alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ALEXZANDRA BLANCO,

Defendant.

8:23MJ251

ORDER ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE

DUE PROCESS PROTECTION ACT

This matter came before the Court for Initial Appearance on a Complaint. The government 

was represented by Kim C. Bunjer. The defendant was present and represented by James R. Kozel. 

IT IS ORDERED:

Pursuant to the Due Process Protections Act, the Court confirms the United States' 

obligation to disclose to the defendant all exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, and orders the United States to do so. Failure to disclose 

exculpatory evidence in a timely manner may result in consequences, including, but not limited 

to, exclusion of evidence, adverse jury instructions, dismissal of charges, contempt proceedings, 

or sanctions by the Court.

DATED: May 4, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

s/ F.A. Gossett

United States Magistrate Judge

8:23-mj-00251-SMB Doc # 19 Filed: 05/04/23 Page 1 of 1 - Page ID # 39
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 25 (Wednesday, February 6, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 6999]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-2130]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[NM-920-08-1310FI; TXNM 106959]


Notice of Proposed Reinstatement of Terminated Oil and Gas Lease 
TXNM 106959

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of Reinstatement of Terminated Oil and Gas Lease.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Under the Class II provisions of Title IV, Public Law 97-451, 
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) received a Petition for 
Reinstatement of Oil and Gas Lease TXNM 106959 from the lessee, Sun-
West Oil and Gas Inc., for lands in Trinity County, Texas. The petition 
was filed on time and was accompanied by all the rentals due since the 
date the lease terminated under the law.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lourdes B. Ortiz, BLM, New Mexico 
State Office, at (505) 438-7586.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: No valid lease has been issued that affect 
the lands. The lessee agrees to new lease terms for rentals and 
royalties of $10.00 per acre or fraction thereof, per year, and 16\2/3\ 
percent, respectively. The lessee paid the required $500.00 
administrative fee for the reinstatement of the lease and $166.00 cost 
for publishing this Notice in the Federal Register. The lessee met all 
the requirements for reinstatement of the lease as set out in sections 
31(d) and (e) of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. 188). We 
are proposing to reinstate lease TXNM 106959, effective the date of 
termination, September 1, 2007, under the original terms and conditions 
of the lease and the increased rental and royalty rates cited above.
    Before including your address, phone number, e-mail address, or 
other personal identifying information in your comment, you should be 
aware that your entire comment--including your personal identifying 
information--may be made publicly available at any time. While you can 
ask us in your comment to withhold your personal identifying 
information from public review, we cannot guarantee that we will be 
able to do so.

    Dated: January 31, 2008.
Lourdes B. Ortiz,
Land Law Examiner.
 [FR Doc. E8-2130 Filed 2-5-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-FB-P
Exhibit 10(w)
	 
	Pharmos Corporation

    99 Wood Avenue South, Suite 311

    Iselin, NJ 08830    
	 


	 	February 16, 2005
	 	 


	Dr. Gad Riesenfeld

        c/o Pharmos Corporation

            99 Wood Ave South, Suite 311

                Iselin, NJ 08830
	 	 
	 	Re:          Amendment of Employment Agreement 
	 	 
	Dear Gadi:
	 	 
	              I am writing to confirm our agreement about the following amendment to the Employment Agreement dated as of April 2, 2001 between Pharmos Corporation (the “Company”) and Gad Riesenfeld, as amended (the “Employment Agreement”). Unless otherwise indicated, capitalized terms used in this letter shall have the same meaning as when used in the Employment Agreement. Except for the changes provided herein, the Employment Agreement remains in full force and effect.

	 	 
	 	We have agreed as follows:
	 	 
	              Pursuant to a letter agreement dated as of April 2, 2001, we agreed to create a separate account into which we have been depositing each year an amount equal to the cost of premiums that otherwise would have been payable by us to obtain and maintain a “split dollar” life insurance policy on your life in the amount of $500,000, which policy we have not, with your permission, obtained. Such amounts have been held by your benefit and have earned interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum (the “Benefit”). 

	 
	              We have agreed that notwithstanding the original Employment Agreement or any amendment thereof, your right to receive the Benefit vests and is payable at age 62. However if you should terminate prior to age 62 due to death, disability, involuntary termination without Cause, voluntary termination or termination following a Change in Control, the Benefit will vest at termination. However, any distribution of the Benefit due to involuntary termination without Cause, voluntary termination or termination following a Change of Control but occurring more than 12 months after a Change of Control may not be made any sooner than six months after the date of termination (separation), in accordance with IRC Section 409A(2)(B)(i). 

	 
	              Please acknowledge your acceptance of the foregoing by signing and returning a copy of this letter to us.

	 


	 	PHARMOS CORPORATION
	 	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/	HAIM AVIV
	 	 	

	 	 	 	  Haim Aviv,
	 	 	 	  Chairman of the Board and 
	 	 	 	  Chief Executive Officer


	 
	AGREED AND ACCEPTED:
	 
	/s/ GAD RIESENFELD
	

	Gad Riesenfeld
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Leonard L. Kenney

v. Civil No. 06-cv-001-PB

N.H. Department of Corrections,

Commissioner, et al.

O R D E R

 Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add Joyce A. Leeka

as a defendant. He alleged that she decided that: 

“. . . the petitioner . . . does not meet the

State of New Hampshire Hepatitis C treatment

state protocol . . .”

In its objection defendants stated: 

“Joyce Leeka does not make treatment

decisions . . . but Dr. Englander makes

treatment decisions based on prison

protocol.” 

They further stated that Leeka shouldn’t be made a defendant,

that she is only the messenger for the decision maker. 

In reliance on defendants’ judicial admission that Dr.

Englander, not Ms. Leeka, denied the treatment to petitioner, I

denied the motion. “The treatment” in that admission means

“treatment combination therapy (Peginterferon/Ribavirin)”; not

any or other treatment. 

Case 1:06-cv-00001-PB Document 15 Filed 05/16/06 Page 1 of 2
2

Granted as set forth. 

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: May 16, 2006

cc: Leonard L. Kenney, pro se

 Daniel J. Mullen, Esq.

Case 1:06-cv-00001-PB Document 15 Filed 05/16/06 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 35.1

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2018-5 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, (the “Report”), the
undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Santander Consumer USA Inc. (the “Servicer”), does hereby certify and represent that:

| | 1. | A review of the activities and performance of the Servicer under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of October 24,
2018, among Santander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, Santander Consumer USA Inc., Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2018-5 and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (the “Agreement”) during the period that is the subject of the Report
has been made under my supervision.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement
in all material respects throughout the period that is the subject of the Report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.
| | ---------------------------
| |                            
| | By:                        
| | Name:                      
| | Title:                     
| | Date:                      
| |                            
| | By:                        
| | Name:                      
| | Title:                     
| | Date:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 06-cr-016-01-SM

Wayne Thompson

O R D E R

Defendant appeared for a bail revocation hearing pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3148. 

Defendant has pled guilty and is due for sentencing on

January 5, 2007. On motion he was bailed to a “28 day” program. 

Without permission of the court or the probation officer,

defendant left Keystone after 21 days on his own accord. He

twice was turned down for the Farnum Center “28 day” residential

program for lack of motivation. He also took a prescription drug

supplied by a friend. He has lied to his lawyer about what his

probation officer said and to that officer about what his lawyer

said. Given the number of failed opportunities to comply with

conditions I find that the defendant is unlikely to abide by any

condition or combination of conditions. The conditions of

release are revoked.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant be detained

pending sentencing. 

Case 1:06-cr-00016-SM Document 38 Filed 10/25/06 Page 1 of 2
2

The defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney

General or his designated representative for confinement in a

corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from

persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody

pending appeal. The defendant shall be afforded a reasonable

opportunity for private consultation with defense counsel. On

order of a court of the United States or on request of an

attorney for the government, the person in charge of the

corrections facility shall deliver the defendant to the United

States Marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection

with a court proceeding. 

SO ORDERED.

___________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: October 25, 2006 

cc: Helen W. Fitzgibbon, Esq.

 Harry C. Batchelder, Jr., Esq.

 U.S. Marshal

 U.S. Probation

Case 1:06-cr-00016-SM Document 38 Filed 10/25/06 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Corey Henry, certify that:

1.             I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be
filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2018-3 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

2.             Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3.             Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4.            Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report
under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

5.             All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and
15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wilmington Trust, National
Association.



| | By:    | /s/ Corey Henry                                                                          | 
| | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
| | Name:  | Corey Henry                                                                             
| | Title: | President and Chief Executive Officer Santander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, as Depositor
| |        | (senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)                           
| | Date:  | March 30, 2020
1 I interpret Rule 12 to require a report in all cases in which

th e defe ndant is convicted of first degree murder, regardless of whether the State seeks the death penalty. 

# FILED December 1, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) For Publication ) Appellee, ) Filed: ) v. ) Shelby County ) ANDRE S. BLAND, ) Hon. Arthur T. Bennett, Judge ) Appellant. ) No. 02-S-01-9603-CR-00032

SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION I concur, in principle, with Justice Reid’s dissent. I would, however, increase the pool of similar cases to include all cases in which a trial judge’s report is required by Supreme Court Rule 12. 1 The majo rity chose to exclude from the proportionality reviewpool all cases in which the State did not seek the death penaltyand all cases in which no capital sentencing hearing was held. In my view, this exclusion discourages a more meaningful proportionality analysis.

Defendants are often convicted of first d egree murder after a trial in which the prosecution, for whatever reason, did not seek the death penalty. The pool defined by the majority would exclude such cases. However, cases in which the death penalty is not sought are equally relevant to proportionality as cases in whichthe death penalty is sought. Without all first degree murder2

convictions included in the pool, it would be, in myopinion, quite di ffic ult to conduct the proportionality review as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(Supp. 1996). Thus, because of my viewthat the pool of similar cases as described by the majority is too narrow, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion.

I agree with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of premeditation and torture. Further, I agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s find ing that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. However, like Justice Reid, I would find the death sentence disproportionate in this case.

_____________________ __________

____ _ ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
AO 472 (Rev. 11/16), modified by NED (9/17) 

Page 1 of 1 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v. Case No. 8:23cr116 

 

ADAM THOMAS, ORDER OF DETENTION PENDING TRIAL

Defendant

Part I - Eligibility for Detention

 Upon the 

☒ Motion of the Government attorney pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1), 

the Court held a detention hearing and found that detention is warranted. 

 This order sets forth the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), in 

addition to any other findings made at the hearing. 

Part II - Findings of Fact and Law as to Presumptions under § 3142(e) 

☒ B. Rebuttable Presumption Arises Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) (narcotics, firearm, other offenses): There is a 

rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the 

defendant as required and the safety of the community because there is probable cause to believe that the defendant 

committed one or more of the following offenses: 

☒ (1) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed in the 

Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 

U.S.C. §§ 951-971), or Chapter 705 of Title 46, U.S.C. (46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70508); 

☒ C. Conclusions Regarding Applicability of Any Presumption Established Above

☒ The defendant has not introduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption above, and detention is 

ordered on that basis. (Part III need not be completed.)

 

Part III - Analysis and Statement of the Reasons for Detention

 

Part IV - Directions Regarding Detention

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Attorney General or to the Attorney General’s designated representative 

for confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or 

being held in custody pending appeal. The defendant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity for private consultation 

with defense counsel. On order of a court of the United States or on request of an attorney for the Government, the person 

in charge of the corrections facility must deliver the defendant to a United States Marshal for the purpose of an appearance 

in connection with a court proceeding. 

Date: 8/1/2023 s/ Susan M. Bazis 

 United States Magistrate Judge

8:23-cr-00116-RFR-MDN Doc # 11 Filed: 08/01/23 Page 1 of 1 - Page ID # 20
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**1138 KA 13-00536**  PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHARLES W. FRYSINGER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

JAMES A. BAKER, ITHACA, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

BROOKS T. BAKER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATH (JAMES P. MILLER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Steuben County Court (Peter C. Bradstreet, J.), rendered October 19, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, the plea and the waiver of indictment are vacated, and the matter is remitted to Steuben County Court for further proceedings.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree (Penal Law § 260.20 [2]). We note at the outset that defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal is invalid. Despite the existence of a written appeal waiver form signed by defendant and his attorney, no questions were asked of defendant about the appeal waiver and his understanding thereof. In addition, the appeal waiver was not mentioned until after defendant pleaded guilty. Thus, the record is “insufficient to establish that [County Court] ‘engage[d] the defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice’ ” ( People v Brown , 296 AD2d 860, 860, lv denied 98 NY2d 767; see People v Hamilton , 49 AD3d 1163, 1164).
We agree with defendant that the court erred in denying his motion to vacate his guilty plea, which, inter alia, challenged the factual sufficiency of his plea allocution ( see People v Lopez , 71 NY2d 662, 665). Defendant was expressly charged with the act of providing alcoholic beverages to persons under 21 years of age, but during the brief factual colloquy at the plea proceeding he never admitted that he provided alcohol. Here, defendant “preserve[d his] challenge to the factual sufficiency of [the] plea allocution . . . [by making] a motion to withdraw the plea under CPL 220.60 (3)” ( id. ),**-2- 1138 KA 13-00536** 
and we conclude that the court erred in denying that motion.

Entered: November 15, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1260

To prohibit the cloning of humans, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH, 28, 2001

Mr. KERNS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on the Judiciary

A BILL

To prohibit the cloning of humans, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ban on Human

5 Cloning Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION REGARDING CLONING OF HUMANS.

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—It shall be unlawful for a person

8 to engage in a human cloning procedure with the intent

9 of implanting the resulting cellular product into a uterus.

10 (b) CLONING PROCEDURE.—A person shall be con11 sidered to have engaged in a human cloning procedure for

12 purposes of subsection (a) if the person transfers the nu-
2

•HR 1260 IH

1 cleus of a human somatic cell into an egg cell from which

2 the nucleus has been removed.

3 (c) CRIMINAL PENALTY.—Any person who violates

4 subsection (a) shall be fined in accordance with title 18,

5 United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 5 years,

6 or both.

7 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This Act takes effect upon

8 the expiration the 30-day period beginning on the date of

9 the enactment of this Act.

Æ
#### Francelle B. RASH, Appellant, v. Jack O. W. RASH, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division B.

Feb. 16, 1955.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 05-cr-253-01-SM

Keith Shane MacLeod

O R D E R

Defendant MacLeod’s motion to continue the final pretrial conference and

trial is granted (document 18). Trial has been rescheduled for the May 2006

trial period. Defendant Landers shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights not

later than March 7, 2006. On the filing of such waiver, his continuance shall be

effective. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: April 21, 2006 at 11:00 a.m.

Jury Selection: May 2, 2006 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:05-cr-00253-SM Document 20 Filed 02/27/06 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

February 27, 2006

cc: Stanley Norkunas, Esq.

Mark Howard, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00253-SM Document 20 Filed 02/27/06 Page 2 of 2