COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 24, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP1787-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF183

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JARVIS KENWAUN WEBB,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: JOSEPH R. WALL, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Brash, P.J., Dugan and Donald, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2019AP1787-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jarvis Kenwaun Webb appeals from the judgment 

convicting him of burglary of a building or dwelling, as a party to a crime. He 

also appeals the order denying his motion for postconviction relief in which he 

argued that his conviction should be vacated and dismissed because there was 

insufficient evidence at trial. He also argued that his sentence should be modified 

because his sentence was unduly harsh compared to his two co-actors. For the 

reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Five men burglarized a Guarantee Bank located in a Pacific Produce

grocery store shortly after 1:00 a.m. during a blizzard on December 18, 2016. 

They emptied the contents of the teller machines and took a large amount of coins 

from a coin machine. The bank’s video surveillance cameras captured the entire 

event. 

¶3 Money packs removed from the teller drawers contained GPS 

tracking devices that were designed to activate when removed from the bank, 

which the men failed to remove. Accordingly, one of the tracking devices began 

transmitting a signal, tracking the men when they left the bank. Officers located

the signal coming from the tracking device at 1:09 a.m. about fourteen blocks 

from the bank. Given the blizzard conditions and the distance travelled in four 

minutes, officers believed the device was transmitting from a vehicle, likely from 

the time it left the bank. When officers caught up to the signal, they observed a 

gold SUV and a sedan. However, the gold SUV turned and started traveling a 

different route than the sedan, and officers continued to follow the signal coming 

from the sedan. The sedan was Webb’s blue Lincoln Town Car. 
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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¶4 Officers followed Webb’s car and conducted a stop at 1:22 a.m. 

Webb was driving, and he had two passengers, Dontrell Henley and Pierre Webb,1

in the car. Webb complied with officers during the stop and did not attempt to 

flee. 

¶5 When the car was stopped, Pierre was wearing a Nike windbreaker 

similar to the windbreaker seen on one of the men in the surveillance footage, and 

Henley had 337 quarters in his jacket pocket; he was also wearing a heavy winter 

coat similar to the coats worn by the men in the surveillance footage. When 

officers later booked Pierre, they discovered that he also had a tracking device in 

his shoe. At the time of the stop, officers did not notice any indications that any of 

the men had been running or had spent time outside in the snow. 

¶6 As a result of a search of Webb’s car, officers recovered several 

items further indicating that Webb and his passengers were connected to the 

burglary, including a coin bag with the words Guarantee Bank printed on it. The

bag contained more than $300 worth of coins and matched the serial number of a

coin bag missing from the bank. Also, even though Webb’s car already had 

license plates on it, officers found a license plate with the number 907-MRP in his 

car. A subsequent search of Webb’s cell phone that officers recovered from his 

car showed pictures of his car with the 907-MRP license plate on it instead of the 

license plates that were on the car at the time of the stop. Officers also found that

there was no recorded activity on his phone in the week leading up to the burglary. 

 

1

 All parties involved indicate that Pierre Webb is not related to Jarvis Webb. We refer 

to Pierre Webb throughout this opinion as Pierre to avoid confusion.
No. 2019AP1787-CR

4

¶7 Further investigation of the burglary did not place Webb inside the 

bank. Footprints left in the snow did not match Webb’s shoes, his fingerprints 

were not found inside the bank, he could not be identified using the surveillance 

footage because the men had concealed their faces while inside the bank, and at 

the time of the stop, Webb was wearing a gray hoodie, which was different than 

the heavy winter coats worn by the men in the surveillance footage. Webb 

maintained that he had been at his girlfriend’s house that night and simply gave 

Pierre and Henley a ride, without any knowledge of the burglary. 

¶8 On February 10, 2017, Webb was charged with burglary of a 

building or dwelling, as a party to a crime, under the theory that Webb served as 

the getaway driver. Webb’s and Pierre’s cases were joined for trial, and both were 

tried together at the end of February 2018.2 On February 23, 2018, the jury found 

both Webb and Pierre guilty following the trial. 

¶9 The trial court sentenced both Webb and Pierre on April 19, 2018. 

Pierre received a sentence of four and one-half years of imprisonment composed 

of one and one-half years of initial confinement and three years of extended 

supervision, and Webb received a sentence of five and one-half years of 

imprisonment composed of two and one-half years of initial confinement and three 

years of extended supervision. In determining an appropriate sentence for Webb, 

the trial court considered a multitude of factors, including his extensive criminal 

 

2 Henley pled guilty on February 26, 2018, and he was sentenced on March 16, 2018. 

Henley received a sentence of seven years of imprisonment composed of three years of initial 

confinement and four years of extended supervision. Henley’s sentence was stayed for four years 

of probation. 
No. 2019AP1787-CR

5

record and the fact that Webb showed no remorse for his involvement in the 

burglary. 

¶10 On July 15, 2019, Webb filed a motion for postconviction relief

seeking to vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, to modify his sentence. He 

argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the 

trial court imposed a sentence that was unduly harsh. The trial court denied 

Webb’s motion on September 11, 2019, and this appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

¶11 On appeal, Webb renews his arguments that there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction and that the trial court imposed a sentence that 

was unduly harsh and severe in comparison to the sentences imposed on Pierre 

and Henley. We address each argument in turn.

I. There was sufficient evidence to support Webb’s 

conviction

¶12 Wisconsin law allows a “person concerned in the commission of a 

crime” to be charged as a principal even if the person did not directly commit the 

crime. WIS. STAT. § 939.05(1) (2017-18).

3 A person can be concerned in the 

commission of a crime if the person “[i]ntentionally aids and abets” the 

commission of the crime. Sec. 939.05(2)(b). Under this approach, the State is

required to prove that “the aider: (1) undertook conduct (either verbal or by overt 

action) which as a matter of objective fact aided another in the execution of a 

crime; and (2) consciously desired or intended that the conduct would yield such 

 

3

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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assistance.” State v. Knoll, 2000 WI App 135, ¶8, 237 Wis. 2d 384, 614 N.W.2d 

20. In his appeal, Webb disputes that there was sufficient proof of the second 

aspect, namely that he had a conscious desire or intent to aid in the commission of 

the burglary, because he claims that he had no knowledge of the burglary. 

¶13 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal 

conviction is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Smith, 2012 WI 

91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410. State v. Poellinger establishes the 

standards that we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

a conviction as follows: 

[We] may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the trier 

of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 

[S]tate and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value 

and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have 

found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If any possibility 

exists that the trier of fact could have drawn the appropriate 

inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the 

requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict 

even if it believes that the trier of fact should not have 

found guilt based on the evidence before it. 

Id., 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990) (citation omitted). 

Additionally, 

[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to 

support a conviction, [we] need not concern [ourselves] in 

any way with evidence which might support other theories 

of the crime. [We] need only decide whether the theory of 

guilt accepted by the trier of fact is supported by sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict rendered. 

Id. at 507-08. Applying this standard of review, we conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence for the jury to have reasonably concluded that Webb intended 

to aid and abet the commission of the burglary.
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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¶14 At trial, the jury heard testimony from several officers involved in 

the stop and subsequent investigation of the burglary. The jury also heard 

testimony from two of the bank’s employees regarding the burglary and the bank’s 

security measures. Importantly, the jury heard repeated testimony that movement

out of the bank triggered a GPS tracker from a money pack at 1:05 a.m. The jury 

also heard testimony from the officer who followed Webb’s car and conducted the 

stop that the signal from the tracker was located fourteen blocks from the bank just 

four minutes later at 1:09 a.m. That same officer then testified that Webb was 

stopped at 1:22 a.m. with two individuals in his car who readily appeared to be 

connected to the burglary based on their clothing and items they were carrying. 

That officer also testified that there were no indications that Webb or his 

passengers were out of breath or had wet clothing as if they had been traveling on 

foot as would have been consistent with Webb’s defense that he offered a ride to

Pierre and Henley after they committed the burglary. 

¶15 Additional testimony by officers involved in the search of Webb’s 

car showed that a coin bag from the bank was located in the backseat, that Webb 

had a license plate with a different number on the front seat, and that Webb’s cell 

phone was recovered from the driver’s side door. Additional testimony by bank 

employees and investigating officers identified the coin bag as one of the bags

missing from the bank and also identified the GPS tracker as one of the trackers 

missing from the bank.

¶16 As it relates to the license plate, an officer testified as to the 

significance of finding a second license plate in the front seat of Webb’s vehicle: 

“[I]t’s not uncommon for ... criminals to use numerous plates for one vehicle in 

order to disguise that vehicle from law enforcement to avoid detection by law 

enforcement.” Another officer then testified regarding the search conducted on 
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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Webb’s cell phone and the lack of activity on the phone during the week preceding 

the burglary, which was consistent with an inference that information had been 

deleted from the phone. Further, this officer testified that the phone logged 

multiple calls and other activity on it until December 12, 2016, when all activity 

on the phone just stopped. Viewed as a whole, we conclude that the jury could 

reasonably infer that Webb knew about the burglary and, therefore, intended to aid 

in its commission by serving as the getaway driver for Pierre and Henley.

¶17 Webb argues that the evidence introduced at trial is merely 

circumstantial and also supports an inference that he offered a ride to Pierre and 

Henley without any knowledge of the burglary. He supports his argument with the 

fact that the jury asked several questions during its deliberations.4 However, “[i]t 

is well established that a finding of guilt may rest upon evidence that is entirely 

circumstantial and that circumstantial evidence is oftentimes stronger and more 

satisfactory than direct evidence.” Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 501. Moreover,

“[b]y its very nature, intent is an elusive element and is rarely susceptible to proof 

by direct evidence. Because one generally intends the consequences of his acts, 

intent can often be inferred from those acts and their consequences.” State v. 

Marshall, 92 Wis. 2d 101, 123, 284 N.W.2d 592 (1979) (citation omitted). 

Therefore, we reject Webb’s argument that the fact that the jury’s verdict was 

supported by circumstantial evidence should lead us to conclude that there is 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

 

4

 Webb also seems to raise the point that the trial court did not adequately answer the 

jury’s questions. We decline to address this point as it has not been adequately developed. See

State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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¶18 We also reject Webb’s argument that there was insufficient evidence 

to support his conviction because the jury could have inferred that Webb picked 

up Pierre and Henley without knowledge of the burglary. It is not our role to 

question the inference of Webb’s guilt chosen by the jury so long as it is a 

reasonable inference from the evidence. See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506-07. 

Nor is it our role to replace the jury as the trier of fact. We “must accept and 

follow the inference drawn by the trier of fact unless the evidence on which that 

inference is based is incredible as a matter of law.” Id. at 507. The evidence here 

shows that Webb was driving in the area of the burglary at 1:09 a.m. during a 

blizzard with items taken from the bank and two individuals who could readily be 

placed inside the bank. We cannot conclude that the jury’s chosen inference that 

Webb knew of the burglary and, thus, intended to aid in the commission of the 

burglary as the getaway driver, is incredible as a matter of law. Therefore, we 

reject Webb’s argument.

II. The trial court properly exercised its discretion at the 

time of sentencing

¶19 Webb next argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its 

discretion by imposing a sentence on him that is unduly harsh and unconscionable, 

particularly in light of the lesser sentences imposed on Pierre and Henley. 

¶20 We review whether the sentence imposed is unduly harsh and 

unconscionable for an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Grindemann, 

2002 WI App 106, ¶30, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507. “We will not set aside 

a discretionary ruling of the trial court if it appears from the record that the court 

applied the proper legal standards to the facts before it, and through a process of 

reasoning, reached a result which a reasonable judge could reach.” Id. We 

presume that the trial court acted reasonably. State v. Tappa, 2002 WI App 303, 
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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¶16, 259 Wis. 2d 402, 655 N.W.2d 223. However, a trial court’s reliance on 

improper factors constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Pico, 

2018 WI 66, ¶48, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95.

¶21 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court began by stating that it was 

“to look at the gravity of the offense, the background of [Webb], and protect the 

public.” The trial court acknowledged that the burglary here was non-violent in 

that it occurred in the middle of the night when no one was present to be harmed 

and that it did not involve the use of guns. However, the trial court still considered 

the nature of the offense to be “very, very serious,” especially given the evidence 

that the burglary was “well-planned out.” The trial court also considered it to be 

an “aggravating factor” that the crime was a burglary of a bank because of the 

burglary’s impact on the community’s trust in its banks and the impact on this 

bank’s reputation and business as a secure institution. 

¶22 The trial court acknowledged that it received several letters in 

support of Webb, including letters from Webb’s wife, his pastor, and his 

employer, indicating that Webb had a positive impact on his community that 

weighed in Webb’s favor. The trial court, however, recognized that Webb has 

consistently had the support of those around him yet still had an extensive criminal 

record involving violent crimes. The trial court last considered that Webb showed 

no remorse for his actions, except for the impact this has had on his wife, and used 

Webb’s lack of remorse to find that Webb is “just not getting the picture.” The 

trial court, therefore, found that Webb’s extensive criminal record coupled with 

his lack of remorse showed a need to protect the public and to deter Webb. Based 
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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on these considerations, the trial court imposed a sentence of five and one-half 

years.5 

¶23 As noted, Webb further argues that his sentence was unduly harsh 

and unconscionable in light of the lesser sentences that the trial court imposed on 

Pierre and Henley. However, “[t]he court is not required to base its sentence 

determination on the sentences of other defendants.” Tappa, 259 Wis. 2d 402, 

¶20. “A mere disparity between the sentences of co-defendants is not improper if 

the individual sentences are based upon individual culpability and the need for 

rehabilitation.” State v. Toliver, 187 Wis. 2d 346, 362, 523 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 

1994). Based on the record before us, the disparity among the sentences imposed 

here exists due to the attempt to individualize the sentences based on the specific

needs of each defendant. At the time of Webb’s sentencing, the trial court

considered Webb’s particular circumstances, without comparing him to Pierre or 

Henley. 

¶24 Moreover, in its decision denying Webb’s postconviction motion, 

the trial court noted that there were differences between Webb, Pierre, and Henley

that explained the differences in the sentences. It stated that neither Pierre nor

Henley had the same extensive criminal record that Webb has. The trial court

noted that Pierre had multiple charges that never resulted in convictions and 

Henley’s record indicated that he was involved in non-violent offenses. 

Additionally, it stated that both Pierre and Henley took responsibility for their 

 

5

 Webb’s sentence of five and one-half years is well within the statutory maximum for a 

Class F felony set by WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3)(f) and is, therefore, presumptively reasonable. See

Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975) (“The trial judge has discretion in 

determining the length of sentence within the permissible range set by statute.”).
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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actions and showed remorse. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 496, 219 

N.W.2d 286 (1974) (allowing the consideration of remorse as a mitigating factor).

¶25 By contrast, the trial court described Webb’s criminal history as a 

“march of criminal offenses.” The trial court went on to describe each of Webb’s 

criminal acts that he committed as a juvenile, which included a stolen car, theft, 

possession of a dangerous weapon, and retail theft, for which he received ten 

months at a juvenile facility. It also noted that, as an adult, Webb was convicted

of felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to prison for eighteen 

months of initial confinement and eighteen months of extended supervision. It 

also noted that Webb violated his conditions of extended supervision and his agent 

placed him in custody for those violations. Next, the trial court stated that Webb 

“had the obstruction causing injury to a police officer, possession of cocaine” and 

received seven months “in jail on that.” “Then soon after getting out [Webb] 

violated a domestic violence injunction by apparently right after he was charged 

[he] went to the victim’s house [and] threw a brick through her window.” 

¶26 The trial court then stated: “I don’t know when he is going to wake 

up. He gets sent to prison for eighteen months and then this happens. He 

obviously is not learning.” It then explained “[s]o the goals of my sentence here 

are protection of the community. That’s a priority because of his criminal record, 

deterrence of [Webb] is very, very strong in terms of the goals.” 

¶27 Webb further argues that the trial court placed undue weight on an 

improper factor, namely his lack of remorse. We disagree. Although the failure to 

express remorse “can be used at sentencing only if it is one amongst other factors, 

and it receives no undue consideration,” Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶49, based on the 

trial court’s reasoning at the time of sentencing and in its decision denying Webb’s 
No. 2019AP1787-CR

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postconviction motion, it is obvious from the record that the trial court considered 

a wide range of factors in imposing Webb’s sentence. Webb’s lack of remorse 

was far from the determining factor in the trial court’s decision.

¶28 We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not erroneously 

exercise its discretion when imposing Webb’s sentence.

CONCLUSION

¶29 In sum, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s verdict, and that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 

regarding Webb’s sentence.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.