### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00814- CV

In the Matte r of C. R. M.

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 98TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -JV- 14- 0004 26, H ONO RAB LE RHO NDA HURLEY , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidenc e, appellant C.R.M.,

a juveni l e, pleade d true to eng ag ing in delinquent conduct by committing the misdemeanor

o ffense of possession of marihuana in a drug -fr ee zone. The district court, sitti ng as a j u v en i l e 1 court, adjudicate d C.R.M. delinquent and place d him on probation for a period of six months. I n his sole issue on appea l, C.R.M. asser ts t hat the juvenile court abused its discretion in deny ing his motion to s uppress. We will aff irm the juvenile cour

t’s judgme nt.

BACK GR OUND
At the hear ing on the motion to suppress, the j u v en i l e court hear d evidenc e that

on November 11, 2013, Day na Anthony Swain, an assistant principal at Manor Hig h S chool,

rec eived a repor

t of a “suspicious” backpa ck “being passed around in the classroom.” The backpa ck

was taken by a teac her and g iven to Swain, who sear ched the backpa ck and interviewe d the student

See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 481.121, 481.134(a) (5). 1who owned it. Swain testified that upon sear ching the backpa ck, s h e discovere d “two bag g ies

of marihuana ” inside. Swain rec ounted that the student who owned the backpa ck denie d t hat the marihuana belong ed to him. S wa i n then proce eded to interview another student, C.R.M., who was also suspected of possessing the backpa ck. Ac cording to Swain, C.R.M. admitted during the interview that the marihuana belong ed to him. Subsequently , C.R

. M

. wa s taken into custody by Deputy Steven C oleman of the Travis County Sheriff’ s Offic e, who serve d as t he school resour ce office r (SRO) for

Manor Hig h School.
At the conclusion o f t h e suppression hear ing, C.R.M. asked the juvenile court “to suppress any co n fe s s i o n m ade by [C .R.M.] to Ms. Swain.” Acc ording to C.R.M., his acknowledg ment to Swain that the marihuana belong ed to him was the product of custodial interrog ation and should be suppressed beca use C.R.M. was not provided with the s ta tu to r y w a r n in g s require d by section 51.095 of the J uvenile J ustice Code. The State arg ued in response that C.R.M. 2

was not in custody at the time he made his statement t o S wain and that, there fore , the statutory

wa rn i n gs were not require d. The juvenile court ag ree d with the State and denied the motion 3 to suppress. C .R.M. subsequently pleade d true to enga g ing in de linquent conduct and w as plac ed on six months’ probation as noted a bove. This appe al followed.

See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a )(5) (listing statutory war nings)

. 2 See id

. § 51.095(b), (d) (li miting applicability of warning s require d by section 51.095 to 3 situations in which child is subj ect to custodial interr og ation). 2STANDARD OF REVIEW “Juvenile c ases, though classified as civil pr ocee dings, are quasi-cr iminal in natur e and fre quently conce rn constitutional rig hts and proce dures normally found only in criminal law.” 4
Moreove r, the J uvenile J ustice Code p rovi des that juvenile-de linquency proce eding s, althoug h
g ener ally g overne d by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e, are additionally subject to Chapter 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedur e, which includes provisions rela ting to the admissibili ty of evidenc e in c riminal case s. For

these re asons, when r eviewing a motion to suppress evidenc e in a juvenile 5

case , we are to use the s am e b i furcated standard applicable to the revie w of suppression motions i n adult criminal case s. Thus, we g ive almost total defe renc e to a trial court’s deter mination of 6
historical facts and mi x ed questions of l aw and fac t that rely upon the cr edibility

of a witness, but apply a de novo standard of revie w to pure questions of law and mix ed questions of law and fac t that do not depend on c redibility deter minations. 7 Additionally , we are to revie w a trial co u rt’s ruling on a motion to suppress in

a juvenile case for abuse of discretion. I n other words, we will “over turn the t ri al court’s ruling 8

In re H.V

. , 252 S.W .3d 319, 323 (Tex. 2008). 4 See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.17(a ), (c ); see also Tex. Code Crim. P roc. a rt. 38.22, .23. 5 See In r e R

. J. H. , 79 S.W .3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002); In re A.M. , 333 S.W .3d 411, 414-15 6 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. denied) ; In re D.G. , 96 S.W .3d 465, 467 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). Martinez v. State , 348 S.W .3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Guzman v. State ,

7 955 S.W .2d 85, 87-89 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997)); see R.J .H. , 79 S.W .3d at 6-7. R.J.H. , 79 S.W .3d at 6; In re D.J.C. , 312 S.W .3d 704, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 8 2009, no pet.). 3only if it is outside the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment.” “We will sustain the trial court’s ruling 9
if that ruling is ‘re asonably supported by the record and is corre ct on any theory of l aw applicable to the case .’” We must vi ew the e vidence in the light most favor able to the tria l court’s ruling

.

1 0 1 1 “Thus, the party that preva iled in the trial court is aff orded the strong es t l egi timate view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona

ble infer ence s that may

be dra wn from that e vidence .” 1 2

ANALYSIS
I n his sole issue on appea l, C.R.M. asser ts that the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that C.R.M.’s st at em en t to Swain—acknow ledg ing that the marihuana belong ed to him—was admissible in evidenc e. This is so, C.R.M. arg ues, beca use he was subjected to custodial interrog ation at the time he made the statement. I n case s in w hich a juvenile has made a statement while being subjected to custodial interrog ation, the statement is adm issible in evidenc e only if cer tain statutory war

nings wer e provided t o t h e j u venile prior to the statement being made. 1 3

Martinez , 348 S.W .3d at 922. 9 Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W .3d 442, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Dixon , 1 0 206 S.W .3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); D.J.C. , 312 S.W .3d at 711.

State v. Garcia-Cantu , 253 S.W .3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); R.J.H. , 79 S.W .3d 1 1 at 7. Garcia-Cantu , 253 S.W .3d at 241.

1 2 See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a) (1)( A) , (5). These war nings are that: (i) the child may 1 3 rema in silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement that the child makes may be used i n evidenc e aga inst the child; (ii) t he child has t he right to have an attorne y prese nt to advise the ch i l d ei ther prior to any questioning or during the questioning; (iii) if the child is unable to employ an attorne y , the child has t he right t o have an attorney appointed to counse l with the child befor e or during any interviews with pe ace office rs or attorney s repr esenting the state; and (iv) the child has the rig ht to terminate the intervie w at any time. 4Howeve r, in the absenc e of custodial interrog ation, these war nings are not require d. I n this c ase, 1 4
it is undispute d t h at C

. R

. M. did not rec eive the statutory war nings prior to making his statement. There fore , the dispositi ve issue is whether C.R.M. was s u b j ec t ed to custodial interrog ation at the time he made his stateme nt to Swain.

Custodial interrog at i o n is define d as “questioning initiated by law enfor ceme nt office rs afte r a person has been taken into custody .” Be cause the questioning must be “initiated” 1 5 by law enfor ceme nt office rs, “the term ‘custodial interrog ation’ encompa sses only police
prac tices.” Acc ording ly , t h i s C o u rt has held that questioning of a student by a principal does

1 6 not, as a g ener al rule, rise to the level of custodial interrog ation. Only when the principal or other 1 7
school offic ial is acting as an “ ag ent” of law enf orce ment does the que stioning rise to that leve l. 1 8

See id

. § 51.095(b), (d); see also Martinez v. State , 131 S.W .3d 22, 32 (Tex. A pp.—San 1 4 Antonio 2003, no pet.) (“[A] statement which is not the product of custodial inte rr o gat i o n i s not require d to be suppressed, even when the juvenile does not rec eive the statutory admonishments.”).

Miranda v. Ariz ona , 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Elizondo v. State , 382 S.W .3d 389, 394 1 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Paez v. State , 681 S.W .2d 34, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis , 1 6 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980)) ; see also Macias v. State , 733 S.W .2d 192, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Oriji v. State , 150 S.W .3d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, pet. re f’d)

.

See In re V.P. , 55 S.W .3d 25, 3 2 -3 3 (T ex . App.—Aust in 2001, pet. denied) ; see also 1 7 In re M.R. , No. 11-08-00155- CV, 2010 Tex. App. L E XIS 3 681, at *9-10 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 13, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). See V.P. , 55 S.W .3d at 32-33; see also M.R. , 2010 Tex. App. L EXI S 3681 at *9 (“[T]he 1 8 safe g uards attendant to custodial interrog ation do not come into play unless the person to whom the statements ar e made is acting as an a g ent of the police .” (c iting Paez , 681 S.W .2d at 37)). 5“The term ‘ag ency ’ denotes a consensua l rela tionship which ex i s ts betwee n

two persons or parties whe re one of them is acting for or on behalf of the other .” “The law does

1 9 not, howeve r, presume an ag ency rela tionship.” “The person alleg ing such a rela tionship has the

2 0
burden of proving it.” I n deter mining whether this burden of proof has been satisfied, “cour ts must 2 1
examine the entire rec ord.” Fa ctors to consider in the analy sis include whether the p o l i ce wer e 2 2
prese n t d uring the interview; whether the police provided instructions to the interviewe r on what questions to ask; whether the questions asked by the interviewe r wer e “aimed at g aining information and evidenc e for a criminal prosec ution” or wer e “re lated to some other g oal”; and whether t he defe ndant believe d that he wa s speaking with a law- enfor ceme nt ag ent during the interview

. 2 3

I n this case , Swain testified that her purpose in interviewing C.R.M. was “to know if he wa s the s tudent who put the m arihua na in the backpack” so that she could deter mine who t o “discipline” for that behavior

. She explained, “[W ]e have a cer tain matrix that we g o by

. I f y ou do this, then this happens. I f it happens ag ain then this happens ty pe of thing. I t’s [a] discipline matrix

we use for the district. And for a first offe nse that would require a remova l to the alterna tive school, the first offe nse is 15 day s [sus pension].” Swain added, “And on my side, we don’t do criminal.
You know, we do school conseque nces for things that could be criminally rela ted, but we don’t, y ou

W ilkerson v. State , 173 S.W .3d 521, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 1 9 Id

. 2 0 Id

. 2 1 Id . at 530. 2 2 Id . at 530-31. 2 3 6know, [t he police] have to make that call on if it’s criminal or not, I g uess, y ou know.” L ater during

h er t es t i mony , Swain further testified t hat s he considered her i nvestig ation to be “administrativ e” rathe r than criminal in nature

. She explained, “I have to abide by school rules. I have scho o l lawbooks I keep in my desk.

. . . Once it become s criminal,

. . t hat’s out of my pay g rade or whateve r y ou want to call it. So any time that I h av e t o d o an i n t ervie w or a sear ch it’s administrative.” Ba sed on this evidenc e, the juvenile court would not have abused its discretion in finding that Swain had interviewe d C.R.M. not for a law-e nforc ement purpose b u t for the administrative purpose of fo l l o wi ng school disciplinary proce dures. Additionally , when asked if Deputy Coleman was “in any way involved in how [S wain] conducte d the interview,” Swain testified, “No.” Swain also testified that she was “ce rtain” that Coleman did not enter her office until afte r C.R.M. had admitted that the marihuana belong ed to him. Coleman provided s im il a r te s ti mony , confirming that he was not prese nt during the interview and did not participa te i n S wain’s investiga tion. Moreove r, there is nothing in the rec ord tending to show that C.R.M. wa s under the impression during the interview that Swain was acting as an ag ent of law enfor ceme nt during the interview or that Swain said or did any thing during the interview to cre ate such an impression. We conclude that this rec ord supports a finding by the juvenile court that C.R.M. failed t o s at i s fy h is burden to prove that Swain was acting as an ag ent of law enfor ceme nt when she interviewe d C.R.M.
Acc ording ly , we cannot con cl u d e t h at the juvenile court abused its discretion in deter mining that
C.R.M. was not subjected to custodial interrog ation when he admitted that the marihuana belong ed to him and in deny ing the motion to s uppress on that g round. 2 4

See V .P. , 55 S.W .3d at 32-33; see also M.R. , 2010 Tex. App. L EXI S 3681 at *9-10. 2 4
7We overrule C.R.M.’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION We affir m the juvenile cour

t’s judgme nt of delinquenc y .

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice
Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and B ourland Affir med Filed: Aug ust 10, 2016

8