COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

January 22, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP1359 Cir. Ct. No. 2015CV474

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

MENN LAW FIRM, LTD,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

LINDA VEERKAMP,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Outagamie

County: GREGORY B. GILL, JR., Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Linda Veerkamp, pro se, appeals a judgment 

requiring her to pay her former attorneys, Menn Law Firm, LTD, $44,000 in 
No. 2018AP1359

2

attorney fees and $5395.39 in costs. Veerkamp contends the circuit court erred by 

granting Menn Law Firm’s motion for a declaratory judgment regarding its 

entitlement to attorney fees and costs. We reject Veerkamp’s arguments and 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Veerkamp believed her brother, Donald Veerkamp, had unduly 

influenced their mother, Rita Veerkamp, to modify her estate planning documents 

in order to exclude Veerkamp as a beneficiary. On April 19, 2012, Veerkamp

executed a written representation agreement with Menn Law Firm.

1

 The 

agreement stated Veerkamp had engaged Menn Law Firm to: (1) “[c]ommence 

and litigate lawsuit vs. Donald Veerkamp re: Rita Veerkamp Trust”; and 

(2) provide “all representation needed in Rita Veerkamp Estate or with Rita 

Veerkamp Trust.” The agreement further provided that Veerkamp would pay 

Menn Law Firm an hourly rate for its legal services and would reimburse it for all 

out-of-pocket expenses.

 

1

 The appellate record contains a three-page representation agreement dated April 19, 

2012. In her brief-in-chief on appeal, Veerkamp asserts that she “signed a one-page hourly 

agreement,” and Menn Law Firm then “created a three-page hourly agreement and forged [her] 

name to” it. However, the record citation Veerkamp provides for this assertion does not support 

it. We have no duty to scour the record to review arguments unaccompanied by adequate record 

citations. Roy v. St. Lukes Med. Ctr., 2007 WI App 218, ¶10 n.1, 305 Wis. 2d 658, 741 N.W.2d 

256.

We further note that the “Statement of Case and Facts” in Veerkamp’s brief-in-chief does 

not contain any citations to the appellate record, in violation of WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(d)

(2017-18). We caution Veerkamp that future violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure may 

result in sanctions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2) (2017-18).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2018AP1359

3

¶3 On April 25, 2012, Menn Law Firm filed a lawsuit against Donald 

on Veerkamp’s behalf (Outagamie County case No. 2012CV588). It is undisputed 

that after filing that lawsuit, Menn Law Firm expended significant time and 

incurred costs in prosecuting Veerkamp’s undue influence claim against Donald.

¶4 On August 7, 2012, Douglas Hahn, an attorney from Menn Law 

Firm, sent Veerkamp a letter with an enclosed bill for $24,793.37. Hahn informed 

Veerkamp that after applying a previous payment of $6000, she owed Menn Law 

Firm a balance of $18,793.37. Hahn also referred to a prior correspondence, 

which had “talked about the choice of having us handle this case on a contingency 

or an hourly fee.” He continued:

You had indicated that because you believed this case was 

close to settling you wanted to leave it on the hourly basis 

for the time being. [A decision by the circuit court] on 

August 6th makes it unlikely that a settlement will occur in 

the near future.

We need to decide at this time if you want to convert the 

hourly fee to a one-third contingency fee. If we do, we will 

want payment for one-third of the time already spent, as 

reflected on this August 7th billing, or $7,435. In addition, 

we will want payment of all of our out-of-pocket expenses 

to date ($2,489.37), plus a $2,500 advance for future outof-pocket expenses. Thus we will need total payment of 

$12,424.37. Since you already paid us $6,000, we will 

need an additional $6,424.37 in the immediate future.

If we are successful in the lawsuit, our attorney’s fees will 

then be one-third of the amount recovered. We will 

subtract from that the $7,435 which we have already 

received.

¶5 Hahn’s letter also informed Veerkamp that Donald’s lawyer was 

demanding she repay over $150,000 in loans that she had received from Rita. 

Hahn stated that the computation of Menn Law Firm’s legal fees would be “more 

complicated” if Donald sued Veerkamp to recover that amount. He then inquired:
No. 2018AP1359

4

Do you want us to defend you on that allegation? If so, if 

we do that on a one-third contingency fee, that means if 

these are determined to be gifts instead of loans (so you do 

not have to repay Don), our fee will wind up being about 

$55,600 for that work. Or do you want us to defend that on 

an hourly basis? Because the cases are so intermixed, that 

seems very difficult to do. Therefore, we need to have a 

discussion by telephone about this.

¶6 On March 27, 2013, Veerkamp entered into a contingency fee 

agreement with Menn Law Firm. The agreement stated Menn Law Firm would be 

entitled to one-third of the “gross amount recovered, either by settlement or suit,

and before deduction of advanced costs and disbursements.” The agreement also 

stated that Veerkamp was responsible for all costs incurred by Menn Law Firm

“regardless of whether any recoveries are obtained.” In addition, the agreement 

provided that Veerkamp’s previous payment to Menn Law Firm of $6000 would 

be credited against any legal fees she owed under the contingency fee agreement. 

The agreement expressly stated that it “superseded” the parties’ previous hourly 

fee agreement.

¶7 In describing the scope of the representation, the contingency fee 

agreement stated:

I, Linda Veerkamp, hereby retain Menn Law Firm ... and 

give it the exclusive right to prosecute my claim for injuries 

and/or damages and/or inheritance against Donald 

Veerkamp/Rita Veerkamp Trust/Rita Veerkamp Estate, and 

any other responsible parties as a result of Death of Rita 

Veerkamp [and] the provisions in her estate planning 

documents and Don Veerkamp’s undue influence of Rita –

Outagamie County Case 12CV588 (“this event”).

The agreement further stated that Veerkamp agreed to employ Menn Law Firm “to 

handle all matters connected with the recovery of the damages resulting from this 

event, and to commence whatever actions are necessary to recover these 

damages.”
No. 2018AP1359

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¶8 On July 1, 2013, Donald, acting as personal representative of Rita’s 

estate, filed a lawsuit against Veerkamp seeking to recover the money Rita had 

loaned to her (Outagamie County case No. 2013CV764). That case was 

consolidated with Veerkamp’s undue influence lawsuit against Donald. Following 

a bench trial, the circuit court found that Donald had not unduly influenced Rita 

and that Veerkamp was not entitled to any distributions from Rita’s estate or trust. 

Nevertheless, based on Rita’s decision to disinherit Veerkamp, the court 

concluded Rita did not expect Veerkamp to repay any of the money Rita had 

loaned to her. Accordingly, the court found that Veerkamp did not need to repay 

the $150,000 in loans that she had received from Rita.

¶9 After the circuit court issued its decision in case Nos. 2012CV588 

and 2013CV764, Menn Law Firm asked Veerkamp to pay it $50,000 for its legal 

services—i.e., one-third of the amount of debt the circuit court had determined 

Veerkamp did not need to repay. Menn Law Firm also demanded that Veerkamp 

reimburse it for $7890.31 in litigation costs. Veerkamp refused to pay, asserting 

she did not owe Menn Law Firm any amount under the contingency fee agreement 

because she “did not win any money” in the consolidated cases.

¶10 Menn Law Firm then filed the instant lawsuit against Veerkamp, 

asserting she had breached the contingency fee agreement by failing to pay Menn 

Law Firm $50,000 for its legal services and by refusing to reimburse it for the 

litigation costs it had incurred. In the alternative, Menn Law Firm sought 

rescission of the contingency fee agreement and reinstatement of the parties’ 

original hourly fee agreement. As a third alternative, Menn Law Firm asserted an 

unjust enrichment claim and asked the circuit court to award it the reasonable 

value of the legal services it had performed on Veerkamp’s behalf. In addition, 

Menn Law Firm asked the court to “[d]eclare the rights and obligations of the 
No. 2018AP1359

6

parties under both the Hourly and Contingency Agreements insofar as Menn’s 

right to compensation is concerned.”

¶11 At a pretrial conference on October 20, 2016, counsel for Menn Law 

Firm informed the circuit court that efforts to settle the case had not been 

successful, and he suggested that the court “convert this into a declaratory action” 

and permit the parties to “just brief the matter” rather than holding a trial. The 

court asked Veerkamp’s attorney whether he would agree to that procedure, and 

he responded in the affirmative. Veerkamp’s attorney subsequently filed a motion 

to withdraw, which the court granted on November 18, 2016.

¶12 Menn Law Firm ultimately filed a motion for a declaratory judgment

in June 2017. It asked the circuit court to declare that it was entitled to recover 

$52,368 in attorney fees under the hourly fee agreement and $7890.31 in costs 

under either the hourly fee agreement or the contingency fee agreement. Menn 

Law Firm filed two affidavits with attached documents in support of its motion. 

Veerkamp filed a four-page, pro se “Answer to Plaintiff[’]s Petition for a 

Declaratory Judgment” in November 2017. She did not submit any affidavits or 

evidence in support of that filing.

¶13 After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the circuit court issued an 

oral ruling on Menn Law Firm’s declaratory judgment motion on May 30, 2018. 

Treating the motion as one for summary judgment, the court concluded the 

undisputed facts established that the contingency fee agreement was “the proper 

agreement under which to determine [the parties’] rights.” The court further 

concluded that under the contingency fee agreement, Menn Law Firm was entitled 

to one-third of the amount of Veerkamp’s debt that had been forgiven in the 

consolidated cases. Accordingly, the court ordered Veerkamp to pay Menn Law 
No. 2018AP1359

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Firm $44,000—i.e., one-third of $150,000, minus the $6000 payment Veerkamp 

had already made. The court also ordered Veerkamp to pay “any costs incurred 

subsequent to the signing of the contingency fee agreement.” The court later

entered a written judgment awarding Menn Law Firm $44,000 in legal fees and 

$5395.39 in costs, and Veerkamp now appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Declaratory judgment

¶14 Veerkamp argues the circuit court erred by granting Menn Law 

Firm’s declaratory judgment motion. The grant or denial of a declaratory 

judgment is addressed to the circuit court’s discretion. Olson v. Farrar, 2012 WI 

3, ¶24, 338 Wis. 2d 215, 809 N.W.2d 1. In this case, however, the court treated 

Menn Law Firm’s declaratory judgment motion as a motion for summary 

judgment. We independently review a grant of summary judgment, using the 

same methodology as the circuit court. Hardy v. Hoefferle, 2007 WI App 264, ¶6, 

306 Wis. 2d 513, 743 N.W.2d 843. Summary judgment is appropriate where “the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
No. 2018AP1359

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fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”2 WIS.

STAT. § 802.08(2).

¶15 Veerkamp argues the circuit court erred by determining that she 

owed Menn Law Firm any amount of legal fees under the contingency fee 

agreement. She contends the plain wording of that agreement provides that Menn 

Law Firm would recover fees for its legal services only if it successfully 

prosecuted her undue influence claim against Donald. She argues the agreement 

does not entitle Menn Law Firm to recover legal fees based on the forgiveness of 

her obligation to repay $150,000 in loans to Rita’s estate.

¶16 Like the circuit court, we conclude the contingency fee agreement 

applies to the $150,000 in loan forgiveness that Menn Law Firm obtained on 

Veerkamp’s behalf. The agreement initially states that Veerkamp retained Menn 

Law Firm “to prosecute [her] claim for injuries and/or damages and/or inheritance 

against Donald Veerkamp/Rita Veerkamp Trust/Rita Veerkamp Estate, and any 

other responsible parties as a result of Death of Rita Veerkamp [and] the 

provisions in her estate planning documents and Don Veerkamp’s undue influence 

of Rita ... (‘this event’).” This language refers specifically to the prosecution of 

Veerkamp’s undue influence claim. The agreement later states, however, that 

 

2

 A court must be presented with a justiciable controversy before it may exercise its 

jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment claim. Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, 

¶28, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211. Four factors must be present in order for a controversy 

to be deemed justiciable. Id., ¶29. In the circuit court, Veerkamp conceded that the first two 

justiciability factors were satisfied, but she argued the third and fourth factors were not. On 

appeal, Veerkamp does not raise any argument regarding the four justiciability factors. She has 

therefore abandoned her argument that Menn Law Firm’s declaratory judgment claim is not 

justiciable, and we will not address it further. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 

Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating an issue raised in the circuit court, 

but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned).
No. 2018AP1359

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Veerkamp employed Menn Law Firm “to handle all matters connected with the 

recovery of the damages resulting from this event.” (Emphasis added.)

¶17 The defense of the estate’s lawsuit to recover the loans Rita made to 

Veerkamp was clearly a matter “connected with” the recovery of damages on 

Veerkamp’s undue influence claim. The two lawsuits were consolidated for trial. 

The circuit court ultimately found that Donald had not unduly influenced Rita and 

that Veerkamp was not entitled to any distributions from Rita’s estate or trust. 

The court also determined, however, that given Rita’s decision to disinherit 

Veerkamp, Rita did not expect repayment of any money she had loaned to 

Veerkamp. The court’s decision regarding the loans was therefore intertwined 

with its decision on the undue influence claim, and, as such, the claims were 

clearly “connected.” 

¶18 Moreover, had the circuit court found in Veerkamp’s favor on the 

undue influence claim and concluded Veerkamp was required to repay the loans, 

the balance due on the loans would presumably have been offset against any 

damages awarded on the undue influence claim. As such, the defense of the 

estate’s claim to recover the loans was plainly “connected with” Veerkamp’s

recovery of damages on the undue influence claim. Under the plain language of 

the contingency fee agreement, Menn Law Firm was therefore entitled to recover 
No. 2018AP1359

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one-third of the amount of debt forgiveness that it obtained on Veerkamp’s behalf, 

minus the $6000 payment it had already received.

3

¶19 In any event, even if we concluded the contingency fee agreement 

was ambiguous as to whether it applied to the estate’s claim to recover 

Veerkamp’s debt, we would then look to extrinsic evidence to resolve the

ambiguity.4 See Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2015 WI 65, ¶36, 

363 Wis. 2d 699, 866 N.W.2d 679. In support of its declaratory judgment motion, 

Menn Law Firm submitted attorney Hahn’s August 7, 2012 letter, which expressly 

discussed how Menn Law Firm would be paid for its work defending Veerkamp 

against the estate’s claim. Hahn explained, “[I]f we do that on a one-third 

contingency fee, that means if these are determined to be gifts instead of loans (so 

you do not have to repay Don), our fee will wind up being about $55,600 for that 

work.” Hahn further explained it would be “very difficult” for Menn Law Firm to 

 

3

 Veerkamp asserts the circuit court’s decision to forgive the loans “was not based on 

Menn Law Firm’s efforts.” However, she provides no record citation in support of that assertion. 

Again, we need not consider arguments unaccompanied by adequate record citations. See Roy, 

305 Wis. 2d 658, ¶10 n.1. Moreover, in her answer to Menn Law Firm’s complaint, Veerkamp 

admitted that the court in the consolidated cases “was persuaded by Menn’s argument that [Rita], 

in disinheriting Ms. Veerkamp, did not expect repayment of any sums loaned to Ms. Veerkamp.” 

(Emphasis added.) Veerkamp’s argument on appeal that the court’s decision to forgive the loans 

was not based on Menn Law Firm’s efforts is directly contrary to that earlier admission.

4

 Veerkamp argues that if the contingency fee agreement is ambiguous, we must 

construe it against the drafter—i.e., Menn Law Firm—instead of considering extrinsic evidence. 

However, our supreme court has stated that when the terms of a contract are ambiguous, 

“evidence extrinsic to the contract itself may be used to determine the parties’ intent, and any 

remaining ambiguities will be construed against the drafter.” Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & 

Bishop, Ltd., 2015 WI 65, ¶36, 363 Wis. 2d 699, 866 N.W.2d 679 (emphasis added). Stated 

differently, the rule that we construe an ambiguous contract against the drafter is a “default rule” 

that applies “only in the event of an unresolvable ambiguity—a tie—and only at the end of the 

process after extrinsic evidence has failed to clear up the question.” Roth v. City of Glendale, 

2000 WI 100, ¶51, 237 Wis. 2d 173, 614 N.W.2d 467 (Sykes, J., concurring). Here, because 

extrinsic evidence resolves any ambiguity regarding the parties’ intent, we need not resort to 

construing the contingency fee agreement against Menn Law Firm.
No. 2018AP1359

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defend against the estate’s claim on an hourly basis because the two cases were so 

“intermixed.”

¶20 Hahn’s letter provides strong evidence that the contingency fee 

agreement Veerkamp later signed was intended to apply to Menn Law Firm’s 

work in defending against the estate’s claim to recover Veerkamp’s debt. In 

response to Menn Law Firm’s declaratory judgment motion, Veerkamp did not 

submit any evidence suggesting a contrary intent. The undisputed facts therefore 

establish that under the contingency fee agreement, Menn Law Firm was entitled 

to recover as its fee one-third of the amount of debt that was forgiven in the 

consolidated cases, less the $6000 payment it had already received.

¶21 Veerkamp also argues that the circuit court erred by awarding Menn 

Law Firm $5395.39 in costs. However, the contingency fee agreement expressly 

states that Veerkamp is “responsible for all costs advanced and/or incurred by 

[Menn Law Firm] in the prosecution of my claim regardless of whether any 

recoveries are obtained.” After the court issued its oral ruling on Menn Law 

Firm’s declaratory judgment motion, Menn Law Firm provided documentation 

supporting its request for $5395.39 in costs. On appeal, Veerkamp does not 

clearly explain why that amount is incorrect, or what amount of costs the court 

should have instead awarded. We need not address arguments that are not 

adequately explained or developed. M.C.I., Inc. v. Elbin, 146 Wis. 2d 239, 244-

45, 430 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1988).

II. Veerkamp’s other arguments

¶22 Veerkamp raises a number of other arguments on appeal, all of 

which we reject. Several of these arguments are entirely undeveloped. For 

instance, Veerkamp argues that the circuit court was biased against her and should 
No. 2018AP1359

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have recused itself. Relatedly, she asserts that the court erred by “guiding and 

favoring” Menn Law Firm “while refusing to answer her question and 

manipulat[ing] and confus[ing] her.” Veerkamp does not, however, provide any 

record citations in support of these assertions. Moreover, she does not cite the 

legal standards regarding either judicial bias or recusal, nor does she explain why 

the facts of this case satisfy those standards. We need not address arguments that 

are undeveloped, unsupported by legal authority, or unsupported by citations to 

the appellate record. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 

633 (Ct. App. 1992); Roy v. St. Lukes Med. Ctr., 2007 WI App 218, ¶10 n.1, 305 

Wis. 2d 658, 741 N.W.2d 256.

¶23 Veerkamp also argues that the circuit court erred by permitting her 

attorney to withdraw “without holding a hearing to hear [her] side.” Again, 

however, Veerkamp does not cite any legal authority supporting her claim that the 

court should have held a hearing before granting her attorney’s motion to 

withdraw. We therefore decline to address this undeveloped argument. See Pettit, 

171 Wis. 2d at 646-47.

¶24 Veerkamp next argues that the circuit court erred by failing to hold a 

jury trial regarding Menn Law Firm’s entitlement to attorney fees and costs. This 

argument fails because Veerkamp’s attorney agreed during the October 20, 2016 

pretrial conference that the court could resolve the matter based on the parties’ 

briefs without the need for a trial. “[U]nder agency law, ordinarily a litigant is 

bound by the acts of counsel during the representation.” Harold Sampson 

Children’s Tr. v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Tr., 2004 WI 57, ¶36, 271 Wis. 2d 

610, 679 N.W.2d 794. Veerkamp does not develop any argument that, under the 

facts of this case, she should not be bound by her attorney’s agreement to resolve 

the matter without a trial. By virtue of that agreement, Veerkamp has waived her 
No. 2018AP1359

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right to argue on appeal that the court erred by failing to hold a jury trial on Menn 

Law Firm’s claims.

¶25 Finally, Veerkamp argues that the circuit court erred by failing to 

rule on her motions for sanctions against Menn Law Firm. Veerkamp contends 

sanctions were warranted under WIS. STAT. § 802.05(2)(b) because Menn Law 

Firm “knew well before the complaint was filed that its claims were without any 

reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith 

argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” We have 

already concluded, however, that the court properly granted Menn Law Firm a 

declaratory judgment on its claim against Veerkamp for attorney fees and costs. 

Accordingly, Veerkamp was not entitled to sanctions under § 802.05(2)(b)

because Menn Law Firm’s claims did not lack a reasonable basis in law or equity. 

The court’s failure to rule on Veerkamp’s motions for sanctions was therefore 

harmless and provides no basis for reversal. See WIS. STAT. § 805.18.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.