1 I have incorporated portions of the Magistrate Judge’s

February 8, 2005 preliminary review order (Doc. No. 5) in

describing the background facts. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Daniel Small

v. Case No. 04-cv-405-PB

Opinion No. 2006 DNH 134

Bruce Cattell, Warden,

New Hampshire State Prison

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Daniel Small has filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus challenging his conviction on over 100 different grounds. 

Small and Bruce Cattall, Warden of the New Hampshire State

Prison, have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Because I

determine that all of Small’s claims are all either procedurally

barred or without merit, I deny his motion for summary judgment

and grant the Warden’s cross-motion. 

I. BACKGROUND1

A. The Temporary Protective Order

In June of 2000, Small served divorce papers on his thenCase 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 1 of 24
2 Exhibits (“Ex.”) referenced are those attached to Small’s

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 9); page

references correspond to the electronic filings in the U.S.

District Court. References to the state trial transcript are as

follows: “T1" through “T3" are the three volumes of trial

transcript from June 5, 7, and 10, 2002; “TM1" and “TM2" are the

two volumes of hearing transcript from Small’s post-conviction

motions heard on March 16, 2004 and April 16, 2004 in

Hillsborough County Superior Court. 

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wife, Donna. Shortly thereafter, Donna obtained a Temporary

Protective Order (“TPO”), pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

(“RSA”) § 173:B, from the Goffstown District Court. The TPO

restricted Small’s contact with both Donna and their children.

Jurisdiction over the TPO was later transferred to the

Hillsborough County Superior Court, where Small’s divorce

action was pending. 

By agreement of the parties, the Hillsborough County

Superior Court amended the TPO in November 2000. The amended

order stated that “[t]he domestic violence order entered by the

Goffstown District Court on July 11, 2000 shall remain in full

force and effect” except with respect to its visitation

conditions. Ex. 4 at 26-29.2 A final hearing on the TPO was

scheduled to be heard with the divorce action on January 30,

2001. 

On January 30, 2001, the Hillsborough County Superior Court

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granted Small’s request to continue the hearing for both the TPO

and divorce to allow the state to comply with orders directing it

to provide tapes and/or transcripts of a 911 dispatch that was

relevant to the issuance of the TPO. Continuing the case to June

26, 2001, the court stated that “[p]ending further order of the

Court, the Temporary Domestic Violence orders . . . shall

continue in full force and effect.” Ex. 6 at 6-7. Small’s

counsel subsequently learned that the evidence from the 911

dispatch had been destroyed in the normal course of events,

despite court orders to produce it. On its own motion, the

Hillsborough County Superior Court again continued the TPO and

divorce hearing to January 8, 2002. Id. at 8. 

On October 17, 2001, and again a week later, Small was

accused of violating the TPO by following Donna’s car at close

range, pulling in front of Donna’s car, gesturing to Donna with

his middle finger, and following a car driven by Donna’s daughter

from a previous marriage at close range with his high beam

headlights activated. These events are described in detail in

the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s opinion affirming Small’s

conviction. See State v. Small, 150 N.H. 457, 458-60 (2004). 

At this time, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 3 of 24
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database had not yet been updated to reflect the continued effect

of the TPO. Rather, an outdated record showed that the TPO was

scheduled to expire on June 26, 2001, one year from the date it

issued. On November 6, 2001, after reviewing his files on the

matter, County Attorney Andrew Ouellette caused the NCIC database

to be updated to reflect the continuing effect of the TPO. On

November 7, 2001, Small was arrested for violating the TPO and

ultimately charged with six counts of felony stalking.

B. The Trial

Small based his defense to the stalking charge in part on

his claim that Ouellette had acted improperly in causing

modifications to be made to the NCIC database. Prior to and

during his trial, Small sought, but apparently did not receive,

evidence from the state supporting his theory that the NCIC

database had been improperly altered. 

Following the state’s case in chief, Small moved for a

directed verdict, claiming the state had presented insufficient

evidence to support the charge. T2 at 23-39. Specifically, he

argued that: (1) the TPO was not valid in October of 2001; (2)

the state could not prove an essential element of the charge,

namely that he lacked a legitimate purpose to be at the location

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where the alleged stalking occurred; and (3) one of the alleged

victims in the case, Donna’s daughter, was not protected by the

TPO even if it was valid because she was not a member of Donna’s

household. The trial court denied Small’s motion on these

grounds but allowed Small’s trial counsel, Dawn Caradonna, to

argue the issues to the jury. T2 at 26-39. 

At the close of evidence, Small asked the court to instruct

the jury that it must find that the TPO remained in effect on the

date in question and that it must find that Small lacked a 

legitimate purpose to be at the location in question. The trial

court declined Small’s requests, and again told Small’s counsel

that she could argue these points to the jury. 

On June 10, 2002, a jury convicted Small of six counts of

stalking. He was sentenced to three to six years in the New

Hampshire state prison, with an additional three- to six-year

suspended sentence. 

C. The Direct Appeal

Small, represented by a new counsel, took a direct

appeal from his conviction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court

affirmed his conviction in January 2004. See Small, 150 N.H. at

457. The court held, in pertinent part, that Small was

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procedurally barred from collaterally challenging the protective

order in his criminal proceeding because he had failed to

challenge his divorce case. The New Hampshire Supreme Court

denied rehearing on March 25, 2004. 

D. Post Conviction Motions

Small filed numerous post-conviction motions in the

Hillsborough County Superior Court, including a motion to recuse

the trial judge, a motion for discovery, a motion to set aside

the verdict, a motion for a new trial based on new evidence, and

a motion for services other than counsel. Among other things,

Small alleged judicial misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct,

failure to adequately notify him of a jury question or the

Court’s response thereto, failure to make a record of the jury

question and response thereto, falsification and destruction of

evidence, witness tampering by both the prosecution and defense

counsel, and illegal enhancement of the charges.

In March and April of 2004, the Hillsborough County Superior

Court held a hearing on several issues. Small was given “full

and unfettered opportunity, without time constraints, to present

anything that he might so desire, as well as the opportunity to

call any witnesses that he desired. He called only one witness,

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 6 of 24
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Lt. Ernest Belletete of the Peterborough Police Department.” Ex.

5 at 37. Belletete testified that in his initial report he

concluded that Small had not violated the TPO, but that he later

discovered he was mistaken as to the terms of the TPO and that

Small had in fact violated the order. TM2 at 54. Small’s

motions were all denied. Proceeding pro se, he appealed this

denial to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which declined to

accept his appeal. Other post-conviction litigation in the state

trial court resulted in two additional pro se notices of appeal,

neither of which were accepted for consideration by the New

Hampshire Supreme Court. 

Small subsequently filed another motion for a new trial in

the trial court, citing the discovery of new evidence,

ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to record the jury

instructions, the jury question issues raised previously, a

charging document issue, prosecutorial and judicial misconduct,

improper penalty enhancement, jury instruction issues, severance

of the charges, and sufficiency of the evidence. His motion was

again denied without a hearing on August 28, 2004. Small did not

appeal from this ruling because he believed that the appeal would

have been futile.

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E. Federal Habeas Petition

Small filed the instant petition in October 2004, raising

more than 100 claims, which broadly assert violations of his

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. No.

3) The Magistrate Judge stayed the case in February 2005 pending

exhaustion of certain unexhausted claims. (Doc. No. 5) Small

then returned to state court and filed a motion for a new trial

in the superior court. The motion was unsuccessful and Small

appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which again declined

to accept his appeal. 

Small filed an amended petition in this court in November

2005, including all of his original habeas claims and 27

additional claims. (Doc. No. 9) The Magistrate Judge again

determined Small had filed a mixed petition with numerous

unexhausted claims and recommended dismissal. In response, Small

waived his unexhausted claims and now proceeds with his exhausted

claims. See Doc. Nos. 10-12.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Small’s habeas corpus petition is governed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28

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U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (1996). Under AEDPA, I may only grant

habeas relief if I find that the state court adjudication

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. See

also Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2004).

Under the “contrary to” prong, the petition may be granted

if the state court “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Id. at 80 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412-13 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong, the petition may

be granted only if the state court “identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Horton, 370 F.3d at 80 (quoting Williams, 529

U.S. at 413) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To be an

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 9 of 24
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unreasonable application of governing law, the state court’s

determination must not only be incorrect but also be objectively

unreasonable.” Id. “In other words, if the petition presents a

close call, it must be rejected, even if the state court was

wrong.” Id. “If, however, the petition presents a federal claim

that was raised before the state court but was left unresolved,

AEDPA’s strict standards do not apply” and the court will review

the claim de novo. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Before me today are cross motions for summary judgment on

the 69 exhausted claims in Small’s amended petition. These

claims fall into four distinct categories: (1) constitutional

violations based on Small’s challenge to the validity and

duration of the TPO; (2) Sixth Amendment violations allegedly

caused by ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment violations allegedly caused by prosecutorial

misconduct; and (4) Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment violations

allegedly caused by judicial bias or misconduct. I address each

of these claims in turn. 

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 10 of 24
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A. The Temporary Protective Order

Small bases 42 of his 69 claims on his contention that the

restraining order he was convicted of violating expired prior to

the date of the charged conduct. He alleges that the county

attorney, trial judge, several police officers and his own

attorney conspired against him by fabricating an extension of the

TPO in order to establish probable cause for his arrest as

retribution for complaints he had made against several police

officers. As evidence of this conspiracy, he points to County

Attorney Ouellette’s November 2001 act of modifying the NCIC

records to reflect the continuing validity of the TPO as amended

by the Hillsborough County Superior Court. 

It is a basic principle of habeas corpus law that “if a

state court decision rests on the adequate and independent state 

ground of procedural default, then federal habeas review is

unavailable absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a showing

that a miscarriage of justice will otherwise result.” 

McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2002). Procedural

default can only be an adequate and independent basis for

affirming a petitioner’s conviction if it is a rule that is

“consistently or regularly applied.” See Gunter v. Maloney, 291

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F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2002). In order to prove prejudice, a

habeas corpus petitioner must establish a “reasonable

probability” of a different result at trial. See Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289-90 (1999). 

On Small’s direct appeal of his conviction, the New

Hampshire Supreme Court held that Small was procedurally barred

from collaterally challenging the protective order in his

criminal proceeding because he had never challenged it in the 

underlying divorce proceeding. Small, 150 N.H. at 461. Small

offers no proof that this rule is inconsistently or irregularly

applied. See Gunter, 291 F.3d at 79. As for cause, Small argues

that because the TPO expired by operation of law one year after

its June 26, 2000 issuance, he had no reason to challenge its

duration or expiration until after he was arrested for violating

its terms on November 7, 2001. Small’s contention, however,

conflicts with (1) the Hillsborough County Superior Court’s clear

orders continuing the TPO “in full force and effect” pending a

final divorce decree, and (2) Small’s own signature on the

amended order acknowledging the same. See Ex. 4, 6. Similarly,

Small has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a

different result at trial had he raised this argument there

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 12 of 24
3 Even assuming arguendo that Small’s claim had been

preserved, I still could not review it because “it is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). It is beyond dispute that the validity

and duration of a restraining order issued by a state court under

a state statute are issues of state law. After a lengthy hearing

on Small’s post-conviction motion for a new trial, the

Hillsborough County Superior Court reviewed the evidence and held

as a matter of state law that “the domestic violence restraining

order remained in effect by operation of law at the time of the

alleged crimes.” Ex. 5 at 40. The New Hampshire Supreme Court

declined to accept Small’s appeal. That ends the matter. 

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because the extension of the TPO is clear on the face of the

court orders extending it. See Ex. 4, 6. Moreover, a notation

in an NCIC record has no bearing on the validity or duration of a

restraining order, it merely logs the order in a searchable

database. Absent cause or prejudice, I see no miscarriage of

justice in denying further review.3

For the reasons stated, I grant defendant’s motion on all of

Small’s claims challenging the validity or duration of the

restraining order; the state’s correction of a clerical error in

the NCIC records; and allegations of misconduct against the

prosecutor, judge, police officers, and Small’s attorney related

to the validity of the protective order. This includes the

following claims: 22, 39-49, 51-52, 57-58, 60-62, 66-71, 74, 78-

85, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 108, 126, 129.

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 13 of 24
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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Small bases 12 of his claims on his contention that his

attorney violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

effective assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant claiming a

Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance violation must establish

“(1) that counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528

U.S. 470, 476-77 (2000) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). To show prejudice, Small must establish

that there was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Because Small’s

claims of ineffective assistance were denied without a hearing by

the superior court, I review them de novo. 

In claims 7, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113 and 117, Small

contends his counsel was ineffective because she failed to adhere

to his desired trial strategy of charging the state with

misconduct, prejudice and retaliatory prosecution, and for

failing to present specific evidence to support that theory. To

the extent Caradonna strayed from Small’s desired strategy, it

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was within her purview as trial counsel to make tactical

judgments about the case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Tactical trial decisions include not only the broad theory of the

case, but also which witnesses to call and what evidence to

present. See id. Accordingly, the following claims fail because

Small cannot show the Caradonna’s performance was deficient: 7,

117 (failure to adhere to desired trial strategy); 105, 113

(failure to call particular fact and character witnesses); 107,

109, 112 (failure to publish/present certain evidence); 111

(failure to impeach police officer regarding destruction of 911

tapes).

In claim 114, Small contends Caradonna was ineffective

because she failed to withdraw from the case despite a known

conflict of interest, and that her failure to withdraw denied him

access to a witness. Small seems to refer to an alleged attempt

by Caradonna to contact Small’s daughter indirectly by asking her

own daughter to pass along a note to Small’s daughter at the

school they both attend. Donna Small testified to this effect at

Small’s January 2, 2002 sentencing on a prior charge. Caradonna

denied the allegation and the trial judge found no impropriety. 

Ex. 7 at 19. 

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This claim fails both because Caradonna’s actions do not

amount to ineffective assistance and Small has failed to show

prejudice. Although Small asserts a violation of his right to

conflict-free representation, the conduct he cites does not

support his conflict of interest claim. While it may have been

unwise to seek contact with Small’s daughter in the manner

alleged, it does not give rise to a conflict of interest on

Caradonna’s part even if Small’s claims are true. Furthermore,

to the extent this matter denied Small access to his daughter as

a trial witness, as he claims, I see no prejudice because Small

has failed to demonstrate that her testimony would have been

favorable to his defense. 

In claim 119, Small contends that Caradonna was ineffective

because she failed to tell him of an unrelated professional

conduct complaint against her which was then pending before the

New Hampshire Professional Conduct Committee. The matter Small

refers to was unrelated to Small’s case and the complaint was

dropped shortly after his trial. It had no bearing on her

representation of him. Therefore, it cannot serve as the basis

for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 16 of 24
4 Claim 63 is completely meritless or too undeveloped for

review. 

-17-

I also grant defendant’s motion on claim 37 (performance

below minimum standard) and claim 122 (failure to report

prosecutor’s pre-arrest involvement) because Small has failed to

allege facts sufficient to support either claim.

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct4

Small asserts several claims of prosecutorial misconduct, 

alleging improper destruction of exculpatory 911 tapes, failure

to turn over other exculpatory materials, and failure to present

a contradictory witness statement to the jury. To prevail on a

claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Small must show a

prosecutorial error so severe as to deprive him of a fair trial. 

See Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 148 (1st Cir.

2003). 

In claim 64, Small argues that the prosecutor improperly

denied him exculpatory evidence in violation of due process where

the police destroyed the tapes of the 911 calls that led to the

issuance of the TPO. It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant

has a due process right to request and receive exculpatory

evidence that the government possesses. Olszewski v. Spencer,

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5 In any event, Small does not explain how the destroyed

evidence could have been exculpatory. 

 I also grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

claims 103 and 104 alleging judicial misconduct by Justice Barry

with respect to his handling of the missing tapes. Because the

underlying substantive argument is without merit, these claims of

improper judicial activity also must fail.

-18-

No. 05-1833, 2006 WL 2988662, at *6 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2006)

(citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). In order to

establish a claim that the state violated this constitutional

right by losing or destroying potentially exculpatory evidence,

Small must demonstrate that the state acted in bad faith. 

Olszewski, 2006 WL 2988662, at *6 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood,

488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)). Here, the superior court judge who

reviewed Small’s post-conviction motions concluded that the state

did not act in bad faith when it destroyed the 911 tapes as a

part of its routine practices. Ex. 5 at 37-38. I have no reason

to question this finding.5 

In claims 65 and 72, Small broadly asserts that the

prosecutor denied him due process by failing to turn over other

unspecified exculpatory information, including statements and

notes in police records and the grand jury “evidence packet.” In

order to prove this claim, Small must show (1) that the evidence

at issue is favorable to him because it is either exculpatory or

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 18 of 24
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impeaching, (2) the State suppressed the evidence either

willfully or inadvertently, and (3) prejudice ensued. Strickler,

527 U.S. at 281-82. A general objection that the prosecutor

failed to hand over exculpatory material, without more, is not

sufficient to support this claim. 

With respect to most of the police record claims, Small has

failed to show that the evidence he sought could be exculpatory

or impeaching. To the extent Small makes this threshold showing

with respect to Lt. Belletete’s initial mistaken report that

Small did not violate the TPO, his claim still fails because he

cannot prove prejudice. This is so even though Small called Lt.

Belletete as a witness at his post-conviction hearing and

thoroughly questioned him regarding the report and Lt.

Belletete’s change of opinion. Small’s related claim, that the

prosecutor failed to turn over the grand jury “evidence packet,”

fails because there is no categorical right to grand jury

information absent some showing that such material might be

exculpatory. See State v. Silva, 142 N.H. 269, 271-71 (1997). 

Small has made no such showing. Accordingly, claims 65 and 72

fail. 

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 19 of 24
6 Claims 91, 98 and 100 are completely meritless or too

undeveloped for review. In either case, they do not warrant

discussion. 

-20-

In claim 53, Small argues that the prosecutor violated his

right to due process by failing to present contradictory witness

statements to the jury after Small requested them. Small appears

to be referring to his demand of the prosecutor, during the

prosecutor’s cross examination of Small, that the prosecutor show

the jury an earlier police report. The prosecutor was under no

duty to comply with Small’s demands. Thus, claim 53 fails. 

D. Judicial Bias or Misconduct6

In several claims, Small contends that Superior Court

Justice Barry violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

by serving as his trial judge despite being biased against him. 

To show a due process violation due to a trial judge’s lack of

impartiality, Small must prove either that the judge was actually

biased against him or that the appearance of bias was sufficient

to establish a conclusive presumption of bias. See, e.g., Bracy

v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997); U.S. v. Lopez, 944 F.2d

33, 37 (1st Cir. 1991). Justice Barry reviewed Small’s

allegations of judicial bias and misconduct at Small’s postCase 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 20 of 24
7 Arguably, this claim is barred here, as are all of

Small’s claims challenging the validity of the TPO and NCIC

modification. See supra. 

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conviction motion for a new trial and recusal in March and April

2004 and denied the motions. As I explain in greater detail

below, I conclude that Justice Barry’s rulings were neither

contrary to, nor unreasonable in light of Supreme Court precedent

or the evidence presented. 

In claim 88, Small alleges that Justice Barry revealed his 

prejudice against Small prior to and during trial. He seems to

base this generalized complaint on Justice Barry’s rulings on the

validity of the restraining order and the propriety of the

State’s modification of the NCIC records.7 “[O]pinions formed by

the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in

the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,

do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless

they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540,

555 (1994). Small has failed to make such a showing here. 

In claim 89 and 90, Small claims that Justice Barry’s

acquaintance with one of the state’s witnesses and alleged

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 21 of 24
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victims caused him to be bias against Small. Specifically, Small

complains of Justice Barry’s alleged 20-year friendship with

police officer Thomas Thibeault. I disagree with Small and

reject these claims. Small misconstrues both the alleged

relationship and the nature of Thibeault’s involvement in this

case. As for the relationship, it was a bare acquaintance from

20 years prior, when Justice Barry knew Thibeault as an office

boy at the Union leader while Justice Barry’s private law firm

represented the newspaper. Ex. 5 at 38-39. Justice Barry

explained this in both his post-conviction order denying Small’s

motion to recuse on this basis and in a letter to the Committee

on Judicial Conduct. As Justice Barry noted, “‘such innocuous

and isolated contact does not form the basis upon which a

reasonable person would question the impartiality of the judge.’” 

Ex. 5 at 39 (quoting State v. Whittey, 149 N.H. 463, 466 (2003)). 

Furthermore, contrary to Small’s assertion, Thibeault was not a

witness in the stalking case upon which he bases his habeas

petition, but rather the victim in a previous criminal

threatening case arising from an incident when Thibeault

responded to a complaint by Donna Small. Ex. 5 at 38-39, T1 24-

25. For the reasons stated, I conclude that Justice Barry’s

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8 Small is barred from transforming this argument into an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim because this court

already dismissed that claim as unexhausted. See Doc. No. 10 at

6 (discussing claim No. 116). 

-23-

denial of Small’s motion to recuse for bias was proper.

In claim 86, Small complains that Justice Barry denied him a

fair trial and due process by failing to record a jury question

during deliberations and his answer thereto. This claims fails

because the burden was on Small to request that such jury

question be preserved. See State v. Bergmann, 135 N.H. 97, 99

(1991). Small has failed to show that he requested the

now-desired record.8

Claim 92, alleging an excessive sentence, also fails. The

sentence Small received was not the kind of “grossly

disproportionate” sentence that warrants habeas corpus relief. 

See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (holding state

court imposition of two consecutive 25-year to life sentences for

“third strike” convictions on two counts of petty theft did not

violate AEDPA standard). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, I grant defendant’s motion for

Case 1:04-cv-00405-PB Document 23 Filed 11/28/06 Page 23 of 24
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summary judgment (Doc. No. 19) on all claims, deny Small’s

amended motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 20), and deny

Small’s amended habeas corpus petition (Doc. No. 9). 

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

November 28, 2006

cc: Daniel Small, pro se

Nicholas Cort, Esq.

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