J. A03015/16

2016 PA Super 102

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

v. :

:

JERMAINE LANCIT :

Appellant : No. 2238 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered July 31, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division No.: MC-51-CR-0035498-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY,J., and DUBOW, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 18, 2016

Appellant, Jermaine Lancit, appeals from the order entered July 31, 

2014, in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, denying his Petition for 

Writ of Certiorari. After careful review, we agree that the Law of the Case 

Doctrine barred a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, acting in an 

appellate capacity, from granting a Writ of Certiorari to overrule another 

judge of coequal jurisdiction. We therefore affirm.

The trial court stated the relevant facts and procedural history as 

follows:

On December 18, 2013, the Honorable Felice Stack of the 

Municipal Court granted a Motion to Suppress in this matter for 

lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to pat down the 

Defendant. On January 17, 2014, the Commonwealth appealed 

Judge Stack's decision, submitting that the findings were "in 

clear error." On March 28, 2014, the Honorable Joan Brown of 

the Court of Common Pleas granted the Commonwealth's 
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appeal, finding the lower court's decision to be erroneous and 

reversed the Motion to Suppress. On April 14, 2014, the 

Defendant pled not guilty in front of the Honorable Robert Blasi 

and was found guilty following a stipulated trial on the facts. On 

the same day, the Defendant was sentenced to twelve (12) 

months of reporting probation.

The Defendant filed a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Common 

Pleas on May 5, 2014, stating that Judge Brown erred in 

reversing the Municipal Court's suppression decision. [The 

Honorable Thomas Street, sitting in the Philadelphia Court of 

Common Pleas,] initially agreed with the Municipal Court thereby 

granting the Writ of Certiorari and reversing Judge Brown's 

previous decision on July 8, 2014. On July 10, 2014, the 

Commonwealth filed a Motion to Reconsider the Order granting 

the Defendant's Writ of Certiorari [to which the Defendant 

responded]. On July 31, 2014, [Judge Street] granted the 

Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider and vacated [the] prior 

order that granted the Defendant's Writ of Certiorari.

Supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, dated 5/8/15, at 1-2. 

On August 1, 2014, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. 

Appellant frames the issue on appeal as follows:

Was it not error for the Court of Common Pleas judge, sitting as 

a post-trial en banc court of review on [A]ppellant’s petition for 

writ of certiorari to the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, to 

determine that it could not review a pre-trial suppression ruling 

made interlocutorily by a different judge of the same Court of 

Common Pleas?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.1 

 

1 We expressly reject Appellant’s unsubstantiated assertion that Judge Street 

acted with the powers of an en banc panel. Although Appellant is correct 

that an en banc panel is not barred from revisiting the ruling of a single 

member of the same court, Appellant does not cite any statute or case law 

vesting en banc power in a single judge sitting on the Court of Common 

Pleas hearing an appeal from Municipal Court. 
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Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement and brief to this Court do not argue the 

merits of the underlying stop or ask this Court to review Judge Brown’s 

ruling on the Motion to Suppress. Thus, the only issue properly before this 

Court is whether Judge Street had the authority to review Judge Brown’s 

ruling on the Motion to Suppress. Accordingly, the issue before us pertains 

to the applicability of the Law of the Case Doctrine. 

Whether the Law of the Case Doctrine precludes review in a given 

situation is a pure question of law. Jones v. Rivera, 866 A.2d 1148, 1150 

(Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Durante v. Pennsylvania State Police, 809 A.2d 

369, 371 (Pa. 2002). Therefore, our standard of review is de novo. Id.

Pennsylvania’s well-established Law of the Case Doctrine bars a judge 

from revisiting rulings previously decided by another judge of the same 

court, absent exceptional circumstances. Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 

A.2d 1326, 1333 (Pa. 1995). The Law of the Case Doctrine is an important 

tool of judicial efficiency that “serves to protect the expectations of the 

parties, to insure uniformity of decisions, to maintain consistency in 

proceedings, to effectuate the administration of justice, and to bring finality 

to the litigation.” Zane v. Friends Hosp., 575 Pa. 236, 243, 836 A.2d 25, 

29 (2003).

Three “related but distinct” rules comprise the Law of the Case 

Doctrine:

(1) upon remand for further proceedings, a trial court may not 

alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the 
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appellate court in the matter; (2) upon a second appeal, an 

appellate court may not alter the resolution of a legal 

question previously decided by the same appellate court; 

and (3) upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of 

coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court may not alter 

the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the 

transferor trial court.

Starr, supra at 1331 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

When a defendant who is convicted in Philadelphia Municipal Court files 

a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, “the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 

sits as an appellate court.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 

1118-19 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted). 

Ignoring the appellate nature of the Court of Common Pleas in this 

case, Appellant urges us to recognize a pre-trial / post-trial distinction 

between the judges of the Court of Common Pleas in this case. He avers 

there is a well-established authority that post-trial courts can overrule pretrial courts. He further argues that in the instant case, Judge Street sat as a 

post-trial appellate court with some extra-appellate power beyond that of 

Judge Brown as a pre-trial appellate court. Appellant’s assertions are 

without foundation in law, and his argument – that Judge Brown’s review of 

the case should be understood solely as a post-sentence review – is 

unpersuasive. 

As our Supreme Court has made clear, an appellate court may not 

alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the same 

appellate court. See Starr, supra at 1331. The procedural posture of this 
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case falls squarely within the Law of the Case Doctrine governing second 

appeals to the same appellate court. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 

125 A.3d 425, 431 (Pa. Super. 2015) (noting that, under the Law of the 

Case Doctrine, an appellant convicted in Municipal Court after his motion to 

suppress was denied by the Court of Common Pleas in an interlocutory 

appeal would be “legally prohibited from asking the [Court of Common 

Pleas] to overrule another judge of the [Court of Common Pleas].”) 

(emphasis in original).

When Judge Stack, sitting in Municipal Court, granted Appellant’s 

Motion to Suppress, the Commonwealth properly sought an appeal in the 

Court of Common Pleas. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1005. Judge Brown, sitting in 

the Court of Common Pleas in an appellate capacity, then reversed the 

suppression order. Appellant was then tried and convicted back in Municipal 

Court. Appellant properly filed a Writ of Certiorari in the Court of Common 

Pleas, where Judge Street sat in the same appellate capacity. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1006(1)(b) (giving the defendant the option of seeking either 

certiorari or a trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas following a 

conviction in Municipal Court). 

We find that Judge Street properly determined that Judge Brown 

“already acted in an appellate role . . . for purposes of the suppression 

motion” and that Judge Street was therefore “barred from reversing another 
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judge similarly seated when the issues and facts remain unchanged.” 

Supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, dated 5/8/15, at 7. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/18/2016