### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 17, 200 7 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . ANTONIO DEWAYNE W ATERS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sum ner County

No. 661-2004 Jane Wheatc raft, Judge

No. M2006- 01468-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Septem ber 21, 2007

The de fenda

nt, after denial of his motion to suppr ess evidenc e, enter ed a plea of g uilty to possession with intent to sell m ore tha n one-ha lf g ram of coca ine, a Class B felony

. The ne g otiated sentenc e was e ight y ear s as a standa rd off ender . The de fenda

nt appea ls pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)( 2)(I ). After review, we conclude that denial of the motion to s uppress wa s e rr or . A c c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the c on vic tio n a nd dis mis s th e c ha

rg e s.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t R e ve r se d and Dism issed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., d elivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Jose phE. Clif

ton , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, An ton io D e wa

y ne Wat e rs

. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Mark

A. F ulk s, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; L awr enc e R ay

Whit ley , J r., District Attorney Gene ral; and D ee D avid Gay , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Fa ctual History

Tes ti mo ny

b y th e a r r esting office rs at the suppre ssion hearingprovided the f ollowing a ccount of the de fe nd ant’ s arr e st.

De pu ty Th e od or e L of

tis , Sr ., o f t h e S u mn e r C o u nt y S h e r i f f ’ s D e pa rtme nt, wa s p a tr oll ingwi th
a re se rv e tr a ine e de pu ty , K e vin B re we r, on

Ap ri l 6, 20 04 . T he de pu tie s w e re on the He nd e rs on vil le By pass when they o b s erve d a pede strian, the def endant, ne ar the Sandersville Road e x it at approximately

4:12 p.m. The defe ndant was talking on a ce ll phone when De puty L oftis activated his blue lights and stopped to que stion the defe ndant. The defe ndant told De puty L oftis that he was-2-

sp e a kin g wi th his a tto rn e y and a sk e d if De pu ty L of tis wa nte d to ta lk w iththe a tto rn e y . D e pu ty L of tis
re pli e d th a t he “ did

n’ t ne e d to ta lk t o Joh nny Coc hr an” and

or de re d th e de fe nd ant t o te rm inate his phone conve rsation. In response to Deputy L oftis’ question s , the def endant state d he had no identification and g ave varying answer s as t o how he had arrived at the s cene

. When asked if he had
a weap on , th e de fe nd ant s a id h e did no t and pu lle d mo ne y

and a c ig ar f ro m hi s p oc ke t. D e pu ty L oftis decided to pat the defe ndant down for wea pons and plac ed a ha

nd on the defe ndant’s shoulder. The de fenda

nt then broke awa

y and ran. The de puties pursued a nd saw the de fenda

nt discard two pa c ka g e s th a t w e re late r f ound to c on ta in c oc a ine

. De pu ty B re we r w a s a ble to c a tc h th e de fe nd ant,
a dmi nis te re d p e pp e r s pr ay to o ve rc ome the de fe nd ant’ s r e sis tanc e , a nd the n h andcuff

ed h im. Deputies L oftis and B rew er w ere the only witnesses at the suppr ession hear ing, a nd the fa cts related
wer e undisputed. The trial judg e foun d t h at t he off icer s had ac ted prope rly

and over ruled the de fenda

nt’s mot ion to s up pr e ss.
Standard of Re view

In r e v i e w i n g a t r i a l c o u rt ’ s r u l i n g o na p r e t r i a l s u

p p r e s s i o nm o t i o n , a l l i s s u e s o f c r e d i b i l i t y, weig ht and value of

the evidenc e, and r esolution of evidentiar y conflicts ar e entr

usted to the trial judge , and finding s of fa ct must be upheld unl es s t h e ev idence preponde rate s otherwise. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) . The re viewing court is not b o u n d b y the trial judg e’s conclusions of law. State v. Simps on, 968 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998) . Our re view is de novo if applying la

w to undisputed fac ts. St ate v. Da niel, 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000)

. Certified Que stion of L aw
The State, in its reply brief, contends that the defe ndant failed to stat e w i t h s ufficie nt sp e c i f i c i t y t h e c e rt i f i e d qu e s t i o no f

l aw , t h u s d e p r i v i n g t h i s c o u rto f j u r i s d i c t i o n

. W e r e s p e c tf ull y disag ree

. The re quirements for

rese rving a certified question of l aw are presente d in State v. Preston, 759 S.W .2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988), and S tate v. P ender g rass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Tenn. 1996), and ar e in c o r

p o r a te d in T e n n e s s e e Ru le o f Cr im in a l Pr o c e d u r e 3 7 ( b )

. T h e St a te ar g u e s th at the defe ndant fa iled to specifica lly “identify clea rly the scope and limits of the leg al i ssue re serve d,” as require d in Tennesse e Rule of Criminal Proc edure 37(b)( 2)(A) (ii). The re quirement wa s illust rate d in Preston. [T]he fi na l or de r o r j ud g me nt f ro m w hic h the tim e be g ins to r un to p ur su e a

T. R.A .P. 3 appea l must contain a statement of the disposit ive ce rtified question of law rese rved by defe nd ant fo r a

pp e llate re vie w a

nd the qu e sti on

of law mus t be state d s o a s to clea rly identify the scope and the limit s of the leg al issue reserv ed

. Fo r ex ample, wher e q u e s ti o n s o f la

w inv o lv e th e v a li d it

y o f s e ar c h e s an d th e a dmi s s ib il ity of statements and c onfessions, etc., the rea s o n s relied upon by defe ndant in the trial court at the suppression hea ring must be identified in the statement of the cer tified-3-

qu e sti on , a

bs e nt a c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nt o the rw ise. W ith ou t an e xplic it
s t at em en to f t h e c er t i fi ed qu es t i o n , n ei t h er t h e d ef en d an t , t h e S t at e n o r t h e t ri al j u d ge c an ma ke a me anin g fu l de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he iss ue so ug ht t o be re vie we d is dispositi ve of the case

. 759 S.W .2d at 650. The Judgment conta ined the followinglang uag e intended to pr eser ve the c ertified que stion: Ple a e nte re d purs uan t to Rule 37 wh e re thi s is su e is d isp os iti ve and pr e se rv e d a s a c e rt if ie d qu e sti on of law fo r a pp e a l. Th e qu e sti on of law pr e se rv e d fo r a pp e a l is whether the evidenc e siezed [si c] f rom the def

endant should have been suppr essed beca use of the war

rantless arr est of the defe ndant not suppor ted by probable cause

. Se e a tta c he d o rd e r i nc lud e d b y re fe re nc e a s p art

of thi s ju dg me nt. An Agre ed Order was attache d to the j udg ment and sig ned by the par ties and the trial judg e. Th e Or de r c on ta ine d la

ngua g e a s f

oll ow s: The qu es t i o n of law pr eser ved for appea l is whether the e vidence seized from the defe ndant in this case should have been suppr essed be cause it was seized pursuant to t he wa rr antl e ss arr e st of the de fe nd ant fo r wh ic h the po lic e ha d n o p ro ba ble c a us e in violation of the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and Article One, Se c tio n Se ve n o f t

he Te nn e sse e Con stitu tio n a s w e ll a s th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court’s decision in State of Te nnessee v. Perry Thomas R an dolph, 74 S.W .3d 330 (Tenn. 2002)

.
I n a dd iti on

to a ll p art ie s c on se nti ngto t he pre se rv a tio n o f t

his iss ue fo r a

pp e a l, a ll parties, includingthe Trial J udg e and the State, are of the opinion that this question is disposi tive of the c ase, . . . Appellate c ourts are not bound to acc ept as dispositi ve certified que stions st ipulated as such by the par ties and the trial c ourt. Preston, 759 S.W .2d at 651. In this case, we ag ree that the lack of admissibilit y

of this evidence would be dispositive in all respec ts. W e conclude that the def endant has ar ticulat ed and identified the issues in clear enoug h lang uag e to satisfy the mandator

y require ments of Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 37( b) and Pre ston.

An a ly sis

Both the F ourth Amendment to the United States Const itution and Ar ticle I , section 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution protect our citizens from unrea sonable sea rche s and seiz ures. The essenc e o f th is p r o te c ti o n u n d e r th e F o u rth A me n dme n t is to “ s a f e g u ar d th e p r iv a c y an d s ecur ity of individuals ag ainst arbitra ry invasions of g overnme nt officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U

. S

. 5 2 3 , 5 2 8 , 8 7 S

. C t

. 1 7 2 7 , 1 7 3 0 ( 1 9 6 7 )

. “ A rt i c l e I , § 7 i s i d e n t i c a l i ni n t e n tan d p u r p o s e wi th the Four th Amendment.” Snee d v. State, 423 S.W .2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968)

. Our Supreme Court has extended gre ater privac y protec tions to citi zens by its int erpr etation of Ar

ticle I , section 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution. S ee State v. Ra ndolph, 74 S.W .3d 330 (T en n

. 2002). In deter mining-4-

whether a seiz ure has occur

red, Tennessee adher es to a totality of the c ircumstance s standard, that is, if in the view of a ll the circ umstances, a rea sonable person would have believed that he or she wa s not free to leave. I d. at 336.

Se ve ra l f a c tor s h a ve be e n id e nti fi e d a s r e le va nt t o th e tot a lity

of c ir c ums tanc e s te st: the time, place and purpos e o f t he enc ounter; the wor ds used by the offic er; the office r’s tone of voice and g ener al demeanor; t he officer ’s s tatements t o others who
wer e present during t he encounter; the thre ateningprese nce of sever al offic ers; the display of a w eapon by

an off i ce r; and the phy sical touchingof the pe rson of the citizen. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 425-26 (Tenn. 2000)

. Al so in D anie l, se ve ra l poli c e e nc ounte rs we re lis te d w hic h a re g e ne ra lly

he ld t o c on sti tut e “seizure” : if an off icer : (1) pursue s an individual who has attemp t ed to terminate the contac t by depar ting; (2) continues to interrog ate a person who ha s clea

rly expressed a desire
no t to c oo pe rate ; (3) re ne ws int e rr og a tio n of a pe rs on wh o ha s earl ie r r e sp on de d f ull y to police inquiries; (4) ve rbally order s a citizen to stop and answer ques t i ons; (5) reta ins a citizen’s identification or other proper ty ; (6) phy sically

restra ins a citizen or blocks the c itiz en’s path; (7) display s a we apon duringthe enc ounter. I d. at 426 (c iting 4 Way

ne R. L aF ave, Sea

rch a n d Seizure, § 9.3(a) , at 104 (3d e d. 1996 & Supp. 1999)). When a police of

fice r ac tivates the blue lig hts of a vehic le, he has clea rly initiated a stop and has seized the subjec t of the stop. State v. Bine tte, 33 S.W .3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000)

. Under both th e Fourth Amendment a nd Article I , section 7 of the T ennesse e Constituti on,

“ a wa rr antl e ss s e arc h o r s e izur e is p re sume d unr e a so na ble , a nd evi den ce disc ov e re d a s a re su lt there o f is s u

b je c t to s u p p r e s s io n u n le s s th e St a te d e mo n s tr a te s th a t th e s e ar c h o r s e izure was conducte d pursuant to one of the narrowly define d exceptions to the warr ant re quirement.” State v. Yea rg an , 958 S.W .2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) . One e x ce p t i o n i s “whe n a police of fice r make s an investigatory

stop based upon re asonable suspicion, supported by specific and ar ticulable fa cts, that
a cr iminal offense has bee n or is about to be committed.” State v. B inette, 33 S.W.3d at 218.

The de fenda

nt in this cause was near a public road, eng ag ed in not hing mor e suspicious than
a ce ll phone conver sation. The off icer s conductin g t h e s t o p wer e not investig ating any criminal activity in which the def

endant mig ht have been a suspect. Past Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that “a se izure does not occur simply beca use a police office r appr oache s an individual and asks a f ew que stions.” Florida v. B ostick, 5 0 1 U. S

. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct . 2382 (1991). A mor e expansive statement of this rule stated: [L ]awe nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs do no t vi olate the F ourth Ame ndme nt b y me re ly
a pp ro a c hin g an in div idu a l on the str e e t or in a

no the r p ub lic pla c e , b y

a sk inghim

if he is w ill ingto a

ns we r s ome qu e sti on s, by pu tti ngqu e sti on s to him

if the pe rs on

is-5-

willing to listen, or by

offe ring in evidence in a cr iminal prosec u t i o n h is voluntary
answe rs to such questions. Nor would the fa ct that the off icer identifies himself as
a po lice of fi c e r, wi tho ut m or e , c on ve rt the e nc ounte r i nto a

se izur e re qu ir ingso me level of objective j ustification. The person approa ched, however , need not a nswer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may g o on his w ay

. He may not be detaine d even momenta rily without reasona

ble, objective g rounds for doingso; and his r efusa l to listen or answe r does not, without
mor e , f ur nis h th os e g ro un ds

. Florida v. Roy er, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L . Ed. 2d 229 (1983) ( citations omitt ed). The State sug g ests that the officers were acting in their capac ity as a “ community

car etake r” to re nd e r a ssi sta

nc e to the de fe nd ant. Suc h a c tio ns a re jus tif ia ble and la ud a ble so lon g a s th e a id i s actua lly neede d or sought b y the citizen. Otherwise, it is mere ly a guise for unw anted of ficial intrusion into t he priva cy

of the a ffe cted c itiz en. I t is inst ructive to note that the second count of the indi ctm ent ch arg e d th e de fe nd ant w ithfl ig ht “ wh ile kn ow ingthat sa id o ff ic e r w a s atte mpt ingto
arr est him.” State v. Randolph involved the investigation of a possible burg lary in prog ress. The office r drove to the ne ighbor

hood of the suspec ted burg lary and saw t h e d ef

en d an t riding a bicycle. The office r ac tivated his blue lights and told the de fenda nt to stop. The defe ndant kept riding in spite of
a re peate d demand by

the offic er to stop. After a pur suit, the office r found the de fenda nt and observe d him discard a shotgun and two box es of ammuniti on. These items a nd a phone in the de fe nd ant’ s p os se ssi on

we re late r i de nti fi e d a s h a vi ng been st ole n in the burg lary . T he Sup re me Court held that the def

endant wa s seized when the of fice r ac tivated the bl u e lights, orde red the defe ndant to stop, and pursued the defendant. Be cause the officer lacked pr obable c ause to e ffe ct a seizure, the e vidence was prope rly suppressed. 74 S.W.3d at 330.

The c ase of

State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W .3d 649 (Tenn. 2006) , i n v o l v ed a de fenda nt who happene d upon a sce ne whe re of fice rs were i n vestig ating for possible g angactivity . Prior to the de fe nd ant’ s a

pp e ara nc e , th e of

fi c e rs ha d uns uc c e ssf

ull y a tte mpt e d to cha se and a pp re he nd su sp e c ts in that are a. The defe ndant, when told to “hold up,” turned and ra n awa y . The off

icer pursued the defe ndant and or dere d, “stop, police.” The Supreme Court held th at t h i s const ituted a seizure without spe cific and articula ble fa cts to provide a r easona ble suspicion to seize the defe ndant. The Court rec og nized that flight does not alwa y s amount to a rea sonable suspicion. I d. at 261. Returning to the case at hand, we conclude that the defendant was seized by the ac tivation of the blue lig hts and the command to the defe ndant to terminate his phone c onversation. Neither of fi cer tes ti fi ed th a t th e a c tiv a tio n o f t he blu e lig hts on

the mark e d p a tr ol c ar w a s d on e fo r p ub lic safe ty purposes or that it was necessa ry

. I nstead, the office rs’ course of action, both in activating the blu e lig hts and

in s ub se qu e nt a c tio ns , s ug g e ste d c on du c t in te nd e d to e xer t c on tr ol o v e r

t h e d e fe nd ant. The fa ct that the def

endant g ave c onflicting acc ounts of how he ar ri v ed at a public loca tion was irrele vant in that he had no oblig ation to answer or submit to these questions. The offic ers ha d not observe d the commi ssion of a crime and had no rea sonable suspi cion t hat a c rime wa s about to be-6-

committed. The improper seizure mandate s the suppression of the subse quently found evide nce. Th e State c on te nd s that the e vid e nc e is a dmi ssi ble a s e ith e r “ a ba nd on e d p ro pe rt

y ” or by the “ pla in view” doc trine. Ne ither doctrine is applicable w hen the e vidence is a bandoned or in plain view due to prior police misconduc t. State v. Bre nda Hill, No. 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Aug . 7, 1990), 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 526, at *4, appea l denied (Tenn. Oct. 22, 1990). The evidence in this case wa s tainted by the illeg al police a ction, and its subsequent di scover y was the fruit of a poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. U. S., 371 U.S. 471, 484-86, 83 S . Ct. 407, 415-16 (1963).

Conclusion

After revie w, we c onclude, ba sed on the tot ality of t he circumstance s, that the s eizure of the defe ndant was violative of the defe ndant’s rig hts unde r Article I , section 7 of th e T ennesse e Constit ution. Denial of the motion to suppress was in e rror . There fore , we r ever se the c onviction and dismiss the charg es ag ainst the defe ndant.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI L L I AMS, J UDGE