* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determ ined th at this opinio n should not be published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set fo rth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 11, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-20628 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Pl aint iff-Appellee,

versus GEORGE HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Southern District of Texas (No. 4:05-MC-0073) Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * George Henderson appeals from the di strict court’s enforcement of an administrative
summo ns from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 19, 2004, the IRS served an adm inist rative summons on Henderson to gather evidence related to Henderson’s tax liability for 1999, 2000, and 2001. Henderson did not comply wit h the summo ns, and the Unit ed States sought enforcement of the summo ns in district court. The1 Henderson’s claim th at he is not a cit izen of the Unit ed States is frivo lo us. See, e.g., United

States v. Price , 798 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1986). 2 district court i ssued an enforcement order against Henderson, which he appeals to this court
. Henderson argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction over him and th at his Fift h Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated by the summons. II. DISCUSSION We review both of Henderson’s challenges de novo. See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ. , 213 F.3d 858, 869 (5th Cir. 2000) (de novo review of jurisdictional issues); FDIC v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland , 45 F.3d 969, 977 (5th Cir. 1995) (de novo review of legal issues, including Fift h Amendment challenges). The Unit ed States Di strict Court f or the Southern Di strict of Texas is an Article III court established by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 124. The IRS has authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) to issue an administ rative summo ns in order to “determin[e] the liabilit y of any person fo r any int ernal revenue tax” and to seek enforcement of th at summo ns in federal court under 26 U.S.C. § 7604. Both of these statutes are federal laws that the district court has jurisdiction to consider under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The court had personal jurisdiction over Henderson because of his dom icile in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 1 Thus, the district court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over th e enforcem

ent action brought by the IRS. We also note that the IRS summons was valid under United States v. Powell , 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). See also United States v. Wyatt , 637 F.2d 293, 300 (5th Cir. 1981). The district court’s enforcement of the summo ns did not vio lat e Henderson’s Fift h Amendment right to not incriminat e himself. An administ rative summons implicates the Fifth3

Amendment if it s sole purpose is to build a criminal case. U nited States v. Roundtree , 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Ci

r. 1969). There is no indication that the government’s sole purpose in enforcing t he
summo ns was to gather evidence to bring criminal charges against Henderson; inst ead, the purpose of the summ

ons, parti ally if no t enti

rely, was to assess Henderson’s tax liability. Therefore, the enforcement of the summons did not violate the Fifth Amendment. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.