Nos. 94-4033/95-3791

Waymon Powell; Claudell Smith, * Willie Griffin; Hershel Ward; * Odell Lawson; International * Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, * CLC, and Local 5-475, * * Appellants, * * v. * * Georgia-Pacific Corporation, * * Appellee. * * * Appeals from the United States

----------------- * District Court for the Western * District of Arkansas. * International Woodworkers of * America, AFL-CIO, CLC, and Its * Local 5-475; Roy Matheny, Jr.; * and Others, * * Appellants, * * v. * * Georgia-Pacific Corporation, * * Appellee. *

Submitted: June 14, 1996 Filed: July 19, 1996

### The HONORABLE CAROL E. JACKSON, United States Distric t * 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

-2- Befor e MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and JACKSON, * District Judge.
MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiffs filed this appeal from the district court's orde r directing the clerk of the court to disburse certain funds from the court' s registry to the Georgia-Pacific Foundation ("dis bursement order") in order to establish a scholarship program approved by the district court in a n earlie r order ("scholarship order"). The substance of the plaintiffs ' appeal, however, focuses on the merits of the scholarship order.

Because t he order from which the plaintiffs appealed is not a final one, we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal from it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
. The di strict court quite obviously intended the scholarship order t o represent the final disposition of the case and said so. The orde r provided a "'clear and unequivocal manifestation by the trial court of its belief that the decision made ... [was] the end of the case.'" Goodwin v. Unite d States , 67 F.3d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1995), quoting Fiataruolo v
. United State s , 8 F.3d 930, 937 (2d Cir. 1993). In fact, the orde r specifically directed the plaintiffs to file a n otice of appeal if they so desired. The disbursement order, from which the plaintiffs appealed, is merely a "housekeepin g" order, and we have repeatedly held that "the mere retention of jurisdic tion for future ministerial orders does not withhold the fin ality required to make [a previous] order appealable." Unite d States v. 1,431.80 Acres of Land , 466 F.2d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 1972) ( per cur iam ); see also , e.g. , Goodwin , 67 F.3d at 151, and Lewis v. Unite d States Farmers Home Admin. , 992 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1993). Because th e

### -3-

disbursement order is not a final one, the plaintiffs may not appeal from it. See Sperry Corp. v. City of Minneapolis , 680 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir
. 1982), quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd. , 519 F.2d 1001, 1020 (2d Cir. 1975), fo r the proposition that parties cannot "'appeal from an order which ... merel y permits an expenditure in accordance with the provisions of ... previous [final] orders.'"
Georgia Pacific argues that we must dismiss this case for lack o f jurisdi ction because the plaintiffs failed to file a notice of appea l within thirty days after the court issued the sc holarship order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). We note, however, that the scholarship order was no t accompanied by a judgment entered on a separate document as required b y Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. We therefore conclude that this appeal is "premature because i t precedes the filing of a final judgment." Sanders v. Clemc o Industrie s , 862 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1988). Had the plaintiff s appealed from the scholarship order, we might find that they had waived th e sepa rate-document requirement. They did not, however, and th e "'separate-document requirement must be applied mechanically in order to protect a party's right of appeal'" (emphasis in original). Id. at 167, quot ing Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc. , 479 U.S. 966, 96 9 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
We therefore dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.