* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30855

ANTHONY BOUDREAUX, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus

NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL., 

Defendants, 

BAKER HUGHES INC. LONG 

TERM DISABILITY PLAN, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(93-CV-1456)

May 11, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

In this appeal from the district court’s grant of summary

judgment rejecting his claim under the Employment Retirement Income
1 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

2 We also conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of

this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying attorneys’ fees to Boudreaux. 

2

Security Act (ERISA),1 Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Boudreaux

complains that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to

whether the plan administrator of Defendant-Appellee Baker Hughes

Long Term Disability Plan (the Plan) acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in terminating Plan benefits to Boudreaux. He also

complains that the district court abused its discretion in denying

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(G). In our de novo

review of summary judgment, we reach the same conclusion as did the

district court and therefore affirm.2 As such, we need not and

therefore do not reach the issue raised by the Plan, i.e., whether

a participant’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies within

the period of time specified by an ERISA plan constitutes a

procedural bar to filing suit, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Under the instant circumstances, that issue is

more properly left to a future panel of this court in a future

case. 

The operable facts of this case and its procedural history in

district court are fully and accurately set forth in the Memorandum

Ruling and Judgment of the district court filed July 28, 1997. We

therefore adopt them herein by reference. 

When distilled to its essence, the issue that was before the
3 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115

(1989). 

4 Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973 (1991); see also Sweatman v.

Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1994). 

5 Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.,

97 F.3d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 1996). 

3

court for consideration on the Plan’s motion for summary judgment

was whether the plan administrator’s termination of Boudreaux’s

disability benefits as of July 26, 1993, amounted to an abuse of

discretion. As the Plan gives its administrator “discretionary

authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the

terms of the Plan,”3 factual applications made by its plan

administrator can only be reviewed by the courts under the

deferential abuse of discretion standard.4 Here, the plan

administrator was not interpreting the Plan, but merely applying

its provisions to Boudreaux’s factual situation. The principle is

well settled that in testing determinations of entitlement to

benefits for abuse of discretion by plan administrators when they

are not interpreting the plans, courts cannot consider evidence

that was not available to the plan administrator and must look

solely to the administrative record.5 

We have carefully reviewed the administrative record in this

case, have duly considered the appellate briefs submitted by

counsel for the parties to this appeal, and have considered well

the legal arguments advanced and the facts that are material to the
4

question of the plan administrator’s purported abuse of discretion.

As a result, we are convinced, as was the district court —— and for

essentially the same reasons —— that there is no genuine issue of

material fact whether the plan administrator abused its discretion

in determining that Boudreaux ceased to be disabled within the

contemplation of the Plan as of July 26, 1993. When we are

constrained under the abuse of discretion standard as we are today,

we cannot say that the administrator of the Plan abused its

discretion in terminating Boudreaux’s benefits. For the foregoing

reasons, the rulings of the district court are, in all respects, 

AFFIRMED.