alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIR E

Antonio King,

Plaintiff,

v . Civil No. 04-CV-356-JD

Cesar Rivas et al.,

Defendants .

Order to Make Christopher Robertson Available for Video Testimony

It is hereby ordered that the NH Department of Corrections shall make witnes s

Christopher Robertson (NHSP #35532) available for video testimony from the Northern

Correctional Facility in Berlin to the United States Courthouse in Concord on January 24, 2006,

at 9 :30 a.m.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:04-cv-00356-SM Document 46 Filed 01/17/06 Page 1 of 1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSCAR EFRAIN OSORIO RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-151

Agency No.

A200-064-017

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 4, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BENCIVENGO, 

District Judge.

***

Oscar Efrain Osorio Rodriguez (“Osorio”), a native and citizen of El 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo, United States District Judge

for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 8 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-151

Salvador, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 

decision denying his motion to reopen. We deny in part and dismiss in part the 

petition. 

1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Osorio’s motion to 

reopen based upon failure to establish materially changed country conditions. See

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The evidence that Osorio submitted in support of his 

motion to reopen—his 2019 declaration and the 2018 Human Rights Report for El 

Salvador—does not show an appreciably different level of gang violence in El 

Salvador when compared to the evidence Osorio submitted at his 2016 hearing. 

Moreover, the new evidence describes only “generalized conditions” of crime and 

violence and is thus immaterial to the success of Osorio’s petitions. Najmabadi v. 

Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, Osorio cannot establish that 

“circumstances have changed sufficiently that” he, who “previously did not have a 

legitimate claim” now does. Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not to exercise its 

sua sponte authority to reopen Osorio’s proceedings. See Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 

1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2020) (“BIA denials of sua sponte relief premised on legal or 

constitutional error remain the ‘one narrow exception’ to our rule that the agency’s 

sua sponte authority is not subject to judicial review.” (quoting MenendezGonzalez v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2019))). Here, the BIA’s decision 
3 22-151

rested on Osorio’s failure to establish “exceptional circumstances,” a benchmark 

which “does not provide a sufficiently meaningful standard to permit judicial 

review.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 586 (9th Cir. 2016) (as amended). 

Osorio has not identified any “legal or constitutional error” in the BIA’s denial of 

sua sponte reopening; as such, “there is nothing left for us to review.” Lona, 958 

F.3d at 1235.

DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jerry D’Anna, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed, in accordance with the following memorandum: The evidence supports defendant’s convictions of larceny by false promise. The facts and circumstances proven were wholly consistent with guilty intent or belief and they excluded to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that of defendant’s intention or belief that his promises would not be performed *(see,*Penal Law § 155.05 [2] [d]). The facts proven show more than nonperformance of promises; they show that, at the time defendant made the promises, he could not have believed that they would be performed. Defendant promised the investors an inordinately large profit, yet he knew that the business was not being operated at a profit and it could never yield profits as great as those promised. At the same time that the business was being operated without a profit, defendant withdrew money from the business for his own use. From all of the evidence, the conclusion is inescapable that defendant was engaged in a fraudulent scheme to deprive investors of their money by making promises of unrealistically high profits, which he knew could not be attained *(see, People v Luongo,*47 NY2d 418).

The court erred, however, in directing that the sentence *811upon the conviction for scheme to defraud in the first degree run consecutively to the sentences upon the convictions for grand larceny in the second degree. Concurrent sentences must be imposed where "two or more offenses [are] committed through * * * an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other” (Penal Law § 70.25 [2]). A material element of scheme to defraud involves obtaining property from 10 or more persons by false or fraudulent pretense or promises *(see,*Penal Law § 190.65 [1]). The convictions for grand larceny in the second degree were based on proof of larceny by false promise. Because the two crimes, as proven, have an element in common, the sentence imposed on the conviction for scheme to defraud in the first degree must run concurrently with the sentences imposed on the convictions for grand larceny in the second degree.

We find no merit to the other arguments contained in defendant’s main brief and in his supplemental *pro se*brief. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Marshall, J.—scheme to defraud, first degree.) Present—Boomer, J. P., Pine, Balio and Davis, JJ.
NUMBER 13-20-00496-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF C.M.D., A CHILD

On appeal from the 24th District Court

of Victoria County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

This is an appeal of the trial court’s order dated August 25, 2020, terminating the 

parental rights of S.G. (Mother) and R.D. (Father) to one minor child, C.M.D. On 

September 23, 2020, Father submitted a pro se notice of appeal. 

On September 23, 2020 and October 28, 2020, the Clerk of this Court notified 

Father, in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c), that we would 

dismiss this appeal unless the $205.00 filing fee was paid within ten days from receipt of 
2

the letter. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c). Father has not responded to either of the notices 

from the Clerk or paid the $205.00 filing fee. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 12.1(b), 42.3(c). 

On October 26, 2020, the Clerk of this Court sent another notice to Father,

instructing that this appeal was also subject to dismissal for want of prosecution under 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1), unless within seven days from the receipt 

of the letter, Father provided a reasonable explanation for his failure to timely file a brief,

and the appellee is not significantly injured by Father’s failure to timely file a brief. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a), 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c). More than seven days have passed, and 

Father has not filed a brief or otherwise responded to the Clerk’s notice.

An appellate court may dismiss a civil appeal for want of prosecution or failure to 

comply with a notice from the clerk requiring a response or other action within a specified 

time. See TEX. R.APP.P. 42.3(b), (c). In light of the foregoing, and mindful of the expedited 

deadlines and procedures that apply to parental termination appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 

28.4; TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2(a), we conclude this appeal should be dismissed.

Accordingly, the appeal in cause number 13-20-00496-CV is hereby DISMISSED 

for want of prosecution and failure to comply with a notice from the Court. See TEX. R. 

APP. P. 5, 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c). 

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice

Delivered and filed the

19th day of November, 2020.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Josiah Israel ROBLEY, aka Jonathan Robley, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-30228. D.C. No. CR-01-00073-SEH.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*697Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 29, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Josiah Israel Robley appeals his 33-month sentence imposed following a guilty plea conviction for a mail fraud/lawyer impersonation scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s decision to depart from the calculated criminal history category for abuse of discretion, and we affirm. *See United States v. Martin,*278 F.3d 988, 1001-02 (9th Cir.2002).

Robley’s main contention is that his conduct was not sufficiently serious to warrant an upward departure in his criminal history category. The record belies this contention. His uncounted Canadian conviction alone is sufficient to justify the upward departure. *See United States v. Connelly,*156 F.3d 978, 985 (holding that theft of at least $2000 through credit card fraud and forgery is serious and supports horizontal departure); *see also United States v. Myers,*41 F.3d 531, 534 (9th Cir.1994) (affirming the district court’s upward departure and holding that $1690 obtained by wire fraud is serious conduct).

Robley also contends that the district court made insufficient findings regarding whether his criminal history was significantly more serious than others in criminal history category IV, citing *United States v. George,*56 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir.1995). Robley is mistaken. *See United States v. Goshea,*94 F.3d 1361, 1364 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing *George*and finding it sufficient for the district court to adopt the presentencing report). Additionally, Robley contends that the district court erred by relying on inadmissible grounds for the upward adjustment. Again, the record is contrary to his position. The district court relied upon proper sentencing factors. *See*U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (a), (d) and (e).

Finally, Robley contends that the upward departure was not warranted on the basis of recidivism because recidivism alone is not a legal basis for departure and because his conduct is insufficient to find a likelihood of recidivism. Robley is incor*698rect on both grounds. *See Connelly,*156 F.3d at 985 (stating that departure is justified purely on the basis of defendant’s likelihood of recidivism and affirming an upward departure where defendant engaged in similar conduct years prior to instant offense).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

AARON JOHNSON,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 382 EAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2024, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed March 8, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-0593

Lower Tribunal No. F03-5785B

________________

Desmon Hallman,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from 

the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge.

Daniel J. Tibbitt, P.A., and Daniel Tibbitt, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kseniya Smychkouskaya, 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 9, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 52444]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20842]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i>11414 and <greek-i>11415]


Nebraska Disaster <greek-i> NE-00022

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Administrative declaration of a 
disaster for the State of Nebraska dated 09/02/2008.
    Incident: Severe Thunderstorms, Heavy Rain, Hail and Straight Line 
Winds.
    Incident Period: 06/27/2008.
    Effective Date: 09/02/2008.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 11/03/2008.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 06/02/2009.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: M. Mitravich, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of 
the Administrator's disaster declaration, applications for disaster 
loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally 
announced locations.
    The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected 
by the disaster:
Primary Counties: Douglas.
Contiguous Counties:
    Nebraska: Dodge, Sarpy, Saunders, Washington.
    Iowa: Pottawattamie.
    The Interest Rates are:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeowners With Credit Available Elsewhere:..................      5.375
Homeowners Without Credit Available Elsewhere:...............      2.687
Businesses With Credit Available Elsewhere:..................      8.000
Businesses & Small Agricultural Cooperatives Without Credit        4.000
 Available Elsewhere:........................................
Other (Including Non-Profit Organizations) With Credit             5.250
 Available Elsewhere:........................................
Businesses and Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit             4.000
 Available Elsewhere:........................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 11414 B 
and for economic injury is 11415 0.
    The States which received an EIDL Declaration <greek-i> are 
Nebraska, Iowa.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)


    Dated: September 2, 2008.
Sandy K. Baruah,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8-20842 Filed 9-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

 v. Case No. 05-cr-199-01-SM

Christopher Bouchard

O R D E R

Defendant's assented-to motion to continue the trial (document no. 7) is granted.

Trial has been rescheduled for the September 2006 trial period. Defendant shall file a

Waiver of Speedy Trial Rights not later than February 8, 2006. On the filing of such waiver,

his continuance shall be effective.

The court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh

the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the

defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation taking into account the

Case 1:05-cr-00199-SM Document 8 Filed 02/01/06 Page 1 of 2
2

exercise of due diligence under the circumstances.

Final Pretrial Conference: August 28, 2006 at 9:00 AM

Jury Selection: September 6, 2006 at 9:30 AM

SO ORDERED.

February 1, 2006 _________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

cc: Joseph Laplante. Esq.

 William Christie, Esq.

 U. S. Probation

 U. S. Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00199-SM Document 8 Filed 02/01/06 Page 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<CIK> 0000081100
<NAME> PUGET SOUND ENERGY
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                    3,198,684
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                    265,751
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         256,484
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                             0
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                 401,742
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,122,661
<COMMON>                                       845,607
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                      450,923
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                             41,936
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>               1,338,466
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    173,627
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                         1,162,696
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                             104,000
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                 152,972
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                  102,920
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>               1,087,980
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                4,122,661
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      341,021
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                             7,249
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     298,351
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     305,600
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         35,421
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               6,029
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  41,450
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        29,452
<NET-INCOME>                                    11,998
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                      3,045
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                    8,953
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        38,898
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       26,855
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                          19,047
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.11
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Federal Trade Commission

v. Civil No. 04-cv-377-JD

SmartBot.Net, Inc., et al.

O R D E R

Counsel who has represented defendants SmartBot.Net, Inc.,

and Sanford Wallace moves for leave to withdraw. In support of

the motion, counsel represents that he has experienced increasing

difficulty in communicating with his clients and does not

anticipate that communications will improve. Counsel represents

that he notified SmartBot and Wallace of his intent to withdraw,

and Wallace consented, but he did not provide his consent in

writing. Although counsel sent a copy of the motion to withdraw

to SmartBot and Wallace at their last known address, no further

response has been received by the court. Therefore, the motion

to withdraw filed by Ralph A. Jacobs, Esquire, is granted.

SmartBot shall have a notice of appearance filed in this

court by an attorney on its behalf within twenty days of the date

of this order, failing which, default will be entered against it.

Wallace shall have a notice of appearance filed in this

court by an attorney on his behalf or shall file a notice of

appearance pro se within twenty days of the date of this order,

Case 1:04-cv-00377-JD Document 80 Filed 10/11/05 Page 1 of 2
2

failing which default will be entered against him.

Ralph A. Jacobs shall use his best efforts to notify

SmartBot and Wallace of this order and shall file a certification

with the court to that effect.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to withdraw (document

no. 69) is granted, subject to the requirement that Attorney

Jacobs use his best efforts to notify his clients of this order

and file a certification to that effect.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

October 11, 2005

cc: Ralph A. Jacobs, Esquire

Steven M. Notinger, Esquire

W. Scott O’Connell, Esquire

Charulata B. Pagar, Esquire

Laura M. Sullivan, Esquire

Martha Van Oot, Esquire

Case 1:04-cv-00377-JD Document 80 Filed 10/11/05 Page 2 of 2
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-05-00410-CV

Central United Life Insurance Company, Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Insurance and Jose Montemayor, in his capacity

as Commissioner of Insurance, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. GN404034, HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The parties have filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal advising that they have

settled their differences. The appeal is dismissed on the joint motion and costs are assessed against

the party incurring them. 

 

Bea Ann Smith, Justice

Before Justices B. A. Smith, Patterson and Puryear

Dismissed on Joint Motion

Filed: January 24, 2006
2
IA

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 34

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative

to taxing the people of the United States progressively.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 6, 2001

Mr. JACKSON of Illinois introduced the following joint resolution; which was

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States relative to taxing the people of the United States

progressively.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when

7 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several

8 States:
2

•HJ 34 IH

1 ‘‘ARTICLE—

2 ‘‘SECTION 1. The Congress of the United States shall

3 tax all persons progressively in proportion to the income

4 which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the

5 United States.

6 ‘‘SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to en7 force this article by appropriate legislation.’’.

Æ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIR E

United States of America

V .

Juan J . Aldea

06-cr-014-01-JD

O R D E R

The assented to motion to reschedule jury trial (document no .

21) filed by defendant is granted .

Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights within 10

days . The court finds that the ends of justice served by granting

a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the

defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U .S .C . § 3131 (h) (8) (B) (iv) , for the

reasons set forth in the motion .

SO ORDERED .

/s/Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr .

Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr .

United States District Judge

Date : October 8, 200 7

cc : Jeffrey S . Levin, Esq .

Mark A . Irish, Esq .

U .S . Marsha l

U .S . Probation

Case 1:06-cr-00014-JD Document 22 Filed 10/08/07 Page 1 of 1