## NO. 12

- 14

- 00216

- CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN THE INTEREST OF J. L. H. ,
A CHILD §
§
§ APPEAL FROM THE 420T H

JUDICIAL D ISTRICT COURT
NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
K. H . appeals the termination of her parental rights to J.L.H. and raises three issues on appeal. We affirm.

B ACKGROUND J.L.H., born August 14, 2013, is K.H.’s third child. K.H. became pregnan t with J.L.H. while the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) had an open case involving K.H.’s olde r children, M.H. and N.H. At the time of J.L.H.’s birth, K.H. was not compliant with the Department’s service plan and had not done anything to show that “she was willing or able to care for” M.H. and N.H. 1 These factors, in additio n to J.L.H.’s inability to
self- protect , p rompted the D epartment to file its original petition for protection of a child, for conservatorship, and for ter mination in a suit affecting the parent

- child relationship. On August 16, 2013 , the trial court signed an order for protection of a child in an emergency and appointed the Department as the temporary sole managing conservator of J.L.H.
A bench trial was h eld, and K.H.’s parental rights were terminated. The trial court found

t hat K.H. constructively abandoned J.L.H. for not less than six months, failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary to obtain the retur n of J.L.H.,
and that K. H . has a mental or emotional illness or mental deficiency that renders her unable to

1 The testimony at trial showed that K.H.’s parental rights to her two oldest children were terminated in January 2014.2

provide for the physical, emotional, and mental needs of J.L.H. until his eighteenth birthday.
The trial court also found that termination of the parent

- child relationship was in J.L.H.’s best interest. This appeal followed.

T ERMINATION OF P ARENTAL R IGHTS The i nvoluntary termination of parental rights embodies fundamental constitutional rights. In re C.L.C

. , 119 S.W.3d 382, 390 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2003, no pet.); Vela v. Marywood
, 17 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2000), pet. denied per curiam , 53 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. 2001). When the state seeks to terminate one’s parental rights, it seeks not only to infringe one’s fundamental liberty interest, but to end it. See In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 273 (Tex. 2002). A termination decree is “complete, final, irrevocable [
, and] divests for all time the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers with respect to each other except fo r the child’s right to inherit.” Wiley v. Spratlan , 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976); In re Shaw , 966 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 1998, no pet.). Thus, the breaking of bonds between a parent and child “can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.” Wiley
, 543 S.W.2d at 352; In re Shaw , 966 S.W.2d at 179. Because a termination action “permanently sunders” the bonds between a parent and child, the proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. Wiley
, 543 S.W.2d at 352; In re Sha w , 966 S.W.2d at 179. However, parental rights are not absolute, and it is vital that the emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed at the expense of preserving that right. See In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). The family c ode permits termination of parental rights if (1) the parent has engaged in any one of the acts or omissions itemized in Section 161.001(1) of the family code, or the parent suffers from a mental deficiency as set forth in Section 161.003 of the family cod e, and (2)
termination is in the best interest of the child. See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. §§ 161.001, 161.003( a) (West 2014). Termination under Sections 161.001 and 161.003 requires “clear and convincing evidence,” and proof of one statutory element does not alleviate the petitioner’s burden of proving the other. Id. §§ 161.001; 161.003 ( a)(2); see also In re C.L.C. , 119 S.W.3d at 390.

“ Clear and convincing evidence ” is the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind
of the trier of fact a firm b elief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established. T EX

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. C ODE A NN

. § 101.007 (West 2014).3

There is a strong presumption that the best interest of the child is served by preserving the parent

- child relationship, and the b urden of proof rests upon the party seeking to deprive the parent of her parental rights. See Wiley , 543 S.W.2d at 352; In re C.L.C. , 119 S.W.3d at 390

- 91

.

S TANDARD OF R EVIEW When the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence, we conduct a legal

s ufficiency review by looking at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true

. In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266. We mus t a ssume that the fact finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact finder could do so. Id. Thus, it follows that the reviewing court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable fact finder could have
disbelieved or foun d to have been incredible, but this does not mean that the reviewing court must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding. Id. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear an d convincing
evidence. Id. If, after conducting our legal sufficiency review, we determine that no reasonable fact finder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then we will conclude that the evidence is legal ly insufficient. Id. When we conduct a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id. Our inquiry is whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department's allegations. Id. We consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding

. Id. If, when viewed in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence is so significant that a fact finder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. Id. In finding evidence factually insufficient, the appellate court should detail why it has concluded that a reasonable fact finder could not have credited disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. at 267. The standard of review for legal and factual sufficiency challenges maintains a deferenti al standard for the fact finder’ s role, which means the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. In re C.H. , 89
S.W.3d at 26

- 27; Nordstrom v. Nordstrom , 965 S.W.2d 575 , 580 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st4

Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). Thus, our review must not be so rigorous that the only fact findings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt. In re C.H. , 89
S.W.3d at 26.

T ERMINATION U NDER S EC TION 161.003 In her first issue, K.H. argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Section 161.003 of the family code. Section 161.003 of the Texas Family Code permits the termination of parental rights if
five elements are met. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.003 ( a) (West 2014). Termination of the parent

- child relationship may be ordered if the court finds that

(1) the parent has a mental or emotional illness or mental deficiency that renders the parent unable to provide for the physical, emotional, and mental needs of the child; (2) the illness or deficiency, in all reasonable probability, proved by clear and convincing evidence, will continue to render the parent u nable to provide for the child’s needs until the 18th birthday of the child; (3) the department has been the temporary or sole managing conservator of the child of the parent for at least six months preceding the date of the hearing on the termination[;] (4) the department has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; and (5) the termination is in the best interest of the child.

T EX

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. §161.003 (a)(1 )

- ( 5). T he Department has been the sole temporary managing conservator of J.L.H. for at least six months prior to the trial on the hearing on termination, and K. H . does not challenge this part of the trial court’s find ing. Accordingly, our sufficiency review focuses on the evidence showing K.H.’s mental deficiency, her ability to meet
the ne eds of J.L.H., the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts to return J.L.H. to K.H., and
whether termination is in J.L.H.’s best interest. Mental Deficiency and Ability to Meet Child’s Needs A mental illness or deficiency of a parent is not , in and of itself, grounds for termination of the parent

- child relationship. See Liu v. Dep’t Family & Protective Servs. , 273 S.W.3d 785, 791 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). There must be evidence to support a determination that a parent’s mental ill ness or deficiency excludes her from now and in the future providing for her child or children. See In re A.L.M. , 300 S.W.3d 914, 92 8

- 2 9 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2009, no pet.).5

The Evidence K.H. has been subjected to psychological evaluations since she w as at least fourteen years old. A psychological review dated December 7, 2000, showed that K.H. was diagnosed

w ith mild intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD)

. 2 As a result of this diagnosis, K.H.
was recommended for respite care services. 3
At the Department’s request, a mental status interview of K.H was conducted on
October 26, 2012

. At that time, K.H. had two children, N.H. (two years old) and M.H. (one year old). The purpose of the referral was to gain a mental health diagnosis and determ ine K.H.’s intellectual level of functioning. The referral specifically stated that the Department needed to
know

if [K.H.] has a mental or emotional illness or a deficiency that renders [K.H.] unable to provide for the physical, emotional, and mental n eeds for her children. If there is that illness or deficiency, in all reasonable probability, proved by clear and convincing evidence, will that continue until the 18th birthday of the child[?]

Dr. Angus Don Walker conducted the mental status interview of K.H. He explained that
his main concern was w hether K.H. suffered from mild IDD , but noted that he suspected K.H. might have been slightly depressed. Dr. Walker testified that K.H. “ fidgeted a lot ” during the interview, did not actively cooperate but was not passive aggressive, and described her as having

a “devil

- may

- care” or “I could care less” attitude

. The results of the testing showed that K.H.’s arithmetic skills are “very minimal,” and her reading is “seriously limited.” K.H. has “an IQ of 63 in the extremely low range at the 1st percentile,” and her academic scores were “also very low and consistent with her learning potential. ” Although Walker’s evaluation was conducted more than one year before trial, he explained that the results are unlik ely to have changed in any significant manner

. Dr. Walker ’s evaluation noted that K.H. has some narcissistic and dependent personality
traits. It states , “Given the diagnosis of mild mental retardation . . . and the deficits in working

2 “Intellectual and developmental disabilities” (IDD) is used instead of “mental retardation.”

3 Respite c are is a service available to individuals with IDD in which someone is assigned to the home to care for the individual in the event that family is not available, or housing is provided for individuals with IDD for a short period of time.6

memory, common se nse, judgment, and reasoning, it seems clear that [K.H.] lacks the abilities to make necessary decisions about the care, and safety of her children.”
Dr. Walker testified that K.H.’s ability to provide safety and care for her children “is severely compr omised and [she] w ill require aid.” According to Dr. Walker, e ven with counseling and social skills training, K.H. w ill not be able to independently care for her children

. While there were certain types of “very minimal skills” that K.H. could learn, Dr. Walker explained that K.H. could not know when it was appropriate or not appropriate to use those
skills. Dr. Walker maintained that K.H. did not have the necessary cognitive abilities required to provide for a child’s needs until the child’s eighteent h birthday, and testified that her abilities would not change over time. He explained that in order to raise J.L.F., K .H. would need a surrogate, not assistance , i.e., someone to live with her and to “trump” her de cisions. But Dr.
Walker testified that e ven under those circumst ances, he “would have some question about [K.H.] being consistently willing to take the leadership of a surrogate.” On June 9, 2014, K.H. submitted to additional testing at the Burke Center. 4 Charlotte Ingle, a licensed profe ssional counselor and psychological associate for the Essential Services division for the Burke Center, conducted K.H.’s test. The results of the testing showed that K.H.
has mild IDD. Ingle testified that the overall age equivalent for K.H.’s adaptive b ehavior is ten years and nine months. She explained that the tests measured K.H.’s motor skills, social and communication skills, personal living skills, K.H.’s interaction with the community, and K.H.’s overall ability to function independently. K.H.’s testing scores made her eligible for counseling, respite care, placement in a group home, and a program for obtaining employment, but K.H. sought only counseling services. After the completion of Ingle’s evaluation, K.H. attended a counseling session (the Friday before trial)

. Ingle was asked whether she had an opinion relating to whether it would be in an infant’s best interest to be placed with K.H. as the primary caregiver. Ingle testified, “There are some people who have mental retardation who can p arent a child and some who can’t.” Ingle confirmed that people with IDD can be trained to care for a child, and that counseling services are one way to provide training . Ingle did not give an opinion as to whether it would be in an

4 The Burke Center is the local Mental Health/Mental Retardation center. There are two main parts of the Burke Center: Burke Center Mental Health and Burke Center Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.7

infant’s best interest to be place d with K.H. as the primary care giver, but testified that parenting a child would be “difficult” for someone who was ten years and nine months old. Janice Robinson, a licensed professional counselor, began seeing K.H. in January 2013

— prior to J .L.H.’s birth

— because K.H. had a case with the Department involving her two olde r children. Robinson testified that the counseling sessions were supposed to address K.H.’s parenting skills, and her ability to cope with t he stressors of being a parent. K. H. attended only five counseling sessions, did not cooperate or seem to want to make progress, would not talk
about the issues for wh ich she was in counseling, and sometimes did not talk during a session. Robinson testified that K.H.’s last “no

- show” appo intment was after the termination trial involving K.H.’s two oldest children

— “I think March 18, 2014.” When asked whether it would be in an infant’s best interest to have K.H. serve as his primary caregiver, Robinson testified that K.H. had “very poor jud gment,” never mentioned the children, and did not seem to have much
interest in them. K.H. also had “very limited” problem

- solving skills and handled stressors “very poorly.” “[B]eyond that,” Robinson testified
, she did not know what she would be qualifi ed to
say regarding an infant’s best interest

. DeAnn Stewart was the conservatorship worker assigned to K.H.’s case involving her
two olde r children and to the current case

. She testified that K.H.’s t wo olde r children were removed, in part, because they wer e not being taken “well care of. ” She stated that the home was infested with insects, roaches were inside the refrigerator, trash was strewn about the home,
and food items were left uncovered on the cabinets.
Stewart testified that K.H. does not app ear to understand that her parental rights to her
two olde r children were ter minated. On April 22, 2014, K.H. texted Stewart about wanting to go on a field trip with N.H. and M.H. , and Stewart had to tell K.H. that she could not go (because K.H.’s parenta l rights were terminated and the Department had permanent managing conservatorship ). Furthermore, when K.H. saw Stewart in public on July 7, 2014 , she asked about the children and told Stewart “that she was going to get the boys back.”
Stewart testified that t hroughout the pendency of this case, she has observed K.H. bicker
with her mother (J.H.) and described the bickering as “ beyond ” normal . Stewart testified that there was “ lots of shouting,” “telling each other to shut up, especially from [K.H.], ” a nd that K.H. would curse at J.H. Stewart further testified that throughout the case, K.H. would refuse to cooperate or take direction fr om J.H.8

J.H. testified that K.H. is the younge r of her two daughters. J.H.’s olde r daughter has special needs and li ves in a group home, and K.H. is continuing to live with J.H. J.H. testified that p rior to J.L.H.’s birth, she watched K.H.’s two olde r children before their removal because K.H. could not watch the children on her own. Nevertheless, she testified that K .H. could live on her own because “ [i] t’s ability or have a mind what she needs because she knows how to do, because I trained my daughter how to do.”
Discussion Testing results from 2 000, 2012, and 2014 all show that K.H. has mild IDD. K.H. has the adap tive behavior equivalency of ten years and nine months. Although she can be trained to perform specific skills and tasks related to parenting, this training is generally provided through counseling. K.H. was provided the opportunity to attend counseling from the time that her two
olde r children were removed from her care in 2012 , until the time of this trial in 2014

. Despite her attendance, K.H. did not ac tively participate in counseling, and the evidence showed that her personality traits made it unlike ly that she would submit to the leadership of a surrogate in parenting J.L.H. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude that a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that K.H. has a m ental or emotional illness or a mental deficiency that renders her unable to provide for the physical,
emotional , and mental needs of the child, and that K.H.’s illness or deficiency, in all reasonable probability, will continue to render her unable to pro vide for J.L.H.’s needs until his eighteenth birthday. See T EX

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. C ODE A NN

. § 161.003 (a)(1), (2); In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266. After viewing the entire record, we hold that a fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief
or conviction that the Department’s allegations under Section 161.003(a)(1) and (2) are true. See id.
Reasonable Efforts The Department’s preparation and administration of a family service plan is generally
considered “ reasonable effort s” to return a child to its parent. In re M.R.J.M. , 280 S.W.3d 494, 505 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). Efforts to provide a parent with training, classes, assistance with medical or mental needs, and information to address those needs also qualify as “reasonable efforts
, ” even if th e parent fails to make significant improvement. See Rodriguez v.9

Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. , No. 03

- 05

- 00321

- CV, 2006 WL 1358488, *7 (Tex. App.

— Austin May 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The Evidence Stewart testified that the Department cre ated a service plan which mirrored the service plan that was implemented in K.H.’s case with her two olde r children

. She confirmed that the plan for J.L.H. “was always termination,” and that attempts at reunification and visitation were never actively pur sued.
Stewart described K.H. as being “hostile” and “constantly angry ” towards her. She testified that much of the hostility was due to K.H.’s belief “ that I removed those children [(K.H.’s two olde r children)] and . . . I didn’t.” Although K.H. attend ed some counseling, it was unsuccessful because K.H. was “catatonic” or “would not participate” du r ing the sessions. Stewart attempted to schedule visits between K.H. and J.L.H., but when she tried to schedule them, K.H. “cursed me numerous times and told me she didn’t want to talk to me about the children. So I didn’t schedule a visit.” Stewart testified that she attempted to schedule visits once each month, but was repeatedly told by K.H. to “leave me alone.”
Discussion Although family reunificatio n was not actively pursued, a service plan was created and counseling services were offered to K.H. throu ghout the entirety of this case. Furthermore, the Department continued its attempts to schedule visits between K.H. and J.L.H. despite K.H.’s
terminat ion of parental rights to her two olde r children, hostility towards the Department, and
demands to leave her alone. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude that a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a fi rm belief or conviction that the Department has
made reasonable effort s to return J.L.H. to K.H. See T EX

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. § 161.003 (a)(4); In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266. After viewing the entire record, we hold that a fact finder could reasonably have fo rmed a firm belief or conviction that the Department made reasonable efforts
to return J.L.H. to K.H. See id.
Best Interest of the Child The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. See T EX

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. C ODE A NN

.10

§ 161.00 3 ( a)(5 ). Parental rights may not be terminated merely because a child might be better off living elsewhere. In re C.R. , 263 S.W.3d 368, 375 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2008, no pet.). In determining th e best interest of the child, the courts consider a number of factors including (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the a cts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent

- child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W.2d 367, 371

- 72 (Tex. 1976). The family code also provides a list of factors that we will consider in conjunction with
the above

- mentioned Holley factors. See T EX

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. § 263.307( b) ( West 2014). Here, the applicable statutory factors include (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; ( 2) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home; (3) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’ s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (4) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriat e agency’s close supervision; (5 ) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting
skills ; and ( 6 ) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and
friends is available to the child. Id. § 2 63.307(b) (1), (6), (7), (10), (12), (13). The Department need not prove all of the statutory or Holley factors to show that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See Holley , 544 S.W.2d at 372; In
re J.I.T.P. , 99 S.W.3d 841, 848 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Undisputed
evid ence of just one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re M.R.J.M. , 280 S.W.3d at 507. But the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a fi nding. Id. Evidence supporting termination of parental rights is also probative in determining whether termination is
in the best interest of the child. See In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 28

- 29.11

Discussion
In addition to K.H.’s diagnosis of mild IDD, the ev idence showed that prior to the removal of K.H.’s oldest children, she would eat dirt, and ha d refused to pick up one of her children from school “because she just didn’t feel like going and getting him.” These factors weigh in favor of termination. See T EX

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. § 263.307 (b)(6) ; Holley , 544 S.W.2d
at 372. Although J.H. testified that she was willing and able to be a surrogate for J.L.H., the evidence showed that J.H. had heard K.H. hitting one of her older children at night, had said that
K.H. refused to feed her children, and blamed K.H. for the conditions of the home at the time of the removal of K.H.’s two olde r children

. J.H. confirmed that she never called the Department or sought help from anyone else even though she knew K.H. was neglect ing her children. J.H. testified that the reason she did not seek help was because “I didn’t know the phone number.” 5 At the time of trial, J.L.H. was less than one year old and was unable to self

- protect. These factors weigh in favor of termination. S ee T EX

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. § 263.307 (b)( 1), ( 7) , (12) ; Holley , 544 S.W.2d at 372. J.H. agreed that despite her best efforts, they were not enough to keep her house clean, which was among the contributing factors leading to the removal of K.H.’s two olde r child ren. A t the time of trial, J.H. testified that her house was clean and bug

- free. She also testified that if something happened that made her unable to serve as a surrogate, her sisters could help K.H.
But none of J.H.’s sisters sought consideration as a placement for J.L.H. at the time of his
removal. Moreover, the evidence showed that Stewart contacted two of K.H.’s aunts

— Ella and
Carol

— abou t adopting J.L.H. Stewart testified that n either aunt was interested in adopting J.L.H. “because they don’t want to have to deal with [K.H.’s] and [J.H.’s] behaviors.” She also
stated that the aunts “mentioned that they have spent a lifetime assisting these two ladies; and they felt that if they adopted [J.L.H.], they couldn’t deal with [K.H. and J.H.]. ” No other family members are available to adopt J.L.H. These factors also weigh in favor of termination. See
T EX

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. § 263.307 (b)(13); Holley , 544 S.W.2d at 372. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of K.H.’s

5 J.H. confirmed that she knew how to find the Department’s phon e number

. She testified that if J.L.H. was returned home and assistance was needed, she would seek help from the Department, family members, or anyone else.12

parental rights was in J.L.H.’s best interest. See T EX

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. § 161.003 (a)(5); In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266. After viewing the entire record, we hold that a fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that the allegation that the termination of K.H.’s parental rights is in J.L.H.’s best interest is true. See T EX

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. § 161. 003 (a)(5); In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 2 66. Conclusion We conclude that the evidence supporting termination of K.H.’s parental rights pursuant to Section 161.003 of the family code is legally and factually sufficient. Accordingly, we overrule K.H.’s first issue. Because we have held the evi dence is legally and factually sufficient to terminate K.H.’s parental rights under Section 161.003, we need not address K.H.’s sufficiency challenges for termination of parental rights under Section 161.001 of the family
code. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.1; s ee, e.g. , In re C.C. , No. 12

- 09

- 00429

- CV, 2011 WL 1985 9 5, at *6 n.2 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Jan. 19, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (when evidence is sufficient to support termination under one ground, appellate court need not address sufficiency challenges to other g rounds for termination).

D ISPOSITION Having overruled K.H.’s first issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

J AMES T. W ORTHEN Chief Justice
Opinion delivered December 3, 2014

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

( PUBLISH )

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

DECEMBER 3 , 2014

NO. 12

- 14

- 00216

- CV

IN TH E INTEREST OF J. L. H., A CHILD

Appeal from the 420th District Court of Nacogdoche s County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. C1329423) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed , and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.

James T. Worthen , Chief Justice

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle , J

.