SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1999- 22 LAQUANE CURRY, Appellant,

v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

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Submitted September 12, 2024

– Decided October 8, 2024 Before Judges Sabatino and Jacobs. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Laquane Curry, appellant, pro se. Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorn ey General, of counsel; Dorothy M. Rodriguez, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 1999

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Incarcerated person, Laquane Curry , appeals the January 17, 2023 final agency decision of the Department of Corrections (D OC) upholding a hearing officer's determination that he committed prohibite d act *.803/*.002, attempting

to assault any person, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4 -4.1(a)(1)(ii), (xxiv). We affirm. We derive facts from the DOC "preliminary incident, " "special c ustody, " "disciplinary," and "use of force" reports, adjudic ation records, appellant's oral and written statements, and the parties' respective pleadings. There is no video or audio recording of the incident in the record. On January 9, 2023, Curry was housed at South Woods State Prison. In

a purported effort to re ce ive medical attention for chest pain , Curry asked Lieutenant J. Inman "what he need[ed] to do to get at custody staff and get them into his cell." With this, Lieutenant Inman notified medical staff as to the medical emergency. Because Curry was housed in the Emergency Confineme nt Unit (ECU) due to his "assaultive history," prison proto col required medical personnel to respond and enter Curry's cell. A team of correction officers was assembled and pre pared to enter the cell , telling Curry to "cuff up." Curry remained on his bed, refusing to comply with commands of the officers and accompanying medical s taff. Wary of a perceived3 A- 1999

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excessive number of officers who arrived in response, Curry stated he no longer wanted medical attention. Notwithstanding Curry's change of mind, officers proceeded to enter his cell. The first to enter was Officer Velez. As Vel ez made entry, Curry purportedly jumped from his bed, charg ed and "swung at [him] with [a] clenched fist." In response, Velez struck Curr y in the mouth with a closed fist. Other officers then brought Curry to the ground and placed him in restraints. They then transported Curry to a medical unit "wher e he was evaluated and received [an] EKG." Both Officer Velez and Curry incurred injuries from their encounter. Velez sustained injury to his right hand and left k nee. In a DOC "special" medical report, it was noted that Curry had cuts an d swelling to his "left top and bottom lips, " "redness and scratch" on his left shoulder, and "chest redness." Aside from these injuries, the report reads, "[i]nm ate has no other cuts, scrapes, bruises, or bleeding . . . at this time." Curry wa s then "medically cleared for constant watch." The next day, prison authorities served Curry with an "attempting to assault" disciplinary charge and referred the case to a hearing officer. At a hearing before Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) Zi mmerman , Curry pleaded not guilty to having committed the charged prohibit ed act. Substitute counsel4 A- 1999

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for Curry submitted a two-page written statement an d requested leniency. In his statement, Curry acknowledged telling Lieutenant In man he was having chest pains. However, he claim ed more than twenty officers arrived in response , whereupon he turn ed around and walk ed toward a window in his cell. Officers then pushed their way in. Curry contended that Off icer Velez hit him in the
mouth and other officers kick ed him as he lay prone for over a two-minute period. He also claimed that the number of respond ing officers was excessive and in violation of prison protocol. In testimony, Curry alleged he was assaulted and that his cell "door should've never been opened ." Curry declined the opportunity to call witnesses on his behalf or to confront adverse witnesses via cross-examination

. Five correction officers submitted a countervailing rendition of events in the form of "special c ustody " reports. Specifically, the officers cast Curry a s "combative" and the "aggressor," maintaining he was "not respons[ ive ]" to verbal commands to be cuffed and brought for medica l examination. Also submitted to the DHO were five "use of force" repor ts, a preliminary report, and

a disciplinary report. Those reports uniformly described Curry as the aggr essor and attested to the need for additional manpower based on h is assaultive history within the institution.5 A- 1999

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DHO Zimmerman found Curry guilty of committing a pr ohibited act and assessed a sanction of 210 days in the "restorative housing unit" or Administrative Segregation (ADSEG), 120 days' loss of commutation time, and fifteen days' loss of core privileges. Based on Curry's allegations of protocol violation, the DHO referred the matter to the Speci al Investigations Division for further investigation. DHO Zimmerman's decision was review ed by Assistant Superintendent Griffith. Griffith upheld Zimmerman's decision, spec ifically including findings regarding the D OC 's compliance with procedural safeguards, presumabl y the number of officers assigned to extract Curry from h is cell and bring him to the medical unit. Griffith also upheld the sanctions i mposed and the declination of leniency.
On appeal, Curry raises a single argument in his i nitial merits brief:

POINT I The Plaintiff Argues [t]he New Jersey Department [o]f Corrections Violated Procedure [a]nd P ro tocol [i]n [t]he Guilt Finding.6 A- 1999

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In a reply brief, Curry raises a second argument:
POINT [I I]

THE DEPARTMENT'S FINAL DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED DUE TO THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE WRITER FOR THE DIS CI PLINARY REPORT AND PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF ABILITY TO CONFRONT THIS INDIVIDUAL. Appellate review of a final decision made by the D OC is "limited." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr

. , 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010). As we have long recognized, "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexib ility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999). "We [therefore] defer to an agency decision, and do not reverse unless it is arbitrary, capricio us or unreasonable or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the re cord." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2010) ; see also In re Stallworth , 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) ("A reviewing court 'may n ot substitute its own judgement for the agency's, even though the court m ight have reached a different result.'" (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007))). This customary deference stems from the "[w]ide discretion [ ] aff orded to administrative7 A- 1999

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decisions because of an agency's specialized knowle dge." In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357, 390 (2020). Applying these well -settled principles, we affirm the DOC's final agen cy decision. Here, the DHO relied on sufficient and substantial credible evid ence to conclude that appellant refused reasonable steps taken to address his health complaints. As documented, the presence of additio nal officers was needed based on appellant's history of violent infractions and his housing in a heightened security "Emergency Confinement Unit." In that regard, reasonable steps implemented to ensure the safety of all conce rned -- including the assignment of extra personnel

-- are not within the province of an inmate to unilaterally dictate or refuse. This is particular ly so when such steps are taken for the ultimate benefit of the inmate, as was the circumstance here. Curry points to no provision of the New Jersey Administra tive Code that was transgressed during the incident in question. Acco rdingly, we are satisfied that the D OC 's findings were based on substantial reliable evid ence and that the sanctions imposed were proportionate to the offense found. In his reply brief, Curry advances a second argumen t. Our case law does not allow an appellant to raise a new argument in r eply. See State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 488 (1970) (stating that it is improper t o raise new issues in a reply8 A- 1999

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brief). Nonetheless, for purposes of completeness, we set f orth verbatim the substance of Curry's second argument in which he re fers to himself in the third
person: In the present matter[,] Curry argues[ ] the individual

named on the disciplinary report was not present fo r the incident nor is listed on the use of force, prelimi nary report[,] or any of the supplemental reports at all . Yet , the DHO finding of guilt is due to accusations by o thers who did not complete the required form. N.J.A.C. on10A:4 -9.1. [(Emphases added) (citations reformatted).] Section 10 A:4 -9.1 of the New Jersey Administrative Code reads:

(a) When a violation of a prohibited act as identif ied in N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4, Inmate Prohibited Acts, has occurred, the DOC staff member or the staff of a contracted vendor who witnessed it or who has probable cause to believe that a prohibited act has occurred shall prepare Form 259 Disciplinary Report and forward it to the appropriate correctional supervisor. (b) The correctional supervisor may change the repo rt to an On- The -Spot Disciplinary Report/Adjudication or forward it to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer or Adjustment Committee for further disposition.
Curry does not identify the individual(s) who purportedly made accusations against him without completing the prope r disciplinary report form. Our examination of the record reflects that all evi dence considered against Curry9 A- 1999

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consisted of reports prepared by identified D OC officers and staff with direct knowledge of the incident concerned. Thus, we reje ct this argument. To the extent we have not addressed them, all other arguments raised by appellant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussi on. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(D) , (E). Affirmed.