COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Lemons∗

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

EDDIE LEE GILLS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗∗ BY 

v. Record No. 0584-99-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 JULY 5, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 

 Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge 

 Steven D. Benjamin (Betty Layne DesPortes; 

Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 ∗

 Justice Lemons participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme 

Court of Virginia. 

∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Eddie Lee Gills was convicted following a bench trial of 

feloniously driving after having been declared an habitual 

offender, a second or subsequent offense, in violation of Code 

§ 46.2-357. On appeal, Gills argues that the trial court erred 

by admitting the certified copy of a district court warrant, 

with certain dispositional notations thereon, as evidence of a 

prior habitual offender violation. He contends that the 
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notations on the warrant are insufficient to support the 

conviction because they do not prove a prior conviction of 

driving after having been declared an habitual offender. We 

agree that the notations on the warrant are insufficient to 

prove a prior conviction of driving after having been declared 

an habitual offender. Accordingly, we reverse the habitual 

offender conviction as a second or subsequent offense and remand 

the case to the trial court for sentencing as a first offense 

under Code § 46.2-357. 

BACKGROUND

 On review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, the prevailing party, and grant to it all 

reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See

Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 225 Va. 516, 521, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 

(1998). On October 18, 1997, Gills was arrested and charged 

with feloniously driving after having been declared an habitual 

offender, a second or subsequent offense. At trial, the 

Commonwealth introduced a certified copy of an order of the 

Circuit Court for Stafford County to prove that Gills had been 

declared an habitual offender. The Commonwealth also proffered 

a certified copy of a warrant from a district court proceeding 

as evidence that Gills had previously been convicted of driving 

after being declared an habitual offender in violation of Code 
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§ 46.2-357(B)(1).1 Gills, relying on the holding in McBride v. 

Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 30, 34-35, 480 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1997), 

objected to the introduction of the warrant. He argued that the 

warrant failed to indicate the offense of which he was 

convicted; thus, it failed to prove that he had been convicted 

of driving after having been declared an habitual offender in 

violation of Code § 46.2-357(B)(1). The trial court admitted 

the evidence, finding that McBride was factually distinguishable 

from the instant case. The Commonwealth offered no other 

evidence to prove the prior conviction. 

ANALYSIS

 Gills argues that the trial court erred by admitting the 

warrant as evidence of his prior conviction because the warrant 

 1

 The relevant portion of the warrant, which charged Gills 

with driving in Stafford County on February 14, 1997, after 

having been declared an habitual offender, also showed the 

following: 

 The Accused Pleaded: 

 ____ not guilty 

 ____ nolo contendere 

 X guilty 

 And was TRIED and FOUND by me: 

 ____ not guilty 

 ____ guilty as charged 

 ____ guilty of _____________ 

The warrant also contained notations that Gills was present and 

represented by counsel and that the judge imposed a $300 fine 

and a ninety day jail sentence with sixty days suspended for 

three years conditioned upon good behavior and keeping the 

peace. 
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was irrelevant, incompetent, and insufficient to prove the prior 

violation, an element which the Commonwealth was required to 

prove under the statute. Gills argues that, although the 

notation on the warrant indicates that Gills pled guilty and was 

sentenced, the warrant fails to indicate that Gills was found 

guilty of the charged offense. 

 Despite the Commonwealth's assertion that Gills failed to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence below, we find that 

Gills preserved the issue for appeal. See Rule 5A:18; see also

Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 434, 357 S.E.2d 742, 743 

(1987). As a basis for objecting to the admissibility of the 

warrant for the prior offense, Gills expressly relied on the 

holding in McBride. Gills discussed the holding in McBride and 

its applicability to this case. He argued that based on the 

warrant, "there's no indication that he was convicted of having 

been declared a habitual offender, a misdemeanor, which is a 

prerequisite and a necessary element of the charge that he is 

now facing in court." Although the trial court factually 

distinguished McBride and overruled the objection, the trial 

court was fully aware of the nature of Gills' objection and was 

aware that Gills was challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Thus, the issue was preserved for appeal. 

 "As with all elements of a crime, the burden is on the 

Commonwealth to prove the prior conviction beyond a reasonable 
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doubt." McBride, 24 Va. App. at 33, 480 S.E.2d at 123. "The most 

efficient way to prove the prior . . . conviction is to offer in 

evidence an authenticated copy of the prior conviction." Essex v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 168, 171, 442 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1994). 

 Here, Gills was charged with the felony of driving after 

having been declared an habitual offender, a second or subsequent 

offense, in violation of Code § 46.2-357. An element of the crime 

which the Commonwealth had to prove was a previous conviction for 

driving after having been declared an habitual offender. 

"Evidence which 'tends to cast any light upon the subject of the 

inquiry' is relevant" and admissible, unless excluded by some 

other principle or rule of law or by statute. Cash v. 

Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 506, 510, 364 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1988); see

also Crews v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 115, 118, 442 S.E.2d 407, 

409 (1994) (finding that the admissibility of evidence is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion); Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. 

App. 188, 196, 361 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1987) (stating that the 

general rule for the admissibility of evidence is that it be 

relevant and material). Therefore, under the general rule, a 

warrant that shows that the defendant has been previously charged 

and convicted of driving after having been declared an habitual 

offender is relevant and admissible. Although the warrant was 

admissible, Gills contends the warrant and the notation thereon 

were insufficient to establish the prior conviction. Gills argues 
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that the warrant merely shows that he was charged with a violation 

of Code § 46.2-357 and that he pled guilty and was sentenced. 

Thus, he contends it does not prove that the court found him 

guilty of the charged offense as opposed to a lesser or 

lesser-included offense. The Commonwealth, citing Savino v. 

Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 539, 391 S.E.3d 276, 278 (1990), argues 

that a plea of guilty is a self-executing conviction and that the 

presumption of regularity justified the trial court's conclusion 

that Gills pled guilty to the charged offense. 

 We find that this case is controlled by our holding in 

McBride. In McBride, the defendant was convicted of a second 

offense of driving under the influence. At trial, the 

Commonwealth introduced a certified copy of an arrest warrant, 

indicating that the defendant was charged with previously 

violating Code § 18.2-266. The warrant contained a printed form 

upon which the district court had reported the proceedings. The 

form indicated that the defendant was charged, pled not guilty, 

and was sentenced. However, the form was blank in the space where 

the court is to designate whether the defendant was tried and 

found guilty of the charged offense. The Commonwealth offered no 

other evidence to prove a prior conviction. The defendant moved 

to strike the evidence, arguing that the evidence did not prove 

that he had been previously convicted of violating Code 
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§ 18.2-266. The trial court denied the motion and found the 

defendant guilty of the second offense. 

 We reversed McBride's conviction, finding that the evidence 

was insufficient to prove that he had been previously convicted of 

violating Code § 18.2-266. We found that the warrant from the 

previous proceeding failed to prove that the defendant was 

convicted of the charged offense, rather than some other offense 

or a lesser-included offense. Moreover, we declined to infer or 

speculate the nature of the actual judgment of conviction based on 

the sentence imposed by the trial court. 

 "It is the firmly established law of this Commonwealth that a 

trial court speaks only through its written orders." Davis v. 

Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996) (citation 

omitted). Here, the warrant proffered by the Commonwealth 

indicated only that Gills was charged with violating Code 

§ 46.2-357(B)(1), that he pled guilty at that proceeding, and that 

he was sentenced. The warrant contained no notation indicating of 

what offense Gills was convicted. Often charges are amended or a 

defendant is permitted to plead guilty to a reduced charge other 

than the charged offense. So that district court judges will not 

have to prepare dispositional orders for each case, the Supreme 

Court provides pre-printed forms on the warrants which contain 

blocks or blanks that enable judges to specify, by merely checking 

the section or filling in a blank, the disposition of a case, the 
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offense of which the accused is found guilty, and the amount of a 

fine and/or jail sentence. Moreover "every act of a court of 

competent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly 

done, till the contrary appears." Nicely v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. 

App. 579, 584, 490 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1997) (internal quotation and 

citation omitted). But, we apply a presumption of regularity 

where a proceeding appears in all respects regular on its face and 

some procedural issue is being challenged, such as whether a 

defendant was represented by counsel in a prior conviction. The 

presumption does not apply where the proceeding is irregular on 

its face, in that it fails to specify the offense for which a 

defendant was convicted. In the absence of a notation or 

specification on the warrant stating the offense of which Gills 

was convicted, we will not presume or surmise as to the offense of 

which Gills was convicted. 

 Accordingly, we hold that the warrant was insufficient to 

prove the prior conviction. We, therefore, reverse Gills' 

conviction and remand the case to the trial court for 

resentencing. 

 Reversed and remanded.