Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2013-450

MARCH TERM, 2014

Eejipp Ala } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Orleans Unit,

 v. } Civil Division

}

}

Andrew Pallito, Commissioner of the 

Vermont Department of Corrections

}

}

DOCKET NO. 106-4-13 Oscv

Trial Judge: Howard E. VanBenthuysen

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Plaintiff appeals pro se from the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint as moot. He 

argues that: the court should have held a hearing before dismissing his complaint; the court failed 

to explicitly address his “amended complaint”; and the court should have granted judgment in his 

favor. We affirm the court’s order.

Plaintiff is incarcerated. In April 2013, he filed a pro se complaint under Vermont Rule 

of Civil Procedure 75. Counsel was appointed for plaintiff, and counsel filed an amended 

complaint in May 2013. In his complaint, plaintiff sought review of the Department of 

Corrections’ decision to deny his release from prison on reintegration furlough. See 28 V.S.A. 

§ 808c (describing reintegration furlough program). The DOC had decided in March 2013 that 

plaintiff was not eligible for reintegration furlough. It based its decision on the fact that plaintiff

had been convicted of a prohibited act—a sex offense—in 2005 and, pursuant to a 2008 DOC 

interim memorandum, sex offenders were not eligible for reintegration furlough. Plaintiff 

alleged that the 2008 memorandum did not have the force of law, and that by rule and by statute, 

all inmates with a minimum sentence of at least 365 days were eligible for reintegration 

furlough. In June 2013, plaintiff moved for summary judgment in his favor.

Counsel for the DOC subsequently entered an appearance. In August 2013, the DOC 

moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as moot. The DOC acknowledged that, according to its 

own rule, it could not deny reintegration furlough to plaintiff on the basis of the 2008 interim 

memorandum. See Rule 16 “Granting Reintegration Furlough,” 4 Code of Vt. Rules 13 130 026-

1 to 3. The DOC stated that it had since reevaluated plaintiff’s eligibility for reintegration 

furlough under the criteria stated in the rule. It maintained that this reevaluation mooted 

plaintiff’s claim that the DOC improperly denied him reintegration furlough on the basis of the 

interim memorandum. 
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While the DOC’s motion to dismiss was pending, plaintiff, who was still represented by 

counsel, filed a pro se “amended complaint” challenging the DOC’s reevaluation decision. He 

asserted that the DOC denied his request on reevaluation because he was a violent offender, but 

that the DOC had released other violent offenders. Plaintiff maintained that the DOC was 

discriminating against him in violation of his equal protection rights. Plaintiff also asserted that 

a caseworker told him that he would be released on reintegration furlough if he completed 

“CSC” and that the denial of his request for reintegration furlough constituted a breach of 

contract. Finally, plaintiff asked that the court not dismiss the complaint without a hearing, 

citing Huminski v. Lavoie, 173 Vt. 517 (2001). 

In an October 2013 order, the court granted the DOC’s motion to dismiss. It found that

the DOC’s reevaluation of plaintiff’s eligibility for reintegration furlough, together with its 

concession that the review based on the 2008 memorandum was void, rendered the complaint

moot. The court noted that plaintiff had not addressed the mootness argument in any of the three 

filings he had made since the DOC’s motion was filed; this included plaintiff’s “amended 

complaint.” The court accordingly granted the DOC’s motion to dismiss. By order on the same 

date, the court granted plaintiff’s attorney’s motion to withdraw. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff first argues that the court should have held a hearing before dismissing his 

complaint, citing Huminski as support. We reject this argument. In Huminski, the trial court 

dismissed a complaint sua sponte on grounds not raised by the defendant. 173 Vt. at 519. We 

found that, under such circumstances, the plaintiff had been deprived of adequate notice and 

opportunity to respond. Id. at 519-20. We stated that “before the trial court may dismiss a 

complaint for failure to state a cause of action on its own motion, the court must notify the 

parties of the proposed action, and afford an opportunity to address the asserted grounds for 

dismissal, either in written form or at an oral hearing.” Id. at 519. Unlike Huminski, the court

here dismissed plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds specifically advanced by the DOC in its 

motion. Plaintiff had ample notice of the motion and ample opportunity to respond. Despite 

such notice, neither plaintiff nor his attorney responded to the mootness argument. The court 

was not obligated to hold a hearing before dismissing this case. 

We agree with the trial court, moreover, that this case is moot. Generally, “a case 

becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome.” In re Moriarty, 156 Vt. 160, 163 (1991) (quotation omitted). 

As set forth above, plaintiff argued that the DOC had evaluated his request for reintegration 

furlough using the wrong standard. The DOC conceded that it had erred, and it reevaluted 

plaintiff’s request under the appropriate standard. Plaintiff has obtained all of the relief that the 

court could have granted him. Id. (“A case is moot if the reviewing court can no longer grant 

effective relief.” (quotation omitted)).

Plaintiff also asserts that the court failed to address his pro se “amended complaint.” 

Plaintiff did not follow the proper procedure in seeking to amend his complaint. See V.R.C.P. 

15(a) (as relevant here, party may amend pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of 

the adverse party). In any event, this document challenged the DOC’s reevaluation decision. It 

was a new complaint based on a new DOC decision; plaintiff remains free to file such complaint 
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in the civil division after following any DOC grievance procedure that may exist. The 

allegations in this new complaint did not undermine the fact that the existing complaint was 

moot. We find no error in the court’s decision.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Beth Robinson, Associate Justice