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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46524

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSHUA D. DEWITT,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: January 23, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Jerome County. Hon. John K. Butler, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to suppress and judgment of conviction for trafficking in 

marijuana, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge 

Joshua D. Dewitt appeals from the judgment of conviction for trafficking in marijuana. 

Dewitt argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons set 

forth below, we affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dewitt was charged with trafficking in marijuana, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(1). The 

charges arose after Trooper Marrott observed a vehicle, later determined to be driven by Dewitt,

make two illegal lane changes. Based on the observed violations, Trooper Marrott initiated a 

traffic stop, approached the passenger side of Dewitt’s vehicle, and made contact with Dewitt. 

Trooper Marrott informed Dewitt of the purpose of the stop. Next, the district court found that 

Trooper “Marrott asked Dewitt for his driver’s license, proof of insurance, and vehicle 
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registration. . . . While waiting for Dewitt to produce the requested documents, Marrott asked 

several standard questions about the origin and destination of Dewitt’s trip, and the presence of 

anything illegal in the vehicle.”1 In response to Trooper Marrott’s travel inquiries, Dewitt 

explained that he traveled from Pekin, Illinois to Twin Falls and the drive took twenty-eight 

hours. 

While Dewitt was searching for his documentation, Trooper Marrott inquired regarding 

specific drugs including methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and prescription 

medication. In regard to prescription medication, Dewitt explained that he had a bottle of

amphetamine which was prescribed to him. Next, Dewitt stopped searching for the requested 

documentation, reached in the glove box, retrieved the pill bottle, and handed it to Trooper 

Marrott for his inspection. Thereafter, Dewitt continued to search for his documentation but was

unable to produce a valid registration card. Trooper Marrott told Dewitt to continue searching 

and he would return to his patrol vehicle to run Dewitt’s other information. Upon returning to 

the patrol vehicle, the trooper ran Dewitt’s information through dispatch. While waiting for a 

return call from dispatch, Trooper Marrott used his computer to verify that the drive time from 

Pekin, Illinois to Twin Falls was actually twenty-two hours. By the time Trooper Marrott had 

finished his search regarding the drive time, a second trooper had arrived on scene. Trooper

Marrott informed the second trooper about the stop, removed Dewitt from the vehicle, and ran 

his drug dog around Dewitt’s vehicle. The dog indicated on the vehicle. As a result of the dog’s

indication, Trooper Marrott searched the vehicle and discovered two large duffle bags of 

marijuana. Trooper Marrott advised Dewitt of his Miranda2 rights, asked him various questions, 

and placed him under arrest. 

Based on the results of the vehicle search, the State charged Dewitt with trafficking in 

five pounds or more of marijuana. Dewitt filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a 

result of the search and the statements made after he allegedly invoked his right to counsel. The 

district court held a hearing and ultimately denied Dewitt’s motion to suppress. Consequently, 

Dewitt entered a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in less than five pounds of marijuana, 

Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(1)(A), reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his 

 1 On appeal, Dewitt challenges the district court’s factual findings arguing that “the 

undisputed evidence establish[es] that [Trooper] Marrott made unrelated travel inquiries prior to 

requesting Mr. Dewitt’s documentation . . . .” The State does not dispute Dewitt’s contention. 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Dewitt to a unified term of seven years with one 

year determinate. Dewitt timely appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 

motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

III. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Dewitt argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 

suppress because Trooper Marrott (1) unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and (2) unlawfully 

questioned him after he invoked his right to counsel. In response, the State contends that the 

district court did not err in denying Dewitt’s motion to suppress because the traffic stop was not 

unlawfully extended and Dewitt did not invoke his right to counsel. 

A. Unlawful Extension

Dewitt argues that Trooper Marrott unlawfully extended his traffic stop in violation of the

Fourth Amendment three times: (1) by asking Dewitt questions relating to his travel prior to 

requesting Dewitt’s license and registration; (2) asking Dewitt questions relating to illegal and 

prescription drugs; and (3) by deploying a canine without reasonable suspicion. We will address 

each of Dewitt’s contentions in turn below.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “the right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 

and seizures, shall not be violated.” As the text indicates, the “touchstone of the Fourth 

Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated 

searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”
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Idaho 262, 264, 371 P.3d 316, 318 (2016) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 

(1991)). 

A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates 

the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. In the context 

of traffic stops, authority for the seizure ends when the tasks related to the infraction are, or 

reasonably should have been, completed. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); 

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in 

issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time 

reasonably required to complete that mission.”). Such tasks include ordinary inquiries incident 

to the traffic stop such as checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are 

outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of 

insurance. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)

(“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court 

has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long 

as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”). An officer may also 

require the occupants to exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 

412 (1997). 

1. Travel related questions

First, Dewitt contends that Trooper Marrott’s questions relating to Dewitt’s travel 

unlawfully extended his traffic stop because Trooper Marrott paused processing the traffic stop 

and took forty-five seconds to question Dewitt regarding his travel plans. Dewitt asserts that the

United States Supreme Court holding in Rodriguez and the Idaho Supreme Court holding in State 

v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 389 P.3d 150 (2016), dictate that Trooper Marrott’s questions 

constituted an abandonment of the traffic mission because they were unrelated to the purpose of 

the stop and added time to Dewitt’s detention making it an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment.

In making this argument, Dewitt challenges the district court’s factual finding regarding 

the order in which Trooper Marrott inquired into Dewitt’s travel plans. Dewitt argues that “the 

undisputed evidence establish[es] that [Trooper] Marrott made unrelated travel inquiries [after 

informing Dewitt of the basis of the stop, but] prior to requesting Mr. Dewitt’s documentation
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. . . .” The State does not dispute Dewitt’s contention. The district court’s relevant findings are

as follows: “Marrott asked Dewitt for his driver’s license, proof of insurance, and vehicle 

registration. . . . While waiting for Dewitt to produce the requested documents, Marrott asked 

several standard questions about the origin and destination of Dewitt’s trip and presence of 

anything illegal in the vehicle.” After a review of the evidence, we agree with Dewitt. The 

undisputed evidence presented below was that Trooper Marrott informed Dewitt of the basis of 

the stop, asked four travel-related questions, and then requested Dewitt’s documentation. 

Thereafter, Dewitt began searching for the requested documentation. While he was doing so, 

Trooper Marrott questioned Dewitt about the presence of illegal substances. 

Notwithstanding the erroneous factual finding and accepting the district court’s other 

unchallenged factual findings as true, we will review the constitutional question de novo. Thus, 

we turn our analysis to Dewitt’s contention that, under Rodriguez and Linze, an officer engaging 

in a lawful traffic stop may not question a driver regarding his or her past or future travel plans.3

This Court recently examined Rodriguez and Linze and concluded that “based on the context and 

the language of Rodriguez and Linze, abandonment occurs when officers deviate from the 

purpose of the traffic mission in order to investigate, or engage in safety measures aimed at 

investigating crimes unrelated to roadway safety for which the officers lack reasonable 

suspicion.” State v. Still, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Ct. App. Aug. 28 2019) (review 

pending). Based on this rule, we conclude that an officer’s questions, asked during a lawful 

traffic stop, regarding a driver’s destination and purpose do not constitute a Rodriguez

abandonment. To the contrary, such questions are ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. 

State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 480, 362 P.3d 551, 555 (Ct. App. 2015).

Trooper Marrott did not abandon the purpose of the traffic stop to engage in a separate 

criminal investigation. As the district court found, Trooper Marrott asked Dewitt “several 

standard questions about the origin and destination of Dewitt’s trip.” In specific, Trooper 

Marrott asked (1) “Where are you coming from today?”; (2) “Where are you headed?”;

 3 The district court did not make a legal conclusion in relation to Dewitt’s argument that 

the stop was prolonged because of the trooper’s travel related questions. The only prolonged 

stop argument the district court addressed was whether the dog sniff amounted to an unlawful 

extension. However, Dewitt did raise this argument, albeit inartfully, in his memorandum in 

support of his motion to suppress and neither party contends that this argument is not preserved

for appeal. 
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(3) “Where is home for you?”; and (4) “How long were you out here?” These questions, and 

questions regarding a driver’s destination and purpose in general, relate to the traffic-based 

mission and are permitted to put the traffic violation into context. Although Dewitt contends 

otherwise, “Rodriguez does not prohibit all conduct that in any way slows the officer from 

completing the stop as fast as humanly possible. It prohibits abandoning the stop to investigate 

other crimes.” Still, ____ Idaho at ____, ____ P.3d at ____. Here, Trooper Marrott was not 

investigating any other crime apart from the basis of the traffic stop when he inquired into 

Dewitt’s travel itinerary. Such questions are routine tasks that an officer is permitted to engage 

in when conducting a traffic stop and do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the 

district court did not err in denying Dewitt’s motion to suppress on this basis.

2. Drug-related questions

Second, Dewitt contends that Trooper Marrott prolonged the stop by asking questions

about the presence of drugs in the vehicle. In specific, Dewitt contends that the stop was 

prolonged because the trooper’s inquiry regarding prescription drugs caused Dewitt to stop 

looking for his documentation, search for a pill bottle, and hand it to Trooper Marrott for 

inspection. In response, the State argues that Trooper Marrott’s questions were proper because, 

although they were unrelated to the purpose of the stop, they did not add time to Dewitt’s 

detention. 

As set forth above, “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for 

the traffic stop, [the United States Supreme Court] has made plain, do not convert the encounter 

into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend 

the duration of the stop.” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. In this case, the district court found that, 

“While waiting for Dewitt to produce the requested documents, Marrott asked several standard 

questions about . . . [the] presence of anything illegal in the vehicle.” Based on this finding, we 

conclude that Dewitt’s detention was not unlawfully prolonged by Trooper Marrott’s drugrelated inquiries. 

Trooper Marrott’s questions about drugs were unrelated to the purpose of the stop. 

Nevertheless, the inquiries did not extend the normal length of the stop because Dewitt was in 

the process of searching for his documentation when the trooper posed the questions. Although 

Dewitt contends that his stop was prolonged because the prescription drug inquiry caused him to 

stop looking for his documentation, search for a pill bottle, and hand it to Trooper Marrott for
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inspection, we are not persuaded by Dewitt’s contention. The fact that Dewitt chose to find his 

prescription medication bottle and chose to hand it over to the trooper has no bearing on our 

analysis of whether Trooper Marrott extended Dewitt’s stop in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. Trooper Marrott did not extend the stop by asking Dewitt questions about drug 

usage while waiting for Dewitt to retrieve his documentation. See State v. Renteria, 163 Idaho 

545, 548-49, 415 P.3d 954, 957-58 (Ct. App. 2018). Accordingly, Trooper Marrott’s questions

did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

3. Drug-dog sniff

Third, Dewitt argues his traffic stop was prolonged because Trooper Marrott abandoned 

the purpose of the traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff without reasonable suspicion. In response, 

the State argues that the district court correctly concluded that (1) deploying the drug dog did not 

extend the stop, and (2) regardless, the dog sniff was supported by independent reasonable 

suspicion.

Although a drug-dog sniff cannot fairly be characterized as part of the officer’s traffic 

mission, it is well-established that a drug-dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop is 

constitutionally permissible if it is executed in a reasonable manner and does not itself infringe 

upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest. Conversely, a drug-dog sniff conducted after 

an otherwise-completed traffic stop is unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion 

for the sniff. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350-51. The “critical question” is “not whether the dog sniff 

occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether the sniff adds time to the stop.”

State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736, 740, 418 P.3d 1245, 1249 (Ct. App. 2018); see also Rodriguez, 

575 U.S. at 357.

In this case, Trooper Marrott called Dewitt’s information in to dispatch and then, among

other things, engaged in a drug dog sniff of Dewitt’s vehicle while waiting for dispatch. The 

district court found that “[Trooper] Marrott was able to complete the deployment of [the drug 

dog] before dispatch returned the information . . . .” The court explained that “[t]here [was] no 

indication or accusation that [Trooper] Marrott was not diligently pursuing his duties.” Based on 

these findings, the court concluded that Dewitt was not entitled to suppression because the sniff 

did not prolong the stop as Trooper “Marrott was still waiting on a return from dispatch, and for 

Dewitt to produce valid registration.” In addition, the district court concluded that the dog sniff 
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was also proper because Trooper Marrott had independent reasonable suspicion to engage in a 

drug investigation. 

Dewitt argues that the district court erred because Trooper Marrott “explicitly and 

unequivocally abandoned the purpose of the stop right after he discovered the discrepancy in 

travel times report[ed] by Mr. Dewitt” to engage in a drug investigation. Dewitt rests this 

argument on the fact that Trooper Marrott believed he had reasonable suspicion to engage in the 

drug-dog sweep. According to Dewitt, 

The video shows clearly that, after discovering the travel time discrepancy, 

[Trooper] Marrott told dispatch that he had “reasonable suspicion” to believe 

Mr. Dewitt was involved in criminal activity, and [Trooper] Marrott left his patrol 

car and made the same announcement to Mr. Dewitt, telling Mr. Dewitt he was 

now being detained due to reasonable suspicion of drug activity.

Whether Trooper Marrott abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop does not answer the relevant 

legal question because, as noted, a drug-dog sniff that occurs during a lawful traffic stop is 

permitted. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); Linze, 161 Idaho at 609 n.1, 389 

P.3d at 154 n.1. The question, instead, is whether the drug-dog sniff occurred during the course 

of the traffic stop or whether the stop was unlawfully prolonged as a result of the sniff. 

We conclude that Dewitt’s stop was not prolonged by the drug-dog sniff. Regardless if 

Trooper Dewitt thought he had reasonable suspicion to engage in a drug investigation, the drugdog sniff did not add time to Dewitt’s traffic stop. See Renteria, 163 Idaho at 548-49, 415 P.3d 

at 957-58 (finding that the officer’s unrelated investigation did not extend the traffic stop 

“because dispatch still had not confirmed Renteria’s valid driving privileges or responded about 

. . . any outstanding warrants.”). Dewitt was being detained for a traffic violation and his 

detention was not unlawfully prolonged by the drug-dog sweep. To the contrary, the district 

court found that Trooper Marrott completed the drug-dog sweep before dispatch returned 

Dewitt’s information. Dewitt does not challenge this finding on appeal. Trooper Marrott was 

free to engage in the drug-dog sweep while he waited for dispatch to return Dewitt’s information.

After the dog indicated on the vehicle, Trooper Marrott had probable cause to search Dewitt’s 

vehicle. Accordingly, the drug-dog sweep did not violate Dewitt’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

Because we conclude that Dewitt’s detention was not prolonged, we need not analyze whether 

the drug-dog sweep was supported by independent reasonable suspicion.
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B. Right to Counsel

Finally, Dewitt argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 

statements that he made after Trooper Marrott advised him of his Miranda rights. Dewitt claims

that he clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and Trooper Marrott violated his 

Fifth Amendment Rights by continuing to question him. 

After an individual is advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, interrogating 

officers are only required to cease questioning if the individual makes a clear and unequivocal 

request for counsel. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994). If a reference 

regarding a desire for an attorney’s assistance is ambiguous or equivocal so that a reasonable 

officer, in light of the circumstances, would have understood only that the suspect might be 

invoking the right to counsel, the officer is not required to stop questioning the suspect. Id. at 

454-61; State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 559, 199 P.3d 123, 134 (2008).

In this case, the district court found that Trooper Marrott informed Dewitt of his Miranda

rights immediately after arresting him. Trooper Marrott asked Dewitt if he understood his rights 

and Dewitt responded that he did understand. Thereafter, the district court explained the events 

as follows: 

[Trooper] Marrott said to Dewitt “so let’s talk. You work with me and I’ll work 

with you the best I can.” Marrott and Dewitt continued to converse about the 

source of the drugs and his willingness to cooperate with police for a couple of 

minutes. Marrott asked Dewitt if he would be willing to cooperate. Dewitt 

paused for a moment and appear[ed] to be contemplating his options, he 

eventually responds while shaking his head side to side, “without my lawyer.”

Marrott said “okay, that’s fine.” Marrott then proceeded to empty and inventory 

the contents of Dewitt’s pockets. While doing so, Marrott asked “how much do 

you have total?” Dewitt responded “eighteen.” Marrott then asked “how much 

did you buy it for?” Dewitt stated that he paid “twenty-one.” Marrott asked 

“what are you selling it for in Illinois?” Dewitt said that “it depends.” After 

taking an inventory of the contents of Dewitt’s pockets, Marrott reminded Dewitt 

that he does not have to answer, and asks again about where he picked up the 

drugs. Dewitt continued to discuss the source of the drugs with Marrott. 

Based on this exchange, the district court concluded that Dewitt did not invoke his right to 

counsel. We agree. 

We conclude that Dewitt did not make a clear and unequivocal invocation of his right to 

counsel. Dewitt alleges that the statement “without my lawyer” while shaking his head side to 

side amounted to an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. In light of the circumstances, 

a reasonable officer in Trooper Marrott’s position could have thought that Dewitt might be 
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invoking his right to counsel. However, an officer could have reasonably assumed otherwise. 

Because it was not clear and unequivocal, Dewitt did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to 

counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 454-61. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying 

Dewitt’s motion to suppress the statements he made after being given Miranda warnings. 

IV. 

CONCLUSION 

Because the district court did not err in denying Dewitt’s motion to suppress, Dewitt’s 

judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.