17-3812 

Chailla v. Navient Department of Education

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 4th day of November, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

AMALYA L. KEARSE,

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

Circuit Judges. 

___________________________________________ 

Florence R. Parker Chailla, Relator, USA, U.S. 

Department of Education, Federal Trade 

Commission, Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau, U.S. Treasury Department, Internal 

Revenue Service, States of California, 

Connecticut, Florida and New York, 

Plaintiffs-Appellant, 

v. 17-3812 

Navient Department of Education; United States 

Department of Education; Navient, (Sallie Mae); 

Michele Ahmad, Navient; Navient Consumer 

Advocate Education Management Corporation; 

Education Management Holdings LLC; 

Educational Credit Management Corp, Inc.; Pam 

Esaw, ECMC Resolution Advocate; Melanie 

Engberg, Navient's Assistant Vice President, 

Compliance Department and Student Assistance 

Foundation, collectively as “the Enterprise”; 
AlliedInterstate; TransWorld Inc.,; LLC Account 

Control Technologies, Inc., collectively as “the 

Agencies”; New York College of Health 

Professions, RezenAkpnar; Steve Haffner; Pacific 

College of Oriental Medicine; Atlantic Institute of 

Oriental Medicine; Canadian College of 

Naturopathic Medicine; Laura Sun, Financial 

Aid Representative of CCNM and University of 

Bridgeport College of Naturopathic Medicine; 

John Doe, Academic Board Director; Professor 

Gaulton; Dr. Zamprino, collectively as 

‘University of Bridgeport College of Naturopathic 

Medicine & Academic Board’ and all Academic 

Institutions as ‘Al,’ New England Association of 

Schools and Colleges; Commission on Institutions 

of Higher Education; Carol Anderson, personally 

and professionally; Barbara Brittingham, 

personally and professionally; National 

Accrediting Agency for Clinical Laboratory 

Sciences; Gwen James-Oriaikhi, personally and 

professionally, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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___________________________________________ 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Florence R. Parker Chailla, 

pro se, Stroudsburg, PA. 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 

(Thompson, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Florence Parker Chailla, proceeding pro se, brought this qui tam action on behalf 

of the United States and California, Connecticut, Florida, and New York under the False Claims 

Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. The district court dismissed the action because she failed 

1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above. 
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to obtain counsel, and Chailla appeals. Chailla also moves in this Court for leave to file under 

seal, to file an oversize brief, to amend the caption, and for injunctive relief. We assume the 

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on 

appeal. 

We review the dismissal of an action for failure to retain counsel de novo. See United 

States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewing grant of a motion 

to dismiss for failure to retain counsel); Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 

(2d Cir. 1983) (affording no deference to a court’s sua sponte dismissal of an action for failure to 

retain counsel). The FCA provides a cause of action against anyone who knowingly submits a 

false or fraudulent claim for payment to the federal government. The government may bring an 

FCA action, or a private citizen, known as a “relator,” may bring a qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3730(a), (b). Such an action is brought “for the person and for the United States Government,” 

and “in the name of the Government.” Id. § 3730(b). 

The right to appear pro se in civil litigation in federal court is guaranteed by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1654, which provides that “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by 

counsel.” However, a person who is not an attorney and is not represented by an attorney “may 

not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 

558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A person [proceeding pro se] must be litigating an interest personal to him.”). 

In Mergent Services, this Court held that a non-attorney relator in an FCA qui tam action cannot 

proceed pro se because, since “the United States remains the real party in interest in qui tam

actions, the case, albeit controlled and litigated by the relator, is not the relator’s own case as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, nor one in which he has an interest personal to him.” 540 F.3d at 
4 

93 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The record lacks any indication that Chailla 

herself is an attorney admitted to the practice of law. The district court therefore did not err in 

dismissing this action after Chailla failed to retain counsel, despite being granted ample 

opportunity to do so. Although Chailla argues on appeal that appointment of counsel was 

warranted, Chailla did not move for appointment of counsel in the district court, and the court was 

not required to sua sponte appoint counsel. 

Chailla argues that the district court erred in dismissing the action without the 

Government’s written consent. We disagree. Although the FCA provides that a qui tam action 

“may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal 

and their reasons for consenting,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), this provision “applies only in cases 

where a plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal of a claim or action brought under the False Claims 

Act, and not where the court orders dismissal,” Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 

1990). 

Chailla’s remaining arguments are also unavailing. She claims that the district court was 

biased against her and that the judge should have recused himself. Contrary to her assertion on 

appeal, however, the court’s decisions were adequately explained, and the timing of the court’s 

decisions does not suggest bias. The court’s adverse rulings also do not establish judicial bias. 

See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never 

constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”). Next, Chailla argues that the defendants 

are liable to her for Hobbs Act and RICO violations, but she did not raise these claims in her 

amended complaint, and there is no basis for this Court to consider these claims for the first time 

on appeal. See In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., Nos. 18-2120 et al., 2019 WL 4127327, at *2 (2d Cir. 
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Aug. 30, 2019) (stating that we do “not permit a party to raise an entirely new claim on appeal”). 

Finally, Chailla’s arguments regarding mootness, sovereign immunity, and timeliness are 

inapposite because the district court dismissed this action solely based on her failure to retain 

counsel. 

We deny Chailla’s motions for leave to file under seal, to file an oversize brief, to amend 

the caption, and for injunctive relief. Contrary to Chailla’s contention, the FCA does not require 

that her filings remain under seal. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (requiring only that the complaint 

in an FCA qui tam action be filed under seal for a period of at least 60 days). Her motion to file 

an oversize brief is moot because she filed a brief that is not oversize; her motion to amend the 

caption to include the U.S. Department of Education as a defendant is moot because it is already a 

defendant in this action; and her request for injunctive relief is moot in light of our decision to 

affirm the judgment. 

We have considered all of Chailla’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and DENY the motions for 

leave to file under seal, to file an oversize brief, to amend the caption, and for injunctive relief. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court