alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CITY OF SHREVEPORT v. DICKSON (FORD, Intervener). *

No. 4750.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Nov. 3, 1933.

Blanchard, Goldstein, Walker & O’Quin, of ■Shreveport, for appellant.

Lee, Gilmer & Lee and Aubrey M. Pyburn, all of Shreveport, for appellees.

*

Rehearing denied December 1, 1&33.

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

This case and that between the same parties, No. 4749, 150 So. 574, this day decided by us, were consolidated for trial in the lower court and also in this court.

The pleadings and the issues involved in each case are practically the same, save that in this case a writ of injunction is sought to restrain defendant! from:

> “(a) * * * Entering, posting and keeping a record of all business and other transactions of the Water and Sewerage Department in books of accounts and records in said Department of the City of Shreveport.

> “(b) * * * Collecting the funds and revenues due the City of Shreveport from the sales of water, sewerage rentals, and other services performed by the Department of Water & Sewerage; from placing same in a safety deposit bos, and from in any manner administering and disbursing said funds.”

Whereas, in No. 4749 a writ of mandamus was sought.

The lower court granted the prayer for injunction and defendant appealed. Our decree in Case No. 4749 affirms the judgment of the lower court which ordered mandamus to issue as prayed for. That judgment, in effect, virtually strips defendant of any authority over or official connection with the collection of any money or funds for water sales or rentals, and divests him of the custody of the records, books, and equipment pertaining to the ' department of water and sewerage. When he complies with said judgment, thei’e will be no books of account of thei affairs of the water and sewerage department in his department in which to make entries and no equipment with which to perform any of the duties formerly exercised by his department pertaining to financial affairs of the water and sewerage department. These acts could then only be performed by him by the acquisition qf other books, records, and equipment.

However, as the relief sought through the issuance of a writ of injunction is companion to that sought from issuance of the writ of mandamus, we see no good reason why defendant should not be enjoined from the performance of those acts which we have held he has no further right to perform.

For the reasons assigned in our opinion in ease No. 4749, and herein, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. •
Exhibit 10.42  — Base Salaries of
the Named Executive Officers for Fiscal Year 2005


                The
Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors has established the following
base salaries for the named executive officers for fiscal year 2005:


 


	
  Name and Principal Position

  	
   

  	
  Fiscal Year

  	
   

  	
  Salary

  	
   

  
	
  Burton M. Tansky 

  President and Chief Executive Officer

  	
   

  	
  2005

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  1,300,000

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Karen W. Katz

  President and Chief Executive Officer

  Neiman Marcus Stores

  	
   

  	
  2005

  	
   

  	
  715,000

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  James E. Skinner

  Senior Vice President and

  Chief Financial Officer

  	
   

  	
  2005

  	
   

  	
  510,000

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Brendan L. Hoffman 

  President and Chief Executive Officer

  Neiman Marcus Direct

  	
   

  	
  2005

  	
   

  	
  440,000

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  James J. Gold 

  President and Chief Executive Officer

  Bergdorf Goodman

  	
   

  	
  2005

  	
   

  	
  400,000
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Brett D. Davis, certify that:

 

1.                                      I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of CNH Equipment Trust 2018-B (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

 

2.                                      Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.                                      Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.                                      I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

 

5.                                      All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Citibank, N.A.

 

March 25, 2019

 

 
|   | By:    | /s/ Brett D. Davis                                               |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Name:  | Brett D. Davis                                                   |
|   | Title: | President (senior   officer in charge of the servicing function) |

 

----
Exhibit 32.a



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of DataJungle Software Inc. (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:



The Annual Report on Form 10-QSB for the three and six months ended June 30, 2005 (the Form 10-QSB) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Form 10-QSB.



|Dated: August 12, 2005 |  | /s/Edward Munden
Edward Munden
President & Chief Executive Officer
|---------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------





The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-QSB pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-B and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.

















---
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States

v. Criminal No. 05-cr-174- 01-SM

Kelly Guay

ORDER

Re: Document No. 26, Letter/Motion for a Reduction of 

Sentence and Modification of Term (of half-way house length 

of time)

Ruling: Defendant’s motion (letter) seeking a reduction or

modification of her sentence is necessarily denied. The sentence

is not subject to reduction by the court under the circumstances

described, having become final and no direct appeal or collateral

attack having been filed. And, the modification she seeks (two

years to be served in a half-way house or community corrections

center) is a matter for consideration by the Bureau of Prisons in

the first instance. The Bureau is, of course, required to take

into account individualized circumstances when determining a

prisoner’s eligibility for placement in a community corrections

center. See Putnam v. Winn, 441 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D. Mass. 2006)."

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief District Judge

Date: January 25, 2007

cc: Kelly Guay, pro se

US Probation Office

Case 1:05-cr-00174-SM Document 27 Filed 01/25/07 Page 1 of 1
[No. 33777.

Department One.

September 17, 1957.]

#### *In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of*Harold Richey, *Petitioner,*v. P. J. Squier, *as Superintendent of the State Reformatory, Respondent.*
      *1*

*Harold Richey, pro se.*

*The Attorney General*and *Michael R. Alfieri, Assistant,*for respondent.

Reported in 315 P. (2d) 638.

Per Curiam.

On December 23, 1956, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to a charge of taking a motor vehicle without permission of the owner, in violation of RCW 9.54-.020, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2601-1. The court entered judgment and sentence that petitioner be punished by imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty years.

The petitioner now claims that the judgment and sentence were illegal, in that his term of confinement could not legally exceed ten years, as provided by RCW 9.92.010, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2265. The statute reads as follows:

> “Every person convicted of a felony for which no punishment is specially prescribed by any statutory provision in force at the time of conviction and sentence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both.” Laws of 1909, chapter 249, § 13, p. 894.

*39RCW 9.54.020, under which statute petitioner was convicted, makes the offense a felony, but does not prescribe any maximum or minimum term of punishment. Laws of 1919, chapter 64, § 1, p. 131.

RCW 9.95.010 (Laws of 1935, chapter 114, § 2, p. 309 [c/. Rem. Supp. 1947, § 10249-2 part]) provides that, when a person is convicted of a felony (with certain exceptions), the court shall fix only the maximum term of such person’s sentence, but if the law under which such person is convicted does not provide a maximum term, the court shall fix such maximum term at not less than twenty years. The statute is part of the act relating to prison terms and paroles.

*In re Klapproth v. Squier*(1957), 50 Wn. (2d) 675, 314 P. (2d) 430, overruled our former decision *In re McDuff v. Cranor*(1953), 42 Wn. (2d) 488, 256 P. (2d) 293, and held that RCW 9.92.010 is the applicable sentencing statute, rather than RCW 9.95.010 when no specific penalty is provided for the offense in question; here, the intentional taking of a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner is a violation of RCW 9.54.020.

The twenty-year maximum term to be fixed by the court under RCW 9.95.010 does not apply in the instant case. The ten-year maximum sentence prescribed by RCW 9.92-.010 is the correct penalty to be applied here.

*In re Klapproth v. Squier, supra,*makes it necessary to correct the sentence pronounced upon the petitioner by the trial court, and, accordingly, the respondent (or his successor) is directed to produce the petitioner in the court where his plea was entered. That court is directed to impose a corrected sentence in accord with this opinion.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 8:00CR52

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

LORENZO AVENDANO-RAMIREZ, )

)

Defendant. )

This matter is before the court on petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability.

Filing No. 87. This court has denied petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct his

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Filing No. 85.

This habeas corpus action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 476 (2000) (holding that

when a habeas corpus petitioner seeks to initiate an appeal of the dismissal of a habeas

corpus petition after the effective date of AEDPA, the right to appeal is governed by the

certificate of appealability (COA) requirements now found at 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)). The

AEDPA requires the issuance of a COA before a petitioner can appeal the denial of his

§ 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Under section 2253(c), the district court will

issue a certificate of appealability only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right. Id. A “substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right” requires that petitioner demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in

a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 482. Where a district court has rejected the

8:00-cr-00052-JFB Doc # 88 Filed: 06/08/05 Page 1 of 2 - Page ID # 80
constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Id. 

The court has reviewed petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability and finds,

for the reasons stated in its earlier order denying the section 2255 petition, that petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly,

petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability will be denied. The petitioner may

request a certificate of appealability from the Court of Appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).

IT IS ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability, Filing No.

87, is denied.

DATED this 8th day of June, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

s/Joseph F. Bataillon 

JOSEPH F. BATAILLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8:00-cr-00052-JFB Doc # 88 Filed: 06/08/05 Page 2 of 2 - Page ID # 81
Case 1:05-cv-00187-SM Document 6 Filed 07/28/05 Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AMY JACOBY,

Defendant.

8:23CR126

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial (Filing No. 95). 

The parties need additional time to finalize plea negotiations. For good cause shown, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial (Filing No. 95) is granted 

as follows:

1. The jury trial now set for November 18, 2024, is continued to January 6, 2025.

2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the Court finds that the ends of 

justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result 

of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today’s date and January 

6, 2025, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the 

requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny 

counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account 

the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).

3. No further continuances will be granted.

Dated this 8th day of November 2024.

BY THE COURT:

Robert F. Rossiter, Jr.

Chief United States District Judge

8:23-cr-00126-RFR-MDN Doc # 96 Filed: 11/08/24 Page 1 of 1 - Page ID # 154
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
REGISTRANT'S UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1996
AND UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NINE MONTHS 
THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS  
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                         2,773,283 
<SECURITIES>                                   0         
<RECEIVABLES>                                  110,294   
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0         
<INVENTORY>                                    0         
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               3,689,040 
<PP&E>                                         1,708,120 
<DEPRECIATION>                                 1,302,588 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 4,330,574 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          312,912
<BONDS>                                        259,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0      
<PREFERRED>                                    0      
<COMMON>                                       88,095 
<OTHER-SE>                                     16,053,587
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   4,330,574
<SALES>                                        0        
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               49,316    
<CGS>                                          0      
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0       
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               162,949
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               559,647
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             16,500 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (200,886)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0      
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (113,633)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 (87,253)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0      
<CHANGES>                                      0       
<NET-INCOME>                                   (200,886)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.18)  
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.18)   
        


</TABLE>
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-18-00152-CR

GAVIN HEATH GILBERT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 8th District Court

Hopkins County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1826694

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
2

O RDER

Our review of the clerk’s record and the reporter’s record in this case indicates that they 

contain “sensitive data” as that phrase is defined in Rule 9.10 of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a). Sensitive data includes “a birth date, a home address, and 

the name of any person who was a minor at the time the offense was committed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 

9.10(a)(3). The clerk’s record and volumes one through nine of the reporter’s record contain the 

names of persons who were minors at the time the offense was committed. Rule 9.10(b) states, 

“Unless a court orders otherwise, an electronic or paper filing with the court, including the contents 

of any appendices, must not contain sensitive data.” TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(b).

Rule 9.10(g) provides, “A court may also order that a document be filed under seal in paper 

form or electronic form, without redaction.” TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(g). Therefore, because the 

clerk’s record and volumes one through nine of the reporter’s record contain sensitive data, we 

order the clerk of this Court or her appointee, in accordance with Rule 9.10(g), to seal the 

electronically filed clerk’s record and volumes one through nine of the reporter’s record. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT

Date: February 7, 2019
181 La. 442

#### STATE v. BOWDEN et al.

No. 33210.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 4, 1935.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1935.

John G. Gibbs, of Natchitoches, for applicants.

G. L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., James O’Con-nor, Asst. Atty. Gen., S. R. Thomas, Dist. Atty., of Natchitoches, and Lessley P. Gardi-ner, Asst, to Atty. Gen., for respondent.

HIGGINS, Justice.

These cases are before us on writs of cer-tiorari and prohibition granted on the application of the defendants as a result of the trial judge refusing to permit them to waive trial by a jury and to be tried before the judge alone.

The return of the trial judge consists of the record below. In the case No. 5132, entitled “State of Louisiana v. Bill Bowden, John Fike, and Henry Walker,” the defendants were charged in an indictment with feloniously and unlawfully assaulting one Will Black by willfully shooting at him. Defendants filed a motion in which they waived trial by a jury, but the trial court declined to enter an order to that effect.

Article 259 of the Criminal Code of Procedure reads as follows:

> “In all felony eases, not capital, or necessarily punishable with imprisonment at hard labor, the defendant shall at the time of arraignment be informed by the court that he may waive trial by jury and elect to be tried by the judge alone. If he so elect the judge shall fix and try the case without a jury according to the prescribed rules of the court.”

The crime of assault by willfully shooting at a person is neither a capital offense nor necessarily punishable with imprisonment at hard labor. Article 766, Louisiana Criminal Code of Procedure, Rev. St. § 792, Act No. 59 of 1896, Act No. 9 of 1912, § 1.

Therefore, the accused were entitled to waive trial by a jury and to elect to be tried by the judge. Our learned brother below erred in refusing the request of the accused.

In the ease No. 5131 entitled “State of Louisiana v. Bill Bowden, John Fike, and Henry Walker,” the defendants were charged in an indictment with feloniously and unlawfully shooting at the dwelling house of Joe Col-lia, when persons were lawfully therein.

The crime of shooting at an inhabited dwelling house is necessarily punishable with imprisonment at hard labor. Article 1311, Louisiana Criminal Code, Act No. 8 of 1870, Ex. Sess., § 8.

Consequently, the defendants were not entitled to waive trial by a jury and to be tried *\*by the district judge. The ruling of the judge 1 *711a quo was correct. State v. Shall, 177 La. 923, 149 So. 523.

In the ease No. 5132, where the accused were charged with assault by willfully shooting at a person, the rule is made peremptory and the preliminary writs perpetuated.

In the case No. 5031, where the defendants were charged with willfully shooting at an inhabited dwelling house, the relief prayed for by relators is denied.