T.C. Memo. 1997-403

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

MELVIN J. LANEY AND CAROLYN A. LANEY, Petitioners v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 24510-90. Filed September 11, 1997. 

Petitioners (Ps) claimed on the Schedule C of

their 1983 tax return a $16.3 million “theft/casualty”

loss. Ps carried forward this loss as a net operating

loss to their 1986, 1987, and 1988 tax returns. Ps

contend they are entitled to the claimed deductions,

even if the deductions are not otherwise allowable,

because of a settlement agreement with the Department

of Justice in connection with a suit in the Court of

Claims. Ps also contend that they had a binding

settlement agreement with the Internal Revenue Service

in the instant case, allowing a net operating loss of

more than $0.5 million. 

1. Held: Ps did not have a settlement agreement

with either the Department of Justice or the Internal

Revenue Service. 

2. Held, further, Ps are not entitled to loss

carryover deductions on account of theft, casualty, or
- 2 -

1 Unless indicated otherwise, all section and chapter

references are to sections and chapters of the Internal Revenue

Code of 1986 as in effect for the years in issue. 

trade or business; respondent concedes Ps are entitled

to capital loss carryover deductions. 

3. Held, further, Ps are liable for additions to

tax under sec. 6651(a), I.R.C. 1986, for 1987, and

under sec. 6653(a), I.R.C. 1986, for 1986, 1987, and

1988. 

4. Held, further, Ps are not liable for additions

to tax under sec. 6661, I.R.C. 1986, for 1986, 1987,

and 1988. 

Melvin J. Laney and Carolyn A. Laney, pro sese.

Diane D. Helfgott, Robert Dietz, and Kristine A. Roth, for

respondent. 

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

CHABOT, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in

Federal individual income tax and additions to tax under sections

6651(a)1 (failure to timely file tax returns), 6653(a)(1)

(negligence, etc.), and 6661 (substantial understatement of

income tax liability) against petitioners as follows:

 Additions to Tax 

Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec.

Year Deficiency1 6651(a) 6653(a)(1)(A) 6653(a)(1)(B) 6653(a)(1) 6661

1986 $14,096 $331 $705 2 --- $3,524

1987 9,159 2,052 458 2 --- 2,290

1988 8,582 429 --- --- $429 2,146

1 Of these amounts, $3,070 for 1987 and $3,776 for 1988 are self-employment taxes

under ch. 2; the remainders are income taxes under ch. 1. 
- 3 -

2 Among respondent’s concessions are the following: 

(1) Respondent concedes that petitioners timely filed

their 1986 and 1988 tax returns, and thus that petitioners

are not liable for the sec. 6651(a) addition to tax for 1986

and 1988. 

(2) Respondent concedes that the Rodriguez Key project

was a transaction entered into for profit.

(3) Respondent concedes, for purposes of the instant

case, that petitioners’ 1984 and 1985 tax returns are

correct, with the exception of the net operating

“theft/casualty” loss carryover deductions claimed thereon.

(4) Respondent concedes that Laney had a 1983 loss from

the foreclosure of the Rodriguez Key property and that

petitioners may carry this loss forward to 1986 and later

years, but contends that the amount available for 1986 is

$90,578.21 and that the loss is a capital loss, subject to

the limitations of secs. 165(f) and 1211. The effect of

this concession would be to allow petitioners to deduct

$3,000 from ordinary income for each of the years in issue. 

3 Although petitioners dispute the self-employment tax

determinations, it appears that this is merely a consequence of

their contention that they are entitled to deduct theft/casualty

net operating loss carryovers, and not because they otherwise

dispute the application of ch. 2. As infra table 2 shows,

(continued...)

2 Fifty percent of the interest due on the entire deficiency. Some parts of the

notice of deficiency that list the additions to tax do not show that respondent

determined any additions to tax under sec. 6653(a)(1)B), but Schedules 5, 8, and 14 of

the notice of deficiency do show these determinations. Taking the 20-page notice of

deficiency as a whole, and in light of the fact that par. 3 of respondent’s answer

specifically refers to sec. 6653(a)(1)(B) and that petitioners have not raised any

objection to that reference, we conclude that petitioners were not misled by

respondent’s failure to note the sec. 6653(a)(1)(B) determinations on several pages of

the notice of deficiency where one would have expected the determinations to be noted. 

Accordingly, we hold that respondent made the above-noted sec. 6653(a)(1)(B)

determinations in the instant case’s notice of deficiency. Bokum v. Commissioner, 94

T.C. 126, 127 n.2 (1990), affd. 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993); Saint Paul Bottling

Co. v Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1137 (1960).

After concessions by respondent2 and a deemed concession by

petitioners,3 the issues for decision are as follows: 
- 4 -

3(...continued)

petitioners reported self-employment tax liabilities for each

year from 1978 through 1982. However, see sec. 1402(a)(4),

which, for purposes of self-employment taxes expressly disallows

net operating loss deductions in computing net earnings from

self-employment. Apart from the disallowance of the claimed

theft/casualty net operating loss deductions, respondent has not

made any adjustments to the amounts, categories, or accounting

methods that petitioners reported on the Schedules C attached to

petitioners’ tax returns for the years in issue. Apart from

these disallowed deductions, the amounts shown on petitioners’

Schedules C would result in a net profit of $24,959 for 1987 and

$29,000 for 1988. See infra table 1. As a result, it appears

that respondent’s determination of self-employment tax

liabilities is correct, regardless of our conclusions as to the

proper treatment of petitioners’ claimed deductions. 

(1) Whether petitioners had a binding settlement

agreement entitling them to deduct a net operating loss

carryover for the years in issue.

(2) Whether petitioners had a 1983 theft loss, or

casualty loss, or trade or business loss that could

properly be carried over to the years in issue and, if

so, then in what amount. 

(3) Whether petitioners are liable for a late

filing addition to tax under section 6651(a) for 1987. 

(4) Whether petitioners are liable for negligence,

etc., additions to tax under section 6653(a)(1) for

1986, 1987, and 1988 and if so for 1986 or 1987, then

in what amounts.

(5) Whether petitioners are liable for additions

to tax under section 6661 for 1986, 1987, and 1988.
- 5 -

4 In addition, in December 1970 Laney received a J.D.

degree from American University, in the District of Columbia. He

noted this on his resume, but he is not admitted to practice in

any jurisdiction, and he did not hold himself out as selling his

services as a lawyer. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated; the stipulations and

the stipulated exhibits are incorporated herein by this

reference. 

When the petition was filed in the instant case, petitioners

Melvin J. Laney (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Laney) and

Carolyn A. Laney resided in Spencerville, Maryland. 

Background

Laney has a degree in medicinal chemistry.4 Laney began to

develop an expertise in computer work during the 1950's as a high

school student. About 1957 Laney won a national prize for a

computer program. Laney also received other awards for his

computer skills. After he completed his schooling, Laney

frequently was called on to use his expertise in designing

computer and information systems both in a university setting and

professionally. 

From about 1971 through 1974 Laney was the Executive

Director of the Society for Computer Medicine. He conducted, or

was the keynote speaker of, several national conferences for this

organization. He also edited journals in the field of computer

medicine. 
- 6 -

For more than 2 years in the mid-1970's Laney provided

consulting services exclusively to the Federal Government. In

this period Laney worked as an expert consultant to the National

Institutes of Health (hereinafter sometimes referred to as NIH)

to develop a national database for laboratory animals. Laney

obtained national recognition because of his work at NIH. As a

result of the renown and expertise he developed, when Laney left

NIH, he was approached by pharmaceutical companies to perform

consulting work. In late 1976 or early 1977 Laney began to do

consulting work for the Lederle Laboratories Division of American

Cyanamid Co., hereinafter sometimes referred to as Lederle. By

the end of July 1977 this arrangement was formalized in a

consulting contract for work in “toxicology computer systems

development”. 

After Laney began to do consulting work for Lederle, he also

began to do consulting work for several other pharmaceutical

companies, including the following: Dow Chemical Co., Monsanto

Co., Merrill Pharmaceutical Co., and Sterling-Winthrop Research

Institute, hereinafter sometimes referred to as Dow, Monsanto,

Merrill, and Sterling-Winthrop, respectively. 

Laney began his consulting work for Dow in 1979. Around

this time Laney visited divisions of Dow in order to meet with

scientists who were involved with the production of animal data,

and to view the information systems and procedures of these
- 7 -

scientists. Laney did this in order to get knowledge to enable

him to relate their information systems to the type of

information systems that Laney would put into place at the

Rodriguez Key project (hereinafter sometimes referred to as

R.K.), described infra. Laney’s work with Dow continued into at

least 1982. Laney consulted with Dow about a computerized system

for managing animal data in Dow’s toxicology studies. Laney was

initially invited to work for Dow because he was working on the

information system prototype for R.K. Laney’s initial work for

Dow was not related to R.K., but was to help Dow’s Health and

Safety Division construct its own computer centers that could be

designed, programmed, and run independent of Dow’s controller’s

office. At some point, Laney also consulted with Dow about

problems with “Agent Orange”. Eventually Laney advised Dow on

how to develop an information system that could communicate with

outside sources such as (1) other divisions of Dow located in

various places around the world and (2) R.K. As a result of

Laney’s work with Dow, Dow built a computer center that was tied

into an international communications network; the software that

was used in this computer center was consistent with software

that Laney designed for Lederle and Sterling-Winthrop. 

In or around 1978 Laney began to consult for Monsanto. 

Laney was initially invited to work for Monsanto because he was

working on the information system prototype for R.K. Laney
- 8 -

consulted with Monsanto about the development of integrated,

centralized, information systems for health and safety testing. 

The information system that Monsanto developed was consistent

with the information system that would be put into place at R.K. 

Laney’s consulting work for Monsanto did not involve Monsanto’s

sponsorship of research at R.K.

During the time that Laney was working on the information

system prototype for R.K., he began his consulting work for

Merrill. Laney consulted with Merrill about designs for a

centralized and integrated information system. This was

consistent with the use of the information system prototype for

R.K. Although Merrill expressed an interest in sponsoring

research at R.K., this sponsorship never occurred. 

Laney did consulting work for Sterling-Winthrop from 1980 to

at least 1982. Laney was initially invited to work for SterlingWinthrop because he had designed the information system prototype

for R.K. Laney consulted for Sterling-Winthrop to design a

centralized and integrated information system for health and

safety testing that could communicate with outside sources, such

as (1) Sterling-Winthrop divisions, (2) Sterling-Winthrop

contractors, and (3) the information system that would be put

into place at R.K. As a result of Laney’s work for SterlingWinthrop, Sterling-Winthrop spent substantial amounts for an

information system. 
- 9 -

In the early 1970's, Laney created a sole proprietorship

known as Melvin J. Laney Associates. On March 19, 1981, Laney

incorporated Melvin J. Laney Associates, Inc. These businesses

are hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Laney Proprietorship

and the Laney Corporation, respectively, and as the Laney

Entities, in the aggregate. Laney was the sole owner of each of

the Laney Entities. The Laney Corporation’s only consulting

contract was with Sterling-Winthrop.

Laney did some of his consulting work in his office, which

was located in a building on the same property as his residence. 

Laney also traveled to do consulting work. Laney either was

reimbursed for his travel related to his consulting work, or he

included these costs in his fees; however, Laney was often housed

in a corporate suite or motel room when he traveled. In or

around 1980 Laney almost completely stopped doing consulting work

that was not related to the information system prototype for R.K. 

The Rodriguez Key Project

Overview

In 1977 Laney began to work on R.K. R.K. involved the

development of a primate breeding and vaccine testing facility.

On June 24, 1978, Laney bought an island, Rodriguez Key

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Island), in Monroe

County, Florida; the Island was to be used as a situs for R.K. 

Laney bought the Island for a total of $184,442.20 (purchase
- 10 -

5 Also, Laney paid at least the following amounts in

connection with R.K.: (a) $9,673.14 in property taxes, (b)

$24,334.45 in engineering and consulting fees, (c) $28,550.22 in

legal fees, (d) $270.50 for permits, and (e) $1,326.74 for

services. 

6 The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-

164, 96 Stat. 25, merged the United States Court of Claims into

the newly created Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and,

in effect, reconstituted the trial division of the Court of

Claims into a newly created United States Claims Court, a socalled Article I court. More recently, the United States Claims

Court was renamed the United States Court of Federal Claims. 

Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-572, sec.

902(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516. These changes in status and

name do not affect the substance of any action for purposes of

the instant opinion. In order to avoid the confusions attendant

on name and status changes during the course of Laney’s damages

litigation, we will generally refer to the forum for that

litigation as the Court of Claims.

price $183,750, closing costs $692.20), with a purchase-money

mortgage in the amount of $147,000, a term of 4 years, and an

interest rate of 8-1/2 percent. Laney did not make any principal

payments on the mortgage, but he made $46,856.25 in interest

payments.5 Laney intended to house 40,000 primates on the Island

to be used by pharmaceutical companies to test drugs and for AIDS

research. 

Laney filed for appropriate permits from the Army Corps of

Engineers and a Florida agency. He eventually received the

Florida agency permit, but not the Army Corps of Engineers

permit. He sued in the United State Court of Claims,6 which

denied both sides’ summary judgment motions and remanded the case

for trial. In the meanwhile, Laney could not make mortgage
- 11 -

payments, and the Island was sold at foreclosure. Then Laney

filed for bankruptcy. Then Laney voluntarily dismissed his Court

of Claims petition. 

The Property and Lawsuits

The Island was well situated to house a large-scale primate

breeding and research facility, because of its (1) subtropic

climate, (2) isolation, and (3) biological conditions. R.K., as

contemplated by Laney, would have been the largest primate

research center of its kind in the world. Laney planned to make

a profit from R.K. by renting primate cage space. He also

expected to rent housing and other facilities for the people that

the pharmaceutical companies would send to the Island to conduct

studies. Thus, he worked on a design for hurricane-proof housing

for humans. Also, Laney expected to be able to charge the

pharmaceutical companies for his consulting services in

connection with their studies. He planned to offer the

combination of his expertise in computer planning, his scientific

background, and his understanding of Federal Drug Administration

requirements for approval of drugs. However, he did not intend

to require that the companies that rented facilities on the

Island use his consulting services.

Laney designed a computer system to control R.K. and the

research expected to be conducted in that project. The initial

design for this computer system was completed in 1978. The
- 12 -

information systems Laney worked on at Dow, Lederle, Monsanto,

Merrill, and Sterling-Winthrop were designed to be able to

communicate with the computer system that would be put into place

at R.K. 

Although much time, effort, and money were spent in the

design and planning of R.K., the only improvements ever made to

the Island were trails, boardwalks, and some improvements to the

landing sites. R.K. did not become operational, either as a

primate facility or as a source of data for computer systems. 

Laney ordinarily did not use accountants in connection with

his consulting trade or business. However, around the start of

his work on R.K., Laney told an accountant that R.K. was separate

from his consulting activities and that he expected to put a lot

of money into R.K., and that he wanted advice as to how to

account for his R.K. expenditures for tax purposes and for

accounting purposes. The accountant advised him to separately

account for expenditures that were investments in R.K., that

Laney had a choice of deducting certain expenditures when paid or

capitalizing the expenditures and deducting them later, and that

it probably was better to capitalize and deduct later. Laney

agreed, and capitalized his R.K. expenditures. As early as 1977

Laney capitalized his expenditures for rental of certain computer

equipment used exclusively for foundation planning for R.K. 
- 13 -

When most of Laney’s consulting work related to R.K., his

practice was to pay himself a “salary”, “my typical salary at the

time”. Petitioners reported these “salary” amounts on their tax

returns. See infra table 2 note 1. Petitioners did not report

as income the amounts in excess of this “salary” that Laney

received for his consulting work related to R.K. In particular,

petitioners did not report on their 1977 tax return at least

$14,162.73 that Laney had received for consulting work and that

he spent on R.K. For the years 1977 through 1982, petitioners

omitted to report, in this manner, about $480-490 thousand of

Laney’s consulting fee receipts. 

When Laney asked the accountant for advice on the treatment

of expenditures, Laney did not ask for and did not receive advice

about the treatment of receipts. 

Laney understood from his questioning of the accountant that

there would come a time when petitioners could deduct their

capitalized R.K. expenditures. However, Laney did not believe

that he would ever have to include in income the 1977 through

1982 consulting fees that petitioners had omitted to report when

received; petitioners did not include these amounts in income on

their 1983 tax return, even though they did report their

capitalized R.K. expenses on that tax return. 

Laney bought a Data General computer. In 1981 Laney sold it

to Sterling-Winthrop and made a profit of about $18,000 on the
- 14 -

7 So stipulated. The Court of Claims found that the

application was filed on July 9, 1978. Laney v. United States,

228 Ct. Cl. 519, 661 F.2d 145, 146 (1981). The difference in

dates is not material for our purposes. 

sale. Laney used the $18,000 to pay R.K. expenses. Petitioners

did not report the sale, the $18,000 income therefrom, or the

R.K. expenditures on their 1981 tax return. Petitioners deducted

the $18,000 expenditures on their 1983 tax return, but did not

report the $18,000 income on their 1983 tax return. 

On July 31, 1978,7 Laney filed a joint permit application

with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Florida Department of

Environmental Regulations for permits to develop the Island as a

primate breeding and vaccine testing facility. In a “FINAL

ACTION” dated October 22, 1979, the Army Corps of Engineers

denied Laney’s permit application to (1) discharge fill material

in navigable waters in order to form a permanent concrete capped

pier, and (2) construct a floating pier in navigable waters, both

of which Laney believed were necessary in order to develop the

Island as a primate breeding and vaccine testing facility. 

On March 16, 1980, Laney sued in the Court of Claims,

alleging (1) that the action, described supra, of the Army Corps

of Engineers denied any access to or use of the Island, and thus

(2) that the action constituted a taking for which Laney should

be compensated in the amount of $16,347,250. Laney’s counsel in
- 15 -

the Court of Claims case was Thomas C. Henry, hereinafter

sometimes referred to as Henry. 

On August 19, 1981, the Court of Claims denied Laney’s

motion for summary judgment and also denied the United States’

cross-motion for summary judgment on the takings issue, holding

that “Under any view of the law short of these inadmissible

extremes there are relevant issues of fact requiring trial.” 

Laney v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 519, 661 F.2d 145, 150

(1981). The Court of Claims remanded the case to its trial

division for further proceedings. 

On October 23, 1981, the Florida Department of Environmental

Regulations granted Laney’s permit application to develop the

Island as a primate breeding and vaccine testing facility. 

On May 17, 1983, a Florida court granted a foreclosure sale

of the Island to the holder of the mortgage note, Frederick

Poppe, hereinafter sometimes referred to as Poppe. The Island

was sold for $50,000 to Poppe, and Poppe also received a $75,000

deficiency judgment against Laney. A trial date had not yet been

set in his Court of Claims suit, and on December 6, 1983, Laney

voluntarily dismissed his Court of Claims petition. 

On October 25, 1983, the Laney Corporation filed for relief

under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On January 6, 1984,

this case was converted to a case under chapter 7, on motion of

the Laney Corporation. On Mach 20, 1984, Laney, t/a (trading as)
- 16 -

the Laney Proprietorship, filed for relief under chapter 7 of the

Bankruptcy Code. On July 24, 1984, Laney was granted a discharge

under chapter 7 which, among other matters, discharged the

$75,000 foreclosure deficiency judgment. 

On February 25, 1992, Laney filed a motion to reopen the

Court of Claims suit that he had previously dismissed. This

motion was denied on June 18, 1992. Laney v. United States, 26

Cl. Ct. 318 (1992). 

Tax Returns

Petitioners did not attach Schedules C to their tax returns

for 1977 through 1982. See infra table 2 note 1. On the

Schedules C attached to their tax returns for 1983 through 1988,

petitioners showed the business name as the Laney Proprietorship

and the main business activity as “Consulting & Primate Farm”. 

Table 1 summarizes information appearing on the Schedules C

attached to petitioners’ tax returns for 1983 through 1988. 
Table 1

 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Gross receipts $564,189.13 1 

1 1 $91,723.54 $110,448.33

Gross income 345,282.92 $9,465.00 $183.49 $3,398.00 91,723.54 110,448.33

Total deductions 230,449.78 15,762.39 3,985.52 4,942.42 66,764.54 2 81,448.28

 excluding theft/

 casualty loss 

 deduction

Net profit(loss) 114,833.14 (6,297.39) (3,802.03) (1,544.42) 24,959.00 2 29,000.05

 excluding theft/

 casualty loss

 deduction

Theft/casualty loss 16,347,250.00 16,194,002.60 16,182,867.55 16,142,546.20 16,072,854.77 16,047,895.77

 deduction

Net profit (loss) (16,232,416.86) (16,200,299.99) (16,186,669.58) (16,144,090.62) (16,047,895.77) 2 (16,018,895.77)

1 Petitioners did not show any amounts on the “Gross receipts or sales” lines of the indicated Schedules C. 

2 The total of the 1988 Schedule C deductions shown on the tax return is 5 cents less than the amount shown on the

“total deductions” line of the 1988 Schedule C. This 5-cent error does not affect the amount of the “rounded-off”

deficiency. 
- 18 -

The $564,189.13 amount that petitioners reported as gross

receipts on their 1983 tax return represents the amount that

Laney believed his clients had spent on R.K., both the actual

outlays of his clients and the value of the time of his clients’

personnel. This amount does not include any amounts that Laney’s

clients paid to him. The claimed $16,347,250 theft/casualty loss

deduction includes some $480-490 thousand that petitioners had

omitted from gross income over the period 1977 through 1982 and

had spent on R.K. 

Petitioners chose not to carry back their claimed 1983 net

operating loss, but instead to carry it only forward, and

attached statements to this effect to their 1983 and later tax

returns. 

Table 2 summarizes information appearing on the first and

second pages of petitioner’s tax returns for 1977 through 1988. 
Table 2

 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Wages, etc. $19,841.96 1 

 1 1 1 1

Business inc -0- 1 $6,500.00 1 $18,150.00 1 $26,000.00 1$25,000.00 1 $19,032.97

 (loss)

Int., div., tax 382.26 265.68 35.08 -0- -0- 8,726.79

 refund, cap 

 gain inc.

 (unexplained)

Misc. inc. -0- 5,763.29 -0- -0- -0- -0-

AGI 20,224.22 12,528.97 18,185.08 26,000.00 25,000.00 27,759.76

Ch. 1 tax 1,023.00 24.00 394.00 1,829.00 1,692.00 2,162.00

 (regular income)

Ch. 2 taxes -0- 526.50 1,458.00 2,097.90 2,325.00 1,779.58

 (self employ-

 ment)

1 Petitioners reported this income on Form 1040, line 8 (wages, etc.), and not line 13 (business income). Also,

the retained copy of the tax return did not include a Schedule C or a Schedule SE. However, the amounts of the

self-employment taxes shown on petitioners’ tax returns for 1978 through 1982 appear to be correct for the amount

of income shown. 
Table 2 Cont.

 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Wages, etc. $33,310.59 -0- $38,833.30 $63,710.73 $14,993.18 -0-

Business inc. (16,232,416.86) ($16,200,299.99) (16,186,669.58) (16,144,090.62) (16,047,895.77) (16,018,895.77)

 (loss)

Int., div., tax 5,103.67 17,432.44 5,290.08 7,525.12 7,743.67 14,770.02

 refund, cap

 gain inc.

Misc. inc. -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 27.00

AGI (16,194,002.60) (16,182,867.55) (16,142,546.20) (16,072,854.77) (16,025,158.92) (16,004,098.75)

Ch. 1 tax -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0-

 (regular income)

Ch. 2 taxes -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0-

 (self employ-

 ment)
- 21 -

Petitioners timely filed tax returns for 1986 and 1988. 

Petitioners timely filed for an automatic extension of time,

until August 15, 1988, to file their 1987 tax return. On August

15, 1988, petitioners timely filed a request for a further

extension, until May 5, 1989, to file their 1987 tax return. 

Petitioners were granted an extension only until October 17,

1988. Petitioners filed their 1987 tax return on May 11, 1989. 

Petitioners did not file their 1987 tax return, or a “first”,

“initial”, or “preliminary” 1987 tax return, before the May 11,

1989, filing referred to supra. 

After petitioners filed their petition in the instant case,

they dealt with an Appeals officer. After petitioner and the

Appeals officer failed to settle the case, petitioners sent a

letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, urging him to enter into

a section 7121 closing agreement with petitioners. The letter

and accompanying materials were referred to the Philadelphia

Internal Revenue Service Center. An employee at this Center

somehow came to the conclusion that the Appeals Office and

petitioner had entered into a binding settlement agreement and

thus a section 7121 closing agreement would not be appropriate. 

Respondent did not audit petitioners’ 1983, 1984, and 1985

tax returns. 

On May 5, 1988, the Maryland Tax Court issued an Order and

Memorandum of Grounds for Decision in a proceeding involving
- 22 -

petitioners’ Maryland income taxes for 1983, 1984, and 1985. In

its opinion the Maryland Tax Court concluded that petitioners

lost $563,784 in 1983 on account of the foreclosure sale of the

Island. 

 

Petitioners did not enter into a binding settlement

agreement with the Department of Justice in connection with

Laney’s Court of Claims suit. 

Petitioners and respondent did not have a binding settlement

agreement in the instant case, nor did they enter into a section

7121 agreement with respect to the instant case or any issue

therein. 

The Army Corp of Engineers did not criminally appropriate

the Island or any other asset connected with R.K. Poppe did not

criminally appropriate the Island or any other asset connected

with R.K.

R.K. was not part of Laney’s trade or business of offering

his services as a consultant. R.K. had not gone into operation

before Laney suffered his losses and was forced to give up the

Island and the entire project. 

Petitioners did not use due care in claiming the $16.3

million theft and casualty loss with a 15-year net operating loss

carryforward; and they failed to do what a reasonable and

ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances. 
- 23 -

Petitioners’ failure to file their 1987 income tax return

until May 11, 1989, was not due to reasonable cause.

Petitioners substantially understated their income tax

liabilities for 1986, 1987, and 1988; however, they adequately

disclosed in a statement attached to their tax returns the

relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of their claimed net

operating loss carryforward. 

OPINION

Every matter that we are to resolve in the instant case

stems directly from, or is substantially affected by, R.K.

I. Settlement

A. With Justice Department

Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a 1983

theft/casualty loss deduction with a 15-year net operating loss

carryover because Laney had an agreement with the Department of

Justice that he is entitled to deduct this net operating loss

carryover in exchange for voluntarily dismissing the Court of

Claims petition in which he alleged a taking of R.K. by the

United States. 

Respondent contends that petitioners did not have an

agreement with the Department of Justice. 

We agree with respondent.

In their pretrial memorandum, the first witness petitioners

listed was Henry, who was expected to testify about “the
- 24 -

settlement agreement [in Laney’s Court of Claims suit] forced by

the United States on Petitioner to take a theft/casualty loss on

their tax returns.” At trial, Laney stated petitioners’

intention to have Henry testify. On the third day of the trial

Laney stated that Henry was to testify on the fifth day of the

trial. On the fourth day of the trial Laney again assured us

that Henry was to appear and testify on the fifth day. Henry did

not testify on the fifth day. As one of the first items of

business on the sixth day, the Court noted the importance of

Henry’s testimony on the negligence issue, as part of an effort

to make sure that both sides understood the Court’s concerns

about apparently missing pieces of the puzzle presented in the

instant case. The trial lasted 7 days.

In the final analysis, petitioners chose not to call Henry,

and he did not testify. We are entitled to, and we do, infer

that if Henry had testified, then his testimony would have been

unfavorable to petitioners on this issue. O’Dwyer v.

Commissioner, 266 F.2d 575, 584 (4th Cir. 1959), affg. 28 T.C.

698, 703 (1957); Stoumen v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 903, 907 (3d

Cir. 1953), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated March

13, 1953; Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.

1158, 1165 (1946), affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947). 

We observed Laney at the trial in the instant case. On the

basis of these observations and the evidence of record, it is
- 25 -

obvious that Laney is intelligent, perceptive, cautious, and

self-protective to a fault. He generally refused to concede

anything he thought might be to his disadvantage, no matter how

clear the matter was. We are convinced that, if Laney understood

that the Department of Justice conceded his entitlement to a

$16.3 million deduction in exchange for his dropping his Court of

Claims suit, then (1) Laney would not have proceeded to drop that

suit unless he had the Department of Justice’s concessions in

writing, (2) Laney would have preserved this writing, and (3)

Laney would have produced this writing for the record in the

instant case. Petitioners did not present any such written

settlement agreement or any evidence that there ever was a

written settlement agreement. From the foregoing we infer that

(1) there was not a written settlement agreement, and (2) there

was no oral concession by the Department of Justice that Laney

would be entitled to the claimed deduction in consideration for

dropping his Court of Claims suit. 

On the first day of the trial petitioners offered into

evidence an affidavit by Henry. Laney explained that the

affidavit was offered as an expert witness report. The Court

indicated doubt that the affidavit would so qualify but noted

that ordinarily an expert witness report “is admissible if it is

identified [and adopted] by the expert at the trial and the

expert is made available for cross examination.” The Court
- 26 -

8 Compare Rule 143(b), that ex parte affidavits are not

evidence, with, e.g., Rule 121 to illustrate proper use of

affidavits in certain aspects of motion practice before this

Court. Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to

the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 

suggested that, if Laney wanted to offer the affidavit as an

expert witness report, then the time to do so was when Henry

appeared as a witness, as we had been informed would be the

situation. In the absence of agreement by respondent, the Court

declined to receive the affidavit into evidence on the first day

of the trial. 

Before the trial in the instant case, Laney had sought to

reopen his prior Court of Claims case. In support of his motion

before the Court of Claims (see supra note 6), Laney presented

what appears to be the same Henry affidavit that petitioners

offered into evidence in the instant case.8 We note that, in

the opinion denying Laney’s motion to reopen, the chief judge of

that court quoted from the affidavit and concluded that the

Department of Justice attorney did not make a settlement offer

and further “[concluded] that no settlement agreement was ever

consummated.” Laney v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 318, 322, 323

(1992). 

On the record in the instant case, we conclude, and we have

found, that petitioners did not enter into a binding settlement
- 27 -

9 Thus it is not necessary to decide whether, if the

Justice Department had made an agreement with petitioners, that

agreement would be binding on respondent. See Graff v.

Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743 (1980), affd. 673 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.

1982). 

agreement with the Department of Justice in connection with

Laney’s Court of Claims suit.9 

We hold for respondent on this issue. 

B. With Respondent

Petitioners argued at trial that they had entered into a

binding settlement agreement with respondent for the years in

issue. Petitioners explained that they believed perhaps

respondent had settled their case without their knowledge. 

Respondent contends that the parties in the instant case did

not enter into a binding settlement agreement. 

We agree with respondent. 

Petitioners were aware that they did not have a binding

settlement agreement with the Appeals officer. Petitioners’

letter to the Secretary of Treasury illustrates that, when they

wrote that letter, petitioners did not believe that they had a

binding settlement agreement with respondent. 

Petitioners rely on documents in which one or more of

respondent’s employees refer to binding settlement agreements. 

Testimony was presented by respondent’s employees as to how it

came to be that respondent advised the Secretary of the Treasury

that the Secretary could not enter into a closing agreement under
- 28 -

section 7121 because there was a binding settlement agreement in

the instant case. We did not come away from this part of the

case with the belief that we understand substantially everything

that happened. We do not understand how it came to be that

petitioners’ letter to the Secretary of the Treasury elicited the

response that there was a binding settlement agreement. 

We have recently discussed the nature of, and requirements

for, binding settlement agreements. Dorchester Industries, Inc.

v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320 (1997). We have reexamined the

record in the instant case; we conclude, and we have found, that

petitioners and respondent did not have a binding settlement

agreement, nor did they enter into a section 7121 agreement with

respect to the instant case or any issue therein. 

Respondent’s significant concessions, whether by stipulation

or unilateral, are limited as described supra note 2. Those

concessions will be given effect in the Rule 155 computation, but

do not have the far-reaching effect that petitioners seek. 

Because we conclude that there was not a settlement

agreement in the instant case, we do not need to consider, and we

do not consider, whether any individuals with whom petitioners

dealt had authority to enter into settlement agreements on behalf

of respondent. 

We hold for respondent on this issue. 
- 29 -

10 Sec. 6214 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

SEC. 6214. DETERMINATIONS BY TAX COURT. 

* * * * * * *

(b) Jurisdiction Over Other Years and Quarters.--The

Tax Court in redetermining a deficiency of income tax for

any taxable year or of gift tax for any calendar year or

calendar quarter shall consider such facts with relation to

the taxes for other years or calendar quarters as may be

necessary correctly to redetermine the amount of such

deficiency, but in so doing shall have no jurisdiction to

determine whether or not the tax for any other year or

calendar quarter has been overpaid or underpaid. 

II. Carryover Deductions

The years in issue in the instant case are 1986, 1987, and

1988. The deficiencies that respondent determined in the instant

case result from the disallowance of deductions carried over from

1983. In order to redetermine these deficiencies we must

consider whether an item arose in 1983, whether the item is of

the sort that might give rise to a carryover to the years in

issue, and if so, then what is the nature and amount of the item. 

Sec. 6214(b);10 Hill v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 437, 439-444

(1990), and cases cited therein. In general, the nature and

amount of the carryover item is determined and redetermined under

the law in effect for the year in which the carryover item arose

(1983), rather than the year(s) to which the carryover item is

carried. Sec. 172(e). 
- 30 -

11 Petitioners’ original claim, and the expert witness

evidence they presented at trial, go to the expected value of the

enterprise that was expected to arise from R.K. Petitioners

initially overlooked the effect of sec. 165(b), as follows:

SEC. 165. LOSSES.

* * * * * * *

(b) Amount of Deduction.--For purposes of

subsection (a), the basis for determining the amount of

the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis

provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from

the sale or other disposition of property. 

At one point in their answering brief petitioners contend

that their basis in the property involved in R.K. was “at least

$563,784”, but for the most part they still contend that they are

entitled to deduct $16,347,250 for 1983 and to carry over to the

years in issue the amounts shown on their tax returns for these

years. See supra table 1. 

Petitioners contend that they suffered a “theft/casualty”

loss in 1983 in the amount of $16,347,250, which is treated in

effect as a business loss for net operating loss deduction

purposes.11 See 172(d)(4)(C). Their deduction of this item on

the Schedule C attached to their 1983 tax return resulted in a

net loss in the amount of $16,232,416.86. They contend that they

properly elected to waive the carrybacks (sec. 172(b)(3)) and

instead claim to be entitled to carry this loss forward for 15

years including the years in issue as a net operating loss (sec.

172(b)(1)(A)(ii)). 

Respondent contends that (1) petitioners’ loss was much less

than petitioners claim, (2) the loss was not from a theft or
- 31 -

casualty, and (3) R.K. was not a trade or business, so

petitioners did not have a net operating loss, and so petitioners

are not entitled to net operating loss carryover deductions for

the years in issue. Respondent concedes that (1) petitioners had

a loss from R.K., (2) R.K. was a transaction entered into for

profit, and (3) petitioners are entitled to capital loss

carryover deductions for the years in issue. Because petitioners

did not have any capital gains for the years in issue, the

capital loss carryover deductions are only $3,000 per year. For

1986, see sec. 1211(b)(2)(B). For 1987 and 1988, see sec.

1211(b)(1). 

We agree with respondent.
- 32 -

12 Sec. 165, as in effect for 1983, provides, in pertinent

part, as follows: 

SEC. 165. LOSSES.

(a) General Rule.--There shall be allowed as a

deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not

compensated for by insurance or otherwise. 

* * * * * * *

(c) Limitations on Losses of Individuals.--In the case

of an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall

be limited to--

(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;

(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered

into for profit, though not connected with a trade or

business; and

(3) except as provided in subsection (h) [relating

to presidentially proclaimed disasters], losses of

property not connected with a trade or business, if

such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other

casualty, or from theft. 

* * * * * * *

(e) Theft Losses.--for purposes of subsection (a), any

loss arising from theft shall be treated as sustained during

the taxable year in which the taxpayer discovers such loss. 

Although the years in issue are 1986, 1987, and 1988, we use

the statute as in effect for 1983 because that is the year for

which the loss was claimed and from which the loss was carried

forward. The later amendment of subsec. (c)(3), by sec.

711(c)(2)(A)(i) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-

369, 98 Stat. 494, 943, does not affect the instant case. 

Losses are deductible under section 165.12 Individuals are

not permitted to deduct losses unless the losses are (1) incurred
- 33 -

in a trade or business, or (2) incurred in a transaction entered

into for profit, or (3) arise from a casualty or a theft. Sec.

165(c). 

Laney began to work on R.K. in 1977. He bought the Island

in 1978, and applied for permits to develop the Island and make

it accessible. The Army Corps of Engineers turned him down in

1979. Laney sued in the Court of Claims in 1980. The Court of

Claims denied both sides’ summary judgment motions in 1981, and

the case was returned to the trial division of the Court of

Claims. Laney failed to make the principal payment on his

purchase-money mortgage, and Poppe, the then holder of the

mortgage note, foreclosed; the Florida court granted foreclosure

in 1983. Later in 1983 the Laney Corporation filed a chapter 11

bankruptcy petition. In 1984 this was converted to a chapter 7

proceeding; then Laney trading as the Laney Proprietorship filed

under chapter 7; then Laney was granted a discharge under chapter

7. 

A. Loss From Theft

In order to be treated as a theft loss under section 165,

the loss must arise from a criminal appropriation of the

taxpayer’s property. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th

Cir. 1956); Horn v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 908, 940 (1988);

Nichols v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 842, 884 (1965). A seizure of

property by a government under color of legal authority is not a
- 34 -

13 See Laney v. United States, 661 F.2d at 147-149,

holding that the Army Corps of Engineers misinterpreted the law. 

theft, whether or not the government conduct is arbitrary or

despotic. Farcasanu v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C.

Cir. 1970), affg. 50 T.C. 881 (1968); Powers v. Commissioner, 36

T.C. 1191, 1192 (1961). As to foreclosures and repossessions,

see Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 908, 909 (8th Cir. 1961);

Rafter v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 1, 13 (1973), affd. without

published opinion 489 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974). 

Whether or not the Army Corps of Engineers acted within its

lawful authority,13 we conclude, and we have found, that the Army

Corps of Engineers did not criminally appropriate the Island or

any other asset connected with R.K.

We conclude, and we have found, that Poppe’s actions in

successfully enforcing his rights under the purchase-money

mortgage note did not constitute a criminal appropriation of the

Island or any other asset connected with R.K. Johnson v. United

States, 291 F.2d at 909. 

Petitioners point out that respondent did not dispute their

1983, 1984, and 1985 theft/casualty loss deductions and

carryovers. As supra table 1 shows, petitioners reported a

substantial profit for 1983, but for this deduction. Also,

petitioners reported other income for 1984, and wage and other

income for 1985 (see supra table 2), in amounts substantially
- 35 -

greater than the losses that petitioners reported for these

years, but for their theft/casualty deductions. Thus, it appears

that petitioners would have had tax liabilities for 1983, 1984,

and 1985 if respondent had disallowed the claimed theft/casualty

deductions. We do not know why respondent failed to audit

petitioners’ tax returns for these years. Respondent’s failure

to timely audit petitioners’ 1983, 1984, and 1985 tax returns may

have resulted in petitioners’ obtaining a windfall for those

years, but it does not estop respondent from auditing petitioners

for 1986, 1987, and 1988 on the theft/casualty loss deduction

carryover issue and determining deficiencies for these years on

this issue. Thomas v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 206, 225-227 (1989),

and cases there cited. 

We hold, for respondent, that Laney’s claimed 1983 loss did

not arise from theft. 

B. Loss From Casualty

A loss must arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or “other

casualty” in order to be treated as a casualty loss under section

165. Sec. 165(c)(3). Clearly, Laney’s R.K. loss did not arise

from a fire, a storm, or a shipwreck. Generally, in order for a

loss to arise from an “other casualty” (1) the event causing the

loss must be sudden, undesigned, violent or forceful, unexpected,

and accidental, and (2) the direct and proximate damage from the

event must cause a loss that is similar to losses arising from
- 36 -

fires, storms, and shipwrecks. Popa v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.

130, 132-133 (1979); White v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 430, 434-435

(1967); Durden v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1, 3-4 (1944). As we put

it in Billman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 139, 141-142 (1979)--

We cannot believe that the Internal Revenue Code

was designed to take care of all losses that the

economic world may bestow on its inhabitants. It is

restricted in its description of a casualty loss to

“losses aris[ing] from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other

casualty, or from theft.” Certainly these taxpayers

did not suffer from “fire, storm, [or] shipwreck.” Of

course they suffered. But, was it from “other

casualty?” To us, “other casualty” means a similar

kind of occurrence to “fire, storm, [or] shipwreck.” 

* * *

Firstly, Poppe’s successful foreclosure proceeding is not

the type of event that is sudden, undesigned, violent or

forceful, unexpected, and accidental. Secondly, even assuming

that petitioners lost all value of the Island and R.K. on account

of the Army Corps of Engineers’ action of denying permits to

develop the Island, that denial is not the type of event that is

sudden, undesigned, violent or forceful, unexpected, and

accidental. Thus, Laney’s loss was not from an “other casualty”. 

Powers v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. at 1193; see Beltran v. United

States, 441 F.2d 954, 960 (7th Cir. 1971); Alvarez v. United

States, 431 F.2d 1261, 1264 (5th Cir. 1970). 

We hold, for respondent, that Laney’s claimed 1983 loss did

not arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty. 
- 37 -

C. Loss From Trade or Business

As a result of subsections (c) and (d) of section 172, the

basic category of an individual’s losses that may constitute net

operating losses is losses from the conduct of a trade or

business. In general, expenditures paid or incurred in preparing

to enter a trade or business must be capitalized, even if those

expenditures are of a sort that ordinarily would be currently

deductible if the taxpayer had already entered the trade or

business. Hardy v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 684, 687 (1989), affd.

on this issue and remanded to consider a new issue per order

(10th Cir., Oct. 29, 1990). 

Because we conclude, for reasons described infra, that (1)

R.K. was not a part of Laney’s then-ongoing consulting trade or

business, and (2) R.K. had not yet gone into operation when Laney

suffered his losses therefrom, petitioners are not permitted to

carry over Laney’s R.K. losses as a net operating loss to the

years in issue. 

Whether a transaction is an expansion of an existing

business, or creates a new and distinct trade or business depends

on the facts and circumstances. In First Security Bank of Idaho,

N.A. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644 (1975), affd. 592 F.2d 1050

(9th Cir. 1979), this Court concluded that when First Security

Bank of Idaho and First Security Bank of Utah initiated consumer

credit card plans, the initial expenses were expenses of
- 38 -

expanding their already existing commercial banking activities,

and not preopening expenses of new businesses. On the other hand

in Hardy v. Commissioner, supra, this Court concluded that the

taxpayer’s intent to buy and thereafter to own and manage large

commercial hotel and motel properties was unrelated to the

taxpayer’s part-time work managing rental homes. 

We believe that the situation in the instant case is more

like a rental real estate manager beginning a new business as a

manager and owner of hotels and motels, than it is like

commercial banks expanding into the credit card industry. Laney

worked as a computer programming consultant. In or around 1977

Laney began to do computer consulting for several pharmaceutical

companies. Laney designed integrated computer systems for these

companies that could communicate with other computer systems. 

His work for these companies was performed either at their

facilities or at his home office. Laney’s consulting work

consisted of providing a service; it did not include rental of

space or ownership of real property. In the case of R.K.,

however, Laney’s plan was to profit from the rental of cage

space. He expected to offer his consulting services to the R.K.

researching entities, but none of those entities would be

required to use his consulting services. 

Petitioners called Clement C. Darrow II (hereinafter

sometimes referred to as Darrow), as an expert witness, both to
- 39 -

show the legitimacy of R.K. and to provide Darrow’s opinion as to

the value of R.K., if that project had not been cut off in its

infancy. Darrow had been director of a primate center for Litton

Bionetics under contract to NIH in 1978, when he was approached

by American Cyanamid Co. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as

American Cyanamid) to review plans for R.K. In August 1978,

Darrow began to work for American Cyanamid. He was hired to

direct American Cyanamid’s primate breeding and research work

that was planned to be carried out on the Island. He continued

to work for American Cyanamid in this role until March 1982. The

Court was satisfied that Darrow’s prior experience in responsible

positions in creating or supervising primate research operations,

and his lengthy involvement in R.K. planning as an American

Cyanamid employee, qualified him as an expert witness in the

offered matters. Darrow valued R.K. at $19,200,000, entirely on

the basis of an analysis of the cage fees that Laney was likely

to receive from the operations of R.K. To us, Darrow’s analysis

emphasizes the substantial differences between R.K. and Laney’s

established trade or business as a consultant. 

Also, Laney kept separate books and records for his

consulting services expenditures and his R.K. expenditures; he

generally deducted his consulting services expenditures currently

but capitalized his R.K. expenditures. Laney testified that he
- 40 -

14 Neither side discusses sec. 195, relating to

deductibility of startup expenditures. Laney’s testimony about

his pre-1983 notions of proper accounting procedures, his

promises to clarify matters later in the trial, and his brief

(continued...)

regarded R.K. as “a separate entity” for tax and accounting

purposes. 

We conclude, and we have found, that R.K. was not part of

Laney’s trade or business of offering his services as a

consultant. 

Because R.K. had not yet gone into operation when Laney

suffered his reverses and, in 1983, his loss in connection

therewith, Laney’s 1983 R.K. loss was not a loss attributable to

a trade or business, and so could not enter into the computation

of a net operating loss. Sec. 172(d)(4); Todd v. Commissioner,

77 T.C. 246 (1981), affd. 682 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1982). 

We hold, for respondent, that Laney’s claimed 1983 loss did

not arise from a trade or business. 

D. Nature and Amount of Loss

Respondent concedes that R.K. was a transaction entered into

for profit, within the meaning of section 165(c)(2). We have

held that Laney’s 1983 R.K. loss could not be carried forward as

a theft loss, a casualty loss, or a trade or business loss. 

Petitioners have not suggested, and we have not found, any other

ordinary loss that could be carried from 1983 to the years before

the Court.14 
- 41 -

14(...continued)

explanations of only a small portion of his 1,300-plus exhibits,

do not leave us in a position to determine on the record in the

instant case whether petitioners would be entitled to deductions

under sec. 195 that would affect any of the years in issue. 

Respondent concedes that Laney suffered a capital loss that,

under section 165(f), could be deducted and carried over within

the limits of sections 1211 and 1212. Respondent further

concedes that “the amount of loss available for carryforward as

of 1986 is $90,578.21". Petitioners have not reported any

capital gains or losses for 1986, 1987, or 1988. Under section

1211(b)(1), petitioners are entitled to deduct against ordinary

income up to $3,000 of this capital loss carryover for each of

the years before the Court. 

It is evident that respondent’s concession exceeds the

maximum amount that petitioners could deduct for the entire

period before us. Accordingly, even if we were to conclude that

petitioners are entitled to carry over a greater amount of loss

than respondent has conceded, any such conclusion could not

result in any greater deduction by petitioners for any of the

years in issue, and so any such conclusion could not affect the

decision to be entered in the instant case. 

As a result, we decline to determine in the instant case

whether petitioners are entitled to a greater capital loss

carryover than respondent has conceded. Chevron Corp. v.
- 42 -

15 Sec. 6651(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

SEC. 6651. FAILURE TO FILE TAX RETURN OR TO PAY TAX.

(a) Addition to the Tax.--In case of failure--

(1) to file any return required under

authority of subchapter A of chapter 61 * * *

on the date prescribed therefor (determined

with regard to any extension of time for

filing), unless it is shown that such failure

is due to reasonable cause and not due to

willful neglect, there shall be added to the

amount required to be shown as tax on such

return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if

the failure is for not more than 1 month,

with an additional 5 percent for each

additional month or fraction thereof during

which such failure continues, not exceeding

25 percent in the aggregate; 

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 590 (1992); LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 64

T.C. 589 (1975).

We hold that petitioners are entitled to deduct $3,000

against ordinary income for each of the years before us, on

account of their capital loss carryover to these years. 

III. Additions to Tax

A. Section 6651(a)(1)

Section 6651(a)(1)15 imposes an addition to tax of 5 percent

per month (with a maximum of 25 percent) in case of failure to

file a timely income tax return, unless it is shown that this

failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful

neglect. Petitioners have the burden of proving error in

respondent’s determination that this addition to tax should be
- 43 -

imposed against them. Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264, 266

(8th Cir. 1982), affg T.C. Memo. 1981-506; Ehrlich v.

Commissioner, 31 T.C. 536, 540 (1958). 

Respondent concedes that petitioners timely filed their 1986

and 1988 tax returns. See supra note 2. 

Petitioners received an automatic extension of time, until

August 15, 1988, to file their 1987 tax return. They timely

filed a request for a further extension, until May 5, 1989; they

were granted an extension only until October 17, 1988. They

filed their 1987 tax return on May 11, 1989, almost 7 months

late. 

At trial and on brief petitioners contend that they filed a

1987 “first return”, or “initial return”, on August 15, 1988,

together with their request for a further extension. 

Respondent’s records show both extensions, but do not show any

1987 tax return for petitioners filed before May 11, 1989. We

note that petitioners’ August 15, 1988, request for further

extension states the following as the last sentence of their

explanation of why they need the further extension: “Tax Payer

will be due a refund of $953.08 when the Federal return is filed

and owes no tax.” (Emphasis added.) This language strongly

suggests that the request for further extension was not

accompanied by any tax return for 1987. 
- 44 -

When this contention by petitioners first became apparent to

the Court, on the morning of the sixth day of trial, the

following colloquy occurred: 

THE COURT: And all this time you have not

provided for the Court, and I gather not provided for

respondent, a copy of the document that you are now

telling us was your tax return for 1987. 

THE WITNESS [Laney]: I discussed it at audit. I

discussed it with appeals. I have contended that we

did file on time and I have mentioned the fact that we

also asked for an extension and that a second return

was filed and petitioners have been consistent in that

position, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Laney, I had understood until now

that when you said that you contended that your tax

return was filed on time you were contending that you

had received extensions until May 5, 1989, and so the

question is whether or not you had indeed received such

an extension. But now, if I understand correctly, you

are telling us no, that’s not the deadline that is

applicable here and that is not the tax return that is

applicable here; the relevant deadline was August 15,

1988, and you satisfied that August 15, 1988, deadline

by mailing a tax return on August 15, 1988. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. When the trial

began for this day and we were discussing penalties

petitioner said that he had a certified mail receipt

for the fact that he had filed his return on time and

that it was dated August 15, 1988. 

THE COURT: But the only stipulated document as

the tax return was Exhibit 2-B, which clearly showed

your signature and Mrs. Laney’s signature of May 1989,

which was a flat out contradiction to your position. 

THE WITNESS: But we still stated at that time

that we had filed a return on August 15th. We’ve never

varied from that. We also took extensive precautions

in case that return was in error to provide us with the

ability to file a second return without paying a

penalty for having the refund if we did not deserve it. 
- 45 -

THE COURT: When, if at all, did you intend to

provide the Court with a copy of the return you claimed

to have filed on August 15, 1988?

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I will go to my records

and make a copy of that and bring that in tomorrow. I

apologize for the confusion. When we were audited and

that copy was first produced for the convenience of the

auditor and then apparently passed in the

administrative file and on up, it now appears that we

should have provided a copy of the initial filing. We

apologize for not doing that. 

Petitioners were given an opportunity to produce any retained

copy, or other evidence, of an earlier filed 1987 tax return.

They did not produce any such evidence. 

We do not believe Laney’s testimony that petitioners sent to

respondent a tax return for their 1987 liability together with

their August 15, 1988, request for further extension. We do not

believe that petitioners sent to respondent any tax return for

their 1987 liability before they sent the tax return with the May

5, 1989, signature dates, which respondent filed on May 11, 1989.

We have so found. 

Thus, petitioners’ tax return was filed almost 7 months

after the October 17, 1988, extended due date. Under section

6651(a)(1), this results in an addition to tax of 25 percent of

the amount of petitioners’ tax liability, “unless it is shown

that such failure [to file timely] is due to reasonable cause and

not due to willful neglect”. 

Petitioners contend, and Laney testified, that they received

from respondent a notice that their August 15, 1988, request for

further extension was granted for “maximum time allowed”, and
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this was stated to be until May 5, 1989. The only documentary

evidence that petitioners presented on this point is a letter

attached to their 1987 tax return, as follows (emphasis in

original): 

Melvin J. & Carolyn A. Laney

1515 Spencerville Rd.

Spencerville, Md. 20868

November 9, 1988

Director

Internal Revenue Service

Philadelphia, Pa. 19255

Dear Director:

Re: Verification of Special Extension to File 1987 

Return for Account # 215 38 2691

On August 15, 1988 we filed Form 2688 plus a special

request to file our 1987 return by May 5, 1989. As part of

our special request we enclosed a copy of our May 5, 1988

Md. Tax Court opinion ruling in our favor. The Md.

Comptroller had taken no action on this ruling and we

requested a special extension. Yesterday we received a

notice from your office granting our request for “Maximum

time allowed”. 

Today we called 488-3100 and spoke with a Mr. Hill in

the Problem Resolution Office and then with a Mr. Wilson of

the Accounts Office. Mr. Wilson assured us that we could

assume the words “Maximum time allowed” applied to our

special request and not to the standard Form 2688 extension

time. The time period for Form 2688 expired last month. 

We are writing this letter to verify approval of our

special request based on the Maryland Tax Court opinion

previously enclosed. The final resolution of this case will

effect how our Federal Income Tax/Md. return is completed. 

We will owe no federal tax and will receive a refund for

1987. 

Sincerely,

Melvin J. Laney
- 47 -

Respondent’s records show that, on August 22, 1988, it was

posted that petitioners’ request for further extension was

granted until October 17, 1988. 

In evaluating the evidence we note the following:

(1) Petitioners appear to have made up their story

about a 1987 tax return filed on or about August 15,

1988. 

(2) Petitioners have kept extensive tax-related

records dating back to 1977 but have not produced the

notice they received from respondent so that we could

view the language described in petitioners’ November 9,

1988, letter. 

(3) Petitioners have not described with

particularity what they asked of respondent’s employees

in the telephone call described in petitioners’

November 9, 1988, letter.

Petitioners have to persuade us that it is more likely than

not that respondent’s employees advised petitioners that

petitioners had until May 5, 1989, to file their 1987 tax return,

that petitioners in fact relied on this advice, and that it was

reasonable for petitioners to rely on this advice. 

We doubt the correctness of petitioners’ story; we doubt

that respondent’s employees really advised petitioners that the
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16 For example, it may be that respondent’s employees

merely advised petitioners that, if petitioner in fact did not

have a tax liability (or no tax liability in excess of their

$953.08 of withholding), then petitioners would not be liable for

an addition to tax under sec. 6651(a)(1). As we have held on

other occasions, that advice would not protect petitioners in the

instant case, because they do have a 1987 tax liability in excess

of their withholding. E.g., Beales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1992-608; Morgan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-384, affd. 807

F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1986); Wilkinson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1982-429; see also Patronik-Holder v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 374,

379-381 (1993); Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner,

39 T.C. 93, 133-134 (1962), affd. in part and revd. in part 324

F.2d 633, 646 (8th Cir. 1963). 

due date of petitioners’ 1987 tax return was extended to May 5,

1989; and in light of our lack of information as to the foregoing

we cannot conclude that petitioners acted reasonably in delaying

the filing of their 1987 tax return.16 

We hold, for respondent, that petitioners filed their 1987

tax return more than 6 months late, and that petitioners have not

shown that their failure to file timely was due to reasonable

cause. 

B. Section 6653(a)(1)

In the notice of deficiency respondent determined, and on

brief respondent contends, that petitioners were negligent in

claiming the theft/casualty loss deduction. At trial Laney

testified, and on brief petitioners contend, that they relied on

the advice of Henry, their lawyer, in claiming this deduction.

We agree with respondent.
- 49 -

17 Sec. 6653(a), as in effect for 1986 and 1987, provides,

in pertinent part, as follows:

SEC. 6653. ADDITIONS TO TAX FOR NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUD.

(a) Negligence.--

(1) In general.--If any part of any underpayment 

* * * is due to negligence or disregard of rules or

regulations, there shall be added to the tax an amount

equal to the sum of--

(A) 5 percent of the underpayment, and

(B) an amount equal to 50 percent of the

interest payable under section 6601 with respect

to the portion of such underpayment which is

attributable to negligence for the period

beginning on the last date prescribed by law for

payment of such underpayment (determined without

regard to any extension) and ending on the date of

the assessment of the tax (or, if earlier, the

date of the payment of the tax). 

Sec. 6653(a), as in effect for 1988, provides, in pertinent

part, as follows:

SEC. 6653. ADDITIONS TO TAX FOR NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUD.

(a) Negligence.--

(1) In general.--If any part of any underpayment

(as defined in subsection (c)) of tax required to be

shown on a return is due to negligence (or disregard of

rules or regulations), there shall be added to the tax

an amount equal to 5 percent of the underpayment.

The later amendment of this provision by sec. 7721(c)(1) of

the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 89), Pub. L.

101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2399, does not affect the instant case. 

The substance of this provision now appears in subsecs. (b)(1)

and (c) of sec. 6662. 

Section 6653(a)(1)(A)17 (sec. 6653(a)(1), as to 1988)

imposes an addition to tax of 5 percent of the underpayment if
- 50 -

any part of the underpayment is due to negligence or intentional

disregard of rules or regulations. Section 6653(a)(1)(B) imposes

an additional addition to tax equal to 50 percent of the interest

payable under section 6601 with respect to the portion of the

underpayment attributable to the negligence, etc. Petitioners

have the burden of proving error in respondent’s determination

that these additions to tax should be imposed against them. 

Korshin v. Commissioner, 91 F.3d 670, 671 (4th Cir. 1996), affg.

T.C. Memo. 1995-46; Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 791-792

(1972). 

Broadly speaking, for purposes of this provision, negligence

is lack of due care or failure to do what a reasonable and

ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances. 

Cluck v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 324, 339 (1995); Neely v.

Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947-948 (1985). Reasonable and goodfaith reliance by a taxpayer on an accountant or attorney may be

sufficient to avoid the addition to tax for negligence. See

United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985). 

The $16 million-plus deduction that petitioners took on

their 1983 tax return and carried over to each of their tax

returns through at least 1988, was many times as great as any

other items on their tax returns from 1977 on. See supra tables

1 and 2. From 1983 on, these deductions took petitioners off the
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Federal tax rolls as to both the regular income tax and, they

contended, the self-employment taxes. See supra table 2. 

Clearly, the ordinarily prudent taxpayer would consult with a

qualified tax adviser before claiming a deduction of such

relative size and consequence. 

Petitioners claim that they did just that--they consulted

with Henry and they acted on Henry’s advice. However,

petitioners did not tell us exactly what Henry’s advice was, nor

did they provide us with information from which we could conclude

that it was reasonable for them to rely on Henry’s advice. 

Finally, as discussed supra (I. Settlement A. With Justice

Department), petitioners promised that we would have Henry’s

testimony, but then did not call Henry. As discussed supra in

Part I.A., we are entitled to, and we do, infer that if Henry had

testified, then his testimony would have been unfavorable to

petitioners on this issue. O’Dwyer v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d at

584; Stoumen v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d at 907; Wichita Terminal

Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. at 1165. 

Also apart from the effect of the Wichita Terminal doctrine,

when taxpayers rely on the claim that they are not negligent

because they merely followed competent professional advice, it is

particularly important that they present their adviser, that they

show with some precision what their adviser advised them to do,
- 52 -

18 We have held that, under some circumstances, an audit

for an earlier year and a concession by the Commissioner that the

corresponding deduction for the earlier year was correct, might

relieve a taxpayer from the obligation to thereafter obtain

advice from competent tax counsel. See, e.g., Bermingham v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-69; see also Washburn v.

Commissioner, 44 T.C. 217, 225-226 (1965). There was no such

audit in the instant case, and no apparent approval by respondent

as to the claimed theft/casualty loss deductions. 

and that they show that they followed that advice. Zfass v.

Commissioner, 118 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1997), affg. T.C. Memo.

1996-167. Petitioners failed on all these counts in the instant

case. We do not credit petitioners’ contention that they relied

on Henry’s advice. 

Petitioners point out that respondent did not dispute their

1983, 1984, and 1985 theft/casualty deductions and carryovers. 

Respondent’s failure to audit merely results in an apparent

windfall to petitioners; it does not relieve petitioners from

their obligation to act prudently and obtain advice from

competent tax counsel.18 

We conclude, and we have found, that petitioners were

negligent in claiming the theft/casualty carryover deductions for

each of the years in issue. 

For each of the years in issue the entire deficiency in tax

is due to petitioners’ negligence in claiming the theft/casualty

carryover deduction. For each of the years in issue the

deficiency is equal to the “underpayment of tax”, which is the
- 53 -

19 See Emmons v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 342, 347-351

(1989), affd. 898 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1990), as to the effect that

the late filing of petitioners’ 1987 tax return would have on the

negligence addition for 1987. We have not engaged in an Emmonstype analysis in the instant case because the parties did not

present the point, and such an analysis would not affect the

conclusions we reached on different grounds. 

20 SEC. 6661. SUBSTANTIAL UNDERSTATEMENT OF LIABILITY.

(a) Addition to Tax.--If there is a substantial

understatement of income tax for any taxable year, there

shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 25 percent of

the amount of any underpayment attributable to such

understatement. 

Sec. 6661 was repealed by sec. 7721(c)(2) of OBRA 89, 103

Stat. 2399. The substance of former sec. 6661 now appears as

secs. 6662(b)(2), 6662(d), and 6664(c)(1). 

base for the negligence additions to tax. Sec. 6653(c), now to

be found in sec. 6664(a). 

Consequently, we hold, for respondent, that for each of the

years in issue19 the entire underpayment of tax is due to

petitioners’ negligence. 

C. Section 6661(a)

Section 6661(a)20 imposes an addition to tax of 25 percent

of the amount of any underpayment attributable to a substantial

understatement of tax. Cochrane v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 18, 29

(1996); Pallottini v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 498 (1988). An

understatement is substantial if it exceeds the greater of 10

percent of the correct tax or $5,000. Sec. 6661(b)(1)(A). (Our
- 54 -

holdings make it clear that petitioners have substantial

understatements for 1986, 1987, and 1988.) 

If an item is not attributable to a tax shelter, then the

understatement shall be reduced on account of the item, and the

addition to tax accordingly reduced, if (1) the taxpayer’s

treatment of the item was based on substantial authority, or (2)

the taxpayer adequately disclosed on the tax return or in a

statement attached to the tax return the relevant facts affecting

the item’s tax treatment. Sec. 6661(b)(2)(B). 

Petitioners were not involved with a tax shelter, and they

attached a note to their tax returns explaining that the

carryover loss they claimed originated from a 1983 net operating

loss from business property seized by the Army Corps of

Engineers. We believe that this disclosure is adequate in the

context of the instant case. 

We hold for petitioners on this issue.

To reflect the foregoing, and respondent’s concessions, see

supra note 2, 

Decision will be entered 

under Rule 155.