FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN H. PIRTLE, 

Petitioner-Appellee, No. 07-16097

v. D.C. No.

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PRISON  CV-04-00518-

TERMS; D. L. RUNNELS; ATTORNEY FCD/KJM

GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF OPINION CALIFORNIA,

Respondents-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Frank C. Damrell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 12, 2008—San Francisco, California

Submission Vacated December 3, 2008

Resubmitted May 28, 2010

Filed July 12, 2010

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, John T. Noonan, and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

10199
COUNSEL

Daniel J. Broderick, Federal Defender, Ann C. McClintock,

Assistant Federal Defender, Sacramento, California, for the

petitioner-appellee.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General for the State of California, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer

A. Neill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento,

California, for the respondents-appellants.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

California state prisoner John H. Pirtle was given a parole

date in 1990, but in 1994, the California Board of Prison

Terms rescinded his parole. After that, the Board denied Pirtle

10202 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS
parole three other times prior to a denial in 2002.1

 Pirtle filed

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the

Board’s 2002 denial of parole violated his constitutional right

to due process. The state courts denied his petition, but the

district court granted the writ. The State appeals. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we

affirm.

I.

In 1980, Pirtle was convicted of second-degree murder for

killing his wife. He was sentenced to a term of seventeen

years to life in prison. Ten years later, after a hearing, the

Board determined that Pirtle was “suitable for parole and

would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or

a threat to public safety if released from prison.” The Board

found that Pirtle committed the crime “as a result of significant stress in his life,” that he showed remorse, and that he

accepted responsibility for his actions. It also found that Pirtle

had a stable social history prior to his marriage to the victim,

had no juvenile or adult convictions for violent offenses, had

performed well in his prison job assignments, had matured

since his crime, had received positive psychiatric reports, and

had developed realistic plans for his parole. The Board set his

release date for December 30, 1994. 

In March 1994, however, the Board rescinded Pirtle’s

parole. It found that the previous panel had not given sufficient weight to the gravity of the original offense, the fact that

he had been carrying a concealed weapon, or his history of

alcohol abuse, crime, and domestic violence. The Board

denied Pirtle’s parole again in 1995, 1996, 1998, and 2002.

Each time, the Board relied on the circumstances of Pirtle’s

crime, his history of criminal conduct, and his failure to attend

1On July 1, 2005, the California Board of Parole Hearings replaced the

Board of Prison Terms. Cal. Penal Code § 5075(a). The two entities perform the same function, and we use the term “Board” to refer to both. 

PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS 10203
a substance abuse program. The Board’s 2002 denial of parole

is the subject of this appeal.

At the 2002 hearing, the Board considered two descriptions

of Pirtle’s crime. The first was from the 1990 Board report

following Pirtle’s first parole hearing, at which he was

deemed suitable for parole. That report was read into the

record at the hearing and was transcribed as follows:

On March the 8th, 1980 at approximately 1:17 a.m.,

the Gridley Police Department was notified of the

shooting at The Moose Lodge. Upon arrival at the

scene, the responding police officers observed the

victim, Diane Pirtle, lying on the floor with a gunshot wound to her upper chest area. The victim was

transported to the memorial hospital where she was

pronounced dead at approximately 1:20 a.m. The

prisoner, John Pirtle, arrived at the police department

and informed personnel on duty that he had just shot

his wife at The Moose Lodge. He then produced a

small pistol and placed it on the counter. Pirtle then

was taken into custody, and when informed that the

victim, his wife, had died, responded by stating,

okay. An autopsy performed on the victim revealed

that she had died as a result of a single 25 caliber

bullet entering her upper chest and penetrating her

heart and liver. Witnesses relate that at approximately 10:30 p.m. on March 7, 1980, the defendant

— the prisoner had entered The Moose Lodge,

approached his wife, slapped her in the face and then

left. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on March 8, 1980,

the prisoner returned to the Moose Lodge, ordered a

drink at the bar and paced around the bar area while

the victim and another man danced to the music.

When the music stopped, the prisoner walked up to

the victim, placed his arms around her and shot her

in the chest. The prisoner then exited the building.

10204 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS
(name spelling and reading errors omitted).

Next, the Board read into the record Pirtle’s own account

of the crime that he gave in 1990. It was transcribed as follows:

The prisoner relates that on the day prior to the killing, he and his wife discussed their marital problems

and decided to give their marriage one more try. The

following day his wife came to pick him up at the

bar where he was bartending. She told him that she

wanted to stay in town and drink and he could go

home if he wished. The prisoner stated that he left

his wife and proceeded home in order to give money

to his children for dinner. He then returned to town,

had several drinks and went to The Moose Lodge

where he observed his wife with another man. The

prisoner indicated that this upset him to the point

that he slapped his wife before going uptown to continue drinking. He then went to a nearby town where

he continued to drink before returning to Gridley.

The prisoner stated that on the way back he was

stopped by a police officer who told him to go home,

which he did. After sleeping for an hour, the prisoner

stated he woke up and found his wife was still not

home. He returned to look for her. Not finding her

at several bars, he went to The Moose Lodge where

he found her dancing with another man. He waited

for the music to end before approaching the victim

and asked her if she was ready to go home. The prisoner indicated that his wife told him that she was not

going to go home with him, but that she was going

home with Ron, her dancing partner. The prisoner

stated that the next thing he recalled was a loud bang

and seeing his wife fall to the floor. He then found

himself over the gun and became very confused. He

walked out of the bar and drove to the police station.

The prisoner indicated his remorse for the killing of

PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS 10205
his wife by stating that he cared for her a great deal.

He further indicated that he had no predisposition to

murder her. He states that he had a habit of carrying

a loaded weapon with him most of the time for protection. He had been drinking prior to this shooting

but does not feel that he was inebriated at the time

of the shooting. The prisoner gave no explanation or

motive for his action other than his wife rebuffing

him for someone else.

In addition to the circumstances of the commitment

offense, the Board considered Pirtle’s prior criminal history.

He had no juvenile arrest record,2 and as an adult he had misdemeanor convictions for drunk driving, disturbing the peace,

disorderly conduct, and escape from the county honor farm.

He also had a felony drunk driving conviction.

The Board also discussed Pirtle’s tumultuous marriage to

the victim. Both Pirtle and the victim were alcoholics and

they fought frequently. On at least six occasions, the police

were called to break up drunken fights between the Pirtles. 

Finally, the Board questioned Pirtle about his history of

alcohol abuse. Pirtle was asked why he stopped attending

Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings in prison. He told

them that attendance at AA meetings was a condition of his

original parole date, but when his date was revoked, he

stopped attending because he does not believe in a higher

power, which is an important aspect of AA. At a 1996 hearing, the Board asked him why he did not attend AA meetings

and he replied, “if you don’t believe in a higher power you

cannot do the 12 steps, and I don’t believe in a higher power.”

The 2002 panel was aware of Pirtle’s reasons for not attending AA. 

2Although the Board stated that Pirtle had no juvenile arrest record, he

reported to the Board that when he was fourteen years old, he spent seven

days in juvenile hall after being accused of forging a check on his uncle’s

bank account. He was then put on probation. ER 24. 

10206 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS
At the conclusion of the 2002 hearing, the Board found that

Pirtle was “not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety

if released from prison.” It found that his crime was committed in “an especially cruel and callous manner,” and that it

was “carried out in a dispassionate calculated manner.” Additionally, the Board found that “[t]he motive for the crime was

inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the offense.”

The Board also found that Pirtle had an “escalating pattern

of criminal behavior” and that he had “failed to profit from

society’s previous attempts to correct his criminality.” It

noted his unstable social history, including his alcohol abuse

and the allegations that he was abusive toward his wife. The

Board found that he needed to upgrade vocationally, participate in therapy or a self-help group to learn how to manage

anger and stress, and take part in a substance abuse program.

The Board emphasized its particular concern that Pirtle had

not “made a lifelong commitment to a substance abuse program.”

On January 27, 2003, Pirtle filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in the Butte County Superior Court, asserting

that the Board’s denial of parole violated his constitutional

right to due process because the decision was not supported

by any evidence. The state court issued a Waltreus denial of

his petition, which is a summary dismissal issued when a petitioner raises claims in a habeas corpus petition that were

already decided on direct appeal. See In re Waltreus, 397 P.2d

1001, 1005 (Cal. 1965). The Waltreus denial was in error,

because the question whether the Board denied Pirtle parole

in violation of his constitutional right to due process was not

and could not have been decided on direct appeal from his

original conviction. The California appellate courts issued

summary denials of Pirtle’s subsequent appeals.

Pirtle then filed a habeas corpus petition in district court. A

magistrate judge issued a report and recommended that the

PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS 10207
writ be granted because the Board’s decision was not supported by any evidence. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in full, granted

the writ, and ordered the Board to set a parole date for Pirtle

within 30 days. The State timely appealed.

II.

The parties dispute the proper scope of review in this case.

The State contends that we must apply the deferential standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Under the relevant portion of AEDPA,

federal courts may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Pirtle argues that AEDPA’s deferential standard does not

apply to his claim because it was not adjudicated on the merits by a state court. Under the “look through” doctrine, in

order to determine whether the state courts ever reached the

merits of a federal claim, we must “look through” unexplained state court decisions, such as summary denials, to the

last reasoned state court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 802, 806 (1991); see also Mendez v. Knowles, 556

F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the only reasoned state

court decision was a Waltreus denial, which has been held by

the Supreme Court to be neither a procedural denial nor a

denial on the merits. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06; see also Hill v.

10208 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS
Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the state

courts did not reach the merits of Pirtle’s federal claim, “there

is no state court decision on this issue to which to accord

[AEDPA] deference.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167

(9th Cir. 2002). Where, as here, “it is clear that a state court

has not reached the merits of a properly raised issue, we must

review it de novo.” Id.

III.

[1] “California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable

liberty interest in release on parole.” McQuillon v. Duncan,

306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). That liberty interest

encompasses the state-created requirement that a parole decision must be supported by “some evidence” of current dangerousness. Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 562-63 (9th

Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d

606, 608-09 (9th Cir. 2010).

[2] Our “some evidence” analysis is shaped by the state

regulatory, statutory, and constitutional law that governs

parole suitability determinations in California. See Hayward,

603 F.3d at 561-62. California law requires the Board to grant

an eligible inmate a parole date unless the Board determines

that “consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual.” Cal. Penal

Code § 3041(b). According to the California Supreme Court,

“public safety” is the “overriding statutory concern” of the

state’s parole scheme. In re Dannenberg, 104 P.3d 783, 795

(Cal. 2005); accord In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535 (Cal.

2008); In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573 (Cal. 2008). The emphasis on public safety is also evident in California’s parole regulations, which provide that a prisoner will be found unsuitable

for parole if “in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released

from prison.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a). In short,

“ ‘some evidence’ of future dangerousness is indeed a state

PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS 10209
sine qua non for denial of parole in California.” Hayward,

603 F.3d at 562.

To assist in determining who may pose an unreasonable

risk of danger, the California parole regulations identify circumstances that “tend[ ] to indicate unsuitability for release.”

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c). These circumstances

include the aggravated nature of the commitment offense, a

previous record of violence, an unstable social history, sadistic sexual offenses, a history of severe mental problems

related to the offense, and serious misconduct in jail. Id. The

regulations also identify circumstances that “tend to show

suitability” for parole, including the lack of a juvenile record,

a stable social history, signs of remorse, significant stress as

a motivation for the crime, lack of criminal history, realistic

plans for the future, and good institutional behavior. Id.

§ 2402(d).

[3] While the regulatory factors are designed to guide the

Board’s decision, the ultimate question of parole suitability

remains whether the inmate poses a threat to public safety.

“There must be ‘some evidence’ of such a threat,” Hayward,

603 F.3d at 562, and not merely evidence that supports one

or more of the Board’s subsidiary findings. In particular, the

Board may not rely solely on the circumstances of a commitment offense, because “[t]he prisoner’s aggravated offense

does not establish current dangerousness ‘unless the record

also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or postincarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state’ supports the inference of dangerousness.” Id. (quoting Lawrence, 190 P.3d at 555). Accordingly, under

California’s parole system and the constitutional requirements

of due process, we must determine whether the record contains “some evidence” that Pirtle poses a current threat to public safety.

[4] Here, the Board’s stated reasons for denying Pirtle

parole can be divided into three categories: 1) findings about

10210 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS
the circumstances of the commitment offense; 2) findings

about Pirtle’s background and history; and 3) findings about

Pirtle’s conduct while incarcerated. The most substantial of

the Board’s findings relate to Pirtle’s crime. First, the Board

found that the offense was carried out in an “especially cruel”

manner and demonstrated “an exceptionally callous disregard

for human suffering.” All of the evidence in the record, however, actually supports the opposite conclusion. As the district

court correctly determined, Pirtle did not torment or terrorize

his wife on the night of the crime. Although he slapped her

early in the evening, she continued to drink and dance at the

bar, clearly not traumatized by the experience. Moreover, the

record contains no evidence regarding particular suffering as

a result of the gunshot wound. The Board identified no characteristic of the shooting that, on a comparative basis, made

the action “especially cruel” or “exceptionally callous.”

[5] Next, the Board found that the offense was committed

in a “dispassionate calculated manner.” This finding appears

to be based on the Board’s speculation that, after Pirtle’s confrontation with his wife earlier in the evening, “he retrieved

a weapon” from his home. Presumably, this suggested to the

Board that Pirtle returned to the bar with the “dispassionate”

and “calculated” intention or at least consideration of killing

his wife. No evidence in the record supports the Board’s conjecture. To the contrary, Pirtle testified at the hearing that he

often carried a gun so as to have it available for selfprotection while performing his job as a bartender. At the

1994 parole hearing, the transcript of which the panel

reviewed before the hearing, he testified that on the night of

the murder, he had the gun with him the whole time, including during the first confrontation when he slapped his wife at

the bar. According to Pirtle, he decided to return to the bar

only after he woke to find that his wife was not home yet. The

event that triggered the murder was when he asked her if she

was ready to go home and she told him that she was going

home with another man, her dance partner.3 He shot her

3The State agrees that Pirtle shot his wife only after she told him that

she was going home with another man. Indeed, the State asserts that the

facts of the commitment offense are “undisputed.” 

PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS 10211
immediately following that public humiliation. Nothing in

this account — or anywhere else in the record — suggests

that Pirtle spent time coolly planning the crime in advance.

Thus, no evidence in the record supports the Board’s finding

that the offense was dispassionate and calculated.

[6] The Board also found that the motive for the crime was

inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the offense.

Nothing in the record supports this characterization either.

Pirtle shot his wife in a highly-charged, emotional moment.

The day after the couple agreed to try to save their failing

marriage, Pirtle watched his intoxicated wife dance with

another man at a bar. When Pirtle tried to take her home, she

refused and instead declared that she was going home with the

other man. This public moment of rejection, betrayal, and

infidelity created a motive that was hardly trivial or inexplicable. To hold otherwise would be to disregard the history of

human nature. No motive is more frequently recorded in literature and in song than jealousy and betrayal.4

 A wife who tells

her husband that she is “going home” with another man provides that traditional motive, even if the act of infidelity is not

yet consummated, but only clearly contemplated. Accordingly, as with the Board’s other findings with regard to the

crime, no evidence in the record supports the finding that

Pirtle committed the offense for trivial or inexplicable reasons.

4

In some instances the motive has a basis in truth: 

Frankie and Johnny were lovers . . . .

She shot her man, ‘cause he done her wrong. 

In other instances, however, it does not, such as in Othello’s murder of

Desdemona after being deceived into believing her unfaithful: 

Yet I’ll not shed her blood;

Nor scar that whiter skin of hers than snow,

And smooth as monumental alabaster.

Yet she must die, else she’ll betray more men.

Put out the light, and then put out the light . . . . 

William Shakespeare, Othello act 5, sc. 2. 

10212 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS
[7] The Board’s next set of findings had to do with Pirtle’s

background. The Board found that Pirtle had demonstrated an

“escalating pattern of criminal behavior” and “failed to profit

from society’s previous attempts to correct his criminality.”

The district court correctly found that Pirtle’s handful of

minor misdemeanors and one felony drunk driving offense

can hardly be described as an “escalating pattern of criminal

behavior.” Similarly, no evidence supports the Board’s finding that Pirtle failed to profit from society’s previous attempts

to rehabilitate him. First, although the Board stated that Pirtle

“failed previous grants of probation,” the record contains no

evidence of any such failure.5 Moreover, although he served

two brief jail terms for non-violent, alcohol-related offenses

before he committed the murder, this does not serve as evidence that Pirtle “cannot be counted on to avoid criminality,”

as the Board asserted. To hold otherwise would be to create

a per se rule that any inmate who previously spent time in jail

for any crime, no matter how minor, “cannot be counted on

to avoid criminality” and is therefore unsuitable for parole.

Such a rule would actually violate the parole regulations,

which consider a lack of “any significant history of violent

crime” to be an indicator of suitability for parole. Cal. Code

Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(d)(6).

[8] The Board next found that Pirtle had an unstable social

history based principally on alcohol, and additionally on an

“escalating pattern of domestic encounters” in his relationship

with the victim. A tumultuous relationship with a wife who

engaged in multiple extra-marital affairs does not support a

finding of an unstable social history, much less does it provide “some evidence” that, thirty years later, Pirtle poses a

5

Indeed, there is no evidence that Pirtle was ever put on probation as an

adult. The only evidence in the record with regard to probation of any kind

comes from Pirtle’s own account of an incident that occurred when he was

fourteen years old. According to Pirtle, he was accused of forging a check

on his uncle’s bank account, and as a result he was placed in juvenile hall

for seven days and then put on probation. The record contains no evidence

that he failed to complete juvenile probation successfully. 

PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS 10213
danger to public safety. The transcript of the 2002 parole

hearing makes clear, however, that the Board found Pirtle’s

history of alcoholism to be the most troubling aspect of the

record before it and the principal basis of its conclusion

regarding an unstable social history. Pirtle’s episodic abuse of

alcohol played a significant role in his prior convictions as

well as in the commitment offense. Recognizing the relationship between Pirtle’s prior alcohol abuse and his commitment

offense, the Board has repeatedly advised Pirtle that he should

attend AA meetings. Pirtle regularly attended such meetings

for four years after he was given a parole date in 1990,

because doing so was a condition of that original order, but

he stopped when the parole date was revoked. Pirtle has

explained to the Board that he is an atheist, and as such, he

objects to AA’s religious content and its emphasis on a higher

power.6 He has also explained to the Board that he is willing

to attend a secular substance abuse program, and at his 2002

hearing, he provided the Board with a list of such programs

in the area of Northern California in which he could participate if he were released. Pirtle had been unable to attend secular substance abuse programs in prison, however, because

according to his uncontroverted testimony, no such programs

were available.7 His failure to attend a program that is not

6We note that, although the issue is not before us, it would likely violate

Pirtle’s First Amendment rights to require him to attend AA as a condition

of parole. See Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712-715 (9th Cir. 2007)

(holding that requiring a parolee to attend AA or Narcotics Anonymous

violates the First Amendment). The California Department of Corrections

is, of course, free to impose other parole conditions relating to alcohol, the

substance of which we do not presume to consider here. 

7At his 1996 hearing, the Board informed Pirtle that there was a new

secular alternative program to AA at the prison. Two years later, Pirtle testified that he signed up for that program, but he was subsequently transferred to a new facility that did not offer the secular program. 

At oral argument, the State contended that Pirtle could have attended

self-help programs or engaged in self-study. The record shows that he did

attend two self-help programs — Breaking Barriers and Alternatives to

Violence. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that self-study was

10214 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS
available has no probative value, and thus cannot support the

Board’s decision in any way.

[9] Notwithstanding his unwillingness to attend AA

because of his religious beliefs, Pirtle has been consistently

forthright with the Board about his alcohol abuse. He has

repeatedly expressed his commitment to abstain from alcohol,

both to the Board and to prison psychologists. Pirtle’s psychological assessments report that he has a history of episodic

alcohol abuse, and that it is now in remission. The assessments also state that Pirtle has a great deal of insight about his

problem with alcohol and its role in his crimes, and they note

that he is committed to sobriety.

[10] Pirtle’s attitude about alcohol was demonstrated most

colorfully at one parole hearing in which he stated: “I mean

I wouldn’t stick my hand in a jar of rattlesnakes — drinking

would be paramount to the same thing.” Consistent with the

self-awareness that he has demonstrated and that his psychologists have observed, Pirtle had not consumed any alcohol

during the twenty-two years of incarceration that preceded his

2002 parole hearing. Because there is no evidence that Pirtle

will be unable or unwilling to manage his alcohol problem

effectively upon release, as he has already done for more than

two decades, we agree with the district court that “the record

does not support the panel’s determination that petitioner’s

abuse of alcohol up to 1980 rendered him dangerous in 2002.”

available to Pirtle as a treatment for substance abuse, or that self-study

was suggested by any of the psychologists who regularly assessed Pirtle

and recommended that he attend secular AA programs upon release. We

can only speculate about the nature of the self-study program to which the

State referred at oral argument, and speculation does not, of course, constitute evidence. What does constitute evidence is Pirtle’s abstention from

alcohol throughout the twenty-two years prior to his parole hearing, as

well as his impeccable disciplinary record in prison, both of which are

highly probative of his attitude towards alcohol and his capacity for selfdiscipline. 

PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS 10215
[11] The Board’s remaining two reasons for denying

parole concern Pirtle’s rehabilitation program. First, the

Board found that Pirtle “failed to upgrade vocationally.” It is

true that he had not recently completed any vocational training programs at the time of the 2002 hearing, but as the district court noted, he “maintained steady employment while in

the institution, building an employment record characterized

as ‘exceptional.’ ” Additionally, the record demonstrates that

Pirtle already possessed several job skills, including that of

farm equipment operator, mechanic, and welder, and that he

had an offer of employment upon release doing ranch work

for sixty hours per week.8 In light of his existing vocational

skills and post-release employment offer, there is no logical

connection between Pirtle’s failure to take vocational classes

in prison and the conclusion that he would pose a threat to

public safety upon release. Accordingly, the Board’s finding

that Pirtle failed to upgrade vocationally does not constitute

evidence of current dangerousness.

[12] Finally, the Board found that Pirtle requires additional

therapy or self-help in order to learn how to cope with anger

and stress.9 There is no evidence, however, that as of 2002

Pirtle had a difficult time coping with either anger or stress.

During his twenty-two years of incarceration, he received no

serious disciplinary infractions, which demonstrates that he

knows how to “cope with stress in a non-destructive manner.”

His most recent psychological evaluation notes that “[w]hile

admitting that he feels helpless from time to time, he remains

cooperative with prisoner programming and continues his

impeccable record with no [serious disciplinary violations] at

any time.” Far from suggesting that Pirtle requires additional

therapy in order to become non-dangerous, his psychological

8We note that the parole regulations list “realistic plans for release” as

a factor that demonstrates suitability for parole. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 2402(d)(8). 

9Oddly enough, in the same paragraph, the Board commended Pirtle for

completing an Alternatives to Violence program and acknowledged that

his psychiatric report was positive. 

10216 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS
reports are consistently positive. In fact, when the Board first

recommended that Pirtle seek psychotherapy in 1995, he consulted a psychologist who reported that

Mr. Pirtle has not and does not manifest any characteristic of psychiatric concern. Having evaluated him

myself, as well as having observed him at his place

of work for three or more years, I am in accord with

the past unanimity of clinical opinion. To involve

this man in any type of psychotherapy . . . is a needless and profligate waste of professional effort more

wisely extended to emotionally unstable prisoners,

or to those who pose a likely danger to society. Mr.

Pirtle is neither unstable [n]or potentially dangerous.

The record contains no evidence that contradicts this professional assessment, or that otherwise supports the Board’s

finding that Pirtle needs additional programming in order to

learn how to cope with anger and stress.

[13] In sum, there is no evidence in the record to support

the Board’s finding that Pirtle poses a current threat to public

safety. The Board’s stated reasons for the denial of parole

either lacked evidentiary support, had no rational relationship

to Pirtle’s current dangerousness, or both. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s decision to grant the writ of habeas

corpus.

IV.

Upon granting the writ, the district court ordered the Board

to set a parole date for Pirtle within thirty days. The State

argues that the district court’s remedy was improper, and that

the appropriate remedy would be to remand the case to the

Board with instructions to hold another hearing. There is no

merit to this argument. Federal courts have the latitude to

resolve a habeas corpus petition “as law and justice require.”

28 U.S.C. § 2243. Ordering the release of a prisoner is well

PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS 10217
within the range of remedies available to federal habeas

courts. “Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty;

when that right is denied and a person confined, the federal

court has the power to release him.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.

391, 430-31 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Accordingly, we hold

that the district court’s remedy was proper.10 Moreover, given

the extraordinary passage of time since the district court’s

order, it may wish to order the Board not simply to set the

parole date within thirty days but to set a date for parole that

would ensure Pirtle’s release on parole within thirty days.

V.

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Board’s

decision to deny Pirtle parole was not supported by “some

evidence” of current dangerousness and thus violated his right

to due process. We further hold that the district court’s remedy of ordering the Board to set a parole date within thirty

days was proper. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

10By the same token, the Governor’s power to review parole decisions

under California Penal Code § 3041.1 does not compel a delay in setting

Pirtle’s release date. Because the scope of the Governor’s review is limited

to the materials presented to the Board, our finding that the Board’s decision was not supported by “some evidence” would render “a remand to the

Governor in this case . . . an idle act.” In re Smith, 109 Cal. App. 4th 489,

507 (2003); see also McQuillion v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (9th

Cir. 2003). 

10218 PIRTLE v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS