common law doctrine of covenants running with the land. We 

must first determine, therefore, whether the complainants 

are entitled to enforce the restriction under that doctrine. 

 If so, it would be unnecessary in deciding this case to 
consider whether an equitable servitude exists. 

 At common law, a landowner may enforce a covenant 

running with the land provided he establishes: (1) privity 

between original parties; (2) privity between original 

parties and their successors; (3) an intent that the 

restriction will run with the land; and (4) that the 

covenant "touches and concerns" the land. Additionally, the 

conveyance must be in writing. 7 Thompson on Real Property 

§ 62.03 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994); 9 Richard R. Powell and 

Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on Real Property, § 60.04[.1] 

(1997). 

 Here, the evidence shows there was privity between the 

original parties, viz., Hagan and the respective grantees in 

the deeds he executed to convey the three lots involved in 

this controversy, namely, the Abels, Joseph L. Gaddy, and 

the Dyes. There was also privity between the three original 

grantees and their successors in interest. The three lots 

were all made subject to the restriction in dispute, and the 

words used in the deeds between Hagan and the predecessors 

in interest of the complainants and the defendants evinced 

an intent that the limitation on the number of houses which 

could be constructed on each lot would run with the land; 

those words provided for the automatic renewal of the 

restriction, essentially in perpetuity, negating any idea 

that the restriction was personal to Hagan. The covenant 

"touches and concerns" the land because it limits the number 

of houses that may be constructed upon each lot. Finally, 
the covenant is in writing. Hence, the complainants are 

entitled to enforce the restriction under the common law 

doctrine of covenants running with the land. 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court and enter a declaration here that the restrictive 

covenants are enforceable and that the defendants may not 

construct a second house on their property. This results in 

final judgment in favor of the complainants. 

Reversed and final judgment.